Army top brass had doubts over Lt Col 'H' Jones's Falklands VC - Telegraph Army top brass had doubts over Lt Col 'H' Jones's Falklands VC Lt Col Herbert Jones By Ben Fenton 12:01AM BST 28 Mar 2005 The best-known Victoria Cross award of the post-war era was surrounded by controversy from the earliest days and questioned at the highest levels of the military, newly-released documents have revealed. Lt Col Herbert Jones, universally known simply as 'H', was awarded the VC for charging Argentine positions defending the settlement of Goose Green during the first land battle of the Falklands conflict. He died in the act, but his men, the 2nd Bn Parachute Regiment (2 Para), went on to take all of their objectives against heavy odds. Some time later, authors and historians began to report doubts about the award, suggesting that his actions were ill-judged and rash, much to the anger of his friends and many former comrades.

Related Articles Rallying charge was 'devastating display of courage' 28 Mar 2005 But files show that even by the time the first recommendations for medals were received in London, less than six weeks after the final recapture of the Falklands, these doubts were already circulating. The VC is awarded only on the recommendation to the Queen by the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary and they act only on the recommendation of the VC committee for the relevant service. This committee is made up of three senior officers and the deputy permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defence. In turn, they act on the recommendations made through the chain of command, when senior officers can offer various levels of support for an award, from simply recommending them to strongly, or very strongly recommending them. The new papers show that Lt Col Jones's citation was "very strongly recommended" by the overall commander of Land Forces for the campaign. But his superior, the Task Force commander Adml Sir John Fieldhouse, had given it "only" a recommendation. The files also show that the committees considered awarding him a posthumous Military Cross instead.

Papers composed by or for Lt Gen Sir Roland Guy, the Military Secretary of the Army and secretary to the VC committee, give an insight into why this may have happened. Sir Roland wrote to his colleagues about Lt Col Jones on July 24, 1982: "It can be argued that [his] action was reckless and that at a critical moment in the attack he needlessly risked his life and showed a lack of judgment rather than conspicuous bravery. "It is clear from the citation, however, that his action, which epitomises the determination, drive and offensive spirit which exemplified his leadership of the Battalion, was committed at what was the critical and pivotal moment of the battle; that its effect upon the enemy and his own battalion was decisive and that such action was necessary at that moment to break the stalemate which had already lasted an hour or more." Sir Roland did not include in his recommendation the remarks of his deputy, who had written: "The fact is that Jones's single-minded determination to get on, to close with and destroy the enemy so inspired his own battalion that they went to achieve a feat of arms which defied all accepted military theory.

"It set the tenor for subsequent British land operations and gave the enemy a marked sense of inferiority in combat. There is no doubt that his VC, if approved, will also, inseparably, be 2 Para's VC." A similar approach had already been taken by a tri-service committee set up specially by the MoD "to adjudicate on overall standards [inserted] & to monitor the number of awards by grades to each service" arising from the conflict. They wrote of Lt Col Jones: "His was considered to be the key action at a moment of stalemate which probably unlatched the gate to further momentum and ultimate success. "There could be a view that his action was hot-headed and ill-judged but this did not detract from the conspicuous bravery he showed." Maj Gen [then Brig] Julian Thompson, his commanding officer, said: "In my opinion, a commanding officer does occasionally have to put his life on the line. I do not in any way think H was doing the wrong thing when he died.

"I know that he was an impatient man, but that does not in any way detract from what he did." He told The Telegraph: "I think it was perfectly fair of them to describe that as 2 Para's VC. They were given a bloody awful job by me and were given no support and they won that battle with no support." Major Chris Keeble, then the executive officer of 2 Para, who took command when Lt Col Jones died, said of his commander's "reckless" charge: "At that moment we had to get going to sustain the momentum. "There is no question about it, it was a horrible, beastly battle and our momentum had to be sustained. "It was the first land battle of the campaign and it really mattered. Things had not gone well at sea. We needed a victory both militarily and politically. We needed to break the enemy's will. "It's summed up in the vignette of H's action. This is virtue and integrity that is at stake. "It's not performance management. It's valour. I know we live in an age of performance management, but this is a completely different lens we are looking through.

"This is a man living up to what he stood for, for what the battalion stood for, for what the Army stood for." Battle of Goose Green Goose Green The Battle of Goose Green ( May 27th to May 28th , 1982 ) was the first major land-battle of the Falklands War. After the British landed at San Carlos , the nearest Argentine position was Goose Green. It was felt that the position could not be ignored, and moreover that a quick victory at Goose Green would boost British morale and momentum. The British forces consisted of three companies of the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment ("2 PARA"), total strength around 600 men, supported by three 105mm artillery pieces from 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, one MILAN anti-tank missile platoon, Scout helicopters and three RAF Harriers . They attacked the Argentines holding Goose Green and the nearby settlement at Darwin, after a softening up bombardment by naval gunfire. In overall command of the British force was Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones, known to his men as simply H.

The defending Arrgentine forces, known as Task Force Mercedes consisted of the 12th Infantry Regiment (RI 12) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Italo Piaggi, and a company of the 25th Infantry Regiment (RI 25), totalling over 1,000 men. These troops were backed by a battery of 20mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns and two Oerlikon 35mm anti-aircraft guns, all of which were employed in a ground support role, as well as four 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment, with air support from Pucarás based in Port Stanley. After heavy fighting, including the death of British commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones (who was posthumously awarded a Victoria Cross), the British eventually overcame the larger Argentine force . The British lost 17 killed and 64 wounded. The Argentines lost 47 killed, 120 wounded and around 1,000 captured. Additionally, the British captured a large quantity of Argentine weapons and stores.

One noteable incident was that the BBC World Service announced the taking of Goose Green before it actually happened. This broadcast may have forewarned the Argentines to the impending attack, and was seen as an act of disloyalty by many in the British military. Indeed, at one point, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones even threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason. Your Comments Please share your comments on this page: Disclosure : The following book(s) details and descriptions provided by Amazon.com. Our company may receive a payment if you buy products from them after following a link from this website. Used Book in Good Condition Product Description: This book tells the story of the battle for Goose Green - the first crucial clash of the Falklands war - through the eyes of the commanders, both British and Argentine, from brigadier to corporal. It follows in detail, with the aid of maps, the 14 hours of vicious infantry fighting of both sides as they struggled for the tiny settlement of Goose Green. The book explains how 2 Para came close to failure as the battalion fought over open ground, in daylight, without adequate fire support against prepared positions. Controversial questions - such as: was it an unnecessary battle?

