BBC ON THIS DAY | 1 | 1973: Britain joins the EEC 1973: Britain joins the EEC The United Kingdom has become a fully-fledged member of the European Economic Community. Ireland and Denmark also joined Britain in becoming the newest members of the community, bringing the total number of member states to nine. At midnight last night a Union Jack flag was raised at the EEC's headquarters in Brussels to mark the occasion. Celebrations were held in the city and one of Britain's new European Commissioners, George Thomson, joined revellers in a torch lit procession. Prime Minister Edward Heath is optimistic that Britain's membership of the community will bring prosperity to the country. He said: "It is going to be a gradual development and obviously things are not going to happen overnight. "But from the point of view of our everyday lives we will find there is a great cross-fertilisation of knowledge and information, not only in business but in every other sphere.

"And this will enable us to be more efficient and more competitive in gaining more markets not only in Europe but in the rest of the world." More than 1,000 Britons will relocate to Brussels over the coming months to take up their places as civil servants of the community. Britain will be given four votes within the council, which proposes policies on issues ranging from the environment to public health. Membership applications by the UK to join the EEC were refused in 1963 and 1967 because the French President of the time Charles de Gaulle doubted the UK's political will. It is understood, however, his real fear was that English would suddenly become the common language of the community. EUROPA - The history of the European Union Europa The Founding Fathers of the EU The following visionary leaders inspired the creation of the European Union we live in today. Without their energy and motivation we would not be living in the climate of peace and stability that we take for granted nowadays. From resistance fighters to lawyers, the Founding Fathers were a diverse group of people who held the same ideals: a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe. Beyond the Founding Fathers described below, many others have worked tirelessly towards, and inspired, the European project.

This section on the Founding Fathers is therefore a work in progress. 1945 - 1959 A peaceful Europe – the beginnings of cooperation The European Union is set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War. As of 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community begins to unite European countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace. The six founding countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The 1950s are dominated by a cold war between east and west. Protests in Hungary against the Communist regime are put down by Soviet tanks in 1956. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome creates the European Economic Community (EEC), or ‘Common Market’. 1960 - 1969 A period of economic growth The 1960s is a good period for the economy, helped by the fact that EU countries stop charging custom duties when they trade with each other. They also agree joint control over food production, so that everybody now has enough to eat - and soon there is even surplus agricultural produce.

May 1968 becomes famous for student riots in Paris, and many changes in society and behaviour become associated with the so-called ‘68 generation’. 1970 - 1979 A growing Community – the first enlargement Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom join the European Union on 1 January 1973, raising the number of Member States to nine. The short, yet brutal, Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 results in an energy crisis and economic problems in Europe. The last right-wing dictatorships in Europe come to an end with the overthrow of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974 and the death of General Franco of Spain in 1975. The EU regional policy starts to transfer huge sums of money to create jobs and infrastructure in poorer areas. The European Parliament increases its influence in EU affairs and in 1979 all citizens can, for the first time, elect their members directly. The fight against pollution intensifies in the 1970s. The EU adopts laws to protect the environment, introducing the notion of ‘the polluter pays’ for the first time.

1980 - 1989 The changing face of Europe - the fall of the Berlin Wall The Polish trade union, Solidarność, and its leader Lech Walesa, become household names across Europe and the world following the Gdansk shipyard strikes in the summer of 1980. In 1981, Greece becomes the 10th member of the EU, and Spain and Portugal follow five years later. In 1986 the Single European Act is signed. This is a treaty which provides the basis for a vast six-year programme aimed at sorting out the problems with the free flow of trade across EU borders and thus creates the ‘Single Market’. There is major political upheaval when, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall is pulled down and the border between East and West Germany is opened for the first time in 28 years. This leads to the reunification of Germany, when both East and West Germany are united in October 1990. 1990 - 1999 A Europe without frontiers With the collapse of communism across central and eastern Europe, Europeans become closer neighbours.

In 1993 the Single Market is completed with the 'four freedoms' of: movement of goods, services, people and money. The 1990s is also the decade of two treaties: the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. People are concerned about how to protect the environment and also how Europeans can act together when it comes to security and defence matters. In 1995 the EU gains three more new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden. A small village in Luxembourg gives its name to the ‘Schengen’ agreements that gradually allow people to travel without having their passports checked at the borders. Millions of young people study in other countries with EU support. Communication is made easier as more and more people start using mobile phones and the internet. 2000 – 2009 Further expansion The euro is now the new currency for many Europeans. During the decade more and more countries adopt the euro. 11 September 2001 becomes synonymous with the 'War on Terror' after hijacked airliners are flown into buildings in New York and Washington.

EU countries begin to work much more closely together to fight crime. The political divisions between east and west Europe are finally declared healed when no fewer than 10 new countries join the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. A financial crisis hits the global economy in September 2008. The Treaty of Lisbon is ratified by all EU countries before entering into force in 2009. It provides the EU with modern institutions and more efficient working methods. BBC News - A timeline of the EU A timeline of the EU 1948 Plans for a peaceful Europe In the wake of World War II nationalism is out of favour in large parts of continental Europe and support for federalism is high. The European Union of Federalists organises a Congress at The Hague in 1948 in the hope of drawing up a European constitution. But the UK rejects the federal approach and the result is the Council of Europe a loose grouping that becomes a guardian of Europe's human rights. 1949 Nato is born The Washington Treaty is signed by the USA Canada and 10 Western European states Britain France the Benelux countries Iceland Italy Norway and Portugal.

The key feature of the pact is a mutual defence clause if one country is attacked the others will come to its defence. The US is supportive of European integration but it is another year before real progress is made in this field. 1950 The Schuman Declaration French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announces a plan for France and Germany to pool coal and steel production and invites other states to join them. His plan is based on the idea that European unity is the key to peace. Solidarity in production he said would make war between France and Germany "not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." 1951 Treaty of Paris establishes European Coal and Steel Community ECSC Six countries sign the treaty France Germany the Benelux states and Italy. It sets up a High Authority to manage the coal and steel industries and a Common Assembly a precursor of the European parliament. The Dutch supported by the Germans also insist on the creation of a Council of Ministers made up of ministers from member states to counterbalance the supranational High Authority. 1952 The ECSC begins work with Jean Monnet at its head The first president of the High Authority is Jean Monnet the inspiration behind the Schuman Declaration. The ECSC guarantees German coal to the French steel industry.

It also provides funds to upgrade Belgian and Italian coal mines. Germany agrees to this and to the dismantling of its steel cartels in order to gain international respectability. 1954 The rise and fall of the European Defence Community In response to the Korean War the USA insists that Europe must contribute more to its own defence and that Germany must rearm. In 1952 the six ECSC members agree to create a European Defence Community which envisages German soldiers joining a European army. But the French parliament delays ratification and ultimately rejects the idea in 1954. 1957 The Treaty of Rome a first step towards the common market The six members of the ECSC sign the Treaty of Rome setting up the European Economic Community EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community Euratom. The EEC aims to create a common market a customs union plus free movement of capital and labour. To please France it also promises subsidies to farmers. Euratom's goal is the joint development of nuclear energy. 1958 The EEC takes off dominating the other European communities The EEC starts work and quickly establishes itself as the most important of the European communities.

