Sputnik NASA Main Page Multimedia Interactive Feature on 50th Anniversary of the Space Age Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age History changed on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I. The world's first artificial satellite was about the size of a beach ball (58 cm.or 22.8 inches in diameter), weighed only 83.6 kg. or 183.9 pounds, and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its elliptical path. That launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific developments. While the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R space race. The story begins in 1952, when the International Council of Scientific Unions decided to establish July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, as the International Geophysical Year (IGY) because the scientists knew that the cycles of solar activity would be at a high point then.

In October 1954, the council adopted a resolution calling for artificial satellites to be launched during the IGY to map the Earth's surface. In July 1955, the White House announced plans to launch an Earth-orbiting satellite for the IGY and solicited proposals from various Government research agencies to undertake development. In September 1955, the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard proposal was chosen to represent the U.S. during the IGY. The Sputnik launch changed everything. As a technical achievement, Sputnik caught the world's attention and the American public off-guard. Its size was more impressive than Vanguard's intended 3.5-pound payload. In addition, the public feared that the Soviets' ability to launch satellites also translated into the capability to launch ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons from Europe to the U.S. Then the Soviets struck again; on November 3, Sputnik II was launched, carrying a much heavier payload, including a dog named Laika. Immediately after the Sputnik I launch in October, the U.S. Defense Department responded to the political furor by approving funding for another U.S. satellite project.

As a simultaneous alternative to Vanguard, Wernher von Braun and his Army Redstone Arsenal team began work on the Explorer project. On January 31, 1958, the tide changed, when the United States successfully launched Explorer I. This satellite carried a small scientific payload that eventually discovered the magnetic radiation belts around the Earth, named after principal investigator James Van Allen. The Explorer program continued as a successful ongoing series of lightweight, scientifically useful spacecraft. The Sputnik launch also led directly to the creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In July 1958, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act (commonly called the "Space Act") , which created NASA as of October 1, 1958 from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and other government agencies. Updated October 10, 2007 Explorer 1: The First U.S. Satellite Explorer 1: The First U.S. Satellite By Elizabeth Howell, Space.com Contributor | September 28, 2012 04:59pm ET MORE Explorer 1 was the United States' first satellite in space.

The 1958 launch of the satellite — twice the size of a basketball — was an important moment for the country, as the Space Race with the Soviet Union was just beginning. Explorer 1 was the first U.S. satellite and the first satellite to carry scientific instruments. Credit: NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory The satellite marked a moment when the United States got its confidence back after a series of unsuccessful launches and the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik. The satellite also helped buttress the nation's technological confidence in the eyes of the world. It signalled that the country was ready to explore the universe. Spurred by the Soviets Explorer 1's ride to space came through a complicated set of circumstances. The United States actually had at least three main rocket options for sending the satellite into space. The ones that are most remembered today are Vanguard — under development by the Navy — and Juno. The latter rocket was based on an Army rocket designed by German scientist Wernher Von Braun , who worked on the V-2 missile program that sent bombs to England during World War II.

The satellite was supposed to launch as the United States' contribution to science during International Geophysical Year (which ran from 1957-1958). Then history intervened. The Soviet Union rocketed Sputnik into space on Oct. 4, 1957. This was the first artificial satellite any nation sent out of the Earth. The launch — revealed only after it was a success — stunned most of the Western world. It was a coup for Soviet rocket technology, and led some to muse that bombs could be launched just as easily as a satellite. This accelerated the United States' plans. Rocket and satellite engineers quickly got to work, trying to prove they were also capable of launching into space. Behind the Vanguard On Dec. 6 of that year, a long two months after Sputnik, live reports of the Vanguard rocket carrying Explorer 1 broadcast in televisions and radios across the United States. Vanguard, according to NASA, was chosen because it had more overtones of a civilian program — a policy decision going all the way up to President Dwight Eisenhower, who did not want the appearance of using ballistic rockets intended for military purposes to usher in the new Space Age.

Unfortunately, the rocket exploded moments after the launch in front of TV cameras. Amid headlines such as "Kaputnik," senior space officials took stock and examined their alternatives. Behind closed doors, they decided to proceed with the Juno rocket. Preparations at Cape Canaveral went on in secrecy for weeks, according to NASA, but as launch date approached the media was informed. Explorer 1 successfully flew into space on Jan. 31, 1958. One of history's most famous space photos occurred that night. Von Braun and two other people held a model Juno rocket over their heads during a press briefing concerning the successful launch. It was a good night for the Germans, as well as for the American space program. Explorer 1's science Explorer 1's launch was a large policy coup , to be sure, but what was also interesting was the science the little satellite beamed back. Its prime science experiment was a cosmic ray detector designed by James Van Allen, a physicist at the University of Iowa. Cosmic rays are energetic radiated particles from space — bits of atoms that can include protons, electrons or nuclei.

The little satellite detected fewer cosmic rays in its orbit (which ranged from 220 miles from Earth to 1,563 miles) than Van Allen expected. The physicist proposed this might be because radiation in Earth's magnetic field may prevent the cosmic rays from coming in. Explorer 3, launched in March 1958, discovered these magnetic field belts. Today, they are known as the Van Allen Belts . Simplicity and reliability Of Explorer 1's 30 pounds, more than 18 pounds of that was made up of instruments. Besides the cosmic ray detectors, it also carried experiments such as temperature sensors (both internal and external) and a microphone to listen for micrometeorites hitting the satellite. NASA painted the instrument portion of the satellite white and dark green, which was supposed to regulate temperatures on the section. Dark colors absorb more heat, and white absorb less. The agency notes that the satellite was simple by design, as they wanted to ensure it was as reliable as possible. On that count, NASA succeeded. Explorer 1 sent data back to Earth for four months, ceasing communications on May 23, 1958.

The satellite remained aloft for more than a decade before re-entering Earth's atmosphere on March 31, 1970. Explorer 1 spawned a series of other satellites. While Explorers 2 and 5 failed due to rocket stage problems, Explorers 3 and 4 both launched successfully in 1958 and transmitted science from orbit. Even though the satellites are no longer working, their legacy remains. They launched the United States into space and showed that it was possible to do science from orbit. — Elizabeth Howell, SPACE.com Contributor Sputnik 1, Earth's First Artificial Satellite (Photos) Sputnik 1, Earth's First Artificial Satellite (Photos) By SPACE.com Staff | October 1, 2012 04:31pm ET MORE Sputnik 1 on the Pad Credit: NASA The Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik 1 satellite on October 4, 1957, surprising the world and starting the space race. The 183-pound (83-kilogram) spacecraft whipped around the Earth every 98 minutes, transmitting a series of beeps. Sputnik means "companion" in Russian.

Soviet Technician Works on Sputnik 1 Credit: NASA A Soviet technician works on Sputnik 1 before the satellite's Oct. 4, 1957 launch. Sputnik 1 Rides R-7 Rocket to Space Credit: Novosti Sputnik 1 launched on a Soviet R-7 rocket to Earth orbit on October 4, 1957, the first artificial satellite in space. Sputnik 1, Exploded View Credit: NASA History Program Office Sputnik 1, exploded view. S. P. Korolev. Father of the Soviet Space Program Credit: NASA History Program Office Korolev, Sergei Pavlovitch (1906-1966), Russian spacecraft designer and headed the Vostok and Voskhod projects, as well as the early Zond and Cosmos series. His R-7 ICBM launched Sputnik 1 on October 4,1957. Crowd Looking at a Sputnik Credit: History Films/Balcony Releasing A crowd gazes upon one of seven Sputniks produced by the Soviet Union.

