Compound Interest - Chemical Warfare: Poison Gases in World War 1 Chemical Warfare: Poison Gases in World War 1 Click to enlarge I’ll be accompanying some of the students from my school on a history trip to Ypres and a few other World War 1 battlefields in a few weeks’ time. Obviously, they’d much rather be learning chemistry, so I’ve been reading up on the different chemical agents used during World War 1, and this graphic is a byproduct of that. As it turns out, several of them were used for the first time at Ypres, so it’ll even be topical! A range of different chemicals were used as weapons throughout the conflict. The French were actually the first to utilise them in conflict, when they attempted to use tear gas against the German army in August 1914. The precise agent used seems to be uncertain, with both xylyl bromide and ethyl bromoacetate being mentioned; both are colourless liquids, with the former having an odour described as ‘pleasant and aromatic’, and the latter being described as ‘fruity and pungent’. These tear gases weren’t designed to kill; rather, to incapacitate the enemy and render them unable to defend their positions.

They are all lachrymatory agents – that is, they cause crying, due to irritation of the eyes. They also irritate the mouth, throat and lungs, leading to breathing difficulties. Exposure to larger concentrations can lead to temporary blindness, but symptoms commonly resolved within 30 minutes of leaving affected areas. In practice, the use of tear gas on the battlefield wasn’t extraordinarily effective. However, it opened the door to the use of more harmful gases. The first of these was chlorine, first used on a large scale by the German forces at Ypres in April 1915. Chlorine is a diatomic gas, about two and a half times denser than air, with a pale green colour and a strong, bleach-like odour which soldier described as a ‘mix of pineapple and pepper’. It reacts with water in the lungs to form hydrochloric acid, which can quickly lead to death. At lower concentrations, it can cause coughing, vomiting, and irritation to the eyes. In its first uses, chlorine was deadly. Against soldiers not yet equipped with gas masks, it wreaked havoc, and it’s estimated over 1,100* were killed in the first large scale attack at Ypres.

The German forces weren’t prepared for just how effective it would prove, and their delay in pressing into the gap formed in enemy lines actually meant they gained very little ground initially. However, chlorine’s effectiveness was short-lived. Its obvious appearance, and strong odour, made it easy to spot, and the fact that chlorine is water-soluble meant that even soldiers without gas masks could minimise its effectiveness by placing water-soaked rags over their mouth and nose. Additionally, the initial method of its release posed problems, as the British learnt to their detriment when they attempted to use chlorine at Loos in France. The released gas changed direction as the wind changed, engulfing the British lines instead of those of the enemy, and leading to a large number of self-inflicted casualties. Phosgene was the next major agent employed, again used first at Ypres by the Germans in December 1915 (although some sources state the French were the first to employ it). Phosgene is a colourless gas, with an odour likened to that of ‘musty hay’.

For this odour to be detectable, the concentration of phosgene actually had to be at 0.4 parts per million, several times the concentration at which harmful health effects could be expected. It is highly toxic, due to its ability to react with proteins in the alveoli of the lungs and disrupt the blood-air barrier, leading to suffocation. Phosgene was much more effective and deadly than chlorine, though one drawback was that the symptoms could sometimes take up to 48 hours to manifest. Its immediate effects are coughing, and irritation to the eyes and respiratory tract. Subsequently, it can cause the build-up of fluid in the lungs, leading to death. It’s estimated that as many as 85% of the 91,000 deaths attributed to gas in World War 1 were a result of phosgene or the similar agent diphosgene. It’s hard to put a precise number on, since it was commonly used in combination with chlorine gas, along with the related chemical diphosgene. Combinations of gases became more common as the war went on.

For example, chloropicrin was often used for its irritant effects, and its ability to bypass gas masks, causing sneezing fits which made soldiers remove their masks, exposing them to poison gases. Along with chlorine, the most commonly known poison gas used in the conflict is mustard gas. Sulfur mustards are actually a class containing several different compounds; in their pure forms, they are colourless liquids, but in warfare impure forms are used, with a yellow-brown colour and odour akin to garlic or horseradish. Mustard gas is an irritant, and also a strong vesicant (blister-forming agent). It causes chemical burns on contact with the skin, leading to large blisters with yellow fluid. Initially, exposure is symptomless, and by the time skin irritation begins, it is to late to take preventative measures. The effectiveness of mustard gas was due to its debilitating effects. Its mortality rate was only around 2-3% of casualties, but those who suffered chemical burns and respiratory problems due to exposure were unable to return to the front, and required extensive care for their recovery. Those who did recover were at higher risk of developing cancers during later life due to the chemical’s carcinogenic properties.

Overall, though the psychological factor of poison gas was formidable, it accounted for less than 1% of the total deaths in World War 1. Though their use was feared in World War 2, and they were employed in some cases, they were never employed on as large and as frequent a scale as seen in World War 1. Use of poison gas as a weapon was later prohibited by the Geneva Protocol in 1925, which most countries involved in the First World War signed up to. However, the chemicals used still have their uses – for example, phosgene is an important industrial reagent, used in the synthesis of pharmaceuticals and other important organic compounds. History of CW use History of CW use History of CW use Brief History of Chemical Weapons Use Although chemicals had been used as tools of war for thousands of years—e.g. poisoned arrows, boiling tar, arsenic smoke and noxious fumes, etc.—modern chemical warfare has its genesis on the battlefields of World War I. During World War I, chlorine and phosgene gases were released from canisters on the battlefield and dispersed by the wind.

These chemicals were manufactured in large quantities by the turn of the century and were deployed as weapons during the protracted period of trench warfare. The first large-scale attack with chlorine gas occurred 22 April 1915 at Ieper in Belgium. The use of several different types of chemical weapons, including mustard gas (yperite), resulted in 90,000 deaths and over one million casualties during the war. Those injured in chemical warfare suffered from the effects for the rest of their lives; thus the events at Ieper during World War I scarred a generation. By the end of World War I, 124,000 tonnes of chemical agent had been expended. The means of delivery for chemical agent evolved over the first half of the twentieth century, increasing these weapons’ already frightening capacity to kill and maim through the development of chemical munitions in the form of artillery shells, mortar projectiles, aerial bombs, spray tanks and landmines. After witnessing the effects of such weapons in World War I, it appeared that few countries wanted to be the first to introduce even deadlier chemical weapons onto the World War II battlefields. However, preparations were made by many countries to retaliate in kind should chemical weapons be used in warfare.

