BBC - History - Ancient History in depth: Rome's Greatest Enemies Gallery Rome's Greatest Enemies Gallery Hannibal, Carthaginian general and political leader Born 247 BC Died 182 BC Enemy of Rome: Carthaginian general famed for bringing his army, including elephants, over the Alps. Inflicted three huge defeats on Roman armies, including the largest ever at the battle of Cannae in 216 BC. Born in 247 BC, Hannibal became commander of the Carthaginian forces in Spain, in succession to his father Hamilcar in 221 BC. At the time, Rome and Carthage were moving towards the outbreak of the second of the three so-called Punic wars (264-241 BC, 218-201 BC, and 149-146 BC) through which their conflict over the control of the western Mediterranean was eventually decided. Hannibal took the war to Rome, and in May 218 BC conquered northern Spain before crossing the Alps in the autumn with 50,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and, famously, 37 elephants.

In Italy he fought a protracted campaign, winning three huge victories over the Roman armies sent against him: at Trebbia in December 218 BC, Late Trasimene in 217 BC (where 15,000 Romans were killed and another 10,000 captured) and, greatest of all, at Cannae in 216 BC. Here, Hannibal showed the mastery of the combined use of infantry and cavalry for which he was famous to surround and annihilate a huge Roman army. Of perhaps 70,000 Romans, only 14,500 survived to be taken prisoner at the end of the day. It is the greatest number of casualties suffered in a single battle by any western army before or since. In the long run, he never received enough reinforcements to threaten Rome itself despite his army surviving in Italy for over a decade. Roman victories elsewhere meant that peace was eventually made on Roman terms in 201 BC. Hannibal then became involved - eventually unsuccessfully - in internal Carthaginian politics, and was driven into exile in 195 BC.

In 183 BC, he committed suicide by taking poison to prevent himself being handed over to the Romans. Battle of Cannae in the Second Punic War 54,000-87,000 men Battle of Cannae - Background: After the start of the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian general Hannibal boldly crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. Winning battles at Trebia (218 BC) and Lake Trasimene (217 BC), Hannibal defeated armies led by Tiberius Sempronius Longus and Gaius Flaminius Nepos. In the wake of these victories, he moved south plundering the countryside and working to make Rome's allies defect to Carthage's side. Reeling from these defeats, Rome appointed Fabius Maximus to deal with the Carthaginian threat. Avoiding direct contact with Hannibal's army, Fabius struck at the enemy's supply lines and practiced the form of attritional warfare that later bore his name .

Unhappy with this indirect approach, the Senate did not renew Fabius' dictatorial powers when his term ended and command passed to the consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus ( Map ). In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal seized the Roman supply depot at Cannae in southeast Italy. Situated on the Apulian Plain, this position allowed Hannibal to keep his men well fed. With Hannibal sitting astride Rome's supply lines, the Roman Senate called for action. Raising an army of eight legions, command was given to the Consuls Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The largest army ever assembled by Rome, this force advanced to face the Carthaginians. Marching south, the consuls found the enemy encamped on the left bank of the Aufidus River. As the situation developed, the Romans were hampered by an unwieldy command structure which required the two consuls to alternate command on a daily basis.

Battle of Cannae - Preparations: Approaching the Carthaginian camp on July 31, the Romans, with the aggressive Varro in command, defeated a small ambush set by Hannibal's men. Though Varro was emboldened by the minor victory, command passed to the more conservative Paullus the next day. Unwilling to fight the Carthaginians on open ground due to his army's smaller cavalry force, he elected to encamp two-thirds of the army east of the river while establishing a smaller camp on the opposite bank ( Map ). The next day, aware that it would be Varro's turn, Hannibal advanced his army and offered battle hoping the lure the reckless Roman forward. Assessing the situation, Paullus successfully prevented his compatriot from engaging. Seeing that the Romans were unwilling to fight, Hannibal had his cavalry harass the Roman water-bearers and raid in the vicinity of Varro and Paullus' camps. Seeking battle on August 2, Varro and Paullus formed up their army for battle with their infantry densely packed in the center and the cavalry on the wings. The Consuls planned to use the infantry to quickly break the Carthaginian lines.

Opposite, Hannibal placed his cavalry and most veteran infantry on the wings and his lighter infantry in the center. As the two sides advanced, Hannibal's center moved forward, causing their line to bow in a crescent shape. On the Hannibal's left, his cavalry charged forward and routed the Roman horse ( Map ). Battle of Cannae - Rome Crushed: To the right, Hannibal's cavalry was engaged with that of Rome's allies. Having destroyed their opposite number on the left, the Carthaginian cavalry rode behind the Roman army and assaulted the allied cavalry from the rear. Under attack from two directions, the allied cavalry fled the field. As the infantry began to engage, Hannibal had his center slowly retreat, while ordering the infantry on the wings to hold their position. The tightly packed Roman infantry continued to advance after the retreating Carthaginians, unaware of the trap that was about to be sprung ( Map ). As the Romans were drawn in, Hannibal ordered the infantry on his wings to turn and attack the Roman flanks. This was coupled with a massive assault on the Roman rear by the Carthaginian cavalry, which completely surrounded the Consuls' army.

