Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal - Jul 26, 1956 - HISTORY.com Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal Share this: Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal Author Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal URL Publisher A+E Networks The Suez Crisis begins when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalizes the British and French-owned Suez Canal. The Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas across Egypt, was completed by French engineers in 1869. For the next 87 years, it remained largely under British and French control, and Europe depended on it as an inexpensive shipping route for oil from the Middle East. After World War II, Egypt pressed for evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, and in July 1956 President Nasser nationalized the canal, hoping to charge tolls that would pay for construction of a massive dam on the Nile River. In response, Israel invaded in late October, and British and French troops landed in early November, occupying the canal zone. Under Soviet, U.S., and U.N. pressure, Britain and France withdrew in December, and Israeli forces departed in March 1957.

That month, Egypt took control of the canal and reopened it to commercial shipping. Ten years later, Egypt shut down the canal again following the Six Day War and Israel’s occupation of the Sinai peninsula. For the next eight years, the Suez Canal, which separates the Sinai from the rest of Egypt, existed as the front line between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. In 1975, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat reopened the Suez Canal as a gesture of peace after talks with Israel. Today, an average of 50 ships navigate the canal daily, carrying more than 300 million tons of goods a year. Related Videos Suez Crisis - Cold War - HISTORY.com Suez Crisis A+E Networks Introduction On October 29, 1956, Israeli armed forces pushed into Egypt toward the Suez Canal after Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-70) nationalized the canal in July of that same year, initiating the Suez Crisis. The Israelis soon were joined by French and British forces, which nearly brought the Soviet Union into the conflict, and damaged their relationships with the United States.

In the end, the British, French and Israeli governments withdrew their troops in late 1956 and early 1957. Google Suez Crisis: Background The catalyst for the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1956. The situation had been brewing for some time. Two years earlier, the Egyptian military had begun pressuring the British to end their military presence (which had been granted in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty) in the canal zone. Nasser’s armed forces also engaged in sporadic battles with Israeli soldiers along the border between the two countries, and the Egyptian leader did nothing to conceal his antipathy toward the Zionist nation. Did You Know? The 120-mile Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, took 10 years to construct and opened in 1869. The canal was developed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps, who in the 1880s made an unsuccessful attempt to develop the Panama Canal.

Supported by Soviet arms and money, and furious with the United States for reneging on a promise to provide funds for construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River, Nasser ordered the Suez Canal seized and nationalized. The British were angry with the move and sought the support of France (which believed that Nasser was supporting rebels in the French colony of Algeria) and Israel (which needed little provocation to strike at the enemy on its border) in an armed assault to retake the canal. Suez Crisis: 1956-57 The Israelis struck first, on October 26, 1956. Two days later, British and French military forces joined them. Originally, forces from the three countries were set to strike at once, but the British and French troops were delayed. Behind schedule, but ultimately successful, the British and French troops took control of the area around the Suez Canal. However, their hesitation had given the Soviet Union–also confronted with a growing crisis in Hungary–time to respond.

The Soviets, eager to exploit Arab nationalism and gain a foothold in the Middle East, supplied arms from Czechoslovakia to the Egyptian government beginning in 1955, and eventually helped Egypt construct the Aswan Dam on the Nile River after the United States refused to support the project. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) railed against the invasion and threatened to rain down nuclear missiles on Western Europe if the Israeli-French-British force did not withdraw. The response of President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration was measured. It warned the Soviets that reckless talk of nuclear conflict would only make matters worse, and cautioned Khrushchev to refrain from direct intervention in the conflict. However, Eisenhower (1890-1969) also issued stern warnings to the French, British and Israelis to give up their campaign and withdraw from Egyptian soil. Eisenhower was upset with the British, in particular, for not keeping the United States informed about their intentions. The United States threatened all three nations with economic sanctions if they persisted in their attack. The threats did their work. The British and French forces withdrew by December; Israel finally bowed to U.S.

pressure in March 1957. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Britain and France found their influence as world powers weakened. Tags THE 1956 SUEZ CANAL CRISIS!! THE 1956 SUEZ CANAL CRISIS!! This year is the 60th anniversary of the Suez Canal Crisis The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis was the beginning of the Decline and Fall of the British Empire. Unfortunately, the Empire was not about to retire gracefully . . . but fought a furious rearguard action....This resulted in the creation of the 1957 European Economic Community, and the 1958 replacement of Pope Pius XII with British Secret Service agent Angelo Roncalli aka Pope John XXIII....This was followed by the Kennedy Administration, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Beatles!! The Suez Canal opened in 1869 and was the work of a brilliant French civil engineer named Ferdinand de Lesseps, with financing provided by the French government.

A treaty signed in 1888 guaranteed that the canal would be open to the maritime traffic of all nations: The principal international instrument governing the Suez Canal, an instrument much cited' during the crisis of 1956, was the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 between Turkey (the nominal sovereign of the Canal) and the European Powers of the day. It substantially confirmed a compromise worked out by France and Britain–French principles and British exceptions. It started off with a fine flourish: 'The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.' In time of war the Canal was to be not so much 'neutralised' –de Lesseps's favourite expression does not in fact appear in the Convention – as made into a safe corridor for any and all belligerents. The signatories were not to keep any war vessels stationed in the Canal or raise any defence structures along its banks, but they were each entitled, if they so wished, to maintain two warships in or off the two ports of access, Port Said and Suez. (Kyle, Suez, pp. 15-16).

The Convention was signed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Japanese War, the British blocked Russian access to the canal. As a result, the Russian fleet had to make an 18,000 mile voyage to relieve Port Arthur. The British acquired a majority of the stock in the Canal Company and the vast revenue from this goldmine enriched its private stockholders. In June 1954, Muhammad Naguib threw off the yoke of British imperialism and exploitation by declaring Egypt a Republic. President Muhammad Naguib Muhammad Naguib was the father of the Egyptian Republic. Gamel Abdel Nasser was the 2nd President of the Egyptian Republic. Both men were very anxious to end their country's exploitation by Churchill's British Empire. President Nasser (1918–1970). Before the Arab conquest, Egypt was a Christian country and very technologically advanced. The Pharos Lighthouse in Alexandria was lit by ELECTRICITY. The Great Pyramid at Giza was an electric generating station (wireless).

