'Speak softly and carry a big stick' - the meaning and origin of this phrase Speak softly and carry a big stick Meaning A proverb advising the tactic of caution and non-aggression, backed up by the ability to do violence if required. Origin The notion being expressed here is the opposite of the tactics employed by every temporary schoolteacher - who begin stern and tough and, when discipline allows it, become more easy-going. The 'speak softly...' doctrine, like the earlier phrase 'the iron fist in the velvet glove', was to begin gently, but hold a decisive weapon in reserve. The widespread use of 'speak softly and carry a big stick' began with American president Theodore Roosevelt. In a letter to Henry L. Sprague, on January 26th 1900, he wrote: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." Roosevelt claims the phrase to be of West African origin, but I can find no corroborative evidence for that assertion. If it truly was proverbial in 1900 it ought to be easy to find earlier citations of it, but I can find none. Nor is there any record of the phrase actually being used in West Africa before Roosevelt's time.

Whether Roosevelt actually believed, for whatever reason, that the expression was West African, or whether he knew that it wasn't and was indulging in a form of 'Confucious he say' hokum in order to impart a degree of distinction to it, we don't know. It is certainly possible that he coined the phrase himself. Speak Softly and Carry the BEST Stick - USCCA-Concealed Carry Self Defense Insurance & CCW Info Speak Softly and Carry the BEST Stick By Scott W. Wagner // 08/22/2013 President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly but carry a BIG stick” as a way of expressing his foreign policy. For President Roosevelt, his big stick was the American Navy; for you, the “big stick” needs to be exactly that: a big stick. Not just any big stick, but what I consider to be the BEST big stick. If you are a concealed carry permit holder or cop, you MUST have less lethal options available.

George Zimmerman might not have had to spend the rest of his life with a media induced “Mark of Cain” on his forehead had he had a less lethal option available, even though he was deemed justified in using deadly force in self-defense by a jury of his peers. We can all learn from his tragic experience. Many cops also carry only an off-duty gun, and no less lethal options other than bare hands. A carpenter can’t build a house with just a hammer; he needs additional tools to complete his mission. The same rule applies to cops and permit holders—we need additional tools to complete our mission as well. In the law enforcement community, there is a resurgence of interest in wooden nightsticks or batons—new designs using very dense woods. This is due to the lack of effectiveness of the expandable metal baton. Expandable batons place the largest percentage of weight in the handle end. The tip end—the part of the baton that actually strikes the target—is the narrowest and lightest portion of expandable batons. Wooden batons are uniform in weight throughout, thus delivering much more impact weight on target.

Realizing this, Nate Humes, a California Deputy Sheriff and woodcrafter, has elevated the wood baton to a new level of effectiveness and art. His company, Ninja Nate Woodworking, produces what I believe to be the finest batons in existence. Based on the style of the Samurai sword, Nate uses a number of the densest woods available to handcraft his batons and finishes them to a mirror finish, wrapping the handles with paracord in various styles and colors. Argentine Lignum Vitae, Bolivian Rosewood, Cocobolo, Maple, and African Blackwood are the wood choices. Paracord wrappings can be smooth, spiral, straight or zig-zag, with black or camo as color choices. My sample was crafted in African Blackwood, and was black spiral wrapped. The wrapping knots eliminate the need for rubber grommets for police users. Length is 26 inches—ideal in terms of power, speed, and reach. The Ninja Nate design and wood density aid in power generation. Practice on a heavy bag—open air strikes are like target shooting without a paper target. Hold the baton with your index finger and thumb just above the point where the wrap ends.