Model of Sputnik at the United Nations, New York City Credit: UN Photo/MB These young students on a guided tour of United Nations Headquarters are seen studying the model of the first Sputnik launched in the USSR in 1957. The Sputnik model was presented to the UN as a gift from the Soviet Union. Sputnik Replica at the National Air & Space Museum Credit: Eric Long/National Air and Space Museum. Sputnik replica on display in the Milestones of Flight at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum. Sputnik 1 Model Sputnik was the world's first artificial satellite, launched Oct. 4, 1957. Sputnik 1 The Soviet Union's Sputnik 1 became the first artificial satellite on October 4, 1957. Sputnik 1 Replica in the National Air & Space Museum Credit: National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution A replica of Sputnik 1 satellite hangs in the National Air & Space Museum, Washington, DC.

Replica of Sputnik 1 at Chabot Space & Science Center Credit: Courtesy of Chabot Space & Science Center Visitors to Chabot Space and Science Center can view space artifacts including a replica of Sputnik 1 (top). Launching a Miniature Sputnik Satellite Credit: Russian Federal Space Agency A cosmonaut tosses a miniature Sputnik satellite into orbit during a spacewalk outside the Russian Mir Space Station in this time-lapse series of video images. previous | next Sputnik 1 on the Pad Credit: NASA The Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik 1 satellite on October 4, 1957, surprising the world and starting the space race. The 183-pound (83-kilogram) spacecraft whipped around the Earth every 98 minutes, transmitting a series of beeps. Sputnik means "companion" in Russian. Soviet Technician Works on Sputnik 1 Credit: NASA A Soviet technician works on Sputnik 1 before the satellite's Oct. 4, 1957 launch.

Sputnik 1 Rides R-7 Rocket to Space Credit: Novosti Sputnik 1 launched on a Soviet R-7 rocket to Earth orbit on October 4, 1957, the first artificial satellite in space. Sputnik 1, Exploded View Credit: NASA History Program Office Sputnik 1, exploded view. S. P. Korolev. Father of the Soviet Space Program Credit: NASA History Program Office Korolev, Sergei Pavlovitch (1906-1966), Russian spacecraft designer and headed the Vostok and Voskhod projects, as well as the early Zond and Cosmos series. His R-7 ICBM launched Sputnik 1 on October 4,1957. Crowd Looking at a Sputnik Credit: History Films/Balcony Releasing A crowd gazes upon one of seven Sputniks produced by the Soviet Union. Model of Sputnik at the United Nations, New York City Credit: UN Photo/MB These young students on a guided tour of United Nations Headquarters are seen studying the model of the first Sputnik launched in the USSR in 1957.

The Sputnik model was presented to the UN as a gift from the Soviet Union. Sputnik Replica at the National Air & Space Museum Credit: Eric Long/National Air and Space Museum. Sputnik replica on display in the Milestones of Flight at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum. Sputnik 1 Model The Soviet Union's Sputnik 1 became the first artificial satellite on October 4, 1957. Sputnik 1 Replica in the National Air & Space Museum Credit: National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution A replica of Sputnik 1 satellite hangs in the National Air & Space Museum, Washington, DC. Replica of Sputnik 1 at Chabot Space & Science Center Credit: Courtesy of Chabot Space & Science Center Visitors to Chabot Space and Science Center can view space artifacts including a replica of Sputnik 1 (top). Launching a Miniature Sputnik Satellite Credit: Russian Federal Space Agency A cosmonaut tosses a miniature Sputnik satellite into orbit during a spacewalk outside the Russian Mir Space Station in this time-lapse series of video images. What Was the First Artificial Satellite to Orbit Earth?

- The Origin and Development of Sputnik 1 What Was the First Artificial Satellite to Orbit Earth? written by: Jason C. Chavis•edited by: George Adcock •updated: 1/11/2010 What was the first artificial satellite to orbit Earth? Sputnik 1 was launched on October 4, 1957, by the Soviet Union. The mission represented a major advancement in scientific research as well as the beginning of the Space Race between the two major powers of the Cold War. slide 1 of 7 Origin of the Sputnik Program The initiative to launch the first artificial satellite into earth's orbit was stimulated by the developing need for communication outside of earth orbit. In the early 1950s, as both the Soviet Union and the United States endeavored to develop rocketry for the space program, launching an artificial satellite became a primary mission. Specifically, in May 1954, the head of the Soviet space program , Sergei Korolev, met with the Soviet Minister of Defense Industries, Dmitry Ustinov, with a plan to launch an artificial satellite into orbit. This was also prompted by the announcement by U.S.

President Dwight Eisenhower on July 29, 1955, that his country would launch a satellite into orbit between 1957 and 1958. slide 2 of 7 Development in the Soviet Union It wasn't until early August 1955 that the Politburo, the governing body of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, approved the creation of what was the first artificial satellite to orbit Earth. Initial development was headed by Korolev as well as Vasily Ryabikov, director of the test launches for the R-7 rocket program. The three-stage rocket and satellite required an extensive operation crossing a number of different Soviet ministries as well as the nation's Academy of Sciences. While many of the organizations focused on developing an artificial satellite with major scientific capabilities for the time, as the timeline to beat the Americans arrived, the Soviets chose to launch a satellite with a simple radio transmitter instead. Right: Sputnik 1. (Supplied by NASA; Public Domain; slide 3 of 7 Details of the First Artificial Satellite Sputnik 1 was a 23 inch (585 mm) sphere covered in a heat shield composed of aluminum, magnesium, and titanium.

It featured four long antenna capable of transmitting a simple beeping noise to the Earth's surface in two frequencies. The satellite was powered by three silver-zinc batteries, designed to work for two weeks. In order to keep the temperature regulated within the Sputnik 1, the Soviets filled the inside of the unit with dry nitrogen and used a fan activated by two thermal switches. slide 4 of 7 The Sputnik Crisis Becoming what was the first artificial satellite to orbit Earth, Sputnik 1 was carried into orbit on October 4, 1957. The mission launched the Space Race between the Soviets and Americans. Since Eisenhower and the American space industry had made such a priority out of placing a satellite into orbit, the Soviet success proved to be a public relations disaster. Additionally, the American public and media was so surprised by the technological breakthrough that a wave of paranoia and intrigue spread across the country. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the leadership of their space program failed to immediately capitalize on the success, instead focusing on the scientific advances of the mission's success.

slide 5 of 7 End of the First Artificial Satellite Sputnik 1 went around the Earth at a rate of 18,000 miles per hour (29,000 km), resulting in a full orbit every 96.2 minutes. Despite the fact that it was designed to only last two weeks, the mission continued for 22 days until the batteries failed. It burned up in reentry on January 4, 1958. During its mission, radio operators around the world monitored the beeping sounds. What was the first artificial satellite to orbit Earth helped change the dynamics of communication, bringing the world together for the first time. slide 6 of 7 The World's First Artificial Satellite By Nick Greene The World in Shock On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1. The name comes from a Russian word for "traveling companion of the world." It was a smallish metal ball that weighed just 83 kg (184 lbs.), and was lofted into space by an R7 rocket. It carried a thermometer and two radio transmitters.

