BBC ON THIS DAY | 2 | 1982: British sub sinks Argentine cruiser About This Site | Text Only 1982: British sub sinks Argentine cruiser Argentina's only cruiser, the General Belgrano, has been sunk by a British nuclear submarine in the South Atlantic. It is the first serious attack on the Argentine navy by the British since the conflict over the disputed Falkland Islands began last month. The second largest ship in the Argentine navy was struck by two Tigerfish torpedoes from HMS Conqueror. It is thought there were about 1,000 men on board. British helicopters also sank a patrol boat and damaged another using Seaskua air-to-surface missiles. According to sources in Buenos Aires, at least five Argentine warships have been taking part in the search for survivors throughout the day. I sincerely hope it will not be a long and bloody conflict John Nott, Defence Secretary Chances of anyone being found are limited with reports of 30-foot high waves and icy conditions. The Belgrano, an old World War II ship, was reported to have been severely damaged this morning. News that she had actually sunk came as the Defence Secretary, John Nott, was answering questions from journalists this afternoon.

The Belgrano was outside the 200-mile total exclusion zone at the time of the attack and Mr Nott was asked whether the bombing was therefore justified. He replied: "The General Belgrano was a threat to our men and therefore it is quite correct that she was attacked by our submarines." Mr Nott said the past week had been a successful one for British armed forces, but that the overriding aim was a peaceful and lasting settlement. "I sincerely hope it will not be a long and bloody conflict," he added. Earlier today, the government announced the next stage in the military build-up. The QE2 has been called into service - she is due back at Southampton at midnight tonight - as well as two ferries and a container ship. They will be used to carry 3,000 infantrymen.

HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia - Telegraph Defence HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia The submarine that sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands war was involved in a much more daring and dangerous Cold War operation only weeks later Comments It was dark, in the early hours, and the sea was freezing as Her Majesty’s Submarine Conqueror came to periscope depth. Her captain, Christopher Wreford-Brown, had been stalking his target methodically, a hunter in pursuit of wary prey. There she was, 1,000 yards ahead, slow-moving, seemingly unaware of the submarine coming up on her tail. Gathered around Commander Wreford-Brown in the darkened operations room, officers and men waited in silence, inner tension masked by outward calm. It was 1982 and this was the real thing. HMS Conqueror is famous, some would say notorious, for sinking the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered attack submarine, a type also known menacingly as a hunter-killer, that year became the first of her kind to fire in anger.

The Belgrano was sent to bottom in short order, her ancient hull rent by two torpedoes: 323 men, many of them young conscripts, died. The Falklands war began in earnest that day, May 2 1982. But the ship now in the crosswires was not the Belgrano. This was August, almost two months after the liberation of the Falklands, and on the other side of the world, in the Barents Sea, backyard of the mighty Soviet Northern Fleet. Conqueror was sailing as close to Russian territorial waters as was legally allowed – or maybe closer. Submariners, a tight-knit community, politely disdainful of their surface counterparts, joke that there are two types of naval vessel: submarines and targets. Wreford-Brown’s target was a spy trawler – an AGI in Nato parlance, meaning Auxiliary General Intelligence. Crammed with interception and detection equipment, they were a ubiquitous presence during the Cold War, shadowing Nato exercises or loitering off naval bases.

This one was special: Polish-flagged, she was pulling a device long coveted by the British and Americans, a two-mile string of hydrophones known as a towed-array sonar. It was the latest thing in Soviet submarine-detection technology and Conqueror’s job was to steal it. To do so, the bow was equipped with electronically controlled pincers, provided by the Americans, to gnaw through the three-inch-thick steel cable connecting it to the trawler. The name of this audacious exercise in piracy? Operation Barmaid. Thirty years on, and the story of this mission, classified Top Secret to this day, is being told. It may be that the Russian government is learning for the first time the fate of what was one of its most closely guarded devices. Related Articles 'Heat of the moment firefight' could be behind Royal Marine arrests 12 Oct 2012 “This was a quite remarkable feat, a daring exploit that carried with it immense risk,” says the documentary maker Stuart Prebble, whose new book, Secrets of the Conqueror, discloses the existence of Barmaid.

“When we think of the Cold War we think of Cuba and Berlin and missiles and tanks, but it was at sea, and under the sea in particular, where the East-West struggle was often at its most dangerous. “I have known about Barmaid for nearly 30 years and two years ago I approached the Ministry of Defence and asked that its details be released under the 30-year rule. They spent eight months thinking about it and eventually came back and said no. Their final position was that, although they wouldn’t help, they wouldn’t try to stop me writing about it.” Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Anglo-Americans rested on their laurels, confident of their superiority in naval technology over the fledgling Soviet fleet. But as the 1970s wore on that confidence was eroded. Soviet submarines were not just becoming quieter and faster, they were able to turn the tables on their supposedly more advanced Western opponents. Submariners call it “bouncing”, the practice of creeping up on a hostile submarine before switching on active, wave-emitting sonar. The deafening ping in the earphones of the target crew tells them: “I’m here.

If this was a war, you’d be dead.” Towed-array sonar is different. It is passive and does not emit a signal. It floats at a prescribed depth, trailing behind a ship or submarine, simply listening for enemy submarines. Because the hydrophones are spaced out, they can achieve a multi-dimensional fix on a target, and are less vulnerable to noise from the host vessel. The American and British navies imagined themselves to be far ahead in this technology and were disturbed to discover that the Russians were matching them. Had they caught up through ingenuity, or by spying? The issue was sensitive for the British, who had been plagued by spy scandals in the post-war period. The “Portland Spy Ring” had betrayed naval secrets, as had the Admiralty clerk John Vassall. The Americans took the lead, conceiving a project to capture a towed array and discover its origins. General Dynamics, supplier of kit to the CIA, built the pincer equipment, which was installed in British submarines. But why not use the bigger US Navy? “There are two schools of thought about that,” says Prebble, a former editor of World in Action.

“The British believed they were selected because they had more skilled submariners, and exercises do seem to bear this out. British submariners tend not to play by the book to the extent that the Americans do. “The more cynical view has it that if a British sub was caught the diplomatic fall-out would be less severe than if an American one was involved. No one wanted to provoke a superpower confrontation.” Cutting a towed-array cable and making it look like an accidental loss was no easy task. Before Conqueror was fitted with the television-guided pincers, her sister ship HMS Churchill had tried to steam through an array to sever it from the towing ship. She was damaged and depth-charged for her pains. Conqueror made two attempts to use the pincers, in the Barents Sea and the Mediterranean, before her final attempt in August. “When crews heard about these pincers, everybody thought it was absolutely crazy,” says Prebble. “Their use demanded the most brilliant seamanship, coming up from below into the array’s blind spot and edging towards the cutting point only a few yards from the tow ship.

