The Battle of Cannae AD 378 The Battle of Cannae The Battle of Cannae in the summer of 216 BC is a milestone in Roman history. It was Hannibal's finest hour and forced the Romans to learn a painful lesson. The Roman legions were perhaps the finest military units of their day. Their methods of fighting, their training and their equipment were highly sophisticated and very effective. But an army on its own, no matter how devastating, will not win battles. It stands or falls with its commander. The long line of brilliant Roman military leaders should largely arise from the lessons learnt against Hannibal. Having famously crossed the Alps with his elephants, Hannibal descended into Italy and wrought havoc against the Roman forces. Major battles took place at Trebia and at Lake Trasimene, in both of which Hannibal remained victorious. A lot is made of the psychological impact his elephants had on terrified Roman troops. But by the battle of Cannae all Hannibal's elephants had died. Rome put a massive infantry force into the field against him. Force was to be conquered by greater force. Such was the Roman way.

The Roman commanders L.Aemilius Paullus and C.Terrentius Varro led a force of 50'000 men or more against Hannibal, who could had 40'000 or less to face them. More so, Hannibal's troops were most likely not of the same quality as Roman legionaries. They were a colourful mix of Gauls, Spaniards, Numidians and Carthaginians. In theory the Roman sledgehammer should have crushed the Carthaginian menace, but for the way it was to be wielded. Near the town of Cannae next to the River Aufius (Ofanto) the armies met. 1. The Armies meet Hannibal first masked his moves as he drew up his army, by placing his light slingers and spearmen at the front. Behind them, he positioned his Celtic and Spanish swordsmen in a crescent in the center. On his left wing he stationed his Celtic and Spanish heavy cavalry, on the right he stationed his light Numidian cavalry. Preparing for battle, he now ordered his light troops at the front to fall back and act as reserves. The Romans meanwhile acted as usual.

The velites were positioned at the front to cover their position. Behind them, in the centre the main body of the legion took its position, with allied Italian infantry on either side of it. On the Roman right wing stood the Roman cavalry, on the left wing was the allied cavalry. 2. The Armies engage The Romans drove in hard, using their superior infantry to best advantage. They had their velites fall back and ploughed into their foe with their heavy infantry. The crescent of Celtic and Spanish swordsmen buckled and retreated. To the Romans this appeared to be due to their powerful drive into the opponents lines. In fact the troops had been told to retreat. Note: the Carthaginian light troops pulled back at the beginning had by now taken position at the rear of the crescent as well to each side of the crescent. Simultaneously with the advance of their infantry the Roman cavalry on the right wing now engaged the Spanish and Celtic heavy cavalry on the Carthaginian left. 3. The Trap The Roman infantry kept on driving into the Carthaginian lines. Forcing them back, they still felt confident that they were winning.

But as they shunted forward and the opponent withdrew, the light infantry on the Carthaginian side, though itself staying stationary as it wasn't withdrawing, began to emerge on the Roman flanks. Worse still, on the wings, Hannibal's Celtic and Spanish heavy cavalry was driving the Roman cavalry back. Combined with the advance of the Roman infantry this meant that there emerged a gaping breach in the Roman line. A large body of cavalry now separated from the Carthaginian left wing and charged across the field of battle to the right wing, where it fell into the rear of the cavalry of the Roman allies. 4. The Trap closes Had the Carthaginian cavalry effectively defeated the Roman cavalry, the Carthaginian infantry was doing the same with the Roman legions. The Roman infantry had continued to drive forward, and had driven itself into an alley formed by the light Carthaginian infantry stationed at the sides. Shielded by these Carthaginian troops, their comrades who had stayed at the rear could now swing around and come in behind the Roman army. The Roman doomed legions were encircled and being attacked from all sides.

In effect the Roman infantry had been defeated by the opposing infantry, although the returning Carthaginian cavalry helped further accelerate their victory. In effect, the Roman army had defeated itself. It had solely relied on the superiority of its legionaries, having lined them up and told them to advance. No use had been made of the superior numbers, other than to simply add more ranks onto the back of the advancing columns. As the Carthaginian units manoeuvered, nothing was done to counter their actions. One simply did what one had always done - advance. Such ignorance was most likely born from the fact that the battles with Hannibal were the largest contests Rome had ever fought by that time. Despite their earlier dealings with king Pyrrhus, they most likely had not gathered enough experience yet in such matters to be able to cope with such huge a challenge. And the superiority of their legions perhaps made them rely to heavily on their soldiers alone. In short, Roman tactics were non-existent at Cannae. The Roman force acted with brute force, charging at its dangerously clever opponent like a bull. Defeat in this battle was a blow from which Rome should be reeling for some time to come.

More than ever Rome needed brilliant generals, capable men of intelligence and imagination. Rome needed a Scipio Africanus - and he was soon to emerge to deliver her from the Carthaginian menace. 6/12/2006 • Military History Dawn of that August morning in 216 BC found Hannibal, commander of Carthage’s army in Italy, peering down at the plain separating his vantage point from the waters of the Adriatic Sea some three miles away. The Roman enemy was already advancing–an army of more than 85,000 men, aligned in the standard offensive formation of the widely feared legions. Hannibal’s force, some 56,000 in number, faced long, very long, odds. The third century BC already had witnessed the growth of Rome and Carthage as the foremost powers of the central Mediterranean. Rome had developed slowly, over the previous five centuries, and was now the dominant military power on the Italian Peninsula. There had been frequent reverses, but Rome was able to build and solidify its holdings through political means, such as extending full or partial Roman citizenship to conquered cities or deserving individuals.

A large degree of autonomy was granted to the peoples Rome defeated, in exchange for military help when Rome needed it. In this way, Rome was able to expand its territory and build its pool of available manpower without diluting its strength by creating armies of occupation. Future rival Carthage was a city located near present-day Tunis, Tunisia, and was founded by colonists from Phoenician Tyre. Instead of gradually conquering and assimilating neighboring cities, Carthage grew through maritime commerce. Its empire was based on overseas trading stations in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the Balearic Islands and along the North African coast. The hinterlands near these trading stations provided markets for Carthaginian commerce, manpower for Carthage’s armies and sources of wealth such as silver and gold mines. The income from the mines paid for mercenary armies, and people living in the area immediately surrounding Carthage were not given the freedoms such as those granted by Rome. No strong bond of loyalty was forged between Carthage and the immediate satellite area because of Carthage’s exploitation and the Carthaginian tendency to respond to resistance with great cruelty.

