Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant-near Harrisburg, Pen… | Flickr Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant-near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania May 27, 2007 On 28 March 1979 the unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg Pennsylvania USA suffered a partial core meltdown. It started with a relatively minor failure of the secondary cooling system which led to the automatic opening of a safety valve in the primary cooling circuit for the reactor itself. That would not have been problematic, but the valve stayed stuck in the open state un-noticed by the reactor operators. Despite the nuclear fission process being shut down, the reactor remained very hot owing to the radioactive decay heat of the nuclear fuel. With insufficient coolant, parts of the core eventually dried out and finally melted. There was a build up of steam and some radioactive gas was vented to the outside. The radiation exposure to the public was extremely small and it is probable that no-one suffered adverse health effects as a result of the accident. It is certain that no-one was killed promptly. In many ways the design features of the reactor prevented what could have been a far more serious accident.

Done NRC: Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Fact Sheets > Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Printable Version (does not include Animated Diagram of the Sequence of Events) Plant Diagram The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor, near Middletown, Pa., partially melted down on March 28, 1979. This was the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history, although its small radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on plant workers or the public. Its aftermath brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also caused the NRC to tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. All of these changes significantly enhanced U.S. reactor safety. A combination of equipment malfunctions, design-related problems and worker errors led to TMI-2's partial meltdown and very small off-site releases of radioactivity. Summary of Events The accident began about 4 a.m.

on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, when the plant experienced a failure in the secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant (one of two reactors on the site). Either a mechanical or electrical failure prevented the main feedwater pumps from sending water to the steam generators that remove heat from the reactor core. This caused the plant's turbine-generator and then the reactor itself to automatically shut down. Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to control that pressure, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) opened. The valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments in the control room, however, indicated to the plant staff that the valve was closed. As a result, the plant staff was unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve. As coolant flowed from the primary system through the valve, other instruments available to reactor operators provided inadequate information. There was no instrument that showed how much water covered the core. As a result, plant staff assumed that as long as the pressurizer water level was high, the core was properly covered with water.

As alarms rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. They took a series of actions that made conditions worse. The water escaping through the stuck valve reduced primary system pressure so much that the reactor coolant pumps had to be turned off to prevent dangerous vibrations. To prevent the pressurizer from filling up completely, the staff reduced how much emergency cooling water was being pumped in to the primary system. These actions starved the reactor core of coolant, causing it to overheat. Without the proper water flow, the nuclear fuel overheated to the point at which the zirconium cladding (the long metal tubes that hold the nuclear fuel pellets) ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt. It was later found that about half of the core melted during the early stages of the accident. Although TMI-2 suffered a severe core meltdown, the most dangerous kind of nuclear power accident, consequences outside the plant were minimal. Unlike the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, TMI-2's containment building remained intact and held almost all of the accident's radioactive material.

Federal and state authorities were initially concerned about the small releases of radioactive gases that were measured off-site by the late morning of March 28 and even more concerned about the potential threat that the reactor posed to the surrounding population. They did not know that the core had melted, but they immediately took steps to try to gain control of the reactor and ensure adequate cooling to the core. The NRC's regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., was notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28. By 8 a.m., NRC Headquarters in Washington, D.C., was alerted and the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Md., was activated. The regional office promptly dispatched the first team of inspectors to the site and other agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, also mobilized their response teams. Helicopters hired by TMI's owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear, and the Department of Energy were sampling radioactivity in the atmosphere above the plant by midday. A team from the Brookhaven National Laboratory was also sent to assist in radiation monitoring.

At 9:15 a.m., the White House was notified and at 11 a.m., all non-essential personnel were ordered off the plant's premises. By the evening of March 28, the core appeared to be adequately cooled and the reactor appeared to be stable. But new concerns arose by the morning of Friday, March 30. A significant release of radiation from the plant's auxiliary building, performed to relieve pressure on the primary system and avoid curtailing the flow of coolant to the core, caused a great deal of confusion and consternation. In an atmosphere of growing uncertainty about the condition of the plant, the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh, consulted with the NRC about evacuating the population near the plant. Eventually, he and NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie agreed that it would be prudent for those members of society most vulnerable to radiation to evacuate the area. Thornburgh announced that he was advising pregnant women and pre-school-age children within a five-mile radius of the plant to leave the area. Within a short time, chemical reactions in the melting fuel created a large hydrogen bubble in the dome of the pressure vessel, the container that holds the reactor core.

NRC officials worried the hydrogen bubble might burn or even explode and rupture the pressure vessel. In that event, the core would fall into the containment building and perhaps cause a breach of containment. The hydrogen bubble was a source of intense scrutiny and great anxiety, both among government authorities and the population, throughout the day on Saturday, March 31. The crisis ended when experts determined on Sunday, April 1, that the bubble could not burn or explode because of the absence of oxygen in the pressure vessel. Further, by that time, the utility had succeeded in greatly reducing the size of the bubble. Animated Diagram of the Sequence of Events The following animated diagram graphically depicts the sequence of events associated with the accident at TMI-2. Health Effects The NRC conducted detailed studies of the accident's radiological consequences, as did the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), the Department of Energy, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Several independent groups also conducted studies. The approximately 2 million people around TMI-2 during the accident are estimated to have received an average radiation dose of only about 1 millirem above the usual background dose.

