Politics, Elections and the “Reality” of Women’s Rights in Kuwait - Diplomatic Courier Diplomatic Courier April 8, 2013 Written by Richard Rousseau, Contributor Political authoritarianism has been constant feature in the Arab political systems, and despite the ongoing “Arab Spring,” there is a continuing tendency to prevent women from freely participating in political processes. Recently, a handful of Arab countries have consented to slightly alter their political systems so as to allow women and opposition groups to have a greater say on political issues. Nevertheless, the Arab Middle East as a whole is still a long way from being a region where women are engaged in political life. Politics in the Gulf monarchies or states making up the Fertile Crescent still remains a male-dominated profession. The ratio of female to male politicians is significantly small in comparison to other regions of the world. Some positive changes have been made in Bahrain (women have the right to vote since 2002, but none have ever been elected to parliament so far) and Morocco where more women are now included in politics and government. In 2003 Egypt appointed the first women judge, and Qatar saw the appointment of the first woman to the cabinet of ministers.

Kuwait, however, is a ‘special case’ in the Arab Middle East. Until 2005, the all-male Kuwaiti parliament excluded women from all political processes. In fact, only about 15 percent of Kuwaiti citizens had the right to vote. However, on May 16, 1999 the first steps towards electoral change were taken. Emir Jaber, who reigned from 1977 to 2006, unpredictably issued a decree allowing women the right to vote and hold public office; however, the Kuwaiti parliament rejected the decree on the ground that it was legislated by decree. Then, on May 16, 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers approved a new women’s suffrage bill, but a year later, on May 3, 2005, the Islamist and conservative elements in parliament abstained from voting on the bill, and therefore the parliament postponed the vote on women’s suffrage bill. It was not until May 17th of the same year that the parliament finally passed the law, giving women the right to vote and hold public office.

Between the establishment of the parliament in 1963 as part of the country’s first post-independence constitution and the passage of the women’s suffrage bill, Kuwait’s parliament had been the sole preserve of men. Among the most activist groups for the recognition of fundamental political and social rights to women are the Kuwait Federation of Women’s Association and the Women’s Cultural and Social Society, both accredited by the government as representatives of Kuwaiti women. They are also authorized by the central government to hold meetings and organize events against the exclusion of women from the political scene. Kuwaiti politics has featured constant clashes between the government and the elected MPs during the past decade. On March 19, 2008, Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah dissolved the National Assembly and announced that a parliamentary election would be held on May 17, 2008. A total of 361,685 Kuwaitis turned out to vote, 57 percent of them women. While 27 of the 275 election candidates were women, none of the female candidates won.

Kuwait’s voters handed a slight victory to reformists who formed a loose alliance with Islamists in order to control two thirds of the seats. Emir al-Sabah once again dissolved the parliament on March 18 2009, due to an unresolved conflict between some members of the government and the Assembly, and called for another poll two months later. The May 16-17, 2009 parliamentary election marked a breakthrough in Kuwaiti politics. More than 195,000 women voted, and of the twenty-eight who ran for seats in the parliament four emerged winners. Massouma al-Mubarak, a cabinet minister in 2005, Salwa al-Jassar and Aseel al-Awadhi, both U.S.-educated professors, and Rola Dashti, an economist, were the first women to obtain seats in the Kuwaiti parliament or anywhere in the Gulf. Their victories were an achievement for Kuwait and a beckon of hope for the whole region; they were also personal triumphs since they came out victorious without organized political parties to support them or a quota system.

Most analysts construed the election of woman MPs and female suffrage as huge leaps forward for Kuwait’s democracy. The 1990 occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq proved instrumental in liberalizing the country and granting women political and social rights. Between August 2, 1990 and February 25, 1991, the period of the occupation, thousands of Kuwaiti women took on important responsibilities: running hospitals to compensate for the lack of trained medical staff, or risking their lives by engaging in smuggling food, money, and weapons across military Iraqi checkpoints. Another cycle of tensions and deadlocks between the Kuwaiti government and parliament unfolded in 2011 in the midst of the Arab Spring. Amid opposition-led rallies and protests in many Islamic countries, including Kuwait, numerous corruption claims were levied in the Kuwaiti parliament. This forced the Prime Minister and his cabinet to resign in November 2011. The Emir again called for early elections in February 2012. The opposition scored a massive victory in the February 2012 parliamentary elections.

The elections produced a National Assembly with an unprecedented majority of opposition groups in an alliance between Islamists and tribes controlling 35 of the 50 seats. The election saw a decline in the weight and presence of the liberal movements, including women’s movements, and those representing the Shiite sect. Throughout the last decade there were repeated hopes that changes of MPs would bring about a more constructive and consensual parliament. Such hopes came to fruition, especially in 2009, when, among other changes, four women were elected to parliament for the first time. Yet in practice, the elected candidates who battled for a more cooperative relationship with the government, including the four women, were defeated at the polls in the next election in February 2012. This result suggested that the public was not convinced that a consensual parliament was the right approach, or that women could make a significant difference. Kuwaiti politics took another strange turn when in June 2012 the constitutional court nullified the election and scrapped parliament, and the judges ruled for the reinstatement of the 2009 assembly in July.