The pincers were designed to gnaw rather than slice cleanly to give the impression that the array had snagged on an underwater obstacle and been torn off.” There, then, was Wreford-Brown, staring though his periscope that August night. The TV cameras were useless until a few inches from the target, so black was the Arctic water. Wreford-Brown and his officers had to fall back on mental arithmetic to calculate their distance from the target. “That was the genius of the exercise,” says Prebble. “There is a way of approaching the blind spot that involves going deep and then coming up at an angle, literally below the vessel.” The trawler’s propeller was feet away from Conqueror’s hull. A momentary miscalculation and a collision was inevitable. But nerves held and a connection was made. The pincer blades gnawed, and in seconds that seemed like hours the array was freed. Clamps held on to the cable as Conqueror dropped away to a safe depth, trailing the array by her side. “Everyone in the control room was tense,” says one of those present.

“We were expecting at any time that we would be discovered and were ready to run, if necessary.” None of the crewmen who spoke to Prebble was prepared to confirm Conqueror’s position but the suspicion is that the operation took place inside Soviet territorial waters, just three miles from the coast. If discovered, the sub would have faced attack from Russian air and naval units. Once Conqueror reached a safe distance, divers were sent out to secure the array. The submarine later surfaced so that they could swim out again to haul the device aboard and bundle it in the hull. Did the crew of the AGI know what had happened? Even if they suspected foul play it would not have been in their interests to admit it to their superiors. A sojourn in the gulag might have followed. Immediately after Conqueror reached her base on the Clyde, the array was put on to an aircraft and sent for analysis in the United States. It is said that the name Conqueror was whispered with a certain reverence in the Pentagon for some time afterwards. Following the sinking of the Belgrano, much speculation surrounded the disappearance of the Conqueror’s logs.

The assumption in some quarters was that they had been destroyed to conceal embarrassing details about the submarine’s movements before and after the attack on the cruiser. Prebble thinks otherwise. “I believe the logs were shredded or incinerated to hide the Barents Sea operation,” he says. “This was a top-secret mission.” The submarine arm is known as the Silent Service, partly because of its stealthy approach to warfare but also because of the secrecy attending its activities. Rarely does it receive public praise. Now, at least, we know of Operation Barmaid. The Conqueror’s crew had to celebrate their triumph in secret. Let’s hope they enjoyed a pint or two. Sinking of Argentine Navy cruiser ARA General Belgrano recalled — MercoPress Thursday, May 2nd 2002 - 21:00 UTC Full article 2 May 1982. Ceremonies were held in Argentina today to mark the twentieth anniversary of the sinking of the Argentine Navy's cruiser ARA General Belgrano during the South Atlantic War.

The 43-year-old Belgrano was sunk in the South Atlantic at mid afternoon on 2 May 1982 by two torpedoes fired from the Royal Navy nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror, with the loss of 323 lives. The main ceremonies ware held before the monument to the Malvinas War dead in the gardens of the Navy HQ buildings in downtown Buenos Aires and at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base 500 miles south of this city, home port of the Navy sea fleet and of the Belgrano. Defence Minister Horacio Jaunarena and Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Joaquin Stella headed the ceremonies at which medals were presented to families of servicemen lost with the sinking of the cruiser. In a newspaper article published today the then Captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, now retired from the Navy, who heads the Friends of the General Belgrano Cruiser Association, argues that the lessons of 2 May 1982 are a legacy which lives on to this day. "If those men could overcome that trial with solidarity, mutual respect, honesty and ethics.

We can surely achieve these same things today." Bonzo is internationally recognised for his endeavours at saving the surviving crewmembers abandoning the stricken cruiser. Of a crew of 1.093 men, 323 were killed and 770 survived not only the explosions but up 48 hours adrift in life rafts in freezing South Atlantic waters. Bonzo and his crew are credited with having handled the aftermath of the sinking with great skill, which is probably why 2/3rds of the crew survived in such appalling conditions. Nevertheless the death toll for the sinking of the Belgrano was 323 which accounts for almost half the 649 Argentine South Atlantic War dead. The Friends of the Belgrano Association in turn held separate ceremonies at the Cenotaph to the Malvinas War dead at the Naval Hospital and a Mass at the Armed Forces Stella Maris chapel in memory of those who served on and died on the Belgrano. The Argentine Navy's ARA General Belgrano was a US built Brooklyn class cruiser originally commissioned in 1939 as the USS Phoenix.

During the second World War it saw action in the South Pacific surviving the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 engaging in combat in Guadacanal, Leyte and Corregidor. After the war she was mothballed for several years and sold to Argentina in 1951 as ARA 17 de Octubre and later renamed ARA General Belgrano in 1956. Equipped by the Argentine Navy to carry one Alouette III helicopter and armed with Seacat SAM missiles she also carried 5 x 3 x 152mm (6 in) gun turrets, 8 x 125 mm (5 inch) guns, 20 x 40mm anti aircraft guns and 20 x 20mm machine guns. Although the Belgrano was not deployed during the Operation Rosario on 2 April, she put to sea from Ushuaia on April 26 as part of Task Force 79 patrolling the area between Islas de los Estados and Burwood Bank.

On 30 April 1982 Britain announced the setting up of a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) excluding all Argentine vessels and aircraft in a radius of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland Islands. On Friday 30 April the cruiser was detected by nuclear powered fleet submarine HMS Conqueror at long range. The following day, Admiral Woodward's carriers entered the TEZ and the air war begun with air attacks on Stanley and Goose Green and air battles between the British Naval Air Squadron and Argentine Air Force aircraft over and around the Falkland Islands. HMS Conqueror closed in to shadow Belgrano ? which at this stage was outside the 200 nm TEZ ? but was nonetheless the southern arm of Task Force 79 and rated in London as "a potential threat to the British carriers." The nuclear submarine was instructed to sink the cruiser. Shortly after 4pm on Sunday 2 May when at 55Ãâ€šÃ‚Âº 30'S 61Ãâ€šÃ‚Âº 40' W the Belgrano was struck by two 21 in conventional Mk8 torpedoes fired from Conqueror and sunk 15 minutes later.

According to the Admiral of the Fleet at the time, Sir Terence Lewin, the decision to launch torpedoes at Belgrano was taken in London and not by the commander on the spot under the existing "rules of engagement." At the time critics argued that the Belgrano had been sunk "just when it looked as if the United Nations General Secretary was about to reach a mutually honourable compromise" in the words of Labour MP Tam Dalyell. Of all the events which took place in the South Atlantic War, the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano remains the most controversial. Although the Argentine Navy has always insisted that it was an - albeit regrettable - act of war, critics around the world argued that it was decided by the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to scupper any possibility of a negotiated peace settlement over the islands. Critics argued that the fact that the vessel was outside the TEZ and was sailing away from the area were clear indications that it presented no immediate threat to the British Task Force.