Chemical weapons were deployed on a large scale in almost all theatres in the First and Second World Wars, leaving behind a legacy of old and abandoned chemical weapons, which still presents a problem for many countries. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both maintained enormous stockpiles of chemical weapons, amounting to tens of thousands of tonnes. The amount of chemical weapons held by these two countries was enough to destroy much of the human and animal life on Earth. Iraq used chemical weapons in Iran during the war in the 1980s, and Iraq also used mustard gas and nerve agents against Kurdish residents of Halabja, in Northern Iraq, in 1988. The horrific pictures of Halabja victims shocked the world at the time of the negotiations in Geneva on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The two most recent examples of the use of chemical weapons were the sarin poisoning incident in Matsumoto, a Japanese residential community, in 1994, and the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, both perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyu doomsday cult.

These two attacks re-focussed international attention on the potential use of chemical weapons by terrorists, and on the dangers posed by chemical weapons. The devastating impact chemical weapons have had in the past, and the potential for the use of modern—even more deadly—chemical agents not only by States at war but in other violent conflicts and by non-State actors, provide the imperative for the international effort to uphold the ban on such weapons and to work towards the complete, global elimination of chemical weapons. Chemical Warfare: What are the Types of Chemical Weapons? Mustards Treatment and Prognosis Risk of Exposure to Chemical Weapons Injury from chemical weapon agents, known as CWAs, may result from industrial accidents, military stockpiling, war, or a terrorist attack. Industrial accidents are a significant potential source of exposure to chemical agents. Chemicals such as phosgene, cyanide, anhydrous ammonia, and chlorine are used widely. These chemicals are frequently transported by industry. The accidental release of a methylisocyanate cloud (composed of phosgene and isocyanate) was implicated in the Bhopal, India, disaster in 1984.

Chemical weapons first were used in 1915, when the German military released 168 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium, killing an estimated 5,000 Allied troops. Two years later, the same battlefields saw the first deployment of sulfur mustard. Sulfur mustard was the major cause of chemical casualties in World War I. CWAs have been used in at least 12 conflicts since, including the first Persian Gulf War (Iraq-Iran War). The Iraqi military also used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds during the second Persian Gulf War. Civilians also have been exposed inadvertently to chemical weapons many years after weapon deployment during war. Some 50,000 tons of mustard shells were disposed of in the Baltic Sea following World War I. Since then, numerous fishermen have been burned accidentally while hauling leaking shells aboard boats. Leaking mustard shells also have injured collectors of military memorabilia and children playing on old battlefields. Although a number of international treaties have banned the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, these agents reportedly are stillbeing produced or stockpiled in several countries. Within the last decade, terrorists deployed chemical weapons against civilian populations for the first time in history.

The release of sarin in Matsumoto, Japan, in June 1994 by the extremist Aum Shinrikyo cult left 7 dead and 280 injured. The following year, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin vapor in the Tokyo subway system during morning rush hour, leaving 12 dead and sending more than 5,000 casualties to local hospitals. Several characteristics of chemical weapon agents lend themselves to terrorist use. Chemicals used in CWAs are widely available, and recipes for CWA production may be found on the Internet. CWAs are transported easily and may be delivered by a variety of routes. Chemical agents often are difficult to protect against and quickly incapacitate the intended targets. Most civilian medical communities are inadequately prepared to deal with a chemical terrorist attack. Medically Reviewed by a Doctor on 7/7/2016 Medical Author: Chemical Weapons United States FAS | Nuke | Guide | USA | CBW |||| Index | Search | Chemical Weapons Chemical agents in the modem sense were first used in World War I, when chlorine gas was released, from large cylinders, in a favorable wind.

This surprise operation caused massive casualties, demoralisation of the forces attacked and demonstrated the need for protection from this kind of warfare. The first improvised mask was a cotton pad soaked in sodium thiosulphate, glycerine and sodium carbonate. Subsequently in World War I, a great variety of chemical agents were used by both sides, the most damaging being the blister producing mustard gas. Military clothing, even with a respirator, gave little protection against this agent. Immediately prior to World War II and during the early part of that war, Japan is supposed to have used chemical weapons against China. During World War II, President Roosevelt announced a no-first-use policy but had promised instant retaliation for any Axis use of chemical agents. Over 600 military casualties and an unknown number of civilian casualties resulted from the 1943 German bombing in Bari Harbor, Italy, of the John Harvey, an American ship loaded with two thousand 100-pound mustard bombs. At the end of the war stockpiles of newer agents, called "nerve gases," were discovered. These were found to be effective in much lower concentrations than those agents known up to that time.

The end of World War II did not stop the development or stockpiling of chemical weapons. The U.S., which used defoliants and riot-control agents in Vietnam and Laos, finally ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975 but with the stated reservation that the treaty did not apply either to defoliants or to riot-control agents. US policy renounces the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents. However, it retains the right to retaliate if deterrence fails to prevent the enemy's first use of chemicals. As is the case with nuclear weapons, the President of the United States must approve the initial use of chemical weapons. This approval procedure is known as chemical release. The United States stockpile of unitary lethal chemical warfare munitions consists of various rockets, projectiles, mines, and bulk items containing blister agents (mustard H, HD, HT) and nerve agents (VX, GB). About 60% of this stockpile is in bulk storage containers; 40% is stored in munitions, many of which are now obsolete.

The stockpile is stored at eight sites throughout the Continental US (Edgewood Chemical Activity, MD; Anniston Chemical Activity, AL; Blue Grass Chemical Activity, KY; Newport Chemical Depot, IN; Pine Bluff Chemical Activity, AR; Pueblo Chemical Depot, CO; Deseret Chemical Activity, UT; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR) and at one site outside of the Continental US on Johnston Atoll. In 1985, the Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Army to destroy the US stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and munitions. Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical warfare materiel requiring disposal, the Congress directed the Army in 1992 to plan for the disposal of materiel not included in the stockpile. This materiel, some of which dates back as far as World War I, consists of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. In 1992, the Army established the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to dispose of the materiel. In 1993, the United States signed the UN-sponsored Chemical Weapons Convention.

