Atomic Bomb-Truman Press Release-August 6, 1945 Truman Library Educational Programs Introduction In the early morning hours of July 16, 1945, great anticipation and fear ran rampant at White Sands Missile Range near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, could hardly breathe. Years of secrecy, research, and tests were riding on this moment. "For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and when the announcer shouted Now!' and there came this tremendous burst of light followed abruptly there after by the deep growling of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief," recalled General L. R. Groves of Oppenheimer, in a memorandum for Secretary of War George Marshall. The explosion carrying more power than 20,000 tons of TNT and visible for more than 200 miles succeeded. The world's first atomic bomb had been detonated. With the advent of the nuclear age, new dilemmas in the art of warfare arose. The war in Europe had concluded in May. The Pacific war would receive full attention from the United States War Department. As late as May 1945, the U.S.

was engaged in heavy fighting with the Japanese at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In these most bloody conflicts, the United States had sustained more than 75,000 casualties. These victories insured the United States was within air striking distance of the Japanese mainland. The bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese to initiate United States entrance into the war, just four years before, was still fresh on the minds of many Americans. A feeling of vindication and a desire to end the war strengthened the resolve of the United States to quickly and decisively conclude it. President Harry Truman had many alternatives at his disposal for ending the war: invade the Japanese mainland, hold a demonstration of the destructive power of the atomic bomb for Japanese dignitaries, drop an atomic bomb on selected industrial Japanese cities, bomb and blockade the islands, wait for Soviet entry into the war on August 15, or mediate a compromised peace. Operation Olympia, a full scale landing of United States armed forces, was already planned for Kyushu on November 1, 1945 and a bomb and blockade plan had already been instituted over the Japanese mainland for several months. The Japanese resolve to fight had been seriously hampered in the preceding months.

Their losses at Iwo Jima and Okinawa had been staggering. Their navy had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force and the air corps had been decimated. American B-29's made bombing runs over military targets on the Japanese mainland an integral part of their air campaign. Japan's lack of air power hindered their ability to fight. The imprecision of bombing and the use of devastating city bombing in Europe eventually swayed United States Pacific theater military leaders to authorize bombing of Japanese mainland cities. Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe all were decimated by incendiary and other bombs. In all, hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed in these air strikes meant to deter the resolve of the Japanese people. Yet, Japanese resolve stayed strong and the idea of a bloody "house to house" invasion of the Japanese mainland would produce thousands more American and Allied casualties. The Allies in late July 1945 declared at Potsdam that the Japanese must unconditionally surrender. After Japanese leaders flatly rejected the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman authorized use of the atomic bomb anytime after August 3, 1945.

On the clear morning of August 6, the first atomic bomb, nicknamed Little Boy, was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. Leveling over 60 percent of the city, 70,000 residents died instantaneously in a searing flash of heat. Three days later, on August 9, a second bomb, Fat Man, was dropped on Nagasaki. Over 20,000 people died instantly. In the successive weeks, thousands more Japanese died from the after effects of the radiation exposure of the blast. Vocabulary incendiary bomb The incendiary bomb was a mixture of thermite and oxidizing agents employed by the Allies and Axis powers after 1943. Sometimes incorporating napalm, these bombs were responsible for burning over 41.5 square miles of Tokyo by the United States in March 1945. unconditional surrender Unconditional surrender is a term used by victors in war to describe the type of settlement they wish to extoll from the vanquished. The settlement demands that the loser make no demands during surrender proceedings.

Unconditional surrender was first enunciated by the Allies during World War II at a summit meeting at Casablanca in January 1943. providence the final propositions, conditions, or terms offered by either of the parties during a diplomatic negotiation Source Read the press release from President Truman on August 6, 1945 following the dropping of the atomic bomb noting important details about its production and the rhetoric used. Document Analysis Distribute copies of the document to each student to read. Ask students to answer the following questions: Who wrote this document? What is the purpose of this document? What date was this document issued? Why is the name of the city left out? Why does the atomic bomb's power have to be explained? Look at the last paragraph of the second page of the press release. What were Truman's plans for ending the war? Did he accomplish those goals in dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Why or why not? On page three, Truman advocates the use of atomic power for world peace. How does he propose to fulfill this goal? What reasons does President Truman use to justify dropping the bomb?

Follow-Up Questions Armed with all of the knowledge that President Truman and his advisors had accumulated, how would you have ended the war in the Pacific? Make a table listing the advantages and disadvantages that the atomic bomb presented to modern warfare? Why did the fire bombing of Tokyo just weeks earlier that killed over 120,000 civilians not receive the same moral criticism that the atomic bomb received? One newspaper critic stated after dropping the bomb, "Yesterday we clinched victory in the Pacific, but we sowed the whirlwind." What did he mean by this? Argue for or against this statement. Five Reasons for Dropping the Atomic Bomb...According to J. Samuel Walker in his book, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bomb Against Japan, states that Truman justified dropping the bomb with five reasons: it would end the war successfully at the earliest possible moment it justified the effort and expense of building the atomic bombs it offered hope of achieving diplomatic gains in the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union there were a lack of incentives not to use the weapons because of America's hatred of the Japanese and a desire for vengeance Divide the class into five groups, giving each group one of the reasons. Ask them to explain them in their own words.

