Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport - Mar 27, 1977 - HISTORY.com Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport Share this: Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport Author Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport URL Publisher A+E Networks On this day in 1977, two 747 jumbo jets crash into each other on the runway at an airport in the Canary Islands, killing 582 passengers and crew members. Both Boeing 747s were charter jets that were not supposed to be at the Los Rodeos Airport on Santa Cruz de Tenerife that day. Both had been scheduled to be at the Las Palmas Airport, where a group of militants had set off a small bomb at the airport’s flower shop earlier that day. Thus, a Pan Am charter carrying passengers from Los Angeles and New York to a Mediterranean cruise and a KLM charter with Dutch tourists were both diverted to Santa Cruz on March 27. The Los Rodeos airport is known for its sudden fog problems and was not a favorite location for pilots. At 4:40 p.m.

on a typically foggy afternoon, the KLM jet was cleared to taxi to the end of the single main runway. The Pan Am jet followed behind it and was to wait in side space while the KLM jet turned around to begin takeoff. However, in the fog, the Pan Am pilot was unable to keep the KLM jet in sight and did not move into the proper position. The Dutch crew of the KLM jet, apparently unable to understand the accented English spoken by the flight controllers, began to take off down the runway before the Pan Am jet was able to move to the side space. At the last minute, the Pan Am pilot saw the other 747 coming straight at his own jet and screamed What’s he doing? He’ll kill us all! while attempting to swerve into a grassy field. It was too late. The KLM 747 slammed into the side of the Pan Am jet and both planes erupted into a huge fireball. The only survivors on either plane were those in the very front of the Pan Am 747. Survivor Lynda Daniel later said of the disaster, It exploded from the back. Most of the people in the first six rows made it.

More on This Topic BBC ON THIS DAY | 27 | 1977: Hundreds dead in Tenerife plane crash About This Site | Text Only 1977: Hundreds dead in Tenerife plane crash At least 560 people have died after two jumbo jets collided on a runway in the holiday destination of Tenerife. It is thought to be the world's worst disaster involving aircraft on the ground. A massive explosion followed by a ball of fire erupted at Los Rodeos airport, Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, in dense fog as both airliners were taxiing for take-off at 1800 local time. The sound of the explosion was heard across the island. Early reports suggest a Boeing 747, belonging to Dutch national airline KLM, and a Pan American 747 travelling from Los Angeles to Las Palmas were involved in the accident. No-one survived from the Dutch airliner which was carrying 249 passengers including crew, and was travelling from Schipol airport, Amsterdam.

The Pan-Am plane was a charter flight carrying 16 crew and 378 passengers and there were said to be about 60 survivors, the majority of whom were injured. Rescue efforts Eyewitnesses said the airport is now covered in dense black smoke following the explosions and emergency services are struggling to cope with the enormous numbers of casualties. Rescue workers have been plunging into the burning wreckage to pull out survivors. The army is expected to move in to help the rescue operation. Neither airline was originally due to be at the airport but both were diverted from the much bigger Las Palmas on nearby Gran Canaria island after a terrorist bomb blast near the departure lounge. Experts say it is too early to suggest the cause of the crash but many believe it was in part due to the extra number of flights and pressure on resources at the small airport following several diversions from Las Palmas. It will once again place security at Spanish airports under the spotlight, hard pressed by package tour flights. A crash of such magnitude before take-off has horrified industry insiders. Previously the worst accident in aviation history was a Turkish airlines crash near Paris with the loss of 346 lives.

Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands Crash of the Century - YouTube Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands Crash of the Century Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Jul 20, 2012 ★★★★★ Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full On March 27th 1977, on the runway at a Canary Islands airport, two 747 jumbo jets crashed into each other, killing 583 passengers and crew members. The crash still stands as the worst in aviation history. The airport was the Los Rodeos Airport on Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

The Boeing 747s were both charter jets that were not scheduled to be at their that day. Both had been diverted from the Las Palmas Airport, after a group of militants had set off a small bomb at the airport's flower shop earlier that day. The first plane was a Pan Am charter carrying passengers from Los Angeles and New York to a Mediterranean cruise. The second was a KLM charter with Dutch tourists. Both were diverted to Santa Cruz that fateful day. The Los Rodeos airport is infamous for its sudden fog problems and was not a favourite location for pilots. At 4:40 p.m. on a typically foggy afternoon, the KLM jet was cleared to taxi to the end of the single main runway. The Pan Am jet followed behind it and was to wait in side space while the KLM jet turned around to begin takeoff. However, in the fog, the Pan Am pilot was unable to keep the KLM jet in sight and did not move into the proper position. The Dutch crew of the KLM jet, possibly unable to understand the accented English spoken by the flight controllers, began to take off down the runway before the Pan Am jet was able to move to the side space.

At the last minute, the Pan Am pilot saw the other 747 coming straight at his own jet and screamed "What's he doing? He'll kill us all!" He attempted to swerve into a grassy field, but it was too late. The KLM 747 slammed into the side of the Pan Am jet and both planes erupted into a huge fireball. The only survivors on either plane were those in the very front of the Pan Am 747. Survivor Lynda Daniel later said of the disaster, It exploded from the back. Most of the people in the first six rows made it. The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Captain Van Zanten (KLM) took off without takeoff clearance. The investigators suggested the reason for his mistake might have been a desire to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with KLM's duty-time regulations, and before the weather deteriorated further. Other major factors contributing to the accident were: •The sudden fog greatly limited visibility. The control tower and the crews of both planes were unable to see one another. •Simultaneous radio transmissions, with the result that neither message could be heard.

