Pompey The Great- 48 BC | Armstrong Economics Pompey The Great- 48 BC Dictator, 53 – 48 BC Born 106 – died 48 BC, age 58 GNAEUS POMPEIUS MAGNUS (Pompey the Great) was Rome’s most famous general during the later period of the Republic. He was the son of Pompeius Strabo who was born in 106 BC. Pompey was married several times. Finally, during his third marriage to Mucia, his two sons were born – Gnaeus Junior and Sextus. When Pompey was only 17 years old, he served in the military campaign during the Social War (90-88 BC) when the whole of Italy rose up against the dominance of Roman power. Pompey fought on the side of Sulla against the Marius in 83 BC upon Sulla’s return to Italy following the Mithradatic War. Pompey’s brilliant skills were largely responsible for Sulla’s victory over the army of the Marian Party.

However, it was his successful campaign in Africa in 81 BC, when Pompey was given the surname “MAGNUS” (the Great). Marius had been an uneducated man of humble origins. His rise to the rank of senator was previously unprecedented. Lacking noble heritage, Marius was a man of the people and not the favorite of the Senate. Thus the conflict between Sulla and Marius was perhaps the first warning signs that the Republic would eventually fall from its own internal political corruption. Following his African campaign, Pompey led a victorious five-year campaign against the Marian leader, Sertorius, in Spain which came to an end in 71 BC. Pompey also claimed credit for the final victory over the embarrassing slave revolt led by the slave Spartacus, despite the fact that the battle had actually been won by Marcus Licinius Crassus . Pompey was then appointed Consul in 70 BC. Following his Consulship appointment, Pompey set out to wipe out the pirates that had been dominating the Mediterranean Sea. Pompey managed to accomplish this task in only three months during 67 BC.

By 66 BC, Pompey took command of the Roman army from Licinius Lucullus, whose spectacular victories over Mithradates were viewed too slow in coming for the impatient Senators. Under Pompey’s command, he brought the Third Mithradatic War (74-65 BC) to a glorious victory, whereupon he then annexed Syria and Palestine adding them both to the Roman Empire. Pompey reached a level of such power through his military accomplishments that he almost assumed dictatorial powers that had been granted to him by the Senate for the conduct of the Mithradatic War. However, Pompey set aside these powers, and returned to Rome where, in 60 BC, he formed an alliance with Julius Caesar and Marcus Crassus. First Triumvirate In 60 BC the alliance between Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar and Marcus Licinius Crassus became known as the “First Triumvirate” thus setting the stage for what would eventually become the birth of the Roman imperial government.

Pompey married Caesar’s daughter, Julia in 59 BC, with the intent that this would strengthen the bond between these two men since they had been on opposite sides during the war between Marius and Sulla. Crassus had also supported Sulla against Marius but Crassus had been saved by Caesar during the Catiline affair. Crassus had shared a consulship with Pompey during which the two men argued almost constantly. Crassus also never forgave Pompey for stealing the glory for the defeat of Spartacus. Thus it was a political partnership very much designed by Caesar. Shortly thereafter, Caesar departed from Rome to assume the conquest of Gaul (59-49 BC), leaving Pompey and Crassus in charge of administration in the capital city. Unfortunately, the bonds between Pompey and Caesar were not altogether that strong and Julia proved to be the great mediator. Unfortunately, Julia died in 54 BC while in childbirth. Crassus was killed in 53 BC, while undertaking an expedition into Mesopotamia against the Parthians. With both Julia and Crassus gone, there was little to prevent these two men from drifting apart.

While Caesar’s conquest of Gaul was starting to rival Pompey’s past victories, Pompey was getting jealous at losing his place of honor in military history. The corrupt Senate of Rome also sought to exploit the situation by undermining the alliance between Caesar and Pompey in order to retain their privileged institution through which their vast trade monopolies were maintained. Pompey was named sole Consul in 53 BC, thus usurping Caesar’s Consulship. In 52 BC, Caesar was confronted by a major rebellion in Gaul during which time Pompey sought to take advantage of the situation. Pompey allied himself with the Senatorial Party in direct opposition to Caesar who had been aligned with the Democratic Party (the Populares) which had opposed the Senatorial nobility since the days of Marius. Pompey, now supported by the Senate, was the acknowledged military and political leader of Rome. On January 1st, 49 BC, the Senate ordered Caesar to give up his command in Gaul, and return to Rome as a private citizen. Caesar had little choice and marched into Italy. Upon crossing the Rubicon, Caesar’s words accurately described the situation – “the die is cast!” Civil war was now unavoidable.

Caesar gathered his army and crossed the Rubicon River which formed the border between his province and mainland Italy and proceeded to march toward Rome. Pompey had miscalculated Caesar’s resolve, skills and intelligence. The majority of the Senate was now terrified realizing that they had gone too far. Pompey hastily mobilized his army and fled across the Adriatic Sea with the majority of senators. Caesar entered Rome without any resistance. Pompey set about building an army in Greece for the inevitable clash with Caesar. But Caesar instead moved on to Spain quickly removing his enemies and any of Pompey’s supporters. Caesar was no fool. His move into Spain was unexpected by Pompey. After protecting his rear, Caesar then returned to Italy and sailed across the Adriatic to confront Pompey’s still unprepared army. In a decisive battle at Pharsalus in Thessaly on August 9, 48 BC, Pompey was utterly defeated. The once great general of Rome retreated on a ship bound for Egypt where he had hoped to find sanctuary. Upon his arrival in Egypt, Pompey was brutally slain by order of Ptolemy, King of Egypt. Pompey was no match for the brilliant Julius Caesar.

Pompey’s greatness was in confrontation – not in strategy and long-term planning. Thus the once Pompey the Great ended pleading for his life in Egypt only to have his head handed over to Caesar upon his arrival. Monetary System First Triumvirate - Ancient History Encyclopedia First Triumvirate by Donald L. Wasson published on 20 March 2016 The First Triumvirate of ancient Rome was an uneasy alliance between the three titans Julius Caesar , Pompey , and Crassus which, from 60 BCE until 53 BCE, dominated the politics of the Roman Republic . Alliances have always been a part of history. Whether one looks to the unification of Sparta and Athens against the Persians in the 5th century BCE or the allied forces of the Triple Entente in World War I, nations and individuals - even former enemies - have sought assistance for one reason or another to overcome a common foe. Ancient Rome was no different. An unstable Republic and a near civil war brought three men to set aside their differences and even contempt for one another to join forces and dominate the government of Rome, even controlling elections, for nearly a decade.

