Ukraine's two different revolutions - BBC News BBC News By Oleg Karpyak BBC Ukrainian 3 December 2013 Close share panel Image caption As temperatures continue to fall, demonstrating on the streets is becoming more challenging Ukrainians are back on the streets nine years after the Orange Revolution - voicing similar aims but with a hardened sense of reality. What a sense of deja vu! Hundreds of protesters lie on the floor in sleeping bags, eating and chatting in the opulent conference hall of Kiev city council - just as they did nine years ago. But things have changed, as this time people did not wait for the city administration to open its doors voluntarily. Instead, they stormed the building on Sunday, broke a few windows and occupied the ground floor. In 2004-2005 mass protests lasting for two months - the Orange Revolution - helped bring to power pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko, who defeated his rival Viktor Yanukovych in a repeat run-off election. Now Mr Yanukovych, who took his revenge and was elected president in 2010, faces a wave of protests against his rule - the biggest since the Orange Revolution.

The mass demonstrations were triggered by his government's decision not to sign a wide-ranging association agreement with the European Union, because of pressure from Russia. Image caption Nationalist demonstrators are a conspicuous part of the protests in Kiev's Independence Square 'Horizontal' protesters Despite several clashes with police, which left dozens of people injured, the general mood of the protesters is rather peaceful. But you see almost no children on the streets of central Kiev, and many demonstrators wear plastic helmets and gas masks. That is miles away from the romantic feeling of the Orange Revolution. Yet some of the key anti-Yanukovych slogans are still there: "Out with the gang!" and "Out with the con!" The last refers to two alleged criminal convictions dating back to Mr Yanukovych's youth - convictions not documented in any official records. Something has changed, and in the right direction. It is not the president who must be replaced, but the whole system Yuriy Lutsenko, former interior minister Another major difference is the conspicuous presence of nationalist activists among the demonstrators. On the streets of Kiev, far-right youths in black balaclavas instruct volunteers to resist the riot police, and organise security shifts in the barricaded Independence Square.

Some of them are dedicated supporters of the ultra-nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party, which is one of three opposition forces in parliament. Another two parties involved in the protests are Fatherland, of the imprisoned former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Udar (Punch), led by heavyweight world boxing champion Vitali Klitschko. None of them seems to enjoy the full trust of the demonstrators - unlike 2004, when Mr Yushchenko's name became the main slogan of the Orange Revolution. That is why the new protests are sometimes described as "horizontal", rather than top-down, and truly social. "Today politics is conducted not in the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) or in the cabinet, but here, on the square," said Yuriy Lutsenko, a former "Orange" interior minister. Image caption Some protesters were given refuge at Kiev's St Michael Cathedral A former ally of Mr Yushchenko, he spent more than a year in jail after Mr Yanukovych came to power. His trial was widely seen as political by the Western powers. "Something has changed, and in the right direction. You have understood one thing.

It is not the president who must be replaced, but the whole system," Mr Lutsenko told the protesters in central Kiev. 'Eurorevolution' That raises a key issue for the opposition leaders: how exactly to change the system legitimately? Social networks are full of images and videos of riot police beating demonstrators and journalists. And there are no signs that the security forces are prepared to side with the protesters. The majority of MPs still back the president. In parliament, they defeated an opposition attempt to dismiss the government on Tuesday. They also reject demands to hold early presidential and parliamentary elections. As temperatures are falling below zero, demonstrating on the streets is becoming more and more challenging. More wood is needed for the fires to warm those manning the barricades, as more people come to Kiev from different parts of the country, to join the "Eurorevolution". Ukrainian Protests Compared to 2004 Orange Revolution Ukrainian Protests Compared to 2004 Orange Revolution Nov 25, 2013 — 23:00 Spy Games: How The Spectre of Surveillance Impacts Moscow’s Foreigners Protesters squaring off with riot police in front of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers building in Kiev on Monday.

Sergei Chuzavkov / AP Protests against the Ukrainian government's decision to delay an association deal with the European Union last week in favor of closer ties with Russia continued in Kiev on Monday, prompting memories of the 2004 Orange Revolution, while the EU issued a statement condemning Russia's actions in the dispute. Just as nine years ago, the protests have been driven by a feud between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces over the future of Ukraine, a key geopolitical prize in eastern Europe. The Kremlin was deeply angered by the outcome of the Orange Revolution, which saw demonstrators protest against the Russian government's favored presidential candidate and current Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who then lost to pro-Western politician Viktor Yushchenko in a re-run election. President Vladimir Putin has already accused the EU of being willing to sponsor protests to get its way this time around as well. Russia appears to have the upper hand in this dispute, but the European Union may end up drawing Ukraine into its fold eventually. "There is no geopolitical victory for Russia" in the suspension of EU talks, said Stanislav Belkovsky, head of the National Strategy Institute.