Trapped, the Romans became so compressed that many did not have space to raise their weapons. To speed the victory, Hannibal ordered his men to cut the hamstrings of each Roman and then move on to the next, commenting that the lamed could be slaughtered later at the Carthaginian's leisure. The fighting continued until evening with approximately 600 Romans dying per minute. Battle of Cannae - Casualties & Impact: Various accounts of the Battle of Cannae show that 50,000-70,000 of the Romans, with 3,500-4,500 taken prisoner. It is known that approximately 14,000 were able to cut their way out and reach the town of Canusium. Hannibal's army suffered around 6,000 killed and 10,000 wounded. Though encouraged by his officers to march on Rome, Hannibal resisted as he lacked the equipment and supplies for a major siege. While victorious at Cannae, Hannibal would ultimately be defeated at the Battle of Zama (202 BC), and Carthage would lose the Second Punic War.

Battle of Cannae | Carthage-Rome | Britannica.com Battle of Cannae Italy Battle of Cannae, (August 216 bce), battle fought near the ancient village of Cannae, in southern Apulia (modern Puglia ), southeastern Italy , between the forces of Rome and Carthage during the Second Punic War . The Romans were crushed by the African, Gallic , and Celtiberian troops of Hannibal , with recorded Roman losses ranging from 55,000 (according to Roman historian Livy ) to 70,000 (according to Greek historian Polybius ). One of the most significant battles in history, it is regarded by military historians as a classic example of a victorious double envelopment. Hannibal was the first to arrive at the battle site, with a force of about 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. His army took command of the Aufidus (now Ofanto) River, the main source of water in the area. That added to the strain on the Romans, who would struggle to satisfy the thirst of their greater number of soldiers in the early August heat.

Hannibal positioned his lines facing north, compelling the Romans to face mostly to the south, where the hot libeccio wind blew dust and grit into their eyes, an irritant and disadvantage that, according to ancient authorities, cannot be ignored. In addition, Hannibal confined the eight Roman legions in a narrow valley, hemmed in by the river. In one stroke, Hannibal thus restricted the mobility of the Roman cavalry and forced the Roman infantry to adopt a formation that was deeper than it was wide, two factors that would prove critical in the outcome of the battle. Breaking from the Fabian strategy of nonengagement, the Roman consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro brought to Cannae roughly 80,000 men, about half of whom lacked significant battle experience. They sought to meet Hannibal, who had just taken a highly coveted grain depot at Canusium , in the hope of delivering a knockout blow and ending the destructive Carthaginian invasion of Italy.

Terentius Varro had been popularly elected as a plebeian consular political appointee, and ancient sources describe his character as overconfident and rash, ascribing to him the hope that he could overwhelm Hannibal with sheer numbers. Aemilius Paullus, however, was both a veteran and patrician from an established military family, and he was justifiably cautious about facing Hannibal on his enemy’s terms. Similar Topics Battle of Mylae The Romans faced southwest, with their right wing resting on the Aufidus and with the sea about three miles (five kilometres) to their rear. They placed their cavalry (about 6,000) on their wings and massed their infantry in an exceptionally deep and narrow formation in the centre in the hope of breaking the enemy centre by weight and push. To counter that, Hannibal relied on the elasticity of his formation. He stationed his Gallic and Spanish infantry in the centre, two groups of his African troops on their flanks, and the cavalry on the wings. But before engaging the enemy, his line adopted a crescent shape, the centre advancing with the African troops on their flanks en échelon.

As Hannibal had anticipated, his cavalry won the struggle on the wings, and some then swept around behind the enemy. Meanwhile, the Roman infantry gradually forced back Hannibal’s centre, and victory or defeat turned upon whether the latter held. It did: although it fell back, it did not break, and the Roman centre was gradually drawn forward into a trap. Hannibal’s crescent became a circle, with Hannibal’s African and Spanish troops on the wings pressing inward on the Romans and the Carthaginian cavalry attacking from the rear. Some of the equipment used by troops engaging the Roman flanks—especially shields and other armour—had been taken from dead Romans after the Carthaginian victory at Trasimene . That may have further confused the Romans, who were already fighting through a steady torrent of dust. Pressed tightly together and hence unable to properly use their arms, the Romans were surrounded and cut to pieces. It is possible that the falcata, a brutally effective curved short sword employed by Celtiberian troops, played some role in the dismemberment of the Roman ranks.

Britannica Stories Dinosaur Eggs May Have Taken Six Months or More to Hatch Terentius Varro fled the field of battle with the remnants of the Roman and allied cavalry. Aemilius Paullus was killed along with many other high-ranking commanders, including Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, Marcus Minucius Rufus, and other veteran patricians. Among the Roman dead were 28 of 40 tribunes, up to 80 Romans of Senatorial or high magistrate rank, and at least 200 knights (Romans of equestrian rank). It was estimated that 20 percent of Roman fighting men between the ages of 18 and 50 died at Cannae. Only 14,000 Roman soldiers escaped, and 10,000 more were captured; the rest were killed. The Carthaginians lost about 6,000 men. The Roman Empire When word of the defeat reached Rome, panic gripped the city, and women flocked to temples to weep for their lost husbands, sons, and brothers.

