Treaty of Troyes | England-France [1420] | Britannica.com Treaty of Troyes THIS IS A DIRECTORY PAGE. Britannica does not currently have an article on this topic. Learn about this topic in these articles: in United Kingdom: The French war ...the conquest of Normandy and the grant of Norman lands to English nobles and lesser men. This was a new strategy for the English to adopt, replacing the plundering raids of the past. In 1420 in the Treaty of Troyes it was agreed that Henry would marry Catherine, Charles VI’s daughter. He was to be heir to the French throne, and that throne was to descend to his heirs in perpetuity. But Charles... in France: Charles VI ...to meet with the dauphin in 1419 and offer to betray the English, but he was assassinated by the dauphin’s followers. His successor, Philip III (the Good), renewed the alliance with Henry V. By the Treaty of Troyes (1420) the deranged Charles VI was induced to set aside the dauphin’s right of succession in favour of Henry V, who married Charles VI’s daughter. The ancient dream of a dynastic...

in Charles VI (king of France) ...the Battle of Agincourt (1415) against the French. In December 1418 Charles, the 15-year-old dauphin, proclaimed himself regent, but in May 1420, under Isabella’s influence, Charles VI signed the Treaty of Troyes for the marriage of his daughter Catherine of Valois to Henry V of England, who was declared regent of France and heir to the French throne (as if the dauphin were not his son).... in Henry V (king of England): The French Wars. ...of northern France, surrendered in January 1419, and the murder of Duke John of Burgundy in September 1419 brought him the Burgundian alliance. These successes forced the French to agree to the Treaty of Troyes on May 21, 1420. Henry was recognized as heir to the French throne and regent of France, and Catherine, the daughter of Charles, was married to him on June 2. He was now at the... in Troyes ...who was a Troyes shoemaker’s son.

In the church of Saint-Jean-au-Marché (14th–17th century) on June 2, 1420, Henry V of England married Catherine of Valois, daughter of Charles VI. The Treaty of Troyes (May 21, 1420) had just recognized Henry as heir to the throne of France. The remarkable cathedral of Saint-Pierre-et-Saint-Paul (13th–17th century) is built in a variety of... 'The Contending Kingdoms': England and France 1420-1700 | Reviews in History 'The Contending Kingdoms': England and France 1420-1700 Book: 'The Contending Kingdoms': England and France 1420-1700 edited by: Glenn Richardson Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, ISBN: 9780754657897; 210pp.; Price: £55.00 Reviewer: Mr Simon Lambe, review of 'The Contending Kingdoms': England and France 1420-1700, (review no.

802) Date accessed: 20 January, 2017 Glenn Richardson’s latest contribution to early modern Anglo-French relations comes in the form of this edited volume covering nearly three centuries of contact between England and France from 1420 to 1700. The Contending Kingdoms is essentially the proceedings of a Society for Court Studies conference which took place in London in November 2004. The conference, and indeed this book, marked the centenary of the entente-cordiale signed by Britain and France in 1904. The contributors, based mainly in England and France, reflect on a century’s worth of Anglo-French historical research. Framed between two treaties (Troyes and the Spanish Partition Treaties), the underlying hypothesis is that, despite bouts of conflict, England and France enjoyed significant periods of peace and cooperation which cultivated great cultural, political and mercantile interaction. There was, however, an almost sibling-like relationship between England and France: shaped by petty squabbles, violent episodes and competition mirrored in the rhetoric of Francis I and Henry VIII. There are three obvious themes within the book: comparison, cooperation and ecclesiastical involvement in government.

The treaty of Troyes, signed in the aftermath of Agincourt on 21 May 1420, effectively created a ‘dual monarchy’, bestowing the title ‘King of England and France’ on Henry V and his successors in perpetuity. Anne Curry’s contribution, ‘Two Kingdoms, One King: The Treaty of Troyes (1420) and the Creation of a Double Monarchy of England and France’, stresses the diplomatic brilliance of the treaty as it was ‘skilfully worded to fudge the past’ avoiding Henry’s ‘existing claim to the throne’ (pp. 26–30). Curry suggests that in fact Henry’s son, Henry VI, was the first and only ‘dual’ monarch. Significantly, the treaty, in creating a ‘union of two crowns’ rather than a union of two countries, called for an end to all ‘dissensions, hatreds, rancours, and conflict between the two kingdoms and their people’: an entente-cordiale of its own (p. 40). We soon encounter the comparative themes within the book.

Robert Knecht, in his ‘The French and English Nobilities in the Sixteenth Century: A Comparison’, provides an overview of noble membership on both sides of the Narrow Sea. Knecht notes the shared Anglo-French heritage of the feudal, Christian nations during the Middle Ages, not to mention the overlapping spheres of authority in western France due to English continental expansion as discussed by Curry. While the two nations shared aspects of common heritage, they branched out over time resulting in three primary areas of difference: ‘size and structure, wealth and power’ (p. 65). While he makes light work of the issue of the definition of nobility, Knecht’s treatment of the nobility on either side of the Channel does appear to place disproportionate emphasis on the French élite. Moreover, once we approach the issue of gentry definition, Knecht seems to sidestep the problem, approaching the issue from a quantitative rather than qualitative approach. Perhaps Knecht could have consulted Peter Coss’s excellent definition in his The Origins of the English Gentry as a point of reference.

(1) From the outset, in her treatment of Elizabeth I and Catherine de’ Medici, Susan Doran defends her choice of subject: a comparison between two contemporaneous powerful women. Principally, the criticism stems from Catherine de’ Medici being neither French nor queen regent of France while Elizabeth was an English queen. However, Doran justifies her decision suitably, stressing the significance of Catherine’s influence as la reine mere although, as we discover, their relationship was by no means equal. Indeed, Doran presents Catherine as a mother-in-law figure to Elizabeth. There were clear differences in personality, notably religion, education and style. Despite the apparent personality clash, the achievement of this chapter is Doran’s ability to piece together the women’s shared characteristics. Doran notes that politically both put ‘short-term benefits before long-term considerations’ and recognised the importance of religious toleration. Doran also suggests that both held a similar stance on Mary Queen of Scots, for Elizabeth feared the threat she posed to her crown while Catherine was wary of her Guise connections. Thus, they were able to cooperate with each other towards respective domestic security.

As for marriage, Doran revises the traditional view that Elizabeth was pursued by the French suggesting that Elizabeth was equally proactive in negotiations (p. 130). Instead, Doran argues that Anglo-French marriage overtures failed simply due to irreconcilable religious incompatibility. The editor’s own contribution, ‘The French Connection: Francis I and England’s Break with Rome’, explores the cooperative role of Francis I in Henry’s diplomatic efforts to secure his divorce. Richardson provides a sense of the mutual frustration experienced by both England and France during the late 1520s and early 1530s. Richardson argues that following the rise of the Boleyn faction at court and Francis’s apparent support for Henry’s case, by March 1531 challenging the legal rather than spiritual papal jurisdiction became the focus of French diplomatic activities with England. Richardson suggests that Henry interpreted Francis’s verbal assurance as an outright endorsement of his divorce campaign. Here we reach the crux of Richardson’s argument: that by 1532, Henry and his chief minister Thomas Cromwell did not act in isolation in their manoeuvres against the papacy.

