Egypt's border with Libya, Sudan ripe for Islamic State expansion Egyptian farmers harvest wheat in a village near Aswan, April 26, 2009. (photo by REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih) Egypt's border with Libya, Sudan ripe for Islamic State expansion Author: Mahmoud Salem Posted September 22, 2014 As the United States gears up for its war on the Islamic State (IS), US Secretary of State John Kerry is flying all over the Middle East to form an international coalition of regional powers to join the war. His efforts have been met with nothing more than lip service for many reasons , but primarily the lack of credibility the United States has in the Middle East under President Barack Obama’s leadership, especially in Egypt. The Egyptian government’s official position is “ backing the coalition ” but “ not joining ” it, preferring to “fight its own battle against this common enemy.” Summary ⎙ Print Egypt’s border regions with Libya and Sudan lack government control, and are perfect ground for would-be jihadists to conduct smuggling and build up their strength.

Author Mahmoud Salem Posted September 22, 2014 Egypt may be interested in fighting its own battles, or at least not opening up new international fronts that would stretch its armed forces when it needs them here, but the reality is that the frontline against IS is everywhere. The ingenious use of social media by IS has a reach and purpose far greater than simply asking Islamic-minded people to emigrate there; it aims to radicalize locals in other countries to start fighting their un-Islamic governments as well. There are many roads to having other countries join the caliphate, and it’s not only through expanding in the territories around IS' geographical borders, as we are seeing in Libya. The situation is further complicated once you consider the concept of “bayaa” (swearing fealty) to the caliph in Islam. The bayaa doesn’t require being under the geographical rule of the caliph or being part of his structure; it is a simple act of mutual recognition and loyalty at the price of blood. By swearing bayaa, the people state that they recognize the caliph as their ruler, and therefore he should recognize them as his subjects, and that the caliph’s enemy is their enemy, and their enemies are the caliph’s enemies.

So, for example, if the United States attacks IS, and someone who has sworn bayaa to IS lives in the United States, then by duty, and with no prior corporation or alignment, that someone can commit violent acts against the US government on US soil. Swore bayaa, but live in Ghana? No problem. Attack the local US Embassy, citizens or US-affiliated businesses in Ghana in IS' name, and IS won’t mind or distance itself from the act or deny involvement and most likely will claim responsibility. What would a group of Egyptian jihad-minded individuals who want to help spread IS to Egypt, but have no actual connection to IS itself, do to achieve this goal? They will quickly realize that three things are required: recruits, money and weapons. With the current state of discontent and disillusionment that young Islamists have in Egypt, coupled with the seductiveness of the caliphate dream, it won’t be hard to find recruits. In the end, it comes down to money to obtain weapons, and since IS will not be sending funds to any ragtag group that claims affiliation, this money will have to be self-raised. How does one raise such an amount of money?

Simple: The same three ways IS itself, at its beginning, would acquire money: Kidnapping: The fastest way to raise money is kidnapping someone and asking for ransom, which is why Iraq suffered an epidemic of kidnapping in the last 10 years. Interestingly, anyone who has been following Egyptian news in the past two months would have noticed the spike in kidnappings coupled with huge ransoms, especially the kidnapping of children. Kicking out religious minorities and appropriating their property: This is fairly straight to the point and actually quite common in a country such as Egypt that suffers from sectarianism. While such incidents usually take place in Upper Egypt, in June it took place in Cairo’s underclass neighborhood of Al-Matareya, where an entire Christian family was forced to leave its home and give up its property — worth millions — to a Muslim family that clashed with it. Why didn’t the police stop this? Because the police facilitated this “conflict resolution” solution in post-June 30 Egypt. Weapons smuggling: This method gets you both money and weapons, and it’s fairly easy in a country with long, porous borders such as Egypt, particularly when its neighbors are Sudan and Libya, whose governments are not the most functional at the moment.

On July 24, 21 Egyptian border guards were slaughtered at the Farafra checkpoint near the Libyan border. The attackers allegedly left the black IS flag, and a quickly suspended Twitter account called the "Islamic State in Egypt" claimed responsibility . Government critics have been skeptical of the IS Egypt story, contending that it’s the result of an armed clash between the military and smugglers , but there is no reason not to believe that the group may be both. Keeping in mind that these three methods are already active, where is the best place for IS loyalists to emerge in Egypt? The quick answer is the Sinai Peninsula, but the correct one is Upper Egypt. Upper Egypt already has weapons, hard-line Islamists and very little government control. It’s where Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamaa Islamiya emerged back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when there was no social media and the caliphate was a pipe dream. Imagine how easy it would be now. For Egypt to prevent such a catastrophe from taking place, its government should take a narrative that is opposed to everything that IS stands for, embracing citizenship rights, liberties and freedoms.

Unfortunately, the government is too busy trying to appear as a centrist voice of moderate Islam, and thus cracking down on liberties and freedom and ignoring citizenship rights (as shown by the Al-Matareya incident). It is a tactic that was tried and failed in the 1980s and '90s, and that will fail again now. The government supporters’ talking point against those who point this out has been, “At least we are better than Iraq and Syria.” They believe that what the government is doing will stop the emergence of an Egyptian version of IS. What they fail to understand is that it is already here. Read More: Located in the middle east Egypt borders Libya in the west, Sudan in the south, the Mediterranean Sea in the north, and the Red Sea and Israel in the east. Egypt is full of many different kinds of wild life, although most of the animals that the ancient Egyptians worshiped are gone wildlife is still in abundance. Expect to see some of the 430 different types of birds that pass through Egypt every year. As well as camels and donkeys in abundance. They are some of the most valuable types of animals and a large source of transportation.

One of the biggest and most popular tourist spots in the world. Egypt has something for everyone to enjoy. From an exciting nightlife to some of the oldest tourist attractions in the world. You can find it here in Egypt. Located in the middle east Egypt borders Libya in the west, Sudan in the south, the Mediterranean Sea in the north, and the Red Sea and Israel in the east. Egypt is full of many different kinds of wild life, although most of the animals that the ancient Egyptians worshiped are gone wildlife is still in abundance. Expect to see some of the 430 different types of birds that pass through Egypt every year. As well as camels and donkeys in abundance. They are some of the most valuable types of animals and a large source of transportation. One of the biggest and most popular tourist spots in the world. Egypt has something for everyone to enjoy. From an exciting nightlife to some of the oldest tourist attractions in the world. You can find it here in Egypt. Egypt's climate is hot and dry most of the year. During the winter months of December, January and February - average daily temperatures stay up around 68 degrees Fahrenheit. Egypt's history and culture is one of the most famous and well known in the world.

