Operation Torch - Invasion of North Africa 60,000 men Operation Torch - Planning: In 1942, having been persuaded of the impracticality of launching an invasion of France as a second front, American commanders agreed to conduct landings in northwest Africa with the goal of clearing the continent of Axis troops and preparing the way for a future attack on southern Europe. Intending to land in Morocco and Algeria, Allied planners were forced to determine the mentality of the Vichy French forces defending the area. These numbered around 120,000 men, 500 aircraft, and several warships. It was hoped that as a former member of the Allies, the French would not fire on British and American forces. To aid in assessing local conditions, the American consul in Algiers, Robert Daniel Murphy, was instructed to gather intelligence and reach out to sympathetic members of the Vichy French government. While Murphy conducted his mission, planning for the landings moved forward under the overall command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The naval force for the operation would be led by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. Initially dubbed Operation Gymnast, it was soon renamed Operation Torch.

The operation called for three main landings to take place at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. Operation Torch - Contact with the Vichy French: Endeavoring to accomplish his objectives, Murphy provided evidence suggesting the French would not resist and made contact with several officers, including the commander-in-chief of Algiers, General Charles Mast. While these men were willing to aid the Allies, they requested a meeting with a senior Allied commander before committing. Meeting their demands, Eisenhower dispatched Major General Mark Clark aboard the submarine HMS Seraph. Rendezvousing with Mast and others at Cherchell, Algeria on October 21, 1942, Clark was able to secure their support. In preparation for Operation Torch, General Henri Giraud was smuggled out of Vichy France with the aid of the resistance. Though Eisenhower had intended to make Giraud the commander of French forces in North Africa after the invasion, the Frenchman demanded that he be given overall command of the operation. This was refused and Giraud became a spectator. With the groundwork laid with the French, the invasion convoys sailed with the Casablanca force departing the United States and the other two sailing from Britain.

Eisenhower coordinated the operation from his headquarters at Gibraltar ( Map ). Operation Torch - Casablanca: Slated to land on November 8, 1942, the Western Task Force approached Casablanca under the guidance of Major General George S. Patton and Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt. Consisting of the US 2nd Armored Division as well as the US 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, the task force carried 35,000 men. On the night of November 7, pro-Allies General Antoine Béthouart attempted a coup d'etat in Casablanca against the regime of General Charles Noguès. This failed and Noguès was alerted to the impending invasion. Landing to south of Casablanca at Safi as well as to the north at Fedala and Port Lyautey, the Americans were met with French opposition. Approaching Casablanca, Allied ships were fired upon by French shore batteries.

Responding, Hewitt directed aircraft from USS Ranger (CV-4) and USS Suwannee (CVE-27) to attack targets in the harbor while other Allied warships, including the battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), moved inshore and opened fire. The resulting fighting saw Hewitt's forces sink the unfinished battleship Jean Bart as well as a light cruiser, four destroyers, and five submarines. After weather delays at Fedala, Patton's men succeeded in taking their objectives and began moving against Casablanca. To the north, operational issues caused delays at Port-Lyautey, and initially prevented the second wave from landing. As a result, these forces came ashore under artillery fire from French troops in the area. Supported by aircraft from carriers offshore, the Americans pushed forward and secured their objectives. In the south, French forces slowed the landings at Safi and briefly pinned Allied troops down on the beaches. Though the landings fell behind schedule, the French were eventually driven back. On all fronts, the French were eventually overcome and American forces tightened their grip on Casablanca. By November 10, the city was surrounded and seeing no alternative, the French surrendered to Patton.

Operation Torch - Oran: Departing Britain, the Center Task Force was led by Major General Lloyd Fredendall and Commodore Thomas Troubridge. Tasked with landing the 18,500 men of the US 1st Infantry Division and the US 1st Armored Division on two beaches west of Oran and one to the east, they encountered difficulty due to insufficient reconnaissance. Overcoming shallow waters, the troops went ashore and encountered stubborn French resistance. At Oran, an attempt was made to land troops directly in the harbor in an effort to capture the port facilities intact. Dubbed Operation Reservist, this saw two Banff-class sloops attempt to run through the harbor defenses. While it was hoped that the French would not resist, the defenders opened fire on the two ships and inflicted significant casualties. As a result, both vessels were lost with the entire attack force either killed or captured. Outside of the city, American forces fought for a full day before the French in the area finally surrendered on November 9. Fredendall's efforts were supported by the United State's first airborne operation of the war.

Flying from Britain, the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion was assigned the mission of capturing the airfields at Tafraoui and La Senia. Due to navigational and endurance issues, the drop was scattered and the bulk of the aircraft forced to land in the desert. Despite these issues, both airfields were captured. Operation Torch - Algiers: The Eastern Task Force was led by Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the US 34th Infantry Division, two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Division, and two British Commando units. In the hours prior to the landings, resistance teams under Henri d'Astier de la Vigerie and José Aboulker attempted a coup against General Alphonse Juin. Surrounding his house, they made him a prisoner. Murphy attempted to convince Juin to join the Allies and did the same when he learned that the overall French commander, Admiral François Darlan, was in the city. While neither was willing to switch sides, the landings began and met with little to no opposition. Leading the charge was Major General Charles W. Ryder's 34th Infantry Division as it was believed the French would be more receptive to the Americans.

As at Oran, an attempt was made to land directly in the harbor using two destroyers. French fire compelled one to withdraw while the other succeeded in landing 250 men. Though later captured, this force did prevent the destruction of the port. While efforts to land directly in the harbor largely failed, Allied forces quickly surrounded the city and Juin surrendered at 6:00 PM on November 8. Operation Torch - Aftermath: Operation Torch cost the Allies around 480 killed and 720 wounded. French losses totaled around 1,346 killed and 1,997 wounded. As a result of Operation Torch, Adolf Hitler ordered Operation Anton which saw German troops occupy Vichy France. In North Africa, the French Armée d’Afrique joined with the Allies as did several French warships. Building up their strength, Allied troops advanced east into Tunisia with the goal of trapping Axis forces as General Bernard Montgomery 's Eighth Army advanced from their victory at Second El Alamein . Anderson nearly succeeded in taking Tunis but was pushed back by determined enemy counterattacks. American forces encountered German troops for the first time in February when they were defeated at Kasserine Pass .

Fighting through the spring, the Allies finally drove the Axis from North Africa in May 1943. Selected Sources Operation Torch (Nov 8, 1942) in World War II NEXT Nov 8, 1942 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, American ground troops saw virtually no action for almost a year. It was not because President Roosevelt or the American public were unwilling; the American army was just not prepared—and Roosevelt, at least, was not sure where he wanted to fight. 33 Roosevelt recognized that the most pressing military needs were in Europe. France had been defeated; Britain was under nightly attack. With the bulk of the German army heading toward Moscow, the Russians were taking a terrible beating--they begged Roosevelt for a second front that would pull off some of the German divisions that were pounding across their country. Given all of these factors, an attack from England across the channel into occupied France made the most sense. The proposal—code-named Operation Sledgehammer—was supported by most of the American high command. But this plan would cost thousands of lives and wipe out a large part of the existing American army. Moreover, most Americans were only really interested in fighting Japan.

