Yom Kippur War - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com Google 1973 Yom Kippur War: Background Israel’s stunning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 left the Jewish nation in control of territory four times its previous size. Egypt lost the 23,500-square-mile Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights. When Anwar el-Sadat (1918-81) became president of Egypt in 1970, he found himself leader of an economically troubled nation that could ill afford to continue its endless crusade against Israel. He wanted to make peace and thereby achieve stability and recovery of the Sinai, but after Israel’s 1967 victory it was unlikely that Israel’s peace terms would be favorable to Egypt. So Sadat conceived of a daring plan to attack Israel again, which, even if unsuccessful, might convince the Israelis that peace with Egypt was necessary. Did You Know?

On October 6, 1981, Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Muslim extremists in Cairo while viewing a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Egypt’s crossing of the Suez Canal at the start of the Yom Kippur War. In 1972, Sadat expelled 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt and opened new diplomatic channels with Washington , D.C., which, as Israel’s key ally, would be an essential mediator in any future peace talks. He formed a new alliance with Syria, and a concerted attack on Israel was planned. Yom Kippur War: October 1973 When the fourth Arab-Israeli war began on October 6, 1973, many of Israel’s soldiers were away from their posts observing Yom Kippur (or Day of Atonement), and the Arab armies made impressive advances with their up-to-date Soviet weaponry. Iraqi forces soon joined the war, and Syria received support from Jordan. After several days, Israel was fully mobilized, and the Israel Defense Forces began beating back the Arab gains at a heavy cost to soldiers and equipment. A U.S.

airlift of arms aided Israel’s cause, but President Richard Nixon (1913-94) delayed the emergency military aid for a week as a tacit signal of U.S. sympathy for Egypt. On October 25, an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was secured by the United Nations. Yom Kippur War: Aftermath Israel’s victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government’s lack of preparedness. In April 1974, the nation’s prime minister, Golda Meir (1898-1978), stepped down. Although Egypt had again suffered military defeat at the hands of its Jewish neighbor, the initial Egyptian successes greatly enhanced Sadat’s prestige in the Middle East and gave him an opportunity to seek peace. In 1974, the first of two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements providing for the return of portions of the Sinai to Egypt were signed, and in 1979 Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1913-92) signed the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors.

In 1982, Israel fulfilled the 1979 peace treaty by returning the last segment of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. For Syria, the Yom Kippur War was a disaster. The unexpected Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire exposed Syria to military defeat, and Israel seized even more territory in the Golan Heights. In 1979, Syria voted with other Arab states to expel Egypt from the Arab League. Tags Ynetnews News - The Yom Kippur War (1973) The Yom Kippur War (1973) Ynetnews|Published: 11.11.08 , 15:02 The Yom Kippur War began on October 6, 1973, when a coalition of Arab forces launched a surprise strike on Israel on Yom Kippur – the holiest day of the Jewish faith. Winds of war On August 7, 1970 the ceasefire ending the War of Attrition took effect. Tension between Israel and Egypt remained high, and shortly after the armistice was inducted, Egypt began moving new surface-to-air missile formations to the Suez Canal line.

The IDF formed its defensive line in the Canal by setting up a series of waterfront and rear strongholds, along with securing multiple access roads to the area. Several days after the War of Attrition ended, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and Anwar Sadat was named his successor. Sadat began reforming the military and simultaneously trying to acquire advanced weapon systems from the Soviet Union. His initial failure to do so led the Israeli defense and intelligence establishments to believe that the Arab nations were left incapacitated by the war, and that they would not be able to strike Israel again in the near future. Egypt's army, it was believed, was too weak to fight the IDF; and Syria was unlikely to strike without Egypt in its corner. Intelligence assessment aside, the military and the public were basking in a euphoric feeling of invincibility; having won the Six Day and the Attrition wars, the IDF was seen as more than capable to crush any attack, be it from Cairo or Damascus.

On the way to the front line (Photo: GPO) Israeli intelligence was left oblivious to the realignment preformed by the Egyptian military, and more importantly, to Sadat's decision to attack Israel again, in order to "melt" the political frost which had enveloped the Middle East since the Six Days War. Syrian President Hafez Assad was also eager to strike Israel, and in June of 1973 the two met and decided to mount an attack within several months. The date chosen was October 6, 1973 – Yom Kippur. Both Sadat and Assad believed that striking the Jewish State on its holiest day would be detrimental to morale. Strike's prelim The Egyptians put together a plan meant to feint the Israeli intelligence: In early October, several of the Egyptian military's division's moved their forces near the Suez Canal as part of a would-be military drill – and the IDF believed it to be just that. On October 4 the "drill" came to its end, and the forces seemed to retreat, but in fact, only a few of the units taking part in it were told to turn back.

The Syrians made no attempt to mask their troops' realignment along the Israel-Syria border, alerting the IDF to their actions. On September 13, the Israeli and Syria air forces engaged in battle. Syria lost 13 fighter jets, cementing further the Israeli assessment that Damascus was in no shape to fight. Nevertheless, the IDF boosted its forces in the Golan Heights. About two weeks before Israel was struck, and more so on October 4 and 5, the IDF began receiving foreign intelligence reports indicating a buildup of forces near its borders. Military Intelligence, however, dismissed the warnings, but then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered the IDF on high alert as a precautionary measure. It wasn’t until the morning hours of October 6 that the IDF received word of the impending attack from an "irrefutable source." War breaks out The Yom Kippur War began on October 6, 1973, at 1:55pm. The strike caught Israel by complete surprise. The military strongholds in the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights were sparsely manned, as were the rear posts.

IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar ordered a mobilization of the entire reserve force, but the emergency warehouses, meant among other things to supply reserve forces, were nearly empty; and the regular forces were in near disarray. Syria's fighting forces were made up of three divisions, each with its own armor brigade – a total of 400 tanks and 1,200 machineguns. Those were backed by surface-to-air missile batteries, as well as by hundreds of fighter jets. The IDF fought back using two armor divisions – 177 tanks – and two infantry divisions spread across 17 outposts and 11 artillery batteries. The commanders: Ariel Sharon (L), Haim Bar-Lev (M), David Elazar (R) (Photo: GPO) The Syrian offensive began by heavily bombarding IDF outposts and civilian communities in the Golan Heights. A Syrian commando force took over the IDF's stronghold on Mount Hermon shortly after the fighting began, allowing the Syrians to break through the IDF's northern lineup. Israeli armor divisions attempted to block them, but were only partially successful. By October 7, Syrian tanks were overlooking the Sea of Galilee.

At this point, the IDF's reserve forces arrived at the Golan Heights, boosting Israeli military presence to three divisions, which were able to fend off the Syrians: Damascus' main armored force in the Heights was annihilated by October 9, and by the next day, it was pushed away from the entire Golan, with the exception of the Mt. Hermon stronghold, which the Syrians were able to hold on to until the last day of fighting. On the Sinai front, the IDF had 268 tanks and a reserve armored brigade manning the stronghold line. Many of the military posts were left unmanned, essentially stripping the line of its original purpose – observing and defending the waterfront. Egypt's fighting forces included five armor divisions, each with its own tank brigade, two mechanized divisions, commando forces, paratroopers and special forces units. Those were backed by 2,000 machineguns and some 50 surface-to-air missile batteries, as well as numerous antitank missiles. The Egyptians positioned their troops atop a rampart which they built on their side of the canal, allowing them to decimate the Israeli armor forces rushing to the front.

Moshe Dayan (R) on the banks of the Suez Canal (Photo: GPO) The Egyptian offensive began with heavy artillery fire on targets all over Sinai. The Egyptian forces were able to cross the canal in several places and lay down bridges. They then funneled additional forces to the Sinai front. IDF forces attempted to hold them off, but the tanks and fighter jets sent in met heavy antitank and anti-aircraft missile fire and suffered mass losses. By the end of the fighting on October 7, the Egyptians were in control of many of the IDF's strongholds along the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, Egyptian commando forces were engaged in battle with IDF forces in southern Sinai, and the Israeli Navy was called to the Suez and Eilat bays to fight off the Egyptian Naval forces. By October 8, the IDF sent three reserve divisions to the southern front and mounted an assault meant to push the Egyptian forces back across the canal. The strike proved unsuccessful, and is believed to have dealt the most devastating morale blow to the IDF, as its finest troops, commanders and battle plans failed to drive the Egyptian forces out.

The fighting was also the backdrop for the now infamous "general wars" within the IDF's top echelon. Final battles The government eventually decided to send Minister of Trade and Industry and former IDF Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev to take command of the Sinai front off then-Southern Command Chief Shmuel Gonen's hands. Bar-Lev's first order was to launch a series of hold-defense battles along the canal, which resulted in the IDF fending off a massive Egyptian attack on October 14. Bar-Lev then ordered the IDF to circumvent the Egyptian forces, cross the canal and surround them from the rear, forming a direct threat on Cairo in the process. By October 17, the IDF was able to stretch a floating bridge over the canal and funnel troops to the western part of the sector. Three IDF divisions crossed the canal by October 19 and began making their way towards Ismailiya and the city of Suez, striking at the "seam" between the Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Egyptian Third Army in the south.

By the end of the fighting on October 24, the Egyptian armies east of the canal found themselves separated by an Israeli-held area, stretching west of the canal and reaching 62 miles off Cairo. During the fighting, the Egyptian Military lost 10,000 men and 8,000 of its troops were taken prisoners. It also lost 1,000 tanks and 283 planes. Strategizing (Photo: GPO) On the Syrian front, Damascus concentrated its forces on the Damascus-Quneitra road, in an attempt to block any possible advancement by the IDF. The Syrian forces were backed by Moroccan, Iraqi and Jordanian troops. On October 11, the IDF launched a two-way offensive, storming Quneitra en route to Damascus, and fighting to regain control of Mt. Hermon. Despite fierce resistance, the IDF was able to reclaim all the territories taken by the Syrians and create an enclave within Syria and make its way to about 24 miles off Damascus, where it held its forces until the war ended. Mt. Hermon was taken back on October 21.

During the fighting, the Syrian Military lost 4,000 men, 1,100 tanks and 168 planes as well as several gunships. War's end The Yom Kippur War took the world powers by surprise as well. The Soviet Union aligned itself with the Arab forces, preventing the UN Security Council from intervening in the fighting and sending weapons to Egypt and Syria. The US eventually sided with Israel, and began sending the IDF massive quantities of weapons and ammunition. On October 22, largely due to the efforts of then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 calling for a ceasefire, and urging "all parties to the present fighting to terminate all military activity immediately." The armistice came into effect 12 hours later, at 6:52pm (GMT), but tensions remained high and sporadic fighting still erupted, coming to a halt two days later, as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 339, calling on all parties to adhere to the ceasefire guidelines established in Resolution 338. Fighting on all fronts eventually came to an end on October 26.

The final disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria was singed on May 31, 1974, with the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The Yom Kippur War claimed the lives of 2,569 IDF soldiers and left 7,500 wounded. Another 301 soldiers were taken captive and later returned to Israel. Digging in Suez sands (Photo: GPO) War's aftermath Though emerging victorious form the war, Israel was left battered and bruised: The great "invincible IDF" myth created on the heels of the Six Days War was shattered and the public lost all faith in the political and military leadership. In the weeks following the war, the government formed the Agranat Commission – an official National Commission of Inquiry tasked with probing the circumstances leading up to the war, as well as its course. The Agranat Commission chose not to hold any of Israel's political leaders personally responsible for the war's failures, but nevertheless, then-Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan resigned.

The Agranat Report did, however, hold four of the IDF's top officers personally responsible for intelligence failure which left Israel so vulnerable to the strike: Chief of Staff David Elazar was found at fault for misreading the geo-military situation and for failing to maintain IDF wartime readiness. He was relieved of his command. Intelligence Chief General Eli Zeira, his deputy, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, the head of Military Intelligence's Egypt Desk and the Southern Command's chief intelligence officer were all found responsible for the intelligence failure which led to Israel being caught off guard. Both Zeira and Shalev were dismissed, while the junior intelligence officers were reassigned, per the commission's recommendations, away from intelligence duties.