Rather, while making their own legislation, Francis provided the support and encouragement which ‘steeled Henry’s nerves’ in return for Henry’s assurances of military assistance (p. 102). Yet, Richardson also convincingly portrays a real sense of panic in Henry’s own mind. In this chapter, Richardson not only turns the traditional view of the English Reformation as a ‘quintessentially English phenomenon’ on its head, he in fact convincingly pushes back the limits of Anglo-French cooperation over Henry’s ‘Great Matter’ by some three years, suggesting the lines of diplomatic communication remained open until late 1534, rather than late 1531 (p. 113). Charles Giry-Deloison’s, ‘France and England at Peace, 1475–1513’, stresses that despite the seemingly constant warfare between England and France, with the exception of October-November 1492, the nations experienced peace lasting 38 years, from the Treaty of Picquigny (29 August 1475) to Henry VIII’s first military campaign of 1513 which stimulated Anglo-French mercantile and cultural interaction.

This chapter is split in three distinct sections of Anglo-French interaction: trade, war and culture. The latter focuses in particular on the use of political tracts in the ‘formation of public opinion’, introducing the plausible concept of battles being fought ‘in print’ (p. 50–4). Giry-Deloison cites Picquigny as a turning poing in Anglo-French relations as it allowed both sides to deal with domestic stability and for trade and cultural exchange to flourish, although this was essentially a one way flow from France to England. To sum up, trade benefitted France while cultural exchange benefitted England. Giry-Deloison makes the point that France acted as a ‘facilitator’ of Italian art from the continent to England. However, England’s retreat from French territory from c.1400–50 resulted in a decline in Anglo-French cultural exchange. However, Giry-Deloison’s list of printers active in France and England may have worked better as an appendix rather than being part of the body of the text as it acts as a distraction from the discussion about the impact of cultural interaction.

Additionally, throughout the volume, with the exception of the introduction, the authors have segmented their work through the use of bold subtitles. However, this chapter employs the use of mid-page asterisks which creates a break in continuity. Perhaps a revised edition of the work might take this into account. There is also a visible contradiction. Richardson is keen to make the point early on that ‘rather than being unremittingly hostile … early modern Anglo-French relations are perhaps better described as ambivalent in the true sense of the word’ (p. 1). Yet, the cover displays a detail of the Battle of the Spurs (16 August 1513), in which a combined English and Imperial army routed the French forces forcing a humiliating and devastating defeat. While the Battle of the Spurs is mentioned in Giry-Deloison’s chapter as marking the end of a culturally and economically lucrative period in Anglo-French relations, perhaps Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’ might have been a more suitable alternative for two main reasons. First, the painting is featured in Richardson’s own chapter and, second, it neatly encapsulates most of the book’s themes of political and cultural communication.

David Onnekink’s chapter, ‘Anglo-French Negotiations on the Spanish Partition Treaties (1698–1700): A Re-evaluation’, aims is to put Anglo-French relations into a wider European perspective. Onnekink offers a ‘third perspective’: rather than the failure of negotiations around the partition treaties stemming from either animosity or even misunderstanding between William III and Louis XIV, Onnekink suggests that both parties genuinely intended to create a settlement. However, neither party was able to uphold the treaty due to shifting circumstances and allegiances. This assessment comes from an assessment of William III's later years: a much understudied area. The focus of the chapter is the earl of Portland's embassy to France which Onnekink notes was one of the 'grandest' of the 17th century, costing some £48,000. Onnekink’s central hypothesis is that William and Louis's relationship was not one of animosity but of 'shrewd and cynical calculation' (p. 170). The Second Partition Treaty was the product of a breakdown in William III's foreign policy through weakening British military strength.

Consequently, the treaty, signed in March 1700, was very much favourable towards the Archduke Charles and the dauphin. Onnekink suggests that British ‘weakness’ was ultimately the cause of the European conflict. Onnekink concludes by suggesting that, in contrast to the historiography, Louis XIV accepted the will of Carlos II because he felt that neither Britain nor the United Provinces in 1700 was able to uphold the treaty or an alliance of this kind. Geoffrey Elton may have approved of Cedric Michon’s contribution, with its treatment of personalities as political forces. In his ‘Pomp and Circumstances: State Prelates under Francis I and Henry VIII’, Michon provides a useful assessment of the function of ecclesiastics within government, introducing the idea that state prelates were the ‘third pillar’ of government. As for similarities, Michon suggests that Anglo-French prelates were comparable in size, number and wealth. However, when calculating the comparative numbers of prelates and their wealth, Michon does not always show his working out. The purpose of the chapter seems to be to highlight the dissimilarity between the ‘third pillar’ in England and France.

The point, claims Michon, is that while the French prelates were of noble birth, their English counterparts were forced to climb the greasy pole. Indeed, Michon suggests the French prelates were able to exploit their familial contacts while the English ecclesiastics used their university contacts – the ‘Cambridge Connection’ – as a kind of extended family: perhaps taking alma mater too literally. Michon suggests these class boundaries prevented the English prelates from integrating into court society and, in a way, created a lucid distinction between the various ‘pillars’ of state. However, the chapter seems unevenly balanced, providing an initial comparison and then propounding his ‘Cambridge Connection’ theory at length. Moreover, the ‘Cambridge Connection’ is not entirely convincing as it only seems to apply to a brief period before the ‘laicisation’ of government. It is indeed unsurprising that Old Boys would recommend their fellow graduates to lofty positions. It seems to some extent inevitable that the pool of ecclesiastics graduating from their theological and civil education would encounter each other in court circles. While England experienced some continental influence during the early 15th century, by the mid 17th century England had become only peripherally significant politically and militarily.

As Loïc Bienassis writes, the common historical perspective is that by the time of the Thirty Years War, Britain held a ‘secondary place’ in international politics. The purpose of Bienassis’s contribution, ‘Richelieu and Britain (1634–1642)’, is to revise this view by stressing the importance of British neutrality during the conflict. After establishing Richelieu’s ‘firm policy towards Spain’, Bienassis provides an outline of relations between England, France and Spain in the early to mid 17th century. Bienassis neatly covers James I’s failed Anglo-Spanish enterprise, attempts at Anglo-French cordiality through Charles I’s marriage to Henrietta Maria, the disaster at La Rochelle and the subsequent peace agreements with France in 1629 and Spain in 1630. The fallout of this was Britain’s poor standing as a potential ally on the international stage and particularly with Richelieu. After the treaty of The Hague (1635), however, France began to look for support from Britain in the form of a defensive alliance. Richelieu’s approach towards Britain became focused on destroying potential Anglo-Spanish relations and bringing England under French influence.