But the 2009 pro-government assembly was again dissolved by the Emir in December 2012 following a cabinet request and protests by the opposition amid allegations of corruption against some cabinet members and former Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Mohammad al-Ahmad Al-Sabah. The December 2012 polls were the second of the year and the fifth since June 2006. In the December 1, 2012 election, turnout was 40.3 percent, the lowest in Kuwaiti election history. The boycott of the election by tens of thousands of people can easily explain this low participation; consequently, the opposition, composed of Islamists and liberals, has no representatives in the 50-seat Kuwaiti Parliament. The widespread boycott was a major blow to Kuwait’s efforts to represent itself as more democratic than its neighbors, especially to the international community. For the first time the Shiite minority gained more than one third of the seats, with 17 out of 50 seats in the parliament. Compared to the previous 2009 election, Sunni Islamists were reduced to a minority status, and only three women managed to win a majority of votes in their districts.

It became clear that the right to vote and hold public offices, given by the Emir’s decree, will not be enough to discuss and solve Kuwaiti women’s issues, including forced early marriage and a lack of professional opportunities for young women. Efforts to democratize and enfranchise Kuwaiti society, and the Arab Middle East, are ongoing. The political competition between the head of state, parliament, and various opposition Kuwaiti groups defending diverse ideologies and platforms has been fierce, and more recently turned violent. In such circumstances, women’s rights and empowerment issues are marginalized by the male elite. The task of reforming women’s human rights issues and gender and social roles is then incumbent on individual activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), along with occasional external pressures. As long as Kuwaiti women’s issues remain out of public view and the number of female deputies does not increase, the parliament, dominated by men, will continue with business as usual. Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan. This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier’s March/April 2013 print edition.

Lifting the veil in the Middle East - Editorials & Commentary - International Herald Tribune - The New York Times The New York Times The Opinion Pages |Lifting the veil in the Middle East - Editorials & Commentary - International Herald Tribune Search Lifting the veil in the Middle East - Editorials & Commentary - International Herald Tribune Sylvia Maier Continue reading the main story ATLANTA — Amid the images of death, destruction and mayhem in Iraq, some piece of good news from the Middle East has gone virtually unnoticed. Women's rights are progressing in many Middle Eastern countries, and numerous small but important victories have been won. Over the past several years, women in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Morocco, Bahrain and Qatar have won political and legal reforms unthinkable a decade ago. While some developments may appear minor to those who take these freedoms for granted, they are revolutionary in conservative Muslim societies. Take Saudi Arabia. In this intensely traditional country that enforces strict gender segregation in all aspects of public life, women were allowed to run, campaign and vote in elections for the board of the Jidda Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the first time last November. Two successful businesswomen were elected overwhelmingly with the votes of men.

In addition, women finally won the right to their own identity cards and, just this year, a Saudi woman appeared unveiled for the first time ever in a Saudi feature film. In neighboring Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, all tiny oil-rich Arab Gulf states, the ruling emirs extended voting rights to women over the past few years. Several women now hold high government offices. Advertisement Continue reading the main story In Morocco, Islamists were forced to accept a reformed personal-status code, the Moudawana, which gives women more rights in marriage and divorce, as well as the appointment of 50 women preachers for mosques, schools, hospitals and prisons. King Mohammed VI of Morocco himself married a computer engineer who does not wear a veil and who has become a role model for many Moroccan women. In Afghanistan, the constitution now enshrines the equality of the sexes, and Afghan women constitute a third of the elected representatives in the lower house and a quarter in the upper house of parliament. Despite these signs of progress, the political, legal and social position of women in the Middle East leaves much room for improvement.

"Honor murders" - killing a woman for allegedly sullying her family's honor by refusing an arranged marriage or trying to escape an abusive one - still claim the lives of more than 6,000 women per year, with the murderers - most often their brothers, fathers or husbands - going free as a matter of course. Please verify you're not a robot by clicking the box. Invalid email address. Please re-enter. You must select a newsletter to subscribe to. Sign Up Privacy Policy Child marriage is widespread; family laws in all Muslim countries still disproportionately favor men, and literacy rates of women, on average, are half those of males. Finally, most reforms were imposed by royal fiat over fierce opposition from conservative Islamic parties. Thus they do not necessarily reflect a fundamental societal shift and can be reversed by a change in government or if it proves politically necessary to win the support of the clergy. What made these developments possible? First and foremost, a generational shift brought to power young, reform-minded, Western-educated royals with some philosophical commitment to democracy and human rights, who also realized, quite pragmatically, that further economic development was contingent upon increased female participation in the public sphere.

Second, indigenous women's-rights groups took advantage of this political opening and waged well- organized campaigns, neutralizing charges of being Western agents by basing their demands on a modern interpretation of the Koran. This "Islamic feminism" has become for many Muslim women an effective way to reconcile faith with feminism. Advertisement Continue reading the main story The question now is how these achievements can be sustained and expanded. First, Western countries should support progressive Arab monarchs, such as King Mohammed VI of Morocco, King Abdullah of Jordan and the emirs of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in their reform efforts. The European Union's Neighborhood Policy, which offers preferred access to the European market in return for political and social reforms, is one example. Second, the West should provide moral, political and logistical support to women's groups in the region, taking its cue from local activists about their priorities and needs. For example, Rana Husseini, the Jordanian journalist who has been fighting against honor killings for years, deserves full backing. Conferring the Nobel Peace Prize on Iranian lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi was of great symbolic value. Finally, there must be awareness-raising campaigns in the United States and Europe about human rights violations committed against women.

