Dr David Kelly: 10 years on, death of scientist remains unresolved for some | Politics | The Guardian Dr David Kelly: 10 years on, death of scientist remains unresolved for some Death of WMD dossier scientist contributed to erosion of trust in politics Dr David Kelly during questioning by a Commons select committee in 2003. Photograph: PA Tuesday 16 July 2013 18.07 EDT First published on Tuesday 16 July 2013 18.07 EDT Close This article is 3 years old It was a case of the political becoming personal, only so overwhelmingly, that it crushed a man. A decade ago on Wednesday, just after 3.20pm, Dr David Kelly began a walk from his Oxfordshire home that ended the next morning with the discovery of his body, slumped in a wood. The Kelly family lost a loved one and a chain of events was set off that damaged trust in the Blair government and decapitated the leadership of the BBC . Kelly was the distinguished government scientist who hunted down weapons of mass destruction of the kind used by the Blair government to justify the 2003 war with Iraq .

The problem was the Saddam Hussein regime did not have them. A BBC Today programme report claimed the government had embellished or "sexed up" the intelligence it presented to the public in 2003 to justify the war. A furore erupted between the government, led by chief spin doctor Alastair Campbell , and the BBC, which refused to back down, having failed to spot the flaws in its reporting. Kelly was outed as the BBC's source, felt publicly humiliated and was reprimanded by his bosses. A proud man felt let down by them, and that his reputation built up over a lifetime was being irreparably tarnished. In the days before that final walk Kelly's family said they had never seen him so low. As news of his death spread, the normally self-assured Blair seemed stunned when a reporter cried: "Do you have blood on your hands?" Kelly's death led not to an inquest, but a public inquiry by Lord Hutton, which brought a rare glimpse into the secret worlds of Whitehall, British intelligence, the low arts of high politics, and the workings of the BBC. Its conclusion largely absolved the government of blame, and surprised observers.

Its criticism of the BBC led to the demise at the corporation of then chairman Gavyn Davies, correspondent Andrew Gilligan and director general Greg Dyke , who on Tuesday said history has proven the broadcaster was right: "Ten years on, it is very difficult to find anyone who believes they did not 'sex up' that document." Debate still surrounds Hutton's conclusion that Kelly committed suicide. The inquiry found that Kelly died after cutting an artery, had taken an overdose of painkillers and had heart disease which left his arteries "significantly narrowed". Thus, said experts, less blood loss may have killed the scientist than that needed to kill a healthy man. Among those who have called for an inquest or have doubts it was a suicide are former Tory leader Michael Howard, and Liberal Democrat minister Norman Baker, who wrote a book saying Kelly was most likely murdered. A group of doctors say Hutton's findings should be discarded and a new inquest held. Dr Stephen Frost said: "We have lots of evidence … No coroner in the land would reach a verdict of suicide as Lord Hutton did." Experts in forensic pathology point out the sceptics may be expert in their own fields, but not in the science of establishing the cause of death.

Hutton has kept silent since his report, breaking it only to write a letter denouncing the conspiracy theorists. Hutton's conclusion is supported by the available facts and experts: "At no time … was there any suggestion from any counsel for the interested parties or in any of the extensive media coverage that any of the police officers engaged in investigating Dr Kelly's death or any of the medical or scientific witnesses was involved in any sort of cover-up or plot to make a murder appear like a suicide." Dyke claimed that: "Some of Dr Kelly's wider family don't believe it's suicide." But the Conservative-led government has said the evidence for suicide is so compelling there is no need for a fresh hearing. Ben Page, chief executive of pollsters Ipsos Mori said the row over the 2003 Iraq war was part of a continued lack of trust in government and politicians: "It was part of the continuum of declining trust." "It is clear that Dr Kelly and anger over the reason Britain joined in with the Iraq war are intertwined." Later this year the Chilcot report is expected, but for ex-BBC boss Dyke, a one-time supporter of Tony Blair , the verdict is in: "History tells us Blair was destroyed by Iraq.

Blair will be only remembered for that, just as Sir Anthony Eden will be remembered for Suez." Iraq evidence 'vindicates BBC's dossier claims' » Alex Jones' Infowars: There's a war on for your mind! Independent May 14, 2011 The editor of the BBC’s Today programme at the time of its controversial 2003 report which claimed the Government had “sexed up” an Iraqi weapons dossier said last night that evidence provided to the Iraq Inquiry by the former intelligence official Michael Laurie proved that his team had been right all along. Kevin Marsh described Maj-Gen Laurie’s evidence as “devastating for [Alastair] Campbell”, the former Downing Street communications chief, whose furious response to the Today report led to the Hutton Inquiry and ultimately to the resignations of the BBC’s director general and chairman. “The thing that rankles with me a little bit is that I thought at the time when [the Today reporter] Andrew Gilligan came with the story was that it wasn’t just broadly correct, it was 100 per cent correct,” Mr Marsh said.

Fresh food that lasts from eFoods Direct (Ad) “Here’s the guy at the very top of the [Defence Intelligence Staff] saying, ‘we knew we were being pushed to find a certain bit of evidence and it was being presented in a certain way’ and that’s exactly what Andrew said in his story.” BBC NEWS | UK | Politics | Inquiry hears BBC's Kelly tape Inquiry hears BBC's Kelly tape Watts taped Dr Kelly conversation A tape recording of a conversation between BBC Newsnight reporter Susan Watts and Dr David Kelly has been played to the third day of the Hutton Inquiry. Ms Watts spoke to Dr Kelly the day after a report on BBC Radio 4's Today programme claimed that a government dossier on Iraqi arms had been "sexed up" by Downing Street. She told the inquiry she had recognised the gist of the comments in the Today report from her earlier conversations with Dr Kelly, but said she had not recognised the claim that the dossier had been transformed in the week before publication by Downing Street. After hearing the Today report, which quoted an unnamed source now known to be Dr Kelly, she e-mailed and then telephoned Dr Kelly.