A costly cross-channel invasion would therefore not only cost lives, it could cost Roosevelt the support of the American public. What Roosevelt needed was some sort of action that would satisfy the American public clamoring for action, be relatively safe and casualty free so that the public would not turn against the war, and offer at least a token front so that the Russians would get some relief. North Africa fit these criteria. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Germany, Italy, and Britain had battled to protect their interest in North Africa. By mid 1942, Britain had driven the Italians out and fought a see-saw battle with the Germans in Libya and Egypt. Further to the west, Germany controlled Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia through its proxies, the Vichy French—the French who, faced with certain defeat in 1940, had opted to collaborate with their German invaders rather than resist them. Germany had deployed a few divisions to defend their Mediterranean acquisition, but they had not committed huge resources to the region. It was, therefore, not much of a second front—the Russian were certain to complain that an action in North Africa provided only minimal help. But it was something.

Therefore on 8 November 1942, 124,000 British and American troops landed at Casablanca in Morocco, and Oran and Algiers in Algeria. The attacking armies were unsure as to how the Vichy French troops would respond—the Vichy were, after all, under the control of an occupying German army. Moreover, American diplomats and intelligence officers had contacted Vichy commanders promising them a role in the Allied effort if they provided no resistance. British and American negotiators also reminded the Vichy of their successful alliance during World War I. But French memories were not all positive. The United States had stood by quietly when France was overrun by Germany in 1940. And shortly after France had surrendered to the Germans, their fleet was attacked by the British at Mers-el-Kébir. The Ally-French relationship was, therefore, a mixture of historic friendship and recent animosity. Not surprisingly, the Vichy response to the American invasion was mixed. Some units lay down their arms, others attacked the Allied forces as they attempted to land. The most intense resistance occurred at Casablanca.

Under the command of General George Patton, American troops waded ashore waving the stars and stripes in hopes that the Vichy would not fire on them—but they did. Two days of intense fighting followed, including air battles between American and French pilots both flying American planes. In the end, the resistance in North Africa was ended only by promising Vichy Admiral Jean Darlan that he would remain in power—North Africa would continue to be governed not by the leaders of the French Resistance, but by those who had surrendered and then collaborated with the Germans. Operation Torch thus provided Roosevelt with uneven results. Casualties were held to a minimum—about 500 Allied soldiers were killed, another 700 were injured. The United States got the quick, painless action that Roosevelt believed necessary to slowly lead the American public toward intervention in Europe rather than Japan. But Roosevelt also had to cut a deal with a fascist collaborator and leave the discredited Vichy, rather than the heroic French Resistance, in power. In December, Darlan was assassinated, allowing the United States to install the far more respectable Henri Giraud, one of the leaders of the French Resistance.

But the deal with Darlan left a bad taste in the mouths of many Americans. Nor were the Russians all that pleased with the scope of the “second front” mounted by the Americans in response to their urgent pleas. Operation Torch | World War 2 Facts Operation Torch Map (Movement to Objective) Operation TORCH - Outward movements of assault and advance convoys Operation Torch Map (Overview) Operation Torch; November, 1942. Torch Landings. Operation Torch Video Operation Torch Facts and Summary Russia was constantly pushing the Allies to start a new front against the Axis in west Europe but in 1942 the Allies, mainly the British didn’t think that they were strong enough to attack Germany in Europe. However having won the Battle of El Alamein in November they felt confident going against the German forces in North Africa. Even though American military leadership wanted a landing in France and were confident that they could successfully pull it off, Roosevelt supported Churchill in his request that the Allies make preparations for an invasion of French North Africa. The plan that would later evolve into Operation Torch was to first make their way into North Africa and then later invade Sicily and move onto mainland Italy .

Such a victory would have been very important for the Allies because it would have cleared the Mediterranean for shipping purposes. The first planned targets of the Allies were Morocco and Algeria. These two countries were under the rule of Vichy France, which the Allies considered to be in collaboration with Germany so both of the African countries were legitimate targets for the Allies. Morocco had around 60, 000 French troops and a small naval fleet at Casablanca, but instead of fighting against the French army the Allies wanted to cooperate with them. Operation Torch was under the command of General Eisenhower and the headquarters were in Gibraltar. Rober Daniel Murphy located in Algiers at the time was assigned with the task to determine if and how cooperative the French army would be. What the Allies wanted above all else was a good amphibious landing, for that purpose Casablanca, Oran and Algiers were chosen as the landing sites. The Western Task Force under the command of Major-General George Patton was chosen to land near Casablanca with some 35, 000 troops. The Central Task Force was set on Oran under the command of Major-General Lloyd Fredendall with 18, 500 troops.

The Eastern and final task force which was under the command of General Ryder was to land at Algiers with 20, 000 troops. The landings started on 8th November. When the landings began there were no air or naval bombardments because the Allies hoped Seated are (from left to right) Gens. William H. Simpson, George S. Patton, Carl A. Spaatz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Courtney H. Hodges, and Leonard T. Gerow; standing are (from left to right) Gens. Ralph F. Stearley, Hoyt Vandenberg, Walter Bedell Smith, Otto P. Weyland, and Richard E. Nugent. that the French troops would cooperate and wouldn’t resist the landings but the French did fire at the transport ships which drew quick counter-fire from the Allied naval fleet. It was the sniper fire of the French that proved far more difficult to deal with. Because of the unexpected French resistance planes had to be launched from the carriers to protect the landing beaches. For the Allies the Vichy French resistance was a mere inconvenience and not a real military problem.

Patton’s main target was the capture of Casablanca, the city was captured on November 10th when he took the city without resistance, just two days into Operation Torch a major objective was already accomplished. The major problems at the Oran landings were also more of a logistics nature, the beach that was meant for the landing hadn’t been properly inspected and the shallow waters lead to damage on some of the landing craft which slowed down the deployment of equipment and troops. A few ships of the French navy also tried to attack the Allied fleet but were quickly sunk or driven away and by November 9th the French troops had surrendered. The Algiers landings also went according or even better than planned. The Vichy government had their hands full with dealing with an attempted coup to handle the Allied invasion and by the end of the day the landings at Algiers began the city surrendered to the Allies. Operation Torch Conclusions All three landings during Operation Torch were extremely successful. The French resistance, despite being surprising was minimal and so were the casualties of the Allies. After regrouping the landed Allied troops moved to Tunisia.