"The vector for European integration is irreversible … and the current protests are cementing that vector." According to various estimates, 50,000 to 200,000 people took to the streets in Kiev on Sunday, the largest protests since the Orange Revolution, while smaller rallies took place all over Ukraine. The Kiev protesters set up a protest camp on central square Evropeiska Ploshcha, clashed with police and tried to break a police cordon around the Cabinet building. Most of the people either went home or were dispersed by the police by Monday morning. But some remained, and more protesters poured into central Kiev on Monday, flocked to the Cabinet building again, fought with police and blocked Vulitsya Grushevskogo. The police used batons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators, and the authorities initiated a criminal case against protesters who clashed with police on Sunday on charges of hooliganism and resisting arrest. In Lviv — the major stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism and pro-Western sentiment — about 10,000 students demonstrated against the government on Monday, and all classes at universities were canceled, Kommersant reported.

As the standoff with the government escalated, Ukraine’s center-right Svoboda party urged the parliament to pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, while the liberal Batkivshchina party asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to initiate a criminal case against Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and the Cabinet for allegedly exceeding their authority by suspending the deal with the EU. The EU reacted to the developments in the country by issuing a statement Monday decrying Russia’s actions in relation to Ukraine. “While being aware of the external pressure that Ukraine is experiencing, we believe that short-term considerations should not override the long-term benefits that this partnership would bring,” said European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in the statement. “It is up to Ukraine to freely decide what kind of engagement they seek with the EU.” “Ukrainian citizens have again shown these last days that they fully understand and embrace the historic nature of the European association,” the EU leaders said, apparently referring to the protests. “We therefore strongly disapprove of the Russian position and actions in this respect. Stronger relations with the EU do not come at the expense of relations between our Eastern partners and their other neighbors, such as Russia.

The Eastern Partnership is conceived as a win-win where we all stand to gain,” they said. Russia has been accused of pressuring Ukraine to suspend the deal with the EU by introducing cumbersome customs checks on Ukrainian imports and initiating a dispute over gas supplies in recent months. Putin said Monday that Russia would have to put restrictions on Ukrainian imports if the country signed the Association Agreement. During the 2004 Orange Revolution, Russia was also accused of interfering with Ukrainian events in favor of Yanukovych, while the Kremlin said Western money and intelligence agencies were behind the revolution. Some observers said the current protests could trigger changes similar to the Orange Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of people protested on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev from November 2004 to January 2005 against perceived election fraud. As a result of the uprising, Yanukovych’s victory in a presidential vote was canceled, and Yushchenko came to power in a repeat election. Jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, one of Yanukovych’s chief political foes and a leader of the Orange Revolution, said Sunday that the ongoing protests marked an anniversary of the 2004 events.

“Due to a mystical turn of fate, Yanukovych again made us take to the streets during the same days of the month as nine years ago,” she said in a statement. “This means that we must complete what we failed to do after the 2004 Orange Revolution. We must once and for all expel corrupt clans out of the government.” But Konstantin Zatulin, head of the CIS Countries Institute and a State Duma deputy, dismissed comparisons with the power transition of 2004. “Color revolutions happened in countries where the government was weak and unconsolidated,” he said, adding that Yanukovych’s current position was strong, unlike that of then-President Leonid Kuchma in 2004. The Orange Revolution was partially a result of Kuchma’s intrigues, and he lost his influence as a result of unsuccessful efforts to get his protege Yanukovych elected, Zatulin said. But now Yanukovych is fighting for his own future, not that of a successor. “He will fight until the end,” Zatulin said.

Belkovsky said Yanukovych had already opted for a pro-European course, however, and was using the current delay in talks on the EU agreement as a bargaining chip to get $10 billion in EU loans that he needed for the 2015 presidential election. Belkovsky added that Kiev was likely to sign an association deal with the EU within a year — and that the Kremlin can do nothing about it. Contact the author at o.sukhov@imedia.ru shares Orange Revolution Orange Revolution Ukraine 's "Orange Revolution" of 2004-2005 was a series of protests and political events that took place throughout the country in response to allegations of massive corruption, voter intimidation and direct electoral fraud during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. The protests were prompted by reports from numerous domestic and foreign observers and the widespread public perception that the results of the run-off vote of November 21, 2004 between leading candidates Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych were rigged in favor of Yanukovych.

