The Problem with Alliances: Britain and the Falklands | Cato Institute The Problem with Alliances: Britain and the Falklands By Doug Bandow This article appeared in the Daily Caller on April 2, 2010. Washington collects alliances like people collect Facebook “friends.” As the Falklands Islands dispute heats up again, the U.S. finds itself being pressed to take sides. It turns out that collecting allies can be expensive. Nearly 30 years ago Argentina and Great Britain fought an improbable war over the lightly populated British colonial outpost (called the Malvinas by Buenos Aires). The islands likely had been visited by Patagonian Indians but were uninhabited when first discovered by Europeans, probably either the Portuguese or Spanish. France established the first known settlement, followed by Great Britain. The Spanish took over the French claim and demolished the British community. The two countries settled their dispute in 1771 and Britain eventually withdrew. Revolution caused Argentina to supplant Spain. The former established a settlement in 1828, which was attacked by U.S. warships after a seal-hunting dispute. The British returned in 1833 in force and re-established control. So who “owns” the island?

The proper answer is: who cares? Alas, fishing rights and possible oil deposits are involved, as well as national pride. Buenos Aires began pressing its claim in 1945 when it signed the United Nations Charter. The two countries negotiated in the 1960s, but no settlement emerged since the Falklands residents wanted to remain British. In 1982 the Argentine military junta invaded the islands, apparently hoping that London would accept the loss. Instead, Britain responded with force, winning a short but sharp war. The junta was swept from power; Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher won a landslide re-election. The two nations renewed diplomatic ties in 1992 but the issue languished, until a British oil company recently began exploratory drilling in island waters. Argentine President Christina Kirchner accused London of violating her nation’s sovereignty. In early February her government blocked departure of a ship with supplies for the drilling operation. Argentina’s foreign minister recently met with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who offered to mediate.

Moreover, 32 Latin American governments expressed their support for “the legitimate rights of the republic of Argentina in the sovereignty dispute with Great Britain.” The appropriate question for Washington is: what does this have to do with the U.S.? Alas, both Argentina and Britain want America’s support. And out of London has come the plaintive plea: aren’t we allies? The U.S. has no discernible interest in the controversy. England controls the islands, but that doesn’t mean its control is legitimate: Washington’s position has been to support British administration, not sovereignty. Obviously, the dispute should be handled peacefully. But President Barack Obama, whose Kenyan grandfather apparently was tortured by British colonial overlords during the 1950’s “Mau Mau” revolt, has no reason to defend this vestige of Britain’s colonial past. On her recent visit to Buenos Aires Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that the dispute be handled by the UN. Of course, no Western industrialized nation should want its affairs decided by the denizens of Turtle Bay. The secretary was on firmer ground in offering Washington’s “help in facilitating” negotiations.

Alas, in London anything other than full-throated support is being treated as disloyalty of the most monstrous character. Officially, the British government expressed its thanks to Secretary Clinton but denied any need for mediation. The private reaction was less restrained. Con Coughlin of the Daily Telegraph wrote that “British officials are angry at what they regard as a cavalier disregard for Britain’s interests at a time when Britain is the only major European power committed significant numbers of combat troops to fight in Afghanistan.” British analyst Nile Gardiner, of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, argued in late February: “If the Obama administration does not take a clear position in support of London, the Anglo-American Special Relationship will be significantly damaged. It is imperative that in the coming days the White House issues an unequivocal statement backing UK sovereignty over the Falklands in the face of Argentinian bullying.” Rep. John Campbell (R-Calif.), who co-chairs the United States/United Kingdom Caucus, has joined the pro-London chorus.

He wrote for the same Daily Telegraph that “The Obama Administration’s recent statements regarding the future of the Falkland Islands have been deeply troubling to those of us in Washington who cherish the Special Relationship and the close ties that bind Great Britain and the United States.” Indeed, he added, “The saber-rattling on behalf of the Argentine government is ridiculous and laughable, to say nothing of being factually dishonest, and economically expedient.” The Falklands contretemps illustrates the problem of maintaining an alliance at a time when none is necessary. “Special relationships” make a lot of sense among individuals. They are a lot more problematic among nations. In fact, George Washington famously warned: “a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.” What could be better illustrate his concern than the U.S. getting involved in the middle of the Falklands dispute? America’s historical ties with Great Britain are long, but for decades were largely negative.

The two peoples broke apart violently in the American Revolution. They fought in 1812. There were constant foreign policy confrontations over Latin America and near war over Venezuela; Washington also rattled its saber at Britain in the boundary dispute with Canada. The threat of conflict also was real during the American Civil War over British neutrality and the Confederacy. Since then relations have been much better, though not without disagreement. Only during World War II and the Cold War did a close alliance make sense. (The U.S. was merely an “associated power” in World War I, and had no reason to enter that foolish, bloody imperial slugfest other than Woodrow Wilson’s delusion that he could inaugurate peace on earth.) Participating in an alliance intended to be fought unto the military death can force one to swallow hard and back even stupid positions taken by one’s friends. The sovereignty of a small south Atlantic island doesn’t look particularly important next to keeping British carriers occupied tracking the Red Navy. The Reagan administration likely was driven by such considerations. Although temporizing initially, Washington tilted toward Britain. After all, the war was initiated by a military junta against a valued ally in the midst of the Cold War before perestroika had transformed the Soviet Union.

But the fact that Washington felt the need to get involved demonstrates why alliances should be limited in time and scope. With the end of the Cold War, there is no reason for the U.S. to be part of NATO and tied militarily to London. That doesn’t mean the American and British peoples should not feel a special relationship. I spent three of my teen years in Great Britain and loved exploring a nation with such a rich history that effectively birthed America. The common values and related culture also suggest that there will be many issues upon which the corresponding governments will agree and cooperate. That might even include fighting wars together. However, London should have supported the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq because the British government perceived the operations to be necessary for its own and global security, not out of a misguided sense of kinship. In fact, Washington would have been better served had Prime Minister Tony Blair not been President George W. Bush’s “poodle,” as the former has been widely derided in Britain. A more skeptical British leader might have slowed if not halted the Bush administration’s costly and foolish rush to war. In the same way, the U.S. should back London when the latter is in the right.

