1. Composition 19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established. 20. The Military Armistice commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general of flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents. 21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required. 22. The Military Armistice Commission shall able provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. (a) The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. (b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor mire than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams. 24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement. 25.

The military Armistice Commission shall: (a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37 57'29" n, 126 40'00" e). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission. (b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman. (c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary (d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary. (e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams. (f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement. (g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral nations supervisory Commission. (h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

(i) Act as intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from Communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ. (j) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission. 26. The Mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary. 27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission. 28.

The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. 29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides. 30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides. 3. General 31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side. 32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting. 33.

The Joint Observer teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. 34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side. 35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 1. Compositions 36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established. 37.

The Neutral Nations supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander- in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side. 38. Members of the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required.

These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission. 39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. 40. (a) The Neutral Nations supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations supervisory Commission only. (b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointed.

In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral nations supervisory Commission is composed. 2. Functions and Authority 41.

The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission. 42. The Neutral nations Supervisory Commission shall: (a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. (b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary. (c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral nations Inspection teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs of characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition. (d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. (e) Station five (5) neutral nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission. (f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraphs, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission. (g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels used in the Performance of this mission. 43. Neutral nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry.

Territory under the military contrail of the United Nations Command INCHON..................................(37 28, 126 38'E) MANPO....................................(41 46'N, 126 18'E) SINANJU...................................(39 36'N, 125 36'E) These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5). 3. General 44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member. 45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese. 46.

The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as information only. 47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission.

Members of the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted. 48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side. 49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. 50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicated with any member of the Military Armistice Commission. Article III Arrangement Relating to Prisoners of War 51.

The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement. (a) Within sixty (60) days after this agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, or personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto, "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission." (c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to other side shall, for the purposes of the Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, ( ) "Song Hwan" in Korean and ( ) "Ch'ien Fan" in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war. 52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this armistice agreement. 53. All the sick and injured prisoners of was who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority.

Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance enroute. 54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete repatriation of the above- mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time. 55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. 56. (a) A committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established.

It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for co- ordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervision the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to co-ordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war. (b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Committee upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war. 57. (a) Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war.

(b) The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below: (1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representative from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. (2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing to forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team. (4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require. (5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. (c) The Commander of each side shall co-operate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the Joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control. (d) The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all of the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation. 58. (a) The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war: (1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody. (b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. (c) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition. 59.

(a) All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement become effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south Military Demarcation Line.

The Commander of each side shall e responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home. (b) All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military Control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so.

The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control of contents of the provisions of this sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorizes to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side. (c) Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (a) hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59 (b) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. (d) (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displace Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

This committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians. (2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. (3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission. Article IV Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides 60.

In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. Article V Miscellaneous 61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides. 62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides. 63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic. NAM IL North Korea declares 1953 armistice invalid - CNN.com North Korea declares 1953 armistice invalid By Madison Park, CNN Updated 1:07 PM ET, Mon March 11, 2013 Chat with us in Facebook Messenger. Find out what's happening in the world as it unfolds. JUST WATCHED The agreement ended the three-year war between the North and South The North has nullified the agreement on several occasions Diplomacy between North and South has zigzagged from conciliatory to bellicose The North Korean army has declared invalid the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953, the official newspaper of the country's ruling Workers' Party said Monday. Since last week, North Korea had been threatening to scrap the armistice after the U.N. Security Council passed tougher sanctions against it in response to its February 12 nuclear test.

On Monday, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that the Supreme Command of North Korea's army had done so. "The U.S. has reduced the armistice agreement to a dead paper," the newspaper said. North Korea also cut off direct phone links with South Korea at the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency. The phone line was the emergency link for quick, two-way communication between the two sides. JUST WATCHED MUST WATCH What to make of N. Korea's newest threat 03:10 The armistice agreement, signed in 1953, ended the three-year war between North and South Korea in a truce. Since the two sides remain technically at war, it remains to be seen whether the invalidation means that either side can resume hostilities. The Rodong Sinmun reported the Supreme Command saying that it can now make a "strike of justice at any target anytime, not bound to the armistice agreement and achieve the national reunification, the cherished desire of the Korean nation." However, the North has nullified the agreement on several occasions in the past. A look back at the history of the armistice.

