Three Mile Island - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com Three Mile Island A+E Networks Introduction In March 1979, a series of mechanical and human errors at the Three Mile Island nuclear generating plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, resulted in an accident that profoundly affected the utility industry. A combination of stuck valves, misread gauges and poor decisions led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core and the release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. Although the health effects were not serious, the accident heightened public fears and led to the immediate shutdown of several plants. In addition, a moratorium on the licensing of all new reactors was temporarily imposed, significantly slowing the industry for several years. Google An unlikely series of mechanical and human errors in Unit 2 of the nuclear generating plant at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania , in 1979 resulted in an accident that profoundly affected the utility industry. A complicated combination of stuck valves, misread gauges, and poor decisions led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core and a release of significant amounts of radioactive gases. The near-total devastation of the nuclear power industry resulted, because the disaster at Three Mile Island tipped the scales in the ongoing controversy over nuclear power in favor of those opposed to it.

Massive demonstrations followed the accident, culminating in a rally in New York City that attracted upward of 200,000 people. By the mid-1980s, the construction of nuclear power plants in the United States had virtually ceased. The radioactive gases released by the accident prompted the governor of Pennsylvania to evacuate pregnant women from the area. An investigation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission claimed that the amount of radioactivity released was not a health threat, but antinuclear activists and many local citizens disputed this. The reactor itself remained unusable-in fact, virtually unapproachable-more than a decade later. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, Editors. Copyright © 1991 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Tags Three Mile Island | TMI 2 |Three Mile Island Accident. - World Nuclear Association Three Mile Island Accident (March 2001, minor update Jan 2012) In 1979 at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in USA a cooling malfunction caused part of the core to melt in the #2 reactor. The TMI-2 reactor was destroyed.

Some radioactive gas was released a couple of days after the accident, but not enough to cause any dose above background levels to local residents. There were no injuries or adverse health effects from the Three Mile Island accident. The Three Mile Island power station is near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in USA. It had two pressurized water reactors. One PWR was of 800 MWe (775 MWe net) and entered service in 1974. It remains one of the best-performing units in USA. Unit 2 was of 906 MWe (880 MWe net) and almost brand new. The accident to unit 2 happened at 4 am on 28 March 1979 when the reactor was operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the secondary cooling circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to rise. This in turn caused the reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took about one second. At this point a relief valve failed to close, but instrumentation did not reveal the fact, and so much of the primary coolant drained away that the residual decay heat in the reactor core was not removed. The core suffered severe damage as a result.

The operators were unable to diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor. Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency response training proved to be root causes of the accident The chain of events during the Three Mile Island Accident Within seconds of the shutdown, the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) on the reactor cooling system opened, as it was supposed to. About 10 seconds later it should have closed. But it remained open, leaking vital reactor coolant water to the reactor coolant drain tank. The operators believed the relief valve had shut because instruments showed them that a "close" signal was sent to the valve. However, they did not have an instrument indicating the valve's actual position. Responding to the loss of cooling water, high-pressure injection pumps automatically pushed replacement water into the reactor system. As water and steam escaped through the relief valve, cooling water surged into the pressuriser, raising the water level in it. (The pressuriser is a tank which is part of the primary reactor cooling system, maintaining proper pressure in the system. The relief valve is located on the pressuriser.

In a PWR like TMI-2, water in the primary cooling system around the core is kept under very high pressure to keep it from boiling.) Operators responded by reducing the flow of replacement water. Their training told them that the pressuriser water level was the only dependable indication of the amount of cooling water in the system. Because the pressuriser level was increasing, they thought the reactor system was too full of water. Their training told them to do all they could to keep the pressuriser from filling with water. If it filled, they could not control pressure in the cooling system and it might rupture. Steam then formed in the reactor primary cooling system. Pumping a mixture of steam and water caused the reactor cooling pumps to vibrate. Because the severe vibrations could have damaged the pumps and made them unusable, operators shut down the pumps. This ended forced cooling of the reactor core. (The operators still believed the system was nearly full of water because the pressuriser level remained high.) However, as reactor coolant water boiled away, the reactor?s fuel core was uncovered and became even hotter. The fuel rods were damaged and released radioactive material into the cooling water.

At 6:22 am operators closed a block valve between the relief valve and the pressuriser. This action stopped the loss of coolant water through the relief valve. However, superheated steam and gases blocked the flow of water through the core cooling system. Throughout the morning, operators attempted to force more water into the reactor system to condense steam bubbles that they believed were blocking the flow of cooling water. During the afternoon, operators attempted to decrease the pressure in the reactor system to allow a low pressure cooling system to be used and emergency water supplies to be put into the system. Cooling Restored, radioactive releases to air By late afternoon, operators began high-pressure injection of water into the reactor cooling system to increase pressure and to collapse steam bubbles. By 7:50 pm on 28 March, they restored forced cooling of the reactor core when they were able to restart one reactor coolant pump. They had condensed steam so that the pump could run without severe vibrations. Radioactive gases from the reactor cooling system built up in the makeup tank in the auxiliary building. During March 29 and 30, operators used a system of pipes and compressors to move the gas to waste gas decay tanks.

The compressors leaked, and some radioactive gas was released to the environment. These went through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal filters which removed most of the radionuclides, except for the noble gases, the estimated total of which was about 370 PBq (the Kemeny Commission said ‘a maximum of 480 PBq noble gases’ and NRC also quotes 1.6 PBq of krypton rlelease in July). With short half-life and being biologically inert, these did not pose a health hazard. The Hydrogen Bubble When the reactor's core was uncovered, on the morning of 28 March, a high-temperature chemical reaction between water and the zircaloy metal tubes holding the nuclear fuel pellets had created hydrogen gas. In the afternoon of 28 March, a sudden rise in reactor building pressure shown by the control room instruments indicated a hydrogen burn had occurred. Hydrogen gas also gathered at the top of the reactor vessel. From 30 March through 1 April operators removed this hydrogen gas "bubble" by periodically opening the vent valve on the reactor cooling system pressuriser.

For a time, regulatory (NRC) officials believed the hydrogen bubble could explode, though such an explosion was never possible since there was not enough oxygen in the system. Cold Shutdown and investigation After an anxious month, on 27 April operators established natural convection circulation of coolant. The reactor core was being cooled by the natural movement of water rather than by mechanical pumping. The plant was in "cold shutdown", ie with the water at less than 100°C at atmospheric pressure. The head of the reactor pressure vessel was removed in July 1984 allowing access to the remains of the core. Subsequent investigation revealed that at lest 45% of the core - 62 tonnes - had melted and 19 tonnes of this had ended up in the lower plenum, mostly in the lower head of the reactor pressure vessel, but without seriously damaging the vessel. Most of the melted core material (corium) had remained in the core region. In 1988 a multinational OECD Vessel Investigation Project (VIP) took samples to evaluate the situation in detail and confirmed that there was much less damage than anticipated.

