opsimath - alphaDictionary * Free English On-line Dictionary Pronunciation: ahp-sê-mæth • Hear it! Part of Speech: Noun Meaning: (Literary) A person who undertakes study late in life, a person who learns late in life (an old dog that can learn new tricks). Notes: As more and more people return to school and on-line study after retirement, the more we need today's Good Word. We even predict that the growing number of opsimaths will include many polymaths, people who are educated in many subjects. The activity of opsimaths is opsimathy. Things pertaining to opsimathy and opsimaths are opsimathic.

In Play: The popularity of opsimathy is growing in the US as baby-boomers age and more and more of them return to university after retirement: "Professor Badenoff was surprised to discover that 25% of the students enrolled in his medieval philosophy course were opsimaths." Experience, in fact, enhances learning, so be careful how you speak to older folks these days: "I didn't realize what an opsimath the boss was when I told him that old dogs can't learn new tricks." Word History: Today's Good Word comes to us from Greek, where opse means "late" and math- means "learning". Mathematics shares the same root, but it comes from the adjective of mathema "science, learning". The original Proto-Indo-European stem that became math in Greek turned into Russian mudry "wise", Avestan mazda "wise", and Sanskrit mantrah "counsel, prayer". It turns up with a Fickle N (an N that is sometime there, sometimes not) in Latin mens, mentis "mind" that we find in the English borrowing, mental, and the common abstract noun suffix -ment found in English and Romance languages. P.S.

- Register for the Daily Good Word E-Mail! - You can get our daily Good Word sent directly to you via e-mail in either HTML or Text format. Go to our Registration Page to sign up today! Come visit our website at < for more Good Words and other language resources! opsimath | WordReference Forums Dictionary and thread title search: WordReference Forums Italian Salve An opsimath is a person who begins, or continues, to study or learn late in life. Abbiamo un equivalente in italiano? Anche noi usiamo la radice -opsi, ma opsimata non esiste. Grazie tipo università della terza età? Abbiamo un equivalente in italiano? Click to expand... Yes and no, Paul. The word opsimatìa (barely) exists in Italian but I couldn't find any cognates or derivatives, either. Italian (Italy) Girando in rete quoto Teerex.

"opsimath" Significato | Gratuito Italian Dizionario | dizionario-internazionale.com qui lo lasciano come opsimath e qui in un vecchio thread Late bloomer/developer come sinonimo ma non saprei come renderlo in italiano Theories Of Developmental Psychology Intelligent Advice for Intelligent People Theories of Developmental Psychology Developmental psychology is a branch of psychology that studies the growth and maturation of a person over time. This includes things such as physical, cognitive and social changes, and how each of these affects us during the different stages of our life. Child psychology is a subset of developmental psychology, and focuses on the stages of life from birth to the beginning of adolescence (around age 12-13). Adolescent psychology is also a subset of developmental psychology, and is concerned with development during early adolescence to our late teenage years of life (13-19). The reason why theories of developmental psychology are an important area of study, is because all adults are products of their childhood and the things they experienced during that childhood. Therefore, by studying infants, children, and teenagers, developmental psychology theories can help us to gain a better understanding of the adult mind.

In addition to this, developmental psychology also studies the changes that occur during adulthood, which subsequently, allows to us understand the various factors that affect our behavior from birth to death. Biological Development She could just have easily been a boy. Whilst much of our behavior comes as a result of the things we learn and experience in life, what underlines the type of behavior that we display is our biology, or more specifically, our genetics. For example, if a fertilized egg contains two X chromosomes (XX), then the resulting individual will be born a female. Should however, that egg contain an X and a Y chromosome (XY), then that individual will be born a male. So right from the very start of life our biology plays a hugely significant role in the type of behavior that we will display throughout our entire life. For example, if you are born a female, then you may like the color the pink and enjoy playing with dolls. If you are born a male, then you may like the color blue and enjoy playing with toy cars or action men. Of course, I am stereotyping the sexes here, but this is only done to demonstrate how a small difference in our biology (our chromosomal patterns) can result in us behaving in one way or another.

Trisomy 21 Another example of how biology can affect our behavior at the chromosomal level, can be found with people who suffer from Down’s syndrome. These individuals are born with a chromosomal abnormality called trisomy 21, which results in three chromosomes instead of the usual pair. The effect of this is mental retardation, poor health and a shortened lifespan. Trisomy 21: A chromosomal abnormality that leads to Down’s syndrome. This view of biology playing a significant role in development was something which was held by Sigmund Freud, who is quoted as saying “Biology is destiny“. Whether or not biology is our ultimate destiny is open to debate, because as is shown with feral children, even though our genetics may give us the potential to achieve something, it is the environment which ultimately determines whether or not we will realize that potential. Sperm, Ovum & Chromosomes Life begins when a sperm (spermatozoon) provided by the father unites with an egg (ovum) provided by the mother. Both the sperm and egg contain twenty-three single chromosomes, and when the ovum is fertilized, these chromosomes combine to form twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.

You are here because you won the race. Through the process of mitosis, these chromosomal pairs in the fertilized egg are replicated into daughter cells which each contain the same number of chromosomes as the original egg. These daughter cells then continue to divide, eventually producing billions of cells. Each chromosome contains a series of genes, which are ultimately responsible for the various characteristics that we develop when we are born and then display throughout our life. For example, one person may have a gene that gives them blonde hair, whilst another person may have a gene that gives them brown hair. These genes, and their resulting characteristics, are inherited from both the mother and father. They are therefore, passed on from generation to generation through the process of sexual reproduction. Conception & Birth There are four stages associated with conception and birth: 1) Zygote A zygote is a fertilized egg which is formed when the sperm and ovum unite. This stage lasts for about one week, and is characterized by the division of one single cell into a large group of cells. 2) Embryo After the zygote has been formed, its cells continue to divide and replicate forming a structure known as the embryo. This occurs from weeks one to seven.

