Persian Gulf and it’s Iranian islands | Where is IRAN The Persian Gulf and its Iranian islands -Iran The Persian Gulf The Persian Gulf is in the south, separating Iran from Saudi Arabia. The Gulf is 990kms long and at its widest place about 340kms wide. The Strait of Hormoz is less than 55kms wide. The average depth is 35ms but increases up to 90 to 100ms in some places. The ancient Greeks called this gulf “Persikos” and the Arabs referred to it as “Bahrolfars”. In contemporary times it has become famous for its international oil wells which are located on the sea bed. Naming the Persian Gulf An epitaph from Darius the first (Darius the Great) which mentions “the sea which passes from Pars” has been found in the Strait of Hormoz, and the Gulf has been called “the Pars Sea” from the time of Sassanians. The second century Greek Historian, Flavius Arrianus, mentioned it as “Persikon karitas” (meaning Persian Gulf) in his work, as did Esterabon, the first century Greek geographer.

Latin books from the Middle Ages refer to it as “Persicus Sinus” or “Persicus mare”. In other languages the word “Persicus” is used with slight variations. Arab and Iranian Muslim scientists mentioned the Gulf as “Bahr e Fars”, “Bahrolfarsi”, or “Khalij e Fars” in historical and geographical books. Masoudi, the fourth century Arab historian and geographer travelled from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf and later to Kerman, Transoxiana and China. He says, “The Sea of Oman is the continuation of the Persian Sea.” Estakhri, the fourth century geographer and Ibn e Hoghal e Baghdadi had the same idea and named the Persian Gulf “Bahr e Fars” in their work. The islands of the Persian Gulf The Persian Gulf has many islands such as Kish, Khark and Gheshm, which are important in economic terms and a large number of Iranians and non-Iranians reside there. Some of these islands are still uninhabited because of a lack of water.

In recent years, Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tonb Island have come to the attention of Western politicians and media because of the baseless claims the United Arab Emirates have laid to them. Geographical characteristics and the position of the three islands The Strait of Hormoz, with a length of 185kms and a width of 56 to 180kms is the narrow channel which links the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and international shipping lines by way of the Sea of Oman. Iran owns some of the prominent and strategic islands in the Strait of Hormoz and the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Although all of the Iranian islands hold special importance, Lark, Gheshm, Hengam, Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tonb Island are more significant. Abu Musa Island is 12kms wide and 75kms from the south east of Lenge port. Abu Musa’s oil is in the surrounding sea in the district of Mobarak and is considered to be the highest quality in the Persian Gulf.

TThe historical background of Iran’s sovereignty over the three islands Historical research shows that in the second millennium BC the three islands, like the others, were ruled by and were part of the Persian Empire. Similarly, during the Islamic era these islands were also part of southern states of Iran like Fars. Portuguese forces occupied the three islands for some time but they were taken back during the reign of King Abbas Safavi. King Nader Afshar and Karim Khan Zand controlled the three islands and in the reign of King Fathali Ghajar, the Fars Sea islands of Kish, Bahrain, Abu Musa, Hendurabi, Greater and Lesser Tonb Island and Faru were part of the Fars state. In 1263, the islands of the Persian Gulf, including Abu Musa, were part of the Fars state. A precise study of historical books and documents leaves no doubt about Iran’s sovereignty over these three islands. Iran’s sovereignty over the islands in the Persian Gulf and the claims of the United Arab Emirates 1. It is noteworthy that while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) claim to own the Iranian islands, the Sheikhdoms which form the country did not exist before the nineteenth century.

