The Argentinian Side of the Falklands War - Page 2 of 2 The Argentinian Side of the Falklands War SHARE: Facebook Twitter Argentine POWs On March 19th, 1982, the Argentinians launched an invasion of the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, 165 kilometres from the coast of Patagonia. Following the initial invasion, they started to disembark on the shores of the Falklands Islands on April 2nd. Concerning the occupation of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, the British deployed two submarines, but it wasn’t until the invasion of the Falklands that they had taken the matter seriously. The war was never officially declared although both sides did declare the Islands areas a war zone and officially recognized that a state of war existed between them). Hostilities were limited almost exclusively to the territories under dispute and the area in the South Atlantic where they lie. Argentina’s original intention was to mount a quick, symbolic occupation, followed rapidly by withdrawal, leaving only a small garrison to support the new military governor. This strategy was based on the Argentinean assumption that the British would not respond militarily.

Argentinian assault units were indeed withdrawn to the mainland in the days following the invasion, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction forced the Junta to change their plans and reinforce the islands since they could not afford to lose the islands once the British came out to fight. When the conflict broke out the UN called for peace talks, the immediate end to the hostilities and urged both parties to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The US feared that Argentina would ask the Soviet Union for help and so they stood firmly on the side of the British. On the South American mainland, Chile actively helped Great Britain with intelligence support. The support was evident and Argentina was forced to keep some of its best trained and best-equipped mountain troops on the Chilean border counting on the possible military intervention by the neighboring British ally. The intervention never took place, but the Argentinians were on high alert throughout the war. British forces landed on the islands, after which a war for aerial domination commenced. Several intense dogfights occurred during the war. The British were using Harriers as their main combat airplane while Argentina used Mirage III fighter jets, which were purchased from France several years before the war.

The Mirage was not good enough for the Argentinian air force to successfully engage the far nimble RAF fighters. Other than the Mirage, Argentine Air Force used American A-4 Skyhawks, Israeli Daggers, the Israeli version of the Mirage fighter, and English Electric Canberras. The most important naval incident during the war was the sinking of the ARA Belgrano, an Argentinean WWII era light cruiser, by the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror on May 2nd, 1982. 323 men aboard the ARA Belgrano lost their lives. The retaliation for this loss occurred two days after, when a British Type 42 Destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was bombed by a naval air strike. The British lost 20 men with additional 24 others severely injured. ARA Belgrano sinking on May 2nd, 1982 After the British victory on land, their terms for the Argentinians surrender proved to be much harsher than originally expected by the Junta, but Argentina accepted them on 14th of June 1982. Argentinean troops withdrew from the islands, leaving them in British hands.

The relations between the two countries were disrupted for a while, until their official normalization in 1989. Argentina continues to debate the sovereignty of the Falklands to this day. In 2013, a referendum was held on the Falkland Islands, after which the majority stated that they wish to stay under the British crown. The Falklands conflict remains the largest air-naval combat operation between modern forces since the end of the Second World War. FEATURED VIDEO Falklands War 1982 Tweet Causes The Falkland Islands are a desolate and cold group of islands in the South Atlantic, 400 miles off the South American mainland. The two main islands are about the same area as Wales in the UK and in 1982 had a population of 1,820 people and 400,000 sheep - hardly a place that would expect an invasion or a war of liberation in response. Before 1816 the island had a chequered past and were often left unguarded and uninhabited. After 1816 when Argentina won its independence from Spain they laid claim to the islands.

With the end of the Napoleonic Wars Britain was determined to reassert its imperial claims and this included the Falklands. Pride was also at stake after the failure of a British expedition to Argentina during the Napoleonic Wars. In 1833 a British Naval force evicted the Argentineans and it was this act of aggression that they wished to avenge in 1982. Under international law the Argentineans had no case, despite the original British aggression the Island had been settled and inhabited by the British continuously since 1833 with most of the islanders descended from the Scottish settlers brought there by the Falkland Islands Company to raise sheep. If such a claim as the Argentinean one was honoured then it would open an immense can of worms for many countries throughout the world. The British also pointed out that the UN charter gave small nations the right of National Self Determination and the islanders definitely wanted to remain British. Yet with such a seemingly worthless piece of territory at stake with a population equal to a large block of flats it seemed to the Argentineans that the British would offer no physical resistance especially with the distances involved and a population of 100,000 British Ex pats living on the Argentine mainland.

The Argentines had been taught since school that the British had stolen the islands and the country had not suffered the horrors of war as seen in the two world wars. It is also clear that if the Junta had not invaded the Falklands it would have gone to war elsewhere. The British didn't take such childish claims seriously while for the Argentineans it was a passionate, national cause. Caught up in a wave of patriotism the Argentinean government and people were about to pay a heavy price. Not expecting any British military response the Argentineans invaded on 2 April 1982 (Spring). If they had waited for 2 months it would have been too late for any British counter attack, but then the Argentineans hadn't even considered such an event. The Beginning of the War The British and Argentineans had periodically conducted talks on the Islands, the Argentineans had tried economic incentives for the islands to join their country but few willing wanted to be ruled by a military dictatorship. Running out of time and needing a victory the military junta led by General Galteri decided invasion was the only option to retake the island before the 150th anniversary of British rule.

The Argentineans who had a good relationship with the US government under President Reagan believed the US would support them in the coming war or at least remain quiet, it would be yet another mistake. The Argentineans then needed a Causus Beli, this was soon found. An Argentinean scrap merchant had been contracted to remove an abandoned whaling station on South Georgia, a British Island to the east of the Falklands (which the Argentineans also claimed). He landed without permission and was told to leave or gain permits and just over 20 Royal marines were sent to enforce the decision. On 25th March the Argentineans sent troops to protect the scrap dealer and occupy the Island, at the same time the invasion of the Falklands was ordered with troops landing at Port Stanley, the capital, on 2nd April 1982, taking the British completely by surprise. The Argentineans had taken the cutbacks proposed in the British 1981 White paper as an indication that the British would not fight for the Falklands. They were terribly mistaken. The British saw it as a point of honour and were furious at the actions of what they saw as a ‘Tin-pot’ dictator.

