China Starts Building Artificial Islands in Vietnam's Paracel Islands - Breitbart by Frances Martel 16 Feb 2016 0 16 Feb, 2016 16 Feb, 2016 SIGN UP FOR OUR NEWSLETTER Satellite images published in The Diplomat indicate that China has begun an extensive construction operation in the South China Sea’s Paracel Islands, following years of work building artificial islands in the Spratly Archipelago. The Diplomat is showcasing images of specific islands in the Paracels, which lie in disputed territory in the body of water. China claims both the Spratly and Paracel Islands for itself, a claim disputed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Malaysia. Vietnam claims most of the Paracel region China has begun working on. SIGN UP FOR OUR NEWSLETTER According to the magazine, Chinese construction crews are working on a helicopter base on Duncan Island, which has required land dredging that has “increase[d] by 50 percent the area of Duncan Island.” In addition to the base, The Diplomat finds evidence for the beginnings of a number of new, potentially military facilities in the region.

Construction appears to have begun in earnest in early December 2015. The magazine suggests these facilities may resmeble the “water capture reservoirs and fuel bunkers” constructed illegally on the Spratly Islands. The new construction occurs just 15 kilometers from Woody Island, where China already boasts a military base, Bloomberg reports . It is not the first time evidence has surfaced of Chinese construction in the Paracel Islands, however. In April 2015 , The Diplomat published images showing that the Woody Island military base “is undergoing a major expansion of its runway and airport facilities,” including the installation of a “new concrete runway measuring 2,920 meters in length, accompanied by a new taxiway, expanded runway aprons and adjacent large buildings under construction.” The construction at the Paracels appears to be similar to that in the Spratly Islands, where China has made islands out of major parts of the Fiery Cross Reef. Environmentalists have suggested that China has destroyed at least 17 reefs in the Spratly region, in international waters also claimed by the Philippines.

Construction there has continued despite international outrage and a claim by the Chinese government in June 2015 that construction in the region would be “ complete ” soon. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper suggested last week that American intelligence expects further construction in the region, describing China’s territorial claims as “exorbitant.” U.S. military officials have for months expressed concern regarding China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) chief Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., saying this month that the world can expect American Navy freedom of navigation operations to occur more frequently in the region. “I think that as we continue down the path of freedom of navigations, you will see more of them, and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope in areas of challenge,” he said . Admiral Harris’s remarks followed the latest in a series of such exercises, as the USS Curtis Wilbur sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands. The U.S.

Navy did not send advance warning to Beijing of the missile destroyer’s presence in the region, a move that prompted an infuriated response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry , accusing America of seeking “maritime hegemony” and engaging in “dangerous and irresponsible” behavior. The Chinese government reacted similarly in October 2015, when the USS Lassen sailed near the Spratly Islands in a similar freedom of navigation exercise. Read More Stories About: Whatever Is Behind China's Spratly Island Showdown, It Isn't Drilling For Oil Whatever Is Behind China's Spratly Island Showdown, It Isn't Drilling For Oil {{article.article.images.featured.caption}} Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own. Full Bio The author is a Forbes contributor. The opinions expressed are those of the writer. Loading ... Loading ... This story appears in the {{article.article.magazine.pretty_date}} issue of {{article.article.magazine.pubName}}. Subscribe China is building airbases in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, dredging sand and dirt to create 2,000 acres of land where little more than rocky reefs existed before.

Its biggest project is on Mischief Island, which sits less than 150 miles off the Philippines' Palawan Island but is 600 miles from China's own Hainan Island. Like virtually all the of the Spratlys, Mischief is claimed by more than one country. China says it owns them all. The United States objects. China is ratcheting up the tension in the Spratlys. China's nationalist, Communist Party-controlled Global Times tabloid wrote this week that war between China and the United States would be "inevitable" if Washington continued to insist that Beijing stop its construction project. Yesterday China’s ambassador to Australia wrote an opinion piece for The West Australian newspaper that asserted China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands. All this over a bunch of islands? It sounds crazy. Why should we even care about the Spratly Islands? The 35 islands and hundreds more reefs and guano-covered rocks are spread across an area the size of California but comprise less land area than San Francisco. The Chinese and Vietnamese think there might be great bonanzas of oil and gas there. The U.S. Energy Information Administration thinks the chance of that is roughly zero .

Indeed the Spratlys are not important for any oil and gas under them -- but rather because of the oil and gas (and everything else under the sun) that floats past them. More than half of world maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, with the world's busiest shipping lane passing right by the Spratlys. That includes billions of barrels of oil a year and hundreds of billions of cubic feet worth of liquefied natural gas. Control this flow and you control the energy security of Asia. This week Beijing made the unprecedented admission that its construction project in the Spratly Islands is part of a military strategy that includes the extension of its naval strength beyond the mainland and into the open seas. China criticized the U.S. for “meddling” in the South China Sea and on Monday complained about a U.S. recon flight over the Spratlys. A Pentagon spokesman defended U.S. movements there, reportedly saying: "All of our flights and all of our ship movements are through international airspace and international waters," said Col. Steve Warren. "This is part of our mission to defend freedom of navigation." The animosity isn't new. Chinese vessels have harassed U.S. ships and aircraft in the region for years.

In 2001 a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. observation plane; the Chinese jet crashed and the American plane made an emergency landing on Hainan Island. China has had hundreds of more serious run ins with other countries that claim the Spratlys as their own, especially Vietnam. It was just a year ago when a Chinese deepwater drilling rig called the Haiyang Shiyou 981 began drilling in in another group of islands in the South China Sea called the Paracels, just 120 miles from the coast of Vietnam. In the ensuing naval standoff Chinese ships sank a Vietnamese trawler and anti-Chinese riots across Vietnam. President Obama in April made it clear he intends to stand up for the little guys in the South China Sea. "Where we get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily abiding by international norms and rules and is using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions," he said at an event while traveling in Jamaica. "We think this can be solved diplomatically, but just because the Philippines or Vietnam are not as large as China doesn't mean that they can just be elbowed aside.” Flying over Mischief Reef, May 2015.