Wind up like you would with a ball bat, tip end touching your shoulder. Rotate your hips toward the bag with the baton as the strike begins. Strike your target with the last third of the baton. Make sure you keep your weak hand up to protect yourself. “Reload” the baton fully before doing another practice strike; don’t shortchange yourself. Your baton is a less lethal tool—head strikes are out unless life is in danger. A Ninja Nate baton being drawn from your vehicle or bag may turn the tables, and it definitely shows you mean business. Nate’s batons are $100, but they will last a lifetime and are nearly unbreakable. They are highly crafted tools that can save the day for a cop or civilian when deadly force is not the best option. Learn more at . Barack Obama Foreign Policy: Speak Loudly and Carry a Small Stick | New Republic Speak Loudly and Carry a Small Stick Obama has turned Teddy Roosevelt's famous maxim on its head By John B.

Judis March 13, 2014 Theodore Roosevelt won fame, and was later lionized, as the leader of the Rough Riders in Cuba and as the bellicose advocate of American expansionism in the Pacific. “I should welcome any war, for I think the country needs one,” Roosevelt wrote a friend in 1897. But Roosevelt’s most important contribution to American foreign policy came later—when he became president in 1901 and when he replaced his colonel’s spurs with a subtle understanding of what diplomacy entailed. During his two terms, Roosevelt wound down the war in the Philippines that he had helped start in 1898, thwarted European designs upon Latin America, and mediated the Algeciras Crisis and the Russo-Japanese War, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Barack Obama promised to bring a fresh perspective to American foreign policy. He had been raised overseas, and could see the U.S. from the outside; he had captured the Democratic nomination for president partly on the basis of his opposition to the Iraq War. He has had some success—notably in killing Osama Bin Laden and in initiating negotiations with Iran that could, if they succeed, transform the politics of the Middle East.

But Obama has also stumbled—initially, out of inexperience (his awkward mix of escalation and withdrawal in Afghanistan), but more recently in Syria and the Ukraine out of disregard for the principles of successful diplomacy that Roosevelt enshrined. Roosevelt summed up presidential diplomacy in what he claimed to be a West African adage, “speak softly and carry a big stick.” By contrast, Obama’s recent diplomacy in Syria and Russia could be described as “speak loudly and carry a little stick, or no stick at all.” What did Roosevelt’s “speak softly and carry a big stick” mean? It’s not as obvious as it might seem. “Speak softly” draws an implicit distinction between the public space of, say, a domestic political campaign or a courtroom drama and the public space of international relations. In a political campaign, candidates often say nasty things to each other. They want to rouse supporters and discredit their opponents. After the campaign is over, these accusations are often forgotten. But in international relations, the very success of a negotiation can depend upon adjusting one’s rhetoric so that, if an opponent does concede, he still saves face and maintains his nation’s honor.

If the goal of the negotiation is to change another country’s behavior, putting the country’s ruler down publicly may make success less likely and also imperil cooperation in areas that don’t directly pertain to what is immediately at issue. The meaning of “carry a big stick” is more obvious. If you want to change another country’s behavior in ways it might not initially desire, you need to have a credible threat to back up your demand for change. Roosevelt primarily thought in military and specifically naval terms—the U.S. economy was not yet large enough for economic sanctions to be a credible threat. During Roosevelt’s presidency, the U.S. added eleven new battleships and almost doubled the size of the navy. Roosevelt was intent, Frederick Marks wrote in his study of Roosevelt’s foreign policy Velvet on Iron , on “tailoring policy to power.” He rejected the idea that conflicts of national interest could be settled through good will—or in contemporary terms, by sitting adversaries down in a room and insisting that they come to an agreement. Roosevelt described that kind of diplomacy as “slop,” and designated “Thou shalt not slop over” as the Eleventh Commandment.

Roosevelt applied these principles in the Venezuela crisis of November-December 1902. Britain and Germany threatened to blockade Venezuela if it did not repay its loans to them. Roosevelt was not concerned about Britain’s intentions, but he did worry that Germany would demand territory for failure to repay the loan, as it had done in China. When the Germans and British started firing at Venezuelan ships, and Venezuela’s president called for arbitration, Roosevelt gave the Germans ten days to agree. If they did not, he threatened to send the U.S. Navy, whose ships in the Caribbean outnumbered the Germans. But Roosevelt did not announce this publicly. Roosevelt issued his ultimatum entirely in private—the visit by the German ambassador was not even listed on the White House calendar. Roosevelt distrusted German Kaiser Wilhelm, but he also knew that he was vain and subject to delusions of grandeur. “It would be foolhardy to humiliate a person like that in the Caribbean,” Roosevelt explained . On December 17, convinced that Roosevelt was serious, the Germans backed down and agreed to arbitration, but the details of what had happened weren’t known until Roosevelt was out of office.