Chiefly, as noted by Bienassis, Britain was an attractive potential ally as she could muster a vast naval fleet and call on ‘a wealth of manpower’ (p. 141). This interest in Britain resulted in a proposed alliance treaty in June 1637 which would have procured British military support for France, effectively drawing Britain into the Franco-United Province bloc. However, the treaty was never signed due to ‘deep-rooted distrust’ and, once again, Britain turned to Spain as an ally. At this critical time, Charles was distracted by the Bishops’ Wars in Scotland. In direct contrast to Samuel R. Gardiner’s view, Bienassis remains convinced that Richelieu was indeed involved in fanning the flames of the Bishops’ Wars by secretly mustering Scottish troops. (2) Indeed, as Bienassis puts it, ‘what better means of neutralizing Britain … than to have her engulfed in a civil war?’ (p. 145). While this idea may not be completely new, Bienassis makes a compelling argument. Perhaps some consideration of Charles I's wider domestic agenda may have provided a more complete survey of Anglo-French relations.

(3) This chapter provides an important re-evaluation of the British role in the Thirty Years War and, importantly, the author’s revisionist sentiments climax in a call for other ‘peripheral’ powers to be studied to understand the conflict in a wider European context. In ‘A Stranger Born’: Female Usage of International Networks in Times of War’, rather than examining diplomatic relations as such, Sonja Kmec focuses on Anglo-French relations in a more literal sense. Indeed, Kmec examines the marriage between the French Protestant Charlotte de La Trémoïlle and her English husband James Stanley, Lord Derby. Kmec discusses the creation of alternative networks based on religion and kinship in order to ease her transition to life as an English wife with the use of some very rich sources covering some 40 years. The de La Trémoïlle family were not so much concerned with the Stanley family’s manxian assets but rather the possibility of creating links with Henrietta Maria. Indeed, Charlotte’s Protestantism itself was an asset at court: her religion could offset Henrietta Maria’s growing public image as an overbearing queen actively involved in dictating English religious policy.

As Kmec points out, it is of significance that she never turned to France for fear of appearing a papal sympathiser. However, the chapter’s title is slightly misleading. The point is that Charlotte de La Trémoïlle was able to use both her own and her husband’s familial connections to integrate into English political society throughout the period in question which was most beneficial during times of war. It was not used exclusively for that end as the title suggests. Indeed, the chapter’s success is that it covers a number of issues associated with repatriation, if that’s not too anachronistic a word. Gestures and tensions have continued to characterise Anglo-French relations even since the centenary of the entente cordiale. Indeed, in the time that has passed since 2004, we have witnessed a much publicised state visit to Britain by President Sarkozy in which talk of a renewed entente came to the fore. More recently, however, we have seen the underlying tensions between the nations in the wake of the alleged royal ‘snub’ by Sarkozy in his apparent failure to invite Queen Elizabeth II to Normandy to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the allied landings in 1944.

Taken together, this collection of essays provides an important reassessment of Anglo-French relations very much in keeping with Richardson’s recent tendency towards moderate revisionism. What remains to be seen is whether The Contending Kingdoms continue to cause mutual ‘irritation and fascination’ (p. 1) in the century to come. Notes P. Coss, The Origins of the English Gentry (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 1–11. Back to (1) S. R. Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603–1642 (10 vols., London, 1883), x, pp. 383–6. Back to (2) R. Cust, Charles I. A Political Life (London, 2005), pp. 124–130.

Back to (3) September 2009 Charles VI | king of France | Britannica.com king of France Alternative Titles: Charles le Bien-aimé, Charles l’Insensé, Charles the Mad, Charles the Well-Beloved Charles VI Napoleon III Charles VI, byname Charles the Well-beloved or the Mad, French Charles le Bien-aimé orL’insensé (born Dec. 3, 1368, Paris , France —died Oct. 21, 1422, Paris), king of France who throughout his long reign (1380–1422) remained largely a figurehead, first because he was still a boy when he took the throne and later because of his periodic fits of madness. Charles VI the Well-Beloved, detail of a miniature from a contemporary manuscript; in the … Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva Crowned on October 25, 1380, at Reims at the age of 11, Charles remained under the tutelage of his uncles until his declaration to rule alone in 1388.

During those early years France was ruled by his uncles and their creation, the administrative Council of 12. Philip the Bold of Burgundy conducted the council from 1382. The marriage of Isabella of Bavaria to Charles (July 17, 1385) was arranged by Philip, who had inherited the countship of Flanders and needed German allies to offset English intervention there. Philip also induced Charles to support Jeanne of Brabant, the aunt of Philip’s wife, and to lead an expedition in August 1388 against Duke William of Gelderland ; Charles, however, made a speedy peace with William and returned to France. It was then (November 2, 1388) that Charles made his decision to rule alone. His uncles withdrew, and the former officials of his father, Charles V , took over. Governmental reorganization and reforms were initiated, and a number of ordinances were promulgated in early 1389. The following winter Charles visited the antipope Clement VII in Avignon, France, and discussed plans to install Clement as pope in Rome and thus enhance French power in Italy.

Reports of those plans brought about the resumption of negotiations with England, which had been at war with France since 1337 (the Hundred Years’ War). England’s king Richard II favoured the Roman pope Boniface IX . While efforts were being made for peace in 1392, however, Charles became ill with a fever and convulsions, the first of his 44 attacks of madness. The attacks lasted from three to nine months and were interspersed with three- to five-month periods of sanity for the remainder of his life. Royal authority waned, and the dukes of Burgundy and Orléans began to vie for power. The Burgundians, led by John the Fearless , successor of Philip the Bold , arranged the murder of Louis, duc d’Orléans, in 1407 and allied themselves with King Henry V of England, who won the Battle of Agincourt (1415) against the French.

In December 1418 Charles, the 15-year-old dauphin , proclaimed himself regent, but in May 1420, under Isabella’s influence, Charles VI signed the Treaty of Troyes for the marriage of his daughter Catherine of Valois to Henry V of England, who was declared regent of France and heir to the French throne (as if the dauphin were not his son). After Charles VI’s death in 1422, the country north of the Loire was under the control of England, while southern France, excluding English Aquitaine, was loyal to the dauphin as Charles VII . Learn More in these related articles: Treaty of Troyes and Trouble Ahead Part 1 Send to Kindle Treaty of Troyes 1420 : signed and sealed in the name of Henry V and Charles VI Part 1 of Treaties and Trouble Ahead: can a treaty envisaged to create the conditions for the resolution of disputes between nations, kings and their peoples, be the catalyst for chaos and internal division that leads England to civil war in the middle of the 15th century?

The Treaty of Troyes 1420 was sealed and ratified by two Kings, following the meetings that took place in Troyes. This document ratified by a mad French King (Charles VI of Valois) and arguably a great Lancastrian King (Henry V) would impact long after both Kings were dead, some 30 years later and lead England into to civil war. Does the Treaty of Troyes lead to a a set of unintended consequences, creating a domino effect, a chain of events, that in Victorian times would come to be known as the War of the Roses? Is this too ‘far-fetched’ or at the least a plausible hypothesis? In this series of posts about the impact of Treaties designed to create accord, peace and the resolution of international disputes can we explore the intriguing connections between treaties ostensibly designed to resolve conflict in England’s favour, having the reverse effect within England itself, its government, Kings and the ruling elite. Would this obsession with France lead England to its own downfall and cause the decimation of a generation of the great families and the men who fought with and followed them? Who should govern France an English King or a French one had been disputed for decades. indeed the best part of a hundred years.