The following factors were considered contributing but not critical: •Use of ambiguous non-standard phrases by the KLM co-pilot ("We're at take off") and the Tenerife control tower ("OK"). •The Pan Am aircraft had not exited the runway at C-3. •The airport was (due to rerouting from the bomb threat) forced to accommodate a great number of large aircraft, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways. Category March 27 1977 Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands | China Daily Mail March 27 1977 Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands Filed Under Air Disasters , Aviation , Aviation History , Canary Islands , History , Plane Crashes On March 27th 1977, on the runway at a Canary Islands airport, two 747 jumbo jets crashed into each other, killing 583 passengers and crew members. The crash still stands as the worst in aviation history. The airport was the Los Rodeos Airport on Santa Cruz de Tenerife. The Boeing 747s were both charter jets that were not scheduled to be at their that day.

Both had been diverted from the Las Palmas Airport, after a group of militants had set off a small bomb at the airport’s flower shop earlier that day. The first plane was a Pan Am charter carrying passengers from Los Angeles and New York to a Mediterranean cruise. The second was a KLM charter with Dutch tourists. Both were diverted to Santa Cruz that fateful day. The Los Rodeos airport is infamous for its sudden fog problems and was not a favourite location for pilots. At 4:40 p.m. on a typically foggy afternoon, the KLM jet was cleared to taxi to the end of the single main runway. The Pan Am jet followed behind it and was to wait in side space while the KLM jet turned around to begin takeoff. However, in the fog, the Pan Am pilot was unable to keep the KLM jet in sight and did not move into the proper position. The Dutch crew of the KLM jet, possibly unable to understand the accented English spoken by the flight controllers, began to take off down the runway before the Pan Am jet was able to move to the side space.

At the last minute, the Pan Am pilot saw the other 747 coming straight at his own jet and screamed “What’s he doing? He’ll kill us all!” He attempted to swerve into a grassy field, but it was too late. The KLM 747 slammed into the side of the Pan Am jet and both planes erupted into a huge fireball. The only survivors on either plane were those in the very front of the Pan Am 747. Survivor Lynda Daniel later said of the disaster, It exploded from the back. Most of the people in the first six rows made it. The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Captain Van Zanten (KLM) took off without takeoff clearance. The investigators suggested the reason for his mistake might have been a desire to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with KLM’s duty-time regulations, and before the weather deteriorated further. Other major factors contributing to the accident were: The sudden fog greatly limited visibility. The control tower and the crews of both planes were unable to see one another. Simultaneous radio transmissions, with the result that neither message could be heard.

The following factors were considered contributing but not critical: Use of ambiguous non-standard phrases by the KLM co-pilot (“We’re at take off”) and the Tenerife control tower (“OK”). The Pan Am aircraft had not exited the runway at C-3. The airport was (due to rerouting from the bomb threat) forced to accommodate a great number of large aircraft, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways. Share this: Deadliest Plane Crash In History - Business Insider print A landing gear from one of the Boeing 747s AP Editor's Note: The following excerpt is from " Cockpit Confidential ," by Patrick Smith. March 27, 2014 marks the 37th anniversary of the deadliest accident in aviation history. On this day in 1977, a pair of fully loaded Boeing 747s collided on the runway of Los Rodeos Airport on the island of Tenerife. The collision resulted in the deaths of 583 of the 644 passengers on board the two jumbo jets.

Nearly 40 years later, the Tenerife Air Disaster remains a watershed moment that transformed how the aviation industry views safety not just in the air, but on the ground as well. The book is available on Amazon and more information can be found on the " Cockpit Confidential " website. Most people have never heard of Tenerife, a pan — shaped speck in the Atlantic. It’s one of the Canary Islands, a volcanic chain governed by the Spanish, clustered a few hundred miles off the coast of Morocco. The big town on Tenerife is Santa Cruz, and its airport, beneath a set of cascading hillsides, is called Los Rodeos. There, on March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747s — one belonging to KLM, the other to Pan Am — collided on a foggy runway. Five hundred and eighty--three people were killed in what remains the biggest air disaster in history. The magnitude of the accident speaks for itself, but what makes it particularly unforgettable is the startling set of ironies and coincidences that preceded it.

Indeed, most airplane crashes result not from a single error or failure, but from a chain of improbable errors and failures, together with a stroke or two of really bad luck. Never was this illustrated more calamitously— almost to the point of absurdity— than on that Sunday afternoon almost forty years ago. In 1977, in only its eighth year of service, the Boeing 747 was already the biggest, the most influential, and possibly the most glamorous commercial jetliner ever built. For just those reasons, it was hard not to imagine what a story it would be — and how much carnage might result — should two of these behemoths ever hit each other. Really, though, what were the chances of that — a Hollywood script if ever there was one. PH-BUF, The KLM 747 involved in the Tenerife Disaster Wikimedia Commons Imagine we’re there: Both of the 747s at Tenerife are charters. Pan Am has come from Los Angeles, after a stopover in New York, KLM from its home base in Amsterdam. As it happens, neither plane is supposed to be on Tenerife.

They were scheduled to land at Las Palmas, on the nearby island of Grand Canary, where many of the passengers were on their way to meet cruise ships. After a bomb planted by Canary Island separatists exploded in the Las Palmas airport flower shop, they diverted to Los Rodeos, along with several other flights, arriving around 2:00 p.m. The Pan Am aircraft, registered N736PA, is no stranger to notoriety. In January 1970, this very same plane completed the inaugural commercial voyage of a 747, between New York’s Kennedy airport a nd London--Heathrow. Somewhere on its nose is the dent from a champagne bottle. White with a blue window stripe, it wears the name Clipper Victor along the forward fuselage. The KLM 747, also blue and white, is named the Rhine . N750PA, A sister ship of the Clipper Victor Wikimedia Commons Let’s not forget the airlines themselves: Pan Am, the most storied franchise in the history of aviation, requires little introduction.

