Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Hu Jintao was elected president of the People's Republic of China on March 15, 2003. He is now general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, president of the People's Republic of China, chairman of the Central Military Commission. Hu Jintao, a native of Jixi, Anhui Province, was born in December 1942. He joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1964 and began to work in July 1965 after he graduated from the Water Conservancy Engineering Department of Tsinghua University, where he had a major in the study of hub hydropower stations. He is an engineer. Hu began to work at the grassroots in west China's Gansu Province in 1968 and stayed there until 1982 when he became a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Youth League of China Central Committee and president of the All-China Youth Federation. Beginning in 1985, he was appointed, successively, secretary of the CPC Guizhou Provincial Committee and of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee.

In 1992, 49-year-old Hu was elected member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenum of the 14th CPC Central Committee, which was then widely considered as an important step the CPC had taken toward generational transition of the central leadership. From 1993 to the end of 2002, Hu was concurrently president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, which has been the training base for senior CPC cadres and backbones of theoretical studies over the past 70 years. In September 1997, Hu was re-elected member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee. Hu became vice-president of China in March 1998 and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 1999. In November 2002, Hu was elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee at the 16th National Congress of the CPC.

In March 2003, He was elected president of China at the First Session of the 10th National People's Congress, the top legislature of the country. Hu and his wife Liu Yongqing were schoolmates at Qinghua University. The couple have a son and a daughter, who are also graduates of Qinghua University. 1959-1964: Student at the Water Conservancy Engineering Department of Tsinghua University. 1964-1965: Postgraduate and political instructor at the Water Conservancy Engineering Department of Tsinghua University. 1965-1968: Participated in R&D at the Water Conservancy Engineering Department of Tsinghua University and served as political instructor before the start of the "cultural revolution." 1968-1969: Worked with the housing construction team of Liujia Gorge Engineering Bureau, Ministry of Water Conservancy. 1969-1974: Technician and secretary of No. 813 Sub-Bureau, Fourth Engineering Bureau, Ministry of Water Conservancy and deputy-secretary of the general Party branch of the sub-bureau's head office.

1974-1975: Secretary of the Gansu Provincial Construction Committee (GPCC). 1975-1980: Deputy director of the design management division, GPCC. 1980-1982: Vice chairman of GPCC and secretary of the Gansu Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League (Sept.1982-Dec.1982). 1982-1984: Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, chairman of the All-China Youth Federation. 1984-1985: First secretary, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China. 1985-1988: Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee. 1988-1992: Secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region. 1992-1993: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.

1993-1998: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. 1998-1999: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of the People's Republic of China, president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. 1999-2002: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, vice president of the People's Republic of China, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. 2002-March 2003: General secretary of the CPC Central Committee, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and vice president of the People's Republic of China.

He was an alternate member, member of the 12th CPC Central Committee, member of the 13th, 14th and 15th CPC Central Committees and is a member of the 16th CPC Central Committee. He was a member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the 14th and 15th CPC Central Committees and is a member of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee, and general secretary of the 16th CPC Central Committee. He was made an additional vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the 6th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He succeeded Jiang Zemin as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, which ended in Beijing Sept 19, 2004.

Hu Jintao Biography (President of China) Birthplace: Anhui Province, China Best known as: President of the People's Republic of China, 2003-13 Hu Jintao became president of the People's Republic of China in 2003, succeeding Jiang Zemin . Hu, a trained engineer, joined the communist party in 1964 and quickly worked his way up, gaining notice in Beijing as a leader in the Communist Youth League. Most of his career was spent in western China, overseeing Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet. Picked for the Central Committee's Political Bureau in 1992 by Deng Xiaoping , Hu was the first modern Chinese leader to start his political career after the 1949 communist revolution. In 2002 all other senior leaders of the Central Committee stepped down to make way for a "fourth generation" of party officials, but Hu remained, leading political analysts to conclude that Hu would eventually take over for President Jiang Zemin .

(The same year Hu was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.) Although considered a reformer by some, Hu also demonstrated his loyalty to traditional policies of Beijing, including the rigid control over political opposition; in 1989 Hu imposed martial law in Tibet to deter pro-independence demonstrations. After taking office as president, Hu took charge of China's military and reached out diplomatically to countries around the world. He was succeeded in 2013 by Xi Jinping. Copyright © 1998-2017 by Who2?, LLC. All rights reserved. Hu Jintao Biography (President of China) Birthplace: Anhui Province, China Best known as: President of the People's Republic of China, 2003-13 Hu Jintao became president of the People's Republic of China in 2003, succeeding Jiang Zemin . Hu, a trained engineer, joined the communist party in 1964 and quickly worked his way up, gaining notice in Beijing as a leader in the Communist Youth League. Most of his career was spent in western China, overseeing Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet.

Picked for the Central Committee's Political Bureau in 1992 by Deng Xiaoping , Hu was the first modern Chinese leader to start his political career after the 1949 communist revolution. In 2002 all other senior leaders of the Central Committee stepped down to make way for a "fourth generation" of party officials, but Hu remained, leading political analysts to conclude that Hu would eventually take over for President Jiang Zemin . (The same year Hu was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.) Although considered a reformer by some, Hu also demonstrated his loyalty to traditional policies of Beijing, including the rigid control over political opposition; in 1989 Hu imposed martial law in Tibet to deter pro-independence demonstrations. After taking office as president, Hu took charge of China's military and reached out diplomatically to countries around the world. He was succeeded in 2013 by Xi Jinping. Copyright © 1998-2017 by Who2?, LLC. All rights reserved.