Hannibal was exhorted to march on Rome by Maharbal , one of his commanders, but Hannibal did not do so. Livy reports that Maharbal then told Hannibal that he knew how to win battles but not how to take advantage of them. For his part, Hannibal had hoped that many South Italians would desert Rome and ally with him after his crushing victory. In spite of the massive blow to Rome’s morale and its manpower in the short term, Cannae ultimately steeled Roman resistance for the long fight ahead. Rome resumed the Fabian strategy, denying Hannibal the opportunity to achieve a second victory of Cannae’s scale, and Hannibal saw the strength of his armies and his allies whittled away through slow attrition . Hannibal - Ancient History - HISTORY.com Google Hannibal’s Early Life and Attack on Saguntum Hannibal was born in 247 B.C. in North Africa.

Polybius and Livy, whose histories of Rome are the main Latin sources regarding his life, claimed that Hannibal’s father, the great Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca, brought his son to Spain (a region he had begun to conquer around 237 B.C.) at a young age. Hamilcar died in 229 B.C. and was succeeded by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who made the young Hannibal an officer in the Carthaginian army. In 221 B.C., Hasdrubal was assassinated, and the army unanimously chose the 26-year-old Hannibal to command Carthage’s empire in Spain. Hannibal swiftly consolidated control in the region from the seaport base of Cartagena (New Carthage); he also married a Spanish princess. Did You Know? According to Polybius and Livy, Hannibal's father Hamilcar Barca made the 9-year-old Hannibal dip his hand in blood and swear an oath of hatred against Rome.

In 219 B.C., Hannibal led a Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, an independent city in the middle of the eastern Spanish coast that had shown aggression against nearby Carthaginian towns. According to the treaty that ended the First Punic War, the Ebro River was the northernmost border of Carthage’s influence in Spain; though Saguntum was south of the Ebro, it was allied with Rome, which saw Hannibal’s attack as an act of war. Carthaginian forces besieged Saguntum for eight months before the city fell. Although Rome demanded Hannibal’s surrender, he refused, instead making plans for the invasion of Italy that would mark the beginning of Second Punic War. Hannibal’s Invasion of Italy Leaving his brother, also named Hasdrubal, to protect Carthage’s interests in Spain and North Africa, Hannibal assembled a massive army, including (according to Polybius’ probably exaggerated figures) as many as 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and nearly 40 elephants.

The march that followed–which covered some 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) through the Pyrenees, across the Rhone River and the snowcapped Alps, and finally into central Italy–would be remembered as one of the most famous campaigns in history. With his forces depleted by the harsh Alpine crossing, Hannibal met the powerful army of the Roman general Publius Cornelius Scipio on the plains west of the Ticino River. Hannibal’s cavalry prevailed, and Scipio was seriously wounded in the battle. Late in 218 B.C., the Carthaginians again defeated the Romans on the left bank of the Trebia River, a victory that earned Hannibal the support of allies including the Gauls and Ligurians. By the spring of 217 B.C., he had advanced to the Arno River, where despite a victory at Lake Trasimene he declined to lead his exhausted forces against Rome itself.

In the summer of the following year, 16 Roman legions–close to 80,000 soldiers, an army said to be twice the size of Hannibal’s–confronted the Carthaginians near the town of Cannae. While the Roman general Varro massed his infantry in the center with his cavalry on each wing–a classic military formation–Hannibal maintained a relatively weak center but strong infantry and cavalry forces at the flanks. When the Romans advanced, the Carthaginians were able to hold their center and win the struggle at the sides, enveloping the enemy and cutting off the possibility of retreat by sending a cavalry charge across the rear. From Victory to Defeat The Roman defeat at Cannae stunned much of southern Italy, and many of Rome’s allies and colonies defected to the Carthaginian side. Under the leadership of Scipio’s son-in-law, also named Publius Cornelius Scipio, and his fellow general Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Romans soon began to rally. In southern Italy, Fabius used cautious tactics to gradually push back against Hannibal’s forces, and had regained a considerable amount of ground by 209 B.C.

In northern Italy in 208 B.C., Roman forces defeated an army of reinforcements led by Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal, who had crossed the Alps in an attempt to come to Hannibal’s aid. Meanwhile, the younger Scipio drew on Rome’s seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower to launch an attack on New Carthage and drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. He then invaded North Africa, forcing Hannibal to withdraw his troops from southern Italy in 203 B.C. in order to defend his home state. The following year, Hannibal met Scipio’s forces on the battlefield near Zama, some 120 kilometers from Carthage. This time it was the Romans (with the help of their North African allies, the Numidians) who enveloped and smothered the Carthaginians, killing some 20,000 soldiers at a loss of only 1,500 of their own men. In honor of his great victory, Scipio was given the name Africanus.

