FIRST U.S. MISSILES ARRIVE BY PLANE AT A BRITISH BASE - NYTimes.com FIRST U.S. MISSILES ARRIVE BY PLANE AT A BRITISH BASE By JON NORDHEIMER Published: November 15, 1983 Text of Briton's statement, page A14. LONDON, Nov. 14 - American- made cruise missiles arrived today at an air base in England, the British Government announced. They are the first of NATO's new generation of medium- range missiles to be deployed in Western Europe. Britain's Defense Secretary, Michael Heseltine, told a deeply divided House of Commons that the shipment, delivered to Greenham Common air base by a United States plane, meant that an unspecified number of cruise missiles would be operational on schedule by the end of the year.

Shouting to make himself heard over howls of protest from opposition legislators, he said, ''I have to inform the House that earlier today the first cruise missiles were delivered by air.'' 'Reckless Cynicism' Charged Neil Kinnock, the Labor Party leader, accused the Government of ''reckless cynicism'' in permitting deployment while the Soviet Union and the United States are continuing arms negotiations in Geneva. ''The installation of cruise weapons makes Britain a more dangerous place today than it was yesterday,'' Mr. Kinnock said. ''It increases the risk for our country without contributing to the defense of the country.'' Antiwar groups in Britain said tonight that the deployment at Greenham Common would open a new round of protest demonstrations and actions against the missiles. For her part, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discussed the missiles' arrival in a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London, saying, ''It is our destiny to be living at a time when there exist weapons of war of a dimension hitherto unknown.'' Arrival Reported in Soviet The Soviet press reported briefly and without commentary the arrival of the missiles in Britain.

Soviet leaders have said that the new American missiles scheduled for deployment across Western Europe would make a continuation of the arms negotiations with the United States in Geneva impossible. But diplomats in Moscow noted that the last statement by Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader, was ambivalent on whether bringing missiles into Europe or actually deploying them would be cause for a Soviet walkout. (Page A15.) The arrival of the missiles at Greenham Common, a Royal Air Force base used by the United States about 50 miles west of London in the heart of Berkshire, came two weeks after the House of Commons, after a heated debate, voted overwhelmingly to go ahead with deployment. The delivery of mobile launchers and other components of the cruise system began immediately. Next week, the West German Parliament is to hold its debate on the stationing of the American missiles. The Government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl has a comfortable parliamentary majority that is expected to approve deployment of the systems, which are scheduled to be operational by Dec. 15. The cruise missiles delivered to Britain today are among 41 weapons that are to be deployed in initial deliveries to Britain, Italy and West Germany by the first of next year.

By then, both Britain and Italy are to receive 16 cruise missiles, while West Germany is to receive nine Pershing 2 ballistic missiles. 572 Missiles by 1988 The 41 weapons are the first of 572 cruise and Pershing missiles that are to be deployed by 1988. All of the Pershing 2's will go to West Germany; the additional cruise missiles will be deployed not only in Britain and Italy but also in Belgium and the Netherlands. The arrival of the missiles came after 3 years and 11 months of efforts by the North Atlantic allies to get the Soviet Union to agree to remove the SS-20 medium-range missiles it placed on its frontiers in the late 1970's. According to figures given to Parliament today by Mr. Heseltine, the Russians have increased the number of SS-20's confronting Europe from 81 in 1979 to 252 today. The United States Air Force puts the current total at more than 260.

West Germany is scheduled to begin deploying the first components of 108 Pershing 2 ballistic missiles later this month and Italy is preparing sites for the first of the 112 cruise missiles it has agreed to take. Deployment of a total of 96 cruise missiles by the Netherlands and Belguium is still contingent on final approval by the governments of those countries and will not take place until a year or more after most of the missiles in Britain, Germany and Italy are operational. The cruise missile is essentially a small, pilotless aircraft that carries an explosive warhead, conventional or nuclear. It is called a cruise missile because it cruises like an airplane rather than being fired into a trajectory like a ballistic missile. Powered by Light Engine It has a navigational system and is powered by a light turbofan engine rather than by the rockets that drive ballistic missiles, and has a range of 1,500 miles. The Pershing 2, by comparison, is a ballistic missile with a range of 1,100 miles. Soviet officials have made clear that they are more concerned about the Pershings, with their great accuracy and speed, than with the slower, ground-hugging cruise.

1 BBC - Berkshire - Anti-nuclear protesters at AWE 14:40 GMT, Thursday, 11 February 2010 Anti-nuclear protesters at AWE By Emma Midgley BBC Berkshire A large development called Project Pegasus is to be built at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, to replace existing post-war buildings. On Wednesday, 10 February, West Berkshire councillors approved the plan for new buildings on the site - which is Britain's nuclear weapons "factory". The new buildings will be used to handle and store enriched uranium. The council received more than 1,400 objection letters, but many were from people who do not live near the site. AWE Aldermaston is the biggest employer in West Berkshire. The headquarters of AWE is based at Aldermaston - it is also the centre of design, research and development for Trident, Britain's submarine-launched missiles. About a dozen protesters gathered at the West Berkshire council meeting. The Nuclear Information Service (NIS) said there had not been not enough consultation over the planning application. Nearby Aldermaston, Padworth and Mortimer parish councils were all consulted and did not object to the proposal.

History of campaigns at AWE Since 1958, when 10,000 people marched from London to Aldermaston in protest at Britain's first hydrogen bomb tests, AWE Aldermaston has been the site of campaigns against nuclear weapons. Nearby, RAF Station Greenham Common was used by both the Royal Air Force and United States Army until the Cold War ended and it closed in 1993. In protest at the Cruise missiles stored there, the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp was formed in 1981. The camp became well know when on 1 April 1983, tens of thousands of protesters formed a 14-mile human chain from Greenham to Aldermaston and the ordnance factory at Burghfield. In 2008, fashion designer Vivienne Westwood was among protesters who demonstrated at the atomic weapons centre in Aldermaston to mark the 50th anniversary of the first anti-nuclear march to the base in 1958. However, the AWE site is a major employer for people living in West Berkshire, and thousands of people living nearby are employed at Aldermaston.

Present day Aldermaston councillor Irene Neill said: "This is not a new operation, it is just a continuation of what's already there. All they are doing is demolishing the old building, which is a post-war building, and building a new properly fit-for-purpose building. "It's all part of a 10-year refurbishment project for the whole site. The new building will be moved into the centre of the site, which will be further away from roads and houses and as a new building, with new technology, it will be safer. "There will be no increase in the amount of uranium on site or in the number of staff." However, the planning decision on Wednesday evening was objected to by campaigners such as Sian Jones from the Aldermaston Women's Group. She said: "It's just a complete sham. What's the difference between the Iranians having enriched uranium, and us having enriched uranium? None, we're just all making nuclear bombs." Nuclear Information Service director, Peter Burt, criticised what he saw as a lack of consultation. "The planning application was submitted just before the Christmas holiday period and no attempt was made to engage with members of the public to explain the need for the development," he said.

