Prohibition ends - Dec 05, 1933 - HISTORY.com Prohibition ends Publisher A+E Networks The 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is ratified, repealing the 18th Amendment and bringing an end to the era of national prohibition of alcohol in America. At 5:32 p.m. EST, Utah became the 36th state to ratify the amendment, achieving the requisite three-fourths majority of states’ approval. Pennsylvania and Ohio had ratified it earlier in the day. The movement for the prohibition of alcohol began in the early 19th century, when Americans concerned about the adverse effects of drinking began forming temperance societies. By the late 19th century, these groups had become a powerful political force, campaigning on the state level and calling for national liquor abstinence. Several states outlawed the manufacture or sale of alcohol within their own borders. In December 1917, the 18th Amendment, prohibiting the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes,” was passed by Congress and sent to the states for ratification.

On January 29, 1919, the 18th Amendment achieved the necessary three-fourths majority of state ratification. Prohibition essentially began in June of that year, but the amendment did not officially take effect until January 29, 1920. In the meantime, Congress passed the Volstead Act on October 28, 1919, over President Woodrow Wilson’s veto. The Volstead Act provided for the enforcement of Prohibition, including the creation of a special Prohibition unit of the Treasury Department. In its first six months, the unit destroyed thousands of illicit stills run by bootleggers. However, federal agents and police did little more than slow the flow of booze, and organized crime flourished in America. Large-scale bootleggers like Al Capone of Chicago built criminal empires out of illegal distribution efforts, and federal and state governments lost billions in tax revenue. In most urban areas, the individual consumption of alcohol was largely tolerated and drinkers gathered at “speakeasies,” the Prohibition-era term for saloons. Prohibition, failing fully to enforce sobriety and costing billions, rapidly lost popular support in the early 1930s.

In 1933, the 21st Amendment to the Constitution was passed and ratified, ending national Prohibition. After the repeal of the 18th Amendment, some states continued Prohibition by maintaining statewide temperance laws. Mississippi, the last dry state in the Union, ended Prohibition in 1966. Related Videos National Constitution Center <iframe width="560" height="315" src="" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe> Amendment XXI Repeal of Prohibition By Annenberg Classroom *Note: The Interactive Constitution is being developed over the course of the next two years. So far, Amendments 1-15 have Interactive content, and we are working on bringing you Interactive content for this Amendment. In the meanwhile, the interpretation below is supplied by the Annenberg Classroom . The nation’s fourteen-year experiment with prohibition ended on December 5, 1933, when Utah became the thirty-sixth state to ratify Amendment XXI. Amendment XXI returned the regulation of alcohol to the states. Each state sets its own rules for the sale and importation of alcohol, including the drinking age.

Because a federal law provides federal funds to states that prohibit the sale of alcohol to minors under the age of twenty-one, all fifty states have set their drinking age there. Rules about how alcohol is sold vary greatly from state to state. Amendment XXI: Repeal of Prohibition Amendment XXI: Repeal of Prohibition Repeal of Prohibition Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. Amendment XXI When the nation repealed Prohibition via the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, it vested primary control over alcoholic beverages in the states.

The common understanding of the framers of the Twenty-first Amendment was that it grants each state the power to regulate alcoholic beverages within its borders without intrusion by federal law or regulation. The question remains, however, as to how much and what kind of federal intrusion the amendment blocks. The Twenty-first Amendment has three parts. Section 1 explicitly repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and brought an end to Prohibition. Accordingly, because many saw the Twenty-first Amendment as nothing but a repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress passed the resolution without much substantive debate. Most of the legislative debate centered on the issue of saloons and the ratification process codified in Section 3 of the amendment, which mandated the use of state conventions. The amendment was passed by the Senate on February 16, 1933, and by the House four days later. It became law on December 5, 1933. In the original resolution there was an additional section, which granted Congress and the states "concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold." This provision was designed primarily to authorize the prohibition of saloons.

But Members of Congress finally agreed that such regulation belonged with the states, and the section was removed. Section 2 became the Twenty-first Amendment's primary source of judicial conflict. The question was whether the amendment gave the states absolute control over alcohol, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause, or whether the amendment permitted the states only enough autonomy to be dry without infringing on the scope of the rest of the Constitution. The amendment tracks very closely the language of a pre-Prohibition federal statute, the Webb-Kenyon Act (1913), current version at 27 U.S.C. Â§ 122 (1994), that gave states power to tax alcoholic beverages not only when sold in state, but also when sold through the mail in interstate commerce. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. (1936) and in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves (1939), the Supreme Court originally interpreted the Twenty-first Amendment as an absolute exception to the Commerce Clause. However, this changed in 1964 with a string of Twenty-first Amendment cases. In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.

