BBC ON THIS DAY | 7 | 1945: Black Sea talks plan defeat of Germany Search ON THIS DAY by date About This Site | Text Only 1945: Black Sea talks plan defeat of Germany Plans are being drawn up by London, Washington and Moscow for the final phase of the war against Germany. Leaders of the three countries, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Franklin D Roosevelt and Marshal Joseph Stalin, have been meeting at a secret location in the Black Sea area. A statement issued this evening is the first official confirmation of the talks which are said to have begun three days ago. They were there to discuss the future of Europe now that the end of the war was assured People's War memories » According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Information in London the purpose of the meeting is to complete plans for the defeat of the "common enemy" and to build firm foundations for a lasting peace. The three leaders, who are also accompanied by their chiefs of staff, foreign secretaries and other advisers, are said to have reviewed the latest information from all the battle fronts in Europe. The statement continued: "There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany.

The military staffs of the three governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans." Discussions on how to secure a lasting peace have also been held. Topics likely to be considered are the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of a liberated Europe and proposals for an international organisation to maintain peace. A further communiqu� is to be issued at the conclusion of the talks. The statement gave no further details of the exact location of the meeting. But the Black Sea was considered an ideal choice as it gave Marshal Stalin easy access to Moscow and news from the eastern front. There has been some speculation the three leaders might appeal over the heads of the German leadership to the people themselves to get out of a "lost war". The German media has already issued warnings that any such appeal should be ignored as an attempt to undermine the fighting will of its forces. It seems likely much of the conference will be spent on working out the details of the administration of an occupied Germany. Already General Charles de Gaulle of France has declared his country would like to be involved. There is also the thorny issue of a Russo-Polish settlement as well as a need to get urgently needed food and other supplies distributed as quickly as possible.

Presidential aide remembers the Yalta conference In Context What became known as the Yalta or Crimea Conference ended on 11 February. Its location was revealed to be the former imperial palace at Livadia in Yalta. An official agreement was published in which the three leaders declared their intention to combine their military plans and work in close partnership to defeat Germany. They also drew up plans for the occupation of Germany and agreed France should be a fourth occupying power. The leaders announced their determination to stamp out Nazism and to disarm and disband all German armed forces and bring all war criminals to justice. All liberated territories in Europe were to have democratic government. On the question of Poland, they agreed on plans for a provisional government until a free election could be held and also on where the border should lie between Poland and the USSR. An agreement was reached, without Churchill's knowledge, on the Soviet Union's territorial demands for joining the war against Japan. The leaders also called for a Conference of United Nations to meet on 25 April 1945.

Stories From 7 Feb Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War - Feb 04, 1945 - HISTORY.com Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War Share this: Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War Author Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War URL Publisher A+E Networks President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin meet to discuss the Allied war effort against Germany and Japan and to try and settle some nagging diplomatic issues. While a number of important agreements were reached at the conference, tensions over European issues—particularly the fate of Poland—foreshadowed the crumbling of the Grand Alliance that had developed between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union during World War II and hinted at the Cold War to come. Meeting in the city of Yalta in the Russian Crimean from February 4 to 11, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin each arrived with their own agendas for the conference. For Stalin, postwar economic assistance for Russia, and U.S. and British recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe were the main objectives.

Churchill had the protection of the British Empire foremost in his mind, but also wanted to clarify the postwar status of Germany. Roosevelt’s goals included consensus on establishment of the United Nations and gaining Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan once Hitler had been defeated. None of them left Yalta completely satisfied. There was no definite determination of financial aid for Russia. Many issues pertaining to Germany were deferred for further discussion. As for the United Nations, Stalin wanted all 16 Soviet republics represented in the General Assembly, but settled for three (the Soviet Union as a whole, Belorussia, and the Ukraine). However, the Soviets did agree to join in the war against Japan 90 days after Hitler’s Germany was defeated. It was over the issue of the postwar status of Poland, however, that the animosity and mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union that would characterize the Cold War were most readily apparent. Soviet troops were already in control of Poland, a procommunist provisional government had already been established, and Stalin was adamant that Russia’s interests in that nation be recognized. The United States and Great Britain believed that the London-based noncommunist Polish government-in-exile was most representative of the Polish people.

The final agreement merely declared that a “more broadly based” government should be established in Poland. Free elections to determine Poland’s future were called for sometime in the future. Many U.S. officials were disgusted with the agreement, which they believed condemned Poland to a communist future. Roosevelt, however, felt that he could do no more at the moment, since the Soviet army was occupying Poland. As the Cold War became a reality in the years that followed the Yalta Conference, many critics of Roosevelt’s foreign policy accused him of “selling out” at the meeting and naively letting Stalin have his way. It seems doubtful, however, that Roosevelt had much choice. He was able to secure Russian participation in the war against Japan (Russia declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945), established the basic principles of the United Nations, and did as much as possible to settle the Poland issue. With World War II still raging, his primary interest was in maintaining the Grand Alliance. He believed that troublesome political issues could be postponed and solved after the war. Unfortunately, Roosevelt never got that chance—almost exactly two months after the end of the conference, Roosevelt suffered a stroke and died.

Related Videos Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1937–1945 The Yalta Conference, 1945 The Yalta Conference took place in a Russian resort town in the Crimea from February 4–11, 1945, during World War Two. At Yalta, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin made important decisions regarding the future progress of the war and the postwar world. World Leaders at the Yalta Conference The Allied leaders came to Yalta knowing that an Allied victory in Europe was practically inevitable but less convinced that the Pacific war was nearing an end. Recognizing that a victory over Japan might require a protracted fight, the United States and Great Britain saw a major strategic advantage to Soviet participation in the Pacific theater. At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed with Stalin the conditions under which the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan and all three agreed that, in exchange for potentially crucial Soviet participation in the Pacific theater, the Soviets would be granted a sphere of influence in Manchuria following Japan’s surrender.

This included the southern portion of Sakhalin, a lease at Port Arthur (now Lüshunkou), a share in the operation of the Manchurian railroads, and the Kurile Islands. This agreement was the major concrete accomplishment of the Yalta Conference. The Allied leaders also discussed the future of Germany, Eastern Europe and the United Nations. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed not only to include France in the postwar governing of Germany, but also that Germany should assume some, but not all, responsibility for reparations following the war. The Americans and the British generally agreed that future governments of the Eastern European nations bordering the Soviet Union should be “friendly” to the Soviet regime while the Soviets pledged to allow free elections in all territories liberated from Nazi Germany. Negotiators also released a declaration on Poland, providing for the inclusion of Communists in the postwar national government. In discussions regarding the future of the United Nations, all parties agreed to an American plan concerning voting procedures in the Security Council, which had been expanded to five permanent members following the inclusion of France. Each of these permanent members was to hold a veto on decisions before the Security Council. Initial reaction to the Yalta agreements was celebratory.

