Cod Wars | Britishseafishing.co.uk Britishseafishing.co.uk Advice and information on sea fishing in the UK Search The Cod Wars Background to the Cod Wars The cod wars were a series of disputes between Britain and Iceland running from the 1950s to the 1970s over the rights to fish in Icelandic waters. Although it was never a war in the conventional sense of the word (the massive and well-equipped Royal Navy would have easily defeated the tiny Icelandic Navy), the peak of the Cod Wars saw thirty seven Royal Navy warships mobilised to protect British trawlers fishing in the disputed territory. While the wars were eventually settled through diplomatic means there was conflict between British naval vessels and Icelandic ships out at sea. The Cod Wars showed how seriously nations took their fishing rights, and the lengths they would go to in order to access rich fishing grounds. The Royal Navy’s 2,500 ton Leander-class frigate HMS Scylla collides with the Icelandic vessel ICGV Odinn in the third and final Cod War. The First Cod War The first Cod War took place in autumn 1958 and was caused by a dispute over who could fish in the seas surrounding Iceland.

In the late 1950s a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – the area of sea that a country controlled and could fish in exclusively – only extended four miles out to sea from a country’s coastline. British trawlers could therefore fish very close to Iceland and take advantage of the fertile fishing grounds that surrounded the country. Iceland – worried that foreign vessels were overexploiting their fisheries – brought in a new law that extended their EEZ to twelve miles. Britain was not happy and chose to ignore this new limit and continued to fish up to the original four-mile limit. The situation escalated when Britain sent warships to protect its trawlers fishing in the disputed areas. This was seen as a David versus Goliath conflict, as Britain had, at that time, the second most powerful navy in the world (after the USA), while Iceland had little more than patrol boats and militarised coast guard vessels to protect itself. A number of incidents took place including Icelandic patrol boats firing across the bows of British trawlers in an effort to force them to leave the new zone, and Britain threatening to sink any Icelandic vessels that attacked British trawlers.

Eventually, Britain accepted that it had no right to stop Iceland extending the EEZ to twelve miles and backed down. There was also an agreement that future conflicts would be settled at the International Court of Justice to avoid further conflict. The Second Cod War A diagram showing how net cutters are used to sever a trawler’s net. The second cod war took place in September 1972 when Iceland ignored the agreement about disputes being settled via diplomatic means and unilaterally extended its EEZ from twelve to fifty miles. Again Britain refused to recognise this new limit leading to Iceland using its patrol boats to chase British and West German trawlers out of its newly declared exclusive zone. The Icelandic coast guard then started using net-cutters to destroy the trawling nets of the British fishing vessels that ventured inside the zone. Soon the Royal Navy was sent to protect the British trawlers. Confrontations took place for over a year with British trawlers continuing to have their nets cut by Icelandic ships and Royal Navy ships being rammed by Icelandic coast guard boats. A serious incident took place in March 1973 when the British trawler Brucella refused to follow directions of the patrol boat Arvakurto leave the EEZ.

Crew from the Icelandic vessel then appeared on deck and began firing rifles at the Brucella, damaging her bridge and lifeboats. The trawler then followed the Icelander’s instructions to leave the EEZ. No one was injured in the incident. But worse was to come in July of the following year. The trawler C.S. Forester, one of the biggest trawlers in the British commercial fleet, was spotted fishing within the twelve-mile limit by the Icelandic patrol boat V/S ÞórI. The British vessel was pursued for over one hundred miles and then shelled with non-explosive ammunition by the Icelandic vessel. At least two shells hit causing damage to the ship. The C.S. Forester was eventually boarded and towed to an Icelandic port where it was impounded and the skipped was jailed for thirty days. He was eventually released when the C.S. Forester’s owners paid £2,300 and a further £26,500 for the release of the trawler.

Eventually, a breakthrough was reached when it was agreed British trawlers could fish within certain specified areas in the fifty-mile zone, as long as Britain took no more than 130,000 tons of cod per year. However, this agreement was only valid for two years, and expired on 13 November 1975. The Third, and Final, Cod War As soon as this agreement expired the third cod war began. In late 1975 Iceland increased the EEZ limit again, this time to 200 miles. Britain, along with other European nations, were furious, arguing that although there was broad agreement that a 200-mile limit would be brought in throughout the world, this agreement was still years away and Iceland had no right to impose such a limit so soon. This Cod War led to some of the most heated confrontations of the three wars. One of the most contentious episodes involved the Icelandic patrol boat Þór and three Royal Navy support ships.

British and Icelandic accounts differ about exactly what happened, but what is clear is that Þór was rammed by British vessels to the extent that it began to sink and in an attempt to defend itself fired blank, and then live ammunition at the British ships. Some of the live rounds struck a British ship, the Star Aquarius although no injuries and only minor damage resulted. Iceland raised the stakes by attempting to procure US Asheville-class gunboats, such as the USS Tacoma, pictured. These vessels were heavily armed with four machine guns, a 40mm cannon and could be configured to launch surface-to-surface missiles. Another serious incident took place when another Iceland patrol boat, the Týr, tried to cut the nets of a British trawler. HMS Falmouth, a 2800 ton Rothesay-class frigate intervened to protect the trawler. HMS Falmouth rammed the Týr which continued, and eventually succeeded in cutting the trawler’s nets. This caused HMS Falmouth to ram the Týr a second time, nearly capsizing the vessel. The captain of the Týr ordered his men to man the ship’s guns.