But justice is irrelevant to some advocates of a reflexive “special relationship.” For instance, wrote Gardiner: “President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cannot remain neutral and sit on the fence over an issue of vital national interest to the United Kingdom. While British and American soldiers fight side by side on the battlefields of Afghanistan, the United States must stand shoulder to shoulder with the British people as they once again confront Argentine aggression and defend their own kith and kin.” Washington cannot confront aggression, which has not occurred, though it should discourage any nation resorting to force to resolve territorial disputes. Nor can Washington treat as vital to America another nation’s cause just because the latter believes it to be vital. (Set aside why anyone in Britain would view the status of the Falklands as “vital.”) Without overriding justification, the U.S. government should not reflexively endorse claims and actions that are dubious at best. A similar problem looms in East Asia. The People’s Republic of China has made extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea, especially regarding the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Exactly who owns what is a matter of much international dispute. Must the U.S.

stand by former colony Philippines even if Beijing has the better juridical claim? What about competing claims between China and Vietnam? Even worse, Japan and South Korea, both long-term allies of America, bitterly disagree over the name as well as the sovereignty of Dokdo/Takeshima Island. Both countries have a “special relationship” with America. Which is deserving of Washington’s first loyalty? Not every international problem requires America’s attention, even those involving countries with a “special relationship” with Washington. Contrary to the U.S. government’s current practice, America needs fewer allies. Washington should no longer act as the world’s 9-1-1 number. The Falkland Islands - Geography, History and the Falklands War The Falkland Islands The Falklands are a group of islands located in the southern Atlantic Ocean , about 460 km east of the South American coast. They belong to the United Kingdom but govern themselves. The Falkland Islands have been an issue of conflict between Argentina and Great Britain over the centuries, resulting in a war between the two countries in 1982. About 3,000 people live on the Falklands, most of whom are British citizens.

The island group is ruled by the Queen who sends a governor to administer the territory. 380 children who live on the Falklands are given an education according to the British school system. After attending school up to the age of 16 they can go to England to take their A-levels. The Falkland Islands consist of two main islands and hundreds of smaller ones. The coastline has rough with many fjords, bays and inlets. The climate is influenced by its southern location near the Antarctic continent . Summer temperatures average 13°C in January while winter temperatures drop to 4°C in July. The islands are often hit by storms and heavy rainfall. More than 90% of the islands are farmland. Fishing and sheep farming are the main sources of income for the Falkland Islanders. Its high quality wool is exported to the UK. In the last few years tourism has increased, largely because of cruise tours that visit the Falklands for its unique scenery and wildlife. Map and location of the Falkland Islands History and the Falklands War During the centuries a number of European nations founded settlements on the Falkland Islands. In 1833 Britain took command over the group of islands and set up a naval station there.

In the second half of the 20 th century argument erupted between Great Britain and Argentina over the colony. Since the 19th century Argentina has claimed the islands. It states that it got the islands from Spain when it became independent in 1816. On April 2, 1982 Argentine forces invaded and occupied the islands. The leader of Argentina’s military government, President Galtieri, ordered the invasion to draw away attention from the problems the South American country had at home. The British sent its Navy and Air Force to defend the Falklands and take over control of the islands again. The conflict lasted for two and a half months. On June 14, 1982 Argentine forces surrendered the islands and Britain took control again. Over 600 Argentine soldiers and 250 British troops were killed. The conflict had a great impact on the governments of both countries. Shortly after the war Argentina’s military regime collapsed. In Britain the won war strengthened the political position of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher . Although relationships between the two countries have become normal, Argentina still claims sovereignty over the Malvinas – the Falkland Islands.

Penguins near the coastline of the Falklands - Gentoo {enguins according to = following the laws and rules of … administer = run, govern A-levels = examinations that you take in Great Britain when you are 18 although = while bay = part of the sea that has curved land around it century = a hundred years citizen = a person who lives in a country and has rights there claim = to say that you have the right to own something coastline = where land meets the sea collapse = break down, fall apart conflict = discussion, argument cruise tour = holiday on a large ship draw away attention = to make people stop worrying about a problem drop = go down fjord = narrow valley with high cliffs, filled with water forces = soldiers, army government = people who rule a country heavy = strong income = the money that you get for doing a job increase = to go up invade = to enter an area with an army and take control of it issue = topic largely = mostly located = situated, to be found military regime = government made up of army officers who have not been elected by the people naval = marine, sea occupy = to keep control of another country with an army relationship = connection, link settlement = group of houses in a place where no people have lived before

 soldier = member of an army of a country source = where something comes from sovereignty = to have the power to control a place state = to say officially Argentina Britain Falklands Malvinas War 1982 (Falklands War, Malvinas War, South Atlantic War) [ 1982 ] Falkland Islands War, also called FALKLANDS WAR, MALVINAS WAR, or SOUTH ATLANTIC WAR a brief, undeclared war fought between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982 over the control of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and associated island dependencies.

Argentina had claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (which lie 300 miles [480 km] east of its coast) since the early 19th century, but Britain had occupied and administered the islands since 1833 and had consistently rejected Argentina's claims. In early 1982 the Argentine military junta led by Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri gave up on long-running negotiations with Britain and instead launched an invasion of the islands. The decision to invade was chiefly political: the junta, which was being criticized for economic mismanagement and human rights abuses, believed that the "recovery" of the islands would unite Argentines behind the government in a patriotic fervour. An elite invasion force trained in secrecy, but its timetable was shortened on March 19, when a dispute erupted on British-controlled South Georgia island (1,000 miles [1,600 km] east of the Falklands) between Argentine salvage workers and British scientists stationed there. Naval forces were quickly mobilized.