The population of the city of Carthage itself was relatively small; the people were devoted to commercial enterprise. When military might was needed, Carthage found it expedient to use its mercenary troops, drawn from its economic spheres of influence. As the two states grew, they came into conflict in Sicily. The city of Messina, located at the northeastern tip of Sicily, appealed to Rome for protection from nearby Syracuse. Carthage regarded Roman intervention as an intrusion into its domain and the First Punic (Latin for Phoenician) War resulted (264-241 BC). It was a costly conflict, to a large extent due to Roman lives lost while that city attempted to become a sea power. In 255 BC, the Romans lost 180 ships and 95,000 men in a single storm off the Sicilian coast, and in 253 BC another storm cost Rome an additional 150 vessels and their crews. A third Roman fleet later was ground to pieces off the rocky coast of southern Sicily in yet another storm. Characteristic Roman persistence in the face of adversity finally brought victory–and the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily.

By the end of the years-long war, Carthage’s naval supremacy in the western and central Mediterranean had been broken. To be sure, Carthage’s ability to build and man a fleet had not been seriously impaired, but Carthage did not aggressively challenge the Romans at sea in subsequent conflicts. The reasons for this seeming lethargy on the part of the expert seafaring people will never be known, as no Carthaginian history of the Punic Wars has survived. Our information today comes from Roman sources. Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal’s father, had been one of Carthage’s principal generals in the first war and had held out in Carthage’s last stronghold in western Sicily for a considerable period. Though finally defeated, he did not suffer the fate sometimes meted out to the unsuccessful Carthaginian generals–crucifixion. At the conclusion of the First Punic War, Carthage’s mercenaries rose in revolt, aided by disaffected elements from the lands surrounding the city. Rome took advantage of her rival’s distraction and, in spite of the recent peace agreement, took control of Sardinia and Corsica and forced Carthage to pay a large indemnity.

Carthage finally won the mercenary war, but the loss of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica left her economic empire crippled and reduced the area from which she could hire troops. Hamilcar took it upon himself to rebuild Carthaginian fortunes by occupying Spain. The city of Gades (Cadiz), located on the Atlantic Ocean outside the Pillars of Hercules, was older than Cartage and, like her North African ally, had started as a Phoenician colony. Carthage itself had traded in Spain and used Spanish mercenaries for many years. Hamilcar decided to build on these foundations and formally place large sections of Spain under Carthaginian rule. This would provide a base for military operations against Rome (which Hamilcar felt were inevitable anyway), give access to the large silver and gold deposits of the country and draw closer the region’s excellent Iberian and, Celt-Iberian mercenaries, both useful in combating the Romans. Hamilcar Barba and Hasdrubal the Splendid, his son-in-law and successor, subdued a large portion of southern and eastern Spain and established the city of Cartagena (New Carthage) on the southeastern coast as the capital of Carthaginian Spain.

The city-state’s leadership in the new land remained in the hands of one family, the Barcids. To minimize the unreliability to mercenary troops and recognize the loyalty of Spanish tribesmen to a worthy leader, the Barcid clan built an empire based on close relationships with local tribal leaders, rather than with the distant city of Carthage. Hasdrubal the Splendid utilized diplomacy and marriage to an influential chief’s daughter to cement relations with the indigenous tribes. Hamilcar’s three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago, would continue the work of Hamilcar and the first Hasdrubal–and nearly bring Rome to its knees during the Second Punic War. Few details of Hannibal’s youth have survived. At age 5, he was with his father in Sicily at the end of the first war. At 9, he accompanied Hamilcar to Spain and spent his adolescent years there while the empire was created. In 226 BC, Hasdrubal the Splendid had reached an agreement with Rome that recognized the Ebro River in northeastern Spain as the northern limit of Carthaginian interest in the area.

Five years later, Hasdrubal was assassinated, and Hamilcar’s son Hannibal became the leader. At about that time, Rome began involving itself in the affairs of Saguntum, a city on the Mediterranean coast of Spain well south of the Ebro and therefore presumably in Carthaginian territory. Hannibal viewed the Roman moves as a prelude to the type of intervention that had touched off the first war. Hannibal laid siege to the town, which fell after eight months. Hannibal’s strategic insight now became evident. From study of the First Punic War, Hannibal realized that Carthage could not prevail in a war far from Rome’s heartland. The huge populations at Rome’s disposal made a simple war of attrition a losing proposition for Carthage. Hannibal decided to fight in Italy itself, making Rome’s people bear the burden of the war while at the same time weakening the loyalty of Rome’s allies in Italy. Concurrently, military alliance could be negotiated with Rome’s enemies, notably Macedonia and Syracuse. And since Carthage’s fleet was no longer a match for Rome’s, the invasion of Italy would be by land.

To that end, Hannibal did his best to negotiate with tribes in his line of march well in advance of the onset of hostilities; he also concluded alliances with various north Italian Celtic tribes that were traditional enemies of Rome. Hannibal’s was the first civilized army to cross the Alps. Exposure, desertion, accidents and fierce resistance by mountain tribes reduced his army from 40,000 to 26,000 during the trip, and most of the elephants accompanying the remarkable host also perished. Fortunately, once Italy was reached, the Celtic alliances provided replacements that brought the army back to its original strength. Shortly thereafter, Hannibal fought two battles that demonstrated his mettle as a field commander and his determination to destroy rather than merely defeat his enemy. At the Trebia River, only 10,000 Romans escaped an ambush out of 40,000 engaged, and at Lake Trasimene, virtually an entire Roman force of 25,000 was killed or captured. From then on, the Romans were reluctant to fight a large-scale engagement.

Hannibal, for his part, was careful to treat prisoner from Rome’s allied cities courteously, often freeing them without ransom to encourage disaffection with Rome’s cause. Captured Roman citizens, on the other hand, were held for ransom used to pay Hannibal’s men, or failing that, were often sold into slavery. The Carthaginian army lived off the land causing as much damage to the economy as possible. After Lake Trasimene, Hannibal moved his army to southern Italy in order to recruit additional help in that quarter. And there, Hannibal’s depredations forced the Romans to become more aggressive. Two now consuls, Caius Terentius Varro and Aemilius Paulus, were given command of the combined legions of Rome with orders to make an end to the feared Carthaginian. Normally, the two consuls would have independent commands but, by custom, when their forces were combined, command of the whole alternated daily. Hannibal’s efficient intelligence system soon informed him that Varro was the more impetuous of his opponents, and so Hannibal decided to force an action on a day Varro was in overall command.