Advertisement Advertisement Profile: Hu Jintao | The Economist Profile: Hu Jintao Tweet AFTER being appointed head of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, Hu Jintao became state president in 2003 and commander-in-chief of the army in 2004. With these three positions, Mr Hu has his hands firmly on the main levers of power in one of the world's largest and fastest-growing economies (and its most populous country). Unlike heads of state in the West, not much is known about Mr Hu. He was born in the province of Anhui and studied hydraulic engineering at Beijing's Tsinghua University, graduating in 1964, the same year that he joined the Communist Party. According to his official biography, he has a photographic memory. The early years of Mr Hu's ascent to power were largely played out in three of China's poorest provinces: Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet. After running the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China—one of the more liberal bits of the Communist Party—he served as secretary of the Party Committee in Guizhou. He went on to do the same job in Tibet, where he used martial law to suppress pro-independence demonstrations.

His ability to protect the interests of the central government did not go unnoticed, and in 1992 he was elevated to the powerful, secretive Politburo Standing Committee, whose members are the leading lights of the Communist Party. In the late 1990s, Mr Hu began to promote large numbers of protégés to senior positions in both Beijing and the provinces, creating a formidable power-network. Since becoming China's leader, Mr Hu has shown a populist streak, concerning himself with the growing gap between urban rich and rural poor resulting from China's uneven economic boom. In the past couple of years there has been an upsurge in the number of protests triggered by these disparities, as well as by rampant corruption. Mr Hu is trying to strengthen the Communist Party's legitimacy by stressing its sympathy for the disadvantaged. Personally taking a number of high-profile trips to the poorer areas of China, he has also increased investment in the impoverished western regions while slowing development in the richer coastal regions. Mr Hu has also placed increased emphasis on strengthening and enforcing the rule of law and protecting rights enshrined in China's constitution.

At the National People's Congress in September 2004, he said: “Unfalteringly enforcing the rule of law is a vital guarantee of the country's stability and prosperity,” though he added that this “ensures the governing role of the Chinese Communist Party.” Many intellectuals expressed hopes that Mr Hu would push political reform at a faster pace than his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. However, he is increasingly revealing himself to be a conservative authoritarian, holding up Cuba and North Korea as examples of how the party should keep its ideological grip. As well as ordering millions of officials to take part in many hours of ideological training designed to tighten party discipline, he has cracked down on liberal intellectuals, political dissidents and the media. Mr Hu wants to bring China into the economic mainstream, but its rapid rise has proven threatening. Trade is a particular flashpoint, with calls growing for protectionist measures against Chinese goods. Both America and the European Union have slapped quotas on Chinese textile imports of late. China's military expansion is also causing concern in the West. Under Mr Hu, China has continued to increase its spending on defence, and tensions remain high with Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province.

America is particularly worried that China may get its hands on technology that allows its military to match American forces in controlling the battlefield. Historically a passive member of the UN Security Council, China has often abstained from important votes and has seldom taken the lead on big diplomatic issues. However, Mr Hu seems to want his country to be more assertive: for instance, China is hosting the six-nation talks aimed at halting North Korea's nuclear-weapons programme. America has welcomed this apparent willingness to take a bigger role in regional issues. President Hu Jintao Attending the 2003 APEC Economic Leaders'Meeting President Hu Jintao Attending the 2003 APEC Economic Leaders'Meeting 2003/10/22 From October 20 to 21, 2003, President Hu Jintao attended the 11th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting held in Bangkok. This is the first time that Hu attended the APEC meeting since he became president, and a major diplomatic move, drawing attention from home and abroad.

President Hu attended two leaders' meetings, two business circles' meetings, made important speeches on several occasions, and held bilateral meetings with leaders of the US, Russia, Japan and other APEC members. Hu made remarkable achievements attending the meeting, which are as follows in a summary. First, Hu further displayed China's achievements of reform and opening up. Hu made a speech at APEC business leaders' meeting, and introduced China's economic development, its good momentum, and the task of building a well-off society in an all-round way. As regards international concern over the rate of RMB, Hu emphasized that China's development has brought new opportunities to the world economy. The stability of the rate of RMB conforms to the needs of economic development in the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world. Hu also held a press conference after the APEC meeting, explaining China's assessment of the results of the meeting, and took questions from the press. His remarks have increased the outside world's understanding and admiration of China. Second, Hu put forward important propositions on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. Hu pointed out that the members should enhance mutual trust to promote Asia-Pacific stability, adopt effective measures to promote economic and social development, and open markets to improve multilateral trade mechanisms.

Hu also expressed his views on the future direction of APEC, information technology cooperation, the fight against terrorism, and APEC reform, and raised proposals on sci-tech innovation and social security. These proposals and initiative conform to the needs of China's reform and development, reflect the consensus of all APEC members, developing members in particular, and are widely supported and embodied in the Leaders' Declaration. Third, Hu sticked to the correct direction of APEC development. APEC is an economic cooperation forum. Hu emphasized that APEC should not depart from the purposes and goals of economic cooperation. The Chinese stance is welcomed and paid attention to. Fourth, Hu was actively engaged in summit diplomacy and promoted bilateral relations between China and relevant countries. Hu met with leaders of 10 members including the US, Russia, Japan and Mexico, exchanged views with them on bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common concern, enhancing mutual understanding, deepening bilateral cooperation and promoting friendly relations between China and the US, Russia, the ROK, Japan, PNG, Mexico, Chile, Peru and 10 ASEAN countries.