KLM, for its part, is the oldest continuously operating airline in the world, founded in 1919 and highly regarded for its safety and punctuality. The KLM captain, Jacob Van Zanten, whose errant takeoff roll will soon kill nearly six hundred people, including himself, is the airline’s top 747 instructor pilot and a KLM celebrity. If passengers recognize him, it’s because his confident, square-jawed visage stares out from KLM’s magazine ads. Later, when KLM executives first get word of the crash, they will attempt to contact Van Zanten in hopes of sending him to Tenerife to aid the investigation team. The normally lazy Los Rodeos is packed with diverted flights. The Rhine and Clipper Victor sit adjacent to each other at the southeast corner of the apron, their wingtips almost touching. Finally at around four o’clock, Las Palmas begins accepting traffic again. Pan Am is quickly ready for departure, but the lack of room and the angle at which the jets face each other requires that KLM begin to taxi first.

The weather is fine until just before the accident, and if not for KLM requesting extra fuel at the last minute, both would be on their way sooner. During the delay, a heavy blanket of fog swoops down from the hills and envelopes the airport. That fuel also means extra weight, affecting how quickly the 747 is able to become airborne. For reasons you’ll see in a moment, that will be critical. Because of the tarmac congestion, the normal route to runway 30 is blocked. Departing planes will need to taxi down on the runway itself. Reaching the end, they’ll make a 180-degree turn before taking off in the opposite direction. This procedure, rare at commercial airports, is called a “back-taxi.” At Tenerife in ’77, it will put two 747s on the same runway at the same time, invisible not only to each other, but also to the control tower. The airport has no ground tracking radar. Los Rodeos, now known as Tenerife North Airport, in 2006 Wikimedia Commons KLM taxis ahead and onto the runway, with the Pan Am Clipper ambling several hundred yards behind.

Captain Van Zanten will steer to the end, turn around, then hold in position until authorized for takeoff. Pan Am’s instructions are to turn clear along a left-side taxiway to allow the other plane’s departure. Once safely off the runway, Pan Am will report so to the tower. Unable to differentiate the taxiways in the low visibility, the Pan Am pilots miss their assigned turnoff. Continuing to the next one is no big problem, but now they’re on the runway for several additional seconds. At the same time, having wheeled into position at the end, Van Zanten comes to a stop. His first officer, Klaas Meurs, takes the radio and receives the ATC route clearance. This is not a takeoff clearance, but rather a procedure outlining turns, altitudes, and frequencies for use once airborne. Normally it is received well prior to an aircraft taking the runway, but the pilots have been too busy with checklists and taxi instructions until now. They are tired, annoyed, and anxious to get going. The irritability in the pilots’ voices, Van Zanten’s in particular, has been duly noted by the control tower and other pilots.

There are still a couple dominos yet to fall, but now the final act is in motion—literally. Because the route clearance comes where and when it does, it is mistaken for a takeoff clearance as well. First officer Meurs, sitting to Van Zanten’s right, acknowledges the altitudes, headings, and fixes, then finishes off with an unusual, somewhat hesitant phrase, backdropped by the sound of accelerating engines. “We are now, uh, at takeoff.” Van Zanten releases the brakes. “ We gaan ,” he is heard saying on the cockpit voice recorder. “Let’s go.” And with that, his mammoth machine begins barreling down the fog--shrouded runway, completely without permission. “At takeoff” is not standard phraseology among pilots. But it’s explicit enough to grab the attention of the Pan Am crew and the control tower. It’s hard for either party to believe KLM is actually moving, but both reach for their microphones to make sure. “And we’re still taxiing down the runway,” relays Bob Bragg, the Pan Am first officer. At the same instant, the tower radios a message to KLM. “Okay,” says the controller.

“Stand by for takeoff. I will call you.” There is no reply. This silence is taken as a tacit, if not exactly proper, acknowledgment. Either of these transmissions would be, should be, enough to stop Van Zanten cold in his tracks. He still has time to discontinue the roll. The problem is, because they occur simultaneously, they overlap. Pilots and controllers communicate via two--way VHF radios. The process is similar to speaking over a walkie--talkie: a person activates a microphone, speaks, then releases the button and waits for an acknowledgment. It differs from using a telephone, for example, as only one party can speak at a time, and has no idea what his message actually sounds like over the air. If two or more microphones are clicked at the same instant, the transmissions cancel each other out, delivering a noisy occlusion of static or a high--pitched squeal called a heterodyne. Rarely are heterodynes dangerous. But at Tenerife this is the last straw. Van Zanten hears only the word “okay,” followed by a five--second squeal. He keeps going.

Ten seconds later there is one final exchange, clearly and maddeningly audible on the post--crash tapes. “Report when runway clear,” the tower says to Pan Am. “We’ll report when we’re clear,” acknowledges Bob Bragg. Focused on the takeoff, Van Zanten and his first officer apparently miss this. But the second officer, sitting behind them, does not. Alarmed, with their plane now racing forward at a hundred knots, he leans forward. “Is he not clear?” he asks. “That Pan American?” “Oh, yes,” Van Zanten answers emphatically. In the Pan Am cockpit, nose--to--nose with the still unseen, rapidly approaching interloper, there’s a growing sense that something isn’t right. “Let’s get the fuck out of here,” Captain Victor Grubbs says nervously. A few moments later, the lights of the KLM 747 emerge out of the grayness, dead ahead, 2,000 feet away and closing fast. “There he is!” cries Grubbs, shoving the thrust levers to full power. “Look at him!

Goddamn, that son of a bitch is coming!” He yanks the plane’s steering tiller, turning left as hard as he can, toward the grass at the edge of the runway. “Get off! Get off! Get off!” shouts Bob Bragg. Van Zanten sees them, but it’s too late. Attempting to leapfrog, he pulls back on the elevators, dragging his tail along the pavement for 70 feet in a hail of sparks. He almost makes it, but just as his plane breaks ground, its undercarriage and engines slice into the ceiling of the Victor , instantly demolishing its midsection and setting off a series of explosions. Badly damaged, the Rhine settles back to the runway, skids hard on its belly for another thousand feet, and is consumed by fire before a single one of its 248 occupants can escape. Remarkably, of 396 passengers and crew aboard the Pan Am jumbo, 61 of them survived, including all five people in the cockpit—-the three--man crew and two off--duty employees riding in the jumpseats.

