Gang of Four Trial For additional information about the trial and a Chinese language version of this account, see: The Gang of Four (GoF) was the name given to a leftist political group composed of four Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members. They wielded significant power during China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and were subsequently charged of various crimes. Their trial in late 1980 represented a significant change in China’s history since the founding of P.R.C. in 1949. The Gang of Four at trial. From left to right: Zhang Chunqiao,Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Jiangqing. (1980/11/20) I. Background In 1966, Mao Zendong, the Chairman of the CCP, launched the Cultural Revolution, the proclaimed aim of which was to “root out and right-wing capitalist who infiltrated the party.” In the following ten years or so, millions of “Red Guards” (mostly young people) across the country were mobilized to destroy the “right-wing capitalists” --- mostly the intelligentsia and bureaucrats.

While Mao was worshiped like a “living God,” almost all the high-level officials who disagreed with Mao were persecuted. During the Cultural Revolution, the GoF, representing the leftist political faction within the CCP, essentially became the central mobilizing force at the National level. The leading figure of the GoF was Jiangqing, Mao’s third and last wife, who became a member of the Politburo in 1969. Her three other associates were all high-level officials by 1976 ---- Zhang Chuanqiao was a vice-Primer Minister of the State Council, Wang Hongwen was vice-chairman of CCP, Yao Wenyuan was a Sectary of CCP in Shanghai. They also held many other positions in the Party, government and even military. Immediately after Mao’s Death on December 9, 1976, a power struggle occurred between the “leftists” GoF and the “rightists”--- an alliance led by Deng Xiaoping and Marshall Ye Jianying. At that time, the nominal “head” of the country was Hua Guofeng, who was Mao’s designated successor.

Although Hua was clearly faithful to Mao, it was unclear whether he would support the “leftist” or the “rightist.” Indeed, Mao chose Hua as his successor largely because Hua was a compromise candidate between the “leftists” and “rightists.” Upon Mao’s death, both sides attempted to convince or even coerce Hua to surrender power to them. The GoF were particularly aggressive. With effective control over the State’s media, the GoF continued to denounce Deng and his “rightist” ally. The top leaders of China standing before Mao's remains after Mao's death on Sep. 9, 1976. From left to right: Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Hua Guofeng, Mao Yuanxin, Yao Wenyuan, Chen Xillian, Wang Dongxing. (1976/9/12) After almost three weeks’ struggle, Hua finally leaned toward the “rightist” side. He consented to Marshall Ye’s suggestion to arrest the GoF. However, they knew it was not an easy task. The GoF had certain control in military.

Being aware the risk, Hua and Ye secretly worked out a detailed “kidnap” plan. II. Arrest In the evening of October 6, 1976, each member of the GoF was informed to attend an emergency session of the Politburo. The session was to take place in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. As several important issues were to be discussed, all Politburo members were required to attend the session. Some time between 7:55 PM and 8:30 PM on that day, the members of GoF came to the Great Hall of People. One by one, they were apprehended by military personnel as soon as they passed through the doors into the entrance lobby. All was done in superb efficiency. Without any gunfire, the members of GoF and some of their associates were captured. They did not even have a chance to cry for “help.” In the same night, the GoF and their associates were transported to Qincheng prison, a maximum-security prison located in northwestern Beijing. Also in that night, the Hua group met with other Politburo members informed them that the GoF had been arrested. Soon, the public denunciations of the GoF began.

In many cities around the country, a lot of people gathered to celebrate the arrest of GoF. The trial, however, would not begin until four years later. III. Between Arrest and Trial Between the arrest of the GoF in October 1976 and their formal trial in November 1980, China’s political landscape underwent significant changes. While the “rightists” gradually consolidated their power, the GoF’s influence was quickly diminishing. In July 1977, the “rightist” leader Deng Xiaoping came to power. A year later, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee (NPCCC) became a turning point in modern Chinese history. In the Plenum, the Party officially ended the Culture Revolution and its class-struggle ideology, proclaiming “Four Modernization” as its goal.

In September 1979, in the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh NPCCC, Marshal Ye Jianying declared that the Cultural Revolution “an appalling catastrophe” and “the most severe setback to the socialist cause since 1949.” During the same Plenum, Deng proposed to hold an open trial of the GoF so as to show the CCP’s determination to “correct” the mistakes of Cultural Revolution and to educate the public. A special panel was formed to direct the trial. In February 1980, Deng called on the convention of the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh NPCCC. The Committee elevated Deng's proteges Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. In addition, the Committee ｄｅｃｌａｒｅd the innocence of Liu Shaoqi, one top CCP leader who was allegedly persecuted to death by the GoF during the Cultural Revolution. At the Fifth National People's Congress session in August and September 1980, Deng's protege Zhao Ziyang became the Primer Minister. Also, the Congress authorized the establishment of a “Special Prosecutor Team” as well as two “Special Courts” to try the GoF and their associates.

The trial was to begin in November 1980. IV. Trial The trial formally began on November 20 , 1980. More than 880 “representatives of the masses” from all parts of the country attended the “open trial.” Among them were some family members of senior officials who were prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Also, there were more than 300 journalists from various parts of the country. All the ten defendants, including GoF and their six associates, were brought to court on the first day of the trial. Also, ten defense attorneys appeared with their clients. (Several days before the trial, the defendants were asked whether they want a defense attorney to represent them. Five of the ten defendants said “yes” while the other five said “no.” Each defendant who wanted the assistance of council was assigned two attorneys.) The courtroom on the first day of trial. Ten defendants were sitting in the front row. (1980/11/20) At about 3:20 PM, the prosecution began the “opening statement.” They had prepared a 20,000-word indictment, portions of which had been printed in China’s major newspapers the day before the trial.

The indictment charged the GoF and their associates of various crimes that took place during the Cultural Revolution, including treasure, persecution of others, attempts to seize power, training a large militia to oppose the regular army, and other “Anti-Revolution crimes.” Particularly, it specified that during the Cultural Revolution, the GoF “persecuted” 750,000 people, 34,375 of whom died, though it is dubious how these ten individuals could persecute so many people. Because the indictment was too long for a prosecutor to read, two prosecutors alternated in reading the indictment. Although the defense attorneys were present in the courtroom, they did not have a chance to make their “opening statement” that day. In the following forty days or so, the GoF were to be tried by the No. 1 “Special Court,” while their associates would be tried by the No. 2 “Special Court.” It is impossible to provide a detailed account of the trial here. The following part outlines some of the major issues raised during the trial of GoF in the No. 1 “Special Court.” A.

