Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1961–1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact troops in an invasion of Czechoslovakia to crack down on reformist trends in Prague. Although the Soviet Union’s action successfully halted the pace of reform in Czechoslovakia, it had unintended consequences for the unity of the communist bloc. Czech youths holding Czechoslovakian ﬂags stand atop of an overturned truck as other Prague residents surround Soviet tanks in downtown Prague on Aug. 21, 1968. (AP Photo/Libor Hajsky/CTK) Before the Second World War , the nation of Czechoslovakia had been a strong democracy in Central Europe, but beginning in the mid 1930s it faced challenges from both the West and the East. In 1938, the leadership in Great Britain and France conceded the German right to takeover the Sudetenland in the Munich Agreement, but the Czech government condemned this German occupation of its western-most territory as a betrayal.

In 1948, Czech attempts to join the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan to aid postwar rebuilding were thwarted by Soviet takeover and the installation of a new communist government in Prague. For the next twenty years, Czechoslovakia remained a stable state within the Soviet sphere of influence; unlike in Hungary or Poland, even the rise of de-Stalinization after 1953 did not lead to liberalization by the fundamentally conservative Czech government. In the 1960s, however, changes in the leadership in Prague led to a series of reforms to soften or humanize the application of communist doctrines within Czech borders. The Czech economy had been slowing since the early 1960s, and cracks were emerging in the communist consensus as workers struggled against new challenges. The government responded with reforms designed to improve the economy. In early 1968, conservative leader Antonin Novotny was ousted as the head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and he was replaced by Alexander Dubcek.

The Dubcek government ended censorship in early 1968, and the acquisition of this freedom resulted in a public expression of broad-based support for reform and a public sphere in which government and party policies could be debated openly. In April, the Czech Government issued a formal plan for further reforms, although it tried to liberalize within the existing framework of the Marxist-Leninist State and did not propose a revolutionary overhaul of the political and economic systems. As conflicts emerged between those calling for further reforms and conservatives alarmed by how far the liberalization process had gone, Dubcek struggled to maintain control. Soviet leaders were concerned over these recent developments in Czechoslovakia. Recalling the 1956 uprising in Hungary, leaders in Moscow worried that if Czechoslovakia carried reforms too far, other satellite states in Eastern Europe might follow, leading to a widespread rebellion against Moscow’s leadership of the Eastern Bloc. There was also a danger that the Soviet Republics in the East, such as the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia might make their own demands for more liberal policies. After much debate, the Communist Party leadership in Moscow decided to intervene to establish a more conservative and pro-Soviet government in Prague.

The Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20–21 caught Czechoslovakia and much of the Western world by surprise. In anticipation of the invasion, the Soviet Union had moved troops from the Soviet Union, along with limited numbers of troops from Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Bulgaria into place by announcing Warsaw Pact military exercises. When these forces did invade, they swiftly took control of Prague, other major cities, and communication and transportation links. Given the escalating U.S. involvement in the conflict in Vietnam as well as past U.S. pronouncements on non-intervention in the East Bloc, the Soviets guessed correctly that the United States would condemn the invasion but refrain from intervening. Although the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia was swift and successful, small-scale resistance continued throughout early 1969 while the Soviets struggled to install a stable government. Finally, in April of 1969, the Soviets forced Dubcek from power in favor of a more conservative administrator. In the years that followed, the new leadership reestablished government censorship and controls preventing freedom of movement, but it also improved economic conditions, eliminating one of the sources for revolutionary fervor. Czechoslovakia once again became a cooperative member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was significant in the sense that it delayed the splintering of Eastern European Communism and was concluded without provoking any direct intervention from the West. Repeated efforts in the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the attacks met with opposition from the Soviet Union, and the effort finally died away. The invasion did, however, temporarily derail progress toward détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NATO allies valued the idea of a lessening of tensions, and as a result they were determined not to intervene. Still, the invasion forced U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to cancel a summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Although Brezhnev knew this was the most likely outcome of the invasion, he considered maintaining Soviet control in the East Bloc a higher priority in the short-term than pursuing détente with the West. As it turned out, the progress on arms control agreements were only delayed by a few years in the aftermath of the Prague Spring. There were also long-term consequences.

After the invasion, the Soviet leadership justified the use of force in Prague under what would become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that Moscow had the right to intervene in any country where a communist government had been threatened. This doctrine, established to justify Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, also became the primary justification for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and even before that it helped to finalize the Sino-Soviet split, as Beijing feared that the Soviet Union would use the doctrine as a justification to invade or interfere with Chinese communism. Because the United States interpreted the Brezhnev Doctrine and the history of Soviet interventions in Europe as defending established territory, not expanding Soviet power, the aftermath of the Czech crisis also lent support to voices in the U.S. Congress calling for a reduction in U.S. military forces in Europe. Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 Other State Department Archive Sites Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact troops in an invasion of Czechoslovakia to crack down on reformist trends in Prague.

Although the Soviet Union's action successfully halted the pace of reform in Czechoslovakia, it had unintended consequences for the unity of the communist bloc. Before the Second World War, the nation of Czechoslovakia had been a strong democracy in Central Europe, but beginning in the mid 1930s it faced challenges from both the West and the East. In 1938, the leadership in Great Britain and France conceded the German right to takeover the Sudetenland in the Munich Agreement, but the Czechoslovak government condemned this German occupation of its western-most territory as a betrayal. In 1948, Czechoslovak attempts to join the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan to aid postwar rebuilding were thwarted by Soviet takeover and the installation of a new communist government in Prague. For the next twenty years, Czechoslovakia remained a stable state within the Soviet sphere of influence; unlike in Hungary or Poland, even the rise of de-Stalinization after 1953 did not lead to liberalization by the fundamentally conservative Czechoslovak government.

In the 1960s, however, changes in the leadership in Prague led to a series of reforms to soften or humanize the application of communist doctrines within Czechoslovak borders. The Czechoslovak economy had been slowing since the early 1960s, and cracks were emerging in the communist consensus as workers struggled against new challenges. The government responded with reforms designed to improve the economy. In early 1968, conservative leader Antonin Novotny was ousted as the head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and he was replaced by Alexander Dubcek. The Dubcek government ended censorship in early 1968, and the acquisition of this freedom resulted in a public expression of broad-based support for reform and a public sphere in which government and party policies could be debated openly. In April, the Czechoslovak Government issued a formal plan for further reforms, although it tried to liberalize within the existing framework of the Marxist-Leninist State and did not propose a revolutionary overhaul of the political and economic systems. As conflicts emerged between those calling for further reforms and conservatives alarmed by how far the liberalization process had gone, Dubcek struggled to maintain control.

Soviet leaders were concerned over these recent developments in Czechoslovakia. Recalling the 1956 uprising in Hungary , leaders in Moscow worried that if Czechoslovakia carried reforms too far, other satellite states in Eastern Europe might follow, leading to a widespread rebellion against Moscow's leadership of the Eastern Bloc. There was also a danger that the Soviet Republics in the East, such as the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia might make their own demands for more liberal policies. After much debate, the Communist Party leadership in Moscow decided to intervene to establish a more conservative and pro-Soviet government in Prague. The Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20-21 caught Czechoslovakia and much of the Western world by surprise. In anticipation of the invasion, the Soviet Union had moved troops from the Soviet Union, along with limited numbers of troops from Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Bulgaria into place by announcing Warsaw Pact military exercises. When these forces did invade, they swiftly took control of Prague, other major cities, and communication and transportation links. Given the escalating U.S. involvement in the conflict in Vietnam as well as past U.S.

pronouncements on non-intervention in the East Bloc, the Soviets guessed correctly that the United States would condemn the invasion but refrain from intervening. Although the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia was swift and successful, small-scale resistance continued throughout early 1969 while the Soviets struggled to install a stable government. Finally, in April of 1969, the Soviets forced Dubcek from power in favor of a more conservative administrator. In the years that followed, the new leadership reestablished government censorship and controls preventing freedom of movement, but it also improved economic conditions, eliminating one of the sources for revolutionary fervor. Czechoslovakia once again became a cooperative member of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was significant in the sense that it delayed the splintering of Eastern European Communism and was concluded without provoking any direct intervention from the West. Repeated efforts in the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the attacks met with opposition from the Soviet Union, and the effort finally died away. The invasion did, however, temporarily derail progress toward d�tente between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NATO allies valued the idea of a lessening of tensions, and as a result they were determined not to intervene.

Still, the invasion forced U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to cancel a summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Although Brezhnev knew this was the most likely outcome of the invasion, he considered maintaining Soviet control in the East Bloc a higher priority in the short-term than pursuing d�tente with the West. As it turned out, the progress on arms control agreements were only delayed by a few years in the aftermath of the Prague Spring. There were also long-term consequences. After the invasion, the Soviet leadership justified the use of force in Prague under what would become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that Moscow had the right to intervene in any country where a communist government had been threatened. This doctrine, established to justify Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, also became the primary justification for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and even before that it helped to finalize the Sino-Soviet split, as Beijing feared that the Soviet Union would use the doctrine as a justification to invade or interfere with Chinese communism.

Because the United States interpreted the Brezhnev Doctrine and the history of Soviet interventions in Europe as defending established territory, not expanding Soviet power, the aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis also lent support to voices in the U.S. Congress calling for a reduction in U.S. military forces in Europe. Soviets Invade Czechoslovakia - Aug 20, 1968 - HISTORY.com Soviets Invade Czechoslovakia Publisher A+E Networks On the night of August 20, 1968, approximately 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops and 5,000 tanks invade Czechoslovakia to crush the “Prague Spring”–a brief period of liberalization in the communist country. Czechoslovakians protested the invasion with public demonstrations and other non-violent tactics, but they were no match for the Soviet tanks. The liberal reforms of First Secretary Alexander Dubcek were repealed and “normalization” began under his successor Gustav Husak. Pro-Soviet communists seized control of Czechoslovakia’s democratic government in 1948.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin imposed his will on Czechoslovakia’s communist leaders, and the country was run as a Stalinist state until 1964, when a gradual trend toward liberalization began. However, modest economic reform was not enough for many Czechoslovakians, and beginning in 1966 students and intellectuals began to agitate for changes to education and an end to censorship. First Secretary Antonin Novotny’s problems were made worse by opposition from Slovakian leaders, among them Alexander Dubcek and Gustav Husak, who accused the central government of being dominated by Czechs. In January 1968, Novotny was replaced as first secretary by Alexander Dubcek, who was unanimously elected by the Czechoslovakian Central Committee. To secure his power base, Dubcek appealed to the public to voice support for his proposed reforms. The response was overwhelming, and Czech and Slovak reformers took over the communist leadership. In April, the new leadership unveiled its “Action Program,” promising democratic elections, greater autonomy for Slovakia, freedom of speech and religion, the abolition of censorship, an end to restrictions on travel, and major industrial and agricultural reforms.

Dubcek declared that he was offering “socialism with a human face.” The Czechoslovakian public greeted the reforms joyously, and Czechoslovakia’s long stagnant national culture began to bloom during what became known as the Prague Spring. In late June, a popular petition called the “Two Thousand Words” was published calling for even more rapid progress to full democracy. The Soviet Union and its satellites Poland and East Germany were alarmed by what appeared to be the imminent collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned Dubcek to halt his reforms, but the Czechoslovakian leader was buoyed by his popularity and dismissed the veiled threats. Dubcek declined to attend a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers in July, but on August 2 he agreed to meet with Brezhnev in the Slovakian town of Cierny. The next day, representatives of European Europe’s communist parties met in the Slovakian capital of Bratislava, and a communiquÉ was issued suggesting that pressure would be eased on Czechoslovakia in exchange for tighter control over the press.

However, on the night of August 20, nearly 200,000 Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops invaded Czechoslovakia in the largest deployment of military force in Europe since the end of World War II. Armed resistance to the invasion was negligible, but protesters immediately took to the streets, tearing down streets signs in an effort to confuse the invaders. In Prague, Warsaw Pact troops moved to seize control of television and radio stations. At Radio Prague, journalists refused to give up the station and some 20 people were killed before it was captured. Other stations went underground and succeeded in broadcasting for several days before their locations were discovered. Dubcek and other government leaders were detained and taken to Moscow. Meanwhile, widespread demonstrations continued on the street, and more than 100 protesters were shot to death by Warsaw Pact troops. Many foreign nations, including China, Yugoslavia, and Romania, condemned the invasion, but no major international action was taken. Much of Czechoslovakia’s intellectual and business elite fled en masse to the West. On August 27, Dubcek returned to Prague and announced in an emotional address that he had agreed to curtail his reforms.

Hard-line communists assumed positions in his government, and Dubcek was forced gradually to dismiss his progressive aides. He became increasingly isolated from both the public and his government. After anti-Soviet rioting broke out in April 1969, he was removed as first secretary and replaced by Gustav Husak, a “realist” who was willing to work with the Soviets. Dubcek was later expelled from the Communist Party and made a forest inspector based in Bratislava. In 1989, as communist governments collapsed across Eastern Europe, Prague again became the scene of demonstrations for democratic reform. In December 1989, Gustav Husak’s government conceded to demands for a multiparty parliament. Husak resigned, and for the first time in nearly two decades Dubcek returned to politics as chairman of the new parliament, which subsequently elected playwright and former dissident Vaclav Havel as president of Czechoslovakia. Havel had come to fame during the Prague Spring, and after the Soviet crackdown his plays were banned and his passport confiscated. Related Videos Was the 1968 Czech Invasion a Success Was the 1968 Czech Invasion a Success?

By Cindy Urrutia "Military occupation of the country had been successfully carried out... yet a nearby unanimous response of Czech population, rulers and institutions had taken shape, freezing authority along the line of legitimacy." (Eidlin, 319) When Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Red Army in August of 1968, people were numbed with disbelief. How was it possible that Czechoslovakia was betrayed by a protector it had put its trust in? Evidently, the Kremlin did not approve of Czechoslovakia progressive ideals to buy a "human face" to socialism. However, before one can examine the events that led to the Soviet invasion, a person should be aware of the important historical events which shaped the mentality of the Czech people. These events will help the reader understand why the Czech people had progressive ideals and why they resisted an overwhelming army. Although this brief historical synopsis can not fully encompass everything which has shaped a nation, there are a few incidents whose importance cannot be denied. With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia became an autonomous independent nation.

With its recently acquired independence and democracy, the Czech nation struggled to consolidate unity amongst its minorities in order to bring about a prosperous egalitarian society. Amongst its social issues, Czechoslovakia had serious economic problems to overcome. However, after hard work and determination, Czechoslovakia achieved peak post WWI prosperity in 1929 as well as adopting the gold standard. One-third of its industrial product was destined for export. For this reason the collapse of international trade ensued by the Great Depression was disastrous for the economy. By 1933 industrial production decreased by 60% and agriculture by 61%. The situation was intensified by wide spread unemployment. Recovery was a slow process which was aided by the re-armament due to Nazi threat. Just when the economy began to stabilize the Czech government had to attend to the German demand for greater autonomy. Tied into this issue was Hitlers decree in 1938 in which he declared himself the protector of all Germans abroad. Clearly Czech authority within its own boundaries was challenged. A person must now look at the international scene. Hitlers expansion program brought the Austrian Anschlus. At the same time the other European nations wanted to avoid another great war.

For this reason, France did not honor its alliance with Czechoslovakia when Hitler demanded the Sudeten territory. Instead, France and Britain suggested compliance. The Czechoslovakian people were indignant, but nonetheless forced to accept the Munich Agreement. This set the pattern of capitulation in which Germany promoted disintegration from the complete invasion of this central European nation. During the German occupation terror was used to subjugate the citizens of Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, the Czechs resisted the best they could. During this time there was a government vacuum which the communist party used to influence people who felt dislocated during WWII. The communist cause was facilitated by the liberation the Red Army brought. With the closure of the military war (WWII) in Europe, one sees the opening of an ideological one. The Soviet Union exerted its influence on countries it liberated. Czechoslovakia saw massive nationalization. The USSR also used the menace of its army to influence elections. By 1947 the communist undermined all other government groups by a coup which would solidify its power. Thus, the country was set on a course to imitate the Soviet example.

Along with collectivization, the USSR brought purges (49-57) against anyone who they felt would undermine its power in Czechoslovakia. The worry was that Titoism would spread. This had to be prevented at all cost! To the dismay of the Kremlin, the Czech people did not wish to be subjects of manipulation. In 1953 the world saw the first anti-government manipulations in Czechoslovakia. Along with discontent inside the Kremlin itself. Kruschov, the leader of the USSR, gave a "Secrete Speech" denouncing some of Stalins hardline purge practices. Kruschov wanted to work toward rehabilitation of communism. In lieu of what has been discussed above, one can foresee great discontent in Czechoslovakia. The nation was not prospering and instead of bringing nirvana, communism brought repression. The workers felt absolutely no incentive to work, when in the end they gained nothing but hardship. There was confusion at the top, worker absenteeism and worker job-hopping seriously slowed down industry labor productivity. Dislocation and resentment reached its height in 1963. The economy was in a serious crisis, the partys structure was collapsing, and intellectuals were rebelling.

Permissiveness was allowed in the culture field and Cisar began reforms in the education system which deviated from the Soviet model. The above "reforms" set the ideological profile for what is referred to as the Prague Spring. One important factor in reform is to realize that economic reform cannot be separated from political reform. On January 1, 1967 the economic model designed by Ota Sik was initiated. The success of this model would depend on the creation of a market economy, supply and demand would be spontaneous, realistic salaries and prices, decentralization of industry, incentives, and a formation of international convertibility for the Czech crown. Modernization and the import of Western technology and equipment would enable Czechoslovakia to be a competitive international force. A person can deduce that these ideas are radical in the face of communism and would encounter opposition. Such as the case amongst conservatives in the Czech government and the Soviet Union. These reforms were not a smooth process, but were nonetheless attempted. At this point one must shift ones attention to Soviet politics. In this time frame one finds neo-Stalinist Brezhnav as the head of the USSR.

Brezhnav was greatly concerned over the deterioration of Soviet style communism in Eastern Europe and advocated tighter controls. He began to discuss the Czech problems in great detail with the central committee in the Kremlin as well as with other Warsaw Pact nations. Brezhnav was not going to concede any reforms which would soil the Soviet Socialism ideology and bring insubordination from other Eastern European countries. The spring of 1968, known as the Prague Spring, brought the rebirth of hope into a people who had been demoralized by the depression, WWII, and strong Stalinist measure. The democratic tendencies suppressed by the historical events of the last 30 years could no longer be denied. These rejuvenation is personified by the reforms instigated by President Svoboda and party leader Dubcek. Socialism with a "human face" was the goal. Unfortunately the aspirations of the government and its citizens was short lived as the Soviet Union decided Czech reforms were of non-socialist tendencies, and Soviet control was essential. With the support of the other Warsaw Pact countries, the Red Army marched onto Czechoslovakian soil in August 20, 1968. The military expedition was a success, but politically a failure.

During the Prague Spring progressive ideal became deeply rooted within the mind of the Czech nation. The Czech people refused to go without a fight. The invasion of 1938 could not be forgotten and people did not want it to repeat. Compliance was not an option. This can be seen in the leaderships survival during the first crucial hours. Most importantly, the people supported the government through radio stations. The radio stations support of the government along with its broadcast undermined the credibility of the Soviets and by not allowing them to communicate with the country. This massive resistance also incorporate large riots. The voices of freedom would not be silenced. To the great dismay of the nation, superior might forced capitulation, censorship, and the enforcement of Soviet type socialism. Although, the USSR won militarily it failed miserably politically. The spirit of Prague remained and the Soviets knew it. The peoples mind could not be manipulated into believing in the righteousness of Soviet Socialism. The new Czech government was not based on legitimacy through trust and support of its people, but on military suppression. What is significant is that the world (including the other Soviet protectorates) knew this. A government based on subversion and totalitarians could not be respected nor supported.

In this sense the invasion of 68 was a failure because the people of Czechoslovakia could not be fooled. They knew that Soviet Socialism was not the best way of life. Force authority is illegitimate and unreal. References "Capitulation", "Resistance" and the Framework of "Normalization": the August 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Response". Eidlin. 1981 "Czech Sin WWII". Tad Szulc. 1971 "A History of the Czech Rep". Mamatey and Luza. Princeton University Press. 1973 "Prague Spring". Zeman. 1969 August 21, 1968: The Soviet-Led Invasion Of Czechoslovakia August 21, 1968: The Soviet-Led Invasion Of Czechoslovakia August 21, 2015 Forty-seven years ago, Soviet troops and their Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to bring an end to that country's brief period of political liberalization, called the Prague Spring.

About 500,000 troops were involved in the invasion and occupation, during which 108 Czechoslovaks died and some 500 were wounded. The invasion ended the political and economic reforms led by Alexander Dubcek and reasserted dominant Soviet and Communist authority in Czechoslovakia. It also helped establish the Brezhnev Doctrine, which Moscow said allowed the U.S.S.R. to intervene in any country where a Communist government was under threat. (Photos from the Czech Press Agency archives) 1 Soviet tanks are surrounded by crowds of Czechs protesting against the invasion on Prague's Wenceslas Square on August 21, 1968. 2 A young Prague resident climbs on a Soviet T-54 tank on Vinohradska Sreet near the state radio building. 3 Invading Soviet tanks with white markings deploy near the Communist Party headquarters in Prague. 4 A Czechoslovak woman talks to Soviet soldiers on a tank as she protests against the invasion in Prague. 5 Young women watch as tanks approach the state radio headquarters. 6 Buses and trucks used as a barricade by protesters were reduced to rubble by fire and Soviet tanks.

8 A protester holds a bloodstained Czechoslovak flag in front of a Soviet tank. 9 Soviet soldiers try to extinguish a burning tank set on fire by protesters near the Czechoslovak Radio headquarters in Prague. 10 A photographer approaches a Soviet tank to take a photo on central Wenceslas Square. 11 Protesters throw stones at the Soviet tanks entering Prague. 12 A Soviet tank rams a city bus after protesters set up a barricade to block Soviet forces near the Czechoslovak radio headquarters. 13 Soviet tanks and armored vehicles guard an area of Republic Square in downtown Prague. 14 Mourners attend the funeral of 20-year-old Milan Kadlec, who was killed during the invasion. 15 The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Prague Spring Prague Spring In the morning hours of August 21, 1968, the Soviet army invaded Czechoslovakia along with troops from four other Warsaw Pact countries. The occupation was the beginning of the end for the Czechoslovak reform movement known as the Prague Spring. The reform movement had been brewing for years, fed by economic problems as well as growing demands from Communist intellectuals for more freedom and pluralism within a socialist system.

But it really gathered steam at the beginning of 1968, in January, when the Communist Party's Central Committee replaced its hard-line First Secretary Antonin Novotny with the moderate reformer Alexander Dubcek, who eventually sided more and more clearly with the forces for change. In March, censorship was loosened and Novotny was relieved of his other function, President of the Republic. He was replaced by a career soldier, Ludvik Svoboda, whose last name in Czech means "freedom"-- a purely linguistic coincidence that countless posters and flyers during the invasion made use of (documents 3B , 3C and 3I ), although Svoboda ultimately sided with opponents of reform. In the following months, censorship was further loosened (document 1A ), some political prisoners were freed, and topics that until recently had been taboo--such as the politically motivated show trials of the 1950's--began to be openly discussed (document 1B ). The government adopted an "Action Program" that aimed at democratization of the Communist party and pluralism in politics and society.

Meanwhile, Communist leaders elsewhere in Central Europe began to express more and more reservations about the reforms; during the spring, Warsaw Pact troops began maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. Although the Czechoslovak reformers always affirmed their intention of remaining within the bounds of a socialist system led by the Communist party, the reforms eventually began to take on a life of their own. Czechoslovakia 1968: 'Lenin wake up, Brezhnev has gone mad' | 1968 | History & Theory | Front page articles Czechoslovakia 1968: 'Lenin wake up, Brezhnev has gone mad' +1 'Lenin wake up, Brezhnev has gone mad.' This was one of the slogans chanted on the street of Prague 30 years ago as Russian and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. The upheavals in Czechoslovakia had began with a stormy session of the Writers Union which passed a resolution supporting Soviet author Solzhenitsyn's protest against censorship.

'Lenin wake up, Brezhnev has gone mad.' This was one of the slogans chanted on the street of Prague 30 years ago as Russian and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. The upheavals in Czechoslovakia had began with a stormy session of the Writers Union which passed a resolution supporting Soviet author Solzhenitsyn's protest against censorship. This ferment amongst the intelligentsia rapidly spread to the students who demonstrated against power failures in their hostels. The demonstration was brutally attacked by the secret police, who wounded several of the students. The bureaucracy was so rattled that they tried to pacify the students by offering to pay the hospital bills of the injured demonstrators. The students' response was to demand that those responsible be punished and the press publish the facts. Student leaders warned that if the papers did not report the truth they would march to the factories and report the incident to the workers themselves. The split in the bureaucracy, the fall of Novotny and the rise of Dubcek which followed these events cannot be explained solely by the actions of the writers and the students, but must be seen against the background of the developing crisis of the Czech economy.

Stalinist The insanity of the various national Stalinist bureaucracies of Eastern Europe trying to build socialism in 'their own' countries led to each state attempting to construct every branch of industry 'independently,' without giving any consideration to the inevitable restrictions imposed by the old capitalist national boundaries. Bureaucratic planning 'from above' and the concomitant inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement meant that the necessity of 'meeting the plan' led to the replacement of quality with quantity. Those consumer goods which were produced, could not be sold on the world market, while their price put them beyond the reach of Czech workers. The Czech economy was grinding to a halt, clogged with bureaucracy. The need to rationalise the economy, and fear of the consequences among the Czech workers, led to a split at the top of the Czech bureaucracy, and the emergence of the Dubcek wing of 'reformers.' In the West Dubcek and co. were lauded by the media, but what and who did Dubcek really represent? The main thrust of Dubcek's programme was an economic reform where directives from the central plan would be replaced by plans drawn up by individual enterprises or associations of enterprises.

Far from abolishing the privileges of the bureaucrats, Dubcek was aiming to increase wage differentials and grant 'incentives' to the factory managers. This was a classical Bonapartist manoeuvre balancing on one set of bureaucrats (the factory managers etc.), against another layer (state bureaucrats). Initially the Western press reported that many workers were suspicious of Dubcek, and with good reason. In the last analysis Dubcek's reforms would work against the interests of the Czech workers. Competition between state-owned enterprises would inevitably lead to the closure of unprofitable factories producing large-scale unemployment. From the beginning Dubcek looked primarily to the intellectuals and students for support. The Czech bureaucracy was clearly frightened that the ferment in the intelligentsia would spread to the workers - that was a lesson they had learned from the "Crooked Circle" in Poland and the "Petofi Circle" in Hungary, whose agitation sparked off the revolutionary movements of 1956. They were prepared to grant concessions temporarily, especially to the intelligentsia, in order to protect their own privileged position. The rapid development of the mass movement in Czechoslovakia terrified Brezhnev and the Moscow bureaucracy.

Dubcek's reforms were timid (incidentally it later emerged that Dubcek himself was a compromise candidate of the Central Committee, not even the most radical of the bureaucrats!) but they were enough to act as a catalyst to the discontent welling up in the working class. The split in the bureaucracy precipitated an unparalleled outburst of discussion, protest meetings and demonstrations. In every factory, college and village a furious discussion raged. Resolutions poured in demanding the sacking of Novotny and the speeding up of reforms. Even Communist Party meetings were the scene of noisy debate. The movement was gathering impetus and the bureaucracy was forced to swim along with the current, granting reform after reform. The Kremlin alleged that the "forces of reaction....with the aim of restoring the bourgeois system" were behind the movement. This was the standard contemptible formula employed by the Russian bureaucracy to frighten the workers into line. The Stalinist bureaucracies of Russia and Eastern Europe feared strikes like the plague because they saw within them the potential for a movement which could overthrow their rule. Even worse in their eyes was the development of political organisations around which an alternative socialist programme to the perverted caricature of socialism that existed in these countries could crystallise.

Heavy pressure bore down from Moscow on the Czech bureaucrats to 'put their house in order.' The 'reformers' meanwhile had realised that they could not simply rule by the old methods. If the reforms created a dangerous situation for the bureaucracy, an attempt to go back to their previous policy would be ten times as dangerous. When a whole people stand up and say "No," no force on earth can stop them. Dubcek Dubcek's immediate intention was to grant concessions, removing the worst causes of discontent, but leaving the power and privileges of the ruling clique intact. However the movement below could not be allowed to go too far. The pressure from Moscow wasn't the sole cause of Dubcek's rapid backsliding. His main concern was to restrict the movement of the Czech masses. With one hand the bureaucrats gave out concessions, with the other they issued warnings to the workers to "avoid another Hungary at all costs." As always these so-called reformers constantly appealed for "calm," attempting to lull the masses into passivity. As the pressure from other frightened Stalinist cliques mounted, the Czech bureaucracy began to retreat step by step from the concessions they had made. The Czech press was warned off printing articles too critical of the Soviet Union.

At a meeting with Romanian Stalinist leader Ceaucescu on August 16th, Dubcek announced, "We need order in our country. The meetings in Prague [ie public discussions], if they continue, will have a negative effect on the democratisation process." (The Times, August 17th 1968). They were taking very seriously the warnings from the Kremlin. The Russian bureaucracy were terrified that if censorship were to be abolished in Czechoslovakia, they would be left with little justification for resisting the clamour of Soviet intellectuals for the dead hand of bureaucracy to be lifted from literature and the arts. More serious still would have been the effect on the working class. A free airing of opinions in the press would provide a focal point for organised expressions of discontent, inevitably leading in the direction of a new programme and a new party.

In Czechoslovakia, as in Hungary in 1956, (where the workers actually set up workers' councils, soviets in all but name) the working class would undoubtedly have tried to move in the direction of the programme drafted by Lenin in 1919, based around the following four demands: Free and democratic elections with the right of recall No official to receive a higher wage than a skilled worker No standing army, but an armed people No permanent bureaucracy, "every cook should be able to be Prime Minister." At least one Czech journal was already raising the idea of genuine, democratic workers councils. In the course of events, experience would have demonstrated to the workers the need to by-pass the limitations imposed on them by the Dubcek clique. In 1956 the Hungarian workers went much further than the "reformers" like Nagy and Dubcek had foreseen. They built a genuine workers' revolution, not a social counter-revolution to overthrow the socialist property relations, but a political revolution to oust the bureaucracy and establish a healthy, democratic workers' state. That movement was only crushed by the intervention of Russian tanks at a tremendous cost.

Now again in 1968 Moscow was faced with a stark choice, either intervene which would mean yet another blow against the power and prestige of Stalinism; or stay out which would probably create an even more dangerous situation for the bureaucracy, a danger which would not be confined to the borders of Czechoslovakia. In other words, the invasion was not a sign of strength on the part of the bureaucracy but of weakness, motivated by fear. Superficial From a superficial point of view the appearance of tanks on the streets of Prague spelt immediate and inevitable defeat for the movement in Czechoslovakia. From a purely military point of view any talk of Czech resistance to the mighty army of Soviet Russia would be ridiculous. However, for Marxists military factors by themselves are not decisive in war. If that were the case, then the young Soviet Republic would have been crushed by the twenty-one armies of foreign intervention sent against them. But this did not happen. The reason was the clear internationalist position adopted by the Bolsheviks and the class appeals made to the workers in uniform of the foreign armies.

The result of the Bolshevik propaganda and fraternisation on the already demoralised troops led to mutinies in the armies of intervention which became infected with "Bolshevik influenza." A genuine Leninist leadership would have prepared the Czech people for the eventuality of an invasion, both politically and militarily. If the Red Army had been confronted by an armed working class organised in soviets it would have made a tremendous impact on the Russian workers in uniform. As it was, numerous eye-witness reports tell of the bewilderment and demoralisation of the troops, as the realisation dawned on them that they had been duped by their leaders. There were instances of Russian troops breaking down and weeping in the streets, protesting that they didn't even know they were in Czechoslovakia. In this situation a clear internationalist, class appeal would have led to massive disaffection in the Red Army. The Czech workers and youth showed an instinctive grasp of the need to fraternise. Mere passive resistance is not enough though. The interventionist troops should have been made to feel the absolute determination of the Czech people to fight to the death if necessary to defend their gains.

They should have been confronted with a force so implacable as to encourage them to disobey the officer with his pistol at their back. Without such a confrontation the officer caste can always force the troops back into line with the threat of the firing squad. The tragedy of Czechoslovakia was that at the crucial moment the Czech people found themselves leaderless, disarmed and unprepared. The cowardice of the Dubcek clique, which preferred to see the country occupied rather than arm the working class, is a clear indication of their real interests. Undoubtedly the Soviet invasion was a defeat for the Czech working class. As in 1956 the capitalist press had a field day exploiting the invasion as proof of the barbarity of communism. They shed crocodile tears but were not prepared to lift a finger to help because they knew that all the Kremlin's propaganda about counter-revolution was a lie. There was no desire on the part of the Czech workers to restore capitalism, rather they were groping towards creating a genuine workers' state. Of course the capitalists have no interest in allowing that to happen.

So despite all their hypocrisy, they were quite pleased to see Russian forces crush the movement, while taking advantage of the cheap propaganda opportunity to drag the name of socialism through the mud. For decades the capitalist class in the West and the Stalinist bureaucrats in the East leaned on each other for support, while simultaneously the western capitalists used the crimes of Stalinism to discredit socialism, and the bureaucratic cliques relied on the threat of counter-revolution to control their own workers. Bureaucracy In the end it proved to be the bureaucracy itself, no longer able to guarantee its power and privileges on the basis of a nationalised planned economy strangled by the absence of democratic workers control, who turned towards capitalism as Trotsky had predicted in the 1930s. In Czechoslovakia their actions were eventually responsible for the criminal break up of the country. The movement towards capitalism in Russia and throughout Eastern Europe has created a nightmare for the working class. Every day is providing new lessons in the wonders of the market.

In the next period the workers of Eastern Europe will rediscover the traditions of 1956 and 1968 and the other marvellous struggles of the working class, and rediscover too the genuine programme of socialism and Bolshevism. The banner of Marx and Lenin will be recovered from the mud through which the Stalinist bureaucracies dragged it by a new generation who, standing on the shoulders of their forebears, will link arms with their brothers and sisters in the West in the struggle for a socialist future for all humanity. This is an edited version of an article by Alan Woods originally published in 1968. Bootstrap is a front-end framework of Twitter, Inc. Code licensed under MIT License. Czechoslovakia The 1968 Invasion - Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System << Back to Czechoslovakia Government The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a pivotal event in Czechoslovakia's political development.

The August intervention by forces from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary marked the beginning of the end of the Prague Spring and the reformist policies introduced by the Dubcek regime. It also set the stage for the reemergence in Czechoslovakia of a pro-Soviet regime and a politically orthodox environment. In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek, who since 1963 had been first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunisticka strana Slovenska--KSS), was chosen to replace Antonin Novotny as first secretary of the KSC. Dubcek was not then the leader of the KSC reformers but rather was a compromise selection. The removal of Novotny triggered an outpouring of demands for further changes in all sectors of society. The drive for reform centered on four broad issues: the overall question of political structure and participation, justice and civil liberties, Czech-Slovak relations, and economic organization and planning.

In April 1968 the KSC Central Committee issued its so-called Action Program, which outlined steps toward constructing a "Czechoslovak way to socialism." Within the framework of a socialist society ruled by the communist party, the program attempted to decentralize and democratize the system of authority by reducing the role of the KSC in national life and transferring greater responsibility to the elected bodies of government. Other goals of the reform were to introduce strong guarantees of civil liberties and justice by establishing a system of checks and balances and reducing the power of police organs; to construct a more equitable relationship between Czechs and Slovaks by granting greater autonomy to the latter; and to institute a decentralized planning apparatus with aspects of market socialism. A number of public opinion polls taken at the time indicated that the reforms envisioned in the Action Program received an extraordinary measure of public support. It was for this reason that they aroused deep concern among the leadership of the Soviet Union and neighboring communist nations. Those leaders feared that the reformist policies in Czechoslovakia would result in the erosion of the authority of the communist party, which in turn would weaken Czechoslovakia's commitment to socialist unity and to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon alliances.

They also worried that the implementation of reforms in Czechoslovakia would lead to calls for similar reforms in the Soviet Union and other East European nations. During the night of August 20-21, the armies of five Warsaw Pact nations invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. The KSC Presidium issued a statement over Prague radio condemning the invasion and appealing to the people to remain calm and the army not to resist. No armed resistance was forthcoming. Instead, outrage at the massive invasion was expressed nonviolently: road signs were altered and removed to slow the oncoming invaders; radio transmitters were repeatedly moved to elude takeover; and foreign soldiers were refused service in stores and restaurants and were engaged in heated arguments with Czechoslovak citizens from whom they vainly sought cooperation. As the Warsaw Pact troops moved into Prague, Soviet security forces arrested Dubcek and other top party leaders and flew them to Moscow. Meanwhile, despite the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Prague, the National Assembly met August 21-27, and delegates managed to convene the "Extraordinary" Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Dubcek's supporters in the government refused to recognize the Soviet-imposed government and instead demanded to join Dubcek in directly negotiating with the Soviets. The talks resulted in the signing of the Moscow Protocol, an uneasy compromise allowing Dubcek to remain in power but also requiring the dismissal of some reformists, a tightening of press control, a commitment to no persecution of pro-Soviet communists, and increased Soviet control over KSC appointments. After signing the Moscow Protocol, Dubcek was allowed to return to Prague, where he resumed his duties as first secretary of the party. Dubcek's efforts to maintain political control and to salvage the reform program were stymied by the new conditions imposed by the Soviets. Furthermore, popular resistance to the Soviet invasion continued and was reflected in such episodes as the public suicide of a university student and the vandalizing of Prague's Aeroflot office. All of these factors kept tensions high and led to Dubcek's ouster in April 1969. He was replaced by the more orthodox, Soviet-backed Gustav Husak. Data as of August 1987 NOTE: The information regarding Czechoslovakia on this page is re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook.

No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Czechoslovakia The 1968 Invasion information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Czechoslovakia The 1968 Invasion should be addressed to the Library of Congress and the CIA. Please put this page in your BOOKMARKS - - - - - Copyright © 2004 Photius Coutsoukis (all rights reserved) ctr040601

Question: Who led Czechoslovakia before the 1968 Soviet invasion
Answer: Alexander Dubcek