A reconstruction of the collision AP Over the past few years, I’ve been fortunate enough to meet two of those Pan Am survivors and hear their stories firsthand. I say that nonchalantly, but this is probably the closest I’ve ever come to meeting, for lack of a better term, a hero. Romanticizing the fiery deaths of 583 people is akin to romanticizing war, but there’s a certain mystique to the Tenerife disaster, a gravity so strong that shaking these survivors’ hands produced a feeling akin to that of a little kid meeting his favorite baseball player. These men were there , emerging from the wreckage of what, for some of us, stands as an event of mythic proportions. One of those survivors was Bob Bragg, the Pan Am first officer. I met him in Los Angeles, on the set of a documentary being made for the thirtieth anniversary of the accident. It was Bragg who had uttered, “And we’re still taxiing down the runway”—seven easy words that should have saved the day, but instead were lost forever in the shriek and crackle of a blocked transmission. Just thinking about it gives me the chills.

But there’s nothing dark about Bob Bragg—nothing that, on the surface, feels moored to the nightmare of ’77. He’s one of the most easygoing people you’ll ever meet. Gray-haired, bespectacled, and articulate, he looks and sounds like what he is: a retired airline pilot. God knows how many times he’s recounted the collision to others. He speaks about the accident with a practiced ease, in a voice of modest detachment, as if he’d been a spectator watching from afar. You can read all the transcripts, pore over the findings, watch the documentaries a hundred times over. Not until you sit with Bob Bragg and hear the unedited account, with all of the strange and astounding details that are normally missing, do you get a full sense of what happened. The basic story is well known; it’s the ancillaries that make it moving—and surreal: Bragg describes the initial impact as little more than “a bump and some shaking.” All five men in the cockpit, located at the forward end of the 747’s distinctive upper--deck hump, saw the KLM jet coming and had ducked.

Knowing they’d been hit, Bragg instinctively reached upward in an effort to pull the “fire handles”—a set of four overhead-mounted levers that cut off the supply of fuel, air, electricity, and hydraulics running to and from the engines. His arm groped helplessly. When he looked up, the roof was gone. Turning around, he realized that the entire upper deck had been sheared off at a point just aft of his chair. He could see all the way aft to the tail, 200 feet behind him. The fuselage was shattered and burning. He and Captain Grubbs were alone in their seats, on a small, fully exposed perch 35 feet above the ground. Everything around them had been lifted away like a hat. The second officer and jumpseat stations, their occupants still strapped in, were hanging upside-down through what seconds earlier was the ceiling of the first class cabin. There was no option other than to jump. Bragg stood up and hurled himself over the side. He landed in the grass three stories below, feet-first, and miraculously suffered little more than an injured ankle. Grubbs followed, and he too was mostly unharmed.

The others from the cockpit would unfasten their belts and shimmy down the sidewalls to the main cabin floor before similarly leaping to safety. Mechanics examine an engine from the Pan Am 747 AP Once on the ground, they faced a deafening roar. The plane had been pancaked into the grass, but because the cockpit control lines were severed, the engines were still running at full power. It took several moments before the motors began coming apart. Bragg remembers one of the engines’ huge forward turbofans detaching from its shaft, falling forward onto the ground with a thud. The fuselage was engulfed by fire. A number of passengers, most of them seated in forward portions of the cabin, had made it onto the craft’s left wing, and were standing at the leading edge, about 20 feet off the ground. Bragg ran over, encouraging them to jump. A few minutes later, the plane’s center fuel tank exploded, propelling a plume of flames and smoke a thousand feet into the sky. The airport’s ill-equipped rescue team, meanwhile, was over at the KLM site, the first wreckage they’d come to after learning there’d been an accident.

They hadn’t yet realized that two planes were involved, one of them with survivors. Eventually, authorities opened the airport perimeter gates, urging anybody with a vehicle to drive toward the crash scene to help. Bob Bragg tells the cracked story of standing there in fog, surrounded by stunned and bleeding survivors, watching his plane burn, when suddenly a taxicab pulls up out of nowhere. Wreckage from the crashed 747s AP Bragg returned to work a few months later. He eventually transferred to United when that carrier took over Pan Am’s Pacific routes in the late 1980s, and retired from the company as a 747 captain. He lives in Virginia with his wife, Dorothy. (Captain Grubbs has since passed away, as has second officer George Warns.) During the documentary shoot, I traveled with Bob Bragg and the producers to the aircraft storage yards at Mojave, California, where he was interviewed alongside a mothballed 747, describing that incredible leap from the upper--deck.

A day earlier, using a flight deck mock--up, director Phil Desjardins filmed a reenactment of the Tenerife collision, with a trio of actors sitting in as the KLM crew. To provide the actors with a helpful demo, it was suggested that Bob Bragg and I get inside the mock-up and run through a practice takeoff. Bragg took the captain’s seat, and I took the first officer’s seat. We read through a makeshift checklist and went through the motions of a simulated takeoff. That’s when I looked across, and all of a sudden it hit me: Here’s Bob Bragg, lone surviving pilot of Tenerife, sitting in a cockpit, pretending to be Jacob Van Zanten, whose error made the whole thing happen. Surely Bragg wanted no part of this dreary karma, and I hadn’t the courage to make note of it out loud—assuming it hadn’t already dawned on him. But I could barely keep the astonishment to myself. One more creepy irony in a story so full of them.

