French defeated at Dien Bien Phu - May 07, 1954 - HISTORY.com French defeated at Dien Bien Phu Share this: French defeated at Dien Bien Phu Author French defeated at Dien Bien Phu URL Publisher A+E Networks In northwest Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces decisively defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu, a French stronghold besieged by the Vietnamese communists for 57 days. The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu signaled the end of French colonial influence in Indochina and cleared the way for the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel at the conference of Geneva. On September 2, 1945, hours after the Japanese signed their unconditional surrender in World War II, communist leader Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam, hoping to prevent the French from reclaiming their former colonial possession. In 1946, he hesitantly accepted a French proposal that allowed Vietnam to exist as an autonomous state within the French Union, but fighting broke out when the French tried to reestablish colonial rule. Beginning in 1949, the Viet Minh fought an increasingly effective guerrilla war against France with military and economic assistance from newly Communist China.

France received military aid from the United States. In November 1953, the French, weary of jungle warfare, occupied Dien Bien Phu, a small mountain outpost on the Vietnamese border near Laos. Although the Vietnamese rapidly cut off all roads to the fort, the French were confident that they could be supplied by air. The fort was also out in the open, and the French believed that their superior artillery would keep the position safe. In 1954, the Viet Minh army, under General Vo Nguyen Giap, moved against Dien Bien Phu and in March encircled it with 40,000 Communist troops and heavy artillery. The first Viet Minh assault against the 13,000 entrenched French troops came on March 12, and despite massive air support, the French held only two square miles by late April. On May 7, after 57 days of siege, the French positions collapsed. Although the defeat brought an end to French colonial efforts in Indochina, the United States soon stepped up to fill the vacuum, increasing military aid to South Vietnam and sending the first U.S. military advisers to the country in 1959.

Related Videos (Vietnam) France Indochina War 1946-1954 French Indochina War 1946-1954 [ 1946 - 1954 ] The French were not in a strong position to immediately reassert their authority in their former colony, French Indochina, after the Japanese invaders withdrew at the end of World War II. In the north, the Vietminh, a political party led by Ho Chi Minh (1890?-1969), proclaimed the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam. France agreed to recognize Vietnam as a free state within the French Union, but negotiations dragged on. In December 1946, Vietminh forces attacked French garrisons, and during the ensuing years guerrilla activity increased in the countryside. In 1949, a Vietnamese provisional government, headed by Emperor Bao Dai (1913-97), was established, which was recognized by France and, in 1950, by the United States. The communist-dominated Vietminh rejected any remnant of French authority and consequently attacked French outposts along Vietnam's border with China, from whom they received substantial military aid.

In 1951, the Vietminh created a common front with communist groups in Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea) and became more and more aggressive. They were led by General Vo Nguyen Giap (1912-), who launched an attack on March 13, 1954, against the strategic French stronghold at Dienbienphu in northwestern Vietnam. Giap's siege lasted 56 days; his Vietminh troops continually attacked with artillery and mortar fire until the French defenders, short of ammunition, surrendered on May 7, 1954. Meanwhile, an international conference in Geneva was working out an agreement whereby the fighting would cease and the French would withdraw. The Vietminh set up a government north of the 17th parallel, while the Vietnamese non-communists set upa government south of the demarcation line. The was was unpopular in France, most of whose citizens were relieved when it was over, despite the defeat and the loss of influence in Southeast Asia. In July 1954, Vietnam was divided into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

Cold War Museum Back to the 1940s First Indochina War During the era of conquest in East Asia, France focused on the fortune withheld in Indochina. The French had been in the area for centuries, yet policies changed when other Western European nations began to colonize and claim their own pieces of Asia. The French corrupted the Vietnamese sovereignty by colonizing and dividing the nation. It became known as a French “protectorate” from 1883-1939 and remained a colonial empire or “possession” until about 1945. The Vietnamese people strongly resented the tyrannical rule and political and social implementations of the French. Thus, a guerrilla-type revolutionary organization, the Viet Minh, formed to drive out the French. They were led by Ho Chi Minh, the recently elected leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (currently known as North Vietnam). The First Indochina War was virtually a stalemate between the French and the Viet Minh from 1946 – 1950; then towards the end in 1954, the Viet Minh gained significant advances in driving out the French.

In 1949, France set up the State of Vietnam (currently known as South Vietnam) as an “associated statehood” under Bao Dai because he had been cooperative with France in the past. But this government clashed with Ho’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its political and social ideals as well as his nationalistic goals. The Vietnamese and other nations felt that this attempt was not a significant step towards Vietnamese independence, but rather just a cover up of the fact that Vietnam was to remain a “puppet nation.” The Viet Minh, supporters of communism, also focused heavily on the ideas of nationalism in their fight for freedom from France; this broadened their pool of allies within Vietnam. Although the French had superior weapon technology and financial aid from the United States, they were greatly outnumbered by the Viet Minh in manpower. The French also suffered from unfamiliarity with fighting in a jungle environment against a guerrilla soldier waiting in the tall grass. Enemies were hard to identify, for they looked no different than civilians; in fact, some were, during the day. The Viet Minh easily recruited local fighters, and because of the Vietnamese hatred of the French occupation, the Viet Minh also benefited from the intelligence information the civilians provided them.

When the Chinese Communist Party won control of China in 1949, the advanced weapons gap between the two opposing sides slowly closed because China, along with the communist Soviet Union, began to supply the Viet Minh with artillery. Yet, the most impressive feat of the Viet Minh guerilla fighters was that they overtook the Red River Delta without any major battle. Their guerrilla tactics and civilian intelligence allowed the Viet Minh to defeat the French. At Dien Bien Phu, in 1954, the French made their final stand in this long, grueling battle. The siege and battle took a toll on the French military from when, they could not recover. In the same year, the Geneva Accords were signed, and the French left their colonies in Indochina. These accords split Vietnam in half, North and South, but did not end the fighting. South Vietnam now quaked in fear of the communist North overtaking them. The U.S. soon came to the aid of South Vietnam and the War which ensued would greatly stir up American politics and cost a massive amount of American lives. Researched by Rachel Disselkamp Volunteer for the Cold War Museum Cosby High School Sources: Allen, Joe .

“Vietnam: The war that the U.S. lost.” International Socialist Review Issue 29May-June 2003 22 May 2008 . “Indochina wars.” Encyclopedia Britannica Article 22 May 2008 . Joyce, C. Alan. “Vietnam War.” The World Almanac for Kids 2008. 2007. World Almanac for Kids. 22 May 2008 Moise, Edwin E.. “The First Indochina War.” The Vietnam Wars. 1998. 22 May 2008 . “Vietnam : First Indochina War 1946-1954.” Wars. 2008. War Crimes Limited (UK) . 22 May 2008 . “Vietnam: Timeline of Events to 1974 .” Vietnam - 1945 and before. 22 May 2008 . Cold War Museum Back to the 1950s The first Indochina War: Attack at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam The French gained control of Vietnam in the nineteenth century, during the Age of Imperialism.

