What does epistemology mean? Definitions for epistemologyɪˌpɪs təˈmɒl ə dʒi This page provides all possible meanings and translations of the word epistemology Princeton's WordNet(0.00 / 0 votes)Rate this definition: epistemology(noun) the philosophical theory of knowledge Wiktionary(0.00 / 0 votes)Rate this definition: epistemology(Noun) The branch of philosophy dealing with the study of knowledge; theory of knowledge, asking such questions as "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?". Some thinkers take the view that, beginning with the work of Descartes, epistemology began to replace metaphysics as the most important area of philosophy. epistemology(Noun) A particular theory of knowledge. In his epistemology, Plato maintains that our knowledge of universal concepts is a kind of recollection. Origin: From ἐπιστήμη, from ἐπίσταμαι + -λογία, from λέγω.

The term was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864). Webster Dictionary(0.00 / 0 votes)Rate this definition: Epistemology(noun) the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge Origin: [Gr. knowledge + -logy.] Freebase(0.00 / 0 votes)Rate this definition: Epistemology Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge and is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which any given subject or entity can be known. Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification. The term "epistemology" was introduced by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary(0.00 / 0 votes)Rate this definition: Epistemology ep-is-tē-mol′oj-i, n. the theory of knowledge.—adj. Epistemolog′ical. [Gr.

epistēmē, knowledge, logia, discourse.] Numerology Vocabulary Archives - K.(-em-).K K.(-em-).K Epistemology Epistemology is the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity. Epistemology is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of… Read more › Social justice warrior Define: SJW “Social justice warrior” (commonly abbreviated SJW) is a pejorative term for an individual promoting socially progressive views, including feminism, civil rights, multiculturalism, and identity politics.

The accusation of being an SJW carries implications of pursuing personal validation rather… Read more › About: Epistemology About: Epistemology An Entity of Type : Thing , from Named Graph : , within Data Space : dbpedia.org Epistemology (/ᵻˌpɪstᵻˈmɒlədʒi/; from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge, understanding", and λόγος, logos, meaning "word") is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge; it is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". Put concisely, it is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification.

The term was probably first introduced in Ferrier's Inst Property abstract نظرية المعرفة هي فرع من فروع الفلسفة تهتم بطبيعة ومجال المعرفة، أو نظرية المعرفة العلمية وتعنى البحث فى إمكان المعرفة ومصادرها وطبيعتها. فالبحث فى إمكان المعرفة يتضمن النظر فى إمكان الوجود أو العجز عن معرفته، وفيما إذا كان فى وسع الإنسان عن طريق العلوم المختلفة أن يدرك الحقائق اليقينية وأن يطمئن إلى صدق إدراكه وصحة معلوماته أم أن قدرته على معرفة الأشياء مثار للشك وعدم اليقين. والبحث فى مصادر المعرفة يتعرض للنظر فى منابعها وأدواتها ومناهج البحث فيها المنهجية ومدى مقدرة هذه المناهج على ضمان سلامة التحصيل المعرفي.

وهي تحاول الإجابة عن الأسئلة التالية: ما هي المعرفة؟ كيف يمكن امتلاك المعرفة؟ وما هو مدى المعرفة بموضوع ما؟ يركز البحث والنقاش في هذا المجال على تحليل طبيعة المعرفة ومدى إرتباطها بمفاهيم الحقيقة والإيمان والتبربر. (ar) Epistemology (/ᵻˌpɪstᵻˈmɒlədʒi/; from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge, understanding", and λόγος, logos, meaning "word") is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge; it is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". Put concisely, it is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired.

Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification. The term was probably first introduced in Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being (1854), p. 46. (en) L'épistémologie (du grec ancien ἐπιστήμη / epistếmê « connaissance vraie, science » et λόγος/lógos « discours ») peut désigner deux concepts : L'épistémologie est l'étude des sciences et des activités scientifiques, mais ce n'est pas une science elle-même. Parmi tous les thèmes qu'elle a étudiés, celui qui a traversé toute l'histoire de la discipline est relatif à la question de l'unité de la science.

Confronté aux avancées prodigieuses des sciences et des technologies la permettant, le XXIe siècle s'interroge plutôt sur l'unité des sciences autour de 4 piliers épistémologiques : L'épistémologie est bien placée pour distinguer, à chaque époque, ce qui appartient à la science et ce qui relève de la spéculation (page 123). Elle cherche à répondre aux questions relatives à la nature de l'activité scientifique : La valeur ajoutée de l'épistémologie ? : c'est ce que l'on sait de plus quand on a réfléchi à la valeur de l'intégration d'une nouvelle connaissance (apports + reliance). (fr) Die Erkenntnistheorie (auch Epistemologie oder Gnoseologie) ist ein Hauptgebiet der Philosophie, das die Fragen nach den Voraussetzungen für Erkenntnis, dem Zustandekommen von Wissen und anderen Formen von Überzeugungen umfasst.

Dabei wird auch untersucht, was Gewissheit und Rechtfertigung ausmacht und welche Art von Zweifel an welcher Art von Überzeugungen objektiv bestehen kann. (de) L'epistemologia (dal greco επιστήμη episteme, "conoscenza certa" ossia "scienza", e λόγος logos, "discorso") è quella branca della filosofia che si occupa delle condizioni sotto le quali si può avere conoscenza scientifica e dei metodi per raggiungere tale conoscenza. In un'accezione più ristretta l'epistemologia può essere identificata con la filosofia della scienza, la disciplina che si occupa dei fondamenti e dei metodi delle diverse discipline scientifiche. Soprattutto nei paesi di lingua inglese il concetto di epistemologia è invece usato come sinonimo di gnoseologia o teoria della conoscenza, la disciplina che si occupa dello studio della conoscenza in generale.