Roosevelt and many other Americans viewed it as proof that the spirit of U.S.-Soviet wartime cooperation would carry over into the postwar period. This sentiment, however, was short lived. With the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States. By the end of April, the new administration clashed with the Soviets over their influence in Eastern Europe, and over the United Nations. Alarmed at the perceived lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviets, many Americans began to criticize Roosevelt’s handling of the Yalta negotiations. To this day, many of Roosevelt’s most vehement detractors accuse him of “handing over” Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia to the Soviet Union at Yalta despite the fact that the Soviets did make many substantial concessions. Yalta Conference - World War II - HISTORY.com Google The Yalta Conference was a meeting of British prime minister Winston Churchill, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin , and President Franklin D. Roosevelt early in February 1945 as World War II was winding down.

The leaders agreed to require Germany’s unconditional surrender and to set up in the conquered nation four zones of occupation to be run by their three countries and France. They scheduled another meeting for April in San Francisco to create the United Nations. Stalin also agreed to permit free elections in Eastern Europe and to enter the Asian war against Japan. In turn, he was promised the return of lands lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. At the time, most of these agreements were kept secret. Yalta became controversial after Soviet-American wartime cooperation degenerated into the cold war. Stalin broke his promise of free elections in Eastern Europe and installed governments dominated by the Soviet Union. Then American critics charged that Roosevelt, who died two months after the conference, had “sold out” to the Soviets at Yalta. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, Editors. Copyright © 1991 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved.

Tags Unity and Strategy - Churchill and the Great Republic | Exhibitions - Library of Congress Churchill and the Great Republic Unity and Strategy Sections: An Age of Youth | Stirring Affairs | Finest Hour | Sword for Freedom | Unity & Strategy | Cold War & Long Sunset Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin U.S. Army Signal Corps. Conference of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Marshal Josef Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill… , 1943. Photographic print. Office of War Information Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (206) The war in the Mediterranean theater continued to dominate Churchill's thoughts after he met with Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. After many frustrating delays, Allied forces (principally British, American, and French) wiped out the last remaining Axis (German and Italian) troops in North Africa. They exploited this success by undertaking operations in Sicily and from there moved onto the Italian peninsula. Churchill's American allies, however, made known their desire to come to grips with Hitler's armies in northwest Europe in a series of additional wartime conferences.

These began with the TRIDENT meeting in Washington in May 1943 and culminated in the first meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in Teheran, Iran, at year's end. At the conclusion of the Teheran meeting the Americans and Soviets had overridden Churchill's lingering doubts and had secured a firm commitment to launch a cross-Channel attack in northwest France by the late spring of 1944, together with a supporting amphibious operation in southern France. The Finest Way to Die In May 1943 Churchill boarded the S.S. Queen Mary for a trip to the United States and another meeting with Roosevelt. At sea, Churchill told Averell Harriman of reported submarines along their course. He explained that he had arranged for a machine gun to be mounted on his life boat: “I won't be captured. The finest way to die is in the excitement of fighting the enemy… You must come with me in the boat and see the fun.” W. Averell Harriman, May 6, 1943. Facsimile. W.

Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (194) Bookmark this item: #194 “Heavier Work Lies Ahead” In May, 1943, Churchill was in Washington for the TRIDENT Conference, during which the Americans and British agreed to launch the cross-Channel attack in a year's time. He also made a second speech to Congress. Churchill reminded them that “the main burden of the war on land” was still being borne by the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front. He added that the final triumph, in spite of the recent victory in Tunisia, would come only after battles as difficult and costly as those that had followed the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War. Winston Churchill addressing joint session of Congress , 1943. Copyprint. Connally Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (196). LC-USZ62-90452.

[Digital ID# cph 3b36803] Bookmark this item: #196 A Letter From Sicily Churchill's son Randolph, a soldier serving with a British Special Raiding Squadron during the invasion of Sicily, wrote his father two letters during the landings. He described the weather conditions, troop morale, and enemy resistance: “So far it has been like clockwork. I trust that by breakfast time good news will be flooding in on you.” The next day, with the operation a success, he wrote, “The whole enterprise in our sector was too good to be true… I do hope it has gone as well with the Americans.” Bookmark this item: #196_1 Petting the Lion Amid the burdens of the war Churchill occasionally found time for diversions and outings. In July 1943, he and Clementine visited the London Zoo, where with one finger he tentatively petted a lion cub. Associated Press. Churchills with a British Symbol , 1943.

New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (199) Bookmark this item: #199 Haunting Hitler's Dreams In September 1943, with British forces once more on the European continent and the Soviet Red Army moving westward, the war's outcome seemed inevitable. After Italy's surrender to the Allies was announced on September 8, Adolf Hitler declared that he would continue to fight. This Clifford Berryman cartoon portrays the goose-stepping German dictator's attitude as whistling through his own graveyard, while the spirits of Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill look on. Clifford Berryman. They Can't Scare Him—Much , 1943. Drawing. Cartoon Drawings Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (200). LC-USZ62-47661. [Digital ID# acd 2a05979] Bookmark this item: #200 Quebec and Washington On his trip to North America for the first Quebec Conference (QUADRANT), Churchill was accompanied by his wife Clementine and his daughter Mary, who served as his aide-de-camp.

In Quebec, the conferees discussed plans for the cross-Channel attack—the Second Front—and the development of the atomic bomb. After the conference (August 17-24, 1943), the Churchills went to Washington. Here Mary and Clementine speak with three Women's Army Corps officers while visiting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Acme Newspictures. The Churchills Meet Some WAC's , 1943. Copyprint. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (203) Bookmark this item: #203 Strategic Bombing Churchill's military strategy relied heavily on taking the war to the German enemy by means of strategic bombing. This letter to General Ira Eaker, commander of the American Eighth Air Force, was sent through Eaker's superior, General Jacob Devers. Churchill praised Eaker's recent daylight attacks on German industrial targets, which complemented the nighttime strikes made by British Bomber Command. Eaker's campaign would culminate in the costly October 14 raid on Schweinfurt's ball-bearing factories. Winston Churchill to Jacob Devers, October 11, 1943. Holograph letter.

Ira Eaker Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (205). © Crown copyright 1943 Bookmark this item: #205 Discover! Teheran Conference Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met for the first time at Teheran, Iran, from November 28 to December 1, 1943. At the conference, Stalin finally forced the issue of the Second Front. Accusing Churchill of not backing the cross-Channel attack, now code-named OVERLORD, he prodded the Anglo-Americans to take a firm and final stand by naming a supreme commander for the operation. Roosevelt selected U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower, allowing overall command in the Mediterranean to pass into British hands. U.S. Army Signal Corps. Conference of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Marshal Josef Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill… , 1943. Photographic print. Office of War Information Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (206) Bookmark this item: #206 Three Knights Slay A Monster These color postcards were painted to commemorate the Teheran Conference by placing contemporary characters in a Persian legend.

