Falklands War: HMS Conqueror remembers Belgrano sinking - BBC News BBC News Media playback is unsupported on your device Falklands War: HMS Conqueror remembers Belgrano sinking 2 May 2012 Last updated at 14:07 BST It is 30 years since a British submarine sank the Argentine navy cruiser, the General Belgrano. More than 300 sailors were killed in what remains one of the most controversial actions of the Falklands War. The crew of the submarine sent by the UK, HMS Conqueror, has held a reunion to remember what happened. The BBC's Allan Little reports. HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia - Telegraph Defence HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia The submarine that sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands war was involved in a much more daring and dangerous Cold War operation only weeks later Comments It was dark, in the early hours, and the sea was freezing as Her Majesty’s Submarine Conqueror came to periscope depth. Her captain, Christopher Wreford-Brown, had been stalking his target methodically, a hunter in pursuit of wary prey.

There she was, 1,000 yards ahead, slow-moving, seemingly unaware of the submarine coming up on her tail. Gathered around Commander Wreford-Brown in the darkened operations room, officers and men waited in silence, inner tension masked by outward calm. It was 1982 and this was the real thing. HMS Conqueror is famous, some would say notorious, for sinking the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered attack submarine, a type also known menacingly as a hunter-killer, that year became the first of her kind to fire in anger. The Belgrano was sent to bottom in short order, her ancient hull rent by two torpedoes: 323 men, many of them young conscripts, died. The Falklands war began in earnest that day, May 2 1982. But the ship now in the crosswires was not the Belgrano. This was August, almost two months after the liberation of the Falklands, and on the other side of the world, in the Barents Sea, backyard of the mighty Soviet Northern Fleet.

Conqueror was sailing as close to Russian territorial waters as was legally allowed – or maybe closer. Submariners, a tight-knit community, politely disdainful of their surface counterparts, joke that there are two types of naval vessel: submarines and targets. Wreford-Brown’s target was a spy trawler – an AGI in Nato parlance, meaning Auxiliary General Intelligence. Crammed with interception and detection equipment, they were a ubiquitous presence during the Cold War, shadowing Nato exercises or loitering off naval bases. This one was special: Polish-flagged, she was pulling a device long coveted by the British and Americans, a two-mile string of hydrophones known as a towed-array sonar. It was the latest thing in Soviet submarine-detection technology and Conqueror’s job was to steal it. To do so, the bow was equipped with electronically controlled pincers, provided by the Americans, to gnaw through the three-inch-thick steel cable connecting it to the trawler. The name of this audacious exercise in piracy? Operation Barmaid. Thirty years on, and the story of this mission, classified Top Secret to this day, is being told.

It may be that the Russian government is learning for the first time the fate of what was one of its most closely guarded devices. Related Articles 'Heat of the moment firefight' could be behind Royal Marine arrests 12 Oct 2012 “This was a quite remarkable feat, a daring exploit that carried with it immense risk,” says the documentary maker Stuart Prebble, whose new book, Secrets of the Conqueror, discloses the existence of Barmaid. “When we think of the Cold War we think of Cuba and Berlin and missiles and tanks, but it was at sea, and under the sea in particular, where the East-West struggle was often at its most dangerous. “I have known about Barmaid for nearly 30 years and two years ago I approached the Ministry of Defence and asked that its details be released under the 30-year rule. They spent eight months thinking about it and eventually came back and said no. Their final position was that, although they wouldn’t help, they wouldn’t try to stop me writing about it.” Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Anglo-Americans rested on their laurels, confident of their superiority in naval technology over the fledgling Soviet fleet.

But as the 1970s wore on that confidence was eroded. Soviet submarines were not just becoming quieter and faster, they were able to turn the tables on their supposedly more advanced Western opponents. Submariners call it “bouncing”, the practice of creeping up on a hostile submarine before switching on active, wave-emitting sonar. The deafening ping in the earphones of the target crew tells them: “I’m here. If this was a war, you’d be dead.” Towed-array sonar is different. It is passive and does not emit a signal. It floats at a prescribed depth, trailing behind a ship or submarine, simply listening for enemy submarines. Because the hydrophones are spaced out, they can achieve a multi-dimensional fix on a target, and are less vulnerable to noise from the host vessel. The American and British navies imagined themselves to be far ahead in this technology and were disturbed to discover that the Russians were matching them. Had they caught up through ingenuity, or by spying? The issue was sensitive for the British, who had been plagued by spy scandals in the post-war period. The “Portland Spy Ring” had betrayed naval secrets, as had the Admiralty clerk John Vassall.

The Americans took the lead, conceiving a project to capture a towed array and discover its origins. General Dynamics, supplier of kit to the CIA, built the pincer equipment, which was installed in British submarines. But why not use the bigger US Navy? “There are two schools of thought about that,” says Prebble, a former editor of World in Action. “The British believed they were selected because they had more skilled submariners, and exercises do seem to bear this out. British submariners tend not to play by the book to the extent that the Americans do. “The more cynical view has it that if a British sub was caught the diplomatic fall-out would be less severe than if an American one was involved. No one wanted to provoke a superpower confrontation.” Cutting a towed-array cable and making it look like an accidental loss was no easy task. Before Conqueror was fitted with the television-guided pincers, her sister ship HMS Churchill had tried to steam through an array to sever it from the towing ship. She was damaged and depth-charged for her pains. Conqueror made two attempts to use the pincers, in the Barents Sea and the Mediterranean, before her final attempt in August.

