SparkNotes: World War II (1939–1945): North Africa and the Invasion of Italy North Africa and the Invasion of Italy World War II (1939–1945) History SparkNotes North Africa and the Invasion of Italy → North Africa and the Invasion of Italy, page 2 page 1 of 3 January 12, 1941 Britain captures Tobruk, Libya June 21, 1942 Germans retake Tobruk October 23 Battle of El-Alamein begins November 8 Operation Torch; joint U.S.-British landing in French North Africa November 11 Britain retakes Tobruk November 25 Allies begin offensive into Tunisia March 7, 1943 Tunis falls to Allied forces July 10 Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) begins July 22 Palermo falls to Allies July 24 Mussolini is overthrown in a peaceful coup September 2 Allied invasion of Italy begins September 8 Italy surrenders to Allies October 1 Allies capture Naples May 18, 1944 Monte Cassino falls to Allies June 5 Rome falls to Allies Key People Erwin Rommel - German tank commander

 whose strategic skill and surprise attacks earned him the nickname “Desert Fox” Benito Mussolini - Italian dictator whose ill-advised military offensives embroiled Italian and German forces in North Africa; was deposed by coup in July 1943 Tobruk At the same time that war was going on in the European and Pacific theaters, conflict also escalated in North Africa, primarily as a result of Italy’s aggression in the region in 1940 and 1941.

One of the primary flash points in North Africa was the key port of Tobruk, Libya, which changed hands between the Germans and the British several times and was the site of several major battles. Originally in Italy’s sphere of influence, Tobruk fell to the British on January 12, 1941, building upon the initiative they had seized after Italy’s defeat in Egypt the previous year. More than a year later, in June 1942, Tobruk fell to the Germans after a long and intensive siege by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s tank forces. Then, in November 1942, Tobruk fell once more to the British and remained under their control for the rest of the war. El-Alamein Perhaps the most decisive battle in North Africa was the Battle of El-Alamein, from October 23 to November 3, 1942, in which a powerful British offensive defeated German forces overwhelmingly. The British outnumbered the Germans two to one, and Rommel, who had by this time earned the nickname “Desert Fox” for his brilliant surprise attacks, was away on sick leave when the battle began.

As the battle started, Rommel’s substitute died of a heart attack, and by the time Rommel arrived, the situation was hopeless. Operation Torch Within days of the British victory at El-Alamein, the Allies launched Operation Torch, the code name for their invasion of North Africa. On November 8, 1942, British and American forces carried out an amphibious landing on the coast of French North Africa (present-day Morocco). The invasion involved more than 100,000 men and over 600 ships, placing it among the largest such invasions in history. Operation Torch was highly successful and enabled the Allies to take more than 1,000 miles of North African coastline. Tunisia With Operation Torch completed and many Allied troops on the ground in Africa, the Allies energetically pursued the Axis forces that had begun retreating into Tunisia. The desert terrain in Tunisia was ideal for a defending force, and it was here that Rommel planned to make a stand against the Allies. The Allies did not begin their offensive into Tunisia until November 25, 1942, however, and the delay of several weeks gave Germany and Italy time to airlift more troops and equipment to the region.

Thus, by the time U.S. and British forces began their attacks, the Axis forces substantially outnumbered them. The Allies faced a difficult challenge in Tunisia, and their progress was very slow. Rommel’s forces fought with tenacity in one battle after another as the fighting continued well into the spring of 1943. Nonetheless, the Allies did consistently gain ground on the Axis forces. On May 7, the Allies took Tunis and soon took the remaining Axis forces in Africa—more than 200,000 in all—prisoner. With that, the war in North Africa was over. 1 Operation Torch - History Learning Site Operation Torch Citation: C N Trueman "Operation Torch" historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 19 May 2015. 16 Aug 2016. Operation Torch was the name given to the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942 . Operation Torch was the first time the British and Americans had jointly worked on an invasion plan together. Stalin’s Russia had been pressing the Allies to start a new front against the Germans in the western sector of the war in Europe.

