Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1937–1945 The Potsdam Conference, 1945 The Big Three—Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (replaced on July 26 by Prime Minister Clement Attlee), and U.S. President Harry Truman—met in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. After the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Stalin, Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to meet following the surrender of Germany to determine the postwar borders in Europe. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, and the Allied leaders agreed to meet over the summer at Potsdam to continue the discussions that had begun at Yalta. Although the Allies remained committed to fighting a joint war in the Pacific, the lack of a common enemy in Europe led to difficulties reaching consensus concerning postwar reconstruction on the European continent.

Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin and President Harry Truman The major issue at Potsdam was the question of how to handle Germany. At Yalta, the Soviets had pressed for heavy postwar reparations from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. While Roosevelt had acceded to such demands, Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, were determined to mitigate the treatment of Germany by allowing the occupying nations to exact reparations only from their own zone of occupation. Truman and Byrnes encouraged this position because they wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation created by the Treaty of Versailles, which had exacted high reparations payments from Germany following World War One. Many experts agreed that the harsh reparations imposed by the Versailles Treaty had handicapped the German economy and fueled the rise of the Nazis. Despite numerous disagreements, the Allied leaders did manage to conclude some agreements at Potsdam. For example, the negotiators confirmed the status of a demilitarized and disarmed Germany under four zones of Allied occupation.

According to the Protocol of the Conference, there was to be “a complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany”; all aspects of German industry that could be utilized for military purposes were to be dismantled; all German military and paramilitary forces were to be eliminated; and the production of all military hardware in Germany was forbidden. Furthermore, German society was to be remade along democratic lines by repeal of all discriminatory laws from the Nazi era and by the arrest and trial of those Germans deemed to be “war criminals.” The German educational and judicial systems were to be purged of any authoritarian influences, and democratic political parties would be encouraged to participate in the administration of Germany at the local and state level. The reconstitution of a national German Government was, however, postponed indefinitely, and the Allied Control Commission (which was comprised of four occupying powers, the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) would run the country during the interregnum. One of the most controversial matters addressed at the Potsdam Conference dealt with the revision of the German-Soviet-Polish borders and the expulsion of several million Germans from the disputed territories.

In exchange for the territory it lost to the Soviet Union following the readjustment of the Soviet-Polish border, Poland received a large swath of German territory and began to deport the German residents of the territories in question, as did other nations that were host to large German minority populations. The negotiators at Potsdam were well-aware of the situation, and even though the British and Americans feared that a mass exodus of Germans into the western occupation zones would destabilize them, they took no action other than to declare that “any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner” and to request that the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians temporarily suspend additional deportations. In addition to settling matters related to Germany and Poland, the Potsdam negotiators approved the formation of a Council of Foreign Ministers that would act on behalf of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China to draft peace treaties with Germany’s former allies. Conference participants also agreed to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which gave Turkey sole control over the Turkish Straits.

Furthermore, the United States, Great Britain, and China released the “Potsdam Declaration,” which threatened Japan with “prompt and utter destruction” if it did not immediately surrender (the Soviet Union did not sign the declaration because it had yet to declare war on Japan). The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman’s July 24, 1945 conversation with Stalin, during which time the President informed the Soviet leader that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945. Historians have often interpreted Truman’s somewhat firm stance during negotiations to the U.S. negotiating team’s belief that U.S. nuclear capability would enhance its bargaining power. Stalin, however, was already well-informed about the U.S. nuclear program thanks to the Soviet intelligence network; so he also held firm in his positions. This situation made negotiations challenging. The leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, who, despite their differences, had remained allies throughout the war, never met again collectively to discuss cooperation in postwar reconstruction.

Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian Milestones: 1937–1945 The Yalta Conference, 1945 The Yalta Conference took place in a Russian resort town in the Crimea from February 4–11, 1945, during World War Two. At Yalta, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin made important decisions regarding the future progress of the war and the postwar world. World Leaders at the Yalta Conference The Allied leaders came to Yalta knowing that an Allied victory in Europe was practically inevitable but less convinced that the Pacific war was nearing an end. Recognizing that a victory over Japan might require a protracted fight, the United States and Great Britain saw a major strategic advantage to Soviet participation in the Pacific theater. At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed with Stalin the conditions under which the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan and all three agreed that, in exchange for potentially crucial Soviet participation in the Pacific theater, the Soviets would be granted a sphere of influence in Manchuria following Japan’s surrender.

This included the southern portion of Sakhalin, a lease at Port Arthur (now Lüshunkou), a share in the operation of the Manchurian railroads, and the Kurile Islands. This agreement was the major concrete accomplishment of the Yalta Conference. The Allied leaders also discussed the future of Germany, Eastern Europe and the United Nations. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed not only to include France in the postwar governing of Germany, but also that Germany should assume some, but not all, responsibility for reparations following the war. The Americans and the British generally agreed that future governments of the Eastern European nations bordering the Soviet Union should be “friendly” to the Soviet regime while the Soviets pledged to allow free elections in all territories liberated from Nazi Germany. Negotiators also released a declaration on Poland, providing for the inclusion of Communists in the postwar national government. In discussions regarding the future of the United Nations, all parties agreed to an American plan concerning voting procedures in the Security Council, which had been expanded to five permanent members following the inclusion of France. Each of these permanent members was to hold a veto on decisions before the Security Council. Initial reaction to the Yalta agreements was celebratory.