During this stage, the cells begin to differentiate (become specialized) and form three distinct embryonic layers. The ectoderm Ectoderm means outside skin, and will eventually become the sense organs, skin and nervous system. The mesoderm Mesoderm means middle skin, and will eventually become the heart, bones, connective tissue and muscles. The endoderm Endoderm means inside skin, and will eventually become the inner lining of the stomach, intestines and lungs. 3) Foetus From weeks seven to birth the embryo becomes the foetus, during which time the cells of the foetus continue to divide and become more specialized. During this period, cells such as brain cells, skin cells and hair cells are formed, and later, the body will start to form as the head and limbs begin to appear. The foetal stage typically lasts for around seven months, which makes the time from conception to birth around nine months. 4) Neonate Neo means “new” and nate means “birth”. A neonate is therefore a newborn, something that most people simply refer to as a baby. Technically, a baby is an infant, which is a neonate that has gained weight after birth and can neither walk nor talk.

Freud’s Psychosexual Development Theory Sigmund Freud: Father of psychosexual development. Sigmund Freud’s theory of development attempts to explain how we form our sexual identity, our attitudes towards sexual behavior and our emotional reactions to sex. He called this theory “Psychosexual Development”, because Freud believed that sexual development was more psychological in nature than it was biological. Freud's Psychosexual Stages So psychosexual development could be rephrased as “the psychology of sexual development“, which studies the mental and emotional aspects of sexual development. Stages of Psychosexual Development According to Freud, our sex drive causes us to seek pleasure in different parts of our body during the various stages of psychosexual development. Freud called this sex drive our psychosexual energy or libido, which we use to experience pleasure in our erogenous zones (i.e. areas of the body associated with sexual pleasure) during the five different stages of psychosexual development. The main erogenous zones are the mouth, anus and genitals. Freud believed we pass through several stages of psychosexual development. Below are the five stages of psychosexual development.

Oral (birth to 18 months) The oral stage lasts for about two years, during which time the infant obtains pleasure via their mouth by sucking, biting and chewing on things. Anal (18 months to three years) The anal stage lasts for about one to two years, during which time toddlers obtain pleasure from withholding fecal matter or expelling it. Note : This stage coincides with when children are toilet trained. Phallic (ages three to six) The phallic stage lasts for about three years, during which time the preschool child obtains pleasure from self stimulation of the phallus. In males, the phallus is the penis, and in females, it is the clitoris. This stage ends at around six years of age. Latency (age six to puberty) The latency stage lasts for about six years, beginning at age six or seven and ending at age twelve to thirteen or as puberty begins. During this stage, the child’s sexual desire is focused on their parent of the opposite sex. However, because this type of sexual desire is considered to be socially unacceptable, the child feels guilty and so represses these desires at an unconscious level. This subsequently causes their libido to become dormant (hidden away).

This unconscious sexual desire for the parent is what Freud called the Oedipus complex, which was inspired from an ancient Greek tragedy called “Oedipus The King”. In this play, Oedipus inadvertently kills his own father and then unknowingly marries his own mother. Oedipus kills his father and then marries his mother. Freud used the term Oedipus complex to refer to both males and females, although some people use that term only when referring to males, and the term “Electra Complex” to refer to females, which was a play that had a similar storyline to Oedipus The King. Genital (puberty onwards) The genital stage begins at age twelve or thirteen and continues throughout adulthood. As puberty begins, the repression previously exerted on the libido begins to lift, and the individual starts to become conscious of sex and their sexual desires towards members of the opposite sex. This sexual desire shifts from a focus on the phallus, to a more general interest in sex with the opposite sex. Note: The liberation of sexual desire from the unconscious level to the conscious level, manifests itself as an interest in members of the opposite sex and away from the parent or other family members.

This is something Freud considered to be normal sexual development. Fixation of Libido Freud believed that sexual development could be negatively affected if there was too much excitement or inhibition associated with a particular psychosexual stage. The result of either too much excitement or inhibition would result in a “fixation of libido”, which would cause the libido to become “stuck” in one particular erogenous zone. “Argh! My libido is stuck!” This could cause a person to develop various problems later in life, such as overeating, constipation, pedophilia, alcoholism, fetishism, erectile dysfunction and an inability to enjoy sex or a lack of sexual desire. Criticisms of Freud’s Psychosexual Theory It is important to see Freud’s views on sexual development not as a series of facts, but rather as a series of concepts which may help to explain the process of sexual development. Many people do not agree with Freud’s theory, and suggest that his views on sexual development were a result of the era in which he was brought up in. Freud lived during the Victorian era, a time in which the display of sexual desires and sexuality was generally discouraged. As a result, this may have heavily influenced Freud’s views and the theory on sexual development he ultimately came up with.

Many people today may view Freud’s theory with disgust, especially his belief that the child possessed a sexual desire for their parent. It could be the case, as some people would say, that the child did not have a sexual interest in their parent but rather was jealous of the power they had within that family. As a result the child wishes to take the place of their parent, but despite their desire to do so, they cannot. It is also important to remember that for any theory there is a tendency for the theorist to project their own views, and possibly, also their own experiences in life onto that theory. So what may be true and therefore apply to one person, may not be true and apply to another. Erikson’s Psychosocial Development Theory Erik Erikson: Psychosocial development. Unlike Freud’s theory of psychosexual development which places great emphasis on sex, Erik Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development focuses more on the choices that people make and the conflicts they face during the different stages of their life. Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development has eight stages.

Within each stage, there are different types of conflicts that an individual must resolve, and if they are unable to do so, they will struggle with those conflicts later in life. Erikson's theory of psychosocial development The eight stages of psychosocial development are : • Trust Vs Mistrust • Generativity Vs Self-Absorption • Integrity Vs Despair For each of these stages, the first attribute is considered to be a positive or desirable personality trait. For example, autonomy is a positive trait. The second attribute is considered to be a negative or undesirable trait. For example, isolation is a negative trait. Throughout a person’s life, as they move from stage to stage, they must overcome the various challenges they face so that they can form the positive trait. If they are unable to do this, it will cause them problems later in life. So basically, Erikson’s theory is about the challenges we face in life, and whether or not we are able to overcome those challenges to form certain desirable (positive) traits. Let’s explore each of these eight stages of psychosocial development in more detail. Trust vs Mistrust (birth – 2 years old) Trust is something that must be earned. Trust vs.

mistrust is a stage associated with infancy, and lasts until we are two years of age. If an infant develops a sense of trust as a result of being looked after, attended to and loved by its parents, then that infant will be happy and in good health. However, if the infant develops a sense of mistrust as a result of being neglected or treated poorly by its parents, they will display a lack of interest in their surroundings and have poor health. These are characteristics associated with infantile depression, which may then result in adult depression later in life. So overall, this stage can be summarized by saying that if the infant is looked after well (develops trust) it will be happy and healthy. But if the infant is looked after poorly (develops mistrust) it will be depressed and unhealthy. Autonomy vs Shame and doubt (2-3 years old) She is ready to explore the world. The stage of autonomy vs. shame and doubt occurs during year’s two to three (toddlerhood). A toddler with a sense of autonomy will be interested in exploring their surroundings, and will constantly be looking for new things to stimulate (mentally) themselves with.