It has a commission a council of ministers and an advisory parliamentary assembly whose members are drawn from national parliaments. At the same time the European Court of Justice comes into existence to interpret the Treaty of Rome and rule in disputes over Community decisions. 1960 EFTA is launched another kind of Europe An alternative to the EEC emerges when Austria Denmark Norway Portugal Sweden Switzerland and the UK set up EFTA the European Free Trade Association. Like the EEC EFTA aims to establish free trade but it opposes uniform external tariffs and sees no need for supranational institutions. 1961 Britain Denmark and Ireland apply to join the EEC The UK's decision to apply for membership of the EEC was taken by the government of Harold Macmillan a Conservative. It was not welcomed by French President Charles de Gaulle who saw it as a threat to his goal of using the EEC to amplify France's voice in world affairs. He was also concerned about the UK's close ties with the US. 1963 French President Charles de Gaulle vetoes British membership France's nationalist leader Charles de Gaulle refuses to back the UK's application to join the EEC saying that the British government lacks commitment to European integration.

1967 Treaty creating a single Council and a Commission for the three communities comes into effect 1968 The European Community customs union is completed 1973 Britain Denmark and Ireland join the European Community The three countries and Norway had failed to join 10 years earlier because of General de Gaulle's veto on British membership. This time all sign an accession treaty in 1972 but Norwegians reject it in a referendum later in the year. Denmark and Ireland hold successful referendums. The UK does not hold a referendum until 1975 after renegotiating its entry terms the result is twotoone in favour. 1979 The road to the euro begins with the EMS The European Monetary System EMS introduces the European currency unit Ecu and the exchange rate mechanism ERM. The Ecu a unit for the communitys internal budget also takes on some of the features of a real currency it is used for travellers cheques and bank deposits. The ERM gives national currencies an exchange rate band denominated in Ecus. All EC members join except the UK.

1981 Greece becomes the ECs 10th member 1984 The UK wins its budget rebate 1985 Jacques Delors becomes president of the European Commission Jacques Delors proposes that the European Community should by the end of 1992 remove a series of barriers to free trade and free movement of capital and labour creating a "single market". Delors believes the single market programme will revive European integration by spilling over from the economic into the political arena. It is widely seen as a necessity if Europe is to compete with the United States. 1986 Portugal and Spain join the EC and the European flag is unveiled 1987 The Single European Act enters into force The SEA modifies the Treaty of Rome aiming to complete the formation of a common market which the earlier treaty had begun. It abolishes national vetoes in a host of areas relating to the single market increases the legislative powers of the European parliament and makes the first commitment by member states to create a "European Union". 1988 Regional aid is doubled Market liberalisation is seen to work to the benefit of the more developed northern European member states so the poorer southern states demand compensation.

This comes in the form of agreement to double the allocations for structural funds paid to poorer regions. 1990 Britain and Europe: Making the break | The Economist purchase-rights icon BRITAIN has never been too keen on tying the knot with Europe. It sat aside in the 1950s as Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries forged a single market in coal and steel, which became a broader common market. It eventually joined, in 1973, largely because Europe seemed to be where the money was. Britons still think of their relationship with Europe as a transaction. But their feelings about the costs and benefits of membership have changed utterly. Europe is no longer the thriving economic club that Britain joined 40 years ago. The euro-zone crisis has exposed the lack of dynamism in much of Europe (though Britain itself is hardly booming) and the British also feel sidelined, as countries that use the single currency are pulled more tightly together. Britons have come to associate the EU with the uncontrolled immigration of Poles and other east Europeans, seemingly to every village. Although many political leaders are determined to stop it happening, a British exit from Europe is coming to seem ever more possible.

If Britain falls out of the EU, it may find itself completely outside the single market. It might try to stay in the European Economic Area (EEA), a free-trade club that also includes Iceland and Norway. Or it could leave both the EU and the single market, but attempt to recreate a free-trade relationship through bilateral agreements. In this article we explain what each would mean for British business and the economy. But, first, how could an exit happen? Almost by accident The likeliest trigger is a referendum. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister, is under enormous pressure to call one from his own Conservative Party, which dominates Britain’s coalition government. Last year 81 Tory MPs voted for a referendum on Britain’s EU membership. “It’s moved very fast,” says John Redwood, a veteran critic of the EU. “People used to call me an extreme Eurosceptic. Now I’m a moderate.” Truly fervent Eurosceptics seek a referendum because they want to quit the EU. Other Tories want one to spike the guns of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which campaigns for an exit.

UKIP, a once-minor party that came second to Labour in two by-elections on November 29th, takes votes from all parties but most terrifies Conservative MPs. If the party does well in the next European Parliament elections, due in 2014, the pressure on Mr Cameron will increase. He is already bending. In September the prime minister hinted that Britons might have an opportunity to give “fresh consent” to their country’s place in a looser union—a rather fuzzy suggestion that is unlikely to dampen calls for a starker question. Some Tory cabinet ministers now expect the party to include a promise of an “In-Out” referendum on Europe in its 2015 general-election manifesto. That might persuade Labour to follow suit—which is the second referendum scenario. Although the party is broadly pro-European, some Labour strategists have been urging Ed Miliband, its leader, to promise a referendum all the same, chiefly to pile pressure on Mr Cameron but also to stay on the right side of public opinion. “Whatever our position on Europe, we cannot be seen as the anti-referendum party,” a senior Labour figure says. The third scenario is already in play, thanks to the 2011 European Union Act.

Passed by the coalition, this dictates that a referendum must be held on any new EU treaty that shifts power from Westminster to Brussels. The EU is acutely aware of this obstacle, so where treaty change is envisaged, it is trying to focus it as narrowly as possible on the euro zone, of which Britain is not a member. But the EU’s creeping claim on its constituents’ sovereign powers suggests that this “referendum lock” could be activated. The next treaty change, which could take place in 2015 or 2016, will be the moment for Mr Cameron (if he is re-elected) to try to repatriate some powers from Brussels in the “new settlement” he seeks with Europe. If Britons voted to reject the revised treaty there would be redoubled pressure for a second referendum, on their membership of the European club. There is a fourth scenario: simple diplomatic miscalculation. A year ago, at a summit where they agreed on a fiscal compact, almost all other EU leaders banded together to sidestep a British veto. If that were to happen again on an issue that Britons care more deeply about, Mr Cameron may face irresistible pressure to call an early referendum.

The early signs are that Britons would opt to push off. YouGov’s latest poll on the issue suggests that 49% would vote to leave, whereas only 32% would choose to stay (the rest are unsure). One senior Tory, who wants Britain to stay in, says blankly that it would be impossible to win a referendum at the moment. The leaders of all three main parties, backed by business and trade unions, could try to woo Britons to Europe. But they would have plenty of opposition, and not just from other MPs. When Britain last voted on Europe, in 1975, every national newspaper except the Morning Star campaigned for an “In” vote. That will not be repeated. Britain’s two biggest-selling dailies, the Daily Mail and the Sun—combined circulation, 4.5m—are deeply Eurosceptic. What would make the vote unpredictable is that Britons cannot have what they really want. If offered a “detached relationship that is little more than a free-trade agreement”, according to the same YouGov poll, only 26% would still opt for the exit. The biggest group of respondents, 46%, would accept those looser terms.