Head of the Southern Command, Shmuel Gonen, was relieved of his command after the commission found "he had failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which the troops found themselves." OPEC enacts oil embargo - Oct 17, 1973 - HISTORY.com OPEC enacts oil embargo Publisher A+E Networks The Arab-dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announces a decision to cut oil exports to the United States and other nations that provided military aid to Israel in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. According to OPEC, exports were to be reduced by 5 percent every month until Israel evacuated the territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In December, a full oil embargo was imposed against the United States and several other countries, prompting a serious energy crisis in the United States and other nations dependent on foreign oil. OPEC was founded in 1960 by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela with the principle objective of raising the price of oil. Other Arab nations and Third World oil producers joined in the 1960s and early 1970s.

For the first decade of its existence, OPEC had little impact on the price of oil, but by the early 1970s an increase in demand and the decline of U.S. oil production gave it more clout. In October 1973, OPEC ministers were meeting in Vienna when Egypt and Syria (non-OPEC nations) launched a joint attack on Israel. After initial losses in the so-called Yom Kippur War, Israel began beating back the Arab gains with the help of a U.S. airlift of arms and other military assistance from the Netherlands and Denmark. By October 17, the tide had turned decisively against Egypt and Syria, and OPEC decided to use oil price increases as a political weapon against Israel and its allies. Israel, as expected, refused to withdraw from the occupied territories, and the price of oil increased by 70 percent. At OPEC’s Tehran conference in December, oil prices were raised another 130 percent, and a total oil embargo was imposed on the United States, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Eventually, the price of oil quadrupled, causing a major energy crisis in the United States and Europe that included price gouging, gas shortages, and rationing.

In March 1974, the embargo against the United States was lifted after U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succeeded in negotiating a military disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. Oil prices, however, remained considerably higher than their mid-1973 level. OPEC cut production several more times in the 1970s, and by 1980 the price of crude oil was 10 times what it had been in 1973. By the early 1980s, however, the influence of OPEC on world oil prices began to decline; Western nations were successfully exploiting alternate sources of energy such as coal and nuclear power, and large, new oil fields had been tapped in the United States and other non-OPEC oil-producing nations. Related Videos Stand for Israel - 1970's Yom Kippur : War, Peace and Politics Get Email Updates War, Peace & Politics1970's Yom Kippur Israel's third decade was a volatile time. Golda Meir sat in the Prime Minister's chair, having taken over after former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol died in office.

In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan launched a military campaign to drive out the PLO from his country and reestablish his monarchy. When Syria invaded Jordan, intent on helping the PLO, Israel massed troops at the Syrian border, and Syria withdrew its forces. The PLO subsequently moved its headquarters to Lebanon, taking over the south of the country. Also at this time, Soviet Jews were trying desperately to gain entry to Israel, due to increased anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. However, many were refused exit visas from the USSR and became known as Prisoners of Zion, or "refuseniks." One of the most famous refuseniks, who became an outspoken advocate for the refusenik cause and later a member of Knesset was Nathan Sharansky. 1972 was also the year of the tragedy at the Munich Olympics. A PLO-affiliated organization, Black September, organized a systematic attack on the Jewish athletes living in the Olympic Village. Due to the lax security, the terrorists were able to gain entry to the Israelis' apartments. Two athletes were killed in the apartment, and nine others were taken hostage and eventually murdered following a failed rescue attempt.

In the aftermath of the murders, Israel launched with a campaign to assassinate the surviving hostage-takers and IDF forces attacked PLO headquarters in Lebanon as well. Within the Israeli borders, however, there was a sense of peace and ease, and the Israeli people were fully confident that their army would protect them from further attacks. This complacency had disastrous consequences. Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, had repeatedly made claims that Egypt would attack Israel. He alternated those threats with offers of peace in exchange for the land Israel had conquered in 1967. King Hussein, in an effort to repay Israel for its help with Syria in 1970, warned Israel that an attack was imminent. Golda Meir, though, did not take the warning seriously, and the Israeli people were convinced that their military might was enough of a deterrent. They were completely taken by surprise, then, when, on the morning of Yom Kippur in 1973, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel.

The forces entered Israel through the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights with the stated goals of recapturing land conquered by Israel. The Egyptian-Syrian effort was assisted by other Arab countries: Iraq; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which sent both money and troops; the North African countries of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan; and Lebanon. Even King Hussein, somewhat reluctantly, sent two of his best units to Syria. The Israeli people were taken completely by surprise and did not have sufficient time to ready themselves. At first, the Egyptian and Syrian armies made headway. They were better armed than in 1967, and the Israeli army had neglected basic maintenance tasks on their tanks and weaponry, leaving them unprepared with underperforming weapons. However, in a span of three weeks, the IDF pulled itself together and was able to recapture the Golan from Syrian forces and push back against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Within a month, cease-fires had been signed. Despite the victory, the Yom Kippur War is generally considered a failure, due to the heavy casualties suffered by the Israeli troops.

Over 2,600 soldiers were killed, with an additional 7,200 wounded; the high number of fatalities are generally blamed on Israel's lack of preparedness for an attack of this magnitude. In addition to the troop losses, the economy suffered due to the huge arms budget needed for the war. In the wake of the debacle, Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned, and Yitzhak Rabin, who had been a previous Chief of Staff of the IDF, took over as prime minister. Another result of the war was that Egypt and Israel showed greater signs of willingness to negotiate, leading up to the Camp David Accords at the end of the decade. As a result of the Yom Kippur War, Saudi Arabia initiated an oil embargo against any countries trading with Israel, specifically the United States and the Netherlands, which had supported Israel during the war. Israel, which had made headway in the diplomatic sphere during the 1960s, regressed, as many African and Asian countries broke off diplomatic ties with Israel. The United States was required to purchase oil via European countries, and oil prices skyrocketed worldwide.

