BBC ON THIS DAY | 17 | 1979: Sandinista rebels take Nicaraguan capital About This Site | Text Only 1979: Sandinista rebels take Nicaraguan capital Fighters of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front have overthrown the regime in the central American republic of Nicaragua and taken the capital, Managua. The notorious US-trained National Guard has crumbled and its surviving commanders are negotiating a surrender. In the last six weeks Sandinista fighters have gained control of 27 cities around the capital as well as the southern part of Nicaragua that borders Costa Rica. President Anastasio Somoza Debayle - the third member of the Somoza dynasty to rule Nicaragua since 1937 - has fled to the United States. This evening he abandoned the battle-torn capital with about 45 other people in five planes that landed at Homestead US Air Force base near Miami, Florida. Earlier, he had presented his resignation to the Congress and handed over to the chairman of the lower house, Francisco Urcuyo, who is now caretaker president. Mr Urcuyo has declared the Sandinistas will have no part in his new government and demanded they lay down their arms.

But the Sandinista-backed provisional government currently based in the city of Leon is expected to force Mr Urcuyo to resign. Seven years of war The Sandinistas, named after Nicaraguan resistance leader Augusto Cesar Sandino, was set up in 1962 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge. For the last seven years they have waged a civil war against the Somoza government. Fighting has been at its most intense in the last two months and thousands have been killed and about half a million left homeless. Last year, the assassination of the leader of the opposition Democratic Liberation Union, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, triggered a general strike and brought together moderates, the Roman Catholic Church and the Sandinistas in a united front against Mr Somoza The Americans have long supported the Somoza regime but realising that the Sandinista rebels had the upper hand in the war, US officials have spent the last few weeks trying to persuade President Somoza to step down assuring him that his Liberal Party and the National Guard would survive.

Last week, William Bowdler, a special American envoy, began talks with members of the provisional government asking them to enlarge the junta by including representatives of the National Guard and Liberal Party. His request was rejected. The Impact of the Sandinistas on Nicaragua The Impact of the Sandinistas on Nicaragua Copyright 1998, by Jorian Polis Schutz ROUGH DRAFT The Sandinista Revolution of 1979, in the nation of Nicaragua, is a controversial and thought-provoking revolution. In one year, Nicaraguans went from being ruled by a strict right-wing dictatorship to being controlled by left wing, idealistic revolutionaries. Which is the lesser of the two evils? Which, if any, was good for the nation and people of Nicaragua? These questions can only be answered by studying the Sandinista Revolution in close detail. The Sandinistas have undeniably had an enormous impact on their people, and in evaluating them, all aspects of their rule must be taken into account. Before delving into the Sandinista revolution, the scene must be set, and the background must be understood.

The Republic of Nicaragua is the largest nation in Central America, both size-wise (with 49,579 sq. mi.) and population-wise (with more than four million). In 1926, a large revolution in Nicaragua threatened dictatorial rule of the nation. Headed by General Augusto Sandino, the new leftist revolutionaries took to guerilla warfare and killed many US marines, who had come to aid the rightist regime. The war continued until 1934, when General Anastasio Somoza, of the rightist regime, invited Sandino to meet in Managua for peace talks. Sandino agreed, and upon his arrival Somoza summarily seized and executed the man. The revolution was finally subdued, and in 1937 Somoza became dictator. From 1937 to 1979, Nicaragua was ruled autocratically by two successive generations of the Somoza family. This seemed to please the US, which preferred rightist regimes to leftist ones. But though Sandino�s revolution had failed, the seed of radicalism had been planted, and soon new leftist groups had emerged.