According to the tale, an evil despot (Hitler) once ruled by terror, decapitating men to feed their brains to the snakes (shown as Italian and Japanese) that grew from his shoulders. Three knights (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill) appeared, first in a dream and later in reality, to destroy the tyrant and restore justice. Teheran Conference commemorative postcards, 1943. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (207) Bookmark this item: #207 Bodyguard of Lies As this summary of a Teheran Conference meeting indicates, Churchill realized that the scale of the proposed cross-Channel attack into Normandy meant that the enemy would know that an invasion was coming. He therefore called for “some form of cover plan” in order to trick the German defenders into thinking the blow would fall elsewhere, causing them to disperse their defenses. “Truth,” he said, “deserves a bodyguard of lies.” The code name BODYGUARD was later given to the Allies' massive deception effort. Summary of the third regular session of the Teheran Meeting, November 30, 1943. Typed memorandum.

Facsimile. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (208) Bookmark this item: #208 The Big Three This place card bears the signatures of Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin. Averell Harriman kept it as a souvenir of the Teheran Conference. Autographed card, 1943. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (209) Bookmark this item: #209 Convalescing in Carthage After the Teheran Conference, Churchill contracted pneumonia, followed by a heart attack. He was well enough by Christmas Day, however, to discuss military plans with General Eisenhower (left) and Field Marshal Harold Alexander (second from left) in Carthage. Churchill is shown wearing his famous dragon-emblazoned dressing gown over his even more famous “siren suit”—a one-piece zip-front jumpsuit named for its simplicity in putting on quickly at the sound of an air raid siren. Associated Press. Churchill At Work on the War Again , 1943. Copyprint.

New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (211) Bookmark this item: #211 Back to Top Operation Overlord As the Allies were learning details of the Nazis' ongoing mass-murder program taking place at the Auschwitz death camp, the greatest Anglo-American action of World War II began: the cross-Channel airborne and amphibious attack known as “D-Day.” Churchill enthusiastically supported this operation, long-advocated by the Americans, after some initial hesitation and despite his hopes for an Italian campaign. On June 6, 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Forces landed more than 150,000 British, Canadian, and American troops on the Normandy coast. The invasion, which was code-named “OVERLORD,” marked the opening of the final drive to defeat German forces in northwestern Europe. A number of deception measures, outlined by Churchill at the Teheran Conference, helped make D-Day a success. The most important of these was “FORTITUDE SOUTH,” the creation of a phantom group of armies that supposedly were to invade the European mainland after the actual Normandy landings.

These measures were greatly assisted by the use of highly secret ULTRA intelligence, generated by the British from deciphered radio communications. Anti-Semitic Propaganda Both the war against Nazi Germany and efforts to stop the Holocaust were hampered by anti-Semitism. Axis propaganda sought to portray Churchill, who was sympathetic to Zionist aims and had many Jewish friends, as part of a supposed Jewish conspiracy. Here, he is shown as an octopus fastening his tentacles on the globe. At the same time, Churchill was aware of the persecution of the Jewish people, and in this telegram to Roosevelt he signaled his clear support for their right to fight back through the creation of the Jewish Brigade Group. 1 of 2 Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt, August 23, 1944. Telegram. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K (213.1). © Crown copyright 1944. Archival Reference # CHAR 20/170/59 Bookmark this item: #213 Could More Have Been Done? Debate still rages among historians as to whether the Allies could have done more to stop or reduce the atrocities of the Holocaust.

By July 1944, it is clear that the Allied leaders knew of the existence of the Auschwitz death-camp complex. In this note to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Churchill supports a request made by the Jewish Agency for Palestine that the Royal Air Force should destroy the railway lines leading to the camp. The operation was never undertaken by British or American forces. Winston Churchill to Anthony Eden, July 7, 1944. Facsimile. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (213.2) Bookmark this item: #213_2 Churchill Outraged Churchill expressed his outrage as the scale of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews became apparent. It was, he said, “probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world.” Further, “Declarations should be made in public, so that everyone connected with it will be hunted down and put to death.” Winston Churchill to Anthony Eden, July 11, 1944. Facsimile. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K.

(213.3) Bookmark this item: #213_3 Patton, Churchill, and the Knutsford Incident Six weeks before D-Day, the irrepressible American General George Patton had been quoted in Knutsford, England, as having said that the British and American peoples were destined to rule the world together. Since the Soviets had apparently been left out of this equation, the remark made newspaper headlines. Patton's handwritten diary entry noted that General Eisenhower had “talked to the P.M. about the incident and Churchill told him that he could see nothing to it as Patton had simply told the truth.” Bookmark this item: #215 Churchill and D-Day Churchill worked energetically for the success of OVERLORD—the cross-Channel airborne and amphibious attack known as “D-Day”—albeit with some misgivings. Casualties from such a direct assault might be catastrophically high. Men and equipment would have to be withdrawn from Italy and the Mediterranean, where things looked promising, and they would be sitting idle for several months. Pre-invasion bombing might kill many French civilians.

This March 1944 photograph may reflect both Churchill's doubts and OVERLORD commander Eisenhower's suspicion that Churchill's heart was not really in it. Associated Press. A Serious Inspection , 1944. Copyprint. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (216) Bookmark this item: #216 D-Day and the “Bodyguard of Lies” The Second Front was finally launched on D-Day, June 6, 1944. The invasion's success was due in part to the deception plan that Churchill had outlined at Teheran. The Germans were convinced that the Normandy landings were only a feint and that the main assault was to come later from a phantom First United States Army Group (FUSAG) at the Pas des Calais. As this “HQ. FUSAG” map shows, documents with misleading headings were created. However, it shows the situation at D-Day's end fairly accurately, except that some Allied units are missing so that the Germans would think the assault was on a smaller scale. Twelfth Army Group. Situation - 2400 HRS 6 JUNE 1944 HQ.

FUSAG , 1944. Printed map. Geography and Map Division , Library of Congress (219) Bookmark this item: #219 Order of the Day General Eisenhower's “Order of the Day” for the D-Day landings expressed his confidence in all those taking part in the “Great Crusade” to destroy Nazi tyranny: “The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!” Dwight David Eisenhower. “Order of the Day,” June 6, 1944. Printed brochure. Carl Spaatz Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (219.1) Bookmark this item: #219_1 OMAHA Beach This photograph shows troops from the First Infantry Division wading ashore under heavy fire at the Normandy beach, code-named OMAHA. Here the first landings resembled Churchill's worst nightmares, as unexpectedly fierce German resistance resulted in the deaths of many American soldiers. The troops finally accomplished their mission, however, and casualties elsewhere on D-Day were not as high as had been feared. Robert Sargent. Taxis to Hell—and Back , 1944. Photographic print.

Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (219.2) Bookmark this item: #219_2 Landing Craft for D-Day Although this photograph shows only a small portion of the Normandy landing beaches, it clearly indicates the massive scale of the operation. Churchill was often frustrated by the scarcity of landing craft, such as those shown here. The overriding priority given to OVERLORD, together with the limited number of landing craft available, curtailed his options in planning for new amphibious operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. U.S. Maritime Commission. Bird's-eye view of landing craft, barrage balloons, and allied troops landing in Normandy, France on D-Day , 1944. Photograph. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (219.3). [Digital ID# cph 3c11201] Bookmark this item: #219_3 Churchill's Request to Accompany Invasion Force Churchill found it hard to stay away from important military operations and asked Admiral Bertram Ramsay to draw up plans that would allow him to accompany the D-Day invasion force.

The Admiral found himself in the difficult position of having to report this request to Eisenhower, who opposed it. In the end, it took the intervention of the King to stop Churchill from going, although he did visit the Normandy beachhead six days after the invasion. Admiral Bertram Ramsay to Winston Churchill, May 16, 1944. Page 2 . Typescript letter. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (219.4). © Crown copyright 1944. Archival Reference # CHAR 20/136/11 Bookmark this item: #219_4 ULTRA The Normandy landings and many other British and Allied operations were greatly facilitated by successful code-breaking efforts. For security reasons, information from decrypted German communications intercepts, which was given the code name ultra, was given only to a few high-ranking military leaders. This review of German Air Force (G.A.F) activity, made shortly after D-Day, contains such super-secret information. All persons to whom the review was sent were warned that they should burn their copies after reading them. Clearly not everyone obeyed the requirement. George McDonald to Carl Spaatz.

June 21, 1944. Typed report. Page 2 . Carl A. Spaatz Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (219.5) Bookmark this item: #219_5 Bayeux The famous Bayeux Tapestry, created in the eleventh century, recounted the successful Norman invasion of England in 1066. This parody appeared on the cover of The New Yorker in July 1944. It portrayed scenes from both the Normandy landings on D-Day and the capture of Bayeux, the first French city to be liberated, on the following day. Featured in the sketch are Churchill, Roosevelt, King George VI, Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, and a cowering Adolf Hitler. Cartoon showing D-Day invasion of France by British troops in a parody of the Bayeux Tapestry , 1944. Ink and watercolor drawing. Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (220). LC-USZ62-98021. Rea Irvin, © 1944, Shown Online Courtesy Virginia Irvin Trust. Bookmark this item: #220 W.

Averell Harriman to Franklin Roosevelt, October 11, 1944. Typed cable. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (222) Bookmark this item: #222 The Division of Germany At the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin tried to work out arrangements for the postwar world, especially in regard to Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the future of the United Nations. This hand-drawn map was intended for use in establishing occupation zones in Germany. Reluctant to make a hasty and final decision on this matter, Churchill said that the Big Three were “dealing with the fate of eighty million people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider.” Manuscript map, 1945. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (223) Bookmark this item: #223 Yalta and Democracy During a dinner held at the Yalta Conference, the topic of a casual discussion turned to leadership in democratic societies.

Churchill told Roosevelt and Stalin that “although he was constantly being 'beaten up' as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger.” Memorandum of conversation, Yalta Conference, February 4, 1945. Page 2 . W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division , Library of Congress (224) Bookmark this item: #224 Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin This photograph of the three Allied leaders, meeting for the last time at the Yalta Conference, clearly shows that President Roosevelt's health was declining. Crimean Conference , 1945. Copyprint. Encyclopedia Britannica Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (225). LC-USZ62-7449. [Digital ID# cph 3a10098] Bookmark this item: #225 Into Germany In March 1945 Churchill visited the American Ninth Army, which formed a part of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group.

Shown here are Churchill, Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke, and the Ninth Army's commander, General William H. Simpson. These men are inspecting “dragon's teeth” anti-tank defenses of the Siegfried Line (West Wall) inside the borders of Germany. Churchill on the Siegfried Line , 1945. Copyprint. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (229) Bookmark this item: #229 The Death of Franklin Roosevelt President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. Churchill's reaction was one of deep sadness: “I was overpowered by a sense of deep and irreparable loss.” He told the House of Commons that Roosevelt had died in “battle harness” with victory in sight: “What an enviable death was his.” From Russia, Clementine Churchill wrote Averell Harriman this condolence note, saying, “No one fought more valiantly than he to save the World.

It is cruel that he will not see the Victory which he did so much to achieve.” Bookmark this item: #230_1 Anglo-American Cooperation This telegram from Churchill to President Truman, sent on the day after Victory in Europe Day, eloquently captures the spirit of Anglo-American political and military cooperation that marked the Grand Alliance of 1941-1945. Winston Churchill to President Harry S Truman, May 9, 1945. Page 2 . Telegram. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (232). © Crown copyright 1945, Archival Reference # CHAR 20/218/56-57 Bookmark this item: #232 Victory Thanksgiving On May 13, 1945, Winston and Clementine Churchill attended a thanksgiving service at St. Paul's Cathedral in London. The war in Europe had just ended, but the conflict with a fiercely resisting Japan seemed likely to continue for some time to come. Associated Press. Churchills Leave Thanksgiving Service , 1945. Copyprint.

New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division , Library of Congress (234) Bookmark this item: #234 Conference At Potsdam The new U.S. President, Harry S Truman, is shown here with Churchill at the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) in Germany. At Potsdam the assembled world leaders agreed on certain measures to be imposed upon the defeated Germans. They also formulated an ultimatum to the Japanese, vowing to destroy their nation unless they surrendered. Other issues, involving the political fate of Eastern Europe, were not resolved. In the middle of the conference, however, the British electorate turned Churchill out of power. Bookmark this item: #237 Dropping the Pilot Given the extent of Churchill's prestige in Britain and abroad, the defeat of the Conservative Party in the 1945 elections, a defeat that turned him out of office, was somewhat unexpected. One cartoonist compared his dismissal to that of the legendary German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, whom Kaiser Wilhelm II had dismissed in 1890.

Imitating a famous drawing of Bismark by Sir John Tenniel entitled Dropping the Pilot, this cartoon of the same title depicts Churchill as a dismissed pilot. After Churchill's defeat in the 1945 British general elections, his wife Clementine told him, “It may well be a blessing in disguise.” Churchill replied, “At the moment it seems quite effectively disguised.” This photograph shows Clementine and her daughter Mary leaving the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street on July 27, the day after Churchill tendered his resignation from office to the King. 1 of 2 The Yalta Conference (1945) The Yalta Conference (1945) The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the Crimea Conference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference, was the wartime meeting from February 4 to 11, 1945 between the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The delegations were headed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, respectively.