The Ras al Khaimah Sheikhdom didn’t even exist at the beginning of the twentieth century, let alone have a basis to claim ownership of the islands and seas. The Sheikhs were heads of large ethnic groups so that in the 1960s Britain officially accepted their sovereignty over their lands. Before that the Sheikhs only governed their own ethnic group rather than the whole land. Britain entered the Persian Gulf in the early nineteenth century to halt the dominance of these ethnic groups who they believed were pirates with no political identity or country. Gradually and by adopting a new imperialistic policy, the heads of these ethnic groups, and by extension the emirates, came under the protection of Britain. From the mid twentieth century these emirates were officially accepted by the England and the last of them, the UAE, took shape after the departure of the English forces from Persian Gulf in the seventies and serve as a reminder of imperialism in the region. 2. According to the international relations principle that “a contract between two countries does not create a right or responsibility for a third country”, the agreement between Iran and Sharjah about Abu Musa Island is an official document which does not allow any other country or organization to interfere.

Greater and Lesser Tonb Island were returned to Iran by Britain based on an unwritten agreement, because the Iranian government of the time believed that any kind of written agreement could leave doubt about Iran’s ownership and sovereignty over them. This was ratified by Britain’s government of the time. It is noteworthy that the Gulf Operation Council and the Arab Council which approve the UAE‘s claims to the islands did not exist at the time of the agreement between Iran and Sharjah (1971). 3. The existence of many atlases and geographical documents before and after the creation of Islam as well as official and semi-official maps from the 18th and 19th centuries (a great deal of which were provided by British governments and navigators) indicate the sovereignty of Iran over these islands. The Iranian names of the islands, including Tonb and Abu Musa (Bu Musa Bumuf Gap Sabzu), is a further indication of their Iranian identity. 4. The Persian Gulf was assumed an Iranian blue breadth in numerous Historical eras and its southern coasts including Bahrain were under the sovereignty of Iranian governments, making it unlikely that the islands between these coasts belong to another country. 5.

While the UAE claims that Iran exerted pressure on Sharjah during the negotiations leading to the agreement in 1971, this is unfounded as Iran dealt directly with the British imperialist empire as was appropriate at the time. Iran and the Gulf States | The Iran Primer Iran and the Gulf States October 13, 2010 Afshin Molavi The Persian Gulf states hold some two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia is the largest Gulf oil producer, Iran a distant second. Iran’s population of 80.8 million is larger than the seven other Gulf states combined. A large population of Iranian nationals lives in the emirate of Dubai, Iran’s most important regional trade partner. Smaller populations live and work in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. After World War II, Gulf geopolitics were dominated for five decades by a triangular balance of power among Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Iraq corner of the triangle began to weaken, and Iran exploited this weakness by developing broad political, economic, social, and militia networks that deeply influenced the Iraqi state.

The region has experienced three “Gulf wars”: the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 fought to a brutal stalemate, the successful 1991 U.S.-led coalition to roll back Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the 2003 U.S.-led war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The 2003 war created an opening for Iran to expand its regional influence. By 2015, the traditional post-World War II balance of power no longer existed. It was replaced by robust Saudi-Iranian competition across the Middle East, most notably in Syria and Lebanon, but also in Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain. The Saudi-Iran conflict is colored by sectarianism and Persian-Arab rivalry, though not driven by it. More traditional geopolitical concerns prevail. Persian Iran is the only non-Arab country in the Gulf region. Its predominant religion, Shiite Islam, is shared by a majority of Iraqis and Bahrainis and significant minorities in other Gulf states.

Overview Modern Iranian leaders—from shahs to ayatollahs—have sought a dominant role in the Gulf region because of Iran’s economic and demographic weight, as well as the value of Persian Gulf oil shipping lanes. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was the pre-eminent Gulf power and guarantor of U.S. national interests in the region. Iran’s 1979 revolution dramatically altered Tehran’s regional stance. Revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the overthrow of existing pro-American monarchs in the Gulf. Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran pulled the Gulf Arabs and the United States into the brutal eight-year conflict, mostly on Baghdad’s side. The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and the rise of more pragmatic leadership in Tehran led to an easing of tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab states. The two subsequent “Gulf wars” in 1991 and 2003 weakened Iraq, thereby strengthening Iran’s relative regional power as it poured resources into shaping post-Saddam Iraq.

