The Falklands War Updated August 02, 2016. Falkland War - Overview: Fought in 1982, the Falklands War was the result of the Argentine invasion of the British-owned Falkland Islands. Located in the South Atlantic, Argentina had long claimed these islands as part of its territory. On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands, capturing the islands two days later. In response, the British dispatched a naval and amphibious task force to the area. The initial phases of the conflict occurred mainly at sea between elements of the Royal Navy and the Argentine Air Force. On May 21, British troops landed and by June 14 had compelled the Argentine occupiers to surrender. Falklands War - Dates: The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentine troops landed in the Falkland Islands . Fighting ended on June 14, following the British liberation of the islands' capital, Port Stanley, and the surrender of Argentine forces in the Falklands. The British declared a formal end to military activity on June 20.

Falklands War: Prelude and Invasion: In early 1982, President Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the Argentina's ruling military junta, authorized the invasion of the British Falkland Islands. The operation was designed to draw attention away from human rights and economic issues at home by bolstering national pride and giving teeth to the nation's long-held claim on the islands. After an incident between British and Argentine forces on nearby South Georgia Island, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands on April 2. The small garrison of Royal Marines resisted, however by April 4 the Argentines had captured the capital at Port Stanley. Argentine troops also landed on South Georgia and quickly secured the island. Falklands War: British Response: After organizing diplomatic pressure against Argentina, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the assembly of a naval task force to retake the islands. After the House of Commons voted to approve Thatcher's actions on April 3, she formed a War Cabinet which first met three days later. Commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse , the task force consisted of several groups, the largest of which was centered on the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible.

Led by Rear Admiral "Sandy" Woodward, this group contained the Sea Harrier fighters that would provide air cover for the fleet. In mid-April, Fieldhouse began moving south, with a large fleet of tankers and cargo ships to supply the fleet while it operated more than 8,000 miles from home. All told, 127 ships served in the task force including 43 warships, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and 62 merchant vessels. Falklands War: First Shots: As the fleet sailed south to its staging area at Ascension Island, it was shadowed by Boeing 707s from the Argentine Air Force. On April 25, British forces sank the submarine ARA Santa Fe near South Georgia shortly before troops led by Major Guy Sheridan of the Royal Marines liberated the island. Five days later, operations against the Falklands began with the " Black Buck " raids by RAF Vulcan bombers flying from Ascension. These saw the bombers strike the runaway at Port Stanley and radar facilities in the area. That same day Harriers attacked various targets, as well as shot down three Argentine aircraft.

As the runway at Port Stanley was too short for modern fighters, the Argentine Air Force was forced to fly from the mainland, which placed them at a disadvantage throughout the conflict ( Map ). Falklands War: Fighting at Sea: While cruising west of the Falklands on May 2, the submarine HMS Conqueror spotted the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. Conqueror fired three torpedoes, hitting hitting the World War II -vintage Belgrano twice and sinking it. This attack led to the Argentine fleet, including the carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, remaining in port for the rest of the war. Two days later, they had their revenge when an Exocet anti-ship missile , launched from an Argentine Super Étendard fighter, struck HMS Sheffield setting it ablaze. Having been ordered forward to serve as a radar picket, the destroyer was hit amidships and the resulting explosion severed its high-pressure fire main. After attempts to stop the fire failed, the ship was abandoned. The sinking of Belgrano cost 323 Argentines killed, while the attack on Sheffield resulted in 20 British dead.

Falklands War: Landing at San Carlos Water: On the night of May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp moved into Falkland Sound and began landing British forces at San Carlos Water on the northwest coast of East Falkland. The landings had been preceded by a Special Air Service (SAS) raid on nearby Pebble Island's airfield. When the landings had finished, approximately 4,000 men, commanded by Brigadier Julian Thompson, had been put ashore. Over the next week, the ships supporting the landings were hit hard by low-flying Argentine aircraft. The sound was soon dubbed "Bomb Alley" as HMS Ardent (May 22), HMS Antelope (May 24), and HMS Coventry (May 25) all sustained hits and were sunk, as was MV Atlantic Conveyor (May 25) with a cargo of helicopters and supplies. Falklands War: Goose Green, Mount Kent, & Bluff Cove/Fitzroy: Thompson began pushing his men south, planning to secure the western side of the island before moving east to Port Stanley.

On May 27/28, 600 men under Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones outfought over 1,000 Argentines around Darwin and Goose Green, ultimately forcing them to surrender. Leading a critical charge, Jones was killed later received the Victoria Cross posthumously. A few days later, British commandos defeated Argentine commandos on Mount Kent. In early June, an additional 5,000 British troops arrived and command shifted to Major General Jeremy Moore. While some of these troops were disembarking at Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, their transports, RFA Sir Tristram and RFA Sir Galahad, were attacked killing 56 ( Map ). Falklands War: Fall of Port Stanley: After consolidating his position, Moore began the assault on Port Stanley. British troops launched simultaneous assaults on the high ground surrounding the town on the night of June 11. After heavy fighting, they succeeded in capturing their objectives. The attacks continued two nights later, and British units took the town's last natural lines of defense at Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown.

Encircled on land and blockaded at sea, the Argentine commander, General Mario Menéndez, realized his situation was hopeless and surrendered his 9,800 men on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. Falklands War: Aftermath & Casualties: In Argentina, the defeat led to the removal of Galtieri three days after the fall of Port Stanley. His downfall spelled the end for the military junta that had been ruling the country and paved the way for the restoration of democracy. For Britain, the victory provided a much needed boost to its national confidence, reaffirmed its international position, and assured victory for the Thatcher Government in the 1983 elections. The settlement that ended the conflict called for a return to status quo ante bellum. Despite its defeat, Argentina still claims the Falklands and South Georgia. During the war, Britain suffered 258 killed and 777 wounded. In addition, 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, and 2 auxiliary vessels were sunk. For Argentina, the Falklands War cost 649 killed, 1,068 wounded, and 11,313 captured.

In addition, the Argentine Navy lost a submarine, a light cruiser, and 75 fixed-wing aircraft. PSYOP OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR began settling the islands and declared a colonial administration in 1842. Argentina never recognized the claim and historically has demanded that the islands be part of that nation. They say that Ownership is 90% of the law and the islands have been continuously occupied by residents who have always demanded the right to remain British subjects. In the early 1980s, the period that we will discuss, the population was 1,813 with over half living in the capitol town of Port Stanley on East Falkland . Although there are less than 2000 citizens, there are an estimated 600,000 sheep. Wool and hides are obviously the chief import of the Falklands . The islands were administered at the time by Governor Rex Hunt. They were far from Britain and certainly not an economic or military priority. There might have been some belief among the Argentineans that the occupation of these islands, called by them the Islas Malvinas would be treated by the British as a fait accompli.

The Spanish first colonized what would be known as Argentina and controlled it for about 300 years. The nation gained independence in 1816 after a six year struggle led by General Jose de San Martin. From that time on there were a series of military takeovers and political dictators. The most famous is probably Juan Peron who was elected president in 1945. After Peron there was a series of petty dictators, with Peron himself being recalled to power in 1973. In 1976, another military coup put a junta made up of the commanders of the armed forces in charge. There were a series of generals in a revolving door leadership that led to Army General Leopoldo Galtieri holding power in 1982. Argentina was in deep economic trouble. The inflation was over 600 percent, manufacturing output down 22.9%, and real wages down by 19.2%. In addition, the Junta has kidnapped, tortured and murdered large numbers of the population.