They will tend to perform this exploration by themselves, and as a result, may appear to wander off randomly or try to escape from their parents somehow to explore new surroundings. A toddler with a sense of shame and doubt will tend to do the opposite. They will be more withdrawn, appear to lack confidence and not venture too far into areas that they have not been before. So this stage can be summarized by saying that a child with autonomy likes to explore new things, whereas a child with shame and doubt does not. One is confident, the other isn’t. Initiative vs Guilt (3-6 years old) “…almost finished.” The initiative vs. guilt stage occurs during years three to six (preschool children). A preschooler with a sense of initiative will tend to complete tasks that they start. For example, if they start to draw a picture they will keep drawing until they finish it. A preschooler with a sense of guilt will tend not to seek challenges, and tends to hold back expressing who they are and what they would like to do. This stage can be summarized by saying that a preschooler with initiative expresses who they are, whereas a preschooler with guilt does not.

Industry vs Inferiority (6-12 years old) With age we start to take on more responsibility. Industry vs. inferiority is associated with children aged six to twelve years old. Children with a sense of industry show an interest in school work, tasks they are given at home and display a responsible attitude. Children with a sense of inferiority will tend to display the opposite type of behavior, such as being uninterested in school work or tasks they are given, because they feel that they are not good enough to complete those tasks successfully. This sense of inferiority can become further entrenched if that child is criticized by their parents or other people. So we can summarize this stage by saying that a child with a sense of industry is one who is interested in challenges and enjoys responsibility, being somewhat confident in their abilities to complete the tasks that they are given. Children with a sense of inferiority however, do not like responsibility or being given tasks to complete. They feel that if they are given these tasks, or given responsibility, that they won’t be able to complete them very well and so will be criticized as a result. Identity vs Role confusion (12-18 years old) We must each learn to express the person we are. The identity vs.

role confusion stage is associated with adolescence, with includes years twelve to eighteen. An adolescent with a sense of identity will feel as though they know where they are going in life, or at least what they would like to be when they are older. As a result, they go throughout adolescence with that goal in mind, and tend to have a high level of self-esteem because their life has direction and a sense of purpose. Adolescents with a sense of role confusion feel as though they have no direction or purpose in life, and feel unsure as to what the future holds for them. They are unlikely to have any long-term goals, and their behavior could best be described as drifting aimlessly through life. They are also likely to have low self-esteem. So in summary, an adolescent with a sense of identity knows what they want to be when they are older. Whereas an adolescent with a sense of role confusion, is uncertain as to what they will be or do when they are older. Intimacy vs Isolation (18 onwards) The world is a much better place when you have someone special to share it with. The intimacy vs. isolation stage is associated with early adulthood, and tends to begin at age eighteen when adolescence ends.

However, it is important to note that the stage of adulthood may be delayed somewhat, until the adolescent is able to form a sense of identity (i.e. they know what they want to do with their life). As a result, an “adult” (someone aged over 18) may not technically enter adulthood even if they are in their twenties, thirties or older. Unless they are able to form a sense of identity, they will feel as though they are somewhat trapped in adolescence (like they have never really matured fully from school). An adult who is capable of intimacy will tend to form close bonds with people, such as by forming friends and having romantic relationships with members of the opposite sex, eventually, leading to marriage. An adult with a sense of isolation finds it difficult to form relationships with people, and is unable to understand what other people are thinking or feeling. As a result they spend most of the time by themselves, with little or no friends. This stage can be summarized by saying that an adult with intimacy can form close relationships with people, whereas an adult with isolation cannot. Generativity vs Self-absorption (adult) Caring for others makes us human.

An adult with the trait of generativity is capable of productive work, which they usually undertake for several years. This trait is also linked to helping others in some way, for example, a mother who looks after her children. An adult with a trait of self-absorption is more concerned with themselves rather than other people. This stage can be summarized by saying that a person with generativity likes to give something to others, whereas a person with the trait of self-absorption likes to take things from others. Integrity vs Despair (old age) Things start to look different once you reach a certain age. The stage of integrity vs. despair is associated with old age. A person with a trait of integrity can face death with peace of mind, because they know that their life has been lived to the fullest and that they have achieved the things they wanted to do in life. A person with a trait of despair feels a sense of desperation as their life draws to a close, because they feel that they have wasted it and not been able to do the things they hoped to do. In summary, a person with integrity can accept death, but a person with despair wishes for a second chance and for more time before they die.

Piaget’s Cognitive Development Theory Jean Piaget: Cognitive development. Jean Piaget was a child psychologist who studied how children think and how this ability develops as they grow older. His interest into the child mind came as a result of his interest in epistemology, which is a branch of philosophy that studies knowledge and how we acquire that knowledge. As a result, Piaget wanted to know how we know what we know, and he did this by focusing his study on children. To study the child mind, Piaget used a method known as the phenomenological method. This method of investigation involves asking a child a series of carefully worded questions about something in their immediate environment. Saylor.org PSYCH303: Dr. Andrew Johnson's "Piaget's Theory: Stages of Cognitive Development" The answer the child gives would then reveal how they see and interrupt the world around them. As a result of Piaget’s investigations, he came to the conclusion that there are four stages of cognitive development (the development of we think): • The sensorimotor stage What is a person? - The Mind Project What is a person? Funding This module was supported by National Science Foundation Grant #0127561. What is a person?

