Former Secretaries-General | United Nations Secretary-General Photos Former Secretaries-General Under the Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Mr.

Guterres' predecessors as Secretary-General were: Ban Ki-moon (Korea) who served from January 2007 to December 2016; Kofi Annan (Ghana) who held office from January 1997 to December 2006; Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt), who held office from January 1992 to December 1996; Javier Pèrez de Cuèllar (Peru), who served from January 1982 to December 1991; Kurt Waldheim (Austria), who held office from January 1972 to December 1981; U Thant (Burma, now Myanmar), who served from November 1961, when he was appointed acting Secretary-General (he was formally appointed Secretary-General in November 1962) to December 1971; Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden), who served from April 1953 until his death in a plane crash in Africa in September 1961; and Trygve Lie (Norway), who held office from February 1946 to his resignation in November 19

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List of United Nations Secretaries-General | Article about List of United Nations Secretaries-General by The Free Dictionary List of United Nations Secretaries-General | Article about List of United Nations Secretaries-General by The Free Dictionary Related article: United Nations United Nations (UN), international organization established immediately after World War II. It replaced the League of Nations. In 1945, when the UN was founded, there were 51 members; 193 nations are now members of the organization (see table entitled United Nations Members). ..... Click the link for more information. United Nations Secretaries-General Dates in Office Trygve Halvdan Lie Lie, Trygve Halvdan , 1896–1968, Norwegian statesman, first secretary-general of the United Nations. A lawyer and Labor party leader, he was Norwegian minister of justice (1935–39) and minister of trade and supply (1939–41). ..... Click the link for more information.

Norwegian 1946–53 Dag Hammarskjöld Hammarskjöld, Dag , 1905–61, Swedish statesman, secretary-general of the United Nations (1953–61). He attended the universities of Uppsala and Stockholm (Ph.D., 1934). ..... Click the link for more information. Swedish 1953–61 U Thant Thant, U , 1909–74, Burmese diplomat, secretary-general of the United Nations (1962–72). Educated at University College, Yangon, he later held positions in education, the press, and broadcasting. ..... Click the link for more information. Burmese 1962–71 Kurt Waldheim Waldheim, Kurt , 1918–2007, Austrian diplomat, secretary-general of the United Nations (1972–81) and president of Austria (1986–92). He entered diplomatic service after World War II, serving in France and Canada. ..... Click the link for more information.

Austrian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 1920–, Peruvian diplomat, secretary-general of the United Nations (1982–92). He entered the Peruvian foreign service in 1940 and served in several posts, including ambassador to the USSR (1969–71) and the United Nations ..... Click the link for more information. Peruvian 1982–91 Boutros Boutros-Ghali Boutros-Ghali, Boutros , 1922–2016, Egyptian statesman, secretary-general of the United Nations (1992–96). Born into a politically connected Coptic Christian family, he earned degrees in law at the universities of Cairo (LL.B., 1946) and Paris (Ph.D., 1949). ..... Click the link for more information. Egyptian 1992–96 Kofi Annan Annan, Kofi Atta 1938–, Ghanaian diplomat, secretary-general of the United Nations (1997–2006), b. Kumasi.

The scion of a family of Fante chieftains, he studied at Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn. (grad. 1961), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.A. ..... Click the link for more information. Ghanaian Ban Ki-Moon Ban Ki-Moon , 1944–, South Korean diplomat, secretary-general of the United Nations (2007–), b. Chungju, grad. Seoul National Univ. (B.S., 1970), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard (M.P.A., 1985). ..... Click the link for more information. South Korean 2007– Secretary General Kofi Annan's Reform Agenda - 1997 to 2006 Secretary General Kofi Annan's Reform Agenda - 1997 to 2006 Secretary General Kofi Annan Picture Credit: United Nations Just six months after taking office as Secretary General in January 1997, Kofi Annan announced his plan for United Nations reform. He set out an agenda of better management and coordination across the entire UN system, as well as stronger human rights promotion and peacekeeping operations.

In 2002, Annan announced further reforms, coinciding with the beginning of his second term. These proposals took up earlier technocratic themes, including enhanced coordination of the organizations in the UN system and greater "focus" in the UN's work. Over the years, Annan's priorities have reflected financial and political pressure from Washington amid a deep crisis in UN funding. In such a cash-starved setting, reforms tended to reshuffle resources and bleed important programs to serve ever-new priorities. The results brought some modern management into a cumbersome bureaucracy, but they also made the UN more conservative and less democratic, by shaping it to a neoliberal, security-driven US agenda. In March 2005, Annan presented his most comprehensive reform and policy agenda to date. His report "In Larger Freedom" addressed issues such as terrorism, financing for development, enlarging the Security Council and replacing the Human Rights Commission. Annan wanted states to adopt all proposals as a package and urged delegations to come to consensus in time for the Millennium+5 Summit, before the 60th session of the General Assembly in September 2005.

Instead, after several months of negotiation, the United States demanded hundreds of line-by-line revisions just three weeks before the Summit. As a result, other states proposed new amendments of their own and the negotiating consensus unraveled. Eventually, when world leaders assembled in New York, the text had been reduced to a set of vague generalities. After the Summit, observers wondered about the future of multilateralism in the face of US hostility. But the debate continues over how the UN should be reformed and with what goals for the future. Annan's latest effort revolved around management reform. He released in March 2006 his report, "Investing in the United Nations" which met with controversy from UN staffers and many member states. Proposals included outsourcing and new authority for the Secretary General to shift budgets and close programs without consulting the General Assembly. Many observers argued that Annan's agenda had been set by the US.