Ultimately, the realization of women's rights in the Middle East will require a multigenerational, cross- societal commitment to social change; the political will of Western and Arab leaders, and the continued bravery of women who have fought, argued, lobbied, schemed, pushed, and badgered for women to enjoy life with dignity. A version of this article appears in print on June 19, 2006, in The International Herald Tribune. Today's Paper | Subscribe Close Women’s Suffrage Movement Facts, information and articles about Women’s Suffrage Movement, the struggle for the right of women to vote Women’s Suffrage summary: The women’s suffrage movement (aka woman suffrage) was the struggle for the right of women to vote and run for office and is part of the overall women’s rights movement. In the mid-19th century, women in several countries—most notably, the U.S. and Britain—formed organizations to fight for suffrage. In 1888, the first international women’s rights organization formed, the International Council of Women (ICW).

Because the ICW was reluctant to focus on suffrage, in 1904 the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) was formed by British women’s rights activist Millicent Fawcett, American activist Carrie Chapman Catt, and other leading women’s rights activists. Women’s Suffrage In Europe The first country to grant national-level voting rights to women was the self-governing British colony of New Zealand, which passed the Electoral Bill in September 1893. The British colony of South Australia granted full suffrage in 1894, giving women the right to vote and to stand for parliament. Australia federated in 1901 and country-wide women’s suffrage followed quickly in 1902; however, women of Australia’s indigenous people were specifically excluded until 1949, when the right to vote in federal elections was granted to all indigenous people. Remaining restrictions were abolished in 1962. Other countries followed soon after New Zealand, with limited rights granted to women in Sweden, Britain, Finland, and some U.S. states by the early 20th century.

When World War I began in 1914, many suffrage organizations shifted their focus to supporting the war effort, although some activists continued to fight for suffrage. Because of manpower shortages in warring countries, women took on many roles traditionally held by men and changed the dominant idea of what women were capable of doing, giving further momentum to the suffrage movement. Britain’s Parliament passed the Eligibility of Women Act in November 1918, which allowed women to be elected to Parliament. Ten years later, the Representation of the People Act granted women the right to vote. Following a path similar to Britain’s, many countries—Denmark, Iceland, the USSR, the Netherlands, Canada, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Germany, Luxembourg, the United States—had granted the vote to women by 1920. Other European countries did not grant women the right to vote until much later—Spain in 1931, France in 1944, and Belgium, Italy, Romania, and Yugoslavia in 1946. Later still were Switzerland (1971) and Liechtenstein (1984).

In Latin America, national suffrage was granted to women between 1929 (Ecuador) and 1946 (Argentina). In Africa, the right to vote was generally conferred on both men and women as colonial rule ended and nations became independent—the same is true for India, which granted universal suffrage with its constitution in 1949. Middle Eastern countries granted women the right to vote after World War II, although some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, do not have suffrage at all or have limited suffrage and exclude women completely (Kuwait). Women’s Suffrage In the United States The suffrage movement in the United States gained prominence with the first women’s rights convention in the world: the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848. The convention was organized by Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton , active members of the abolitionist movement who met in England in 1840 at the World Anti-Slavery Convention. In 1851, Stanton was introduced by a mutual friend to Susan B. Anthony , who was most active in the temperance movement at the time. The two would form a life-long friendship and collaboration focused on obtaining suffrage.

They formed the Woman’s National Loyal League in 1863 to support the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery and to campaign for full citizenship for blacks and women. The National Woman Suffrage Association In 1869, with slavery abolished, a rift developed in the suffrage movement over how to gain suffrage. Anthony and Stanton founded the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) and campaigned for a constitutional amendment for universal suffrage in America, and for other women’s rights, such as changes in divorce laws and an end to employment and pay discrimination. Lucy Stone, Julia Ward Howe, and Josephine Ruffin formed the less-radical American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) to focus on obtaining suffrage for black men with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and on winning women’s right to vote state-by-state, ignoring the broader rights the NWSA was campaigning for. By the 1880s, it became clear that the two organizations would be more effective if they merged back into one group, so they formed the National American Women Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1890, with Stanton as president and Anthony as vice president.

Stanton’s position was largely honorary—she departed on a 2-year European speaking tour shortly after being elected, leaving Anthony as acting president. NAWSA was a national, parent organization to hundreds of local groups that campaigned solely for women’s right to vote. However, NAWSA alienated the more radical activists like Stanton, Matilda Joslyn Gage, and Olympia Brown who were campaigning for broader rights along with the right to vote. Political Reform in Qatar: Participation, Legitimacy and Security | Middle East Policy Council Middle East Policy Council Political Reform in Qatar: Participation, Legitimacy and Security Jennifer Lambert Dr. Lambert teaches international relations of the Middle East at George Washington University and works as a foreign-media analyst at Strategic Social, an international strategic communications firm.

Other Essays in this Journal Book Excerpt: "Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel is Coming to an End" (forthcoming, 2011), Chapter 3, "A Conspiracy so Immense" In a surprising announcement in November 1995, the Qatari regime declared its intention to hold elections for the 29-seat Central Municipal Council (CMC), an advisory body attached to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture. All male Qataris over the age of 18 would be eligible to vote. Then, in an even more surprising move, a reporter with CNN asked Qatar’s emir in 1997 whether women would be allowed to vote. The emir cautiously said that he did not know, but that he saw nothing wrong with their voting.1 Later he announced that women would be allowed to vote and run as candidates. Qatar deliberately set the CMC election for March 8, 1999, International Women’s Day. Most regimes in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region allow some form of electoral politics within their states.

