- Anzio -- The Allies' Greatest Blunder of World War II Anzio -- The Allies' Greatest Blunder of World War II - by Irwin J. Kappes Anzio -- The Allies' Greatest Blunder of World War II by Irwin J. Kappes Much has been written by military analysts about the conceptually faulty OPERATION SHINGLE—the Anzio beachhead in January, 1944. But the story that has been overlooked is the naval aspect of the operation, which was a resounding success. On the 50th anniversary of the Anzio landings, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations released a statement reading, in part: "A half-century ago American, British, Dutch and Greek naval forces landed soldiers of the American and British armies on the Italian coast. German resistance was unexpectedly powerful and rapidly increased in strength. For four months the invaders battled foul winter weather, heavy bombing and artillery fire to sustain the Anzio beachhead. Throughout this long struggle on the Italian littoral, our troops were strongly supported by naval gunfire, airpower and a shuttle of ships and craft that braved air and submarine attack to deliver reinforcements.

Late in May 1944 the main Allied advance linked up with Anzio's defenders, and Rome was liberated a few days later. In what many consider a land battle, there were a total of 17 ships lost: ten British and seven U.S. Navy. In this action, 166 American sailors were wounded and 160 made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of freedom. "Anzio was hard-fought and hard-won. By drawing off troops that could have opposed the main Allied offensive in Italy, the Anzio operation helped tilt the balance in our favor and contributed to the drive that led to the fall of Rome." "Anzio beachhead," naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison later wrote, "should endure in our memories as a symbol of heroic tenacity". Imagine the situation: In December 1943 Allied forces had taken the lower third of Italy and were stalled almost midway between Naples and Rome. The well-fortified Gustav Line of German Field Marshal Kesselring was holding against continuous murderous assault from Gen. Mark Clark's 5th Army 60 miles south of Rome.

In Allied war rooms, pressure was building for an end run that would draw enough German resources away from the Gustav Line to allow a breakthrough. This would enable a link-up of the two forces for the final push on the Eternal City. The principal advocate of this bold strategy was Prime Minister Winston Churchill. General Eisenhower had strong misgivings, but as the newly-appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces he was now preoccupied with preparations for OPERATION OVERLORD—the invasion of Normandy. This left British General Sir Henry Wilson in command of the Mediterranean Theater. Wilson did not possess the courage to challenge his headstrong Prime Minister, so despite the doubts of Eisenhower, General Mark Clark and the sacrificial lamb who was put in charge of SHINGLE, U.S. General John P. Lucas, the plan moved into high gear. Actually, such a diversion behind the Gustav Line made a lot of sense from a tactical standpoint. But to succeed, a massive force would be required—one that could quickly overwhelm the Germans and prevent their reinforcement until General Clark was able to break through the Gustav Line. But in January of 1944 these forces were simply not available. At one time, Eisenhower had approved an earlier version of SHINGLE.

It called for Army Rangers to land at Anzio and secure the port . This would have been followed by the dropping of paratroops to seal off the area. It also called for an amphibious assault on Anzio, but only after the Fifth Army breached the Gustav Line and reached a point just north of Frosinone. Intelligence reports had five to six German divisions in the area, while only two divisions (one American, one British) could be mustered for SHINGLE. It took no von Clausewitz to see that the outlook was not auspicious. Further, it required at least 44 LSTs (Landing Ship-Tank) to land one division along with all its materiel and equipment. OPERATION OVERLORD, the upcoming Normandy invasion, was the top priority at this time and naval resources were rapidly being shifted away from the Mediterranean to the British Isles. A mere 56 LSTs and the smaller LCIs and some British LSIs were available. (At the last minute, Churchill succeeded in cajoling and threatening the U.S. Naval Command into making 88 LSTs available).

In the end, there were barely enough amphibious craft to land the two divisions, but not enough to keep them supplied for a protracted period. Everything depended upon two unlikely events: That the Anzio landing would catch the superior German forces completely by surprise and enable the invaders to quickly consolidate their position and capture the rail lines and highways providing the link to Rome. Secondly, General Clark would in short order breach the Gustav Line and link up with the Anzio forces in the area of Frosinone. It would be one of the riskiest gambles of World War II. Nevertheless, just after dawn on 21 January 1944 a motley armada of 240 ships—mostly amphibious landing craft—set sail from the bay of Naples. In peacetime, the receding view of the beautiful bay with a lazily smoking Vesuvius in the distance would have thrilled cruise ship passengers. But the 35,000 infantrymen who were about to be flung into the maw of mortal combat had other concerns. Some attempted nonchalance by avidly playing card games. Others penned what they thought might be their last letters to loved ones.

Understandably, the anxiety wasn't nearly as high among the 31,000 British and American sailors. Besides, many of them had already been through the landings at Sicily and Salerno. None knew exactly where they were headed, but a rehearsal for the landing had left little room for speculation. It had to be somewhere between Naples and Rome, right where German strength was concentrated. Overall command of the two Anzio assault forces was under Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry aboard his flagship U.S.S. BISCAYNE. He also commanded "X-Ray Force" which was made up of about 175 vessels (mostly amphibs) escorted by two light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 24 minesweepers and one sub. It landed troops just south of Anzio, at Nettuno. The "Peter Force" landing was five miles north of Anzio and was commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas H. Troubridge of the Royal Navy. It was comprised of four transports and three LSTs, escorted by three cruisers (U.S.S. BROOKLYN, H.M.S. ORION and H.M.S.

SPARTAN), eight destroyers, two gunboats, six minesweepers, and four PCs. At first the fleet sailed toward the southwest to throw any lurking German reconnaissance planes off the scent. But at 1740 the order came from Adm. Lowry to "Execute course change to 010". All the debates, strategizing, logistical preparations and rehearsals were culminating in their ineluctable end—the fury and confusion of battle and the stench of cordite and death. "H"-hour was 0200 and two British LCTs were first to open fire—with five-inch rockets. Three assault waves of LCVPs and LCIs landed troops without incident. So Lowry had achieved his share of the mandate calling for achieving surprise and the rest was up to General Lucas. In fact, surprise was so total that some of the German troops were captured asleep at their posts, despite all the rocket fire and the whining of five-inch shells from offshore destroyers. With the exception of Tinian, no other landing in Europe or the Pacific was initially as successful as that at Anzio.