“When crews heard about these pincers, everybody thought it was absolutely crazy,” says Prebble. “Their use demanded the most brilliant seamanship, coming up from below into the array’s blind spot and edging towards the cutting point only a few yards from the tow ship. The pincers were designed to gnaw rather than slice cleanly to give the impression that the array had snagged on an underwater obstacle and been torn off.” There, then, was Wreford-Brown, staring though his periscope that August night. The TV cameras were useless until a few inches from the target, so black was the Arctic water. Wreford-Brown and his officers had to fall back on mental arithmetic to calculate their distance from the target. “That was the genius of the exercise,” says Prebble. “There is a way of approaching the blind spot that involves going deep and then coming up at an angle, literally below the vessel.” The trawler’s propeller was feet away from Conqueror’s hull. A momentary miscalculation and a collision was inevitable. But nerves held and a connection was made. The pincer blades gnawed, and in seconds that seemed like hours the array was freed.

Clamps held on to the cable as Conqueror dropped away to a safe depth, trailing the array by her side. “Everyone in the control room was tense,” says one of those present. “We were expecting at any time that we would be discovered and were ready to run, if necessary.” None of the crewmen who spoke to Prebble was prepared to confirm Conqueror’s position but the suspicion is that the operation took place inside Soviet territorial waters, just three miles from the coast. If discovered, the sub would have faced attack from Russian air and naval units. Once Conqueror reached a safe distance, divers were sent out to secure the array. The submarine later surfaced so that they could swim out again to haul the device aboard and bundle it in the hull. Did the crew of the AGI know what had happened? Even if they suspected foul play it would not have been in their interests to admit it to their superiors. A sojourn in the gulag might have followed. Immediately after Conqueror reached her base on the Clyde, the array was put on to an aircraft and sent for analysis in the United States. It is said that the name Conqueror was whispered with a certain reverence in the Pentagon for some time afterwards.

Following the sinking of the Belgrano, much speculation surrounded the disappearance of the Conqueror’s logs. The assumption in some quarters was that they had been destroyed to conceal embarrassing details about the submarine’s movements before and after the attack on the cruiser. Prebble thinks otherwise. “I believe the logs were shredded or incinerated to hide the Barents Sea operation,” he says. “This was a top-secret mission.” The submarine arm is known as the Silent Service, partly because of its stealthy approach to warfare but also because of the secrecy attending its activities. Rarely does it receive public praise. Now, at least, we know of Operation Barmaid. The Conqueror’s crew had to celebrate their triumph in secret. Let’s hope they enjoyed a pint or two. BBC ON THIS DAY | 2 | 1982: British sub sinks Argentine cruiser About This Site | Text Only 1982: British sub sinks Argentine cruiser Argentina's only cruiser, the General Belgrano, has been sunk by a British nuclear submarine in the South Atlantic. It is the first serious attack on the Argentine navy by the British since the conflict over the disputed Falkland Islands began last month.

The second largest ship in the Argentine navy was struck by two Tigerfish torpedoes from HMS Conqueror. It is thought there were about 1,000 men on board. British helicopters also sank a patrol boat and damaged another using Seaskua air-to-surface missiles. According to sources in Buenos Aires, at least five Argentine warships have been taking part in the search for survivors throughout the day. I sincerely hope it will not be a long and bloody conflict John Nott, Defence Secretary Chances of anyone being found are limited with reports of 30-foot high waves and icy conditions. The Belgrano, an old World War II ship, was reported to have been severely damaged this morning. News that she had actually sunk came as the Defence Secretary, John Nott, was answering questions from journalists this afternoon. The Belgrano was outside the 200-mile total exclusion zone at the time of the attack and Mr Nott was asked whether the bombing was therefore justified.

He replied: "The General Belgrano was a threat to our men and therefore it is quite correct that she was attacked by our submarines." Mr Nott said the past week had been a successful one for British armed forces, but that the overriding aim was a peaceful and lasting settlement. "I sincerely hope it will not be a long and bloody conflict," he added. Earlier today, the government announced the next stage in the military build-up. The QE2 has been called into service - she is due back at Southampton at midnight tonight - as well as two ferries and a container ship. They will be used to carry 3,000 infantrymen. Belgrano Inquiry :: Is Maggie Thatcher a War Criminal? HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO Click image to enlarge We have the act itself (the sinking of a ship), as well as the end to be gained (keep the British government in power and torpedo a peace initiative) and the circumstances surrounding it (an attack outside the exclusion zone in an undeclared war). The History of the south Atlantic conflict The War for the Malvinas Ruben Moro 1989, p.165.

The ARA General Belgrano was an Argentine Navy cruiser which was controversially sunk by a British submarine during the 1982 Falklands War as she sailed away from the conflict zone. 323 people died, mainly young sea cadets. Originally a US Navy cruiser, launched in 1938, the ship survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was decommissioned from the US Navy in 1946. In 1951, the ship was sold to Argentina. In 1956, the ship was renamed ARA General Belgrano after a hero of the Argentine war of independence. On April 26th, 1982, the General Belgrano, accompanied by two destroyers, left the port of Ushuaia in southern Argentina. On April 29th, the Argentine task group began patrolling South of the Falkland Islands. On the following day, the ship was detected by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror which gradually closed over the next day. On May 2nd, HMS Conqueror fired three Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes, two of which hit the Belgrano.

With the ship holed, no electrical power, and unable to pump out water, the Belgrano soon began to list to port and sink towards the bow. Captain Hector Bonzo therefore ordered the crew to abandon ship using the seventy-odd rubber dingys. Tragically, the Belgrano’s two escorts did not know that something had happened to the Belgrano and continued on a westward course. By the time that the escorts realized something had happened to the Belgrano, it was already dark, the weather had worsened, and the Belgrano’s life rafts had been scattered. Consequently, even though Argentine and Chilean ships did rescue 770 men over the next two days, 321 members of the Belgrano’s crew died. In early editions on Tuesday May 4th, 1982, Britain’s The Sun newspaper led with the infamous headline “GOTCHA”: ”Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser”.

