Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre - Aug 24, 1572 - HISTORY.com Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre Share this: Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre Author Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre URL Publisher A+E Networks King Charles IX of France, under the sway of his mother, Catherine de Medici, orders the assassination of Huguenot Protestant leaders in Paris, setting off an orgy of killing that results in the massacre of tens of thousands of Huguenots all across France. Two days earlier, Catherine had ordered the murder of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, a Huguenot leader whom she felt was leading her son into war with Spain. However, Coligny was only wounded, and Charles promised to investigate the assassination in order to placate the angry Huguenots. Catherine then convinced the young king that the Huguenots were on the brink of rebellion, and he authorized the murder of their leaders by the Catholic authorities. Most of these Huguenots were in Paris at the time, celebrating the marriage of their leader, Henry of Navarre, to the king’s sister, Margaret.

A list of those to be killed was drawn up, headed by Coligny, who was brutally beaten and thrown out of his bedroom window just before dawn on August 24. Once the killing started, mobs of Catholic Parisians, apparently overcome with bloodlust, began a general massacre of Huguenots. Charles issued a royal order on August 25 to halt the killing, but his pleas went unheeded as the massacres spread. Mass slaughters continued into October, reaching the provinces of Rouen, Lyon, Bourges, Bourdeaux, and Orleans. An estimated 3,000 French Protestants were killed in Paris, and as many as 70,000 in all of France. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew’s Day marked the resumption of religious civil war in France. Related Videos The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre King from 1556 to 1598. Gregory XIII (1572 to 1585) Francis Borgia (1510 -1572). Jesuit general from 1565 to 1572.

The future Pope Gregory served as a legate to Philip II of Spain, being sent by Pope Pius V to investigate the Cardinal of Toledo. It was there that he formed a lasting and close relationship with the Spanish king, and the groundwork was laid for the extermination of the French Protestants. Don Francis Borgia was the great-grandson of Pope Alexander VI and co-founder of the Jesuits with Ignatius LIEola. On his mother's side he was descended from King Ferdinand of Aragon. King Philip II was the most bigoted fanatic that ever counted beads or crossed himself before a crucifix. It was said that the only time he ever laughed was when he heard the report of the infamous massacre: "But nothing could exceed the satisfaction which the event occasioned in the mind of Philip the Second. There was an end now of all assistance from the French Government to the Netherlands Protestants. "The news of the events upon St. Bartholomew's Day," wrote the French envoy at Madrid, St. Goard, to Charles IX., "arrived on the 7th September.

The King, on receiving the intelligence, showed, contrary to his natural custom, so much gaiety, that he seemed more delighted than with all the good fortune or happy incidents which had ever before occurred to him. He called all his familiars about him in order to assure them that your Majesty was his good brother, and that no one else deserved the title of Most Christian. He sent his secretary Cayas to me with his felicitations upon the event, and with the information that he was just going to St. Jerome to render thanks to God, and to offer his prayers that your Majesty might receive Divine support in this great affair. I went to see him next morning, and as soon as I came into his presence he began to laugh, and, with demonstrations of extreme contentment, to praise your Majesty as deserving your title of Most Christian, telling me there was no King worthy to be your Majesty's companion, either for valour or prudence.

He praised the steadfast resolution and the long dissimulation of so great an enterprise, which all the world would not be able to comprehend..." "I thanked him," continued the ambassador, "and I said that I thanked God for enabling your Majesty to prove to his Master that his apprentice had learned his trade, and deserved his title of Most Christian King. I added, that he ought to confess that he owed the preservation of the Netherlands to your Majesty." (The Rise of the Dutch Republic, vol. II, p. 483). The French Protestants were Les Misérables The work of extermination began suddenly in Paris with the ringing of church bells. Admiral Coligny—the Protestant leader—was stabbed and his body thrown out the window. French soldiers and the Roman Catholic clergy fell upon the unarmed people, and blood flowed like a river throughout the entire country. Men, women, and children fell in heaps before the mobs and the bloodthirsty troops. In one week, almost 100,000 Protestants perished. The rivers of France were so filled with corpses that for many months no fish were eaten.

In the valley of the Loire, wolves came down from the hills to feel upon the decaying bodies of Frenchmen. The list of massacres was as endless as the list of the dead! Many were imprisonedmany sent as slaves to row the king's shipsand some were able to escape to other countries. . . . The best and brightest people fled to Germany, Switzerland, England, Ireland and eventually the United States, and brought their incomparable manufacturing skills with them. . . . France was ruined. . . . Wars, famine, disease and poverty finally led to the French Revolutionthe guillotinethe Reign of Terrorthe fall of the Roman Catholic monarchyatheismcommunism, etc., etc. Scene from the massacre of the Huguenots in Paris. Blood flowed like a river on the streets of Paris. Pope Gregory was jubilant when news of the massacre reached the Vatican!! When news of the Massacre reached the Vatican, there was jubilation! Cannons roaredbells rungand a special commemorative medal was struckto honor the occasion!

The Pope commissioned Italian artist Vasari to paint a mural of the massacrewhich still hangs in the Vatican!! Medal struck by Pope Gregory XIII to commemorate the slaughter of over 100,000 French Christians!! Pope Gregory XIII had the great red dragon of Satan as his heraldic symbol! This is the same Pope Gregory XIII who MASSACERED the calendar in 1582 by omitting 11 days from the month of October. At the present time, the Gregorian calendar is used in most countries of the world. Editor's Note The Huguenots won a short period of relief from persecution with the ascension of Henry IV to the throne. The Edict of Nantes gave full freedom to his Protestants subjects. The signing of this Edict inaugurated an era of peace and great prosperity for France. However, for granting his subjects liberty of conscience, the king was stabbed to death by a Jesuit named Ravaillac. This Edict of Toleration was revoked in 1685, and a new storm of persecution ensued. The exodus began again with over a million Huguenots fleeing France to avoid certain torture and death.

The descendants of the survivors that reached the New World were determined that this tragedy should not occur here. Many of them were prominent in the founding of the country. They knew that an armed citizenry in France would have prevented this tragedy from ever happeningand as a resultthey gave us the First and Second Amendments to the Constitution. They knew that freedom of religion and an armed citizenry go hand in hand: Amendment 1 Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the PEOPLE peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Amendment 2 A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the PEOPLE to KEEP and bear arms, shall not be infringed. The French Protestants were called Huguenots: President George Washington had a Huguenot ancestor, as did at least 4 other Presidents: John Adams, John Quincy Adams, John Tyler, James Garfield.

A Huguenot refugee named Apollos de Revoire settled in Boston, and had a son who signed his name Paul Revere....Three members of the Continental Congress—Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Elias Boudinot were Huguenots. Other great names include Francis Marrion, General George Patton, Clair Chennault, Admiral Dewey, Du Ponts, Henry Thoreau, Longfellow etc., etc. References Gray, Janet Glenn. The French Huguenots, Anatomy of Courage. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1981. Motley, John Lothrop. The Rise of the Dutch Republic. (In 2 volumes). George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1889. Nogueres, Henri. The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew. Allen & Unwin, London, 1962. Roche, Owen I.A. The Days of the Upright; the Story of the Huguenots. C.N. Potter, New York, 1962.