Hannibal’s Postwar Life and Death In the peace agreement that ended the Second Punic War, Carthage was allowed to keep only its territory in North Africa but lost its overseas empire permanently. It was also forced to surrender its fleet and pay a large indemnity in silver, and to agree never again to re-arm or declare war without permission from Rome. Hannibal, who escaped with his life from the crushing defeat at Zama and still harbored a desire to defeat Rome, retained his military title despite accusations that he had botched the conduct of the war. In addition, he was made a civil magistrate in the government of Carthage. According to Livy, Hannibal fled to the Syrian court at Ephesus after his opponents within the Carthaginian nobility denounced him to the Romans for encouraging Antiochus III of Syria to take up arms against Rome. When Rome later defeated Antiochus, one of the peace terms called for the surrender of Hannibal; to avoid this fate, he may have fled to Crete or taken up arms with rebel forces in Armenia. He later served King Prusias of Bithynia in another unsuccessful war against the Roman ally King Eumenes II of Pergamum.

At some point during this conflict, the Romans again demanded the surrender of Hannibal. Finding himself unable to escape, he killed himself by taking poison in the Bithynian village of Libyssa, probably around 183 B.C. Tags 1000+ images about Images of Ancient Rome on Pinterest | Phoenician, Rome and Janus Forward Tunisia Carthage The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, which took place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia Barletta. The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus.

It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and, in terms of the numbers killed, the second greatest defeat of Rome See More Ancient Rome's Darkest Day: The Battle of Cannae - History in the Headlines Ancient Rome's Darkest Day: The Battle of Cannae - History in the Headlines Ancient Rome's Darkest Day: The Battle of Cannae - History in the Headlines HISTORY - Republican Rome was pushed to the brink of collapse on August 2, 216 B.C., when Hannibal annihilated at least 50,000 of its legionaries at the Se 2016-8-3 6:33 Ancient Rome's Darkest Day: The Battle of Cannae - History in the Headlines - 2016-8-3 6:33 HISTORY Source: Republican Rome was pushed to the brink of collapse on August 2, 216 B.C., when Hannibal annihilated at least 50,000 of its legionaries at the Second Punic War's Battle of Cannae.

On August 2, 216 B.C., the Roman Republic was plunged into crisis after the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, annihilated at least 50,000 of its legionaries at the Battle of Cannae. Get the story behind the bloodiest battle the ancient world has ever seen. Latest Comments Romulus and Remus had a contest to determine who would name the city. Each bird they saw represented one century that the city would last. Romulus saw 12 birds; Remus only saw 6. 12 centuries versus 6. Rome it is. Rome was founded in 753 BC. The battle of Cannae was 537 years after that. Almost six centuries. The fall of Rome, in 476 AD, was 1,229 years after the founding. Twelve centuries. The prophecy of the birds was pretty close. Perhaps if the city had been named Reme, Carthage would've won. Too bad for Hannibal Rome had Marcellus, Nero, Scipio, among others. Hasdrubal was beaten in Spain then killed at Metarus, and as for Gisco, he committed suicide after Zama.

Unfortunately for Carthage, Rome had the will, manpower, despite temporarily losing cities to Hannibal, and better commanders overall. Cannae was bad but the Romans ate the loss of 8 consular armies like it was nothing. The 2nd Punic war is one of the best examples of "You can win every battle and still lose the war" or "You can win 90% of the battles but losing the last 10% can spell the end" Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War: The Experience of ... - Gregory Daly - Google Books 2 Reviews On a hot and dusty summer's day in 216 BC, the forces of the Carthaginian general Hannibal faced the Roman army in a dramatic encounter at Cannae. Massively outnumbered, the Carthaginians nevertheless won an astonishing victory - one that left more than 50,000 men dead. Gregory Daly's enthralling study considers the reasons that led the two armies to the field of battle, and why each followed the course that they did when they got there. It explores in detail the composition of the armies, and the tactics and leadership methods of the opposing generals.

Finally, by focusing on the experiences of those who fought, Daly gives an unparalleled portrait of the true horror and chaos of ancient warfare. This striking and vivid account is the fullest yet of the bloodiest battle in ancient history. Battle of Cannae | Military Wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia Carteia Battles of Trebia , Lake Trasimene and Cannae, from left to right The Battle of Cannae ( / ˈ k æ n i / or / ˈ k æ n eɪ / ), a major battle of the Second Punic War , took place on 2 August 216 BC in Apulia in southeast Italy. The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a larger army of the Roman Republic under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro . It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and has been regarded as the worst defeat in Roman history. Having recovered from their losses at Trebia (218 BC) and Lake Trasimene (217 BC), the Romans decided to engage Hannibal at Cannae, with roughly 86,000 Roman and allied troops.

The Romans massed their heavy infantry in a deeper formation than usual while Hannibal utilized the double-envelopment tactic. This was so successful that the Roman army was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. Following the defeat, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the Roman Republic to Carthage. Contents Edit Shortly after the start of the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian general Hannibal crossed into Italy by traversing the Pyrenees and the Alps during the summer and early autumn. He quickly won major victories over the Romans at the Trebia and at Lake Trasimene . After these losses the Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as dictator to deal with the threat. [2] :p.8 Fabius used attrition warfare against Hannibal, cutting off his supply lines and avoiding pitched battle . These tactics proved unpopular with the Romans who, as they recovered from the shock of Hannibal's victories, began to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy which had given the Carthaginian army a chance to regroup. [3] The majority of Romans were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war.

