September 1938 - The Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia | The Globe at War September 1938 - The Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia Submitted by SteveMerc on Thu, 08/18/2011 - 21:45 Following the Third Reich's Anschluss, or political union, with Austria Hitler looked to Czechoslovakia for his next conquest. As a pretext for war the German media, under Goebbels direction, emitted a constant propaganda stream heightening tensions in the area by calling for protecting the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Goebbels agitations focused on the Sudetenland, a Czechoslovakian region running along the German border and home to most of Czechoslovakia's ethnic Germans. Nazi collaborators worked from within the Sudetenland, just as during the Austrian Anschluss, to play up alleged concerns regarding the well fare of German blooded Czechoslovak citizens arguably facing discrimination. Throughout the volatile summer of 1938 the British Government, led by newly elected Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, eagerly sought to avoid confronting Hitler over Czechoslovakia.

Hitler seized the opportunity provided by British hesitancy and moved aggressively toward war with Czechoslovakia. As summer's days began to wane Hitler's speeches became even more warlike. Hitler ordered German combat units placed on a heightened state of alert and the Wehrmacht frantically prepared for invading Czechoslovakia. On September 15, 1938 Chamberlain, desiring to avoid war, met with Hitler at Hitler's private retreat in Berchtesgaden. Hitler deceivingly told Chamberlain he coveted "only the Sudetenland". Chamberlain returned to London confident he could appease Hitler and win French and Czech acquiescence for Hitler's "request". On September 18, Chamberlain met with the French Premier, Edouard Daladier, in London. The French anxiously sought to avoid war and, as did the British, incorrectly believed the French army and air force lacked the power to challenge Germany. The Soviet Union possessed the only military willing to intervene, but Romania and Poland, considering Russia's imperialistic history, refused to grant the Red Army military access across their borders.

On September 19, 1938 the British and French asked the Czech government to accept an agreement ceding the Sudetenland to Germany. To his credit, Czech President Eduard Benes firmly turned down this request to give up nearly half of sovereign Czech territory. Moreover, defending Czechoslovakia would be nearly impossible without the Sudetenland - further emboldening Benes to hold onto this critical piece of his nation. The well-equipped Czech army had studded the Sudetenland with a maze of fortifications embedded in rugged defensive terrain. In addition, handing over the Sudetenland would mean crippling the Czechoslovakian economy; via the loss of heavy industry and natural resources located therein. In spite of all this, the Czech cabinet refused to stand with Benes and instead voted for relinquishing the Sudetenland; ostensibly in the interest of peace. On September 21, 1938, the Czech government grudgingly gave notice of acquiescence to the German annexation of the Sudetenland. Chamberlain flew to meet with Hitler, in Germany at Bad Godesberg on the Rhine River, and seal the deal.

Hitler, ever the gambler, switched his terms and pushed for a quicker turnover of the Sudetenland than the Czechs had agreed. Hitler pressed aggressively with little concern over crossing the precipice of war. Hitler's underhanded "bait and switch" not only undercut his ability to negotiate with Britain after the fall of France but meant Chamberlain's shuttle diplomacy and subsequent deal to avoid war nearly fell apart. Britain and Czechoslovakia mobilized for war. On September 26th, Hitler spoke at the Sportspalast in Berlin, arguing in highly inflammatory terms for a decision over the Sudetenland, no matter the consequences for peace. Hitler expressed readiness for war but the German army in particular was appalled at the prospect of war. Many of Hitler's generals, especially Army Chief of Staff Ludwig Beck, adamantly argued against forcing the issue. Several generals, including most prominently future Army Chief of Staff General Franz Halder, planned a coup in response to Hitler's provocations. Even as war loomed likely, Hitler ignored the protestations from his general staff.

Before an afternoon deadline for averting war expired on September 28, however, Hitler received messages from the French Ambassador seeking compromise and a message from Mussolini proposing a conference between Italy, Britain, France and Germany to decide the issue diplomatically. In Munich on September 29th and 30th the allies and Germany held the conference deciding the Sudetenland's fate. Mussolini proposed a plan to Hitler's satisfaction, Chamberlain and Daladier accepted the plan almost as is. The Munich agreement stipulated German occupation of the Sudetenland by October 10, 1938. Hitler had "acquired" the Sudetenland. In doing so, he annexed approximately 10,000 square miles and 3,500,000 persons, again without firing a shot. The Polish and Hungarians promptly joined Germany at the Czech carcass. The Poles seized the Teschen region of Czechoslovakia on October 2nd, and on November 2nd Hungary swooped in for a strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia.

The deed to the Poles covered about 400 square miles and 240,000 persons; the deed to Hungary, about 5,000 square miles and 1,000,000 persons. Hitler had won an enormous success; fueling the Third Reich's drive to world war. by Steven Douglas Mercatante The History Place - Triumph of Hitler: Nazis Take Czechoslovakia Nazis Take Czechoslovakia Shortly after he signed the Munich Agreement in September 1938, Adolf Hitler privately complained to members of his SS bodyguard, "That fellow Chamberlain spoiled my entrance into Prague." Hitler originally wanted to smash Czechoslovakia via a lighting military strike and then make a Caesar-like entry into the old capital city. But he had been overwhelmed by the eagerness of Britain and France to serve Czechoslovakia to him "on a plate." For Hitler, the Munich Agreement was nothing more than a worthless piece of paper.

On October 21st, just three weeks after signing the document, he informed his generals that they should begin planning for "the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia." ADVERTISEMENT Hitler had promised British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the German people that the Sudetenland would be his "last territorial demand" in Europe. In reality, it was only the beginning. And Hitler now wanted to grab the remainder of Czechoslovakia due to its strategic importance. By now, the Nazis had perfected the art of stealing neighboring territory. They would start by encouraging political unrest inside the area. At the same time, they would wage a propaganda campaign citing real or imagined wrongs committed against local Germans. When neighboring political leaders finally came to see to Hitler to resolve the ongoing crisis, they would be offered help in the form of a German Army occupation to "restore order." The new political leader of Czechoslovakia was 66-year-old Dr. Emil Hácha, an inexperienced politician with a bad heart condition. He had replaced Czech President Eduard Benes who fled to England after the Munich Agreement fearing assassination by the Nazis. Hácha now presided over an ever-shrinking republic.

By early 1939, two outlying border areas had already been seized by Poland and Hungary with Hitler's approval. At Hitler's instruction, nationalist Slovaks living in the eastern portion of Czechoslovakia began agitating for a completely independent state, which would take another huge chunk out of Czechoslovakia. On March 10, 1939, President Hácha responded to the Slovak demand for independence by ousting the leaders of the Slovak government and declaring martial law inside the province of Slovakia. Hácha's unexpected and defiant action took the Nazis by surprise, upsetting their carefully laid plans. Hitler reacted to this turn of events just as he had when Schuschnigg took a defiant stance in Austria – he ordered his generals to prepare for an immediate invasion. Meanwhile, the pro-German Slovak leader, Monsignor Tiso, was summoned to Berlin to see Hitler. Tiso arrived at the Chancellery on Monday evening, March 13th, and was told by Hitler that the situation in Czechoslovakia had become "impossible." Time was running out said Hitler.

