Stasi...the secret police... - Google Groups Stasi...the secret police... 12/26/15 12:46 AM Stasi This article is about the secret police of East Germany. For its other common meaning, see Stasi Commission. For the regular police in East Germany, see Volkspolizei. Ministry for State Security Seal of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR Agency overview Dissolved 3 October 1990 (end of GDR) Headquarters East Berlin, Germany Erich Mielke (1957–1989) Wolfgang Schwanitz (1989–1990) The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaːziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), also State Security Service (German Staatssicherheitsdienst, SSD), was the official state security service of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), colloquially known as East Germany.

It has been described as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies to have ever existed.[2][3][4][5][6][7] The Stasi was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. The Stasi motto was "Schild und Schwert der Partei" (Shield and Sword of the Party), referring to the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). One of its main tasks was spying on the population, mainly through a vast network of citizens turned informants, and fighting any opposition by overt and covert measures, including hidden psychological destruction of dissidents (Zersetzung, literally meaning decomposition). Its Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (German: Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung) was responsible for both espionage and for conducting covert operations in foreign countries. Under its long-time head Markus Wolf, it gained a reputation as one of the most effective intelligence agencies of the Cold War. Numerous Stasi officials were prosecuted for their crimes after 1990.

After German reunification, the surveillance files that the Stasi had maintained on millions of East Germans were laid open, so that any citizen could inspect their personal file on request; these files are now maintained by the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records. Creation Edit The Stasi was founded on 8 February 1950.[8] Wilhelm Zaisser was the first Minister of State Security of the GDR, and Erich Mielke was his deputy. Zaisser tried to depose SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht after the June 1953 uprising,[9] but was instead removed by Ulbricht and replaced with Ernst Wollweber thereafter. Wollweber resigned in 1957 after clashes with Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, and was succeeded by his deputy, Erich Mielke. In 1957, Markus Wolf became head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) (Main Reconnaissance Administration), the foreign intelligence section of the Stasi. As intelligence chief, Wolf achieved great success in penetrating the government, political and business circles of West Germany with spies.

The most influential case was that of Günter Guillaume, which led to the downfall of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in May 1974. In 1986, Wolf retired and was succeeded by Werner Grossmann.

Relationship with the KGB Edit See also: Eastern Bloc politics, Eastern Bloc information dissemination and Active measures Although Mielke's Stasi was superficially granted independence in 1957, until 1990 the KGB continued to maintain liaison officers in all eight main Stasi directorates, each with his own office inside the Stasi's Berlin compound, and in each of the fifteen Stasi district headquarters around East Germany.[10] Collaboration was so close that the KGB invited the Stasi to establish operational bases in Moscow and Leningrad to monitor visiting East German tourists and Mielke referred to the Stasi officers as "Chekists of the Soviet Union".[10] In 1978, Mielke formally granted KGB officers in East Germany the same rights and powers that they enjoyed in the Soviet Union.[10] Organization Edit The Ministry for State Security also included the following entities: Administration 12 was responsible for the surveillance of mail and telephone communications. Administration 2000 was responsible for the reliability of National People's Army (NVA) personnel. Administration 2000 operated a secret, unofficial network of informants within the NVA.

Administration for Security of Heavy Industry and Research and Main Administration for Security of the Economy: protection against sabotage or espionage. Division of Garbage Analysis: was responsible for analyzing garbage for any suspect western foods and/or materials. Felix Dzerzhinsky Guards Regiment: the armed force at disposal of the ministry, named for the founder of the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police. The members of this regiment, who served at least three years, were responsible for protecting high government and party buildings and personnel. The regiment was composed of six motorized rifle battalions, one artillery battalion, and one training battalion. Its equipment included PSZH-IV armored personnel carriers, 120 mm mortars, 85 mm and 100 mm antitank guns, ZU-23 antiaircraft guns, and helicopters. A Swiss source reported in 1986 that the troops of the Ministry of State Security also had commando units similar to the Soviet Union's Spetsnaz GRU forces. These East German units were said to wear the uniform of the airborne troops, although with the violet collar patch of the Ministry for State Security rather than the orange one of paratroopers.

They also wore the sleeve stripe of the Felix Dzerzhinsky Guards Regiment.[11] Main Administration for Reconnaissance: focused its efforts primarily on West Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but it also operated East German intelligence in all foreign countries. Main Administration for Struggle Against Suspicious Persons was charged with the surveillance of foreigners — particularly from the West — legally traveling or residing within the country. This included the diplomatic community, tourists, and official guests. Main Coordinating Administration of the Ministry for State Security: coordinated its work with Soviet intelligence agencies. Main Department for Communications Security and Personnel Protection: provided personal security for the national leadership and maintained and operated an internal secure communications system for the government. Penal System: to facilitate its mission of enforcing the political security of East Germany, the Stasi operated its own penal system, distinct from that of the Ministry of the Interior. This system comprised prison camps for political, as opposed to criminal, offenders.

Operations Edit Further information: Eastern Bloc politics See also: Censorship in East Germany Personnel and recruitment Edit Between 1950 and 1989, the Stasi employed a total of 274,000 people in an effort to root out the class enemy.[12][13] In 1989, the Stasi employed 91,015 people full-time, including 2,000 fully employed unofficial collaborators, 13,073 soldiers and 2,232 officers of GDR army,[14] along with 173,081 unofficial informants inside GDR[15] and 1,553 informants in West Germany.[16] Regular commissioned Stasi officers were recruited from conscripts who had been honourably discharged from their 28 months' compulsory military service, had been members of the SED, had had a high level of participation in the Party's youth wing's activities and had been Stasi informers during their service in the Military.

The candidates would then have to be recommended by their military unit political officers and Stasi agents, the local chiefs of the District (Bezirk) Stasi and Volkspolizei office, of the district in which they were permanently resident, and the District Secretary of the SED. These candidates were then made to sit through several tests and exams, which identified their intellectual capacity to be an officer, and their political reliability. University graduates who had completed their military service did not need to take these tests and exams. They then attended a two-year officer training programme at the Stasi college (Hochschule) in Potsdam. Less mentally and academically-endowed candidates were made ordinary technicians and attended a one-year technology-intensive course for non-commissioned officers.

By 1995, some 174,000 inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs) Stasi informants had been identified, almost 2.5% of East Germany's population between the ages of 18 and 60.[12] 10,000 IMs were under 18 years of age.[12] From the volume of material destroyed in the final days of the regime, the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) believes that there could have been as many as 500,000 informers.[12] A former Stasi colonel who served in the counterintelligence directorate estimated that the figure could be as high as 2 million if occasional informants were included.[12] Infiltration Edit Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants (the extensiveness of any surveillance largely depended on how valuable a product was to the economy)[13] and one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo).[17] Spies reported every relative or friend who stayed the night at another's apartment.[17]

 Tiny holes were drilled in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed citizens with special video cameras.[17] Schools, universities, and hospitals were extensively infiltrated.[17] The Stasi had formal categorizations of each type of informant, and had official guidelines on how to extract information from, and control, those who they came into contact with.[18] The roles of informants ranged from those already in some way involved in state security (such as the police and the armed services) to those in the dissident movements (such as in the arts and the Protestant Church).[19] Information gathered about the latter groups was frequently used to divide or discredit members.[20] Informants were made to feel important, given material or social incentives, and were imbued with a sense of adventure, and only around 7.7%, according to official figures, were coerced into cooperating.