"West Berkshire Council likes to pretend that planning applications submitted by AWE are treated the same as those submitted by anyone else, but no-one else would be allowed to submit a planning application for a factory handling radioactive substances and hazardous chemicals without giving a copper-bottomed explanation of how they intend to manage the risks and guarantee safety." BBC ON THIS DAY | 17 | 1980: Government announces missile sites About This Site | Text Only 1980: Government announces missile sites The locations for the first US nuclear cruise missiles to be stored on British soil have been revealed by the government. Secretary of State for Defence Francis Pym told the House of Commons the 160 missiles would be located at RAF Greenham Common, Berkshire, and the disused RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. Mr Pym said neither of the bases would be used as a launch site. In times of crisis the American-owned warheads will be moved to secret launching sites within 50 miles (80 km) of their storage silos. Although there is no "dual-key" system to launch the weapons, the minister assured the Commons the United States would not use them in an attack without Britain's assent.

The ground-launched missiles will be stored in purpose-built shelters and security will be considerably upgraded at both sites. The UK will contribute 220 personnel to help guard the bases and the cost to the country will be �16m. In an attempt to reassure local communities, Mr Pym said nuclear warheads would not be carried on exercises and no test flying would take place. But the military would regularly practice the dispersal of the weapons to their launch sites after consultation with local authorities. Most of the missiles will be stored at the Greenham Common base. Residents in nearby Newbury vigorously opposed the basing of noisy tanker aircraft so close to them, but seemed resigned to the arrival of the American arms. "If it has to be - so be it," said the District Council Chairman. Cruise Missiles - Destructive power and strategic significance | Newsroom | guardian.co.uk Education: Greenham Common 25 years on Cruise Missiles - Destructive power and strategic significance David Fairhall, the Guardian's defence correspondent during the Greenham Common peace camp, assesses the missiles at the centre of the protest.

guardian.co.uk Each cruise missile based at Greenham Common carried a destructive power (the equivalent to at least 50,000 tons of TNT) four times that of the atomic bomb which obliterated Hiroshima. Greenham's complete force of 96 ground-launched US Tomahawk missiles threatened 400 times the devastation wrought on the Japanese city, with another 64 missiles planned for Molesworth but never fully deployed. The UK based missiles were part of a planned European-wide NATO deployment of 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles to be dispersed across West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Holland, as well as the UK. While many factors prompted the extraordinary women's protest at Greenham Common, the Berkshire base was logically the correct focus of anti-nuclear demonstrations because as the first Cruise missile base to become operational, it was politically the most important. However, it was the Germany based Pershing missiles with their much shorter flight time that caused the Russians more concern. The cruise missiles were the product of NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy of 'flexible response'.

They had an intermediate range (between short-range battlefield artillery and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles) which provided an important rung in the ladder of nuclear escalation should it ever come to outright conflict. Notionally, cruise missiles were intended to match the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe (a move Mikhail Gorbachev regarded as a dangerous provocation on the Warsaw Pact's part.) They certainly alarmed the members of the Warsaw Pact, but domestically, their deployment had the opposite effect to that intended by NATO. Though in retrospect it may seem difficult to believe, European members of the alliance were supposed to be reassured by the presence of these US missiles on their territory. The ground launched version of the missile was chosen precisely to emphasise this visible presence. The locally based weapons would 're-couple' the US nuclear guarantee to the deterrent defence of Western Europe. In fact, as the women's protest demonstrated so spectacularly, the deployment had absolutely the opposite effect domestically. It alarmed Europeans - even some of those who broadly supported NATO's strategy) with the fear that if deterrence failed, the Americans now secretly planned to fight their nuclear war in Europe, devastating our civilisation while leaving their own homeland intact.

David Fairhall's book, Common Ground - the Story of Greenham is available now in the Newsroom's bookshop. CRUISE MISSILE SITES (Hansard, 17 June 1980) CRUISE MISSILE SITES The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Francis Pym) With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about ground-launched cruise missiles. I announced on 13 December last year the NATO Foreign and Defence Minister's decision to modernise the Alliance's long-range theatre nuclear forces. I am now able to advise the House where the 160 cruise missiles to be deployed in the United Kingdom will be stationed. The missiles will be stationed at two existing military establishments. They are the United States Air Force standby base at RAF Greenham Common, in Berkshire, and RAF Moles-worth, a disused airfield in Cambridgeshire, currently used by the United States Air Force for storage purposes. Greenham Common will be the main operating base and will house six flights of cruise missiles. Moles-worth will house four flights. It is planned that the first units will deploy at Greenham Common in 1983.

The factors affecting the decision stemmed from the prime operational need to bring the first missiles into service as soon as possible. The choice had therefore to concentrate on establishments already in defence occupation which had sufficient space available and as many as possible of the basic facilities, in particular, adequate accommodation, road communications, and access to training areas and suitable dispersal areas. Many different locations for stationing have been very carefully studied but the two bases chosen proved to be the most suitable in the light of the considerations to which I have just referred. The deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile force will generate very little aircraft movement at either of the bases—probably no more than a few a month. As to ground movements, it will be necessary from time to time to practise the deployment of the launcher and its support vehicles to dispersed sites away from the base. These exercises will be along preplanned routes and will take place after consultation with the local authorities concerned. 1343 No live missiles, or warheads, will be carried on exercises at any time, and no missile test-flying will take place in this country.

The missiles will be stored in purpose-built shelters in conditions that fully meet the United Kingdom's very stringent safety standards—standards that have proved themselves effective since the inception of a nuclear capability in Britain. As part of the security arrangements we shall be contributing 220 British personnel towards the guard forces for the bases and dispersal deployments. I am having an information folder prepared covering all aspects of the basing of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. Copies will be placed in the Library and will also be sent to the local authorities in the areas concerned. The information folder will also be available to those members of the public living in the areas of the sites who wish to know more about the reasons underlying these decisions. I am notifying the local authorities concerned about the deployment, and their views on the environmental and social aspects of the arrival of the units will be taken into account to the fullest possible extent. They will of course be consulted in due course on the detailed building plans. The total cost to the United Kingdom of the whole modernisation programme thoughout the Alliance will be about £16 million.