Tiso had to decide right then and there whether Slovakia wanted to break off from Czechoslovakia and become an independent country. Hitler promised Tiso that he would protect Slovakia after its independence was proclaimed. Tiso hesitated briefly then decided to go along with Hitler. The Nazis then drafted a proclamation of independence for Tiso to use, along with a phony telegram to be sent later containing an appeal for the Führer's protection. The following day, Tuesday, March 14th, Tiso returned home and presented the independence proclamation to Slovakia's parliament. He told the assembly that if they failed to approve this proclamation, Hitler's troops would simply march in and take Slovakia. Faced with this prospect, the Slovak assembly gave in and voted with Tiso. Thus the independent country of Slovakia was born. A night-time view of the imposing new Reich Chancellery building in Berlin - setting for the last in a series of bloodless diplomatic triumphs by Hitler. Below: Revealing body language - the diminutive President Hácha (center) speaks with the Führer during their March 15 meeting - held in the early morning hours in Hitler's ornate study room.

Below: Later that same day - March 15th - Hitler is in Prague, capital of the former Czechoslovakia - and reviews his own troops. Below: Deep inside the former Czechoslovakia, residents of the city of Brno (in Moravia) watch as Hitler's troops roll in. Now, all that remained of shrunken Czechoslovakia were the two central provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. At this point, Goebbels' propaganda machine went into high gear spreading reports of alleged persecution of local Germans there by Czechs. Out of convenience, or perhaps out of laziness, Goebbels' propaganda people used the same fake newspaper stories they had printed six months earlier concerning the Czech "reign of terror" in the Sudetenland. President Hácha, bewildered by all that was happening to Czechoslovakia, sent a message to Hitler asking for a face-to-face meeting to resolve the ongoing crisis. Hitler, of course, agreed to see him as soon as possible. Hácha was unable to fly due to his heart condition and arrived by train in Berlin at 10:40 p.m. on Tuesday evening.

He was met by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and taken to the Adlon Hotel to await Hitler's call. Nearly three hours later, at 1:15 a.m., Hácha was finally summoned to the Reich Chancellery to see the Führer. At this meeting, Hitler let the Czech president speak first and for as long as he wanted. President Hácha proceeded to humble himself unabashedly in the presence of the all-powerful German dictator. He disavowed any link with the previous democratic government in Czechoslovakia and promised to work toward eliminating any anti-German sentiment among his people. He then pleaded for mercy on behalf of his little country. But Hácha's pitiful pleading brought out the worst in Hitler, a man who had utter contempt for human weakness. When Hácha finished his monologue, Hitler launched into a blistering attack, citing all of the alleged wrongs committed by Czechs against Germans. Working himself into a self-induced state of rage, Hitler hollered out that his patience with Czechoslovakia had ended, and that the German Army was about to invade the country, beginning in just a few hours. Now, the Führer bellowed, the Czech people had two options.

They could offer futile resistance and be violently crushed, or, the president could sign a document telling his countrymen to peacefully receive the incoming troops. The president had to decide soon. The troops would march in regardless beginning at 6 a.m. that morning. President Hácha, taken completely by surprise, was at first too shocked to respond and just sat there as if he had turned to stone. Hitler was done with him for the time being and sent him into an adjoining room for further discussions with Göring and Ribbentrop. The two Nazis immediately pounced on the sickly president, badgering him to sign the surrender document which was placed on the table before him. But Hácha, after regaining his composure, refused outright. The Nazis insisted again, even pushing a pen at him. He refused again. Now, Göring played his trump card. He told the Czech president that unless he signed, half of Prague would be bombed to ruins within two hours by the German Air Force. Upon hearing this, the frail president collapsed onto the floor. The Nazis panicked, thinking they had killed the man with fright. Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Theodor Morell, was rushed in and injected the president with vitamins to revive him.

When Hácha recovered his senses, the Nazis stuck a telephone in his hands, connecting him with his government back in Prague. Hácha spoke into the telephone and reluctantly advised his government to surrender peacefully to the Nazis. After this, Hácha was ushered back into Hitler's presence. At 3:55 a.m., Wednesday, March 15th, the Czech president signed the document stating he had "confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich." Two hours later, amid a late winter snowstorm, the German Army rolled into the first non-Germanic territory to be taken by the Nazis. "Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist!" Hitler announced to the German people later that day, just before departing for Prague. That evening, Hitler made his long-awaited entry into the grand old city at the head of ten vehicle convoy. But there were no cheering crowds. The streets of Prague were deserted. Hitler spent the night in Prague's Hradschin Castle, former home to the Kings of Bohemia.

The next day, Thursday, March 16th, from inside the castle, Hitler issued a proclamation establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. "Czechoslovakia," Hitler declared, "showed its inherent inability to survive and has therefore now fallen victim to actual dissolution." That same day, Tiso sent his pre-arraigned telegram from Slovakia urgently requesting the Führer's protection. The two-day-old independent country of Slovakia thus ceased to exist as the German Army rolled in, supposedly at the request of the Slovaks themselves. At this point, the whole world waited to see how Prime Minister Chamberlain would react to the incredible happenings in Czechoslovakia, all of which were gross violations of the Munich Agreement. Chamberlain responded to Hitler's aggression by claiming the British were not bound to protect Czechoslovakia since the country in effect no longer existed after Slovakia had voted for independence on March 14th. And Hitler's actions had occurred the next day, March 15th. The Prime Minister's willy-nilly statement caused an uproar in the British press and in the House of Commons. Chamberlain was lambasted over his lack of moral outrage concerning Hitler's gangster diplomacy.

Angry members of the House of Commons vowed that Britain would never again appease Hitler. Interestingly, while traveling on a train from London to Birmingham on Friday, March 17, Chamberlain underwent a complete change of heart. He had in his hand a prepared speech discussing routine domestic matters that he was supposed to give in Birmingham. But upon deep reflection, he decided to junk the speech and outlined a brand new one concerning Hitler. In the new speech, which was broadcast throughout England on radio, Chamberlain first apologized for his lukewarm reaction to Hitler's recent actions in Czechoslovakia. Then he recited a list of broken promises made by Hitler dating back to the Munich Agreement. "The Führer," Chamberlain asserted, "has taken the law into his own hands." "Now we are told that this seizure of territory has been necessitated by disturbances in Czechoslovakia...If there were disorders, were they not fomented from without?" "Is this the last attack upon a small state or is it to be followed by others?

Is this, in effect, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?" If so, Chamberlain declared: "No greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fiber that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it ever were made." Now, for the first time in the history of the Third Reich, Great Britain had finally declared it would stand up to the German dictator and was willing to fight. The next day, March 18, British diplomats informed the Nazis that Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia was "a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement...devoid of any basis of legality." The French also lodged a strong protest saying they "would not recognize the legality of the German occupation." However, Hitler and the Nazis could care less what they thought. Hitler had seen his "enemies" at Munich and considered them to be little worms. But now, in an ominous development for Hitler, Britain and France went beyond mere diplomatic protests.