Roosevelt and many other Americans viewed it as proof that the spirit of U.S.-Soviet wartime cooperation would carry over into the postwar period. This sentiment, however, was short lived. With the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States. By the end of April, the new administration clashed with the Soviets over their influence in Eastern Europe, and over the United Nations. Alarmed at the perceived lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviets, many Americans began to criticize Roosevelt’s handling of the Yalta negotiations. To this day, many of Roosevelt’s most vehement detractors accuse him of “handing over” Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia to the Soviet Union at Yalta despite the fact that the Soviets did make many substantial concessions. Yalta Conference - World War II - HISTORY.com Google The Yalta Conference was a meeting of British prime minister Winston Churchill, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin , and President Franklin D. Roosevelt early in February 1945 as World War II was winding down.

The leaders agreed to require Germany’s unconditional surrender and to set up in the conquered nation four zones of occupation to be run by their three countries and France. They scheduled another meeting for April in San Francisco to create the United Nations. Stalin also agreed to permit free elections in Eastern Europe and to enter the Asian war against Japan. In turn, he was promised the return of lands lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. At the time, most of these agreements were kept secret. Yalta became controversial after Soviet-American wartime cooperation degenerated into the cold war. Stalin broke his promise of free elections in Eastern Europe and installed governments dominated by the Soviet Union. Then American critics charged that Roosevelt, who died two months after the conference, had “sold out” to the Soviets at Yalta. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, Editors. Copyright © 1991 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved.

Tags World War II: Yalta Conference World War II: Yalta Conference World War II: Yalta Conference Churchill, Roosevelt, & Stalin at the Yalta Conference, February 1945. Photograph Source: Public Domain Updated August 11, 2015. Yalta Conference Overview: In early 1945, with World War II in Europe drawing to a close, Franklin Roosevelt (United States), Winston Churchill ( Great Britain ), and Joseph Stalin (USSR) agreed to meet to discuss war strategy and issues that would affect the postwar world. Dubbed the "Big Three," the Allied leaders had met previously in November 1943, at the Tehran Conference . Seeking a neutral site for the meeting, Roosevelt suggested a gathering somewhere on the Mediterranean. While Churchill was in favor, Stalin refused citing that his doctors prohibited him from making any long trips. In lieu of the Mediterranean, Stalin proposed the Black Sea resort of Yalta. Eager to meet face to face, Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's request. As the leaders traveled to Yalta, Stalin was in the strongest position as Soviet troops were a mere forty miles from Berlin.

This was reinforced by the "home court" advantage of hosting the meeting in the USSR. Further weakening the western Allies' position was Roosevelt's failing health and Britain's increasingly junior position relative to the US and USSR. With the arrival of all three delegations, the conference opened on February 4, 1945. Each leader came to Yalta with an agenda. Roosevelt desired Soviet military support against Japan following the defeat of Germany and Soviet participation in the United Nations , while Churchill was focused on securing free elections for Soviet-liberated countries in Eastern Europe. Counter to Churchill's desire, Stalin sought to build a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to protect against future threats. In addition to these long-term issues, the three powers also needed to develop a plan for governing postwar Germany. Shortly after the meeting opened, Stalin took a firm stance on the issue of Poland, citing that twice in the previous thirty years it had been used as an invasion corridor by the Germans. Furthermore, he stated that the Soviet Union would not return the land annexed from Poland in 1939, and that the nation could be compensated with land taken from Germany.

While these terms were non-negotiable, he was willing to agree to free elections in Poland. While the latter pleased Churchill, it soon became clear that Stalin had no intention of honoring this promise. In regard to Germany, it was decided that the defeated nation would be divided into three zones of occupation, one for each of the Allies, with a similar plan for the city of Berlin. While Roosevelt and Churchill advocated for a fourth zone for the French, Stalin would only acquiesce if the territory was taken from the American and British zones. After reasserting that only unconditional surrender would be acceptable the Big Three agreed that Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification, as well as that some war reparations would be in the form of forced labor. Pressing on the issue of Japan, Roosevelt secured a promise from Stalin to enter the conflict ninety days after the defeat of Germany. In return for Soviet military support, Stalin demanded and received American diplomatic recognition of Mongolian independence from Nationalist China. Caving on this point, Roosevelt hoped to deal with the Soviets through the United Nations, which Stalin did agree to join after voting procedures in the Security Council were defined.