One of the three would eventually rise above the others and become dictator. His name was Gaius Julius Caesar . However, that was several years away. For now he was part of what modern historians have come to call the First Triumvirate. Rome in Chaos The Republic was in dire straits. Roman political order was in chaos. There was street violence and rioting. To some the Roman citizenry was falling victim to moral decay. The statesman, philosopher and poet Marcus Tillius Cicero had even exposed a conspiracy led by the prominent senator Lucius Sergius Catiline to overthrow the Roman leadership. Many believed that it was only a matter of time before the Republic would fall. However, three men, often referred to as “a Gang of Three”, seized the opportunity for personal gain, forming an alliance or triumvirate that would eventually transform the government. Despite individual differences and pure animosity, this “three-headed monster” would remain in control, even through bribes and threats, to dominate both the consulship and military commands.

Advertisement Triumvirate Members The three men who would change the face of Roman politics were Gnaius Pompeius Magnus (Pompey), Marcus Lucinius Crassus, and Gaius Julius Caesar. Each man had his own personal reason for joining together, realizing that he could not achieve it alone. While each had attained personal success, he wanted even more gloria and dignitas (glory and dignity). So, in 60 BCE the three men combined their resources, set aside their personal differences (Crassus, although one of the wealthiest men in Rome, actually despised Pompey) and seized control of the state; however, despite good intentions and personal achievements aside, the union was tenuous at best. In 60 BCE Crassus, Pompey & Caesar combined their resources, set aside their personal differences, and seized control of Rome. Although he considered himself a friend to both Caesar and Pompey, Cicero, who disliked the optimates (Rome's senators) as much as they did, was opposed to joining the triumvirate even though they respected his oratory skills and made regular use of his legal services.

He still cherished the old aristocratic patrician values (even though many of them didn’t respect him). Unfortunately for Cicero, his exposure of the Catiline conspiracy and opposition to the conservatives brought about his exile. It would take an appeal to Pompey and Caesar that allowed him to return to Rome in 57 BCE. Eventually the differences between the alliance's members and their personal greed would spell the triumvirate’s doom. For now, however, the “gang” saw an opportunity and took it, but this triumvirate did not come together overnight. The alliance had its beginning a decade earlier. Advertisement Beginnings - Crassus In 73 BCE a Thracian named Spartacus led a revolt at a gladiator school at Capua, a city south of Rome. He and his followers went on a rampage throughout Italy . The revolt continued for almost two years, defying the Roman forces sent against them, so that in 71 BCE Crassus was sent by the Roman Senate to finally suppress the uprising. Eventually, Spartacus was killed and 6,000 of his followers were crucified along the Appian Way -- the road between Rome and Capua - to serve as a warning to others.

Although most of the praise should have gone to the military leadership of Crassus, Pompey, who had recently returned from Spain, attempted to steal most of the credit for the defeat even though his only accomplishment was to round up the stragglers. Afterwards, both men disobeyed Senate orders and refused to disband their armies. Although Pompey actually scorned the Republican government, the defeat of Spartacus and his followers ensured both men were named co-consuls in 70 BCE. Crassus never forgot Pompey’s arrogance and always sought a military command where he, alone, would achieve glory. Pompey Problems in the East - piracy for one - caused a shortage of food in Rome. In 67 BCE Pompey was sent eastward to not only suppress the presence of pirates on the high seas but also confront Mithridates of Pontus who posed a dangerous threat to the power of Rome in Asia Minor by continually attacking Roman provinces. His eventual death would bring power to his heir and peace with Rome. From 66 to 63 BCE Pompey and his army marched from the Caucasus Mountains in the north to the Red Sea and would “redraw the map” in the eastern Mediterranean.

He reorganized the provinces into Rome's client states, returning to the city in 62 BCE a hero. However, upon his return, he entered the city as a citizen, not a soldier, having disbanded his army. He had a new agenda: he wanted land and eastern settlement for his veterans. The idea was a logical one as no one wanted unemployed veterans in the city, and resettling them in the east would reduce tensions there; however, this was something the Senate would never approve. Standing in the way was Marcus Porcius, better known as Cato the Younger, leader of the optimates, the conservative members of the Senate. Advertisement Caesar Two of the three had valid reasons to unite: Pompey wanted his veterans to be rewarded for their bravery in the east while Crassus hoped to gain not only dignity in a military command but also sought to recoup money he and his fellow investors had lost during the food crises in the east. The third member of the “gang” Julius Caesar, a military hero in his own right, returned from Spain in triumph , something that he hoped would help bring him additional fame and wealth.

While he was not as prosperous as the others (he was actually deeply in debt), he, too, had a goal - to be named consul and afterwards gain a pro-consulship/military command in Gaul . The Three Join Forces However, to achieve these lofty goals, all three realized that mutual support was essential, so by pooling their personal resources (mostly Crassus’ money), contacts (Cicero) and most of all ambition, they set their plan in motion. The first order of business: Caesar was able to reconcile the differences between Pompey and Crassus. Next, he married his daughter Julia to Pompey to seal the alliance. Together, the “gang” overcame their first obstacle when Caesar was named co-consul for the year 59 BCE with Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, unfortunately a good friend of Cato. In his The Twelve Caesars Roman historian Suetonius wrote that Caesar, … succeeded in conciliating Pompey and Marcus Crassus - they were still at odds after their failure to agree on matters of policy while sharing the consulship.

Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus now formed a triple pact, swearing to oppose all legislation of which any one of them might disapprove. (16) Despite his best efforts, Caesar was unable to push Pompey’s agenda or any of his other reforms through the Senate. By law a consul had the right to veto a proposal made by his fellow consul, and that was exactly what Bibulus did, so instead of fighting with the Senate, Caesar took his idea to the popular assembly. As Caesar stood in the Forum and presented his proposal to the assembly, Bibulus attempted to interfere but instead was thrown down the steps of the Temple of Castor where he was showered with garbage. He returned to his home where he remained out of public life. Caesar would rule as consul alone. Cato finally admitted defeat and accepted the bill; the veterans got their land. The triumvirate was apparently working. Crassus' Death After the end of his consulship Caesar and his army crossed over the Alps into Gaul where he would spend the next ten years, returning to Italy in triumph in 50 BCE.