Circling Earth once every 96.2 minutes, it transmitted atmospheric information by radio for 21 days. Just 57 days after its launch, Sputnik was destroyed while reentering the atmosphere. The whole mission was a major shock to the world, especially in the United States, and it triggered the start of the Space Age. Setting the Stage for the Space Age To understand why Sputnik 1 was such a surprise, look back to the late 1950s. The world was poised on the brink of space exploration. The United States and​ the Soviet Union (now Russia) were rivals both militarily and culturally. Scientists on both sides were developing rockets to take payloads to space and both countries wanted to be the first to explore the high frontier. continue reading below our video 4 Tips for Improving Test Performance It was just a matter of time before someone sent a mission into orbit. Space Science Enters the Main Stage Scientifically, the year 1957 was established as the International Geophysical Year (IGY), and it was timed to coincide with the 11-year sunspot cycle.

Astronomers were planning to observe the Sun and its influence on Earth throughout that time, particularly on communications and in the newly emerging discipline of solar physics. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences created a committee to oversee U.S. IGY projects. These included investigations of what we now call "space weather" : auroras, airglows, cosmic rays, geomagnetism, glaciology, gravity, the ionosphere, determinations of longitude and latitude, meteorology, oceanography, seismology, solar activity, and the upper atmosphere. As part of this, the U.S. had a plan for a program to launch the first artificial satellite. Artificial satellites were not a new idea. In October 1954, scientists called for the first ones to be launched during IGY to map Earth's surface. The White House agreed that this might be a good idea, and announced plans to launch an Earth-orbiting satellite for the IGY. Officials solicited proposals from various government research agencies to undertake development. In September 1955, the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard proposal was chosen. Teams began building and testing missiles, with varying degrees of success.

However, before the United States could launch its first rockets to space, the Soviet Union beat everyone to the punch. The U.S. Responds The "beeping" signal of Russian superiority galvanized ​public opinion in the U.S. The political backlash over the Soviets "beating" Americans to space led to some interesting and long-reaching results.The U.S. Defense Department immediately began providing funding for another U.S. satellite project. At the same time, Wernher von Braun and his Army Redstone Arsenal team began work on the Explorer project, which was launched to orbit on January 31, 1958. It was beginning of the Space Race, and very quickly, the Moon was announced as a major target. The Sputnik launch also led directly to the creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In July 1958, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act (commonly called the "Space Act"). That act created NASA on October 1, 1958, uniting the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and other government agencies to form a new agency aimed at putting the U.S. squarely in the space business.

You can see models of Sputnik at the United Nations building in New York City, the Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C., the World Museum in Liverpool, England, the Kansas Cosmosphere and Space Center in Hutchinson, the California Science Center in L.A., the Russian Embassy in Madrid, Spain, and several other museums in the U.S. They are gleaming reminders of the earliest days of the Space Age. NASA - NSSDCA - Spacecraft - Details NSSDCA/COSPAR ID: 1957-001B Description The Sputnik 1 spacecraft was the first artificial satellite successfully placed in orbit around the Earth and was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome at Tyuratam (370 km southwest of the small town of Baikonur) in Kazakhstan, then part of the former Soviet Union. The Russian word "Sputnik" means "companion" ("satellite" in the astronomical sense). In 1885 Konstantin Tsiolkovsky first described in his book, Dreams of Earth and Sky, how such a satellite could be launched into a low altitude orbit.

It was the first in a series of four satellites as part of the Sputnik program of the former Soviet Union and was planned as a contribution to the International Geophysical Year (1957-1958). Three of these satellites (Sputnik 1, 2, and 3) reached Earth orbit. The Sputnik 1 satellite was a 58.0 cm-diameter aluminum sphere that carried four whip-like antennas that were 2.4-2.9 m long. The antennas looked like long "whiskers" pointing to one side. The spacecraft obtained data pertaining to the density of the upper layers of the atmosphere and the propagation of radio signals in the ionosphere. The instruments and electric power sources were housed in a sealed capsule and included transmitters operated at 20.005 and 40.002 MHz (about 15 and 7.5 m in wavelength), the emissions taking place in alternating groups of 0.3 s in duration. The downlink telemetry included data on temperatures inside and on the surface of the sphere.

Since the sphere was filled with nitrogen under pressure, Sputnik 1 provided the first opportunity for meteoroid detection (no such events were reported), since losses in internal pressure due to meteoroid penetration of the outer surface would have been evident in the temperature data. The satellite transmitters operated for three weeks, until the on-board chemical batteries failed, and were monitored with intense interest around the world. The orbit of the then inactive satellite was later observed optically to decay 92 days after launch (January 4, 1958) after having completed about 1400 orbits of the Earth over a cumulative distance traveled of 70 million kilometers. The orbital apogee declined from 947 km after launch to 600 km by Dec. 9th. The Sputnik 1 rocket booster also reached Earth orbit and was visible from the ground at night as a first magnitude object, while the small but highly polished sphere, barely visible at sixth magnitude, was more difficult to follow optically. Several replicas of the Sputnik 1 satellite can be seen at museums in Russia and another is on display in the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C.

Alternate Names Korolev-- Sputnik Source: James J. Harford, "Korolev's Triple Play: Sputniks 1, 2, and 3," adapted from James J. Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon (John Wiley: New York, 1997).

Abstract The paper deals with the politics, planning and technology of the period 1946-1958, spanning the development of the R-7 ICBM technology which made possible the launching of an artificial satellite; the strategy used by Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, with the support of Mystislav Keldysh, in bringing the satellite from conceptualization by Mikhail Tikhonravov to actuality; the early work on Sputnik 3, which was planned to be Sputnik 1; the hurried development of Sputnik 1 when Sputnik 3 was not ready; the even more hurried development of Sputnik 2 (the Laika carrier) at Khrushchev's behest; the actual launches; the failure to map the radiation belts; the casual reaction, at first, by Kremlin officialdom to Sputnik 1's success; and then the quick switch to braggadocio when the world impact was realized.

1 Initial Soviet Reaction to Sputnik 1 Launch While it jolted the rest of the world, the successful launch of Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, received casual treatment, at first, in Moscow. Korolev's former colleague, Academician Boris Rauschenbakh, told me, some 35 years later, "Look up the pages of Pravda for the first day after the launch. It got only a few paragraphs. Then look at the next day's issue, when the Kremlin realized what the world impact was." 2 The article in the October 5 Pravda was, indeed, tersely phrased. Positioned modestly in a right hand column part way down on the first page, it did not even mention the satellite in its head. Titled routinely, "Tass Report," it gave the facts of the launch clinically, and the editors apparently felt obliged from the very first sentence to educate the readers on what it was all about: In the course of the last years in the Soviet Union scientific research and experimental construction work on the creation of artificial satellites of the Earth has been going on.

