Iqtisadi: The Dominoes Fall: The War in Syria, Europe and Turkey | Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies Iqtisadi: The Dominoes Fall: The War in Syria, Europe and Turkey In this issue of Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy, MDC Senior Researcher Dr. Paul Rivlin examines the demographic, economic, and political implications of the war in Syria for Europe and Turkey. Author: description: Syrian and Iraqi Refugees Arrive at Lesbos, Greece / Credit: Ggia, via Wikimedia Commons The war in Syria has resulted in the loss of up to 450,000 lives and some 13.5 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance, including six million children. There are 4.7 million refugees in neighboring countries, including 2.6 million in Turkey, one million in Lebanon, and 600,000 in Jordan. The loss of GDP in Syria was estimated at $275 billion and it will take many years for the country to be reconstructed once the conflict ends.

This catastrophe has had effects beyond the Middle East and this edition of Iqtisadi examines the implications for the European Union (EU) and Turkey. The 28 members of the EU and ten Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended) and Tunisia – have signed an agreement known as the European Neighborhood Policy. This aimed to achieve the political association and economic integration between the EU and MENA members. While they are separated only by the Mediterranean Sea, the demographic and economic differences are huge. In 2014, the EU had a population of just over 500 million, while MENA states (including Iran and the Gulf Arab states) had over 350 million. After a long period of demographic transition, the countries of the EU are now characterized by low fertility and a dwindling and aging population. This demographic predicament has economic and social consequences, including a shortage of labor. Families in MENA have, on average, twice as many children than those in the EU, which has led to a substantial increase in the number of young people, as well as an overall increase in the total population.

Table 1 shows that the contrast is economic as well as demographic. Average income levels in the EU are much higher than in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries listed. The developing countries of MENA (excluding Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) have a combined GDP of $1.5 trillion, equal to only eight percent of that of the EU. If the list was widened and Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the countries of the Sahel were included, then the gap would be even wider. description: Table 1: The North-South Gap. The author’s calculation using World Bank data These demographic and economic gaps form very powerful push and pull factors driving the emigration from MENA to Europe, but in recent years they have been overshadowed by the wars that have engulfed MENA and have caused millions to flee to Europe. In 2015, more than a million migrants and refugees fled to Europe, compared with 280,000 in 2014. More than 135,000 people arrived during the first two months of 2016 and it is estimated that two thousand a day are arriving in Greece.

Over 80 percent of those who reached Europe by boat in 2015 came from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The refugees aim to reach the richer northern members of the European Union (EU), particularly Germany and Sweden, that had, until recently, liberal policies towards the admittance of refugees. This is taking place against a background of terrorist attacks on European targets by the Islamic State (IS), the latest of which were two attacks in Paris— in January 2015 when 17 people were killed November 2015 when 130 were killed —and Brussels on March 22, 2016, in which more than 30 people were killed. Most of the migrants have fled via Turkey to Greece and then, with increasing difficulty, north towards Germany. The effects of the recent mass migration to Europe have been dramatic with the re-imposition of border controls in much of the EU. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed by five of the then European Community member states . The Schengen Area was established separately from the European Community, when consensus could not be reached among all EC member states on the abolition of border controls.

In 1990, the Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen Convention, which proposed the abolition of internal border controls and a common visa policy. Border controls in the Schengen Area were abolished on March 26, 1995. It currently consists of 26 states, including four that are not members of the EU. Ireland and the United Kingdom are not part of the agreement and operate border controls with other EU member states. In order to improve control over the flow of immigrants, in Autumn 2015, six Schengen states – Norway, Austria, Sweden, Germany, Hungary and Slovenia – reintroduced checks on their internal borders in a bid to halt the flow of migrants. France and Malta introduced controls due to the threat of terrorism. The most dramatic measures were taken by Sweden in November 2015, when it announced it would tighten its asylum and border regime after the number of asylum seekers reached 10,000 a week. In 2015, Sweden received 163,000 asylum seekers, the highest number per head of any EU country.

Denmark received only 18,000 applications and successfully deterred would-be applicants with a strict regime, including a proposal to empower police to search asylum seekers’ clothes and luggage for valuables that might offset the cost of looking after them. In response to the Swedish measures, Denmark also introduced border controls. These measures that in effect suspend the Schengen Area could result in the loss of 0.8 percent of the EU's GDP as well as damaging its plans for political union. On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggests that the inflow of asylum seekers is likely to have an immediate expansionary effect on the economy. In the short term, additional public spending will increase domestic demand and GDP. This effect will be modest for the EU as a whole (raising the level of GDP by some 0.1 percent in 2017), but more pronounced in the main asylum seeker destination countries. GDP per capita will be however lower, reflecting the weaker labor market performance of refugees and restrictions on labor market access to asylum seekers in some countries. In the long run, the economic impact will depend on the speed of integration of refugees into the labor market.

The IMF forecasts an inflow of 1.3 million first-time asylum seekers. This means that by 2017, there could be a total of four million immigrants with more expected afterwards. By virtue of its geographic location, Turkey has received the largest number of migrants from Syria and is a major transit route for those fleeing from Iraq and Afghanistan. It has therefore emerged as a key partner in the EU's struggle to contend with the migration crisis. Turkey is not however an easy partner for the EU. Negotiations for Turkish membership of the EU have been going on for fifty years and there is the belief that neither side wants to conclude them. In the early years of its rule, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government introduced many of the reforms that the EU demanded as pre-conditions for membership, but in recent years there has been a major retreat from democracy in Turkey. Human Rights Watch stated that the AKP has become increasingly intolerant of political opposition, public protest, and critical media. Elected to office for a fourth term in 2015, with a strong parliamentary majority, the AKP government has increasingly interfered with the courts and prosecutors thus undermining judicial independence and the rule of law.

