Sinking of German Battleship Graf Spee Newsreel 1939 70700 : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive Sinking of German Battleship Graf Spee Newsreel 1939 70700 Movies Preview Share or Embed this Item EMBED <iframe src="" width="560" height="384" frameborder="0" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" allowfullscreen></iframe> EMBED (for wordpress.com hosted blogs) [archiveorg 70700SinkingOfTheGrafSpee width=560 height=384 frameborder=0 webkitallowfullscreen=true mozallowfullscreen=true] movies Sinking of German Battleship Graf Spee Newsreel 1939 70700 Topics Kriegsmarine , Graf Spee , River Plate , Uruguay , Montevideo , Royal Navy , Nazi Germany , cruiser , battleship , German navy This 1939 sound newsreel vividly shows the sinking of the German heavy cruiser Admiral Graf Spee.

Admiral Graf Spee was a Deutschland-class heavy cruiser (originally termed Panzerschiff or armoured ship, sometimes referred to as "pocket battleship") which served with the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany during World War II. The vessel was named after Admiral Maximilian von Spee, commander of the East Asia Squadron that fought the battles of Coronel and Falkland Islands in World War I. She was laid down at the Reichsmarinewerft shipyard in Wilhelmshaven in October 1932 and completed by January 1936. The ship was nominally under the 10,000 long tons (10,000 t) limitation on warship size imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, though with a full load displacement of 16,020 long tons (16,280 t), she significantly exceeded it. Armed with six 28 cm (11 in) guns in two triple gun turrets, Admiral Graf Spee and her sisters were designed to outgun any cruiser fast enough to catch them.

Their top speed of 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph) left only a handful of ships in the Anglo-French navies able to catch them and powerful enough to sink them. The ship conducted five non-intervention patrols during the Spanish Civil War in 1936–1938, and participated in the Coronation Review for King George VI in May 1937. Admiral Graf Spee was deployed to the South Atlantic in the weeks before the outbreak of World War II, to be positioned in merchant sea lanes once war was declared. Between September and December 1939, the ship sank nine ships totaling 50,089 gross register tons (GRT), before being confronted by three British cruisers at the Battle of the River Plate on 13 December. Admiral Graf Spee inflicted heavy damage on the British ships, but she too was damaged, and was forced to put into port at Montevideo. Convinced by false reports of superior British naval forces approaching his ship, Hans Langsdorff, the commander of the ship, ordered the vessel to be scuttled.

The ship was partially broken up in situ, though part of the ship remains visible above the surface of the water. This film is part of the Periscope Film LLC archive, one of the largest historic military, transportation, and aviation stock footage collections in the USA. Entirely film backed, this material is available for licensing in 24p HD and 2K. For more information visit 1000+ images about Admiral Graf Spee on Pinterest | The battle, Montevideo and The germans Forward February 1940, The ships company of HMS, 'Exeter' and HMS, 'Ajax' passing Big Ben, given a rousing welcome in London after the destruction of the German battleship 'Admiral Graf Spee' which was eventually scuttled at the Battle of the River Plate (Photo by Popperfoto/Getty Images) See More Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939 Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939 Montevideo Introduction The battle of the River Plate is one of the most famous naval battles of the Second World War, despite only involving four ships.

Part of its fame came because it took place in the “phoney war” period and part because of the unjustifiably high reputation of the Admiral Graf Spee, the German pocket-battleship involved in the battle. The Graf Spee had been designed while Germany was still publicly obeying the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. This limited her capital ships to a standard displacement of 10,000 tons, and required her to seek permission to use anything above an 11in gun. Work on the design of the Graf Spee and her two sister ships began in 1923. A large number of designers were considered, before in 1926 it was decided to build lightly armoured ships, armed with 28cm (11in) guns and with a speed of 26kts. Funding was approved in 1928, and the first member of the class was laid down soon afterwards. The resulting ships were officially known as Panzerschiffe (armoured ships), despite being very poorly armoured - the side armour on the Graf Spee was only 3.1-2.4in thick.

Their design speed was 26kts, but in trials all three ships would reach 28kts. Their six 11in guns were carried in two three-gun turrets, with another eight 5.9in guns in single turrets. She was powered by diesel engines. These gave her a much longer range than turbine powered ships, but at the cost of a decrease in reliability. The new ships caused something of a panic in Britain and France, where their combat ability was over-rated. In Britain they were given the rather over dramatic name of “pocket battleships”, although in fact they rather more resembled the British battlecruisers of World War One, a type of ship that had proved to be very vulnerable to German gunfire. Their top speed of 28kts did make them fast enough to escape from most battleships that were in existence when they were being built. The two British interwar battleships, Nelson and Rodney were also too slow to catch them, while France and the United States were still relying on First World War vintage ships.

The only British capital ships with the speed to catch them were the battlecruisers Renown, Repulse and Hood, each of which was better armoured and armed than the Graf Spee. However, by the time the war broke out France had built two Dunkerque class ships, each faster than the Graf Spee, while the British King George V class ships were approaching completion. HMS Exeter, 1934, Panama Canal Zone A bigger threat to the Graf Spee came from the numerous 8in cruisers of the Royal Navy. The British had an existing tactic for dealing with a pocket battleship using two 8in cruisers, which involved them attacking from different directions to confuse the enemy’s fire control system. HMS Exeter had played the part of a battlecruiser in a pre-war exercise that had tested out this theory. At the River Plate the Graf Spee would be faced by one 8in and two 6in cruisers. HMS Exeter had been launched in 1929, carried six 8in guns and was protected by a 4in armoured box.

