Belgrano Inquiry :: Is Maggie Thatcher a War Criminal? HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO Click image to enlarge We have the act itself (the sinking of a ship), as well as the end to be gained (keep the British government in power and torpedo a peace initiative) and the circumstances surrounding it (an attack outside the exclusion zone in an undeclared war). The History of the south Atlantic conflict The War for the Malvinas Ruben Moro 1989, p.165. The ARA General Belgrano was an Argentine Navy cruiser which was controversially sunk by a British submarine during the 1982 Falklands War as she sailed away from the conflict zone. 323 people died, mainly young sea cadets. Originally a US Navy cruiser, launched in 1938, the ship survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was decommissioned from the US Navy in 1946. In 1951, the ship was sold to Argentina. In 1956, the ship was renamed ARA General Belgrano after a hero of the Argentine war of independence.

On April 26th, 1982, the General Belgrano, accompanied by two destroyers, left the port of Ushuaia in southern Argentina. On April 29th, the Argentine task group began patrolling South of the Falkland Islands. On the following day, the ship was detected by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror which gradually closed over the next day. On May 2nd, HMS Conqueror fired three Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes, two of which hit the Belgrano. With the ship holed, no electrical power, and unable to pump out water, the Belgrano soon began to list to port and sink towards the bow. Captain Hector Bonzo therefore ordered the crew to abandon ship using the seventy-odd rubber dingys. Tragically, the Belgrano’s two escorts did not know that something had happened to the Belgrano and continued on a westward course. By the time that the escorts realized something had happened to the Belgrano, it was already dark, the weather had worsened, and the Belgrano’s life rafts had been scattered.

Consequently, even though Argentine and Chilean ships did rescue 770 men over the next two days, 321 members of the Belgrano’s crew died. In early editions on Tuesday May 4th, 1982, Britain’s The Sun newspaper led with the infamous headline “GOTCHA”: ”Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser”. When news began to emerge that the Belgrano had indeed been sunk, with a large number of casualties, later editions of the Sun led with the more sombre headline “Did 1,200 Argies drown?” THE CONTROVERSY The sinking of the Belgrano became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners in Britain. This was for a variety of reasons, including the ship being well outside the 200 mile (320 kilometre) Total Exclusion Zone that the British had declared around the Falklands, because the ship was on a westerly heading at the time it was attacked, and because a Peruvian peace proposal was still on the table at the time of the attack. Was the sinking of the Belgrano justifiable under international law?

Some argue that, the ship being outside the British-declared Total Exclusion Zone would not affect this analysis, since the British Government stated on April 23rd, that ‘the approach’ of any warship or aircraft ‘which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic’ would encounter an ‘appropriate’ response. The Belgrano was neither ‘approaching’ the task force and was it a ‘threat’? That statement was put out while the British task force was still travelling South, as a warning that any approaching aircraft etc might be shot. Once the Task Force had arrived, it then announced on 28 April the Total Exclusion Zone – and, that would have superceded an earlier statement. War was not declared, that is why these definitions were important. Some Argentine Views on May 3rd 1982, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, that the sinking of the Belgrano was “at a point at the 55 º 24 ‘south latitude and 61 º 32′ west longitude. That this point is located 36 miles outside the area maritime exclusion set by the government of Great Britain.

Such an attack is a treacherous act of armed aggression.’ Was it? Debate has raged on this issue, mostly misinformed due to the torrent of British MOD fabrications. This website will enable you to have that calm debate you always wanted to, but based on correct info. Let’s hear a statement by Alicia Pierini, Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires on April 25 2005: “The Argentine ship was away from the area of ​​belligerency, not navigating towards it and not even close to any British units: so it could not have been any threat or danger to the United Kingdom. Torpedoing it was, quite simply, a war crime, through the disproportionate and illegitimate use of force in violation of the rights of those who fought then. Why would Britain have designated the exclusion zone – thus drawing the boundaries of war-theater – if it was immediately to be violated? “ Political analyst Rosendo Fraga expressed the following cautious view, immediately prior to Lawrence Freedman’s Official History appearing in 2005: The debate over whether the British attack took place within the international rules to be respected in conflict or outside, is controversial.

Probably resolving the issue will be the function of legal historians, politicians and diplomats. The reality is that the cruiser was sunk by breaking rules, but the international community seems to have taken over the matter, not mostly sharing this view. For Argentines, the idea that the cruiser was sunk in violation of the rules will remain as a manifestation of the Argentine claim to sovereignty, though the world does not share this view and only historians can give a more definitive opinion about it. Vice Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, in an interview published in the NATION March 31, 2001 said this: “I gave the order to attack on 1 May. When the British force set out to land would be the key moment of danger and their whole strategy would be to defend people who disembarked. Then they put all their elements, including submarines, to defend that position. That was the moment when we had to take the opportunity to do something. It was time to think about a transport strike, a damaged ship [?]. But, three groups of attack open to the West to wrap and search vessels were lost [?].