HUTTON INQUIRY Set up after apparent suicide of Dr David Kelly in July Dr Kelly was government expert in Iraq weapons programmes He was named as source of controversial BBC report Report alleged government had 'sexed up' a dossier on Iraq's weapons capability Government denies the allegations Gilligan admits flawed language Ms Watts, who used a handheld tape recorder to record the conversation, said she asked Dr Kelly whether she had "missed a trick" in not picking up on his comments about Tony Blair's press chief Alastair Campbell in an earlier conversation with her. Dr Kelly said he could not say Mr Campbell had personally put the pressure on for the inclusion in the dossier of the claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction at 45 minutes' notice. He had never met Mr Campbell, he said, adding: "All I can say is the Number 10 Downing Street press office... But... I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible for it." 'Glib statement' Of the 45 minute claim, and Downing Street's attitude to it, Dr Kelly said: "I knew there was concern about the statement... it just got out of all proportion...

they were desperate for information, they were pushing hard for information which could be released - that was one that popped up and was seized on. "It was unfortunate that it was, which is why there is the argument between the intelligence services and cabinet office/number ten, because things were picked up on, and once they've picked up on it you can't pull it back, that's the problem." Lord Hutton has ruled that the tape of the discussion will not be released. In the earlier conversation Dr Kelly told Ms Watts it was a mistake for the government's dossier to include a claim that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could be ready within 45 minutes. Her notes of that conversation indicate he had suggested Mr Campbell may have played a part in its inclusion. EXTRACT FROM CONVERSATION BETWEEN SUSAN WATTS AND DR KELLY Susan Watts: OK, just back momentarily on the 45 minute issue I'm feeling like I ought to just explore that a little bit more with you... so would it be accurate then, as you did in that earlier conversation, to say that it was Alastair Campbell himself who... Dr Kelly: No I can't. All I can say is the Number 10 press office.

I've never met Alastair Campbell so I can't (SW interrupts "they seized on that?") But I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible for it. Kelly tape: Full transcript But she considered the reference to Downing Street's communications head to be a "a glib statement" of gossip, rather than fact, so she did not include it in her report. On Wednesday, Ms Watts told the inquiry she considered that Dr Kelly had "specifically denied" the suggestion that Alastair Campbell was responsible for any changes to the dossier. Dr Kelly apparently committed suicide after being named as the main source for the BBC Radio 4 Today programme report claiming Downing Street exaggerated Iraq's weapons capability to make the case for war. On Tuesday Mr Gilligan, the Today programme's defence correspondent behind that report, defended his account. But Ms Watts distanced her reporting from that of Mr Gilligan. The BBC is the focus of most of the hearing on Wednesday with BBC News special correspondent Gavin Hewitt following Ms Watts into the witness stand. Richard Sambrook Mr Hewitt told the inquiry that he spoke to Dr Kelly later on the day that the Today report had been broadcast.

Mr Hewitt said that Dr Kelly told him that "spin did come into play" in the drawing up of the dossier but added that the intelligence itself was "fundamentally reasonable" and that Dr Kelly would have liked to have seen more caveats in it. WITNESSES TO THE HUTTON INQUIRY THIS WEEK: Terence Taylor Day two: Key points Mr Hewitt said that the final week before publication had been "very frenetic" and that the dossier had changed substantially. The BBC's director of news, Richard Sambrook, began giving evidence after Mr Hewitt on Wednesday afternoon in London. Mr Sambrook began by outlining some of the history of complaints made by Downing Street about Andrew Gilligan reports. It emerged on Tuesday that the journalist had been criticised by his Today programme editor, Kevin Marsh, as demonstrating "flawed reporting" because of the language he used. Gilligan told the inquiry his first Today broadcast on 29 May, at 0607 BST, mistakenly said the government knew the 45-minute claim to be wrong. In the 18 subsequent broadcasts he did that day, he instead said the government knew it to be questionable, because the claim came from a single source.

Ms Watts, who finished her evidence shortly after 1230 BST, said that she had felt pressurised by her BBC bosses to reveal who the source was for her Newsnight reports on the Iraqi weapons dossier. She said this was because the BBC wanted to "mould the stories" and "to corroborate" Mr Gilligan's Today report. Ms Watts said: "I was unhappy about that." BBC NEWS | UK | Politics | Butler shows BBC was right - Dyke Butler shows BBC was right - Dyke Greg Dyke had to resign as BBC director general over the report The Butler report shows the BBC was right to broadcast Dr David Kelly's concerns over the government's Iraq weapons dossier, Greg Dyke said. The former BBC director general told Channel 4 News Dr Kelly's allegations were that Downing Street had "sexed-up" the dossier. That was the same as Lord Butler's conclusion that caveats should not have been removed from the dossier, he said. Mr Dyke resigned over the Hutton report into weapons expert Dr Kelly's death. 'Unfounded' Lord Hutton cleared the government of inserting material it "probably knew to be wrong" - including claims Iraq could launch WMD in 45 minutes - in the dossier.

as claimed in a BBC report. Mr Dyke said: "Dr Kelly's allegation was that Downing Street had "sexed up" the documents, i.e. that they had removed the caveats about the 45 minutes. "We now know the caveats were removed. We are now told by Butler they should not have been removed. "But nobody is telling us who removed them." 'Perfectly right' He said he thought a "number of people" involved in the production of the dossier would be "relieved they still had their jobs" following the publication of Wednesday's report, which found the intelligence case for the war in Iraq was "unreliable". He said he did not think the report took the issue of his own resignation "any further forward", other than to show "the BBC was perfectly right to report Dr Kelly's allegations and concerns". He added: "That's why I am not at the BBC today and that's why (former BBC chairman) Gavyn Davies is not at the BBC.

"I would defend that decision (to broadcast Dr Kelly's concerns) forever." Gilligan reaction Andrew Gilligan, the reporter responsible for the now infamous 6.07 Today programme broadcast, said there was "ample evidence" the government had "sexed up" the Iraq dossier. Caveats were removed and certain things were given more weight than they could bear, he told Channel 4 News. Lord Hutton said the key claims in Mr Gilligan's story were "unfounded" and cleared the government of "sexing up" the dossier. News on television 387 At 607am on May 29 2003 BBC - BUS - 10001 Trust in the news on television News on television 387 at 607am on may 29 2003 bbc SCHOOL View Full Document At 6.07a.m.

on May 29, 2003, BBC correspondent Andrew Gilligan fled a report on the Today Programme on Radio 4 in which he claimed that a DeFence Ministry source had accused the government oF exaggerating claims about the danger posed to Britain and the rest oF the world by Iraq in order to justiFy military invasion oF that country and the toppling oF its ruling dictator, Saddam Hussein. In a Famous phrase, the source was reported to have claimed that the government “sexed up” its September 2002 dossier on Iraq. In so doing, the government claimed that Iraq could launch weapons oF mass destruction (by which were meant biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) within 45 minutes. The Prime Minister’s then Director oF Communications, Alastair Campbell, was identifed as playing a prominent role in the draFting oF this statement, allegedly against the advice oF the intelligence services who took a more cautious view oF the immediacy oF the extent oF danger From Iraq’s weapons oF mass destruction. An internal investigation was launched by the government to seek out the source.

He was eventually identifed as Dr David Kelly, a Ministry oF DeFence (MoD) expert on Iraq. Shortly aFter a Commons Select Committee enquiry at which he Faced a public grilling over his part in the Gilligan story, Dr Kelly was discovered dead near his home, having apparently committed suicide. The Prime Minister immediately launched a public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly’s death, led by Lord Hutton. The Hutton inquiry heard evidence From government and intelligence sources, From the BBC and From Dr Kelly’s Family and other relevant sources. The Hutton inquiry Found Gilligan’s allegation that the government “sexed up” its Iraq dossier to be False. Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell were cleared oF any wrongdoing and DeFence Minister GeoFF Hoon got oFF lightly. The MoD was criticised For not telling Dr Kelly that his name could be confrmed or could come out as the source oF Gilligan’s accusation. The inquiry Found no evidence, however, oF any underhand or dishonourable conduct on the part oF the MoD. The BBC, in contrast, was Found to be seriously culpable in several respects.

