BBC NEWS | Europe | How the Rose revolution happened Printable version How the Rose revolution happened In November 2003, a revolution took place in Georgia - a revolution of a kind the turbulent region had never seen before. Roses symbolised the protesters' peaceful intentions Not one person was injured, not a drop of blood was spilled. Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest against the flawed results of a parliamentary election. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, a man who had ruled Georgia for more than 30 years in total, as its Soviet-era Communist Party boss and its longest-serving post-independence president. Mr Shevardnadze told protesters they risked causing a civil war and he deployed hundreds of soldiers on the streets of Tbilisi. At that point, student demonstrators decided to give red roses to the soldiers. Many soldiers laid down their guns. Parliament stormed "People were kissing the police and military, it was really spectacular," said Giorgi Kandelaki, a 21-year-old student.

Constitutional changes have boosted Mr Saakashvili's powers "And the roses of course which people had with them, which Misha carried with him into the parliament hall, that was the moment when people said that it was a rose revolution." Misha is Mikhail Saakashvili, the US-educated 35-year-old firebrand who, on 23 November, led the demonstrators to the parliament building. Along with thousands of his supporters he forced his way through the thick wooden doors of the parliament chamber where Mr Shevardnadze was inside, giving a speech. Mr Saakashvili held a long-stemmed red rose above his head and shouted "Resign!" He waved the rose in the face of Georgia's 75-year-old president. Mr Shevardnadze's bodyguards rushed him out of the parliament building by a back door. That was the moment that power changed hands in Georgia. Anti-corruption drive In January 2004, Mr Saakashvili was elected president. The following month, the Georgian parliament passed constitutional amendments which strengthened the presidency at the parliament's expense, and gave the country a cabinet and a prime minister for the first time.

Then in March 2004, Mr Saakashvili's National Movement-Democratic Front won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections. In the first year after the revolution, dozens of former government officials were jailed on corruption and embezzlement charges. Their assets were confiscated and their savings moved to state coffers. One of Mr Saakashvili's two main allies in the Rose Revolution, Zurab Zhvania, became prime minister. The other, Nino Burjanadze, remained in her position as speaker of the weakened parliament. Mr Zhvania died of gas poisoning blamed on a faulty heater, in February 2005. Georgia's "Rose Revolution" Georgia in the Crunch by Mark Ames exile.ru Georgia's "Rose Revolution" In mid-November 2003 Russia indicated it might try to mediate the political crisis in the former Soviet republic of Georgia along with two of Georgia's neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The move came after nearly two weeks of demonstrations calling on President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Loshchinin says Moscow may try to mediate between the opposing factions in Georgia, telling reporters that Russia "cannot be indifferent" to what happens there.

The political crisis is being watched closely by western countries because of the impact unrest in Georgia can have on the volatile Caucasus Mountain region as a whole. Georgia's "Rose Revolution" was planned and centrally coordinated by the US government. The 24 November 2003 Wall Street Journal credited the fall of Eduard Shevardnadze's regime to the operations of "a raft of non-governmental organizations . . . supported by American and other Western foundations." According to the Journal, the NGOs had "spawned a class of young, English-speaking intellectuals hungry for pro-Western reforms" who laid the groundwork for a bloodless coup. Shevardnadze had switched sides, and was backed by the Russians. Richard Miles, the US ambassador to Georgia, was the chief of mission (effectively ambassador) to Yugoslavia from 1996 to 1999, and laid to groundwork to get rid of Milosevic in 2000. After returning to his homeland in 1992, Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, had helped restore stability to a country wracked by chaos and lawlessness. He fostered the establishment of political parties and state institutions and promoted a cadre of impressive young politicians.

But by the late 1990s, Shevardnadze's pluses were increasingly vanishing. Under his leadership, Georgia had degenerated into what many viewed as a failed state, plagued by rampant corruption, unable to provide basic services and incapable of controlling its borders. The separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had been factually independent since 1993. Ajara, an ethnically Georgian region on the Black Sea coast, was ruled by a defiant local boss, Aslan Abashidze, who refused to pay taxes to the national budget and skimmed millions from customs and contraband. Abashidze also cultivated cozy ties with Russia which maintained a military base in his fiefdom. By 2002, therefore, Shevardnadze's position was increasingly problematic. Georgia's prospects of restoring its shattered unity, which required Russian neutrality if not active cooperation, seemed bleak. At home, Shevardnadze's former reformist allies and protï¿½gï¿½s accused him of tolerating corruption.

Former Justice Minister Mikheil Saakashvili, former Parliament Speaker Zurab Zhvania, and current Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze aligned against Shevardnadze in a fractious opposition bloc. The United States, for its part, continued to support the Government of Georgia but Washington's patience with Shevardnadze's perpetual balancing act among Georgia's corrupt and reformist political forces was quickly coming to an end. To emphasize the importance of holding of a free and fair parliamentary election in November, President Bush during the summer sent former Secretary of State James Baker as his personal envoy to Tbilisi. His goal was to facilitate agreement between Georgia's Government and the opposition over the most contentious issues, especially the composition of the Central Election Commission. Despite much hoopla, however, the "Baker Plan" was not fully implemented by Tbilisi. Against that backdrop, Georgia's November 2003 parliamentary election turned out far more interesting than anyone had expected.

Pro-Shevardnadze forces united in the bloc "For a New Georgia." Other leading contenders, apart from Aslan Abashidze's Revival Party, included: Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement; the Burjanadze-Democrats, uniting supporters of Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania: the New Rights; and Industry Will Save Georgia. Tens of thousands of people came from across the land demanding freedom, fair elections, and democracy. Without violence they came, after an independent parallel vote count showed the government claim to have won the Nov. 2 parliament election was a fraud. Waving red and white banners bearing the St. George's Cross-now on the national flag-demonstrators grew in number and determination for 20 days until President Eduard Shevardnadze left his office peacefully. When the Central Election Commission announced after substantial delay (November 20) results that gave Saakashvili's National Movement only 18 percent of the vote, he, Zhvania and Burjanadze decided matters had come to a head.

On November 22, when Shevardnadze, whose support was visibly melting away, tried to seat the newly elected parliament, Saakashvili and his backers entered the legislature bearing roses and demanded that Shevardnadze step down. The chastened president, already incapable of resistance, was hustled away by bodyguards. The January 2004 election was less a contest among candidates than a coronation. Though five other politicians threw their hat into the ring, Saakashvili's victory was certain. His leadership of the peaceful revolution had completely transformed Georgian politics: politicians allied with Shevardnadze's For a New Georgia had either left the scene or were irrelevant; opposition parties like the New Rights or Industry Will Save Georgia, which did not join Saakashvili's bandwagon, lost much of their popular support. International NGOs were deeply involved in Georgian events. Much press and analytical attention has been focused on the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, which funded critically important groups like Georgia's Liberty Institute, its leading human rights organization. Some Liberty Institute associates traveled to Serbia to study how Slobodan Milosevic had been ousted.