Six hours, after I send a new message to Allara (the head of the fleet of sea) landing there, that because of serious danger to their ships, they should retire? “ Six hours after the abortive Argenine attempt to attack, on May 1st, he gave the order to retire. That is important as a statement by the man who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine South Atlantic Theatre of Operations. In 1994, Argentina added its claim to the islands to the Argentine constitution , stating that this claim must be pursued in a manner “respectful of the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law.” It would be strange if also in 1994 the Argentine government conceded that the sinking of the Belgrano had been a “ legal act of war?” The evidence heard at the Belgrano Inquiry – here summarised – offers an alternative view. You decide. It would have been a legal act of war if the Belgrano had either the intention or the capability to threaten Britain’s Task Force. Did it? That depends upon what its mission was.

Arguments of ‘military necessity’ for sinking have a logistical problem: had it been perceived as a threat to the Task Force, that would have happened on May 1st, while it was sailing East, towards the Task Force. That didn’t happen. Only after it had turned round and had been sailing East, for 11 hours, away from the fleet, was it sunk. That’s what it was doing. Thirty Years Later … January 2012: The sky is darkened with the lame ducks of Britain’s Falklands policy coming home to roost. The UK is now re-violating the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it did thirty years ago by bringing ships such as HMS Sheffield, armed with nuclear depth-charges, into the conflict. South America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Britain has announced in January 2012 that it was sending a nuclear-armed destroyer, HMS Dauntless, to the South Atlantic region. America has put out a humiliating-for-Britain policy statement alluding to ‘Los Malvinas,’ i.e.

using the Argentine word for the Falkland islands, and describing the British occupation of it as ‘de facto’ – and that means, in contrast with de Jure. De Jure means occupation by right, de facto just means, they’re there because they’re there. One British conservative analyst called this statement, ”hugely insulting to Britain.” The US has affirmed: This is a bilateral issue that needs to be worked out directly between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. We encourage both parties to resolve their differences through dialogue in normal diplomatic channels, adding that “we recognize de facto United Kingdom administration of the Islands but take no position regarding sovereignty.” Fox News reported that the Obama Administration was backing Argentina over the U.K. in the Falklands dispute. The Organization of American States earlier this week adopted a declaration calling for negotiations between the UK and Argentina over the “sovereignty” of the Falkland Islands. While the U.S. delegation did not speak in support of the measure, it ultimately joined a consensus adopting it.

That basically puts the negotiating situation back to where it was in January-February 1982, before the war broke out… Prime Minister Cameron accused Argentina of being ‘colonialist’ in its demands for sovereignty over the Falklands. In response, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner told Mr Cameron to re-read his history books. Prince William is being posted to the islands as an RAF search-and-rescue pilot next month – a move Argentina attacked as ‘provocative.’ In response the South American trading bloc, Mercosur, is closing its ports to all ships flying the Falklands flag. Britian’s Foreign Office has closed half a dozen embassies in Latin America in recent years, to minimise the danger of receiving subversive opinions from foreign capitals. If oil is found in commercial quantities it will be difficult for any company to exploit it without the assistance and co-operation of the Argentinian mainland.

Argentine protesters have burnt the Union flag outside British Embassy in Buenos Aires in rage over Cameron’s pledge on Falklands, urging their government to sever diplomatic links with London Former head of the British army General Sir Michael Jackson said that it would be impossible for the British military to confront Argentina in case a military confrontation takes place over the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands. “What if an Argentinean force was able to secure the Mount Pleasant airfield? Then our ability to recover the islands now would be just about impossible,” said Jackson in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph. Likewise the head of the Naval task force in the Falklands War has warned that defence cuts mean Britain can now do “ precisely nothing” to prevent Argentina retaking the islands. the Royal Navy no longer has aircraft carriers, has lost its force of Harrier jump jets and seen its warship fleet cut in half over the last decade.

General Sir Peter Whiteley, a former commandant general of the Royal Marines, said: ‘If the Argentines decided to invade again we could never consider trying to take them (the Falklands) back because of our lack of naval resources.’ And Surgeon Rear Admiral Ralph Curr, the Royal Navy’s former medical director-general, added: ‘There’s no way we could defend the Falklands or re-engage the Argentines if it all happened again.’ In the Telegraph’s view, Britain can do ‘nothing’ to prevent Argentina retaking Falkland Islands. Argentine asserts sovreignty over Falkaland Islands March 2012 The Argentine senate has unanimously voted for a measure asserting the South American country’s “legitimate sovereignty” over the disputed Malvinas Islands. The draft document, known as the “Ushuaia Declaration,” was adopted ahead of the 30th anniversary of the war between Argentina and Britain over the islands, also known as the Falklands.The declaration also rejected “the persistent colonialist and militarist attitude of the United Kingdom” and warned against the “militarization” of the Malvinas.

Britain has deployed its most sophisticated warship, HMS Dauntless, and a nuclear submarine to the South Atlantic to prevent Argentina’s possible counter-move. Tensions have been mounting in recent months over the South Atlantic islands, with the UN calling on Britain to discuss decolonization, but the UK has so far refused to do so. HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia - Telegraph Defence HMS Conqueror’s biggest secret: a raid on Russia The submarine that sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands war was involved in a much more daring and dangerous Cold War operation only weeks later Comments It was dark, in the early hours, and the sea was freezing as Her Majesty’s Submarine Conqueror came to periscope depth. Her captain, Christopher Wreford-Brown, had been stalking his target methodically, a hunter in pursuit of wary prey. There she was, 1,000 yards ahead, slow-moving, seemingly unaware of the submarine coming up on her tail. Gathered around Commander Wreford-Brown in the darkened operations room, officers and men waited in silence, inner tension masked by outward calm. It was 1982 and this was the real thing.