"In Larger Freedom" The Report of the UN Secretary General for the Millennium+5 Summit (April 2005) This Global Policy Forum and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Briefing Paper examines Secretary General Kofi Annan's UN reform agenda and notes that "for some, the initiatives are not sufficiently far-reaching, [yet] others view them as too radical and unsuitable to implement politically." The paper criticizes Annan for his weak stance on alternative development financing, including global taxes on currency transactions. It also draws attention to the need for greater civil society participation in the preparations for the Millennium+5 Summit in September 2005. UN Documents Investing in the United Nations: for a Stronger Organization Worldwide (March 7, 2006) In this Report of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan lays out the Secretariat's plans for UN management reform. Due to "dramatic operational expansion" in a wide range of areas, such as peacekeeping, Annan believes that a "radical overhaul" of the UN Secretariat is required. The report contains 23 proposals including development of staff skills, information technology, and budget and finance. The report also includes controversial schemes for staff buyout and outsourcing of labor.

Report of the Secretary General on Management Reform (November 28, 2005) Since the Millennium+5 Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan has focused heavily on Secretariat reform, often after pressure to do so from powerful countries like the US. In this report to the General Assembly, Annan lays out his plans for reform, including establishing a new UN ethics office. The office would have external oversight and auditing, and is intended to address perceptions of unethical behavior at the UN following the oil-for-food report, and the results of a UN staff survey. Secretary General Kofi Annan's Address to the World Summit (September 14, 2005) In his speech to the heads of state present at the Millennium+5 Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan discussed the rhetoric surrounding the UN reform process. Referring to his own 2003 speech, Annan clarified his use of the term "fork in the road," maintaining that his statement in no way referred to an "existential crisis" at the UN.

In Annan's view, the threat that "states of all kinds might increasingly resort to self-help, leading to a proliferation of ad hoc responses that would be divisive, destabilizing, and dangerous" resulted in allowing "posturing to get in the way of results" in the Summit outcome document. Explanatory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission (April 17, 2005) United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan provides a detailed description of his proposed Peacebuilding Commission outlined in the "In Larger Freedom" report of March 2005. Annan discusses the functions, financing and structure of the Commission. He recommends that the new body stand between the Security Council and ECOSOC, and be composed of a small "sub-set" of Security Council and ECOSOC members, as well as major donors and some leading troop contributors.

General Assembly Debate on a 'In Larger Freedom' (April 6-8, 2005) The following UN press releases detail the General Assembly plenary debates on the Secretary General's report "In Larger Freedom." During the three-day session to review the report, the General Assembly heard the views of 83 countries on topics ranging from foreign debt and terrorism to Security Council expansion. (United Nations) In Larger Freedom – Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (March 21, 2005) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's report to the General Assembly follows on from proposals of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Millennium Project. In dealing with the advancement of development, debt relief, security and human rights, "In Larger Freedom" also sets out a sweeping UN reform agenda that includes enlarging the Security Council, replacing the Human Rights Commission and overhauling the Secretariat. Heads of states will consider Annan's recommendations at a high level summit in September 2005.

(United Nations) Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (August 27, 2004) In his 2004 report on the progress of the Millennium Development Goals, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan looks towards the High Level Plenary Meeting at the Sixtieth Session of the General Assembly in 2005, which he sees as an opportunity to rejuvenate states' commitment to development and UN reform. (United Nations) Speech to the Millennium General Assembly (September 12, 2000) The SG acknowledges that after last week's monumental Millennium Summit, the General Assembly may seem an anticlimax. But UN Chief Kofi Annan asks member states to "roll up their sleeves" and to implement their bold pledges to the UN and the world. Press Conference by Secretary General Kofi Annan at Headquarters on the Global Compact (July 26, 2000) Kofi anwers some very delicate questions about the Global Compact.

World Needs to Have United States, United Nations Working Well Together Says Secretary General, in Remarks to John Quincy Adams Society (May 25, 2000) Noting that states cannot provide all of the financial assistance the UN needs, Kofi Annan discusses the necessity of a partnership between the private sector and the UN. Yet, he also stresses the importance of international standards for business practices, as "economic rights and social responsibilities are two sides of the same coin." Annan Leaves A Mixed Legacy (January 2, 2007) This Inter Press Service article discusses the complex legacy left by Kofi Annan, whose ten-year term as the highest ranking official at the United Nations ended on December 31, 2006. The former UN chief weathered harsh criticism – especially over the "oil-for-food" scandal – from mostly conservative US politicians who often sought to discredit the organization.

Global Policy Forum's Executive Director James Paul says that "for all his faults, [Annan] should be seen as a strong Secretary General who served the United Nations well." 2006 UN Chief Challenged at Contentious Meeting (March 8, 2006) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's speech detailing his plan for management reform was met with criticism by UN staffers. The staff opposes proposals relating to lay-offs and appointments, specifically targeting Annan's desire to grant more "formal authority" to the Deputy Secretary General (DSG). The General Assembly created the DSG position and diplomats argue that Annan lacks the power to alter the DSG's role. Commentators state that under pressure from Washington, Annan has been trying to "strong arm the General Assembly" and turn the post of Secretary General into that of a corporate CEO. (Inter Press Service) 2005 UN Chief Denies Making a "Grab for Power" (November 22, 2005) Secretary General Kofi Annan responded to developing countries' allegations that the UN Secretariat is becoming a pawn of the US.