Do they agree or disagree with President Truman's thinking? Why or why not? Can they come up with more reasons to justify dropping the bomb? What reasons are there to not drop the bomb? Be sure they use facts and figures to support their answers. Harry Truman in 1945 "regarded the [atomic] bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt it should be used." In a 1958 handwritten document on the rise of the atomic age, he later stated, "Now we are faced with total destruction. The old heckler prophets presented the idea of the destruction of the world by fire after their presentation of a destruction by water. Well that destruction is at hand unless the great leaders of the world prevent it." Do you think Truman's views on the use of atomic technology changed? Would Truman have dropped the atomic bomb in 1958, granted the situation warranted decisive action? Why or why not?

President Eisenhower, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, on December 8, 1953, stated, "Even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating material retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression." Analyze this statement. What does it mean? Chart the line of events and personalities of atomic military buildup from President Truman to the present. What trends do you see? What do you think the future of atomic weaponry is? Write a press release as President of the United States for a current event. Be sure to give important details of the event keeping in mind your audience is the entire United States. Share your press release with your class. In Karl Compton's "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," he states, "The atomic bomb introduced a dramatic new element into the situation, which strengthened the hands of those [Japanese government officials] who sought peace and provided face-saving argument for those who had hitherto advocated continued war." Analyze this statement. Explain Dr. Compton's statement in your own words. Use other sources to support your answers to the following questions.

Why had some Japanese officials continued to support the war even after the atomic bomb had been dropped? What was Emperor Hirohito's role in the surrender process? Why was Hirohito not forced to abdicate as promised by the Potsdam Declaration? Issues for Discussion Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - World War II - HISTORY.com Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Author Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki URL A+E Networks Introduction On August 6, 1945, during World War II (1939-45), an American B-29 bomber dropped the world’s first deployed atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The explosion wiped out 90 percent of the city and immediately killed 80,000 people; tens of thousands more would later die of radiation exposure. Three days later, a second B-29 dropped another A-bomb on Nagasaki, killing an estimated 40,000 people.

Japan’s Emperor Hirohito announced his country’s unconditional surrender in World War II in a radio address on August 15, citing the devastating power of “a new and most cruel bomb.” Google The Manhattan Project Even before the outbreak of war in 1939, a group of American scientists–many of them refugees from fascist regimes in Europe–became concerned with nuclear weapons research being conducted in Nazi Germany. In 1940, the U.S. government began funding its own atomic weapons development program, which came under the joint responsibility of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the War Department after the U.S. entry into World War II . The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was tasked with spearheading the construction of the vast facilities necessary for the top-secret program, codenamed “The Manhattan Project ” (for the engineering corps’ Manhattan district). Did You Know? After World War II, most of Hiroshima would be rebuilt, though one destroyed section was set aside as a reminder of the effects of the atomic bomb. Each August 6, thousands of people gather at Peace Memorial Park to join in interfaith religious services commemorating the anniversary of the bombing.

Over the next several years, the program’s scientists worked on producing the key materials for nuclear fission–uranium-235 and plutonium (Pu-239). They sent them to Los Alamos, New Mexico , where a team led by J. Robert Oppenheimer worked to turn these materials into a workable atomic bomb. Early on the morning of July 16, 1945, the Manhattan Project held its first successful test of an atomic device–a plutonium bomb–at the Trinity test site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. No Surrender for the Japanese By the time of the Trinity test, the Allied powers had already defeated Germany in Europe. Japan, however, vowed to fight to the bitter end in the Pacific, despite clear indications (as early as 1944) that they had little chance of winning. In fact, between mid-April 1945 (when President Harry Truman took office) and mid-July, Japanese forces inflicted Allied casualties totaling nearly half those suffered in three full years of war in the Pacific, proving that Japan had become even more deadly when faced with defeat.

In late July, Japan’s militarist government rejected the Allied demand for surrender put forth in the Potsdam Declaration, which threatened the Japanese with “prompt and utter destruction” if they refused. General Douglas MacArthur and other top military commanders favored continuing the conventional bombing of Japan already in effect and following up with a massive invasion, codenamed “Operation Downfall.” They advised Truman that such an invasion would result in U.S. casualties of up to 1 million. In order to avoid such a high casualty rate, Truman decided–over the moral reservations of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General Dwight Eisenhower and a number of the Manhattan Project scientists–to use the atomic bomb in the hopes of bringing the war to a quick end. Proponents of the A-bomb–such as James Byrnes, Truman’s secretary of state–believed that its devastating power would not only end the war, but also put the U.S. in a dominant position to determine the course of the postwar world. “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” Hiroshima, a manufacturing center of some 350,000 people located about 500 miles from Tokyo, was selected as the first target. After arriving at the U.S.

base on the Pacific island of Tinian, the more than 9,000-pound uranium-235 bomb was loaded aboard a modified B-29 bomber christened Enola Gay (after the mother of its pilot, Colonel Paul Tibbets). The plane dropped the bomb–known as “Little Boy”–by parachute at 8:15 in the morning, and it exploded 2,000 feet above Hiroshima in a blast equal to 12-15,000 tons of TNT, destroying five square miles of the city. Hiroshima’s devastation failed to elicit immediate Japanese surrender, however, and on August 9 Major Charles Sweeney flew another B-29 bomber, Bockscar, from Tinian. Thick clouds over the primary target, the city of Kokura, drove Sweeney to a secondary target, Nagasaki, where the plutonium bomb “Fat Man” was dropped at 11:02 that morning. More powerful than the one used at Hiroshima, the bomb weighed nearly 10,000 pounds and was built to produce a 22-kiloton blast.