The book War in the Falklands, the Sunday Times of London Insight Team, Harper & Row, NY, 1982 comments on the civil rights violations: In just over two years, according to estimates of human rights organizations, up to 18,000 Argentineans vanished, including thousands of high-school children. Most of the disappeared were young, radical, and middle-class. Over one hundred journalists and two hundred scientists vanished. Galtieri accepted the collective responsibility of the junta. He coldly stated: In any war, there are people who disappear. The Argentine people were clamoring for change, and the leadership decided that the best way to take their mind off the numerous problems at home is to give them a glorious patriotic victory and the return of the Islas Malvinas. The campaign was originally named Operaci�n Azul after the blue robe of the Virgin Mary, but later changed to Operaci�n Rosario (Rosary) in what appears to be an attempt by the Argentine government to give the impression of a patriotic Catholic religious crusade. The invasion was initially planned for 25 May, the anniversary of the revolution and one of the most important national holidays.

Due to the mounting pressures on the government, and mass union demonstrations in late March, the date of the invasion was moved earlier to 2 April. Its main purpose was to divert public attention from the internal problems and restore the long lost popularity and prestige of the dictatorship. and reconnoitered potential landing beaches near Port Stanley . In 1968 another Argentine aircraft crashed while attempting a landing to publicize the Argentine demands. The Note from the Governor of the Falkland Islands to the Trespassers This letter was offered in 2016 as the letter that started the Falklands War, estimated at 24,000 British pounds. Of course, it did not. The Argentinians had secretly invaded South Georgia Island, raised their flag and about 50 Marines came ashore and ransacked a British Antarctic Survey research base. Falkland governor Sir Rex Hunt radioed British researchers based on the island and dictated a letter to scientist Neil Shaw. He wrote it on a piece of paper and took it to the Argentinian Marines who ignored it and invited him on board for drinks. The 1982 Argentinean invasion did not start in the major islands.

Instead, an Argentine businessman named Constantino Davidoff sailed to South Georgia to salvage scrap metal on the fleet transport Bahia Buen Suceso. It arrived on 19 March 1982 without British permission. The Argentine flag was placed near the work site. The British protested, the political situation escalated and Governor Hunt sent 22 Royal Marines to remove the workers, while Argentina sent 100 Marines to protect them. That quickly erupted into a gun-battle on 3 April and the Argentineans overpowered the smaller British force. The die was cast and military movements set into motion that were unstoppable. Did Argentina think that Great Britain would not defend the islands? There are often misunderstandings. Kim il Sung believed the United States had no interest in protecting South Korea in 1950 and Saddam Hussein believed the United States had no interest in Kuwait in 1990. Both dictators invaded their neighbors. According to the newsletter The Week, in an article entitled How did the conflict start? dated 21 March 2016: The Port Stanley invasion caught Whitehall off-guard. Just six months earlier, British intelligence had concluded privately that Argentina would not invade the islands.

In January 1982, Margaret Thatcher's government inadvertently sent out a signal that Britain had no wish to fight over the islands when it scrapped the only British warship in their vicinity, HMS Endurance. Argentine confidence was further boosted after the British Nationality Act denied UK citizenship to many islanders. Britain protested in vain about the landing on South Georgia . On 26th March, British Intelligence reported that a number of Argentine military vessels were at sea. Hunt received a top secret telegram from the Foreign Office on 1 April. We have apparently reliable evidence that an Argentine task force could be assembling off Stanley at dawn tomorrow. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly. Governor Hunt announced over the radio that an invasion was imminent. It occurred as expected early on 2 April. Port Stanley was defended by 40 Royal Marines and about the same number of naval personnel. The first landings occurred about 0600. The Argentineans attacked along a number of fronts with both helicopter and light armored vehicles. The British could not defend against such overwhelming odds and surrendered at 0930. The Argentineans quickly reinforced their troops to about 10,000 and put a military governor in command.

Argentina made several immediate changes to the culture of the Falkland Islands , MD, 1992, the author mentions that in 1973 he worked on a report about Britain 's ability to protect the Falklands in case of an Argentine invasion. This is reminiscent of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf having studied the problem of defending Kuwait prior to the first Gulf War. The result: It seemed to us that Her Majesty's government would be largely powerless to do anything whatsoever to stop them. We couldn't afford to station a large enough force in the islands themselves; nor could we get a reinforcement force out there in the time which would probably be available to us. Careful consideration inevitably pointed to the only conclusion: "impossible." A second coincidence is that Woodward had captained the destroyer Sheffield in 1976. The ship had caused him many problems at the time, the computer weapons program crashing about every four minutes. The Sheffield would cause Woodward and the fleet more worry during the war when it was hit by an Argentine exocet missile. He mentions going to war with no intelligence data. Once again we are reminded of the fog of war.

The American invasion of Grenada was carried out with some commanders using commercial automobile maps of the islands. Woodward says: Our knowledge was in fact largely confined to that which was in the public domain. Janes Fighting Ships, the standard reference book on the fleets of the world , was our main source of information on the strength of Admiral Anaya's navy. Likewise, Jane's companion book on the world's aircraft was our primary guide to the strength of their air force. On 2 May the British submarine Conqueror located the Argentine Cruiser General Belgrano just outside the exclusion zone and sunk her. The cruiser was previously the American "Phoenix" The Sun Gloats about the Attack on the Belgrano The newspaper apparently does not know that the ship was sunk The General Belgrano had a crew of approximately 1,042 of whom 368 lost their lives. Although the action is surrounded in controversy it did stop the Argentine Navy from taking further action during the remainder of the war. It never again ventured from the continental shelf where the water was too shallow for the British submarines to operate.

There was some world outrage at the sinking, but the British explained that at any time the warship could have turned around and attacked the British fleet. The Argentine Navy fled the war zone and did not take to sea again during the next two months. Air-launched Exocet missle Destroyer Sheffield after it was hit by the Exocet missle The Argentines struck back on 4 May when the destroyer  Sheffield  was hit by an air-launched Exocet missile and sunk. The Exocet was named after the Exocoetus flying fish which skims over the waves. The British warning code for an Exocet attack was "Handbrake." Once the incoming missile was positively identified as an Exocet the warning signal became Ash Tray. The British tried to defend against the missiles by having Sea King helicopters fly at the flanks of the larger warships during Exocet alerts using their greater heat signature as bait to draw the missiles away from the ships. Colonel Harry G. Summers says in an article entitled Yomping to Port Stanley , Military Review, March, 1984 that the British suffered from a lack of advanced planning.

For instance, Brigadier Julian Thompson, the commander of the marine 3d Commando Brigade had been given the responsibility of planning the amphibious invasion but had been specifically directed by Rear Admiral John Woodward, the amphibious force commander, to plan no further than the beachhead. Marine Major General Jeremy Moore, the designated land force commander, was scheduled to prepare the attack plan when he arrived with the army's 5th Infantry Brigade. This sounded like a plan but as soon as the British landed troops on the ground, London started demanding forward movement and victories to report to its citizens. London demanded that Thompson engage the enemy although no detailed plan was in place. London also selected the target, the Argentine base at Goose Green some 13 miles south of the beachhead. The politicians wanted a tangible victory, and it was to be Goose Green. Worse, ignoring all military strategy, the politicians ordered to British forces split with a second group marching 50 miles to attack Port Stanley . On 21 May the British Commandos made a diversionary attack on Port San Carlos on the northern coast of East Falkland . From this beachhead the British infantry advanced southward to capture the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley .

The same day HMS Ardent was sunk by an Argentine air attack, but nine Argentine aircraft were shot down. On 23 May HMS Antelope was attacked and sunk but ten Argentine aircraft were destroyed. The British were bleeding at sea, the Argentineans in the air. Captain Rod Bell We are now going to see the name of Royal Marine Captain Roderick Bell quite often. Bell was the son on a United Nations official and was raised in Costa Rica . Spanish was his first language and he spoke it perfectly and believed that he understood the Latin temperament and could talk to the Argentineans in a friendly and honest manner. As one of the only Spanish speaking members of the task force, he became almost the sole proponent of British PSYOP. On D-Day, 21 May, when the British discovered an unexpected Argentine observation post on Fanning head, at the mouth of the seaborne entrance to San Carlo, Captain Bell was called forward with a loudspeaker. The Argentineans had air-lifted a 60-man platoon to Port San Carlos code-named EC Hermes Captain Bell suggested that EC stood for Equipo Combate or Combat Team, which would be no more than a company in strength.

Combat Team Eagle made its headquarters at Port San Carlos and sent 20 men to Fanning Head to set up an OP overlooking San Carlos Water. This group of Argentineans became known to the British as The Fanning Head Mob. Bell called upon the Argentines to surrender. Four of the Argentines raised their hands but others opened fire on the Special Boat Squadron with a machine gun. Because some of the British troops were hit by the fleeing Argentineans, the British commanders temporarily lost faith in the value of the surrender appeal. The British 2nd Parachute Battalion prepares for Goose Green - 2 days before the battle Courtesy Good Guys in Bad Lands On 26 May the British 2nd Parachute Regiment (2 Para), consisting of about 450 men moved against Argentine troops occupying Goose Green. Intelligence indicated that the settlement was defended by one weakened battalion (Bn-). By 30 May, after bitter fighting Captain Bell chose two Argentine senior non-commissioned officer prisoners-of-war to take a surrender message written by Bell in Spanish to the enemy commander.

The Argentines agreed to surrender and to the shock of the British, about 1200 troops marched out of Goose Green and laid down their arms. Bell 's use of PSYOP in a well-written letter helped to save the day and avert what could have been a disaster caused by faulty intelligence. The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, Norton, London , 1983, says: One of the many deficiencies revealed by the campaign was the lack of a PsyWar unit at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense. Even more astonishing, Bell - who had been co-opted as an interpreter from his usual job as adjutant of the Commando brigade's headquarters and signals squadron - was almost the only Spanish speaker available to the force. By 28 May British paratroopers controlled Darwin and Goose Green. The British lost 17 men and the Argentineans lost 200. A total of about 1,400 Argentine troops are taken prisoner. By 31 May the British have surrounded Port Stanley . Battles continue all over the island with vicious hand-to-hand fighting reported.

War in the Falklands says that after surrounding the Argentine troops occupying Port Stanley, Royal Marine Captain Roderick Bell and an SAS colonel (code-name Reid) broadcast in Spanish starting 6 June appealing to them to surrender before more blood was shed: They began with a simple humanitarian request to assist civilians and casualties, but later hinted at the Argentineans hopeless military situation. They had fought a noble war and could surrender with their dignity intact. Gradually they raised wider issues; Britain , the world will judge you accordingly. This British patriotic postcard showing Argentine prisoners-of-war is one of a set of Falkland War postcards entitled the Sovereign Pictorial Series. By 14 June the large Argentine garrison in Port Stanley is defeated, and the war is all but over. The Argentine commander agrees to cease fire and 9800 Argentine troops throw down their weapons. British Major General Jeremy Moore flew in to Port Stanley at 2300 on 14 June, 1982 to meet with General Menendez.

General Menendez is allowed to strike unconditional from the surrender document since he had been promised by the British PSYOP broadcasts that the surrender would be with dignity and honor. General Moore does not allow him to insert the Argentine propaganda term Islas Malvinas after  Falklands . By 2359 the document was formally signed and the war was officially over. Both sides were plagued by tactical errors. The British had sailed off to war without careful preparation, and some units were stationed on different naval crafts, had left sections behind, or were without their supplies. They also learned to their horror that although aluminum ships do not burn, they do melt. Some British sailors called them floating flares. The Argentines had worse problems. Navy Commander Admiral Jorge Anaya was the most warlike of the three-man junta and yet when the bullets started flying he pulled his ships back and never ventured into the war zone again. The British had spread disinformation that their hunter-killer subs were deployed in number in the exclusion zone and the Argentineans apparently believed the reports.

The Army had 10,000 men who could have fought the British on the beaches and perhaps pushed them back into the sea. Instead, the majority of them stayed huddled near Port Stanley . Air Force Commander and junta member Brigadier General Lami Dozo was the least enthusiastic proponent of the Falklands war, but his pilots probably did the best job of all the Argentine services. However, many of the attacks were made in dribs and drabs, and if they had made one major assault using all their aircraft they might have broken through the picket line and attacked the British carriers Invincible and Hermes. That could have effectively ended the war. Admiral Woodward was in dread of such a mass attack all through the war, and even after the surrender of the Argentine troops. He could never be sure that the generals would not send one last wave of fighter-bombers to try and destroy the British fleet. The Falklands garrison surrendered, not the nation of Argentina . Since the war was undeclared, there really was no way for them to surrender. The war lasted 72 days and claimed the lives of 236 British and 655 Argentine troops. The war cost of at least 2 billion dollars.

It helped revive and reelect Margaret Thatcher. In 1990 she would supply the backbone to George Bush and urge him to take military action when Iraq invades Kuwait . At the same time, the ignominious defeat severely discredited the military government and forced the resignation of Leopoldo Galtieri, paving the way for the restoration of democracy in Argentina ISLAND WAR PSYOP There is some debate about how much PSYOP was disseminated during the Falkland Islands War. It is agreed that both sides used radio to a great extent, but there is some question about the use of aerial propaganda leaflets. In the book Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, by Bryant Perrett, Blanford Press, Poole, Dorset , UK , the author mentions the radio war. He points out that the junta controlled the radio and television networks as well as the popular press and could broadcast whatever it liked. It had immediate access to visual material flown in from the Falklands so that the first pictures the world saw of the conflict were invariably Argentine, and these were accompanied by a suitable propaganda commentary.

An unnamed author says in an untitled British Joint Services Command and Staff College abstract: Despite a lengthy political build up to hostilities there is little evidence of the use of tactical PSYOPS being used. PSYOP leaflet product was developed but the effort was entirely wasted as the means of delivery were not available. Badly informed and poorly led Argentine conscripts were targeted by PSYOP in the form of Radio Atlantico del Sur. Despite the assertion that this effort was effective, little evidence in the way of measures of effectiveness appear to have been gathered and it remains unclear whether this had a significant impact on in the Argentine Garrisons ultimate defeat. Had intelligence, production and dissemination been integrated into the campaign plan along with measurement of effect, the UK there was a pause for thought. He then points out where the Argentineans went wrong: Having made a good beginning, the propaganda machine then departed from the established ground rules of the game. In this it was doubtless doing its masters' bidding, for the junta's popularity soared with every success; therefore, the junta reasoned, its people should have a diet of success, while the enemy should be vilified.