Roosevelt succeeded with the Germans in Venezuela because he actually had a big stick that he was wielding. But the corollary of Roosevelt’s adage was that when a president doesn’t have a big stick, it’s best not to make hollow threats. Roosevelt was wary of trying to enforce the American Open Door policy (for free access to markets) in the Far East because the U.S. couldn’t compete there with the British, German, French, and even Russian and Japanese forces. Roosevelt acquiesced to Japanese control of Korea and sought a compromise when the Chinese boycotted American imports in 1905. He was also attuned to domestic opposition. Faced with a war-weary Congress in 1907, he opted not to intervene militarily in Venezuela when it reneged on loans from the United States. Consider by contrast Obama’s policy toward Syria. On August 18, 2011, Obama issued a statement calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to leave office. “The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way,” Obama said.

“For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.” This was speaking loudly, but Obama was not prepared to follow it up when Assad failed to step aside. He rejected arming Assad’s opposition. In January 2012, he told The New Republic, “In a situation like Syria, I have to ask, can we make a difference in that situation?” There was no stick. On August 20, on the eve of the party conventions, Obama warned that if the Assad government either used or transferred its chemical weapons, it would constitute a “red line” that would invite military action. The next spring, Assad was widely believed to have used chemical weapons against the opposition. After a month of dithering, the White House announced that the intelligence community had judged with “varying degrees of confidence” that Assad had used gas on a “small scale.” But it did not propose any military response. Six weeks later, it finally promised to provide some military equipment to the rebels, but the aid failed to arrive. Last August, the administration affirmed that the Assad regime had launched a large-scale chemical attack in the rebel-held Damascus suburbs, and this time Obama threatened military reprisals.

But he had done nothing to build support for a military response. The British balked, and then majorities in Congress indicated they would not support military action. Obama was bailed out by the Russians, who obtained a promise from Assad to destroy his chemical weapons arsenal. But the failure to take action when the Assad government crossed the “red line” undermined America’s credibility in the Middle East. The Syrian red line fiasco showed that the Obama administration was reluctant to make good on its threat to use military force to back up its diplomacy. In Rooseveltian terms, the administration should either have not threatened military action in the first place or carefully laid the basis for its use. America’s relations with Putin’s Russia are now being seen through the prism of the Cold War past, but that vantage obscures the degree of cooperation that occurred between the nations during Obama’s presidency. The two nations signed a new START treaty in 2011; Russia continued to assist the United States in Afghanistan; it backed UN resolutions against Iran for its nuclear program and signed the interim agreement last November. However, Obama also angered Russia by deceiving it in United Nations negotiations over intervention in Libya. (The U.S.

claimed its purpose was limited to humanitarian intervention.) And Russia, for its part, backed Assad in Syria; and defied the Obama administration by granting asylum to Edward Snowden. (By refusing to hand over Snowden, the Russians actually did Obama a favor by sparing him the uproar and loss of popularity that prosecuting the whistle-blower would have deservedly cost him.) The United States had a similar mixed record with China, but it acted far differently toward its rulers. With them, Obama engaged in respectful competition; with Putin, he conveyed a lack of respect toward someone who, like the Kaiser in Roosevelt’s time, craves respect for himself and for his country. Obama skipped meetings; he sent an underling—former Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano—to represent the United States as the Winter Olympics in Sochi and a delegation headed by gay athletes to protest a recent Russian law banning gay “propaganda.” Obama’s sending Napolitano was a gratuitous snub and made it more likely that Putin would refuse to cooperate when the U.S. needed Russia’s support.