The run-off was mandated by Ukrainian law due to the official results of the presidential vote held on October 31, 2004, in which no candidate carried more than 50% of the cast ballots. The winner of the run-off would become Ukraine 's third president since its 1991 independence following the demise of the Soviet Union . The orange ribbon became a symbol of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Ribbons are a common symbol of a non-violent protest.Orange was adopted by the protesters as the official color of the movement since it was the election campaign color of the main opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. The symbol of solidarity with Yushchenko's movement in Ukraine was an orange ribbon or a flag bearing the "ï؟½ï؟½ï؟½! ï؟½ï؟½ï؟½ï؟½ï؟½ï؟½!" ("Yes! Yushchenko!") slogan. Millions of Ukrainians demonstrated daily in Kyiv, which was the center of the revolution where a large 24-hour tent city was set up by Yushchenko's supporters , and this action was highlighted by a series of nationwide protests, sit-ins, and general strikes organized by the opposition.

This was all following the disputed results of the November 21 run-off election. Due in large part to the oppositionï؟½s efforts, the results of the original run-off were annulled and a second run-off election was ordered by Ukraine 's Supreme Court for December 26, 2004. Under intense international scrutiny, the official results of the second run-off proved to be virtually problem-free, legally valid and clearly in Yushchenko's favor. He was declared the official winner and was inaugurated into office as the third President of Ukraine on January 23, 2005. The Orange Revolution reached its successful and peaceful victory. Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004 | Global Nonviolent Action Database Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004 View Location on Map Goals: The campaign began in response to the fraudulent presidential elections and the campaigners demanded new, fair, and fraud-free elections. With new fair elections the campaigners expected presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko to win. Presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko and Politician Yulia Tymoshenko.

Partners: Foreign governments and NGOs provided monetary support for the campaigners Involvement of social elites: Foreign government leaders supported negotiations and provide monetary support for the campaigners. Joining/exiting order of social groups Groups in 1st Segment: Groups in 6th Segment: Additional notes on joining/exiting order: The joining order of groups and elites is not known. Leaders and Partners participated from the very beginning. More and more Ukrainians joined the protests every day. Segment Length: Opponent, Opponent Responses, and Violence Opponents: The government of President Kuchma, who supported the election of Viktor Yanukovych and initiated the election fraud that the campaigners were protesting. Nonviolent responses of opponent: None known Repressive Violence: None known. President Kuchma had ordered 10,000 troops, stationed outside Kiev, to attack the demonstrators, but the Ukrainian intelligence services defied Kuchma's orders and prevented the attack.

Success Outcome Success in achieving specific demands/goals: 6 points out of 6 points Survival: 1 point out of 1 points Growth: 3 points out of 3 points Total points: 10 out of 10 points Notes on outcomes: The campaigners were successful in gaining an open and fair run-off vote in which Yushchenko was determined as the next president of Ukraine. The campaign grew to cover other parts of the country and nearly one million protesters in the streets of Kiev at some points. The October 31, 2004, presidential elections in Ukraine pitted popular opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. The incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma, had personally chosen Yanukovych as his successor, but their political party was losing popular support. Yushchenko, supported by a united opposition, was expected to win the election. However, the October 31 election yielded no winner, with each candidate receiving about 40% of the votes. At this point most opposition groups, such as the student group Pora, already suspected fraud. Pora set up a protest camp immediately, but other groups awaited the run-off vote.

This run-off vote took place on November 21, 2004, and official results from Kuchma’s government showed that Yanukovych had won by 3%. Exit polls, on the other hand, showed Yushchenko winning by 11%. For the supporters of Yushchenko and his opposition coalition, this was a clear sign of election fraud. This perception was supported by evidence of ballot manipulation. Yushchenko’s supporters took to the streets in large-scale protest beginning on November 22, determined to defend their right to free elections and to instate the rightful winner. These demonstrators congregated in the Maidan, Kiev’s main square. The next day 500,000 people in Kiev marched to the parliament building. These demonstrators formed a sea of orange, the color of Yushchenko’s campaign, by wearing orange ribbons and carrying orange flags. Several other cities also refused to recognize the results of the election, believing Yushchenko to be the true winner. Yushchenko, in a largely symbolic act, entered parliament and took the presidential oath. Prime Minister Yanukovych’s supporters also held demonstrations, especially in the south and east.