During World War II, the French loosened their control and focused on their own battles. However, as World War II came to a close, the French returned to Vietnam, expecting their control to remain. Under Ho Chi Minh, a communist leader of Vietnamese nationalists, independence from the French became a fervent goal of the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese came to the United States for independence support, but as Eastern Europe fell to communism, the United States decided to support the French. The French returned to Vietnam in 1946, setting up a puppet government ruled by Bao Dai. France’s reoccupation of Vietnam marked the beginning of the Indochina War. Against the reoccupation, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh attacked the French. The first confrontation began in November 1946 at the city of Haiphong when French civilians were attacked by the Vietminh. As the years dragged on, the French began to lose momentum, while the Vietnamese remained strong and united. At the end of 1953, the French settled in Dien Bien Phu, a city in northwestern Vietnam. Hoping to fight the Viet Minh, the French built up their garrison.

The attack at Dien Bien Phu began on March 13, 1954, with a strong Viet Minh attack, and continued through May. The first French victory of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was on March 22 as the last tanks were used to attack the Viet Minh. After another French success on March 26, the Viet Minh, commanded by Giap, started to lose faith in themselves. The tables turned, though, after a Viet Minh assault of the French troops at the end of April, which continued until French defeat in early May. After years of fighting this gruesome war, the French surrendered at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. The defeat of the French denoted the end of the first Indochina War. As a result, the French halted their colonial control of the country. The United States, on the other hand, did not want the country to fall to communism. They believed in the domino theory, which stated that if one Southeast Asian country fell to communism, the rest would also fall. The Geneva Accords divided the country of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

North Vietnam became communist under Ho Chi Minh, while South Vietnam remained under Western influence, with Ngo Dinh Diem in control. The roots of the Vietnam War were planted with the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. Researched by Megan Skochdopole Volunteer for the Cold War Museum Cosby High School “Battle of Dien Bien Phu.” World History: The Modern Era. 2008. ABC-CLIO. 1 May 2008 “Indochina War.” World History: The Modern Era. 2008. ABC-CLIO. 1 May 2008 Kennedy, Bruce. “Dien Bien Phu.” The Cold War . CNN. 3 Jun 2008 . Milestones: 1953–1960 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1953–1960 Dien Bien Phu & the Fall of French Indochina, 1954 In the late 1940s, the French struggled to control its colonies in Indochina - Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Despite financial assistance from the United States, nationalist uprisings against French colonial rule began to take their toll.

On May 7, 1954, the French-held garrison at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam fell after a four month siege led by Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French pulled out of the region. Concerned about regional instability, the United States became increasingly committed to countering communist nationalists in Indochina. The United States would not pull out of Vietnam for another twenty years. French Foreign Legionnaire in French Indochina Southeast Asia, with Indochina at the center, had long been a region of interest to outside powers. Most of the region fell under European colonial control after the mid-19th century. During World War Two, Japan also sought the resources the area had to offer. After Japanese defeat, many of the countries of Southeast Asia occupied by Japan protested their return to colonial status, resulting in a surge of nationalism. American officials involved in the U.S. occupation of Japan also developed a strong interest in the region, which they viewed as a potential market for Japanese goods and a source of raw materials (like tin, oil, rubber, and rice) to supply Japanese manufacturing.

Like the other colonial powers, France attempted to reestablish its position in Indochina after 1945, but found that it was difficult. Laos gained its independence in 1949, and Cambodia became independent in 1953. France promised Vietnam its autonomy by 1949, but only offered limited independence, with France continuing to oversee defense and foreign policy. To counter the influence of popular nationalist Ho Chi Minh, the French attempted to reinstate former emperor Bao Dai, but he was never as popular as Ho Chi Minh, and Vietnam’s independence movement continued to grow. Bao Dai eventually abdicated a second time and lived out his life in exile in France. Ho Chi Minh Although Ho Chi Minh would become famous for leading the North Vietnamese forces against the United States in the 1960s, despite his communist leanings, he was not at the outset anti-American. He had been disappointed by the lack of support given native peoples struggling for independence from colonial rule at the Versailles Conference that ended World War I. In the 1940s, he made repeated requests for American aid and campaigned for independence.

Following unsuccessful discussions with the French in 1946, general war broke out between Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces and French troops in the northern part of Vietnam. U.S. interests in the late 1940s and early 1950s did not, however, include supporting Vietnam’s effort to gain independence under a nationalist with communist leanings. Active communist rebellions in Malaya and the Philippines, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, caused U.S. officials great concern. President Eisenhower explained the link between Vietnam’s status and that of the rest of Southeast Asia through the metaphor of falling dominoes: if one country fell to communism, the rest of them would follow. The United States also required French assistance developing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and rebuilding West Germany, and, as such, supported the failing French regime in Indochina. By the time of the Korean War armistice in 1953, the United States was already irrevocably committed to defending the French against the increasingly aggressive Viet Minh forces.

In early 1954, the French Army was encamped at Dien Bien Phu, a heavily fortified base located deep in a valley and near communications links on the Laotian border. By mid-March, it was clear that the French were struggling under a Viet Minh seige and that only outside intervention in the form of fresh troops or airstrikes could save them. Though President Eisenhower was determined to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam, the U.S. Congress and officials in the Administration were equally determined not to intervene unless they could do so as a part of a larger coalition. Britain and other members of NATO declined to participate in rescuing what they thought was a lost cause. Dien Bien Phu fell in May, and the French retreated from Vietnam. In the wake of the French defeat, the French and Vietnamese, along with representatives from the United States and China, met in Geneva in mid-1954 to discuss the future of Indochina. They reached two agreements. First, the French and the Viet Minh agreed to a cease-fire and a temporary division of the country along the 17th parallel. French forces would remain in the South, and Ho Chi Minh’s forces would control the North.

The second agreement promised that neither the North nor the South would join alliances with outside parties, and called for general elections in 1956. Laos and Cambodia were to remain neutral. The United States did not sign the second agreement, establishing instead its own government in South Vietnam. As the French pulled out, the United States appointed Ngo Dinh Diem to lead South Vietnam. Like Bao Dai, Diem was an unpopular choice in Vietnam as he had waited out the nationalist struggle against France abroad. Diem had also collaborated with the Japanese occupation, but his Catholicism appealed to the Western powers. The United States also supported the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, designed to respond if there was an armed attack on any nation in the region. French fall to Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu - May 07, 1954 - HISTORY.com French fall to Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu Share this: French fall to Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu Author French fall to Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu URL Publisher A+E Networks Dien Bien Phu falls to the Viet Minh.