(1964), Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, argued forcefully that the Twenty-first Amendment was not an absolute exception to the Commerce Clause as far as liquor was concerned. Likewise, in Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co. (1964), the Court held that Kentucky's tax on imported whiskey violated the Import-Export Clause. Justice Stewart, again writing for the majority, stated: To sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case would require nothing short of squarely holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned. Nothing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history leads to such an extraordinary conclusion. This Court has never intimated such a view, and now that the claim for the first time is squarely presented, we expressly reject it. Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971), the Court held that a Wisconsin statute, which empowered a police chief to post in all local retail liquor outlets a notice forbidding the sale of alcohol to the plaintiff because of his excessive drinking, without giving the plaintiff any advance notice or opportunity to contest it, violated the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to chip away at the Twenty-first Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi (1975) (holding that the states could not tax the sale of liquor on military bases within their borders because the United States has concurrent jurisdiction over military bases); Craig v. Boren (1976) (noting that the Twenty-first Amendment does not override the equal-protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (1980) (finding that the Twenty-first Amendment does not protect a state regulation that violates the Sherman Act because of the Supremacy Clause); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. (1982) (stating that the state may not exercise its powers under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way that impinges the rights protected under the Establishment Clause). But see New York State Liquor Authority v.

Bellanca (1981) (allowing a state to prohibit the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs because "[w]hatever artistic or communicative value may attach to topless dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment"). In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984), the Court finally articulated a balancing test to determine when the state's powers under the Twenty-first Amendment trump the Commerce Clause: In such a case, the central question is whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail, even though its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies. Utilizing this balancing test in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias (1984), the Court struck down a Hawaiian tax law that favored certain liquors that were only manufactured locally because "[s]tate laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are...not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor." In 324 Liquor Corp. v.

Duffy (1987), the Court balanced the state's virtually complete control over the liquor distribution system within its borders against the policy behind the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and found the latter of more weight. In a sharp dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, rejected the majority's conclusion. The dissent described in detail the legislative history and the subsequent state practices to show that the amendment was designed to give the states absolute control over the manufacturing and distribution of liquor within their borders. The "Senate discussions," she wrote, "clearly demonstrate an intent to confer on States complete and exclusive control over the commerce of liquor." The states understood the meaning as well. Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, states enacted strong price-control measures, "the very type of statute that this Court strikes down today." The majority opinion answered Justice O'Connor's argument with a one-paragraph footnote that focused on maintaining federal economic power through the Commerce Clause and the Antitrust Laws. That same year in South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Court held that Congress could use its spending power to regulate indirectly interstate commerce with regard to intoxicating liquors.

In Dole, Congress made certain highway funding contingent upon a state's acceptance of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one years. Justice O'Connor and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., each filed dissents, with Brennan arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment limited the spending power. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996), the Court held that Rhode Island's prohibition against certain advertisements stating the prices of liquor was an abridgment of the First Amendment's protection of free speech. Although the lengthy decision contained several concurring opinions, all nine Justices agreed that the Rhode Island law was not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. After a number of years in which the Supreme Court pruned state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the amendment now leaves a state with the power to become dry if it chooses. Beyond that, however, the Court has held that state control of liquor is subject to federal power under the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3), Granholm v.

Heald (2005), the Spending Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1), the First Amendment, and, it follows, the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) and the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2). Regent University School of Law Further Reading Edward Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America (1997) Thomas Pegram, Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800â€“1933 (1998) Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 Duke L.J. 1619 (2000) John Foust, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-first Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. Rev.

659 (2000) John Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (reprint 1993) Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Warsâ€”Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-first Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers' Rights, 38 Am. Business L.J. 1 (2000) Russ Miller, The Wine Is in the Mail: the Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 2495 (2001) Case Law South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S.

395 (1939) Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964) Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599 (1975) California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.