The English term, "person," is ambiguous. We often use it as a synonym for "human being." But surely that is not what we intend here. It is possible that there are aliens living on other planets that have the same cognitive abilities that we do (e.g. E.T: The Extraterrestrial or the famous "bar scene" from Star Wars). Imagine aliens that speak a language, make moral judgments, create literature and works of art, etc. Surely aliens with these properties would be "persons"--which is to say that it would be morally wrong to buy or sell them as property the way we do with dogs and cats or to otherwise use them for our own interests without taking into account the fact that they are moral agents with interests that deserve the same respect and protection that ours do. Thus, one of our primary interests is to distinguish persons from pets and from property. A person is the kind of entity that has the moral right to make its own life-choices, to live its life without (unprovoked) interference from others. Property is the kind of thing that can be bought and sold, something I can "use" for my own interests.

Of course, when it comes to animals there are serious moral constraints on how we may treat them. But we do not, in fact, give animals the same kind of autonomy that we accord persons. We buy and sell dogs and cats. And if we live in the city, we keep our pets "locked up" in the house, something that we would have no right to do to a person. How, then, should we define "person" as a moral category? [Note: In the long run, we may decide that there is a non-normative concept of "person" that is equally important, and even conceptually prior to any moral concept. At the outset, however, the moral concept will be our focus.] Initially, we shall define a person as follows: PERSON = "any entity that has the moral right of self-determination." Many of us would be prepared to say, I think, that any entity judged to be a person would be the kind of thing that would deserve protection under the constitution of a just society. It might reasonably be argued that any such being would have the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." This raises the philosophical question: What properties must an entity possess to be a "person"?

At the Mind Project, we are convinced that one of the best ways to learn about minds and persons is to attempt to build an artificial person, to build a machine that has a mind and that deserves the moral status of personhood. This is not to say that we believe that it will be possible anytime soon for undergraduates (or even experts in the field) to build a person. In fact, there is great disagreement among Mind Project researchers about whether it is possible, even in principle, to build a person -- or even a mind -- out of machine parts and computer programs. But that doesn't matter. Everyone at the Mind Project is convinced that it is a valuable educational enterprise to do our best to simulate minds and persons. In the very attempt, we learn more about the nature of the mind and about ourselves. At the very least, it forces us to probe our own concept of personhood. What are the properties necessary for being a person? Many properties have been suggested as being necessary for being a person: Intelligence, the capacity to speak a language, creativity, the ability to make moral judgments, consciousness, free will, a soul, self-awareness . . and the list could go on almost indefinitely.

Which properties do you think are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being a person? Star Trek: Is Commander Data a Person? To begin our exploration of this question, we shall consider an interesting thesis, advanced in an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation ("The Measure of a Man"). In that episode one of the main characters, an android called "Commander Data," is about to be removed from the Starship Enterprise to be dismantled and experimented upon. Data refuses to go, claiming to be a person with "rights" (presumably, this includes what we are calling the moral right of self-determination). He believes that it is immoral to experiment on him without his consent. His opponent, Commander Maddox, insists that Data is property, that he has no rights. A hearing is convened to settle the matter. During the trial, the attorneys consider the very same questions that concern us here: What is a person? Is it possible that a machine could be a person?

In the Star Trek episode, it is assumed that anything that is "sentient" should be granted the status of "personhood" and Commander Maddox suggests that being sentient requires that the following three conditions must be met: Intelligence Self-awareness Consciousness Captain Picard, who is representing Commander Data in the hearing, does not contest this definition of a person. Rather, he tries to convince the judge that Data possesses these properties (or at the least, that we are not justified in concluding that he lacks the properties). What is intelligence? Before turning to the specific arguments raised in the Star Trek episode, it will prove helpful to pause for a moment to consider the first property on the list, "intelligence." Could a computer be intelligent? Why or why not? A careful consideration of these questions requires a very close look both at computers and intelligence. And so we suggest that you first examine a few fascinating computer programs and think seriously about the questions, What is intelligence? and Is it possible for a machine to be intelligent? To help you reflect on these questions we recommend that you visit one of our modules on artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence: Can a machine think?

[When you've finished with that section, return here] Now that you have thought about "Intelligence" and pondered the possibility of "Machine Intelligence" let us turn to the Star Trek episode. You may find it interesting to note that while some people deny that machine intelligence is even a possibility, Commander Maddox (the one who denies that the android Data is a person) does not deny that Data is intelligent. He simply insists that Data lacks the other two properties necessary for being a person: self-awareness and consciousness. Here is what the character Maddox says regarding Data's intelligence. PICARD: MADDOX: Yes. Commander Maddox, though admitting that Data is "intelligent" nonetheless denies that Data is a person because he lacks two other necessary conditions for being a person: self-awareness and consciousness. Before examining Maddox's reasons for thinking that Data is not self-aware, let us explore the concept of "self-awareness." It is important to get clear about what we mean by self-awareness and why it might be a requirement for being a person. What is Self-Awareness?

Let us turn to the second property that the Star Trek episode assumes is necessary for sentience and personhood: "self-awareness." This has been the topic of considerable discussion among philosophers and scientists. What exactly do we mean by "self-awareness"? One might believe that there is something like a "self" deep inside of us and that to be self-aware is simply to be aware of the presence of that self. Who exactly is it, then, that is aware of the self? Another self? Do we now have two selves? Well, no, that's not what most people would have in mind. The standard idea is probably that the self, though capable of being aware of things external to it, is also capable of being aware of its own states. Some have described this as a kind of experience. I might be said to have an "inner experience" of my own mental activity, being directly aware, say, of the thoughts that I am presently thinking and the attitudes ("I hope the White Sox win") that I presently hold.