To put this into context, exposure from a chest X-ray is about 6 millirem and the area's natural radioactive background dose is about 100-125 millirem per year for the area. The accident's maximum dose to a person at the site boundary would have been less than 100 millirem above background. In the months following the accident, although questions were raised about possible adverse effects from radiation on human, animal, and plant life in the TMI area, none could be directly correlated to the accident. Thousands of environmental samples of air, water, milk, vegetation, soil, and foodstuffs were collected by various government agencies monitoring the area. Very low levels of radionuclides could be attributed to releases from the accident. However, comprehensive investigations and assessments by several well respected organizations, such as Columbia University and the University of Pittsburgh, have concluded that in spite of serious damage to the reactor, the actual release had negligible effects on the physical health of individuals or the environment. Impact of the Accident A combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures caused the Three Mile Island accident, which permanently changed both the nuclear industry and the NRC.

Public fear and distrust increased, NRC's regulations and oversight became broader and more robust, and management of the plants was scrutinized more carefully. Careful analysis of the accident's events identified problems and led to permanent and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees – which, in turn, has reduced the risk to public health and safety. Here are some of the major changes that have occurred since the accident: Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment requirements. This includes fire protection, piping systems, auxiliary feedwater systems, containment building isolation, reliability of individual components (pressure relief valves and electrical circuit breakers), and the ability of plants to shut down automatically; Identifying the critical role of human performance in plant safety led to revamping operator training and staffing requirements, followed by improved instrumentation and controls for operating the plant, and establishment of fitness-for-duty programs for plant workers to guard against alcohol or drug abuse; Enhancing emergency preparedness, including requirements for plants to immediately notify NRC of significant events and an NRC Operations Center staffed 24 hours a day.

Drills and response plans are now tested by licensees several times a year, and state and local agencies participate in drills with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and NRC; Integrating NRC observations, findings, and conclusions about licensee performance and management effectiveness into a periodic, public report; Having senior NRC managers regularly analyze plant performance for those plants needing significant additional regulatory attention; Expanding NRC's resident inspector program – first authorized in 1977 – to have at least two inspectors live nearby and work exclusively at each plant in the U.S.

to provide daily surveillance of licensee adherence to NRC regulations; Expanding performance-oriented as well as safety-oriented inspections, and the use of risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities of any plant to severe accidents; Strengthening and reorganizing enforcement staff in a separate office within the NRC; Establishing the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the industry's own "policing" group, and formation of what is now the Nuclear Energy Institute to provide a unified industry approach to generic nuclear regulatory issues, and interaction with NRC and other government agencies; Installing additional equipment by licensees to mitigate accident conditions, and monitor radiation levels and plant status; Enacting programs by licensees for early identification of important safety-related problems, and for collecting and assessing relevant data so operating experience can be shared and quickly acted upon; and Expanding NRC's international activities to share enhanced knowledge of nuclear safety with other countries in a number of important technical areas. Current Status Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down and all its fuel had been removed. The reactor coolant system is fully drained and the radioactive water decontaminated and evaporated.

The accident's radioactive waste was shipped off-site to an appropriate disposal area, and the reactor fuel and core debris was shipped to the Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory. In 2001, FirstEnergy acquired TMI-2 from GPU. FirstEnergy has contracted the monitoring of TMI-2 to Exelon, the current owner and operator of TMI-1. The companies plan to keep the TMI-2 facility in long-term, monitored storage until the operating license for the TMI-1 plant expires, at which time both plants will be decommissioned. Below is a chronology of highlights of the TMI-2 cleanup from 1980 through 1993. Date Monitored storage began. Additional Information Further information on the TMI-2 accident can be obtained from sources listed below. The NUREG documents, many of which are on microfiche, can be ordered for a fee from the NRC's Public Document Room at 301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209; e-mail pdr@nrc.gov .

The PDR is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md.; however the mailing address is: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public Document Room, Washington, D.C. 20555. A glossary is also provided below. Additional Sources for Information on Three Mile Island NRC Annual Report - 1979, NUREG-0690 "Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," NUREG-0558 "Environmental Assessment of Radiological Effluents from Data Gathering and Maintenance Operation on Three Mile Island Unit 2," NUREG-0681 "Report of The President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island," October, 1979 "Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement," NUREG-0600 "Three Mile Island; A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, NUREG/CR-1250, Vols.

I-II, 1980 "Lessons learned From the Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Advisory Panel," NUREG/CR-6252 "The Status of Recommendations of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," (A ten-year review), NUREG-1355 "NRC Views and Analysis of the Recommendations of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," NUREG-0632 "Environmental Impact Statement related to decontamination and disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from March 28, 1979 accident Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2," NUREG-0683 "Answers to Questions About Updated Estimates of Occupational Radiation Doses at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," NUREG-1060 "Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Cleanup Activities at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," NUREG-0732 "Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants" (TMI Action Plan Reqmts.), NUREG-1435 Walker, J. Samuel, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Glossary Auxiliary feedwater - (see emergency feedwater) Background radiation - The radiation in the natural environment, including cosmic rays and radiation from the naturally radioactive elements, both outside and inside the bodies of humans and animals. The usually quoted average individual exposure from background radiation is 300 millirem per year. Cladding - The thin-walled metal tube that forms the outer jacket of a nuclear fuel rod. It prevents the corrosion of the fuel by the coolant and the release of fission products in the coolants. Aluminum, stainless steel and zirconium alloys are common cladding materials. Emergency feedwater system - Backup feedwater supply used during nuclear plant startup and shutdown; also known as auxiliary feedwater. Fuel rod - A long, slender tube that holds fuel (fissionable material) for nuclear reactor use. Fuel rods are assembled into bundles called fuel elements or fuel assemblies, which are loaded individually into the reactor core. Containment - The gas-tight shell or other enclosure around a reactor to confine fission products that otherwise might be released to the atmosphere in the event of an accident. Coolant - A substance circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer heat. The most commonly used coolant in the U.S. is water.