The invasion was on a Friday by Tuesday a British task force had set sail to retake the islands! It was an amazing feat of mobilisation considering the islands lie 8250 miles from the UK. Merchant ships were drafted into service including two liners - the Canberra and the QEII. The Canberra returning from a cruise on the 7th April to be quickly refitted, a helipad added and setting sail two days later with 2400 troops on board, the QEII also became a troop ship like the Queen Elizabeth liner in World War 2 . With the nearest British airbase being at Ascension Island 4000 miles from the Falklands the operation had to be completely naval. The US tried to avert war diplomatically but both sides were now in a bellicose mood. The US public was massively pro British and the US lent the British arms and provided intelligence even offering the use of the USS Guam a 12,000 ton assault ship. It is likely that US intelligence proved vital during the war. British Assault The British Task force reached the South Atlantic on 1st May and quickly retook South Georgia and then prepared for the more difficult task of retaking the main Islands.

The British chose to land on the other side of the island to the capital Port Stanley in a narrow stretch of water called San Carlos sound which lines between the two main islands. The landing started on the 21st May and was hardly opposed. British elite units such as the Parachute regiment and Royal Marine Commandos faced a weak, mainly conscript, Argentinean army, which proved to have poor morale. Once a British Submarine sunk the Argentinean Cruiser the General Belgrano the Argentinean navy stayed in port. The Argentinean Air force did much better and only luck saved the British from some awful casualties. They operated some 400 miles from their home bases and sank several British ships. British air defence was weak with a few Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft and Rapier missile batteries. Bombs sank four British ships, and Exocet missiles sank the destroyer HMS Sheffield and the transport the Atlantic Conveyor. Many other ships were damaged some badly with considerable lost of life. The ground phase took 3 weeks and the British fought their way across the island with an Argentine surrender on 14th June 1982.

The British lost 250 men including Colonel H Jones of the Parachute regiment and captured 12,278 prisoners, 5 civilians died. The Argentines lost 746 killed of which 368 had been on the Belgrano when it sunk. There have been some hints of war crimes carried out by British troops against Argentine prisoners but no firm evidence. Aftermath The Argentine government quickly collapsed, a return to democracy quickly followed and many former Junta officials received long prison sentences as torturers and leaders of government death squads. Argentina then entered a period of political unrest and threatened and abortive military coups. In 1990 Britain and Argentina resumed normal diplomatic relations and a naval exclusion zone around the islands was lifted. The British had spent £600 million on an air base at Port Stanley and it still proves costly to maintain today, although the British military presence is small and often contains Territorial Army units (part time volunteer soldiers). Two huge Squid fisheries opened bringing in $50 million in licenses a year.

Large oil deposits also almost certainly exist in the waters around the Falklands and although in the 1980s it was difficult to locate them and uneconomic to extract them, technology is now making this feasible. It will never be known but is possible that the British knew about the long tem oil prospects when they made their decision to go to war. The population of the Island has increased but many islanders seek to marry service personnel as a way to escape these barren isolated islands. Argentina has not renounced its claim but continues to try and win hearts and minds. With the events of the Gulf War and Kuwait the Argentineans are unlikely to try force again especially against a much better defended Island. Should oil production start the Argentines have much to gain economically by co-operating, as they would be the nearest supplier of men and materials needed in the oil industry.

How to cite this article: Dugdale-Pointon, T., (18 February 2006), The Falklands War 1982, Argentina invades Falklands - Apr 02, 1982 - HISTORY.com Argentina invades Falklands Publisher A+E Networks On April 2, 1982, Argentina invades the Falklands Islands, a British colony since 1892 and British possession since 1833. Argentine amphibious forces rapidly overcame the small garrison of British marines at the town of Stanley on East Falkland and the next day seized the dependent territories of South Georgia and the South Sandwich group. The 1,800 Falkland Islanders, mostly English-speaking sheep farmers, awaited a British response. The Falkland Islands, located about 300 miles off the southern tip of Argentina, had long been claimed by the British. British navigator John Davis may have sighted the islands in 1592, and in 1690 British Navy Captain John Strong made the first recorded landing on the islands. He named them after Viscount Falkland, who was the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time.

In 1764, French navigator Louis-Antoine de Bougainville founded the islands’ first human settlement, on East Falkland, which was taken over by the Spanish in 1767. In 1765, the British settled West Falkland but left in 1774 for economic reasons. Spain abandoned its settlement in 1811. In 1816 Argentina declared its independence from Spain and in 1820 proclaimed its sovereignty over the Falklands. The Argentines built a fort on East Falkland, but in 1832 it was destroyed by the USS Lexington in retaliation for the seizure of U.S. seal ships in the area. In 1833, a British force expelled the remaining Argentine officials and began a military occupation. In 1841, a British lieutenant governor was appointed, and by the 1880s a British community of some 1,800 people on the islands was self-supporting. In 1892, the wind-blown Falkland Islands were collectively granted colonial status.

For the next 90 years, life on the Falklands remained much unchanged, despite persistent diplomatic efforts by Argentina to regain control of the islands. In 1981, the Falkland Islanders voted in a referendum to remain British, and it seemed unlikely that the Falklands would ever revert to Argentine rule. Meanwhile, in Argentina, the military junta led by Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri was suffering criticism for its oppressive rule and economic management, and planned the Falklands invasion as a means of promoting patriotic feeling and propping up its regime. In March 1982, Argentine salvage workers occupied South Georgia Island, and a full-scale invasion of the Falklands began on April 2. Under orders from their commanders, the Argentine troops inflicted no British casualties, despite suffering losses to their own units. Nevertheless, Britain was outraged, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher assembled a naval task force of 30 warships to retake the islands. As Britain is 8,000 miles from the Falklands, it took several weeks for the British warships to arrive.

On April 25, South Georgia Island was retaken, and after several intensive naval battles fought around the Falklands, British troops landed on East Falkland on May 21. After several weeks of fighting, the large Argentine garrison at Stanley surrendered on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. Britain lost five ships and 256 lives in the fight to regain the Falklands, and Argentina lost its only cruiser and 750 lives. Humiliated in the Falklands War, the Argentine military was swept from power in 1983, and civilian rule was restored. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s popularity soared after the conflict, and her Conservative Party won a landslide victory in 1983 parliamentary elections. Related Videos 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands | Military Wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands 204,343pages on Share Ad blocker interference detected! Wikia is a free-to-use site that makes money from advertising. We have a modified experience for viewers using ad blockers Wikia is not accessible if you’ve made further modifications. Remove the custom ad blocker rule(s) and the page will load as expected.