A stand-off developed between the two ships which only ended when the heavily damaged Týr was forced to limp back to port due to the damage it had sustained when it was rammed for the second time. In total there were fifty-five incidents of Royal Navy vessels ramming Icelandic boats during the third Cod War. This presented a problem for the Royal Navy as the frigates it was using were designed for launching missiles at distant enemy ships or hunting enemy submarines in the open ocean. They were ill-suited to the close in maneuvering and ramming Icelandic boats which they were required to perform in the third Cod War, and the frequency with which they were used to ram Icelandic vessels was beginning to cause significant damage to a number of Royal Navy frigates. By the end of the third Cod War the Royal Navy was even strengthening the hulls of frigates before they were sent to Iceland in order to limit the damage that was caused to the vessels when they rammed and Icelandic boats. The situation escalated again when it was revealed that the Icelandic justice minister Ólafur Jóhannessonwas attempting to upgrade Icelandic naval power by loaning a number of powerful Asheville-class gunboats from the US, or purchasing Mirka-class frigates from Russia.

Although this was probably a ploy, and America turned down Iceland’s request outright, it had the desired effect of showing that Iceland had no intention of backing down and was willing to take on the Royal Navy head on. But Iceland still had their ace card to play. A US-manned NATO naval air base was located on the Reykjanes peninsula, near the town of Keflavík in western Iceland. This base housed the US 85th Air Group, radar stations and anti-submarine warfare units as well as serving as a base for US search and rescue units. As the third cod war was taking place at the height of the Cold War this naval air station was crucial for the Americans to track and monitor Soviet submarine and airplane movements through the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) gap – a key choke point for Soviet forces gaining access to the open Atlantic and US territorial waters. The GIUK gap was of crucial importance in the third cod war, and Iceland’s threat to close the NATO base located there forced Britain to give in to Iceland’s demands. Without this base America would be blind to what was happening in huge areas of the north Atlantic, as well as losing the deterrent factor of having forces amassed relatively close to the USSR.

Believing that Iceland was serious about closing the air base America began putting huge pressure on Britain to comply with Iceland’s extended EEZ. Talks to end the Cod Wars took place in Oslo in spring 1976, with the threat to close the NATO base placing pressure on Britain to end the dispute. An agreement was eventually reached on May 28th. A maximum of twenty-four British trawlers were allowed to fish within the new EEZ as long as their catch was limited to 50,000 tons. However, this agreement only lasted for six months, after which Britain agreed that it had no right to fish inside the zone. Aftermath Diagram showing the increasing size of Iceland’s EEZ as the three cod wars progressed. Although it was never a war in the conventional sense, the Cod Wars none the less showed how close two countries would come to combat over the issue of fishing rights. In the end Iceland were successful in extending their EEZ massively, and today the 200-mile limit is accepted internationally (apart form in Europe where the Common Fisheries Policy takes precedence).

Britain’s reason for challenging Iceland’s ever increasing EEZ was perfectly logical – British trawlers relied on catching cod in the plentiful waters of Iceland, and without this fish many ports built on the fishing industry would struggle. However, Iceland were always going to eventually win international backing to extend their EEZ, and Britain was fighting a losing battle by opposing this. The loss of access to these fisheries devastated many British fishing communities such as Hull and Grimsby and many Scottish ports, with as many as 1,500 fishermen and several thousand shore-based workers from these areas losing their jobs. Share this page: When tiny Iceland did beat England: It’s time to brush up on the Cod Wars - The Washington Post When tiny Iceland did beat England: It’s time to brush up on the Cod Wars The inside track on Washington politics. Be the first to know about new stories from PowerPost. Sign up to follow, and we’ll e-mail you free updates as they’re published. You’ll receive free e-mail news updates each time a new story is published. You’re all set!

Got it By Sverrir Steinsson By Sverrir Steinsson June 26, 2016 Iceland’s Arnor Ingvi Traustason celebrates with Birkir Bjarnason after scoring the second goal during the Iceland v Austria soccer match in the EURO 2016 championship on June 22, 2016. (REUTERS/Darren Staples) Tiny Iceland has surpassed everyone’s expectations in the Euro 2016 soccer championships. Even qualifying for the tournament was unexpected, but reaching the knockout stage (and doing so undefeated against Portugal, Austria and Hungary) deserves some bragging rights. England are now set to face the overachieving microstate in the round of 16 on June 27. There is no doubt that the England team is an overwhelming favorite. However, as Lawrence Freedman cautions, Iceland has a history of overcoming great odds and defying common expectations in its battles with the British. Freedman is referring to the Cod Wars, when the two countries militarized over fishing rights disputes in the North Atlantic. Yes, “wars” over fish. How did tiny Iceland defeat a great power?

The Cod Wars were disputes over Iceland’s territorial waters, fought in four bouts over a 25-year period: The Proto Cod War (1952-1956); the First Cod War (1958-1961); the Second Cod War (1972-1973); and the Third Cod War (1975-1976). Iceland wanted to expand its territorial waters and exclude foreign fishing fleets. The U.K. would have none of that. The British distant fishing fleet fished extensively in the waters off Iceland — and supplied a lot of fish-and-chips shops. But the U.K. also wanted to prevent precedents that violated the principle of narrow territorial waters . Narrow territorial waters were key for the Royal Navy to sail freely and continue to project power across the world. [ Do we really need a new U.N. oceans treaty? Yes, and here’s why. ] The Icelanders were motivated by the prospective economic gains. An extension of its territorial waters meant greater catches — and a way to exclude competing trawler fleets and conserve important fishing grounds.

The country’s heavy dependence on fishing meant that extensions had a significant impact on Iceland’s GDP (roughly one-quarter of which was tied to the fisheries sector), export earnings (one-half to two-thirds of which were tied to the fisheries sector) and employment (roughly 15 percent of which was in the fisheries sector). Each Cod War broke out when Iceland unilaterally extended its territorial waters and the British failed to comply with the new Icelandic regulations. Clashes and confrontations ensued between Icelandic patrol ships and British trawlers. The harassment of British trawlers in the contested waters provoked the British to sanction the Icelanders in the Proto Cod War (preventing the Icelanders from accessing their largest export market) and send the Royal Navy into the contested waters during the last three Cod Wars. Neither side actively tried to cause casualties but the clashes at sea were still dangerous. Individuals were injured, and there was one fatality on the Icelandic side. [ Here’s why Jakarta doesn’t push back when China barges into Indonesian waters ] Why didn’t they negotiate? Surely bargaining would have saved both sides the inevitable costs and risks of unilateral, unrecognized expansions.