But continental leaders are unwilling to grant Britain full access to the single market without the costly bits. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, says she dearly wants to keep Britain in the EU—but “as a good partner”. In the run-up to a promised referendum, Mr Cameron could win only trifling concessions. That might convince some Britons that life outside the EU would be difficult; but it might equally inflame Eurosceptic opinion and make an “out” vote more likely. Very well, alone If Britain walked away entirely—the most extreme scenario—it would quickly see some benefits. The country would no longer have to transfer funds to the EU to subsidise farm incomes or poorer regions. Treasury figures suggest it would be £8 billion ($13 billion) better off each year. Food could become cheaper. Under WTO rules, countries may slash import barriers unilaterally as long as they do not favour some countries over others. Britain could do this for agricultural produce. It would regain control over fishing rights around its coast. Some irksome regulations could be ditched, too. First to go (if the Tories are in power when Britain leaves) would be the working-time directive.

This limits how long people can be at work without a break or a holiday and caps the working week at 48 hours. The scrapping of the EU’s agency-worker directive, which gives temporary staff the same rights as regular employees, would be cheered by business, too. Britain would be free to set itself a less exacting target for green-power generation than it is bound to under the EU’s renewable-energy directive. That could mean cheaper power. London’s financial district would look to past glories. It thrived as an offshore centre for deposit-taking and loan-making in dollars long before Britain joined the EU. Outside the club, it would be freer to market itself as a freewheeling hub for emerging-market finance—a sort of Singapore on steroids. Free of the obligation to abide by ever-changing EU rules on alternative investments, hedge funds that have left London might be lured back. The burden of impending European Solvency 2 regulations on the insurance industry would become less onerous. Yet a bonfire of regulations would smoulder rather than blaze. Domestic and global commitments to greenery constrain Britain’s energy policy, for example. And EU regulations bite less hard than is commonly supposed.

Britain already has one of the most flexible labour markets in the rich world (employees can opt out of the 48-hour week). This helps to explain why the unemployment rate is as low as in America or Canada, despite a more sluggish economy. Product regulations would be harder to junk than labour laws. The British suppliers to Airbus, the Franco-German aircraft manufacturer, have to comply with exacting standards. But these exist not because of meddling by Brussels, but to ensure aircraft are safe. Similarly, a minimum standard of food safety stops a race to the bottom by competing firms. British ones would still have to observe Europe’s product regulations in order to export there. A separate set of regulations tailored for the home market would only add to red tape. That goes for the City, too. Global finance favours common standards, such as the Basel accords on bank capital. And, far from racing to the bottom, countries with large financial sectors are now as likely to create even tougher rules. The Bank of England has hinted that Basel is not strong enough. And some immediate gains would evaporate as special-interest groups redirected their attention from Brussels to Westminster. British farmers would lose £2.7 billion in EU subsidies once Britain left.

They are a noisy lobby group, and it is unlikely that the government would hang on to all that cash. The farming lobby would also try to stand in the way of lowering tariffs on food imported from beyond Europe, potentially depriving the government of a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with big emerging markets such as Brazil and India. If the benefits of leaving the single market are qualified, what of the costs? The price of exclusion is much smaller than when Britain joined in 1973. Tariff barriers across the world have been steadily lowered in trade deals brokered by GATT and its successor, the WTO. If import tariffs are weighted by the volume of trade in each product, the average faced by exporters from outside the EU into the single market has fallen to around 3%. Exporters routinely have to absorb cost increases of this size caused by a surge in the oil price or a jump in the exchange rate. Even so, the impact on industries such as food and textiles, where tariffs are much higher than the average, would be far from mild. British dairy exports would incur an import tax of 55% to reach the EU market, with tariffs on some items of more than 200%.

Cheddar cheese would face a tariff of €167 per 100kg; the mark-up on Stilton would be €141. Average tariffs on clothing would push up their price in European markets by 12%. Parts of Britain’s car industry would move out. British-based producers would face a 4% tariff on car-equipment sales to the EU, and there would be pressure to impose tariffs on components imported from it. Factories owned by carmakers with plants and supply chains in other parts of the EU would be most at risk. Vital car components might be held up by customs as they leave the continent. A cheap pound and a flexible workforce may not be enough to keep GM in Britain, for instance, even though it sells many cars there. The calculation would be slightly different for other carmakers. Only a small fraction of the 300,000 cars Jaguar Land Rover makes in Britain are destined for the EU market. A lot of Minis, made in Britain by BMW, are also sold outside Europe, where they attract an import tariff anyway. Much of what distinguishes a Jaguar from a Mercedes is that it is designed and made in Britain (as are lots of components).

There would be little benefit, but huge costs to the brand, in shifting production elsewhere. Japanese carmakers would suffer: most of their British output is sold in the EU, says John Leech of KPMG, a consultancy. But they cannot easily switch production to continental factories, and many of their supplies come from Japan. They would stick around longer than many think. Over time, though, the general drift of business investment would be away from Britain and towards the continent. That goes for finance, too. If London wants to be the regional hub for trading China’s currency, it will need to retain its position as the main centre for settling trades of cash and derivatives in euros. Some in Europe resent this: the governor of France’s central bank complained this week that euro deals should be done in euroland. Without the shield of single-market rules, London could lose out to rival EU centres. Financiers from today’s rising economic powers, in Asia and Latin America, are keener on access to a European market of 500m than on the light regulation that drew American banks to London in the 1950s and 1960s.

TheCityUK, a lobby group, studied 147 siting decisions between 2006 and 2012. It found that more than two-fifths of finance firms gave access to European markets as a core reason for choosing London. Although the single market in financial services is still a work in progress, “passporting rights” entitle investment firms, banks and insurers based in Britain to establish branches or provide services throughout the EEA. Aerospace is another industry that relies on frictionless trade with the rest of the continent. Britain has the world’s largest industry outside America, but it would lose ground to France. The high-tech bits of production, such as the making of carbon-fibre wing spars, could not speedily be replicated elsewhere. But suppliers of basic parts, such as metal brackets, would be vulnerable. Big manufacturers like Airbus prefer to keep supply chains simple. They might sponsor entry by new suppliers in the EU to avoid a customs barrier. These reallocations of fixed capital would take years or decades. By contrast, Britain and its erstwhile EU partners would have to decide quickly how people on the wrong side of newly erected barriers to the free movement of labour should be treated.

Around 2.3m people from EU countries were living in Britain in 2011, up from 1.1m in 2004; around 1.7m Britons have gone the other way. The rights of residency for such migrants would no longer be automatic. Forced repatriation would be damaging to all countries. The simplest solution would be to offer citizenship to all those resident in Britain at a particular date, in return for a similar offer to Britons living in other parts of Europe. Anticipation of such an amnesty would spur a rush to and from Britain in the run-up to its exit. As the drawbridge eventually rose, businesses would suffer. London’s growing tech cluster, as well as the City, relies heavily on the free flow of young workers from other parts of Europe. Another huge disruption would be to trade beyond Europe. Britain would swiftly have to negotiate bilateral deals with dozens of countries. The experience of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, which make up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a club of European refusers loosely linked to the EU, suggests it is usually possible to obtain similar terms to those won by EU negotiators.