It was feared that, if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, Rome's allies might defect to the Carthaginian side for self-preservation. [4] Therefore, when Fabius came to the end of his term, the Senate did not renew his dictatorial powers and command was given to consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus . In 216 BC, when elections resumed, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were elected as consuls, placed in command of a newly raised army of unprecedented size, and directed to engage Hannibal. Polybius wrote: The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. ...Most of their wars are decided by one consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.

— Polybius, The Histories of Polybius [5] Estimates of Roman troop numbers Edit Eight legions, some 40,000 Roman soldiers and an estimated 2,400 cavalry, formed the nucleus of this massive new army. As each legion was accompanied by an equal number of allied troops, and allied cavalry numbered around 4,000, the army that faced Hannibal could not have been much less than 90,000. [6] However, some have suggested that the destruction of an army of 90,000 troops would be impossible. They argue that Rome probably had 48,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry against Hannibal's 35,000 troops and 10,000 cavalry. [7] Livy quotes one source stating the Romans added only 10,000 men to their usual army. [8] While no definitive number of Roman troops exists, all sources agree that the Carthaginians faced a considerably larger foe.

Roman command Edit Ordinarily each of the two consuls would command his own portion of the army but, since the two armies were combined into one, Roman law required them to alternate their command on a daily basis. It appears that Hannibal had already realized that the command of the Roman army alternated,Script errorScript error[ citation needed ] and planned his strategy accordingly. The traditional account puts Varro in command on the day of the battle, and much of the blame for the defeat has been laid on his shoulders. [1] However, his low origins seem to be exaggerated in the sources, and Varro may have been made a scapegoat by the aristocratic establishment. [1] Varro lacked the powerful descendants that Paullus had: descendants who were willing and able to protect his reputation — most notably, Paullus was the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus , the patron of Polybius. [2] Prelude Edit In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain, placing himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply.

As Polybius noted, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district". [3] The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of him. After two days' march, they found him on the left bank of the Aufidus River and encamped six miles (10 km) away. Reportedly, a Carthaginian officer named Gisgo commented on how much larger the Roman army was. Hannibal replied, "another thing that has escaped your notice, Gisgo, is even more amazing—that although there are so many of them, there is not one among them called Gisgo." [4] Varro, in command on the first day, is presented by ancient sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris , and was determined to defeat Hannibal. While the Romans were approaching Cannae, a small portion of Hannibal's forces ambushed them. Varro successfully repelled the attack and continued on his way to Cannae.

This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps to overconfidence on Varro's part. Paullus, however, was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry (both in quality and quantity). Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the Aufidus River, sending the remainder to fortify a position on the opposite side. The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy. [5] The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1), Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused.

When his request was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the Aufidus water to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications. According to Polybius, [3] Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp. [6] The battle Edit Modern interpretation of a slinger from the Balearic Islands (famous for the skill of their slingers). Figures for troops involved in ancient battles are often unreliable and Cannae is no exception. The following figures should be treated with caution, especially those for the Carthaginian side. [7] The Roman forces totaled 80,000 infantry, 2,400 Roman cavalry and 4,000 allied horse (involved in the actual battle) and, in the two fortified camps, 2,600 heavily armed men, 7,400 lightly armed men (a total of 10,000), approximately 86,400 men.

Opposing them was a Carthaginian army of roughly 40,000 heavy infantry, 6,000 light infantry , and 10,000 cavalry in the battle itself, irrespective of detachments. [8] The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions. Along with the core of 8,000 Libyans, there were 8,000 Iberians, 16,000 Gauls (8,000 were left at camp the day of battle) and around 5,500 Gaetulian infantry.Script errorScript error[ citation needed ] Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Liby-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had around 8,000 skirmishers consisting of Balearic slingers and mixed nationality spearmen, a total of around 47,950. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal.

[1] Equipment Edit Rome's forces used typical Roman equipment including pila (heavy javelins) and hastae (thrusting spears) as weapons as well as traditional helmets, shields, and body armor. On the other hand, the Carthaginian army used a variety of equipment. Iberians fought with swords suited for cutting and thrusting and javelins or various types of spear. For defense, Iberian warriors carried large oval shields and the falcata . The Gauls were likely wearing no armor and the Gaulish weapon was usually a long, slashing sword. [2] The heavy Carthaginian cavalry carried two javelins and a curved slashing sword with a heavy shield for protection. Numidian cavalry were very lightly equipped, lacking saddles and bridles for their horses, and used no armor but carried a small shield, javelins and possibly a knife or longer blade. Skirmishers acting as light infantry carried either slings or spears. The Balearic slingers, who were famous for their accuracy, carried short, medium, and long slings used to cast stones or bullets. They may have carried a small shield or simple leather pelt on their arms, but this is uncertain.