HMS Achilles and HMS Ajax had been launched in 1932 and 1934 respectively, carried eight 6in guns and were protected by a 3.5in armoured box. All three ships were capable of over 30kts. They would be outgunned, but not out-armoured. The Admiral Graf Spee put to sea on 23 August 1939 under the command of Captain Langsdorff, and was safely in the Atlantic by the start of the war. On 26 September Hitler allowed the navy to begin commerce raiding, and the Graf Spee began a moderately successful cruise that would see her sink nine ships totalling just over 50,000 tons. The British and French responded with a massive deployment of ships – during October seven hunting groups were active in the Atlantic, although the most dangerous allied ships were operating to the north of the Graf Spee. After sinking five ships in the South Atlantic between 30 September and 22 October, Captain Langsdorff took the Graf Spee into the Indian Ocean, sinking the Africa Shell on 15 November before returning to the Atlantic.

This move successfully convinced the British that the Graf Spee had left the Atlantic, and two of the Hunting Groups spend 28 November-2 December patrolling south of the Cape of Good Hope. By the time the British were in place, the Graf Spee was already back in the South Atlantic. Her diesel engines were now beginning to cause concern, and on 24 November Captain Langsdorff informed his officers that the Graf Spee would need to return to Germany for an overhaul. Before returning home Langsdorff wanted to achieve some final successes. He sank two ships off the west coast of Africa on 2-3 December, and then turned west, heading towards South America and the estuary of the River Plate, where he expected to find a large number of merchant ships. On 7 December the Graf Spee sank her final victim, the British ship Streonshalh. With the end of her cruise in sight, Langsdorff decided to ignore his orders not to engage with enemy warships.

The logic behind these orders was that even a successful clash with an Allied cruiser might have inflicted damage on the Graf Spee that would have forced her home for repairs, but as she was about to return to Germany anyway, that consideration was no longer relevant. On the night of 12-13 December the Graf Spee took up a position off the River Plate, searching for a four-ship convoy, escorted by an auxiliary cruiser. At the same time as the Graf Spee was heading to the River Plate, so was the British Hunting Group G under Commodore Harwood. From his latest information Harwood had calculated that the Graf Spee could reach Rio de Janeiro on 12 December, the River Plate on 13 December or the Falkland Islands on 14 December. He decided to take his three battle-worthy cruisers (Exeter, Ajax and Achilles) to the River Plate while his fourth cruisers, HMS Cumberland underwent a refit at the Falklands. The Battle On the morning of 13 December the British and German ships were sailing on converging courses. The Graf Spee was to the north, sailing south east, with the British cruisers to the south, sailing north east.

At 5.52 am the Graf Spee’s lookout spotted two masts on the horizon. The Graf Spee’s lookout position was much higher than that on the British ships, so for some time the British were unaware that they were about to encounter the German ship. At first Captain Langsdorff believed that he had found his convoy, and continued to sail in the same direction. At 6.00am the Exeterwas identified, but Achilles and Ajaxwere misidentified as destroyers. At this point the British had not yet sighted the Von Spee. Captain Langsdorff decided to attack the British force, and increased his speed. His diesels produced a cloud of dark smoke, which was spotted from the British ships. At 6.14am Commodore Harwood detached the Exeter to investigate the smoke, which he still expected to be a merchant ship. This illusion was very quickly shattered – at 6.16am the British finally realised that they had found their target. All three British captains knew exactly what to do in this situation.

By chance Harwood’s three ships were in exactly the right positions to carry out his plans – HMS Exeter was heading north west, and would be to the right of the Graf Spee, while Achilles and Ajax were cutting across her bows, and would soon be to her left. Harwood’s plan was for his ships to close with the Graf Spee at full speed to bring the shorter range guns of the two 6in cruisers into action. His divided ships would also be able to correct each others shooting. Langsdorff now had to decide whether he should concentrate his two main turrets on a single target, or split his fire. At 6.17am he opened fire on the Exeterwith all of his 11in guns, straddling her with his third salvo at 6.23am. Meanwhile, to the north east the Ajaxand Achilles opened fire at 6.20am. The Exetersoon suffered heavy damage. The Graf Spee’s eighth salvo knocked out B turret, while splinters hit the bridge, killing most of the officers and wounding Captain Bell. The ship was briefly out of control before the captain was able to take command from the rear of the ship.

The Ajaxand Achilles were now in a good position to launch a torpedo attack, and so Captain Langsdorff ordered a turn to the north to make the Graf Spee a harder target for torpedoes. At the same time another 11in salve hit the Exeter, causing fires all along the ship. Seeing this, the Graf Spee’s 11in guns turned on the Ajax and fired a salvo that straddled her. Meanwhile the Exeterhad come into a good position to launch her starboard torpedoes. A first salvo of three missed because of the Graf Spee’s turn to the north, and so the Exeterbegan to turn to use her bow torpedo tubes. Seeing this, Langsdorff turned his 11in guns back onto the Exeter. At 6.39am an 11in shell hit her in the navigator’s office, followed by another hit which knocked out A turret and a third hit which knocked out most of her electrical circuits. Only the rear Y turret was still firing, aimed manually by the Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Jennings, who was standing on the roof.

Eventually floodwater would reach the power supply to Y turret, knocking it out of action. At that point Commodore Harwood ordered the Exeterto leave the actions (7.30am). The Graf Spee now turned to the Ajaxand the Achilles. At 6.40am the Achilles was damaged by a near miss, which briefly knocked her off course. The two British cruisers then suffered from a series of misunderstandings which reduced the accuracy of their fire until they were sorted out at around 7.08am (most involved the Seafox aircraft from Ajax). At 7.16am the Graf Spee turned to the south, apparently to finish off the Exeter. Commodore Harwood ordered Ajaxand Achilles to close with the Graf Spee to protect the badly wounded Exeter. The ploy worked, and the Graf Spee turned to the north west and opened fire on the Ajaxwith her 11in guns. She soon scored telling hits. At 7.25am the Ajaxsuffered a heavy hit, losing both of her aft turrets, and at 7.38 she lost her topmast.