Iran’s relationship with the smaller states of the lower Persian Gulf has historically been centered on trade. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Dubai has emerged as Iran’s most vital Gulf trade partner and an occasional outlet to skirt sanctions. Despite Dubai’s robust trade with Iran, the UAE capital Abu Dhabi, remains wary of the Islamic Republic and has maintained cool relations with Tehran. Kuwait and Bahrain generally side with Riyadh on Iran matters, though Qatar has reached out tactically – but not strategically – to Tehran. The sultanate of Oman stands apart from its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors, and has maintained a cordial – even collaborative – relationship with Iran. As a result, Muscat has played a vital intermediary role in opening negotiations between the United States and Iran – much to the chagrin of it GCC partners. The monarchy 1941-1979 In 1968, Britain declared its intention to abandon all military outposts in the Persian Gulf. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi sought to fill the British vacuum and become the “policeman of the Gulf.” Washington encouraged Tehran by adopting a “twin pillar” policy, anointing both Saudi Arabia and Iran as guarantors of U.S.

national security interests in the region. The Nixon administration opened the floodgates to U.S. arms purchases to Iran. Although they were all pro-Western regimes, the Persian monarchy had tense exchanges with the Arab sheikhs across the Gulf. In 1968, the shah declared Bahrain a historic Iranian territory, only to pull back after a U. N. mission found that Bahrainis preferred independence. In 1971, Iran seized three strategic Persian Gulf islands—Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs—claimed by the newly formed union of seven emirates, known as the UAE. The shah also refused to participate in the Arab oil embargoes of 1967 and 1973. He continued to sell oil to the West and Israel, a source of contention between Riyadh and Tehran. The shah also had serious ideological differences with socialist and Soviet-allied Iraq. The two countries had a serious dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway that required international mediation to resolve in 1975.

Yet the shah’s Iran—with its large conventional army, high-tech weapons, large population and strong ties to Washington—seemed like the biggest power on the bloc in the 1970s. Decade of conflict 1979-1988 Iran’s 1979 revolution dramatically altered regional geo-politics. Ayatollah Khomeini declared his intent to overthrow Gulf monarchs. Iran was implicated in a coup plot in Bahrain, unrest in Kuwait, and attacks on U.S. facilities in the Gulf states. In 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, sensing weakness from revolutionary chaos, attacked Iran to prevent the newly formed Islamic Republic from inspiring Iraq’s own Shiite majority and to gain strategic depth on its border. The Iran-Iraq War turned out to be a defining feature of Iran-Gulf Arab relations throughout the 1980s. In 1981, the five smaller states of the Gulf—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE—joined with Saudi Arabia in what was billed a security and political alliance, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The Gulf states sided largely with Iraq, although each state—and even emirates within states—charted their own path regarding Iran. Oman was the most notable outlier. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait underwrote Saddam’s war efforts to the tune of an estimated $40 billion. The new UAE federation was split. The emirates of Dubai, Sharjah and Umm Al-Quwain remained neutral, fearful of jeopardizing trade and commercial links with Iran. Indeed, Dubai flourished as a re-supply entrepot (trading post) for the Iranian military. But the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi, supported the Saudi-Kuwaiti position. After 1984, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pulled into the war after Iraq struck Iran’s main oil export terminal and Iran retaliated by striking at tankers of Gulf nations allied to Iraq. The United States intervened by re-flagging Kuwait and Saudi tankers, which in turn raised tensions between Tehran and Washington. After a U.S.-flagged ship was hit, the U.S. Navy bombarded an Iranian oil platform in October 1987.

U.S.-Iran tensions ultimately led to the accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian passenger plane by the USS Vincennes, killing 290 passengers and crew, in July 1988. The war finally ended when Iran accepted U.N. Resolution 598 in August 1988. Ayatollah Khomeini said accepting the terms was akin to drinking “a poisoned chalice.” There was no clear victor, but the triangular balance of power between the Gulf big trio—Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia—largely remained intact. Rafsanjani’s bridge-building 1989-1997 Shortly after he assumed the presidency in 1989, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani proclaimed, “Iran needs to stop making enemies.” He signaled a substantive shift in foreign policy from an aggressive revolutionary state to a new pragmatic coexistence. Rafsanjani saw the GCC states not as ripe pawns to be toppled, but as cash-rich investors to entice.

Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, suggested shortly thereafter that the two countries could see “a future of positive relations.” But the third piece of the triangular balance of power, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, seethed at the sight of his fellow Arab states making conciliatory gestures to Iran. He also seethed at the war debt that he accrued, which he expected Kuwait to forgive since he had fought the dreaded “Persian menace” and “the scourge of Khomeini” on behalf of all Arabs. Unable to come to terms with Kuwait, Saddam Hussein invaded in August 1990. President George H. W. Bush organized an international coalition to liberate Kuwait and protect its Saudi ally. Iran treaded a fine line during the 1991 Gulf War, neither siding with Washington nor hindering its war effort, despite U.S.-Iran tensions. Tehran’s neutrality in the Gulf War did not sway Washington. In 1993, the Clinton administration announced its policy of “dual containment,” targeting both Iraq and Iran. But Rasfanjani’s position did alter GCC perceptions of Iran. Trade increased. Direct flight links were restored. And money began flowing more freely across borders.

The Rafsanjani era offered Iran and the region a soft landing from the war’s ravages and the revolution’s zealotry. Khatami’s rapprochement 1997-2005 The 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami introduced a period of outreach in his attempt to launch a “dialogue of civilizations.” In December 1997, Tehran hosted the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit. Among the delegates was Crown Prince Abdullah, the de-facto Saudi head of state, and the most senior Saudi visitor to Iran since the 1979 revolution. The Saudi-Iran détente was accelerating. When President Clinton also initiated an outreach to Iran, several GCC states lined up to play intermediary between Washington and Tehran, although a breakthrough never occurred. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York City and Washington D.C. altered the dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations. Within the next two years, President George W. Bush launched two wars on Iran’s borders—in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. The U.S.

ouster of Saddam Hussein particularly rocked the region—and ended up dramatically changing the balance of power in Iran’s favor. For Iran, the U.S.-led war knocked out a primary rival. Tehran also sensed an opportunity to shape and influence post-Saddam Iraq. Over the next two years, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and ministry of intelligence began a sophisticated campaign using both hard and soft power. Tehran’s growing role distressed the GCC states. In 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal expressed some of the frustration, “We fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason." Rising oil prices also gave Tehran new economic leverage. Flush with new cash, Iranians looked for regional investment opportunities and increasingly turned to Dubai, which emerged as Iran’s offshore business center – its Hong Kong. By the end of Khatami’s term in 2005, most of the GCC states were again wary of Iran. Iraq was being shaped more by Iran than any other regional state.

Sunni Arab states from as far as Egypt and Jordan began to whisper about fears of a Shiite crescent taking hold of the region. The Gulf was in deep flux. Ahmadinejad’s brinkmanship 2005-2013 The surprise election of the populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 again changed the dynamics of Iranian foreign policy—this time back to the hardline positions of the early revolution. The regime immediately announced a resumption of uranium enrichment. And Iran’s controversial nuclear program immediately became the focal point of its foreign policy and world diplomacy. Iran’s Gulf neighbors were at least as alarmed as Israel and the United States. Saudi Arabia and Iran increasingly found themselves vying for regional influence in proxy battles in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Iraq and even Afghanistan. The days of détente seemed a distant memory. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s Sunni monarchy tried to protect the Sunni minority while Iran worked with an array of Shiite groups and the two major Kurdish parties to influence the budding Iraqi state. Iraq’s March 2010 elections seemed to indicate that Iran’s efforts had paid off. Immediately after the disputed elections, three of the top four candidates turned up in Tehran for “consultations” with Iranian officials.