Hannibal himself was wearing Musculata armor and carried a falcata as well. [3] The equipment of the Libyan line infantry has been much debated. Head has argued in favor of short stabbing spears. [4] Polybius states that the Libyans fought with equipment taken from previously defeated Romans. It is unclear whether he meant only shields and armor or offensive weapons as well, [5] though a general reading suggests he meant the whole panoply of arms and armor, and even tactical organization. Apart from his description of the battle itself, when later discussing the subject of Roman Legion versus Greek Phalanx, Polybius says that "...against Hannibal, the defeats they suffered had nothing to do with weapons or formations" because "Hannibal himself...discarded the equipment with which he had started out (and) armed his troops with Roman weapons". [6] Dally is inclined to the view that Libyan infantry would have copied the Iberian use of the sword during their fighting there and so were armed similarly to the Romans. [7] Connolly has argued that they were armed as a pike phalanx.

[8] This has been disputed by Head because Plutarch states they carried spears shorter than the Roman Triarii [4] and by Dally because they could not have carried an unwieldy pike at the same time as a heavy Roman-style shield. [5] Tactical deployment Edit The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking "wings." The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry, hoping to use this to quickly break through the center of Hannibal's line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at Trebia , and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. The principes were stationed immediately behind the hastati , ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As Polybius wrote, "the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased...and the maniples showed more depth than front." [9] [10] Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their fewer opponents.

Initial deployment and Roman attack (in red) To Varro, Hannibal seemed to have little room to maneuver and no means of retreat as he was deployed with the Aufidus River to his rear. Varro believed that when pressed hard by the Romans' superior numbers, the Carthaginians would fall back to the river and, with no room to maneuver, would be cut down in panic. Bearing in mind that Hannibal's two previous victories had been largely decided by his trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at Cannae was clear, with no possibility of hidden troops being brought to bear as an ambush. [11] Hannibal, on the other hand, had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses. [12] He placed his Iberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition across the front line, with himself right at the front and center. Infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. These infantry were battle-hardened, remained cohesive, and would attack the Roman flanks.

Hasdrubal led the Iberian and Gaulish cavalry on the left (south near the Aufidus River) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus river, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal was given about 6,500 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,500 Numidians on the right. Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal's weakened center. His veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans. The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the Aufidus River, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat. [13] In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face east.

Not only would the morning sun shine low into the Romans' eyes, but the southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield. [10] Hannibal's unique deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive. Subsequent events Edit As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the center of his line, as Polybius described: "After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics and Celts." Polybius described the weak Carthaginian center as deployed in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the African troops on their flanks in echelon formation .

[9] It is believed that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively. [14] While the majority of historians feel that Hannibal's action was deliberate, some have called this account fanciful, and claim that the actions of the day represent either the natural curvature that occurs when a broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed Roman center. [14] Destruction of the Roman army When the battle was joined, the cavalry engaged in a fierce exchange on the flanks. Polybius described the Hispanic and Celtic horse dismounting in what he considers a barbarian method of fighting. When the Hispanic and Gauls got the upper hand, they cut down the Roman cavalry without giving quarter. [9] On the other flank the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. When the victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry came up, the allied cavalry broke and the Numidians pursued them off the field.

[9] While the Carthaginians were in the process of defeating the cavalry, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. The wind from the east blew dust in the Romans' faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would have been potentially debilitating to sight. [10] Although it made seeing difficult, troops would still have been able to see others in the vicinity. The dust, however, was not the only psychological factor involved in battle. Because of the somewhat distant battle location, both sides were forced to fight on little sleep. The Romans faced another disadvantage caused by lack of proper hydration due to Hannibal's attack on the Roman encampment during the previous day. Furthermore, the massive number of troops would have led to an overwhelming amount of background noise. All of these psychological factors made battle especially difficult for the infantrymen. [15] Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them to a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew.

Knowing the superiority of the Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw deliberately, creating an even tighter semicircle around the attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion, as they began crowding themselves into the growing gap. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons. In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored (possibly due to the dust) the African troops that stood uncommitted on the projecting ends of this now-reversed crescent. [14] This also gave the Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks and attack the Roman center in the rear. The Roman infantry, now stripped of protection on both its flanks, formed a wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley formed by the African infantry on the wings.

[16] At this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating an encirclement in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer movement . When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began destroying them. Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood." As Livy described, "So many thousands of Romans were dying ... Some, whom their wounds, pinched by the morning cold, had roused, as they were rising up, covered with blood, from the midst of the heaps of slain, were overpowered by the enemy.

Some were found with their heads plunged into the earth, which they had excavated; having thus, as it appeared, made pits for themselves, and having suffocated themselves." [17] Cowley claims that nearly six hundred legionaries were slaughtered each minute until darkness brought an end to the bloodletting. [18] Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape, most of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium . Casualties Edit The Death of Aemilius Paulus by John Trumbull , 1773 Polybius writes that of the Roman and allied infantry, 70,000 were killed, 10,000 captured, and "perhaps" 3,000 survived. He also reports that of the 6,000 Roman and allied cavalry, only 370 survived. [19] Livy wrote "it is said that 45,500 foot soldiers and 2,700 horsemen were slain in almost equal proportion of citizens and allies".

