Soviets blockade West Berlin - Jun 24, 1948 - HISTORY.com Soviets blockade West Berlin Publisher A+E Networks One of the most dramatic standoffs in the history of the Cold War begins as the Soviet Union blocks all road and rail traffic to and from West Berlin. The blockade turned out to be a terrible diplomatic move by the Soviets, while the United States emerged from the confrontation with renewed purpose and confidence. Following World War II, Germany was divided into occupation zones. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and, eventually, France, were given specific zones to occupy in which they were to accept the surrender of Nazi forces and restore order. The Soviet Union occupied most of eastern Germany, while the other Allied nations occupied western Germany. The German capital of Berlin was similarly divided into four zones of occupation. Almost immediately, differences between the United States and the Soviet Union surfaced. The Soviets sought huge reparations from Germany in the form of money, industrial equipment, and resources. The Russians also made it clear that they desired a neutral and disarmed Germany. The United States saw things in quite a different way. American officials believed that the economic recovery of Western Europe was dependent on a strong, reunified Germany.

They also felt that only a rearmed Germany could stand as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into Western Europe. In May 1946, the Americans stopped reparations shipments from their zone to the Soviets. In December, the British and Americans combined their zones; the French joined some months later. The Soviets viewed these actions as a threat and issued more demands for a say in the economic future of Germany. On June 22, 1948, negotiations between the Soviets, Americans, and British broke down. On June 24, Soviet forces blocked the roads and railroad lines into West Berlin. American officials were furious, and some in the administration of President Harry S. Truman argued that the time for diplomacy with the Soviets was over. For a few tense days, the world waited to see whether the United States and Soviet Union would come to blows. In West Berlin, panic began to set in as its population worried about shortages of food, water, and medical aid. The United States response came just two days after the Soviets began their blockade. A massive airlift of supplies into West Berlin was undertaken in what was to become one of the greatest logistical efforts in history. For the Soviets, the escapade quickly became a diplomatic embarrassment.

Russia looked like an international bully that was trying to starve men, women, and children into submission. And the successful American airlift merely served to accentuate the technological superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union. On May 12, 1949, the Soviets officially ended the blockade. Related Videos Berlin Blockade - Cold War - HISTORY.com Berlin Blockade A+E Networks Introduction The Berlin Blockade was an attempt in 1948 by the Soviet Union to limit the ability of France, Great Britain and the United States to travel to their sectors of Berlin, which lay within Russian-occupied East Germany. Eventually, the western powers instituted an airlift that lasted nearly a year and delivered much-needed supplies and relief to West Berlin. Coming just three years after the end of World War II, the blockade was the first major clash of the Cold War and foreshadowed future conflict over the city of Berlin. Google The agreement after World War II to divide Germany and Berlin into occupation zones, with Berlin located deep in the Russian zone, had come out of the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and had included no arrangements for access to Berlin.

Since then, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West had deteriorated steadily, as reflected in disputes at the United Nations, Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in March 1946, growing emphasis in U.S. foreign policy on containment of Russian expansion, Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan , and growing Western commitment to establishing a separate capitalist West Germany. Did You Know? Nearly 700 aircraft were used during the Berlin Airlift, more than 100 of which belonged to civilian operators. In late 1947, discussions on Germany broke down over Soviet charges that the Allies were violating the Potsdam Agreement, and on March 20, 1948, the Soviets withdrew from the Allied Control Council administering Berlin. Ten days later, guards on the East German border began slowing the entry of Western troop trains bound for Berlin. On June 7, the Western powers announced their intention to proceed with the creation of West Germany. On June 24, arguing that if Germany was to be partitioned, Berlin could no longer be the single German capital, the Soviets stopped all surface travel between West Germany and Berlin.

Within the United States there was some sentiment for accepting the Soviet logic; many were reluctant to risk war over maintaining ties to their recent enemies, the Berliners. But the Truman administration was convinced that losing Berlin would mean losing all of Germany. After a military challenge was considered and rejected, the Berlin airlift was initiated. Over the next 321 days, Western fliers made 272,000 flights into West Berlin, delivering thousands of tons of supplies every day. The effort gained wide public sympathy, and on May 12, 1949, the Soviets, concluding that the blockade had failed, reopened the borders. East and West Germany were established as separate republics later that month. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, Editors. Copyright © 1991 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Tags What Was the Berlin Blockade? (with pictures) What Was the Berlin Blockade?

Last Modified Date: 25 December 2016 Copyright Protected: You won't believe these 10 facts about people The Berlin Blockade was an attempt by the Soviet Union to block Allied access to the German city of Berlin in 1948 and 1949. Ultimately, the blockade turned out to be a total political failure for the Soviet Union, and the West managed to turn it into a major victory. This event was one of the first major conflicts of the Cold War , and the lessons of it were kept in mind during future episodes of tension between the Soviet Union and the Western world. After the Second World War, Germany was split up among the Allies, with the French, Americans, British, and Russians each controlling a section of the country. The city of Berlin was located in East Germany, the section controlled by the Soviet Union, but it was deemed so important politically that it was split into miniature administrative districts, ensuring that the Allies had a presence there. Being surrounded by East Germany left the Western-occupied sections of Berlin very vulnerable, however.

In June 1948, Allied efforts to produce a unified currency for West Germany triggered alarm in the Soviet Union, and officials decided to block all access to Berlin, in the hopes of forcing the Allies to give them more control of the city. Essentially, the Soviet Union planned to starve the city in order to coerce the West into capitulating. When the Soviet Union announced the blockade, the West was forced to make a decision about how to deal with. Giving in to Russian demands was rejected as an option, and some consideration was given to invasion. Ultimately, officials decided that this would be too dangerous, and they seized upon the idea of simply waiting the blockade out. For the citizens of Berlin, who only had a month of supplies available, this solution posed an obvious problem. The remedy turned out to be the Berlin Airlift , an ambitious plan to supply all of the fuel, food, and shelter needs of West Berlin by plane. At the peak of the airlift, planes were landing in Berlin every three minutes, and sometimes planes didn't even land, instead shoving out pallets of supplies and zooming out again.