Sending a delegation that not merely included, but was headed by gay athletes, was an important moral statement, and perhaps was appropriate, but it also turned the game’s ceremonies into an overt attempt to embarrass their host and threatened America's ability to influence Russian behavior in other areas. The events that occurred in the Ukraine during the last week of February remain murky. Did the United States and European Union put sufficient weight behind a transitional solution to the crisis that was worked out with Russian representatives present? Or did they encourage a new anti-Russian government in Kiev that ended up eliminating Russian as a second language and replacing pro-Russian governors in the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea? Could Obama, if less intent on dissing Putin, have engineered a compromise during that fateful weekend that would have prevented Russia’s invasion of Crimea? If Obama had followed TR’s principles, he would not have gone out of his way to insult Putin at the Olympics. There was some domestic political advantage to doing so (Putin is not popular and gay rights are), but there was a diplomatic price to be paid. And he would have recognized that he had limited ability to affect events in Ukraine and would have attempted at the beginning, as trouble was brewing, to mediate between the Russians and the E.U.

But that’s not what he did. On February 28, Obama warned Putin that “there will be costs” if Russia sent troops to the Ukraine. That had all the earmarks of an ultimatum, but it was delivered publicly and not backed up by credible threats. By the next day, Russian forces were spotted taking control of government buildings. The White House then raised the possibility of Iran-style sanctions against Russian banks. Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that “all options” were on the table. But as happened with Syria in August, the White House had issued threats before assembling the appropriate coalition to back them up. On March 4, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, which had far deeper economic ties to Russia than did the United States, all indicated they would not go along with punitive sanctions against Russian banks, only with restrictions on visas for Russian officials linked to the invasion. In his attempt to pressure Putin and Russia to withdraw, Obama had come up empty again. He had not put any power behind his policies. And he may have forfeited any Russian cooperation in the Middle East. Why at critical times has Obama conducted diplomacy in this way?

Final answers will have to await the release of his papers decades hence, but a few factors come to mind. First, in these cases, Obama publicly articulated ends but ignored or slighted the development of the means to achieve them. That’s been characteristic of his governing style. Think of the failed rollout of the Affordable Care Act last fall. In domestic policy, a failure to match means to ends can lead to falling approval numbers. In foreign policy, it can lead to the perception of fecklessness, which can severely limit a country’s effectiveness. Secondly, in these cases, domestic political considerations may have impinged on Obama’s foreign policy decisions. He issued his “red line” warning to Syria in the wake of Republican attacks that he was displaying weakness toward Assad. His Republican challenger Mitt Romney had accused him of a “lack of leadership” and a “policy of paralysis.” During the last month, Obama may have been responding to John McCain, Lindsay Graham and other Republicans who attacked him for showing weakness toward Putin and in the Ukraine. These critics advocated even louder speech, but they usually did not offer substantive alternatives to what Obama was doing. Third, Obama, particularly in the case of Putin, may have fallen into the trap of personalizing his international adversaries.

There is no question that some of Putin’s policies—including his support for Assad and his apparent to desire to restore the old Soviet Union—run counter to what the United States and any proponent of democracy and human rights would like to see happen. But Obama—again prodded, perhaps, by Republican critics—has inserted Putin into that pantheon of demonic foes that includes Fidel Castro, Mao Zedong, Saddam Hussein, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. That has obscured past areas of cooperation, and made future cooperation much less likely. Kaiser Wilhelm was no bargain either, and Theodore Roosevelt knew it. But he also knew that he had to be handled carefully, and if handled carefully, could even occasionally prove useful to the United States. Obama, and much of the rest of official Washington, forgot that lesson in dealing with Putin. Obama and American diplomacy may still emerge unscathed from the crisis in the Ukraine. Putin, fearful of the E.U.’s and America's disfavor, may opt for an autonomous rather than annexed Crimea. Or he may annex Crimea and leave the East Ukraine alone. That will be a setback, but not necessarily the beginning of a new twilight struggle with the Russians.