Public concern and confusion When the TMI-2 accident is recalled, it is often in the context of what happened on Friday and Saturday, March 30-31. The drama of the TMI-2 accident-induced fear, stress and confusion on those two days. The atmosphere then, and the reasons for it, are described well in the book "Crisis Contained, The Department of Energy at Three Mile Island," by Philip L Cantelon and Robert C. Williams, 1982. This is an official history of the Department of Energy's role during the accident. "Friday appears to have become a turning point in the history of the accident because of two events: the sudden rise in reactor pressure shown by control room instruments on Wednesday afternoon (the "hydrogen burn") which suggested a hydrogen explosion? became known to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [that day]; and the deliberate venting of radioactive gases from the plant Friday morning which produced a reading of 1,200 millirems (12 mSv) directly above the stack of the auxiliary building. "What made these significant was a series of misunderstandings caused, in part, by problems of communication within various state and federal agencies.

Because of confused telephone conversations between people uninformed about the plant's status, officials concluded that the 1,200 millirems (12 mSv) reading was an off-site reading. They also believed that another hydrogen explosion was possible, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had ordered evacuation and that a meltdown was conceivable. "Garbled communications reported by the media generated a debate over evacuation. Whether or not there were evacuation plans soon became academic. What happened on Friday was not a planned evacuation but a weekend exodus based not on what was actually happening at Three Mile Island but on what government officials and the media imagined might happen. On Friday confused communications created the politics of fear." (Page 50) Throughout the book, Cantelon and Williams note that hundreds of environmental samples were taken around TMI during the accident period by the Department of Energy (which had the lead sampling role) or the then-Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. But there were no unusually high readings, except for noble gases, and virtually no iodine. Readings were far below health limits. Yet a political storm was raging based on confusion and misinformation.

No Radiological Health Effects The Three Mile Island accident caused concerns about the possibility of radiation-induced health effects, principally cancer, in the area surrounding the plant. Because of those concerns, the Pennsylvania Department of Health for 18 years maintained a registry of more than 30,000 people who lived within five miles of Three Mile Island at the time of the accident. The state's registry was discontinued in mid 1997, without any evidence of unusual health trends in the area. Indeed, more than a dozen major, independent health studies of the accident showed no evidence of any abnormal number of cancers around TMI years after the accident. The only detectable effect was psychological stress during and shortly after the accident. The studies found that the radiation releases during the accident were minimal, well below any levels that have been associated with health effects from radiation exposure. The average radiation dose to people living within 10 miles of the plant was 0.08 millisieverts, with no more than 1 millisievert to any single individual. The level of 0.08 mSv is about equal to a chest X-ray, and 1 mSv is about a third of the average background level of radiation received by U.S.

residents in a year. In June 1996, 17 years after the TMI-2 accident, Harrisburg U.S. District Court Judge Sylvia Rambo dismissed a class action lawsuit alleging that the accident caused health effects. The plaintiffs have appealed Judge Rambo's ruling. The appeal is before the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals. However, in making her decision, Judge Rambo cited: · Findings that exposure patterns projected by computer models of the releases compared so well with data from the TMI dosimeters (TLDs) available during the accident that the dosimeters probably were adequate to measure the releases. · That the maximum offsite dose was, possibly, 100 millirem (1 mSv), and that projected fatal cancers were less than one. · The plaintiffs' failure to prove their assertion that one or more unreported hydrogen "blowouts" in the reactor system caused one or more unreported radiation "spikes", producing a narrow yet highly concentrated plume of radioactive gases. Judge Rambo concluded: "The parties to the instant action have had nearly two decades to muster evidence in support of their respective cases....

The paucity of proof alleged in support of Plaintiffs' case is manifest. The court has searched the record for any and all evidence which construed in a light most favourable to Plaintiffs creates a genuine issue of material fact warranting submission of their claims to a jury. This effort has been in vain." More than a dozen major, independent studies have assessed the radiation releases and possible effects on the people and the environment around TMI since the 1979 accident at TMI-2. The most recent was a 13-year study on 32,000 people. None has found any adverse health effects such as cancers which might be linked to the accident. The TMI-2 Cleanup The cleanup of the damaged nuclear reactor system at TMI-2 took nearly 12 years and cost approximately US$973 million. The cleanup was uniquely challenging technically and radiologically. Plant surfaces had to be decontaminated. Water used and stored during the cleanup had to be processed. And about 100 tonnes of damaged uranium fuel had to be removed from the reactor vessel -- all without hazard to cleanup workers or the public.

A cleanup plan was developed and carried out safely and successfully by a team of more than 1000 skilled workers. It began in August 1979, with the first shipments of accident-generated low-level radiological waste to Richland, Washington. In the cleanup's closing phases, in 1991, final measurements were taken of the fuel remaining in inaccessible parts of the reactor vessel. Approximately one percent of the fuel and debris remains in the vessel. Also in 1991, the last remaining water was pumped from the TMI-2 reactor. The cleanup ended in December 1993, when Unit 2 received a license from the NRC to enter Post Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). Early in the cleanup, Unit 2 was completely severed from any connection to TMI Unit 1. TMI-2 today is in long-term monitored storage. No further use of the nuclear part of the plant is anticipated. Ventilation and rainwater systems are monitored. Equipment necessary to keep the plant in safe long-term storage is maintained. Defueling the TMI-2 reactor vessel was the heart of the cleanup. The damaged fuel remained underwater throughout the defueling.

In October 1985, after nearly six years of preparations, workers standing on a platform atop the reactor and manipulating long-handled tools began lifting the fuel into canisters that hung beneath the platform. In all, 342 fuel canisters were shipped safely for long-term storage at the Idaho National Laboratory, a program that was completed in April 1990. It was put into dry storage in concrete containers. TMI-2 cleanup operations produced over 10.6 megalitres of accident-generated water that was processed, stored and ultimately evaporated safely. In February 1991, the TMI-2 Cleanup Program was named by the National Society of Professional Engineers as one of the top engineering achievements in the U.S. completed during 1990. In 2010 the generator was sold by FirstEnergy to Progress Energy to upgrade its Shearon Harris nuclear power plant in North Carolina. It was shipped in two parts, the rotor, which weighs 170 tonnes, and the stator, which weighs about 500 tonnes. The NRC web site has a factsheet on Three Mile Island .