The Plot to Seize Power (of CCP) In the morning of November 24, the prosecution announced the charge against the GoF that they attempted to seize power in 1974. According to the prosecutor, when the former Primer Minister Zhou En’lai fell ill in 1972, he convinced Chairman Mao to bring back the then “exiled” Deng Xiaoping to serve as the First Vice-Primer Minister. Because the GoF “purged” and exiled Deng during Cultural Revolution, they worried about Deng’s retaliation. Therefore, they conspired to prevent Deng from re-gaining power. The first witness took stand was Wang Hongwen, who testified that he secretly went to see Mao on October 18, 1974. The purpose was to intimated Mao that Deng and Prime Minister Zhou were conspiring against Mao’s leadership, so as to undermine Deng’s “rehabilitation.” He further testified that he was acting under the instructions of Jiang and Zhang. In the afternoon of the same day, Yao Wenyuan also admitted that he participated in the plot. However, he attempted to defend himself by reading a “defense statement” he himself drafted before the trial.

Also, Yao’s lawyers argued that Yao only played an “accessory” role during the plot and therefore should be treated leniently. [i] On November 26, Jiang testified for the first time. When the judge asked her about the plot, she replied with “I can not remember.” Then, the prosecutor called on Wang and two other individuals to testify about the plot. Upon hearing the testimony, Jiang still denied any participation in the plot. She requested to “cross-examine” Wang. But the judge dismissed her request. Jiang began to shout, “This trial is nothing more than a parody of justice!” At that point, the judge ordered the court personnel to escort Jiang out of the courtroom. B. Persecution of Liu Shaoqi The trial revealed many details of GoF’s persecution of senior officials during the Cultural Revolution. Particularly, the persecution of Liu Shaoqi gained special attention during the trial. Liu had been one of the top leaders of CCP during China’s revolutionary years since 1920s. In 1959, he was elected to be the Chairman of PRC, succeeding Mao, who served as the Chairman between 1954 and 1959.

He was then re-elected to be the Chairman in 1965. However, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu quickly became the subject of Red Guards’ attack. In December 1966, the Red Guards began to publicly denounce Liu as a “traitor.” Within three years, Liu was persecuted to death. Liu’s wife was “arrested” by Red Guards in January 1967 and then imprisoned for almost twelve years before being released in 1979. She was attending the trial as an observer. [ii] Wang Guangmei, Liu Shaoqi's wife, was being publicly denounced at Tsinghua University. (1967/4/1) On November 27, 1980, Zhang Chunqiao was brought to the court. After the prosecutors announced the changes that Zhang played a key role in persecuting several of former Chinese leaders, the judge demanded Zhang to respond. However, Zhang refused to speak. The chief judge warned Zhang that he could be convicted despite his silence. Zhang disregarded the warning as if he heard nothing.

Later, reporters would describe Zhang as “the most obstinate member of the GoF” because he barely said anything throughout the forty-day trial. As Zhang had rejected government’s offer to provide attorney assistance, none spoke on his behalf throughout the trial. Then the prosecutor called on its witness Kuai Dafu, who was a student at Stinghua University in 1966 and later became a prominent leader of “Red Guards” in Beijing. Kuai testified that on December 18, 1966, Zhang privately met him and instigated him to mobilize Red Guards to “overthrow” Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, the deputy Prime Minister at that time. Under the instructions of Zhang, Kuai summoned more than 5,000 students on December 25, and began to publicly denounce Liu and Deng. The news shocked many Chinese at that time. After all, both Liu and Deng were top leaders of PRC. On December 3 and December 5, the prosecutors introduced further evidence that the GoF, particularly Jiang and Zhang, played a key role in persecuting Liu and other senior officials.

Several witnesses testified that they were tortured to “expose” Liu and his wife’s “crimes." Also, the prosecutor introduced evidence that several individuals were tortured to death because they refused to falsely testify against Liu. Finally, another individual testified that Kang Sheng, one of Jiang’s close associates in the early years of Cultural Revolution, wrote the report about Liu’s crime based on mostly fabricated evidence or allegations without evidence. Jiang then relied on the report to “convict” Liu. The persecution eventually resulted in Liu’s death in November 12，1969. Faced with the evidence, Jiang did not deny her participation in the persecution of Liu. However, she argued that she was only an “assistant” in persecuting Liu, implicating that she was merely following the orders of Mao. Moreover, she asked: “most members of the CCP Central Committee at that time denounced Liu. If I am guilty, why not hold them guilty as well?” This remark irritated the Chief Judge. He ordered Jiang to “shut up!” In response, Jiang shouted “Revolution is glorious! Revolution is no crime!” This is a familiar slogan during Culture Revolution. The judge ordered the court personnel to escort Jiang out of the courthouse.

At that point, Jiang seemed to be crazy, reportedly shouted “I was Chairman Mao's dog. I bit whomever he asked me to bit!" Again, she implicated Mao into the persecution of Liu and other senior officials. Jiang Qing at trial. On the left, she was listening to the indictment. On the right, Jiang was being escorted out of the courthouse. She was still shouting "Revolution is glorious!" (1980/11) C. Jiang’s Persecution of Artists Before marrying Mao in 1938, Jiang had been an actress in Shanghai. In early 1930s, Jiang fell in love with Tang Na. Many artist friends witnessed their love affairs. After marrying Mao, Jiang attempted to cover up her earlier “scandals.” Particularly during the Cultural Revolution, she threw many of her early artist friends to prison so that they would not disclose her “private matters” to the public. Several witnesses were called on to testify about Jiang’s persecution of some of her artist friends. For example, Jiang Tengjiao testified that in October 1966 he lead 40 people to carry out raids on the homes of several well-know actors and writers.

They were acting under the order of Jiang Qing. The purpose of the raids was to search for “love letters,” photos and other potentially damaging materials related to Jiang Qing's early career in Shanghai. Later, they arrested the actors and threw them in jail. Another witness was Huang Chen, the wife of a famous artist. She described how their home was searched and their property confiscated or destroyed by “Red Guarders” dispatched by Jiang, and how her husband was secretly arrested and then tortured to death. Huang shed tears while recapitulating the story. Jiang attempted to converse with Huang by saying “A’Huang, I do not know about this.” Huang was in such a rage that she shouted “shut up! You are such an evil person that you have no right to talk with me at all!” D. Summary of the Trial As the trial went on, Jiang became increasingly defiant.