The breakdown of a peace process and escalating conflict between the security forces and the armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) across the southeast has led to mounting civilian deaths and multiple human rights violations . The EU needs Turkey's cooperation in curbing the flow of migrants. The clash in November 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter plan that overflew its territory, along with the Russian occupation of Crimea, and the conflict in Ukraine may have encouraged the Europeans to offer aid to the Turks in exchange for help on the migration issue.

On March 7, 2016, the EU agreed to return to Turkey all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands with the costs covered by the EU; to resettle, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey in the EU, within the framework of the existing commitments; to accelerate the implementation of the visa liberalization roadmap with all member states with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016; to speed up the disbursement of the three billion euros to ensure funding of a first set of projects before the end of March, and to decide on additional funding for the Refugee Facility for Syrians; to prepare for the decision on the opening of new chapters in the Turkish accession negotiations as soon as possible, building on conclusions of the October 2015 European Council; to work with Turkey in joint endeavors to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe. This deal has many similarities to that agreed in 2010 between Italy and Muammar al-Qaddafi, the former leader of Libya.

It was Colonel Qaddafi, the former Libyan strongman, who, before Europe and the United States helped to overthrow him, had an agreement with Italy to keep migrants from its shores. In 2010, during a visit to Rome, Colonel Qaddafi demanded about $6.6 billion a year from the then the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, to continue to stem the tide of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East trying to flee to Europe through Italy. Turkey itself is facing multiple crises. Its security forces have intensified operations in Kurdish areas of southern and southeastern parts of the country and have killed hundreds of people and displaced tens of thousands since last year. Curfews and martial law, backed by tanks, have been used in areas near the Iraqi and Syrian borders. Turkey’s Kurdish problem is only one of the challenges that President Erdoğan has exacerbated. Turkey is at war with Syrian Kurdish militias fighting the Islamic State in northern Syria because it fears that they may try to create a separate political entity linked to the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq.

Tension inside the country has increased following Erdoğan’s manipulation of the judiciary, repeated threats to prosecute pro-Kurdish MPs and leaders, curbs on the freedom of the media, corruption, and Erdoğan’s attempt to enact a new constitution giving him wide presidential powers. Turkey has been subject to repeated terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and by extremist Kurdish groups. As the civil war in Syria moves towards a cease-fire, the situation in Turkey looks worse than it has for many years. Schengen Area Schengen Area Securing EU borders Schengen Area The free movement of persons is a fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens. It entitles every EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities. Schengen cooperation enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, as well as to many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory.

Schengen Area as of 1/7/2013 Free movement in Europe Originally, the concept of free movement was to enable the European working population to freely travel and settle in any EU State, but it fell short of abolishing border controls within the Union. A break-through came in 1985 when cooperation between individual governments led to the signing, in Schengen (a small village in Luxembourg), of the Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders, followed by the signing in 1990 of the Convention implementing that Agreement. The implementation of the Schengen Agreements started in 1995, initially involving seven EU States. Born as an intergovernmental initiative, the developments brought about by the Schengen Agreements have now been incorporated into the body of rules governing the EU. Today, the Schengen Area encompasses most EU States, except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom. However, Bulgaria and Romania are currently in the process of joining the Schengen Area. Of non-EU States, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have joined the Schengen Area.

The jogger , courtesy of Visage populaire Any person, irrespective of nationality, may cross the internal borders without being subjected to border checks. However, the competent national authorities can carry out police checks also at the internal borders and in border areas, provided that such checks are not equivalent to border checks. This is valid for cases when, in particular, the checks do not have border control as an objective and are based on general police information and experience. It's also valid when the checks are carried out in a manner clearly distinct from systematic border checks and on the basis of spot-checks. Under such circumstances, the police may for example ask you to identify yourself or pose questions regarding your stay, depending on the purpose of the check. If there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security, a Schengen country may exceptionally temporarily reintroduce border control at its internal borders for, in principle, a limited period of no more than thirty days. If such controls are reintroduced, the other Schengen countries, the European Parliament and the Commission should be informed, as should the public.

More information on checks at internal borders can be found in the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, concerning cases C-188/10 (Melki) and C-278/12 (Adil) , as well as in the Commission's reports COM (2010) 554 on internal borders , COM (2012) 230 on the functioning of the Schengen area and COM (2013) 326 on the functioning of the Schengen area . Freedom and security for travellers The Schengen provisions abolish checks at the Union's internal borders, while tightening controls at the external borders, in accordance with a single set of rules. These rules cover several areas: a common set of rules applying to people crossing the EU external borders, including the types of visa needed and how checks at external borders have to be carried out harmonisation of the conditions of entry and of the rules on visas for short stays (up to three months) enhanced police cooperation (including rights of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit) stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of criminal judgments documents needed for travelling in Europe .