The Arab world gained an edge, as other countries realized the great power they wielded with their crucial oil supply. The embargo did not end until March 1974. In May 1974, another PLO-affiliated organization committed a brutal act of terrorism against children. 102 children at a school in Ma'alot were held hostage by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Twenty-two children were killed. Despite this, that same year the UN recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Many claim that this was an appeasement effort toward the Arab world, with the oil embargo still fresh in everyone's mind. The PLO was granted permanent "observer status" at the UN, and in 1975, the UN passed the "Zionism is Racism" act. During the Rabin years, from 1975 - 1976, Jewish religious settlements began to expand in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The historic raid on Entebbe took place in 1976, when an Air France plane was hijacked by Palestinian and German terrorists, from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Revolutionary Cells, respectively, and flown to Uganda, at the time ruled by dictator Idi Amin. The non-Jewish hostages were released, and the terrorists threatened to kill the remaining Jewish hostages if the hijackers' prisoner-release demands were not met. Rabin launched a risky operation to rescue the hostages, and under the cover of night, the Israeli commandos flew in, rescued the hostages, and killed many of the terrorists. Three hostages were killed, and five Israeli commandos wounded. The only Israeli soldier to die was Yonatan "Yoni" Netanyahu, brother of Benjamin Netanyahu. In his honor, the operation was later renamed "Operation Yonatan." Menachem Begin became prime minister in 1977, the first right-wing politician to do so. Begin actively supported the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza started under Rabin's leadership, despite receiving a warning from the US that it considered such actions contrary to international law. In November 1977, a turning point in the Egypt-Israeli conflict was reached.

President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem to talk with Begin. The two countries began the process of creating peace. In March of 1978, Lebanese-Palestinian terrorists who opposed this peace process hijacked a bus of Israeli families, killing thirty-five of them, including thirteen children. Israel crossed into Lebanon, but withdrew a few days later after the UN created a peace-keeping force to remain in Lebanon. In September 1978, US president Jimmy Carter met with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp David, and a framework for peace between the countries was agreed upon. The accords set out a broad plan for Middle East peace, including autonomy for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza (which was never implemented), and a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. In March 1979, the two heads of state signed the treaty, with Carter acting as a witness. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982.

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 - History Learning Site The Yom Kippur War of 1973 Citation: C N Trueman "The Yom Kippur War of 1973" historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 26 May 2015. 16 Aug 2016. The Yom Kippur War of 1973, the most recent ‘full’ war in Middle East history , is so-called because it began on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), the holiest day of prayer and fasting in the Jewish calendar. The Yom Kippur War is also known as the October War. At the time of Yom Kippur, Israel was led by Golda Meir and Egypt by Anwar Sadat . The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise Arab attack on Israel on Saturday 6th October 1973. On this day, Egyptian and Syrian military forces launched an attack knowing that the military of Israel would be participating in the religious celebrations associated with Yom Kippur. Therefore, their guard would temporarily be dropped.

The combined forces of Egypt and Syria totalled the same number of men as NATO had in Western Europe. On the Golan Heights alone, 150 Israeli tanks faced 1,400 Syria tanks and in the Suez region just 500 Israeli soldiers faced 80,000 Egyptian soldiers. Other Arab nations aided the Egyptians and Syrians. Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jet fighter planes to Egypt a few months before the war began. Iraqi Russian-built MIG fighters were used against the Israelis in the Golan Heights along with 18,000 Iraqi soldiers. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait effectively financed the war from the Arabs side. Saudi troops – approximately 3,000 men – also fought in the war. Libya provided Egypt with French-built Mirage fighters and in the years 1971 to 1973, Libya bankrolled Egypt’s military modernisation to the tune of $1 billion which was used to purchase modern Russian weapons. Other Arabic nations that helped the Egyptians and Syrians included Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco.

Jordan also sent two armoured brigades and three artillery units to support the Syrians, but their participation in the war was not done with vast enthusiasm – probably because King Hussein of Jordan had not been kept informed of what Egypt and Syria planned. Facing such an attack, the Israeli forces were initially swiftly overwhelmed. Within two days, the Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal and moved up to 15 miles inland of the most advanced Israeli troops in the Sinai. Syrian troops advanced by the same distance into the strategic Golan Heights in north Israel. By the end of October 7th, the military signs were ominous for Israel. However, on October 8th, Israeli forces, bolstered by called-up reserves, counter-attacked in the Sinai. They pushed back the Egyptian military and crossed the Suez Canal south of Ismailia. Here, the Israelis used the Suez-Cairo road to advance towards the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and got to within 65 miles of it. The Israelis experienced similar success in the Golan Heights where the Syrian forces were pushed back and Israel re-captured lost land. Using the main road from Tiberias to Damascus, the Israelis got to within 35 miles of the Syrian capital.

On October 24th, a cease-fire was organised by the United Nations . The United Nations sent its own peacekeepers to the highly volatile regions affected by the fighting. Between January and March 1974, Israeli and Egyptian forces disengaged along the Suez Canal region. Here, the Israelis managed to keep control over the strategic Sinai Desert – an area that allowed Israel a buffer to ensure any fighting there did not spill over into Israel itself. In the Golan Heights, 1,200 United Nations troops were sent to keep the peace there in May 1974. They effectively formed a United Nations buffer between Syria and Israel. The American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissenger, acted as a peace broker between Egypt and Israel. In September 1975, Egypt and Israel signed an interim agreement which declared their willingness to settle their differences by peaceful means rather than by military. This was to lead to the American sponsored talks at Camp David that followed the 1977 ‘ Sadat Initiative ’.

To some Arabs, Anwar Sadat , leader of Egypt, seemed to have betrayed their cause and it was to cost him his life when he was assassinated by Muslim fundamentalists in 1981. In October 1973, Sadat had adopted a warlike approach to Arab relations with Israel – he was seen by many Arabs to be the spiritual successor to Nasser and the saviour to the Palestinians in Israel. His adoption of a diplomatic approach to solving the region’s problems was too much for some Arabs. The United Nations had played a muted part in the whole war. At the moment of the war, the United Nations was in a difficult position as its Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, had been implicated in war crimes in the Balkans during World War Two. Such an association did little to enhance the reputation of the United Nations. What did Israel get out of the Yom Kippur War? Despite the initial successes of the Egyptian and Syrian forces, the war proved once again how effective the Israeli military could be. After the initial set-backs, the war served as a huge morale boost to Israelis.