In short, Hu's attending of the APEC meeting has further established China's international image of maintaining world peace and promoting common development, displayed the new leaders' ability to keep complicated situations under control and open, pragmatic and people-oriented style. It has also reached the goal of making friends with people from various circles and deepening cooperation. It is conducive to creating a good international and neighboring environment for the goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way and a successful diplomatic practice. Appendix: Hu Jintao biography | birthday, trivia | Chinese President of China | Who2 President of China Hu Jintao became president of the People’s Republic of China in 2003, succeeding Jiang Zemin . Hu, a trained engineer, joined the communist party in 1964 and quickly worked his way up, gaining notice in Beijing as a leader in the Communist Youth League. Most of his career was spent in western China, overseeing Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet. Picked for the Central Committee’s Political Bureau in 1992 by Deng Xiaoping , Hu was the first modern Chinese leader to start his political career after the 1949 communist revolution.

In 2002 all other senior leaders of the Central Committee stepped down to make way for a “fourth generation” of party officials, but Hu remained, leading political analysts to conclude that Hu would eventually take over for President Jiang Zemin . (The same year Hu was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.) Although considered a reformer by some, Hu also demonstrated his loyalty to traditional policies of Beijing, including the rigid control over political opposition; in 1989 Hu imposed martial law in Tibet to deter pro-independence demonstrations. After taking office as president, Hu took charge of China’s military and reached out diplomatically to countries around the world. He was succeeded in 2013 by Xi Jinping. Hu Jintao Biography - life, family, children, parents, school, young, son, old, information, born - Newsmakers Cumulation Hu Jintao Biography President of China Born in December of 1942 in Shanghai, China; married Liu Yongqing; children: one son, one daughter. Education: Tsinghua University, degree in hydraulic engineering, 1964; Central Party School, 1980.

Addresses: Office— Office of the President, State Council Secretariat, Zhong Nan Hai, Beijing, China.

Career Political instructor in Water Conservancy Department of Tsinghua University, 1964–65; worked in hydropower research, 1965–68; laborer on Gansu Liujiaxia Power Station project, 1968–69; joined staff of Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power, working his way up through the ranks, 1969–74; deputy chief, Project Design Management Division, Gansu Provincial Construction Commission, 1974–1980; deputy secretary, Gansu Provincial Communist Youth League, 1980–82; alternate member, Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 1982; head of Communist Youth League, 1984; secretary, Guizhou Provincial Party Committee, 1985–88; party secretary, Tibet Autonomous Region, 1988–92; member, Politburo Standing Committee, 1992–98; director, Central Party School, 1993–2002; vice president, People's Republic of China, 1998–2002; general secretary, Chinese

 Communist Party, 2002—; president, People's Republic of China, 2003—.

Sidelights For the leader of a country of 1.3 billion people, Hu Jintao remains something of a mystery to much of the outside world. Although Hu became Hu Jintao China's president in March of 2003, he had already ascended to the highest office in the land in the fall of 2002 when he was named to succeed Jiang Zemin as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Active in Chinese politics for nearly four decades, Hu has nevertheless spent much of his public life toiling in the background, out of the spotlight. But it is a sign of the high regard in which he has long been held by party leaders that for nearly a decade Hu served as director of the country's Central Party School. Based in Beijing, the school provides training for almost all of China's top–tier national leaders and also arbitrates most national debates over party ideology. One of China's youngest leaders of the communist era, Hu is the only member of the communist party's previous politburo standing committee to be carried over onto the new committee, which formally took office in November of 2002.

Although he is clearly the group's leader, his ability to significantly alter party policy—and thus the future course of the country—is likely to be inhibited by the presence on the committee of so many close allies of outgoing party leader Jiang Zemin. A technocrat by training, Hu is seen by many China observers as a champion of the country's poor, in contrast to his predecessor who focused much of his time and energy on working for the interests of China's growing middle class. Another major question mark hanging over Hu's administration is the future direction of China's policy toward the United States. In a February of 2002 assessment of China's prospective new leader, John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center wrote, "For a man destined to be China's supreme leader, he has rarely dealt with U.S. issues. In the past, he has complained of Cold War 'hegemony' and has voiced suspicion of American power.

In 1994 a Hong Kong journal reported that Hu told a secret party meeting that 'strangling China's development' was 'a strategic principle pursued by the United States.' And one pseudonymous Chinese scholar reports that after the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999, Hu told a closed–door conference of party and government workers that 'the hostile forces in the United States will never give up its attempt to subjugate China.'" One of the first big challenges faced by Hu was the epidemic of the potentially deadly viral infection known as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), believed to have originated in China. In June of 2003, according to Agence France Presse, Hu told reporters, "The Chinese people are full of confidence and determination to bring this epidemic under proper control and we are sure mankind will be victorious over the epidemic." By the end of that month, the World Health Organization dropped Beijing—the last of the Chinese cities hard hit by SARS—from its health–related travel advisories. Although the Chinese government came under fire for its early failure to fully disclose the full extent of its SARS outbreak, it appeared that the measures taken to halt the spread of SARS had been successful.