Secretary General Annan assured UN member states that the General Assembly and its committees will retain their importance, even if Annan's management reform plans, which are heavily endorsed by Washington, are realized. (Inter Press Service) Developing Nations Blast UN for Appeasing US (October 10, 2005) The Group of 77 sent a critical letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan, stating their disagreement with activities of UN Secretariat officials. Although the letter did not name individuals, the G77 was clearly reacting to public statements made by Secretariat Chief of Staff Mark Malloch-Brown, in which he criticized member states for interfering in Secretariat affairs. The G77 also disapproved of Malloch-Brown's apparent pandering to the US government in an appearance before Congress during which he discussed UN reform. (Inter Press Service) "In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN (June 2005) Writing in Foreign Affairs, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan highlights the need for upholding human rights, development and democracy, and proposes strengthening the global security system by preventing terrorism, reinforcing nonproliferation, and building peace in war-torn lands.

Arguing that the UN should be used as a vehicle to reach the goals outlined in his report " In Larger Freedom ," Annan emphasizes the urgency for reform to better achieve the UN's "mission of peace." It's Crunch Time at the United Nations (June 3, 2005) While encouraged by diplomats' commitments in the fields of human rights and peacekeeping, President of the International Peace Academy Terje Roed-Larsen expresses concern in the progress of the "new security agenda". He warns that if member states fail to agree on how to handle terrorism, disarmament and nonproliferation, these blockages could unravel progress achieved in other areas. (International Herald Tribune) "In Larger Freedom": A Challenge to the United Nations and to the South (June 2005) Reflecting the position of developing nations, the intergovernmental organization South Centre provides a refreshing analysis of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's reform agenda. The group argues that many of Annan's recommendations will make "the international order less and less participatory," and offers alternative proposals for establishing a more democratic UN.

Such measures include making the Security Council accountable to the General Assembly, securing regional staff representation at the currently "undemocratic" UN Secretariat, and installing global taxes to reduce UN dependence on major donors. UN Reform Needs an African Perspective (May 23, 2005) African civil society leaders express their concern about the lack of African involvement in the UN reform debate, in particular the absence of African leadership in the UN Secretariat. The group calls for increased focus on debt cancellation, advocates adding African seats in the Security Council, and expresses qualms on the US-led "war on terrorism." Is UN reform simply "an attempt to appease Western interests"? (Mail & Guardian) Time to Look Beyond Mere Administrative Reforms (April 26, 2005) This Financial Express piece considers Kofi Annan's report on UN reform "cautious, if not conservative." The article suggests that realpolitik prevents the reform debate from going beyond administrative restructuring. The writer attributes this approach to governments' "attachment to parochial symbols of power and influence" and presents radical suggestions for change, including redesigning the principle organs of the UN.

Kofi Annan and the Need for Real UN Reform (March 31, 2005) While acknowledging that Kofi Annan's High Level Panel report on UN reform and Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Project report "have provided stimulus for significant reform efforts," the authors of this Globalist article believe the proposed recommendations "fall far short" of what the world requires. Specifically, they point to the growing gap between the West and the South, claiming this as an issue that the reports do not adequately address. Reinventing "We the Peoples" (March 26, 2005) This Salon article assesses the recommendations in Kofi Annan's report on UN reform as generally positive and achievable, and in particular commends what it sees as the Secretary General's attempt to "reinterpret" the UN Charter rather than rewriting it. It further admires the report's "joint appeal to both altruism and self-interest" noting that they "often prove more potent than either on its own".

The Annan Report (March 28, 2005) This Washington Post editorial praises Kofi Annan's agenda for UN reform, but notes that "real power is vested not in the secretary general but rather in the UN member states - and they will determine whether Mr Annan's proposals make any difference". The article urges the US to take the lead in making these recommendations a reality. Our Mission Remains Vital (February 22, 2005) Writing in the Wall Street Journal, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan responds to critics by citing examples of the world body's accomplishments, from successful peacekeeping missions to tsunami relief. Annan also recognizes the organization's shortcomings and stresses the importance of UN reform, which he is "determined to see through." Is Beleaguered UN Chief Caving In to US Pressure? (February 10, 2005) Inter Press Service reporter Thalif Deen responds to an "unrelenting media and political campaign" against UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with evidence that reduces Annan to little more than a US puppet.

Deen describes how many of the senior UN positions have gone to the US, Britain and other donor nations in a "power driven" hiring policy to ensure these nations maintain their "often-insufficient" support for the global organization. Only Reformed UN Can Confront Combined Threats of Terror and Poverty (February 10, 2005) Speaking at a high level London seminar, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated his plan for UN reform. He described the UN as a fundamental "instrument of collective action" that provides "a forum for collective decision-making." In his speech Annan focused on global interconnectedness with its implications for potentially widespread terrorism, and stressed the importance of alleviating poverty and disease for a safer world. (UN News) The Right's Assault on Kofi Annan: How the Neocoms Created a "Scandal" to Punish a Critic of US Policies (January 10, 2005) "The reality is that the current calls for Annan's head are provoked by his opposition to America's pre-emptive war in Iraq," says The Nation's UN correspondent.

