Conspiracy | Wex Legal Dictionary / Encyclopedia | LII / Legal Information Institute FAQ Conspiracy An agreement between two or more people to commit an illegal act, along with an intent to achieve the agreement's goal. Most U.S. jurisdictions also require an overt act toward furthering the agreement. An overt act is a statutory requirement, not a constitutional one. See Whitfield v. United States , 453 U.S. 209 (2005). The illegal act is the conspiracy's "target offense." Conspiracy generally carries a penalty on its own. In addition, conspiracies allow for derivative liability where conspirators can also be punished for the illegal acts carried out by other members, even if they were not directly involved. Thus, where one or more members of the conspiracy committed illegal acts to further the conspiracy's goals, all members of the conspiracy may be held accountable for those acts. Where no one has actually committed a criminal act, the punishment varies. Some conspiracy statutes assign the same punishment for conspiracy as for the target offense. Others impose lesser penalties. Conspiracy applies to both civil and criminal offenses. For example, you may conspire to commit murder , or conspire to commit fraud .

Conspiracy Definition Conspiracy Definition: An agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal act. An agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal or unlawful act, or to achieve a legal act but by illegal or unlawful means. R. v. Cotroni, Canada's Supreme Court wrote. "The word conspire derives from two Latin words, "con" and "spirare", meaning "to breathe together". "To conspire is to agree. "The essence of criminal conspiracy is proof of agreement. On the charge of conspiracy the agreement itself is the gist of the offence." Or, from Boots v Grundy (England, 1900): "A conspiracy exists when two or more combine to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. No conspiracy is ... known to the law which has not for its object the accomplishment of an unlawful act (not necessarily a criminal act) or which does not involve the use of unlawful means". Those forming the conspiracy are called conspirators. Conspiracy can form the basis for an action in tort as well as constituting a crime .

Quoting from the 1983 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd., this is the succinct summary as to tort law, where conspiracy is often referred to and distinguished as a civil conspiracy (see Legal Definition of Civil Conspiracy ), and tendered in Alford v Canada: "There are two types of actionable conspiracy in Canada: (1) Where the predominant purpose of the defendants' conduct is to injure the plaintiffs, whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful; and (2) where the defendants conduct is unlawful and is directed towards the plaintiffs (alone or together with others) and the defendant should have known that injury to the plaintiffs is likely to and does result.To be complete, the tort of conspiracy requires not only a conspiratorial agreement, but also proof that overt acts have caused damage to the plaintiffs." In criminal law, from R v Lam : "The crime of conspiracy is ... an agreement between two or more persons to commit an indictable offence. The actual commission of the indictable offence which is the subject of the agreement may be relied upon as evidence of the conspiratorial agreement, but it is not an element of the offence of conspiracy.

The offence is complete once the agreement has been entered even though the indictable offence which is the subject of the agreement is never actually committed. It is also not necessary in order for an accused to be convicted of conspiracy for the agreement to have called for the accused to himself commit the indictable offence which is the subject of the conspiratorial agreement." In Canada, the crime of conspiracy is set out at §465 of the Criminal Code which includes, inter alia : "(E)very one who conspires with any one to commit an indictable offence ... is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the same punishment as that to which an accused who is guilty of that offence would, on conviction, be liable." Note, also, the oft-quoted words of Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in Krulewitch where he spoke of the crime of conspiracy as that: "... elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense." REFERENCES: Conspiracy legal definition of conspiracy Conspiracy legal definition of conspiracy Related to conspiracy: conspiracy theory Conspiracy An agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act, or an act that is innocent in itself but becomes unlawful when done by the combination of actors. Conspiracy is governed by statute in federal courts and most state courts.

Before its Codification in state and federal statutes, the crime of conspiracy was simply an agreement to engage in an unlawful act with the intent to carry out the act. Federal statutes, and many state statutes, now require not only agreement and intent but also the commission of an Overt Act in furtherance of the agreement. Conspiracy is a crime separate from the criminal act for which it is developed. For example, one who conspires with another to commit Burglary and in fact commits the burglary can be charged with both conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary. Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory, crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both crimes are committed by manifesting an intent to engage in a criminal act. It differs from solicitation in that conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons, whereas solicitation can be committed by one person alone. Conspiracy also resembles attempt. However, attempt, like solicitation, can be committed by a single person. On another level, conspiracy requires less than attempt. A conspiracy may exist before a crime is actually attempted, whereas no attempt charge will succeed unless the requisite attempt is made.

The law seeks to punish conspiracy as a substantive crime separate from the intended crime because when two or more persons agree to commit a crime, the potential for criminal activity increases, and as a result, the danger to the public increases. Therefore, the very act of an agreement with criminal intent (along with an overt act, where required) is considered sufficiently dangerous to warrant charging conspiracy as an offense separate from the intended crime. According to some criminal-law experts, the concept of conspiracy is too elastic, and the allegation of conspiracy is used by prosecutors as a superfluous criminal charge. Many criminal defense lawyers maintain that conspiracy is often expanded beyond reasonable interpretations. In any case, prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike agree that conspiracy cases are usually amorphous and complex. The Elements of Conspiracy Agreement The essence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. A single person acting alone cannot be guilty of conspiracy. Quiz Show Conspiracies In the 1950s, the new medium of television was fast becoming a staple in U.S. households, and quiz shows, with their low production costs and high-stakes drama, were enjoying immense popularity. Contestants on quiz shows played until they lost; some competed for months and won tens of thousands of dollars.

The quiz show concept of rewarding intelligence with instant wealth appealed to the U.S. public and inspired many to seek an invitation to play. In May 1958, Edward Hilgemeier was in the studio audience of the quiz show "Dotto" when he was approached by a "Dotto" producer. The producer asked if Hilgemeier would like to compete on the show. Hilgemeier, an aspiring actor, accepted the offer. On May 20, he went to the "Dotto" set as a standby contestant. Marie Winn, a student at Columbia University, was the defending champion of "Dotto." A charming, animated native of Czechoslovakia, the twenty-one-year-old Winn had won "Dotto" on two consecutive nights. As Hilgemeier waited for his possible turn against Winn, he got the impression that studio personnel were unduly familiar with the woman. Winn's first challenger that day was Yeffe Kimball Slatin. Hilgemeier watched as Winn defeated Slatin with ease; Winn seemed to have every answer at hand.