As already reported in the press, the first launches of satellites in the USSR were planned for implementation in accordance with the program of scientific research for the International Geophysical Year. As the result of a large, dedicated effort by scientific-research institutes and construction bureaus the world's first artificial satellite of the Earth has been created. On 4 October, 1957 in the USSR the first successful satellite launch has been achieved. According to preliminary data, the rocket launcher carried the satellite to the necessary orbital speed of about 8,000 meters per second. At the present time the satellite is moving in an elliptical trajectory around the Earth and its flight can be observed in the rays of the eastern and western Sun with the help of simple optical instruments (binoculars, spyglasses, etc.). 3 The article went on to give the basic information--size, weight, orbital inclination, radio frequency on which the beep could be heard--and it credited the great Tsiolkovsky with having established the feasibility of artificial Earth satellites decades earlier. 4 The Next Day's Turnabout The next day's Pravda was something else.

5 "World's First Artificial Satellite of Earth Created in Soviet Nation" stretched across the top of page one, which was devoted almost entirely to the achievement. But the lead story in the right hand column did not recount the feat itself, with first hand reports from the Soviet protagonists--their names were top secret, after all, so they could not even be contacted. Instead, the column was datelined New York, and it quoted in detail the congratulations of Russia's fiercest Cold War rival, the USA. The words, generous in their praise, were from Joseph Kaplan, chairman of the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year. Both the Soviet and American satellite programs were carried out under IGY auspices, with the results available to the world's scientists. Below the Kaplan item were congratulatory bulletins from A. C. B. Lovell, the British astronomer, and from a member of the USSR's political family, Pavel Novatsky of the Polish Academy of Sciences--the latter headed "Big Victory." Big victory it certainly was.

Poems lyricized the event, like "Leap into the Future" and "Scouting the Celestial Deep." An ephemeris, showing the times when the carrier rocket would be visible over cities in the USSR, as well as Detroit and Washington, was printed like a train timetable. It was the moment to cash in on the performance of a feat that Nikita Khrushchev could never have dreamed would have so powerful an effect. He, after all, had been apathetic about "just another Korolev rocket launch," as Rauschenbakh described the attitude of the Soviet premier and his claque on first hearing the news. In the days to come, though, Pravda was delighted to print the praises of friends and enemies. Reactions from Peking and Shanghai (that friendship would dissolve only a few years hence), Warsaw, Paris, Vienna, Rome, London, and an especially long one from New York, ran under a big headline that ran across the page, "Russians Won the Competition." 6 The US Muffed the Chance to be First It was a competition which the Americans should have won hands down. The concept of putting up a satellite had been known to the world's space enthusiasts for many years.

In America serious proposals to launch a spacecraft into Earth orbit had been discussed since the mid-1940's. Robert P. Haviland recalls that when he was working in the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics in 1945, motivated by a report on space rockets in a document captured from the Peenemunde Germans, he "wrote a 4-5 page memo proposing a Navy satellite development but it was scorned." 7 In February, 1946, the US Army Air Corps asked the major air frame companies to submit secret proposals for the design of an "earth orbiting satellite." Douglas Aircraft was notified on July l that its design was judged the winner. Today's aerospace companies will find it hard to believe that the Air Corps evaluation was completed in less than four months! What's more, Douglas was funded for the study at the "unheard of amount in those days" of $1 million but their contract was switched to the newly-formed Project RAND (for Research and Development) in Santa Monica, California.

8 RAND's eventual report on "Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship" predicted, with keen perception, that "The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb." 9 Alas, nothing followed the study, and so it would not be a US satellite that would generate those repercussions. Tsiolkovsky Showed in 1903 That a Satellite Could be Orbited In Russia, as mentioned earlier, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky had shown mathematically in 1903 how a device launched at a certain velocity would achieve Earth orbit. Then in 1948, forty-five years later, the visionary Mikhail Tikhonravov had made the case to Korolev for developing just such a device. At first he was unable to get support for the concept. His presentation to a meeting of the Academy of Artillery Sciences was treated skeptically. Golovanov quotes the remarks of the Academy president, Anatoli Blagonravov, at the meeting: "The topic is interesting. But we cannot include your report.

Nobody would understand why...They would accuse us of getting involved in things we do not need to get involved in..." However, what Blagonravov said officially was not what he thought instinctively. This courteous, mild-mannered, chain-smoking, white-haired former general, who would become in later years one of the chief spokesmen for the Soviet Union in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, was bothered by the wary reception of Tikhonravov's ideas. "There was no way he could escape the thought that this ridiculous report was in fact not very ridiculous at all." Blagonravov, risking the derision of his colleagues, put the report back on the agenda, thereby giving Tikhonravov--and Korolev--license to study possible satellite designs. 10 The R-7 ICBM Carrier Made a Sputnik Launch Feasible Some five years later, towards the end of 1953, having redesigned the R-7 rocket to carry a heavier payload, Korolev had drafted a proposed decree for the Central Committee of the Communist Party which included the possibility of using the vehicle to launch a satellite.

However, while the draft "was making its way to the top" mention of the satellite was struck out. 11 Not until May 26, 1954 did Korolev formally propose the satellite launch to Dimitri Ustinov, Minister of Armaments. 12 By then the R-7 was capable of propelling an H-bomb warhead of 5 tons--the actual size had not yet been determined--over an intercontinental ballistic trajectory. It could easily orbit a satellite of some 1.5 tons. According to Korolev's deputy, Vassily Mishin, Korolev had to propose a Sputnik launch as part of the test program of the ICBM program. 13 In any case, Korolev's proposal to Ustinov is so delicately phrased that R-7 is not mentioned at all, but merely referred to as the ...new article which permits speaking about the possibility of designing an artificial Earth satellite within the next few years. By a certain reduction of the weight of the payload it will be possible for the satellite to achieve the necessary velocity of 8,000 m/sec.

14 As Roald Sagdeev, longtime head of the USSR Space Research Institute, put it, "Korolev and his colleagues could have only had a vague idea of how heavy the final reentry vehicle (for the ICBM warhead) should be. Sakharov <Andrei> was still far from knowing how to make this deadly weapon relatively compact and easily portable. Since rapid progress was required, rocket designers adopted a worst-case strategy and started to develop an ICBM that, as it was discovered later, had a substantial excess of launch capability, or throw weight." 15 US Vanguard Chosen Over Project Orbiter Meanwhile more substantive thinking on possible satellite designs had been resumed in the U.S. The most expedient design approach came from Von Braun's team at the Army's Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Starting with a meeting in early 1954 with George Hoover of the Office of Naval Research, von Braun and his colleagues eventually came up with Project Orbiter, which would have been an Army-Navy-Air Force design using already-developed Army Ordnance weapons technology to put a small satellite into orbit. 16 But the Eisenhower administration had reasons to choose a different approach.

Eisenhower wanted to keep the military out of the IGY program, which was dedicated to scientific purposes. That was the surface reason. The other one, more telling, was--ironically--based on military strategy. He wanted to be consistent with his well-publicized "Open Skies" stance at a time when U-2's and spy satellites were being developed to begin reconnoitering the USSR. Eisenhower reasoned that a satellite put up as part of the IGY program would strengthen the freedom of the skies policy and would be less likely to disturb Nikita Khrushchev's sensibilities about overflight than one sponsored by three military services. Also, Soviets were likely to launch an IGY satellite themselves. And so a project named Vanguard--which proved to be an embarrassing choice of names--was chosen to carry the US banner into the space age. Based on a sounding rocket developed by the Naval Research Laboratory, but under the auspices of the National Science Foundation, it was going to be a riskier venture than Orbiter because it called for substantially modified first and second stages, a new third stage, and new rocket engines and guidance technology.