A significant proportion of those informing were members of the SED; to employ some form of blackmail, however, was not uncommon.[19] A large number of Stasi informants were trolley conductors, janitors, doctors, nurses and teachers; Mielke believed that the best informants were those whose jobs entailed frequent contact with the public.[21] The Stasi's ranks swelled considerably after Eastern Bloc countries signed the 1975 Helsinki accords, which GDR leader Erich Honecker viewed as a grave threat to his regime because they contained language binding signatories to respect "human and basic rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and conviction."[22] The number of IMs peaked at around 180,000 in that year, having slowly risen from 20,000–30,000 in the early 1950s, and reaching 100,000 for the first time in 1968, in response to Ostpolitik and protests worldwide.[23] The Stasi also acted as a proxy for KGB to conduct activities in other Eastern Bloc countries, such as Poland, where the Soviets were

 despised.[24] The Stasi infiltrated almost every aspect of GDR life.

In the mid-1980s, a network of IMs began growing in both German states; by the time that East Germany collapsed in 1989, the Stasi employed 91,015 employees and 173,081 informants.[25] About one out of every 63 East Germans collaborated with the Stasi. By at least one estimate, the Stasi maintained greater surveillance over its own people than any secret police force in history.[26] The Stasi employed one full-time agent for every 166 East Germans. The ratios swelled when informers were factored in: counting part-time informers, the Stasi had one informer per 6.5 people. By comparison, the Gestapo employed one secret policeman per 2,000 people. This comparison led Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal to call the Stasi even more oppressive than the Gestapo.[27] Additionally, Stasi agents infiltrated and undermined West Germany's government and spy agencies.[citation needed] In some cases, spouses even spied on each other.

A high-profile example of this was peace activist Vera Lengsfeld, whose husband, Knud Wollenberger, was a Stasi informant.[21] Zersetzung Edit Main article: Zersetzung The Stasi perfected the technique of psychological harassment of perceived enemies known as Zersetzung (pronounced [ʦɛɐ̯ˈzɛtsʊŋ]) – a term borrowed from chemistry which literally means "decomposition". …the Stasi often used a method which was really diabolic. It was called Zersetzung, and it's described in another guideline. The word is difficult to translate because it means originally "biodegradation". But actually, it's a quite accurate description. The goal was to destroy secretly the self-confidence of people, for example by damaging their reputation, by organizing failures in their work, and by destroying their personal relationships. Considering this, East Germany was a very modern dictatorship. The Stasi didn't try to arrest every dissident. It preferred to paralyze them, and it could do so because it had access to so much personal information and to so many institutions.

—Hubertus Knabe, German historian [28] By the 1970s, the Stasi had decided that the methods of overt persecution that had been employed up to that time, such as arrest and torture, were too crude and obvious. It was realised that psychological harassment was far less likely to be recognised for what it was, so its victims, and their supporters, were less likely to be provoked into active resistance, given that they would often not be aware of the source of their problems, or even its exact nature. Zersetzung was designed to side-track and "switch off" perceived enemies so that they would lose the will to continue any "inappropriate" activities. Tactics employed under Zersetzung generally involved the disruption of the victim's private or family life. This often included psychological attacks, such as breaking into homes and subtly manipulating the contents, in a form of gaslighting – moving furniture, altering the timing of an alarm, removing pictures from walls or replacing one variety of tea with another.

Other practices included property damage, sabotage of cars, purposely incorrect medical treatment, smear campaigns including sending falsified compromising photos or documents to the victim's family, denunciation, provocation, psychological warfare, psychological subversion, wiretapping, bugging, mysterious phone calls or unnecessary deliveries, even including sending a vibrator to a target's wife. Usually, victims had no idea that the Stasi were responsible. Many thought that they were losing their minds, and mental breakdowns and suicide could result. One great advantage of the harassment perpetrated under Zersetzung was that its subtle nature meant that it was able to be plausibly denied. This was important given that the GDR was trying to improve its international standing during the 1970s and 80s, especially in conjunction with the Ostpolitik of West-German chancellor Willy Brandt massively improving relations between the two German states. Zersetzung techniques were used by other East Bloc intelligence and security agencies. This includes extensive use by the hierarchically superior agency in the USSR intelligence framework, the Russian KGB.

Techniques that would be described as Zersetzung techniques, would otherwise be described and fall under those of "active measures" as termed by the KGB.[29] Techniques that would be classified as active measures or Zersetzung continue to be employed by selected security and intelligence organizations worldwide to this date. The Russian FSB, which has the present organizational responsibilities and congruent authorizations to the internal security, CI, investigatory directorates of the former KGB, has been widely implicated in continued use of active measures techniques in numerous operations.[30] International operations Fall of the Soviet Union Recovery of the Stasi files Museum in the old headquarters Stasi officers after the reunification Alleged informants Biodegradation & Gaslighting Techniques In Mississippi ----- Zersetzung Main article: Zersetzung The Stasi perfected the technique of psychological harassment of perceived enemies known as Zersetzung (pronounced [ʦɛɐ̯ˈzɛtsʊŋ]) – a term borrowed from chemistry which literally means "decomposition". …the Stasi often used a method which was really diabolic. It was called Zersetzung, and it's described in another guideline. The word is difficult to translate because it means originally "biodegradation".

But actually, it's a quite accurate description. The goal was to destroy secretly the self-confidence of people, for example by damaging their reputation, by organizing failures in their work, and by destroying their personal relationships. Considering this, East Germany was a very modern dictatorship. The Stasi didn't try to arrest every dissident. It preferred to paralyze them, and it could do so because it had access to so much personal information and to so many institutions. —Hubertus Knabe, German historian [28] By the 1970s, the Stasi had decided that the methods of overt persecution that had been employed up to that time, such as arrest and torture, were too crude and obvious. It was realised that psychological harassment was far less likely to be recognised for what it was, so its victims, and their supporters, were less likely to be provoked into active resistance, given that they would often not be aware of the source of their problems, or even its exact nature. Zersetzung was designed to side-track and "switch off" perceived enemies so that they would lose the will to continue any "inappropriate" activities. Tactics employed under Zersetzung generally involved the disruption of the victim's private or family life.

This often included psychological attacks, such as breaking into homes and subtly manipulating the contents, in a form of gaslighting – moving furniture, altering the timing of an alarm, removing pictures from walls or replacing one variety of tea with another. Other practices included property damage, sabotage of cars, purposely incorrect medical treatment, smear campaigns including sending falsified compromising photos or documents to the victim's family, denunciation, provocation, psychological warfare, psychological subversion, wiretapping, bugging, mysterious phone calls or unnecessary deliveries, even including sending a vibrator to a target's wife. Usually, victims had no idea that the Stasi were responsible. Many thought that they were losing their minds, and mental breakdowns and suicide could result. Excerpt From: ----- Zersetzung (German; variously translated as decomposition, corrosion, undermining, biodegradation or dissolution) was a psychological technique of the East German secret police, the Stasi used to silence political opponents. The "measures of Zersetzung", defined in the framework of a directive on police procedures in 1976,[1] were used in the context of so-called "operational procedures" (in German Operative Vorgänge or OV).