Returning to European affairs, it was jointly agreed that the original, prewar governments would be returned to liberated countries. Exceptions were made in the cases of France, whose government had become collaborationist, and Romania and Bulgaria where the Soviets had effectively dismantled the governmental systems. Further supporting this was a statement that all displaced civilians would be returned to their countries of origin. Ending on February 11, the three leaders departed Yalta in a celebratory mood. This initial view of the conference was shared by the people in each nation, but ultimately proved short-lived. With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, relations between the Soviets and the West became increasingly tense. As Stalin reneged on promises concerning Eastern Europe, perception of Yalta changed and Roosevelt was blamed for effectively ceding Eastern Europe to the Soviets. While his poor health may have affected his judgment, Roosevelt was able to secure some concessions from Stalin during the meeting. Despite this, many came to view the meeting as a sellout that greatly encouraged Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia. The leaders of the Big Three would meet again that July for the Potsdam Conference .

During the meeting, Stalin was effectively able to have the decisions of Yalta ratified as he was able to take advantage of new US President Harry S. Truman and a change of power in Britain that saw Churchill replaced partway through the conference by Clement Attlee. Selected Sources Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War - Feb 04, 1945 - HISTORY.com Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War Share this: Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War Author Yalta Conference foreshadows the Cold War URL Publisher A+E Networks President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin meet to discuss the Allied war effort against Germany and Japan and to try and settle some nagging diplomatic issues. While a number of important agreements were reached at the conference, tensions over European issues—particularly the fate of Poland—foreshadowed the crumbling of the Grand Alliance that had developed between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union during World War II and hinted at the Cold War to come. Meeting in the city of Yalta in the Russian Crimean from February 4 to 11, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin each arrived with their own agendas for the conference.

For Stalin, postwar economic assistance for Russia, and U.S. and British recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe were the main objectives. Churchill had the protection of the British Empire foremost in his mind, but also wanted to clarify the postwar status of Germany. Roosevelt’s goals included consensus on establishment of the United Nations and gaining Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan once Hitler had been defeated. None of them left Yalta completely satisfied. There was no definite determination of financial aid for Russia. Many issues pertaining to Germany were deferred for further discussion. As for the United Nations, Stalin wanted all 16 Soviet republics represented in the General Assembly, but settled for three (the Soviet Union as a whole, Belorussia, and the Ukraine). However, the Soviets did agree to join in the war against Japan 90 days after Hitler’s Germany was defeated. It was over the issue of the postwar status of Poland, however, that the animosity and mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union that would characterize the Cold War were most readily apparent.

Soviet troops were already in control of Poland, a procommunist provisional government had already been established, and Stalin was adamant that Russia’s interests in that nation be recognized. The United States and Great Britain believed that the London-based noncommunist Polish government-in-exile was most representative of the Polish people. The final agreement merely declared that a “more broadly based” government should be established in Poland. Free elections to determine Poland’s future were called for sometime in the future. Many U.S. officials were disgusted with the agreement, which they believed condemned Poland to a communist future. Roosevelt, however, felt that he could do no more at the moment, since the Soviet army was occupying Poland. As the Cold War became a reality in the years that followed the Yalta Conference, many critics of Roosevelt’s foreign policy accused him of “selling out” at the meeting and naively letting Stalin have his way. It seems doubtful, however, that Roosevelt had much choice. He was able to secure Russian participation in the war against Japan (Russia declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945), established the basic principles of the United Nations, and did as much as possible to settle the Poland issue.

With World War II still raging, his primary interest was in maintaining the Grand Alliance. He believed that troublesome political issues could be postponed and solved after the war. Unfortunately, Roosevelt never got that chance—almost exactly two months after the end of the conference, Roosevelt suffered a stroke and died. Related Videos Stefan|Roosevelt & Stalin (2) The Tehran Summit Conference November 28-December 1, 1943 The first Big Three wartime Summit in Tehran was, arguably, the most significant meeting of the entire war. It marks the moment when the decision to invade western France in the spring of 1944 finally became irreversible. This decision was climaxed at the November 30 plenary when FDR pledged to name shortly the Commander-in-Chief for the "Overlord" operation. (In the event, this officer would be General Dwight D. Eisenhower). Other parts of the Tehran discussions, both formal and informal, were hardly less important, particularly those concerning the vexing problems of Poland.

Churchill suggested to Stalin that Poland might move westwards after the war, and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden explicitly linked this movement to territory that Poland would lose in the east; i.e., the territory east of the Curzon line, which would go to the USSR. FDR, in a private conversation with Stalin on December 1, indicated his relative lack of concern about the Polish problem. 7 Even before Tehran, during a conversation on October 2, 1943, between the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico and Joseph E. Davies, the controversial former American Ambassador to Moscow, FDR had sent a signal to Stalin that the United States would eventually accept the Curzon line as the frontier between the USSR and postwar Poland. Churchill apparently was not informed by FDR about this conversation. 8 It is difficult to resist the conclusion that after Tehran, Stalin had good reason to believe that the Western allies were prepared to go along with his desire -- made abundantly clear to Foreign Secretary Eden during their discussions in Moscow in December 1941 -- to reestablish the Soviet frontiers of pre-invasion 1941 in Europe.