In 1942, the British did not feel strong enough to attack Germany via France but the victory at El Alamein in November 1942 was a great stimulus to the Allies to attack the Axis forces in North Africa . Though American military commanders were confident about a successful landing in France, the British got their way when Roosevelt supported Churchill’s request that the Allies prepare for the French North African option. From North Africa, the plan was to invade Sicily and then on to mainland Italy and move up the so-called “soft underbelly” of Europe. Victory in the region would also do a great deal to clear the Mediterranean Sea of Axis shipping and leave it more free for the Allies to use. The Allies planned to invade Morocco and Algeria. Both these countries were under the nominal rule of Vichy France. As the Vichy government in France was seen by the Allies to be in collaboration with Nazi Germany, both North African states were considered to be legitimate targets. There were about 60,000 French troops in Morocco with a small naval fleet based at Casablanca. Rather than fight the French, plans were made to gain the cooperation of the French army.

General Eisenhower was given command of Operation Torch and in the planning phase he set up his headquarters in Gibraltar. An American consul based in Algiers – Robert Daniel Murphy – was tasked with sounding out how cooperative the French army would be. On October 21st 1942 , a senior American general, Mark Clark, was sent by submarine to Cherchell to meet with senior French army officers based in French North Africa. The key to Torch was a successful amphibious landing. Three landing sites were chosen – Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The Western Task Force was to land near Casablanca at Safi, Rabat and Mehdia and Major-General George Patton commanded it. 35,000 troops were in this task force. The Central Task Force was to land at Oran. It was commanded by Major-General Lloyd Fredendall. 18,500 troops were in this task force. The Eastern Task Force was to land at Algiers and General Ryder commanded it. 20,000 troops were in this task force. The landings started before daybreak on November 8th.

There was no preliminary air or naval bombardment as the Allies hoped that the French based at the three landing zones would not resist the landings. French coastal batteries did fire at transport ships but Allied naval gunfire retaliated. However, French sniper fire proved more difficult to resolve. Carrier-based planes were needed at the landing beaches to deal with the unexpected and unwanted French resistance. The resistance put up by the French was more an inconvenience as opposed to a major military problem. The key target for Patton was the capture of Casablanca. This he achieved on November 10th when he took the city unopposed, just two days after landing. One problem faced at Oran was the fact that the beach had not been suitably investigated by those who wished to land 18,500 men on it and a sizeable amount of equipment. The landing crafts found that the water was unusually shallow and damage was caused to some of the landing craft. Such mistakes were learned from and taken into account for the landings at D-Day in June 1944 . At Oran some ships from the French Navy attempted to attack the Allied invasion fleet but were sunk or driven ashore.

French troops at Oran finally surrendered on November 9th after their positions were attacked by gunfire from a British battleship. Operation Torch also saw the first large scale American airborne drop when the US 509th Parachute Regiment captured two airfields near Oran. The landing at Algiers was aided by an attempted coup within the city by pro-Allied forces. Therefore, the Vichy government in Algiers was more concerned with putting down this coup than with countering the Allies landing on the beaches. By 18.00, the city had surrendered to the Allies. The landings at all three beaches were highly successful. French resistance had been minimal as were Allied casualties. After consolidating their forces, the Allies moved out into Tunisia. After Montgomery’s success at El Alamein , the Afrika Korps was in retreat. However, the further it moved west from El Alamein, the nearer it got to the recently landed Allied troops. Though damaged, the Afrika Korps was still a potent fighting force as the Allies found out at Faid Pass and at the Kasserine Pass .

However, the might of two advancing Allied armies meant that it was trapped and on May 7th, 1943 , the Afrika Korps surrendered. Whether the surrender would have come about so quickly without the success of Operation Torch is open to question. Naval Battle of Casablanca - World War II 11 submarines Naval Battle of Casablanca - Background: In 1942, having been convinced of the impracticality of launching an invasion of France as a second front, American leaders agreed to conduct landings in northwest Africa with the goal of clearing the continent of Axis troops and opening the way for a future attack on southern Europe. Intending to land in Morocco and Algeria, Allied planners were required to determine the mentality of the Vichy French forces defending the area. These totaled approximately 120,000 men, 500 aircraft, and several warships. It was hoped that as a former member of the Allies, the French would not engage British and American forces. To assist in assessing local conditions, the American consul in Algiers, Robert Daniel Murphy, was directed to acquire intelligence and reach out to sympathetic members of the Vichy French government.