Hannibal seized a grain depot to lure the Romans to the site he had chosen for battle. The depot was located at the small village of Cannae, south of Rome and on the Adriatic side of the ‘boot’ of Italy. The Roman force available for battle was large by the standards of the day. Eight full legions of infantry, some 40,000 men, were augmented by 40,000 allied infantrymen. About 2,400 Roman cavalry and 4,000 allied horse completed the army, for a total strength of 86,400. In battle, the Roman infantry usually advanced on a broad front, with cavalry screens on the flank. The heavy infantry was preceded by skirmishers, who opened the engagement with flights of javelins and then retired to the rear of the formation. They were able to pass through the Roman formation because deliberate gaps were left in each line. The basic fighting unit of the heavy infantry was the maniple of about 160 men divided into two centuries. Rather than forming a continuous line, the two centuries were deployed one behind the other, leaving the gaps used by the retired skirmishers.

At the point of attack or when in a defensive posture, the rear centuries could be moved up to fill the gaps. The Hastati made up the first line of Roman heavy infantry. They were equipped with a heavy shield, a helmet, light and heavy pila (javelins) and a short, straight sword. The Princeps were the second line of heavy infantry. They were armed like the Hastati, but were somewhat older and more experienced. The Princeps’ centuries formed behind those of the Hastati, but were offset to block the gaps in the Hastati line. The third line, made up of the old veteran troops called Tritarii, had its centuries form behind the gaps in the second line, giving an overall checkerboard effect to the formation. The Tritarii had a thrusting spear in place of the pila of the first two lines. In the hands of a skilled commander, the flexibility possible with this formation was advantageous, particularly against older military formation such as the phalanx. Unfortunately, the Roman method of appointing new consuls each year and rotating command daily if the consuls were deployed together made it unlikely the top military talent would be allowed to pursue a coherent plan.

Roman courage, discipline and patriotism were rarely lacking, but the coming battle of Cannae would highlight the need for changes in the selection and responsibilities of army commander. Aside from the top commanders, very few Carthaginians were present in Hannibal’s army. His basic components at Cannae consisted of North African, Spanish and Celtic personnel. Perhaps the steadiest foot soldiers available to Hannibal were the Liby-Phoenician heavy infantry, echo of the fact that Carthage was originally a Phoenician colony. The Phoenicians living in Africa (Libya) were subject to Carthaginian military service and acquitted themselves well. Originally armed like Greek hoplites, they now began equipping with Roman arms captured at the Trebia and Lake Trasimene. In addition to the infantry, 2,000 Spanish cavalry were available to Hannibal. They were heavily armed and used as heavy cavalry, but the excellent quality of their horses allowed them to rival the speed of the Numidians. About 25,000 Celtic infantry and 5,000 Celtic cavalry made up the remainder of Hannibal’s force.

These wild tribesmen lived for war, but without the guidance of a commander like Hannibal, their lack of discipline made them unreliable. They were excellent swordsmen, but only the wealthiest wore armor. Often, the Celt fought naked, equipped solely with sword, shield and helmet. At the time of Cannae, Hannibal was arming these men with captured Roman weapons. He liked to use the Celts as shock troops that would cause disruption in enemy ranks prior to committing his African infantry. Of course, heavy Celtic casualties resulted, but they accepted their loses as the natural result of occupying the position of honor. At Cannae (Barletta, Italy, today), the Romans were determined to crush Hannibal’s center. They formed extremely deep battle lines in order to bring maximum pressure to bear against the middle of the Carthaginian line. On the Roman right, the legion cavalry, some 2,400 strong, faced Hannibal’s Spaniards and Celts, totaling 7,000. The mismatch would prove a decisive element in the battle’s surprising outcome. On the Roman left, the 4,000 allied cavalry faced an equal number of Numidians. Hannibal aligned his infantry in an unusual manner.

The center of his position was convex, facing outward toward the advancing Romans. The wings bent backward from the center. Alternating units of Spanish and Celtic swordsmen held this convex line, and they were greatly outnumbered by the oncoming Romans. Hannibal positioned himself at the left end of the line, and his youngest brother Mago, held the right. Each end of the line was anchored by a dense square of African infantry, the location of which ensured that they would not be engaged until long after those at the center. As the Romans advanced, a hot west wind blew dust in their faces and obscured their vision. At a range of about 35 yards, the Romans hurled their light javelins, causing casualties among the Spaniard and Celts. These pila often caused problems even if they only penetrated a man’s shield, because the shaft was difficult to remove and weighed the shield down, making the man vulnerable to an oncoming legionary. At closer range, the heavy pilum was thrown, and then the infantry lines crashed together, the agile Celts and acrobatic Spaniards against the disciplined Roman masses.

In time, the weight of the Roman assault began to take effect on Hannibal’s troops, and the center of the Carthaginian line receded. As Hannibal’s men were forced back, they found themselves slowly backing up a slope. The top of the slope formed a ‘V’ if viewed from above, the Spaniards and Celts now formed a concave line that conformed to that ‘V,’ with the African squares still anchored to their original position at the tips. Due to the nature of the terrain, the Romans fought uphill as they advanced and at the same time were restricted into a narrowing front as their mass of men entered the ‘V.’ Although the Roman infantrymen did not know it, their fate was all but sealed by this time. Hannibal had planned for his cavalry to strike the decisive blows while his infantry fought a large-scale delaying action. As the battle opened, Hannibal launched the Spanish and Celtic cavalry on his left against the outnumbered Roman horse. The consul Aemilius accompanied these cavalrymen, who could not withstand the weight of the Carthaginian assault. Aemilius was wounded and the bulk of the Roman horse was driven from the field, uncovering that flank of the Roman army.

While this occurred on the Carthaginian left, the Numidians on the right had been inconclusively engaged with the horsemen of Rome’s allies. Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian cavalry commander on the left, reorganized his units and proceeded to ride behind the Roman infantry to the far side of the battlefield, where the stalemated cavalry fight continued between the Numidians and Rome’s allies. The allied horsemen now were taken by surprise and crushed between the two Carthaginian forces. The allied cavalry fled the field, taking the consul Varro with them. At this point, Aemilius was dead or dying, and Varro, the other commander, no longer was with the Roman army. The Roman and allied cavalrymen had been killed, captured or driven from the field. The Numidians were in pursuit of the allied horsemen, leaving the Celts and Spaniards as the only effective cavalry fore in the area. By that time, the Roman infantry had fought its way up the slope and into the enclosed end of the ‘V,’ the point. As the men became more tightly packed into a confined space, fewer of them could use their weapons effectively.

