hum3di - 1983_President Reagan proposes Strategic Defense Initiative hum3di Export (PDF) 1983: President Reagan proposes Strategic Defense Initiative The Strategic Defense Initiative was a plan proposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. The SDI was a defense system with the main purpose to prevent nuclear attacks on the U.S. by the Soviet Union. It came to be known as Star Wars because of it’s technological similarities to the popular sci-fi movie. The initiative included such as lasers in space as well as on the ground along with computer-guided projectiles to stop missiles in mid-flight. No part of the plan was ever implemented and with the downfall of the Soviet Union the SDI became unnecessary. Though the project was not needed once the Cold Ward ended, many believed it was of great knowledge to have the SDI in place in case of an attack for proceeding years. It’s important to the conflict between the United States and the USSR because a major component of the Cold War was the threat of nuclear weapons. This initiative was created in order to limit the threat of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil and possibly if it was effective it would make the Soviet Union less likely to attack.

This image was a 'Strategic Defense Initiate advertisement in 1983. This image shows the more unlikely components of Reagan’s proposed SDI such as space-based lasers. Link: Image #1: "SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative, Strategic Defence Initiative - Amiga Game / Games - Download ADF, Cheat - Lemon Amiga." Lemon Amiga - Games, Download, Emulator, Cheats & Forum. Marukpa, 6 Aug. 2006. Web. 10 Apr. 2011. < >. Image #2: "Strategic Defense Initiative: Special Aviation Features: Wings Over Kansas." Worldwide Aviation News, History, Education, Photos, Videos, Careers, Pioneers, Features, Quizzes and Learn To Fly - Wings Over Kansas. Wings Over Kansas. Web. 10 Apr. 2011. < >. Sources: Strategic Defense Initiative Encyclopedia > Social Sciences and the Law > Political Science and Government > Military Affairs (nonnaval) Strategic Defense Initiative Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), former U.S. government program responsible for research and development of a space-based system to defend the nation from attack by strategic ballistic missiles (see guided missile ).

The program is now administered by the Missile Defense Agency (originally the Strategic Defense Initiative Office), a separate agency in the U.S. Dept. of Defense . SDI, popularly referred to as "Star Wars," was announced by President Ronald Reagan in a speech in Mar., 1983, and was derided by critics as unrealistic. Space programs from other agencies and services were brought together in the organization. It has investigated many new technologies, including ground-based lasers, space-based lasers, and automated space vehicles. Critics argued that the original SDI program would encourage the militarization of space and destabilize the nuclear balance of power, and was technologically infeasible, based on untested technologies, and unable to defend against cruise missiles , airplanes, or several other possible delivery systems. In addition, some countermeasures to SDI technologies, such as decoy missiles and shielding of armed missiles, would be simple to implement. In 1987 the Soviet Union revealed it had a similar program. The end of the cold war led to criticism that SDI was unnecessary, and in 1991 President G. H. W.

Bush called for a more limited version using rocket-launched interceptors based on the ground at a single site. In 1993, SDI was reorganized as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The more limited system, called the National Missile Defense (NMD), is intended to protect all 50 states from a rogue missile attack, but the deployment of such a system was forbidden under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia opposed the NMD plan but, under President Putin, also proposed a mobile, pan-European missile defense system with a similar purpose that would not violate the ABM treaty. In 2001, President George W. Bush called for accelerated development of the NMD system, and subsequently withdrew from the ABM treaty to permit the system's development and deployment. Apparently successful early tests of the U.S. system were later revealed to have occurred after the odds of success had been enhanced (1984, 1991). Subsequent tests were generally more successful, although flawed or limited in certain respects, but tests in 2002, 2004, and 2005 involved failures.

In 2002, President Bush ordered the deployment of a modest missile defense system by 2004, with interceptors based at sea (in the Pacific and, to a lesser degree, the Atlantic) and at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., and several interceptor missiles were emplaced by the end of 2004. Also in 2002, the BMDO was renamed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In addition to NMD, the MDA is also working to develop missile defenses for the battlefield as part of the Theater Missile Defense program. In 2007 the MDA reported that, although missile defense system was still under development and not officially operational, it was ready for use. Antimissile systems stationed in Poland and Czech Republic were also proposed, and agreements signed with those nations in 2008; Russia objected strongly to the proposal. Those plans were abandoned (2009) under President Barack Obama , who proposed stationing interceptor missiles in SE Europe. In Nov., 2011, NATO agreed to establish a missile defense system that would incorporate the U.S. interceptors and protect all member nations.

Russia was invited to participate but continued to oppose the revised plan. Plans for the system now include a command center at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany, a radar site in Turkey (operational in 2012), and missile interceptors based at sea and in Spain, Poland, and Romania. See studies by S. Lakoff and H. York (1989) and F. FitzGerald (2000). The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. 2 In 1983 Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative - HIST - 223 View Full Document 2. In 1983 Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as “Star Wars” after a 1977 film which helped protect Americans against nuclear attack. The massive satellite shield in outer space was created to intercept and destroy incoming Soviet missiles. vi. Recession and Recovery 1. During Reagan’s first two years in office, the United States experienced the worst recession it had seen since the Great Depression. 2.

The 1981-1982 recession did, however, pave the way for an economic recovery. C. Reagan’s Second Term i. Patriotic Renewal 1. Reagan wanted to recreate the sense of community he had known and loved in his youth, and to help people revive the virtues that had made America strong 2. In the summer of 1984 the Olympic Games were held in Los Angeles. 3. Two years later in 1986, the nation celebrated the centennial of the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor. 4. Bicentennial of the Constitution – the following year of the United States celebrated the 200 th anniversary of the Constitution, drafted in 1787. ii. The Unequal Divide 1. The gap between rich and poor grew larger. This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version. View Full Document 2. By the end of the 1980s, wealth was more unevenly shared than at any time since the end of World War II. iii. Continuing Social Debates 1.