In March, a force of 40,000 Viet Minh troops with heavy artillery had surrounded 15,000 French soldiers, holding the French position under siege. The Viet Minh guerrillas had been fighting a long and bloody war with French colonial interests for control of Vietnam since 1946. In an attempt to score a decisive victory, French General Henri Navarre had positioned the large French force 200 miles behind enemy lines in a remote area adjacent to the Laotian border. He had planned to draw the communists into a set-piece battle in which he hoped superior French firepower would destroy the enemy, but he vastly underestimated his foe. Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap entrenched artillery in the surrounding mountains and massed five divisions around the French positions. The battle, which far exceeded the size and scope of anything to date in the war between the French and the Viet Minh, began with a massive Viet Minh artillery barrage and was followed by an infantry assault. The tide of the battle quickly turned against the French. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other members of the Eisenhower administration were stunned at the turn of events and discussions were held to decide on a course of action.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford proposed the use of nuclear strikes against the Viet Minh. Other options included massive conventional air strikes, paratrooper drops, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. In the end, President Eisenhower decided that the situation was too far gone and ordered no action to be taken to aid the French. Fierce fighting continued to rage until this day, when the Viet Minh overran the last French positions. During the siege, 1,600 French troops were killed, 4,800 were wounded, and 1,600 missing. The Viet Minh captured 8,000 French and marched them off on foot on a 500-mile trek to prison camps; fewer than half survived the march. Viet Minh casualties were estimated at approximately 7,900 killed and 15,000 wounded. The battle of Dien Bien Phu marked the end of the French involvement in Southeast Asia. France had lost more than 35,000 men and 48,000 had been wounded in a war that was considered financially and militarily humiliating.

The shock of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu led the French government, already plagued by public opposition to the war, to agree to the independence of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference in 1954. Related Videos BBC ON THIS DAY | 21 | 1954: Peace deal ends Indo-China war About This Site | Text Only 1954: Peace deal ends Indo-China war The major world powers have reached agreement on the terms for a ceasefire in Indo-China, ending nearly eight years of war. The war began in 1946 between nationalist forces of the Communist Viet Minh under leader Ho Chi Minh and France, the occupying colonial power. But there is no lasting agreement on peace in Korea, the main subject of the talks in Geneva, Switzerland between France, Britain, the USA, the USSR, China and countries of Indo-China. The news of a ceasefire has come as a great relief in Europe and the United States. The newly appointed French Prime Minister, Pierre Mendes-France, had set a deadline for an agreement that was finally signed in the early hours of this morning.

This afternoon he told the French Parliament he had achieved his aim of "an honourable settlement" to end a war that has cost at least 300,000 lives. However, there is concern that the terms of the Geneva Accord concede too much to the Viet Minh - not least in the United States which gave $385m to equip the Vietnamese Army. President Dwight D Eisenhower said in a statement from Washington the agreement contained elements which he did not like - such as the division of Vietnam between north and south - and a great deal depended on how they worked in practice. Senate leaders from both parties went one step further and expressed their alarm at what is widely regarded as a victory for Communism. "We may regret that such an agreement has been forced upon the French," said Senator William Knowland, Republican and Senate Majority Leader. The conference was the first international meeting at which the Communist government of China took part.

The main provisions of the Geneva Accord are: Vietnam will be divided between north and south along the 17th parallel a Communist government under Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh will control the north and a nationalist one in the south under Emperor Bao Dai and prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem ; the capitals will be Hanoi in the north and Saigon in the south; elections will be held in 1956 with the aim of creating a unified government; prisoners of war will be released on both sides; French forces will withdraw from the north and the Viet Minh from the south; the Communists will recognise Laos and Cambodia as independent countries and agree to the withdrawal of their forces from both. In Saigon, Supreme French Commander General Paul-Henri-Romuald Ely promised the Vietnamese Army that "in peace, as in war, we will remain at your sides". In a message to the Vietnamese people he said France would pay for transportation of all those who wanted to leave Communist-controlled Vietnam. Since the Geneva conference opened on 26 April the French have suffered major defeats at the hands of the Viet Minh, the last and most humiliating being the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May after a 55-day siege.

It signalled the end of French rule in Indo-China. Last month France began a major retreat giving up the south zone of Tonkin's Red River delta leaving behind 2.5 million people and a fertile rice-growing region. ShoreHistory - Indochina 1. After the French ShoreHistory 1) Indochina after the French Consequences of the Vietnamese victory against the French ·The Vietnamese victory against the French was marked by the Defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7th 1954. ·The French had been crippled throughout the eight years of conflict in the First Indochina War by the passionately patriotic Vietminh. Dien Bien Phu was to be France’s strong fortified garrison in Vietnam in 1953-1954: General Navarre saw it as being the best place to relieve the threat in Laos, as well as an area where open battle would see French firepower dominate. However, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu had quashed their desire for colonial rule in Indochina. The losses they were suffering could not justify their colonial presence.

·The Vietminh force consisting of the People’s Army, conscripts, and workers had an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 casualties at Dien Bien Phu. The French had only 8,000 soldiers killed and 7,000 wounded. But the depth of the Vietnamese forces ensured this amount was sufficient for victory. The comparative losses at Dien Bien Phu are consistent with the comparative losses in the entire of the First Indochina War, with an estimated 90,000 French Union soldiers killed and 200,000 Vietminh fighters killed. Despite these lopsided death counts, the Vietminh won the war. ·Vietnamese victory did wonders for the Vietminh nationalist movement. The Vietminh movement, led by Ho Chi Minh in the mould of communism had defeated one of the most prominent powers in Europe – which was being 70% funded in their war effort by the USA (the world’s Superpower). The victory strengthened the Vietminh in its confidence, recruitment, and most importantly its resolve (determination in achieving its purpose). ·The bond between the communists had strengthened.

The Soviets and the Chinese had provided funding for the Vietminh during the War, and their contributions had borne fruition. Vietnam was now in a position to become an independent state, to be ruled by the victorious Vietminh communists. The ‘Red Tide’ was flowing. ·Laos, as a result of the Vietnamese victory was liberated from French rule when France withdrew. The circumstances in Cambodia were slightly different. The Cambodian people celebrated independence on November 9th 1953, six months before the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. This was because the Khmer Issarak (an anti-French, Khmer nationalist political movement formed in 1945) who were working with the Vietminh, had control over around 50% of Cambodia. In addition, King Norodom Sihanouk (who had previously been pliable by the French) had exiled himself to Thailand, and would only return when Cambodia was granted Independence. Therefore, Dien Bien Phu resulted in the liberation of Laos, however Cambodia had already become independent and so the consequences of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu were minimal to Cambodia.

·The failure of the French to maintain colonial control over Indochina had profound consequences on US Foreign Policy. “You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over very quickly” [President Eisenhower 1954]. China had recently become a communist state, Korea had to be divided due to the communist threat, Russia was rivalling America in Superpower status, and now Western influence in Indochina had fallen and the communist threat was looming. Therefore, the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu provoked the US Foreign policy of containment, in accordance with the domino theory. Vietnam was to become a battleground for conflicting ideology. ·The Vietnamese victory also gave the Vietminh some leverage at the [[#|Geneva]] Peace Conference – they were in a better bargaining position than the French. Consequences of the Geneva Peace Agreement for the Vietnamese People to 1964 ·The Geneva Conference took place during May-July 1954, and sought an end to hostilities and a restoration of Peace in Vietnam - among other countries. However, as Pollock argues, “The Geneva Conference did not end the conflict.

It produced a military truce.” ·The terms of the Geneva Agreements which impacted the Vietnamese people over the next five years were: 1) Cease-fire 2) French troops to withdraw 3) Vietnam divided into North and South Vietnam at the 17th Parallel 4) Laos and Cambodia established as independent states 5) National elections to be held in two years (by July 1956) throughout Indochina 6) No foreign bases 7) Freedom of movement between the North and South Vietnam for 300 days. The majority of these terms were ignored. ·Ho Chi Minh of the North, accepted the terms on the advice of Communist China’s Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai who, along with the Russians wanted to avoid conflict with the US. Ho would have preferred more favourable terms for the Vietminh as they were the victors in the First Indochina War – such as communist rule over the entire of Vietnam – but the conflicting ideology of the US prevented this. Ho was however, not too concerned. ·America did not sign the Agreement because they did not want to acknowledge Communist China (who had signed the agreement).

However, in accordance with the ‘Domino Theory’, US President Eisenhower made a commitment that America would “preserve [Vietnam] from Communist domination”. ·President Eisenhower in his letters to Ngo Dinh Diem gave a clear indication of America’s growing commitment to the survival of a non-communist South Vietnam. America saw no harm in violating the ‘No Foreign Bases’ term of the Geneva Agreement with Secretary of State Dulles quoted as saying “we have a clean base there”. The French had withdrawn, but the Americans had stepped in to take their place. ·Diem was essentially a “puppet leader” as Ngo Vinh Long argues. He was supported by, funded by, and being advised by the Americans. He appealed to America because he was both anti-communist and anti-French. To begin with, Bao Dai (who was the leader during French rule) was the Head of State, and appointed Diem as his Prime Minister after succumbing to US pressures. Diem then threw this in his face and held a elections in October 1955, asking the people if they wished to become a Republic with him as President or remain as a constitutional monarchy with Bao Dai as Head of State.

America rigged the election, advising Diem to claim victory with around 70% of the vote; however Diem claimed victory with 98.2% of the vote. ·Ngo Dinh Diem was President of the South (proper name is the Republic of Vietnam) and it was a democratic society. The leader of the North (proper name is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) was Ho Chi Minh and he ruled a communist state. The 300 days of free movement term in the Agreements resulted in fluxes of refugees moving north and (mostly) south. Diem launched a propaganda campaign claiming that the North was building concentration camps for Catholics. 1,000,000 people fled the North whilst over 90,000 Vietminh troops and another 45,000 political activists headed North. 15,000 activists stayed in the South to build support for the July 1956 elections, and a further 10,000 military cadre also remained in the South with instructions from General Giap to stay hidden and ‘wait and see’ what unfolded under the new arrangements. There was also an attachment to the land that influenced people to remain where they were.

·All in all, Diem never had a true connection with the people, nor did he seek to cater for their needs, or act in the best interests of the population. ·In contrast, despite the turmoil during the land reform campaign the North gained strength after the Geneva Agreements. A combination of communist camaraderie and Vietminh nationalism ensured that the people were devoted to Ho Chi Minh, and in return, Ho looked after the people. ·The elections which, in accordance with the Agreements, were meant to be called by the South in July 1956 never occurred. It is easily argued that on July 16th 1956 when Diem made the announcement not to call the election, the Geneva Agreement had failed. ·Harpur argues that “the major impetus towards the Vietnam war was the failure to hold general elections throughout the country.” Diem had not signed the Accords, and so claimed he was in no way bound by the Agreement. Schulzinger argues that it was US Senator Mike Mansfield, the senate’s leading expert on Vietnam, who advised Diem not to call the election.

The non-elections of July 1956 provoked the necessary retaliation by the Vietcong that escalated violence in the South, triggering the US to step in as ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘advisors’. Ho Chi Minh officially committed the Communist North to a revolutionary war with the creation of the NLF (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam) on December 20th 1960. People in the South were affected by the escalating violence throughout the late 1950s. Political, Social, Economic and Military developments within North and South Vietnam Political ·North: the DRV government was restructured to include only communists (members of the Vietnam Workers’ Party). The DRV was guided by a September 1954 Workers’ Party manifesto – “The New Situation, the New Mission, and the New Policy of the Party” – which argued the time had come to shift the emphasis from war to peace, and prepare for unification. Inspired by the Chinese experience, there were the extreme ‘leftists’ who argued for a massive reform agenda, and the ‘moderates’ who argued that Chinese-inspired reforms could prompt US intervention. The leftists triumphed, and closely followed the Chinese model.

By late 1955, peasants were protesting against the government. In 1956-57, a number of ‘Intellectuals’ staged a counter-revolution against the DRV, which was quelled with ferocity. Those not killed were subjected to ‘re-education’. This debacle nearly brought the DRV to the point of collapse. Ho Chi Minh, who was considered to be above day-to-day politics, stepped in to save the DRV. He did however; admit that ‘errors had been made.’ ·South: Diem gained Presidential status after rigging the referendum election in October 1955. From this point onwards, the government in the South was made up only of Diem and his relatives (a nepotistic oligarchy) – continual rigged elections ensured this, as did US support. For example, in a general election in September 1959, Diem won 78 of 123 seats, with the remainder won by right-wing independents such as Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu (his sister-in-law).

Diem was subject to three coups: November 11th 1960 led by Lieutenant Colonel Vuong Van Dong failed, February 27th 1962 (the Presidential Palace bombing) by two Republic of Vietnam Air Force Pilots which also failed, and finally the successful coup and assassination on November 1st and 2nd 1963 led by General Duong Van Minh ‘Big Minh’. Social ·North: the major social change in the North was the land reforms. Harpur argues that “the North in 1954 was in social and economic disarray, and the land reforms were a way of improving the situation.” It ended up being a case of getting worse before it got better. In 1955 the Vietminh established Agricultural Reform Tribunals to supervise the redistribution of land and to purge the north of ‘landlords and other feudal elements’. The Vietminh estimated that 5% of the rural population fitted this category. Things got out of hand. The purge was extended to include ‘traitors’ of the Vietminh and very quickly these denunciations became witch-hunts.

Betrayal, fear, panic, and terror prevailed as fair-trials were abandoned, and executions were common. The campaign fuelled a wave of violence that saw many peasants unleash revenge on brutal landlords. It would seem likely that up to 100,000 people perished at the hands of the Agricultural Reform Tribunal. Harpur argues that the reform period (1954-57) was the most divisive and potentially destructive period of recent North Vietnamese history. ‘North Vietnam floundered in an atmosphere of suspicion and apprehension.’ However, in early 1958, the Communist Party abandoned the Tribunals in favour of introducing Co-operativisation Plans in an attempt to win back the peasant population. The co-operative was based on the principle that each village or hamlet shared the work and responsibility amongst its members. By 1960, 86% of the population was working and living in this structure. Social success for the North! ·South: Diem’s main policies throughout the 1950s were antagonistic, and sought to vindicate those who ‘opposed him’ and those he disliked.

The Binh Xuyen, the Hoa Hao, and the Cao Dai were three prominent religious sects in South Vietnam with a large following. Schulzinger argues that Diem “immediately despised them as either thugs or illiterate peasants.” After denying each of the sects a seat in his government, Diem proceeded to eliminate them using the Saigon Police and the ARVN. The summer of 1955 also saw Diem launch his Denunciation campaign. The aim was to eradicate communists from the South – such that no uprising against Diem could be coordinated, and also so that communists could not ‘convert’ the mistreated peasants. Communist sources claim that in 1955 alone, 25000 suspected communist sympathizers were arrested, 4231 were injured, and 1000 were killed. Much like the social problems outlined in the North, the denunciations became a witch-hunt: the sheer brutality and savagery evoked fear amongst the peasants, and social unrest.

Diem’s advice to the people, from an article in the ‘Diem Regime Magazine’: “We must let the peasants know that to give shelter to a communist or to follow his advice makes them liable to the death penalty. We must behead them, and shoot them as people kill mad dogs.” Survivors of Diem’s brutality in the mid 1950s (not just communists) went on to form a resistance group, dubbed the ‘Vietcong’ by Diem and the Americans. Harpur says “the strict and often brutal security enforced by Diem in the period 1954-60 was primarily aimed to reinforce his control of South Vietnam. Economic ·North: the division of the country (at the 17th Parallel) meant that the overpopulated Red River Delta of the North was unable to receive rice from its usual supplier, the Mekong Delta in the South. Emergency supplies were imported from the Soviets, and although 1,000,000 Catholics had fled to the South (demand shift to left), but widespread famine still prevailed. Also, during the First Indochina War, French bombing had destroyed infrastructure in the North.

To make matters worse, refugees often looted buildings as they fled in the 300 days of free movement. The land reforms intensified the widespread starvation and agricultural slowdown. However, 1957 North Vietnam had achieved self-sufficiency in rice production. Post-1957 saw growth in key industries such as transport, coal production, cement production, and electricity. By 1960, North Vietnam had changed from a country facing impending famine to the country with the fastest growing economy in South-East Asia. ·South: there were some social issues that had economic consequences. The South was now a capitalist nation, steering as far away from communism as possible. Diem therefore aided the wealthy/landlords and ignored the workers/peasants. This in turn, caused an unequal distribution of wealth among the population. Landlords were given the right to reclaim land that the communists had distributed among the local peasantry in the First Indochina War. Moreover, they could demand ‘back rent’ from the peasants, for the years of lost income. Another social issue was the creation of ‘Agrovilles’ which were purpose-built communities to physically remove peasantry from communist influence. These land reforms further depleted agricultural output.

The South, was funded by America. In 1957, the US made an assurance to Diem that US$250million in aid would be provided each year, US$170million of which went to the military. Military ·North: the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) had existed since the Japanese conflict – these were the blooded soldiers who were experienced, and ruthless in their guerrilla tactics. NLF (National Liberation Front) was established on December 20th 1960 by Ho Chi Minh – were separate to the Communist Party, allowing for greater membership. PLAF (People’s Liberation Armed Forces) was an official recognition of the Vietcong in 1961 – the Vietcong had been fighting independent of the Communist Party since 1955. ·South: the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was the official South Vietnamese army – it was an army of conscripts that fought alongside the American forces. American military commitment was minimal during the 1950s (relative to the peak of the war). In November 1963, America had only 16,732 military servicemen in South Vietnam.

Why did the French lose their war on Ho Chi-Minh? – Alexander Frost | INTERPOL BLOG / BLOG GWLEIDYDDIAETH RYNGWLADOL INTERPOL BLOG / BLOG GWLEIDYDDIAETH RYNGWLADOL News & Views from the Home of International Politics / Newyddion a Sylwadau o Gartref Gwleidyddiaeth Ryngwladol Search Why did the French lose their war on Ho Chi-Minh? – Alexander Frost Posted on by International Politics Blog [Note from the Editor: Below is the winning essay of Aberystwyth University’s Security Research Group’s Undergraduate Essay Competition 2014. It is analysis on the French defeat and withdrawal of its South East Asian territories during the First Indochina War (1946-1954).] French-backed Army of Vietnam paratroopers during the First Indochina War. ‘Should you re-establish a French administration here, it will not be obeyed.

Every village will be a nest of resistance, each former collaborator an enemy, and your officials and colonists will themselves seek to leave this atmosphere, Bao Dai[1] On the afternoon of May 7, 1954, the red Vietminh flag was raised over the besieged French garrison at Dienbienphu.[2] The next morning in Geneva, nine delegations opened discussions aimed at ending the war in Indochina.[3] Bao Dai’s prophecy had come true; La Sale Guerre was finally over for France, but it had been nothing short of a catastrophe. Indecision, infighting, instability and disinterest plagued both the French political community and its under-resourced military during the war. However, defeat was not solely self-inflicted; Ho Chi Minh and his burgeoning Vietminh cause, accompanied by its military arm led by the resourceful Vo Nguyen Giap, were a considerable thorn in the side of the French forces. The convergence of these factors resultantly contributed to one of the most infamous, but least understood military defeats of the 20th Century.

Thus, to fully comprehend the nature of French defeat, one has to appreciate the state of France domestically during the Indochina war, and the standing of the conflict in both the eyes of the French political community and French society. As George Kelly noted ‘Ignorance of the Indochinese situation was general…moreover the country was deeply involved in its own dilemmas.’[4] For instance in 1948, a national poll asked Frenchman to rank the most important problems confronting the country; Indochina featured at the end of the list.[5] In 1951, a national poll asked respondents what were their greatest concerns at the time; one out of three Frenchmen said ‘the cost of meat’.[6] Mobilized support is most crucial in a time of war, but such indifference saw France’s populace become disillusioned to the Indochina cause when confronted with staggeringly high cost and casualty figures, which gave rise to a potent notion of La Sale Guerre.

This view was no less distorted in France’s political community, particularly on the French Left, where many ‘deplored the vitiating effect of the Indochina War’ and sought ‘schematic ways of halting the operation.’[7] Despite dedicated support form the French Right, France’s notoriously powerful legislative served as a platform for such opposition and resistance; resultantly full political support and motivation for the conflict was not always forthcoming. This gave rise to a detached and divided response to Indochinese affairs, particularly when it concerned the appropriation of finances, material or men. As the war stagnated, opposition increased, particularly within France’s political moderates, and François Mitterrand echoed a view shared by many; ‘We have granted Vietnam ‘full independence’ eighteen times…isn’t it about time we did just once, but for good?’[8] Moreover, the French Fourth Republic was politically complex and polarized, and was plagued by instability and infighting which severely hampered a stable and collective consensus on the Indochina question.

Kelly criticized ‘the dreary succession of fourteen tottering governments of the Fourth Republic’ which had given ‘the Indochina War as much consistency and direction as it possessed.’[9] Roger Lévy meanwhile labelled French policy as ‘indecisions, contradictions, hesitations, decisions; orders and counter-orders of successive governments’[10] whilst Paul Isoart described Indochina merely becoming a ‘political football’ for the Assemblée nationale whilst genuine ‘interest in France or Vietnam had long been lost.’[11] As Bernard Fall asserted ‘Although French internal chaos did not in itself cause the military defeats…it certainly made a concerted Vietnam policy completely impossible.’[12] Unsurprisingly, General Henri Navarre declared; ‘This uncertainty over political goals is the real reason why we were prevented from a continuous and coherent military policy in Indochina…the divorce between policy and strategy dominated the war.’[13] Though Navarre had reason to shift the blame, his criticism was certainly indicative of the political conduct of the war; as Robert Guillan declared; ‘Dien Bien Phu was not born in Indochina, but in Paris.’[14] Indeed, civil-military relations were clearly fragmented and strained during the

 war, being blighted by scandal, conflict and disagreement which ‘left a persistent scar on the bitter history of French civil-military relations.’[15] Aggrieved at what they sensed was a lack of political support and motivation, a strong notion of ‘abandonment’ swept the French military post-war.[16] However, administration ‘on the ground’ in Indochina faired little better; termed ‘a two-headed monstrosity’[17] by Fall, the Ministry of Overseas France and the Ministry of Associated States (formed through ‘tardy and reluctant federal arrangements’[18]) held ‘inordinate influence over the conduct of war’[19] and presided, but more often collided, over domestic Indochinese affairs, whilst lacking a constructive relationship with the Assemblée nationale and the military.

Moreover, the French-installed administration of Bao Dai, which was supposed to lend credibility to French control and represent true Vietnamese nationalism, was widely unpopular and disregarded, only driving support for the Vietminh. As Stanley Karnow asserted ‘composed principally of urban elite and wealthy landowners, it resembled the French bureaucracy it was supposed to replace’ and had ‘no appeal whatsoever to the masses.’[20] Yet, despite being well debated, Indochina was also susceptible to losing precedence in French affairs, not least due to the concerted focus on French recovery and stability after World War Two. France, though not losing a generation of young men as in World War One, suffered greatly during World War Two, particularly from its devastating invasion, occupation and liberation. Northern towns and cities as well as general infrastructure and industry were the heaviest hit, which resulted in the French economy stagnating by an incredible 62%.[21] This gave rise to political and civil unrest (fuelled by food and fuel shortages) which saw worrying parallels to the turmoil in post-war Greece.[22] Moreover, France was obligated to assist in the Allied occupation of Western Germany and Austria.

Resultantly, for much of the post-war era France experienced a huge vacuum and refocus of resources (both military and economic) as well as a concerted social and political will towards French recovery and stability, leaving little in the way for Indochina. Even at the height of the war, French recovery was still very much evident, but had been greatly accelerated by the support afforded to it by the United States administered Marshall Plan. The success of European recovery ‘depended on the effective revitalization of [French] industry and the maximization of its material and human resources.’[23] Therefore, France would be central to the American plans of a strong, stable and prosperous Europe which would offset and contain the risk posed by communism. However, the US soon recognized communism would not be deterred by financial mobilization alone, as tensions in Prague, Turkey, Greece and Berlin demonstrated. Therefore, President Harold Truman, buoyant after re-election, declared to address the issue of European defence and pledge support to those willing to defend themselves.

His solution was the creation of a collective trans-Atlantic defence force – NATO.[24] France became a founding member of NATO in 1949,[25] and was well valued due to the relative size and strength of its armed forces compared with its European counterparts (in a way France was seen as a ‘first bastion’ against Soviet aggression, since the ‘indefensible’ West Germany would be without a military until 1955).[26] However, such obligations would have a telling impact on France’s military capabilities in Indochina. NATO and other European defence commitments, besides their significant costs, tied down a great deal of French men and material, particularly combat soldiers, pilots, support staff and officers as well as equipment (critically aircraft), supplies and munitions, all of which were in great demand in Indochina. This also served to further limit the pool for potential Metropolitan recruits, since the use of conscripted troops was forbidden under constitution.[27] More so, financially France could not undertake a war in Indochina whilst contributing to European defence at the same time.

Pierre Mendès-France warned the Assemblée nationale that the increasing cost of the war threatened ‘rising prices and civil unrest’,[28] declaring ‘you will never succeed in organizing our defences in Europe if you continue to send all your cadres to Asia, to sacrifice them every year without result.’[29] Such sentiment resonated within political and public opinion; there were heated debates when it became apparent Marshall Aid finances and American military aid were being siphoned off to Indochina.[30] Many shared François Quilici’s view when he asked ‘Hasn’t it always seemed paradoxical we fight Communism 12,000km away from our doors when a powerful Communist Party camps on our soil and Soviet tanks are two days from Strasbourg.’[31] Such notions were ‘widely discussed and generally approved’[32] and it was not long until many in the Assemblée nationale favoured a ‘Europe first’ approach, and this had all but taken precedence by the time of Navarre’s appointment. Thus, with France and her military now heavily reliant on lucrative American aid, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea dealt a cruel blow to any prospect of a French victory.

As the US led-force became bogged down in a bloody, attritional war in Korea, the indispensible financial and material began to dry up, whilst any prospect of a US military intervention in Indochina all but disappeared. In the fiscal year 1951-52, financial aid ‘proved to be a disappointing $23.5 million, instead of the $146 million needed.’[33] Arms deliveries were ‘delayed as long as six months to one year’[34] with shortages ranging from 52% for submachine guns to 100% for recoilless cannons.[35] The rearming of ROK forces (whom were woefully underequipped) prioritized over those in Indochina.[36] Moreover, all this occurred at a time France was pursuing one of its most successful military policies, the jaunissement (Vietnamization)of its Indochinese forces.[37] Indeed, much has been made of French defeat militarily, and the French armed forces came under a significant amount of largely undue criticism for its conduct and ultimate defeat in Indochina.

However, a great deal of its failure rested on several core deficiencies which severely weakened the efficacy of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Extrême-Orient (CEFEO) whilst consigning victory to a mere hope rather than reality. Firstly, the CEFEO lacked a clear, coherent and overall strategy. Navarre himself admitted ‘we had no policy at all….at the end of seven years of war we had come to a complete imbroglio, and no one, from the common soldier to the commander-in-chief, knew exactly why the war was being fought.’[38] Kelly declared the French command ‘implemented no single viable strategy’[39] whilst genuine aims were ‘oblique… hesitant…vague and shifting.’[40] Of course, this was not assisted by the fact the CEFEO was blighted by its ‘carousel of commanders’, which displayed about as much continuity as the administration back home. Each brought their own perception and approach to the conflict, and despite the excellent Jean de Lattre and the conversant Phillipe Leclerc, few others coveted themselves in such glory.

Some were too defensive, apprehensive perhaps, whilst others, reared in conventional concepts, struggled to comprehend the complex and demanding nature of the conflict; as Kelly asserted ‘in Indochina, the stodgy immobility of classical warfare was challenged.’[41] Many failed to instil respect or faith from their men, and throughout the conflict the CEFEO suffered weakened morale. Relations between commanders in the field and high command were strained, especially when those in the field learnt through ‘bitter circumstance that the traditional manual of tactics had to be thrown away.’[42] However, one can only sympathize with CEFEO’s leadership considering the limited manpower and resources they had under their control.

The CEFEO was straddled with an impossible Force-to-Space ratio, with only ever a meagre c.100,000 troops in Indochina at any one time.[43] Demands for additional troops were seldom granted; when Navarre requested 12 battalions, 750 officers and 2550 NCO’s, he received only 8 battalions, 320 officers and 200 NCO’s, which, incredibly, were an advance on next years reinforcements.[44] Such shortages are greatly emphasized when considering William Westmoreland, commander of MACV, had at one point 541,500 troops (and much greater resources)[45] under his command during the Vietnam War, yet failed to deliver any more success than the CEFEO.

This is even more impressive when considering CEFEO had to disperse their forces throughout the three Associated States of Indochina; Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam – 737,000km² combined.[46] Westmoreland rather, ‘only’ ever had to spread his forces over 173,809km².[47] Indeed, such statistics highlight the sheer magnitude of the task facing such a meagre force. Presiding over such a vast and hostile territory requires an equally vast and integrated logistical network, but the case was quite the opposite for the CEFEO. With only limited resources and primitive infrastructure, transporting men, supplies and equipment became a difficult and unenviable task. Reduced to using Indochina’s sparse and isolated road system, transport times were slow, whilst ambushes were prevalent.

The lack of aircraft was particularly chronic; there were no more than 275 aircraft (of which only 10 were helicopters,[48] in contrast to the 12,000 under Westmoreland’s control[49]) present in Indochina before 1954.[50] Fall details a popular joke in which the ‘Korea Battalion’ (a volunteer French battalion who had fought in Korea, and used to ‘standards of logistics which, to the French in Indochina, represented unreasonable luxury.’[51]), having suffered ‘only’ 20 casualties, request heli-CASEVAC. The Zone commander personally appeared over the radio and roared back; ‘Dammit, this isn’t Korea. You carry your own wounded like everybody else!’[52] Indeed, Fall reiterates the shocking contrast between two very different wars faced by the ‘Korea Battalion’, whilst highlighting, even with generous US support, the CEFEO was still a woefully underequipped and underprepared force.

Finally, throughout the war, particularly in France’s military hierarchy, there was a ‘woeful misunderstanding and gross underestimation of the Vietminh and Giap.’[53] This was demonstrated not least at Dien Bien Phu, where, according to Karnow, the French lost not on the battlefield, but in ‘Navarre’s air-conditioned headquarters in Saigon, where he had woefully miscalculated Giap’s intentions and capabilities even before the shooting started.’[54] Indeed, a French study into the debacle summed up a fundamental error; Navarre and his aides ‘substituted their preconceived idea of the Vietminh for the facts.’[55] Giap, often one for exaggeration, perhaps correctly asserted ‘…[Navarre’s] greatest mistake was that with the conception of the bourgeois strategist he could not visualize the immense possibilities of a people’s army.’[56] However, one should be careful to dwell too long on French deficiencies and detract from the point that the Vietminh ‘had something to do with it.’[57] The Vietminh’s greatest strength laid arguably in the wealth of its popular support, which was mobilized and sustained by Ho’s organizational

 expertise and fluidly persuasive rhetoric.

The strong anti-French sentiment that swept the Indochinese peninsula throughout and after World War Two (which intensified once the French reasserted control over Ho’s ‘independent’ Vietnam)[58] was manipulated by Ho to expand both the size and scope of the Vietminh. Within these ranks, Ho had a formulated ‘a nationalistic culture, nearly xenophobic in intensity, [which] inspired Vietminh activists the concept of a virtually holy war against the foreign invaders and their native clients.’[59] For the Vietnamese this was no dirty war, but a righteous war, a national war, a ‘people’s war’. Utilizing such popular support, Giap would demonstrate an almost perfect representation of Mao Tse-tung’s ‘three phases’ of warfare, as the Vietminh evolved from a rural nuisance to a conventionally able force. On occasion Giap sought to accelerate the transition of phases too quickly,[60] but his quick reversion, and at times concurrent deployment of phases, demonstrated the sheer flexibility and adversity of the Vietminh. France, though no stranger to ‘small wars’, was unable to grasp the complex intricacies and multi-dimensional nature of Ho’s and Giap’s doctrine of war.

France’s response was primarily military, yet in reality it was a total war, being fought on all fronts. Moreover, as Giap would demonstrate years later, he was a masterful logistician, moving troops, supplies and equipment discreetly with fluidity and purpose.[61] However, Ho and Giap were greatly assisted by the generous foreign support afforded to them from a number of communist sources, most notably the USSR and Mao’s China. As we have observed, Chinese aid proved the most prolific, extending into economic, political, military, ideological, diplomatic and even geographic fields. Much of this exploded in scale and consistency at the cessation of hostilities in mainland China. Now ‘the Chinese communists were able to spare greatly increased quantities of materiel in the form of guns and ammunition…more advisers were being sent in’[62] whilst exhausted Vietminh troops ‘were trained and refitted.’[63] According to Fall, the war was by now ‘strategically hopeless’[64] for victory by Mao’s forces provided a crucial sanctuary for the Vietminh at a time it was most greatly needed.

Kelly noted Mao’s China brought ‘an undisguised military threat…[with] intense repercussions’ as it became a ‘potent supply base and ideological citadel that the Vietminh could draw on inexhaustibly.’[65] Indeed, and incredible $662 million and 21,500 tonnes of Chinese military aid found its way to the Vietminh,[66] and ‘thanks in large part to this assistance, Giap built, coordinated, and unleashed a remarkably modern army.’[67] The distraction of the Korean War did little to slow Chinese support, but its cease-fire ‘literally threw the whole burden of the Red Chinese war making potential onto the side of the Vietminh.’[68] The plight of the Vietminh is worthy of an essay in itself, but one should be careful to fall into this romanticized image of the ‘grasshopper vs. the elephant’[69]; by the advent of Dien Bien Phu, the Vietminh was a lavishly equipped, well organized, and fiercely determined force. The unfortunate CEFEO meanwhile paled in comparison to the force envisaged, and requested, by its command.

Much needed men, finances and equipment got little further than the contours of Western Europe, for both France and her Allies regarded the stability and security of Europe as their primary aim. By 1952, and with French political support long departed, it was a far-right deputy who summed the case up best of all: ‘distant expeditions are enormous trials for democracies’[70], a message which would be all too relevant twenty years later. Bibliography – Abouzahr, S. The Tangled Web: America, France and Indochina 1947-50 [Online] Available at: < [Accessed 28 October 2013] -A mbler, J. The French Army in Politics (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1966) – Ambrose, S. Brinkley D. Rise to Globalism (New York, Penguin Group, 2011) – Davidson, P. Vietnam at War (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988) – Gilbert, M. Why the North won the Vietnam War (New York, Palgrave, 2002) – Fall, B.

Hell in a Very Small Place (Cambridge, Da Capo, 2008) – Fall, B. Last Reflections on War (Mechanicsburg, Stackpole Books, 2000) – Fall, B. Street Without Joy (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964) – Fall, B. The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London, Praeger, 1968) – Gildea, R. France since 1945 (London, Oxford University Press, 2002) – Guillain, R. La fin des illusions, Notes d’Indochine: fevrier-juillet 1954 (Paris, 1954) – Isoart, P. Le Phenomene National Vietnamien (Paris, LGDJ, 1961) – Journal Officiel: Debats de l’Assemblee Nationale – Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History (London, Penguin Books, 1997) – Kelly, G. Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1965) – Lancaster, D.