After only 22 hours, Lowry and Rear Admiral Troubridge had landed 36,034 men, 3069 vehicles and 90% of the U.S. VI Corps' assault equipment. Losses were only 13 killed, 44 missing and 97 wounded. The big problem was resupplying the forces landed. The captains of the Liberty ships were civilian merchant marine officers and therefore not under direct control of the naval commanders. When cargo arrived at the beachhead "after working hours", they would often refuse to unload it and Navy amphibious craft tied up alongside would simply have to wait. Because of the German shelling that soon erupted, they were also refusing to go in close enough to be unloaded by the Army DUKWs (2 ½-ton 6x6 amphibious craft). Finally, Adm. Lowry was obliged to assume liability for any damage to Liberty ships that might result from enemy attack. The real heroes of Anzio were unquestionably the black soldiers who manned the DUKWs. They braved attack from German shore batteries and from sporadic strafing by enemy fighters—and did so with good-natured courage and élan. Despite having achieved surprise, Gen.

Lucas delayed, feeling that insufficient forces had been landed to make the push inland. This is the major point of contention between historians who continue to debate SHINGLE. Most American strategists at the time felt that Lucas would have been dealt a severe sucker punch. British tacticians on the other hand reasoned that Lucas was lacking in courage and that a more forceful general like Patton or their own Field Marshal Montgomery would have pushed inland rapidly, encircling the Germans north of the Gustav Line. But while Patton was courageous he was not reckless. His words to Lucas have been reported in nearly every account of the Anzio invasion: "John, there is nobody in the U.S. Army I would less like to see killed than you, but you can't get out of this alive. Of course, you might get wounded and nobody ever blames a wounded general". In spite of submarines, mines, air raids and artillery fire, there was a steady inflow of supplies. The real reason has often been overlooked. One supply officer who had served with the 7th Fleet in the South Pacific remembered an efficient plan that had been devised there for the unloading of LSTs.

It called for driving loaded trucks ashore to storage dumps while the LSTs quickly doubled back with empty trucks from the previous trip. When the method was proposed by American officers it was disapproved by British Adm. Cunningham, by U.S. General Walter Bedell Smith and by Churchill himself. But gutsy American colonels adopted it anyway because it reduced unloading time from 20 hours down to one. Adm. Samuel Eliot Morison concluded in his history of SHINGLE that this insubordinate move alone prevented the invasion from becoming an utter disaster. The day following the landing, the Germans staged their first all-out attack on the ships in the anchorage. They followed this up by rapidly encircling the beachhead. At one point, they nearly succeeded in cutting it in half. To complicate things further, there was another raging dispute between the British and American leaderships. The egotistical Gen. Mark Clark, having originally opposed an end-run but now eager to go down in history as "The Liberator of Rome", wanted a rapid push north. British Gen. W.R.C. Penney felt that Rome could wait. The important objective now was to capture the German army stationed south of Rome.

But the grandstanding Clark prevailed, and the German army escaped north and set up the "Gothic Line". This would have to be dealt with later at great cost. And on their way, the Germans massacred over 300 civilians at the Ardeatine Caves. World War II was the first war demanding entire fleets of highly-specialized landing craft. Each was designed to accomplish a unique task. There were craft for putting the first wave ashore; craft to fire rockets and lay smoke screens; craft to provide antiaircraft flak. Most important were the huge craft that were purposely run aground to open their three-story doors and spew forth battle-ready troops and tanks. Among Navy ships, the LSTs, unlovely as they were in appearance, were second only to aircraft carriers among surface ships in their contribution to final victory. To their crewmen, the 88 LSTs that took part in SHINGLE were referred to as "Long Stationary Targets". But despite their vulnerability, only three LSTs and one LCI (Landing Craft-Infantry) were lost in SHINGLE.

This is a resounding tribute to the fire support they got from the cruisers and destroyers assigned to keep German artillery and aircraft disoriented. In many ways, Anzio was much like the Pacific war. There was no rear area that was safe from attack. If you were at Anzio at all, you were in the front lines. No bunker, no ship, was safe. One sailor aboard the U.S.S. TRIPPE described it as a "vision of hell. For four hours we were under continuous attack. The bombers were merciless and the sky was ablaze with shellfire. Hollywood couldn't have staged it any better except for the terror. And no movie can simulate that". One of the more heroic destroyer actions of SHINGLE was staged by the U.S.S. MAYO, under the command of Commander A.D. Kaplan. It was assigned the hazardous task of coming in close ashore to impede the reinforcing of Nazi infantry units. MAYO and other ships of DESRON 7 shelled enemy forces attempting to cross the Mussolini Canal for more than 17 hours.

Out of ammunition and on her way back to Naples, a mine blew open a large hole in her starboard side, flooding the after fire and engine rooms and damaging her propeller shaft. A British tug took her under tow for temporary repairs in Naples. But the enemy hadn't seen the last of "The Merry Mayo", as she was known to her crew. She escorted five more convoys to Europe and even took part in the Okinawa operation. Typical of the intensity of the naval battle of Anzio was the sinking of the British cruiser SPARTAN on 29 January. She was anchored close to shore when she was hit amidships by a guided missile. Farther out, another missile hit a Liberty ship. A U.S. salvage tug that stood by SPARTAN until she was beyond help went to the aid of the Liberty and was itself badly damaged by the air raid that followed. The Liberty's cargo of fuel and ammunition lit up the sky for over eight hours before she finally exploded in a ferocious pyrotechnic display and slid beneath the Tyrhennian Sea. Several new German weapons made their debuts during SHINGLE.

The "Fritz X" guided missile had already been introduced during the Salerno campaign but it was now being used more extensively. This rocket was primarily an anti-ship weapon. In a sense, it was the precursor of today's cruise missile. It had fins so it was designed to glide rather than drop and was radio-controlled from the launching aircraft. Fritz had an armor-piercing warhead with 320 kilograms of amatol, which surrounded a set of central explosive tubes. It had a range of nearly four miles and a speed of 600 mph. But the radio-controlling feature which made it so effective turned out to be its Achilles heel. Its reliability depended on a radio beam, but this could be detected and jammed. The U.S. and British navies quickly equipped three destroyer escorts with jamming devices and the early-warning equipment was so efficient that it could detect the German bombers on the runway just outside of Rome before their takeoff. Then a desperate game of cat-and-mouse ensued, with the bomber pilot trying to keep his glider bomb on target while the destroyermen fought to stay on the beam to direct the bomb away from the target. They weren't always successful.