They replaced the overt terror of the Ulbricht era. The practice of repression in Zersetzung comprised extensive and secret methods of control and psychological manipulation, including personal relationships of the target, for which the Stasi relied on its network of informal collaborators,[2] (in German inoffizielle Mitarbeiter or IM), the State's power over institutions, and on operational psychology. Using targeted psychological attacks the Stasi tried to deprive a dissident of any chance of a "hostile action". The use of Zersetzung is well documented thanks to numerous Stasi files published after East Germany's Wende. Several thousands or up to 10,000 individuals are estimated to have become victims[3]:217 5,000 of whom sustained irreversible damage.[4] Pensions for restitution have been created for the victims. Excerpt From: Stasi Facts for Kids | KidzSearch.com 90,000 (1989) [1] The Stasi was the official state security service of East Germany , the German Democratic Republic or GDR. The Stasi motto was "Schild und Schwert der Partei" (Shield and Sword of the Party).

"The Party" was the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany . The main job of the Stasi was to prevent opposition to the Party. It was one of the most effective and ruthless secret police agencies in the world. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] The Stasi headquarter was in East Berlin , with a group of buildings in Lichtenberg and several other buildings in Berlin. One of its main tasks was spying on the people, through a vast network of citizens who were informants ("snitches"). Informants were paid, or given favours for this. The Stasi also worked as an intelligence agency abroad, using espionage and covert operations in foreign countries. Under its long-time head Markus Wolf it got a reputation as one of the most effective intelligence agencies of the Cold War . After German reunification in 1990, many Stasi officials were prosecuted for their crimes. The files that the Stasi had kept on millions of East Germans were laid open. Now citizens can see their personal files on request; these files are kept by the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives .

References THE FALL OF THE WALL AND THE EAST GERMAN POLICE POLICING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, © 1996 College of Police and Security Studies, Slovenia THE FALL OF THE WALL AND THE EAST GERMAN POLICE Belinda Cooper INTRODUCTION The revolutionary events of October and November 1989 ushered in a period of dizzying change in Germany, particularly in East Germany and the reunited city of Berlin. As familiar social and political institutions fell along with the Berlin Wall, crime patterns changed almost overnight and the policing system in East Germany experienced fundamental transformations. While East Germany would seem to have been in an ideal position among post-communist societies, in that new, more democratic structures did not have to be reinvented, but mererly taken over from the West, in reality--like so much else in the unification process--this transition was extremely painful on a psychological and social level. This article will investigate that transition in the crucial period immediately following the events of autumn 1989.

In addition to the intrinsically interesting nature of this period, understanding its dynamics helps shed light upon more general issues of East Germany's transition from communism and on more recent incidents and events in Germany. This paper was first written in the years 1990-91, before any body of scholarly work existed on the issues it addresses. Thus it relies largely on primary sources such as interviews and documents, as well as newspaper and journal articles published while the changes were taking place, along with some later materials. It begins with a brief overview of the political events leading up to these changes, followed by brief descriptions of the theoretical and practical aspects of crime-fighting structures in East Germay. Changes in crime patterns in Eastern Germany after the fall of the Wall are then discussed, with particular attention to the problems East German police faced in dealing with increased crime. Finally, the psychological tensions in eastern Germany brought about by reunification are highlighted through the use of two brief case studies involving the police (squatting and neo-Nazi incidents). OVERVIEW OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS The year 1989 would prove to be a turning point in German history (Bundeszentrale f�r politische Bildung 1991).

The year saw major changes in the Hungarian and Polish political systems and--in part as a result of this--rumblings of discontent among East Germans. Local East German elections on May 7, 1989 were attended by observers from opposition movements, who testified that the results were rigged. The small demonstrations that followed were dispersed with some brutality by police and the secret service (called the Staatssicherheitsdienst or, more commonly, Stasi), but dissatisfaction did not abate. In August of 1989, East Germans began storming West German embassies in Prague and Budapest in hopes of receiving asylum in West Germany. As this news began to dominate West German television (watched by almost all East Germans), the atmosphere within East Germany became increasingly tense. Relatively large demonstrations took place in Leipzig during an international trade fair in September 1989, and again were broken up forcibly by the police and Stasi. Finally, also in September, the Hungarian government opened its borders and East Germans began to pour out of the country by the tens of thousands. It was against this backdrop that the East German government prepared to celebrate the country's fortieth anniversary on October 7.

October 7 and 8 would become key dates in what is sometimes termed East Germany's "revolution." On these two days, the hollow phrases and hymns of praise to an East German state whose citizens were departing in droves, as well as the presence of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, a symbol of hope to many East Germans, became the catalyst for large-scale protests throughout the country. On the 7th, a spontaneous demonstration by several thousands erupted in the center of Berlin--the first of its size in East Berlin since the 1950's. The police had been primed for weeks to expect "counter-revolutionary" actions by "enemies of the state," and many believed this indoctrination ("Versuch," Die Polizei 1990: 260-62). For these officers, unaccustomed to dealing with any sort of mass protest and suddenly confronted with the hostility of thousands of very angry fellow citizens, the situation was unexpected and frightening. Both police and Stasi were involved in the operation against the demonstrators.

Eye witnesses later described their behavior: more than 1,000 people were beaten and arrested, then taken to various police stations and prisons, where during the night and the next day they were humiliated, mistreated, denied food or use of toilets, and in some cases forced to stand for hours without moving or to run a gauntlet of police armed with clubs ("Ich zeige an," 1989). In the following weeks, a major demand by the opposition would be prosecution of those responsible for this behavior. October 9 then became the crucial turning point. In Leipzig, a traditional Monday prayer service for peace turned into a demonstration by 70,000 (Spiegel, October 16, 1989). The East German army and all security forces had been mobilized, but last-minute intervention by a number of prominent persons prevented violence. For the first time, the protest was not broken up by security forces. This marked the beginning of change in East Germany. One month later, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell.

SOCIALIST POLICING In every country, the police play an important role in executing the political will of the state (Die Polizei 1990: 257). Their role becomes more complex in totalitarian countries, where the state consists of a single party claiming possession of absolute truth. Following Marxist- Leninist theory, East Germany's ruling "Social Unity Party" (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) claimed, through its laws, to represent the will of the ruling working class, which was implemented by organs like the police. In theory, conflicts between the interests of the people and those of the state could not exist; hence they were ignored as far as possible, or suppressed ("Versuch," Die Polizei 1990: 257). The police were expressly instructed to implement "socialist legality," that is, to take an instrumental role in promoting the "socialist order" (Wolfe 1992). Policing emphasized protection of the state and society over the rights of the individual, in the belief that achievement of a socialist society was, in the end, the best protection of those rights.