The EFTA countries tend to rush in behind the EU, though in some cases—South Korea, for example—they go first. But the bigger club can win slightly better terms. “The EU is more powerful than we are,” says Didier Chambovey of Switzerland’s state secretariat for foreign affairs. A deal with Britain would be top of few countries’ priorities. Britain would have less diplomatic and military clout, too. For the Americans, a Britain that is disengaged from the rest of Europe would be a much less useful and influential ally. For NATO, a Britain that is semi-detached from Europe would weaken the ties that bind the continent and its defence to the United States at a time when those ties are already under strain because of slashed defence budgets and America’s strategic “rebalancing” towards Asia. Another likely casualty would be the budding Anglo-French defence treaty, seen by both countries as a way to help themselves continue to punch above their weight. Viking spirit, or Swiss rules? Although a complete exit from Europe is certainly possible, few British Eurosceptics want it. They view the common market as a pearl surrounded by a dismal encrustation of European bureaucracy and regulation.

What they would really like to do is pull back until Britain’s relationship with Europe becomes one based on free trade, with the minimum necessary regulation. In effect, they want to create the kind of Europe that British Conservatives fought to join in the 1970s. Once it became clear that Britain was falling out of the EU, they could grab at two halfway options: a Norwegian one and a Swiss one. Together with Iceland and Liechtenstein, oil-rich Norway is about as close to the EU as it is possible to be without actually becoming a member. It simply belongs to the EEA. The EU is broadly happy with the arrangement, partly because Norway pays into its coffers (indeed, it pays slightly more per head than Britain). A similar arrangement might well be obtained. Many businesses would hardly notice the difference. But a few would suffer minor irritation. Although EEA countries are part of the single market, businesses must complete customs and VAT forms when goods are shipped into and out of the EU. For big companies serving big customers, this is no problem. For smaller ones it can be a nuisance.

Moods of Norway, an echt-Norwegian fashion company (its logo is a tractor), has solved the problem by setting up a small subsidiary in Sweden, which is a member of the EU. The subsidiary handles customs clearance for the European boutiques that carry Moods of Norway’s clothes. Small, export-oriented British businesses would end up doing the same. If Britain were to join the Norwegian club, though, it would remain bound by virtually all EU regulations, including the working-time directive and almost everything dreamed up in Brussels in future. Once out of the EU, the country would have little say in the regulations and laws that would continue to bind its industry. It would be consulted by the European Commission but would have no voice in the increasingly powerful European Parliament, and no vote. In Euro-jargon, it would be a decision-shaper, but not a decision-maker. Officials and lobbyists would frequently be unaware of discussions about legislation that could affect British industry, except at second hand, through officials in a friendly nation. “We take our Scandinavian colleagues out to lunch and ask them what happened,” explains Petter Brubakk of NHO, Norway’s main business lobby.

It would depend on other countries to fight its corner, as Norway now relies on Britain to resist proposed EU legislation on offshore oil-drilling. It would be as though Britain maintained a golden fax machine linked to Brussels, which cost billions of pounds a year to run and from which regulations issued ceaselessly. It could ignore the faxes about farming and fishing: members of the EEA are allowed to run their own agriculture policies. But it would have to obey the others. The Norwegian option could well fail for domestic reasons. As soon as British MPs learn that Norway has to swallow almost every regulation that comes out of Brussels, despite having virtually no power to shape them, they will waver. When they also learn that Norway has to pay for the privilege, they may reject it outright. Britain might, however, seek a more distant relationship. It could steer clear of the EEA but join EFTA, which it helped to set up in 1960. Optimistically, it could come to look rather like Switzerland. Switzerland does business with EU countries through bilateral deals, and by routinely aligning its regulations with those made in Brussels. To an extent, it can pick and choose. In the same position, Britain could drop some irksome labour rules.

It could also move to co-operate more, and trade more freely, in some areas than in others. Switzerland has a comprehensive bilateral agreement with the EU covering trade in goods, but no equivalent agreement for financial services. Switzerland has got into the occasional trade dispute with the EU, over Gruyère cheese for example. Still, for the most part it has secured good access to European markets so far. Its firms have subsidiaries in EU countries through which they can trade freely. And non-membership of the EEA means Switzerland has remained partly aloof from financial regulations emanating from Brussels. But the Swiss have come up with their own, often extremely stringent, financial regulations, partly in fear of losing access to EU customers. And the country is not beyond the reach of Brussels. The Swiss are currently exercised over several European directives, including those covering finance, chemical factories and the movement of labour. Switzerland is hampered by the lack of an accord with the EU on financial services and by its lack of representation in Brussels. In the broader fight against protectionism and financial over-regulation in Europe, it relies on an informal alliance with another country that also has a big financial-services industry, as well as a valuable seat at the negotiating table: Britain.

In any case, it is unlikely that Britain could get similar treatment. The EU is already trying to muscle Switzerland out of its special niche and into an arrangement more like Norway’s, where EU legislation would be speedily taken up by the country. Relations have become more fraught since the EU expanded eastward. The EU used to be a club of Western nations which share a broad culture with Switzerland (many share a border with it, too) and tolerated its peculiarities. The club is now bigger and more bureaucratic, and includes east European countries which were forced to swallow much unpalatable stuff as the price of entry to the club. There is little chance that Britain, a far bigger country with a history of being difficult, would be allowed to squeeze in alongside Switzerland. And don’t come back No country has ever left the European Union (though Greenland, an autonomous dependency of Denmark’s, voted to leave in 1982). The halfway options of Norway and Switzerland were offered largely in hopes of tempting both to become full members one day. Britain would be travelling in the opposite direction, without a map. In this, as in so many other ways, leaving the EU would be a colossal gamble.

The British would doubtless try to negotiate a special deal with their former partners, using the argument that trade benefits both sides and that Britain is itself a large market for many. But the process could take many years (it took a decade for the much smaller Switzerland). Europe might well be more of a fortress with Britain outside. And even the country’s closest friends, who would rather keep Britain in to bolster liberal voices inside the EU, would be unlikely to be generous to a country that had chosen to leave. The most likely outcome would be that Britain would find itself as a scratchy outsider with somewhat limited access to the single market, almost no influence and few friends. And one certainty: that having once departed, it would be all but impossible to get back in again. Ireland: From Rapid Immigration to Recession | migrationpolicy.org Ireland: From Rapid Immigration to Recession You are here Ireland: From Rapid Immigration to Recession September 1, 2009 Profile By Martin Ruhs, Emma Quinn Ireland's economic boom during the 1990s brought unprecedented levels of prosperity and helped transform it into a "country of net immigration" by the early 2000s.

