Treaty of Tlatelolco Treaty of Tlatelolco What is it? Latin American nations drafted the treaty on February 14, 1967 in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, and it went into force on April 22, 1968. Since then all thirty-three nations in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed it and only Cuba has not ratified it. 1 The document establishes Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Each country signing the treaty promises, as stated in Article 1, to outlaw within their territority "the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons" and "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons." Protocol I of the treaty obligates states with territories in Latin America (France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to keep the region a NWFZ. The four nations have signed the treaty.

Protocol II obligates nuclear-weapon states (NWS) not to undertake any action that would violate the nuclear-weapon free status of the region, including using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against any of the states participating in the treaty. The People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now the Russian Federation), France, the United Kingdom, and the United States had ratified Protocol II. 2 Verification Measures in the Treaty The Treaty created the Organization of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), a regional organization that ensures that all contracting parties are abiding by the treaty. The organization of OPANAL is similar to the organization of the United Nations. There is a General Conference that convenes every two years and at special sessions, that are called if necessary. Among other duties, it establishes "procedures to ensure the adherence to the Control System established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco," creates accords with governments and international agencies, and elects the Council and the General Secretary to four-year terms. The Council of OPANAL is composed of five member states that meet every two months, and at special sessions if necessary.

Among other duties, the Council, through the General Secretary, "oversee[s] the Control System to ensure its proper function according to the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions adopted by the General Conference" and presents reports to the Conference. 3 Articles 12-18: The Control System 12: The purposes of the Control System are to ensure that facilities that are meant for the peaceful of nuclear energy are not used to create nuclear weapons and that no activities are present in the zone that violate Article 1 of the treaty. 13: Each party must enter into multi-lateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 14: Each party will submit semi-annual reports to the IAEA and OPANAL that state that no activities forbidden by the treaty are taking place within its borders. 15: With the permission of the Council, the General Secretary may ask any party to submit additional information relating to security measures in the treaty. If so asked, each party should comply with the request. 16: The IAEA has the power to carry out special inspections in accordance agreements reached in article 13. The Council may carry out special inspections if it suspects a violation of the treaty.

Each Party must allow the inspectors full access to any area and/or information that relates to the inspection. The General Secretary will transmit reports on the special inspection to all Parties of the Treaty and the Secretary-General of the UN, who will then share the information with the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Council of the OAS. 17: The Parties have a right to nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 18: The Parties have a right to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, but they must notify OPANAL and the IAEA beforehand. Also, the General Secretary and any personnel the Council and the IAEA authorize are allowed to observe the explosion. Articles 19-20: Information relating to the Control System 19: With the permission of the General Conference,OPANAL may enter into agreements with the IAEA with regards to verification of the Treaty. OPANAL may also enter into agreements with other international organizations. 20: If the General Conference believes that a Party is not complying with the Treaty, it will inform the Party of its opinion and make recommendations.

If the Conference feels that international peace is being threatened, it will report so to the Secretary-General of the UN, who in turn will inform the Security Council and the General Assembly. 4 Notes The treaty of Tlatelolco is a very significant document. Besides being the first treaty to forbid nuclear weapons over a populated region (unlike the Antarctic Treaty), the Treaty of Tlatelolco is also significant for its pioneering verification measures. It is the first treaty to include challenge on-site inspections for verification. 5 The Treaty also served as a base for other disarmament treaties: the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Bangkok, and the Treaty of Pelindaba.

6 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs February 14, 1967 Signed at Mexico City February 14, 1967 Entered into force April 22, 1968 [ Full text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco ] Narrative The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Besides the agreement among the Latin American countries themselves, there are two Additional Protocols dealing with matters that concern non-Latin American countries. Protocol I involves an undertaking by non-Latin American countries that have territories in the nuclear-free zone. Protocol II involves an undertaking by those powers which possess nuclear weapons. The United States is a party to both protocols.