A microcosm of the rivalry played out in the UAE. For years, Iran’s top GCC trade partner was oil-less Dubai in the UAE, the Gulf’s rising commercial center which was home to as many Iranians as Emiratis. Tehran’s rival was oil-rich Abu Dhabi, the politically powerful UAE capital allied with the United States. Dubai’s 2008 financial crisis and Abu Dhabi’s subsequent bail-out of its over-leveraged brother tipped the balance in Abu Dhabi’s favor. Rouhani’s Reintegration Amid Disintegration 2013 - present Hassan Rouhani overwhelmingly won the June 2013 presidential election with a mandate to improve Iran’s economy, unlock the nuclear dispute with the West, remove sanctions, and reintegrate Iran into the international community and global economy. On July 14, 2015, Rouhani’s negotiating team completed a final nuclear deal with the world’s six major powers. Rouhani’s efforts to reintegrate Iran into the world community and exorcise its pariah status came amid a unique moment of regional disintegration and geopolitical disorder, posing significant challenges for the Islamic Republic.

The deadly Syrian civil war devolved into a dangerous stew of rising Islamist extremism, sectarian hatred, unprecedented levels of migration, and crimes against humanity perpetrated by a host of actors from President Bashar al Assad’s government to so-called “Islamic State” militants. Iran maintained – and amplified – its support for Assad with weapons, advice, and money. It also closely coordinated with Lebanese Hezbollah, who fought on Assad’s behalf. Meanwhile, a Riyadh-Ankara-Doha axis formed to support the Syrian opposition, creating a direct proxy battle with Iran. In Iraq, the rise of the Sunni extremist “Islamic State” posed a challenge to Iran on two levels: first, the group threatened the rule of Iran’s allied government in Baghdad; second, the group’s venomous ideology exacerbated anti-Shiite views percolating across the Sunni world. In late March 2015, Saudi Arabia began a robust bombing campaign in Yemen. Its origins – Riyadh says – are in Iranian support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who took over large parts of the country in late 2014. While Iran undoubtedly maintains influence over Lebanese Hezbollah and has deep ties in Iraq, its Houthi alliance is more shallow.

Still, the GCC and other Sunni states see the war in regional terms as yet another Saudi-Iran proxy battleground. To quell rising Gulf concerns about a possible nuclear deal with Iran, President Barack Obama gathered GCC leaders in Camp David in May 2015 to assure them of America’s “ironclad” commitment to their security. The absence of King Salman of Saudi Arabia from the meetings was widely interpreted as a snub. Rouhani has made outreach to the Gulf states a priority, but amid regional turmoil, his initiatives have landed off the mark. Rouhani, however, hails from the Rafsanjani camp that believes in pragmatic engagement with Gulf Arab states, not confrontation. But the powerful IRGC is less interested in rapprochement with GCC states. This view is seemingly shared by Iran’s most powerful figure, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Factoids Trade relations between Iran and the UAE have weathered the storm of sanctions, battered but not beaten. The UAE remains a vital trade lifeline for Iran, its second largest trade partner after China. Most of this total trade – valued at some $25 billion – comprises re-exports to Iran from Dubai ports.

Iran and Oman serve as joint “policemen of the Straits of Hormuz,” the world’s most important oil chokepoint. Some two-fifths of the world’s globally traded oil passes through the Strait, which at its narrowest point is only 21 miles wide. Iran’s threats to “close down the Strait” in the event of military conflict ring hollow, as a closure would damage Iran’s own oil industry, the most vital source of state revenues. Qatar’s tactical outreach to Iran over the past few years has been strained by the Syrian civil war where the countries are on opposite sides. The name of the body of water linking these eight states has occasionally sparked diplomatic spats. For Iranians, it is indisputably the Persian Gulf. For many Arab states, it is either “the Gulf” or, more provocatively, “the Arabian Gulf.” Most official atlases refer to the body of water as the Persian Gulf. Trendlines The world’s major oil players have largely abandoned Iran, but are circling again amid talk of sanctions removal. Still, they will tread with caution in the immediate aftermath of any deal, cognizant that implementation is full of obstacles.

Iraq has surpassed Iran as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ second largest producer. Despite Abu Dhabi’s misgivings about a nuclear deal, UAE-based companies are gearing up for trade and investment opportunities with Iran. If Iran achieves greater integration and if sanctions begin to fall, the most immediate regional beneficiary will be Dubai. The Persian Gulf commercial city-state is best positioned to grow its Iran trade and services network, and its logistics facilities from Dubai International Airport to the Jebel Ali container port will be well-placed to serve the Iranian market. Rising anti-Shiite sentiment prevalent across social media in several Gulf states and anti-Iran media messaging will continue to erode what little is left of Iranian soft power. Salafist jihadism will fuel new recruits not only satisfied with targeting Shiites, but also Iranian interests. Saudi-Iran rivalry will continue to play out across a disintegrating region. Afshin Molavi is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. Understanding the Gulf States - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Understanding the Gulf States inFocus Quarterly Spring 2014 A closer look at the most pressing economic, diplomatic, territorial, and succession issues in each of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Money, they say, can't buy you everything. But in the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf (or the Arabian Gulf as they prefer to call it), money can buy a lot. What is the tallest building in the world? The Burj al-Khalifa in the sheikhdom of Dubai. What is one of the best airlines in the world? Washington, DC friends vacationing in Asia recently chose to fly there with Qatar Airways via Doha. The newness of aircraft, quality of on-board service and well-timed connecting flight trumped any political misgivings, such as Qatar's support for Hamas in Gaza and the weapons it gives to some of the worst jihadists in Syria. This prosperity, of course, is a consequence of oil, but in regional terms, the Gulf Arab states -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman -- found oil late in the game. Oil was first discovered in Iran in 1908. The giant oilfield at Kirkuk in northern Iraq was found in 1927. The first oil on the southern side of the Gulf was found in Bahrain in 1931.

Saudi Arabia, which now has the largest reserves of conventional oil in the world -- between a sixth and a quarter of the total depending how you do the math -- found its first oil only in 1938. Production did not take off until 1941. Oil was not found in Abu Dhabi, the leading emirate of the UAE, until 1958. It is now estimated to have around 6 percent of the world's oil. Not bad, considering its population is less than one million. Apart from hydrocarbon riches, the distinguishing feature of the conservative Gulf Arab states is their small populations. Saudi Arabia is the largest with a population of about 27 million though this probably includes at least 7 million expatriate workers. The smallest is Qatar, with about 2 million people but perhaps as few as 10 percent, 200,000, actual Qatari citizens. So it is hardly surprising that these fabulously oil-rich countries and, in the case of Qatar natural gas-rich, have now emerged on the world stage. Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Manama (Bahrain) are now iconic city-states, joining countries like Singapore and Hong Kong.

Yet their entrance coincides with their region collapsing into turmoil. They have only been nation-states for a few decades yet their immediate future, what with an almost-nuclear Iran and the turmoil of the "Arab Spring," is uncertain. To make matters worse, the trend line is bad. Ten, or more likely 20 years ahead, there is predicted to be an energy glut in North America (Canada, the U.S., and Mexico.) This will hammer oil and natural gas prices. So what if, collectively, you have more than 30 percent of the world's oil and more than 20 percent of the world's natural gas? Lower prices would certainly be to the benefit of the developed world but probably a disaster to the relatively undiversified economies of the Gulf Arabs. There is a major "but" in this sweep of analysis. The Gulf States, loosely grouped together since 1981 in the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC, have seen crises come and go, but, with the exception of Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, have themselves been spared political catastrophe.

Indeed, one could make the argument -- and quite a few people do -- that their quasi-monarchial-but-listening approach to government and administration has worked well. It hardly fits into the democracy playbook of liberals in the United States and Europe, but their general success has served to highlight the deficiencies of 1950s and 1960s Arab nationalist revolutions in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. The major problem would appear to be the growing internal contradictions among the GCC member states. In early March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha to protest Qatari meddling in the internal affairs of the other countries. Apparently there had been a row about this last year, which had led to an agreement in late November 2013. But Qatar was not living up to its side of the bargain. The root cause of the crisis was Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, though this was unstated. Indeed, the November 2013 pact had never been revealed and the announcement of the withdrawal of ambassadors only emerged in a communique issued at the end of a meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Riyadh.

Such a public schism opens to discussion consideration of whether the GCC as such will continue to exist. It wouldn't be the first shakeup in national boundaries. When the British left the Gulf in the early 1970s, they created the UAE out of the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al-Quwain. Qatar and Bahrain were originally intended to be part of the confederation as well but could not agree with the others on the terms. Taking each member state in turn: SAUDI ARABIA The kingdom is facing a succession crisis. King Abdullah is 91 years old this year and his half-brother and designated replacement, Crown Prince Salman, is 78. Neither man is in good physical health. There are particular concerns about Salman's mental abilities. Competition to replace either will likely be intense from sons and nephews, many of whom are more privileged than they are able. Stability in the kingdom is maintained by conservative attitudes and the generous distribution of subsidies and government jobs. If the oil price falls, the government's ability to maintain these handouts will be lessened.

Uncertainties for the future include a drop in oil exports as more energy is consumed at home. The populace has become used to highly subsidized prices for gasoline and electricity. Re-educating them will be a challenge. The main foreign threat is Iran, which Riyadh sees as trying to achieve hegemonic status in the Gulf area. On the other side of the kingdom, Yemen is also watched closely because its population probably is larger than that of Saudi Arabia but is much poorer. Within Saudi Arabia, income disparity is an issue with many citizens living in comparative poverty. The tribes along the border with Yemen are suspected of dubious loyalty. On the other side of the country, on the Gulf coast, the population is largely Shiite, co-religionists of Iran and the neighboring island of Bahrain. Saudi Shiites are economically and politically disadvantaged. In addition, hardline Saudi Sunni clerics regard Shiites as not proper Muslims. The Saudi authorities handle the issue carefully but often badly. Any civil unrest could have wider consequences, as the area is also the epicenter of Saudi oil production and export. KUWAIT The ruler is Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, 84 years old, with a lifetime of government service and experience but now in poor health.

The authority of the al-Sabah ruling family is limited by the high standing of other prominent families and a political system that makes for gridlock. The national assembly, the oldest established parliament-type system in the southern Gulf, is divided among hardline Sunnis, tribal elements, and Shiites, with a leavening of technocratic types. Once the most modern emirate in the Gulf, Kuwait has been overtaken by Qatar and the UAE, partly a consequence of never really recovering from the shock of Saddam Hussein's invasion in 1990. There must be a concern that next time, American forces will not come galloping to the rescue. When Sabah retires or dies, the ruling family will nominate possible replacements but the final choice will be a compromise with the members of the national assembly. BAHRAIN The island state has been wracked by political turmoil since February 2011 when pro-democracy supporters, aroused by the "Arab Spring" in other parts of the region, staged protests. The demonstrations rapidly took on a sectarian hue. The Sunnis disappeared, making the events into Shiite confrontations with Bahrain's Sunni Muslim security forces.

The main development since then has been the Shiites splitting into those advocating violence and, the apparent majority, those confining their activities to peaceful protests. A secondary, and probably more significant, change has been the emergence of Iranian backing for the violent groups. The initial protests had prompted the intervention of Saudi paramilitary and UAE police reinforcements. Neither group actually was involved directly in countering the demonstrations, though in March 2014, an Emirati police officer died when an improvised bomb exploded near a Bahrain police unit. Political reconciliation has been thwarted by differences within the Bahrain royal family on whether compromises should be made. The lead conciliator is Crown Prince Salman but he is opposed by hardliners, including the minister of the royal court and the commander-in-chief of the Bahrain Defense Forces, collectively known as the Khawalid. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa vacillates between the two factions. Failing political reforms, the more likely outcomes include more violence and fresh involvement by Saudi security forces. The House of Saud is anxious that violence in Bahrain does not spread to the kingdom and that political reforms do not encourage demands for matching gestures by Saudi Shiites. An outside possibility is that Saudi Arabia will seek political union with Bahrain.