Historians and political scientists have identified how domestic pressure on elites and the nature of alliance politics contributed to miscalculation on both sides that contributed to bargaining failure. Neither Icelandic nor British leaders accurately discerned the public pressure that their counterparts were under. Icelandic politicians were particularly vulnerable to domestic pressure, as opposition parties, media and public sentiment likened compromise to treason. Contradictory statements from different members of the Icelandic government, diplomats and other elites contributed to the mistaken British view that the Icelanders were divided and not fully committed to expansive and legally dubious extensions. The British trawling industry, which had a staunch ally in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, put great pressure on the British government. The Ministry favored aggressive and extreme actions in the disputes, while the Foreign Office was more conciliatory and concerned about the Cod Wars’ impact on British security interests and international standing. The Icelanders deemed it unlikely that their NATO ally and friend would sanction the Icelanders or send in the Royal Navy. Both sides also believed that the U.S . and other NATO allies would side with them. Even though the American position on territorial waters tended to line up with the British view — and the U.S. opposed Iceland’s unilateralism — the U.S.

ultimately intervened on Iceland’s behalf. The U.S. had a stake in the outcome The U.S. bought up unsold Icelandic fish, making the British sanctions toothless in the Proto Cod War. Then the U.S. pressured the U.K. behind the scenes in the last three Cod Wars. At stake was a strategically important U.S. base in Keflavík , which was needed to track Soviet submarine activity. For the U.S., Iceland also was an important chain in the line of defense in case of war with the Soviet Union. Neither Iceland or the U.K. found the other’s threats and demands credible prior to the outbreak of conflict. However, as each Cod War intensified and Icelandic statesmen came under major domestic pressure, they found themselves forced to threaten to withdraw Iceland’s NATO membership and expel U.S. forces from the military base in Keflavík in desperate attempts to push the U.K. to give in to Iceland’s demands. What started as minor disputes over fishing rights suddenly had implications for the Cold War.

President Eisenhower (during the Proto Cod War) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (during the Second Cod War) talked about the Icelanders in terms of the “ tyranny of the weak,” as they felt compelled to oblige their small, obstinate, strategically important ally. With NATO allies heaping pressure on the U.K. to settle and Icelandic politicians clearly constrained by public pressure, the U.K. reluctantly gave in to most of the Icelanders’ demands. Iceland achieved favorable agreements in each Cod War, with the last Cod War concluding 40 years ago when the Icelanders achieved a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. [ Here’s how the Euro soccer tournament will affect the Brexit vote. ] So what does this have to do with soccer? As in the Cod Wars, the Icelandic players will have to show greater commitment than the English players to stand any chance of winning. The players have given their all to reach this point — and more than 8 percent of the Icelandic population traveled to support the team in France . Of those still in Iceland, fully 99 percent remained glued to the TV coverage of the matches . This suggests there is no shortage of commitment to the cause on the Icelandic side. Áfram Ísland!

Sverrir Steinsson is a researcher and lecturer in international relations at the University of Iceland. His study “The Cod Wars: a re-analysis” appears in the June 2016 issue of European Security. He tweets at @SverrirSte . Save British Icelandic Cod Wars - YouTube British Icelandic Cod Wars Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Jan 3, 2013 The problems of distant-water trawling centred on limited access due to claims of territorial rights. The British distant-water fishing industry was based on the idea of freedom of the high seas, and the assumption that the sea was an open resource to be exploited. This idea was increasingly challenged in the post-war period. The Icelandic government had long-standing concerns about the depletion of fish stocks along its coast.

Following independence from Denmark in 1944, Iceland annulled the Anglo-Danish Territorial Waters Agreement of 1901, which was due to expire in 1951. This treaty had mutually restricted territorial waters to within three miles of the coast, but now the Icelandic government extended the limit to four miles. The case was put before the International Court of Justice. The British industry banned Icelandic vessels from landing fish in Britain. These events led to a long-running dispute between the British and Icelandic fishing industries and governments. Britain was forced to concede the four-mile limit following a decision by the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation in 1956. In 1958, however, the United Nations (UN) held the first International Conference on the Law of the Sea. Various nations made claims for extending the limit of territorial waters to 12 miles, but nothing definite was decided. The Icelandic government unilaterally declared a 12-mile limit. Britain did not recognise the Icelandic declaration and continued to fish within the new limit. This led to the first Cod War, in which Iceland's Navy harassed British trawlers.

There was some violence, including 'rammings', and Royal Navy ships were deployed to protect the trawlers. Following the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea between 1960 and 1961, Britain agreed to the 12-mile limit. In September 1972, however, Iceland declared a 50-mile limit. The outcome was the second Cod War, in which Icelanders used 'cutters' to sabotage the nets of British and German trawlers. The dispute assumed greater international significance because of American anxieties about the US/NATO base at Keflavik in Iceland, and the possibility of an Icelandic rapprochement with the USSR. In October 1973, UK and Icelandic representatives agreed that a limited number of British trawlers would be allowed to operate within the 12-limit for the following two years. In 1975, at a third United Nations (UN) Conference of the Law on the Sea, it became apparent many countries supported a 100-mile limit. In May 1975, Iceland declared a 200-mile limit. The British government refused to recognise this, which led to the third Cod War.

By the end of 1976, the British conceded the limit. The closure of the Icelandic grounds effectively ended British long-distance fishing. BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Britain v Iceland: Fish now finance Britain v Iceland: Fish now finance By Paul Reynolds World affairs correspondent, BBC News website British savers had billions of pounds invested in Iceland's banks Here we go again. Having fought three rather pointless - though at times bitter - little wars over fishing limits, Britain and Iceland have now allowed a problem over British deposits in a failed Icelandic bank to become a crisis. Instead of two North Atlantic islands who are partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and who both charged into financial danger zones quietly sorting this out, prime ministers have swapped insults. Echoes of those cod wars are heard. The British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, has publicly declared Icelandic actions to be "effectively illegal" and "unacceptable" and the Icelandic Prime Minister, Gier Haarde, has expressed his annoyance that the UK used anti-terrorism legislation to seize assets in Britain of the one of the Icelandic banks. In a situation where people's money is at stake, one government tends to blame another and vice versa.