For the first time in its history, Ireland experienced a significant inflow of migrants — both workers and asylum seekers — from outside the European Union. Consequently, Ireland had to develop policies in a very short period of time. Three policy areas stand out. First, to slow a rising number of asylum applications, the government created a list of safe countries of origin and began prioritizing applications accordingly. Second, over the period 2003 to 2005, Ireland's citizenship laws were fundamentally changed to eliminate an Irish-born child's automatic right to citizenship when the parents are not Irish nationals. Third, with regard to labor immigration, Ireland moved away from its more liberal work permit system as it sought to meet most of its low-skilled labor needs from within the enlarged European Union. The key decision: Ireland, along with the United Kingdom and Sweden, agreed to allow citizens from the 10 countries that joined the European Union in May 2004 to work in the country immediately. This contributed to an acceleration in EU immigration flows, a large proportion of which came from Poland. Many nationals from new EU Member States have filled lower-skilled jobs than appropriate for their level of education.

More recently, Ireland instituted stricter policies that favor highly skilled immigrants from outside the European Union. Now, in the context of an economic recession, Ireland is facing a new set of policy issues with reduced but still high immigration rates and a substantial population of legal foreign residents. These issues include rising unemployment rates among immigrants and Irish nationals, and stress on the social welfare system. Background The recent history of Irish migration can be characterized as having had five phases (dates are approximate): Generally net emigration prior to the early 1990s. Increasing immigration from the mid-1990s to early 2000s, driven by returning Irish nationals. There were also dramatic increases in the number of asylum applicants. New peaks in non-EU immigration flows and in numbers of asylum applications from 2001 to 2004. A shift from non-EU immigration flows to EU flows after EU enlargement (2004 to 2007). The high levels of immigration from the new EU Member States brought immigration to unprecedented levels. Reduced but still significant net immigration in 2007-2009, the fall largely resulting from decreased flows from new EU Member States.

Irish Immigration Policy Irish immigration policy is unusual within Europe in that it is strongly influenced by the Common Travel Area shared with the United Kingdom. Unlike the other 25 EU Member States, Ireland and the United Kingdom are not "Schengen states" and have chosen instead to maintain border controls with the rest of the European Union. Only Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark may opt out of EU legal instruments on immigration and asylum. Ireland's long history as a country of significant emigration is well known and documented. Between 1871 and 1961, the average annual net emigration from Ireland consistently exceeded the natural increase in the Irish population, which shrank from about 4.4 million in 1861 to 2.8 million in 1961. Caused primarily by Ireland's lagging economic development, net emigration was particularly high in the "age of mass migration" (1871 to 1926) and in the post-World War II era (1951 to 1961). Traditional destinations included the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia.

With the exception of the 1970s, when, for the first time in Irish history, net migration to Ireland was positive, outflows continued to exceed inflows until the early 1990s. In 1996, Ireland reached its migration "turning point," making it the last EU Member State to become a country of net immigration. The main reason: rapid economic growth created an unprecedented demand for labor across a wide range of sectors, including construction, financial, information technology, and health care. Unemployment declined from 15.9 percent in 1993 to a historic low of 3.6 percent in 2001. Comparing Ireland to other EU countries underlines its rapid changes. From 1990 to 1994, Ireland was the only Member State with a negative net migration rate (number of migrants per 1,000 inhabitants) according to the EU statistical agency Eurostat. By 2007, Ireland had the third highest migration rate across the 27 EU Member States — 14.5 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants — surpassed only by Spain and Cyprus.

Total emigration flows (including Irish and non-Irish nationals) have remained significant with an annual average of about 27,300 from 2000 to 2005. Since 2006, emigration flows have increased to levels similar to the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Ireland experienced dramatic increases in immigration flows (which include returning Irish citizens) from the mid-1990s but most markedly after the 2004 EU enlargement. Flows peaked in 2006-2007 at well over 100,000 immigrants per year before dropping off in 2008 (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration in Ireland, 1987 to 2008 Note: Immigrants are defined as individuals who are usual residents of Ireland who did not usually live in the country on April 30 of the previous year. Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Dublin.

Although the number of Irish return migrants increased almost continuously between 1987 and 2002 (peaking at 27,000 in 2002), their relative share in total immigration fell from about 65 percent in the late 1980s to 44 percent from 2000 to 2002 (see Figure 2). Between 2003 and 2005, the share fell again to 27 percent, and between 2006 and 2008, Irish immigrants made up only 18 percent of the inflow. From 2003 to 2008, the absolute number of Irish return migrants remained steady. As the share of returning Irish migrants fell, non-EU migrants came to dominate the flows between 2001 and 2004. These immigrants constituted more than half of all non-Irish immigrants arriving in Ireland between 2001 and 2004, up from one-third from 1992 to 1995.

Since the accession of 10 new EU Member States in 2004, EU nationals have not only dominated migratory inflows, they have helped push flows to new heights. Between 2005 and 2008, an average of 44 percent of the immigration flow and 54 percent of the non-Irish immigration flow was made up of nationals of the 10 EU states that acceded in 2004, together with Romania and Bulgaria, which acceded in 2007. Figure 2. Immigration Flow by Nationality, 1999 to 2008 Note: The 12 Member States that have joined since 2004 were included in the “rest of world” category prior to 2005. Source: CSO, Cork.

Among the various categories of non-EU nationals coming to Ireland in the last decade, the great majority have been workers (about 280,000 work permits were issued during from 1998 to 2008), followed by asylum seekers (74,000 applications made from1998 to 2008), and students and dependents. Time-series data are not available for these latter groups, but the foreign student population has grown rapidly in recent years. During 2008, just under 45,000 immigration (registration) stamps were issued to students from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Lichtenstein in addition to EU Member States. This figure represents a 13 percent increase in stamps issued to students in 2007 and a 49 percent increase on the number issued in 2005. (Non-EEA nationals present in the country must register periodically with the Gardai (Irish police). These data do not include multiple registrations in the same 12-month period and so present a stock figure of non-EEA nationals).

Labor force survey data indicate that the vast majority of EU nationals who moved to Ireland in recent years came to work. In the third quarter of 2008, 57 percent of Irish national adults were employed, compared to an average employment rate of 66 percent among non-Irish nationals and 76 percent among nationals of the Member States that joined in 2004 (also known as the EU-10). EU-10 workers, who do not need work permits, tend to be concentrated in lower-skilled sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, other production industries, construction, and wholesale and retail trade. Data on the Foreign-Born Population The increase and change in the composition of migration to Ireland has obviously had a significant impact on the country's population. The share of foreign-born persons living in Ireland rose from 6 percent in 1991 to over 10 percent in 2002 and almost 15 percent in 2006 (including 1.2 percent born in Northern Ireland).

In 2002, the first year when the Census of the Population included a question on nationality, 5.8 percent of the total population usually resident in Ireland had non-Irish nationality (see Table 1). That share increased to 10.1 percent in 2006 (in Dublin, over 15 percent of residents were non-Irish nationals). At the same time, the percentage of those with Irish nationality fell from 92.9 percent in 2002 to 88.8 percent in 2006. The most significant increase was seen in the EU nationality category, whose share rose from 3.5 percent in 2002 to 6.6 percent in 2006. Most of these EU nationals came from the EU-10: 120,500 people or almost 3 percent of the population counted in the 2006 census. Table 1.