Commodore Harwood was very badly outclassed and at 7.40am he turned away to the east, intended to renew the fight after dark. He now only had twelve 6in guns, while the Graf Spee was apparently undamaged, and was firing with all of her main armament. Captain Langsdorff now made the most crucial decision of the battle. He had been wounded twice, and even knocked out for a short period. His judgement would appear to have been somewhat impaired by this. The Graf Spee had been hit several times, but had only lost two of her secondary guns and suffered minor damage to her galley. The only potentially serious damage was a six foot wide hole in the bow, well above the waterline. Captain Langsdorff would later make much of this hole, claiming that it made his ship unfit for the North Atlantic. None of this damage was relevant to the decision Langsdorff now made. Instead of turning back to finish off the badly mauled British squadron, he decided to continue on to the west, and seek safety in Montevideo.

It is generally agreed that he could have turned on the Exeterand sunk her with little difficulty, and that the two British light cruisers would probably have come to her rescue, at great cost to themselves. However, having decided that the Graf Spee needed repairs before she would be fit to return to Germany, it is possible to understand Langsdorff’s decision. He had already forced the Exeterout of the battle, and had badly damaged one of the remaining ships. To a certain extent they were no longer relevant. They would not have been able to prevent him leaving Montevideo if he had chose to fight his way out, but a luck shot or a torpedo hit in the last minutes of the fight could have caused critical damage. Langsdorff would almost certainly still have gone into port even if he had sunk all three British ships. The battle now developed into a long stern chase. Ajaxand Achilles attempted to follow the Graf Spee at a safe different, to make sure she was indeed heading into port. This section of the battle was not without incident.

At 10.10 the Achilles came dangerously close to the Graf Spee, and was nearly hit by an 11in salvo, while at 3.30pm the British sighted a strange ship that was briefly taken to be a German Hipper class cruiser. She was eventually recognised as a modern streamlined British merchant ship. The three ships exchanged salvoes on a number of further occasions, although the only effect was to hide the Graf Spee behind smoke for some time. Finally, at 11.17pm the Achilles was recalled when it was clear that the Graf Spee was about to enter Montevideo. The two British cruisers took up a position off the River Plate, and began a nervous watch over the estuary. Montevideo The scene of the action now moved from the open sea to the port of Montevideo. The most important figures over the next few days would be Sir Henry McCall, the British Naval Attaché to Uruguay, Argentine and Brazil, and the head of British Intelligence in the area, Captain Rex Miller, whose office overlooked the harbour at Montevideo. On 14 December they rowed around the German ship looking for damage.

All they found was the hole in the bows and some superficial damage to the superstructure. They assumed that she must have suffered some serious hidden damage, perhaps to her fire-control system, or was very short on ammunition. Believing this, they spent the rest of the first day attempting to make sure that the Graf Spee was only allowed the 24 hours in port she was allowed under international law. On the next day they were in contact with Commodore Harwood, and discovered that the Graf Spee was in fact still intact. They now had to change tack completely, and find ways to keep her in port. One method they used was to take advantage of the 24 hour rule. This stated that if a merchant ship from one belligerent nation left a neutral port, any hostile warship in that port would have to wait for 24 hours before leaving. A number of British merchant ships that were in Montevideo at the time were sent to sea at regular intervals. They also considered sabotaging the Graf Spee but dismissed the idea because of the impact it would have on neutral opinion. Somewhat ironically Langsdorff was attempting the exact same thing.

He convinced the Uruguayan authorities to allow him to stay for another 72 hours and would have liked longer to carry out the repairs he believed to be needed. The deadline for his departure would eventually be 8.00pm on 17 December. While Miller and McCall were doing their best to keep the Graf Spee in port, British reinforcements were rushing towards the River Plate. Harwood’s last ship, the Cumberland, arrived from the Falklands on 14 December. She carried eight 8in guns, making her 25% more powerful than the Exeter. This more than made up for the damaged guns on Ajax, and gave Commodore Harwood a slightly more squadron than he had had during the battle. Cumberland, Ajaxand Achilles were the only ships that Harwood could expect to have by 17 December. The battlecruiser Renown and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal were on their way via Rio, but couldn’t arrive before 19 December. Three more cruisers - Dorsetshire, Shropshire and Neptune were also on their way, as was the 3rd Destroyer Division, but none of these ships could arrive in time in the Graf Spee chose to fight her way out.

It is normally stated that the Graf Spee would have been able to overwhelm the British squadron outside the River Plate. This is not an entirely convincing argument. The Graf Spee had used 57.5% of her 11in ammunition, most of it presumably during the battle on 13 December. She had crippled Exeterbut both of the light cruisers had survived the battle. It would seem likely that a fight with an equally strong cruiser squadron on 17 December would have exhausted the Graf Spee’s ammunition. This was certainly one of Langsdorff’s chief concerns. On 15 one of his artillery officers believed that he had sighted the Renown’s fighting top through the ship’s range finders, although by 1939 that fighting top had been removed. If Renown was present, then the Ark Royal was probably with her. Langsdorff even received instructions from Berlin to photograph the Ark Royal, as the Germans believed they had already sunk her! Miller and McCall helped to reinforce this belief by leaking a request for refuelling facilities at a nearby Argentine naval base.