British argument The complaint in the present case from the British side is that Iceland was not prepared to compensate UK investors equally but was protecting its domestic savers first. I am told that the case refers only to that of the internet bank Icesave. Britain did not get the assurance it sought that a legal agreement for equal treatment would be honoured. Icelanders are hurt that the British government acted under the Anti-terrorism Act The British government therefore decided that it had to take steps to try to protect its own savers and seized assets of Icesave's parent bank, Landsbanki, in the UK. It is interesting to note that the tone adopted by Treasury minister Stephen Timms in the House of Commons on Thursday was much milder than that of his prime minister. Mr Timms said the freeze was a "precautionary measure... and could be lifted once safeguards are in place." But the damage had been done and will take some repairing. Icelandic complaint The Icelanders are hurt that the British government acted under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, specifically Part 2, Article 4.

Geir Haarde on the 'painful process' facing the banking industry The Act is in fact very broadly based and says that assets can be frozen in the UK if the Treasury "reasonably believe" that "action to the detriment of the United Kingdom's economy (or part of it) has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons, or action constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of the United Kingdom..." The person against whom action is taken has to be either a foreign government or resident. It is not clear why the Act and not another had to be used but one suspects that it was to hand and was quick. And it shows how an Act designed for one set of circumstances can easily be used for another. Cod wars It is worth recalling how angry each side got over fish to understand these feelings about finance. It was all about the extension of fishing rights, something that has since been settled and indeed, at the height of the third round of clashes between British trawlers and frigates and Icelandic gunboats, was already on the way to being agreed internationally.

Britain and Iceland have had bitter disputes over fishing rights Britain was furious that Iceland started to cut British trawler nets within the 200 mile zone before an actual international agreement was reached. Iceland countered that it had to show that it was serious. No shots were fired, though at one stage an Icelandic captain did order his guns to be manned, in the face of somewhat superior firepower from a Royal Navy frigate. One lighter moment came when the BBC's venerable agriculture correspondent, Archie McPhee, who also doubled as fisheries correspondent, landed in Iceland from a British vessel, without taking the precaution of checking in with immigration. He was arrested and held for several hours before resuming his duties, now with a good story to tell. But at the time, I recall, it seemed to be the Icelanders who had the better of it. They had designed their gunboats to cut nets and be strong enough to withstand ramming. The British frigates were lightly armoured and at one stage had to fix wooden planks to their bows to strengthen themselves. They were designed for anti-submarine warfare, not protecting the nets of trawlers.

The damage had been done and will take some repairing It was a classic case of how a small force designed for a specific job can hold off a larger force designed for another. Fishing stocks have nevertheless declined even in Icelandic waters and the island turned to finance and tourists instead. Iceland has become a favourite haunt for racy weekenders after hot tubs and environmental explorers after hot springs. It has come as a surprise to many of us how much British public money was invested in Icelandic banks. An island of 300,000 souls seems to have been supporting not just West Ham United (whose owner is Icelandic) but a great swathe of private and public investors. Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Template 1. Abstract Mixing of Labrador Current and Gulf Stream The relatively shallow waters, coupled with the mixing of the cold Labrador current and the warm waters of the Gulf Stream have made the Grand Banks, located off of Canada’s eastern shore, one of the most productive fisheries in the world. Not surprisingly, the region’s resource rich waters have attracted intense fishing from countries from all over the globe for centuries. Unfortunately, this has culminated in seriously overexploited fisheries.

As fisheries populations have become increasingly diminished, the conflict over the management of the fisheries in this region has escalated. Management of the fisheries of the Grand Banks falls under the jurisdiction of Canada (90% of the Grand Banks are located within its 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Moratoriums on these fish stocks have been declared by both Canada and NAFO, but have not succeeded as fish populations continue to decline more than a decade later. As Canada and the other member countries of NAFO continue to struggle over the protection of the fish stocks of the Grand Banks, the conflict over fisheries management is only anticipated to escalate further as Canada submits a proposal to extend its continental shelf and the effects of global climate change begin to emerge. 2. Description The impressive biological productivity of the Grand Banks is attributed to the cold waters of the Labrador Current mixing with the warm Gulf Stream over a relatively shallow banks ranging in depth from 25 to 100 meters.

These conditions result in an upwelling and a region of nutrient rich waters with high productivity which fuel the growth of marine organisms that range from microscopic plankton, groundfish like the Atlantic cod, seals, harbor porpoises and humpback whales. Over the past 400 years the region has supported one of the world’s most productive fisheries, but severe overfishing has resulted in the virtual decimation of many of its fish stocks. There are many factors that will contribute to whether or not the management of these fisheries erupts into further conflict, as global climate change and the extension of Canada’s continental shelf will throw new variables into an already overcomplicated equation. In order to best anticipate the potential conflicts that may ensue over the fishing rights of the Grand Banks there are 4 aspects that must be discussed: Canada’s jurisdictional authority of the Grand Banks in respect to its EEZ and continental shelf, the management of fisheries by Canada and NAFO, the threats of overexploitation faced by the fisheries and the potential effect global climate change may have on these fish stocks, especially Atlantic Cod. Fertile Grand Banks Plankton Bloom European explorers first discovered the abundant fisheries resources of the Grand Banks in the 15th century.