Argentine invasion of the Falklands British Royal Marines surrender their weapons. Date Beginning of the Falklands War Belligerents Argentina Commanders and leaders Governor Rex Hunt Major Mike Norman RM Major Phil Summers FIDF Rear Admiral Carlos Büsser Lieutenant commander Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots 11 RN sailors 25–40 FIDF and some volunteer civilians [1] 600 troops (some 80 actually clashed with British forces) [2] [3] Casualties and losses 96–114 POWs [4] Several military trucks and jeeps disabled by gunfire 3 coastal boats confiscated [5] 3 small planes confiscated [6] 1 killed 3 wounded 1 Amtrac vehicle slightly damaged On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland Islands (Spanish language: Islas Malvinas ). It marked the beginning of the Falklands War . The Argentinians mounted amphibious landings, with the invasion ending with the battle and final surrender of Government House . Contents Edit Governor Rex Hunt was informed by the British Government of a possible Argentine invasion on 1 April 1982.

At 3:30 pm that day he received a telegram from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stating: We have apparently reliable evidence that an Argentine task force could be assembling off Stanley at dawn tomorrow. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly. [7] Forces involved Edit The Governor summoned the two senior Royal Marines officers of Naval Party 8901 to Government House in Stanley to discuss the options for defending the Falklands. He said during the meeting, "Sounds like the buggers mean it", remaining composed despite the seriousness of the situation that the islands faced. [8] Major Mike Norman was given overall command of the Marines due to his seniority, while Major Gary Noott became the military advisor to Governor Hunt. The total strength was 68 Marines and 11 sailors, which was greater than would normally have been available because the garrison was in the process of changing over. Both the replacements and the troops preparing to leave were in the Falklands at the time of the invasion. [9] This was decreased to 57 when 22 Royal Marines embarked aboard the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance to observe Argentine soldiers based at South Georgia .

The Royal Navy , on the other hand, states that a total of 85 marines were present at Stanley. [9] Their numbers were reinforced by at least 25 Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) members. [10] Graham Bound, an islander who lived through the Argentine occupation , reports in his book Falkland Islanders At War that the higher figure of approximately 40 (both serving and past) members of the FIDF reported for duty at their Drill Hall. Their commanding officer, Major Phil Summers, tasked the volunteer militiamen with guarding such key points as the telephone exchange , the radio station and the power station. Skipper Jack Sollis, on board the civilian coastal ship Forrest, operated his boat as an improvised radar screen station off Stanley. Two other civilians, former Marine Jim Alister and a Canadian citizen, Bill Curtiss, also offered their services to the Governor. [1] Operation Rosario Edit The Argentine amphibious operation began in the late evening of Thursday 1 April, when the destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad disembarked special naval forces south of Stanley.

The bulk of the Argentine force was to land some hours later from the amphibious warfare ship ARA Cabo San Antonio near the airport, on a beach previously marked by frogmen from the submarine ARA Santa Fe . [11] The operation had been called Azul (Blue) during the planning stage, but it was finally renamed Rosario ( Rosary ). [12] ARA Santa Fe Edit The very first move of Operation Rosario was the reconnaissance of Port William by the submarine ARA Santa Fe and the landing of 14 members of the tactical divers group near Cape Pembroke, including the commander of this elite unit, Captain Cufré. The recce mission began as early as 31 March, when the trawler Forrest was spotted through the periscope at 10:00 PM off Port Stanley. The next day, the Santa Fe learned that the authorities in Stanley were aware of the Argentine intentions, so a change of plans was in order. Instead of landing right on Pembroke, the commandos would initially take a beach near Menguera Point, south of Kidney Island . [13] [14] They left the Santa Fe at 1:40 PM.

From the beach, they headed towards Pembroke peninsula in Zodiac boats . They reached Yorke Bay at 4:30 AM of 2 April. After planting beacons for the main landing, they took over the airstrip and the lighthouse without resistance. Argentine sources claim that they captured a few prisoners. This team was later given the task of gathering and taking in custody the Royal Marines in their flight out of the islands after the British surrender. [13] [14] Attack on Moody Brook barracks Edit On the night of 1/2 April 1982, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad halted 500 metres off Mullet Creek and lowered 21 Gemini assault craft into the water. They contained 84 special forces troopers [15] of Lieutenant-Commander Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots' 1st Amphibious Commandos Group and a small party [16] under Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino , who was normally 2IC of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion , that was to capture Government House.

[17] The Argentine Rear Admiral Jorge Allara , through a message radioed from Santisima Trinidad, had requested to Rex Hunt a peaceful surrender, but the proposal was rejected. [17] Giachino's party had the shortest distance to go: two and a half miles due north. Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was six miles away, over rough Falklands terrain. Lieutenant-Commander Sánchez-Sabarots, in the book The Argentine Fight for The Falklands, describes the main party's progress in the dark: It was a nice night, with a moon, but the cloud covered the moon for most of the time. It was very hard going with our heavy loads; it was hot work. We eventually became split up into three groups. We only had one night sight ; the lead man, Lieutenant Arias had it. One of the groups became separated when a vehicle came along the track we had to cross. We thought it was a military patrol. Another group lost contact, and the third separation was caused by someone going too fast. This caused my second in command, Lieutenant Bardi, to fall.

He suffered a hairline fracture of the ankle and had to be left behind with a man to help him. We were at Moody Brook by 5.30 a.m., just on the limits of the time planned, but with no time for the one hour's reconnaissance for which we had hoped. [18] The main party of Argentine Marines assumed that the Moody Brook Barracks contained sleeping Royal Marines. The barracks were quiet, although a light was on in the office of the Royal Marine commander. No sentries were observed, and it was a quiet night, apart from the occasional animal call. Lieutenant-Commander Sánchez-Sabarots could hear nothing of any action at Government House, nor from the distant landing beaches; nevertheless, he ordered the assault to begin. Lieutenant-Commander Sánchez-Sabarots continues his account: It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible. That was the most difficult mission of my career. All our training as commandos was to fight aggressively and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy.

We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley Harbour. Anyone who did get away would not able to reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty. [18] The noise of the grenades alerted Major Norman to the presence of Argentines on the island, and he thus drove back to Government House. Realising that the attack was coming from Moody Brook, he ordered all troop sections to converge on the house to enable the defence to be centralised. [8] Although there were no Royal Marine witnesses to the assault, British descriptions of the state of Moody Brook barracks afterward contradict the Argentine version of events. After the action, some of the Royal Marines were allowed to return to barracks to collect personal items. Major Norman describes walls of the barracks as riddled with machine gun fire and bearing the marks of white phosphorus grenades—"a classic houseclearing operation". [8] Amphibious landing at Yorke Bay Edit Argentine marines and APCs at Stanley, 2 April 1982. There was a more pressing action on the eastern edge of Stanley.