The author also denounces the "creation" of the oil-for-food scandal as simply a way for US neoconservatives – who have been historically opposed to the United Nations – to push their own "reform" agenda to weaken "multilateral institutions and their role in the world." Kofi Annan | United Nations Secretary-General Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan KOFI A. ANNAN of Ghana , the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations, served from 1997 to 2006 and was the first to emerge from the ranks of United Nations staff. One of Mr. Annan's main priorities as Secretary-General w as a comprehensive programme of reform aimed at revitalizing the United Nations and making the international system more effective. He was a constant advocate for human rights, the rule of law, the Millennium Development Goals and Africa , and sought to bring the Organization closer to the global public by forging ties with civil society, the private sector and other partners. At Mr. Annan's initiative, UN peacekeeping was strengthened in ways that enabled the United Nations to cope with a rapid rise in the number of operations and personnel. It was also at Mr.

Annan's urging that, in 2005, Member States established two new intergovernmental bodies: the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. Mr. Annan likewise played a central role in the creation of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the adoption of the UN's first-ever counter-terrorism strategy, and the acceptance by Member States of the “responsibility to protect” people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. His “Global Compact” initiative, launched in 1999, has become the world's largest effort to promote corporate social responsibility. Mr. Annan undertook wide-ranging diplomatic initiatives. In 1998, he helped to ease the transition to civilian rule in Nigeria . Also that year, he visited Iraq in an effort to resolve an impasse between that country and the Security Council over compliance with resolutions involving weapons inspections and other matters -- an effort that helped to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, which was imminent at that time. In 1999, he was deeply involved in the process by which Timor-Leste gained independence from Indonesia .

He was responsible for certifying Israel 's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and in 2006, his efforts contributed to securing a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hizbollah. Also in 2006, he mediated a settlement of the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula through implementation of the judgement of the International Court of Justice. His efforts to strengthen the Organization's management, coherence and accountability involved major investments in training and technology, the introduction of a new whistleblower policy and financial disclosure requirements, and steps aimed at improving coordination at the country level. Career highlights Mr. Annan joined the UN system in 1962 as an administrative and budget officer with the World Health Organization in Geneva . He later served with the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa , the UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) in Ismailia , the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva , and in various senior posts in New York dealing with human resources, budget, finance and staff security. Immediately before becoming Secretary-General, he was Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping . Mr.

Annan also served as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the former Yugoslavia (1995-1996), and facilitated the repatriation from Iraq of more than 900 international staff and other non-Iraqi nationals (1990). Education Mr. Annan studied at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi , Ghana , and completed his undergraduate work in economics at Macalester College in St. Paul , Minnesota in 1961. In 1961-1962, he undertook graduate studies at the Institute of International Affairs in Geneva , and in 1972 earned a Master of Science degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management. Prizes and awards Mr. Annan was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize for Peace, jointly with the Organization. He has also received numerous honorary degrees and many other national and international prizes, medals and honours. Personal Mr. Annan was born in Kumasi , Ghana , on 8 April 1938, and is fluent in English, French and several African languages. He and his wife, Nane, between them have three children.

Kofi Annan: UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006. (eVideo, 2005) [WorldCat.org] FMG Humanities & Social Sciences Collection. Abstract: Professing the goal of "bringing the United Nations closer to the people," Secretary-General Kofi Annan ushered in a new era of UN involvement with international social and medical issues. This program features the Ghanaian-born diplomat's ideas about the role of the UN in today's world, with particular attention to the so-called Millennium Goals of ending poverty and inequality, increasing access to education, fighting AIDS, protecting the environment, and preventing humanitarian crises due to violent conflicts. Annan also poignantly shares his thoughts about the loss of Sergio Vieira de Mello and 22 others in the 2003 bombing of the UN's Baghdad headquarters. (27 minutes). Reviews Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Be the first. Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Be the first.

Tags schema:datePublished "2005" ; schema:description "Professing the goal of "bringing the United Nations closer to the people," Secretary-General Kofi Annan ushered in a new era of UN involvement with international social and medical issues. This program features the Ghanaian-born diplomat's ideas about the role of the UN in today's world, with particular attention to the so-called Millennium Goals of ending poverty and inequality, increasing access to education, fighting AIDS, protecting the environment, and preventing humanitarian crises due to violent conflicts. Annan also poignantly shares his thoughts about the loss of Sergio Vieira de Mello and 22 others in the 2003 bombing of the UN's Baghdad headquarters. (27 minutes)."@ en ; Righting might Ft. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (1997-2006) RT — Worlds Apart Read the full transcript OB:And one of the issues you particularly stress is this notion of collective security. And the reason I mention that is, obviously, you just came back from a meeting with the Russian President. And for him, the issues of multilateralism, collective security are very, very close to his heart.

I don't know if he expressed that in a conversation with you, but I think he sees the current crisis in Ukraine, as well as many other geopolitical crises, as a failure by certain powers to accept that principle. I wonder, though, if you have any of the criticisms for his position? KA: I think we had a very frank discussion. We had a frank discussion on the issues of Ukraine, we talked about the Middle East, Syria, Iraq and the spread of terrorism, and the need to cooperate to contain it. And what was important is that I left the president convinced that he wants to work with others. He wants to work with the European Union, with the US and other governments to try and improve the world we live in. That is the way to go. In today's interdependent world, no country can go it alone, however powerful. You need to cooperate with others to make the world and your own country safe. And in fact, when we sit back and consider seriously, we will come to the conclusion that the international interest is often also the national interest. And if we work effectively with others to solve some of the problems, we are also improving the situation for ourselves and at home.