Sedov Reveals Soviet Satellite Plan at IAF On July 29, 1955, the Eisenhower Administration announced that the U.S. would launch Vanguard for scientific purposes during the 1957-58 IGY. A few days later, at the Sixth Congress of the International Astronautical Federation in Copenhagen, a delegation of Soviet scientists, appearing at IAF for the first time, revealed at a press conference that the USSR, too, might be in the game. Leonid Sedov, head of the Soviet delegation, and the newly appointed chairman of an Academy of Sciences Commission on Interplanetary Communications, 17 choosing his words carefully, said: From a technical point of view, it is possible to create a satellite of larger dimensions than that reported in the newspapers which we had the opportunity of scanning today. The realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the comparatively near future. I won't take it upon myself to name the date more precisely. 18 But, Sedov, it seems, was speculating, since no official decision had yet been made that there would be a Soviet satellite in IGY.

In fact, not until January 30, 1956 would the Council of Ministers issue a decree authorizing its development. Tikhonravov Transferred to Korolev Bureau It was at this time that Korolev was able to arrange for Mikhail Tikhonravov and his team, which had been working on a satellite concept at Special Design Bureau #385 in the Ural Mountains, to join him. One of the members of that team, Konstantin Feoktistov, recalled: We wanted to build a satellite but Korolev had that responsibility. Tikhonravov was transferred to Korolev's bureau in early 1956 after the Party and the Goverment had authorized Korolev to proceed with the development of a satellite. But the rest of us in the group had to apply to Korolev individually. However, Korolev relied on the advice of Tikhnoravov, his old friend and, by the end of 1957 I was chosen, although it was difficult to leave #385.

19 Sputnik Plans Lag, Keldysh Criticizes Industry Even the January decision, however, was not followed by sufficiently aggressive support for the satellite development in the opinion of Korolev and his close ally, Mstislav Keldysh. Time to beat the Americans had flown by and the Soviet establishment was not yet revved up. Nine months later, on September 14, in what must have been exasperation, and probably with Korolev's prodding, Keldysh appeared before the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to state his case. 20 He first reviewed patiently, like a good teacher, the physics of placing a satellite in orbit. Then he covered the pioneering scientific measurements which the Soviet satellite would make--the Earth's magnetic fields, the "ionic composition of the upper layers of the atmosphere," the "corpuscular radiation of the Sun," cosmic radiation, possible micrometeorites. He must have caused eyes to widen a bit when he said "...we are considering placing a live organism in the satellite--a dog. It turns out that the perception of a dog is the most similar to the perception of a man--biologists so consider it.

The dog will live there in the absence of a gravitational field, in conditions of irradiation, of cosmic radiation. The dog will be undergoing all sorts of dangers, because if the satellite is hit by a large meteoric particle, it will broach the satellite..." By then he surely had their full attention, but he went on. "We, of course, can't stop at the task of creating an Earth satellite. We, naturally, are thinking of further tasks--of space flight. The first project along these lines, I believe, will be to fly around the Moon and photograph it from the side which is always hidden to us." Then came hard criticism: "We have come up short in a whole series of tasks in the Academy of Sciences, and are lagging now.

Back in August we were to turn in the dimensions of the equipment and their mode of attachment to the rocket...We delayed this work, which resulted in a notable delay in the planning and development of the satellite itself." He called out specific industry laggards: "In general, the radiotechnological industry isn't helping us enough...They are sluggishly regarding the creation of this satellite...We have already committed one breach in delaying the delivery of size specifications and other information to the Korolev Design Bureau." Finally, the ultimate motivation came out baldly: "...it would be good if the Presidium were to turn the serious attention of all its institutions to the necessity of doing this work on time...we all want our satellite to fly earlier than the Americans'." 21 Keldysh and Korolev had not only the Academy of Sciences and industry to motivate, they had to deal with the objections of the military generals, who feared that the satellite project would slow down the development of the R-7 ICBM. The fear was understandable since R-7's first five launch attempts had failed. 22 But foot-dragging by the support institutions was only one of Korolev's problems.

In spite of Keldysh's speech, the satellite which was supposed to have the honor of being first continued to fall behind schedule. In fact, it would lag so badly that it would become Sputnik 3--a huge, sophisticated satellite, eventually launched on May 15, 1958. Sputnik 3's 1,327 kg payload included virtually all of the instruments called out in Keldysh's speech. "Simplest" Sputnik Moves Ahead of Big Science Satellite "But," said Gyorgi Grechko, one of the engineers who worked at the Korolev design bureau during those days, and who later became a cosmonaut, "these devices were not reliable enough so the scientists who created them asked us to delay the launch month by month. We thought that if we postponed and postponed we would be second to the US in the space race so we made the simplest satellite, called just that--Prostreishiy Sputnik, or 'PS'.

We made it in one month, with only one reason, to be first in space." 23 It was at this time, on August 21, 1957, that the R-7, in its sixth attempt, propelled a dummy H-bomb warhead all the way to Kamchatka, some 6,000 km. With that success the confident Korolev made his move to beat the Americans with his PS. His next obstacle was a skeptical State Commission for the R-7 ICBM. Discussion of Korolev's satellite proposal before that body, according to a 1992 report by a journalist in a Moscow magazine, was "sharp, the opponents arguing primarily about the tight timing," and "complete agreement was not achieved." Korolev had to go back to the Commission a second time. This time he tried a different ploy. Why not, he challenged the members, put the question of authorization to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party--in the context of whether or not the USSR should try to be the first country in the world to launch a satellite? The Commission blanched. "Nobody wanted to be scapegoat." And so the project proceeded.

24 With the Commission's nervous acquiescence, Korolev bulldozed the development, in a little more than a month, of a plain, polished 83.6 kg sphere containing only a radio transmitter, batteries and temperature measuring instruments, with the intent to place it in orbit on a rocket which had failed in five of its first six launch attempts. It was a very hectic month, and while the satellite was simple, the attention given to its manufacture was unsparing, especially by Korolev, himself. "I coordinated the production, testing, launch preparations and the launch itself," recalled Oleg Ivanovsky, looking back 36 years during a 1993 interview. Ivanovsky had been deputy to Mikhail Khomyakov, Sputnik 1's principal designer. He recalled that there were problems: For example, there were two peculiarities which satellites had that missiles did not. One was that the satellite required precise thermal control and the other was that vacuum sealing was used to assure reliable performance. We had to find new techniques of manufacturing the surfaces in order to achieve the necessary optical and thermal qualities. We had no experience in this work. We needed vacuum chambers.

I recall one episode when we had to persuade the production shop that the satellite was a new item, not a missile. Korolev, with his iron character, was able to influence the attitude of people. The Party directed that new paint be put on the factory walls. Korolev put the satellite on a special stand, draped in velvet, in order that the workers would show reverence towards it. He supervised the carrying out of the production schedule every day personally. 25 One of the metalworkers who was assigned to the Sputnik 1 manufacture was Gennadi Strekalov, later to become a cosmonaut. "My teacher in metalworking did the finishing," he told me. "Two half spheres were stamped, then machined, then the masters did the finishing." 26 Strekalov, who, in 1995, flew to the Mir space station with American astronaut Norman Thagard and then participated in the first Mir-Shuttle rendezvous, is as proud of his work on Sputnik 1 as he is of his four orbital flights.