In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the convention making the treaty effective on April 29, 1997. Through ratification, the United States agreed to dispose of its unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 2002. US Chemical Munitions (1) Munitions quantities are as of July 11, 1997 The Non-Stockpile Project While the stockpile project poses many challenges, the non-stockpile project faces its own set of complex issues. The term non-stockpile chemical materiel describes a wide variety of chemical warfare materiel that is not part of the unitary stockpile as declared in 1986. This materiel exists in a variety of physical configurations that range from chemical agent identification sets once used to teach soldiers how to identify chemical agents to large former weapons-production facilities. This materiel is located on active or former military bases, and much of it is buried at small, geographically dispersed sites, as burial was once an accepted disposal practice.

The logistical problems posed by locating burial sites, identifying what is buried there, and determining how to remove it safely are serious and far-ranging. By the end of Fiscal Year 1999, materiel had been identified, or was believed to exist, at 99 locations in 38 states and U.S. territories, some of which had or have multiple burial sites. Approximately 229 known or suspected sites have been identified. At 33 of the 99 locations, hazardous materiel was removed, or no hazardous materiel was found. Transportable treatment systems provide the flexibility to rapidly identify, treat and/or neutralize certain types of materiel. The Army prepared a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, issued in the fall of 1999, that examined the feasibility of deploying these systems across the country at locations where chemical warfare materiel must be treated.

Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2016 | Arms Control Association Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2016 Latest ACA Resources Contact: Daryl Kimball , Executive Director, 202-463-8270 x107; Kelsey Davenport , Director for Nonproliferation Policy, 202-463-8270 x102. October 2016 In July 2012, Syria publicly acknowledged that it possesses chemical weapons. For a number of years preceding this announcement, the United States intelligence community assessed that Syria has a stockpile of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, blister agents, and nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Syria has the capability to deliver these agents using aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets. Below is a timeline of significant events related to Syria’s chemical weapons program from July 2012 to the present.

2012 July 23, 2012: Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi confirmed for the first time that Syria has chemical weapons, stating that these weapons would never be used against the Syrian people, but only against “external aggression.” August 20, 2012: President Barack Obama articulated his red-line regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Obama said his calculations on a military response would change significantly if the United States sees “a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” August 23, 2012: An official in the State Department confirmed that “Syria has a stockpile composed of nerve agents and mustard gas” and that the U.S. government monitors Syria’s chemical weapons activities “very closely.” December 23, 2012: The first allegation of chemical weapons use was reported. Seven people were allegedly killed in Homs by a “poisonous gas” used by the Assad regime. The coverage included the report of side effects such as nausea, relaxed muscles, blurred vision, and breathing difficulties. 2013 January 15, 2013: A secret State Department cable from the U.S.

consul general in Istanbul said there was compelling evidence that the Syrian military had used a chemical weapon known as Agent 15 in Homs on December 23, 2012. January 16, 2013: Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said that the alleged incident of chemical weapons use in December was not consistent with information that the White House has about Syria’s chemical weapons program. March 19, 2013: Alleged chemical weapons attacks were reported in Syria’s two main cities, the Khan al-Assel neighborhood of Aleppo and the Damascus suburb of al-Atebeh. About 25 people reportedly were killed and dozens more injured. The Assad regime claimed that Syrian opposition forces used chemical weapons in the fighting there. March 20, 2013: The Syrian government requested the United Nations conduct an investigation of the March 19 attack on Aleppo, claiming that opposition forces used chemical weapons and killed 25 people. President Obama said in a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that “the use of chemical weapons is a game changer,” in Syria.

March 21, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the United Nations will conduct an investigation on the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria, in conjunction with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Prior to the announcement, France and the United Kingdom sent letters to the Secretary-General, calling for investigations into three alleged incidents of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. March 24, 2013: Syrian opposition activists reported that Syrian forces used chemical weapons from multiple rocket launchers at the town of Adra, northeast of Damascus, alleging two deaths and 23 injuries. Doctors described that the weapons used were phosphorus bombs that harm the nervous system and induce imbalance and loss of consciousness. April 13, 2013: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said that the Syrian army dropped two gas bombs on rebel-controlled Aleppo, killing two people and wounding 12. Opponents of the Syrian governmen accused the army of using chemical weapons.

April 17, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that Syria has impeded the UN investigation by failing to agree to the scope of the UN inquiry on chemical weapons use. April 25, 2013: A letter sent to Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) from the U.S. intelligence community said that the Assad regime may have used the nerve agent sarin “on a small scale” in Syria, but that the United States needs more evidence to provide “some degree of certainty” for any decision-making on further action. The letter also said that the Assad regime maintains custody of the chemical weapons in Syria. April 26, 2013: President Obama remarked that the United States and the international community will work together to gain “strong evidence” of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. April 29, 2013: A helicopter dropped canisters allegedly containing chemical weapons on the town of Saraqeb. Eight people claimed symptoms such as nausea and breathing problems, and one of them later died.

June 4, 2013: French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius asserted that there was “no doubt” that the Syrian regime used sarin in multiple cases. Fabius said that the French government confirmed the use of sarin by testing specimen taken from Syria. A UN report also said that there are “reasonable grounds” to have confidence in Syria’s use of chemical weapons four times in March and April, although the report cannot specify the chemical agents or verify who used them. June 13, 2013: The White House said that the U.S. intelligence community has “high confidence” that the Assad regime attacked opposition forces by using chemical weapons multiple times over the past year. In the statement, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, said that physiological samples from multiple sources show exposure to chemical weapons. The evidence of use is recognized as “credible” in the statement. August 14, 2013: Assad agreed to allow the UN inspection team into Syria to investigate three possible uses of chemical weapons. The team’s mandate only allows it to establish whether or not chemical weapons were used, not who used them.