The Task Force was described as a pirate fleet, while Margaret Thatcher was portrayed as a Viking, a vampire and a Nazi Storm Trooper. There were endless stories of Harriers being sent tumbling in dogfights, of ships sunk, of Hermes and Invincible being damaged again and again, of soldiers dramatically repelling raids. Even failure was exploited to the full. After South Georgia had been recaptured by the British it was announced that Argentine special forces had retired into the island's interior, from whence they would continue to fight - and this, in one of the cruelest environments on Earth. When the British landed at San Carlos they were said to be surrounded and on the verge of a second Dunkirk . Sometimes, the propaganda machine simply placed the most favorable interpretation on the facts, but most of its output was the purest fabrication. Until the very last moments the Argentine public sincerely believed that they would win the battle. One of the odder aspects of Argentine propaganda was the story spread among troops on the Falklands that the British would butcher their prisoners; not only that, the Gurkhas would eat them!

There seems to have been a genuine horror of the Gurkhas and the junta is said to have asked the government of Nepal to have them withdrawn. The Gurkhas were truly feared by the Argentine troops. Writer Gabriel Barcia Marquez quoted witnesses as saying that the Gurkhas: beheaded Argentine soldiers with their assassins' scimitars and were so bloodthirsty that the English had to handcuff them to stop further killing after the Argentines had surrendered. Gurkhas As the Nazis found out in WWII, overestimating your victories and deriding the enemys strength can be quite dangerous. When the truth comes out, and it always does, the public is furious at being lied to and duped. It can easily rise up against the government in power. It is also dangerous to build up the ferocity of the enemy in your propaganda. In such a case as the Gurkha descriptions above, just the sight of the cannibalistic mercenaries was probably enough to have the Argentine conscript throw down his arms and surrender. If there is one rule to good PSYOP, it is that you always tell the truth.

Gurkhas with captured Argentine Rheinmetall 20 mm anti-aircraft gun One Argentine broadcast to the approaching British fleet in May 1982 can be found on the Internet: Would you like to be reminded of your hometown? [Sound of bells] Yes, it's good old Big Ben. It's been a long time since you listened to it. There was never an organized British propaganda campaign. In fact, the Ministry of Defense made no provision for journalists of any kind to accompany the Task Force. Prime Minister Thatcher intervened and some reporters were embedded with the military units. As the American military discovered during Operation Iraqi Freedom, embedded reporters tend to identify completely with the troops they live and share danger with and as a result the stories from the front were very patriotic and pro-Government. BLACK OPERATIONS In The Official History of the Falklands Campaign  Volume II: War and Diplomacy, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Routledge, London and New York , 2005, the author mentions British prospective black and deception operations. He describes a Special Projects Group (SPG) charged with developing plans for deception and psychological operations.

It would point out that British weaponry and technology was invincible while demoralizing the Argentines by pointing out their weaknesses. It would attempt to exacerbate Argentine inter-service rivalries, discredit the Junta and its members and point out economic problems in Argentina . It would imply that Argentine facilities on the mainland would be attacked by air and that the carrier group had an amphibious warfare capability that could land an invasion force on Argentina proper. The SPG proposed a rumor that Britain might resort to mining Argentine mainland waters. This mining, if actually done, would affect the Argentine economy as well as the movement of its military forces. The British might have taken part in at least one rumor [they call them sibs] operation. There was a mysterious report of a British helicopter going down in Chile and stories that it was on its way to or from a secret British fighter squadron that had been allowed to prepare an attack base on Chilean soil. If the Argentineans believed the rumor they would be forced to keep some defensive aircraft to protect the nation from an air attack from the west, leaving less to fight the British in the southeast. It was reported at the time that: One of the strangest incidents of the war took place involving Chile .

About 17 May the Chilean authorities found a burnt out Sea King helicopter near the southern town of Punta Arenas The British quietly gave Chile a number of electronic reconnaissance, fighter and bomber aircraft. In return, the Chilean Army created increased radio traffic along the border to hold the elite Argentine ground forces in place, and the Chilean Navy put to sea under radio silence, a fact sure to make the Argentine Navy very nervous. The British also considered using Chile as a base for commando operations into Argentina and actually planned an Operation Mikado where two C-130 Hercules aircraft would crash land at the Rio Grand Air Base and a SAS squadron would destroy the Super Entendards based there, all the Exocet missiles, and kill all the Argentine pilots. British Intelligence also got involved in a number of very complicated black operations to insure that Argentina could not rearm itself with additional Exocet missiles. They set up various dummy deals with bankers, front-corporations and arms dealers so that if Argentina tried to buy the weapons, the money might conveniently disappear or the missiles get lost in transit. These operations seem to have been successful.

On the general subject of black operations and rumors, there is an interesting internal rumor that apparently spread among the British sailors of the Falklands fleet. A story went around that the ink on the original propaganda leaflets was specially treated with some kind of pepper solution or irritant. The idea being that if the Argentines decided to use the leaflets as toilet paper to show their disapproval they would get a rather nasty surprise. It was both a prank and something that would ultimately reduce their fighting effectiveness. The individual that mentioned this rumor believes that it is true but it more likely what the Navy likes to call scuttlebutt. In reality, the first individual who suffered any kind of medical emergency from using British leaflets would be a propaganda goldmine for the Argentine military who could then warn their troops not to touch the leaflets because they were poisoned by the British. A second rumor that apparently went around the fleet was that the Special Air Service laced the Argentinean water supply with LSD. The Argentineans were also active. They sent a 3-man team of Marines to Gibraltar to blow up ships of the British fleet.

The team of divers was captured by Spanish police (tipped off by British Intelligence) on 17 May 1982 as they were about to attack the tanker British Tamar. The Argentineans were also able to create and use a secret land-based Exocet launch site to attack British ships shelling forces near Stanley . The system was placed on a heavy-duty truck body and powered by a WWII German generator originally designed for searchlights. Readers who want to know more about these various plots are advised to read The Secret War for the Falklands, Nigel West, Little, Brown and Company, UK 3 June. Propaganda leaflet raid of Port Stanley . On 3 June our diary made special mention that at about 6 a.m. a low-flying aircraft had been heard passing over the back of the town under cover of poor visibility. Later we connected this with the information that propaganda leaflets were being dropped over the Argentine positions. These leaflets, in the form of safe-conduct passes, offered the chance for individual troops to surrender. This was one of the mysteries of the conflict, for we never saw one of these leaflets, and have yet to hear from anyone who did.

We wonder if they were dropped in some remote region where they still may be found, or whether instead of dispersing they might have landed in bulk and been quickly destroyed. Although the British have never confirmed the actual number, we believe that at least four PSYOP leaflets were dropped on the Falklands and have been illustrated in publications. They are entitled " Safe of the Condemned," and "South Atlantic Radio." The Falling Leaf, The journal of the Psywar Society, says in its autumn 1982 issue: We understand that all the leaflets were prepared and printed in England and then flown to the Task Force flagship for distribution. Quantities printed, actual dates of dissemination and localities involved as well as which leaflets were dropped are not yet known. At the time of publication, the Psywar Society researchers had seen four different leaflets. By the winter 1982 issue the Falling Leaf states that there are five such leaflets, but the fifth one is not named. Apparently the five leaflets were exhibited at the British Aerophilatelic Federations National Airmail Exhibition held at the Royal 's inability to air-drop leaflets at this time. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign agrees.