After centuries of exploitation by the Terrible Turks and the British, the country was in an abysmal condition. In 1955, President Nasser asked the U.S. for a loan to built the Aswan Dam!! In 1955, President Nasser approached the United States for a loan to build the Aswan Dam. The dam was vitally necessary for the agricultural and economic development of his country. It was incongruous that President Nasser had to borrow money to improve the infrastructure of his own country while the British were draining the wealth of the Suez Canal. President Eisenhower in a wheelchair after his 1955 "heart attack." In February 1955, President Nasser approached President Eisenhower for a loan to build the Aswan Dam. In August 1955, President Eisenhower was stricken by a "heart attack." Pentagon general Howard Snyder was the White House physician in charge of keeping the President healthy!! White House Physician Major General Howard Snyder. Physician is another good cover for "spy" because doctors are taught how to prepare all kinds of poisons.

For the most important man in the world, at the most critical time in world history, to be incapacitated, is very, very coincidental. Even though he was a tough old soldier, President Eisenhower took weeks to convalesce from his frequent "heart attacks." During that crucial time, a sinister Jesuit and spy named John Foster Dulles dominated the State Department. John Foster Dulles French prime minister from '56 to '57. This top secret agreement was called the Protocol of Sèvres or Protocole de Sèvres. During all this planning for a war that could ignite a thermonuclear conflict, President Eisenhower was kept totally in the dark by Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA. General Moshe Dayan with his men during the Sinai campaign. The conflict began on Oct. 29, when "Israeli" Air Force Mustangs launched a series of attacks on Egyptian position all over the Sinai desert. Soon thereafter, an Anglo-French coalition began bombing Port Said. A pall of smoke rising over Port Said after the Anglo-French bombing. The bombing caused extensive loss of life, and Port Said, at the mouth of the canal, was laid in ruins.

On November 5, British landing craft, screened by helicopters, landed troops at Port Said, and occupied the city. A little child amid the ruins of Port Said. (1905–1990). British Amb. from '56 to '61. Lord Lyons quit suddenly just before the assassination of President Lincoln so he wouldn't have to shed any crocodile tears at his funeral. Likewise, Makims did not want to face the music and explain why his government double-crossed the President of the United States. He could have made the excuse that he was only carrying out Churchill's orders. The new Ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia's job was to restore the "special relationship." Allen Dulles (1893–1969). Another man who deceived the President about the intentions of the British was CIA director Allen Dulles. On October 31–Reformation Day–President Eisenhower addressed the nation on the Suez Crisis. He disavowed any knowledge of the invasion and he diplomatically ordered the British to "get out of Egypt." A somber President Eisenhower addressed the nation on Oct. 31.

It was the President's FINEST HOUR....The Pentagon was reluctant to use the 6th Fleet to force the British out so President Eisenhower had one last weapon left: financial coercion. It is amazing why the British didn't try that on the Kaiser and Hitler. Modern wars can bankrupt a state in no time at all. George M. Humphrey President Eisenhower celebrating his great election victory. The overwhelming majority of the American people approved of the President's handling of the Suez Crisis because they returned him to the White House by a vast majority. De Lesseps statue blown off its pedestal!! The last act of revenge by the retreating British was the blowing up of the statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps in December 1956, Anthony Eden resigned his position as prime minister in January 1957 and was replaced by Harold Macmillan. Anthony Eden exiting 10 Downing St. for the last time, Jan. 1957. It was the greatest victory of the United States over the British since the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815. The Aswan Dam was The Suez Canal is a peaceful waterway today. The Aswan Dam also generates electricity . . .

but not in the same way as the ancient Great Pyramid at Giza power plant. Winston Churchill was FURIOUS that his puppet Anthony Eden was forced to resign and the British were compelled to withdraw from Egypt. Unlike former times, declaring war on the United States was out of the question. The old bulldog did have one weapon left in his arsenal: an army of spies. Churchill ordered "La Popessa" to poison Pope Pius XII in 1958 The cold-blooded killer Winston Churchill was behind WWI, WWII, and he almost ignited WWIII, so to eliminate another man–even the Pope in Rome–meant nothing to him....After supporting his "ally" Pope Pius XII during WWII, he doubled-crossed him also!! After Rome was liberated by general Mark Clark in June 1944, a special relationship developed between the U.S. and the Vatican called the Vatican-Washington Alliance. Cardinal Spellman–the American Pope–epitomized that "special relationship." From Cardinal Spellman's vantage point, it looked like the U.S. military offered the best prospects for a restoration of the Papal States. President Eisenhower and Cardinal Spellman at the Al Smith dinner, Oct.

1954. Cardinal Spellman was known as the "American Pope" and he was military vicar of the U.S. armed forces. He was the chosen successor to Pope Pius XII and he would have taken the name Pius XIII in honor of his mentor. Pope Pius XII greeting Cardinal Spellman at the Vatican. Churchill too was anxious to restore the Papal States, and serve his queen, whose title was Fidei Defensor or "Defender of the Latin Church." However, after the Suez Crisis, his hatred of the U.S. exceeded his zeal for the Papacy. Pope Pius XII taking a brisk walk in the gardens of Castel Gondolfo, Oct. 1958. These photos of vigorous Pope Pius XII taking a brisk walk in the gardens of Castel Gondolfo were taken by Dr. Galeazzi-Lisi just days before the timely demise of his patient. Dr. Galeazzi-Lisi was an optometrist and he kept a watchful eye on the Pope's health!! A very fit Pope Pius XII walking briskly in the gardens. Only 6 days before his timely demise, Cardinal Spellman had an audience with the Pope.

On his voyage back to the U.S., he had to return to Rome for the funeral. It so happens that the Pope's "housekeeper" was a MI6 agent named Sister Pascalina. She was the most influential female in Rome since the time of Pope Joan . Since arriving in Rome in 1939, Pascalina was in constant secret communication with her MI6 "handlers" in London. Top secret "La Popessa" in the papal car on a rare occasion when she failed to draw the curtains. As imperious Pius XII dominated the world, he in turn was dominated by a Bavarian nun named Josefine Luhnert a.k.a. Mother Pascalina or "La Popessa." This femme fatale was the mistress of Pius and was responsible for most of his appointments. Pascalina was an MI6 agent, spoke English fluently, and was responsible for making sure that Pius never excommunicated Hitler. "La Popessa" (1894–1983). MI6 Sister Pascalina prepared the fatal cup of coffee for Pope Pius XII. She was by the Pope's side during his final moments and tried to take charge . . . even after his death.