Conditions for joining the Schengen Area Joining the Schengen Area is not merely a political decision. Countries must also fulfil a list of pre-conditions, such as be prepared and have the capacity to: take responsibility for controlling the external borders on behalf of the other Schengen States and for issuing uniform Schengen visas efficiently cooperate with law enforcement agencies in other Schengen States in order to maintain a high level of security once border controls between Schengen countries are abolished apply the common set of Schengen rules (the so-called "Schengen acquis"), such as controls of land, sea and air borders (airports), issuing of visas, police cooperation and protection of personal data connect to and use the SIS. Applicant countries undergo a "Schengen evaluation" before joining the Schengen Area and periodically thereafter to ensure the correct application of the legislation. Will EU border controls really threaten the euro? - BBC News BBC News Will EU border controls really threaten the euro?

By Theo Leggett Business correspondent, BBC News 8 December 2015 Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Car and lorries queue as they wait to cross the Austria-Germany border The village of Schengen sits on the banks of the Moselle river in Luxembourg, close to the point where its frontier meets those of France and Germany. It is an unassuming place - but it gives its name to one of the most radical treaties in the history of the European Union. The Schengen Agreement, drawn up in 1985, laid the foundations for gradually abolishing internal borders across the EU. Today, the Schengen area includes 26 countries - including Norway and Switzerland which aren't in the EU - although Britain is not part of it. Until very recently it was possible for European citizens to pass from one side of the continent to the other without being stopped at any frontier. For many of Europe's leaders, the Schengen area embodies one of the EU's most treasured principles - the free movement of people. Alongside the euro - the European Union's single currency - it has become a potent symbol of the "European project".

Ideology aside, it's also fair to say that Schengen has been something of a day to day hit with the European public - including myself. I've taken high-speed trains from Paris to Brussels, or from Paris to Cologne without even noticing the borders I've crossed. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Schengen and the euro: EC President Jean-Claude Juncker says one doesn't make sense without the other The days when trains would stop at frontiers and polite but stern customs officers would stalk the corridors, seem like quaint memories from a bygone age. Likewise when driving, national borders have become little more than signposts, emblazoned with the European flag. Britain's own passport and customs controls at St Pancras station and the port of Dover seem all the more irritating by comparison. Economic implications Schengen, for all the criticisms levelled at it over the years, for making smuggling far too easy and encouraging illegal immigration, simply takes a lot of the pain out of international travel. However, the freedom it gives is now under threat. Germany, Sweden, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia have all restored some frontier controls in response to the migrant crisis.

France, meanwhile, introduced random checks at border posts in the aftermath of the Paris attacks. At a meeting last week ministers discussed plans to allow border controls to be reinstated for up to two years if necessary. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The numbers of migrants and refugees reaching Europe has led to the reintroduction of border controls There is now a growing fear that emergency controls like these, introduced during times of crisis, could end up becoming permanent once again. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, has already admitted that the Schengen agreement is "partly comatose". He has also warned that if Schengen were to fail, the euro itself could follow. All of this has serious implications for the European economy. If borders were to return, there would certainly be an impact on international commerce. Since the EU's single market was fully established in the mid-1990s, trade between European countries has grown dramatically - from €800bn to €2.8tn (£2tn; $3tn). Business delays Businesses have become accustomed to operating without frontiers.

"Our companies now operate in a huge value chain, and production is often split between countries", says Guntram Wolff, director of the Brussels-based research organisation Breugel . Image copyright Getty Images Image caption EU-based businesses have become used to operating without frontiers "The more inefficient the logistics chain becomes, the higher the cost for businesses". The problem is that border controls create delays - which can range from a few minutes to several hours. This can be a serious problem for hauliers. Industry sources suggest that the cost for such delays is around €55 (£39; $59) an hour, per vehicle. In addition, for companies carrying perishable goods, excessive delays can mean the loss of whole consignments. According to the International Road Transport Union (IRU), re-establishing border controls between Germany and Austria alone would cost the industry around €100m (£72m; $109m) a year. "Increased waiting times at internal borders would increase journey times for road freight and passenger transport services and inevitably result in significantly increased costs," says Michael Nielsen, the IRU's representative in Brussels.

"With the industry being dominated by small and medium sized enterprises, many operating on very small profit margins, any increased costs would be passed on to end consumers as well as challenge the survivability of many transport companies." Costly but not impossible Also likely to lose out would be the EU's estimated 1.7 million cross-border commuters. Since frontier controls were removed, it has become increasingly common for people in border regions to live in one country and work in another. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Increased waiting times at internal EU borders would mean significantly higher costs, says the International Road Transport Union Many workers in Luxembourg, a major financial centre, actually live in France, Germany and Belgium, for example. For them, border controls would become a daily irritation. Other regular business travellers - those driving or using Europe's high speed train networks to travel to meetings in neighbouring states - would also have to allow more time for their journeys. There is also the cost of implementing the new bureaucracy, and creating the infrastructure to go with it. On many of Europe's major highways the old, pre-Schengen border posts still exist. But on newer roads, this is not the case - so new facilities would have to be built, and manned.

According to Vasileos Douzenis of consultants Europe Economics, that could prove politically indigestible. "Especially in an era of austerity, such a development can create frictions within a government," he says. So abandoning Schengen would certainly come at a substantial economic cost. However, it is fair to say it would not be insurmountable, in a region with a combined GDP of $18.5tn (£12.2tn). But the damage to the region's prestige would be much more serious. "The European Union existed before Schengen and it can exist after Schengen," says Breugel's Guntram Wolff. "But it would be a serious blow to the narrative of integration, Schengen is a powerful symbol. The EU is a place where we don't have border controls and we pay in a common currency. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The refugee crisis has led to protests from some, like France's far-right National Front (FN), for Schengen to be abandoned "To lose Schengen would undermine the rationale for the EU in everyday consideration." This is why Jean-Claude Juncker has connected the future of Schengen to the future of the euro.