Despite a co-ordinated attack on two fronts, Israel had survived and had pushed back the nations that had initially broken through Israel’s defences. Though the Americans provided the Israeli military with weaponry, they also provided Israel with something far more important – intelligence. Documents relating to the American spy-plane, the ‘SR-71 Blackbird’, show that the Israelis knew where major concentrations of Arab forces were as they were supplied with this information as a result of a SR-71 flying over the war zone. With such knowledge, the Israelis knew where to deploy their forces for maximum effect. What appeared to be intuitive devastating counter-attacks by the Israelis, were based on very detailed information gained from American intelligence. Basically, the Israelis knew where their enemy was and could co-ordinate an attack accordingly. The war also served as a salutary lesson to the Arab nations that surrounded Israel in that initial victories had to be built on. The failure of the Egyptian and Syrian forces to defeat Israel pushed Sadat towards adopting a diplomatic approach. It also encouraged some Palestinians to more extreme actions. On the diplomatic front, the Camp David talks took place while the actions of the PLO became more violent. Why didn’t the Arab nations build on their initial successes?

Clearly, the use of intelligence massively benefited the Israelis. However, as in 1948 , the Arab nations did not fight as one unit. Their command structure was not unified and each fighting unit (in the Sinai and the Golan Heights) acted as individual units. With up to nine different nationalities involved on the Arab side, mere co-ordination would have been extremely difficult. Secondly, the Israelis had to work to one simple equation: if they lost, the state of Israel would cease to exist. Therefore, for Israel it was a fight to the finish – literally “death or glory”. If the various Arab nations lost, they could survive for another day. NOVA | Spies That Fly | Firebee 1241 (Israel) | PBS 1970s Firebee 1241 (Israel) Impressed by America's AQM-34 Ryan Firebee UAV, Israel secretly purchased 12 Firebees from the U.S. in 1970, modified them, and designated them Firebee 1241 UAVs.

These Firebee 1241s played an important role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, both as reconnaissance vehicles and as new kinds of UAVs: decoys. On the second day of the war the Israeli Air Force deployed their fleet of armed Firebees to lead attacks against Egyptian air defenses along the Suez. The Egyptians fired their entire inventory of surface-to-air missiles at the Firebees—43 missiles in all. The Firebees successfully evaded 32 of the missiles and destroyed 11 with their Shrike anti-radar missiles. 11 of 21 Background & Overview - Yom Kippur War | Jewish Virtual Library Background & Overview Tweet After the exhilaration of the victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, Israelis became increasingly dispirited. The growing level of terrorism , combined with increasingly ominous threats from Egypt , made peace seem further away than ever. Rather than reconciling themselves to Israel’s existence, the Arab states looked for a way to avenge the humiliation of their defeat. The Soviet Union was doing its share to stoke the flames of war by pouring arms into the region.

And the Arab states in the Persian Gulf were beginning to take greater control of their oil resources and use the revenues to flex their political muscle. - Egypt Saves Face Sadat Cries Wolf In 1971, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat raised the possibility of signing an agreement with Israel , provided that all the territories captured by the Israelis were returned. Later, many people would claim Israel missed an opportunity to avoid war, but the truth was that Sadat expected Israel to ignore the threats that led to the 1967 War and to capitulate to Egyptian demands without any guarantee of peace. The suggestion was a nonstarter from Israel's point of view. Moreover, Sadat could not negotiate an agreement until Egypt erased the shame of 1967. For all the talk of peace, though, it was still violence that grabbed the headlines. During the summer of 1972, Palestinian terrorists infiltrated the Munich Olympics and murdered 11 Israeli athletes. With no progress toward peace, Sadat began to say that war was inevitable and that he was prepared to sacrifice one million soldiers in the showdown with Israel.

Throughout 1972 and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of Resolution 242 — total Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in 1967. Simultaneously, Sadat appealed to the Soviets to bring pressure on the United States and to provide Egypt with more offensive weapons. The Soviet Union was more interested in maintaining the appearance of détente with the United States than a confrontation in the Middle East; therefore, it rejected Sadat’s demands. Sadat’s response was to abruptly expel approximately 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt. In an April 1973 interview, Sadat again warned that he would renew the war with Israel. But it was the same threat he had made in 1971 and 1972, and most observers remained skeptical. In fact, almost up to the start of the shooting, no one expected a war. “The news of the imminent attack on Israel took us completely by surprise,” President Nixon said later. “As recently as the day before, the CIA had reported that war in the Middle East was unlikely.” Had U.S.

intelligence realized at the beginning of October 1973 that the Arabs were about to attack, Nixon might have been able to prevent the war through diplomacy or threats. Golda’s Fateful Decision Despite the conventional wisdom that Israel was surprised by the attack that did eventually come, the truth is the Israelis began to prepare for battle on October 5 and were convinced war was imminent the following morning. But, like U.S. intelligence officials, Israeli analysts were skeptical about the threat of war. According to documents declassified in 2012, the failure to anticipate the Arab attacks was a result of a number of intelligence failures. For example, Israeli soldiers on the southern front were given a secret document that provided 14 signals that would indicate an Egyptian attack was forthcoming. None of those indicators were apparent before the invastion. Similarly, in the north, a warning was passed on to the commander that Syria planned to attack on October 2. That intelligence could not be confirmed and was dismissed. On October 4, a day before learning that Russian civilians were leaving Egypt and Syria, Military Intelligence reported the chances for war were low.