While Murphy commenced his mission, planning for the landings moved forward under the overall command of Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower . The naval force for the operation would be led by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham . Initially dubbed Operation Gymnast, it was soon renamed Operation Torch . The plan called for three main landings to take place at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. In preparation for Operation Torch, General Henri Giraud was smuggled out of Vichy France with the aid of the resistance. Though Eisenhower had intended to make Giraud the commander of French forces in North Africa after the invasion, the Frenchman demanded that he be given overall command of the operation. This was refused and Giraud became a spectator. With the groundwork laid with the French, the invasion convoys sailed with the Casablanca force departing the United States and the other two sailing from Britain. Naval Battle of Casablanca - Hewitt Approaches: Scheduled to land on November 8, 1942, the Western Task Force approached Casablanca under the guidance of Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt and Major General George S. Patton .

Consisting of the US 2nd Armored Division as well as the US 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, the task force carried 35,000 men. Supporting Patton's ground units, Hewitt's naval forces for the Casablanca operation consisted of the carrier USS Ranger (CV-4), the light carrier USS Suwannee (CVE-27), the battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and fourteen destroyers. On the night of November 7, pro-Allies General Antoine Béthouart attempted a coup d'etat in Casablanca against the regime of General Charles Noguès. This failed and Noguès was alerted to the impending invasion. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the French naval commander, Vice Admiral Félix Michelier, had not been included in any Allied efforts to prevent bloodshed during the landings. Naval Battle of Casablanca - First Steps: To defend Casablanca, Vichy French forces possessed the incomplete battleship Jean Bart which had escaped the Saint-Nazaire shipyards in 1940.

Though immobile, one of its quad-15" turrets was operational. In addition, Michelier's command contained a light cruiser, two flotilla leaders, seven destroyers, eight sloops, and eleven submarines. Further protection for the port was provided by the batteries on El Hank at the western end of the harbor. At midnight on November 8, American troopships moved inshore off Fedala, up the coast from Casablanca, and began landing Patton's men. Though heard by Fedala's coast batteries, little damage was incurred. As the sun rose, the fire from the batteries became more intense and Hewitt directed four destroyers to provide cover. Closing, they succeeded in silencing the French guns. Naval Battle of Casablanca - The Harbor Attacked: Responding to the American threat, Michelier directed five submarines to sortie that morning and French fighters took to the air. Encountering F4F Wildcats from Ranger, a large dogfight ensued which saw both sides take losses. Additional American carrier aircraft began striking targets in the harbor at 8:04 AM which led to the loss of four French submarines as well as numerous merchant vessels.

Shortly thereafter, Massachusetts, the heavy cruisers USS Wichita and USS Tuscaloosa, and four destroyers approached Casablanca and began engaging the El Hank batteries and Jean Bart. Quickly putting the French battleship out of action, the American warships then focused their fire on El Hank. Naval Battle of Casablanca - The French Sortie: Around 9:00 AM, the destroyers Malin, Fougueux, and Boulonnais emerged from the harbor and began steaming towards the American transport fleet at Fedala. Strafed by aircraft from Ranger, they succeeded in sinking a landing craft before fire from Hewitt's ships forced Malin and Fougueux ashore. This effort was followed with a sortie by the light cruiser Primauguet, the flotilla leader Albatros, and the destroyers Brestois and Frondeur. Encountering Massachusetts, the heavy cruiser USS Augusta (Hewitt's flagship), and the light cruiser USS Brooklyn at 11:00 AM, the French quickly found themselves badly outgunned. Turning and running for safety, all reached Casablanca except Albatros which was beached to prevent sinking.