After the contest between Winn and Slatin, Hilgemeier returned to the contestants' dressing room, where he discovered a notebook belonging to Winn that appeared to contain answers to "Dotto" questions. Hilgemeier notified Slatin, and the two returned to the dressing room, where one of them tore the apparent answer sheet out of Winn's notebook. That night, after speaking to Slatin's lawyer, Hilgemeier and Slatin went to the "Dotto" offices, where they spoke with the show's producers. The "Dotto" producers promised compensation to both Hilgemeier and Slatin. Slatin agreed to stay quiet about the affair for a nominal sum of money from "Dotto," but Hilgemeier, fearing for his reputation, refused. Hilgemeier took his information to Manhattan district attorney Frank Hogan and assistant district attorney Joseph Stone. Initially, the Manhattan district attorney's office was skeptical of Hilgemeier's complaint. The rigging of quiz shows was, after all, not illegal. Shortly into the investigation, however, it became apparent to Hogan and Stone that a widespread conspiracy was in place to hide the truth from the public—and conspiracy to commit Fraud wasillegal.

The Manhattan district attorney's office convened Grand Jury hearings, and a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives held congressional hearings on the quiz shows' practices. Many producers and contestants lied to the grand jury and the congressional subcommittee about their role in quiz show trickery. On October 14, 1959, their elaborate web of deceit began to unravel when Charles Van Doren, a Columbia University professor, admitted to the subcommittee his involvement in a rigged quiz show, "Twenty-One." (This incident was the basis of Robert Redford's 1995 film Quiz Show.) Quiz show producers and contestants eventually admitted their subterfuge to authorities. What emerged were stories of how favored quiz show contestants were coached to agonize and sweat over answers they already knew. On August 30, 1960, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that made giving or receiving assistance on a quiz show a federal crime. The bill was signed into law by President dwight d. eisenhower two weeks later. Now, under 47 U.S.C.A. § 509, it is a federal crime to rig quiz shows with the intent to deceive the listening or viewing public.

Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, a conspiracy to engage in prohibited practices regarding radio and television quiz shows is also a federal crime. However, if a coconspirator dies prior to the indictment or trial, the surviving coconspirator may still be charged with conspiracy. A Husband and Wife can be guilty of conspiracy. A corporation is considered a person for conspiracy purposes, so a corporation can be guilty of conspiracy, but it cannot conspire with itself. For example, if two or more employees within a corporation conspire to break the law and subsequently commit an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the corporation itself is not criminally liable for conspiracy.The agreement must be made voluntarily and with an intent to participate in furthering a common purpose. Mere knowledge or approval, in the absence of an actual agreement to cooperate, does not constitute conspiracy. Once an agreement with criminal intent is made, the conspiracy is complete, unless the applicable statute requires the additional element of an overt act. The agreement need not be written or formal, and it may be proved by Circumstantial Evidence . A tacit understanding is sufficient to constitute agreement, even if no words are spoken that expressly communicate the conspiracy.

Conspiracy exists if there is some form of mutual understanding between persons working together with a common unlawful end. Intent Criminal intent is also necessary to create a conspiracy. This means that the parties must intend both to agree on and to engage in the unlawful act. Ignorance of the law is not usually a defense to a crime, but an unwitting conspirator may defend against conspiracy charges on grounds of ignorance. Ignorance will not be a defense if the person continues to participate in the common plan after learning of its illegality. Either the purpose of the agreement or the means by which it is accomplished must be illegal to support criminal prosecution on conspiracy charges. If the purpose is unlawful, the offense is committed even if the means used to achieve the purpose are lawful. One illustration is where a noncustodial parent conspires with another person to kidnap the parent's child, and the child is abducted during a court-approved visit. Conspiracy also occurs if the purpose of the agreement is lawful but the means used to achieve it are illegal. For example, if a custodial parent chooses to retrieve a child who has been kidnapped by the noncustodial parent, an agreement to use unlawful force constitutes conspiracy.

Overt Act An overt act can be any step that indicates that the execution of the conspiracy has begun. This can be an innocuous act and need not be illegal unto itself. For example, if two persons agree to rob a bank, then purchase a ski mask, the act of buying the mask may constitute the overt act required to charge the two with conspiracy. The overt act must follow the agreement and must be executed with an intent to carry out the purpose of the conspiracy. For example, if one of the potential bank robbers buys a ski mask after the agreement is made, the purchase may not constitute the overt act if the ski mask will not be worn to carry out the Robbery . An overt act need not be committed by each and every conspirator; an overt act by one conspirator solidifies the offense for all coconspirators. Thus, a conspirator who does not participate in the overt act can be charged with conspiracy. If a conspirator completely and voluntarily renounces the criminal purpose to all conspirators, that person may withdraw from the conspiracy before the overt act is committed. Many jurisdictions require that the withdrawing conspirator also inform law enforcement officials or take measures to thwart the crime, in order to avoid criminal liability for the conspiracy.

Other Considerations A conspiracy exists as long as measures are taken to conceal evidence of the crime. A person who did not participate in the original agreement can become a coconspirator after the actual criminal act if the person joins in the concealment of the conspiracy. Whether a coconspirator received personal benefit or profit is of no importance. Generally, conspirators are liable for all crimes committed within the course or scope of the conspiracy. The application of this general rule varies from state to state. Ordinarily, an act is within the course or scope of the conspiracy if it is a foreseeable result of the agreement. In some states, a conspirator is not liable where he or she has no knowledge of the specific act and argues successfully that the act was beyond the scope of the conspiracy. Also, if the purpose of the agreement is later changed by coconspirators, a conspirator who did not participate in the alteration may not be held liable for the new conspiracy. A person is liable for conspiracy only in regard to the meaning of the agreement as he or she understands it. In some jurisdictions, a person may be guilty of conspiracy even if a coconspirator is immune from prosecution.