In May 1949, the Russians realized that the Berlin Blockade had not worked as planned, and they lifted the restrictions. The Allies continued to use their established airspace to transport the majority of supplies into the city, as they did not want to become dependent on Soviet-controlled rails and roads. In 1961, frustrated with the use of West Berlin as a way-station for people leaving East Germany, the Soviet Union constructed the Berlin Wall , a massive barrier that bisected the city until 1989. Ad Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1945–1952 The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 At the end of the Second World War, U.S., British, and Soviet military forces divided and occupied Germany. Also divided into occupation zones, Berlin was located far inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany. The United States, United Kingdom, and France controlled western portions of the city, while Soviet troops controlled the eastern sector.

As the wartime alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union ended and friendly relations turned hostile, the question of whether the western occupation zones in Berlin would remain under Western Allied control or whether the city would be absorbed into Soviet-controlled eastern Germany led to the first Berlin crisis of the Cold War. The crisis started on June 24, 1948, when Soviet forces blockaded rail, road, and water access to Allied-controlled areas of Berlin. The United States and United Kingdom responded by airlifting food and fuel to Berlin from Allied airbases in western Germany. The crisis ended on May 12, 1949, when Soviet forces lifted the blockade on land access to western Berlin. U.S. Navy and Air Force aircrafts unload at Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift. (U.S. Air Force) The crisis was a result of competing occupation policies and rising tensions between Western powers and the Soviet Union. After the end of the Second World War, the future of postwar Germany was plagued by the divisions within and between Allied powers. The only decision of significance that emerged from wartime planning was the agreement of zones of occupation.

Even after the end of hostilities, the problem of what to do about Germany was not successfully addressed at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference. Not only was there a lack of consistency in the political leadership and policymaking among the British and the Americans, occupation policy on the ground also confronted unforeseen challenges. Two and a half million Berliners, spread between four zones of occupation, faced profound privations: Allied bombing had reduced the city to rubble, shelter and warmth were scarce, the black market dominated the city’s economic life, and starvation loomed. While mired in such conditions, Berlin emerged as a forward salient in the Western struggle against the Soviet Union. The year 1947 saw major shifts in occupation policy in Germany. On January 1, the United States and United Kingdom unified their respective zones and formed Bizonia, which caused tensions between East and West to escalate. In March, the breakdown of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine served to harden the lines of an increasingly bipolar international order. In June, Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European Recovery Program.

The purpose of the Marshall Plan—as the program came to be called—was not only to support economic recovery in Western Europe, but also to create a bulwark against Communism by drawing participating states into the United States’ economic orbit. In early 1948, the United States, United Kingdom, and France secretly began to plan the creation of a new German state made up of the Western Allies’ occupation zones. In March, when the Soviets discovered these designs, they withdrew from the Allied Control Council, which had met regularly since the end of the war in order to coordinate occupation policy between zones. In June, without informing the Soviets, U.S. and British policymakers introduced the new Deutschmark to Bizonia and West Berlin. The purpose of the currency reform was to wrest economic control of the city from the Soviets, enable the introduction of Marshall Plan aid, and curb the city’s black market. Soviet authorities responded with similar moves in their zone. Besides issuing their own currency, the Ostmark, the Soviets blocked all major road, rail, and canal links to West Berlin, thus starving it of electricity, as well as a steady supply of essential food and coal The United States and United Kingdom had few immediate options if hostilities broke out.

Because of the draw down in U.S. and British combat forces since the end of the Second World War, the Red Army stationed in and around Berlin dwarfed the Western Allied military presence. On June 13, 1948, the administrator of U.S.-occupied Germany General Lucius Clay reported to Washington that “There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis.... We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.” The Truman administration agreed. Based upon written agreements with the Soviet Union in 1945, the only connections to Berlin left to the Western Allies were air corridors from West Germany used to supply Berlin by air. The administration calculated that if the Soviets opposed the airlift with force, it would be an act of aggression against an unarmed humanitarian mission and the violation of an explicit agreement. Thus, the onus of igniting a conflict between the former allies would be on the aggressor.

The United States launched “Operation Vittles” on June 26, with the United Kingdom following suit two days later with “Operation Plainfare.” Despite the desire for a peaceful resolution to the standoff, the United States also sent to the United Kingdom B-29 bombers, which were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The beginning of the airlift proved difficult and Western diplomats asked the Soviets to seek a diplomatic solution to the impasse. The Soviets offered to drop the blockade if the Western Allies withdrew the Deutschmark from West Berlin. Even though the Allies rebuffed the Soviet offer, West Berlin’s position remained precarious, and the standoff had political consequences on the ground. In September 1948, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the German Communist Party of the Soviet zone of occupation, marched on the Berlin City Council and forced it to adjourn. Fearing that the Western Allies might halt the airlift and cede West Berlin to the Soviets, 300,000 West Berliners gathered at the Reichstag to show their opposition to Soviet domination. The turnout convinced the West to keep the airlift and the Deutschmark. In time, the airlift became ever more efficient and the number of aircraft increased.

At the height of the campaign, one plane landed every 45 seconds at Tempelhof Airport. By spring 1949, the Berlin Airlift proved successful. The Western Allies showed that they could sustain the operation indefinitely. At the same time, the Allied counter-blockade on eastern Germany was causing severe shortages, which, Moscow feared, might lead to political upheaval. On May 11, 1949, Moscow lifted the blockade of West Berlin. The Berlin Crisis of 1948–1949 solidified the division of Europe. Shortly before the end of the blockade, the Western Allies created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Two weeks after the end of the blockade, the state of West Germany was established, soon followed by the creation of East Germany. The incident solidified the demarcation between East and West in Europe; it was one of the few places on earth that U.S. and Soviet armed forces stood face-to-face. It also transformed Berlin, once equated with Prussian militarism and Nazism, into a symbol of democracy and freedom in the fight against Communism.