The topography of Nagasaki, which was nestled in narrow valleys between mountains, reduced the bomb’s effect, limiting the destruction to 2.6 square miles. At noon on August 15, 1945 (Japanese time), Emperor Hirohito announced his country’s surrender in a radio broadcast. The news spread quickly, and “Victory in Japan” or “V-J Day” celebrations broke out across the United States and other Allied nations. The formal surrender agreement was signed on September 2, aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri , anchored in Tokyo Bay. Tags Did Congress Approve Dropping the Atomic Bomb? | The Classroom | Synonym Did Congress Approve Dropping the Atomic Bomb? by Dell Markey Experts were unsure whether the first atomic bomb would detonate properly when dropped from an airplane. Related Articles Relationship Between Chinese & Japanese That Led Them to War in WWII Before the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, very few civilian or military leaders knew of the weapon's existence, including most of the U.S. Congress. As vice president, Harry S.

Truman was likewise unaware of the bomb's existence, and was informed only after he assumed the presidency on April 12, 1945 -- a scant four months before he authorized its use against Japan. Interim Committee After being informed of the existence of the atomic bomb, President Truman convened his top military advisers and scientists -- the "Interim Committee" -- to discuss the possible ramifications of using the atomic bomb. The committee was unanimous in recommending to use the bomb on Japan and nearly unanimous -- one member dissented -- in recommending to do so without warning the Japanese about its potential destructive power. Truman's Decision As commander in chief, Truman had the constitutional authority to order use of the weapon without congressional approval, which he did. An American bomber dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The same day, Truman publicly announced the atomic bomb's existence and its use against Japan. At the end of his address, Truman said he would recommend that Congress form a commission to control U.S. use of atomic power. After a second bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki three days later, the Japanese sent word that they would surrender, forestalling a third attack.

References Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: History: Pre Cold War: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Decision: Chronology Hiroshima and Nagasaki Chronology on Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1945 March 25 At the urging of Leo Szilard , Albert Einstein signs a letter of introduction of Szilard to President Roosevelt . Szilard wishes to warn Roosevelt of the post-war dangers of a nuclear arms race if the atomic bomb is used against Japan. The letter states: "The terms of secrecy under which Dr.

Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy." In the memorandum accompanying the letter, Szilard wrote: "our demonstration' of atomic bombs will precipitate a race in the production of these devices between the United States and Russia and that if we continue to pursue the present course, our initial advantage may be lost very quickly in such a race.” April Eleanor Roosevelt, who received a copy of Szilard's letter to President Roosevelt , replies to Szilard proposing a meeting in her Manhattan apartment on May 8. The president, however, died on April 12. April 12 Franklin Roosevelt dies, and Harry Truman becomes the 33rd President of the United States. April 25 Secretary of War Stimson and General Groves brief President Truman on the bomb. In this briefing, Groves insists that Japan had always been the target of the bomb's use.

April 25 Joint Chief Planners advise Joint Chiefs of Staff that "unless a definition of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bring about capitulation." April 27 The Target Committee meets for the first time to decide which Japanese cities to target with the atomic bomb. By the end of May the following cities are selected: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kokura and Niigata. [See minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee in Related Sites.] Eventually Kyoto is replaced by Nagasaki and the listed cities are spared further conventional bombing by the American Army Air Force. April 29 In a report entitled Unconditional Surrender , the Joint Intelligence Committee informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "numbers of informed Japanese, both military and civilian, already realize the inevitability of absolute defeat." May 8 War in Europe ends. May 9 The Interim Committee meets for the first time.

Its purpose is "to study and report on the whole problem of temporary war controls and later publicity, and to survey and make recommendations on post war research, development and controls, as well as legislation necessary to effectuate them." The Interim Committee appoints a Scientific Panel, which included Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Fermi and Compton. May 12 William Donovan , Director of the Office of Strategic Services, reports to President Truman that Japan's minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase , wished "to help arrange for a cessation of hostilities." May 25 Leo Szilard visits White House with letter of introduction from Albert Einstein to warn President Truman of the dangers atomic weapons pose for the post-War world and to urge him not to authorize use of atomic weapons against Japan. Szilard is referred Matthew J. Connelly , Truman's appointments secretary, to James Byrnes in Spartanburg, South Carolina. May 28 Assistant Secretary of War John J.

McCloy argues to Secretary of War Stimson that the term "unconditional surrender" should be dropped: "Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of face and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term." May 28 In a State Department Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew describes a meeting with President Truman that day. Grew writes: "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in the future will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely." May 30 Wanting to influence the Interim Committee, Szilard arranges a meeting with Oppenheimer in Groves' office. Oppenheimer tells Szilard, "this is a weapon with no military significance.