Pompey, already feeling a tinge of jealousy over Caesar’s success, won favor with the Senate when he was given command over the city’s grain supply in 57 BCE after a series of food riots. Next, Pompey and Crassus returned to a joint consulship in 55 BCE. Afterwards, Pompey was named governor of Spain although he remained in Rome and ruled Spain through a series of deputies. Elsewhere, Crassus got his wish and was awarded the command of an army, hoping to achieve personal fame in the east. Unfortunately, he would never realize his goal. In 53 BCE at the Battle of Carrhae he was defeated, killed, and decapitated by the long-time enemy of Rome, the Parthians. In a further insult his head would be used as a prop by the king in a presentation of the Euripides play The Bacchae. His death spelled the doom for the triumvirate. Although the alliance had been renewed in 56 BCE at Luca (Caesar had even left Gaul to attend), Crassus had been the glue that held them together.

The split widened between Caesar and Pompey when Pompey’s wife and Caesar’s daughter Julia died in childbirth in 54 BCE. Civil War - Caesar as Dictator With 40,000 soldiers Caesar crossed the Rubicon and returned to Rome. He was wealthier and more powerful, desiring a return to politics and the consulship - the latter was something both Pompey and the conservatives opposed. By now Pompey was the favored son of the Senate. He had even been named consul in 52 BCE with the full support of Cato. Later, he was rewarded with the command of the Roman forces in Italy. The deep hatred that had lay dormant for years between Caesar and Pompey, together with Pompey’s jealousy, led to a civil war. Because of his friendship with both men, Cicero grew concerned over the hostility between Caesar and Pompey, He wrote to Caesar in March of 49 BCE, … if you are disposed to protect our friend Pompey and reconcile him to yourself and the state, you will certainly find no one better adapted to that aim than myself. … I have always advocated peace … now I am deeply concerned for the rightful position of Pompey.

(Grant, 81-2) Cicero further added that he still considered both of the men his friends and hoped to “…achieve a conciliation between yourself and Pompey, and peace for the people of Rome.” Caesar wrote back that he trusted Cicero would not interfere. “Although I was convinced that you would take no rash or ill-judged action...in the name of our friendship, that you should not make any move, now that things have gone my way.” Pompey left Rome with his army for Greece and was followed by Caesar. In 48 BCE they met in the Battle of Pharsalus. Caesar was victorious. Pompey fled to Egypt where he was murdered on the beach on the orders of Ptolemy XIII and beheaded. His head was then presented to Caesar. Caesar would go on to secure his power in both Asia Minor and northern Africa, eventually returning to Rome where he served in his new role as dictator only to die by assassination on the Ides of March 44 BCE.

About the Author Pompey the Great | Roman statesman | Britannica.com Pompey the Great Alternative Title: Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus Pompey the Great Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Pompey the Great, Latin in full Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (born September 29, 106 bce, Rome —died September 28, 48 bce, Pelusium, Egypt ), one of the great statesmen and generals of the late Roman Republic , a triumvir (61–54 bce) who was an associate and later an opponent of Julius Caesar . He was initially called Magnus (“the Great”) by his troops in Africa (82–81 bce), and he assumed the cognomen Magnus after 81. Pompey, bust c. 60–50 bc; in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen, Den. Courtesy of Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen Early career Pompey belonged to the senatorial nobility, although his family first achieved the office of consul only in 141.

Fluent in Greek and a lifelong and intimate friend of Greek literati, he must have had the normal education of a young Roman nobleman, and his early experience on the staff of his father, Pompeius Strabo, did much to form his character, develop his military capabilities, and arouse his political ambition. The family possessed lands in Picenum, what is now the Marches region of eastern Italy , and a numerous body of clients, which Strabo greatly enlarged in the year of his consulship. In a civil war (88–87) between the rival generals Lucius Sulla and Gaius Marius , Strabo defied Sulla and favoured the Marians and a fellow general . After his father’s death, however, Pompey detached himself from the Marians. A report that he was “missing” in Cinna ’s army, when it was embarking for the Balkans to deal with Sulla, led to the lynching of Cinna by his troops (84). Pompey’s part in this mutiny is unclear. He next appears with three legions recruited in Picenum, joining Sulla as an independent ally in the campaign to recover Rome and Italy from the Marians (83).

Sulla made ample use of his youthful ally’s military abilities. Pompey married Sulla’s stepdaughter. On Sulla’s orders the Senate gave Pompey the job of recovering Sicily and Africa from the Marians—a task he completed in two lightning campaigns (82–81). Pompey ruthlessly executed Marian leaders who had surrendered to him. To his enemies he was Sulla’s butcher; to the troops he was “Imperator” and “Magnus.” From Africa Pompey demanded that a triumph be given him in Rome; he refused to disband his army and appeared at the gates of Rome, obliging Sulla to yield to his demand. After Sulla’s abdication, Pompey supported the renegade Sullan Marcus Lepidus for the consulship of 78. Once in office Lepidus attempted revolution, and Pompey promptly joined the forces of law and order against him. The rising crushed, however, Pompey refused to disband his army, which he used to bring pressure on the Senate to send him with proconsular power to join Metellus Pius in Spain against the Marian leader Sertorius . Britannica Stories Ringling Bros.

Folds Its Tent The reconquest of Spain taxed Pompey’s military skill and strained his own and the state’s resources to the utmost. In the end it was he, not Metellus, who imposed on Spain a settlement reflecting and promoting his own political aims. His policy was one of reconciliation and rehabilitation. His personal authority and patronage now covered Spain, southern Gaul, and northern Italy. Unlike Metellus, Pompey took his army back to Italy with him, ostensibly to assist in putting down a slave revolt led by Spartacus but in reality to secure a triumph and election to the consulship for 70. The nobles whom Sulla had restored to power had proved to be more corrupt and incompetent than ever. Pompey promised reforms at home and abroad. A bargain was struck with his rival Marcus Licinius Crassus (who had actually defeated Spartacus), the two were jointly elected consuls, and Pompey was given another triumph. During their joint consulate, they substantially repealed Sulla’s political reforms by restoring the powers of the tribunes and stripping senators of their monopoly as jurors on standing courts.