Andrew Gilligan was criticised For poor journalistic practice and the BBC’s management was castigated For Failing to instigate the proper checks on the veracity oF this report, given the seriousness oF its allegations. Hutton’s criticisms oF the BBC were so severe that the BBC’s Chairman, Gavyn Davies and Director General, Greg Dyke, resigned within two days oF the fndings being published on January 28, 2004. Gilligan had claimed that the government had put pressure on the intelligence services to insert claims lacking in unequivocal evidence, that Saddam could launch weapons oF mass destruction within 45 minutes. He subsequently wrote a newspaper article blaming Alastair Campbell personally For persuading intelligence chieFs to revise the dossier. Hutton called Gilligan’s accusations unFounded. Doubt was cast on This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document. TERM Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology BUS 10001 - Spring 2011 NAME MUHAMMEDATIF REGNO.

7068 SUBMITTEDTO DR.AYUBMAHER COURSE THESIS1 TOPIC IMPACTOFG Front Page dossier in a Sentence | Vocabulary Builder Search Sentences Containing 'dossier' Géricault posed models, compiled a dossier of documentation, copied relevant paintings by other artists, and went to Le Havre to study the sea and sky. He also added that if elected, his administration would bolster Iran’s international relations and would find a “political solution” to closing the “dossier once and for all”. The Conservative Party Chairman Norman Tebbit, with the help of an academic lawyer, assembled a dossier of the BBC's coverage of the American bombing raid on Libya in which he claimed that the reporting was heavily biased against the Americans. In May 2003, the defence correspondent of the BBC Radio 4 "Today" programme, Andrew Gilligan, quoted a government official who stated that the British Government had ""sexed up"" a dossier concerning weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, against the wishes of the intelligence services. A second inquiry by Lord Butler of Brockwell did review the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction and the production of the dossier. Amongst other things, the "Butler Report" concluded that: "...

the fact that the reference the 45 minute claim in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions that it had been included because of its eye-catching character". Andrew Gilligan claims that the "Butler Report" vindicated his original story that the dossier had been ""sexed up"". His novels of this period include "Ladies Day/This Crowded Earth" (1968)(sf), "The Star Stalker" (1968)and "The Todd Dossier" (1969) (the book publication of which bears the byline "Collier Young"). See also "The Todd Dossier" under the Bibliography section above. For the first six evolutions, the team with the lower score was forced to vote off a player, and then headed into the dossier room to select a replacement. The James Bond Dossier (1965), by Kingsley Amis, is a critical analysis of the James Bond novels. "The James Bond Dossier" was the first, formal, literary study of the James Bond character.

Written at the Bond-mania’s zenith in the 1960s, "The James Bond Dossier" is the first, thorough, albeit tongue-in-cheek, literary analysis of Ian Fleming's strengths and weaknesses as a thriller-writer. Kingsley Amis had several motives for writing the "Dossier". In one hundred and sixty pages, "The James Bond Dossier" methodically catalogues and analyses the activities and minutiae of secret agent 007: the number of men he kills, the women he loves, the villains he thwarts, and the essential background of Ian Fleming's Cold War world of the 1950s. In the event, the "Dossier"’s publication was delayed a year, because Jonathan Cape asked Amis to include discussion of "The Man With the Golden Gun". "The James Bond Dossier" includes most of the Bond fiction cycle, excepting "Octopussy and The Living Daylights" (1966), the final collection of 007 short stories, which was published after the "Dossier".

Although written in Amis’s usual accessible, light-hearted style, "The James Bond Dossier" is neither patronising nor ironic — it is a detailed literary criticism of the Ian Fleming canon. Amis reserves his most serious criticism for what he considered to be academically pretentious rejections of the Bond books, a theme implicitly informing much of the "Dossier". Although, as noted elsewhere, Amis wrote three books related to the James Bond franchise, and may or may not have contributed to one of Fleming's novels, "The James Bond Dossier" would end up being the only book of this type to be published under Amis's own name. The defendants had collated a dossier of evidence that outlined alleged links between EDO Corp and war crimes which included statements given by witnesses and bombing victims from Palestine. Concerns about James Kakoza's education background have been a matter of speculation for quite a long time until recently, Tuesday 24 August 2010 when a Ugandan tabloid "The Red Pepper" recently released a dossier complete with scanned copies of the ministers academic papers describing the minster as a "grade F" Hero. Dossier 51 () is a novel by Gilles Perrault.

In 1978 it was made into a French film, directed by Michel Deville. The book resembles a dossier (file) containing notes, memos, wiretap transcripts, expense reports and interoffice correspondence (including administrative details, even some bickering) written in various personal styles. The book/dossier concludes with an irrelevant administrative memo, there is no remorse whatsoever about the tragic consequences of the investigation. In 1962, when a British resident of the United States, Mary Hardwick Hare, presented a dossier proving that support for such an event was overwhelming, the ITF was persuaded that a team championship played over one week in a different venue each year was a 'good idea'. More Vocab Words dazzle - make blind with a sudden intense light; amaze; fill with wonder asunder - into parts; apart; V. sunder putrid - decayed and foul-smelling; foul; rotten; decayed; N. putridity ignominy - deep disgrace; shame or dishonor; ADJ. ignominious; Ex. ignominous defeat convulsion - violent uncontrollable shaking movement (caused by illness); V. convulse; ADJ.

convulsive platitude - trite remark; commonplace statement; ADJ. platitudinous halting - hesitant; faltering; not fluent; Ex. halting steps/voice; V. halt: proceed or act with uncertainty; falter; hesitate; waver; stop Chilcot report: The power struggles, leaks and scandals behind the Iraq War | The Independent UK Politics Chilcot report: The power struggles, leaks and scandals behind the Iraq War The Iraq inquiry ought to mark the culmination of 13 years of recrimination – but it will not be the last word Monday 4 July 2016 19:34 BST Click to follow Indy Politics Demonstrators outside Parliament earlier this year Getty Images In the United States, George W Bush seemed to be able to ride out the waves of bad news from Iraq . In Britain, by contrast, Tony Blair was continually on the defensive, in particular over those weapons of mass destruction that did not exist. It was this issue that led to the lonely death of the weapons inspector Dr David Kelly .