"Britannia waives the rules" screamed the headline of one morning paper at the time playing on the words of patriotic song "Rule Britannia." Labour MP Tam Dalyell made the sinking of the Belgrano his cause célÃÃ‚Â¨bre and fought a long lasting battle against Mrs Thatcher trying to prove foul play. Ultimately, as one leading analyst of the Falklands War summed it up, the sinking of the Belgrano may of been an act of war or not, but it will probably remain a sore point in Argentine-British relations for many years to come. At the time of the sinking of the Belgrano the then British Defence Minister John Nott had dismissed any criticism over the decision to sink the vessel forecasting that, "In twenty years time they will say: The British stopped aggression." Today, neither his name nor his words were remembered. Belgrano Inquiry :: Is Maggie Thatcher a War Criminal?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO Click image to enlarge We have the act itself (the sinking of a ship), as well as the end to be gained (keep the British government in power and torpedo a peace initiative) and the circumstances surrounding it (an attack outside the exclusion zone in an undeclared war). The History of the south Atlantic conflict The War for the Malvinas Ruben Moro 1989, p.165. The ARA General Belgrano was an Argentine Navy cruiser which was controversially sunk by a British submarine during the 1982 Falklands War as she sailed away from the conflict zone. 323 people died, mainly young sea cadets. Originally a US Navy cruiser, launched in 1938, the ship survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was decommissioned from the US Navy in 1946. In 1951, the ship was sold to Argentina. In 1956, the ship was renamed ARA General Belgrano after a hero of the Argentine war of independence.

On April 26th, 1982, the General Belgrano, accompanied by two destroyers, left the port of Ushuaia in southern Argentina. On April 29th, the Argentine task group began patrolling South of the Falkland Islands. On the following day, the ship was detected by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror which gradually closed over the next day. On May 2nd, HMS Conqueror fired three Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes, two of which hit the Belgrano. With the ship holed, no electrical power, and unable to pump out water, the Belgrano soon began to list to port and sink towards the bow. Captain Hector Bonzo therefore ordered the crew to abandon ship using the seventy-odd rubber dingys. Tragically, the Belgrano’s two escorts did not know that something had happened to the Belgrano and continued on a westward course. By the time that the escorts realized something had happened to the Belgrano, it was already dark, the weather had worsened, and the Belgrano’s life rafts had been scattered.

Consequently, even though Argentine and Chilean ships did rescue 770 men over the next two days, 321 members of the Belgrano’s crew died. In early editions on Tuesday May 4th, 1982, Britain’s The Sun newspaper led with the infamous headline “GOTCHA”: ”Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser”. When news began to emerge that the Belgrano had indeed been sunk, with a large number of casualties, later editions of the Sun led with the more sombre headline “Did 1,200 Argies drown?” THE CONTROVERSY The sinking of the Belgrano became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners in Britain. This was for a variety of reasons, including the ship being well outside the 200 mile (320 kilometre) Total Exclusion Zone that the British had declared around the Falklands, because the ship was on a westerly heading at the time it was attacked, and because a Peruvian peace proposal was still on the table at the time of the attack. Was the sinking of the Belgrano justifiable under international law?

Some argue that, the ship being outside the British-declared Total Exclusion Zone would not affect this analysis, since the British Government stated on April 23rd, that ‘the approach’ of any warship or aircraft ‘which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic’ would encounter an ‘appropriate’ response. The Belgrano was neither ‘approaching’ the task force and was it a ‘threat’? That statement was put out while the British task force was still travelling South, as a warning that any approaching aircraft etc might be shot. Once the Task Force had arrived, it then announced on 28 April the Total Exclusion Zone – and, that would have superceded an earlier statement. War was not declared, that is why these definitions were important. Some Argentine Views on May 3rd 1982, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, that the sinking of the Belgrano was “at a point at the 55 º 24 ‘south latitude and 61 º 32′ west longitude. That this point is located 36 miles outside the area maritime exclusion set by the government of Great Britain.

Such an attack is a treacherous act of armed aggression.’ Was it? Debate has raged on this issue, mostly misinformed due to the torrent of British MOD fabrications. This website will enable you to have that calm debate you always wanted to, but based on correct info. Let’s hear a statement by Alicia Pierini, Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires on April 25 2005: “The Argentine ship was away from the area of ​​belligerency, not navigating towards it and not even close to any British units: so it could not have been any threat or danger to the United Kingdom. Torpedoing it was, quite simply, a war crime, through the disproportionate and illegitimate use of force in violation of the rights of those who fought then. Why would Britain have designated the exclusion zone – thus drawing the boundaries of war-theater – if it was immediately to be violated? “ Political analyst Rosendo Fraga expressed the following cautious view, immediately prior to Lawrence Freedman’s Official History appearing in 2005: The debate over whether the British attack took place within the international rules to be respected in conflict or outside, is controversial.

Probably resolving the issue will be the function of legal historians, politicians and diplomats. The reality is that the cruiser was sunk by breaking rules, but the international community seems to have taken over the matter, not mostly sharing this view. For Argentines, the idea that the cruiser was sunk in violation of the rules will remain as a manifestation of the Argentine claim to sovereignty, though the world does not share this view and only historians can give a more definitive opinion about it. Vice Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, in an interview published in the NATION March 31, 2001 said this: “I gave the order to attack on 1 May. When the British force set out to land would be the key moment of danger and their whole strategy would be to defend people who disembarked. Then they put all their elements, including submarines, to defend that position. That was the moment when we had to take the opportunity to do something. It was time to think about a transport strike, a damaged ship [?]. But, three groups of attack open to the West to wrap and search vessels were lost [?].

Six hours, after I send a new message to Allara (the head of the fleet of sea) landing there, that because of serious danger to their ships, they should retire? “ Six hours after the abortive Argenine attempt to attack, on May 1st, he gave the order to retire. That is important as a statement by the man who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine South Atlantic Theatre of Operations. In 1994, Argentina added its claim to the islands to the Argentine constitution , stating that this claim must be pursued in a manner “respectful of the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law.” It would be strange if also in 1994 the Argentine government conceded that the sinking of the Belgrano had been a “ legal act of war?” The evidence heard at the Belgrano Inquiry – here summarised – offers an alternative view. You decide. It would have been a legal act of war if the Belgrano had either the intention or the capability to threaten Britain’s Task Force. Did it? That depends upon what its mission was.