Why did London overrule the brigadier commander's reluctance to attack? Did Colonel Jones's solo charge, which won him the VC, decide the issue? - are discussed frankly. The author, himself a former infantry officer, has had the full support of The Parachute Regiment, and has assembled the views and comments of over 45 veterans of all ranks who fought there. Battle of Goose Green | Military Wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia Battle of Goose Green Darwin school-house after being hit by Argentine 35 mm fire Date Maj. Chris Keeble Strength 790 army 202 airforce 64 wounded [3] The Battle of Goose Green (28–29 May 1982) was an engagement of the Falklands War between British and Argentine forces. Goose Green and its neighbour Darwin are settlements on East Falkland in the Falkland Islands. They lie on Choiseul Sound on the east side of the island's central isthmus. They are about 13 miles (21 km) south of the site of the major British amphibious landings in San Carlos Water ( Operation Sutton ).

The bulk of the Argentine forces were in positions around Port Stanley about 50 miles (80 km) to the east of San Carlos . The position at Goose Green and Darwin was well defended by a force of combined units totalling about 1,200 (at the start of the battle the number was thought by the British to be less than half this), well equipped with artillery, mortars, 35 mm cannon and machine guns. However, the force was fairly static and judged to present little threat to the beachhead. Consequently, it had no strategic military value for the British in their campaign to recapture the islands, so early plans for land operations had called for Goose Green to be isolated and bypassed. Things changed in the days following the landings on 21 May. While the bridgehead was being consolidated, no offensive ground operations of any size were feasible and yet Argentine air attacks caused significant loss of and damage to British ships in the sea area around the landing grounds. This led to a feeling among senior commanders and politicians in the UK that the momentum of the campaign was being lost. [4] As a result, British Joint Headquarters in the UK came under increasing pressure from the British Government for an early ground offensive.

[5] And so, on 25 May, Brigadier Julian Thompson , ground forces commander, commanding 3 Commando Brigade , was ordered to mount an attack on Argentine positions around Goose Green and Darwin. [4] Contents Edit The British force consisted of three rifle companies, one patrol company, one support company, and the HQ company of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones ' 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) which had the following support: three 105 mm artillery pieces with 960 shells from 29 Commando Regiment , Royal Artillery ; one MILAN anti-tank missile platoon; Scout helicopters, and at dusk, air support was provided by three Royal Air Force Harriers later in the battle. HMS Arrow shelled the Argentine forward positions. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones commanded the battalion. The defending Argentine forces known as Task Force Mercedes consisted of the Lieutenant-Colonel Italo Piaggi 's 12th Infantry Regiment (RI 12) and a company of the Ranger-type 25th Infantry Regiment (RI 25).

Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín , considered by many Argentines to be the 'father' of the Argentine commandos , who chafing at his role as commanding officer of an ordinary infantry unit, put all his conscripts through a compressed version of the commando course in March 1982, dressing them in the green berets of the Army Commandos and changing the title of RI 25 unofficially to 25th 'Special' Infantry Regiment. [6] [7] The 12th Regiment chaplain, Padre Santiago Mora, later wrote, The conscripts of 25th Infantry wanted to fight and cover themselves in glory. The conscripts of 12th Infantry Regiment fought because they were told to do so. This did not make them any less brave. On the whole, they remained admirably calm. [8] Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall manned by Air Force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion that would be employed in a ground support role in the last stages of the fighting.

There was also one battery of four OTO Melara Mod 56 105 mm pack howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment. Pucarás based at Stanley, armed with rockets and napalm, provided ground support. [9] [10] Unknown to the Argentine outpost, a four-man SAS patrol, led by Corporal Trevor Brookes, had infiltrated the 12th Regiment's A Company area, attempting to pinpoint the Argentinian positions. For over a fortnight, Brookes successfully avoided Argentine helicopter and foot patrols. [11] As part of the diversionary raids to cover the British landings in the San Carlos area on 21 May, which involved naval shelling and air attacks, 'D' Squadron of the SAS put in a major raid to simulate a battalion-sized attack on the Argentine troops dug in on Darwin Ridge. [12] On 4 May, three Royal Navy Sea Harriers operating from HMS Hermes attacked the airfield and installations at Goose Green. During the operation, a Sea Harrier was shot down by Argentine 35mm anti-aircraft fire, killing its pilot, Lt-Commander Nick Taylor.

His body, still in the ejector seat, was recovered by residents of Goose Green, and buried with full military honours under Argentine supervision. [13] [14] Throughout 27 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Goose Green. One of them, responding to a call for help from 2 PARA, was lost to 35mm fire while attacking Darwin Ridge. [15] [16] [17] Battle The Battle of Goose Green, 28–29 May 1982 Detailed map of Goose Green isthmus. Just after 2.30 am of 28 May, 2 Para launched its attack on the Argentines to capture Goose Green 'before breakfast'. RI 12's A Company under First Lieutenant Jorge Manresa defended the Darwin Parks sector with two rifle platoons , and a mortar platoon. For 90 minutes the forward Argentine platoons were pounded with naval artillery from HMS Arrow. In the ensuing night battle about twelve Argentines were killed.

[6] The platoon under Sub-Lieutenant Malacalza fought a delaying action against the British paratroopers, blooding themselves on Burntside Hill before taking up combat positions again on Darwin Ridge. [6] Major Philip Neame's D Company was temporarily halted by the Coronation Ridge position. Two of his men, 25-year-old Lance-Corporal Gary Bingley and 19-year-old Private Barry Grayling darted out from under cover to charge the enemy machine gun nest that was holding up the advance. Both were hit 10 metres (11 yd) from the machine gun, but shot two of the crew before collapsing. He [Bingley] got hit in the head and I got hit in the hip, Grayling recalled in an interview published in 2007. Unfortunately, he didn't make it. [18] Bingley was posthumously awarded the Military Medal and Grayling was decorated with the Queen's Gallantry Medal . With the enemy machine gun out of action, the Paras were able to clear the Argentine platoon position, but at the cost of three dead. [6] Then 2 Para moved on to the south via Darwin Parks.

The Argentines made a determined stand along Darwin Ridge. As A and B Companies moved south from Coronation Ridge they were raked by fire from a couple of concealed Argentine FN MAG machine guns. An Argentine senior NCO, Company Sergeant-Major Juan Carlos Cohelo, is credited with rallying the RI 12's A Company remnants falling back from Darwin Parks. He was seriously wounded later in the day and for his bravery was awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal . The first British assault was broken up by fire from Sub-Lieutenant Ernesto Peluffo's RI 12 platoon. Corporal Osvaldo Faustino Olmos, of RI 25 refused to leave his foxhole and continued firing at the British company as it moved forward. The Paras called on the Argentines to surrender. Corporal Olmos was later interviewed by the British newspaper "Daily Express" and credited with the killing of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. [19] At this juncture of the battle, 2nd Para's advance had become stuck. A Company was in the gorse line at the bottom of Darwin Hill, and against the entrenched Argentines who were looking down the hill at them.