As I made clear in the House on 13 December, the 160 missiles to be based in the United Kingdom are an integral part of a programme to deploy 572 United States missiles in a number of European countries. The Alliance-wide support for the new system and its widely spread deployment throughout Europe is a clear expression of the determination of NATO as a whole to preserve its security. The Soviet Union has developed a large and expanding capability in long-range theatre nuclear forces which directly threatens the whole of Western Europe. In view of the markedly increasing threat that we face, the Alliance has decided that it is essential to modernise its own theatre nuclear forces, which are ageing and becoming increasingly vulnerable. At the same time, the Government and the Alliance remain fully 1344 committed to the parallel arms control approach, which was agreed in December as part of the modernisation decision. As the House will be aware, the Soviet Union has rejected repeated offers by the United States to negotiate and has maintained its obviously unacceptable demand that NATO should abandon its modernisation programme as a precondition for negotiation. However, we shall continue to try to persuade the Russians to come to the table and play their part in a genuine negotiation.

The instability in the world today and the growing military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries require us to be exceptionally vigilant. NATO's unanimous decision on theatre nuclear modernisation was taken for the continuing security of the whole Alliance, and the United Kingdom is determined to play her full part. § Mr. Rodgers The whole House will welcome the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has made an oral statement today and not passed the matter off in the way that some of his right hon. Friends do in a written answer. I know that the right hon. Gentleman will understand that even amongst those who accept the inevitable necessity for nuclear weapons and believe that Britain should be properly defended, these decisions and locations are bound to provoke strong feelings and natural anxieties. Although it is principally a matter for hon. Members who are directly concerned, it is right that the Government should accept an obligation to explain why these decisions have been taken and to deal fully with the genuine anxieties of the many people who will be affected by them. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the arrangements for the security of the missiles and the fact that British troops will be available to help. Will he make clear that there is a single responsibility for security and say where it lies?

Whereas the arrangements that he has described are in some ways satisfactory, any divided responsibility would clearly be very dangerous. Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman again confirm that there is no question of the use of these bases except by a joint decision—I repeat, decision—between the 1345 United States and Her Majesty's Government? Finally, the right hon. Gentleman said that the first missiles would not be deployed until 1983. He will know that we attach the greatest importance to using this breathing space to negotiate an agreement that will make it unnecessary for the missiles to be deployed. Clearly the greatest step to such an agreement would be a plain decision by the Soviet Union to abandon its SS20 missile. Despite its present unwillingness to move, will the right hon. Gentleman say that even if it is impossible, in the coming year, to get round the table in further SALT discussions, he will look for ways, perhaps amongst the European members of NATO, to begin genuine negotiations as soon as possible, so that this breathing space is not wasted? § Mr. Pym I certainly understand that a number of people will have anxieties about this decision. I recognised that from the outset.

It is partly for that reason that I have agreed—indeed, volunteered in a positive way—to explain nationally and to individuals, if necessary, what is involved in this deployment. I certainly accept that responsibility. The protection is a United States capability and the responsibility lies with that country, but we shall contribute to it as we believe to be appropriate and valuable in this context. On the question of use, I confirm absolutely and have no hesitation in saying that the political decision requires a joint decision by the two Governments. As to the use of the interval between now and the deployment of the first cruise missiles for further arms control negotiations, if there were a change of heart on the other side of the Iron Curtain, certainly we would talk. But I must point out the facts to the House. In terms of the long-range land-based theatre nuclear forces, NATO has 226 systems altogether whereas the Soviet Union has 920, which is more than four times as many. That is a major imbalance. What is more, one new SS20 with three new warheads is coming into service at a faster rate than one a week.

I say to the House in all seriousness that arms control negotiations could be prejudiced by too great a gap between the 1346 one side and the other. Weakness puts us in a bad negotiating position. It is for this reason that the decision by NATO is so important. None the less, there is an unremitting effort on our part, and we shall take any opportunity that comes along should there be a change of heart on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, there is no sign of it, but, were it to come—were a new situation to be created—of course we would look at it. However, we must be realistic about the facts of the situation today. § Mr. David Steel Is the Secretary of State aware that although the statement is unlikely to be welcomed it is bound to be accepted generally in the country as one of sombre and sad necessity, and part of our general commitment to the NATO Alliance? Will he explain why we do not get a forward statement about the Government's intentions on the Trident missile programme, which is not part of our NATO commitment? We believe that the two should be considered together.

Does he accept that we, for our part, will oppose the expenditure involved in the attempt to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent when we are already undertaking the programme that he has announced? § Mr. Pym I note what the right hon. Gentleman said. Both these weapons systems—the long-range theatre nuclear and the strategic systems—are part of a comprehensive pattern of defence capability and they must be looked at in that light. There is no decision on what is to succeed Polaris, and Polaris, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, is assigned to NATO. Undoubtedly the allies are of the view, as are the United Kingdom Government and as were all our predecessors in the past 25 or 30 years, that the strength of the Alliance and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by this capability. We must come to that other decision when we are ready to take it. This one applies to the whole Alliance, affects other countries in Europe, and is a widely based deployment. We intend to play our full part in fulfilling our obligations to our allies under this arrangement. § Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson Is my right hon.

Friend aware that, in my view, the vast majority of my constituents recognised the threat posed by the build-up 1347 of Soviet arms in the West and by the aggression in Afghanistan, and that Greenham must play its part in NATO's defence posture? Having said that, I should like to ask my right hon. Friend three questions. First, will he reassure my constituents about the storage of nuclear warheads? Can he say that, as far as humanly possible, the danger of a radioactive leak or accident can be ruled out? Secondly, how much of the £16 million modernisation programme is likely to be spent locally? Will it provide possible job opportunities, and are local construction companies likely to be involved? Lastly, does my right hon. Friend's announcement this afternoon essentially resolve the future of Greenham, and will it spare the people of West Berkshire from the threat of noisy aircraft for the future? § Mr. Pym I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he said at the beginning of his questions. I feel sure that the whole House and the country appreciate what the leader of the Liberal Party indicated—that it is a sad necessity, but that for our protection we have to go along with this programme.

I think that I can give a strong reassurance on storage and the extreme unlikelihood of an accident or a leak. The United Kingdom's safety regulations are the most stringent in the world. It is a fact that since we have had nuclear weapons in this country we have been able to preserve ourselves from either an accident or a leak. That is a reassuring fact. The same most stringent regulations will continue in future. Substantially more than £16 million will be spent in this country in connection with this programme. The £16 million is the United Kingdom's contribution to the whole programme, and that is shared throughout NATO. Quite a lot of work will be generated by this decision and it will be available to local contractors, but because it is arranged and organised under the NATO infrastructure scheme we must follow the rules and regulations. That means that it must be done by tender. However, I am sure that contractors in or near my hon. Friend's constituency will put in competitive tenders, so it is to be hoped that they will get the job. 1348 I have no plans to alter the present status of Greenham Common as a standby base, but I think that this decision finally resolves the status of that airfield. § Mr.