Closely allied with the Liberty Institute was the student movement Kmara ["Enough"], which mobilized opposition to vote fraud countrywide. These groups, urged on by opposition politicians, were determined not to let Shevardnadze and Georgia's entrenched political groups steal the election. "The success in Georgia is a result of the people's commitment to democracy, but without foreign assistance I'm not sure we would have been able to achieve what we did without bloodshed," said Levan Ramishvili of the Liberty Institute, an NGO that received U.S. funds since 1996. Ukraine's Orange Revolution followed in 2004; and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution took place in March 2005. NEWSLETTER Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective | United States Institute of Peace Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective Published: By: Giorgi Kandelaki Why did neither protestors nor the government use force during Georgia's Rose Revolution, despite orders to do so? Author Giorgi Kandelaki provides a participant's perspective on this question and more. Summary Efforts to resist calling the 2003 events in Georgia a "revolution" were misplaced.

Although the turmoil was marked by a lack of violence, a critical mass of people did come out to move the country away from the rampant corruption of the Shevardnadze regimes of 1972 to 1985 (when he was Communist Party first secretary) and 1992 to 2003 (when he was president). As president, Shevardnadze supported independent civil society groups and media outlets such as the television station Rustavi-2. His support of these groups ended in 2001, when he tried to shut down Rustavi-2. This action prompted reform-minded members of his government to form opposition parties. Before the 2003 parliamentary elections, opposition groups hoped only to gain momentum for the 2005 presidential elections. However, blatant electoral fraud, Shevardnadze's refusal to compromise, and the discipline of nonviolent opposition groups precipitated his exit. The youth group Kmara (Enough) played an important role in combating widespread political apathy among the Georgian public and youth in particular. The successful mobilization of so many young people continues to reverberate as former Kmara members maintain their interest in politics.

Saakashvili's National Movement party believed that its success depended on radicalizing the political sphere and thereby broadening political participation. It was particularly effective at increasing political participation among provincial populations. Georgia's independent media, particularly Rustavi-2, supported the Rose Revolution by providing a forum for opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) critical of the government. The channel also co-funded and broadcast exit polls that contradicted the official election results. Although a few civil society organizations did play significant roles in the revolution, most were constrained by foreign funding priorities and their own elitism. Similarly, foreign actors played a limited role because they lacked information or were overly cautious about fostering significant political change. There was no violence because the various security forces chose not to respond to public demonstrations with force. Three main factors drove their decision: 1) The security forces were accustomed to responding to democratic pressures and not defending autocratic rule; 2) a divided ruling party could not speak with one voice; 3) opposition groups, including Kmara, made strong efforts to build sympathy for their cause while downplaying the threat posed by political change.

International actors can best support democratic transitions by targeting assistance to nationwide election watchdogs, such as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), that can carry out parallel vote tabulations (PVT). Ideally, large numbers of observers from similar organizations outside Georgia should be deployed, since they can be more outspoken about electoral fraud. Introduction When asked why the Rose Revolution took place in Georgia, many westerners point out that Georgians were fed up with their gloomy economic prospects and the government's rampant corruption. It is true that corruption, sharp economic decline, and, of course, blatant election rigging all fed the popular frustration that fueled the revolution, but these and other injustices can be found in many other countries where no democratic revolutions have occurred. Why of all countries, including the states of the former Soviet Union, did such a breakthrough happen first in Georgia? What made this country special? What factors and actors were involved? Finally, to what extent did western assistance make the revolution possible? This report examines the specifics of the political and social landscape in Georgia before the revolution, dynamics of the protests sparked by rigged elections, and the actors who contributed to laying the groundwork for change and supporting the revolution itself.

A clear picture of the Rose Revolution helps explain the most intriguing aspect of the events: that neither protesters nor the government used force despite the orders given. As an active member of Kmara, I consider all these questions and issues from a participant's perspective, providing insights not readily available from most outside observers. Terminology: Coup, "Revolution," or Revolution? In the immediate aftermath of the Rose Revolution, many analysts and political scientists preferred to call it a "coup." Thus they suggested that what happened on November 22-23, 2003, was no more than a group of people ousting the incumbent government. Many other authors did use the word "revolution" inside quotation marks, as if to distance themselves from such a dramatic idea. A consensus on terminology emerged only after events in Ukraine a year later, amid growing enthusiasm for the future of democracy in the former Soviet Union. During the twentieth century, supporters of democracy came to distrust revolutions, not least because they invariably were linked to violence. Supporters of democratization preferred to describe transformation of a political regime as "transition." As a result, an entire academic discipline of "transitology" developed, inspired by democratic consolidations in Latin America and southern Europe.

A new debate ensued over whether the paradigm of democratic transitions could be extended to the regime transformations taking place in Eastern Europe. In the end, the word transition prevailed, although in most Eastern European countries the changes did include the definitive defeat of one side and the involvement of the masses. If we do not consider violence a necessary attribute of a revolution, the November 2003 events in Georgia clearly qualify as a genuine revolution, since they involved both a sudden change of power and mass mobilization. One paradoxical feature of both the Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is that they did not seek to challenge the existing political regime as defined by the national constitution. Instead, Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia describes the Georgian revolution as a revolt in defense of the constitution. In more general terms, the Rose Revolution was a revolt against corruption and kleptocratic government. Rampant corruption in all spheres of life had forced increasing numbers of Georgians to engage in corrupt practices. This was one of the main criticisms of Shevardnadze's opponents, and it drove people out into the square in November 2003.

Conclusion A variety of factors made the Rose Revolution possible: the incumbent regime's systemic weakness, its history of liberal policies, the National Movement party's success in radicalizing politics and broadening political participation, civic education efforts by civil society members during recent years, free media, and the radical, nonpartisan, nonviolent Kmara. The legacy of the Rose Revolution is great. As the first bloodless change of power in the region's history, it rekindled hopes for democracy, which many believed intrinsically foreign to this part of the world. Many observers refer to the Rose Revolution as an inspiration for what some, including Georgia's new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, have called a "new wave of democratization." In addition to profoundly altering the development of Georgia and the Caucasus for years to come, the revolution inspired supporters of democracy throughout the former Soviet Union. Neither before nor during the 2003 mass protests in Georgia could opposition activists in Tbilisi have dreamt of the level of support the Ukrainian opposition would receive a year later from western countries and institutions. In Georgia expectations of western support were based on western behavior following the presidential elections in Azerbaijan in October 2003.