Despite reaching the harbor, the other three vessels were ultimately destroyed. Naval Battle of Casablanca - Later Actions: Around noon on November 8, Augusta ran down and sank Boulonnais which had escaped during the earlier action. As fighting quieted later in the day, the French were able to repair Jean Bart's turret and the guns on El Hank remained operational. At Fedala, landing operations continued over the next several days though weather conditions made getting men and material ashore difficult. On November 10, two French minesweepers emerged from Casablanca with the goal of shelling American troops that were driving on the city. Chased back by Augusta and two destroyers, Hewitt's ships were then forced to retreat due to fire from Jean Bart. Responding to this threat, SBD Dauntless dive bombers from Ranger attacked the battleship around 4:00 PM. Scoring two hits with 1,000 lb. bombs, they succeeded in sinking Jean Bart. Offshore, three French submarines mounted torpedo attacks on the American ships with no success. Responding, subsequent anti-submarine operations led to the beaching of one of the French boats.

The following day Casablanca surrendered to Patton and German U-boats began to arrive in the area. Early on the evening of November 11, U-173 hit the destroyer USS Hambleton and the oiler USS Winooski. In addition, the troopship USS Joseph Hewes was lost. During the course of the day, TBF Avengers from Suwannee located and sank the French submarine Sidi Ferruch. On the afternoon of November 12, U-130 attacked the American transport fleet and sank three troopships before withdrawing. Naval Battle of Casablanca - Aftermath: In the fighting at the Naval Battle of Casablanca, Hewitt lost four troopships and around 150 landing craft, as well as sustained damage to several ships in his fleet. French losses totaled a light cruiser, four destroyers, and five submarines. Several other vessels had been driven aground and required salvage. Though sunk, Jean Bart soon was raised and debate ensued on how to complete the vessel. This continued through the war and it remained at Casablanca until 1945.

Having taken Casablanca, the city became a key Allied base for the remainder of the war and in January 1943 hosted the Casablanca Conference between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Operation Torch Operation Torch ▼ Primary Sources ▼ Operation Torch In July, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill decided that the Allies should open a Second Front to help the Red Army fighting in the Soviet Union . Joseph Stalin favoured an invasion of Europe but Roosevelt and Churchill opted for an invasion of northwest Africa. Given the code-name Operation Torch, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied commander of the invasion. Over 100,000 Vichy troops were stationed in Algeria , Morocco and Tunisia . It was hoped that the French troops not to resist the Allied invasion.On 7th November, Eisenhower had a secret meeting with General Henri Giraud in Gibraltar . Eisenhower told Giraud about Operation Torch and persuaded him to become commander of French forces in Algeria , Morocco and Tunisia after the invasion of North Africa. The following day Allied forces landed in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

The French troops fought back at Oran and General Mark Clark immediately began negotiations with Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan , overall C-in-C of Vichy forces, in an attempt to negotiate a ceasefire. Adolf Hitler threatened Henri-Philippe Petain that the German Army would invade Vichy if his troops did not resist. When Darlan surrendered on the 11th November, Hitler carried out his threat and occupied the rest of France . French troops in Morocco stopped fighting but some joined the Germans in Tunisia . General Dwight D. Eisenhower now controversially appointed Jean-Francois Darlan as the political head of the French North Africa. The decision infuriated General Charles De Gaulle and the French Resistance who claimed that Darlan was a fascist and a Nazi collaborator. However, the decision was endorsed by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt who both agreed with Eisenhower that the deal with Darlan would assist military operations in the area. Darlan was assassinated by, Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, an anti-Nazi royalist, on 24th December, 1942.

Although he had been trained by the SOE and had been a member of the resistance group led by Emmanuel d'Astier , it is believed he was acting as an individual rather than under the orders of any particular group. Darlan was now replaced by the more acceptable Henri Giraud . Allied forces led by General Kenneth Anderson advanced into Tunisia and got to within 12 miles of Tunis before being attacked at Djedeida by General Walther Nehring and the Deutsches Afrika Korps . In January 1943, General Jurgen von Arnium took control of the German forces in Tunisia. Later that month he was joined by General Erwin Rommel and his army in southern Tunisia. Rommel was in retreat from Egypt and was being chased by General Bernard Montgomery and the 8th Army. Montgomery now spent several weeks in Tripoli building up his supplies. Arnium and Rommel decided to take this opportunity to attack Allied forces led by General Kenneth Anderson at Faid Pass (14th February) and Kasserine Pass (19th February).