The Berlin Airlift-June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949 June 27, 1948 to May 12, 1949 Introduction Following World War II, a delicate balance of power had surfaced between the once united Allies: Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. The opposing economic structures of capitalism and communism emerged triumphant at the end of the war. The two blossoming superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, sought to ensure their permanence by negotiating territorial claims throughout the globe. At the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Europe and the Far East were partitioned off as spheres of influence to their respected Ally governments. Germany was divided into fourths allowing each Ally to run its division by a military government until a suitable national government could be devised and the country put back together. This divided Germany, under direct supervision of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Allied Control Council or ACC) and the Kommandatura, was to become the first battleground of the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The year of 1948 was a critical turning point in the presidency of Harry Truman. He was staring down the barrel of a re-election campaign, presented with his lowest approval rating to date, and faced with the threat of a possible World War III with the Soviet Union over a developing situation in Berlin. Furthermore, Truman's record against the Soviets, up to this date, had been ineffective in keeping them from occupying Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Republicans were calling him soft on communism and Senator Joseph McCarthy was at his prime on his communist witch hunts in Washington. In regards to the German situation, General Clay remarked that the mood in the western zones was "more tense than at any time since surrender." British and American staff were leaving Berlin for the expanding administration of Bizonia, giving Berliners reason to believe the Western powers were leaving. Food rations in some parts of Germany were being cut to 900 calories a day, far below the recommended daily allowance for adequate nutrition. Labor unrest was prevalent throughout all the regions of Germany. Communist groups on all sides of Germany were gaining followers because they offered hope and prosperity in the future.

American, British, and French authorities were facing their worst fears....a beleagured German people searching for drastic solutions. In early September 1947, the United States had, along with Great Britain, combined their zones into one military province called "Bizonia," hoping to bring security back to the German people. This formal joining helped to provide economic stability to a cash strapped British zone. Soon after, France followed suit and annexed its section to Bizonia. The new Trizone leadership now looked to secure some economic stability in the midst of the German recession. In February 1948, the United States and British proposed to the ACC that a new four-power currency be created. The Soviets, however, hoping to continue the German recession, refused to accept the new currency, in favor of the overcirculated Soviet Reichsmark. By doing so, the Soviets believed they could foster a communist uprising in postwar Germany through civil unrest. In a March 1948 meeting of the ACC, it was evident that no agreements could be reached on a unified currency or quadpartite control of Germany and an infuriated Marshal Sokolovsky and his Soviet delegation stormed out of the meeting.

Both sides waited for the other to make a move. Trizonia, finally, in an effort to stabilize the economy, established its own currency on June 18, 1948. The Soviets, trying to push the west out of Berlin, countered this move by requiring that all Western convoys bound for Berlin travelling through Soviet Germany be searched. The Trizone government, recognizing the threat, refused the right of the Soviets to search their cargo. The Soviets then cut all surface traffic to West Berlin on June 27. American ambassador to Britain, John Winnant, stated the accepted Western view when he said that he believed "that the right to be in Berlin carried with it the right of access." The Soviets, however, did not agree. Shipments by rail and the autobahn came to a halt. A desperate Berlin, faced with starvation and in need of vital supplies, looked to the West for help. The order to begin supplying West Berlin by air was approved later by U.S. General Lucius Clay on June 27. President Truman, wishing to avoid war or a humiliating retreat, supported the air campaign, against many advisors wishes.

Surviving a normally harsh German winter, the airlift carried over two million tons of supplies in 270,000 flights. The blockade of Berlin was finally lifted by the Soviets on May 12, 1949. Berlin became a symbol of the United States resolve to stand up to the Soviet threat without being forced into a direct conflict. Issues for Discussion Consider some of these questions with your class. Do you agree or disagree with President Truman's handling of the Soviet Blockade of Berlin? Why or why not? Was it effective in solving the crisis? In what ways did President Truman's handling of the blockade lead to greater Cold War tensions? Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain during most of World War II, once described Russia as a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." What does he mean by this? How does this statement apply to the Soviets during the Berlin blockade? Should the Western powers have left Berlin to appease the Soviets? In what ways did President Truman's airlift support the foreign policy of containment? Donovan, Frank. 1968. Bridge in the Sky. New York: David McKay Inc. Man, John. 1973. Berlin Blockade.

New York: Ballantine Books Inc. Nelson, Daniel J. 1978. Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma. Alabama: University of Alabama Press. Tusa, Ann and John. 1988. The Berlin Airlift. New York: Atheneum. Berlin Airlift by David Harrisville The story of the Berlin Blockade and the subsequent Airlift has its origins in the Second World War and grew out of mounting tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies over the question of Germany’s, and indeed, Europe’s future. Before the downfall of Hitler’s Reich, the Allies worked to formulate plans for the administration of defeated Germany. In the London Protocol of 1944 Britain, France, the USA and Soviet Union agreed that once the war was won, Germany would be divided into four Zones, each to be overseen by one of these victorious powers. Each Zone would be managed by a supreme commander representing his country, and the policies of all four Powers would be coordinated in an Allied Control Council. The capital city, Berlin, was a special case.

Though the city fell within the Soviet Zone in northeastern Germany, the Allies determined that the administration of Berlin would be divided between them in four Sectors, one each for Britain, France, the USSR and USA. [i] left: the Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin; the men who shaped postwar Europe The plan for Germany’s postwar future was confirmed and expanded throughout 1944 as Allied armies continued to advance on all fronts. During this time, the Western Allies (chiefly America, Britain and France) made an oversight that would later come back to haunt them. In the agreements for postwar Germany, they failed to acquire an official guarantee of free access from their Zones through the Soviet Zone to Berlin. This would allow the Soviets to later argue that they didn’t technically have to allow such access. [ii] However, the Western Allies did obtain a 1945 guarantee in writing from the USSR to unimpeded use of three air corridors to the city, from Frankfurt, Bueckeburg, and Hamburg. [iii] Germany surrendered in the spring of 1945 and, as agreed, Allied forces occupied their respective Zones, as well as their designated Sectors of Berlin.