Much of which is tied to the Nile river that runs through the country. The river has been the source of economic, social, political and religious life since the area was first settled. Stories of dynasties and pharohs fill the history of Egypt. With pyramids, temples and many other public works or art it will be hard for you not to notice this countries rich past. As for the culture of Egypt, both the life and lifestyle have changed little in hundreds of years. Although Egypt is famous for belly dancing, wiggling the body around is generally regarded as vulgar and a sign of promiscuity. Many of the dancers at belly-dancing shows at the resorts and tourist hotels are in fact European or American, because it's considered improper for Arab women to behave so provocatively. Analysis: Libya closer to full civil war - Middle East - Jerusalem Post Analysis: Libya closer to full civil war Middle East Analysis: Libya closer to full civil war Analysis: Libya closer to full civil war The situation in the country has deteriorated so much that the US suspended training by US special forces after a local militia stole a cache of American-provided weapons. Libya uprising 521.

(photo credit:ISMAIL ZITOUNY/ REUTERS) Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Libya seems to be heading towards a major civil war, waiting for its next strong man to put a lid on the chaos and control the various parties. The Libyan government is unable to control its territory. Be the first to know - Join our Facebook page. The situation in the country has deteriorated so much that the US suspended training by US special forces after a local militia stole a cache of American-provided weapons. According to a report published in the British newspaper, The Times, on Friday, quoting Olivier Guitta, the director of the London-based Henry Jackson Society think-tank, French, American and Algerian special forces are on their way to southern Libya to attack al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After a contested vote in parliament three weeks ago, businessman Ahmed Maiteeq was appointed as Libya’s third prime minister in two months – with backing from Islamists and independents in the splintered General National Congress (GNC). On Wednesday, his predecessor, acting prime minister Abdullah al-Thinni, refused to hand over power after questioning the legality of Maiteeq’s appointment by parliament.

Meanwhile, a former Libyan army officer, Khalifa Haftar, began a self-declared campaign against extremists he accuses Islamist parties in the GNC of allowing to flourish. The West helped create a vacuum in Libya where various tribes, militias and Islamist groups roam, where each group seeks to aggrandize and/or protect its own power and territory. Like in other Arab countries, local identity, or that of the family or ethnic group, override an overarching, modern national one. Philip S. Koury and Joseph Kostiner wrote in the introduction to their book Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East: “States that contain or coexist with tribal societies have encountered difficulty developing efficient administrative machineries and compelling ideologies necessary to achieve legitimacy.” “Instead, they have depended heavily on physical and psychological coercion to expand their control,” they said. The continuing chaos that broke out upon the uprising and the subsequent Western military intervention in 2011 is because no one party has been able to monopolize power within Libyan territory, and hence, put a stop to inter-group warfare. And like in other Arab countries, to maintain order, it seems necessary for an unforgiving strongman to hold the disparate factions together.

Former Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi was able to do it, though brutally. In Syria, the country is suffering from similar chaos due to ethnic and religious divisions and President Bashar Assad has lost control of much of the country’s territory. And in Sudan, which borders Libya to the southeast, it broke up into two states, and the strife there is still far from over. Some analysts have opined that breaking up the Arab states and drawing new borders that better reflect ethnic and tribal divisions would provide for more stability. But drawing such borders would be difficult to carry out and moreover, would not perfectly align with ethnic divisions on the ground, with disputes lingering as to their location. Libya, which lies on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, is bordered by Algeria on the West, Niger, Chad and Sudan to the south, and Egypt to the East. These countries are very concerned about the instability in Libya and are no doubt interfering to support groups in the country that support their interests. Egypt’s newly elected president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is likely to continue the all-out battle against the Islamist insurgency at home and work to prevent Libya from becoming an Islamist bastion – along with its Gulf allies, led by Saudi Arabia.

For this reason, they are likely to support the upstart Haftar and his forces that struggle against the Islamist- backed Maiteeq. Weapons are already flowing from Libya to Islamists in Sinai and even into Gaza. If Haftar’s forces can help control the border-area and reduce the Islamist threat to Sisi’s government, cooperation could be carried out. On the other hand, Qatar and Turkey, which have a history of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, could throw their support behind Maiteeq. Reuters contributed to this report. Relevant to your professional network? Please share on Linkedin Think others should know about this? Please share | Algeria at a Crossroads: Borders and Security in North Africa Map of Algeria's border (Source: Wikipedia Commons) Algeria at a Crossroads: Borders and Security in North Africa George Bajalia September 24th, 2014 The militarization of border crossings throughout North Africa and the Sahel has intensified recently, as a result of security concerns over weapons smuggling, terrorist networks, and armed violence in Libya. Algeria’s border lies at the center of many of these developments.

As of May 2014, Algeria has closed 6,385 km (3,967 miles) of its borders with Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Libya, and placed its border crossings under military control. Algeria’s southern border with the Sahara is also incredibly vast and difficult to monitor. It has long been a major crossing for thousands of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa traveling through Agadez, Niger to the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset. It is in response to the decades of illegal smuggling and international calls to eliminate terrorist networks operating out of this relatively ungoverned “no-man’s land” that the Algerian government has now increased patrols and militarization of this border region. According to sources cited by Al-Monitor, “the army banned access to the desert corridors in the southeastern border region without a prior security permit. These measures will further tighten the noose around the neck of terrorist groups in desert pathways….these strict instructions will eliminate terrorism in the Algerian Sahara.” To the east, Algeria must manage a vast border with Libya, which has been nearly overtaken by armed militias that threaten to spill over into Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt.

In light of these various threats to regional security, it is tempting to view the Algerian government’s actions as a direct consequence of militant activity. But, Algeria’s recent border closures represent more of a continuation, rather than a rupture, in its regional policies. Algeria’s total closure of nearly all its borders (only the Tunisian frontier remains open) is a concerted effort to maintain and secure its economic and political relations with EU and NAFTA countries, at the expense of potential trade and, perhaps, long-term partnerships, with neighboring states. From the perspective of the Algerian government, this isolationist stance functions as a potential buffer against the uncertainty surrounding it. It also parallels Algeria’s continuing border closure with its neighbor to the west, Morocco. Since 1994, Algeria’s border with Morocco has been officially closed. The Algerian government has historically had frosty relations with Morocco over issues ranging from drug smuggling to territorial conflict over the Western Sahara. The question of borders and territory represents a key area of contestation between Morocco and Algeria.

