Cuban Missile Crisis - Cold War - HISTORY.com Cuban Missile Crisis A+E Networks Introduction During the Cuban Missile Crisis, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a tense, 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. In a TV address on October 22, 1962, President John Kennedy (1917-63) notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and made it clear the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this news, many people feared the world was on the brink of nuclear war. However, disaster was avoided when the U.S. agreed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) offer to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Google Discovering the Missiles After seizing power in the Caribbean island nation of Cuba in 1959, leftist revolutionary leader Fidel Castro (1926-) aligned himself with the Soviet Union. Under Castro, Cuba grew dependent on the Soviets for military and economic aid. During this time, the U.S. and the Soviets (and their respective allies) were engaged in the Cold War (1945-91), an ongoing series of largely political and economic clashes. Did You Know? The actor Kevin Costner (1955-) starred in a movie about the Cuban Missile Crisis titled "Thirteen Days." Released in 2000, the movie's tagline was "You'll never believe how close we came." The two superpowers plunged into one of their biggest Cold War confrontations after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane making a high-altitude pass over Cuba on October 14, 1962, photographed a Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile being assembled for installation. President Kennedy was briefed about the situation on October 16, and he immediately called together a group of advisors and officials known as the executive committee, or ExCom.

For nearly the next two weeks, the president and his team wrestled with a diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, as did their counterparts in the Soviet Union. A New Threat to the U.S. For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.S. mainland–just 90 miles south of Florida . From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U.S. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which up to that point had been dominated by the Americans. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had gambled on sending the missiles to Cuba with the specific goal of increasing his nation’s nuclear strike capability. The Soviets had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.

The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island–the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961–and Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a means of deterring further U.S. aggression. Weighing the Options From the outset of the crisis, Kennedy and ExCom determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The challenge facing them was to orchestrate their removal without initiating a wider conflict–and possibly a nuclear war. In deliberations that stretched on for nearly a week, they came up with a variety of options, including a bombing attack on the missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ultimately decided on a more measured approach. First, he would employ the U.S. Navy to establish a blockade, or quarantine, of the island to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional missiles and military equipment. Second, he would deliver an ultimatum that the existing missiles be removed. In a television broadcast on October 22, 1962, the president notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact the blockade and made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security.

Following this public declaration, people around the globe nervously waited for the Soviet response. Some Americans, fearing their country was on the brink of nuclear war, hoarded food and gas. Showdown at Sea A crucial moment in the unfolding crisis arrived on October 24, when Soviet ships bound for Cuba neared the line of U.S. vessels enforcing the blockade. An attempt by the Soviets to breach the blockade would likely have sparked a military confrontation that could have quickly escalated to a nuclear exchange. But the Soviet ships stopped short of the blockade. Although the events at sea offered a positive sign that war could be averted, they did nothing to address the problem of the missiles already in Cuba. The tense standoff between the superpowers continued through the week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, and a U.S. invasion force was readied in Florida. (The 35-year-old pilot of the downed plane, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the sole U.S. combat casualty of the Cuban missile crisis.) “I thought it was the last Saturday I would ever see,” recalled U.S.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916-2009), as quoted by Martin Walker in “The Cold War.” A similar sense of doom was felt by other key players on both sides. A Deal Ends the Standoff Despite the enormous tension, Soviet and American leaders found a way out of the impasse. During the crisis, the Americans and Soviets had exchanged letters and other communications, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.S. leaders not to invade Cuba. The following day, the Soviet leader sent a letter proposing that the USSR would dismantle its missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey. Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and ignore the second Khrushchev letter entirely. Privately, however, American officials also agreed to withdraw their nation’s missiles from Turkey. U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-68) personally delivered the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washington , and on October 28, the crisis drew to a close. Both the Americans and Soviets were sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The following year, a direct “hot line” communication link was installed between Washington and Moscow to help defuse similar situations, and the superpowers signed two treaties related to nuclear weapons. The Cold War was far from over, though. In fact, another legacy of the crisis was that it convinced the Soviets to increase their investment in an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. from Soviet territory. Tags Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1961–1968 The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically involved in the foreign policy process.

Aerial view of missile launch site at San Cristobal, Cuba. (John F. Kennedy Library) After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL–28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States. That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

The President also went on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba. On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S.

reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate. That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day.

“If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.” Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba. It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba. The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL–28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963. The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms.