Reorganization of the East The Roman Empire Although the nobles were to continue to dominate the consular elections in most years, the real sources of power henceforth lay outside of Italy. Extraordinary commands would have to be created if Rome was to recover control of the sea from pirates. It was Pompey who benefited most from the restoration of tribunician initiative . After his consulship, he waited in Rome while rival nobles undermined the position of Lucius Licinius Lucullus , who was campaigning against Mithradates in Anatolia , and made halfhearted attempts to deal with the pirates. Finally, in 67, the tribune Aulus Gabinius forced a bill through the popular assembly empowering Pompey to settle the pirate problem. Britannica Lists & Quizzes Editor Picks: Exploring 10 Types of Basketball Movies Pompey was still in the East, resettling pirates as peaceful farmers, when in Rome another tribune, Gaius Manilius, carried through, against weakened opposition, a bill appointing Pompey to the command against Mithradates , with full powers to make war and peace and to organize the whole Roman East (66).

Pompey displaced Lucullus and lost no time defeating Mithradates in Asia Minor. After the death of Mithradates in 63, Pompey was free to plan the consolidation of the eastern provinces and frontier kingdoms. For 6,000 talents he set up King Tigranes in Armenia as a friend and ally of Rome—and as his own protégé. Pompey rejected the Parthian king’s request to recognize the Euphrates as the limit of Roman control and extended the Roman chain of protectorates to include Colchis , on the Black Sea , and the states south of the Caucasus . In Anatolia, he created the new provinces of Bithynia-Pontus and Cilicia . He annexed Syria and left Judaea as a dependent, diminished temple state. The organization of the East remains Pompey’s greatest achievement. His sound appreciation of the geographical and political factors involved enabled him to impose an overall settlement that was to form the basis of the defensive frontier system and was to last, with few important changes, for more than 500 years.

Pompey’s power and prestige were at their height in December 62, when he landed at Brundisium ( Brindisi ) and dismissed the army. His third triumph (61) trumpeted the grandeur of his achievement. The following decade was the period of his ascendancy in Italy, an ascendancy that was to be eroded through Caesar’s growing military power and gradual capture of Pompey’s worldwide clientelae, from the power base Caesar, in turn, created in northern Italy and Gaul. Pompey’s inveterate enemies in Rome were the Optimates , the inner ring of nobles, not Crassus or Caesar, who had merely tried to steal the limelight in Pompey’s absence and to maneuver into a better position for bargaining with their former political ally. The nobles meanwhile had gradually reasserted their dominance in Rome and hampered attempts to alleviate the condition of Italy and the Roman populace. Once back in Italy, Pompey avoided siding with popular elements against the Optimates . He was no revolutionary. He wanted all classes to recognize him as first citizen, available for further large-scale services to the state.

He had divorced his third wife, Mucia, allegedly for adultery with Caesar, and now proposed to ally himself by marriage to the party of the young senatorial leader Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger . But the nobles were closing their ranks against him, and his offer was rebuffed. Lucullus and others were determined to prevent the en bloc ratification of Pompey’s eastern settlement and to reject his demand for land for his veterans. The “First Triumvirate” Facebook Twitter YouTube Instagram Pinterest Help came only when Caesar returned from his governorship in Spain. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar formed the unofficial and at first secret “First Triumvirate.” (This was not a legal position, and the term, although convenient, is modern.) It was to become more than a mere election compact. It would strain all the resources of the triumvirs to wrest one consulship from the Optimates; their continued solidarity was essential if they were to secure what Caesar gained for them in 59. Caesar, for his part, wanted a long-term command. Pompey, who now married Caesar’s daughter, Julia , saw Caesar as his necessary instrument.

Caesar, once consul, immediately forced through a land bill and, shortly after, another appropriating public lands in Campania . Once he had secured a five-year command in Illyria and Gaul he could be relied on to take off a large proportion of Pompey’s discharged troops and give them further opportunities for profitable employment. Pompey solved the problem of Rome’s grain supply with his usual efficiency , but the nobles kept up their opposition. The year 56 was a critical one for the triumvirs. The nobles concocted religious impediments to prevent the dispatch of Pompey on a military mission to Egypt, while Publius Clodius contrived to persuade Pompey that Crassus had designs on his life. An attempt was made to suspend Caesar’s law for the distribution of Campanian land. Alarmed at Pompey’s suspicions and truculence, Crassus set off to meet Caesar at Ravenna , and Caesar in turn came to the limit of his province at Luca to meet Pompey.

The Luca conference (56) prepared the ground for the next phase of cooperation: Pompey and Crassus were to secure election to the consulship for 55, for they too wanted five-year commands in the provinces, while Caesar’s command was to be renewed for another five years. The three secured their ends by violence and corruption after a prolonged struggle. Early in 55 Pompey and Crassus were at last elected consuls, with most of the lesser magistracies going to their supporters. Caesar obtained the extension of his command, while Pompey and Crassus received commands in Spain and Syria, respectively. Pompey could stay on in Italy and govern his provinces by deputies. But their cooperation was coming to an end. The death of Julia (54) destroyed the strongest bond between Pompey and Caesar, and Crassus suffered disastrous defeat and death in Mesopotamia . The compact existed no longer, but Pompey as yet showed no inclination to break with Caesar. Civil war Eyjafjallajökull volcano Meanwhile, from outside the walls of Rome, Pompey watched the anarchy in the city becoming daily more intolerable.

He was prepared to wait without committing himself until the Optimates found an alliance with him unavoidable. He refused further offers from Caesar of a marriage alliance. There was talk in Rome as early as 54 of a dictatorship for Pompey. Street violence made it impossible to hold the elections. In January 52 Clodius was killed by armed followers of Titus Annius Milo , whose candidacy for the consulship was being bitterly opposed by both Pompey and Clodius. Now both factions exploded into even greater violence. The senate house was burned down by the mob. With no senior magistrates in office, the Senate had to call on Pompey to restore order. It was the hour he had waited for. He speedily summoned troops from Italy. The nobles would not have him as dictator; they thought it safer to appoint him sole consul. Pompey’s legislation of 52 reveals his genuine interest in reform and the duplicity of his conduct toward Caesar. He reformed procedure in the courts and produced a panel of respectable jurors. A severe law against bribery at elections was made retrospective to 70 and, for all Pompey’s protests, was rightly taken by Caesar’s friends as aimed at him.