It says about leaflets in part: Another high priority item was the preparation of leaflets for distribution over the Falklands . During the first phase, when there was still uncertainty about the future course of the campaign, three items were produced: a safe conduct pass, a message of inevitable defeat, which took the form of a message from Woodward to General Menendez, and a reassuring letter to the civilian population from the Governor. Later on extra items were produced, announcing the recapture of South Georgia and the opening of Radio Atlantico del Sur. Although 12,000 copies of each leaflet were produced and reached Hermes in time for the landing, unlike the leaflet rounds that could be fired from the big guns of the world wars, a similar capability did not exist for modern field guns so they were never actually distributed. Bryant Perett says in Weapons of the Falklands Conflict: A further attempt to undermine the garrison's morale was the printing of leaflets in Spanish urging soldiers to surrender in their own interests and incorporating a safe conduct pass. There is some doubt that they were ever used, for the means of distribution did not exist.

The best method of delivery is by means of a shell which bursts above the enemy positions, scattering the leaflets, but this type of ammunition was not available; nor could Harriers be used as a substitute and nor was it worth risking valuable helicopters in the role. Perett is wrong about the use of artillery for disseminating leaflets. It is not the best method. In fact, it is rather poor. Soldiers tend to keep their head down when being fired upon and are not likely to leave their fighting positions during an artillery attack. It is also difficult to pinpoint the enemy, and the blast of the shell often chars, crinkles and is some case burns the leaflet. Air dissemination is much preferable. More leaflets can be dropped over a much greater area. It is also true that any aircraft that can carry a bomb can carry leaflets, since they can be placed in cluster bomb shells, flare cases, or even specially designed containers. There are arguments for the dropping of leaflets too. We have the word of a seaman and several British newspapers of the time. Able Seaman Gunner Kevin Prout of the HMS Hermes said: I was a Sea Cat director/aimer stationed near the flight deck.

The flight crews would often give us the leaflets as souvenirs prior to them being loaded on the Harrier aircraft. I dont know how they dropped the leaflets at 500 mph but few probably survived considering the conditions ashore. Most of the leaflets were dropped in the early days after the fall of South Georgia . I remember seeing boxes of them but they were gone after a while so I assume that they were all disseminated. I kept a small cache of the souvenir leaflets in my emergency lifejacket bag until I got home. Authors note: the Sea Cat was the first point-defense missile to enter Naval service. War in the Falklands mentions the British dropping leaflets on Port Stanley just prior to 11 June in an attempt to avoid further bloodshed: For two days Harriers dropped warning leaflets on Stanley , spelling out the reality of the garrison's position. The London Daily Mail of 4 June 1982 published a story entitled "Surrender or Suffer Warns Admiral. It said in part: Thousands of leaflets urging Argentine troops to surrender were dropped on the besieged garrison of Port Stanley yesterday.

British Harriers flew low over the Argentine trenches scattering the documents - one a letter to the enemy's commander from task force chief Admiral Sandy Woodward and the other a direct appeal to each soldier to lay down his arms. One of the leaflets includes a safe conduct to allow any Argentine who surrenders through British lines. The leaflets were dropped in a last ditch attempt to prevent a bloodbath. But the Argentines must move quickly to take up the surrender offer. The leaflet addressed to the soldiers carried a photograph of the Argentine commander of South Georgia, Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, signing the surrender document there. The second leaflet gives the text of a letter sent to the Argentine commander in the Falklands, Brigadier Benjamin Menendez, by Admiral Woodward. The Daily Star of 4 June had a similar article which said in part; Harrier jump-jets yesterday plastered the Argentine troops in Port Stanley with thousands of leaflets, urging them to surrender. The leaflets showered down like confetti on the Argentinean positions. The Falling Leaf adds: In late May the British Broadcasting Corporation had announced that leaflets had been disseminated by planes of the Task Force over East Falkland.

No additional information appeared in the press on the following day so it was believed that this information was not for public information at the time. A phone call to the Ministry of Defense seeking details brought a very evasive and non-committal reply: Yes, we may have dropped leaflets and No, we have no confirmation. A second newspaper report said that another leaflet mission was carried out over Lafonia in the southern part of East Falkland, which resulted in the immediate surrender of 200 Argentinean soldiers. The paperback The Falklands War by the Sunday Times adds: For two days Harriers dropped warning leaflets on Stanley spelling out the reality of the garrisons position Robert Fox adds in Eyewitness Falklands Rear Admiral John Forster Woodward, Royal Navy. Commander in Chief of the British forces. The leaflet ends with the following instructions: If you wish to take advantage of the terms offered in this pass you should take the following action: a. Lay down your weapon. b. Hold this pass in a prominent position c. Move forward to the nearest member of the British forces.

On 29 June 1982, the Daily Telegraph reported that the citizens of Port Stanley were looking to purchase souvenir leaflets asking for the garrisons surrender, but none had been found. The citizens claimed that they had heard a number of BBC reports of the leaflets being dropped over the town but had never seen any. The article continues: One local said he had heard a report that the leaflets were dropped in containers that did not open. He understood Argentine officers simply collected the containers after each drop. A ministry of defense or military spokesman was not available to comment yesterday in Port Stanley. There is the possibility that the leaflets were lost in the winds. Surrender at South Georgia The leaflet depicts a photograph of the Argentine commander of South Georgia, Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, signing the surrender document in the wardroom of HMS Endurance. It is notable that not only did he surrender his army and navy troops, but also the crew of the Argentine submarine Santa Fe . The surrender was photographed and forwarded for world-wide media dissemination. The Ministry of defense then placed it on this leaflet. This leaflet bears the code 4. The back is all text, depicts the symbol of the H.M.S.

Endurance at the top, and says: SOLDIERS The captain of the frigate, Alfredo Astiz, commander in charge of the forces in South Georgia , becoming aware that the British forces possessed superior armed power, surrendered honorably. This photo shows him signing the document of surrender. The British and argentine people are two nations with a traditional bond of friendship encompassing more than 100 years. We do not want to spill any more blood, but we are determined to do so if there is no other alternative. More useless loss of life will only create more disconsolate mothers. Your companions at arms in South Georgia made the right and honorable decision. You must now do the same. Think of the danger in which you find yourself. Your rations and military equipment are in short supply due to the British naval blockade. Matters will worsen. Think of your loved ones and your home where they await your happy return.

The Daily Express The Daily Express of 4 June 1982 depicted the safe conduct pass and Argentine Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz signing the surrender document in an article entitled Passport to Safety. Some of the article text is: On the eve of battle in Port Stanley yesterday the British gave 7,000 Argentinian soldiers a chance to get out and go home. Leaflets showered over the beleaguered garrison by plane told them, Think of the danger you are in  The leaflets that floated down from a high-flying Harrier followed a long, two-way bombardment by Royal Navy ships and by artillery supporting the British forces now poised to attack the island capital A second leaflet, under the crests of the British ships Endurance and Plymouth, advises the Argentines to think of their valiant companions in arms recently on South Georgia who have now returned to their fatherland. In The for the Falklands, Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, Norton, London , 1983, explains why the crew of the Santa Fe was captured. The sub was spotted on 25 April.