Miners that favored Yanukovych made their way to Kiev, but they were largely outnumbered by the pro-Yushchenko demonstrators. Furthermore, on November 24, the Central Election Commission announced Yanukovych as the winner, sparking even greater anger from the pro-Yushchenko groups. Despite the confrontational nature and huge size of demonstrations, the pro-Yushchenko campaigners were determinedly nonviolent, with organizers like Pora having been influenced by the writings of Gene Sharp. The campaigners were also influenced by the previous nonviolent Colour Revolutions in Serbia (see “ Serbians overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution), 2000 ”) and Georgia (see “ Georgians overthrow a dictator (Rose Revolution), 2003 ”). The Yushchenko supporters continued their mass demonstrations in Kiev, with numbers nearing one million people. Demonstrators from outside Kiev also came to the capital to join in the protests. In order to support the presence in Kiev of demonstrators from around the country, the campaigners took over public buildings, offered private homes, and set up open kitchens. Protestors also occupied the Maidan and set-up tents to continue the spirit of protest day and night.

The demonstrators gave flowers to the soldiers that surrounded the Maidan and played music for them. The Maidan became a site for speeches and musical entertainment in conjunction with the political protest. And each morning and night, a multi-denominational religious service was held in the square. Citizens in other parts of the country also held local protests, demonstrations, and strikes. As the campaign grew, Yushchenko set up the Committee of National Salvation and called for a national strike until the true results of the election were honored. On November 28, a high up government official (either the Interior Minister or the Chief of Staff) ordered troops to move in on the demonstrators. The higher ranks of soldiers refused the orders, however, and the attack never took place. On December 1, the parliament joined the side of the campaigners, passing a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Yanukovych ‘s government. On December 3, the Supreme Court followed suit, announcing that the election was fraudulent and Yanukovych’s “victory” could not be recognized. Following this decision, parliament set up a new run-off election for December 26.

After negotiations that lasted until December 8, Yanukovych and Kuchma agreed to a new run-off vote, when Yuschenko and the parliament agreed to measures that would limit the future president’s power. On December 26, 2004, observers from around the world monitored the elections in order to prevent fraud. When all votes had been counted—this time without manipulation—Yushchenko won, 52% to Yanukovych’s 44%. The “Orange Revolution” by Ukrainians was successful. Research Notes Influences: What ever happened to the Orange Revolution? | Europe | Former Soviet Union | Politics | Ukraine | spiked Tara McCormack What ever happened to the Orange Revolution? Last year we were told that a popular uprising in Ukraine had ousted a fraudulent leader. So why has that fraudulent leader now been voted into power? I 4 April 2006 Get spiked by email If Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2005 really was a popular rising to depose a fraudulent leader and replace him with someone more progressive, then why has that fraudulent leader now been returned to power in a general election on Sunday?

The Orange Revolution was the latest ‘people’s revolution’ to overthrow an incumbent government in a former communist country, coming shortly after the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia. Each has followed the pattern set by the 2001 overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia: people, backed by student groups (Otpor in Serbia, Khmara in Georgia, and Pora in Ukraine), take to the streets to challenge fraudulent elections and demand change. Each has been interpreted by Western commentators as representing radical democratic transformation from below. During November and December of 2004 three rounds of elections took place in Ukraine. The previous Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, had initially been favoured by Western governments, but in recent years had fallen out of favour. In the first round, the West’s new preferred candidate, Viktor Yushchenko (leader of the Our Ukraine coalition), supported by Yulia Tymoshenko (leader of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc), appeared to be defeated by Viktor Yanukovich, the incumbent prime minister and head of the Party of the Regions.

The difference in votes cast was marginal: Yushchenko gained 46.6 per cent to Yanukovich’s 49.5 per cent. It was argued that Yushchenko represented a pro-Western, anti-corruption programme, while Yanukovich (often referred to as Kremlin-backed) had a pro-Russian orientation. Support in the country was also divided: the Eastern, more industrialised regions felt closer to Russia, while in the Western, poorer regions, there was stronger support for Yushchenko. Then US secretary of state Colin Powell immediately condemned the results, as did EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (1). The EU, NATO and the US urged a review of the election (2), and Powell warned Ukraine that it would be internationally ostracised if Yanukovich remained (3). Apparently without irony, the EU complained that Russia had been intervening in the election. The opposition launched protests, claiming that the votes had been rigged. Between November 2004 and January 2005 the media were saturated with images of people dancing to open-air rock concerts set up with laser light shows and giant plasma screens that materialised in the centre of Kiev.