Ioan Evans When the Secretary of State is making his decisions about nuclear arms, will he read the speech made by the late Earl Mountbatten of Burma, in which he said that it was nuclear nonsense to believe that by increasing the total uncertainty one increases one's own certainty? Is the Secretary of State aware that if a 100-megaton nuclear bomb dropped on London, steel would melt in Watford and Slough and rayon would melt in Birmingham and Bristol? Surely we should try to return to talks about nuclear disarmament rather than join the arms race. § Mr. Pym I had the privilege of conversations on that subject with the late Lord Mountbatten before his death. I recall his speech accurately. He was strongly against any unilateralism. Defence must be carried out on a multilateral basis if it is to be carried out at all. The whole object of the decisions is to preserve peace and to prevent war. I do not think that anyone who thought deeply about the subject would have anything good to say about unilateralism. § Mr. Major Is my right hon. Friend aware that I fully support the Government's decision to install cruise missiles in Britain, notwithstanding the fact that many of them will be sited in my constituency?

Will he specifically reassure my constituents in Molesworth that no live missiles will be transported to and from that site, that no live warheads will be used on local exercises, that there will be no local test flying of cruise missiles, and that he will use his best endeavours to ensure that there is the minimum possible impact on the local environment? § Mr. Pym I am grateful for my hon. Friend's support for the Government's decisions. I assure him that no live missiles will be used on exercises and that there will be no test flying of those missiles in the United Kingdom. It has never been the practice to indicate where the missiles will be stored, but they are being stored under conditions of the greatest safety, as I said in reply to an earlier question. Would it not greatly improve the chance of nuclear disarmament and the early ratification of SALT II if the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan? § Mr. Pym That would create an entirely new position in the world. It would be a great relief to everyone. My right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary has taken initiatives to try to achieve that end. Unfortunately, there appears to be not the slightest sign that that will happen.

If it did, it would create a totally different position. § Mr. Farr I congratulate my right hon. Friend on all that he is doing to strengthen the NATO partnership. Is he aware that his American counterpart said that the firing of the missiles will be an American responsibility alone? Under those circumstances, will he make arrangements to ensure that firing will be impossible without the use of a British-held master key? § I adhere to what I told the House earlier. The decision to fire will be a joint political decision. That is the arrangement that exists between ourselves and the United States. § Mr. Frank Allaun Does it matter where the missiles are stationed? In a time of military tension they would be widely dispersed. Would not the enemy destroy virtually the whole of Britain as a launching pad for the American missiles if we were suicidal enough to oppose it? Is the Secretary of State aware that next Sunday the Labour Party will demonstrate the country's opposition to the missiles? § Mr. Pym I think that I heard the hon. Gentleman correctly when he said "If we were suicidal enough to oppose it"—meaning the Soviet Union. That is abject surrender.

There are thousands of potential targets throughout Western Europe on which the Soviet Union could pick if it so wished, and if it wanted to launch a nuclear attack out of the blue—which everyone thinks is extremely unlikely. It has the capability. It will soon have a comprehensive capability to hit almost all targets with the SS20s that it is churning out at a rate of more than one a week, including three new warheads each. If the Soviet Union would give some indication that it would stop doing that, it might give us some hope to think that 1350 it would be prepared to negotiate downwards. However, it has refused to negotiate at all, and is steadily and remorselessly increasing its nuclear capability. We should be concerned about that. § Mr. Eldon Griffiths Because of the difficulties faced by the United States Air Force in building shelters for the Fills, will my right hon. Friend lend all his assistance to ensure that the underground shelters are built expeditiously, so that the weapon can be rapidly deployed? Will he say something about the point defence, and whether there is a role for Rapier?

In his publication of information for the general public, will he not only give the devastating figures that he has given to the House but rebut the arguments of those who wish to shelter under the American nuclear umbrella while quite unwilling to help them carry it? § Mr. Pym We shall do everything possible to ensure that the shelters are completed on time and that we do not become embroiled in the difficulties that have existed in some cases in East Anglia. On the question of point defence and the possibility of Rapier, only in the circumstances of a bolt-from-the-blue attack would those stations be vulnerable. As my hon. Friend knows, the design of the weapons system is such that in a time of tension, or if it is thought that the position is deteriorating, the weapons are sent from the bases to other areas, and no one knows where they will be. Therefore, the stations themselves are reasonably safe from the possibility of a direct attack. On the question of public presentation, I do all that I can to make those points. It is crucial to appreciate that we cannot defend ourselves by ourselves ; neither can any other member of NATO. We can do so only by co-operating with our Allies.

As a Government, we are dedicating ourselves to ensuring that that occurs. § Does the Secretary of State recall that the December communiqu6 saw the arms control negotiations taking place within the SALT process? If so, did he seriously imagine that those negotiations could commence while SALT II remained unratified? § Mr. Pym There is no reason why the negotiations should not commence if 1351 there was a complete change of heart on the other side of the Iron Curtain. If the Russians were prepared to talk in a realistic and genuine manner we would be prepared—indeed, we would desire—to sit down and talk to them. § Mr. Cormack Will my right hon. Friend take a little time to write personally to the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun), the chairman of the Labour Party, and all those who think like him, to explain three matters? Will he explain, first, precisely the events that are taking place in Afghanistan; secondly, the nature of the SS20 and details of its deployment; and, thirdly, the details of the free exchanges that do not take place in the Supreme Soviet and the Praesidium of the Soviet Union? § Mr.

Pym I would not single out the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun). I wish to present to the public all those aspects, and others, of our decisions. I have done my best to do so already at every available opportunity. § Mr. Cryer Do not the cruise missiles represent a distinct escalation of the arms race? Is it not true that they are difficult to verify and that that is regarded as an asset by the Secretary of State? Are there not graver dangers in the vicinity through the road movement of the missiles? Does the Secretary of State agree that there will be widespread local and national opposition to an escalation of the arms race? Does he accept that already NATO and United States nuclear missiles outnumber Warsaw Pact and Soviet missiles by two to one? Is that not a step towards a graver danger? § Mr. Pym As I explained to the House earlier, the number of long-range and land-based systems is greater in the Soviet Union by more than four to one when compared to the Alliance. Even if all 572 cruise missiles and Pershing IIs were in existence now, and deployed tomorrow, we should still be outnumbered in that area by the Soviet Union. § Mr.