Although the Azeri presidential elections were characterized as "falling short of democratic standards," all the western diplomats in Baku except the Norwegian ambassador rushed to congratulate the incumbent president's son, Ilham Aliev, who suppressed public protests that erupted after he grabbed power. Ukraine's political weight is far greater than Georgia's, but the Georgian experience convinced many western policymakers that nonviolent regime change is indeed possible in the former Soviet Union and will not necessarily lead to civil war. Open international support and solidarity increased the chances of success for democratic forces in Ukraine, and this could happen elsewhere in similar situations. At the same time, problems in Ukraine also confirmed the necessity to fund and train election observers capable of carrying out PVT and exit polling. Ideally, similar organizations from other former Soviet countries should assist such groups. Politically active youth groups such as Kmara must be included as well. At the same time, in more repressive and authoritarian systems like Belarus, where it is impossible to carry out comprehensive monitoring, the danger is that the regime will control election monitoring projects and groups and approach international actors for funding.

Finally, international actors such as the European Union and the United States should abandon the illusion that rigged elections might "not be so bad" or could be "an improvement over the last elections" in most post-Soviet countries. Softening wording of election monitoring results might undermine the reputation of authoritative election monitoring organizations such as the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, while putting democratic activists and forces in danger. Pressures on nondemocratic regimes should include measures responding to the country 's internal situation—for example, pressure on governments to release political prisoners and stop arresting people for distributing posters. Western or EU ambassadors could make good use of their diplomatic status by publicly supporting demonstrations asserting that freedom is a right, not a luxury. About the Report Georgia's Rose Revolution of 2003, the first bloodless change of power in the Caucasus, occurred largely unpredicted by analysts and policymakers. Both Georgian and western observers feared and predicted yet another wave of bloodshed in this troubled former Soviet nation.

Yet the enthusiasm, hard work, and nonviolent discipline of initially small groups sparked what many now call "Europe's fourth wave of liberation." "I did not think to pay serious attention to these young people running around with flags and drawing graffiti on the streets," deposed President Eduard Shevardnadze said shortly after the revolution. "I was wrong," he added. Author Giorgi Kandelaki was elected in 2001 to Tbilisi State University's first student self-government, which pursued a high-profile campaign against corruption and for reform in higher education. In April 2003 he co-founded the youth movement, Kmara (Enough), which played an instrumental role in Georgia's November 2003 Rose Revolution. More recently he has trained young activists to organize for nonviolent change in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldova, and, most recently, Belarus, where he and a colleague were detained for eleven days. Since June 2005 he has been an adviser in the administration of President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia.

Georgians overthrow a dictator (Rose Revolution), 2003 | Global Nonviolent Action Database Georgians overthrow a dictator (Rose Revolution), 2003 047. Assemblies of protest or support ›20,000 rallied outside the parliamentary building Methods in 5th segment: Mikhail Saakashvili - Leader of United National Movement (UNM) Partners: Zurab Zhvania (Ex-parliamentary speaker), Nino Burjanadze (parliamentary speaker ) - both of Burjanadze democrats.

KMARA (pro democracy youth organization whose name translates to 'enough!') Liberty Institute (local Georgian NGO involved in protest activities) External allies: International Society for fair elections and democracy (ISFED - disputed election results), Georgian Young Lawyer's Association (GYLA) (disputed election results), Rustavi -2 (tv station which supported protesters and gave them an outlet to get out the message) Involvement of social elites: George Soros - American Billionaire provided over 42 million dollars towards the overthrow Joining/exiting order of social groups Groups in 1st Segment: Opponent, Opponent Responses, and Violence Opponents: Eduard Shevardnadze and his regime Nonviolent responses of opponent: Not known. Repressive Violence: There were allegations coming from the campaign that an elderly woman had been shot by police officers. Success Outcome Success in achieving specific demands/goals: 6 points out of 6 points Survival: 1 point out of 1 points Growth: 3 points out of 3 points Total points: 10 out of 10 points Notes on outcomes: The government was properly ousted with new free elections being held. Campaign organizers survived throughout the campaign The rallies continued to grow massively throughout the campaign.

The Rose Revolution in Georgia sought to overthrow President Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was elected as president in 1995. A hold-over from the communist period, Shevardnadze was often seen as a puppet for the Soviet Union. In 2003, his actions would lead to the downfall of his regime and the institution of free elections in Georgia. Parliamentary elections in Early November of 2003 had a great number of seats up for grabs. The political landscape at the time saw such distrust of the Shevardnadze regime due to its intense corruption. Although these were not presidential elections, people took them as a decision on the future of Shevardnadze. If his party lost many seats, it would confirm the people’s distrust for his presidency and signal a shift in power. The election process ended with Shevardnadze being victorious. However, there were many reports alleging that the election results had been rigged. External election observers deemed the results wildly false and altered to depict Shevardnadze as the winner. In response to the allegations, Shevardnadze disputed rigging reports.

Mikheil Saakashvili, an opposition leader who had earlier resigned from Shevardnadze’s party due to his displeasure with corruption, claimed that his party had won the election, a result which independent observers supported. Saakashvili urged all Georgians to demonstrate non-violently against the Shevardnadze regime. Demonstrations began all over Georgia. Large groups of demonstrators (sometimes totaling over 25,000 people) protested periodically throughout the next couple of weeks for a repeat of the elections and the resignation of Shevardnadze. On the 4th of November, citizens held large rallies in protest of the election results. Saakashvili, leader of the United National Movement (UNM), called upon all opposition forces to "join up." Other rallies were planned to occur in the towns of Zugdidi, Telavi, and Gori. And opposition groups held another set of large rallies on the 8th of November. Two days later, thousands more gathered for a protest rally outside the parliamentary building where Shevardnadze had been meeting with leaders of the opposition.

The largest demonstration occurred on the 14th of November when between 20,000 and 30,000 took to the streets and gathered around the presidential building, chanting and dancing. In response to the massive unrest, Shevardnadze went on television and made a call for peace, warning that a civil war could be a possibility. NGOs played a large role (as did American billionaire George Soros by donating millions) helping to organize the protests. While the protesters occasionally clashed with military forces, the protesters responded by giving the soldiers roses or kisses. Eventually, even some of the elite military forces stood in opposition to the current regime. The final protest occurred on the 24th of November when protesters stormed the new session of parliament. Protesters carried red roses as they interrupted the parliamentary session. Saakashvili raised his rose in the air shouting “Resign!” in the face of the illegitimate leader, presenting it to him. The breach caused bodyguards of the president to evacuate him. It also prompted Russian politicians to set up a meeting with Shevardnadze regime and the opposition. Following the meeting, Shevardnadze announced his resignation.