The Deutsches Afrika Korps then headed for Thala but were forced to retreat after meeting a large Allied force on 22nd February, 1943. General Harold Alexander was now sent to oversee Allied operations in Tunisia whereas General Erwin Rommel was placed in command of the German forces. On 6th March 1943, Rommel attacked the Allies at Medenine. General Bernard Montgomery and the 8th Army fought off the attack and the Germans were forced to withdraw. Rommel now favoured a full retreat but this was rejected by Adolf Hitler . On 9th March, Rommel left Tunisia on health grounds and was replaced by General Jurgen von Arnium as commander of the Deutsches Afrika Korps . Arnium now concentrated in defending a 100 mile arc across north-east Tunisia. By April 1943 the Allies had over 300,000 men in Tunisia . This gave them a 6-to-1 advantage in troops and a 15-to-1 superiority in tanks. The Allied blockade of the Mediterranean also made it difficult for the German Army to be supplied with adequate amounts of fuel, ammunition and food.

The Allies now decided to make another effort to take Tunis. General Omar Bradley , who had replaced General George Patton , as commander of the 2nd Corps, joined General Bernard Montgomery for the offensive. On 23rd April the 300,000 man force advanced along a 40 mile front. At the same time there was a diversionary attack by the 8th Army at Enfidaville. On 7th May 1943, British forces took Tunis and the US Army captured Bizerte. By 13th May all Axis forces in Tunisia surrendered and over 150,000 were taken prisoner. (1) Dwight D. Eisenhower , Crusade in Europe (1948) Fundamentally the expedition was conceived in the hope that the French forces, officials, and population of northwest Africa would permit our entry without fighting and would join with us in the common battle against Germany. However, there was nothing in the political history of the years 1940-42 to indicate that this would occur; it was a hope rather than an expectation.

Consequently we had to be prepared to fight against forces which, in all, were estimated to number 200,000. But our governments were clear in their instructions that we were to strive to create an ally in North Africa; we were not to act as if we were conquering a hostile territory unless this attitude should be forced upon us by continued French resistance. Everything that might induce the French forces in Africa to join us was incorporated into our plans, including careful wording of pronouncements and proclamations to be issued coincidentally with the beginning of the invasion. (2) General Dwight D. Eisenhower , message to General George Marshall (1st September, 1942) The following are the particular factors that bear directly upon the degree of hazard inherent in this operation: (a) The sufficiency of carrier-borne air support during initial stages. The operational strength of the French Air Force in Africa is about 500 planes. Neither the bombers nor the fighters are of the most modern type, but the fighters are superior in performance to the naval types on carriers.

Consequently, if the French make determined and unified resistance to the initial landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their air against either of the major ports, they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at that point. The total carrier-borne fighter strength (counting on 100 U.S. fighters on Ranger and auxiliary) will apparently be about 166 planes in actual support of the landings. Only twenty to thirty will be with the naval covering forces to the eastward. These fighters will be under the usual handicaps of carrier-based aircraft when operating against land-based planes. (b) Efficiency of Gibraltar as an erection point for fighter aircraft to be used after landing fields have been secured. Since Gibraltar is the only port available to Allies in that region, the rapid transfer of fighter craft to captured airdromes will be largely dependent upon our ability to set up at Gibraltar a reasonable number for immediate operations and a flow thereafter of at least thirty planes per day. The vulnerability of Gibraltar, especially to interference by Spanish forces, is obvious.