Israel had a spy in Egypt;h however, Ashraf Marwan, ** the son-in-law of ex-president Gamal Abdel Nasser , who passed on a warning to his Mossad handler in London that war was imminent a day-and-a-half before it started. The Mossad director, Zvi Zamir, was informed by his aide and planned to meet with his agent in London the next day. Zamir subsequently learned from Israeli Military Intelligence that Soviet scientists were preparing to leave Syria, which added weight to the report of pending war. Two weeks earlier, Israel learned that Russia was transferring Scud missiles to Egypt; another worrisome sign. According to Zamir's aide, Alfred Eini, Marwan's warning of impending war was not passed on to the Prime Minister immediately because the Mossad thought it would be done by Military Intelligence. Zamir did not reach someone in the prime minister's office until a day later, hours before the attack. It was not until 5 a.m. on October 6 that General David Elazar , the chief of staff, first recommended a full, immediate mobilization of forces and a preemptive air strike. He was overruled.

A few hours later, a partial call-up of reserves was approved, but Prime Minister Golda Meir still refused to authorize Elazar to take military action. She advised the U.S. ambassador of the situation and asked him to pass on the message that the Arabs should be restrained. Henry Kissinger , who now was secretary of state, subsequently appealed to Sadat and Syrian president Hafez Assad not to do anything precipitously. He also cautioned Meir not to shoot first. Meir found herself in a nearly impossible position. The intelligence community had not given her sufficient warning of the impending attack to adequately prepare the nation for war. Still, Israel’s chances for victory and minimizing casualties could be greatly enhanced by a preemptive strike and the rapid mobilization of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). However, she feared that striking first, as Israel had done in 1967, might so anger the United States that Nixon would not support Israel’s prosecution of the war or policies afterward. And, unlike 1967, she did not feel Israel could afford to go it alone.

Unholy War On October 6, 1973 — Yom Kippur , the holiest day in the Jewish calendar (and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan) — Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe was mobilized on Israel’s borders. On the Golan Heights , approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders with only 3 tanks were attacked by 600,000 Egyptian soldiers, backed by 2,000 tanks and 550 aircraft. At least nine Arab states, including four non–Middle Eastern nations ( Libya , Sudan , Algeria , and Morocco ), actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort. A few months before the attack, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions.

Iraqi MiGs began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8 — the third day of the war. Besides serving as financial underwriters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus. Also violating Paris’s ban on the transfer of French-made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt. Other North African countries responded to Arab and Soviet calls to aid the front-line states. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade, and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria. Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory. Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.

In September 2013 shamed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak claimed that he personally started the Yom Kippur war during a secret mission during his time as an Egyptian air force commander. Mubarak stated that six munites before the large attack on Israel commenced including other Arab armies, he attacked an Israeli communications outpost in his fighter jet in the first attack of the war. Hussein Doesn’t Repeat His Mistake Jordan’s King Hussein , who apparently hadn’t been informed of Egyptian and Syrian war plans, chose not to fight this round, correctly calculating that his forces were vastly inferior to the Israelis’. Hussein’s decision was crucial to Israel’s defense because it freed up forces that would otherwise have had to fight on a third front. Still, Arab brotherhood required that Hussein contribute to the cause, so he sent two of his best units to Syria. Three Jordanian artillery batteries also participated in the assault, carried out by nearly 100 tanks. Oil Becomes a Weapon During the October war, the Arab oil-producing states imposed an embargo on oil exports to the United States , Portugal , and Holland because of their support for Israel.

The impact was to cause a shortage of petroleum in the United States and a quadrupling of gas prices. Americans soon had to contend with long lines at gas stations. Several U.S. oil companies that got most of their petroleum supplies from the Middle East, and depended on the goodwill of the Arab states to maintain their business relations in the region collaborated, in the embargo against their own nation. Oil company executives lobbied the Nixon administratio n to offer more support to the Arabs and less to Israel. They, along with state department Arabists, hoped to convince the public that Israel was to blame for the United States’s economic hardships and that it was far more important for the United States to ally itself with the Arab states than with Israel. The oil embargo was lifted in March 1974, but the United States and other Western nations continued to feel its effects for years to come. The IDF Stages a Comeback Thrown onto the defensive during the first two days of fighting, Israel mobilized its reserves and began to counterattack. In the south, Israeli forces were having little success in stopping the Egyptian onslaught. Still, the Sinai Desert offered a large buffer zone between the fighting and the heart of Israel.

The situation was different in the north, where the Syrians had swept across the Golan and could, in short order, threaten Israel’s population centers. Consequently, most reserves meant for the Egyptian front were shifted to the Golan. The replenished Israeli forces stopped the Syrian advance, forced a retreat, and began their own march forward toward Damascus. Superpower Chess The Soviets gave their wholehearted political support to the Arab invasion. Starting as early as October 9, they also began a massive airlift of weapons, which ultimately totaled 8,000 tons of materiel. The United States had given Israel some ammunition and spare parts, but it resisted Israeli requests for greater assistance. As the Soviets continued to pour weapons into the region, Kissinger decided that the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Union’s allies to win the war. The secretary of state wanted to show the Arabs they could never defeat Israel with the backing of the Soviets. He also couldn’t afford to let U.S. adversaries win a victory over a U.S. ally. By sending arms to Israel, the United States could ensure an Israeli victory, hand the Soviets a defeat, and provide Washington with the leverage to influence a postwar settlement.

On October 12, Nixon ordered an emergency airlift to Israel. Cargo planes carrying spare parts, tanks, bombs, and helicopters flew round-the-clock to Israel. The resupply efforts were hampered by America’s NATO allies who, capitulating to Arab threats, refused to allow American planes to use their air space. The one exception was Portugal, which as a consequence became the base for the operation. Between October 14 and November 14, 1973, 22,000 tons of equipment were transported to Israel by air and sea. The airlift alone involved 566 flights. To pay for this infusion of weapons, Nixon asked Congress for and received $2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel. The View from Egypt In the greatest tank battle since the Germans and Russians fought at Kursk in World War II , roughly 1,000 Israeli and Egyptian tanks massed in the western Sinai from October 12 through 14. On October 14, Israeli forces destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks in the first 2 hours of fighting. By late afternoon, the Israeli forces had routed the enemy.