Churchill Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the ground-launched cruise missiles have little to do with the defence of the United States but are evidence of the strong, vital and ongoing commitment of the United States to the 1352 defence of Western Europe, and should be welcomed as such? § I agree that they are part of a comprehensive defensive capability. § Miss Joan Lestor Bearing in mind the block on any questions about the base about which I am not allowed to speak, and the widespread concern in many parts of the country that will follow the announcement that has just been made, will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that there will be no such block on any questions surrounding the activities around these bases and all questions emanating from them? § Mr. Pym I am thankful to say that the question of blocking questions, Mr. Speaker, is a matter not for me but for you. [HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."] What I want to block is any aggressive activity by a potential enemy, and I want to preserve the peace and the security not only of the United Kingdom but of any allies and friends. That is my objective.

So far as possible, as I think I have indicated, I wish to do all that I can positively to explain everything relating to this decision, why it is necessary, how it will work, and so on. I think that that is the most forthright way in which I can try to help explain, not only to the House but principally to the public, the importance of the decision. § Mr. Tapsell I fully support my right hon. Friend in his statement and congratulate him on the leading and constructive role that he has played in the NATO discussions that have led to it. If one of the reasons why it is necessary for us to have these missiles is the growing and formidable capacity of the Soviet Union to make a first strike against the NATO countries, why is it wise to have only two of these bases? Is it really wise to assume that we can ignore the possibility of the bolt out of the blue? § Mr. Pym We cannot ignore the possibility of the bolt out of the blue, but it is the one that really introduces a holocaust that we have dedicated ourselves to try to prevent. The point about the cruise missiles is that they will not be on just two bases.

There are 10 nights altogether, and at a time of tension, or in war, they will not all be deployed in the same place. They will be deployed in many different places. Therefore, the number of targets 1353 is enormous. That is why it is not necessary to have more than two bases. § Mr. Dalyell Will the Secretary of State forgive us for our somewhat sour and hollow laugh when he emphasises the words "joint decision"? What joint decision took place in relation to Diego Garcia and the exchange of letters? If the emphasis is on joint decision, and if the Americans had meant it, why the reluctance to give us a dual key system? Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the question that was put to him by his hon. Friend the Member for Har-borough (Mr. Farr)? § Mr. Pym We could have a dual key if we shared in the cost and the ownership of the weapon, but we do not; it is a United States weapon. The dual key is appropriate in the circumstances of joint ownership, which applies in some cases. It is not appropriate in this case.

We have taken the view that it is neither necessary nor a very sensible use of our very limited resources to have joint ownership, because the United States is willing to meet the cost of it. That is why there is no dual key but there is a joint decision. For all his assiduousness, I think that the hon. Gentleman is in danger of doing a disservice by creating a wrong impression. What matters for the defence of the West, the maintenance of peace and the continuation of freedom is that the allies and all those countries in the rest of the world combine together and rely upon each other and make their own contribution to the mutual defence of the West. By continually going on about one particular matter, the hon. Gentleman is, I think, trying to create a wrong impression. There is, as there has been for years, a very close alliance between ourselves and our European and American allies. We are entirely confident and content with the present arrangements. They are working mutually to our advantage and the advantage of the preservation of peace. Whereas, of course, the hon.

Gentleman can ask any questions he likes, the crucial point is to realise that if the free world co-ordinates its efforts there is no reason whatsoever why, be- 1354 tween us, we should not continue to preserve the peace. § Mr. Gummer Is my right hon. Friend aware that my constituents and others in Suffolk have willingly supported a high proportion of the present nuclear deterrent, and were willing and would be willing to continue, if that were necessary? In those circumstances, though, can he say whether a number of the warheads at present deployed in the United Kingdom, some of which are in my constituency, will not now need to be deployed, because of the decisions mentioned in his announcement today? § Order. I propose to call those hon. Members who have been rising in their places from the beginning of questions. § Mr. Bidwell Will the right hon. Gentleman explain that in spite of his detailed explanation today, this decision will greatly stimulate millions of his fellow countrymen who are patriots and who believe in the defence of Britain to support the campaign for unilateral nuclear disarmament, on ground of this country's then being able more intelligently to play a role on the world scene? § Mr.

Pym It ought not to do so. I hope that it will not do so. Indeed, I think that the great majority of people in this country are very supportive of the defence efforts being made by this country, and appreciate the need for them. After all, 1355 some of us have been involved in war before, and we remember what happened when we became too weak. Whereas there is no desire on our part, or the Alliance's part, to match the Soviet Union weapon for weapon, we must nevertheless be sure that between us all we have an adequate guard, so that peace and freedom can continue. § Mr. Kilfedder Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that at some time some country—some Government—must take the first historic step to end the nuclear stampede before a nuclear holocaust is unleashed on the world either through mistake or through fear? Surely this Government and this country should lead the way, since we pride ourselves on justice rather than that Britain should be treated as the first line in the defence of the United States. § Mr. Pym I do not think that it is at all right to look upon this country in that light.

All I can say is that I do not support unilateralism. I think that almost everyone who has thought deeply about this matter realises that that is an unsound path down which to go. Everyone dislikes nuclear weapons, but we cannot dis-invent them. We have managed to keep the peace for the last 30 years, and we are dedicating ourselves to continue that process for the rest of time. § Mr. Faulds Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that many of us on the Opposition Benches who are not prepared to kiss the ring of Marx are nevertheless deeply concerned about the deployment in Britain of cruise missiles that are not under our immediate control—whatever the right hon. Gentleman says—because of the dangers of going along with American policy, either in foreign affairs or in defence matters, in America's present political hysteria, which some of us have, sadly, come to know in conversations in the last few months, both with the State Department and with members of the National Security Council? § Mr. Pym I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman says, but I would point out that this was a unanimous decision of NATO. It was not just a United States decision, with support from us.

We have been in that situation before now, but this decision was taken unanimously by all the members of NATO. Mr. Delwyn Williams Does my right hon. Friend agree that Britain should have an independent power of operating the cruise missile, on the grounds, first, that we face retaliation ; secondly, the genuine fear of many British people that America would not respond at all, or perhaps slowly, in the event of a Russian thrust into Europe; and, thirdly, the added strategic attraction of a dual control centre? § Mr. Pym As the United States will be stationing these missiles in various countries in Europe, including the United Kingdom, we have taken the view that it is not necessary, nor is it a very sensible use of our limited resources, also to have our own completely separate cruise missiles. § Mr. James Lamond Since the unanimous decision was taken by NATO to deploy these missiles in Western Europe at least two weeks before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, how can the Secretary of State pretend that that intervention played any, part in the decision making? Does the right hon.