On 23 January a bomb evaded the defenses and hit the British destroyer JANUS. She went down in 20 minutes with the loss of her captain and over 150 men. When Fritz proved a dud, the Nazis came up with the midget submarine, steered by one man in a diving suit. The pilot sat astride one torpedo moving along the surface, with a second one slung underneath. When he reached his target and fired it, he could make a wide swing to return to base. The problem was that the craft was underpowered and was usually spotted and destroyed within minutes of firing its first shot. While they cannot be said to have been decisive, there were two minor elements that hindered the Anzio operation. The most serious was the nearly constant backbiting between the top-level British and American commanders. For example, Mark Clark's diary for 16 February 1944 said, "I want to record my definite feelings that Adm. Cunningham [Royal Navy] has been as uncooperative as possible in this SHINGLE operation. Yesterday, Lucas asked for cruiser gunfire support and did not get it. Today he asked again.

Admiral Cunningham will give it only if it comes from Lucas through his liaison officer, not honoring my request". Curiously, this jealousy and rivalry was entirely absent at lower levels. Lt. Cdr. Martin N. Chamberlain, executive officer of the U.S.S. PARKER reports that "Our squadron was attached to a British command—Flag Officer Western Italy (FOWIT), operating out of Naples. Our assignment was to provide fire support for the Allied troops which were hunkered down in trenches…then to support the British First Army in its advance up the Italian West Coast. "Operating under British command was quite different but pleasant. They were much more laid back then we and we appreciated the informality. I recall one time being on deck when we were anchored in Naples harbor and watched a local fishing boat approach our gangway. Someone in that boat held up a long pole. The OOD [Officer of the Deck] noticed this, grabbed the pole and removed the paper. It was our orders to get underway and proceed to Anzio. Can you imagine the U.S. Navy doing anything that simple?" Of lesser consequence was a factor that constitutes one of the dirty little secrets of World War II.

It came into play in nearly every major operation of the war. Generals and admirals not directly involved in an invasion would often appear on the scene uninvited, when there was no longer much physical danger, just to pick up another campaign ribbon or battle star—and to view the action as a spectator from a safe distance. Anzio was no exception. Several generals sailed up from Naples in a party that even included "Wild Bill Donovan", head of the O.S.S., the predecessor of the C.I.A. It is not difficult to imagine what an annoyance such visitors constituted to Adm. Lowry and his staff. When Gen. Lucas finally attempted a breakout on 31 January it was beaten back by the six available German divisions. Lucas had predicted that his head would roll in a basket and this proved to be prophetic. He was replaced by his subordinate, Maj. Gen. Lucien Truscott. But Truscott wasn't able to work a miracle either. Three months later, he finally broke out just as the Gustav Line was being breached. And two days after that, he made contact with Mark Clark's forces. So in the end, SHINGLE had accomplished little except to serve as a diversionary tactic.

However, at long last the push toward Rome was on. But at least the Germans were not permitted to withdraw gracefully. Enemy encampments north of Anzio at Practica di Mare were mercilessly pounded by five plucky U.S.destroyers, CHAMPLIN, KEARNY, KENDRICK, MACKENZIE and PARKER. With shore fire-control parties providing coordinates, they rained an incessant barrage of 5-inch rounds on Nazi guns, tanks and troops, giving the enemy no opportunity to either retreat or respond. Each shell was 70 pounds of steel and explosive traveling at 3000 feet per second. Lieutenant Steve Anastasion's matter-of-fact entry in CHAMPLIN's log of 2 June tells the story: "1721: Completed firing shore bombardment having expended 285 rounds. Secured from General Quarters. Proceeded through swept channel at ten knots to Anzio anchorage." Assigned to evening patrol about four miles offshore in an area believed to be mine-free, the night was uneventful. But at daybreak, CHAMPLIN's lookouts spotted three mines in rapid succession.

Each was dispatched by rifle fire, leaving the crew pondering the big "what if" question. Even after 53 years, the words, "Red Anzio" are indelibly stamped on the minds of the surviving British and American sailors who participated in the ill-starred Anzio operation. These were the code words signifying a call for all gunners, fire-controlmen and ammunition handlers to man their battle stations. "Red Anzio", the cautionary "Yellow Anzio" and "White Anzio" (all clear) were alternately piped dozens of times each day aboard the scores of ships anchored in and patrolling the small harbor of Anzio-Nettuno between the invasion date of 22 January and 24 May 1944 when the operation officially ended. One day aboard the U.S.S. CHAMPLIN, "Red Anzio" was piped five times within a two-hour period. It is difficult to imagine the strain and terror of the call to battle stations.

What really shattered the nerves of the sailors at Anzio beachhead was the fact that "Red Anzio", "Yellow Anzio", and "White Anzio" were often sounded in rapid succession, providing little opportunity for sleep or even getting a bite to eat. Still, they got periodic respite through R&R—sometimes even at fashionable Capri. Toward the end of SHINGLE the atmosphere became so relaxed that the CHAMPLIN's popular Recreation Officer, Ensign Norman Glass, was able to organize a swimming party for the crew off the ship's fantail during an extended period of "White Anzio". Was a great strategic opportunity lost between 22 January and 1 February 1944? Did nearly 5000 British and American soldiers and sailors die a needless death because of an ill-conceived strategy? How could a nearly flawless naval effort have been allowed to turn into a near-rout on the ground? These are questions that are still being debated after more than a half century. British historians such as Wynford Vaughn-Thomas, author of "Anzio" insist that the area north of Anzio was lightly defended and could easily have been overwhelmed by a swift inland drive.

But Field Marshal Kesselring's memoirs (Bis zum Letzen Soldat) give the lie to these claims. According to his postwar account, the Germans had sufficient reserves in the area to turn any northward offensive into a massacre. One thing is not in doubt. Those who were there would never be able to forget the sheer terror inspired by that feared and angst-ridden command, "Red Anzio, Red Anzio". SUGGESTED READING: "Anzio. Edge of Disaster" by William L. Allen "Anzio. Epic of Bravery" by Fred Sheehan "Anzio 1944. An Unexpected Fury" by Peter Verney "Bis Zum Letzen Soldat", the memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring Written by Irwin J. Kappes Copyright © 2003 Irwin J. Kappes Images Operation Shingle: Central Italy - January 22, 1944. U.S.S. CHAMPLIN (DD-601) pounds retreating Germans near Practica di Mare, north of Anzio beachhead.

ANZIO 1944 Map: The Landing the Allies off-loaded twenty-one cargo ships and landed 6,350 tons of materiel on 29 January alone, and on 1 February the port of Anzio went into full operation. Improving air defenses downed ninety-seven attacking Luftwaffe aircraft prior to 1 February, but the Germans did succeed in sinking one destroyer and a hospital ship, as well as destroying significant stocks of supplies piled on the crowded beaches. Mindful of the need for reinforcements, Lucas ordered ashore the rest of the 45th Infantry Division and remaining portions of the 1st Armored Division allotted to the Anzio operation, raising the total number of Allied soldiers in the beachhead to 61,332. 10 Preloaded supply trucks and DUKWs at Naples. (National Archives) The Germans had not been idle during the week after the Anzio landing. The German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) in Berlin was surprised at the location of the landing and the efficiency with which it was carried out.