August 21, 2013: Syrian opposition activists claimed that a large-scale chemical weapons attack occurred at the suburbs of the Ghouta region, where Syrian forces had been attempting to expel rebel force. Reports said that thousands of victims of the attack have been counted in the Damascus suburbs, whose symptoms were typically body convulsion, forming from mouths, blurry vision and suffocation. Although the number of victims has not been clarified yet, it is estimated to exceed 1,000 people, many of whom were non-combatant. The United Nations Security Council also held an emergency meeting regarding the attack. The meeting produced a statement demanding further clarity of the incident. August 23, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s spokesperson expressed the intention of the UN to conduct “a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation” on the alleged chemical weapons attack in Syria on August 21. The OPCW Director General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, expressed grave concerns about the latest attack in Syria, and said that the OPCW experts were already in Syria with the UN investigation team.

August 25, 2013: The Syrian regime announced that it will let the UN inspection team investigating past incidents of chemical weapons use visit the Damascus sites in the following days. August 26, 2013: The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said in his press briefing that all information the U.S. has, including reports of the number of victims, their symptoms, and the firsthand accounts from humanitarian organizations, strongly indicate that chemical weapons were used in Syria. He also said that Syria attempted to cover-up the incident in the days following the attack. Syrian President Bashar Assad announced that his army did not use chemical weapons in the August 21 attack in Damascus. Assad recognized the allegation of his use of chemical weapons as “politically motivated," in his meeting with Russia's Izvestia daily. A convoy transporting the UN investigation team of chemical weapons was attacked by snipers in Syria. No UN personnel were injured, but they were unable to visit all of the sites affected by the attack.

August 28, 2013: The United States has concluded that the Assad regime conducted chemical weapons attacks against civilians, President Obama said in “PBS NewsHour.” Obama said he had not yet made a decision whether to take a military action in Syria. A second UN Security Council meeting was held. August 29, 2013: The British Parliament voted against supporting military action in Syria. Before the vote, a report from the Joint Intelligence Committee released a report which stated that chemical weapons were used in the August 21 attach, and that it was "highly likely" that the Assad regime was responsible. August 30, 2013: The White House released the U.S. Government Assessment on the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21. The report says that the intelligence community has "high confidence" that the Syrian government used chemical weapons against the opposition elements in Damascus. Secretary Kerry, in an address, also said that the regime used chemical weapons "multiple times" over the past year. Kerry said discussions on military action are underway. The U.S. Government Assessment included this map of Damascus and the areas impacted by the alleged August 21 chemical weapons attack.

August 31, 2013: President Obama made a statement saying that he would seek an authorization for the use of force from Congress for a limited military strike in Syria. Given the evidence of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in the August 21 attack, Obama said he supported limited action in order to deter further chemical weapons use and uphold international norms. September 2, 2013: France released its declassified intelligence assessment , which concluded that the Assad regime used Sarin gas in the August 21 attack, and in two earlier attacks in April. The report also said France assessed that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol. September 9, 2013: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced a Russian proposition whereby Syria would agree to place its chemical weapons under international control and dismantle them and the United States would agree not to conduct a military strike on the country. Prior to the Russian announcement, Secretary of State Kerry, speaking in the United Kingdom, suggested that if the Assad regime turned over all of its chemical weapons to the international community "without delay", a miltiary strike could be averted.

Speaking to media outlets after Secretary Kerry, President Barack Obama said that the United States would consider the plan. September 10, 2013: Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said that the Assad regime welcomed discussion on Russia's plan to give up Syria's chemical weapons and join the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Barack Obama, French President Francois Hollande, and British Prime Minister David Cameron discussed how to implement the plan through the UN Security Council, with France beginning to draft a resolution based on the Russian proposal, but with stipulations that force be authorized if Assad fails to implement the provisions of the resolution. President Obama, in an address to the nation, also requested that Congress postpone a vote on the use of force while the diplomatic path proposed by the Russians is pursued in the UN Security Council. However, he also reiterated his commitment to pursue miltiary action if a deal on securing Syria's chemical weapons is not reached. September 12, 2013: The Assad regime sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General which said that Assad signed a legislative decree providing the accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In the letter, Assad said Syria woud observe its CWC obligations immediately, as opposed to 30 days from the date of accession, as stipulated in the treaty. In Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry met with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, to begin discussions of the Russian proposal for securing the Assad regime's chemical weapons. September 14, 2013: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached an agreement on a detailed plan for the accounting, inspection, control, and elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. The plan requires Syria to provide a full declaration of its stockpile “within a week” and provide the OPCW and the UN access to all chemical weapons sites in Syria. The plan calls for the OPCW inspectors to complete their initial inspections by November and calls for the destruction of the stockpile of chemical weapons and chemical agents by the first half of 2014. The United States and Russia will now seek to secure approval of the plan by the OPCW executive council and then a UN Security Council resolution.

The agreement outlined states that “in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. September 16, 2013: UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon delivered a report on the UN investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The report concluded that chemical weapons were used against on August 21 on a "relatively large scale", and that the victims included civilians. The report cited evidence of the nerve agent sarin both in the environment and present in victims of the attack. It was outside of the report's mandate to assign blame for who used the chemical weapons. September 20, 2013: In accordance with the terms of the agreement negotiated by the United States and Russia, Syria submitted a declaration of its stockpiles of chemical weapons to the OPCW. September 27, 2013: The Executive Council of the OPCW adopted a timeline for destroying Syria's chemical weapons. Hours later, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to adopt a resolution that endorses the OPCW timeline for destroying Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal.

The Security Council Resolution says that the body will impose measures under Chapter VII of its charter if Syria does not comply with the resolution, or uses or authorizes the transfer of any chemical agents. October 1, 2013: A joint team of OPCW and UN officials arrived in Syria to begin destruction of the country's chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities. October 6, 2013: Officials from the OPCW and UN team said that destruction of Syria's stockpiles of chemical weapons began. The officials confirmed that the Syrians will actually complete the destruction work, while the UN and OPCW team will monitor and verify the activities. October 27, 2013: Syria submitted the details of its plans for "total and verified destruction" of its chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities to the OPCW. This declaration follows an initial declaration submitted on Sept. 20. October 31, 2013: The OPCW confirmed that Syria destroyed, or rendered inoperable, all of its declared facilities for mixing and producing chemical weapons. The OPCW was able to inspect 21 of the 23 sites where these facilities were housed.