OB:Well, one of the ways of working productively with others would be to use the infrastructure of the United Nations and the Security Council. And you know that the Security Council of late has been the platform where certain powers – Russia, the United States – had many, many disagreements. Now you said famously back in 1999 that “unless the UN Security Council is restored to its pre-eminent position as the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force, we are on a dangerous path to anarchy.” Now, given the conflict in Ukraine that you mentioned, given the conflicts in Syria, in Libya, in a host of other countries, are we still on the path, or have we actually reached the destination that you mentioned? KA: We've made some serious mistakes. There have been some serious omissions and serious diversions. But the principle is still the same. When it comes to use of force, a country can use force to protect itself if its under threat of imminent attack, or it's attacked. But when it comes to the collective interest and the use of force for collective protection, only the Security Council can authorise that force. And that was one of the reasons, for example, on Iraq, my position was very clear.

I did not support the war in Iraq because I think it was not in conformity with the Charter, and actually I still feel the same way. And we have seen the results of some of these interventions and the impact it has had on the countries, and in some situations, on the whole region. So I still maintain it is safer to go through the Council, work with the other member states, to make our world a better place. And whenever we have ignored the Council and gone it alone, the results have not been very encouraging. OB: Now, the problem is, and perhaps you would disagree with me, is that it's not only the great powers that ignore the Security Council. But I think there are also a number of countries, Saudi Arabia being the latest example, that have felt perhaps that they can do it alone. Do you see that as perhaps a sort of permissive environment for the use of force spreading around the world? And where does it start, or where does it finish for that matter? KA: No, but that is actually the problem. Because if one country gets away with it, powerful or weak, if they get away with it, it sets a precedent and others think they can also get away with it.

And this is why, as an international community, we need to be firm, we need to try and have a Council that is highly respected and takes the decisions which applies to all. But the decisions must not only be applied to the weak, the powerful should apply the same rules to themselves. Because if they don't, and they make exceptions for themselves, others are going to copy, others will see it as a precedent. And before you know it, you have proliferation of all sorts of unwelcome military actions. OB:Now, one way to avoid that would be a reform of the UN Security Council, which you have advocated for a very, very long time. And you also said that the only way this reform could be effective is if the permanent members of the Security Council accepted that the Council was not just yet another stage to act out on their national interests, but rather the “management committee of our fledgling collective security system.” And from many encounters that I had, both with the Russian officials, the American officials, none of them believes that they are acting out of selfishness, or national selfishness. They all believe that they are working in the service of humanity.

The problem is that their definitions of good and evil, and how to get there, are very, very different. I wonder if you see any chance, any opportunity for other members of perhaps the Security Council, or perhaps the United Nations, to circumvent this constant bickering between Moscow and Washington, and do something without them? KA: I think, first of all, I would still press for expansion of the Council. Expansion of the Council to bring around the table some of the emerging powers. Because I believe if you have the emerging powers around the table – let's assume, for argument's sake, I'm not promoting any country's candidacy for the Council – let's assume, as new members, you had India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, South Africa, and countries of that, Egypt, at the table. For a country, one country to veto and ignore the whole world, with all that group of people representing large populations around the table, would be much more difficult than it is today. Because they would understand that they are taking on the rest of the world, not only in abstract, but they are in the room and sitting at the table around them. So that is one thing.

The other thing that some have argued is that the General Assembly should play a role. Because under the General Assembly rules, they could sometimes under a procedure called “Uniting for Peace”, can take action, can pass resolutions which can have impact on questions of war and peace. OB:I'm sorry for interrupting, that would also mean diminishing the power of veto. Do I get you right? KA: It will mean you have a way of working out, it will diminish the power of veto. Let me put it this way - the veto powers would be careful not to veto, if the General Assembly were to accept and can override Council vetoes. No country would want to put itself in that situation. OB:Well, Mr Annan, we have to take a very short break now, but when we come back - Might makes right has almost become the axiom of the 21st century. Is it too late to return to the rules? That's coming up in a moment on Worlds Apart, stay tuned. OB: Welcome back to Worlds Apart where we are discussing global security with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Now, over the last couple of years, especially in relation to Syria, we had heard a lot of complaints about how various powers are exercising their veto. And I think, again I'm talking primarily about Russia and the United States. And I think you too, at one point, had had enough with the two of them bickering, I mean the moment when you decided to step down from your position as the UN and Arab League Envoy. And I was in Damascus at that time, and I remember, the situation was obviously very, very different from what it is now. But it already, that news already ushered in the sense of despair and the sense of hopelessness that many in Syria feel today. Did you ever regret that decision, that perhaps you have stepped down too early? If you stayed, you may have had some civilising effect on the powers, and perhaps there could have been more progress on the issue? KA: No, I had no regret. It was a very difficult decision for me, because I accepted willingly to go in to help. France said you have taken on an impossible job.