Credit: RITCHIE B. TONGO /POOL/EPA/Newscom It’s not obvious that the Spratlys should be under Chinese domain. They are more than 400 nautical miles from mainland China. Yet the strategic importance of this region to China cannot be understated. In the early 1990 Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping proclaimed that in the South China Sea "sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint development." China and the Deep Blue Sea by James Borton and Nguyen Chu Hoi - Project Syndicate 2 China and the Deep Blue Sea HO CHI MINH CITY – Since December 2013, China has added more than 1,200 hectares to islands in the South China Sea. The geopolitical implications of these land reclamation efforts are well documented: The majority of the activity has taken place on the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in the waters between Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, all of which – along with China, Taiwan, and Brunei – have competing claims to the region. What has been less discussed is the project’s environmental impact, which borders on catastrophic.

China’s activities are endangering fish stocks, threatening marine biodiversity, and creating a long-term threat to some of the world’s most spectacular sea life. Thousands of coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other shallow-water ecosystems are rapidly being destroyed and buried as China’s leaders rush to stake their claim to the region. The land reclamation project is undermining the ecological connection between the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea, choking off the supply of nutrients upon which these ecosystems depend. Moreover, China’s bellicose stance, together with the undefined ownership of the region and its fish stocks, has led to destructive overfishing, degrading the marine ecosystem and threatening endangered species, including sea turtles, sharks, and giant clams. Since 2010, the fishery reserves in the Spratly Islands and the western part of the South China Sea have been reduced by 16%. Approximately 300 million people depend on the South China Sea’s marine resources for their livelihoods; should China continue on its current course, the risk of massive economic dislocation will grow. But the South China Sea is an important body of water for the entire world, not only for the countries that border it.

It is an essential international maritime transportation route – connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean – through which roughly 300 vessels, including 200 oil tankers, pass daily. The international community should condemn China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands and urge it to reverse course, thereby minimizing the risk of a conflict that could be even more disastrous for the marine environment. More broadly, all countries responsible for the degradation and destruction of the South China Sea’s shallow-water ecosystems must halt activities that threaten the region’s biodiversity and economic productivity. China’s claim to the Spratly Islands and a large portion of the South China Sea is based on the so-called nine-dash line, a demarcation extending far south of its territory that has been repeatedly contested since it was first proposed after World War II. And China’s recent land reclamation efforts violate several international environmental conventions, most notably the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). China’s actions in the South China Sea also contravene the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , which guarantees the right to navigation within its waters.

And its militarization of the Spratlys is clearly a violation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea . That declaration requires its signatories (the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China) to “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.” This includes “refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” China's man-made islands in disputed waters raise worries - LA Times China's man-made islands in disputed waters raise worries Spratlys project Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs A Chinese vessel works on a building project in the Spratly Islands in 2014. A Chinese vessel works on a building project in the Spratly Islands in 2014. (Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs) David S. Cloud Contact Reporter Chinese dredging has created a new island nearly 2 miles long and several hundred yards wide China is rapidly building five man-made islands from tiny reefs and shoals in the South China Sea, U.S.

officials say, sparking concern that Beijing is growing more assertive in the disputed waters even as the United States boosts its own forces in the western Pacific. Dredging around Fiery Cross Reef, a former outcropping in the Spratly Islands, over the last year has created a new island nearly 2 miles long and several hundred yards wide. U.S. officials say it is large enough for China to build its first airstrip in the remote archipelago, one long enough for most of its combat and support aircraft. Satellite photos also reveal a small port under construction. U.S. officials worry that the buildup indicates a Chinese push to establish de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets also claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and Vietnam. Except for Brunei, those nations all maintain small airstrips or symbolic military outposts in the Spratlys, but the Chinese military dwarfs others in the region and could undermine the tense status quo. Confrontations have broken out over fishing, oil and gas drilling and military maneuvers in recent years.

India is the latest country to express alarm about Beijing's growing military clout, partly because the Chinese navy has sent nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean, rattling New Delhi's defense community. During a three-day visit to New Delhi that ended Tuesday, President Obama signed a joint statement with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling for "safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea." They urged all parties "to avoid the threat or use of force." Johnson Reef Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs / Associated Press The Johnson Reef is called the Mabini Reef by the Philippines and the Chigua by China. The Johnson Reef is called the Mabini Reef by the Philippines and the Chigua by China. (Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs / Associated Press) White House aides portrayed Obama's trip as a way to emphasize his attempt to focus more military and other resources on Asia and the western Pacific, a pivot intended in part to offset China's influence. The Pentagon has sent more warships and troops to the region and has forged closer military ties with several of China's neighbors.

A military-grade airstrip and dredged harbor on Fiery Cross Reef, which lies on the western edge of the Spratly archipelago, clearly would expand China's ability to operate in an area considered a potential tinderbox. Land reclamation is also underway at Johnson South Reef, Johnson North Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Gaven Reef. "China appears to be expanding and upgrading military and civilian infrastructure — including radars, satellite communication equipment, antiaircraft and naval guns, helipads and docks — on some of the man-made islands," according to a report last month by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which was set up by Congress. Beijing insists the reclamation projects are an internal matter taking place on Chinese territory, and recently said it needs a base in the South China Sea to support radar and intelligence gathering. It has rebuffed regional demands to submit to international arbitration to resolve the maritime and territorial disputes. The White House has refused to take sides in the territorial disputes, calling for a halt in all provocative activities. But the Obama administration faces growing pressure from allies to push back any Chinese effort to establish a permanent offshore military presence in the contested area.

Pentagon officials and the State Department repeated those demands in the last week, urging China to halt the island-building projects. "We call on China to clarify their reclamation intentions" and "to cease these large-scale reclamation activities, recognize how they are increasing regional tensions, and pursue diplomatic alternatives," said Lt. Col. Jeffrey Pool, a Pentagon spokesman. "They're reclaiming land in shoals and rocks in sensitive areas whose sovereignty is contested," Assistant Secretary of State Daniel R. Russel said at a Jan. 21 news conference in Manila. "We think there is a powerful case to be made for the maximum exercise of restraint." Evan P. Garcia, a senior Philippine diplomat, told reporters the island-building "is not helpful in terms of finding a way forward.... It's so frustrating." In late 2013, China's Defense Ministry sparked deep unease when it warned that it would take "defensive emergency measures" against foreign aircraft that did not give notification before entering an air-defense identification zone that Beijing had declared off its coast. In response, the Pentagon sent a pair of unarmed B-52s over the East China Sea to challenge the Chinese claim.