Civil Rights – the federal commitment to extend voting rights had given the vote to millions of African Americans who had been denied it for decades. 2. The Women’s Movement—As women gained increasing access to jobs and other opportunities previously denied to them, the women’s movement met with a backlash. One of these backlashes was the defeat of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment in the Constitution. 3. The campaign for gay and lesbian rights caused similar polarization. The discovery of acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome ( AIDS) in 1981 contributed to the backlash. Most victims at first were drug users and gay men. iv. Conservatives in the Courts 1. Many of these controversial social issues wound up in the courts, and Reagan used his 8 years in office to appoint conservatives as federal judges. In 1981 he made his first Supreme Court appointment by selecting Arizona judge Sandra Day O’Connor, who became the first woman Supreme Court justice. v. Reagan’s Hands-off Approach 1. “Thrift institutions” or savings and loan banks often called S & Ls, made home mortgage loans to individuals. This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

TERM Chapter 23 Outline - The Civil Rights Movement 1960-1968 University of Louisiana at Lafayette HIST 223 - Spring 2012 THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1958 Leaders and Strategies Key Concepts o The civil Chapter 23 Outline - The Civil Rights Movement 1960-1968 Reagan's Star Wars Missile Program Had Its Own Video Game Reagan's Star Wars Missile Program Had Its Own Video Game Go to permalink Remember President Ronald Reagan's plan for space weapons in the 1980s? Today, it's little more than a punchline, but it used to be serious business. How serious? Video game serious. Yes, there really was an SDI video game, and thanks to the Internet Archive you can even play it. Advertisement President Reagan first proposed his space age missile defense program in an infamous 1983 speech . Officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), detractors would soon refer to it as Star Wars. The plan was to launch laser weapons into space, where they could shoot down any long range missiles that the Soviets might direct toward U.S. soil.

Screenshot from the video game SDI (1988) of New York City getting attacked by Soviet missiles Advertisement From a technical perspective the plan was absurd (some compared it to shooting a bullet out of the air with another bullet) but it certainly stirred the public imagination about the future of war. Sometimes those visions were rather dark, like in the video game — set in a version of the 21st century where not only are the Soviets still a thing, their missiles could destroy the United States at any minute. The game was called SDI: Now The Odds Are Even, and it started as an arcade machine that was originally released in 1987 . It was brought to home consoles the following year, available on Amiga, Commodore 64, and Atari ST, among others. And over at the Internet Archive, we here in the early 21st century can even play it in our web browsers . Some versions of the game gave you the introduction above, set in 2017. In that version, the KGB seizes missile bases in the Soviet Union and demand that the Americans dismantle their Star Wars defense system. Your missions, naturally, was to protect the United States by shooting missiles out of the sky.

The space shuttle even made a cameo, as you can see from the 1988 ad below. Amazingly, the game doesn't just imagine space-based wars over Earth. By the end of the game the Cold War even spills into battles over Mars . The plan for Star Wars may have been absurd, but it had real consequences during negotiations with the Soviets. Reagan believed in the Star Wars plan so much that he refused to make concessions about it, even though its capabilities were entirely theoretical. Reagan's October 1986 meeting with Gorbachev in Iceland failed because Reagan wouldn't confine research into the program to the laboratory. Advertisement Sponsored Both sides were seemingly ready and willing to get rid of all their ICBMs over the course of ten years. That's right, all of them. But Reagan wouldn't budge on Star Wars. And the talks were an utter failure. The Strategic Defense Initiative would prove to be a flop, right up there with its lesser known sister program, the Strategic Computing Initiative . The closest Star Wars would get to reality would be in the form of pixels and joysticks.

But I guess the best we can say for it is that at least the SDI video game didn't nearly start World War III . From 1983 to 1993 DARPA spent over $1 billion on a program called the Strategic Computing… Read more Read more Thanks to ColdWarHist on Twitter for pointing out the SDI video game ad. Advertisement Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative: Looking Back a Quarter of a Century Later Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative: Looking Back a Quarter of a Century Later Thursday's Editorial — Posted on March 27, 2008 Jump to... Just Questions (by Caspar Weinberger Jr., HumanEvents.com) – In 1983, the still “new” President Ronald Reagan announced an innovative change in our entire defense strategy, a program labeled the “Strategic Defense Initiative,” and known simply as SDI. But that name would not stand alone for long. Because what Reagan wanted to do was to develop a defensive shield against nuclear missiles.

And, by God, that was just too threatening to the status quo, to the way things were usually being done to keep the peace concerning the obviously sensitive subject of nuclear bombs and the two great super powers, the United States and Russia, who had the lion’s share of those devices. Right up until Reagan’s proposal for a missile shield, the tacit understanding of nuclear defense was all caught up in something called “MAD” — “mutual assured destruction” — which assumed that no one would launch a nuclear first strike because the other side would respond in kind, resulting in the utter destruction of both sides. No one was supposed to suggest any other way of keeping the peace. The consensus view was we had to realize that the Russians were just like us and they would wipe us out if we wiped them out and since both sides realized this fact, no one would act: in chess parlance this was the big stalemate. No one would win, but no one would lose either because no one was crazy enough to launch the first nuclear missile. What a relief!

Sort of… Ronald Reagan described the MAD concept in terms of a western movie plot of which he was of course, as an actor, most familiar: “It was like having two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head-permanently. There had to be a better way.” But the hand-wringers in the our own Congress and in the bureaucratic levels of the State Department, the intellectuals who abhorred any move that didn’t placate Russia, that did not adhere to “keeping the peace” the old fashioned way, essentially by mutual and quite permanent terror, were shocked and askance at such tom-foolery suggested by this brash Western cowboy actor, who had, in their view, by some horrible accident become the American President. They were sure he was going to cause the whole world to blow up. So they set about with the help of the liberal press (who else?) to make sure this insane idea of deliberately attempting to protect ourselves, of being terribly provocative towards the Soviets, was taken off the table immediately and permanently.

Their first move was to give SDI a new name: “Star Wars.” That was brilliant, of course, because it conveyed both fantasy, a lot of alien destruction stuff from the movie, and above all the idea that Reagan was taking our “war machine” up into space with a desire to destroy the other side-Russia– while protecting our own country. Nothing could have been further from the truth. All Ronald Reagan wanted to do was to create a defensive weapon that could intercept incoming nuclear weapons and destroy them before they destroyed us. “As the myths (about the SDI program) grew,” Ronald Reagan wrote, “one of them was that I had proposed the ideas to produce a bargaining chip for use in getting the Soviets to reduce their weaponry. I’ve had to tell the Soviet leaders a hundred times that the SDI was not a bargaining chip. I’ve told them I’d share it with others willing to give up their nuclear missiles.” Indeed, that is what SDI has really been all about: going from MAD-mutually assured destruction to MAP-mutually assured peace: a glass at least half-empty to a glass at least half full. Is that such a bad idea?

Anyone with an ounce of brain power knows it is not, and that frankly it is not only not a bad idea, it is downright brilliant. But Ronald Reagan was not just a man among many lesser men of his time; he was also a visionary for the centuries. He also said: “One day a madman could come along and make the missiles and blackmail all of us-but not if we have a defense against them…We all got together in 1925 and banned the use of poisoned gas. But we all kept our masks.” Ring any bells? Here we are in 2008 and it doesn’t take an expert to know that the madmen, probably mad women too, are out there and moving closer and closer to controlling weapons of mass destruction. And we know they are the types that are trigger happy and would pull the switch just for the fun of it, MAD or not. And mad it most certainly is. The trouble with the MAD policy and with so many well meaning but weak individuals who unfortunately so often control key elements of U.S. domestic and foreign policy is that their philosophies are based on the fact that the other side-whoever our enemies happen to be at a particular time-are somehow just like us.