In realtà il termine, coniato dal filosofo scozzese James Frederick Ferrier, indica specificatamente quella parte della gnoseologia che studia i fondamenti, la validità e i limiti della conoscenza scientifica. (it) La epistemología (del griego ἐπιστήμη epistḗmē, "conocimiento", y λόγος lógos, "estudio") es la rama de la filosofía cuyo objeto de estudio es el conocimiento. La epistemología, como teoría del conocimiento, se ocupa de problemas tales como las circunstancias históricas, psicológicas y sociológicas que llevan a la obtención del conocimiento, y los criterios por los cuales se lo justifica o invalida, así como la definición clara y precisa de los conceptos epistémicos más usuales, tales como verdad, objetividad, realidad o justificación. La epistemología encuentra ya sus primeras formas en la Grecia Antigua, inicialmente en filósofos como Parménides o Platón.

En Grecia, el tipo de conocimiento llamado episteme se oponía al conocimiento denominado doxa. La doxa era el conocimiento vulgar u ordinario del ser humano, no sometido a una rigurosa reflexión crítica. La episteme era el conocimiento reflexivo elaborado con rigor. De ahí que el término "epistemología" se haya utilizado con frecuencia como equivalente a "ciencia o teoría del conocimiento". Diversos autores distinguen la gnoseología, o estudio del conocimiento y del pensamiento en general, de la epistemología o teoría del modo concreto de conocimiento llamado ciencia. Para otros autores, sin embargo, el término "epistemología" ha ido ampliando su significado y lo utilizan como sinónimo de "teoría del conocimiento". Por otro lado, las teorías del conocimiento específicas son también epistemología; por ejemplo, la epistemología científica general, epistemología de las ciencias físicas o de las ciencias psicológicas.

(es) 認識論（にんしきろん、独: Erkenntnistheorie、英: Epistemology、仏: Épistémologie）は哲学の一部門である。存在論ないし形而上学と並ぶ哲学の主要な一部門とされ、知識論（英: theory of knowledge）とも呼ばれる。認識、知識や真理の性質・起源・範囲（人が理解できる限界など）について考察する。日本語の「認識論」は独語の訳語であり、日本ではヒト・人間を考慮した場合を主に扱う。英語と仏語の語源は「知」(希: epistēmē) + 「合理的な言説」(希: logos) 。フランスでは「エピステモロジー」という分野があるが、20世紀にフランスで生まれた科学哲学の一つの方法論ないし理論であり、日本語では「科学認識論」と訳される。 哲学はアリストテレス以来その領域を諸科学によって置き換えられていったが、最後に狭い領域が残り、

それが大きく認識論と存在論に大別され、現在もこの分類が生きている。認識論ではヒトの外の世界を諸々の感覚を通じていかに認識していくかが問題視される。認識という行為は、人間のあらゆる日常的、あるいは知的活動の根源にあり、認識の成立根拠と普遍妥当性を論ずることが存在論である。しかし、哲学における方法論は思弁に尽きるため、仮説を立て実験によって検証するという科学的方法論は長年取り入れられることはなかった。哲学論は基本的に仮設の羅列に過ぎず、単に主観的な主張であった。客観性の保証が全くない内観法が哲学者の主たる武器であった。19世紀末ごろ、認識論の一部が哲学の外に出て心理学という学問を成立させるが、初期にはもっぱら内観や内省を方法論とし、思弁哲学と大差はなかったため、のちにアームチェア心理学と呼ばれた。やがて、思

弁を排し客観的、科学的方法論をもとに実験心理学が登場し、認識の一部は、心理学に取り込まれていった。錯覚現象などがその研究対象になった。実験心理学では、データの統計的処理では科学的であったが、なぜ錯覚が生まれるかというメカニズムの解明では、仮説を立て実験データとの照合を論じてはいたものの、その仮説自体はやはり思弁に過ぎなかった。それを嫌い人間の主観を排し、実験動物を用いた観察可能な行動のみを研究対象とする一派も存在したが、人間の認識は研究対象から外された。このため、認識論の問題は比較的最近まで客観科学化されずに哲学の領域にとどまり続けた。しかし、脳科学の進歩によって急速に、認識論と存在論の2つの世界は大きく浸食されつつある。 (ja) Epistemologia (od stgr.

ἐπιστήμη, episteme – „wiedza; umiejętność, zrozumienie”; λόγος, logos – „nauka; myśl”), teoria poznania lub gnoseologia – dział filozofii, zajmujący się relacjami między poznawaniem, poznaniem a rzeczywistością. Epistemologia rozważa naturę takich pojęć jak: prawda, przekonanie, sąd, spostrzeganie, wiedza czy uzasadnienie. "Co to jest poznanie i czym jest poznawanie? Wyjaśnianie praw dotyczących zarówno poznawania i tego, co jest poznane. Ten dział nauki zwany jest epistemologią".

(pl) Kennistheorie of epistemologie (Grieks: Επιστήμη, epistèmè: kennis en λόγος, logos: leer), ook wel kentheorie, kennisleer, kenleer of criteriologie genaamd, is de tak van de filosofie die de aard, oorsprong, voorwaarden voor en reikwijdte van kennis en het weten onderzoekt. Het vakgebied is vooral vooraanstaand binnen de analytische filosofie en er worden dan ook vaak verbanden gelegd met de inzichten uit de logica. Ook bij verscheidene continentale filosofen komt deze problematiek terug, voornamelijk in de fenomenologie, maar dan vaak gekaderd in een groter geheel. In de wetenschapsfilosofie onderzoekt men specifiek de redelijkheid en de vooruitgang van wetenschappelijke theorieën en kan dan ook gezien worden als een deelgebied van de epistemologie.

De centrale vragen binnen de epistemologie zijn: Verder worden deze vragen gecombineerd met een analyse van gerelateerde termen zoals overtuiging, rechtvaardiging, waarheid en waarneming. Vaak wordt er gezocht naar een zeker fundament of criterium, zij het intern in de mens zelf, zij het extern ergens in de buitenwereld, dat als garantie kan dienen voor zekere kennis. Verdere belangrijke problemen binnen de epistemologie zijn het Gettier-probleem en het probleem van het filosofisch scepticisme. (nl) Epistemologia (do grego ἐπιστήμη [episteme]: conhecimento científico, ciência; λόγος [logos]: discurso, estudo de) é o ramo da filosofia que trata da natureza, etapas e limites do conhecimento humano, especialmente nas relações que se estabelecem entre o sujeito e o objeto do conhecimento. Nesse sentido, pode ser também chamada teoria do conhecimento ou gnosiologia.