It will make a big bang - a very big bang - but it is not a weapon which is useful in war." May 31 The Interim Committee agrees that "the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses." Among those agreeing is James Conant, the president of Harvard University. May 31 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reports on receiving a Japanese peace feeler through a Japanese diplomat stationed in Portugal. The Japanese diplomat says that the actual terms are unimportant so long as the term "unconditional surrender" is not used. June 1 Interim Committee makes formal decision decides not to warn the civilian populations of the targeted cities. June 9 Chief of Staff General George Marshall , in a memo to Secretary of War Stimson, writes, "We should cease talking about unconditional surrender of Japan and begin to define our true objective in terms of defeat and disarmament." June 11 The Franck Committee on the social and political implications of the atomic bomb, headed by Nobel Laureate James Franck , issues a report advising against a surprise atomic bombing of Japan.

The report states, "If we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear warfare as the paramount objective.this kind of introduction of atomic weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of success." The report correctly predicts that dropping an atomic bomb "will mean a flying start toward an unlimited armaments race." June 14 The Franck Committee Report - with its recommendation that bomb be demonstrated to Japan before being used on civilians - is taken by Compton to Los Alamos, and copies were given to Fermi, Lawrence and Oppenheimer. June 16 Compton, Fermi, Lawrence and Oppenheimer conclude: "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." June 17 McCloy tells Stimson that "there were no more cities to bomb, no more carriers to sink or battleships to shell; we had difficulty finding targets." June 18 President Truman convenes a meeting of his chief advisors to discuss the military's contingency plans for the invasion of Japan.

The invasion was to begin no earlier than November 1, 1945 and, according to Admiral William Leahy , "The invasion itself was never authorized." McCloy is asked to prepare language for what is to become Article 12 of the draft Potsdam Declaration. It specifies that the post-war Japanese government "may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty." June 18 Admiral Leahy makes diary entry noting, "It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression." He also notes that General Marshall believes that an invasion of Kyushu, the southern-most Japanese island, "will not cost us in casualties more than 63,000 of the 190,000 combatant troops estimated as necessary for the operation." This may be compared to later estimates, after the atomic bombings, of 500,000 to 1,000,000 American lives saved. June 19 James Forrestal's diary describes top-secret "State-War-Navy Meeting" in which surrender terms are discussed.

He writes, "Grew's proposal, in which Stimson most vigorously agrees, that something be done in the very near future to indicate to the Japanese what kind of surrender terms would be imposed upon them and particularly to indicate to them that they would be allowed to retain their own form of government and religious institutions while at the same time making it clear that we propose to eradicate completely all traces of Japanese militarism." June 20 A meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council before Emperor Hirohito is held on the subject of ending the war. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "the Emperor, supported by the premier, foreign minister and Navy minister, declared for peace; the army minister and the two chiefs of staff did not concur." June 26 Stimson , Forrestal and Grew agree that a clarification of surrender terms should be issued well before an invasion and with "ample time to permit a national reaction to set in." The three agreed that "Japan is susceptible to reason." July 1 Szilard begins circulating a petition to President Truman expressing opposition on moral grounds to using the atomic bomb against Japan.

July 2 Secretary of War Henry Stimson advises Truman to offer a definition of unconditional surrender, and states, "I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender." July 3 James Byrnes becomes U.S. Secretary of State. July 3 New York Times reports, "Senator [William] White of Maine, the minority [Republican] leader, declared that the Pacific war might end quickly if President Truman would state, specifically, in the upper chamber just what unconditional surrender means for the Japanese." July 4 Szilard writes to a colleague regarding the petition to president: "I personally feel it would be a matter of importance if a large number of scientists who have worked in this field went clearly and unmistakably on record as to their opposition on moral grounds to the use of these bombs in the present phase of the war." July 7 Truman leaves for Potsdam on the Augusta accompanied by Secretary of State Byrnes . July 10 At a meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council, Emperor Hirohito urges haste in moves to mediate the peace through Russia.

July 13 Washington intercepts and decodes a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to his Ambassador in Moscow that states, "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace.." July 13 Secretary of Navy Forrestal writes in his secret diary: "The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today through intercepted messages from Togo , Foreign Minister, to Sato , Jap Ambassador in Moscow, instructing the latter to see Molotov if possible before his departure for the Big Three meeting and if not then immediately afterward to lay before him the Emperor's strong desire to secure a a termination of the war." July 13 Farrington Daniels , Director of the Met Lab at the University of Chicago, reported to James Compton that 72 percent of the scientists favored a military demonstration of the bomb in Japan or in the U.S. with Japanese representatives present before using the weapon on civilians. July 15 President Truman lands at Antwerp on his way to Potsdam meeting . Byrnes has convinced him to drop Article 12 of the Potsdam Declaration, which had provided assurance that the Emperor would be allowed to retain his throne as a constitutional monarch.