But even if we grant that we have such "inner experiences," they do not, by themselves, supply everything that we intend to capture by the term, "self-awareness." When I say that I am aware of my own mental activity (my thoughts, dreams, hopes, etc.) I do not mean merely that I have some inner clue to the content of that mental activity, I also mean that the character of that awareness is such that it gives me certain abilities to critically reflect upon my mental states and to make judgments about those states. If I am aware of my own behavior and mental activity in the right way, then it may be possible for me to decide that my behavior should be changed, that an attitude is morally objectionable or that I made a mistake in my reasoning and that a belief that I hold is unjustified and should be abandoned. Consider the mental life of a dog, for example. Presumably, dogs have a rich array of experiences (they feel pain and pleasure, the tree has a particular "look" to it) and they may even have beliefs about the world (Fido believes that his supper dish is empty). Who knows, they may even have special "inner experiences" that accompany those beliefs.

However, if we assume that dogs are not self-aware in the stronger sense, then they will lack the ability to critically reflect upon their beliefs and experiences and thus will be unable to have other beliefs about their pleasure or their supper-dish-belief (what philosophers call "second-order beliefs" or "meta-beliefs"). That is to say, they may lack the ability to judge that pleasure may be an unworthy objective in a certain situation or to judge that their belief that the supper dish is empty is unjustified. But if that is getting any closer to the truth about the nature of self-awareness (and I'm not necessarily convinced that it is), then it becomes an open question whether being "self-aware" need be a kind of experience at all. It might be that a machine (a robot for example) could be "self-aware" in this sense even if we admit that it has no subjective experiences whatsoever. It might be self-aware even if we deny that "there is something that it is like to be that machine" (to modify slightly Thomas Nagel's famous dictum). Douglas Hofstadter offers a suggestion that will help us to consider this possibility.

Now, let us turn to the Star Trek dialogue and see what they have to say about self-awareness. PICARD: My right to choose. Perhaps my very life. PICARD: "My rights" . . "my status" . . "my right to choose" . . "my life". Seems reasonably self-aware to me. . . .Commander . . I'm waiting. MADDOX: This is exceedingly difficult. We might well imagine that Commander Maddox is thinking about subjective experiences when he speaks of being "conscious" of one's existence and actions. However, Picard's response is ambiguous. The only evidence that Picard gives of Data being self-aware is that he is capable of using particular words in a language (words like 'my rights' and 'my life''). Is it only necessary that Data have information about his own beliefs to be self-aware or must that information be accompanied by an inner feeling or experience of some kind? Douglas Hofstadter has some interesting thoughts on the matter.

Douglas Hofstadter on "Anti-sphexishness" In one of his columns for Scientific American ("On the Seeming Paradox of Mechanizing Creativity"), Douglas Hofstadter wrote a thought-provoking piece about the nature of creativity and the possibility that it might be "mechanized" -- that is, that the right kind of machine might actually be creative. While creativity is his primary focus, here, much of what he says could be applied to the property of self-awareness. The kernel of his idea is that to be uncreative is to be caught in an unproductive cycle ("a rut") which one mechanically repeats over and over in spite of its futility. On this account, then, creativity comes in degrees and consists in the ability to monitor one's lower level activities so that when a behavior becomes unproductive, one does not continually repeat it, but "recognizes" its futility and tries something new, something "creative". Hofstadter makes up a name for this repetitive, uncreative kind of behavior--he calls it sphexishness, drawing inspiration for the name from the behavior of certain kind of wasp named, Sphex.

In his discussion, Hofstadter quotes from Dean Wooldridge who describes the Sphex as follows: When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds a burrow for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she stings in such a way as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then flies away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed off the paralyzed cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the wasp equivalent of a deepfreeze. To the human mind, such an elaborately organized and seemingly purposeful routine conveys a convincing flavor of logic and thoughtfulness -- until more details are examined. For example, the wasp's routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge, and then drag the cricket in.

If the cricket is moved a few inches away while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection, the wasp, on emerging from the burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again she will move the cricket up to the threshold and reenter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one occasion this procedure was repeated forty times, with the same result. [from Dean Wooldridge's Mechanical Man: The Physical Basis of Intelligent Life] Initially, the sphex's behavior seemed intelligent, purposeful. It wisely entered the burrow to search for predators. But if it really "understood" what it was doing, then it wouldn't repeat the activity 40 times in a row!! That is stupid!! It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that it doesn't really understand what it is doing at all. It is simply performing a rote, mechanical behavior -- and it seems blissfully ignorant of its situation.

We might say that it is "unaware" of the redundancy of its activity. To be "creative", Hofstadter then says, is to be antisphexish -- to behave, that is, unlike the sphex. If you want to create a machine that is antisphexish, then you must give it the ability to monitor its own behavior so that it will not get stuck in ruts similar to the Sphex's. Consider a robot that has a primary set of computer programs that govern its behavior (call these first-order programs). One way to make the robot more antisphexish would be to write special second-order (or meta-level) programs whose primary job was not to produce robot-behavior but rather to keep track of those first-order programs that do produce the robot-behavior to make sure that those programs did not get stuck in any "stupid" ruts.

(A familiar example of a machine caught in a rut is the scene from several old science fiction films in which a robot misses the door and bangs into the wall over and over again, incapable of resolving its dilemma -- "unaware" of its predicament.) A problem arises, however, even if it were possible to create these programs that "watch" other programs. Can you think what it is? What if the second-order program, the "watching" program gets stuck in a rut? Then you need another program (a third-order program) whose job is to watch the "watching"-program. But now we have a dilemma (what philosophers call an "infinite regress"). We can have programs watching programs watching programs -- generating far more programs than we would want to mess with -- and yet still leave the fundamental problem unresolved: There would always remain one program that was un-monitored. What you would want for efficiency sake, if it were possible, is what Hofstadter calls a "self-watching" program, a program that watches other programs but also keeps a critical eye pealed to its own potentially sphexish behavior.

Yet Hoftstadter insists that no matter what you do, you could never create a machine that was perfectly antisphexish. But then he also gives reasons why human beings are not perfectly antisphexish -- and why we shouldn't even want to be. Can you see now why this kind of self-watching computer program might give us something like "self-awareness"? I am not saying that it is self-awareness -- that is ultimately for you to decide. But there are people who believe that human beings are basically "machines" and that our ability to be "self-aware" is ultimately the result of a complex set of computer programs running on the human brain. If one had reason to think that this was a plausible theory, then one might well think that Hofstadter's "self-watching" programs would play a key role in giving us the ability for self-awareness. Let us return now to the discussion of Star Trek and Commander Data and the question: Is Data, the android, self-aware? Whether you think that Captain Picard has scored any points against Commander Maddox or not, Maddox seems less confident about his claim that Data lacks self-awareness than he was initially.