In the upcoming weeks, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in which Saakashvili’s party won the majority. Throughout the entire campaign, demonstrators remained nonviolent. Research Notes Georgia's 'Rose Revolution Political Science Student at Tbilisi State University; Member of International Association for Political Science Students; Member of Youth for International Socialism; November 23, 2003 was a very significant day in the history of Georgia. For the first time in Georgian history a revolution took place in the old southern Caucasus state. About 100,000 people forced Shevardnadze to resign. Shevardnadze's regime failed and a new era was opened in Georgia; an era without Shevardnadze and without his politics. Eduard Shevardnadze and Georgia before the "Rose Revolution" Eduard Shevardnadze was born to a poor family in a little village in Georgia called Mamati, January 26, 1928. His father, a teacher, did not earn enough money to feed the family, including Eduard and his three brothers and one sister. Shevardadze remembered that when he was a child he did not even have shoes for the walk to school.

His friends also say that Eduard was a very poor child who was always hungry. During his child hood he worked as a post man, and used to read many newspapers. Eduard's father, Ambrosi Shevardnadze always noted that Eduard would become a great man who would one day govern the country. When Eduard was about 17 years old, he decided to enroll in medicine. He was step-by step building himself a good future. He then took an important position in a communist office in Kutaisi, the second largest city in Georgia. At the same time he enrolled in the Faculty of History, his second specialty. He then moved from Kutaisi to Tblisi, the capital of Georgia, and worked in various positions of the Communist Party. He then became the Minister of Internal Affairs, and then became the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, becoming the number one man in Georgia. He eventually received the post of Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR, the second in command next to Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Shevardnadze then resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the December 21, 1991, the USSR collapsed. During his activities in the USSR, Shevardnadze demonstrated that he needed 'Marxism-Leninism' and the Communist Party in order to create a good political career for himself. The truth of the matter was that he was not a defender of Marxism-Leninism and that he was a very ambitious politician who was involved in bribery. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia held presidential elections. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a writer and strong anti-communist was elected president. Unfortunately, Zviad Gamskhurdia could not govern the country. There were many reasons for this, among which were his Nazism and his lack of ability to play the political game. He also appointed uneducated and people incapable of doing anything to very important positions in the government. It should be noted that Gamskhurdia himself was an intellectual, but also a person whose government caused many problems in Georgia. The situation soon became difficult. Civil war erupted in Abkhazia, an autonomous region of Georgia, which demanded independence.

The civil war is a black spot on recent Georgian history. Georgians were killing one another and the level of destabilization was very high. Gamskhurdia, time and time again, lost control of state power and his government eventually collapsed. He left Tblisi and his place of living was unknown. Some thought that he was in the North Caucasus, but he had in fact died in Jikhashkari, a village in western Georgia. According to official information, he had committed suicide. After the withdrawal of Gamskhurdia, the opposition came to state power. A military council governed the state under the leadership of Jaba Ioseliani. Jaba Ioseliana and his supporters contacted Shevardnadze in Moscow, and asked him to return to Georgia to become the head of state. Shevardnadze agreed and arrived in Georgia in February 1992. In the fall he became the head of state, and at the same time a tragic war erupted in Abkhazia. Georgia lost many young citizens in the course of the war and eventually lost its territorial unity. Shevardnadze worked hard to create stability.

In 1995 an assassination attempt was made on his life, but he survived. Shevardnadze arrested Jaba Ioseliani as an organizer of this act of terror. He also tried to arrest Igor Giorgadze, who was the Minister of State Security, whom Shevardnadze claimed had been involved in the assassination attempt. Giorgadze fled Georgia and was declared the number one terrorist in the country by Shevzrdnadze. Giorgadze has been sought by Interpol since 1995. In August 1995, the parliament of Georgia approved a new constitution which was to be the Georgian model of western style democracy. Parliamentary elections were held in the same year and Shevardnadze's party, the "Citizens' Union of Georgia", took first place. Presidential elections also took place and Shevardnadze became the president for a five - year term. Shevardnadze declared that Georgia's foreign orientation would be pro-Western. He also claimed that Georgia was entering a new era - an era of democracy.

Both elections were rigged but the US and its western allies did not say a thing, because Shevardnadze was the go - to - man in Georgia. The economy began to improve under Shevardnadze. The years 1996-1997 were not bad years for Georgia. During this time the budgetary system was more proper. Georgia also developed NGOs and became a strategic state for the US in the Caucasus region. The Georgian state sent out many foreign delegations and investments and grants were increased both to the state and to NGOs. However, Georgia still had many problems such as corruption and improper management. From 1997 on, the situation hadn't really improved and the level of corruption increased. Shevardnadze helped create a strong oligarchy and his family came into great wealth. There were however not many problems in foreign policy. In 1999, Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe. The population still lived in poverty and social problems were becoming quite severe. For any state it is important to feed its people and to not blatantly fill the pockets of oligarchs and officials, who in Georgia had helped Shevardnadze to come to power.

The US was aware of everything that was going on but again was silent. In 1999, parliamentary elections were held and the Citizens' Union yet again gained first place. These elections were also rigged and the US still did nothing. In 2000, presidential elections were held and Shevardnadze became president for a second term. Georgia was in a state of regression from 2000-2003. Bribery became the main force in politics. Un-professionals were appointed to key posts in the government and the oligarchy became stronger. The level of poverty was becoming quite high and people began to detest Shevardnadze. From 2000-2003, Zurab Zhvania and Mikhail Saakashvili became the main force of opposition to Shevardnadze. Zhvania was the Chairman of Parliament who had resigned and Saakashvili was Shevardnadze's former supporter. Saakashvili also formed a new political party called the "National Movement", and quickly became Shevardnadze's number one enemy.

The Creation and Activities of the student movement "KMARA" ("ENOUGH") "KMARA" was created by the students of the Tbilisi State University and was the Georgian version of the Serbian "OTPOR". On April 14, 2003, KMARA announced its formation and held a demonstration of 300 students. The demonstration began at the State university and continued to the President's office. KMARA activists carried Georgia's former Soviet flags in their hands and burned them near the President's office. There were also pictures of Shevardnadze and his supporters on these flags. KMARA was sponsored by the infamous financier George Soros. His foundation in Georgia was called the "Open Society - Georgia Foundation" and was anti-Shevardnadze. This organization financed KMARA. The main goal of KMARA was the removal of Shevardnadze by peaceful means. This movement held a number of demonstrations against Shevardnadze's government. KMARA had many posters which exclaimed "ENOUGH". KMARA did have its problems though, and it was a problem of neutrality. A very well-known anti-Shevardnadze NGO in Georgia was the "Liberty Institute", and activists of KMARA were subordinated to this institution.