27 "Korolev came over to the shop and insisted that both halves of the sputnik's metallic sphere be polished until they shone, that they be spotlessly clean," recalled Konstantin Feoktistov, who would be the first engineer-cosmonaut to go into orbit in the three-man Voskhod 1 seven years later. "The people who developed the radio equipment were actually the ones demanding this. They were afraid of the system overheating, and they wanted the orbiting sphere to reflect as many rays of the Sun as possible." 28 An idea of how intense were the preparations for the launch of the "simplest satellite," and how sensitive Korolev was to the event's historical importance, comes from the recollections, on the 30th anniversary of the launch, of one of the design team, Mikhail Floriansky: The jettisoning of the nose cone and the process of separation of the sputnik from its carrier was being tested at the assembly shop late in August, 1957. It is not a complex procedure, but fraught with possible surprises.

Everything was going on normally--or so it seemed--when Korolev all of a sudden subjected the plant's chief engineer to a terrible dressing down. Korolev was berating him--what for!--for the poor quality of the surface of the mockup of the sputnik! The quality of the surface is really important in flight because the heat conditions of the sputnik depend on it, but why the dressing down now, when quite a different process was being tested? Korolev said angrily: 29 It was Korolev's aesthetic as well as engineering sense that had led him to insist on the ball shape for Sputnik 1, although one of the early designs proposed was for a cone-shaped structure. "Today, after decades have passed," recalled colleague Mark Gallai in a 1980's interview, "we simply cannot imagine the first sputnik to be anything other than what it was: an elegant ball...with an antenna thrown back like a galloping horse." 30 There were two flight-ready spheres built, one for the launch and another one for ground testing, developing the welding and other fabrication techniques.

The second one would later be launched too, with the carrier for the dog Laika on Sputnik 2. Rebrov Recalls the Launch Preparations A recollection of the preparations for Sputnik 1, and the launch itself from Baikonur, comes from Colonel Mikhail Rebrov: People in the "space room" worked in white smocks, performing each operation with the greatest thoroughness. The rocket was assembled in the big hangar. Silence fell when the Chief Designer appeared. At the time Sergei Korolev was exacting and more strict than ever... Only two days were left. The carrier rocket was rolled out to the launch pad in the early morning of October 2, 1957. Korolev walked in front, together with all the other chief designers. They walked in silence the entire 1.5 km long way from the assembly-testing building to the pad. No one will ever know what was going through Sergei Korolev's mind at the time.

Later on, when the sputnik was installed in orbit, and its call sign was heard over the globe, he said: "I've been waiting all my life for this day!" The moment of the blast-off has been described many times. Then the rocket got out of the radio zone. The communication with the sputnik ended. The small room where the radio receivers were was overcrowded. Time dragged on slowly. Waiting built up the stress. Everyone stopped talking. There was absolute silence. All that could be heard was the breathing of the people and the quiet static in the loudspeaker...And then from very far-off there appeared, at first very quietly and then louder and louder, those "bleep-bleeps" which confirmed that it was in orbit and in operation. Once again everyone rejoiced. There were kisses, hugs and cries of "Hurrah!" The austere men, who were greeted out of space by the messenger they had made, had tears in their eyes. 31 Americans Shocked But Determined to Respond Hardly tearful, more like rueful, was the reaction of the American space community.

Even though the possibility that the Soviets had been making plans for launching a satellite was known in the US, and not only to government insiders, the fact of the launch was a deep jolt to the space professionals. 32 At that time, I was Executive Secretary of the professional society for space engineers--the American Rocket Society (ARS). Astronautics magazine, the main ARS publication, could not resist reminding its readers that, "A little over two years ago, when the government's guided missile policy committee decided against the Von Braun-Medaris 33 satellite proposal in favor of Project Vanguard, there were four dissenters who voted to send the idea on to the National Security Council for further consideration. One of them was the 'Lone Eagle,' Charles A. Lindbergh, the last one to make aviation headlines of the same magnitude as 'Sputnik.'" 34 Grim determination characterized the American rocketeers. "They <the Russians> must not be allowed to win this game--a game with far-reaching political, social and economic consequences," Astronautics editorialized.

35 In the same issue, a very insightful interpretation of the technological significance of the Russian feat by Martin Summerfield of Princeton University had an upbeat aspect, but was somber in its reflection on the advanced state of Soviet space technology. The success of the Russian "Sputnik" was convincing and dramatic proof to people around the world of the real prospects of space travel in the not distant future. The fact that a 23-in. sphere weighing 184 lb has been placed in an almost precise circular orbit indicates that a number of important technological problems such as high thrust rocket engines, lightweight missile structures, accurate guidance, stable autopilot control, and large scale launching methods have been solved, at least to the degree required for a satellite project. 36 I got a phone call at my home in Princeton about 7:00PM on Friday evening, October 4, from the New York Times aeronautics reporter, Richard Witkin. Had I heard? What is the reaction of the US rocket community? My response is not even in my memory. But the impact of the launch on the US, as well as on my own career, would be powerful, indeed.

ARS at the time had a membership of about 5,000 engineers and scientists, most of them working on missile programs, although a few dozen were on Project Vanguard. By 1962, just seven years later, the membership quadrupled to 20,000, a growth so rapid that industry and government pressures caused a merger of ARS with the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, the society for aeronautical engineers, into what is today the 40,000 member American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). World Reaction The news of the launch in the world's leading newspapers got Second Coming treatment. The New York Times, receiving the story in the late afternoon of Friday, October 4, printed the next morning a rarely used three-line head in half-inch capital letters, running full length across the front page: SOVIET FIRES EARTH SATELLITE INTO SPACE; IT IS CIRCLING THE GLOBE AT 18,000 M.P.H.; SPHERE TRACKED IN 4 CROSSINGS OVER U.S. Other world newspapers gave the event similar play. Then the interpretation began.

The Manchester Guardian needed only a couple of days to begin to speculate apocalyptically on what the Russians might now do. An October 7 editorial titled "Next Stop Mars?" read, "The achievement is immense. It demands a psychological adjustment on our part towards Soviet society, Soviet military capabilities and--perhaps most of all--to the relationship of the world with what is beyond." Some of the Guardian's speculation was downright clairvoyant. "We must be prepared to be told what the other side of the Moon looks like <Lunik 3 produced the photos only two years later>, or how thick the cloud on Venus may be <revealed by the Soviet Venera and US Mariner series starting in the '60's>. Accurately, the Guardian pointed out that, "The Russians can now build ballistic missiles capable of hitting any chosen target anywhere in the world." That, certainly, was true, but it would be some years before improvements in guidance technology made the capability an actuality. It certainly did not follow, as the Guardian stated a few sentences later, that "Clearly they have established a great lead in missile technology." This was one of the earliest inaccurate predictions of a missile gap. French reaction was equally ebullient.

"Myth has become reality: Earth's gravity conquered," bannered Le Figaro, and went on to report the "disillusion and bitter reflections" of "The Americans (who) have had little experience with humiliation in the technical domain." 37 For three weeks the world could hear the beeping of Sputnik 1 before the radio died out, and it orbited more than 1,400 times before burning up in the atmosphere after three months in space. Much has been written about the effect of the Sputnik 1 launch on the world scene. Many American space enthusiasts, stricken with gloom at the time, now reflect that it might have been the best thing that could have happened to awaken the need for an aggressive space program. Only four years later President Kennedy would call for what became the Apollo program. An enormous infrastructure of space research and development centers, test and launch facilities and supporting industry and university programs, would come into being. Some Negative Western Reaction to Space Buildup There were those who reacted negatively to the surge in space technology and its consequent spurring of the growth of high tech weapons.