Even at this early date, things did not go smoothly between the USSR and the Western Allies. When American troops crossed the Soviet Zone to reach their Sector of Berlin, they were met with delaying tactics and frequent obstructions. When they did arrive, they discovered that the Soviets had dismantled much of West Berlin’s manufacturing, technical, utilities, and other installations. Despite friction, the administration of Berlin was set up as planned, and few foresaw that a crisis was coming. [iv] Just after the war in Europe ended, the Four Victorious Powers’ representatives met at Potsdam, outside Berlin. At the conference, the Allies decided to postpone a political decision for Germany but to establish economic unity in the meantime, as the State Department’s “Berlin Background” memorandum describes. They also worked out reparations agreements. Unfortunately, things did not go according to plan, especially economically. No unified economic policy emerged in the work of the Allied Control Council, and trade between the Soviet and Western Zones declined. [v] Talks between the Western Allies and the USSR regarding Germany’s future continued. In 1946 and ‘47 a definitive settlement was still not forthcoming. For instance, a Foreign Minister’s conference took place in Moscow between the four Powers.

The representatives, U.S. secretary of state General George Marshall, British foreign minister Ernest Bevin, French foreign minister Georges Bidault, and Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented their opposing ideas for Germany. Molotov advocated the formation of a strong central government, insisted on heavy reparations payments, and was content to postpone the country’s economic recovery. The Western Allies feared that such an agreement would be too conducive for a communist takeover, especially in that a weak economy would incline German citizens toward a communist system, and large reparations would give the USSR a strong degree of control over the country’s future. In contrast, the US and its allies pushed for economic reunification and rehabilitation first, to be followed by the formation of a unified government to be determined by the German people. Unsurprisingly, the conference did little except to solidify the Soviet and Western blocks and convince the Americans and British in particular to work for Germany’s economic revival without Soviet cooperation. [vi] In fact, the Soviets had begun already in 1945 to implement their own plans for their Zone of Germany.

They ensured that the German Communist Party (KPD) had a disproportionate influence, and in 1946 forced the merger of the KPD with the German Socialist Party (SPD) into an organization called the SED, which became powerful in Berlin as well as eastern Germany. [vii] For their part, the Western Allies decided to act without the Soviets and put their energies into the economic and political rebuilding of their former enemy. The crowning achievement of this policy was the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan, announced on June 5, 1947, was an unprecedented program through which participating European countries would receive American aid in the form of goods given freely by the United States that each recipient country would then sell to provide funding for postwar investment and recovery. The idea was the brainchild of William Clayton, a government official who had worked on supply and procurement during the war, and was further developed by Midwest-born diplomat George Kennan . Secretary of state Marshall worked tirelessly to see it enacted. [viii] America, Britain, and France also made plans to introduce a new currency to their Zones of occupation in order to stabilize a financial system which was running only on cigarettes and chocolate.

[ix] French, American, and British representatives gathered in London in February 1948 to solidify their own policies for Germany. Their long-term plan, developed in consultation with the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) was to unite their Zones into a sovereign West German state, just as the Soviets appeared to be on their way to forming an East German one. [x] right: 8 April 1948. the Marshall Plan becomes a reality as President Truman signs the Economic Cooperation Act America had several reasons for wanting to rehabilitate both Germany and Europe, especially the west. For one, an economically strong Western Europe would be better able to resist communist encroachment both from within and without. Second, the Marshall program was a way for the United States to encourage freer trade and prop up some of its greatest trading partners. [xi] Also, it was realized that Germany’s recovery was especially important for the economic stability of other European nations, who relied on German coal and manufactured goods.

Even France itself, whose political leaders were extremely wary of another German resurgence, had to face the fact that its economy was heavily dependent upon German goods, and came to agree with its allies that Germany had to be included in European recovery. [xii] left: unloading Marshall Plan aid boxes in Europe The Soviets were not happy with American plans, viewing a rehabilitated and sovereign West Germany as a threat to their security (after all, they had just suffered a German invasion) and a breach of previous agreements guaranteeing multilateral action, though the USSR itself had been shaping Eastern Europe without consulting the West, and was refusing to cooperate on joint measures for Germany. In response to the West’s moves, the Soviets began in the spring of 1948 to increasingly disrupt traffic to Berlin. [xiii] In March 1948 General Lucius Clay, the American commander in Berlin, expressed “concern” to Washington “that a clear change in Soviet behaviour was noticeable,” alluding to the increasing obstructionism. In correspondence with his government, Clay argued that the Americans in Berlin should not show any sign of weakness in the face of Soviet pressure.

Later that month, the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council, marking the end of the organization which was supposed to foster cooperation on Germany. On 1 April the Soviets tightened their grip on the city by severing railroad traffic, soon followed by water traffic. [xiv] Stalin’s purpose was probably twofold. He hoped to cause the Allies to leave Berlin, but more importantly he wished to disrupt or prevent the formation of West Germany. [xv] As a result of the blockade, the Western Allied troops in Berlin were soon lacking supplies. The American leadership in Washington was uncertain what course to take. While his superiors were debating a course of action, General Clay, acting on his own authority, ordered what has been known as the “Baby Airlift,” an attempt to provide supplies for the garrison of West Berlin by air. It lasted only 3 days and involved only 24 planes, but it kept the American contingent supplied until the Soviets lifted the travel restrictions. Fortunately, there was no direct confrontation, and the situation normalized. [xvi] Washington’s hesitancy regarding whether to stand firmly behind the West Berliners or tell its troops to pack their bags was a product of a contemporary debate over how to deal with the Soviet Union.