Although they had considered such an attack probable for some time and had made preliminary plans for meeting it, Kesselring and his local commanders were powerless to repel the invasion immediately because of the lack of adequate reserves. Nevertheless, German reaction to the Anzio landing was swift and ultimately would prove far more powerful than anything the Allies had anticipated. Upon receiving word of the landings, Kesselring immediately dispatched elements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads leading north from the Alban Hills. Within the next twenty-four hours Hitler dispatched other units to Italy from Yugoslavia, France, and Germany to reinforce elements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions that were already moving into the Anzio area. By the end of D-day, thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite delays caused by Allied air attacks. 11 Men and equipment move ashore south of Anzio on D-day. (National Archives) OKW, Kesselring, and Brig. Gen.

Siegfried Westphal, Kesselring's chief of staff, were astonished that the Anzio forces had not exploited their unopposed landing with an immediate thrust into the virtually undefended Alban Hills on 23-24 January. As Westphal later recounted, there were no significant German units between Anzio and Rome, and he speculated that an imaginative, bold strike by enterprising forces could easily have penetrated into the interior or sped straight up Highways 6 and 7 to Rome. Instead, Westphal recalled, the enemy forces lost time and hesitated. As the Germans later discovered, General Lucas was neither bold nor imaginative, and he erred repeatedly on the side of caution, to the increasing chagrin of both Alexander and Clark. By 24 January Kesselring, confident that he had gathered sufficient forces to contain the beachhead, transferred the Fourteenth Army headquarters under General Eberhard von Mackensen from Verona in northern Italy to Anzio. Mackensen soon controlled elements of 8 divisions, totaling 40,000 troops, with 5 more divisions on the way.

Seeking to prevent a permanent Allied foothold at Anzio, Kesselring ordered a counterattack for 28 January, but Mackensen requested and received a postponement until 1 February to await further reinforcements, especially armored units that were being held up by Allied air attacks. Two days before the scheduled offensive, the Fourteenth Army numbered about 70,000 12 Map: Expanding the Beachhead combat troops, most already deployed in forward staging areas, with several thousand more on the way. Racing against the expected German counterattack, both the Fifth and Eighth Armies prepared to renew their stalled offensives in the south. Lucas meanwhile planned a two-pronged attack for 30 January. While one force cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills, a second was to advance northeast up the Albano Road, break through the Campoleone salient, and exploit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A quick link-up with Fifth Army forces in the south was believed 13 Isola Bella and Cisterna. (National Archives) still possible even though German resistance all along the perimeter of the beachhead was becoming stronger.

The 3d Division and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions under Col. William O. Darby were responsible for the initial attack on Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Rangers were to spearhead the assault by infiltrating the German lines and seizing and holding Cisterna until the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry, 3d Division, arrived via the Conca-Cisterna Road. Meanwhile, at 0200, 30 January, the 7th Infantry, 3d Division, was to push on the left to a point above Cisterna and cut Highway 7, while the 15th Infantry passed to the right of Cisterna and cut the highway south of town. As a diversion the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment would attack along the Mussolini Canal. Unknown to the Americans, their assault was aimed directly at the center of the area where thirty-six enemy battalions were massing for their 1 February counterattack.

The Rangers moved out at 0130 to the right of the Conca-Cisterna Road and by dawn were within 800 yards of Cisterna. But German soldiers of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division discovered the lightly armed Ranger force during the night and sprang a devastating ambush at first light. Heavy fighting broke out and the Rangers were pinned down quickly by an enemy superior in arms 14 and numbers. Efforts by the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry to rescue the beleaguered units failed, and by noon armored units of the Hermann Goering Division had forced the Rangers into the open. The Americans had only grenades and bazookas for antitank weapons, and as they attempted a fighting withdrawal in small and scattered groups they were cut down mercilessly. Of the 767 men in the two battalions, only 6 eventually returned to Allied lines. In spite of the disaster that befell the Rangers, the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments continued their attacks toward Cisterna, one soldier recalling that the defenders clung stubbornly to their entrenched positions while launching locally heavy counterattacks. Sgt. Truman O.

Olson, a light machine gunner with Company B. 7th Infantry, took part in one sixteen-hour assault on entrenched enemy positions in which one-third of his company became casualties. Having seized a toehold, the survivors dug in while Sergeant Olson and his crew took their one available machine gun and placed it forward of the line to bear the brunt of an expected enemy counterattack. Although he had been firing without respite all day, Olson stuck grimly to his post throughout the night while his gun crew was killed, one by one, by accurate and overwhelming enemy fire. Weary from over twenty-four hours of continuous battle and suffering from an arm wound, Olson manned his gun alone, meeting the full force of a 200-man enemy dawn assault supported by mortars and machine guns. After thirty minutes of fighting, Olson was severely wounded, but he refused evacuation. For an hour and a half after receiving a second and subsequently fatal wound, he continued to fire his machine gun, killing at least twenty of the enemy, wounding many more, and ultimately forcing the attackers to withdraw. For his actions Sergeant Olson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

While some progress was made by 3d Division units in the face of noticeably stronger enemy resistance, by nightfall on 31 January the Americans were still one mile from the village, battling stubbornly forward but unable to break through. On the following day fighting was equally inconclusive, and by noon it had become obvious, after three days of costly attacks and counterattacks, that the Americans could not capture Cisterna, still 1,500 yards away. Heeding intelligence reports delivered on 2 February, which indicated the arrival of new German units in the Anzio area and an imminent enemy counterattack, Truscott, on the orders of Clark and Lucas, again told his command to dig in. 15 The other prong of the Allied attack launched by the British 1st Division and CCA, 1st Armored Division, toward Campoleone and the Alban Hills initially fared little better. Rain-soaked terrain, fierce enemy fire, and ubiquitous minefields slowed CCA's advance, and by nightfall on 30 January the unit was still struggling to reach its line of departure. The British succeeded in advancing two miles the first day, but they also failed to breach the German defenses.