First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin—perhaps because of it—Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout the crisis to clearly understand each others’ true intentions, while the world hung on the brink of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the “Hotline.” Second, having approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum Cuban Missile Crisis Cuban Missile Crisis For thirteen days in October 1962 the world waited—seemingly on the brink of nuclear war—and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In October 1962, an American U-2 spy plane secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met in secret with his advisors for several days to discuss the problem.

After many long and difficult meetings, Kennedy decided to place a naval blockade, or a ring of ships, around Cuba. The aim of this "quarantine," as he called it, was to prevent the Soviets from bringing in more military supplies. He demanded the removal of the missiles already there and the destruction of the sites. On October 22, President Kennedy spoke to the nation about the crisis in a televised address. No one was sure h ow Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would respond to the naval blockade and US demands. But the leaders of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba. In a separate deal, which remained secret for more than twenty-five years, the United States also agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey. Although the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, they escalated the building of their military arsenal; the missile crisis was over, the arms race was not. In 1963, there were signs of a lessening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In his commencement address at American University, President Kennedy urged Americans to reexamine Cold War stereotypes and myths and called for a strategy of peace that would make the world safe for diversity. Two actions also signaled a warming in relations between the superpowers: the establishment of a teletype "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House and the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on July 25, 1963. In language very different from his inaugural address, President Kennedy told Americans in June 1963, "For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal." Presidents | Cuban Missile Crisis George W. Bush Barack Obama “Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age where a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War.

It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.” Lesson: "A nuclear war cannot be cannot be won and must therefore never be fought.” (Often-quoted one-liner from President Ronald Reagan in 1984) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles -- which can only destroy and never create -- is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary, rational end of rational men.” Lesson: There are better ways to peace than simply building up one’s nuclear stockpile. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.

To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy--or of a collective death-wish for the world.” Lesson: Nuclear crisis management is too dangerous; we must therefore avoid confrontations that could force an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat or nuclear war. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “Let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's futures. And we are all mortal.” Lesson: Put yourself in the shoes of your adversary. What are their common interests with you? Are there ways to resolve your differences? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “[The United States and USSR] have also been talking in Geneva about our first-step measures of arm[s] controls designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and reduce the risk of accidental war.

Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament, designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this government since the 1920s. It has been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And however dim the prospects are today, we intend to continue this effort -- to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are.” Lesson: States must eliminate nuclear weapons. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “I'm taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard. First, Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hope must be tempered -- Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history; but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second, to make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on this matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so.” Lesson: A step to reducing the risk of nuclear war: banning nuclear tests. John F. Kennedy, “American University Commencement Address” (speech at American University, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1963). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “President Kennedy was disturbed by [the military chiefs’] inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war- that was their life. Perhaps we would feel more concerned if they were always opposed to using arms or military means…But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations.” (p. 97) Lesson: It is important for civilians to hold reins of power during crisis and to challenge the military. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1969).

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- “Arthur Schlesinger noted that President Kennedy himself was concerned that people might draw the wrong lessons from the event -- he worried especially that people would conclude: Just be tough with the Russians, and they will back down.” (p. 24-25) Lesson: America did not win the crisis as a result of its toughness towards the Soviets. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “Kennedy believed his policy had worked for three reasons. First, the United States had overwhelming local superiority; second, Soviet security was not at stake in Cuba, so they could afford to back down if necessary; and third, “they did not have a case they could plausibly sustain before the world.” (p. 25) Lesson: The United States won Cuban Missile Crisis for three reasons: (1) The U.S. had military superiority in the Caribbean; (2) Soviet national interests were not imperiled by the crisis; and (3) case for nuclear missiles in Cuba was unsustainable in world global public opinion. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., as cited by Ted Sorensen in in James G.

Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “The challenge we face in [Vietnam] today is the same challenge we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba.” Lesson: Soviet aggression and expansionism was at the heart of the Cuban Missile Crisis and future crises during the Cold War. “The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia” (speech at Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, August 5, 1964). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “There were times when [Khrushchev] was guilty of dangerous adventure. It required great American firmness and good sense -- first in Berlin and later in the Cuban Missile Crisis- to turn back his threats and actions without war.” Lesson: Crises require “firmness and good sense.” “Recent Events in Russia, China, and Great Britain,” (radio and television Presidential address, October 18, 1964). [N.B.