On December 24, after the Chief Judge summarized the charges against Jiang, Jiang suddenly stand up and loudly accused the Chief Judge as a “fascist.” She claimed that “the real purpose of the trial is to vilify Chairman Mao and the great Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao.” Obviously she was “defending” herself by cloaking herself in Mao's mantle. When the Judge reminded her to “rationally” defend herself, Jiang became even angry. “This trial is only a show trial. I do not bother to defend myself.” Jiang then announced that it would be “more glorious to have my head chopped off” and dared the court to execute her. On December 29, 1980, after the testimony of forty-nine witnesses and the showing of more than 870 pieces of evidence, the trial finally came to the end. Summing up the case, the Chief prosecutor acknowledged Chairman Mao’s “great contribution” to China, but also noted that Mao was responsible for the “plight” of people during the Cultural Revolution.

He argued that the GoF (particularly Jiang) can not escape punishment by raising Chairman Mao as a “shield.” He then cited some remarks of Mao in 1974 and 1975, trying to demonstrate that Mao disagreed with the GoF on many issues. He then demanded death sentence for Jiang. Upon hearing this, Jiang immediately began to shout “Revolution is glorious! Revolution is no crime!” Again, she was dragged out of the courthouse. On January 25, 1981, the sentences were handled down. Jiang and Zhang were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. Wang was sentenced to life imprisonment. Yao received a 20-year imprisonment sentence. There was no appeal process. IV. Aftermath On January 25, 1983, Both Jiang and Zhang death penalty sentence were commuted to life imprisonment. It was reported that Jiang showed no repentance on receiving the reduced sentence. Instead, she shouted “kill me! Why you do not kill me?” More than nine years later, on May 14, 1992, Jiang committed suicide in a hospital, after being released on medical grounds.

All other three members of the GoF have died. Wang Hongwen passed away in 1992. Yao Wenyuan was released on October 5, 1996, after finishing his twenty-year imprisonment. He then passed away in December 2006. Zhang Chunqiao passed away in 2005. Many westerners criticized the trial as a “show trial.” Indeed, the GoF were declared to be “guilty” in major Chinese newspapers moths before the trial. Also, some participating judges later revealed that the sentence to Jiang and Zhang ---- death penalty with a two-year reprieve --- were determined by the Politburo of CCP Central Committee before the trial. The real question was the “appropriate” sentences for other members of the GoF and their associates. Nevertheless, the trial was significant in China for several reasons. First, it discredited the GoF and other leftist radicals who initiated the Cultural Revolution. Second, it lowered public esteem for Mao without entirely discrediting him.

Third, it afforded the defendants an “open trial.” In spite of its numerous defects, the trial represented a progress compared with the situation in Culture Revolution, when individuals can be arrested, jailed and tortured without any formal trial. [i] Among the four members of the GoF, Yao Wenyuan was probably the one who made best efforts to defend himself. While all other three dismissed the government’s offer of assistance of lawyer, Yao did “accept” the offer. [ii] See., Liu Shaoqi (Wikipedia), available at . Victory over the “gang of four” Victory over the “gang of four” First Published: Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1977 Transcription, Editing and Markup: Sam Richards and Paul Saba Copyright: This work is in the Public Domain under the Creative Commons Common Deed . You can freely copy, distribute and display this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit the Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line as your source, include the url to this work, and note any of the transcribers, editors & proofreaders above.

For the third time in a year the masses of the Chinese people came onto the streets in their millions in August following the eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of China. They were jubilantly hailing the victory led by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng over the “gang of four” anti-Party clique. They demonstrated enthusiastically, militantly and joyfully, just as they did in their millions in October last year when the plot of the “gang of four” was first smashed, and just as they did in July this year to greet the decisions of the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee to expel the “gang of four” from the Party forever. Yet there are still forces in Britain in the Marxist-Leninist movement who block their ears to the triumphant shouts of the Chinese working people. Foremost among them are the handful of leaders of the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) who are intensifying their opportunist errors and heading straight down the path towards revisionism, trying to take their members with them. Despite an extensive programme of public meetings the CPBML has not held a single meeting on China for a whole year.

When asked about the view of the party on the victories in the class struggle in China comrades working in their bookshop, Bellman Books, have been told to say: “We don’t think its any of our business. “What an insult to the Chinese people and the British working class! What an insult to the Communist Party of China! The genuine socialist countries have been built mainly by their own workers and working people under their own Marxist-Leninist Parties. But international support is also a contributory factor. For example in the 1930’s British workers and progressive people gave internationalist assistance to the Chinese people’s struggle against Japanese imperialism. Small though that contribution was compared to the struggles of the Chinese people themselves and of the entire international’ Communist movement, we are proud of it. Today socialist China is a great base area supporting revolution throughout the world. We are immensely inspired by the victories of the Chinese working class. The fact that one fifth of the world’s population is already living under socialism makes a tremendous difference to the balance of forces in the world. In the past when the Soviet Union was also a great socialist state it inspired and strengthened the working class throughout the world.

Then, when it was taken over by Khrushchev’s clique of revisionists the loss to the working class was of world-wide significance. Genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organisations came into existence in country after country in the struggle against modern revisionism headed by the Soviet revisionist clique. It was and still is very much the “business” of all of us. Now in the critical period after the death of the great leader and teacher Mao Tsetung when the great Communist Party of China was similarly threatened by a band of revisionists, the leaders of the CPBML try to tell us “it is none of our business”! Their motives are sinister. They are not being open and aboveboard. What they really mean to do is to encourage as many genuine revolutionaries as possible to withhold support from the Communist Party of China headed by Hua Kuo-feng. In fact they regard the class struggle in China as being very much their business. And their business is to try to give tacit support to the anti-Party clique of Wang, Chang, Chiang and Yao, the “gang of four”!

They want to see the Communist Party of China taken over by revisionists in the hope that these revisionists will support their own opportunist line on the class struggle in Britain and the world. TWO TELLING REASONS Class struggle in a socialist country can often be protracted and complicated. The leaders of the CPBML have had plenty of time to make up their minds on the present struggle and give a lead to the working class. But honest rank and file comrades may still be confused. How do we know that Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and the Central Committee are the genuine supporters of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and revolutionary aims? There are two simple telling reasons which no opportunist or revisionist can deny. 1. The Enthusiasm of the Masses All commentators including bourgeois commentators on China, report the tremendous enthusiasm of the masses about the overthrow of the “gang of four” and in favour of the present leadership of Chairman Hua. This was seen in October 1976 immediately after the downfall of the “gang”. It was seen after the 3rd Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in July 1977 and again after the triumphant 11th Congress in August 1977.