Copyright © 2007 by Niall Kilkenny Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day | French history [1572] | Britannica.com Paris Massacre of Saint Bartholomew’s Day, (August 24/25, 1572), massacre of French Huguenots (Protestants) in Paris plotted by Catherine de Médicis and carried out by Roman Catholic nobles and other citizens. It was one event in the series of civil wars between Roman Catholics and Huguenots that beset France in the late 16th century. French Huguenots grieving after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day (August 24–25, 1572), … Hulton Archive/Getty Images The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day had for its background the political and religious rivalries of the court of France.

Admiral Gaspard II de Coligny , a Huguenot leader, supported a war in the Low Countries against Spain as a means to prevent a resumption of civil war, a plan that the French king, Charles IX , was coming to approve in the summer of 1572. Catherine de Médicis , the mother of Charles, feared Admiral Coligny’s growing influence over her son. She accordingly gave her approval to a plot that the Roman Catholic house of Guise had been hatching to assassinate Coligny, whom it held responsible for the murder of François de Guise in 1563. On Aug. 18, 1572, Catherine’s daughter, Margaret of France (Marguerite de Valois), was married to the Huguenot Henry of Navarre (the future Henry IV of France), and a large part of the Huguenot nobility came to Paris for the wedding. The attempt on Admiral Coligny’s life four days later failed; he was only wounded. To placate the angry Huguenots, the government agreed to investigate the assassination attempt.

Fearing discovery of her complicity, Catherine met secretly with a group of nobles at the Tuileries Palace to plot the complete extermination of the Huguenot leaders, who were still in Paris for the wedding festivities. Charles was persuaded to approve of the scheme, and, on the night of August 23, members of the Paris municipality were called to the Louvre and given their orders. Shortly before dawn on August 24 the bell of Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois began to toll and the massacre began. One of the first victims was Coligny, who was killed under the supervision of Henry de Guise himself. Even within the Louvre, Navarre’s attendants were slaughtered, though Navarre and Henry I de Bourbon, 2nd Prince de Conde, were spared. The homes and shops of Huguenots were pillaged, and their occupants brutally murdered; many bodies were thrown into the Seine. Bloodshed continued in Paris even after a royal order of August 25 to stop the killing, and it spread to the provinces. Huguenots in Rouen , Lyon , Bourges , Orléans , and Bordeaux were among the victims.

Estimates of the number that perished in the disturbances, which lasted to the beginning of October, have varied from 2,000 by a Roman Catholic apologist to 70,000 by the contemporary Huguenot Duke de Sully, who himself barely escaped death. Modern writers put the number at 3,000 in Paris alone. Similar Topics CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre Home > Catholic Encyclopedia > S > Saint Bartholomew's Day Saint Bartholomew's Day Help support New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download . Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more  all for only $19.99... This massacre of which Protestants were the victims occurred in Paris on 24 August, 1572 (the feast of St. Bartholomew ), and in the provinces of France during the ensuing weeks, and it has been the subject of knotty historical disputes.

The first point argued was whether or not the massacre had been premeditated by the French Court — Sismondi, Sir James Mackintosh, and Henri Bordier maintaining that it had, and Ranke, Henri Martin, Henry White, Loiseleur, H. de la Ferrière, and the Abbé Vacandard, that it had not. The second question debated was the extent to which the court of Rome was responsible for this outrage. At present only a few over-zealous Protestant historians claim that the Holy See was the accomplice of the French Court: this view implies their belief in the premeditation of the massacre, which is now denied by the majority of historians. For the satisfactory solution of the question it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the attempted murder of Coligny on 22 August and his assassination on the night of 23-24 August, and the general massacre of Protestants .

The idea of a summary execution of the Protestant leaders, which would be the means of putting an end to the civil discord that had caused three "religious wars " in France in 1562-1563, 1567-1568, and 1569-1570 respectively, had long existed in the mind of Catherine de' Medici , widow of Henry II and mother of the three successive kings, Francis II, Charles IX, and Henry III; it had also been entertained by her sons.

As early as 1560 Michaelis Suriano, the Venetian ambassador, wrote: "Francis II (1559-1560) wanted to fall upon the Protestant leaders, punish them without mercy and thus extinguish the conflagration." When, in 1565, Catherine de' Medici with her son Charles IX (1560-1574) and her daughters Margaret of Valois and Elizabeth, wife of Philip II, investigated the political and religious questions of the hour at the conferences of Bayonne , the Duke of Alba, who was present on these occasions, wrote to Philip II: "A way to be rid of the five, or at most six, who are at the head of the faction and direct it, would be to seize their persons and cut off their heads or at least to confine them where it would be impossible for them to renew their criminal plots." Just at that time Alava on his side confided to the same Spanish king this dark forecast, "I foresee that these heretics will be completely wiped out".

In 1569 Catholics and Protestants were in arms one against the other, and the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Carrero, remarked: "It is the common opinion that, in the beginning it would have sufficed to do away with five or six heads and no more". This same year Parliament promised a reward of 50,000 écus to whoever would apprehend the Admiral de Coligny (1517-72), leader of the Calvinist party, the king adding that this sum would be awarded to him who would deliver up the admiral either alive or dead. Maurevel tried to overtake the admiral for the purpose of killing him but instead only assassinated one of his lieutenants.

Thus we see that the idea of a summary execution of the leaders of Protestantism was in the air from 1560 to 1570; moreover it was conformable to the doctrine of political murder as it flourished during the sixteenth century when the principles of social morality and Christian politics elaborated by the theology of the Middle Ages , were replaced by the lay and half-pagan doctrine of Machiavellianism , proclaiming the right of the strongest or the most crafty. The peace signed at Saint-Germain, August, 1570, between the Court and the Protestants seemed to reestablish order. It was sanctioned by conferences held at La Rochelle in which on the one side a war was planned against Philip II, all the Calvinist nobility being supposed to enlist; and on the other, the marriage of Henry of Bourbon (the future King Henry IV ), a Calvinist and the son of Jeanne of Albret, with Margaret of Valois, sister of Charles IX.

On 12 September, 1571, the Admiral de Coligny came to Blois , where Charles IX resided, to superintend and further this new policy, and it would seem that just at that time the king was sincere in seeking the support of Coligny and the Protestants against Philip II. And Catherine de' Medici was shrewdly endeavouring to court favour on all sides. Upon hearing of Spain's victory at Lepanto (7 October, 1571), she remonstrated with Charles IX for his lack of policy in severing relations with Philip II; and in June, 1572, she tried to arrange a marriage between her third son, the Duke of Alençon, and the Protestant Elizabeth of England , and also made active preparations for the marriage of Margaret of Valois with Henry of Bourbon, taking every means to have it solemnized in Paris . Meanwhile Coligny, with money which Charles IX had given him unknown to Catherine, sent 4000 men to the relief of Mons, who was at the time besieged by the Duke of Alba.

They were beaten (11 July, 1572) and the Duke of Alba, having ascertained that Charles IX was instrumental in the attempt to defeat him, thenceforth entertained the most hostile feeling toward the French King. Charles IX, greatly irritated, made open preparations for war against Spain , relying on Coligny for assistance. Suddenly on 4 August, Catherine made her way to Charles IX, who was then hunting at Montripeau, and insisted that unless he would give up the conflict with Philip II she would withdraw to Florence , taking with her the Duke of Anjou. A conference was held and Coligny, with the idea of sustaining his co-religionists in Flanders , demanded war with Spain , but the council unanimously refused it. Then with rash audacity Coligny declared to the king and to Catherine that if war were not waged against Spain , another war might be expected. From this Catherine deduced that the Protestant party, with the admiral for spokesman, threatened the King of France with a religious war which would be the fourth within ten years.