116 (1982) Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) Bill of Rights and later Amendments to the United States Constitution Amendment 27 Congressional pay raises Original Ten Amendments: The Bill of Rights Passed by Congress September 25, 1789. Ratified December 15, 1791. Amendment I Freedoms, Petitions, Assembly Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II Right to bear arms A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Amendment III Quartering of soldiers No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. Amendment IV Search and arrest The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V Rights in criminal cases No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Amendment VI Right to a fair trial In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VII Rights in civil cases In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. Amendment VIII Bail, fines, punishment Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Amendment IX Rights retained by the People The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Amendment X States' rights The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Later Amendments Amendment 11 Lawsuits against states The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. February 7, 1795.

Amendment 12 Presidential elections The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.

But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.]* The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. June 15, 1804. Superseded by Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment.

Amendment 13 Abolition of slavery Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce these article by appropriate legislation. December 6, 1865. Amendment 14 Civil rights Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.

But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.

But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. July 9, 1868. Amendment 15 Black suffrage Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. February 3, 1870.

Amendment 16 Income taxes The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. February 3, 1913. Amendment 17 Senatorial elections The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. April 8, 1913. Amendment 18 Prohibition of liquor Section 1.

After one year from the ratification of this article, the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. January 16, 1919. Repealed by the Twenty-First, December 5, 1933. Amendment 19 Women's suffrage The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any States on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. August 18, 1920. Amendment 20 Terms of office Section 1.

The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin. Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. Section 4.

The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them. Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article. Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission. January 23, 1933. Amendment 21 Repeal of Prohibition Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3.

The article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. December 5, 1933. Amendment 22 Term Limits for the Presidency Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term. Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

February 27, 1951. Amendment 23 Washington, D.C., suffrage Section 1. The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. March 29, 1961. Amendment 24 Abolition of poll taxes Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. January 23, 1964. Amendment 25 Presidential succession Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Section 4.

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.

If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. February 10, 1967. Amendment 26 18-year-old suffrage Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. June 30, 1971. Amendment 27 Congressional pay raises No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. May 7, 1992. (Note: Congress submitted the text of this amendment as part of the proposed Bill of Rights on September 27, 1789.

The Amendment was not ratified together with the first ten Amendments.) 21: Prohibition repealed 21: Prohibition repealed Wednesday, November 27, 2002 21ST AMENDMENT (1933) Prohibition officially ended on Dec. 5, 1933, one day after Utah, Ohio and Pennsylvania ratified the 21st Amendment. But an end to Prohibition didn't mean an end to liquor regulation. The law now allowed individual states to regulate the sale and importation of alcoholic beverages. Mississippi, for instance, did not officially legalize alcoholic drinks until 1966, although its favorite son, William Faulkner, always managed to find some. In Pennsylvania, the end of Prohibition introduced a new creature -- the state Liquor Control Board. Before Prohibition, individual counties licensed bars and retailers. Under the 21st Amendment, Pennsylvania gave itself a monopoly on the sale of liquor and wine, establishing a series of "State Stores" to sell those items, while the sale of beer was assigned to licensed distributors and bars.

Ashlynn Rose Miller, 8 months old, won't enjoy the fruits of the 21st Amendment for another 20 years and 4 months. For now, she's content do go along for the ride as her father, Dave, selects a bottle of wine at the State Store near their home in Penn Hills. Amendment XXI: Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several states, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the states by the Congress.

18th and 21st Amendments - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com 18th and 21st Amendments A+E Networks Introduction By the late 1800s, prohibition movements had sprung up across the United States, driven by religious groups who considered alcohol, specifically drunkenness, a threat to the nation. The movement reached its apex in 1920 when Congress ratified the 18th Amendment, prohibiting the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating liquors. Prohibition proved difficult to enforce and failed to have the intended effect of eliminating crime and other social problems–to the contrary, it led to a rise in organized crime, as the bootlegging of alcohol became an ever-more lucrative operation. In 1933, widespread public disillusionment led Congress to ratify the 21st Amendment, which repealed Prohibition. Google Origins of Temperance Movement A wave of intense religious revivalism that swept the U.S.

during the 1820s and 30s led to the formation of a number of prohibition movements driven by religious groups who considered alcohol, specifically drunkenness, a “national curse.” (This revivalism also helped inspire the movement to end slavery.) The first temperance legislation appeared in 1838, in the form of a Massachusetts law prohibiting the sale of spirits in less than 15-gallon quantities. Though it was repealed two years later, Maine passed the first state prohibition law in 1846, and by the time the Civil War began, a number of other states had followed suit. Did You Know? Prohibition was known as "the noble experiment." The phrase was coined by President Herbert Hoover, who wrote to an Idaho senator in 1928: "Our country has deliberately undertaken a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose." As early as 1873, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) of Ohio called for the abolition of the sale of alcohol.