The eldest of three children, Hu was born in Shanghai in December of 1942. His family, which previously had enjoyed prosperity in the tea trade, had fallen on hard times, undoubtedly exacerbated by the ever–tightening Japanese occupation of China's largest city. The family's chain of tea shops, which once were found in cities throughout several of the country's coastal provinces, had been reduced to a single outlet in Shanghai by the time of Hu's birth. While he was still an infant, the family moved from Shanghai to Taizhou county in Jiangsu Province, where Hu grew up and attended high school. In 1959 Hu was granted admission to China's prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. A promising scholar and the youngest student in his class, Hu specialized in hydropower generation in the school's hydraulic engineering department and eventually earned his degree in hydraulic engineering. Early in his college career, he was identified as a potential leader by senior members of the school's party organization and groomed for eventual membership in the party. He also developed a close relationship with Tsinghua President Jiang Nanxiang, who maintained close ties with local leaders in Beijing and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

With Jiang's approval Hu was accepted into the party on a probationary basis in April of 1964. He had already completed his studies at Tsinghua and had stayed on as a political assistant. With his elevation to probationary status, Hu was appointed a researcher at the university and also became a political instructor. He attained full party membership in 1965. During his years at Tsinghua Hu met and married a young woman named Liu Yongqing. The couple has two grown children. Hu was still a political instructor at Tsinghua University when China's Cultural Revolution began in the fall of 1966. For the next two years the Chinese capital—particularly its institutions of higher learning—was torn by civil strife between thousands of college students of the so–called Heaven Faction and others in the Earth Faction. Caught up in the struggle, Hu was eventually denounced for his role in the civil turmoil and banished, along with thousands of others—students and instructors as well—to the hinterlands. Hu, sent to the poverty–stricken, desert province of Gansu, was selected to work on the Gansu Liujiaxia Power Station project because of his background in hydropower engineering.

After serving for a year as a laborer on the power station project, he was assigned to another local project managed by the national government's Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. He quickly rose through the ranks to a party position with some clout. Transferred in 1974 to work as a secretary and deputy chief of the Gansu Provincial Construction Commission's Project Design Management Division, Hu soon came to the attention of provincial party chief Song Ping, an ultra–conservative revolutionary. It was at Song's recommendation that Hu in 1980 was accepted into the Central Party School in Beijing in 1980. While attending Beijing classes for cadre leaders, Hu was named by Song to serve as deputy secretary of the Gansu Provincial Communist Youth League (CYL). In 1982, Song managed to win for Hu an appointment to the secretariat of the national CYL. Hu also became president of the All–China Youth Federation. By the end of 1984, Hu had advanced to the top post in the CYL secretariat.

His involvement in the CYL soon brought Hu into close contact with Hu Yaobang, a pioneering revolutionary who at the time was seeking to promote both economic reforms and great political openness. For his support of the elder Hu's goals, which brought him into conflict with some factions within the CYL, Hu was rescued from possible repercussions and further entanglements in Beijing by being named provincial party committee secretary in Guizhou province. As he had during his years of service in Gansu, Hu made it his business to familiarize himself with the land and people of the new province to which he had been assigned. He eventually visited virtually every corner of the Guizhou. During his very first month in the province, Hu embarked on an eleven–day tour that brought him to some of Guizhou's more remote counties. As he traveled, Hu frequently dropped into the homes of local residents to inquire into the problems of day–to–day life they found most pressing. Fred Hu, who is unrelated but knew Hu Jintao while the latter was a student at Tsinghua, told Time of a visit made to the Guizhou home of a former classmate.

Although his friend was out at the time, Hu spent a couple of hours drinking tea and speaking with the classmate's parents. "Only after he left did the parents slowly realize that he was the new party secretary," Fred Hu said. It was in Guizhou that Hu first provided a clue as to his policies for dealing with dissent. When student demonstrators at Guizhou University, in a burst of pro–democracy fervor, seized the school's main lecture hall in late 1986, Hu rejected a hard–line approach and instead visited the campus personally to persuade students to end their protest. Writer Ge Shiru, who witnessed the events, told Time that Hu "did a beautiful job winning over the students by treating them as equals." Hu's masterful handling of the Guizhou crisis helped win for him in December of 1988 an appointment as party secretary for the Tibet Autonomous Region. For some years Tibetans had enjoyed a degree of cultural freedom, but it was not enough to satisfy the mountainous region's people who continued to press for independence.

Only three months after taking the party's reins in Tibet, Hu found himself faced with another political crisis when a group of monks demonstrated in the streets of Lhasa with homemade Tibetan flags. This time, the crisis was not handled nearly as well as had been the case in Guizhou. Government police fired upon the demonstrators, setting off even more widespread civil unrest, which forced Beijing to declare martial law. Approximately 70 Tibetans were killed in the riots that followed. Although Hu remained the nominal party chief in Tibet for the next three years, he spent most of his time in Beijing and not Lhasa. Despite the unfortunate outcome of the political standoff in Tibet, Hu managed to stay in the good graces of the country's top leaders. In 1992 Deng Xiaoping, who had resigned most of his official posts but remained one of the most powerful figures in China, brought Hu into the politburo's seven–member Standing Committee. Most observers believed that Hu, the youngest member on the committee, had been selected to be groomed as a successor to Jiang Zemin.

Only a year later Hu was given control of the Central Party School, where he moved the focus away from old–line Marxist orthodoxy to the consideration of fresh new ideas, including political reform. Chinese liberal intellectuals developed nicknames for each of the seven members of the politburo's Standing Committee. According to Yao Jin in a China Brief article, Hu was nicknamed "sunzi," which literally means "grandson" but is often used to denote "yes–man." Hu, the youngest man on the committee, was frequently assigned thankless tasks by Jiang as a test of the younger man's loyalty. One such assignment was briefing party workers on the implications of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in the spring of 1999. In another thorny task, Hu was assigned by Jiang in 2001 to counter hardliners' attacks on Jiang's proposal to open the party to capitalists. Walking a fine line in order to avoid infuriating either conservatives or reformists, Hu temporarily suspended two left–wing publications for "rectification" (according to Yao) but declined to close them down altogether. He also warned the rest of the nation's media not to publish future articles critical of Jiang's policy change.

