Afghanistan was invaded by Russia in 1979 the Russians - CIS - 231 View Full Document Afghanistan was invaded by Russia in 1979 (the Russians withdrew ten years later). After the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, the U.S. military deposed the Afghan government (the Taliban), which had harbored the terrorist organization. The new Afghan government faces many challenges as it attempts to consolidate power and promote development. Asia, home to over half the world’s population, produces less than 25 percent of the world’s GDP. Asia is unique in that it is a source of both high- and low-quality products and of both expensive and inexpensive labor. ²urther, the region attracts MNC investments, and is a major supplier of capital to non-Asian countries. Moreover, its companies are increasingly pressuring European and North American companies to improve their operations. Japan Japan, with a population of 128 million, has enjoyed rapid growth over the last 50 years in part because of the close relationship between the Ministry of International Trade and Investment and the industrial sector.

Japan, through the use of keiretsus, has also made it di³cult for foreign Frms to penetrate its marketplace. A keiretsu is a large family of interrelated Frms. Sogo Soshas (export trading companies that serve as the marketers for the keiretsu in international markets) facilitate the exports of keiretsu members. Although Japan is frequently criticized for its exports, it should be recognized that its exports are a smaller portion of its GDP than is the case for many nations. However, the country seemingly restricts importers from competing for its domestic market. This topic will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Nine. Japan's economy slowed in the 1990s, averaging only .7 percent growth (compared to 2.7 percent average growth in the world economy). Australia and New Zealand Australia and New Zealand are traditional economic powers in PaciFc Asia. Some 40 percent of its population lives in Sydney or Melbourne. Australia’s exports capitalize on its natural resources (gold, iron ore, coal, etc.) and land-intensive agricultural goods (wool, beef, and wheat).

New Zealand, the other traditional industrial power in PaciFc Asia, has aggressively moved to deregulate and privatize its economy. Australia, Japan, and the United States account for approximately half of New Zealand's exports and imports. The Four Tigers The ²our Tigers – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong – enjoy the position of being among the fastest industrializing nations in the world. While many publications still classify the ²our Tigers as Emerging Markets, they have in fact already emerged as indicated by their having achieved high income classiFcation by the World Bank for more than a decade. South Korea has grown rapidly through tight cooperation between the government and chaebol. Chaebol are large, privately owned conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo. Today, however, many of the chaebol are experiencing Fnancial di³culties as a result of the Asian currency crisis. South Korea has followed a similar recipe for economic This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version. This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

TERM "Employee Monitoring: Watch This Way" Daintry Duffy, CSO February 01, 2003 business last Russia and Afghanistan | Institute for the Study of War Demographics Afghanistan is overwhelmingly Muslim (99 percent), and Islam is the second largest religion in Russia, with around fifteen to twenty million adherents in the country, or ten to fifteen percent of the population. But these demographic details have minimum bearing on the relations between the two countries. Most Russian Muslims live in the North Caucasus and Middle Volga Regions. Russia and Afghanistan also share sizeable Turkic ethnic minorities, such as the Uzbeks and Turkmen . History In December 1979, in the midst of the Cold War, the Soviet 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in order to prop up the communist government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency. At the time, the United States had been making headway in the Middle East at Moscow’s expense, successfully courting Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. The Soviet Union feared the loss of its communist proxy in Afghanistan.

Thus, over the course of the 1980's, the Soviet Union poured in billions of dollars (US) into the war in Afghanistan, and at its peak, more than 100,000 Soviet soldiers were fighting in the country. However, the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen) was heavily supported by a wide variety of international actors, including the US, Pakistan , Saudi Arabia, Iran , China, and Egypt. In the end, the mujahideen prevailed and the Soviet Army was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1989, having lost tens of thousands killed and wounded. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow continued to supply and arm the communist regime of Dr. Najibullah, but this was not enough, and Kabul fell to the mujahideen in 1992. The different mujahideen factions could not agree on how to share power, and the country quickly descended into a bloody civil war.

In 1994, a movement of Pashtun fundamentalist students most of whom were trained in madrasas (religious schools) in the refugee camps in Pakistan seized Kandahar and started a campaign to wrest the country from the hands of the warlords. Known as the Taliban, this force marched into Kabul in 1996 and took control of most of the rest of the country by 1998. Many mujahideen warlords were forced to flee to the north, where they joined the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud. Even though Rabbani and Massoud’s Jamiat-e Islami was one of the main mujahideen factions responsible for the defeat of the Soviet Army during the 1980s, Moscow decided to lend its support to the Northern Alliance, as did Iran, India, and others. Russia did not want to see a fundamentalist state emerge in Afghanistan. More importantly, the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies were providing training and sanctuary to Chechen rebels, Central Asian militants, and others whom Moscow deemed as a threat.

Russia did not take part in the U.S.-led invasion to overthrow the Taliban in 2001, but Moscow shared intelligence with Washington during the invasion. Russia has also allowed the U.S.-led coalition to send logistical and military supplies through Russian territory, and Moscow has been a major arms supplier to the Afghan government . Ethnic Separatism, Islamism, and Terrorism Moscow fears the rise of Islamic extremism among Russia’s substantial Muslim population, in addition to separatist movements among certain ethnic groups, particularly the Chechens. The Kremlin views these forces as a severe threat to the state, and thus it willingly supported the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban—a movement which had provided aid to these groups. Moscow has also used its participation in America’s “War on Terror” as an excuse for heavy-handedness in its crackdown on Islamist and separatist movements in Chechnya and elsewhere. Outside its borders, Russia is concerned about the growth of Islamism and terrorism in its traditional sphere of influence or “near abroad”—the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Many militants from these areas have significant ties to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or other groups in Afghanistan, and therefore Russia does not want to see a Taliban comeback in Kabul or a failed state emerge in Afghanistan. While the Kremlin may disapprove of NATO ’s presence along its southern frontier, it does not want to see Afghanistan become a safe haven for a separatist, terrorist, or Islamist forces. NATO Russia has always been suspicious of the former anti-Soviet alliance, especially as many of its former satellite states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Unsurprisingly, Moscow is wary of the presence of so many NATO and US troops along its southern frontier. Russia supported the overthrow of the Taliban and wanted to see a stable government emerge in Kabul. It allowed the US and its partners to set up bases in its “near abroad” in Central Asia—Uzbekistan and later Kyrgyzstan—and allowed for the transport of supplies through Russian territory. However, in recent years, Russia has shifted its policy towards its “near abroad,” seeking a more assertive role in the former Soviet territories, including the Central Asian states, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states.