Persons Usually Resident and Present in Ireland by Nationality, 2002 and 2006 4,172,013 100 Notes: *2006 data include EU-10 countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). **Excludes "no nationality" and "not stated". EU-15 (excluding United Kingdom and Ireland) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Source: Census 2002 and Census 2006. Central Statistics Office. Asylum Flows and Policies The number of persons seeking asylum in Ireland increased dramatically from only 362 in 1994 to a peak of 11,634 in 2002, before falling off in 2003 and down to approximately 3,900 in 2008 (see Figure 3).

Most asylum seekers have come from Nigeria and Romania although the number of applications from Romanian nationals has fallen off since the country joined the European Union in 2007 as Ireland does not accept asylum applications from nationals of other EU Member States. In 2008, 26.1 percent of applications came from Nigerian nationals, 6.1 percent from Pakistani nationals, 5.3 percent from Iraqi nationals, and 4.7 percent from both Georgian and Chinese nationals. The remaining 56 percent of applications include a diverse range of nationalities. Between 1992 and 2008, 9,574 non-EU nationals received refugee status. In 2007, the overall refugee recognition rate of asylum applicants at first and appeal stage was 10 percent. Figure 3. Applications for Asylum in Ireland, 1994 to 2008 Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, Dublin. The increase in asylum applications in the early 2000s necessitated an urgent policy response as the government simply did not have the infrastructure for processing large numbers of applications.

The Refugee Act 1996, which was commenced in 2000, established the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) as a statutorily independent body that considers asylum applications at first instance. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal was also established under this act and hears appeals of negative asylum decisions. In 2003, the Irish parliament passed a bill making carriers liable for transporting unauthorized migrants. Also that year, Ireland implemented the "safe country of origin" concept whereby applicants from such countries were presumed to not be in need of refugee protection unless shown otherwise. In 2005, the government introduced new arrangements for processing prioritized applications from "safe countries of origin" and other countries. The measures applied mainly to nationals of Nigeria, Croatia, and South Africa. These domestic policies likely contributed to the downward trend in applications since 2003. The decrease was also part of a larger drop in asylum applications lodged in industrialized countries that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported between 2004 and 2006. Asylum seekers do not have the right to work in Ireland while the government is reviewing their applications.

If, however, their applications are successful and they are officially recognized as refugees, they acquire full employment and social rights and can eventually naturalize. Citizenship Policy Ireland used to grant citizenship to anybody born in Ireland (the jus soli principle). The non-Irish parents of Irish-born children could then apply for residency in Ireland based on the Irish citizenship of their child. This led to concerns that non-Irish nationals, particularly asylum applicants, were travelling to Ireland and having children in order to gain that status. Prior to January 2003, about 11,000 families with Irish-born children lawfully applied for residency. After a referendum in 2004 and a subsequent constitutional amendment, citizenship laws changed so that any person born in Ireland after January 1, 2005, to non-Irish parents is not automatically entitled to Irish citizenship unless one of the parents was lawfully resident in Ireland for at least three out of the four years preceding the child's birth (periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant or student are not considered).

In January 2005, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform invited non-Irish national parents of Irish-born children who had had their claims suspended in 2003 to apply to remain under the Irish Born Child 2005 Scheme (IBC/05). Under this scheme, the non-Irish parents of Irish-born children can be granted permission to remain in the country for two years after which they can apply for a renewal of permission. Applicants successful under the renewal process have had their leave to remain renewed for up to three years; at that point, those qualifying are eligible to apply for full citizenship. Almost 18,000 applications were submitted under the scheme, and of these, almost 16,700 were approved. During 2007, the government made arrangements to process applications for renewal; 14,117 renewals had been granted by the end of 2008. Labor Immigration and Policies Pre-EU Enlargement 2004 As a member of the European Union, Ireland's labor immigration policies have made and continue to make an important distinction between persons from within and outside the European Economic Area.

EEA nationals enjoy the unrestricted right to migrate and take up employment in Ireland. This means their numbers and selection — by skill level and nationality, for example — cannot be directly influenced by Ireland's immigration policies. Until April 2003, Ireland's employment permit policies were almost entirely employer led. As long as Irish employers were prepared to go through the work permit system's administrative procedure — which mandated proof that "every effort has been made" to recruit an EEA national before making a work permit application — they could legally recruit as many non-EEA workers as they wished, from any country, and to employ them in any job, regardless of the skill level required. As a result, the total number of work permits issued to non-EEA nationals rose dramatically from 6,262 in 1999 to 47,551 in 2003, an increase of more than 650 percent (see Figure 4). Most of these permits were issued in low-skilled occupations in sectors such as catering, other services, and agriculture. Figure 4.

Total Work Permits Issued, 1998 to 2008 Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Dublin. The Employment Permits Bill 2003 granted workers from the 10 EU accession countries free access to the Irish labor market upon EU enlargement on May 1, 2004. This bill marked a shift in government policy, namely to source all but the highly skilled and/or scarce labor from EEA countries. The government felt that its liberal policy toward workers from the EU-10 required a more managed approach to non-EEA migrant workers. Consequently, in 2003, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and the state training authority (FÁS) published a list of occupational categories that became ineligible for work permits (these included clerical and administrative, general laborers and builders, operator and production staff, sales staff, and child-care workers), and employers were encouraged to give preference to EU-10 workers. The number of new work permits issued dropped dramatically between 2003 and 2004 in anticipation of EU enlargement and went as low as 8,166 after enlargement in 2005.

Since enlargement, the number of work permits issued to Indian nationals has jumped; nationals of the Philippines had the most work permits after Indians in 2007 (see Table 2). The majority of work permits post-2004 have been for jobs in the services sector, and within this sector, mainly catering and medical/nursing; the number of permits for agriculture has decreased (see Table 3). Table 2. Work Permits Issued and Renewed by Nationality, 1998 to 2007 Country or region 24,854 23,604 Notes: 1. The EU-10 comprise Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. From May 2005, numbers of permit holders from the EU-10 states refer to aliens who are registered in , but not citizens of, those states. 2. Other Eastern Europe comprises Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia (FYR). Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment website. Table from Philip J.

O'Connell, "International Migration and Ireland, 2007" (OECD Continuous Reporting System On Migration (SOPEMI), forthcoming). Table 3. Work Permits Issued and Renewed by Sector, 1998 to 2007 Sector 24,854 23,604 Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment website. Table from O'Connell, "International Migration and Ireland, 2007." Until January 2007, when the law changed (see below), an Irish employer could apply for a work permit or a work visa/authorization for a non-EEA worker. There were no limits on the number of either type that could be issued each year. Among the differences between the two: work permits were for low-skilled and/or low-wage occupations while work authorizations/visas were for higher-skilled workers in sectors such as information and computing technologies, construction, and a broad range of medical, health, and social-care professions.

Also, work authorizations/visas were fast tracked and the holder had preentry visa clearance and could apply for family reunification immediately rather than after three years, as in the case of a work permit holder. EU Enlargement 2004 and 2007: Impact on Labor Immigration and Policy The 2004 EU enlargement of the EU marked the start of unprecedented immigration to Ireland due in part to Ireland's booming economy. In addition, Ireland was one of only three countries (along with the United Kingdom and Sweden) of the 15 Member States that granted accession-state nationals unrestricted access to its labor market immediately upon EU enlargement. Accession essentially legalized those new Member State nationals already in the country. However, Ireland, like the United Kingdom, chose to restrict access to social welfare benefits, requiring two years of residency for eligibility. The Irish Department of Social and Family Affairs issues Personal Public Service (PPS) numbers, which are necessary for employment. In the 12 months following enlargement, the department issued about 80,000 PPS numbers to people from the 10 new Member States.