Argentine troops invaded the Falklands on April 2, rapidly overcoming the small garrison of British marines at the capital of Stanley (Port Stanley); they obeyed orders not to inflict any British casualties, despite losses to their own units. The next day Argentines seized the associated islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich group. By late April Argentina had stationed more than 10,000 troops on the Falklands, although the vast majority of these were poorly trained conscripts. As expected, the Argentine populace reacted favourably, with large crowds gathering at the Plaza de Mayo (in front of the presidential palace) to demonstrate support for the military initiative. In response to the invasion, the British government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared a war zone for 200 miles (320 km) around the Falklands and assembled a naval task force with which to retake the islands. Most European powers voiced support for Great Britain, and European military advisers were withdrawn from Argentine bases; however, most Latin American governments sympathized with Argentina. A notable exception was Chile, which maintained a state of alert against its neighbour, owing to a dispute over islands in the Beagle Channel.

The perceived threat from Chile prompted Argentina to keep most of its elite troops on the mainland, distant from the Falklands theatre. In addition, Argentine military planners had trusted that the United States would remain neutral in the conflict, but, following unsuccessful mediation attempts, the United States offered full support to Great Britain, allowing its NATO ally to use its air-to-air missiles, communications equipment, aviation fuel, and other military stockpiles on British-held Ascension Island, as well as cooperating with military intelligence. On April 25, while the British task force was steaming 8,000 miles (13,000 km) to the war zone via Ascension Island, a smaller British force retook South Georgia island, in the process capturing one of Argentina's vintage diesel-electric submarines. On May 2 the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was sunk outside the war zone by a British submarine. Following this controversial event, most other Argentine ships were kept distant from the conflict, but Argentine submarine action continued to threaten the British fleet. Meanwhile, the British naval force and the land-based Argentine air force fought intensive battles, during which the Argentines sank the HMS Sheffield and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor with Exocet air-to-sea missiles.

In addition, two frigates and another destroyer were sunk and several other vessels damaged, but the majority of Argentine bombs did not detonate. Argentina also failed to prevent the British from making an amphibious landing near Port San Carlos, on the northern coast of East Falkland, on May 21. From this beachhead the British infantry advanced southward to capture the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green, after which they turned eastward to surround Stanley on May 31. The large Argentine garrison there surrendered on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. British forces reoccupied the South Sandwich Islands on June 20. The British captured some 11,400 Argentine prisoners during the war, all of whom were afterward released. Nearly 750 Argentine troops were killed--including 368 in the sinking of the General Belgrano--while Britain lost 256. Scores of Argentine aircraft of various types were destroyed, most while on the ground, and the British lost 10 Harrier jets and more than two dozen helicopters.

Military strategists have debated key aspects of the conflict but have generally underscored the roles of submarines (both Britain's nuclear-powered vessels and Argentina's older, diesel-electric craft) and antiship missiles (both air-to-sea and land-to-sea types). The war also illustrated the importance of air superiority--which the British had been unable to establish--and of advanced surveillance. Logistic support was vital as well, because the armed forces of both nations had operated at their maximum ranges. (See also Naval warfare: The age of the guided missile.) Argentina's ignominious defeat severely discredited the military government and led to the restoration of civilian rule there in 1983. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher converted widespread patriotic support into a landslide victory for her Conservative Party in that year's parliamentary election.

<table class='table table-bordered col-lg-12 col-md-12 col-sm-12 col-xs-12 margin20 row-30' border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><tbody><tr><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">State</font></td><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Entry</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Exit</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Combat Forces</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Population</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Losses</font></td></tr><tr><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Argentina</font></td><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">19

82</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">1982</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">108000</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">27000000</font></td><td width="17%"><span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: small; line-height: 18.571430206298828px;">2306</span><br></td></tr><tr><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">Britain</font></td><td width="16%"><font face="Arial" size="2">1982</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">1982</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">20000</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">6000

0000</font></td><td width="17%"><font face="Arial" size="2">1030</font></td></tr></tbody></table> The Falkland Islands: One of Great Britain's last colonial possessions | United Church of God United Church of God The Falkland Islands: One of Great Britain's last colonial possessions You are here UCG.org / World News and Prophecy / The Falkland Islands: One of Great Britain's last...

The Falkland Islands One of Great Britain's last colonial possessions Posted on Feb 20, 1999 by Fred Nance Estimated reading time: 4 minutes Login or Create an Account With a UCG.org account you will be able to save items to read and study later! Sign In | Sign Up × A brief war was fought in 1982 between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Before the recent attempts to reclaim the islands diplomatically, the first move was by force. A brief war was fought in 1982 between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Located in the South Atlantic, the islands have been a possession of Great Britain since British occupation in 1833. Argentina claims the islands as its territory and lately has been making strong diplomatic moves to try to reclaim the property known to Argentinians as “Las Malvinas.” However, before the recent attempts to reclaim the islands diplomatically, the first move was by force. The start of the 1980s found the economy of Argentina in shambles, and the military regime in power was accused of political arrests, murders, and disappearances of some 30,000 people.

It was against this chaotic backdrop that the government of General Leopoldo Galtieri rallied the country behind it in April 1982 by forcibly occupying the British-held Falkland Islands. The intent was to strike a chord of national pride with its people. After two months of war Great Britain recaptured the islands in June 1982. More than a thousand Argentine lives were lost and the war remains a bitter memory. The issue of Falklands sovereignty has been a source of irritation to the British. But to the Argentines it is a matter of reclaiming lost territory. Since the war, a relationship of goodwill has prevailed between the two countries. As reported in The Economist of October 30, 1998, both parties agreed in 1989 that matters concerning the islands could be handled in a practical manner without affecting either country's claim to sovereignty. Seeking Help The two countries cooperate in international affairs, and both are allies of the United States. Carlos Menem became the first Argentine president to visit Britain since the 1960s this past October. The visit was one of reconciliation for both sides. However, Mr.