This often meant combatting those who expressed dissident political viewpoints considered by the Party to pose a threat to its own existence ("Klassenauftrag," Deutsche Polizei, April 1990: 5). The "enemy" was imperialism, often in the form of West German capitalist influence. However, the police's main function in East Germany, as in any country, was day-to-day crimefighting. Official ideology held that crime and socialism were incompatible, and that any remaining crime was merely a relic of the previous social order. The task of the entire criminal justice system, including the police, was at least in part an educational one, since criminals were considered "socially retarded" people who "had not yet internalized socialist values." (Wolfe 1992: 10). Community cooperation in crimefighting was not only encouraged, but even required (Wolfe 1992: 9). THE CONTROL ORGANS The East German system was propped up by a variety of control organs, of which the Volkspolizei, or People's Police, was only one (Harnischmacher 1990: 275-79).

Though the organs were subordinated to various government ministries, all were actually 2 under the control of the East German ruling party, the SED. The most important of these control organs, the Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi (state security service), dealt with political crimes. The Stasi possessed domestic police powers, including the right to arrest and to investigate. Thus many crimes did not come to the attention of the police or were taken out of police hands altogether. The Stasi also supervised the police at many levels, essentially exercising final control over its actions ("Versuch," Die Polizei 1990: 259). In addition, the criminal police had its own net of spies and informants that worked together with or took orders from the Stasi (Gast 1990). POLICE CHARACTERISTICS The East German police, unlike its Western counterpart, was centrally administered and directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. Its military structure left the individual police officer very little discretionary or other freedom ("Versuch," Die Polizei 1990: 258-59).

4 individual work contracts, rather than the civil-service status and benefits West German police enjoyed, though they were well-paid by East German standards. As in many professions considered to involve state security, police could not have relatives or other contacts in the West; theoretically, they could not even watch Western television or listen to Western radio. A history of political loyalty was a must ("Lenin," Deutsche Polizei 1990: 5). Requirements for joining the regular force were a tenth-grade education, army service, and a completed course of vocational training in another profession; actual police training included only 5 months of police school, consisting largely of political indoctrination and legal theory, followed by a six-month practical internship (Harnischmacher 1990: 282-83). Criminal investigators (members of the criminal investigation department or Kripo) received more extensive training (Howorka 1990: 601). Further academic and practical training was possible for all members of the force in the criminology department of East Berlin's Humboldt University, which was also known for training secret police officers.

6 The reasons offered by individual police officers for joining the force differ little from those of their Western, including American, counterparts: A desire to work with people, idealism, family tradition, belief in the system and the wish to serve one's country. CRIME IN EAST GERMANY BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL Crime in Pre-1989 East Germany According to East German propaganda, the Wall was built to protect East Germans from negative influences from the West (Honecker 1981: 197-207). This claim turned out, paradoxically, to contain an element of truth. It is somewhat difficult to achieve an accurate picture of the crime situation in East Germany prior to November 1989 because of the many different organs that dealt with illegal activities, their secrecy, and the state's conscious effort to downplay the extent of crime in this "socialist paradise" (Baier & Borning 1991); nevertheless 9 Political crimes were another matter. As in any totalitarian country, many types of apparently non-political behavior constituted crimes against the state.

Attempting to leave the country without official permission (which was difficult to obtain and subject to a host of restrictions) was illegal. Contact with Westerners could be interpreted as passing information to the enemy, or espionage. Publication of "underground" periodicals and unauthorized demonstrations were punishable. Many apparently harmless activities could be defined as conspiracy against the state (Bundeszentrale f�r politische Bildung 1991). 10 Yet violence, on a psychological as well as physical level, tended to be a government monopoly. Violence by individual citizens remained relatively rare; when it occured, it primarily took the form of bar brawls and domestic violence. In attempting to describe the atmosphere before the fall of the Wall, one policeman I spoke to stated only half-jokingly that the most common crime was "theft of baby carriages." For the average police officer, this absence of violent crime meant that he or she rarely confronted the situations faced by policemen in any large Western city. The fall of the Wall would change this literally overnight.

AFTER THE FALL 12 Immediate Changes The fall of the Wall created a chaotic situation; while familiar structures were discredited almost immediately, no new ones emerged to take their place, leaving a sort of anarchic vacuum. The police and other security forces were no exception. The fear they had nourished for decades disappeared; a liberated but confused citizenry took "freedom" to mean "anything goes." When the public was not openly hostile to the police, it simply ignored them. At the 13 same time, the psychological difficulty of dealing with the sudden, complete breakdown of a familiar social order increased the overall level of tension in the East German population, leading in turn to an increased level of violence. A host of problems and crimes connected with the new, uncontrolled borders appeared almost immediately, among them increases in highway accidents, weapons and currency smuggling, and robberies. Starting in 14 early 1990, a rash of bomb threats hit East Germany ("Ansteigen," Die Polizei, October 1990: 287). Further, latent hostilities toward East Germany's African and Asian guest workers quickly exploded into racist violence.

An additional problem was created following the monetary union and introduction of West German currency in July 1990, in conjunction with the dismantling of the East German army and changes in the status of the Soviet military in East Germany. Soviet soldiers, still paid in non-convertible, low-value Soviet rubles, could no longer afford to shop in a country that now required payment in Western currency. Thus it became common for soldiers openly to sell Soviet weapons of all types in exchange for West German Marks. Weapons were also taken from the stores of the East German army, the NVA, during the chaotic months of late 1989 and early 1990 ("Ansteigen," Die Polizei, October 1990: 287). Thus automatic weapons became widely available for the first time. Combined with the change in weapons laws in Berlin (see below), this created a major increase in lethal arms on the territory of what used to be East Germany that, in conjunction with the tensions described above, could only worsen the crime situation. Monetary union increased East Germany's problems. The sudden influx of Western currency and products resulted in increased shoplifting.

Residential burglary and auto theft also rose (the East German Trabant and Wartburg cars had not been as attractive to thieves as the Western cars now owned by growing numbers of East Germans). Bank robberies increased following monetary union by as much as 87 percent (Skoda 1991: 44), as banks now dealt in Western currency and Western cars made safe, rapid getaways possible. There had been little incentive in the past to steal relatively worthless Eastern marks, especially in a communist state with rigidly-controlled prices and limited opportunities to spend extra money. Thus banks had none of the protective devices taken for granted in the West; they resembled mere shops with counters. Purse snatchings increased rapidly until they almost matched the rate in the West. In addition, with the introduction of the West German mark in the East a new drug market opened up, though drug use did not rise as steeply as had been feared (Die Polizei, April 1990: 94).

LONG-TERM CHANGES Traffic Accidents and Deaths According to the Federal Statistics Office, the number of deaths from traffic accidents climbed from 1,784 in 1989 to 3,330 in 1990. The report shows an 85% increase in traffic deaths on East German territory in 1991. Many were attributable to the fact that many East Germans, accustomed to their slower Trabant cars, immediately bought faster, more powerful, and thus more dangerous, western cars following monetary union. However, West Germans were also responsible for many accidents in the former East Germany; accustomed to smooth Autobahns without speed limits, they ignored such limits on East Germany's bad roads, or drove under the influence of alcohol, ignoring the complete ban on drinking and driving in the eastern part of Germany ("Ansteigen," Die Polizei 1990 claimed almost every third accident in East Germany was caused by Western motorists). Larger, heavier, faster Western cars were capable of causing especially great havoc among the slower-moving, more fragile Eastern automobiles. Weapons With reunification on October 3, 1990, the Allies gave up their status as occupying forces in Berlin.