Romans in the rear ranks continued to push forward, but found they had little room to maneuver. The prevailing winds continued to blow dust in the faces of the advancing legionaries, making it difficult for them to appreciate their danger. At this moment, the African square anchoring the Carthaginian flanks turned inward and advanced to further constrict the Roman infantry. Hasdrubal assaulted the Roman rear with his heavy cavalry, assisted by the Carthaginian light infantry. The encirclement was complete. Many Romans first discovered the danger when they felt the searing pain of being hamstrung by the knives and swords of the Balearic slingers. The courage of the Roman soldier was amply demonstrated–the legions fought on even though all hope was gone. Gradually, though, the pocket of resistance was reduced in size as thousands of Romans were killed. And when, finally, it was over, the Roman army had been truly annihilated. Of the original force of 86,400, about 50,000 were dead, with about 4,500 others taken prisoner.

About 17,000 Romans took refuge in two fortified camps nearby, but after further resistance cost 2,000 more fatalities, the remaining 15,000 surrendered. In all, some 71,500 Romans were dead or captured–83 percent of the entire army. Carthaginian losses were less than 6,000, most of them suffered by the Celts. It is a measure of the greatness of the Roman people that they did not give up after a disaster of such magnitude, especially after the previous defeats at the Trebia and Lake Trasimene. When the Roman Senate next convened, 177 vacancies had to be filled, due to the casualties suffered at Cannae, but the Romans did not hesitate to continue the war. Cannae represented the apex of Hannibal’s career, although he has been criticized for not attempting to end the war by sacking Rome itself at that point. Hannibal remained in Italy for 13 more years, but the determination of the Romans to fight on, regardless of losses, eventually gave them the opportunity to defeat the great Carthaginian.

The failure of Carthage to build a fleet strong enough to challenge that of the Romans made Hannibal’s task enormously difficult. He attempted to reduce Rome’s naval advantage by occupying the Italian coastal cities, home for the bulk of Rome’s sailors. Could Hannibal have held them, the odds against the Carthaginian fleet would have improved, but his limited manpower made it difficult for him to detach sufficient garrisons to prevent Roman recapture of the port cities. For 15 years in all, from 218 to 203 BC, Hannibal occupied large areas of Italy. He fought and defeated the Romans on numerous occasions but could not break their spirit. After Cannae, the Romans again became cautious about entering into full-scale battle against Hannibal, but their command of the sea and the decision to invade Spain, in spite of Hannibal’s continued presence on Italian soil, made reinforcement of Hannibal’s army a problem. Gradually, the troops who had crossed the Alps with Hannibal dwindled in number as well as in age, disease and wounds claimed them.

Hannibal was able to maintain his army in the field by replacing casualties with men from the Italian Peninsula, first with Celts from the north and, later, when this source was cut off, with Bruttians and Lucanians from the south. But Carthage’s lack of naval strength prevented Hannibal’s alliances with Syracuse and Macedonia from becoming fruitful. The Roman navy captured the text of the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia, and by the time the latter received a duplicate copy and acted upon it, a Roman fleet prevented his troops from crossing the Adriatic to Italy. Hannibal could not go to the aid of Syracuse when it was besieged by Roman troops because the Roman fleet prevented him from crossing the narrow Straits of Messina, and Syracuse fell. In spite of all the difficulties, Hannibal proved to be a gifted leader able to get the very best from his men. His army was composed of mercenaries with no real ideological commitment to the Carthaginian cause, yet no record exists of any mutiny during its 5 years of campaigning in Italy. The army did not merely endure, it maintained a high level of morale and fighting spirit.

After nearly a decade in Italy, the 500-man Numidian garrison of Salabria chose to fight to the death in the street defending their post when they might have cut their way to safety. Such conduct was especially remarkable for mercenaries having no great patriotic motivation. Too, they could reap no financial reward once they were dead. But…fight they did, anyway. Spain was taken from Carthage and the Barcid family after Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal duplicated the crossing of the Alps with a relief force, a desperate move that gave the Romans in Spain a free hand. Hasdrubal was unable to effect a union with Hannibal before being confronted by a strong Roman army in 207 BC. In the ensuing battle, Hasdrubal was defeated and killed. The first news Hannibal had of his brother’s arrival in Italy was when his head was catapulted into Hannibal’s camp. The loss of Spain cost Carthage an excellent source of mercenaries, along with the absolutely vital gold and silver mines needed to finance the use of mercenaries from other countries.

In October of 203 BC, Publius Cornelius Scipio, the conqueror of Spain, invaded North Africa and forced Hannibal’s recall to defend Carthage itself. Hannibal’s defeat at Zama at the hands of Scipio in the following spring, caused largely by a deficiency of cavalry strength, ended the Second Punic War. Hannibal rose to the position of prominence in Carthage after the war and took steps that helped Carthage recover economically from the conflict. Rome viewed Carthage’s revival with suspicion, and Hannibal was forced to flee to the east, where he committed suicide in 183 BC rather than fall into Roman hands. This article was written by Greg Yocherer and originally published in the February 2000 issue of Military History magazine. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Military History magazine today! The Battle of Zama AD 378 The Battle of Zama The Battle of Zama in the summer of 202 BC marked the end of the power of the great Hannibal Barca. With its greatest son, also Carthage should be at a virtual end.

True, it should limp on for some time, but with its defeat at the end of the Second Punic War it no longer was a significant power. Zama also marks the pinnacle in the career of the outstanding Roman general Publius Cornelius Scipio, whose reforms to the Roman army made him legendary. The Second Punic War took a turn as Roman forces finally landed in Africa and began marauding the area, defeating the Carthaginian armies under Syphax and supporting a Numidian rising against Carthaginian rule. Carthage was ready to sue for peace when Hannibal with 15'000 veterans returned from Italy. Emboldened by the return of its great hero at its our of need Carthage continued to war. Despite his veterans, Hannibal though was not in an ideal position. Syphax' forces having been destroyed he had to raise a new army in order to deal with the extra-ordinary challenge which lay ahead. Just as at Cannae, the Roman meeting with Hannibal was to be of huge scale.