At the time of the marriage of Henry of Bourbon and Margaret of Valois (18 August), the situation was as follows: on the one side were the Guises with their troops, and on the other Coligny and his musketeers, while Charles IX, although recognizing both parties, leaned more towards Coligny, and Catherine favoured the Guises with a view to revenging herself on Coligny and recovering her influence over Charles IX. Just at this time Philip II was of the opinion that the King of France should strike a decisive blow against the Protestants , and we have proof of this in a letter written to Cardinal Come, Secretary of State to Gregory XIII , by the Archbishop of Rossano , nuncio in Spain . Wrote the nuncio : The King (Philip II) bids me say that if his Most Christian Majesty means to purge his kingdom of its enemies, the time is now opportune, and that by coming to terms with him (Philip II) His Majesty could destroy those who are left. Now, especially as the Admiral is at Paris where the people are attached to the Catholic religion and to their king, it would be easy for him (Charles IX) to do away with him (Coligny) forever.

It is probable that Philip II sent similar suggestions to his ministers at Paris , and that the latter conferred with Catherine and the Duke of Anjou, even offering them military assistance for the struggle against the Protestants . This intervention caused Catherine to plan Coligny's assassination, and at a meeting to which she called Madame de Nemours, widow of the great Duke of Guise , it was decided that Maurevel should set a trap for the admiral. This was done, with the result that on the morning of 22 August, a musket-shot fired by Maurevel struck Coligny although wounding him but slightly. The Protestants became excited and Charles IX grew angry, declaring that the peace edict must be observed. He went to visit the wounded Coligny and Catherine accompanied him, but at Coligny's request she had to withdraw and, if we may credit the account given by the Duke of Anjou (Henry III), the admiral, lowering his voice, warned Charles IX against his mother's influence.

But just at that moment Charles had but one idea , which was to find and punish Henry of Guise , whom he suspected of being the instigator if not the perpetrator of the attempt on Coligny's life. It was because the attack made on Coligny, 22 August, had failed that Catherine conceived the idea of a general massacre. "If the Admiral had died from the shot," wrote Salviati, the nuncio , "no others would have been killed." Those historians who claim the massacre to have been premeditated explain that Catherine had the marriage of Margaret and Henry of Bourbon solemnized in Paris in order to bring the Protestant leaders there for the purpose of murdering them. However, this interpretation is based merely upon a very doubtful remark attributed to Cardinal Alessandrino and of which we shall speak later on, and it was certainly unlike Catherine, who was always more inclined to placate the various parties by dint of subtle manoeuvring them, after careful deliberation, to inaugurate a series of irreparable outrages.

As we shall see, the decision to have recourse to a massacre arose in Catherine's mind under pressure of a sort of madness; she saw in this decision a means of preserving her influence over the king and of preventing the vengeance of Protestants , who were exasperated by the attack made on Coligny. "The Admiral's death was premeditated, that of the others was sudden," wrote Don Diego de Zuniga to Philip II, on 6 September 1572. Herein lies the exact difference: the attempt on Coligny's life was premeditated whereas the massacre was the outcome of a cruel impulse. On the night of 22 August Catherine de' Medici felt herself lessened in her son's consideration. She learned from one Bouchavannes that the Huguenots had decided to meet at Meaux, 5 September, and avenge Coligny's attempted murder by marching on Paris ; she knew that the Catholics were preparing to defend themselves, and she foresaw that between both parties the king would be alone and powerless.

At supper she heard Pardaillan, a Huguenot , say that justice would be rendered even if the king would not render it, and Captain Piles, another Huguenot , was of the opinion that "even if the Admiral lost an arm there would be numberless others who would take so many lives that the rivers of the kingdom would run with blood". The threats of the Huguenots and her son's consternation impelled Catherine to try to avert this civil war by organizing an immediate massacre of the Protestants . But Charles IX had to be won over. In the account of the dreadful events subsequently given by the Duke of Anjou he alludes to a single conversation between Catherine and Charles IX on 23 August, but Tavannes and Margaret of Valois mention two, the second of which took place late at night. As to the decisive interview there is conflicting testimony. The Duke of Anjou claims that Charles IX, suddenly converted to the cause by Catherine's ardent importuning, cried out: "Good God !

since you deem it well to kill the Admiral, I agree, but all the Huguenots in France must likewise perish, so that not one be left later to upbraid me." Cavalli, the Venetian Ambassador, maintained in his report that the king held out for an hour and a half, finally yielding because of Catherine's threat to leave France and the fear that his brother, the Duke of Anjou, might be named captain-general of the Catholics . Margaret of Valois stated in her account that it was Rets, his former tutor, whom Catherine sent to reason with him, who eventually succeeded in obtaining the king's consent. Is it then true , as certain documents claim, that, toward midnight, Charles IX again hesitated? Perhaps. At any rate, it was he who, on 24 August, a little after midnight, ordered Le Charron, Prévot des Marchands, in charge of the Paris police, to call to arms the captains and bourgeois of the quarters in order that he (the king) and the city might be protected against the Huguenot conspirators. Catherine and the Duke of Anjou had previously secured the assistance of Marcel, former Prévot des Marchands.

Whilst Le Charron, without any great enthusiasm, marshalled the bourgeoisie who were to quell a possible uprising of Huguenots , Marcel drew up the masses, over whom he had unlimited influence, and who, together with the royal troops, were to attack and plunder the Huguenots . The royal troops were especially commissioned to kill the Huguenot nobles; the mob, mobilized by Marcel, was to threaten the bourgeois troops in case the latter should venture to side with the Huguenots . Charles IX and Catherine decided that the massacre should not begin in the city till the admiral had been slain, and afterwards Catherine claimed that she took upon her conscience the blood of only six of the dead, Coligny and five others; however, having deliberately fired the passions of the multitude, over whom Marcel had absolute control, she should be held responsible for all the blood shed. The massacre Toward midnight the troops took up arms in and around the Louvre, and Coligny's abode was surrounded.

A little before daybreak the sound of a pistol-shot so terrified Charles IX and his mother that, in a moment of remorse, they despatched a nobleman to Guise to bid him refrain from any attack on the admiral, but the order came too late; Coligny had already been slain. Scarcely had the Duke of Guise heard the bell of Saint-Germain l'auxerrois than he started with a few men toward the Coligny mansion. Besme, one of the duke's intimates, went up to the admiral's room. "Are you Coligny?" he asked. "I am," the admiral replied. "Young man, you should respect my years. However, do as you please; you will not be shortening my life to any great extent. Besme plunged a dagger into the admiral's breast and flung his body out the window. The Bastard of Angoulême and the Duke of Guise , who were without, kicked the corpse and an Italian, a servant of the Duke of Nevers , cut off its head.