French Cardinal Tisserant hated her and ordered her to quit the Vatican by nightfall on the day of the Pope's funeral. Cardinal Tisserant administering last rites to Pope Pius XII. At left can be seen the Pope's personal physician, Dr. Galeazzi-Lisi. Pope John XXIII. Pope from Oct. 28, '58 to June 3,'63. When Cardinal Spellman returned home from Rome after the conclave, he gave his opinion of the new Pope: Spellman held his tongue in Rome, where it was unwise to be indiscreet about a new pope, but when he returned home, the Cardinal announced his disdain. "He's no Pope," Spellman scoffed to his aides. "He should be selling bananas." (Cooney, The American Pope, p.261). In 1962, Pope John XXIII turned the Papacy upside down with his innovations. Deeply held traditions and centuries-old practices were abandoned in the name of "modernization". Some of those changes included: 1.

The History Guy:Arab-Israeli Wars:Suez War (1956) The History Guy British Troops in the Suez Canal, 1956 The Suez/Sinai War (1956) This page deals with the Suez War of 1956. Please use the following information, links and sources to learn more about the Anglo-French attack on the Suez Canal and the Israeli seizure of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. A brief summary of the campaign: In 1956, three of the Twentieth Century's most dominant forces came together in a short, violent clash in the Egyptian regions known as the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula. These three forces, (or, to use a literary term, themes), were: Nationalism, the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict . Egypt and other Arab nations had recently gained full independence from the empires controlled by European powers such as Great Britain and France. These young nations with ancient cultures and histories strove to gain economic and military sufficiency while asserting their political rights as free peoples.

The Cold War struggle between the mostly democratic and capitalist West against the Communist East dominated by the Soviet Union and China both helped and hindered the Nationalist goals of many African and Asian countries. For example, Egypt sought foreign aid in building the Aswan Dam project which would control the wild Nile River. The United States and Britain, major players in the West, declined to help Egypt because of her political and military ties to the Soviet Union. The Soviets eagerly rushed in to aid Egypt. After this, Egypt came to be considered a friend of the Soviets, and a nation not overly friendly to the West. In this way, the Cold War affected the young nation of Egypt and her relations with the rest of the world. The Arab-Israeli conflict began in 1948 and caused Egypt and Israel to be bitter foes until 1979. The second war between these Middle East neighbors took place in 1956. As part of Egyptian President Nasser's nationalist agenda, he took control of the Suez Canal zone away from the British and French companies which owned it.

At the same time, as part of his ongoing struggle with Israel, Egyptian forces blocked the Straits of Tiran, the narrow waterway that is Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea. Israel and Egypt had clashed repeatedly since their 1948 war as Egypt allowed and encouraged groups of Palestinian fighters to attack Israel from Egyptian territory. In response, Israeli forces constantly made cross-border raids in retaliation. Britain and France, both of whom were in the process of losing their centuries-old empires, decided on a strategy straight out of their 19th Century Imperial histories. This plan led to a joint invasion and occupation of the Suez Canal zone by Britain and France. This was meant to reassert control of this vital waterway to the British and French companies stung by Nasser's bold nationalization. At France's suggestion, planning was coordinated with Israel, a fact which all three nations denied for years afterwards. On October 29, 1956, Israeli troops invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and quickly overcame opposition as they raced for Suez.

The next day, Britain and France, following their part of the script, offered to temporarily occupy the Canal Zone and suggested a 10 mile buffer on either side which would separate the Egyptian forces from the Israelis. Nasser of course refused, and on October 31, Egypt was attacked and invaded by the military forces of Britain and France. In response to these developments, the Soviet Union, which at the time was ruthlessly suppressing an anti-Communist uprising in Hungary, threatened to intervene on Egypt's behalf. President Eisenhower of the United States pressured Britain, France and Israel into agreeing to a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal from Egypt. The United States, caught by surprise by the dual invasions, was more concerned with the Soviet war in Hungary and the Cold War than with Britain and France's dealings involving Suez. The last thing President Eisenhower wanted was a wider war over Suez. The war itself lasted for only a week, and invading forces were withdrawn within the month. As a result, Egypt now firmly aligned herself with the Soviet Union, which armed Egypt and other Arab nations for the continuing struggle against Israel. Suez War Maps and Pictures: General Links: Arab-Israeli Conflict --The Hutchison Encyclopedia article on the Arab-Israeli Wars.

American Reaction to the Suez War --Places the Suez Crisis and War within the proper context of world affairs at the time and explains America's reactions. Suez 1956 --Very good essay on the Suez Crisis written by University of San Diego student Chris Leininger. The Suez War of 1956 : Table of Contents -- Part of the Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE). Anglo-French Attack on the Suez Canal Suez Canal War (1956) --A web page on French aviation details some of the French units involved in the war. Israeli Invasion of the Sinai BBC - History - British History in depth: The Suez Crisis Print this page Creation of the Canal In 1854 Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French former diplomat, persuaded the Viceroy of Egypt, Mohamed Said, to permit the construction of a shipping canal through the 100 miles of desert between Africa and Asia. A prospectus was circulated and on 20 December 1858 the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal was constituted.

Britain, which had regarded France's increased influence in this region with suspicion, declined the offer of shares and even organised a boycott resulting in a shortage of investors. Egypt therefore acquired 44% of the shares. Construction began on 25 April 1859 and the canal was opened in November 1869 complete with a statue of de Lesseps dominating the harbour. Said, who died in 1867, was succeeded by his nephew Ismail. In the first year of the canal's existence, some three-quarters of the vessels using it were British. By the mid 1870s, Ismail, who had set out to modernise Egypt, but had incurred massive debts, offered his country's shares in the canal for sale. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli bought Egypt's shareholding for £4 million establishing Britain's influence in the running of this new and extremely important waterway. Top Vital British interest British Sherman tanks advance in North Africa during World War Two © The Suez Canal provided Britain with a shorter sea route to its empire and, as the 20th century dawned and oil grew in importance, it provided a short sea route to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf.