Another useful law enforced a five-year interval between tenure of magistracies in Rome and assumption of provincial commands. But this law and another, which prohibited candidature in absence, effectively destroyed the ground of Caesar’s expectation that he should become designated consul, and so safe from prosecution, before he had to disband his army in Gaul. Several attempts were made in the years 51–50 to recall Caesar before the expiration of his second term in Gaul. They were frustrated by the assertiveness of Caesar’s faction and agents in Rome. Pompey, for all his growing fear and suspicion of Caesar’s ambitions, did not come out openly against Caesar until late in 51, when he suddenly made clear his intentions. He declared that he would not consider the suggestion that Caesar should become designated consul while still in command of his army. His proposals for a compromise date for Caesar’s recall were unacceptable to Caesar, whose sole resource now was to use the wealth he had accumulated in Gaul to buy men who could obstruct his enemies in the Senate. When war came, the Senate was evenly divided between Caesar and Pompey. The consulars were solidly for Pompey, although they saw him simply as the lesser evil.

Late in 50 the consul Gaius Marcellus, failing to induce the Senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, visited Pompey with the consuls designate and placed a sword in his hands. Pompey accepted their invitation to raise an army and defend the state. Caesar continued to offer compromise solutions while preparing to strike. On January 7, 49, the Senate finally decreed a state of war. Four days later Caesar crossed the Rubicon . Pompey’s strategic plan was to abandon Rome and Italy to Caesar and rely on his command of the sea and the resources of the East to starve out the Caesarians in Italy, but he did not have the disciplined loyalty and full cooperation of his Optimate allies, and Caesar’s swift advance southward only just failed to prevent his withdrawal from Italy. Across the Adriatic at Dyrrhachium (now Durrës, Albania) the wisdom of Pompey’s strategy became clear. Caesar, after a hazardous crossing in pursuit, found himself cut off from his base in Italy by sea and facing superior land forces.

Pompey, however, eventually had to abandon his naval blockade of the rest of Caesar’s forces in Brundisium and failed to prevent their crossing to join Caesar. Caesar’s army was repulsed in an assault on Pompey’s camp at Dyrrhachium and, failing a quick decision in the West, Caesar was obliged to move eastward into Thessaly . Pompey followed and joined forces with the Senate’s army there under Scipio, rendering Caesar’s position untenable . At this juncture, Pompey, under pressure from his Optimate allies, decided for battle, a sensible enough decision if his opponent had not been a commander of genius. Pompey suffered a disastrous defeat on the plain of Pharsalus (48). He fled from his camp as the enemy stormed it and made his way to the coast. His supporters were to rally and involve Caesar in strenuous fighting in Africa, Spain, and the East for three more years, but Pompey did not live to play a part in this struggle. Hurried on by Caesar’s rapid pursuit, he lost contact with his own fleet. He moved on southward to Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt.

He decided to land at Pelusium and seek the assistance of Ptolemy , his former client. The king marched down to the coast, ostensibly to welcome him, but he and his counsellors had chosen not to risk offending the victorious Caesar. Pompey’s small squadron lay offshore while Pompey, bidding farewell to his wife, Cornelia, complied with an insidious invitation to enter, with several companions, a small boat sent to bring him to land. As he prepared to step ashore, he was treacherously struck down and killed (September 28, 48 bce). Assessment Pompey’s name cast a lasting shadow. His end inspired some of Lucan ’s finest verses. In the empire he acquired official respectability, and the greatness of his achievement was fully appreciated by the great writers. But there are few clearheaded or unbiased accounts of Pompey by his own contemporaries. Caesar would have his readers believe that he wrote of Pompey more in sorrow than in anger; his propaganda was discreet and subtly damaging to his rival’s reputation. Cicero ’s veering, day-to-day judgments of Pompey reveal his inability to see clearly through the distorting medium of his own vanity.

The inflated eulogies of Pompey in Cicero’s speeches are punctured by his persistent sniping at him in his letters. Yet he looked up to him for leadership and, in the moment of decision, joined him. But Pompey was neither a revolutionary nor a reactionary, willing to wreck the fabric of the commonwealth for the advantage of self or class. He expected a voluntary acceptance of his primacy but was to discover that the methods he had used to get his commands had permanently alienated the dominant nobility. So year after year he had to play a passive role, covertly intriguing or waiting for successive occasions to arise that would force them to accept his leadership. Some thought his waiting game duplicity, others sheer political incompetence. He was an ineffective politician, not from incapacity for intrigue or ruthless action but from lack of candour and consistency in speech and action. As a military leader, Pompey fell short of real greatness, lacking Caesar’s genius, his dynamism and panache, and his geniality in personal relationships. He was circumspect and thorough—the perfect administrator. His vision of empire was no narrower than Caesar’s.

Like many a more recent imperialist, he was satisfied with the ideal of efficient and clean-handed administration and justice , and many of his contemporaries believed that he went far to achieve that aim in his own practice. Pompey, the wealthiest man of his age, invested his millions prudently; his landed estates were distributed throughout Italy in manageable units. For all the extravagance of his triumphal shows and the inexcusable heartlessness of the contests in slaughter with which he entertained the populace, he was a plain-living man, friend and admirer of the Stoic Panaetius . His third wife, Mucia, bore him two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus, and a daughter, Pompeia, before he divorced her for infidelity (62). Julia was the wife he loved most dearly. Cornelia outlived him and mourned his death. More about Pompey the Great 36 References found in Britannica Articles association with Crassus - 44BC | Armstrong Economics BC member of 1st Triumvirate Marcus Licinius Crassus is best remembered by history as the third member of the First Triumvirate along with Caesar and Pompey .

Crassus was indeed a leading figure in the final days of the Roman Republic who played a key role in transforming history. Crassus was known as one of the wealthiest men in Rome. His family had long been involved in politics, and his father served as consul in 97 BC before entering into conflict with Marius in his struggle with Sulla . This conflict resulted in the father’s death in 87 BC . The young Marcus Licinius Crassus had been sent off to Spain to insure his safety. Following his father’s death, Crassus immediately returned to Rome and joined the supporters of Sulla. His loyalty to Sulla was rewarded when large amounts of confiscated property fell under his control when Sulla became the dictator of Rome. He continued his accumulation of wealth and rose in political power as a result. His primary source of wealth came from his estates, from the slave trade and from silver mines. Political strength came from his contacts and popularity that had been carefully developed over the years. Crassus became praetor, earning eventually a proconsular position over several legions. In 72 BC , a slave revolt broke out lead by perhaps the most famous of all slaves in history – Spartacus .