What is the armistice agreement? It is the agreement that ended the war between North and South Korea. It is a truce, rather than a peace treaty. Has the North ended the armistice before? Yes. In 2003, Pyonyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that it may have "no option" but to stop honoring the armistice because of the United State's "persistent war moves." In 2009, North Korea said its military would no longer be bound by the agreement because South Korea was joining a U.S.-led anti-proliferation plan. Part of the reason for the latest move are the joint exercises between the United States and South Korea. A bigger reason is t ougher sanctions passed in the U.N. Security Council against North Korea in response to its nuclear test on February 12. Pyongyang carried out its third nuclear test, despite international condemnation. What caused the division of Korea? For most of the first half of the 20th century, Japan controlled the Korean peninsula as its colony. By the end of the World War II as Japan neared defeat, the allies agreed to an independent Korea.

The United States and Soviet Union divided postwar occupation of Korea along the 38th parallel and the two sides were ideologically opposite. Pyongyang scraps armistice amid heightened saber rattling Why did war break out? On June 25, 1950, a surprise attack by North Korean soldiers who crossed the 38th parallel easily overwhelmed South Korean forces. The United States leapt to the defense of the South. As South Korean, U.S. and U.N. forces fought back and gained ground into North Korea, Chinese forces joined the war on the North's side later that year. To this day, China remains a crucial ally of North Korea and the U.S. of South Korea. What toll did the war take? The toll of the war included about 1.2 million deaths in South Korea, 1 million deaths in North Korea, 36,500 deaths for U.S. troops and 600,000 deaths for Chinese soldiers. What are the lasting effects of the war? The brutal war separated thousands of families, and created the world's most heavily fortified border. It also drew the alliances that exist today. When was the armistice signed?

The armistice was signed in July 1953. What were its terms? The terms of the armistice included the creation of the Demilitarized Zone, aheavily fortified 155-mile long (250 kilometers) 2.5-mile wide line separating the two countries. How have relations between the North and South been since then? In the last 60 years, diplomacy between North and South has zigzagged from conciliatory to bellicose. During more friendly times, the two countries arranged emotional family reunions for those separated by the war in 2000, their leaders shook hands in a 2007 Pyongyang summit and ran freight trains across the border. But periods of rapprochement have been counterpointed by flareups. More recently, the North shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong leaving two marines and two civilians dead. Pyongyang claimed Seoul provoked the 2010 attack by holding a military drill off their shared coast in the Yellow Sea. That same year, North Korea was also accused of sinking a South Korean warship , killing more than 40 sailors. Without an armistice, what can happen?

The two sides can resume hostilities if they so choose. What are the risks of a military clash? A military clash could risk drawing in the United States, which has about 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea as part of the security alliance between the two countries. Korean War Armistice turns 60 July 27 | Article | The United States Army Korean War Armistice turns 60 July 27 By Mr. Franklin Fisher (Red Cloud)July 24, 2013 Share via Email 1 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – A Korean girl with her brother on her back moves wearily past a stalled tank near Haengju, in Kyonggi Province, Korea, June 9, 1951, during the Korean War of 1950-1953. The war, which claimed millions of lives and left the Korean peninsula devastated, halted with the signing of an armistice July 27, 1953, 60 years ago Saturday. (Photo Credit: U.S.

Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 2 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – The front page of the Cleveland Plain Dealer's July 27, 1953 edition announced the long-awaited news of the armistice that 60 years ago Saturday was signed in Panmunjom, ending full-scale fighting in the Korean War of 1950 " 1953. (Photo Credit: U.S. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 3 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Marines use scaling ladders as they assault North Korean positions at Inchon in South Korea Sept. 15, 1950. The amphibious landings there were crucial in turning the tables " for a time " on the North Korean invaders. (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. W.W. Frank) VIEW ORIGINAL 4 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – In war-ravaged Seoul Nov. 1, 1950, an aged Korean woman pauses in her search for salvageable materials amid the rubble. (Photo Credit: Capt. C.W. Huff) VIEW ORIGINAL 5 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – In a Jan.

8, 1951 photo, a long column of Korean refugees plods south through the snow outside Kangnung in Kangwon Province. (Photo Credit: Cpl. Walter Calmus) VIEW ORIGINAL 6 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – (Photo Credit: U.S. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 7 / 7 Show Caption + Hide Caption – 1st Lt. Alvin Anderson, one of many repatriated Korean War POWs to arrive aboard ship in San Francisco Sept. 14, 1953, is greeted by family members. Release of prisoners came after signing of the armistice July 27, 1953. (Photo Credit: Herb Weiss) VIEW ORIGINAL CAMP RED CLOUD -- Saturday, July 27 marks the 60th anniversary of the armistice that ended full-scale hostilities during the Korean War of 1950-1953. By the time the fighting stopped the entire Korean peninsula -- North and South -- was a war-ravaged ruin and millions had died.