For example, if two persons conspire to commit murder and one is found to have been insane at the time of the killing, the other conspirator may not be exempt from prosecution for conspiracy. One who provides services to conspirators will not be guilty of conspiracy if that person has not participated in the agreement and does not know that a conspiracy exists. There must be a willful participation in the conspiracy, as well as an intent to further the common purpose or design for conspiratorial liability. Therefore, aiding a conspiracy by selling material to further it does not make someone a conspirator if the person does not know of the conspiracy, even if that person knows the goods sold will be used for an unlawful purpose. However, if the circumstances indicate a conspiracy, one who cooperates and knowingly sells goods for illegal use may be guilty of conspiracy. Generally, if a number of conspirators agree to carry out different functions in furtherance of the conspiracy, the agreement constitutes a single conspiracy. This is so even if the different functions amount to more than one unlawful purpose. In some states, however, the different functions may constitute multiple conspiracies if there is an agreement to commit more than one crime.

Punishment for the crime of conspiracy is ordinarily defined by statute and varies in accordance with the conspiracy's objective. For example, a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor will not be subject to the same punishment as a conspiracy to commit a felony. Conspiracy may be alleged in a civil case if the plaintiff has suffered an injury as a result of the conspiracy. Civil conspiracy is ordinarily not a Cause of Action , but the existence of a conspiracy may be used in determining the amount of damages in a civil action and the respective liabilities of civil codefendants for the payment of damages. History of Conspiracy Federal conspiracy statutes were first passed in 1909. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, it is a crime to commit an offense against or to defraud the United States or any agency of the United States. If the crime actually committed is a felony, the punishment is a fine of not more than $10,000 or five years' imprisonment, or both. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 372, it is a crime to conspire to impede or injure a federal law enforcement officer. The U.S. Congress has made specific conspiracies illegal through a variety of statutes.

For example, conspiracy to murder federal or foreign officials is prohibited by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1117, a freestanding statute. Conspiracy to kidnap is contained in subsection C of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201, the federal kidnapping statute. Other federal statutes prohibit conspiracies to assassinate the president, the vice president, and their successors; assassinate the director or deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); assassinate or kidnap a Supreme Court justice; interfere with commerce and trade; violate computer laws; launder money; obstruct state or local regulation of gambling; injure property of the federal government; tamper with consumer products; gather, transmit, lose, remove, or destroy national defense information or materials; incite sailors to mutiny; engage in prohibited practices regarding radio broadcasts or game show contests; defraud the Tennessee Valley Authority ; violate or interfere with voting rights; and sexually exploit children. Conspiracy cases are often infamous for their ambition and breadth. The assassination of President Abraham Lincoln in 1865 by John Wilkes Booth was a product of a conspiracy between Booth and several supporters of the defunct Confederacy.

In the early 1950s, the U.S. Congress conducted numerous hearings on Communist conspiracies against the United States. In the mid-1970s, several White House aides were indicted on charges of conspiracy in connection with the 1972 burglary of the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate Hotel, in Washington, D.C. In November 1986, a Lebanese weekly, Al-Shiraa, reported that the U.S. government had secretly sold military weapons to so-called moderate factions in Iran. In exchange for the arms sales, according to Al-Shiraa, the moderate Iranians would work to secure the release of U.S. citizens held hostage in Lebanon. Thus began an investigation into a conspiracy that became popularly known as the Iran-Contra Affair . Congressional investigations that followed the Al-Shiraa article revealed a covert "enterprise" connected with the arms sales. The operation, staffed by private citizens and funded by private monies, had diverted profits from the sale of the weapons to the Contras, a loosely knit military force in Honduras that sought to overthrow the socialist Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Congressional investigations in the spring of 1987 revealed that the enterprise had been supervised by U.S. National Security Council (NSC) staff. The NSC, created by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496 [50 U.S.C.A. §§ 402]) and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579 [50 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.]), existed to advise the president with respect to the Integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. One of the many problems presented by the enterprise was its apparent violation of the Boland amendments to a series of appropriations bills. These bills were established in the early 1980s to prevent any "agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" from spending funds available to it "to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua" (133 Cong. Rec. H4982-87 [daily ed. June 15, 1987]).

The covert arms sales also violated procedural and substantive requirements of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 [22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2751–2796c (1989 Supp.)]). Moreover, the executive branch's failure to notify Congress of the covert arms sales flouted the reporting provisions of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act (Pub. L. No. 96-450, tit. IV, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981 [50 U.S.C.A. § 413 (1982)]). In 1987, Lawrence Walsh, a former American Bar Association president and former federal judge, was assigned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Independent Counsel Division, to investigate the Contra-funding scheme. In March 1988, Walsh charged Richard Secord, Albert Hakim, Oliver North, and John Poindexter with conspiracy to obstruct the U.S. government.

North and Poindexter had worked for the NSC. As in all conspiracy cases, an important goal of the prosecution was to determine who was involved in the agreement. A major issue in the Iran-Contra investigation was to determine precisely who in the Executive Branch authorized or was aware of the arms diversions and, specifically, whether the president had knowledge of the unlawful activities. In the legal battles that ensued over access to information in connection with the prosecutions, Walsh faced challenges by the ronald reagan and george h. w. bush administrations, the Justice Department , intelligence agencies, and lawyers for the accused. Ultimately, the White House refused to relinquish classified information crucial to the prosecutions, and Walsh was forced to drop all conspiracy charges. The Iran-Contra Affair resulted in criminal convictions of several persons directly connected with the Reagan administration, but Walsh was never able to link the president to a conspiracy to obstruct the U.S. government. In another conspiracy case, Patricia Caldwell, a bookkeeper with the Northwest Community Exchange (NCE), was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States because she refused to provide to the IRS certain account information it requested regarding NCE customers.

The NCE was one of a number of warehouse banks, which promised their customers that they would not reveal account information to third parties, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As a result, the IRS shut down the warehouse banks, and it charged several customers and employees with conspiracy to defraud the United States. A jury convicted Caldwell of conspiring to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Caldwell's conspiracy conviction (United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056 [1993]). The government had argued that people have a duty to conduct their business affairs so as to not impair or impede the collection of revenue by the IRS. The majority opinion, written by Judge Alex Kozinski, rejected this interpretation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and held that to defraud the government, a person had to act deceitfully or dishonestly. To allow otherwise would create an oppressive theory of criminal conspiracy.