Other coolants include air, carbon dioxide, and helium. Core - The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements, and control rods. Decay heat - The heat produced by the decay of radioactive fission products after the reactor has been shut down. Decontamination - The reduction or removal of contaminating radioactive material from a structure, area, object, or person. Decontamination may be accomplished by (1) treating the surface to remove or decrease the contamination; (2) letting the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased by natural decay; and (3) covering the contamination to shield the radiation emitted. Feedwater - Water supplied to the steam generator that removes heat from the fuel rods by boiling and becoming steam. The steam then becomes the driving force for the turbine generator. Nuclear Reactor - A device in which nuclear fission may be sustained and controlled in a self-supporting nuclear reaction. There are several varieties, but all incorporate certain features, such as fissionable material or fuel, a moderating material (to control the reaction), a reflector to conserve escaping neutrons, provisions for removal of heat, measuring and controlling instruments, and protective devices.

Pressure Vessel - A strong-walled container housing the core of most types of power reactors. Pressurizer - A tank or vessel that controls the pressure in a certain type of nuclear reactor. Primary System - The cooling system used to remove energy from the reactor core and transfer that energy either directly or indirectly to the steam turbine. Radiation - Particles (alpha, beta, neutrons) or photons (gamma) emitted from the nucleus of an unstable atom as a result of radioactive decay. Reactor Coolant System - (see primary system) Secondary System - The steam generator tubes, steam turbine, condenser and associated pipes, pumps, and heaters used to convert the heat energy of the reactor coolant system into mechanical energy for electrical generation. Steam Generator - The heat exchanger used in some reactor designs to transfer heat from the primary (reactor coolant) system to the secondary (steam) system. This design permits heat exchange with little or no contamination of the secondary system equipment. Turbine - A rotary engine made with a series of curved vanes on a rotating shaft. Usually turned by water or steam. Turbines are considered to be the most economical means to turn large electrical generators.

Plant Diagram Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, December 12, 2014 Home Three Mile Island | TMI 2 |Three Mile Island Accident. - World Nuclear Association Three Mile Island Accident (March 2001, minor update Jan 2012) In 1979 at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in USA a cooling malfunction caused part of the core to melt in the #2 reactor. The TMI-2 reactor was destroyed. Some radioactive gas was released a couple of days after the accident, but not enough to cause any dose above background levels to local residents. There were no injuries or adverse health effects from the Three Mile Island accident. The Three Mile Island power station is near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in USA. It had two pressurized water reactors. One PWR was of 800 MWe (775 MWe net) and entered service in 1974. It remains one of the best-performing units in USA. Unit 2 was of 906 MWe (880 MWe net) and almost brand new.

The accident to unit 2 happened at 4 am on 28 March 1979 when the reactor was operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the secondary cooling circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to rise. This in turn caused the reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took about one second. At this point a relief valve failed to close, but instrumentation did not reveal the fact, and so much of the primary coolant drained away that the residual decay heat in the reactor core was not removed. The core suffered severe damage as a result. The operators were unable to diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor. Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency response training proved to be root causes of the accident The chain of events during the Three Mile Island Accident Within seconds of the shutdown, the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) on the reactor cooling system opened, as it was supposed to. About 10 seconds later it should have closed. But it remained open, leaking vital reactor coolant water to the reactor coolant drain tank. The operators believed the relief valve had shut because instruments showed them that a "close" signal was sent to the valve.

However, they did not have an instrument indicating the valve's actual position. Responding to the loss of cooling water, high-pressure injection pumps automatically pushed replacement water into the reactor system. As water and steam escaped through the relief valve, cooling water surged into the pressuriser, raising the water level in it. (The pressuriser is a tank which is part of the primary reactor cooling system, maintaining proper pressure in the system. The relief valve is located on the pressuriser. In a PWR like TMI-2, water in the primary cooling system around the core is kept under very high pressure to keep it from boiling.) Operators responded by reducing the flow of replacement water. Their training told them that the pressuriser water level was the only dependable indication of the amount of cooling water in the system. Because the pressuriser level was increasing, they thought the reactor system was too full of water. Their training told them to do all they could to keep the pressuriser from filling with water. If it filled, they could not control pressure in the cooling system and it might rupture. Steam then formed in the reactor primary cooling system. Pumping a mixture of steam and water caused the reactor cooling pumps to vibrate.