On March 31st, Prime Minister Chamberlain issued a solid declaration, with the backing of France, guaranteeing Hitler's next likely victim, Poland, from Nazi aggression. The era of Hitler's bloodless conquests had ended. The next time German troops rolled into foreign territory there would be an actual shooting war. It had been just six months since the Munich Agreement and there were only about six months left until the outbreak of World War II. During these months, the various countries of Europe formed military alliances, choosing up sides like schoolboys preparing for a game of football – France with Britain and Poland, Italy with Germany and so forth. No one, however, could figure out what Soviet Russia under Josef Stalin would do. Copyright © 2001 The History Place All Rights Reserved Munich Agreement - Wikimedia Commons Munich Agreement Jump to: navigation , search English: The Munich Agreement was an agreement regarding the Sudetenland Crisis between the major powers of Europe after a conference held in Munich, Germany in 1938, and signed on 29 September 1938. The Sudetenland was an area of Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans formed a majority of the population.

It was of immense strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenses were situated there, along with a huge armament facility Škoda Works. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia and it ended up surrendering much of that state to Nazi Germany . Front page of the Czechoslovak newspaper Večerní České Slovo on 22 September 1938, on the eve of conclusion of the Munich Agreement. Neville Chamberlain makes a brief speech on arrival at Heston Airport on 30 September 1938 following the Munich Conference, with the paper referred to in his later " Peace for our time " speech at 10 Downing Street. Czechoslovakia after Munich Agreement, and then after dissolution and German occupation of Bohemia Partition of Czechoslovakia Munich Agreement | Europe [1938] | Britannica.com Munich Agreement France Munich Agreement, (September 30, 1938), settlement reached by Germany , Great Britain , France , and Italy that permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia .

After his success in absorbing Austria into Germany proper in March 1938, Adolf Hitler looked covetously at Czechoslovakia, where about three million people in the Sudeten area were of German origin. It became known in May 1938 that Hitler and his generals were drawing up a plan for the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks were relying on military assistance from France , with which they had an alliance. The Soviet Union also had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and it indicated willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain if they decided to come to Czechoslovakia’s defense, but the Soviet Union and its potential services were ignored throughout the crisis. (Left to right) Italian leader Benito Mussolini, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, a German … Tramonto—age fotostock/Imagestate Newsreel announcing that, thanks to the agreement struck with Germany by the leaders of Britain and … Stock footage courtesy The WPA Film Library As Hitler continued to make inflammatory speeches demanding that Germans in Czechoslovakia be reunited with their homeland, war seemed imminent .

Neither France nor Britain felt prepared to defend Czechoslovakia, however, and both were anxious to avoid a military confrontation with Germany at almost any cost. In mid-September, Neville Chamberlain , the British prime minister, offered to go to Hitler’s retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the situation personally with the Führer. Hitler agreed to take no military action without further discussion, and Chamberlain agreed to try to persuade his cabinet and the French to accept the results of a plebiscite in the Sudetenland. The French premier, Édouard Daladier , and his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, then went to London , where a joint proposal was prepared stipulating that all areas with a population that was more than 50 percent Sudeten German be returned to Germany. The Czechoslovaks were not consulted. The Czechoslovak government initially rejected the proposal but was forced to accept it reluctantly on September 21.

Similar Topics Gentlemen’s Agreement On September 22 Chamberlain again flew to Germany and met Hitler at Godesberg, where he was dismayed to learn that Hitler had stiffened his demands: he now wanted the Sudetenland occupied by the German army and the Czechoslovaks evacuated from the area by September 28. Chamberlain agreed to submit the new proposal to the Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British cabinet and the French. On the 24th the French ordered a partial mobilization; the Czechoslovaks had ordered a general mobilization one day earlier. In a last-minute effort to avoid war, Chamberlain then proposed that a four-power conference be convened immediately to settle the dispute. Hitler agreed, and on September 29, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich , where Mussolini introduced a written plan that was accepted by all as the Munich Agreement.

(Many years later it was discovered that the so-called Italian plan had been prepared in the German Foreign Office.) It was almost identical to the Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by October 10, and an international commission would decide the future of other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak government chose to submit. German Chancellor Adolf Hitler (left) and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (third from … Photos.com/Jupiterimages Munich Agreement - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up) The pact of September 30, 1938, under which the leaders of Great Britain, France, and Italy allowed Nazi Germany to take over part of Czechoslovakia is known as the Munich Agreement, after the city where it was brokered. By 1938 Adolf Hitler was firmly in power in Germany, and the military buildup that led to World War II was well under way. He made no secret of his territorial ambitions in Europe, especially in the east. Austria had been annexed to Germany in March 1938.

Next he cast his eyes on Czechoslovakia, which was home to some 3 million people of German origin, mainly in the section called the Sudetenland. Acquisition of this territory was to be the next step in what he considered Germany’s destined march eastward. By May it had become known to other European powers that the German General Staff was drawing up plans for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. Article History Sudetenland | historical region, Europe | Britannica.com historical region, Europe Bohemia Sudetenland, sections of northern and western Bohemia and northern Moravia , in the vicinity of the Sudeten mountain ranges. The Sudetenland, which had a predominately German population, was incorporated into Czechoslovakia when that new nation’s frontiers were drawn in 1918–19. The Sudeten and other Germans in Czechoslovakia numbered about 3,000,000 in the interwar period. Because of its German majority, the Sudetenland later became a major source of contention between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and in 1938 participants at the Munich Conference, yielding to Adolf Hitler , transferred it to Germany.

The annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was, to a large degree, prepared by the Sudeten Germans, who—after accepting with great reluctance the Treaty of Saint-Germain , which had placed them under Czechoslovak rule in 1919—responded with increasing approval to the German nationalist, anti-Czech, anti-Semitic propaganda disseminated by the Sudeten German (or Nazi) Party during the mid-1930s. That party, led by Konrad Henlein, exploited the dissatisfaction of unemployed workers in the Sudetenland, where the heavily industrialized economy had come almost to a standstill as a result of the Great Depression . The party also capitalized on discontent over the ethnic discrimination practiced in the region by Czech officials. In the parliamentary elections of May 1935, the party received almost two-thirds of the Sudeten German vote and sent the second largest bloc of representatives to the Czechoslovak Parliament. Afterward, the Sudeten Nazis increased their activities, which were basically aimed at uniting the Sudetenland with Germany and included hostile outbreaks and provocative incidents.

They not only succeeded in embarrassing the Czechoslovak government but also convinced Great Britain and France that the situation in the Sudetenland was highly inflammatory and that the Czechoslovak leaders must be persuaded to take extreme action, even ceding the region to Germany, to avoid a war. The Czechoslovak government responded to the Sudeten Germans’ grievances to the satisfaction of the non-Nazi groups (1937) and also acceded (in September 1938) to almost all of Henlein’s demands, which were made in April 1938 and called for full autonomy for the Sudetenland and the adoption of a pro-German foreign policy by Czechoslovakia. But the Czech government was unable to reach an accommodation with Hitler (who was using the Sudetenland as a pretext for the eventual takeover of all of Czechoslovakia). Consequently, France and Great Britain arranged to meet with Italy and Germany at Munich (September 29–30), where they issued an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Germany by October 10.