An inability to cooperate on political matters not only plagues the two countries, but also rules out any hope for bilateral or regional economic integration through the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), a regional institution founded by the leaders of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania in 1989, which sought to coordinate economic, political, and security issues through greater coordination between the five states of the greater Maghreb. Monitoring the 1,559 km (969 miles)—or 1,601 km including the Western Sahara—borderline between the two countries has been difficult for the two regional rivals . The recent border closures, and their intended consequences, are not isolated events. Rather, they are reflective of the Algerian government’s standing policies on dealing with the preexisting networks of trade, formal and informal, and trafficking that run through the country. These three particular nodes of pressure give important context to Algeria’s recent border closures, and reveal the disconnect between the regime’s historical aims and the day-to-day circumstances of the Algerian people. Point of Pressure 1: the Moroccan-Algerian Rivalry and the Western Sahara The source of Moroccan-Algerian tension is often attributed to the Western Sahara conflict.

After Spain left the territory in 1975, a dispute arose between two groups in the area. An indigenous movement known as the Polisario Front—which is fighting for independence and a referendum for self-determination—and the Moroccan government—which claims to have historical ties with the land—have clashed over the territory. The Moroccan government has proposed a regional autonomy plan for the Western Sahara, while Algeria has consistently backed the Polisario and supported a referendum for self-determination in the region. But disputes between Algeria and Morocco pre-date the Western Sahara question, which became a regional preoccupation only in the 1970’s. While this conflict is an important obstacle to improving relations between the two countries and increasing the likelihood of regional economic integration—currently next to nonexistent—Yahia H. Zoubir, Professor of International Relations and Director of Research in Geopolitics at Euromed Management, argues that: “Algerian-Moroccan relations have always been at odds, the existence since 1989 of the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA) notwithstanding. In fact, the UMA has not been operational due precisely to tensions between the two countries.

Strained relations derive from a historical and post-colonial evolution – dominated by power politics – of which Western Sahara is only one, albeit major, aspect. Thus, a definitive resolution of the Western Sahara conflict will not necessarily mean a definitive ending of the distrust that exists between the two neighbours.”[1] Following independence, Morocco and Algeria went to war over a border dispute that was left unresolved by France. The border war of 1963 was bloody and ended with a cease-fire in 1964 brokered by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It was not until 1972, however, that the Moroccan-Algerian border was officially demarcated by a bilateral treaty . Algeria immediately signed the convention, which dealt with both border and economic cooperation, but Morocco did not officially recognize the agreement until 1989. In 1988, diplomatic relations between the two countries were reestablished. 1989 marked the founding of the UMA. A UN brokered cease-fire in the Western Sahara finally took hold in 1991.

Against this backdrop, the beginning of the 1990s was a hopeful time for regional relations and potential economic integration in the Maghreb. Then, in August 1994, the Moroccan-Algerian border was officially closed, as a result of a “guerrilla attack” at the Atlas Asni Hotel in Marrakech, which Moroccan authorities believed Algeria had supported. After the incident, the Moroccan government deported thousands of Algerian tourists and official residents and applied new visa regulations to Algerians traveling to the country. In response, Algeria closed the border. Despite periods of warming relations between the two countries, the border has remained shut ever since. The border closure implicates many issues, including the management of migration flows to Europe from sub-Saharan and North Africa, the existence of vast illegal drug smuggling as a result of Morocco’s approximately 57,000 hectares of cannabis production , and the increasing rise of armed terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). There are also concerns that, if the border was re-opened, Morocco would use it to pressure Algeria into withdrawing its support for the Polisario Movement.

While both countries have officially stated their desire to open borders and increase regional integration, the larger impact of such a move remains unclear, since the Arab Maghreb Union has not officially convened since 1994 . Morocco and Algeria’s formal trade continues to be with EU countries, and “Trade within the AMU (UMA) quintet accounts for a paltry 2% of what the region conducts with the whole of the rest of the world.” Point of Pressure 2: Formal and Informal Trade Algeria’s formal trade networks virtually ignore its North African neighbors. According to data compiled by the MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity , Algerian exports of crude petroleum and petroleum gas make up 82% of its net exports. Refined petroleum (14%), and coal tar oil (1.2%) increase Algeria’s total mined exports to 97.2%, with the remainder of exports split among chemical exports and agricultural products. Most of these exports go to Italy (15%), the United States (15%), Spain (12%), France (7.5%), and Canada (7.4%). Algeria’s imports come from many of these same countries, in addition to China and Germany.

Like Algeria, Morocco’s import and export patterns also do not include its fellow North African countries. Only 1.3% of Morocco’s exports go to Algeria and 1.5% of Algeria’s exports go to Morocco. But forgoing regional trade relations comes with high opportunity costs. Over three billion dollars in Moroccan imports (8.45%) consist of crude petroleum, which comes primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Russia. With further instability in Iraq and potential economic sanctions on Russia, Algeria’s crude petroleum exports could find a home in its old rival. Informally, smugglers on both sides of the Moroccan-Algerian border have a much friendlier relationship. There are no official statistics on how much hashish is exported by Moroccan traders via Algeria, nor how much medication and gasoline enter Morocco from Algeria. In 2013, however, The Guardian claimed the illicit gasoline trade generated income for 3,000 to 5,000 families in Morocco’s eastern province. Algeria’s border crackdowns will surely have an impact on these long-standing informal trade relations. Measures taken by Morocco along the border will also have a negative effect on these networks.

All in all, it is hard to tell which will have greater ramifications for these economic forces, Morocco’s proposed 450km long wall along the border or Algeria’s envisioned 700km long trench. Point of Pressure 3: Migration One of the primary routes into Europe from North Africa begins in the Nigerien city of Agadez, continues through southern Algeria, and goes up toward the coast. From there, many migrants follow the road west toward Maghnia, Algeria, and cross from Maghnia directly into Morocco, near the city of Oujda. EU pressure to stop the flow of migrants from North Africa into Europe, combined with a seeming lack of cooperation between Algeria and Morocco, have resulted in more and more migrants being shuffled back and forth between the two countries with an alarming disregard for human rights. On its eastern border, Algeria is dealing with a stream of migrants and refugees from Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Eastern Africa. As a result of these increased pressures, the Algerian government has pursued what appear to be contradictory policies. In mid-August, Algeria announced it would open portions of the border with Libya to facilitate the return of refugees from Egypt.