The arguments which eventually prevailed were based on the ideas of George Kennan , who argued that communism’s territorial ambitions should be opposed everywhere around the globe, a policy dubbed “containment,” which would become the staple of American policy toward the USSR up to its disintegration in 1991. According to Kennan and others, America’s best policy was to stay in Berlin and thereby prevent the further spread of communism. [xvii] However, there were those who disagreed, [xviii] and in the case of the Berlin question some worried that remaining in the city might trigger a general war with the USSR, [xix] which was often perceived, albeit incorrectly, as the stronger power due to the size of its land army. At the time before the Berlin crisis, the U.S. and its Allies did not have a definite policy in place. [xx] With currency disagreements becoming more and more central, economic experts of the USSR and the Western Allies met on 22 June to discuss the issue, two days after the Western Allies introduced their currency, the Deutsche Mark, into their Zones. Unfortunately, no agreement was forthcoming.

The Soviets insisted that the currency in all Berlin be the same as that of the Eastern Zone of Germany and rejected the American appeal for Four-Power currency control for Berlin. The next day, the Soviets introduced their new currency to both the Eastern Zone and Berlin, and the day after the Western Allies introduced the Western currency into their sectors of Berlin. [xxi] Though the roads were reopened after the successful “Baby Airlift,” the danger to the city had not yet passed. Stalin remained heavily opposed to a united West Germany, especially one with a reformed currency which would make it very difficult for the eastern section to compete economically. In fact, when the Western Allies introduced the new currency into their Zones (including in their sectors of Berlin, where these bills were marked with a “B”), the old Reichsmarks were now useless in these parts and most ended up in Eastern Germany, flooding the market and causing massive inflation until the Soviets introduced their own currency a few days later. Stalin reacted boldly to the announcement of the new currency by commencing what has come to be known as the Berlin Blockade. He was gambling, but he said later that he knew the U.S.

was unwilling to respond with nuclear weapons, and he himself would have backed down if a full-scale war seemed imminent. So he made his move, and then watched to see what concessions he might obtain from the West. On the night of the 23rd, the Soviets cut the supply of electricity to the Western sectors and at 6 a.m. on the 24th, every road and railroad from the western Zones to Berlin was closed, soon followed by waterways as well. West Berlin was cut off from the world. [xxii] The American government immediately protested the Soviet action, Secretary Marshall writing that “The United States Government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements.” [xxiii] Unsurprisingly, the Soviets responded by declaring that their blockade was legal, and accused the Western Allies of violating their treaty obligations. [xxiv] Diplomacy seemed to be getting nowhere, and meanwhile time was running out for the population of West Berlin. a Berlin newspaper the day after the start of the Blockade; the front page article title reads “Berlin Appeals to the World” The Truman administration was not willing to risk war, so the use of military force was not a possibility.

With time running out for the West Berliners, General Clay once again organized an airlift, beginning 25 June, to supply not only troops but the city’s inhabitants as well. [xxv] No one was sure whether this method would work, since after all the city required a minimum of 4-5 thousand tons of supplies per day simply to maintain itself, far higher than the mere 700 daily tons which the airlift could move in its infant stages. Great Britain committed itself to the airlift effort and its Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin helped ensure America’s own commitment. About two weeks later President Truman voiced his support for General Clay’s decision, writing in his diary “We’ll stay in Berlin—come what may.” [xxvi] The Berlin Airlift was up and running, under the appropriate codename “Operation Vittles” for the American effort. [xxvii] airlift planes at Tempelhof Airport The most pressing problem at the start of the Airlift was the scarcity of transport planes. West Berlin required enormous amounts of supplies, around 5,000 tons a day at minimum. The early Airlift was hauling a daily 700 tons, far less than what was needed.

At the request of General Clay, aircraft from all over the world were requisitioned to increase the Airlift's capacity. Planes were brought in from every part of Europe, and then from Alaska, Hawaii, Texas, the Bermudas, even as far as Tokyo. The Airlift effort would eventually utilize about 300 planes. The models used toward the start of the Airlift were 2-engined C-47s, nicknamed “Dakotas,” which carried about 3 tons. These were gradually replaced by the larger 4-engined C-54s, hauling up to 14 tons. [xxviii] As the prior agreement between the USSR and the Western Allies dictated, the planes were able to operate within three corridors connecting Berlin to the Western Zones of Germany. Berlin itself had only two airports at the Airlift's start, Templehof and Gatow, and the Allies made plans to construct a third. Planes flew into the city from 10 different airports in the various Western Zones. [xxix] In addition to airfields, waterways were also used as a landing ground. The British began to use Short Sunderland flying boats, which could land on lakes near Berlin.

They proved especially useful in transporting much-needed salt, because their cargo holds were resistant to salt’s corrosive effects which would have been damaging to other aircraft. [xxx] Sunderland flying boats supported the Berlin Airlift West Berlin was hard-hit by food and electricity shortages throughout the Airlift. A rationing system was put in place, and both gas and electricity were only available a few hours a day. Berlin’s mayor, Ernst Reuter, contributed greatly to buoying the morale of the city’s population, and though its industrial output was greatly diminished, Berlin still managed to export goods in boxes marked “Made in Blockaded Berlin.” [xxxi] The Airlift’s capacity rose steadily as more planes became available, but Berlin’s minimum daily requirements weren’t yet being met in the summer of 1948. The military leaders, such as General Joseph Smith, the American Airlift commander, and General LeMay, in charge of American Air Forces in Europe, tried various methods to improve efficiency, such as filling the planes with less fuel so they could carry more weight in supplies. They also designated each air corridor for only 1-way traffic, retaining the southern and northern corridors for flights to Berlin, and allowing only return flights in the middle corridor.