Meanwhile, Israeli General Ariel Sharon had been chomping at the bit to cross the Suez Canal but had been ordered not to do so until after the main Egyptian force had been defeated in the Sinai. With that mission accomplished, Israeli paratroopers snuck across the canal and established a bridgehead. By October 18, Israeli forces were marching with little opposition toward Cairo. For the Israelis, the crossing was a great psychological boost; for the Egyptians, it was a humiliation. About the same time, Israeli troops were on the outskirts of Damascus, easily within artillery range of the Syrian capital. Prime Minister Meir did not want to attack Damascus, so the IDF stopped its advance and focused its activities on recapturing Mount Hermon — the highest peak in the region and a key Israeli radar and observation post that had fallen to the Syrians early in the fighting. On October 22, Israel once again controlled the Golan Heights. Meanwhile, the air battles were one-sided. Israel lost 114 planes during the war — only 20 in aerial combat. Israeli pilots shot down at least 450 Arab aircraft in dogfights. The Brink of Nuclear War As Israeli troops began to advance on Damascus, the Soviets started to panic.

On October 12, the Soviet ambassador informed Kissinger that his government was placing troops on alert to defend Damascus. The situation grew even more tense over the next two weeks, as Israeli forces reversed the initial Egyptian gains in the Sinai and began to threaten Cairo. The Egyptian Third Army was surrounded, and Israel would not allow the Red Cross to bring in supplies. At this point, Sadat began to seek Soviet help in pressing Israel to accept a cease-fire. On October 24, the Soviets threatened to intervene in the fighting. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the Soviet airlift to Egypt had stopped and that it was possible the planes were being prepared to change the cargo from weapons to troops. Responding to the Soviet threat, Nixon put the U.S. military on alert, increasing its readiness for the deployment of conventional and nuclear forces. The United States was in the midst of the political upheaval of the Watergate scandal, and some people believed Nixon was trying to divert attention from his political problems at home, but the danger of a U.S.–Soviet conflict was real.

In fact, this was probably the closest the superpowers ever came to a nuclear war other than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Fortunately, the Soviets backed down and never sent troops to fight. Saving the Losers The Soviet Union showed no interest in initiating peacemaking efforts, so long as it looked like the Arabs might win. The same was true for UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim. After the situation on the battlefield changed in Israel’s favor, however, desperate calls were made for the fighting to end. On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for “all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately.” The resolution also called for the implementation of Resolution 242 . The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it. Israel reluctantly complied with the cease-fire, largely because of U.S. pressure, but also because the next military moves would have been to attack the two Arab capitals, something few believed would be politically wise. By the end of the fighting, 2,688 Israeli soldiers had been killed.

Combat deaths for Egypt and Syria totaled 7,700 and 3,500, respectively. Disengagement Lays Groundwork For Peace Ironically, the United States had helped save Israel by its resupply effort[md]and then rescued Egypt by forcing Israel to accept the cease-fire. Henry Kissinger had used U.S. power and diplomacy to try to bring about a war result that would allow Egyptians to erase the stain of 1967 without allowing them to win or Israel to humiliate them again. In January 1974, Israel and Egypt negotiated a disengagement agreement ( Sinai I ) thanks to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy — so named because he flew back and forth between the two countries with American suggestions, as well as offers and counteroffers from the two governments. The Sinai I accord allowed the Egyptians to retain control of the Suez Canal, freed the Third Army, and drew a cease-fire line on the east side of the canal, with a buffer zone between the two forces. A second disengagement agreement ( Sinai II ) was signed in September 1975, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes in the Sinai and some surrounding territory.

The Egyptians were not allowed back into this neutral zone. Instead, U.S. peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the area. Syria Fronts for the Rejectionists The negotiations with the Syrians were more tortuous. It was not until May 1974 that a separation of forces agreement was signed that created a UN–policed buffer zone, a reduction in troop deployment, and the return of the town of Kuneitra to Syria . And that came only after a renewal of fighting in March. Syria fired artillery at Israeli positions between March and May, during which 37 more Israeli soldiers were killed. The United States rewarded Syria for the agreement with a modest grant of financial assistance[md]the first in 30 years — in hopes of building a new relationship with the regime of Hafez Assad and encouraging him to negotiate a peace agreement. As Nixon’s successors would also discover, Assad was happy to take whatever the United States was willing to offer, but he gave nothing in return. Rather than join the peace process, Assad became one of the leaders of the Rejectionist Front . Assad was also determined to impede Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.

He feared that an agreement between them would reduce Egypt’s willingness to fight for the Arab cause and that Sadat would accept a separate deal with Israel that would not address Syrian grievances. Israel’s Political Earthquake The fact that the Arabs had succeeded in surprising the IDF and inflicting heavy losses in the early part of the war against the supposedly invincible Israeli army was a traumatic experience for Israel. Its government reacted to the public’s calls for an inquiry by establishing a commission chaired by Shimon Agranat, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court. The Agranat Commission concluded that Israeli intelligence had sufficient warning of the impending attack, but, for a variety of reasons, had failed to interpret the in-formation correctly. Chief of Staff Elazar bore the brunt of the commission’s blame and resigned. The commission did not assess the role of Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan , but the public viewed them as the officials who were actually responsible for the mistakes that were made. The public was angered by what many viewed as scapegoating career military officials for the mistakes of their political leaders. This outrage ultimately led Meir to resign. Dayan would have been the logical heir, but his reputation was now in tatters.

The alternatives of the dominant Labor Party for a successor came down to a choice between two very different men. One, Minister of Information Shimon Peres , was a popular nonmilitary man who had played a key role in building the nation’s military might through his diplomatic skills. The other was Yitzhak Rabin , a native-born Israeli and military leader from the days of the Haganah , who had served as chief of staff during the Six-Day War and later as ambassador to Washington . In a tight election that fueled a 20-year political rivalry, Rabin was chosen to be prime minister . Egypt Saves Face Although Egypt lost the war, with Israeli troops prepared to march on Cairo and the Third Army saved by the United States from annihilation, Egyptians saw the battle as a victory for them. They had surprised the arrogant Israelis and nearly defeated them. If not for U.S. support, many believed, they would have driven the Jews into the sea. Sadat did not seem to have that as his objective. It was more important for him to erase the humiliation of 1967.