Overview The key Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, were known as the "Big Three" because of the might of the nations they represented and their peaceful collaboration during World War II. These three leaders met together only twice during World War II, but when they did conference, their decisions changed the course of history. After the Tehran Conference, the three leaders promised to meet again, and this agreement came to pass at the Yalta Conference of February 1945. Although Stalin had expressed concern about Roosevelt's health during the Teheran conference, this concern did not translate into action. The Soviet dictator refused to travel further than the Black Sea Resort, Yalta, in the Crimean Riveria (then part of the Soviet Union, now part of Ukraine) for the next summit and, once again, Churchill and Roosevelt were both the ones taking long and tiring trips to attend the Yalta summit. Each of the three powers brought their own agenda to the Yalta Conference. The British wanted to maintain their empire, the Soviets wished to obtain more land and to strengthen conquests, and the Americans wanted to insure the Soviet's entry into the Pacific war and discuss postwar settlement.

Moreover, Roosevelt hoped to obtain a commitment from Stalin to participate in the United Nations. As the first topic on the Soviet's agenda for expansion, the subject of Poland immediately arose, and Stalin was quick to succintly state his case with the following words: "For the Russian people, the question of Poland is not only a question of honor but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Poland is a question of life and death for Russia." Accordingly, Stalin made it clear that some of his demands regarding Poland were not negotiable: the Russians were to gain territory from the eastern portion of Poland and Poland was to compensate for that by extending its Western borders, thereby forcing out millions of Germans. Reluctantly, Stalin promised free elections in Poland, notwithstanding the recently installed Communist puppet government. However, it soon became apparent that Stalin had no intentions of holding true to his promise of free elections. In fact, it was fifty years after the Yalta Conference that the Poles first had the opportunity to hold free elections. As mentioned earlier, at Yalta a principal aim of Roosevelt was to make sure that the Soviets would enter the Asian war, i.e., the war against the Japanese.

Unfortunately, however, Roosevelt should never have spent any time agonizing over Soviet involvement in the Pacific war because Stalin did not need convincing. The Soviets themselves were keen to assuage the intense feelings of humiliation that resulted from a long ago defeat by Japan and loss of privileges in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviets were keen on regaining lost territories and optimistic that they could obtain more lands. However, Roosevelt was oblivious to Stalin's objectives because of Stalin's excellent 'poker face,' and he readily met Stalin's price, leaving the Yalta Conference exuberant because Stalin had agreed to enter the Pacific war against Japan. Moreover, the Soviets had agreed to join the United Nations given the secret understanding of a voting formula with a veto power for permanent members in the Security Council, there by providing the Soviets with more control in world affairs and greatly weakening the United Nations. Overall, Roosevelt felt confident that Yalta had been successful. The Big Three had ratified previous agreements about the postwar division of Germany: there were to be four zones of occupation, one zone for each of the three dominant nations plus one zone for France.

Berlin itself, although within the Soviet zone, would also be divided into four sectors, and would eventually become a major symbol of the Cold War because of the division of the city due to the infamous Berlin Wall, which was constructed and manned by the Soviets. The Big Three had further decided that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries and that all civilians would repatriated. Democracies would be established, all territories would hold free elections, and order restored to Europe, as declared in the following official statement: "The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice." In the postwar setting, Russia would gain the southern half of the Sakhalin Islands and Kuriles, half of East Prussia, Konigsberg, Germany, and control of Finland. In addition, Roosevelt let it slip that the United States would not protest if the Soviet Union attempted to annex the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) or establish puppet governments, therefore leaving Stalin as pleased with the overall results as Roosevelt, and more rightly so.

The Yalta Conference is often regarded by numerous Central European nations as the "Western betrayal." This belief, held by countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and the Czech Republic, is rooted in the belief that the Allied powers, despite venerating democratic policies and signing numerous pacts and military agreements, allowed smaller countries to be controlled by and/or made Communist states of the Soviet Union. At the Yalta conference, the Big Three "attempted to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability," and many believe the decisions and concessions of Roosevelt and Churchill during the summit lead to the power struggle of the ensuing Cold War. The meeting The conference was held in Yalta, a resort town on the Crimean peninsula in the Soviet Union (now in Ukraine). The American delegation was housed in the Tsar's former palace, while President Roosevelt stayed at the Livadia Palace where the meetings took place. The British delegation was installed in Prince Vorontsov's castle of Alupka. Key members of the delegations were Edward Stettinius, Averell Harriman, Anthony Eden, Alexander Cadogan, and Vyacheslav Molotov. According to Anthony Beevor, all the rooms were bugged by the NKVD.

Stalin arrived by train on February 4. The meeting started with an official dinner on the evening of that day. Major points * There was agreement that the priority was the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. After the war, the country would be split into four occupied zones, with a quadripartite occupation of Berlin as well. * Stalin agreed to let France get the fourth occupation zone in Germany and Austria, carved out from the British and American zones. France would also be granted a seat in the Allied Control Council. * Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification. * Creation of an allied reparation council with its seat in Moscow. * The status of Poland was discussed but was complicated by the fact that Poland by this time was under the control of the red army. It was agreed to reorganize the Provisionary Polish Government that had been set up by the Red Army through the inclusion of other groups as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to be followed by democratic elections. (This effectively excluded the exile Polish government that had formed in London). * The Polish eastern border should basically follow the Curzon Line, and Poland should receive substantial territorial compensation in the west from Germany.

* Citizens of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia were to be handed over to their respective countries, regardless of their consent. * Roosevelt obtained a commitment by Stalin to participate in the United Nations once it was agreed that each of the five permanent members of the Security Council would have veto power. * Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empire of Japan within 90 days after the defeat of Germany. The Soviet Union would receive the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands after the defeat of Japan. Aftermath Yalta was the last great conference before the end of the war and the last trip of Roosevelt abroad. To observers he appeared already ill and exhausted. Arguably, his most important goal was to ensure the Soviet Union's participation in the United Nations, which he achieved at the price of granting veto power to each permanent member of the Security Council, a condition that significantly weakened the UN. Another of his objectives was to bring the Soviet Union into the fight against Japan, as the effectiveness of the atomic bomb had yet to be proven. The Red Army had already removed Nazi forces from most of Eastern Europe, so Stalin essentially got everything he wanted: a significant sphere of influence as a buffer zone.

In this process, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable and sacrificed for the sake of stability, which would mean that the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would continue to be members of the USSR. The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War | History Today The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War By Robin Edmonds - Hamish Hamilton, 1991 - 608 pp. - £22.50 Our idea of the wartime 'Big Three' may be derived from their photographs together at Teheran in 1943 and at Yalta in 1945; it is well to be reminded that these were the only occasions at which they met as a group. On the other hand, Churchill and Roosevelt met together on eleven occasions (including the Atlantic Conference before the US entered the war) and Churchill and Stalin on three occasions. Roosevelt and Stalin never met except on the margins of the two trilateral meetings. In so far as a triumvirate existed, it was a matter of communications through messages or intermediaries. Room for misunderstanding was always present.