As former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan put it in his memoirs, "It <Sputnik> caused Western alarmists, such as my friend Joe Alsop, to demand the immediate subordination of all other national interests to the launching of immensely expensive crash programs to outdo the Russians in this competition. It gave effective arguments to the various enthusiasts for nuclear armament in the American military-industrial complex. That the dangerousness and expensiveness of this competition should be raised to a new and higher order just at the time when the prospects for negotiation in this field were being worsened by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the armed forces of the Continental NATO powers was a development that brought alarm and dismay to many people besides myself." 38 Sputnik 2, Pushed by Khrushchev, Readied in One Month While all this introspection was taking place in the West, the creators of Sputnik were unable to be interviewed, take bows, be photographed, get medals. Sergei Korolev was literally back at the office, because Khrushchev, realizing what a hot property he had, gave him new orders.

Do something bold, Sergei Pavlovich, to celebrate the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Revolution! It's only a month away. Cosmonaut Grechko tells the story. I heard this from Korolev himself with my own ears. After Sputnik 1 Korolev went to the Kremlin and Khrushchev said to him, "We never thought that you would launch a Sputnik before the Americans. But you did it. Now please launch something new in space for the next anniversary of our revolution." 39 The anniversary would be in one month! I'll bet that even with today's computers nobody would launch something into space in one month. It was, I think, the happiest month of his <Korolev's> life. He told his staff, and his workers, that there would be no special drawings, no quality check, everyone would have to be guided by his own conscience. The engineers would make drawings and give them directly to the workers. And we launched on November 3, 1957, in time for the celebration of the Revolution.

The payload of Sputnik 2 weighed 508 kg, more than six times the weight of Sputnik 1. A shroud housed a carrier containing the world's first space passenger, the mongrel dog Laika, plus a duplicate of the Sputnik 1 sphere. Laika is reported to have barked and eaten food during his lonely sojourn but, alas, he died when the capsule overheated after failing to separate from its booster, thereby rendering the thermal control system inoperative. Animal groups protested, but the Soviets made Laika into a martyr for a noble cause. Veterans of the Sputnik 2 project regard it as an even more significant achievement than Sputnik 1. Not a single engineering task had been performed on it until after Sputnik 1 went up. With the new triumph Khrushchev could not resist escalating his needling of the Americans. In a speech at the 40th anniversary of the Revolution, on November 6, he said, "It appears that the name Vanguard reflected the confidence of the Americans that their satellite would be the first in the world.

But...it was the Soviet satellites which proved to be ahead, to be in the vanguard...In orbiting our earth, the Soviet sputniks proclaim the heights of the development of science and technology and of the entire economy of the Soviet Union, whose people are building a new life under the banner of Marxism-Leninism." Vanguard, Rushed to Launch, Explodes on Pad Those derisive comments proved even more galling to the Americans a month later when, on December 6, the first attempt to launch the Vanguard satellite was an ignominious failure before the world's television cameras. The three stage rocket was designated TV-3, for Test Vehicle 3, and it had been originally scheduled to be just that, a test. But under Sputnik pressure, the "test" was moved up several months, and made into a full-fledged attempt at a satellite launch. But the vehicle got only a few feet off the ground before sagging back, buckling, bursting into a huge conflagration and tossing its tiny 1.47 kg payload, still transmitting, some yards away.

Pravda delightedly reproduced the front page of the London Daily Herald which showed a photo of the Vanguard being readied on the launch pad next to one of the explosion. Superimposed above the immense Herald headline, which read, "OH, WHAT A FLOPNIK!" was Pravda's comment, "Reklama and Deistvitelnost," or "Publicity and Reality." US Explorer Authorized, Launched, Discovers Van Allen Belts Following the Sputnik 2 launch, a team composed of the Von Braun group from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency--for the launch vehicle--and one from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California--for the space capsule --the latter headed by William H. Pickering, was given the nod to put up the first US satellite. On its initial try the team launched the 14 kg Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. Fortunately, Pickering and Ernst Stuhlinger, one of Von Braun's staff chiefs, conscious of the odds against Vanguard's success, had persuaded James Van Allen of the University of Iowa to make the package of scientific instruments being readied for Vanguard compatible with Explorer 1's Jupiter C launch vehicle.

40 This turned out to be particularly fortuitous because Explorer 1, with only one sixth the payload weight of Sputnik 1, scored a major scientific coup when its instruments sensed a pattern of radiation around the Earth leading to the discovery of the now famous Van Allen Belts. It is an interesting footnote on scientific history that Sputnik 1 could have made the discovery if it had installed simple instruments. Sputnik 2, in fact, did have the instruments, wrote Van Allen: "a pair of Geiger-Mueller tubes...which operated properly and yielded data for seven days" . 41 but the Soviet scientists failed to develop the data necessary to interpret the discovery. Sputnik 3 Finally Orbited, NASA Established Oleg Ivanovsky, who worked on Sputniks 1, 2, and 3, speaks with deserved satisfaction of the Soviet achievements of those months in late 1957 and early 1958. But there was trouble too. "We had our first space failure," he told me, with the difficult Sputnik 3. "It was April 27, 1958, and it was caused by a rocket engine failure.

The rocket went up about 12-15 km and the satellite fell separately. There was a search for the satellite. I remember that the pilots conducting the search were not allowed to know what they were looking for. 'Just search the area for anything unusual,' they were told, 'and don't attract the camels.' It was crazy secrecy. Finally one pilot came back and said he had seen something that sounded to us like the satellite. We sent out a rescue team in an armored vehicle. When we got it back some of the instruments could still operate." Ivanovsky then showed me proudly a copper wire which he had recovered from one of the instruments which kept the satellite beeper from operating prematurely. When the 1.5 ton Sputnik 3 was launched successfully, on May 15, 1958, it caused even more anxiety in the West. Any doubt that the Russians would soon have the capability to send an ICBM to the United States was demolished. Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, had demanded a Congressional investigation of the impact of Sputnik 1 only a few days after its launch.

On the Senate floor in January he had made recommendations originating in his Preparedness Subcommittee to "Start work at once on the development of a rocket motor with a million pound thrust," "Put more effort in the development of manned missiles (satellites)," and "Accelerate and expand research and development programs, provide funding on a long-term basis, and improve control and administration within the Department of Defense or through the establishment of an independent agency." During the same months in early 1958 President Eisenhower, with his science adviser, James Killian, also concluded that a civilian space agency was needed, and directed Hugh Dryden, head of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), to prepare legislation which would create such an agency on that relatively small organization's structure. The result was Public Law 85-568, signed on July 29, 1958 by the President, calling for the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

It was quite an about-face for a president whose staff members had belittled Sputnik 1 as "a silly bauble" and "a neat scientific trick" and who, himself, had said that it had not bothered him "one iota." . 42 Sputnik 3's large load of scientific instruments was designed to measure micrometeorites, density of the upper atmosphere, cosmic rays, solar radiation, the presence and effect of high energy particles and the Earth's own radiation environment. . 43 It could have performed a tour de force of scientific research in virgin territory. The Manchester Guardian reported that "This impressive list (of instruments) is a telling demonstration of the fact that the latest Russian sputnik has been launched for strictly scientific purposes." Sputnik 3 Misses Chance to Map Van Allen Belts Unfortunately, to the great embarrassment of the Soviets, the huge vehicle missed one more chance at what would have been its most significant achievement--mapping the radiation belts. Explorer 1's instruments, which had revealed the existence of the radiation from the belts, had at first been overwhelmed by its intensity, and it took some time for the Van Allen analysis team to understand what it had measured.