These demonstrations were far more widespread among the masses and far livelier than the demonstrations in April 1976 after the Tien An Men Square incident when the “gang of four” were in control of a large amount of power and influence. The fact that the Party has been able to smash the conspiracy of the “gang of four” without fighting and bloodshed is because of the overwhelming support of the people and the extreme isolation of the anti-Party clique from the masses. Is this isolation significant or not? To armchair “super-revolutionaries” this was very unfortunate for the “gang of four” but in no way significant. To Mao Tsetung however, isolation from the masses is of tremendous significance. He wrote in 1945: Twenty-four years of experience tell us that the right task, policy and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably strengthen our ties with the masses, and the wrong task, policy and style of work invariably disagree with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably alienate us from the masses. (’Quotations’, p 123) The “gang of four” were extremely alienated and isolated from the masses.

That’s not accidental. It was because they were a band of revisionists out to seize power for themselves and serve the bourgeoisie, not the working class and working people. That is its significance. 2. Hua was chosen by Mao himself In 1975 Premier Chou En-lai, who had stood at Chairman Mao’s right hand for forty years, became too ill to carry on the day to day business of the government. At this time two prominent, members of the “gang of four” might have been expected to take over out of seniority, Chang Chun-chiao or Wang Hung-wen. Wang Hung-wen had sat on Mao’s right hand side at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Chang Chun-chiao had acted as deputy prime minister. Yet they were passed over. In their place, on Chairman Mao’s proposal, Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping took up the day to day work of the government. This was an unmistakable slap in the face for the “gang of four”. It is a proof that by 1975 significant errors by the “gang of four” were already coming to light which they were not correcting through self-criticism.

Mao Tsetung was clearly determined not to give any more power to the “gang of four”. On January 8th 1976 the great revolutionary Chou En-lai died. Following this, on Chairman Mao’s proposal Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, who had previously held somewhat more junior positions in the leadership, was appointed “Acting Premier”. Once again it is unmistakable that Mao Tsetung deliberately passed over the “gang of four” as undesirable candidates. On April 17th 1976 on Mao Tsetung’s personal proposal the Central Committee went further: Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Premier and First Vice-Chairman. Again Chairman Mao’s intentions in blocking the “gang of four” are unmistakable. In particular no-one has ever held the position of “First Vice-Chairman” in the Party before. Can any of the supporters of the “gang of four”, open or hidden, think of a case? Or do they imagine Chairman Mao overlooked the little word “First”!

No, it is quite clear that this was a major strategic decision by Mao Tsetung to ensure that the Party and state leadership would not fall into the hands of the “gang of four” even when he was critically ill or had passed away. STUDY THE CRITICISM OF THE “GANG OF FOUR” These two telling reasons for supporting Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and the Communist Party of China – the enthusiasm of the masses and the decisions of Chairman Mao – cannot be denied even by the most cynical supporter of the “gang of four”. They are based on entirely independent evidence. In addition we most strongly urge all comrades to study material by the Communist Party of China exposing and criticizing the “gang of four”. The material is militant and careful, lively and factual, as well as penetrating and profound. This is no bourgeois hatchet job like Khrushchev’s secret speech slandering Stalin. It is the work of a great and deeply tempered revolutionary party drawing searching lessons to arm its battles in the future. These articles, in Peking Review and other Chinese publications, tell of how Chairman Mao repeatedly warned the “gang of four” of their growing errors.

But they did not listen because of their arrogance and their reactionary class background which they tried to cover up. These articles and particularly the powerful speech by Chairman Hua at the 11th Congress of the CPC, show how the “gang of four” perverted Mao’s great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under the pretext of waging the class struggle they treated contradictions amongst the people as contradictions with the enemy. They attacked many good people and tried to destroy comrades instead of helping them correct their mistakes. Their aim was to overthrow a large number of leading comrades and seize power themselves in the name of continuing the revolution. This is indeed revisionism, dressing bourgeois ideology and politics up in clothes of Marxism to receive the working class and the people. Had the “gang of four” succeeded in their plot they would have tried to turn the great Communist Party of China into a fascist party. Furthermore the rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie, they would have turned China from a socialist country to a capitalist country. Once again they have demonstrated their preference for opportunism rather than standing up for the true interests of the working class.

We call on all genuine Marxist-Leninists in Britain to refute this opportunist stand of the leaders of the CPBML and themselves to come out clearly in support of the great Communist Party of China headed by Chairman Hua and against the line, policies and practice of the “gang of four”! In its victorious struggle against the “gang of four” and its campaign to overcome their influence the Communist Party of China has been able to gain an even firmer grasp of Mao Tsetung’s invaluable teachings. In particular it has emphasised the importance of these basic principles, the “Three Do’s and Three Don’ts”: Practice Marxism and not revisionism, unite and don’t split, be open and above board, and don’t intrigue and conspire. These principles have tremendous significance for the international communist movement and for the struggle to rally all genuine Marxist-Leninists in Britain for the central task of building the revolutionary Communist Party. We must study them well and really take them to heart as we express our militant revolutionary support for the victory of the Communist Party of China over the “gang of four”.

BBC ON THIS DAY | 11 | 1976: China's 'Gang of Four' arrested About This Site | Text Only 1976: China's 'Gang of Four' arrested The new chairman of China's Communist Party, Hua Guofeng, has ordered the arrest of four leading radicals in Peking. It is a sign that China is changing political direction following the death last month of Chairman Mao Zedong. The so-called Gang of Four is led by Chairman Mao's widow Jian Qing, and includes Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao. They were active proponents of the Cultural Revolution instigated ten years ago by Chairman Mao. This was a political and ideological campaign aimed at reviving revolutionary fervour and resulted in enormous social, economic and political upheaval. Ideological cleansing began with attacks by young Red Guards on so-called "intellectuals" to remove "bourgeois" influences. It is believed millions were forced into manual labour, and tens of thousands were executed. Mr Zhang rose up the ranks during the first year of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai and was until recently chief political commissar of the armed forces.