It was not long before it attracted fishing vessels from all over the world, and served as the catalyst for establishing European colonies up and down the Atlantic seaboard. In fact, the first settlements in Newfoundland were created as bases for drying and salting fish for transport back to Europe. As 20th century technological advancements made for more efficient commercial fishing large vessels from Russia and Japan joined the European, Canadian and American boats that were already heavily fishing the region by the mid-1950’s. Unfortunately, the pressure these highly efficient vessels were putting on the Grand Banks ecosystem became too much, and virtually decimated key stocks like the Atlantic Cod. The collapse in the Grand Banks cod population led to the Canadian government placing a moratorium on all cod fishing within its 200 mile EEZ in 1995. NAFO followed suit and declared a moratorium on the species as well. Unfortunately, both efforts have proven ineffective, and stocks continue to decline despite more than a decade of protection, and the future of management over the Grand Banks fisheries is not anticipated to get any easier. Excessive amounts of bycatch and illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing practices need to be halted.

This is ultimately an effort that will demand cooperation between Canada and the member countries of NAFO. A vast majority of the Banks (90%) falls within Canada’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and Canada has long been searching for the way to bring the entire stretch of the extremely fertile submarine plateau of the Grand Banks within its jurisdiction. The remaining 10% of the Grand Banks that does not fall within Canada’s EEZ, is referred to as the “nose” and the “tail” the northern and southern most portions of the Grand Banks that is not within Canada’s EEZ. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states have sovereign fishing rights within their EEZ. Thus, because the nose and tail do not fall within Canada’s EEZ management of these regions goes to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Gaining sovereign control over the Banks is extremely important for Canada for a number of reasons, and is only further heightened by the impending onset of global climate change. Finally, as the impacts of global climate change begin to emerge, there are predictions that some fish stocks like Atlantic cod in the northwestern Atlantic may actually rebound as a result of warming ocean temperatures.

Assuming the stock was able to rebound, this development would turn the debate over the management of Atlantic cod on its head. The result would likely be a fishery which already has a history of being a highly coveted and contested would become the subject of even more international conflict. It will be a true test as to the strength and effectiveness of international resolutions like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and regional fisheries management organizations like the Northwestern Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) as to whether the conflicts over fisheries which may result from global climate change can be avoided, or at least mitigated. Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Courtesy of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans - Canada) According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states can extend their continental shelf past the 200 nautical mile limit of their EEZ. This extended continental shelf (ECS) will give Canada the sovereign right to explore and exploit the living and non-living resources of the designated seabed and subsoil. While this includes rights to oil, gas and living organisms that are sedentary living on the seafloor, it does not, however, extend the state’s jurisdiction to include fish stocks.

Sovereign fishing rights are limited to a state’s EEZ. But just because sovereign fishing rights do not extend past a state’s EEZ does not mean that is the end of their ability to influence or protect these resources. Declaring an ECS also grants the coastal state exclusive control over marine scientific research as well as the sovereign right to control and prevent marine pollution in connection with any activities on the ECS. These activities also include the right to extract natural resources like oil and gas from the continental shelf. This could be both a positive and a negative development. While it allows the Canadian government to protect the nose and tail of the Grand Banks from activities like oil drilling by foreign companies and nations, it also means that Canada could decide to drill in these areas all on its own. Either way, this could mean many things for the fate of species like the Atlantic cod that may have a chance of rebounding due to the warming of ocean temperatures as an effect of global climate change. In 1994, just before UNCLOS came into force, Canada began preparing a submission for an extension of its continental shelf.

By expanding its continental shelf, it is estimated that Canada stands to gain approximately 1,750,000 square km (an area equal to the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan combined), and would include the nose and tail of the Grand Banks. Under Article 76 of UNCLOS countries have 10 years from the date they sign on to UNCLOS to submit their petitions for an extension of their outer continental shelf. This means Canada is expected to submit its petition on or before November 7, 2013. Management of the Grand Banks: Canada and the NAFO NAFO Regions outside of Canada's EEZ In response to Canada’s unilateral declaration of its 200 nautical mile EEZ in 1977, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) was formed in 1978 to manage fisheries located outside Canada’s (and eventually any other country in the Northwest Atlantic) EEZ. The NAFO was established as a forum for international cooperation in science, conservation and management in the Northwest Atlantic.

NAFO’s member countries include: Canada, Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark (representing the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the European Union (representing Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain), France (on be half of Saint Pierre and Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States. While NAFO does establish management policies for NAFO Regulated Areas (NRAs), its enforcement capabilities over fishing fleets within these waters are lacking. Instead fishing vessels are subject to the control of the country under which flag they are flying. If the country is a NAFO member state, they are obligated to abide by NAFO rules and regulations. Unfortunately, there are no established punishments for not abiding by these policies. The situation is worse for non-NAFO member states that have no obligation to abide by these policies. In 2004 Canada committed to provide an additional $15 million in funding to further enhance its enforcement and surveillance program in the NAFO Regulatory Area with the goal of stopping illegal overfishing.

These measures would include expanding Canada’s patrol presence from one dedicated vessel to three on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks (and on the Flemish Cap which also falls outside Canada’s EEZ, but within NAFO waters). A key element of Canada’s plan is to increase the number of boardings (under the auspice of NAFO observers) of foreign trawlers so they can monitor their level of compliance towards NAFO regulations. Threats to the Fisheries of the Grand Banks Long considered one of the most fertile regions of the world in terms of resources, Canada’s Grand Banks boasts some of the world’s richest oil deposits and fisheries. Nearly 90% of the Grand Banks fall within Canada’s EEZ, leaving only the “nose” and “tail” lying outside its jurisdiction. Over the years there have been many threats to the fish and shellfish populations endemic to this region ranging from over-fishing from domestic and international fishers, to the potential development of petroleum reserves thought to be located beneath the Banks.