[xxxii] C-54's at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin during the Airlift In spite of improvements, the Berlin Airlift remained for the first months very much a makeshift operation. This was partly because few initially believed the Blockade would last long and also because the commanders involved had no experience in such an operation. There were a handful of U.S. Air Force personnel, however, who had operated a successful airlift during the war (the so-called Hump Airlift over the Himalayas [xxxiii]), and now Air Force commander Hoyt S. Vandenberg worked to place General Tunner, who had led that effort, into position as commander of the American Airlift effort. The move was not popular with the generals who had managed the Airlift up to that point, but when Tunner was installed he immediately made changes that significantly improved the Airlift’s efficiency, including ordering planes which had missed their first landing to continue their return flight rather than circling back to attempt a second landing and thereby holding up the planes behind. Tunner also ordered that crews who had landed in Berlin stay with their planes until taking off again so they were immediately ready to go when the order came.

The crews were unhappy about this until a mobile snack bar was devised, which brought them refreshments as they waited. Tunner quickly won the respect of all involved in the Airlift, and contributed greatly to its efficiency. On Tunner’s recommendation, the British and Americans set up a Combined Airlift Task Force to coordinate their efforts. [xxxiv] the air corridors and airports of the Airlift, with Berlin forming the rightmost point, with American Zone in Green with one corridor, and the British in blue with two; French in yellow Tunner’s goal was to maximize the number of flights to Berlin, and his work paid off. With the introduction of further measures such as requiring all pilots to fly by instrument flight rules, the addition of more air traffic control experts from the U.S., and the withdrawal of all C-47’s after September once enough larger planes were available. With these and other changes, the number of daily flights increased from 436 per day in July to 578 in August and 658 in September, which meant that by September a plane was landing in Berlin roughly every four minutes. Another major factor was the completion of the third airport at Tegel in the French sector of the city.

Built by 19,000 German workers, it was ready for air traffic in October 1948. [xxxv] Throughout the Airlift, the American public was for the most part supportive. A State Department memo dated July 1948 reported that “The overwhelming majority of press and radio commentators remain united in support of the official U.S. position". Many Americans were not quite willing to risk war over a foreign city, but it was commonly believed that "surrender in Berlin would only result in future aggression elsewhere.” The memo emphasized that Americans would be supportive of any attempt to reach a peaceful settlement to end the Blockade. [xxxvi] In fact, diplomatic negotiations did continue throughout the Airlift. After the initial exchange of notes between the U.S. and USSR, a Foreign Minister’s conference was held in Moscow. The Western governments insisted on their right to remain in Berlin but they were willing to compromise by accepting the East German currency as the sole currency there as long as it was under quadripartite control. The Soviets, however, insisted that they have full control over the currency, and thus control over Berlin’s economy.

More fundamentally, the USSR was unwilling to acknowledge the right of the British, French, and Americans to be in Berlin and offered no true guarantee that a blockade would not be repeated. Further, they asked for a halt to plans for a West German government, something the Western Allies were not willing to discuss. In fact, the Western Powers and the Soviets were able to compromise on many of these issues, but unfortunately no comprehensive settlement was reached in the summer of 1948, and the blockade remained in place. [xxxvii] The U.S.’s attempt to settle the matter in the UN was thwarted by a Soviet veto. Meanwhile, plans for a West German government went forward as a Parliamentary Council convened to draft a constitution. In addition, the Western Allies initiated a counter-blockade to interrupt supplies from their zones to the Soviet one.[xxxviii] The Airlift went on. Flights dropped in the winter due to bad weather, but they picked up again in the spring of 1949. [xxxix] Indeed, the winter was a difficult time for the Airlifters.

An article in a 1949 issue of Naval Aviation News magazine described “bitter cold” that “numbed fingers after 10 minutes” and “sweeping ice and snow from wings with brooms dipped in alcohol” to keep the planes flyable. In spite of the weather, the Airlift did not let up, and the Soviets began to realize that their goals of forcing the Allies from Berlin and/or preventing the formation of a sovereign West Germany were proving unattainable in the face of Western determination. In fact, Stalin announced in January 1949 he would end the Blockade if the Western Allies would delay plans for West Germany. The proposition was, of course, not accepted. [xli] The climax of the Airlift came in the spring of 1949. General Tunner decided to send a message to the Soviets and to the people of Berlin by transporting more freight in 24 hours than the Airlift ever had before. The day chosen was Easter Sunday.

After considerable preparation, the operation was launched that came to be known as the “Easter Parade.” Within 24 hours, crews made 1,398 flights and brought an incredible 12,941 tons of supplies to Berlin with an interval of only 62 seconds between planes (compare this to the required minimum of 4,500 tons). The Easter Parade showed the Soviets just how effective the Airlift was, and negotiations followed soon after. On 12 May the Soviet Union agreed to end the Blockade. [xlii] As a precaution, the Airlift was continued through September, but the crisis was over and the population of West Berlin celebrated. [xliii] the last flight to Berlin: the number on the plane is the total tonnage of the Berlin Airlift The Berlin crisis brought to a head the differences between the Soviet bloc and the West and marked the end of the cooperative wartime relationship between the US and Russia. America would no longer hold any trust for its former wartime ally, and the two powers spent the next half-century facing off in the Cold War. The Berlin Airlift was a moral victory for the Western Allies.

Instead of backing out or being unable to agree on a response to the Blockade, the Americans, British and French demonstrated their solidarity in defense of democracy. The Airlift demonstrated also America's political and economic commitment to Europe and especially Germany, leading the West Germans to increasingly align themselves with the Western Powers, eventually joining NATO. In addition, the Airlift showed that the containment policy put forth by George Kennan could work, perhaps even without armed conflict. [xliv] The freedom of West Berlin, however, had come at a sacrifice. No fewer than 78 men lost their lives in the Airlift, from pilots to radio operators. The population of Berlin created an Airlift Gratitude Foundation to support surviving family members. [xlv] Stalin did not achieve any of his goals, in fact the opposite. The Blockade accelerated Western plans for a West German government, which was formed soon after its end, and the Soviets errected a communist East German state in response. Following the crisis, this seemed acceptable, if not ideal, to both sides, as well as the Germans themselves, since a joint solution for a unified Germany appeared impossible.