If the Spaniards should take hostile action against us immediately upon the beginning of landing operations, it would be practically impossible to secure any land-based fighter craft for use in northern Africa for a period of some days. (c) Another critical factor affecting the air will be the state of the weather. It is planned to transfer by flying to captured airdromes in North Africa the American units now in Great Britain except the Spitfire groups. These last will necessarily be shipped and set up at Gibraltar or captured airdromes. A spell of bad weather would so weaken the anticipated air support in the early stages of the operation as to constitute another definite hazard to success. (d) The character of resistance of the French Army. In the region now are some fourteen French divisions rather poorly equipped but presumably with a fair degree of training and with the benefit of professional leadership. If this Army should act as a unit in contesting the invasion, it could, in view of the slowness with which Allied forces can be accumulated at the two main ports, so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the expedition could not be achieved, namely, the seizing control of the north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by the Axis.

(e) The attitude of the Spanish Army. While there have been no indications to date that the Spaniards would take sides in the war as a result of this particular operation, this contingency must be looked on as a possibility, particularly if Germany should make a definite move toward entering Spain. In any event, Spain's entry would instantly entail the loss of Gibraltar as a landing field and would prevent our use of the Strait of Gibraltar until effective action could be taken by the Allies. In view of available resources, it would appear doubtful that such effective action is within our capabilities. (f) The possibility that the German air forces now in western Europe may rapidly enter Spain and operate against our line of communications. This would not be an easy operation for the Germans except with the full acquiescence and support of Spain. Gasoline, bombs, and lubricants do not exist at the Spanish airfields and the transfer to the country of ground and maintenance crews and supplies would require considerable time. Certain facts that bear upon the likelihood of such enemy action are, first, that Germany already has excellent landing fields in Sicily, from which their long-range aircraft can operate without going to the trouble of establishing new bases.

Secondly, the advantages to Germany of occupying the Iberian Peninsula in force have always existed. The fact that Germany has made no noticeable move in this direction, even under the conditions lately existing when substantial parts of the British naval strength have been inside the Mediterranean, is at least some evidence that the enemy does not consider this an easy operation. (3) Jean-Francois Darlan , broadcast (21st November, 1942) Under German pressure the Marshal has just abandoned exercise of power to the Head of Government only reserving for himself the signing of constitutional laws. This means that the Marshal does not wish decisions that the French Government may be impelled to make in the sole interest of Germany to bear his signature. The Marshal declared yesterday (November 19) that he was the living embodiment of France. This is so and that is why we have pledged ourselves to him. We have not pledged ourselves to the Head of Government. Our patriotic duty remains unchanged. Liberate the homeland and the Empire and, I should add, liberate the Marshal, the living embodiment of imperial France.

In 1940 by signing the armistice at a time when France was invaded and practically disarmed the Marshal prevented France from disappearing as a nation and saved Africa from destruction and occupation. Ever since and until lately France remained alone. If this policy had not been followed the Germans and Italians would have been in Africa a long time ago not as friends respectful of French sovereignty but as oppressors. Their actions in occupied France serve to prove it. And if this had happened it is probable that allied forces would not be on our side today to help us recover our freedom. Ever since June 16, 1940, I have been a loyal collaborator of the Marshal who often confided his feelings to me. I know his feelings of affection for the great nation of the U.S. I know that, at the bottom of his heart, what matters most to him is the friendship of the American people. By feeling thus the Marshal is loyal to true French tradition.

Is it after all possible for us to imagine that the victor of Verdun walks hand in hand with the dictators who would deprive France of Alsace Lorraine, Flanders, Savoy, Nice, Corsica, and part of North Africa-with the dictators who keep 1,000,000 of our prisoners in Germany and who starve the country? When he was free to act the Marshal always expressed his confidence to me. He did it again on November 9 before the invasion of the free zone. It is, therefore, with certainty of being a loyal interpreter of his real feeling that I confirm to you my previous orders to fight at the side of American and allied forces for defense and liberation of our territories and integral restoration of French Sovereignty. I add-in agreement with American authorities-that the African Army will never be placed in the position of fighting against Frenchmen. (4) Joseph Stalin , message to Franklin D.