No coincidence really when if we cast our minds back to a certain Norman the conqueror, whether of Viking descent or not, the Royal families of England descended from William I certainly had some French blood coursing in their veins. There are times when the English Court only used French for polite conversation. There were English Kings who not only most commonly spoke French, it is even questionable whether they spoke English at all. But by the time of Henry V, if you believe his heroic aura largely cast by the fictional account of Shakespeare’s history plays, being English was about a a particular cultural and national identity, separate and different from being French. Or was it, let’s get back to the Treaty of Troyes. Leading up to the Treaty of Troyes Henry V maintains his right to both the crowns of England and France Troye would enshrine the right of Henry V to be King of France as well as England. Could it also lead to the rise and ultimate supremacy of a new dynasty of relative royal upstarts, the Tudors? With the obvious benefit of hindsight ‘Be careful what you wish for’, might have been the best advice to King Harry?

But we are seeing events from a ‘birds-eye view’ across time and with some knowledge of what transpires subsequently. Does Henry make avoidable errors or could he have planned better for his succession? Do Kings fail in their obligations to educate and parent their heirs to be better equipped for the their future succession or are they just too wrapped-up in maintaining a grip on day-to-day government and/or have little concern or loyalty to what happens after they are gone? For Harry in his prime, making such headway and just But Harry was hot on a series of successes, a military and charismatic leader who had been achieving significant success, could he really have had the vision and foresight of what would transpire and even if he could would the tenuous link back to the Lancastrians be enough for him to claim the Tudors as his kin? An extension of the Lancaster line of succession or not? The unintended consequences were immense, a secret marriage that would lead to the creation of a new dynasty, the Tudors and would also extend the succession crisis for years to come. We think of treaties as a means of achieving peace but the aims were much more complex for these monarchs.

They were about power, land money, personal ambition, national pride, pure vanity, ego and somewhere along the way a means to acquire a politically advantageous and preferably wealthy wife. The Treaty of Troyes, designed to create a lasting peace would have potentially had a quite different and long term impact for England. So what went wrong?. Historical background and the climate in which the treaty is agreed In 1415 England and France had enjoyed a sustained peace for some 25 years. A truce ironically called by the much discredited Richard II (last Plantagenet King) who was usurped by Henry’s father (Henry of Bolingbroke.) Henry IV had grabbed the crown by usurping Richard II and was ultimately the instrument of his murder. It was not the first time and definitely not the last time a ‘would be heir presumptive’ impatient to secure the crown for himself and his successor, would murder an incumbent monarch as an act of expedience. But when Henry IV had died another young King would come to the throne, more in the mould of his ancestor Edward the III, a charismatic leader, a warrior King who defeated the french at Agincourt and was restoring the pride of the English nation.

This Lancastrian king was driven by the desire in the spirit of his A ngevin and Plantagenet ancestors ,to acquire territory, land and ultimately the twin crowns of England and France. The question was could he achieve it at a cost to the realm that was acceptable? Henry sought to strike a bargain. the French crown, lands and money but the negotiations broke down. A king in the 15th century is still measured by his conquests, his lands and the revenues he can leverage from them and his people as a subsidy to fund his military conquests and excessively expensive lifestyle. When the opposition refuse to negotiate and you are a warrior king, what action would you take? You go back to war and seek to force your enemy to concede, your tax your people and extract even more for even less and keep pressing. Henry raised a force of 11.000 and set to lay siege to Harfleur at the mouth of the Siene with himself in command. They set the siege and are 5 weeks in but its not only the townsfolk who suffer. Its August and conditions are hot and insanitary for the English force as well.

Terrible disease takes grip and Henry V’s force is reduced by deaths from sickness by more than 25% of the English, that is some 2.5k to 3k men. Harfleur holds out for another 4.5 weeks until late September. Henry eventually begins to undermine Harfleur’s immense defenses. Harfleur is taken but Henry V continues onwards at breakneck speed deep into Normandy. Henry V’s objective is to press through to the safety of Calais which had remained firmly in English hands but he meets a large entrenched french force of opposition. He wins the day ultimately and continues to press on ruthlessly taking the other key towns and making inroads towards Calais. English are increasing the pressure on France, Henry V is wanting to press his advantage and capitalise upon this opportunity. This is in the climate of the 100 Years War. It was not continuous conflict but it had sapped both sides and there had been no overall winner, the ebb and flow would often lead to now outright winner. It was more a snatch and grab, countered by another from the opposition.

It wasn’t really in the interests of either side to not reach a final conclusion and save the vast costs both human and financial that these running disputes had cost England and France for a large part of a century. Henry V was in a position of military domination in Northern France, his alliance with Burgundy had worked well. Burgundy was hungry for revenge on the Capetian kings because the Dauphin had been party to the murder of duke John the Fearless of Burgundy in 1419. The Dauphin views the Duke of Burgundy as a traitor and enemy meets with the Duke of Burgundy and has him murdered. Not unsurprisingly Burgundy then aligned with Henry V and the alliance proved effective. The Dauphin is also detested by his own Mother, who is acting as Regent , given the mental instability of her husband, King Charles VI (Valois) of France and the devious acts of her son, she too was ready to settle with Henry and meet with new Duke of Burgundy to achieve a lasting peace, the meeting place is Troyes.

The pressure was on France, Henry had the upper hand and classically a pragmatic dynastic marriage could secure peace and accord for France without more bloodshed but at what price? Imagine how pressured the circumstances must have been to induce a King and Queen to disinherit their own son (their heir) and worst still marry his sister to their mortal enemy. But desperate times called for radical solutions. What was the Treaty of Troyes? The meeting at Troyes is set with strict conditions and the parties limited to a supporting force of 2,500 men each. Henry writes to his brother, advising him in England of his expectations and optimistic outlook, whilst Humphrey as Duke of Gloucester was left as Warden of the realm: “To our right trusty and well-beloved brother [the Duke of Gloucester, Warden in our realm of England and to all the [others] of our Council there.] For as much as we knew well that your desire was to hear joyful tidings of our good speed touching the conclusion of peace between the two realms…we signify unto you that, worshipped be our Lord…our labour has sent us a good conclusion.

Upon Monday, the 20th day of this present month, we arrived in this town of Troyes and on the morrow we had a convention between our mother, the Queen of France, and our brother, the Duke of Burgundy…” From this letter we can see the confident earnest intent and optimistic expectations of Henry himself the day before the meeting. It was a permanent peace they were planning for and the substance of the treaty confirms this.