Must-reads from the past week Ukraine The Orange Revolution took its name from Our Ukraine’s colours; it was the colour worn by the protesters. In early December it was also alleged that Yushchenko had been the victim of an attempted poisoning by the KGB at a dinner he had attended in September. Certainly his face appeared drastically altered. After three contested votes, Yanukovich stood aside, and Yushchenko was sworn in as president in January, stating that freedom had triumphed over tyranny and promising to take Ukraine into the EU (4). Whatever the truth about the elections, it is fairly certain that they were subject to much external meddling. Claims about Russian interference dominated the media here, but the more than generous role of Western, especially American government-funded NGOs such as Freedom House was largely ignored (5). Of course, there is nothing new about interference in the elections of smaller states by their stronger neighbours, or by the Great Powers. During the Cold War, intervention in the political processes of other countries was often much more direct and violent than it is now (for example, in the assassination of Salvador Allende). What is really striking about the recent so-called people’s revolutions is how quickly they run out of steam once the protests are over (6).

And in Ukraine this collapse seems to have occurred even more quickly then usual. By July 2005 there had already been public rows between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko. Amid bitter accusations of corruption and bribe-taking, Yushchenko sacked his entire cabinet in September and accused Tymoshenko of being interested only in self-promotion. Tymoshenko responded by seeking to ‘out orange’ Yushchenko, and arguing that she represented the ideals of the Orange Revolution. Polls registered general public disappointment with the new government. After the September split, the level of support for Yushchenko was around 13.5 per cent, 12.4 for Tymoshenko, and around 17.5 per cent for Yanukovich (7). A complicated deal struck between Ukraine and Russia after the recent gas crises - in which Russia attempted to force Ukraine to pay the market rate for the gas it bought and which has involved gas being sold through an intermediary company that has been investigated for its alleged links to organised crime - only added to the general accusations of corruption, and to disillusionment. Tymoshenko threatened to take the government to court over the deal.

In the run up to the election last month, polls suggested that Yanukovich was gaining support. Sunday’s election showed a complete reversal of fortunes for the Orange Revolution. Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions came in first place with around 35 per cent of the vote, followed by Tymoshenko’s party, with Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine trailing behind with only 14 per cent. A coalition will have to be worked out, with the very possible scenario of a link between Yushchenko and Yanukovich (8). Both the US and the EU have claimed that this election was entirely free and fair and seem to have no more interest in Ukraine. The ‘people’s revolution’ has disappeared almost as quickly as it appeared, as has Western hostility to Yanukovich. Certainly the differences between the parties of the Orange Revolution and Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions were much more hyperbole then real. Yanukovich, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had all served as prime minister or deputy prime minister under Leonid Kuchma. Despite the assertions that Yanukovich was ‘Kremlin-backed’ he was also in favour of membership of the EU for Ukraine.

It was suggested that he did not support joining NATO, but Ukraine was already part of the ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme, which it joined under Kuchma. Yanukovich may have been more ‘pro-Russian’, but his was hardly a call to recreate the Soviet Union; rather his was simply a pragmatic stance towards a neighbour which had the lion’s share of Ukraine’s trade (plus a large Russian population). Upon Yushchenko’s assumption of the presidency he immediately arranged to visit Moscow. If the Orange Revolution represented a radical democratic transformation from below, it is difficult to understand the rapid (and protest-free) switch in public support from Yushchenko, who, as many of the protesters quoted in the media argued, stood for freedom, honesty and Europe, to Yanukovich who represented the opposite. The sudden turnaround would suggest that whatever the motivations of those who protested throughout November and December, theirs was not, in fact, a coherent, positive or transformative political agenda. The parties that formed the Orange Revolution had no particular political programme. Their main programme was formed in opposition to the Kuchma government and an exaggerated argument about the alleged hostility of Yanukovich to the West.