Similar Topics Munich Pact of 1938 | Article about Munich Pact of 1938 by The Free Dictionary Munich Pact of 1938 | Article about Munich Pact of 1938 by The Free Dictionary Munich Pact of 1938 an agreement on the partition of Czechoslovakia signed in Munich on September 29 by the heads of the governments of Great Britain (N. Chamberlain), France (E. Daladier), fascist Germany (A. Hitler), and fascist Italy (B. Mussolini). The Munich Pact was concluded in an atmosphere of undisguised military and political pressure on Czechoslovakia by fascist Germany. After Germany’s occupation of Austria in March 1938 this pressure became more intense and was accompanied by heightened activity of the Hitlerite network of agents in Czechoslovakia. A number of major steps led immediately to the preparation of the Munich Pact. On Apr. 24, 1938, Henlein’s fascist Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei), acting on Hitler’s directives, made demands that, in essence, required Czechoslovakia to renounce its sovereignty over the Sudetenland.

Various maneuvers by the British and French were aimed at justifying before public opinion the deal that was being arranged with the aggressor and at persuading Czechoslovakia to capitulate (the Runciman mission of 1938). A rebellion by the Sudetenland fascists on September 13 was put down by the armed forces of Czechoslovakia. At the Berchtesgaden meeting on Sept. 15, 1938, Chamberlain agreed in principle to Hitler’s demands that the Czechoslovak border regions be transferred to Germany. An Anglo-French ultimatum (September 18) demanding the transfer of part of Czechoslovakia to Germany was accepted by Czechoslovak president E. Beneŝ on September 21. On September 22, Chamberlain met with Hitler in Bad Godesberg to discuss the German government’s new demands, which were even more oppressive for Czechoslovakia. In view of the rising threat of fascist aggression, the government of the USSR resolutely supported Czechoslovakia and carried out large-scale military measures aimed at rendering, if necessary, immediate and effective help to the victim of aggression.

Calling on the Western powers to forestall aggression through collective action, the government of the USSR repeatedly declared its readiness to fulfill its obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of 1935, which provided for Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia in case of an aggression against that country, on the condition that France would also render aid. Furthermore, the USSR was willing to support Czechoslovakia even in the absence of French support, if Czechoslovakia would resist the aggression and ask for help. Contrary to the demands of democratic forces, the Czechoslovak bourgeois government, which was well acquainted with the Soviet Union’s position but was guided by narrow class interests, refrained from accepting assistance from the country of victorious socialism. In this situation, Hitler, encouraged by the conciliatory attitude of the Western powers, demanded that Czechoslovakia accept his new proposals, which were confirmed by all the parties to the Munich Pact, with the behind-the-scenes support of the USA, at a conference held on September 29–30. The Munich Pact provided for the transfer to Germany, between Oct. 1 and Oct.

10, 1938, of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, with all its installations and fortifications, factories, plants, raw material reserves, and means of transportation. The territorial claims of Hungary and Poland were to be satisfied at the expense of Czechoslovakia within three months. The parties to the pact were to provide “guarantees” of Czechoslovakia’s new frontiers against unprovoked aggression. The hollowness of these guarantees was demonstrated when German troops invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939. On September 30 the Czechoslovak government accepted the Munich dictates without the consent of the National Assembly. The pact signed in Munich was among the clearest manifestations of the policy of appeasement pursued by the governments of Great Britain and France on the eve of World War II. This policy was directed at reaching an accord with the aggressive states, particularly fascist Germany, at the expense of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. It was also designed to divert fascist aggression away from Great Britain and France and direct it toward the East against the Soviet Union.

The statesmen who pursued this policy intended to crush or weaken the might of the USSR with the forces of the states of the fascist bloc and to weaken the latter by using the military might of the USSR. This policy was consistently supported by the USA. The Munich Pact, which was imposed on Czechoslovakia by force and in violation of international and Czechoslovak law, was an important landmark in the events leading to World War II. After the war Czechoslovakia, supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, demanded that the unlawful Munich Pact be recognized as having been invalid from the outset. In a treaty signed in December 1973, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany declared the Munich Pact “in view of their mutual obligations stemming from the present treaty, null and void.” SOURCES BBC - Higher Bitesize History - Munich : Revision Sudetenland Invasion, October 1938 In 1938, Hitler turned his attention to the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia. The nation of Czechoslovakia had been created after WWI.

Two Slavic peoples, the Czechs and the Slovaks, came together to form the country along with three million German speakers from the Sudeten area on the border with Germany, and smaller numbers of Hungarians, Ukrainians and Poles. The 20 years since its creation had seen its democracy and economy flourish. The main threat to the fledgling nation was from Hitler's plans for expansion and from the Sudeten Germans who, used to being part of the German-speaking Austrian empire, were not happy at their inclusion in a Slav-controlled state. By March 1938, Hitler had successfully invaded Austria without a shot being fired. With one major German-speaking territory under his control he then turned his attention to another - the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia. Hitler wanted to use the Sudeten Germans to create trouble in Czechoslovakia and, as he had in the Rhineland and Austria, use this as a pretence for invading and "restoring order". Not content with merely one piece of Czechoslovakia, Hitler planned to smash the country.

The Czechs and Slovaks were of Slavic origin and, according to Hitler's racial proclamations that the German/Aryan people were superior to other races, they were considered Untermenschen (subhuman). Hitler builds the tension Czechoslovakia 1933 Hitler financed and supported the Sudeten German Party under Conrad Henlein. With Hitler's backing the party became a force to be reckoned with in Czechoslovakia. In March 1938, Hitler ordered Henlein to create a crisis in the country. The Sudeten Germans made increasingly bold demands from the government. When the demands could not be met they insisted that they were being persecuted. In April 1938, Henlein announced his Karlsbad Programme for Sudeten self-government, and organised civil unrest. In May 1938, Hitler moved his armies to the Czech border to intimidate the Czechoslovakian President, Benes. In response, Benes mobilised the Czech army into positions along the border. In July 1938, Hitler promised Britain's Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that he would not invade Czechoslovakia if he were given control of the Sudetenland.

In September 1938, Hitler made an inflammatory speech against the Czechoslovakian President, Benes, at a Nazi rally at Nuremberg. On the 12 September, the Sudeten Germans rioted and martial law was declared in Czechoslovakia. Page Munich Agreement Munich Agreement References During the weekend of 23rd October 1937, Nancy Astor and her husband, Waldorf Astor , had thirty people to lunch. This included Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times ), Nevile Henderson (the recently appointed Ambassador to Berlin), Edward Algernon Fitzroy (Speaker of the Commons), Sir Alexander Cadogan (soon to replace the anti-appeasement Robert Vansittart as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office), Lord Lothian and Lionel Curtis . They were happy that Neville Chamberlain , a strong supporter of appeasement was now Prime Minister and that this would soon mean promotion for people such as Lothian and Lord Halifax . According to Norman Rose , Lothian gave a talk on future relations with Adolf Hitler . "He wished to define what Britain would not fight for. Certainly not for the League of Nations, a broken vessel; nor to honour the obligations of others.