HMS Conqueror is famous, some would say notorious, for sinking the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered attack submarine, a type also known menacingly as a hunter-killer, that year became the first of her kind to fire in anger. The Belgrano was sent to bottom in short order, her ancient hull rent by two torpedoes: 323 men, many of them young conscripts, died. The Falklands war began in earnest that day, May 2 1982. But the ship now in the crosswires was not the Belgrano. This was August, almost two months after the liberation of the Falklands, and on the other side of the world, in the Barents Sea, backyard of the mighty Soviet Northern Fleet. Conqueror was sailing as close to Russian territorial waters as was legally allowed – or maybe closer. Submariners, a tight-knit community, politely disdainful of their surface counterparts, joke that there are two types of naval vessel: submarines and targets. Wreford-Brown’s target was a spy trawler – an AGI in Nato parlance, meaning Auxiliary General Intelligence.

Crammed with interception and detection equipment, they were a ubiquitous presence during the Cold War, shadowing Nato exercises or loitering off naval bases. This one was special: Polish-flagged, she was pulling a device long coveted by the British and Americans, a two-mile string of hydrophones known as a towed-array sonar. It was the latest thing in Soviet submarine-detection technology and Conqueror’s job was to steal it. To do so, the bow was equipped with electronically controlled pincers, provided by the Americans, to gnaw through the three-inch-thick steel cable connecting it to the trawler. The name of this audacious exercise in piracy? Operation Barmaid. Thirty years on, and the story of this mission, classified Top Secret to this day, is being told. It may be that the Russian government is learning for the first time the fate of what was one of its most closely guarded devices.

Related Articles 'Heat of the moment firefight' could be behind Royal Marine arrests 12 Oct 2012 “This was a quite remarkable feat, a daring exploit that carried with it immense risk,” says the documentary maker Stuart Prebble, whose new book, Secrets of the Conqueror, discloses the existence of Barmaid. “When we think of the Cold War we think of Cuba and Berlin and missiles and tanks, but it was at sea, and under the sea in particular, where the East-West struggle was often at its most dangerous. “I have known about Barmaid for nearly 30 years and two years ago I approached the Ministry of Defence and asked that its details be released under the 30-year rule. They spent eight months thinking about it and eventually came back and said no. Their final position was that, although they wouldn’t help, they wouldn’t try to stop me writing about it.” Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Anglo-Americans rested on their laurels, confident of their superiority in naval technology over the fledgling Soviet fleet. But as the 1970s wore on that confidence was eroded.

Soviet submarines were not just becoming quieter and faster, they were able to turn the tables on their supposedly more advanced Western opponents. Submariners call it “bouncing”, the practice of creeping up on a hostile submarine before switching on active, wave-emitting sonar. The deafening ping in the earphones of the target crew tells them: “I’m here. If this was a war, you’d be dead.” Towed-array sonar is different. It is passive and does not emit a signal. It floats at a prescribed depth, trailing behind a ship or submarine, simply listening for enemy submarines. Because the hydrophones are spaced out, they can achieve a multi-dimensional fix on a target, and are less vulnerable to noise from the host vessel. The American and British navies imagined themselves to be far ahead in this technology and were disturbed to discover that the Russians were matching them. Had they caught up through ingenuity, or by spying? The issue was sensitive for the British, who had been plagued by spy scandals in the post-war period. The “Portland Spy Ring” had betrayed naval secrets, as had the Admiralty clerk John Vassall.

The Americans took the lead, conceiving a project to capture a towed array and discover its origins. General Dynamics, supplier of kit to the CIA, built the pincer equipment, which was installed in British submarines. But why not use the bigger US Navy? “There are two schools of thought about that,” says Prebble, a former editor of World in Action. “The British believed they were selected because they had more skilled submariners, and exercises do seem to bear this out. British submariners tend not to play by the book to the extent that the Americans do. “The more cynical view has it that if a British sub was caught the diplomatic fall-out would be less severe than if an American one was involved. No one wanted to provoke a superpower confrontation.” Cutting a towed-array cable and making it look like an accidental loss was no easy task. Before Conqueror was fitted with the television-guided pincers, her sister ship HMS Churchill had tried to steam through an array to sever it from the towing ship. She was damaged and depth-charged for her pains. Conqueror made two attempts to use the pincers, in the Barents Sea and the Mediterranean, before her final attempt in August.