Because the severe vibrations could have damaged the pumps and made them unusable, operators shut down the pumps. This ended forced cooling of the reactor core. (The operators still believed the system was nearly full of water because the pressuriser level remained high.) However, as reactor coolant water boiled away, the reactor?s fuel core was uncovered and became even hotter. The fuel rods were damaged and released radioactive material into the cooling water. At 6:22 am operators closed a block valve between the relief valve and the pressuriser. This action stopped the loss of coolant water through the relief valve. However, superheated steam and gases blocked the flow of water through the core cooling system. Throughout the morning, operators attempted to force more water into the reactor system to condense steam bubbles that they believed were blocking the flow of cooling water. During the afternoon, operators attempted to decrease the pressure in the reactor system to allow a low pressure cooling system to be used and emergency water supplies to be put into the system. Cooling Restored, radioactive releases to air By late afternoon, operators began high-pressure injection of water into the reactor cooling system to increase pressure and to collapse steam bubbles.

By 7:50 pm on 28 March, they restored forced cooling of the reactor core when they were able to restart one reactor coolant pump. They had condensed steam so that the pump could run without severe vibrations. Radioactive gases from the reactor cooling system built up in the makeup tank in the auxiliary building. During March 29 and 30, operators used a system of pipes and compressors to move the gas to waste gas decay tanks. The compressors leaked, and some radioactive gas was released to the environment. These went through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal filters which removed most of the radionuclides, except for the noble gases, the estimated total of which was about 370 PBq (the Kemeny Commission said ‘a maximum of 480 PBq noble gases’ and NRC also quotes 1.6 PBq of krypton rlelease in July). With short half-life and being biologically inert, these did not pose a health hazard.

The Hydrogen Bubble When the reactor's core was uncovered, on the morning of 28 March, a high-temperature chemical reaction between water and the zircaloy metal tubes holding the nuclear fuel pellets had created hydrogen gas. In the afternoon of 28 March, a sudden rise in reactor building pressure shown by the control room instruments indicated a hydrogen burn had occurred. Hydrogen gas also gathered at the top of the reactor vessel. From 30 March through 1 April operators removed this hydrogen gas "bubble" by periodically opening the vent valve on the reactor cooling system pressuriser. For a time, regulatory (NRC) officials believed the hydrogen bubble could explode, though such an explosion was never possible since there was not enough oxygen in the system. Cold Shutdown and investigation After an anxious month, on 27 April operators established natural convection circulation of coolant. The reactor core was being cooled by the natural movement of water rather than by mechanical pumping. The plant was in "cold shutdown", ie with the water at less than 100°C at atmospheric pressure. The head of the reactor pressure vessel was removed in July 1984 allowing access to the remains of the core.

Subsequent investigation revealed that at lest 45% of the core - 62 tonnes - had melted and 19 tonnes of this had ended up in the lower plenum, mostly in the lower head of the reactor pressure vessel, but without seriously damaging the vessel. Most of the melted core material (corium) had remained in the core region. In 1988 a multinational OECD Vessel Investigation Project (VIP) took samples to evaluate the situation in detail and confirmed that there was much less damage than anticipated. Public concern and confusion When the TMI-2 accident is recalled, it is often in the context of what happened on Friday and Saturday, March 30-31. The drama of the TMI-2 accident-induced fear, stress and confusion on those two days. The atmosphere then, and the reasons for it, are described well in the book "Crisis Contained, The Department of Energy at Three Mile Island," by Philip L Cantelon and Robert C. Williams, 1982. This is an official history of the Department of Energy's role during the accident.

"Friday appears to have become a turning point in the history of the accident because of two events: the sudden rise in reactor pressure shown by control room instruments on Wednesday afternoon (the "hydrogen burn") which suggested a hydrogen explosion? became known to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [that day]; and the deliberate venting of radioactive gases from the plant Friday morning which produced a reading of 1,200 millirems (12 mSv) directly above the stack of the auxiliary building. "What made these significant was a series of misunderstandings caused, in part, by problems of communication within various state and federal agencies. Because of confused telephone conversations between people uninformed about the plant's status, officials concluded that the 1,200 millirems (12 mSv) reading was an off-site reading. They also believed that another hydrogen explosion was possible, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had ordered evacuation and that a meltdown was conceivable. "Garbled communications reported by the media generated a debate over evacuation. Whether or not there were evacuation plans soon became academic.

What happened on Friday was not a planned evacuation but a weekend exodus based not on what was actually happening at Three Mile Island but on what government officials and the media imagined might happen. On Friday confused communications created the politics of fear." (Page 50) Throughout the book, Cantelon and Williams note that hundreds of environmental samples were taken around TMI during the accident period by the Department of Energy (which had the lead sampling role) or the then-Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. But there were no unusually high readings, except for noble gases, and virtually no iodine. Readings were far below health limits. Yet a political storm was raging based on confusion and misinformation. No Radiological Health Effects The Three Mile Island accident caused concerns about the possibility of radiation-induced health effects, principally cancer, in the area surrounding the plant. Because of those concerns, the Pennsylvania Department of Health for 18 years maintained a registry of more than 30,000 people who lived within five miles of Three Mile Island at the time of the accident. The state's registry was discontinued in mid 1997, without any evidence of unusual health trends in the area.