Gentleman realise that one of the reasons given today by himself, that he was very anxious to press on with the preparations for stationing these missiles in Britain, is effectively destroying any hope that we have of multilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, which has, despite what the Secretary of State said, changed its position, slightly at least, in the last few weeks, by saying that it no longer demands the abandonment of this decision but is prepared to negotiate provided that the decision is suspended to allow the negotiations to go ahead? § Mr. Pym In answer to the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, I have never suggested that the invasion of Afghanistan had anything to do with this decision. The decision was taken before that. In answer to the second part of the question, I do not think that the representation of the Soviet position is as the hon. Gentleman describes. I have already indicated to the House the massive superiority of the Soviet Union over the rest of the Alliance in this type of weapon, and I have also indicated the rate at which new weapons of that type are being created in the Soviet Union. That is not happening in the NATO Alliance at present.

If 1357 there is a change of heart in the Soviet Union we shall review the decision. § Mr. Ernie Ross Does the Secretary of State accept that in a week when the House debated the Brandt report, which clearly outlined the disparities between North and South and showed that hundreds of millions of people exist in poverty, his statement today that Britain will spend £16 million on a weapon that will never be fired will be found particularly offensive? § Mr. Pym If we do not protect ourselves adequately, and if we do not have an adequate shield, freedom and democracy will not be continued into the future. I also point out to the hon. Gentleman the remarkable fact that the Soviet Union pays scant regard to the needs of other countries. It makes a very small contribution in terms of foreign aid. It will supply weapons if necessary, but practically no foreign aid. We should also take that point into account. It is all the more reason to make sure that we are adequately defended. It we are not, the whole world may be taken over by the Soviet Union, and we can imagine the fantastic mess that would result. Mr. Ron Brown The Government are great supporters of secret ballots.

May I take it that the Minister will also organise a ballot of the people who live in areas surrounding these missile sites, or is that stretching democracy too far? § Mr. Pym As the hon. Gentleman knows, that has never been the practice, nor would it be sensible to take decisions on major matters of national and Alliance security on the basis of local polls. People can express opinions, but decisions on national security—a concern that everyone shares—must be taken by national Governments, and the House understands that. § Mr. Frank Allaun On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It is a long-established custom in the House that if a question has been asked previously hon. Members cannot table the same question again. The Table Office forbids it. But this afternoon my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Lestor) asked a supplementary question. I have been a Member of the House for a fairly long time, and I have never known a supplementary 1358 question to be barred because it had been asked previously. May I ask for your guidance on this point, Mr. Speaker? § Mr. Speaker It is quite simple.

I am willing to make another statement tomorrow when I have looked at the matter again, but if a question is not permissible at the Table Office it is not permissible as a supplementary question. It is as simple as that. I shall look at the matter further in case I need to correct myself. § Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. When you look at the matter further tomorrow, will you lake into account that question No. 32 on the Order Paper on Diego Garcia implied considerations of troop movements? § Ground Launched Cruise Missile Wing in Europe Search billions of records on Ancestry.com Twenty years ago, the U. S. Air Force activated its first Ground Launched Cruise Missile Wing in Europe. The Short, Happy Life of the Glick-Em By Peter Grier, July 2002 On July 1, 1982, USAF's 501st Tactical Missile Wing was activated at RAF Greenham Common in Great Britain. That step--taken 20 years ago this month--marked the start of what would prove to be a major political upheaval in Europe. Noisy protesters came early for the arrival of the wing's first batch of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.

However, US troops brought them in late at night, as the protesters slept. The Ground Launched Cruise Missile, with its combined transport and launch vehicle shown here, had a short operational life but proved to be an effective counter to Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. Flash forward 18 months, to Dec. 12, 1983. Greenham Common on that day was besieged by thousands of women anti-nuclear activists. They were chanting, singing, and blowing trumpets in protest of the presence of the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. These anti-nuclear zealots even briefly penetrated a perimeter fence protecting the base against intruders. A makeshift "peace camp" had been established outside the main gate. Resident activists vowed to live there indefinitely in an attempt to force NATO to abandon its planned deployment of several hundred BGM-109G GLCM (pronounced "glick-em") weapons and the US Army's nuclear-tipped Pershing II ballistic missiles. The burgeoning Western anti-nuclear movement did not regard these new weapons as a much-needed counter to the Soviet Union's SS-20 intermediate-range missiles.

For the protesters, they were a terrifying sign of the Western alliance's determination to be able to fight and win a nuclear war, if necessary. In short they were, by definition, bad. "They don't add to our security, but [they] increase our insecurity," asserted Bruce Kent, who was at the time the head of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Now They're Gone Today, all of the GLCMs are gone, withdrawn from Greenham Common and every other NATO base in Europe and dismantled. The huge M.A.N. (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg) diesel tractors no longer haul the GLCM canisters around the surrounding Salisbury Plain on midnight deployment exercises, as they once did. The protests are no more. However, the demonstrations had nothing to do with the removal of the weapons. Contrary to the protesters' beliefs, the GLCMs (and their strategic cousins, the Pershing IIs) did not destabilize the West. In fact, NATO's deployment of the weapons in the face of popular unrest had a destabilizing effect in the other direction.

The West's ability to stand firm and carry out the deployments in the face of nerve-wracking Soviet threats convinced the Kremlin that NATO could not be intimidated. It was this realization that led to the opening of the more serious Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and an INF treaty that eventually removed an entire class of nuclear arms from the superpower arsenals--a major step in the weakening and ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. The GLCM existed for less than a decade. Because the weapon system had such a short operational life, some Air Force members had the unusual experience of being on hand at both the beginning and the end. The happy circumstances of its demise also gave many GLCM personnel the feeling that they had helped shape world events for the better. "We thought GLCM held a very important place in history," said retired Col. Doug Livingston, former commander of the 868th Tactical Missile Training Group. "It was one of the key elements that helped win the Cold War." Throughout the tumultuous years of US-Soviet INF negotiations, the Army's Pershing II tended to get the most media attention. It was big, powerful, accurate, and fast-flying.