Mr Wang had less power but was regarded a wonderboy - he rose to number three in the party in 1973 while still only in his late thirties, relatively young by Chinese standards. Mr Yao, also a member of the Politburo standing committee, is regarded as dedicated, if not fanatical, in his belief in Maoist ideals of social development. 'Forged will' Jian Qing, formerly an actress, became Chairman Mao's third wife in 1939. She is regarded as a radical and active proponent of Maoist principles but in the years before his death, had led an independent life from her husband. News of the arrests have not been confirmed by China's officials but it is believed the four were attempting a coup in the wake of the death of Chairman Mao on 9 September. Some reports say Jian Qing was in the process of forging Chairman Mao's will placing her as Mao's successor, when she and her associates were surrounded by Hua Guofeng's personal bodyguards and placed under house arrest. They are being questioned about their campaign against former prime minister Zhou Enlai, who died in January.

Commentators say the arrests might lead to a liberalisation of foreign, cultural and economic policy -the Times newspaper editorial calls this latest move "the most potent sign of a new political direction" following 27 years of Maoist dogma. The Gang of Four Search for: The Gang of Four The Gang of Four was a quartet of political and economic radicals who emerged as powerbrokers during the Cultural Revolution. The most notable member of the gang was Jiang Qing or ‘Madame Mao’; others were career communists Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen. There were other party members not in the four but involved on the periphery, such as Chen Boda, Mao Zedong’s leading speech writer and editor. As Mao’s health waned the Gang of Four began working to accumulate influence in and control of the party post-Mao, though to what extent they were protecting Mao’s ideological vision or simply making a selfish grab for power is speculative. This rise of the Gang of Four stemmed from a confluence of events in the early 1970s.

After the flight of Lin Biao and his fiery death in a plane crash, the Cultural Revolution began to lose its purpose and energy; the People’s Liberation Army re-established control and therefore lessened the singular control of the CCP. Within the party itself, Mao’s worsening health took him away from the helm more; and in 1973 Zhou Enlai engineered the rehabilitation and return of Deng Xiaoping. The Gang of Four, recognising that Mao’s death was imminent and that a moderate bloc of Zhou and Deng might seize power, decided to manoeuvre in order to be best-placed to seize the party leadership when the time came. It seems they had Mao’s blessing: at the tenth CCP Congress in 1973 he ensured that the Gang of Four occupied key positions in the Politburo. “Unquestionably, the Gang of Four was at least tacitly supported by Mao in its various activities. Jiang’s most important qualification in exercising power was that she was Mao’s wife. To an extent the gang served as an instrument for Mao to realise his radical vision of ‘permanent revolution’ as a form of national development, yet in the process the gang also used Mao to enhance its own position and influence.

Together this ‘gang of five’ created a decade of destruction and terror in China.” Wang Ke-wen, historian The most active of the Gang was Jiang Qing, who continually worked to undermine political rivals (she launched the ‘Criticise Lin Biao’ propaganda campaign in late 1973, attempting to link the now-dead and discredited Lin Biao with the highly popular Zhou Enlai). In January 1976 Zhou’s long battle with cancer ended and the Gang of Four made its fatal mistake, forbidding public acts of mourning and tribute for Zhou, and preventing the state-run media from reporting on the people’s grief. The masses were outraged by this and in April ignored the prohibition on public assembly, gathering in enormous numbers in Tiananmen Square with flowers, poems and anti-Gang of Four placards. The Gang’s response was to send in the Beijing police: many were beaten, driven away or shot, while those carrying placards were whisked away to be summarily executed. Deng Xiaoping was linked with the Tiananmen ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and for a second time temporarily removed from office and purged from the CCP.

The so-called ‘Tiananmen Incident’ was the Gang of Four’s desperate response to public unrest, however it would soon backfire. When Mao himself died five months after (September 1976) the Gang of Four – with the people, the PLA and others in the Politburo against them – were soon deposed, arrested and charged with crimes against the people. It was at their subsequent show trials that they were dubbed the ‘Gang of Four’ (the term hadn’t been used previously) and all were given hefty prison sentences. © Alpha History 2015. Content on this page may not be republished or distributed without permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use . This page was written by Glenn Kucha and Jennifer Llewellyn. To reference this page, use the following citation: G. Kucha & J. Llewellyn, “The Gang of Four”, Alpha History, accessed [today’s date], This website uses pinyin romanisations of Chinese words and names. Please refer to this page for more information. What Was the Gang of Four?

Asian History Expert By Kallie Szczepanski The Gang of Four, or siren bang, was a group of four influential Chinese Communist Party figures during the latter years of Mao Zedong's rule. The Gang consisted of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and her associates Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao. Wang, Yao, and Zhang were all major party officials from Shanghai. They rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), pushing Mao's policies in China's second city. When Mao's health began to decline over that decade, they gained control of a number of major government functions. It is not clear how much control the Gang of Four really exercised over the policies and decisions surrounding the Cultural Revolution, and to what extent they simply carried out Mao's wishes. Although the Red Guards who implemented the Cultural Revolution across the country did revive Mao's political career, they also brought a dangerous degree of chaos and destruction to China. The unrest sparked a political struggle between a reformist group, including Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying, and the Gang of Four.

continue reading below our video Test Your General Science Knowledge When Mao died on September 9, 1976, the Gang of Four sought to take control of the country, but in the end none of the major players took power. Mao's choice, and his eventual successor, was the previously little known but reform-minded Hua Guofeng. Hua publicly denounced the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. On October 6, 1976, he ordered the arrest of Jiang Qing and the other members of her cabal. The official press gave the purged officials their nickname, "The Gang of Four," and asserted that Mao had turned against them in the last year of his life. It also blamed them for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, setting off a nation-wide round of denunciations against Jiang and her allies. Their major supporters in Shanghai were invited to Beijing for a conference, and were immediately arrested as well. In 1981, the members of the Gang of Four went on trial for treason and other crimes against the Chinese state.

Among the charges were the deaths of 34,375 people over the course of the Cultural Revolution, as well as the persecution of three-quarters of a million innocent Chinese. The trials were strictly for show, so the three male defendants did not mount any defense. Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan both confessed to all the crimes with which they were charged, and offered their repentance. Zhang Chunqiao quietly and steadfastly maintained his innocence throughout. Jiang Qing, on the other hand, yelled, cried, and ranted during her trial, shouting that she was innocent and had only obeyed orders from her husband, Mao Zedong. In the end, all four defendants were convicted. Wang Hongwen was sentenced to life in prison; he was released to a hospital in 1986, and died of an unspecified liver ailment in 1992 at just 56 years of age. Yao Wenyuan received a twenty year sentence; he was released from prison in 1996, and passed away from complications of diabetes in 2005. Both Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were sentenced to death, although their sentences were later commuted to life in prison.