Indeed, more than a dozen major, independent health studies of the accident showed no evidence of any abnormal number of cancers around TMI years after the accident. The only detectable effect was psychological stress during and shortly after the accident. The studies found that the radiation releases during the accident were minimal, well below any levels that have been associated with health effects from radiation exposure. The average radiation dose to people living within 10 miles of the plant was 0.08 millisieverts, with no more than 1 millisievert to any single individual. The level of 0.08 mSv is about equal to a chest X-ray, and 1 mSv is about a third of the average background level of radiation received by U.S. residents in a year. In June 1996, 17 years after the TMI-2 accident, Harrisburg U.S. District Court Judge Sylvia Rambo dismissed a class action lawsuit alleging that the accident caused health effects. The plaintiffs have appealed Judge Rambo's ruling. The appeal is before the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

However, in making her decision, Judge Rambo cited: · Findings that exposure patterns projected by computer models of the releases compared so well with data from the TMI dosimeters (TLDs) available during the accident that the dosimeters probably were adequate to measure the releases. · That the maximum offsite dose was, possibly, 100 millirem (1 mSv), and that projected fatal cancers were less than one. · The plaintiffs' failure to prove their assertion that one or more unreported hydrogen "blowouts" in the reactor system caused one or more unreported radiation "spikes", producing a narrow yet highly concentrated plume of radioactive gases. Judge Rambo concluded: "The parties to the instant action have had nearly two decades to muster evidence in support of their respective cases.... The paucity of proof alleged in support of Plaintiffs' case is manifest. The court has searched the record for any and all evidence which construed in a light most favourable to Plaintiffs creates a genuine issue of material fact warranting submission of their claims to a jury.

This effort has been in vain." More than a dozen major, independent studies have assessed the radiation releases and possible effects on the people and the environment around TMI since the 1979 accident at TMI-2. The most recent was a 13-year study on 32,000 people. None has found any adverse health effects such as cancers which might be linked to the accident. The TMI-2 Cleanup The cleanup of the damaged nuclear reactor system at TMI-2 took nearly 12 years and cost approximately US$973 million. The cleanup was uniquely challenging technically and radiologically. Plant surfaces had to be decontaminated. Water used and stored during the cleanup had to be processed. And about 100 tonnes of damaged uranium fuel had to be removed from the reactor vessel -- all without hazard to cleanup workers or the public. A cleanup plan was developed and carried out safely and successfully by a team of more than 1000 skilled workers. It began in August 1979, with the first shipments of accident-generated low-level radiological waste to Richland, Washington.

In the cleanup's closing phases, in 1991, final measurements were taken of the fuel remaining in inaccessible parts of the reactor vessel. Approximately one percent of the fuel and debris remains in the vessel. Also in 1991, the last remaining water was pumped from the TMI-2 reactor. The cleanup ended in December 1993, when Unit 2 received a license from the NRC to enter Post Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). Early in the cleanup, Unit 2 was completely severed from any connection to TMI Unit 1. TMI-2 today is in long-term monitored storage. No further use of the nuclear part of the plant is anticipated. Ventilation and rainwater systems are monitored. Equipment necessary to keep the plant in safe long-term storage is maintained. Defueling the TMI-2 reactor vessel was the heart of the cleanup. The damaged fuel remained underwater throughout the defueling. In October 1985, after nearly six years of preparations, workers standing on a platform atop the reactor and manipulating long-handled tools began lifting the fuel into canisters that hung beneath the platform.

In all, 342 fuel canisters were shipped safely for long-term storage at the Idaho National Laboratory, a program that was completed in April 1990. It was put into dry storage in concrete containers. TMI-2 cleanup operations produced over 10.6 megalitres of accident-generated water that was processed, stored and ultimately evaporated safely. In February 1991, the TMI-2 Cleanup Program was named by the National Society of Professional Engineers as one of the top engineering achievements in the U.S. completed during 1990. In 2010 the generator was sold by FirstEnergy to Progress Energy to upgrade its Shearon Harris nuclear power plant in North Carolina. It was shipped in two parts, the rotor, which weighs 170 tonnes, and the stator, which weighs about 500 tonnes. The NRC web site has a factsheet on Three Mile Island . TMI-1: Safe and World-Class From its restart in 1985, Three Mile Island Unit 1 has operated at very high levels of safety and reliability. Application of the lessons of the TMI-2 accident has been a key factor in the plant's outstanding performance.

In 1997, TMI-1 completed the longest operating run of any light water reactor in the history of nuclear power worldwide - 616 days and 23 hours of uninterrupted operation. (That run was also the longest at any steam-driven plant in the U.S., including plants powered by fossil fuels.) And in October 1998, TMI employees completed three million hours of work without a lost-work day accident. At the time of the TMI-2 accident, TMI-1 was shut down for refueling. It was kept shut down during lengthy proceedings by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. During the shutdown, the plant was modified and training and operating procedures were revamped in light of the lessons of TMI-2. When TMI-1 restarted in October 1985, General Public Utilities pledged that the plant would be operated safely and efficiently and would become a leader in the nuclear power industry. Those pledges have been kept. The plant's capability factor for 1987, including almost three months of a five-month refueling and maintenance outage, was 74.1 percent, compared to an industry average of 62 percent.

(Capability factor refers to the amount of electricity generated compared to the plant's maximum capacity.) In 1988 a 1.3% (11 MWe) uprate was licensed. For 1989, TMI-1's capability factor was 100.03 percent and the best of 357 nuclear power plants worldwide, according to Nucleonics Week. In 1990-91, TMI-1 operated 479 consecutive days, the longest operating run at that point in the history of US commercial nuclear power. It was named by the NRC as one of the four safest plants in the country during this period. By the end of 1994, TMI-1 was one of the first two plants in the history of US commercial nuclear power to achieve a three-year average capability factor of over 90% (TMI-1 had 94.3%). In October 1998, TMI workers completed two full years without a lost workday injury. Since its restart, TMI-1 has earned consistently high ratings in the NRC's program, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP).