Speech made after Khrushchev had been removed from power.] -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “In this pursuit we have defended against Communist aggression—in Korea under President Truman—in the Formosa Straits under President Eisenhower—in Cuba under President Kennedy—and again in Vietnam.” Lesson: Syntactically equates the Cuban Missile Crisis with other crises of the Cold War, suggesting American military power defuses crises. [N.B. aforementioned crises involved American show of force or use of force] “State of the Union” (speech at U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1966). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “In his announcement of the incursion into Cambodia, he compared himself to Kennedy who, in his finest hour, had sat in the identical room in the White House and made the great decision that removed the missiles from Cuba. Later Nixon used the Missile Crisis to justify his failure to consult Congress over Cambodia. “I trust we don’t have another Cuban Missile Crisis. I trust we don’t have another situation like Cambodia, but I do know that in the modern world, there are times when the Commander-in-Chief…will have to act quickly.

I can assure the American people that this president is going to bend over backward to consult the Senate and consult the House whenever he feels it can be done without jeopardizing the lives of American men. But when it is a question of the lives of American men or the attitudes of people in the Senate, I am coming down hard on the side of defending the lives of American men.” (p. 189) Lesson: Crises necessitate quick action that, at times, may mean acting quickly without input of other influential individuals. “Richard Nixon’s Cambodia Incursion Address,” (radio and television presidential address, April 30, 1970), as cited in Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “The most dangerous moment of the 45 year history of the Cold War took place in the early 1960s when we had the Cuban Missile Crisis. Where the Soviet Union threatened to move nuclear weapons into Cuba and President Kennedy recognized that that was totally unacceptable to the United States and he communicated that very forcefully to the head of the Soviet Union, and the net result was any Soviet actions that put nuclear weapons into Cuba was stopped.

But if there hadn't been a negotiation on ending that action, by the Soviet Union, you could have had a serious military exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because under no circumstances could the United States have permitted the installation of long range nuclear weapons in Cuba, 90 miles from the shores of the United States and when President Kennedy forcefully challenged Mr. Khrushchev on that issue, the Soviet Union withdrew I should say the action that they contemplated at one time.” Lesson: Crisis management requires a combination of strength and diplomacy during negotiations with an adversary. Interviewed by George Washington University National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1999. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “In the 1960s we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin, and we faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. And we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the Cold War and away from confrontation. And in the 1970s three American presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race.

We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive, not only for the sake of our two nations but for the security and peace of the entire world. In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.” Lesson: Engagement with adversaries and honoring past promises are necessary for crisis management. “State of the Union” (speech at U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis…it had been relatively easy to stand up to the Soviets: Our nuclear weapons outnumbered theirs almost 10 to one; the Soviets took their missiles out of Cuba and Khrushchev backed down. But the balance of power had all been changed by the early 1980s. The Soviet Union was building missiles hands over fist, and their nuclear forces outnumbered ours.” (p. 295) Lesson: Nuclear superiority was critical to the success of the United States during Cuban Missile Crisis.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- “In 1962, JFK stood up to Castro and Moscow and blocked the establishment on Cuban soil of a Soviet missile base capable of hurling nuclear weapons at the U.S. Nevertheless, 20 years later, Cuba was, in effect, serving the very function that had caused President Kennedy to face off against Khrushchev…” (p. 472) Lesson: A strong stand against an adversary is required in a crisis. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . “Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962, 'Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world,' he said, 'where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nations security to constitute maximum peril.' Lesson: Preemption and force are necessary to solve crisis.

“President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat” (speech at Cincinnati Museum Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- President Bush and the Kennedy's watched Thirteen Days at the White House. “I felt a connection to history as we watched a movie about how his brothers had defused a crisis from the West Wing.” (p. 272-273) George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishing, 2010). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . When discussing presidents who displayed “uncommon courage,” Obama identified JFK. “During the Cuban Missile Crisis, facing intense pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and congressional leaders to bomb and invade Cuba, John F. Kennedy stood firm. With his determined leadership and his calm, rational judgment, he forged a strong path to peace that used aggressive diplomacy backed by military force, and helped bring the world back from the brink of war.” Lesson 1: Negotiate from strength. Lesson 2: Take time to discuss possible solutions. “The Contenders: An Admiring Crowd,” Newsweek, May 13, 2007.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- On the campaign trail, about Iran: “In Montana, Obama said President Kennedy’s willingness to engage the Soviets defused the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Obama asked, ‘Why shouldn’t we have the same courage and the confidence to talk to our enemies?’” Lesson: Talk with adversaries during crisis. Richard Sisk, “Iran No ‘Tiny’ Threat, Mac Barks at Barack,” New York Daily News, May 20, 2008. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- “Obama often quotes JFK’s words from his inaugural address, ‘Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.’” Lesson: It is necessary to negotiate in crises, but only from a position of strength. Evan Thomas, “The Mythology of Munich,” Newsweek, June 23, 2008. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- How Obama and McCain see the world: “Obama himself, in private meetings, has cited Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a model, especially how JFK consulted widely and negotiated directly with the Soviets to defuse an intense situation effectively.