Arguments of ‘military necessity’ for sinking have a logistical problem: had it been perceived as a threat to the Task Force, that would have happened on May 1st, while it was sailing East, towards the Task Force. That didn’t happen. Only after it had turned round and had been sailing East, for 11 hours, away from the fleet, was it sunk. That’s what it was doing. Thirty Years Later … January 2012: The sky is darkened with the lame ducks of Britain’s Falklands policy coming home to roost. The UK is now re-violating the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it did thirty years ago by bringing ships such as HMS Sheffield, armed with nuclear depth-charges, into the conflict. South America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Britain has announced in January 2012 that it was sending a nuclear-armed destroyer, HMS Dauntless, to the South Atlantic region. America has put out a humiliating-for-Britain policy statement alluding to ‘Los Malvinas,’ i.e.

using the Argentine word for the Falkland islands, and describing the British occupation of it as ‘de facto’ – and that means, in contrast with de Jure. De Jure means occupation by right, de facto just means, they’re there because they’re there. One British conservative analyst called this statement, ”hugely insulting to Britain.” The US has affirmed: This is a bilateral issue that needs to be worked out directly between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. We encourage both parties to resolve their differences through dialogue in normal diplomatic channels, adding that “we recognize de facto United Kingdom administration of the Islands but take no position regarding sovereignty.” Fox News reported that the Obama Administration was backing Argentina over the U.K. in the Falklands dispute. The Organization of American States earlier this week adopted a declaration calling for negotiations between the UK and Argentina over the “sovereignty” of the Falkland Islands. While the U.S. delegation did not speak in support of the measure, it ultimately joined a consensus adopting it.

That basically puts the negotiating situation back to where it was in January-February 1982, before the war broke out… Prime Minister Cameron accused Argentina of being ‘colonialist’ in its demands for sovereignty over the Falklands. In response, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner told Mr Cameron to re-read his history books. Prince William is being posted to the islands as an RAF search-and-rescue pilot next month – a move Argentina attacked as ‘provocative.’ In response the South American trading bloc, Mercosur, is closing its ports to all ships flying the Falklands flag. Britian’s Foreign Office has closed half a dozen embassies in Latin America in recent years, to minimise the danger of receiving subversive opinions from foreign capitals. If oil is found in commercial quantities it will be difficult for any company to exploit it without the assistance and co-operation of the Argentinian mainland.

Argentine protesters have burnt the Union flag outside British Embassy in Buenos Aires in rage over Cameron’s pledge on Falklands, urging their government to sever diplomatic links with London Former head of the British army General Sir Michael Jackson said that it would be impossible for the British military to confront Argentina in case a military confrontation takes place over the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands. “What if an Argentinean force was able to secure the Mount Pleasant airfield? Then our ability to recover the islands now would be just about impossible,” said Jackson in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph. Likewise the head of the Naval task force in the Falklands War has warned that defence cuts mean Britain can now do “ precisely nothing” to prevent Argentina retaking the islands. the Royal Navy no longer has aircraft carriers, has lost its force of Harrier jump jets and seen its warship fleet cut in half over the last decade.

General Sir Peter Whiteley, a former commandant general of the Royal Marines, said: ‘If the Argentines decided to invade again we could never consider trying to take them (the Falklands) back because of our lack of naval resources.’ And Surgeon Rear Admiral Ralph Curr, the Royal Navy’s former medical director-general, added: ‘There’s no way we could defend the Falklands or re-engage the Argentines if it all happened again.’ In the Telegraph’s view, Britain can do ‘nothing’ to prevent Argentina retaking Falkland Islands. Argentine asserts sovreignty over Falkaland Islands March 2012 The Argentine senate has unanimously voted for a measure asserting the South American country’s “legitimate sovereignty” over the disputed Malvinas Islands. The draft document, known as the “Ushuaia Declaration,” was adopted ahead of the 30th anniversary of the war between Argentina and Britain over the islands, also known as the Falklands.The declaration also rejected “the persistent colonialist and militarist attitude of the United Kingdom” and warned against the “militarization” of the Malvinas.

Britain has deployed its most sophisticated warship, HMS Dauntless, and a nuclear submarine to the South Atlantic to prevent Argentina’s possible counter-move. Tensions have been mounting in recent months over the South Atlantic islands, with the UN calling on Britain to discuss decolonization, but the UK has so far refused to do so. The Submariners Lounge: *Falklands War 1982* The Submariners Lounge The Blog for Submariners their Families and Friends Monday, 23 May 2011 >> Newly Released Files and Documents << The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas/Guerra del Atlántico Sur), also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) over the disputed Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina; their name and sovereignty over them have long been disputed. The Falklands War started on Friday, 2 April 1982, with the Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.

Britain launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Argentine Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. The conflict ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982, and the islands remained under British control. The war lasted 74 days. It resulted in the deaths of 257 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and the deaths of three civilian Falkland Islanders. It is the most recent external conflict to be fought by the UK without any allied states. Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Belgrano on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather.

The losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of the Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict and the loss of the ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government. Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of the conventional submarine ARA San Luis, returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy Lynx helicopters fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.

United Kingdom – A total of 255 British servicemen and 3 female Falklands Island civilians were killed during the Falklands War. Royal Navy – 86 + 2 Hong Kong laundrymen (see below) Royal Marines – 27 (2 officers, 14 NCOs and 11 marines) Royal Fleet Auxiliary – 4 + 4 Hong Kong laundrymen Merchant Navy – 6 + 2 Hong Kong sailors British Army – 123 (7 officers, 40 NCOs and 76 privates) Royal Air Force – 1 (1 officer) Falklands Islands civilians – 3 women killed by friendly fire Of the 86 Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in HMS Ardent , 19 + 1 lost in HMS Sheffield , 19 + 1 lost in HMS Coventry and 13 lost in HMS Glamorgan. Fourteen naval cooks were among the dead, the largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.

Thirty-three of the British Army's dead came from the Welsh Guards, 21 from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18 from the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment , 19 from the Special Air Service (SAS), 3 from Royal Signals and 8 from each of the Scots Guards and Royal Engineers Only one dead was from the 1st battalion/7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles. Two more British deaths may be attributed to Operation Corporate, bringing the total to 260: Captain Brian Biddick from HMHS Uganda underwent an emergency operation on the voyage to the Falklands, was repatriated by an RAF medical flight to the hospital at Wroughton where he died on 12 May. Paul Mills from HMS Coventry suffered from complications from a skull fracture sustained in the sinking of his ship and died on 29 March 1983; he is buried in his home town of Swavesey. Relations between Argentina and UK were restored in 1989 under the umbrella formula which states that the islands' sovereignty dispute would remain aside.