The court observed that under the government's theory, "a husband who asks his wife to buy him a radar detector would be a felon … because their actions would obstruct the government function of catching speeders." According to the court, Congress did not intend to make a federal crime out of actions that merely make "the government's job more difficult." The jury in Caldwell's case had not been instructed that it had to find that Caldwell agreed to obstruct the IRS's tax-collecting functions by deceitful or dishonest means. This failure to inform the jury about an essential element of conspiracy constituted reversible error, and Caldwell's conviction was overturned. American Honda Conspiracy The sheer size of a conspiracy can create distinct problems for prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. In 1993, U.S. attorneys in New Hampshire began to investigate employees of the American Honda Motor Company. By 1994, prosecutors had cobbled together an immense conspiracy-based commercial Bribery case. The conspiracy prosecutions of American Honda executives and dealers began to develop in 1989, when Richard Nault, an automobile dealer in Nashua, New Hampshire, brought a civil suit against American Honda, claiming unfair treatment.

In 1993, after testimony raised concerns of bribery, the judge in Nault's case recommended that federal authorities investigate the financial affairs at American Honda. Investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed a widespread pattern of illegal payoffs in which American Honda executives were given cash, jewelry, cars, and store ownership interests in return for the awarding of new Honda dealerships and favorable car allocations. According to the prosecutors, assistant U.S. attorneys Michael Connolly and Donald Feith, the alleged conspiracy involved twenty-two American Honda executives and dealers, encompassed thirty states, and was responsible for the misappropriation of approximately $50 million. In 1993 and 1994, prosecutors dangled various substantive and conspiracy charges before the executives and dealers. By the end of 1994, only three of the alleged conspirators had refused to plead guilty: John Billmyer, an 18-year American Honda veteran and longtime vice president of auto field sales; Stanley Cardiges, another vice president of auto field sales and Billmyer's protégé; and Dennis Josleyn, whose last position was West Coast sales manager for Acura, American Honda's flagship automobile.

In March 1994, Billmyer, Cardiges, and Josleyn were arrested at their homes, booked at local jails, and then released pending trial. A federal Grand Jury charged Billmyer with one count of conspiring with Cardiges and Josleyn to defraud American Honda, the United States, the Treasury Department , and the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. Specifically, the indictment alleged that Billmyer, Josleyn, and Cardiges had conspired to receive money and gifts by secretly selling the valuable contract rights conferred on prospective dealers by American Honda. Cardiges and Josleyn were charged with participating in the broad conspiracy with Billmyer and also conspiring to receive kickbacks in connection with an American Honda advertising campaign. Cardiges and Josleyn were further charged with violating the racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.). In November 1993, Cardiges allegedly asked former American Honda zone manager Edward Temple to tell the FBI that payments the two had received from a hidden interest in a Conway, Arkansas, car dealership were actually loan payments.

American Honda was portrayed by prosecutors as a victim of the conspiracies. As the trial approached, lawyers for Cardiges and Josleyn prepared a defense that would further victimize the company. According to Cardiges's lawyer Philip Israels, any conspiracy case should have included the Japanese executives of Honda Motor Company International, the owner of American Honda. Israels maintained that the Japanese executives knew of, condoned, and even participated in the kickback schemes. Israels further charged that the federal government had information that suggested that Japanese executives knew of the kickbacks, and that the decision not to prosecute the Japanese executives was being used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations between the United States and Japan. Josleyn adopted a defense similar to that of Cardiges. Josleyn's attorneys, Paul Twomey and Mark Sisti, noted that the alleged conspiracy was so widespread that Japanese executives must have known of it. Josleyn would deny no specific facts. Rather, he would invert the meaning of the mountain of evidence uncovered by the prosecutors and the FBI, to show that the Japanese executives must have known about and approved of the kickback schemes.

Such a showing would allow Josleyn's attorneys to argue that the alleged conspiracy was actually a lawful, routine business practice promoted by American Honda's parent company. Billmyer had retired from American Honda in 1988. His lawyers, David Long and Kevin Sharkey, centered his defense on a variety of grounds. Their arguments included that the prosecution of Billmyer was barred by the five-year Statute of Limitations on conspiracy charges because the indictment actually alleged multiple conspiracies, and any criminal liability for a conspiracy involving Billmyer expired in 1993; Billmyer had withdrawn from any alleged conspiracies by retiring in 1988; and New Hampshire was an improper venue because none of the acts Billmyer was alleged to have committed had any relation to New Hampshire. In the months before trial, several motions to dismiss the case were denied by Judge Joseph DiClerico of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. On January 22, 1994, after two years of maintaining his innocence and just one day before jury selection was scheduled to begin, Cardiges pleaded guilty to all charges.

In exchange for lenient sentencing recommendations by the prosecutors, Cardiges agreed to testify against Billmyer and Josleyn. All the conspirators except Billmyer and Josleyn were prepared to testify to conspiracies to defraud. The case proceeded to jury trial in February 1995 and was presided over by Judge DiClerico. In opening statements, assistant U.S. attorney Connolly submitted to the jury that the conspiracy was limited to a few rogue U.S. executives and dealers, and that the United States and American Honda had been conspired against and defrauded by them. Twomey declared that "the government is going to take you everywhere—north, south, east and west" to prove a conspiracy that was supposedly limited to U.S. executives and was completely unknown to Japanese executives. Long and Sharkey covered the litany of apparent infirmities in the government's conspiracy case against Billmyer. A seemingly endless stream of witnesses then proceeded to testify against Billmyer and Josleyn. American Honda executives and dealers regaled the jury with descriptive accounts of opulence and excess.