They were soon joined in the fight by the even more powerful Anti-Saloon League (ASL), founded in 1893 in Ohio but later expanded into a national organization that endorsed political candidates and lobbied for legislation against saloons. Beginning around 1906, the ASL led a renewed call for prohibition legislation at the state level. Through speeches, advertisements and public demonstrations at saloons and bars, prohibition advocates attempted to convince people that that eliminating alcohol from society would eliminate poverty and social vices, such as immoral behavior and physical violence. One prominent temperance advocate, Kentucky-born Carrie Amelia Moore Nation (she called herself “Carry A. Nation”), became known for particularly violent tactics against what she called “evil spirits.” In addition to making protest speeches, Nation was known for breaking saloon windows and mirrors and destroying kegs of beer or whiskey with a hatchet. She was arrested numerous times, and became a household name across the country for her “saloon-smashing” campaign. From State to Federal Prohibition Legislation By 1916, 23 of 48 states had passed anti-saloon legislation. Many went further, prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic beverages as well.

After the congressional elections that year, “dry” members (as those who favored a national prohibition of alcohol became known) won a two-thirds majority over “wet” in the U.S. Congress. On January 29, 1919, Congress ratified the 18th Amendment, which prohibited the manufacturing, transportation and sale of alcohol within the United States; it would go into effect the following January. Later in 1919, the National Prohibition Act–popularly known as the Volstead Act, after its legislative sponsor, Representative Andrew J. Volstead of Minnesota–was enacted in order to provide the government with the means of enforcing Prohibition. Loopholes in this act–such as the fact that liquor used for medicinal, sacramental or industrial purposes remained legal, as did fruit or grape beverages prepared at home–as well as varying degrees of government support throughout the 1920s hampered the enforcement of Prohibition, and it would remain more of an ideal than a reality. Unexpected Events Under Prohibition, the illegal manufacture and sale of liquor–known as “bootlegging”–occurred on a large scale across the United States.

In urban areas, where the majority of the population opposed Prohibition, enforcement was generally much weaker than in rural areas and smaller towns. Perhaps the most dramatic consequence of Prohibition was the effect it had on organized crime in the United States: as the production and sale of alcohol went further underground, it began to be controlled by the Mafia and other gangs, who transformed themselves into sophisticated criminal enterprises that reaped huge profits from the illicit liquor trade. When it came to its booming bootleg business, the Mafia became skilled at bribing police and politicians to look the other way. Chicago’s Al Capone emerged as the most notorious example of this phenomenon, earning an estimated $60 million annually from the bootlegging and speakeasy operations he controlled. In addition to bootlegging, gambling and prostitution reached new heights during the 1920s as well. A growing number of Americans came to blame Prohibition for this widespread moral decay and disorder–despite the fact that the legislation had intended to do the opposite–and to condemn it as a dangerous infringement on the freedom of the individual.

Calls for Prohibition’s Repeal If public sentiment had turned against Prohibition by the late 1920s, the advent of the Great Depression only hastened its demise, as some argued that the ban on alcohol denied jobs to the unemployed and much-needed revenue to the government. The efforts of the nonpartisan group Americans Against Prohibition Association (AAPA) added to public disillusionment. In 1932, the platform of Democratic presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt included a plank for repealing the 18th Amendment, and his victory that November marked a certain end to Prohibition. In February 1933, Congress adopted a resolution proposing the 21st Amendment to the Constitution, which repealed both the 18th Amendment and the Volstead Act. The resolution required state conventions, rather than the state legislatures, to approve the amendment, effectively reducing the process to a one-state, one-vote referendum rather than a popular vote contest. That December, Utah became the 36th state to ratify the amendment, achieving the necessary majority for repeal. A few states continued statewide prohibition after 1933, but by 1966 all of them had abandoned it.