The crisis was defused when China backed down and signaled it would not endanger the lives of pilots and passengers. Pentagon officials were furious in August when a Chinese fighter jet did a barrel roll over a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft over the South China Sea, and the White House called the incident a deliberate provocation. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a Navy EP-3 surveillance plane, forcing it to make an emergency landing on nearby Hainan island. At the same time, the Chinese military still faces severe limitations. Most of its fighter aircraft lack the range to patrol over the Spratly Islands, which lie more than 600 miles from China's nearest air base and more than 400 miles from a Chinese airstrip in the Paracel Islands at the northern end of the sea, according to the report by the congressional commission. Its navy similarly has a limited ability to operate in open waters for long periods because it lacks offshore bases for refueling and resupply, according to U.S. officials who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of discussing China's military.

China launched its first aircraft carrier in 2012, but the ship is not expected to be capable of flight operations until 2016, at the earliest. A senior Chinese military official said in November that Chinese leaders decided to expand a military presence in the South China Sea after participating in the multinational search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared March 8 while flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 people aboard. The pilots made their last voice contact over the South China Sea, although the search soon expanded to the vast reaches of the southern Indian Ocean. Debris from the missing jet still has not been found. "There is a need for a base to support our radar system and intelligence-gathering activities," Jin Zhirui of the Chinese air force headquarters told reporters at the Xiangshan Forum, a Beijing national security conference, according to news reports. The search "made us realize we lacked sufficient air force capabilities in the South China Sea," Jin said.

"There is a need for a base of operations in the South China Sea for state security and to protect national interests." China is unlikely to build a major military base in an area regularly hit by typhoons, said Jeffrey Engstrom, an Asia security expert at Rand Corp., a Santa Monica-based think tank. But, he said, the "man-made islands would be useful for establishing presence and limited power projection in the South China Sea." Times staff writer Julie Makinen in Beijing contributed to this report. MORE FROM CHINA Expert unmasks China strategy of ‘creeping expansion’ | INQUIRER.net Expert unmasks China strategy of ‘creeping expansion’ Filamstar.net (INQUIRER.net News Partner) / 04:07 AM December 25, 2014 Dr. Alexander Yuving, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studie A prominent global security scholar has unmasked China’s “grand strategy” of gaining control of the Asia Pacific Region by “creeping expansion” rather than waging major battles. Dr. Alexander L.

Vuving, an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies based in Honolulu, Hawaii, writes in an essay posted by Commentators.com that China is creating its own islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea to leverage its claim on the strategic areas teeming with marine life and potentially huge oil and gas reserves. Beijing’s territorial claims — based on its self-declared horseshoe-shaped, nine-dash line map — cover areas close to the coasts of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. ADVERTISEMENT China claims practically the whole South China Sea, a vast expanse of water that encompasses islands, islets, atolls and reefs that stretches from the Paracels, Spratlys, Scarborough Shoal in the West Philippine Sea and Pulau and Natuna Islands in Indonesian waters. Creeping expansion “The ultimate goal is to gain control of the region. The campaign to achieve this goal relies on creeping expansion, rather than major battles,” wrote Vuving in a commentary aptly titled “China’s Grand-Strategy Challenge: Creating its own Islands in the South China Sea.” Dr. Vuving studied political science, economics, sociology and electronic engineering at Cornell University, the Johannes Gutenberg University and the Budapest University of Technology.

He received his master of arts (summa cum laude) in political science, sociology and economics, and his doctor’s degree (magna cum laude) in political science from the Johannes Gutenberg University in Germany. According to Vuving, Beijing’s preferred tactics in its protracted strategy for regional dominance, often at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, are salami slicing and small-stick diplomacy. This strategy, Vuving stresses, requires three “imperatives,” each of which is built on top of another, namely: First, to avoid open armed strikes as much as possible; clashes can be initiated, but only to exploit an existing favorable situation. Second, to control the most strategic positions in the sea; if not already in possession, these positions must be seized stealthily if possible and in a limited conflict if necessary. And third, to use these position as logistical hubs and bases for power projection. Vuving — whose varied areas of research interests include Asian security, the rise of China and Vietnamese politics — observed that the history of the China’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute has neatly followed these imperatives.

Two armed conflicts He cited the fact that of the numerous attempts by Beijing to snatch new possessions during these six decades, only two involved armed conflicts. The first took place in January 1974 against South Vietnam during which China ended up seizing the western half of the Paracel Islands, the Crescent Group, from the former. The second was a far smaller—but no less bloody—skirmish against unified Vietnam at Johnson South Reef in March 1988. “What’s remarkable about these two confrontations is that they both were fought at a time when a power vacuum was swelling in the region, with the United States withdrawing at the time of the first, and the Soviet Union pulling out at that of the second,” Vuving writes. “In both events, China also enjoyed the acquiescence of the United States, the most powerful actor in the larger Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the military clashes caused little diplomatic repercussions,” he adds. The second imperative of taking control the most strategic positions is reflected in Beijing’s choice of places to occupy in the disputed areas.

Quality, not quantity Thus, he notes that when China tangled with Vietnam for a foothold in the Spratly Islands in 1988, Beijing traded quantity for quality, taking six reefs as opposed to 11 by Hanoi. Five of the six, Vuving opines, are among the most strategic features in the archipelago. China’s first choice in the Spratly Islands was Fiery Cross Reef, one of the best in the archipelago in terms of location and the potential for land reclamation. The atoll occupies an ideal spot at the western gateway into the Spratly Islands and is one of the few Spratly islands that are most exposed to the main transoceanic shipping routes traversing the South China Sea. The atoll, known as Kagitingan in the Philippines and Yongshu in China, is the focus of ongoing reclamation by Beijing as shown by satellite images released last month in IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly. The Jane’s report says China is building what could be an airstrip and apron on the reclaimed area measuring 3,000 meters long and 200 meters wide.

Its location not too far from, but not too close to, the other island groups reduces its vulnerability and enlarges its sphere of influence. Adding to these advantages, Fiery Cross Reef occupies an area of 110 square kilometers, one of the largest in the Spratly Islands. Four of the remaining five—Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef and Cuarteron Reef—lie at the edge of four different island groups, from where they can control a large maritime area and the key waterways into the Spratly Islands. The two land features that China later added to its possessions also boast immense strategic values. PH reefs seized Vuving observes that Mischief Reef, which China surreptitiously took from the Philippines in late 1994 or January 1995, lies at the center of the eastern wing of the Spratly Islands and close to the water highways that run along the eastern South China Sea. China also seized in 2012 the strategically located Scarborough Shoal, a traditional Filipino fishing ground that lies only 123 miles from Palauig, Zambales.