"You've got to remember, five years removed from World War II you saw ground combat that rivaled the intensity of battles fought in World War II or, as far as that goes, any war in history," said Ron Miller, Eighth Army command historian. The war began June 25, 1950 when around 4 a.m. North Korean forces struck south across the 38th Parallel that divided North and South Korea. In response to the invasion, President Harry Truman ordered immediate U.S. naval and air action to try to slow the North Korean advance and avert the capture of South Korea's capital, Seoul. Within three days the North Koreans had captured Seoul, and pressed their drive south. Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council the night of June 27 voted for military action to repel the invasion. Eventually 16 member-nations sent military forces or some other form of direct aid to the effort. By June 30, the first American ground troops had been rushed to Korea from occupation duty in Japan, and more units continued arriving thereafter. But though at times the North Korean advance was slowed it could not be stopped and by August U.S.

forces were backed into a corner of the southeastern peninsula in what came to be called the Pusan Perimeter. The Perimeter was an 80-by-50-mile front bounded on the north and west by the Naktong River, on the south by the Korea Strait, and on the east by the Sea of Japan. North Korean forces kept the Perimeter under intense pressure and for most of the desperate battle there was fear the enemy might carry out their boast to drive UN forces into the sea. But it was while that battle raged that the war reached one of its several turning points. UN forces under command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur carried out an amphibious landing Sept. 15 on South Korea's west coast at Inchon, cutting off the enemy's lines of communication and resupply The North Korean forces were outflanked and soon began a flight north. This also enabled U.S. forces to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and drive at the North Koreans from the south. By October 1950 North Korean forces had been expelled from South Korea.

But what came next soon led to one of the worst reversals in American military history, one that changed the entire scale and duration of the war: UN forces pursued the enemy into North Korea itself. U.S. and South Korean troops captured North Korea's capital, Pyongyang on Oct. 19, and by Oct. 26 elements of the South Korean 6th Division reached the Yalu River, where North Korea borders China. It was then, only days later, that a massive Chinese ground force sprang a surprise offensive that threw UN forces into a retreat that continued all the way back into South Korea. Seoul fell once again to the enemy, on Jan. 4, 1951. Command of the Eighth U.S. Army had meanwhile passed to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, a veteran combat leader who soon got demoralized UN ground forces back on the offensive. Ridgway took command after Eighth Army's previous commander, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, was killed in a jeep accident Dec. 23. Camp Walker in Daegu is named in his honor. After weeks of back-and-forth fighting, UN troops reentered Seoul in mid-March.

See-saw fighting continued for several more months but by June 1951 UN forces had pushed the enemy out of South Korea and the war entered a new phase, one of mainly static, positional warfare. Both sides now faced each other from entrenched positions on the slopes and ridgelines in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Truce talks began July 21, 1951, and continued stop-and-go for two years, with one of the main sticking points being disagreement over the terms governing prisoner exchange. But, at last, agreement was reached and an armistice signed at Panmunjom 10 a.m. July 27, 1953. According to figures compiled by the U.S. Forces Korea Command History Office, military casualties for North Korean and Chinese forces combined are estimated at 615,000 - 750,000 killed and 789,000 wounded. South Korean forces killed, 137,899; wounded 450,742. U.S.

dead, 36,940, of which 33,665 were killed in action and 3,275 were non-combat deaths; wounded, 103,284. Military casualties for other UN forces: more than 3,700 killed; wounded, more than 12,500. Civilian casualties -- dead and injured -- on both sides have been estimated at 2.5 million. "The suspension of full-scale hostilities definitely brought an end to the high casualty rates," said Miller. "Unfortunately, the civilian population suffered almost as much as frontline Soldiers," he said. "It divided families, it rendered many homeless. It definitely was a hardship." RELATED LINKS Korean War armistice remembered at Bangor ceremony | BDN Maine | Bangor Daily News Korean War armistice remembered at Bangor ceremony Gabor Degre | BDN People gather at the Maine Korean War Memorial in Bangor to commemorate the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953, which ended three years of fighting on the Korean Peninsula, in this July 2010 file photo.