The German troops that were battling with Montgomery at El Alamein were now retreating in the direction of the now landed Allies, with seemingly nowhere else to retreat. Consequences of Operation Torch When France surrendered to Germany earlier in World War 2 , the Germans agreed to allow southern France to remain free of occupying forces and to be governed from Vichy. A related condition to this agreement; however, was that Vichy French forces overseas would resist attacks by the Allied forces to include naval forces. Due to the lack of resistance by the French in North Africa, the Germans immediately occupied southern France and seized the remainder of the French Fleet located in Toulon (Operation Lila). The majority of the ships were scuttled at the dock; however, before the Germans could press them into service. For the Allies, Operation Torch was an overwhelming success. After the victory, British forces led by General Montgomery were to the east of Tunisia and the U.S. forces were located to the west effectively sandwiching Rommel in Tunisia. This would allow the Allies to eventually defeat Rommel in the Battle of Tunisia in mid-1943 and give the Allies a solid-base to invade Sicily and Italy.

At the time of Operation Torch being conducted, it was the largest amphibious operation conducted in warfare and was also the first big success of the war for the Allied powers. Operation Torch | World War II Database World War II Database Contributor: C. Peter Chen ww2dbaseAs the United States Army was becoming ready for war, although the Americans had wanted a direct assault on occupied Europe, American President Franklin Roosevelt lost the "the transatlantic essay competition" to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, resulting in the attention being placed on eliminating Axis forces from North Africa rather than a direct assault on continental Europe. The long term goal was to relieve the pressure on the Allied forces in Egypt and to establish a base for a future invasion of Southern Europe. The operation was to be placed under the overall command of US Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower, who would issue orders from Gibraltar. He had approved an attack plan that called for simultaneous landings at several ports along the Casablanca-Oran railway. Although the operation targeted territory under Axis influence, politically it was not as straight-forward, as it was Vichy French territory.

Although the Vichy government had aligned with Germany, the Allies took the assumption that the 125,000 French and colonial ground troops would put up no more than token resistance. The potential response of the French Navy, however, was more difficult to predict, as the British attacks on French naval forces at Mers-el-Kï¿½bir and Dakar in French West Africa, with the deaths of over 1,000 French servicemen, had severely strained British-French relations. ww2dbaseInitially the planners wished to strike east of Gibraltar to directly threaten Tunisia, which with Tunis and Bizerte represented two of the best deep water ports in North Africa, but ultimately the Allies conservatively chose landing sites much further west due to the threat of Spain potentially allowing the Germans to cross Spanish territory to invade Gibraltar, which might cut off any Allied contingents between Gibraltar and Tunisia. ww2dbaseTwo weeks before the attack, on 21 Oct 1942, Eisenhower dispatched Major General Mark Clark aboard British submarine HMS Seraph (under disguise as an American submarine) to meet with Vichy French officers in an attempt to gain support, while Eisenhower also conducted several rounds of persuasion at Gibraltar.

Among the high ranking French officers was General Henri Giraud, who was offered the post of commander-in-chief of French forces in North Africa after a successful operation should he choose to support it. Giraud demanded the position as overall commander of the operation in return, which was something that cannot be fulfilled by the Allies; nevertheless, he pledged to remain inactive at Gibraltar once the invasion began, thus eliminating him as a potential enemy. The influential French Admiral Franï¿½ois Darlan, on the other hand, was offered by Eisenhower the position of overall French chief in French North Africa should he choose to join the Allies. This was met with fury by the Free French and the French Resistance as this represented a Vichy French-controlled North Africa rather than a Free French one. French General Antoine Bï¿½thouart was persuaded to join the Allies; at the eve of the invasion, 7 Nov 1942, he would attempt a failed coup d'etat, which, instead of causing confusion among French leadership, it actually alarmed those in command, who ordered defenses be bolstered.

ww2dbaseCasablanca, French Morocco 8-16 Nov 1942 ww2dbaseSailing toward Casablanca was the Western Task Force under the overall command of US General George Patton, with US Rear Admiral Henry Hewitt as the naval commander of the fleet of 102 ships. Aboard, the 35,000 Americans organized in two infantry divisions and one armored division were shipped directly from the United States. US Army Major General Jimmy Doolittle's aircraft covered the operation, while naval aircraft from carrier USS Ranger also provided air cover. ww2dbaseThe French defenses at Casablanca were formidable, as the port was a major French Navy base. The coastal batteries contained four 194-millimeter guns, four 138-millimeter guns, three 100-millimeter guns, and two 75-millimeter guns; the incomplete battleship Jean Bart, acting as a stationary gun platform, added four 380-millimeter guns mounted in one turret to the defensive armament.

One light cruiser, two flotilla leanders, seven destroyers, eight sloops, eleven minesweepers, and eleven submarines were present on the day of the invasion. ww2dbaseThe invasion fleet arrived at Casablanca to unprepared French defenses despite the French had detected this large fleet passing by the Strait of Gibraltar. The fleet broke up into three groups as follows.

Northern group (Operation Goalpost): Battleship USS Texas, cruiser USS Savannah, six destroyers, six troopships, and two cargo ships; 9,000 men of US 60th Infantry Regiment and 65 light tanks; assigned to attack Port Lyautey and its airfield Southern group (Operation Blackstone): Battleship USS New York, cruiser USS Philadelphia, six destroyers, four troopships, and two cargo ships; 6,500 men of US 47th Infantry Regiment and 90 medium and light tanks; assigned to attack Safi Center group (Operation Brushwood): Battleship USS Massachusetts, many cruisers, many destroyers, fifteen troopships, many cargo ships; 19,500 troops of US 3rd Infantry Division with 79 light tanks; assigned to attack Fedala 15 miles northeast of Casablanca ww2dbaseAt 0000 hours, center group troopships dropped anchor 8 miles off of Fedala, which was 15 miles northeast of Casablanca.

At 0210 hours, French troops manning the battery at Pont Blondin reported the presence of American naval activity off Fedala, and an alert was ordered at 0325 hours. American guide boats set out at 0145 hours and they were all in place by 0500 hours. At 0357, French personnel at Safi reported the sighting of enemy destroyers. At about 0400, American aircraft began dropping propaganda leaflets over Casablanca. At 0420 hours, French fleet at Morocco, Marine Maroc, ordered submarines to patrol off Casablanca. At 0430 hours, French auxiliary sloop Estafette was boarded by the Americans, and the crew's distress signal led to a general alert issued by Marine Maroc. At 0505 hours, French Admiralty ordered the Marine Maroc to sortie against Allied shipping traffic west of Gibraltar. The first wave of American landing craft approached the landing beaches at 0545 hours, before daybreak. French coastal guards illuminated the American vessels by searchlights, but the lights were quickly destroyed by machine guns mounted on Allied ships.

By dawn, 3,500 American troops had already landed. Just before 0700 hours, two French aircraft approached the fleet, but they were driven off by anti-aircraft gunfire. At 0700 hours, French submarines Amazone, Antiope, Meduse, Orphee, and La Sybille began maneuvering to defensive positions. Shortly after 0700 hours, the coastal batteries opened fire, damaging destroyers USS Ludlow and USS Murphy. Although Patton had been instructed not to conduct any pre-invasion naval bombardment to minimize the bloodshed on the defenders as to achieve a better political standing with the French, at 0720 hours, Admiral Hewitt authorized returned fire on the French guns. Destroyers USS Ludlow and USS Wilkes were successful in silencing the French guns at the Point Blondin battery, while cruiser USS Augusta silenced the guns at the Fedala battery.