Since then, liquor control in the United States has largely been determined at the local level. Tags Eighteenth Amendment - U.S. Constitution - FindLaw Eighteenth Amendment - U.S. Constitution Amendment Text | Annotations Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. 18th Amendment Annotations Cases relating to this question are presented and discussed under Article V. Enforcement Cases produced by enforcement and arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment s are considered in the discussion appearing under the those Amendments.

Repeal This Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, and titles I and II of the National Prohibition Act 1 were subsequently specifically repealed by the act of August 27, 1935, 2 federal prohibition laws effective in various Districts and Territories were repealed as follows: District of Columbia--April 5, 1933, and January 24, 1934; 3 Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands--March 2, 1934; 4 Hawaii--March 26, 1934; 5 and Panama Canal Zone--June 19, 1934. 6 Taking judicial notice of the fact that ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment was consummated on December 5, 1933, the Supreme Court held that the National Prohibition Act, insofar as it rested upon a grant of authority to Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment, thereupon become inoperative, with the result that prosecutions for violations of the National Prohibition Act, including proceedings on appeal, pending on, or begun after, the date of repeal, had to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Only final judgments of conviction rendered while the National Prohibition Act was in force remained unaffected. 7 Likewise a heavy ''special excise tax,'' insofar as it could be construed as part of the machinery for enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment, was deemed to have become inapplicable automatically upon the latter's repeal. 8 However, liability on a bond conditioned upon the return on the day of trial of a vessel seized for illegal transportation of liquor was held not to have been extinguished by repeal when the facts disclosed that the trial took place in 1931 and had resulted in conviction of the crew. The liability became complete upon occurrence of the breach of the express contractual condition and a civil action for recovery was viewed as unaffected by the loss of penal sanctions. 9 Footnotes [Footnote 1] Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305. [Footnote 2] Ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872. [Footnote 3] Ch. 19, 48 Stat. 25; ch. 4, 48 Stat. 319. [Footnote 4] Ch. 37, 48 Stat. 361. [Footnote 5] Ch.

88, 48 Stat. 467. [Footnote 6] Ch. 657, 48 Stat. 1116. [Footnote 7] United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222 -26 (1934). See also Ellerbee v. Aderhold, 5 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ga. 1934); United States ex rel. Randall v. United States Marshal for Eastern Dist. of New York, 143 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1944). The Twenty-first Amendment containing ''no saving clause as to prosecutions for offenses therefore committed,'' these holdings were rendered unavoidable by virtue of the well-established principle that after ''the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force. . . .'' The General Pinkney, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 281, 283 (1809), quoted in United States v.

Chambers, supra, 291 U.S. at 223 . [Footnote 8] United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). The Court also took the position that even if the statute embodying this ''tax'' had not been ''adopted to penalize violations of the Amendment,'' but merely to obtain a penalty for violations of State liquor laws, ''it ceased to be enforceable at the date of repeal,'' for with the lapse of the unusual enforcement powers contained in the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress could not, without infringing upon powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, ''impose cumulative penalties above and beyond those specified by State law for infractions of . . . [a] State's criminal code by its own citizens.'' Justice Cardozo, with whom Justices Brandeis and Stone were associated, dissented on the ground that, on its face, the statute levying this ''tax'' was ''an appropriate instrument of . . . fiscal policy. . . . Classification by Congress according to the nature of the calling affected by a tax . . .

does not cease to be permissible because the line of division between callings to be favored and those to be reproved corresponds with a division between innocence and criminality under the statutes of a state.'' Id. 294, 296, 297-98. In earlier cases it was nevertheless recognized that Congress also may tax what it forbids and that the basic tax on distilled spirits remained valid and enforceable during as well as after the life of the Amendment. See United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450, 462 (1921); United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1923); United States v. Rizzo, 297 U.S. 530 (1936). Amendment XXI: Repeal of Prohibition Amendment XXI: Repeal of Prohibition Repeal of Prohibition Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2.

The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. Amendment XXI When the nation repealed Prohibition via the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, it vested primary control over alcoholic beverages in the states. The common understanding of the framers of the Twenty-first Amendment was that it grants each state the power to regulate alcoholic beverages within its borders without intrusion by federal law or regulation. The question remains, however, as to how much and what kind of federal intrusion the amendment blocks. The Twenty-first Amendment has three parts. Section 1 explicitly repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and brought an end to Prohibition. Accordingly, because many saw the Twenty-first Amendment as nothing but a repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress passed the resolution without much substantive debate.