So far as Poland was concerned, this position was certainly made easier for Churchill and Eden to accept because the boundary demanded by Stalin was reasonably close to the Polish-Soviet frontier associated with the name of Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary in 1920. FDR understandably did not wish to entangle the United States in the quarrels and ethnic disputes of Eastern Europe. Both FDR and Churchill, however, confronted domestic political factors which imposed definite restraints on their public postures. Hitler's invasion of Poland had, after all, precipitated the British declaration of war on Germany. Moreover, substantial Polish forces were fighting and continued to fight valiantly on the British side throughout World War II. For FDR, there was the matter of the Polish-American vote. During the last of his private meetings with Stalin at Tehran, FDR volunteered to the Soviet dictator that he would like to see the eastern frontier of Poland moved further west (i.e., to at least the vicinity of the Curzon line) and the western frontier moved to the Oder River. However, reasons of domestic politics -- the six to seven million Polish-American voters -- would, during an election year, prevent him from saying anything in public on this issue.

Finally, at the subsequent tripartite meeting, FDR in effect confirmed the Churchill-Eden suggestion of the Curzon line as the post-war frontier between Poland and the USSR. In addition, he proposed the dismemberment of Germany into five self-governing parts, plus two additional crucial areas. The first of these latter areas would be the Kiel Canal and the city of Hamburg, and the second, the Ruhr and the Saar, which would be placed under international control. Churchill suggested detaching Prussia from Germany and moving southern Germany into a Danubian Confederation. Stalin predictably preferred FDR's suggestion. The Big Three finally decided to hand the problem of Polish boundaries over to the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London, which had been established during the preparatory foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow in October of 1943. (The members of the new EAC were the UK Foreign Secretary and the US and USSR Ambassadors in London.) 9 Apart from the Polish question, it is worth noting that at Tehran, Stalin reiterated to the Western leaders the pledge he had earlier given to Secretary of State Hull in Moscow about Soviet entry into the Pacific war against Japan.

Specifically, Stalin asserted at Tehran that once Germany had capitulated, the Soviet Union would be able to reinforce its military in Siberia, after which there would be "a common front" against Japan. 10 Subsequently, as noted below, FDR and Stalin were to negotiate at Yalta the specific terms concerning the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. Additionally, there were discussions about the partition of Nazi Germany and the organization of the post-war world. Both of these issues would be on the agenda at Yalta. In his private conversations with Stalin, FDR made clear his opposition to colonialism and, in particular, to continued French rule in Indochina. It was FDR's belief that "trusteeship" there and elsewhere would meet the problem of colonialism which was bound to arise after the end of the war. Roosevelt did not live long enough, however, to implement his views about colonialism in the immediate post-war period. Thus we shall never know if events in French Indochina might have taken a different turn than they, in fact, did. Apart from developments in French Indochina if FDR had lived, we shall also probably never know if FDR's comments to U.S.

Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins after the Tehran Conference are entirely valid. As recorded by Perkins in her book published in November 1946, Roosevelt told her that in order to make "personal headway" with Stalin, he "couldn't stay in Tehran forever." At a plenary meeting, he had teased "Churchill about his Britishness, about John Bull, about his cigars, about his habits." FDR observed that "then . . . the ice was broken" and he and Stalin "talked like men and brothers.'' 11 Career U.S. diplomat Charles E. Bohlen, who was at Tehran, has observed that FDR "sometimes liked to embroider the picture,'' 12 and FDR may well have done so when talking with Perkins after Tehran. In any case, FDR, in order to avoid any impression by Stalin that the United States and the UK were "ganging up" against the Soviets, avoided private meetings with Churchill at Tehran.

Finally, the Big Three at Tehran declared themselves "at one with the government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran.'' 13 While the Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran, adopted at the very end of the Conference, had no impact during the war, it did play a role in 1946 during the dispute over the continued Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan. The Iranian referral of this dispute to the UN Security Council led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the disputed territory and the reimposition there of Iranian sovereignty. 14 FDR was not to confer directly with Stalin again until the Big Three met at Yalta February 4-11, 1945. Between Tehran and Yalta much had happened. A detailed consideration of these events is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these developments must be enumerated so that the reader will be aware of their significance as our story unfolds. On the Western side, one must cite the liberation of Rome, followed two days later by the successful invasion of Normandy and the subsequent push of Allied armies to the border of the Third Reich.

The Soviets, greatly facilitated by the flow of Lend-Lease supplies, undertook the great offensives which brought their forces to the Oder river. These offensives were separated in time by Stalin's decision to halt on the outskirts of Warsaw and let the Nazis destroy the brave uprising in that city by anti-Soviet forces. One should also cite Churchill's second visit to the Kremlin in October 1944. On the German side, there occurred the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler in July 1944. The failure of this attempt led to Hitler's final military gamble in the Ardennes in December 1944. Although this offensive was unsuccessful, it did serve to ensure that the Western Allies were held west of the Rhine when FDR and Stalin met for the second time at Yalta. The Yalta Summit Conference February 4-11, 1945 The Yalta Conference has been the subject of a wide variety of books and articles by distinguished statesmen and academicians. I cannot here attempt to deal with all the facets of this most controversial of the wartime Summits. I shall instead focus on certain features directly relevant to my subject.