Immediately the king's guards and the nobles on the side of the Guises slew all the Protestant nobles whom Charles IX, but a few days previously, when he wanted to protect the admiral against the intrigues of the Guises , had carefully lodged in the admiral's neighbourhood. La Rochefoucauld, with whom that very night Charles IX had jested till eleven o'clock, was stabbed by a masked valet; Téligny, Coligny's son-in-law, was killed on a roof by a musket-shot, and the Seigneur de la Force and one of his sons had their throats cut, the other son, a child of twelve, remaining hidden beneath their corpses for a day. The servants of Henry of Bourbon and the Prince of Condé who dwelt in the Louvre were murdered under the vestibule by Swiss mercenaries. One nobleman fled to the apartment of Margaret, who had just married Henry of Bourbon, and she obtained his pardon. Whilst their servants were being slaughtered Henry of Bourbon and the Prince of Condé were ordered to appear before the king, who tried to make them abjure , but they refused.

After that the massacre spread through Paris , and Crucé, a goldsmith, Koerver, a bookseller, and Pezou, a butcher, battered in the doors of the Huguenot houses. A tradition, long credited, claims that Charles IX stationed himself on a balcony of the Louvre and fired upon his subjects; Brantôme, however, supposed that the king took aim from the windows of his sleeping apartment. But nothing is more uncertain as the balcony on which he was said to have stood was not there in 1572, and in none of the accounts of the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew sent to their governments by the various diplomatists then in Paris does this detail figure. It was first mentioned in a book published at Basel in 1573: "Dialogue auquel sont traitées plusieurs choses advenues aux Luthériens et Huguenots de France" and reprinted in 1574 under the title: "Le reveille matin des Français". This libel is the work of Barnaud, a native of Dauphiné, a Protestant greatly disliked by his co-religionists, and whose calumnies caused a Protestant nobleman to insult him in public.

The "Tocsin contre les auteurs du Massacrede France", another narration of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, that appeared in 1579, makes no allusion to this sinister pastime of Charles IX, and the accounts given of it twenty years afterwards by Brantôme and d'Aubigné do not agree. Moreover, the anecdote quoted by Voltaire, according to which the Ambrose Maréchal de Tessé had known a gentleman then over a hundred years old who was supposed to have loaded Charles IX's musket, is extremely doubtful , and the absolute silence of those diplomatists who addressed to their respective governments detailed reports of the massacre must ever remain a strong argument against this tradition. On the following morning blood flowed in streams; the houses of the rich were pillaged regardless of the religious opinions of their owners.

"To be a Huguenot ," emphatically declares Mézeray, the historian, "was to have money, enviable position, or avaricious heirs." When at eleven o'clock in the morning the Prévot Le Charron came to inform the king of this epidemic of crime, an edict was issued forbidding a continuation of the slaughter; but the massacre was prolonged for several days more, and on 25 August Ramus, the celebrated philosopher , was assassinated in spite of the formal prohibition of the king and queen. The number of victims is unknown. Thirty-five livres were paid to the grave-diggers of the Cemetery of the Innocents for the interment of 1100 corpses; but many were thrown into the Seine. Ranke and Henri Martin estimate the number of victims in Paris at 2000. In the provinces also massacres occurred. On the evening of 24 August, a messenger brought to the Provost of Orléans a letter bearing the royal seal and ordering him to treat all Huguenots like those of Paris and to exterminate them, "taking care to let nothing leak out and by shrewd dissimulation to surprise them all".

Only that day the king had written to M. d'Eguilly, Governor of Chartres , that there was question merely of a quarrel between Guise and Coligny. On 25 August an order was issued to kill the factious; on the next day the king solemnly announced in open session that his decision of 24 August was the only means of frustrating the plot; on 27 August he again began to prohibit all murder ; and on the following day he solemnly declared that the punishment of the admiral and his accomplices was due not to their religion but to their conspiracy against the Court, and he despatched letters bidding the governors to repress the factionists; on 30 August he ordered the people of Bourges to kill any Huguenots who should congregate, but revoked "all verbal commands that he had issued when he had just cause to fear some sinister event". In this series of contradictory instructions may be detected the ever-slumbering antagonism between Catherine's fixedness of purpose and the vacillation of Charles IX, but almost everywhere in the country the policy of bloodshed prevailed. The general opinion throughout France was that the king had to kill Coligny and the turbulent in self-defence.

President de Thou publicly praised Charles IX; Attorney-General du Faur de Pibrac wrote an apology for the massacre; Jodelle, Baïf, and Daurat, poets of the "P1éiade", insulted the admiral in their verse; a suit was entered in the Parlement against Coligny and his accomplices whether living or dead, and its immediate result was the hanging of Briquemaut and Cavaignes, two Protestants who had escaped the massacre. This protracted severity on the part of the Parlement of Paris set the pace for outside places, and in many places an excess of zeal led to an increase of brutality. Lyons, Toulouse , Bordeaux , and Rouen all had their massacres. So many Lyonese corpses drifted down the Rhône to Arles that, for three months, the Arlesians did not want to drink the river water. At Bayonne and at Nantes compliance with royal orders was refused. The intervals between these massacres prove that on the first day the Court did not issue formal orders in all directions; for instance, the Toulouse massacre did not occur till 23 September and that of Bordeaux till 3 October.

The number of victims in the provinces is unknown, the figures varying between 2000 and 100,000. The "Martyrologe des Huguenots", published in 1581, brings it up to 15,138, but mentions only 786 dead. At any rate only a short time afterwards the reformers were preparing for a fourth civil war . From the foregoing considerations it follows: That the royal decision of which the St. Bartholomew massacre was the outcome, was in nowise the result of religious disturbances and, strictly, did not even have religious incentives; the massacre was rather an entirely political act committed in the name of the immoral principles of Machiavellianism against a faction that annoyed the Court.

That the massacre itself was not premeditated; that, up to 22 August, Catherine de' Medici had only considered — and that for a long time — the possibility of getting rid of Coligny; that the criminal attack made on Coligny was interpreted by the Protestants as a declaration of war , and that, in the face of impending danger, Catherine forced the irresolute Charles IX to consent to the horrible massacre. Such, then, are the conclusions to be kept in view when entering upon the discussion of that other question, the responsibility of the Holy See . The Holy See and the massacre Pius V (1566-May 1, 1572) Pius V , being constantly informed in regard to the civil wars in France and the massacres and depredations there committed, looked upon the Huguenots as a party of rebels who weakened and divided the French Kingdom just when Christianity required the strength of unity in order to strike an effective blow against the Turks .

In 1569 he had sent Charles IX 6000 men under the command of Sforza, Count of Santa-Fiore, to help the royal troops in the third religious war ; he had rejoiced over the victory at Jarnac (12 March, 1569), and on 28 March had written to Catherine de' Medici : "If Your Majesty continues openly and freely to fight (aperte ac libere) the enemies of the Catholic Church unto their utter destruction, divine help will never fail you." After the Battle of Moncontour in October, 1569, he had begged the king thenceforth to tolerate in his states the exercise of Catholicism only; "otherwise," he said, "your kingdom will be the bloody scene of continual sedition". The peace concluded in 1570 between Charles IX and the Huguenots caused him grave anxiety.