Menem raised the issue of sovereignty of the islands to deaf ears among the British. The next stop for President Menem was a visit with President Clinton of the United States on January 11, 1999. Before leaving for the U.S. he said, “Of course the subject that we are not going to elude…is the Malvinas.” In La Nacion it was reported that President Menem asked President Clinton to intervene. Mr. Clinton responded that he would like to see both countries (Great Britain and Argentina),whom he considers friends, come to a solution, adding, “I am going to call Prime Minister Blair.” To complicate matters, a recent BBC revelation was released of Great Britain's “intent” to return sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina 30 years ago . The Daily Express of London broke the 1969 secret, reporting that Great Britain was acceding to Argentinian claims. However, the islanders themselves obstructed the path of negotiations between the two countries. After elections in 1970 and a change in the British government the negotiations were tabled. The Falklands remained British territory.

Bible prophecy reveals that a “company of nations,” or a group or commonwealth of nations, was to arise from the descendants of Jacob, whose name was changed to Israel ( Genesis 35:10 Genesis 35:10And God said to him, Your name is Jacob: your name shall not be called any more Jacob, but Israel shall be your name: and he called his name Israel. Falkland Islands War | Argentina-United Kingdom | Britannica.com Falkland Islands War Alternative Titles: Falklands War, Malvinas War, South Atlantic War Related Topics Falkland Islands War, also called Falklands War, Malvinas War, or South Atlantic War, a brief undeclared war fought between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982 over control of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and associated island dependencies.

The Argentine cruiser General Belgrano sinking after being torpedoed … AP The outbreak of conflict Argentina had claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, which lie 300 miles (480 km) east of its coast, since the early 19th century, but Britain seized the islands in 1833, expelling the few remaining Argentine occupants, and since then consistently rejected Argentina’s claims. In early 1982 the Argentine military junta led by Lieut. Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri gave up on long-running negotiations with Britain and instead launched an invasion of the islands. The decision to invade was chiefly political: the junta, which was being criticized for economic mismanagement and human rights abuses, believed that the “recovery” of the islands would unite Argentines behind the government in a patriotic fervour. An elite invasion force trained in secrecy, but its timetable was shortened on March 19 when a dispute erupted on British-controlled South Georgia island, where Argentine salvage workers had raised the Argentine flag, 800 miles (1,300 km) east of the Falklands. Naval forces were quickly mobilized.

Argentine troops invaded the Falklands on April 2, rapidly overcoming the small garrison of British marines at the capital Stanley (Port Stanley); they obeyed orders not to inflict any British casualties, despite losses to their own units. The next day Argentine marines seized the associated island of South Georgia. By late April Argentina had stationed more than 10,000 troops on the Falklands, although the vast majority of these were poorly trained conscripts, and they were not supplied with proper food, clothing, and shelter for the approaching winter. As expected, the Argentine populace reacted favourably, with large crowds gathering at the Plaza de Mayo (in front of the presidential palace) to demonstrate support for the military initiative . In response to the invasion, the British government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared a war zone for 200 miles (320 km) around the Falklands. The government quickly assembled a naval task force built around two aircraft carriers, the 30-year-old HMS Hermes and the new HMS Invincible light carrier, and two cruise ships pressed into service as troop carriers, the Queen Elizabeth 2 and the Canberra. The carriers sailed from Portsmouth on April 5 and were reinforced en route.

Most European powers voiced support for Great Britain, and European military advisers were withdrawn from Argentine bases. However, most Latin American governments sympathized with Argentina. A notable exception was Chile , which maintained a state of alert against its neighbour because of a dispute over islands in the Beagle Channel . The perceived threat from Chile prompted Argentina to keep most of its elite troops on the mainland, distant from the Falklands theatre. In addition, Argentine military planners had trusted that the United States would remain neutral in the conflict, but, following unsuccessful mediation attempts, the United States offered full support to Great Britain, allowing its NATO ally to use its air-to-air missiles, communications equipment, aviation fuel, and other military stockpiles on British-held Ascension Island , as well as cooperating with military intelligence. The course of the conflict Similar Topics War of 1812 On April 25, while the British task force was steaming 8,000 miles (13,000 km) to the war zone via Ascension Island, a smaller British force retook South Georgia island, in the process capturing one of Argentina’s vintage U.S.-made diesel-electric submarines.

On May 2 the obsolete Argentine cruiser General Belgrano (purchased from the United States after World War II) was sunk outside the war zone by a British nuclear-powered submarine . Following this controversial event, most other Argentine ships were kept in port, and the Argentine navy’s contribution was limited to its naval air force and one of its newer German-made diesel-electric submarines. The latter posed more of a threat to the British fleet than was expected, launching torpedo attacks that narrowly failed. The Falkland Islands War zone (left) and route of British landing forces (right). Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. EU Considers Rules For Robots Meanwhile, the British naval force and the land-based Argentine air forces fought pitched battles. Argentine aircraft consisted mainly of several dozen old U.S. and French fighter-bombers armed only with conventional high-explosive bombs and lacking electronic countermeasures or radar for acquiring targets. That they proved as effective as they did was a testimony to the skill and motivation of their pilots. In addition, the Argentine navy had recently taken delivery of a few new French-made Super Etendard attack aircraft armed with the newest Exocet antiship missiles; though only a handful in number, these proved particularly deadly.