When news began to emerge that the Belgrano had indeed been sunk, with a large number of casualties, later editions of the Sun led with the more sombre headline “Did 1,200 Argies drown?” THE CONTROVERSY The sinking of the Belgrano became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners in Britain. This was for a variety of reasons, including the ship being well outside the 200 mile (320 kilometre) Total Exclusion Zone that the British had declared around the Falklands, because the ship was on a westerly heading at the time it was attacked, and because a Peruvian peace proposal was still on the table at the time of the attack. Was the sinking of the Belgrano justifiable under international law? Some argue that, the ship being outside the British-declared Total Exclusion Zone would not affect this analysis, since the British Government stated on April 23rd, that ‘the approach’ of any warship or aircraft ‘which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic’ would encounter an ‘appropriate’ response.

The Belgrano was neither ‘approaching’ the task force and was it a ‘threat’? That statement was put out while the British task force was still travelling South, as a warning that any approaching aircraft etc might be shot. Once the Task Force had arrived, it then announced on 28 April the Total Exclusion Zone – and, that would have superceded an earlier statement. War was not declared, that is why these definitions were important. Some Argentine Views on May 3rd 1982, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, that the sinking of the Belgrano was “at a point at the 55 º 24 ‘south latitude and 61 º 32′ west longitude. That this point is located 36 miles outside the area maritime exclusion set by the government of Great Britain. Such an attack is a treacherous act of armed aggression.’ Was it? Debate has raged on this issue, mostly misinformed due to the torrent of British MOD fabrications. This website will enable you to have that calm debate you always wanted to, but based on correct info.

Let’s hear a statement by Alicia Pierini, Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires on April 25 2005: “The Argentine ship was away from the area of ​​belligerency, not navigating towards it and not even close to any British units: so it could not have been any threat or danger to the United Kingdom. Torpedoing it was, quite simply, a war crime, through the disproportionate and illegitimate use of force in violation of the rights of those who fought then. Why would Britain have designated the exclusion zone – thus drawing the boundaries of war-theater – if it was immediately to be violated? “ Political analyst Rosendo Fraga expressed the following cautious view, immediately prior to Lawrence Freedman’s Official History appearing in 2005: The debate over whether the British attack took place within the international rules to be respected in conflict or outside, is controversial. Probably resolving the issue will be the function of legal historians, politicians and diplomats. The reality is that the cruiser was sunk by breaking rules, but the international community seems to have taken over the matter, not mostly sharing this view.

For Argentines, the idea that the cruiser was sunk in violation of the rules will remain as a manifestation of the Argentine claim to sovereignty, though the world does not share this view and only historians can give a more definitive opinion about it. Vice Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, in an interview published in the NATION March 31, 2001 said this: “I gave the order to attack on 1 May. When the British force set out to land would be the key moment of danger and their whole strategy would be to defend people who disembarked. Then they put all their elements, including submarines, to defend that position. That was the moment when we had to take the opportunity to do something. It was time to think about a transport strike, a damaged ship [?]. But, three groups of attack open to the West to wrap and search vessels were lost [?]. Six hours, after I send a new message to Allara (the head of the fleet of sea) landing there, that because of serious danger to their ships, they should retire? “ Six hours after the abortive Argenine attempt to attack, on May 1st, he gave the order to retire.

That is important as a statement by the man who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine South Atlantic Theatre of Operations. In 1994, Argentina added its claim to the islands to the Argentine constitution , stating that this claim must be pursued in a manner “respectful of the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law.” It would be strange if also in 1994 the Argentine government conceded that the sinking of the Belgrano had been a “ legal act of war?” The evidence heard at the Belgrano Inquiry – here summarised – offers an alternative view. You decide. It would have been a legal act of war if the Belgrano had either the intention or the capability to threaten Britain’s Task Force. Did it? That depends upon what its mission was. Arguments of ‘military necessity’ for sinking have a logistical problem: had it been perceived as a threat to the Task Force, that would have happened on May 1st, while it was sailing East, towards the Task Force. That didn’t happen. Only after it had turned round and had been sailing East, for 11 hours, away from the fleet, was it sunk. That’s what it was doing.

Thirty Years Later … January 2012: The sky is darkened with the lame ducks of Britain’s Falklands policy coming home to roost. The UK is now re-violating the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it did thirty years ago by bringing ships such as HMS Sheffield, armed with nuclear depth-charges, into the conflict. South America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Britain has announced in January 2012 that it was sending a nuclear-armed destroyer, HMS Dauntless, to the South Atlantic region. America has put out a humiliating-for-Britain policy statement alluding to ‘Los Malvinas,’ i.e. using the Argentine word for the Falkland islands, and describing the British occupation of it as ‘de facto’ – and that means, in contrast with de Jure. De Jure means occupation by right, de facto just means, they’re there because they’re there. One British conservative analyst called this statement, ”hugely insulting to Britain.” The US has affirmed: This is a bilateral issue that needs to be worked out directly between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.

We encourage both parties to resolve their differences through dialogue in normal diplomatic channels, adding that “we recognize de facto United Kingdom administration of the Islands but take no position regarding sovereignty.” Fox News reported that the Obama Administration was backing Argentina over the U.K. in the Falklands dispute. The Organization of American States earlier this week adopted a declaration calling for negotiations between the UK and Argentina over the “sovereignty” of the Falkland Islands. While the U.S. delegation did not speak in support of the measure, it ultimately joined a consensus adopting it. That basically puts the negotiating situation back to where it was in January-February 1982, before the war broke out… Prime Minister Cameron accused Argentina of being ‘colonialist’ in its demands for sovereignty over the Falklands. In response, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner told Mr Cameron to re-read his history books. Prince William is being posted to the islands as an RAF search-and-rescue pilot next month – a move Argentina attacked as ‘provocative.’ In response the South American trading bloc, Mercosur, is closing its ports to all ships flying the Falklands flag.