The remaining two sites could not be visited due to security concerns, but inspectors said that the equiptment was moved out of these sites and destroyed. November 15, 2013: The OPCW Executive Council approved a plan for the elimination of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons. The plan call for transporting the weapons outside of Syria and destruction of the chemical agents in a country that has yet to be identified. The "most critical" chemicals are to be transported out of Syria by December 31, 2013 and the remainder by February 5, 2014. The plan calls for the destruction no later than June 30, 2014, and the destruction of certain priority chemicals by March 15, 2014. The Executive Council also announced that the OPCW was able to verify that 60 percent of Syrian declared, unfilled, munitions for chemical weapons delivery had been destroyed. Syria committed to destroying all of its unfilled munitions by January 31, 2014. November 30, 2013: The OPCW announced that Syria's chemical weapons will be destroyed on a U.S.

ship using hydrolysis. Hydrolysis is a process that breaks down chemical agents using hot water and other compounds to neutralize the agents. December 12, 2013: The UN team led by Ake Sellstrom investigating incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria issued its final report to UN Secreatary-General Ban Ki Moon. The report found that chemical weapons were likely used in five of the seven attacks investigated. The nerve agent sarin was likely used in four of the attacks, one of which was the large scale attack on a Damascus suburb in August. December 31, 2013: Syria missed the deadline for sending all of its chemical weapons out of the country. This deadline was set by a UN Security Council Resolution approved in September. 2014 January 7, 2014: Syria delivered the first load of chemical weapons to its port city Latakia. The chemical weapons were then loaded on a Danish ship that sailed out into international waters. China and Russia are providing protection for the ship, which will eventually transer the cargo to the US ship, the MV Cape Ray, to be neutralized using hydrolysis.

January 9, 2014: The German government announced its willingness to assist in the disposal of the chemical waste byproduct that will be created from the hydrolysis process. January 16, 2014: Italian Transport Minister Maurizio Lupi said that Gioa Tauro, a port in southern Italy, will be used to transfer Syrian chemical weapons to the US ship, the Cape Ray, that will neutralize the chemicals using hydrolysis. January 27, 2014: A second shipment of Syrian chemical weapons was loaded onto Dannish and Norwegian ships at the Syrian port of Lattakia. The U.S. ship that will receive the chemical weapons and then neutralize them using hydrolysis, the Cape Ray, left port. The chemicals will be transfered to the Cape Ray at the Italian port Gioa Tauro. February 6, 2014: Sigrid Kaag, head of the UN/OPCW mission for destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, addressed the UN Security Council a day after Syria missed a second deadline for handing over its critical chemicals and said that she did not believe that the Assad regime was deliberately stalling the removal process.

However, she urged Syria to speed up the shipments in order to meet the destruction deadline of June 30. February 10, 2014: A third shipment of Syrian chemical weapons was loaded on a Norwegian cargo ship. In totaly, the Assad regime 11 percent of Syrian's chemical weapons have been shipped out of Syria. February 14, 2014: The OPCW announced that two companies, one in Finland (Ekokem OY AB) and one in Texas (Veolia), were awarded contracts to dispose of the effluent created during the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. February 21, 2014: The OPCW executive committeed met to consider the Assad regime's new proposal for shipping out its chemical weapons. After failing to meet a Feb. 5 deadline to remove all of its chemical weapons and precursor chemicals out of the country, the regime proposed a 100 day extension. The OPCW executive committee, however, said that it an be accomplished more quickly. The 100 day extension also will not allow the the Cape Ray enough time to destroy the chemical weapons by the June 30 UN Security Council deadline.

February 25, 2014: The Assad regime delivered a shipment of mustard gas to the Syrian port of Latakia to be loaded onto ships. March 4, 2014: The Assad regime submitted a revised proposal to remove its chemical weapons from Syria by the end of April 2014. Two additional shipments of chemical weapons also reached the port of Latakia and were loaded onto ships. In total, more than 35% of the country's chemical weapons have been removed. March 7, 2014: The Executive Council concluded its 75th Session and noted in its report the “increasing pace” of removal of Syria’s chemical stockpile and requested the Syria continue “systematic, predictable and substantial movements” to complete the shipments. Another shipment of priority 1 chemicals was reached the port of Latakia, bringing the total amount of chemical agents removed from Syria to 29 percent of the total stockpile. March 19, 2014: The OPCW said that two additional shipments of Priority 1 and Priority 2 chemicals were delivered to the port of Latakia and loaded onto cargo vessels during the past week.

Syria has now shipped out more than 45 percent of its stockpile. April 4, 2014: The 12th shipment of Syrian chemical weapons reached the port of Latakia, according to the OPCW. April 11, 2014: Reports emerged of an attack using chlorine-gas bombs in Kafr Zita, a village controlled by oposition forces in northwestern Syria. April 14, 2014: The Syrian government delivered its 13th consignment of chemicals to Latakia, which was removed today from the port on cargo ships. As of this delivery, the OPCW said that the Assad regime has shipped out 65 percent of its total stockpile of chemical weapons, including 57 percent of the Priority 1 chemicals. April 18, 2014: Additional shipments of chemical weapons reached the port of Latakia between April 14-18. The OPWC said in an April 18 statement that in total, the 16 shipments constitute about 80 percent of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons.

April 22, 2014: Another shipment reached Latakia port, bringing the total of the chemical weapons stockpile removed from Syria to 86 percent. April 24, 2014: An additional shipment to Latakia brings the total to 92 percent. April 29, 2014: The OPCW announced that it would send a team to investigate the April 11 attacks that the Assad regime used cholorine gas. May 1, 2014: Syria missed the revised deadline to remove all of its chemical weapons stockpile from the country by the end of April. Approximately 8 percent of the stockpile, largely sarin precursor chemicals, remains in Damascus. June 8, 2014: The Norwegian ship Taiko departed for Finland and the United States to deliver Syrian chemical weapons for destruction. June 17, 2014: The OPCW's fact finding mission in Syria to investigate the use of chlorine gas concluded that it was used in earlier attacks. The team was unable to visit all of the locations due security issues.