Obama admires Kennedy’s steady, cool leadership and his ability to bring many people into the process: Ben Rhodes says that Obama also often cites the successful resolution of the crisis as an example of what can come from negotiations, even if there is no immediate resolution. Only five months before, JFK held a summit in Vienna with Nikita Khrushchev. "JFK had begun to acquire some knowledge of Khrushchev, which not only enabled him to be in touch with the Kremlin during the crisis, but to have a little bit of insight into the guy," says Rhodes. "There are benefits to direct contact with adversaries, even if you don't reach agreement. You get to know your adversary.” (Newsweek, 10/6/08) Lesson: (1) Negotiation is necessary in a crisis. (2) Access to wide and varied opinions is necessary in formulating a crisis response. Michael Hirsh, “World’s Apart,” Newsweek, October 6, 2008. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- During his senior year at Columbia, Obama participated in a seminar on U.S. foreign policy. “The first semester…covered such Cold-War flashpoints as the Cuban Missile Crisis.” William J.

Broad and David Sanger, “Obama’s Youth Shaped His Nuclear-Free Vision,” New York Times, July 4, 2009. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- About Afghanistan: “Aides said Obama looked to President John F. Kennedy's relationship with the military, in particular how he managed the Cuban Missile Crisis when his military leaders urged a quick strike on the island, an act he resisted. One senior adviser said Obama valued Kennedy's 'think before you shoot' ethos.” Lesson: Take time to determine a strategy during a crisis: “Think before you shoot.” Scott Wilson, “The Making of a Wartime Commander in Chief,” Washington Post, January 19, 2010. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- . The Cuban Missile Crises - Short History - Department History - Office of the Historian The Cuban Missile Crises - Short History - Department History A Short History of the Department of State The Cuban Missile Crises In October 1962, the Kennedy Administration faced its most serious foreign policy crisis. President Kennedy with his cabinet during the Cuban Missile Crisis Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev saw an opportunity to strengthen the relationship between the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro’s Cuba and make good its promise to defend Cuba from the United States.

In May 1960, Khrushchev began to ship ballistic missiles to Cuba and technicians to operate them. He believed that President Kennedy was weak and would not react to the Soviet move. After extensive consultation with his foreign policy and military advisers, Kennedy blockaded Cuba on October 22, 1962. The two sides stood on the brink of nuclear war, but Khrushchev capitulated six days later and the missiles were dismantled. In return, Kennedy disbanded its own missile sites in Turkey. The most confrontational period in US-Soviet relations since World War II was at an end. BBC - History - World Wars: John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis By Professor Ernest R May Last updated 2013-11-18 For fourteen days during October 1962, the world held its breath as John F Kennedy (known as JFK ) and Nikita Khrushchev tried to reach a compromise and avoid nuclear war. Ernest May investigates how Kennedy demonstrated his leadership skills during the crisis.

On this page Print this page The 'gravest issues' Early on Tuesday 16 October 1962, John F Kennedy's national security assistant, McGeorge Bundy, brought to the President's bedroom some high-altitude photographs taken from U-2 planes flying over Cuba. They showed Soviet soldiers hurriedly and secretly setting up nuclear-armed missiles. For some time previously the Soviets had openly been sending weaponry to Cuba, including surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs). To deflect any criticism about this from the Republicans, who were busy campaigning for the November congressional elections, Kennedy had said he would not protest about such defensive weaponry being installed in Cuba, but warned that if the Soviets ever introduced offensive weapons, 'the gravest issues would arise.' The 'gravest issues' were at hand. Since Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had promised repeatedly not to send offensive weapons to Cuba, and America's top intelligence analysts had predicted that he would keep his word, Kennedy felt safe in voicing this warning. The U-2 photographs, however, showed that Khrushchev had been lying. The 'gravest issues' were at hand.

The United States at the time had more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenal. The Soviet Union had not quite half as many. Kennedy's predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, had calculated in 1960 that, if a crisis led either side to fire nuclear weapons, all humans in the northern hemisphere could perish. 'Gravest issues' indeed. Top The ExComm and the secret tapes A P2V Neptune US patrol plane flying over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 © To help him decide what to do about the Cuban situation, and how much risk to run of a nuclear exchange, Kennedy assembled a small group that came to be called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council - or ExComm for short. Early in his presidency, Kennedy had had to make a decision about a CIA plan to land Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, in Cuba, with the hope that these exiles would overthrow Cuba's Communist government, headed by Fidel Castro. Kennedy had asked for advice about this from only a handful of people - those he knew he was officially obliged to consult.