Twenty US-built LVTP-7A1 Argentine tracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers from the 1st Amphibious Vehicles Battalion, carrying D and E Companies of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM-2) from Puerto Belgrano , had been landed from the tank landing ship ARA Cabo San Antonio at Yorke Bay, and were being watched by a section of Royal Marines under the command of Lieutenant Bill Trollope. The armoured column trundled along the Airport Road into Stanley, with three Amtracs (Numbers 05, 07 and 19) in the vanguard, and, near the Ionospheric Research Station, at exactly 7:15 am, was engaged by a section of Royal Marines with anti-tank rockets and machine guns. This from Lieutenant-Commander Hugo Santillán's official post-battle report: We were on the last stretch of the road into Stanley. A machine-gun fired from one of the three white houses about 500 metres away and hit the right-hand Amtrac. The fire was very accurate. Then there were some explosions from a rocket launcher, but they were inaccurate, falling a long way from us.

We followed our standard operating procedure and took evasive action. The Amtrac on the right returned fire and took cover in a little depression. Once he was out of danger, I told all three vehicles to disembark their men. I ordered the crew with the recoilless rifle to fire one round of hollow charge at the ridge of the roof of the house where the machine-gun was, to cause a bang but not an explosion. We were still following our orders not to inflict casualties. The first round was about a hundred metres short, but the second hit the roof. The British troops then threw a purple smoke grenade ; I thought it was their signal to withdraw. They had stopped firing, so Commander Weinstabl started the movement of the two companies around the position. Some riflemen in one of the houses started firing then; that was quite uncomfortable. I couldn't pinpoint their location, but one of my other Amtracs could and asked permission to open up with a mortar which he had. I authorized this, but only with three rounds and only at the roofs of the houses. Two rounds fell short, but the third hit right in the centre of the roof; that was incredible. The British ceased firing then.

[18] The Amtrac on the right manoeuvred itself off the road into a little depression and as it did so, disembarked the Marines inside out of view. This encouraged the Royal Marines to think that Marine Mark Gibbs had scored a direct hit on the passenger compartment of the APC. Lieutenant Bill Trollope, with No. 2 Section, describes the action: Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down the Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84 mm and one 66 mm, missed. Subsequently one 66 mm fired by Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84 mm Marines Brown and Betts hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG , SLR and sniper rifle [Sergeant Shepherd] for about a minute before we threw a white phosphorus smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens.

Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate. [19] Lieutenant Trollope and his men withdrew along Davis Street, running behind the houses with Argentine Marines in hot pursuit, and went to ground firing up the road when it became obvious they could not reach Government House. [20] Battle of Government House and surrender Edit Lying on a small hillock south of Government House, Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino faced the difficulty of capturing this important objective with no radio and with a force of only sixteen men. He split his force into small groups, placing one on either side of the house and one at the rear. Unknown to them, the Governor's residence was the main concentration point of the Royal Marines, who outnumbered the Commandos by two to one. The first attack against this building came at 6.30 a.m., barely an hour before the Yorke Bay amphibious landing, when one of Giachino's platoons, led by Lieutenant Gustavo Lugo, [21] started to exchange fire with the British troops inside the house.

At the same time, Giachino himself, with four of his subordinates, entered the servants' annexe, believing it to be the rear entrance to the residence. Three Royal Marines, Corporals Sellen and Fleet and Marine Dorey, who were placed to cover the annexe, beat off the first attack. Giachino was hit instantly as he burst through the door, while Lieutenant Diego Garcia Quiroga was shot in the arm. The remaining three retreated to the maid's quarters. Giachino was not dead, but very badly wounded. An Argentine paramedic, Corporal Ernesto Urbina, attempted to get to Giachino but was wounded by a grenade. Giachino, seeing what had happened, pulled the pin from a hand grenade and threatened to use it. The Royal Marines then attempted to persuade the officer to get rid of the grenade so that they could give him medical treatment, but he refused, preventing them from reaching his position. After the surrender of the British forces at Government House, some three hours later, Giachino was taken to Stanley Hospital but died from loss of blood.

[22] ARA Granville At the Governor's office, Major Norman received a radio report from Corporal York's section, which was positioned at Camber peninsula, observing any possible Argentine ship entering Stanley Harbour. The Corporal proceeded to report on three potential targets in sight and which should he engage first. What are the targets? the Major enquired. Target number one is an aircraft carrier, target number two is a cruiser, at which point the line went dead. Corporal York decided to withdraw his section and proceeded to booby trap their Carl Gustav recoilless rifle , before paddling their Gemini assault boat north across Port William. As he did so, York claimed an Argentine destroyer began pursuing them (the corvette ARA Granville according to Argentine sources). His initiative led to the Gemini reaching an anchored Polish fishing vessel, hiding the small assault boat under her shadow. They patiently waited for a chance, before moving to the shore and landing on a small beach. [17] Back at Government House, the Argentine commandos' pressure continued unabated.

There is some evidence that their use of stun grenades and their continuous shift of firing positions during the battle led the Royal Marines inside to believe they were facing a company of marines and were hopelessly outnumbered. Actually, after the failure of Giachino's platoon to break into the residence, the British were surrounded by only a dozen elite troops. These men were under Lieutenant Lugo, Giachino's Second-in-Command . The Land Rovers used by the Royal Marines were disabled by automatic gunfire from the commandos. [23] Governor Hunt called Patrick Watts (at the radio station, Radio Stanley), by telephone and said he believed the assaulting force to be the equivalent of a reinforced company: We're staying put here, but we are pinned down. We can't move.(...) They must have 200 around us now. They've been throwing rifle grenades at us; I think there may be mortars, I don't know. They came along very quickly and very close, and then they retreated. Maybe they are waiting until the APCs [Amtracs] come along and they think they'll lose less casualties that way.

[24] [25] [26] File:FIDF-Pows-a.jpg Consequently, Hunt decided to enter talks with Argentine commanders around 8 o'clock. The liaison was Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert, the head in the islands of LADE , the Argentine government's airline company. Gilobert and a Governor's deputy went to the Argentine headquarters displaying a white flag. A de facto ceasefire was put in place at that time which was occasionally breached by small arms fire. [27] The Governor's envoys found the Argentine commanding post at Stanley's Town Hall. The Argentine chief accepted the British offer of a face to face meeting with Hunt at his battered office. While the negotiations were still going on, another incident occurred inside the residence. Three Argentine survivors of the first skirmish along the compound inadvertently alerted Major Noott to their presence, while they had been preparing to leave their hiding place. The Major fired his Sterling submachine gun into the ceiling of the maid's room. According to British reports, the stunned commandos tumbled down the stairs, laying their weapons on the ground.