Britain was therefore committed to protect the canal. During the two World Wars, the Suez Canal came under attack. Soon after the outbreak of World War One, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate and British and Indian forces were sent to protect the canal. Turkey, which had entered the war as Germany’s ally in 1914, sent troops to seize the canal in February 1915. This attack was beaten back and by 1916 British defensive lines had been driven deep into the Sinai desert to prevent any further attempt. The defeat of Turkey in 1918 resulted in much of the Ottoman (Turkish) empire being divided between Britain and France, leaving Britain in control of the oilfields of what is now Iraq. The fighting ebbed and flowed until 1942, when Axis forces seemed poised to break through to the Suez Canal. In 1922, Britain gave nominal independence to Egypt, but it was some years before an agreement was reached.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty signed in London in 1936 proclaimed Egypt to be an independent sovereign state, but allowed for British troops to continue to be stationed in the Suez Canal zone to protect Britain’s financial and strategic interest in the canal until 1956, at which time the need for their presence would be re-examined and, if necessary, renegotiated. Soon after the outbreak of World War Two, Italy, Germany’s ally, sent forces to invade Egypt from Libya. A British and Commonwealth counter-offensive in December 1940 drove the Italians out of Egypt, but in March 1941 the Italians, reinforced by the German Afrika Korps, attacked again and pushed the Allied forces back. The fighting ebbed and flowed along the North African coast until the summer of 1942, when the Axis forces seemed poised to break through to the Suez Canal and beyond. Their new offensive, launched on 1 July, lasted most of the month, but the Allied lines held. In August, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery was appointed commander of the British Eighth Army.

On 23 October 1942, he launched a major offensive from El Alamein which forced the German-Italian Panzer Army into retreat. Subsequent Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria on 8 November cut off the Axis forces in Tunisia, and on 13 May 1943 they surrendered. The canal was safe once more. Top The crisis builds Anthony Nutting and Abdel Nasser sign the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Agreement © The Suez Crisis of 1956 has its roots in the post-war upsurge of nationalism in Egypt. In 1951, Nahas Pasha leader of the recently-elected nationalist Wafd party revoked the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Attacks on the British garrison soon followed and in January 1952 the British government authorised an operation to disarm the Egyptian paramilitary police force in Ismailia which was orchestrating the violence. This was successful, but the violence continued. Riots in Cairo of an unprecedented scale followed, culminating in attacks on Saturday 26 January on British property and the expatriate community, thereafter known as Black Saturday.

It was agreed that British troops would be permitted to return if the Suez Canal was threatened. British threats to occupy Cairo prompted King Farouk of Egypt to dismiss Nahas Pasha, but in July 1952 Farouk was overthrown in a military coup and General Mohammed Neguib seized power. Rather than insist on Britain's rights under the 1936 Treaty, Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary tried to negotiate with the new government. In 1954, Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser replaced General Neguib. He had three goals: to make Egypt independent by ending British occupation; to build up Egyptian forces for a successful attack on Israel; to improve Egypt’s economy by constructing a high dam at Aswan to irrigate the Nile valley. On 19 October 1954 a treaty was signed by Nasser and by Anthony Nutting, British minister of state for foreign affairs. The agreement was to last for seven years. British troops were to be withdrawn from Egypt by June 1956, and the British bases were to be run jointly by British and Egyptian civilian technicians.

Egypt agreed to respect the freedom of navigation through the canal, and it was agreed that British troops would be permitted to return if the Suez Canal was threatened by an outside power. Top Appeasement fears In February 1955, Anglo-Egyptian affairs were strained once more by Eden's decision to deprive Nasser of promised British arms. In April, Eden succeeded Winston Churchill as prime minister. As the last British troops left Egypt, Nasser was completing the purchase of Soviet-made aircraft, tanks and arms from Czechoslovakia, which might help him to realise one of his goals, the destruction of Israel. On 26 July 1956, President Nasser nationalised the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company to finance his dam. Despite anti-western demonstrations in Egypt, in January 1956 the United States and Britain had pledged funding to help finance the construction of a new High Dam at Aswan. The US, however, became convinced that the Dam project would not be a success and wanted to reduce expenditure on foreign aid. It was also concerned about Nasser's purchase of Soviet arms.

On 19 July, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the Egyptian ambassador in Washington that his government had decided that it would not provide funding for the construction of the dam. The British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, followed suit and withdrew the British offer of aid. The World Bank then refused to advance Egypt a promised $200 million. On 26 July 1956, President Nasser nationalised the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company, declaring that he would take the revenue from the canal to finance his dam. Eden, who recalled Britain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, looked to military action which might result in Nasser's downfall and restore Britain's influence in the region. The United States, however, made it clear that unjustified military action would not be tolerated. Top Treaties and collusion Detail of the Israeli national flag © The end of the Second World War in 1945 had brought a period of rapid change. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was followed by the first Arab-Israeli War, and a renewed upsurge of Arab nationalism made the Middle East a volatile region.

The United States had emerged from World War Two as a global superpower and, as a former colony itself it was committed to overseeing the decolonisation of the globe. Furthermore, the spread of communism fostered by the Soviet Union was seen by the US as a threat to western democracy. A secret agreement was made that Israel should attack Egypt as a pretext for an Anglo-French invasion of Suez. In an attempt to strengthen security in the Middle East against Soviet influence, Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan signed a treaty known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955. But Egypt, which was looking to the Soviet Union for armaments, refused to sign. Iraq later withdrew and the pact, which was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation, became ineffective in preventing the Cold War from reaching the Middle East. In January 1956, Guy Mollet was elected prime minister in France and promised to bring peace to Algeria, a French colony, in the throes of a nationalist uprising. But the presence of a million French settlers there made a withdrawal from Algeria politically impossible and his attempts to resolve the situation escalated the violence.