Because the Falklands were at the extreme edge of the Argentine aircraft’s combat radius, the planes could take only one pass at the task force. British ships therefore remained out of range except when closing in to attack Argentine positions. British Culture and Politics For the British, the problem was their dependence on two aircraft carriers, as the loss of one would almost certainly have forced withdrawal. Air cover was limited to perhaps 20 short-range Sea Harrier naval jets armed with air-to-air missiles. To make up for the lack of long-range air cover, a screening force of destroyers and frigates was stationed ahead of the fleet to serve as radar pickets. However, not all of them were armed with full antiaircraft systems or close-in weapons for shooting down incoming missiles. This left the British ships vulnerable to attack, and on May 4 the Argentines sank the destroyer HMS Sheffield with an Exocet missile. The Argentines, meanwhile, lost some 20–30 percent of their planes. Thus weakened, the Argentines were unable to prevent the British from making an amphibious landing on the islands. Apparently expecting a direct British assault, the Argentine ground-forces commander, Gen.

Mario Menéndez, centralized his forces around the capital of Stanley to protect its vital airstrip. Instead, the British navy task-force commander, Rear Adm. John Woodward , and the land-force commander, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, decided to make their initial landing near Port San Carlos , on the northern coast of East Falkland , and then mount an overland attack on Stanley. They calculated that this would avoid casualties to the British civilian population and to the British forces. Connect with Britannica Facebook Twitter YouTube Instagram Pinterest The British landed unopposed on May 21, but the Argentine defenders, some 5,000 strong, quickly organized an effective resistance, and heavy fighting was required to wear it down. The Argentine air forces, meanwhile, kept up their attacks on the British fleet, sinking two frigates, a destroyer, a container ship carrying transport helicopters, and a landing ship disembarking troops. In addition, they damaged several other frigates and destroyers. Nevertheless, they were not able to damage either aircraft carrier or sink enough ships to jeopardize British land operations. They also lost a considerable portion of their remaining jets as well as their Falklands-based helicopters and light ground-attack planes.

From the beachhead at Port San Carlos, the British infantry advanced rapidly southward, through forced marches under extremely adverse weather conditions, to capture the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. After several days of hard fighting, some of it hand-to-hand, against determined Argentine troops dug in along several ridgelines, the British succeeded in taking and occupying the high ground west of Stanley. With British forces surrounding and blockading the capital and main port, it was clear that the large Argentine garrison there was cut off and could be starved out. Menéndez therefore surrendered on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. British forces removed a small Argentine garrison from one of the South Sandwich Islands , some 500 miles (800 km) southeast of South Georgia, on June 20. Costs and consequences The British captured some 11,400 Argentine prisoners during the war, all of whom were released afterward. Argentina announced that about 650 lives had been lost—about half of them in the sinking of the General Belgrano—while Britain lost 255.

Military strategists have debated key aspects of the conflict but have generally underscored the roles of submarines (both Britain’s nuclear-powered vessels and Argentina’s older, diesel-electric craft) and antiship missiles (both air-to-sea and land-to-sea types). The war also illustrated the importance of air superiority—which the British had been unable to establish—and of advanced surveillance. Logistic support was vital as well, because the armed forces of both countries had operated at their maximum ranges. (See also naval warfare: The age of the guided missile .) Britannica Lists & Quizzes New government, same claim over Falklands in Argentina New government, same claim over Falklands in Argentina Pin it Share Veterans of the 1982 Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina, take part in a protest outside the Argentinian Supreme Court in Buenos Aires on June 16, 2015 (AFP Photo/Eitan Abramovich) More Buenos Aires (AFP) - Argentina's new conservative government affirmed on Sunday that it will continue to press the country's claims to the Falkland Islands, which Britain insists that it owns.

Britain and Argentina fought a two-month long war over the archipelago in 1982, in which 649 Argentinian servicemen and 255 British were killed. Decades after the Falklands War, ownership of the rocky outpost remains at the center of diplomatic tensions between the two nations. "Argentina renews its firm commitment to peacefully settling its differences, to international law and multilateralism, the foreign ministry under the country's new president, Mauricio Macri, said in a statement. Buenos Aires "invites the United Kingdom to resume as soon as possible negotiations aimed at settling fairly and definitively, the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas (Falklands) islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich islands and surrounding territorial seas," the statement said. Argentina maintains that it inherited the remote, windswept Falklands from Spain when it gained independence. Britain says it has historically ruled them and that the islanders should have the right to self-determination. Reblog The Falklands War Updated August 02, 2016. Falkland War - Overview: Fought in 1982, the Falklands War was the result of the Argentine invasion of the British-owned Falkland Islands.

Located in the South Atlantic, Argentina had long claimed these islands as part of its territory. On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands, capturing the islands two days later. In response, the British dispatched a naval and amphibious task force to the area. The initial phases of the conflict occurred mainly at sea between elements of the Royal Navy and the Argentine Air Force. On May 21, British troops landed and by June 14 had compelled the Argentine occupiers to surrender. Falklands War - Dates: The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentine troops landed in the Falkland Islands . Fighting ended on June 14, following the British liberation of the islands' capital, Port Stanley, and the surrender of Argentine forces in the Falklands. The British declared a formal end to military activity on June 20. Falklands War: Prelude and Invasion: In early 1982, President Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the Argentina's ruling military junta, authorized the invasion of the British Falkland Islands.

The operation was designed to draw attention away from human rights and economic issues at home by bolstering national pride and giving teeth to the nation's long-held claim on the islands. After an incident between British and Argentine forces on nearby South Georgia Island, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands on April 2. The small garrison of Royal Marines resisted, however by April 4 the Argentines had captured the capital at Port Stanley. Argentine troops also landed on South Georgia and quickly secured the island. Falklands War: British Response: After organizing diplomatic pressure against Argentina, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the assembly of a naval task force to retake the islands. After the House of Commons voted to approve Thatcher's actions on April 3, she formed a War Cabinet which first met three days later. Commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse , the task force consisted of several groups, the largest of which was centered on the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. Led by Rear Admiral "Sandy" Woodward, this group contained the Sea Harrier fighters that would provide air cover for the fleet.