Langsdorff now believed that he was faced with a battlecruiser, an aircraft carrier, three or four cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. If this had been true then the Graf Spee would have been very badly outclassed. He asked Berlin for advice – if he could not fight his way out, should the Graf Spee be scuttled or interned? He was told that the best option was for him to fight his way out, but if he had no other choice to scuttle the ship rather than risk internment. On 6.61pm on 17 December the Graf Spee set sail, heading out into the estuary. At least 800 of her crew had been transferred to the German steamship Tacoma, which then followed the Graf Spee out to sea. At 7.56pm smoke was seen coming from the Graf Spee, followed by an enormous explosion. Rather than risk the Graf Spee falling into British hands after she ran out of ammunition after a battle with the ghost fleet outside the River Plate, Captain Langsdorff had decided to destroy his ship in the shallow water of the River Plate.

The explosions were designed to prevent the British from examining the design of his ship. The crew of the Graf Spee were soon interned in Argentina and on 20 December, after writing a letter to Hitler, Captain Langsdorff committed suicide. The destruction of the Graf Spee was treated as a great triumph in Britain. It was the first real Allied success of the war, which had begun with the defeat of Poland and then the start of the “phoney war”. Hitler was predictably furious with Langsdorff’s decision to destroy his own ship, while the fate of the Graf Spee put the entire concept of commerce raiding by warships in doubt. Admiral Raeder issued new orders to the navy, which stated that “The German warship and her crew are to fight with all their strength to the last shell; until they win or go down with their flag flying”. This order would certainly be obeyed by the captain and crew of the Bismarck, at the end of their sortie into the Atlantic in 1941. In the Wake of the Graf Spee, Enrique Dick .

Looks at the life of Hein Dick, a crewman on the Graf Spee who was interned in Argentina after the Battle of the River Plate, married an Argentinean, then had to struggle to get back to the country after he was deported back to Germany at the end of the Second World War. The first half, looking at his military career is interesting, but the second half, from the internment onwards is totally fascinating, and covers a neglected area. [ read full review ] The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Volume I: The Defensive, S. W. Roskill . This first volume in the British official history of the war at sea covers the period from the outbreak of the war through to the first British disasters in the Pacific in December 1941. Amongst other topics it covers the Norwegian campaign, the evacuation from Dunkirk and the first two years of the Battle of the Atlantic. The text is meticulously researched, and is rooted in a detailed study of wartime records, both British and German.

[ see more ] The Battle of the River Plate, 1939: Admiral Graf Spee at Bay Admiral Graf Spee and the Battle of The River Plate written by: AMT • edited by: Lamar Stonecypher • updated: 2/7/2011 The Battle of the River Plate involved the most famous German pocket battleship: Admiral Graf Spee, and three British cruisers operating in the South Atlantic. One of the first surface engagements of the Second World War, it ended in the scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee outside Montevideo harbor slide 1 of 7 Pocket Battleship Admiral Graf Spee: Raider by Necessity The Deutschland class German pocket battleships were designed to push the limits of the Versailles Treaty, which stipulated that the German Navy could possess no vessel with a displacement exceeding 10,000 tons. Admiral Graf Spee, the third and last of this unique class, was commissioned in January, 1936 and was the largest of her sisters - weighing at least 12,000 tons when not fully crewed, stocked, and armed.

The Versailles Treaty's naval stipulations had been designed to prevent Germany from operating any warship larger than a cruiser, and so incapable of posing a threat to British or French fleets heavily equipped with battleships. German naval designers responded by producing a class of vessels that could threaten British and French maritime shipping while evading any ship large enough to defeat these raiders in direct combat. Named for the commander of Germany's Far East Squadron, Admiral Maximilian von Spee (the term Graf comes from his title as a member of the German nobility, and is equivalent in meaning to "count"). This squadron was destroyed by a superior British naval force in the Battle of the Falkland Islands in the first years of World War I. slide 2 of 7 Admiral Graf Spee's World War II Raids Captained by Hans Langsdorf (spelled in German sources as Langsdorff, but often spelled without the second f), Graf Spee shipped out to raid British shipping as the Second World War erupted in September 1939, and late that month begain conducting commerce raids in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. Admiral Graf Spee's assaults on British and allied merchant ships threw the Royal Navy into turmoil.

She sank ship after ship, and even captured a number wholly intact and sent them to Germany as prizes. In all, Graf Spee ship sinkings totalled nine vessels comprising more than fifty thousand tons of shipping capacity. The 8000 ton liner Huntsman was captured and later sunk with a cargo of tea, and the 10,000 ton liner Doric Star was sunk with a load of animal products as Hans Langsdorf brought his vessel back into the Atlantic from the Indian Ocean. Of particular note in this spree, aside from the fact that the Royal Navy dedicated more than two dozen capital ships and cruisers to hunt this lone raider, is that no lives were lost in any of the sinkings. Maritime law was strictly followed by the Graf Spee's crew at the behest of her captain, and though the German raider was determined in its prosecution of British shipping, every vessel attacked was halted, boarded, and its crew evacuated prior to being sunk. Some crews were interned on the Graf Spee or sent on a prison ship, the Altmark, back to Germany, and others were allowed to retreat to their life boats while their location was radioed to nearby ships so that they could be rescued.

This concern for life and law was, sadly, set aside during the long years of the Second World War by both sides. slide 3 of 7 The Opening Moves in the Battle of the River Plate Unfortunately for this unique German pocket battleship, Admiral Graf Spee's final victim, the Doric Star, was able to radio an alert to the Royal Navy before being taken and sunk. The commander of the nearest British hunting party, Commodore Henry Harwood, correctly surmised that the Graf Spee would make for the River Plate - a major shipping lane east of the border between Uruguay and Argentina. The former was quite friendly to the Allies, and a good deal of cargo transited these waters. Harwood sailed to a point near the River Plate with three cruisers - the heavy cruiser Exeter armed with 8" guns, and the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles equipped with 6" guns. Unaware that she was to be ambushed, Graf Spee came into sight of the British cruiser force on the 13th of December, making for the River Plate area as anticipated.