Known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc and Panatag Shoal, the area is a triangle-shaped chain of reefs with a perimeter of 29 miles. It covers an area, including an inner lagoon, of 58 sq. miles. Manila decided to take Beijing’s maritime claims to arbitration in January 2013 by an Arbitral Tribunal under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in an effort to secure a peaceful resolution of the maritime dispute. Power projection “With its control of the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal and several strategically located lands in the Spratly archipelago, China is far more advantaged than any other countries to project control of strategic sea routes,” Vuving writes.

For example, he explains, Woody Islands (the largest feature in the Paracels), Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal form a “four-point constellation from which, with a radius of only 250 nautical miles, the entire main body of the South China Sea can be kept under intense watch.” “This means that all it takes for China to become the lord of the South China Sea is to develop these assets into robust platforms that can provide both logistic support for a myriad of fishing boats, government vessels, submarines and aircraft to dominate the sky and the water of the region, and some grounds for generating large economic and security zones,” Vuving stresses. This was how China transformed Woody Island, an uninhabited sandbank 60 years ago into a fortress populated by at least 1,000 military personnel and civilians, Vuving says.

The island now features a 2,700-meter airport with a runway and a parallel taxiway, which is capable of handling eight or more fourth-generation aircrafts such as SU-30MKK fighters and JH-7 bombers, and a 1,000-meter long deep-water port that can accommodate vessels of 5,000 tons or more. Massive building projects According to Vuving, China has also been conducting “massive construction projects” to turn the rocks China occupies into islands down south in the Spratlys. Quoting Taiwan’s top intelligence official Lee Hsiang-chou, Vuving says Chinese President Xi Jinping has approved plans to reclaim lands to build military installations not only on Fiery Cross Reef but also on the Cuerteron Reef, Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reef and Hughes Reef. It would not be surprising for Beijing to built military installations, like airstrips and deep water harbors at Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal and eventually set up an air defense identification zone in the South China, Vuving surmises.

“With its enlarged and strategically located islands, China has more potential than any other major powers to gain air and naval supremacy in the South China Sea,” says Vuving. “Although Beijing still has a long way to go, it is not unimaginable to see in the next two decades a South China Sea dotted with powerful Chinese staging bases that stretch from the Paracel Islands in the northwest to Mischief Reef in the southeast, and from Scarborough Shoal in the northeast to Fiery Cross Reef in the southwest.” Counter-measures In the face of the creeping expansion, Vuving suggests the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could send international observers as part of ASEAN-China 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to verify the constructions and exert diplomatic pressure to persuade to suspend the work. Another way to challenge China’s strategy, Vuving says, is to take a page from Beijing’s own playbook. “For example, in a first step, Vietnam can offer the Indian military access to naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and the U.S. military access to air bases in Da Nang, two of Vietnam’s most strategic locations along the South China Sea coast,” he says. If China does not heed the message, the U.S.

and Japanese militaries and coast guards could be offered access to Cam Ranh and Da Nang, from which they can patrol the South China Sea. Ultimately, if China is still determined to “turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake,” then a strong alliance between Vietnam, the Philippines, the United States, Japan and India is necessary to redress the imbalance of power,” Vuving says. RELATED STORIES 60 maps debunk China’s ‘historical claim’ on South China Sea Chinese President Reasserts Astroturf Sovereignty Claims in South China Sea | VICE News Chinese President Reasserts Astroturf Sovereignty Claims in South China Sea Photo via Getty Images By Jacquelyn Bengfort September 29, 2015 | 4:58 pm During a joint press conference on Friday, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the increasingly tense situation in the South China Sea, an important body of water with rich fishing and untapped mineral and energy resources that is also the site of a thicket of overlapping claims by the six countries that surround it: Brunei, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

The Spratly Islands — a group of islets, reefs, and atolls that have been the site of China's widely reported land-reclamation efforts — were a particular focus of the two leaders' remarks. Xi used the opportunity to press China's claims to the Spratlys and their wealth, stating that the islands have been Chinese territory "since ancient times." Many of China's neighbors have competing claims over the Spratlys, which Xi referred to in his speech as the Nansha Islands, as well as other outcroppings in the South China Sea. The Philippines has challenged China's claim on the Spratlys and much of the South China Sea before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. China has been the most active country reclaiming land by piling dredged sand on top of narrow reefs, but Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines have also done so to a lesser degree. China had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres as of June, according to the US Department of Defense, while the Philippines had reclaimed some 14 acres.

"China has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands," wrote the Department of Defense in its recent Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy report. Understanding Chinese claims in the region requires an understanding the geography of the Spratly Islands, which are not really islands but rather a collection of uninhabitable rocks, submerged reefs, and low-tide elevations. The legal status of these formations — and, to a lesser extent, neighboring ones — prior to China's land-reclamation work is itself a matter of some dispute. Related: China Goes on the Offensive in the South China Sea "There may be definitive status in some states' minds, but there is disagreement by other states," James Kraska, a professor at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the United States Naval War College, said.

"There is no final arbitration to issues of territorial title unless the states submit their claims to the International Court of Justice or some other adjudicative body." The status of such sites is crucial because under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which China is a signatory, the unaugmented state of a land featuredetermines the maritime zones that can be claimed. In other words, astroturfed sovereignty doesn't count in the eyes of the law. Artificial islands do not generate a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea; nor do so-called "low-tide elevations" — small reefs or islands that disappear completely at high tide — if they fall outside of a nation's existing territorial sea. Rocks, which remain above water regardless of tidal fluctuations but are unable to sustain human life, do generate a territorial sea, but not the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone that is accorded to a habitable island, giving a country sole rights to whatever sources of wealth lies beneath that stretch of water.

China's large-scale land-reclamation project has obscured many of the natural features of the South China Sea, while its actions, including warning away US military aircraft operating in the vicinity of the islands, suggest that it is enforcing maritime zones that have no basis in the original geography of the region. But if given time and left unchallenged, they could become de facto reality considering the customary nature of international law. Watch the VICE News documentary Talking Heads: China Strikes Back: "There are a couple of overlapping legal issues," said Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "One: These are… not necessarily high seas, which means that it is certainly reasonable for other states to argue that China is illegally building artificial islands in their claimed exclusive economic zones, rather than in international waters." "The other," he added, "is whether or not China is claiming maritime entitlements beyond a 500-meter safety zone for an artificial island.