As they met near Zama Regia in the summer of 202 BC, both armies numbered 35'000 to 40'000 men. Hannibal now had a strong elephant corps with him, but his infantry were of lesser quality to the highly trained legions of Scipio. Further Scipio had an advantage in cavalry, having delayed an engagement for long enough to allow for a strong Numidian force under Masinissa to join him. 1. The Armies meet The Romans drew up their forces in three lines, creating an effective reserve in the rear. The maniples however stood in separate formations, not creating a continuous line. The gaps were loosely filled by the velites (skirmishers). The Roman left wing was made up of Italian allied cavalry, while the right wing consisted of the Numidian calvary of Massinissa. Hannibal meanwhile also aligned his troops in three lines. His mercenaries took the front, the second line was formed by the Carthaginian forces and those of the Carthaginian territories (Liby-Phoenicians). Finally at the rear stood Hannibal's most reliable troops, the veterans from the campaign in Italy.

At the very front of the army Hannibal placed his elephant corps. On his left wing he had his Numidian cavalry and to the right stood the Carthaginian cavalry. 2. The Elephants charge After some initial skirmishes between the cavalry units, the battle began with a charge of the Carthaginian war elephants. They were meant to cause confusion and terrify the enemy. But it was here that Scipio's preparation in lining up his troops in separate maniples bore fruit. The velites in the gaps now engaged the elephants, drawing them up through the alleys between the main Roman units. Also Scipio had ordered for every trumpeter of the army to blow, creating a startling noise which terrified the nervous beasts. This Roman tactic was largely successful. Most of the elephants simply charged up the alleys between the units, others even turned and collided with their own cavalry. However some did indeed drive into the Roman ranks and caused considerable damage before escaping up the alleys. Had Scipio not found a means by which to deal with the Carthaginian elephant corps, it indeed might have been his undoing. 3.

The Roman Cavalry charges, the Infantry deploys It was in the confusion immediately following the charge of the elephants that the Roman cavalry decided to launch its attack. The Carthaginian cavalry crumbled under the charge and fled, being pursued by the Romans. Scipio will not have been much pleased with the departure of his own cavalry. Having driven the enemy away, he no doubt counted on them to attack the flanks of the main Carthaginian body, instead of pursuing a fleeing foe. But nonetheless, Scipio remained calm, knowing himself with the superior infantry force. Both sides gradually advanced on each other, until the Romans charged. The initial charge was quite competently halted by the Hannibal's mercenaries in the front line, but soon the Roman discipline began to win over and started to force the Carthaginian line to give ground. The Carthaginian second line though failed to give any support and when the mercenaries tried to fall back the second line actually levelled their weapons on them, causing some of the mercenaries to actually turn on their own side and begin attacking the line behind them.

As the pressure from the advancing Romans grew Hannibal's veterans stood firm, forcing the mercenaries and regular Carthaginian troops to the sides instead of throwing the veteran line into disorder. Hannibal's veterans were no doubt among the best troops in the world at that time and they caused a significant impact on the center of a tired Roman line when the lines met. Scipio in response to the sideways move of the Carthaginian front rows, moved his principes to the sides and their triarii to the very flanks to give his army more width and prevent the Carthaginians from outflanking him. For a time the battle hung in the balance. 4. The Cavalry returns Now the Roman cavalry, having driven the fleeing Carthaginian horse away, returned and immediately fell into the rear of the Carthaginian lines. This decided the battle and at once Hannibal's army began to collapse. Had Scipio been unable to defeat Hannibal in a pure infantry engagement, his superior cavalry did the job for him. Scipio's critics would argue that he did not so much outwit Hannibal, as merely copy his tactics in extending the line of battle and allow for his superior troops to do the damage.

However, Scipio was in the stronger position. His role was merely that of defending his advantage and letting his side's superiority do the work. The pressure was on Hannibal to produce some surprising tactic by which he could once again swing the odds in his favour. But with a commander such as Scipio the Roman army was a yet fiercer foe than it had been at Cannae. And this time the odds were simply too great. There has been a traditional simplifying view that Hannibal encircled his enemy at Cannae and was defeated by the same tactics at Zama. This though proves to be incorrect. Hannibal was not outgeneraled at Zama. For Scipio won the battle of Zama by winning the cavalry duel, due to superior numbers. Thereafter his legions could not defeat the Carthaginian infantry, but needed to wait for the return of the cavalry. Scipio's respect for his dangerous foe is shown in the simplicity of his manoeuvres. Had he at Ilipa shown elaborate manoeuvres against the Carthaginian commander Hasdrubal, then with Hannibal he merely reacted, keeping his reserves at the rear, waiting for Hannibal's moves.

If there is an irony in Hannibal's defeat at Zama though, it is that he was vanquished by the very thing he had sought to provoke with his invasion of Italy. Had he sought to inspire the tribes of Italy to rise against Roman rule, he had failed. Yet it was exactly the addition of the rebel Masinissa's Numidian cavalry to Scipio's forces which effectively sealed Hannibal's defeat. If to Carthage the Battle of Zama meant the end of their empire, then to Rome it was also a significant event. Not only had they vanquished a dangerous and able opponent and gained valuable territories, but their armies had now proven their superiority in battle against highly skilled and sophisticated foes. Had Cannae exposed Roman tactics as primitive, then Scipio's reforms had turned his army into a fighting machine which could match even commanders as great as Hannibal. The Roman army had mastered tactics and now could begin with its near unstoppable conquest of the civilized world.

Battle of Cannae (216 BC) | The Success of the Roman Republic and Empire The Success of the Roman Republic and Empire Go to Content Battle of Cannae (216 BC) The Battle of Cannae, 216 BC, remains one of the greatest military reversals of all time. The Roman army, which outnumbered its Carthaginian enemies and was undoubtedly better equipped, should have logically won an easy victory. However, Hannibal and his army arrived at Cannae coming off two consecutive victories over Roman legions, at Trebia and Trasumennas (Polybius briefly mentions, but never names, a third Carthaginian victory); Hannibal had, indeed, proven to be the greatest weapon Carthage could field. Hannibal marched his army to the nearby town of Cannae, and set up his camp along the river Aufidus. When he learned of the Roman approach, he sent his cavalry and skirmishing troops to attack the legions while they were still marching in column. The attack was indecisive, and the Romans likewise camped along the Aufidus. Disagreement between Varro and Paulus prevailed over the next several days.