In turn, the Liberty Institute was subordinated to Georgia's two main opposition parties: the National Movement and the united Democrats. The Liberty Institute was the founder of KMARA and controlled its finances. The movement was initially progressive but it became very ugly and many anti-intellectuals became part of the movement by the middle and end periods of its activity. KMARA was also supported by other non-politicians. There were various groups of singers and writers who supported it, for example. This decision to support KMARA was a wrong one. KMARA was also the strongest pro-American movement. It was greatly influenced by American organizations and pro-Western NGOs in Georgia. During the electoral campaign KMARA urged the population to vote in the elections. Its leading activists believed that Shevardnadze would rig the elections and that KMARA and the opposition parties, along with the people, could go through with a revolution to oust Shevardnadze - they wanted a repeat of Serbian events in Georgia. The Georgian Opposition Parties There were many opposition parties in Georgia before the Rose Revolution. These included the National Movement, the United Democrats, the New Rightists, the Labour Party, and Unity.

There were also two other so-called opposition parties: The Union of Democratic Revival of Georgia, which was lead by Aslan Abashidze, the head of the autonomous republic of Ajara. He had formerly been in opposition to Shevardnadze but was in reality one of his biggest supporters. The second was called Industry Will Save Georgia". Leaders of this party were businessmen who claimed to be in opposition to Shevardnazde but in reality they supported him. The US and its allies greatly supported two real opposition parties: the National Movement and the United Democrats. The leader of the National Movement, today a candidate for the presidency of Georgia, was Mikhail Saakashvili. Saakashvili, who is a very young politician, received his education in the US as well as in some European countries, and as great of a name both in Georgia and abroad. Saakashvili was a member of the Georgian parliament some years ago. He was also at one time the head of the parliamentary faction of the Citizens' Union of Georgia. He was a Shevardnadze supporter, and was appointed the minister of Justice in Shevardnadze's administration.

Eventually, as a mark of protest against Shevardnadze, he resigned and became a Member of Parliament from Vake (Tbilisi). Saakashvili created a political movement called the "National Movement", which formed a faction in parliament. From 2002 on, Saakashvili increased his detestation of Shevardnadze. He always noted in his public speeches that Shevardnadze was a symbol of evil and that he had helped some attain wealth while the levels of poverty were rising greatly in Georgia. Saakashvili also confronted many other high officials involved in bribery that supported Shevardnadze. He promised society that he would arrest all individuals that were destroying Georgia. In 2002 Georgia held elections of local self-governmental bodies and Saakashvili along with his party won. Saakashvili, who had promised Tbilisi that he would develop the economy and would increase the level of well being in the area, left parliament and became the Chairman of the Tbilisi City Assembly. He increasingly criticized Shevardnadze and his popularity with the people was improving greatly.

The United Democrats was the second largest opposition party in Georgia, the head of which was Zurab Zhvania, who was the Chairman of Parliament from 1995 until 2001, and was during this time a Shevardnadze supporter. Zhvania left his post as Chairman in 2001 and moved into opposition. Like the National Movement, the United Democrats was pro-American in orientation and was strongly supported by the US and Geroge Soros. Zhvania did not have as great of a name as Saakashvili, but he knew how to play the political game and won support from the White House. Zhvania criticized Shevardnadze but was not quite as radical as Saakashvili. He was in favour of being constructive and has close relations with strong figures in Georgia. After Zhvania, Mrs. Nino Burdjanadze became the Chairman of Parliament. She was a member of Zhvania's political team and the daughter of a famous Georgian businessman and the wife of a Georgian high official.

In the months leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2003, Burdjanadze officially declared that she supported Zhvania and became on e of the leaders of the United Democrats. During the pre-election campaign the United Democrats were renamed and became a block called the "Burdjanadze-Democrats. Burdjanadze became a top figure in the party. Zhvania played very cleverly. He was not formally the leader but was in fact deciding everything. He was used to controlling not only his own party but also many pro-American organization in Georgia. The other opposition parties such as the Labour Party, the New Rightists, and Unity turned out not to be a strong opposition and also found themselves in opposition to the National Movement and the United Democrats. Shevardnadze had his own political block in the parliamentary elections which was called the "Block for New Georgia". The leaders of the new block were very horrible high state officials and included those members of parliament whose hatred of the population was demonstrated by their dirty political and financial activities.

Shevardnadze also found support in the Union of Democratic Revival, Abashidze's party, which was a formal opposition party only to become Shevardnadze supporter during the revolutionary days. This regime was also supported by Industry Will Save Georgia. It is important that there were not and still are not any real leftist, centrist, or right - wing parties in Georgia. The Labour Party is formally leftist but in reality is not, because it includes many oligarchs and anti-intellectuals. The New Rightists do not also represent a genuine right-wing party. The Media and NGOs before the Rose Revolution Anti-Shevardnadze TV stations, the press, and NGOs were very active before the Rose Revolution. The TV station "Rustavi2, which was strongly pro-American, had struggled against Shevardnadze for many years. The newspaper "24 hours" was anti-Shevardnadze because the owner of the newspaper, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, is also the owner of "Rustavi2". Along with truthful information "Rustavi2" also disseminated lies for many years. It is a commercial organization sponsored by the US and is carrying out Western interests in Georgia.

It can be said that the TV station did not search for the truth. Shevardnadze's media support came from the television station "Channel 1". It was very ugly TV because it served Shevardnadze and was reporting on how good he was. This of course is a great lie. There were many NGOs that struggled against Shevardnadze; all of which were sponsored by the Soros Foundation, UNDP, USAID and other Western foundations and organizations. Leaders of such NGOs were the Liberty Insti tute, whose leaders were very popular figures but most people could not stand them. The Liberty Institute was a very ugly NGO. It was developing a strongly anti-Marxist campaign in Georgia and it compared Shevardnadze with Karl Marx. This of course points to the anti-intellectualism in the Liberty Institute. It also prepared many reports for the US, providing improper information regarding the rights of national minoritie s and religious rights in Georgia. They did this for money. In the pre-revolutionary processes the Soros Foundation played the greatest role with support of the NGOs. The NGOs struggled minute by minute against Shevardnadze, but unfortunately this was not a struggle for a better life in Georgia.