Roosevelt (13th December 1942) In view of all sorts of rumours about the attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards the use made of Darlan or other men like him, it may not be unnecessary for me to tell you that, in my opinion, as well as that of my colleagues, Eisenhower's policy with regard to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and others is perfectly correct. I think it is a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the orbit of the Allies fighting Hitler. (5) Harold Alexander , Memoirs: 1940-1945 (1961) The objectives of the British First Army were the ports of Tunis and Bizerta, some 1,850 miles from Alamein. The landings took place on 8 November; by the end of the month the first dash to capture the ports had expired. Thereafter, for more than four months, the only big movement was the American retreat through the Kasserine Pass in the following February. Throughout these months the Eighth Army was fighting a succession of hard battles through Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.

Tripoli itself was captured on 23 January 1943; but the Anglo-American forces were not to enter Tunis and Bizerta until 7th May - and then only with the assistance of two divisions and a Guards brigade from Eighth Army. (6) Bernard Montgomery , The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (1958) The initial attempt of the First Army to break through to Tunis was not successful. It took place on the 23rd April. 5th Corps attacked on a front of three divisions, each on a front of six miles, and each division with all three infantry brigades up; it was more of a partridge drive than an attack and had no hope of success. 9th Corps with two armoured divisions tried to break through somewhere else. I was in bed at the time with an attack of tonsillitis and influenza, and so I asked Alexander if he would come and see me at my headquarters near Sousse. He arrived on the 30th April. I said it was essential to regroup the two armies, First and Eighth, so that the attack on Tunis could be made with the maximum strength in the most suitable area.

I suggested that I should send First Army the 7th Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division, 201st Guards Brigade, and some extra artillery, together with a very experienced corps commander to handle the attack; I meant Horrocks. I finally said we really must finish off the war in Africa quickly. We were due to invade Sicily in July and there was much to do before we could tackle that difficult combined operation. Alexander thoroughly agreed. Horrocks went over to the First Army and staged the corps attack on Tunis on the 6th May; it was made in great strength at the selected point and broke clean through the enemy defences to the west of Tunis. Bizerta and Tunis were captured on the 6th May and the enemy was then hemmed in to the Cap Bon peninsula. The first troops to enter Tunis were those of our own 7th Armoured Division. They had earned this satisfaction. Organized enemy resistance ended on the 12th May, some 248,000 being taken prisoner. And so the war in Africa came to a close. It ended in a major disaster for the Germans; all their troops, stores, dumps, heavy weapons, and equipment were captured.

From a purely military point of view the holding out in North-Africa once the Mareth Line had been broken through, could never be justified. I suppose Hitler ordered it for political reasons. It is dangerous to undertake tasks which are militarily quite unsound, just for political reasons; it may sometimes be necessary, but they will generally end in disaster. The Stamford Historical Society Presents Pride and Patriotism: Stamford’s Role in World War II Online Edition The Battles Operation Torch and the Invasion of North Africa Operation Torch was the code name for the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa that initiated the North African Campaign, starting 8 November 1942. The objective of the attack was to clear Axis forces from North Africa and to secure better Naval control of the Mediterranean in preparation for the invasion of Southern Europe in 1943. The invasion was planned to take place in Morocco and Algeria, territory nominally in the hands of the Vichy French government. The French had 60,000 troops in Morocco as well as coastal artillery, some tanks, and aircraft with some 10 warships and 11 submarines based at Casablanca.

The Allies were certain the French would not fight; however, they were unsure whether or not the French Navy might shell them. The Allies were intent on securing French cooperation in order to make for a quick advance eastward into Tunisia to attack the German rear forces. Lt. General Dwight Eisenhower was commander of the operation with headquarters at Gibraltar. The Allied forces numbered 73,500 men while the total number of French defenders was unclear. In preparation for the assault, American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy was appointed to the consulate in Algeria to negotiate with the French commanders. He was able to make contact with a number of French officers, including General Charles Emmanuel Mast, Commander in Chief in Algiers, all of whom claimed they would support the Allies, but who also asked that a secret conference be held with a senior Allied general in Algeria. Major General Mark Wayne Clark was dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria aboard the HMS Seraph, a submarine, and met with the officers on 21 October. The Allies planned a three-pronged amphibious assault with landings aimed to seize key ports and airport of Morocco and Algeria simultaneously. The targets were Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

The Western Task force with Casablanca as its target was an all-American unit under Major General George S. Patton, and with Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt heading the naval operations. It consisted of the U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisons, 35,000 troops in all. The Central Task Force, with Oran as its objective, included the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the U.S. 1st Infantry Divison and the U.S. 1st Armored Division, 18,500 troops. It was commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredenall and the naval forces were under Commodore Thomas Troubridge. The Eastern Task force, with Algiers as its target, was commanded by Lt. General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th Infantry Division and the 34th U.S. Infantry Division, 20,000 troops in all. Naval forces there were under Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough. Aerial operations were split into eastern and western zones on either side of Cape Tenes, Algeria.