Hu's ability to deal quickly and efficiently with the tasks assigned him by Jiang as well as his stewardship of the Central Party School accelerated his rise to the very top ranks of China's leadership. In March of 1998 Hu was named state vice president by Jiang, who also took pains to point out that while Hu had proven his ability to quiet political turmoil, particularly from the party's left wing, former premier Li Peng had shown an equal ability to put down turmoil from the right. Jiang thus set up a power struggle between Hu as leader of the party's reform movement and Li as its leading hardliner. In the end, the reformers prevailed, lifting Hu to the highest office in the land in 2003. Considering his dramatic rise to the top of China's Communist Party and government, Hu has ruffled relatively few feathers in the process. His ability to keep almost everyone happy may well be attributed to the deliberately low profile he's assigned to his own political philosophy, only fragments of which have been subtly hinted.

As Yao observed in the China Brief article, "A Chinese saying best describes the risk of showing one's clear political or ideological leanings: 'The bird that sticks its head out gets shot.'" Hu Jintao has been careful enough to act as 'a bird that keeps its head down.'" Sources Hu Jintao Rises to the Top in China, Remains a Mystery - 2003-03-14 Hu Jintao Rises to the Top in China, Remains a Mystery - 2003-03-14 October 29, 2009 6:30 PM Share Email to a Friend Print Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Jintao is to replace 76-year-old Jiang Zemin as the country's president. Mr. Hu became party leader last November, and since then has portrayed himself as an advocate for China's poor and disadvantaged. But it is still not clear how much real power he will wield, or whether his beliefs will translate into policy changes. In many other countries, a candidate for president would try to win power by proclaiming his convictions and setting a clear political agenda. Not so in China.

Sixty-year-old Hu Jintao has climbed to the top by remaining a mystery. Mr. Hu has been groomed as China's next ruler for at least a decade, quietly biding his time and careful not to offend senior party leaders. Fred Teiwes, a Chinese politics professor at the University of Sydney, says Mr. Hu owes his promotion to former supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping. He says Mr. Deng handpicked the young Hu as a successor to President Jiang Zemin during the 14th Communist Party Congress 11-years ago. "With Hu Jintao, we do know that in 1992, when he was raised to the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the age of 49, that this was at the very least a decision sanctioned by Deng, and I think the evidence on the whole suggests it was really Deng's imprimatur which put the issue beyond any doubt," he says. China's decision-making process is collective and secretive among the elite party inner circle. That circle is still today influenced by Mr. Deng. Mr. Teiwes says that although current President Jiang Zemin did not personally want Mr. Hu to succeed him, Mr.

Hu won the approval of other senior leaders by avoiding being identified as either a conservative or a reformist. "Being that in no way did Jiang Zemin have the same sort of clout and authority as Deng Xiaoping, the position then was subject, I think, to a certain amount of ratification by a broader collective decision," he says. Born in 1942, Mr. Hu studied hydraulic engineering at Beijing's prestigious Qinghua University. He earned his Communist Party stripes working in the poor, inland provinces of Gansu and Guizhou. During this time, the conservative party chief of Gansu, Song Ping, became Mr. Hu's mentor. Thanks largely to his connection to Mr. Song, Mr. Hu was promoted rapidly, becoming the youngest member of the party's Central Committee in 1982. He was appointed party chief of Guizhou province for several years, then became party head of Tibet from 1988 to 1992 - taking on one of the most politically sensitive posts in the country. Mr. Hu declared martial law in Tibet in March 1989, to crush widespread anti-government protests. Tibet activists point to his record in that region as proof that Mr.

Hu is a hardline conservative. But other observers say Mr. Hu may simply have carried out orders from Beijing. In 1993, Mr. Hu became head of the Central Party School, where government officials are trained. He shook up the stolid curriculum, introducing lively debates about political reform and Western management. Some believe Mr. Hu's achievements at the Central Party School indicate he is a moderate liberal. At the16th Communist Party congress last November, Mr. Hu inherited Mr. Jiang's position as party chief. During the past four-months he has slowly begun to stake out positions. Wu Guoguang, a political scientist at Chinese University in Hong Kong, says Mr. Hu has portrayed himself as a friend to China's disadvantaged masses, especially farmers and laid-off workers. Professor Wu says Mr. Hu has made frequent, highly-publicized trips to backward regions of the country, calling for more poverty and unemployment relief. But Mr. Wu and others say it is too soon to tell if Mr. Hu's politicking about China's poor will actually result in meaningful policy changes. Mr. Hu is just one person in China's nine-member elite governing body, the Politburo Standing Committee.

Six of the other eight most-powerful men in China are loyal to Mr. Jiang, due to friendship or a shared background in governing Shanghai, the country's financial capital. Mr. Jiang is staying on as head of China's military. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, head of the French Center for Research on Contemporary China in Hong Kong, says Mr. Hu may find it difficult to do anything without Mr. Jiang's indirect oversight. "I rather see Hu Jintao keeping his cards very close to his chest as long as Jiang Zemin remains influential, and as long as he has not secured a more powerful power base, before initiating any new reforms," he says. Mr. Cabestan and other observers expect that at least in the short term, Mr. Jiang's allies will have the upper hand over Mr. Hu in terms of formulating policy. President Hu may be China's top ruler in name, but it could well be years before he reveals his true political nature, and what impact it will have on China.