Em sentido mais restrito, refere-se às condições sob as quais se pode produzir o conhecimento científico e dos modos para alcançá-lo, avaliando a consistência lógica de teorias. Nesse caso, identifica-se com a filosofia da ciência. Existem limites epistemológicos, que se devem ao facto de a diversidade e a complexidade dos seres humanos e dos ambientes onde estes se desenvolvem tornarem virtualmente impossíveis os procedimentos de controle experimental. Relaciona-se também com a metafísica. A sua problemática compreende a questão da possibilidade do conhecimento - nomeadamente, se é possível ao ser humano retratar o conhecimento total e genuíno-, dos limites do conhecimento (haveria realmente uma distinção entre o mundo cognoscível e o mundo incognoscível?) e da origem do conhecimento (por quais faculdades atingimos o conhecimento? Haverá conhecimento certo e burro em alguma concepção a priori?). (pt) Эпистемоло́гия (от др.-греч.

ἐπιστήμη — «научное знание, наука», «достоверное знание» и λόγος — «слово», «речь»); гносеоло́гия (от др.-греч. γνῶσις — «познание», «знание» и λόγος — «слово», «речь») — теория познания, раздел философии. (ru) comment Die Erkenntnistheorie (auch Epistemologie oder Gnoseologie) ist ein Hauptgebiet der Philosophie, das die Fragen nach den Voraussetzungen für Erkenntnis, dem Zustandekommen von Wissen und anderen Formen von Überzeugungen umfasst. Dabei wird auch untersucht, was Gewissheit und Rechtfertigung ausmacht und welche Art von Zweifel an welcher Art von Überzeugungen objektiv bestehen kann. (de) Epistemologia (od stgr.

ἐπιστήμη, episteme – „wiedza; umiejętność, zrozumienie”; λόγος, logos – „nauka; myśl”), teoria poznania lub gnoseologia – dział filozofii, zajmujący się relacjami między poznawaniem, poznaniem a rzeczywistością. Epistemologia rozważa naturę takich pojęć jak: prawda, przekonanie, sąd, spostrzeganie, wiedza czy uzasadnienie. "Co to jest poznanie i czym jest poznawanie? Wyjaśnianie praw dotyczących zarówno poznawania i tego, co jest poznane. Ten dział nauki zwany jest epistemologią". (pl) Эпистемоло́гия (от др.-греч. ἐπιστήμη — «научное знание, наука», «достоверное знание» и λόγος — «слово», «речь»); гносеоло́гия (от др.-греч.

γνῶσις — «познание», «знание» и λόγος — «слово», «речь») — теория познания, раздел философии. (ru) Epistemology (/ᵻˌpɪstᵻˈmɒlədʒi/; from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge, understanding", and λόγος, logos, meaning "word") is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge; it is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". Put concisely, it is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification.

The term was probably first introduced in Ferrier's Inst (en) نظرية المعرفة هي فرع من فروع الفلسفة تهتم بطبيعة ومجال المعرفة، أو نظرية المعرفة العلمية وتعنى البحث فى إمكان المعرفة ومصادرها وطبيعتها. فالبحث فى إمكان المعرفة يتضمن النظر فى إمكان الوجود أو العجز عن معرفته، وفيما إذا كان فى وسع الإنسان عن طريق العلوم المختلفة أن يدرك الحقائق اليقينية وأن يطمئن إلى صدق إدراكه وصحة معلوماته أم أن قدرته على معرفة الأشياء مثار للشك وعدم اليقين. (ar) L'épistémologie (du grec ancien ἐπιστήμη / epistếmê « connaissance vraie, science » et λόγος/lógos « discours ») peut désigner deux concepts :L'épistémologie est l'étude des sciences et des activités scientifiques, mais ce n'est pas une science elle-même.

Parmi tous les thèmes qu'elle a étudiés, celui qui a traversé toute l'histoire de la discipline est relatif à la question de l'unité de la science. Confronté aux avancées prodigieuses des sciences et des technologies la permettant, le XXIe siècle s'interroge plutôt sur l'unité des sciences autour de 4 piliers épistémologiques : (fr) L'epistemologia (dal greco επιστήμη episteme, "conoscenza certa" ossia "scienza", e λόγος logos, "discorso") è quella branca della filosofia che si occupa delle condizioni sotto le quali si può avere conoscenza scientifica e dei metodi per raggiungere tale conoscenza. In un'accezione più ristretta l'epistemologia può essere identificata con la filosofia della scienza, la disciplina che si occupa dei fondamenti e dei metodi delle diverse discipline scientifiche.

(it) La epistemología (del griego ἐπιστήμη epistḗmē, "conocimiento", y λόγος lógos, "estudio") es la rama de la filosofía cuyo objeto de estudio es el conocimiento.La epistemología, como teoría del conocimiento, se ocupa de problemas tales como las circunstancias históricas, psicológicas y sociológicas que llevan a la obtención del conocimiento, y los criterios por los cuales se lo justifica o invalida, así como la definición clara y precisa de los conceptos epistémicos más usuales, tales como verdad, objetividad, realidad o justificación. La epistemología encuentra ya sus primeras formas en la Grecia Antigua, inicialmente en filósofos como Parménides o Platón.