Nationals from the new Member States, most significantly from Poland, dominated the flows, comprising over 40 percent of immigrants, from 2005 to 2007, according to the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Recent CSO analysis of PPS numbers and revenue data indicates a very high drop-off rate for employment of foreign nationals between 2004 and 2007. Of the 118,000 foreign nationals age 15 and over assigned PPS numbers in 2004, only 45 percent of these had insurable employment in Ireland at any time during 2007. Of the 58,100 EU-10 nationals who entered the system in 2004, 59 percent had some employment in 2007. It appears that EU-10 nationals tend to stay longer in Ireland than foreign nationals in general.

Analysis of labor force survey data from 2000 to 2005 by researchers Emma Quinn and Philip O'Connell suggests postenlargement policies have indeed resulted in non-EEA nationals more or less maintaining their representation among highly skilled workers, with EU-10 nationals filling skilled and low-skilled positions. In 2003, 3.5 percent of workers employed in semi- and unskilled occupations were EU nationals; by 2005, this proportion had increased to 6.3 percent. In January 2007, Ireland instituted the Employment Permits Act 2006, a new employment permits system. This system was designed to further reduce the number of work permits issued while increasing Ireland's attractiveness to highly skilled non-EEA workers. The three main elements to the scheme: A type of green card (permanent residency) for a) any position with an annual salary of 60,000 euros or more in any sector, or b) a position in an occupation where skill shortages have been identified with an annual salary range from 30,000 to 59,999 euros.

A work permit scheme for a very restricted list of occupations, with an annual salary up to 30,000 euros, where the shortage is one of labor rather than skills. An intracompany transfer scheme for temporary transnational management transfers. It is significant that Ireland chose to maintain a work-permit requirement for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals after those countries joined the European Union in January 2007. The minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment attributed this decision to the need to focus on maintaining stability in the Irish labor market, and avoiding the potential imbalances additional migratory inflows could cause in the context of an economic downturn. Since the Employment Permits Act 2006 came into effect, the number of new work permits has held steady although renewals dropped in 2008, possibly due to the recession. In 2008, the overall immigration rate slowed in response to economic contraction. Of the 83,800 people who migrated to Ireland between April 2007 and April 2008, 33,700 were EU-12 nationals (those from the EU-10 plus nationals of Bulgaria and Romania) — about 40 percent of the total.

In contrast, the EU-12 made up 46 percent of all immigration flows in 2006 and 48 percent in 2007. Ireland further tightened the work permit system in June 2009 due to the country's recession. No new work permits will be issued for jobs with a salary of under 30,000 euros. Also, the required period for advertising a job within the European Economic Area has been lengthened, and spouses and dependents of work permit holders are no longer permitted to work unless they obtain their own work permits. Illegal Immigration and Illegal Working Given its geography, the level of illegal immigration in Ireland is likely to be fairly low. Unlike the United States, for example, Ireland does not have any land borders with migrant-sending countries. Illegal entry into Ireland is probably easiest via Northern Ireland, which may be easily accessed from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, because of the Common Travel Area agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom, there are no passport controls for Irish and UK citizens traveling between the two countries. Illegal working of non-EEA nationals — which may follow legal or illegal immigration — is likely to be more pervasive.

For example, some foreign workers may not leave Ireland after their employment permits expire, or they overstay a tourist visa. Similarly, some non-EEA students may choose to work more than the legally allowed 20 hours per week. There are no estimates for the number of non-EEA nationals living and/or working illegally in Ireland. Concerns that some English "language schools" were effectively selling visas to non-EEA nationals wishing to work in Ireland (without going through the work permit system) led to attempts to regulate the system in 2004. Since then, only students pursuing courses that last at least one year and lead to a "recognized qualification" as approved by the Department of Education and Science may enter the Irish labor market. In the June 2006 Social Partnership Agreement Towards 2016, which lays out broad societal goals for government and partners including trade unions, businesses, and farming organizations, it was agreed that non-EU students should be subject to a work permit application before they access the Irish labor market. This provision has yet to be formally introduced. In recent years, Ireland has passed a number of laws aimed at combating illegal immigration.

Together, these laws provide a legal basis for deporting nonnationals in violation of Ireland's immigration laws, ban the smuggling of illegal immigrants and the carrying of a passenger who does not have proper immigration documents, and financially penalize or imprison employers and workers who do not comply with the Employment Permits Act 2003. Trafficking of women, men, and children for prostitution and forced labor, mainly from Eastern Europe, Nigeria, and Asia, remains a problem. In 2008, Ireland stepped up its prevention measures and enacted the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, its first piece of anti-trafficking legislation. Although no one was prosecuted in 2008, the government investigated 96 alleged offenses, according to the U.S. Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report 2009. Exploitation of migrant workers is an ongoing concern. Non-EEA migrant workers are particularly vulnerable. The government established the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA) in 2007 as promised in Towards 2016. NERA is tasked with maintaining employment rights and labor standards throughout the labor market, with a particular concern for the rights of migrant workers.

The Employment Permits Act 2006 contributed to improving migrants' rights. For example, employment permits, which state certain rights and entitlements of the worker concerned, must be granted to the employee and not the employer. The act also prohibits employers from retaining an employee's passport or other personal documents. Data from mid-2008 indicate that there have been 47 convictions of employers under the Employment Permits Act 2003 and no convictions under the 2006 Employment Permits Act. Another measure designed to curb illegal immigration and illegal working has been to increase the number of deportations, which rose from 188 in 2000 to 599 in 2004. Although only 135 people were deported in 2007, this number represents 32 percent of the orders signed that year, compared to an average of 20 percent in the preceding three years. To facilitate repatriation, Ireland signed return agreements with Nigeria, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria (only the one with Nigeria is still relevant), and has also engaged the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to operate voluntary assisted return programs on its behalf.

In 2008, 454 people were returned on such IOM programs. The lack of hard data or any systematic evidence makes it difficult to assess the extent to which Ireland's current immigration and employment laws are actually enforced. However, recent policy measures suggest the government is expanding its efforts to combat illegal immigration. Current and Emerging Policy Issues Due to the dramatic increase in asylum applications in the early 2000s, the government prioritized the development of asylum systems, often at the expense of immigration systems, which evolved in an ad hoc manner and were based on administrative codes rather than legislation. Ireland is currently poised to overhaul its immigration and asylum systems through the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008. If and when this bill goes into effect, it would do the following: Collate many existing and disparate measures. It would repeal, inter alia, the Immigration Acts of 1999, 2003 and 2004, the Refugee Act 1996, and Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, which deals with judicial review. Introduce policy where none existed before.