Follow our latest updates on the Chilcot report That part of the story began soon after 6am on 29 May 2003 when Andrew Gilligan, defence correspondent for the Today programme on BBC Radio 4, broadcast a sensational claim that he had been told by someone high up in the security services that the spooks were aggrieved because the September dossier had been transformed on instructions from Downing Street. In a subsequent article for the Daily Mail, Gilligan named Alastair Campbell as the culprit. On the day of the broadcast, Tony Blair was visiting the troops in Iraq, with Campbell at his side. The next day he was in Warsaw. Trying to talk about Poland's future in Europe, Blair was plagued with questions about Gilligan's allegation. When the Prime Minister's party returned to London, Campbell began a relentless campaign to get the BBC to say that Gilligan was wrong. This included trying to find his source in the intelligence services. Dr Kelly came forward and admitted talking to the journalist, but did not admit to saying everything Gilligan had attributed to his unnamed source. His identity was soon leaked.

A behind the scenes look at how Tony Blair took Britain to war in Iraq Gilligan claimed that he had spoken to more than one person, and was not prepared to name his principle source when subjected to hostile questioning by the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The committee insisted on questioning Dr Kelly. What he did not know as he gave evidence was that Gilligan had privately told a member of the committee that Dr Kelly had also spoken to another BBC journalist, Susan Watts. Confronted, Dr Kelly admitted speaking to her but said he did not recognise comments that Watts had used in her broadcast. But Watts had a recording to prove they were his - although whether Dr Kelly lied or simply became confused under pressure, no one knows. Afterwards, it probably dawned on him that he was going to be exposed, and would probably never work as a weapons inspector again. On 17 July, two days after his appearance at the committee, he went for a walk in woods near his Oxfordshire home. His body was found the following morning. He had died from an overdose of painkillers.

Campbell began a relentless campaign to get the BBC to say that the Today Programme's Andrew Gilligan was wrong (Getty Images) The death of Dr Kelly has found its way into mythology. There is a school of thought that says he did not kill himself but was assassinated to prevent him revealing the secrets behind the Iraq war. In the hope of dampening that kind of speculation, Tony Blair ordered a judge-led inquiry into the death. This was the Hutton inquiry, the first of three into the Iraq war, which ran from August 2003 to January 2004, eventually concluding that Dr Kelly's death was a suicide, that the Government was not at fault, but that the BBC was. The BBC's chairman, Gavyn Davies, and its director-general, Greg Dyke, resigned. Naturally, the Hutton report was denounced as a whitewash. The next inquiry was a review of the intelligence reports by the former head of the civil service, Lord Butler, whose report came out in July 2004.

While it was mildly critical of MI6's weaknesses in checking the reliability of its sources, Lord Butler's general conclusion was that the Iraq war happened because of the 11 September atrocities, not because faulty intelligence had caused the government to believe Iraq held WMDs. What is the Chilcot Inquiry? In the light of that conclusion, it is worth asking why the WMDs issue, and the dodginess of the September dossier, have assumed such importance over the years. One factor, curiously, is the BBC charter. The conditions under which BBC journalists work did not allow them to express a view on the wisdom or folly of going to war. If the Government had misled the public, however, their duty was to expose the falsehood. The “sexed up” dossier was a story into which they could sink their teeth and demonstrate independence from government control. Tony Blair leaves the Iraq Inquiry in January 2011 (GETTY) The WMD theme has also served the purposes of people who supported the Iraq war at the time, then wished they had not.

Boris Johnson, for example, is now one of the war's harshest critics, although he voted for it in March 2003 when Parliament's vote made a difference. His explanation is that he was misled by Tony Blair. “I would like to understand more deeply on what basis a prime minister who, at that time, commanded so much trust, was able to persuade Parliament and the country and me to go for war in Iraq with absolutely catastrophic consequences,” he said in an interview last May. The third inquiry, chaired by Lord Chilcot, began its work in November 2009, and held its last public session in February 2011, from which date the long wait for the report began.

The key players in the Iraq War The key players in the Iraq War 1/11 Jack Straw Jack Straw was the UK foreign secretary at the time of the Iraq invasion, and fully endorsed the decision Getty Images Geoff Hoon was Tony Blair’s defence secretary from October 1999 to May 2005 Getty Images 3/11 Alastair Campbell Alastair Campbell was involved in the drafting of two Downing Street dossiers on the war, in September 2002 and in February 2003 Getty Images 4/11 John Scarlett John Scarlett was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time of the 2003 invasion Getty Images Peter Goldsmith was Mr Blair’s attorney general from 2001 to 2007 AFP/Getty Images 6/11 Condoleezza Rice Condoleezza Rice was named as National Security Advisor to George W Bush in 2000, becoming the first woman to occupy the post, and argued publicly in favour of the 2003 invasion Getty Images Colin Powell was Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005 Getty Images for TIME Tommy Franks was the leading US general at the start

 of the Iraq war 9/11 Dick Cheney Dick Cheney was George W Bush’s vice president from 2001 to 2009 Getty Images 10/11 Paul Bremer Paul Bremer ran Iraq for 14 months after the invasion, appointed Bush’s Presidential Envoy in charge of the occupying forces Getty Images Hans Blix was the UN weapons inspector tasked with monitoring Iraq from 2002 to 2003 Getty Images It takes many years for the impact of an event as significant as the Iraq war to be seen in its true context.

To take another case from that region of the world, in 1953 the CIA organised the overthrow of Iran's elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossabegh , who appeared to threaten Western oil interests, and returned the Shah of Persia to absolute power. For 26 years afterwards, the organisers of the coup could congratulate themselves on successfully protecting Western interests. Since the revolution of 1979, it has been difficult for anyone to argue that the overthrow of Mossabegh was anything but a colossal blunder. Words of mass destruction that continue to deceive There are people who supported the action at the time but who now think it was a mistake, or worse. There has been almost no intellectual traffic in the opposite direction. Jack Straw , who was Foreign Secretary in 2003, is one of those who have remained wedded to the idea that the war was justifiable. During the “ Arab Spring ” of 2010-11, he pointed out that Iraq was one of the few countries in the region where there were no crowds in the streets trying to bring down the government - hard evidence, he suggested, that Iraq was beginning to function like a democracy.

Later, Straw conceded that this judgement was “premature”, but it was not frivolous. Whatever their faults, the governments that have operated out of Baghdad since 2003 have been an improvement on the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Iraq's Shia majority at last have a government dominated by their co-religionists. The Kurds have also gained de facto self-rule in a part of Iraq. Israel is no longer threatened by a hostile Iraqi regime with powerful weapons. That summarises the case for the Iraq war, such as it is. How the Blair and Bush 'liberation' of Iraq backfired But, to go back to the beginning: the event which triggered the Iraq war was the terrorist outrage of 11 September 2001, and the original purpose of the “war on terror”, of which the invasion of Iraq was a major part, was to stop such outrages from happening again. George Bush and Dick Cheney continue to maintain that there was a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam's regime, a theory that Blair has never renounced either, despite no hard evidence having been produced to support that supposition.