Ships lost and Damaged Argentina's General Belgrano - Modern Warships - World of Warships official forum World of Warships official forum 26 replies to this topic Tanz #1 Posted 20 September 2012 - 12:14 AM Lieutenant Member since: 08-09-2012 The General Belgrano, an Argentine cruiser, was sunk during the Falklands War on May 2nd 1982. The Belgrano was sunk by the British submarine HMS Conqueror with considerable loss of life. The Belgrano was launched in 1938 as an American light cruiser – then named the USS Phoenix. The Phoenix was based at Pearl Harbour when the naval base was attacked by the Japanese in December 1941, thus bringing America into World War Two. The Phoenix was decommissioned in 1946 and sold to the Argentine Navy in 1951. In 1956, the ship was re-christened ‘General Belgrano’ after General Manuel Belgrano, a leading military figure in Argentina’s fight for independence.

On April 29th, 1982, the Belgrano and two destroyers were patrolling to the south of the Falkland Islands. All three ships were detected by HMS Conqueror and on April 30th, the Conqueror started her approach to them. The Belgrano was outside of the Total Exclusion Zone established by the British government around the Falkland Islands. However, at 12,000 tons fully loaded and with a decent array of weapons (including British Sea Cat missiles), the Belgrano was considered to be a threat to the Task Force even if she was outside of the Exclusion Zone. The commander of Conqueror, Chris Wreford-Brown was given the go-ahead to attack. On May 2nd, the Conqueror fired three conventional torpedoes at the Belgrano. The first one hit the bow but internal bulkheads held and the damage done at this end of the Belgrano, though substantial, was not critical and there were no deaths or injuries from this torpedo. The second torpedo hit the Belgrano towards the stern.

Here, the explosion from the hit resulted in massive damage and caused an estimated 275 deaths from this single torpedo. The explosion caused a 20-metre gash in the Belgrano’s deck and so damaged the ship’s electrical system that the captain did not have sufficient power to put out a distress call to the nearby destroyers. The lack of power also meant that the ship’s pumps could not work and the hull quickly filled with water and smoke. Twenty minutes after the first torpedo hit the Belgrano, Captain Hector Bonzo ordered the evacuation of the cruiser. Bad weather caused the scattering of lifeboats. Many of the crew were picked up and over the next two days 770 men were rescued. In total, 323 men were killed – by far the largest number in any single event during the Falklands War. Questions were asked about the legitimacy of the attack especially as the Belgrano was outside of the Exclusion Zone. The British government maintained that the Belgrano still represented a threat to the Task Force and in this they were, to an extent, supported by the Belgrano’s captain.

Hector Bonzo later made the point that though the Belgrano was sailing away from the Exclusion Zone, it was not sailing to its port in Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, It was simply moving to another unspecified position to await further orders – that could have included attacking the Task Force. The naval commander of the Task Force, Admiral Sandy Woodward, made the point that the Belgrano and its escorts were more than capable of turning about at speed and thus returning to a course towards the Task Force. Also on April 23rd, the Argentine government was handed a message from the British government (via the Swiss Embassy) that it held the right to take whatever action was required to defend itself if any Argentine “warship, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft” seemed to threaten the naval Task Force. Clearly as the Belgrano was considered to be a threat, it was attacked and sunk. After the war, Argentinean Rear- Admiral Allara admitted that the whole of the South Atlantic became an operational theatre during the conflict and that the Belgrano was a casualty of war. The sinking of the ‘General Belgrano’ sent a salient message to the military junta that ruled Argentina.

The Argentinean Navy after the sinking was effectively confined to port, especially their aircraft carrier, ‘Veinticinco de Mayo’. That meant their only means of attacking the Task Force was via its air force which, though it had its successes during the war, had to face an array of weaponry both at sea, and after the landings at San Carlos Bay, on land. She is the only ship ever to have been sunk in anger by a nuclear-powered submarine.

HMS Conqueror Specification for the General Belgrano Class: Brooklyn-class light cruiser Length: 608.3 ft (185.4 m) Beam: 61.8 ft (18.8 m) Draft: 19.5 ft (5.9 m) Speed: 32.5 knots (60 km/h) Complement: 1,138 officers and men Armament: 15× 6"/47 cal (152 mm) 8 × 5"/25 cal (127 mm) AA 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns 2 British Sea Cat missile AA systems (added 1968) Armor: Main Belt: 5.5 in (140 mm) Deck: 2 in (50 mm) Barbettes: 6 in (152 mm) Turret Roofs: 2 in (50 mm) Turret Sides: 6.5 in (170 mm) Conning Tower: 5 in (127 mm) Aircraft carried: 2 helicopters (One Aérospatiale Alouette III was on board when

 sunk) Good article.

Even today the Belgrano's loss is a harsh pill for us argentinians. But we cant blame the UK for the loss of the ship, in a middle of a war we started. To bad we didnt hang our admirals by the nuts after the war. "Tickle us, do we not laugh? Prick us, do we not bleed? Wrong us, shall we not revenge?" Around 23:53, KIRISHIMA and ATAGO illuminate SOUTH DAKOTA with their searchlights and then open fire, followed by TAKAO. Within the next few minutes KIRISHIMA fires a total of 117 14-inch shells (68 Type 3 incendiaries, 22 Type 0 Common and 27 Type 1 APC), scoring multiple hits with secondary and main guns. One Type 1 APC explodes against SOUTH DAKOTA's No. 3 turret's barbette.

08-09-2012 Crag_r, on 20 September 2012 - 02:57 AM, said: No matter which side of the conflict you thought was in the right, rest in peace to the 323 men killed that day. Amen to that Crag Jumarka, on 20 September 2012 - 05:47 AM, said: Good article. Even today the Belgrano's loss is a harsh pill for us argentinians. But we cant blame the UK for the loss of the ship, in a middle of a war we started. To bad we didnt hang our admirals by the nuts after the war. I really wasn't sure if I should have even made a topic on this, due to the nature of the sinking & strong feelings about it on both sides. Many people have probably never even heard of the General Belgrano until now but those two ship, the Belgrano & Conqueror are now and will always be an important part in the history of Naval combat.

Tanz, on 20 September 2012 - 12:14 AM, said: (...) Twenty minutes after the first torpedo hit the Belgrano, Captain Hector Bonzo ordered the evacuation of the cruiser. Bad weather caused the scattering of lifeboats. Many of the crew were picked up and over the next two days 770 men were rescued. In total, 323 men were killed – by far the largest number in any single event during the Falklands War. Questions were asked about the legitimacy of the attack especially as the Belgrano was outside of the Exclusion Zone. The British government maintained that the Belgrano still represented a threat to the Task Force and in this they were, to an extent, supported by the Belgrano’s captain. Hector Bonzo later made the point that though the Belgrano was sailing away from the Exclusion Zone, it was not sailing to its port in Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, It was simply moving to another unspecified position to await further orders – that could have included attacking the Task Force.