It is a permanent union of the two realms that is contemplated; ” After our death [Charles VI], and from that time forward, the crown and kingdom of France, with all their rights and appurtenances, shall be vested permanently in our son [son-inlaw], King Henry [of England], and his heirs.” Clause 6 Treaty of Troyes.” Treaty of Troyes delegates full full regency powers to Henry V to act during Louis’s remaining life as French King: “The power and authority to govern and to control the public affairs of the said kingdom shall, during our lifetime, be vested in our son, King Henry, with the advice of the nobles and wise men who are obedient to us, and who have consideration for the advancement and honor of the said kingdom….” “[It is agreed] that the two kingdoms shall be governed from the time that our said son, or any of his heirs shall assume the crown, not divided between different kings at the same time, but under one person who shall be king and sovereign lord of both kingdoms; observing all pledges and all other things to each kingdom its rights, liberties or customs, usages and laws, not submitting in any manner one kingdom to the other.” Treaty of Troyes and Marriage Agreement

 for the French Kings Daughter to be Wife and Queen to Henry V Part of the agreement would be the marriage of the french kings daughter, Catherine of Valois to Henry, uniting the previously warring kingdoms as two realms two crowns, ruled by the same man.

Catherine would be come Queen of England and Wife to Henry but that happy estate would be very short lived. The Treaty was agreed in May 1420, Catherine was married to Henry in France 2 June 1420, crowned Queen in 1421 she was just 20. She would quickly provide Henry with an heir in the December of 1421, born at Windsor Castle. Henry had already returned to campaigning in France before his son was born. He was taken ill whilst laying seige to Meaux and would not live to meet his son. In summer both sides would suffer from heat and disease, not just those being besieged. Henry caught dysentery, realised he was unlikely to recover and hastily made plans with his brothers John Duke of Bedford (who had led the French dominions and fought most of his life in France and Humphrey Duke of Gloucester to provided the needed protection for his legacy and the heir that he would never meet.

By August 31st 1422 Henry was dead and a young Queen was now the Dowager Queen at far too young an age with a vulnerable young Prince Henry (later Henry VI) without a father needing to be protected and learn quickly how to hold his place and live long enough to inherit his realm. He would need help, he would need strong protection from his Uncles. He was only 9 months old at the time of his father’s death. Boy kings had not struggled in the past including Richard II. How could such an outcome be avoided for the next Lancastrian king? This boy would become Henry VI but would he be well and strong enough to reach his majority? How did the Treaty of Troyes impact upon our intriguing history? The Treaty of Troyes was intended to have long and lasting positive consequences for both England and France but it had been agreed at a very high price and had little time to be implemented and maintained before its instigators were already dead and buried.

The impact was already profound on British history: The English potentially had the right to hold the crown and lands of both realms surpassing even the lands held by the Plantagenets before King John lost the majority of the spoils of war but their charismatic leader was dead and there would be potentially a chasm in royal leadership hat needed to be plugged quickly. France would never forgive Isabeau of Bavaria for selling France short and deserting the Dauphin, despite that he was a far from admirable individual in his own right. Henry VI was less than 1 year old, when Henry V’s died, this was relatively unexpected. There had been no time to plan for such an early transfer of power. His own kin were strong and might hold the country together for a period of time but a boy king was vulnerable and arguably a french Queen would not be popular amongst the English nobility and great families. Potentially a line had been introduced to the English royal blood that would introduce a propensity, maybe even a genetic propensity to mental illness via Charles the VI, Catherine the Queen’s father. Henry VI is already vulnerable if he inherits a medical condition that problem obviously becomes even more likely to lead to his downfall and that of the House of Lancaster.

How would the great families react to the death of a hailed King replaced by a child, ‘protected by his uncles’ with the danger of a French Queen influencing matters of state throughout the heir’s minority? Catherine as a dowager queen has gone from national asset, a spoil of war to being a potential supporter of the French cause from within the English camp. The memory of Mortimer and Isabella’s treachery and the three years of control of the kingdom before Edward III reasserted his rights as King,was not forgotten in he collective memory and especially amongst the ruling elite that currently led by Henry’s brothers were seeking to stabilise government and keep the line of succession going for the family the House of Lancaster. The two brothers were without immediate heirs themselves, luck for Henry VI, he might not have lived through boyhood never mind his majority if they had. Inheritance is about more than lands and titles, the tangled web of co-mingled blood genetics and family genealogies surely? There were specific vulnerabilities in the close intermarriages amongst the Noble and Royal families of the land already. Boy kings did not have a great record in England, think of Edward II , and Richard II for example.

Henry VI showed little early promise or evidence of the charisma and military capabilities of his father and would later suffer a complete breakdown and sustained periods of mental incapacity. Henry V had not and could not have envisaged such a downturn in the House of Lancaster so rapidly and all his hope and celebrations of Troyes and his well received marriage already are dashed and in pieces. Lawyers will always advise anyone considering a will, a long term legal instrument to consider carefully what happens if things go wrong but in reality neither France or England could have considered that both Kings would be dead within 2 years of the sealing of the agreement. But perhaps they should have done. The Treaty of Troyes is it the cause or just a marker in the events that coincide to create the climate for civil war? It is perhaps not the letters of the treaty that create the problem, it is the lack of a broader view of what happens if something goes wrong and circumstances change? But we know from the National archives that Henry V at least changed his Will three times, he was aware of the need to forward plan to some degree.

But he was living in the full bloom of success in France, at the peak of his powers, when Troyes was negotiated and agreed, there was not any reason to believe his health would fail and he would dies so soon. But he surely must have known and used the mental incapacity of the French king in aquiring the French crown. Did no one contemplate what that might mean for the royal line going forward? What was their concept and understanding of mental illness? But with Catherine producing that heir, the Treaty of Troyes has put in motion from a position of English strength, quite literally the seeds of mental illness that would at least contribute to if not cause the downfall of the House of Lancaster, a dispute amongst cousins and the creation of a new dynasty with at best a tenuous English Royal pedigree. Treaties and Trouble Ahead: an attempt to reach an accord creates the circumstances in which treaties are agreed at a given point in time, in the 14th century treaties signal a pause in hostilities but rarely resolve the core issues. Troyes could have been different if Henry V had lived to fulfill his full promise. But alternatively he might have waned and failed to live-up to his early successes as he aged.

Shakespeare and English jingoism made Henry V a heroic figure in literature and also in our cultural consciousness, a symbol of the Agincourt spirit, conjured and called upon even in WW2 propaganda when Laurence Oliver played Henry himself. The quote so famous it need hardly be stated again but the reality and tragedy is that forwards from Troyes, Lancaster and England are set on a course of conflict not against a foreign power but an internal struggle of Lancasters Yorks and Tudors. The Lancasters and Yorks descended from sons of Edward III, foolishly descend in a battle for the succession and decimate a generation of nobles in the course of pursuing their fractional ambitions. What a waste, and yes the Treaty of Troyes is the marker if not the exact instrument that at least marks and signals the potential for disaster that will turn Englishmen against each other. This was not the first time and not the last but this treaty marks the start of a conflict based on nothing more than a family disagreement, a failure after the debacle of Richard II to secure a clear line of succession.