Saddam was guilty of countless crimes, but, while he was in power, no one in Iraq was planning terrorist outrages in London or New York. Now we have to assume that they are. Thirteen years after it began, the Iraq war can be seen to have facilitated the very thing it was supposed to prevent. This week, Sir John Chilcot’s report will finally suggest to us what lessons we can learn from that long-drawn-out calamity. More about: Sexed up: How London sold its war on Iraq NEWS YOU WON'T FIND ON CNN Sexed up: How London sold its war on Iraq By David Isenberg 01/28/04 ( Asia Times ) Aside from jointly invading another country, it appears that the United States and Great Britain have another thing in common as a part of their "special relationship". They both twisted and distorted intelligence to suit their political needs. That this has happened in the US is now well known, but the British equivalent has not been well appreciated outside of the UK. That is about to change.

Political careers are on the line with the imminent release, on February 28, of the report of the Hutton inquiry, chaired by Lord Hutton, set up last year to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly. Geoff Hoon, the Minister of Defense, is considered the odds on favorite to be the fall guy, with Prime Minister Tony Blair also expected to have some hard explaining to do - which he has promised once Hutton's report is finally released. The Independent newspaper has reported that at least six people associated with Blair's government could be in for criticism. The daily said that these six had sent late written submissions to Hutton, following letters from him saying that they faced possible criticism. Kelly was a scientist, a leading British government expert in chemical and biological warfare, and a former United Nations weapons inspector who was the source of information for the assertion by BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan, who in a 6:07 am Today program last May 29 claimed that the British government had "sexed up" the dossier it released on September 24, 2002 regarding the purported threat of Iraqi unconventional weaponry. Gilligan claimed that the dossier was transformed against the wishes of the intelligence agencies.

He also said that the government knew the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was false. As it turned out Gilligan, admitted that it was he, and not Kelly, who first uttered the phrase "sexed up"; Kelly merely repeated back to him the phrase that Gilligan first said. On July 15 last year, Kelly testified before a televised hearing of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee about an unauthorized interview he had given to Gilligan. Although he was told by his employer, the Ministry of Defense, that it wouldn't take any disciplinary action, Kelly, by all accounts, a deeply private man, found the publicity excruciating. On July 17 he killed himself by slitting his wrist. But none of this should be taken to mean that the British government was innocent of deception. As Cambridge academic Glen Rangwala noted: "A member of the defense intelligence staff ... wrote just before the dossier's release to Tony Cragg, then the deputy chief of defense intelligence, to express formal reservations about the dossier.

According to Martin Howard, Mr Cragg's successor, the reservation was partly that 'the language was too strong on the continued production of chemical and biological agents'." Neither the senior intelligence official nor Kelly accepted that Iraq had continued to produce prohibited weapons. The ongoing production of weapons was a crucial element of the case for a threat from Iraq, because most of its chemical or biological agents produced before 1991 would have become useless. The suspicion that the intelligence community focused on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) potential rather than existing weapons is increased by changes to the text visible in the limited excerpts released so far during the Hutton inquiry from earlier drafts of the September dossier.

The draft of the dossier from September 10, two weeks before its release, concludes: "Intelligence confirms that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programs, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687." This is changed in the final version of the dossier to: "Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programs, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687, and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents." On the same page is the only allegation that Iraq actually has such weapons: "Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production." In the final version of the dossier, this is strengthened to: "Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production." Similarly, the claim that weapons could be used within 45 minutes was strengthened between the draft of the dossier dated September 16 and that published eight days later.

The earlier version raised a possibility: "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." The version released to the public lost the element of uncertainty: "Military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them." According to the BBC's Panorama program shown last week in Britain, Kelly believed that Saddam Hussein's arsenal posed an immediate threat to Western interests, but could not have been deployed within minutes, as the British government claimed. The program also accused the BBC's own managers of badly mishandling the row over the Blair government's justification for war against Iraq, and concluded that Britain's top spy chiefs had improperly acted as tools of the ruling Labour Party government. Robin Cook, British foreign minister before resigning over the UK's decision to participate in the war against Iraq, wrote: "When the cabinet of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government discussed the dossier on Hussein's WMD, I argued that I found the document curiously derivative. It set out what we knew about Hussein's chemical and biological arsenal at the time of the 1991 Gulf War.

It then leaped to the conclusion that Hussein must still possess all those weapons. "There was no hard intelligence of a current weapons program that would represent a new and compelling threat to our interests. Nor did the dossier at any stage admit the basic scientific fact that biological and chemical agents have a finite shelf life, a principle understood by every pharmacist. Go to your medicine chest and check out the existence of an expiration date on nearly everything you possess. Nerve agents of good quality have a shelf life of about five years and anthrax in liquid solution of about three years. Hussein's stocks were not of good quality. The Pentagon itself concluded that Iraqi chemical munitions were of such poor standard that they were usable for only a few weeks." Furthermore, public evidence to the Hutton inquiry has already revealed a number of discrepancies in the role of the intelligence agencies. For example, when Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, officially known only as "C", emerged from secrecy to give evidence, he insisted that the compilation of the September dossier had been perfectly proper, but also revealed some damning information.

When asked whether the dossier had given undue prominence to the 45 minutes claim, Dearlove replied: Dearlove: Well, I think given the misinterpretation that was placed on the 45 minutes intelligence, with the benefit of hindsight, you can say that is a valid criticism. But I am confident that the intelligence was accurate and that the use made of it was entirely consistent with the original report. Lord Hutton: Would you just elaborate what you mean by the misinterpretation placed on the 45 minutes claim? Dearlove: Well, I think the original report referred to chemical and biological munitions, and that was taken to refer to battlefield weapons. I think what subsequently happened in the reporting was that it was taken that the 45 minutes applied, let us say, to weapons of a longer range. This exchange surely validates Gilligan's claim that the dossier had been "sexed up". Furthermore, Iraqi battlefield weapons with chemical and biological warheads, even if they did exist, presented no threat to the stability of the Middle East, still less to Britain and the US. Documentary evidence provided to the inquiry has also demonstrated that senior figures inside Downing Street knew the evidence about Iraqi WMD was weak.

An email sent to John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, from Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, shortly before the dossier was published, said: "The document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat, from Saddam ... We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat." But this is exactly what the final version of the dossier claimed. As Clare Short, the international development secretary who resigned from Blair's cabinet in May 2003, said: "... as a result of the Hutton inquiry, we now know that two defense intelligence officials wrote to their boss to put on record their disquiet at the exaggeration in the dossier. Moreover, one official asked his boss for advice as to whether he should approach the Foreign Affairs Select Committee after the foreign secretary had said that he was not aware of any unhappiness among intelligence officials about the claims made in the dossier." In fact, the Hutton inquiry is expected to confirm that while members of the defense intelligence staff protested at many of the claims in the dossier, they were ignored - not by Downing Street, but by top intelligence officials.