They soon found out that all the NGO-financed rock concerts in the world cannot substitute for a coherent programme and a genuine political basis in society. Their superficial and opportunistic unity crumbled in the face of internal back-stabbing and intriguing. It appears also that despite the large amounts of cash channelled into the Orange Revolution, the West does not really have much interest in the post-Kuchma political arrangements or the alleged poisoner Yanukovich who is gaining power. This seems to give the lie to the argument that the West plotted to have ‘pro-Western’ regimes put in place. Those who are branded as ‘anti-Western’ plainly are not, while the West seems to have no long-term plan for any government that it decides to fund, instead losing interest once its own opportunities for moral posturing and grand-standing are over. In some ways, this kind of intervention is even worse than strong, politically motivated intervention, which would at least aim to install and protect a ‘friendly’ regime. Instead we now have a kind of half-hearted interference, which pays for laser light shows and plenty of orange clothing but has no long-term interest in the political or economic stability of small states; these interventions fracture the political system but are indifferent to what comes next.

For the people of Ukraine, whose country is subject to the vacillations of an opportunistic and venal elite, and an equally opportunistic and self-serving international community, the future is not looking too bright.

(1) ‘US rejects Ukraine poll result’, Sarah Left and George Wright, Guardian, 24 November 2004 (2) ‘Ukraine crisis threatens rift between US and Russia’, Nick Paton Walsh, Guardian, 24 November 2004; ‘EU anger at Putin’s role in election’, Ewen MacAskill and Nick Paton Walsh, Guardian, 25 November 2004 (3) ‘US rejects Ukraine poll as protesters dig in’, Nick Paton Walsh’, Guardian, 25 November 2004 (4) ‘Yushchenko hails victory over tyranny’, Ian Traynor, 24 January 2005 (5) ‘Inquiry sought into claims of US funding’, Nick Paton Walsh, Guardian, 13 December 2004; ‘US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev’, Ian Traynor, Guardian, 26 November 2004 (7) ‘One year on, the orange uprising leaves a bitter aftertaste’, Tom Parfitt, 19 November 2005 (8) ‘Rivals weigh up options after Ukrainian poll’, Tom Parfitt, Guardian, 28 March

 2006 For permission to republish spiked articles, please contact Viv Regan .

Orange Revolution Kiev | Ukrainian Politics 8 The Future's Bright...? When 500,000 people took to the streets of Kiev in November 2004 to protest against election rigging there was a sense of something truly wonderful happening. An event of unprecedented import that would see the Ukrainian people wrest power from the corrupt, Moscow-backed oligarchs that had ruled the state ever since the fall of Communism in 1991, and would hand power to a pro-democratic leader who would steer Ukraine westwards to economic prosperity and political freedom within Europe - all this seemed on the cards. In the short term that is exactly what seemed to have happened, but several years down the line, when we examine the events of the Orange Revolution and the political status quo in Ukraine today, is that what happened? A Dirty Campaign The last months of 2004 were certainly an exciting time in Ukraine's history. Presidential elections were forthcoming, and there was a hotly contested campaign being fought between the two principal candidates, Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko.

Yanukovych, the current Ukrainian Prime Minister, had the backing of outgoing president Leonid Kuchma, a pro-Russian statesman who had reinforced ties with Russia after being elected in 1994, whose final years in office were dogged with corruption scandals. Yanukovych also had the backing of much of heavily russified East Ukraine and the open support of Vladimir Putin (who, as we all know, is ever keen to maintain a Russian sphere of influence in old Soviet states). Yushchenko meanwhile, a pro-European and pro-democratic leader enjoyed the backing of Yulia Tymoschenko, a charismatic and extremely popular politician who chose not to run herself in order to support Yushchenko (but who was promised the post of prime minister, should Yushchenko win). Voter wise Yushchenko was supported by the vast majority of Western Ukraine and much of Ukraine's younger generation. The campaign was not fought cleanly, with Yushchenko nearly dying of Dioxin poisoning (he survived but was visibly disfigured) widely regarded to be perpetrated by supporters of Yanukovych.

The First Round of Voting The first vote of October 31st, 2004, was a tight run contest and, despite allegations of vote rigging, the two candidates ran neck and neck with Yushchenko collecting 39.87% and Yanukovych 39.32%, with other parties making up the rest of the vote. With neither party claiming the 50% required for victory, a run-off vote was then ordered by law for November 21st between the two leading candidates to determine the presidency. When Oleksandr Moroz, the third placed candidate in October's vote and leader of the Socialist party, threw his weight behind Yushchenko the vote seemed all but a foregone conclusion. The Protests Needless to say Ukrainians turned out in their millions to vote in the run-off for president. Exit polls (polls taken by the media asking voters who they voted for) had Yushchenko up to eleven percent in the lead, however when the official results were tallied they had Yanukovych up by three percent.