Roosevelt clearly had two primary goals at Yalta, and he secured both of them during the negotiations in the Crimea. One of these key objectives was to pin down Stalin on Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Many people -- especially Europeans -- tend to forget that in early February 1945, the Japanese seemed far from being defeated. The atomic bomb had not yet been tested, 15 and Iwo Jima and Okinawa had not yet been invaded and conquered; above all, it was clear to most Americans -- and certainly to those of us in the U.S. Armed Forces at the time -- that the men in the Japanese military were, to put it mildly, determined warriors who disdained surrender. In these circumstances, it is indeed difficult for me to be too critical of FDR's emphasis at Yalta on his objective of ensuring Soviet entry into the war against Japan, which was urged by Generals Marshall and MacArthur and was supported by the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Ambassador Bohlen, who served as FDR's interpreter at both Tehran and Yalta, concluded in his memoirs that "Roosevelt's one reason for seeking Soviet entry into the Asian war was to save the hundreds of thousands of American lives his military experts estimated would otherwise be lost''. 16 His other major objective at Yalta was to establish the UN along the lines proposed by the American side. As Bohlen has pointed out, FDR believed that the UN "was the only device that could keep the United States from slipping back into isolationism" after WWII. 17 After detailed explanations of the U.S. proposals by Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Stalin and Churchill accepted them. However, with the strong support of Churchill, who wished to have certain countries then in the British Commonwealth and Empire admitted to the UN, Stalin did obtain FDR's reluctant approval of UN membership for the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian republics. 18 Of the other principal issues considered at Yalta, the problem of Poland was predictably much higher on both Stalin's and Churchill's list of priorities than it was on the American President's.

The Polish crisis of 1939 had provided the occasion for British entry into WWII as well as Stalin's rather short-lived pact with Nazi Germany. For both Churchill and Stalin, Poland was an important element in the European balance of power, being then the largest and most-strategically situated country between Germany and the USSR. Poland was a vexing problem for Roosevelt, and one that for a variety of reasons, he preferred to leave to the British, the Soviets, and the Poles themselves. By the beginning of the Yalta Conference, however, FDR was clearly aware that the Big Three would have to come to grips with the Polish problem. Churchill has pointed out that "Poland was discussed at no fewer than seven out of the eight plenary meetings of the Yalta Conference, and the British record contains an interchange on this topic of nearly eighteen thousand words between Stalin, Roosevelt, and myself.'' 19 Despite these efforts neither Churchill nor FDR was able to achieve the kind of agreement on Poland that they initially sought.

While they obtained Stalin's agreement in principle to the "reorganization" of the latter's puppet régime in Poland and to the holding thereafter by the new Polish government of "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot," Stalin resisted all suggestions that those elections be observed and supervised by American, British, and Soviet representatives. 20 When Presidential aide Admiral William Leahy read the compromise document on Poland submitted at the plenary meeting on February 10, he remarked to FDR that it was "so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without technically breaking it." To this, FDR replied: "I know, Bill -- I know it. But it's the best I can do for Poland at this time.'' 21 Two other issues discussed at Yalta are noteworthy in the context of this topic. Of the greatest importance to Stalin was the matter of reparations from Germany. After considerable discussion, the actual amount to be paid by the Germans was to be decided by a reparations commission which would sit in Moscow.

FDR, prodded by Harry Hopkins, finally agreed that this commission should "take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of reparations should be 20 billions and that 50 percent should go to the Soviet Union." However, a historian close to Roosevelt has opined that in accepting Hopkins' advice, FDR believed that "he had left the door open for all sorts of deliberations in the future." 22 Subsequent events were to prove that FDR's judgment on this issue was very much on target. A decision on another issue related to Germany could not so easily be deferred by the device of referring it to a committee. This issue was the question of an occupation zone for France and the related matter of a seat for France on the Allied Control Commission (ACC), to be established in Berlin immediately after the surrender of the Third Reich. Churchill took the initiative on this issue, arguing with great vigor that France be given both an occupation zone and a seat on the ACC. The British prime minister was understandably anxious to engage France in the task of occupying and controlling Germany, and in general to rebuild French power with a view to help offset the Soviet military presence in Central Europe.

After substantial behind-the-scenes persuasion by Hopkins, Bohlen, and senior U.S. diplomat H. Freeman Matthews, FDR was finally convinced that France should be given a seat on the ACC. 23 Stalin then agreed, but it should be noted that this decision in no way affected the size and location of the Soviet Zone of occupation. It had always been understood that any zone for France would be formed out of part of the British and American Zones, already delineated. Churchill's concern about these particular issues undoubtedly reflected his apprehension that the United States would not maintain an armed presence in Europe very long after the defeat of Germany.