How could this not be the case since their countries, their personal philosophies and national objectives were so different? What united them was the determination between June 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and the end of the European war (by which time Roosevelt was dead) that Hitler's Reich should suffer total defeat and Nazism be extirpated. Everything else was problematic and contingent. To tell the story of the war in terms of the actions of the Big Three presents a major technical challenge which Robin Edmonds, professional diplomat turned historian, has triumphantly surmounted. The task for a British writer is particularly difficult since Churchill devoted his time in opposition after his electoral defeat in 1945 to making sure that the war would be seen at least in Britain through his own eyes. In historiography as in war it pays 'to get in firstest with the mostest'. Roosevelt did not live to tell his own story and though most of his collaborators presented their's, none had an overall view, largely as a result of Roosevelt's highly idiosyncratic methods of doing business.

So the tale was left to the historians, some of whom saw Roosevelt as a Machiavellian conspirator against the hest interests and traditions of the United States, while others accepted rather uncritically the Rooseveltian view of the world which had many deplorable gaps. As for the Russians, their prime concern was the propagation of myths to enhance the infallibility of Stalin who survived in power during the crucial post-war years and to debar access to documents which might call into question the received version. Mr Edmonds' treatment of Stalin is thus the most novel aspect of the book since he has been able to make use of materials released by the Russians as a result of glasnost and of recent if incomplete Soviet historical revisionism. Mr Edmonds' comment on these sources are not the least important part of this scholarly work. Mr Edmonds has clearly found Stalin the most interesting of his three subjects and with the lapse of time to help him can do justice to the fact that it was Stalin who in the end got more of what he wanted than anyone else; it is only now that the full cost of his victories is becoming apparent.

In order to cope with his theme, Mr Edmonds has extended its time-span, at the beginning by dealing with the very different ways in which Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin came to be their countries' leaders in the war, and at the end by including the Potsdam Conference from which Roosevelt (through death) and Churchill (because of the ingratitude of his countrymen) were absent. To neither Truman nor Attlee could the adjective 'big' be applied, though Truman was to grow in stature in the face of subsequent challenges. What Mr Edmonds leaves out deliberately is an account of how the war itself actually came about – arguing not incorrectly that it would be hard to better Donald Cameron Watt's account in his How War Came. Otherwise the reader is carried along effortlessly from Churchill at Omdurman and Stalin at the seminary and Roosevelt at Harvard to their apotheosis at Teheran and Yalta. It could be argued that Mr Edmonds' narrative skills might more often have been supplemented by a closer analysis of particular episodes and problems whether in the military or diplomatic field. Where does one now take one's stand on the 'second front' or on the Greek campaign or on Churchill's espousal of Tito?

Was Crete lost so as to preserve the secrecy of 'Ultra'? Mr Edmonds does not deny that his interests extend beyond his narrative to the legacy of these years and in particular to what the 'Big Three' failed to do. He sees two main weaknesses which contribute to the assessment of their achievements and in the British and American con- text of that of their successors. The most important for him is the failure to appreciate the change in the conditions of world politics brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. The second was the failure to come to a proper solution of the problems of Central Europe, a solution which is only now in the ~process of negotiation. On that issue, it is harder to fault the Western powers, since given the ideological preconceptions that Stalin imbibed from Lenin and that still haunt the Soviet Union today, grounds for agreement hardly existed. As always the relationships of power settled what happened, and Churchill's wooing of both Roosevelt and Stalin became less efficacious as Britain's relative power decline. It seems to me that there is one other legacy of the war year which still affects international relations today and to our detriment.

I think that Mr Edmonds underplays Roosevelt's essential weakness of perception and the gaps in his knowledge, even more significant than Churchill's blindness over the Japanese threat. Roosevelt made one great decision for which we must be eternally thankful, to give and retain the priority of defeating Germany. On the other hand, his anti-colonialist prejudice made him too easy a prey to the vain belief that he and Stalin were always on the same wavelength with the imperialist British as a disturbing factor. In the event that did not matter. What did matter was Roosevelt's consistent bias not merely against de Gaulle and in favour of Vichy, but against France itself. The extraordinary idea that France could be treated after its liberation as a conquered country subject to external control is something to which Mr Edmonds devotes little attention. But does not the persistent pull of France against an Atlantic solution to the problems of European security derive precisely from de Gaulle's experience at Roosevelt's hands? Churchill and Roosevelt were obviously much closer to each other personally than Churchill and Stalin. Yet Churchill and Stalin had this in common.

For both of them war and diplomacy went hand in hand; in Roosevelt's mind as in that of other American presidents past and future, war was something outside the daily run, to be fought, won and left behind. Mr Edmonds is better placed than anyone to examine this paradox; perhaps one day he will. Meanwhile what a treat he has given us in this eloquent and absorbing book. MAX BELOFF is the author of Dream of Commonwealth 1921-42 Volume 2 of Imperial Sunset (Macmillan, 1989). World War II: Yalta Conference World War II: Yalta Conference World War II: Yalta Conference Churchill, Roosevelt, & Stalin at the Yalta Conference, February 1945. Photograph Source: Public Domain Updated August 11, 2015. Yalta Conference Overview: In early 1945, with World War II in Europe drawing to a close, Franklin Roosevelt (United States), Winston Churchill ( Great Britain ), and Joseph Stalin (USSR) agreed to meet to discuss war strategy and issues that would affect the postwar world.

Dubbed the "Big Three," the Allied leaders had met previously in November 1943, at the Tehran Conference . Seeking a neutral site for the meeting, Roosevelt suggested a gathering somewhere on the Mediterranean. While Churchill was in favor, Stalin refused citing that his doctors prohibited him from making any long trips. In lieu of the Mediterranean, Stalin proposed the Black Sea resort of Yalta. Eager to meet face to face, Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's request. As the leaders traveled to Yalta, Stalin was in the strongest position as Soviet troops were a mere forty miles from Berlin. This was reinforced by the "home court" advantage of hosting the meeting in the USSR. Further weakening the western Allies' position was Roosevelt's failing health and Britain's increasingly junior position relative to the US and USSR. With the arrival of all three delegations, the conference opened on February 4, 1945. Each leader came to Yalta with an agenda. Roosevelt desired Soviet military support against Japan following the defeat of Germany and Soviet participation in the United Nations , while Churchill was focused on securing free elections for Soviet-liberated countries in Eastern Europe.

Counter to Churchill's desire, Stalin sought to build a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to protect against future threats. In addition to these long-term issues, the three powers also needed to develop a plan for governing postwar Germany. Shortly after the meeting opened, Stalin took a firm stance on the issue of Poland, citing that twice in the previous thirty years it had been used as an invasion corridor by the Germans. Furthermore, he stated that the Soviet Union would not return the land annexed from Poland in 1939, and that the nation could be compensated with land taken from Germany. While these terms were non-negotiable, he was willing to agree to free elections in Poland. While the latter pleased Churchill, it soon became clear that Stalin had no intention of honoring this promise. In regard to Germany, it was decided that the defeated nation would be divided into three zones of occupation, one for each of the Allies, with a similar plan for the city of Berlin. While Roosevelt and Churchill advocated for a fourth zone for the French, Stalin would only acquiesce if the territory was taken from the American and British zones.

After reasserting that only unconditional surrender would be acceptable the Big Three agreed that Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification, as well as that some war reparations would be in the form of forced labor. Pressing on the issue of Japan, Roosevelt secured a promise from Stalin to enter the conflict ninety days after the defeat of Germany. In return for Soviet military support, Stalin demanded and received American diplomatic recognition of Mongolian independence from Nationalist China. Caving on this point, Roosevelt hoped to deal with the Soviets through the United Nations, which Stalin did agree to join after voting procedures in the Security Council were defined. Returning to European affairs, it was jointly agreed that the original, prewar governments would be returned to liberated countries. Exceptions were made in the cases of France, whose government had become collaborationist, and Romania and Bulgaria where the Soviets had effectively dismantled the governmental systems. Further supporting this was a statement that all displaced civilians would be returned to their countries of origin. Ending on February 11, the three leaders departed Yalta in a celebratory mood. This initial view of the conference was shared by the people in each nation, but ultimately proved short-lived.

With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, relations between the Soviets and the West became increasingly tense. As Stalin reneged on promises concerning Eastern Europe, perception of Yalta changed and Roosevelt was blamed for effectively ceding Eastern Europe to the Soviets. While his poor health may have affected his judgment, Roosevelt was able to secure some concessions from Stalin during the meeting. Despite this, many came to view the meeting as a sellout that greatly encouraged Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia. The leaders of the Big Three would meet again that July for the Potsdam Conference . During the meeting, Stalin was effectively able to have the decisions of Yalta ratified as he was able to take advantage of new US President Harry S. Truman and a change of power in Britain that saw Churchill replaced partway through the conference by Clement Attlee. Selected Sources 'Big Three' meet at Yalta > Eastern Front > Key Moments > WW2History.com 'Big Three' meet at Yalta Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met together for the last time at Yalta On 3 February 1945, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt arrived at Yalta, a resort on the southern coast of the Crimea on the Black Sea.

They were there to meet with Stalin to discuss the final attack on the Germans and Japanese and the future of the post-war world. They were meeting in the Crimea – a place Churchill described as the ‘Riviera of Hades’ – rather than anywhere else, for one simple reason; Stalin controlled where they met. It had been Stalin who had said that he would only meet the British and American leaders in Tehran back in November 1943, and it had been Stalin who had insisted this meeting would be on Soviet territory in the Crimea. It was a small – but significant – sign of Stalin’s power. Much has been written about Roosevelt’s physical appearance at the Yalta conference. Hugh Lunghi, who was there as part of the British mission, was shocked to see the American President: ‘His face was waxen to a sort of yellow, waxen and very drawn, very thin, and a lot of the time he was sort of sitting there with his mouth open sort of staring ahead. So that was quite a shock.’ Roosevelt would be dead less than four months after Yalta, and he was clearly a sick man already.

But what is certain is that, despite his obvious ill-health, Roosevelt’s aims and strategies for the conference were in perfect sync with his previously expressed views. His illness did not prevent his politics from being consistent. The problem for the future of the world – at least in the eyes of Roosevelt’s critics – was that the American President was not overly concerned with the fate of Eastern Europe, with the exception of the fate of post-war Germany. Roosevelt’s focus was primarily on one practical measure – he wanted to get the Soviet Union to commit to fighting the Japanese after Germany had been defeated – and one ‘visionary’ measure – he wanted to get the Soviet Union to play an active part in the founding of the United Nations. Churchill, on the other hand, arrived at Yalta much more focused on European issues – principally the seemingly never-to-be-resolved question of the future of Poland. The trouble he faced was that he had talked with near brutal frankness to Stalin, back in October on his visit to Moscow, about the relative ‘percentages’ of ‘influence’ that the Soviet Union and Britain/America should have over a number of Eastern European countries. This – to Churchill – had already resulted in the Communist control of Greece being prevented.

But now, having seemingly ‘given away’ influence in other countries like Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, how could he have a non-brutal, ‘honourable’ conversation about Poland – a country that had deliberately been excluded by Churchill from the ‘percentages’ deal? As for Stalin, he was clearly looking to consolidate Soviet influence over the territory of Eastern Europe – territory that his troops had shed blood to gain. ‘Stalin behaves as if the only interests that are worth considering in the march across Europe are Soviet interests,’ says Professor Robert Service, talking of Stalin’s actions at Yalta, ‘and that the peoples of Eastern Europe and East Central Europe are lucky to be liberated and they should accept their liberation by the Red Army with grateful hands and allow the Red Army to do virtually as it wanted. So the future history of Eastern Europe is already there in 1944 and in 1945 – that there was going to be one superior state that’s going to have the right to act as it wants in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War.

And it has won that right by all of the sacrifices of Soviet people in the so-called Great Patriotic War… We don’t yet know quite what was in Stalin’s mind, and we’ll never know because he didn’t keep a diary, but we can look at what he did in 1945 or earlier in 1944. He plans for an Eastern Europe that is subject to Soviet influence. That’s not the same as an Eastern Europe that’s fully communised, but it does mean that communist political influence is going to be very strong in those countries.’ The most divisive issue at the conference remained Poland. Though the boundaries of the new Poland had effectively been decided – like so much else – at the Tehran conference back in November 1943, there remained questions of detail, particularly about how the newly created Poland should be governed. Stalin had established his own puppet government of Poland – know as the ‘Lublin Poles’ – whilst the British and the Americans still supported the Polish government-in-exile based in London.

Ultimately, at Yalta, both Churchill and Roosevelt decided to accept Stalin’s assurance that the Soviets would conduct free and democratic elections in Poland, and that a few of the politicians from the Polish government-in-exile would be absorbed into the new ruling group of Poland. It was scarcely a ringing declaration from the West that guaranteed the freedom and independence of the new Poland. In fact, as Admiral William Leahy told Roosevelt, ‘this [the agreement on Poland] is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without even technically breaking it.’ Roosevelt simply replied, ‘I know Bill, but it is the best I can do for Poland at this time.’i But that was only half true, because Roosevelt had decided to focus on other – to him more important – issues at Yalta. And on both of Roosevelt’s key concerns – Japan and the UN – Stalin seemed to be amenable, agreeing to come into the war against the Japanese three months after the end of the war in Europe (in part in exchange for some Japanese territory) and to co-operate with the foundation of the United Nations.