And that is just not the case. It is true that, as my father, Cap Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s first Secretary of Defense, stated on many occasions: “A great paradox of our national security posture is that without military strength, we have little leverage to secure real arms reductions.” But that does not mean that we are like other conquering nations. We do not choose to conquer land and plant our flag upon them. We do not seek additional land or desire to enslave our people or others. We are a free nation and wish to remain so. And that would appear to be a great difference between our side and many others. A nineteenth century Frenchman who traveled to Russia, the Marquis de Custine remarked in his journal: “I do not blame the Russians for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be what we are.” And that is the great difference: we know what we are, a free nation who wants to remain that way and is willing, when asked, to help others to gain their freedom. Ronald Reagan recognized that we should not adhere to a policy that made us like the Russians, held hostage from defending ourselves by the threat of being annihilated.

The Russians thought that if we could defend ourselves from them, we would do what they would do in similar circumstances: if they could defend themselves from us firing at them, why then certainly they were free to fire at us with no consequences. However, Reagan diffused that argument entirely by saying he’d give them SDI technology too, if they got rid of their weapons. But an enslaved, territorial aggrandized nation can’t see what it means to be free and they were distrustful then and they still are. Ain’t it shame? Yes it most certainly is. Today, the United States must be more vigilant than ever. The stakes are even much higher than they were in the ’80’s. Everything moves even faster and people seem ever more on a hair trigger. Nuclear arms have proliferated and the threats to peace and to our very existence as a species are profound.

Over 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out: “The ever increasing numbers of men of property who are lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are produced by the equality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms, all these causes concur to quench the military spirit…in a democracy” And it is a spirit that if allowed to languish will most definitely cause our downfall. We cannot ever assume that other hostile nations merely want to exist and keep themselves from being destroyed. Ronald Reagan and his superb team laid down the gauntlet to the Soviets and they were too distrustful to accept the offer. In the final analysis a free nation must never assume that others feel the same way. Therefore we must vigorously build the armaments necessary to defend ourselves and our way of life whatever other nations, less free than ourselves, may think about it. SDI made sense when it was proposed in 1983 as it most certainly does today.

It took that great visionary, the true man with the white horse, that symbol of Twentieth Century strength and goodness, the ultimate cowboy of the Lord, Ronald Reagan, to bring it down from the heavens for us and fight right up to his death to make it a reality. Mr. Weinberger is the son of the late U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. A 1968 graduate of Harvard College, Weinberger is a writer and lecturer on world events. A former television writer, producer and director for NBC affiliate KRON-TV in San Francisco, he served in both California Gov. and President Ronald Reagan’s administrations. He now resides in Maine. Copyright ©2008 HUMAN EVENTS, March 21, 2008. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted here on March 27th with permission from Human Events. Visit the website at . Questions 1. Fill in the blanks: (answers to this question found at the bottom of this page) In a)_________________, President Ronald Reagan announced an innovative change in our entire defense strategy, a program labeled the b)______________________ and known simply as SDI. SDI was a defensive shield against c)_______________________.

“MAD,” also called d)______________________ assumed that no one would launch a nuclear first strike because the other side would respond in kind, resulting in e)_____________________________ of both sides. Reagan wanted to create a defensive weapon that could intercept incoming nuclear weapons and destroy them before f)____________________________. 2. a) What is MAD? b) What is Ronald Reagan’s SDI policy? 3. What is the problem with using MAD to keep our country safe from nuclear attack, according to Mr. Weinberger? (see para. 13-14 and 21 for the answer) 4. What do you think Mr. Weinberger’s purpose was for writing this commentary? 5. What do you think of Mr. Weinberger’s assertion that Ronald Reagan was right in changing the U.S.’s defense strategy from MAD to SDI, based on the premise that the real way to ensure our safety – establishing a means to intercept and destroy strategic nuclear missiles – eliminates the threat of an enemy’s nuclear weapons program? Scroll down to the bottom of the page for the answers. Resources For information on missile defense click here .

(Scroll down for an explanation to the opposition to missile defense.) Read President Reagan’s speech explaining the SDI here . Answer(s) Reagan's Star Wars | Cold War: A Brief History | History of the Atomic Age | atomicarchive.com Cold War: A Brief History Cold War: A Brief History Reagan's Star Wars On March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an ambitious project that would construct a space-based anti-missile system. This program was immediately dubbed "Star Wars." An artist's rendering of an X-ray laser hit an incoming missile. The SDI was intended to defend the United States from attack from Soviet ICBMs by intercepting the missiles at various phases of their flight. For the interception, the SDI would require extremely advanced technological systems, yet to be researched and developed. Among the potential components of the defense system were both space- and earth-based laser battle stations, which, by a combination of methods, would direct their killing beams toward moving Soviet targets. Air-based missile platforms and ground-based missiles using other non-nuclear killing mechanisms would constitute the rear echelon of defense and would be concentrated around such major targets as U.S. ICBM silos.

The sensors to detect attacks would be based on the ground, in the air, and in space, and would use radar, optical, and infrared threat-detection systems. This system would tip the nuclear balance toward the United States. The Soviets feared that SDI would enable the United States to launch a first-strike against them. Critics pointed to the vast technological uncertainties of the system, in addition to its enormous cost. Although work was begun on the program, the technology proved to be too complex and much of the research was cancelled by later administrations. The idea of missile defense system would resurface later as the National Missile Defense. Page 20 of 27 Cold War Museum Back to the 1980s The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): Star Wars The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars, was a program first initiated on March 23, 1983 under President Ronald Reagan. The intent of this program was to develop a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system in order to prevent missile attacks from other countries, specifically the Soviet Union. With the tension of the Cold War looming overhead, the Strategic Defense Initiative was the United States’ response to possible nuclear attacks from afar.

Although the program seemed to have no negative consequences, there were concerns brought up about the program “contravening” the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks years before. For this reason, in conjunction with budgetary constraints, the Strategic Defense Initiative was ultimately set aside. The nickname “Star Wars” may have been attached to the program for some of its abstract and farfetched ideas, many of which included lasers. Furthermore, the previously released science fiction movie titled “Star Wars,” caused the public to easily associate this program with new and creative technologies. “The weapons required included space- and ground-based nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle beams, and computer-guided projectiles fired by electromagnetic rail guns—all under the central control of a supercomputer system.” By using these systems, the United States planned to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles while they still flew high above the Earth, minimizing their effects. However, there was a large power requirement for these types of weapons — power requirements so vast that nuclear power was the method of choice. Thus, as the reality of creating numerous nuclear plants diminished, so did the ambitious designs.