TMI-1: Safe and World-Class From its restart in 1985, Three Mile Island Unit 1 has operated at very high levels of safety and reliability. Application of the lessons of the TMI-2 accident has been a key factor in the plant's outstanding performance. In 1997, TMI-1 completed the longest operating run of any light water reactor in the history of nuclear power worldwide - 616 days and 23 hours of uninterrupted operation. (That run was also the longest at any steam-driven plant in the U.S., including plants powered by fossil fuels.) And in October 1998, TMI employees completed three million hours of work without a lost-work day accident. At the time of the TMI-2 accident, TMI-1 was shut down for refueling. It was kept shut down during lengthy proceedings by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. During the shutdown, the plant was modified and training and operating procedures were revamped in light of the lessons of TMI-2. When TMI-1 restarted in October 1985, General Public Utilities pledged that the plant would be operated safely and efficiently and would become a leader in the nuclear power industry.

Those pledges have been kept. The plant's capability factor for 1987, including almost three months of a five-month refueling and maintenance outage, was 74.1 percent, compared to an industry average of 62 percent. (Capability factor refers to the amount of electricity generated compared to the plant's maximum capacity.) In 1988 a 1.3% (11 MWe) uprate was licensed. For 1989, TMI-1's capability factor was 100.03 percent and the best of 357 nuclear power plants worldwide, according to Nucleonics Week. In 1990-91, TMI-1 operated 479 consecutive days, the longest operating run at that point in the history of US commercial nuclear power. It was named by the NRC as one of the four safest plants in the country during this period. By the end of 1994, TMI-1 was one of the first two plants in the history of US commercial nuclear power to achieve a three-year average capability factor of over 90% (TMI-1 had 94.3%).

In October 1998, TMI workers completed two full years without a lost workday injury. Since its restart, TMI-1 has earned consistently high ratings in the NRC's program, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP). In 2009, the TMI-1 operating licence was renewed, extending it life by 20 years to 2034. Immediately following this, both steam generators were replaced as TMI's "largest capital project to date" In 1999, TMI-1 was purchased by AmerGen, a new joint venture between British Energy and PECO Energy. In 2003 the BE share was sold so that the plant became wholly-owned by Exelon, PECO's successor. It is now listed as producing 786 MWe net. Training improvements Training reforms are among the most significant outcomes of the TMI-2 accident. Training became centred on protecting a plant's cooling capacity, whatever the triggering problem might be. At TMI-2, the operators turned to a book of procedures to pick those that seemed to fit the event.

Now operators are taken through a set of "yes-no" questions to ensure, first, that the reactor's fuel core remains covered. Then they determine the specific malfunction. This is known as a "symptom-based" approach for responding to plant events. Underlying it is a style of training that gives operators a foundation for understanding both theoretical and practical aspects of plant operations. The TMI-2 accident also led to the establishment of the Atlanta-based Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and its National Academy for Nuclear Training. These two industry organisations have been effective in promoting excellence in the operation of nuclear plants and accrediting their training programs. INPO was formed in 1979. The National Academy for Nuclear Training was established under INPO's auspices in 1985. TMI's operator training program has passed three INPO accreditation reviews since then. Training has gone well beyond button-pushing. Communications and teamwork, emphasizing effective interaction among crew members, are now part of TMI's training curriculum. Close to half of the operators' training is in a full-scale electronic simulator of the TMI control room. The $18 million simulator permits operators to learn and be tested on all kinds of accident scenarios.

Increased safety & reliability Disciplines in training, operations and event reporting that grew from the lessons of the TMI-2 accident have made the nuclear power industry demonstrably safer and more reliable. Those trends have been both promoted and tracked by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). To remain in good standing, a nuclear plant must meet the high standards set by INPO as well as the strict regulation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A key indicator is the graph of significant plant events, based on data compiled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The number of significant events decreased from 2.38 per reactor unit in 1985 to 0.10 at the end of 1997. On the reliability front, the median capability factor for nuclear plants - the percentage of maximum energy that a plant is capable of generating - increased from 62.7 percent in 1980 to almost 90 percent in 2000.

(The goal for the year 2000 was 87 percent.) Other indicators for US plants tracked by INPO and its world counterpart, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) are the unplanned capability loss factor, unplanned automatic scrams, safety system performance, thermal performance, fuel reliability, chemistry performance, collective radiation exposure, volume of solid radioactive waste and industrial safety accident rate. All are reduced, that is, improved substantially, from 1980. Summary What Happened: After shutting down the fission reaction, the TMI-2 reactor's fuel core became uncovered and more than one third of the fuel melted. Inadequate instrumentation and training programs at the time hampered operators' ability to respond to the accident. The accident was accompanied by communications problems that led to conflicting information available to the public, contributing to the public's fears A small amount of radiation was released from the plant. The releases were not serious and were not health hazards. This was confirmed by thousands of environmental and other samples and measurements taken during the accident. The containment building worked as designed. Despite melting of about one-third of the fuel core, the reactor vessel itself maintained its integrity and contained the damaged fuel.

What did not happen: There was no "China Syndrome". There were no injuries or detectable health impacts from the accident, beyond the initial stress. Longer-Term Impacts: Applying the accident's lessons produced important, continuing improvement in the performance of all nuclear power plants. The accident fostered better understanding of fuel melting, including improbability of a "China Syndrome" meltdown breaching the reactor vessel and the containment structure. Public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in USA, declined sharply following the Three Mile Island accident. It was a major cause of the decline in nuclear construction through the 1980s and 1990s. Sources GPU Nuclear Corp., 10 briefing papers, 1999. NEI, Nuclear Energy Overview 8/5/00.

Share NRC: Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Fact Sheets > Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident Printable Version (does not include Animated Diagram of the Sequence of Events) Plant Diagram The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor, near Middletown, Pa., partially melted down on March 28, 1979. This was the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history, although its small radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on plant workers or the public. Its aftermath brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also caused the NRC to tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. All of these changes significantly enhanced U.S. reactor safety. A combination of equipment malfunctions, design-related problems and worker errors led to TMI-2's partial meltdown and very small off-site releases of radioactivity. Summary of Events The accident began about 4 a.m.

on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, when the plant experienced a failure in the secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant (one of two reactors on the site). Either a mechanical or electrical failure prevented the main feedwater pumps from sending water to the steam generators that remove heat from the reactor core. This caused the plant's turbine-generator and then the reactor itself to automatically shut down. Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to control that pressure, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) opened. The valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments in the control room, however, indicated to the plant staff that the valve was closed. As a result, the plant staff was unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve. As coolant flowed from the primary system through the valve, other instruments available to reactor operators provided inadequate information. There was no instrument that showed how much water covered the core. As a result, plant staff assumed that as long as the pressurizer water level was high, the core was properly covered with water.