I am afraid that it was a struggle to gain a lot of money. Parliamentary Elections in Georgia On November 2, 2003, Georgia held parliamentary elections. The Central Election Commission was controlled by Shevardnadze. This election was of great political importance for the political situation in Georgia. On November 2, the NGO "Fair Elections" began a parallel counting of votes. This was sponsored by the West. Exit polls were also applied. Rustavi2 contracted the Global Strategic Group USA to take the exit poll results. The government was against the use of exit polls by any organization and tried to break down, in vain, this decision of Rustavi2. In contrast, the government contacted the PR group Nikolo M., who contracted the Austrian sociological group Sora with taking exit poll results. By the evening the exit poll results were different from one another. Global Strategic Group said that the winner was the National Movement and Sora claimed that the government block had won. After two weeks the Central election Commission published the results of the elections from first place to last: the government block, the Union of Democratic Revival, the National Movement, the Labour Party, the Burdjanadze Democrats, and the New Rightists.

Fair Elections also published the results of parallel counting: the National Movement, the government block, the Labour Party, the United Democrats, the Union of Democratic Revival. The opposition was angry and they warned Shevardnadze to change the results and to recognize the results of Fair Elections and the victory of the National Movement. Saakashvili, Burdjanadze, and Zhvania met with Shevardnadze, but nothing came from this meeting. Shevardnadze said that he didn't know what had happened and that his party had won. Opposition parties held a number of demonstrations as a warning to Shevardnadze and denounced the results of the Central Election Commission. Then the opposition and KMARA halted all demonstrations for three days. The opposition was gathering people from all parts of Georgia. The demonstrations were then renewed on November 20, 21, 22 where about 100,000 people were demanding the resignation of Shevardnadze.

Mikhail Saakashvili declared that all negotiations with the president had been stopped and that they now had only one demand: 100,000 people cried "Resign; Go Home!" The streets of Tbilisi were filled by the largest number of people - people who were fed up with Shevardnadze and his regime. The government ordered the Armed Forces and the police to defend constitutional order. The streets of Tbilisi were also gulled by thousands of armed soldiers. Shevardnadze tried to stay at his post, but it was too late - the Revolution was over. November 23: the Birthday of the Rose Revolution and the Death of the Shevardnadze Regime On the morning of November 23 the demonstrations became larger. Students, professors/teachers, workers, and many other youngsters as well as older people were demanding the resignation of Shevardnadze. The opposition and KMARA were of course active, but KMARA was just a little group of protesters. There were many people and it was they who were the force of the Revolution and not the opposition parties and KMARA. An emergency situation was declared in Georgia. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs met with protesters and supported them.

Mikhail Saakashvili and other leaders of the opposition parties stressed that Shevardnadze was finished and that he would resign in a few hours. By the afternoon the situation was out of control. People moved to the President's office and soldiers could not provide any resistance. Tbilisi was visited by many foreign journalists and the situation in Georgia was covered by CNN, the BBC, and other well known TV stations. Saakashvili gave an interview to CNN. The US supported the opposition. By the afternoon Saakashvili entered parliament where the new parliament was in session and spoke to Shevardnadze. Saakashvili and some people entered parliament and told Shevardnadze to go home. Shevardnadze left the building under guard. Some members of parliament were beaten by people. By the evening Saakashvili said that if Shevardnadze would not resign, the people would go to his residence. The process was really uncontrolled. The streets of Tbilisi were paralyzed. Not even God could stop the people. Soldiers and policemen stood aside. Shevardnadze stayed alone and the many governmental supporters left Tbilisi.

Saakashvili visited Shevardnadze and after speaking with him,Saakashvili said that the President of Georgia had resigned and that a Rose Revolution had taken place in Georgia. People were very happy. The streets of Tbilisi were filled with many happy people. Everyone was drinking, singing and dancing. Georgia celebrated the withdrawal of Shevardnadze who had governed Georgia for many years, and who could also not build a democratic state. Georgia after the Rose Revolution On November 24 the world was informed that a Rose Revolution had taken place in Georgia and that Shevardnadze had resigned. According to the Constitution of Georgia, the Chairman of Parliament, Nino Burdjanadze, was to become the head of state. Burdjanadze is now the interim President of Georgia. Many events have taken place since November 23 and many things have changed. The Opposition came to power, Zurab Zhvania became the Minister of State, and a member of the United Democrats became the Minister of Internal Affairs. Shevardnadze stayed in Georgia and began to write his memoirs. Several state officials left their posts and have left Tbilisi. Some people were arrested.

The US expressed its support for the Opposition and it is now clear that the US supported the Rose Revolution. It is very good that corrupt officials have left their posts. All government bodies, executive, legislative, and judicial are now subordinate to the government. There are still problems such as the fact that the Liberty Institute along with the Soros Foundation and the US embassy are actually governing the country. Some people who are well known as being corrupt have been appointed to important positions. Georgia's coffers are empty and the government cannot pay its salaries. Many young ambitious, anti-intellectual, and pro-American people have become high officials. On January 4, Georgia will hold new presidential elections. The candidate of the Opposition is Mikhail Saakashvili. Saakashvili is saying that a new era will begin in Georgia - an era of prosperity. But does Georgia stand a chance of achieving it? I don't think there is an answer, and if we look at the current situation, I think that the promises of the Rose Revolution will stay just that - promises. So I think that prosperity and the well being of the people lies in their own hands and with Saakashvili. People must not allow him to be a governer such as Shevardnadze was.

The majority are going to vote for Saakashvili, but they must know the words of John Lennon who said that we must create our life our selves, and not rely on presidents. Let's see what will happen. You are here: Georgia: Flags used during the Rose Revolution (November 2003) This page is part of © FOTW Flags Of The World website Georgia: Flags used during the Rose Revolution (November 2003) Georgia Historical outline The so-called "Rose Revolution" led to the ousting of former President Shevernadze. The revolution started in the beginning of November following elections considered as rigged by the opposition and ended on 22 November with taking over of the Parliament by the opposition and Shevarnadze's resignation. His main opponent, Mikhail Saakashvili, was elected President of Georgia on 4 January 2004. Ivan Sache, 24 January 2004 National Movement Flag of National Movement - Image by Željko Heimer, 23 November 2003 The flag with the five crosses has been used for about three years by the opposition coalition led by Mikhail Saakashvili, called National Movement.