The one, he says, simply doesn't make sense without the other. And if the euro were to disappear, would the EU still make sense? The single currency is, after all, the single most tangible expression of economic and political union. So the stakes are high. EU governments have already decided to tighten up controls at the Schengen Area's external frontiers, a move seen by many as the price of maintaining freedom of movement within Europe. But if those efforts fail, and internal borders become the norm once again, then the European Union itself could be left facing an existential crisis. Europe's open borders under enormous strain - Nov. 18, 2015 Related: The cost of fighting terrorism The Dutch truckers' association has estimated that adding an hour's wait at each border would cost its members an extra $684 million a year. Trade would suffer too. In a paper published last year, Dane Davis of CRU Group and Thomas Gift of Duke University calculated that where two countries are members of Schengen, their total trade increases by 0.1% a year -- in the case of Italy and Spain that amounts to $50 million annually.

Related: G20: We will fight terror funding But Schengen means much more than just driving across borders without slowing down. It's a cornerstone of modern Europe. "Schengen is hugely important symbolically," said Vincenzo Scarpetta of think tank Open Europe. "It's the other big flagship project along with the euro." Most people cite freedom of movement when asked what the EU means to them, and rate it as the EU's second biggest achievement after securing peace. Border security will be a big issue at an emergency EU meeting on Friday. France says it will renew its calls for greater scrutiny of all travelers -- EU and non-EU nationals alike -- when they cross Europe's external border. Some controls are already creeping back The Schengen agreement does allow countries to reintroduce passport controls in certain circumstances, for a limited period of time. Before the Paris attacks that killed 129 people, France had already suspended Schengen for the Paris climate summit to be attended by world leaders next month. Poland suspended the agreement for a major soccer tournament in 2012, and Iceland suspended it for a visit by the Hells Angels in 2009.

This year, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Hungary and other countries put temporary border controls in place to stem the influx of refugees who have streamed across the Mediterranean. Hungary has even built a wall on part of its border with Croatia, forcing refugees towards Austria. Some countries have complained that migrants entered Greece -- which is inside the Schengen area -- overwhelmed the authorities there, and then were able to travel to other countries without checks. The EU has said any border controls must only be temporary spot checks, not walls or resurrected border posts, and should not last more than 30 days. Related: The list of suspensions of the Schengen Agreement Schengen does not equal the EU Not all EU members have signed the Schengen agreement. The United Kingdom and Ireland maintain permanent border control for visitors arriving from other EU countries. Non-EU countries Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are in the passport-free travel zone, while new EU entrants Cyprus, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania must join eventually. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has called for a Europe-wide border and coast guard system, instead of leaving it to individual countries to police the external frontier of the European Union.

He says that would make it harder for people to enter the Schengen area illegally. CNNMoney (London) First published November 18, 2015: 12:42 PM ET Faltering Movement: Explaining Europe's Schengen Struggle | migrationpolicy.org Faltering Movement: Explaining Europe's Schengen Struggle You are here Faltering Movement: Explaining Europe's Schengen Struggle November 2, 2011 Feature By Elizabeth Collett Six months ago, a chain reaction of external events and internal politics led to the brief, but significant, suspension of Schengen cooperation between France and Italy. Images of guards searching trains at the small station of Ventimiglia reminded European citizens of an EU achievement they rarely notice, yet value deeply: the ability to move across Europe without undergoing passport checks and vehicle searches. The four-hour, high-speed train service from Paris to Cologne — unfettered by border guards — symbolizes the distance Europe has travelled in its 60-year history.

Politicians are proud of the unique multilateral cooperation that Schengen represents, yet it seemed for a short while as if they might be willing to let the system collapse over 22,000 residence permits offered by the Italian government to unauthorized Tunisian migrants fleeing unrest during the Arab Spring. Looking Out for Number One: Pressure on Schengen Many considered the revolutions in North Africa exceptional enough to offer sufficient explanation for the current situation in itself. Chronologically, the events had a domino effect. The arrival of the migrants to Italian shores (mainly to the small island of Lampedusa) sparked a call from the Italian government for pan-European support to help manage the inflow, specifically through financial and technical support and the relocation of refugees to other EU Member States. North-West European states were largely unsympathetic for a variety of reasons: Some, including Germany and Sweden, which deal with more asylum applications than Italy annually, felt the numbers were not high enough to catalyze an EU response. Others felt that Italy was not justified in asking for support because the country had so closely collaborated with former Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi to prevent migrant inflows from the Southern Mediterranean.

Still more reacted on principle: While financial and technical support largely via Frontex may be reasonable, the relocation of refugees, and particularly asylum seekers, within Europe remains a contentious issue. After several pleas and a number of hyperbolic statements from (primarily) Lega Nord representatives of the Italian government, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi took matters into his own hands and offered the Tunisian migrants residence permits — papers allowing them to move freely throughout Europe. Alarmed by this unilateral action, and recognizing that many Tunisians have familial and social ties in France, the French government moved to close its Southern borders with Italy and reinstated checks on trains. While some, including the European Commission, focused on the legal legitimacy of each Member State's actions — including the legality of the actual residence permits – the political fallout was unavoidable. Seeking reconciliation, both heads of state met and drafted a joint letter to European Commission President José Manuel Barroso. Most of the requests contained therein were mild, and many had already been proposed and discussed within the EU institutions.