June 23, 2014: OPCW Director General Uzumcu announced that the last 8 percent of Syria's chemical weapons was shipped out of the country from the port of Latakia on the Danish ship Ark Futura. Uzumcu says the chemicals should be destroyed within four months. July 2, 2014: Over 600 metric tons of chemical weapons were loaded on to the Cape Ray at the port of Gioia Tauro in Italy. July 21, 2014: The OPCW announced that all of the chemical weapons have reached the various facilities in Finland, the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Cape Ray for destruction. At the time of the announcement nearly 32 percent of the total stockpiles had been destroyed. July 24, 2014: The executive council of the OPCW also announced that seven hangars in Syria that were part of the country's chemical weapons will be destroyed and five bunkers will be permanently sealed.

August 13, 2014: The OPCW announced that 581 metric tonnes of a precursor chemical for sarin gas have been neutranlized on the Cape Ray. Operations to neutralize the blister agent sulfer mustard have now begun. August 19, 2014: The Cape Ray completed destruction of 600 metric tons of Syrian chemical weapons and precursor chemicals. The OPCW announced that the ship will now transport the effluent to Finland and Germany for disposal at land-based facilities. September 10, 2014: The OPCW confirmed that chlorine gas is being used in Syria. While the OPCW did not assign blame for the attacks, US Secretary of State John Kerry said that the use of helicopters to drops the chlorine gas "strongly points" to the Assad regime as the perpetrator. 2015 March 6, 2015: The UN Security Council adopted a resolution March 6 condemning the use of chlorine as a weapon in Syria’s civil war and threatening action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if chemical arms are used again. April 16, 2015: Doctors testified at the UN Security Council about recent chlorine gas attacks in Syria.

Human Righs Watch estimated that over 200 were killed by recent chloring attacks. May 8, 2015: Reuters reported that the OPCW confirms traces of sarin and VX gas at a military facility in Syria that were not declared. The samples were taken in December and January. August 7, 2015: Security Council Resolution 2235 was adopted, creating an investiagtive unit to determine the responsible parties for reported chemical weapons attacks in Syria. November 6, 2015: A press release from the OPCW fact-finding team claimed with "the utmost confidence" that the Islamic State used sulfur mustard in an attack on August 21, 2015 in Marea, in northern Syria. January 4, 2016: The OPCW announced in a press release that the last of the Syrian chemical weapons material, 75 cylinders of hydrogen fluoride, had been destroyed by Veolia Environmental Services Technical Solutions. August 10, 2016: Hospital officials reported a chemcial weapons attack using chlorine gas in Aleppo.

August 24, 2016: The third report of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism was realeased, finding that the Syrian government was responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin in March 2015. -Researched by Yuta Kawashima, updated by Alicia Sanders-Zakre Posted: August 19, 2014 The Five Most Deadly Chemical Weapons of War | The National Interest Search The Five Most Deadly Chemical Weapons of War "Chemical weapons require a relatively low investment, can cause severe psychological and physical effects and are agents of disruption." Tweet Share Share The three year crisis in Syria has led to a resurgence of interest in chemical weapons. Often referred to as the “ poor man’s bomb ,” chemical weapons require a relatively low investment, can cause severe psychological and physical effects and are agents of disruption. Modern chemical weapons were introduced during World War I in an effort to reduce the deadlock of trench warfare. But they are subject to topography and weather patterns. As munitions have become more precise, their tactical advantage is being eroded. Today, they horrify more than they contribute to victories on the ground.

Their indiscriminate nature and unpredictability, coupled with the sometimes-gruesome effects they have make them effective weapons of fear. Below are five of the worst chemical weapons: Most toxic: VX VX belongs to organophosphorus compounds and is classified as a nerve agent because it affects the transmission of nerve impulses in the nervous system. It is odorless and tasteless in its pure form, and appears as a brownish oily liquid. Developed in the UK in the early 1950s, VX is particularly potent because it’s a persistent agent: Once it’s released into the atmosphere it’s slow to evaporate. Under regular weather conditions, VX can persist for days on surfaces, while it can last for months in very cold conditions. “VX vapor is heavier than air,” which means that when released, “it will sink to low-lying areas and create a greater exposure hazard there.” Such characteristics make VX potentially useful as an area-denial weapon. VX is also a fast-acting agent. Symptoms can appear only seconds after exposure. They include salivation, constriction of the pupils and tightness in the chest.

As with other nerve agents, VX works by affecting the enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) that acts as the body’s ‘off switch’ for glands and muscles. With the enzyme blocked, molecules constantly stimulate the muscles. As the muscles spasm, they tire. Death is caused by asphyxiation or heart failure. While it is possible to recover from exposure, tiny amounts of the agent can be lethal. Most recently used: Sarin In September 2013, the UN confirmed that a chemical weapons attack involving specially designed rockets that spread sarin over rebel-held suburbs of the Syrian capital took place the month before. UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon stated that this was the “most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them in Halabja in 1988.” Sarin (also known as GB) is a volatile but toxic nerve agent. A single drop the size of the head of a pin is enough to kill an adult human rapidly. It is a colorless and odorless liquid at room temperature, but evaporates rapidly when heated. After release, sarin will spread into the environment rapidly and present an immediate but short-lived threat.

Similar to VX, “ symptoms include headaches, salivation and secretion of tears, followed by gradual paralysis of the muscles” and possible death. Sarin was developed in 1938 in Germany when scientists were researching pesticides. The Aum Shinrikyo cult used it in a 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway. While the attack caused mass panic, it only killed 13 because the agent was dispersed in liquid form. In order to maximize casualties, not only must the sarin be a gas, but the particles need to be small enough so they are easily absorbed through the lining of the lungs, yet heavy enough that they are not breathed back out. Sarin is not easy to weaponize. The quality of the agent also matters. Sarin (and VX) is susceptible to degradation, especially if it isn’t pure. Iraq’s sarin for example, had a shelf life of about one to two years. While the degraded products are still toxic, they can’t be used as weapons.