He had endeavoured to dissuade the king from signing it and had written as follows to the Cardinals of Bourbon and Lorraine: "The King will have more to fear from the hidden traps and knavishness of the heretics than from their barefaced brigandage during the war ." What Pius V wanted was an honest, open war waged by Charles IX and the Guises against the Huguenots . On 10 May, 1567, he said to the Spanish Ambassador, Don Juan de Luniga: "The masters of France are meditating something which I can neither advise nor approve and which conscience upbraids: they want to destroy by underhand means the Prince of Condé and the Admiral." To reestablish political peace and religious unity by the royal sword was the inexorable dream of Pius V who must not be judged according to our modern standards of toleration; but this end, worthy as he deemed it, could not justify the proposed means of attainment; he would sanction no intriguing, and five years previous to the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, he disapproved the dishonest "means" by which Catherine dreamed of getting rid of Coligny.

Cardinal Alessandrino, sent from the Holy See to Paris, in 1572 Some historians have wondered whether Cardinal Alessandrino, sent by Pius V to Charles IX in February, 1572, to persuade the king to join a Catholic league against the Turks , was not an accomplice in Catherine's murderous designs. In February Alessandrino, who had vainly endeavoured to prevent the marriage of Margaret of Valois with the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, closed his report with these words: "I am leaving France without accomplishing anything whatever: I might as well not have come." Let us be mindful of this tone of discouragement, this acknowledgment of failure. In March he wrote: "I have other special matters to report to His Holiness but I shall communicate them orally . . . ." When the cardinal returned to Rome Pius V was dying, and he expired without learning what were the "special matters" to which Alessandrino had alluded. Whatever they may have been they certainly have no bearing upon the conclusion that Pius V had been previously informed of the massacre.

A life of this pontiff, published in 1587 by Girolamo Catena, gives a conversation that took place a long time afterwards between Alessandrino and Clement VIII in which the cardinal spoke of his former ambassadorship. When he was endeavouring to dissuade the king from Margaret's marriage to Henry, the king said: "I have no other means of revenging myself on my enemies and the enemies of God ." This fragment of the interview has furnished those who hold that the massacre was premeditated with a reason for maintaining that the solemnizing of the nuptials in Paris was a snare prearranged with the concurrence of the papal nuncio . The most reliable critics contest the perfect authenticity of this interview, chiefly because of the very tardy account of it and of its utter incompatibility with the discouragement manifested in Alessandrino's notes written the day after the conversation had taken place. The arguments against the thesis of premeditation as we have considered them one by one seem to us sufficiently plausible to permit us to exclude all hypothesis according to which, six months ahead of time, Alessandrino was confidentially apprised of the outrage.

Salviati, nuncio at Paris in 1572 At the time of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, Salviati, a relative of Catherine de' Medici , was the pope's nuncio at Paris . In December, 1571, Pius V had entrusted him with a first extraordinary mission, and at the time Catherine, according to what was subsequently related by the Venetian Ambassador, Michaeli, "had secretly bade him tell Pius V that he would soon see the vengeance that she and the king would visit upon those of the religion (of the Huguenots )". Catherine's conversation was so vague that the following summer, when Salviati came back to France as nuncio , she thought he must have forgotten her words.

Accordingly she reminded him of the revenge that she had predicted, and neither in December, 1571, nor in August, 1572, was Salviati very explicit in his correspondence with the Court of Rome as, on 8 September, 1572, three weeks after the massacre, Cardinal Come, Secretary of State to Gregory XIII , wrote to Salviati: "Your letters show that you were aware of the preparations for the blow against the Huguenots long before it was dealt. You would have done well to inform His Holiness in time." In fact on 5 August, Salviati had written to Rome : "The Queen will rap the Admiral's knuckles if he goes too far" (donnera à l'Admiral sur les ongles), and on 11 August: "Finally, I hope that God will give me the grace soon to announce to you something that will fill His Holiness with joy and satisfaction." This was all.

A subsequent letter from Salviati revealed that this covert allusion was to the scheme of vengeance that Catherine was then projecting in regard to Coligny's assassination and that of a few Protestant leaders: however, it seems that at the Court of Rome the reference was supposed to be to a re-establishment of cordial relations between France and Spain . The replies of the Cardinal of Come to Salviati show that this last idea was what absorbed the attention of Gregory XIII and that the Court of Rome gave but little heed to Catherine's threats against the Protestants . Notwithstanding that Salviati was Catherine's relative and that he was maintaining a close watch, all documents prove, as Soldan, the German Protestant historian, says, that the events of 24 August were accomplished independently of Roman influence. Indeed, so little did Salviati foresee the Massacre of St. Bartholomew itself that he wrote to Rome the day after the event: "I cannot believe that so many would have perished if the Admiral had died of the musket-shot fired at him . . . . I cannot believe a tenth of what I now see before my very eyes." The attitude of Gregory XIII on receiving the news of the Massacre of St.

Bartholomew It was on 2 September that the first rumours of what had occurred in France reached Rome . Danes, secretary to Mandelot, Governor of Lyons , bade M. de Jou, Commander at Saint-Antoine, to inform the pope that the chief Protestant leaders had been killed in Paris , and that the king had ordered the governors of the provinces to seize all Huguenots . Cardinal de Lorraine , when thus informed, gave the courier 200 écus and Gregory XIII gave him 1000. The pope wanted bonfires lighted in Rome , but Férals, the French Ambassador, objected on the ground that official communication should first be received from the king and the nuncio . On 5 September Beauvillier reached Rome , having been sent thither by Charles IX. He gave an account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew and begged Gregory XIII to grant, antedating it, the dispensation required for the legitimacy of the marriage of Margaret of Valois and Henry of Navarre , solemnized three weeks previously.

Gregory XIII deferred discussing the subject of the dispensation and a letter from the Cardinal de Bourbon dated 26 August and a despatch from Salviati, both received at this time, duly informed him of what had taken place in France . Wrote the Cardinal de Bourbon, Said Admiral was so wicked as to have conspired to kill said King, his mother, the Queen and his brothers . . . . He (the Admiral) and all the ringleaders of his sect were slain . . . . And what I most commend is the resolution taken by His Majesty to exterminate this vermin. In his letter describing the massacre Salviati said: "I rejoice that it has pleased the Divine Majesty to take under His protection the King and the Queen-mother." Thus all the information received from France gave Gregory XIII the impression that Charles IX and his family had been saved from great danger. The very morning of the day that Beauvillier had brought him Salviati's letter, the pope held a consistory and announced that "God had been pleased to be merciful". Then with all the cardinals he repaired to the Church of St.

Mark for the Te Deum, and prayed and ordered prayers that the Most Christian King might rid and purge his entire kingdom of the Huguenot plague. He believed that the Valois had just escaped a most terrible conspiracy which, had it succeeded, would have unfitted France for the struggle of Christian against Turk. On 8 September a procession of thanksgiving took place in Rome , and the pope , in a prayer after mass, thanked God for having "granted the Catholic people a glorious triumph over a perfidious race" (gloriosam de perfidis gentibus populo catholico loetitiam tribuisti). A suddenly discovered plot, an exemplary chastisement administered to insure the safety of the royal family, such was the light in which Gregory XIII viewed the St.

Bartholomew massacre, and such was likewise the idea entertained by the Spanish Ambassador who was there with him and who, on 8 September, wrote as follows: "I am certain that if the musket-shot fired at the Admiral was a matter of several days' premeditation and was authorized by the King, what followed was inspired by circumstances." These circumstances were the threats of the Huguenots , "the insolent taunts of the whole Huguenot party", alluded to by Salviati in his despatch of 2 September; to put it briefly, these circumstances constituted the conspiracy. However, the Cardinal of Lorraine, who belonged to the House of Guise and resided in Rome , wished to insinuate that the massacre had been planned long ahead by his family , and had a solemn inscription placed over the entrance to the Church of St.