The Tenerife Air Disaster Memorial Wikimedia Commons Closing note: On the thirtieth anniversary of the crash, a memorial was dedicated overlooking the Tenerife airport, honoring those who perished there. The sculpture is in the shape of a helix. “A spiral staircase,” the builders describe it. “[…] a symbol of infinity.” Maybe, but I’m disappointed that the more obvious physical symbolism is ignored: early model 747s, including both of those in the crash, were well known for the set of spiral stairs connecting their main and upper decks (see High Art, page 23). In the minds of millions of international travelers, that stairway is something of a civil aviation icon. How evocative and poetically appropriate for the memorial—-even if the designers weren’t thinking that way. ©Sourcebooks 2013 March 27, 1977 : Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport Introduction On this day in 1977, two 747 jumbo jets crash into each other on the runway at an airport in the Canary Islands, killing 582 passengers and crew members.

Both Boeing 747s were charter jets that were not supposed to be at the Los Rodeos Airport on Santa Cruz de Tenerife that day. Both had been scheduled to be at the Las Palmas Airport, where a group of militants had set off a small bomb at the airport’s flower shop earlier that day. Thus, a Pan Am charter carrying passengers from Los Angeles and New York to a Mediterranean cruise and a KLM charter with Dutch tourists were both diverted to Santa Cruz on March 27. The Los Rodeos airport is known for its sudden fog problems and was not a favorite location for pilots. At 4:40 p.m. on a typically foggy afternoon, the KLM jet was cleared to taxi to the end of the single main runway. The Pan Am jet followed behind it and was to wait in side space while the KLM jet turned around to begin takeoff. However, in the fog, the Pan Am pilot was unable to keep the KLM jet in sight and did not move into the proper position.

The Dutch crew of the KLM jet, apparently unable to understand the accented English spoken by the flight controllers, began to take off down the runway before the Pan Am jet was able to move to the side space. At the last minute, the Pan Am pilot saw the other 747 coming straight at his own jet and screamed What’s he doing? He’ll kill us all! while attempting to swerve into a grassy field. It was too late. The KLM 747 slammed into the side of the Pan Am jet and both planes erupted into a huge fireball. The only survivors on either plane were those in the very front of the Pan Am 747. Survivor Lynda Daniel later said of the disaster, It exploded from the back. Most of the people in the first six rows made it.

Article Details: March 27, 1977 : Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport Author March 27, 1977 : Jumbo jets collide at Canary Islands airport URL Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands Crash of the Century | Tune.pk Two Jumbos Collide In Canary Islands Crash of the Century Copy video URL at current time Copy video embed Please login or create a new account to subscribe channels You Can't Leave This Empty. You Can't Leave This Empty. e.g jhon.doe, shondoe Learn More You Can't Leave This Empty. Verification Code Type the text Enter the numbers you hear: By clicking "Create New Account" button on this website, you accept and agree to our Terms & Conditions & Privacy Policy or Skip to Embed Video <iframe width="600" height="350" src="" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen scrolling="no"></iframe> x Report Video Please select the category that most closely reflects your concern about the video, so that we can review it and determine whether it violates our Community Guidelines or isn't appropriate for all viewers. Abusing this feature is also a violation of the Community Guidelines, so don't do it.

Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full Mayday - S03E14 - Crash of the Century Full On March 27th 1977, on the runway at a Canary Islands airport, two 747 jumbo jets crashed into each other, killing 583 passengers and crew members. The crash still stands as the worst in aviation history. The airport was the Los Rodeos Airport on Santa Cruz de Tenerife. The Boeing 747s were both charter jets that were not scheduled to be at their that day. Both had been diverted from the Las Palmas Airport, after a group of militants had set off a small bomb at the airport’s flower shop earlier that day. The first plane was a Pan Am charter carrying passengers from Los Angeles and New York to a Mediterranean cruise. The second was a KLM charter with Dutch tourists. Both were diverted to Santa Cruz that fateful day.

The Los Rodeos airport is infamous for its sudden fog problems and was not a favourite location for pilots. At 4:40 p.m. on a typically foggy afternoon, the KLM jet was cleared to taxi to the end of the single main runway. The Pan Am jet followed behind it and was to wait in side space while the KLM jet turned around to begin takeoff. However, in the fog, the Pan Am pilot was unable to keep the KLM jet in sight and did not move into the proper position. The Dutch crew of the KLM jet, possibly unable to understand the accented English spoken by the flight controllers, began to take off down the runway before the Pan Am jet was able to move to the side space. At the last minute, the Pan Am pilot saw the other 747 coming straight at his own jet and screamed "What’s he doing? He’ll kill us all!" He attempted to swerve into a grassy field, but it was too late. The KLM 747 slammed into the side of the Pan Am jet and both planes erupted into a huge fireball. The only survivors on either plane were those in the very front of the Pan Am 747.

Survivor Lynda Daniel later said of the disaster, It exploded from the back. Most of the people in the first six rows made it. The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Captain Van Zanten (KLM) took off without takeoff clearance. The investigators suggested the reason for his mistake might have been a desire to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with KLM’s duty-time regulations, and before the weather deteriorated further. Other major factors contributing to the accident were: •The sudden fog greatly limited visibility. The control tower and the crews of both planes were unable to see one another. •Simultaneous radio transmissions, with the result that neither message could be heard. The following factors were considered contributing but not critical: •Use of ambiguous non-standard phrases by the KLM co-pilot ("We’re at take off") and the Tenerife control tower ("OK"). •The Pan Am aircraft had not exited the runway at C-3. •The airport was (due to rerouting from the bomb threat) forced to accommodate a great number of large aircraft, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.