Britian’s Foreign Office has closed half a dozen embassies in Latin America in recent years, to minimise the danger of receiving subversive opinions from foreign capitals. If oil is found in commercial quantities it will be difficult for any company to exploit it without the assistance and co-operation of the Argentinian mainland. Argentine protesters have burnt the Union flag outside British Embassy in Buenos Aires in rage over Cameron’s pledge on Falklands, urging their government to sever diplomatic links with London Former head of the British army General Sir Michael Jackson said that it would be impossible for the British military to confront Argentina in case a military confrontation takes place over the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands. “What if an Argentinean force was able to secure the Mount Pleasant airfield? Then our ability to recover the islands now would be just about impossible,” said Jackson in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph. Likewise the head of the Naval task force in the Falklands War has warned that defence cuts mean Britain can now do “ precisely nothing” to prevent Argentina retaking the islands. the Royal Navy no longer has aircraft carriers, has lost its force of Harrier jump jets and seen its warship fleet cut in half over the last decade.

General Sir Peter Whiteley, a former commandant general of the Royal Marines, said: ‘If the Argentines decided to invade again we could never consider trying to take them (the Falklands) back because of our lack of naval resources.’ And Surgeon Rear Admiral Ralph Curr, the Royal Navy’s former medical director-general, added: ‘There’s no way we could defend the Falklands or re-engage the Argentines if it all happened again.’ In the Telegraph’s view, Britain can do ‘nothing’ to prevent Argentina retaking Falkland Islands. Argentine asserts sovreignty over Falkaland Islands March 2012 The Argentine senate has unanimously voted for a measure asserting the South American country’s “legitimate sovereignty” over the disputed Malvinas Islands. The draft document, known as the “Ushuaia Declaration,” was adopted ahead of the 30th anniversary of the war between Argentina and Britain over the islands, also known as the Falklands.The declaration also rejected “the persistent colonialist and militarist attitude of the United Kingdom” and warned against the “militarization” of the Malvinas.

Britain has deployed its most sophisticated warship, HMS Dauntless, and a nuclear submarine to the South Atlantic to prevent Argentina’s possible counter-move. Tensions have been mounting in recent months over the South Atlantic islands, with the UN calling on Britain to discuss decolonization, but the UK has so far refused to do so. General Belgrano General Belgrano General Belgrano General Belgrano The Argentine cruiser known as The General Belgrano, went down during the Falklands War of 1982, after she was attacked by the submarine HMS Conqueror. She sank with a considerable number of men on board. The General Belgrano, an Argentine cruiser, was lost at sea during the Falklands War, on 2 May 1982. She was attacked by the hunter-killer submarine known as HMS Conqueror and her loss also saw a large number of Argentine troops killed. First launched in 1938 to be an American light cruiser, Belgrano was first known as the USS Phoenix and was based at Pearl Harbour when the Japanese attacked in 1941.

Following the War, the ship was decommissioned in 1946 and was then sold on to the Argentine Navy in 1951. The Argentines then gave the ship the name General Belgrano, in honour of General Manuel Belgrano who had been a key military figure who had played a major part in the country’s fight for independence. ARA General Belgrano Underway The ship was patrolling an area just to the south of the Falkland Islands on 29 April 1982, along with two other destroyers. The ships were picked up on the radar belonging to HMS Conqueror and the submarine began working its way towards them on 30 April. The Belgrano was viewed as a major threat to the British Task Force as a result of her large collection of weapons and her sheer weight – she weighed in at 12,000 tons when loaded with men and goods. Despite being outside the Total Exclusion Zone around the Islands that had been put in place by the British Government, the ship was still seen as a threat that the Task Force wished to remove.

As a result, HMS Conqueror’s commander, Chris Wreford-Brown, was given the green flag to launch an attack on the ship. The Conqueror fired three torpedoes at the ship on 2 May, the first of which hit the bow but did not causing any major damage to be done. No deaths or injuries were caused to the Argentines as a result of this first stage of the attack. Meanwhile, the second torpedo fired by the British submarine hit the stern of the Belgrano, leading to huge damage and causing around 275 Argentine deaths. The ship’s electrical system was also so badly damaged that its captain was unable to make the necessary distress call to the destroyers. The ship’s Captain, Hector Bonzo, ordered the evacuation of the whole ship twenty minutes after the first attack by the submarine. Seven hundred and seventy men were collected and rescued by lifeboats, however 323 men lost their lives, making this event the largest single loss of life during the Falklands War.

Following the attack, queries were raised about whether it should have taken place, as the ship was outside the Exclusion Zone, however the British Government said that, as the Belgrano represented such a threat to the Task Force, the attack was essential. Even the Captain of the ship, Bonzo, supported this, saying that the ship was not sailing to its port, but rather that it was moving away to wait for further orders, and these could well have included launching an attack on the British Task Force. Admiral Sandy Woodward, the naval commander of the Task Force, also said that Belgrano could have easily turned quickly and travelled towards the British troops, so it was indeed the threat it was feared to be. The Argentine Government had been given a message from the British Government on 23 April 1982, saying that the British were allowed to take ‘whatever action’ was needed in order to protect its Task Force if any Argentine “warship, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft” appeared to be a threat.

Argentina was shaken by the sinking of the General Belgrano, after which point the country’s Navy was kept in port, in a bid to protect it and its aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo. As a result of this, it relied heavily on its air force to defend against and attack the British. However, this was to prove not enough to win the conflict. Argentina names top football league after ship sunk in Falklands war | World news | The Guardian Argentina names top football league after ship sunk in Falklands war First division league is named after General Belgrano as diplomatic row between London and Buenos Aires escalates The General Belgrano sinks after it was hit by three torpedos from a British submarine during the Falklands war in 1982. Photograph: AP Tuesday 7 February 2012 10.27 EST First published on Tuesday 7 February 2012 10.27 EST Close This article is 4 years old Nobody ever thought the General Belgrano would give Argentinians reason to cheer but that's because nobody, until now, thought to name the nation's football league after the sunken ship.