The naval commander of the Task Force, Admiral Sandy Woodward, made the point that the Belgrano and its escorts were more than capable of turning about at speed and thus returning to a course towards the Task Force. Also on April 23rd, the Argentine government was handed a message from the British government (via the Swiss Embassy) that it held the right to take whatever action was required to defend itself if any Argentine “warship, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft” seemed to threaten the naval Task Force. Clearly as the Belgrano was considered to be a threat, it was attacked and sunk. After the war, Argentinean Rear- Admiral Allara admitted that the whole of the South Atlantic became an operational theatre during the conflict and that the Belgrano was a casualty of war. The sinking of the ‘General Belgrano’ sent a salient message to the military junta that ruled Argentina. The Argentinean Navy after the sinking was effectively confined to port, especially their aircraft carrier, ‘Veinticinco de Mayo’.

That meant their only means of attacking the Task Force was via its air force which, though it had its successes during the war, had to face an array of weaponry both at sea, and after the landings at San Carlos Bay, on land. (...) Nice reading. However I disagree in several key points. You are trying to be impartial, and that's commendable, however you fail at the precise moment that you only provide the British name of the islands (Falklands). It would have been much more polite and respectful to add both names, since it's a zone still in conflict: Falklands/Malvinas. At least, to show respect to the deads, and to the Argentinian people. But that's the smallest mistake. Then, your following arguments are, at least, controversial and not yet verified by both sides of the conflict, or reliable and neutral external sources; but in this post, they are still presented to us as the Truth. You only provide information from the British point of view. How is that fair? You could have mentioned the Argentinian point of view too, for the sake of fairness (and not only "Questions were asked about the legitimacy of the attack...." and then, the whole British arguments).

Read this, perhaps it will help you understand the conflict (and that precise battle action) better: It is a zone still in dispute, you cannot avoid controversy... at least not if you are clearly supporting one side's point of view on that conflict. Neutrality means to show both points of view, both claims, and conclude nothing. Or, you can always start the post by saying "Ok, I'm with the British in this..." And that would be clear enough. My point of view? It was a stupid war, not wanted by the immense majorty of the Argentinian people. It was started by war criminals: a de facto military government, never chosen by the Argentinian people (who in fact, paid with many thousand lives just for thinking different, mostly left wing and moderated thinkers, tortured and killed by common criminals in uniforms, not to mention people who were tortured and survived, or people who had to flee to other countries). British reaction was absolutely expected, you cannot just attack a military power and expect to win, much less flawless. The Argentinian people, and soldiers from both sides, paid for this criminal belligerent act.

And yet, with all that Argentinian military government's fault, the Belgrano sinking was one of those criminal acts of the war. I don't want to feed the controversy, but I considered necessary to bring to light the always conveniently ignored Argentinian point of view. So, this will be my first and last post in this thread. Feel free to comment, investigate, disagree, troll, -1, or why not: learn... or whatever you want. Have a nice day. It is a zone still in dispute, you cannot avoid controversy... at least not if you are clearly supporting one side's point of view on that conflict. Neutrality means to show both points of view, both claims, and conclude nothing. Or, you can always start the post by saying "Ok, I'm with the British in this..." And that would be clear enough. My point of view? It was a stupid war, not wanted by the immense majorty of the Argentinian people.

It was started by war criminals: a de facto military government, never chosen by the Argentinian people (who in fact, paid with many thousand lives just for thinking different, mostly left wing and moderated thinkers, tortured and killed by common criminals in uniforms, not to mention people who were tortured and survived, or people who had to flee to other countries). British reaction was absolutely expected, you cannot just attack a military power and expect to win, much less flawless. The Argentinian people, and soldiers from both sides, paid for this criminal belligerent act. And yet, with all that Argentinian military government's fault, the Belgrano sinking was one of those criminal acts of the war. I don't want to feed the controversy, but I considered necessary to bring to light the always conveniently ignored Argentinian point of view. So, this will be my first and last post in this thread. Feel free to comment, investigate, disagree, troll, -1, or why not: learn... or whatever you want. Have a nice day. Hey, Ohsi...all good. This is what this forum is for to discuss things and learn. You post away man .

Also no worries about -1, or things like that from me...I'm not one of those people. It is a zone still in dispute, you cannot avoid controversy... at least not if you are clearly supporting one side's point of view on that conflict. Neutrality means to show both points of view, both claims, and conclude nothing. Or, you can always start the post by saying "Ok, I'm with the British in this..." And that would be clear enough. My point of view? It was a stupid war, not wanted by the immense majorty of the Argentinian people. It was started by war criminals: a de facto military government, never chosen by the Argentinian people (who in fact, paid with many thousand lives just for thinking different, mostly left wing and moderated thinkers, tortured and killed by common criminals in uniforms, not to mention people who were tortured and survived, or people who had to flee to other countries). British reaction was absolutely expected, you cannot just attack a military power and expect to win, much less flawless. The Argentinian people, and soldiers from both sides, paid for this criminal belligerent act.

And yet, with all that Argentinian military government's fault, the Belgrano sinking was one of those criminal acts of the war. I don't want to feed the controversy, but I considered necessary to bring to light the always conveniently ignored Argentinian point of view. So, this will be my first and last post in this thread. Feel free to comment, investigate, disagree, troll, -1, or why not: learn... or whatever you want. Have a nice day. Nice and polite way to display a different point of view (+1). Discussing with a British officer: "You French fight for money, while we British fight for honour." "Sir, a man fights for what he lacks the most." Robert Surcouf (French Corsair) 08-09-2012 ohsi, on 20 September 2012 - 05:23 PM, said: And yet, with all that Argentinian military government's fault, the Belgrano sinking was one of those criminal acts of the war. Nice post, and I agree with you that being entirely neutral is difficult, in fact the Vatican found this out during WW2.... But I digress.

I would like to agree a small point of your above post. I do not see how the sinking of the Belgrano was criminal because communications with Subs are extremely difficult. The sub had orders to sink the Belgrano, due to her aggressive posturing. By the time of the sinking, the Belgrano was no longer in an aggressive posture relative to the British forces, but by that time there was nothing the British Admiralty could do because they had to wait until the Sub surfaced in order to pass along new orders. This is one reason why Subs are not involved in Fleet actions, despite the current argument on this forum, and why Subs rarely work in concert in the same operational area. I do believe that it was a tragedy, but I will not and cannot place the blame on the British Government, but rather on the De Facto Government of Argentina at the time because without their actions this would not have happened. I salute the brave men who fought on land, air and sea during World War 2. Most especially those who landed on D- Day and those men of Taffy-3... May God preserve their souls and May men always remember them.