Over-fishing /Illegal Fishing One of the characteristics of the Grand Banks that makes it special is its unique position along the warm waters of the Gulf Stream (the Gulf Stream passes over the southern portion in the summer and covers almost all of the Banks in the winter.) These water temperature patterns, in combination with the relative shallowness of the water helps bring the nutrients to the surface, resulting in especially favorable conditions for growth of plankton. Plankton serves as the base of the food chain and is the direct food source for marine life of the Grand Banks ranging from Atlantic cod to humpback whales. The excessive supply of plankton on the Banks has made these waters especially fertile fisheries, as well as important spawning, nursery and feeding areas to large numbers of Atlantic fish and shellfish species, including the Atlantic cod. Because many of these fisheries (including the Atlantic cod) have been so excessively over harvested, in 1995 they were closed on the Grand Banks in hopes of recovering their populations. Unfortunately, these fish are not stationary and do not stay within Canada’s EEZ (known as straddling stocks), making them vulnerable to fishers located outside of the EEZ’s boundaries.

Throughout history there have been many disputes over fishing rights in these waters as Canada attempted to protect not only the health of the fish populations on the Grand Banks, but the local economies that depend upon them for their own survival as well. The problem was that not all Grand Banks fisheries were closed, and Canada suspected foreign vessels (especially from the European Union) of fishing in international waters with illegal fishing gear that would take moratoria stocks “inadvertently”. Tensions reached their peak in 1995 when Canada boarded a Spanish fishing trawler that was fishing outside Canada’s EEZ in international waters. The Canadians, suspecting that the Spanish vessel the Estai was using illegal fishing gear, and in hopes of making an example of the trawler engaged in an all out pursuit that only ended when the Canadian’s fired a shot across the bow of the Estai and placed the crew under arrest. It was later determined that the Estai, which was supposed to be fishing for Turbot, another groundfish not under moratoria, was indeed using illegal fishing gear.

While there was great controversy between the EU and Canada over the use of “extra-territorial force” (being that Canada had arrested the crew of the Estai outside of its EEZ) the case clearly demonstrated illegal fishing practices were occurring in NRAs. Even though Canada and NAFO have imposed a moratorium on nine of the 20 NAFO managed stocks (including Atlantic cod) there has been little indication of species recovery. While this can be blamed on many culprits (the desperately low levels the population was allowed to reach before the moratoriums were put in place and illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing) one of the biggest worries for Canada and environmental organizations working on the preservation of the Grand Banks is the impact of moratoria stocks bycatch. It is estimated that up to 70-89% of the 3NO cod (southern Grand Banks cod) were harvested by vessels flying NAFO member flags in 2003. If fisheries management officials hope to recover moratoria stocks, it is becoming increasingly apparent that moratoria stock bycatch needs to be addressed and mitigated.

Canadian Aerial Enforcement of Grand Banks But regulating bycatch is a difficult task, and a certain level of bycatch is not only unavoidable, but allowed, under NAFO regulations. Unfortunately, there is evidence that fishing vessels are targeting and removing significant amounts of moratoria species (like Atlantic cod) under the auspice of permitted bycatch limits. The WWF estimates that bycatch of 3NO cod has increased to ten times the level it was at when the moratorium was established in 1995. In 2003 there were 5,400 tons of cod were taken as bycatch, this represents almost 90% of the estimated biomass of the stock and would offer an explanation for the perpetual decline in Atlantic cod populations despite the moratoria. The vessels which took the majority of the cod bycatch in this area were flying Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Canadian flags. NAFO has issued a number of measures to minimize bycatch like minimum mesh seizes, bycatch limits, sorting grates and small fish protocols, but it is difficult to determine whether or not fishing vessels are actually in compliance. Another problem is that there are vessels fishing in NAFO waters that are not NAFO members.

Because the fishing is occurring in international waters, those vessels are not required to abide by NAFO’s management measures, thus further undermining the organization’s efforts. In fact, under international law all countries must consent to be regulated, which has been NAFO’s Achilles heel since its inception. While fishing by non-NAFO member vessels does not appear to be a major problem presently, it is expected to represent more challenges in the future. This would be especially true if the impacts of global climate change resulted in increased fish stocks in the Grand Banks while others in the Atlantic and else where in the world suffered. Climate Change Even though the excessive fishing of the Grand Banks has historically been its worst enemy, the desire to fish in the region could be exacerbated by global climate change. Increasing ocean temperatures and the potential shifting of the Gulf Stream have the potential to severely alter marine ecosystems, including the Grand Banks. As discussed previously, because of its unique placement along the warm waters of the Gulf Stream and its shallow depths, the Grand Banks have been an ideal home to many Atlantic marine organisms.

But as waters warm and the Gulf Stream shifts, these highly adapted organisms may be forced to relocate, and potentially venture into international seas that are not protected as effectively as they are when they exist in Canadian waters. Some species like the Atlantic Cod are expected to experience a population increase, as well as an increase in their spatial distribution. While this may signify positive implications for the struggling cod population, it will undoubtedly result in an increased desire to reopen the fishery. Depending on the status of Canada’s application to extend its continental shelf and its jurisdictional management capabilities, tensions over management of this, and other northwest Atlantic species, will rise. 3. Duration: 1977 - Ongoing Canada declared its EEZ in 1977, thus creating the need for NAFO and international cooperation over the management of fisheries that fall outside of Canada’s EEZ. Management of the fisheries in and around the Grand Banks is currently under review by Canadian officials, the NAFO and environmental organizations. As the impacts of climate change emerge, this review will need to be constantly readdressed. 4. Location Northwestern Atlantic Ocean, southeast of Newfoundland 5.

Actors Canada Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and its member states: Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark (representing the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the European Union (representing Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain), France (on be half of Saint Pierre and Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States (also includes Canada). Countries that are not party to NAFO but fishing in the region are also considered actors in the conflict. 6. Type of Environmental Problem There has already been serious species loss in the Grand Banks due to overfishing, much of it illegal unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing by foreign flagged vessels. Canada and the NAFO have attempted to manage these fisheries at the international and national levels, but with limited success. These efforts will be further challenged by changes induced by global climate change, because as sea temperatures rise, the waters of the Grand Banks are expected to become even more fertile, potentially leading to the recovery of moratoria fish stocks like the Atlantic cod. If this were to happen it would likely perpetuate the conflict over fishing rights and privileges in the region.