(es) 認識論（にんしきろん、独: Erkenntnistheorie、英: Epistemology、仏: Épistémologie）は哲学の一部門である。存在論ないし形而上学と並ぶ哲学の主要な一部門とされ、知識論（英: theory of knowledge）とも呼ばれる。認識、知識や真理の性質・起源・範囲（人が理解できる限界など）について考察する。日本語の「認識論」は独語の訳語であり、日本ではヒト・人間を考慮した場合を主に扱う。英語と仏語の語源は「知」(希: epistēmē) + 「合理的な言説」(希: logos) 。フランスでは「エピステモロジー」という分野があるが、20世紀にフランスで生まれた科学哲学の一つの方法論ないし理論であり、日本語では「科学認識論」と訳される。 (ja) Kennistheorie of epistemologie (Grieks: Επιστήμη, epistèmè: k

ennis en λόγος, logos: leer), ook wel kentheorie, kennisleer, kenleer of criteriologie genaamd, is de tak van de filosofie die de aard, oorsprong, voorwaarden voor en reikwijdte van kennis en het weten onderzoekt.

Het vakgebied is vooral vooraanstaand binnen de analytische filosofie en er worden dan ook vaak verbanden gelegd met de inzichten uit de logica. Ook bij verscheidene continentale filosofen komt deze problematiek terug, voornamelijk in de fenomenologie, maar dan vaak gekaderd in een groter geheel. In de wetenschapsfilosofie onderzoekt men specifiek de redelijkheid en de vooruitgang van wetenschappelijke theorieën en kan dan ook gezien worden als een deelgebied van de epistemologie. De centrale vragen binnen de epistemol (nl) Epistemologia (do grego ἐπιστήμη [episteme]: conhecimento científico, ciência; λόγος [logos]: discurso, estudo de) é o ramo da filosofia que trata da natureza, etapas e limites do conhecimento humano, especialmente nas relações que se estabelecem entre o sujeito e o objeto do conhecimento.

Nesse sentido, pode ser também chamada teoria do conhecimento ou gnosiologia. Em sentido mais restrito, refere-se às condições sob as quais se pode produzir o conhecimento científico e dos modos para alcançá-lo, avaliando a consistência lógica de teorias. Nesse caso, identifica-se com a filosofia da ciência. (pt) Philosophy - RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY (Why) | Pearltrees Philosophy > RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY (Why) To tell someone they're wrong, first tell them how they're right — Quartz. For a firm that makes most of its money selling software and cloud services, Microsoft sure wants to look like a hardware company. Alongside new features for Windows 10, Microsoft execs spent more than an hour of the company’s event on Oct. 26 pitching new computers, VR headsets, and accessories focused on artists and designers. When it comes to Microsoft’s bottom line, hardware sales are just a drop in the bucket. And while niche-targeted products like creative-friendly desktops are unlikely to change that, new hardware puts the company right next to Apple in the headlines.

They also paint a clear picture of the message Microsoft wants investors and consumers to hear: Macs are over, and PCs are once again for creative types. In a hardware landscape that has users living in fear of which port Apple will nix next, the strategy just might work. Surface Studio Today’s largest announcement was a 28″ 4K desktop PC called the Surface Studio. Windows 10 Creators Edition. 35 Incredible Tim Berners-Lee Quotes. Sir Tim Berners-Lee is an English computer scientist and is also known as the inventor of the World Wide Web. As the founder and director of the World Wide Consortium (W3C), he oversees the mission, freedom, and openness of the Web. 18 Greatest Robert Hooke Quotes. Robert Hooke was an English philosopher, architect, and polymath. Hooke is known as one of the greatest experimental scientists of the seventeenth century. With a broad scope of interest ranging from physics and astronomy to chemistry and biology, Hooke invested many historic mechanical components and instruments. Here is a short listing to some of the greatest Robert Hooke quotes from his life.

“By the help of microscopes, there is nothing so small, as to escape our inquiry; hence there is a new visible world discovered to the understanding.” Philosophers: The Ancient Romans Epistemology . Epistemology ( i/ᵻˌpɪstᵻˈmɒlədʒi/; from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge", and λόγος, logos, meaning "logical discourse") is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge.[1] Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief. Much of the debate in epistemology centers on four areas: (1) the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to such concepts as truth, belief, and justification,[2][3] (2) various problems of skepticism, (3) the sources and scope of knowledge and justified belief, and (4) the criteria for knowledge and justification. The term 'Epistemology' was first used by Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier in 1854.

[a] However, according to Brett Warren, King James VI of Scotland had previously personified this philosophical concept as the character Epistemon in 1591.[5] Epistemon[edit] Etymology[edit] Knowledge[edit] Belief[edit] Truth[edit] What Is Love? Famous Definitions from 400 Years of Literary History . By Maria Popova “Love has nothing to do with what you are expecting to get — only with what you are expecting to give — which is everything.” After those collections of notable definitions of art, science, and philosophy, what better way to start a new year than with a selection of poetic definitions of a peculiar phenomenon that is at once more amorphous than art, more single-minded than science, and more philosophical than philosophy itself? Carl Sagan on Science and Spirituality. An Antidote to the Age of Anxiety: Alan Watts on Happiness and How to Live with Presence . By Maria Popova Wisdom on overcoming the greatest human frustration from the pioneer of Eastern philosophy in the West.

“How we spend our days is, of course, how we spend our lives,” Annie Dillard wrote in her timeless reflection on presence over productivity — a timely antidote to the central anxiety of our productivity-obsessed age. Indeed, my own New Year’s resolution has been to stop measuring my days by degree of productivity and start experiencing them by degree of presence. But what, exactly, makes that possible? 20-Year-Old Hunter S. Thompson’s Superb Advice on How to Find Your Purpose and Live a Meaningful Life . As a hopeless lover of both letters and famous advice, I was delighted to discover a letter 20-year-old Hunter S. Thompson — gonzo journalism godfather, pundit of media politics, dark philosopher — penned to his friend Hume Logan in 1958. Found in Letters of Note: Correspondence Deserving of a Wider Audience (public library | IndieBound) — the aptly titled, superb collection based on Shaun Usher’s indispensable website of the same name — the letter is an exquisite addition to luminaries’ reflections on the meaning of life, speaking to what it really means to find your purpose.

