Why is the South China Sea contentious? - BBC News BBC News Why is the South China Sea contentious? 12 July 2016 Close share panel Image copyright Getty Images Image caption China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims over territory in the South China Sea Rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but tension has steadily increased in recent years. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols. The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes, but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them "freedom of navigation" operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes. Both sides have accused each other of "militarising" the South China Sea. There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The Paracels and the Spratlys are two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries What is the argument about?

It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys - two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries. Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal. Why are they worth arguing over? Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The sea is a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them. There has been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighbouring areas. The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region. Who claims what? China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption A map issued by Beijing shows the two island groups falling entirely within its territory Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan. However, critics say China has not clarified its claims sufficiently - and that the nine-dash line that appears on Chinese maps encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates. It is also not clear whether China claims only land territory within the nine-dash line, or all the territorial waters within the line as well. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal, or Huangyan Island as it is known in China Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the documents to prove it.

The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping. Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The Philippines has invoked its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim Recent flashpoints The most serious trouble in recent decades has flared between Vietnam and China, and there have also been stand-offs between the Philippines and China. Some of the incidents include: In 1974 the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops.

In 1988 the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors. In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal. Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration operations in late 2012 led to large anti-China protests on Vietnam's streets. In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships. Have they tried to reach a resolution? China prefers bilateral negotiations with the other parties. But many of its neighbours argue that China's relative size and clout give it an unfair advantage. Some countries have argued that China should negotiate with Asean (the Association of South East Asian Nations), a 10-member regional grouping that consists of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia.

However, China is opposed to this, while Asean is also divided over how to resolve the dispute. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption China has opposed negotiations with Asean, a 10-member regional grouping The Philippines has sought international arbitration instead. In 2013, it announced it would take China to an arbitration tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In July 2016, the tribunal backed the Philippines' case, saying China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights. China had boycotted the proceedings, and called the ruling "ill-founded". It says it will not be bound by it. Spratly Islands Encyclopedia > Places > Asia > Southeast Asia Physical Geography Spratly Islands Spratly Islands, group of about 100 low islands and coral reefs in the central South China Sea, intersecting busy shipping lanes. The whole group is claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines.

Various islands, valued primarily for the petroleum and gas potential of the surrounding waters and to a lesser degree for their fishing grounds, are occupied by their claimants; China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have forces there. In 1984 Brunei established an exclusive economic zone encompassing Louisa Reef, but it has not claimed the islet. There have been many disputes and some fighting, most notably between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in 1988 and 1992, and the Spratlys remain a source of tension among the claimants. A 2002 agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China called for all claimants to avoid activities that would heighten tensions over the islands. In 2004, China and the Philippines signed agreements to stop illegal fishing and to explore jointly for oil in the islands; the bilateral accord was criticized by Vietnam. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. South China Sea Tourism? Vietnam Sending Tourist Cruises To Disputed Spratly Islands South China Sea Tourism?

Vietnam Sending Tourist Cruises To Disputed Spratly Islands 06/08/15 AT 1:02 PM Close Amid territorial disputes and rising geopolitical tension in the region, the presence of military ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is not really surprising. Soon, however, Vietnam will join China in adding civilian cruise ships into the mix. Vietnam is offering civilian cruises for particularly patriotic citizens who want to visit some of the region's most disputed areas. According to the Ho Chi Minh City government website, a limited-time promotion will let 180 Vietnamese take a six-day tour of two reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands, known to Vietnamese as Truong Sa, and partake in activities like fishing, visiting a lighthouse and eating local seafood. Conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea by various countries in the region. Photo: Wikicommons Vietnamese sailors wave to visitors on Truong Sa islands, or Spratly islands, in this April 19, 2010, picture. Maritime claims in the disputed South China Sea have become deeply personal for some.