As daylight was now all over the battlefield, Jones led an unsuccessful charge up a small gully resulting in the death of the adjutant, Captain Wood, A Company's second-in-command Captain Dent, and Corporal Hardman. [20] Shortly thereafter Jones was seen to run West along the base of Darwin Ridge to a small re-entrant, followed by his bodyguard. He checked his Sterling SMG then ran up the hill toward an Argentine trench. He was seen to be hit once, then fell, then got up and was hit again from the side. He fell metres short of the trench, had been hit in the back and the groin, and died within minutes. [20] Jones was later to receive the Victoria Cross for his efforts. As Jones lay dying, his men radioed for urgent casualty evacuation. However, the British Scout Helicopter sent to evacuate Jones was shot down by an Argentine FMA IA 58 Pucara ground attack aircraft. The pilot, Lt. Richard Nunn RM was killed and posthumously received the DFC, and the aircrewman, Sgt. Belcher RM badly wounded in both legs.

[20] 12th Regiment Corporal José Luis Ríos, who in the opinion of historian Hugh Bicheno killed Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, [21] was later fatally wounded in his trench by Corporal Abols firing a 66 mm rocket. Darwin hill Edit By then it was 10.30 am and Major Dair Farrar-Hockley 's A Company made a third attempt, but this petered out. Eventually the British company, hampered by the morning fog as they advanced up the slope of Darwin Ridge, were driven back to the gulley by the fire of 1st Platoon of RI 25's C Company, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Roberto Estévez . During this action Lieutenant Estévez directed Argentine 105 mm artillery and 120 mm mortar fire that posthumously earned him the Argentine Nation to the Heroic Valour in Combat Cross (CHVC). 2 Para's mortar crews fired 1,000 rounds to keep the enemy at bay, and helped stop the Argentines getting a proper aim at the Paras. [22] It was almost noon before the British advance resumed.

Inspired by their commanding officer's sacrifice, A Company soon cleared the eastern end of the Argentine position and opened the way forward. There had been two battles going on in the Darwin hillocks – one around Darwin Hill looking down on Darwin Bay, and an equally fierce one in front of Boca Hill, also known as Boca House Ruins. Sub-Lieutenant Guillermo Ricardo Aliaga's 3rd Platoon of RI 8's C Company held Boca Hill. The position of Boca Hill was taken after heavy fighting by Major John Crosland's B Company with support from the MILAN anti-tank platoon. Sub-Lieutenants Aliaga and Peluffo were gravely wounded in the fighting. Crosland was the most experienced British officer, and as the events of the day unfolded, it was later said that Crosland's cool and calm leadership of his soldiers on the battlefield turned the Boca House section of the front line. About the time of the victory at the Boca Hill position, A Company overcame the Argentine defenders on Darwin Hill, finally taking the position that had caused many casualties on both sides. Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross for their efforts.

Corporal David Abols received a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his daring charges which turned the Darwin Hill battle. Airfield Edit After the victory on Darwin Ridge, C and D Companies began to make their way to the small airfield as well as Darwin School, which was east of the airfield, while B Company made their way south of Goose Green Settlement. A Company remained on Darwin Hill. C Company took heavy losses when they became the target of intense anti-aircraft 35 mm direct fire suffering 20 per cent casualties. [23] Private Mark Hollman-Smith, a signaller in the company headquarters, was killed by anti-aircraft fire while trying to recover a heavy machine gun from wounded Private Steve Russell. [24] Lieutenant James Barry's No. 12 Platoon, D company, saw some fierce action at the airfield. They were ambushed, [6] by another platoon of the 25th Regiment but one of his men shot dead two of the attackers, and then reported the events to Major Neame. [25] The platoon sergeant charged the attacking enemy with his machine gun, killing four of them. Private Graham Carter won the Military Medal by rallying No.

12 Platoon and leading it forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. [6] The RI 25 platoon defending the airfield fled into the Darwin-Goose Green track and was able to escape. Sergeant Sergio Ismael Garcia, of RI 25, single-handedly covered the withdrawal of his platoon during the British counterattack. He was posthumously awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal . Four Paras of D Company and approximately a dozen Argentines were killed in these engagements. Among the dead was 29-year-old Lieutenant Barry, who, along with two NCOs (Lance-Corporal Smith and Corporal Sullivan), was killed after a local truce in which the British officer tried to convince Sub Lieutenant Juan José Gómez Centurión of the need of his RI 25 platoon to lay down their arms. [6] [26] [27] C Company had not lost a single man in the Darwin School fighting, but Private Steve Dixon, from D Company, died when a splinter from a 35 mm anti-aircraft shell struck him in the chest.

[28] The Argentine anti-aircraft guns reduced the building to rubble. As day became night, two Argentine Air Force warrant officers who were POWs were sent to the Argentine commanders at Goose Green by the acting CO of 2nd Para, Major Chris Keeble , with the terms of surrender. "MILITARY OPTIONS We have sent a PW to you under a white flag of truce to convey the following military options: 1. That you unconditionally surrender your force to us by leaving the township, forming up in a military manner, removing your helmets and laying down your weapons. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW under a white flag with him briefed as to the formalities by no later than 0830 hrs local time. 2. You refuse in the first case to surrender and take the inevitable consequences. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW without his flag (although his neutrality will be respected) no later than 0830 hrs local time. 3.

In the event and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Geneva Convention and Laws of War you will be held responsible for the fate of any civilians in Darwin and Goose Green and we in accordance with these terms do give notice of our intention to bombard Darwin and Goose Green. C KEEBLE Commander of British Forces" 'Juliet' Company, 42 Commando (composed mainly of members of Naval Party 8901) was flown to Darwin to reinforce 2 Para and at the same time plans were made that night for 'Bravo' Company, 6th Regiment to be taken by helicopter to Goose Green in a spoiler move. The following day Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi surrendered all Argentine forces, approximately 1,000 men, including 202 men of the Air Force. He was later discharged from the army in disgrace. Major Keeble was awarded the Distinguished Service Order . The fourteen-hour battle had cost the British 17 killed and 64 wounded according to Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly , who was in charge of treating the wounded.

[3] 47 Argentines were killed and 120 wounded, with the 12th Regiment losing 32 killed and about 70 wounded. [29] After the battle, vast quantities of Argentine weapons and unused ammunition, were deployed among ships of the Royal Navy moored at San Carlos Water . BBC incident Edit During the planning of the assault of both Darwin and Goose Green, the Battalion Headquarters were listening in to the BBC World Service . The newsreader announced that the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment were poised and ready to assault Darwin and Goose Green, causing great confusion with the commanding officers of the battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Jones became furious with the level of incompetence and told BBC representative Robert Fox he was going to sue the BBC, Whitehall and the War Cabinet. [30] Argentine military trials of 2009 Edit Argentine army officers and NCOs were later accused of abusing and killing their own troops at Goose Green. Our own officers were our greatest enemies, says Ernesto Alonso, the president of CECIM, a veterans group founded by Rodolfo Carrizo and other conscripts of the 7th Regiment.