The Argentinian government plans to name the first division, which kicks off this Friday, in honour of the navy cruiser sunk by Britain during the Falklands war in 1982 with the loss of 323 Argentine lives. Military defeat, trauma and humiliation: not typical ingredients for sports sponsorship, but amid a fast-escalating diplomatic row between London and Buenos Aires these are anything but normal days. The president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has mobilised much of Latin America behind Argentina's diplomatic and commercial squeeze on "las Malvinas", its name for the disputed islands 300 miles off its Atlantic coast, in the runup to the war's 30th anniversary. Its latest gambit would turn Argentina's vocal, ultra-passionate football following into an enduring source of resentment and nationalism. The executive committee of the Argentine Football Association (AFA), which relies on state funding, will discuss the proposal on Tuesday night. Argentina's government owns the rights to first division matches and shows the games on free-to-air television. It regularly uses advertising opportunities for political promotion.

If the AFA approves the government plan, hoardings are expected to show " Crucero General Belgrano " – Cruiser General Belgrano – at Friday's opening game between the reigning champions, Boca Juniors, and Olimpo. The prospect divided Argentines, with blogs hosting debates between those who felt it would honour fallen heroes and those who sensed political opportunism and jingoism. The British nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the cruiser with three torpedoes on 2 May 1982. It was outside the British-declared exclusion zone but the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, ruled it was a threat and approved the attack. The loss of life and firepower shocked Argentina's ruling military junta. The Sun's famous headline, "Gotcha", aggravated the nation's anger and grief. Argentinian media reported on Tuesday that the government also wished to name the first division cup "Gaucho Rivero" after Antonio Rivero, a cattle herder who lived on the islands and is credited by some Argentines with "rising up" against British rule in 1833.

Rivero led a group of Argentinian labourers and creole Indians that killed five prominent British settlers, becoming, over time, a folk hero on the mainland. Some historians said the rebellion was a dispute over pay and conditions, not politics, and that Rivero was a common murderer. After a decade-long diplomatic thaw, tensions over the islands rose last year when British companies began drilling for oil offshore. The dispatch of the destroyer HMS Dauntless to the area and the arrival Prince William, who last week began a six-week stint as a search-and-rescue pilot in the archipelago, further inflamed Buenos Aires. Kirchner's office said she would make an important announcement about the islands from the presidential palace on Tuesday night.

Argentinian foreign minister to submit formal complaint about Britain's 'militarisation' of seas around disputed islands Published: 10 Feb 2012 Thousands of complaints after insult that followed Fernández accusing Britain of militarising south Atlantic islands Published: 8 Feb 2012 Cristina Kirchner warns of 'grave risks to international security' and states intention to prevent war over natural resources Published: 7 Feb 2012 President Fernández summons political elite for announcement expected to intensify diplomatic standoff with Britain Published: 7 Feb 2012 Belgrano: Britain WAS right to sink the ship before it attacked our Task Force | Daily Mail Online comments About one minute before the first torpedo hit, Seaman Marcelo Pozzo had lain down on his bunk and was looking forward to some sleep. He had been on duty for most of the day at the Damage Control Station in the heart of the light cruiser the General Belgrano as it pushed through the 15m waves of the South Atlantic, and he was due back on at midnight. As soon as Pozzo closed his eyes, he felt a ‘hammer blow’ that propelled him into the air with such force that he hit the upper bunk.

The Belgrano's last moments. It now emerges the ship had been ordered to proceed into the Exclusion Zone at the time it was attacked ‘When I fell down, a heatwave engulfed me,’ he later recalled, ‘it felt as if the door of a huge blazing oven had suddenly opened.’ Pozzo rushed out of his berth, and saw his fellow sailors coming up from the lower decks. He asked a friend what had happened, who answered him in no uncertain terms: ‘We’ve been torpedoed, you idiot!’ It was only then that Pozzo noticed that the skin on both his legs had been lacerated below the knees. In addition, his right forearm was completely burned, but because he was in shock, he felt no pain. RELATED ARTICLES Share this article Share Dutifully, Pozzo made his way to Damage Control Station, but when he arrived, an officer told him to go to the sickbay. Pozzo would never reach it, because the order was soon given to abandon ship. A second torpedo had hit the Belgrano, and the captain, Hector Bonzo, knew that there was no chance of saving the 44-year-old vessel.

With the ship now listing severely to port, Pozzo made his way to the starboard side. He started to shin down a rope towards a raft. Above him, comrades urged him to hurry up and jump, as the ship was rapidly sinking. ‘I calculated the trajectory,’ Pozzo later recalled, ‘and jumped.’ He was lucky, and landed squarely on the raft. Others were not so fortunate, and ended up in the freezing South Atlantic, where they perished within a few minutes. The Belgrano (pictured) and two destroyers carried deadly Exocet missiles Just then, Pozzo remembered, ‘from below the surface came several muffled explosions. That was the end. The General Belgrano would never come back.’ Since that fateful afternoon on May 2, 1982, the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser Belgrano by the British nuclear-powered submarine Conqueror has been regarded as one of the most controversial events of the Falklands War. Many British critics of the action, which resulted in the deaths of 323 Argentinian sailors, see the sinking as a war crime.

These critics, who are invariably on the far Left, and include the former Labour MP Sir Tam Dalyell and the former Ministry of Defence civil servant Clive Ponting, argue that the Belgrano represented no threat, and was actually sailing away from the 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone declared by the British around the Falkland Islands. In their eyes, the action was a disgraceful act of provocation by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher designed to escalate the conflict. However, a new book reveals that these critics have been wrong all along, and the Belgrano was indeed a fair target, not least because — it now emerges — it had been ordered to proceed into the Exclusion Zone at the time it was attacked. In The Silent Listener, the book’s author Major David Thorp recounts how in 1984 he was ordered by Mrs Thatcher to carry out an investigation — never published — into the circumstances of the sinking.