The kickback schemes resembled homage to the executives, a practice that Honda and Acura dealers called kissing the ring. Dealers and executives told of expensive offerings, including cash payments, free automobiles, Rolex watches, shopping sprees, swimming pools, and tuition payments for children. In several days on the witness stand, Cardiges alone testified to the receipt of approximately $5 million in kickbacks. At the close of the government's case in chief, Long made a motion to dismiss, arguing that the suit was one of multiple conspiracies, that any conspiracy involving Billmyer supported by the evidence was barred by the statute of limitations, and that any payments or gifts received by Billmyer were unconnected to any conspiracy with Josleyn. The motion was denied, Billmyer called no witnesses, and Josleyn began his defense. Throughout the presentation of the government's case, Josleyn's lawyers had been fighting a battle with American Honda. They sought to obtain, and eventually received, a copy of handwritten notes kept by Sherry Cameron, American Honda's vice president of human resources. Cameron's notes had been made in connection with American Honda's 1992 internal investigations into rumors of kickbacks.

American Honda had appealed Judge DiClerico's decision to order American Honda's release of the notes to the defense, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse the order. Cameron had testified for the government in March 1995, and Sisti's cross-examination of her had been suspended while the production of her notes was contested. On May 15, 1995, Cameron resumed the witness stand and was faced with poster-sized copies of her notes, one of which revealed that her "point of view" in the investigation was to "try to protect" the company. Cameron further testified that she had limited her investigation to facts, not rumors. Twomey then called to the stand J. D. Powers, a prominent market research specialist for the automobile industry. Powers testified that in 1983, he sent a letter to Yoshihida Munekujni, then president of American Honda, informing him of widespread rumors of corruption in American Honda. According to Powers, several unindicted top-ranking American Honda executives knew of the kickback schemes in the early 1980s.

This and other evidence allowed Twomey to argue in his closing statement that the conspiracy was so implicit as to constitute one company's policy. Twomey asked the jury whether it could be satisfied that it knew the entire truth in the case. Long contended, in part, that the government had been selective and heavy-handed in its prosecution. The case was submitted to the jury. After five days of deliberations, Billmyer and Josleyn were convicted of all charges. Both vowed to appeal. Although no Japanese executives were charged in the case, 20 American Honda executives and dealers pleaded guilty, making this the largest conspiracy-based commercial bribery prosecution in the history of the United States. United States v. Mohamed Even before the September 11th Attacks against the United States in 2001, the country and the world were well aware of the activities of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network known as al Qaeda. In October 2000, 48-year-old Ali A. Mohamed pled guilty in federal court in New York to five counts of conspiracy, including conspiring to kill U.S.

nationals; conspiring to murder, kidnap, and maim outside the United States; conspiring to murder in general; and conspiring to destroy U.S. buildings and property. The charges stemmed from the August 7, 1998, Terrorism at U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More than 200 people, including 12 American citizens, were killed in the attacks, and more than 5,000 were injured. The case attracted national and international attention because Mohamed was a former U.S. Army officer and because he implicated bin Laden in the bombings. Mohamed, a native Egyptian, served briefly with the CIA in 1984, until the agency determined that Mohamed had revealed his assignment to Middle East terrorists. In 1985, Mohamed moved to the California, seeking to become a U.S. citizen. He enlisted in the U.S. Army and was assigned to the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, where the Army trains its Special Forces. Mohamed was trained as a paratrooper and achieved the rank of sergeant before being honorably discharged in 1989.

Upon his discharge, he renewed his contacts with the Egyptian "Islamic Jihad," a radical group he had secretly associated with since the early 1980s. In 1991 he was recruited by al Qaeda to serve several missions directly related to bin Laden's terrorist activities. In 1993, bin Laden asked Mohamed to scout possible sites in Kenya to target for terrorist attacks. Mohamed, then a naturalized U.S. citizen, took photographs and drew diagrams of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. He personally delivered these to bin Laden, who planned the attack that occurred about five years later. Mohamed became a suspect when one of his aliases turned up at the Nairobi bombing site. After reaching a plea bargain agreement with federal prosecutors, Mohamed implicated bin Laden in the attacks. At the time, prosecutors said it was the first time that a close associate of bin Laden had implicated the reputed terrorist in open court. Mohamed faces a prison term for an unspecified number of years. Less than one year after he gave his testimony, the United States suffered terrorist attacks on its own soil, as al Qaeda operatives destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City and seriously damaged the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.

Further readings Kaplan, John, and Robert Weisberg. 1991. Criminal Law: Cases and Materials. 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown. Stone, Joseph, and Tim Yohn. 1992. Prime Time and Misdemeanors. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. Cross-references Conspiratorially | Define Conspiratorially at Dictionary.com Synonyms Expand 1. collusion, sedition. 2. Conspiracy, plot, intrigue, cabal all refer to surreptitious or covert schemes to accomplish some end, most often an evil one. A conspiracy usually involves a group entering into a secret agreement to achieve some illicit or harmful objective: a vicious conspiracy to control prices. A plot is a carefully planned secret scheme, usually by a small number of persons, to secure sinister ends: a plot to seize control of a company. An intrigue usually involves duplicity and deceit aimed at achieving either personal advantage or criminal or treasonous objectives: the petty intrigues of civil servants. Cabal refers either to a plan by a small group of highly-placed persons to overthrow or control a government, or to the group of persons themselves: a cabal of powerful lawmakers.

Dictionary.com Unabridged Conspiracy – An USLegal Topic Area An object to be accomplished, Meeting of minds on the objective or course of action, One or more overt acts, Damages Further, proof of malice or an intent to injure, can be included as essential elements. However, conspiracy is treated as a crime under many jurisdictions when a conspiracy to commit a particular offense occurs. The crime of conspiracy is defined as two or more persons conspiring to commit any crime, together with proof of the commission of an overt act to effect an objective of the agreement[ii]. A conspirator remains a participant in the conspiracy unless and until s/he communicates a decision to renounce the agreement. Likewise, a person who joins a conspiracy after its formation is equally guilty with the original conspirators[iii]. It is to be noted that a conspirator is liable for the acts of his/her co-conspirators. There are various elements that constitute conspiracy. A criminal conspiracy will be complete if it fulfills the following main elements[iv]: An agreement about the objective of the conspiracy; Specific intent to achieve that object; An overt act in furtherance of the agreement. Conspirators are jointly liable in conspiracy.