Just a few days later, the government arrested 300 Syrians heading for the same Libyan border. It remains to be seen how these policies will play out. Public Response While Algeria’s borders continue to be the subject of domestic political debate, it is important not to conflate this conversation with popular consensus on the issue. Despite the closed borders, Algerians are able to travel to neighboring countries via air or by entering through another country. In August, the Algerian paper L’Expression reported that the top four tourism destinations for Algerians were Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, and Spain. Both Royal Air Maroc and Air Algiers offer regular flights between Algiers and Casablanca, though the cost is often prohibitive for residents looking to see family just across the border. The price of air travel, coupled with the time the journey requires, drives many families to make other arrangements. One group of Algerian and Moroccan youth is following the example of residents of Naco, Mexico and Naco, United States, and arranging a cross-border volley ball match in October. Their aim is to draw attention to the individuals and families impacted by two decades of closed borders, and inspire dialogue focused on these affected people, instead of government political posturing.

Colonialisms’ Continuing Legacy Ultimately, it is impossible to separate North Africa’s current borders from the recent history of European colonialism. While lines drawn on a map by colonial cartographers mean very little to the region’s social fabric or the lives of residents on either side of these borders, they have a strong impact on both. In the period following independence, Algeria and Morocco embarked upon parallel, but ultimately divergent, paths toward post-independence reformation. Morocco embraced its favored status with NATO and its member countries as a “model” for slow-paced reform after King Mohammed VI’s much lauded constitutional reforms in 2011. Although many have criticized these reforms as strictly cosmetic , others have declared the measures as appropriate and reflective of Morocco’s history as a kingdom invested in tolerance and civil society. At least rhetorically, Algeria has been a bastion of support for resistance and anti-imperialist movements. In contrast to its neighbor, Algeria pursued a largely socialist system until economic problems and political pressure caused it to accept IMF loans and economic restructuring in 1989.

The country’s traumatic experience during the Black Decade of the 1990s, a period of great bloodshed fueled by armed conflict between government forces and militant Islamist groups, has remained in the backdrop, as the government watches instability in neighboring Libya and Mali unfold. All in all, Algeria’s border closures are a function of its isolationist stance vis-à-vis regional neighbors, as well as the government’s efforts to keep out any potentially destabilizing external forces. This issue is not just about regional and domestic security for Algerian authorities, but also inherently connected to regime survival. [1]Yahia H.

Zoubir (2000) Algerian‐Moroccan relations and their impact on Maghribi integration, The Journal of North African Studies, 5:3, 43-74, DOI: 10.1080/13629380008718403 {"data":[{"ID":46431,"post_author":"1","post_date":"2016-11-30 00:05:14","post_date_gmt":"2016-11-30 05:05:14","post_content":"","post_title":"ANERA Nov 30, 2016 onwards","post_excerpt":"","post_status":"publish","comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","post_password":"","post_name":"anera-nov-30-2016-onwards","to_ping":"","pinged":"","post_modified":"2016-11-25 21:02:01","post_modified_gmt":"2016-11-26 02:02:01","post_content_filtered":"","post_parent":

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Advertise on Muftah. Advertisement Geography of Egypt - Physical Size, Borders, Regions, Climate Geography of Egypt World Facts Index > Egypt > Geography Map of Egypt Physical Size and Borders Egypt, covering 1,001,449 square kilometers of land, is about the same size as Texas and New Mexico combined. The country's greatest distance from north to south is 1,024 kilometers, and from east to west, 1,240 kilometers. The country is located in northeastern Africa and includes the Sinai Peninsula (also seen as Sinai), which is often considered part of Asia. Egypt's natural boundaries consist of more than 2,900 kilometers of coastline along the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Red Sea. Egypt has land boundaries with Israel, Libya, Sudan, and the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian area formerly administered by Egypt and occupied by Israel since 1967. The land boundaries are generally straight lines that do not conform to geographic features such as rivers. Egypt shares its longest boundary, which extends 1,273 kilometers, with Sudan.

In accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899, this boundary runs westward from the Red Sea along the twenty-second parallel, includes the Sudanese Nile salient (Wadi Halfa salient), and continues along the twenty-second parallel until it meets the twenty-fifth meridian. The Sudanese Nile salient, a finger-shaped area along the Nile River (Nahr an Nil) north of the twenty-second parallel, is nearly covered by Lake Nasser, which was created when the Aswan High Dam was constructed in the 1960s. An "administrative" boundary, which supplements the main Egyptian-Sudanese boundary permits nomadic tribes to gain access to water holes at the eastern end of Egypt's southern frontier. The administrative boundary departs from the international boundary in two places; Egypt administers the area south of the twenty-second parallel, and Sudan administers the area north of it. Egypt shares all 1,150 kilometers of the western border with Libya. This border was defined in 1925 under an agreement with Italy, which had colonized Libya.

Before and after World War II, the northern border was adjusted, resulting in the return of the village of As Sallum to Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt shares 255 kilometers of its eastern border in Sinai with Israel and 11 kilometers with the Gaza Strip. Egypt is divided into twenty-six governorates (sometimes called provinces), which include four city governorates: Alexandria (Al Iskandariyah), Cairo (Al Qahirah), Port Said (Bur Said) and Suez; the nine governorates of Lower Egypt in the Nile Delta region; the eight governorates of Upper Egypt along the Nile River south from Cairo to Aswan; and the five frontier governorates covering Sinai and the deserts that lie west and east of the Nile. All governorates, except the frontier ones, are in the Nile Delta or along the Nile Valley and Suez Canal. Natural Regions Egypt is predominantly desert. Only 35,000 square kilometers- -3.5 percent of the total land area--are cultivated and permanently settled. Most of the country lies within the wide band of desert that stretches from Africa's Atlantic Coast across the continent and into southwest Asia.

Egypt's geological history has produced four major physical regions: the Nile Valley and Delta, the Western Desert (also known as the Libyan Desert), the Eastern Desert (also known as the Arabian Desert), and the Sinai Peninsula. The Nile Valley and Delta is the most important region because it supports 99 percent of the population on the country's only cultivable land. Nile Valley and Delta The Nile Valley and Delta, the most extensive oasis on earth, was created by the world's second-longest river and its seemingly inexhaustible sources. Without the topographic channel that permits the Nile to flow across the Sahara, Egypt would be entirely desert; the Nile River traverses about 1,600 kilometers through Egypt and flows northward from the Egyptian-Sudanese border to the Mediterranean Sea. The Nile is a combination of three long rivers whose sources are in central Africa: the White Nile, the Blue Nile, and the Atbarah. The White Nile, which begins at Lake Victoria in Uganda, supplies about 28 percent of the Nile's waters in Egypt. In its course from Lake Victoria to Juba in southern Sudan, the elevation of the White Nile's channel drops more than 600 meters.