Given access to every document related to the Belgrano, Thorp, a member of a highly-secret signals-intercept unit during the Falklands War, describes in his book how he found an Argentinian signal intercepted by the British in which the Belgrano was ordered to rendezvous with other Argentinian warships at a location east of the islands, and well inside the Exclusion Zone. This crucial new evidence flies in the face of what is often claimed by many Argentinians and their useful idiots among the British Left — that the Belgrano was heading back to her home port when she was sunk, and that she did not represent a threat to the British Task Force. Nearly three decades later, it is now possible to tell the full story of the General Belgrano, and to show that the sinking, although horrific, was a justifiable act of war that probably saved more lives than it claimed. HMS Conqueror returns home. It was commanded by 36-year-old Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown.

Built in 1971, it carried a crew of more than 100 The Falklands were invaded by Argentina on April 2, 1982, and within three days the first ships of a British Task Force had set sail to the South Atlantic. Commanded by the 49-year-old Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, the force eventually consisted of two aircraft carriers — Hermes and Invincible — and some 50 other warships and numerous support vessels. Beneath the waves and sailing in secret, the Task Force also included a complement of nuclear-powered submarines. Among them was Conqueror, commanded by 36-year-old Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown. Built in 1971, it carried a crew of more than 100. As the Task Force sailed south, on April 12 the UK announced it was imposing a 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands. Any Argentinian vessel found inside the Zone would be attacked in order to stop the invaders from supplying their troops on the Islands.

However, the British soon realised the Zone would be too small, and on April 23, the Swiss government was asked to convey to the Argentinians a cable that declared ‘any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response’. The significance of this cable was appreciated by both sides, as it effectively turned the whole of the South Atlantic into a combat area. As a result, it mattered little whether a ship was inside or outside the Exclusion Zone, or in which direction it was heading — any craft anywhere had been ruled ‘fair game’, and the Argentinians knew it. What they could not know were the British Rules of Engagement, which dictated that British commanders still had to seek permission from the highest level in London to launch attacks on Argentinian craft which were outside the Exclusion Zone. By April 29, the British Task Force arrived within 200 miles of the Falklands. Rear Admiral Woodward was concerned that his fleet would be caught in a pincer movement.

To the north lay the Argentinian aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, along with an escort of around five ships, including two destroyers. To the south-west of the Falklands, meanwhile, and just outside the Exclusion Zone, was the Belgrano and two destroyers which carried deadly Exocet missiles. Minister of Defence, Sir John Nott (pictured with Margaret Thatcher in 1982), later observed of the attack: 'It was one of the easiest decisions of the whole war' Woodward was desperate to attack the carrier, as she represented the greater threat, but the British submarines shadowing the ship had lost contact with her. As a result, Woodward turned his attention to the Belgrano, which was being stalked by the Conqueror. ‘I had to take one claw out of the pincer,’ he later wrote. ‘So it would have to be the Belgrano and her destroyers.’ Woodward acknowledged that although the Belgrano was ‘not that big a threat’, she was unlikely to be a ‘push-over’. In a previous life, the 608ft ship had been the Phoenix, and had belonged to the U.S.

Navy, even surviving the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. ‘I was rather afraid this venerable armoured veteran was approaching the end of her journey,’ Woodward drily noted. Because of the Rules of Engagement, Woodward was not supposed to issue a direct order to the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano because she was outside the Exclusion Zone. But knowing that asking for permission from London could take several hours, if not days, Woodward decided he had to shake things up back in Britain by disobeying orders and ordering the submarine’s commander, Wreford-Brown, to attack. Woodward knew that if he breached Naval discipline in this way, the top brass back in London would assume that he had either gone mad, or that he was in a great hurry. Because the cable to the Conqueror had to be routed via a communication system in London, the order was intercepted and, instead of being passed to the submarine, it was taken to Margaret Thatcher’s War Cabinet, which had assembled at 10am on May 2 at Chequers. The PM was her typically decisive self. ‘It was clear to me what must be done to protect our Forces,’ Lady Thatcher later wrote.

As her Minister of Defence, Sir John Nott, later observed: ‘It was one of the easiest decisions of the whole war.’ At 1.30 that afternoon, the order conveying the permission to attack was sent directly to Conqueror. As soon as he received the signal, Wreford-Brown started his attack. He chose to use three 21in Mark 8 torpedoes, each of which was equipped with an 805lb warhead containing high explosives. Although he had more sophisticated torpedoes, only the older Mk 8s, a design which had been in use since 1927, packed the necessary punch to penetrate the thick armour plating of the Belgrano. After spending two hours working his way into an attack position, Wreford-Brown ordered the torpedoes to be fired at a range of 1,400 yards. The submarine’s crew could hear the whine of the torpedoes’ motors as they accelerated towards their target. For a while, there was silence, save for the chuffing sound of the Belgrano’s engines. Wreford-Brown watched calmly through his periscope.

Then, 55 seconds later, just after 4pm at local time — 7pm GMT — he saw an orange fireball explode near the ship’s mainmast. ‘Explosion’ reported the sonar operator of the Conqueror, impassively. A few seconds later, he said: ‘Second explosion.’ According to Woodward, it appeared the Belgrano’s captain, Hector Bonzo, had not been aware of the danger his ship was in, despite the British warning of April 23. In total, 770 men, including Bonzo, survived the sinking. But the attack utterly demoralised the Argentinian Navy, whose surface warships — including its aircraft carrier — would not venture more than a few miles away from Argentina’s coastline for the duration of the conflict. Although the action was a military success, the sinking was political dynamite. The great loss of life was unsettling, and, coupled with the fact that the Belgrano was observed by the Conqueror heading away from the Falklands when she was hit, meant that many opponents of the war regarded it as murder.