We have every indication that they are doing so, since they are warning away other military craft and civilian vessels." While the United States does not lay claim to any of the features comprising the Spratly Islands and is not a signatory to UNCLOS, the US Navy nevertheless routinely conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) wherever excessive maritime claims are made worldwide, including in the South China Sea. "The entire point of FONOPS is to show consistent contestation of what you would consider excessive or illegal maritime claims," Poling said. "A one-off operation within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef or Subi Reef doesn't do much." He noted that the US contested every nation's claims to the South China Sea except for Brunei's last year. "The goal is not to show the flag," he remarked. "The goal is not to send a message to China. It is to contest extralegal claims." "The very worst thing the US can do is FONOPS that skirt away from 12 nautical miles, which is what it has done," Kraska said. "It must go inside 12 nautical miles on a routine basis and with routine presence — in the air, on the surface, and submerged.

And other states should as well." Related: How the US and Chinese Navies Are Trying to Avoid Accidentally Starting World War III Despite the anxiety that China's attempts to dredge sovereignty from the seabed have caused, conflict over these territorial disputes is far from inevitable, said Dr. Jacques deLisle, director of the Asia Program for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. "Nobody wants to go to war over this," he said. "The real risks are accidental escalation, and one of the things that can happen to help avoid that is to have better communications." Last year, China and the US moved in that direction with the creation of a multinational agreement known as CUES, or Conduct for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. China's government could also clarify its position. "One of the things the US has been very frustrated about has been trying to get from China a clear answer on whatexactly the natures and contours of its claims are," deLisle said.

"Until we know what they're claiming, it's hard to know where we would be crossing what they consider significant lines." On Friday, Obama reiterated his intention to continue to combat excessive maritime claims, stating that "the United States will continue to sail, fly, and operate anywhere that international law allows." He was essentially saying that the US will continue to express its view of the facts on the ground by operating as though these artificial islands are just that. Follow Jacquelyn Bengfort on Twitter: @jacib Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Spratly Islands I. CASE BACKGROUND 1. Abstract The Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea and consist of over 100 small islands and reefs, territorially contested by the governments of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia. None of the islands lies more than 4m above sea level, with many actually lying below sea level at high tide. The combined area of the islands is approximately 5 sq km. The islands are considered strategically important because of their location in strategic shipping lanes, extensive fisheries, and the large amounts of hydrocarbons estimated to lie under the ocean bed.

Approximately 45 of the islands are occupied by military forces of the claimant countries, and none of the islands have indigenous inhabitants. Tension in the region over competing territorial claims has occasionally boiled over in the past into limited military skirmishes, although a recent ASEAN accord has limited open disputes. [1] Rising sea levels and global competition for energy resources have increased tensions, especially in the context of rapidly expanding economies in the Asian region and the increased assertiveness related to territorial claims that has accompanied economic growth in China. The US has attempted to remain relevant in the discussion, because of the presence of energy resources and shipping lanes in the region, as well as requests by regional allies to act as a counter-balance to Chinese aggression. [2] As sea levels rise, many reefs and islands are likely to be submerged, increasing the urgency of territorial claims, requiring construction of new facilities, and increasing the likelihood of confusion and accidents between naval patrols or fishing vessels around newly submerged reefs. 2. Description The dispute began in 110 CE when China first asserted its control of the islands during the repression of rebellion in Vietnam, and began using the islands as a stopping over point for trading, fishing, and military ventures.

[3] The most recent contemporary occupation of the islands seems to have been France in the early 1930’s, until the islands were taken by Japan in 1938 and used as a submarine resupply base until the end of WWII. From 1946 to 1950, the main island was occupied by forces from the Republic of China, and Japan officially renounced its claim to the islands in 1951. The ROC reoccupied the main island in 1956, and Vietnam began occupying several islands in 1973, with the Philippines following suit in 1978, Malaysia in 1983, and the People’s Republic of China in 1988. None of the claims were accepted diplomatically, and their official status remains undetermined. [4] In 2002 the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" was signed, but holds no legal binding. [1] In 2010, after the Chinese-Japanese confrontation around Senkaku Island the parties again committed themsevles to peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue.

The US weighed in saying it was in its national interests and regional interests to see the issue resolved peacefully and protect vital sea lanes, and suggested it could play a mediating role. This announcement angered China, who alleged the US was performing military operations in its territorial waters, and had no business interfering in what should be a bilateral affair between China and individual claimaint countries, a stance disputed by the other members of ASEAN. [13] The largest of the islands is Itu Aba, at 0.43 sq. km. There are only six more islands greater than 0.1 sq. km, including West York Island, Spratly Island, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, Sandy Cay, and Thitu Island. The highest island is Namyit Island. There are only ten islands that are able to naturally sustain trees, [5] four of the islands have airports, and three have heliports. [1] Of the occupied islands, several can be classified as artificial islets, in that they do not naturally lie above sea level without human construction of structures.

This includes Chinese occupations at Subi Reef, Johnson South Reef, and Mischief Reef, Malaysia's occupations at Dallas Reef and Investigator Shoals, and Vietnam's occupations at Vanguard and Prince of Wales Banks. [6] Technically such artificial islands are not allowed to generate territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. [6] There have been a number of recent military disputes and diplomatic incidents in the South China Sea. In March 1988 China and Vietnam briefly clashed over the islands, China sank three Vietnamese ships, killed 72, and captured 9. [3] Again, in 1995, the Philippines discovered the construction of concrete support structures on Johnson Reef, and protested this by increasing naval patrols in the region and intercepting Chinese fishermen in the region. In 1999, further construction was discovered and caused another similar incident. [6] In 2002 claimaint countries at an ASEAN meeting signed a "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," but it was not legally binding. [1] There have been several seizures of Vietnamese fishermen by the Chinese since then as well.

[7] In 2009 there was a confrontation between a US naval patrol vessel performing seismic surveillance, when it claimed it was harassed by a number of Chinese vessels. The US claimed it was travelling in international waters and had rights of navigation and passage, while China suggested that the ship, gathering sonar data, was performing an intelligence operation in territorial waters claimed by China. [8] As the recent collision between a Chinese fishing vessel and Japanese naval patrols in the Senkaku Islands has shown, minor incidents and accidents have the potential to escalate to national levels and drastically increase tensions and consequences related to territorial disputes. [9] Recent naval exercises by the United States and Vietnam demonstrate the involvement of the US, and its cocern for international navigation and trade rights in the South China Sea and desire to form a strategic partnership with Vietnam. [10] China has also increased naval patrols in the region claiming its necessary to counter illegal fishing in its territorial waters. [11] It has also staged several military exercises it has claimed demonstrate its ability to protect its interests militarily in the region.

[12] As sea levels rise, many reefs and islands are likely to be submerged, increasing the urgency of territorial claims, requiring construction of new facilities, and increasing the likelihood of confusion and accidents between naval patrols or fishing vessels around newly submerged reefs. Figure 1: A map of mischief reef, where China has artificial island structures. (source: Google Earth) Figure 2: A map of Subi reef, where China has artificial structures (source: Google Earth) Figure 3: A aerial shot of Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef (source: Flickr Creative Commons, Storm Crypt) Figure 4: A view of a dock at Vietnam occupied Pearson Reef (source: Wikimedia Commons, Ha Petit) Figure 5: A picture of artificial structures at Vietnam occupied West London Reef (source: Wikimedia Commons, Ha Petit) 3. Duration: Historic: CE 110-Present, Recent: 1930-Present Chinese occupation of the islands began in 110 CE, around the same time as colonization of Vietnam. The islands were used by Chinese sailors as a stay over until roughly 1933 when France took over the islands began changing hands up until today's current status quo. [3] 4.

Location: Ocean, Asia Figure 6: Map depicting the claimed and occupied islands of the various countries. Claims are identified by the flag of the country, and as such, only claims by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines are shown, as Brunei has no occupied islands. (Spratly With Flags, Wikimedia Commons, < accessed Nov 29th, 2010) 5. Actors Direct Actors: China (PRC): China claims all the islands as its own, and desires bilateral resolution of disputes. It has also been seen as the most aggressive in building island structures in the past to lay claim to reefs Namely, cement structures that it claims are shelters for fishermen, and then building light houses or military garrisons upon these if they are not disputed as it did in Mischief reef. [6] China has aggressively pursued expanded blue water navy abilities and engaged in intelligence and surveillance in the South China Sea region. [22] Taiwan (ROC): Taiwan's claims are limited, and complicated by the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty or inclusion as part of China. Regardless, its occupation is likely to persist until its other issues with China are resolved.

Vietnam: Vietnam claims both islands on its continental shelf, and all of the islands. It asserts that Chinese claims are based on China's former subjugation of Vietnam, and thus the islands are rightfully part of Vietnam. There have been military clashes between the two in 1988. It is attempting to build a strategic relationship with the US. It has also announced the acquisition of six new submarines at a cost of $2.4 billion, believed to be designed to bolster its deterrence against Chinese agression in the region. [20] Malaysia: Malaysia claims a limited number of islands and features on its continental shelf. It has also announced the recent decision to purchase two submarines from France at a cost of $1 billion. [20] Philippines: The Philippines claim several islands as part of its Palawan province, and has clashed with China over its construction of artificial structures on Mischief reefs. Yet the Philippines recently announced a massive arms purchase from China, suggesting there may be a changing relationship. [21] Brunei: Brunei is the only claimant without militarily occupied islands.

Indirect Actors: US: The US is concerned with its right to free passage and navigation in the region, as well as the concerns of its regional allies, Vietnam and the Philippines. Japan: Japan receives almost 90% of its oil shipped through the South China Sea, amongst other goods and commodities. [18] Oil Companies: There are a number of Western and Chinese oil firms involved in exploration in the region, and it was Vietnamese contracts to Western oil companies to explore the region that first led to conflict with China in the 1970's over the islands. The actual amount of oil is disputed or unknown, because of limited exploration thus far. II. Environment Aspects 6. Type of Environmental Problem: Climate Chan ge As previosuly stated, the highest island is only 4m above sea level, but most lie more less equivalent with the Maldives Islands (2m) [19] who have already expressed their concerns over the danger of rising sea levels. In addition, the estimated oil reserves in the South China Sea are largely unknown, creating more incentive for exploration to discern their exact value.

The islands are also home to numerous species of turtles and birds that use the islands for roosting, and will be threatened by greater human occupation, oil exploration, or disappearance of the islands into the sea. 7. Type of Habitat: Ocean, Tropical 8. Act and Harm Sites: Global and Spratly Islands Low lying islands reefs especially. Vulnerable to extreme weather events as well, given a small storm surge could overwhelm many garrisons and elicit national response or an international incident. III. Conflict Aspects 9. Type of Conflict: International With six different countries laying claim, and two major regional powers concerned, and the regional body ASEAN involved, the conflict is highly internationalized. 10. Level of Conflict: Threat Currently, the conflict seems only to be a risk or threat in the future, but as the incident with Japan illustrated, small incidents in the region could escalate very quickly if tensions are perceived as high. 11. Fatality Level of Dispute (military and civilian fatalities): Low Past: 1988: 72 Vietnamese sailors killed. This conflict was limited to the Spratlys, but should the conflict escalate into a larger regional dispute, the casualties could be much higher. 12.

Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: Indirect Figure 7: Causal Diagram: The above diagram represents the interactions between rising sea levels and the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands. Climate change is resulting in rising sea levels, that in turn increases the urgency of territorial claims, as many islands lie only barely above sea level and are likely to be submerged in the near future. Especially on islands where military garrisons exist to back up territorial claims, this will require construction of higher structures to resist the rising seas. This requires notification under the cooperation agreement between the territorial claimants, but will likely result in an increase in tension if it is believed the construction coincides with increased military capability. If there is no notification and it is discovered there has been construction, it will likely increase tension even more. Meanwhile, the expanding Chinese economy plays a role (not the only cause of course) in the increasing temperatures from climate change, and also increased global demand for hydrocarbons. This increased global demand for hydrocarbons also increases the urgency of claims, because of the vast amounts of valuable hydrocarbons estimated to lie underneath the sea bed in the region.

Also, an expanding Chinese economy has coincided with a more assertive Chinese foreign policy, as the recent tension between Japan and China in the disputed Senkaku islands demonstrates. That a recent cooperation agreement did not resolve any of the substantive issues regarding the Spratlys means the issue has merely been delayed, but as tension rises, the likelihood of an accident or confrontation that leads to military escalation increases over time. The increased tension has also merited the attention of the United States, whose attempts at mediating were immediately rebuffed angrily by China. [13] The UN’s Law of the Sea clearly states in Article 121 that any territorial feature of a state that is above high tide is under Article 3 entitled to territorial seas “to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.” [14] Many of the islands and reefs already lie under the surface at high tide, and the highest point in the archipelago is 4m. [5] A projected sea level rise somewhere between 19cm-59cm in the next century is thus extremely relevant.