As one generation of nobles kills another feuds simmer and boil over in a series of complex events all coming back to Troyes, the marriage of Henry V to Catherine of Valois and the birth of a king, probably disadvantaged by his genetic inheritance from birth who would reach his majority and have his father’s brother killed (Humphrey of Gloucester.) So don’t feel too sorry for Henry VI either he too would continue the policy of using violence to silence any political threat of substance. There are more treaties and troubles ahead that is for sure and as England moves towards civil war we can further explore what other tries mark or mar the descent into civil war. 2 Kings Dead, a beautiful 21 year old widowed French queen living in England, a 1 year old heir to the the throne, two Dukes as Uncles and their loyalty to Henry V certain but to his heir is it for him or themselves that they are running France and England? Part 2 of Treaties and Trouble Ahead will focus what happens next and the downfall of the Lancastrians and how another treaty marks a decisive moment in our history.

More Reading and references on the Treaty of Troyes 1420 treaty of troyes : definition of treaty of troyes and synonyms of treaty of troyes (English) 4 References Terms The treaty arranged for the marriage of Charles VI's daughter Catherine to Henry V of England , who was made regent of France and acknowledged (along with his future sons) as successor to the French throne. The Dauphin Charles was disinherited from the succession. The Estates-General of France ratified the agreement later that year after Henry V entered Paris. (See main article: The Dual-Monarchy of England and France ) Background The French king Charles VI suffered bouts of insanity through much of his reign. Henry V had invaded France in 1415 and delivered a crushing defeat to the French at Agincourt . In 1418, John the Fearless , Duke of Burgundy , whose political and economic interests favoured an agreement with the English, occupied Paris. One year later he was murdered by his Armagnac opponents on the bridge at Montereau. His son Philip the Good formed an alliance with the English and negotiated the treaty with the English King.

Isabeau of Bavaria , Charles VI's queen, whose participation in the negotiations was merely formal, agreed to the treaty disinheriting her son, hoping that if the dynasties were joined through Henry V the war could be ended and leave France in the hands of a vigorous and able king. The disinheriting of the Dauphin was supported by earlier rumours that the Queen had an affair with her brother-in-law Louis, Duke of Orléans . These rumours were gladly taken up by Louis' main rival, John the Fearless, who had the Duke of Orléans assassinated in 1407. Charles' disinheritance received further legal sanction when he declared himself regent for Charles VI in rivalry to the regency declared by Henry V. The dauphin was summoned to a lit-de justice (legal hearing) in 1420 on charges of lèse-majesté . When he failed to appear, a Parisian court in 1421 found Charles the dauphin guilty of treason and sentenced him to disinheritance and banishment from the Kingdom of France, losing all privileges to land and titles. This was an important aftermath to the Treaty of Troyes.

Aftermath The treaty was undermined by the deaths of both Charles VI and Henry V within two months of each other in 1422. The infant Henry VI of England became King of both England and France, but the Dauphin Charles also claimed the throne of France upon the death of his father. He was crowned King of France on 17 July 1429 in Reims Cathedral . He ruled a region of France centred around Bourges and was derisively referred to as the "King of Bourges" by his opponents. The terms of the Treaty of Troyes were later confirmed once again at the Treaty of Amiens (1423) , when Burgundy and Brittany confirmed the recognition of Henry VI as King of France and agreed to form a triple-defensive alliance against the Dauphin Charles. The military victory of Charles VII over both the French and English supporters of the claims of Henry VI to be king of France rendered the treaty moot. The Kings of England continued to claim the crown of France until the claim was abandoned after the Act of Union in 1800/1801 merged the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland .

References Siege of Orléans | Religion-wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia Background Hundred Years' War The siege of Orléans occurred during the Hundred Years' War, contested between the ruling houses of France and England for supremacy over France. The conflict had begun in 1337 when England 's King Edward III decided to press his claim to the French throne, a claim based in part on ancient inheritance from William the Conqueror and augmented by inheritance from strategic marriages. Following a decisive victory at Agincourt in 1415, the English gained the upper hand in the conflict, occupying much of northern France. Under the Treaty of Troyes of 1420, England's King Henry V became regent of France. By this treaty, Henry married Catherine, the daughter of the current French king, Charles VI, and would then succeed to the French throne upon Charles's death. The dauphin Charles , the son of Charles VI and presumptive heir prior to the treaty, was then disinherited. Geography Orléans is located on the Loire River in north-central France. During the time of this siege it was the northernmost city that remained loyal to the French crown.

The English and their allies the Burgundians controlled the rest of northern France, including Paris . Orléans's position on a major river made it the last obstacle to a campaign into central France. England already controlled France's southwestern coast. Armagnac party As the seat of the duke of Orléans, this city held symbolic significance in early fifteenth century politics. The dukes of Orléans were at the head of a political faction known as the Armagnacs who rejected the Treaty of Troyes and supported the claims of France's uncrowned king Charles VII . This faction had been active for two generations. As a result, the duke of Orléans was one of the very few combatants from Agincourt who remained a prisoner of the English fourteen years after the battle. Under the customs of chivalry, a city that surrendered without a struggle was entitled to lenient treatment from its new ruler. A city that resisted could expect a harsh occupation. Mass executions were not unknown in this type of situation. By late medieval reasoning, the city of Orléans had escalated the conflict and forced the use of violence upon the English, so a conquering lord would be just in exacting vengeance upon its citizens.

The city's association with the Armagnac party made it unlikely to be spared if it fell. Early stages of the siege When the siege, under the direction of the Earl of Salisbury, began on 12 October 1428, English forces already controlled several towns in the Loire River valley. Orléans was the last major Armagnac stronghold. Very early on in the siege, the English attacked the Augustins, a walled monastery, and beyond it, the Tourelles, a fortified gatehouse located at the southern end of a nearly 1/4 mile (400 m) long bridge leading over the Loire River into the city (which was located on the northern side of the river). The Orléanais, for their part, soon made a decision to abandon the Tourelles and retreat behind the city walls to conduct their defense, tearing up a portion of the bridge behind them. Soon after the English took possession of the Tourelles, in late October, the Earl of Salisbury was struck in the face by debris kicked up in cannon fire and, after lingering for about a week, died.

About a month later, in early December 1428, after a series of temporary siege commanders, Sir William de la Pole, 1st Duke of Suffolk , 1st Marquess of Suffolk, 4th Earl of Suffolk assumed overall command of the siege, a post he would retain until the end of the siege in May of the following year. Meanwhile, in the first few months of the siege, the English established a series of fortified positions around the city. Since they lacked a large enough force to fully invest the city, it was still possible for the defenders to move men and supplies in and out, though such movement could hardly be said to be unimpeded. This loose blockade was enforced with a series of forts to the west and north, while the Tourelles and a fortress immediately in front guarded the south. To the east, the fort of Saint Loup was located over 2 km distant from the city's eastern gate. Apart from Les Augustins, Tourelles and bridgehead on the south, the other forts were only lightly garrisoned.