As alarms rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. They took a series of actions that made conditions worse. The water escaping through the stuck valve reduced primary system pressure so much that the reactor coolant pumps had to be turned off to prevent dangerous vibrations. To prevent the pressurizer from filling up completely, the staff reduced how much emergency cooling water was being pumped in to the primary system. These actions starved the reactor core of coolant, causing it to overheat. Without the proper water flow, the nuclear fuel overheated to the point at which the zirconium cladding (the long metal tubes that hold the nuclear fuel pellets) ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt. It was later found that about half of the core melted during the early stages of the accident. Although TMI-2 suffered a severe core meltdown, the most dangerous kind of nuclear power accident, consequences outside the plant were minimal. Unlike the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, TMI-2's containment building remained intact and held almost all of the accident's radioactive material.

Federal and state authorities were initially concerned about the small releases of radioactive gases that were measured off-site by the late morning of March 28 and even more concerned about the potential threat that the reactor posed to the surrounding population. They did not know that the core had melted, but they immediately took steps to try to gain control of the reactor and ensure adequate cooling to the core. The NRC's regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., was notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28. By 8 a.m., NRC Headquarters in Washington, D.C., was alerted and the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Md., was activated. The regional office promptly dispatched the first team of inspectors to the site and other agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, also mobilized their response teams. Helicopters hired by TMI's owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear, and the Department of Energy were sampling radioactivity in the atmosphere above the plant by midday. A team from the Brookhaven National Laboratory was also sent to assist in radiation monitoring.

At 9:15 a.m., the White House was notified and at 11 a.m., all non-essential personnel were ordered off the plant's premises. By the evening of March 28, the core appeared to be adequately cooled and the reactor appeared to be stable. But new concerns arose by the morning of Friday, March 30. A significant release of radiation from the plant's auxiliary building, performed to relieve pressure on the primary system and avoid curtailing the flow of coolant to the core, caused a great deal of confusion and consternation. In an atmosphere of growing uncertainty about the condition of the plant, the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh, consulted with the NRC about evacuating the population near the plant. Eventually, he and NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie agreed that it would be prudent for those members of society most vulnerable to radiation to evacuate the area. Thornburgh announced that he was advising pregnant women and pre-school-age children within a five-mile radius of the plant to leave the area. Within a short time, chemical reactions in the melting fuel created a large hydrogen bubble in the dome of the pressure vessel, the container that holds the reactor core.

NRC officials worried the hydrogen bubble might burn or even explode and rupture the pressure vessel. In that event, the core would fall into the containment building and perhaps cause a breach of containment. The hydrogen bubble was a source of intense scrutiny and great anxiety, both among government authorities and the population, throughout the day on Saturday, March 31. The crisis ended when experts determined on Sunday, April 1, that the bubble could not burn or explode because of the absence of oxygen in the pressure vessel. Further, by that time, the utility had succeeded in greatly reducing the size of the bubble. Animated Diagram of the Sequence of Events The following animated diagram graphically depicts the sequence of events associated with the accident at TMI-2. Health Effects The NRC conducted detailed studies of the accident's radiological consequences, as did the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), the Department of Energy, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Several independent groups also conducted studies. The approximately 2 million people around TMI-2 during the accident are estimated to have received an average radiation dose of only about 1 millirem above the usual background dose.

To put this into context, exposure from a chest X-ray is about 6 millirem and the area's natural radioactive background dose is about 100-125 millirem per year for the area. The accident's maximum dose to a person at the site boundary would have been less than 100 millirem above background. In the months following the accident, although questions were raised about possible adverse effects from radiation on human, animal, and plant life in the TMI area, none could be directly correlated to the accident. Thousands of environmental samples of air, water, milk, vegetation, soil, and foodstuffs were collected by various government agencies monitoring the area. Very low levels of radionuclides could be attributed to releases from the accident. However, comprehensive investigations and assessments by several well respected organizations, such as Columbia University and the University of Pittsburgh, have concluded that in spite of serious damage to the reactor, the actual release had negligible effects on the physical health of individuals or the environment. Impact of the Accident A combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures caused the Three Mile Island accident, which permanently changed both the nuclear industry and the NRC.

Public fear and distrust increased, NRC's regulations and oversight became broader and more robust, and management of the plants was scrutinized more carefully. Careful analysis of the accident's events identified problems and led to permanent and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees – which, in turn, has reduced the risk to public health and safety. Here are some of the major changes that have occurred since the accident: Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment requirements. This includes fire protection, piping systems, auxiliary feedwater systems, containment building isolation, reliability of individual components (pressure relief valves and electrical circuit breakers), and the ability of plants to shut down automatically; Identifying the critical role of human performance in plant safety led to revamping operator training and staffing requirements, followed by improved instrumentation and controls for operating the plant, and establishment of fitness-for-duty programs for plant workers to guard against alcohol or drug abuse; Enhancing emergency preparedness, including requirements for plants to immediately notify NRC of significant events and an NRC Operations Center staffed 24 hours a day.

Drills and response plans are now tested by licensees several times a year, and state and local agencies participate in drills with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and NRC; Integrating NRC observations, findings, and conclusions about licensee performance and management effectiveness into a periodic, public report; Having senior NRC managers regularly analyze plant performance for those plants needing significant additional regulatory attention; Expanding NRC's resident inspector program – first authorized in 1977 – to have at least two inspectors live nearby and work exclusively at each plant in the U.S.

to provide daily surveillance of licensee adherence to NRC regulations; Expanding performance-oriented as well as safety-oriented inspections, and the use of risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities of any plant to severe accidents; Strengthening and reorganizing enforcement staff in a separate office within the NRC; Establishing the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the industry's own "policing" group, and formation of what is now the Nuclear Energy Institute to provide a unified industry approach to generic nuclear regulatory issues, and interaction with NRC and other government agencies; Installing additional equipment by licensees to mitigate accident conditions, and monitor radiation levels and plant status; Enacting programs by licensees for early identification of important safety-related problems, and for collecting and assessing relevant data so operating experience can be shared and quickly acted upon; and Expanding NRC's international activities to share enhanced knowledge of nuclear safety with other countries in a number of important technical areas. Current Status Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down and all its fuel had been removed. The reactor coolant system is fully drained and the radioactive water decontaminated and evaporated.

The accident's radioactive waste was shipped off-site to an appropriate disposal area, and the reactor fuel and core debris was shipped to the Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory. In 2001, FirstEnergy acquired TMI-2 from GPU. FirstEnergy has contracted the monitoring of TMI-2 to Exelon, the current owner and operator of TMI-1. The companies plan to keep the TMI-2 facility in long-term, monitored storage until the operating license for the TMI-1 plant expires, at which time both plants will be decommissioned. Below is a chronology of highlights of the TMI-2 cleanup from 1980 through 1993. Date Monitored storage began. Additional Information Further information on the TMI-2 accident can be obtained from sources listed below. The NUREG documents, many of which are on microfiche, can be ordered for a fee from the NRC's Public Document Room at 301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209; e-mail pdr@nrc.gov .