At 0750 hours, French fighters engaged the oncoming American bombers with escorting fighters, with 7 French and 5 American fighters lost in the ensuing fight, but the French fighters were unsuccessful in stopping the American bombers, which dropped bombs on Casablanca harbor at 0804 hours, sinking French submarine Amphitrite, and at least 12 other civilian and military ships. ww2dbasePatton landed on the beach at 0800 hours to personally lead the invasion from the front lines. ww2dbaseShortly after, battleship USS Massachusetts and cruisers USS Wichita and USS Tuscaloosa, with a screen of four destroyers (USS Mayrant, USS Rhind, USS Wainwright, and USS Jenkins), joined the attack on the French coastal batteries. The guns of the El Hank battery straddled USS Massachusetts with its first salvo at 0804 hours, while a salvo from Jean Bart also landed 600 yards off the starboard side of the American battleship at 0808 hours and then another to port shortly after.

USS Massachusetts chose to target Jean Bart, hitting her with the 5th salvo at 0825 hours (7 minutes after Jean Bart was hit by an aerial bomb), which jammed her turret rotating mechanism, rendering her guns useless. Between 0835 and 0836 hours, shells from Massachusetts, although missing Jean Bart, caused damage. Massachusetts ceased fired between 0840 and 0848 while attempting to find out Jean Bart's condition, and after spotter aircraft reported that Jean Bart remained operational, Massachusetts opened fire again at 0848 hours. ww2dbaseWhile the American and French ships exchanged shells, American aircraft bombarded the port. Passenger ships Porthos, Savoie, and Lipari, some still under the process of being evacuated of their civilian passengers from Dakar, were hit as well. ww2dbaseAt 0900 hours, off Fedala, seven ships of the French 2nd Light Squadron sortied, making smoke as they approached the American ships.

At 0918 hours, a F4F Wildcat fighter launched from USS Ranger spotted the French column; the pilot reported the findings via radio and expressed his intention to strafe the French ships with other fellow pilots. Two minutes later at 0920 hours, French destroyer Milan, leader of the attack with Contre-Amiral Raymond de Lafond aboard, spotted the American ships, but at the same time the American F4F Wildcat fighters struck, injuring Lafond and killing the executive officer of destroyer Brestois. At 0925 hours, Milan led the other French destroyers in attacking destroyers USS Wilkes, USS Swanson, and USS Ludlow; the American ships fled northward amidst geysers of missed rounds, though Ludlow was hit once. At 0930 hours, Milan's guns turned and fired at the Higgins boats carrying American troops toward the shore; one boat was sunk and another was damaged; this was the only time that an American amphibious assault was attacked by hostile forces from the sea. 0934 hours, French destroyer Albatros hit USS Ludlow, blasting a hole in the main deck and wounding four men.

At 0940 hours, Milan spotted USS Augusta and USS Brooklyn; outgunned, Lafond turned around in the hope that he would be able to lure the American cruisers closer to the coastal guns at El Hank, but the Americans did not follow. Three minutes later, USS Augusta opened fire, followed by USS Brooklyn a moment later. At 1115 hours, USS Brooklyn hit French light cruiser Primauguet, causing minor damage. Five minutes later, Primauguet was hit three more times, but none of the American shells detonated. At 1140 hours, Albatros was damaged at the bow by a near miss. At 1145 hours, tug Lavandou approached the battle-damaged Milan to evacuate the wounded, while Contre-Amiral Lafond relocated his command to the sloop Commandant Delage. Milan was beached to prevent sinking shortly after. At 1146 hours, Albatros hit USS Brooklyn's No. 1 5-inch gun mount, wounding 5, but the shell failed to detonate thus the American cruiser avoided worse damage.

USS Massachusetts was hit by light cruiser Primauguet at 1157 hours, but it only caused minor damage. About five minutes later, the American observed that the French naval resistance was in general becoming ineffective, thus USS Massachusetts was ordered to cease fire to conserve ammunition in case the French battleship Richelieu appeared on the scene; shortly after, USS August also disengaged from battle. Although fighting continued off Casablanca, actions were not great. At 1456 hours, USS Augusta's spotter aircraft reported all surviving French ships as heavily damaged. Between 1500 and 1600 hours, sloop Commandant Delage attempted to rescue French seamen in the sea, but it was strafed by American aircraft on several occasions. At 1605 hours, American ships withdrew. Primauguet and Albatros were beached to prevent sinking. During the fighting, French submarine Amazone fired a salvo of torpedoes against USS Brooklyn, but all torpedoes missed.

ww2dbaseAt the end of the day, the Americans believed that Jean Bart had been disabled for good, but they did not realize that French shipyard workers were on the double in the repair of the damaged turret rotating mechanism. ww2dbaseSafi surrendered in the afternoon of 8 Nov. ww2dbaseThe American attack on Port Lyautey (now Kenitra, Morocco) was under the command of Major General Lucian Truscott. The landing forces easily overwhelmed the light defenses at the beach village of Mehdiya. US Colonel Demas Craw and Major Pierpont Hamilton approached Port Lyautey in the morning of 8 Nov in pursuit of a diplomatic end to the attacks, but as they approached a road fork outpost, a nervous French soldier pulled the trigger on his machine gun out of instinct, killing Craw. Hamilton proceeded with his mission, meeting French Colonel Charles Petit, only to find that Petit lacked the authority to make any decision to cease fighting. On 9 Nov, American troops continued their attack on the fort of Kasbah, which began on the previous day.

ww2dbaseOn 10 Nov 1942, French ships Commandant Delage, La Gracieuse, and La Servannaise sortied at 1110 hours to open fire on American troops advancing on the ground from Fedala to the outskirts of Casablanca, successfully driving back the American attack. USS Augusta and destroyers USS Edison and SS Tillman responded, driving the French ships back into Casablanca harbor; Commandant Delage was hit once, killing 5 men. The American ships were caught by surprise, however, as the large caliber guns of Jean Bart fired on them, driving them back. USS Ranger dispatched nine dive bombers to attack Jean Bart, hitting her with two 450-kilogram bombs, causing flooding, sinking her in shallow waters at 1600 hours. In response, French submarines Le Tonnant, Meduse, and Antiope counter attacked USS Ranger, USS Massachusetts, and USS Tuscaloosa, respectively with torpedoes, but none hit; Meduse was damaged by American gunfire during the attack and had to be beached off Cape Blanc by her crew.

ww2dbaseOn 10 Nov, the Americans captured Kasbah near Port Lyautey, which led to the fall of the port as well as the nearby airfield. Patton later praised French efforts at the Port Lyautey area, particularly at the face of overwhelming American strength. ww2dbaseOne hour prior to the scheduled ground invasion on Casablanca on 11 Nov, the French garrison there surrendered. French submarines Amazone and Antiope escaped to Dakar, while Orphee returned to Casablanca after it had surrendered. ww2dbaseAlso on 11 Nov, German submarines arrived to attack the American fleet. In the early morning, U-173 attacked destroyer USS Hambleton, oiler USS Winooski and troopship USS Joseph Hewes; the former two were damaged, and USS Joseph Hewes sank, taking 100 lives. Later on that day, French submarine Sidi Ferruch was sunk by TBF Avenger torpedo bombers of squadron VGS-27 from escort carrier USS Suwanee. In the afternoon of 12 Nov, U-130 sank troopships USS Tasker H.