The operation proved to be a fiasco, and afterwards Kennedy had resolved in future to consult more widely. Included in the ExComm were the regular participants in National Security Council meetings, plus Kennedy's brother, the attorney general Robert Kennedy, and the President's chief speechwriter, the White House counsel Theodore Sorensen. Both of these men could help Kennedy to think about the domestic political aspects of the crisis. The President also invited several other key advisors to join the group: C Douglas Dillon, who had held high posts under Eisenhower and who gave Kennedy a link to the Republican leadership; Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, who had served under President Harry Truman and could help Kennedy see the current crisis in longer historical perspective; and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, probably the person in the President's circle who was best acquainted with Khrushchev. We know today exactly what was said in the meetings of the ExComm, because Kennedy had a tape recorder installed in an unused part of the White House basement ...

We know today exactly what was said in the meetings of the ExComm, because Kennedy had a tape recorder installed in an unused part of the White House basement, with wires running to concealed microphones in the Oval Office and Cabinet Room. He had told no one about this other than his private secretary, the two guards who maintained the machines, and perhaps his brother, Robert. Since he kept it on through almost all ExComm meetings, anyone today can listen in on the proceedings. Top Quarantine In the first day's debates, everyone favoured bombing Cuba. The only differences concerned the scale of attack. Kennedy, Bundy, and some others spoke of a 'surgical strike' solely against the missile sites. 'It corresponds to "the punishment fits the crime" in political terms', said Bundy. Others joined the chiefs of staff in insisting that an attack should also take out air defence sites and bombers, so as to limit losses of US aircraft and prevent an immediate air reprisal against US bases in Florida. The under secretary of state, George Ball, had commented that a US surprise attack on Cuba would be '... like Pearl Harbor ...' By the third day, 18 October, another option had come to the fore.

The under secretary of state, George Ball, had commented that a US surprise attack on Cuba would be '... like Pearl Harbor. It's the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.' Robert Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concurred, Rusk observing that the decision-makers could carry 'the mark of Cain' on their brows for the rest of their lives. To meet this concern and to obtain time for gaining support from other nations, there developed the idea of the President's publicly announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, ordering a blockade to prevent the introduction of further missiles, and demanding that the Soviets withdraw the missiles already there. (Both for legal reasons and for resonance with Franklin Roosevelt's 'Quarantine Address' of 1937, the term 'quarantine' was substituted for 'blockade'.) To those of Kennedy's advisers who still favoured quick use of military force (the 'hawks' in later classification), this quarantine constituted an ultimatum. If Khrushchev did not capitulate within a day or two, a US air attack on Cuba would follow, followed before long by an invasion.

For those in the ExComm who would later be classed as 'doves,' the quarantine bought time for possibly developing some diplomatic solution. Top A Berlin crisis, not a Cuba crisis American tanks on alert in the Berlin Grunewald, West Germany, as the crisis over the Cuban blockade looms during the Cuban missile crisis (25th October 1962) © In the early phase of ExComm debate, Kennedy blamed himself for the crisis - 'Last month I should have said that we don't care' - implying that if he had not given such a strong public warning, he could possibly have let Khrushchev get away with placing missiles in Cuba; 'It doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union, or one from 90 miles away. Geography doesn't mean that much', he said. But Kennedy explained over and over to members of the ExComm and others why, since he had issued the warning and Khrushchev had chosen to challenge him, the crisis involved much more than just a personal affront. The reason was that, for Kennedy, the crisis was not centrally about missiles in Cuba; it was about Berlin.

The Soviets had tried to take over West Berlin in 1948-9. Their blockade had been frustrated by an Anglo-American airlift and by the astonishing resolution of the West Berliners, but in 1958 Khrushchev had once more revived the threat, and he continued to do so. In 1961, he and the East Germans built a wall around West Berlin as a stopgap measure to halt the exodus of East Germans from Soviet-controlled areas. Earlier in 1962 he had told Kennedy that he intended to act on West Berlin as soon as the US congressional elections were over. ... Kennedy interpreted the installation of missiles in Cuba as a move preparatory to a showdown on Berlin. Counselled by Thompson, Kennedy interpreted the installation of missiles in Cuba as a move preparatory to a showdown on Berlin. For him, such a showdown would create a horrible dilemma. The United States had promised to protect the million and a half West Berliners from Soviet take-over, but had no means whatever for physically preventing the thousands of East German and Soviet troops that surrounded Berlin from taking control of the city if they chose to do so.