General Lucas changed plans for the second day of the attack and ordered the British to breach the enemy line along the Albano Road at Campoleone for exploitation by CCA. During the next two days the Allies reached Campoleone, penetrated the German main line, and opened a two-mile-wide gap. But the exhausted Allied troops were unable to exploit their success, and the drive ground to a halt. The failure of the Allied breakout attempt, stymied by stiff resistance, convinced Alexander, Clark, and Lucas that an enemy counterattack must be in the offing. Reinforcements were rushed to Anzio, including 1,800 men of the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force, elements of the British 56th Division, and additional antiaircraft and artillery units, raising the total number of Allied soldiers in the beachhead to 100,000. Despite these additions, the Fourteenth Army outnumbered the Allies at Anzio by 4 February. But the German force was a hodgepodge of rapidly thrown together units. All were critically short of ammunition, training, qualified leaders, and reserves.

Allied air attacks had disrupted communications, hampered troop and supply movements, and caused morale problems. From the outset Mackensen had doubted the available force could eliminate the Anzio beachhead, but he prepared a forceful counterattack nonetheless. The 4th Parachute and 65th infantry Divisions of the I Parachute Corps were to pinch off the Campoleone salient and recapture the Factory at Aprilia. The same units would then break through to the sea along the Albano Road. Elsewhere the LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 3d Panzer Grenadier, 715th Motorized Infantry, 71st Infantry, Hermann Goering, and 26th Panzer Divisions would attack south of Cisterna along the Mussolini Canal and attempt to breach the Allied perimeter and advance on Nettuno and Anzio. The counterattack opened with an artillery barrage on 3-4 February, followed by armored and infantry assaults which smashed into the partially prepared British 1st Division defenses in 16 "The Factory." (National Archives) the Campoleone salient.

The British held, despite suffering 1,400 casualties, but their dangerously exposed position prompted Lucas to order their withdrawal to one mile north of the Factory and Carroceto on the night of 4-5 February, a retreat of about 2.5 miles. Although the salient was eliminated, the Germans failed to break the Allied line or retake the Factory. The undulating and soggy Albano Road area was just as inhospitable to German armor and infantry as it had been to Allied forces the week before. However, the critical situation the Germans created in the Allied center convinced Lucas to form a beachhead defense line running from the Moletta River in the north, through the fields of the central sector, to the Mussolini Canal in the south. He issued orders to all Allied troops that this was the final line of resistance to be held at all costs-the shallow beachhead precluded any further retreat. The Germans renewed their attacks on 7 February in the weakened British 1st Division sector and, in two days of bitter fighting, pushed the British troops from the Factory and Carroceto.

Although battered and exhausted, they managed to maintain a coherent line and were reinforced on 10 February by the 1st Armored Regiment, CCA, 1st Armored Division (itself at 50 percent strength), the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 179th and 157th regiments of 17 the U.S. 45th Infantry Division. Ordered to counterattack and retake Aprilia on 11 February, the 179th Infantry and 191st Tank Battalion began a two-pronged attack seeking to outflank the Germans holding the Factory. In two days of costly, hand-to-hand fighting, the Americans failed to retake the lost ground, but inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Lucas still expected further attacks in the weakened central sector and removed the British 1st Division from the line, replacing it with the British 56th and U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. As an added precaution, VI Corps artillery was strengthened and Allied tactical air attacks were stepped up.

Spurred by the elimination of the Campoleone salient, the Germans continued their counterattack on 16 February by moving down the Anzio-Albano Road on a four-mile front. The brunt of the assault hit the 45th Division sectors held by the 157th and 179th Infantry regiments. The initial attacks by the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 715th Motorized Infantry Divisions were beaten back with heavy losses, allowing only minor penetrations, while the 180th Infantry rebuffed lighter attacks. Just before midnight, however, enemy persistence paid off. A gap was created between the 179th and 157th Infantry, which was promptly exploited by three German regiments supported by sixty tanks. By dawn the Germans had driven a two-by-one-mile wedge in the center of the 45th Division and were poised to break the Allied line, threatening the entire beachhead. Compounding the already critical situation, the 179th Infantry attempted to withdraw in full view of the enemy the following afternoon and suffered heavy casualties.

All through 16-17 February the Allies scrambled to plug the gap with hastily redeployed 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, naval gunfire, and units of the 1st Armored Division. The XII Tactical Air Command flew 730 ground support sorties and later claimed that the total weight of bombs dropped and the number of bombers employed was the greatest ever allotted up to that date in direct support of ground forces. The Germans launched a more intense assault against the 45th Division at dawn on 18 February and destroyed one battalion of the 179th Infantry before pushing the remainder of the unit back a half mile farther to Lucas' final defensive line by midmorning. Fearing that the 179th Infantry was in danger of giving way, Lucas ordered Col. William O. Darby to take command of the unit and allow no further retreat. The regiment held, later counting 500 dead Germans in front of its positions. Elsewhere, the 180th and 157th regiments also held their positions in spite of heavy losses 18 Map: Holding the Beachhead during three days of German attacks.

By midday, Allied air and artillery superiority had turned the tide. When the Germans launched a final afternoon assault against the 180th and 179th regiments, it was halted by air strikes and massed mortar, machine gun, artillery, and tank fire. Subsequent enemy attacks on 19 and 20 February were noticeably weaker and were broken up by the same combination of Allied arms before ground contact was made The crisis had passed, and while harassing attacks continued until 22 February, VI Corps went over to the offensive locally and succeeded in retaking some lost ground. 19 The Germans could ill afford the loss of the 5,389 men killed, wounded, and missing during their five-day counterattack. Enemy troop morale plummeted, and many units lost their offensive capability. The 65th Infantry Division's combat strength had dropped to 673 effectives by 23 February, and one regiment of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division numbered fewer than 185 men. Allied casualties numbered some 3,496 killed, wounded, or missing in addition to 1,637 nonbattle casualties from trench foot, exposure, and combat exhaustion.

Allied commanders at Anzio often claimed that losses would have been lower if soldiers were periodically rotated away from the lines, but replacements simply were not available. All 96,401 Allied soldiers were required to hold the 35-mile perimeter against an estimated ten German divisions in the Fourteenth Army, totaling 120,000 men by 12 February. Despite the fact that their drive to eliminate the Anzio beachhead with an attack down the Albano Road had failed, the Germans resumed the offensive on 29 February. This time their main effort was directed against the U.S. 3d Division holding the Cisterna sector of the Allied beachhead. The LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 114th Light Infantry, 362d Infantry, 26th Panzer, and Hermann Goering Divisions began a drive to breach the outer beachhead defenses from Carano to Isola Bella, which, if successful, would be exploited by the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division all the way to Nettuno and Anzio. The Americans, however, had anticipated this move.