Most of the legislative debate centered on the issue of saloons and the ratification process codified in Section 3 of the amendment, which mandated the use of state conventions. The amendment was passed by the Senate on February 16, 1933, and by the House four days later. It became law on December 5, 1933. In the original resolution there was an additional section, which granted Congress and the states "concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold." This provision was designed primarily to authorize the prohibition of saloons. But Members of Congress finally agreed that such regulation belonged with the states, and the section was removed. Section 2 became the Twenty-first Amendment's primary source of judicial conflict. The question was whether the amendment gave the states absolute control over alcohol, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause, or whether the amendment permitted the states only enough autonomy to be dry without infringing on the scope of the rest of the Constitution. The amendment tracks very closely the language of a pre-Prohibition federal statute, the Webb-Kenyon Act (1913), current version at 27 U.S.C.

§ 122 (1994), that gave states power to tax alcoholic beverages not only when sold in state, but also when sold through the mail in interstate commerce. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. (1936) and in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves (1939), the Supreme Court originally interpreted the Twenty-first Amendment as an absolute exception to the Commerce Clause. However, this changed in 1964 with a string of Twenty-first Amendment cases. In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. (1964), Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, argued forcefully that the Twenty-first Amendment was not an absolute exception to the Commerce Clause as far as liquor was concerned. Likewise, in Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co. (1964), the Court held that Kentucky's tax on imported whiskey violated the Import-Export Clause. Justice Stewart, again writing for the majority, stated: To sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case would require nothing short of squarely holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned.

Nothing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history leads to such an extraordinary conclusion. This Court has never intimated such a view, and now that the claim for the first time is squarely presented, we expressly reject it. Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971), the Court held that a Wisconsin statute, which empowered a police chief to post in all local retail liquor outlets a notice forbidding the sale of alcohol to the plaintiff because of his excessive drinking, without giving the plaintiff any advance notice or opportunity to contest it, violated the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to chip away at the Twenty-first Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi (1975) (holding that the states could not tax the sale of liquor on military bases within their borders because the United States has concurrent jurisdiction over military bases); Craig v. Boren (1976) (noting that the Twenty-first Amendment does not override the equal-protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.

(1980) (finding that the Twenty-first Amendment does not protect a state regulation that violates the Sherman Act because of the Supremacy Clause); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. (1982) (stating that the state may not exercise its powers under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way that impinges the rights protected under the Establishment Clause). But see New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca (1981) (allowing a state to prohibit the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs because "[w]hatever artistic or communicative value may attach to topless dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment"). In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984), the Court finally articulated a balancing test to determine when the state's powers under the Twenty-first Amendment trump the Commerce Clause: In such a case, the central question is whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail, even though its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies. Utilizing this balancing test in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.

Dias (1984), the Court struck down a Hawaiian tax law that favored certain liquors that were only manufactured locally because "[s]tate laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are...not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor." In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy (1987), the Court balanced the state's virtually complete control over the liquor distribution system within its borders against the policy behind the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and found the latter of more weight. In a sharp dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, rejected the majority's conclusion. The dissent described in detail the legislative history and the subsequent state practices to show that the amendment was designed to give the states absolute control over the manufacturing and distribution of liquor within their borders. The "Senate discussions," she wrote, "clearly demonstrate an intent to confer on States complete and exclusive control over the commerce of liquor." The states understood the meaning as well.

Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, states enacted strong price-control measures, "the very type of statute that this Court strikes down today." The majority opinion answered Justice O'Connor's argument with a one-paragraph footnote that focused on maintaining federal economic power through the Commerce Clause and the Antitrust Laws. That same year in South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Court held that Congress could use its spending power to regulate indirectly interstate commerce with regard to intoxicating liquors. In Dole, Congress made certain highway funding contingent upon a state's acceptance of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one years. Justice O'Connor and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., each filed dissents, with Brennan arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment limited the spending power. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996), the Court held that Rhode Island's prohibition against certain advertisements stating the prices of liquor was an abridgment of the First Amendment's protection of free speech. Although the lengthy decision contained several concurring opinions, all nine Justices agreed that the Rhode Island law was not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.