By the 1970�s, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had grown in popularity and started to threaten Somoza�s hegemony. The Sandinistas, naturally, had taken their name from Augusto Sandino, the martyr who fathered the leftist cause in Nicaragua. The Sandinista cause was supported by three major beliefs, �the three legs of the stool of Nicaraguan revolutionary democracy� . The first, political democracy, meant that the Sandinistas supported a republican form of government, based on elections with universal suffrage. The second, participatory democracy, meant active citizen participation in government organizations, task forces, etc. Finally the third, economic equality, meant a communistic economy and complete equalization of wealth, incorporating both Marxist and socialist ideas. These three ideals together form a very interesting combination. Whereas in Russia Lenin and Stalin had focused primarily on economic equality, and �forgotten� Marx�s rule by the workers, the Sandinistas held a much better potential of representation of "Applied Marxism". The Sandinistas were influenced by three major groups of thought. First, and perhaps most heavily, they were influenced by the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Marx�s dialectical materialism, proletariat revolution, and rule by the workers seemed perfect and ingenious. The Sandinistas arrogantly viewed themselves as the catalyst of the proletariat revolution in Nicaragua. Second, they were influenced by Augusto Sandino, the aforementioned hero of the anti-US struggle. Sandino was a paternal character whose ideas were reflective of his pagan religion, his Marxist beliefs, and his close association with anarchism. Finally, they were influenced by the Christian Theology of Liberation. With this philosophy, the Sandinistas justified their revolution as freeing people from social, economic, and political oppression. The Sandinistas were a mixture of these influences, which made them a very unique cause, and very unique leaders. On August 22, 1978, twenty-four Sandinista guerillas stormed the national palace at Managua, and by July 17, 1979, the Sandinistas had formally taken power. The Sandinistas quickly wrote and passed a provisional constitution, The Fundamental Law of State. This constitution guaranteed human rights that were previously ignored by the Somoza regime. It guaranteed equal justice under law, the right to free expression, and the abolition of torture.

It seemed that the people were already benefiting from this great revolution, which truly did liberate them. Despite this advance in human rights, though, the Nicaraguan economy was still failing, and with the newly imposed US embargo, Nicaraguans were suffering greatly. The Sandinistas, in the first few months of their sovereignty, seemed to ignore the first and most important of their principles: political democracy. They immediately set up a ruling junta, made up of five top Sandinista officials, including Daniel Ortega and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. The Sandinistas had promised political pluralism and free elelctions�what had happened? Even the Sandinistas� call for international nonalignment was violated in the years of the junta, who allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba, receiving heavy financial and military aid from these countries. They grew more and more distant from the US and other capitalist nations, creating international alignment�contrary to what they had promised. The junta did, though, set out to educate their people in a way the Somoza regime had never attempted. The National Literacy Campaign of 1980 affected one in every two Nicaraguans .

The literacy rate rose from 45% to 86% in one of the largest literacy campaigns ever, and the Sandinista government drew international acclaim. In September, 1980, the Minister of National Education, Carlos Tunnermann received the UNESCO Prize. Critics accused the Sandinistas of educating their people with propaganda and attempting to win over the rural proletariat in this way. This was undeniably true in part, but the outcome of this mass campaign was indeed positive. The junta then quickly set to work on the equalization of wealth that had been promised in the Sandinista platform. Prior to 1979, about 4% of the landowners controlled about 52% of the arable land. The Sandinista junta set out to fix this, trying to make it an equal proportion. They directly started to confiscate Somoza family land, and other, similar land. The nationalization of Somoza�s property alone affected a total of 168 factories�25% of industrial plant in Nicaragua, valued at $200 million.

This initial confiscation led directly to the Agrarian Reform Law of 1981, which targeted unused farms, property of absent landlords, and unproductive land for expropriation. From 1981-1985, thousands of acres of land were expropriated and turned into new, peasant collectives. This was efficient and productive towards the communist cause, but many were still unhappy, and all knew that this couldn�t last. The landlords that had had their land expropriated were also politically and socially persecuted. They eventually fled to the hills and joined the growing group of rightists, left over from the Somoza regime. From the commencement of Sandinista rule, many rightists and right-wing sympathizers had fled for the hills. They feared for their lives, as political persecution was very common in Nicaragua, even under the �secure� new Sandinista regime. With the discrete help of the US, these so-called counter-revolutionaries, or contras, began a guerilla war on the Sandinistas. Despite the irony of this switch in positions, the contras, indeed, became guerillas, right after the Sandinista guerillas had ousted them from power.

Though the Reagan administration was officially forbidden by congress to support the contras, the US secretly provided financial aid for them. Through Ollie North and the highly controversial Iran-Contra Affair, the US provided the contras with endless financial aid stemming from profits from an illegal arms trade with Iran. With this aid the guerillas conducted a war similar to that of the Sandinistas before they had taken power. Many Nicaraguans were now starting to doubt both Sandinista rule and the expropriation of the bourgeois land that led to this violence, terrorism, and death. Along with nationalizing aristocratic land, the Sandinistas began to nationalize certain industries. The Sandinistas issued reform that nationalized sugar distribution, commenced state control over agricultural cooperatives, and started a limited policy of nationalization of business. By 1981, the state accounted for more than 30% of the industry of Nicaragua. The government also initiated control, with so-called �wildcat nationalizations�, over 20% of the cotton industry, 50% of the tobacco industry, and 60% of the �staple cereal� industry.