General Truscott, who had replaced Lucas as VI Corps commander on 23 February, had reinforced the line with additional artillery. Further, he made certain that each unit had at least one battalion in reserve with additional reinforcements available at the corps level. At midnight, 28 February, German artillery signaled the commencement of the new attack. But VI Corps and 3d Division artillery responded in mass, returning twenty shells for each one fired by the Germans, expending 66,000 rounds on 29 February alone. When the enemy infantry advanced at dawn at a half-dozen points along the 3d Division front, only one attack made any progress, penetrating 800 yards northeast of Carano before being halted with heavy losses. The other attacks fared less well amid a hail of American artillery and mortar fire. Attacking on too broad a front, the Germans lacked the overwhelming strength needed to break through anywhere, and by the end of the day they had barely dented the American line. Over the next several days, the well-en- 20 trenched Americans, supported by closely coordinated artillery, armor, and air support, shattered subsequent German attacks.

Even though the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion often were hard pressed and suffered heavy losses between 1 and 4 March at the hands of the 715th and the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions, all three units held their positions and beat back successive enemy assaults. The Germans continued to seek a breakthrough, but their efforts gradually weakened. Mackensen realized that the Fourteenth Army had spent itself in a costly and futile offensive after a last German assault failed on 4 March. The final five-day German counterattack cost 3,500 men killed, wounded, and missing, plus thirty tanks destroyed. It had failed to eliminate the beachhead, and 3d Division counterattacks quickly reclaimed all territory. From then, the Germans went over to the defensive, clearly incapable of mounting any further serious offensive action. After six weeks of continuous bombing, shelling, and fighting, the men of the VI Corps were as exhausted as their German adversaries. Following the collapse of the final enemy drive on 4 March, a three-month lull began.

During this time both armies limited their operations to defending the positions they held at the beginning of March, while they conducted limited counterattacks and raids and marked time until the renewal of offensive operations on the southern front. Although the reinforced Fourteenth Army, totaling 135,698 troops by 15 March, considered another offensive, plans were shelved in early April in favor of conserving troop strength to counter an expected Allied spring offensive. The VI Corps spent this time reorganizing and regrouping as well. The British 56th Division was relieved by the British 5th Division while Commando, Ranger, and parachute units were sent to England to begin preparations for OVERLORD. The U.S. 34th Infantry Division took up positions before Cisterna on 28 March, replacing the 3d Division, which had seen sixty-seven days of continuous front-line action and now reverted to corps reserve. Over 14,000 replacements arrived to fill other depleted Allied units, bringing VI Corps to its full combat strength of 90,000 men in six divisions. In preparation for its role in the spring offensive, VI Corps received Combat Command B (CCB) of the U.S.

1st Armored Division, giving the beachhead forces a complete armored division. 21 Map: The Breakout On 22 May the entire U.S. 36th Infantry Division landed, bringing the total number of Allied troops at Anzio to seven full divisions. During March, all of April, and the first part of May 1944, recalled one veteran, the Anzio beachhead resembled the Western Front during World War I. The vast majority of Allied casualties during this period were from air and artillery attacks, including fire from "Anzio Annie," a 280-mm. German railway gun which fired from the Alban Hills. During March, shrapnel caused 83 percent of all 3d Division casualties, and other units experienced similar rates. The Anzio beachhead became a honeycomb of wet and muddy trenches, foxholes, and dugouts. Yet the Allied troops made the best of a bad situation, and one soldier recalled that during these months the fighting was light and living was leisurely. Supply problems at Anzio, originally one of the main concerns of Allied planners, never reached a crisis stage.

Beginning on 28 January, six LSTs left Naples daily for Anzio, each carrying 1,500 tons of cargo distributed among fifty combat-loaded trucks. Driving off the ships at Anzio, the trucks moved directly to front-line positions with ammunition, fuel, and rations and were replaced on the LSTs by the fifty empty trucks that had made the voyage the previous day. In addition to LSTs, fifteen smaller vessels arrived each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty ships delivered heavier equipment. Between 22 January and 1 June over 531,511 long tons of supplies were unloaded at Anzio, a daily average of 3,920 tons. On the night of 11-12 May, the Fifth and Eighth Armies launched their long-awaited spring offensive against the Gustav Line. Stymied in attempts to break through at Cassino in February, March, and April, the Allies initially encountered little success in their new drive. Nonetheless, the Germans abandoned Monte Cassino after a week of heavy fighting by Polish forces, and the French Expeditionary Corps and U.S. II Corps succeeded in breaking the Gustav Line by 15 May.

The II Corps continued its drive north toward Terracina, which fell on 23-24 May, and raced toward the Anzio beachhead against rapidly crumbling German resistance as enemy troops began withdrawing northeast toward Rome. On 5 May General Clark gave General Truscott orders for a new Allied offensive code-named BUFFALO. The VI Corps was to break out of the beachhead on the Cisterna front at Cori, at the base of the Lepini Mountains, and at Velletri near the base of the Alban Hills. Once the breakout occurred, the Anzio units were to 23 Patrol moving through Cisterna. (National Archives) drive east through the Velletri Gap to Valmontone, cut Highway 6, the main German route of retreat, and trap the bulk of the enemy forces withdrawing north through the Liri valley. The basic operational concept had been dictated to Clark by Alexander, who was acting on Churchill's desire to destroy the entire Tenth Army south of Rome at Valmontone. Clark, however, had little faith in the feasibility of the plan.

Furthermore, he believed that most of the recognition for Allied gains thus far obtained in Italy had been attributed unjustly to British forces, and he wanted the Fifth Army to have the singular honor of liberating Rome. He therefore informed Truscott that the VI Corps was to be prepared at any moment during the breakout to swing north for a rapid advance on the Italian capital, especially if stiff enemy resistance was encountered on the route to Valmontone or if the British advance up the Liri valley was slower than planned. The U.S. 1st Armored Division was to make the initial assault out of the beachhead, supported by the 3d Division and 1st Special Service Force. The 45th Division was to move beyond Carano on the left as far as the Campoleone-Cisterna railroad, while the 36th Infantry Division exploited the expected breakthrough. 24 At 0545, 23 May, a 45-minute Allied artillery barrage opened on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry attacks along the entire line from Carano to the Mussolini Canal.