There is relative uncertainty as to what the actual effects of global climate change will be on northwestern Atlantic ecosystems. Some species will benefit, while others will suffer making management of the region’s fisheries even more complicated than it already is. In fact, because climate change will most likely result in the warming of the waters off Canada’s eastern shores, and especially those around the already extremely fertile Grand Banks, many populations are expected to flourish, which will in turn lead to increased competition for access to these fisheries. While there is virtually no doubt that the Atlantic cod has historically been overfished, and current efforts to manage its population are struggling at best, some scientists are predicting a potential surge in its numbers along the Grand Banks as a result of global climate change. As waters in the north Atlantic warm, Atlantic cod populations are expected to migrate to the shallow banks of the region, and flourish. Based on observations made on the cod’s response to temperature, some scientists predict that cod stocks in the Celtic and Irish Seas will most likely disappear by 2100, and those in the Georges Bank and the southern portions of the North Sea will also experience declines.

And a recent report released by WWF-UK echoed these findings stating that increasing ocean temperatures coupled with fishing of an already seriously depleted fishery will most likely decimate the Atlantic cod stock in that region entirely. Atlantic Cod But because of its migratory nature, cod populations are expected to migrate northward along the coasts of Greenland and Labrador, and are even thought to potentially occupy portions extending all the way to the continental shelf of the Artic Ocean, which is expected to open up by the melting Arctic ice sheet. In the end, the Atlantic cod population is expected to experience an overall increase in the North Atlantic, including the waters of the Grand Banks, due to the impacts of global climate change. These projections are further strengthened by historical documentation of the effects of warming sea temperatures on Atlantic cod. During a cooling of the waters off the coast of Labrador and the Grand Banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s a southward shift in cod stocks was documented. While the opposite proved true in the Barents Sea during a warming period in the early 1990s. Warmer sea water temperatures don’t only effect the distribution and migratory tendencies of cod.

Warmer seas are also thought to lead to faster growth rates, and earlier maturation. In the Grand Banks specifically, Atlantic cod have also been documented as spawning earlier when sea temperatures are higher. Ultimately, it appears that global climate change will result in a potential rebound of the Atlantic cod population in the waters of the Grand Banks, which could also signify an increase in the tension over fishing rights in the region’s seas. There have also been recent discoveries of shifting ecosystems along the continental shelf of the northwestern Atlantic. While there will continue to be intense competition over cod fishing (especially if the stocks begin to recover either because of successful fisheries management, or as a product of global climate change), there will also be conflict over the right to fish for other groundfish and shellfish species in the region. As previously stated, many scientists now believe that one of the impacts of global climate change will be an increase in the productivity of these already fertile ecosystems. It is thought that because of increasing amounts of fresh water entering the northern oceans as a result of the melting of Arctic ice, surface seawater that would traditionally be very mixed will instead have a lower salinity and thus remain at shallower levels longer.

Having sea water with a low salinity close to the surface longer will allow for increased production of phytoplankton, zooplankton and populations of fish that live near the surface. As these species remain closer to the surface longer, they also have more time to grow, and their production cycles will last longer. This has also led to larger populations of the fish that feed off of these species, such as herring. 7. Type of Habitat: Ocean 8. Act and Harm Sites: Commons Impacts, Commons The Grand Banks and the surrounding waters of the Northwest Atlantic. 9. Type of Conflict: War If there is conflict it will be between Canada and other nations (primarily Western European countries) that want to fish in the waters of the Grand Banks. There may also be some sort of diplomatic conflict between Canada and international organizations/institutions (like the Secretariat of UNCLOS) if Canada decides to claim more territory than allowed under UNCLOS. 10. Level of Conflict: Threat The potential conflict would be interstate (mostly likely between Canada and the European Union on behalf of Spain and Portugal) and the level of the potential conflict is low.

Disputes over fishing rights and territories in the area (especially between the previously mentioned states) escalated to the heights of Canada arresting a Spanish fishing vessel in 1995 for using illegal nets. This confrontation occurred in international waters (high seas) during the Turbot War, which led to the protests of the EU. (See TURBOT case study for more information). 11. Fatality Level of Dispute (military and civilian fatalities) Despite the long history of disputes over the fisheries of the Grand Banks, there have been no documented casualties or deaths. 12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: Climate change is expected to have a direct impact on the environment and the already present conflict over fisheries management in the Grand Banks. As ocean temperatures rise as an expected result of climate change, Atlantic cod stocks are expected to recover in and around the region as the population moves north. As cod stocks recover, the desire to resume fishing is expected to increase, both by Canadian and foreign flagged fishing fleets. This will have a direct impact on the number of fishing boats in the region, and have a direct impact on the level of conflict over fishing rights and management.

Canada, which is already pursuing an extension of its continental shelf and ability to manage fisheries and other marine resources, will be further encouraged to establish this jurisdiction, which could intern also impact the potential conflicts over fishing rights, and Canada’s right to regulate foreign fishing vessels. However, if the moratorium is lifted because stock level had recovered, and fishing is resumed, the desire to fish the Grand Banks will undoubtedly increase as well. This will lead to an increase in the number of fishing boats and further necessitate the need for a strong and clear regulatory process for managing the fisheries so that they do not fall into the same cycle once more. The strength and effectiveness of this process will impact the number of fish, and the rate of recovery of the species, thus completing the loop. (Though not addressed in depth, emissions from fishing vessels are also large contributors to climate change. Thus, the more fishing boats there are operating on the oceans, the more GHG emissions and thus increased levels of climate change, which further perpetuates the cycle.) 13. Level of Strategic Interest: Multilateral Interest in the fisheries of the northwest Atlantic extends beyond the region’s coastal states as fishing vessels from all over the world utilize these waters. 14.