Bliss, USS Hugh L. Scott, and USS Edward Rutledge with torpedoes, killing 74 men. On 13 Nov, an American PBY Catalina aircraft detected French submarine Le Conquerant off Villa Cisneros, Spanish Morocco; Le Conquerant's crew scuttled her off Cadiz, Spain on 15 Nov. On 16 Nov, American destroyers sank German submarine U-173 off Casablanca. ww2dbaseOran, French Algeria 8-9 Nov 1942 ww2dbaseUS Major General Lloyd Fredendall commanded the Center Task Force, which was tasked to invade Oran; British Commodore Thomas Troubridge acted as the naval commander. The transports of the task force carried one infantry division, one armored division, and one paratrooper regiment, totaling 18,500 American servicemen. Major General Doolittle's American aircraft also supported this invasion target, along with Casablanca. ww2dbaseThe invasions took place on four sites, two west of Oran, Arzew to the east of Oran, and the port of Oran itself.

Landings at the westernmost beach was delayed by the unexpected presence of a French convoy and the unexpected shallowness of the water that damaged some landing craft; the latter would prove to be a lesson to be learned regarding the importance of proper intelligence gathering for later amphibious operations in the European War. At Arzew, the US 1st Ranger Battalion captured the coastal battery smoothly. The landing attempt at Oran harbor, however, proved to be costly; although the French warships defending the port was driven off, damage to Allied warships caused many casualties. Proving the Allied planners wrong, French troops at Oran fought on stubbornly, surrendering only on 9 Nov after a heavy naval bombardment by British battleships. ww2dbaseSimultaneous to the 8 Nov amphibious invasion, an airborne assault was also conducted at Oran, targeting at Tafraoui and La Senia airfields 15 and 5 miles south of Oran. This attack conducted by the US 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment represented the first major American airborne operation. They were flown from Britain, over Spain, to the drop zone.

The operation was marred by various communications and weather-related problems; because the latter, 30 of the 37 transport aircraft experienced so much trouble that they landed in the dry salt lake to deliver their loads of troops rather than having the men jump. Nevertheless, both airfields were captured to prevent French interference from the air. ww2dbaseAlgiers, French Algeria 8 Nov 1942 ww2dbaseThe third and final major target of Operation Torch was Algiers, which fell under the responsibility of British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson's Eastern Task Force; British Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burrough served under him as the naval commander of the fleet of 650 ships, while US Major General Charles Ryder was to be placed in command for the amphibious operation. The 20,000 men sailing with this invasion force were of a mix of British and American servicemen, with one British infantry division, one American infantry division, and two British commando battalion-sized units. Above, British aircraft under the command of Air Marshal Sir William Welsh supported the ground and naval operations.

ww2dbaseThe invasion on Algiers was preceded by the uprising of 400 French Resistance fighters under the leadership of Henri d'Astier de la Vigerie and Josï¿½ Aboulker. The uprising by the resistance fighters, which began at 0000 hours, seized control of the telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house, the headquarters of French 19th Corps, and most importantly, all of the coastal artillery batteries. At the governor's house, General Alphonse Juin and Admiral Darlan (whose presence was not expected) remained under captivity by the resistance fighters until the fighters were surrounded and defeated by French Gendarmerie military police after daybreak. ww2dbaseThe landings of Allied troops were planned to target three separate beaches near Algiers, but in the confusion some of the troops were delivered to the wrong location. Nevertheless, French coastal defense at Algiers proved to be minimal, especially with all the coastal guns under the control of resistance fighters. The only major fighting in the invasion took place in the port of Algiers (Operation Terminal), where two British destroyers attempted to land US Rangers were met with heavy artillery fire.

Only one of the two destroyers was able to disembark passengers, and the 250 Rangers promptly took control of the docks. ww2dbaseGeneral Juin surrendered Algiers at 1800 hours on 8 Nov 1942. ww2dbaseEpilogue ww2dbaseOn 9 Nov, amidst fighting, Darlan signed an armistice with Eisenhower. On the following day, Darlan distributed a message to all French forces to cease fighting against the Allies. The ease of French leaders being persuaded to remain inactive or to cooperate alarmed Adolf Hitler, who would soon decide to act against Vichy France to prevent such an occurrence should the Allies invade Southern France. The Vichy government, with Philippe Pï¿½tain at its head, also immediately moved against Darlan, dismissing him dishonorably. Darlan, embarrassed by to dismissal, felt the need to rescind his order, but he was dissuaded by Clark. ww2dbaseBeginning on 9 Nov, Axis forces began building up in Tunisia in response of the Anglo-American invasion to the west.

French General Barrï¿½, with some delay, set up a defensive line from Teboursouk to Medjez el Bab in Tunisia to curb Axis movement, but this line was penetrated by the Axis troops under Walter Nehring after two attacks. ww2dbaseSources: 1. Anonymous says: 20 Oct 2011 03:59:40 AM i was there,you landed at fedala 20 km from casablanca i have a leaflet that was dropped that morning i picked it that morning i was 8 years old. would you like to buy it 2. Anonymous says: 28 Dec 2014 06:35:52 AM My grandad was a duck driver foes anyone know anyone who would know my grandad jack pickering 3. tahraoui says: 26 Apr 2015 09:44:03 AM hello; l want informations about allied army installed in NEMOURS and BERAOUN (ALGERIA) during Torch Operation .

Thanks 26 Oct 2015 09:20:48 AM Like to see pics of Ike's north African headquarters.My Dad was a clerk/typist there. 5. C E Mac Kay says: 4 Oct 2016 04:06:20 PM There is no evidence Le Tonnant attacked the Ranger on the day indicated. At the time and day her diary just says periscope sighted. Although her records show she was attacked more than three times by submarines. 6. 4 Oct 2016 09:36:29 PM CE MacKay: The book *World War II Sea War, Vol 7: The Allies Strike Back* by Donald A. Bertke, Gordon Smith, & Don Kindell on page 296 says Le Tonnant unsuccessfully attacked Ranger off Casablanca on 10 Nov 1942 and named the destroyer Ellyson as the escort. It is not clear what their sources were. Ellysonï¿½s War Diary says they spotted a periscope and dropped one pattern of depth charges on it.