In February 2009, the Kyrgyz government announced that it would close the US airbase at Manas, a decision largely seen as a quid pro quo for the multi-billion dollar Russian aid package previously promised to Kyrgyzstan. It comes at a critical time for the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan, as growing unrest in Pakistan has put the eastern supply route—through which 75 percent of coalition supplies travel—in jeopardy. The coalition has therefore begun looking into alternate supply routes in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan , and Turkmenistan . (Iran refused to allow NATO supplies to be transported through its territory.) Moscow has seized the opportunity and has volunteered to transport more coalition supplies through Russia. This increased dependence on Russia would give Moscow more power in its dealings with NATO and greater leverage on issues such as the US’s proposed missile defense shield, the Iranian nuclear program, and the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive moves in its “near abroad”—Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Russian invasion of Afghanistan - History Learning Site Russian invasion of Afghanistan Citation: C N Trueman "Russian invasion of Afghanistan" historylearningsite.co.uk.

The History Learning Site, 9 Mar 2015. 16 Aug 2016. Afghanistan hit the world’s headlines in 1979. Afghanistan seemed to perfectly summarise the Cold War . From the west’s point of view, Berlin , Korea , Hungary and Cuba had shown the way communism wanted to proceed. Afghanistan was a continuation of this. In Christmas 1979, Russian paratroopers landed in Kabal, the capital of Afghanistan. The country was already in the grip of a civil war. The prime minister, Hazifullah Amin, tried to sweep aside Muslim tradition within the nation and he wanted a more western slant to Afghanistan. This outraged the majority of those in Afghanistan as a strong tradition of Muslim belief was common in the country. Thousands of Muslim leaders had been arrested and many more had fled the capital and gone to the mountains to escape Amin’s police. Amin also lead a communist based government – a belief that rejects religion and this was another reason for such obvious discontent with his government. Thousands of Afghanistan Muslims joined the Mujahdeen – a guerilla force on a holy mission for Allah. They wanted the overthrow of the Amin government.

The Mujahdeen declared a jihad – a holy war – on the supporters of Amin. This was also extended to the Russians who were now in Afghanistan trying to maintain the power of the Amin government. The Russians claimed that they had been invited in by the Amin government and that they were not invading the country. They claimed that their task was to support a legitimate government and that the Mujahdeen were no more than terrorists. On December 27th, 1979, Amin was shot by the Russians and he was replaced by Babrak Kamal. His position as head of the Afghan government depended entirely on the fact that he needed Russian military support to keep him in power. Many Afghan soldiers had deserted to the Mujahdeen and the Kamal government needed 85,000 Russian soldiers to keep him in power. The Mujahdeen proved to be a formidable opponent. They were equipped with old rifles but had a knowledge of the mountains around Kabal and the weather conditions that would be encountered there. The Russians resorted to using napalm, poison gas and helicopter gun ships against the Mujahdeen – but they experienced exactly the same military scenario the Americans had done in Vietnam .

By 1982, the Mujahdeen controlled 75% of Afghanistan despite fighting the might of the world’s second most powerful military power. Young conscript Russian soldiers were no match against men fuelled by their religious belief. Though the Russian army had a reputation, the war in Afghanistan showed the world just how poor it was outside of military displays. Army boots lasted no more than 10 days before falling to bits in the harsh environment of the Afghanistan mountains. Many Russian soldiers deserted to the Mujahdeen. Russian tanks were of little use in the mountain passes. The United Nations had condemned the invasion as early as January 1980 but a Security Council motion calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces had been vetoed……by Russia. America put a ban on the export of grain to Russia, ended the SALT talks taking place then and boycotted the Olympic Games due to be held in Moscow in 1980. Other than that, America did nothing. Why ? They knew that Russia had got itself into their own Vietnam and it also provided American Intelligence with an opportunity to acquire any new Russian military hardware that could be used in Afghanistan.

Mujhadeen fighters were given access to American surface-to-air missiles – though not through direct sales by America. Mikhail Gorbachev took Russia out of the Afghanistan fiasco when he realised what many Russian leaders had been too scared to admit in public – that Russia could not win the war and the cost of maintaining such a vast force in Afghanistan was crippling Russia’s already weak economy. By the end of the 1980’s, the Mujahdeen was at war with itself in Afghanistan with hard line Taliban fighters taking a stronger grip over the whole nation and imposing very strict Muslim law on the Afghanistan population. Why Did the Soviet Union Invade Afghanistan in 1979? Why Did the Soviet Union Invade Afghanistan in 1979? Uday Rai Mehra , Oct 9 2014, 98941 views This content was written by a student and assessed as part of a university degree. E-IR publishes student essays & dissertations to allow our readers to broaden their understanding of what is possible when answering similar questions in their own studies.

The near seventy-year history of the Soviet Union is one dominated by its tradition of foreign military interventions that spanned most of its existence and stretched geographically from Krakow to the Kuril Islands. Within this trajectory, the Soviet invasion of, and subsequent war with Afghanistan (1979-1989) stands out in particular, as a lasting legacy of the Cold War. Globally, its outcome continues to plague international society in the current struggle between the Western liberal democratic order and Islamic extremism. Domestically, the remains of the war have rendered the nation’s political institutions, economy and society fragile, and transformed Afghanistan into a battlefield for factional rivalries and a breeding ground for religious fundamentalism. As a rooted historical understanding of the war is necessary to contextualize the struggles from the region that dominate our contemporary international affairs, the very nature of the event’s historiography has evolved over time. Previously, it was commonplace among scholars to examine the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan within the Cold War framework: the USSR invaded foreign nations in the name of socialist internationalism, prestige and with the objective to thwart their Western enemies.