Jaume Ollé, 23 November 2003 This flag became the national flag on Georgia on 14 January 2004. More details on its disputed origin can be read on the Georgia main page . Ivan Sache, 24 January 2004 Kmara! Flag of Kmara! - Image by Victor Lomantsov, 1 December 2003 The flag of the youth movement Kmara! (That's enough!), here reconstructed from a photography, is a white flag with a white fist on black disc above the name of the movement, კმარა! set in black lowercase Georgian serif letters. Victor Lomantsov & António Martins, 1 December 2003 The flag of Kmara! is strikingly similar to the Otpor flag. Otpor (Resistance) is the students' movement that significantly contributed to the fall of Milošević, in Serbia. According to Courrier International #682 (27 November 2003), a member of Otpor said to the Serbian radio B92 that the Georgian students have been trained by Otpor.

The Hungarian daily Nepszabadsag stated that the students of Otpor had themselves been trained by American experts in Hungary. It was reported that a national flag of Georgia was displayed in December 2004 during the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. It was also said that the students' movement Pora was supported by the Georgian movement Kmara!. In a paper dated 11 February 2005 and published on the Café Babel website, the free-lance journalist Sébastien Daycard-Heid explains that there is an important Georgian community in Ukraine, mostly made of students. The Georgian flag was hoisted on a tent neighbouring the tent commemorating the Georgian journalist Georgiy Gongadze. The journalist worked in Ukraine, where he was murdered in 2000. The affair was never elucidated but video tapes implicating former President Kutschma and former Prime Minister Yanukovitch circulated in the country and contributed to the uprising. Daycard-Heid reports also that some demonstrators hold an orange rose, as a symbol of Georgian solidarity with the Ukrainian revolution.

Ivan Sache, 6 September 2005 Unidentified flags Unidentified flag - Image by Jaume Ollé, 22 November 2003 This flag was seen on the Catalan TV channel 3/24, showing live images from the Parliament square in Tiflis, on 22 November 2003, 3 AM. Jaume Ollé, 22 November 2003 Two unidentified flags - Images by Ilya Kartashov, 24 November 2003 Yet another unidentified flag - Image by Ivan Sache, 24 November 2003 These flags, which use the colours of the (then) Georgian national flag , were seen in news reports on Russian channels ORT, RTR and NTV I on 22 and 23 November 2003. Mikhail Revnivtsev, 24 November 2003 On The World on BBC4 TV on 11 June 2004 there was a long interview with Nino Burjanadze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, who was visiting London.

Ms Burjanadze came to notice outside Georgia during the "Rose Revolution" when she acted as President after the resignation of President Shevardnadze. The interview was illustrated with clips from that time. An image shows a yellow flag with a symbol. There was also a white flag being waved vigorously which I'm sure was that of Kmara! , though the logo was on a white background in the centre circle, and not, as we have it, on a black background. André Coutanche, 15 June 2004 Georgia's Rose Revolution | The Huffington Post Georgia's Rose Revolution 11/24/2015 11:03 am ET | Updated Nov 24, 2016 ADST American Diplomacy, Warts and All Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991; Eduard Shevardnadze was chosen as Georgia's second president in 1995. Several bloody conflicts wracked the young country early on, such as a stunning military defeat by a separatist movement in the region of Abkhazia and ethnic violence in the region of South Ossetia.

During this time, Shevardnadze's government faced many charges of corruption and steadily declined in support and popularity. The instability during Shevardnadze's presidency led to poverty and economic stagnation, which, coupled frustration with the government, led to a widespread desire for change. On November 2nd, 2003, elections were held for the Georgian Parliament. These elections were seen as crucial for laying the groundwork for the 2005 presidential election, during which Georgians hoped to elect someone who could move the country forward. It was suspected that Shevardnadze rigged the elections in his party's favor, and non-violent protests broke out on November 3, 2003, following the announcement of the election results. This "Rose Revolution," so called for the roses protestors carried, resulted in the resignation of Shevardnadze and new elections being held the following January. Mikheil Saakashvili, a prominent politician and leader of the movement, ran unopposed and was inaugurated on January 25th, 2004. Richard Miles served as the U.S. Ambassador to Georgia from 2002 to 2005. Read the entire Moment here .

"You had to pay bribes to accomplish the most simple thing" MILES: In 2002, people were not really looking for street action nor were they engaged in conspiracies to oust Shevardnadze. They were going through the motions of the democratic system but with the idea that change was still a year and a half or two years away. In 2002, crime and corruption were rampant. You had to pay bribes to accomplish the most simple thing, policemen were not paid basically. A police or Customs Officer job was considered a license to steal. Policemen would buy their jobs from the local police chief or the regional police chief or the Minister, depending on how high up the job was, and he would then buy his uniform and his equipment, such as it was, and then he would collect bribes. Physical conditions in the hospitals, clinics and schools were unbelievably bad. No electricity, no heat, no running water; children and the teachers would have to go out and use an outhouse in the back. Buildings not painted or repaired for 10 years; the windows broken and replaced with a piece of cardboard.

Each child, every day, had to bring in a couple of sticks of firewood to fuel the fire in this little tin stove to heat the class room that day. In order to get medical care, you would pay the doctor directly -- you'd bribe the doctor in essence to provide you with a little bit of medical care, and your family would bring food for you and maybe a brazier and some charcoal to the hospital ward for a tiny bit of heat.... The issue was Shevardnadze's willingness to implement the decisions that he had made and by the stage of his career when we were together from 2002 to 2003 he either was no longer capable of implementing unpleasant decisions, unpopular decisions or really unwilling to. That's one of the major reasons why you had this enormous feeling of hopelessness on the part not only of the population, but even on the part of the Members of Parliament, even the leaders of the Parliament, his own ministers, his own personal staff; the feeling of hopelessness was absolutely and totally pervasive and depressing as hell.

The Beginning of the End: The 2003 Parliamentary Elections Q: The fraudulent election of 2003 -- how did we see that at the time and what happened? MILES: That is what brought the Shevardnadze government down, basically. This was the regularly scheduled parliamentary election. And it's a real Parliament; it's not a rubber stamp in Georgia. We felt as the Georgians felt, that the November 2003 parliament election was a rehearsal for the presidential elections in April 2005 and so we wanted to do everything we could to get the Georgian authorities to run an open and honest and decent election. It didn't have to be perfect but it should be something like our own elections, except for Florida I guess, and we really went at it hammer and tongs. We spent a lot of U.S. taxpayer money on this process -- I'll give some examples. We set up an Election Advisory Committee of all the ambassadors who were interested in this issue and we included the Russian and the Chinese ambassadors if they wanted to come. The Russian ambassador would come from time to time, never did anything, but he'd attend from time to time. I never saw the Chinese ambassador but he was invited....