All visitor submitted comments are opinions of those making the submissions and do not reflect views of WW2DB. Posting Your Comments on this Topic Your Name 6/12/2006 • World War II On November 8, 1942, the military forces of the United States and the United Kingdom launched an amphibious operation against French North Africa, in particular the French-held territories of Algeria and Morocco. That landing, code-named ‘Torch,’ reflected the results of long and contentious arguments between British and American planners about the future course of Allied strategy — arguments that were finally stilled by the intervention of the American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt. In both a direct and an indirect sense, Torch’s impact was enormous on the course of Anglo-American strategy during the remainder of the war. It may have been the most important strategic decision that Allied leaders would make. In fact, this amphibious operation inevitably postponed the landing in France until 1944, but at the same time it allowed the United States to complete mobilization of its immense industrial and manpower resources for the titanic air and ground battles that characterized the Allied campaigns of 1944.

American strategic thinking in early 1942 aimed at defeating Nazi Germany before turning to the problems that a flood of Japanese conquests and victories were raising in the Pacific. General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army’s chief of staff, viewed the strategic problem in simple terms: The United States should concentrate its military might on achieving a successful lodgment on the European continent as soon as possible. In the summer of 1942 the plight of the Soviet Army seemed desperate, as Adolf Hitler’s panzer divisions pushed ever onward toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Some American military planners believed that it might be necessary to invade northwestern Europe in 1942 to take the heat off the hard-pressed Soviets. But their preferred date was spring 1943, when American ground forces would be better prepared, trained and equipped to fight the Wehrmacht on the European continent. Whatever the difficulties of such an operation, they believed that American know-how and resources could solve them. British military leaders, led by the formidable chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, took a very different approach.

They were not at all optimistic about a cross-Channel amphibious operation in 1943, and they were completely against launching such an operation in 1942. Part of their opposition lay in the fact that the United Kingdom would have to bear much of the military burden for such an attempt. Moreover, Britain’s military leaders had experienced the vicious fighting against the Germans in World War I that had inflicted such heavy casualties on their forces. Most of them had also confronted the Wehrmacht’s formidable fighting power during the disastrous 1940 campaign in France, while the experiences of British forces in North Africa and Libya against Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had done nothing to diminish their respect for German military capabilities. After the war, Brooke put the situation in these terms: ‘I found Marshall’s rigid form of strategy very difficult to cope with. He never fully appreciated what operations in France would mean — the different standard of training of German divisions as opposed to the raw American divisions and to most of our new divisions.

He could not appreciate the fact that the Germans could reinforce the point of attack some three to four times faster than we could, nor would he understand that until the Mediterranean was open again we should always suffer from a crippling shortage of sea transport.’ Thus, particularly because they would have supplied the bulk of the invading forces, the British staunchly opposed any amphibious landing in 1942. Instead, they urged the Americans to consider the possibility of intervening in the Mediterranean to clear Axis military power from the shores of North Africa and open up that great inland sea to the movement of Allied convoys. The result was a deadlock — one that led Marshall to consider for a short period switching the U.S. Army’s emphasis from the European Theater of Operations to the Pacific. However, President Roosevelt refused to hear of any such change in U.S. grand strategy. At that point, in the summer of 1942, he did something that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was never to do during the entire course of World War II. He intervened and overruled his military advisers. Roosevelt gave his generals a direct order to support the British proposal for landings along the coast of French North Africa. The president’s reasoning was largely based on political necessity.

If Germany remained the main focus of the American war effort, something Roosevelt believed in even more fervently than did his military advisers, then U.S. troops were going to have to fight against the Germans somewhere in Europe. Given British attitudes, there was no choice but to move against Morocco and Algeria and thus commit U.S. forces to the battle for control of the Mediterranean. The final plan was an ambitious one. The western Allies would transport 65,000 men, commanded by Lt. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, from ports in the United States and England, and invade French North African possessions at Casablanca, Oran and Algers. The Allied move against French North Africa benefited enormously from the fact that the attention of Axis political and military leaders remained focused elsewhere. The Germans were involved in their struggle for Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Moreover, the situation in Egypt was growing increasingly grim throughout September and into October, as the British built up their forces under Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery for a renewed offensive against Rommel’s Afrika Korps.

At the end of October, Montgomery’s Eighth Army attacked the Germans at El Alamein, precipitating a massive battle of attrition that Axis forces had no hope of winning. Not surprisingly, Axis leaders concentrated on what was happening in Egypt’s desert sands. By early November, Rommel’s forces were rapidly retreating back into Libya against Hitler’s express orders. At the beginning of November, German and Italian intelligence did detect a major buildup of Allied shipping around Gibraltar. But the Germans dismissed the threat as simply another large supply convoy to reinforce Malta. The Italians were not so sure, but by that point in the war the Germans were paying them little attention. A diary entry for November 8 by the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, suggests the extent of the disarray in the Axis camp at the beginning of Torch: ‘November 8, 1942: At five-thirty in the morning [German foreign minister Ulrich Jaochim] von Ribbentrop telephoned to inform me of American landings in Algerian and Moroccan ports. He was rather nervous, and wanted to know what we intended to do.

I must confess that, having been caught unawares, I was too sleepy to give a very satisfactory answer.’ At the operational level, the Torch landings almost immediately succeeded. The initial Allied hope was that dissident French officers who supported the Allied cause would rise up and seize control of the levers of power. Such hopes, however, proved false. Ironically, the military forces of Vichy France once again, as they had done at Dakar in 1940 and in Syria in 1941, resisted Allied military forces — something they failed to do against invading German forces in France in November 1942 and in Tunisia that same month. Fortunately for the fate of the Allied invasion, the Germans had never trusted the Vichy leaders and, as a result, had prevented them from modernizing their military forces in North Africa. The result was that French tanks were obsolete even by 1940 standards, while the defenders possessed insufficient combat aircraft. Nevertheless, the French gave a good account of themselves. In some places it was touch and go, but in the end the French were never in a position to put up sustained resistance against attacking Allied forces.

For the initial landings, the Americans provided the bulk of the forces, in the hope that the French would be less willing to offer resistance to U.S. troops. That also proved to be an idle hope. On the coast of Morocco, the French failed to put up effective opposition against most of the American landings, but the heavy Atlantic surf more than made up for the weak resistance. During the landings at Fedala, the transport Leonard Wood lost 21 of its landing craft in the surf, with heavy loss of life. The transport Thomas Jefferson lost 16 of its 31 landing craft, with three more damaged, in delivering just the first wave of troops. The transport Carroll had the worst experience: She lost 18 of her 25 landing craft in the first wave and five in the second wave, leaving just two operable boats to move troops and supplies to the beachhead. Luckily for the Americans, only the landings near Mehdia ran into serious opposition from defending French forces. As the official history notes: ‘The situation of [the landing] force at nightfall, 8 November, was insecure and even precarious.’ Only first-class leadership by Maj. Gen.