In its 1,600-kilometer course from Juba to Khartoum, Sudan's capital, the river descends only 75 meters. In southern and central Sudan, the White Nile passes through a wide, flat plain covered with swamp vegetation and slows almost to stagnation. The Blue Nile, which originates at Lake Tana in Ethiopia, provides an average of 58 percent of the Nile's waters in Egypt. It has a steeper gradient and flows more swiftly than the White Nile, which it joins at Khartoum. Unlike the White Nile, the Blue Nile carries a considerable amount of sediment; for several kilometers north of Khartoum, water closer to the eastern bank of the river is visibly muddy and comes from the Blue Nile, while the water closer to the western bank is clearer and comes from the White Nile. The much shorter Atbarah River, which also originates in Ethiopia, joins the main Nile north of Khartoum between the fifth and sixth cataracts (areas of steep rapids) and provides about 14 percent of the Nile's waters in Egypt. During the low-water season, which runs from January to June, the Atbarah shrinks to a number of pools.

But in late summer, when torrential rains fall on the Ethiopian plateau, the Atbarah provides 22 percent of the Nile's flow. The Blue Nile has a similar pattern. It contributes 17 percent of the Nile's waters in the low-water season and 68 percent during the high-water season. In contrast, the White Nile provides only 10 percent of the Nile's waters during the highwater season but contributes more than 80 percent during the lowwater period. Thus, before the Aswan High Dam was completed in 1971, the White Nile watered the Egyptian stretch of the river throughout the year, whereas the Blue Nile, carrying seasonal rain from Ethiopia, caused the Nile to overflow its banks and deposit a layer of fertile mud over adjacent fields. The great flood of the main Nile usually occurred in Egypt during August, September, and October, but it sometimes began as early as June at Aswan and often did not completely wane until January. The Nile enters Egypt a few kilometers north of Wadi Halfa, a Sudanese town that was completely rebuilt on high ground when its original site was submerged in the reservoir created by the Aswan High Dam.

As a result of the dam's construction, the Nile actually begins its flow into Egypt as Lake Nasser, which extends south from the dam 320 kilometers to the border and an additional 158 kilometers into Sudan. Lake Nasser's waters fill the area through Lower Nubia (Upper Egypt and northern Sudan) within the narrow gorge between the cliffs of sandstone and granite created by the flow of the river over many centuries. Below Aswan the cultivated floodplain strip widens to as much as twenty kilometers. North of Isna (160 kilometers north of Aswan), the plateau on both sides of the valley rises as high as 550 meters above sea level; at Qina (about 90 kilometers north of Isna) the 300-meter limestone cliffs force the Nile to change course to the southwest for about 60 kilometers before turning northwest for about 160 kilometers to Asyut. Northward from Asyut, the escarpments on both sides diminish, and the valley widens to a maximum of twenty-two kilometers. The Nile reaches the Delta at Cairo.

At Cairo the Nile spreads out over what was once a broad estuary that has been filled by silt deposits to form a fertile, fan-shaped delta about 250 kilometers wide at the seaward base and about 160 kilometers from north to south. The Nile Delta extends over approximately 22,000 square kilometers (roughly equivalent in area to Massachusetts). According to historical accounts from the first century A.D., seven branches of the Nile once ran through the Delta. According to later accounts, the Nile had only six branches by around the twelfth century. Since then, nature and man have closed all but two main outlets: the east branch, Damietta (also seen as Dumyat; 240 kilometers long), and the west branch, Rosetta (235 kilometers long). Both outlets are named after the ports located at their mouths. A network of drainage and irrigation canals supplements these remaining outlets. In the north near the coast, the Delta embraces a series of salt marshes and lakes; most notable among them are Idku, Al Burullus, and Manzilah. The fertility and productivity of the land adjacent to the Nile depends largely on the silt deposited by floodwaters.

Archaeological research indicates that people once lived at a much higher elevation along the river than they do today, probably because the river was higher or the floods more severe. The timing and the amount of annual flow were always unpredictable. Measurements of annual flows as low as 1.2 billion cubic meters and as high as 4.25 billion cubic meters have been recorded. For centuries Egyptians attempted to predict and take advantage of the flows and moderate the severity of floods. The construction of dams on the Nile, particularly the Aswan High Dam, transformed the mighty river into a large and predictable irrigation ditch. Lake Nasser, the world's largest artificial lake, has enabled planned use of the Nile regardless of the amount of rainfall in Central Africa and East Africa. The dams have also affected the Nile Valley's fertility, which was dependent for centuries not only on the water brought to the arable land but also on the materials left by the water. Researchers have estimated that beneficial silt deposits in the valley began about 10,000 years ago. The average annual deposit of arable soil through the course of the river valley was about nine meters. Analysis of the flow revealed that 10.7 million tons of solid matter passed Cairo each year.

Today the Aswan High Dam obstructs most of this sediment, which is now retained in Lake Nasser. The reduction in annual silt deposits has contributed to rising water tables and increasing soil salinity in the Delta, the erosion of the river's banks in Upper Egypt, and the erosion of the alluvial fan along the shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Western Desert The Western Desert covers about 700,000 square kilometers (equivalent in size to Texas) and accounts for about two-thirds of Egypt's land area. This immense desert to the west of the Nile spans the area from the Mediterranean Sea south to the Sudanese border. The desert's Jilf al Kabir Plateau has an altitude of about 1,000 meters, an exception to the uninterrupted territory of basement rocks covered by layers of horizontally bedded sediments forming a massive plain or low plateau. The Great Sand Sea lies within the desert's plain and extends from the Siwah Oasis to Jilf al Kabir. Scarps (ridges) and deep depressions (basins) exist in several parts of the Western Desert, and no rivers or streams drain into or out of the area.