The PDR is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md.; however the mailing address is: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public Document Room, Washington, D.C. 20555. A glossary is also provided below. Additional Sources for Information on Three Mile Island NRC Annual Report - 1979, NUREG-0690 "Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," NUREG-0558 "Environmental Assessment of Radiological Effluents from Data Gathering and Maintenance Operation on Three Mile Island Unit 2," NUREG-0681 "Report of The President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island," October, 1979 "Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement," NUREG-0600 "Three Mile Island; A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, NUREG/CR-1250, Vols.

I-II, 1980 "Lessons learned From the Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Advisory Panel," NUREG/CR-6252 "The Status of Recommendations of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," (A ten-year review), NUREG-1355 "NRC Views and Analysis of the Recommendations of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," NUREG-0632 "Environmental Impact Statement related to decontamination and disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from March 28, 1979 accident Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2," NUREG-0683 "Answers to Questions About Updated Estimates of Occupational Radiation Doses at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," NUREG-1060 "Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Cleanup Activities at Three Mile Island, Unit 2," NUREG-0732 "Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants" (TMI Action Plan Reqmts.), NUREG-1435 Walker, J. Samuel, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Glossary Auxiliary feedwater - (see emergency feedwater) Background radiation - The radiation in the natural environment, including cosmic rays and radiation from the naturally radioactive elements, both outside and inside the bodies of humans and animals. The usually quoted average individual exposure from background radiation is 300 millirem per year. Cladding - The thin-walled metal tube that forms the outer jacket of a nuclear fuel rod. It prevents the corrosion of the fuel by the coolant and the release of fission products in the coolants. Aluminum, stainless steel and zirconium alloys are common cladding materials. Emergency feedwater system - Backup feedwater supply used during nuclear plant startup and shutdown; also known as auxiliary feedwater. Fuel rod - A long, slender tube that holds fuel (fissionable material) for nuclear reactor use. Fuel rods are assembled into bundles called fuel elements or fuel assemblies, which are loaded individually into the reactor core. Containment - The gas-tight shell or other enclosure around a reactor to confine fission products that otherwise might be released to the atmosphere in the event of an accident. Coolant - A substance circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer heat. The most commonly used coolant in the U.S. is water.

Other coolants include air, carbon dioxide, and helium. Core - The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements, and control rods. Decay heat - The heat produced by the decay of radioactive fission products after the reactor has been shut down. Decontamination - The reduction or removal of contaminating radioactive material from a structure, area, object, or person. Decontamination may be accomplished by (1) treating the surface to remove or decrease the contamination; (2) letting the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased by natural decay; and (3) covering the contamination to shield the radiation emitted. Feedwater - Water supplied to the steam generator that removes heat from the fuel rods by boiling and becoming steam. The steam then becomes the driving force for the turbine generator. Nuclear Reactor - A device in which nuclear fission may be sustained and controlled in a self-supporting nuclear reaction. There are several varieties, but all incorporate certain features, such as fissionable material or fuel, a moderating material (to control the reaction), a reflector to conserve escaping neutrons, provisions for removal of heat, measuring and controlling instruments, and protective devices.

Pressure Vessel - A strong-walled container housing the core of most types of power reactors. Pressurizer - A tank or vessel that controls the pressure in a certain type of nuclear reactor. Primary System - The cooling system used to remove energy from the reactor core and transfer that energy either directly or indirectly to the steam turbine. Radiation - Particles (alpha, beta, neutrons) or photons (gamma) emitted from the nucleus of an unstable atom as a result of radioactive decay. Reactor Coolant System - (see primary system) Secondary System - The steam generator tubes, steam turbine, condenser and associated pipes, pumps, and heaters used to convert the heat energy of the reactor coolant system into mechanical energy for electrical generation. Steam Generator - The heat exchanger used in some reactor designs to transfer heat from the primary (reactor coolant) system to the secondary (steam) system. This design permits heat exchange with little or no contamination of the secondary system equipment. Turbine - A rotary engine made with a series of curved vanes on a rotating shaft. Usually turned by water or steam. Turbines are considered to be the most economical means to turn large electrical generators.

Plant Diagram Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, December 12, 2014 Home Partial and Nuclear Meltdowns: What’s the Difference? - The New York Times The New York Times Environment |A Look at the Mechanics of a Partial Meltdown Search Continue reading the main story The difference between a partial meltdown and a full meltdown at a nuclear plant is enormous, both in the degree of damage and in the potential release of radiation, experts in nuclear power said. A partial meltdown, like those suspected at two reactors in northeastern Japan over the weekend, may not necessarily mean that any of the uranium fuel in the core has melted, experts said. The fuel rods may be only damaged, a portion of them having been left uncovered by cooling water long enough to crack, allowing the release of some radioactive elements in the fuel. But in a full meltdown — which could occur within hours if all cooling water was lost and the rods became completely uncovered — melting is all but guaranteed, as thousands of fuel pellets fall to the bottom of the reactor and heat themselves into a molten pool at several thousand degrees Fahrenheit.

While it is considered highly unlikely that a full meltdown would result in a nuclear chain reaction, experts said, such lava-like fuel might breach the reactor’s pressure vessel and then its containment, leading to widespread release of radioactivity. To avoid such a catastrophe, workers at the two reactors have tried to pump enough seawater into them to keep the cores completely covered. But unless normal cooling systems can be restored, they will have to keep pumping seawater for weeks. Advertisement Continue reading the main story “You’re looking at several thousands of gallons a day potentially out as long as a year,” said Arnold Gundersen, a former nuclear engineer who worked on reactors of the same design as those in Japan. The Japanese reactors, made by General Electric and built in the 1970s, have thousands of thin, 12-foot-long fuel rods stacked like straws inside a pressure vessel made of steel up to 6 inches thick. The rods, tubes made of a zirconium alloy, contain ceramic pellets of uranium oxide that are about the size of a fingertip. Photo One of the two nuclear plants in Fukushima Prefecture in northern Japan where partial meltdowns have taken place.

Credit Kyodo/Reuters Ordinarily, this fuel core is kept submerged in water that circulates to remove the heat of nuclear fission, making steam that is used to turn turbines to generate electricity. With loss of power and pumps after the earthquake, the fission reactions at the plants were successfully halted. But there is much residual heat in the reactors, both because they operated at about 550 degrees Fahrenheit and because the radioactive elements in the fuel continue to produce heat as they decay. Without pumps to circulate the water, it will boil off quickly. That apparently is what happened at least one of the reactors, leaving the upper part of the cores uncovered until technicians, in what has been described as a desperate measure, rigged up a way to pump seawater in. The sea water is laced with boric acid, which would quench a fission reaction if one began. Please verify you're not a robot by clicking the box. Invalid email address. Please re-enter. You must select a newsletter to subscribe to. Sign Up Privacy Policy Once part of the core is exposed, the zirconium starts to oxidize, or rust, extremely rapidly, becoming brittle and cracking.