In mid-April, Fieldhouse began moving south, with a large fleet of tankers and cargo ships to supply the fleet while it operated more than 8,000 miles from home. All told, 127 ships served in the task force including 43 warships, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and 62 merchant vessels. Falklands War: First Shots: As the fleet sailed south to its staging area at Ascension Island, it was shadowed by Boeing 707s from the Argentine Air Force. On April 25, British forces sank the submarine ARA Santa Fe near South Georgia shortly before troops led by Major Guy Sheridan of the Royal Marines liberated the island. Five days later, operations against the Falklands began with the " Black Buck " raids by RAF Vulcan bombers flying from Ascension. These saw the bombers strike the runaway at Port Stanley and radar facilities in the area. That same day Harriers attacked various targets, as well as shot down three Argentine aircraft. As the runway at Port Stanley was too short for modern fighters, the Argentine Air Force was forced to fly from the mainland, which placed them at a disadvantage throughout the conflict ( Map ).

Falklands War: Fighting at Sea: While cruising west of the Falklands on May 2, the submarine HMS Conqueror spotted the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. Conqueror fired three torpedoes, hitting hitting the World War II -vintage Belgrano twice and sinking it. This attack led to the Argentine fleet, including the carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, remaining in port for the rest of the war. Two days later, they had their revenge when an Exocet anti-ship missile , launched from an Argentine Super Étendard fighter, struck HMS Sheffield setting it ablaze. Having been ordered forward to serve as a radar picket, the destroyer was hit amidships and the resulting explosion severed its high-pressure fire main. After attempts to stop the fire failed, the ship was abandoned. The sinking of Belgrano cost 323 Argentines killed, while the attack on Sheffield resulted in 20 British dead.

Falklands War: Landing at San Carlos Water: On the night of May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp moved into Falkland Sound and began landing British forces at San Carlos Water on the northwest coast of East Falkland. The landings had been preceded by a Special Air Service (SAS) raid on nearby Pebble Island's airfield. When the landings had finished, approximately 4,000 men, commanded by Brigadier Julian Thompson, had been put ashore. Over the next week, the ships supporting the landings were hit hard by low-flying Argentine aircraft. The sound was soon dubbed "Bomb Alley" as HMS Ardent (May 22), HMS Antelope (May 24), and HMS Coventry (May 25) all sustained hits and were sunk, as was MV Atlantic Conveyor (May 25) with a cargo of helicopters and supplies. Falklands War: Goose Green, Mount Kent, & Bluff Cove/Fitzroy: Thompson began pushing his men south, planning to secure the western side of the island before moving east to Port Stanley.

On May 27/28, 600 men under Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones outfought over 1,000 Argentines around Darwin and Goose Green, ultimately forcing them to surrender. Leading a critical charge, Jones was killed later received the Victoria Cross posthumously. A few days later, British commandos defeated Argentine commandos on Mount Kent. In early June, an additional 5,000 British troops arrived and command shifted to Major General Jeremy Moore. While some of these troops were disembarking at Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, their transports, RFA Sir Tristram and RFA Sir Galahad, were attacked killing 56 ( Map ). Falklands War: Fall of Port Stanley: After consolidating his position, Moore began the assault on Port Stanley. British troops launched simultaneous assaults on the high ground surrounding the town on the night of June 11. After heavy fighting, they succeeded in capturing their objectives. The attacks continued two nights later, and British units took the town's last natural lines of defense at Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown.

Encircled on land and blockaded at sea, the Argentine commander, General Mario Menéndez, realized his situation was hopeless and surrendered his 9,800 men on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. Falklands War: Aftermath & Casualties: In Argentina, the defeat led to the removal of Galtieri three days after the fall of Port Stanley. His downfall spelled the end for the military junta that had been ruling the country and paved the way for the restoration of democracy. For Britain, the victory provided a much needed boost to its national confidence, reaffirmed its international position, and assured victory for the Thatcher Government in the 1983 elections. The settlement that ended the conflict called for a return to status quo ante bellum. Despite its defeat, Argentina still claims the Falklands and South Georgia. During the war, Britain suffered 258 killed and 777 wounded. In addition, 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, and 2 auxiliary vessels were sunk. For Argentina, the Falklands War cost 649 killed, 1,068 wounded, and 11,313 captured.

In addition, the Argentine Navy lost a submarine, a light cruiser, and 75 fixed-wing aircraft. Falklands: U.K.-Argentina Tensions are Rising Again PA Wire Defence Secretary Michael Fallon makes a statement to MPs in the House of Commons saying that Britain is to bolster the defences of the Falklands, in London on Tuesday March 24, 2015. U.K increases defense spending on islands in response to Argentina's military investment Argentina still poses a “very live threat” to the British-ruled Falkland Islands, Britain’s defense minister warned on Tuesday as he announced plans to increase security spending on the South Atlantic islands to counter Argentina’s attempts to improve its military. Michael Fallon told Parliament the government planned to spend £180 million ($268 million) over the next 10 years to boost the security of the islands as part of a defense review, although the level of military and civilian personnel involved would remain at around 1,200. “The principle threat to the islands remains,” he told legislators. “I am confident that, following this review, we have the right deployment.” The minister’s announcement comes as Argentina has been trying to upgrade its military capabilities.