However, the inquiry has already revealed that Blair's closest advisers, including Alastair Campbell, his communications chief, and Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, put pressure on senior intelligence officers, and they succumbed. Aside from the misuse of intelligence, it appears that the British government also resorted to outright propaganda. In late December 2003, the British government confirmed that the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, had run an operation to gain public support for sanctions and the use of military force in Iraq. It had organized Operation Mass Appeal, a campaign to plant stories in the media about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And finally, there is the case of a second "dodgy dossier" published by Downing Street in February last year. In its annual report published on June 10, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) was heavily critical of the February dossier: "We believe that material produced by the [intelligence] agencies can be used in publications and attributed appropriately, but it is imperative that the agencies are consulted before any of their material is published. This process was not followed when a second document was produced in February 2003.

Although the document did contain some intelligence-derived material, it was not clearly attributed or highlighted amongst the other material, nor was it checked with the agency providing the intelligence or cleared by the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] prior to publication." Downing Street has apologized for failing to admit that much of the dossier came from published academic sources, including an article by a California PhD student. The bulk of the 19-page document (pages 6-16) was directly copied without acknowledgement from an article in the September 2002 edition of Middle East Review of International Affairs, entitled "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis". The author was Ibrahim al-Marashi, a postgraduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. But the question remains, who authorized its release in this format, and why? Officially, Blair has remained confident that evidence of proscribed Iraqi weaponry would be found, and has even hinted that some of the evidence has already been accumulated.

In a television interview at a Russia-European Union summit at the end of May 2003, Blair said that he had already seen plenty of information that his critics had not, but would in due course: "Over the coming weeks and months we will assemble this evidence and then we will give it to people ... I have no doubt whatever that the evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction will be there. Those people who are sitting there saying 'Oh it is all going to be proved to be a great big fib got out by the security services, there will be no weapons of mass destruction', just wait and have a little patience. I certainly do know some of the stuff that has already been accumulated ... which is not yet public but what we are going to do is assemble that evidence and present it properly." But to date, no evidence has been released. In reality, however, it seems likely that Hutton and other reports to come will continue to produce shades of grey, rather than the conclusive outcome for which many, especially in the media, are looking. Hutton is unlikely to imply that Blair has lied or was responsible for Kelly's death.

But Downing Street is open to criticism over the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that was presented to parliament in September 2002. And public opinion is liable to swing further against Blair, depending on how critical Hutton is. One poll for The Guardian found that 63 percent of Britons want the 50-year-old prime minister to resign if Hutton says that he lied about revealing Kelly's identity. And to a greater degree than US President George W Bush, Blair sold the Iraq war to the British public by warning of the dangers of Saddam's pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the risk of those weapons falling into the hands of global terrorists. The inquiry is also sure to continue for some time. It was reported in The Times of London last week that a British coroner is prepared to open a new inquest into the death of Kelly. Nicholas Gardiner, the Oxfordshire Coroner, believes that the Hutton inquiry was unable to examine all the evidence. At least five witnesses refused to release their statements to the Hutton inquiry, and police handed Lord Hutton only 70 of the 300 witness statements they took during their inquiries, the newspaper said.

David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide background in arms control and national security issues. He co-authored the recently released report, Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq . Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd Join our Daily News Headlines Email Digest Fill out your emailaddress Chilcot Report: Who Are The Key Players In The Iraq War Inquiry | The Huffington Post Chilcot Report: Who Are The Key Players In The Iraq War Inquiry 05/07/2016 21:12 | Updated 06 July 2016 110 Some seven years in the making, the long-awaited report into the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War will finally be published. On Wednesday morning, Sir John Chilcot will deliver his findings of the period from 2001 until the end of July 2009, specifically the decision of then Prime Minister Tony Blair to lead the country into the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Here are some of the public figures we can expect to see mentioned in the 2.6 million word report.

Tony Blair Dominic Lipinski/PA Wire Tony Blair is expected to be heavily criticised in the report. Many believe he misled the public over the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before launching what many still believe was an illegal war. The former prime minister is said to be planning a press conference or a major speech in response to the report, with one source informing The Times: “He will come out all guns blazing. But Iraq has affected him a lot. It has made him into a defensive, awkward, self-conscious individual who feels destabilized by it.” Blair’s decision to go to war in Iraq will not be investigated by the International Criminal Court, a spokesman told The Sunday Telegraph . He added that prosecutors would comb through the report for evidence of war crimes committed by British troops, but that the decision to go to war remained outside of its remit. This means individual soldiers could be prosecuted for war crimes but not Blair.

Alastair Campbell Dominic Lipinski/PA Wire In the run-up to the Iraq War, Campbell, who was Blair’s chief spin doctor, was involved in the preparation and release of the September Dossier in September 2002 and the Iraq Dossier (later known as the ‘Dodgy Dossier’) in February 2003. Both documents argued the case for concern over possible weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both have been criticised as “misrepresenting” the actual intelligence findings and making a case for war. It is believed Campbell will escape serious criticism in the Chilcot report as he has not been sent a letter by the inquiry, nor has been offered a right to reply. A source told The Sunday Times : “Campbell has not had a letter. He is in the clear. He was in some ways a bit of a bit player in this.

“Those who were directly responsible were the heads of agencies who allowed him to ‘sex up’ the ‘dodgy dossier’ and of course the prime minister for whom he was working.” Saddam Hussein Reuters Photographer / Reuters Saddam Hussein had served as President of Iraq since 1979 when Tony Blair joined US President George W Bush’s coalition to topple the dictator in 2003. Saddam was tracked down and captured by US forces in December 2003. He was found cowering in a hole in the ground, stinking, filthy and with his face covered with an unkempt beard. He was executed by hanging in December 2006 after an Iraqi special tribunal found him guilty of crimes against humanity for the killing of Shiites and Kurds. Hans Blix KATHY WILLENS/AP Hans Blix was the UN weapons inspector tasked with finding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction between 2000 and 2003. He and his team of inspectors had visited 500 sites but found no evidence of WMDs.

When he and his team were forced to pull out of Iraq on the eve of the war, he said he had been “looking for smoking guns” but had not found any. Speaking during an inquiry into the war in 2010, Blix said: “We carried out about six inspections per day over a long period of time. All in all, we carried out about 700 inspections at 500 different sites and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction.” He has since stated it is his “firm view” that the Iraq War was illegal. Dr David Kelly PA Biological warfare expert Dr David Kelly had an off-the-record conversation with BBC Today journalist Andrew Gilligan, which led to him producing a report alleging the government had “sexed up” the dossier making the case to go to war and naming Dr Kelly as one of his sources. Dr Kelly was ordered to give evidence before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on July 15 2003, where he said he did not believe he was the main source for Gilligan’s story.