During a BBC interview, Mrs Thatcher was famously grilled by Diana Gould, a 56-year-old teacher from Cirencester, who accused the PM of ‘sabotaging any possibility of any peace plan succeeding’. Mrs Thatcher vehemently denied the charge, and stressed that she was proud of giving the order, and that ‘one day, all of the facts, in about 30 years’ time, will be published’. In saying so, she was referring to the 30-year rule which forbids the publication of private government papers for three decades. Thus, the official files on the Falklands War will be released in 2012, the same year as Major Thorp’s book. What Mrs Thatcher failed to make clear to Mrs Gould (who died earlier this month at the age of 85) was that the direction in which the Belgrano was heading was irrelevant. As John Nott later wrote: ‘I remain astonished . . . that anyone should consider the momentary compass bearing of Belgrano’s passage to be of any consequence whatever.

Any ship can turn in an instant.’ Nevertheless, the likes of Tam Dalyell would never be satisfied, despite the fact that even members of the Argentinian Navy agreed the sinking was a legitimate act of war. ‘It was absolutely not a war crime,’ said the Belgrano’s captain, Hector Bonzo, in an interview two years before his death in 2009. ‘It was an act of war, lamentably legal.’ Meanwhile, the Argentine admiral Enrique Molina Pico later admitted the location of the Belgrano outside the Exclusion Zone ‘did not mean it was withdrawn from the war’. ‘The integrated naval force had been deployed to carry out an attack on the British fleet in a co-ordinated operation with other naval groups,’ he wrote. ‘The heading away from the enemy fleet was only momentary, as the commander saw fit to wait for a more convenient time (to attack). 'The Belgrano and the other ships were a threat and a danger to the British.’ These admissions tally with the signals intercepts revealed by Major Thorp, which show that the Argentinian vessels had been ordered to engage in a pincer attack. There is a final irony.

Major Thorp discovered in his investigation in 1984 that the intercepted signal which ordered the Belgrano to the rendezvous point had been ignored by the British duty intelligence analysts at the time. ‘Somehow, the significance of this intelligence had been overlooked, misread or perhaps not read at all,’ Thorp writes, blaming the oversight on the ‘fog of war’. Had Mrs Thatcher been armed with the knowledge of this signal in 1982 — and minded to reveal our abilities to intercept Argentinian intelligence — she could have silenced her critics. Thanks to Major Thorp, it should be obvious even to Tam Dalyell that it is finally time to stop using the tragic deaths of so many sailors as a political football. The sinking of the Belgrano was a tragedy, but it was no war crime. The Silent Listener: British Electronic Surveillance Falklands 1982 by Major D.J. Thorp (The History Press, £12.99) will be published on February 1, 2012.

Top secret details of the submarine which sank the Belgrano are revealed for the first time | Daily Mail Online Revealed for the first time: How HMS Conqueror submarine which sank the Belgrano was sent on spy ship interception mission just weeks later HMS Conqueror was tasked with stealing a two-mile string of hydrophones from a Polish-flagged spy trawler It didn't emit a signal and was designed to subtly listen to enemy submarines The Anglo-Americans wanted to find out how the enemy had managed to develop it The crew got perilously close to the trawler to cut through a three-inch-thick steel cable without being seen "B is for Belgrano": The Falklands War The Falklands War "B is for Belgrano": The Falklands War On 2 April 1982, Argentine troops landed on the British colony of the Falkland Islands and captured them after a short battle with the small garrison of Royal Marines and part-time soldiers of the Falkland Islands Defence Force. British response was rapid. Three days later the first ships of a task force set sail from Portsmouth bound for the South Atlantic. British aerial combat operations began on 1 May and troops began to land at San Carlos Water on 21 May.

Fighting continued until 14 June, when the Argentine garrison surrendered. The war cost the lives of 255 British military and Merchant Navy personnel, 649 Argentine military personnel and three islanders. This is an online version of an exhibition at the Modern Records Centre. Click on the thumbnails to see larger versions of the images. Statement from the Commonwealth Trade Union Council condemning the Argentine invasion Condemnation of the Argentine invasion was swift from the Commonwealth, the EEC and two thirds of the UN Security Council, although much of Latin America and a number of other nations supported Argentina's actions. [Trades Union Congress archive: MSS.292D/980.9/2] The Royal Fleet Auxiliary The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) was established in 1905 to operate transport, replenishment and refuelling vessels for the Royal Navy. Although they are uniformed, work for the Ministry of Defence and come under naval discipline in wartime, its personnel are civilian members of the Merchant Navy and can join trades unions. Twenty-two RFA ships served in the war.

The task force suffered its worst casualties of the war on 8 June when 48 men (mostly from the Welsh Guards) were killed and more than 150 wounded during air attacks on the landing ships RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram in Bluff Cove. The former was lost and the latter badly damaged. Ten RFA personnel were killed during the war. RFA personnel received two Distinguished Service Orders, three Distinguished Service Crosses, two George Medals, two Queen's Gallantry Medals, one Mention in Dispatches, one Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct, six Commander-in-Chief Fleet Commendations, five OBEs and three British Empire Medals.

Ship-by-ship account of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's contribution to the war from their newsletter, Force 4 [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] Details of some of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's bravery awards from their newsletter, Force 4 [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] The Merchant Navy In order to supplement the task force's transport capabilities, the Ministry of Defence requisitioned and chartered forty-five civilian vessels, which were known as Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). They were crewed by volunteers from the Merchant Navy, supplemented by parties from the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Merchant Navy personnel received one Distinguished Service Cross, one Queen's Gallantry Medal, two Mentions in Dispatches, one Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct, three CBEs, four OBEs, one MBE and six British Empire Medals. List of Ships Taken Up From Trade A list of STUFT vessels and their estimated date of return to the UK following the war.