In 2009, the TMI-1 operating licence was renewed, extending it life by 20 years to 2034. Immediately following this, both steam generators were replaced as TMI's "largest capital project to date" In 1999, TMI-1 was purchased by AmerGen, a new joint venture between British Energy and PECO Energy. In 2003 the BE share was sold so that the plant became wholly-owned by Exelon, PECO's successor. It is now listed as producing 786 MWe net. Training improvements Training reforms are among the most significant outcomes of the TMI-2 accident. Training became centred on protecting a plant's cooling capacity, whatever the triggering problem might be. At TMI-2, the operators turned to a book of procedures to pick those that seemed to fit the event. Now operators are taken through a set of "yes-no" questions to ensure, first, that the reactor's fuel core remains covered. Then they determine the specific malfunction. This is known as a "symptom-based" approach for responding to plant events.

Underlying it is a style of training that gives operators a foundation for understanding both theoretical and practical aspects of plant operations. The TMI-2 accident also led to the establishment of the Atlanta-based Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and its National Academy for Nuclear Training. These two industry organisations have been effective in promoting excellence in the operation of nuclear plants and accrediting their training programs. INPO was formed in 1979. The National Academy for Nuclear Training was established under INPO's auspices in 1985. TMI's operator training program has passed three INPO accreditation reviews since then. Training has gone well beyond button-pushing. Communications and teamwork, emphasizing effective interaction among crew members, are now part of TMI's training curriculum. Close to half of the operators' training is in a full-scale electronic simulator of the TMI control room. The $18 million simulator permits operators to learn and be tested on all kinds of accident scenarios. Increased safety & reliability Disciplines in training, operations and event reporting that grew from the lessons of the TMI-2 accident have made the nuclear power industry demonstrably safer and more reliable.

Those trends have been both promoted and tracked by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). To remain in good standing, a nuclear plant must meet the high standards set by INPO as well as the strict regulation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A key indicator is the graph of significant plant events, based on data compiled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The number of significant events decreased from 2.38 per reactor unit in 1985 to 0.10 at the end of 1997. On the reliability front, the median capability factor for nuclear plants - the percentage of maximum energy that a plant is capable of generating - increased from 62.7 percent in 1980 to almost 90 percent in 2000. (The goal for the year 2000 was 87 percent.) Other indicators for US plants tracked by INPO and its world counterpart, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) are the unplanned capability loss factor, unplanned automatic scrams, safety system performance, thermal performance, fuel reliability, chemistry performance, collective radiation exposure, volume of solid radioactive waste and industrial safety accident rate.

All are reduced, that is, improved substantially, from 1980. Summary What Happened: After shutting down the fission reaction, the TMI-2 reactor's fuel core became uncovered and more than one third of the fuel melted. Inadequate instrumentation and training programs at the time hampered operators' ability to respond to the accident. The accident was accompanied by communications problems that led to conflicting information available to the public, contributing to the public's fears A small amount of radiation was released from the plant. The releases were not serious and were not health hazards. This was confirmed by thousands of environmental and other samples and measurements taken during the accident. The containment building worked as designed. Despite melting of about one-third of the fuel core, the reactor vessel itself maintained its integrity and contained the damaged fuel. What did not happen: There was no "China Syndrome". There were no injuries or detectable health impacts from the accident, beyond the initial stress. Longer-Term Impacts: Applying the accident's lessons produced important, continuing improvement in the performance of all nuclear power plants. The accident fostered better understanding of fuel melting, including improbability of a "China Syndrome" meltdown breaching the reactor vessel and the containment structure.

Public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in USA, declined sharply following the Three Mile Island accident. It was a major cause of the decline in nuclear construction through the 1980s and 1990s. Sources GPU Nuclear Corp., 10 briefing papers, 1999. NEI, Nuclear Energy Overview 8/5/00. Share Nuclear Reactor Melts Down In The USA | English Club This Week in History: Week 13 (28 March 1979) Nuclear Reactor Melts Down In The USA Deadly radiation escapes from a US nuclear power plant, endangering nearly 2,000,000 people. In 1979, a reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, USA, suffered a partial meltdown. Gamma radiation was emitted and spread throughout the area, potentially affecting up to 2,000,000 people. Many who were exposed later suffered various forms of cancer, and many tried to claim personal injury against the owner of the plant, Metropolitan Edison Company. The company was found not liable in all cases.

nuclear reactor (noun): a device used to cause and control nuclear reactions melt down (verb): overheat and cause the release of harmful radiation radiation (noun): energy travelling through space as rays or waves endanger (verb): bring someone or something closer to trouble or risk expose (verb): leave open to harm liable (adjective ): responsible for damage Transcript: "Could I have your attention please! There has been a state of emergency declared on Three Mile Island." That frightening warning greeted many who lived around the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in the days after the March 28th accident. Thousands left the area to get away from what they couldn't see, touch or smell - radiation that could have been released from the plant. Then Governor Dick Thornburgh contemplated an evacuation from the moment he heard about the incident. Two days later he told pregnant women and young children to leave. To this day there's debate about whether anyone's health was affected by the TMI accident. What we do know now is [that] a portion of the TMI unit 2 reactor core melted. At the time we heard often that a complete core meltdown would have made this area uninhabitable for decades.