Bush, China's Hu Jintao Discuss North Korea, SARS, Taiwan | IIP Digital Bush, China's Hu Jintao Discuss North Korea, SARS, Taiwan White House background briefing in Evian-les-Bains June 1 President Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao discussed North Korean nuclear developments, terrorism, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and Taiwan in June 1 talks in Evian-les-Bains, France, during the G-8 Summit. Hu was among the non-G-8 leaders invited to the meeting. A senior Bush administration official speaking on background following the Bush/Hu meeting said the U.S. president "reiterated his vision of a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship" between the United States and China and issued an invitation for the Chinese president to visit Washington "as soon as he can make it; hopefully, perhaps in late 2003 or early 2004." On North Korea nuclear weapons development, the official said, Bush "reiterated his strong desire for a peaceful diplomatic resolution of this issue, working with the concerned countries, including not only China, but of course, our good Northeast Asia allies, Japan and South Korea.

He also specifically thanked China for hosting the trilateral [U.S.-North Korea-China] talks in Beijing in April, and he underscored that we continue to believe that China's cooperation will play a key role in the peaceful resolution of this issue." The official said the Chinese "made it clear that they think it's urgent to get North Korea back to the table." Bush said, according to the official, "that he wanted to make clear that our policy is not changing on the question of bilateral talks versus multilateral talks. We don't think we have enough influence by ourselves to change North Korean behavior. Therefore, we firmly believe that we need to go in in a group and let the North Koreans know that their nuclear program is not an issue just for the United States, but is an issue for all of the countries in their region." The official reported that "The Chinese said that the North Koreans are saying that there has to be some sort of bilateral contact as the price for a multilateral meeting. And they were conveying that to us." The official reported that "[B]asically the president said there is no change in our stance of we have to have multilateral talks if this is to move forward.

Within those multilateral talks, if the North Koreans look us in the eye on one corner of the table and say things directly to us, we're going to listen, obviously, and we will do the same thing back to them." The president welcomed China's cooperation in the war on terrorism, in particular China's "willingness to sign with us an agreement on the container security initiative, which should be happening in the coming weeks," the official said. On the issue of SARS, the official said, "President Bush once again expressed condolences to the families and friends of the SARS victims in China, and he specifically praised Hu's leadership in addressing this problem. He also discussed U.S. government contributions to China's efforts to eradicate SARS, and he specifically praised President Hu's willingness to become transparent on the issue of SARS." On Taiwan, the president "repeated our policy of a one-China policy based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, no support for Taiwan independence," the official said. "The President also said, however, within that context, if necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself. We will, as we say in the Taiwan Relations Act, provide necessary defensive weapons," the official added.

Following is a transcript of the briefing, as released by the White House: THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary (Evian-les-Bains, France) BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU International Filing Center Evian-les-Bains, France MR. MCCORMACK: Good evening, everybody. We have a senior administration official here tonight to brief you and give you a readout on President Bush's meeting with Chinese President Hu, and to take some of your questions about that meeting. So I'll turn it over to our senior administration official. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Bush and President Hu had their third meeting, but the first since President Hu became President, today. The two Presidents discussed a wide range of international and bilateral issues, and discussed their joint desire to promote cooperation between our two countries around the world. President Bush reiterated his vision of a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship between the two countries. He also issued an invitation to President Hu to visit Washington as soon as he can make it; hopefully, perhaps in late 2003 or early 2004.

President Hu thanked him for the invitation, suggested that the two sides would be able to work it out at their mutual convenience, and the two sides both said that they look forward to continuing and accelerating high-level visits between our two countries. As you would all expect, the two discussed the situation in North Korea. This was, in effect, the President's third in a round of consultations with the key countries on the North Korea issue. As you remember, he met with President Roh the second week of May in Washington. He then met with Prime Minister Koizumi at Crawford last week. And now he has met with President Hu. President Bush reiterated his strong desire for a peaceful diplomatic resolution of this issue, working with the concerned countries, including not only China, but of course, our good Northeast Asia allies, Japan and South Korea. He also specifically thanked China for hosting the trilateral talks in Beijing in April, and he underscored that we continue to believe that China's cooperation will play a key role in the peaceful resolution of this issue. On the issue of SARS, President Bush once again expressed condolences to the families and friends of the SARS victims in China, and he specifically praised Hu's President Hu's leadership in addressing this problem.

He also discussed U.S. government contributions to China's efforts to eradicate SARS, and he specifically praised President Hu's willingness to become transparent on the issue of SARS. On the war on terrorism, the two Presidents exchanged views. The President welcomed China's willingness to sign with us an agreement on the container security initiative, which should be happening in the coming weeks. Finally, on north excuse me north proliferation nonproliferation, President Bush stressed how important bilateral cooperation will be if we are to get this scourge under control. The two sides expressed interest in continuing to work together to face this problem. That's my brief readout, and I would take any questions that you may have. Q: Yes, did the President bring up the issue of Chinese assistance to Iran in its missile program? If so, did they discuss the sanctions that have been imposed on NORINCO and what was President Hu's response? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no specific mention of the NORINCO sanctions. The President did bring up his concerns about Iran, stating very clearly that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons presents a grave threat that China and the U.S. have to work together to address. Q: That was on the nuclear side.