Jiang was moved to house arrest at her daughter's home in 1984, and committed suicide in 1991. She reportedly had been diagnosed with throat cancer, and hanged herself to avoid suffering any longer from the condition. Zhang was released from prison on medical grounds in 1998 after being diagnosed with pancreatic cancer . He lived until 2005. The downfall of the Gang of Four signaled widespread changes for the People's Republic of China. Under Hua Guofeng and the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping, China moved away from the worst excesses of the Mao era. It established diplomatic and trade relations with the United States and other western countries, and began to pursue its current course of economic liberalization paired with firm political control. Gang of Four | Define Gang of Four at Dictionary.com Gang of Four noun 1. a group of four radical members of the Chinese Communist Party who were leaders of the Cultural Revolution and who were purged and imprisoned after the death of Mao Zedong: Jiang Qing (widow of Mao), Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao.

Expand Origin of Gang of Four Expand translation of Chinese sìrén bāng Dictionary.com Unabridged British Dictionary definitions for Gang of Four Expand noun 1. the Gang of Four, a radical faction within the Chinese Communist Party that emerged as a political force in the spring of 1976 and was suppressed later that year. Its members, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Jiang Qing, were tried and imprisoned (1981) Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition © William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © HarperCollins Publishers 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012 Word Origin and History for Gang of Four Expand 1976, translating Chinese sirenbang, the nickname given to the four leaders of the Cultural Revolution who took the fall in Communist China after the death of Mao.

Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2010 Douglas Harper Gang of Four in Culture Expand Gang of Four definition Four Chinese political leaders of the twentieth century who were closely associated with Mao Zedong (one of the four was his wife). They were denounced when moderates came to power in China in 1976 and were convicted in 1981 of committing crimes, such as torture, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition Copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. People invent new words all the time, but which ones actually make it?

Word of the Day Hua Guofeng, successor to Chairman Mao, dies - Telegraph Obituaries Hua Guofeng, successor to Chairman Mao, dies Hua Guofeng, the former Chinese Communist leader who died on Wednesday aged 87, changed the course of China’s modern history in October 1976 when, a few weeks after the death of Chairman Mao, he arrested the “Gang of Four”, the radicals led by Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow, who revelled in the turmoil unleashed by the Cultural Revolution and were determined to keep China focused on class-struggle and closed to the outside world. Hua's rise to the top in Beijing occurred in the context of Mao Zedong's growing awareness of his own mortality Photo: AP 3:25PM BST 20 Aug 2008 In thwarting the Gang’s plans with a series of dramatic midnight arrests in Beijing, Hua almost certainly saved his country from further unrest and, possibly, civil war.

Even more important, his spectacular, pre-emptive strike against the radicals paved the way for the return to power of the “moderates” led by Deng Xiaoping, who carefully unpicked Mao’s policies, as well as his reputation, and set China on the course of reform and opening to the outside world. The consequences of this decisive shift in the centre of gravity in Beijing are even now reshaping the international balance of power as rapid economic growth transforms China’s global standing. Amid the complexity, chaos and uncertainty of political life during the final months of Mao’s rule, Hua can have had little understanding of the forces that his decision to arrest the Gang would unleash. He was a stranger to boldness and vision. Neither a gifted ideologue nor an exceptional administrator, he reached the top through a mixture of good fortune and his loyalty to Mao, in whose home province of Hunan he served for more than two decades. Related Articles Gay rights champion dies 20 Aug 2008 Moreover, Hua was soon eclipsed by the forces he unleashed. His role in the reshaping of his country, though decisive, proved momentary.

A creature of the party he served rather than, as his status as Mao’s successor implied, its master, he was soon outwitted at every turn by opponents, chief among them Deng Xiaoping. Deng and his younger, reform-minded allies mercilessly undermined Hua in the years following Mao’s death, rendering him an almost pitiful figure. He held all the titles but none of the power. He advocated change, but not beyond that laid down by Mao, from whose strictures most Chinese were delighted at last to be free. He was a beneficiary of radical policies that the Party now had to abandon in order to survive. It was not long, then, before Hua’s own survival was in doubt. The only consolation was that he was let down gently. Although publicly criticised for his errors and eventually shunted out of office, Hua was not otherwise punished or persecuted. Instead, rather curiously, he retained his seat on the central committee continuously up until 2002, when, aged 81, he finally slipped into complete obscurity. Hua’s rise to the top in Beijing occurred in the context of Mao Zedong’s growing awareness of his own mortality.

As illness and age took their toll, the Chairman searched with increasing desperation for a successor to sustain and develop his revolution, which he believed to have barely begun despite his 20 years in power. Both former President Liu Shaoqi, a “moderate”, and Marshal Lin Biao, a brilliant military leader, had at different times been identified as heirs apparent. Yet neither of these members of the Communist “old guard” was to enter into his inheritance. Liu was toppled at the start of the Cultural Revolution and died in prison in 1969. Indeed, Mao launched the movement partly to defeat his erstwhile lieutenant’s vision of a Party composed of politically-loyal technocrats who would lead China towards economic modernisation. Lin, more radical but also more ambitious, died in a air crash in 1971, apparently while trying to flee to the Soviet Union after launching an abortive attempt to assassinate Mao. By the early 1970s Mao saw enemies everywhere. At home, the biggest threat came from Deng Xiaoping’s “bourgeois revisionism”, or penchant for economic reform, a vision too close to Liu’s for comfort.

Abroad, the principal worry was Moscow, the world headquarters of “revisionism”, and seat of Soviet expansionism. In 1972 Mao was forced to counter the threat from the north by welcoming President Richard Nixon to Beijing, and distantly embracing the country he had denigrated as a “paper tiger”. Since then, the ill health of Premier Zhou Enlai, ultimately loyal to Mao though no friend of the radicals, had raised the stakes in Beijing. The health of China’s Communist titans was deteriorating. The country’s destiny hung in the balance. All this provided fertile ground for the Gang of Four — a pejorative epithet that referred to Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen (a labour activist), Yao Wenyuan (a polemicist) and Zhang Chunqiao (a propaganda specialist). The Gang worked hard to capitalise on Mao’s declining powers and were in a good position to do so. The romance might have gone out of Mao’s marriage to Jiang Qing (the chairman’s predilection for ruddy-faced peasant girls, members of army dance troupes, and railway conductresses saw to that), but Jiang vigorously championed her husband’s political ideas.