Louis des Français, proclaiming that the success achieved was an answer "to the prayers , supplications, sighs and meditation of twelve years"; this hypothesis, according to which the massacre was the result of prolonged hypocrisy , the outcome of a protracted ruse, was shortly afterwards maintained with great audacity in a book by Capilupi, Catherine's Italian panegyrist. But the Spanish Ambassador refuted this interpretation: "The French," wrote he, "would have it understood that their King meditated this stroke from the time that he concluded the peace with the Huguenots , and they attribute to him trickery that does not seem permissible even against heretics and rebels." And the ambassador was indignant at the Cardinal of Lorraine's folly in giving the Guises credit for having set a trap. The pope did not believe any more than did the Spanish Ambassador in a snare laid by Catholics , but was rather convinced that the conspiracy had been hatched by Protestants . Just as the Turks had succumbed at Lepanto , the Protestants had succumbed in France .

Gregory XIII ordered a jubilee in celebration of both events and engaged Vasari to paint side by side in one of the Vatican apartments scenes commemorative of the victory of Lepanto and of the triumph of the Most Christian King over the Huguenots . Finally, he had a medal struck representing an exterminating angel smiting the Huguenots with his sword, the inscription reading: Hugonottorum strages. There had been a slaughter of conspirators (strages) and the information that reached the pope was identical with that spread throughout Europe by Charles IX. On 21 September Charles IX wrote to Elizabeth of England concerning the "imminent danger" from the plot that he had baffled; on the next day he wrote as follows to La Mothe-Fénélon, his ambassador at London : "Coligny and his followers were all ready to visit upon us the same fate that we dealt out to them"; and to the German princes he sent similar information. Certainly all this seemed justified by the decree of the French magistracy ordering the admiral to be burned in effigy and prayers and processions of thanksgiving on each recurring 24 August, out of gratitude to God for the timely discovery of the conspiracy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, on 22 September, Gregory XIII should have written to Charles IX: "Sire, I thank God that He was pleased to preserve and defend Your Majesty, Her Majesty, the Queen-mother and Your Majesty's royal bothers from the horrible conspiracy. I do not think that in all history there is mention of such cruel malevolence." Nor again is it astonishing that the pope should have despatched Cardinal Orsini to Charles IX with congratulations on his escape. From Rome again Cardinal de Pellevé wrote to Catherine de' Medici : "Madame, the joy of all honest people in this city is complete, and never was there more glad-some news than that of Your Majesty being free from danger." The discourse delivered 3 December by Muret, the Humanist, was a veritable hymn of thanksgiving for the discovery of the plot contrived against the king and almost all the royal family. The Huguenot party having plotted regicide had to be punished, and its punishment seemed once more to put France in condition to combat the Turks ; such was the twofold aspect under which Rome considered the massacre. Besides, the pope's joy did not last long.

A rather involved account by Brantôme leads us to think that, becoming better informed, he grew angry at the news of such barbarity, and it is certain that when, in October, 1572, the Cardinal of Lorraine wished to present Maurevel, who had fired on Coligny on 22 August, Gregory XIII refused to receive him, saying: "He is an assassin." Doubtless by this time the vague despatches sent by Salviati during the weeks preceding the massacre had, in the light of events, become more comprehensible and rendered it clearer that the origin of these tragic events was the assault of 22 August; without ceasing to rejoice that Charles IX had eventually escaped the conspiracy then commonly asserted in France and abroad, Gregory XIII judged the criminal, Maurevel, according to his deserts . The condemnation by Pius V of the "intrigues" against Coligny and the refusal of Gregory XIII to receive Maurevel "the assassin" establish the unbending rectitude of the papacy , which, eager as it was for the re-establishment of religious unity, never admitted the pagan theories of a certain raison d'état according to which the end justified the means.

As to the congratulations and the manifestations of joy which the news of the massacre elicited from Gregory XIII , they can only be fairly judged by assuming that the Holy See , like all Europe and indeed many Frenchmen , believed in the existence of a Huguenot conspiracy of whose overthrow the Court boasted and whose punishment an obsequious parliament had completed. The St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State | Reviews in History The St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State Book: The St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State Arlette Jouanna Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013, ISBN: 9780719088315; 320pp.; Price: £65.00 Reviewer: Boston University Citation: Professor Barbara Diefendorf, review of The St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State, (review no. 1463) See Author's Response This is a welcome translation of an important book.

Arlette Jouanna’s studies of the French nobility in its relations with the monarchy and the 16th-century Wars of Religion give her the breadth of vision and contextual knowledge necessary to offer new insights into perhaps the single most famous event of these wars. She has found an able translator in Joseph Bergin, a prominent historian of early modern religious history, who has produced a translation as fluid and vigorous as the original. The French edition was part of a remake of a series focused on key events in French history and on their long-term significance. As such, the book was intended for a broad audience. It is not, however, a mere synthesis or popularization of previous scholarship and is based on a careful reappraisal of both secondary literature and primary sources, including some manuscript sources largely overlooked by previous scholars. The only historiography it engages directly is French, perhaps because it was intended primarily for a French audience. The notes, however, show thoughtful assimilation of a wider literature.

Moreover, although she rejects key elements of the interpretations of the Massacre recently offered by Jean-Louis Bourgeon and Denis Crouzet, Jouanna borrows usefully from them to arrive at an interpretation that, while incorporating much that will be familiar to scholars in the field, is distinctive and original. (1) The book opens with a description of the slaughter that commenced in Paris on 24 August 1572 but then doubles back to tell how the celebrations surrounding the marriage of the royal princess, Marguerite de Valois, to Henri de Bourbon, King of Navarre, the previous week were characterized by the theme of unity and concord. How, Jouanna asks, can we explain this sudden reversal? This is the first of three ‘enigmas’ around which the book is framed (p. 11). The second is the question of how to reconcile the king’s decision to execute the Huguenot leadership with his explicit desire, maintained even after the massacre, to preserve the edict of pacification that had ended the third War of Religion in August 1570.

The third enigma is why the attempted execution of the Huguenot leadership degenerated into a more generalized massacre that persisted despite attempts to call a halt and spread beyond Paris to other French cities. All three questions are important, but the second broaches most directly Jouanna’s broader thesis that the Massacre’s long-term importance lay in its contribution to two contrasting developments: the articulation of ‘reason-of-state’ arguments supporting royal absolutism and the long process of secularization made possible by the conceptualization of autonomous political and religious spheres. As might be expected, Jouanna sets the Massacre in the context of France’s religious quarrels. Emphasizing the tension between the passions aroused in the Wars of Religion and the requirement explicit in the 1570 pacification edict to act as if the conflicts had never occurred, she stresses the difficulty of renouncing the desire for vengeance stoked by the brutality of the fighting. At the same time, she acknowledges that only this policy of ‘voluntary amnesia’ could ‘break the dreadful spiral of violence’ (p. 20).