“When crews heard about these pincers, everybody thought it was absolutely crazy,” says Prebble. “Their use demanded the most brilliant seamanship, coming up from below into the array’s blind spot and edging towards the cutting point only a few yards from the tow ship. The pincers were designed to gnaw rather than slice cleanly to give the impression that the array had snagged on an underwater obstacle and been torn off.” There, then, was Wreford-Brown, staring though his periscope that August night. The TV cameras were useless until a few inches from the target, so black was the Arctic water. Wreford-Brown and his officers had to fall back on mental arithmetic to calculate their distance from the target. “That was the genius of the exercise,” says Prebble. “There is a way of approaching the blind spot that involves going deep and then coming up at an angle, literally below the vessel.” The trawler’s propeller was feet away from Conqueror’s hull. A momentary miscalculation and a collision was inevitable. But nerves held and a connection was made. The pincer blades gnawed, and in seconds that seemed like hours the array was freed.

Clamps held on to the cable as Conqueror dropped away to a safe depth, trailing the array by her side. “Everyone in the control room was tense,” says one of those present. “We were expecting at any time that we would be discovered and were ready to run, if necessary.” None of the crewmen who spoke to Prebble was prepared to confirm Conqueror’s position but the suspicion is that the operation took place inside Soviet territorial waters, just three miles from the coast. If discovered, the sub would have faced attack from Russian air and naval units. Once Conqueror reached a safe distance, divers were sent out to secure the array. The submarine later surfaced so that they could swim out again to haul the device aboard and bundle it in the hull. Did the crew of the AGI know what had happened? Even if they suspected foul play it would not have been in their interests to admit it to their superiors. A sojourn in the gulag might have followed. Immediately after Conqueror reached her base on the Clyde, the array was put on to an aircraft and sent for analysis in the United States. It is said that the name Conqueror was whispered with a certain reverence in the Pentagon for some time afterwards.

Following the sinking of the Belgrano, much speculation surrounded the disappearance of the Conqueror’s logs. The assumption in some quarters was that they had been destroyed to conceal embarrassing details about the submarine’s movements before and after the attack on the cruiser. Prebble thinks otherwise. “I believe the logs were shredded or incinerated to hide the Barents Sea operation,” he says. “This was a top-secret mission.” The submarine arm is known as the Silent Service, partly because of its stealthy approach to warfare but also because of the secrecy attending its activities. Rarely does it receive public praise. Now, at least, we know of Operation Barmaid. The Conqueror’s crew had to celebrate their triumph in secret. Let’s hope they enjoyed a pint or two. The Falklands War Updated August 02, 2016. Falkland War - Overview: Fought in 1982, the Falklands War was the result of the Argentine invasion of the British-owned Falkland Islands. Located in the South Atlantic, Argentina had long claimed these islands as part of its territory. On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands, capturing the islands two days later.

In response, the British dispatched a naval and amphibious task force to the area. The initial phases of the conflict occurred mainly at sea between elements of the Royal Navy and the Argentine Air Force. On May 21, British troops landed and by June 14 had compelled the Argentine occupiers to surrender. Falklands War - Dates: The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentine troops landed in the Falkland Islands . Fighting ended on June 14, following the British liberation of the islands' capital, Port Stanley, and the surrender of Argentine forces in the Falklands. The British declared a formal end to military activity on June 20. Falklands War: Prelude and Invasion: In early 1982, President Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the Argentina's ruling military junta, authorized the invasion of the British Falkland Islands. The operation was designed to draw attention away from human rights and economic issues at home by bolstering national pride and giving teeth to the nation's long-held claim on the islands. After an incident between British and Argentine forces on nearby South Georgia Island, Argentine forces landed in the Falklands on April 2.

The small garrison of Royal Marines resisted, however by April 4 the Argentines had captured the capital at Port Stanley. Argentine troops also landed on South Georgia and quickly secured the island. Falklands War: British Response: After organizing diplomatic pressure against Argentina, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the assembly of a naval task force to retake the islands. After the House of Commons voted to approve Thatcher's actions on April 3, she formed a War Cabinet which first met three days later. Commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse , the task force consisted of several groups, the largest of which was centered on the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. Led by Rear Admiral "Sandy" Woodward, this group contained the Sea Harrier fighters that would provide air cover for the fleet. In mid-April, Fieldhouse began moving south, with a large fleet of tankers and cargo ships to supply the fleet while it operated more than 8,000 miles from home. All told, 127 ships served in the task force including 43 warships, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and 62 merchant vessels.

Falklands War: First Shots: As the fleet sailed south to its staging area at Ascension Island, it was shadowed by Boeing 707s from the Argentine Air Force. On April 25, British forces sank the submarine ARA Santa Fe near South Georgia shortly before troops led by Major Guy Sheridan of the Royal Marines liberated the island. Five days later, operations against the Falklands began with the " Black Buck " raids by RAF Vulcan bombers flying from Ascension. These saw the bombers strike the runaway at Port Stanley and radar facilities in the area. That same day Harriers attacked various targets, as well as shot down three Argentine aircraft. As the runway at Port Stanley was too short for modern fighters, the Argentine Air Force was forced to fly from the mainland, which placed them at a disadvantage throughout the conflict ( Map ). Falklands War: Fighting at Sea: While cruising west of the Falklands on May 2, the submarine HMS Conqueror spotted the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. Conqueror fired three torpedoes, hitting hitting the World War II -vintage Belgrano twice and sinking it.