However, this assessment failed to acknowledge the nuances of the Soviet decision-making process and account for those unique developments within the theatres of intervention. Contemporarily, a number of historians have analysed the events of the Cold War through a ‘pericentric lens’, which has shifted the scholarship from examining the events of the conflict from their ‘core’ – from the White House and the Kremlin – to the ‘periphery’. This scholarly shift reshapes our understanding of, and approach to Cold War dynamics through elaborating the interplay of a range of factors, and magnifying the intricacies of the Soviet and American decision-making processes. The invasion of Afghanistan was the Soviet Union’s final foreign military intervention before its eventual dissolution in 1991. Soviet troops invaded Kabul on December 25th 1979, on order from Moscow to replace the radical Hafizullah Amin with the Soviet-endorsed Babrak Karmal as head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

On December 31st, the Politburo announced, that by overthrowing Amin, they would ease the pace of Afghanistan’s communist revolution and thereby protect the communist (PDPA) regime from collapsing due to its domestic unpopularity, and thereby ceding to Islamist and Western forces. Although in hindsight this provides the justification surrounding Moscow’s decision, it gives little consideration of the concerns that drove the USSR to invade. Expanding upon those factors central to Soviet decision-making in 1979, this essay will argue that the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was foremost driven by the security concerns a rapidly weakening Afghanistan, vulnerable to Islamic extremism and Western encroachment, posed to the Soviet Union’s southern borders. As the attempts at negotiation and sending advisors had failed to stabilise the PDPA regime from collapse, and consequently facing an increasingly narrowing set of options, military intervention became the favoured alternative.

Facilitating this decision was the threat of the ‘reversibility of communism’ pervading across fragile Third World socialist states like South Yemen, Ethiopia and Angola; the pressures imposed by the Ustinov-Gromyko-Andropov troika in Politburo decision-making, heightened by reports by on-ground Soviet staff and advisors who were increasingly involved in Afghan affairs; and the end of Détente framework following the rejection of the SALT II Agreement by the United States Congress. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion, a range of historians interpreted the invasion within the broader continuum of Russian and Soviet foreign Policy. Milan Hauner cited Russia’s inherent desire to control Afghanistan, stemming from the Great Game (1813-1907), through which they would have access into warm water ports and the Gulf oilfields. A.Z. Hilali similarly places the invasion within the trajectory of Soviet Union’s relationship with its satellites and emphasises Soviet prestige in sustaining its grip on client states. Matthew Ouimet broadens this analysis, pointing to Soviet ‘grand strategy’, which fuses Soviet national interests with those of left leaning states globally.

Though these historians skillfully place the invasion within the nature of Russian/Soviet foreign policy, they fail to distinguish Afghanistan from other Soviet interventions. Unlike Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968), communism emerged independent of Soviet interference in Afghanistan, which until 1978 was neutral within the Cold War and peripheral to Soviet-American rivalry. Furthermore, the decision to invade was not immediate: the Kremlin faced the option to intervene in March 1979 – following the Heart Rebellion – to stabilise the domestic situation, but rejected that proposal and instead only intervened in December. Therefore, it is vital to bridge an understanding and elaborate on those short-term factors that caused this volte-face from March to December. The invasion was a culmination of a process whereby the USSR became increasingly, and actively involved in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs after the PDPA regime emerged in 1978 and failed to procure widespread support for their socialist reforms.

Following the Saur Revolution (27-28 April 1978) a Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emerged with Nur Muhhammad Taraki as Premier and PDPA General Secretary; Babrak Karmal as his deputy; and Hafizullah Amin as Foreign Affairs Minister. [1] The USSR, quick to recognise the DRA, was cautious in engaging with Afghanistan, given the Kremlin’s concerns over extent of political stability the PDPA would attain due to its lack of experience in Afghan politics. [2] In May 1979, Soviet ambassador Aleksandr Puzanov reported that the USSR would gradually set aside earlier reservations about the new regime and welcome the PDPA as comrades. [3] From its initiation, Taraki’s regime sought to engineer Afghanistan into a new era and transform it into a modern socialist nation. [4] However, the contrast between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the influence of cultural and religious traditions over Afghan society proliferated domestic popular backlash and rural opposition in reaction to the PDPA’s reforms.

In spite of Puzanov’s recommendations to ease the reforms’s pace and preserve party unity between the rivaling Khalq and Parcham factions [5] as a bulwark to rural opposition, [6] the regime instead implemented land reforms and female literacy campaigns in early 1979. Moreover, Taraki purged Parchamites from cabinet, and subsequently dismissed Karmal from his post in July 1978 to strengthen the Khalq in government. [7] Opposition to the reforms gained momentum throughout the countryside, and culminated in the Herat Uprising in which rebels violently demonstrated against the PDPA. [8] Efforts to control the rebellion failed and instead military officers and soldiers defected and joined the rebels. [9] The Herat Uprising surfaced Soviet concerns over Afghanistan’s future; statesmen like Gromyko declared that “under no circumstances may [the USSR] lose Afghanistan” [10] at the March Politburo meeting.

Moscow was convinced that neither Taraki nor Amin could control the deteriorating situation alone, and in consequence Moscow increased their on-ground advisors from 1000 in January to 5000 in August 1979, and delivered large quantities of weapons consisting of tanks and helicopter gunships. [11] The impact of the Herat Uprising was two-fold: it exposed the inherent failures of the PDPA regime and the scant popular appeal of its revolution, and marked a significant shift in Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. The USSR no longer solely sought a successful PDPA revolution, but became entrenched in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs to facilitate its stable socialist transformation. The change in Soviet policy from sending advisors and being involved in Afghan affairs in March, to full-scale intervention in December, was the result of the narrowing of options available to the Politburo throughout 1979 as it failed to stabilise Afghanistan’s continually weakening domestic situation. Although the Politburo vetoed military intervention in March, under the premise that its involvement in Afghan affairs would stabilise the domestic situation, Amin continued to implement policies following his own agenda.

Amin used the Herat Uprising to consolidate his own political position, in which he assumed Premiership on 27th March [12] and by July he took office as Defence Minister. [13] His increased power position reflected Afghanistan’s worsening domestic situation due to Amin’s fixation on implementing reforms rapidly. This alongside his ‘balanced’ foreign policy, in which Amin sought rapprochement with the US, China and Pakistan [14] sparked the Kremlin’s hostility toward his rule. They preferred Taraki as he retained close relations with the Soviets and was open to their advice on the pace of reforms. Having deployed Vasiliy Safronchuk and General Ivan Pavlosky as advisors to Kabul to oversee and attempt to stabilise the political situation, Amin isolated Taraki by overthrowing pro-Taraki politicians in cabinet and retained his stance on the pace of reforms. [15] However, Amin’s power struggle piqued on September 16th in which he overthrew Taraki in a bloody coup d’état and subsequently assassinated Taraki on October 9th. This provided a critical turning point for the Soviet decision-making process and pushed the Kremlin to take firm action.