[20] He also reports that 3,000 Roman and allied infantry and 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry were taken prisoner by the Carthaginians. [21] Although Livy does not cite his source by name, it is likely to have been Quintus Fabius Pictor , a Roman historian who fought in and wrote on the Second Punic War. It is Pictor whom Livy names when reporting the casualties at the Battle of Trebia . [22] In addition to the consul Paullus, Livy goes on to record that among the dead were 2 quaestors, 29 of the 48 military tribunes (some of consular rank, including the consul of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus , and the former Master of the Horse , Marcus Minucius Rufus ), and 80 "senators or men who had held offices which would have given them the right to be elected to the Senate". [23] Later Roman and Greco-Roman historians largely follow Livy's figures. Appian gave 50,000 killed and "a great many" taken prisoner.

[24] Plutarch agreed, "50,000 Romans fell in that battle... 4,000 were taken alive". [25] Quintilian : "60,000 men were slain by Hannibal at Cannae". [26] Eutropius: "20 officers of consular and praetorian rank, 30 senators, and 300 others of noble descent, were taken or slain, as well as 40,000 foot-soldiers, and 3,500 horse". [27] Some modern historians, while rejecting Polybius's figure as flawed, are willing to accept Livy's figure. [28] Some more recent historians have come up with far lower estimates. Cantalupi proposed Roman losses of 10,500 to 16,000. [29] Samuels also regards Livy's figure as far too high, on the grounds that the cavalry would have been inadequate to prevent the Roman infantry escaping to the rear. He doubts that Hannibal even wanted a high death toll, as much of the army consisted of Italians whom Hannibal hoped to win as allies.

[30] Punic and allied Livy recorded Hannibal's losses at "about 8,000 of his bravest men." [31] Polybius reports 5,700 dead: 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spanish and Africans, and 200 cavalry. [19] Aftermath Edit For more details on this topic, see Second Punic War . Hannibal counting the signet rings of the Roman knights killed during the battle, statue by Sébastien Slodtz , 1704, Louvre “ Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been such excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe it, nor will I weaken the reality by going into details... it was not wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in existence; Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly there is no other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight of calamity.

” —Livy, on the Roman Senate's reaction to the defeat [32] For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their best armies in the peninsula were destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely discredited. It was an appalling catastrophe . As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there was not a single person who was not either related to or acquainted with a person who had died. The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive [33] at the Forum of Rome and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic Sea [33] (perhaps one of the last instances of human sacrifices by the Romans, apart from public executions of defeated enemies dedicated to Mars). Lucius Caecilius Metellus, a military tribune , despaired so much of the Roman cause as to suggest that everything was lost, and called the other tribunes to sail overseas and hire themselves into the service of some foreign prince. [34] Afterwards, he was forced by his own example to swear an oath of allegiance to Rome for all time.

The survivors of Cannae were reconstituted as two legions and assigned to Sicily for the remainder of the war as punishment for their humiliating desertion of the battlefield. [34] In addition to the physical loss of her army, Rome suffered a symbolic defeat of prestige. A gold ring was a token of membership in the upper classes of Roman society; [34] Hannibal and his men collected more than 200 from the corpses on the battlefield, and sent this collection to Carthage as proof of his victory. The collection was poured on the floor in front of the Punic Senate, and was judged to be "three and a half measures." Hannibal had defeated the equivalent of eight consular armies (16 legions plus an equal number of allies). [35] Within just three campaign seasons (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of the entire population of male citizens over 17 years of age. [36] Furthermore, the morale effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause.

After Cannae, the Hellenistic southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Tarentum (two of the largest city-states in Italy) revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal. As Livy noted, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae than those which preceded it, can be seen by the behavior of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman power." [37] In the same year the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V , pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with the new King Hieronymus of Syracuse , the only independent left in Sicily. Following the battle, the commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal , urged Hannibal to seize the opportunity and march immediately on Rome. It is told that the latter's refusal caused Maharbal's exclamation: "Truly the gods have not bestowed all things upon the same person.

Thou knowest indeed, Hannibal, how to conquer, but thou knowest not how to make use of your victory." [38] Hannibal had good reasons to judge the strategic situation after the battle different from Maharbal. As the historian Hans Delbrück pointed out, due to the high numbers of killed and wounded among its ranks, the Punic army was not in a condition to perform a direct assault on Rome. It would have been a fruitless demonstration that would have nullified the psychological effect of Cannae on the Roman allies. Even if his army was at full strength, a successful siege of Rome would have required Hannibal to subdue a considerable part of the hinterland to secure his own and cut the enemy's supplies. Even after the tremendous losses suffered at Cannae and the defection of a number of her allies, Rome still had abundant manpower to prevent this and maintain considerable forces in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia and elsewhere despite Hannibal's presence in Italy.

[39] Hannibal's conduct after the victories at Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae, and the fact that he first attacked Rome only five years later, in 211 BC, suggests that his strategic aim was not the destruction of his foe but to dishearten the Romans by carnage on the battlefield and to wear them down to a moderate peace agreement by stripping them of their allies. [40] [41] Immediately after Cannae Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. Despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Senate refused to parley. Instead, they redoubled their efforts, declaring full mobilization of the male Roman population, and raised new legions, enlisting landless peasants and even slaves. [42] So firm were these measures that the word "peace" was prohibited, mourning was limited to only 30 days, and public tears were prohibited even to women. [10] :386 The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing other battles, had at this point learned their lesson and re-established trust in Fabius whose special tactics prior to Cannae have been blamed.