As he had explained to the Nazi leaders, 'Britain had no primary interests in eastern Europe,' areas that fell within 'Germany's sphere'. To be dragged into a conflict not of Britain's making and not in defence of its vital interests would bedevil relations with the Dominions, fatal for the unity of the Empire. For the Clivedenites, this was always the bottom line... In effect, Lothian was prepared to turn central and eastern Europe over to Germany." Geoffrey Dawson also agreed with Lothian and this was reflected in an editorial in The Times that he wrote a few days later. (1) In November, 1937, Neville Chamberlain sent Lord Halifax in secret to meet Adolf Hitler , Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Göring in Germany.

In his diary, Lord Halifax records how he told Hitler: "Although there was much in the Nazi system that profoundly offended British opinion, I was not blind to what he (Hitler) had done for Germany, and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country." This was a reference to the fact that Hitler had banned the Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Germany and placed its leaders in Concentration Camps . Halifax had told Hitler: "On all these matters (Danzig, Austria, Czechoslovakia) ... the British government... "were not necessarily concerned to stand for the status quo as today... If reasonable settlements could be reached with... those primarily concerned we certainly had no desire to block." (2) The story was leaked to the journalist Vladimir Poliakoff . On 13th November 1937 the Evening Standard reported the likely deal between the two countries: "Hitler is ready, if he receives the slightest encouragement, to offer to Great Britain a ten-year truce in the colonial issue... In return... Hitler would expect the British Government to leave him a free hand in Central Europe".

(3) On 17th November, Claude Cockburn reported in The Week , that the deal had been first moulded "into usable diplomatic shape" at meetings of the Cliveden Set that for years has "exercised so powerful an influence on the course of British policy." He added that Lord Halifax was "the representative of Cliveden and Printing House Square rather than of more official quarters." (4) David Low , had a cartoon published in the Evening Standard , showing James Garvin , Nancy Astor , Philip Henry Kerr and Geoffrey Dawson , holding high the slogan "Any Sort of Peace at Any Sort of Price". The term Cliveden Set was first used by the Reynolds News on 28th November, 1937, in an article that argued that the group were highly sympathetic to fascism. (5) David Low , Any Sort of Peace at Any Sort of Price (November, 1937) Nevile Henderson , the British ambassador in Berlin, constantly warned the British government that Nazi Germany was building up its armed forces.

In January 1938 he reported: "The rearmament of Germany, if it has been less spectacular because it is no longer news, has been pushed on with the same energy as in previous years. In the army, consolidation has been the order of the day, but there is clear evidence that a considerable increase is being prepared in the number of divisions and of additional tank units outside those divisions. The air force continues to expand, at an alarming rate, and one can at present see no indication of a halt. We may well soon be faced with a strength of between 4000 and 5000 first-line aircraft.... Finally, the mobilisation of the civilian population and industry for war, by means of education, propaganda, training, and administrative measures, has made further strides. Military efficiency is the god to whom everyone must offer sacrifice. It is not an army, but the whole German nation which is being prepared for war." (6) Sudetenland Henderson believed that we would lose a war with Nazi Germany . He therefore recommended that the British government should apply pressure on President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia to give up the Sudetenland , with its largely German-speaking population, to Germany.

Henderson's biographer, Peter Neville , pointed out: "So strong was this conviction that he sometimes erred on the side of prejudice against the Czechs and their president, Beneš". (7) In March 1938 Hugh Christie told the British government that Hitler would be ousted by the military if Britain joined forces with Czechoslovakia against Germany. Christie warned that the "crucial question is How soon will the next step against Czechoslovakia be tried?... The probability is that the delay will not exceed two or three months at most, unless France and England provide the deterrent, for which cooler heads in Germany are praying." (8) Neville Chamberlain, Nevile Henderson and Adolf Hitler (30th September, 1938) In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain , the British prime minister, met Hitler at his home in Berchtesgaden. Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Britain supported Germany's plans to takeover the Sudetenland. After discussing the issue with the Edouard Daladier (France) and Eduard Benes (Czechoslovakia), Chamberlain informed Hitler that his proposals were unacceptable.

(9) Henderson pleaded with Chamberlain to go on negotiating with Hitler. He believed, like Lord Halifax , the Foreign Secretary, that the German claim to the Sudetenland in 1938 was a moral one, and he always reverted in his dispatches to his conviction that the Treaty of Versailles had been unfair to Germany. "At the same time, he was unsympathetic to feelers from the German opposition to Hitler seeking to enlist British support. Henderson thought, not unreasonably, that it was not the job of the British government to subvert the German government, and this view was shared by Chamberlain and Halifax". (10) Munich Agreement Benito Mussolini suggested to Hitler that one way of solving this issue was to hold a four-power conference of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. This would exclude both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and therefore increasing the possibility of reaching an agreement and undermine the solidarity that was developing against Germany. The meeting took place in Munich on 29th September, 1938. Desperate to avoid war, and anxious to avoid an alliance with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union, Chamberlain and Daladier agreed that Germany could have the Sudetenland .

In return, Hitler promised not to make any further territorial demands in Europe. (11) David Low , What, no chair for me? (30th September, 1938) The meeting ended with Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini signing the Munich Agreement which transferred the Sudetenland to Germany. "We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as Symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries." (12) Nevile Henderson defended the agreement: "Germany thus incorporated the Sudeten lands in the Reich without bloodshed and without firing a shot. But she had not got all that Hitler wanted and which she would have got if the arbitrament had been left to war... The humiliation of the Czechs was a tragedy, but it was solely thanks to Mr.

Chamberlain's courage and pertinacity that a futile and senseless war was averted." (13) Most of the newspapers agreed. For example, the Daily Express reported: "Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war Peace is a victory for all mankind. If we must have a victor, let us choose Chamberlain. For the Prime Minister's conquests are mighty and enduring - millions of happy homes and hearts relieved of their burden. To him the laurels. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the Continent to confuse us." (14) David Low , Evening Standard (10th October, 1938) Some newspapers such as the The Manchester Guardian criticised the agreement. "If Germany's aim were the economic and financial destruction of Czechoslovakia the Munich agreement goes far to satisfy her. But, it may be urged, while the Czechs may suffer economically, they have the political protection of an international guarantee. What is it worth?

Will Britain and France (and Russia, though, of course, Russia was not even mentioned at Munich) come to the aid of an unarmed Czechoslovakia when they would not help her in her strength? Politically Czechoslovakia is rendered helpless, with all that that means to the balance of forces in Eastern Europe, and Hitler will be able to advance again, when he chooses, with greatly increased power." (15) Henderson wrote to Chamberlain and told him to ignore these comments: "Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having saved their sons from the horrors of war. Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your action." (16) Opponents of appeasement, in the Conservative Party such as Robert Boothby , were appalled by what had happened: "The terms of the Munich Agreement turned out to be even worse than we had supposed. They amounted to unconditional surrender. Even Göring was shocked. He said afterwards that when he heard Hitler tell the conference at Munich (if such it could be called) that he proposed to occupy the Sudeten lands, including the Czech fortifications at once... But neither Chamberlain nor Daladier made a cheep of protest.