While the scientist said certain aspects of Gilligan’s report tallied with their conversation, his account of Campbell’s intervention with the September dossier was not “a factual record of my interaction with him.” “From the conversations I had with him, I don’t know how he could have had the authority to make the statements he is making,” Dr Kelly told the committee. Publicly humiliated, Dr Kelly was found dead on July 18 2003. Andrew Gilligan Jeff Overs via Getty Images Andrew Gilligan was the BBC journalist responsible for the Today programme report which claimed the Government had “sexed up” the September dossier. Gilligan said a “senior official in charge of compiling the dossier” had alleged the government had included the claim that WMDs could be launched within 45 minutes even though it had come from just one unreliable source. Biological warfare scientist Dr David Kelly was later outed as one of Gilligan’s sources, though he told a panel of MPs at a Foreign Affairs Select Committee he did not believe he could be the source quoted in the report.

The Hutton Report stated Gilligan’s allegation that the “Government probably knew that the 45-minutes claim was wrong before the government decided to put it in the dossier, was an allegation which was unfounded.” In January 2004, Gilligan resigned from his job as the defence and diplomatic correspondent for BBC Radio 4’s Today programme. Jack Straw Dave Thompson/PA Archive The British foreign secretary at the time of the invasion, Straw has since admitted he was skeptical of the war and considered resigning. His resignation would have likely stopped British involvement in the war and could have toppled Blair’s government. However, he came to the conclusion at the time that the war was “right and inevitable.” In 2012 Straw said the war and his support for it, was a mistake. “I deeply regret it, and I regret even more the fact the whole basis on which we went to war turned out to be wrong,” he said. Sources claim Straw will also be singled out for the inexperience of Foreign & Commonwealth personnel sent to run the civilian administration in Iraq and the lack of and poor resources given to them. George W.

Bush Jim Young / Reuters US President George W Bush declared war on Iraq on 20 March 2003. During a televised address, he said: “My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. “On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign.” Following the September 11 2001 terror attacks launched by Al-Qaeda on New York’s World Trade Centre and other US east coast targets, then-prime minister Tony Blair had promised Bush the UK would support the US in whatever action it took. In a broadcast from Downing Street on the same day, Blair cemented the friendship, vowing: “We here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends.” Clare Short Chris Young/PA Archive Former Labour MP Clare Short quit Tony Blair’s cabinet over the invasion, stating neither WMDs or the 9/11 attacks could justify it.

In 2010 Short, who maintains the decision to go to war put the world in greater danger of international terrorism, gave evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, in which she accused Blair of lying to her and misleading parliament in the build-up to the war. Last year she condemned the Chilcot Inquiry as a “very, very poor” piece of work. Speaking to BBC Radio 4’s World At One, she said the report is likely to find that: “Everyone’s to blame [and] no one’s to blame.” She added: “The hope of it being a good piece of work that Britain learns what went wrong and we don't do it again looks very, very poor to me.” Sir Richard Dearlove Stefan Rousseau/PA Wire The ex-head of M16, who helmed the agency from 1999 to 2004 is expected to be strongly criticised for intelligence given to Tony Blair, which laid the groundwork for the ‘dodgy dossier’ about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and the subsequent ground invasion.

Sources tell The Sunday Times Dearlove will specifically be admonished for preventing the Downing Street “gloss” which led to the now infamous claim Saddam Hussein could attack British targets at 45 minutes' notice. John Scarlett Frank Augstein/AP A former spy, John Scarlett was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time of the invasion. He was involved in drawing up dossiers on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. In 2009 he told the Chilcot Inquiry said there had been a misinterpretation in the claim Saddam Hussein could hit British targets with WMDs in 45 minutes. He said: “It would have been much clearer and better, the matter would not have been lost in translation, if it had been spelt out in the dossier that the word was ‘munitions’, not ‘weapons’. But he insisted: “There was absolutely no conscious intention to manipulate the language or obfuscate or create a misunderstanding as to what they might refer to.” British Military ASSOCIATED PRESS The Chilcot Inquiry is expected to slam senior defence chiefs for being too slow to replaced lightly-armoured Snatch Land Rovers, after their vulnerability to roadside bombs became evident.

The vehicles, originally designed to transport troops in Northern Ireland and shipped to Iraq for their speed over rough ground, became known as “mobile coffins” by soldiers. The MoD has maintained decisions about battlefield equipment are for politicians and military commanders. Armoured Mastiff vehicles did not arrive until the end of 2006. Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as 'Chemical Ali' Pool via Getty Images Iraqi military commander Ali Hassan al-Majid was one of Saddam Hussein’s most notorious henchmen and also the dictator’s cousin to boot. In the autumn of 2002 he was named as one of the “dirty dozen” of Saddam’s closest allies by US President George W Bush. He was executed in 2010 after being sentenced to death for the poison gas attacks that killed more than 5,000 Kurds in 1988. Al-Majid — widely known as “Chemical Ali” for the gas attacks — was convicted for ordering the poison gas to be dropped on the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988 as part of a campaign against a Kurdish uprising. “The armed forces must kill any human being or animal present,” he decreed.

It was the fourth death sentence against him for crimes against humanity. Sir John Chilcot David Cheskin/PA Wire Sir John Chilcot was the Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office from 1990 before retiring from his career as a civil servant at the end of 1997. Sir John launched the inquiry into Britain’s participation in the Iraq war in July 2009. An analysis by The Independent in 2015 claims Sir John and his fellow committee members, and their advisers, have shared more than £1.5m in fees since the start of the inquiry. The total expenditure since 2009 is £10,375,000. Donald Rumsfeld ASSOCIATED PRESS Donald Rumsfeld served as George W. Bush’s defence secretary from 2001 to 2006. He was responsible for the US campaign during the Iraq War which saw the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Though he initially received praise for his handling of the war, he was later criticised for it, with some accusing him of deploying an inadequate number of troops. He resigned as defence secretary in 2006 and was replaced by Robert M Gates.

In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations two months after the invasion, Rumsfeld said: “This much is clear: we have a stake in their success. “For if Iraq, with it’s size, capabilities, resources and its history – is able to move to the path of representative democracy, however bumpy the road, then the impact in the region and the world could be dramatic. Iraq could conceivably become a model – proof that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremism taking place in the Muslim world today.” In 2015, Rumsfeld appeared to contradict this when he told The Times : “The idea that we could fashion a democracy in Iraq seemed to me unrealistic. “I was concerned about it when I first heard these words… I’m not one who thinks that our particular template of democracy is appropriate for other countries at every moment of their histories.” Dick Cheney Olivia Harris / Reuters Dick Cheney was vice president from 2001 to 2009 under George W. Bush. He helped shape Bush’s approach to the ‘War on Terror’ and made repeated public statements alleging the presence of WMDs in Iraq – none of which were ever found.