During the British prime minister's visit to Moscow in the fall of 1944, Stalin had noted that "a long occupation of Germany would be required." In reply, Churchill stated that he "did not think the Americans would stay very long." This opinion was subsequently confirmed for Churchill by FDR in a telegram of November 18, 1944, in which the latter stated inter alia: "You know, of course, that after Germany's collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit." 24 It thus came as no surprise to Churchill when FDR at Yalta, during the discussion of the French role in the occupation of Germany, remarked that American occupation troops would not remain in Germany much more than "two years." 25 At a later session at Yalta, he amended this statement to some extent by explaining that he had made it with current American attitudes in mind; if an international organization was created, FDR thought the American people were much more likely to take part in "world activity." 26 Finally, Stalin accepted a watered-down Declaration on Liberated Europe, one based on an American draft.

While little more than a statement of intent to consult about the achievement of democratic governments in "liberated" Europe, it at least kept the door open for discussions to this end. It is necessary to add here that FDR -- for whatever reasons, perhaps in part because he did not wish to complicate the negotiations with Stalin on issues which he regarded as more important, and probably also because of his reluctance to get the United States too involved in the complex affairs of Eastern Europe -- declined a State Department proposal that a High Commission for Liberated Europe be established to enforce the Declaration. The absence of such an entity undoubtedly made it easier for Stalin to accept the Declaration and may have helped convince him that Roosevelt was really not very concerned about the implementation of its high principles. 27 Before leaving this summary of the deliberations at Yalta, it is pertinent to consider briefly several questions which have aroused differences among both historians and participants in the wartime Summits. The first of these questions concerns the state of FDR's health at Yalta and the extent to which this factor might have affected his performance. Witnesses disagree on FDR's physical condition at Yalta, although the long trip and the demands of the negotiating schedule must have been taxing on a man in increasingly declining health.

Perhaps Anthony Eden has provided the best answer we are likely to get to this question: "I do not believe," he concluded. "that the President's declining health altered his judgment, though his handling of the Conference was less sure than it might have been." Yalta Conference facts, information, pictures | Encyclopedia.com articles about Yalta Conference The Oxford Companion to American Military History © The Oxford Companion to American Military History 2000, originally published by Oxford University Press 2000. Yalta Conference (1945).In 1945, the “Big Three” of World War II — Franklin D. Roosevelt , Winston S. Churchill , and Josef Stalin —had not met since December 1943. Because of Allied landings in France and the Soviet thrust across Poland and into Germany , by the summer of 1944 a second meeting of the three men was deemed necessary. But arguments over the time and place of their meeting delayed the conference until 4–11 February 1945, when they met at Yalta in the Crimea because Stalin refused to leave the Soviet Union . Each man traveled to Yalta for different reasons.

Roosevelt came because of his desire to create a United Nations before World War II ended. Churchill feared the growing power of the Soviet Union in a devastated Europe . Stalin was intent on protecting the Soviet Union against another German invasion. The major problems facing the three leaders included Poland, Germany, Soviet entry into the war against Japan , and the United Nations. At Yalta, Roosevelt attained his goal in an agreement for a conference on the United Nations to convene in San Francisco , 25 April 1945. In addition, Stalin accepted the American proposal on the use of the veto in the Security Council and the number of Soviet states represented in the General Assembly. Much time was spent on Poland because Stalin insisted on a “friendly” Poland. The three men agreed to move the Polish eastern boundary westward to the 1919 Curzon Line and to restore western Byelorussia and the western Ukraine to the Soviet Union. At Stalin's insistence, a Communist Polish provisional government would be reorganized to include primarily Polish leaders from within Poland, but he agreed to some from abroad to placate Roosevelt. Stalin promised free elections there within a month on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot.

Stalin demanded $20 billion in reparations from Germany, half of this sum to be destined for the Soviet Union. Churchill rejected this amount while Roosevelt accepted the sum as a basis for future discussion. Germany would be temporarily divided into three zones of occupation, with France invited to become a fourth occupying power. Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the fighting ended in Europe. Stalin's terms for this were accepted: the southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands to be returned to the Soviet Union; Darien to be internationalized; Port Arthur to be leased as a naval base to the Soviet Union; Chinese‐Soviet companies to operate the Chinese‐Eastern and the South Manchurian railroads; Outer Mongolia to remain independent of China ; and the Kurile Islands to be handed over to the Soviet Union. China would be sovereign in Manchuria . In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, proposed by Roosevelt, the three governments pledged jointly to assist liberated people in forming temporary governments representing all democratic elements and pledged to free, early elections. When the three governments thought action necessary, they would consult together on measures to fulfill their responsibilities. There could be no action without the agreement of all three governments.