However, one clause requested that Schengen rules be adjusted to allow states to close borders in "exceptional circumstances." The European Commission agreed in principle, though emphasized that they themselves would be the only ones capable of overseeing such adjustments. Member States have since confirmed their unanimous support for Schengen, not least at the June 2011 European Summit where EU heads of state reiterated their commitment to Schengen as "one of the most tangible and successful achievements of European integration." However, they also outlined the development of a "mechanism" to respond to exceptional pressures — a series of measures of support that could ultimately lead to the reintroduction of internal border controls. A proposal for such a mechanism has since been published by the European Commission and is currently under discussion. Crisis averted? During the French-Italian spat, the Danish government re-established customs checks along its German and Swedish borders, ostensibly to address transborder crime. The stand has been short-lived. Amidst doubts as to the legality of the move and strong criticism from neighboring states, particularly Germany, the new Danish government (a center-left government has been formed since the elections in October 2011) has announced it will remove border controls once more.

This second unilateral move highlights that whilst, overall, Schengen principles are holding in place, they are still under pressure. A number of underlying factors suggest that the events of the past several months are a symptom rather than cause of tension surrounding Schengen cooperation, and the European Commission should expect further challenges in the future. A Brief History of Schengen It is interesting to note that, while the European Commission is now the central bastion of Schengen cooperation, the first meetings to discuss developing freedom of movement were done outside of the bounds of the EU framework. Five countries came together in 1985 to negotiate and sign the founding agreement in the small town of Schengen, Luxembourg, close to the tri-border with France and Germany. It took a further ten years for this cooperation to become operational, and an additional two years before it was brought within the fold of the European Union through the Amsterdam Treaty. In the meantime, additional countries joined the initiative, including the European Economic Area (EEA) states of Switzerland, Norway, and Lichtenstein. Thus, the fact that Member States are battling with the European Commission on the terms of the treaty is in itself a departure from the original government-led spirit of Schengen.

What is Schengen cooperation? Schengen cooperation has resulted in the removal of internal border controls between 25 EU/EEA Member States. At the current moment, all EU Member States participate with the exception of the UK and Ireland (who have opted out), and Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus (who have yet to join). In addition, EEA states Norway, Lichtenstein, and Switzerland also participate. The removal of internal borders has also sparked a raft of policies to strengthen the common external borders of the Schengen area, known as "compensating measures." Schengen cooperation should not be confused with the right of free movement, through which EU citizens have the right to live and work in other Member States (with the exception of those still restricted by ‘transitional measures' allowing limits on free movement for citizens of new accession countries, currently Romania and Bulgaria). However, the ability to live and reside in other EU countries is greatly facilitated by Schengen cooperation (allowing citizens to live in one country commute to work in another), while tourists from outside of the European Union can take advantage of a single visa that allows travel to all countries within the Schengen space.

Schengen cooperation has never been a smooth ride, as concerns over fellow countries' abilities to manage external borders and ports of entry have led to halts and postponements. Take Germany's concern about the quality of Austrian border controls in 1995, for example, or the 8-month delay of expansion to Central European states in 2007 due to delays in implementing new common information systems. Most recently, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area has been postponed — perhaps indefinitely — over worries about high levels of corruption and transnational crime. Separately, the planned upgrade of the common Schengen Information System to include additional biometric data is both over budget and overdue. And reintroduction of internal border controls is not without precedent. Member States may close internal borders for up to 30 days when there is a serious threat to public policy or national security, and this tack has been used when large sporting or political events were feared to spark unrest. Indeed, on more than one occasion, border controls have been reintroduced over concerns related to immigration and asylum.

Thus, the key element of the French-Italian request is not to introduce a new concept into the Schengen agreement per se, but expand – and possibly blur – the terms through which controls may be reintroduced. Continuing Challenges for Schengen Cooperation A confluence of trends — some long-standing, others newly emergent — can be identified with respect to the continued pressure on the Schengen system. External Border Pressures and Uneven Burdens The Schengen space is ultimately dependent upon the existence of a strong external border and a shared responsibility for that border among all Member States. Borders are only as strong as their weakest link, as amply demonstrated by the situation on the Greek-Turkish border in 2010 when record numbers of unauthorized migrants from the Middle East and North Africa crossed into the Schengen space. A great deal of trust between countries is required and has slowly been built up, reliant upon the idea that countries with external borders will hold up to the challenge of securing them and those without will offer support when required. This trust has come under pressure during moments of enlargement and crisis, but has ultimately been maintained.

While the need for high levels of trust for external border cooperation had been foreseen from the beginning, the disproportionate pressure placed on some countries regarding border management – real in the case of countries such as Malta and Cyprus, less dramatic (but still felt) in the case of Italy – was less anticipated. The political perception that these countries have been "burdened" by external border management, and that Northern countries have avoided taking their fair share of responsibility, is enduring and has yet to be sustainably resolved. Northern states, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, note that they deal with more spontaneous asylum applications than their Southern partners and believe offering financial and technical support is sufficient. Southern states, however, would like to establish deeper cooperation that would include a system for the relocation of refugees and possibly asylum seekers across the European Union. This lack of unity is eroding essential trust between Member States and highlights how equity is necessary for the Schengen system to keep working effectively. In the absence of an equitable and sustainable compromise, this trust will continue to erode until one external-border country is unable to live up to its obligations to police borders further. The Italian action can, in some ways, be read as a warning shot to EU partners.