Putin could, however, attempt to stir up trouble in the Eastern Ukraine and to encourage a partition of the country. Here, finally, is the question for the future: Is the Obama administration preparing for that possibility by drawing up with the relevant European countries a sanctions strategy that could quietly deter Putin from moving ahead? Or will it settle again for angry declamations and denunciations? The Big Stick About Watch and Favorite Watch Watching this resources will notify you when proposed changes or new versions are created so you can keep track of improvements that have been made. Favorite Favoriting this resource allows you to save it in the “My Resources” tab of your account. There, you can easily access this resource later when you’re ready to customize it or assign it to your students. The Big Stick Roosevelt's big-stick diplomacy refers to negotiating peacefully with other nations while simultaneously displaying military might. Learning Objective Describe Roosevelt's foreign policy and the meaning of the proverb, "Speak softly, and carry a big stick" Key Points The concept of big-stick diplomacy is derived from Theodore Roosevelt 's memorable quote: "Speak softly, and carry a big stick." Big-stick diplomacy was a major component of Roosevelt's international relations policy.

The theory is that leaders should strive for peace while also keeping other nations aware of their military power. Roosevelt displayed his policy during the Venezuela Crisis when he amended the Monroe Doctrine to read that the United States would get involved with the affairs of its Latin American neighbors if they defaulted on their debt to Europe. Big-stick diplomacy also was applied to the Panama Canal crisis and the Cuba question; the United States set a list of rules and standards to which it would hold Cuba instead of annexing it. Terms Roosevelt Corollary An addition to the Monroe Doctrine articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt that states that the United States will intervene in conflicts between European and Latin American countries to enforce legitimate claims of the European powers, rather than having the Europeans press their claims directly. Register for FREE to remove ads and unlock more features! Learn more Full Text The term "big-stick diplomacy" refers to President Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and is taken from his famous quote, "Speak softly, and carry a big stick." Roosevelt attributed the phrase to a West African proverb, "Speak softly, and carry a big stick; you will go far," but the claim that it originated in West Africa has been disputed.

Essentially, big-stick diplomacy is the idea of negotiating peacefully with other nations while simultaneously threatening them with displays of military muscle. Roosevelt first used the phrase in a speech at the Minnesota State Fair on September 2, 1901, 12 days before the assassination of President William McKinley , which subsequently thrust him into the presidency. As president, Roosevelt described his style of foreign policy as, "the exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis." The Roosevelt Corollary The Roosevelt Corollary is an addition to the Monroe Doctrine that was articulated by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union address in 1904. The corollary states that the United States will intervene in conflicts between European nations and Latin American countries to enforce legitimate claims of the European powers, rather than having the Europeans press their claims directly. Roosevelt tied his policy to the Monroe Doctrine, and it was also consistent with his foreign policy included in his big-stick diplomacy. Roosevelt stated that in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was justified in exercising, "international police power" to put an end to chronic unrest or wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere.

While the Monroe Doctrine had sought to prevent European intervention , the Roosevelt Corollary was used to justify U.S. intervention throughout the hemisphere. Background: The Venezuelan Affair In late 1902, Britain, Germany, and Italy implemented a several-month-long naval blockade against Venezuela because of the Venezuelan president's refusal to pay foreign debts and damages suffered by European citizens in a recent Venezuelan civil war. The incident was called the "Venezuela Crisis" of 1902–1903, and an international court concluded on February 22, 1904, that the blockading powers involved in the Venezuela Crisis were entitled to preferential treatment in the payment of their claims. The United States disagreed with the decision in principle, and feared that it would encourage future European intervention to gain such advantage. In order to preclude European intervention, the Roosevelt Corollary was created to assert the United States' right to intervene in order to "stabilize" the economic affairs of small states in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts. Using the Corollary The Roosevelt Corollary was supposed to be an addition to the Monroe Doctrine; however, it could be seen as a departure.

While the Monroe Doctrine said European countries should stay out of Latin America, the Roosevelt Corollary took this further to say that the United States had the right to exercise military force in Latin American countries in order to keep European countries out. In other words, while the Monroe Doctrine sought to bar involvement by European empires, the Roosevelt Corollary announced America's intention to take their place. The Corollary rejected territorial expansion , but upheld interventionism. U.S. presidents cited the Roosevelt Corollary as justification for U.S. intervention in Cuba (1906–1909), Nicaragua (1909–1910, 1912–1925, and 1926–1933), Haiti (1915–1934), and the Dominican Republic (1916–1924). As president from 1914–1921, Woodrow Wilson frequently intervened in Latin America using the justification of the Roosevelt Corollary. Nicaragua and Panama Canal Affair Roosevelt also wielded his "big stick" following the questionable diplomatic actions of the U.S. government to sponsor and pursue a canal project across Central America.

Both Nicaragua and Panama experienced Roosevelt's signature diplomacy in canal-related incidents. In 1901, Secretary of State John Hay pressed the Nicaraguan government for approval of a canal. The deal was that Nicaragua would receive $1.5 million in ratification , plus $100,000 annually, and the United States would, "provide sovereignty , independence, and territorial integrity" to Nicaragua. Nicaragua then returned the contract draft with a change: Instead of an annual $100,000, they wished to receive $6 million in ratification. The United States accepted the deal, but after Congress approved the contract, the problem of court jurisdiction arose. Many anti-canal advocates argued that because the United States did not have legal jurisdiction in Nicaragua, it could not sponsor a canal project. After Nicaragua was ruled out, Panama was the obvious choice for U.S. leaders determined to build a Central American canal. However, Panama also posed numerous logistical and political problems. As Panama was then a region of Colombia, the United States was subject to the whims of the Colombian government and of manufacturing companies that provided the construction materials at a higher price.

Roosevelt refused to pay the higher than expected fees and responded with an "engineered revolution" in Colombia that aimed for the secession of Panama. On November 3, 1903, Panama (with the support of the U.S. Navy) revolted against Colombia and declared itself a republic, receiving $10 million from the United States for the canal project. Colombia had little diplomatic recourse and was no match for U.S. military strength, so it was forced to concede Panama's independence. Panama also received an annual payment of $250,000, and a guarantee of national independence. The United States, on the other hand, gained the rights to the canal strip "in perpetuity." Roosevelt later said that he, "took the Canal, and let Congress debate" the matter after the event. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick February 1, 2012, by Ken Jorgustin U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt once said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far”, and established a foreign diplomacy ideology nicknamed ‘Big Stick diplomacy’.

The meaning of the phrase advises a tactic of caution and non-aggression, backed up by the ability to do violence if required. Similar to the phrase, ‘the iron fist in the velvet glove’, the idea was to begin gently, but hold a decisive weapon in reserve. As I was sitting here this evening contemplating a quick post, my wife watching Jeopardy on TV (I admit to enjoying the Jeopardy challenge too), I heard a reference to the famous phrase ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’. It got me to thinking about similarities to preparedness in general. Let me explain… How often have you heard others in conversation bragging about this or that, all the while boisterous or bloviating on and on? Does this type of behavior bother you? Well it shouldn’t… Here’s why. If you have all your ducks in a row, so to speak, there is absolutely no need to brag or boisterously bloviate. In fact, to do so will only paint a target on your back for others to notice, who may trip you up in some way out of jealousy or vindictive pleasure. It happens. Speak softly. Live under the radar. Don’t paint a target on your back.