Battle of the Herrings Main article: Battle of the Herrings The most significant military action following the investment of the city prior to Joan's arrival in late April of 1429 took place to the north of the besieged city of Orléans outside a small French town by name of Rouvray. Here, on 12 February, several thousand French and Scottish soldiers attempted unsuccessfully to intercept and divert an English supply convoy in an action which has come to be known to history as the Battle of the Herrings , so named because the convoy was carrying a large supply of fish for the forthcoming Lenten season. It was on the very day of this battle that Joan was meeting with Robert de Baudricourt in Vaucouleurs for the last time before setting out, some time later and with his support, to see the Dauphin in Chinon. The story gained currency that at this meeting with Baudricourt, Joan had disclosed to him that the Dauphin's arms had that day suffered a great reversal near Orléans and that if she were not sent to him soon, there would be others.

Again, according to this version, it is when news of the defeat at Rouvray reached Vaucouleurs that Baudricourt, now convinced of the girl's prescience, relented and agreed to give her an escort to Chinon. Whatever the truth of the story, and it is not accepted by all authorities, Joan left Vaucouleurs on February 23 for Chinon and, later, Orléans. The English numbers were insufficient to truly invest and surround the city, and their cannon were incapable of breaking the thick stone city walls. Nevertheless, by spring of 1429, despite several supply runs by the French, the city's situation was growing desperate. Joan's arrival at Orléans For years, vague prophecies had been circulating in France concerning an armed maid who would rescue France. Many of these prophecies foretold that the armed maid would come from the region of Lorraine, where Domrémy , Joan's birthplace, is located. As a result, when word reached the besieged citizens of Orléans concerning Joan's journey to see the King , expectations and hopes were high.

Joan arrived in Chinon in early March, at which time she met with the Dauphin. Following this, she was sent to Poitiers so that church officials and other dignitaries could examine her. Once she received ecclesiastical and royal approval, she joined the relief army which was being assembled in Blois. It was from Blois that Joan sent the first of at least two letters addressed to the English forces besieging Orléans. In this letter, she called on the English to quit the siege, surrendering all the cities and territories in France which they then occupied, and return to England. If they refused, she promised that she would raise a "...war cry against them that would last forever." She then said, "I shall not write any further". It was a promise whose audacity was exceeded only by the accomplishment. Joan of Arc arrived with the relief army on the outskirts of Orléans on April 28, 1429, and after spending the night at Checy entered the city, to much rejoicing, the next day.

Preparing to raise the siege The Journal du siege d'Orléans, as quoted in Pernoud, reports several heated discussions over the next week concerning military tactics between Joan and Jean de Dunois , the Bastard of Orléans, who directed the city's defense. Dunois left the city on May 1 to return to Blois to gather reinforcements, returning on May 4. Meanwhile, Joan went outside the city walls and scouted all of the English fortifications, at one point exchanging words with Glasdale himself. On May 4, Joan rode out of the city, and lent aid to the French assault on the English-held fort of St. Loup. The fort was taken, the English defenders suffering over a hundred dead, with an additional 40 taken prisoner. The taking of the fort at St. Loup allowed for relatively unimpeded communication and movement between the city and that portion of the French forces which had been stationed south of the Loire since their arrival from Blois the previous week. Following this action, Joan wrote once again to the English demanding that they quit the field or face dire consequences.

Two days later, following another of the almost daily disputes regarding battle tactics wherein Joan was urging attack against the recommendations of the more cautious French military leaders, a large force left the city, crossed over to the south side of the Loire and launched a direct frontal assault on the fortified English position at the Augustins on the south bank of the river in front of the Tourelles. After fighting which lasted from morning until the evening, the walled monastery compound finally fell, leaving the English garrison in the Tourelles isolated. Attack on Les Tourelles While the other military leaders met in council without Joan being present and decided to wait for reinforcements to arrive before attacking Les Tourelles itself, Joan , with the support of the troops, was preparing for battle the next morning. On the morning of May 7, the assault on the fortified gateway called Les Tourelles began. It would be another direct, frontal assault. The French forces attempted to undermine the bridge arches which served in part as the foundation to the structure and burning barges were sent against it as well, though deVries is of the opinion that this tactic would not have had much effect.

In the midst of the fight, Joan was wounded by an archer (likely using bodkin arrows). The English (many of whom considered that any woman leading an army was a witch) began to dance about singing, 'The witch is dead! The witch is dead!' In his rehabilitation trial testimony, Jean Pasquerel , Joan's confessor, stated that Joan herself had some type of premonition or foreknowledge of this event, stating the day before the attack that "tomorrow blood will flow from my body above my breast." Joan pulled the arrow out of her own shoulder. After receiving a salve for the wound, Joan returned to the fight. Later that day, towards evening, Dunois was prepared to order the engagement broken off, but Joan prevailed on him to delay this order. Then, after retiring into nearby woods to pray, she returned and the assault was renewed, this time successfully. Les Tourelles was taken with all its defenders either killed or captured. Glasdale himself, leading the defense of Les Tourelles, drowned in the Loire River. The next day, in the morning, the English forces in the remaining forts assembled in battle formation.

The French, for their part, matched this with their own battle-ready formation. After facing each other like this for about an hour, with neither side initiating an attack (it being Sunday, Joan did not wish to initiate an attack), the English turned and marched off. The siege of Orléans was over. Aftermath Volunteers of men and supplies swelled the French army in the weeks that followed this victory. First clearing the Loire valley, then marching on Rheims to the north for the coronation of Charles VII , and finally attacking English-held Paris , the 1429 offensive made this one of the most important years of the Hundred Years' War. The French Loire campaign of 1429 consisted of five actions: 1. The Siege of Orléans. Azincourt Alliance King Charles VI b. December 3, 1368, Paris d.

October 21, 1422, Paris Title: By the Grace of God, King of France (Par la gr�ce de Dieu, Roi de France) Reign: September 16, 1380 - October 21, 1422 Coronation: November 4, 1380, consecrated and crowned, Notre-Dame Cathedral, Reims Regents: August/September 1380 - early 1382 [minority]: Regent: Louis, duc d'Anjou (b. July 23, 1339 - d. Sept. 20, 1384) August 2, 1380 - November 1, 1388 [minority] Captain General of the Kingdom (Capitaine g�n�ral du royaume): Philippe, duc de Bourgogne [byname: the Bold/French: le Hardi] (b. Jan. 15, 1342 - d. Apr.

27, 1404) November 6, 1417 - late 1418 [incapacity] Lieutenant General of the Kingdom (Lieutenant g�n�ral du royaume): Dauphin Charles de France (later Charles VII) June 24, 1418 - October 30, 1422 [incapacity] Regent (R�gent): Dauphin Charles de France (later Charles VII) May 21, 1420 - August 31, 1422 [according to the Treaty of Troyes] Regent (R�gent): Henri V, king of England (later Henri II, king of France) End of reign: October 21, 1422, deceased Name/byname: Dauphin of Viennois (dauphin de Viennois); byname: Well-Beloved, Mad (French: le Bien-Aim�, l'Insens�) The elder surviving son and successor of Charles V, Charles VI was crowned on November 4, 1380, at Reims at the age of 11 by the archbishop

 Richard de Picque (Besan�on).