But what solutions exist? The proposal from the European Commission concerning Schengen rules includes the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls should one Member State exhibit a "persistent deficiency to manage a section of the EU's external border," though only after all other avenues of action have been exhausted. Clearly aimed at Greece amid concerns as to the lack of infrastructure that exists to manage that country's external borders, this proposal essentially provides for the temporary expulsion of a Member State from the Schengen space in an effort to reduce the concerns of larger Northern states regarding the border management capacity of their Southern partners. In the long term, however, any mechanism for reintroducing border controls will have to be accompanied by a substantive set of burden-sharing measures capable of satisfying both Southern and Northern states. But beyond financial and technical support and a stronger role for the European Union's border management agency, Frontex, states have struggled to collectively articulate what this might mean. Broad solutions such as the fully harmonized completion of the Common European Asylum System, for example, have become ever more elusive in the absence of high levels of trust, yet shorter-term, patchwork responses fail to restore that trust.

National Politics on the EU Stage Arguably, much of the debate over the past six months has not been a challenge to EU cooperation, but rather a reflection of increasingly tense national political debates on immigration across Europe. Italy and France were in no small part reacting to national political pressure (Lega Nord in Italy, the National Front in France) to be tough on immigration from third countries, while Denmark was responding to calls from the People's Party to be tougher at the border. In the particular area of immigration, asylum, and the movement of people, the level of solidarity necessary for EU cooperation requires a certain amount of national interest to be set aside. Populist pressure, marginal but in many cases critical, means that EU Member States are finding it harder and harder to collaborate on these issues. In reality, immigration policy in Europe never strays too far from the constraints of domestic politics. However, drawing the line between legitimate national policy concerns and playing electoral politics with EU policy is also becoming harder, polarizing the EU debate. But tinkering with Schengen may not be a vote-winning policy for national politicians.

During the October national elections in Denmark, the popularity of the People's Party declined significantly, and the new socialist government has announced that the policy of re-establishing internal border controls will be abandoned. Similarly, when the Italian government decided to renew the six-month visa for Tunisians still residing in Italy in October, neither the Italian or French politicians made any noise about it. This may, in small part, suggest that any political advantage to looking tough with respect to Schengen is short-lived and, if carried too far, may ultimately be self-defeating. Clash Between Free Movement and Immigration Rules Over the past couple of years, there have been several indications that, in the absence of completely harmonized third country immigration policies (i.e., policies towards non-European immigrants), conflicts between internal systems of free movement and national policy are gradually eroding trust between EU Member States. The French-Italian dispute highlighted one essential fact: Immigration policy decisions adopted by a single Member State may have unwanted spill-over effects for other (particularly neighboring) Member States. This is not the first occasion where such unilateral policy decisions have affected EU cooperation on immigration.

The 2006 Spanish decision to regularize around 600,000 unauthorized migrants upset the French government, as they believed many of those offered legal status would then travel to France. Real or imagined, this concern sparked a debate on regularization at the EU level. The result was a "mutual information mechanism" whereby governments were asked to inform fellow states of impending amnesties, and later a political statement in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008. While the Spanish-French dispute did not escalate into Schengen brinkmanship, the resulting debate highlighted how trust between Member States is predicated on an unspoken set of parameters — the common belief that the group of states all hold roughly the same philosophies and priorities — within which governments will make national choices. The aforementioned EU immigration pact, which was promulgated under the French EU Presidency in 2008, was an effort to articulate these priorities. Thus, action outside of these boundaries will spark political debate and potentially counteraction within the European Union. Unfortunately, a resolution to this tension — either by harmonizing immigration and asylum laws completely or dismantling Schengen entirely — is unlikely.

Instead, the European Commission will have to continue to make compromise decisions and find ways to circumvent and manage these conflicts. However, any new mechanism will need to make clearer that national immigration policy decisions in a single Member State should not be capable of triggering the reintroduction of borders, regardless of how unconventional their actions might seem to their neighbors. What Next for Schengen? The current political high tide has subsided, yet the watermarks are still visible. Few believe that the proposed adjustment of Schengen rules will resolve the tensions in the long term. Rather, any modifications made will likely paper over the cracks of the current crisis. Continued Schengen cooperation is predicated on three separate factors: trust, equity, and low political salience, all of which are at a premium in the current EU political climate. It is important to remember that, at the European Summit in June, ministers publicly and unanimously reaffirmed their support for the Schengen space. While they may have concerns, no politician wishes to be at the helm of such a significant backslide from free to fettered movement.

Irresponsible public statements and a demonstrated lack of leadership are not just damaging to the Schengen system itself, but also to relationships between Member States and future collaboration in related policy fields. However, continued cooperation will be more and more difficult to maintain in the absence of common consensus on Europe's future immigration dynamic, particularly as Member States are likely to continue to refer to domestic politics when negotiating at the EU level. In this context, a common immigration policy will be pursued on a prophylactic basis, preventing what are perceived to be the worst excesses of nonconforming Member States, from border management to policies addressing regularization, and perhaps even citizenship and family reunification laws. It may be that the European Union is entering a new era of more fragile and less certain cooperation in the area of immigration, and that "saving" Schengen might come at the expense of some of the more ambitious plans held by those seeking a more comprehensive common immigration policy. Sources European Commission. 2011. Schengen Governance — strengthening the area without internal border control. Brussels: European Commission. Available Online . European Commission. 2011. Communication on Migration. Brussels: European Commission. Available Online . European Council. 2011. Council Conclusions.