Crassus took the field against Spartacus and won a major victory for which Pompey received the credit. Crassus worked quietly against Pompey regarding his rise to power with great caution. Despite this sense of doubt, Crassus served in theconsulship of 70 BC with Pompey. They argued and debated almost every issue resulting in their term together virtually useless with nothing much on their list of accomplishments. Crassus did finance a huge festival with 10,000 tables for the citizens during his office, but not much else was worth recording. In 63 BC it was the Catiline affair which gripped all of Rome in a scandal. Many officials of note fell. Crassus had himself served with Catiline in the censorship and even he too came under suspicion for a time. But Crassus was saved from political disaster by Julius Caesar. It was Caesar who desired to build an alliance against the corruption that had consumed the Senate. With Crassus and Pompey bitterly opposed to one another, Caesar sought a political partnership between the three notable men. In 60 BC , Crassus agreed to join what would become known as the First Triumvirate with Pompey and Caesar.

Each shared all the full benefits of the state. Crassus found his situation basically unchanged. Pompey, who always lacked true intellect, was gradually being influenced by the senate while Caesar was conquering Gaul. In 56 BC , a meeting was held at Luca where their partnership was to be discussed. Crassus, it was decided, would share a consulship again with Pompey, and Caesar would remain in Gaul to finish his conquest. For Crassus, he was still the rich boy who lacked glory compared to Pompey and Caesar. Crassus attempted to establish himself militarily and demanded the territory of Syria. Even though he was 60 years old and deaf in one ear, Crassus put together an army and prepared for the invasion of Parthia. Despite two years of meticulous planning, Crassus’ attempt at military glory proved to be one of the worst disasters ever inflicted upon the Roman army. In 53 BC , in the middle of the desert of Mesopotamia, near a town called Carrhae, Crassus allowed his troops to be surrounded by the Parthians. The Parthians showered the Roman army with arrows.

In the blistering sun, Crassus’ army disappeared. Plutarch reported that a Parthian named Pomaxarthres killed Crassus himself while Dio wrote that Crassus died at the hands of one of his men in order to avoid capture. Nonetheless, the head and right hand of Crassus were sent to King Orodes of Parthia. Reportedly, Orodes poured molten gold into Crassus’ mouth, saying: “Satisfy yourself with the metal for which in life you were so greedy.” Monetary System 1st Triumvirate Timeline 1st Triumvirate Timeline Roman Republic Timeline > First Triumvirate Timeline This 1st Triumvirate timeline fits within the End of the Republic time frame. The word triumvirate comes from the Latin for 'three' and 'man' and so refers to a 3-man power structure. The Roman Republican power structure was not normally a triumvirate. There was a 2-man monarchical element known as the consulship. The two consuls were elected annually. They were the top figures in the political hierarchy. Sometimes a single dictator was put in charge of Rome instead of the consuls.

The dictator was supposed to last for a short period, but in the later years of the Republic, dictators were becoming more tyrannical and less amenable to leaving their position of power. The first triumvirate was an unofficial coalition with the two consuls plus one, Julius Caesar. Year Marcus Licinius Crassus | Roman statesman | Britannica.com Marcus Licinius Crassus Marcus Aurelius Marcus Licinius Crassus, (born c. 115 bc—died 53), politician who in the last years of the Roman Republic formed the so-called First Triumvirate with Julius Caesar and Pompey to challenge effectively the power of the Senate. His death led to the outbreak of the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey (49–45). Crassus fled from Rome when Gaius Marius captured the city in 87. As a young officer, he supported Lucius Cornelius Sulla during the civil war (83–82) between Sulla and the followers of Marius, returning to Rome to help Sulla seize power in 82. The hostility between Pompey and Crassus probably originated in Sulla’s clear preference for Pompey.

Crassus held the praetorship c. 73, and in 72–71 he put down the slave uprising led by Spartacus , although Pompey managed to take the credit. Crassus and Pompey cooperated to pressure the Senate to elect them to the consulship for 70; once in office they overthrew parts of the Sullan constitution. During the 60s, while Pompey was scoring military victories abroad, Crassus was building a political following at Rome. He used his great wealth—derived largely from the sale of property confiscated by Sulla—to extend credit to indebted senators. The young Julius Caesar was helped in this fashion in 62. In 65 Crassus served as censor . In 60 Crassus joined with Pompey and Caesar to form the so-called First Triumvirate. Crassus entered this informal coalition partly to effect passage of laws helpful to his business ventures in Asia. From 58 to 56 he supported efforts to neutralize Pompey’s power.

He and Pompey were reconciled at a meeting of the three leaders at Luca , Etruria, in 56, and in the following year they were both again made consuls. As governor of Syria in 54, Crassus attempted to gain military glory by embarking on an unwarranted invasion of Parthia , to the east. He was defeated and killed at the Battle of Carrhae (see Carrhae, Battle of ) in southern Anatolia. Learn More in these related articles: Pompey The Great (106-48 B.C.) Pompey The Great (106-48 B.C.) Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus one of the great statesmen and generals of the late Roman Republic, a triumvir (61-54 BC), the associate and later opponent of Julius Caesar. He was initially called Magnus (the Great) by his troops in Africa (82-81 BC). Early career. Pompey belonged to the senatorial nobility, although his family first achieved the office of consul only in 141.

Fluent in Greek and a lifelong and intimate friend of Greek literati, he must have had the normal education of a young Roman nobleman; but his early experience on the staff of his father, Pompeius Strabo, did much to form his character, develop his military capabilities, and arouse his political ambition. The family possessed lands in Picenum, in eastern Italy, and a numerous body of clients, which Strabo greatly enlarged in the year of his consulship. In a civil war (88-87) between the rival generals Lucius Sulla and Gaius Marius, Strabo defied Sulla and favoured the Marians and a fellow general. After his father's death, however, Pompey detached himself from the Marians. A report that he was "missing" in Cinna's army, when it was embarking for the Balkans to deal with Sulla, led to the lynching of Cinna by his troops (84). Pompey's part in this mutiny is unclear; he next appears with three legions recruited in Picenum, joining Sulla as an independent ally in the campaign to recover Rome and Italy from the Marians (83).