What about the missiles? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was more on the nuclear, but it was basically the concept that Iran is a problem that we have to address, given its current policies. Those policies have to change. Q: Was there any response from President Hu on that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not much, really. Q: Two things on North Korea and the discussion. First, the Chinese have indicated in recent days that they thought it was perfectly good to just get the same group together again, China, North Korea, the U.S. -- well, of course the U.S. is trying to get South Korea and Japan into it. They did discuss the configuration of the talks, the timing of the talks? And secondly, was there any discussion of what role China would play, if any, in any ultimate economic sanctions on North Korea? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The conversation did not go as far as economic sanctions. There was a little bit of back and forth on the question of possible formats. As I said, we ended with both sides agreeing that we have to work together on this, and with the -- both sides also acknowledging that the Japanese and South Koreans have a key role to play.

Q: Can you tell us a little more about this back-and-forth? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Back-and-forth. Basically, the Chinese did tell us that the North Koreans are pushing for a bilateral conversation. They acknowledge that that is not only not likely, but also not productive. They did hope that in a multilateral format we would exchange views with the North Koreans. Q: How much pressure did the President put on the Chinese in general to just take a more aggressive stand with North Korea? You didn't get specifically the sanctions. Did you at least discuss the overall approach and the need to turn up the heat? And how did the Chinese react if you did talk about it? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the push was that we cannot let this drift too long. The question, though, is how do we address that effectively. The Chinese made it clear that they think it's urgent to get North Korea back to the table, and we agree with that. We've got to look at how we deal with the North Koreans. We have to finish our -- we have finished our consultations, initially. Now we have to go back to our Japanese and South Korean allies and talk about the way forward.

Again, the emphasis was, as I said, we've got to resolve this diplomatically, peacefully, but from our perspective, of course, there has to be a little bit of encouragement to get the North Koreans back to the table. Q: When you said the Chinese said that it's unlikely and not productive to have a bilateral meeting, have they said that to the North Koreans, as well? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What they say to the North Koreans is, look, you're going to have to find a way to meet; you cannot just hold out and say you're only going to meet in a bilateral setting. There is a little bit of to-and-fro here on this issue. I mean, the North Koreans are digging in, saying that they want bilateral talks. The Chinese are saying, look, that's not going to happen. What can we do? Can you express your concerns to the Americans in a multilateral format. Q: Two questions. One is, a senior administration official today said, we've been working on the issue of trying to get the Chinese to improve their export control rules so that they actually have something to sanction companies with.

Can you just elaborate on exactly what you're talking about in terms of U.S.-Chinese cooperation on that? And the second question is, did the President raise Tibet, Falun Gong, or what Secretary Powell has recently described as alarming developments on the human rights front? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- excuse me. I forgot your first question. It's been a long day. Q: Sorry. The first one is about the attempt to improve export controls with the Chinese? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When we about working together with the Chinese on proliferation issues, our understanding -- and I think the Chinese understand this, too is that there has to be an effective system in place and that it has to be implemented effectively. The Chinese argue that they have put a system in place. In fact, that was what President Hu said to President Bush, that we have put in an effective system, or we have put in a comprehensive system, was the word he used, to address our proliferation concerns. We, of course, want to see a little bit better implementation, and that was why you saw the sanctions.

Now, I won't say that those were the words of the President, but that's what the President was implying when he was saying that we have to fight proliferation together. It means that we both have to be effective in implementing our respective controls on proliferation. He acknowledged that even U.S. companies engage in some degree of proliferation around the world. Q: And on Tibet? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, on Tibet. Excuse me. My aging memory here. I'll be honest with you. The issue didn't come up directly because we have been raising it with the Chinese already. We have raised our concerns both in Beijing and in Washington. Q: Did the issue of how much influence China actually has over North Korea come up? In the past, the Chinese have suggested that they don't have as much influence as they might have had in the past. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believes and continues to say to the Chinese that we think you have a lot of influence over North Korea and probably in many ways more than the U.S. has. He said that again today, and President Hu did not respond one way or the other. Q: You said it was critical -- that China and the U.S.

agreed that it was critical to get the parties back to the table as soon as possible. There's a Japanese paper reporting today that there may be a meeting in Kuala Lumpur at the end of the month. Is there any talk of a meeting as soon as this month? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, because we haven't really finished yet. I mean, like I said earlier, we've done a preliminary round of consultations at the presidential level with the three leaders who are concerned. Now we're going to go back to our Northeast Asian allies and make sure that we agree on a way ahead. Q: It sounds like the way ahead is, what, another meeting? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Perhaps. And we haven't come to that conclusion, is what I'm saying. If you ask me; probably. But we do have to consult with the South Koreans and Japanese before we move forward. Q: You said that the Chinese President made clear that the North Koreans do want bilateral discussions. Did he say that basically anything beyond that at this point is definitely off the table, or did you talk about moving forward and, in fact, perhaps specifically about what meetings -- in the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President said that he wanted to make clear that our policy is not changing on the question of bilateral talks versus multilateral talks. We don't think we have enough influence by ourselves to change North Korean behavior. Therefore, we firmly believe that we need to go in in a group and let the North Koreans know that their nuclear program is not an issue just for the United States, but is an issue for all of the countries in their region. And he made that very clear to the Chinese. The Chinese, like I said, were saying, well, can there be some sort of bilateral contact within a multilateral format. The President said, look, in a multilateral format, sure, the North Koreans can look us in the eyes and say something. But it's got to be within a multilateral format. Q: Did the Chinese President ask President Bush if it would be possible for a bilateral -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said -- no, he didn't ask for a bilateral meeting. The Chinese have given up on that, and the Chinese acknowledge that that probably isn't the most effective way.