Incorporating recent research on the extraordinary efforts made by the commissioners Charles IX sent out to oversee the peace, she revises exaggerated notions of the ineffectiveness of his reign, while conceding that the commissioners’ efforts were often frustrated. Despite the failures, these efforts to make peace work support her argument that Charles was doing everything possible to reconcile his divided subjects. In contrast to Denis Crouzet, who locates Charles’s desire for concord in the Neoplatonic philosophy that penetrated his court, Jouanna sees the king’s efforts to ensure peace as more strategic than philosophical, but none the less real for that. The characteristic that emerges most strongly in her portrait of Charles is his extreme touchiness and desire to have his authority respected, a need that prompted him ‘to declare on every possible occasion that he was the sovereign and that his orders should be implemented’ (p. 28). This characteristic, introduced in the context of attempts to enforce the 1570 peace, foreshadows Jouanna’s explanation of Charles’s order two years later to execute the Huguenot military leaders, whom he saw as a threat to both peace and his sovereign authority.

As she explains it, the issue that prompted the king abruptly to terminate attempts to conciliate the Huguenots and turn murderously against them was the aggressive stance they took when a sharpshooter tried to assassinate their leader, Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, on 22 August 1572. Addressing the inevitable question of who was behind the attack, she dismisses all of the usual candidates. Queen Mother Catherine de Medici, was too heavily committed to peace to so abruptly reverse her course, as was Charles IX. The Guises, although leaders of the ultra-Catholic faction in the wars and long-time enemies of Coligny, were in too ‘fragile’ a position in court to risk angering the king (p. 79). Jouanna also dismisses the idea that Philip II of Spain had Coligny killed so as to prevent Charles IX from coming to the aid of Protestant rebels in the southern Netherlands. Philip was convinced, she argues, that if Coligny had gone to the aid of the rebels, Charles would disavow his efforts so as to avoid open warfare.

It was thus not necessary to kill him to prevent the revolt from escalating into an international war between France and Spain (p. 62). After ruling out the usual candidates, Jouanna offers a new take on the assassination attempt. Contemporaries just assumed that someone powerful had to be behind it, but we should also consider other possibilities. Who most wanted to ‘scuttle the peace’ celebrated with the wedding? For Jouanna, the answer is clear: radical Catholics in Paris; ‘the murderous fury of the most inflamed Catholics of Paris was incitement enough to the authors of such an enterprise’ (p. 83). She does not attempt to identify more specifically the responsible parties and instead sketches out a picture of religious zeal and cumulative grievances on the part of Parisian Catholics that, she argues, culminated in a determination to exterminate not only the admiral but also every hope of peace. Extinguishing the possibility of peace is a key point here. For Jouanna, the attack on Coligny was less an attempt to deprive the Huguenots of their leader, as it has usually been portrayed, than a deliberate provocation intended to plunge France back into a war that would result in the final extermination of heresy.

Implicating the Guises in the assassination attempt by employing individuals connected with them in its execution was, by this logic, intended to stoke the Huguenots’ desire for revenge and prompt reprisals that would destroy the king’s hopes for reconciliation. Charles’s anger on first learning of the assassination attempt was thus sincere. It was, moreover, only increased by the Protestant leaders’ reactions and the demands they made. Charles had forced himself to suppress his distrust of the Huguenots in the interest of peace but could do so no longer. Jouanna cites sources alleging that Coligny had used threatening language in trying to persuade Charles IX to go war in Flanders but insists that Charles ‘had kept his resentment under control’ (p. 100) in the interest of peace up until 23 August, when Coligny’s strident words and those of his supporters ‘attacked the king’s dignity’ (p. 101) in ways he could not tolerate. The language Protestant leaders employed when demanding justice for the ambush ‘amounted to a denial of royal sovereignty’ (p. 101).

The royal council decided on the night of 23 August to kill the Protestant leaders as a direct response to these threats. Coligny appeared more than ever an ‘over-mighty and potentially dangerous subject to the king’ – the ‘uncontrollable leader of a private army and member of a dissenting church, [whose] authority rivaled the king’s’ (p. 101). Although admitting that rumors circulating in Paris might have provoked a sense of panic on the part of the king and council, Jouanna discounts suggestions that they acted to ward off an immediate attack by the Huguenots. This, she insists, was largely a justification drummed up after the fact to justify the recourse to sudden action. Even if not anticipating an immediate attack, the council was convinced that the Huguenot leaders posed a threat to the king’s majesty and to the state and, as such, considered recourse to ‘extraordinary justice’ necessary. There were too many armed Protestant nobles in the tense capital for ‘ordinary justice’ – the arrest and trial of the Huguenot leaders – to seem possible.

The ‘extraordinary justice’ meted out to the Protestant leaders as a result of the council’s order must thus remain separate from the popular killings that followed. Jouanna agrees with other recent analyses of the Massacre that long-festering fear and hatred on the part of Parisian Catholics catalyzed into a willingness to kill when Guise was heard telling his soldiers to go on with their killing because it was the king’s command. This gave people ‘the unexpected legitimation of their murderous intentions’ (p. 128). The popular massacres were, moreover, not mere mob violence but rather ‘war for the purification of territory’ (p. 133). Charles’s insistence on concord had de-legitimized him among intransigent Catholics. Authorizing the killing of Protestants re-legitimized him briefly, but when he issued orders for the killing to stop, the people disobeyed him to take up ‘the cause of God and of the community’ (p. 139). The Guises and other ultra-Catholics at court could, Jouanna believes, have brought the killings to a stop but instead let them happen, knowing they would not have to take responsibility for them.

‘It was now the people who exercised their extraordinary justice’ (p. 141; italics in the original). The council’s decision on 23 August to resort to ‘extraordinary justice’ and kill the Huguenot leaders might have been taken in a moment of panic and certainly was taken without thinking through all possible consequences. The argument that the king had a right to resort to extraordinary means to protect the state when faced with imminent danger nevertheless became the foundation of Charles’s explanation and defense of this decision at home and abroad, although, as Jouanna points out, the defense did not extend to the generalized massacres, for which the king never accepted responsibility. Inherent in this defense was a separation of politics from religion: the Huguenot leaders were killed as rebels and not as members of a dissident church. This separation of politics from religion, in which Jouanna sees an incipient logic of ‘reason of state’, explains why Charles could insist, initially at least, that he wanted the edict of pacification maintained. This proved, of course, a futile hope.

Not only did Protestants who escaped the Massacre prepare for war, but Catholic intransigents, experiencing a ‘new vigor’ after the Massacre (p. 173), pressured Charles to complete the eradication of heresy that, in their minds, he had begun. Jouanna discusses the trauma produced by the Massacre, noting that ‘divine wrath’ was the most common explanation cited by both sides to explain the horror of these events (p. 181). She is most interested, however, in the political explanations that were offered. Her discussion of Protestant resistance theory and the denunciations of tyranny expressed by the ‘monarchomachs’ will be familiar to early modernists, but she makes good use of this discussion to advance her argument that the Massacre ended all hope for a ‘kingdom of love’ (p. 204) in which it was simply assumed that the king would respect the people’s liberties without recourse to a written constitution. She also makes a strong argument that the alliance between Protestants and moderate Catholics that emerged after the Massacre in the Malcontents was rooted in a common aversion to tyranny and desire for institutional reform.