There were immediate and widespread accusations by Yushchenko, his supporters and Ukrainian and foreign monitors that Yanukovych's adherents were engaging in electoral fraud, including voter intimidation, physical assaults and the torching of ballot boxes with Yushchenko's campaign able to provide solid proof in many instances (for example they had trained thousands of volunteers and sympathisers to record what happened at the polling stations using video-cameras). Meanwhile the state-controlled media reported no violations were occurring. Then came boiling point. Years of dissatisfaction with their politicians came to a head at this point for a large proportion of the Ukrainian people (although not quite as spontaneously as it seemed, but more on that later!). Convinced that their votes were being undermined and that the election had been stolen thousands of Yushchenko supporters took to the streets determined to claim it back, publicly exhorted and encouraged by the Yushchenko electorate campaign. The day the results were due to be announced, 21st November, hundreds of thousands gathered in central Kiev, flooding Independence Square and blockading government buildings (the Parliament was largely pro-Yanukovych).

Yushchenko's supporters were easily identified by their orange garments and ribbons, orange being the colour of the Our Ukraine party of which Yushchenko is the head. The bright warm colour certainly made a striking impression against the Kiev winter snow, and the strong visual impact was responsible for the term coined later of the Orange Revolution. A Spectacular Coup This mass protest was a spectacular coup pulled off by Yushchenko's campaign and far from a spontaneous outburst that it might have seemed to the outside observer from the West. As Yushchenko urged his supporters not to leave Independence Square until the fraudulent election results had been annulled, his campaigners had already organised the means for them to remain as long as possible in what was a very carefully planned operation. 5,000 tonnes of porridge and 10,000 loaves of bread were supplied to protesters each day, 300 portable toilets were laid on, tents were supplied with heaters (to combat sub-zero temperatures), plus foam pads and sleeping bags, with 11 truckloads of rubbish spirited away each day - largely financed by American money.

Meanwhile Ukrainian popstar Ruslana and the Klitchko brothers (Ukraine's famous heavyweight boxers) appeared on stage to lend kudos to the campaign. Military Intervention Averted Behind the scenes even more important work was being done by Ukraine's top spies and military generals. General Popkov (possible urged by Russia, or pro-Russian sympathisers) was ready to take military action against the protesters, but a series of phonecalls made by and to various highly influential parties averted any chance of violence. These key members of the security services feared that if troops were deployed then there might be a repeat of Tianamen Square (many of the generals had family members who were at the protests in Independence Square) or worse could trigger a civil war between the East and West of Ukraine. This was a crucial development as it was thought that the military was in the hands of Kuchma, Yanukovych and other pro-Russian stakeholders. With Yanukovych unable to call the military to his aid, and with his own supporters protests in Donetsk, his political stronghold, impotent in comparison, the two opposing candidates were clamped in a deadlock, whilst vast numbers of Ukrainians continued to strike, protest and practice peaceful civil disobedience.

Behind the Scenes Negotiations During this time of highly visible protests however much of the nation's fate was being decided behind the scenes. Yushchenko, Yanukovych, Kuchma, and other high-level officials held three meetings in the ensuing twelve days in an attempt to negotiate an end to the political stalemate. The result was that Yushchenko got his wish of a second runoff election (the Supreme Court announced on the 3rd December that they had annulled the results of the first runoff election) and the two sides also agreed upon reforms to reduce electoral fraud and, importantly, to transfer some of the Presidential powers to parliament. This package agreement was immediately ratified by the Ukrainian parliament. The Final Countdown The second run-off election between the two Victors, Yushchenko and Yanukovych, took place on December 26th under extreme scrutiny from Ukrainian and foreign monitors and press. On 28th December the Election Commission declared Yushchenko the winner with 52 percent of the vote, versus Yanukovych's 44.

Subsequent legal cases filed by Yanukovych were all summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court and Yushchenko was officially sworn in as the President of the Ukraine on 23rd January 2005. The people had spoken. The good guys had won. The future was bright... The future was orange! Three Years On... ...or was it? At first glance it is easy to sell the Orange Revolution as a fairy tale story. A story in which the people rose up and took control from the politicians in a tremendous show of democratic power. They crowned their champion, a man who bore the terrible scars of his suffering for the cause, and who promised to fight corruption and bring prosperity to the land and the bad guys were forced to leave the political arena never to be heard of again. Unfortunately politics are rarely black and white - and it seems even rarer are they orange. Yushchenko's presidential term has been characterised by power squabbling and bickering and although both economic growth and foreign investment are on the up, Ukrainians' hopes have turned from optimism, into anger, despair and frustration.