They became the first Argentine prisoners of war of the Falklands War, albeit by then, Governor Hunt had already been in contact with Argentine officials negotiating the terms of surrender. [28] The version of the commander of these men, Captain Cufré, who was then at Stanley airport, is that his three subordinates kept their fighting position right to the end of the hostilities. [29] Surrender File:CaboBatista.jpg Admiral Carlos Büsser , commander in chief of the operation, states that a cease fire was already in place when the three commandos, after realising that the battle was coming to a close and that any loss of life at the time would be futile, laid down their arms to the marines in order to assist the wounded. Just a few minutes after this event, Government house capitulated. [28] Meanwhile, the Royal Marines in the House saw the approaching Amtracs that had been engaged earlier by Lieutenant Trollope and his section. The vehicles pushed on toward Moody Brook to link up with Sánchez-Sabarots forces. His amphibious commandos were plodding slowly along the road to reinforce their colleagues besieging Government House after taking some prisoners near the racecourse.

[30] [31] Major Norman had earlier advised Governor Hunt that the Royal Marines and the Governor could break out to the countryside and set up a 'seat of government' elsewhere, but when he finally met the commander-in-chief of the Argentine operations, Admiral Büsser, he agreed to surrender his troops to the now overwhelming Argentine forces at 9:30 AM. After the surrender, the Royal Marines and the members of the FIDF were then herded onto the playing fields. Pictures and film were taken of the British prisoners arranged face-down on the ground. This was probably an attempt to demonstrate the lack of British casualties, but it backfired: The images galvanised the British public when they were broadcast on television and increased public opposition to the invasion. Soon afterward, the Royal Marines were moved to a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which would take them to Comodoro Rivadavia , where they were to be picked up by another airliner to Uruguay and on to the United Kingdom . Members of FIDF were not taken to Argentina along with members of NP 8901; instead they were disarmed and returned to their homes.

[32] As the Marines were being taken to Montevideo, one of them said to an Argentine guard "don't make yourself too comfy here mate, we'll be back". [17] Corporal York's section remained at large. On 4 April, they reached a secluded shepherd's hut owned by a Mrs Watson. York had no radio, and due to worries about possible civilian deaths, chose to surrender to Argentine forces. They gave their position to the Argentine Army using a local islander's radio, and York subsequently ordered his men to destroy and then bury their weapons. [33] In Buenos Aires, huge flag-waving crowds flooded the Plaza de Mayo upon hearing the news. Argentina's losses in the operation were one dead and three wounded. In London, where the bad news was fully known from Argentine sources, the government was in a state of shock. The crisis prompted the resignation of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington . [34] Main article: 1982 invasion of South Georgia The next day, Argentine forces captured the island chain of South Georgia, 1350 km to the east of the Falklands.

In that action, the Argentines suffered one sailor from the corvette ARA Guerrico and two marines killed (Navy Corporal Patricio Guanca and marine conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Aguila). One British Royal Marine was wounded in an exchange of fire with the Argentine troops. The Marines eventually surrendered when this position was bracketed by the Guerrico's main 100mm gun. [35] Informing London At 4.30pm on 2 April 1982, the Governor's telex operator had this conversation with a Ministry of Defence operative in London, announcing that the islands were under Argentine control.

[36] LON (London): HELLO THERE WHAT ARE ALL THESE RUMOURS WE HEAR THIS IS LON FK (Falklands): WE HAVE LOTS OF NEW FRIENDS LON: WHAT ABOUT INVASION RUMOURS FK: THOSE ARE THE FRIENDS I WAS MEANING LON: THEY HAVE LANDED LON: ARE YOU OPEN FOR TRAFFIC IE NORMAL TELEX SERVICE FK: NO ORDERS ON THAT YET ONE MUST OBEY ORDERS LON: WHOSE ORDERS FK: YES LON: ARE THE ARGENTINIANS IN CONTROL FK: YES YOU CAN'T ARGUE WITH THOUSANDS OF TROOPS PLUS ENORMOUS NAVY SUPPORT WHEN YOU ARE ONLY 1600 STRONG. STAND BY. Operation timeline Operation Rosario The timeline of the operation was as follows: [11] A. 21:30 1 April – The Type 42 destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad begins loading naval commandos of the Amphibious Commandos Group into 21 small inflatable motor boats. These set out for Mullet Creek but sail too far north and are caught up in beds of kelp , which cause problems for the boats.

They decide to head for the nearest beach, which is near Lake Point. B. 23:00 1 April – The first group of 84 men lands on an unnamed beach at Lake Point. The group splits into a smaller force led by Lieutenant-Commander Giachino which heads towards Government House, and a larger force commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots which heads towards Moody Brook barracks. C. 04:30 2 April – A small advanced team of the Tactical Divers Group is landed undetected from the Submarine ARA Santa Fe near Yorke Bay. D. 05:30 2 April – Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots' force reaches and surrounds the barracks. They throw tear gas grenades into the buildings and storm the buildings with heavy machine gun fire. They find the buildings deserted. E. 06:00 2 April – 20 FMC Amtracs and several LARC-V stores-carrying vehicles land on Yorke Bay from the LST ARA Cabo San Antonio . The force splits into 3 groups: A four Amtrac vanguard. Including one carrying the Army Platoon. The main force of 14 Amtracs.

The second in command, a recovery Amtrac and LARC vehicles. F. 06:30 2 April – The first Amtracs meet no resistance. The Army platoon secures the deserted airport, previously swept by Navy tactical divers. G. 06:30 2 April – An Argentine force of 16 naval commandos reaches Government House, where they are stopped by 31 Royal Marines, 11 armed Royal Navy personnel and 1 local. Three Argentines are wounded, including the leader of the platoon, Lieutenant-Commander Giachino, who later dies. Another three are later captured inside the House, although by then (around 8:00) talks with Argentine officials about the surrender had already begun. H. 07:15 2 April – Having met no resistance, the Argentine Amtracs advance on Stanley, when they are ambushed from a house about 500 metres from the road. Royal Marines use rockets and machine guns. The Royal Marines fall back to government house. One of the Amtracs is scarred by machine gun fire, and there is one minor injury. I.

08:30 2 April – The Argentine Amtrac force secures Stanley. J. Lieutenant Colonel Seineldín's Regiment 25th platoon begin to clear the runway, while Navy tactical divers provide security on the airport and seize the lighthouse. Reaction in the United Nations Edit On 3 April 1982 the United Nations Security Council comprising the 5 permanent members and the 10 elected members (Poland, Spain, Ireland , Panama, Guyana, Japan , Jordan, Uganda , Zaire, and Togo) passed the Resolution 502 demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands and called on the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to the situation and refrain from further military action. Panama voted against this resolution, with China, Poland, Spain and the USSR abstaining. All 10 remaining members voted for the resolution. [37] See also BBC ON THIS DAY | 2 | 1982: Argentina invades Falklands 1982: Argentina invades Falklands Argentina has invaded the British territory of the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic.

The islands, off the coast of Argentina, have been a cause of friction between the two countries since Britain claimed them in 1833. The Argentine flag is now flying over Government House in the Falkland Islands' capital, Port Stanley. The head of the country's military junta, General Leopoldo Galtieri, has welcomed the "recovery" of "Las Malvinas" - the Argentine name for the Falklands. General Galtieri said Argentina had been left with no option other than military action. The invasion followed months of sabre-rattling and a build-up over the past few days of Argentine war ships off the Falkland Islands, home to about 1,800 people. 'Unprepared' At 0600 on Friday Argentina began "Operation Rosario" when a unit of Argentine troops landed near Port Stanley. The leader of the Argentine forces, Admiral Jorge Anaya, had contacted the Falklands' governor, Rex Hunt, to appeal for a peaceful surrender. But the request was rejected and the 80 members of the Royal Marine regiment stationed on the island and 20 locals were mobilised.

But by early afternoon they were vastly outnumbered by about 3,000 Argentine troops. After an attack on Government House during which one Argentine soldier is said to have been killed, Rex Hunt ordered the British troops to surrender. No Falkland Islanders or Royal Marines died in the fighting though one serviceman is reported to be badly wounded. The British Government has cut diplomatic ties with Argentina and started to assemble a large naval taskforce to reclaim the islands. Questions are being asked as to why the government was so unprepared given two recent "invasions" by Argentine civilians of another British territory in the region. In the latest incident in March they planted a flag on South Georgia, an uninhabited island 800 miles (1287 kilometres) north east of the Falklands. When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, how did they expect Britain to react? - Quora Quora Military History and Wars When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, how did they expect Britain to react?

I know Argentine government didn't expect all out war; but did they expect the British to quickly accept Argentine rule over the Falklands, or did they expect there to be protracted diplomatic negotiations followed by some kind of compromise? Written May 28, 2015 I think they didn't expect a counterattack. I believe they hoped that having troops on the ground would make it a fait accompli, and the UK would then negotiate in the UN for some kind of settlement. What they failed to realize is that their actual reason for starting the war -- the junta's deep unpopularity at home -- was the exact same situation that Margaret Thatcher was in. The war revived her flagging political fortunes. A less nationalistic PM who was already secure at home might have done a deal. They attacked the wrong PM at the wrong time. (However, Thatcher actually agonized over the decision in private much more than she allowed the public to know.) They also failed to anticipate the reaction of the UN Security Council. The UK did accept a compromise, which the junta rejected; and then the Security Council passed Resolution 502, calling for a withdrawal of Argentine troops.

Even though the Soviet Union and China might have chosen to oppose the western bloc on principle and veto the resolution, in fact, neither of them wanted to set the precedent that countries could bring up centuries-old claims to justify invasion of long-settled territories. 13.6k Views · View Upvotes · Answer requested by Updated May 29, 2015 Considering the other replies, I add only one comment. From what I recall of the press coverage, Argentina didn't expect the UK would bother enough to do more than make angry noises. Columnists were pontificating that it wasn't worth the risk and effort, and I recall one speculation that all the UK would do is "rescue" its citizens. I recall the aftermath of the sinking of General Belgrano. The Argentinian Navy damned near ceased operations. They clearly didn't believe the Royal Navy would (or could) enforce the Exclusion Zone around the Falklands. I was working for a defence contractor then, and my boss's boss was an ex-Royal Navy senior officer. At the time, the "coffee pot" consensus was that the UK was far too overextended and outdated to do anything worth mentioning.

The response from our ex-Royal Navy superior was a wry smile, and an observation that it took time for an SSN [1] to get in place. One fellow insisted that the Royal Navy didn't have the SSNs to make any difference. The counter-reply: "It will only take one." That's merely an anecdote, of course. Even so, I think it sums up the general attitude toward the UK at the time: a bankrupt, toothless old codger of a nation, clinging hopelessly to dreams of long-gone glory. I'd guess the Argentinian junta figured they could pull off a quick, simple occupation and sell it at home as a great victory. --- Updated May 30, 2015 The expectation was that the UK, being so very far away, would not contemplate attacking a fortified island and that the Falklands would stay in Argentinian hands. The UK military had just been through some cuts, the Navy had been hit quite hard and it was not reasonable to expect a small country on the edge of Europe to want to go to war over an island in the South Atlantic and some ex-whaling station near to the Antartic Circle.

The UK's orbat was two jump jet carriers, the Harrier had never been in combat and was not supersonic so was considered inferior to Argentina's French made Super Etendard. The UK was not considered to have any long range bombers, the only thing close was 1950's Vulcans (completely beautiful but old) As for troops, most were stationed in West Germany and were part of the British Army of the Rhine. It would not have been sensible to think that the UK would just rip out part of BAOR and send it south. What Argenina expected was mostly to do with their own internal politics. The military junta was under severe economic pressure and a victory over an old imperial power would (and did) play well with the public at home. The Junta did expect to lose some markets for its exports but the short term loss would not have been considered bad against turning a hostile home crowd in their favour. The Junta would probably have expected some censure in the UN but as China and USSR would have definitelyt vetoed anything serious the chance of sanctions would have been very low.

The EU or EC as it was then was not in any way joined up politically as it is now and so there would not have been sanctions from them. Besides the French were major exporters to Argentina and so would also have vetoed any sanctions. So never in their wildest dreams did the Argentinian Junta think that the UK would pile as many troops as they could onto as many ships as they could find and then ship them to the Falklands. They would also never have considered how well the Harrier performed, how effective UK troops were against conscripts and that a 1950's V bomber would make a run 8,000 miles to bomb a runway. To think that would be crazy. A factor that should not, perhaps, be overlooked is the machismo and sexism of the Argentinian leaders. No doubt they imagined that their aggression and bluster would intimidate a female prime minister. The Falklands War also embodies a cautionary lesson about faith in experts and their prognostications. In the US media coverage of the Falklands War conventional wisdom ruled. Very little thought had been given to the Thatcher government's domestic political position or how its tame submission to such a blatant act of aggression would be received by the British public.

Instead, platoons of print and broadcast pundits explained how the UK had no viable military options and people were flummoxed when the RN task force was dispatched south. At virtually every point of the ensuing campaign those same pundits assured their readers and listeners that having staged a show of force, e.g. by the recapture of South Georgia, the Thatcher government would open negotiations or agree to arbitration. Once again they were blind to the political realities. Having accepted the risks and costs of a campaign to retake the Falklands, was Thatcher really likely to forego a clear-cut victory? In retrospect this idea seems delusional. But it was held by the (self-described) smartest people in the room. Paul Irving wrote a good informative response, but I want to add to it with a key fact no one has mentioned. Britain had surrendered passport control for the Falkland Islanders to Argentina. The only travel routes out of the Falkland Islands went to Argentina, where the residents were required to have, and present, Argentine passports, which some islanders actually acquired. Thus for all intents and purposes they were now regarded as Argentine nationals by the world community. This sort of "technicality" is what national citizenship hinges on.

The government of Argentina thought this meant that Britain was washing its hands of islands, and a lot of the islanders thought so too. Argentina thought that there would be no contest over their sovereignty, and that the world community would rally to the obvious correctness of their view. If they had tried a more gentle means of establishing authority, instead of the in-your-face insult of a military landing, they might have succeeded. Falklands/Malvinas War England Falklands / Malvinas War The Falklands War was by far the largest and most extended series of naval battles since the Pacific campaign in World War II. Designated Operation CORPORATE by the British, the five month war included the world's most significant amphibious operations since the Inchon landings in 1950, a logistics pipeline of over 7000 miles, and a winter combat arena 3300 miles from the nearest friendly base at Ascension Island. The war was a product of a combination of miscalculations by both the British and the Argentines.

On the one hand the British never imagined that Argentina would attempt to take over the islands by force, while on the other hand the Argentines did not expect that Britain would respond with force or that the United States would refuse to take the Argentine side. In the end, about 1,000 people died, scarce resources were spent, and international relations were strained. In 1982 the Galtieri administration sought a way out of political and economic crises by initiating a suicidal war. The military was victorious in the short run, and indeed it rallied popular support around national loyalty. The actual motivation for Argentina's April 1982 invasion was a more immediate threat to General Leopoldo Galtieri's ruling military junta: internal instability in Argentina threatened to topple his dictatorship. Galtieri needed a uniting diversion, an outside conflict to distract the public and maintain domestic control. Argentina's claim on the Falklands (which it calls the Malvinas Islands) was based on sheer proximity to Argentina's mainland and its purported "inheritance" of sovereignty from the failed 1810 Spanish government.

This claim had great emotional significance for the Argentinean public, and had been part of public school history curricula for generations. In 1979 full diplomatic relations were reestablished between Argentina and Britain, and in 1980 both countries resumed talks on the Falkland/ Malvinas question. During a round of talks in February 1982, however, Argentina refused to establish a compromise with Britain, and on March 1 the Minister of Foreign Relations Nicanor Costa Mï¿½ndez of Argentina warned Britain that Argentina would seek other means of settling the dispute. On 19 March 1982, less than three weeks after the Argentine warning to Britain, a group of 30 Argentine scrap merchants landed on South Georgia/Georgia del Sur Island (part of the area under dispute) to dismantle an old whaling station under contract with a Scottish-based shipping firm. The venture was approved by both the British Embassy and the Argentina Foreign Ministry. The men, who did not carry appropriate visas and work permits, raised the Argentine flag on the island. News of this incident was transmitted to London, but the tone of the report implied that the Argentines had invaded South Georgia with civilian and military personnel.

This was picked up by the press and fueled public outcry that something had to be done to stop this outrage. Reprisal came the following day when a group of Falkland/ Malvinas islanders invaded the offices of the Argentine State Airline in the islands' capital of Stanley, replaced the Argentine flag with the British flag, and vandalized the office. HMS Endurance was dispatched from Stanley with half the Falklands garrison embarked -- 22 Royal Marines and one lieutenant. They were under orders to deport the salvagers back to Argentina. Endurance arrived on 23 March and landed the Royal Marines. Reports of the Stanley incident prompted Argentine naval movements in the South Atlantic. On 26 March, 100 Argentinean troops arrived by sea, purportedly to defend the salvagers. There were no plans to reinforce or sustain this force for a long period, the Argentines felt that this was just a gentle push to get the British back to the negotiating table. This Argentinean diversion on South Georgia achieved surprise, and provided a pretext for the 02 April invasion of East Falkland Island and the capture of Stanley.

Additional Argentinean reinforcements arrived steadily, and eventually there were over 4000 Argentinean troops were on the islands. The outnumbered British force observed the troops until 03 April, when the Royal Marines on South Georgia surrendered after the fall of Stanley. The reaction of the British was not as the Argentines expected. The British viewed the invasion as a direct slap in the face. International reaction to Argentina's deployment of troops was quick to follow. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 502 on April 3, 1982, which deplored the invasion by Argentina, requested the cessation of hostilities, and demanded the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands. Resolution 502 was soon invoked by the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) in their calls for an end to the war. On April 6 Britain imposed a commercial embargo on all Argentine imports, which was seconded by the EEC and followed by Norway, Australia, and the Commonwealth of Nations countries, including Canada and the English-speaking nations of the Caribbean. The Argentine position was defended by a number of Latin American countries; Brazil declared itself neutral.

On 12 April, Britain declared a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone around the islands, with the intent of weakening Argentinean supply and reinforcement efforts. Three British nuclear attack submarines enforced it until the arrival of the surface task force three weeks later. As the submarines continued interim blockade operations, 65 British ships were enroute the Falklands by the end of April: 20 warships, 8 amphibious ships, and 40 logistics ships from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy. The British task force carried 15,000 men, including a landing force of about 7000 Royal Marines and soldiers. The logistics ships carried provisions for about three months of combat. Finally, on 25 April, a small British surface action group of two destroyers, six helicopters, and 230 men overwhelmed the 156-man Argentinean garrison on South Georgia. Argentina's refusal to comply with a United States peace initiative prompted United States economic sanctions and the end of its officially neutral stance. On April 30 the United States declared a suspension of deliveries of all military hardware in the pipeline to Argentina and the withdrawal of further financial credits and guarantees.

The main Royal Navy task force arrived east of the Falklands on 01 May. Its plan was to establish naval and air supremacy by luring Argentinean warships and aircraft out from the mainland and destroying them, followed by an amphibious landing at Stanley. Two British attack submarines were positioned north of the Falklands to screen British ships against the main Argentinean naval task force and the aircraft carrier Veinticinco De Mayo, which had been operating in the area since 20 April. A third submarine was stationed south of the Falklands to monitor the Exocet-equipped Argentinean cruiser Belgrano and two accompanying destroyers. The British submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed and sunk Belgrano, which lost 368 of 1042 crewmen. The Argentinean task force to the north returned to base, where it remained until the end of the war; De Mayo disembarked it's A-4's, which operated from bases ashore for the rest of the war. Air attacks from mainland bases against British ships were frequent throughout the war.

Despite high-tech shipboard AAW defenses and the partially successful use of Sea Harriers in an air-to-air fleet defense role, the British Navy always remained on the defensive against Argentinean airpower. Argentinean attack aircraft hit approximately 75 percent of British surface ships with bombs, only three British warships (one destroyer and two frigates) and two landing ships were sunk or severely damaged by bombs. The only other British ships sunk, one destroyer and one supply ship, were hit by Exocet missiles. The British Navy managed to destroy over half of Argentina's 134 combat aircraft during the war, using a combination of electronic warfare, Harriers, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery. The OAS held an emergency meeting from May 27 to 29 to deliberate on the Falkiand/Malvinas crisis, and a resolution was passed that invoked the principle of inter-American solidarity and called for a peaceful settlement. The OAS asked the United States to withdraw its support for Britain and lift its economic sanctions against Argentina. The war concluded with Argentina's surrender on 14 June 1982, after a three-week British amphibious and ground operation on East Falkland Island.

Three groups of Argentine troops under General Mario Benjamin Menï¿½ndez formally surrended to the British. For more than two months the propaganda machine in Argentina had worked feverishly. On June 15, however, Galtieri acknowledged the military defeat. It was not only the war that had been lost, but the military's professional competence was also brought into question, as well as its capacity to provide political leadership for Argentina. The war dealt a fatal blow to Galtieri's political aspirations and prompted the president's resignation on June 17. The discussions between the military government and the political parties broke down as soon as news of the military defeat reached Buenos Aires. The frustration of an entire nation could be heard in the demands for the return of civilian rule that was embodied in the Multipartidaria's call for elections before the end of 1983. Pertinent to the lack of cohesion among the Argentines was the great social distance between officers, NCOs, and conscripts. The latter served one year or less in the army.

When the war began, "the majority of the class of 1962 (year of birth) had already been sent home, while the class of 1963 had not . . . even basic instruction." Further, most of the untrained conscripts came from the tropical northern provinces and were simply not prepared to confront "dreadful conditions and a well-trained and well-equipped enemy." The Royal Marines routinely trained in the boggy marshes of Dartmouth Moors and had completed annual maneuvers in arctic conditions in Norway in April 1982. The paras regularly trained on the cold plains of Salisbury and had just returned from duty in Northern Ireland. One of the paras said: "I started out in a class with eighty-three men and only eleven of us finished. You know that you're the best in the world when you finish that training." Another said: "I could never figure out why the hell we were training in the muck and goo at Salisbury when we were going to fight in Northern Europe. Then when we were in the Falklands, I said to my mates, `Bloody Hell! This place is just like home.'" Tradition was a powerful force in bonding.

A Royal Marine commander told his 45 Commando, "We marched from Normandy to Berlin. We can bloody well march eighty miles to Stanley." A soldier told our author: "I'll be damned if I'm going to let down those chaps who fought at Arnhem." These are the words of proud, hard, and confident professionals. The contrast was stark, and both sides knew it. An Argentine soldier said: "If I had had real officers who were real men, maybe I would have stayed. No way! I'm Argentine and we aren't made for killing people. We like to eat, go to the movies, drink, and dance. We aren't like the English. They are professional soldiers--war is their business." The Falklands or Malvinas War raises a series of points regarding the causes of conflicts between nations. It also challenges some of the assumptions about conflict that have become axiomatic among political professionals. The first axiomatic assumption challenged by the Malvinas/Falklands War is the notion that "weaker" states will normally not assault "stronger," especially nuclear, states. The second challenged assumption is that leaders seek war to distract their citizens from domestic difficulties.

The Malvinas/Falklands War also points out the dangerous potential for miscalculating an opponent's interests, the danger of misperceiving the character of a head of state, and the importance of cultural and historical perspectives. Who would have thought that Argentina, an isolated nation, would go to war with its largest customer for agricultural exports, Great Britain? Who would have thought that this country, whose history included no real wars since the mid-nineteenth century, would challenge a nuclear-equipped nation? Who would have thought that Great Britain, a member of the UN Security Council and NATO, would fight over a desolate pile of rocks populated by a few sheepherders in the South Atlantic Ocean? Who would have thought that Great Britain would have gone to war to preserve remnants of its empire 37 years after World War II? Serious economic problems, defeat by the UK in 1982 after an unsuccessful Argentine attempt to forcibly take control of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, public revulsion in the face of severe human rights abuses, and mounting charges of corruption combined to discredit and discourage the military regime. This prompted a period of gradual transition and led the country toward democratic rule.

Acting under public pressure, the junta lifted bans on political parties and restored other basic political liberties. Argentina experienced a generally successful and peaceful return to democracy. Argentina has restored diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. In September 1995, Argentina and the UK signed an agreement to promote oil and gas exploration in the Southwest Atlantic, defusing a potentially difficult issue and opening the way to further cooperation between the two nations. In 1998, President Menem visited the UK in the first official visit by an Argentine President since the 1960's. References "A Chronology of the Major Events Relating to the Malvinas/Falkland Islands from their Discovery to the Argentine Invasion 2 April 1982," Englebrecht, Col Joseph A., Jr., 1995, pp. 1 "Falklands/Malvinas (A): Breakdown of Negotiations," and Appendix B, "Early History and Legal Issues," Lippincott, Don (revised by Gregory F. Treverton), 1986, pp. 1- 18 and 20- 23.

The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons The Secretary of State for Defence, December 1982, pp. 5- 46. Tilford, Earl H., Jr., "Air Power Lessons," Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States, 1984, pp. 37- 50. Clausewitz and Seapower: Lessons of the Falkland Islands War Edward B. Zellem; Albert L. St Clair (Faculty Advisor) Air Command and Staff College 1999

Question: The Argentinean invasion of which island in 1982 started the 'Falklands War'?
Answer: SOUTH GEORGIA