Sulla made ample use of his youthful ally's military abilities. Pompey married Sulla's stepdaughter. On Sulla's orders the Senate gave Pompey the job of recovering Sicily and Africa from the Mariansa task he completed in two lightning campaigns (82-81). Pompey ruthlessly executed Marian leaders who had surrendered to him. To his enemies he was Sulla's butcher; to the troops he was "Imperator" and "Magnus." From Africa Pompey demanded that a triumph be given him in Rome; he refused to disband his army and appeared at the gates of Rome, obliging Sulla to yield to his demand. After Sulla's abdication, Pompey supported the renegade Sullan Marcus Lepidus for the consulship of 78. Once in office Lepidus attempted revolution, and Pompey promptly joined the forces of law and order against him. The rising crushed, however, Pompey refused to disband his army, which he used to bring pressure on the Senate to send him with proconsular power to join Metellus Pius in Spain against the Marian leader Sertorius.

The reconquest of Spain taxed Pompey's military skill and strained his own and the state's resources to the utmost. In the end it was he, not Metellus, who imposed on Spain a settlement reflecting and promoting his own political aims. His policy was one of reconciliation and rehabilitation. His personal authority and patronage now covered Spain, southern Gaul, and northern Italy. Unlike Metellus, Pompey took his army back to Italy with him, ostensibly to assist in putting down a slave revolt led by Spartacus, but in reality to secure a triumph and election to the consulship for 70. The nobles whom Sulla had restored to power had proved to be more corrupt and incompetent than ever. Pompey promised reforms at home and abroad. A bargain was struck with his rival Marcus Licinius Crassus, the two were jointly elected consuls, and Pompey was given another triumph. Reorganization of the East. Although the nobles were to continue to dominate the consular elections in most years, the real sources of power henceforth lay outside of Italy. Extraordinary commands would have to be created if Rome was to recover control of the sea from pirates.

It was Pompey who benefitted most from the restoration of tribunician initiative. After his consulship, he waited in Rome while rival nobles undermined the position of Lucius Licinius Lucullus, who was campaigning against Mithradates in Anatolia, and made halfhearted attempts to deal with the pirates. Finally, in 67, the tribune Aulus Gabinius forced a bill through the popular assembly empowering Pompey to settle the pirate problem. Pompey was still in the East, resettling pirates as peaceful farmers, when in Rome another tribune, Gaius Manilius, carried through, against weakened opposition, a bill appointing Pompey to the command against Mithradates, with full powers to make war and peace and to organize the whole Roman East (66). Pompey displaced Lucullus and lost no time defeating Mithradates in Asia Minor. After the death of Mithradates in 63, Pompey was free to plan the consolidation of the eastern provinces and frontier kingdoms. For 6,000 talents he set up King Tigranes in Armenia as a friend and ally of Romeand as his own prot�g�.

Pompey rejected the Parthian king's request to recognize the Euphrates as the limit of Roman control and extended the Roman chain of protectorates to include Colchis, on the Black Sea, and the states south of the Caucasus. In Anatolia, he created the new provinces of Bithynia-Pontus and Cilicia. He annexed Syria and left Judaea as a dependent, diminished temple state. The organization of the East remains Pompey's greatest achievement. His sound appreciation of the geographical and political factors involved enabled him to impose an overall settlement that was to form the basis of the defensive frontier system and was to last, with few important changes, for more than 500 years. Pompey's power and prestige were at their height in December 62, when he landed at Brundisium (Brindisi) and dismissed the army. His third triumph (61) trumpeted the grandeur of his achievement.

The following decade was the period of his ascendancy in Italy, an ascendancy that was to be eroded through Caesar's growing military power and gradual capture of Pompey's worldwide clientelae, from the power base Caesar, in turn, created in northern Italy and Gaul. Pompey's inveterate enemies in Rome were the Optimates, the inner ring of nobles, not Crassus or Caesar, who had merely tried to steal the limelight in Pompey's absence and to manoeuvre into a better position for bargaining with their former political ally. The nobles meanwhile had gradually reasserted their dominance in Rome and hampered attempts to alleviate the condition of Italy and the Roman populace. Once back in Italy, Pompey avoided siding with popular elements against the Optimates. He was no revolutionary. He wanted all classes to recognize him as first citizen, available for further large-scale services to the state. He had divorced his third wife, Mucia, and now proposed to ally himself by marriage to the party of the young senatorial leader Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger. But the nobles were closing their ranks against him, and his offer was rebuffed.

Lucullus and others were determined to prevent the en bloc ratification of Pompey's eastern settlement and to reject his demand for land for his veterans. The First Triumvirate. Help came only when Caesar returned from his governorship in Spain. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar formed the unofficial and at first secret First Triumvirate. It was to become more than a mere election compact. It would strain all the resources of the triumvirs to wrest one consulship from the Optimates; their continued solidarity was essential if they were to secure what Caesar gained for them in 59. Caesar, for his part, wanted a long-term command. Pompey, who now married Caesar's daughter, Julia, saw Caesar as his necessary instrument. Caesar, once consul, immediately forced through a land bill and, shortly after, another appropriating public lands in Campania. Once he had secured a five-year command in Illyria and Gaul he could be relied on to take off a large proportion of Pompey's discharged troops and give them further opportunities for profitable employment. Pompey solved the problem of Rome's grain supply with his usual efficiency, but the nobles kept up their opposition.

The year 56 was a critical one for the triumvirs. The nobles concocted religious impediments to prevent the dispatch of Pompey on a military mission to Egypt, while Publius Clodius contrived to persuade Pompey that Crassus had designs on his life. An attempt was made to suspend Caesar's law for the distribution of Campanian land. Alarmed at Pompey's suspicions and truculence, Crassus set off to meet Caesar at Ravenna, and Caesar in turn came to the limit of his province at Luca to meet Pompey. The Luca conference (56) prepared the ground for the next phase of triumviral cooperation: Pompey and Crassus were to secure election to the consulship for 55, for they, too, wanted five-year commands in the provinces, while Caesar's command was to be renewed for another five years. The three secured their ends by violence and corruption after a prolonged struggle. Early in 55 Pompey and Crassus were at last elected consuls, with most of the lesser magistracies going to their supporters. Caesar obtained the extension of his command, while Pompey and Crassus received commands in Spain and Syria, respectively.