Roosevelt probably hoped that in the United States , the Declaration would project an acceptable image of the Yalta Conference as the protector of the rights of liberated peoples. It could also be a standard against which Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe could be judged. However, when put to the test, Declaration proved ineffective. After the Yalta Conference, the Western powers accepted a Polish government in which two‐thirds of the members were Communists. When elections finally came in 1947, they were not democratic. In the Far East, Soviet armies went to war against Japan two days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima . The Soviet entry into the war accelerated the Japanese surrender. However, in February 1945, American military planners had expected the war against Japan to drag on into 1946 or even 1947. As the Cold War heated up, anti‐Communist American critics, particularly in the Republican Party, condemned Yalta as a symbol of appeasement and a diplomatic defeat for the United States. Poland and Eastern Europe had been betrayed. The United States should avoid negotiating with the Soviet Union. Some critics later insisted that China had gone Communist because of the Yalta Conference.

The severest claimed that Roosevelt was either too sick to deal with Stalin or was duped by him. The reality of Yalta was that the location of armies determined the final outcome. Soviet armed forces decided the politics of Eastern Europe; Allied forces influenced politics in Western Europe. China became Communist because the armies of Chiang Kaishek were defeated, not because Roosevelt had abandoned Chiang. Yalta was an attempt to transform a temporary wartime coalition into a permanent agency for peace. Roosevelt apparently hoped to modify Stalin's behavior through the United Nations and postwar U.S. policies. Agreements had been negotiated while war was in progress when unity was vital. After the enemies were vanquished, however, the victors quarreled and their fundamental disagreements emerged. COPYRIGHT 2003 The Gale Group Inc. YALTA CONFERENCE YALTA CONFERENCE. In early February 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Marshal Joseph Stalin met in the Black Sea port city of Yalta to discuss the postwar administration of Europe.

At the time of the conference, Allied forces had pushed Nazi Germany to the brink of collapse, and all sides recognized that the end of World War II was imminent. Roosevelt hoped to use the conference not only as a planning meeting for the postwar period but also as a forum to establish a warmer personal relationship with Stalin. Although weakened by a deteriorating heart condition that took his life two months later, Roosevelt believed he could use his charm and skills of persuasion to win Stalin's confidence in American goodwill, thereby ensuring a peaceful postwar world order. Despite Roosevelt's efforts, however, Stalin drove a hard bargain at Yalta. Roosevelt's physical weakness as a dying man and Churchill's political weakness as head of a dying empire left Stalin in the strongest bargaining position of the three. The fact that Soviet forces had numerical superiority over their American and British allies on the continent of Europe further strengthened Stalin's hand.

After a week of negotations, the three leaders announced agreement on (1) the occupation of Germany by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France in four separate zones; (2) a conference of the signatories of the United Nations Declaration to open at San Francisco on 25 April 1945, for the purpose of establishing a world peace organization; (3) a (then-secret) large-power voting formula in the new organization; (4) an eastern boundary of Poland mainly following the Curzon Line (which gave the Soviet Union about one-third of prewar Poland), for which Poland was to be compensated by unspecified German territory in the north and west, and a new, freely elected, democratic Polish government; and (5) freely elected democratic governments for other liberated European nations.

A supplementary secret agreement provided for Soviet entry into the war with Japan in two or three months after Germany surrendered, and, in return, British and American acceptance of (1) the status quo of Outer Mongolia; (2) restoration to the Soviet Union of its position in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), with safeguarding of Soviet interests in Dairen, Port Arthur, and the Manchurian railways; and (3) the cession to the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Contrary to Roosevelt's hopes, the conference failed to establish a spirit of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the months and years following Germany's capitulation in May 1945, relations between Moscow and Washington steadily deteriorated, and a Cold War developed between the two rival superpowers. The Yalta conference became a major point of friction, as Americans charged the Soviets with systematically violating the Yalta agreements. Although at Yalta Stalin had agreed to support freely elected democratic governments in the liberated territories, he broke his pledges and brutally suppressed incipient democratic movements across Eastern Europe.

The establishment of pro-Soviet puppet regimes in Eastern Europe led Churchill in a 1946 speech to accuse Moscow of having divided the continent with an Iron Curtain. In the United States, Republican critics accused the Roosevelt administration of having cravenly capitulated to Stalin's demands at Yalta. The controversy over Roosevelt's diplomacy at Yalta later became a major part of Senator Joe McCarthy's crusade of anticommunism in the early 1950s. The Republicans' accusation that Democratic administrations were "soft" on communism remained a significant feature of American presidential campaigns until the end of the Cold War. BIBLIOGRAPHY COPYRIGHT 2004 The Gale Group Inc. YALTA CONFERENCE The Yalta Conference was the second wartime summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill , and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from February 4 through February 11, 1945, in the Crimean city of Yalta. A mood of optimism prevailed at the conference because German armies were in retreat throughout Europe and victory was assured. The principal agenda item was Germany .