Stalin's hostile actions also lead to the formation of the NATO alliance and greater US involvement in European military security. [xlvi] Though it ushered in an era of hostility and distrust, there was at least one sign of hope during the Berlin crisis. Despite high tensions, neither side resorted to war, and though agreements were not easy, they were reached through diplomatic means. Notes: [i] Blockade and Airlift: Legend or Lesson? The Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949, ed. Heinz-Gerd Reese and Michael Schroeder (Benedict Press: 1988), 16. [ii] Wolfgang Huschke, The Candy Bombers: The Berlin Airlift 1948/49: A History of the People and Planes (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 1999), 77. [iii] Blockade and Airlift, 23. [iv] Huschke, 78. [v] “Berlin Background,” Information Memorandum No. 28.

Department of State, Truman Papers, Truman Library (Washington: January 7, 1949), 2-3, and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (NY: Free Press, 2007), 30-44. [vi] “Berlin Background,” 3-4. [vii] Blockade, 18 and 24. [viii] Behrman, 45-70, Judt, 93 and Kissinger, 453. The offer was theoretically available to all European countries, but only the western ones actually accepted, many of the eastern states being cajoled by the USSR into declining. [ix] Blockade, 21 and 28. [x] Blockade, 21 and Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (NY: Penguin Press, 2005), 125-6. [xi] Judt, 93-4. [xiii] Huschke, 83 and Blockade, 26.

[xiv] Huschke, 80-1. [xvi] Huschke, 81-2 and Blockade, 27. [xvii] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 447-9, 454-6, 471-2. [xviii] Kissinger, 463-470. [xix] Huschke, 82, and Blockade, 31-2. [xx] Blockade, 31-2. [xxi] “Berlin Background ,” 4-5 and Blockade, 28. [xxii] Huschke, 77, Blockade, 29 and Kissinger, 436. [xxiii] Note from Secretary Marshall to Ambassador Panyushkin, July 6, 1948, in H.L. Trefousse, The Cold War: A Book of Documents (Capricorn Books, 1966), 112.

[xxiv] Note of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States of July 14, 1948 in Trefousse, 115-19. [xxv] Blockade, 32-3. [xxvi] Huschke, 84 and Judt, 147. Quote taken from “Diary, July 19, 1948” in Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), 145. Truman had always hoped to avoid confrontation, but he was not prepared to make unilateral concessions to the Soviets. (131-2) Part of the reason the US stayed in Berlin was to send a message to democratic European nations that it would not abandon its position in Europe, as the “Berlin Background” memorandum states: “"The abandonment of Berlin would be interpreted throughout Germany and Europe as evidence of our lack of determination both to defend our rights and to support democratic peoples in their effort to resist totalitarian threats and pressures.

Psychologically and politically such a step would have profound consequences, leading to a hasty effort on the part of many European people[s] to reinsure themselves with the Communists, to whom it would be felt that central Europe had been abandoned." (“Berlin Background,” 5.) [xxvii] Huschke, 85. [xxviii] Blockade, 37 and Huschke 85-90. [xxix] Blockade, 38. The Berlin blockade The Berlin blockade A famous image of the Red Army erecting the Soviet flag over Berlin in 1945 As World War II was ending, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union agreed that each should occupy part of the divided Germany. This occupation would be coordinated and administered from one location, Berlin, which itself would be segmented into occupied zones. The Soviet Red Army was the first to arrive in Berlin in April 1945, prompting Hitler’s suicide and the surrender of the German high command. Russian generals refused to allow Allied troops into the capital for two months.

During this time, Soviet soldiers engaged in an orgy of murder, looting and sexual violence (as many as 400,000 Berlin girls and women were subjected to rape). American and British military personnel were permitted to enter the German capital in July, when they began setting up their discrete zones in Berlin’s west and south-west. Weeks later they were joined by the French, who occupied a small quadrant in the north-west. The Soviets controlled almost all of Berlin’s eastern half. The occupied sectors of post-war Berlin in the late 1940s The Allied occupation forces were shocked by the devastation in Berlin. The city had almost no means of sustaining itself. Berlin produced only two per cent of its food requirements; the rest had to be shipped in from rural areas. Food supplies were exhausted and thousands of Berliners were starving. Months of heavy bombing had destroyed buildings, factories, homes and critical infrastructure. All of Berlin’s 87 sewage networks had been destroyed, spoiling drinking water supplies and spreading diseases like typhus and dysentery. Hospitals, railways and roads had been decimated by bombing and artillery.

Many had long since fled the city, fearing the advancing Soviet troops, causing Berlin’s population to drop from 4.6 million in 1944 to 2.8 million in mid-1945. “The Western counter-blockade of eastern Germany… hurt the eastern occupation zone and Soviet standing in Germany more than the Soviet blockade hurt the western zones. Eastern Germany lacked sufficient quantities of essential industrial material like coal and steel, and there was no equivalent to the airlift that could supply these necessary commodities. Francois Seydoux de Clausonne, a French government advisor on Germany, conjectured that the Berlin Blockade was worse than a failure – it was a political embarrassment to the Soviet Union.” Roger R. Miller, historian The Allied-controlled sections of Berlin were enclaves, located in the heart of the Soviet occupation zone of greater Germany. The Americans, British or French could not move men and supplies in or out of Berlin without crossing Soviet-occupied territory or airspace. This was not a concern initially, while there was considerable goodwill in Soviet-Allied relations. In 1945 Red Army commander Marshal Zhukov granted the Allies permission to use one road, one rail and one aerial route across the Soviet zone.