The United States has favored the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where, inter alia, they would limit the spread of nuclear weapons; they would not disturb existing security arrangements; provisions exist for adequate verification; the initiative for such zones originates in the geographical area concerned; and all states important to the denuclearization of the area participate. Considering that Soviet proposals for the denuclearization of Central Europe and other areas have not met these criteria, the United States has opposed them. From the start, however, the United States supported and encouraged Latin American countries in this undertaking. In mid-1962, the Brazilian representative to the UN General Assembly proposed making Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the seventeenth regular session of the General Assembly, during the October Cuban missile crisis, a draft resolution calling for such a zone was submitted by Brazil and supported by Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. While asserting support for the principle, Cuba stipulated certain conditions, including the requirement that Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone be included in the zone, and that foreign military bases, especially Guantanamo Naval Base, be eliminated. The draft resolution was not put to a vote at the General Assembly that year.

On April 29, 1963, at the initiative of the President of Mexico, the Presidents of five Latin American countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico -- announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. On November 27, 1963, this declaration received the support of the UN General Assembly, with the United States voting in the affirmative. The Latin American nations followed this initiative by extensive and detailed negotiations among themselves. At the Mexico City Conference (November 23-27, 1964) a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was created, with instructions to prepare a draft Treaty. Important differences among the Latin American countries emerged over questions of defining the boundaries of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, transit guarantees, and safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. On February 14, 1967, the Treaty was signed at a regional meeting of Latin American countries at Tlatelolco, a section of Mexico City.

On December 5, 1967, the UN General Assembly endorsed it by a vote of 82-0 with 28 abstentions, the United States voting in support of the Treaty. As of January 1, 1989, the Treaty had entered into force for 23 Latin American states. Belize and Guyana were not invited to accede to the Treaty because a special regime is foreseen for those political entities whose territories are wholly or partially the subject of disputes or claims by an extracontinental state and one or more Latin American states. When all eligible states ratify the Treaty, it will enter into force for all of them, as specified in Article 28. Alternatively, under that article, any Latin American state may bring the Treaty into force for itself at any time by waiving that provision. The basic obligations of the Treaty are contained in Article I: 1.

The contracting parties undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories; (b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. (a) The testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and 2.The contracting parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession, or control of any nuclear weapon. Important provisions in the Treaty deal with verification. Treaty parties undertake to negotiate agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for application of its safeguards to their nuclear activities. The Treaty also establishes an organization to help ensure compliance with Treaty provisions -- the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) -- with a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat as its permanent organs.

The five-member elected Council is empowered to perform "special inspections." Of the accompanying protocols, Protocol I calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible." All four powers having such territories have signed -- the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and the United States. All except France have ratified. The U.S. Protocol I territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Since the entry into force of the Panama Canal Treaties on October 1, 1979, U.S. obligations to the former Canal Zone have been governed by those treaties and by Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. President Carter signed Protocol I for the United States in 1977. In November 1981, the Senate completed its review of the Protocol and gave its advice and consent to ratification subject to certain understandings which were supported by the executive branch and are outlined below. President Reagan ratified Protocol I in November 1981, and the U.S.

instrument of ratification was deposited in Mexico City on November 23, 1981. Senate advice and consent to ratification of Protocol I was made subject to three understandings: -- That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by the protocol do not affect the rights of the contracting parties regarding the exercise of freedom of the seas or passage through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a State; -- That the understandings and declarations the United States attached to ratification of Protocol II apply also to its ratification of Protocol I. -- That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by the protocol do not affect the rights of the contracting parties to grant or deny transport and transit privileges to their own or other vessels or aircraft regardless of cargo or armaments; In Protocol II, nuclear-weapon states undertake (1) to respect the denuclearized status of the zone; (2) not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties; and (3) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties. France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union are parties to Protocol II. The United States signed Protocol II on April 1, 1968.

When President Nixon transmitted it to the Senate on August 13, 1970, he recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent subject to certain understandings and declarations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee revised the statement slightly during its hearings on the Protocol in September 1970 and February 1971, and the full Senate made its consent to ratification, on April 19, 1971, subject to the revised statement. The President ratified the Protocol on May 8, 1971, and the United States deposited the instrument of ratification on May 12, 1971, subject to the following understandings and declarations: -- The Treaty does not affect the rights of the contracting parties to grant or deny transport and transit privileges to non-contracting parties.