Meanwhile, Israel, greatly concerned about Egypt’s rearmament and involved in a series of border clashes with Egypt, was purchasing aircraft and weapons from France. The French government had been meeting secretly with Israel and invited Britain to join the negotiations. In October 1956, Mollet, Eden and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion met at Sevres near Paris and concluded a secret agreement that Israel should attack Egypt, thereby providing a pretext for an Anglo-French invasion of Suez. Top Military action British troops moving through Port Said © Ben-Gurion then ordered General Moshe Dayan, his chief of staff to plan an attack on Egypt. On 29 October 1956, the Israeli attack was spearheaded by an airborne drop to seize control of the Mitla Pass. Heavy fighting followed. The next day, Britain and France issued ultimatums to both sides to stop the fighting immediately. The Israelis continued their operations, expecting an Egyptian counter-attack. Instead, Nasser’s army was withdrawing. Militarily the operation was well on its way to being a great success.

On 5 November, some three months and 10 days after Nasser had nationalised the canal, the Anglo-French assault on Suez was launched. It was preceded by an aerial bombardment, which grounded and destroyed the Egyptian Air Force. Soon after dawn, soldiers of 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, dropped onto El Gamil airfield, while French paratroopers landed south of the Raswa bridges and at Port Fuad. Within 45 minutes, all Egyptian resistance on the airfield had been overcome and Royal Naval helicopters were bringing in supplies. With El Gamil secured, the British Paras moved eastwards towards Port Said, meeting their first serious opposition en route. With air support, they overwhelmed the Egyptian forces then stopped and dug-in overnight because the beach area of Port Said was to be bombarded next day during the seaborne landing. On 6 November, the sea and helicopter-borne assault went in. Royal Marine Commandos, together with British and French airborne forces supported by British tanks soon defeated the Egyptian forces, capturing men, vehicles and many of the newly purchased Czech-manufactured weapons.

At midnight on 6 November a cease-fire was called on the insistence of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. The Anglo-French forces had reached El Cap, just south of Port Said, but were not yet in control of the entire canal when they were stopped. Militarily, the operation was well on its way to being a great success. Top Backlash Anthony Eden in 1956 © Politically, the intervention in Suez was a disaster. US President Dwight Eisenhower was incensed. World opinion, especially that of the United States, together with the threat of Soviet intervention, forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from Egypt. In Britain too there had been widespread outrage. A United Nations peacekeeping force was sent in to supervise the ceasefire and to restore order. The Suez Canal was cleared and reopened, but Britain in particular found its standing with the US weakened and its influence 'east of Suez' diminished by the adventure. Eden told the Commons: 'There was not foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt. There was not.’ Accusations of collusion between Britain, France and Israel started in 1956, but were denied in parliament by Eden who tried to avoid giving a clear and categorical answer.

He was at last asked whether there was foreknowledge of the Israeli attack and on 20 December in his last address to the House of Commons, recorded in Hansard, he replied: 'I want to say this on the question of foreknowledge, and to say it quite bluntly to the House, that there was not foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt. There was not.’ In January 1957, his health shattered and his political credibility severely damaged, Sir Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, resigned. Guy Mollet, the French prime minister, survived longer despite fierce criticism, but his government collapsed in June 1957 over the taxation he imposed to pay for the Algerian War. Anglo-American relations were strained by the Suez Crisis, but as Cold War Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) they continued to cooperate, and by 1962 Britain had adopted the US Polaris missile system. Nonetheless, the real balance of power in the post-World War Two world had been starkly demonstrated and Britain's prestige was dealt a severe blow.

Find out more Books Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis by W Scott Lucas (Hodder and Stoughton, 1991) Britain and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement 1936-1952 by Hoda Gamel Abdel Nasser (Ithica Press, 1994) Suez by Keith Kyle (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991) Suez 1956 by Barry Turner (Hodder and Stoughton, 2006) The Canal Zone and Suez by Laurie Milner, in The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare edited by Major General Julian Thompson (Sidgewick and Jackson, 2002) Places to visit Top About the author Laurie Milner was an historian at the Imperial War Museum's Research and Information Department from 1984 to 2006 and was principal historian on the permanent 'First World War', 'Conflicts Since 1945' and 'Montgomery - Master of the Battlefield' galleries. He co-authored the IWM's 'Battle of the Somme' online exhibition with Nigel Steel.

He has acted as consultant to military museums internationally, including the British galleries at the El Alamein Museum for the 60th anniversary of the battle. He is the author of two books, 'Leeds Pals' (Pen and Sword 1991); and 'Royal Scots in the Gulf' (Pen and Sword 1994). Milestones: 1953–1960 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1953–1960 The Suez Crisis, 1956 On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the joint British-French enterprise which had owned and operated the Suez Canal since its construction in 1869. Nasser’s announcement came about following months of mounting political tensions between Egypt, Britain, and France. Although Nasser offered full economic compensation for the Company, the British and French Governments, long suspicious of Nasser’s opposition to the continuation of their political influence in the region, were outraged by the nationalization. The Egyptian leader, in turn, resented what he saw as European efforts to perpetuate their colonial domination.

Nine members of United Nations Security Council signify support of the resolution endorsing operation of the Suez Canal on Oct. 14, 1956.(AP Photo/Tom Fitzsimmons) The Eisenhower administration, worried by the prospect of the outbreak of hostilities between its NATO allies and an emergent, influential Middle Eastern power (and the possible intervention of the Soviet Union in such a conflict), attempted to broker a diplomatic settlement of the British-French-Egyptian dispute. On September 9, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the creation of a Suez Canal Users’ Association (SCUA), an international consortium of 18 of the world’s leading maritime nations, to operate the Canal. Although SCUA would have given Britain, France, and Egypt an equal stake in the Canal, this, and various other U.S. and international mediation efforts failed to win the full support of any of the contending powers. In discussions with the United States between August and October, the British Government repeatedly hinted that it might resort to force in dealing with Nasser.