Brussels: European Council, 24 June. European Council. 2008. European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. Brussels: European Council. Available Online . Tanaka, Hiroyuki. 2007. Europe's Disappearing Internal Borders. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available Online . IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS ARTICLE, CONTACT US AT Source@MigrationPolicy.org EUR-Lex - l33020 - EN - EUR-Lex Text The Schengen area and cooperation The Schengen area and cooperation are founded on the Schengen Agreement of 1985. The Schengen area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed. The signatory states to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border. Here common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controls. Simultaneously, to guarantee security within the Schengen area, cooperation and coordination between police services and judicial authorities have been stepped up. Schengen cooperation has been incorporated into the European Union (EU) legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.

However, all countries cooperating in Schengen are not parties to the Schengen area. This is either because they do not wish to eliminate border controls or because they do not yet fulfil the required conditions for the application of the Schengen acquis. During the 1980s, a debate began over the meaning of free movement of persons. Some Member States felt the concept should apply to European Union (EU) citizens only, which would involve keeping internal border checks in order to distinguish between citizens of the EU and non-EU nationals. Others argued in favour of free movement for everyone, which would mean an end to internal border checks altogether. Since Member States could not reach agreement, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands decided in 1985 to create a territory without internal borders. This became known as the "Schengen area", after the town in Luxembourg where the first agreements were signed. Following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, this intergovernmental cooperation was incorporated into the EU framework on 1 May 1999. Development of Schengen cooperation and extension of the Schengen area The first agreement between the five original group members was signed on 14 June 1985.

A further convention was drafted and signed on 19 June 1990. When it took effect in 1995, it abolished checks at the internal borders of the signatory states and created a single external border where immigration checks for the Schengen area are carried out in accordance with identical procedures. Common rules regarding visas, right of asylum and checks at external borders were adopted to allow the free movement of persons within the signatory states without disrupting law and order. Accordingly, in order to reconcile freedom and security, this freedom of movement was accompanied by so-called "compensatory" measures. This involved improving cooperation and coordination between the police and the judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal security and, in particular, to fight organised crime. With this in mind, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up. SIS is a sophisticated database used by authorities of the Schengen member countries to exchange data on certain categories of people and goods. The Schengen area gradually expanded to include nearly every Member State.

Italy signed the agreements on 27 November 1990, Spain and Portugal joined on 25 June 1991, Greece followed on 6 November 1992, then Austria on 28 April 1995 and Denmark, Finland and Sweden on 19 December 1996. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined on 21 December 2007 and the associated country Switzerland on 12 December 2008. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are not yet fully-fledged members of the Schengen area; border controls between them and the Schengen area are maintained until the EU Council decides that the conditions for abolishing internal border controls have been met.

(Details of the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland are given below.) Measures adopted by the Member States as part of cooperation under Schengen Key rules adopted within the Schengen framework include: removal of checks on persons at the internal borders; a common set of rules applying to people crossing the external borders of the EU Member States; harmonisation of the conditions of entry and of the rules on visas for short stays; enhanced police cooperation (including rights of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit); stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of criminal judgments; establishment and development of the Schengen Information System (SIS). The Schengen Information System (SIS) At the heart of the Schengen mechanism, an information system was set up. It allows national border control and judicial authorities to obtain information on persons or objects. Member States supply information to the system through national networks (N-SIS) connected to a central system (C-SIS). This IT system is supplemented by a network known as SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry), which is the human interface of the SIS.

Incorporating the Schengen acquis into the EU framework A protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporates the developments brought about by the Schengen Agreement into the EU framework. The Schengen area is now within the legal and institutional framework of the EU. Thus, it comes under parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, and attains the objective of free movement of persons enshrined in the Single European Act of 1986, while ensuring democratic parliamentary control and giving citizens accessible legal remedies when their rights are challenged (Court of Justice and/or national courts, depending on the area of law). In order to make this integration possible, the Council of the EU took a number of decisions. First, as set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council took the place of the Executive Committee created under the Schengen Agreements. With its Decision 1999/307/EC of 1 May 1999, the Council established a procedure for incorporating the Schengen Secretariat into the General Secretariat of the Council, including arrangements relating to Schengen Secretariat staff. Subsequently, new working groups were set up to help the Council manage the work.

One of the Council's most important tasks in incorporating the Schengen area was to choose those provisions and measures taken by the signatory states that formed a genuine acquis, or body of law, and that could serve as a basis for further cooperation. A list of the elements that make up the acquis, setting out the corresponding legal basis for each of them in the Treaties (EC Treaty or the Treaty on the European Union), was adopted by Council Decisions 1999/435/EC and 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999. Most of these acts are published in the Official Journal. Since then, the Schengen legislation has been further developed. For example, some articles of the Schengen Convention have been replaced by new EU legislation (e.g. the Schengen Borders Code ). The participation of Denmark Although Denmark has signed the Schengen Agreement, it can choose whether or not to apply any new measures taken under Title IV of the EC Treaty within the EU framework, even those that constitute a development of the Schengen acquis. However, Denmark is bound by certain measures under the common visa policy.

The participation of Ireland and the United Kingdom In accordance with the protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland and the United Kingdom can take part in some or all of the Schengen arrangements, if the Schengen Member States and the government representative of the country in question vote unanimously in favour within the Council. In March 1999, the United Kingdom asked to cooperate in some aspects of Schengen, namely police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the fight against drugs and the SIS. The Council Decision 2000/365/EC approving the request by the United Kingdom was adopted on 29 May 2000. In June 2000, Ireland too asked to take part in some aspects of Schengen, roughly corresponding to the aspects covered by the United Kingdom’s request. The Council adopted the Decision 2002/192/EC approving Ireland’s request on 28 February 2002. The Commission had issued opinions on the two applications, stressing that the partial participation of these two Member States should not reduce the consistency of the acquis as a whole.

After evaluating the conditions that must precede implementation of the provisions governing police and judicial cooperation, the Council consented with its Decision 2004/926/EC of 22 December 2004 that this part of the Schengen acquis could be implemented by the United Kingdom. Relations with third countries: common principles The gradual expansion of the Schengen area to include all EU Member States has led third countries that have particular relations with the EU to take part in Schengen cooperation. The precondition for association with the Schengen acquis by non-EU countries is an agreement on free movement of persons between those states and the EU (this is provided for by the Agreement on the European Economic Area in the cases of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein and by the Agreement on the free movement of persons in the case of Switzerland). For these countries this participation involves: being included in the area without checks at internal borders; applying the provisions of the Schengen acquis and of all Schengen-relevant texts adopted pursuant to it; being involved in decisions relating to Schengen-relevant texts. In practice, this involvement takes the form of mixed committees that meet alongside the working parties of the EU Council.

They comprise representatives of the Member States' governments, the Commission and the governments of third countries. Associated countries therefore participate in discussions on the development of the Schengen acquis, but do not take part in voting. Procedures for notifying and accepting future measures or acts have been laid down. Relations with Iceland and Norway Together with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Iceland and Norway belong to the Nordic Passport Union, which has abolished internal border checks. Iceland and Norway have been associated with the development of the Schengen Agreements since 19 December 1996. Although they did not have voting rights in the Schengen Executive Committee, they were able to express opinions and formulate proposals. To extend this association, the agreement on Iceland’s and Norway’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, as based on the Council Decision 1999/439/EC of 17 May 1999, was signed between Iceland, Norway and the EU on 18 May 1999.

An agreement approved by the Council on 28 June 1999 covers relations between Iceland and Norway on the one hand, and Ireland and the United Kingdom on the other, in the areas of the Schengen acquis applying to Iceland and Norway [Official Journal L 15 of 20.1.2000]. The Council Decision 2000/777/EC of 1 December 2000 provides for the application of the Schengen acquis arrangements to the five countries of the Nordic Passport Union as from 25 March 2001. The participation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein The EU concluded an agreement with Switzerland on its participation in the Schengen area [Official Journal L 53 of 27.2.2008]; consequently, Switzerland joined on 12 December 2008. It has the same associate status as Norway and Iceland. A protocol on the participation of Liechtenstein in the Schengen area was signed on 28 February 2008.

The second-generation Schengen Information System ( SIS II ) As the SIS has been operational since 1995, work is in progress on a new system with enhanced functionalities and based on new technology. This new system (SIS II) is currently undergoing extensive tests in cooperation with Member States. The Council adopted two legislative instruments on 6 December 2001: Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 and Decision 2001/886/JHA , making the Commission responsible for developing SIS II and providing for the related expenditure to be covered by the general budget of the EU. These instruments were modified in 2006, extending the period of their validity until 31 December 2008. The Commission published a communication [ COM(2001) 720 ] on 18 December 2001 examining ways of creating and developing SIS II. Following studies and discussions relating to the architecture and functionalities of the future system, the Commission presented three proposals for legislative instruments in 2005.

Two of the instruments in this package (Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on 1st pillar aspects of the establishment, operation and use of SIS II and Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 on access to SIS II by the services responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates) were adopted on 20 December 2006. The third instrument (Decision 2007/533/JHA determining 3rd pillar aspects of the establishment, operation and use of SIS II) was adopted on 12 June 2007. The Justice and Home Affairs Council of December 2006 endorsed the SISone4all project (a joint effort by Member States coordinated by Portugal). SISone4all was a temporary solution, which enabled nine EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 to connect to the current SIS system (SIS1+), with some technical adjustments.

The successful completion of SISone4all, in conjunction with the positive Schengen evaluations, allowed the lifting of internal border controls with these new countries at the end of 2007 for land and sea borders and in March 2008 for air borders. The lifting of internal border controls paved the way for implementing alternative and less risky approaches for migrating from SIS1+ to SIS II. Following requests by the Member States to allow more time for testing the system and to adopt a less risky strategy for migration from the old system to the new one, the Commission presented proposals for a regulation and a decision defining the tasks and responsibilities of the various parties involved in preparing for the migration to SIS II (including testing and any further development work needed during this phase). These proposals were adopted by the Council on 24 October 2008. Last updated: 03.08.2009

Question: Which 1985 agreement between many EC states led to the removal of border controls between those countries?
Answer: Schengen