Upon sighting the British cruisers, the Graf Spee's spotters appear to have mistaken the light cruisers for destroyers, leading to the assumption that the vessels were guarding a British convoy. Graf Spee moved to engage. slide 4 of 7 The advent of radio technology made it more difficult for a powerful vessel like the Graf Spee to conduct its mission undetected, and after leaving a trail of sunken merchant vessels in her wake, Admiral Graff Spee was brought to bear by three British cruisers in The Battle of the River Plate. 1939 was a bad year for the enemies of Germany, as Poland had fallen in less than a month and U-boat attacks already threatened Britain's vital shipping lanes. The Battle of the River Plate resulted in a badly needed victory for the Royal Navy, which had already lost the battleship Royal Oak in a daring U-boat raid on the British naval base at Scapa Flow and the aircraft carrier Courageous to a U-boat in the Atlantic.

Though Admiral Graf Spee badly damaged a British heavy cruiser in the engagement, she herself received significant damage to her superstructure and was scuttled by her captain, Hans Langsdorf, outside the port of Montevideo in order to spare his crew from being killed in a hopeless battle against what he believed to be a much-reinforced squadron waiting in ambush. slide 5 of 7 The Battle of the River Plate: Admiral Graf Spee versus the Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles In the early morning hours of the 13th of December, the four vessels approached one another to begin the Battle of the River Plate. The three cruisers split into two groups. One was composed of just the Exeter, whose six 8" guns had the best chance of penetrating and damaging Admiral Graf Spee's tough hide. The other comprised Ajax and Achilles working in tandem to do what damage they could with their lighter 6" guns. By splitting his forces, Harwood hoped to divert his opponent's fire between the threats. It is unknown when Hans Langsdorf realized that he was facing a full three cruisers, but once he had moved to engage his choices were limited.

His pocket battleship could not outrun cruisers, so he had to rely on his superior firepower to carry him through the battle. Ordering Admiral Graf Spee's diesel engines to full power, the vessel accelerated towards her maximum speed of 28 knots and opened fire with her 11" guns at just under ten nautical miles, firing at the Exeter. slide 6 of 7 The Battle of the River Plate: German Tactical Victory Admiral Graf Spee bracketed the Exeter on her third salvo. Minutes later, her first shells struck home: a near miss showered Exeter's superstructure with shrapnel, killing the exposed crews manning the torpedo tubes. Within a several more minutes more of the deadly 11" shells struck one of Exeter's turrets, taking out a third of her combat power and killing most of the bridge crew and destroying most of her communications equipment. Ajax and Achilles accelerated to render aid to their embattled comrade. Five minutes after Exeter's turret was struck, they made a torpedo run across Admiral Graf Spee's bow at a range of about six nautical miles.

Though the torpedoes missed, they drew fire away from the Exeter, allowing her to heel over in a hard turn to unmask her surviving torpedo tubes and let the crews fire at Graf Spee. Unfortunately for Exeter, this maneuver was interrupted by two more devastating strikes from 11" shells which destroyed another turret and tore a hole in her hull. Now listing dangerously to starboard, Exeter continued to fight. One of her 8" shells made it through some of Admiral Graf Spee's decks and damaged a vital fuel system. Recognizing the danger of prolonging combat, the German pocket battleship turned away from the attacking cruisers. But Exeter's captain did not let her go without a fight. Badly damaged and with only two of six guns operational, Exeter tried to keep pace with the Graf Spee for another forty minutes, until another near miss cascaded water across the striken heavy cruiser's sole surviving turret, short circuiting its electronics. Exeter was out of action.

slide 7 of 7 Tactically Victorious, the Embattled Admiral Graf Spee is Scuttled Outside Montevideo The now defenseless Exeter would have been doomed if alone, but the Ajax and Achilles fired furiously at the Graf Spee with their 6" guns. Incapable of destroying Graf Spee, these weapons could still inflict considerable damage to less well armored portions of the ship and so they could not be ignored. And more critically, they still had torpedoes to use. Ajax fired a spread at her enemy, and in response was struck by an 11" shell that knocked out half of her primary armament. But the tenacious attack served its purpose: Admiral Graf Spee turned away from the fight and made for Montevideo at full speed. The Graf Spee made Montevideo in the early morning hours of the 14th of December. As it was a neutral port, Graf Spee could only remain for 72 hours, and the Germans could not hope to complete repairs in only three days.

Making matters worse, the British spread rumors of massive reinforcements arriving in short order - although only the damaged Ajax, the Achilles, and another heavy cruiser, the Cumberland would be in the area for some time. Efforts to secure Uruguayan permission for Graf Spee to remain in harbor for more than 72 hours were fruitless. Faced with the prospect of his crew dying in hopeless battle, Hans Langsdorf sailed with a skeleton crew to the mouth of the port, and had the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee scuttled. Several days later, he committed suicide to demonstrate that he chose to scuttle Graf Spee not out of cowardice or fear of personal injury, but to save the lives of his sailors. He is buried in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Graf Spee remains where she sank at the conclusion of The Battle of The River Plate.