The British Air Force was under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh and American forces under Major General James Doolittle, under the direct command of General Patton. The Casablanca campaign called for the landing of Allied forces at three points on 8 November 1942: Safi (Operation Blackstone), Fedala (Operation Brushwood) and Mehedia-Port Lyautey (Operation Goalpost). Landing began before dawn, and given hopes for French cooperation, there was no preliminary bombardment. An attempted coup against pro-Vichy General Auguste Paul Nogues the evening before had failed, while at the same time alerting Vichy forces. At Safi, landings were successful and were accomplished without covering fire initially. When coastal batteries did fire on landing craft, Naval forces opened up. French snipers were able to pin assault troops on the beaches. Landings fell behind schedule, although air support did manage to destroy a convoy of trucks intending to reinforce Vichy positions. Safi surrendered by the afternoon of 8 Novembe,r and by 10 November the defenders were pinned down and the bulk of the invading force was on the march to Casablanca.

At Port-Lyautey, landing positions were not secure and the second wave was delayed. Defenders put up strong organized resistance and all subsequent landings were accomplished with heavy artillery bombardment. Air and carrier support helped the troops win the day and push out to capture their targets. At Fedala, the largest landing with 19,000 men, the weather undermined the ease of the landing. Beaches were attacked shortly after dawn. General Patton landed at 8 AM, and by the end of the day beaches were secured. On 10 November Casablanca was surrounded and the city surrendered. In general, French resistance had been weak and the French Navy had not left its anchorage in Casablanca. The Oran campaign called again for the splitting of the force into three, two west of Oran and one east. Landings at the western beaches were delayed due to a French convoy’s appearance and shallow waters and sandbars. The U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion landed east of Oran and quickly captured the shore battery at Arzew. French naval forces protected the harbor of Oran from invasion and the French Navy attacked the Allied fleet, but in the end were driven off or sunk.

On 9 November Oran surrendered after suffering heavy shelling from British battleships. While the amphibious assault went on, the first major airborne assault carried out by the U.S. was launched, with the U.S. 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion dropped near Oran. The targets were two airfields at Tafarquay and Youks-les Bains, both of which they successfully captured. At Algiers, the invasion was coordinated by a coup lead by the French resistance on 8 November in the city of Algiers. Key targets were quickly seized. Although subsequently Vichy troops retook positions lost in the morning’s coup, the city surrendered to the invasion force by that evening. This force, also split in three, landed two groups west of Algiers and one east. There was virtually no French resistance and one French commander welcomed the Allies. The only fighting was in the city itself and it was brief. On 8 November the 10th French Tunisian forces under General Barre left the country open for the Germans, withdrawing to the Algerian border. Fighting by French forces against Germans did not begin until 18 November.

By January 1943 German troops retreating westwards from Libya reached Tunisia. Allied forces were attacked by Rommel in February at Faid Pass on the 14 and at Kasserine Pass on the 19th. Allied forces continued to retreat until the 22nd when the Germans were stopped. By March Rommel was urging Hitler to withdraw fully, but was refused. On May 6 as the culmination of Operation Vulcan, the British took Tunis and American forces reached Bizerte. By 13 May, Axis forces in Tunisia surrendered. Given the scale of the operation casualties were light. The Allies suffered 479 to500 dead and 720 wounded. The defenders had casualties of some 1346 dead and 1997 wounded.

Question: What was the codename given to the invasion of French North Africa in November 1942?
Answer: 'OPERATION TORCH'