This wasn't an American thing, in other words. We involved the EC [European Commission], we involved the UNDP, UN Development Programme people there, we had the European Commission representative, we got the British and the others to provide a fair amount of money. We organized a massive campaign to rectify the voter registration list. That list was just a bloody mess and so through USAID we rented a huge, vacant building, like a gymnasium; we filled it up with tables and chairs, computers, of course, and then we hired a small army of young people who would sit and type these lists precinct by precinct into the computer in a way in which you could cross-check names. The result was a pretty useable list. That cost over $1 million; I think $1.8 million or something to do all that. Now, I have to confess that, in the end, these lists were often ignored by the various election commissions -- they preferred "their" lists which were easy to manipulate. But where you had a more progressive set of local election officials or a certain balance in the local electorate, then the lists were a wonderful asset.

We provided training, which we do in a lot of countries, but we did a lot of it in Georgia. It didn't matter which political party -- the government party, the opposition parties, the radical parties -- we would provide training for them, for election workers, even for people working in the political campaign. How do you run a political campaign? How do you organize a political rally? And so on. How do you do media? We organized working visits to the United States but we also had U.S. experts coming to Georgia. We had a leading American expert on exit polls come to Georgia and help set up a professional exit polling system for Georgia so everyone would have a rough count of how the election was looking as the day went on. This proved quite valuable when I had my conversations with Shevardnadze after Election Day. "Shevardnadze thought this fuss over the election would blow over and that he would be able to get away with this" Then Election Day came. And actually the first returns on election morning indicated that things were going smoothly but then it got worse during the day and it was clear that the election wasn't going well.

The exit polls showed that the opposition parties were winning the majority of the seats in the Parliament, not one opposition party but two or three opposition parties, which all together would have developed a majority in the Parliament, and Shevardnadze's government party was coming in third or fourth and so they would have been relegated to a minority position in the Parliament, which they controlled up to that point. The situation got worse during the day and meanwhile there were 600 foreign observers there in a country of four and a half million people; that's a lot of observers. And they issued a scathing report. My own people reported some of the weird things which they had seen. I went out and looked at a few polling places myself; it was just a debacle.

It was too obvious, too massive, too well documented by the foreign observers and the Georgian observers, too much at odds with the rather scientific exit polling which had been done, and Shevardnadze ran up against a very determined and dedicated and intelligent opposition in the form of [Mikheil] Saakashvili, the [future] President, but also backed up by Nino Burjanadze, the Speaker of the Parliament, and by Zurab Zhvania, who later became Prime Minister, who had been in the government before and had fallen out with Shevardnadze. And the three of them called for a rally of their supporters down in the main city square of Tbilisi. A lot of people turned out, and to make a long story short they stayed for a month down there during very bad weather; this was already November. Tbilisi has relatively mild winters but it does snow and blow and it can get pretty damn cold and unpleasant. And the people stayed through all that. The organizers were very good at changing the venue slightly, bringing in entertainment, declaring, "Okay, we're going to take a day off.

Everybody go home and have a shower and a hot bath if you can and drink some tea and come back the next day and we'll do this again" and so on. And Shevardnadze just wasn't willing to compromise. "Saakashvili saw the moment and in an astute, if demagogic, political move, began immediately to call for Shevardnadze's resignation" Saakashvili, in contrast to the other leaders of the opposition, had immediately called for Shevardnadze's resignation. Now, this was a parliamentary election and, logically the Georgians really should have focused on correcting the parliamentary election and worried about the presidency later, because after all the presidential election was set for April 2005 --only a year and a half away. But Saakashvili saw the moment and in an astute, if demagogic, political move, began immediately to call for Shevardnadze's resignation. Neither Burjanadze nor Zhvania had planned to appear continuously at the demonstrations downtown. But they simply couldn't break away --the demonstrations were simply too big and too enduring -- so they began to reappear more frequently than they had planned.

People were already fed up with the Shevardnadze administration. They were unhappy over the poor collection of revenues, the abysmal state of the infrastructure, the failure to pay salaries and pensions and the increase in crime and corruption, and they responded to Saakashvili's repeated demand for Shevardnadze's resignation and so there began to be increasing pressure on Shevardnadze, not just to rectify the election but to resign. In the end it was quite non-violent, quite bloodless. This was the Rose Revolution. It was a major political development and all achieved bloodlessly. [The roses were] a kind of a gimmick, actually the idea of Mark Mullen, of the National Democratic Institute. I expect he was as surprised as anyone to see the way in which this became the symbol of the democratic movement in Georgia. But it was designed to demonstrate the non-violent nature of the opposition. Amazing, the over-sized role such gestures can assume. In the last days just before Shevardnadze resigned, the opposition leaders called on their supporters to march on the Parliament building. Shevardnadze had decided to open the Parliament based on the fraudulent returns.

Predictably, the opposition declared this an illegitimate Parliament, refused to attend the session and had then marched on the Parliament in a demonstrative way, carrying roses as a symbol of non-violence -- you know, "We're not carrying guns, we're not carrying clubs, we are carrying roses." And as the opposition leaders approached the Parliament, and Shevardnadze was already in there speaking, the ranks of the uniformed policemen opened like Moses parting the Red Sea and the demonstrators poured into the Parliament building waving their red roses and declaring that this is an illegal Parliament and people should disperse and go home.... Shevardnadze was hustled out by his security guards, Saakashvili took the podium, the rostrum, and ceremoniously drank the tea out of Shevardnadze's glass that had been left sitting there on the rostrum and declared that the people have taken power, or whatever, and then everybody went home. They actually stayed around the building for a while but basically they went home....

"Some guy in the Parks Department had some very serious fireworks; the instant that resignation was announced, poom, off into the air went these fireworks" That evening, as usual for the past month, there were tens of thousands of people out in the streets of Tbilisi. This was late at night; I was at the Embassy with the team, and you began to hear this roar. We were close enough to where the people were to hear the roar of the crowd and at the same time they were broadcasting the news on the TV and on the radio and simultaneously, and I don't know what insightful civil servant had thought about this, but fireworks broke out. I mean, I'm talking about the kind of big fireworks that you have on the mall here on the Fourth of July. So some guy in the parks department had somehow managed to get his hands on some very serious fireworks and the instant that resignation was announced, poom, off into the air went these fireworks. It was a pretty amazing thing, really. [Presidential elections were held.] We were very supportive of the new government. [Inauguration in photo]...

And then after that, because the government immediately embarked on a serious reform program, and I'm not saying they did that perfectly...but it was so vastly superior to what the Shevardnadze government had done that there was no question that we would support these efforts and would be very helpful to them in the process. So we began doing things that we would not have dreamed of doing before with Shevardnadze. Follow ADST on Twitter: More:

Question: In which country in 2003 was the 'Rose Revolution'?
Answer: GEORGIA