The only protection for West Berlin was the US threat to respond to an attack by using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. If Kennedy demanded uncompromisingly that the Soviets remove their nuclear weapons from Cuba, Khrushchev would have to decide whether to comply or to take the risk of actual war, which might become a nuclear war. The onus would be on him. If Kennedy showed weakness in face of Khrushchev's challenge, the effect might be to embolden Khrushchev to ignore American warnings about Berlin. It would then be Kennedy, not Khrushchev, who would bear the onus. 'A Soviet move on Berlin,' Kennedy said to the joint chiefs of staff, 'leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative.' Top Dreadful days Robert McNamara in 1965 © On Monday 22 October, Kennedy went on radio and television, describing the secret Soviet build-up in Cuba, proclaiming the quarantine, and demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles. In the next few days, one harrowing moment followed another.

Kennedy and his advisers mulled over the question of how actually to stop a Soviet ship that crossed the quarantine line. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara described the Navy's plan for dealing with a Soviet submarine that was escorting a merchantman. A destroyer would use small depth charges to signal that the submarine should surface. McNamara acknowledged that the submarine commander might think he was being attacked rather than being sent a signal and might fire at the destroyer. Kennedy said, 'I think we ought to wait on that today. We don't want to have the first thing we attack as a Soviet submarine. I'd much rather have a merchant ship.' ... one harrowing moment followed another. When McNamara protested, Kennedy gave way, but, as his brother Robert recalled later: 'His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth, and he closed his fist. His eyes were tense, almost grey, and we just stared at each other across the table.' Fortunately, before there was an encounter at sea, Khrushchev ordered all Soviet merchantmen bound for Cuba to turn back. Meanwhile, Kennedy and his advisers faced the question of how to keep track of continuing missile construction in Cuba.

At the urging of McNamara and the chiefs of staff, Kennedy authorised low-level daytime surveillance flights in addition to continuing U-2 flights. He also agreed provisionally to night-time coverage involving the use of flares. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson worried aloud about these. 'Imagine some crazy Russian captain,' he said. 'The damn thing goes "blooey" and lights up the skies. He might just pull a trigger. Looks like we're playing Fourth of July over there or something.' Also fortunately, the crisis ended before flares were actually used. Top Finessing the Turkish missiles issue On 26-27 October, the crisis came to a head. Khrushchev cabled Kennedy that he was prepared to remove missiles from Cuba in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba - a promise that had already been given more than once. But, just as Kennedy and his ExComm began to discuss a response, Khrushchev broadcast from Moscow a second message saying the missiles would be removed if, in addition, the United States withdrew nuclear missiles and other 'offensive means' from Turkey. The second Khrushchev message provoked furious debate.

With Ball in the lead, Kennedy's advisers said almost unanimously that Khrushchev's new condition was unacceptable. America's NATO allies would think the United States was sacrificing their security for the sake of its own. Kennedy alone seemed unconvinced. When Ball said, 'If we talked to the Turks... this would be an extremely unsettling business', Kennedy replied with asperity, 'Well, this is unsettling now, George, because ... most people would regard this as not an unreasonable proposal ... I think you're going to have it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba ... when he's saying, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba."'. What Kennedy wanted was to mollify Khrushchev without seeming to make a concession, and above all to avoid any prolonged negotiations. In the end, Kennedy found a way to finesse the situation. He sent Robert Kennedy to see the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to tell him that the missiles in Turkey were obsolete, and that the US planned to pull them out within about six months. All this was true.

He said further, however, that, if the Soviet Union used this knowledge to claim that the US had struck the deal proposed in Khrushchev's radio message, Kennedy would deny the claim and would not remove the missiles from Turkey. What Kennedy wanted was to mollify Khrushchev without seeming to make a concession, and above all to avoid any prolonged negotiations. He had to insist that Soviet missiles come out of Cuba unconditionally, or he would compromise the display of firmness that he judged necessary to protect against a Berlin crisis. In fact, the exchange between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin had no effect. Khrushchev had already decided to retreat to a simple request for a no invasion pledge. And the crisis ended on that basis. US reconnaissance aircraft kept watch while the Soviets dismantled their missiles and loaded the parts on ships for return to the Soviet Union. Top Resolution The world escaped nuclear war in October 1962 largely because of the prudence of Kennedy and the belated prudence of Khrushchev.