By the end of SDI, the primary focus of the weapons design group was focused on “land based kinetic energy weapons.” These weapons were essentially guided missile projectiles. At the end of the Strategic Defense Initiative, thirty billion dollars had been invested in the program and no laser and mirror system was ever used, not on land, not in space. The Strategic Defense Initiative was eventually abandoned, and after a few years, it was nothing other than a short chapter in history books. With bold intentions, the Star Wars program was hopeful of a revolutionary defense system, a system which was said to be nearly impenetrable. Yet with political pressure, both domestic and international, combined with budgetary conflicts, the Strategic Defense Initiative was slated for failure from the start. Fear of Soviet retaliation due to violations in the ABM treaty from the first S.A.L.T. talks was a primary factor in these international pressures, but United States legislators and congressmen also argued that a creation of a large anti-ballistic missile system would raise tensions between the two nations and potentially spark a conflict. Because having a pre-emptive strike in a nuclear war would be advantageous, both nations were already on edge and so it was decided that any project which could jeopardize the balance would be discarded.

The treaties set up by the S.A.L.T. talks remained in effect for nearly 30 years and it was not until 2001 when President George W. Bush cited Article 15 of the ABM treaty and pulled America out. By this point, the SDI was far behind and relations with Russia, no longer the Soviet Union, were vastly improved. Research by Kevin Crowley Volunteer for the Cold War Museum Cosby High School “America Withdrawls From ABM Treaty.” BBC News. 13 Dec. 2001. BBC. 20 May 2008 . Cimbala, Stephen J. “The Strategic Defense Initiative.” 21 Nov. 2006. Air University. 20 May 2008 . Pike, John. “Strategic Defense Initiative.” Strategic Defense Initiative: Nuclear Thermal Propulsion. Federation of American Scientists. 2 May 2008 . “Strategic Defense Initiative.” MSN Encarta. 2007. Microsoft. 2 May 2008 .

Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative: Looking Back a Quarter of a Century Later | Human Events Share on Facebook 1 1 SHARES In 1983, the still "new" President Ronald Reagan announced an innovative change in our entire defense strategy, a program labeled the "Strategic Defense Initiative," and known simply as SDI. But that name would not stand alone for long. Because what Reagan wanted to do was to develop a defensive shield against nuclear missiles. And, by God, that was just too threatening to the status quo, to the way things were usually being done to keep the peace concerning the obviously sensitive subject of nuclear bombs and the two great super powers, the United States and Russia, who had the lion’s share of those devices. Right up until Reagan’s proposal for a missile shield, the tacit understanding of nuclear defense was all caught up in something called "MAD" — "mutual assured destruction" — which assumed that no one would launch a nuclear first strike because the other side would respond in kind, resulting in the utter destruction of both sides. No one was supposed to suggest any other way of keeping the peace.

The consensus view was we had to realize that the Russians were just like us and they would wipe us out if we wiped them out and since both sides realized this fact, no one would act: in chess parlance this was the big stalemate. No one would win, but no one would lose either because no one was crazy enough to launch the first nuclear missile. What a relief! Sort of… Ronald Reagan described the MAD concept in terms of a western movie plot of which he was of course, as an actor, most familiar: "It was like have two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head-permanently. There had to be a better way." But the hand-wringers in the our own Congress and in the bureaucratic levels of the State Department, the intellectuals who abhorred any move that didn’t placate Russia, that did not adhere to "keeping the peace" the old fashioned way, essentially by mutual and quite permanent terror, were shocked and askance at such tom-foolery suggested by this brash Western cowboy actor, who had, in their view, by some horrible accident become the American President. They were sure he was going to cause the whole world to blow up.

So they set about with the help of the liberal press (who else?) to make sure this insane idea of deliberately attempting to protect ourselves, of being terribly provocative towards the Soviets, was taken off the table immediately and permanently. Their first move was to give SDI a new name: "Star Wars." That was brilliant, of course, because it conveyed both fantasy, a lot of alien destruction stuff from the movie, and above all the idea that Reagan was taking our "war machine" up into space with a desire to destroy the other side-Russia– while protecting our own country. Nothing could have been further from the truth. All Ronald Reagan wanted to do was to create a defensive weapon that could intercept incoming nuclear weapons and destroy them before they destroyed us. "As the myths (about the SDI program) grew," Ronald Reagan wrote, "one of them was that I had proposed the ideas to produce a bargaining chip for use in getting the Soviets to reduce their weaponry. I’ve had to tell the Soviet leaders a hundred times that the SDI was not a bargaining chip.

I’ve told them I’d share it with others willing to give up their nuclear missiles." Indeed, that is what SDI has really been all about: going from MAD-mutually assured destruction to MAP-mutually assured peace: a glass at least half-empty to a glass at least half full. Is that such a bad idea? Anyone with an ounce of brain power knows it is not, and that frankly it is not only not a bad idea, it is downright brilliant. But Ronald Reagan was not just a man among many lesser men of his time; he was also a visionary for the centuries. He also said: "One day a madman could come along and make the missiles and blackmail all of us-but not if we have a defense against them…We all got together in 1925 and banned the use of poisoned gas. But we all kept our masks." Ring any bells? Here we are in 2008 and it doesn’t take an expert to know that the madmen, probably mad women too, are out there and moving closer and closer to controlling weapons of mass destruction. And we know they are the types that are trigger happy and would pull the switch just for the fun of it, MAD or not.

And mad it most certainly is. The trouble with the MAD policy and with so many well meaning but weak individuals who unfortunately so often control key elements of U.S. domestic and foreign policy is that their philosophies are based on the fact that the other side-whoever our enemies happen to be at a particular time-are somehow just like us. And that is just not the case. It is true that, as my father, Cap Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s first Secretary of Defense, stated on many occasions: "A great paradox of our national security posture is that without military strength, we have little leverage to secure real arms reductions." But that does not mean that we are like other conquering nations. We do not choose to conquer land and plant our flag upon them. We do not seek additional land or desire to enslave our people or others. We are a free nation and wish to remain so. And that would appear to be a great difference between our side and many others.

A nineteenth century Frenchman who traveled to Russia, the Marquis de Custine remarked in his journal: "I do not blame the Russians for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be what we are." And that is the great difference: we know what we are, a free nation who wants to remain that way and is willing, when asked, to help others to gain their freedom. Ronald Reagan recognized that we should not adhere to a policy that made us like the Russians, held hostage from defending ourselves by the threat of being annihilated. The Russians thought that if we could defend ourselves from them, we would do what they would do in similar circumstances: if they could defend themselves from us firing at them, why then certainly they were free to fire at us with no consequences. However, Reagan diffused that argument entirely by saying he’d give them SDI technology too, if they got rid of their weapons. But an enslaved, territorial aggrandized nation can’t see what it means to be free and they were distrustful then and they still are. Ain’t it shame? Yes it most certainly is. Today, the United States must be more vigilant than ever.