They supplied themselves with whiskey from the pubs, but they weren't prepared for war. They disappeared when things got serious. [31] There are others who maintain that the conscripts were helped to make themselves as comfortable as possible under the circumstances and that their officers and NCOs fought well and tried hard to bolster morale. [32] In 2009, Argentine authorities in Comodoro Rivadavia ratified a decision made by authorities in Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego (which, according to Argentina, have authority over the islands) charging 70 officers and NCOs with inhumane treatment of conscript soldiers during the war. [33] We have testimony from 23 people about a soldier who was shot to death by a corporal, four other former combatants who starved to death, and at least 15 cases of conscripts who were staked out on the ground, Pablo Vassel, under-secretary of human rights in the province of Corrientes, told Inter Press Service News Agency. [34] On 19 May a 12th Regiment conscript, Secundino Riquelme, reportedly died of starvation.

There are claims, however, that false testimonies were used as evidence in accusing the Argentine officers and NCOs of abandonment and Vassel had to step down from his post as under-secretary of human rights of Corrientes in 2010. [35] Other veterans are sceptical about the veracity of the accusations with Colonel Martiniano Duarte saying that it has become fashionable for ex-conscripts to now accuse their superiors of abandonment. [36] Former conscript Fernando Cangiano has also dismissed the claims about the supposed widespread sadism present among the Argentine officers and NCOs and the claim that the conscripts had not handled themselves well in the fighting. [37] Former conscript César Trejo also accused the current Argentine Ministry of Defense, Nilda Garré of promoting a state of confused politics in favour of the CECIM. [38] Sub-Lieutenant Gustavo Malacalza is accused of handing out field punishment in his platoon in the form of having staked three conscripts at Goose Green, for having abandoned their positions to go looking for food and revealing their positions with gunfire.

"We said it was going to be us next," said Private Mario Oscar Nuñez recalling the death of conscript Riquelme. Soon after the British landings, he and two other conscripts took the decision to kill a sheep. The three men were skinning the sheep when they were discovered by Sub-Lieutenant Malacalza, who was accompanied by fellow conscripts of A Company, 12th Regiment and given a beating. They started kicking and stamping on us. Finally came the staking. [39] See also Was Colonel 'H' a mad fool? Part 2 | Daily Mail Online Was Colonel 'H' a mad fool? Part 2 by JOHN GEDDES Last updated at 00:35 12 May 2007 Much has been written about the hero's death that won Colonel 'H' Jones a Falklands VC. Here, for the first time, is the brutally honest and vivid account of one of the Paras who fought with him. It raises some deeply unsettling questions, On the ground, H was furious to discover that D Company, which should have remained in reserve, had some-how managed to get lost and ended up in front of him.

"What the hell are you people doing here?" he asked their boss Major Phil Neame after bumping into the back of them as he marched along. "You lot shouldn't be in front of me. My orders were quite f****** clear." The lads in D Company didn't have a lot of time for H, probably out of loyalty to Phil Neame, who they lionised. He was pure para, unlike H who they regarded as a blow-in, and they felt H saw him as competition. Certainly, it seemed to me that the colonel was barely civil to Neame most of the time and the friction between them would become more apparent as the battle continued. H strode forward with his command team but before long they came under enemy fire. Scroll down for more... Reluctantly, they made their way back to D Company's position where he told Neame to clear the enemy off the track ahead. The problem was that no one knew where the enemy were. Not Neame or the colonel or anyone else. The battle was beginning to defy the maps and strategies and take on a life of its own. Fate would take lives or spare them and decide who would get the victor's spoils.

And there was little H could do about it. As D Company followed his orders and moved forward, Argy guns erupted in the night, opening up on them from only 40 yards away. Undaunted, they started crawling straight towards the enemy trenches, rounds constantly whining over their heads. Within the space of 20 minutes, three good men were killed. Meanwhile, H was trumpeting down the radio, nagging Major Neame. "Get a move on!" That was the clear message from the boss, whose tendency to micro-manage had burst to the fore and got worse as the battle went on. Soon it extended to A Company, who had encountered hardly any enemy resistance. They were eager to press onwards to Darwin Ridge - a row of hills that contained the main Argy line of defence. If they were to avoid being spotted, it was vital they proceed under cover of darkness but H sent an order to wait for him to arrive so he could assess the situation himself. It took him an hour to catch up with them and give them the goahead, and by the time they approached the gorse-filled gully leading to the ridge, it was almost daylight.

Intelligence had suggested that the enemy trenches here were empty so when the lads saw three figures silhouetted in the pre-dawn light they presumed at first they were shepherds. Only as they got closer did they realise that the "shepherds" were carrying weapons. Our blokes were first on the trigger and dropped two of the enemy only for the Argy bunkers to reveal themselves with a storm of heavy machine-gun fire. Most of the lads ran forward and found cover in the gorse gully but Corporal Steve "Monster" Adams fell forward like a rag doll into the bracken as four shots slammed into his shoulder and back like blows from a jack-hammer. Somehow he managed to get up and reach cover, his right arm hanging like a pendulum from his shattered shoulder as he dropped to the ground before clamping a couple of field dressings onto his back and lying on them to slow the blood. "You been hit, Monst?" asked one of the lads. "Yeah." "F****** poor skills that, mate," came the reply. The next man to pass asked Monster the same question: "Been hit?" "Yeah," he replied, resigned to the mockery.

"Oh well, Monst, you won't need these then, will you, mate?" replied his tormentor, relieving him of his black leather gloves. This goading was the Toms' way of seeing how much life was left in Monster. When he threatened to kill them, they were satisfied that he'd be all right and continued on their way to try to smash the Argies. It was fight or die in the gorse gully and the lads began making their way up to the Argy trenches on the lower slopes of the ridge. The machine-guns in them could not fire directly downwards, creating a narrow sliver of dead ground right under the enemy's noses from which our boys could launch their attacks. Whoomph! A 66mm rocket struck the side of an Argy trench with devastating effect. Blood and shredded kit were blended by the explosion and then two grenades exploded simultaneously, sending the occupants to oblivion. Screams of attack and pain filled the air as A Company succeeded in clearing five or six of those misery-making bunkers. But 14 untouched Argy trenches higher up still dominated the battle and had also pinned down B Company to the west. They had brought our advance to a complete standstill.