Hitler did not even have to send an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain did that for him." (17) In the debate that took place in the House of Commons on 3rd October, 1938, Clement Attlee , the leader of the Labour Party , stated: "We all feel relief that war has not come this time. Every one of us has been passing through days of anxiety; we cannot, however, feel that peace has been established, but that we have nothing but an armistice in a state of war. We have been unable to go in for care-free rejoicing. We have felt that we are in the midst of a tragedy. We have felt humiliation. This has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute force. At every stage of the proceedings there have been time limits laid down by the owner and ruler of armed force. The terms have not been terms negotiated; they have been terms laid down as ultimata. We have seen to day a gallant, civilised and democratic people betrayed and handed over to a ruthless despotism. We have seen something more.

We have seen the cause of democracy, which is, in our view, the cause of civilisation and humanity, receive a terrible defeat... The events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest diplomatic defeats that this country and France have ever sustained. There can be no doubt that it is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler. Without firing a shot, by the mere display of military force, he has achieved a dominating position in Europe which Germany failed to win after four years of war. He has overturned the balance of power in Europe. He has destroyed the last fortress of democracy in Eastern Europe which stood in the way of his ambition." (18) Lord Rothermere , the owner of the Daily Mail , immediately sent a telegram to Adolf Hitler : "My dear Führer everyone in England is profoundly moved by the bloodless solution to the Czechoslovakian problem. People not so much concerned with territorial readjustment as with dread of another war with its accompanying bloodbath. Frederick the Great was a great popular figure. I salute your excellency's star which rises higher and higher." (19) The Munich Agreement was popular with most people in Britain because it appeared to have prevented a war with Germany.

However, some politicians, including Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden , attacked the agreement. These critics pointed out that no only had the British government behaved dishonorably, but it had lost the support of Czech Army, one of the best in Europe. Members of the Cliveden Set were delighted with the Munich Agreement. According to Lord Lothian , "Chamberlain had pulled off a masterly coup". He told Waldorf Astor : "Nobody else could have done the trick and I've no doubt prayer helped the result.

He'll be the darling of the Western world - a most unexpected position - for a while." Lothian predicted "some nasty moments as the Germans march into the Sudenten territory and the worthless Czechs and Social Democrats flee before them." Lothian was now convinced that Hitler would not now go to war: "My own impression is that Europe, including the Nazis, have now turned their back on world war, if only because a general war means letting Russia loose in Europe, and trust a final settlement, including disarmament, may be possible if Neville's lead is followed up." (20) Invasion of Czechoslovakia On 15th March 1939, the German Army seized the rest of Czechoslovakia . In taking this action Adolf Hitler broke the Munich Agreement . "Prague, a sorrowing Prague, yesterday had its first day of German rule - a day in which the Czechs learned of the details of their subjection to Germany, and in which the Germans began their measures against the Jews... Bridges were occupied by troops and each bridge-head had a heavy machine-gun mounted on a tripod and pointing to the sky. Every twenty yards along the pavement two machine-guns were mounted facing each other.

Suicides have begun. The fears of the Jews grow. The funds of the Jewish community have been seized, stopping Jewish relief work. The organization for Jewish emigration has been closed." (21) Nevile Henderson was devastated by Hitler's action: "Hitler had staged another of his lightning coups, and once more the world was left breathless... By the occupation of Prague, Hitler put himself once for all morally and unquestionably in the wrong, and destroyed the entire arguable validity of the German case as regards the Treaty of Versailles... By his callous destruction of the hard and newly won liberty of a free and independent people, Hitler deliberately violated the Munich Agreement, which he had signed not quite six months before, and his undertaking to Mr. Chamberlain, once the Sudetenlands had been incorporated in the Reich, to respect the independence and integrity of the Czech people." (22) The British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain , now realized that Hitler could not be trusted and his appeasement policy now came to an end. David Low , one of his main critics wrote: "He wanted peace - but so did we all. No one impugned his motives, but only his judgment.

That his appeasement approach to Hitler was wrong was soon demonstrated, for the ink was hardly dry on the Munich agreement before the Führer was openly and noisily preparing his next step. But devotion to Chamberlain was so strong that his friends were unwilling to admit it. Having committed themselves to a fairy-tale, they could not bring themselves to face cold reality." (23) (1) Neville Chamberlain , letter to King George VI (13th September, 1938) The continued state of tension in Europe which has caused such grave concern throughout the world has in no way been relieved, and in some ways been aggravated by the speech delivered at Nuremberg last night by Herr Hitler. Your Majesty's Ministers are examining the position in the light of his speech, and with the firm desire to ensure, if this is at all possible, that peace may be restored. On the one hand, reports are daily received in great numbers, not only from official sources but from all manner of individuals who claim to have special and unchangeable sources of information.

Many of these (and of such authority as to make it impossible to dismiss them as unworthy of attention) declare positively that Herr Hitler has made up his mind to attack Czechoslovakia and then to proceed further East. He is convinced that the operation can be effected so rapidly that it will be all over before France or Great Britain could move. On the other hand, Your Majesty's representative in Berlin has steadily maintained that Herr Hitler has not yet made up his mind to violence. He means to have a solution soon - this month - and if that solution, which must be satisfactory to himself, can be obtained peacefully, well and good. If not, he is ready to march. In these circumstances I have been considering the possibility of a sudden and dramatic step which might change the whole situation. The plan is that I should inform Herr Hitler that I propose at once to go over to Germany to see him. If he assents, and it would be difficult for him to refuse, I should hope to persuade him that he had an unequalled opportunity of raising his own prestige and fulfilling what he has so often declared to be his aim, namely the establishment of an Anglo-German understanding, preceded by a settlement of the Czechoslovakian question.

Of course I should not be able to guarantee that Dr. Benes would accept this solution, but I should undertake to put all possible pressure on him to do so. The Government of France have already said that they would accept any plan approved by Your Majesty's Government or by Lord Runciman. (2) Hannah Senesh , diary entry (17th September, 1938) We're living through indescribably tense days. The question is: Will there be war? The mobilization going on in various countries doesn't fill one with a great deal of confidence. No recent news concerning the discussions of Hitler and Chamberlain. The entire world is united in fearful suspense, for one, feel a numbing indifference because of all this waiting. The situation changes from minute to minute. Even the idea there may be war is abominable enough. (3) Neville Chamberlain held a Cabinet meeting on 24th September 1938. Duff Cooper , First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote about it in his autobiography, Old Men Forget (1953) The Cabinet met that evening. The Prime Minister looked none the worse for his experiences. He spoke for over an hour.

He told us that Hitler had adopted a certain position from the start and had refused to budge an inch from it. Many of the most important points seemed hardly to have arisen during their discussion, notably the international guarantee. Having said that he had informed Hitler that he was creating an impossible situation, having admitted that he had "snorted" with indignation when he read the German terms, the Prime Minister concluded, to my astonishment, by saying that he considered that we should accept those terms and that we should advise the Czechs to do so. It was then suggested that the Cabinet should adjourn, in order to give members time to read the terms and sleep on them, and that we should meet again the following morning. I protested against this. I said that from what the Prime Minister had told us it appeared to me that the Germans were still convinced that under no circumstances would we fight, that there still existed one method, and one method only, of persuading them to the contrary, and that was by instantly declaring full mobilisation. I said that I was sure popular opinion would eventually compel us to go to the assistance of the Czechs; that hitherto we had been faced with the unpleasant alternatives of peace with dishonour or war.