The stakes are even much higher than they were in the ’80’s. Everything moves even faster and people seem ever more on a hair trigger. Nuclear arms have proliferated and the threats to peace and to our very existence as a species are profound. Over 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out: "The ever increasing numbers of men of property who are lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are produced by the equality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms, all these causes concur to quench the military spirit…in a democracy" And it is a spirit that if allowed to languish will most definitely cause our downfall. We cannot ever assume that other hostile nations merely want to exist and keep themselves from being destroyed. Ronald Reagan and his superb team laid down the gauntlet to the Soviets and they were too distrustful to accept the offer. In the final analysis a free nation must never assume that others feel the same way.

Therefore we must vigorously build the armaments necessary to defend ourselves and our way of life whatever other nations, less free than ourselves, may think about it. SDI made sense when it was proposed in 1983 as it most certainly does today. It took that great visionary, the true man with the white horse, that symbol of Twentieth Century strength and goodness, the ultimate cowboy of the Lord, Ronald Reagan, to bring it down from the heavens for us and fight right up to his death to make it a reality. UC Davis: Prized Writing : “Star Wars”: The Strategic Defense Initiative “Star Wars”: The Strategic Defense Initiative MELANIE KRIEG Writer’s Comment: I was quite surprised to hear that this essay was a winner, considering that it was the very first essay I wrote in college. It is also the longest piece of technical writing I have ever written, and I even had to cut several pages of graphics to get it down to the fifteen-page limit. The prompt for this essay was to investigate in depth one subject in the life and legacy of Dr.

Oppenheimer, the “father of the atomic bomb.” We were encouraged to discuss any topic which derived from or was an implication of the development of the first atomic weapons. I am a huge Star Wars fan, so when I came across the other Star Wars (Strategic Defense Initiative) in my research, I decided that it would be something fun to learn about, even if it’s hardly related to the movies. After skimming through nearly twenty library books, I was able to choose a few subtopics to focus on, including the physical aspects of how Star Wars would work and what its effects on the economy would be. I hope you enjoy my essay as you learn about this interesting subject. —Melanie Krieg Instructor’s Comment: I am very proud of Melanie’s award for her paper originally prepared for my Fall 08 class IST8C – Dr. Oppenheimer: Or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love WMD. The course, provided through the Integrated Studies Honors Program, focused on the relationship between J. Robert Oppenheimer and two other contemporary physicists, Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller, all three of whom were at one time UC professors (Oppenheimer and Lawrence at Berkeley and Teller at Davis).

Melanie’s term paper explored Teller’s important role in encouraging President Reagan to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative, more popularly known as “Star Wars” due to SDI’s similarities to the very popular science fiction films by George Lucas. Melanie did an exceptional job of exhaustively covering the technology, politics, and economics of SDI. Her paper was a tour de force and not surprisingly contributed to her well-deserved grade of A+ in the class. The Prized Writing award is further evidence of the exceptional quality of her scholarship. —James Shackelford, Integrated Studies Honors Program In a keynote speech on March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced “a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive,” and he further called “upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete” (Bowman 132). Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed “Star Wars” by opponents who believed it to be fantastic and untenable, became the focus of much controversy during the 1980s.

Aside from the physical complexities involved in developing a missile defense system, SDI encountered several political barriers concerning its economic effects and its conflicts with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The debate on Star Wars spread worldwide, creating competition from countries such as the Soviet Union, and attracting several prominent scientists, including Edward Teller. Now, over two decades since SDI was announced by President Reagan, Star Wars has been abandoned, but the United States is still trying to develop a system to counter a nuclear attack. As Freeman Dyson said during his visit to our class, the concept of SDI is “not altogether foolish in principle,” but it is merely “a hope without much technical substance.” I. The Basics of a Strategic Defense System The ICBM, or intercontinental ballistic missile, is first introduced in Brotherhood of the Bomb as the “hypersonic, H-bomb-tipped [. . .] ‘ultimate weapon’” (Herken 308). A typical ballistic missile is between 30 and 100 feet long, and can accelerate to speeds of 15,000 miles per hour (Margulies 25).

Some ICBMs carry only one warhead, which is defined as the portion of the missile that contains the actual nuclear weapon. However, other ICBMs are classified as MIRVed, which stands for “multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.” This means that several bombs are mounted on top of the bus of the missile, and each of these separate bombs can be simultaneously launched at different targets (Lampton 14). Once launched, the course of an ICBM consists of four phases: the boost phase, postboost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase, which can also be called the reentry phase (Margulies 26). The boost phase is very quick, sometimes lasting only three or four minutes. This is the time when the missile is launched and accelerates to the edge of the atmosphere, where the engine will drop to decrease the weight of the missile. During the postboost phase, a single-warhead missile will direct itself toward its target, while a missile with multiple warheads will release all of its bombs. Additionally, missiles can detach decoy bombs, which are made of tinfoil, aluminum, or chaff.

During the midcourse phase, which lasts for approximately twenty minutes, the warheads and decoys travel through space towards their intended targets. When the decoys are detected by radar, it is nearly impossible to distinguish them from the actual bombs. Therefore, the defensive forces may waste a lot of time and resources trying to shoot them down. In the last phase, referred to as the terminal or reentry phase, the warheads reenter the atmosphere and finally explode at a specified height or on the ground. During this last phase, it is hardest to shoot down the missiles. However, the atmosphere affects the decoys differently than the actual warheads, so it is easy to distinguish them from one another at this time. “For a missile flying from the Soviet Union to the United States, the whole trip would take about half an hour” (Lampton 16). The main purpose of Star Wars was to create a “shield,” with the goal of stopping or deflecting a missile attack. A strategic defense system would consist of layered defenses. Each “layer” targets a different phase of the flight of the enemy’s missile (Margulies 29).

The first layer consists of spy systems, such as satellites, ground radar, and infrared detectors to detect the missiles as soon as they are launched. Because of the bulkiness of the engines and the volume of rocket fuel in the missile, it is easiest to destroy a missile during the boost phase. During this phase, missiles would be destroyed with counter-missiles, which could be ground, air, or space-based, and kinetic energy weapons, which collide with the ballistic missile. During the midcourse phase, strategic defense would have to rely on an EKV, or exoatmospheric kill vehicle, which is a package of sensors similar to a computer that could be launched on top of the intercepting rocket and home in on the warhead, destroying it by colliding with it (Margulies 31). Ground-based interceptors are lasers, particle beams, and missiles located on the ground or on aircraft and submarines. These weapons would be used as the final “layer” of defense to shoot down the warheads that have already entered the atmosphere. The Star Wars program consisted of several plans to counter nuclear missiles, including laser beams, which would be mounted on satellites in space to shoot down nuclear missiles.

A mirror would be used to reflect the beam towards the missile. There was also a proposition to use an excimer laser, which is a very powerful laser beam with a short wavelength (Lampton 36). However, the excimer laser would be much too big to launch into orbit. Particle-beam weapons and smart rocks, missiles with computers inside, were also proposed as means to counter a Soviet missile attack. However, each of these countermeasures has several technical problems, and none of them has been proven to be completely effective. II. Arms Control and the ABM Treaty Before 1972, the United States was a signatory with the Soviet Union in two important treaties: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Outer Space Treaty (1967). In these treaties, both countries agreed to neither test nor deploy nuclear weapons in outer space. In 1972, a new treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed that prohibited each country from having an anti-ballistic missile system, thereby “[halting] a competition in defensive weaponry against strategic weapons systems, and [preventing] a runaway offensive nuclear arms race” (Boutwell and Scribner 17).

This Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty specifically prohibited the development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems and components. The physical aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, if achieved, would undoubtedly violate the ABM Treaty. While the United States would not be violating the treaty by doing research, once system development began there would be blatant conflicts. To add further complications, the treaty failed to specifically address how it would deal with any future technologies that might be constructed differently than the current ABM systems. To appease his detractors, President Reagan asserted in the April 1987 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative that he would comply with a more restrictive interpretation of the treaty rather than the broader one. Under this restrictive interpretation, “development and testing of ABM systems based on other physical principles are allowed only for fixed land-based systems and components” (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1987, Appendix D-3). For the United States to be in complete compliance with the ABM Treaty, it could pursue three specific types of allowed activities. First, conceptual design and laboratory testing would be permitted under the treaty’s limits.

Secondly, “field testing” of devices that are not ABM components or prototypes of ABM components is allowed. However, Article V of the ABM Treaty specifically prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of weapons that are ABM systems, whether they are land-based, sea-based, or air-based. Thirdly, “field testing” of fixed land-based ABM components is permitted, as long as it occurs in the agreed ABM test ranges and the total number of launched missiles does not exceed fifteen. The important aspect of fixed land-based systems which differentiates it from land-based systems is that the missiles must remain within the atmosphere instead of being launched all the way into outer space. The 1987 Report to Congress states that “SDI projects and experiments have been reviewed to ensure that they will be conducted in accordance with one of the three categories of activities permitted by the Treaty” (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Appendix D-8). The ABM Treaty is so significant because it essentially foreclosed a “destabilizing competition”(Boutwell and Scribner 20) between the two superpowers in defensive forces.

By making such strict constraints on the permitted BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) deployments, the Treaty reduced fears that one country would “break out” of the Treaty and surreptitiously develop BMD systems that could be rapidly deployed, giving that country a great strategic advantage. In a pamphlet published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science concerning arms control implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Jeffrey Boutwell and Richard Scribner postulated that in the next few years (late 1980s) the United States and Soviet Union might both find it in their best interests to amend or renegotiate parts of the ABM Treaty. However, it would be far better if this were a joint decision, so that the ABM Treaty is not “jeopardized by default” (20). The ABM Treaty helped to lessen the fears of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by providing more security in the agreement to not develop the said BMD systems. Violations of the ABM Treaty by either country during this time would have certainly added more tension to the Cold War. III.

The Cost of Star Wars and its Effects on the Economy One of the main issues surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative was its cost and how it would affect the economy. Dr. David Robinson of New York University analyzes the four main components of the Strategic Defense Initiative: SDI I is the “impenetrable shield” which would cover the United States, consisting of several aspects of boost-phase defense; SDI II is the system to defend our country’s own land-based ICBMs; SDI III is a system to defend against accidental launches; and SDI IV is a strategic defense against terrorists who might use an ICBM as blackmail (37). Robinson believes that there are several “better and cheaper” ways to solve the problems associated with these four components. For example, for SDI II, he suggests that instead of using active defense, we should improve our passive defense capabilities. Passive defense could be defined as placing missiles in secret areas, such as in silos, submarines, and aircraft, so that they are less likely to be attacked. For SDI IV, against terrorists, Dr.

Robinson believes that a ground-based defense would be much more effective and cheaper than a space-based defense, and that the money allocated to the space-based defenses could be better spent. In his report, Robinson concludes that the “development and deployment of an SDI system wouldn’t bankrupt the economy, but it would exacerbate the economic distortions, diversion of technical talent, and general waste already typical of our defense and space procurement process” (38). In one cost analysis published in October, 1986, by Barry Blechman and Victor Utgoff, the estimate to build a strategic defense system would “take perhaps $700 billion over a period of twenty-five years, with a peak expenditure of about $40 billion per year” (qtd. in Robinson 40n1). When asked if $40 billion a year of extra expenditures would bankrupt the economy, Blechman and Utgoff concluded that SDI “would have a significant effect on the economy unless fiscal and monetary policies at the time served to offset its impact” (qtd. in Robinson 39).

However, instead of cutting programs or increasing taxes, Robinson believes that the defense budget would get distorted so that “low priority research on SDI is being carried out, while other defense-supported research of higher priority cannot go on.” Thus, the impact of SDI on the military research budget might have been greater than its impact on the economy as a whole (Robinson 41). One of the main issues discussed in the book, Star Wars: The Economic Fallout, by Rosy Nimroody, is the uneven distribution of SDI tax money on the states. The majority of the money went to the few states that had large military bases and seemed to already have high proportions of the SDI contracts. Between 1983 and 1986, “a total of 43 states comprising 80 percent of the nation’s population suffered net losses from the uneven distribution of SDI money” (112). California, referred to as the “heart of the military industrial complex,” received an overwhelming majority of the SDI contracts by 1988, which generated a large source of revenue for the state.

However, Georgia, representing the other extreme, paid seven percent of its taxes for SDI, yet received only 0.2 percent of all SDI contracts compared with California’s 45 percent. These examples illustrate that “some areas prosper, [while] others in need lose vital tax dollars, employment, and consumer spending” (112). Although Star Wars was not completely bankrupting the economy at the time, the cost was much too high to be maintained. The Economic Fallout ends with the appeal, “We must seriously explore alternative peaceful solutions to the threat of nuclear war—now” (206). IV. The Soviet Union’s Perspective on Star Wars In November, 1985, in a press conference in Geneva, Mikhail Gorbachev addressed SDI by boasting that “The Soviet leadership has already given the relevant instructions to competent organizations and scientists and we can say that our response will be effective, less costly, and may be realized in a shorter period” (qtd. in Mikheyev 78). However, this appeared to be merely a show of bravado.

Dmitry Mikheyev states in the preface of The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative that “Seen from the Kremlin, SDI poses formidable technological and economic challenges to the Soviet Union” (xi). One of the great fears of the Soviet Union in the 1980s was the loss of its existing legitimacy as a superpower, along with the fear of losing its overall power. SDI also posed threats to the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. In an effort to remain technologically, economically, and politically competitive with the United States, the Soviet Union would have to improve the quality and competitiveness of its products. However, these actions would require a “market mechanism” which would directly challenge the ideology of the communist regime. “In short, SDI places before Moscow the following problem: to survive, it must compete; to compete, it must reform; yet to reform is to admit bankruptcy of the communist regime, and to make clear the unwisdom of the totalitarian control” (Mikheyev x). As can be seen, the Soviet Union regarded SDI in a much broader aspect than the “narrow military context” in which the United States held the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Soviet Union believed that the most important implications of SDI were those relating to the impact on the current and future military balance. The Soviet Union made several claims “for public consumption” as to the military purpose of SDI: first, the U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, thus threatening to disrupt the current relationship of nuclear equality; second, SDI would undermine the arms control process and place the fate of humankind in the “hands” of computers, not humans; third, the objective of a completely defensive shield is illusive and will achieve no gain unless the United States’ ulterior motive is “the militarization of space under U.S. dominion”; and fourth, the United States seeks to acquire the first strike capability, placing Soviet space and ground-based installations at risk (Mikheyev xi). Although each of these claims reflects an element of falsehood, they all present a particular fear that was then part of the Soviet political mentality. In the 1989 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, the United States mentions several programs that the Soviet Union was then pursuing, including kinetic energy weapons, laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and radio-frequency weapons.

Additionally, as of this time, the Soviet Union was in possession of ASAT, the world’s only operational anti-satellite system. ASAT works by launching a satellite into an orbit very close to that of the target satellite and then exploding a warhead, destroying the target satellite. However, “despite these efforts, the Soviets remain an average of 10 years behind the West in civil and industrial applications of computers” (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1989, Appendix A-5), which is a fact that the Soviets themselves acknowledge in The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Another program that the Soviet Union had undertaken in response to SDI was to make their military assets less vulnerable to attack, by building ICBM silos, launch facilities, and command and control centers (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1989, Appendix A-6). Obviously, the Soviet Union viewed SDI as a great threat to their society and made large efforts to retain their technological equality with the United States. Only one decade after the ratification of the ABM Treaty, both nations were on the path to building enormous anti-ballistic missile and counter-missile systems.

One interesting statement made by Dmitry Mikheyev in 1987 is that “reductions in SDI—signifying a weakening of U.S. determination to follow through on the prospects of a defense-oriented deterrent—will send to Moscow the signal that the dilemma need not be confronted” (Mikheyev xii). Of course, neither nation would ever trust the other to completely abandon the “arms race,” and even by bringing the situation back to how it was after the creation of the ABM Treaty, the Cold War tensions would most likely have continued to exist. V. Edward Teller’s Relationship with Reagan and his Constant Support of SDI Edward Teller first became interested in missile defense as early as 1945, but it was not until a visit in 1961 to the U.S. Air Command Center in Colorado Springs that he became an “enthusiastic proponent of research on missile defense” after hearing from the commanding general that they could track an incoming missile, but “there is nothing more we can do, other than to issue a warning” (Lettow 19).

In January 1967, Ronald Reagan, after taking office as Governor of California, accepted an invitation to visit Teller at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore. Teller briefed Reagan for two hours on the Spartan and Sprint antimissile systems being developed in Livermore. Spartan and Sprint were “interceptor” missiles that would detonate warheads close enough to the enemy missiles to destroy them. This meeting with Teller was the first time that Reagan was introduced to the possibilities of missile defense. Although Reagan did not at that time endorse either Spartan or Sprint, he acknowledged that “missile defense” might be a possibility. (Lettow 20). Teller became a great proponent of the X-ray laser as a missile defense system, which would require a nuclear explosion to generate the laser’s energy (Lettow 58). On September 14, 1982, Teller met with Reagan for the first time since the latter became president. The X-ray laser was then being researched at the Livermore Laboratory, and Teller still believed it to be the best method of destroying ballistic missiles.

However, President Reagan was “disinclined to favor the X-ray laser (and the Spartan and Sprint systems from the late 1960s) because they depended on nuclear detonations to destroy missiles” (Lettow 82). Teller admitted that Reagan did “have a real point” in asserting that SDI should focus on non-nuclear weapons as it would be more favorable both politically and technologically (Lettow 267). Although Reagan’s vision of SDI was influenced by the ideas of several prominent scientists, he asserts in his memoirs that “SDI wasn’t conceived by scientists” (qtd. in Lettow 82). Evidence indicates that the idea for SDI “originated with Reagan himself” (Lettow 82). As a policymaker, one of Reagan’s lifetime goals was to abolish nuclear weapons. He hoped that SDI would protect people from a nuclear holocaust while also providing a catalyst for the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons. Teller may have been disappointed that his X-ray concept was not favored, but he nevertheless began to champion other technologies that were being explored.

When confronted by critics about how SDI would not be one hundred percent effective, Teller responded, “Every weapon which is shot down, and shot down in such a manner that it will not explode, will fail to light a fire and will further decrease the chance for a nuclear winter” (Blumberg 181). Although SDI was confronted with several technological difficulties, Teller remained optimistic, concluding that “for the time being, we must aim at establishing some defense, if not a perfect defense” (Blumberg 202). Teller did have some bitter feelings about how the Soviet Union was reacting to SDI, responding in an interesting play on words that “the strategic defense initiative should be relabeled strategic defense response, for that is what we are doing, responding to the Soviet missile defense initiative” (Blumberg 203). Teller also faced much criticism from his long-time rival, Hans Bethe, who was strongly against the Strategic Defense Initiative. Nonetheless, after several spats with Bethe about the technological feasibility of Star Wars, Teller refused to back down, insisting that “American citizens are entitled to protection against enemy missiles” (Goodchild 383). VI.

The Star Wars Debate: Arguments For and Against SDI Shortly after delivering his famous Star Wars speech, President Ronald Reagan foreshadowed in his diary that it “would be a source of debate for some time to come” (Lettow 112). Although the majority of the population believed in the ultimate goal of Star Wars, the project would be a huge undertaking, spanning “a period of 30 years, from 1983 to about 2010,” and consisting of four phases, “a research phase, a systems development phase, a transition phase, and a final deployment phase” (Barnaby 87). Those who were in favor of Star Wars can be divided into four main groups (Barnaby 88). The first group consists of those who believed in the possibility of a complete defense against a Soviet ballistic missile attack, which is known as the “shield” or “astrodome” concept. The second group of advocates believed that a near-total defense against an attack was desirable mostly for the protection of the nation’s cities. The third group advocated the deploying of defensive missiles to protect not cities, but military targets, such as silos and command centers.

Lastly, the fourth group, which represented a “rather extreme view” (Barnaby 89) believed in having a defensive missile attack which would only be sufficient to deal with the Soviet nuclear forces that survive an American pre-emptive attack. Regardless of which view they took, all proponents of Star Wars believed that such a defensive system was necessary to protect our nation from attack. However, there were countless arguments against Star Wars on both moral and technological grounds. Several eminent scientists were outstanding critics of Star Wars, including Hans Bethe. Many of these scientists were not against the principle of defense, but they believed that the research programs would cost billions and billions of dollars yet lead to only a feasible missile defense (Dyson, October 2008 lecture). In order for SDI to be effective, it would have to be one hundred percent effective, because even if a few Soviet missiles made it through America’s counter-attack, entire cities could be demolished. One of the main problems with Star Wars was that the stations, satellites, and mirrors in space would be extremely vulnerable to attack.

Since these satellites and mirrors would have to be in a space orbit for a long time before any perceived attacks, the enemy would have plenty of time to detect their locations. Therefore the enemy could destroy the satellites so that the United States had no means of detecting and destroying the missiles that were launched into space. Thus, all of the radar and sensors for tracking enemy missiles had a major weakness that could have been easily exploited (Lampton 57-59). Additionally, there was no guarantee that SDI would work. A space-based defense would have to be run by a battle management computer, which would be programmed to detect attacks and aim the counter-missiles. Since computer simulation of a nuclear war would be nearly impossible to create, there would be no way to test these computers for accuracy except during the actual nuclear war, by which time it might be too late (Lampton 60). Ronald Reagan described Star Wars, saying, “it might take twenty years or more” (Lettow 112). However, an international crisis can erupt without warning, perpetrating an immediate nuclear war. While SDI defenses were still being researched and developed, the country would be vulnerable to attack.

Many people believe that the best “defense” against an all-out nuclear attack is the concept of MAD (mutually assured destruction). The United States and the Soviet Union both have had the ability to create a nuclear war since the 1950s, but neither has used this ability. Several experts agree that the only reason a nuclear war has not occurred is because of the fear that the other side will retaliate with equal if not greater force. Although MAD is not a reliable system and does not create any assurances, it has continued to work. So far, the world is still in “one piece” (Lampton 55). VII. Conclusion As Freeman Dyson expressed during his visit to our class, having nuclear weapons provides more “political status” than any true security and “doesn’t make much difference.” Even now, 25 years after the announcement of SDI, fewer than a dozen countries have nuclear programs, and some countries, such as South Africa, have had the “good sense” to abolish their nuclear programs. Strategic defense systems, such as Star Wars, have a clear purpose of defending a country from nuclear attack, but they have also encountered several technological and political obstacles.

The best hope for a more peaceful future is for the United States to destroy all of its nuclear weapons, with the expectation that other countries will follow suit. Until this change actually occurs, complete peace between nations is only an illusive dream which may never occur. Bibliography Barnaby, Frank. What on Earth is Star Wars? London: Fourth Estate Ltd., 1986. Blumberg, Stanley A., and Panos, Louis G. Edward Teller: Giant of the Golden Age of Physics. New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1990. Boutwell, Jeffrey, and Richard A. Scribner. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Arms Control Implications. Washington DC.: The American Association for the Advancement of Science, May 1985. Bowman, Robert M. Star Wars: A Defense Expert’s Case Against the Strategic Defense Initiative. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. Dyson, Freeman. Class lecture. University of California, Davis. 28 October 2008. Goodchild, Peter. Edward Teller: The Real Dr. Strangelove.

London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004. Herken, Gregg. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002. Lampton, Christopher. Star Wars. New York: Franklin Watts, 1987. Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. Margulies, Phillip. Strategic Defense Systems of the Future. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2006. Mikheyev, Dmitry. The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative. New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1987. Nimroody, Rosy. Star Wars: The Economic Fallout. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988. Robinson, David Z. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Its Effect on the Economy and Arms Control. New York: New York University Press, 1987. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

1987 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization: April, 1987. Stategic Defense Initiative Organization. 1989 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Stategic Defense Initiative Organization: March 13, 1989. = Reagan calls for new antimissile technology - Mar 23, 1983 - HISTORY.com Reagan calls for new antimissile technology Share this: Reagan calls for new antimissile technology Author Reagan calls for new antimissile technology URL Publisher A+E Networks In an address to the nation, President Ronald Reagan proposes that the United States embark on a program to develop antimissile technology that would make the country nearly impervious to attack by nuclear missiles. Reagan’s speech marked the beginning of what came to be known as the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Despite his vigorous anticommunist rhetoric, Reagan made nuclear arms control one of the keynotes of his administration. By 1983, however, talks with the Soviets were stalled over issues of what kinds of weapons should be controlled, what kind of control would be instituted, and how compliance with the controls would be assured.

It was at this point that Reagan became enamored with an idea proposed by some of his military and scientific advisors, including Dr. Edward Teller, the “father of the hydrogen bomb.” What they proposed was a massive program involving the use of antimissile satellites utilizing laser beams or other means to knock Soviet nuclear missiles out of the sky before they had a chance to impact the United States. Reagan therefore called upon the nation’s scientists to “turn their great talents” to this “vision of the future which offers hope.” He admitted that such a highly sophisticated program might “not be accomplished before the end of this century.” Reagan’s speech formed the basis for what came to be known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, though pundits immediately dubbed it the “Star Wars Initiative.” Some scientists indicated that even if the SDI were able to destroy 95 percent of Soviet missiles, the remaining five percent would be enough to destroy the entire planet. Nevertheless, Congress began funding the program, which ran up a bill of over $30 billion by 1993 (with little to show for the effort).

The Soviets were adamantly opposed to SDI, and a 1986 summit meeting between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ended acrimoniously when Gorbachev demanded that talks on arms control were contingent on the United States dropping the SDI program. By December 1987, Gorbachev-desperately in need of a foreign policy achievement and eager to reduce his nation’s burdensome defense budget-dropped his resistance to the SDI program and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The Strategic Defense Initiative never really got off the ground–by the mid-1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and with costs skyrocketing, it was quietly shelved. Related Videos

Question: Proposed in 1983, what was President Reagan's 'Strategic Defense Initiative', or SDI, more popularly known as?
Answer: Star Wars