For example, for the first time in domestic legislation, the phrase "foreign nationals" would refer only to those who are from outside the European Union. It would also introduce the first statutory basis for the issuing and revoking of visa applications. Significantly reform parts of the existing systems, particularly in the asylum field by introducing a procedure where all protection claims, including claims for both asylum and subsidiary protection, would be examined under a single procedure and at first instance. The bill also proposes a long-term residence status, the first such system to be statutorily based in Ireland. This status was designed to increase Ireland's attractiveness to highly skilled non-EEA workers. The government has also begun addressing immigrant integration. The Junior Ministry for Integration was created in 2007. In addition to developing and coordinating integration policy across government departments, the ministry is tasked with promoting the integration of legal immigrants into Irish society, establishing new structures for this purpose, and managing refugee resettlement.

The ministry's efforts to date have included education, including English-language support and instruction (in the 2007-2008 school year, about 10 percent of primary-school students were newcomers); integration in the workplace, with attention to unemployment and racism and discrimination; and support of local integration initiatives. Certainly, Ireland intends to take a proactive approach to integration. It it worth noting that in May 2008 the integration minister's office published a statement on integration strategy in which it suggested that it could essentially learn from and avoid the integration mistakes of other European countries. Some have called Ireland a leader in integration for allowing non-Irish nationals to vote in local elections and for its strong antidiscrimination laws. Ireland also received international attention following the June 2007 election of Nigerian immigrant Rotimi Adebari as mayor of Portlaoise, a small city outside Dublin. In order for Ireland to benefit fully from the enlarged pool of workers with free access to the Irish labor market, it is important that migrants' skills match their labor market attainment.

Economists Alan Barrett, David Duffy, and Adele Bergin have shown that Ireland's immigrants are generally a highly educated group (meaning they have a postsecondary degree) but that not all immigrants are employed in occupations that fully reflect these high education levels. Immigrants have also been shown to earn less than their Irish counterparts. EU-10 migrants tend to have the lowest occupational attainment. One possible explanation for inequity in labor market experience is discrimination. Research by O'Connell and sociologist Frances McGinnity has shown that non-Irish nationals are three times more likely to report experiencing discrimination while looking for work than Irish nationals. Furthermore, a recent field experiment study by McGinnity et al. has shown that employers are twice as likely to invite a candidate with an Irish name to interview as an equivalent candidate with a distinctively non-Irish name. International experience suggests that such problems may worsen as competition for jobs increases. It remains to be seen how migration trends will change in light of the severe economic downturn now underway. Between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, the number of people unemployed in Ireland increased 104 percent according to the Quarterly National Household Survey.

The overall unemployment rate stood at 10.2 percent as of the first quarter of 2009 and is expected to continue to rise steeply by the end of 2009. So far, the recession has hit non-Irish nationals harder: their unemployment was 14.7 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 9.4 percent for Irish nationals. The same quarterly report showed that non-Irish nationals made up 15.6 percent of the labor force (those between ages 17 and 65). The sectors experiencing the most significant job losses, including construction, wholesale, and retail trade and industry, are those where migrants tend to work. The number of unemployed continues to grow, representing an increasing burden on the state. Even given the habitual residency condition on social welfare, the number of non-Irish unemployed workers entitled to support is substantial. According to CSO, which tracks claims for unemployment and other employment-related government assistance, non-Irish nationals made up 18.5 percent of all persons (80,786 of 435,735) on the Live Register in July 2009.

Of those non-Irish nationals, over half were from EU-12 countries. The difficult economic conditions could result in migrants returning to their countries of origin in large numbers, as EU-10 nationals have the ability to legally return and take up work once conditions improve. Sufficient data to test this hypothesis are not yet available. If international economic conditions improve, large-scale Irish emigration could resume. There are some indications this may happen: emigration rates overall rose 25 percent between 2006 and 2008. However, net migration remains strongly positive. Relevant references Barrett, A., A. Bergin, and D. Duffy. 2006. "The Labour Market Characteristics and Labour Market Impacts of Immigrants in Ireland". The Economic and Social Review 37: 1-26. Available online . Barrett, A. and D. Duffy. 2008. Are Ireland's Immigrants Integrating into its Labour Market? International Migration Review 42 (3). Available online . Central Statistics Office. Various years. Population and Migration Estimates. Dublin. ———. Quarterly National Household Survey. Dublin. ———. 2009.

Foreign Nationals: PPSN Allocations and Employment, 2007. Dublin. ———. 2009. Live Register Additional Tables: July 2009. Released August 11, 2009. Available online . Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. 2004. Elements Guide, accessed on 12 August 2004. ———. 2004a. Annual Report 2003. Dublin. Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. 2003. Annual Report 2002. Dublin. EUROSTAT. 2008. Population in Europe 2007: first results. Available online . Immigrant Council of Ireland. 2003. Handbook on Immigrants' Rights and Entitlements in Ireland. Dublin. Available online . ———. 2003a. Labour Migration Into Ireland. Dublin. Available online . Government of Ireland, Department of the Taoiseach. 2006. Towards 2016: Ten-Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement 2006-2015. Dublin: Stationery Office. Available online .

Government of Ireland, Office of the Minister for Integration. 2008. Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management. Dublin: OMI. Available online . Joyce, C. 2008. Annual Policy Report on Migration and Asylum 2007: Ireland. ESRI: Dublin. Available online . McGinnity, F., J. Nelson, P. Lunn, and E. Quinn. 2009. Discrimination in Recruitment: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Equality Authority/ESRI: Dublin. Available online . O'Connell, Philip J. Forthcoming. Recent Changes in Migration Movements and Policies: Ireland, 2007. Report to OECD Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI). ESRI: Dublin. O'Connell, Philip J. and N. Doyle. 2006. Recent Changes in Migration Movements and Policies: Ireland, 2006. Report to OECD Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI). ESRI: Dublin. O'Connell, Philip J. and Frances McGinnity. 2008. Immigrants at Work: Nationality and Ethnicity in the Irish Labour Market.

Equality Authority/ESRI: Dublin. Available online . Quinn, Emma. 2009. The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in Ireland. ESRI: Dublin. Available online . Quinn, Emma and Philip J. O'Connell. 2007. Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third Country Highly-Skilled Workers in Ireland 2006. ESRI: Dublin. Available online . Quinn, Emma, J. Stanley, C. Joyce, and Philip J. O'Connell. 2008. Handbook on Immigration and Asylum in Ireland 2007. ESRI: Dublin. Available online . Ruhs, Martin. 2003. Emerging Trends and Patterns in the Immigration and Employment of Non-EU Nationals in Ireland: What the Data Reveal. Policy Institute Working Paper No. 6, The Policy Institute, Trinity College Dublin. ———. 2003a. How welcoming does Ireland want to be? Opinion editorial published in The Irish Times, December 24, 2003. ———. 2004. Employment laws must be enforced.

Opinion editorial published in The Irish Times, April 28, 2004. Seaver, Michael. 2007. Ireland steps up as immigration leader. The Christian Science Monitor, September 5, 2007. Available online . U.S. Department of State. 2009. Trafficking in Persons Report 2009. Washington, DC: Department of State. Available online . IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS ARTICLE, CONTACT US AT Source@MigrationPolicy.org

Question: Two other countries joined the 'Common Market' at the same time as the UK, Ireland and who?
Answer: DENMARK