With Amin as the sole ruler of Afghanistan he would continue his reforms at a radical pace, consequently proliferating domestic turmoil. Having seen the failure of their methods, and Amin’s resolute approach to the PDPA revolution, the Soviets were pushed to assert control over Afghanistan and replace Amin decisively in order to stabilise the country and safeguard the future of the Afghan revolution. Trepidations over the regime that would overthrow the PDPA were central to the Politburo’s decision to invade Afghanistan. The Soviets feared that the proliferation of Islamism in reaction to the PDPA and their reforms would subvert the crumbling socialist regime and give rise to an anti-Soviet, Islamist Afghanistan on the Soviets’ southern border. As the PDPA initiated their early reforms, which sought to bring ethnic equality to rural tribes; cancel debts incurred by small farmers; and abolish bridal dowries in 1978 [16] , conservative landowners and clergymen who opposed reforms united against the government as the National Salvation Front. [17] The NSF actively opposed the PDPA and engaged in campaigns to overturn the course of their reforms.

Though many Afghans would benefit from reforms, the PDPA’s ideological basis and their intention to reshape Afghanistan sharply conflicted with the religious and cultural structures inherent in Afghan society. Contributing to this internal crisis was the support Pakistani General Zia ul-Haq gave to Islamist Afghans. The ISI endorsed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his radical Islamist group, Hezbi-i-Islami to undermine and overthrow the PDPA, and armed them with supplies and the military resources necessary to achieve this. [18] Similarly, the land reform provoked the emergence of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan led by Pir Sayed Gailani. [19] Though these different rebel groups rivaled one another, their opposition to the reforms united them against the PDPA, and their existence and active resistance discredited the Taraki-Amin regime. PDPA rule decentralised under the autonomous rule of rebel groups and by September 1979 rebel formations were active in 25 out of 28 provinces, and controlled 17 of those provinces. [20] Ultimately, Soviet fears that a weakened PDPA would succumb to internal subversion by these groups, and result in an Islamist Afghan regime accentuated the perceived need for intervention.

These concerns heightened as the Iranian Revolution overturned the Shah and resulted in an anti-American Islamist state ruled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. [21] Although historians like A.Z. Hilali argue that Islamism instigated Soviets alarm of Islamist spillover into their Central Asian Republics, which would disenfranchise Soviet rule, [22] examination of Soviet archival material suggests otherwise. [23] Instead, the Soviets feared that an Islamist Afghanistan would ally itself with Iran and Pakistan, and assert hostility toward the USSR due to Moscow’s association with the failed PDPA regime. [24] This outcome would weaken the Soviet’s southern border and encircle the USSR with hostile powers: China to the Southeast; Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to the South; and the Western Bloc to the West. The Kremlin’s security apprehensions intensified with intelligence of American counter-insurgency forces subverting the PDPA. Misgivings surrounding Soviet encirclement through external forces emerged after October as Soviet relations with Amin broke down. Once Amin overthrew Taraki, he engaged in a more balanced foreign policy whereby he engaged with America.

[25] In October, Amin signaled a distancing from the Soviets as his staff openly criticised Moscow in a meeting with other Ambassadors [26] and throughout November and December, the Soviets saw Amin make desperate attempts to establish relations with Pakistan. [27] Moscow consequently became increasingly suspicious of Amin and doubted his commitment to the USSR and socialism. The KGB accused him as a CIA agent and posthumously, Brezhnev denounced Amin as “an agent of American Imperialism.” [28] Although for the Soviets this led to direct intervention, Matthew J. Ouimet rightly contends that this simply justified Soviet intervention. [29] Nevertheless, until the Saur Revolution, Afghanistan maintained a neutral Cold War policy and engaged in friendly relations with both the USA and the USSR. It was equally in the Americans’ interests to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan to protect their Pakistani allies, as it had been in the Soviets’ to protect their southern border. However, the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, and presence of American warships in the Persian Gulf and the consequent speculation over an American attack on Iran intensified threat of similar American counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

[30] It would serve to both contain Afghan Islamism, and then to make Afghanistan a base by which to later invade Iran, and thereby stabilise the Gulf region. American encroachment – like Islamism – would geopolitically isolate the Soviet Union and would also foster a situation in which the American missiles would point up at the USSR as experienced with Turkey in the 1950s. The Soviets calculated that by invading Afghanistan, they could safeguard their border from American encroachment and depose Amin to stabilise the deteriorating domestic situation in the country. Therefore, the decision to intervene was made on the basis of a calculus that a failure to do so would facilitate Islamist or American encroachment on the Soviets’ southern border. However, Islamism and Western Encroachment alone did not compel the Politburo to pursue action. KGB officers on the ground in Afghanistan heightened the perceived security threat that these two factors posed to the Soviets, thus fostering a feeling that full-scale invasion was needed. Since the 1950s, the KGB had been active in Afghanistan, building a covert station there, making contact with local communists and becoming versed in Afghan politics.

[31] The Politburo depended upon these officers to assess the Afghan situation as they did on the growing PDPA crisis. However, having been ‘localised’ in Afghan affairs, the KGB invested much of its financial and political capital in the Parcham. Therefore, once Taraki exiled Karmal from the government and Amin overthrew Taraki in his coup, the KGB reported to the Politburo that “the situation in Afghanistan could be saved only by the removal of Amin from power” and his replacement by Karmal and his Parcham colleagues. [32] To achieve this, in November, the KGB brought Karmal to Moscow to plan to oust Amin and set up a new Parcham government. [33] Faced with resistance from the military bureaucracy that argued against intervention, thus influencing the Politburo against invading in March, the KGB staff played on Soviet security concerns to achieve their aims. KGB reports exaggerated the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and consistently championed that the only plausible action was intervention.