Laws created by Allied directives lost their validity as lawmaking powers were relinquished once and for all to the German political authorities. One of the most radical differences between the laws governing Berlin and those governing the rest of West Germany concerned possession of weapons. According to occupational directives, only members of the occupying forces could possess weapons; only collectors and hobbyists were excepted, but they were required to comply with strict registration laws. Additionally, due to Berlin's "island" status, cars and travellers entering West Berlin always underwent searches by East German border guards or West German police. The opening of the borders, the merger of the two Germanies and the adoption of West Germany's less-strict laws on weapons possession led to an increase in buying, selling and trading of weapons in a once gun-free society (Heilig 1990). RESTRUCTURING EAST GERMANY'S POLICE The West Berlin police found it difficult to adjust to crime increases following the historical events of 1989; but for the East German police, coping was next to impossible.

Not only did they lack the training and equipment to deal with violent situations, as well as the experience of acting on their own discretion; perhaps most difficult of all was the psychological effect of the East German "revolution." Its major consequence for the police was a fundamental disorientation and insecurity that continued long after unification. The government they had served had forfeited its legitimacy; in the eyes of the population the police, as representatives of that government, no longer possessed any authority. Police behavior over forty years, and particularly in the recent past, was everywhere condemned; officers very much felt their unpopularity and literally feared to enforce the law. 15 In many cases they could no longer even be sure which laws continued to apply and how those that did were to be enforced. A large number of old structures and rules had clearly lost their validity since the "revolution," but no new ones took their place in the governmental and administrative uncertainty that reigned. In addition, no new police law was passed to define the police's changed responsibilities and duties.

In the long period beginning in November 1989 and continuing even past the March 1990 East German elections, a "legal vacuum" existed in East Germany that would not end (at least formally) until unification on October 3, 1990 ("Rechtsvakuum," tageszeitung, April 19, 1990). CHANGES PRIOR TO UNIFICATION Personnel Despite this chaotic situation, some changes did occur. East Berlin's chief of police was replaced early in 1990 ("Das Ende," Bhrgerrecht & Polizei 1991: 8), and the "Round Table" that acted as a de facto East German legislature until the March 1990 elections began investigations into the behavior of the police on October 7 and 8, 1989. Yet change in personnel occurred quite slowly. Contrary to the general impression outside of Germany that the fall of the Wall meant instant freedom and democracy, few overnight alterations occured anywhere in East German society.

Many of the old top police officials, like their political counterparts, remained in power, including those responsible for the police misbehavior on October 7 and 8; few investigations actually resulted in prosecution (Baum 1991). One reason 17 for this was that the investigations remained in the hands of the same government prosecuters who had served under the old regime; another was stalling tactics by the police bureaucracy itself ("Das Ende," B�rgerrecht & Polizei 1991: 7-8). The East German police's inability to deal honestly with its own past was illustrated in radical fashion when, shortly before unification, it had to be prevented from destroying files that included evidence pertaining to the events of October 1989 (Malzahn 1990). Security partnerships Most important from a psychological point of view, the grass-roots organizations that had initiated the revolution made great efforts to work with, rather than against, the police. So-called "security partnerships" became common, in which these groups collaborated with the police to prevent violence and ensure order at demonstrations and other public events ("Versuch," Die Polizei 1990: 262).

Although West German demonstrations also had to be registered with the police in advance, confrontational behavior on the part of both demonstrators and police tended to be more common in the West; the East German security partnerships strove to avoid such confrontation. The insecurity of the East German police and their desire to reduce popular hostility aimed at them undoubtedly contributed to the success of these partnerships ("Das Ende," B�rgerrecht & Polizei 1991: 8). Cooperation with the West Cooperation between the East and West German police began soon after the fall of the Wall. In Berlin, the chiefs of police of the two cities were connected by a direct telephone line (tageszeitung, December 21, 1989). East German police sought the advice of their Western counterparts in dealing with the various crime areas with which they had little experience. West German police held seminars in West Germany for their East German colleagues (Kampmann & Wildt 1990; tageszeitung, May 22, 1990). The police also cooperated concretely, if informally, in solving cross-border crimes (Fuchs, Kriminalistik 1990: 119-21).

As early as January 1990, police unions began forming in the East and making contact with unions in the West. The rank-and-file demanded better working conditions, better pay, and the right to civil servant status. In May 1990 18 , they succeeded in changing the police ranking system from the previous military hierarchy to one that mirrored the West German system (Die Volkspolizei/Bereitschaft Extra 1990: 7). In January 1990, a department for drug crimes was formed in the East Berlin police department; in March, the police began to create an "anti-terror" squad, employing in part former Stasi members (Asendorpf, tageszeitung, March 31, 1990).

In summer of 1990, the East and West German police finally created a formal "law enforcement union" to promote cooperation in catching and prosecuting criminals who until then could escape punishment by crossing, respectively, to either the East or the West (Schloesser, tageszeitung, June 18, 1990; tageszeitung, August 18, 1990.) Unification and Beyond The interim period following the fall of the Wall was short-lived, ending with unification on October 3, 1990. Unlike other East-Central European countries, East Germany was generally not in a position to restructure its society, including its police force, to suit its own needs. Instead, for better or worse, West German structures and laws were essentially superimposed onto the East. This was most obvious in Berlin, where the East Berlin police were completely absorbed by the West Berlin force. However, the situation changed throughout East Germany, as control of the police was decentralized and passed over to the states. Following unification, East German police were required to fill out long, probing questionnaires concerning their political and professional history before being accepted conditionally onto the "new" police force.

Those accepted 19 only slowly received the status of civil servants; their pay remained low compared with the past and with their Western colleagues. Further, their training in the East was generally not recognized, meaning that those who had held higher rank were forced to move farther down the career ladder. In any case, the force would not take on all of the East German police who wished to keep their jobs. Older 20 officers had little chance of retaining their positions, and none at all of reaching the rank many held in the East (von Bebenburg, Frankfurter Rundschau, October 30, 1990.) This situation created a significant morale problem, and many East Germans simply quit (B�hmer, die tageszeitung, May 13, 1991); those that remained 21 feared for their jobs in the situation of mass unemployment facing the East. There were complaints that fear of making a mistake that might cost them their jobs led police from the East to hesitate before enforcing the law. The situation slowly improved as former East German police underwent the necessary background checks and were accepted onto the new force.

For those former East German members of the force who remained, the introduction of the West German system required massive retraining. Suddenly, the entire corpus of West German law had to be learned from scratch. In Berlin, retraining was offered by the police department itself, but particularly in smaller cities and towns officers essentially had to teach themselves, occasionally with the help of a West German advisor (Frankenstein, Berliner Zeitung 1991; Wildt, tageszeitung 1990). On the other hand, however, West German police forces quickly created partnerships arrangements with East German cities and regions, offering training and helping build up local forces (Diederichs). A significant issue among those concerned with crimefighting, particularly in the East, was how to "teach" the principles of democratic policing to officers trained in an undemocratic system. East German criminologists themselves admitted that the process would be difficult-- certainly more difficult than many in the West at first comprehended (Zinycz and Hahn, Kriminalistik 1991). The Situation in Berlin The effect of Germany's unique East-West split and its psychological consequences on the police were most obvious in Berlin, where the two systems enjoyed the closest proximity.