I now saw a third possibility, namely war with dishonour, by which I meant being kicked into the war by the boot of public opinion when those for whom we were fighting had already been defeated. I pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff had reported on the previous day that immediate mobilisation was of urgent and vital importance, and I suggested that we might one day have to explain why we had disregarded their advice. This angered the Prime Minister. He said that I had omitted to say that this advice was given only on the assumption that there was a danger of war with Germany within the next few days. I said I thought it would be difficult to deny that such a danger existed. (4) Statement issued by Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler after the signing of the Munich Agreement (30th September) We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as Symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries. (5) Editorial in the Daily Express (30th September, 1938) Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war Peace is a victory for all mankind. If we must have a victor, let us choose Chamberlain. For the Prime Minister's conquests are mighty and enduring - millions of happy homes and hearts relieved of their burden. To him the laurels. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the Continent to confuse us. (6) The Manchester Guardian (1st October, 1938) No stranger experience can have happened to Mr. Chamberlain during the past month of adventures than his reception back home in London. He drove from Heston to Buckingham Palace, where the crowd clamoured for him, and within five minutes of his arrival he was standing on the balcony of the Palace with the King and Queen and Mrs. Chamberlain.

The cries were all for "Neville," and he stood there blinking in the light of a powerful arc-lamp and waving his hand and smiling. For three minutes this demonstration lasted. Another welcome awaited the Premier in Downing Street, which he reached fifteen minutes later. With difficulty his car moved forward from Whitehall to No. 10. Mounted policemen rode fore and aft and a constable kept guard on the running board of the car. Every window on the three floors of No. 10 and No. 11 was open and filled with faces. The windows of the Foreign Office across the way were equally full - all except one, which was made up with sandbags. Everywhere were people cheering. One of the women there found no other words to express her feelings but these, "The man who gave me back my son." Mr. and Mrs. Chamberlain stood for a few moments on the doorstep acknowledging the greeting. Then Mr. Chamberlain went to a first-floor window and leaned forward happily smiling on the people.

"My good friends," he said - it took some time to still the clamour so that he might be heard - "this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany 'peace with honour.' I believe it is peace for our time." No one in this country who examines carefully the terms under which Hitler's troops begin their march into Czechoslovakia to-day can feel other than unhappy. Certainly the Czechs will hardly appreciate Mr. Chamberlain's phrase that it is "peace with honour." If Germany's aim were the economic and financial destruction of Czechoslovakia the Munich agreement goes far to satisfy her. But, it may be urged, while the Czechs may suffer economically, they have the political protection of an international guarantee. What is it worth? Will Britain and France (and Russia, though, of course, Russia was not even mentioned at Munich) come to the aid of an unarmed Czechoslovakia when they would not help her in her strength? Politically Czechoslovakia is rendered helpless, with all that that means to the balance of forces in Eastern Europe, and Hitler will be able to advance again, when he chooses, with greatly increased power.

(7) Lord Rothermere , telegram to Adolf Hitler (1st October, 1938) My dear Fuhrer everyone in England is profoundly moved by the bloodless solution to the Czechoslovakian problem. People not so much concerned with territorial readjustment as with dread of another war with its accompanying bloodbath. Frederick the Great was a great popular figure. I salute your excellency's star which rises higher and higher. (8) Robert Boothby , Recollections of a Rebel Hardcover (1978) The terms of the Munich Agreement turned out to be even worse than we had supposed. They amounted to unconditional surrender. Even Göring was shocked. He said afterwards that when he heard Hitler tell the conference at Munich (if such it could be called) that he proposed to occupy the Sudeten lands, including the Czech fortifications at once, 'we all knew what that meant'. But neither Chamberlain nor Daladier made a cheep of protest. Hitler did not even have to send an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain did that for him. Ashton-Gwatkin of the Foreign Office brought it from Munich to Prague for presentation to the Czech Government.

He had breakfast with our Military Attaché, Brigadier Humphrey Stronge, before he showed it to the British Minister, Basil Newton. Stronge said that Czechoslovakia could never accept such terms, as they involved, amongst other things, surrendering all the fortifications, and thereby rendering her defenceless. Ashton-Gwatkin said that they had got to accept, and that there was no alternative. Stronge, in his own words, was 'staggered'; and wondered what the outcome could possibly be. Later that day, after a heated argument with some of his generals and politicians, Benes capitulated. (9) Clement Attlee , speech in the House of Commons (3rd October, 1938) We all feel relief that war has not come this time. Every one of us has been passing through days of anxiety; we cannot, however, feel that peace has been established, but that we have nothing but an armistice in a state of war. We have been unable to go in for care-free rejoicing. We have felt that we are in the midst of a tragedy. We have felt humiliation. This has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute force.

At every stage of the proceedings there have been time limits laid down by the owner and ruler of armed force. The terms have not been terms negotiated; they have been terms laid down as ultimata. We have seen to day a gallant, civilised and democratic people betrayed and handed over to a ruthless despotism. We have seen something more. We have seen the cause of democracy, which is, in our view, the cause of civilisation and humanity, receive a terrible defeat. ... The events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest diplomatic defeats that this country and France have ever sustained. There can be no doubt that it is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler. Without firing a shot, by the mere display of military force, he has achieved a dominating position in Europe which Germany failed to win after four years of war. He has overturned the balance of power in Europe. He has destroyed the last fortress of democracy in Eastern Europe which stood in the way of his ambition. He has opened his way to the food, the oil and the resources which he requires in order to consolidate his military power, and he has successfully defeated and reduced to impotence the forces that might have stood against the rule of violence.

(10) Winston Churchill , The Second World War (1948) For the French Government to leave her faithful ally Czechoslovakia to her fate was a melancholy lapse from which flowed terrible consequences. Not only wise and fair policy, but chivalry, honour, and sympathy for a small threatened people made an overwhelming concentration. Great Britain, who would certainly have fought if bound by treaty obligations, was nevertheless now deeply involved, and it must be recorded with regret that the British Government not only acquiesced but encouraged the French Government in a fatal course. (10) In his memoirs Lord Halifax attempted to justify his appeasement policy that culminated in the signing of the Munich Agreement in September, 1938. The criticism excited by Munich never caused me the least surprise. I should very possibly indeed have been among the critics myself, if I had not happened to be in a position of responsibility. But there were two or three considerations to which those same critics ought to have regard. One was that in criticizing the settlement of Munich, they were criticizing the wrong thing and the the wrong date.

They ought to have criticized the failure of successive Governments, and of all parties, to foresee the necessity of rearming in the light of what was going on in Germany; and the right date on which criticism ought to have fastened was 1936, which had seen the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in defiance of treaty provisions. I have little doubt that if we had then told Hitler bluntly to go back, his power for future and larger mischief would have been broken. But, leaving entirely aside the French, there was no section of British public opinion that would not have been directly opposed to such action in 1936. To go to war with Germany for walking into their own backyard, which was how the British people saw it, at a time moreover when you were actually discussing with them the dates and conditions of their right to resume occupation, was not the sort of thing people could understand. So that moment which, I would guess, offered the last effective chance of securing peace without war, went by.