Category NOVA - Official Website | The Final Eight Minutes NOVA Posted 10.17.06 NOVA On March 27, 1977, on the island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands, two 747 jumbo jets collided on a fog-shrouded runway, killing 583 people in what is still the deadliest crash in aviation history. Because the actions of both the flight crews of the two aircraft and Los Rodeos Airport's air traffic controllers directly contributed to the disaster, the log of conversations between the two planes and the tower in the minutes leading up to the collision was investigators' key tool for ultimately piecing together the events. Here, read an annotated transcript of the two planes' communications with the tower. By the time either flight crew saw the other plane in the fog, it was too late to avert the disaster, which arose out of a series of miscommunications among both flight crews and the control tower.

Enlarge Photo credit: © WGBH Educational Foundation Cockpit Recordings APP—Air traffic control tower at Los Rodeos Airport PA RT—Pan Am aircraft radio transmission PA 1—Victor Grubbs, Pan Am Captain PA 2—Robert Bragg, Pan Am First Officer PA 3—George Warns, Pan Am Flight Engineer PA 4—Unidentified fourth person in Pan Am cockpit, likely one of two Pan Am employees who boarded in Tenerife and were sitting in the cockpit jumpseats KLM RT—KLM aircraft radio transmission KLM 1—Veldhuyzen (Jacob) van Zanten, KLM Captain KLM 2—Klaas Meurs, KLM First Officer KLM 3—Willem Schreuder, KLM Flight Engineer ?—Unidentified Note: The transcript below comes from the official Spanish accident report (see ) and has been slightly modified for clarity and ease of reading. Paragraphs preceding sections of the transcript, and also explanatory text attached to linked words or phrases, are NOVA annotations. Click on highlighted terms for a glossary. The Final Minutes At 4:58 p.m.

on March 27, 1977, when this transcript begins, the KLM and Pan Am 747s are both in queue to taxi down the runway and turn around for takeoff. The KLM aircraft is ahead of the Pan Am aircraft (see Figure 1 below). Some back-and-forth occurs initially about what Air Traffic Control considers the best way to get the KLM plane into position for takeoff, but ultimately the controllers decide to send it taxiing straight down the runway. This portion of the transcript comes from the KLM cockpit voice recorder. Figure 1 Enlarge Photo credit: © Galaxie Production 1658:14.8 KLM RT: Approach KLM 4805 on the ground in Tenerife. 1658:21.5 APP: KLM—ah—4805, roger. 1658:25.7 KLM RT: We require backtrack on 12 for takeoff Runway 30 . 1658:30.4 APP: Okay, 4805 ... taxi ... to the holding position Runway 30.

Taxi into the runway and—ah—leave runway (third) to your left. 1658:47.4 KLM RT: Roger, sir, (entering) the runway at this time and the first (taxiway) we, we go off the runway again for the beginning of Runway 30. 1658:55.3 APP: Okay, KLM 80—ah—correction, 4805, taxi straight ahead—ah—for the runway and—ah—make—ah—backtrack. 1659:04.5 KLM RT: Roger, make a backtrack. 1659:10.0 KLM RT: KLM 4805 is now on the runway. 1659:15.9 APP: 4805, roger. 1659:28.4 KLM RT: Approach, you want us to turn left at Charlie 1, taxiway Charlie 1 ? 1659:32.2 APP: Negative, negative, taxi straight ahead—ah—up to the end of the runway and make backtrack.

1659:39.9 KLM RT: Okay, sir. With the KLM aircraft now taxiing down Runway 12, Air Traffic Control turns its attention to Pan Am 1736. The controllers instruct the plane to travel down the runway and then exit it using one of the transverse taxiways. This would clear the way for the KLM plane to take off. This portion of the transcript comes from the Pan Am cockpit voice recorder. 1701:57.0 PA RT: Tenerife, the Clipper 1736 . 1702:01.8 APP: Clipper 1736, Tenerife. 1702:03.6 PA RT: Ah—we were instructed to contact you and also to taxi down the runway, is that correct? 1702:08.4 APP: Affirmative, taxi into the runway and—ah—leave the runway third, third to your left, [background conversation in the tower]. 1702:16.4 PA RT: Third to the left, okay. 1702:18.4 PA 3: Third, he said.

PA?: Three. 1702:20.6 APP: [Th]ird one to your left. 1702:21.9 PA 1: I think he said first. 1702:26.4 PA 2: I'll ask him again. 1702:32.2 PA 2: Left turn. 1702:33.1 PA 1: I don't think they have takeoff minimums anywhere right now. 1702:39.2 PA 1: What really happened over there today? 1702:41.6 PA 4: They put a bomb (in) the terminal , sir, right where the check-in counters are. 1702:46.6 PA 1: Well, we asked them if we could hold and—uh—I guess you got the word, we landed here... 1702:49.8 APP: KLM 4805 how many taxiway—ah—did you pass? 1702:55.6 KLM RT: I think we just passed Charlie 4 now.

1702:59.9 APP: Okay ... at the end of the runway make 180 [degree turn] and report—ah—ready—ah—for ATC clearance. [background conversation in tower] 1703:09.3 PA 2: The first one is a 90-degree turn . 1703:11.0 PA 1: Yeah, okay. 1703:12.1 PA 2: Must be the third ... I'll ask him again. 1703:14.2 PA 1: Okay. 1703:16.6 PA 1: We could probably go in, it's ah... 1703:19.1 PA 2: You gotta make a 90-degree turn. 1703:21.6 PA 1: Yeah, uh. 1703:21.6 PA 2: Ninety-degree turn to get around this ... this one down here, it's a 45 .

1703:29.3 PA RT: Would you confirm that you want the Clipper 1736 to turn left at the third intersection? ["third" drawn out and emphasized] 1703:35.1 PA 1: One, two. 1703:36.4 APP: The third one, sir, one, two, three, third, third one. 1703:38.3 PA ?: One two (four). 1703:39.0 PA 1: Good. 1703:39.2 PA RT: Very good, thank you. 1703:40.1 PA 1: That's what we need right, the third one. 1703:42.9 PA 3: Uno, dos, tres. 1703:44.0 PA 1: Uno, dos, tres. 1703:44.9 PA 3: Tres—uh—si. 1703:46.5 PA 1: Right. 1703:47.6 PA 3: We'll make it yet.