[15] If the dispute were ever to theoretically be adjudicated internationally, islands that have sunk beneath the surface or were already under at high tide could become contentious and complicated issues. Would claims be based on elevations before sea level rises? How would artificial structures built to withstand sea level rises be evaluated in this context? Under the law of the sea, the artificial islands and reefs below sea level at hide tide would not qualify. It is also unclear whether The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also states in Article 15, that ““Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.” [16] However, even if the participants in the conflict were to accept adjudication, it is not clear which coast or territories would be used, contiguous territory, occupied islands, or claimed islands.

To make matters more unclear, it goes on to say “The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.” [16] Of course, it is the allowance for special circumstances to which many states have appealed, and suggested a historical title to the islands. [14] It is all these complications in addition to rising sea levels that make the prospect of mutually agreed international adjudication unrealistic. If this is the case, then states will likely expect to occupy the islands on which they currently have military garrisons for the long term, and thus, especially on low lying islands, need to construct more permanent artificial structures to withstand rising sea levels. Such construction however could be construed in a number of ways, including contributing to an altered balance of force or improved military capabilities. 13. Level of Strategic Interest: Regional All of the claimaint countries, as well as regional powers, and ASEAN, have concerns over a potential conflict in such an important trade route, and over regional conflict escalation in general. 14. Outcome of Dispute: Ongoing 15.

Related ICE and TED Cases Falk-16 16. Relevant Websites and Literature Sources: [1] CIA World Factbook. [2] Landler, Mark. "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands." New York Times. July 23rd, 2010. < > [3] Jian, Sanqiang, “Multinational Oil Companies and the Spratly Dispute,” Journal of Contemporary China. < #db=aph&AN=9711101084> [5] Van Dyke, Jon M. and Valencia, Mark J. "How Valid Are the South China Sea Claims Under the Law of the Sea Convention?" Southeast Asian Affairs. 2000. < #db=mth&AN=3499208 > [6] "Should Some of the Spratly Features Now Be Characterized as "Artificial Islands", and, If So, What Is Their Legal Status?" Southeast Asian Affairs. 2000. < [7] Pham, Nga. "China Releases Vietnam Fishermen." BBC News. August 12th, 2009.

< > [8] England, Vaudine. "Who's Right in South China Sea Spat?" BBC News. Mar 13th, 2009. < > [9] "Japan Extends China Boat Captain's Detention." BBC News. September 10th, 2010. < > [10] "US and Vietnam Stage Joint Naval Exercises." BBC News. August 10th, 2010. < > [11] "China to step up naval patrols." BBC News. March 19th, 2010. < > [12] "China Air Force Exercises 'Carry Message.'" BBC News. August 3rd, 2010. < > [13] England, Vaudine. "Why Are South China Sea Tensions Rising?" BBC News. September 2nd, 2010. < > [14] “Are the Spratly Islets That Are Above Water at High Tide Entitled to Generate 12-Nautical-Mile Territorial Seas?” Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore: 2000. < [15] James Painter.

“Americas On Alert For Sea Level Rise.” BBC News. April 8th, 2009. < [16] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. < > [17] "'Code of conduct' for disputed islands." BBC News. [18] Wong, Kam C. "Who Owns the Spratly Islands? The Case of China and Vietnam." China Report. 2002. 38: 345. DOI: 10.1177/000944550203800301. < [19] "The Maldives Battle Against Extinction." BBC News. Nov. 9th, 2009. < > [20] Pomfret, John. "Concerned About China's Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build Up Militaries." Washington Post, Aug. 9th, 2010. < > [21] McGeown, Kate. "China and Philippines to Sign First Military Deal." BBC News. Dec. 7th, 2010. < > [22] Rose, Gideon, and Kaplan, Robert D.

"China's Expanding Naval Power." Council on Foreign Relations, April 30th, 2010. < > Image and Graphic Sources: Figure 1: Google Earth. Accessed Dec. 13th, 2010. Figure 2: Google Earth. Accessed Dec. 13th, 2010. Figure 3: Flickr Creative Commons, Storm Crypt, < > accessed Dec. 13th, 2010. Figure 5: Wikimedia Commons, Ha Petit, < > accessed Dec. 13th, 2010. Figure 6: Wikimedia Commons, < accessed Nov 29th, 2010 Why is the South China Sea contentious? - BBC News BBC News Why is the South China Sea contentious? 12 July 2016 Close share panel Image copyright Getty Images Image caption China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims over territory in the South China Sea Rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but tension has steadily increased in recent years. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.

China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols. The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes, but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them "freedom of navigation" operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes. Both sides have accused each other of "militarising" the South China Sea. There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The Paracels and the Spratlys are two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries What is the argument about? It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys - two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries. Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal. Why are they worth arguing over? Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The sea is a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them.

There has been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighbouring areas. The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region. Who claims what? China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption A map issued by Beijing shows the two island groups falling entirely within its territory Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan. However, critics say China has not clarified its claims sufficiently - and that the nine-dash line that appears on Chinese maps encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates. It is also not clear whether China claims only land territory within the nine-dash line, or all the territorial waters within the line as well.

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal, or Huangyan Island as it is known in China Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the documents to prove it. The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping. Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The Philippines has invoked its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim Recent flashpoints The most serious trouble in recent decades has flared between Vietnam and China, and there have also been stand-offs between the Philippines and China. Some of the incidents include: In 1974 the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops. In 1988 the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors. In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal. Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration operations in late 2012 led to large anti-China protests on Vietnam's streets. In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.

Have they tried to reach a resolution? China prefers bilateral negotiations with the other parties. But many of its neighbours argue that China's relative size and clout give it an unfair advantage. Some countries have argued that China should negotiate with Asean (the Association of South East Asian Nations), a 10-member regional grouping that consists of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia. However, China is opposed to this, while Asean is also divided over how to resolve the dispute. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption China has opposed negotiations with Asean, a 10-member regional grouping The Philippines has sought international arbitration instead. In 2013, it announced it would take China to an arbitration tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In July 2016, the tribunal backed the Philippines' case, saying China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights. China had boycotted the proceedings, and called the ruling "ill-founded". It says it will not be bound by it.

About TED Categories and Clusters CASE NUMBER: 325 CASE MNEMONIC: SPRATLY CASE NAME: Spratly Islands Dispute A. IDENTIFICATION 1. The Issue The Philippines made their first claim in the area--which they refer to as the Kalayaan islands--in 1975 and has been developing oil in the region between the Spratlys and the island of Palawan since 1976. The Philippines real history in the region began in May 1956 when a private Philippine expedition surveyed and occupied some of the islands. The Philippines were a trusteeship of the Allied powers at the time and the guarantee of Allied protection kept the Philippines from garrisoning troops on its islands. However, as that guarantee weakened the Philippines decided to beef up its defense. In 1976, it set up a garrison on Palawan and in 1978 it established more soldiers on seven of the islands. There are currently about 1,000 Marines stationed on the islands. In 1979, the Philippines stated that it only wanted control of the seven islands under its control and administration and not the rest of the archipelago. 2.

Description Malaysia has been involved in the dispute since 1979. It currently has control over three of the islands but claims the whole chain. Malaysiaws case is based on the fact that the islands are part of its continental shelf. This gives it right to the islands under the Law of the Sea Convention. Brunei's claims to the island also rest on the Law of the Sea. It states that the southern part of the Spratly chain is actually a part of its continental shelf and therefore its territory and resources. Taiwan has maintained a garrison on the biggest of the islands since 1956. Its claims to the island are based on its assertion that Taiwan and its Kuomintang government are the true China. Both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China say that the islands were discovered by Chinese navigators, used by Chinese fishermen for centuries, and under the administration of China since the 15th century. Further, the Kuomintang sent a naval expedition to the islands and took formal possession in 1946. It left a garrison on the largest island of Itu Aba.

However, since Taiwan claims to be the true China, it believes the islands belong to it and not to the PRC. Its main concern is that China alone or China and Vietnam will gain control and thus, have a monopoly on the South China Sea. China and Vietnam are the main protagonists in the dispute. Vietnam claims to the islands--which they call the Truong Sa islands--are part of the empire of Annam, Vietnam's ancestor, in the l9th century. In 1815, an expedition sent by king Gia Long to chart sea lanes occupied and settled the islands. The French, who were Vietnamws colonial rulers, annexed the Spratlys in 1933, so Vietnam says the islands are theirs as the inheritors of the French possessions. In September 1973, Vietnam declared that the Spratlys were part of the Phuoc Tuy province. It has since stated that the Philippines are occupying part of its territory. Vietnam currently holds three islands. China's claims to the island are based on the same history as Taiwan's claim.

The PRC government maintains that it is the legitimate Chinese government and that, therefore, the islands--which they call the Nansha islands--are their territory. They have been the most belligerent in pursuing their claim. The dispute between China and Vietnam picked up in 1988. Chinese naval vessels sailed into the Spratlys in January 1988 and Chinese marines started building defenses on one of the largest islands--the first time China has settled soldiers on the islands. In March, fighting broke out between Vietnam and China and China sunk two Vietnamese ships. While they have moved to more political means of dealing with the dispute, tensions remain high in the area. Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted with a US firm to begin testing for oil sights, even though the territorial issue remains far from solved. Occassional harassment of fishermen by all sides continues as well. Each of the six countries maintain its claim to all the islands. The protagonists have been discussing the possibility of shelving the sovereignty issue to undertake joint development of its resources and have sent a joint scientific team to run tests on resource potential. The dispute has not been taken to any official forum as of this date. Indonesia tried to start talks among the disputants.

Jakarta believed that as a non-involved Asian country, it could be an impartial mediator. No decisions on sovereignty were reached at the meetings but the disputants did agree to send a scientific team to the islands to assess their resource potential and the environmental condition. 3. Related Cases SHETLAND case MINAMATA case DOOSAN case BALTIC case BLACKSEA case MEDIT case BOLSEA case Keyword Clusters (1): Forum = Philippines (2): Bio-geography = TROPical (3): Environmental Problem = OIL/GAS 4. Draft Author: Leigh Powell (May, 1994) B. LEGAL Cluster 5. Discourse and Status: DISagreement and INPROGress So far no measures have been instituted but the territorial dispute has proven to be the most effective ban because it has prevented exploitation of the oil and natural resources completely. 6. Forum and Scope: CHINA and REGION 7. Decision Breath: 4 (Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and China) 8. Legal Standing: TREATY The Law of the Sea Convention -- an international law/standard agreed to by the countries of the world -- is involved in the claims of Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

These three countries claim that all or part of the islands are a part of their continental shelf. According to the Law of the Sea, the countries have legal right over the area of their continental shelf. In 1987 China claimed that the Hainan Island--the closest recognized Chinese territory to the islands--was a separate province that would be developed as a special economic zone and declared a new law on its territorial waters in 1992. These laws gave China a greater basis for claiming control over the Spratlys as a "contiguous zones" for territory. C. GEOGRAPHIC Cluster 9. Geographic Locations a. Geographic Domain : Asia b. Geographic Site : East Asia c. Geographic Impact : Philippines 10. Sub-National Factors: NO 11. Type of Habitat: TROPical D. TRADE Cluster 12. Type of Measure: Regulatory Standard [REGSTD] 13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: INDirect 14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact a. Directly Related : YES OIL/GAS b. Indirectly Related : NO c. Not Related : NO d.

Process Related : YES Pollution Sea [POLS] 15. Trade Product Identification: OIL 16. Economic Data 17. Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness: LOW 18. Industry Sector: OIL/GAS China estimates the natural reserves to be in the billions of US dollars to $1 trillion. US estimates are much lower given the deep water conditions and geology of the ocean floor. 19. Exporter and Importer: PHILippines and MANY E. ENVIRONMENT Cluster 20. Environmental Problem Type: Pollution Sea [POLS] 21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species Name: Many Type: Many Diversity: PHILippines 22. Impact and Effect: LOW and PRODuct 23. Urgency and Lifetime: MEDIUM and 100s years 24. Substitutes: Biodegradable products VI. OTHER Factors 25. Culture: NO 26. Trans-Border: NO 27. Rights: YES 28. Relevant Literature Cushing, Jerry. Far Eastern Economic Review. 17 March 1988 Day, Alan J. Borders and Territorial Disputes.

Gale Research Center. Detroit. 1982. Heinzig, Dieter, Disputed islands in the South China Sea: the Paracels, Spratlys, and Pratas. Wiesbaden, 1976.

Question: The Spratly Islands lie in which body of water?
Answer: The South China Sea