For many, including Vietnamese, navigating the waters also claimed by China, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia is a source of national pride. Related Stories Anti-China Riots In Vietnam Enrage Chinese Bloggers “Traveling to Truong Sa ... means the big trip of your life, reviving national pride and citizens' awareness of the sacred maritime sovereignty of the country,” a promotion for the trip said, according to Reuters . “Tourists will no longer feel Truong Sa as far away. The blue Truong Sa ocean will be deep in people’s hearts. “See 300 species of coral creating wonderful reefs in sparkling colors, in ravishing, fantastic beauty,” the brochure says without suggesting the political implications of such a vacation. “Watch the sunrise over the ocean and say goodbye to the sunset in the evening amid the immense sky and sea.” The move is likely to magnify the strain on relations with China. Though other countries lay claim to parts of the Spratly archipelago, China lays claim to the entire cluster of islands and reefs in addition to about 90 percent of the South China Sea. Last May, the dispute prompted anti-China protests in various parts of Vietnam after disputes between Chinese expats living in Vietnam and locals became violent.

Disputes were reportedly rooted in reactions to Beijing’s decision to erect an oil rig within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, delineated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China does not obey. China instead uses its self-prescribed Nine-Dash Line as demarcation of its sovereignty in the South China Sea. Anti-Chinese sentiment continued to bubble, driving out a significant number of expats and Chinese businesses. While Vietnam’s actions may be seen as inflammatory, the country is not alone in offering a controversial tourist service in the area. In 2013, China introduced tourist cruises bound for the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Similarly, the four-day trip offered Chinese citizens a chance to see different smaller islands and reefs in the disputed waters.

Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims | World Affairs Journal Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims Mohan Malik The Spratly Islands—not so long ago known primarily as a rich fishing ground—have turned into an international flashpoint as Chinese leaders insist with increasing truculence that the islands, rocks, and reefs have been, in the words of Premier Wen Jiabao, “China’s historical territory since ancient times.” Normally, the overlapping territorial claims to sovereignty and maritime boundaries ought to be resolved through a combination of customary international law, adjudication before the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While China has ratified UNCLOS, the treaty by and large rejects “historically based” claims, which are precisely the type Beijing periodically asserts.

On September 4, 2012, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that there is “plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters.” As far as the “jurisprudence evidence” is concerned, the vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China’s claim to historic title over the South China Sea, implying full sovereign authority and consent for other states to transit, is invalid. The historical evidence, if anything, is even less persuasive. There are several contradictions in China’s use of history to justify its claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, not least of which is its polemical assertion of parallels with imperialist expansion by the United States and European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Justifying China’s attempts to expand its maritime frontiers by claiming islands and reefs far from its shores, Jia Qingguo, professor at Beijing University’s School of International Studies, argues that China is merely following the example set by the West.

“The United States has Guam in Asia which is very far away from the US and the French have islands in the South Pacific, so it is nothing new,” Jia told AFP recently. China’s claim to the Spratlys on the basis of history runs aground on the fact that the region’s past empires did not exercise sovereignty. In pre-modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed. Unlike a nation-state, the frontiers of Chinese empires were neither carefully drawn nor policed but were more like circles or zones, tapering off from the center of civilization to the undefined periphery of alien barbarians. More importantly, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and delimited. But now, when it comes to islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing claims otherwise. In other words, China’s claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China’s maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited.

Herein lies a basic contradiction in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. Actually, it is the mid-twentieth-century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China’s territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. Put simply, sovereignty is a post-imperial notion ascribed to nation-states, not ancient empires. Read On Follow weekly commentary in Gordon G. Chang's World Affairs blog. China’s present borders largely reflect the frontiers established during the spectacular episode of eighteenth-century Qing (Manchu) expansionism, which over time hardened into fixed national boundaries following the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state system over Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Official Chinese history today often distorts this complex history, however, claiming that Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Hans were all Chinese, when in fact the Great Wall was built by the Chinese dynasties to keep out the northern Mongol and Manchu tribes that repeatedly overran Han China; the wall actually represented the Han Chinese empire’s outer security perimeter.

While most historians see the onslaught of the Mongol hordes led by Genghis Khan in the early 1200s as an apocalyptic event that threatened the very survival of ancient civilizations in India, Persia, and other nations (China chief among them), the Chinese have consciously promoted the myth that he was actually “Chinese,” and therefore all areas that the Mongols (the Yuan dynasty) had once occupied or conquered (such as Tibet and much of Central and Inner Asia) belong to China. China’s claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea are also based on the grounds that both were parts of the Manchu empire. (Actually, in the Manchu or Qing dynasty maps, it is Hainan Island, not the Paracel and Spratly Islands, that is depicted as China’s southern-most border.) In this version of history, any territory conquered by “Chinese” in the past remains immutably so, no matter when the conquest may have occurred. Such writing and rewriting of history from a nationalistic perspective to promote national unity and regime legitimacy has been accorded the highest priority by China’s rulers, both Nationalists and Communists.

The Chinese Communist Party leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China’s imperial legacy, often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. From primary-school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled information system has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of imperial China’s grandeur. As the Australian Sinologist Geremie Barmé points out, “For decades Chinese education and propaganda have emphasized the role of history in the fate of the Chinese nation-state . . . While Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought have been abandoned in all but name, the role of history in China’s future remains steadfast.” So much so that history has been refined as an instrument of statecraft (also known as “cartographic aggression”) by state-controlled research institutions, media, and education bodies. China uses folklore, myths, and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater territorial and maritime claims. Chinese textbooks preach the notion of the Middle Kingdom as being the oldest and most advanced civilization that was at the very center of the universe, surrounded by lesser, partially Sinicized states in East and Southeast Asia that must constantly bow and pay their respects.

China’s version of history often deliberately blurs the distinction between what was no more than hegemonic influence, tributary relationships, suzerainty, and actual control. Subscribing to the notion that those who have mastered the past control their present and chart their own futures, Beijing has always placed a very high value on “the history card” (often a revisionist interpretation of history) in its diplomatic efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially to extract territorial and diplomatic concessions from other countries. Almost every contiguous state has, at one time or another, felt the force of Chinese arms—Mongolia, Tibet, Burma, Korea, Russia, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan—and been a subject of China’s revisionist history. As Martin Jacques notes in When China Rules the World, “Imperial Sinocentrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.” If the idea of national sovereignty goes back to seventeenth-century Europe and the system that originated with the Treaty of Westphalia, the idea of maritime sovereignty is largely a mid-twentieth-century American concoction China has seized upon to extend its maritime frontiers.

As Jacques notes, “The idea of maritime sovereignty is a relatively recent invention, dating from 1945 when the United States declared that it intended to exercise sovereignty over its territorial waters.” In fact, the UN’s Law of the Sea agreement represented the most prominent international effort to apply the land-based notion of sovereignty to the maritime domain worldwide—although, importantly, it rejects the idea of justification by historical right. Thus although Beijing claims around eighty percent of the South China Sea as its “historic waters” (and is now seeking to elevate this claim to a “core interest” akin with its claims on Taiwan and Tibet), China has, historically speaking, about as much right to claim the South China Sea as Mexico has to claim the Gulf of Mexico for its exclusive use, or Iran the Persian Gulf, or India the Indian Ocean. Ancient empires either won control over territories through aggression, annexation, or assimilation or lost them to rivals who possessed superior firepower or statecraft. Territorial expansion and contraction was the norm, determined by the strength or weakness of a kingdom or empire. The very idea of “sacred lands” is ahistorical because control of territory was based on who grabbed or stole what last from whom.

The frontiers of the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties waxed and waned throughout history. A strong and powerful imperial China, much like czarist Russia, was expansionist in Inner Asia and Indochina as opportunity arose and strength allowed. The gradual expansion over the centuries under the non-Chinese Mongol and Manchu dynasties extended imperial China’s control over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang), Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Modern China is, in fact, an “empire-state” masquerading as a nation-state. If China’s claims are justified on the basis of history, then so are the historical claims of Vietnamese and Filipinos based on their histories. Students of Asian history know, for instance, that Malay peoples related to today’s Filipinos have a better claim to Taiwan than Beijing does. Taiwan was originally settled by people of Malay-Polynesian descent—ancestors of the present-day aborigine groups—who populated the low-lying coastal plains.

In the words of noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring, writing last year in the South China Morning Post, “The fact that China has a long record of written history does not invalidate other nations’ histories as illustrated by artifacts, language, lineage and genetic affinities, the evidence of trade and travel.” Unless one subscribes to the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, imperial China’s “historical claims” are as valid as those of other kingdoms and empires in Southeast and South Asia. China laying claim to the Mongol and Manchu empires’ colonial possessions would be equivalent to India laying claim to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia (Srivijaya), Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka on the grounds that they were all parts of either the Maurya, Chola, or the Moghul and the British Indian empires. China’s claims in the South China Sea are also a major shift from its longstanding geopolitical orientation to continental power. In claiming a strong maritime tradition, China makes much of the early-fifteenth-century expeditions of Zheng He to the Indian Ocean and Africa. But, as Bowring points out, “Chinese were actually latecomers to navigation beyond coastal waters.

For centuries, the masters of the oceans were the Malayo-Polynesian peoples who colonized much of the world, from Taiwan to New Zealand and Hawaii to the south and east, and to Madagascar in the west. Bronze vessels were being traded with Palawan, just south of Scarborough, at the time of Confucius. When Chinese Buddhist pilgrims like Faxian went to Sri Lanka and India in the fifth century, they went in ships owned and operated by Malay peoples. Ships from what is now the Philippines traded with Funan, a state in what is now southern Vietnam, a thousand years before the Yuan dynasty.” And finally, China’s so-called “historic claims” to the South China Sea are actually not “centuries old.” They only go back to 1947, when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government drew the so-called “eleven-dash line” on Chinese maps of the South China Sea, enclosing the Spratly Islands and other chains that the ruling Kuomintang party declared were now under Chinese sovereignty. Chiang himself, saying he saw German fascism as a model for China, was fascinated by the Nazi concept of an expanded Lebensraum (“living space”) for the Chinese nation.

He did not have the opportunity to be expansionist himself because the Japanese put him on the defensive, but cartographers of the nationalist regime drew the U-shape of eleven dashes in an attempt to enlarge China’s “living space” in the South China Sea. Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war in 1949, the People’s Republic of China adopted this cartographic coup, revising Chiang’s notion into a “nine-dash line” after erasing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953. Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region. The passage of domestic legislation in 1992, “Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas,” which claimed four-fifths of the South China Sea, was followed by armed skirmishes with the Philippines and Vietnamese navies throughout the 1990s.

More recently, the dispatch of large numbers of Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels to the disputed waters in what is tantamount to a “people’s war on the high seas” has further heightened tensions. To quote commentator Sujit Dutta, “China’s unmitigated irredentism [is] based on the . . . theory that the periphery must be occupied in order to secure the core. [This] is an essentially imperial notion that was internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Kuomintang and Communist. The [current] regime’s attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiers often with little historical basis have had and continue to have highly destabilizing strategic consequences.” One reason Southeast Asians find it difficult to accept Chinese territorial claims is that they carry with them an assertion of Han racial superiority over other Asian races and empires.

Says Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school: “Intuitively, acceptance of the nine-dash line is a corresponding denial of the very identity and history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Malays; it is practically a modern revival of China’s denigration of non-Chinese as ‘barbarians’ not entitled to equal respect and dignity as peoples.” Empires and kingdoms never exercised sovereignty. If historical claims had any validity then Mongolia could claim all of Asia simply because it once conquered the lands of the continent. There is absolutely no historical basis to support either of the dash-line claims, especially considering that the territories of Chinese empires were never as carefully delimited as nation-states, but rather existed as zones of influence tapering away from a civilized center. This is the position contemporary China took starting in the 1960s, while negotiating its land boundaries with several of its neighboring countries. But this is not the position it takes today in the cartographic, diplomatic, and low-intensity military skirmishes to define its maritime borders.

The continued reinterpretation of history to advance contemporary political, territorial, and maritime claims, coupled with the Communist leadership’s ability to turn “nationalistic eruptions” on and off like a tap during moments of tension with the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, makes it difficult for Beijing to reassure neighbors that its “peaceful rise” is wholly peaceful. Since there are six claimants to various atolls, islands, rocks, and oil deposits in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands disputes are, by definition, multilateral disputes requiring international arbitration. But Beijing has insisted that these disputes are bilateral in order to place its opponents between the anvil of its revisionist history and the hammer of its growing military power. Mohan Malik is a professor in Asian security at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, in Honolulu. The views expressed are his own. His most recent book is China and India: Great Power Rivals. He wishes to thank Drs. Justin Nankivell, Carlyle Thayer, Denny Roy, and David Fouse for their comments on this article.

OG Image: Spratly Islands - Reef Madness - Foreign Correspondent - ABC Broadcast: 20/05/2014 Reporter: Eric Campbell Eric Campbell takes us on a journey to a place few outsiders ever get to experience ï¿½ the place some say could be the trigger for the worldï¿½s next major conflict ï¿½ the Spratly Islands, smack bang in the middle of the oil-rich South China Sea. In an Australian television exclusive, he catches a series of boats to reach the remote chain of islands and coral reefs that are claimed by no fewer than six countries ï¿½ China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. Many of the so called ï¿½isletsï¿½ are simply specks of submerged rock in the middle of nowhere, but have been built up by competing nations over the years in order to bolster their claims of ownership. There are military forces from different countries living on different islands, often within shouting distance of each other. Theyï¿½re probably the most contested islands in the world.

Itï¿½s believed the undersea bed in the region is rich in oil and gas, itï¿½s an important shipping lane, and there are vast fishing grounds to be exploited. ï¿½We call our island group the submerged Saudi Arabia of the Philippinesï¿½, the mayor of one island tells Foreign Correspondent. Mayor Eugenio Bito-onon runs a municipality with just 150 residents ï¿½ Kalayaan, which means Freedomland in the local language. Posing as fishermen, Campbell and his crew go to Ayungin Shoal, where besieged marines live on a rusting, scuttled ship on the submerged reef. Chinese maritime forces attempt to stop them in a high-speed chase. The crew managed to reach the shallow coral before the vessels could block them. They found a group of hungry marines living on fish they catch on the reef as Chinese ships circle the reef 24 hours a day. ______________________________ Transcript CAMPBELL: Iï¿½ve been to plenty of conflict zones but never on a boat full of chickens. Itï¿½s taking supplies to a small village in the Spratly Islands.

Thatï¿½s the centre of one of Asiaï¿½s most volatile disputes, with six countries fighting over undersea oil fields. Weï¿½ve been allowed to come along for the ride. ï¿½We have really lucked out here. I have been trying to get to the Spratly Islands for 20 years. It is such a sensitive area and itï¿½s normally completely off limits to Western media and thatï¿½s one of the remarkable things about this conflict. It has simmered for decades, itï¿½s regularly put the region on the brink of war, but outside of Asia few people have even heard of the islands and almost nobodyï¿½s seen them. This is going to be quite a tripï¿½. The Spratly Islands are a smattering of islets, reefs and sandbars in the South China Sea. They have no value in themselves but theyï¿½re believed to be surrounded by vast oil and gas beds. Weï¿½re heading to the main Philippine controlled island, Pagasa, and weï¿½ll be sailing through hostile waters.

Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also claim some of the islands and China reckons it owns the lot ï¿½ right up to its neighboursï¿½ shores. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Thatï¿½s where this conflict is really getting serious, because China claims the whole of the South China Sea - probably because the name is South China Seaï¿½ (laughs). CAMPBELL: Eugenio Bito-Onon is mayor of the land claimed by the Philippines. His municipality called Kalayaan has just 150 residents - but he believes the oil could transform his impoverished nation. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½We call our Kalayaan Island group, the submerged Saudi Arabia of the Philippinesï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½The Spratly Islands have only ever had one outing in popular culture and that was back in the 90s when the great thriller writer Tom Clancy penned this book, SSN, the code for nuclear-powered attack submarines. Just to quote the back cover: ï¿½China has invaded the oil-rich Spratly Islands.

The American response has been swift and deadly and the Third World War has begunï¿½. Clancy was so taken with the idea of it, he even turned it into a CD ROM video gameï¿½. VIDEO GAME: This is Greg Haze of the Pentagon. In a shock move China has launched an all-out assault on the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. We have reports that Chinese forces have overrun positions maintained by other nations who claim the islands as their own. CAMPBELL: The game lets computer nerds command US submarines to sink the Chinese fleet. In real life the only serious fighting has been between China and Vietnam. In 1988 they fought a brief but bloody skirmish on a disputed reef. More than 60 Vietnamese died in what China hailed as a great victory. CHINESE COMMENTARY: ï¿½History will remember this moment foreverï¿½. CAMPBELL: Diplomacy stopped further bloodshed but this year relations have deteriorated dramatically. On May 7, Chinese maritime forces rammed a Vietnamese ship in disputed islands north of the Spratlys. Vietnam was trying to stop China installing an oil rig. Both sides fired on each other with water cannon.

MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½By all kinds of assertiveness, China is doing a lot of things, maybe not just by bullying around our fishermen or small naviesï¿½. CAMPBELL: China has been trying to squeeze the Philippines out of the Spratlyï¿½s and seize every unoccupied land mass. Itï¿½s built a huge installation on Mischief Reef, an underwater shoal it took from the Philippines in 1994. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½This is Mischief Reef and itï¿½s an atoll. Itï¿½s not even an island. The Chinese constructed first this fishermenï¿½s shelter - later on, a three-storey high garrison with a basketball court. Thereï¿½s already a wind generatorï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½So theyï¿½ve been just built above the sea lineï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONION: ï¿½The reefï¿½.

CAMPBELL: ï¿½Yeah, above the reefï¿½. Malaysia and Vietnam have followed Chinaï¿½s lead, building reef bases that would look at home in a James Bond film. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½You see the premises of the hotel and you see the swimming pool and a jetty portï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½You donï¿½t have that on your islands do you?ï¿½ MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½We just envyï¿½. CAMPBELL: To the mayorï¿½s despair the only country building hardly anything is the cash strapped Philippines. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½This is Pagasa, our pristine, beautiful island waiting for developmentï¿½. CAMPBELL: After two days at sea we stop off at one of the Philippinesï¿½ islands, called Lewak. Rather than no expense being spared, it looks like no expense has been spent. There are just a few marines living rough on a ration of six glasses of water a day.

But this is luxury compared to conditions at a neighbouring marine base seven nautical miles away. Itï¿½s on a sand bar. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Thereï¿½s a structureï¿½ a concrete structure where they are accommodatedï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½Wowï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Thatï¿½s where theyï¿½ their sleeping quartersï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½On a sand barï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Yeahï¿½. CAMPBELL: Back on the boat, conditions arenï¿½t much better. Jacqueline Morales is the village school teacher on Pagasa. With three tired children of her own, the trip home is anything but restful. JACQUELINE MORALES: ï¿½Itï¿½s very difficult for me to stay on this ship, because of the conditions ï¿½ itï¿½s very hotï¿½.

CAMPBELL: It takes a dose of patriotism to move to a speck of disputed land in the middle of the ocean. JACQUELINE MORALES: ï¿½As a teacher, it is a big thing that I am living there and the school stays. It will deter the Chinese, because they do not like that there is a school there and that people live in that placeï¿½. CAMPBELL: By the morning of day three weï¿½re in the middle of disputed territory. A Filipino navy frigate shadows us as we approach land occupied by Vietnam and China. Sometimes theyï¿½re literally side by side. This is the islet of Parola. Thereï¿½s a small detachment of Filipino marines drilling against Chinese attacks. The Philippines used to also have marines on the neighbouring island of Pugad less than 3 kilometres away, but in 1975 Vietnam seized it. ï¿½Now the way this side tells it is that one day the Filipino marines left the island to go on patrol and the Vietnamese whoï¿½d been watching and waiting offshore, took the chance to sweep in and claim possession and they have been there ever since.