Moreover, her status as the chairman’s wife seemed to render her untouchable. Of the other members of the Gang, Mao most favoured Wang Hongwen, whom he earmarked as Zhou Enlai’s successor. Everyone but the Chairman, however, knew that Wang was not up to running the government . Mao turned instead to the little-known Hua Guofeng, then a relative novice in elite politics who had joined the central committee as recently as 1969 and the Politburo in 1973. Mao and Hua appear to have met first when the latter was Party secretary in Shaoshan, Mao’s birthplace in Hunan. By that time Hua was in his late twenties. He had been born on February 16 1921 at Jiaocheng, Shanxi province , and joined the Red Army aged 15. In 1938 he became a full Party member, and was assigned to Hunan shortly after the Communists took over the province during the closing stages of the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists.

Hua’s position in Hunan meant that, as the cult of Mao flourished during the 1950s and 1960s, he became keeper of one of China’s “holiest” places. He kept the chairman informed of important developments in his hometown, which Mao visited rarely but with much fanfare. During the early 1960s Hua quickly sided with Mao when Hunan, along with dozens of other provinces, reaped the bitter harvest of the Great Leap Forward, the chairman’s programme of rural collectivisation. Millions died in the man-made famine that followed, but Hua downplayed the death toll and supported Mao against those who demanded that the communes be disbanded and family farming restored. He well understood that complacency in the face of the facts — however inconvenient or compelling they might be — and loyalty to superiors were the keys to advancement in Chinese Communist politics. Hua was required to grapple with “facts” of a different kind in 1971, when Mao is understood to have called on him to chair the group charged with investigating Lin Biao’s alleged plot to seize power.

The conduct and results of the investigation remain as mysterious as the events themselves, but Mao’s choice of Hua for this work said much about the Chairman’s trust in the younger, relatively untried provincial leader. Nevertheless, it was no preparation for the events of 1975, when Mao appointed him vice-premier and minister of public security. The promotion was something of a compromise. The key contenders to succeed the ailing Zhou as chief executive were Deng, whose ideological pragmatism and enthusiasm for market-style economic reforms were anathema to Mao, and one of the radicals (probably Wang Hongwen), whom Mao feared would plunge the country into fresh upheavals as they pursued their revolutionary goals. Since Hua owed his rise to the Cultural Revolution, Mao believed that he would hardly reverse course and side with Deng. And if it was true that Hua was something of a nonentity, that had its advantages: at least he had few enemies; he would probably be accepted, if not welcomed, by rivals in Beijing and beyond. So it proved. Zhou died in January 1976 and the following month Hua was made acting premier.

Jiang Qing and the other members of the Gang, though put out by the elevation of an upstart, had a bigger foe on their minds: Deng Xiaoping, who since his return to power in 1973 had backed Zhou against the radicals and was trying to build support for his programme of economic modernisation. Hua could be dealt with later; crushing Deng was a priority. It was also risky. The masses suddenly seemed to have had enough. The radicals’ shabby treatment of Zhou, and their persecution of Deng, who was seen as trying to restore stability to a country wracked by strikes, falling output and collective unease, became the touch paper of popular revolt. It was lit in April 1976, when tens of thousands of ordinary citizens flocked to Tiananmen Square to lay wreaths in honour of Zhou, whom the Gang seemed determined to deny the tributes he was due. Posthumous praise of Zhou was a direct attack on the Gang. It was also, at one remove, a protest against Mao and his policies. By further extension, it was a form of support for Deng Xiaoping. The radicals seemed to be on the ropes.

But the Gang impressed upon a nervous Hua Guofeng the dangerous nature of the events unfolding in Tiananmen Square and, on a smaller scale, in other major cities. They also managed to convince Mao that counter-revolutionaries, led by Deng, were at work. The movement was pronounced a counter-revolutionary rebellion and suppressed. Deng was dismissed from all his posts, and sought sanctuary among military allies in the south, where he plotted yet another comeback. In Beijing, Mao rewarded Hua by confirming him as premier and appointing him first vice-chairman of the Communist Party. His status as successor was now unambiguous. It was confirmed, at least in Hua’s mind, by a phrase the Chairman is said to have uttered to him at the end of April 1976: “With you in charge, I’m at ease.” A further five months passed before Hua inherited the power he had been promised, and they were five months of high drama. In July the death was announced of Zhu De, the military hero whose loyalty to Mao during the 1920s and 1930s did much to ensure the Chairman’s triumph in the decade that followed.

A few weeks later a huge earthquake struck Tangshan in Hebei province, spreading death and destruction to Tianjin and Beijing. Hua, unlike the Gang, was quick to visit the site and made a point of being seen to direct relief work at the frontline of a disaster that cost perhaps 250,000 lives. Then, on September 9, Mao died. A stunned nation contemplated a future without the semi-divine figure it had been told to lean on for guidance in every difficulty. In Beijing, however, there was everything to play for. The Gang and their allies, most of them in Shanghai, prepared to outmanoeuvre their opponents, Hua among them. The extent of their plotting, and indeed their readiness to seize power by force during the days following Mao’s death, will probably never be known. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that, if they were planning to topple Hua, they made a poor job of it. Shortly after Mao’s death, Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, two “moderates” on the Politburo, both of them friends of Deng, persuaded Hua that he must eliminate the Gang or be eliminated himself.

The country would not be at peace as long as the radicals were on the scene. It was imperative to strike quickly. With some reluctance, Hua concurred. On the night of October 6 1976 all four members of the Gang were arrested. The next day the Chinese people were told that Hua had been appointed chairman of the Communist Party. Rumours of the Gang’s dramatic demise spread among well-informed circles in Beijing, posing a particular dilemma for reporters: here was a sensational story for which early official confirmation (or denial) was unlikely, given the disarray in Chinese politics and the country’s long tradition of secrecy. Nigel Wade, Beijing correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, decided to break the story, which appeared on October 12 1976. A further week passed before the official Chinese media confirmed that the Gang had been arrested. If the arrest of Jiang Qing and her allies removed an immediate danger, Hua still faced numerous problems. Chief among them were questions of legitimacy and process, but there was also the question of the parlous state of the country. The economy was in disarray, the military disgruntled, and the public desperate for stability. The need for reform and modernisation was overwhelming.