I said, I know it's going to be difficult, probably impossible, but how can you refuse to help, when women, children and a whole host of people are dying? So I accepted the job, but on condition that those who gave me the job would stay united, speak with one voice and support me. That didn't happen. It happened for a while, but then the divisions emerged. The mediator or the peacemaker cannot want peace more than the protagonist or more than the people who gave him the job. So without their support, and particularly after the first Geneva Conference on Syria, where I thought we had made good progress, we came out with a Communiqué including a paragraph which said what we need to do in Syria is to try and establish a transitional government with full executive authority, of course with the involvement of the Syrians and the people. Basically, saying let's try and manage this process, let's try and organise a transition so that we don't get a chaotic collapse with nothing.

And I had, all the permanent members were there – my friend Sergey Lavrov was there, Mrs Clinton - OB: (crosstalk) yeah, they were all on board, and yet they didn't follow through - KA: …and they signed the agreement. Unfortunately we did not get some of the countries we wanted from the region to come. I had wanted Iran and Saudi Arabia to join us, but they were both not there, for reasons that would take me a bit longer to explain. So in the end, we had Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar. But the real regional powers were not there. And if one has a chance to put together that group, it should be, in my judgement, the Permanent Five, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and possibly Qatar and Jordan, to make a common cause, for them to say we face a common danger, let's work together to pacify this region. OB: I want to expand on this point, and mention your book. In your book “Interventions”, there is one phrase in particular that caught my attention. You wrote that you can disagree with behaviour or a particular position, but you do not resort to calling an opponent worthless.

And I was really surprised to hear that from you, because I think that's the way modern geopolitics is done. Whatever crisis we take, there is very little discussion on the substance, it's all about calling each other names and trying to deny each other legitimacy or respect. Now, you are a person of a different kind. I think you have this very dignified bearing as a politician or as a diplomat. But don't you think that this style of diplomacy is essentially extinct at this point? And don't you believe that this lack of emotional restraint in geopolitics is ultimately responsible for what we have on our hands today? KA: I think you've answered the question. In fact, you are right. When you begin to call each other names, when you begin to demonise the other, when you begin to hate the other in order to accept yourself, you are really complicating the situation. You can agree with them on policy, you can agree with them on approach, you can disagree with them on the brutality, but still find a way of talking to them, find a way to get a solution.

And in fact, sometimes when you reach [inaudible] and you are able to get to understand what is it that is driving them, what is it that is making them behave the way they do. And you begin to work with that knowledge, you'd sometimes be surprised the progress you would make. But if you're dealing with somebody that you have demonised, that you consider is worthless, you are starting a conversation on a very false basis. You've lost the conversation before you even get into it. And I think some of the situations we are seeing around the world is because of this attitude and this behaviour. OB: Now, in that same book, you also make a very interesting observation that the international community's appetite for interventions depends not only on individual circumstances of any given crisis, but also on the outcome of previous interventions. You mention that the world was so slow on Rwanda because it came on the back of Somalia. And we all know that the Libyan campaign had an impact on Syria. I wonder, though, given your personal experience, do you still believe that the price of non-intervening is higher than the price of intervening? KA: I think it depends. You have to start on the basis that you should do no harm.

You shouldn't do more harm than is necessary. So you have to assess the situation to see will the intervention help, would it have a positive aspect, or would it do more harm. And if you analyse it and you were to conclude that the results would be much more disastrous, then what's the point of intervention? What would the people gain? What are you offering them, if it's going to make their situation worse? And how do you explain to the world why you intervened? OB: Well, that leads me to my next question. I don't know, though, if you would agree with the premise. But I think that the use of violence as a political and geopolitical tool has become much more acceptable since you stepped down from your position. And this is an issue that I often debate with my guests. And some of them, particularly Western politicians, like to quote you, that famous quote when you said that “you can do a lot with diplomacy, but with diplomacy backed up by force, you can get a lot more done.” You said that in relation to Saddam Hussein when he was in Iraq. But do you still subscribe to that principle? KA: No. I think it should not be misinterpreted.

It is one thing to have the threat of use of force, and actual use of force. In fact, sometimes the threat of potential use of force is much more effective than actual use of force. When the other side knows that you have the capacity and you may use it, the attitude is different. If you do not have the capacity and you go naked, like a Secretary-General of the UN, where some leaders have asked, “How many divisions [has the] Secretary-General got?”, it's quite different. But if the Secretary-General, the individual, is saying, look, be careful, you have to do the right thing otherwise you may provoke a reaction that will be much more brutal than the conversation I'm having with you, is something quite different. So, for me it's the threat rather than actually jumping in to intervention. I'm not a pacifist. There are moments when use of force can be justified. But it has to be analysed very carefully, and one shouldn't be trigger-happy. OB: Well, I just want to remind our viewers that you said that about Saddam Hussein when he was still in Iraq, and obviously some people misinterpreted what you said back then.

You also mentioned that your position on Iraq was pretty straight forward. You believe that was illegal, not in conformity with the UN Charter. And I don't think it's a controversial statement any more. But what is controversial is where the consequences of that illegal intervention end. Do you believe, or do you see the events, the current events in Iraq or perhaps in the neighbouring countries, as a direct consequence of that intervention, or perhaps as something that is separate? KA: No, absolutely, you can not disassociate the situation in Iraq today from the US intervention of 2003. Because not only did the intervention take place, but they dismantled the Iraqi Army, which was the tool of Saddam to maintain law and order. The civil service, the Baathist Party were all [dismantled]. So the structures and state institutions vanished overnight, creating a very serious vacuum which has led to where we are today. So I don't think anybody can argue with that. So the link is clear, and it's not [inaudible].