As Egyptian chief of staff Sa’ad Shazli, said on October 8, 1973, “The war has retrieved Arab honor.” This psychological shift was critical to Sadat's ability to enter negotiations later to reach a peace agreement with Israel . Sources: Mitchell G. Bard, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict. 4th Edition. NY: Alpha Books, 2008; Roi Mandel, “Declassified documents reveal failures of Yom Kippur War,” Ynetnews.com, (September 25, 2012); Yaakov Lappin, “Declassified Yom Kippur papers reveal failures,” Jerusalem Post, (September 21, 2012) *In the United States, the October 1973 war is typically referred to as the Yom Kippur War. Because the war was fought during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the Arabs and Muslims refer to it as the Ramadan War. **An intelligence controversy exists over whether Marwan was a double agent. We will never know; Marwan fell to his death under mysterious circumstances in 2007.

***Ironically, Sadat was assassinated during a parade in Cairo in 1981 celebrating Egypt's “victory” in 1973. Milestones: 1969–1976 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1969–1976 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States. The war thus paved the way for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, November 1973. (U.S.

News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection, Library of Congress) The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973 President Richard Nixon came into office convinced that the Arab-Israeli standoff over the fate of the occupied territories could damage America’s standing in the Arab world and undermine prospects for U.S.-Soviet détente. In attempt to break the deadlock, he ordered Secretary of State William Rogers to negotiate with the Soviets on the parameters of a Middle East settlement, with the goal of reaching an agreement that each superpower could sell to its regional clients. By December 1969, however, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel had all rejected the so-called “Rogers Plan,” which called for Israeli to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines, with “insubstantial alterations,” in return for peace. The failure of the Rogers Plan led Nixon to suspend efforts to reach a settlement with the Soviets and lent credence to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States should not push Israel for concessions so long as Egypt, the leading Arab state, remained aligned with the Soviets.

In the summer of 1970, Nixon broke with Kissinger and allowed Rogers to present a more limited initiative to halt the Israeli-Egyptian “War of Attrition” along the Suez Canal, in which the Soviets had become militarily involved. “Rogers II,” which called for Israel and Egypt to agree to a three month ceasefire and negotiations under the auspices of U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring, was accepted by both parties, who stopped fighting on August 7. Yet Nixon’s appetite for diplomacy was spoiled by Egyptian and Soviet efforts to move anti-aircraft missiles closer to the Canal and Syrian intervention in Jordan’s civil war. Until February 1971, Kissinger’s arguments against prematurely rewarding Soviet clients again held sway. In February 1971, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat presented the Nixon administration with a new opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Sadat proposed that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pulled back from the Canal’s east bank and later agreed to a timetable for further withdrawals. He also indicated that he would renounce all claims of belligerency against Israel if the IDF withdrew to the international border.

Rogers’ efforts to capitalize on Sadat’s statements by working toward an interim settlement, however, were opposed by the Israelis, and received little support from Kissinger and Nixon. Kissinger believed that Egyptian proposals for an interim settlement, along with a Soviet peace plan tabled that September, would be rejected by the Israelis, and did not want discord over the Middle East to undermine efforts at détente before the Moscow summit of May 1972. For Nixon, such reasoning was reinforced by a desire to avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations before the 1972 presidential elections. In the wake of the Moscow summit, where the Americans and the Soviets deliberately avoided discussing the Middle East, Sadat made two more moves to get the Nixon administration to break the Arab-Israeli stalemate. In July 1972, he decided to expel Soviet military advisors from Egypt, and opened a backchannel to Kissinger through Hafiz Isma‘il, his national security advisor.

In February 1973, Isma‘il met with Kissinger and informed him that Egypt would be willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel that could involve demilitarized zones on both sides of the international border and peacekeepers in sensitive locations like Sharm al-Shaykh. However, Egyptian-Israeli normalization would have to wait until Israel withdrew from all the territories it had conquered in 1967. The Israelis responded haltingly, and Nixon and Kissinger made little effort to change their minds. Despite Sadat’s public displays of frustration, as well as warnings from Jordan’s King Hussein and Soviet Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon and Kissinger believed that given the military balance, Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, a view supported by much of the U.S. intelligence community. Until the fall of 1973, the President and Kissinger held that any American diplomatic initiative would have to wait until after Israel’s elections that October. The War and its Consequences On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

Despite initial Israeli setbacks, Kissinger, now both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, believed that Israel would win quickly. He feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. Thus, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union call for an end to the fighting and a return to the 1967 ceasefire lines. The Soviets, who were uneager to intervene on behalf of their clients, agreed, but the Egyptians rejected the ceasefire proposal. Wanting to avoid both an Arab defeat and military intervention, the Soviets then began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons. By October 9, following a failed IDF counter-attack against Egypt’s forces, the Israelis requested that America do the same for them. Not wanting to see Israel defeated, Nixon agreed, and American planes carrying weapons began arriving in Israel on October 14. With the American airlift underway, the fighting turned against the Arabs. On October 16, IDF units crossed the Suez Canal. Sadat began to show interest in a ceasefire, leading Brezhnev to invite Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate an agreement.

A U.S.-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington. When Kissinger returned to the United States, he agreed to a Soviet request to seek another ceasefire resolution, which the Security Council adopted on October 23. Yet the Israelis still refused to stop. On October 24, Brezhnev sent Nixon a hotline message suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops to Egypt to “implement” the ceasefire. If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25. By the end of the day, the crisis abated when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces to their October 22 positions, and U.N. observers and peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire.

This time, the Israelis accepted the resolution. The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States. Though the war did not scuttle détente, it nevertheless brought the United States closer to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis. The American military airlift to Israel, moreover, had led Arab oil producers to embargo oil shipments to the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval. The stage was set for Kissinger to make a major effort at Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Question: In which year of the 1970's was the 'Yom Kippur War'?
Answer: 1973