Three British helicopters attacked it with depth charges, torpedoes and rockets. One missile went through the submarine's conning tower, forcing it to return to land and beach itself near Grytviken. The capture of Captain Astiz caused some problems for the British. Hastings and Jenkins explain: Captain Alfedo Astiz formally surrendered. He was an embarrassing prisoner of war, as he was wanted for questioning by several nations in connection with the disappearance of their citizens while in government custody on the Argentine mainland years earlier. Britain (Image courtesy of Lee Richards ) A leaflet not mentioned in the newspaper article is entitled Island of the Condemned. The front depicts the Falkland Islands surrounded by barbed wire and warships, Harrier jets and helicopters. The image clearly shows that the Argentinean soldiers are trapped and there will be no relief. The leaflet is coded 2. The back is all text and reads: SOLDIERS OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES: You are completely alone. There is no hope of relief or help from your motherland. You are condemned to the sad fate of defending a remote island.

Soon there will fall upon you all the rigors of a cruel and merciless winter and the Argentine Navy is in no any condition to supply you with the reinforcements or provisions that you so desperately need. Your families live with the terrible fear of never seeing you again. You well know that all of this is the honest truth. WHAT ARE THE REASONS THAT YOU FIND YOURSELVES IN SUCH A CALAMITOUS SITUATION? Those responsible are the egotists who have named themselves the leaders of Argentina without taking into consideration the wishes of the Argentine people, and who have sent you on a ridiculous adventure, knowing there is no hope of any kind for an end to it. Now, these same leaders look for a way to disguise their stupid incompetence. SOLDIERS! YOU HAVE DONE ALL YOUR COUNTRY CAN ASK OF YOU! ONLY THE GENERALS STILL ASK FOR MORE. IT IS NOT FAIR THAT YOU SHOULD FORFEIT YOUR LIVES TO FULFILL THE AMBITIONS OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CRAZY ADVENTURE THAT THE WHOLE WORLD SEES AS WRONG. A Message from his Excellency The leaflet coded 3 depicts a portrait of the Governor of the Falklands Islands , Mr.

Rex Masterman Hunt (Order of St. Michael and St. George). It obviously is meant to raise the morale of the Falklands population and reminds them that the British are on the way and that the ordeal of the occupation will soon be over. This idea of an exiled leader writing a letter to the occupied subjects is a tried and true method first used by the British in WWII. For instance, after the Germans occupied Norway , King Haakon VII and Queen Wilhelmina fled to Britain from whence leaflet letters were prepared in their name and dropped over their nations by the Royal Air Force to lift the morale of their people. This letter by the island's governor is an example of the exact same technique. The text on the back is in English: A Message from His Excellency the Governor Mr. Rex Hunt CMG The British Task Force is now at hand and has cut the Argentine access to the islands. I am sorry that I cannot be with it in person but am confident that I shall rejoin you shortly. Your terrible experience under the occupying force will soon be ended. I know that you will continue to be patient and resolute. Do nothing to antagonize the Argentines and stay under cover until the Task Force has liberated you.

My thoughts and feelings are with you all in this final hour of trial before the aggressors are defeated and your freedom is restored. Best wishes and God bless you. R. M. Hunt The Front of this leaflet is all text: Notice to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands I have the great pleasure of announcing to them a new radio station. South Atlantic Radio will transmit news daily from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on a frequency of 9.71 MHz. This broadcast will operate like an additional station to the LRA National Radio of the Falklands. The back of the leaflet bears the code 5 and the text: From 8:00 to 11:00 p.m. R. A. S. (inside a lightning bolt) 9.71 MHz frequency. Perrett says in Weapons of the Falklands Conflict: During World War II one of the most successful British psywar devices had been a radio station beamed at German troops based in north-western France. Known as Soldatensen der Calais, it was listened to because its news broadcasts were truthful, while those of Dr.

Goebbels' radio stations were not. Having acquired its audience, Soldatensender Calais insidiously set about undermining the confidence of the troops in their leaders and even in their own weapons. Argentina having promptly jammed the BBC's World Service transmissions on the outbreak of hostilities, it was decided to set up a duplicate of Soldatensender Calais, on Ascension Island, beamed specifically at General Menendez' garrison on the Falklands and known as Radio South Atlantic. The anti-Argentine Atlantico del Sur propaganda radio operation was not a great success. It first broadcast on 19 May 1982 at 2300 using the Ascension Islands relay Transmitter. The British Broadcasting Corporation issued this press release the same day: The Ministry of Defense this morning contacted the BBC to make available one of the transmitters at the Atlantic relay station at Ascension Island The BBC will accordingly make a transmitter available to the Ministry of Defense for its own broadcasting purpose. This public statement effectively destroyed any chance the British had to claim that the station was a black radio operation broadcasting from Argentina or the Falkland Islands .

Glenn Hauser recalls the station in the DX Listening Digest, 30 September 2002. Some of his comments are: The station was operated by Defense Ministry personnel. The station had a magazine format and fake record dedications. Music with a PSYOP theme such as Chariots of Fire was regularly heard. The station was subject to front page ridicule in the quality British press; they commented that the announcers were not native Spanish speakers, spoke in a Cambridge educated Chilean accent, the music chosen would not appeal to Argentinean forces and that the station was so obviously phony that it would have no effect. The estimated cost of the operation was 10 to 20 thousand pounds a week. Argentina did jam the station but the jamming was ineffective. This is a bit different from comments made about radio Atlantico del Sur in the 4 August 2001 DX Listening Digest: The two speakers, a male and female, were Foreign Office employees who had learned Spanish from a Colombian and thus spoke with pronounced Colombian accents, causing much mirth in downtown Buenos Aires , as they were claiming to be Argentinean!

The program apparently had quite a big audience amongst Argentineans with a penchant for unintentional comedy. People at BBC World Service were incandescent with rage at this amateurish operation by civil servants, broadcast on a well-known BBC frequency. Tim Tyler monitored and taped the radio broadcasts during the war and told me: I monitored Radio Atlantico del Sur as a short wave radio listener and although there were complaints that the radio did not broadcast effective PSYOP, someone was actively jamming the broadcasts, or at least the broadcasts that I heard and recorded. Due to the way shortwave radio works, it is possible that the jammer did not block the broadcasts being heard on the Falkland Islands or Argentina, though if they had shortwave jamming equipment, I would assume they were smart enough to know the proper placement of the jammer to make it effective. I also remember the British Forces Broadcasting Service eventually set up service (also using BBC transmitters on Ascension Island, I believe) to provide news and entertainment to their troops deployed to the Southern Atlantic during the crisis, and I monitored them too.