At the same time, the British and French held secret military consultations with Israel, who regarded Nasser as a threat to its security, resulting in the creation of a joint plan to invade Egypt and overthrow its President. In keeping with these plans, Israeli forces attacked across Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956, advancing to within 10 miles of the Suez Canal. Under the pretext of protecting the Canal from the two belligerents, Britain and France landed troops of their own a few days later. In response, the Eisenhower administration, concerned about dissociating the United States from European colonialism—especially in light of its strident condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Hungary the same week—as well as the possibility that the Soviets would intervene to assist Nasser, pressured Britain and France to accept a United Nations ceasefire on November 6. Moreover, the United States voted for U.N. resolutions publicly condemning the invasion and approving the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force. Washington’s public censure of two of its most important allies temporarily soured relations with London and Paris and helped contribute to the resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in January 1957. Concurrently, U.S.

worries about the continued viability of European (particularly British) political and military power in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis prompted the creation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which gave the administration increased power to aid countries in the region. By March 1957, however, the U.S.–U.K. bilateral relationship had recovered under Eden’s successor, Harold Macmillan. Suez Crisis Further Reading Suez Crisis The Suez Crisis began on 26 July 1956, when, following the United States' decision to withdraw its offer of a grant to aid the construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The governments of Britain and France secretly began planning for an invasion of Egypt. Not to be outdone, Israel soon was doing its own invasion planning, completing its final plan on 5 October. After several international mediation efforts had failed, Britain and France agreed in mid-October 1956 to undertake a joint intervention in Egypt.

Aware of the upcoming Israeli plan to invade the Sinai, French officials suggested that a Franco-British force could enter Egypt ostensibly to separate the combatants, while actually seizing control of the entire Suez waterway. On 26 October, the United States learned of Israel's military mobilization, and President Dwight Eisenhower sent the first of two personal messages to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion asking that Israel do nothing to endanger the peace. In the Mediterranean on the 28th, the U.S. Sixth Fleet was placed on alert. Undeterred by U.S. diplomatic maneuvering, Israeli forces began attacks in Egypt on 29 October. The following day Britain and France began to make their move. The British government issued an Anglo-French ultimatum calling on the Israelis and Egyptians to withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal and demanding that Egypt allow British and French forces to temporarily occupy key positions guarding the canal. That same day, Admiral Walter F. Boone, U.S. Commander Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, ordered the Sixth Fleet to assist in the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Israel and Egypt.

Coral Sea (CVA 43) and Randolph (CVA 15), the fleet's two attack carriers that were already operating in the eastern Mediterranean, were directed to keep clear of British naval units operating there. In Norfolk, VA, the Navy ordered one attack carrier, a heavy cruiser and a destroyer squadron to get ready to sail to the Mediterranean to augment the Sixth Fleet and a second CVA and a division of destroyers to be on 72-hour notice. The Anglo-French attack on Egypt began at dusk on 31 October with a series of large-scale air strikes. The following day Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Arleigh Burke signaled Vice Admiral Charles R. "Cat" Brown, Commander Sixth Fleet: "Situation tense; prepare for imminent hostilities." Brown signaled back: "Am prepared for imminent hostilities, but whose side are we on?" In classic Burke style, the CNO's return response was, "Keep clear of foreign op areas but take no guff from anybody." The Suez Crisis increased in intensity on the afternoon of 5 November when the Soviet Union sent diplomatic notes to Britain, France and Israel threatening to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East through the use of force.

President Eisenhower's reaction to these threats was that "if those fellows start something, we may have to hit 'em-and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket." Coral Sea and Randolph and their escorts shifted to an operating area southwest of Crete in order to improve their readiness posture for a general emergency. Agreeing to a cease-fire on 6 November, Britain and France ended their military operations that night at midnight. Soviet military moves continued during the next few days, however, and on the 7th, Burke ordered attack carriers Forrestal (CVA 59) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) to sail from Norfolk toward the Azores, together with a heavy cruiser and three divisions of destroyers, to act as a standby augmentation to the Sixth Fleet. U.S. Navy forces were directed to maintain readiness to execute emergency war plans. Lester Pearson, the Canadian external affairs minister, suggested the creation of an United Nations Emergency Force to keep the peace between the opposing forces until a political settlement could be achieved. Tensions remained high until 15 November, when United Nations forces were brought into Egypt to provide a buffer between the Egyptians and the invasion forces.

From that point on, the Soviet intervention threat gradually dissipated. Pearson won the 1957 Nobel Pace Prize for his efforts at creating U.N. peacekeeping forces. References Adapted from "Answering the Call: Carriers in Crises Response Since World War II," By Jeffrey G. Barlow NAVAL AVIATION NEWS January-February 1997 NEWSLETTER An affair to remember | The Economist The Suez crisis An affair to remember The Suez crisis of 50 years ago marked the end of an era, and the start of another, for Europe, America and the Middle East Jul 27th 2006 Tweet Corbis ON JULY 26th 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt, addressed a huge crowd in the city of Alexandria. Broad-shouldered, handsome and passionate, Nasser stunned even this gathering of enthusiastic supporters with the vehemence of his diatribe against British imperialism.

Britain had ruled Egypt, one way or another, from 1882 to 1922, when the protectorate gained nominal independence, and continued to influence Egyptian affairs thereafter, maintaining troops there and propping up the decadent monarchy overthrown by Nasser in 1952. In that speech in Alexandria, though, Nasser chose to delve back even further into history, in a long digression on the building of the Suez canal a century earlier. That gave him the chance to mention the name of the Frenchman who had built the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps. This he did at least 13 times. “De Lesseps”, it turned out, was the codeword for the Egyptian army to start the seizure, and nationalisation, of the canal. It also launched the start of a new era in the politics of Europe, the Middle East and America. The Suez crisis, as the events of the following months came to be called, marked the humiliating end of imperial influence for two European countries, Britain and France.

It cost the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, his job and, by showing up the shortcomings of the Fourth Republic in France, hastened the arrival of the Fifth Republic under Charles de Gaulle. It made unambiguous, even to the most nostalgic blimps, America's supremacy over its Western allies. It thereby strengthened the resolve of many Europeans to create what is now the European Union. It promoted pan-Arab nationalism and completed the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into an Israeli-Arab one. And it provided a distraction that encouraged the Soviet Union to put down an uprising in Hungary in the same year. It also divided families and friends, at least in Britain and France, with a degree of bitterness that would not be seen in a foreign-policy dispute until the invasion of Iraq in 2003. If that is difficult to understand, remember that the world was a different place then. Many European politicians still believed their countries had a right to run the affairs of others. Many were also scarred by memories of appeasement in the 1930s.