Q: -- bilateral -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, bilateral contacts were the way they were putting it. Q: The Chinese have expressed concerns about unilateral actions outside of the U.N. Did that issue come up all? Did the President offer them any assurances about commitments to the U.N.? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no specific talk about the U.N. In fact, the one mention of the U.N. was when the Chinese said that they had worked with us on the Iraq issue in the U.N. in the past, and they looked forward to cooperating in the reconstruction of Iraq in the future. Q: Could I ask one more on Iran? Did the President mention at all the impending IAEA report? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that did not come up at all. Q: And can I ask you one atmospherics question? In the past, with Jiang Zemin, these things were fairly tightly scripted, there wasn't a conversational sense. Was it the same? Were their atmospherics at all different? Was Hu more conversational at all? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to compare this one with the past one.

But I think the atmospherics were actually pretty good. There was a little bit more give-and-take than you traditionally get. And I think the President believes that -- and he said this to President Hu -- that he thinks Hu is doing a good job trying to take the reins under difficult conditions. The SARS epidemic has made the transition in China fairly complicated. The President understands that and thinks Hu is probably doing a pretty job at it. Q: Can I clarify two points? You mentioned bilateral contacts. Can you tell me exactly what you meant by that? Is that what the Chinese said the North Koreans are saying? Or what -- I don't want to blow up the context of that. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, let me be as clear as I can. The Chinese said that the North Koreans are saying that there has to be some sort of bilateral contact as the price for a multilateral meeting. And they were conveying that to us. Q: And did we have a reaction to that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was just what I just said, that basically the President said there is no change in our stance of we have to have multilateral talks if this is to move forward.

Within those multilateral talks, if the North Koreans look us in the eye on one corner of the table and say things directly to us, we're going to listen, obviously, and we will do the same thing back to them. Q: So you might do bilateral contacts in order to pave the way for a multilateral -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, let me be clear. It's got to be a multilateral meeting. We're not going to pull aside. We're not going to go into a separate room. We're not going to say, please, North Korea, you come and talk -- spill to us without the Chinese listening in on what's going on here. Q: One last clarification. What if anything did he ask of Russia when it comes to the question of North Korea? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No mention of Russia at all in the North Korea context. Q: But were you in the Russia the Putin-Bush meeting? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no I wasn't. Sorry. Q: Quick clarification. Were the Chinese simply conveying this North Korean request, or did they also indicate that they would endorse it or in any way favor the North Korean position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were, in effect, conveying it and asking us to consider it. That was the word they use. Q: They asked you to consider it. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, as a possible way forward. Q: In your mind, is this a move a change in the North Korean position then? The North Koreans have in the past said it had to be bilateral. What you heard today was a change in the North Korean position? And similarly, when the President says, sure, in a multilateral format the North Koreans can look us in the eyes, sounds very much like what Secretary Armitage said in Congress that was not so welcome at the White House months ago. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of the North Koreans, yes, they've moved -- they have moved a little bit. They were, as you recall, about two months ago saying that the only type of talks that would be possible would be bilateral talks. And now they've gone beyond that. In terms of, is this a change for the President? No, he has said this in the past, that basically it has to be multilateral talks. And I want you to concentrate on that.

We haven't changed; it has to be multilateral talks. And all he's saying in response to can there be bilateral contacts, he's asking, well, what does that mean? If it means the North Koreans sitting at a table with two or three or four other parties, look us in the eye and say what's on their mind, if you want to consider that a bilateral contact, then, sure, that will happen. Q: That's exactly what Rich said in his testimony, and you'll recall people came back and said this could undercut the concept of a multilateral meeting. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no -- I'm not exactly familiar with what Rich said. I remember it caused a little bit of a stir at the time. But I will say that we, all along, have been saying that it's got to be multilateral. And that's really what I want you concentrating on. It's not whether we speak first to the Chinese, then to the Japanese or South Koreans if they're there, or maybe even to the North Koreans sitting across the table. It's the fact that you have to have the parties around a table, and it's not just going to be us talking to the North Koreans.

And I hope we're all clear on that. Have I made that clear? Okay. Q: Did they push at all? President Bush said that that was -- bilateral contacts were not acceptable, that multilateral talks had to be the way. Did he push back at all and try to convince him at all, or just accepted it? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They accepted it, and I think just the assurance that we'd be willing to listen to North Korean concerns, sitting around a table of four or five other parties -- the Chinese did not push back on that concept. Q: Did the Chinese leader emphasize peaceful solution of North Korea issues in specific words? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did he stress peaceful resolution? Q: Yes. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, absolutely, yes. Both sides did. I mean, we have that common area where we totally agree that we need a peaceful diplomatic resolution and that we have to be working together. Q: Could you clarify, was it the Chinese who proposed bilateral contacts within a multilateral format, or the North Koreans who advanced -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we're covering the same ground here, I've said that already.

Yes, it was the Chinese conveying the North Korean desire there. Q: The North Koreans are now, in effect, proposing -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. No questions on Taiwan? You guys asleep? (Laughter.) Q: What about Taiwan? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Glad somebody is awake out there. Which meant I forgot to include it in my opening remarks. On Taiwan, the President repeated our policy of a one-China policy based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, no support for Taiwan independence. The Chinese basically accepted that, and said, okay, that's positive. They did say that they have concerns about forces on Taiwan moving towards independence. The President said, we don't support independence. The President also said, however, within that context, if necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself. We will, as we say in the Taiwan Relations Act, provide necessary defensive weapons. Q: Thanks. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm out of here. See you. (Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: Keywords:

Question: Hu Jintao became President of which country in 2003?
Answer: China