Although resistance was very stiff, by evening the 1st Special Service Force and 1st Armored Division had breached the enemy main line of resistance, while the XII Tactical Air Command completed the last of 722 sorties. The following day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna and encircled the town, the scene of continued heavy fighting by desperate enemy forces. The town finally fell on 25 May at the cost of 476 Americans killed, 2,321 wounded, and 75 missing. Earlier on 25 May, at 0730, troops of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 85th Infantry Division, U.S. II Corps, racing north from Terracina across the Pontine Marshes, met soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment, from the Anzio beachhead, effecting the long-planned and longer-awaited link-up between Fifth Army forces. With the physical juncture of the II and VI Corps, the beachhead ceased to exist and the formerly isolated soldiers became the left flank of the Fifth Army. Clark personally greeted the II Corps troops three hours later.

Meanwhile, the breakout west was proving costly to the VI Corps. The 1st Armored Division lost 100 armored vehicles in the first day alone, while the entire corps took over 4,000 casualties in the first five days of the offensive. Allied troops, however, counted 4,838 enemy prisoners, including 1,000 in Cisterna, and destroyed or damaged 2,700 enemy vehicles. On the same day that the Fifth Army front merged with the Anzio beachhead, General Clark also split Truscott's forces into two parts, sending the 3d Division, the 1st Special Service Force, and elements of the 1st Armored Division toward Valmontone. This thrust, however, proved insufficient, and most of the Tenth Army escaped north to fight again. In the meantime the 45th and 34th Infantry Divisions, along with the rest of the Fifth Army, joined in the hot pursuit of German forces falling back on Rome, a scarce thirty miles distant. Americans liberated the Italian capital on 4 June 1944.

Analysis During the four months of the Anzio Campaign the Allied VI Corps suffered over 29,200 combat casualties (4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, 6,800 prisoners or missing) and 37,000 noncombat casualties. Two-thirds of these losses, amounting to 17 percent of VI Corps' 25 "Anzio Harbor Under German Bombardment" by Edward A. Reep. (Army Art Collection) effective strength, were inflicted between the initial landings and the end of the German counteroffensive on 4 March. Of the combat casualties, 16,200 were Americans (2,800 killed, 11,000 wounded, 2,400 prisoners or missing) as were 26,000 of the Allied noncombat casualties. German combat losses, suffered wholly by the Fourteenth Army, were estimated at 27,500 (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, and 4,500 prisoners or missing)-figures very similar to Allied losses.

The Anzio Campaign continues to be controversial, just as it was during its planning and implementation stages. The operation clearly failed in its immediate objectives of outflanking the Gustav Line, restoring mobility to the Italian campaign, and speeding the capture of Rome. Allied forces were quickly pinned down and contained within a small beachhead, and they were effectively rendered incapable of conducting any sort of major offensive action for four months pending the advance of Fifth Army forces to the south. Anzio failed to be the panacea the Allies sought. As General Lucas repeatedly stated before the landing, which he always considered a gamble, the paltry allotments of men and supplies were not commensurate with the high goals sought by British planners. He steadfastly maintained that under the circumstances the small Anzio 26 force accomplished all that could have been realistically expected. Lucas' critics charge, however, that a more aggressive and imaginative commander, such as a Patton or Truscott, could have obtained the desired goals by an immediate, bold offensive from the beachhead.

Lucas was overly cautious, spent valuable time digging in, and allowed the Germans to prepare countermeasures to ensure that an operation conceived as a daring Allied offensive behind enemy lines became a long, costly campaign of attrition. Yet the campaign did accomplish several goals. The presence of a significant Allied force behind the German main line of resistance, uncomfortably close to Rome, represented a constant threat. The Germans could not ignore Anzio and were forced into a response, thereby surrendering the initiative in Italy to the Allies. The 135,000 troops of the Fourteenth Army surrounding Anzio could not be moved elsewhere, nor could they be used to make the already formidable Gustav Line virtually impregnable. The Anzio beachhead thus guaranteed that the already steady drain of scarce German troop reserves, equipment, and materiel would continue unabated, ultimately enabling the 15th Army Group to break through in the south. But the success was costly. 27 Further Readings For additional reading see William L.

Allen, Anzio: Edge of Disaster (1978); Fred Sheehan, Anzio: Epic of Bravery (1964); and Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (1963). For a British perspective, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio (1961). The official U.S. Army histories, which include Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (1969); Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Alps (1977); and the War Department Historical Division, Anzio Beachhead, 22 January-25 May 1944 (1948) , remain the most comprehensive histories available on the overall operational and tactical aspects of the Anzio Campaign.

Battle of Anzio - World War II - Italian Campaign 36,000 men increasing to 150,000 men Germans Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen 20,000 men rising to 135,000 men Battle of Anzio - Background: Following the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, American and British forces drove up the peninsula until being halted at the Gustav (Winter) Line in front of Cassino. Unable to penetrate Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's defenses, British General Harold Alexander, commander of Allied forces in Italy, began assessing his options. In an effort to break the stalemate, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed Operation Shingle which called for landings behind the Gustav Line at Anzio ( Map ). Initially ignored by US Chief of Staff General George Marshall , planning moved forward after Churchill appealed to President Franklin Roosevelt . The plan called for Lieutenant General Mark Clark's US Fifth Army to attack along the Gustav Line to draw enemy forces south while Major General John P. Lucas' VI Corps landed at Anzio and drove northeast into the Alban Hills to threaten the German rear.

It was thought that if the Germans responded to the landings it would sufficiently weaken the Gustav Line to permit a breakthrough. If they did not respond, the Shingle troops would be in place to directly threaten Rome. As preparations moved forward, Alexander desired Lucas to land and quickly begin offensive operations into the Alban Hills . Clark's final orders to Lucas did not reflect this urgency and gave him flexibility regarding the timing of the advance. This may have been caused by Clark's lack of faith in the plan which he believed required at least two corps or a full army. Lucas shared this uncertainty and believed that he was going ashore with insufficient forces. In the days before landings, Lucas compared the operation to the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of World War I which had also been devised by Churchill. Battle of Anzio - Landing: Despite the misgivings of the senior commanders, Operation Shingle moved forward on January 22, 1944, with the British 1st Infantry Division landing north of Anzio, the 6615th Ranger Force attacking the port, and the US 3rd Infantry Division landing south of the town. Coming ashore, Allied forces initially met little resistance and began moving inland.