It would have been the weapon of choice to strike time-sensitive Soviet targets in the event of all-out war. In some ways, however, the GLCM was the system most feared by the Soviets. For one thing, they were to be more numerous than the Pershings. Plans called for deployment of 464 cruise missiles in Belgium, Britain, Italy, Netherlands, and West Germany. By contrast, NATO forces were to receive only 108 Pershing IIs, and they would be based only in West Germany. The GLCMs also represented an area of NATO technological superiority. At the time, Soviet weapons-makers were unable to duplicate the sophisticated guidance systems of US GLCMs. The GLCM deployment of the 1980s had roots in political events of the 1970s. By the middle of that decade, it had become clear to NATO planners that the Soviet Union intended to undertake a concerted effort to modernize its Intermediate-range Nuclear Force targeted on NATO Europe. Anti-nuclear protesters feared GLCMs would destablize the West. By 1981 they established a permanent "peace camp" outside the main gate of Greenham Common. (USAF photo by SSgt.

James Pearson) The SS-20 Threat Until that time, the most threatening weapons aimed at Western Europe were the single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 theater missiles, based at vulnerable fixed sites. In 1977, however, Soviet forces began to field the new SS-20, a missile fitted with three accurate, independently retargetable warheads. Worse, its launcher was highly mobile, allowing their dispersal at times of tension. Each launcher was equipped with refire missiles. This signified an increase in Soviet firepower on a tremendous scale. By 1979, Soviet forces had fielded SS-20s in significant numbers. In that year, NATO political leaders agreed on a historic "dual track" approach to solving the problem. One track was political: The West would attempt to engage the Soviets in serious talks aimed at curbing the INF forces of both sides. The other track was military: NATO would deploy in Europe hundreds of GLCMs and Pershing IIs unless Moscow agreed to stop and then reduce its SS-20 deployments. For the Western alliance, the matter went far beyond the need to have equivalent forces.

NATO's worry was that, in nuclear parlance of the time, the Soviet buildup would "decouple" the defense of Europe from the US strategic nuclear arsenal. In other words, Moscow might believe it could threaten Western Europe's high-value targets--ports, rear-echelon areas, and the like--with SS-20 nuclear attack and not provoke US retaliation because it was not threatening US strategic weapons or US soil. Deployment of NATO INF forces was an attempt to make the West's nuclear deterrent more credible, by providing commanders nuclear options short of all-out retaliatory war. Western Europe's leaders, in particular, were eager to show that the continent was still shielded by the US strategic nuclear umbrella despite the existence of the SS-20 threat. Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, told Congress in a 1980 message: "We do not plan to match the Soviet program system by system or warhead by warhead, which might be construed as an attempt to create a European nuclear balance separate from the overall strategic relationship. ...

Instead, we seek to strengthen the linkage of US strategic forces to the defense of Europe." NATO planners chose to deploy a pair of weapons to counter the Soviet SS-20 because the GLCM and the Pershing II had distinctive, complementary characteristics. The new Pershing was a follow-on to the existing, shorter range Pershing IA. As a ballistic missile, it offered a high assurance of penetrating any Soviet defenses. Its speed enabled it to threaten time-sensitive targets. It was designed to take advantage of the existing Pershing IA infrastructure in Europe. The smaller GLCMs were projected to have lower life-cycle costs. Their longer range--1,550 miles--allowed them to be based farther from the front lines. This increased their survivability and--not incidentally--allowed more allied nations to accept deployments on their territory. As Brown put it: "The deployment of a mixed ballistic/cruise missile force hedges against the failure of one type of system, provides the flexibility to select the best weapon for a given mission, and greatly complicates enemy planning." In a crisis, the GLCM system would be deployed to secret, presurveyed launch sites. At top, a camouflaged GLCM unit was hard to spot.

Here, a GLCM was fired during a test launch in the US. (USAF photo by TSgt. Bill Thompson) Naval Origins The Air Force's BGM-109G GLCM, nicknamed Gryphon, did not begin life as an Air Force system. It was a modified version of the Navy's Tomahawk sea launched cruise missile. Development began in 1977. Because of the political need for the system, the GLCM passed rapidly from concept through development, but its progress was not always smooth. Engineers found that they needed to do much more than simply slap a Tomahawk on a trailer and hand the driver a portable radio. Development of the Transporter Erector Launcher and associated infrastructure such as the launch control center was a task that proved to be far more complicated than first imagined. Crashes of test vehicles also caused the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office to decertify the missile on two occasions. The finished production missile was almost 21 feet long, with its stubby wings stretching out to about nine feet. Top speed was just under Mach 1. The Convair Division of General Dynamics was the prime contractor.

McDonnell Douglas made the guidance system, and Williams International/Teledyne provided the small F107 turbofan power plant GLCMs were stored in protective aluminum canisters with their wings, control fins, and engine inlets retracted. In a crisis, the canisters would be loaded onto Transporter Erector Launchers--giant 78,000-pound tractor trailers. The TELs and their support vehicles would be deployed to secret, presurveyed launch sites in remote areas of the host country. Coordinates for the launch location, along with weather information, were then to be entered in the missile's flight computer. Two launch officers would have taken 20 minutes to enter launch codes received by satellite. Once authorized, the officers would have simultaneously pressed "execute" buttons. GLCMs were blasted out of their launch tubes by a solid-fuel rocket booster. Once clear of the canister, the booster was jettisoned and the missile's wings, control fins, and engine inlet would snap into place. The turbofan engine then took over and powered the missile on a precise, preprogrammed route to a target hundreds of miles away.

The GLCM was intended to overfly friendly nations at high altitudes to save fuel. Approaching hostile territory, it would then drop to an altitude of about 50 feet above ground level and its terrain-following guidance system would steer it toward its target. On final approach it would swoop upward to avoid any physical barriers and then plunge down onto the designated impact point. Likely targets would have been second-echelon fixed sites such as the Kronstadt naval base or the Severomorsk headquarters of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Source of Crews On July 1, 1981, the 868th Tactical Missile Training Squadron, Davis- Monthan AFB, Ariz., became operational. The 868th was the only US-based GLCM unit and the source of the crews that staffed the forward deployed wings a year later. Many GLCM personnel were missileers who switched over from ICBM duty. Coming from an environment that focused on fixed-site systems, many found the mobility of their new weapon, and all the bouncing about the countryside that training entailed, both strange and exhilarating. "It was new to everybody," said Livingston.

"That's what made it so exciting." Livingston served as a GLCM test official and then training group commander. He can claim to have been involved with the launch of the first Gryphon as well as the destruction of the last one under the INF accord. The six overseas NATO units, in order of their deployment, were as follows: July 1982, 501st Tactical Missile Wing, RAF Greenham Common, UK June 1983, 487th TMW, Comiso AB, Italy August 1984, 485th TMW, Florennes AB, Belgium April 1985, 38th TMW, Wueschheim AB, West Germany December 1986, 303rd TMW, RAF Molesworth, UK August 1987, 486th TMW, Woensdrecht AB, Netherlands Comiso Air Base, located on Sicily, was far removed from Italy's large population centers and thus was somewhat insulated from the anti-nuclear movement then sweeping Europe. All of the other GLCM bases were, to some extent, subjected to political protests--sometimes intense ones.