Faced with a provocation, even an entirely legal one involving the nationalisation of a foreign-owned asset like the Suez canal, the instinct of such Europeans was to go to war. They and their Israeli partners-in-invasion were restrained, eventually, by the United States, led by a Republican president and war hero, Dwight Eisenhower. The venture involved intrigue, lies, nemesis—and no end of a lesson. How did it come about? The road to collusion In Egypt, the British had become so resented for their racist, arrogant ways that by the early 1950s even Winston Churchill, the grand old imperialist who had returned as prime minister in 1951, felt he could resist the tide of nationalism no more. After 1951 the British were confined to the Suez canal zone, harassed by Egyptian irregulars who wanted them out altogether. By June 1956 the last British soldiers had left even the canal zone. Yet Anglo-Egyptian relations did not improve. Nasser was enraged by America's withdrawal of its offer of loans to help pay for the building of a dam on the Nile at Aswan. This project was central to his ambitions to modernise Egypt.

But John Foster Dulles, the American secretary of state, thought the dam would place too much strain on the resources of newly independent Egypt. For their part, the British, mistrustful of Nasser and feeling the pinch, were also ready to withdraw their loan offer. So, thought Dulles, best to let the Russians take on the dam, as he knew they would if the West backed out. He did not, however, bargain for Nasser's immediate response—the nationalisation of the Suez canal, whose revenues, Nasser argued, Egypt now needed to replace the loans promised by Britain and America for the dam. The reaction in Britain was unanimous in condemning “Grabber Nasser”, as the Daily Mirror put it. Comparisons were immediately made to Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s: if he got away with this, where would he—and other emboldened post-colonial leaders—stop? Eden, who had succeeded Churchill as prime minister the year before, argued that the canal was Britain's “great imperial lifeline”, especially for oil. Nasser could not be allowed to have his hand “on our windpipe”. The French reacted just as strongly, but for different reasons.

First, they had a stake in the Paris-based company that ran the canal. Second, they were fighting an increasingly nasty little colonial war in Algeria. The new government of Guy Mollet was resolved to put down an Arab uprising there with all the force that the Fourth Republic could muster. By the summer of 1956 France had about 400,000 soldiers in Algiers. Nasser backed the Arab insurgents, so the French were as eager as the British to see the back of him. Accordingly, Britain and France started to co-ordinate plans for a military invasion of Egypt and a reoccupation of the canal zone. But their bellicosity was matched by the scepticism of the Americans, and of Eisenhower in particular, who from the beginning was against the use of force by his two main allies. One concern for him was the presidential election due that November, which he intended to win as the incumbent “peace” president. He knew that the voters would not thank him for taking them into a foreign imbroglio in which America had no direct interest. Eisenhower was also motivated by an anti-imperialism rooted in the attitudes that had made Americans break free from the British empire.

Intensifying his scepticism was a fear that, in the new cold war, any British and French bullying of Egypt would alienate Arabs, Asians and Africans and drive them towards the communist camp. To head off Anglo-French military action, Eisenhower and his secretary of state ensnared the Europeans in a fruitless round of talks and conferences. Aware that they were on shaky legal ground for an invasion, the British and French reluctantly played along. But they were losing the momentum for military action, which was the American intention. The increasingly histrionic Eden, in particular, wanted not only the reversal of the canal's nationalisation but also regime change: he wanted Nasser “destroyed”. The Israelis provided a way out. On September 30th a delegation secretly presented the French with a fabricated casus belli: Israel would invade Egypt and race to the canal. The French and British could then invade, posing as peacekeepers to separate the two sides, and occupy the canal, ostensibly to guarantee the free passage of shipping. When this plan was presented to Eden, he jumped at it. Thus was collusion born. The details were agreed on at a secret meeting in Sèvres, outside Paris.

Not for nothing is the Suez crisis known in Egypt as the “tripartite aggression”. The British and French forces now had a pretext to invade. For the Israelis, it would punish Egypt for its escalating incursions into Israel from Gaza. It would also hitch the major European powers to the cause of Israel: up to that point, the French had tried to be even-handed between Israel and its neighbours; the British had leaned towards the Arab states. A complete mess and botch Only a handful of people were let in on the collusion. Most of them thought it was mad from the start, arguing, quite correctly, that the cover for the invasion was so flimsy it would soon be blown. To disguise what was going on, the British, in particular, were drawn ever deeper into a bog of lies and deception, particularly with the Americans. Parliament was also deceived. Both Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, his foreign secretary, told the House of Commons that, as Lloyd put it, “there was no prior agreement” with Israel. On October 29th, Israeli paratroopers, led by a zealous officer called Ariel Sharon, were dropped into Sinai to fulfil their side of the bargain.

Feigning surprise, the British and French issued an ultimatum to both sides to cease fire. When the Egyptians rejected this, British planes started bombing the Egyptian air force on the ground and on November 5th Anglo-French troops went ashore to begin the invasion of the canal zone and, it was hoped, topple Nasser. Eisenhower, kept completely in the dark, felt utterly betrayed by his erstwhile allies. “I've just never seen great powers make such a complete mess and botch of things,” he told his aides. He determined to put a stop to the whole enterprise. America struck at Britain's fragile economy. It refused to allow the IMF to give emergency loans to Britain unless it called off the invasion. Faced by imminent financial collapse, as the British Treasury saw it, on November 7th Eden surrendered to American demands and stopped the operation, with his troops stranded half way down the canal. The French were furious, but obliged to agree; their troops were under British command. America also proved adept at working through the UN. On November 2nd an American resolution demanding a ceasefire was passed by a majority of 64 to five, the Russians voting with the United States.

And to sidestep Anglo-French vetoes at the Security Council, for the first time the General Assembly met in emergency session (where no country held a veto) and took up a Canadian suggestion to assemble an international emergency force to go to the canal and monitor the ceasefire. These were to be the first “blue hat” UN peacekeepers. The organisation was one of the clear winners of the crisis, gaining an enhanced role in the world. For the other participants in the drama, the consequences were more mixed. The French drew the clearest lessons. Suez showed that they could never rely on perfide Albion. Britain, then Europe's strongest power, would, it seemed, always put its “special” relationship with America above its European interests. And the Americans, to the French, were both unreliable and annoyingly superior. So the French would have to look elsewhere for more durable allies—a search that was, by one account, short. The story goes that on the evening of November 6th, when Mollet got the call from Eden that he was aborting the invasion, he happened to be with the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.