Buy Photo By Nok-Noi Ricker , BDN Staff July 28, 2016, at 7:38 p.m. BANGOR, Maine — Two dozen Korean War veterans who made it home 63 years ago when America’s “Forgotten War” ended with a ceasefire came together Wednesday to remember their fallen brothers-in-arms. They gather at 10 a.m. every July 27 to mark the end of the war in 1953 when an armistice halted the conflict after claiming the lives of nearly 55,000 U.S. troops, 245 who called Maine home. “It was a three-year war. A very bitter, bitter war,” John Wedin, secretary of the Burton-Goode-Sargent Chapter 1 of the Korean War Veterans Association, said Thursday. “The capitol of Seoul was captured and lost and captured again three times.” The names of the lost Mainers are inscribed on a granite memorial built at Mount Hope Cemetery by veterans and volunteers. Two other names of soldiers who grew up in the state but settled elsewhere have been added since the memorial was dedicated in 1992, Wedin said.

Ed Davis of Orland, president of the Burton-Goode-Sargent Chapter 1, which is the only Korean War Veterans Association chapter in Maine, spoke at the annual gathering. He reminded people that the time of the 10 a.m. ceremony reflects the time the ceasefire was signed in 1953, which was 10 p.m. in Panmunjom, Korea. As the years have past, the number of Korean War veterans continues to diminish, Wedin said. “When we started out in ‘92, we had just over 100 members, and now we have 56,” he said, adding that some of the members are spouses and associate members. “We’re all at least 82 or older,” Wedin said later of the surviving Korean War veterans. “We are too old to even march now, so we have the Marine Corps League do our honor guard.” About 35 people gathered at the Mount Hope Avenue memorial for the ceremony on Wednesday. Invited guest speaker Consul General of the Republic of Korea Yong Joo was unable to make the event.

“We do this three times a year — Memorial Day, Veterans Day and the [anniversary of the Korean War] armistice,” Wedin said. Project MUSE - Reflections on the Korean War and Its Armistice Reflections on the Korean War and Its Armistice Marilyn Young (bio) The preface to Robert S. McNamara’s memoir, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, quotes from T. S. Eliot’s poem “Little Gidding,” We shall not cease from explorationAnd the end of all our exploringWill be to arrive where we startedAnd know the place for the first time. 1 The problem with US policy in Korea (as indeed with McNamara himself) is that policymakers never do know the place; they simply arrive where they started. The Korean War ended not in a peace treaty but a cease-fire agreement signed by the representatives of the UN Command, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China. South Korea did not sign it and still has not. Unhappy with the outcome of the war and determined to constrain Chinese influence in Asia—North, East, and Southeast—and project its own, the United States set about establishing and reinforcing military bases in the area.

The Americans took over the French effort in Indochina, branded China an aggressor, and blocked its entrance into the United Nations. US forces trained ROK military forces, enabled Chinese Nationalist sabotage efforts on the mainland, blocked any rapprochement between Japan and China, and encouraged the creation of a Japanese self-defense force. In short, the United States pursued a militarized policy in the region in the name of anticommunism, stability, and order. Now, sixty years later, the United States is back in the same place. Well, not [End Page 403] quite, since North Korea declared the Armistice, the subject of this special issue of The Journal of Korean Studies, nullified on March 11, 2013. 2 Now, instead of marking in a memorial way the sixtieth anniversary of the event, these articles reflect on the Armistice in history, literature, and film and enable the reader to better understand the fragility of the Armistice and to wonder how it has lasted this long.

Indeed, that is the point of Steven Lee’s magisterial history of the Armistice from 1953 to 1976: over time the Armistice Agreement “became more an obstacle to peace than a means of preserving it.” 3 Steven Lee’s article, like others in this issue, corrects the received wisdom of most Americans (and American historians), whose focus is on the combative rhetoric and actions of the North Korean regime. From the moment when the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1958 to the 1976 nearwar crisis in the Joint Security Area, peace on the peninsula has been hostage to America’s larger political and strategic needs. Avram Agov’s article tells a different story: the way in which North Korea, maneuvering between the PRC and the Soviet Union, was able to maintain its independence and receive essential aid. During the Korean War itself, however, the North Koreans were also subject to the policy goals of its supporters, who prolonged the war despite Kim Il Sung’s (Kim Ilsŏng) desire to negotiate its end.

“This war spills American blood,” 4 Stalin told Zhou Enlai, not so much indifferent to the spilt Korean blood as clear about his priorities. By contrast, as Robert Barnes makes clear, Nehru’s persistent efforts to use the UN to end the war met with some modest success. The role of the war, the Armistice, and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is its geographic embodiment, has a prominent place in the South Korean imagination and collective memory, explored in the articles of Susie Jie Young Kim, Youngmin Choe, and Jung Joon Lee. For North Korea as well, the war and the American enemy remain a constant presence, as Martin Petersen shows in his article. Insofar as the Korean War is remembered in the United States (it is repeatedly remembered as forgotten), the Armistice and the DMZ play no role in America’s imagination or collective memory. Most Americans think of the Armistice not as a cease-fire but as a peace treaty and, as Steven Lee emphasizes, US policymakers, who know better, insist that the Armistice contributes to the peace and stability of the peninsula and that anyhow it is a matter for the two Koreas to resolve.