The permanent Greenham Common peace camp was probably the most famous concentration of protesters. The peace camp, a semiorganized band of squatters who lived outside the facility's gates for years, was a constant irritant to base officials. Anti-nuclear protesters occasionally would breach exterior defenses and reach logistics buildings. They always seemed to know when GLCM units would be leaving the base to practice launch deployments on Salisbury Plain. Not that such convoys were easy to hide. A full deployment consisted of more than 20 vehicles, most of which were filled with security guards and logistics support for the TEL and the mobile launch centers. "It was tough," recalled Livingston, then the GLCM wing's deputy commander for logistics at Greenham Common. "We had to 'protester proof' the vehicles." That meant, for instance, installing safety wiring over the gas caps to prevent the insertion of foreign material or protecting parts of the vehicles against the ever-present paint bombs thrown by protesters. "They may have slowed us down a bit, but there were never any serious accidents," said Livingston. Formal talks began between the US and USSR in 1981, but the INF treaty wasn't signed until 1987. The US then began removing GLCM systems from Europe.

Here, a unit is loaded aboard a C-5A for the trip back to the US. (USAF photo by Sgt. David Jablonski) Fringe and Freeze Greenham Common residents were the colorful fringe of the anti-nuke movement. Protests were often scheduled to coincide with solstices, equinoxes, and other astrologically significant events and took on overtly pagan characteristics. The camp survived for years following the withdrawal of the last GLCM. It was maintained as a permanent protest against nuclear weapons everywhere. At one point, its residents petitioned the local council to have the camp declared a historic national site. The Greenham Common protestors were part of a larger Western movement that gathered considerable force in the 1980s. In some European nations, the anti-nuclear sentiment grew so large that political leaders weren't sure they could fulfill commitments to host the weapons. In the US, anti-nuke sentiment surfaced in a widespread nuclear freeze movement. In many ways, the opposition to NATO's new INF forces reflected the old split between what might be called "nuclear minimalists" and "nuclear warfighters." The former group included those who believed that a small, survivable force of nuclear weapons was adequate for deterrence.

The godfather of this view was Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who, in his years at the Pentagon (1961-68), moved to limit the nuclear weapons budget as much as possible. The latter group believed that a more elaborate, flexible arsenal produced sounder deterrence. Those who held this view--including most of the senior leadership of the Air Force and the other military services--thought that an adversary would be less likely to launch a nuclear strike if it believed a US president had retaliatory options short of all-out nuclear response. To minimalists, the GLCMs and Pershing IIs were at best redundant and at worst provocative. They rejected the whole idea of "linking" US and Western Europe together via placement of new INF systems on European soil. The leading proponent of this view was Paul Warnke, the dovish director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Carter Administration. "There is no military justification" for cruise missile deployment, Warnke wrote in an op-ed article in the Washington Post. "The potential targets for these missiles are already covered by ballistic missiles." Warnke was enthusiastic about depriving the US of nuclear weapons.

He urged the Reagan Administration to quickly strike an arms deal that would halt the deployment of the American GLCMs and Pershing IIs in return only for a reduction--not the elimination--of the Soviet SS-20 force. Warnke opined that, without progress on arms control, "The United States will face a further deterioration in its relations with the Soviet Union, and Western Europe's confidence in American leadership will decline." In the end, of course, Reagan declined to take Warnke's advice. Formal INF talks between the US and the USSR began in 1981 but didn't really get serious until the major deployments began. The US position was a simple one: "zero-zero"--elimination of the new longer-range INF systems in Europe by both sides. Moscow, for its part, proposed a limit of 300 missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, with British and French nuclear systems counting toward NATO's quota. The INF treaty called for destruction of all but eight display articles. Here, at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz., a circular saw cuts through the door of a GLCM transport-launch vehicle. (USAF photo by MSgt.

Jose Lopez Jr.) Soviet Walkout At the time, GLCM deployments had not yet begun, and with the power of the anti-nuclear movement still building, the Soviets must have thought time was on their side. But NATO hung together. After additional US systems began arriving in Europe in late 1983, the USSR walked out of the talks. No negotiations took place in 1984. Eventually, Moscow blinked and agreed to come back to the negotiating table. In January 1985, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed to parallel talks on INF, strategic forces, and defense and space issues. That fall, Moscow hinted that it wanted an INF treaty separate from the other negotiating tracks. Soviet negotiators offered a proposal that would have allowed NATO to keep some GLCMs--but which still would have permitted SS-20 warheads equal to GLCM and British and French forces combined. This was clearly unacceptable to the West. Then the pace of events began to accelerate.

High-level discussions took place in 1986, capped by the confusion caused by the October 1986 summit between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. In February 1987, the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to work an INF deal detached from all other nuclear issues. That July, Gorbachev agreed to the original US zero-zero position. He also agreed to then unprecedented verification protocols, including on-site monitoring of INF production facilities. The political context of the INF accords will be a subject of historical inquiry for years to come. Deteriorating internal conditions in the USSR clearly played a part in Soviet decisions. Perhaps Reagan's determination to pump billions into strategic defense technology contributed, too. The agreement also validated NATO's original two-track response to the advent of the SS-20. The deployment of GLCMs and Pershing IIs demonstrated in a convincing manner the depth of the US commitment to European security and the strength of alliance solidarity. The two sides signed the INF treaty in 1987, and soon thereafter the Air Force began withdrawing its GLCMs from Europe.

By May 1991, all were gone, sawed up into expensive scrap. All, that is, except for the eight display articles permitted under terms of the treaty. The US Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, has the first of the Gryphons that went on alert at Greenham Common. The Ground Launched Cruise Missile Historical Foundation dedicated a second display article this spring at the Pima Air and Space Museum in Tucson, Ariz. Eventually the GLCM foundation hopes to have a full display reflecting all the capabilities of a squadron, including launch facilities and security forces. "We knew all along we were political pawns," said Livingston, who serves as president of the foundation. "Everybody knew the importance of what we were doing. That pride has carried over to today." Peter Grier, a Washington, D.C., editor for the Christian Science Monitor, is a longtime defense correspondent and a contributing editor to Air Force Magazine. His most recent article, " Meltdown of the Nuclear Critics ," appeared in the June 2002 issue. Copyright Air Force Association. All rights reserved

Question: Where in Berkshire were Britain's first Cruise missiles based
Answer: Greenham Common