The KGB alleged that Amin was a CIA agent and supported their claims with confirmations from Afghan secret police chief – a long time KGB contact – Assadullah Sarwari who had leveled this accusation against Amin since 1967. [34] Concerns over Western encroachment in Afghanistan were matched with exaggerated KGB reports on increases in Mujahedeen control across Afghanistan’s provinces and the increasing influence wielded by Pakistan and China having armed insurgent groups like Hizbi-i-Islami. [35] Although Moscow deployed senior Soviet officials to provide a secondary assessment of the situation, those officials sent reports contradicting the KGB [36] , exacerbating the Politburo’s Afghanistan dilemma. Ultimately Moscow trusted the KGB reports as Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated after Amin’s take-over because those officials, unlike the KGB, were, as Braithwaite contends, “men with little or no experience” in Afghanistan. [37] The on-ground KGB staff’s ability to expose and heighten the threat Islamism and Western Encroachment posed on Soviet security induced the fear and panic necessary in the Politburo by which they agreed that only decisive action could resolve Afghanistan’s situation.

Ultimately, the decision was taken by the Dmitriy Ustinov (Defence Minister), Andrei Gromyko (Foreign Minister) and Yuri Andropov (KGB Chairman) ‘troika’, which dominated the decision-making process whereby invasion was sanctioned as they controlled the key foreign policy institutions. [38] Preoccupations with Soviet security and ideology resonated in reports sent by the KGB whereby they championed the decision to invade Afghanistan. The trio feared that the failure to act would instead permit the emergence of a new regime that would ultimately encircle, and confront the Soviets with a hostile power on their Southern border. [39] Such a situation would mirror the years before the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which America encroached on the USSR’s western border in deploying Jupiter missiles to Turkey. Although these fears were contingent, Gibbs rightly asserts that such ‘old-school’ perceptions of rivalry influenced decision-making. [40] Andropov served as Ambassador to Hungary during the Hungarian Revolution (1956) and convinced Khrushchev to intervene militarily.

[41] Brezhnev too, viewed the spiraling situation in Afghanistan from the same decision-making lens as in the Prague Spring (1968): that it was necessary to restore order to preserve socialist rule. [42] Furthermore, he saw Afghanistan within the framework of the larger Cold War struggle: the failure of the PDPA in Afghanistan would expose the ‘reversibility of socialism’ and threaten those other politically fragile socialist Third World nations like South Yemen, Ethiopia and Angola. [43] However, as Afghanistan alongside these states were never within the Soviet sphere, prestige did not directly influence Brezhnev. Rather, it heightened the security threat and necessitated invasion to safeguard the socialist model to protect Soviet borders from being confronted by adversaries. Therefore, the decision-making process within the troika also determined the decision to invade, achieved primarily through the troika’s manipulation tactics within the Politburo. Andropov supported KGB claims of Amin’s Western links by confirming that the CIA recruited Amin while studying in America. Andropov simultaneously ignored conflicting reports that underplayed the domestic situation’s deterioration.

[44] Similarly, Ustinov championed intervention, asserting that anything other than a military invasion would “seriously alter the military-strategic situation in the region” to the detriment of Soviet security.” [45] Furthermore, to sanction intervention, this trio regularly silenced those Politburo voices against intervention. [46] The troika’s influence on Soviet decision-making ultimately shaped the final decision to invade. Brezhnev was confident to pursue intervention, as it appeared to be the only effective way the USSR could both safeguard the PDPA from increasing threats and protect their own Southern border. The demise of détente in 1979 and the stable security framework détente set up for the USA and the USSR provided the timing by which the Soviet Union could invade Afghanistan. Throughout the duration of Politburo meetings, Soviet decision-makers were concerned with the impact that any military action in Afghanistan would have on the USA and the damage it may make to the détente framework. As Ouimet explains, détente constrained the Soviets from acting as freely on the basis of upholding socialist internationalism like in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, to save a Third World communist coup.

[47] As archival documents highlight, Brezhnev was strongly committed to détente and was concerned with American views of the Soviets had they intervened in Afghanistan immediately after the Herat Uprising. [48] Ultimately, the end of détente limited the potential strain on Soviet-American relations, which consequently made it easier for the Soviets to choose intervention. Brezhnev and Carter were still negotiating SALT II throughout 1979 [49] and it could have been seen as hypocritical for the Soviets to invade Afghanistan while simultaneously discussing limiting their armaments stockpiles. Nevertheless, as the United States Congress failed to ratify SALT II in July 1979, the Soviets were freed from this binding security framework. While some historians claim that the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe in December 1979 pushed the Soviets intervene due to its unsettling effect on the otherwise stable European balance, the missile deployment and the Soviet decision occurred on the same day. [50] Moreover, the information lag time from Soviet agents to Moscow limited the likely impact deployment would have had on Moscow.

Therefore, by December, with détente no longer constraining Soviet policy, the Politburo ratified the decision for a full-scale invasion. In conclusion, the decision to invade Afghanistan was the result of an intertwined set of concerns and interests within Moscow. The political crisis within Afghanistan threatened the survival of the PDPA regime, and simultaneously gave way to rising Islamism and the potential for Western encroachment. Crucially, in either scenario, the Soviets would face a hostile power encircling their southern border, thus posing a major threat to their security. Although the Kremlin reached such a realisation by March, following the Herat Uprising, it was the limiting of alternative options between March and December that compelled the Soviets to choose a military approach to Afghanistan. Although this was the major reason behind the Soviet’s decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979, a number of other factors exacerbated or accelerated this underlying process. Notably, trusted field KGB staff exploited Moscow’s security threats by exaggerating and distorting the true situation, whereby invasion would take place and satisfy their own vested interests in deposing Amin and replacing his rule with a Parcham-dominated cabinet, led by the much-favoured Karmal.

Combined with the troika’s dominance of the Politburo decision-making process, the KGB agents’ manipulation of other cabinet members and ability to play on Brezhnev’s ‘old school’ fears and perceptions of power and security, encouraged the final decision to intervene, which on an international level was also facilitated by the cotemporaneous demise of détente and its constraints on Soviet decision-making. Bibliography Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Share By Kallie Szczepanski Over the centuries, various would-be conquerors have thrown their armies against the sere mountains and valleys of Afghanistan . In just the past two centuries, great powers have invaded Afghanistan at least four times. It has not turned out well for the invaders. As former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, "They (the Afghanis) have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country." In 1979, the Soviet Union decided to try its luck in Afghanistan, long a target of Russian foreign policy. Many historians believe that in the end, the Soviet War in Afghanistan was key in destroying one of the Cold War world's two superpowers.

Background to the Invasion: On April 27, 1978, Soviet-advised members of the Afghan Army overthrew and executed President Mohammed Daoud Khan. Daoud was a leftist progressive, but not a communist, and he resisted Soviet attempts to direct his foreign policy as "interference in Afghanistan's affairs." Daoud moved Afghanistan toward the non-allied bloc, which included India , Egypt, and Yugoslavia. continue reading below our video 4 Tips for Improving Test Performance Although the Soviets did not order his ouster, they quickly recognized the new communist People's Democratic Party government that formed on April 28, 1978. Nur Muhammad Taraki became Chairman of the newly-formed Afghan Revolutionary Council. However, infighting with other communist factions and cycles of purging plagued Taraki's government from the start. In addition, the new communist regime targeted Islamic mullahs and wealthy landowners in the Afghan countryside, alienating all of the traditional local leaders. Soon, anti-government insurgencies broke out across northern and eastern Afghanistan, aided by Pashtun guerrillas from Pakistan . Over the course of 1979, the Soviets watched carefully as their client government in Kabul lost control of more and more of Afghanistan.

In March, the Afghan Army battalion in Herat defected to the insurgents, and killed 20 Soviet advisers in the city; there would be four more major military uprisings against the government by the end of the year. By August, the government in Kabul had lost control of 75% of Afghanistan - it held the large cities, more or less, but the insurgents controlled the countryside. Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet government wanted to protect their puppet in Kabul, but hesitated (reasonably enough) to commit ground troops to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. The Soviets were concerned about the Islamist insurgents taking power, since many of the USSR's Muslim Central Asian republics bordered on Afghanistan. In addition, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran seemed to shift the balance of power in the region toward Muslim theocracy. As the Afghan government's situation deteriorated, the Soviets sent in military aid - tanks, artillery, small arms, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships - as well as ever-greater numbers of military and civilian advisers.

By June of 1979, there were approximately 2,500 Soviet military advisers and 2,000 civilians in Afghanistan, and some of the military advisers actively drove tanks and flew helicopters in raids on the insurgents. Moscow also secretly sent in units of the Spetznaz, or special forces. On September 14, 1979, Chairman Taraki invited his chief rival in the People's Democratic Party, Minister of National Defense Hafizullah Amin, to a meeting at the presidential palace. It was supposed to be an ambush on Amin, orchestrated by Taraki's Soviet advisers, but the chief of palace guards tipped off Amin as he arrived, so the Defense Minister escaped. Amin returned later that day with an Army contingent and placed Taraki under house arrest, to the dismay of the Soviet leadership. Taraki died within a month, smothered with a pillow on Amin's orders. Another major military uprising in October convinced the Soviet leaders that Afghanistan had spun out of their control, politically and militarily.

Motorized and airborne infantry divisions numbering 30,000 troops began preparing to deploy from the neighboring Turkestan Military District (now in Turkmenistan ) and the Fergana Military District (now in Uzbekistan ). Between December 24 and 26, 1979, American observers noted that the Soviets were running hundreds of airlift flights into Kabul, but they were unsure whether it was a major invasion or simply supplies intended to help prop up the tottering Amin regime. Amin was, after all, a member of Afghanistan's communist party. All doubt vanished over the next two days, however. On December 27, Soviet Spetznaz troops attacked Amin's home and killed him, installing Babrak Kamal as the new puppet-leader of Afghanistan. The following day, the Soviet motorized divisions from Turkestan and the Fergana Valley rolled in to Afghanistan, launching the invasion. Early Months of the Soviet Invasion: The Islamic insurgents of Afghanistan, called the mujahideen , declared a jihad against the Soviet invaders. Although the Soviets had vastly superior weaponry, the mujahideen knew the rough terrain and were fighting for their homes and their faith.

By February of 1980, the Soviets had control of all of the major cities in Afghanistan, and were successful in quashing Afghan Army revolts when army units marched out in formation to fight the Soviet troops. However, mujahideen guerrillas held 80% of the country. Try and Try Again - Soviet Efforts to 1985: In the first five years, the Soviets held the strategic route between Kabul and Termez, and patrolled the border with Iran, to prevent Iranian aid from reaching the mujahideen. Mountainous regions of Afghanistan such as Hazarajat and Nuristan, however, were completely free of Soviet influence. The mujahideen also held Herat and Kandahar much of the time. The Soviet Army launched a total of nine offensives against one key, guerrilla-held pass called the Panjshir Valley in the first five years of the war alone. Despite heavy use of tanks, bombers, and helicopter gunships, they were unable to take the Valley.

The mujahideen's amazing success in the face of one of the world's two superpowers attracted support from a number of outside powers seeking either to support Islam or weaken the USSR: Pakistan, the People's Republic of China , the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Withdrawal from the Quagmire - 1985 to 1989: As the war in Afghanistan dragged on, the Soviets faced a harsh reality. Afghan Army desertions were epidemic, so the Soviets had to do much of the fighting. Many Soviet recruits were Central Asians, some from the same Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups as many of the mujihadeen, so they often refused to carry out attacks ordered by their Russian commanders. Despite official press censorship, people in the Soviet Union began to hear that the war was not going well, and to notice the large number of funerals for Soviet soldiers. Before the end, some media outlets even dared to publish commentary on the "Soviets' Vietnam War," pushing the boundaries of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost or openness. Conditions were terrible for many ordinary Afghans, but they held out against the invaders.

By 1989, the mujahideen had organized some 4,000 strike bases across the country, each manned by at least 300 guerrillas. One famous mujahideen commander in the Panjshir Valley, Ahmad Shah Massoud , commanded 10,000 well-trained troops. By 1985, Moscow was actively seeking an exit strategy. They sought to intensify recruitment and training for the Afghan armed forces, in order to transition responsibility to local troops. The ineffectual president, Babrak Karmal, lost Soviet support, and in November of 1986, a new president named Mohammad Najibullah was elected. He proved less than popular with the Afghan people, however, in part because he was the former chief of the widely-feared secret police, the KHAD. From May 15 to August 16, 1988, the Soviets completed phase one of their withdrawal. The retreat was generally peaceful, since the Soviets first negotiated cease-fires with mujahideen commanders along the withdrawal routes.

Remaining Soviet troops withdrew between November 15, 1988 and February 15, 1989. A total of just over 600,000 Soviets served in the Afghan War, and about 14,500 were killed. Another 54,000 were wounded, and an astonishing 416,000 became ill with typhoid fever, hepatitis, and other serious diseases. An estimated 850,000 to 1.5 million Afghan civilians died in the war, and five to ten million fled the country as refugees. This represented as much as one-third of the country's 1978 population, severely straining Pakistan and other neighboring countries. 25,000 Afghans died from land mines alone during the war, and millions of mines remained behind after the Soviets withdrew. Aftermath of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Chaos and civil war ensued when the Soviets left Afghanistan, as rival mujahideen commanders fought to enlarge their spheres of influence.

Some mujahideen troops behaved so badly, robbing, raping, and murdering civilians at will, that a group of Pakistani-educated religious students banded together to fight against them in the name of Islam. This new faction called itself the Taliban , meaning "the Students." For the Soviets, the repercussions were equally dire. Over the previous decades, the Red Army had always been able to quash any nation or ethnic group that rose in opposition - the Hungarians, the Kazakhs, the Czechs - but now they had lost to the Afghans. Minority peoples in the Baltic and Central Asian republics, in particular, took heart; indeed, the Lithuanian democracy movement openly declared independence from the Soviet Union in March of 1989, less than a month after the withdrawal from Afghanistan finished. Anti-Soviet demonstrations spread to Latvia, Georgia, Estonia, and other republics. The long and costly war left the Soviet economy in shambles. It also fueled the rise of a free press, and open dissent among not only ethnic minorities, but also from Russians who had lost love ones in the fighting.

Although it was not the only factor, certainly the Soviet War in Afghanistan helped to hasten the end of one of the two superpowers. Just over two and a half years after the withdrawal, on December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved. Sources: MacEachin, Douglas. "Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record," CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Apr. 15, 2007. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan | 1979 | Britannica.com Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 by troops from the Soviet Union . The Soviet Union intervened in support of the Afghan communist government in its conflict with anticommunist Muslim guerrillas during the Afghan War (1978–92) and remained in Afghanistan until mid-February 1989. In April 1978 Afghanistan’s centrist government, headed by Pres. Mohammad Daud Khan , was overthrown by left-wing military officers led by Nur Mohammad Taraki .

Power was thereafter shared by two Marxist-Leninist political groups, the People’s (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party—which had earlier emerged from a single organization, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan—and had reunited in an uneasy coalition shortly before the coup . The new government, which had little popular support, forged close ties with the Soviet Union, launched ruthless purges of all domestic opposition, and began extensive land and social reforms that were bitterly resented by the devoutly Muslim and largely anticommunist population. Insurgencies arose against the government among both tribal and urban groups, and all of these—known collectively as the mujahideen (Arabic mujāhidūn, “those who engage in jihad”)—were Islamic in orientation. These uprisings, along with internal fighting and coups within the government between the People’s and Banner factions, prompted the Soviets to invade the country on the night of Dec. 24, 1979, sending in some 30,000 troops and toppling the short-lived presidency of People’s leader Hafizullah Amin .

The aim of the Soviet operation was to prop up their new but faltering client state, now headed by Banner leader Babrak Karmal , but Karmal was unable to attain significant popular support. Backed by the United States , the mujahideen rebellion grew, spreading to all parts of the country. The Soviets initially left the suppression of the rebellion to the Afghan army, but the latter was beset by mass desertions and remained largely ineffective throughout the war. Similar Topics Operation Barbarossa The Afghan War quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than 100,000 Soviet troops controlling the cities, larger towns, and major garrisons and the mujahideen moving with relative freedom throughout the countryside. Soviet troops tried to crush the insurgency by various tactics, but the guerrillas generally eluded their attacks. The Soviets then attempted to eliminate the mujahideen’s civilian support by bombing and depopulating the rural areas. These tactics sparked a massive flight from the countryside; by 1982 some 2.8 million Afghans had sought asylum in Pakistan , and another 1.5 million had fled to Iran .

The mujahideen were eventually able to neutralize Soviet air power through the use of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union’s Cold War adversary, the United States . The mujahideen were fragmented politically into a handful of independent groups, and their military efforts remained uncoordinated throughout the war. The quality of their arms and combat organization gradually improved, however, owing to experience and to the large quantity of arms and other war matériel shipped to the rebels, via Pakistan, by the United States and other countries and by sympathetic Muslims from throughout the world. In addition, an indeterminate number of Muslim volunteers—popularly termed “Afghan-Arabs,” regardless of their ethnicity—traveled from all parts of the world to join the opposition. The war in Afghanistan became a quagmire for what by the late 1980s was a disintegrating Soviet Union. (The Soviets suffered some 15,000 dead and many more injured.) Despite having failed to implement a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, in 1988 the Soviet Union signed an accord with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and agreed to withdraw its troops. The Soviet withdrawal was completed on Feb.

15, 1989, and Afghanistan returned to nonaligned status. A convoy of Soviet army armoured personnel vehicles crossing a bridge at the Soviet-Afghan border … Vitaly Armand—AFP/Getty Images Why has Russia been invaded so many times? - Quora Quora History Why has Russia been invaded so many times? I just recently came across the title of a book--something like "Russia Invaded: From Genghis Khan to Hitler." And it got me wondering: why do people want to capture/conquer the place? A lot of it is cold tundra or deep forest, not conventionally valuable. Updated Sep 16, 2014 Indeed, Russia has been invaded a lot, but not more than other countries. The territory of modern-day France has been invaded by Rome (many times) - despite the mountains, Germany (many times), England (many times) - despite the very wide channel between them, and Russia - despite the distance (not to mention the US, the UK, and Canada in 1944, although that was a liberation from Germany).