With the battle deadlocked, the lads in B Company decided there was nothing for it but to have a cup of tea. Getting out their stoves behind the bank of gorse which was their cover, they brewed up on the most dangerous picnic site in the world. But the lull in the battle did not last long. His timetable torn to shreds, H arrived in the Gorse Gully at 8.20am. Striding out in front of his team, he was in no mood to accept suggestions from anyone as to how he should move things on, least of all Phil Neame of D Company. By then, Major Neame and his men were within 300 yards of a narrow shingle beach and he radioed the colonel to suggest they sneaked along it to get past the enemy positions and then come round on the Argies from the back. The agitated H was having none of it - as we heard over the airwaves. "Don't try to tell me how to run my f****** battle," he snarled at Neame in his clipped public-school accent. This was not good. Aggro with the Argies was the idea, not aggro between the bosses.

Another suggestion came from Captain Peter Ketley of Support Platoon who proposed that we should mallet the Argy positions with Milan anti-tank missiles. The battle was in the balance. Men were losing their lives. Why not break the gun line with rockets and then let the Toms sweep through without running this gauntlet of lead? H rejected this idea too, even though Ketley was positioned further back from the main clash of arms and had a clear picture of the action. That's where H should have been. Not out of the line of fire altogether but far enough to get an overall view. However, he was more interested in telling Major Dair Farrar-Hockley, the boss of A Company, how to do his job. Everyone else had decided that advancing out of the gully was suicidal, but H wasn't prepared to accept that. "Dair, you've got to take that ledge," he ordered, nodding towards the top of a spur. Fifteen soldiers set off in a disorganised charge up the slope. Within moments, three of them had been shot dead - including Captain Dave Wood, H's best mate. He was urging the lads on, saying: "That's it. Airborne all the way.

Remember Arnhem!" Then he died. The rest of the group worked their way back under intense fire, cursing as they did. It had been a desperate waste of life. God knows what H was thinking at that moment. He had just sent his best friend to his death. Seemingly mesmerised in that smokefilled gully, and stubbornly refusing to step back and assess the situation properly, he grabbed a machine-gun and began running towards the nearest enemy position. "Come on A Company, get your skirts off!" he yelled. "Follow me." None of them did. They were in no mood for public-school gestures or gungho cries from the pages of Commando comic. They knew what was waiting for them further up the gorse gully and they would sort it out in their own way - which didn't include running into machine gun fire, World War I style. If H had bothered to ask his men, they'd have told him that the route he was intending to use led to the spot where Monster Adams had been shot up. There was no way through there. But H didn't stop to ask anything; he didn't even stop to brief his team or outline his intentions. He just plunged off.

The only people who followed him were his small command team. They were brave professionals, obliged by duty to follow him come what may and they acquitted that duty with honour. But H was a fit guy and so quick off the starting blocks that when his team reacted he was already 30 yards ahead of them. While he turned to attack a bunker to his left, going down on one knee to check the magazine on his machine gun before rushing on, his personal bodyguard Sergeant Barry Norman faced a terrible dilemma. He could empty a magazine into the trench H was attacking to give him supporting fire but that left H exposed to the guns in the other trenches. There was no right thing to do so he kept firing in support and screamed a warning to the boss over the racket: "Watch your f****** back!" It was too late. The next burst of fire dropped the colonel, hitting him in the back. One of the Argies in the nearest trench leant out to finish him off, but Sergeant Norman kept the bastard back with a stream of accurate fire. At that point H's radio operator flashed out a message using the boss's call sign.

"Sunray is down!" That signal was to become one of the iconic soundbites of the Falklands War. Sergeant Norman couldn't do anything under such devastating fire, and lay there in cover unable to help his wounded colonel for over quarter of an hour. But then came a turning point - thanks to an heroic Tom named Corporal Dave "Pig" Abols. Pig had chipped away to the top of the ridge until he could see the machine gun that had killed H. It was still knocking out bursts at anything that moved. Lying there with less cover than a stripper, Pig bided his time and then, in an inspiring act of courage, he jumped to his feet and stood in the lead storm as if he was bullet-proof. Lifting a 66 rocket to his shoulder, he lined it up on the bunker, breathed out and squeezed down the rubber trigger. Whoomph! The blistering white ball of an explosion enveloped the command bunker for the trenches along the ridge, breaking the linchpin in the overlapping arcs of Argy fire and shattering their resolve. The effect was electric. Soon white flags started appearing all along the Argy line. But it was too late for H.

Only now could Sergeant Norman reach his side and clamp field dressings on his wounds. He got a line into H and set up a drip, but it was no use. The colonel bled to death as he waited for a helicopter to evacuate him. In the eerie calm that followed, me and the lads talked over a brew on that freezing and wind-buffeted Falklands ridge and tried to understand that most extraordinary event for any soldier: the loss of our leader. Why had H done it? Why had he charged up that gully? It seemed like madness to us. We cannot shirk from the fact that H unravelled at Goose Green. I'm a soldier and I don't criticise him for it in any angry sense because I understand the pressure he was put under by the task force command, who left him without air and sea support, proper intelligence or even basic supplies of ammo. But H also put pressure on himself. His refusal to give his officers their head and trust their judgment that day was a real problem. D Company could have made their move along the beach early in the battle but H just gave Phil Neame an ear-bashing over the suggestion.

Even harder to accept was his rejection of Captain Ketley's offer to hit the Argies on the ridge with rockets. We know that H was conserving the rockets to deal with armoured vehicles later in the conflict, but they were far less of an immediate threat than the bunkers blasting hell out of us in the gorse gully. Should he have got the VC? Well, certainly the battalion deserved a VC and in that sense the award to its colonel may have some justice in it. But the Toms' award for Man of the Match goes to Pig Abols. It was his nerve, courage and superb field craft which broke the Argies and not H's emotional charge into the Valley of Death. I believe H's dash into action was motivated by anger, passion and regret at the loss of his friend Dave Wood. When he realised Wood was dead, he decided to do what he believed was the honourable thing and try to sort it out himself. His judgment was unbalanced and what he did was lionhearted but illconceived and futile. It didn't make a difference to the battle. The simple fact is that H should never have insisted on being so close to the action.

We needed him near but not underfoot and he should have been conducting the battle, not fighting it. He was the colonel; we were the cannon fodder. His "get your skirts off" call to arms was not inspiring and his action was all risk and no calculation. What's more, contrary to the citation for his Victoria Cross, he never fired a shot. Nothing that I say is a criticism of H, even if it does sound harsh. Toms don't think that way. We just say it like it is, because to do otherwise would be disloyal to our mates who died that day. Who knows how I would have performed if I'd had to lead a battalion? H did what he did; it's just that some of it wasn't great on the day. All I know is that H shouldn't have been where he was when he became one of the 17 men who fell at Goose Green. I wish he'd survived. I wish they'd all survived. Meanwhile, for me, the fighting was about to kick off again ...