All the while you’re building your defenses so as to build a personal castle around you and your family, living without fear or dependence as much as reasonably possible. Carry a big stick. Although the original proverb referred to a stick as a weapon, you could look at it as your overall defense strategy against the modern systems of dependence. For example, having a 6 month storage of food and consumable supplies, and 6 months worth of saved cash to maintain your current standard of living, would certainly create a ‘speak easy’ emotion of calm and reassurance. The big stick could be having no debt. With no debt, you are truly free (to an extent). Having no debt is a weapon to be used against the system which is trying its best to enslave you. The big stick is the accumulation of all your preparedness plans, your reserves, knowledge, know-how, all of which could be used if need be. Having and carrying the big stick will inspire a peaceful self-gratifying feeling for most. The thing that I like about the phrase, is that it represents a civil ideal of self reliance. A quiet, but powerful calm. It’s something to strive for. Be Prepared.

If you enjoyed this, or topics of current events risk awareness and survival preparedness, click here to check out our current homepage articles… Biden: 'I Promise You the President Has a Big Stick' - Fox Nation Fox Nation Biden: 'I Promise You the President Has a Big Stick' Published April 26, 2012 Facebook 0 Twitter 0 livefyre 0 Email Print 4/26/2012 | FOXNATION.COM Vice President Joe Biden brought up an old Teddy Roosevelt quote "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far" and related to President Obama's stance on Iran, "I promise you, the president has a big stick. I promise you," ============= NEW YORK (AP) — Vice President Joe Biden has issued a strong defense of President Barack Obama's foreign policy record and suggested that Republican Mitt Romney doesn't understand the role of contemporary commander in chief. Biden delivered a campaign foreign policy speech Thursday at New York University. The vice president said Obama had met the foreign policy challenges facing the United States in the 21st century, including ending the war in Iraq and ordering the mission that killed Osama bin Laden.

He said Romney's foreign policy vision is stuck in the Cold War-era. Joe Biden: Obama 'Has A Big Stick. I Promise You' (VIDEO) | The Huffington Post Joe Biden: Obama 'Has A Big Stick. I Promise You' (VIDEO) 04/26/2012 12:48 pm ET 5k Vice President Joe Biden spoke at length in defense of President Obama's foreign policy on Thursday, managing to draw snickers for a comment about the commander in chief's "big stick." "I promise you, the president has a big stick," Biden said, after quoting President Teddy Roosevelt's enduring foreign policy advice to "speak softly and carry a big stick." The audience at New York University responded with scattered laughter. "I promise you," Biden repeated, deadpanning. The Associated Press reports on the more mature and substantive content of Biden's speech: The vice president said Obama had met the foreign policy challenges facing the United States in the 21st century, including ending the war in Iraq and ordering the mission that killed Osama bin Laden. He said Romney's foreign policy vision is stuck in the Cold War-era. "Governor Romney is counting on our collective amnesia," Biden said .

"But Americans know that we cannot afford to go back to the future." Also on HuffPost: More: "Speak softly and carry a big stick" / Herblock. | Library of Congress "Speak softly and carry a big stick" / Herblock. [ digital file from original drawing ] Full online access to this resource is only available at the Library of Congress. More Resources [ digital file from b&w film copy neg. ] Full online access to this resource is only available at the Library of Congress. About this Item "Speak softly and carry a big stick" / Herblock. Summary Editorial cartoon showing portraits of past presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan, each with a quote attributed to them. Contributor Names Ink drawings--1980-1990. Notes - Title caption continues: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself" ; "The buck stops here" ; "'Mistakes were made' by somebody or other -not me- and just in execution of policy or something." - Distributed by News America Syndicate. - Published in the Washington Post, December 21, 1986. - Copyright 1986 by Herblock.

- Forms part of: Herbert L. Block Collection (Library of Congress). - Exhibited in: Herblock's History: Political Cartoons from the Crash to the Millennium, Library of Congress 2000-2001. Medium 1 drawing on paper : ink, crayon, porous point pen, opaque white, and overlay over blue pencil underdrawing ; 56 x 38.2 cm (sheet) Call Number/Physical Location BLOCK, no. 14390 (C size) [P&P] Source Collection Block, Herbert, 1909-2001. Herbert L. Block collection (Library of Congress) Repository Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA Digital Id Library of Congress Control Number 00652263 LC-DIG-ppmsc-03286 (digital file from original drawing) LC-USZ62-126879 (b&w film copy neg.) Rights Advisory Publication may be restricted. For information see "Herbert Block ("Herblock") Rights and Restrictions," Online Format Rights & Access Rights assessment is your responsibility.

The Library of Congress does not own rights to material in its collections. Therefore, it does not license or charge permission fees for use of such material and cannot grant or deny permission to publish or otherwise distribute the material. Ultimately, it is the researcher's obligation to assess copyright or other use restrictions and obtain permission from third parties when necessary before publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in the Library's collections. For information about reproducing, publishing, and citing material from this collection, as well as access to the original items, see: Herbert Block ("Herblock") - Rights and Restrictions Information For guidance about compiling full citations consult Citing Primary Sources . Rights Advisory: Publication may be restricted. For information see "Herbert Block ("Herblock") Rights and Restrictions," Reproduction Number: LC-DIG-ppmsc-03286 (digital file from original drawing) LC-USZ62-126879 (b&w film copy neg.) Call Number: BLOCK, no. 14390 (C size) [P&P] Access Advisory: --- Obtaining Copies If an image is displaying, you can download it yourself.

(Some images display only as thumbnails outside the Library of Congress because of rights considerations, but you have access to larger size images on site.) Alternatively, you can purchase copies of various types through Library of Congress Duplication Services . If a digital image is displaying: The qualities of the digital image partially depend on whether it was made from the original or an intermediate such as a copy negative or transparency. If the Reproduction Number field above includes a reproduction number that starts with LC-DIG..., then there is a digital image that was made directly from the original and is of sufficient resolution for most publication purposes. If there is information listed in the Reproduction Number field above: You can use the reproduction number to purchase a copy from Duplication Services. It will be made from the source listed in the parentheses after the number. If only black-and-white ("b&w") sources are listed and you desire a copy showing color or tint (assuming the original has any), you can generally purchase a quality copy of the original in color by citing the Call Number listed above and including the catalog record ("About This Item") with your request. If there is no information listed in the Reproduction Number field above: You can generally purchase a quality copy through Duplication Services.

Cite the Call Number listed above and include the catalog record ("About This Item") with your request. Price lists, contact information, and order forms are available on the Duplication Services Web site . Access to Originals Please use the following steps to determine whether you need to fill out a call slip in the Prints and Photographs Reading Room to view the original item(s). In some cases, a surrogate (substitute image) is available, often in the form of a digital image, a copy print, or microfilm. Is the item digitized? (A thumbnail (small) image will be visible on the left.) Yes, the item is digitized. Please use the digital image in preference to requesting the original. All images can be viewed at a large size when you are in any reading room at the Library of Congress. In some cases, only thumbnail (small) images are available when you are outside the Library of Congress because the item is rights restricted or has not been evaluated for rights restrictions. As a preservation measure, we generally do not serve an original item when a digital image is available. If you have a compelling reason to see the original, consult with a reference librarian. (Sometimes, the original is simply too fragile to serve.

For example, glass and film photographic negatives are particularly subject to damage. They are also easier to see online where they are presented as positive images.) No, the item is not digitized. Please go to #2. Do the Access Advisory or Call Number fields above indicate that a non-digital surrogate exists, such as microfilm or copy prints? Yes, another surrogate exists. Reference staff can direct you to this surrogate. No, another surrogate does not exist. Please go to #3. If you do not see a thumbnail image or a reference to another surrogate, please fill out a call slip in the Prints and Photographs Reading Room. In many cases, the originals can be served in a few minutes. Other materials require appointments for later the same day or in the future. Reference staff can advise you in both how to fill out a call slip and when the item can be served. To contact Reference staff in the Prints and Photographs Reading Room, please use our Ask A Librarian service or call the reading room between 8:30 and 5:00 at 202-707-6394, and Press 3.

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate. Chicago citation style:

Question: Which president’s policy was to “speak softly and carry a big stick”?
Answer: Teddy Roosevelt