I also monitored the United States Air Force aircraft shuttling Secretary of State George Shultz between Buenos Aires, Washington DC and London as he tried to negotiate a truce. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign States that the proposal to establish a radio station in the South Atlantic came from the SPG in late April. The operation was code-named MOONSHINE. The station would be aimed at soldiers and their families, with a popular music and news of interest to the Falklands. It would broadcast for four hours each day. Radio Atlantico del Sur was tasked with persuading Argentine troops currently occupying the Falkland Islands to surrender with minimum resistance. It would refer to the long-standing friendship between the British and Argentine Peoples, the lack of training of the conscripts compared with British troops, the physical isolation of the Islands, the lack of medical facilities, the fear of British special forces, and disillusion with the Junta. It would not demean or diminish loyalty to Argentina , or argue against the sovereignty claim, or attempt to create dissension between officers and ranks. The project was approved on 18 May and the first broadcast was made late the next day.

The project lasted until 15 June, by which time 47 broadcasts had been made, three hours each evening from 2300-0200 and an hour in the morning from 0830-0930. Researcher Lee Richards found more data on the British Propaganda radio station and wrote on his website in November 2015: Radio Atlantico del Sur was a Spanish language radio station operated by the UK Ministry of Defence as part of its psychological operations campaign conducted for Operation Corporate  the recapture of the Falkland Islands following the Argentine invasion in April 1982. The radio station, known as Project Moonshine within the Ministry of Defence, was operated by a specially created group called the Media Assessment Team (MAT). The station broadcast from studios in Mayfair, London, via a requisitioned BBC transmitter on Ascension Island. Its first broadcast was on the evening of 19 May 1982 and continued for 47 broadcasts until 15 June.

We should also note that at the same time the Argentineans had taken over the Falkland Islands radio broadcasting station, renamed it  Liberty , and put TV News anchor Silvia Fernandez Barrio known as Argentine Annie on the air. This station operated from 2 April to 26 June 1982. The anti-British propaganda broadcasts actually originated on a military base in the vicinity of Buenos Aires. The short wave-facilities from Cable & Wireless on the Falklands were used to relay Radio Nacional Malvinas and to carry unscrambled radio telephone traffic to Argentina . Glenn Hauser adds in regard to Liberty : The opening and closing announcements were broadcast over a lush orchestral version of Yesterday. The announcer said, I am Liberty and South Sandwich Islands . I am a voice, a spirit, a country. I am now as ever a woman who is proud that the world listens when Argentina speaks. Although the Argentineans were never able to drop propaganda leaflets on the British during the short conflict, there were some cases where patriotic groups prepared pro-war leaflets for the Argentine public.

They were meant to unite the people to defend the islands that they so recently occupied. They are internal consolidation and morale-building leaflets At least two leaflets were prepared by the Group for the Defense of the Malvinas. Both are printed in the sky-blue color of the Argentine flag on cream-colored paper. In both cases an Argentine postage stamp overprinted The Malvinas are Argentina  has been placed on the leaflet and cancelled in Buenos Aires with the first day of cancellation date, 22 April 1982. The attack is against the Argentine people The first leaflet depicts the islands and a text in regard to the British fleet: The attack is against the Argentine people. To organize resistance is our duty. They gave their lives for the Malvinas We don't want to win more The second leaflet depicts the Islands and the text: We don't want to win more. We want to defend what is ours. We trust our armed forces. At first glance this second message doesn't seem to make sense, but I believe that what they are saying is: We do not have aggressive aims on any further lands, and we just want to defend our islands.

Not even the gulls Another anti-British Argentine leaflet depicts an armed British soldier in full dress uniform and a Falkland Islands sea gull. The gull points seawards and says: Go away. No one wants you on these islands, not even the sea gulls Lady Godiva? Another comical anti-British leaflet depicts Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sitting naked on a sway-back horse with a British flag as saddle. The text is: Lady Godiva? No. Venture into the Falklands... Reagan "TIAR" leaflet The above 1982 leaflet shows American President Ronald Reagan wrapped in a Union Jack and squatting on a toilet marked TIAR. The letters stand for Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Rec�proca, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This treatys central principle is that an attack against one is to be considered an attack against them all; sometimes called the "hemispheric defense" doctrine. Argentina abrogated the treaty when it fueled and armed the British navy. And Argentina has Pss, pss, pss. This Argentine patriotic leaflet depicts Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher conspiring.

Reagan is in his cowboy outfit and Thatcher is handing him a handful of money. In return, Reagan tells Thatcher Argentine military secrets and intelligence gathered by an American spy satellite depicted overhead to help her win her war. Reagan whispers in her ear: And Argentina has Pss, pss, pss. There might be a certain degree of truth to this leaflet. A British veteran of the war told me that on reconnaissance patrols he has satellite photos of the Falklands that had been cropped in such a way that their origin could not be ascertained. He called it an obvious case of deniability. To the Falklands Another interesting Argentine leaflet depicts a Royal Navy ship sailing toward the Falkland Islands with four troops at attention. The text is: To the Falklands When turned upside down, the leaflet depicts the same ship, now covered with bullet holes and patches and with the figure of death and four coffins.

The text is: On return to the Falklands Alexander Haig  The Ugly American Another interesting Argentine propaganda leaflet depicts President Ronald Reagans Secretary of State General Alexander Haig, on top of a pack of Chesterfield Invincible silhouette on Argentine aircraft There is an interesting Argentine study of the sea battle by Rolando Mendez entitled, 30 May 1982 - Not so Invincible  The story of an Attack Denied by the British. Mendez claims that on 30 May an Argentine Super Etendard armed with an AM39 Exocet missile and two A4 Skyhawks each armed with three 500-pound bombs attacked the aircraft carrier Invincible. They used information stolen from a Russian satellite relay station to pinpoint the carrier. The British expected any attack to be from the west, so the Argentines attacked from the south, refueling twice from C-130 Hercules tankers. The Super Etendard navigated to find the target and fired the last Exocet in the Argentine inventory at a distance of approximately 24 miles. The Invincible was allegedly struck by the missile. The A4s followed the wake of the missile and bombed the carrier.

The author says that the British later claimed in one version that the attack either hit the Avenger and Exeter , or in a second version said it was the Atlantic Conveyor that was struck. There is no proof that this mission occurred, and the British say that it never happened. Still, the authors article depicts an Argentine fighter bearing the symbol of a hit on the Invincible on its fuselage. British or Argentine disinformation? Your guess is as good as mine. Still, I do not see how the British could have crept into port with all the damage that would have occurred from an Exocet and bomb attack. It doesn't seem feasible. In conclusion, I want to recognize the remarkable bravery of the British Navy and the Argentine Air Force. During WWII the U.S. Navy suffered its worse casualties while serving picket duty off the island of Okinawa . 49,000 men were killed or wounded. The British ships that served as pickets or supported the ground troops in the Falklands were close to land and unable to maneuver as they were designed to do on the high seas. Their radar was faulty due to the nearby mountains, their weapons systems "iffy," and yet they stood their ground.

Two destroyers, two frigates, a large container ship, and a landing ship were sunk. Numerous other ships were badly damaged. In addition, the Navy lost twenty-four helicopters and ten Harrier jets. In fact, the ground forces lost all their Chinook helicopters (except for one that was airborne) when the Atlantic Conveyer (A converted ocean-going container ship) was hit by an Exocet missile and sunk. This led to the ground troops walking to war rather than making air assaults by helicopter. At the same time, the Argentine Air Force attacked day after day and took terrible losses. Their pilots flew at wave top altitude to avoid British radar, then followed the lay of the land through hills and valleys while being fired at by British ground troops. They then attacked the British ships and the naval vessels responded with anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Finally, they had to return to their country through a swarm of Harriers firing sidewinder missiles. And yet, they came, day after day. British Major Andrew M.