The government has considered the Western Desert a frontier region and has divided it into two governorates at about the twenty-eighth parallel: Matruh to the north and New Valley (Al Wadi al Jadid) to the south. There are seven important depressions in the Western Desert, and all are considered oases except the largest, Qattara, the water of which is salty. The Qattara Depression is approximately 15,000 square kilometers (about the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island) and is largely below sea level (its lowest point is 133 meters below sea level). Badlands, salt marshes, and salt lakes cover the sparsely inhabited Qattara Depression. Limited agricultural production, the presence of some natural resources, and permanent settlements are found in the other six depressions, all of which have fresh water provided by the Nile or by local groundwater. The Siwah Oasis, close to the Libyan border and west of Qattara, is isolated from the rest of Egypt but has sustained life since ancient times. The Siwa's cliff-hung Temple of Amun was renowned for its oracles for more than 1,000 years.

Herodotus and Alexander the Great were among the many illustrious people who visited the temple in the pre-Christian era. The other major oases form a topographic chain of basins extending from the Al Fayyum Oasis (sometimes called the Fayyum Depression) which lies sixty kilometers southwest of Cairo, south to the Bahriyah, Farafirah, and Dakhilah oases before reaching the country's largest oasis, Kharijah. A brackish lake, Birkat Qarun, at the northern reaches of Al Fayyum Oasis, drained into the Nile in ancient times. For centuries sweetwater artesian wells in the Fayyum Oasis have permitted extensive cultivation in an irrigated area that extends over 1,800 square kilometers. Eastern Desert The topographic features of the region east of the Nile are very different from those of the Western Desert. The relatively mountainous Eastern Desert rises abruptly from the Nile and extends over an area of approximately 220,000 square kilometers (roughly equivalent in size to Utah). The upward-sloping plateau of sand gives way within 100 kilometers to arid, defoliated, rocky hills running north and south between the Sudan border and the Delta.

The hills reach elevations of more than 1,900 meters. The region's most prominent feature is the easterly chain of rugged mountains, the Red Sea Hills, which extend from the Nile Valley eastward to the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea. This elevated region has a natural drainage pattern that rarely functions because of insufficient rainfall. It also has a complex of irregular, sharply cut wadis that extend westward toward the Nile. The Eastern Desert is generally isolated from the rest of the country. There is no oasis cultivation in the region because of the difficulty in sustaining any form of agriculture. Except for a few villages on the Red Sea coast, there are no permanent settlements. The importance of the Eastern Desert lies in its natural resources, especially oil. A single governorate, the capital of which is at Al Ghardaqah, administers the entire region. Sinai Peninsula This triangular area covers about 61,100 square kilometers (slightly smaller than West Virginia).

Similar to the desert, the peninsula contains mountains in its southern sector that are a geological extension of the Red Sea Hills, the low range along the Red Sea coast that includes Mount Catherine (Jabal Katrinah), the country's highest point--2,642 meters. The Red Sea is named after these mountains, which are red. The southern side of the peninsula has a sharp escarpment that subsides after a narrow coastal shelf that slopes into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. The elevation of Sinai's southern rim is about 1,000 meters. Moving northward, the elevation of this limestone plateau decreases. The northern third of Sinai is a flat, sandy coastal plain, which extends from the Suez Canal into the Gaza Strip and Israel. Before the Israeli military occupied Sinai during the June 1967 War (Arab-Israeli war, also known as the Six-Day War), a single Egyptian governorate administered the whole peninsula. By 1982 after all of Sinai was returned to Egypt, the central government divided the peninsula into two governorates. North Sinai has its capital at Al Arish and the South Sinai has its capital in At Tur.

Climate Throughout Egypt, days are commonly warm or hot, and nights are cool. Egypt has only two seasons: a mild winter from November to April and a hot summer from May to October. The only differences between the seasons are variations in daytime temperatures and changes in prevailing winds. In the coastal regions, temperatures range between an average minimum of 14 C in winter and an average maximum of 30 C in summer. Temperatures vary widely in the inland desert areas, especially in summer, when they may range from 7 C at night to 43 C during the day. During winter, temperatures in the desert fluctuate less dramatically, but they can be as low as 0 C at night and as high as 18 C during the day. The average annual temperature increases moving southward from the Delta to the Sudanese border, where temperatures are similar to those of the open deserts to the east and west. In the north, the cooler temperatures of Alexandria during the summer have made the city a popular resort. Throughout the Delta and the northern Nile Valley, there are occasional winter cold spells accompanied by light frost and even snow.

At Aswan, in the south, June temperatures can be as low as 10 C at night and as high as 41 C during the day when the sky is clear. Egypt receives fewer than eighty millimeters of precipitation annually in most areas. Most rain falls along the coast, but even the wettest area, around Alexandria, receives only about 200 millimeters of precipitation per year. Alexandria has relatively high humidity, but sea breezes help keep the moisture down to a comfortable level. Moving southward, the amount of precipitation decreases suddenly. Cairo receives a little more than one centimeter of precipitation each year. The city, however, reports humidity as high as 77 percent during the summer. But during the rest of the year, humidity is low. The areas south of Cairo receive only traces of rainfall. Some areas will go years without rain and then experience sudden downpours that result in flash floods. Sinai receives somewhat more rainfall (about twelve centimeters annually in the north) than the other desert areas, and the region is dotted by numerous wells and oases, which support small population centers that formerly were focal points on trade routes.

Water drainage toward the Mediterranean Sea from the main plateau supplies sufficient moisture to permit some agriculture in the coastal area, particularly near Al Arish. A phenomenon of Egypt's climate is the hot spring wind that blows across the country. The winds, known to Europeans as the sirocco and to Egyptians as the khamsin, usually arrive in April but occasionally occur in March and May. The winds form in small but vigorous low-pressure areas in the Isthmus of Suez and sweep across the northern coast of Africa. Unobstructed by geographical features, the winds reach high velocities and carry great quantities of sand and dust from the deserts. These sandstorms, often accompanied by winds of up to 140 kilometers per hour, can cause temperatures to rise as much as 20 C in two hours. The winds blow intermittently and may continue for days, cause illness in people and animals, harm crops, and occasionally damage houses and infrastructure. SOURCES: Library of Congress Country Studies/Area Handbook Peacebuilding in Libya: Cross-Border Transactions and The Civil Society Landscape | United States Institute of Peace Peacebuilding in Libya: Cross-Border Transactions and The Civil Society Landscape Published: By: Sherine N.