On the day of Paulus’s command, the Roman army did not form up for battle; the veteran consul knew better than to engage the Carthaginians in an open plain, where the superior Carthaginian cavalry would reign supreme. Furthermore, according to Livy, Hannibal established his camp in such a position that the wind blew a constant butt of dust in the Romans’ direction. Despite these disadvantages, the following day and, according to Polybius and Livy, against the urges of Paulus, Varro formed the Roman legions up for battle in what would become the greatest massacre of a pitched battle in recorded history. Opposing Forces According to Polybius, Rome abandoned its tradition of granting two consuls two legions each in the special case of the Second Carthaginian war. Eight legions were amassed by Rome to confront Hannibal; the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro were assisted in the command of this huge fighting force by the previous year’s consuls, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius.

As is predictable in times of great crises, the Roman legions provided were increased in strength from 4000 to 5000 legionnaires each. About 1500 Roman cavalry and 4500 allied cavalry supported these legions; lighter infantry was also present. Hannibal, champion of Carthage, brought to the fight an army of 40,000 infantry containing elements of Spanish, Celtic, and African troops, and 10,000 supporting cavalry, likewise consisting of Spanish, Gallic, and Numidian regiments. Slingers and other skirmishing infantry supported the Carthaginian army. Dispositions The Roman army crossed the river Aufidus; placing the river on his right, Varro supported his right flank with Roman cavalry, led by Paulus, and his left with allied cavalry. Skirmishing troops and light infantry were arrayed in front of the heavy legionary infantry; Polybius confirms this as a standard Roman battle setup. Hannibal’s formations were much more remarkable. Covering the Carthaginian left flank were Spanish and Gallic cavalry, headed by Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal, across from the Roman cavalry.

Hannibal arranged his Numidian cavalry on his right flank, opposite Varro and the cavalry of Rome’s allies. Spanish infantry, equipped with large shields and swords designed for Romanesque close order battle, and Celtic warriors, armed with longswords, formed the center of Hannibal’s line. On either side of these European regiments were hardened African contingents, armed with the arms and armor of defeated Roman legionnaires, the core of Hannibal’s infantry. What made the formation of Hannibal’s army unique was its crescent shape, which would prove vital to the battle’s outcome. Battle The battle begins with standard skirmishing by light troops on either side as the infantry advanced; meanwhile, the cavalry corps of each side charged forward, colliding violently in the middle. On the Roman right, Paulus and his Roman cavalry crashed into their Spanish and Gallic opponents. Polybius describes the following engagement: “…The struggle that ensued was truly barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man.” This strange departure from typical cavalry warfare is attributed by Livy to the Aufidus on one side of the fight and the massed heavy infantry on the other.

Neither cavalry force would want to circle too far and wind up drowning in the river, nor would they wish a simultaneous engagement with both enemy cavalry and heavy infantry. The Carthaginian cavalry eventually overcame their Roman foes, and chased them from the field. Paulus was not cut down in the pursuit, as he entered the fight of the infantry in the middle of the field, where he believed the battle would be decided. He could not have been more wrong. The infantry engaged as the Roman cavalry was driven from the field; though better equipped and trained, the Roman line could not break the Spaniards and Celts, who they engaged first, as made possible by the crescent shape of Hannibal’s line. However, besides its unique shape, or perhaps because of it, the line was also thinly stretched; as the Roman legions pressed inward to the present engagement, their massed numbers and sheer weight broke through the thin line of Spanish and Celtic infantry. The Romans pursued their prey as the Spaniards and Celts fled between the African contingents. Hannibal’s African infantry then collapsed in on the flanks of the Romans, who were now surrounded by fresh and equally well-equipped troops.

On the Roman left flank, Varro and the allied cavalry engaged the Numidians in an indecisive cavalry battle. Polybius and Livy offer conflicting descriptions of this engagement. Polybius claims that the Numidians had a strange style of fighting but were holding their own against Varro, until Hasdrubal arrived fresh from his victory over the Roman cavalry; as Hasdrubal charged into Varro’s cavalry, the Roman allies fled. Hasdrubal sent his Numidians after Varro, then turned and launched coordinated cavalry charges into the rear of the Roman infantry with his Spanish and Gallic horses. Livy details a complicated Carthaginian tactic wherein a small force of Numidians pretended to flee the field, hid in the cavalry engagement, picked up Roman equipment from the battlefield, then joined the rear ranks of the Roman infantry when no one would notice. This hidden corps of assassins then cut into the unsuspecting Roman rear. Whether by skill or guile, the Carthaginian cavalry proved superior to its Roman counterpart. Varro no longer commanded the Roman infantry, who were now pressed by fresh troops from all sides.

Paulus went down fighting in this hopeless slaughter, along with Servilius and Atilius, all three of whom Polybius honors as having served their Republic with great courage and valor. At day’s end, after the Roman infantry had been killed to the last man, Polybius tallies the Roman dead at just over 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. The Carthaginians suffered 4000 dead Celts, 1500 dead Spanish and African infantry, and 200 dead cavalry. Significance The Battle of Cannae proved two flaws in the Roman war machine, one major and one potential. The Roman legions lacked sufficient cavalry to reliably defeat a Carthaginian army in the field; Hannibal’s cavalry supremacy at Cannae allowed him to launch attacks into the unprotected Roman rear and cut off the only avenue of escape, leading to the slaughter in a single day of the greatest Roman army assembled up to that point. Cannae also highlighted the potential of conflicting command in Roman armies.

The daily transfer of absolute power from one consul to the other led to disaster as Varro had the Senate-given authority to march his army into a disadvantageous battle against Hannibal contrary to all the advice and counsel provided by the more experienced Paulus. These two flaws resulted in Rome’s inability to muster an army to fight Hannibal on the Italian peninsula; not until the successful campaign of Scipio in Africa would Rome escape near catastrophe in the Second Punic War. [Polybius 3.106-117] The Battle of Cannae 216 BC - YouTube The Battle of Cannae 216 BC Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Uploaded on Oct 2, 2010 The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, taking place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia in southeast Italy.

The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history to this day and, in terms of the numbers killed, the second greatest defeat of Rome (second only to the Battle of Arausio, in 105 BC). Category 216 BC Roman defeat at the battle of Cannae one of the two - CLA - 231 View Full Document *216 BC: Roman defeat at the battle of Cannae; one of the two consuls present at the battle, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, is killed. 215 BC: Treaty of mutual assistance between Hannibal and Philip V, king of Macedon. *215-205 BC: The First Macedonian War. The Romans with the help of their Greek allies (the Aetolians) fight against the Macedonians. Peace treaty (= 'the Peace of Phoenice') is signed between Philip V and the Romans in 205.