July 16 Trinity test, a plutonium implosion device, takes place at 5:29:45 a.m. mountain war time at Alamogordo, New Mexico. It is the world's first atomic detonation. The device has a yield of 19 kilotons, which is equivalent to 19,000 tons of TNT. J. Robert Oppenheimer recalls a quote from the Bhagavad Gita, a Hindu classic: "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds." Brigadier General T.F. Farrell , General Groves ' deputy commander, describes the explosion in this way: "The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray, and blue.

It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined.." July 17 President Truman at Potsdam writes in his diary, "Just spend [sic] a couple of hours with Stalin.. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15 th . Fini Japs when that comes about." July 17 Leo Szilard , unaware of Trinity test, prepares final draft of Petition to the President of the United States, calling on the President to "exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as all other moral responsibilities which are involved." The petition was signed by 155 Manhattan Project scientists. July 18 President Truman writes in his diary, "P.M. [ Churchill ] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success).

Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe the Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan [reference to Manhattan Project] appears over their homeland. I shall inform about it at an opportune time." July 21 President Truman approves order for atomic bombs to be used. July 23 UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarks, "[I]t is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan." July 23 and 24 McCloy writes in diary in Potsdam, "Throughout it all the 'big bomb' is playing its part - it has stiffened both the Prime Minister and the President.

After getting Groves' report they went to the next meeting like little boys with a big red apple secreted on their persons." July 24 Walter Brown , special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes , writes in his journal that Byrnes was now "hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press claims against China." July 24 Secretary of War Henry Stimson passes on orders for atomic attack. July 25 President Truman writes in his diary: "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley era, after Noah and his fabulous ark. Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling - to put it mildly.. This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10. I have told the secretary of war, Mr. Stimson , to use it so that military objectives and soldiers are the target and not women and children.

Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new. He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful." July 25 General Carl Spatz , commander of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces, receives the only written order on the use of atomic weapons from acting Chief of Staff, General Thomas Handy . July 26 Potsdam Declaration calls upon Japanese government "to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces." The alternative, the Declaration states, is "prompt and utter destruction." July 26 Forrestal secret diary states, "In the past days Sato in Moscow has been sending the strongest language to the Foreign Office at Tokyo his urgent advice for Japan to surrender unconditionally.

Each time the Foreign Minister, Togo , responds by saying that they want Sato to arrange for the Russians to receive Prince Konoye as a special representative of the Emperor to Moscow. Sato's persistent reply to these messages was that this is a futile hope, that there is no possibility of splitting the concert of action now existing between Great Britain, the United States and Russia." July 28 | Japan rejects Potsdam Declaration. August 3 President Truman aboard Augusta receives new report that Japan is seeking peace. Walter Brown, special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, writes in his diary, "Aboard Augusta - President, Leahy , JFB agreed Japs looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific.) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden." August 6 The world's second atomic bomb, Little Boy , a gun-type uranium bomb, is detonated 1,900 feet above Hiroshima, Japan. It has a yield of approximately 15 kilotons TNT.

Some 90,000 to 100,000 persons are killed immediately; about 145,000 persons will perish from the bombing by the end of 1945. August 6 Upon hearing the news of the atomic bombing of Japan on his way home from Potsdam, President Truman remarked that this was "the greatest day in history." Leo Szilard , the atomic scientist who had worked so hard to prevent the use of the bomb, writes to a friend, "Using atomic bombs against Japan is one of the greatest blunders of history. August 7 Decision is made to drop warning pamphlets on Japanese cities. August 8 Soviet Union informs Japan that it is entering the war. August 8 Decision is made to set up International Tribunal at Nuremberg. August 9 At 9:44 a.m. Bockscar , a B-29 carrying Fat Man , the world's third atomic bomb, arrives at its primary target, Kokura. The city is covered in haze and smoke from an American bombing raid on a nearby city. Bockscar turns to its secondary target Nagasaki . At 11:02 a.m.

the world's third atomic bomb explosion devastates Nagasaki, the intense heat and blast indiscriminately slaughters its inhabitants. August 9 President Truman speaks to the American people via radio broadcast He states, "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in the first instance to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians." [The official Bombing Survey Report stated: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets because of their concentration of activities and population." More than 95 percent of those killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were civilians.] August 9 Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. August 9 Soviet Union begins its offensive against Japan in Manchuria. August 10 U.S. drops warning leaflets on Nagasaki on the day after the bombing. August 13-14 Japanese physicists investigating the epicenter of the Hiroshima bomb burst start noticing high levels of radioactivity. August 14 Japan surrenders. August 15 Emperor Hirohito of Japan, in a radio broadcast to his nation announces that Japan has lost the war.

The Emperor's announcement is hard to understand because he speaks in archaic court Japanese, but one fact is understood: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to damage is indeed incalcuable, taking the toll of many innocent lives." August 15 New York Times reports, "Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so, even if no atomic bombs had been dropped, is the opinion of Major-General Claire Chennault .." August 24 Soviet Union announces that the Japanese Manchurian Army has surrendered. September 2 Japan formally signs documents of surrender. September 9 The Trinity test site is opened to the press for the first time. General Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer dispel rumors of lingering high radiation levels there. 1946 July 1 United States Strategic Bombing Survey states: "The Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the enemy leaders who ended the war did they persuade Japan to accept unconditional surrender.