El Taraboulsi Cross-border transactions have been shaping the Libyan civil and political landscape for decades. However, desk research and field interviews in Tunisia reveal that interventions for peacebuilding are not fully accounting for these transactions or other regional activities. This brief argues that supporting local and regional actors in working toward a unified vision for Libya requires factoring in cross-border, civil society exchanges and the tensions that affect them. Summary Cross-border transactions in North Africa support both conflict and peacebuilding. For instance, while these transactions include arms smuggling, they also include civil society exchanges that are helping to shape both the political and civic landscape in Libya. The emergence of complex networks across North Africa has made it impossible to effectively design an intervention without taking them into account. More multilateral and bilateral attention to civic regional transactions would help build a sustainable infrastructure for peace. These cross-border networks are rooted in historical and communal ties. Their strength presents an opportunity and a challenge to peacebuilding. Achieving peace in Libya is partly dependent on the continuity and reworking of these networks and how they manifest themselves on both sides of the borders. Regional and international actors must participate in efforts to realize a unified local vision.

Introduction Despite the United Nations (UN) brokering of the Government of National Accord in Libya, there is no political consensus on the ground and militia groups maintain a stronghold.1 While the implications of Libya’s unrest in the region have been analyzed, little attention has been given to transactions across the Tunisian-Libyan borders beyond arms smuggling. While arms trafficking is indeed occurring, other exchanges are helping to shape the political and civic landscape in Libya. Organizations in Libya are learning lessons from Tunisia’s experience with civil society engagement and political settlements. In fact, a large portion of Libya’s civil society now operates out of Tunis. Thus, the structuring of political capital, defined here as investment in a particular political settlement for Libya, is undoubtedly informed both in the short and long terms by cross-border transactions. This means that the regional context is as significant as the local and international contexts when designing a peacebuilding intervention. This brief draws on qualitative analysis that combines desk research and fieldwork in Tunisia in April 2015. As the centrality of regional and international networks unfolded, particularly related to activist and Muslim Brotherhood members, follow-up and verification interviews were conducted with respondents in the United Kingdom (in person) and in France, Turkey, and Malta (via Skype).

Twenty semistructured interviews were conducted with Libyan civil society leaders based in Tunisia; Tunisian civil society leaders with activities in Libya; and Libyan youth activists in the United Kingdom, Tunisia, France, Turkey, and Malta with activities in Tunisia and Libya. Networks and Tribal Linkages Cross-border exchanges between Libya and Tunisia are rooted in historical and communal ties. The Jefara Region has a history of largely informal, cross-border tribal and economic exchanges between Tunisia and Libya. These exchanges flourished in the 1960s following the discovery of oil in Libya.2 The Twazin tribe in Tunisia and Nwayel tribe in Libya developed a range of black market services, including exchanging money and smuggling people. The exchanges continued to expand, particularly during the UN embargo of Libya and after adoption of the 1989 Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union, which opened the borders between Tunisia and Libya.

In 2010, an estimated ten thousand Libyans and Tunisians crossed the Ras Jedir border each day.3 However, following the 2011 revolutions, informal economic exchanges in the Jefara Region collapsed; trafficking across Ras Jedir became one way from Libya to Tunisia and demand shifted to mainly staples like food and medical supplies.4 Civic Transactions Post-2011 Between 2011 and 2015, hundreds of civil society organizations (CSOs) and initiatives emerged in Libya, but the majority have stopped operating because of the conflict or have shifted their focus to humanitarian aid.5 Of the 1,900 CSOs registered in Libya, 90 percent were officially registered after the 2011 uprising.6 Interviews conducted in Tunisia show that most CSOs have fled the conflict and are operating out of Tunis. For Libyans, starting an organization in Tunisia is difficult, but most respondents have been trying to either partner with a Tunisian organization or secure funding from international donors. In 2015, Libyan civil society activists were facing extreme security threats.

One respondent said, “Civil society activists are getting jailed, photographers are getting kidnapped, and young people are disappearing from Libya.”7 She estimated that “60 percent of civil society leaders and activists are operating from abroad and many pass through Tunisia.” Libyan civil society leaders now based in Tunis are benefiting from their observations of Tunisian counterparts. An association called We Love Sousse, which heads the Anna Lindh Foundation’s national network in Tunisia, has been developing linkages between civil society in Libya and Tunisia via roundtable discussions and workshops. However, the association has been facing challenges (e.g., getting Libyan workshop participants to Tunis because of insecurity in Libya and navigating the Tunisian border control, which, at times, does not allow participants in). Some institutionalization of the lessons learned has occurred; for example, an association for Libyan judges emerged in 2012 as an offshoot of its Tunisian counterpart. According to one founder, although the association has no official headquarters in Libya, it is registered and currently focusing on the rights of judges who have become “swayed by the power dominant in the place where they operate.”8 For instance, a judge in the eastern part of Libya is likely to submit to the forces of the Tobruk-based government.

Generally speaking, all respondents decried the lack of an independent judiciary in Libya and identified it as a main cause of the civil war. Tunisia has a largely unified front of human rights defenders, which is lacking in Libya even though civil society exchanges are taking place. The effort is immediately inhibited by the fragmented and polarized Libyan setting; while the exchanges between Tunisia and Libya are helping sustain the civic consciousness that emerged in 2011, they are also feeding existing divisions. Human rights organizations in Libya are as divided as the country’s politics; those in the east are documenting violations taking place in the west to gain the favor of the government in the east, and those in the west are doing the exact opposite.9 Key Tensions Cross-border transactions are affected by myriad tensions that manifest themselves differently in each country. However, the regional dialectic that occurs as a result provides an opportunity to maintain civic capital and ease those tensions. Civil society and political shifts. While Tunisian civil society is heavily influenced by political shifts, it has the capacity to operate in an apolitical manner. There are still cultural and grassroots organizations that do not support a particular political effort. For Libyan civil society leaders, this is not the reality.

One respondent, however, described an organization she cofounded as apolitical; and when asked to describe what that meant and what politics was for her, she said that “politics for me is governmental politics.…We do not side with political parties or do events for them and we do not get funding from them.”10 When probed regarding how she manages to engage young people from different political leanings, she described how civil society is a means to “give back” to Libya and that it can be a mechanism whereby young people from a divided country can be united behind one cause. She emphasized that “politics are split but the people are not” and that they should be given a chance to exercise unity. Civil society in Libya seems to be defining itself by what it is not, rather than taking up a consolidated identity. Profit- and mission-driven goals. One respondent related that “it is all about money” and that the flood of donor funds in Libya has led to more harm than good.11 Political activists became “hired” and thus attached to particular efforts instead of staying autonomous and helping establish a vision for their country.