While many of these regimes actually use political participation to avoid democratization2 or manipulate electoral politics to reinforce authoritarian rule,3 political participation in authoritarian regimes, even when not promoting democracy, does open political space within such states. Lust-Okar and Zerhouni, for example, argue that elections in authoritarian states are often fiercely contested by domestic political actors, help lead to the formation of political associations if not actual political parties and can influence decision making. Some Arab Gulf monarchies began to institute some form of electoral politics within their states in the 1990s. Kuwait started holding regular elections in 1992. Oman initiated a Consultative Council in 1991 but only allows each district to submit three suggestions for each seat. In 2003, Oman granted universal suffrage to all Omanis; however, the sultan must still approve each representative. The Qatari leadership followed this trend in 1995, when they decided to initiate national elections for the CMC. They also decided to take a step that none of their neighbors had yet taken by giving women the right to vote and run for office.

As noted earlier, regular elections for the Kuwaiti National Assembly began in 1992.4 Until 2005, however, only Kuwaiti men were allowed to vote and run for office.5 Omani women gained the right to participate in elections in 2003, and Bahraini women only won the right to vote and run for office in 2002. While other states in the MENA region are having far more nuanced discussions about women’s political and social rights (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia), women in the Arab Gulf are only just gaining the right to participate in political life. Women in Qatar, as in most Arab Gulf monarchies, have traditionally been relegated to the domestic sphere and often avoid calling attention to themselves in public. Thus, granting women political rights legitimizes their existence outside the home in a way that is quite revolutionary for the region. Questions remain as to why the Qatari government decided to take this bold step. Conventional explanations suggest that such reforms would only come in response to a loss of oil wealth or as a concession to domestic demands. Both explanations fail to adequately explain the regime’s decision.

This article will show that the leadership decided to initiate national elections and allow women to participate in them to generate international attention for “democratic” and “modern” reforms that seem uncharacteristic in the Arab Gulf. These reforms were instrumental in bolstering the legitimacy — and, ultimately, the security — of the new Qatari regime. While Qatar allows the United States to use the Al Udeid Airbase, and its geopolitical location and liquefied natural-gas supply likely ensure a large measure of Western security guarantees, clearly the regime also feels that being liked by the international community is important. ELECTIONS AND QATARI POLITICS In November 1995, Emir Hamad Al Thani, only five months after he had overthrown his father’s regime, announced that Qatar would directly elect the 29 seats in the CMC. Before Emir Hamad made his announcement, the CMC’s seats were filled by emiri appointment. His announcement “surprised almost everyone in his country and the rest of the Gulf.”6 The CMC has advisory powers and works with the Ministry for Municipal Affairs and Agriculture on issues related to city services like road construction and maintenance, water and sanitation services, and parks and recreation.

The CMC makes recommendations to the ministry; in the event of disagreement, issues can be brought to the Council of Ministers for resolution. Making the CMC an elected body was part of a broader effort to change some of Qatar’s national political institutions and leadership. The emir amended Qatar’s constitution to separate the powers of the prime minister and emir; previously, the emir had held both positions. He then named his brother, Sheikh Abdallah bin Khalifa Al Thani, as the new prime minister.7 The emir also expanded the seats in Qatar’s Consultative Council (an appointed national body) to 35, appointed new members to fill these seats and changed some cabinet ministers. The emir even appointed the first female undersecretary for education in the Gulf, Sheikha Ahmad al-Mahmoud.8 About a week later, the emir convened the new council and cabinet and stressed Qatar’s desire to be an integral part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) order, resolving disputes in a peaceful manner in accordance with international law.9 Relations with the GCC were strained when member-states hosted the emir’s ousted father and refused Qatar’s request for a meeting to discuss the discovery of a coup plot.

Then, in 1997, the emir indicated that women might be able to vote in the upcoming municipal elections. He indicated that he saw no problem himself with women’s participation in the elections.10 The minister of justice indicated that the issue of women’s voting rights was “under consideration.”11 The mere existence of this debate had an impact on political events in Kuwait.

At a meeting of Kuwaiti women, the president of the faculty association of Kuwait University, Fawzia al-Roumi, said, “The state of Qatar, under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, is taking firm steps toward the future in order to build a strong, pioneering state” and indicated that this should be “an example of how to treat Kuwaiti women, who gave their souls and blood during the Iraqi occupation.”12 An Arabic-language newspaper based in London reported that the Arab Gulf was witnessing the development of intense competition between Kuwait and Qatar over the media and “liberal and democratic orientations in general.”13 Finally, in an address to the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) on November 29, 1997, the emir declared that all 29 seats in the CMC would be decided by direct election and that women would be allowed to fully participate in the process: The formation of the Central Municipal Council through direct elections, and granting women the right of membership and voting are a major step toward boosting popular participation in both executive and legislative activities and laying the foundations of democratic practice in our country in a gradual manner until we ultimately reach the full democracy we dream of achieving.

14 By the October 17, 1998, deadline to register as a candidate for the Central Municipal Council, there were 280 candidates, including eight women, for the 29 seats.

Close to 45 percent of Qatari women registered to vote. Though the number of candidates shrank to 227, including six women, by the election, participation was high.