08-09-2012 ohsi, on 20 September 2012 - 05:23 PM, said: It would have been much more polite and respectful to add both names, since it's a zone still in conflict: Falklands/Malvinas. At least, to show respect to the deads, and to the Argentinian people. But that's the smallest mistake. In all reality that because the Argentinian theft failed, the only true name for the Islands in question is Falklands. There is no other name because Argentina failed to force the desired annexation of the said Islands. Using the proper name does not take from the dead, nor does it dishonor them. You claim that using the name Falklands dishonors the Argentinian Dead, if that is the case calling the Islands improperly by the false name Malvinas dishonors the British dead, and yes there are some. Until the International World and the citizens of the Falklands recognizes the Argentinian rule, then there is no question as to the name.

Also, Given that the official website of Her Majesty's Government of the Falkland Islands states this: Quote The Falkland Islands are a United Kingdom Overseas Territory by choice. Supreme authority is vested in Her Majesty The Queen and exercised by a Governor on her behalf, with the advice and assistance of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly. Link: I do not believe that there is any question as to either where the loyalties of the Islands lie, or whom they recognize as their legitimate rulers. I salute the brave men who fought on land, air and sea during World War 2. Most especially those who landed on D- Day and those men of Taffy-3... May God preserve their souls and May men always remember them. Member since: 08-09-2012 Interesting enough it is the so far the last (and second) ship to be sunk in anger since the second world war by a submarine. Also HMS conqueror was using the old Mk VII torpedoes which that type of torpedo originally entered service in 1927, which at the time made the torpedo design 55 years old when used against the ARA General Belgrano.

Also little known fact about British intelligence over the sinking; In late 2011, David Thorp, a former military intelligence officer who led the signals intercept team aboard HMS Intrepid, released the book The Silent Listener detailing the role of intelligence in the Falklands War. The book revealed that despite the fact that the Belgrano was observed by the Conqueror sailing away from the Falklands at the time of the attack, it had actually been ordered to proceed to a rendezvous point within the Exclusion Zone, to engage in a pincer attack. A report prepared by Thorp for Thatcher several months after the incident stated the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine Junta stated; the report was not released because the Prime Minister did not want to compromise British signals intelligence capabilities. Edited by Crag_r, 22 September 2012 - 04:26 AM. 08-09-2012 Crag_r, on 22 September 2012 - 04:22 AM, said: Interesting enough it is the so far the last (and second) ship to be sunk in anger since the second world war by a submarine.

Also HMS conqueror was using the old Mk VII torpedoes which that type of torpedo originally entered service in 1927, which at the time made the torpedo design 55 years old when used against the ARA General Belgrano. Also little known fact about British intelligence over the sinking; In late 2011, David Thorp, a former military intelligence officer who led the signals intercept team aboard HMS Intrepid, released the book The Silent Listener detailing the role of intelligence in the Falklands War. The book revealed that despite the fact that the Belgrano was observed by the Conqueror sailing away from the Falklands at the time of the attack, it had actually been ordered to proceed to a rendezvous point within the Exclusion Zone, to engage in a pincer attack. A report prepared by Thorp for Thatcher several months after the incident stated the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine Junta stated; the report was not released because the Prime Minister did not want to compromise British signals intelligence capabilities. Wasnt the plan for her to swing south then north to attach the task force while the argentine carrier formed the northern pincer?

I think it went awry aswell because the Carrier couldnt get enough wind over her bows to launch her planes, a calm day in the South Atlantic, who woulda thought it! British Task Force - Falklands War 1982 Major General Moore RM, Land Forces Falklands Islands, Brigadier M J A Wilson MC, 5th Infantry Brigade Eventual British Casualties and Losses in Major Equipment Four warships and a landing craft, One fleet auxiliary and one merchantman, 23 Navy, seven RAF, three Marine and one Army helicopters and aircraft. One thousand of the men taking part were killed or wounded. British Aims and Outcome - Once the decision was taken to launch "Operation Corporate" and dispute the Argentine invasion by force if necessary, Britain's military power was rapidly mobilised. Commanders were appointed and from bases thoughout the country, the highly technological ships and aircraft were readied and despatched to transport and support a limited number of professional Marines, Paras and Guardsmen. Fighting as infantrymen, they re-took the Falklands the hard way, and at the end of an 8,000 mile long logistical nightmare and lengthy chain of command.

Directly responsible to the British Cabinet for all military aspects was the Defence Staff at Whitehall not far from Downing Street with its Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin and the other service heads. Working out of Northwood, Middlesex, just outside London were the Task Force Commanders led by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, who in turn controlled events in the South Atlantic through the commanders on the spot. Taking part in this vast undertaking were nearly 30,000 men and a few women, and a large proportion of Britain's Navy and Marines, fleet auxiliaries and merchantmen, aircraft and helicopter squadrons, plus five Army battalions and supporting arms. Nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror, one of the first Royal Navy warships to reach South Georgia and then the Falklands area. She torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano" on the 2nd May 1982 Up to the final Argentine surrender, each of the ships, aircraft squadrons and main military units, as they entered the South Atlantic for the FIRST time in the campaign are introduced below.

Ships lost are in blue CAPITALS, damaged in lower case blue letters: Submarines reaching the Falkland's Area, early April to May Nuclear submarines "Spartan", "Splendid", "Conqueror", "Courageous"(?), "Valiant" and conventionally powered "Onyx", with some SBS. RAF Squadrons reaching or deploying to Ascension, early April to May VC.10 transports of 10 Sqdn, Hercules transports of 24, 30, 47 and 70 Sqdns, Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft of 42(TB), 51(?), 120, 201 and 206 Sqdns, Victor tankers of 55 and 57 Sqdns, Vulcan bombers of 44, 50 and 101 Sqdns, Harrier GR.3 attack aircraft of 1(F), Chinook helicopter of 18 and a Sea King of 202, CDG 38 – Submarine Attack: HMS Conqueror vs. AGA Belgrano, 1982 | Armchair General | Armchair General Magazine - We Put YOU in Command!

Home » Boardgames » CDG 38 – Submarine Attack: HMS Conqueror vs. AGA Belgrano, 1982 Posted on May 3, 2010 in Boardgames CDG 38 – Submarine Attack: HMS Conqueror vs. AGA Belgrano, 1982 By Armchair General Historical outcome and winning Reader Solutions to CDG #38, May 2010 issue. The May 2010 issue of Armchair General® magazine presented the Combat Decision Game “Submarine Attack! Falklands, 1982.” This CDG placed readers in the role of British Royal Navy Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, skipper of the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine HMS Conqueror during the 1982 Falklands War between Britain and Argentina. Argentina, which had long claimed that the British Overseas Territories of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island were rightfully its possessions, invaded and occupied these tracts of lands on April 2, 1982. Britain responded by sending naval, air and ground forces on an 8,000-mile journey to the South Atlantic to reclaim them.