Lucian Truscott, hard fighting by American troops and naval gunfire support finally managed to deliver the airfield near Mehdia into American hands by November 10. At that point fighting stopped due to negotiations between French military leaders and the Allies in Algeria. The landing forces along the Algerian coast, however, ran into stiffer resistance. While the landings at Oran were successful, because of French resistance and the greenness of U.S. troops they soon fell behind schedule. The fact that the French had no air support spared the Americans to some extent. By the evening of November 8 the 1st Infantry Division had achieved its objectives except in the area of St. Cloud, where French resistance was stubborn. As he would do in Normandy, Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., son of the former president, proved to be an inspiring and effective combat leader. Nevertheless, a rising surf began to interfere with landing operations over the course of the day. That evening Allied naval commanders had to suspend landing operations across the beaches. On the second day, the French prepared to launch a counterattack, but Allied air attacks and naval gunfire stopped them dead in their tracks.

Despite considerable resistance from the French, American forces were in a position to attack and overwhelm Oran’s defenses on November 10, when the armistice between the opposing sides came into effect. Operations against the port of Algiers represented the most difficult assignment for the attacking Allied forces. Not only did the French have substantial ground forces in the area, they also possessed 52 fighter aircraft and 39 bombers. The port itself was defended by strong coastal artillery positions. Thus, the main Allied attacks came on beaches to the west and east of the city. British Commandos and Regular infantry, as well as the U.S. Army’s 168th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), landed to the west, and the American 39th Combat Team, supported by Commandos, came ashore east of the port. The Allied attack also included a daring raid on the port itself. Two British destroyers, Broke and Malcolm, carried Royal Navy personnel and the 3rd Battalion, 135th Infantry, from the U.S. 34th Infantry Division. Before either destroyer could breach the harbor’s barrier booms, the French opened fire. Malcolm suffered serious damage and turned back.

Broke made it through the barrier and landed her troops on the mole. Within a short time, the landing party had seized the city’s electric power station and petroleum tank farm. But the French responded vigorously, and when the troops from the 168th RCT failed to show up, the American commander was forced to surrender his forces. The landings in the west were completely successful. By evening the British and American soldiers had achieved all of their objectives, though the pace of their advance had been far slower than planners had expected. Particularly important had been the neutralization of the French airfield at Blida, which removed the air threat, such as it was. The eastern landings also succeeded against mild resistance. By midmorning, American troops had secured the Maison Blanche airfield and Royal Air Force (RAF) Hawker Hurricanes were flying over the city. By night fall, Allied forces from the west were already on the city’s outskirts, while those from the east were approaching the suburbs. The French defenders were in an impossible situation, a fact that led French commanders to agree to a cease-fire.

As chance would have it, the number two man in the Vichy French hierarchy, Admiral FranÇois Darlan, happened to be in North Africa visiting his sick son. Despite his sorry record of collaboration with the Germans, Darlan soon recognized that the Vichy government was in a hopeless situation and that further fighting against the British and Americans would do nothing to advance the long-range interests of France. Moreover, German forces were clearly gathering on the frontiers of Vichy France to occupy the remainder of the country. Darlan proceeded to cut a deal with the Allies that stopped the fighting throughout Algeria and Morocco. In retrospect, the deal saved the lives of a considerable number of American and British soldiers, while eventually putting the French troops in North Africa at the disposal of the Allied cause. Nevertheless, a huge outcry arose in Britain and the United States about dealing with the Fascist Darlan — an outcry that was only hushed by Darlan’s assassination on Christmas Eve 1942. While the Allies fought to suppress French defenses, the FÜhrer and his advisers made one of the most disastrous strategic decisions of World War II.

Despite the enormous overstretch of German forces on the Eastern Front — in a matter of weeks the Soviets would launch their Stalingrad counteroffensive — Hitler ordered the seizure of Tunisia. When the landings took place, the FÜhrer was on a train headed from East Prussia to Munich to give his annual ‘Beer Hall’ speech, commemorating the failed Nazi putsch of 1923. The OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or armed forces high command) staff, remaining in East Prussia, warned that North Africa could not be held, but as one staff officer noted after the war, that assessment ‘passed unnoticed in the general jumble of vague political and strategic ideas based primarily on considerations of prestige.’ There was certainly no overall strategic assessment of additional commitments in North Africa. Hitler rushed paratrooper units across the Mediterranean by Junkers Ju-52s, and Regular infantry and armored units soon followed. In Tunisia, unlike the situation in Morocco and Algeria, the Vichy French garrison and governor cooperated with the German occupation force, a group of lightly armed paratroopers.

The Wehrmacht then moved heavier infantry and armored forces across the Mediterranean to secure Tunisia and hold the Allied attacks at bay along the coast from Algeria. In doing so, Hitler placed a whole army of Germans and Italians in a trap — but unlike the trap at Stalingrad, it was one of his own making. On the far side of the Mediterranean, with only tenuous supply lines from Italy, the Axis forces were hostages to fate. They confronted a logistical battle they could not hope to win in the face of overwhelming Allied superiority — a superiority that the breaking of the Wehrmacht’s high-level communications code via Ultra decrypts only served to reinforce. To exacerbate the difficulties confronting Axis forces, Hitler, infuriated by Rommel’s pessimism that North Africa could not be held, appointed a new commander of German forces in Tunisia. And that commander, JÜrgen Freiherr von Arnim, a prim, unctuous product of the German general staff, refused to cooperate with Rommel in defending Tunisia. At first glance the fact that the Germans were able to grab and then reinforce Tunisia appeared to be a major setback for Allied arms. In the larger sense it was anything but a failure.

The six months of fighting in North Africa’s Tunisian desert served as a further warning of the unpreparedness of U.S. troops to engage the Wehrmacht on its home turf of northern Europe. The defeat of U.S. forces at Kasserine Pass by Rommel’s Afrika Korps in February underlined the general and specific weaknesses of U.S. troops and leaders. But one of the marks of U.S. military effectiveness throughout World War II, in contrast to that of their British allies, was the learning curve with which troops and commanders adapted to the actual conditions of combat. The defeat at Kasserine represented the starting point for Marshall’s generals to begin the process of developing ground forces that could stand up to and beat the Wehrmacht on the fields of France. One might also note that the fighting in North Africa proved a godsend in preparing the U.S. Army’s medical services for the complexities of caring for large numbers of wounded under combat conditions. The initial German successes during the winter of 1942-1943 in holding their own against the pressure of Anglo-American forces turned into catastrophe by spring.

Aided by Ultra decrypts, Allied air and naval forces first shut down German sea lines of communication between Sicily and North Africa. By April 1943, the Axis partners were reduced to moving supplies and reinforcements across the Mediterranean by air alone. Here again, Ultra revealed their movements, and waiting Allied fighters fought off accompanying Luftwaffe aircraft to slaughter the Ju-52 transports. The end came in early May with the surrender of the remaining German and Italian forces in North Africa. The loss of the former robbed the German high command of any chance to establish an effective mobile reserve against an Allied descent on Fascist Italy. In the case of the Italians, the defeat in Tunisia destroyed the last effective military forces with which to defend Sicily and the mainland against Allied landings in early July (Operation Husky). The fall of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist regime followed almost immediately upon the heels of that successful campaign. So what in the end were the pluses and minuses of Torch? In fact, there were relatively few minuses. On one hand, Marshall was clearly correct that an American intervention in the Mediterranean in November 1942 would make a landing on the coast of France impossible in 1943.