But that doesn't mean that Maddox is giving up. There is one more property that Maddox insists is necessary for being a person: "Consciousness". What is Consciousness? Must an entity be "conscious" to be a person? If so, why? What exactly is consciousness? Is it ever possible to know, for certain, whether or not a given entity is conscious? While there are many different ways of understanding the term, `consciousness,' one way is to identify it with what we might call the subjective character of experience. On this account, if one assumes that nothing could be a person unless it were conscious, and if one assumes that consciousness requires subjective experiences, then one would hold that no matter how sophisticated the external behavior of an entity, that entity will not be conscious and thus will not be a person unless it has subjective experiences, unless it possesses an inner, mental life. Thomas Nagel discusses the significance of the "subjective character of experience" in his article, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Note that Nagel is not concerned here with the issue of personhood.

(He most definitely is not suggesting that bats are persons.) Rather he is interested to deny the claim that a purely physical account of an organism (of its brain states, etc.) could, even in principle, be capable of capturing the subjective character of that organism's experiences. Nagel's main concern is to challenge the claim, made by many contemporary scientists, that the objective, physical or functional properties of an organism tell us everything there is to know about that organism. Nagel says, "No." Any objective description of a person's brain states will inevitably leave out facts about that person's subjective experience--and thus will be unable to provide us with certain facts about that person that are genuine facts about the world. One of Nagel's primary targets is the theory called, functionalism, the most popular theory of the mind of the past twenty-five years. It continues to be the dominant account of the nature of mental states help by scientists and philosophers today. Before turning to Nagel's argument, you might want to learn a bit about functionalism. If so, click here and a new window will open up with an introduction to functionalism.

Funtionalism: a theory of the mind Now that you have a basic understanding of the theory of functionalism, here is Nagel's reason for thinking that a functionalist account of the mind will never be able to capture the fundamental nature of what it means to be conscious. Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience, there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism--something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience.

It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experience nothing.* * Footnote: Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience. It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior--for similar reasons. I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. . . . . . . If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.

(Philosophical Review 83:392-393) But maybe Nagel is too quick to give up on a physicalist reduction of consciousness. There are scientific methods currently being used to explore the nature of consciousness. Here is a brief introduction to the scientific study of consciousness that you might find helpful. The Science of Consciousness If an android is to be a person, must it have subjective experiences? If so, why? Further, even if we decide that persons must have such experiences, how are we to tell whether or not any given android has such experiences? Consider the following example. Assume that the computing center of an android uses two different "assessment programs" to determine whether or not to perform a particular act. In most cases the two programs agree. However, in this particular case, let's assume, the two programs give conflicting results. Further, let us assume that there is a very complex procedure that the android must go through to resolve this conflict, a procedure taking several minutes to perform. During the time it takes to resolve the conflict, is it appropriate to say that the Android feels "confused" or "uncertain" about whether to perform A?

If we deny that the android's present state is one of "feeling uncertain," on what grounds would we do so? Colin McGinn considers this question when he asks: "Could a Machine be Conscious?" Could there be something that it is like to be that machine? Very briefly, his answer is: Yes, a machine could be conscious. In principle it is possible that an artifact like an android might be conscious, and it could be so even if it were not alive, according to McGinn. But, he argues, we have no idea what property it is that makes US conscious beings, and thus we have no idea what property must be built into a machine to make it conscious. He argues that a computer cannot be said to be conscious merely by virtue of the fact that it has computational properties, merely because it is able to manipulate linguistic symbols at the syntactic level. Computations of that kind are certainly possible without consciousness. He suggests, further, that the sentences uttered by an android might actually MEAN something (i.e., they might REFER to objects in the world, and thus they might actually possess SEMANTIC properties) and yet still the android might not be CONSCIOUS.

That is, the android might still lack subjective experiences, there might still be nothing that it is like to be that android. McGinn's conclusion then? It is possible that a machine might be conscious, but at this point, given that we have no clue what it is about HUMANS that makes us conscious, we have no idea what we would have to build into an android to make IT conscious. Hilary Putnam offers an interesting argument on this topic. If there existed a sophisticated enough android, Putnam argues that there would simply be no evidence one way or another to settle the question whether it had subjective experiences or not. In that event, however, he argues that we OUGHT to treat such an android as a "conscious" being, for moral reasons. His argument goes like this. One of the main reasons that you and I assume that other human beings have "subjective experiences" similar to our own is that they talk about their experiences in the same way that we talk about ours. Imagine that we are both looking at a white table and then I put on a pair of rose-colored glasses. I say "Now the table LOOKS red." This introduces the distinction between appearance and reality, central to the discipline of epistemology.

In such a context, I am aware that the subjective character of my experience ("the table APPEARS red") does not accurately reflect the reality of the situation ("the table is REALLY white"). Thus, we might say that when I speak of the "red table" I am saying something about the subjective character of my experience and not about objective reality. One analysis of the situation is to say that when I say that the table appears red, I am saying something like: "I am having the same kind of subjective experience that I typically have when I see something that is REALLY red." The interesting claim that Putnam makes is that it is inevitable that androids will also draw a distinction between "how things APPEAR" and "how things REALLY are". Putnam asks us to imagine a community of androids who speak English just like we do. Of course, these androids must have sensory equipment that gives them information about the external world. They will be capable of recognizing familiar shapes, like the shape of a table, and they will have special light-sensors that measure the frequency of light reflected off of objects so that they will be able to recognize familiar colors.

If an android is placed in front of a white table, it will be able to say: "I see a white table." Further, if the android places rose-colored glasses over its "eyes" (i.e., its sensory apparatus), it will register that the frequency of light is in the red spectrum and it will say "Now the table LOOKS red" or it might say "I am having a red-table sensation even though I know that the table is really white." So what is the point of this example? Well, Putnam has shown that there is a built-in LOGIC when it comes to talk about the external world, given that the speaker's knowledge of the world comes through sensory apparatus (like the eyes and ears of human beings or the visual and audio receptors of a robot). A sophisticated enough android will inevitably draw a distinction between appearance and reality and, thus, it will distinguish between its so-called "sensations" (i.e., whatever its sensory apparatus reveals to it) and objective reality. Now of course, this may only show that androids of this kind would be capable of speaking AS IF they had subjective experiences, AS IF they were really conscious--even though they might not actually be so. Putnam admits this.