Sources: Janes Fighting Ships of World War II, 1946 Janes Publishing Company, 1994 reprint edition Barrie Pitt, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1977 Time Life Books Winston Churchill, The Second World War, 1959 Time Life Images courtesy of (respectively) Ferdinand Urbahns, Deutsches Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive), United Kingdom Government, United States Navy: all via Wiki Commons ◄ ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ► WALTER HENRY KIVELL - THE SCUTTLING OF THE POCKET BATTLESHIP GRAF SPEE WALTER HENRY KIVELL The Scuttling of the Battleship Admiral Graf Spee at River Plate An article from the Taranaki Daily News Family Photos - kindly supplied by Karen Kivell (Taiapa) Walter Henry Kivell born at Petone 1914. Walter joined the Navy in his teens and was on board the Achilles in December of 1939 when the German Battleship Graf Spee was scuttled in the River Plate.

GRAF SPEE SCUTTLED TRIED TO FOOL ACHILLES SEAMAN INTERVIEWED How through a cunning ruse, the Admiral Graf Spee tried to divert H.M.S. Achilles from the running fight as she fled into the River Plate to find refuge for her battlescarred hull at Montevideo, was revealed by Able Seaman W. Kivell, at present on leave from the Achilles, in the course of an interview with a Daily News reporter at Hawera. Another little known feature of the engagement revealed by Able Seaman Kivell was that for several hours many aboard the Achilles were under the impression that they were fighting the Admiral Scheer, the Admiral Graf Spee's sister ship. Able Seaman Kivell is a son of Mrs H.M. Wills Hawera. Called from his bed in the forecastle to his station in the B gun turret, that is the second turret forward, shortly after 6 am on the day of the fight, Able Seaman Kivell said that he and his mates were told that the fight was with the Admiral Scheer, a sister ship of the Admiral Graf Spee and almost identical in appearance.

Like the majority of a warship's complement during an engagement, Able Seaman Kivell and his companions did not sight the enemy. Shut away in the armour- plated gun turret they went about their deadly work, taking orders from the control tower, and firing as ordered. Throughout the day, and well into the night the men remained at their stations in the turret, each busy with his appointed task - all the while thinking that their efforts were intended for the Admiral Scheer. Then, late at night, as the Admiral Graf Spee was relentlessly pursued into the entrance to the River Plate, she wirelessed the Achilles, saying that she had sunk a British merchant ship, which had been in the vicinity some time in the forenoon - would the Achilles pick up the survivors? The message was cited as coming from the Admiral Graf Spee, and it was then that the men knew that they had been fighting the Admiral Graf Spee. But the Achilles did not turn back, the Ajax ensuring the message was false.

Describing the impressions of the fight, Able Seaman Kivell said that when the engagement opened the Achilles was firing at the enemy at a range of about seven miles, but later this was reduced to about five - a more effective range for the guns of the lighter British ships. Speaking of the inglorious end of the German pocket battleship, Able Seaman Kivell said that the Achilles and other British vessels, in the belief that the Admiral Graf Spee would fight, were waiting outside the River Plate in battle formation. When the news was received that the Admiral Graf Spee had sealed her own doom, the Achilles and other vessels went closer towards the scene to see the ship burning fiercely after being blown up. Able Seaman Kivell, who has 14 days leave from his ship is a married man with one child, and had been in the navy for a number of years prior to joing the Achilles. When H.M. S. Diomede left the New Zealand station in 1935 in the course of an errand during the Abyssinian trouble, Able Seaman Kivell was aboard , finally leaving the ship in England, where he joined the new Achilles. He has been on the Achilles ever since.

Able Seaman Kivell had some of his schooling at Hawera. Although he subsequently worked at Stratford and Eltham, he entered the naval service from Hawera. Walter also served on other ships including the Monowai, Philomel, Diomede, Tamaki, Gambia. After his discharge from the navy Walter worked for New Zealand Railways. He was married to Thelma Smith and they had two sons, Walter James Henry Kivell and Stanley Trevor Kivell. Walter died of cancer in December 1983 at Auckland. The family resided at 10 Wellpark Avenue, Grey Lynn, Auckland. HMS Achilles a Leander Class Cruiser built by Cammell Laird and laid down on the 11th June 1931, launched 1st september 1932 and completed 6th October 1933, served with the new Zealand Navy from 1937 to 1943, HMS Achilles served in the South Atlantic 1939 taking a major role in the battle of the River Plate against the Graf Spee, firing a total of 1242 6-inch shells in the action.

receiving splinter damage from near misses. Loaned to the newly formed New Zealand navy (along with her sister ship HMS Leander) 1940 to 1943, returning to the home Fleet 1943 - 1944 and then to the Pacific Fleet in 1945. In 1948 she was sold to the Indian Navy and renamed Delhi. arriving there after refit in September 1948. In the 1953 film Battle of the River Plate she played her self in the film. She again saw service in the action to seize Goa by a small naval force in 1961. Seeing no further service until 1969 when she visited Australia, new Zealand and Fiji. after which she was based on harbor duty at Cochin finally being paid of in 1977. Specifications for H.M.S. ACHILLES Displacement: 7,030 tons Speed: 32.5kt Complement: 550 Armament: Eight 6 inch guns in pairs.

Eight 4 inch anti-aircraft guns in pairs and eight 2pdr anti-aircraft guns in pairs as well as twelve 0.5 inch machine guns in fours. Eight 21 inch torpedo tubes in pairs and 1 aircraft. Information kindly suplied by Flora Chisnall Graf Spee Scuttled German Navy : Castle Films : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive Graf Spee Scuttled German Navy Movies Preview Share or Embed this Item EMBED <iframe src="" width="560" height="384" frameborder="0" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" allowfullscreen></iframe> EMBED (for wordpress.com hosted blogs) [archiveorg GrafSpeeScuttledGermanNavy width=560 height=384 frameborder=0 webkitallowfullscreen=true mozallowfullscreen=true] Topics WWII propaganda newsreel The scuttling of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee is shown, off the coast of Uruguay in December of 1939. Features footage of the Graf Spee's captain Hans Langsdorff, and the aftermath of the Battle of the River Plate.

Various British ships from Hunting Group 'G' of the South Atlantic Squadron (HMS Exeter, HMS Ajax, HMS Cumberland and HMS Achilles) are shown along with Beagle Class destroyers such as H30. Producer Castle Films BATTLESHIP GRAF SPEE SCUTTLED PART 1 - German Navy 2048 - YouTube BATTLESHIP GRAF SPEE SCUTTLED PART 1 - German Navy 2048 Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Uploaded on Nov 3, 2009 Attention! A new complete version of this film is now available at: The scuttling of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee is shown, off the coast of Uruguay in December of 1939. Features footage of the Graf Spee's captain Hans Langsdorff, and the aftermath of the Battle of the River Plate.

Various British ships from Hunting Group 'G' of the South Atlantic Squadron (HMS Exeter, HMS Ajax, HMS Cumberland and HMS Achilles) are shown along with Beagle Class destroyers such as H30. This film is part of the Periscope Film LLC archive, one of the largest historic military, transportation, and aviation stock footage collections in the USA. Entirely film backed, this material is available for licensing in 24p HD. For more information visit Category BBC NEWS | Americas | Graf Spee's eagle rises from deep Graf Spee's eagle rises from deep The eagle's swastika was hidden as a mark of consideration Divers have salvaged a 2m (6ft) bronze imperial eagle from the German World War II battleship Graf Spee that was scuttled in the River Plate. Three divers had to loosen 145 bolts securing the 300kg (661lb) eagle to the stern of the craft in the muddy waters off Uruguay's capital, Montevideo. "The eagle is really impressive... it's all virtually intact," said team leader Hector Bado. The ship was scuttled in December 1939 to stop it falling into enemy hands.

Mr Bado told Associated Press news agency the eagle had a wingspan of 2.8m (9ft) and a special barge with a crane was needed to raise it from the river. See more Graf Spee facts The barge brought the eagle back to port on Friday with a yellow tarpaulin covering the swastika at its base - out of consideration for those who still hold strong feelings against the symbol of Nazi Germany, Mr Bado said. When it emerged from the water held by steel cables by the crane, it was just spectacular, something unreal Hector Bado In pictures: Earlier salvaging The eagle was taken to a customs warehouse, but not before curious cruise ship guests had had a chance to disembark and get some snapshots. The ship has lain in waters only 10m deep since its scuttling - until a project financed by private investors from the US and Europe with the backing of the Uruguayan government sought to salvage it. The operation has now been going two years. Previous items raised included a 27-tonne section of the battleship's command tower and a range-finding device for gunners. It is hoped the vessel will become a tourist attraction in Montevideo.

The Graf Spee was once a symbol of German naval might. In the early days of World War II it roamed the South Atlantic, sinking as many as nine Allied merchant ships. But during the Battle of the River Plate it received several direct hits and took refuge in Montevideo harbour. Uruguay, under diplomatic pressure from Britain, ordered the Graf Spee out to sea. And there she was scuttled by her captain, Hans Langsdorff. Capt Langsdorff committed suicide in a Buenos Aires naval camp three days later. Admiral Graf Spee - World War II - Kriegsmarine 6 × 28 cm (11 in.) SK C/28 (2 x 3) 8 × 15 cm (5.9 in.) SK C/28 8 × 53.3 cm (21 in.) torpedo tubes Admiral Graf Spee - Design & Construction: A Deutschland-class panzerschiffe (armored ship), Admiral Graf Spee's design was intended to nominally conform to the naval restrictions set forth by the Treaty of Versailles which ended World War I . These limited future German warships to 10,000 long tons.

Though the vessels of Deutschland-class exceeded this displacement, the German designers devised numerous methods to reduce weight. These included the incorporation diesel propulsion and the large-scale use of welding. The class' armament centered on six 11-inch guns mounted in two triple turrets. As a result, the Deutschland-class ships were able to deliver a potent attack despite their relatively small size. As a result of this, they became know in other navies as "pocket battleships." Capable of around 28 knots, they were able to out-gun many of the foreign warships that were fast enough to catch them. Laid down at Reichsmarinewerft in Wilhelmshaven on October 1, 1932, the new panzerschiffe was named for Vice Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee who had defeated the British at Coronel on November 1, 1914, before being killed at the Battle of the Falklands a month later. Launched on June 30, 1934, the vessel was sponsored by the late admiral's daughter. Work continued on Admiral Graf Spee for another eighteen months.

Commissioned on January 6, 1936, with Captain Conrad Patzig in command, new cruiser drew much of its crew from the old battleship Braunschweig. Departing Wilhelmshaven, Admiral Graf Spee spent the early part of the year conducting sea trials. Upon their completion, it was designated flagship of the German Navy. Admiral Graf Spee - Prewar Operations: With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Admiral Graf Spee entered the Atlantic Ocean and commenced non-intervention patrols off the coast of Spain. After conducting three patrols over the next ten months, the cruiser put into Spithead in late May 1937 to take part in the Coronation Review for King George VI. At the conclusion of the ceremonies, Admiral Graf Spee returned to Spain where it relieved its sister ship, Admiral Scheer . Returning home late in the year, it participated in fleet maneuvers and made a goodwill call to Sweden. Following a final non-intervention patrol in early 1938, command of the ship passed to Captain Hans Langsdorff in October.