It has looked at buying new warplanes and has signed a co-operation deal with Russia that could result in it leasing Russian bombers in return for beef exports. Argentina has always claimed sovereignty over the islands, which it calls Las Malvinas. Britain has ruled there for almost two centuries and the overwhelming majority of the 3,000 inhabitants are of British descent. Successive governments in London have insisted that it is up to the Falklanders to decide who governs them. Tension has periodically surfaced between London and Buenos Aires in the three decades since British troops hoisted the Union flag over the island capital of Port Stanley barely 10 weeks after the invasion. The revival of the Falklands question comes just six weeks ahead of a U.K. general election in which defense spending has latterly emerged as a campaign issue . Fallon’s Conservative Party is traditionally viewed as soundest on defense. However, indications that the government’s austerity policies may soon start to gnaw into the hallowed defense budget have alarmed domestic military chiefs and Britain’s key ally, the United States. General Raymond Odierno, the U.S. Chief of Staff, said this month that he was “very concerned” about falling U.K.

defense spending amid fears it could drop below a Nato target of two percent of national income. Just this week, Fallon tried to reassure the Americans when he wrote in a newspaper article : “When the chips are down, the U.K. will always be at their side. Our American friends know that the U.K. is not about to let down its guard. The latest warning on the Falklands may in part be a reminder to voters that the Conservatives can continue to be trusted on defense. That is not to say that the government has invented the Argentine threat. The cash-strapped government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has announced a boost in military spending for 2015 . Argentina has also been scouting around to upgrade its ageing fleet of military jets , focusing on Israel, China and Russia among potential suppliers. Just last week, Russian and Argentine officials agreed to upgrade military cooperation at a meeting in Moscow. That came amid unconfirmed reports that Russia is offering to lease long-range bombers in exchange for Argentine beef. Vladimir Putin, the Russian President was in Buenos Aires last year as part of policy of strengthening ties in Latin America at a time when Moscow faced Western sanctions over its annexation of Crimea and its stance on Ukraine.

Alexei Pushkov, head of the Russian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, linked the Ukraine and Falklands issues when he posted on Twitter at the weekend: “Attention London: Crimea has far more reason to be in Russia than the Falklands have to be part of Great Britain.” Aligning with Argentina over the Falklands would be one way for Moscow to retaliate for Britain’s support of sanctions. In Argentina, the sovereignty question is one that is guaranteed to unite public opinion. Successive governments have opted to press the Malvinas button as a way of diverting attention from more divisive domestic issues. Among the headaches currently confronting President Fernández de Kirchner is the continuing fallout from the mysterious fatal shooting of Argentine federal prosecutor Alberto Nisman in January . The ruling Argentine junta that ordered the 1982 invasion was at the time floundering economically and facing growing civilian opposition to six years of military rule. Seizing the islands was hugely popular and temporarily quelled the internal unrest. The generals were spurred to their military adventure by their assessment that Britain had lost interest in the islands and would not act to recover them. It turned out to be a bad bet.

The junta’s confidence stemmed in part from defence cuts by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government that included suspending periodic submarine patrols of South Atlantic waters. These were never publicised but London always made sure the Argentines knew about them. When the islands were seized, however, Thatcher responded by dispatching a task force of more than 120 warships and merchant vessels and thousands of soldiers and special forces. U.S. President Ronald Reagan risked alienating his Latin American partners by giving back-up support to his British ally. The two sides lost more than 900 men between them in a 74-day conflict that saw ships sunk on both sides. The war spelled the end of the junta, soon to be replaced by a democratic government, and sealed Thatcher’s domestic popularity as “the Iron Lady”. Britain and the junta’s successors agreed that the issue would not be resolved by force. However, diplomatic efforts to resolve it have come to nothing, particularly after all but three Falklands voters opted to retain the link with Britain in a 2013 referendum . Recently, however, Argentine leaders have ramped up the rhetoric.

President Fernández de Kirchner has referred to the islanders as “squatters”, while according to her foreign minister, Héctor Timerman, they are “non-people”. Britain has also been accused of maintaining its control of the islands in order to exploit disputed oil reserves and extend its strategic hold on the South Atlantic and Antartica. What remains an open question is whether Argentina would actually be tempted to mount a second invasion and how Britain would respond. If Argentina managed to upgrade its air force, with help from the Russians or others, it would have a theoretical window of opportunity to strike before a new British carrier force enters operation in 2020. In the meantime, Britain is relying on improved missile and air defences to deter any aggression. Lawrence Freedman, a war studies professor and Britain’s official historian of the Falklands War, doubts Argentina’s ability to mount a new invasion. “President Kirchner plays the nationalist card, but basically the country is broke,” he says. Any Russian bombers that the Argentines acquired could in theory be used to bomb the runway at the Mount Pleasant military base south of Port Stanley. “The only way to neutralize that would be a surprise attack.

It’s not easy and you’d need a skilled operation.” says Freedman. If, against the odds, Argentina managed to follow up with a troop invasion, “then there would be a problem.” But he believed the modern air defences available would deter any such aggression “It would be quite a gamble for Argentina and their forces have not been particularly updated over the years.” Military rhetoric aside, it appears neither side has an interest in a re-run of 1982 and diplomacy remains the preferred option to settle the long-running dispute for good. Latin America backs Argentina in Falkland Islands drilling dispute with Britain - Telegraph Falkland Islands Latin America backs Argentina in Falkland Islands drilling dispute with Britain Latin American and Caribbean nations have backed Argentina's claim of sovereignty to the Falkland Islands in a growing dispute with Britain over plans to drill for oil off the islands in the Atlantic.

Image 1 of 4 Desire Petroleum PLC said that it has started drilling for oil about 60 miles north of the disputed Falkland Islands Photo: AP Image 1 of 4 The issue had been relatively calm until a British oil exploration company recently announced drilling plans there Photo: EDDIE MULHOLLAND Image 1 of 4 The MoD said the UK's existing "deterrence" in the Falklands was not being increased and UK force levels were being maintained Photo: EPA Mexican President Felipe Calderon Photo: AP 7:00AM GMT 23 Feb 2010 At the Rio Group summit of 32 countries hosted by Mexico, Argentina presented a statement quoting Mexican President Felipe Calderon as saying that "the heads of state represented here reaffirm their support for the legitimate rights of the republic of Argentina in the sovereignty dispute with Great Britain." Mr Calderon did not speak directly about the matter. Britain and Argentina have long disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands - known as Las Malvinas in Latin America - and fought a war over them in 1982. The issue had been relatively calm until a British oil exploration company recently announced drilling plans there.