Abridged extract from Spearhead Assault: Our Fight To Save The Falklands by John Geddes with Alun Rees, to be published by Century on May 17 at £14.99. To order a copy (free p&p) call 0870 161 0870. Was Colonel 'H' a mad fool? | Daily Mail Online Was Colonel 'H' a mad fool? Last updated at 00:39 12 May 2007 Much has been written about the hero's death that won Colonel 'H' Jones a Falklands VC. Here, for the first time, is the brutally honest and vivid account of one of the Paras who fought with him. It raises some deeply unsettling questions My breath sounded like a storm in my ears. Surely they could hear it? They were only a dozen metres away - no distance at all. You know you're really scared when you think your own breathing is going to betray you. Sliding my weapon into the crook of my arms, I inched forward on my elbows, pushing slowly, very slowly, with my feet. The slightest sound could lead to catastrophe for our patrol.

Every movement I made was carefully measured and weighed. I was soaked to the skin, and my knees and thighs were bruised by the rocky ground I'd crawled over. My hands were numb with cold, and the muscles on my neck and shoulders were clenched like a vice. But I had to concentrate. There was an Argy trench directly in front of me. No enemy visible. One heavy machine gun in place. Couldn't miss that. I was staring straight down its barrel. Another trench 20 yards to the left. Two enemy talking - and pink toilet paper everywhere. The dirty devils had not dug latrines, they'd just walked out of their trenches and fouled the ground in front of their own positions. This was encouraging. It told us they'd been worn down by the wind and weather and couldn't be bothered to dig pits in the freezing cold. If they were similarly sloppy about sentry duty, that was good news for our lads. Surprisingly, no one seemed to be manning the gun pointing straight up my nose. What was going on in that trench? Better take a closer look. As I inched forward, I could hear the Argies still chatting away in a low murmur.

What were they talking about? Girlfriends? Mothers? The price of penguin meat? All that mattered was that there was no edge of alarm in their voices; no hint they'd heard anything. I didn't need Spanish to know they hadn't rumbled us. One more push and I was nearly close enough to touch the ice-cold barrel of that machine-gun. Cloaked by the mist, I lifted myself onto one knee, rifle at the ready, and peered down into the gloom of the trench. There they were. Three of them. Sleeping like babes, tucked up nicely in their sleeping bags, counting Falklands sheep in their sleep. Scroll down for more I could have killed all three before they could say their Hail Marys. This was a unit that was exhausted and couldn't give a damn. More good news for our lads. It was time to pull back. But as I crawled away in reverse, slowly and deliberately, I had a hunch that we hadn't discovered all the Argy positions and decided we should look further over to the east. There was no way that we'd let our mates run into a lead storm that they hadn't been warned about.

They were depending on us to recce these outlying positions before we launched our attack on Goose Green. As we began eyeballing the ground we hadn't covered, we were ready for anything. Or so we thought. It was Pete Myers, the youngest member of our patrol, who spotted them first, swirling around like spirits in the mist. "What's that over there?" he growled. "Get down," I ordered. We hit the ground and tried to make out what the hell we were looking at. One thing was for sure, they weren't spirits. These things were neighing and whinnying. "They're f****** wild horses," said Steve Jones, our Welsh lead scout. At that moment, they came thundering straight for us. It was scary as hell. "F*** it. Let's drop the b*******," I spat. "No, don't!" said Jonesy. "Just lie still and flat! They'll run over you! Horses hate stepping on living things!" What did he know that I didn't? Had he been a hussar before he joined the Paras? I didn't think so. There was no time to argue. The herd was upon us.

I looked up at them for a moment before pressing my nose to the ground and squeezing my eyes shut. Heads and manes tossing, they charged over us, pounding the ground in every direction, filling our senses. I opened one eye and looked up as a mustang leapt over me. I could see the blur of its legs for a split second before one of its hooves slapped into the peat inches from my head. Then gun shots! One, two, three! The Argies must have stampeded the horses to flush us out and pinpoint our position. We were done for - laid out in the middle of nowhere with only horse-dung to hide behind. As the horses vanished into the darkness, I snatched up my rifle and took aim. But it was OK. The shooting had stopped. The Argies had only been firing to scare the horses off, turning them away from their trenches. A few relieved shouts and nervous laughter from the enemy. The sight of wild animals coming out of the dark had rattled them, too. "Everyone all right?" A quick head check confirmed that no one had been hoof-minced. "How did you know they wouldn't stamp the f*** out of us?" I asked Steve.

"Some ancient bit of Welsh folklore?" "Nah," he answered, "Grand National. You know when those jockeys come off at Beechers Brook? "They just roll into a ball and stay still as f***, then the horses do anything they can not to put a hoof on 'em." "Really?" I said. "Interesting." My heart was pounding, I'd just produced enough adrenaline to fuel a rocket, and my second in command was telling me the reason we'd lived through it was the Grand National. Still, the Argies didn't suspect it was us who had spooked the horses or they would have mown the grass with machine guns. God, they were sloppy. Careless soldiering costs lives, I reflected as we made our way back to base. Those poor devils were going to discover the truth of that within the next three hours when our lads got stuck into them. The trouble was, so would we. FLASHBACK. December 1981. Kenya. An hour after dawn.

As I gazed out over the African plain stretching far away into the heat haze, I blinked the salty sweat out of my eyes and tried to concentrate on the view through the sight of my rifle as I searched for the enemy. Movement was not an option. One absent-minded swat at the cluster of flies drinking on my sweat and the game was up. We'd laid three long snakes of green parachute cord across the bush and they slithered invisibly through the landscape. Suddenly one came to life with a rapid tattoo of tugs - a signal from one of the other lads that the enemy was advancing into our trap. We watched them every step of the way. They were inching forward, knowing we were out there. And every second took them deeper into our ambush. It was only an exercise. The yellow blank-firing attachments on the muzzles of our rifles showed that. The enemy were just other lads from 2 Para. But the stakes were high. To the victor went the spoils and that meant the right to taunt the losers over free beer for weeks to come. A prize not to be scoffed at.

Then I spotted him, moving up through the scrub to the foot of the ridge we were lying on, right up with the enemy's lead section. It was our boss, 2 Para's commanding officer, Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones. What the hell was H doing there? He should have been back with his tactical headquarters unit conducting operations, not up with the front platoons. Mark Sleap saw him too. Sleapy by name but not sleepy by nature, Mark was sharp as a tack and one of our top guys. As H handed out instructions to his men, Sleapy opened up. The ambush erupted as rifles and machine guns raked the enemy. It was fast, brutal and effective. The colonel was dead. Direct hit. He wasn't happy. No one likes to be killed and H humped and grumped about it. "It wouldn't have happened," he told Mark later. "We'd have got you lot with our artillery when we softened up your area before moving in." "Maybe, sir," said Sleapy diplomatically. "But I did get you, sir." It was a prophetic moment, a glimpse into a future some six months ahead.

