Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1989) - The New York Times The New York Times Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1989) | Search Supported by Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1989) News about Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1989), including commentary and archival articles published in The New York Times. More Updated: Aug. 3, 2010 In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground on Bligh Reef, ruptured and spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound. The spill was the worst that had occured up to that point in American history, damaging more than 1,300 miles of shoreline, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of people in the region and killing hundreds of thousands of birds and marine animals. It occurred after the ship's captain, Joseph J. Hazelwood, left the bridge at a crucial moment. Mr. Hazelwood, an alcoholic, had downed five double vodkas on the night of the disaster, according to witnesses. The spill stopped after just a few days but the recovery may not have an end date.

The damage to the fishing industry and to native subsistence hunting has lasted for years. Exxon originally was ordered by a federal court to pay $5 billion in punitive damages in 1994. A federal appeal in 2006 reduced it to $2.5 billion. In 2008 the United States Supreme Court further reduced the damages to just over $500 million. More than $2 billion has been spent on cleanup and recovery. Exxon has paid at least $1 billion in damages. The accident helped to create a new industry around environmental groups, scientific organizations, experts in the psychological trauma of oil spills. A network of fishermen is now trained and paid by the oil industry to respond to future disasters. Oil Spill Facts - Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council Questions and Answers about the Spill Where is the Exxon Valdez today? After several changes of name and ownership, the tanker was converted for hauling bulk ore in the South China Sea. Following a collision with a cargo ship in November 2012, the ore carrier was sold, again renamed, and then resold for scrap and routed to India.

A court dispute to prevent the ship from being beached in India was resolved when the Supreme Court of India granted permission to the owners to beach the ship for dismantling. The former T/V Exxon Valdez was beached on August 2, 2012. For more details, see After the Big Spill, What Happened to the Ship Exxon Valdez? at the NOAA website . How did the accident happen? The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the accident and determined that the probable causes of the grounding were: The failure of the third mate to properly maneuver the vessel, possibly due to fatigue and excessive workload; the failure of the master to provide a proper navigation watch, possibly due to impairment from alcohol; the failure of Exxon Shipping Company to supervise the master and provide a rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon Valdez; the failure of the U.S. Coast Guard to provide an effective vessel traffic system; and the lack of effective pilot and escort services. Okay. But what actually happened? The Exxon Valdez departed from the Trans Alaska Pipeline terminal at 9:12 pm March 23, 1989.

William Murphy, an expert ship's pilot hired to maneuver the 986-foot vessel through the Valdez Narrows, was in control of the wheelhouse. At his side was the captain of the vessel, Joe Hazelwood. Helmsman Harry Claar was steering. After passing through Valdez Narrows, pilot Murphy left the vessel and Captain Hazelwood took over the wheelhouse. The Exxon Valdez encountered icebergs in the shipping lanes and Captain Hazelwood ordered Claar to take the Exxon Valdez out of the shipping lanes to go around the icebergs. He then handed over control of the wheelhouse to Third Mate Gregory Cousins with precise instructions to turn back into the shipping lanes when the tanker reached a certain point. At that time, Claar was replaced by Helmsman Robert Kagan. For reasons that remain unclear, Cousins and Kagan failed to make the turn back into the shipping lanes and the ship ran aground on Bligh Reef at 12:04 am March 24, 1989. Captain Hazelwood was in his quarters at the time. LISTEN to Captain Hazelwood's radio call to the Valdez Vessel Traffic Center . Can I have more detail, please?

Here's a detailed account of the accident as reported by the Alaska Oil Spill Commission in its 1990 Final Report . Was the captain drunk? The captain was seen in a local bar, admitted to having some alcoholic drinks, and a blood test showed alcohol in his blood even several hours after the accident. The captain has always insisted that he was not impaired by alcohol. The state charged him with operating a vessel while under the influence of alcohol. A jury in Alaska, however, found him NOT GUILTY of that charge. The jury did find him guilty of negligent discharge of oil, a misdemeanor. Hazelwood was fined $50,000 and sentenced to 1,000 hours of community service in Alaska ( State of Alaska v. Hazelwood ). He completed the community service ahead of schedule in 2001. He picked up trash along the Seward Highway and worked at Bean's Cafe, a "soup kitchen" for the homeless in Anchorage, Alaska. What's being done to prevent another Exxon Valdez-type accident? See the Spill Prevention and Response page for a thorough answer. How much oil was spilled?

Approximately 11 million gallons or 257,000 barrels or 35,000 metric tonnes (38,800 short tons). Picture the swimming pool at your school or in your community. The amount of spilled oil is roughly equivalent to 17 olympic-sized swimming pools. How much oil was the Exxon Valdez carrying? 53,094,510 gallons or 1,264,155 barrels How does the Exxon Valdez spill compare to other spills? The Exxon Valdez spill, though still one of the largest ever in the United States, has dropped from the top 50 internationally ( view a list of top oil spills worldwide ). It is widely considered the number one spill worldwide in terms of damage to the environment, however. The timing of the spill, the remote and spectacular location, the thousands of miles of rugged and wild shoreline, and the abundance of wildlife in the region combined to make it an environmental disaster well beyond the scope of other spills. How many miles of shoreline were impacted by oil? Approximately 1,300 miles.

200 miles were heavily or moderately oiled (meaning the impact was obvious); 1,100 miles were lightly or very lightly oiled (meaning light sheen or occasional tarballs). By comparison, there is more than 9,000 miles of shoreline in the spill region. How large an area did the spill cover? From Bligh Reef the spill stretched 460 miles to the tiny village of Chignik on the Alaska Peninsula. View a map of the spill How was the spill cleaned up? Complicated question. It took more than four summers of cleanup efforts before the effort was called off. Not all beaches were cleaned and some beaches remain oiled today. At its peak the cleanup effort included 10,000 workers, about 1,000 boats and roughly 100 airplanes and helicopters, known as Exxon's army, navy, and air force. It is widely believed, however, that wave action from winter storms did more to clean the beaches than all the human effort involved. How much did it cost? Exxon says it spent about $2.1 billion on the cleanup effort. What techniques were used?

TIP: Check out National Geographic, January 1990, Pages 18-19 for a great illustration on how shoreline cleanup was conducted. Hot water treatment was popular until it was determined that the treatment could be causing more damage than the oil. Small organisms were being cooked by the hot water. High pressure cold water treatment and hot water treatment involved dozens of people holding fire hoses and spraying the beaches. The water, with floating oil, would trickle down to the shore. The oil would be trapped within several layers of boom and either be scooped up, sucked up or absorbed using special oil-absorbent materials. Mechanical cleanup was attempted on some beaches. Backhoes and other heavy equipment would till the beaches to expose oil underneath so that it could be washed out. Many beaches were fertilized to promote growth of microscopic bacteria that eat the hydrocarbons. Known as bioremediation, this method was successful on several beaches where the oil was not too thick. More information about bioremediation techniques used can be found on the EPA website. A few solvents and chemical agents were used, although none extensively. How about more detail on cleanup techniques? How many animals died outright from the oil spill? No one knows.

The carcasses of more than 35,000 birds and 1,000 sea otters were found after the spill, but since most carcasses sink, this is considered to be a small fraction of the actual death toll. The best estimates are: 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, up to 22 killer whales, and billions of salmon and herring eggs. How are the animals doing now? Lingering injuries continue to plague some injured species while others are fully recovered. See the Status of Injured Resources section of this web site. Other useful websites that may help answer this question: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill – Alaska 1989. And The response of ExxonMobil Green World Group Learning Simplified in 21st Century You are here: Home / General / Exxon Valdez Oil Spill – Alaska 1989. And The response of ExxonMobil Exxon Valdez Oil Spill – Alaska 1989.

And The response of ExxonMobil Posted on January 6, 2012 Leave a Comment On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, en route from Valdez, Alaska to Los Angeles, California, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska . The vessel was traveling outside normal shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. Within six hours of the grounding, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 10.9 million gallons of its 53 million gallon cargo of Prudhoe Bay crude oil. Eight of the eleven tanks on board were damaged. The oil would eventually impact over 1,100 miles of non-continuous coastline in Alaska, making the Exxon Valdez the largest oil spill to date in U.S. waters. The response to the Exxon Valdez involved more personnel and equipment over a longer period of time than did any other spill in U.S. history. Logistical problems in providing fuel, meals, berthing, response equipment, waste management and other resources were one of the largest challenges to response management.

At the height of the response, more than 11,000 personnel, 1,400 vessels and 85 aircraft were involved in the cleanup. The Exxon Valdez aground on Bligh Reef. (Source: NOAA) Shoreline cleanup began in April of 1989 and continued until September of 1989 for the first year of the response. The response effort continued in 1990 and 1991 with cleanup in the summer months, and limited shoreline monitoring in the winter months. Fate and effects monitoring by state and Federal agencies are ongoing. The images that the world saw on television and descriptions they heard on the radio that spring were of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife, and thousands of workers mobilized to clean beaches. These images reflected what many people felt was a severe environmental insult to a relatively pristine, ecologically important area that was home to many species of wildlife endangered elsewhere.

In the weeks and months that followed, the oil spread over a wide area in Prince William Sound and beyond, resulting in an unprecedented response and cleanup—in fact, the largest oil spill cleanup ever mobilized; however, the scale of this spill will likely be eclipsed by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill originating in the bathypelagic zone of the Gulf of Mexico. Many local, state, federal, and private agencies and groups took part in the effort. Even today, scientists continue to study the affected shorelines to understand how an ecosystem like Prince William Sound responds to, and recovers from, an incident like the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The response of ExxonMobil ExxonMobil acknowledged that the Exxon Valdez oil spill was a tragic accident that the company deeply regrets. Exxon notes that company took immediate responsibility for the spill, cleaned it up, and voluntarily compensated those who claimed direct damages. ExxonMobil paid $300 million immediately and voluntarily to more than 11,000 Alaskans and businesses affected by the Valdez spill.

In addition, the company paid $2.2 billion on the cleanup of Prince William Sound , staying with the cleanup from 1989 to 1992, when the State of Alaska and the U.S. Coast Guard declared the cleanup complete. And, as noted above, ExxonMobil also has paid $1 billion in settlements with the state and federal governments. That money is being used for environmental studies and conservation programs for Prince William Sound. ExxonMobil hired its own scientists to study the impacts of the spill, and they come to different conclusions than many of the results published by government agencies and peer-reviewed academic journals. Exxon’s scientists acknowledge the lingering pockets of oil in the sediments, but they argue that they do not pose a serious risk. It is their position that that there are now no species in Prince William Sound in trouble due to the impact of the 1989 oil spill , and that the data strongly support the position of a fully recovered Prince William Sound ecosystem . Name of the Award - NEBOSH International Technical in Oil and Gas operational Safety.

Mode of Training - Full time (9.00 A.M to 5.30 P.M) Course Fee : INR 49000 Now INR 47000 Course Duration – 7 Days Alaska Oil Spill Response and Cultural Resources Alaska Oil Spill Response and Cultural Resources Quick Links Additional Preservation Planning Resources The 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill and response activities that followed necessitated the development of emergency and long-term measures to protect cultural resources along Alaska's affected coastline. The Alaska State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) played a key role in developing and monitoring these efforts, along with other government and industry cultural resource specialists. In many ways, the response to cultural resources and quick development of an infrastructure to address the challenges were unprecedented. There were lessons learned as protocols, guidelines, and organizational structure evolved over the course of several field seasons.

One of the important accomplishments in the aftermath of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill was the development of a "National Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties During Emergency Response Under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan" and the complimentary "Alaska Implementation Guidelines for Federal On-Scene Coordinators..." Our colleagues in the Gulf of Mexico region are now struggling with many of the same cultural resource issues in the aftermath of the recent oil platform tragedy there. Chris Wooley (Chumis Cultural Resource Services), who has played a key role as an industry contractor for the EXXON VALDEZ spill response and for subsequent spill responses and spill drills, offers this advice for cultural resource professionals responding to a major multi-state oil release: “[Response] … will likely require the organization of a joint Cultural Technical Advisory Group from a number of SHPOs across the spill area. The first thing that typically is done is implement a cleanup-wide cultural resource policy… (customized to the event) that shows the unified command supports the historic properties issues… If there are cultural resource issues (sites in the spill area), get archaeologists on the SCAT (shoreline assessment) teams to document site condition prior to response if at all possible.

Keeping site confidentiality is a challenge, so using shoreline segment numbers – not site names or locations when dealing with the documentation – help protect locations. Get monitors into the cleanup. As you know, this takes coordination with all the Unified Command elements, and most importantly, good communications with the Operations element. The folks involved in laying boom, collecting oil, doing cleanup need to understand we’re not some pinhead “ologists” doing research and standing in the way of cleanup. Rather we’re there to help them work around these sensitive areas – just like a nesting site or spawning area of biological concern. That’s a message that needs to be understood early in the response.” The Alaska Office of History and Archaeology, working with other Alaska agencies and contractors, has compiled digital documents of procedures instituted and lessons learned during the Exxon Valdez spill response (see below). Annotated Guide to Posted Oil Spill Documents 1. National Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties During Emergency Response Under the National Oil and Hazardous Pollution Contingency Plan (1997). This is the national PMOA that provides guidance for cultural resources protection during oil spills. National PA (140KB) 2.

Alaska Implementation Guidelines For Federal On-Scene Coordinators For The Programmatic Agreement On Protection Of Historic Properties During Emergency Response Under The National Oil And Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. This document provides the current guidance for the protection of cultural resources duringAlaska oil spills; the appendices are also useful. AK Implementation Guidelines (184KB) 3. Bittner, Judith, Cultural Resources and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: An Overview, In Proceedings of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Symposium. American Fisheries Society , Bethesda, Maryland, 1996, pp. 814-818. A brief but accurate summary of the State/Federal response and damage assessment of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill by the State Historic Preservation Officer. (Bittner-1996.pdf) Bittner-1996 (584KB) 4. Letter from the Alaska SHPO to Exxon Inc. stating which staff members of the Office of History and Archaeology had authority to make cultural resource decisions and sign shoreline evaluations on behalf of the State of Alaska. This delegation dispersed decision-making to the lowest level of professional administration and speeded up the Section 106 compliance process.

A similar delegation of authority was practiced by the Federal responders. Exxon Oil Spill-Cultural Resources Technical Advisory Group Decision Flow chart (29KB) 10. This consists of two documents. One asks for an answer on the effects of oiling and chemical remediation on archeological remains. The second, from a scientist, replies to the questions (see Dekin (1993) and Reger et. al.(1992) for more information. Exxon Oil Spill-Effects of Oiling and Bioremediation of Cultural Resources (300KB) 11. Instructions to State employees during the spill on the collection of evidence for the litigation that was going to be brought against Exxon. The Feds had a similar effort and much of the damage assessment phase of the cultural resource studies were centered on finding evidence of damage and linking it to the actions or inaction of Exxon. This kind of documentation is required for a legal case and needs to be solid. Exxon Oil Spill: Shoreline Cleanup Segment Cultural Resources Constraints (436KB) 13. Mobley, Charles M. et. al., The 1989 Exxon Cultural Resource Program.

Exxon Company and Exxon Shipping Company, Anchorage, 1990. This is the first professional archeological report by the Exxon archeological team. It is highly professional and explains the assessment process and their findings. 1989 Exxon CR Report 14. Haggarty, James C. et. al., The 1990 Exxon Cultural Resource Program, Exxon Company and Exxon Shipping Company, Anchorage, 1991. This is the second professional report by the Exxon archeological team. This has a very indepth description of the cultural resources decision-making process during the spill and explains the roles and responsibilities of the various players in the process. It also exemplifies the level of professional reporting that should be expected of the cultural resources team of the company that is responsible for the spill. 1990 Exxon CR Report 15. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Alaska Operations Office, and the U.S. Coast Guard, Seventeenth Coast Guard District Concerning FOSC Response Boundaries for Oil Discharges and Hazardous Substance Releases. This is the PMOA that covers cultural resources and oil spill response in Alaska.

The detailed guidelines for its implementation can be found in the file named "AK_IPG_guidelines_08" above. Ke_eepa_17thmoa (381MB) 16. Reger, Douglas and Debra Corbett, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Project: Final Report: Archeological Site Stewardshiip in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Area, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation, Office History and Archaeology, Anchorage, 1999. This report is on one of the restoration efforts that followed the Exxon Valdez spill. It centers on the use of local archeological stewards to monitor sites for looting. Reger-Corbett 17. Reger, Douglas et. al., Effects of Crude Oil Contamination on Some Archaeological Sites in the Gulf of Alaska, 1991 Investigations, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation, Office History and Archaeology, Anchorage, 1992. This report examines the question of the possible contamination of radiocarbon samples at 10 different oiled sites.

As with Dekin's later study of 1993 no recognizable skewing of the dates were observed. Reger_et_al_1992 18. Review of Sorbents and Solidifiers: Review of NRT-RRT Factsheet - Birkedal, Huebner, and Linda Stromquist, "Guidance" on the Application of Oil Sorbents and Solidifiers" from the Perspective of Archeology and other Cultural Resource Types, Manuscript on file at the Alaska Region Office, National Park Service. Review of possible utility and effect of sorbents and solidifiers on cultural resources including museum objects. This guidance was in response to a new factsheet put out by the National Response Team. Oil Spill Facts - Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council Final Report, Alaska Oil Spill Commission Published February 1990 by the State of Alaska The following is a reprint of the text from pages 5-14. Graphics are not included. No one anticipated any unusual problems as the Exxon Valdez left the Alyeska Pipeline Terminal at 9:12 p.m., Alaska Standard Time, on March 23,1989.

The 987 foot ship, second newest in Exxon Shipping Company's 20-tanker fleet, was loaded with 53,094,5 10 gallons (1,264,155 barrels) of North Slope crude oil bound for Long Beach, California. Tankers carrying North Slope crude oil had safely transited Prince William Sound more than 8,700 times in the 12 years since oil began flowing through the trans-Alaska pipeline, with no major disasters and few serious incidents. This experience gave little reason to suspect impending disaster. Yet less than three hours later, the Exxon Valdez grounded at Bligh Reef, rupturing eight of its 11 cargo tanks and spewing some 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. Until the Exxon Valdez piled onto Bligh Reef, the system designed to carry 2 million barrels of North Slope oil to West Coast and Gulf Coast markets daily had worked perhaps too well. At least partly because of the success of the Valdez tanker trade, a general complacency had come to permeate the operation and oversight of the entire system.

That complacency and success were shattered when the Exxon Valdez ran hard aground shortly after midnight on March 24. No human lives were lost as a direct result of the disaster, though four deaths were associated with the cleanup effort. Indirectly, however, the human and natural losses were immense - to fisheries, subsistence livelihoods, tourism, wildlife. The most important loss for many who will never visit Prince William Sound was the aesthetic sense that something sacred in the relatively unspoiled land and waters of Alaska had been defiled. Industry's insistence on regulating the Valdez tanker trade its own way, and government's incremental accession to industry pressure, had produced a disastrous failure of the system. The people of Alaska's Southcentral coast - not to mention Exxon and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company - would come to pay a heavy price. The American people, increasingly anxious over environmental degradation and devoted to their image of Alaska's wilderness, reacted with anger. A spill that ranked 34th on a list of the world's largest oil spills in the past 25 years came to be seen as the nation's biggest environmental disaster since Three Mile Island.

The Exxon Valdez had reached the Alyeska Marine Terminal at 11:30 p.m. on March 22 to take on cargo. It carried a crew of 19 plus the captain. Third Mate Gregory Cousins, who became a central figure in the grounding, was relieved of watch duty at 11:50 p.m. Ship and terminal crews began loading crude oil onto the tanker at 5:05 a.m. on March 23 and increased loading to its full rate of 100,000 barrels an hour by 5:30 a.m. Chief Mate James R. Kunkel supervised the loading. March 23, 1989 was a rest day of sorts for some members of the Exxon Valdez crew. Capt. Joseph Hazelwood, chief engineer Jerry Glowacki and radio officer Joel Roberson left the Exxon Valdez about 11:00 a.m., driven from the Alyeska terminal into the town of Valdez by marine pilot William Murphy, who had piloted the Exxon Valdez into port the previous night and would take it back out through Valdez Narrows on its fateful trip to Bligh Reef.

When the three ship's officers left the terminal that day, they expected the Exxon Valdez's sailing time to be 10 p.m. that evening. The posted sailing time was changed, however, during the day, and when the party arrived back at the ship at 8:24 p.m., they learned the sailing time had been fixed at 9 p.m. Hazelwood spent most of the day conducting ship's business, shopping and, according to testimony before the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), drinking alcoholic beverages with the other ship's officers in at least two Valdez bars. Testimony indicated Hazelwood drank nonalcoholic beverages that day at lunch, a number of alcoholic drinks late that afternoon while relaxing in a Valdez bar, and at least one more drink at a bar while the party waited for pizza to take with them back to the ship. Loading of the Exxon Valdez had been completed for an hour by the time the group returned to the ship. They left Valdez by taxi cab at about 7:30 p.m., got through Alyeska terminal gate security at 8:24 p.m. and boarded ship.

Radio officer Roberson, who commenced pre-voyage tests and checks in the radio room soon after arriving at the ship, later said no one in the group going ashore had expected the ship to be ready to leave as soon as they returned. Both the cab driver and the gate security guard later testified that no one in the party appeared to be intoxicated. A ship's agent who met with Hazelwood after he got back on the ship said it appeared the captain may have been drinking because his eyes were watery, but she did not smell alcohol on his breath. Ship's pilot Murphy, however, later indicated that he did detect the odor of alcohol on Hazelwood's breath. Hazelwood's activities in town that day and on the ship that night would become a key focus of accident inquiries, the cause of a state criminal prosecution, and the basis of widespread media sensation. Without intending to minimize the impact of Hazelwood's actions, however, one basic conclusion of this report is that the grounding at Bligh Reef represents much more than the error of a possibly drunken skipper: It was the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety practices that had been intended, 12 years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevitable mistakes of human beings.

Third Mate Cousins performed required tests of navigational, mechanical and safety gear at 7:48 p.m., and all systems were found to be in working order. The Exxon Valdez slipped its last mooring line at 9:12 p.m. and, with the assistance of two tugboats, began maneuvering away from the berth. The tanker's deck log shows it was clear of the dock at 9:21 p.m. Dock to grounding The ship was under the direction of pilot Murphy and accompanied by a single tug for the passage through Valdez Narrows, the constricted harbor entrance about 7 miles from the berth. According to Murphy, Hazelwood left the bridge at 9:35 p.m. and did not return until about 11:10 p.m., even though Exxon company policy requires two ship's officers on the bridge during transit of Valdez Narrows. The passage through Valdez Narrows proceeded uneventfully. At 10:49 p.m. the ship reported to the Valdez Vessel Traffic Center that it had passed out of the narrows and was increasing speed. At 11:05 p.m.

Murphy asked that Hazelwood be called to the bridge in anticipation of his disembarking from the ship, and at 11: 10 p.m. Hazelwood returned. Murphy disembarked at 11:24 p.m., with assistance from Third Mate Cousins. While Cousins was helping Murphy and then helping stow the pilot ladder, Hazelwood was the only officer on the bridge and there was no lookout even though one was required, according to an NTSB report. At 11:25 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Vessel Traffic Center that the pilot had departed and that he was increasing speed to sea speed. He also reported that "judging, ah, by our radar, we'll probably divert from the TSS [traffic separation scheme] and end up in the inbound lane if there is no conflicting traffic." The traffic center indicated concurrence, stating there was no reported traffic in the inbound lane. The traffic separation scheme is designed to do just that - separate incoming and outgoing tankers in Prince William Sound and keep them in clear, deep waters during their transit. It consists of inbound and outbound lanes, with a half-mile-wide separation zone between them.

Small icebergs from nearby Columbia Glacier occasionally enter the traffic lanes. Captains had the choice of slowing down to push through them safely or deviating from their lanes if traffic permitted. Hazelwood's report, and the Valdez traffic center's concurrence, meant the ship would change course to leave the western, outbound lane, cross the separation zone and, if necessary, enter the eastern, inbound lane to avoid floating ice. At no time did the Exxon Valdez report or seek permission to depart farther east from the inbound traffic lane; but that is exactly what it did. At 11:30 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Valdez traffic center that he was turning the ship toward the east on a heading of 200 degrees and reducing speed to "wind my way through the ice" (engine logs, however, show the vessel's speed continued to increase). At 11: 39 Cousins plotted a fix that showed the ship in the middle of the traffic separation scheme. Hazelwood ordered a further course change to a heading of 180 degrees (due south) and, according to the helmsman, directed that the ship be placed on autopilot.

The second course change was not reported to the Valdez traffic center. For a total of 19 or 20 minutes the ship sailed south - through the inbound traffic lane, then across its easterly boundary and on toward its peril at Bligh Reef. Traveling at approximately 12 knots, the Exxon Valdez crossed the traffic lanes' easterly boundary at 11:47 p.m. At 11:52 p.m. the command was given to place the ship's engine on "load program up"-a computer program that, over a span of 43 minutes, would increase engine speed from 55 RPM to sea speed full ahead at 78.7 RPM. After conferring with Cousins about where and how to return the ship to its designated traffic lane, Hazelwood left the bridge. The time, according to NTSB testimony, was approximately 11:53 p.m. By this time Third Mate Cousins had been on duty for six hours and was scheduled to be relieved by Second Mate Lloyd LeCain. But Cousins, knowing LeCain had worked long hours during loading operations during the day, had told the second mate he could take his time in relieving him.

Cousins did not call LeCain to awaken him for the midnight-to-4-a.m. watch, instead remaining on duty himself Cousins was the only officer on the bridge - a situation that violated company policy and perhaps contributed to the accident. A second officer on the bridge might have been more alert to the danger in the ship's position, the failure of its efforts to turn, the autopilot steering status, and the threat of ice in the tanker lane. Cousins' duty hours and rest periods became an issue in subsequent investigations. Exxon Shipping Company has said the third mate slept between I a.m. and 7:20 a.m. the morning of March 23 and again between 1: 30 p.m. and 5 p.m., for a total of nearly 10 hours sleep in the 24 hours preceding the accident. But testimony before the NTSB suggests that Cousins "pounded the deck" that afternoon, that he did paperwork in his cabin, and that he ate dinner starting at 4:30 p.m. before relieving the chief mate at 5 p.m.

An NTSB report shows that Cousins' customary in-port watches were scheduled from 5:50 a.m. to 11:50 a.m. and again from 5:50 p.m. to 11:50 p.m. Testimony before the NTSB suggests that Cousins may have been awake and generally at work for up to 18 hours preceding the accident. Appendix F of this report documents a direct link between fatigue and human performance error generally and notes that 80 percent or more of marine accidents are attributable to human error. Appendix F also discusses the impact of environmental factors such as long work hours, poor work conditions (such as toxic fumes), monotony and sleep deprivation. "This can create a scenario where a pilot and/or crew members may become the "accident waiting to happen." ... It is conceivable," the report continues, "that excessive work hours (sleep deprivation) contributed to an overall impact of fatigue, which in turn contributed to the Exxon Valdez grounding." Manning policies also may have affected crew fatigue.

Whereas tankers in the 1950s carried a crew of 40 to 42 to manage about 6.3 million gallons of oil, according to Arthur McKenzie of the Tanker Advisory Center in New York, the Exxon Valdez carried a crew of 19 to transport 53 million gallons of oil. Minimum vessel manning limits are set by the U.S. Coast Guard, but without any agencywide standard for policy. The Coast Guard has certified Exxon tankers for a minimum of 15 persons (14 if the radio officer is not required). Frank Iarossi, president of Exxon Shipping Company, has stated that his company's policy is to reduce its standard crew complement to 16 on fully automated, diesel-powered vessels by 1990. "While Exxon has defended their actions as an economic decision," the manning report says, "criticism has been leveled against them for manipulating overtime records to better justify reduced manning levels." Iarossi and Exxon maintain that modem automated vessel technology permits reduced manning without compromise of safety or function.

"Yet the literature on the subject suggests that automation does not replace humans in systems, rather, it places the human in a different, more demanding role. Automation typically reduces manual workload but increases mental workload." (Appendix F) Whatever the NTSB or the courts may finally determine concerning Cousins' work hours that day, manning limits and crew fatigue have received considerable attention as contributing factors to the accident. The Alaska Oil Spill Commission recommends that crew levels be set high enough not only to permit safe operations during ordinary conditions - which, in the Gulf of Alaska, can be highly demanding - but also to provide enough crew backups and rest periods that crisis situations can be confronted by a fresh, well-supported crew. Accounts and interpretations differ as to events on the bridge from the time Hazelwood left his post to the moment the Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef. NTSB testimony by crew members and interpretations of evidence by the State of Alaska conflict in key areas, leaving the precise timing of events still a mystery. But the rough outlines are discernible: Some time during the critical period before the grounding during the first few minutes of Good Friday, March 24, Cousins plotted a fix indicating it was time to turn the vessel back toward the traffic lanes.

About the same time, lookout Maureen Jones reported that Bligh Reef light appeared broad off the starboard bow - i.e., off the bow at an angle of about 45 degrees. The light should have been seen off the port side (the left side of a ship, facing forward); its position off the starboard side indicated great peril for a supertanker that was out of its lanes and accelerating through close waters. Cousins gave right rudder commands to cause the desired course change and took the ship off autopilot. He also phoned Hazelwood in his cabin to inform him the ship was turning back toward the traffic lanes and that, in the process, it would be getting into ice. When the vessel did not turn swiftly enough, Cousins ordered further right rudder with increasing urgency. Finally, realizing the ship was in serious trouble, Cousins phoned Hazelwood again to report the danger - and at the end of the conversation, felt an initial shock to the vessel. The grounding, described by helmsman Robert Kagan as "a bumpy ride" and by Cousins as six "very sharp jolts," occurred at 12:04 a.m.

On the rocks The vessel came to rest facing roughly southwest, perched across its middle on a pinnacle of Bligh Reef. Eight of 11 cargo tanks were punctured. Computations aboard the Exxon Valdez showed that 5.8 million gallons had gushed out of the tanker in the first three and a quarter hours. Weather conditions at the site were, reported to be 33 degrees F, slight drizzle rain/snow mixed, north winds at 10 knots and visibility 10 miles at the time of the grounding. The Exxon Valdez nightmare had begun. Hazelwood - perhaps drunk, certainly facing a position of great difficulty and confusion - would struggle vainly to power the ship off its perch on Bligh Reef. The response capabilities of Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to deal with the spreading sea of oil would be tested and found to be both unexpectedly slow and woefully inadequate. The worldwide capabilities of Exxon Corp. would mobilize huge quantities of equipment and personnel to respond to the spill - but not in the crucial first few hours and days when containment and cleanup efforts are at a premium. The U.S.

Coast Guard would demonstrate its prowess at ship salvage, protecting crews and lightering operations, but prove utterly incapable of oil spill containment and response. State and federal agencies would show differing levels of preparedness and command capability. And the waters of Prince William Sound - and eventually more than 1,000 miles of beach in Southcentral Alaska - would be fouled by 10.8 million gallons of crude oil. After feeling the grounding Hazelwood rushed to the bridge, arriving as the ship came to rest. He immediately gave a series of rudder orders in an attempt to free the vessel, and power to the ship's engine remained in the "load program up" condition for about 15 minutes after impact. Chief Mate Kunkel went to the engine control room and determined that eight cargo tanks and two ballast tanks had been ruptured; he concluded the cargo tanks had lost an average of 10 feet of cargo, with approximately 67 feet of cargo remaining in each. He informed Hazelwood of his initial damage assessment and was instructed to perform stability and stress analysis. At 12:19 a.m. Hazelwood ordered that the vessel's engine be reduced to idle speed.

At 12:26 a.m., Hazelwood radioed the Valdez traffic center and reported his predicament to Bruce Blandford, a civilian employee of the Coast Guard who was on duty. "We've fetched up, ah, hard aground, north of Goose Island, off Bligh Reef and, ah, evidently leaking some oil and we're gonna be here for a while and, ah, if you want, ah, so you're notified." That report triggered a nightlong cascade of phone calls reaching from Valdez to Anchorage to Houston and eventually around the world as the magnitude of the spill became known and Alyeska and Exxon searched for cleanup machinery and materials. Hazelwood, meanwhile, was not finished with efforts to power the Exxon Valdez off the reef. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Chief Mate Kunkel used a computer program to determine that though stress on the vessel exceeded acceptable limits, the ship still had required stability. He went to the bridge to advise Hazelwood that the vessel should not go to sea or leave the area. The skipper directed him to return to the control room to continue assessing the damage and to determine available options.

At 12:35 p.m., Hazelwood ordered the engine back on - and eventually to "full ahead" -- and began another series of rudder commands in an effort to free the vessel. After running his computer program again another way, Kunkel concluded that the ship did not have acceptable stability without being supported by the reef. The chief mate relayed his new analysis to the captain at 1 a.m. and again recommended that the ship not leave the area. Nonetheless, Hazelwood kept the engine running until 1:41 a.m., when he finally abandoned efforts to get the vessel off the reef. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council | dfg.evos.restoration@alaska.gov | Postal Address: 4210 University Drive Anchorage, AK 99508-4626 | Physical Address: Grace Hall, 4230 University Drive, Ste.

220 | Anchorage, AK 99508-4650 | Phone: (907) 278-8012 | Fax: (907) 276-7178 | Toll-Free: (800) 478-7745 | Office Hours: Mon through Fri, 8am-4:30pm ARLIS | Alaska Resources Library & Information Services | reference@arlis.org | UAA Library Building | Phone: (907) 272-7547 Restoring the resources injured by the Exxon Valdez oil spill and understanding environmental change in the Northern Gulf of Alaska. The Valdez oil spill | ExxonMobil Spill prevention and response The Valdez oil spill Shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, in a tragic accident deeply regretted by the company, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Despite the efforts undertaken to stabilize the vessel and prevent further spillage of oil, more than 250,000 barrels of oil were lost in just a short period of time.

Exxon and the U.S. Coast Guard began a massive cleanup effort that eventually involved more than 11,000 Alaskan residents and thousands of Exxon and contractor personnel. In 1992 the U.S. Coast Guard declared the clean up complete. The 1989 Valdez accident was one of the lowest points in ExxonMobil's 125-year history. However, we took immediate responsibility for the spill and have spent over $4.3 billion as a result of the accident, including compensatory payments, cleanup payments, settlements and fines. The company voluntarily compensated more than 11,000 Alaskans and businesses within a year of the spill. In the aftermath of the accident, we also undertook significant operational reforms and implemented an exceptionally thorough operational management system to prevent future incidents. This system has been deployed globally and in the years since the accident, we have had nothing similar occur. We believe our subsequent record of safety stems primarily from disciplined and systematic improvements that we have made. We are particularly proud of the spill prevention performance of our global marine transportation affiliates since the Valdez spill.

In fact in 2008, there were no spills from ExxonMobil marine affiliate owned/operated tank ships or from those on long-term lease. We consider this strong performance encouraging and it serves as a solid platform for continuous improvement efforts. The ecosystem in Prince William Sound today is healthy, robust and thriving. While there were severe short term impacts on many species due to the spilled oil, and they suffered damages, based on the studies of many scientists who have worked extensively in Prince William Sound, there has been no long term damage caused by the spilled oil. This level of recovery conforms to the well established record of recovery documented by the scientific community following many other oil spills around the world, many of them much larger than the one that took place in 1989. ExxonMobil has contracted independent scientists with impeccable credentials who are among the world's leading experts in their fields. They have studied in-depth all pertinent aspects related to the effect of the Valdez oil spill on the Sound's water, shoreline and wildlife. To date these scientists have published approximately 400 peer-reviewed papers relating to all aspects of the Prince William Sound environment.

Changes ExxonMobil has made to prevent another accident like Valdez In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez accident, ExxonMobil redoubled its long-time commitment to safeguard the environment, employees and operating communities worldwide. To improve oil-spill prevention, ExxonMobil has, for example: Modified tanker routes Instituted drug and alcohol testing programs for safety sensitive positions Restricted safety-sensitive positions to employees with no history of substance abuse Implemented more extensive periodic assessment of ExxonMobil vessels and facilities Strengthened training programs for vessel captains and pilots and Applied new technology to improve vessel navigation and ensure the integrity of oil containment systems In the event a spill occurs, we also have improved our response capability. For example: ExxonMobil is a founding member of every major oil spill response center worldwide There are over 1,000 ExxonMobil employees involved in oil spill response teams worldwide We hold frequent, extensive oil spill drills at various ExxonMobil locations around the world and We have developed and applied new spill-detecting technology. ExxonMobil Environmental Performance ExxonMobil is committed to maintaining its leadership presence as a longstanding, technically proficient, industry-leader in safety and environmental stewardship.

Our comprehensive and disciplined approach helps us maintain an unwavering focus on incident prevention, preparedness and emergency response, should the need arise. We are particularly proud of the spill prevention performance of our global marine transportation affiliates. Given the projected growth and important role that marine transportation plays in global commerce, ExxonMobil’s marine affiliates continue to voluntarily find and support innovative ways that often exceed regulatory standards to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of marine transportation. ExxonMobil marine affiliates are active participants in the development of key voluntary industry quality initiatives including the implementation of the Tanker Management and Self Assessment program, a best practice guide for ship operators that complements existing quality standards, and expanding the Ship Inspection Report Exchange (SIRE) beyond tank ships to now include tank barges. The SIRE program promotes a uniformly high standard of common inspections that may be used within vessel screening and inspection processes for member companies. You may also be interested in: Risk management and emergency preparedness 20 years on from Exxon Valdez: what progress for corporate responsibility? | Ethical Corporation 20 years on from Exxon Valdez: what progress for corporate responsibility?

By Adrien Lopez on Mar 27, 2009 The Exxon Valdez tragedy of 24 March, 1989, marked the first birth-pangs of corporate responsibility. Adrien Lopez reflects on why many in Alaska still cannot believe in ethical business. While the Exxon Valdez oil spill 20 years ago can be largely attributed to triggering the modern corporate social responsibility movement, commercial fishermen in Alaska affected by the 11 million gallons of oil spilled into Prince William Sound are yet to be made believers. The massive oil spill on Good Friday, March 24, 1989 was America’s worst environmental disaster. It was caused when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker – owned by the former Exxon Shipping Company, a division of what is now Exxon Mobil – struck Bligh Reef in the early hours of the morning. The outrage caused organisations and citizens the world over to move quickly to create the Valdez Principles, a voluntary code of environmental conduct for companies. The Valdez Principles formed the basis for the founding of Ceres (Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies), established in 1990 to work with companies and investors to address sustainability challenges.

A few years later, the Amsterdam-based Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a household name for those working in corporate social responsibility, split away from Ceres to focus exclusively on the task of promoting transparency through increased corporate reporting on social and environmental performance. The Exxon Valdez (which coincidentally was the name of the tanker and the town where it ran aground), along with other events like the Union Carbide explosion in India in 1984, caused enough reactionary momentum to consolidate a corporate social responsibility movement, made up of organisations like CERES and GRI, that has tried to keep pace with the challenges of globalization. Bitter taste Meanwhile, a world away in southcentral Alaska, a place where you cannot see Russia from your house, and where fancy acronyms like CSR and GRI haven’t yet been translated to English, the only household name that ignites and unites is Exxon. The destruction caused to communities, people, the environment and the livelihood of thousands of Alaskans and future generations, was not an exercise in corporate social responsibility, to say the least.

Neither was the ongoing court battle between the Exxon defendants and the local commercial fishermen, a fight that dragged on until last year when the Supreme Court stepped in to defend the struggling company from being liable for the full amount. The 33,000 plaintiffs waited almost 20 years to receive a settlement they had hoped might come close to equaling their losses. Unfortunately, they had to face the harsh reality that the promising words expressed to them by former Exxon president Dan Cornett back in 1989 – “You won’t have a problem. I don’t care if you believe that or not. That’s the truth. You have had some good luck and you don’t realize it. You have Exxon and we do business straight. We will consider whatever it takes to keep you whole...” – was just another broken promise. Opinions of Governor Sarah Palin aside, she has helped to defend the fishermen and sided with Alaskans demanding accountability from Exxon. Some progress Reflections on this twenty year anniversary are bittersweet. On one hand, we must raise our glasses to applaud the tireless efforts of international organisations who have pushed so that now, in the year 2009, corporate responsibility has been on the lips of most large companies.

It has branched out to focus on more than just the private sector, but the integration of socially responsible practices by the public sector, labour unions, consumers and civil society organizations through the development of the first International Standard on Social Responsibility, ISO 26000. Yet, on the other hand, celebration is not in order when large companies like ExxonMobil have yet to see the light and be accountable for their past corporate irresponsibility. At a moment when most businesses are struggling to stay afloat, Exxon made history in February by posting the highest quarterly profits ever for a US company. By the time Exxon gets around to rejecting Milton Friedman and getting on board with corporate responsibility, Alaskans will be left clinging to a melting iceberg. Adrien Lopez was born and raised in Valdez, Alaska (her father was the harbourmaster at the time of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill). She currently works on corporate social responsibility for the Chilean Government in Santiago, Chile. Clean up crews blast oiled rocks after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound. US Coast Guard We will never know the full extent of the changes to Prince William Sound, but we do know that a similar tragedy could unfold in Arctic waters today.

Editor's note: Nicole Whittington-Evans is The Wilderness Society's Alaska Director. In this blog she reflects on the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound and the lessons to be learned for Alaska's Arctic waters today. Three decades ago, humpback whales breeched offshore and salmon leapt from the waters of Alaska's Prince William Sound on a perfect summer evening. It was the first night of my incredible introduction to Alaska: a month-long kayak trip in a pristine place that would soon be changed forever by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The sea otters, seals, killer whales we saw on that trip were as wonderful as the friendly fishermen who offered us all the crab and halibut we could eat. I had never before experienced anything like the beauty and resources of Prince William Sound. Then, 25 years ago, came the fateful morning of March 24, 1989, when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck Bligh Reef and spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil, fouling approximately 1,300 miles of coastline. Hundreds of thousands of birds and marine mammals were affected, and the environmental damage was devastating. Photo: The Exxon Valdez in its oil slick.

We have only estimates for the total number of animals affected or killed, because most carcasses sunk when oiled, making them impossible to count. We will never know the full extent of the changes to Prince William Sound because, for so many aspects of the area’s ecology, there was no baseline information. Twenty-five years after the spill, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council -- which was established to oversee restoration of the ecosystem using $900 million from a civil settlement – reports that of the injured wildlife species it has been working to restore, nine species are considered “recovered” (including sockeye salmon and harbor seals); seven species are “recovering” (including killer whales and black oystercatchers); and two are not recovering ( Pacific herring and pigeon guillemots ). Photo: Scientists examine the carcass of a gray whale before performing a necropsy to determine if it was killed by the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Alaska, USA, 1989 "We have only estimates for the total number of animals affected or killed, because most carcasses sunk when oiled, making them impossible to count." The spill also affected commercial fishing, as well as recreational and subsistence uses of the Sound, and resulted in huge economic losses. The commercial herring fishery still hasn’t recovered. There’s no assurance that it ever will. To this day, oil can still be found on some beaches. Will history repeat itself? Photo: An oiled bald eagle waits to be taken to a wildlife rescue center in Valdez, Alaska, after the oil spill. A similar disaster could unfold in the Arctic Ocean if oil companies are allowed to explore and develop energy reserves in this harsh, remote and little-understood region. Industry has no proven technology for recovering significant amounts of oil from water, much less from rough, icy seas, and a late-season well blowout could leave oil spewing for months under the Arctic ice cap. In the Arctic Ocean, where ice dominates for most of the year, energy companies are not equipped to safely drill for oil and gas, onshore infrastructure is lacking, and the government has not developed regulations to effectively guide oil and gas operations.

Shell’s series of errors when it attempted to drill in the Arctic Ocean during 2012 demonstrated that oil companies are not prepared for Arctic conditions. "Let us hope we learn from the past and protect the Arctic Ocean so that we never have to mark the 25th anniversary of another disastrous Alaska oil spill." Offshore drilling in America’s Arctic poses severe threats to species such as polar bears, fish, walruses and bowhead whales, as well as to Alaska Native communities that depend on the Arctic Ocean as a source of food. The collapse of an important subsistence species could threaten the cultural survival of local communities. The Exxon Valdez oil spill was a catastrophe for Prince William Sound and the communities on its shores. Twenty-five years later, the Sound is still recovering, and the lessons are still unfolding. Let us hope we learn from the past and protect the Arctic Ocean so that we never have to mark the 25th anniversary of another disastrous Alaska oil spill. Photos: A look back at the Exxon Valdez oil spill Workers spray hot water on oil covered rocks in Northwest Bay after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Prince William Sound, Alaska, USA, 1989 A biologist carries a dead oiled bald eagle collected in Katmai after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Alaska, USA, 1989 High tide mark shows oil on rocky shore spilled by Exxon Valdez oil spill, Prince William Sound, Alaska A bear walks on an oiled Katmai beach in Alaska after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Oil leaches off an island beach weeks after the Exxon Valdez lost its oil. Alaska, USA, 1989 A bird carcass on the beach of the Alaska peninsula more than 500 miles away from the site of the Exxon Valdez spill. Tired oil clean-up workers after a long day of clean up. A red fox explores territory spattered with oil. The supertanker Exxon Valdez lies hard around Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, USA. 1992 An oily patch near seaweed on Prince William Sound. Workers spray hot water on oil-covered beaches in Prince William Sound, Alaska.

Exxon Valdez oil spill, USA, 1989 Researchers catch sea otters in Short Arm Bay in the Bay of Isles on Knight Island, the epicenter of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The data is used to estimate the impact of the oil spill on the sea otter population. See also: Spill prevention and response | ExxonMobil Spill prevention and response Shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, in a tragic accident deeply regretted by the company, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Also in Risk management and emergency preparedness Tropical weather preparedness Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Class Action - International Wildlife Law Contact Us Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Class Action In March of 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground on the Bligh Reef in the pristine waters of Prince William Sound. As the hull was breached, the resulting flood of diesel, oil and industrial chemicals unleashed an environmental disaster unlike anything ever seen in the United States. Until the BP Disaster of 2010, the Exxon Valdez spill was considered to be the worst environmental disaster in the history of the United States.

The resulting damage of the spill led to an historic legal battle between the people who were affected by the tragedy and those who were responsible for it. As the operator of the tanker, Exxon Mobile was held responsible for the spill and all of the consequences that arose from it. Of course, the company came forward to offer financial backing for the clean up, but those who were most impacted by the disaster felt that it was not enough. Due to immense public outcry demanding more from the company, a class-action lawsuit against Exxon was launched. The lawsuit centered around the far-reaching impacts that the spill had on the livelihoods of the people that lived in the area. The environmental impact was itself catastrophic, but there was much more damaged than pristine shorelines. Over 32,000 fishermen saw their income plummet as a result of the disaster. Alaskan fisheries were among the hardest hit of all the industries in Alaska, and the impact of the spill is still felt today in some communities. Native communities in Alaska were also gravely affected by the spill. In Alaska, many communities are largely cut off from the outside world. In these communities, people still regularly meet the majority of their dietary needs through hunting, fishing and foraging.

The spill decimated traditional seaweed harvest, clamming and fishing zones that are vital to the natives of the area. The native corporations overseeing the various affected boroughs took it upon themselves to join the lawsuit. In 1994, a federal jury returned a verdict on the first class-action suit that ordered Exxon Mobile to pay $5 billion in punitive damages. This was on top of what the company was already paying in restitution, fines and cleanup fees. The legal battle didn't end there, and in 2001 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the $5 billion verdict was too excessive. In 2002, the punitive damage award was reinstated at $4 billion by Judge H. Russell Holland. In his statement, Holland stated that Exxon had knowingly place a relapsed alcoholic at the helm of the tanker, which resulted in severe liability on the part of the company. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once again stated that the award was too punitive. Judge Holland was directed to re-evaluate the amount of the award. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set its own ruling and placed the damages at $2.5 billion.

This seemingly final victory for those affected by the disaster was short-lived, as the Supreme Court weighed in on the case and found the damages to be still too severe. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the damages should be no more than $507.5 million. In the end, after all of the legal posturing and after years of litigation, Exxon Mobile has found itself with a $1.515 billion bill resulting from the spill. The majority of the money paid has been set aside for use in environmental remediation to help support fisheries. Some of the money has been used as a stimulus to those most affected by the spill itself and its aftermath. The results of the Exxon Valdez oil spill class-action lawsuit extend far beyond money. As a result of the lawsuit, legislators were forced to look at how oil was transported through Prince William Sound. From this "closer look" sprang the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This act mandates that any oil tanker which has previously spilled up to or more than 1 million US gallons of oil into a marine environment be barred from entry into the sound. The suit also led to a major push for phasing-in the double-hull design.

The Coast Guard believes this design could have lessened the impact of the spill by more than half.

Question: Which company was responsible for the oil spill in Alaska in 1989?
Answer: Exxon