(11) The Manchester Guardian (17th March, 1939) Prague, a sorrowing Prague, yesterday had its first day of German rule - a day in which the Czechs learned of the details of their subjection to Germany, and in which the Germans began their measures against the Jews and against those people who have "opened their mouths too wide." Prague's streets were jammed with silent pedestrians wandering about, looking out of the corners of their eyes at German soldiers carrying guns, at armoured cars, and at other military precautions. Some Czechs were seen turning up their noses at the Germans. Germans were everywhere. Bridges were occupied by troops and each bridge-head had a heavy machine-gun mounted on a tripod and pointing to the sky. Every twenty yards along the pavement two machine-guns were mounted facing each other. Suicides have begun. The fears of the Jews grow. The funds of the Jewish community have been seized, stopping Jewish relief work. The Prague Bar Council has ordered all its "non-Aryan" members to stop practicing at once. The organization for Jewish emigration has been closed. Hundreds of people stood outside the British Consulate shouting: "We want to get away!" This is only the beginning.

According to an official spokesman of the German Foreign Office in Berlin last night, the Gestapo (secret police) will have rounded up hundreds of "harmful characters" within the next few days. So far about fifty to a hundred men have been put in local gaols. "There are certain centres of resistance which need to be cleaned up," said the spokesman. "Also some people open their mouths too wide. Some of them neglected to get out in time. They may total several thousand before we are through. Remember that Prague was a breeding-place for opposition to National Socialism." The head of the Gestapo in Prague is reported to have been more definite: "We have 10,000 arrests to carry out." Already, say Reuter's correspondent, everyone seems to have an acquaintance who has disappeared. Appeasement Munich Agreement - World War II History By Kennedy Hickman Munich Agreement - Background: Having occupied Austria in March 1938, Adolf Hitler turned his attention to the ethnically German Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. Since its formation at the end of World War I , Czechoslovakia had been wary of possible German advances.

This was largely due to unrest in the Sudetenland which was fomented by the Sudeten German Party. Formed in 1931 and led by Konrad Henlein, the party worked to bring the region under German control. Though not recognized by the Czechoslovak government, it was strongly supported among Sudeten Germans. The loss of the Sudetenland was strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak government as the region contained a vast array of natural resources, as well as a significant amount of the nation's industry and banks. In addition, as Czechoslovakia was a polyglot country, there were concerns about other minorities seeking independence. Long concerned about German intentions, the Czechoslovaks had constructed the bulk of their border defenses in the mountains of the Sudetenland. Also, they were able to secure military alliances with France and the Soviet Union. Tensions Rise: Assessing the situation in 1938, Hitler ordered his generals to begin making plans for an invasion of the Sudetenland and instructed Henlein to cause trouble.

It was Hitler's hope that Henlein's supporters would foment enough unrest that it would show that the Czechoslovaks were unable to control the region and provide an excuse for the German Army to cross the border. In response to the actions of Henlein's party, the Czechoslovak government was forced to declare martial law in the region. Following this decision, Hitler began demanding that the Sudetenland immediately be turned over to Germany. Diplomatic Efforts: As the crisis grew, a war scare spread across Europe leading Britain and France to take an active interest in the situation as both nations were eager to avoid a war for which they were not prepared. In an attempt to calm the situation, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain sent a telegram to Hitler requesting a meeting with the goal of finding a peaceful solution. Traveling to Berchtesgaden on September 15, Chamberlain met with the German leader. Controlling the conversation, Hitler lamented about Czechoslovak persecution of Sudeten Germans and boldly requested that the region be turned over. Unable to make such a concession, Chamberlain departed stating that he would have to consult with the Cabinet in London and requested that Hitler refrain from military action in the meantime.

Though he agreed to this, Hitler continued military planning. As part of this, the Polish and Hungarian governments were offered part of Czechoslovakia in return for allowing the Germans to take the Sudetenland. Meeting with the Cabinet, Chamberlain was authorized to concede the Sudetenland and received support from the French for such a move. On September 19, the British and French ambassadors met with the Czechoslovak government and recommended ceding those areas of the Sudetenland where Germans formed more than 50% of the population. Largely abandoned by its allies, the Czechoslovaks were forced to agree. Having secured this concession, Chamberlain returned to Germany on the 22nd and met with Hitler at Bad Godesberg. Optimistic that a solution had been reached, Chamberlain was stunned when Hitler made new demands. Not happy with the Anglo-French solution, Hitler demanded that German troops be permitted to occupy the entirety of the Sudetenland, that non-Germans be expelled, and that Poland and Hungary be given territorial concessions. After stating that such demands were unacceptable, Chamberlain was told that the terms were to be met or military action would result.

Having risked his career and British prestige on the deal, Chamberlain was crushed as he returned home. In response to the German ultimatum, both Britain and France began mobilizing their forces. The Munich Conference: Though Hitler was willing to risk war, he soon found that the German people were not. As a result, he stepped back from the brink and sent Chamberlain a letter guaranteeing the safety of Czechoslovakia if the Sudetenland were ceded to Germany. Eager to prevent war, Chamberlain replied that he was willing to continue talks and asked Italian leader Benito Mussolini to aid in persuading Hitler. In response, Mussolini proposed a four-power summit between Germany, Britain, France, and Italy to discuss the situation. The Czechoslovaks were not invited to take part. Gathering in Munich on September 29, Chamberlain, Hitler, and Mussolini were joined by French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier. Talks progressed through the day and into the night with a Czechoslovak delegation forced to wait outside. In the negotiations, Mussolini presented a plan which called for the Sudetenland to be ceded to Germany in exchange for guarantees that it would mark the end of German territorial expansion.

Though presented by the Italian leader, the plan had been produced by the German government and its terms were similar to Hitler's latest ultimatum. Desiring to avoid war, Chamberlain and Daladier were willing to agree to this "Italian plan." As a result, the Munich Agreement was signed shortly after 1:00 AM on September 30. This called for German troops to enter the Sudetenland on October 1 with the movement to be completed by the 10th. Around 1:30 AM, the Czechoslovak delegation was informed of the terms by Chamberlain and Daladier. Though initially unwilling to agree, the Czechoslovaks were forced to submit when informed that should a war occur they would be held responsible. Aftermath of the Munich Agreement: As a result of the agreement, German forces crossed the border on October 1 and were warmly received by the Sudeten Germans while many Czechoslovaks fled the region. Returning to London, Chamberlain proclaimed that he had secured "peace for our time." While many in the British government were pleased with the result, others were not.

Commenting on the meeting, Winston Churchill proclaimed the Munich Agreement "a total, unmitigated defeat." Having believed that he would have to fight to claim the Sudetenland, Hitler was surprised that Czechoslovakia's erstwhile allies readily abandoned the country in order to appease him. Quickly coming to contempt Britain and France's fear of war, Hitler encouraged Poland and Hungary to take parts of Czechoslovakia. Unconcerned about retaliation from the western nations, Hitler moved to take the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. This was met with no significant response from either Britain or France. Concerned that Poland would be Germany's next target for expansion, both nations pledged their support in guaranteeing Polish independence. Going further, Britain concluded an Anglo-Polish military alliance on August 25. This was quickly activated when Germany invaded Poland on September 1 starting World War II . Selected Sources

Question: Which area of Czechoslovakia was transferred to Germany after the Munich conference of September 1938 ?
Answer: SUDETENLAND