211-209 BC: The Romans recapture southern Italy (capture of Capua in 211 and sack of Tarentum in 209), and Sicily (capture and sack of Syracuse and Agrigentum in 209). 210-206 BC: Conquest of Carthaginian Spain by P. Cornelius Scipio (the future 'Africanus'/'the African'). 207 BC: Battle at the Metaurus river: a Carthaginian army led by Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, is defeated by the Romans and Hasdrubal himself is killed. 204 BC: Scipio lands with a Roman army near Utica. *202 BC: Battle of Zama (actually Naraggara). Scipio's troops defeats Hannibal's army. *201 BC: Carthage asks for peace. - 195: Hannibal goes into exile. - 183 or 182 BC: Hannibal poisons himself to escape capture. POINTS TO KEEP IN MIND: This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

- The 'Ebro Treaty' (226 BC): an agreement between the Romans and Hasdrubal, commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians (son-in-law and successor of Hamilcar Barca who died in 229 BC). It prevented the Carthaginians from This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document. TERM Battle of Cannae HANNIBAL Fought in the summer of 216 BC between the forces of the Carthaginian general Hannibal and a Roman army under the dual command of Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius errentius Varro. The battle of Cannae was to be Hannibal's finest hour and the worst defeat ever suffered by Roman military arms. After a miraculous crossing of Italy's northern Alps, Hannibal's army, comprising a mixture of Gaul's, Spaniard's, Numidian's, Celt's and Carthaginian's proceeded into the interior of the country, easily defeating Roman forces at the battles of the Ticinus and Trebia rivers in 218 BC.

Continuing southward Hannibal then defeated a Roman army sent against him at lake Trasimenus in 217 BC. In an attempt to convert Rome's allies to his cause, Hannibal choose to bypass the capital city of Rome and ravage the countryside, where he came up against yet another Roman army barring his passage at Cannae. Hannibal carefully studied the situation and had some misgivings, for this Roman army was double in size to any other he had yet encountered. The field at Cannae was flat and wide open, the two opposing armies would have no surprises to offer one another. Hannibal, with an army of 45,000 men (35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry) would face a much larger Roman army numbering 80,000 men (75,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry). Both Roman commanders Paullus and Varro, had agreed before hand that each would command the army one day in turn, it was on the day of battle that Varro would find himself in overall command.

Varro decided the Romans would utilize their overwhelming superiority in numbers to attack and crush Hannibal's center On the Roman right flank stood the Roman cavalry 3000 strong which faced Hannibal's Celts and Spaniards numbering 7,000 horseman. On the Roman left flank were some 2000 cavalry supplied by Rome's allies which were opposed by Hannibal's 3,000 Numidian cavalry. Varro formed up his infantry into three extremely deep lines so as to bring their full weight to bear on Hannibal's center. Hannibal's infantry line was convex in formation protruding outward towards the Romans with the wings bending back from the Carthaginian center. Hannibal placed his African infantry on the corners of this convex formation to be sure these forces would not be engaged in the battle to soon, he then formed up his cavalry on the outer flanks of the African infantry. Although puzzled by this formation, Varro was still confident in that before him stood a motley collection of mercenaries representing over five different nationalities. This was an army that fought solely for pay, the Romans were fighting for their very homeland against an invader.

Adding to Varro's overconfidence was that under his command was the largest army Rome had ever put into the field. Varro thus believed that his superiority in numbers combined with a massive frontal attack would punch through Hannibal's center and easily win the day for Rome. Varro thus ordered his troops to advance. BATTLE LINES AT CANNAE The entire Roman army now lumbered forward, as they came within range of their foe they hurled their javelins into the front ranks of the enemy, causing heavy casualties. The Romans then unsheathed their swords and the two infantry lines collided. The weight of the Roman attack on the Carthaginian center soon began to achieve its main goal as Hannibal's line began to fall back, so as to straighten and then slowly recede into the shape of a concave line. Believing that Hannibal's front line was in retreat and about to break, Varro continued pouring his forces into the concave. Hannibal now ordered his African troops on his flanks to move forward and form a line along the side the Roman attack. As the Romans continued to advance they began to lose cohesion and mobility as their ranks became more and more constricted.

Hannibal now ordered both his cavalry wings forward to attack the cavalry formations protecting the Roman flanks. The Roman horseman were easily driven from the battlefield, leaving Paullus wounded and dying. Meanwhile on the Carthaginian right, the Numidian's and the cavalry of Rome's allies were engaged in fierce combat with neither gaining an advantage. After chasing the Roman horseman from the battlefield, Hannibal's left wing cavalry commander Hasdrubal, reorganized his cavalry and charged back across the plains, to strike Rome's allied cavalry from the rear. These horseman would quickly find themselves caught between the two Carthaginian forces and chose to give up the fight and flee, taking the Roman commander Varro with them. With Paullus dead or dying and Varro now absent, the Roman army found itself leaderless and without overall command at a critical moment in the battle. By this time the Roman's had advanced deeper into the concave, with the rear infantry ranks continually pushing forward against the backs of their comrades. As the Romans continued blindly onward they became confined and packed together within an ever shrinking area. As a result they lost the ability to maneuver or use their weapons effectively.

Hannibal's African infantry forming on the sides of the Roman attack now began to turn inward, constricting the Roman infantry ever further. Hasdrubal once again reformed his cavalry and began to attack the Roman's from their rear. The Roman army was now totally encircled with every Roman now fighting for his very survival. The Roman pocket was steadily reduced in size as tens of thousands were slain. When the slaughter was finally over the Roman army which started the battle with such high expectations of overall victory, had been utterly annihilated. The Carthaginian victory at Cannae marked the apex of Hannibal's military carrier. 50,000 Roman's now lay dead, with 20,000 others taken prisoner and 10,000 barely escaping with their lives. Carthaginian losses numbered a mere 6,000 men. The war however would continue for another fourteen years until Hannibal's recall to defend Carthage itself,eventually culminating in Hannibal's complete defeat at the battle of Zama in 202 BC, which would end the war in absolute victory for Rome.