Donors, according to most respondents, are selective; certain organizations are focused on, but they are not necessarily the ones that will have the most impact on the ground. Donor-driven activism was described as a problem. “Star-activism” impedes the coalescing of a vision needed for national unity. According to one respondent, “I have seen cases where donors would give us a call and say we have $25,000—what projects would you like to launch?”12 Eight to nine organizations continue to receive funding in Tripoli; the rest are not funded either because of the lack of capacity to develop proposals and applications or lack of related experience. In addition, donors are often driven by pressure to “burn” or spend money, without regard to what is happening on the ground. For example, donors agreed to fund an initiative to raise awareness around elections, but the funds arrived only three weeks before the elections and, thus, the money became useless. Minority groups and identity politics. Minority groups in Libya have been caught in a precarious situation where they either become allies to one of the two governments or maintain a low profile to avoid polarization.

Now, with many minority group members located in Tunisia, a country with a stronger and more coherent identity, the groups are exploring ways to align their identity with Libya’s statebuilding project. Some Amazigh activists expressed their desire to launch a separate state, while others have committed to becoming part of a unified Libya.13 Within that struggle, a window of opportunity for minority groups to negotiate and assert their identity has presented itself via the civic landscape. A founder of a youth organization for Touareg described its effort to “change the perception of Touareg as solely tribal” and learn from Tunisia’s experience to develop mechanisms that “cultivate allegiance to a state and not to neighbourhoods or tribes.”14 However, having been internally displaced after 2011 (because of supporting the Gaddafi camp), the organization is laying low politically and not openly engaging militarily. The Tebu have also embarked on establishing their identity via the creation of associations and coalitions. Conclusion Efforts to contain and resolve conflict must employ a regional lens and take into consideration the role of cross-border transactions. Donor money has flooded the civic space both in Libya and, subsequently, Tunisia, but resource use has not fully accounted for regional activities or the needs on the ground in Libya.

Donor spending should be coordinated with various local actors to effectively support the peacebuilding process and achieve a unified vision for the country. Notes Rana Jawad, “Libya: Can Unity Government Restore Stability?” BBC News, , accessed April 14, 2016. Moncef Kartas, On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013). Ibid. Ibid. See Sherine N. El Taraboulsi, Mahi Khallaf, Ahmed Salah Eldin, Almongi Zidi, and Naila Taji Farouky, Giving in Transition and Transitions in Giving: Philanthropic Practices in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 2011–2013 (Cairo: John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, American University in Cairo, 2013). Walid Salhi and Khalil Jibara, Mapping and Participatory Needs Assessment of Civil Society in Libya (Tripoli: Foundation for the Future, 2012), , accessed April 14, 2016.

Interview, civil society leader, Tunis, April 9, 2015. Interview, former security officer, Tunis, April 17, 2015. Interview, former security officer, Tunis, April 17, 2015; interview, civil society leader, April 9, 2015; and interview, civil society leader (youth), April 12, 2015. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 9, 2015. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 9, 2015. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader (youth), April 12, 2015. Interview, Naples, Italy, Amazigh activist, December 2014. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 20, 2015. About this Brief Sherine N. El Taraboulsi is a research fellow for the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute and a doctoral candidate in international development at Oxford University.

This brief is based on desk research and fieldwork conducted in Tunisia in April 2015 to examine the role of cross-border transactions in peacebuilding in Libya. Egypt Physical Size and Borders - Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System << Back to Egypt Geography Egypt, covering 1,001,449 square kilometers of land, is about the same size as Texas and New Mexico combined. The country's greatest distance from north to south is 1,024 kilometers, and from east to west, 1,240 kilometers. The country is located in northeastern Africa and includes the Sinai Peninsula (also seen as Sinai), which is often considered part of Asia. Egypt's natural boundaries consist of more than 2,900 kilometers of coastline along the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Red Sea (see fig. 1 ). Egypt has land boundaries with Israel, Libya, Sudan, and the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian area formerly administered by Egypt and occupied by Israel since 1967.

The land boundaries are generally straight lines that do not conform to geographic features such as rivers. Egypt shares its longest boundary, which extends 1,273 kilometers, with Sudan. In accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899, this boundary runs westward from the Red Sea along the twenty-second parallel, includes the Sudanese Nile salient (Wadi Halfa salient), and continues along the twenty-second parallel until it meets the twenty-fifth meridian. The Sudanese Nile salient, a finger-shaped area along the Nile River (Nahr an Nil) north of the twenty-second parallel, is nearly covered by Lake Nasser, which was created when the Aswan High Dam was constructed in the 1960s. An "administrative" boundary, which supplements the main Egyptian-Sudanese boundary permits nomadic tribes to gain access to water holes at the eastern end of Egypt's southern frontier. The administrative boundary departs from the international boundary in two places; Egypt administers the area south of the twenty-second parallel, and Sudan administers the area north of it. Egypt shares all 1,150 kilometers of the western border with Libya.

This border was defined in 1925 under an agreement with Italy, which had colonized Libya. Before and after World War II, the northern border was adjusted, resulting in the return of the village of As Sallum to Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt shares 255 kilometers of its eastern border in Sinai with Israel and 11 kilometers with the Gaza Strip. Egypt is divided into twenty-six governorates (sometimes called provinces), which include four city governorates: Alexandria (Al Iskandariyah), Cairo (Al Qahirah), Port Said (Bur Said) and Suez; the nine governorates of Lower Egypt in the Nile Delta region; the eight governorates of Upper Egypt along the Nile River south from Cairo to Aswan; and the five frontier governorates covering Sinai and the deserts that lie west and east of the Nile. All governorates, except the frontier ones, are in the Nile Delta or along the Nile Valley and Suez Canal. Data as of December 1990 NOTE: The information regarding Egypt on this page is re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Egypt Physical Size and Borders information contained here.

All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Egypt Physical Size and Borders should be addressed to the Library of Congress and the CIA. Please put this page in your BOOKMARKS - - - - - ~8.html Copyright © 2004 Photius Coutsoukis (all rights reserved) ctr040601 Political Map of Libya, Egypt, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Somalia - Atlapedia® Online Somalia Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa in East Africa. It is bound by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the west, Kenya to the southwest, the Indian Ocean to the east and the Gulf of Aden to the north.... Sudan Sudan is located in North East Africa. It is bound by Egypt to the north, Libya to the northwest, Chad to the west, the Central African Republic to the southwest, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) to the south, Uganda and Kenya to the southeast, Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east and the Red Sea to the northeast....

Question: What country has borders with Libya, Sudan and Israel?
Answer: Egypt