The Malcontents were, she argues, united by a belief that the Massacre was at its heart a plot to destroy the great nobility by turning its leaders against one another, so that they could not stand as a check to royal power. The fifth War of Religion, provoked by the Malcontent alliance in 1575, was thus ‘profoundly different from’ (p. 216) and more political in character than the ones that preceded it. The need to keep the book focused on Saint Bartholomew’s Day forces Jouanna to telescope the later religious wars into a very brief summary, which she uses to reinforce her overall thesis. She explains how the Malcontents’ success in the fifth war boomeranged against them when the 1576 Estates General, called in hopes of reform, resulted instead in a resurgence of Catholic intransigence and loss of Huguenot gains. It also ended hopes for balancing royal authority with an increased role for the Estates by showing that the assembly could be more dangerous than the king. Rather than inspiring confidence in representative assemblies, the later wars persuaded people of the need for a transcendent authority.

Jouanna concludes, then, that the Massacre played a direct role in promoting acceptance of absolutism in France. Catholic publicists who depicted Charles IX as a martyr who gave his life to fight heresy after his death from tuberculosis in May 1574 played a part in this by contributing to a ‘super-sacralisation’ of the royal person that Jouanna identifies also in Henri IV’s identification of himself as an instrument of divine providence in the Edict of Nantes. But if the edict reinforced royal absolutism, it also sanctioned a separation of religious and secular spheres. The long-term impact of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre lies in its contribution to these disparate processes – a reinforcement of absolutism but also a laying of the foundations for secularisation of the state. Jouanna’s argument is well supported by evidence and in most respects persuasive. At several points, however, it fails to answer old questions or raises new ones. The supposition that radical Catholics in Paris were behind the initial attempt to kill Coligny is plausible but not proved and seems to rest largely on the elimination of other candidates.

And while I must agree with Jouanna about the explosive situation in the capital on the eve of the Massacre (my work on the subject is frequently cited in her notes), I fail to see how this atmosphere of unrest congealed into an organized plot against the admiral’s life. (2) Who among the city’s radical Catholics would have wanted (or dared) to orchestrate a plot that tried to pin the assassination on the Guises? And why would Maurevert, the man known to have wielded the gun, have lent himself to such a conspiracy? He had his own quarrels with Coligny, but Jouanna thinks the logistics of the event ‘indicate that it was not a simple private matter’ (p. 75). Described as ‘relatively wealthy’ and ‘an adventurer choosing his camp in terms of his immediate interests’ (p. 74), Maurevert was neither in need of money nor committed to the ultra-Catholic cause. He was, moreover, a client of the Guises at the time of the Massacre, as were several individuals who facilitated his escape.

Jouanna considers these connections so obvious as to disqualify the Guises themselves from the attempt, but just who in Paris would have been able to use – and betray – these ties of clientage remains a puzzle. Unless new evidence appears – and that is unlikely – the question of who tried to kill Coligny will remain open to debate. Jouanna’s explanation of the abrupt shift from conciliating the Huguenots to ordering their leaders slain also leaves questions unanswered. One can easily imagine the hyper-sensitive Charles IX losing his temper in the face of the threatening language allegedly employed by Huguenot leaders demanding justice after the attempt to assassinate Coligny. But Jouanna stresses the collective nature of the decision to order the leaders slain, and it is harder to comprehend why the royal council agreed that the angry words of men reeling from the attack on their leader posed such an urgent danger to the state that those men needed to be summarily killed. Jouanna does not think that the council believed the Huguenots were planning an immediate coup, but if there was no imminent danger, why did its members agree that the machinery of ‘ordinary justice’– arrest and trial – offered inadequate protection?

Jouanna cites the high levels of emotion in Paris and large number of Protestant nobles who remained in the city as reasons for resorting to ‘extraordinary justice’, but was there really good reason to believe that nobles who had gathered in Paris for a wedding would have – could have – suddenly mobilized to attack the king in his palace if he arrested their leaders? Were there no calm heads on the council? What about Catherine de Medici? Jouanna is right that Catherine has been too quickly blamed for the Massacre by many past historians, but she almost disappears from this account. Did she, like Charles, really think they could maintain the peace by announcing that the Huguenot leaders were killed as rebels and not as religious dissidents? Should we really abandon the more traditional explanation that, far from hoping to maintain the peace, the council recognized that a new war was inevitable and decided to weaken the Huguenots’ leadership as much as possible before that war began? These questions cannot be answered with certainty, given that all explanations of the order to kill the Huguenot leaders were made after the fact and with the intention of justifying it.

Descriptions of the Huguenots’ threatening demeanor are unreliable for the same reason; they were intended to prove that the slain leaders deserved their fate. Despite the complexities and contradictions inherent in the evidence, Arlette Jouanna has pieced together a powerful argument about the motives for and meanings of the Massacre. Some of ‘the mysteries of a crime of state’ must nevertheless remain unresolved. Notes Jean-Louis Bourgeon, L’assassinat de Coligny (Geneva, 1992); idem, Charles IX devant la Saint-Barthélemy (Geneva, 1995); Denis Crouzet, La nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy: Un rêve perdu de la Renaissance (Paris, 1994); and idem, Le haut cœur de Catherine de Médicis: Une raison politique aux temps de la Saint-Barthélemy (Paris, 2005). Back to (1) Barbara B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (New York, NY, and Oxford, 1991).

Back to (2) August 2013 The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre | Christian History The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre Suspicious and scared, the king of France ordered a political assassination. Then the real killing began. Scott M. Manetsch Subscribe to Christianity Today and get instant access to past issues of Christian History! Christianity Today Weekly (Weekly) CTWeekly delivers the best content from ChristianityToday.com to your inbox each week. Today in Christian History (Daily) A daily newsletter featuring the most important and significant events on each day in Christian History. Christianity Today Connection (Weekly) Get the inside story with this official newsletter of the global media ministry. Email Address Subscribe to the selected newsletters. Free Newsletters More Newsletters Before dawn on the morning of August 24, 1572, church bells tolled in the Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois quarter of Paris. Just moments earlier, soldiers under the command of Henri, duke of Guise, had overcome resistance and assassinated the admiral of France, Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny, in his bedroom.

They threw the body from the window to the ground below, where angry crowds later mutilated it, cutting off the head and hands, and dragged it through the streets of Paris. As Guise walked away from Coligny's lodging, he was overheard to say "it is the king's command." The killing unleashed an explosion of popular hatred against Protestants throughout the city. In the terrible days that followed, some 3,000 Huguenots were killed in Paris, and perhaps another 8,000 in other provincial cities. This season of blood—known as the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre—decisively ended Huguenot hopes to transform France into a Protestant kingdom. It remains one of the most horrifying episodes in the Reformation era. The dangerous decade Historians have long debated the causes of the massacres of 1572. Drawing upon Francis Hotman's De Furoribus Gallicis (1573), Protestant interpreters since the sixteenth century have often portrayed Coligny and his coreligionists as heroic victims of a premeditated plot to destroy the Huguenot movement, masterminded by the wicked queen mother, Catherine de Médicis.

Catholic historians, on the other hand, have usually followed the royal interpretation that the king, Charles IX, issued two days after the violence began. In this view, the king and his council ordered the violence as a justified preemptive strike to protect the Catholic crown from a Protestant ... You have reached the end of this Article Preview To continue reading, subscribe now. Subscribers have full digital access.

Question: Who was the King of France at the time of the St Bartholomew's Day massacre?
Answer: Charles IX