The territories of modern-day Poland and Ukraine have been invaded many times from different directions, including the Mongols who burned down Kiev, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Russian Empire which subjugated both lands for centuries, Germany in WWI, and Hitler who captured both Warsaw and Kiev in WWII. Before being a parts of the Russian empire, Ukraine has been ruled by Lithuania and Poland, raided by the Ottoman Turks many times, and part of Ukraine were ruled by Austria-Hungary. The inclusion into Soviet Union in 1922 was not peaceful either. In February 2014, Ukraine was invaded by the Russian Federation, followed by the annexation of Crimea, subsequent attacks in East Ukraine and Putin's casual remark that he could take Kiev in two weeks. Various areas in the Balkans had so many invasions through the history that most people lost count - by Rome, the Holy Roman empire which was neither holy nor Roman (more like Germany), the Ottoman empire, Austria-Hungary, the Russian empire, France, Italy and the UK. Israel/Palestine/Levant are a whole different story. Perhaps, people trying to draw attention to Russia are not aware of (or neglect) other history.

For example, what do you know about invasions in East Asia? How do you compare multiple invasions to wiping out an entire population? (the Spanish and the British did that in the Americas). The real question is how to avoid invasions, and today the answer is - to faithfully follow international laws and treaties, while being truthful about any violations. The UN was established in 1946, to a large extent, to prevent world wars. Also, you may want to see how many times Russia or the USSR invaded other countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, Czeckoslovakia, all the countries liberated after WWII and then subjugated, Finland, Mongolia/China, the list goes back for centuries. The Mongols invaded most of Eurasia. 1k Views Written Sep 23, 2014 1. Russia is not particularly invaded in history. Russian claim this to promote nationalism. 2. Most of the large countries in the world are protected by geography (ocean, mountain, big rivers etc. ), such as India, China, US, France, Spain, UK, Italy, etc. Historically, these countries survived partially because of the blessing of geography. Russia is not one of them.

It doesn't mean it is unlucky. It simply means Russia is a country built on a series of conquests. After military expansion peaked, Russia survived because Russians are tough fighters, Russia's winter is cruel and conquering entire Russia is not super profitable (Hitler only wanted the arable part and the oil, and Napolen only wanted Russians to corporate embago against British. ). In other words, Russia doesn't have geographical borders to defend. Logically, this kind of country should not last long. Once the military superiority ends, it should not last long. This probably explains why Russia is very sensitive of NATO's expansion, while China can stay cool even if the same thing had happened to PRC since the first day the country established. The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989 - The Atlantic The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989 41 Photos In Focus Nearly twenty-five years ago, the Soviet Union pulled its last troops out of Afghanistan, ending more than nine years of direct involvement and occupation. The USSR entered neighboring Afghanistan in 1979, attempting to shore up the newly-established pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

In short order, nearly 100,000 Soviet soldiers took control of major cities and highways. Rebellion was swift and broad, and the Soviets dealt harshly with the Mujahideen rebels and those who supported them, leveling entire villages to deny safe havens to their enemy. Foreign support propped up the diverse group of rebels, pouring in from Iran, Pakistan, China, and the United States. In the brutal nine-year conflict, an estimated one million civilians were killed, as well as 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan troops, and 14,500 Soviet soldiers. Civil war raged after the withdrawal, setting the stage for the Taliban's takeover of the country in 1996. As NATO troops move toward their final withdrawal this year, Afghans worry about what will come next, and Russian involvement in neighboring Ukraine's rebellion has the world's attention, it is worth looking back at the Soviet-Afghan conflict that ended a quarter-century ago. Today's entry is part of the ongoing series here on Afghanistan .

Soviet tanks roll into Afghanistan - Dec 24, 1979 - HISTORY.com This Day in History: 12/24/1979 - Soviets enter Afghanistan What was the most televised broadcast in history? The answer to this question is quite surprising. The most televised broadcast in history occurred on December 24, 1968, when the Apollo 8 read from the Bible while orbiting the Earth for the first time. In addition, on December 24, 1979, Russia waged a nine year war against Afghanistan that would deplete their supplies and lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. December 24 also marks the composition of one of the most famous Christmas songs of all time; Silent Night in 1818 by an Austrian composer. The last major event that occurred on December 24th, this time in 1923, was President Coolidge's lighting of the first public Christmas tree. To learn more, watch the This Day in History Video: December 24th.

Lead Story Soviet tanks roll into Afghanistan Share this: Soviet tanks roll into Afghanistan Author Soviet tanks roll into Afghanistan URL Publisher A+E Networks On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, under the pretext of upholding the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1978. As midnight approached, the Soviets organized a massive military airlift into Kabul, involving an estimated 280 transport aircraft and three divisions of almost 8,500 men each. Within a few days, the Soviets had secured Kabul, deploying a special assault unit against Tajberg Palace. Elements of the Afghan army loyal to Hafizullah Amin put up a fierce, but brief resistance. On December 27, Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was installed as Afghanistan’s new head of government. And Soviet ground forces entered Afghanistan from the north. The Soviets, however, were met with fierce resistance when they ventured out of their strongholds into the countryside. Resistance fighters, called mujahidin, saw the Christian or atheist Soviets controlling Afghanistan as a defilement of Islam as well as of their traditional culture.

Proclaiming a “jihad”(holy war), they gained the support of the Islamic world. The mujahidin employed guerrilla tactics against the Soviets. They would attack or raid quickly, then disappear into the mountains, causing great destruction without pitched battles. The fighters used whatever weapons they could grab from the Soviets or were given by the United States. The tide of the war turned with the 1987 introduction of U.S. shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. The Stingers allowed the mujahidin to shoot down Soviet planes and helicopters on a regular basis. New Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided it was time to get out. Demoralized and with no victory in sight, Soviet forces started withdrawing in 1988. The last Soviet soldier crossed back across the border on February 15, 1989. It was the first Soviet military expedition beyond the Eastern bloc since World War II and marked the end of a period of improving relations (known as détente) in the Cold War. Subsequently, the SALT II arms treaty was shelved and the U.S. began to re-arm. Fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers were killed.

The long-term impact of the invasion and subsequent war was profound. First, the Soviets never recovered from the public relations and financial losses, which significantly contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire in 1991. Secondly, the war created a breeding ground for terrorism and the rise of Osama bin Laden. Related Videos

Question: Which country was inaded by Russia in 1979?
Answer: Afghanistan