-- With respect to the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Treaty parties, the United States would "have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Partys corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty." -- Considering the technology for producing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes to be indistinguishable from that for making nuclear weapons, the United States regards the Treatys prohibitions as applying to all nuclear explosive devices. However, the Treaty would not prevent the United States, as a nuclear-weapon state, from making nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes available "in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities." -- Although not required to do so, the United States will act, with respect to the territories of Protocol I adherents that are within the Treaty zone, in the same way as Protocol II requires it to act toward the territories of the Latin American Treaty parties. -- The Treaty and its protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was first amended at a special general conference in July 1990 to attach the phrase "and the Caribbean" to the title. The Treaty was amended again in May 1991 to replace paragraph 2 of Article 25. The original Treaty paragraph had excluded political entities "part or all of which whose territory" is in dispute with "an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States" prior to the opening of signature of the Treaty. This clause effectively excluded Belize and Guyana from membership. Belize (formerly British Honduras) attained its independence from the UK in 1981; Guyana gained independence from Britain in 1966, but has ongoing territorial disputes with Venezuela and Suriname.

This amendment replaced the original text with the following: "The condition of State Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco shall be restricted to independent states which are situated within the zone of application of the Treaty in accordance with Article 4 of same, and with Paragraph 1 of the present Article, and which were members of the United Nations as of December 10, 1985, as well as the nonautonomous territories mentioned in Document OAS/CER.P, AG/DOC. 1939/85 of November 5, 1985, once they attain their independence." -- The referenced OAS document lists the Bermuda, Cayman, Turks and Caicos and British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, St. Pierre, Miquelon, Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire, Cura���ao, Saba, St. Eustatius, St. Martin), Greenland, and U.S. Virgin Islands as "nonautonomous territories" in one sense or another; Anguilla, with ties to the UK, is considered something of special case, more than "nonautonomous" but less than independent.

Greenland is not within the zone of application, and as such would not be eligible for membership should it one day achieve independence from Denmark. This amendment, adopted by consensus at the 1991 General Conference, has not yet been ratified by all of the current contracting parties to the Treaty. The third amending of the Treaty occurred at a special general conference in August 1992, when amendments to Articles 14-16 and 19 were adopted. The most significant of these was a change in Article 16 designating the IAEA as having the sole authority to conduct special inspections of Tlatelolco parties; the original text gave this authority both to the IAEA and to OPANAL, the Treaty's executive agency. The complete text of this third set of the amendments is reproduced below: Article 14 2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of the reports sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency in relation to matters subject to the present Treaty which are relevant to the Agency's work. 3. The information provided by the Contracting Parties cannot be divulged or communicated to third parties, totally or partially, by the recipients of the reports except with the express consent of the former.

Article 15 1. At the request of any of the Parties, and with the authorization of the Council, the Secretary General may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary fact or circumstance which affects compliance with the present Treaty, explaining the reasons he/they had for such action. The Contracting Parties commit themselves to cooperate quickly and fully with the Secretary General. 2. The Secretary General will immediately inform the Council and the Contracting Parties about such requests and their respective replies. Article 16 1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power of carrying out special inspections in conformity with Article 12 and with the agreements referred to in Article 13 of this Treaty. 2. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties, and following the procedures established under Article 15 of the present Treaty, the Council may submit to the consideration of the International Atomic Energy Agency a requisition that the latter initiate the arrangements required for the carrying out of a special inspection. 3. The Secretary General shall request the General Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency to transmit to him in a timely manner the information sent by the former to the IAEA Board of Governors regarding the conclusion of the said special inspection.

The Secretary General shall promptly impart such information to the Council. 4. By the Agency or the Secretary General, the Council shall transmit such information to all of the Contracting Parties. Article 19 The Agency may conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers appropriate to facilitate the efficient operation of the Control System established by this Treaty. Article 20 1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any party of the world. 2. The Contracting Parties may, when they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute.

Treaty Text Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Signed at Mexico City February 14, 1967 Entered into force April 22, 1968 Preamble In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness, Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a coordinated programme of disarmament "the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type," Recalling that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII), which established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be taken "in

 the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agreements," Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is an essential purpose of the Organization to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere, Convinced: That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured, That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable, That general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand, That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult and

 would increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration, That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions, That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist, That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interest and for the good of mankind, That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and social development, That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of

 their peoples, Convinced finally: That the military denuclearization of Latin America -- being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons -- will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament, and That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States.

Have agreed as follows: Obligations Article 1 1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. (a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and 2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon. Definition of the Contracting Parties Article 2 For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the Treaty is in force. Definition of territory Article 3 For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.