Outcome of Dispute: In Progress/Compromise The outcome of the dispute over fisheries management in the northwest Atlantic is still pending. As it stands currently, most parties agree that the NAFO is not as effective as it needs to be in order to adequately protect and manage species, nor resolve potential conflicts. If and when Canada does extend its continental shelf, the role of NAFO will need to be reevaluated. And if global climate change does in fact result in a recovery of Atlantic cod stocks on the Grand Banks, strong, clear and effective fisheries management will need to put in place. V. Related Information and Sources 15. Related ICE and TED Case The cases that surfaced with the greatest frequency were directly related to Canada and its fisheries, which historically have often been the source of conflict due to over-fishing and disputed territories. The cases of Turbot , Cancod , Canfish and Satellite-driftnets occurred the most often. The Turbot (No. 102) case study is essentially a precursor to the situation that has been analyzed in this case study (and was previously discussed in previous sections of this case study).

Turbot analyzes the dispute over rights to fish in the NAFO waters especially by European vessels, and the conflict over coastal states' jurisdictional authority to enforce international/regional fishing regulations on the high seas. The primary difference between Turbot and this case study is inclusion of the unexpected impacts of climate change on the migratory patterns of the fish species in the region of the Grand Banks and the possible impacts of Canada extending it continental shelf. Another similar case is the Canfish (No. 62) case. This case study explores the limitations of coastal states trying to use UNCLOS to regulate environmental issues such as overfishing and pollution. One of the examples highlighted in the study was the previously mentioned conflict between Canada and Spain over the turbot fishing vessel. Unfortunately, two of the frist four case studies that are most related to the Canada-EEZ case study, Cancod and Satellite-driftnets do not have functioning websites at the present time. The Cancod case appears to have analyzed the management of Canadian cod stocks while the Satellite-driftnet case, which was the number 4 match, seems as though it is very similar in that it examines fishing disputes on the high seas.

The other related case studies do not relate quite as directly, but almost all are disputes over management of resources or territory. Related Cases: The Vikings in North America: Long-Term Climate Change, Environment, Trade, and Conflict 16. Relevant Websites and Literature Canadian Broadcast Corporation. “Northern Mapping Project Could Expand Canada.” July 21, 2005: < > Cornell University. Warming Climate, Cod Collapse, Have Combined to Cause Rapid North Atlantic Ecosystem Changes. Science Daily. February 23, 2007 < > Drinkwater, Kenneth F. The response of Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) to future climate change. ICES Journal of Marine Scince. Vol. 62 (2005) Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future Generations. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 2005 < > Fisheries and Oceans Canada - News Releases. Government of Canada Announces New Measures to Combat Foreign Overfishing. 6 May 2004 < > Government of Canada. Backgrounder: The Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap.< > Government of Canada.

Backgrounder: The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization.< > Governmennt of Canada. Backgrounder: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. < > Government of Canada. Backgrounder: United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.< > Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. The Grand Banks. < > Macnab, Ron. Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of Canadian Resource Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Geological Survey of Canada. Open File 3209. May 15, 1994 Nichols, S., D. Monahan and M.D. Sutherland. “Good Governance of Canada’s Offshore and Coastal Zone: Towards and Understanding of Maritime Boundary Issues.” Geomatica, Vol. 54, No. 4. pp. 415-424. Planet Ark. “Depleted Canada Cod Stocks Face Devastation-WWF.” Ottawa, Canada: September 20, 2005: < > Rosenberg, Andrew, Marjorie Mooney-Seus, Chris Ninnes.

Bycatch on the High Seas: A Review of the Effectiveness of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. WWF – Canada: September 2005 < > Rosenberg, Andrew A., Robert J. Trimble, Jennie M. Harrington, Oleg martens, and Marjorie Mooney-Seus. High Seas Reform: Actions to Reduce Bycatch and Implement Ecosystem-Based Management for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. WWF-Canada: July 2006 < > Stokke, Olav Schram. The Law of the Sea Convention and the Idea of a Binding Regime for the Arctic Marine Environment. The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Prepared for the 7th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic region, Kiruna Sweden, 2-4 August 2006) < > UNEP Shelf Programme < > U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. Final Report. Washington, DC, 2004. ISBN#0-9759462-0-X WWF-Canada. Bycatch Program - The Grand Banks. < > WWF. Grand Banks - A Global Ecoregion.

< > WWF-UK. Cod is in Hot Water as Climate Change Compounds the Effects of Over-fishing. 6 May 2007 < > Images: "Canadian Aireal Enforcement of Grand Banks" Government of Canada - Overfishing and International Fishing and Ocean Governance< > "Map of Grand Banks with Labrador Current and Gulf Stream" < > "Map of NAFO Regions" < > "Map of Canada's Eastern EEZ & Continental Shelf"< > [May 9, 2007] COD WAR 3 in The Royal Navy Forum My Recent Posts If it came to it.... We could muster 3 River Class. I think a lot of what the RN has learnt about force protection and asymetric threat ops would come into play. Back in the 70s we never really thought about handling ships against smal aggressive surface vesses which want to make physical contact. I doubt we'd want to bend a 23, but if push comes to shove (in this case literally) They are in service to do a job and if that means new plating so be it. I wonder if a well-handled RFA would be any good?

I'd not fancy being in an OPV with a Bay Class towering over me, sweeping away comms gear, fire hoses drenching anything on the upper deck. Also Iceland is no longer the crucial stone aircraft carrier it was back then, a handy cold war base between Greenland and the UK. I could see more use of technology, data links, GPS etc to control the in danger fishing fleet. Also, aggressive ESM, jamming etc, to hinder Icelandic warships. It would also more sense to short term bareboat charter or even commission into the RN/RFA a couple of tugs or oil safety ships. But lets face it, we all know the standard Warships1 answer. We send 6 Black Swans and the job's done! Last Edited By: john daniels Nov 22 12 6:02 PM. Edited 2 times.

Question: With which country did the UK have the long-running 'Cod War' disputes over fishing rights?
Answer: Iceland