If a defendant claims that s/he was not present at the time of the alleged conspiracy, or if s/he was unaware about the means to be employed for committing conspiracy, or defendant was put under coercion by the co-conspirator to commit conspiracy, these will not amount to a defense in criminal conspiracy. [i] Meineke Discount Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. Tex. 1993) [ii] People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593 (Cal. 1996) [iii] United States v. Blackwell, 954 F. Supp. 944 (D.N.J. 1997) [iv] United States v. Wallace, 85 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996) Inside Conspiracy Overt act legal definition of overt act Overt act legal definition of overt act Also found in: Wikipedia . Overt Act An open, manifest act from which criminality may be implied. An outward act done in pursuance and manifestation of an intent or design.

An overt act is essential to establish an attempt to commit a crime. It is also a key element in the crime of Treason and has become a component of federal and some state criminal conspiracy laws. It also plays a role in the right of Self-Defense . An attempt to commit a crime is an offense when an accused makes a substantial but unsuccessful effort to commit a crime. The elements of attempt include an intent to commit a crime, an apparent ability to complete the crime, and an overt act. An overt act is an act that is performed to execute the criminal intention and will naturally achieve that result unless prevented by some external cause. The act must directly move toward commission of the crime and must be more than acts of planning or preparation. Defining when an act is more than preparatory has proved difficult. Several tests have been used to determine when an overt act has been committed. The "unequivocal" test states that a defendant's act, standing alone, is unequivocally consistent only with her or his intent to commit the allegedly attempted crime. This test has been criticized as too lenient on criminals because no act is truly unequivocal.

A person who shoots someone several times can argue that she was only trying to injure the victim and that it was her skilled shooting and not luck that prevented the victim's death. Some jurisdictions favor the "substantial act" test. They permit an attempt conviction when a defendant with the requisite criminal intent performs a substantial act towards the commission of the crime. Under this test, for example, a prospective burglar can be convicted of attempted Burglary if apprehended in an alley with burglary tools, even though he had not determined which building he was going to burglarize. The "probable desistence" test asks whether the defendant had gone so far down the road of crime that it is unlikely that she or he would have voluntarily desisted from completing the crime. One way of measuring this probability is to look at the past criminal record of an accused. Thus, an accused with a previous record may be convicted under this test, because her past propensity makes it unlikely that she would have stopped taking the acts leading to the crime. The need for an overt act also is required in federal and some state criminal conspiracy prosecutions.

A conspiracy is a voluntary agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act that is not in itself unlawful. Under federal law the overt act must be an independent act that comes after the agreement or conspiracy and is performed to effect the objective of the conspiracy. The overt act itself need not be a criminal act, because its sole function is to demonstrate that the conspiracy is operative. If, for example, two persons conspire to rob a bank and rent a getaway car, the rental is an overt act that in itself is perfectly legal. Some states, however, still adhere to the common-law rule that an overt act is not required to prove a conspiracy. An overt act that justifies the exercise of the right of self-defense is one that causes a reasonable person to perceive a present intention to cause his or her death or great bodily harm. The federal crime of treason contains an overt act requirement. Article III, Section 3, Clause 1, of the U.S.

Constitution provides, "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act." In such a case, an overt act means a step taken to execute a treasonable purpose, as distinguished from mere words or a treasonable sentiment, purpose, or design not resulting in action. It is an act in furtherance of the crime. Cross-references embracery References in classic literature ?

In other towns in Italy the people lie around quietly and wait for you to ask them a question or do some overt act that can be charged for--but in Annunciation they have lost even that fragment of delicacy; they seize a lady's shawl from a chair and hand it to her and charge a penny; they open a carriage door, and charge for it--shut it when you get out, and charge for it; they help you to take off a duster--two cents; brush your clothes and make them worse than they were before--two cents; smile upon you--two cents; bow, with a lick-spittle smirk, hat in hand-- two cents; they volunteer all information, such as that the mules will arrive presently--two cents--warm day, sir--two cents--take you four hours to make the ascent--two cents. "Conspiracy" Defined & Explained Our Newest Article: Personal Finance Guide CONSPIRACY 18 U.S.C. 371 makes it a separate Federal crime or offense for anyone to conspire or agree with someone else to do something which, if actually carried out, would amount to another Federal crime or offense.

So, under this law, a 'conspiracy' is an agreement or a kind of 'partnership' in criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member. In order to establish a conspiracy offense it is not necessary for the Government to prove that all of the people named in the indictment were members of the scheme; or that those who were members had entered into any formal type of agreement; or that the members had planned together all of the details of the scheme or the 'overt acts' that the indictment charges would be carried out in an effort to commit the intended crime. Also, because the essence of a conspiracy offense is the making of the agreement itself (followed by the commission of any overt act), it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful plan.

What the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt is: First: That two or more persons, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the indictment; Second: That the person willfully became a member of such conspiracy; Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the methods (or 'overt acts') described in the indictment; and Fourth: That such 'overt act' was knowingly committed at or about the time alleged in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy. An 'overt act' is any transaction or event, even one which may be entirely innocent when considered alone, but which is knowingly committed by a conspirator in an effort to accomplish some object of the conspiracy. A person may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all of the details of the unlawful scheme, and without knowing who all of the other members are.

So, if a person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though he did not participate before, and even though he played only a minor part. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a transaction or event, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. A combination or agreement of two or more persons to join together to attempt to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of 'partnership in criminal purposes,' and willful participation in such a scheme or agreement, followed by the commission of an overt act by one of the conspirators is sufficient to complete the offense of 'conspiracy' itself even though the ultimate criminal object of the conspiracy is not accomplished or carried out.

To establish the offense of 'conspiracy' the Government must prove: (1) That two or more persons in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the indictment; (2) That the person willfully became a member of such conspiracy; (3) That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the methods (or 'overt acts') described in the indictment; and (4) That such 'overt act' was knowingly committed at or about the time alleged in an effort to effect or accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. A person may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of all of the details of the unlawful scheme or the names and identities of all of the other alleged conspirators. So, if a person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though he had not participated before and even though he played only a minor part.