He says we have no reason to think they are conscious, but we also have no reason to think they are not. Their discourse would be perfectly consistent with their having subjective experiences, and Putnam thinks that it would be something close to discrimination to deny that an android was conscious simply because it was made of metal instead of living cells. In effect he is saying that androids should be given the benefit of the doubt. He says: I have concluded . . that there is no correct answer to the question: Is Oscar [the android] conscious? Robots may indeed have (or lack) properties unknown to physics and undetectable by us; but not the slightest reason has been offered to show that they do, as the ROBOT analogy demonstrates. It is reasonable, then, to conclude that the question that titles this paper ["Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?"] calls for a decision and not for a discovery. If we are to make a decision, it seems preferable to me to extend our concept so that robots are conscious--for "discrimination" based on the "softness" or "hardness" of the body parts of a synthetic "organism" seems as silly as discriminatory treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.

[p.91] Since Putnam thinks that there is no evidence one way or the other to settle the question, he says that we must simply decide whether we are going to grant androids the status of conscious beings. He says that we ought to be generous and do so. Not everyone would agree with Putnam on this score. Kurt Baier, for example, disagrees with Putnam, arguing that there would be good reason for thinking that the android in question was not conscious. Putnam considers two of Baier's objections and tries to speak to them. We do not have the space to consider their debate here. It is not a debate easily settled. It is interesting to note, however, that Putnam seems to have one interesting "philosopher" on his side: CAPTAIN PICARD from our Star Trek episode. We are going to close this discussion with a dramatic scene near the end of the Star Trek episode that we've been following. In an earlier scene (with Guinan played by Whoopi Goldberg), Picard was lead to embrace a moral argument in defense of Data. This is an argument that you may find interesting because it is remarkably similar to Putnam's argument in spirit. PICARD: Yes.

PICARD: You see he has met two of your three criteria for sentience. What if he meets the third, consciousness, in even the slightest degree? What is he then? I don't know. Do you? Do YOU [turning to the judge]? Well that's the question you have to answer. Your Honor, the courtroom is a crucible. In it we burn away irrelevancies until we are left with a pure product, the truth, for all time. Now sooner or later this man (MADDOX) or others like him will succeed in replicating Commander Data. Your ruling today will determine how we will regard this creation of our genius. It will reveal the kind of people we are, what he is destined to be. It will reach far beyond this courtroom and this one android. It could significantly redefine the boundaries of personal liberty. Expanding them for some, savagely curtailing them for others. Are you prepared to condemn him, and all those who come after him, to servitude and slavery? Your honor, Starfleet was founded to seek out new life -- well there it sits. Waiting. You wanted a chance to make law. Well here's your chance, make it a good one.

LAVOIR: It sits there looking at me but I don't know what it is. This case has dealt with questions best left to saints and philosophers. I am neither competent or qualified to answer that. I've got to make a ruling, to try to speak to the future. Is Data a machine? Is he the property of Starfleet? No. We've all been dancing around the main question: Does Data have a soul? I don't know that he has. I don't know that I have. But I have to give him the freedom to explore that question himself. It is the ruling of this court that Lieutenant Commander Data has the freedom to choose. So, is Commander Data a person? We do not presume to answer that question in these pages. But we do hope that you've thought through the question a little more deeply that you had before. If you use this as a reading in a course and/or if you are interested in doing further research or curriculum development on these topics, please contact: Dr. David L.

Anderson Copyright: 2000 Activities | Caregiver Center | Alzheimer's Association Caregivers Take Note – Music as Therapy Although music has been with us since the dawn of time, in the last few decades studies have found that music as a therapeutic tool can increase cognitive function in Alzheimer's patients … read more . In the early stages of dementia, the person may withdraw from activities he or she previously enjoyed. It is important to help the person remain engaged. Having an open discussion around any concerns and making slight adjustments can make a difference. For example, a large social gathering may be overwhelming, but the person may be able to interact more successfully in smaller groups. As Alzheimer's progresses, you may need to make other adjustments to the activity. Use the following tips: Keep the person's skills and abilities in mind. A person with dementia may be able to play simple songs learned on the piano years ago. Bring these types of skills into daily activities. Pay special attention to what the person enjoys. Take note when the person seems happy, anxious, distracted or irritable. Some people enjoy watching sports, while others may be frightened by the pace or noise. Consider if the person begins activities without direction.

Does he or she set the table before dinner or sweep the kitchen floor mid-morning? If so, you may wish to plan these activities as part of the daily routine . Be aware of physical problems. Does he or she get tired quickly or have difficulty seeing, hearing or performing simple movements? Focus on enjoyment, not achievement. Find activities that build on remaining skills and talents. A professional artist might become frustrated over the declining quality of work, but an amateur might enjoy a new opportunity for self expression. For activity ideas join ALZConnected , our message boards and online support community. Every day, caregivers like you share new ideas and encourage one another. Encourage involvement in daily life. Activities that help the individual feel like a valued part of the household — like setting the table — can provide a sense of success and accomplishment. Relate to past work life. A former office worker might enjoy activities that involve organizing, like putting coins in a holder or making a to-do list. A farmer or gardener may take pleasure in working in the yard. Look for favorites. The person who always enjoyed drinking coffee and reading the newspaper may still find these activities enjoyable, even if he or she is not able to completely understand what the newspaper says. Consider time of day.