Though Kennedy had felt it necessary to be uncompromising in his demand for removal of the missiles from Cuba, he had been careful to put off to the last possible moment any action that could result in killing a Russian. Khrushchev had probably decided to drop his demand for quid pro quo removals from Turkey as a result of learning that a Soviet anti-aircraft missile in Cuba had shot down a US U-2 plane, killing the pilot. Kennedy and Khrushchev both recognised that, once blood had been spilled, it would be very hard to keep any crisis under control. Kennedy and Khrushchev both recognised that, once blood had been spilled, it would be very hard to keep any crisis under control. Because Khrushchev had been faced down, he did not force a new Berlin crisis. The Soviet bloc lived for the next 27 years with a wall around West Berlin that marked East Germany as a huge penitentiary, and it eventually became possible for west and east to turn towards the stabilising compromises of the later period of détente.

Find out more Books The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May (Editor), Philip D. Zelikow (Editor) (W.W. Norton, 2002) Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam by Lawrence Freedman , (Oxford University Press, 2002) One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J Naftali, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1998) The Cuban Missile Crisis (The Cold War) by Peter Chrisp (Hodder Wayland, 2001) An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 by Robert Dallek (Little, Brown, to be published in 2003) Kennedy by Hugh Brogan (Longman, 1996) The Presidency of John F.

Kennedy by James N Giglio (University Press of Kansas, 1991) President Kennedy: Profile of Power by Richard Reeves (Simon & Schuster, 1993) The Modern American Presidency by Lewis L Gould (University Press of Kansas, 2003) Top About the author Ernest R May is Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University. He is co-editor (with Philip Zelikow) of The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (originally issued in 1997 and updated since) and of The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: the Great Crises (3 volumes, issued in 2002). His other recent book is Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (2000). Earlier books have dealt with the making of the Monroe Doctrine, American expansion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, America's intervention in World War I, American Cold War strategy, and uses of historical reasoning in decision-making. The Leaders | Cuban Missile Crisis U.S. President John F. Kennedy Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Prime Minister of Cuba Fidel Castro White House Photographs.

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston Digital Identifier: JFKWHP-AR6283-A. In 1960, at the age of 43, John F. Kennedy became the youngest elected President in U.S. history, during a period of growing tensions in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry. Soon after taking office in 1961, he authorized the “Bay of Pigs” invasion led by the CIA and exiles from Cuba, whose government had been overthrown by communist rebels in 1959. This failed to overthrow leader Fidel Castro, and was a major embarrassment to Kennedy. Tensions with the Soviet Union further escalated during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. These events set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 15, 1962 Kennedy was informed of the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba and called a meeting of a small circle of trusted advisors (known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm). He resisted pressure to react quickly with a surprise air strike, and took time to deliberate in secret on the possible courses of action.

On October 22 the President announced a naval blockade on further arms shipments to Cuba. He then worked out an agreement with the Soviets, which involved a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles, a threat to attack within 24 hours if the offer wasn’t accepted, and a secret promise to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey in four-five months. Credit: Heinz Junge, Bundesarchiv. German Federal Archive. Accession number Bild 183-B0628-0015-035. Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953 after a power struggle following Stalin’s death, and served as Premier from 1958 to 1964. Khrushchev began efforts to “de-Stalinize” Soviet society. However, in 1961 tensions between the superpowers escalated over the Berlin Crisis. In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev made the decision to place Soviet missiles in Cuba secretly in order to give a quick boost to Soviet missile power, and to strengthen the USSR’s bargaining position regarding the Berlin question.

After the missiles were discovered, Khrushchev initially maintained a hard line, expecting Kennedy to back down. However, as the President stood firm, Khrushchev reassessed the situation. Faced with the very real possibility of nuclear war, Khrushchev decided that “to save the world, we must retreat”. He agreed to withdraw the Soviet missiles, in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and the President’s secret assurance that the U.S. would withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. As this American concession was not revealed publicly, the settlement was viewed by many as unfavorable to the USSR and hurt Khrushchev politically, contributing to his ouster from power in 1964. Credit: Warren K. Leffler. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. In January 1959 Fidel Castro’s revolutionary forces seized power. While the Cuban leader initially claimed this was not a communist revolution, a year later Cuba formally aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Relations with the United States deteriorated further in 1961when the U.S.