Zone of application Article 4 1. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force. 2.

Upon fulfillment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35 north latitude, 75 west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30 north latitude, 75 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30 north latitude, 50 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5 north latitude, 20 west longitude; from there directly southward to a point 60 south latitude, 20 west longitude; from there, directly westward to a point at 60 south latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, directly northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35 north latitude, 150 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 35 north latitude, 75 west

 longitude.

Definition of nuclear weapons Article 5 For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof. Meeting of signatories Article 6 At the request of any of the signatory States or if the Agency established by article 7 should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General Secretary. Organization Article 7 1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the “Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,” hereinafter referred to as “the Agency.” Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions. 2.

The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary consultations among Member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the obligations arising therefrom. 3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt cooperation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other international organization or body. 4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City. Organs Article 8 1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat. 2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference may be established within the purview of this Treaty. The General Conference Article 9 1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years, and may also hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council, the circumstances so require. 2. The General Conference: (b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

(c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the General Secretary. (d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of the Agency so requires. (e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the Council and the General Secretary. (f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum fulfillment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and consideration by the Conference. (g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with Governments and other international organizations and bodies. (a) May consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by this Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any organ provided for in this Treaty. 3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agencys budget and fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by Member States, taking into account the systems and criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations. 4. The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. 5. Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote.

The decisions of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting in the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20, the admission of new Members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as procedural questions and also determination of which questions must be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and voting. 6. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure. The Council Article 10 1. The Council shall be composed of five Members of the Agency elected by the General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken of equitable geographic distribution. 2. The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing Members may not be reelected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty is in force so requires. 3. Each Member of the Council shall have one representative. 4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. 5.

In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference. 6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference as well as such special reports as it deems necessary or which the General Conference requests of it. 7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session. 8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its Members present and voting. 9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. The Secretariat Article 11 1. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term. 2.

The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference. 3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to him by the General Conference, the General Secretary shall ensure, as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the General Conference. 4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable. 5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources and such information from non-governmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency. 6.

In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency. 7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Control system Article 12 1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty. 2.

The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying: (b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and (c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty. (a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons, IAEA safeguards Article 13 Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure. Reports of the Parties Article 14 1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories. 2.

The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards. 3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System. Special reports requested by the General Secretary Article 15 1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the General Secretary. 2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies. Special inspections Article 16 1.

The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases: (b) In the case of the Council: (a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty; (ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated this Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5. (i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Partys behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5. The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary. 2.

The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the agency. 3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article. 4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors. 5.

The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections. 6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article. 7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested. 8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly.

Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes Article 17 Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress. Explosions for peaceful purposes Article 18 1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes -- including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons -- or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5. 2.

Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to cooperate in carrying out, such an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information: (b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion, (c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article, (d) The expected force of the device, and (e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties. (a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained, 3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty. 4.

The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof. Relations with other international organizations Article 19 1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty. 2. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world. 3. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the International American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute. Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty Article 20 1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate. 2.

If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute. United Nations and Organization of American States Article 21 None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties. Privileges and immunities Article 22 1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their functions. 3.

The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. Notification of other agreements Article 23 Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other Contracting Parties. Settlement of disputes Article 24 Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the Parties to the controversy. Signature Article 25 1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by: (b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35o north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference. (a) All the Latin American Republics, and 2.

The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means. Ratification and deposit Article 26 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. 2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Mexican United States, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government. 3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument of ratification. Reservations This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Entry into force Article 28 1.

Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have been met: (b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I annexed to this Treaty by all extra-continental or continental States having de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty; (c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons; (d) Conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the application of Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article 13 of this Treaty. (a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in existence on the date when this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2; 2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph.

They may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived. 3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with this provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work. 4. After the entry into force of this Treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative or upon request by the General Conference, ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol II. Amendments Article 29 1.

Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit its proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to all other signatories in accordance with article 6. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall immediately following the meeting of signatories convene a special session of the General Conference to examine the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting shall be required. 2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with. Duration and denunciation Article 30 1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties. 2.