The rusting also results in the production of explosive hydrogen; the cracking allows the most volatile radioactive elements in the fuel, like iodine and cesium, to escape. To prevent pressure buildup, the gases are allowed to vent into the containment, and in this case must have leaked or were vented through the containment into outside air. As the rods crack apart, the pellets inside them can start to fall out, which engineers call a washout. “There’s nothing holding them there,” said Margaret Harding, a consultant who worked on reactor designs for General Electric for 27 years. But since lower parts of the core are undamaged, the pellets may end up in various places around the reactor, not necessarily in a clump on the floor. “It’s not guaranteed you’re going to have melting,” she said. At the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania in 1979, in which the core was partly uncovered, robotic cameras later determined that melting had occurred. In the Chernobyl accident in 1986, considered the world’s worst, a power surge led to explosions and a reactor fire, sending an enormous plume of radioactive material into the air.

If a full meltdown were to occur at one of the Japanese reactors — meaning operators were unable to keep pumping water and the core became completely uncovered — molten fuel would soon pool on the floor of the pressure vessel. “The worst case is that the molten mass leaves the vessel and creates a steam explosion,” Mr. Gunderson said. “That would destroy the containment.” A version of this article appears in print on March 14, 2011, on Page A9 of the New York edition with the headline: A Look at the Mechanics Of a Partial Meltdown. Order Reprints | Today's Paper | Subscribe Nuclear accident at Three Mile Island - Mar 28, 1979 - HISTORY.com This Day In History: 03/28/1979 - Three Mile Island At 4 a.m. on March 28, 1979, the worst accident in the history of the U.S. nuclear power industry begins when a pressure valve in the Unit-2 reactor at Three Mile Island fails to close. Cooling water, contaminated with radiation, drained from the open valve into adjoining buildings, and the core began to dangerously overheat.

After the cooling water began to drain out of the broken pressure valve on the morning of March 28, 1979, emergency cooling pumps automatically went into operation. Left alone, these safety devices would have prevented the development of a larger crisis. However, human operators in the control room misread confusing and contradictory readings and shut off the emergency water system. By early morning, the core had heated to over 4,000 degrees, just 1,000 degrees short of meltdown. The radiation levels, though not immediately life-threatening, were dangerous, and the core cooked further as the contaminated water was contained and precautions were taken to protect the operators. Finally, at about 8 p.m., plant operators realized they needed to get water moving through the core again and restarted the pumps. The temperature began to drop, and pressure in the reactor was reduced. Two days later, however, on March 30, a bubble of highly flammable hydrogen gas was discovered within the reactor building. The bubble of gas was created two days before when exposed core materials reacted with super-heated steam. On March 28, some of this gas had exploded, releasing a small amount of radiation into the atmosphere.

After the radiation leak was discovered on March 30, residents were advised to stay indoors. Slowly, the hydrogen was bled from the system as the reactor cooled. Lead Story Nuclear accident at Three Mile Island Share this: Nuclear accident at Three Mile Island Author Nuclear accident at Three Mile Island URL Publisher A+E Networks At 4 a.m. on March 28, 1979, the worst accident in the history of the U.S. nuclear power industry begins when a pressure valve in the Unit-2 reactor at Three Mile Island fails to close. Cooling water, contaminated with radiation, drained from the open valve into adjoining buildings, and the core began to dangerously overheat. The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant was built in 1974 on a sandbar on Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna River, just 10 miles downstream from the state capitol in Harrisburg. In 1978, a second state-of-the-art reactor began operating on Three Mile Island, which was lauded for generating affordable and reliable energy in a time of energy crises.

After the cooling water began to drain out of the broken pressure valve on the morning of March 28, 1979, emergency cooling pumps automatically went into operation. Left alone, these safety devices would have prevented the development of a larger crisis. However, human operators in the control room misread confusing and contradictory readings and shut off the emergency water system. The reactor was also shut down, but residual heat from the fission process was still being released. By early morning, the core had heated to over 4,000 degrees, just 1,000 degrees short of meltdown. In the meltdown scenario, the core melts, and deadly radiation drifts across the countryside, fatally sickening a potentially great number of people. As the plant operators struggled to understand what had happened, the contaminated water was releasing radioactive gases throughout the plant. The radiation levels, though not immediately life-threatening, were dangerous, and the core cooked further as the contaminated water was contained and precautions were taken to protect the operators. Shortly after 8 a.m., word of the accident leaked to the outside world.

The plant’s parent company, Metropolitan Edison, downplayed the crisis and claimed that no radiation had been detected off plant grounds, but the same day inspectors detected slightly increased levels of radiation nearby as a result of the contaminated water leak. Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh considered calling an evacuation. Finally, at about 8 p.m., plant operators realized they needed to get water moving through the core again and restarted the pumps. The temperature began to drop, and pressure in the reactor was reduced. The reactor had come within less than an hour of a complete meltdown. More than half the core was destroyed or molten, but it had not broken its protective shell, and no radiation was escaping. The crisis was apparently over. Two days later, however, on March 30, a bubble of highly flammable hydrogen gas was discovered within the reactor building. The bubble of gas was created two days before when exposed core materials reacted with super-heated steam. On March 28, some of this gas had exploded, releasing a small amount of radiation into the atmosphere. At that time, plant operators had not registered the explosion, which sounded like a ventilation door closing. After the radiation leak was discovered on March 30, residents were advised to stay indoors.

Experts were uncertain if the hydrogen bubble would create further meltdown or possibly a giant explosion, and as a precaution Governor Thornburgh advised “pregnant women and pre-school age children to leave the area within a five-mile radius of the Three Mile Island facility until further notice.” This led to the panic the governor had hoped to avoid; within days, more than 100,000 people had fled surrounding towns. On April 1, President Jimmy Carter arrived at Three Mile Island to inspect the plant. Carter, a trained nuclear engineer, had helped dismantle a damaged Canadian nuclear reactor while serving in the U.S. Navy. His visit achieved its aim of calming local residents and the nation. That afternoon, experts agreed that the hydrogen bubble was not in danger of exploding. Slowly, the hydrogen was bled from the system as the reactor cooled. At the height of the crisis, plant workers were exposed to unhealthy levels of radiation, but no one outside Three Mile Island had their health adversely affected by the accident. Nonetheless, the incident greatly eroded the public’s faith in nuclear power. The unharmed Unit-1 reactor at Three Mile Island, which was shut down during the crisis, did not resume operation until 1985.

Cleanup continued on Unit-2 until 1990, but it was too damaged to be rendered usable again. In the more than two decades since the accident at Three Mile Island, not a single new nuclear power plant has been ordered in the United States. Related Videos U.S. approves first new nuclear plant in a generation | Reuters Thu Feb 9, 2012 | 5:51 PM EST U.S. approves first new nuclear plant in a generation By Ayesha Rascoe | ROCKVILLE, Maryland ROCKVILLE, Maryland U.S. regulators on Thursday approved plans to build the first new nuclear power plant in more than 30 years, despite objections of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman, who cited safety concerns stemming from Japan's 2011 Fukushima disaster. The NRC voted 4-1 to allow Atlanta-based Southern Co to build and operate two new nuclear power reactors at its existing Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia. The units will cost Southern and partners about $14 billion and enter service as soon as 2016 and 2017.

The approval was cold comfort for nuclear industry officials who have touted a "renaissance" that has failed to materialize, undercut by high costs and the cheapest natural gas prices in about a decade. No nuclear power plants have been licensed in the United States since the partial meltdown of the reactor core of the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania in 1979. After the accident, the NRC adopted more stringent safety standards, which caused construction costs for nuclear plants to skyrocket and stopped dozens of planned plants in their tracks. Further clouding future prospects, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko cast an extraordinary dissenting vote, citing the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 that spurred the NRC to review whether existing and new U.S. reactors could withstand natural disasters like earthquakes and floods. "I cannot support issuing this license as if Fukushima never happened." said Jaczko, who has close ties to congressional Democrats.

"I believe it requires some type of binding commitment that the Fukushima enhancements that are currently projected and currently planned to be made would be made before the operation of the facility." Supporters of nuclear power saw Jaczko's dissent as another sign of dysfunction at the top of the NRC, where in-fighting among members has been the subject of Congressional hearings where one Democratic commissioner called Jaczko abusive. "The chairman just voted against the first new nuclear reactors in 30 years," said Ed Batts, a partner at law firm DLA Piper. "That's just not the way that confidence is inspired in the average American and thus does not seem like the best way for nuclear regulation." The new plant will use AP1000 reactors built by Westinghouse Electric, a standardized design approved by the NRC in December that will be the foundation for several other proposed nuclear plants. Westinghouse is majority owned by Japanese multinational Toshiba Corp. Thomas Fanning, Southern Co.'s chief executive Officer, called the license a "monumental accomplishment" and said the new Vogtle plants would provide cheap, reliable power to Southeast residents for years to come. "This has been a thorough, thoughtful and complete process," Fanning said.

"Recall that four other commissioners saw the same facts and voted" to issue the license. However, Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts, a Democratic critic of the nuclear industry, said the agency "abdicated its duty to protect public health and safety, just to make construction faster and cheaper for the nuclear industry." Fanning declined to say why Southern would not agree to include language in the new license to complete potential Fukushima modifications before the Vogtle reactors come online as Jaczko suggested. "There will be issues (from the Fukushima review) that apply to the U.S. nuclear fleet, but they apply much more closely to the current fleet, not this newest generation of nuclear technology," Fanning said. The Obama administration has offered Southern and its partners $8.3 billion in federal loan guarantees as an incentive. Fanning said he expects the U.S. Energy Department to finalize the loan in the second quarter of 2012. Southern's Vogtle project is the first in a queue of permits filed by U.S. utilities, like Scana Corp. These were once expected to usher in a "renaissance" of nuclear power, which now accounts for about 20 percent of U.S. electric generation.

Interest in building new nuclear plants had risen about a decade ago when natural gas prices were soaring and experts thought the U.S. Congress would begin to place limits on emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Between the fall of 2007 and the summer of 2009, 13 companies applied for construction and operating licenses to build 25 new reactors, including units of Southern, Scana Corp, Exelon, Duke Energy, NRG Energy, Progress Energy, Dominion Resources, NextEra Energy and Energy Future Holdings. But the case for widespread U.S. nuclear plant construction has eroded due to abundant natural gas supplies, slow electricity demand growth in a weak U.S. economy, lack of financing and uncertainty following the Fukushima disaster. Nuclear industry officials now say they expect just five new reactors to enter service by 2020 -- Southern's two Vogtle reactors, two at Summer in South Carolina and one at Watts Bar in Tennessee, to be built by the federally owned Tennessee Valley Authority. Earlier this week, TVA said the Watts Bar unit was behind schedule and that costs would "significantly exceed" a previous building cost estimate of $2.5 billion.

New nuclear plants are "more questionable because there are economic factors right now which favor gas-fueled power plants and the fact that the economy is only growing slowly means that nationally the need for new generation is lower than people were expecting in 2007," said Michael Golay, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A 1,000-megawatt natural gas plant takes a few years to permit and build and costs up to $1 billion for the most efficient, combined-cycle model. A similar-sized nuclear reactor however could take five to 10 years to develop and build and cost more than $5 billion. Industry experts say building interest is centered in Southeast states like Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia, Alabama and Florida, where traditional utility regulation offers companies the best chance to make a profit on the sizable investment needed to develop new reactors. Southern Co. stock closed at $44.68 per share, nearly unchanged from the previous day. (Additional reporting By Eileen O'Grady in Houston and Scott DiSavino in New York, writing by Chris Baltimore; Editing by Marguerita Choy and David Gregorio) ADVERTISEMENT A Japanese Three Mile Island?

- The Atlantic The Atlantic See our Newsletters > A Japanese Three Mile Island? The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, and the government's clumsy response, both resemble the 1979 U.S. nuclear disaster Most Popular Print Text Size The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, and the government's clumsy response, both resemble the 1979 U.S. nuclear disaster In the aftermath of Japan's devastating earthquake, international fear and uncertainty over the state of emergency declared at two of the country's nuclear power plants--and the possibility of a core meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant--have already drawn inevitable comparisons with America's 1979 Three Mile Island accident. Three Mile Island, in which a partial meltdown occurred, was indeed the worst commercial nuclear power accident in U.S. history, as those of us who covered that frightening event vividly recall. Who could forget the looming white cooling towers that became the iconic image of nuclear disaster? Media coverage of Japan's current nuclear emergency has focused on the danger of a meltdown at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi plant 160 miles northeast of Tokyo.

But, largely lost in the early coverage, is the fact that a meltdown does not necessarily equate to a massive radioactive release to the environment unless the containment structure surrounding the core also fails. The big unanswered questions in the Japanese emergency are the degree to which the hazardous nuclear materials remain safely contained within the plant and the control the operators have over the process. In the case of the Three Mile Island accident, a severe partial meltdown in the plant's unit 2 reactor core, after a loss of coolant, was largely contained within the American nuclear plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania. Only very small off-site releases of radioactivity occurred during the accident, which resulted from mechanical malfunctions and human error. Extensive studies later concluded that the radioactive levels involved were not considered to be of concern to public health or the environment. However, as is now the case in Japan, the unfolding drama at Three Mile Island over a five-day period more than three decades ago was accompanied by tremendous uncertainty, confusion, and contradictory information about what was actually happening and what might happen. Poor coordination and communication by government and company officials at Three Mile Island turned out to be a case study in how not to handle a nuclear emergency.

And the media coverage, and public understanding of the accident, suffered greatly as a result. Today, complaints about poor communication concerning the emergency situation at the nuclear power plants in northeast Japan are arising once again. Word Saturday morning of an explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi plant further escalated concerns about nuclear disaster and left news outlets scurrying to find experts capable of explaining the possible nuclear scenarios--and hazards--that Japan may face. Amid the communication chaos, a Today Show interview with MIT professor Richard Lester provided a remarkably calm voice of informed reason on Saturday morning. Asked about the prospect of a nuclear meltdown, Lester said that is "certainly a possibility at this point. But it is important to say that fuel melting would not necessarily lead to significant radiation off site." Lester, who heads MIT's Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, noted that at Three Mile Island a "significant fraction of the core did melt but remained in the reactor vessel, and there was not a large release of radiation into the environment.... That would not be the best scenario, but it would not be the worst one." The key issue, he emphasized, is whether operators of the Japanese plants are able to control and contain the nuclear materials and keep the containment barriers intact in order to prevent widespread radioactive release.

There are unfortunately few specialty reporters these days covering nuclear energy and technology closely. The New York Times' veteran energy and environment reporter Matthew L. Wald is one of the few with such expertise, and it showed in the paper's initial coverage of the story. While the Japanese nuclear plant explosion topped the Times' website homepage, online stories today by Michael Wines from Tokyo and Wald from Washington D.C. provided a far more measured assessment of the changing situation than the largely breathless, frantic coverage and commentary elsewhere. "An explosion at a nuclear power plant in northern Japan on Saturday blew the roof off one building and destroyed the exterior walls of a crippled reactor, escalating the emergency confronting Japan after a huge earthquake and tsunami...." began a midday story by the two reporters.

But they immediately put that in perspective, saying that "officials said late Saturday that leaks of radioactive material from the plant, which began before the explosion, were receding and that a major meltdown was not imminent." The Times story later noted that "government officials and executives of Tokyo Electric Power, which runs the plant, gave confusing accounts of the causes of the explosion and the damage it caused." Japanese residents and outside experts interviewed by CNN voiced similar frustration about "a lack of information from the government" and "contradictory partial information," with one urging officials to "tell us more about what is actually happening at the plant." Obviously, the situation there is further hampered by the multiple problems the government faces in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami. It is far too early to tell what the outcome will be at the stricken Japanese nuclear power plants in the hours and days ahead, particularly given the possibility of earthquake aftershocks that could cause further problems. But once again, the limited information from Japanese officials has already made a bad situation even worse, particularly since most of those covering the story for media outlets have little background expertise on what a nuclear meltdown might entail.

Although the worst-case fears of a radioactive disaster did not occur at Three Mile Island, the accident and the poor way it was communicated to the public created a lasting climate of fear in the U.S. that helped bring new nuclear development to a halt. Later, the devastating 1986 nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl (in what is now Ukraine) in which human error, poor design and the lack of a proper containment facility resulted in the widespread release of radioactive materials to the environment, created international safety concerns. (Both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl involved coolant problems within the reactor, which is also the case in Japan.) Only recently has a resurgence of interest in nuclear power as an alternative to American oil dependence drawn growing bipartisan political support, from members of Congress to the Obama administration. The current Japanese nuclear energy emergency will undoubtedly have a profound global impact on public views of the safety hazards--and siting--of old and new nuclear power plants. And the speed of communication today--unheard of in the pre-cell phone, pre-Internet Three Mile Island era--means that news and speculation about what is happening, or might happen, in Japan is traveling so far and fast that thoughtful discussion is nearly impossible.

As a precautionary public health measure, Japanese officials have reacted quickly to widen the ring of evacuation around the malfunctioning nuclear plants--out to about 12 miles in the case of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant--to reduce the prospect of immediate radiation exposure should a major release occur. This in itself is creating an additional challenge as thousands flee the devastated area. Interestingly enough, in the case of Three Mile Island, massive evacuation did not occur in the region around the plant, although there was much talk over several days of how a major evacuation might take place if the accident worsened. In fact, one of the most frightening aspects of the story, professionally and personally, were the confusing messages over a several day period from local, state and national officials about what to tell local residents and whether or not to evacuate. When I arrived at Three Mile Island on Friday, March 30, 1979, as a young reporter for the Washington Star, I was able to drive right to the site of the accident and interview local residents living in sight of those large white cooling towers. I borrowed a phone at one home in order to call in an update to my news desk in time for our late edition.

The initial malfunction at the Three Mile Island accident had occurred two days earlier, and officials thought they had it under control and reassured the public that was so. But early on that Friday new concerns arose, and international attention focused over that weekend on a serious threat inside unit 2. (The fear was that a large hydrogen bubble in the pressure vessel containing the reactor core might burn or explode and rupture the pressure vessel and breach the containment unit. A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission backgrounder provides a detailed account.) For three days, I joined a growing crowd of reporters rushing from hurried press conferences by harried company officials to the state capitol in Harrisburg, where Gov. Richard L. Thornburgh and his associates struggled to get a handle on the unfolding disaster. Schools were closed and residents urged to stay inside. Thornburgh, in consultation with federal officials, finally advised voluntary evacuation by pregnant women and preschool children within a five-mile radius of the plant. The immediate crisis resolved over the weekend, and on Sunday President Jimmy Carter (who was an officer in the U.S.

Navy's nuclear submarine program) arrived in Pennsylvania to announce to the world that the situation was under control.* The aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, however, was a presidential commission and series of investigations that resulted in a major overhaul of U.S. nuclear regulatory policies for years to come. The world's eye will be trained on Japan in coming days as we follow all of the ramifications of the earthquake disaster, including the severe nuclear power problems the country now faces. Regardless of what happens, Japan, the U.S. and other countries around the globe that depend on nuclear power will have to cope with the repercussions of the Fukushima Daiichi accident for the foreseeable future. *This sentence was updated for clarification. It previously said Carter was a "nuclear engineer."

Question: Where in Pennsylvania in the USA did a partial nuclear meltdown occur in 1979?
Answer: Three Mile Island