[National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] Harrison Line and the Falkland Islands An account of the Harrison Line's involvement with the Falkland Islands, both before and during the war. One Harrison Line vessel was later used to resupply the task force, although she did not arrive in time to serve in the war itself. [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] Crew list of the SS Atlantic Conveyor The SS Atlantic Conveyor was the only merchant ship sunk in the war. A roll-on, roll-off container ship owned by Cunard and registered in Liverpool, she was requisitioned by the government and sailed to the South Atlantic as part of the task force carrying RAF and Royal Navy Harriers and helicopters, as well as a considerable quantity of military stores. On 25 May she was hit by two Exocet missiles and set on fire; she sank three days later, the first British merchant ship lost to enemy action since the Second World War. The six men circled died in the attack, along with three Royal Navy personnel and three Royal Fleet Auxiliary personnel.

[National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/145] Account of the Merchant Navy's contribution from the British Shipping Review 1982 The photograph at the top right is of the SS Atlantic Conveyor. [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] Order of service for a remembrance service in Liverpool Cathedral for the men lost on the SS Atlantic Conveyor, 1 July 1982 The Atlantic Conveyor was registered in Liverpool. [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/145] Opposition to the War Opposition to the war from left-wing and/or pacifist organisations and individuals began as soon as the Argentines invaded and continued throughout the war and afterwards. Much of the opposition was based on genuine anti-war beliefs and condemned both Argentina for its aggression and Britain for responding with military force of its own. Some left-wing groups, however, supported Argentina's claim to 'Las Malvinas' and opposed the war on the basis that Britain was an old colonial power which should just give in gracefully and allow Argentina to take back what it claimed to be its territory.

War...It's a dying business The Ad Hoc Committee for Peace in the Falklands was set up to campaign against the war and comprised representatives of many pacifist and left-wing organisations, including CND, the Communist Party of Great Britain, the National Union of Students, the Roman Catholic peace movement Pax Christi and the Ecology Party (the forerunner of the Green Party). This handbill advertised a 'March for Peace' from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square on 23 May 1982 which was addressed by, among others, Tony Benn and Harriet Harman. [Alan Clinton papers: MSS.539/2/2/26] Malvinas are Argentina's The Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party made no bones about where it stood in the debate! It wholeheartedly backed Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands. This pamphlet lays out its reasons for doing so and attempts to claim that the military regime in Argentina was simply a reaction to outside 'imperialism' and its atrocities nothing compared to those inflicted by the 'British ruling class' in its efforts to 'turn half the world into a vast concentration camp'.

It argues that Argentinian victory in the Falklands would be the best result for the 'class struggle' in Argentina. [Collection of Trotskyist and other left-wing periodicals and pamphlets: MSS.661/4/2/3] Photograph of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) demonstration against the war in London CND opposed the war for pacifist reasons and were particularly worried about reports that the task force was carrying tactical nuclear weapons. [Mary Brennan papers: MSS.410/3/2] An A to Z of the Falklands, 1984 On 2 May the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror controversially torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with the loss of 323 lives, the only time in history that a nuclear submarine has ever fired her torpedoes in anger. Much of the opposition to the war focused on this incident, which occurred outside the official 'exclusion zone', although it was claimed by British government and military authorities that the vessel was a threat to the task force and that the sinking was wholly legitimate. This 1984 pamphlet was written by Labour MP Tam Dalyell, a staunch opponent of the war.

[National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/145] The Falkland Islands The Falkland Islands are an archipelago of 778 islands in the South Atlantic over 250 nautical miles east of Argentina. Discovered in the 16th century, they were first settled in 1764 and have been claimed and occupied at various times over the ensuing centuries by France, Britain, Spain and Argentina. They have been permanently occupied by the United Kingdom since 1833, but have been claimed by Argentina since her independence from Spain in 1816. State Research Bulletin, no.30, 1984 This publication generally opposed the war, but does give a good chronology of the islands' history. [Collection of anarchist and alternative publications: MSS.758/1/2/29/4] Falkland Islands Weekly News, 22 February 1945 An example of the islands' newsletter detailing a cycling trip across the 'Camp' (countryside).

[Cyclists' Touring Club archive: MSS.328/C/5/FALK] Falkland Islands Weekly News, 1 March 1945 Another example of the islands' newsletter giving the results of a sports meeting in the capital, Stanley, which appears to have combined equestrian events with events commonly seen at a school sports day. [Cyclists' Touring Club archive: MSS.328/C/5/FALK] Documents relating to the Falkland Islands General Employees Union A collection of copies of historic documents assembled to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Falkland Islands General Employees Union (FIGEU) in 1983. FIGEU, previously the Falkland Islands Labour Federation, is the islands' own trade union to which most farm employees belong. [Trades Union Congress archive: MSS.292D/980.9/2] Agreement between the Falkland Islands Sheepowners' Association and the Falkland Islands Labour Federation, 9 August 1952 Wool is the Falkland Islands' main export and this agreement defined the terms and conditions of employees working for sheep farms on the islands.

[Trades Union Congress archive: MSS.292/980.81/2] Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982 The first study was published in 1976 and this updated edition was produced after the war. [National Union of Seamen archive: MSS.175A/146] Minefield map, 1983 This map was compiled by the Royal Engineers a year after the war finished. It shows minefields and mine clearance in the area of the Falklands' capital, Stanley. Green areas have been cleared, blue areas are not known to have ever been mined, red areas are still considered dangerous. People are still being killed and maimed by Argentine mines on the Falkland Islands to this day. [Trades Union Congress archive: MSS.292D/980.9/2] Modern Records Centre

Question: Name the British submarine that during the Falklands War sank the General Belgrano?
Answer: HMS Conqueror