In 2015 Cheney insisted he had no regrets over his administration’s decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein. “It was the right thing to do then. I believed it then and I believe it now,” Cheney said in an interview on CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360. He added: “No apologies.” Robin Cook FIONA HANSON/PA Archive Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook resigned from his positions as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons in protest against the invasion of Iraq. Although he failed to halt the conflict, his speech earned him an unprecedented standing ovation. He said: "I can't accept collective responsibility for the decision to commit Britain now to military action in Iraq without international agreement or domestic support." Cook died of a heart attack two years later. According to the New Statesman , the epitaph on is gravestone reads: "I may not have succeeded in halting the war but I did secure the right of parliament to decide on war." Geoff Hoon David Jones/PA Archive Geoff Hoon was defence secretary from 1999 to 2005.

In 2002 he controversially told the BBC’s Jonathan Dimbleby that a war in Iraq could be justified without a UN resolution. In 2010 Hoon told the Chilcot inquiry he had warned Tony Blair Iran represented a greater threat to British interests than Iraq and admitted there were “private communications” between the Prime Minister and George W. Bush – that he was not privy too. He also claimed extra supplies of enhanced body armour for troops fighting in Iraq were not regarded as a top priority following spending cuts imposed by the Treasury. Kelly 'said government sexed up Iraq dossier' | Media | The Guardian Kelly 'said government sexed up Iraq dossier' Click here to enter the Hutton inquiry website Gilligan: challenged Kelly's accounts of their meetings Tuesday 12 August 2003 11.40 EDT First published on Tuesday 12 August 2003 11.40 EDT Share on Messenger Close BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan today said David Kelly was in no doubt the government had "sexed up" the Iraq intelligence dossier at the heart of the Hutton inquiry.

He told the inquiry it was Dr Kelly who had first raised the name of Alastair Campbell in relation to the "transformation" of the dossier and the scientist had first raised the controversial claim that Saddam Hussein could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. The BBC Radio 4 Today programme's defence correspondent added he spoke to two senior government sources and they did not deny Dr Kelly's claims. Gilligan's notes show Dr Kelly suggested the dossier was transformed from something bland and "not very exciting" to something far more "sexy" in the week before publication. Giving evidence on the second day of the inquiry, Gilligan revealed he did not have "full and comprehensive" notes of his key meeting with Dr Kelly in May. He could not produce a full transcript of the meeting because he had taken notes on a personal organiser that he could no longer find. However, Gilligan did present a printout from the Palm Pilot, which showed his notes of his talks with Dr Kelly about the September dossier in an annotated form. He said these notes made it clear his Today programme report claiming the government had "sexed up" the dossier was an accurate reflection of what Dr Kelly had told him.

Gilligan was asked to the read the notes of his meeting with Dr Kelly on May 22 this year. The annotated notes said: "transformed week before publication to make it sexier, a classic was the 45 minutes, most things in dossier were double-sourced but that was single-sourced". The notes then referred to the 45 minute claim. "One source said it took 45 minutes to set up mobile assembly. That was misinterpreted. "Most people [in the intelligence services] were unhappy with it because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward. Campbell real information but unreliable included against our wishes. Not included in the original draft. Dull. He asked if anything else could go in." James Dingemans QC asked Gilligan whether there was any particular question that had prompted the first part of his notes. Gilligan replied: "We started by talking about other things, then we got on to the dossier and I said 'What's happened to it? When we last met, you were saying it wasn't very exciting'. "He said 'until the last week, it wasn't very exciting, it was transformed the week before publication'.

"I said 'to make it sexy?', and he said 'yes, to make it sexy'. I said 'what do you mean? Can you give me any examples?' He did not use the word 'example'. He said 'the classic was 45 minutes'." Then Gilligan said he asked Dr Kelly "something like 'how did this transformation happen?' And then the answer was just that one word." Mr Dingemans asked Gilligan "He said just 'Campbell'?" "Yes," replied Gilligan. Lord Hutton then asked Gilligan: "Are you clear in your recollection that you asked how was it transformed and that the name 'Campbell' was first spoken by Dr Kelly?" Gilligan replied: "Yes, absolutely. It was him. He first raised the subject of 45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell." Lord Hutton then asked Gilligan: "You put the question: 'Was it to make it sexier?' and Dr Kelly replied 'Yes, to make it sexier.'" Gilligan replied: "Yes." Gilligan was asked if he had taken notes throughout the meeting with Dr Kelly.

The journalist replied: "No, it was like our other meeting in that it was intended as a general discussion of issues around Iraq . "I started out without taking notes, actually, but I asked to start taking notes when he got on to interesting topics." Lord Hutton said: "Are you clear in your recollection that you asked how was it transformed and that the name of Campbell was first spoken by Dr Kelly." Mr Gilligan replied: "Yes, absolutely." Lord Hutton asked: "It wasn't a question by you saying: 'Is Campbell involved in this?'." Gilligan replied: "No, it was him. He raised the subject of 45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell." The revelation that Gilligan did not have full notes of his meeting will be a setback to the BBC, whose reputation is on the line. The Hutton inquiry into the death of the weapons inspector also revealed a BBC memo, dated May 24, that said Gilligan "has a story which he hasn't stood up". Gilligan said he was not sure whether the memo was a reference Dr Kelly.

The BBC reporter also challenged Dr Kelly's accounts of their meetings, with conflicting evidence emerging on several points about the relationship between the reporter and the scientist. Gilligan told the inquiry he did not meet Dr Kelly as often as the weapons expert had said. The journalist said two of the meetings Dr Kelly had claimed to have had with him did not take place and a third lasted longer than the weapons inspector had told his bosses. Dr Kelly had privately revealed at Ministry of Defence interviews that he met Gilligan at international institute of strategic studies in September 2002. He also claimed to have met the reporter in February 2003. However, Gilligan said the September meeting did not take place and neither did the other because he was "out of the country" for much of February, reporting on the run-up to the war in Iraq. Gilligan said he did meet Dr Kelly on May 22 and this meeting led to the Today report at the heart of the row between the BBC and the government. Gilligan said the meeting lasted "45 minutes" longer than Dr Kelly had said. Lord Hutton's investigation was set up to investigate the circumstances surrounding the apparent suicide of the government weapons expert.

The reporter told a packed courtroom Dr Kelly was listed in the BBC's book of contacts and he checked the scientist's credentials before he first met him in early 2001. Gilligan said Dr Kelly had been "open and helpful" and keen to share his knowledge at that first meeting. He also showed the court the contemporaneous notes he took at his meeting with Dr Kelly and discussed the nature of "off the record" and "unattributable" comments. · To contact the MediaGuardian newsdesk email editor@mediatheguardian.com or phone 020 7239 9857

Question: Which reporter claimed on the BBC ‘Today’ programme in 2003 that the government had ‘sexed up’ a dossier about Iraq?
Answer: ANDREW GILLIGAN