By midnight, 36,000 men had landed and secured a beachhead 2-3 miles deep. Rather than move quickly to strike at the German rear, Lucas began strengthening his perimeter. This inaction irritated Churchill and Alexander as it undercut the value of the operation. Facing a superior enemy force, Lucas' caution was justified to a degree, however most agree that he should have attempted drive further inland. Informed of the Allied landings, Kesselring took immediate action by dispatching mobile reaction units to the area. In addition, he received the equivalent of six additional divisions from OKW (German High Command). Though he initially did not believe the landings could be contained, Lucas' inaction changed his mind and by January 24, he had 40,000 men in prepared defensive positions opposite the Allied lines. Battle of Anzio - Battling for the Beachhead: The next day, Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen was given command of the German defenses. Across the lines, Lucas was reinforced by the US 45th Infantry Division and US 1st Armored Division.

On January 30, he launched a two-prong attack with the British attacking up the Via Anziate towards Campoleone while the US 3rd Infantry and Rangers assaulted Cisterna. In the fighting that resulted, the attack on Cisterna was repulsed, with the Rangers taking heavy losses, while the British gained ground up the Via Anziate but failed to take the town. As a result, an exposed salient was created in the lines ( Map ). Battle of Anzio - A Command Change: By early February Mackensen's force totaled over 100,000 men facing Lucas' 76,400. On February 3, the Germans attacked the Allied lines with a focus on the Via Anziate salient. In several days of heavy fighting, they succeeded in pushing the British back. On February 16, the attack was renewed and Allied forces on the Via Anziate front were pushed back to their prepared defenses at the Final Beachhead Line before the Germans were halted by VI Corps reserves. Frustrated with Lucas' performance, Clark replaced him with Major General Lucian Truscott on February 22.

Continuing the pressure, another German assault was conducted near Cisterna on February 29, but was repulsed by the Allies with heavy losses. With the situation at a stalemate, Truscott and Mackensen suspended offensive operations until spring. During this time, Kesselring constructed the Caesar C defensive line between the beachhead and Rome. Working with Alexander and Clark, Truscott helped plan Operation Diadem which called for a massive offensive in May. As part of this, he was instructed to devise two plans. Battle of Anzio - Victory at Last The first, Operation Buffalo, called for an attack to cut Route 6 at Valmontone to aid in trapping the German Tenth Army, while the other, Operation Turtle, was for an advance through Campoleone and Albano towards Rome. While Alexander selected Buffalo, Clark was adamant that US forces be the first to enter Rome and lobbied for Turtle. Though Alexander insisted on severing Route 6, he told Clark that Rome was an option if Buffalo ran into trouble. As a result, Clark instructed Truscott to be ready to execute both operations. The offensive moved forward on May 23 with Allied troops hitting the Gustav Line and beachhead defenses.

While the British pinned Mackensen's men at Via Anziate, American forces finally took Cisterna on May 25. By the end of the day, US forces were three miles from Valmontone with Buffalo proceeding according to plan and Truscott anticipating severing Route 6 the next day. That evening, Truscott was stunned to receive orders from Clark calling for him to turn his attack ninety degrees towards Rome. While the attack towards Valmontone would continue, it would be much weakened. Clark did not inform Alexander of this change until the morning of May 26 at which point the orders could not be reversed. Exploiting the slowed American attack, Kesselring moved parts of four divisions into the Velletri Gap to stall the advance. Holding Route 6 open until May 30, they allowed seven divisions from the Tenth Army to escape north. Forced to reorient his forces, Truscott was not able to attack towards Rome until May 29. Encountering the Caesar C Line, VI Corps, now aided by II Corps, were able to exploit a gap in the German defenses. By June 2, the German line collapsed and Kesselring was ordered to retreat north of Rome.

American forces led by Clark entered the city three days later ( Map ). Battle of Anzio - Aftermath The fighting during the Anzio campaign saw Allied forces sustain around 7,000 killed and 36,000 wounded/missing. German losses were around 5,000 killed, 30,500 wounded/missing, and 4,500 captured. Though the campaign ultimately proved successful, Operation Shingle has been criticized for being poorly planned and executed. While Lucas should have been more aggressive, his force was too small to achieve the objectives it was assigned. Also, Clark's change of plan during Operation Diadem allowed large parts of the German Tenth Army to escape, allowing it to continue fighting through the rest of the year. Though criticized, Churchill relentlessly defended the Anzio operation claiming that though it failed to achieve its tactical goals, it succeeded in holding German forces in Italy and preventing their redeployment to Northwest Europe on the eve of the Normandy invasion .

Selected Sources Battle of Anzio - World War II - HISTORY.com Battle of Anzio A+E Networks Introduction The 1944 Battle of Anzio stemmed from the Allied attempt to draw German troops off the Gustav Line during Operation Shingle. An expeditionary force commanded by U.S. Major General John P. Lucas secured a beachhead near Anzio and Nettuno on Italy’s west coast, but his divisions were quickly contained by German Field Marshall Albert Kesselring. A succession of attacks resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, though no budge in the stalemate for four months. The Allies finally broke out of the beachhead in late May, facilitating the advance that led to the eventual capture of Rome. Google By the end of 1943 the Italian campaign had become a stalemate as Field Marshall Albert Kesselring’s German army group stopped the Allied advance cold at Cassino. The Allied ground commander in chief, General Sir Harold Alexander, concluded that he could not take Rome unless the Allies initiated an amphibious end run and weakened the Cassino front by drawing off German troops manning the Gustav Line.

Operation Shingle, one of the most ill-conceived operations of the war, took place thirty-five miles southwest of Rome on January 22, 1944, when a corps-sized Anglo-American expeditionary force commanded by U.S. major general John P. Lucas landed at Anzio and Nettuno. Alexander believed that if the expeditionary force seized the Alban Hills northeast of Anzio, it could block German resupply of Cassino, thus compelling Kesselring to abandon the Gustav Line and retreat to the Apennines. Lucas recognized that the Anzio force could not hold both the Alban Hills and a vital logistical lifeline to the port of Anzio, and elected merely to establish a beachhead outside Anzio and Nettuno. Kesselring quickly contained the Allied threat and massed German troops. In mid-February, they carried out Adolf Hitler’s order to “lance the abscess south of Rome” with a massive counteroffensive aimed at destroying the beachhead.

A series of furious attacks failed to break the Allied line in what one historian has described as “a charge of the Light Brigade without the horses…sheer slaughter.” Lucas was relieved of command even though he had been given a mission he had no practical possibility of carrying out. After a four-month stalemate during which British and American losses totaled seven thousand killed, thirty-six thousand wounded or missing, and forty-four thousand hospitalized from various nonbattle injuries and sickness, the siege of Anzio finally ended on May 23, 1944, when the Allies launched a breakout offensive. The Reader’s Companion to Military History. Edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. Copyright © 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Tags

Question: In World War II, what was the allies' code name for the Anzio Landings?
Answer: Operation Shingle