It all was set off by an emergency water release valve that opened, failed to close and wasn't identified or corrected by operators. The nuclear fuel overheated and ruptured metal tubes that led to the partial meltdown. Radiation was released but the nuclear regulatory commission said it wasn't enough to be dangerous. It took years and cost a billion dollars to clean up TMI 2. According to the NRC the reactor is permanently shut down and defueled, radioactive water decontaminated and evaporated, and some radioactive waste, fuel and debris shipped off-site to be stored. The NRC indicates that the TMI accident resulted in better operator training, upgraded plant designs and equipment requirements, and enhanced emergency preparedness. It's pointed out that if a similar incident occurred at TMI today 96 sirens would wail throughout the area to warn residents - the legacy of Three Mile Island. For Smart Talk, I'm Scott LaMar Test your understanding: 1. The partial meltdown of a reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant led to a) the emission of Gamma radiation b) the evacuation of 2,000,000 people c) the closing of the Metropolitan Edison Company Show answer a 2.

Many people who developed cancer after being exposed to the radiation sued Metropolitan Edison Company for damages, and compensation was paid a) in all cases b) in a few of the cases c) in none of the cases Show answer c 3. Radiation that escapes from a nuclear power plant when a reactor overheats and melts down a) kills everyone who's exposed to it b) only affects people who are old or weak c) can seriously harm plants and animals, including human beings Show answer Three Mile Island Nuclear | Mesothelioma & Asbestos International Commission on Occupational Health Three Mile Island Nuclear The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station is currently a single-unit nuclear power plant located on the banks of the Susquehanna River, near Middletown, Pennsylvania. It operated as a dual-unit plant until Unit 2, otherwise known as TMI-2, suffered a partial meltdown on March 28, 1979. This incident, which is regarded as the most significant accident involving nuclear power in U.S. history, permanently crippled TMI-2 and delayed the reactivation of Unit 1, otherwise known as TMI-1, until 1985.

It also hindered the development of new nuclear power sites in the U.S. for several decades. TMI-1, which is a Babcock and Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactor with an installed capacity of 802 MW, currently produces 6,645 GWh of electrical power a year for the residents of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Having entered service in 1974 and licensed until 2034, it is currently owned and operated by the Exelon Corporation. TMI-2 was a slightly larger Babcock and Wilcox PWR rated at 906 MW that was commissioned in 1978, with commercial power production beginning on December 30. Its remnants are owned by the First Energy Company of Akron. The incident that brought about the partial meltdown of TMI-2 began on the morning of March 28, 1979, when the pumps for one of the condensate polishers, which were receiving maintenance, failed for unknown reasons. This initiated a sequence of events wherein a polisher valve failed to trip, which in turn caused water to stop flowing into TMI-2’s secondary loop’s main feedwater pump, which then ceased operations.

This resulted in a loss of water flow to the steam generators, thereby causing the turbine to shut down. Though the reactor performed an immediate emergency shutdown, the disruption of the steam cycle prevented the removal of decay heat from the reactor’s water loop, thereby raising TMI-2’s core temperature. Auxiliary pumps, which are intended to introduce coolant in the event of such an emergency, happened to be offline for maintenance at the moment of the accident. This oversight, which was noted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the greatest factor in the escalation of the crisis, prevented the flow of water into the reactor vessel and initiated the partial meltdown. The accident was also compounded by human errors that were later discovered to be the result of poorly designed computer interfaces as, during the crisis, operators were unable to determine the exact status of the reactor’s temperature and pressure. Unfortunately, this might not be the only crisis the Three Mile Island plant has initiated. Many nuclear power plants built in the 1960s and 1970s contained asbestos in their insulation or other construction materials. This mineral helped protect valuable machinery, but exposed plant workers to deadly fibers that, when they accumulate in the lungs, can cause mesothelioma.

References: Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island nuclear disaster 35 years later Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island nuclear disaster 35 years later 23 Photos March 28, 1979 — 35 years ago — the nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island in eastern Pennsylvania suffered a partial meltdown, triggering the worst nuclear disaster in U.S. history, “although its small radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on plant workers or the public, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reported .” Negatives from Jimmy Carter’s trip to Three Mile Island, Pennslyvania, April 1, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Goldsboro, Pa. with cooling towers in the background of Three Mile Island, taken on April 6, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress)Goldsboro, Pa. with cooling towers in the background of Three Mile Island, taken on April 6, 1979.

This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Signs by South Bridge turnoff Highway 114, April 6, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress)Signs by South Bridge turnoff Highway 114, April 6, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Helicopter over TMI, April 11, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Plants, the site of the country’s worst nuclear accident in 1979, is up for sale by GPU Nuclear, the company that owns and operates the plant. This is the view from inside of the cooling tower for nuclear reactor unit Two, the unit that had the accident.