Of course, mere presence at the scene of a transaction or event, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. An agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or an act which may become by the combination injurious to others. Formerly this offence was much more circumscribed in its meaning than it is now. Lord Coke describes it as 'a consultation or agreement between two or more to appeal or indict an innocent person falsely and maliciously, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed and afterwards the party is acquitted by the verdict of twelve men.' The crime of conspiracy, according to its modern interpretation, may be of two kinds, Damely, conspiracies against the public, or such as endanger the public health, violate public morals, insult public justice, destroy the public peace, or affect public trade or business. To remedy these evils the guilty persons may be indicted in the name of the commonwealth.

Conspiracies against individuals are such as have a tendency to injure them in their persons, reputation, or property. The remedy in these cases is either by indictment or by a civil action. In order to render the offence complete, there is no occasion that any act should be done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement entered into between the parties, or that any one should have been defrauded or injured by it. The conspiracy is the gist of the crane. By the former laws of the United States, a willful and corrupt conspiracy to cast away, burn or otherwise destroy any ship or vessel with intent to injure any underwriter thereon, or the goods on board thereof, or any lender of money on such vessel, on bottomry or respondentia, is made felony, and the offender punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars and by imprisonment and confinement at hard labor not exceeding ten years. By the old Revised Statutes of New York it is enacted that if any two or more persons shall conspire either: 1. To commit any offence, or; 2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any offence, or; 3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, or; 4.

To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or; 5. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by means which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtaining property by false pretences, or; 6. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade and commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due administration of the laws; they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. No other conspiracies are there punishable criminally. And no agreement, except to commit a felony upon the person of another, or to commit arson or burglary, shall be deemed a conspiracy, unless some act besides such agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement. When a felony has been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, the latter, which is only a misdemeanor, is merged in the former; but when a misdemeanor only has been committed in pursuance of such conspiracy, the two crimes being of equal degree, there can be no legal technical merger.

--b-- Conspiracy | Define Conspiracy at Dictionary.com conspiracy [kuh n-spir-uh-see] /kənˈspɪr ə si/ Spell the act of conspiring . 2. an evil, unlawful, treacherous, or surreptitious plan formulated in secret by two or more persons; plot. 3. a combination of persons for a secret, unlawful, or evil purpose: He joined the conspiracy to overthrow the government. 4. Law. an agreement by two or more persons to commit a crime, fraud, or other wrongful act. 5. any concurrence in action; combination in bringing about a given result. Origin of conspiracy 1325-75; Middle English conspiracie, probably < Anglo-French; see conspire , -acy ; replacing Middle English conspiracioun; see conspiration Related forms [kuh n-spir-uh-tawr-ee-uh l, -tohr-] /kənˌspɪr əˈtɔr i əl, -ˈtoʊr-/ (Show IPA), conspiratory, adjective conspiratorially, adverb See more synonyms on Thesaurus.com 1. collusion, sedition. 2.

Conspiracy, plot, intrigue, cabal all refer to surreptitious or covert schemes to accomplish some end, most often an evil one. A conspiracy usually involves a group entering into a secret agreement to achieve some illicit or harmful objective: a vicious conspiracy to control prices. A plot is a carefully planned secret scheme, usually by a small number of persons, to secure sinister ends: a plot to seize control of a company. An intrigue usually involves duplicity and deceit aimed at achieving either personal advantage or criminal or treasonous objectives: the petty intrigues of civil servants. Cabal refers either to a plan by a small group of highly-placed persons to overthrow or control a government, or to the group of persons themselves: a cabal of powerful lawmakers. Dictionary.com Unabridged Incomplete Crimes: Conspiracy, Attempt & Solicitation - Lawyers.com Incomplete Crimes: Conspiracy, Attempt & Solicitation Criminal Law By Janet Portman , Attorney The criminal law punishes attempts, agreements to commit crimes, and requests that other people break the law. Updated March 28, 2016 When we think of criminal acts, most of the time we assume that the actor’s intentions have been carried out—the store was robbed, the check was forged.

But some crimes consist of actions that fall short of the final act of commission. These crimes—attempts, conspiracy, and solicitation—are known as incomplete, or “inchoate” crimes. Incomplete crimes fall somewhere in the middle of the “commit a crime” process, which consists of six steps: The actor gets the idea for the crime (killing the victim). The actor evaluates the idea, deciding whether to proceed. The actor decides to go forward with the idea. The actor prepares for the crime, by obtaining necessary weapons, for example. The actor begins the crime, and The actor finishes, or completes the crime. (Jerome Hall, General Principles of the Criminal Law, 558-99 (2d ed. 1960).) We don’t punish people for the first, second, or third steps, because we don’t criminalize having an idea and a decision alone; and we clearly we punish them for the sixth. But activity that happens in the stages in the middle, numbers four and five, is also punishable as an incomplete crime. Attempts An attempted crime is one that wasn’t finished, which failed to achieve completion for one of two reasons: The defendant did everything she set out to do, but failed.

For example, she decides to shoot the victim, buys the gun, follows the victim, shoots, but misses. This is known as a “complete attempt,” or The defendant does some of the acts needed to finish the crime, but is prevented from succeeding or decides to quit. For instance, the defendant takes the steps noted above but changes her mind at the last minute, or is prevented from continuing by the intervention of a police officer. This is known as an “incomplete” attempt. Can one “attempt” to do every crime? A person can be convicted of attempting to commit only certain crimes—those that require “specific intent.” Specific intent describes the defendant’s state of mind, which is to achieve the result that the criminal statute prohibits. Specific intent crimes differ from general intent crimes, which require only the intent to complete the physical act. For example: Murder is a specific intent crime because it requires the prosecutor to show that the defendant intended the victim to die. Battery is a general intent crime, because it requires only that the prosecution prove that the defendant intentionally hit the victim, not that he wanted to cause specific injury or harm. It’s not easy to tell the difference between specific and general intent crimes.

One way is to look at the statute of the crime itself: Does the definition include a requirement that the actor intends the result? Under this test, it’s clear why “receiving stolen property” is a specific intent crime, because its definition includes receiving the property knowing that it is stolen. What must the defendant do to constitute an “attempt?” People must take a concrete, substantial step towards furthering their intent to break the law before they will be guilty of an attempt. This is an act of perpetration (Step Four, above), not mere preparation (Step Three). So, for example, purchasing the weapon, without more, won’t expose the actor to attempted murder, but aiming it towards the victim and firing will. How are attempts punished? Interestingly, the crime of attempt wasn’t even a crime until the late 18th century (before that, “a miss was as good as a mile”). After that, attempts were classified as misdemeanors, but today, almost all attempts to commit a felony are themselves felonies. Attempts to commit specific felonies are often punished at half the maximum allowed for the target crime; if the target is a capital crime or carries life in prison, the attempt will be punished for a specific term of years.

Defendants who successfully complete a crime have also, in the course of their acts, attempted the crime. Logically, they’ve committed an attempt and the resulting crime. They can be charged with both, and the jury can be given both verdicts to choose from, but defendants cannot be convicted of both. In legal lingo, the attempt “merges” with the concluded crime. Conspiracy The crime of conspiracy is another incomplete, or inchoate, crime. It’s an agreement, explicit or implied, among two or more people, to commit a criminal act. But it’s a very controversial crime, because its definition is so vague. Courts have struggled for years to differentiate mere ideas from agreements to break the law; there’s a real risk that people will be punished for what they say, not for what they do. Indeed, historically conspiracy laws have been used to suppress controversial activity, such as strikes and dissent against public policies. Is a mere agreement sufficient for a conspiracy to be formed? Historically, the state did not have to prove that the defendants did any act to further the goal of the agreement. But this led law enforcement to intervene prematurely, before anything dangerous had happened, and to target what turned out to be banter.

Accordingly, modern laws require one step, however trivial, be taken by the actors toward furtherance of their goal. This is known as an “overt act,” and it need not be an attempt to further the conspiracy. For example, making a phone call pursuant to the agreement, or even attending a lawful meeting, may suffice. A single overt act taken by one member of the group suffices to prosecute every member, even members who join the conspiracy after the act has taken place. How do prosecutors prove an agreement? The essence of a conspiracy is a mutual agreement to commit an illegal act or series of such acts. Every member of the group need not agree to every detail of the arrangement, nor must every member agree to commit each element of the offense. It’s enough if each member agrees to commit or facilitate some of the acts that make up the target crime. Prosecutors may establish an agreement with circumstantial evidence, from which juries can draw broad inferences as to a mutual plan. One way of identifying a conspiracy is to ask whether the resulting crime appeared to be “choreographed.” For example, imagine a car driven by Tom, in which Dick and Harry are passengers.

Tom stops the car, Dick and Harry get out, leave the doors open, accost and rob the victim, jump back in the car, and Tom drives off. A jury could validly conclude that the robbery was planned by all three, who could be prosecuted for conspiracy to rob and robbery itself. What is the punishment for conspiracy? Unlike the crime of attempt, conspiracy does not merge into the completed target act. As shown just above, all three defendants face two charges each: conspiracy and robbery. In a typical state statute, the punishment for conspiracy will parallel the punishment for the target crime, so that conspiring to commit a misdemeanor will be a misdemeanor; and conspiring to commit a felony will be a felony (though punished less severely than the target felony itself). What are the defenses to conspiracy? Defendants have offered several defenses to conspiracy charges, depending on the circumstances and the laws of their states. Here are a few of the common ones. Abandoning the plan. Sometimes defendants change their minds and abandon the criminal plan short of accomplishing it. But a change of heart will not defeat a conspiracy conviction, because the crime is complete once the agreement is formed or, in some states, once an overt act has taken place.

But if a conspirator withdraws from the plan (imagine that Dick gets out of the car but runs away), that person at least avoids liability for the completed crime. Conspiring to commit a crime that requires the agreement of two people. Some crimes, such as adultery and bigamy, by definition require the willing cooperation of at least two people. Put another way, one person alone cannot commit these crimes, which also include dueling, selling contraband, and receiving a bribe. Many courts will not allow convictions for conspiring to commit them, but some will disallow a conspiracy conviction only when the target offense has in fact been accomplished or attempted. Interestingly, this rule disappears in some situations when more than two persons are involved in the conspiracy – the conspiracy and the target offense convictions are each allowed to stand. Impossibility. Finally, defendants sometimes raise the issue of factual or legal impossibility as a defense to conspiracy. For example, are Jane and Carol guilty of conspiring to murder someone if the intended victim is already dead? Or, are they guilty of conspiring to steal trade secrets that turn out not to be trade secrets at all, or of conspiring to receive stolen property that isn’t really stolen?

Most courts will not recognize these “impossibilities” as a defense to conspiracy. Solicitation Solicitation is another incomplete crime, consisting of inviting, requesting, commanding, hiring, or encouraging another person to commit a crime. Traditionally, one could solicit only felonies, but modern law applies to misdemeanors, too. What must the defendant intend when soliciting a crime? The prosecution will need to prove to the jury that the defendant intended the other person to do just what the defendant suggested. For example, a joking suggestion to harm someone, which is taken seriously by the listener, won’t rise to the crime of solicitation if the defendant can convince the jury that the words were meant in jest. What must the defendant do to justify a conviction for solicitation? The defendant must invite, request, and so on, but the actual target crime need not be committed, or even attempted, for the accusation of solicitation to stick. For example, if Able asks Bob to rob Victor, but Bob refuses, Able has still solicited Bob.

However, if the request is never communicated, the crime may be attempted solicitation, as when Mary writes to Kay, asking Kay to perform an illegal act, but Kay never receives the letter: Here, Mary may be guilty only of attempted solicitation. Solicitation is a very “incomplete” crime Solicitation is perhaps the most incomplete of the three crimes discussed in this article. If the listener agrees to do the act, the two have formed a conspiracy; and if the act is accomplished or simply attempted, they become principals (responsible for the crime itself or the attempt). So, on the time-line of criminal thinking and behavior, it’s at the far end, where merely asking someone to do a criminal act, without regard to that person’s response, is criminal behavior. In a sense, a solicitation is an attempted conspiracy.

Question: What term is used for the agreement of two or more persons to commit an illegal act?
Answer: Conspiracy