Sputnik 3 could have mapped the belts systematically, but failed to do so because of a defective tape recorder. The recorder, designed to store and transmit to Earth the information collected by the instruments when it was out of direct radio contact, had failed utterly to transmit the necessary data. Roald Sagdeev recounts what happened: A scientific team landed at the Baikonur Cosmodrome for the final integration and testing of hardware on Sputnik 3. Korolev invited everyone for the last briefing before the final okay was to be given and the countdown started...It was the first impressive collection of scientific instruments, each of which was reported to be functioning normally. However, trouble was soon discovered in some of the supporting hardware. The problem was with the more or less routine tape recorder, whose function was to accumulate data from the different experiments and to prepare messages for the ground station.

The spacecraft, revolving around the globe, would only be in contact with the ground station during periods of "direct radio visibility." Simply speaking, the ground station would be unable to sense the signals from the spacecraft when it was behind the horizon...With such a crucial role, members of the scientific team were extremely worried about the troubled tape recorder and they recommended postponing the actual launch to give the technicians a chance to fix it. However, the tape recorder's ambitious engineer, Alexei Bogomolov <"I too often had to depend on his hardware," Sagdeev footnotes acidly> did not want to be considered a loser in the company of winners. He suggested that the testing failure was simply caused by electromagnetic interference from the multiplicity of different electrical circuits in the test room. He boldly proposed to launch Sputnik 3 on time. To the great disappointment of the scientific team, Korolev accepted Bogomolov's suggestion... During the flight, however, it was confirmed that Bogomolov had been dead wrong. His tape recorder did not work.

Consequently, the scientific information gathered was limited by the area of direct radio visibility...Each scientific group had results, but because of the recorder failure they had to guess whether the phenomena discovered were of local or planetary significance. . 44 The most disappointed scientist, says Sagdeev, was Sergei Vernov, a renowned physicist. The detectors on Sputnik 3 sensed extremely high levels of radiation, but was it local or did it exist around the Earth? Some six weeks earlier, on March 26, Explorer 3 had been launched (Explorer 2 had failed to orbit), carrying the first tape recorder ever launched on a satellite. As Van Allen wrote, it "functioned beautifully in response to ground command and fulfilled our plan of providing complete orbital coverage of radiation intensity data." . 45 The Soviets, without tape recorded data, were hogtied. As Van Allen recalled, the team was at first puzzled that they "were encountering a mysterious physical effect of a real nature." . 46 They "worked feverishly in analyzing the data from Explorers 1 and 3 (by primitive hand reduction of pen-and-ink recordings) and organizing them on an altitude, latitude and longitude basis." .

47 In an interesting sidelight on the whole episode, at first there was suspicion that the intense radiation was coming from a Soviet nuclear test. Subsequent analysis, however, proved that it was "geomagnetically trapped corpuscular radiation" distributed in a "belt" around the Earth. At a conference in the summer of 1958, the name "Van Allen radiation belt" . was applied for the first time. . 48 More confirmation of the origin of the radiation, as well as the discovery that there was also an outer belt, came two months later--again from the Americans--when Explorer 4 mapped the belts from July 26 to September 19, 1958. "On a purely observational basis," wrote Van Allen, "the Sputnik 3 data actually represented discovery of the earth's outer radiation belt inasmuch as they were acquired before those of Explorer 4 and Pioneer 3." .

49 However, Vernov and colleagues had not yet interpreted the observational finding, although in what seems to have been hindsight, Vernov published a photo of what is now known as the Van Allen belts in Pravda on March 6, 1959, alleging that the data were based on findings that he had reported at an IGY conference in August, 1958. However, colleagues of Van Allen who heard the paper maintain that the fragmentary data available at that time from Sputniks 1, 2 and 3 could not have formed the basis for such a finding, and, what's more, no such finding was reported in the paper. . 50 Afterwards, a Russian joke circulated that the belts were to be called the Van Allen-Vernov radiation belts. "What did Vernov do? He discovered the Van Allen belts." The Launch of Sputnik, 1957 Other State Department Archive Sites The Launch of Sputnik, 1957 On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the earth's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I.

The successful launch came as a shock to experts and citizens in the United States, who had hoped that the United States would accomplish this scientific advancement first. The fact that the Soviets were successful fed fears that the U.S. military had generally fallen behind in developing new technology. As a result, the launch of Sputnik served to intensify the arms race and raise Cold War tensions. During the 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union were working to develop new technology. Nazi Germany had been close to developing the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) near the end of the Second World War, and German scientists aided research in both countries in the wake of that conflict. Both countries were also engaged in developing satellites as a part of a goal set by the International Council of Scientific Unions, which had called for the launch of satellite technology during late 1957 or 1958. Over the course of the decade, the United States tested several varieties of rockets and missiles, but all of these tests ended in failure. The Soviet launch of the first Sputnik satellite was one accomplishment in a string of technological successes.

Few in the United States had anticipated it, and even those who did were not aware of just how impressive it would be. At 184 pounds, the Russian satellite was much heavier than anything the United States was developing at the time, and its successful launch was quickly followed by the launch of two additional satellites, including one that carried a dog into space. Together, these orbited the earth every 90-minutes and created fear that the United States lagged far behind in technological capability. These concerns were compounded when the United States learned that the Soviet Union also tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile that year. Although President Dwight Eisenhower had tried to downplay the importance of the Sputnik launch to the American people, he poured additional funds and resources into the space program in an effort to catch up. The U.S. Government suffered a severe setback in December of 1957 when its first artificial satellite, named Vanguard, exploded on the launch pad, serving as a very visible reminder of how much the country had yet to accomplish to be able to compete militarily with the Soviets. At last, on January 31, 1958, the United States succeeded in launching its first satellite, the Explorer.

The Explorer was still slighter than Sputnik, but its launch sent it deeper into space. The Soviets responded with yet another launch, and the space race continued. The success of Sputnik had a major impact on the Cold War and the United States. Fear that they had fallen behind led U.S. policymakers to accelerate space and weapons programs. In the late 1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted about Soviet technological superiority and growing stockpiles of ICBMs, so the United States worked simultaneously to develop its own ICBMs to counter what it assumed was a growing stockpile of Soviet missiles directed against the United States. With both countries researching new technology, talk of creating a treaty banning nuclear testing faded away for several years. In this way, the launch of Sputnik fueled both the space race and the arms race, in addition to increasing Cold War tensions, as each country worked to prepare new methods of attacking the other. Eventually, lawmakers and political campaigners in the United States successfully exploited the fear of a "missile gap" developing between U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals in the 1960 presidential election, which brought John F.

Kennedy to power over Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 served to remind both sides of the dangers of the weapons they were developing.

Question: What was the first artificial satellite?
Answer: Sputnik 1