Charles remained under the tutelage of his uncles until his declaration to rule alone in 1388. During those early years France was ruled by his uncles, dukes of Anjou, Burgundy, Berry and Bourbon, and their creation, the administrative Council of 12. Duc d'Anjou soon removed himself from influence by seeking the throne of Naples, Jean, duc de Berry, received the lieutenancy of Languedoc, and Philippe, duc de Bourgogne, conducted the council, but his policies drained the royal treasury and provoked popular uprisings in France and in Flanders. On November 2, 1388, Charles VI declared that he assumes the government. He took as his counselor his brother Louis, duc d'Orl�ans, and recalled his father's ministers, the Marmousets. Governmental reorganization and reforms were initiated, and a number of ordinances were promulgated in early 1389. The following winter Charles visited the antipope Clement VII in Avignon and discussed plans to install Clement as pope in Rome. Reports of those plans brought about the resumption of negotiations with England.

England's king Richard II favored the Roman pope Boniface IX. While efforts were being made for peace in 1392, however, Charles became ill with a fever and convulsions, the first of his 44 attacks of madness. The attacks lasted from three to nine months and were interspersed with three- to five-month periods of sanity for the remainder of his life. Royal authority waned and Philippe of Burgundy returned to power. His rule was challenged by Louis d'Orl�ans and the conflict eventually resulted in war between Philippe's successor, Jean the Fearless, and supporters of the Orleanists, known as Armagnacs. The Burgundians arranged the murder of Louis (Nov. 23, 1407) and allied themselves with King Henry V of England, who invaded France and won the Battle of Agincourt (Oct. 25, 1415) against the French. On November 6, 1417, the 14-year-old dauphin, Charles, was named lieutenant general of the kingdom, but on May 29, 1418, the Burgundians occupied the capital.

On June 24, 1418 [Compte de Ren� Boulegny], Dauphin Charles assumed the title of regent for his deranged father, who disapproved this act and on May 20, 1420, signed the Treaty of Troyes for the marriage of his daughter Catherine de Valois to Henry V of England, who was declared regent of France and heir to the French throne. After Charles VI's death on October 21, 1422, the country north of the Loire was under the control of England, while southern France, excluding English Aquitaine, was loyal to the dauphin as Charles VII. Sources. Text: Auguste Vallet de Viriville, Histoire de Charles VII, roi de France, et de son epoque, Paris: Veuve J.

Renouard, 1862; La Grande Encyclop�die, inventaire raisonn� des sciences, des lettres et des arts, par une soci�t� de savants et de gens de lettres (1886-1902); The Britannica Encyclop�dia, Multimedia Edition, �1994-1998; The Columbia Encyclopedia, Fifth Edition �1993, Columbia University Press; Image: Les Capetiens. John of Lancaster John of Lancaster John of Lancaster, 1st Duke of Bedford Born: June 20, 1389 Rouen, France (Age 46) John in History John of Lancaster was born the third son of Henry Bolingbroke, eldest son and heir of John of Gaunt, third surviving son of King Edward III. He was brought up in highly eloquent fashion like his other brothers and was well educated. In 1399, his father deposed King Richard II and crowned himself as King Henry IV.

After the Percies (the family that had played the biggest role in putting Henry on the throne) unsuccessfully rebelled against the king in 1403, John, along with many others, shared in the spoils they left behind and considerably increased his wealth. He continued to build up his influence and position in government throughout the remainder of his father's reign. When John's eldest brother Henry was crowned as Henry V in 1413, John was given a number of important responsibilities and was awarded several titles, most importantly, the Duchy of Bedford. The king renewed the Hundred Years War with France in 1415 and Bedford played a large part in the proceedings in support of his brother. He was given several important commands and also played a larger part in the day to day governing of England, even passing the death sentence on the Lollard rebel John Oldcastle. It was not until 1422, upon the premature death of the king, that Bedford became a true political colossus within both England and France. The throne was inherited by the nine-month-old infant son of the former king, Henry VI.

Since the conditions of the Treaty of Troyes in 1420 had specified that Henry V would become King of France following the death of the French King Charles VI, it became clear that an infant would now be king of two kingdoms very soon. Two months after the death of Henry V, Charles VI passed away. Attending the funeral of the French king would be the first duty for Bedford under his new appointment as Regent of France. As Regent of France, Bedford had the huge responsibility of not only keeping and maintaining the territories that his brother had conquered, but expanding English interests in France. Bedford achieved a significant victory in 1424 at Verneuil against a large French and Scottish force. Throughout the next several years, the English, under Bedford's command, made significant gains in conquering the remainder of France. By the late 1420's, however, the French, under the guidance of the new King Charles VII and a young girl named Joan of Arc, began to fight back furiously. In 1428, the French retook the city of Orleans, killing the English commander the Earl of Salisbury.

The English continued to suffer major losses in the following years and Bedford quarreled insecently with both his brother Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, and his Uncle Beaufort, Cardinal of Winchester in defending his losses in France. Although Bedford was able to maintain his brother's achievements in France for several years after his death, the situation was becoming impossible to maintain. The country was uniting behind their king and English allies in France were gradually deserting the English cause. Bedford, of course, was held responsible by many of his peers for the losses in France. He was able to defend himself successfully, but, by 1432, he was in decline. His wife died that year and, although he remarried the following year, he was clearly losing control of the situation in France. He died in 1435 at the age of forty-six at the siege of Rouen. Bedford was not as capable as his eldest brother Henry, but he was certainly an excellent commander and politician. He maintained his loyalty to his father, brother and nephew until the day he died. Unfortunately, he was left with such an impossible situation to deal with in France, but dealt with it to the best of his abilities.

It is unlikely anyone else put in his station could have done any better. John in Shakespeare Appears in: Henry IV, Part 1; Henry IV, Part 2; Henry V; Henry VI, Part 1 Prince John first appears in 1 Henry IV where he fights for his father at the Battle of Shrewsbury. Historically, John was only fourteen at the time of the battle, but, considering that boys were put into battle at relatively young ages, it is possible that he may have at least been on the battlefield. In 2 Henry IV he is portrayed in a negative light when he dupes the Archbishop and Earl Marshal into dismissing their army, before arresting them for treason. In reality, it was the Earl of Westmorland who talked down the rebels. Bedford appears as a man who is completely loyal to his brother in Henry V and is a main figure in the government of his nephew Henry VI. As Regent of France, he returns to his area of responsibility in an attempt to subdue the rebellions there. He dies while sitting in a chair at Rouen, just after he hears the patriotic screams of his fellow countrymen.

The last impression one is given of Bedford by Shakespeare is a fairly positive one: he is a loyal servant of the crown who gave his life for his king, cause and country. References Stratford, Jenny. ‘John , duke of Bedford (1389–1435)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Oct 2007 [ accessed 1 Nov 2009]

Question: Following the 1420 Treaty of Troyes, which king became Regent of France and successor to the French throne?
Answer: HENRY the FIFTH