Although Syria’s CW stockpile was growing old and the agents were likely to have deteriorated significantly, the sarin used in the attack on the Ghouta suburbs on August 21, 2013 was higher quality than that used in the 1995 Tokyo attack or in Halabja. But it was still a far cry from the sarin produced by the United States and the Soviet Union. Most popular: Mustard Gas Also known as sulphur mustard, this agent gets its name from its trademark rotten mustard or garlic and onion odor. It belongs to the group of blister agents (or vesicants) that work by targeting the eyes, respiratory tract and skin, first as an irritant and then as poison for the body’s cells. It’s particularly grisly and slow acting. When skin is exposed to it, it reddens and burns for a few hours before large blisters appear and cause severe scarring and pain. Eyes will swell, tear and possibly go blind a few hours after exposure, and when inhaled or ingested, victims will experience sneezing, hoarseness, coughing up blood, abdominal pain and vomiting. But exposure to mustard gas is not always fatal.

When it was first used in WW1, it killed only 5 percent of those exposed . It became a popular chemical weapon—used in both world wars, during the civil war in Yemen and the Iran-Iraq war—because of its properties. Critical issues Critical issues How are chemical weapons destroyed? What are chemical weapons? About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as Chemical weapons (CW) agents during the 20th century. These chemicals are in liquid, gas or solid form and blister, choke and affect the nerves or blood. Chemical warfare agents are generally classified according to their effect on the organism and can be roughly grouped as: Nerve Agents, Mustard Agents, Hydrogen Cyanide, Tear Gases, Arsines, Psychotomimetic Agents, Toxins and Potential CW Agents.

Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) chemicals are divided into three groups, defining their purpose and treatment: * Schedule One are those typically used in weapons such as sarin and mustard gas and tabun; * Schedule Two include those that can be used in weapons such as amiton and BZ; * Schedule Three chemicals include the least toxic substances that can be used for research and the production of medicine, dyes, textiles, etc. CW agents mainly used against people are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The limit between lethal and incapacitating substances is not absolute but refers to a statistical average. Incendiary agents such as napalm and phosphorus are not considered to be CW agents since they achieve their effect mainly through thermal energy. Certain types of smoke ammunition are not classed as a chemical weapon since the poisonous effect is not the reason for their use. Plants, micro-organisms, the produced toxins belong to that class. Pathogenic micro-organisms, mainly viruses and bacteria, are classed as biological weapons.

* Chemicals that blister: sulphur mustard, lewisite, nitrogen mustard, mustard-leweisite, phosgene-oxime. * Chemicals that affect the nerves: VX, Sarin, Soman, tabun, novichole agents. * Chemicals that cause choking: cholrine, phosgene, diphosgene, chloropicrin. * Chemicals that affect the blood: herygem, cynanide, cynaogen chlorine. * Chemicals for riot control: tear agent 2 (SN gas), tear agent 0 (CS gas), psychedelic agent 3 (BZ) When have they been used - a short history 1863- The US War Department issues General Order 100, proclaiming "the use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or foods, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare". World War I - the use of chemical agents in WWI caused an estimated 1,300,000 casualties, including 90,000 deaths. 1914- French begin using tear gas in grenades (xylyl bromide) and Germans retaliate with tear gas in artillery shells.

This was the first significant use of chemical warfare in WWI. 1915- Germans attack the French with chlorine gas at Ypres, France. This was the first effective use of chemical warfare in WWI. 1915 - British use chlorine gas against the Germans at the Battle of Loos. This was the first chemical weapons attack by the British. 1918 - Germans launch the first projectile attack against US troops with phosgene and chloropicrin shells. The first major use of gas against American forces. 1918 - Fist US use of gas in warfare. 1918 - The US begins its formal chemical weapons program with the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service. 1919 - British use Adamsite against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War. 1922-1927 - The Spanish use chemical weapons against the Rif rebels in Spanish Morocco. 1936 - Italy uses mustard gas against Ethiopians during its invasion of Abyssinia. 1942 - Nazis begin using Zyklon B (hydrocyanic acid) in gas chambers for the mass murder of concentration camp prisoners.

1943 - A US ship loaded with mustard bombs s attacked by Germans in the port of Bari, Italy. 1945 - Germans manufacture and stockpile large amounts of tabun and sarin nerve gases but do not use them. 1962-1970 - US uses treat gas and four types of defoliant, including Agent Orange, in Vietnam. 1963-1967 - Egypt uses chemical weapons (phosgene, mustard) against Yemen. 1975-1983 - Alleged use of Yellow Rain (trichothecene mycotoxins) by Soviet-backed forces in Laos and Kampuchea. There is evidence to suggest use of T-2 toxin, but an alternative hypothesis suggests that the yellow spots labelled Yellow Rain were caused by swarms of defecating bees. 1979 - The US government alleges Soviets use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, including Yellow Rain. 1983 - Iraq begins using chemical weapons (mustard gas), in the war against Iran. 1984 - First ever use of nerve agent tabun on the battlefield, by Iraq during Iran-Iraq War.

1987-1988 - Iraq uses chemical weapons (hydrogen cyanide, mustard gas) in its Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, most notably in the Halabja Massacre of 1988. 1995 - The Tokyo Subway sarin gas attack killed nearly a dozen people and incapacitated or injured approximately 5,000 others. Thousands did not die from the Tokyo attack due to impurity of the agent. A tiny drop of sarin, which was originally developed in Germany in the 1930s, can kill within minutes after skin contact or inhalation of its vapour. Like all other nerve agents, sarin blocks the action of acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme necessary for the transmission of nerve impulses. Efforts to ban chemical weapons The experience of large-scale chemical warfare was so horrifying that it led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol , which forbids the use of chemical and bacteriological agents in war. Images of victims gasping, frothing and choking to death had a profound impact. The text of the protocol reflects the global sense of abhorrence.

It affirmed that these weapons had been "justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) reinforces aspects of the Geneva Conventions that also dealt with these agents and was negotiated over a period of 24 years. In 1992, after a decade of long and painstaking negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva agreed to the text of the CWC. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November 1992, in a resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/RES/47/39). The CWC has 188 states parties. Israel and Myanmar have signed but not ratified the treaty; while Angola, Egypt, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria have not yet signed the treaty at all. The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997, 180 days after Hungary, the 65th country, ratified the treaty.