On October 3, 1990, East Germany ceased to exist. The former West Berlin police officially took over responsibility for enforcing the law in all of Berlin. The East Berlin police had lobbied for the creation of three new "directorates," or precincts, in East Berlin, but the West Berlin hierarchy refused to do anything that would give the former East German police independent control of police activity in eastern Berlin. Instead, West Berlin directorates divided the former East Berlin precincts among themselves. Thus former East German police officers were kept out of the new police leadership for all of Berlin ("Die 'Erstreckung,'" B�rgerrecht & Polizei, 1990). This decision was just one of many that reflected the West Berlin police's strategy to take over the entire new Berlin police structure, justified with the argument that the new laws would be those of the Federal Republic and the assumption that many high East German police officials had been involved with the secret police and its crimes (Ibid.). Thus following unification, the entire police leadership in Berlin became West German.

With limited knowledge of the psychological, political and social situation within East Germany, West German police were sent into what was essentially a foreign country, bringing with them attitudes developed over many years in a very different West German setting (East Berlin police also did duty on the western side of the city, but there they were clearly in the subordinate position of trainees in a foreign environment). The Situation Outside Berlin Whereas in Berlin, the post-unification police force simply took on the structure and leadership of West Berlin's police, a more complicated situation existed in the rest of the country. Soon after the 1989 change in regime, the political map of East Germany was redrawn to conform to pre-1945 state borders abolished by the Communist government; five Lender, or states, were recreated as political units, which required the creation of entirely new administrative structures. Once unification occurred, the centralized East German police administration therefore also gave way to the decentralized, state-level West German system, and had to begin building up brand-new policing structures on the Lender level--clearly a difficult task, given the simultaneously-rising crime rate, high attrition from the police force, and the general chaos of a society in transition.

Technical difficulties also created daunting practical problems: the lack of modern equipment to carry out investigations that in the past had been taken care of by the central criminal investigation offices in Berlin, as well as an extremely poor communications infrastructure in the underdeveloped eastern states (Ackermann 113- 14). 23 To gain control of the situation, the five new eastern German states created the so-called "joint state criminal office," (Gemeinsames Landeskriminalamt or GKLA), a central criminal investigating authority, to coordinate crimefighting until the states could create their own criminal investigation departments (Ackermann 113-19). Yet here, too, the police could not escape its past; the GKLA, an entirely eastern German institution, was accused of employing numerous former Stasi officers ("Sp�ren in der M�llt�te," Der Spiegel 1990: 108-13).

As the states built up their own criminal investigation departments with the help of western partner states, and often with Western criminal justice officials at their heads, the GKLA was slowly eliminated (Diederichs, B�rgerrecht & Polizei 1991: 31-33). Case Studies Two case studies may help illustrate some of the problems arising from police restructuring in Berlin and the rest of eastern Germany. In Berlin, events surrounding a number of occupied houses in East Berlin provide an example of the psychological and practical problems that arose when a western-oriented police force attempted to deal with a problem in the eastern part of the city. Outside of Berlin, the growth of right-wing, often racist violence illustrated the helplessness experienced by the restructured police in the face of a major new problem in eastern society. Focus: Squatters In the early 1980's, West Germany, particularly West Berlin, began to experience the phenomenon of "squatting," in which young people would illegally occupy and live in buildings being held empty by speculators. After several years of confrontation with the government and violent combat with police, many of these squatters obtained leases to the buildings and city support for renovation work.

Nevertheless, a hard core of violent squatters continues to provoke occasional clashes with West German police. Organized squatting began to occur in East Germany as well following the revolution. In many East German cities, squatting had always been one unspoken way of finding housing; now, however, young people began to occupy buildings openly and demand the right to remain. In many cases, they also reached agreement with the government and obtained leases. Particularly in East Berlin, however, the issue was complicated by the presence of West Berlin militants, with their extremely confrontational behavior, in addition to the bona fide East German squatters who tended to adhere to a more non-violent philosophy. Until unification, the East Berlin police generally left the squatters alone, occassionally even protecting them when they came under attack by violent right-wing soccer fans and neo- Nazis. But in November 1990, following unification, the West Berlin government decided to use its extended police power over the eastern part of the city to force the squatters out; in the end, several thousand police from West Germany were called in to clear a few hundred squatters.

Militant squatters resisted with molotov cocktails and rocks, and the violent confrontation captured headlines throughout the country (Dokumentation zur Mainzer Strasse, 12-14 November 1990; CILIP 37, 3/1990). While it remains unclear who was most responsible for these events (police and squatters each accused the other of provoking the violence), it was clear that the situation largely involved Western problems fought out on Eastern territory. West Berlin militants had moved into East Berlin, bringing with them their violent and confrontational approach to the state; West German police responded in kind, as they were accustomed to do in West Berlin (few East German police participated in the operation) (Kampmann, tageszeitung, June 25, 1990; Hartung, tageszeitung, November 14, 1990). The most common response of local East German residents was a feeling of being "occupied" by both squatters and police. Focus: Right-Wing Extremism Right-wing violence by neo-Nazis did not begin with the attacks in Rostock in autumn 1992 that shocked the world.

It began as soon as the Wall came down, and quickly became a major issue for the police in the new states. East Germany 24 had a right-wing "skinhead" subculture even before the fall of the Wall; after it fell, West German neo-Nazi groups began to organize in the East, finding fertile ground among disoriented, often unemployed East German youngsters whose entire world had collapsed around them with the changes in the country. While Berlin has also experienced an increase in such neo-Nazi activity, the problem initially was most serious in southern cities such as Leipzig and Dresden; blacks and foreigners feared to venture out on the streets at night, and cafJs and other projects considered "left-wing" were constant targets. In autumn 1991, repeated attacks on housing complexes where foreigners lived, peaking in the Saxon city of Hoyerswerda, made headlines; later violence 25 began to concentrate in the northern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg.

Police and some local government officials openly admitted from the start that they could not cope with right-wing violence (Krall, tageszeitung, December 3, 1990; Schwart, tageszeitung, October 26, 1990; "Leipziger Neonazis," tageszeitung, July 3, 1991; Kaufmann, tageszeitung, May 6, 1991). They complained that too many police were leaving the force or being let go, creating even greater insecurity and hesitancy to act; that their equipment and materials were too primitive to deal with the new types of crime they faced (some police in Rostock apparently bought protective clothing in a local sporting-goods store during the autumn 1992 riots there); and that they were simply not equipped to deal with the problems that had hit the country, particularly those that result from social tensions--unemployment, racism, and the like (Neunzig, Rheinischer Merkur, January 4, 1991).