The effect that this growing socialistic trend had on the people is arguable. It could be seen as a triumph of the people, the workers, who now are beginning to control their own lives. Contrariwise, it could be concluded that the government was growing more controlling, as the junta�s jurisdiction expanded. This is an argument that still goes on today, and in the case of Nicaragua led to a political and social rift between the contra-sympathizers and the Sandinista-sympathizers. This rift led to protests, demonstrations, and an increase in guerilla-warfare. The Sandinistas saw this, and in an attempt to resolve the situation, created the �National Assembly�, in 1985. The president of the assembly became Daniel Ortega, previously of the Sandinista junta. Though the assembly was overwhelmingly seated by Sandinistas and was somewhat biased, it nevertheless represented a semblance of the democracy guaranteed to Nicaraguans by the Sandinista revolutionaries. It did not, however, stop the constant contra war that was causing so much loss of life. How was the individual Nicaraguan affected in this long period?

They definitely gained some basic rights that had been deprived of them during the Somoza years. Moreover, they gained some say in government matters as well as in the workplace, where they now supposedly ruled. But most Nicaraguans were overwhelmingly poor, and too uneducated to enjoy these new rights. In Nicaragua during the Somoza years, the bourgeoisie had risen and turned into a new, unassailable, indomitable aristocracy. This new aristocracy had all but blatantly exploited the people, and Sandinista rule was a great improvement from this. Otherwise, conditions for Nicaraguans barely changed�the previous enemies became leaders, the previous leaders became enemies, and they could care less whether they were ruled by one or ruled by several. The Sandinista regime was, day by day, losing the revolutionary ideals they had fought for. In 1986, they closed a popular Nicaraguan newspaper, La Prensa, because of �subversive activities� and anti-Sandinista literature. This caused a massive uproar that only exacerbated the already present conflict. What was different between this and Somoza�s censorship and other conservative activities? Was the classic summation of communism, as detailed in Orwell�s Animal Farm, coming true?

Were the Sandinistas, in their glory and triumph, picking up traits characteristic of the previous dictatorial regime, and indeed of any ruling, vanguard party? Political oppression, freedom violations, oligarchy--these are all things that the Somoza regime represented, and sadly enough, the Sandinistas inherited. The left-wing turned out to be not much of an improvement from the right-wing, as has been the case in history. Despite this, though, there is a rather happy ending to the story of the Nicaraguan people. In 1990, Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, decided to hold free elections within Nicaragua. This controversial decision occurred for several reasons. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union had left Nicaragua seemingly without allies. International pressure was mounting, and many countries were imposing heavy economic sanctions on Nicaragua. Second, the contra war, going on for more than a decade, was getting unbearable to Nicaraguans, who wanted nothing but peace, and a chance to succeed in global markets. For these reasons Ortega gave the presidency up to elections�a noble act that put him in front of the race for president.

He lost though, barely, to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, previously of the junta, who had split off and formed the political party National Union of Opposition (UNO). Chamorro became president, and was immediately faced with an endless amount of conflicts to resolve. Chamorro now had to deal with all of the Sandinista�s errata. The contras, appeased by free elections, had ceased fighting and even put forth a candidate for the presidency. With the return of peace, Chamorro was faced with a new problem. The landlords whom the Sandinistas had confiscated he land from were now returning to reclaim their land. The peasants who had lived on the land in collectives ever since the early 1980�s, naturally refused to leave. This conflict, and other similar Sandinista-induced conflicts were filling Chamorro�s domestic platter. But now there was peace�and there was democracy. Though the Sandinista Revolution is behind us, the role of the Sandinistas in history is still an enigma, and many questions still remain. Why had the Sandinista�s democratic ideals taken so long to be implemented?

The Sandinistas seemed to have democratized themselves a rather long time after they democratized their nation. They had great intentions, but were their plans ever instated? Is the failing of idealistic revolutionaries inevitable? What is the significance of the failed Sandinista economic model? The Sandinistas� exact long-term contribution to history is as yet unknown. One thing that historians agree upon is that the Sandinistas� unique case should be subject to intense scrutiny, so that we may better understand history, politics, and humanity. Sandinista | political and military organization, Nicaragua | Britannica.com political and military organization, Nicaragua Written By: Alternative Titles: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front Related Topics Daniel Ortega Sandinista, member of Sandinista National Liberation Front, Spanish Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), one of a Nicaraguan group that overthrew President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, ending 46 years of dictatorship by the Somoza family . The Sandinistas governed Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990.

Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega was reelected as president in 2006, 2011, and 2016. Sandinista supporters in Managua, Nicaragua, on July 19, 2009, celebrating the 30th anniversary of … Miguel Alvarez/AP Named for César Augusto Sandino , a hero of Nicaraguan resistance to U.S. military occupation (1927–33), the FSLN was founded in 1962 by Carlos Fonseca Amador , Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez as a revolutionary group committed to socialism and to the overthrow of the Somoza family. Over the next 10 years the FSLN organized political support among students, workers, and peasants. By the mid-1970s its attacks on the Nicaraguan National Guard from sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica were serious enough that Somoza unleashed bloody reprisals against the Sandinistas.

Fonseca and Mayorga were killed, and the FSLN split into three tendencias, or factions, that differed over whether the group should organize revolutionary cells only in the cities, continue to gradually accumulate support throughout the country, or coalesce with other political groups in the growing rebellion. The Nicaraguan revolution of 1978–79 reunited the Sandinistas under the third tendencia, headed by Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra, and the FSLN, now numbering about 5,000 fighters, defeated the National Guard and overthrew Somoza in July 1979. A nine-member National Directorate, composed of three comandantes from each faction, was then set up to lead the FSLN and set policy for a governing junta that was headed by Daniel Ortega . Once in power in Nicaragua, the FSLN organized itself into local and regional committees and built up support through mass organizations of workers, young people, and other groups.

To fight off the attacks of the counterrevolutionary forces known as the contras , who were based in Honduras and were in part armed and financed by the United States, Humberto Ortega created the 50,000-strong Sandinista Popular Army, and Tomás Borge organized a secret-police force to guard against espionage and dissent. The resignations of various non-Marxist members of the Sandinista leadership, chiefly over issues of political rights, pushed the party and Nicaragua progressively to the left, and both became dependent on the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba . Similar Topics The Somoza Regime and the Sandinista Government - Nicaragua: Independence and Post-Independence Nicaragua: Independence and Post-Independence Sitemap The Somoza Regime and the Sandinista Government In 1936, Anatasio Somoza Garcia, the commander of the National Guard, seized power by forcing his uncle, President Juan Sacasa to resign. Somoza ruled as a dictator and for many years his family line continued to rule. The Somozas cooperated with the US, avoiding conflict between the two nations.

The Somozas even sided with the US against Nazi Germany and Soviet Union, and in return, the US gave their government support, which some argue as the reason why Somozas were able stay powerful for so long. However, Albert Colegrove argues that it was Thomas Whelan, the Ambassador to Managua, whose enthusiasm and support for the Somoza government many mistaken for the US government’s support for Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the US did make heavy investments in Nicaragua, once again holding much power in Nicaragua’s economy. Due to the cattle, coffee and cotton market in the US, Nicaragua’s economy expanded; however, most of that wealth went to Somoza himself and spread amongst the middle class. On the other hand, the campesinos, the workers of the large export farms, suffered in poverty due to Somoza’s feudal control of the economy. Opposition and resentment toward the Somoza dictatorship grew, especially in the “Conservatives” and a revolution by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a guerrilla group, began.

When Pedro Joaquín Chamorro-Cardenal, the editor of La Presna, “who courageously preached freedom and social justice,” was assassinated, the resentment reached its peak and a civil war broke out in 1978 (quoted in Cruz 1033). Although the Sandinistas was Marxist in nature, “non-Marxists in this alliance of political parties, labor unions, businessmen, students and professionals were comforted by the pluralistic spirit which then prevailed” (quoted in Cruz 1033). Almost all of them were confident that the Sandinistas would promote and enforce social democracy in which they supported over dictatorship. In fact, the Sandinistas came up with a “Minimum Plan” which promised political pluralism, a mixed economy, and international non-alignment. Even as the support for the Sandinistas grew, US President Carter contended that there was no need for fundamental change in Nicaragua. However, demand for the removal of Somoza was strong within and outside of Nicaragua, and in 1979 the rebels successfully overthrow Somoza.

The new Sandinista government faced many economic problems, but the new government received an $8.5-million grant from the United States, and $20-million bridging loan from the Venezuelans. However, according to Arturo Cruz, the absence of investment by the private sector made it clear that it would be hard to implement socialism in Nicaragua. Although programs such as literacy campaign and public health service reform were worthy of praise, the government used up most of their fiscal revenue through such programs and through the establishment of People's Property Area (PPA). Furthermore, the government was too intent on making all means of production state-owned, so Nicaragua’s economy significantly dropped. Not only that, Dave Kopel argues that the alliance with the middle class had been “an alliance of convenience” (quoted in Kopel). Two years later, the Commandante Humberto Ortega himself declared that the coalition with the middle class had been “temporary and exclusively tactical” (quoted in Kopel). Also, although the government claimed that they would not execute members of the National Guard, more than 43 people died by government order according to the Permanent Commission on Human Rights.

In addition, the Sandinistas ill-treated the respected president of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, Ismael Reyes and censored La Prensa, violating the freedom of press. Such problems moved the Sandinista government far away from the original ideals proposed by them, resulting in much internal opposition during early 1980s. In 1981, the United States charged that Nicaragua was providing weapons to rebels in other Central American countries, and cut off aid to Nicaragua. Furthermore, in 1983, anti-Sandinistas invaded northeastern Nicaragua and fighting between the contras and the government forces began. At this point, the US gave financial aid to the contras, while the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Western European nations aided the Sandinistas. Their difference in support demonstrated the political tension between the democratic America and the communist/socialist Soviet Union, Cuba, and Western Europe during the Cold War. The US took a step further by helping the contras place mines in Nicaraguan harbors, charging that the Sandinistas had set up a Communist dictatorship. Meanwhile in 1984, Daniel Ortega became head of the Sandinista government and was elected president.

The following year, President Reagan placed an embargo on U.S. trade with Nicaragua. The fighting continued on, and eventually the government and the contras signed a cease-fire agreement in April 1990. July 19, 1979: Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution remembered -- Video by John Pilger | Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal July 19, 1979: Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution remembered -- Video by John Pilger On July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan people led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the brutal US-backed dictator Somoza. In this film, made by John Pilger in the 1980s, the background to the revolt and the gains won -- and the United States' virulent opposition -- are graphically explained. On July 19 well over 200,000 Sandinistas rallied in Managua’s Plaza La Fe and the Plaza de la Revolución to celebrate the 29th anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship and the victory of the Popular Sandinista Revolution.

It was at the same time a powerful demonstration of mass support for the Sandinista government led by President Daniel Ortega. And it was a frank and demolishing reply to two recent right wing "protest demonstrations" of from 15 to 20 thousand people at the most -- the public side of the anti-Sandinista destabilization campaign. The rally was addressed by Aleida March Guevara (Che’s widow), Cuba’s Vice President Esteban Lazo, the presidents of Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), Paraguay (Fernando Lugo), Honduras (Manuel Zelaya), and Daniel Ortega. The speeches can be heard on the website of Managua’s Radio La Primerisima August 2009 It’s 30 years since the Sandinistas overthrew the last of the dictatorial Somoza dynasty. And since 2006 the Sandinistas have been back in power in Nicaragua . But did they sell out to their former enemies to regain government?

By Hernando Calvo Ospina In 1927 the Nicaraguan guerrilla leader General Cesar Augusto Sandino replied to a letter from a US marine captain who threatened to hunt him down if he refused to lay down his arms. “I will not surrender,” said Sandino, “and I await you here. I desire a free homeland or death.” US-Nicaraguan tension was by then historically established: the United States had invaded Nicaragua several times, first in 1854-6, and Britain had also tried to take control of its Atlantic coast. The US and UK saw Nicaragua as key to their plans to build a canal between the Caribbean and the Pacific, realised in Panama in 1914. The US Secretary of State Philander C Knox sent troops into Nicaragua in September 1909, under the pretext of easing political and military tension between liberals and conservatives. They stayed until 1925. In 1926 more than 5,000 US Marines landed, and didn’t leave until 1933: they were supposed to be guarding against “agents of Bolshevik Mexico” who wanted to take over the nation.

Sandino (1895-1934) was one of those “agents”. Although he considered himself a liberal, he began to fight in 1927 against the “imperialist, cocaine-addicted” occupier, and against Nicaragua ’s liberal-conservative elite, which he saw as oppressive, exploitative, racist and prepared to sell national independence. “Sandino adopted the ideas, and the black and red flag, of the Mexican anarcho-syndicalist movement, and the class analysis of the Salvadorian Farabundo Martì” (1), explains the sociologist Orlando Nuñez. “He wrote about the need for Latin-American integration, which was the dream of Simon Bolivar, and also the need for indigenous people to be integrated into the political struggle, and for alliances to be forged with nationalist businesses, to confront US imperialism.” The making of a martyr Harassed by Sandino’s small band of guerrillas, the US forces withdrew in 1933. They were considered too expensive during the Great Depression. They left behind a National Guard under the leadership of a soldier trained in the US : Anastasio Somoza.

Sandino agreed to negotiate with the national government, but on 21 February 1934 he was assassinated as he left a meeting with President Juan Batista. A few years later, Somoza admitted that the order to kill had come from the US ambassador, Arthur Bliss Lane . The dynasty of Somoza dictators settled in for four decades, under Washington ’s supervision: Anastasio (1936-56), Luis (1956-63), Anastasio Jr (1967-79). Yet the struggles of the past had not been in vain. In 1960, inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution and guided by the ideas of Sandino, Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomas Borge and other intellectuals formed the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) guerrilla movement. For many years its success was limited by its lack of connection with the rural population. But the political landscape was changing: the concentration of power in the hands of the Somoza family, which remained totally subordinate to US interests, and the abuses of the regime, began to stir discontent among some of the middle class.

They saw that an alliance with the FSLN would allow them to get rid of Somoza and reclaim the power he had denied them. The FSLN believed such a partnership would help it achieve its objectives. The support of followers of Christian liberation theology (“the church of the poor”) was decisive. The FSLN’s spectacular military victories in 1978, against a background of worsening repression, won it sympathy around the world. Even the administration of US president Jimmy Carter (1977-81) could no longer support Somoza. The revolution triumphed on 19 July 1979. The Sandinista revolution became fashionable abroad, and gained the support of many foreign governments, particularly European social democrats. They were reassured by the presence of young people from the upper middle classes in positions of authority in the new government. In Nicaragua , revolutionaries from poor or anti-capitalist backgrounds were most accepted by the population. As Carlos Fonseca junior, the son of the FSLN’s founder, remembers: “The revolution was so exciting and inspiring that it marked the lives of all the Nicaraguans who were just entering adolescence.

We could be optimistic and dream.” A national literacy campaign by young Daniel Ortega’s government reduced illiteracy from 54% to 12% in less than a decade. The poor now had access to higher education, and medical care was no longer the preserve of the privileged few. Agrarian reform benefited the peasants, strategic resources were nationalised, and workers and small producers were encouraged to organise in trade unions and cooperatives. For Nuñez it was “a process of social justice and organisation of the people, without precedent in the history of Nicaragua or of Latin America, with the exception of Cuba .” But to carry out these reforms, the political and economic system needed to be restructured, and this soon exposed fundamental disagreements within the ruling alliance. While the upper middle classes who had united with the FSLN wanted to overturn the dictatorship, they were not prepared to change the structures of the state. They lost the argument. The revolutionaries saw the alliance as a way of giving their government legitimacy abroad and avoiding international isolation or foreign aggression: “The revolution had to show that it was democratic and Catholic,” says Nuñez.

“That is to say that it didn’t threaten the interests of the US and Europe .” But they miscalculated. Under Carter, the US had already been helping ex-Somoza guards form counter-revolutionary groups, and that worsened when Ronald Reagan became president in January 1981. He went as far as declaring Nicaragua his number-one national security priority. Already, by April 1980, almost all the members of the FSLN who came from the upper middle classes had pulled out of the alliance, and joined with the ex-Somocista elite to support Washington ’s destabilisation plans. In Honduras , El Salvador and Costa Rica , US and Cuban-American soldiers and mercenaries trained counter-revolutionary forces: the “Contra”, which carried out murderous cross-border raids. “Our generation was forced to make war,” says Fonseca. “I was just 15 when I had to go and fight, like thousands of other Nicaraguans.

This was the fault of the United States and the country’s elite.” “Atheists”, “warmongers”, “totalitarian exporters of revolution”, “drug traffickers”: the FSLN’s enemies mounted an international propaganda campaign with the help of the anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan daily La Prensa and other local media. Financing the war meant there were food shortages and a slowdown in social programmes, causing suffering among the poor. Sandinistas were partly to blame when some peasants went over to support the Contra, unhappy about the priority given to collective farms, constraints on business and the free market, and price controls. ‘Some big mistakes’ The introduction of military service in September 1983 made things worse. Jacinto Suarez is an FSLN MP and former guerrilla: “We didn’t know how to manage the relationship with the rural population, and when today we talk to ex Contra leaders we realise we made some big mistakes.

We attacked peasant and Indian areas (2): some of us thought that because we had weapons we could impose our will.” The counter-revolution caused the deaths of 29,000, but militarily it was a failure, confined to a narrow band – the “Contra corridor”. The Sandinistas won a convincing victory in the presidential and legislative elections of 1984, and in 1986 Washington was engulfed in scandal: “Irangate” revealed that US officials had been selling arms to Iran in contravention of an embargo, and the CIA were found to be trafficking cocaine from Colombia, both to finance the Contras. In 1987 the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled against the US for mining Nicaraguan ports. But Nicaragua was exhausted economically and psychologically. So the Sandinistas began talks with the Contra, and prepared for a new election campaign. With the support of the US , an anti-Sandinista coalition was formed – the National Opposition Union (UNO). Under its leader Violeta Chamorro, it won the legislative elections of 25 February 1990.

During the election campaign the FSLN still had 53% support, according to opinion polls. Then came the US invasion of Panama (3). According to Suarez: “The war had become less intensive because of the negotiations with the Contra, and so the number of casualties had gone down. We could at last see the end of the tunnel. But when the US invaded Panama , tanks surrounded the US embassy in Managua and armed Sandinistas came out on to the streets in solidarity with Panama . Two days later an opinion poll showed our support had plummeted to 34%. It was too late then to change opinion: the prospect of a return to war had scared people.” The outgoing Sandinista government signed a transition agreement with Chamorro. Despite opposition from the US , the new government agreed not to change the current leadership of the armed forces, police and security services, although the security services were gradually dismantled. According to Lenin Serna, an army inspector at that time, Europeans took on this task through military missions within the context of the “peace process”. The Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez “did what the gringos could not do themselves”, says Serna.

“That’s how, in the end, our intelligence services ended up almost entirely in the hands of the US .” By keeping control of the army and the police, the Sandinistas prevented the security services from becoming instruments of oppression. The last high-ranking officer to have been a Sandinista guerrilla will retire in 2010. No winners With the Contras disbanded, its members had the sometimes difficult task of reintegrating into Nicaraguan society. The new rulers began to renege on the agreements with the FSLN and to reverse the gains of the revolution. Those who did not belong to the new elite soon realised what was going on. Israel Galeano, a former Contra leader, noted: “The oligarchy chased out Somoza with the help of you, the Sandinistas. Then they chased you out with our help. Neither of us won... It was the oligarchy that won” (4). Elena Aguilera is a former Sandinista fighter who works for the Francisco Morazan school for workers and peasants outside Managua .

She says the elite robbed the state and tricked the peasants out of thousands of hectares that had been redistributed to them in the 1980s: “The peasants were told that the original landowners had wanted their land back, but that the government would compensate them for their loss instead, which they did at a good price. Despite this, the landowners went to court claiming their land had been stolen. The cases dragged on for ages. The peasants and the co-ops did not have enough money to defend themselves. So ‘advisers’ turned up and recommended they sell their land to the plaintiffs – those who had already been compensated by the government. It is no coincidence that these landowners had close links to people high up in government.” Chamorro brought Nicaragua into the neo-liberal era, to the benefit of multinational companies – North American in particular, but also European and Asian. The elite devoted itself to embezzling state property and financial speculation. “In only a few years,” says Nuñez, “they had almost wiped out the already weak middle classes, and stifled opportunity for small businesses in the countryside and in the towns.

They plunged Nicaragua into the worst economic and social crisis of its history.” From 1990 onwards, three presidents – Violeta Chamorro, Arnoldo Aleman and Enrique Bolanos – destroyed almost everything the revolution had achieved. Salaries lost a third of their value, unemployment reached 45% and many Nicaraguans were in poverty. This backward slide went unchecked. “The revolution didn’t last long enough to create a new system,” says Fonseca. “This was due to the political and economic realities and the war that was imposed on us. Popular participation in the exercise of power had not been institutionalised. If it had, neoliberalism would not have been able to dismantle our social gains so easily.” The ability of the Sandinistas to resist this was weakened by fierce internal conflict. At the FSLN’s congress in 1994, “one group advocated renouncing the party’s avant-garde, anti-imperialist and socialist position,” says Fonseca. “The other current, led by Daniel Ortega, argued it was necessary to make adjustments to the party’s programme, without straying from Sandinista ideology.” Ortega’s faction gained 12 of 15 leadership posts.

The majority of the party’s national leaders and members of parliament, and most former ministers, denounced Ortega’s “authoritarianism” and left to form the Movement for Sandinista Renewal (MRS) (5). Policy of alliances Nonetheless, the FSLN came to power again on 5 November 2006 when Ortega won the presidency with 38% of the votes. To get in, the party had agreed a series of political deals, which provoked strong criticism from supporters at home and abroad. The FSLN had previously allied itself with the conservatives to get the former president Arnoldo Aleman prosecuted for corruption. Now they offered him a deal: he would be freed from prison (where he was serving 20 years) and put under house arrest in return for the “neutrality” of his Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC). The FSLN also provoked amazement when they signed a pact with a staunch enemy of the 1980s: Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. Under threat from the spread of evangelism, the Catholic church saw an opportunity (6).

“We put in place a daring and advantageous policy of forming alliances with members of the oligarchy,” says Eden Pastora, the famous “Comandante Cero” (7). “And so, without selling out, we divided and weakened the opposition. At first I found it hard to accept this policy, but then I understood. If these pacts get us into power and allow us to relaunch our social programmes, then God bless them.” Cerna adds: “The alliances we struck when we were not in government were manoeuvres. We knew all about tactics and strategy. We had been guerrillas, soldiers and politicians.” But for many, such pragmatism was hard to swallow. Having gained the presidency on 10 January 2007, the FSLN won control of 105 out of 145 councils in the municipal elections of 9 November 2008. After all the ups and downs, health care and education were free again. Thousands of children went back to school. A “zero hunger” programme was started with one million meals a day distributed to educational centres. Land and low-interest loans were given to small producers to ensure food security.

The programme has benefited 100,000 peasant families, and is administered by women organised in cooperatives. “They are more reliable and are usually in charge of the family’s welfare,” observes Aguilar. “Even more so now that men have to go in search of work [often abroad]” (8). These women are given training, cows, pigs and seeds. They pay back 20% of the loan, and reinvest the rest so they can become independent food producers. Another programme called “zero usury” (at an interest rate of 5%, as opposed to the normal 25%) finances some of the 45% of Nicaraguans who are self-employed. The banks saw this as a declaration of war, but small businesses selling shoes, furniture or clothing have benefited, and are able to offer better-value products. “The US embassy and the oligarchy are furious at the loss of political leadership,” says Nuñez, “but also that so many local businesses are moving closer to the Front.” Regional co-operation takes care of the rest: as a member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) (9), Nicaragua exchanges beans, meat and calves for Venezuelan oil (10).

ALBA also finances many of its social programmes. Cuban doctors perform thousands of eye operations free of charge using modern equipment provided by Venezuela, and a literacy campaign has been launched as part of a Cuban aid programme “Yo si puedo” (Yes I can). “We are making good progress with the little we have and with the help of friendly Latin American and Caribbean countries,” says Aguilar. “But a media war has been declared against us. We get nothing but negative press. No doubt they want to prevent the Front winning again in 2012.” In February 2008 the new US ambassador, Robert Callahan, arrived in Managua , reopening old wounds. He had worked as press attaché at the US embassy in Honduras in the 1980s under John Negroponte – at a time when the embassy was being used by the CIA to direct the most violent elements within the Contras. Today, worried by the progress of the Sandinistas, Callahan openly supports the Nicaraguan opposition. Such interference led President Ortega to threaten his expulsion in February 2009. Members of the elite and Ortega’s opponents have replied that the head of state is “biting the hand that feeds him”.

Hernando Calvo Ospina is a Columbian journalist (1) Farabundo Martì was the founder of El Salvador ’s Communist Party. He was shot dead after a popular uprising in 1932, which was crushed, killing more than 20,000 people. (2) A reference to the conflict between the revolutionary powers and the Miskito Indians of the Atlantic coast. (3) On 20 December 1989 the US launched Operation Just Cause to overthrow and arrest Panama ’s leader Manuel Noriega – an undemocratic drug trafficker and former CIA collaborator. (4) Quoted from Orlando Nuñez, La oligarquia en Nicaragua , Cipres, Managua , 2006. (5) Without much success – the dissidents only got 1% of the vote in the 1996 elections (and 7% in 2006). (6) The Nicaraguan elite and Washington immediately put pressure on the Vatican to replace Monsignor Obando y Bravo. (7) On 22 August 1978 the commando leader Eden Pastora took control of the National Assembly.

He became deputy minister of defence, but went over to the Contra in 1982 and joined the front near the border with Costa Rica . The main effect of his faction’s presence there was to stir up ill feeling among the other counter revolutionary groups, and to neutralise the southern front, to the benefit of the Sandinistas. (8) See Raphaelle Bail, “Nicaragua exports its poor”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, January 2007. (9) Instigated by Caracas , ALBA is made up of Venezuela , Cuba , Honduras , Bolivia , Dominica , Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Nicaragua . (10) Around 20 countries signed the PetroCaribe agreement, which gives them preferential payment conditions for Venezuelan oil. They pay 50% upfront and the rest over 20 years at 1% interest. The savings must be used to finance social programmes.

Question: In what country did the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrow the Somoza regime in 1979?
Answer: Nicaragua