supported CIA-trained anti-Castro exiles in the Bay of Pigs invasion – a failed attempt to overthrow Castro and a major blow for President Kennedy. In this context, in the summer of 1962 Castro accepted the Soviet offer to install missiles in Cuba as a deterrent to a U.S. invasion. During the crisis Castro urged Khrushchev to defend Cuba and reject American demands to withdraw the missiles. On October 27, believing a U.S. attack was imminent, Castro urged Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike. Castro was excluded from the negotiations and felt that, by agreeing to withdraw the missiles, the Soviets had betrayed Cuba. Search for: Cuban Missile Crisis - Oct 22, 1962 - HISTORY.com Cuban Missile Crisis Publisher A+E Networks In a televised speech of extraordinary gravity, President John F. Kennedy announces that U.S. spy planes have discovered Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These missile sites—under construction but nearing completion—housed medium-range missiles capable of striking a number of major cities in the United States, including Washington , D.C.

Kennedy announced that he was ordering a naval “quarantine” of Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from transporting any more offensive weapons to the island and explained that the United States would not tolerate the existence of the missile sites currently in place. The president made it clear that America would not stop short of military action to end what he called a “clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.” What is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis actually began on October 15, 1962—the day that U.S. intelligence personnel analyzing U-2 spy plane data discovered that the Soviets were building medium-range missile sites in Cuba. The next day, President Kennedy secretly convened an emergency meeting of his senior military, political, and diplomatic advisers to discuss the ominous development. The group became known as ExCom, short for Executive Committee. After rejecting a surgical air strike against the missile sites, ExCom decided on a naval quarantine and a demand that the bases be dismantled and missiles removed. On the night of October 22, Kennedy went on national television to announce his decision. During the next six days, the crisis escalated to a breaking point as the world tottered on the brink of nuclear war between the two superpowers.

On October 23, the quarantine of Cuba began, but Kennedy decided to give Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev more time to consider the U.S. action by pulling the quarantine line back 500 miles. By October 24, Soviet ships en route to Cuba capable of carrying military cargoes appeared to have slowed down, altered, or reversed their course as they approached the quarantine, with the exception of one ship—the tanker Bucharest. At the request of more than 40 nonaligned nations, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant sent private appeals to Kennedy and Khrushchev, urging that their governments “refrain from any action that may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war.” At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. military forces went to DEFCON 2, the highest military alert ever reached in the postwar era, as military commanders prepared for full-scale war with the Soviet Union. On October 25, the aircraft carrier USS Essex and the destroyer USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Soviet tanker Bucharest as it crossed over the U.S. quarantine of Cuba. The Soviet ship failed to cooperate, but the U.S.

Navy restrained itself from forcibly seizing the ship, deeming it unlikely that the tanker was carrying offensive weapons. On October 26, Kennedy learned that work on the missile bases was proceeding without interruption, and ExCom considered authorizing a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The same day, the Soviets transmitted a proposal for ending the crisis: The missile bases would be removed in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The next day, however, Khrushchev upped the ante by publicly calling for the dismantling of U.S. missile bases in Turkey under pressure from Soviet military commanders. While Kennedy and his crisis advisers debated this dangerous turn in negotiations, a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, and its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed. To the dismay of the Pentagon , Kennedy forbid a military retaliation unless any more surveillance planes were fired upon over Cuba. To defuse the worsening crisis, Kennedy and his advisers agreed to dismantle the U.S. missile sites in Turkey but at a later date, in order to prevent the protest of Turkey, a key NATO member.

On October 28, Khrushchev announced his government’s intent to dismantle and remove all offensive Soviet weapons in Cuba. With the airing of the public message on Radio Moscow, the USSR confirmed its willingness to proceed with the solution secretly proposed by the Americans the day before. In the afternoon, Soviet technicians began dismantling the missile sites, and the world stepped back from the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was effectively over. In November, Kennedy called off the blockade, and by the end of the year all the offensive missiles had left Cuba. Soon after, the United States quietly removed its missiles from Turkey. The Cuban Missile Crisis seemed at the time a clear victory for the United States, but Cuba emerged from the episode with a much greater sense of security.The removal of antiquated Jupiter missiles from Turkey had no detrimental effect on U.S. nuclear strategy, but the Cuban Missile Crisis convinced a humiliated USSR to commence a massive nuclear buildup. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States and built intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking any city in the United States. A succession of U.S.

administrations honored Kennedy’s pledge not to invade Cuba, and relations with the communist island nation situated just 80 miles from Florida remained a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy for more than 50 years. In 2015, officials from both nations announced the formal normalization of relations between the U.S and Cuba, which included the easing of travel restrictions and the opening of embassies and diplomatic missions in both countries. Related Videos

Question: Who was US President during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Answer: John F Kennedy