There were also reports of police sympathy with right-wing attacks, particularly upon foreigners (Der Spiegel, May 27, 1991: 85; Siegler, die tageszeitung, June 28, 1991: 5), though this is more commonly mentioned in connection with the western German police. As can be seen from the two case studies above, the difficulties eastern Germany experienced following unification, in crime fighting as in many other areas, had significant psychological, as well as practical and political, components. CONCLUSION The the opening of the Berlin Wall brought problems in its wake that caught much of Germany unprepared. Euphoria gave way to social tensions in both parts of the country. East Germans, in addition to facing a whole range of new social problems, had to cope with the psychological effects accompanying the collapse of a familiar social order and its replacement by a completely different social structure. Nevertheless, to other Eastern and Central European countries, Germany's experience may seem in some ways ideal. Rather than having to reinvent the wheel, as it were, East Germany simply took over ready-made, westernized structures, concepts and institutions.

But this view is simplistic, as has become clear in the six years since unification. Forty years of divergent experience and behavior cannot simply be molded to suit political purposes--a fact western Germans realized rather late in the process. It is not a judgment of the ultimate effectiveness of the institutional westernization of East Germany to point out that this often involuntary process of westernization--viewed by so many eastern Germans as a sort of colonization--created tensions as significant as any experienced by other post-communist societies undergoing more organic processes of institutional development. The popularity of the PDS, successor to the East German ruling party, in eastern Germany attests to this fact. I have presented the experience of the East German police as a case study of one institution that, I hope, helps illuminate these tensions and the process of change. NOTES ?? See "Die schlagen schneller zu," Der Spiegel, May 27, 1991, pp. 78-85 for a general description of the growth of right-wing extremism in the new states, and Bernd Siegler, "Dresden - Haupstadt der rechten Bewegung," tageszeitung, May 14, 1991, pp.

12-13 for a thorough discussion of the situation in Dresden. AUTHOR NOTES Belinda Copper Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute of the New School for Social Research, New York; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. The author lived in Berlin from 1987- 1994. An earlier version of this paper, which included sections on changes in western German crime and policing, was originally written together with Dr. Alexis Aronowitz, who provided invaluable expertise on the West German policing system. It was presented at the conference of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences in March 1991. Subterranea Britannica: Research Study Group: Stasi [Source: Nick Catford ] The infamous Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security), usually known as the Stasi, was established in April 1950. Similar in structure to the then-operating Russian NKVD (predecessor to the KGB), the Stasi was the secret police force for the communist-controlled German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Stasi used a huge network of informants to repress the citizens of East Germany.

It was not uncommon for members of families to spy on each other for fear of blackmail, as a result of physical threats and even because of monetary rewards from the secret police force. In the late '80s, the Stasi had nearly 175,000 official informants on their books, roughly one informant for every 100 people. (Some estimate the size of the "unofficial" Stasi informant force as nearly 10 times this level.) The Stasi maintained a force of over 90,000 uniformed and plain-clothes agents and kept files on up to 6 million East German citizens; one-third of the entire population. All phone calls from the West were monitored, as was all mail. Similar surveillance was routine domestically. Every factory, social club and youth association was infiltrated. Stasi agents collected scent samples from people by wiping bits of cloth on objects they had touched. These samples were stored in airtight glass containers and special dogs were trained to track down the person's scent. The agency was authorized to conduct secret smear campaigns against anyone it judged to be a threat; this might include sending anonymous letters and making anonymous phone calls to blackmail the targeted person.

Torture was an accepted method of getting information. Aside from their internal operations, the Stasi, in coordination with the KGB, collected external intelligence. The key targets of the Stasi's external efforts were the U.S. occupational forces in Berlin, U.S. and NATO forces in West Germany, the West German government and military and political bodies of other Western European countries. The operations of the Stasi, the uniforms they wore and the geographical situation of East and West Berlin made them the perfect ever-present 'bad guys' of many Cold War spy novels. However, their portrayal in print was only a shadow of their true and far-reaching influence. Stasi abuses led to protests in Leipzig that helped pave the way for the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1990, when West and East Germany were reunited, the Stasi was dissolved. Many sought retribution for the pain, suffering and even loss of life caused by the East German secret police through the court system. Erich Mielke (died.

6.6.2000) Minister for Public Security 1957 - 1989 However, a final decision by the unified German court in 1995 stated that former Stasi officials could not be prosecuted for taking part in or conducting Cold War espionage against the West. Click on districts shown in capital letters to view the bunker For administration purposes, East Germany was divided into 15 Districts, each District having a District Administrative Office. Each district was then sub-divided into areas with, in 1989, a total of 209 Area Offices; there were also 9 specific site offices. As well as the 15 District administrative headquarters, each District also had a protected bunker to where the District Administrator and his staff could retreat to in times of tension or war. These bunkers also acted as communications intercept centres. They were all identical and were located on country estates with a 'cover story' that allowed people to come and go without arousing local interest or suspicion. The bunkers were totally self sufficient with there own generators, ventilation and filtration plant, water purification plant, dormitories, kitchen and a medical bay.

They employed a complex system or air locks that were designed to allow survival for up to 40 personnel for 7 - 14 days following a nuclear or chemical attack. Plan of a typical Stasi bunker The Stasi EastGermany.info The Stasi - Staatssicherheit - State Security Erich Mielke center, Minister of State security from 1957-89 The Ministerium f�r Staatssicherheit or Ministry of State Security (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi, was formed on Feb 8, 1950. The motto of the Stasi was "Schild und Schwert der Partei" (Shield and Sword of the Party). It was modeled after the MGB , Ministry of State Security, then existing in the Soviet Union. The Stasi infiltrated all aspects of daily life in the East Germany, it was estimated that by the 1980s, one out of seven citizens in East Germany was part of the Stasi or a Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs, Unofficial Collaborators) . Like its Soviet counterpart, The Stasi monitored political behavior among East German citizens, and is known to have used torture and intimidation to stop dissent.

The Stasi was East Germany's largest employer in East Germany . East Germany's answer to 007 Das unsichtbare Visier ( The invisible visor) ran from 1973-79 A 70s East German Spy TV series made with co-operation of the Stasi. It starred Armin Mueller-Stahl in the role of Werner Bredebusch, a Stasi agent active abroad . The Stasi ran security checks for most job positions . Files were kept on 6 million of East Germany's 16 million people .A prison was built in the Schumannstrasse, where the Stasi used NKVD techniques to extract information, such as making victims stand in front of a bright light for days, threats against family and isolation . Phones were tapped, letters steamed open and people were arrested on the slightest suspicion. Dissenters were often followed 24 hours a day with exhausting detail. Family members and close friends were also forced or enticed to become informers, leading to much hatred after the fall of East Germany .

An East German citizen never knew who could be trusted .Each year a Said agent had to recruit 25 informers or risk a loss of benefits or demotion .Many were bribed or blackmailed into working for the Stasi . Ich liebe ....doch alle Menschen!� ( But I love...I love all....all the people..) Erich Mielke at the Volkskammer Nov 13, 1989 and being jeered at. Mielke avoided persecution for his role with the Stasi since it was deemed to be done under the laws of a sovereign state. He was charged with the murder of two policemen in 1931 and sentenced to 6 years .He was paroled after 2 years due to health problems and died on May 27, 2000. video of Stasi prison The house or apartment of those who were suspected of anti-state activities were searched while the suspect was away. If someone was seriously suspected of anti-state behaviour, agents would usually appear at their place of work and disappear, perhaps for years . The Stasi was directly linked to the KGB and sent it information until 1990.