The Emperor, the lord privy seal, the prime minister, the foreign minister and the navy minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that the war should be ended even it meant acceptance of defeat on allied terms." The Survey also states: "On 10 July [1945] the Emperor again urged haste in the moves to mediate through Russia, but Potsdam intervened.

While the government still awaited a Russian answer, the Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 6 August." The Survey concluded: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." Copyright ï¿½ 1998 - BBC ON THIS DAY | 6 | 1945: US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima Search ON THIS DAY by date About This Site | Text Only 1945: US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima The first atomic bomb has been dropped by a United States aircraft on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. President Harry S Truman, announcing the news from the cruiser, USS Augusta, in the mid-Atlantic, said the device was more than 2,000 times more powerful than the largest bomb used to date.

An accurate assessment of the damage caused has so far been impossible due to a huge cloud of impenetrable dust covering the target. Hiroshima is one of the chief supply depots for the Japanese army. The bomb was dropped from an American B-29 Superfortress, known as Enola Gay, at 0815 local time. The plane's crew say they saw a column of smoke rising and intense fires springing up. We found the Japanese in our locality were not eager to befriend us - after all, they had not long ago had the most fearful weapon of all time dropped on their doorstep People's War memories » The President said the atomic bomb heralded the "harnessing of the basic power of the universe". It also marked a victory over the Germans in the race to be first to develop a weapon using atomic energy. President Truman went on to warn the Japanese the Allies would completely destroy their capacity to make war. The Potsdam declaration issued 10 days ago, which called for the unconditional surrender of Japan, was a last chance for the country to avoid utter destruction, the President said.

"If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the like of which has never been seen on Earth. Behind this air attack will follow by sea and land forces in such number and power as they have not yet seen, but with fighting skill of which they are already aware." The British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who has replaced Winston Churchill at Number 10, read out a statement prepared by his predecessor to MPs in the Commons. It said the atomic project had such great potential the government felt it was right to pursue the research and to pool information with atomic scientists in the US. As Britain was considered within easy reach of Germany and its bombers, the decision was made to set up the bomb-making plants in the US. The statement continued: "By God's mercy, Britain and American science outpaced all German efforts. These were on a considerable scale, but far behind. The possession of these powers by the Germans at any time might have altered the result of the war." Mr Churchill's statement said considerable efforts had been made to disrupt German progress - including attacks on plants making constituent parts of the bomb.

He ended: "We must indeed pray that these awful agencies will be made to conduce peace among the nations and that instead of wreaking measureless havoc upon the entire globe they become a perennial fountain of world prosperity." The Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki | Teachinghistory.org The Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki The Bombings On August 6, 1945, after 44 months of increasingly brutal fighting in the Pacific, an American B-29 bomber loaded with a devastating new weapon appeared in the sky over Hiroshima, Japan. Minutes later, that new weapon—a bomb that released its enormous destructive energy by splitting uranium atoms to create a chain reaction—detonated in the sky, killing some 70,000 Japanese civilians instantly and leveling the city. Three days later, the U.S. dropped a second atomic bomb over the city of Nagasaki, with similarly devastating results. The following week, Japan’s emperor addressed his country over the radio to announce the decision to surrender. World War II had finally come to its dramatic conclusion. The decision to employ atomic weapons against Japan remains a controversial chapter in American history. Even before the new President Harry S.

Truman finalized his decision to use the bombs, members of the President’s inner circle grappled with the specifics of the decision to drop the new weapon. Their concerns revolved around a cluster of related issues: whether the use of the technology was necessary to defeat an already crippled Japan; whether a similar outcome could be effected without using the bomb against civilian targets; whether the detonation of a second bomb days after the first, before Japan had time to formulate its response, was justified; and what effect the demonstration of the bomb’s devastating power would have on postwar diplomacy, particularly on America’s uneasy wartime alliance with the Soviet Union. Controversy is Alive and Well The ongoing struggle to present the history of the atomic bombings in a balanced and accurate manner is an interesting story in its own right, and one that has occasionally generated an enormous amount of controversy. In 1995, anticipating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum planned a display around the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the aircraft that dropped the first bomb, for its museum on the National Mall.

That exhibit would place the invention of atomic weapons and the decision to use them against civilian targets in the context of World War II and the Cold War, provoking broader questions about the morality of strategic bombing and nuclear arms in general. The ongoing struggle to present the history of the atomic bombings in a balanced and accurate manner is an interesting story in its own right. . . . The design for the exhibit quickly triggered an avalanche of controversy. Critics charged that it offered a too-sympathetic portrayal of the Japanese enemy, and that its focus on the children and elderly victims of the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki encouraged visitors to question the necessity and morality of the weapons. As originally written, those critics alleged, the exhibit forwarded an anti-American interpretation of events surrounding the bombs’ use. That such a message was to appear in a national museum amplified the frustrations of critics (especially veterans’ groups), who believed that the exhibit should not lead museumgoers to question the decision to drop the bomb or to portray the Pacific war in morally neutral terms. In place of the original exhibit, veterans’ organizations offered a replacement exhibit with a very different message.