Embarking on a series of goodwill visits to Atlantic ports, Admiral Graf Spee also appeared in a naval review in honor of Hungarian regent Admiral Miklós Horthy. After visits to Portuguese ports in the late spring of 1939, the ship returned to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Graf Spee - World War II Begins: Anticipating the beginning of World War II , German leader Adolf Hitler ordered Admiral Graf Spee to sail for the South Atlantic to be in position to attack Allied shipping. Departing Wilhelmshaven on August 21, Langsdorff steered south and rendezvoused with his supply ship, Altmark , on September 1. Alerted to the beginning of hostilities, he was directed to stringently adhere to prize law when attacking merchant vessels. This required the raider to search ships for war materials before sinking them and ensuring the safety of their crews. On September 11, one of Admiral Graf Spee's floatplanes spotted the heavy cruiser HMS Cumberland. Successfully evading the British ship, Langsdorff received orders on September 26 directing him to initiate a campaign of commerce raiding against Allied shipping.

On September 30, the cruiser's floatplane sank the steamer Clement. To ensure the crew's safety, Langsdorff radioed Brazilian naval authorities and informed them of the attack. Alerted to the presence of a German raider in the South Atlantic the Royal and French Navies formed eight groups consisting of four carriers, two battleships, one battlecruiser, and sixteen cruisers to hunt down Langsdorff. Admiral Graf Spee - Raiding: On October 5, Admiral Graf Spee captured Newton Beach and two days later sank the cargo vessel Ashlea. Though the former initially was used as a prisoner transport, it proved too slow and was soon discarded. Taking Huntsman on October 10, Langsdorff retained the steamer and took it to a rendezvous with Altmark a week later. Transferring prisoners to his supply ship, he then sank Huntsman. After sinking Trevanion on October 22, Langsdorff steered for the Indian Ocean in an attempt confuse his pursuers. Sinking the tanker Africa Shell on November 15, Admiral Graf Spee turned for the Atlantic in order to refuel from Altmark.

While rendezvousing on November 26, the cruiser's crew made efforts to alter the ship's silhouette by building a fake turret and a dummy funnel. Continuing his campaign, Langsdorff sank the freighter Doric Star on December 2. In the course of the attack, the Allied ship was able to radio for aid and relay its position. Receiving this, Commodore Henry Harwood, commanding the Royal Navy's Force G, steered for the River Plate anticipating that this area would be Admiral Graf Spee's next target. Harwood's command consisted of the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and the light cruisers HMS Ajax (flagship) and HMS Achilles. Also available to Harwood was Cumberland which was refitting in the Falkland Islands. The sinking of Doric Star was quickly followed by an attack on the refrigerator ship Tairoa. Meeting a final time with Altmark on December 6, Langsdorff sank the freighter Streonshalh the next day. On board, his men found shipping information that led him to decide to move against the River Plate estuary.

Admiral Graf Spee - Battle of the River Plate: On December 13, Admiral Graf Spee spotted masts off the starboard bow. While Langsdorff first believed these to be convoy escorts reports soon informed him that it was a British squadron. Electing to fight, he ordered his ship to maximum speed and closed with the enemy. This proved a blunder as Admiral Graf Spee could have stood off and hammered the out-ranged British warships with its 11-inch guns. Instead, the maneuver brought the cruiser within range of Exeter's 8-inch and the light cruisers' 6-inch guns. With the enemy's approach, Harwood implemented a battle plan which called for Exeter to attack separately from the light cruisers with the goal of splitting Langsdorff's fire. At 6:18 AM, Admiral Graf Spee opened the Battle of the River Plate by firing on Exeter with its main guns while its secondary armament targeted Ajax and Achilles. Over the next half hour, the German vessel hammered Exeter disabling both its forward turrets and starting several fires. In return, the British cruiser hit Admiral Graf Spee's fuel processing system with an 8-inch shell.

Though his ship appeared largely undamaged, the loss of the fuel processing system limited Langsdorff to sixteen hours of usable fuel. To aid their compatriot, the two British light cruisers closed on Admiral Graf Spee. Thinking the British ships to be making a torpedo attack, Langsdorff turned away. The two sides continued the fight until around 7:25 AM when the action came to an end. Pulling back, Harwood decided to shadow the German ship with the goal of attacking again after dark. Admiral Graf Spee - Scuttling: Entering the estuary, Langsdorff made a political error in anchoring at Montevideo in neutral Uruguay rather than the friendlier Mar del Plata, Argentina to the south. Putting in a little after midnight on December 14, Langsdorff landed his wounded and asked the Uruguayan government for two weeks to make repairs. This was opposed by British diplomat Eugen Millington-Drake who argued that under the 13th Hague Convention Admiral Graf Spee should be expelled from neutral waters after twenty-four hours.

Advised that few naval resources were in the area, Millington-Drake continued to press for the ship's expulsion publically while British agents arranged to have British and French merchant ships sail every twenty-four hours. This action invoked Article 16 of the convention which stated "A belligerent warship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary." As a result, these sailings held Admiral Graf Spee in place while additional naval forces were gathered. While Langsdorff lobbied for time to repair his ship, he received a variety of false intelligence which suggested the arrival of Force H, including the carrier HMS Ark Royal and battlecruiser HMS Renown. While a force centered on Renown was en route, in reality Harwood had only been reinforced by Cumberland. Completely deceived and unable to repair Admiral Graf Spee, Langsdorff discussed his options with his superiors in Germany. Prohibited from allowing the ship to be interned by the Uruguayans and believing that certain destruction awaited him at sea, he ordered Admiral Graf Spee scuttled in the River Plate on December 17.

This decision infuriated Hitler who later directed that all German ships were fight until the end. Taken to Buenos Aires, Argentina with the crew, Langsdorff committed suicide on December 19. Selected Sources

Question: Which German battleship was scuttled at the River Plate in 1939
Answer: Graf Spee