There had been an estimated 85,000 full time Stasi agents and 109,000 private informers and an estimated 1 to 2 million east Germans had served as Stasi agents at one time or another .The Stasi left behind a staggering 2 trillion pages of reports . Most were hand written, as the Stasi distrusted computers . The colloquial name for the Stasi was Zur Firma (The Firm). Markus Johannes 'Misch' Wolf (1923-2006) head of the General Reconnaissance Administration (Hauptverwaltung Aufkl�rung) during most of the Cold War Video on Markus Wolf The Assenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN) later called the Hauptverwaltung Aufkl�rung (HVA) was the foreign intelligence service of the GDR and a section of the Stasi.During the Cold War Berlin was the 'Spy Capital' of the world where agents from the British SIS, American CIA, the West German BND, French SDECE and the Soviet NKVD-later the KGB were active.

The Soviets were the most active, have over 800 agents in Berlin by 1953 .The HVA under Markus Johannes 'Misch' Wolf had great success in penetrating the government, political and business circles of West Germany with spies. The weak link in West German security, the office staff, was infiltrated by East German spies. East German woman were trained to be 'honeytraps' to seduce important West Germans into relationships, young men were also trained to seduce middle aged single women in important positions .Moles were also used, the most famous being Heinz Felfe, who became head of the Soviet Counter-intelligence of the BND. He was discovered in 1961, a revelation which helped topple the Anenauer government .East German spy Gunter Guillaume, became an aide to Chancellor Willy Brandt . Double agent Klaus Kuron claimed that as many as 25 members of the West German parliament were east German agents in the late 80s.The discovery of this also led to his downfall.

In an interview with Der Spiegel in 1990, Wolf claimed there were 10,000 East German agents working in West Germany in 1985. Watch Former Stasi Agents Defend Their Deeds Talk with Roland Jahn, Head of the Stasi Archives | Talking Germany Roland Jahn has a background in broadcast journalism and since March 2011 he has been head of the German government's caretaker agency for East German Stasi archives. about those who worked for and resisted the Stasi The Untold Story Of the German Secret Police PRISM LINKS TO UTAH DATA CENTER (UDC) Camp Williams - SPYING ON ALL US, UK & EU PUBLIC - YouTube PRISM LINKS TO UTAH DATA CENTER (UDC) Camp Williams - SPYING ON ALL US, UK & EU PUBLIC Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later.

Published on Jun 10, 2013 PRISM LINKS TO UTAH DATA CENTER (UDC) Camp Williams - SPYING ON ALL US, UK & EU PUBLIC SECRET NDA facility - UDC Cryptic Opaque STASI world -- now being rapidly rolled out... Remember the STASI, [Staatssicherheit or State Security in English (formed in 1950 in East Germany - based in East Berlin -- the sign of an ultra evil Communist society until 1990, when it was dissolved)] the secret police who operated in East Germany when it was a communist state? When the Berlin Wall came down, East Germans discovered they had been living in a society so rotted by paranoia that at least one in three of its adult citizens were spying on the other two. From this springs what can be called the "STASI PRINCIPLE": a state's appetite for collecting intelligence expands in direct relationship to its technical ability to do so. In the case of East Germany, this ended up producing warehouses stuffed with bulging files containing the minutely observed details of the everyday, humdrum lives of millions.

[This is now exactly what the usurpers of private Capital Ro-Ro want to engineer to spy on all people in the West -- 24/7 -- aping the Stasi (Edward Snowden is a brave intelligent idealistic person with the highest moral scruples -- upholding the legal and moral principles of International Human Rights & basic Civil Liberties -- trying to save us from the unaccountable United Stasi of America]. The product was both banal and, in its range and results, terrifying (a world caught beautifully in the film The Lives of Others). [Hollywood always depicts the reality in terms of "the Others" -- as this is the case -- knowing who exactly owns the private interests of "Holly-wood" (the 'wood of the holly' was the wood traditionally used by secular Occultists -- warlocks - magicians -- illusionists - sorcerers - Satanists)(the secular Babylonian "TALISMAN OF SATURN" = SATAN = HEXagram)(look it up)].

In the case of the U.S., the apotheosis of the same mind-set lies in a sprawling complex at CAMP WILLIAMS, BLUFFDALE, UTAH, due to start operating this autumn [2013 -- just weeks away]. Billions of dollars have gone into creating this cyberintelligence facility for the National Security Agency. ['NSA'] There's no official explanation of the Utah Data Center's real mission, except that it's the largest of a network of data farms including sites in: Colorado (Co), Georgia (Ga), and Maryland (Md). But it's obviously been built to vastly increase the agency's capacity to suck in, digest, analyze, and store whatever the intelligence community decides to collect. We now know a lot more about the kind of data that includes -- courtesy of whistle-blowers who care about our basic Human Rights -- like Edward Snowden (in the ex British colony of Hong Kong). The national-security industrial complex is now of the size, power, and influence of the military-industrial complex of the Cold War, which President Eisenhower [ex General] first defined and warned us all as to the dangers that a small group can so easily pose [i.e.

those that have become the private controllers of capital -- from the public sector]. As then, this complex uses the national interest as a reason for having to operate in secrecy, and invokes patriotism—literally in the PATRIOT Act—to create a political consensus. [Be aware of the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) section 1021 -- the ability of the President Of The US ('POTUS') to arbitrarily eliminate a person anywhere around the whole world -- unconstitutionally without due process]. The official story of 911 goes that a mere 'Nineteen terrorists with minimal technology—box cutters—have enabled the counterterrorism industry to enjoy unbounded reach'.

[If only the mainstream media was to set the record straight and come clean to inform us of the truth of 911 -- that two sovereign governments were involved in a False Flag Event directed against their own people -- in order to prosecute a war based on a false prospectus - in order to lay down pipelines for oil and gas in other sovereign jurisdictions (such as the TAPI pipeline rather than the Iranian or the Russian pipelines)('Kellogg, Brown & Root' {'KBR'} the subsidiary of Halliburton and 'Merhav' the Israeli company)].

White House Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest used the familiar argument to defend the newly disclosed surveillance: it was, he said, "a critical tool in protecting the nation from terror threats as it allows counterterrorism personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terror activities, particularly people located inside the United States." Category On This Day in History, February 8 On This Day in History Home On This Day On This Day in History, February 8 On This Day in History, February 8 What Happened On This Day – February 8 1971 The NASDAQ holds its first trading day The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations was the world's first electronic stock exchange. 1960 The first 8 stars are added to the Hollywood Walk of Fame More than 2400 five-pointed stars have since been embedded in the sidewalks of Hollywood Boulevard and Vine Street to honor stars of the entertainment industry. 1950 The Stasi, East Germany's notorious secret police, is established The “Staatssicherheit”, which was dissolved in 1990, is considered one of the most repressive intelligence agencies in the world.

1910 The Boy Souts of America is founded 3 years earlier, British General Robert Baden-Powell had founded the Scout movement in England. 1879 Sandford Fleming proposes the use of time zones The later introduction of Universal Standard Time, which is based on time zones, revolutionized time keeping.

Question: Formed 1950 and dissolved 1990, the Stasi was the secret police of?
Answer: East Germany