Countries that ratify must destroy all chemical weapons over a ten year period with the treaty providing a "levelling out principle," which ensures that possessors destroy their stockpiles at roughly the same time. Five years after entry into force, destruction of 20% of the stockpile is to be completed. After seven years, 45% of the destruction should be complete. Under the treaty countries must stop any development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and retention of chemical weapons. The CWC requires States Parties to report the location of chemical weapons storage sites, the location and characteristics of chemical weapons production and research facilities and prohibits trade in certain chemicals with countries not party to the treaty. The verification provisions of the CWC do not only affect the military sector but also the civilian chemical industry, world-wide, through certain restrictions and obligations regarding the production, processing and consumption of chemicals that are considered relevant to the objectives of the Convention. The Convention also contains provisions on assistance in case a State Party is attacked or threatened with attack by chemical weapons and on promoting the trade in chemicals and related equipment among State Parties. What do individual governments have to do after they sign the CWC?

Once a government has ratified the Convention, it is required to declare all of its CW facilities (both commercial and public) within 30 days, and must destroy stockpiles within 10 years in an environmentally sound manner at its own expense. States Parties need to ensure that the prohibitions in the treaty are translated from international law, binding only on states, to Convention specifically requires States Parties to extend their obligations to private entities, it remain silent on precisely how to achieve this. States are required to enact penal legislation, prohibiting their private citizens, no matter where they are on earth, from undertaking any of the activities prohibited to the state itself by the Convention. Many states have also enacted laws laying down an obligation to provide declaration required relating to production, processing, consumption, import and export of chemicals above thresholds specified in the Convention. Another area in which most states have enacted legislation provides two-year, multiple-entry visa to inspectors who on 48 hours notification can inspect to clarify and resolve questions of non-compliance. During inspections they can interview personnel, request samples and evaluate chemical weapons destruction sites. They can evaluate a site for up to 84 hours. What is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons?

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) came into existence on 29 April 1997 and is based in The Hague, Netherlands. The OPCW is made up of about 5,000 staff members that monitor the destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. The staff also implement the complex declaration and short notice challenge inspections under theverification procedures, undertake routine inspections, and trains inspectors. The staff are accountable to all signatories and an Executive Council made up of 41 member states. How are chemical weapons destroyed? Previously the most common disposal methods for chemical weapons were land burial, sea dumping, detonation (firing or exploding the munitions) and open-pit burning. These methods may have been thought to be quite clever at the time (out of sight, out of mind), but their danger has since become starkly apparent. Buried munitions pose problems environmentally. Once the munitions begin to corrode and leak, the agents can contaminate the surrounding soil and even get into water sources. Sea dumping of chemical munitions is another method of disposal that has caused a number of problems.

Some of these dumping operations have occurred in relatively shallow water in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Japan. In both of these regions, dumped chemical weapons caused serious problems for the fishing industry. Fishermen in the Baltic and off the coast of Japan still haul old chemical weapons up in their nets, and are sometimes exposed to still-active agents. There are two major confirmed technologies for destroying chemical weapons acceptable under the CWC limits today, incineration and chemical degradation. However, there are dozens of alternative technologies, and the number is growing. Under the Baseline incineration process, chemical weapons are first taken to the demilitarization facility, where the chemical agent is removed from the munitions or bulk containers by automated equipment. This puts the workers at the demilitarization plant at a very low risk of contamination. Chemical degradation (or chemical neutralization) technologies also take many different forms. There are a number of chemicals, namely alkalis and oxidants, which reduce and often negate the toxicity of chemical agents. While the technologies for destroying chemical weapons do exist, in practice there are many factors that may come into conflict when the destruction process is carried out.

The issues that must be considered include the high costs of destruction and safety, as well as environmental, legal, and political factors. Although environmentalist groups have legitimate concerns that the weapons be disposed of in an environmentally safe manner, weapons experts generally agree that it is environmentally much more dangerous for the weapons to remain in storage for the additional years required to develop alternative methods of destruction. Safety must also be carefully considered in the destruction of chemical weapons. This entails precautions and regulations that protect not only employees working in the destruction facility, but also the civilian population surrounding the facility. Highly sensitive monitoring equipment must be used in order to ensure there is no leakage of toxic agents. The United States claims it has 12,000 tons of chemical agents in munitions and another 19,000 tons in bulk storage. Russia, the sole in-heritor of the former Soviet Union's chemical weapon stockpile, officially reports its stockpile to be 40,000 tons. These two countries are the only signatories to the CWC that have admitted to possessing chemical weapons.

In 1994, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) declared that Iraqi chemical weapons capabilities had been destroyed, leaving Iraq with no surplus (or any) chemical weapons stocks. A large number of old and abandoned chemical weapons still exist in a number of countries. The total amount of chemical weapons and old and abandoned chemical weapons that must be destroyed worldwide is daunting. The first deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons was in April 2007, but when discovered that the United States, Libya, and Russia would miss the deadline the countries were granted an extension of five years to April 2012. This deadline was not to be extended any further. Although even the extended deadline has been missed, the integrity of the Convention is still preserved. The countries in question have submitted detailed plans to the OPCW for the destruction of their remaining arsenals, together with planned dates of completion. Several States Parties have considered assisting Libya in the destruction of its remaining stockpile; Canada has provided large sums towards this goal under the Global Partnership Program. Chemical weapons proliferation One must also consider the threat of proliferation when it comes to reducing arsenals.

In the case of chemical weapons, the threat of proliferation is much smaller than that of nuclear or conventional weapons. This is true for several reasons. First of all, many of the chemical weapons of today's arsenals are aging and dangerous to transport. Second, it would be cheaper in most cases for a country desiring chemical weapons to produce them than to try to buy them on the illegal arms trade market. Third, the quantity of chemical weapons needed to pose a significant threat is large, especially when compared to nuclear weapons. An illegal transfer of a significant quantity of chemical weapons would be very difficult to hide. Finally, a country would not want to import chemical weapons unless it had sufficient chemical protection gear and training for its forces, a costly undertaking. Unfortunately, virtually every country has the technology to produce some of the simple agents used during World War I. In sum, if a country really wants a chemical weapons arsenal, it would be easier to build one itself rather than to import stocks.

Question: What yellow-brown chemical weapon was used?
Answer: Mustard Gas