Cautious that “all advice can only be a product of the man who gives it” — a caveat other literary legends have stressed with varying degrees of irreverence — Thompson begins with a necessary disclaimer about the very notion of advice-giving: Susan Cain on the Power of Introverts, Live-Illustrated by Molly Crabapple. How to Be Alone: An Antidote to One of the Central Anxieties and Greatest Paradoxes of Our Time . The Shortness of Life: Seneca on Busyness and the Art of Living Wide Rather Than Living Long . “How we spend our days,” Annie Dillard memorably wrote in her soul-stretching meditation on the life of presence, “is, of course, how we spend our lives.” And yet most of us spend our days in what Kierkegaard believed to be our greatest source of unhappiness — a refusal to recognize that “busy is a decision” and that presence is infinitely more rewarding than productivity.

I frequently worry that being productive is the surest way to lull ourselves into a trance of passivity and busyness the greatest distraction from living, as we coast through our lives day after day, showing up for our obligations but being absent from our selves, mistaking the doing for the being. Despite a steadily swelling human life expectancy, these concerns seem more urgent than ever — and yet they are hardly unique to our age. How to Live: Lessons from Montaigne, Godfather of Blogging. By Maria Popova Don’t worry about death, pay attention, read a lot, give up control, embrace imperfection. “Living has yet to be generally recognized as one of the arts,” Karl De Schweinitz wrote in his 1924 guide to the art of living. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Philosophy of religion . Perennial philosophy. The Perennial philosophy (Latin: philosophia perennis), [note 1] also referred to as Perennialism, is a perspective in the philosophy of religion which views each of the world’s religious traditions as sharing a single, universal truth on which the foundation of all religious knowledge and doctrine has grown.

Agostino Steuco (1497–1548) coined the term philosophia perennis,[1] drawing on the neo-Platonic philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94). In the early 19th century this idea was popularised by the Transcendentalists. A good question - my attempt in answering it. The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Baruch Spinoza . 1. Biography Bento (in Hebrew, Baruch; in Latin, Benedictus: all three names mean "blessed") Spinoza was born in 1632 in Amsterdam. He was the middle son in a prominent family of moderate means in Amsterdam's Portuguese-Jewish community. As a boy he had undoubtedly been one of the star pupils in the congregation's Talmud Torah school. He was intellectually gifted, and this could not have gone unremarked by the congregation's rabbis.

And then, on July 27, 1656, Spinoza was issued the harshest writ of herem, or excommunication, ever pronounced by the Sephardic community of Amsterdam; it was never rescinded. Reason . Psychologists and cognitive scientists have attempted to study and explain how people reason, e.g. which cognitive and neural processes are engaged, and how cultural factors affect the inferences that people draw. The field of automated reasoning studies how reasoning may or may not be modeled computationally. Animal psychology considers the question of whether animals other than humans can reason. To Live at All is Miracle Enough. I read Richard Dawkins book ‘Unweaving the Rainbow’ a little while ago and there was a part that really brought me up short with one of those ‘WOW’ moments. It really brings home the sheer unliklihood and odds against any of us actually being born and being able to experience and enjoy this only too brief sojourn on earth. Belief . Top 100 Western Philosophers: from Ancient to Contemporary Philosophers.

This article shows the top 100 most important philosophers in the Western civilization from the ancient Greek classics such As Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s to contemporary philosophers such as Levi-Strauss and Foucault, passing by great masters such as Descartes or Spinoza. epistemology - Free definitions by Babylon epistemology Download this dictionary Epistemology Epistemology (; ) is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge ; it is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". Put concisely, it is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth , belief , and justification . The term was probably first introduced in Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being (1854), p. 46. Cool shit - things | Pearltrees Cool shit > Orlahazel > Things Epistemology .

Epistemology ( i/ᵻˌpɪstᵻˈmɒlədʒi/; from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge", and λόγος, logos, meaning "logical discourse") is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge.[1] Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief. Much of the debate in epistemology centers on four areas: (1) the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to such concepts as truth, belief, and justification,[2][3] (2) various problems of skepticism, (3) the sources and scope of knowledge and justified belief, and (4) the criteria for knowledge and justification. NDDhx.jpg (1415×2000) How Many People Are In Space Right Now ? Epistemology - Wikisage Wikisage, the free encyclopedia of the second generation Epistemology Ich sitze mit einem Philosophen im Garten; er sagt zum wiederholten Male:‚Ich weiß, dass das ein Baum ist‘, wobei er auf einen Baum in der Nähe zeigt.

Ein Dritter kommt daher und hört das, und ich sage ihm: ‚Dieser Mensch ist nicht verrückt: Wir philosophieren nur.‘ Ludwig Wittgenstein [1] This stub is derivative from the same lemma in Dutch I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says to Once again, 'I know that that's a tree' where he points to a nearby tree. A third party comes along and listen to this, and I tell him, 'This Man is not crazy: We only philosophize translation required Epistemology (from Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning "knowledge, understanding", and λόγος, logos, meaning "word") is a term first used by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier to describe the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge; it is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". Put concisely, it is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired.

Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification. The term was probably first introduced in Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being (1854), p. 46 Hertog theory In the theory of knowledge according to the Hertog (1995) focuses on two main questions: There is such a thing as an objective reality, independent of our subjective perceptions, and how we can find out that reality? Often scientists simply assume that reality exists and with observation and logical reasoning is to fathom. This is a view of logical positivism. Opposing currents, such as constructivism , interactionism or subjectivism usually pay much more attention to the epistemological questions. The reality is in their eyes a subjective structure, a "construction" or an image by individuals or groups of people, the "subjects" is formed. They see it as the duty of the examiner to this subjective reality to build a new image Popper view Since the 1960s, Karl Popper published special ideas about human knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular.

In his book Objective Knowledge (1972) Popper presents his "Three Worlds Theory". This simply means that there are actually three different worlds with each of those worlds all kinds of objects or beings, and that the three worlds all three equally real and always separate from each other and therefore should not be confused. The first world is that of material things, and with this comes of all that science is involved in. This world is usually considered the "real", objective outside world seen and is actually commonplace. Each man makes, as the body, a part of and live in a part of this world; not every man lives in the same places and regions of the world. The second world is that of the experiences and sensations and perceptions and emotions and thoughts; the inner world everything is subjective. This world is actually just as real as the world outside; people can ignore them any more experienced and feel and think as they have hands or live in a house. Again, that every human being lives in a part of this world and that not every person living in the same regions of the world. The third world is that of the concepts and contents of opinions and ideas and abstractions: the world of theoretical beings.