As for the issue of what territory in Eastern Europe fell under the influence of the Soviet Union, that was not high on FDR’s agenda. ‘Roosevelt was pressured by Eleanor Roosevelt about the Baltics,’ says Professor Robert Dallek. ‘He was pressured by the Poles about what he was doing for Poland. And behind the scenes he’s contemptuous of this. He says at one point: ‘Do you expect me to go to war with Stalin over the Baltics?’ Sure, democracy, freedom, the rhetoric tumbles off their lips; the declaration of liberty for the East, a declaration of freedom for the liberated countries from Nazi control in Eastern Europe; it’s rhetoric.’ Given that Stalin was to break his promises on Poland after Yalta, and given that within months after Yalta the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West was to deteriorate so badly, it’s easy to believe that Churchill and Roosevelt were either conned by Stalin or just shut their eyes to the true nature of his regime.

But as Professor David Reynolds says, the truth is not that simple: ‘Every time you have a conference with the Russians all through the war the British and the Americans have this sense that it’s better than the last one… So there’s this feeling that they’re difficult, nasty people and all the rest of it, but we’re making progress. Okay, they treat some of their minorities badly and all the rest of it, but you sort of push that aside. And then the other thing I think is that these leaders, Churchill and Roosevelt, are saying to themselves at the back of their mind: what alternative do we have? If we say the Bear hasn’t changed its spots, if you’ll let me mix the metaphor, the Russian Bear is essentially the same, as brutal and as bloody as ever. What prospect does that open up for Europe? Better to go with our hopes than surrender to our fears, because by the end of 1943 it’s clear that the Soviet Union and the Red Army are going to be a force in Eastern Europe, and really there’s nothing you can do in London or Washington to stop that. The decisions, in a sense, have already been made by default through delaying the second front [i.e.

the invasion of France by the Western Allies], if that was ever a real alternative. So all that you can try and do is ameliorate the situation in Eastern Europe. Indeed, that’s what Roosevelt says before he goes to Yalta to the senators. He says, look, what we’re going to try and do is ameliorate the situation in Poland as we can’t change it. So there is a sort of fact of life there that the Soviet Union is going to be a force to be reckoned with, and that’s part of why they’re trying to make the best they can of it. Roosevelt says during the Tehran conference when they have a conversation about Poland, ‘Wake me up when we get to Germany, I don’t care two hoots about Poland.’ And what he’s expressing there, and it’s the same for people like Cordell Hull, his Secretary of State, is that what matters is the big picture for the post-war world. It’s setting up a framework of great power co-operation within the general institutional structure of the United Nations.

And if you can do that, particularly if you can get the Soviet Union in it, that’s what really matters compared to the suspicion and the alienation of the inter-war years.’ But, as far as Sir Max Hastings is concerned there was another reality operating at Yalta. ‘Churchill was also naïve,’ he says. ‘Churchill worked himself up into an almost emotional fever in his distress about the sacrifice of Poland and the fact that Polish freedom, which Britain had gone into the Second World War for, was to be sacrificed to the Russians. But Churchill refused to recognise the logic of his own position, that if the Western Allies had been serious about wanting to see that Eastern Europe was free, they would have had to have got into the war on a very big scale and they would have had to have had D-Day in 1943. If they then fought like tigers and accepted casualties many times the scale of those that they did, then they might have been able to save Eastern Europe and Poland from the Russians, though even then it’s pretty doubtful.

But what would have happened if Roosevelt and Churchill had gone to their own electorates and said: ‘We are actually going to launch a major campaign on the continent which is going to cost hundreds of thousands of extra lives, not in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler, but in order to make sure that all these poor Polish and Romanian and Czech and Hungarian peoples don’t fall prey to the wicked Russians.’ No British or American government could have survived that because the other thing one has to remember is the colossal popular enthusiasm for Russia, especially in Britain. British people are saying that they thought Russia was absolutely wonderful. Reading people’s diaries from that period it is absolutely extraordinary, the euphoric expressions of enthusiasm for Uncle Joe Stalin and what he was doing.’ So was Yalta – particularly the failure to get Stalin to agree an enforceable political process that would lead to a democratic Poland – a ‘betrayal’ of the democratic ideals that Britain and America had enshrined in the Atlantic Charter in 1941? Indeed, was it betrayal of the very ideals that underpinned the decision to send so many soldiers of the Western Allies into battle in the first place?

‘It’s a betrayal of the ideals,’ says Andrew Roberts, ‘because we went to war for the integrity of Poland and the independence of Poland. In fact what we wanted in April 1939 was a trip wire for Hitler, something that triggered a war. It could have been Poland, it could have been anywhere else frankly, the key thing was to get us into a war with Germany before Hitler took anymore of Europe. One could argue forever about whether or not it would have been better to have done it earlier at Munich but certainly by the time Poland was invaded there was no alternative.’ ‘But what we didn’t ever promise to the Poles was that we were going to be able to land an army on the other side of Europe. We didn’t ever promise them that we were going to attack Germany from the west, and we were in no position to do so either. So in that sense it was a betrayal of the ideals, but I’m not sure if it was really a betrayal of the country itself because there was simply nothing that could be done short of using a nuclear bomb, or threatening to, which was obviously impossible against our great and glorious comrade that had lost 20 million people fighting the Nazis.

The key thing at Yalta was to try to get Stalin to stump up with the promise to go to war with Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe and also to try and get the Soviet Union into the United Nations organisation that was going to be set up after the war as well. After that you came up with free elections in Eastern Europe and so it wasn’t even the prime desiderata of the British and Americans. I think as well as wishful thinking there was a sense that the kinder and nicer you were to Stalin the more likely it would be that he was going to come into a world organisation that was inclusive... This sounds ridiculous coming from somebody who had, after all, denounced appeasements, which were precisely the same thing effectively only a decade earlier, but I think Churchill was an appeaser to the USSR up to and including Yalta.’ When Churchill returned from Yalta he told ministers that ‘Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don’t think I’m wrong about Stalin.’ii But, on the contrary, the next few months would demonstrate to Churchill that he had made just the same error as ‘poor’ Chamberlain had. Stalin had his own agenda for Eastern Europe.

And it most certainly did not include the formation of a free and democratic Poland. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i Quoted in James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, Harvest Books, 2002, p. 572 ii Quoted in the entry for 23rd February 1945 in Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40, 1945-60, Jonathan Cape, 1987, p. 836 RELATED CONTENT

Question: Where did Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin meet in 1945 to plan the final defeat of Germany?
Answer: Yalta