Their proposed exhibit portrayed the development of the atomic weapons as a triumph of American technical ingenuity, and the use of both bombs as an act that saved lives—the lives of American soldiers who would otherwise have had to invade the Japanese home islands, and the lives of thousands of Japanese who would, it was assumed, have fought and died with fanatic determination opposing such an invasion. The revised exhibit removed the questioning tone of the original, replacing it with more certainty: the use of the bombs, it argued, was both necessary and justified. When the controversy died down, the Smithsonian elected not to stage any exhibit of the aircraft fuselage. The historians who produced the original exhibit stood accused of historical revisionism by their critics, of needlessly complicating patriotic consensus with moral concerns. The fallout from the controversy led to loud, public debate in the halls of Congress and, ultimately, to the resignation of several leaders at the museum. When the controversy died down, the Smithsonian elected not to stage any exhibit of the aircraft fuselage. Years later, the plane went on display at the Smithsonian’s Udvar-Hazy Center outside Washington, DC, where it resides now, accompanied by a brief placard detailing its technical specifications.

The Textbook Approach Because the use of the atomic weapons evokes such passionate responses from Americans—from those who believe that the use of the bombs was wholly justified to those who believe that their use was criminal, and the many people who fall somewhere in between—it is a particularly difficult topic for textbooks to discuss. In order to avoid a potentially treacherous debate, textbooks have often adopted a set of compromises that describe the end of the war but avoid or omit some of the most difficult parts of the conversation. A 1947 history textbook, produced just two years after the bombings did just this, sidestepping the controversy by presenting the story at a distance and refraining from interpretation or discussion of civilian casualties: “The United States unveiled its newest weapon, demonstrating twice—first at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki—that a good-sized city could almost be erased from the map in one blinding flash. Confronted by this combination of forces, Japan surrendered August 14.” “If the war dragged on and Americans had to invade Japan, it might cost a million lives…life for life, the odds were that [the atomic bomb] would cost less.” Later textbooks made other compromises.

The 2005 textbook A History of the United States adopts a familiar tone, arguing that President Truman based his decision to drop the bomb mainly on a complex calculus of the cost in human lives if the war were to continue: “Should the United States use the atomic bomb? No one knew how long Japan would hold out.” That uncertainty forced American planners to assume the worst: “If the war dragged on and Americans had to invade Japan, it might cost a million lives. The atomic bomb, President Truman knew, might kill many thousands of innocent Japanese. But life for life, the odds were that it would cost less.” A 2006 textbook, The Americans, suggests that the decision to drop the bomb occurred largely outside moral concerns: “Should the Allies use the bomb to bring an end to the war? Truman did not hesitate. On July 25, 1945, he ordered the military to make final plans for dropping two atomic bombs on Japan.” The paragraph on the decision concludes with a compelling quote from the President himself: “Let there be no mistake about it.

I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt it should be used.” Other recent textbooks have labored to present this often-contentious topic in a more nuanced manner. The 2007 textbook American Anthem describes the decision-making process as an involved one, observing “Truman formed a group to advise him about using the bomb. This group debated where the bomb should be used and whether the Japanese should be warned. After carefully considering all the options, Truman decided to drop the bomb on a Japanese city. There would be no warning." The carefully written passage does not suggest that the question of whether to use the bomb against civilian targets was part of the debate; it describes the inquiry as focused on where to drop the bomb and whether a warning would precede its use. More recent textbooks often offer viewpoints from other perspectives—including Japanese civilians, who suffered the legacy of atomic fallout for decades after the original explosion—from a morally neutral stance, inviting (or directly asking) readers to make their own judgments. Besides offering a description of Truman’s decision-making process, the American Anthem textbook includes a passage of equivalent length that describes the destruction on the ground, anchored by a quote from a survivor of the Hiroshima bomb.

It also features a “Counterpoints” section that contrasts a quote from Secretary of War Henry Stimson supporting the bomb’s use with one from Leo Szilard, an atomic physicist, characterizing the use of the bombs against Japan as “one of the greatest blunders of history.” What the Documents Reveal A discussion that focuses primarily on the need to employ the bomb in order to save lives—the lives of Japanese civilians as well as those of American soldiers—is incomplete. In fact, as the documentary record shows, there was a good deal of debate over the use of the weapons during the summer of 1945, much of which focused on more complex issues than the lives that would be saved or lost in ending the war. A discussion that focuses primarily on the need to employ the bomb in order to save lives—the lives of Japanese civilians as well as those of American soldiers—is incomplete. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe and one of the architects of the successful campaign against Germany, was one of the dissenters.