In the distance, lower right, is one of the cooling tower for unit One. (Kenneth K. Lam/Baltimore Sun/July 14, 1998) Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Plants, the site of the country’s worst nuclear accident in 1979, is up for sale by GPU Nuclear, the company that owns and operates the plant. Ken Gramilch, one of the control room operator, monitors instrument panels for the primary nuclear sites of TMI plant. (Kenneth K. Lam/Baltimore Sun File/July 14, 1998) The accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant near Harrisburg, Pa., March 28, 1979, exposed the hazards of nuclear power. Two weeks before the accident the York Daily Record team of reporter Jim Hill and photographer Bil Bowden published a series of reports warning that TMI’s owners were operating the plant with inadequate safety precautions. Bowden’s night shot of TMI’s cooling towers accompanied the earliest reports of that event. (Bill Bowden/York Daily Record/AP) Wearing protective boots, President Carter, center right, accompanied by Dr.

Harold Denton, then Director of the U.S. Nuclear Agency, left, and then Pennsylvania Gov. Dick Thornburg, left-rear, tour the control room of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Middletown, Pa. in this April 1, 1979 black-and-white file photo, four days after the nuclear accident. A quarter century after the country’s worst nuclear accident, the atomic power industry is talking about revival. Yet no one can predict when a new reactor will be built and perceptions about safety. (AP Photo, Files)Wearing protective boots, President Carter, center right, accompanied by Dr. Harold Denton, then Director of the U.S. Nuclear Agency, left, and then Pennsylvania Gov. Dick Thornburg, left-rear, tour the control room of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Middletown, Pa. in this April 1, 1979 black-and-white file photo, four days after the nuclear accident. A quarter century after the country’s worst nuclear accident, the atomic power industry is talking about revival. Yet no one can predict when a new reactor will be built and perceptions about safety.

(AP Photo, Files) This April 11, 1979 file photo released by the US National Archives shows a view of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania. Nearly 32 years after the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the Fukushima nuclear accident is considered “worse than Three Mile Island, but not as great as Chernobyl,” Andre-Claude Lacoste, head of France’s safety agency, said on March 14, 2011 (US National Archives/AFP/Getty Images) Fallout shelter sign. Goldsboro, Pennsylvania, April 7, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress)Fallout shelter sign. Goldsboro, Pennsylvania, April 7, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspector checking health physics, April 2, 1979.

This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Three Mile Island, April 11, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Three Mile Island. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) President Jimmy Carter leaving [Three Mile Island] for Middletown, Pennsylvania, April 1, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Overall view [Environmental Protection Agency] sampling station, April 4, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) The Environmental Protection Agency water sampling locations map, April 7, 1979.

This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Anti-nuke rally in Harrisburg [Pennsylvania] at the Capitol, April 9, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspector looking at meters in control room number 2 on April 3, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Aerial image of Three Mile Island taken on April 10, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress)Aerial image of Three Mile Island taken on April 10, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress.

(Credit: Library of Congress) “We Survived TMI” sign in Middletown, Pennsylvania, taken on April 6, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) Reactor piping photographed on April 3, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) A worker checks his hand for contamination on April 3, 1979. This photograph is a part of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island collection for the Library of Congress. (Credit: Library of Congress) A report from Dickinson College says that on March 28, “conflicting reports from various sources, including the utility and its regulators, made it difficult for others, including state officials and journalists, to assess the situation. That day the NRC, the federal oversight body for all nuclear plants in the United States, sent assistance from both its regional office and from Washington D.C.

Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed), a subsidiary of General Public Utilities (GPU) asserted “Everything is under control,” though many at the plant had doubts.” Fergie's Tech Blog: 28 March 1979: Three Mile Island Partial Nuclear Meltdown 28 March 1979: Three Mile Island Partial Nuclear Meltdown 00:01 Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station consists of two nuclear reactors, each with its own containment building and cooling towers. TMI-2, which suffered a partial meltdown, is in the background. Image soure: Wikipedia Via Wikipedia . Three Mile Island is the location of a U.S. nuclear power plant that, on March 28, 1979, suffered a partial core meltdown. The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station sits on the island in the Susquehanna River in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, near Harrisburg. The accident unfolded over the course of five tense days, as a number of agencies at the federal, state, and local level attempted to diagnose the problem (the full details of the accident were not discovered until much later), and decide whether or not the on-going accident required a full evacuation of the population.

In the end, the reactor was brought under control. No identifiable injuries due to radiation occurred (a government report concluded that "the projected number of excess fatal cancers due to the accident ... is approximately one."), but the accident had serious economic and public relations consequences, and the cleanup process was slow and costly. It also furthered a minor decline in the public popularity of nuclear power, exemplifying for many the worst fears of nuclear technology, and until the Chernobyl accident seven years later was considered the world's worst civilian nuclear accident. 1000+ images about Nuclear power plants on Pinterest | Canada, Nuclear reactor and Ontario Forward At four in the morning on March 28, 1979, a malfunction in the cooling system at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station led to the most serious commercial nuclear accident in US history and paved the way for reforms in the way nuclear power plants are operated and regulated. It also made Americans question the safety of nuclear power.

See More 1979: Three Mile Island nuclear accident - CNN Video 1979: Three Mile Island nuclear accident MUST WATCH 1979: Three Mile Island nuclear accident On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant suffered a partial core meltdown. WHTM had the report.

Question: Which Pennsylvania nuclear power plant suffered a partial nuclear meltdown in 1979?
Answer: Three Mile Island