Also this really exists; People can not ignore that they believe in ideas and one theory more where to find than others, and that means that they are in their minds (and from their place in the world 2) can be up to those views (anything in the world 3) relationship, just as they also objects to (something in one world) can do. Epistemology dictionary definition | epistemology defined Epistemology is defined as a branch of philosophy that is defined as the study of knowledge. An example of epistemology is a thesis paper on the source of knowledge. epistemology the study or theory of the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge Origin of epistemology ; from Classical Greek epist?m?, knowledge ; from epistanai, to understand, believe (; from epi- + histanai, origin, originally , to stand before, confront: see stand) + -logy epistemology noun The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity.

Origin of epistemology Greek epist&emacron;m&emacron;, knowledge (from epistasthai, epist&emacron;-, to understand : epi-, epi- + histasthai, middle voice of histanai, to place, determine; see sta- in Indo-European roots) + –logy. Related Forms: e·pis′te·mo·log′i·cal adjective e·pis′te·mo·log′i·cal·ly adverb e·pis′te·mol′o·gist noun Epistemology notes - Points of interest: what about epistemology? What about Epistemology notes Epistemology notes - Points of interest: what about... SCHOOL View Full Document  Points of interest: what about epistemology? What about know- how / know-what / know-why? And the pre-modern / engineering endeavor./ the modern engineering enterprise / and the focal engineering venture?

 Epistemology meaning "knowledge, understanding", and λόγος , logos , meaning "study of") is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge [1] [2] and is also referred to as "theory of knowledge". It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. Much of the debate in this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification. The term "epistemology" was introduced by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808–1864). [3]  Knowledge that, knowledge how, and knowledge by acquaintance  In epistemology in general, the kind of knowledge usually discussed is propositional knowledge , also known as "knowledge that." This is distinguished from " This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version. This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

TERM Jeremy Rifkin (born January 26, 1945) is an economic and social theorist, writer, pub Jeremy Rifkin notes Understanding Epistemology As A Branch Of Philosophy Philosophy Essay Understanding Epistemology As A Branch Of Philosophy Philosophy Essay Published: Last Edited: 23rd March, 2015 This essay has been submitted by a student. This is not an example of the work written by our professional essay writers. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that addresses the philosophical problems surrounding the theory of knowledge. Epistemology is concerned with the definition of knowledge and related concepts, the sources and criteria of knowledge, the kinds of knowledge possible and the degree to which each is certain, and the exact relation between the one who knows and the object known. It deals with the varieties, grounds, and validity of knowledge.Epistemology is a Greek term means "knowledge, science"+ "logos" or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope /limitations of knowledge. It addresses the questions: Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to connected notions such as truth, belief, and justification.

It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims. The term was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864). Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry. Here is an experiment which clarifies the idea of epistemology as a study of knowledge:- Two generals must attack a village, but they want to attack together; if they attack alone, their armies will be wiped out.There is a problem: they are miles apart, and the only way they can communicate is by means of a messenger, who might get lost or captured.

General A sends a message to General B: "Attack at dawn!" General B gets the message, but will he attack? No, because he is worried that General A doesn't know that B got the message. So B sends an acknowledgement. General A gets the acknowledgement. Will he attack now? Again, no, because A is worried that B doesn't know that he (A) knows that B got the acknowledgement. So A acknowledges the acknowledgement. The messenger makes it again (although he's getting tired!). But this still doesn't work -General B is worried that A doesn't know that B knows that A sent the message. There is never common knowledge that the message was sent, where common knowledge is the state in which everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows tha Indeed, as Halpern and his former student Yoram Moses showed, it is impossible to get common knowledge in a system where communication is not guaranteed. Moreover, as they also showed, common knowledge is a necessary and sufficient condition for coordination. Halpern and Moses were awarded the 1997 Gödel Prize for the paper describing this work, which included a general approach for using epistemic logic to analyze distributed systems. The work on knowledge has found application in other areas.

In AI, robots trying to coordinate have to reason about what one robot knows that the other knows. More recently, Halpern and his students Riccardo Pucella and Kevin O'Neill showed that knowledge is critical in reasoning about security. For example, what does it even mean to say that a message is sent anonymously? Roughly speaking, it should mean that no one knows who the sender is. This has typically been taken to mean that all possible senders are equally likely to have sent it. But it's a bit more subtle than that. Somehow, probability has to be involved. A contribution of $5,000,000 to Cornell may be anonymous, but not everyone is equally likely to have made it. Prior beliefs must be taken into account. Knowledge and belief play a critical role in economics, particularly game theory. Here, the celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium is not always applicable because it requires that all agents be aware of all moves. Halpern, his student Leandro Rego, and Larry Blume and David Easley in Economics are exploring models for decision making and game theory that take this lack of awareness into account.

In 1986, Halpern organized a conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (later renamed Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge) in order to bring together computer scientists, economists, and philosophers interested in issues of knowledge. Now, almost 20 years later, the conference is still going strong. The area continues to be active, and everyone knows that Cornell is at the forefront of these activities. Reasoning about knowledge CS Professor Joe Halpern and his former student Yoram Moses received the 1997 Gödel Prize for their paper that showed that common knowledge is a necessary and sufficient condition for coordination. Epistemology, the study of knowledge, has a long and honorable tradition in philosophy, starting with the Greek philosophers. But what does it have to do with computer science? "Quite a lot'' says Joe Halpern. "People intuitively use the word 'know' all the time when thinking about distributed computing. For example, we are apt to say 'this process can't terminate yet because it doesn't know that the other process has received the message.'" How Epistemology can be related to AI Epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines.

Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approach the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. We argue that these two practices should not be conducted in isolation. We illustrate this point by discussing how to represent a class of inference forms found in standard inferential statistics. This class of inference forms is interesting because its members share two properties that are common to epistemic relations, namely defeasibility and par consistency. Our modeling of standard inferential statistical arguments exploits results from both logical artificial intelligence and analytical epistemology. We remark how our approach to this modeling problem may be generalized to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of epistemic relations. INTRODUCTION Traditional epistemology occupies itself primarily with two sorts of problems. The first concerns the analysis of fundamental epistemic notions, such as justification, evidence and perhaps also belief, along with the analysis of key epistemic relations that appear to involve these concepts, like is warranted by, supports, and is reasonable to infer.

In assembling these accounts into a theory, here we will analyze knowledge-what it is to know a proposition, like when each of us says 'I know I have two hands'. The other chief concern is the challenge posed by skeptical arguments to the possibility of having knowledge. While there are varieties of philosophical skepticism, a historically significant version concerns the possibility of empirical knowledge about the external world, such as our respective claims of knowing to have two hands. Knowledge claims such as these are justified by our experience, yet it is conceivable that we haven't hands at all. Perhaps instead we each are a brain in a vat, electrochemically deceived into believing in his two-handedness. The serious problem raised by the problem of skepticism is whether in giving an account of knowledge that is refined enough to distinguish wholesale deception from genuine knowledge claims we in fact filter out entire classes of claims from ever being classified as knowledge, such as empirical claims about the world. While there remain disputes, both over proposals that analyze knowledge on the one hand and various strategies for refuting skepticism on the other, one broad consensus seems to hold among contemporary epistemologists: almost everyone agrees that Cartesian foundationalism is not a viable option.

Cartesian foundationalism is a particular version of foundationalism, one that holds that knowledge of one's two handedness, say, is derived from basic statements about his own sensations, of which knowledge is supposed indubitable. However, no one thinks that sensations provide infallible reports from the external World since no formulation of the basic sense-statement idea seems to escape skeptical challenge. More importantly, it is no longer believed that epistemic notions behave like truth does in valid derivation-a position that has significant ramifications for the study of epistemic relations, particularly inference relations. Justification is conferrable by induction, which is necessarily not truth preserving. Furthermore, justification is not necessarily conferred to the logical consequences of our beliefs nor does it, when conferred to a true belief by derivation, necessarily guarantee knowledge of that derived belief. Defeasibility and Non-monotonic Inference The notion of defeasibility figures in the discussion of epistemic relations and also in logical artificial intelligence. An inference to a proposition A is defensible if additional information added to the premises undermines that inference. The limiting case is learning that A is in fact false, which would signal that something is amiss with making an inference to A based upon this set of premises.

More interesting cases of defeasibility arise when an inference to a claim is undermined by additional, non-contradictory information. For instance, the mean height of a sample of high school students drawn at random is typically reasonable grounds for concluding that the mean height of the sample is a close estimate of the mean height of the school's student body. Standard statistical inferences such as this one are defeasible precisely because we may learn new, non-contradictory information that undermines the support for thinking that the sample is representative. For instance, if we were to learn that the random sample drawn is in fact composed exclusively of the members of the varsity basketball team, then we would no longer consider the sample as likely being a close estimate of the mean height of the student body. One way to represent this type of defeasibility is in terms of a logic that has a genuinely non-monotonic consequence relation-one whereby premises may increase in number while the number of conclusions may decrease. What we propose to do in this section is to present the structure of this statistical inference in terms of a particular kind of non-monotonic inference rule, called a statistical default, which is used within statistical default logic to represent a variety of argument forms common in standard inferential statistics.

The non-monotonic behavior of defaults rests in the possibility that one of the default justifications that permits the rule to be applied may be triggered by new information, thus blocking the applicability of that rule.8 It turns out there is a structural similarity between the workings of default rules and a class of standard statistical inference forms, of which estimating the mean height of a student body is an instance. In making a statistical inference the aim is to select a sample that represents the population with respect to some specified parameter. Often this is achieved by a series of tests designed to detect bias in the sample. It was first noticed in that in making a statistical inference, some conditions are satisfied explicitly, like premises, while others behave like default justifications. Typically a sample is regarded representative of a population when a few explicit conditions hold (like that the sample be drawn from the target population and the distribution of error is normal) and when it is not known that the sample is biased, which translates to the absence of information that would suggest a biased sample. These latter conditions express weaker assumptions than explicitly holding that the sample is representative, for if we could help ourselves to making that explicit assumption we wouldn't need inferential statistics.

The underlying point is that we don't need to accept that the sample is unbiased but rather have no reason, given what we already accept, to infer that the sample is biased. Tolerating Inconsistency Committing an error simply amounts to accepting a false statement. A false-default consequent is just an accepted statement that proposes an interval (on the basis of a collection of evidence reports generated by a reliable measurement procedure) that in fact fails to contain the true value of Î¼. It is important to notice that while erroneous, an accepted but false statement is warranted. The statement is introduced by the correct application of a statistical default rule: no such statements are introduced to the theory by mistake. A reader troubled by the uncertainty introduced by s-defaults might recommend that to decrease the chances of falling into error, simply increase the distance in the interval around Î¼. increasing the interval around Î¼ increases the margin of error and thus reduces the frequency of accepted false evidence statements over the long run. Although mathematically sound, this would be bad advice to follow. Remember that the final goal isn't error elimination but finding the mean height of the class.

If our interest is to hit bulls-eye, we are hardly helped by increasing our target to the barn it's pinned on. Our interest in the true mean value and access only to finite trials presses us to accept a minimal interval around Î¼ whose associated probability of error is known and small enough to ensure confidence, not certainty. Error is but one parameter in this optimization problem and is eliminated completely only at the price of triviality. What is interesting about s-default consequents is that a collection of them can be inconsistent. Such measurement statements are approximations at best, which is the reason they are interval-valued. However, these interval-valued statements are also fallible. S-defaults tell us that, over the long run, a small _ proportion of consequents will be accepted yet false. It is important to notice that accepting a false evidence statement in this manner is an error and not necessarily an inconsistency. But an interesting case is when there are sufficiently many evidence statements, one million for example, that are generated by some s-default where each statement is accepted at a 99% confidence level.