After the war Hannibal's very survival was feared by the Roman's and he was forced to flee. When the Roman's caught up with him in 183 BC, he committed suicide rather than surrender. The battle of Cannae Polybius (3.106-118) The armies Hannibal who had camped during the winter near Gereonium moved his army slowly to the south where he captured a Roman food depot. His army consisted of about 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. The Roman army counted an incredible 80,000 foot and 6000 horse. An army this size has a huge foraging problem. Like a swarm of grasshoppers they can't stay long at the same place and have to keep moving. The two consuls decided to take turns in commanding this army, a huge mistake. Had they split this mass into two armies, they would have created much more flexibility, but Aemilius Paullus agreed, which indicates he agreed also to a frontal attack and not for the Fabian tactics. The terrain Nowadays the distance between the hill foot and the Ofanto (Aufidius then) is about 1 km.

It is very likely the river has many curves in flat terrain. It is possible the distance between hill and river was longer, but unlike very much. Varro chose this spot because he hoped the river prevent the superior Carthaginian to attack them at his flank. The hill at the other side was steep enough the have the same effect. The battlefield of Cannae. The land wasn't cultivated and think away the railway in front too. Just below the horizon the row of trees indicates the river Aufidius (Now Ofanto) The shot is taken from the hilltop. To get a better idea of the battle field enlarge the thumbnails. The Ofanto is easy to cross, but because of its steep shores a formidable obstacle when defended. Consular army A consular army in these days consisted of two Roman legions and two Alae of about the same size. Normally a legion consisted of 3 times 10 manipels. In battle formation a legion would stretch over about 400 m. A consular army would thus take 1600 m. In the picture the Aufidius may seem far off, but should be 600 m further away to fit in the complete army.

The battle Phase I The Roman army, that had marched along the Adriatic sea, neared Hannibal's position from the north. About 50 stades> from Hannibal's camp they built their camp. They moved slowly because every corner and every obstacle was scouted before the army moved on. Both consuls well remembered G. Flaminius and the battle at Lake Trasimeno . There was a, possibly invented, discussion between the consuls wether the battle should be fought here or at a terrain less suitable for cavalry. Varro decided to move closer to Hannibal the next day. The battle Phase II Varro moved the army about 6 km closer to Hannibal. While doing so his columns were attacked by light armed Carthaginian foot and horse. This action certainly slowed the Romans down, but more than that wasn't achieved. Varro had one camp built at the left bank of the Aufidius and a smaller camp at the other side. The next day Paullus was the commander in chief and he decided not to attack, both our authors describe Paullus as the only wise man in the camp, with their hind side knowledge, but the decision was more likely to give the men a day rest.

Hannibal deployed his troops in front of the Roman camp, probably counting on Aemilius Paullus reluctance to combat there. When the Romans didn't react he sent his cavalry to attack the foragers and provoke the Romans by driving them all the way back to their camp. The battle Phase III Varro's mistakes The fact, Hannibal had offered battle on the left bank of the Aufidius, made Varro decide to cross the river and do battle there. Hannibal couldn't hope for better. On the left bank was more room and here Varro could have made proper use of of his numerical advantage. Now he had to squeeze his troops between the the river and the hill. To do this had diminished the room between the manipels and enlarged the depth of the manipels to probably 7 times the normal depth with the extra troops. He was clearly counting on his superiority in numbers and planned to hack his way through the Carthaginians with brute force. But now his extra troops would only serve to be slaughtered. Infantry, especially when armed with spears, is very well capable of resisting a frontal attack by cavalry.

Now Varro's right flank was protected by the river, he should have placed all his horse on his more vulnerable left. According to Polybius he left 10,000 men in the camp. The battle Phase III Hannibal's trap In the battle at the Trebbia Hannibal had experienced the power of the Roman infantry. He had no illusions he could stop them, in stead he decided to use this power to his own advantage. He placed his best and strongest infantry units, not in his centre but he split his Numidian heavy infantry in 2 and placed them on both wings. These units were much deeper then wide. Between the Numidians he placed his Spanish and Celtic troops. In the center this unit was much deeper and closer to the enemy than at the flanks. His heavy cavalry he put at his left flank near the river and his Numidian cavalry at the other flank. Hannibal probably had a lookout on the hilltop, while the Roman highest lookout probably was on horseback. So Varro and the others could only see the Carthaginian front screened by his spear throwers and slingshots. They had no idea they would be lured between the powerful Numidian infantry.

But to pull this off Hannibal needed time. This time he created by the extra depth in his center. The Romans would keep their front in a straight line and the artificial depth would give Hasdrubal, the cavalry commander at the left wing, the time he needed. Battle phase IV Hasdrubal Hasdrubal had an important task. He was to destroy all of the enemies horse. As soon as the screens of velites, spear throwers and slingshots had disappeared he rushed forward and attacked the Roman cavalry at the river. Still nobody had invented stirrups. The four-horned saddle gave a steady seat, but a man was easily pulled or pushed from his horse. Model of a 4-horned saddle Limes Museum Aalburg (GE) Often cavalry fights ended up with the men fighting on foot, either voluntarily or forced. Hasdrubal had more than twice the men as Paullus, in numbers as well as in quality, so the fight didn't take long. After a short pursuit Hasdrubal turned his well disciplined troop to the other flank and attacked Varro's horse on that side.

Battle phase V The centre collapses As foreseen by Hannibal, quite soon his center started to give way. And while the Celts and Spanish moved backwards the Numidians stayed where they were. From the position of Servilius and his subcommanders it looked like everything happened the way they wished. They were pushing back Hannibal's army. Victory seemed near. But they pushed themselves more and more between the Numidians. When Hasdrubal appeared behind the Roman cavalry at the foot of the hill Hanno and his Numidian horse attacked. Varro and his men fled in panic. Battle phase VI Massacre Hanno pursued Varro's cavalry and now not only the Roman flanks were unprotected but also their rear. Hasdrubal and his men attacked the Romans in their back and at the same time the Numidians started to attack the Roman flanks. This stopped the Romans moving forward and Hannibal in the midst of his men made them move forward and to attack the Romans. A real massacre begun. 45,000 Roman foot were killed and 3000 horse. 10,000 were taken prisoner.

But also Hannibal paid a heavy price about 4000 of his men were killed too. Who is to blame? Both ancient authors try and put the blame for the defeat on G. Terentius Varro. They do so for different reasons. Livius, don't forget, is a friend of Augustus, and tries and prove the patricians should always command the armies. Polybius is a friend of the P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, who was victorious in the 3rd Punic war. He will try and protect his friend's grandfather Aemilius Paullus. Aemilius Paullus had the authority to take half the army with him. He should have, but he didn't. It was the senate who funded this huge army and ordered Hannibal to be attacked. Please enter your comment or question here

Question: At what battle did Hannibal defeat the Romans in 216 BC?
Answer: Cannae