For the remainder of the war in Italy, they did not amass such large forces under one command against Hannibal; they utilized several independent armies, still outnumbering the Punic forces in numbers of armies and soldiers. The war still had occasional battles, but was focused on taking strongpoints and constant fighting according to the Fabian strategy . This finally forced Hannibal with his shortage of manpower to retreat to Croton from where he was called to Africa for the battle of Zama , ending the war with a complete Roman victory. Historical significance Edit Shield of Henry II of France depicting Hannibal's victory at Cannae, an allusion to France's conflict with the Holy Roman Empire during the 1500s. Cannae played a major role in shaping the military structure and tactical organization of the Roman Republican army . At Cannae, the Roman infantry assumed a formation similar to the Greek phalanx . This delivered them into Hannibal's trap, since their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army made it impossible for them to counter the encircling tactics employed by the Carthaginian cavalry. The laws of the Roman state requiring command to alternate between the two consuls restricted strategic consistency.

In the years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address these deficiencies. First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or that direction." Script errorScript error[ citation needed ] For instance, at Ilipa and Zama , the principes were formed up well to the rear of the hastati —a deployment that allowed a greater degree of mobility and maneuverability. The culminating result of this change marked the transition from the traditional manipular system to the cohort under Gaius Marius , as the basic infantry unit of the Roman army. In addition, a unified command came to be seen as a necessity. After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war.

This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman Republic but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions. Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen- militia army. Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force: the nucleus of Scipio's army at Zama was composed of veterans who had been fighting the Carthaginians in Hispania for nearly sixteen years, and had been moulded into a superb fighting force. Status in military history Edit Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history . Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio , the battle has acquired a significant reputation in military history . As military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote: Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability... than the battle of Cannae. The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side. The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in échelon ...

was first held there and then withdrawn step by step, until it had the reached the converse position... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics. The advance at the proper moment of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise. The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war. [1] As Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years". [2] Hannibal's double envelopement at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western world to be recorded in detail. [3] The "Cannae Model" Edit Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation , a strategy that has rarely been successfully implemented in modern history. As Dwight D.

Eisenhower , the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae". Furthermore, the totality of Hannibal's victory has made the name "Cannae" a byword for military success, and is studied in detail in military academies around the world. The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke ), who attempted to emulate its tactical paradigm of envelopment and re-create their own "Cannae". [4] Delbrück's seminal study of the battle had a profound influence on German military theorists, in particular the Chief of the German General Staff , Alfred von Schlieffen , whose eponymous " Schlieffen Plan " was inspired by Hannibal's double envelopment maneuver.

Schlieffen taught that the "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in maneuver warfare throughout the 20th century: A battle of annihilation can be carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in long forgotten times. The enemy front is not the goal of the principal attack. The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks be crushed. The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy formation. The annihilation is completed through an attack against the enemy's rear... To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks... Schlieffen later developed his own operational doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were translated and published in a work entitled Cannae. Historical sources Edit Medieval representation of the battle of Cannae There are three main accounts of the battle, none of them contemporary. The closest is Polybius, who wrote his account 50 years after the battle. Livy wrote in the time of Augustus, and Appian later still.

Appian's account describes events that have no relation with those of Livy and Polybius. [5] Polybius portrays the battle as the ultimate nadir of Roman fortunes, functioning as a literary device such that the subsequent Roman recovery is more dramatic. For example, some argue that his casualty figures are exaggerated—"more symbolic than factual". [6] Livy portrays the Senate in the role of hero and hence assigns blame for the Roman defeat to the low-born Varro. Blaming Varro also serves to lift blame from the Roman soldiers, whom Livy has a tendency to idealize. [7] Scholars tend to discount Appian's account. The verdict of Philip Sabin—"a worthless farrago"—is typical. [8] Historian Martin Samuels has questioned whether it was in fact Varro in command on the day on the grounds that Paullus may have been in command on the right. The warm reception that Varro received after the battle from the Senate was in striking contrast to the savage criticism meted out to other commanders. Samuels doubts whether Varro would have been received with such warmth had he been in command.

[9] Gregory Daly notes that, in the Roman military, the right was always the place of command. He suggests that at the Battle of Zama Hannibal was quoted saying that he had fought Paullus at Cannae and concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day. [10] See also ↑ O'Neill, Timothy R.. "A Civil War Reenactor's Manual" (PDF). p. 65. ~8cv/references/rotr-handbook.pdf . Retrieved July 4, 2013. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named cowley ↑ Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, pp. 17–18. ↑ Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, pp. 21–23. ↑ Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, pp. 24–25. ↑ Sabin, Philip. Lost Battles, p. 183. ↑ Samuels, M.

"The Reality of Cannae", Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1990, p. 23. ↑ Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, p. 120. Sources

Question: In ancient history, which Carthagian general beat the Romans at Cannae in 216 BC?
Answer: Hannibal