The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, Oxford University Press, 1961) – Lévy, R. Reagrds sur l’Asie (Paris, Armand Colin, 1952) – Lacouture, J. Devillers, P. La fin d’une guerre, Indochine 1954 (Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1960) – UQAM The Indochina War 1945-1956: An Interdisciplinary Tool [Online] Available at: < [Accessed 5 November 2013] – US Army Corps of Engineers, Historical Vignette 054. Available at: < [Accessed 16 November 2013] [1] Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History (London, Penguin Books, 1997), p. 163. [2] Ibid., p. 214. [3] Ibid. [4] Kelly, G. Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1965), p. 42.

[5] UQAM The Indochina War 1945-1956: An Interdisciplinary Tool [Online] Available at: < [Accessed 5 November 2013] [6] UQAM The Indochina War… [7] Kelly, p. 62. [8] Fall, B. The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London, Praeger, 1968), p. 221. [9] Kelly, p. 55. [10] Lévy, R. Reagrds sur l’Asie (Paris, Armand Colin, 1952), p. 117. [11] Isoart, P. Le Phenomene National Vietnamien (Paris, LGDJ, 1961) p. 381. [12] Fall, The Two Vietnams… p. 213. [13] Lacouture, J. Devillers, P. La fin d’une guerre, Indochine 1954 (Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1960) p. 12n.

[14] Guillain, R. La fin des illusions, Notes d’Indochine: fevrier-juillet 1954 (Paris, 1954), p. 69. [15] Kelly, p. 65. [16] Ambler, J. The French Army in Politics (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 102. [17]Fall, The Two Vietnams… p. 211. [18] Kelly, p. 58 [21] Gildea, R. France since 1945(London, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 9. [22] Ambrose, S. Brinkley D. Rise to Globalism (New York, Penguin Group, 2011), p. 92. [23] Abouzahr, S. The Tangled Web: America, France and Indochina 1947-50 [Online] Available at: < [Accessed 28 October 2013] [24] Ambrose, Brinkley, p.

101. [25] Gildea, p. 8. [27] Fall, B. Hell in a Very Small Place (Cambridge, Da Capo, 2008), p. vii. [28] Karnow, p. 203. [29] Lancaster, D. The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 240. [30] Kelly, p. 62. [31] Journal Officiel: Debats de l’Assemblee Nationale, October 27, 1953, p. 4597. [32] Lancaster, p. 240 [33] Fall, The Two Vietnams…, p. 220 [34] Ibid. [43] UQAM The Indochina War… [44] Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place…, p. ix. [45] Ambrose, Brinkley, p. 237. [46] Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 15. [47] Ibid.

[48] Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 242. [49] US Army Corps of Engineers, Historical Vignette 054. Available at: < [Accessed 16 November 2013] [50] Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 260. [51] Ibid., p. 262. [53] Davidson, P. Vietnam at War (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988), p. 275. [54] Karnow, p. 209. [55] Ibid., p. 210. [56] Davidson, p. 276. [57] Gilbert, M. Why the North won the Vietnam War (New York, Palgrave, 2002), p. 1. [58] Karnow, p. 198.

French Indochina War – History Wars Weapons About French Indochina War The French Indochina War, also called the First Indochina War, was an armed conflict which was fought between the French Far East Expeditionary Corps , led by France, and the communist Viet Minh insurgent guerrilla army, in French Indochina from December 19, 1946, to August 1, 1954. The Far East Expeditionary Corps were French colonial forces which belonged to French Union, supported by Emperor Bao Dai’s Vietnamese National Army. The Viet Minh was a clandestine armed force which was led and commanded by Ho Chí Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Although the conflict engulfed the entire country and also extended into the neighboring French Indochina protectorates of Laos and Cambodia, most of the battles were fought in Tonkin in Northern Vietnam. Following the reoccupation of Indochina by the French following the end of World War II , the area having fallen to the Japanese, the Viet Minh launched a rebellion against the French authority governing the colonies of French Indochina. The first few years of the war involved a low-level rural insurgency against French authority.

However, after the Chinese communists reached the Northern border of Vietnam in 1949, the conflict turned into a conventional war between two armies equipped with modern weapons supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union. French Union forces included colonial troops from the whole former empire (Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Laotian, Cambodian, Vietnamese and Vietnamese ethnic minorities), French professional troops and units of the French Foreign Legion. The use of metropolitan recruits was forbidden by the governments to prevent the war from becoming even more unpopular at home. It was called the “dirty war” (la sale guerre) by supporters of the Left in France and intellectuals (including Sartre) during the Henri Martin Affair in 1950. Although the strategy of pushing the Viet Minh into attacking a well defended base in a remote part of the country at the end of their logistical trail was validated at the Battle of Na San , the lack of construction materials (especially concrete), tanks (because of lack of road access and difficulty in the jungle terrain), and air cover prevented an effective defense. The decisive battle which practically put an end to the war in Indochina was the Battle of Dien Bien Phu , which was fought in 1954.

Other important military operations and battles of the French Indochina War were: the Battle of Cao Bang (1947) , Battle of Hoa Binh , Battle of Dong Khe , Battle of Mang Yang Pass , Operation Brochet , Operation Camargue, Operation Hirondelle , Operation Mouette , Operation Castor . After the war, the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, made a provisional division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, with control of the north given to the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, and the south becoming the State of Vietnam under Emperor Bao Ðai, in order to prevent Ho Chi Minh from gaining control of the entire country. A year later, Bao Dai would be deposed by his prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, creating the Republic of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh’s refusal to enter into negotiations with south Vietnam about holding nationwide elections in 1956, as had been stipulated by the Geneva Conference, would eventually lead to the Vietnam War.

Weapons used in the French Indochina War The weapons used by both the French Far East Expeditionary Corps and the French Foreign Legion units during the First Indochina War were practically American World War II Weapons, which were also used in the Korean War. French infantry elements used the M1 Garand , the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), the Thompson submachine gun, the French FM 24/29 light machine gun (FM: fusil mitrailleur), and the French MAS-36 bolt-action rifle for the snipers. The artillery consisted of French 150mm and 155mm howitzers, and US M101 howitzers, which fired 105 mm high explosive (HE) semi-fixed ammunition and had a maximum range of 7 miles. The most important armored vehicle which the French Army deployed in Indochina was the US M24 Chaffee tank. At the beginning of the armed conflict the Viet Minh troops used both old French and Japanese rifles such as the Lebel M1886 and the MAS-36 rifles (French), and the Arisaka rifle (Japanese).

However, by 1949, the Viet Minh began to be supplied with the Soviet SVT-40 semi-automatic rifles which they obtained via China; and by 1954, at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the communist forces were already using the AK 47 assault rifle. The Viet Minh artillery units used the Soviet 152 mm howitzer-gun M1937, and at Dien Bien Phu they deployed 140 field howitzers, 50 heavy mortars, 70-80 recoilless guns, 36 anti-aircraft guns, and 12 Soviet made Katyusha rocket launchers. French Indochina War (Video)

Question: In which 1954 battle did the Vietminh defeat the French and end their influence in Indochina?
Answer: Dien Bien Phu