Control of the seas surrounding the Falklands was crucial to the success of the British amphibious assault. Therefore, Conqueror’s mission on May 2, 1982, was vitally important to Britain’s naval operations. Subscribe Today Subscribe online and save nearly 40%! Wreford-Brown’s mission was to attack and sink the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano in history’s first-ever nuclear submarine attack on an enemy warship. If successful, Conqueror’s attack would likely convince Argentine naval commanders to withdraw their entire fleet to safer waters, thus conceding command of the sea to the Royal Navy. If the attack failed, however, the outcome of the naval war would remain in doubt, putting Britain’s amphibious assault against the Falklands in jeopardy. HISTORICAL OUTCOME HMS Conqueror, sent to patrol the waters south of the Falklands to screen the southern approaches, detected and began tracking Argentine naval Task Force (TF) 79.3, composed of the cruiser Belgrano (the former USS Phoenix, built in 1938) and two destroyers, Piedra Buena and Hipolito Bouchard (both former U.S.

Navy World War II-vintage warships). TF 79.3 was steaming just outside the 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone that Britain had established primarily to keep neutral vessels safely clear of the combat area. On May 2, while tracking the task force, Wreford-Brown received a high-priority message from the top level of the British government authorizing Conqueror to attack and sink Belgrano. Wreford-Brown decided to maneuver Conqueror into torpedo firing position and immediately attack Belgrano using the “tried and true” Mark 8 torpedoes (CDG Course of Action Two: Immediate Attack). After observing Belgrano through his submarine’s periscope at a distance of 2.5 miles and noting that the escorting destroyers were positioned 2,500 yards fore and aft on the cruiser’s starboard side, Wreford-Brown took Conqueror deeper, to 380 feet, and maneuvered to a firing position on Belgrano’s port side. As the sub was being moved, he had three forward torpedo tubes loaded with Mark 8 torpedoes.

Bringing Conqueror to periscope depth on the cruiser’s port side, Wreford-Brown observed TF 79.3’s actions and judged that the Argentine ships remained unaware of his sub’s approach. He ordered a torpedo firing solution computed. At 4 p.m. Conqueror’s outer torpedo doors were opened, and soon the three “fish” were in the water on a course to intercept Belgrano. Shortly after 4:02 p.m., as Wreford-Brown raised the periscope to observe the cruiser, a massive explosion erupted amidships on the Belgrano. The violent blast ripped through four of the cruiser’s decks, killing 272 Argentine crewmen outright and wounding scores of others. Seconds later, another Mark 8 torpedo struck Belgrano’s bow area. The two torpedoes were fatal to the Argentine cruiser, which began to list dangerously. A third torpedo missed Belgrano but struck the destroyer Bouchard’s keel. Although that torpedo failed to explode, the impact damaged Bouchard’s sonar and caused flooding.

Wreford-Brown ordered his crewmen to take immediate evasive action to avoid any retaliatory attack by TF 79.3’s destroyers. His men took Conqueror down to 500 feet, and the sub raced away from the stricken cruiser at 22 knots. They soon heard the destroyers’ depth charges exploding near the attack area. Widely circling the task force, Conqueror maneuvered to a position 11 miles north of the sinking ship to observe. At 4:40 p.m. Wreford-Brown saw the Belgrano’s remaining 770 crewmen abandon ship and board life rafts (they endured 30 hours in the open sea, and 23 of them succumbed to the elements before the group was rescued). At 5 p.m. on May 2, 1982, Belgrano sank, plummeting 10,000 feet to the bottom of the ocean. As the cruiser went down, Conqueror’s sonar operators could hear it being crushed by the immense pressure. As expected, Argentine naval commanders conceded control of the seas around the Falklands to the British.

Although an Argentine airstrike sank the destroyer HMS Sheffield with an Exocet missile on May 4, the amphibious landings were successful thanks to British control of the seas, which Conqueror had helped to secure. The Falklands were recaptured, and the islands returned to British rule on June 14, 1982. READER SOLUTIONS ACG judges based their selections for winning Reader Solutions and those receiving honorable mention on submissions that chose Course of Action Two: Immediate Attack, or those whose explanations demonstrated a solid understanding of the key points for a submarine attack. (See After Action Report.) With COA Two, the British engaged the enemy at once, ensuring that they did not lose contact with the task force. By using the reliable Mark 8 torpedoes with their superior explosive power, the British increased their chances of a fatal hit against the cruiser. Wreford-Brown reasoned that attacking immediately with a powerful, combat-proven torpedo design was less risky than attacking at a closer range with a less stealthy torpedo design.

The success of Course of Action One: Delayed Attack depended on the British maintaining continuous contact with TF 79.3, which was highly problematic given the rapidly changing weather in that area of the South Atlantic Ocean. Although senior British politicians in London preferred that the Argentine ships be shown as the aggressors by having them engage the British within the 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone, there was no guarantee that TF 79.3 would enter the zone at all. Furthermore, since Wreford-Brown was given the authorization to attack, this indicated that the top level of the British government thought that showing the Argentine ships as the aggressors was a desirable condition and not a mandatory one. Course of Action Three: Standoff Attack turned a combat action into a test of an unproven torpedo design, risking failure of the mission if the Mark 24 did not live up to expectations.

Although the Mark 24’s longer range (up to 17 miles) and homing ability would have given Conqueror a greater chance of avoiding retaliation by Belgrano’s escorting destroyers, the nuclear-powered submarine’s superior speed, deep diving capability, and outstanding maneuverability convinced Wreford-Brown that the sub could get close to the enemy and still evade any counterattacks by the World War II-era destroyers. AFTER ACTION REPORT KEY POINTS FOR A SUBMARINE ATTACK Maintain the highest level of training so that all crewmen can quickly and efficiently perform their combat duties. Keep all submarine weapons, target acquisition, and tracking systems manned and in perfect working order at all times. Adjust tactics to the assigned mission, accounting for weather and sea conditions. Consider torpedo system capabilities and limitations when planning the attack. Monitor enemy escort ship actions during approach to target, attack, and withdrawal. Once torpedoes are launched, take immediate evasive action to avoid enemy escort ship retaliation.

1 Comment challenger 11/11/2011 neither destroyer launched any counter attack although conquerors crew were convinced they had presumably due to the explosions/implosions of munitions/compartments aboard belgrano,upon hearing the explosion reports on sonar both destroyers steamed 30 miles at high speed (as agreed) to escape the danger they returned to search for belgrano several hours later,an 11 mile oil slick was discovered by aircraft at 9:10 and the search for survivors began.

Question: Name the Nuclear powered submarine which sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on May 2nd 1982.
Answer: Hms Conqueror