QATAR The "bad boy" of the GCC, a status achieved under Sheikh Hamad who abdicated in June 2013, is an even more accurate label for his son and successor, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, who is just 33. The country appears to be proud of its reputation for causing trouble whether it is allowing a platform for radical Muslim preacher Yousuf al-Qaradawi, supporting some of the worst jihadists Syria, or backing the Muslim Brotherhood in neighboring UAE. Having agreed to behave better at a meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in November 2013, Sheikh Tamim then failed to deliver, prompting the withdrawal of their ambassadors by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE in March 2014. Having the world's largest reserves of natural gas after Russia and Iran, as well as being the biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) funds a lot of mischief as well as building soccer stadiums for the 2022 World Cup. The interesting question may be how long Saudi Arabia will put up with such nonsense. The al-Thani are a large clan and many members are excluded from political power.

Hamad's authority was questioned because he gained power by overthrowing his father, a reclusive alcoholic. Could Riyadh -- would Riyadh -- fund a coup in Doha? The Qatari military is perhaps one of the few armies that the Saudis could actually defeat. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES The ruler, Sheikh Khalifa, is "stable" after a recent stroke but had essentially already handed over the strings of power to his crown prince and half-brother, Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed, who is pro-American but, like many Gulf leaders, deeply skeptical of the Obama Administration. MbZ, as he is known, represents the new generation of Gulf leadership. The test will be how much he will be constrained by any need to maintain GCC consensus. Much is made of the UAE's persistent dispute with Iran over three islands (Abu Musa, Little Tumb, and Greater Tumb) seized by Iran in 1970. MbZ's views on these islands may be more conciliatory than thought, but sovereignty is claimed by the UAE member sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah and any compromise may threaten the confederation.

Less noticed are two sources of territorial friction with Saudi Arabia -- Riyadh's seizure of land between Qatar and the UAE, removing the common border, and Saudi insistence that a huge oil field on the border lies totally within Saudi territory. The biggest threat is any military confrontation with Iran, which would ruin the commercial viability of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the UAE's cash-cows. OMAN Sultan Qaboos is the odd-man-out of the Gulf. He usually shuns GCC meetings. He takes positions unhelpful to the U.S. -- until, of course, he could be helpful to Washington by facilitating the secret talks with Iran before the diplomacy on the nuclear deal opened up. In socio-economic terms, Oman has got enough oil and gas to keep its relatively large population -- about 3.1 million -- happy. It is the one GCC country that had genuine "Arab Spring" type events in 2011 with riots by discontented youth quashed by a combination of firmness and government handouts. Qaboos believes his people love him. Perhaps most do, perhaps not. His unmarried status and lack of any heirs is a source of disquiet and occasional ridicule.

At 74 years old, the question of "who will succeed Qaboos?" is becoming increasingly relevant. And Oman's strategic position, on the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz, will remain vital for Gulf energy flows even if the U.S. becomes effectively energy independent. All the GCC states have had and continue to have a dependence on the United States. None of them probably think they can rely on Washington for much longer, and certainly not forever. The sensible way forward would be to develop their unity -- but this isn't going to happen. Alternatively, they can look for another security partner. China is the name that springs to mind but there is little immediate evidence that this is going to happen. There remains the prospect of cutting an unpalatable deal with Iran. So far, perhaps with the exception of Oman and perhaps Qatar, this option is being rejected. It makes for a worrying future. Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Share

Question: What country is a group of islands in the Persian Gulf?
Answer: Bahrain