The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States. Authentic texts and registration Article 31 This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratification and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States for its information. Transitional Article Denunciation of the declaration referred to article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation of this Treaty, except that it will take effect on the date of delivery of the respective notification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments. DONE at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Signed by the United States at Washington May 26, 1977 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 13, 1981 Ratified by U.S. President November 19, 1981 U.S. ratification deposited at Mexico City November 23, 1981 Proclaimed by U.S.

President December 4, 1981 The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments, Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommenda-tions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States, Have agreed as follows: Article 1.

To undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty. Article 2. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it. Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Signed by the United States at Mexico City April 1, 1968 Ratification advised by U.S.

Senate April 19, 1971 Ratified by U.S. President May 8, 1971 U.S. ratification deposited at Mexico City May 12, 1971 Proclaimed by U.S. President June 11, 1971 The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments, Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommenda-tions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States, Have agreed as follows: Article 1.

The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect or warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions. Article 2. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof. Article 3. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 4.

The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty. Article 5. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

Proclamation by President Nixon on Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America by The President of The United States of America A Proclamation Considering that: Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, done at the City of Mexico on February 14, 1967, was signed on behalf of the United States of America on April 1, 1968, the text of which Protocol is word for word as follows: [The text of the Protocol appears here.] The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 19, 1971, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of Additional Protocol II, with the following understandings and declarations: I That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of this Treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose

, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commissions interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Partys corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty. II That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore, the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices.

It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that Treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present Treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device.

III That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties. The President ratified Additional Protocol II on May 8, 1971, with the above recited understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate. It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II that the Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was deposited on December 11, 1969 with understandings and a declaration, and the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12, 1971 with the above recited understandings and declarations.

In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol entered into force for the United States of America on May 12, 1971, subject to the above recited understandings and declarations. NOW, THEREFORE, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, subject to the above recited understandings and declarations, on and after May 12, 1971 by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. DONE at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fifth.

(Seal) Treaty of Tlatelolco : definition of Treaty of Tlatelolco and synonyms of Treaty of Tlatelolco (English) USMOI Under the treaty, the states parties agree to prohibit and prevent the "testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons" and the "receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons." There are two additional protocols to the treaty: Protocol I binds those overseas countries with territories in the region (the United States , the United Kingdom , France , and the Netherlands ) to the terms of the treaty. Protocol II requires the world's declared nuclear weapons states to refrain from undermining in any way the nuclear-free status of the region; it has been signed and ratified by the USA, the UK, France, China , and Russia . The treaty also provides for a comprehensive control and verification mechanism, overseen by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), based in Mexico City.

History Meeting in the Tlatelolco district of Mexico City on 14 February 1967, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean drafted this treaty to keep their region of the world free of nuclear weapons . Whereas Antarctica had earlier been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone under the 1961 Antarctic Treaty , this was the first time such a ban was put in place over such a vast, populated area. The Latin American countries other than Argentina and Cuba all signed the treaty in 1967, along with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago , and all of these ratified the treaty by 1972. The treaty came into force on 22 April 1968, after El Salvador had joined Mexico in ratifying it and waived the conditions for its entry into force in accordance with its Article 28. Argentina ratified in 1994, more than 26 years after signature, and was thus unprotected by the zone during the Falklands War . Other English-speaking Caribbean nations signed either soon after independence from the U.K.

(1968, 1975, 1983) or years later (1989, 1992, 1994, 1995), all ratifying within 4 years after signing. However, as British territories they had been covered since 1969 when the U.K. ratified Protocol I. The Netherlands ratified Protocol I in 1971; Suriname signed the Treaty in 1976 soon after independence from the Netherlands but did not ratify until 1997, 21 years after signing. The U.S. signed Protocol I applying to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in 1977 and ratified in 1981. France signed Protocol I applying to its Caribbean islands and French Guiana in 1979 but only ratified in 1992. All five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states ratified Protocol II by 1979. Cuba was the last country to sign and to ratify, in 1995 and on 23 October 2002, completing signature and ratification by all 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Cuba ratified with a reservation that achieving a solution to the United States hostility to Cuba and the use of the Guantánamo Bay military base for U.S. nuclear weapons was a precondition to Cuba's continued adherence. [4] Alfonso García Robles received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982 for his efforts in promoting the treaty. External links

Question: In 1968 the Treaty of Tlatelolco was drafted by the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to keep their region of the world free of what?
Answer: Nuclear weapons