Desire Petroleum PLC said that it has started drilling for oil about 60 miles north of the disputed Falkland Islands, despite strong opposition from Argentina. The country claims the south Atlantic islands as its own and calls them Las Malvinas. Related Articles Falkland Islands War - Credo Reference Topic Page: Falkland Islands War Definition: Falklands War from The Macquarie Dictionary an armed conflict between the UK and Argentina from March 1982 until Argentine surrender in June; resulting from Argentine claim to sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. Summary Article: Falklands War (1982) from The Encyclopedia of War Image from: An Argentine Logistics Battalion prepares... in Britain and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islandsnuestras —“our” — Malvinas (Argentina would follow up with the capture of a tiny garrison on South Georgia Island that same day).

No one except the invasion force and a few planners in the Argentine military staffs knew of the expedition until it was over. There had been long and drawn-out discussions in the United Nations (UN) and other venues for decades about the contentious issue of sovereign control of the islands. Multiple conflicting claims dating back to the Seven Years' War of the eighteenth century ensured that both sides had established rather rigid positions: Britain in favor of “self-determination” for the few settlers on the islands (Scots and Welsh) and the Argentines in favor of exclusive sovereignty over islands on the Argentine continental shelf, with guarantees of civil rights for the settlers as Argentine citizens. Even so, the notion of actual hostilities over the islands seemed remote. The Argentine plan was based on forcing a fait accompli. That the British would undertake the costly and huge operation necessary to recover the islands some 8,500 miles distant in the coming South Atlantic winter was deemed too unlikely; a negotiated settlement would be reached. Argentine planners understood, however, that defeat was a distinct probability if the British did fight. And fight they did. The British navy, not having sailed forth in anger since the frustrating Suez Crisis, mobilized immediately.

The nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror — just one example of British military superiority — departed for the South Atlantic on April 4. Surface forces, including Britain's two aircraft carriers, deployed from Portsmouth on April 5. On April 9, troop transports, loaded with British paratroop and marine units, deployed, and on April 12, Britain announced a two hundred mile exclusion zone around the islands. Even though not yet in theater, British forces were on the offensive; the Argentines sat pat. The UN condemned the invasion and called for withdrawal of Argentine forces, cessation of hostilities, and a negotiated settlement. The United States embarked on shuttle diplomacy between Washington, Buenos Aries, and London in an attempt to effect some kind of settlement. But American efforts came to naught. The Argentines were suspicious—correctly—of the neutrality of America's good offices and the British were determined to press forward. Eventually, the United States offered logistical and intelligence support to the UK and helped pressure the Organization of American States and virtually every American republic to stand aside. Only two Latin American nations involved themselves directly in the conflict and in very limited roles: Peru flew some sorties in support of Argentina; Chile rendered support to Britain.

By May 1, British operations had reached the point that an active offensive could be launched. Royal Marines had recaptured the small base on remote South Georgia Island in late April. With that flank secured, a direct approach to the Falklands was open and the war was on. On May 1, Vulcan bombers from the UK reached and bombed the airstrip at Fort Stanley, the British task force entered the exclusion zone, and Harrier “jump-jets” from the carriers bombed targets on the Falklands. In opposition, the Argentine navy was not an inconsiderable force: it had the Ventecinco de Mayo, one of only two carriers in Latin American maritime forces. It also boasted the heavy cruiser Belgrano, some reasonably modern frigates, and somewhat older diesel submarines. And the navy operated a significant number of attack aircraft. However, once HMS Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Belgrano on May 2 (the heaviest loss of life of any incident in the war) the navy did not sortie to offer battle to the British forces: arguably a missed opportunity. In response, Argentine naval aircraft, French-made Super Entendards carrying exocet missiles, successfully attacked HMS Sheffield on May 4.

The pattern of the largest naval conflict since Okinawa was set: the British controlled the sea, but Argentine aircraft sent six British ships to the bottom and damaged ten others. On land, the issue was more one-sided. Once the British landing was completed in the inland sea of San Carlos Water (Falkland Sound) between the large East and West Falklands on May 21, the outcome was not in doubt. Not that the fighting was easy: the Argentines put up stiff resistance at Goose Green and Darwin on the southern flank of the British landing zone, but were overcome on May 28. Argentine air forces continued to pound landing ships and escort vessels in San Carlos Water and on the southern coast of the East Island, as the British attempted to leap-frog by water towards Port Stanley. Eventually, the British land forces had to march cross-country and attack the capital from the west. This required subduing dug-in Argentine infantry on several mountain ridges, but this was done in good order and all Argentine forces on the islands surrendered on June 14.

The costs of the war were not light: the British lost 255 personnel killed and some 777 wounded; Argentine losses were 652 dead and missing, and an unspecified but larger number of wounded. Most Argentine losses were at sea. Materially, Britain could absorb the number of ships lost, but Argentina could not; in addition to the Belgrano, she lost a submarine and virtually all of her troop carrier capability. The Argentine air arm, both navy and air force, was cut off; perhaps as many as 109 aircraft were lost. But the real costs to Argentina were political. The military government — now demonstrably incapable of performing even its most basic function of national defense — was entirely discredited and stepped down, ending an era of military dominance of political power begun in 1930. The military has not returned to power since. And the British commitment to hold the islands is more solid today than it was before the war. British army vehicles on the Falkland Islands, August 13, 1982.Bettmann Archive/Corbis. Photo: Gary Kemper. SEE ALSO: Gurkhas; Punitive expeditions; Submarine warfare; United Nations.

Further Reading Freedman, L. (2007) The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 vols. Routledge London. Moro, R. O. (1986) La Guerra inaudita: historia del conflict del Atlantico sur. Editorial Pleamar Buenos Aires. Blair Turner

Question: Great Briton fought which country over the Falkland Islands?
Answer: Argentina