Next time, though, 2 Para wouldn't be sweltering in Kenya; we'd be freezing our backsides off in the Falklands. ONCE again, H would be leading from the front, where he shouldn't be, but this time it wouldn't be an exercise. It would be live rounds and H really would be dead. The posthumous Victoria Cross he earned at Goose Green is probably the most controversial VC of all time. The accounts of the events surrounding his death have mostly been written by former officers and military historians. They're fine as far as they go, but they can't tell it like a front-line para - or Toms as we call ourselves - and they haven't told the whole story. But I can. I was there. The first thing to say is that H was a cracking bloke, the best boss I ever had in the army. He was what we called a "crap-hat" - a soldier from a non-Para regiment, and thus a stranger to the coveted red beret - but he made an immediate impact the moment he joined us.

The hard-core Toms loved the way he called battalion meetings in the drill hall and then announced: "Right, now that you're all here we're going on a ten-mile run." All the fat HQ wallahs, drivers and officers, who normally skived off battalion runs, were trapped and H ran the life out of them. Like any good commander, H wanted action and if there was any glory about, he wanted it for his men and not the "Booties", the Royal Marines who led the task force sent to the Falklands after the Argentinian invasion in April 1982. H's distrust of the "Booties" was apparent from the moment we tried to come ashore on the night of May 21, scrambling off the converted car ferry which had brought us south and cramming into landing craft driven by the marines. As the boats swayed and dipped in the swell, sea-sickness was only part of the problem. There was something else in the air. Raw fear. Any minute now a fusillade from the shore might cut us into pieces.

We thought we would head straight for the beach but, instead, we went round and round in endless circles like day-trippers on a municipal boating lake. Just in case the enemy might have any problem spotting us, the whole performance took place in the light of a near-full moon. Boat engines throbbed, chains rattled and clanked, and friendly Booties flashed lights and called out to one another across the water. I was not impressed - and neither was H. We heard him bellowing as he verbally castrated a few gobby marines. When we finally got ashore, we holed up for two days on the freezing slopes of Sussex Mountain before London gave us the go-ahead for a raid on the airfield at Goose Green to the south. H was on top form. He had plans to formulate and there isn't an officer on the planet that doesn't love planning. Critics now say his plan was too complex, with lots of overlapping waves of attack. It certainly started to come unstuck pretty quickly. On the night of May 23, we pressed through dense mist and rain towards Camilla Creek House -a sheep farm which was our initial base for the attack.

But after seven stumbling, mind-numbing, muscle-tearing miles in full kit, we were almost there when we were told to turn back. Bad weather had grounded the Sea King helicopters that were supposed to be moving our artillery forward and Brigadier Julian Thompson, the Bootie in charge of the task force, had called the mission off. H kicked off like a firecracker. "I've waited 20 years for this," he snarled. "Now some f****** marine's cancelled it." There was nothing for it but to slog back to Sussex Mountain. With the gallows humour typical of the paras, me and the lads from the Patrols Platoon started belting out a song: John Lennon's Give Peace A Chance. Suddenly a head popped out of the command HQ tent flap. It was H. He didn't say anything. He just looked at us with an expression that said: "Oh, it's those f****** nutters from Patrols." H loved the Patrols Platoon - fit, aggressive soldiers whose speciality was getting up close to the enemy, acting as the eyes and ears of the regiment. He just looked at us like a patient father with some naughty kids and never said a word.

Four days later, the battle was on for real -but there was more grief for H. On the morning of May 27, we were awaiting orders at Camilla Creek House when suddenly a melee of officers and sergeants appeared among the men. They were in a right flap. "Move out! Move out! Away from these buildings on the double!" one of them yelled. "Grab your kit and f****** get out of here!" It turned out the BBC had announced that we were about to attack Goose Green and, according to some of the men, had even revealed our position at Camilla Creek House. Ironically, it turned out later that the Argy high command thought the bulletins were a double bluff, designed to wrong-foot them. But the BBC announcement was a real jolt for H and left him wondering how much the enemy knew about his intentions. It wasn't his day. The chaos caused by the BBC meant that several officers failed to make a vital briefing meeting.

On top of that, the Special Forces recces that he'd been relying on to assess the readiness of the enemy were turning out to be a fairytale, while a Harrier jet had just been lost in a raid that left the enemy unscathed and on full alert. All of which was enough to put any colonel into a spin on the eve of a battle. Nothing travels faster in a battalion than news of the boss's mood and the word was out. H was not a happy man. CLICK, click. Click, click, click. It sounded like sinister insects calling out to each other in the darkness and the hairs on the back of my neck stood on end. For this wasn't insects. It was our lads fixing their bayonets and preparing to advance down the narrow isthmus of land leading to Goose Green. I was thrilled and I'm not ashamed to say it. I was a soldier and the thought of the fight to come gave me a warrior's rush. One or two hands reached out and briefly clasped mine as they slipped by me into the darkness. Somewhere in the gloom a young para puked up with the tension. He got that off his chest and went on to fight like a demon.

Things kicked off around 3am when one of the lads from B Company spotted a silhouette in the middle of a field. "It must be a scarecrow," whispered a young officer. A scarecrow? He was on the Falklands, the place was crawling with Argies and he thought he was seeing a scarecrow. "Hands up!" shouted one of the lads. With that, the scarecrow came to life. "Por favor?" he said and reached under his poncho for his weapon. Two rifles and two machine guns opened up on him without a moment's hesitation. Bullets tore through him and tracer rounds ignited his clothing, lighting him up like a Halloween pumpkin. Soon B Company had taken out nearly 20 Argy trenches, tearing through them with machine-guns, grenades and bayonets. It was a good start to their advance but elsewhere H's plans were evaporating as fast as a bottle of port in the officers' mess. We were supposed to be receiving support from HMS Arrow, softening up the enemy positions with bombardments of huge shells at the rate of 30 a minute. This would have shortened the engagement by hours. In the event, Arrow had fired just one shell before her gun jammed.

Meanwhile, the Harrier jets we had been promised were fog-bound on their carriers. Jones | Daly History Blog Daly History Blog Falklands 30 – Goose Green The Battle of Goose Green, 28–29 May 1982 (Photo credit: Wikipedia) After the apparent success of the landings at San Carlos , the commander of 3 Commando Brigade – Brigadier Julian Thompson – was under pressure to break out and fight the bulk of the Argentine land forces on East Falkland . This is a quandry often seen in amphibious operations – a desire on the one hand by politicians and higher commanders to win the war quickly, and a more cautious approach by the commander in the field on the other. But with a finite limit to operations – after which the task forces ships would fall apart – the war had to be won. And sooner rather than later. Knowing that the Argentines had a significant garrison around the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green to the south-east of San Carlos, Thompson planned a raid to attack and captured the settlements.