The French foreign minister, Christian Pineau, records Adenauer as saying that “France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States...Not Germany either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world: that is to unite Europe...We have no time to waste; Europe will be your revenge.” Thus was born the six-country European common market, which has now become the 25-country European Union. The founding Treaty of Rome was signed the very next year, in 1957. And the French, particularly Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s, kept the British, America's Trojan horse, out of it for as long as they could, until 1973. France had by then made itself truly independent of American military power (unlike the British) by building its own nuclear deterrent from scratch and, in 1966, leaving NATO's integrated command structure.

It should have been no surprise, then, that in the months before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was the French who played the American role of 1956, though Jacques Chirac could hardly deliver the coup de grâce, as Eisenhower had done in 1956. In reaction to Suez, France had constructed a new identity as the ostensible leader of Europe, upholding a set of universal values in competition with the Americans. The British were hurt most by Suez. Eden resigned soon afterwards, his health wrecked, his reputation in tatters, his lies and evasions damaging the country's always tendentious reputation for fair play. The crisis exploded Britain's lingering imperial pretensions, and hastened the independence of its colonies. Some talked of a “Suez syndrome”, where, in Margaret Thatcher's words, Britain's rulers “went from believing that Britain could do anything to an almost neurotic belief that Britain could do nothing”. Certainly, much of Mrs Thatcher's prime ministership, particularly the retaking of the Falklands in 1982, was an essay in exorcising the demons of Suez.

Tony Blair has not been afraid to take advantage of her success, by deploying British power in Sierra Leone, the Balkans and Iraq. But never without the Americans' support. The major lesson of Suez for the British was that the country would never be able to act independently of America again. Unlike the French, who have sought to lead Europe, most British politicians have been content to play second fiddle to America. Eden recuperated from the crisis in Ian Fleming's house, Goldeneye, in Jamaica. It was an appropriate choice, as it was Fleming who was to mythologise the new relationship in his James Bond novels. The first, “Casino Royale”, was published to little attention in 1953, but the series took off in the years after the Suez crisis, offering some sort of literary consolation to a country coming to terms with its new, humbler status. The partnership between Bond and Felix Leiter, a CIA agent, reflected the way the British now liked to see things, the one suave, smart and endlessly resourceful, the other with a lot of money and a slightly plodding manner. Eisenhower won his election in America.

The crisis affirmed the country's new status as the global superpower, challenged only by the Soviet Union. Suez was also to be the last incident in which America was to take strong action against Israel. As Eisenhower had feared, the Russians moved into the Middle East to fill the gap left by the disorderly retreat of the British, so the Americans felt compelled to get in as well. Thus the cold war spread to north Africa and Egypt (the Russians duly stepped in to finance the Aswan dam, and much else), and Israel became ever more closely tied to the United States. Before 1956, Israel had been militarily vulnerable, but, beyond the Arab world, morally and politically unassailable. The Israeli occupation of Sinai (and Gaza) in 1956 began the gradual inversion of this state of affairs, as it marked the first expansion of Israel beyond its original borders, with all the subsequent criticisms of its occupation of Arab or Palestinian land. In 1956 the Israelis were quickly forced to withdraw from Sinai by American (and Russian) pressure. Never again, however, would an American president face down Israel as Eisenhower had done at Suez.

The rise of Nasserism The chief victor of Suez, in the short term, was Nasser. Before the crisis he had faced lingering opposition in Egypt, not only from the former ruling class but also from communists and the radical Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood. “Pulling the Lion's tail”, and getting away with it, proved wildly popular. As dissidents fled, fell silent or filled its jails, Nasser's Egypt projected itself as the vanguard of Arab nationalism and a beacon to liberation movements across the third world. Puffed up by his own success, Nasser launched misguided adventures such as a short-lived political union with Syria and disastrous nationalisations of Egyptian industry. And the Nasserist dream inspired a wave of pan-Arab nationalism that helped install lookalike leaderships, with similar flags, propaganda and secret police, across much of the Arab world. Saddam Hussein was one who drew inspiration. Nasser himself was largely discredited by Israel's crushing victory in the 1967 war, but the institutions of Nasserism still lived on, in Egypt and elsewhere, as effective systems of political control.

No end of lessonsAFP Nasser's 1956 triumph endured in Arab memory as a moment of cathartic liberation. It inspired, to some extent, Saddam's dramatic moves, such as invading Iran and later Kuwait. A famous Egyptian film, “Nasser 56”, lingers nostalgically over the Egyptian leader. Amid rousing music, he is portrayed in black and white, shrouded in pensive solitude by a swirl of cigarette smoke, reaching his momentous decision to nationalise the canal. But the film jumps to the happy outcome, ignoring the fact that Nasser's victory was not won by this new Arab superman, but delivered by superpower intervention. A wider lesson lies in the interpretation of history. Eden, who had honourably resigned as foreign secretary in 1938 in disapproval of the appeasement of Hitler and, especially, Mussolini, was nonetheless haunted by Neville Chamberlain's readiness to yield to tyrants. His impulses at Suez were surely complex. Eden was far from anti-American or indifferent to American concerns. He had resigned in 1938 partly because he thought his prime minister, Chamberlain, had treated Roosevelt shabbily.

Yet he saw Nasser as a “Mussolini” and was plainly determined to avoid any charge of appeasement, even though the essential features of Munich and Suez were wholly different. Instead of saying that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it, George Santayana might have better said that those who misinterpret the past are condemned to bungle the present.

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HD Stock Footage Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Jun 16, 2014 Link to order this clip: Historic Stock Footage Archival and Vintage Video Clips in HD. Anglo French troops attack to seize the Suez Canal in Egypt. Major events of 1956. Ships underway in Suez Canal, Egypt. President, Abdul Nasser announces the seizure of the canal. Soldiers move up in Egypt and dead Egyptian soldiers as a result of Anglo French attack. Anglo French planes bomb the canal area. Airborne troops land in the canal area. Debris due to aerial bombings spread on the street. Matter discussed at the United Nations meeting leading to a cease fire in the area. The Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold arrives in Egypt for negotiations. The United Nations Emergency Police forces enter a city in Egypt. People give a warm welcome to the forces. Location: Egypt.

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Question: Which Egyptian president ordered the seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956?
Answer: Nasser