Pullan mentions the military cost of the war in his Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, The British Infantry in the Falklands Conflict: By the end of Operation Corporate the Royal Navy had only sufficient ammunition for two more nights of bombardment with the next re-supply three or so weeks away. British casualties for the campaign were: 255 killed (217 from enemy fire, 10 from friendly fire, and 28 in aircraft crashes) and 777 wounded. Equipment losses were: 7 ships sunk (4 of which were warships), 10 warships damaged, and 3 RFA ships damaged; 10 Harriers, and 24 helicopters were destroyed. Eight of the 34 aircraft lost were to enemy fire, 13 were lost in accidents, and 13 lost when their parent ship sank. Of the killed, 148 were from the Army and Royal Marines and of these 66 were killed in set piece battles.

Argentinean losses were 746 killed (393 Navy, 55 Air Force, and 298 Army and Marines), 1,105 wounded, and 12,978 taken prisoner. Argentinean equipment losses were staggering. One cruiser, 1 submarine, 1 intelligence trawler, 2 patrol craft, and 3 transport ships were sunk. Numerous other ships were damaged; 3 small ships were captured following the surrender. Seventy-five fixed wing aircraft and 25 helicopters were destroyed or captured, 44 while flying in action. The Argentinean Army lost the equivalent of 3 Brigades worth of vehicles, weapons and stores. British Patriotic Propaganda Labels In time of war the use of patriotic labels for PSYOP is a common sight. In fact, they are probably one of the most numerous forms of propaganda, produced by both the government and private entrepreneurs and citizens. The pro-British patriotic labels above were prepared to be placed on mail, windows, walls or wherever people gathered. The Argentines also produced such labels. Ian J.

Strange mentions in The Falkland Islands: Shortly after the invasion I was surprised to see small blue and white stickers resembling the Argentine flag displayed on certain house windows. Each emblem bore the words: "Usted tiene derecho a vivir en libertad," the translation being "You have the right to live in freedom," which seemed rather ironic. Why these stickers had been given to some households and not to others remains a mystery...they might well have been part of some propaganda campaign for the benefit of the media. Falklands War Medals . In a message to the 3,100 residents of the islands, Queen Elizabeth said: British forces made a stand for democracy and freedom Since then, you have shown that their sacrifice was not in vain by your continued loyalty and determination to safeguard and develop your way of life in these islands. This week offers you an opportunity to look back with pride on your achievements and to look forward to a prosperous future, living in freedom and governed by those whom you have chosen. Thatcher said: The whole nation rejoiced at the success; and we should still rejoice. Aggression was defeated and reversed. The wishes of local people were upheld as paramount. Britain 's honor and interests prevailed.

No celebration of the end of the war was held in Argentina . President Nestor Kirchner criticized the British victory and said: It was a colonial victory, really unacceptable in the eyes of the world I would like to say to Senora Thatcher that she may have won the battle because she belongs to a major power, but she never defeated us through the force of reason or justice The islands are Argentine and by way of peace will again be Argentina's. So, over 160 years after the British seized the Falkland Islands , and 25 years after the end of the war, the two sides are yet to agree. A Look Back at the Falklands Three Decades Later In 2011, the British considered massive cuts in their defense budget. The arguments for such cuts were obvious; in this age with this economy most nations cannot afford a large diverse military force. Some of the arguments against the cuts referenced the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Much of this data is found in a report published by the Defense Dateline Group.

For instance, there was a belief that the loss of the carrier HMS Ark Royal and the AV-8B Harrier II would leave the United Kingdom unable to defend the Falkland Islands from an Argentine military attack. Admiral Sandy Woodward (commander of the naval task force in 1982) said: The simple truth is, without carriers, we would not have any hope of doing the same again. The Defense Dateline Group counters that the Argentine military is no longer a threat. The Argentine Navy is currently composed of four Almirate Brown class destroyers, three diesel electric submarines, nine corvettes, one converted Type 42 destroyer and a single amphibious cargo ship. This compares to a fleet that, in 1982, possessed an aircraft carrier supporting an air group of A-4 Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers, as well as an armed light cruiser, four submarines and two modern Type 42 assault ships. The Argentine Navy is smaller and less capable than it was in 1982, and the ships of the Royal Navy are now much more capable of withstanding the threats encountered in that war.

The Argentine Air Force possesses 34 A-4 Fighting Hawks, approximately 25 elderly Mirage and Israeli jets, 30 Pucara group attack aircraft, seven C-130 Hercules transport/tanker aircraft and a motley collection of transport aircraft and helicopters. In 1982, they fielded 50 Skyhawks, over 40 Mirage variants and 8 Canberra light bombers. Meanwhile, the British have fortified the islands with Royal Air Force Typhoons with significant beyond visual range abilities that would be able to engage any Argentine aircraft long before they were able to get near the islands. Similarly, the British fleet is now protected by the anti-aircraft systems of the new Type 45 destroyers, whose capabilities are far in excess of Sea Dart and Sea Wolf missiles of 1982. The Defense Dateline Group concludes: The Argentine armed forces are in no state to attempt a military assault on the Falklands, or even install some kind of naval blockade. The situation for Argentina only worsens when one looks at the comparative capabilities of the British armed forces to defend the islands. How odd that three decades after this small war, it is still being used in a debate about the military budget.

As for the Argentines, I would think that hearing the British say that they did not have the will or ability to retake the Falklands might be like waving a red flag in front of a bull. A 2015 Argentina Propaganda Banknote The front of the banknote features the Falklands and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands superimposed over the southern tip of both South America and Argentina. An albatross, native to the region, is located on the bottom of the center. In what is seen as a form of numismatic propaganda, Alejandro Vanoli, president of the Central Bank of Argentina announced a redesign of their 50 peso note to include the Falkland Islands. The design of the note was unveiled last year by President Cristina Kirchner, on the 32nd anniversary of the Argentine invasion of the British archipelago, which in Argentina is termed the Malvinas. Mr. Vanoli gave the bank's reasons for the redesign: The idea is to remind people of the undying claim of the people of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands through the everyday use of money.

The new banknote bears the slogan Malvinas Islands, a sovereign love. The back of the banknote features Argentine folk hero Antonio Rivero atop a horse and holding the national flag. In 1833, he was the leader of a small revolt on the Isla Malvinas that led to the deaths of five prominent British settlers. On the bottom of the note is a portrayal of the General Belgrano, an Argentine naval vessel sunk by a British nuclear submarine in 1982. The banknote was mocked by the British residents of the islands. One said: I am surprised they can afford a color printer," referring to the struggling Argentine economy. Many Argentinians felt the Government should have issued a 500-peso note instead. Argentina has one of the highest inflation rates in the world, estimated by independent experts to stand at over 35% in 2014, double the official figure. I am sure that there is much more to learn about the PSYOP of the Falkland Islands War. The author invites comments on this article, or additions and corrections from people who took part in the campaign. Please write him at sgmbert@hotmail.com .

� 16 June 2007

Question: Who had overall command of the Task Force sent to get the Argentineans out of the 'Falklands'?
Answer: ADMIRAL SANDY WOODWARD