After the war, Eisenhower recalled his position in 1945, asserting that “Japan was defeated and… dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary.” Eisenhower’s objection was, in part, a moral one; as he noted, “I thought our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.'" Eisenhower recalled that his objection found an unreceptive audience with Secretary of War Henry Stimson. In Eisenhower's own words, Stimson was “deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions.” (In a separate document, Stimson himself concurred with Eisenhower’s conclusion that there was little active American attempt to respond to Japan’s peace feelers to prevent the use of the atomic weapons: “No effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb.”) The year after the Japanese surrender, the U.S.

government released its own Strategic Bombing Survey, an effort to assess the effectiveness of dropping bombs on civilian populations, including the firebombs used in Europe and the Pacific, and the atomic weapons detonated over Hiroshima and Tokyo (see Primary Source U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [1946]). Its findings suggested that the bombs were largely superfluous, and that Japan’s surrender was all but guaranteed even without the threat of invasion. “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts,” the SBS concluded, “and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that . . . Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” Though firm in its assertions, the SBS received widespread criticism from many quarters for drawing conclusions far beyond the available evidence. (Many critics noted, rightly, that the SBS was itself hardly a disinterested document, since it was produced by an organization with an interest in emphasizing the effectiveness of conventional airpower.) The compromises 21st-century textbooks have struck appear understandable if not necessary.

The Strategic Bombing Survey’s conclusions highlight another important factor in the decision to employ the bombs against Japan: the message such a display would send to Josef Stalin. Uneasy allies in the war against Germany, Russian forces joined the war in Japan in August 1945. Contemporary observers noted that the demonstration of the deadly new weapon’s considerable might had the additional effect of warning Stalin that the U.S. would exercise considerable power in the postwar period. Furthermore, dropping two bombs only days apart had the added benefit of convincing the Russians that the U.S. possessed a formidable supply of the new weapons; when in fact, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was entirely depleted after the two attacks on Japan. A survey of primary sources from the summer of 1945 and the months afterward reveals a variety of opinions, arguments, and justifications regarding the use of atomic weapons. Embracing the variety of opinions while also presenting a narrative that depicts the decision and its effects from multiple perspectives is a near-impossible task. Given how controversial the story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has proved to be, the compromises 21st-century textbooks have struck appear understandable if not necessary.

Leo Szilard's Petition to the President (1945) Annotation Leo Szilard was one of the first physicists to identify the military application of atomic power. In fact, Szilard wrote most of the famous 1939 letter from Albert Einstein to then-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt outlining the potential of such a bomb and the fears that Hitler’s Germany was currently working to develop one that helped set the American Manhattan Project in motion. As the atomic tests reached their successful conclusion, however, Szilard raised serious concerns about the practical use of such weapons against civilian targets. In July 1945, he circulated a petition among the scientists who had worked on the bomb’s construction in an effort to discourage the President from employing it. Sixty-eight scientists signed the petition, which did not reject the use of the weapon wholesale but referred to the potential of a postwar atomic arms race which might have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. “The atomic bombs at our disposal,” the petition noted, “represent only the first step in this direction”; there would be “almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available” as scientists refined the technology.

Thus their use to end World War II might serve as a disastrous example in the future: “the nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.” Primary Source(s) A Petition to the President of the United States Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in the near future. The liberation of atomic power which has been achieved places atomic bombs in the hands of the Army. It places in your hands, as Commander-in-Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction the use of such bombs in the present phase of the war against Japan. We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently, we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows: The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare.

We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender. If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved. The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.

If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States—singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power. The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.

In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities which are involved. Citation Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima - Aug 06, 1945 - HISTORY.com Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima Share this: Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima Author Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima URL Publisher A+E Networks The United States becomes the first and only nation to use atomic weaponry during wartime when it drops an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Though the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan marked the end of World War II, many historians argue that it also ignited the Cold War. Since 1940, the United States had been working on developing an atomic weapon, after having been warned by Albert Einstein that Nazi Germany was already conducting research into nuclear weapons.

By the time the United States conducted the first successful test (an atomic bomb was exploded in the desert in New Mexico in July 1945), Germany had already been defeated. The war against Japan in the Pacific, however, continued to rage. President Harry S. Truman, warned by some of his advisers that any attempt to invade Japan would result in horrific American casualties, ordered that the new weapon be used to bring the war to a speedy end. On August 6, 1945, the American bomber Enola Gay dropped a five-ton bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. A blast equivalent to the power of 15,000 tons of TNT reduced four square miles of the city to ruins and immediately killed 80,000 people. Tens of thousands more died in the following weeks from wounds and radiation poisoning. Three days later, another bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, killing nearly 40,000 more people. A few days later, Japan announced its surrender. In the years since the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, a number of historians have suggested that the weapons had a two-pronged objective.

First, of course, was to bring the war with Japan to a speedy end and spare American lives. It has been suggested that the second objective was to demonstrate the new weapon of mass destruction to the Soviet Union. By August 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated badly. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill (before being replaced by Clement Attlee) ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima. The meeting was marked by recriminations and suspicion between the Americans and Soviets. Russian armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe. Truman and many of his advisers hoped that the U.S. atomic monopoly might offer diplomatic leverage with the Soviets. In this fashion, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan can be seen as the first shot of the Cold War. If U.S. officials truly believed that they could use their atomic monopoly for diplomatic advantage, they had little time to put their plan into action. By 1949, the Soviets had developed their own atomic bomb and the nuclear arms race began. More on This Topic

Question: Which US President authorised the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
Answer: Harry S Truman