Initial reports indicated that close to 95 percent of registered Qataris in Doha voted in the election, while 75 percent outside Doha participated.15 Figures released later reported the overall turnout at 79 percent of registered voters.16 Interviews with civil servants, academics and journalists indicated that the regime was frustrated that none of the women won election.17 One journalist, laughing, indicated, “It’s almost like [the Qatari leadership] thought, if we say to everyone how important it is to allow women to vote and to have them in office, everyone will say ‘sure it’s ok, let’s vote some women into office,’ and it’s done.”18 One senior Qatari official, speaking confidentially, stated, “After all [the Qatari regime] had done to convince the [Qataris] that allowing women to participate and run for office would enhance Qatar’s image, they didn’t even elect a single one!”19 According to this source, government officials, “important families” and other “important people” held meetings to try to build support for the government’s announcement that women would have the political right to vote and run for office.20 One civil servant suggested that the government was “

pleased with the elections generally but disappointed that no woman was elected.”21 Even though none of the women won, the introduction of elections generated significant debate about democracy throughout the sheikhdom.

Local papers ran special pages with Qataris sending in comments about what democracy meant in Qatar. Qataris attended public lectures and seminars about democracy and public participation. They began referring to the fanfare of attention and debate paid to democracy and elections as “the democracy festival.”22 Elections for the CMC led to a countrywide phenomenon of government officials replacing appointed bodies with elected ones. One of the most significant bodies to adopt the practice of direct elections was the board of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce. Elections for the board took place in April 1998; 3,700 Qatari businessmen voted by secret ballot for 17 seats.23 Previously, the emir had appointed the members of its board on recommendation of the finance minister. This “democracy festival” even impacted schools in Qatar. In December 1998, the deputy minister for education, Sheikha Ahmad Al-Mahmoud, stated that she would apply the principle of democracy in all aspects and at all levels of her ministry.24 She instituted elected student unions in all schools. The discussion of women in political life accompanied other significant changes for women in Qatar.

The emir named his sister, Sheikha Aisha, as head of the Women’s Information Committee, which was encouraging women’s participation in the CMC elections and educating women about the virtues of democracy. The committee oversaw a large public-awareness campaign prior to the first elections and also weighed in on matters regarding constitutional and human rights.25 The first female anchor appeared on the Al Jazeera Satellite Channel in 1997. A Qatar-based women’s magazine appointed a female editor for the first time. Sheikha Moza, Emir Hamad’s second wife, led a two-hour all-female march through Doha in support of a local charity, and she continues to give speeches at public events and interviews in the media. In a particularly visible move that attracted international attention, she traveled to the United States to give speeches at two American universities and appeared in a widely televised interview on the CBS news program 60 Minutes.26 She is the first wife of a GCC ruler to appear abroad in public at a speaking engagement and appear in a televised interview.

Gradually, Sheikha Moza has become known as the “first lady” of Qatar, a sobriquet that describes her functional role as the emir’s wife and how visible she has become in Qatari politics.27 Many indicators suggest that women readily embraced their new rights. The eight women who originally filed to run as candidates in the 1999 CMC election represented a rather diverse group of women. They included a civil servant, a Qatari TV and radio station employee, the director of a nursing school, a psychiatrist, and the head of the women’s section of the Qatari Red Crescent. In anticipation that the more powerful Consultative Council would become a partially elected institution in the future, one candidate, Dr. Mozza al-Malaki, even expressed greater aspirations: “My election to the Municipal Council is only a step to the coming of the Qatari Majlis [Consultative Council], as the Majlis will realize further aspirations.

The Municipal Council deals only with small and local aspirations.”28 Furthermore, of the 22,225 Qataris who cast their votes in the 1999 CMC election, 45 percent were women.29 Female candidates indicated that their families were supportive, and the Qatari media voiced support for women’s political participation in the 1999 elections.30 One author noted that this supportive environment stood in stark contrast to the reception that advancements for women have received elsewhere in the Gulf: “By contrast, when Saudi Arabia allowed the opening of all-female branches of banks in 1980, the Saudi media was divided between supporters and opponents, and there were even Saudi women who criticized the idea of working women.”31 Even the spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood of Qatar supported women’s participation in the elections: “There is nothing in Islam that prevents women from participating in the elections and being a member of parliament; thus there is a role for women in all aspects of life, side by side with men.”32 Not all evidence is positive, however.

Several interviews with individuals familiar with the state of media practices in Qatar indicated that the press was told to cover the issue of women’s political rights in a favorable light. Two journalists, speaking confidentially, indicated that senior Qatari officials “essentially fed stories” and “encouraged positive coverage of anything to do with women’s participation.”33 One Qatari official said the press was essentially “under orders” to portray women’s political rights positively.34 Two public employees indicated that the regime “took measures” to make sure the press knew it was “on order” to only supply positive coverage of women voting,35 although one interviewee familiar with the Qatari press indicated that the regime would not have to take extreme measures to ensure positive coverage, as “the Qatari press doesn’t critically question regime priorities anyway.”36 Failed female candidate Dr.

al-Maliki, following her loss, indicated that the 1999 elections prove that Qatar remains “a male-dominated society to the bone” and suggested that women may have voted the way that their husbands told them to vote.37 Elsewhere, she suggested that women voters may be the key obstacle faced by women candidates, as she claimed that 80 percent of the female candidates’ votes came from men.38 A former Kuwaiti information minister criticized Qatar’s reform efforts in the Kuwaiti press and claimed that “traditionalists express vehement opposition to female participation, opposition that has been ruthlessly put down.”39 The Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported that “a group of Muslim fundamentalists” sent a memo to Qatar’s Consultative Council opposing women’s participation in state affairs.40 Municipal elections are scheduled for every four years; so far elections have taken place in 1999, 2003 and 2007. In 2003, Qatar’s first female candidate was elected to office: Sheikha Yousef Hassan al-Jufairi. She became the first woman in the Gulf region to win elected office, though she did run unopposed in her district.

One Qatari official suggested that the disappointment over the failure to elect a woman in 1999 led the regime to ask men running against Sheikha Yousef in the Old Airport district to step down.41 Still, the first “election” of a woman to political office in the Arab Gulf region marked an important political event. Qatar publicized her victory in the first-ever Qatar embassy newsletter, The Pearl.42 The newsletter also announced the recent appointment of the first female cabinet minister, to the Ministry of Education.43 In another bold move, the emir officially announced that Qatar would draft a new constitution that would include a largely elected national assembly, the Advisory Council. Using the opportunity to criticize the lack of popular input in Arab states, he said that popular participation is “one of the requirements of the future” and that Arab leaders should meet to discuss its wider adoption.44 On April 23, 2003, 98 percent of Qatari voters approved the new constitution in a referendum.45 The constitution replaced the appointed Consultative Council with a 45-member largely elected Advisory Council and stipulated that 30 of the 45 Advisory Council seats be determined by direct election.

The council has the power to pass laws subject to emiri approval, to question ministers and to approve state budgets. The constitution also guaranteed women the right to vote and to run for office; these rights were guaranteed previously by an emiri decree. News of Qatar’s new constitution reached a wide international audience. The president of the European Union “welcomed” the adoption of a more democratic constitution in Qatar.46 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Qatar for attaining “significant milestones” toward the advancement of democracy.47 The secretary general of the GCC even praised the emir, the Qatari government and its people when the constitution officially became law in 2004.48 In the meantime, turnout for the CMC elections fell drastically from 79 percent in 1999 to 38 percent in 200349 amid signs of diminishing enthusiasm for the municipal election.50 Explanations for the low turnout point to concerns about the CMC’s lack of authority.

One candidate called the CMC “powerless”; another report indicated an “absence of confidence in the council’s role.”51 The regime tried to bolster turnout in the 2007 election by insisting they were a “practice run” for upcoming elections to the more powerful Advisory Council.52 Another source reported that the 2007 municipal elections occurred alongside rising expectations that the emir would set a firm election date for the Advisory Council.53 Turnout increased to 51.1 percent for the 2007 elections, and they were heralded as a success in the Qatari media.54 Despite the emir’s stated commitment to increase broader participation, elections for the Advisory Council have been scheduled and postponed several times. The constitution approved by the 2003 referendum officially went into effect in 2004, and elections to the Advisory Council were originally scheduled for the following year. Currently, elections are scheduled for June 2013.

A Qatari civil servant indicated that they have been postponed because some of Qatar’s major families differ as to how districts should be drawn and seats awarded.55 A foreign diplomat suggested that the Qatari elite are afraid that Advisory Council elections may suffer a similar fate to certain reform efforts in Kuwait.56 There, liberal reforms supported by the royal family have routinely met with opposition in the more conservative national parliament. For example, the Kuwaiti royal family encouraged the national parliament to recognize equal political rights for women, but two separate parliaments refused. The Kuwaiti prime minister dissolved parliament twice before a new national parliament finally awarded Kuwaiti women the right to vote and run for office in 2005. Another Qatari seemed to concur with the foreign diplomat’s observation, suggesting that the ruling elite want to make sure they have all the “necessary reforms” cemented into place as law before an elected Advisory Council takes office.57 EXPLANATIONS FOR POLITICAL REFORM Some explanations of current Arab Gulf reform efforts suggest that they are a response to the fiscal crisis of the 1990s.

Hit by the “twin effects” of stagnating oil prices and demographic growth, many Gulf states faced economic pressures, and some initiated political reforms.58 Evidence does indicate that the combination of low oil prices and the large infrastructural expenditures necessary to access its gas reserves put pressure on Qatari government finances. The state budget for 1999 predicted that state revenue would fall by 15 percent, and state expenditures were reduced by 10 percent.59 Yet no cuts were made to spending on housing, and health and social-security spending actually rose. The spending cuts only slowed the development of Qatar’s major infrastructural projects. Furthermore, in that same year, Standard & Poor estimated that Qatar’s oil reserves would last another 95 years and that gas reserves would substantially increase Qatar’s GDP in the future.60 So, not only was the fiscal pressure rather minimal in Qatar, it also promised to be short-lived. Qatar’s ambitious political reforms do not match the rather limited fiscal pressure it faced at the time. Other explanations view Arab Gulf reform efforts as a response to the development and growth of a more educated and sophisticated citizenry.

Sager,61 for example, explains reform as a “response to domestic pressures and developments” such as “the increase in population, in particular in terms of large numbers of youth; the rise in the standard of education and its impact on the population as a whole; and the increase in the levels of political consciousness.” An examination of the evidence on Qatar, however, does not fit this explanation. Qatar’s total population, as reported by the UN Population Division, was 565,000 in 2000; its population in 2050 is projected to reach 831,000.62 Compared to other states in the region whose populations are projected to double (Kuwait) or triple (Saudi Arabia), Qatar’s projected growth rate is rather modest and certainly sustainable as Qatar starts to tap into its liquefied natural-gas reserves.

The percentage of Qatar’s population below age 24, at 39.3 percent, is also the lowest in the region.63 One piece of evidence supportive of this argument, however, is the 1992 petition signed by 50 Qataris demanding political and economic reform.64 Yet the emir at the time dealt with the issue by detaining key signatories. These 1992 demands, however, could foster the belief of current regime members that Qataris do want more political participation or will in the near future. Other evidence, namely candidate comments expressing a desire for a majlis or disappointment in the limited powers of the CMC, do suggest that at least some Qatari elites want an elected national assembly. Yet it is unclear if this demand existed before the promises of an elected assembly were announced. The evidence also suggests that the push for reform is not coming from the Qatari population. The top-down implementation of reforms, the lack of a contested female victory, and the apathy of Qatari voters all suggest that this reform process is driven by the regime and not the society.

Even Al Jazeera’s intense debates and the government-sponsored Doha Debates have not fostered the sort of democratic discussion that the Qatari elite claims to have expected. In confidential interviews, three academics referred to this phenomenon as evidence that Qatari political consciousness still remains low.65 Members of the elite — high-ranking public officials and members of the royal family — do want to maintain that these reforms are driven by domestic factors, particularly after the 2003 U.S.-led Iraqi invasion.66 A debate about the drivers of political change in the Arab world emerged in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion that sought to discredit any claims made by the United States that external pressure or action could promote democratic change. Even academic work dealing with the Gulf’s political changes has embodied this argument. After crediting the changes taking place in the Gulf to “domestic pressures and developments,” Sager67 writes, “Certainly, the steps that have been implemented are not a product of the events associated with the aftermath of September 11 or the result of the U.S. strategy to ‘spread freedom.’” Unfortunately, this argument sets up a false dichotomy whereby political change must be domestically driven or it can be claimed as part of the U.S.

strategy to promote change. One can identify international factors that promote change without crediting them to U.S. policy. One only needs to point out that these changes began in the 1990s, well before the events of September 11 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. Additionally, if these reforms were in response to domestic pressure or developments, why were they introduced by decree rather than referendum? The evidence clearly indicates that the new emir and his supporters within the political elite wanted these reforms and considered their success too important to leave to popular approval. Only after legally enshrining elections and women’s rights as part of Qatari political life did the ruling elite put the issue to a referendum. Even then, the government spent a large number of resources to ensure the new constitution’s victory. There is no evidence of any real domestic demand for either elections or increased women’s rights, certainly not demand of a kind that would have threatened the regime. In fact, allowing women the right to vote and run for political office opens up the regime to domestic and regional dissent unnecessarily.

Sources suggest that other Gulf states placed pressure on the Qatari emir “not to grant his country a permanent constitution that would give large powers to a parliament, for fear that this kind of ‘democracy’ could affect traditional ways of governing.”68 Norms research, however, can account for the Qatari leadership’s ambitious path of political reform and the profile-raising activity that accompanied it. Hurd,69 in his concept of “norm instrumentalism,” examines how political actors can use norms to achieve certain political goals. Gurowitz70 examines how the Japanese leadership, in order to bolster their international role and reputation, initiated policy changes with respect to migrant workers that were more consistent with international norms on racism and equality. Similarly, the reform process in Qatar uses international norms regarding elections and women’s political rights to bolster the state’s external reputation. Elections and women’s political rights are well-accepted international norms that states in the Arab Gulf have traditionally been rather resistant to adopting. The reforms the Qatari leadership initiated, however, embrace these norms in a highly publicized manner.

The norm of elections follows a rather traditional path through Finnemore and Sikkink’s “life cycle of a norm.”71 The use of elections has spread across the globe, reaching far past a “tipping point,” where approximately one-third of states embrace this norm.72 As can be seen below, the number of legislative and executive elections has risen markedly. While the increasing use of elections by authoritarian regimes has sparked some concern about their meaning, the initiation of elections is still met with praise and a hope that this step marks the beginning of a trajectory toward democracy.73 The norms associated with women’s rights, particularly women’s suffrage, are well established internationally. Prior to 1904, several domestic groups of “norm entrepreneurs” pushed for women’s suffrage. In 1904, an international campaign was launched with the founding of the International Women’s Suffrage Association (IWSA). Early adopters of women’s suffrage — New Zealand, Australia and Finland — adopted the norm in response to domestic campaigns in the first stage of the norm cycle. As these states were not hegemons, the case of women’s suffrage represents an exception to the typical path of hegemonic socialization.

States like the United States and the UK were 10 and 20 years behind the initial adopters. Late adopters often encountered little domestic pressure once the norm passed the “tipping point.” Research indicates that women’s suffrage reached this stage in 1930, when 20 states had granted women suffrage rights.74 These 20 states became norm observers in the period from the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 until 1930; 48 countries adopted these norms in the next 20 years, demonstrating how fast a norm can spread after the tipping point has been reached.75 Today, the norm of women’s suffrage is taken for granted, like all well-accepted norms.76 Yet Arab Gulf monarchies are among the few places in the world where a woman’s right to vote or run for political office is still questioned. Before 1999, not one Gulf monarchy had allowed women the right to vote, and members of the political elite still question a woman’s ability to vote or hold political office.

An initiative granting political rights to women failed in Kuwait’s National Assembly by a vote of 32-30 in 1999; women were only granted political rights in 2005. A Freedom House report indicated that there were significant reservations in Kuwait about a woman’s ability to be an elected public official.77 In 2002, a poll conducted in Bahrain indicated that 60 percent of Bahraini women believed that women should not hold political office.78 Thus, it is even more impressive that Qatari women, who largely practice Wahhabi Islam, were the first women in the Arab Gulf states to gain the right to vote and run for public office. The lack of norm observance among its peers also suggests that Qatar would be insulated from the typical international socialization process associated with norm adoption. Yet Qatar chose to allow women to vote and run for office in a highly visible way, even setting the date for the first elections on International Women’s Day. Of course, evidence of norm internalization is often difficult to prove. However, there is some evidence that members of this new and younger Qatari elite believe that democratic elections and women’s rights are principles that Qatar “ought” to embrace. A U.S.

citizen who came to know the emir quite well claims that Sheikh Hamad initiated these political reforms “because he believed it was the right thing to do.”79 Before announcing plans to allow women to vote, the emir indicated that he saw nothing wrong with women’s voting.80 The emir also said that popular participation is “one of the requirements of the future” and urged its wider adoption within the Arab world.81 Yet, when democratic norms are not as readily embraced as desired by the Qatari elite or the risk of creating political conflict seems too great, the evidence suggests that the regime may resort to undemocratic means to ensure that democratic norms seem robust in practice. This is the case with the “election” of a female candidate who ran unopposed for the CMC. The fear of an illiberal Advisory Council also seems to be a factor in the postponement of national legislative elections. Evidence thus suggests that these reforms were clearly important to the leadership’s own self-esteem and Qatar’s reputation — particularly when the regime seems willing to engage in norm-inconsistent (undemocratic) behavior to ensure the norm adoptions are viewed as successful. This evidence calls into question the actual degree to which the norms have been internalized.

The very method of introducing elections and women’s rights by decree indicates they were important to the regime — too important to risk failure. The evidence is more solid in demonstrating that the Qatari leadership became convinced that adopting these norms would help bolster the external legitimacy of the regime and the state. More ambitious reforms demand greater attention and invite praise. Regimes value external legitimacy and may adopt norms to secure or bolster their place within the international system.82 According to a Qatari academic, “These political changes, particularly women’s rights, while they benefit Qatari women, were definitely initiated with an eye to increasing Qatar’s international image. If anything, the issue of women’s rights has cost the emir some domestic support, angered traditionalists domestically and angered GCC members regionally.”83 Hurd84 discusses how norms can be used instrumentally in circumstances where the actor seeks an expected gain from an audience that has internalized the norms. The regime clearly publicizes Qatar’s adoption of these norms to an international audience. As mentioned previously, the first CMC elections took place on International Women’s Day.

The very first edition of the newsletter published by the Qatari embassy in the United States heralded the adoption of the new constitution and the first election ever of a woman in Qatar’s municipal elections.85 These reforms were instrumental to Qatar’s goal of promoting a different image, one Thomas Friedman86 embraced when he described Qatar in The New York Times as “a good modernizing monarchy.” This praise and enhanced visibility is used as proof by the Qatari leadership that “our efforts are bearing fruit.”87 CONCLUSION Have the Qatari elite internalized norms regarding elections and women’s political rights? There is some evidence of elite learning; the regime does espouse some commitment to these norms as principles that it should adopt. Yet the evidence is also ambiguous. How deeply the regime has internalized the norms is at issue, particularly given the evidence that suggests some norm-inconsistent behavior. The evidence pointing to the instrumental use of norms to bolster the external legitimacy of both the regime and the state, however, is stronger. These ambitious and highly visible reforms are best explained by norm diffusion, which emphasizes the importance regimes place on external perception and praise.

Qatari political reform is that rare case in the literature on international norms that demonstrates how important elite agency can be in explaining their diffusion. Without the Qatari leadership’s decision to embrace political reform, the norms of elections and women’s rights likely would not be adopted anytime soon. While the international normative structure is important, the case of Qatari political reform serves as a reminder that domestic agents count, too. This research also raises the question as to why external attention and praise are important to the Qatari government. In 1995, the leadership was part of a new regime initially opposed by the Saudi Arabian elite. The previous emir was content to exist under the shadow of Saudi Arabia. The new emir was eager to differentiate the young state from its Saudi neighbors and be freer to operate according to Qatar’s interests, as he and his new regime viewed them. As one member of the Qatari royal family remarked, “Fanatics and extremists…give us a bad name. Holding elections, electing women, that will cause people to see Qatar in a new and different light.”88 When asked why this was important, he responded: “It’s important for our security.

We have a freer hand in crafting our own foreign policy, and people come to the defense of ‘good’ states.”89 1 Louay Bahry, “Elections in Qatar: A Window of Democracy Opens in the Gulf,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, June 1999, pp. 188-127. 2 Daniel Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies,” Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Vols. 1 and 2, 1995; and Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, accessed April 12, 2010. 3 Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East (Lynn Reinner, 2008). 4 Jill Crystal, “Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar,” 2nd Ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1995). 5 Hassan M.

Fattah, “Kuwaiti Women Join the Voting after a Long Battle for Suffrage,” The New York Times, June 30, 2006. 6 Bahry, “Elections in Qatar,” op. cit. 7 “Emir Enlarges Consultative Council,” Agence France Presse, November, 12, 1996. 8 “How Long until Qatari Women Get the Right to Vote?” Mideast Mirror, April 23, 1997. 9 “Emir Opens Consultative Council, Comments on Peace Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 20, 1996. 10 Bahry, “Elections in Qatar,” op. cit. 11 “How Long until Qatari Women Get the Right to Vote?” Mideast Mirror, April 23, 1997. 12 Ibid.

Question: In which small Middle Eastern Country were women only granted the right to vote in 2006?
Answer: KUWAIT