In March 2013, as has been the case since 1976, the United States and South Korea conducted massive joint military exercises. This time, however, they included nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 stealth aircraft, joint naval exercises in the East Sea, and a computer-simulated invasion and occupation of North Korea. 5 The exercises took place in the context of the Obama administration’s announced “pivot to Asia,” 6 which has included the dispatch of a contingent of US Marines to Australia and a planned drone base there; a major US-ROK naval base on Cheju Island able to host nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers; and a missile defense system in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea itself. The United States, [End Page 404] Obama told the Australian National Parliament in November 2011, “has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation,” 7 by which he meant something more than a geographic description. In September 1952, when President Harry S.

Truman contemplated the peace talks being held in P’anmunjŏm, he worried that an Armistice would return the United States to 1945 “when we accepted the surrender of Japan and then tore up our military machine…. We cannot sit down now with the doors open and no military machine to protect us—we must build our military strength.” 8 In January 2013, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wound down, President Obama assured the country and the world that despite a leaner military, “the United States is going to maintain our military superiority.” 9 The Armistice, when it was finally signed in Korea, halted the war but not the ongoing militarization of US policy in Asia. For the United States, China has remained a once and future enemy, as the first of a set of revolutionary dominoes that threatened perceived US interests throughout the Pacific in the 1950s and today as an economic powerhouse and potential military rival. Some observers of the current situation, like Jeremi Suri, a professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, urge immediate military action.

North Korea “has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests” and the best response would be to use a precision airstrike to demolish North Korea’s missile site. This would be purely an act of self-defense and “would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Such an action might lead to war but “the United States and its allies would still be better off fighting a war with North Korea today, when the conflict could still be confined largely to the Korean Peninsula.” 10 The conflict was confined largely to the Korean peninsula last time, with such consequences as this volume makes clear. Then the way the conflict ended, in a suspended war and a divided country, shaped the next Asian wars the United States fought, in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In the fall of 1950, with a modesty contemporary policymakers might imitate, George F.

Kennan reflected in his diary that the United States was, “in our participation on the international scene, only one of a number of contenders for the privilege of leading a national existence on a portion of the territory of the world.” 11 The ongoing costs to Korea of the war fought on its portion of the territory of the world are evident in these pages. The history encountered here will contribute to another possibility: not the renewal of the Armistice North Korea has rejected, but rather the opening of negotiations for a genuine peace treaty. Korean Armistice Agreement | World History Project Jul 27 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement The 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, with neither side able to claim outright victory. Fifty years on, the truce is still all that technically prevents North Korea and the US - along with its ally South Korea - resuming the war, as no peace treaty has ever been signed. Both sides regularly accuse the other of violating the agreement, but the accusations have become more frequent as tensions rise over North Korea's nuclear programme.

When the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, talks had already dragged on for two years, ensnared in testy issues such as the exchange of prisoners of war and the location of a demarcation line. Military commanders from China and North Korea signed the agreement on one side, with the US-led United Nations Command signing on behalf of the international community. South Korea was not a signatory. The armistice was only ever intended as a temporary measure. The document, signed by US Lieutenant General William K Harrison and his counterpart from the North's army, General Nam Il, said it was aimed at a ceasefire "until a final peaceful settlement is achieved". However, that settlement never came, and a conference in Geneva in 1954 which was designed to thrash out a formal peace accord ended without agreement. The armistice is still the only safeguard for peace on the Korean peninsula.

The agreement provided for: * A suspension of open hostilities * A fixed demarcation line with a four kilometer (2.4 mile) buffer zone - the so-called demilitarization zone * A mechanism for the transfer of prisoners of war Both sides pledged not to "execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone", or enter areas under control of the other. The agreement also called for the establishment of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to ensure the truce held. The MAC, which comprises members from both sides, still meets regularly in the truce village of Panmunjom. Despite the relative peace since the war ended, tensions remain high between the two Koreas, and their border remains the most heavily militarised frontier in the world. On 13 December, 1991 the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation was signed by Chung Won Shik (ROK Prime Minister) and Yon Hyong Muk (DPRK Premier).

Question: Where was the armistice which halted the Korean War signed in 1953?
Answer: PANMUNJON