In later negotiations the Allies were granted three twenty-mile corridors into Berlin. But these agreements were intended to be temporary. When relations began to deteriorate, the Allied presence in Berlin became irksome for the Soviet leader, who had wrongly predicted the Americans would withdraw from Berlin after a year or two. ‘Perhaps we can kick them out’ In 1948 Stalin met with Wilhelm Pieck, his German henchman in the Soviet zone and the future president of East Germany. Pieck complained to Stalin that the presence of the Americans, British and French in Berlin threatened to disrupt elections scheduled for 1949. “Let’s make a joint effort then,” Stalin told him, “and perhaps we can kick them out”. On Stalin’s orders, the Soviet regime in Germany began measures to frustrate the Allies out of Berlin. Soviet troops began stopping Allied trains to check passengers and cargo, while Russian planes began entering Allied airspace over Berlin to menace planes flying in or out of the city. In April 1948 relations worsened after a Soviet fighter ‘buzzed’ and collided with a British commercial passenger plane, killing all fourteen people onboard.

In June the Allies issued a new currency, the deutschmark, while the Soviets – preferring to prevent economic recovery in Germany – gave orders that the deutschmark not be accepted within its zone. A day later, Soviet forces began implementing a full-scale blockade of Allied zones in west Berlin. The Russians closed the land corridors, halting Allied road and rail shipments then sending them back to their originating zones. They shut down thoroughfares and services into west Berlin, closing roads, cutting telephone lines and blocking water supplies. Power lines into west Berlin from electrical stations in the Soviet zone were disconnected. By late June, the Allied sectors of Berlin were almost completely blockaded; only the air routes remained open. Many in the American government now considered that remaining in Berlin was untenable. The Americans had only 9,000 troops stationed in Berlin and another 110,000 in Bizonia, compared to more than one million Russians in the Soviet zone, so military options were ruled out. Berlin’s allied zones had only five weeks’ of food stores and six weeks’ of coal remaining as of the end of June.

Given that the USSR had signed an agreement guaranteeing three flight paths into Berlin from Bizonia, an airlift of food, coal, gasoline and machinery was the only means of re-supply. But an airlift to keep Berlin fed and fuelled would be a monumental task, given that it would need to move 5,000 tons of cargo per day – and the largest American plane carried barely four tons. It would require thousands of flights each week and cost millions of dollars. There was also the risk that the Soviets would breach their agreement of 1945 and attack cargo planes. Yet despite these difficulties, the Berlin airlift was authorised and began in the final week of June. Some significant facts about the airlift include: ‘Flights to freedom’ Allied planes queue for loading and take-off during the Berlin airlift Some significant facts about the airlift include: The Berlin airlift was code-named Operation Vittles and was overseen by US Air Force General Curtis Le May. The operation would use almost 700 planes and 12,000 personnel from the US, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

A study by the Allied command determined that the minimum daily ration needed for the two million people of west Berlin required 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, five tons of real milk for children, 144 tons of vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese – a total of around 1,540 tons. In addition to food, the airlift shifted more than 1.5 million tons of coal and four million litres of gasoline. Among the more unusual items carried in the airlift: gigantic rolls of newsprint for Allied Berlin’s newspapers and two million seedlings to replace trees destroyed during the war. There were more than 277,000 separate flights, the first on June 26th. In total Allied planes flew more than 92 million miles – almost the distance required to travel to Mars and back.

Allied commanders routinely shortened launch timings, safety and inspection procedures in order to fly more cargo runs. One general aimed to achieve 1,440 Berlin landings per day – one for each minute of the day – a figure that was finally achieved in August 1948. The airlift was a challenge for pilots and aircrew. Not only were crews required to battle fatigue by flying several sorties each day, conditions were often extremely difficult. Berlin’s airports were prone to fog and low cloud, while the approach to Templehof airport in the US zone required pilots to fly between high-rise apartment buildings. Planes were often loaded to or just over their cargo limit, which made them notoriously difficult to take off and handle. Twenty-five Allied planes crashed during the airlift, killing 70 pilots and crew. The airlift began slowly, averaging just 90 tons of supplies a day in its first week. Following the arrival of new planes, these figures rose to 1000 tons per day in the second week. The record single-day tonnage was set in a 24-hour period during Easter 1949, when Allied planes transported just under 13,000 tons of supplies.

The citizens of west Berlin offered to assist with the unloading of landed planes, in return for extra food rations. As the airlift progressed, these volunteer crews became very fast (at one point, twelve men unloaded a ten-ton cargo of coal in under six minutes). This allowed for fast turnarounds, as some Allied planes spent barely fifteen minutes on the tarmac in Berlin before returning to Bizonia for another cargo run. Moscow relents A British cartoon depicting Stalin’s frustration at the airlift The pro-Soviet press in eastern Berlin mocked the Allied airlift as a futile exercise, suggesting that it would fail within days or weeks. This prediction proved wrong: in fact the Berlin airlift, much like the Marshall Plan, was an important propaganda victory for the US. One poster produced by a participating aircraft company hailed milk as the “new weapon of democracy”, declaring that 2.5 million Germans were enjoying a better life due to air transport alone. The success of the airlift proved embarrassing for the Soviet Union, which in April 1949 proposed negotiations to end the blockade of Berlin.

The Soviets agreed to reopen land access to the city, and at 12.01am on May 13th the first Allied train in 11 months rolled into Soviet-occupied East Germany, reaching Berlin shortly before dawn. The airlifts continued for another nine weeks, in order to build up a surplus of supplies, before they finally ceased in late July. 1. After 1945 the German capital Berlin was divided into zones, occupied by the US, Britain, France and the USSR. 2. In 1948 Stalin and the East German government resolved to force the Allies out of Berlin by denying access. 3. As Stalin tried to starve them out of Berlin, the West held firm and decided to supply its sectors by air. 4. The Berlin airlift was the largest air supply campaign ever attempted, with more than 550,000 different flights. 5. The airlift proved embarrassing for the USSR, which in April 1949 agreed to negotiations for the re-opening of Berlin. Rail access was eventually granted in May 1949 and supply flights continued until late July 1949. © Alpha History.

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Question: What city was blockaded by the Soviets in 1948, forcing other countries to airlift in supplies?
Answer: West Berlin