Caregivers may find they have more success with certain activities at specific times of day, such as bathing and dressing in the morning. Adjust activities to disease stages. As the disease progresses, you may want to introduce more repetitive tasks. Be prepared for the person to eventually take a less active role in activities. We Can Help It helps to know you aren't alone. Talking to others who are going through the same experiences as caregivers can provide you with ideas, support and resources. Back to top Your approach If you notice a person's attention span waning or frustration level increasing, it's likely time to end or modify the activity. Help get the activity started. Most people with dementia still have the energy and desire to do things but may lack the ability to organize, plan, initiate and successfully complete the task. Offer support and supervision. You may need to show the person how to perform the activity and provide simple, easy-to-follow steps. Concentrate on the process, not the result. Does it matter if the towels are folded properly? Not really. What matters is that you were able to spend time together, and that the person feels as if he or she has done something useful. Be flexible.

When the person insists that he or she doesn't want to do something, it may be because he or she can't do it or fears doing it. Don't force it. If the person insists on doing it a different way, let it happen, and change it later if necessary. Assist with difficult parts of the task. If you're cooking, and the person can't measure the ingredients, finish the measuring and say, "Would you please stir this for me?" Let the individual know he or she is needed. Ask, "Could you please help me?" Be careful, however, not to place too many demands upon the person. Sign up for our weekly e-newsletter Receive ideas to keep the person with Alzheimer's active and engaged. Also get updates about Alzheimer's treatments, care and research. Subscribe now. Stress a sense of purpose. If you ask the person to make a card, he or she may not respond. But, if you say that you're sending a special get-well card to a friend and invite him or her to join you, the person may enjoy working on this task with you. Don't criticize or correct the person.

If the person enjoys a harmless activity, even if it seems insignificant or meaningless to you, encourage the person to continue. Encourage self expression. Include activities that allow the person a chance for expression. These types of activities could include painting, drawing, music or conversation. Involve the person through conversation. While you're polishing shoes, washing the car or cooking dinner, talk to the person about what you're doing. Even if the person cannot respond, he or she is likely to benefit from your communication. Substitute an activity for a behavior. If a person with dementia rubs his or her hand on a table, provide a cloth and encourage the person to wipe the table. Or, if the person is moving his or her feet on the floor, play some music so the person can tap to the beat. Try again later. If something isn't working, it may just be the wrong time of day or the activity may be too complicated. Try again later, or adapt the activity. Did you find this information helpful? Take a short survey to tell us what you think of the Dementia Activities page.

Late Bloomers, Late In Life Success - Infographic Anna Vital < Aug 25' 14 > Late bloomers are people who achieved proficiency in some skill later than they are normally expected to. The key word is “expected.” School Is a Machine, Learning Is Not Ever since the 19th century, when education was first standardized, learning in popular imagination is highly connected to age. The school system, back then and now, is modeled after a factory – people get education in batches, based on their date of manufacture. If you were manufactured seven years ago, that means it’s time to learn the multiplication table, for instance. And if you are ten and you still have not mastered the table, you are reshuffled to the un-smart batch. Perfect logic. Except the lives of many successful people proved it wrong. They mastered a skill at an older age. They are late bloomers. Let’s see who they are and how they did it. Learning Languages Late: At 20 Still Spoke No English When Joseph Conrad became one of the titans of English Literature at 39, few people knew that at 20 Joseph still spoke no English at all.

He was fluent in Polish and French, growing up in the part of Poland that is now Ukraine. He learned English at sea. When he started writing, he himself and his agent hesitated about Joseph’s ability to communicate in English with readers who at the time were members of one of history’s most class-conscious societies. His foreignness proved to be an advantaged, and his English writing style became iconic. The Reasons Why People Bloom Later Parents The life circumstances of late bloomers suggest that they could bloom earlier had circumstances been a bit different. Paul Cezanne’s father protested his son’s plan to study art, envisioning his son a banker like himself, possibly delaying Paul’s education as an artist. Of course, if you really set your mind to something, even parents can’t stop you. Geography Joseph Conrad was simply born in a non-English speaking country. Ultimately, though, it may have been to his advantage, because he may have never developed his original exotic style was he raised in England. Finances Sylvester Stallone originally wanted to be an actor, but being evicted from his apartment lead him to performing in soft pornographic movie roles at $200 for two days work, delaying his big break with Rocky.

Non-Dream Jobs For some people the reason is more trivial – they were simply in the wrong, but good, job for too long. Reid Hoffman enjoyed success at Paypal. Martha Stewart succeeded as a stoke broker. Julia Child had a stable job with the government. But as their lives later showed, they were capable of much more. Simply Having No Clue Fauja Singh knew what running was all his life, but it wasn’t until his son was beheaded by a flying sheet of metal, that Fauja took a different look at life. First he sank into depression. Then he moved on from India to England where he first learned what a ‘marathon’ was. He thought it was 26 kilometers when he showed up for training. It turned out marathons are 26 miles long (41 kilometers). He still ran, even at age 100. Sometimes, ignorance is bliss. Is It Ever Too Late to Learn? Learning something late in life might sound like a bad deal if you compare yourself to all the young talented folk. Understandable. The catch is that doing something earlier does not necessarily make you better at it than if you did it later.

Could you say that Stallone is a worse actor than actors who started in their teens? Was Julia Child a worse cook just because she started cooking at 30? With Fauja Singh it’s even easier – just finishing the marathon at all he already wins. The Rare Late Bloomers To be fair, late bloomers in some fields, like music and computer science, are rare. We did our best to find them, but have not yet succeeded. If you know of one, be sure to write us. Joseph Conrad, English Writer – until 20 Joseph spoke no English at all Paul Cezanne, Painter – until 20 never painted Rocky Marciano, Undefeated boxer – until 20 never boxed J.K.

Rowling, Writer – until 23 taught school Sylvester Stallone, Actor – until 24 only had adult film roles Vincent Van Gogh, Painter – until 27 did not paint, only drew Alan Rickman, Actor – until 28 had no film roles Reid Hoffman, Startup Entrepreneur- until 30 never started companies Julia Child, The French Chef – until 30 knew no French cuisine Martha Stewart, Home Decorator – until 35 did no home decorating Dave McClure, Angel Investor – until 40 did no investing Momofuku Ando, Instant noodle inventor – until 48 sold salt, was in jail Grandma Moses, Painter – until 78 never painted Fauja Singh, Marathon Runner – until 89 though marathons were 26 kilometres

Question: An opsimath is a person who begins to do what later in life?
Answer: Study