On the other hand, the prospects for a successful landing by Allied amphibious forces in 1943 on the heavily defended coast of northern France were dubious at best. However, Torch did make possible the opening of the Allies’ Mediterranean sea lines of communication, which freed up approximately 5 to 6 million tons of shipping for use elsewhere in the world. That alone was an enormous boon to the hard-pressed Allied merchant marine, which had not yet begun to recover from the disastrous losses suffered in the great convoy battles of 1942. One of the major unexpected benefits from Torch was the fact that military operations in the Mediterranean from November 1942 to the fall of 1943 allowed the British and Americans to establish an effective combined, joint high command. It provided Allied staff officers and senior military leaders the opportunity to work together in evolving common practices, and even a common language for military operations. Eisenhower in particular benefited from the experience of leading a combined force of British and American ground, sea and air forces. Beginning in September 1943, British and American senior ground and air commanders began the process of transferring from the Mediterranean to London, to begin planning for Operation Overlord.

Besides Eisenhower, Bernard Law Montgomery (ground force commander), Omar Bradley (First Army commander), George S. Patton (Third Army commander), Carl ‘Tooey’ Spaatz (chief, Strategic Air Forces, Europe), Arthur Tedder (Eisenhower’s principle deputy), and James H. Doolittle (commander of the Eighth Air Force) all transferred from the Mediterranean, where they had won their spurs, to the Overlord operation. Whatever the difficulties that would emerge in the command relationships during the campaigns in northwestern Europe during 1944 and 1945, they were at least manageable. One can only imagine how much more difficult Anglo-American cooperation would have been without that year and a half of seasoning in North Africa and the Mediterranean. That 18 months of fighting, moreover, had a tremendous impact on the capability of the Wehrmacht to repel the invasion. Defeats at Stalingrad, at Kursk and along the Dnieper River in the fall of 1943 were followed by a disastrous series of defeats in the Ukraine over the winter of 1943-1944 that seriously undermined German fighting power.

But it was not just the Reich’s ground forces that were suffering terrible defeats. Over the course of the year from spring 1943 through spring 1944, the combined bomber offensive placed unrelenting pressure on the Luftwaffe and the German air defense system. For a time the Germans gave as good as they got. In two disastrous air raids against Schweinfurt in August and October 1943, the U.S. Eighth Air Force lost 60 bombers shot down in each attack. Crew losses in the Eighth hovered at a rate of over 30 percent each month for the last eight months of 1943. But in January 1944 the tide finally swung in favor of the Americans. The North American P-51 Mustang, with its extraordinary range, provided the great bomber formations with fighter escort all the way to Berlin, and the Luftwaffe suffered a loss rate that eventually led to its collapse. By May 1944, the American air offensive had won general air superiority over the European continent.

Moreover, Allied air forces in spring 1944 possessed capabilities as well as a force structure that allowed them to conduct a massive and effective campaign against the French transportation network. By June 6, 1944, the entire rail network in western and central France had largely broken down, and the Germans had lost the battle of the logistics buildup before the Normandy campaign ever began. Allied air forces had neither the capability nor the force structure to conduct such a campaign in 1943. Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to commit U.S. troops to the seizure of French North Africa proved to be one of the most important of the war. It reflected the actual realities of the strategic situation in fall 1942. The British were right: The military forces of the Western powers were simply not yet ready to take on the Wehrmacht on the European continent. North Africa was sufficiently far from Germany that it minimized the potential of Nazi military power. And the unexpected commitment of substantial German forces to Tunisia provided the U.S. Army an excellent opportunity to learn how to fight a formidable opponent far from its homeland while eventually — together with the British — inflicting a major defeat on the Axis.

Moreover, the opening of the Mediterranean, by shortening Allied sea lines of communications, provided enormous relief to the hard-pressed merchant navies on which the projection of Allied military power absolutely depended. By late 1943, the balance of power had swung so much in favor of the Americans that they were able to dictate that the main effort in 1944 would focus on a landing in northwestern Europe. Despite considerable hesitation on the part of senior British leaders, including Churchill, American strategists forced this crucial change in Allied strategy — a change that would inevitably lead Anglo-American forces into the conquest of western Germany, an accomplishment that laid the strategic groundwork for the eventual victorious confrontation of the Cold War. Torch had set the stage for all of that. This article was written by Williamson Murray and originally appeared in the November 2002 issue of World War II. For more great articles be sure to pick up your copy of World War II . Allies confer secretly about Operation Torch - Oct 22, 1942 - HISTORY.com Allies confer secretly about Operation Torch Share this: Allies confer secretly about Operation Torch Author Allies confer secretly about Operation Torch URL Publisher A+E Networks On this day in 1942, American Maj.

Gen. Mark Clark meets in Algeria with French officials loyal to the Allied cause, as well as Resistance fighters, regarding the launch of Operation Torch, the first Allied amphibious landing of the war. It was decided as early as Christmas 1941, at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, that an Allied offensive against Rommel and the German army in North Africa would be launched. The details were debated for months, as American government officials objected to an early British operation, nicknamed Gymnast, which was deemed costly and ineffective-and was scrapped. The American chiefs of staff were also anxious to engage the Germans in Europe-not Africa. An ultimatum was even proposed: Unless the British supported an Allied cross-Channel attack, that is, an invasion of France, the United States would turn its attention to the Pacific and maintain only a defensive posture toward Germany. President Roosevelt was unwilling to issue such an ultimatum-and the chiefs of staff were ordered to work out a compromise operation for North Africa. Operation Torch was that compromise. A secret meeting in Algiers, which was also one of the intended landing targets, was planned by an American diplomat stationed in North Africa.

General Clark and members of his staff flew to Gibraltar and were then taken to Algiers via British submarine. Meeting with French army officers and Resistance fighters, Clark laid out the plan for the American landing and opened the discussion for who would be entrusted with leading the French forces. Gen. Charles De Gaulle, so instrumental in the organization of Resistance forces, was ruled out, as he would prove antagonistic to those French soldiers and officers still loyal to Petain and Vichy France, but who might be encouraged to turn on their German masters when supported by a massive Allied operation. It was finally agreed that Gen. Henri Giraud would lead the African French, as he had support in both the Vichy and Free French camps. The meeting was interrupted at one point by the arrival of French police loyal to the Vichy government. Clark and company had to hide out in a nearby wine cellar. The conference resumed the next day–and plans for bringing the “Torch” of freedom to French North Africa took final shape. More on This Topic

Question: What in World War II was 'Operation Torch'?
Answer: ALLIED INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA