1/4: Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia - YouTube 1/4: Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading... Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on May 25, 2012 The Winter War was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet offensive on 30 November 1939 and ended on 13 March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty. This was Finland's first war during WW2, followed by: The Continuation War (against the USSR, 25 June 1941 -- 19 September 1944) and The Lapland War (against Nazi Germany, from September 1944 to April 1945).

Category The Winter War | English Russia The Winter War Posted on December 3, 2009 by team Today we have one more documental article for you. In this article you will find out some details and information about not so limelighted, but still, about the war that was stuck down into the record of our history quite tight. Russian-Finnish War 1939-1940 or as it called otherwise – the Winter War. Across the network: loading... The war was a military conflict between Russia and Finland and began with offensive actions of the Soviet Union on November 30, 1939. The USSR had three times soldiers and aircrafts more than Finnish army, and moreover, it had numerous times tanks more. Those times the Red Army had a reduced morale and fighting spirit after the drastic purge in 1937 and had lots of inexperienced soldiers and officers. Because of that, Finnish army could resist the onrush of the Reds much longer than Soviet authorities had predicted. On 13-th of March, 1940, after 3 months of warfare the war was over with the victory of the USSR and Moscow treaty of peace was signed.

By the stipulations of the treaty: The USSR was given Karelian Isthmus with cities of Vyborg and Sortavala located on it. Also several islands in the Gulf of Finland, a part of Finnish territory with Kuolajärvi city in it and a part of peninsulas Rybachi and Sredny. The USSR got Khanko peninsula for lease for 30 years to build a military base there. Advertisement 76 Responses to “The Winter War” OLUT December 3, 2009 at 7:26 pm May be ctalin was cruel dictator,but soviet had no choice at that time.Lenin was no more,trotsky first flew to us and then from the world and Beria was “inexperienced” at that time.so ctalin was the rightist choice for the people,by the people and to the people! !.i personally i thankful to stalin for his “personal” contribution to the liberation of occupied Baltic states. December 4, 2009 at 8:21 pm Yes he liberated approx 20 million peoples, straight to heaven!! Not really funny.

He was so feared that even when dead, nobody dared enter his bedroom, he might not be dead!! And get angry and sent them to Gulag!! December 3, 2009 at 7:17 pm English Russia is a wonderful website, but what in the world is wrong with the horrific english here? What the hell. Learn basic grammar. And I’m not some snobby british person either, I am a native Moscovite. I mean, St.Petersburgsian. December 4, 2009 at 2:13 pm Because most of the comments here are from russians. Everybody knows that the level in english is very high in Russia…English and russians are so different languages, it must be very hard to learn for russian people. Also, i a m not expert too. Some of us like to “scratch” english…and we don’t feel sorry for our bad english. real CZenda and not the impostor says: Can somebody pls provide a direct link to these pictures? I am finding the search engine on the Life magazine page clumsy. Interesting accounts of the Winter War as seen from the Finnish side are included in Curzio Malaparte´s Kaputt.

December 3, 2009 at 8:28 pm Your stinking USSR didn’t win the Winter war. The brave Finns in a couple of months managed to practically fill with red army corps the lands the soviets had so treacherously occupied. Read some books preferably not russian ones which are as usual full of lies. December 3, 2009 at 8:37 pm So if you die for your country you are hero ? Are you for real ? Most soldiers were just fighting for themselves, in order not to get shot in the back by the communist Kommisars, that were pushing them forward, poor people turned into cannon fodder. Wars are politics, and politicians need cannon fodder to play their games. ‘Hero’ is empty term in fact. Victims is right term! Look the drag Hag Troll is pi55ed off! ahaaa haa ha! “Years after the incident the leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev wrote that the Mainila shellings were set up by Marshal of Artillery Grigory Kulik.

In 1994, the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, denounced the Winter War, agreeing that it was a war of aggression.” December 4, 2009 at 4:40 pm “Your stinking USSR didn’t win the Winter war. The brave Finns in a couple of months managed to practically fill with red army corps the lands the soviets had so treacherously occupied. Read some books preferably not russian ones which are as usual full of lies.” Lawdy dam nice trolling there bro. All had to do with TACTICS. And quite frankly our Army was collapsing when the peace was made, and the hard winter of 1939-1940 was the main, and probably the sole, reason we held out against the Soviets for that much time. Cause let’s face it, our Army sucked back then in 1939, and had the Soviets refused to sign the peace in the spring, we would’ve been made to surrender to a puppet. But RIP the veterans and the soldiers who died for their countries. Yes he did, but how…He punished millions of russians and others to gulag to construct all these factories, powerplants, waterways etc.

very skillful man i have to say I could do anything too with 10-15 million slaves also today Nice article and cool pictures. Only one thing I would like changed, USSR didn’ win nor did the Finns. Granted that USSR did get areas from the Finns but with what price? December 5, 2009 at 11:23 am When Himmler asked General Mannerheim, how Finland is going to solve it’s Jewish problem, Mannerheim’s reply was “we don’t have any Jewish problem”. So Mr “Hah” could perhaps check his knowledge of history from neutral sources. Soviet ones are not the most reliable in this world. December 8, 2009 at 12:29 pm Yes, you are completely wrong. This war was the direct result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, where Finland became a part of the Soviet sphere of influence. This agreement led to the Soviet attack in Finland, Germany didn’t interfere. Finland became a German ally after the German attack on the Soviet Union. THis is reffered to as the Continuation war, where Finland tried to get back the territory they lost previously.

Finnish jews were not “sent to Hitler”, they were not touched at all and fought in the Finnish army, just like all the other Fins. Several hundred jewish refugees found their way to Finland, eight (correct, that is 8) were delivered in teh hands of tne nazi’s. Next time first have a look at the facts, before spouting your ignorant nonsense. December 5, 2009 at 6:54 am Stalin did the USSR superpower. But it killed a lots of people during WWII indirectly. He wiped out military oficers, who could help to win war with less casualities, killed many engineers who could build better planes (actualy soviet aviation had some project ongoing, before war, but all was broken). Lucky for hitler guys were late few months because Italy fail in Balkans. Furthermore they forget to pack up winter gear.

337 000–346 500 soldiers 32 Tanks 25 904 Died or disappeared 43 557 wunded 126 875 Died or disappeared 264 908 Wunded December 6, 2009 at 9:20 am Russian started the war, just like they also invaded other countries. Finland managed to defend themselves, lucky for them. If there’s anything that history teaches us is that Russia is the invader, Russia starts wars, Russia is aggressive, Russia causes biggest problems, Russia fakes history and Russia has no decency to admit that they simply try to hurt everyone else. If there’s anything you could ever want is to be born far away from Russia. The further, the better for you. December 6, 2009 at 10:48 am Russian women are prettier than Finnish women. Maybe they should try a different type of army to conquer Baltics? then when they are all married they can nag Finnish men to death and arrange for the in-laws to visit every other day and hey presto Finland becomes de facto Russia. Is this crazy idea?

December 8, 2009 at 12:33 pm Heh. Thats actually situation today in eastern parts of Finland Yep, nagging and lot of it… But still russian girls are the best in the world!! (at least the one I got) Additional comment to “hah”: not true. Jevish people fighted alonside other finns. Not a single finnish citizen were sent to Hitler death camps. December 8, 2009 at 2:00 am Sisu!!! My long dead relatives kicked your long dead relatives arses, even if we “lost the war”. I believe it was a Soviet general(?) who said that the USSR won just enough land to bury all of her dead? Stalin was paranoid that Finland would allow the Germans in. Finland stood proud and was not reduced to the tyranny of the iron curtain nor of fascist German rule either. Stalin was also a fool to have sent unprepared and conscripted troops from the far side of his empire to a climate colder than any they could have imagined.

December 8, 2009 at 12:38 pm I visited Terijoki – which is now called Zelenogorsk – near St Petersburg several times. It was on that part of the territory that the Soviet Union conquered. The Soviet Union tried to wipe out every referral to it’s Finnish past. They even destroyed the Finnish graveyards and used the remnants to build roads. Nowadays, local restaurants hang out the Finnish flag to attract Finnish tourists… Viewing the terrain, it must have been a hell of a fight. The region has very dense woods, and everywhere you still see little fortified bunkers. December 10, 2009 at 7:48 am The Shelling of Mainila (Finnish: Mainilan laukaukset) was a military incident on November 26, 1939, where the Soviet Union’s Red Army shelled the Russian village of Mainila (located near Beloostrov), declared that the fire originated from Finland across a nearby border, and claimed losses in personnel. The Soviet Union gained a great propaganda boost and a casus belli for launching the Winter War four days later.

Seven shots were fired, and their fall was detected by three Finnish observation posts. These witnesses estimated that the shells detonated approximately 800 meters inside Soviet territory.Finland proposed a neutral investigation of the incident, but the Soviet Union refused and broke diplomatic relations with Finland on November 29. Materials in the private archives of Soviet party leader Andrei Zhdanov heavily hint that the entire incident was orchestrated in order to paint Finland as an aggressor and launch an offensive. Some Russian historians have expressed doubts of the document’s authenticity. The Finnish side denied responsibility for the attacks and identified Soviet artillery as their source — indeed, the war diaries of nearby Finnish artillery batteries show that Mainila was out of range of all of them, as they had been withdrawn previously to prevent such incidents. In the days following the shelling, the Soviet propaganda machine generated much noise about other fictitious acts of Finnish aggression. The Soviet Union then renounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and on November 30, 1939 launched the first offensives of the Winter War. Winter war it’s was very hard war, because many russian soldier died of cold.

Finns invented the use molotov cocktail , because they had a shortage of weapons. 1000+ images about Winter War on Pinterest | The winter, Mother sayings and Bread baskets Pinterest • The world’s catalog of ideas Winter War The war between Russia and Finland, generally referred to as the Winter War, lasted from November 30th1939 to March 13th, 1940. The Winter War was a direct result of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of August 1939. The public face of this treaty was a ten-year period of non-aggression between Nazi Germanyand Stalin’s Russia. 48 Pins357 Followers [This excerpt from For a New Liberty was first printed in the Libertarian Review, 1978. An MP3 audio file of this article, read by Jeff Riggenbach, is available for download .] Since World War II, American military and foreign policy, at least rhetorically, has been based upon the assumption of a looming threat of Russian attack — an assumption that has managed to gain public approval for global American intervention and for scores of billions in military expenditures. But how realistic, how well grounded, is this assumption?

First, there is no doubt that the Soviets, along with all other Marxist-Leninists, would like to replace all existing social systems by Communist regimes. But such a sentiment, of course, scarcely implies any sort of realistic threat of attack — just as an ill wish in private life can hardly be grounds for realistic expectation of imminent aggression. On the contrary, Marxism-Leninism itself believes that victory of Communism is inevitable — not on the wings of outside force, but rather from accumulating tensions and "contradictions" within each society. So that Marxism-Leninism considers internal revolution (or, in the current "Eurocommunist" version, democratic change) for installing Communism to be inevitable. At the same time, it holds any coercive external imposition of Communism to be at best suspect, and at worst disruptive and counterproductive of genuine organic social change. Any idea of "exporting" Communism to other countries on the back of the Soviet military is totally contradictory to Marxist-Leninist theory. We are not saying, of course, that Soviet leaders will never do anything contrary to Marxist- Leninist theory.

But to the extent that they act as ordinary rulers of a strong Russian nation-state, the case for an imminent Soviet threat to the United States is gravely weakened. For the sole alleged basis of such a threat, as conjured up by our Cold Warriors, is the Soviet Union's alleged devotion to Marxist-Leninist theory and to its ultimate goal of world Communist triumph. If the Soviet rulers were simply to act as Russian dictators consulting only their own nation-state interests, then the entire basis for treating the Soviets as a uniquely diabolic source of imminent military assault crumbles to the ground. When the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917, they had given little thought to a future Soviet foreign policy, for they were convinced that Communist revolution would soon follow in the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe. When such hopes were dashed after the end of World War I, Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks adopted the theory of "peaceful coexistence" as the basic foreign policy for a Communist state. The idea was this: As the first successful Communist movement, Soviet Russia would serve as a beacon light and supporter of other Communist parties throughout the world.

But the Soviet state qua state would devote itself to peaceful relations with all other countries, and would not attempt to export Communism through interstate warfare. The idea here was not just to follow Marxist-Leninist theory, but also the highly practical course of holding the survival of the existing Communist state as the foremost goal of foreign policy: that is, never to endanger the Soviet State by courting interstate warfare. Other countries would be expected to become Communist by their own internal processes. Thus, fortuitously, from a mixture of theoretical and practical grounds of their own, the Soviets arrived early at what libertarians consider to be the only proper and principled foreign policy. As time went on, furthermore, this policy was reinforced by a "conservatism" that comes upon all movements after they have acquired and retained power for a length of time, in which the interests of keeping power over one's nation-state begins to take more and more precedence over the initial ideal of world revolution. This increasing conservatism under Stalin and his successors strengthened and reinforced the nonaggressive, "peaceful-coexistence" policy.

The Bolsheviks, indeed, began their success story by being literally the only political party in Russia to clamor, from the beginning of World War I, for an immediate Russian pullout from the war. Indeed, they went further and courted enormous unpopularity by calling for the defeat of "their own" government ("revolutionary defeatism"). When Russia began to suffer enormous losses, accompanied by massive military desertions from the front, the Bolsheviks, guided by Lenin, continued to be the only party to call for an immediate end to the war, the other parties still vowing to fight the Germans to the end. When the Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin, over the hysterical opposition of even the majority of the Bolshevik central committee itself, insisted on concluding the "appeasement" peace of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Here Lenin succeeded in taking Russia out of the war, even at the price of granting to the victorious German army all the parts of the Russian Empire it then occupied (including White Russia and the Ukraine). Thus, Lenin and the Bolsheviks began their reign by being not simply a peace party, but virtually a "peace-at-any-price" party.

After World War I and Germany's defeat, the new Polish state attacked Russia and succeeded in grabbing for itself a large chunk of White Russia and the Ukraine. Taking advantage of the turmoil and civil war within Russia at the end of the world war, various other national groups — Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — decided to break away from the pre–World War I Russian Empire and declare national independence. While Leninism pays lip service to national self-determination, it was clear to Soviet rulers from the very beginning that the boundaries of the old Russian state were supposed to remain intact. The Red Army reconquered the Ukraine, not only from the Whites, but also from the Ukrainian nationalists and from the indigenously Ukrainian anarchist army of Nestor Makhno. "War and militarism were the gravediggers of classical liberalism." For the rest, it was clear that Russia, like Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, was a "revisionist" country vis-à-vis the postwar settlement at Versailles: i.e., Lenin, the lodestar of both Russian and German foreign policy was to recapture their pre–World War I borders — what they both considered the "true" borders of their respective states.

It should be noted that every political party or tendency in Russia and Germany, whether ruling the state or in opposition, agreed with this aim of full restoration of national territory. But, it should be emphasized, while Germany under Hitler took strong measures to recapture the lost lands, the cautious and conservative Soviet rulers did absolutely nothing. Only after the Stalin-Hitler pact and the German conquest of Poland did the Soviets, now facing no danger in doing so, recapture their lost territories. Specifically, the Russians repossessed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as the old Russian lands of White Russia and the Ukraine that had been Eastern Poland. And they were able to do so without a fight. The old, pre–World War I Russia had now been restored with the exception of Finland. But Finland was prepared to fight. Here, the Russians demanded, not the reincorporation of Finland as a whole, but only of parts of the Karelian Isthmus that were ethnically Russian. When the Finns refused this demand, the "Winter War" (1939–1940) between Russia and Finland ensued, which ended with the Finns victorious and conceding nothing.

On June 22, 1941, Germany, triumphant over everyone but England in the west, launched a sudden massive and unprovoked assault on Soviet Russia, an act of aggression aided and abetted by the other pro-German states in Eastern Europe — Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Finland. This German and allied invasion of Russia soon became one of the pivotal facts in the history of Europe since that date. So unprepared was Stalin for the assault, so trusting was he in the rationality of the German-Russian accord for peace in Eastern Europe, that he had allowed the Russian army to fall into disrepair. So unwarlike was Stalin, in fact, that Germany was almost able to conquer Russia in the face of enormous odds. Since Germany otherwise would have been able to retain control of Europe indefinitely, it was Hitler who was led by the siren call of anti-Communist ideology to throw away a rational and prudent course and launch what was to be the beginning of his ultimate defeat.

World War II and the Soviets The mythology of the Cold Warriors often concedes that the Soviets were not internationally aggressive until World War II — indeed, they are compelled to assert this point, since most Cold Warriors heartily approve the World War II alliance of the United States with Russia against Germany. It was during and immediately after the war, they assert, that Russia became expansionist and drove its way into Eastern Europe. What this charge overlooks is the central fact of the German and associated assault upon Russia in June 1941. There is no doubt about the fact that Germany and her allies launched this war. Hence, in order to defeat the invaders, it was obviously necessary for the Russians to roll back the invading armies and conquer Germany and the other warring countries of Eastern Europe. It is easier to make out a case for the United States being expansionist for conquering and occupying Italy and part of Germany than it is for Russia doing so — after all, the United States was never directly attacked by the Germans. During World War II, the United States, Britain, and Russia — the three major Allies — had agreed on joint three-power military occupation of all the conquered territories.

The United States was the first to break the agreement during the war by allowing Russia no role whatever in the military occupation of Italy. Despite this serious breach of agreement, Stalin displayed his consistent preference for the conservative interests of the Russian nation-state over cleaving to revolutionary ideology — by repeatedly betraying indigenous Communist movements. In order to preserve peaceful relations between Russia and the West, Stalin consistently tried to hold back the success of various Communist movements. He was successful in France and Italy, where Communist partisan groups might easily have seized power in the wake of the German military retreat; but Stalin ordered them not to do so, and instead persuaded them to join coalition regimes headed by anti-Communist parties. In both countries, the Communists were soon ousted from the coalition. In Greece, where the Communist partisans almost did seize power, Stalin irretrievably weakened them by abandoning them and urging them to turn over power to newly invading British troops. In other countries, particularly ones where Communist partisan groups were strong, the Communists flatly refused Stalin's requests.

In Yugoslavia, the victorious Tito refused Stalin's demand that Tito subordinate himself to the anti-Communist Mihailovich in a governing coalition; and Mao refused a similar Stalin demand that he subordinate himself to Chiang Kai-shek . There is no doubt that these rejections were the beginning of the later, extraordinarily important schisms within the world Communist movement. Russia, therefore, governed Eastern Europe as military occupier after winning a war launched against her. Russia's initial goal was not to Communize Eastern Europe on the backs of the Soviet Army. Her goal was to gain assurances that Eastern Europe would not be the broad highway for an assault on Russia, as it had been three times in half a century — the last time in a war in which over 20 million Russians had been slaughtered. "The only real difference between a democracy and a dictatorship on making war is that in the former more propaganda must be beamed at one's subjects to engineer their approval." In short, Russia wanted countries on her border that would not be anti-Communist in a military sense, and that would not be used as a springboard for another invasion.

Political conditions in Eastern Europe were such that only in more modernized Finland did non-Communist politicians exist whom Russia could trust to pursue a peaceful line in foreign affairs. And in Finland, this situation was the work of one far-seeing statesman, the agrarian leader Julio Paasikivi. It was because Finland, then and since, has firmly followed the "Paasikivi line" that Russia was willing to pull its troops out of Finland and not to insist on the Communization of that country — even though it had fought two wars with Finland in the previous six years. Even in the other Eastern European countries, Russia clung to coalition governments for several years after the war, and only fully Communized them in 1948 — after three years of unrelenting American Cold-War pressure to try to oust Russia from these countries. In other areas, Russia readily pulled its troops out of Austria and out of Azerbaijan. The cold warriors find it difficult to explain Russian actions in Finland. If Russia is always hell-bent to impose Communist rule wherever it can, why the "soft line" on Finland?

The only plausible explanation is that its motivation is security for the Russian nation-state against attack, with the success of world Communism playing a very minor role in its scale of priorities. Schisms and World Communism In fact, the Cold Warriors have never been able either to explain or absorb the fact of deep schisms in the world Communist movement. For if all Communists are governed by a common ideology, then every Communist everywhere should be part of one unified monolith, and one which, given the early success of the Bolsheviks, would make them subordinates or "agents" of Moscow. If Communists are mainly motivated by their bond of Marxism-Leninism, why do we have the deep China-Russia split, in which Russia, for example, keeps one million troops at the ready on the China-Russia frontier? Why is there such enmity between the Yugoslav Communist and the Albanian Communist states? How can there be an actual military conflict between the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists? The answer, of course, is that once a revolutionary movement seizes state power, it very quickly begins to take on the attributes of a ruling class, with a class interest in retaining state power.

The world revolution begins to pale, in their outlook, to insignificance. And since state elites can and do have conflicting interests in power and wealth, it is not surprising that inter-Communist conflicts have become endemic. Since their victory over German military aggression in World War II, the Soviets have continued to be conservative in their military policy. Their only use of troops has been to defend their territory in the Communist bloc, rather than to extend it further. Thus, when Hungary threatened to leave the Soviet block in 1956, or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets intervened with troops — reprehensibly, to be sure, but still acting in a conservative and defensive, rather than expansionist, manner. (The Soviets apparently gave considerable thought to invading Yugoslavia when Tito took that country out of the Soviet bloc, but were deterred by the formidable qualities for guerrilla fighting of the Yugoslav army.) In no case has Russia used troops to extend its bloc or to conquer more territories. Professor Stephen F.

Cohen, director of the program in Russian studies at Princeton, has delineated the nature of Soviet conservatism in foreign affairs in a recent issue of Inquiry: That a system born in revolution and still professing revolutionary ideas should have become one of the most conservative in the world may seem preposterous. But all those factors variously said to be most important in Soviet politics have contributed to this conservatism: the bureaucratic tradition of Russian government before the revolution; the subsequent bureaucratization of Soviet life, which proliferated conservative norms and created an entrenched class of zealous defenders of bureaucratic privilege; the geriatric nature of the present-day elite; and even the official ideology, whose thrust turned many years ago from the creation of a new social order to extolling the existing one. … In other words, the main thrust of Soviet conservatism today is to preserve what it already has at home and abroad, not to jeopardize it. A conservative government is, of course, capable of dangerous militaristic actions, as we saw in Czechoslovakia … but these are acts of imperial protectionism, a kind of defensive militarism, not a revolutionary or aggrandizing one.

It is certainly true that for most Soviet leaders, as presumably for most American leaders, detente is not an altruistic endeavor but the pursuit of national interests. In one sense, this is sad. But it is probably also true that mutual self-interest provides a more durable basis for detente than lofty, and finally empty, altruism ("Why Detente Can Work," December 19, 1977). Similarly, as impeccable an anti-Soviet source as former CIA Director William Colby finds the overwhelming concern of the Soviets in the defensive goal of avoiding another catastrophic invasion of their territory. As Colby testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, You will find a concern, even a paranoia, over their [the Soviets'] own security. You will find the determination that they shall never again be invaded and put through the kinds of turmoil that they have been under and many different invasions. … I think that they … want to overprotect themselves to make certain that that does not happen. Even the Chinese, for all their bluster, have pursued a conservative and pacific foreign policy.

Not only have they failed to invade Taiwan, recognized internationally as part of China, but they have even allowed the small offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu to remain in Chiang Kai-shek's hands. No moves have been made against the British and Portuguese-occupied exclaves of Hong Kong and Macao. And China even took the unusual step of declaring a unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal of forces to its border after having triumphed easily over Indian arms in their escalated border war. (See Neville Maxwell, India's China War [New York: Pantheon Books, 1970].) Neither is China's reconquest and suppression of national rebellion in Tibet a valid point against our thesis. For Chiang Kai-shek as well as all other Chinese have for many generations considered Tibet as part of Greater China, and China was here acting in the same conservative, nation-state manner as we have seen has guided the Soviets. Avoiding A Priori History There is still one thesis common to Americans and even to some libertarians that may prevent them from absorbing the analysis of this chapter: the myth propounded by Woodrow Wilson that democracies must inevitably be peace-loving while dictatorships are inevitably warlike.

This thesis was of course highly convenient for covering Wilson's own culpability for dragging America into a needless and monstrous war. But there is simply no evidence for this assumption. "Once a revolutionary movement seizes state power, it very quickly begins to take on the attributes of a ruling class, with a class interest in retaining state power." Many dictatorships have turned inward, cautiously confining themselves to preying on their own people. Examples range from premodern Japan to Communist Albania to innumerable dictatorships in the Third World today. Uganda's Idi Amin, perhaps the most brutal and repressive dictator in today's world, shows no signs whatever of jeopardizing his regime by invading neighboring countries. On the other hand, such an indubitable democracy as Great Britain spread its coercive imperialism across the globe during the 19th and earlier centuries. The theoretical reason why focusing on democracy or dictatorship misses the point is that states — all states — rule their population and decide whether or not to make war. And all states, whether formally a democracy or dictatorship or some other brand of rule, are run by a ruling elite.

Whether or not these elites, in any particular case, will make war upon another state is a function of a complex interweaving web of causes, including the temperament of the rulers, the strength of their enemies, the inducements for war, public opinion, etc. While public opinion has to be gauged in either case, the only real difference between a democracy and a dictatorship on making war is that in the former more propaganda must be beamed at one's subjects to engineer their approval. Intensive propaganda is necessary in any case — as we can see by the zealous opinion-molding behavior of all modern warring states. But the democratic state must work harder and faster. And also the democratic state must be more hypocritical in using rhetoric designed to appeal to the values of the masses: justice, freedom, national interest, patriotism, world peace, etc. So that in democratic states the art of propaganda the elite uses over its subjects must be a bit more sophisticated and refined. But this, as we have seen, is true of all governmental decisions, not just war or peace. For all governments — but especially democratic governments — must work hard at persuading their subjects that all of their deeds of oppression are really in their subjects' best interests.

What we have said about democracy and dictatorship applies equally to the lack of correlation between degrees of internal freedom in a country and its external aggressiveness. Some states have proved themselves perfectly capable of allowing a considerable degree of freedom internally while making aggressive war abroad, while others have shown themselves capable of totalitarian rule internally while pursuing a pacific foreign policy. The examples of Idi Amin, Albania, China, Great Britain, etc., apply equally well in this comparison. In short, libertarians and other Americans must guard against a priori history: in this case, against the assumption that, in any conflict, that state which is more democratic or allows more internal freedom is necessarily or even presumptively the victim of aggression by the more dictatorial or totalitarian state. There is simply no historical evidence whatever for such a presumption. In deciding on relative rights and wrongs, on relative degrees of aggression, in any dispute in foreign affairs, there is no substitute for a detailed, empirical, historical investigation of the dispute itself. It should occasion no great surprise, then, if such an investigation concludes that a democratic and relatively far freer United States has been more aggressive and imperialistic in foreign affairs than a relatively totalitarian Russia or China.

Conversely, hailing a state for being less aggressive in foreign affairs in no way implies that the observer is in any way sympathetic to that state's internal record. It is vital — indeed, it is literally a life-and-death matter — that Americans be able to look as coolly and clear-sightedly, as free from myth, at their government's record in foreign affairs as they increasingly are able to do in domestic politics. For war and a phony "external threat" have long been the chief means by which the state wins back the loyalty of its subjects. War and militarism were the gravediggers of classical liberalism; we must not allow the state to get away with this ruse ever again. This excerpt from For a New Liberty was first printed in the Libertarian Review, April 1978, pp. 23–27. 3/4: Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia - YouTube 3/4: Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. The interactive transcript could not be loaded. Loading...

Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on May 25, 2012 The Winter War was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet offensive on 30 November 1939 and ended on 13 March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty. This was Finland's first war during WW2, followed by: The Continuation War (against the USSR, 25 June 1941 -- 19 September 1944) and The Lapland War (against Nazi Germany, from September 1944 to April 1945). Category The Hundred Day Winter War: Finland's Gallant Stand against the Soviet Army (Modern War Studies (Hardcover)): Gordon F. Sander: 9780700619108: Amazon.com: Books By J. Michael Stanley on February 25, 2014 Format: Hardcover|Verified Purchase If you are interested (as I was) in the military aspects of this war, this book is definitely not for you.

If, on the other hand, you are interested in the political maneuvering of both sides, the activities of the international corps of correspondents, and, to some degree, the impacts on the Finnish population, then this book will suit your needs. The title of this book would lead one to believe that you will find a description of the movements of the Finnish and Soviet armies and of the evolution of the battles. In fact, very little paper is wasted on these aspects and I would recommend that someone in search of this information look elsewhere. By Aussie Reader on July 22, 2013 Format: Hardcover I have just finished Gordon Sander's book on the 1939 war between Finland and Russian know as the Hundred Day War or the Winter War (Talvisota). Although I have two to three books on this subject in my library this is the first title I have actually read on this conflict. Therefore I cannot compare it to the many books currently available however I can say that it does provide a nice and easy to read overview or general history of this war. The author takes us from the sudden commencement of this unprovoked conflict to the signing of the peace treaty over 100 days later.

The story ranges from the diplomatic, political and home fronts to the severe fighting along the Mannerheim line and other points of conflict. There are six maps provided in the book, which allow the reader to follow the fighting, and a number of black & white pictures. The author has used a number of articles and reports taken from foreign reporters and war correspondents along with numerous first-hand accounts from participants, civilian and military. These accounts blend in well with the story and provide a good idea of what the Finnish people and the Western world thought of this conflict. Many believed that the result was a forgone conclusion, small isolated Finland against the Russian steamroller with unlimited resources and manpower. How could Finland ever win this fight?

As the author states; Mannerheim's strategy was: " ...not based on the absurd hope of outright victory, but, as veteran correspondent John Langdon-Davies put it, on 'the most honourable annihilation, with the faint hope that the conscience of mankind would find an alternative solution as a reward for bravery and singleness of purpose'." Gustaf Mannerheim declared that the Finnish forces were fighting "a Thermopylae every day", and reading of the Russian assaults against the smaller Finnish forces you would almost have to agree. The book is not a detailed military history of this war but it does provide enough information on the many battles, famous ones like the battles of Suomussalmi and Raate Road and the lesser-known ones like the "Sausage War". The many reports from the war correspondents provide a "real time" element to the story and cover a range of incidents during the war. The famous American female war reporter and later author, Virginia Cowles, filed this story for her readers covering aspects of the Russian bombing campaign: "It is difficult to describe indiscriminate aerial warfare against a civilian population in a country with a temperature thirty degrees Fahrenheit below zero.

But if you can visualize farm girls stumbling through snow for the uncertain safety of their cellars; bombs falling on frozen villages unprotected by a single anti-aircraft gun; men standing helplessly in front of blazing buildings with no apparatus to fight the fires, and others desperately trying to salvage their belongings from burning wreckage - if you can visualize these things and picture even the children in remote hamlets wearing white covers over their coats as camouflage against low-flying Russian machine gunners - you can get some idea of what this war was like." Overall this is a great story and one that I think would be suitable for a first read on the Winter War. By B. Olsen on August 21, 2013 Format: Hardcover Having studied Finland's wars in the 20th Century for decades, I was somewhat hesitant about buying this book. Was there really anything new to say about the Winter War? Fortunately I didn't hesitate too long as Gordon F. Sander proves there is. For an American, the author displays a unique knowledge about Finland and, it soon becomes obvious, a love of both the country and its inhabitants.

Not only writing about, but also having a deep understanding of Finland's Winter War, sets his book apart from the plethora of other books on the subject. The author casts his net wide. He takes us behind the scenes to show what went on in political circles, not only in Finland and the Soviet Union but also in the Scandinavian countries. Interestingly, Mr. Sander also focus on the activities of the large press corps that followed the war from the Finnish side - although some of them seem to have preferred the bar of Helsinki's luxurious Hotel Kämp to the ice cold trenches of the front line. Not so the author, he brings us right down into the trenches on both sides of the front. Well-written, the fast-paced text reads like a thriller and gives you a unique feeling of actually being there as the war progresses. I consider myself fairly knowledgeable about the Winter War, yet I found this book hard to put down. Strongly recommended! By A. A.

Nofi on August 18, 2014 Format: Hardcover A summary of the review on StrategyPage.Com: 'Although quite a number of books have examined Finlandâs heroic, if doomed, resistance to Stalinâs aggression, journalist and historian Sander manages to throw a great deal of new light on the 105 day conflict., in a book that was a best-seller in Finland. He covers much more of the civilian side of the war than is common, and tries to give the reader the feel of events as they unfolded, rather than taking a longer-term view. Sander reveals some of the warts on the Finnish side, including an overly rigid press censorship that contributed to false hopes of victory, gives us some detail on foreign aid to the Finns (even from Mussolini!), the proposed Anglo-French relief expedition, Stalinâs decision to end the war at a time when arguably he might have overrun all of Finland, and more. Sander âs discussion of military matters is very good, and his battle pieces are very well done, often gripping, and with coverage of the Soviet side than is common, including the effect of the war on the Red Army.

An excellent look at one of the most unique conflicts in the twentieth century.' For the full review, see StrategyPage.Com HyperWar: The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940 (USMA) The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940 Department of Military Art and Engineering United States Military Academy 1948 Foreword This short account of the Soviet-Finnish War and the German invasion of Norway has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on articles which appeared in the Command and General Staff School Military Review and on material prepared by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department. However, while acknowledging the great indebtedness to the above-named, it is not desired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors, or for any conclusions drawn. July 1941 The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940 Historical Background Prior to 1808, Finland was a part of Sweden.

When Napoleon wanted to punish the Swedes for refusing to aid him in his Continental blockade against Britain, he persuaded Alexander I of Russia to declare war on his Scandinavian neighbor. The prize of victory was Finland, which remained a part of Tsarist Russia from 1808 to 1918. In the latter year, General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, with the help of German troops, succeeded in defeating the Russian Reds. Finland was temporarily under German influence, and the Kaiser's brother-in-law was elected king. When Germany was defeated, General Mannerheim traveled to London and Paris and succeeded in gaining recognition for the Republic of Finland. The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 was brought about by Russia's enigmatic foreign policy of 1939. On the 24th of August of that year, Russia signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. On 17 September, Russian troops marched into Poland to claim a share of that country after it had been defeated by Germany. Shortly thereafter, Russia began to put pressure on her "lost provinces" in an effort to regain the territory which she had lost in 1918.

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia were included in the diplomatic offensive. By a system of mutual-assistance pacts, trade agreements, and military occupations, Russia soon regained virtual control of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Finland, however, refused to submit when presented with the Russian demands on 5 October 1939. On 13 November, the Soviet-Finnish diplomatic negotiations came to an end, and the Finnish delegates to Moscow returned to Helsinki. On 30 November, Russia attacked Finland. Terrain and Communications ( Map 1 ) Finland offers poor maneuver ground for mechanized warfare. Roughly 15 per cent of the country is covered by lakes and swamps, there being some 60,000 lakes in Finland. A further obstacle to --1-- mechanized warfare is the fact that 60 per cent of the dry land is covered with dense forests. In normal times, more than half of the population of 3,700,000 is employed in the timber industry and its by-product plants. A line drawn from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to the eastern edge of Lake Ladoga divides the country into two distinct parts.

The part to the south is the more important. Most of Finland's industry and 95 per cent of her population are concentrated in this area. The terrain here is quite flat and dotted with lakes. Northern Finland is relatively uninhabited and, although containing numerous lakes, is more mountains than the southern part. The eastern boundary roughly follows the divide which separates the watersheds leading to the Baltic and White Seas. This boundary is approximately the same as was specified in the Treaty of Stolbova , signed by Sweden and Russia in 1617. Southern Finland has an excellent net of railroads. There are two rail lines from Finland to Russia, both running to Leningrad along the Karelian Isthmus. One railroad of particular importance is the line to Sweden through Kemi. This was Finland's only land connection with the outside world after she became involved in war with Russia. Severance of this line would have added to Finland's difficulties, but would not have been decisive as long as the Gulf of Bothnia sea lanes were open. The traditional route of invasion, and the one previously used by the Russians, is along the Karelian Isthmus. This is the natural approach to Finland from Russia.

The Russo-Finnish boundary from the Arctic Ocean to Lake Ladoga is a great forest area crossed by only a few roads. A Russian attempt to invade Finland by this route would have been dependent on a very tenuous line of communications. Not only were the east-west motor roads poor and few in number, but the Finnish border was anywhere from 50 to 150 miles from the Leningrad-Murmansk railroad. This railroad is single-track from Leningrad to Kandalaksha and double-track from Kandalaksha to Murmansk. The total length is 845 miles. The only gateway through which the Allies could send troops to Finland without violating the neutrality of Norway and Sweden was Petsamo on the Arctic Ocean. Petsamo is ice-free the year-round and is connected to southern Finland by the so-called Arctic Highway. This highway is a single-lane bituminous road that is kept open throughout the winter. In the campaign against Finland the Russians naturally wanted to gain possession of Petsamo, but as a route of invasion the Arctic Highway offered numerous difficulties. --2-- Another possible means of invasion for the Russians was to land on the coastline of the Gulf of Bothnia or the Gulf of Finland.

However, the coast was strongly fortified and guarded by land troops as well as elements of the small Finnish Navy. The irregularity of the coastline and its many nearby islands facilitated its defense. Strategical Considerations The strategical issues of the Soviet-Finnish War can best be considered by examining the Russian demands that led to the struggle. In brief, Russia sought added protection for Leningrad both by land and sea. She demanded all of the Karelian Isthmus up to Viipuri, but not including that city. This would give her possession of the natural line of defense formed by the lake and river system at the northern extremity of the isthmus. The territorial gain would not only add to the security of Leningrad, but would also make a future invasion of Finland relatively easy. To protect Leningrad from the sea, Russia sought further control of the Gulf of Finland by demanding a lease on the Hango peninsula and four Finnish islands between Helsinki and Kronstadt. Kronstadt is Russia's naval base at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. Having already acquired bases in Estonia, the demands on Finland, if satisfied, would make the Gulf of Finland a Russian lake.

The Soviet demands in Finland also included all of the Rybachi Peninsula. Most of this peninsula was already held by Russia, so that this demand was not of particular significance. It would give greater control over Finland's Arctic outlet at Petsamo, but Russian control of this port was already practically complete. By a 1919 treaty with Finland, Russia had secured a promise that the former would not establish any naval units in the Arctic Ocean. Russian Plans and Preparations ( Map 2 ) The principal value to the military man of a study of the Soviet-Finnish War is that it illustrates the failure of an attempted "blitzkreig" attack. The Russians tried to apply the same strategy used by the Germans in Poland and failed so miserably that they were in the end forced to resort to the old strategy of pure mass. In this respect the Soviet-Finnish War is a connecting link between the strategy of the two world wars. The Russian plan involved a movement by land along every line of approach to southern Finland. By sea, they planned a naval --3-- blockade of Finland and a sea-borne invasion. By air, it was planned to cut Finland's interior communications and to terrorize the population into submission.

By "fifth-column" tactics the Russians planned a Communist uprising which would throw the country into civil strife and assist in its occupation. All the elements of modern war were present in the Russian plan. Failure came through improper preparation, lack of speed and surprise, and a faulty analysis of terrain and communications. The initial objective of the Russian land forces was the Kemi-Sortavala-Leningrad railroad. Possession of this railroad would accomplish two missions. in the first place, it would cut Finland's "wait", severing her only land connection with the outside world. In the second place, it would furnish a good base of operations for a penetration into southern Finland, in case further operations proved necessary. Transportation of supplies from Leningrad to the northern armies could be shifted form the Murmansk railroad to the Kemi railroad, thus saving many miles of railroad and overland transportation. The Russian initial objective also included the capture of Viipuri and the annihilation of Finnish forces between that city and Sortavala. The capture of Viipuri, however, seems to have been secondary to the capture of the leningrad-Kemi railroad.

After reaching their first objective, the Russians apparently intended to launch a final drive toward the general line Helsinki-Oulu. The elements of the Russian plan given above are taken from an article written by Major T. Peitsara of the Finnish Army. Inasmuch as the plan failed, and since no official statement from the Russian side has been made, it is impossible to state whether the outline given is correct. The Russian initial moves indicate that they had some such plan in mind. To execute their plan of operations, the Russians assembled five armies comprising thirty divisions and six tank brigades. The size of the divisions varied with their mission, but the entire force numbered about 500,000 men. The total number of tanks involved was about 2,000. Although all these divisions did not appear in action at once, they were reported soon enough to warrant the assumption that the original plan contemplated their use. On the Karelian Isthmus there were two armies. The Seventh Army, consisting of nine divisions and three tank brigades, was on the left; the Thirteenth Army, composed of four divisions and two tank brigades, was on the right.

From Aunus to Porajarvi, known as the Southeastern Front, there were nine divisions and one tank brigade, all belonging to the Eighth Army. --4-- On the Central Front, from Repola to Kurtti, there were five divisions. These divisions made up the Russian Ninth Army. The Fourteenth Army of three divisions was located in the Murmansk area, known as the Northern Front. Although the Ninth and Fourteenth Armies did not have any independent tank brigades, there were tank units within the divisions. The Russian air and naval plans were devised to assist the effort of the land forces. There were assembled an estimated 800 planes for bombing cities, interior communications, and Finnish positions. The Russian Baltic Fleet consisted of two large battleships, three cruisers, seventeen destroyers, about eighty submarines, and a number of auxiliary vessels. A complete blockade of the Finnish coastline was planned in addition to landing parties at strategic points. The Russian Arctic Fleet comprised some destroyers, patrol vessels, and submarines. Finnish Plans and Preparations Finland could not hope to hold out indefinitely against a power such as Russia.

The most she could expect to do was to stop the initial drive, in the hope that other nations would come to her assistance in time to save her from defeat; or that the enemy might be diverted by the attack of a Finnish ally in another quarter. Throughout the the period of peace between the two world wars the Finns knew that they would someday have to fight Russia. Consequently they were psychologically prepared for war. The impelling force for defensive preparations during peacetime was General Mannerheim. Although he had been in retirement during the 1920's, he had urged defensive preparations and had sent promising young officers to study in the military schools of France and Germany. When made President of the Council of National Defense in 1931,k he was in a position to carry out his aims more effectively. In 1932, a compulsory military service bill was passed; and the armed forces were reorganized. Before mobilization, the Regular Army consisted of approximately 33,000 officers and men, distributed among 1 antiaircraft, 9 infantry, 2 cavalry, 4 field artillery, and 3 coast artillery regiments.

Upon mobilization, this force was expanded into six active divisions totalling about 127,000 men. These constituted the first-line troops. All of the men had served at least one year, as required by the compulsory military service law. In addition to the six active divisions, there were six reserve divisions, with about 100,000 men. Another 100,000 were organized into a territorial --5-- militia known as the civic Guard. The Civic Guard drilled and maneuvered at regular intervals and was closely associated with the Regular Army. Kurt Wallenius, one of the radical Fascist leaders in the Civic Guard, had been chief of staff of the Regular Army prior to 1930. The 327,000 men accounted for above were augmented by additional recruits during the period of hostilities. The total forces mobilized in Finland, including Army, Civic Guard, Navy, and Coast Guard, numbered 400,000 men. Mention should also be made of the 100,000 women of the Lotta Svard organization. This group was associated with the Civic Guard and did more than the usual women's auxiliary organizations.

The members were trained as military clerks, cooks, and laundry workers, as well as nurses. The Finns were thus able to put most of the their manpower into actual fighting, by leaving the administrative and housekeeping functions of army maintenance to the women. At the outbreak of hostilities the Finnish military forces were distributed as follows: Two active divisions and five reserve divisions held the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus; one reserve division occupied the Southeastern Front; two active divisions were in reserve behind the Karelian Front; and two more active divisions were near Helsinki as a strategic reserve. There were three divisions somewhere in the interior; others were on the Karelian and Southeastern Fronts; and some were assigned as frontier guards along the Russo-Finnish boundary north of Suojarvi. The Finns could offer no serious opposition to Russia in the air or on the sea. Their Navy consisted of only 18 vessels, and some of these were on Lake Ladoga. Finland had a total of only 150 airplanes. The extent of her seacoast defenses is unknown, but they proved effective against Russian attacks. Finland depended to a great extent on her natural defensive strength to ward off the invader.

There was much talk of a strong "Mannerheim Line" across the Karelian Isthmus ( Map 3a ). This line did prove itself to be extremely strong, but it was not a fortified position in the same sense as the French Maginot Line or German West Wall. The Karelian fortifications were mostly fieldworks of the type constructed during the First World War, with an occasional concrete machine-gun or artillery emplacement. There were no underground defensive works. According to reports, there were no underground defensive works. According to reports, there were 96 concrete strongholds, 67 of which had been built fifteen years before. The remainder had been under construction since the preceding summer and were barely finished in time for the invasion --6-- on 30 November. The line was particularly well fortified against tanks, however. Numerous ditches were dug and granite boulders placed along possible tank routes. Neither the Finns nor the Russians had occasion to correct the erroneous information sent out to the world that the Mannerheim Line was a strong wall of steel and concrete. For the Russians it offered a good excuse for their setbacks, and the Finns did not wish to admit the true state of their defenses.

Operations ( Map 2 ) The field operations may be divided into three phases, roughly corresponding to the three months of the war's duration, December, January, and February. The first phase is the story of Russian failure. The second is one of relative quiet, during which the Russians prepared for their final drive. The third phase is the Russian drive to victory. During the first phase, neither was the fifth-column attack, the air attack, the naval attack, nor the several land attacks worked as planned. On 1 December, Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish Communist who had fled to Russia in 1918, was set up as premier of the "Finnish People's Government" at Terijoki, a few miles inside Finnish territory. Kuusinen's proclamation calling on the workers of the country to arise against their capitalist tyrants was ridiculed in Finland. Although a bloody class war had been fought in 1918, the Finns' intense nationalism and hatred of Russia overcame the influence of the Communists. The initial Russian air attack on Finland did not hamper mobilization, for several reasons. In the first place, it did not come soon enough.

The Finns were well on the way toward complete mobilization by 30 November because they had received ample warning that an attack was imminent. Diplomatic negotiations had been broken off on 13 November. As early as October, when the original Russian demands were presented, Finland had called up her defense reserves for refresher training. Furthermore, the air attacks on the principal cities and lines of communication were not made in sufficient force nor with sufficient accuracy to do much damage. The fact that 80 per cent of the population lived in the country made it difficult for the Russian Air Force to terrorize the people into quick submission. The shortness of the winter day also hampered air operations. On 21 December, the shortest day of the year, there were only four hours of daylight in southern Finland. Snow began --7-- to fall on 2 December, and on the two succeeding days a terrible blizzard concealed military objectives. Cloudy skies hampered the operations of the Russian Air Force until mid-December. The naval attack on Finland likewise failed. Although the Russians succeeded in occupying some of the undefended outer islands along the coastline, they were unsuccessful in landing on the mainland.

The Russian Baltic Fleet bombarded Porvo, about 20 miles east of Helsinki, and attempted to land troops, but was driven off. Turku and Hango were also bombarded form the sea, and it is possible that landings were planned and postponed because of the severity of the Finish coastal-defense fire. Three Russian destroyers, two submarines, and some auxiliary vessels were either crippled or sunk. Heavy damage was inflicted on the Russian battleship October Revolution. Operations on Northern and Central Fronts.--The operations on the Northern and Central Fronts were limited almost entirely to the first phase of the campaign. Although there were a few pitched battles, most of the fighting on these two fronts was guerilla warfare. The Russians advanced in columns stretched out over many miles of the snow-covered roads. Dense forests surrounded them on all sides. now and then an open space marked the location of a frozen lake,. As the enemy advanced, the Finns retired before them, burning their houses and destroying everything useful. From the surrounding forests the long Russian columns were attacked by ski patrols, which struck at kitchens and supply trucks and then retired before the Russians could close in and destroy them.

Mannerheim's orders to his Civic Guard units in the north were to strike the Russian supply lines. These orders were faithfully carried out. The Finns adopted the strategy used by the Russians on Napoleon in his retreat from Moscow. When the opportunity did come to engage in battle, the Russian troops were so cold, hungry,k and exhausted that they were no match for their numerically inferior foes. The Fourteenth Army had no difficulty in taking Petsamo on the second day of the invasion. Landing parties from the Arctic Fleet were assisted by troops moved overland. From the Petsamo base an advance was made south along the Arctic Highway. By 15 December, the Russians had taken the nickel mines at Salmijarvi, and on 19 December their advance reached Nautsi. Partly as a result of Finnish resistance and partly because of supply difficulties in the extremely cold weather, the Russians retired from Nautsi to a point about twenty miles north. The temperatures took a sudden drop to 25 degrees below zero, Fahrenheit, in mid-December. Reinforced --8-- and resupplied, the Reds again advanced to Nautsi, but never got any farther.

The only Finnish troops in Petsamo at the outbreak of hostilities were one infantry company and a battery of field artillery with four old guns, model 1887. The Finns on the Northern Front never exceed one battalion. The northern thrust of the Russian Ninth Army, on the Central Front,k was directed toward Kemijarvi, the northernmost Finnish town with rail connections. The Russian 122d Division advanced and seized Kuolojarvi on 4 December. By 15 December, this division had moved through Salla to Markajarvi. At Kemijarvi, the Reds found a Finnish Civic Guard division entrenched being the Kemi River. On 19 December, an active division from Mannerheim strategic reserve at Helsinki arrived to assist the Civic Guard division. In a smashing offensive the Finns drove the 122d Division back to Salla. Reinforced by the 88th Division, the Russians on this front later advanced to Markajarvi, where they remained until the end of the war. The central thrust of the Russian Ninth Army was directed toward Suomussalmi, which is also connected to the southern railroad system.

One of the most interesting engagements of the war took place on this front. Known as the Battle of Suomussalmi, it was an encounter in which one Finnish active division, assisted by some Civic Guard units, almost completely destroyed two Russian divisions. On 8 December, the Russian 163d Division, followed by the 44th Division, arrived at Suomussalmi after having been constantly harried by Finnish ski patrols. By 12 December, the Russian advance had pushed the Finnish militia units to a point twenty miles beyond Suomussalmi. Here the Reds were attacked by a Finnish active division from the Vilpur reserve. The Russians were forced to retreat to Suomussalmi, where the Finns succeeded in effecting a penetration between the two enemy divisions. Holding the Russian 44th Division with a small force, the Finns attacked the 163d Division on 30 December and almost completely destroyed it. The Russians were forced to retreat across a frozen lake, with terrible loss of life. The Finns then turned on the Russian 44th Division and repeated the success, 6-7 January.

This action relieved Suomussalmi of any threat for the rest of the war. The Finns took thousands of prisoners and great quantities of war materials. In the early stages of the campaign,. the southern drive of the Ninth Army was very weak, being made by only part of a division. Without much difficulty, local Civic Guard units managed to stop the drive in the vicinity of Kuhmo. In the third phase of the campaign, --9-- the Russians tried to renew this drive, but without success. By 1 March, the Finns had succeeded in cutting off the Russian 54th Division from its base, but the cessation of hostilities saved it from complete destruction. Operations on Southeastern Front.--To protect their Karelian defensive line from an envelopment around Lake Ladoga, the Finns had organized a position from the vicinity of Salmi to Suojarvi. The Russian Eighth Army attempted to push through to Sortavala and Joensu. From these points they could have outflanked the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. Also, they would have been in a position from which a part of their force could push northwest along the railroad to the assistance of the Russian Ninth Army, if such assistance were needed.

The Red Eighth Army concentrated on two main drives. The northern drive was planned to outflank the Finnish defenses in this area and the southern drive to push through the defensive line at Salmi and advance along the shore of Lake Ladoga. The main effort of the northern drive was directed toward Tolvajarvi and was supported by secondary advances on Ilomantsi and Suojarvi. The initial strength of the Russian Eighth Army, including reserves, was nine divisions and a tank brigade. By the end of the war, thirteen Russian divisions had been used on this front. The Finnish strength was originally one reserve division and an unknown number of Civic Guard troops. The Finns were reinforced by an active division on 11 December. The drives north of Suojarvi proved to be the most threatening because they came as a surprise and outflanked the prepared position. By 13 December, the Russian main flanking drive had passed Tolvajarvi, and the lesser effort to the north had almost reached Ilomantsi. The secondary drive on Suojarvi had been stopped by the Finnish fortified line.

The seriousness of the situation at Tolvajarvi forced General Mannerheim to reinforce this front with the two active divisions which he was holding in reserve at Viipuri. One of these divisions was diverted to the Suomussalmi front and participated in the battles there from 30 December to 7 January. The Finns made a very successful counterattack at Tolvajarvi. Their reports indicate that two Russian divisions, the 75th and 139th, were practically destroyed. It was only by hurriedly moving up reinforcements that the Russians were able to hold a defensive line in Finnish territory. This front then remained quiet until the end of the war. --10-- Action on the shore of Lake Ladoga was almost continuous from the beginning to the end of the war. The initial drive broke through the Finnish defenses and reached Leppasilta on 11 December. Finnish counterattacks forced the Russians to retreat to Pitkaranta, where they were again attacked on 18 December. On 6 January, the Finns cut off two Red divisions and a tank brigade. Supplies were flown in by air, but these proved insufficient, and the 18th Division surrendered on 18 February.

The tank brigade followed suit on 29 February. The 168th Division held out until the end of the war. Operations on the Karelian Isthmus ( Map 3a ).--The Russian advance on the Karelian Isthmus was slow form the very beginning. They found themselves forced into narrow corridors between lakes. The corridors were covered with mine fields, tank traps, and machine-gun emplacements, which were effectively camouflaged by the snow that fell in early December. The Finns retreated from advance positions and fell back slowly toward their main line of resistance. In line with their objective of gaining access to the Leningrad-Sortavala-Kemi railroad, the Russians concentrated on their right flank and attempted to break through the Finnish defenses along Lake Suvanto and the Taipale River. The lakes and rivers of southern Finland were not yet frozen, but the Russians succeeded in crossing the Taipale River. Here they were effectively halted by the organized Finnish defensive positions, and no further gains were made in this sector during the remainder of the war. Late in December, the main effort of the Russian Army on the Karelian Isthmus was shifted to the western side. This thrust was also unsuccessful.

By 30 December, the thirteen divisions of the Russian Seventh and Thirteenth Armies were distributed as shown on Map 3a . Unable to pierce the Finnish defenses, the Russians ceased offensive operations in early January. The remainder of the month was relatively quiet, marking the reorganization of the Russian Army for the knockout blow to be delivered in February. The reinforcements that arrived on the Karelian Isthmus were Russia's crack troops. They replaced the poorly organized and badly trained territorials who had suffered terrific losses and had still failed to make appreciable gains. It was reliably reported that the Russian troops originally used in the Finnish campaign were reservists of from 35 to 40 years of age. They were poorly clothed for winter operations, wearing cheap cotton uniforms and lacking warm boots. Some of the early prisoners said they had been called to duty only three months before. --11-- The final drive on the Karelian Isthmus, beginning 1 February 1940, may best be visualized by comparing it to the great drives of the First World War. The Russians were able to throw an overwhelming superiority into the battle and thus exhaust the enemy by continuous activity.

For the first ten days, the Reds kept the Finns under constant pressure. Air and artillery bombardments and infantry attacks alternated throughout the day and night. There were as many as four or five infantry attacks each day. Russian tanks, pushing rollers ahead to detonate the mines, drew armored sledges behind them loaded with infantry. Still the defending Finns beat off the attacks. On 11 February, the offensive reached its climax. In two more days the penetration was made near Summa. Thirteen divisions were operating between Lake Kuolema and Lake Muolaa. From Summa, the Russians drove toward Johannes and cut the communications between the fortress of Koivisto and Viipuri. This fortress had been the bulwark behind the right of the Finnish defensive line. The Finns fell back slowly, fighting determined rear-guard actions, and by 1 March had reached a new line through Viipuri. Russian troops crossed the ice in the Gulf of Finland and outflanked the right of the new position. The eastern end of the defenders' line held its original position behind the Vuoksi Waterway, Lake Suvanto, and the Taipale river.

However, the Finnish cause was hopeless after the Summa break-through, and on 13 March hostilities ceased. Soviet-Finnish war remembered — RT News Tags Anniversary , Conflict , Military , Russia , Europe Joseph Stalin had long wanted to regain Finland – part of the Russian Empire before the Revolution. At the end of November 1939 the Soviet army attacked, expecting a quick victory, but the campaign quickly turned into an icy hell for the poorly prepared Red Army, crippled by the recent purges among officers. The Soviets eventually broke the Finnish defense, but they paid a high price. While some 25,000 Finns were killed, the USSR initially claimed its losses stood at 49,000. It was later revealed the number could be almost three times that. Finland was forced to accept peace terms signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940. The USSR pushed its border west, gaining a large slice of Finnish territory and much of the country's industrial capacity. However, the war dealt a massive blow to the USSR's reputation as world opinion largely supported the Finnish cause. The country was expelled from the League of Nations.

In spite of this, historian Yuri Kilin says Finland too had been nursing plans of an attack against the Bolsheviks. “Although Finland didn't start the war, it had long wanted to capture some Soviet land. The maps were drawn as early as 1919. Finland was never just an innocent victim. It simply didn't plan to attack the USSR alone,” he said. In 1941, soon after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR, the Finns regained their land and moved into Soviet territory. They set up several concentration camps in the city of Petrozavodsk. Out of its 20,000 civilians, 4,000 perished. Lydia Sinukova was 14 at the time, and was one of the prisoners. Now 82 she still remembers the shock she felt then. She recalled: “We woke up in the morning and there was barbed wire all around the city. People were panicking. My mother soon fell ill and was taken to a hospital for prisoners. Two weeks later I was given a scrap of paper saying she had died.” After World War II the 1940 border was restored.

Now, 70 years after the Winter War, enthusiasts take part in reconstructions of the events, saying the key is to remember and come to terms with this bitter part of Russia's past.

Question: The Winter War from 1939 – 1940 was a military conflict between Russia (Soviet Union) and which other country?
Answer: Finland