One of the first signs that the Orange euphoria might have just been a giddy high, came in January 2005 with the sacking of Yulia Tymoshenko from the post of prime minister. Tymoshenko, was dubbed the 'Orange Princess' for her role in helping Yushshenko get to power however she has proved to be a thorn in the president's side ever since, often obstructing his policies and proving erratic and power-hungry. Worse yet for Yushshenko, Yanukovych - far from fading into oblivion - has seen his popularity rise meteorically. In March 2006 his Party of Regions won general elections and he has since taken the post of Prime Minister putting him right back in the centre of the action. Still enjoying the unflinching support of his power base in the East he has been treading a more pro-Western line on many issues in the hope of winning over some of Yushshenko's supporters. Perhaps this is what distresses the Ukrainian people most of all.

Years down the line from the Orange Revolution and the same figures - Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko continue to squabble over policies and vie for power, whilst the same corrupt oligarchs and tycoons get richer with little improvement in the state of affairs for the average Ukrainian. The Orange Revolution will always be remembered as a momentous occasion when the people, if only for a few days, seemed more powerful than the forces that governed them. But with Ukrainian politics quickly reverting to the status quo, it seems that flash of orange was a false dawn... More Information For more information on the meticulous planning of the Orange Revolution, check out this article by the Guardian: A 21st Century Revolt For more information on this thread of the Orange Revolution read this detailed article by the New York Times: How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path For more information of Kiev, head to Kiev Life homepage. Enjoyed it?

ukraine: the orange revolution | openDemocracy Andrew Wilson 17 July 2007 The post-Soviet states still practice forms of political manipulation that are more radical, more pervasive and more corrosive of real democracy than anything attempted by spin-doctors or K-Street consultants in the West, says Andrew Wilson. Andrew Wilson 30 April 2007 A fresh compromise may salve the major political faultlines in the troubled Ukrainian polity. But the depth of the countrys institutional, regional, and personal divisions make repair far harder, says Andrew Wilson. Alexander Motyl 22 December 2006 The romance of revolution is long gone as Ukrainians learn to cope with democracy's disillusions, says Alexander J Motyl. Alexander Motyl 16 August 2006 Ukraine is in post-orange political meltdown while Russia is reinventing itself as a successful energy superpower. Right? Wrong, says Alexander J Motyl, who looks beneath the surface of a changing relationship. Patrice de Beer 3 April 2006 The sheer normality of Ukraines election indicates how profound its post-orange political transition has been, finds Patrice de Beer.

Taras Kuzio 27 March 2006 An "orange coalition" is still the most likely outcome of a Ukrainian election won by the revolutions opponent, says Taras Kuzio. Toby Saul 24 March 2006 After fifteen turbulent months of a hard-won democracy, Ukraine's people are again calling their leaders to account. Askold Krushelnycky talks to Toby Saul about how far the orange revolution's ideals have survived. On 26 March 2006, Ukrainians vote in parliamentary elections which may see Viktor Yanukovych regain a significant share of the vote for his Party of Regions after being swept out of power in the orange revolution of November 2004-January 2005. Alexander Motyl 24 March 2006 Whatever the result of the 26 March parliamentary elections, Ukraine after the orange revolution is moving towards normal democratic politics not back to authoritarianism, says Alexander J Motyl. Alexander Motyl 17 January 2006 The bitter gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine reveals the stark difference in the character of the two states. The European Union should take note, says Alexander Motyl.

Ivan Krastev 19 October 2005 Ukraine's orange revolution was Russia's 9/11, and its result is to convince Moscow that the European Union is its major strategic rival, argues Ivan Krastev. Alexander Motyl 11 September 2005 Kyivs governmental crisis will not derail Ukraines democratic development, says Alexander Motyl. Ivan Krastev 16 December 2004 The orange revolution in Ukraine is not the last of Europes post-1989 velvet revolutions but the first of the European Union-inspired revolutions of the 21st century, says Ivan Krastev. Katinka Barysch and Charles Grant 7 December 2004 Both the European Union and Russia need to learn an important lesson from the Ukraine crisis: how to reconcile strategic interests and political values in order to help Ukraines people realise their own aspirations. Marek Matraszek 2 December 2004 The Ukrainian revolution has catapulted Poland into the leadership of the European Union and released a new political dynamic across the region, says Marek Matraszek.

Question: In which country did the Orange Revolution take place in 2004-2005?
Answer: UKRAINE