1703:47.6 APP: ...er 7136 [sic] report leaving the runway. 1703:49.1 PA 2: Wing flaps? 1703:50.2 PA 1: Ten, indicate 10, leading edge lights are green. 1703:54.1 PA ?: Get that. 1703:55.0 PA RT: Clipper 1736. 1703:56.5 PA 2: Yaw damp and instrument? 1703:58.6 PA 1: Ah—Bob, we'll get a left one... 1703:59.3 PA 2: I got a left. 1704:00.6 PA 1: Did you? 1704:00.9 PA 2: And—ah—need a right. 1704:02.6 PA 1: I'll give you a little... 1704:03.8 PA 2: Put a little aileron in this thing.

1704:05.0 PA 1: Okay, here's a left and I'll give you a right one right here. 1704:09.7 PA 1: Okay, right turn right and left yaw. 1704:11.4 PA 2: Left yaw checks. 1704:12.4 PA 1: Okay, here's the rudders. 1704:13.6 PA 1: Here's two left, center, two right center. 1704:17.8 PA 2: Checks. 1704:19.6 PA 1: Haven't seen any yet! 1704:20.3 PA 2: I haven't either. 1704:21.7 PA 1: They're free, the indicators are checked. 1704:24.6 PA 2: There's one. 1704:25.8 PA 1: There's one. 1704:26.4 PA 1: That's the 90-degree .

1704:28.5 PA ?: Okay. 1704:34.5 PA 2: Weight and balance finals? 1704:37.7: [Sounds similar to stabilizer trim] 1704:37.2 PA 1: We were gonna put that on four and a half. 1704:39.8 PA 3: We got four and a half and we weigh 534. [sound of stabilizer trim] 1704:44.6 PA 2: Four and a half on the right. 1704:46.8 PA 2: Engineer's taxi check. 1704:48.4 PA 3: Taxi check is complete. Figure 2 Enlarge Photo credit: © Galaxie Production 1704:50.5 PA 2: Takeoff and departure briefing? 1704:52.1 PA 1: Okay, it'll be standard. We gonna go straight out there till we get 3,500 feet, then we're gonna make that reversal and go back out to ... 14.

1704:58.2 APP: [KLM] 8705 [sic] and Clipper 1736, for your information, the centerline lighting is out of service. [APP transmission is readable but slightly broken] 1705:05.8 KLM RT: I copied that. 1705:07.7 PA RT: Clipper 1736. 1705:09.6 PA 1: We got centerline markings (only) [could be "don't we"] they count the same thing as ... we need 800 meters if you don't have that centerline ... I read that on the back (of this) just a while ago. 1705:22.0 PA 1: That's two . 1705:23.5 PA 3: Yeah, that's 45 [degrees] there. 1705:25.7 PA 1: Yeah. 1705:26.5 PA 2: That's this one right here. 1705:27.2 PA 1: [Yeah], I know.

1705:28.1 PA 3: Okay. 1705:28.5 PA 3: Next one is almost a 45, huh, yeah. 1705:30.6 PA 1: But it goes... 1705:32.4 PA 1: Yeah, but it goes ... ahead, I think (it's) gonna put us on (the) taxiway. 1705:35.9 PA 3: Yeah, just a little bit, yeah. 1705:39.8 PA ?: Okay, for sure. 1705:40.0 PA 2: Maybe he, maybe he counts these (are) three. 1705:40.0 PA ?: Huh. 1705:44.8 PA ?: I like this. Figure 3 Enlarge Photo credit: © Galaxie Production In the final minute before the collision, key misunderstandings occur among all the parties involved. And in the end, the KLM pilot initiates takeoff, even though Air Traffic Control has not issued the proper clearance.

1705:41.5 KLM 2: Wait a minute, we don't have an ATC clearance. KLM 1: No, I know that. Go ahead, ask. 1705:44.6 KLM RT: Uh, the KLM 4805 is now ready for takeoff and we're waiting for our ATC clearance. 1705:53.4 APP: KLM 8705 [sic] uh you are cleared to the Papa beacon. Climb to and maintain flight level 90 ... right turn after takeoff proceed with heading 040 until intercepting the 325 radial from Las Palmas VOR. 1706:09.6 KLM RT: Ah, roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa beacon flight level 90, right turn out 040 until intercepting the 325, and we're now (at takeoff) . 1706:11.08: [Brakes of KLM 4805 are released.] 1706:12.25 KLM 1: Let's go ...

check thrust. 1706:14.00: [Sound of engines starting to accelerate.] 1706:18.19 APP: Okay. Why Air Traffic Control would say "okay" after KLM has said it is taking off is unknown. Perhaps, the official investigation noted, the controller thought that KLM meant "we're now at takeoff position." But the problem is compounded in the moments immediately following, when both Air Traffic Control and Pan Am RT speak simultaneously. This causes a shrill noise in the KLM cockpit that lasts for almost four seconds and makes the following three communications hard to hear in the KLM cockpit: 1706:20.08 APP: Stand by for takeoff ... I will call you. PA1: No, uh. PA RT: And we are still taxiing down the runway, the Clipper 1736.

Figure 4 Enlarge Photo credit: © Galaxie Production The following messages are audible in the KLM cockpit, causing the KLM flight engineer, even as the KLM plane has begun rolling down the runway, to question the pilot: 1706:25.47 APP: Ah—Papa Alpha 1736 report runway clear. 1706:25.59 PA RT: Okay, we'll report when we're clear. 1706:31.69 APP: Thank you. 1706:32.43 KLM 3: Is he not clear, then? 1706:34.10 KLM 1: What do you say? 1706:34.15 PA ?: Yup. 1706:34.70 KLM 3: Is he not clear, that Pan American? 1706:35.70 KLM 1: Oh, yes. [emphatically] Perhaps because of the KLM pilot's very senior position, neither the copilot nor flight engineer questions the pilot again, and the impact occurs about 13 seconds later.

Based on the Pan Am cockpit voice recording, investigators determined that the Pan Am flight crew saw the KLM coming at them out of the fog about nine seconds before impact. The Pan Am captain says "There he is ... look at him! Goddamn, that [expletive deleted] is coming!" and his copilot yells "Get off! Get off! Get off!" The Pan Am pilot guns the engines but it's too late. At 1706:47.44, the KLM pilot screams, and the collision occurs. Glossary Runway 12/30 In the transcript, both Runway 12 and Runway 30 are mentioned. Both are actually the same runway; the difference lies in which direction a plane is facing as it travels along the runway. The KLM plane, for example, taxis along Runway 12 (short for 120°, the direction it is then facing), then turns 180° and attempts takeoff in the opposite direction on what for it has then become Runway 30 (short for 300°). 1658:14.8 The transcript uses standard aviation notation to represent time.

1658:14.8 signifies 4:58 p.m. and 14.8 seconds. KLM 4805 This aircraft is a Boeing 747 carrying 234 passengers and 14 crew. It is a chartered flight bound from Amsterdam to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. Like the other airplane involved in the crash, it is diverted to Tenerife's airport when the Las Palmas airport suddenly closes. All those onboard this plane when it crashes die. (One passenger, a tour guide, got off the plane in Tenerife.) backtrack Backtracking means using the same runway for both taxiing and takeoff, i.e., taxiing down it in one direction then turning around and taking off in the opposite direction. 12 for takeoff Runway 30 On This Day: 583 Killed as 747s Collide on Tenerife Runway Associated Press The remains of the KLM 747 at Los Rodeos Airport, Santa Cruz de Tenrife, March 27, 1977.

On This Day: 583 Killed as 747s Collide on Tenerife Runway March 27, 2011 06:00 AM by findingDulcinea Staff On March 27, 1977, two 747 airliners collided on a runway in the Canary Island of Tenerife, killing 583 people, more than any plane crash in history. Deadly Plane Crash Occurs on Tenerife Pan Am Flight 1736 from Los Angeles via New York and KLM Flight 4805 from Amsterdam had been scheduled to land at Las Palmas, the capital of the Canary Islands, on the afternoon of March 27, 1977. However, Canary independence group Fuerzas Armadas Guanches set off a bomb at the Los Palmas airport, forcing incoming flights to land at the much smaller Los Rodeos Airport in Tenerife , the largest island of the Canaries. The two 747s waited at Los Rodeos along with several other large planes until Las Palmas was reopened.

The airport’s taxiways were overcrowded, forcing airporrt officials to use the lone runway as both a runway and a taxiway . After several hours, Los Palmas was reopened, and the Pan Am and KLM planes prepared to take off. KLM 4805 went first, taxiing up the runway and turning around to take off. Pan Am 1736, meanwhile, was instructed to taxi halfway down the runway and park at a taxiway; however, pilot Victor Grubbs missed the intended taxiway and continued down the runway toward the next one. Due to a misunderstanding with flight control, KLM pilot Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten decided to takeoff before receiving proper clearance . In a heavy fog, he was unable to see that Pan Am 1736 was still turning left into the taxiway. Sources in this Story Worlds Worst Airline Accident - Tenerife Runway Crash - Pan Am and KLM Boeing 747s - YouTube Worlds Worst Airline Accident - Tenerife Runway Crash - Pan Am and KLM Boeing 747s Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video?

Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Uploaded on Feb 9, 2012 - The worst crash in aviation history occurred on March 27, 1977. Two Boeing 747 passenger airliners collided on the runway of Tenerife Airport on the Spanish island of Tenerife one of the Canary Islands. The crash claimed a total of 583 fatalities. The aircraft involved, KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736, were, along with many other aircraft, diverted to Tenerife from Gran Canaria Airport after a bomb exploded there. The threat of a second bomb forced the authorities to close the airport while a search was conducted, resulting in many airplanes being diverted to the smaller Tenerife airport where air traffic controllers were forced to park many of the airplanes on the taxiway, thereby blocking it. Further complicating the situation, while authorities waited to reopen Gran Canaria, a dense fog developed at Tenerife, greatly reducing visibility.

When Gran Canaria reopened, the parked aircraft blocking the taxiway at Tenerife required both of the subject 747s to taxi on the only runway in order to get in position for takeoff. Due to the fog, neither aircraft could see the other, nor could the controller in the tower see the runway or the two 747s on it. As the airport did not have ground radar, the only means for the controller to identify the location of each airplane was via voice reports over the radio. As a result of several misunderstandings in the ensuing communication, the KLM flight attempted to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The resulting collision destroyed both aircraft, killing all 248 aboard the KLM flight and 335 of 396 aboard the Pan Am flight. 61 people aboard the Pan Am flight, including the pilots and flight engineer, survived the disaster. The accident investigation would reveal that the primary cause of the accident was the captain of the KLM flight taking off without clearance from Air Traffic Control.

The investigation would however specify that the captain did not intentionally take off without clearance; rather he fully believed he had clearance to take off due to misunderstandings between his flight crew and ATC. Dutch investigators would place a greater emphasis on this than their American and Spanish counterparts, but ultimately KLM would admit their crew was responsible for the accident, and the airline financially compensated the victims. Category

Question: In which year did two jumbo jets collide at Tenerife airport, killing 583 people?
Answer: 1977