After a number of years in which the Supreme Court pruned state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the amendment now leaves a state with the power to become dry if it chooses. Beyond that, however, the Court has held that state control of liquor is subject to federal power under the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3), Granholm v. Heald (2005), the Spending Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1), the First Amendment, and, it follows, the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) and the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2). Regent University School of Law Further Reading Edward Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America (1997) Thomas Pegram, Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800–1933 (1998) Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 Duke L.J.

1619 (2000) John Foust, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-first Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 659 (2000) John Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (reprint 1993) Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars—Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-first Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers' Rights, 38 Am. Business L.J. 1 (2000) Russ Miller, The Wine Is in the Mail: the Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 2495 (2001) Case Law South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) State Board of Equalization v.

Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964) Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599 (1975) California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) New York State Liquor Authority v.

Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) Prohibition History Prohibition History You are here: Home / Prohibition History Prohibition History Prohibition: The Noble Experiment 1920 – 1933 “Once, during Prohibition, I was forced to live for days on nothing but food and water” – W.C. Fields, American comedian and actor Prohibition was a period of United States history in which the manufacture, sale and transportation of liquor was illegal.

It led to the first and only time an amendment of the U.S Constitution was repealed. It was a time characterized by speakeasies, glamour, and gangsters and also a time in which even the average citizen broke the law… Temperance After the American Revolution, drinking was on the rise.To combat this, a number of societies were organized as part of a new “Temperance Movement” which attempted to dissuade people from becoming intoxicated. At first, these organizations pushed moderation, but after several decades, the movement’s focus changed to complete prohibition of alcohol consumption. Saloons and taverns came to be viewed as places of debauchery and evil. 18th Amendment and the Volstead Act In 1919, the 18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited the sale and manufacture of alcohol, was ratified. It went into effect on January 16, 1920. That night, restaurants and saloons draped their tables in black cloths in acknowledgement of its passing. From one day to the next people didn’t know where to turn. They were out of work and their livelihood was threatened. Except, there were loopholes.

For instance, the 18th Amendment did not mention the actual drinking of liquor- causing many people to purchase large quantities of alcohol before the Prohibition law went into effect a full year later. Also, the Volstead Act allowed alcohol consumption if it was “prescribed by a doctor.” Needless to say, large numbers of new prescriptions were written for alcohol during this time. Speakeasies and Gangsters For those who didn’t prepare adequately for the start of the law- or who did not know a “good” doctor- there were illegal ways to get a drink during Prohibition. If you knew where to go, and if you knew the password, such as “Joe Sent Me”: at the “speakeasy”. A speakeasy was the place for people to come in, drink and socialize. For every legitimate saloon that closed as a result of the new law, a half dozen underground palaces- or speakeasies- sprung up. By the middle of the decade there were speakeasies throughout Long Island. A new breed of gangsters arose during this period, as well. These people took notice of the amazingly high level of demand of alcohol within society and the extremely limited avenues of supply to the average citizen.

Within this imbalance of supply and demand, gangsters saw profits. Many gangsters opened up their own speakeasies. The 21st Amendment is Ratified On December 5, 1933, after a growing fight put forth by the anti-prohibition movement, and the need for jobs and money brought in by the sale and manufacture of alcohol, the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified. The 21st amendment repealed the 18th Amendment, making alcohol, once again, legal. This was the first and only time in U.S. history that an amendment has been repealed, the 18th Amendment being considered by many as a failed social and political experiment. Rum Running on the North Shore While most people think of the South Shore of Long Island as the prime area for rum running, the activity shifted to the North Shore in the early 1920s. Why? Because there were only two Coast Guard boats patrolling the entire North Shore and the coves and terrain made it difficult to be detected. North Shore’s people, businesses, roads and coastal areas were heavily entrenched in rum running.

The reason was while the trip to the rum fleet was longer, it is much safer owing to a “50-mile stretch” of coast which is protected by only two coast guard stations. Further, the high hills along the North Shore are another advantage to rum runners for signaling purposes, “Almost every night, as far as the eye can see, one can make out the flickering lights of the signalers” (the Long Island Eagle, 1924) Both newspapers and local histories document the stories and lore that became a part of people’s everyday lives on the North Shore. “Every Long Island coastal town has its stories of strange occurrences.” Long Island’s North Shore, from Great Neck to Port Jefferson, is full of documented stories uncovering rum running cartels and the sale of liquor is speakeasies. Search

Question: Which amendment of the US constitution repealed prohibition in 1933?
Answer: 21st