He would probably have preferred not to – early plans had intended for the area to be bypassed – but leaving the Goose Green garrison alone would have left his right flank open in the advance to Stanley. And also, he was under pressure to break out of San Carlos. While there were not enough troops to begin the march to Stanley- and with the loss of helicopter lift this march would take much longer anyway – an attack on Goose Green was feasible. Thompson detailed 2 Para for the attack, as they were located on Sussex Mountains , nearest Goose Green from San Carlos. 2 Para, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel ‘H’ Jones, number three Rifle Companies, a Patrol Company, and a support company with mortars and anti-tank weapons. In support were three 105mm guns of the Royal Artillery, Scout helicopters for resupply and casualty evacuation, Sea Harriers on call for air bombardment, and naval gunfire support from the Frigate HMS Arrow. The Argentine settlement numbered over a thousands Army and Air Force personnel. The bulk comprised 12 Infantry Regiment and a company from the commando-trained 25 Infantry Regiment.

The garrison was supported by six 20mm Rheinmetall cannons, two radar-laid Oerlikon guns and four 105mm howitzers. Pucaras at Goose Green airstrip were armed with Napalm munitions. Hence 2 Para faced a very stiff task – attacking a numerically superior enemy, who had time to dig into prepared positions, and had a superiority of heavy weapons. The terrain and geography also suited the defender – the narrow isthmus restricting room for maneouvre. 2 Para marched down to Camilla Creek House, just north of their start line. During the final planning of their attack the men were startled to be informed by the BBC World Service that they were about to attack Goose Green. The World Service, of course, was being listened to by the Argentines, who therefore knew that the attack was imminent. An angry Jones threatened to sue the BBC, Whitehall and the War Cabinet. Thus 2 Para had almost certainly lost the advantage of surprise. At 0230 on 28 May 2 Para launched its attack, with the objective of using darkness to capture Goose Green ‘by Breakfast’. There followed an intense, bitter battle.

2 Para quickly came upon strong opposition, from Argentine troops dug in on Darwin Hill. Momentum seemed to be lost. At this point Jones took the initiative, leading the Adjutant and A Company’s second-in-command in a charge up a gully in which both men were killed. Soon after Jones assaulted an Argentine trench. He was hit twice. The trench was captured, but he died within minutes. The Scout helicopter sent to evacuate him was shot down by a Pucara. Jones’s second-in-command, Major Chris Keeble , took over a battle at a critical phase. 2 Para were well short of their objective, and caught in daylight against strong opposition. It was almost midday before the attack regained impetus, with A Company clearing the east side of Darwin Hill, and B Company taking Boca House in the west. At one point during the battle for the airfield the Argentines fires anti-aircraft guns at the attacking Paras. But with momentum regained, the evening found 2 Para on the outskirts of Goose Green settlement . Thompson flew in Juliet Company of 42 Commando to Darwin to reinforce 2 Para. The Argentines, meanwhile, prepared to fly in a company from 6 Regiment to reinforce their Garrison.

However, the next day the Garrison commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi, surrendered his forces, after an appeal from Keeble to avoid further loss of life. The Paras were astounded when a thousand men laid down their arms. 17 British personnel had been killed and 64 wounded, while 50 Argentines were killed and 120 were wounded. Goose Green was a notable victory for the Paras. It was reminiscent of some of ther Regiment’s proudest moments, in particular the battle to reach Arnhem Bridge in September 1944. Goose Green showed that experienced, well trained men – many of whom had experience of Northern Ireland – could upset the odds against a numerically superior enemy. On the flip side, Goose Green showed that even badly led, badly equipped and badly trained conscripts can still put up a stern fight when operating heavy weapons and sited in prepared positions. H Jones was awarded a posthumous VC for his bravery at Goose Green. There have been two very different schools of thought about Jones’s actions at Goose Green. Whilst on the one hand he was showing supreme leadership by leading by example, on the other hand, was he being reckless?

Did he deprive his Battalion of its commanding officer when they most needed him? Personally, I try and keep an open mind. I know it’s a cliche in military history circles, but those of us who were not there will find it very hard to understand. Memories of Goose Green Memories of Goose Green Memories of Goose Green Memories of Goose Green One of the corporals who fought at Goose Green during the Falklands War , John Geddes, described the part played in the battle by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones , who was given the Victorian Cross after being killed in action. Army corporal John Geddes has recalled memories of the Battle of Goose Green during the Falklands War and of the part played by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones, known as H. Jones, who was killed in the conflict. Geddes was employed in Patrols Platoon, assisting 2 Para as they moved towards Goose Green following their landing at San Carlos Bay . While Geddes was extremely complimentary about Jones, describing him as “a cracking bloke, the best boss I ever had in the army”, he queried his posthumous receipt of the Victoria Cross.

Jones was awarded the medal as recognition for his role as commanding officer of 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment during Goose Green. Geddes, however, feels that Jones failed in a number of ways during the battle, including striving for glory for 2 Para as a unit, something which may have altered his decisions. Before the Falklands War began, the 2 Para unit had been based in Kenya on a training exercise. While there, Patrols Platoon men had effectively shot Jones as he had moved too far to the front of the fighting. Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, VC Another reason listed by Geddes was that Jones’ plan of attack was far too convoluted and was quickly proven to be unworkable as he was denied support from the helicopter and Harrier side due to thick coastal fog. These issues, said Geddes, were not caused directly by Jones but were linked to the lack of flexibility in his battle plans. “There was a message from the boss whose tendency to micro-manage had burst to the fore and got worse as the battle went on,” said Geddes. Jones appeared unable to delegate the decision making to those he should – namely men on the ground.

An example of this, given by Geddes, was that of Major Phil Neame, who thought he had located a safe beach route by which the unit could get behind Argentine positions but was refused permission by Jones to use it. Geddes also referenced an incident relating to A Company, which was being led by Major Dair Farrar-Hockley. A Company had confirmed it wished to move quickly towards Darwin Ridge, proceeding stealthily under the cover of darkness. However, Jones refused to allow them to proceed until he had reached their position and could assess their plan. This lost hour ensured A Company was exposed to greater risk as they then had to move in the breaking dawn. Jones is also said to have rejected a suggestion by Support Platoon’s Captain Peter Ketley that Milan anti-tank missiles should be utilised in the conflict against Argentine trenches. Rather, Jones planned to use them further down the line in the fight against armoured vehicles. In terms of positioning, Geddes felt that Jones should have been located close to the back of the battle in order that he would gain a better overall picture of the conflict. This, Geddes believed, would have allowed Jones to plan accordingly.

Although his command team – and his bodyguard - was unaware of his plan, Jones called for a heavy machine gun to take position up a gorse gully. The message “Sunray is down” over the radio meant that Jones had been hit. Geddes was not intending to be critical of Jones, however he believes that he should have stepped back from battle in order to better assess what it really took to win the conflict. The death of the overall battalion commander was a major blow and, overall, says Geddes, what Jones did was “lionhearted but ill-conceived and futile.”

Question: In which battle of May 1982 did Colonel H. Jones win his posthumous V.C.?
Answer: Goose Green