This attack led to the Argentine fleet, including the carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, remaining in port for the rest of the war. Two days later, they had their revenge when an Exocet anti-ship missile , launched from an Argentine Super Étendard fighter, struck HMS Sheffield setting it ablaze. Having been ordered forward to serve as a radar picket, the destroyer was hit amidships and the resulting explosion severed its high-pressure fire main. After attempts to stop the fire failed, the ship was abandoned. The sinking of Belgrano cost 323 Argentines killed, while the attack on Sheffield resulted in 20 British dead. Falklands War: Landing at San Carlos Water: On the night of May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp moved into Falkland Sound and began landing British forces at San Carlos Water on the northwest coast of East Falkland. The landings had been preceded by a Special Air Service (SAS) raid on nearby Pebble Island's airfield. When the landings had finished, approximately 4,000 men, commanded by Brigadier Julian Thompson, had been put ashore.

Over the next week, the ships supporting the landings were hit hard by low-flying Argentine aircraft. The sound was soon dubbed "Bomb Alley" as HMS Ardent (May 22), HMS Antelope (May 24), and HMS Coventry (May 25) all sustained hits and were sunk, as was MV Atlantic Conveyor (May 25) with a cargo of helicopters and supplies. Falklands War: Goose Green, Mount Kent, & Bluff Cove/Fitzroy: Thompson began pushing his men south, planning to secure the western side of the island before moving east to Port Stanley. On May 27/28, 600 men under Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones outfought over 1,000 Argentines around Darwin and Goose Green, ultimately forcing them to surrender. Leading a critical charge, Jones was killed later received the Victoria Cross posthumously. A few days later, British commandos defeated Argentine commandos on Mount Kent. In early June, an additional 5,000 British troops arrived and command shifted to Major General Jeremy Moore.

While some of these troops were disembarking at Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, their transports, RFA Sir Tristram and RFA Sir Galahad, were attacked killing 56 ( Map ). Falklands War: Fall of Port Stanley: After consolidating his position, Moore began the assault on Port Stanley. British troops launched simultaneous assaults on the high ground surrounding the town on the night of June 11. After heavy fighting, they succeeded in capturing their objectives. The attacks continued two nights later, and British units took the town's last natural lines of defense at Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown. Encircled on land and blockaded at sea, the Argentine commander, General Mario Menéndez, realized his situation was hopeless and surrendered his 9,800 men on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. Falklands War: Aftermath & Casualties: In Argentina, the defeat led to the removal of Galtieri three days after the fall of Port Stanley. His downfall spelled the end for the military junta that had been ruling the country and paved the way for the restoration of democracy.

For Britain, the victory provided a much needed boost to its national confidence, reaffirmed its international position, and assured victory for the Thatcher Government in the 1983 elections. The settlement that ended the conflict called for a return to status quo ante bellum. Despite its defeat, Argentina still claims the Falklands and South Georgia. During the war, Britain suffered 258 killed and 777 wounded. In addition, 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, and 2 auxiliary vessels were sunk. For Argentina, the Falklands War cost 649 killed, 1,068 wounded, and 11,313 captured. In addition, the Argentine Navy lost a submarine, a light cruiser, and 75 fixed-wing aircraft. Sinking the Belgrano – Justified Attack or War Crime? | Defence of the Realm Defence of the Realm November 1, 2014 They say it took British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher just a few minutes to decide to sink the Argentine Navy cruiser ARA General Belgrano. Yet she would spend the next thirty years up to her death defending that decision.

In May 1982 the Royal Navy was on the verge of its first major naval engagement since the Second World War as the British Taskforce sailed to recover the Falkland Islands from Argentina. Facing them was the Argentine Navy who were both professional servicemen and fighting in a conflict they passionately believed in bordering on the fanatical. One thing was certain; regardless of who would win the battle the losses on both sides would be horrendous. At 1557hrs Falklands time on May 2nd two torpedoes slammed in to the hull of the Belgrano having been fired by the British submarine HMS Conqueror. The explosion and subsequent sinking would claim the lives of 323 Argentinians and force the Argentine Navy to retreat from battle altogether. The Source of the Controversy Following the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on April 2nd 1982 the British Government made it clear that military action was guaranteed unless the Argentine occupation forces withdrew back to the mainland. Their first goal was to stem the flow of supplies going to the forces on the islands and to do this they established a 200 mile Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falklands.

The British Government made it abundantly clear that any Argentine aircraft or vessel in this zone was a threat to the British Taskforce because with the zone in place there would be no reason for any other air or sea traffic to be operating there. This effectively defined the operational area where the bulk of the fighting would take place and also served as a way of keeping vessels from other countries out of the fighting thus avoiding accidentally firing on them. There are two key points relating to the TEZ and the sinking of the Belgrano; The ARA General Belgrano was outside the TEZ when she was attacked. She was heading away from the TEZ when the attack happened. Both these points have been used to claim that the sinking was a war crime. These two facts certainly make the sinking appear as illegal however those who are of this opinion ignore key facts surrounding the decision to fire on the ship. Firstly, as was mentioned earlier the goal of the TEZ was actually to besiege the occupying forces and was not to give the Royal Navy a free hand to wage unrestricted war on the Argentine Navy.

British forces were keen to avoid a fight if possible and it was believed the threat of attack alone inside the TEZ might keep the Argentinians away and put Britain in a better position at the negotiating table. This act ultimately failed and as the British Taskforce sailed ever closer it was becoming clear that at some point the Argentine and Royal navies would clash at sea. In preparation for this and as an extension of the previous policy the British passed a message to the Argentine Government via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aries that; In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty’s Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection Her Majesty’s Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response.

All Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces, will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly. This effectively gave the British free reign to take whatever action they felt necessary to protect the British Taskforce regardless of the threat’s location. The Argentinians therefore knew full well on May 2nd that Argentine forces could be attacked outside of the TEZ without warning and while the political leadership in Argentina continues to argue that the ship was not in the combat area when attacked the Argentine Navy itself has always said they considered the attack justified; surely a sign of mutual respect amongst opposing naval officers. However one factor flies in the face of even this declaration. The Royal Navy has never denied that the Belgrano was sailing away from the TEZ when it was attacked. Had the Belgrano been sailing towards the TEZ or directly towards the Takforce then there would be no doubt that she was intending to commit herself to combat operations. It was this doubt over Belgrano’s intentions that would haunt Margaret Thatcher and her decision for the rest of her life as it appeared she was going against her own policy for prosecuting the war.

May 2nd 1982 – The Bigger Picture Thatcher has repeatedly protested that her decision to sink the Belgrano was to remove a threat to the British fleet. The counter argument is the Belgrano wasn’t a threat because it was sailing away from the TEZ. In this limited view of the situation on May 2nd 1982 it certainly appears that the decision to sink the Belgrano was questionable in its justification. What this position ignores however is that the Falklands War was not limited to just one ship. Belgrano herself was actually the flotilla leader for an Argentine naval task group that included two Exocet missile-armed destroyers and a support ship. To the north of the TEZ was an even greater threat however in the form of the Venticinco De Mayo aircraft carrier and her escorts of two guided missile destroyers. Her aircraft had the capacity to inflict a heavy blow on the British fleet and it was actually this ship that the British feared far more than the Belgrano so much so that a great deal of effort was put in to finding her with HMS Conqueror’s sister submarine, HMS Splendid, marked to sink her if necessary.

Unfortunately for the British the Argentine Navy displayed their excellent seamanship and set up a feint that hoodwinked the Splendid in to losing contact permanently. Had the Splendid found the carrier however then the decision would probably have been taken to sink it instead of Belgrano. This would almost certainly have resulted in a far higher death toll on the Argentine side and this could have soured world opinion over support for the British. Therefore from a purely political standpoint it was fortunate for the British that Belgrano was found first. In the view of the British Admiralty, Venticinco De Mayo’s flotilla in the north and Belgrano’s flotilla in the south constituted a classic pincer attack with which to strike the British fleet; dividing the British defences so that the troop ships could be attacked by the Belgrano’s guns. If successfully executed this would have seen an appallingly high casualty rate amongst the British Army packed aboard the requisitioned cruise liners (see image below) and certainly end the war with an Argentine victory. It was a terrifying prospect for the British. This is where losing sight of the carrier confused matters for the British.

Had HMS Splendid been able to track the carrier then the British Admiralty would have seen that Belgrano was in a position to close more directly on to the British fleet’s position, which at that time was engaged in action against the occupation forces on the island, and would therefore encounter them before the carrier could get in to position. This is why Belgrano was turning south away from the TEZ. It was not retreating from battle as the current Argentine leader Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has tried claiming in order to vilify the Royal Navy but rather it was stalling in order for the carrier to get in to position before the two flotillas converged on the British for their attack. The British Admiralty on the other hand believed that the Argentines were turning away suspecting they were being shadowed by a submarine as the Belgrano appeared to be heading for shallower water where Conqueror could not follow. This added an element of urgency in making the decision to attack as there was now the possibility that they could lose sight of Belgrano and any hope of taking her out before meeting the British fleet. The war of words on just why Belgrano turned south raged for years after the war ended.

It should have been laid to rest however when in 2003 the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, said in an interview that his change of direction was only temporary before turning towards the British and that he had orders to attack any British ship he encountered. Interestingly his orders did not specify if the British ship needed to be in or out of the TEZ when he attacked. Belgrano’s Lethality One often overlooked aspect of this story is just how lethal Belgrano would have been to the British Taskforce in a fight. Some have argued that the Belgrano was such an old vessel that she was no real threat to the modern Royal Navy and its missile armed warships. It is true Belgrano was an old ship; she was in fact the former USS Phoenix which was a Brooklyn-class cruiser of the United States Navy. She was laid down in 1935, launched in 1938 and was at Pearl Harbour when the Japanese attacked in 1941. Upon the completion of the war she was decommissioned and then sold to Argentina initially as the 17 De Octobre but then renamed General Belgrano following the fall of the Peron era.

As a World War II era vessel she was armed with guns which in this case were fifteen six inch guns supported by eight five inch guns. The six inch guns could hurl a 105lb high explosive shell out to a range of 23 miles with targeting information provided by a fire control radar for a high degree of accuracy. These shells could decimate one of the Royal Navy’s frigates many of which were compact designs meaning large quantities of fuel and weapons were stored close together and it would not take a very large explosion to ignite them as was the case when HMS Antelope was sunk by Argentine aircraft. By comparison the Royal Navy’s main weapon was the MM.38 Exocet missile which equipped the Type-22 destroyer and upgraded Leander-class frigates. This weapon was also equipped aboard the destroyers operating with Belgrano and the Venticinco De Mayo thus increasing the two flotillas firepower. The surface launched version of this weapon such as that carried by both the Argentinians and the British had an operational range of around 26 miles.

That is just three miles further than the range of the Belgrano’s guns; a distance that could be closed in a rather short period of time thus negating this advantage. This meant that while they were weapons of an earlier era they were still very viable and very deadly in 1982. Questions have also been raised over whether or not an Exocet fired from a British ship would be able to penetrate the armour belt of Belgrano at all which was designed to defend against a volley of enemy gunfire. Even if the missile could get through the size of the ship meant that several hits would be needed to sink it or at least take the Belgrano out of the fight. Conclusion The trouble with writing an article on such an emotive topic like this is that as a British citizen I am going to be open to accusations of bias when I argue that the sinking of the Belgrano was a necessity of war. The truth is that she was a very real threat to the British Taskforce that was on its way to attack the British fleet as part of a pincer movement. The best way to nullify an enemy pincer movement is to cut off one of the pincers before the enemy can converge and that’s exactly what happened.

I am no Thatcher-ist in any way I assure you but on this subject she was right to act in defence of the British forces she had committed to the campaign. She would later famously say; I think it could only be in Britain that a prime minister was accused of sinking an enemy ship that was a danger to our navy, when my main motive was to protect the boys in our navy. The problem now is that the story has become such a propaganda tool for successive Argentine Governments to distract their people from the economical problems the country has suffered that even with Captain Bonzo’s confession there is still a myth of ‘piracy’ surrounding the sinking. The Argentine Navy has never rescinded its opinion that the sinking of their ship was justified which again shows the real debate is politically motivated. As cold as it may seem to say it but the sinking of the Belgrano probably saved more lives than it cost. Had the Argentine and British fleets met in a naval engagement both sides would have suffered losses and it is likely more than one Argentine ship would be sunk.

If both the Belgrano and the Venticinco De Mayo were damaged or sunk in a battle, regardless of the damage they could have inflicted on the British, then the death toll would be in the thousands. Defence of the Realm on YouTube Share this: Belgrano sinking legal – said the International Red Cross | Falklands News Belgrano sinking legal – said the International Red Cross 3 May In a display of Argentina’s traditional ‘blindness’ with regard to international law, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, called the sinking of the ARA Belgrano, during the Falklands War in 1982, a “criminal and cowardly action.” On the 31st anniversary of the sinking, Fernandez attempted to maintain the fiction that being outside the declared ‘excusion zone’ should have spared the aging Argentine cruiser despite ample evidence that her orders were to attack the British Task Force. Such a claim also flys in the face of the opinion given by the vessels Captain, Héctor Bonzo, when he spoke to the newspaper Clarin in 2007 – “ It was an act of war.

The acts of those who are at war, like the submarine’s attack, are not a crime … The crime is the war. We were on the front line and suffered the consequences. On April 30, we were authorised to open fire, and if the submarine had surfaced in front of me I would have opened fire with all our 15 guns until it sank.” In fact the Argentine Government had been given a warning that if any of its warships presented a danger to the British fleet then they would be attacked. A warning that the Junta did not take seriously until after the Belgrano was torpedoed on May 2nd, 1982 – one month after Argentina had illegally invaded the British archipelago. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who confirmed the Admiralty’s decision to attack, wrote of the incident some years later – “ Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles.

We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward , in command of the Task Force, had every reason to believe that a full scale attack was developing. ….. Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgment about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the Task Force. It was clear to me what must be done to protect our forces, in the light of Admiral Woodward’s concern and Admiral Fieldhouse’s advice. We therefore decided that British forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the same basis as agreed previously for the carrier…. The Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk just before 8 o’clock that evening. Our submarine headed away as quickly as possible.

Wrongly believing that they would be the next targets, the Belgrano’s escorts seem to have engaged in anti-submarine activities rather than rescuing its crew, some 321 of whom were lost ….. “ On May 7th, 1982, Argentina complained to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva which ruled that the vessel, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations and that therefore there was no breach of the Geneva Convention. The action was perfectly legal. BBC News | AMERICAS | Belgrano legal action fails Wednesday, 19 July, 2000, 20:20 GMT 21:20 UK Belgrano legal action fails The sinking of the Belgrano was the turning point An attempt to take the British Government to court over the sinking of the General Belgrano during the Falklands war has failed.

Belgrano sinking Belgrano appeared to be steaming towards Royal Navy Task Force British officers say they believed this posed a risk The ship was outside exclusion zone Margaret Thatcher took decision to torpedo the ship Before the attack, the Belgrano changed course, possibly to head towards Argentine mainland Human Rights Court judges in Strasbourg declared inadmissible an application from lawyers representing families of the 323 Argentinian sailors who died when the vessel was torpedoed by a British submarine. Sitting as a committee of three judges, the Strasbourg court rejected the application by Luisa Diamantina Romero de Ibanez and Roberto Guillermo Rojas on the grounds that it had been submitted too late. The families' lawyers had claimed that, as the Belgrano was attacked outside the UK-imposed exclusion zone, unlawful force was used when it was sunk in 1982. They acknowledged the move was designed to put pressure on the Argentine Government to take its own case against the UK to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Belgrano was torpedoed on 2 May 1982 by the British submarine HMS Conqueror, following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.

It represented the single largest loss of life in the 10-week conflict. The failed legal case maintained that the sinking was deliberately designed to undermine peace negotiations mediated by then Peruvian President Belaunde Terry. Almost a decade after Argentina lost the Falklands conflict, the two countries restored diplomatic relations, although Argentina still maintains its claims to the South Atlantic Islands, which it calls the Malvinas. Buenos Aires says it inherited the islands, populated by about 2,200 people of mostly British ancestry, from the Spanish crown before they were occupied by the UK in 1833. 'Dangerous precedent' Shadow defence secretary Iain Duncan Smith said that "common sense" had prevailed, but added that the case should never have reached court. "It sets a dangerous precedent for Britain if an international court can claim to pass judgment over legitimate acts in times of conflict," he said.

"While we have every sympathy with those Argentinians who lost loved ones, the sinking of the Belgrano - as even the Argentinian government has admitted - was a legitimate act of war." Search BBC News Online Belgrano was 'fair target' as it was headed into Falklands exclusion zone and NOT back to port, according to top secret dossier | Daily Mail Online Belgrano was 'fair target' as it was headed into Falklands exclusion zone and NOT back to port, according to top secret dossier Argentina destroyer was sunk by British submarine with loss of 368 lives Navy's radio signals were intercepted by Falklands force comments It was one of the most controversial events of the Falklands War. The sinking of the Argentine warship the General Belgrano by a Royal Navy submarine with the loss of 323 lives led to accusations of unnecessary force by Britain and became a cause celebre for anti-war campaigners. It was claimed the ship was returning to its home port and was outside an exclusion zone imposed by Whitehall.

Invasion: The Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano sinks after being hit by a torpedo as its crew takes to life rafts in the South Atlantic Ocean during the Falklands War in 1982 But now, just months before the 30th anniversary of the attack, a new book based on a top secret report has revealed that the Belgrano was heading into the exclusion zone when it was hit. RELATED ARTICLES Share this article Share The contents of the report have never been publicly revealed before, but its existence was hinted at by Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister at the time, a year after the attack of May 2, 1982.

Quizzed about the Belgrano by teacher Diana Gould on BBC TV’s Nationwide programme during the 1983 election campaign, Mrs Thatcher said: ‘One day, all of the facts, in about 30 years’ time, will be published.’ Resolute: Margaret Thatcher sent a task force of 100 ships to regain control of the Falklands Islands after the Argentine junta invaded The book’s author, Major David Thorp, tells how after the war Mrs Thatcher ‘requested a complete and thorough investigation into the sinking as pressure was building from opposition parliamentary backbenchers . . . for a ministerial enquiry’. Major Thorp, who spent 34 years working as a signals expert in an elite military intelligence unit, was ‘provided with every conceivable document, file, report and note imaginable that related to, or included the name, Belgrano’. These included the Official War Diary from HMS Conqueror, the hunter-killer submarine which fired the two torpedoes that sunk the Belgrano in the South Atlantic. All the information was covered by the highest security classification. It is thought that much of the material will be made public via the National Archives next year under the 30-year rule on the release of secret documents.

Major Thorp, now 72, was in charge of a signals interception section hidden on the amphibious warship Intrepid as it travelled with the Task Force. In his book The Silent Listener, he writes: ‘Shortly after the UK’s announcement of the exclusion zone, the Argentinian Navy HQ notified its warships, possibly for the purpose of re-grouping, of a pre-arranged rendezvous (RV) point. ‘When the co-ordinates for the RV were plotted on a map, the actual location, though east of the Falkland Islands, was nevertheless inside the 200 nautical miles exclusion zone. ‘Some considerable time prior to the Conqueror firing its torpedoes, my analysis revealed that the General Belgrano had been instructed to alter course and head in the direction of the RV inside the exclusion zone.

‘The findings of my report stated that the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine Junta stated, but the objective of the ship was to relocate to a pre-arranged RV within the exclusion zone.’ Sunk: The Argentinian destroyer Belgrano was torpedoed by HMS Conqueror with the loss of 368 lives Major Thorp’s report was never disclosed by Mrs Thatcher because she did not want to reveal the extent of Britain’s ability to intercept enemy electronic and radio signals. The book was cleared for publication by the security services. The strike on the Belgrano signalled the first loss of life in the Falklands conflict. Two days later Argentina hit back with a missile attack on the British destroyer HMS Sheffield, killing 20. The sea battle continued for many more weeks, then the conflict turned to the land before the Argentine forces finally surrendered and peace was declared on June 20, 1982.

Question: What was the name of the Royal Navy submarine responsible for the sinking of the General Belgrano during the Falklands War?
Answer: H.M.S. CONQUEROR