OB: But Mr Annan, that is, obviously, one of the biggest problems with the current international system – the lack of any accountability for the big powers, and I don't just mean the United States here. But the Iraqi example is particularly relevant, because we had hundreds of thousands of people killed or dying as a result of that intervention, and yet not a single official bearing responsibility for that. Do you believe, realistically, in any mechanism that will make big powers accountable? KA: Well, I think, after the Yugoslav war, attempts were made to make leaders and people accountable. Several tribunals were set up – the tribunal for Yugoslavia and Tribunal for Rwanda, and there have been several indictments. And today, we have the International Criminal Court. But what is interesting is that the big powers are not members of the Court, and yet they sit in the Security Council and refer smaller countries and others to the Court. In effect, saying we are going to apply the law to the small people and the small countries, but we would absolve ourselves, it wouldn't apply to us. What sort of justice is that?

It has to be, we have to aim for a system, and a legal system where the laws are applied fairly and consistently across the board. OB: (crosstalk) But do you believe that such a system could be created with the current set-up of the... KA: It will take time. I don't think it will happen today. But it is something that we aim for. You know, it's a bit like asking me, what's the point of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it's been in force for decades and it hasn't been implemented? But it's aspirational, we should aim for that. We should aim to get these higher standards. Even if we don't achieve it now, it is a challenge for us to wake up every morning, determined to fight for those rights. OB:If I may, very quickly, I would like to bring the discussion closer to home. And you're in Moscow as part of the Elders Group. One of the issues, as you said, that you discussed with President Putin was the situation in Ukraine. What do you think the Elders can do here? I mean, do you plan to continue your discussions with other leaders, like President Poroshenko, perhaps rebel leaders?

KA: We will talk to other leaders. We have been talking to other leaders and we will continue to talk to other leaders. The Elders believe firmly that the Minsk II agreement must be implemented and implemented fully. We have it on the table. The parties have agreed to it. Now, the test is implementation, and we should do everything to get it implemented, and I hope it can be done. And the four leaders who signed it also have a responsibility to make sure it is done, and find a way of bringing the parties together to implement the agreement. OB:Now, compared to other conflicts that you have been involved in, the Ukrainian one is in relatively early stages. And on the one hand, because of its geography, it has gotten the attention of the international community, but on the other hand, because of its geography the stakes are so high. So there are conflicting pushes from different sides. Given your experience, what do you think would be the key for stemming this conflict? Obviously it's not too late, I think, compared to the Syrian one. But what do you think perhaps we could learn from all the other failures to make this one a success? KA: Let me say that you are right.

There are many people around the world, not only in Europe, who have thought for quite a long time that today, war in Europe is unthinkable. And yet we have war in Europe, as they see it, in Ukraine. So there has been a sort of a shock, and gathered attention. But I think, objectively speaking, it should be easier to resolve the Ukrainian problem compared with what we are dealing with in the Middle East. Provided there is will and determination by the leaders concerned and the parties to make the Minsk Agreement work. At least here, you have an agreement. It may not be perfect, but it's workable. What is important is to press all concerned to ensure that the agreement is implemented as soon as possible. Otherwise the situation could get out of hand. Yes, it's not as bad as other crises, but it wasn't more than a couple of years ago when Syria also had only about 10,000 dead. But even one person, one life lost is too much. We don't want one more life lost in Ukraine, particularly when a roadmap for resolving it is on the table. OB: Well, Mr Annan, we have to leave it there, I really appreciate your time.

And to our viewers, please share your thoughts on our Twitter, Facebook and YouTube pages, and I hope to see you again, same place, same time, here on Worlds Apart. Timeline: UN Secretary-Generals - Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Trygve Lie, Norway Ban Ki-moon, Korea (2007 – Present) Ban Ki-moon 's tenure has featured a new emphasis on climate change policy, efforts to mitigate the surging prices of both energy and food in the developing world, and an inherited portfolio of issues including nuclear nonproliferation negotiations with Iran and continued efforts to solidify the United Nations' role in Sudan's Darfur conflict. Prior to serving as secretary-general, Ban was South Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He joined the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970, and served in a variety of diplomatic roles inside and outside of Korea during the next twenty-five years, including posts at embassies in the United States, Austria, and India. In 2001, Ban started work at the United Nations as chief of staff to Han Seung-soo, the president of the General Assembly.

Ban returned to Korea after his term and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2004 until 2006. He has been actively involved in issues relating to inter-Korean relations. In September of 2005, he helped bring about a landmark agreement aimed at promoting peace and stability between North and South Korea through Six-Party Talks . Since becoming Secretary-General, Ban has spoken out on several issues including the North Korean and Iranian nuclear threats, the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region, and administrative reform of UN operations. Share Email Kofi Annan, Ghana (1997-2006) Kofi Annan began his career as a budget officer with the World Health Organization (WHO) and rose through the ranks to become UN under-secretary-general at a time of record increases in peacekeeping operations. In 1995 he was appointed the secretary-general's special representative to the former Yugoslavia. Since his election in 1997, Annan's goals as secretary-general have included implementing management and budget reforms, addressing ever-growing costs and demands for UN peacekeeping operations, and better meeting the needs of poorer nations.