This meant a need for new policies, and here Hua was cornered. A beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution and selected for greatness by Mao himself, he was hardly in a position to distance himself from the immediate past. In fact, he did the opposite, advocating what his opponents branded the “two whatevers policy”. The exact formulation of this curious theory was expressed in the People’s Daily: “We must resolutely uphold whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” This was a hopelessly inadequate response to the demands for change unleashed by Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang. It meant more class struggle and periodic cultural revolutions. Hua later adopted a more pragmatic approach in the form of the “four modernisations”, a wide-ranging programme of economic reforms that seemed to downplay class struggle and open China’s doors to the West. But his unrealistic economic goals bore a strong resemblance to the revolutionary fantasies of his predecessor. No wonder that Hua, buck-toothed and usually wearing a knowing smile, also paid homage to Mao in terms of his personal appearance. He abandoned his crew-cut in favour of longer hair, which he combed straight back in the style of the late chairman.

Within a year of the Gang’s arrest, power was beginning to ebb away from Hua. This was apparent during the Party’s 11th National Congress in August 1977, some of whose deliberations suggested a compromise between radicals and “moderates” but whose decision to appoint Deng the third most senior figure after Hua and Ye showed which way the wind was blowing. Hua soon faced a two-pronged attack. Allies of Deng Xiaoping countered the “two whatevers” theory with the equally arcane “practice criterion”, the view that political theories could be considered “correct” only insofar as they “worked”; they were not correct simply because Mao (or Marx) had invented them. Rather, they had to be put to the test. Meanwhile, in 1978 the Democracy Wall Movement began protesting on the streets of Beijing, attacking both the Gang and the system that brought them to power. For a while Deng looked upon the protestors, their numbers rapidly swelling, as auxiliaries in the campaign to capture power and champion reform. It was another form of pressure to bring to bear on Hua .

Many of the activists, however, wanted a change in the system, not just in the leadership; and when Deng decided that their criticism of the one-party state was intolerable, they branded him a dictator — a judgment he promptly confirmed by suppressing the movement and arresting its leading protagonists. By this time, Deng had gained ascendancy in the Party, hemming Hua in. Deng’s protégés, among them Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, both future Party leaders, occupied leading positions in the Party and the government. His policies, economic reform and opening up to the outside world, were endorsed at a crucial meeting of the central committee in December 1978. Hua was still Party chairman and prime minister — in which capacity he made an official visit to Britain in 1979 — but he looked like yesterday’s man. Within a year of Hua’s visit to London, Zhao Ziyang became premier; Hu Yaobang was made Party general-secretary ; and Deng took charge of the military. “Chairman” Hua retained his most prestigious title but enjoyed little dignity and less power. Yet appearances notwithstanding, a certain amount of delicacy was still required in dealing with Hua.

It was no part of the argument of Deng and his allies that Hua was an illegitimate leader. For one thing, Mao had appointed him. For another, he had arrested the Gang and prevented the radicals from seizing power. A comprehensive verdict on Chairman Mao, the Gang of Four and Hua Guofeng was published in June 1981. The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China sought to account for (and end discussion of) the turmoil and tragedies Mao and those around him inflicted on the Chinese people. It asserted that Mao’s mistakes, though significant, were those of a great revolutionary, and that the Party deserved to maintain its monopoly of power because, uniquely, it had demonstrated an ability to correct its own mistakes. The Resolution’s treatment of Hua was unflattering. He had played an important role in arresting the Gang but was said to have made many errors thereafter. Hua none the less remained Party chairman until 1982, when the post was abolished. Although disgraced, and promptly ousted from the Politburo, Hua retained his seat on the Central Committee for a further 20 years, though he was rarely seen in public.

Thereafter he was a forgotten figure; a man who helped China to break with an unhappy past and yet remained tarnished by it. Tiananmen Square Incident 1976 Tiananmen Square Incident 1976 Share By Charles Custer When people outside of China hear the word “Tiananmen,” they generally think of the 1989 protests and subsequent military crackdown that left hundreds (possibly thousands) dead and made headlines worldwide. But in fact, the Square has a rich history as a place of protest and remonstration with the government. In fact, the ‘89 protests aren’t the only major political protest to have occurred in the Square in the modern era. In 1976, with Mao Zedong close to death and his regime showing its cracks, another major incident -- generally called the Tiananmen Incident -- took place in the Square. What happened? By April of 1976, the Cultural Revolution had been raging for a decade, and China’s people were frustrated with the government leaders, especially the so-called Gang of Four, a group of prominent leaders (including Mao’s wife) that were increasingly running the government as Mao’s illness drew him away from the limelight.

There had already been a few minor outbursts of discontent, but the big one came in Tiananmen Square on April 4th and 5th. In 1976, April 5th was the day of the Tomb-sweeping festival , a traditional day of mourning and paying respect to the deceased. Zhou Enlai, one of China’s few truly beloved leaders at the time, had died in January, and hundreds of thousands of people came to the Square on April 4th to pay their respects and leave mourning wreaths and written messages of tribute at the Monument to the People’s Heroes (which is located in the Square). Zhou’s death was particularly sensitive because he has been such a popular figure, because his revolutionary credentials were unassailable, and because at the time of his death in January, the government had taken significant measures to curb displays of mourning, frustrating his many supporters. Thus a significant percentage of the messages left at the Square on April 4, 1976 were also scathing critiques of the government. Although few dared to criticize the government directly, their messages were full of historical and literary references that offered implicit criticism of Beijing’s leadership.

Needless to say, this greatly concerned the government, and after holding an emergency meeting to determine how to respond, they ordered soldiers to clear the Square overnight. There were still thousands of mourners there at the time, but they were driven away with clubs and batons. When people returned the next day and discovered that all of their messages were gone and that they were no longer allowed near the monument, there was great discontent but ultimately nothing further happened. The Aftermath In the wake of the incident, the Gang of Four referred to the protests in propaganda materials as the work of “capitalist roaders”, and linked the spontaneous demonstrations (probably erroneously) with Deng Xiaoping , who had been an ally of Zhou Enlai’s prior to his death. Deng was placed under house arrest, but he was rehabilitated just a few months later when Mao Zedong died and the Gang of Four was arrested following a bloodless coup d’etat. In 1978, the official government position on the Incident (which had been that it was a rightist display by capitalist roaders) was reversed, and it was labeled patriotic.

Although it did not last as long nor end as badly as the Tiananmen protests in 1989, the Tiananmen Incident of 1976 was in many ways foreshadowing for the 1989 protests. Both incidents began with a spontaneous outburst of mourning following the death of a popular high-level public figure, and both were ultimately concluded with force, although in the case of the 1976 incident there were no deaths and no gunfire or tanks.

Question: Where did the Gang of Four try to size power in 1976?
Answer: China