Although there were sharp policy differences between the three parties, the Yalta Conference reached agreement on most issues, and the Big Three came away convinced that allied unity had been preserved. Germany, it was agreed, would be divided into three zones of occupation (a fourth zone was carved out of the British and American zones for France ). Occupation policy would be made by a Four Power Allied Control Commission to be located in Berlin . Reparations were to be extracted from Germany, with the details to be determined by an Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow . Nazism and German militarism were to be extinguished, and war criminals were to be justly and swiftly punished. Poland proved to be an intractable problem. Churchill and Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade Stalin to recognize the London-based government in exile, but he continued to support the government installed by the Soviet Union in Lublin. At most, the Western leaders secured from Stalin a commitment to free and unfettered elections as soon as possible. No decisions were reached regarding Poland's postwar boundaries, although it was understood that the eastern boundary would be the Curzon line.

As to the liberated countries in Eastern Europe, the conferees pledged in a Declaration on Liberated Europe to respect "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." A secret protocol stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months after Germany's surrender. As compensation, Russia 's losses to Japan resulting from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905 would be restored. These included southern Sakhalin, adjacent islands, and the Kuril Islands. The Soviet Union also received the lease of Port Arthur, internationalization of the port of Dairen, and partial control over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as concessions. Regarding the United Nations, it was agreed that a United Nations conference would be held in the United States on April 25, 1945. The United States and Britain agreed to accept Ukraine and Belorussia as original members, thus giving the Soviet Union three votes in the General Assembly. Also, important provisions related to the voting rules of the Security Council were formulated, including a provision for the veto power of the five permanent members.

Because Stalin ultimately succeeded in imposing communist regimes on the peoples of Eastern Europe, some critics have accused Roosevelt of "selling out" Eastern Europe. However, the consensus of scholarly opinion is that the superior military position of the Red Army at the end of the war virtually guaranteed Soviet predominance, regardless of the decisions made at Yalta. See also: potsdam conference; world war ii bibliography The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright The Columbia University Press Yalta Conference, meeting (Feb. 4–11, 1945), at Yalta, Crimea, USSR, of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill , U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt , and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin . Most of the important decisions made remained secret until the end of World War II for military or political reasons; the complete text of all the agreements was not disclosed until 1947. The Yalta conferees confirmed the policy adopted at the Casablanca Conference of demanding Germany's unconditional surrender. Plans were made for dividing Germany into four zones of occupation (American, British, French, and Soviet) under a unified control commission in Berlin, for war crimes trials, and for a study of the reparations question.

Agreement was also reached on reorganizing the Polish Lublin government (supported by Stalin) "on a broader democratic basis" that would include members of Poland's London government-in-exile, which the Western Allies had supported. The conferees decided to ask China and France to join them in sponsoring the founding conference of the United Nations to be convened in San Francisco on Apr. 25, 1945; agreement was reached on using the veto system of voting in the projected Security Council. Future meetings of the foreign ministers of the "Big Three" were planned. The USSR secretly agreed to enter the war against Japan within three months of Germany's surrender and was promised S Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and an occupation zone in Korea. The secret agreement respecting the disposal of Japan's holdings also provided that the port of Dalian (Dairen) should be internationalized, that Port Arthur should be restored to its status before the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War as a Russian naval base, and that the Manchurian railroads should be under joint Chinese-Soviet administration. China later protested that it was not informed of these decisions concerning its territory and that its sovereignty was infringed.

The United States and Great Britain also agreed to recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and to admit Ukraine and Belorussia (Belarus) to the United Nations as full members. The Yalta agreements were disputed even before the Potsdam Conference later in 1945. The subsequent outbreak of the cold war and Soviet successes in Eastern Europe led to much criticism in the United States of the Yalta Conference and of Roosevelt, who was accused of delivering Eastern Europe to Communist domination. See studies by R. Buhite (1986), F. J. Harbutt (2010), and S. M. Plokhy (2010). Cite this article The Oxford Companion to British History © The Oxford Companion to British History 2002, originally published by Oxford University Press 2002. Yalta conference, 4–11 February 1945. Churchill was increasingly fearful of the rising power of the USSR , but agreed that she was entitled to a buffer zone in eastern Europe . He agitated for some western influence in the reorganization of the Polish government and strove to promote free elections in the east.

He also ensured that France was given an occupation zone in Germany , but was less successful in resisting Stalin's demands for huge reparations. Britain had little say over plans for the Far East, though a proposal to return Hong Kong to China was dropped. Nevertheless, after Yalta Churchill briefly seemed hopeful concerning the future. C. J. Bartlett World Encyclopedia © World Encyclopedia 2005, originally published by Oxford University Press 2005. Yalta Conference (February 1945) Meeting of the chief Allied leaders of World War 2 at Yalta in the Crimea , s Ukraine . With victory over Germany imminent, Roosevelt , Churchill , and Stalin met to discuss the final campaigns of the war and the post-war settlement. Agreements were reached on the foundation of the United Nations (UN); the territorial division of Europe into ‘spheres of interest’; the occupation of Germany; and support for democracy in liberated countries. Concessions were made to Stalin in the Far East in order to gain Soviet support against Japan . Cite this article

Question: Which American President represented his country at the 'Yalta Summit' at the end of World War II?
Answer: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT