Israeli Intelligence Agencies Israeli Intelligence Agencies HaFilosofia shel HaModi'in, by Yitzhak ben Yisrael, Ministry of Defence, Israel, 1999 Secret Israeli database reveals full extent of illegal settlement by Uri Blau, Ha'aretz, February 1, 2009. Mossad - The World's Most Efficient Killing Machine By Gordon Thomas 12-9-2 Standing on a canteen table in down-town Tel Aviv, Israel's spymaster studied the men and women of Mossad. In the few weeks since taking over Mossad, Meir Dagan knew he already commanded something his recent predecessors never managed. Respect. Barely raising his voice he spoke. "When I was fighting in Lebanon, I witnessed the aftermath of a family feud. The patriarch's head had been split open, his brain on the floor. Around him lay his wife and some of his children. All dead. Before I could do anything, one of the murderers scooped up a handful of brain and swallowed it. This is how you will all now operate.

Otherwise someone will eat your brain." His every word held them in thrall - even if they sent a shudder through some of his listeners, hardened as they were. In the canteen were those who had killed many times already. Killing enemies who could not be brought to trial because they were hidden deep inside Israel's Arab neighbours. Only Mossad could find and kill them. Rafi Eitan, the legendary former Operations Chief of Mossad told me when we sat together in his living room in a north Tel Aviv suburb: "I always tried to kill when I could see the whites of a person's eyes. So I could see the fear. Smell it on his breath. Sometimes I used my hands. A knife, or a silenced gun. I never felt a moment's regret over a killing." Meir Amit, when he had been director of Mossad, later insisted "we are like the official hangman or the doctor on Death Row who administers the lethal injection. Our actions are all endorsed by the State of Israel. When Mossad kills it is not breaking the law. It is fulfilling a sentence sanctioned by the prime minister of the day".

We spoke as he walked me through Mossad's own unique memorial in Tel Aviv to the dead - a concrete maze shaped in the form of a brain. Each name engraved on the concrete was of an agent who had been killed while trying to destroy Israel's enemies. Some of those agents had one thing in common. Amit had sent them to their deaths. "We did all we could to protect them. We trained them better than any other secret service. Sometimes, out on a mission, the dice is against you. But there will always be brave men ready to roll the dice," he said. Dagan, his listeners in the canteen knew, was cast in the same mould. He would protect them with every means he knew - legal or illegal. He would allow them to use proscribed nerve toxins. Dum-dum bullets. Ways of killing that not even the Mafia, the former KGB or China's secret service use. But he would not hesitate to expose them to death - if it was for the greater good of Israel. That was the deal those in the canteen had accepted when they were recruited. They, too, were ready to roll the dice.

Dagan, only the tenth man to head Mossad and bear the title of memune - "first among equals in Hebrew" - reminded his listeners sat on their plastic-form chairs what Meir Amit had once said. Then Dagan added: "I am here to tell you those days are back. The dice is ready to roll." Dagan jumped down from the table and walked out of the canteen in total silence. Only then did the applause start. Shortly afterwards came the Mombasa massacre of eleven days ago. An explosive-laden land-cruiser drove into the reception area of the island's Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel. Fifteen people died and 80 were seriously injured. Two shoulder-fired missiles nearly downed an Israeli passenger plane bringing tourists back to Tel Aviv from Kenya. Two hundred and seventy-five barely missed a Lockerbie-style death. Meir Dagan immediately suspected it was the work of Osama bin-Laden's al-Quaeda and that the missiles had come from Iraq's arsenal. But to suspect and prove would be the greatest challenge Mossad had faced since the War on Terrorism was launched by President Bush. "Mossad would not be operating in its own backyard against suicide bombers.

It would be working 1,500 miles away in a hostile environment. There would only be lip-service support from the authorities on the ground. Other intelligence services would be trawling through the evidence looking for clues that would fit their agendas. The CIA for a fix on bin-Laden. MI6 for a lead back to a threat to Britain. The same for the Germans," a senior intelligence man in Tel Aviv told me. But for Meir Dagan it was time to roll the dice. Every person with proven field experience was on a plane to Kenya within an hour of the massacre. They would sift and search the wreckage, using sophisticated equipment to do so. Detectors that could detect a sliver of metal deep inside a corpse - metal that would show where the explosives came from. And much else. The team who would "roll the dice" travelled separately - as they always did. They had their own aircraft, their own pilots. They were the men and women of kidon, Mossad's ultra-secret assassination unit. Their sole job in Mombasa was to find and kill the perpetrators of the massacre: those behind the three bombers who had gone to their deaths laughing.

The kidon would kill the planners of the massacre after they had traced them to their lair - wherever it was. It might take months - as it had with avenging the murder of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. But the kidon would find the men behind the Mombasa outrage and kill them. They would use a small laboratory of poisons, sealed in vials until the moment came to strike. They had long and short-blade knives. Piano wire to strangle. Explosives no bigger than a throat lozenge capable fo blowing off a person's head. An arsenal of guns: short-barrel pistols, sniper rifles with a mile killing range. The team chosen to go to Mombasa had local language skills. They could pass for Arabs or for Indian traders. Between them, they spoke Swahili and other dialects. They dressed the part; they looked the part. They also understood the closed language of their world. They had learned how to memorise fibres - precise physical descriptions of people. Neviof , how to break into an office, a bedroom, or any other given target and plant listening bugs - or a bomb.

Masluh, the skill of shaking off a tail. The women had learned how to use their sex. To be ever ready to sleep with someone to obtain vital information. The link between intelligence work and sexual entrapment is as old as spying itself. Meir Amit had said when he was Mossad's chief: "Sex is a woman's weapon. Pillow talk is not a problem for her. But it takes a special kind of courage. It is not just sleeping with an enemy. It is to obtain information." The kidon team had passed the two years course at the Mossad training school at Henzelia, near Tel Aviv. They had been sent to a special camp in the Negev desert. There they had learned to kill. "They are taught how to use the weapon appropriate for the target. Strangulation with a cheese-cutter if the victim is to be killed at night. A handgun fitted with a silencer. A nerve agent delivered by an aerosol or injection," explained Victor Ostrovsky, a former member of kidon. Ostrovsky, who today lives in Arizona, will not say who he has killed. But he quit Mossad - saying he could not "stomach the way they did things".

My sources in Mossad say he is "long past his sell-by date. We do things differently now". And, by all accounts, more ruthlessly. The man known to Mossad as "The Engineer" was a top Hamas bomb-maker. He lived on the West Bank, protected by gunmen. One day he received a visitor - a distant cousin from Gaza. The young man spoke like so many from that hotbed of Islamic fanaticism. Over mint tea, the two men spoke far into the evening. Finally, The Engineer invited his guest to stay over. The offer was accepted. The youth asked if he could use The Engineer's mobile phone to call his own family to say they should not worry. He asked if he could make the call from outside the house to improve reception. The Engineer nodded. The call over, the two men fell asleep on the floor. Next day, the youth left to return to Gaza. That morning, The Engineer received a call on the mobile. As he put the phone to his mouth and started to speak, his head was blown off. The youth had been recruited by Mossad to plant a powerful explosive inside the phone. The detonation signal had come from a kidon half a mile away.

No one had seen him arrive. No one saw him go. Over the past years, Mossad have killed scores of Israel's enemies by such methods. "We try to never use the same method twice. Our technicians spend all their time devising new ways to kill," a Mossad source told me last week. Their roll-call of Mission Successful includes; Fathi Shkaki, the leader of Islamic Jihad, and Gerald Bull, the rogue Canadian investor of Saddam's supergun. The usual composition of a hit team is four. One is the "target locator". His task is to keep tabs on the victim's movements. Another is the "transporter", to get the team safely away from the killing area. The remaining two men perform the execution. In the case of Gerald Bull they knocked on his front door late in the evening. The ballistic expert had just moved in. He had been assured he was safe by his Iraqi minders. But they had been lured away by some of the kidon back-up team. These are known as sayanim - the Hebrew word for helpers. Throughout the world there are tens of thousands. Each has been carefully recruited to provide the kind of help that the kidon unit required to kill Bull. The assassination was simple.

Both kidon wore FedEx courier uniforms. One carried a package. The other knocked on the door. When Bull opened it, the package was thrust at him. As he stepped back he was shot - once in the forehead and once in the throat. He flew backwards into the hall. The package was retrieved, the door closed behind the dead Bull. Both men calmly walked away to where the "transporter" was waiting. In hours, the team was back in Tel Aviv. Preparation for an assassination can take weeks, even months. The hit team, once selected, is moved to a Mossad safe house, one of many in Israel. Eli Cohen, a former Mossad agent, told me that "a safe house looks like it was furnished from a car boot sale". It was in one such safe house that the plan to assassinate Saddam Hussein was prepared. It was elaborate even by Mossad standards. It revolved around killing Saddam during a visit to one of his mistresses. Mossad agents in Baghdad had discovered that the woman, the widow of a serving Iraqi officer who had died mysteriously, would be driven from the palace to keep a tryst with Saddam in a desert villa outside the city.

Heavily guarded, the villa would be a hard target to hit. But Mossad believed there was a window of opportunity between the time Saddam would land in his helicopter near the villa and enter its well-protected compound. The plan to kill Saddam has long been on Mossad's agenda. But previous attempts had failed due to Saddam's obsession with changing his movements at the last moment. Mossad believed he would not do so this time. "The woman is irresistible," said a report from one of its Baghdad undercover agents. Mossad had scouted an air corridor through which it believed a kidon could be flown in below Iraqi radar. A final rehearsal was held in the Negev desert. Israeli commandos doubled as Saddam and his bodyguards - a party of five. As they landed close to a replica of the villa, the kidon were in position. They were equipped with specially adapted shoulder-firing missiles. But their weapons were to only fire blanks for the rehearsal. In a tragic mistake, one of the missiles had been replaced with a live one. It killed the make-believe Saddam and his bodyguards. The operation was cancelled. But last week Meir Dagan was said to be considering adapting it to once more try and kill Saddam.

After eleven days investigation, his teams in Mombasa confirmed the massacre had all the hallmarks of being an Iraqi-sponsored act carried out by al-Quaeda. How and when Mossad will strike against Saddam is, understandably, a closely guarded secret. But an intelligence sources suggested to me that a successful assassination of Saddam could see the looming threat of war recede. "With Saddam out of the way there is no reason to invade Iraq. The people themselves will rise," said the source. Dagan, the Mossad chief who could possible achieve that was born on a train between Russia and Poland. He speaks several languages. He is an action man, working 18 hour days. His private life is simple: he eschews the trappings of power that goes with the job of running MI6 or the CIA. His salary is a fraction of what their directors get. Three months into the job, he is adored by his staff. In the past years, Mossad has experienced many publicised failures, a loss of morale and, worst of all, growing public criticism among its own people. All that Meir Dagan is determined to change. In his open neck shirt and chain store pants and sneakers, Dagan is no James Bond.

The only spy fiction he is known to read is John Le Carre - because, he has told friends, he can at least empathise with its hero, Smiley. Meir Dagan is also an avid reader of history of other intelligence services. It is said he knows more about the CIA and MI6 than many of its current employees. He constantly reminds his staff that action cannot wait for certainty. That motive and deception are at the centre of their endeavours. That they must create situations which seek to draw fact out of darkness. For him the art of informed conjecture is an essential weapon. Since Mombasa, Dagan has virtually worked and slept in his office. Its windows look eastwards to the Judean Hills. Beyond are the tribal badlands of Pakistan - where Dagan is convinced Osama bin-Laden is hiding - and the desert of Iraq through which Dagan believes Saddam will try and escape if war starts. The Mossad chief will be waiting. Meantime, he is preoccupied with the latest news from Mombasa - and all those points east where his kidon team are tracking the planners of the outrage. Some have gone to the Philippines. Others to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Mossad's scientists and pathologists, as well as field agents, katsas, have combed and bagged the clues from the Paradise hotel disaster area. Every day an El Al plane has flown northwards to Israel with the evidence despite behind-the-scene protests by the Kenyan intelligence service. Mossad agents in Nigeria have provided important details on al-Quaeda in that country. Katsas in South Africa have joined colleagues in Mombasa. From Rome, Malta and Cyprus, other Mossad agents sped down through Africa into the country's fierce heat. Dagan's men are polite to the counter-intelligence officers from the CIA, MI6 and European services. "But these are Israelis who are dead or injured. This is Mossad's job. And everybody had better remember that," said one Mossad source. Mossad has made no friends on the ground. They rarely do. That is their style: go it alone. They believe they know more than anyone else in fighting terrorism. And they may be right. In Tel Aviv, having done all he could for the moment, Meir Dagan waits.

The 57 years-old, battle-hardened hero of past wars in Lebanon, in all those places in the Middle East where the alleys have no names, has earned his reputation as a no-holds barred leader. In those days, with a handgun in his pocket and his dog at his heel, he had led from the front. Twice he had been wounded, so that nowadays he sometimes uses a walking stick. He dislikes doing so. He detests any sign of weakness in himself or in others. Dagan is a blunt man, proud and imperious and prepared to stand on his record. He crushed the first Intifada in Gaza in 1971. Two years later he fought in the Yom Kippur War. For him, Mossad, and ultimately Israel, the Mombasa massacre is a test - to show that Mossad is back on centre stage with a vengeance. No other intelligence service has a better history of operations in Central Africa. In the 1960s Mossad drove out the vaunted Chinese Secret Intelligence Service. It stopped Cuba's Fidel Castro exporting his revolution into Africa. It beat the KGB at its own plans to turn the Congo into its playground.

It was a dirty and deadly war. A terrorist group ambushed a Mossad katsa in the Congo and fed him to the crocodiles. They filmed his last, threshing moments in the water - and sent the footage to the local Mossad station chief. He retaliated by placing a two-pound bomb under the toilet seat of the terrorist leader. It blew the villa apart. Twelve terrorists died. Mossad built up a relationship with BOSS, the security service of the South African apartheid government. It sent a team to Pretoria to teach BOSS the art of sophisticated methods of interrogation. Israeli instructors showed them the black art of sleep deprivation, hooding, forcing a suspect to stand facing a wall for long hours, and mental tortures such as mock tortures. "The one certainty is that if the Mombasa killers are caught Mossad won't bother with mock executions," said a Mossad source. The methods Mossad uses are often outside the law. They have a unit that specialises in burglary - using far more sophisticated means than those employed by the infamous Watergate burglars. Their ineptitude led to the downfall of President Nixon. They have a special team of scientists working at the Institute for Biological Research in Tel Aviv.

They prepare the deadly toxins for the kidon. Where other intelligence agencies no longer allow their agents to kill, kidon have no such restraint. They remain fully licensed to assassinate in the name of Israel once they have routinely convinced the incumbent prime minister of the need to do so. Ariel Sharon needs little convincing. Mossad's assassins routinely witness some of Israel's leading forensic pathologists at work so as to better understand how to make an assassination look like an accident. They learn how a pinprick or small blemish left on a victim's skin can be a give away. They are shown how to ensure against this. It makes them probably the most sophisticated lawfully-approved killers in the world. This morning (Sunday) Meir Dagan, as he has done every day since the Mombasa attack, will awaken from a combat veteran's light sleep. This squat, barrel-chested man will take his customary cold water shower and eat his daily breakfast of natural yogurt, toast spread with honey washed down with several cups of strong black coffee. Next he will study the latest reports from not only East Africa - but from all those areas where his team of hunters have now moved.

After briefing the prime minister on the scrambler phone that links Dagan to Ariel Sharon, the memune may spend an hour at an easel in the corner of his office - touching up one of the watercolour paintings which are the only known passion in his life. But like everything else about him, they will remain under lock and key. Just as with his plan to assassinate Saddam Hussein, the first the world will know, if Mossad is successful, will be after it has happened. SENSATIONAL NEW EBOOK NOW AVAILABLE FROM GORDON THOMAS Documents and details illegal mind control and germ warfare experiments carried out by the CIA on US citizens. It is a shattering account of how the dark side of science collaborated with sheer lunacy to create a chilling tour de force of terror. Based upon impeccable research, it shows how our elected governments lied to the people for over fifty years - and continues to obscure the truth. It is a story of murder, inhuman experiments and torture. It is supported by a wealth of never before published evidence; personal interviews with those doctors involved in the work that mocks their oath to do no harm to their patients.

It is also the story of a brave man, William Buckley, the longest serving agent in the CIA, until his own terrible death at the hands of a doctor trained in the techniques the CIA pioneered. Buckley was a close personal friend of the author. · Never-seen-before documents from inside the White House, CIA and other agencies. · Reveals the documentary evidence that links US Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the cover-up of the death of top CIA scientist, Frank Olson. · Explains how the CIA financed a ruthless and systematic assault of the human psyche - using a British-born psychiatrist to spearhead the assault. · Names other world renowned physicians who were involved in the most sinister research programme ever created by any United States government - and its secret partner - the British government. · Reveals how a woman was programmed to become a CIA assassin. · Describes how a CIA chemist was murdered by his own colleagues after he had turned to the one man he thought he could trust - a London psychiatrist engaged in similar work. · Reveals how "expendables" - the CIA generic name for those selected for killing - were secretly murdered after they had been experimented on in Europe.

· Describes how the CIA used prostitutes and mental patients in other experiments. · Explains how the CIA deliberately pioneered the drug culture whose effects are still with us. · Reveals how the CIA agent selected to monitor the experiments eventually died at the hands of a physician steeped in the methods perfected by the CIA. · Identifies how the CIA experiments are still carried on in secret establishments in Israel and China. · Uncovers CIA terminal experiments on Vietcong prisoners in Vietnam. · Publishes the CIA Manual of Assassination - a shocking document describing how to commit state-approved murder. For further information and download instructions visit ✡✡ Israeli Secret Intelligence Service THE MOSSAD | המוסד ✡✡ - YouTube ✡✡ Israeli Secret Intelligence Service THE MOSSAD | המוסד ✡✡ Want to watch this again later? Sign in to add this video to a playlist. Need to report the video? Sign in to report inappropriate content. Rating is available when the video has been rented. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on May 30, 2012 New video I've just made about the Mossad! Israeli Mossad - the strongest and most qualitative secret intelligence service in the world.

**Credit to Speedy (media) for all the info on the Mossad ops. Category Intelligence During the Six-Day War (1967) | Jewish Virtual Library Intelligence During the Six-Day War (1967) by Doron Geller Tweet There were a number of factors that led to the stunning Israeli victory in June 1967 . Years before the war broke out Wolfgang Lotz had penetrated the highest levels of the Egyptian military and political establishments to obtain vital information on Egypt's defense and contingency plans. Eli Cohen had done the same in Syria. There were many more like them, who remain unknown and anonymous. In August 1966, too, the Iraqi Air Force pilot, Munir Redfa, flew his Soviet-made MiG-21 to Israel, a defection that benefited Israel greatly in terms of its Air Force's ability to train against an aerial adversary. With the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, existing tensions only increased with the rise on cross-border infiltration and Arab terrorist attacks on Israelis. The capture and hanging of Eli Cohen in Damascus in 1965 only fuelled the flames.

Arab attacks in turn led to Israeli retaliation, culminating in an Israeli dogfight with Syrian planes over the Golan Heights on April 7, 1967. Syrian gunners had shelled the settlement of Tel-Katzir below the Golan Heights shortly beforehand. The Israeli Air Force sent out IAF planes to take out Syrian guns, Syrian planes rose up to defend them, and the IAF shot down 6 Syrian planes to no Israeli losses. Chief of Israeli General Staff Yitzhak Rabin warned that Israel would not remain passive in the face of provocation. The Syrians, alarmed by their show of weakness, were nervous about Israeli conclusions and intentions. Thus the Syrians looked to the Egyptians to back them up. Nasser, as the undisputed leader of the Arab world, took up the challenge. On May 14 and 15 lead units of two Egyptian divisions rolled into the Sinai Peninsula. He placed the Egyptian Army on full alert. The move took the Israeli Intelligence Services by surprise. According to Service estimates, the Arab armies would not be ready for war until 1969-70.

The Egyptians had large numbers of forces tied down in Yemen backing the anti-Saudi, anti-royalist forces there. In addition, since the conclusion of the Sinai War of 1956 , the Sinai had been effectively demilitarized. United Nations peacekeeping forces had been stationed there as an Israeli precondition for the withdrawal of her forces from the Sinai following the war. It was true that as early as 1960, following skirmishes on the Israeli-Syrian border, Egypt had sent large forces into the Sinai with the intention of "deterring Israel from attacking Syria." But the Egyptian troop deployments of May 1967 were different. "Unlike 1960, when the Egyptians had entered secretly so that their eventual withdrawal could be low-key and honorable, there was no radio silence in this operation, no secrecy; in fact, the sight of Egyptian tanks in a bright sand camouflage en route to push the Jews into the sea was covered with great glee by the Arab media." Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman) had only a few hours' advance warning of the Egyptian move into Sinai. Even so Aman was not overly worried.

The Israelis thought that Nasser "would order his army and tanks to withdraw after a show of force had put Israel in its place." This was despite the fact that the Soviets were clearly stirring up trouble in the region. "Perhaps wishing to instigate a conflict in order to humiliate Israel, or to instill a sense of invincibility in the Arab camp, the Soviets gave the Egyptians and Syrians false information about nonexistent IDF troop movements and about American intentions.'" On May 13, the Soviets had told Anwar Sadat , Nasser's deputy who was on a visit to Moscow, that Israeli troops "were massing and intended to invade Syria." The Soviet leader had mentioned 11-13 Israeli brigades massing on the border with Syria, of which Sadat quickly informed Nasser. The Soviets probably did not intend war. They thought both Israel and the Arabs would stop short of the brink, but they were wrong. It seems the Soviets completely underestimated Israel's ability and willingness to defend her rights. In a by now rather famous conversation Moshe Sneh (leader of the Israel Communist Party) had with the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Sneh said: "'Israel will win the war.' The Soviet ambassador responded: 'Who will fight?

The espresso boys and the pimps of Dizengoff Street?'" Still, on May 15-16, the Israelis were confident. That changed on May 16, when Nasser asked UN Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw UN forces from the Sinai. U Thant quickly complied , leaving no international forces between Egypt's army in the Sinai and Israel's borders. In fact, the speed with which U Thant complied with Nasser's request may have surprised even Nasser. If Nasser's intentions were only to bluff, then, having gone this far, he could not pull back from the brink for reasons of face. By May 19 the Egyptians had deployed six divisions in the Sinai. Israeli Intelligence chief Meir Amit "proposed that Israel publish abroad aerial reconnaissance photographs of the massive Egyptian deployment…" with the idea of justifying Israel's mobilization of her reserves, which had begun on May 16. However, the Israeli leadership rejected the suggestion. On May 20 Israeli Intelligence learned that Nasser had recalled three Egyptian brigades from Yemen. This was ominous. The same day Egyptian forces took over Sharm El-Sheik, at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula.

At midnight on May 22 Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran, at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, thus closing off Israel's only shipping route through the Red Sea. This was a clear causus belli, which had been understood since 1956 - Israel's shipping routes through the Red Sea would not be impeded. Military Intelligence Chief Aharon Yariv attended the Cabinet meeting the following morning in Tel-Aviv, with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol present. He announced: "'The post-Suez period is over…It is not merely a question of freedom of navigation. If Israel does not respond to the closure of the Straits, there will be no value to its credibility or to the IDF's deterrent power, because the Arab states will interpret Israel's weakness as an excellent opportunity to assail her security and her very existence.'" He called for immediate military action, as did Air Force chief (and Israel's current president) Ezer Weizmann . Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was more reserved but on May 23 he agreed with Yariv's and Weizmann's assessment that Israel should take the initiative and make the first strike.

But Prime Minister Levi Eshkol preferred to continue with the diplomatic route, hoping that Western powers would solve the issue. On May 30 King Hussein of Jordan made a surprise visit to Nasser in Cairo. While there had been a lot of animosity between Nasser and Hussein in the past, they made up and signed a mutual defense pact. Jordan was brought "into a joint military command with Egypt." An Egyptian general was put in command of Arab forces on the Jordanian front. While Soviet warnings may have preempted the crisis and U Thant's decision to withdraw UN forces upon Nasser's request deepened it, the joint Egyptian-Jordanian military pact made war almost inevitable. On June 2 the Israeli Cabinet decided in principle on war. The military realized the dangers of waiting any longer: more Egyptian troops would arrive from Yemen, and the Soviet Union would continue with its supply of weapons to Egypt. Moreover, it was understood that the United States and Washington would do nothing to break Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. More than that, Military Intelligence was also aware of the weakness of Egyptian preparations and morale.

Yariv asserted that "the Egyptians were still busy pushing units across the canal and were doing so in such haste that some of their troops had been left without food and water for two days running." Some of them arrived at the front in traditional Arab peasant dress, "as there had not been time to issue them with uniforms." Mossad Chief Meir Amit returned from consultations in Washington and was convinced that the Americans supported an Israeli first strike. On June 4 the Cabinet decided on war, and on the morning of June 5, the Israeli attack began. Egyptian pilots woke up to the sounds of their planes exploding on the ground that morning. The Israeli Air Force destroyed 304 out of 419 Egyptian aircraft on the ground, 53 out of 112 Syrian planes, and Jordan's entire 28 plane Air Force. The IAF even struck at Iraq's western most airbase at Habbaniya, destroying ten planes on the ground. Israel's main attack on the Egyptian airbase came in two waves. IAF planes flew over the Mediterranean and then east to attack Egypt's Sinai bases. At 12:15 p.m.

Israel attacked the Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces, putting them mostly out of action. With the Arab Air Forces out of the way, Israel rolled into the Sinai, Jerusalem and the West Bank and took them over completely within three days. On the sixth day of the war Israel took the Golan Heights, putting the northern Galilee out of the range of Syrian guns, as well. Israel's tremendous military success came not only as a result of the high level of training, expertise and courage of her pilots and soldiers, but also as a result of accurate intelligence. As Samuel Katz writes; "It is safe to assume that in no time in the history of modern warfare has a nation been equipped with such an intimate portrait of the enemy's disposition, deployment, abilities and inabilities as was the IDF…on the morning of June 5, 1967." King Hussein of Jordan later said; "'Their pilots knew exactly what to expect…their pilots had a complete catalogue of the most minute details of each of the thirty-two Arab air bases, what objectives to strike, where, when and how. We had nothing like that.'" Israel's Intelligence had been so attentive that they knew the exact timing of Egyptian patrols and their air routes.

Air Force commander Motti Hod told Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin on June 4: "'For the past two weeks, we have been keeping a watch on the precise movements of the Egyptian air force…at first light they take off on patrol, staying up for an hour. Then they return to base and go off for breakfast. Between seven and eight, everything is dead, and 7:45 in the morning is the ideal time for us.'" That was the exact time that the Israeli Air Force struck. The groundwork for the successful penetration of the Egyptian and Syrian militaries was laid by Wolfgang Lotz and Eli Cohen, but many other spies, both Israelis and Arabs - and sometimes European or American non-Jews - also worked on behalf of Israel. Ali al-Alfi, the masseur to both Nasser and his successor Anwar el-Sadat, may have spied on behalf of Israel. He was accused by the Egyptians of doing so and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1979.

Anwar Ephraim was a Military Intelligence agent who was believed to be "responsible for organizing a massive and, if reports of the celebration are correct, frenzied party for the pilots of (an air force base) just outside of Alexandria. The party was thrown on June 4, "less than twelve hours before the preemptive Israeli blitz…" They drank and ate and watched belly dancers until the "wee hours of the morning", and a little before Israeli pilots prepared for takeoff, Ephraim left Egypt on an international flight. Another Israeli became a close personal friend of an Egyptian belly dancer, who was presumed to have been privy to many state secrets. An Egyptian officer provided much valuable information to the Israeli Army in the days leading up to the Israeli preemptive strike of June 5. Nor was Israeli Intelligence restricted to the Egyptian or even the Syrian Military. They had accurate knowledge of Jordanian politcal and military installations too. "After the war Samir ar-Rifai (an assistant to King Hussein), told Western reporters that a lone IAF Super Mystere had attacked King Hussein's office in the Royal Palace in Amman on the afternoon of 5 June.

The Israeli plane 'machine-gunned the king's office at point-blank range with a precision and knowledge of its target that was stupefying,' ar-Rifai said. The Israelis had also invented or made good use of existing electronic gadgets to decipher enemy movements or intentions, as well as to listen in on conversations. The best-known example of Israel's technical ability and advantage during the 1967 War was the capturing of a conversation between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan on the second day of the war, June 6. At the time most of Nasser's Air Force had been wiped out, but he didn't tell that to King Hussein. Nevertheless, things were not going well for either of them, as can be understood from the conversation: "Nasser: How are you? The brother (Nasser referring to Hussein) wants to know if the fighting is going on all along the front…Do you know that the US is participating alongside Israel in the war? Should we announce this?…Should we say that the US and Britain (are participating) or only the US?

(Nasser later did broadcast that the Americans had taken part in the initial, decisive air assault, in order to explain away the defeat.) Hussein: The US and England. Nasser: Does Britain have aircraft carriers? Hussein: (Unclear) Nasser: Good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an announcement… we will make sure that the Syrians (also) make an announcement that American and British aircraft are using their aircraft carriers against us…(Meanwhile), our aircraft have been attacking Israel's airfields since this morning." This conversation was carried out over the public telephone system and was tapped "by two veteran Aman (Military Intelligence) officers using Second World War vintage equipment." Their commanding officer told them "'It's worth millions. Make four copies.'" Aman Chief Aharon Yariv opposed the publication of the conversation, fearing that it would reveal the extent of Israel's eavesdropping capabilities and thus encourage the Arabs to upgrade their systems.

But he was overruled by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol , who believed it would have great political effect; the conversation would show that the Arab leaders would shamelessly lie for their own ends (and to make it appear as if Israel was incapable of such military action on her own), as well as to drive a wedge between Nasser and Hussein. The message made it clear that despite the fact that Nasser was aware of the heavy losses he had suffered at that point, he neglected to inform his ally Hussein. The publication of the conversation indeed did lead "the Arabs to considerably upgrade their communications security, rendering Aman's electronic eavesdropping much more difficult. One senior intelligence officer said later that the publication cost Israel 60 per cent of its Sigint (Signal Interception) capability in the Arab states.'" On the other hand, the Arabs no longer knew if what they said was being heard or not. At 2 p.m.

on June 6, Military Intelligence made a very important interception in terms of ground operations "of Nasser's general order to his forces in Sinai to fall back to the Suez Canal, following the major breakthroughs by Israeli divisions led by General Israel Tal (on the northern Sinai axis) and General Ariel Sharon (southern axis) early that day. This enabled the IDF General Staff to decide on opening an offensive against Syria in the southern Golan Heights three days later." The Israeli breaking of the Egyptian military code enabled them to confuse the Egyptian army and air force with false orders. Israeli officers "ordered an Egyptian MiG pilot to release his bombs over the sea instead of carrying out an attack on Israeli positions." When the pilot questioned the veracity of the order, the Israeli Intelligence officer gave the pilot details on his wife and family." The pilot indeed dropped his bombs over the Mediterranean and parachuted to safety. Another major incident occurred when an Israeli Intelligence agent impersonated an Egyptian officer and instructed a lost battalion in the Sinai away from Israeli lines. After the ceasefire was declared the Aman officer guided the Egyptian unit towards a POW camp, where the Egyptian tanks and soldiers were taken under Israeli control. Israeli Intelligence also confused the Egyptian Army about its real intentions regarding invasion routes.

These broadcasts worked so well that major Egyptian units waited for advancing Israeli tank units that never came - they had simply bypassed the Egyptians and made their way all the way to the Suez Canal. Many other measures of Israeli Intelligence ingenuity never came to light. But Intelligence played a major part in the winning of the war. In the years to come, with greatly expanded borders acquired as a result of the 1967 War, Israeli Intelligence at all levels would grow in importance and sophistication as she struggled to deal with the new challenges, many of them unforeseen before the great victory of 1967. Israeli Intelligence Agencies "Inside Israel's secret organisations" JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW October 1996 Mossad The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim Mossad [Hebrew for "institution"] has responsibility for human intelligence collection, covert action, and counterterrorism. Its focus is on Arab nations and organizations throughout the world. Mossad also is responsible for the clandestine movement of Jewish refugees out of Syria, Iran, and Ethiopia. Mossad agents are active in the former communist countries, in the West, and at the UN.

Mossad is headquartered in Tel Aviv. The staff of Mossad was estimated during the late 1980s to number between 1,500 to 2,000 personnel, with more recent estimates placing the staff at an estimated 1,200 personnel. The identity of the director of Mossad was traditionally a state secret, or at least not widely publicized, but, in March 1996, the Government announced the appointment of Major General Danny Yatom as the replacement for Shabtai Shavit, who resigned in early 1996. Danny Yatom resigned on February 24, 1998, following the release of the Ciechanover Commission report which dealt with the failed attempt to assassinate Khalid Meshaal, a top Hamas political leader, and thus found faults with his performance as head of Mossad. Yatom was replace in early March 1998 by Efraim Halevy, then Israel's representative to the European Union. Halevy, as a Mossad agent, had previously worked behind the scenes to help negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

Formerly known as the Central Institute for Coordination and the Central Institute for Intelligence and Security, Mossad was formed on 01 April 1951. Mossad was established by then Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who gave as Mossad's primary directive: "For our state which since its creation has been under siege by its enemies. Intelligence constitutes the first line of defence...we must learn well how to recognise what is going on around us." Mossad has a total of eight departments, though some details of the internal organization of the agency remain obscure. Collections Department is the largest, with responsibility for espionage operations, with offices abroad under both diplomatic and unofficial cover. The department consists of a number of desks which are responsible for specific geographical regions, directing case officers based at "stations" around the world, and the agents they control. Political Action and Liaison Department conducts political activities and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations. In larger stations, such as Paris, Mossad customarily had under embassy cover two regional controllers: one to serve the Collections Department and the other the Political Action and Liaison Department.

Special Operations Division, also known as Metsada, conducts highly sensitive assassination, sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare projects. LAP (Lohamah Psichlogit)Department is responsible for psychological warfare, propaganda and deception operations. Research Department is responsible for intelligence production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports. The Department is organized into 15 geographically specialized sections or "desks", including the USA, Canada and Western Europe, Latin America, Former Soviet Union, China, Africa, the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. A "nuclear" desk is focused on special weapons related issues. Israel's most celebrated spy, Eli Cohen, was recruited by Mossad during the 1960s to infiltrate the top echelons of the Syrian government. Cohen radioed information to Israel for two years before he was discovered and publicly hanged in Damascus Square. Another Mossad agent, Wolfgang Lotz, established himself in Cairo, became acquainted with high-ranking Egyptian military and police officers, and obtained information on missile sites and on German scientists working on the Egyptian rocket program.

In 1962 and 1963, in a successful effort to intimidate the Germans, several key scientists in that program were targets of assassination attempts. Mossad also succeeded in seizing eight missile boats under construction for Israel in France, but which had been embargoed by French president Charles de Gaulle in December 1968. In 1960, Mossad carried out one of its most celebrated operations, the kidnapping of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina. Another kidnapping, in 1986, brought to Israel for prosecution the nuclear technician, Mordechai Vanunu, who had revealed details of the Israeli nuclear weapons program to a London newspaper. During the 1970s, Mossad assassinated several Arabs connected with the Black September terrorist group. Mossad inflicted a severe blow on the PLO in April 1988, when an assassination team invaded a well-guarded residence in Tunis to murder Arafat's deputy, Abu Jihad, considered to be the principal PLO planner of military and terrorist operations against Israel.

Gerald Bull, a Canadian scientist who developed the famed "Super Gun" for Iraq was killed by the Mossad at his Brussels apartment in March 1990, effectively halting the development of the Supergun project. Egyptian security services reported the discovery of a total of seven Israeli espionage networks during 1996, which is a significant increase compared to the 20 similar networks discovered in the previous 15 years. And Mossad's record has also been blemished by a few embarrasing failures. In Lillehammer, Norway, on 07 January 1974, Mossad agents mistakenly killed Ahmad Boushiki, an Algerian waiter carrying a Moroccan passport, whom they mistook for PLO security head Ali Ahmad Salameh, believed to have masterminded the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics [Salameh was killed in a 1979 car-bomb explosion in Lebanon]. Following the attack, the Mossad agents were arrested and tried before a Norwegian court. Five Israeli agents were convicted and served short jail sentences, though Israel denied responsibility for the murder.

In February 1996, the Israeli government agreed to compensate the family of Ahmad Boushiki. On 15 November 1995, Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, an Israeli citizen. Following the controversy over the failure of intelligence to protect Rabin, and the embarrassment over the mistaken assassination of a Swedish national, the Director Geneneral of Mossad, known only as 'S', was forced into retirement. On 24 March 1996, Prime Minister Shimon Peres appointed Major General Danny Yatom as the new Director General of Mossad, the first Director of Mossad to ever be publically identified. On 24 September 1997, Mossad operatives attempted to assassinate Khalid Meshaal, a top political leader of the Palestinian group Hamas. The assassins entered Jordan on fake Canadian, and injected Meshaal with a poison. Jordan was able to wring a number of concessions out of Israel in the aftermath of the fiasco, including the release of the founder of Hamas, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, from an Israeli jail.

Ephraim Halevy, a nephew of the late Sir Isaiah Berlin [who helped to negotiate a peace deal with Jordan], became the new head of Mossad after two bungled operations led to the arrests of agents in Switzerland and Jordan. Mossad scaled down overseas assassinations after the bungled operations in the late 1990s. But by 2002 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to remove Halevy, after the two clashed repeatedly about what strategy to adopt against Palestinian violence In October 2002 General Meir Dagan, who served in the Israeli Army with Ariel Sharon, and assisted him during his election campaign, was confirmed as head of Mossad. Dagan led an undercover commando unit that tracked and killed Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. Sharon wanted Mossad to go back to the undercover and special operations for which it was renowned. NEWSLETTER CounterSpy: Secret CIA Documents on Mossad What Begin and Reagan Didn't Want You to Know Secret CIA Documents on Mossad CounterSpy, May-June 1982 pp. 34-54 Preface: Israel and 9/11 CounterSpy Introduction The secret CIA and State Department documents printed here have come a long way.

They were discovered by the Iranian students who took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Some were complete, others which had gone through a shredding machine were painstakingly pieced together. These documents, made available to CounterSpy by journalists Randy Goodman, Terri Taylor and William Worthy, are only a fraction of a 13 volume paperback set (complete with commentary) readily available for sale in Iran. The three journalists picked up a set at an airport on their way to Shiraz. In late November 1981 they had completed their assignment for CBS and flew home. The FBI and Customs officials seized their luggage and confiscated the documents — with the active assistance of Lufthansa (West German) Airlines. But a second set of the books — sent by another route — was overlooked by customs and reached the U.S. intact. (Some of the volumes were supplied to the Washington Post which analyzed them in a series running from January 31 to February 6, 1982.) The 13 volumes of documents are a goldmine.

They expose covert CIA operations in Iran (an attempt to recurit former Prime Minister Bani Sadr, for example), reveal the CIA's use of corporate covers, and detail former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's attempts to establish ties with U.S. intelligence. The documents supplied to CounterSpy deal with the triangle of U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations. A careful reading of the documents illustrates that the Washington Post's analysis was narrowly focussed on the "U.S. angle." Other disclosures were simply glossed over — systematic Israeli suppression of domestic dissent, for example, or Mossad (Israel's CIA) and Israeli military intelligence support for repressive regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and even Mossad's "psycholgical warfare projects." The main document reprinted here is an in-depth CIA analysis of Israeli intelligence, written in March 1979 and classified secret. Other documents [not included in this online version] are cables between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, most of them discussing U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations (documenting the close collaboration between Mossad and the Shah's intelligence agency SAVAK).

Real History and Mossad,the Israeli Secret Service New York, Wednesday, January 15, 2003 Israel to kill in U.S., allied nations By Richard Sale From the Washington Politics & Policy Desk ISRAEL is embarking upon a more aggressive approach to the war on terror that will include staging targeted killings in the United States and other friendly countries, former Israeli intelligence officials told United Press International. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has forbidden the practice until now, these sources said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The Israeli statements were confirmed by more than a half dozen U.S. foreign policy and intelligence officials in interviews with UPI. With the appointment of Meir Dagan, the new director Israel's Mossad secret intelligence service, Sharon is also preparing "a huge budget" increase for the spy agency as part of "a tougher stance in fighting global jihad (or holy war)," one Israeli official said. Since Sharon became Israeli prime minister, Tel Aviv has mainly limited its practice of targeted killings to the West Bank and Gaza because "no one wanted such operations on their territory," a former Israeli intelligence official said.

Another former Israeli government official said that under Sharon, "diplomatic constraints have prevented the Mossad from carrying out 'preventive operations' (targeted killings) on the soil of friendly countries until now." He said Sharon is "reversing that policy, even if it risks complications to Israel's bilateral relations." A former Israeli military intelligence source agreed: "What Sharon wants is a much more extensive and tough approach to global terrorism, and this includes greater operational maneuverability." Does this mean assassinations on the soil of allies? "It does," he said. "Mossad is definitely being beefed up," a U.S. government official said of the Israeli agency's budget increase. He declined to comment on the Tel Aviv's geographic expansion of targeted killings. An FBI spokesman also declined to comment, saying: "This is a policy matter. We only enforce federal laws." A congressional staff member with deep knowledge of intelligence matters said, "I don't know on what basis we would be able to protest Israel's actions." He referred to the recent killing of Qaed Salim Sinan al Harethi, a top al Qaida leader, in Yemen by a remotely controlled CIA drone. "That was done on the soil of a friendly ally," the staffer said.

But the complications posed by Israel's new policy are real. "Israel does not have a good record at doing this sort of thing," said former CIA counter-terrorism official Larry Johnson. He cited the 1997 fiasco where two Mossad agents were captured after they tried to assassinate Khaled Mashaal, a Hamas political leader, by injecting him with poison. According to Johnson, the attempt, made in Amman, Jordan, caused a political crisis in Israeli-Jordan relations. In addition, because the Israeli agents carried Canadian passports, Canada withdrew its ambassador in protest, he said. Jordan is one of two Arab nations to recognize Israel. The other is Egypt. At the time, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said, "I have no intention of stopping the activities of this government against terror," according to a CNN report. Former CIA officials say Israel was forced to free jailed Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and 70 other Jordanian and Palestinian prisoner being held in Israeli jails to secure the release of the two would-be Mossad assassins. Phil Stoddard, former director of the Middle East Institute, cited a botched plot to kill Ali Hassan Salemeh, the mastermind of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.

The 1974 attempt severely embarrassed Mossad when the Israeli hit team mistakenly assassinated a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway. Salemeh, later a CIA asset, was killed in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1976 by a car bomb placed by an Israeli assassination team, former U.S. intelligence officials said. "Israel knew Salemeh was providing us with preventive intelligence on the Palestinians and his being killed pissed off a lot of people," said a former senior CIA official. But some Israeli operations have been successful. Gerald Bull, an Ontario-born U.S. citizen and designer of the Iraqi supergun -- a massive artillery system capable of launching satellites into orbit, and of delivering nuclear chemical or biological payloads from Baghdad to Israel -- was killed in Belgium in March 1990. The killing is still unsolved, but former CIA officials said a Mossad hit team is the most likely suspect. Bull worked on the supergun design -- codenamed Project Babylon -- for 10 years, and helped the Iraqis develop many smaller artillery systems. He was found with five bullets in his head outside his Brussels apartment.

Israeli hit teams, which consist of units or squadrons of the Kidon, a sub-unit for Mossad's highly secret Metsada department, would stage the operations, former Israeli intelligence sources said. Kidon is a Hebrew word meaning "bayonet," one former Israeli intelligence source said. This Israeli government source explained that in the past Israel has not staged targeted killings in friendly countries because "no one wanted such operations on their territory." This has become irrelevant, he said. Dagan, the new hard-driving director of Mossad, will implement the new changes, former Israeli government officials said. Dagan, nicknamed "the gun," was Sharon's adviser on counter-terrorism during the government of Netanyahu in 1996, former Israeli government officials say. A former military man, Dagan has also undertaken extremely sensitive diplomatic missions for several of Israel's prime ministers, former Israeli government sources said. Former Israel Defense Forces Lt. Col.

Gal Luft, who served under Dagan, described him as an "extremely creative individual -- creative to the point of recklessness." A former CIA official who knows Dagan said the new Mossad director knows "his foreign affairs inside and out," and has a "real killer instinct." Dagan is also "an intelligence natural" who has "a superb analyst not afraid to act on gut instinct," the former CIA official said. Dagan has already removed Mossad officials whom he regards as "being too conservative or too cautious" and is building up "a constituency of senior people of the same mentality," one former long-time Israeli operative said. Dagan is also urging that Mossad operatives rely less on secret sources and rely more on open information that is so plentifully provided on the Internet and newspapers. "It's a cultural thing," one former Israeli intelligence operative explained.

"Mossad in the past has put its emphasis on Humint (human intelligence) and secret operations and has neglected the whole field of open media, which has become extremely important." Regarding Mossad's new policy and budget increase, Kim Farber an Israeli Embassy official said, "There is so little information available on this, there is nothing I can add." Copyright C 2001-2003 United Press International

Question: What is the name of the Israeli Intelligence Service
Answer: Mossad