Pompey could stay on in Italy and govern his provinces by deputies. But the triumvirate was coming to an end. The death of Julia (54) destroyed the strongest bond between Pompey and Caesar, and Crassus suffered disastrous defeat and death in Mesopotamia. The triumvirate existed no longer; but Pompey as yet showed no inclination to break with Caesar. Civil war. Meanwhile, from outside the walls of Rome, Pompey watched the anarchy in the city becoming daily more intolerable. He was prepared to wait without committing himself until the Optimates found an alliance with him unavoidable. He refused further offers from Caesar of a marriage alliance. There was talk in Rome as early as 54 of a dictatorship for Pompey. Street violence made it impossible to hold the elections. In January 52 Clodius was killed by armed followers of Titus Annius Milo, whose candidacy for the consulship was being bitterly opposed by both Pompey and Clodius. Now both factions exploded into even greater violence. The senate house was burnt down by the mob. With no senior magistrates in office, the Senate had to call on Pompey to restore order. It was the hour he had waited for.

He speedily summoned troops from Italy. The nobles would not have him as dictator; they thought it safer to appoint him sole consul. Pompey's legislation of 52 reveals his genuine interest in reform and the duplicity of his conduct towards Caesar. He reformed procedure in the courts and produced a panel of respectable jurors. A severe law against bribery at elections was made retrospective to 70 and, for all Pompey's protests, was rightly taken by Caesar's friends as aimed at him. Another useful law enforced a five-year interval between tenure of magistracies in Rome and assumption of provincial commands. But this law and another, which prohibited candidature in absence, effectively destroyed the ground of Caesar's expectation that he should become designated consul, and so safe from prosecution, before he had to disband his army in Gaul. Several attempts were made in the years 51-50 to recall Caesar before the expiration of his second term in Gaul. They were frustrated by the assertiveness of Caesar's faction and agents in Rome. Pompey, for all his growing fear and suspicion of Caesar's ambitions, did not come out openly against Caesar until late in 51, when he suddenly made clear his intentions.

He declared that he would not consider the suggestion that Caesar should become designated consul while still in command of his army. His proposals for a compromise date for Caesar's recall were unacceptable to Caesar, whose sole resource now was to use the wealth he had accumulated in Gaul to buy men who could obstruct his enemies in the Senate. When war came, the Senate was evenly divided between Caesar and Pompey. The consulars were solidly for Pompey, although they saw him simply as the lesser evil. Late in 50 the consul Gaius Marcellus, failing to induce the Senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, visited Pompey with the consuls designate and placed a sword in his hands. Pompey accepted their invitation to raise an army and defend the state. Caesar continued to offer compromise solutions while preparing to strike. On Jan. 7, 49, the Senate finally decreed a state of war. Four days later Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

Pompey's strategic plan was to abandon Rome and Italy to Caesar and rely on his command of the sea and the resources of the East to starve out the Caesarians in Italy; but he did not have the disciplined loyalty and full cooperation of his Optimate allies, and Caesar's swift advance southward only just failed to prevent his withdrawal from Italy. Across the Adriatic at Dyrrhachium the wisdom of Pompey's strategy became clear. Caesar, after a hazardous crossing in pursuit, found himself cut off from his base in Italy by sea and facing superior land forces. Pompey, however, eventually had to abandon his naval blockade of the rest of Caesar's forces in Brundisium and failed to prevent their crossing to join Caesar. Caesar's army was repulsed in an assault on Pompey's camp at Dyrrhachium and, failing a quick decision in the West, Caesar was obliged to move eastwards into Thessaly. Pompey followed and joined forces with the Senate's army there under Scipio, rendering Caesar's position untenable.

At this juncture, Pompey, under pressure from his Optimate allies, decided for battle, a sensible enough decision if his opponent had not been a commander of genius. Pompey suffered a disastrous defeat on the plain of Pharsalus (48). He fled from his camp as the enemy stormed it and made his way to the coast. His supporters were to rally and involve Caesar in strenuous fighting in Africa, Spain, and the East for three more years; but Pompey did not live to play a part in this struggle. Hurried on by Caesar's rapid pursuit, he lost contact with his own fleet. He moved on southward to Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt. He decided to land at Pelusium and seek the assistance of Ptolemy, his former client. The King marched down to the coast, ostensibly to welcome him; but he and his counsellors had chosen not to risk offending the victorious Caesar. Pompey's small squadron lay offshore while Pompey, bidding farewell to his wife, Cornelia, complied with an insidious invitation to enter, with several companions, a small boat sent to bring him to land.

As he prepared to step ashore he was treacherously struck down and killed (Sept. 28, 48 BC). Assessment. Pompey's name cast a lasting shadow. His end inspired some of Lucan's finest verses. In the empire he acquired official respectability, and the greatness of his achievement was fully appreciated by the great writers. But there are few clear-headed or unbiassed accounts of Pompey by his own contemporaries. Caesar would have his readers believe that he wrote of Pompey more in sorrow than in anger; his propaganda was discreet and subtly damaging to his rival's reputation. Cicero's veering, day-to-day judgments of Pompey reveal his inability to see clearly through the distorting medium of his own vanity. The inflated eulogies of Pompey in Cicero's speeches are punctured by his persistent sniping at him in his letters. Yet he looked up to him for leadership and, in the moment of decision, joined him. But Pompey was neither a revolutionary nor a reactionary, willing to wreck the fabric of the commonwealth for the advantage of self or class.

He expected a voluntary acceptance of his primacy but was to discover that the methods he had used to get his commands had permanently alienated the dominant nobility. So year after year he had to play a passive role, covertly intriguing or waiting for successive occasions to arise that would force them to accept his leadership. Some thought his waiting game duplicity, others, sheer political incompetence. He was an ineffective politician, not from incapacity for intrigue or ruthless action but from lack of candour and consistency in speech and action. As a military leader, Pompey fell short of real greatness, lacking Caesar's genius, his dynamism and panache, and his geniality in personal relationships. He was circumspect and thoroughthe perfect administrator. His vision of empire was no narrower than Caesar's. Like many a more recent imperialist, he was satisfied with the ideal of efficient and clean-handed administration and justice, and many of his contemporaries believed that he went far to achieve that aim in his own practice. Pompey, the wealthiest man of his age, invested his millions prudently; his landed estates were distributed throughout Italy in manageable units.

For all the extravagance of his triumphal shows and the inexcusable heartlessness of the contests in slaughter with which he entertained the populace, he was a plain-living man, friend and admirer of the Stoic Panaetius. His third wife, Mucia, bore him two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus, and a daughter, Pompeia, before he divorced her for infidelity (62). Julia was the wife he loved most dearly; Cornelia outlived him and mourned his death. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Article) Eric William Gray

Question: Pompey the Great and Crassus were two of the 'First Triumvirate' in 60 BC. Who was the third third?
Answer: JULIUS CAESAR