Under his leadership, the United Nations executed contemporary platforms aimed at sustainable development in Africa and the utilization of global capitalism to benefit socioeconomic needs. His "Millennium Report" advocates initiatives to eradicate poverty, combat HIV/AIDS, and protect the environment. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt (1992-1996) Boutros-Ghali served one term as secretary-general, suspending his candidacy for a second term after conflicts with U.S. foreign-policy leaders. He has an extensive international relations background as a scholar, diplomat, and jurist. Boutros-Ghali's term in office was marked by increased operating costs and ineffective peacekeeping efforts that proved burdensome to the UN. Unsuccessful U.S. participation in Somali peacekeeping operations, inability to curb fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, and subsequent reluctance from the international community to act against genocide in Rwanda, all precipitated U.S. support to transition the leadership position of secretary-general.

Javier Perez de Cuellar, Peru (1982-1991) Before assuming office, Perez de Cuellar was Peru's ambassador to Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Venezuela; served as his nation's permanent representative to the United Nations; and represented Peru on the Security Council, even serving as the Council's president. In 1979, he was appointed under-secretary-general for special political affairs. While in office, the UN leader oversaw negotiations for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, facilitated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiated the ceasefire ending the Iran-Iraq War, and developed the 1991 UN-backed peace pact in Cambodia. Kurt Waldheim, Austria (1971-1982) Before he was elected secretary-general, Waldheim was the permanent representative of Austria to the United Nations. During his two-term leadership of the UN, Waldheim participated in the Paris International Conference on Vietnam and presided over the first phase of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

Five years after his second term ended, Waldheim was elected President of Austria, a post he held until 1992; however, during the campaign his service in the German Army came to light. Though he declared no personal involvement, Waldheim was implicated in Nazi atrocities in the Balkans during World War II and was subsequently barred from entering the United States by the Justice Department. U Thant, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) (1961-1971) U Thant served as acting secretary-general after Dag Hammarskjöld's death. Just over a year later, the General Assembly voted unanimously to make him secretary-general. At the time of his appointment, U Thant was the permanent representative of Burma to the United Nations, and had previously chaired the UN Congo Conciliation Commission and the Committee on a UN Capital Development Fund. Under his leadership, the United Nations facilitated the end of the Cuban missile crisis and allayed civil war in the Congo.

Dag Hammarskjöld, Sweden (1953-1961) Dag Hammarskjöld was unanimously elected to two terms as secretary-general and served until September 18, 1961, when he died in a plane crash en route to a peace mission in the Congo. Mr. Hammarskjöld's most significant contributions to the United Nations' mission include promotion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States; the 1956 establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF); and multiple visits to countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East to acquaint himself with officials of member governments and problems in specific areas. Trygve Lie, Norway (1946-1952) Prior to his election as the first secretary-general of the United Nations, Lie led the Norwegian delegation to the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, April 1945; chaired Commission III, which drafted the Security Council provisions of the UN charter; and in 1946 he led the Norwegian delegation to the UN General Assembly in London.

While in office, Lie supported UN intervention in the Korean War and the foundation of Israel and Indonesia. He also advocated UN recognition of People's Republic of China upon the exile of the Nationalist government. Highlights From 2015–2016 Learn more about CFR’s mission and its work over the past year in the 2016 Annual Report . The Annual Report spotlights new initiatives, high-profile events, and authoritative scholarship from CFR experts, and includes a message from CFR President Richard N. Haass. Read and download » The Chronicle The Fall 2016 issue of CFR's member newsletter, the Chronicle, is a guide to CFR's most important news since August 2016, and includes announcements about new programs, partnerships, fellows, meetings, publications, and members. Read it now. Now Available: Foreign Policy Begins at Home The biggest threat to America's security and prosperity comes not from abroad but from within, writes CFR President Richard N. Haass in his provocative new book. More New Foreign Affairs eBook: Tiananmen and After UN. Secretary-General (1997-2006 : Kofi Annan) - UNARMS UN.

Secretary-General (1997-2006 : Kofi Annan) UN. Secretary-General (1997-2006 : Kofi Annan) Identity area UN. Secretary-General (1997-2006 : Kofi Annan) Parallel form(s) of name Standardized form(s) of name according to other rules Other form(s) of name The collected papers of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006 (Book, 2012) [WorldCat.org] Find more libraries Librarian? Claim your library to The collected papers of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006 Author: Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012. Edition/Format: You are connected to the University of Washington Libraries network Hide local services for this item OCLC FirstSearch Add library to Favorites Please choose whether or not you want other users to be able to see on your profile that this library is a favorite of yours. Allow this favorite library to be seen by others Keep this favorite library private Find a copy in the library Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details Kofi A Annan; Kofi A Annan; Kofi A Annan; Kofi Annan Document Type: Notes: Includes index. "The selected papers include speeches, letters, statements to the press (both official statements and informal remarks), meeting notes, op-ed pieces and other articles, reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and transcripts of interviews. These documents, arranged chronologically, provide a picture of the activities of Secretary-General Annan, the conceptual evolution of his ideas, and his indefatigable efforts to use his "good offices" to find peaceful solutions to conflicts and disputes. Each document is annotated with key words and, as appropriate, contextual information and clarifications of the abreviations used in the Secretary-General's handwritten notes"--Preface. Description: 5 volumes (xxix, 4529 pages) ; 26 cm Contents:

Question: Who was the Secretary General from 1997 to 2006?
Answer: KOFI ANNAN