A 0.99 confidence level s-default entails that after applying that s-default one million times we can be 99% sure that at least 500 of the accepted statements are false. So, even though each of the 1 million statements are accepted as true with 0.99 confidence we also accept with no less confidence that at least 500 are false. The idea of an inference procedure that builds in inconsistency is likely to meet strong resistance. It might be thought, for instance, that the advice to measure twice and record once holds at least the promise of eliminating error, thereby avoiding the problem of accumulating inconsistent statements. Notice that what this suggestion to measure twice-write once amounts to is simply to run an experiment. With multiple measurements 'trials' we can expect to catch the very kind of errors under discussion. Unless one is a systematic incompetent, one could discover false reports by repeating the measurement procedure and tossing stray values out. The hope is, then, that we can dismiss this talk of accepted statements that may nevertheless be false. Unfortunately, while it is true that you can reduce the occurrence of error with this approach, you can't eliminate it. To see why this is so, consider another example: significance testing.

Significance testing is a standard experimental practice found in sciences as disparate as psychology, chemistry, and medicine. In each science, experiments are designed to test a null 'no-effect' hypothesis, h0, by choosing a region of rejection within a well-defined sample space of possible outcomes. If evidence lies in this region of rejection, then h0 is rejected. The region is selected so that if the appropriate experimental justifications of randomness, independence and their kin hold, then there is only at most a small chance _ that given the supposition that h0 is true, evidence falling in the rejection region will be collected. Another way to put it is to say that if h0 is true, the probability of mistakenly rejecting it is less than the specified value of _. Often _ may be made as small as one likes by increasing the sample size. Put in practice, we sample, check that the experimental assumptions hold, and then, should the sample obtained fall in the rejection region, we reject the null h0 which states that the controlled variable has no effect. Note that the rejection of h0 isn't hedged, but full-out; for instance, we reject the hypothesis that cigarette smoking has no effect on cancer rates in mice and men.

The grounds for rejecting h0 rest on the statistical -and ipso facto uncertain- claim that there is only a small, preassigned chance that we shall do so mistakenly. Notice that what we've spelled out is similar to the structure of measurement procedures. The proposal to buy certainty at the cost of taking additional measurements fails because our best experimental methods are themselves fallible. There are two points to notice about this result. First, error cannot be eliminated but only, even under the best of circumstances, controlled. Corrected measurements do not eliminate the possibility of accepting a false evidence statement. Patterns in evidence reports-how values may cluster around more than one point, the cardinality of data points in each of these neighborhoods, whether there are non-random trends in data through time-provides a wealth of information about whether the pattern of error fits what we would expect using a measurement procedure (or, more generally, an evidence gathering procedure) whose distribution of error is assumed to be normal. But these methods do not eliminate error, no matter how rigorous our methods. The tests and a well-designed s-default give us very good reason to be practically certain that each of our accepted evidence statements is true.

Yet, at the same time, we may be practically certain that some relatively small proportion of our accepted evidence statements is plain false. Second, controlling error is expensive. We get the best (but not certain) results when we are keenly aware of what kind of errors we're liable to commit and design experiments or conduct measurements in a manner that reduces those risks. Not knowing all the ways one can go Wrong contributes, in part, to the difficulty of identifying and correcting errors: we're ever discovering new ways to err. What can make this problem particularly difficult is deciding whether one has stumbled upon a new way of bungling, is dealing with a faulty instrument or an unusual sample, or is in the position of needing to reject some part of a well-confirmed theory. It is worth pointing out that we are not promoting inconsistency tolerant logics for novelty's sake, nor are we making an ontological claim that the world itself is not inconsistent, nor do we claim that mathematics would be much better off on native foundations. What we claim is that there are different sources of inconsistency when modeling operations that preserve properties like acceptance. One kind of inconsistency arises from using the logic to represent a collection of rules that yield a set of inconsistent formulae.

Another kind of inconsistency arises when we represent within the theory itself a property of the inference scheme used within the logic, in this case a property of acceptance yielded by application of s-default rules. Ideally, we would like to do without either kind of inconsistency. But in practice it may only be practical to consider the first kind of inconsistency a target for correction, which is the subject of belief revision, and adopt a strategy of control for the latter. Living with the latter kind of inconsistency is part of the bargain of accepting defensible conclusions. What statistical default logic does is to make this property explicit and control it with bounded-closure conditions. Mechanizing Logic It can be a complicated matter determining the membership of a statistical default extension, just as it can be a non-trivial matter determining the membership of default extensions for a default theory. Fortunately there has been considerable research in computational logic addressing this issue, both by exploring the inter-relationships between various non-monotonic formalisms and also by exploring the computability of this class of logics. A natural link between computability and default logics is logic programming.

While there are recent results establishing a correspondence between an important fragment of statistical default logic and logic programming, we will focus here on more general correspondence results between semantics for logic programs and semantics for default theories. Again, our interest is to give an overview of the resources available and guide interested readers to references in the literature. Logic programming arose from work begun by logicians in the 1950's with an aim to affect logical reasoning by computation. The first developments were automated theorem proves, which formed the theoretical basis for logical artificial intelligence. What these papers introduced to computer science was the notion of declarative, as opposed to procedural, semantics. The idea underpinning declarative semantics is that a programmer should only concern himself with the declarative meaning of his programs while the procedural aspects of the program's execution are handled automatically. Logic programming, or Prolog, became a privileged tool approximating this idea. Work since has concentrated on development of a precise semantics for logic programs. Of one particular interest is the definition of negation within logic programs, since logic programs do not use classical boolean negation but rely instead on a non-monotonic operator, often called "negation by failure" or "negation by default".

The non-monotonicity of this operator allows one to view logic programs as a special class of non-monotonic theories. Current studies and research, future prospects

Question: James Frederick Ferrier introduced which word to cover the branch of philosophy conerned with "the theory of knowledge"?
Answer: Epistemology