And the lesson drawn from that is that no matter what you argue about law or sovereignty, if you want to control the Spratly Islands, you have to occupy themï¿½. Mayor Eugenio has watched sadly as Vietnam builds multi-story structures and a harbour on Pugad while Parola remains a collection of beach huts. He says money earmarked for his islands has disappeared into politicianï¿½s pockets. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½We belong to the poorest municipality. Iï¿½m not a national government chief executive. I believe that the national government should exist to support the local government. Thatï¿½s what Iï¿½m doing now, just really asking them to help me because my vision for Kalayaan is to develop this for marine fisheries, a special zone for marine fisheries and tourismï¿½. CAMPBELL: Four hours later we finally catch sight of Pagasa. The passengers are a mixture of council workers and returning residents. At 37 hectares itï¿½s the largest Philippine controlled island with a dirt airstrip for the adjoining military base. But surrounded by rusting wrecks, it looks almost as neglected as Parola.

ï¿½I think you need a jettyï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Thereï¿½s supposed to be a jetty, where you see here thereï¿½s a causeway. Never finishedï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½Oh dearï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Since 1997ï¿½. CAMPBELL: Even a smaller boat canï¿½t dock in the shallow water so everything has to be carried the last thirty metres. ï¿½This is not an easy place to get toï¿½. Unlike on some of the other countriesï¿½ islands, thereï¿½s no luxury hotel here ï¿½ in fact there are no facilities for visitors at all. Not that it really matters. After four days on the boat, this feels like luxury. The mayorï¿½s enthusiastic council workers start early. They have a host of new projects to get up over the next two weeks, including the first mobile phone tower. The arrival of the supply boat has temporarily doubled the population.

Before the 1950s these islands were completely uninhabited. The Philippines only began settling civilians here in the late 70s to push its case for sovereignty. The village is only now starting to look like a real community. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: [addressing islandï¿½s population] ï¿½We have a visitor here with us - a doctor doing a medical mission for all in the villageï¿½. [applause] CAMPBELL: Mayor Eugenio has stretched his meagre budget to build some new houses, but itï¿½s a shadow of what heï¿½d like to do. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½If I compare our development to the rest of the islands in the South China Sea I think the site for the West Philippines here is all the least developed and sometimes you know that gives us frustrationï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½Great frustrationï¿½. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Yeahï¿½.

CAMPBELL: After more than three decades, there are just a few dozen houses on sandy tracks. The only power comes from generators and thereï¿½s no running water. We caught up with Jacqueline Morales and her husband catching up on laundry from the four days at sea. JACQUELINE MORALES: ï¿½Iï¿½m so glad we are here in our home today. We can do what we want to do, unlike on the ship. Itï¿½s so hard, you get dizzyï¿½. CAMPBELL: The family has quickly settled back into island life.... the kids catching the evening meal. But sheï¿½s all too aware of how precarious the communityï¿½s future is if China continues to squeeze. JACQUELINE MORALES: ï¿½I worry about what might happen. We know how interested they are in this island. Of course they can do whatever they want to do and even if there are still people here, well, Iï¿½ll leave it in Godï¿½s handsï¿½. CAMPBELL: None of that worries her daughters of course. For them, Pagasa is close to paradise.

The concrete bunkers at the end of the beach are a testament to the long-running hostilities. They were built in the early 70s a few years after the military base was established. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½If you have one like this and you get hit by an M-16, you will not be hurt, because itï¿½s so thickï¿½. CAMPBELL: Unable to match Chinaï¿½s growing military, the Philippines has asked the UN to arbitrate. Beijing has refused to take part in the case and is already exploiting the disputed resources. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Thatï¿½s the boats used for hauling clams and coralï¿½. CAMPBELL: Thereï¿½s a constant rumble of Chinse dredges on the outer reef. They run 24 hours a day crushing the coral. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONON: ï¿½Mainly theyï¿½re using thatï¿½ turning that into powder and then they use that as fillers for boat buildingï¿½.

CAMPBELL: Mayor Eugenio wants to turn the reef into a protected marine park. Now heï¿½s worried thereï¿½ll be no coral or fish left. MAYOR EUGENIO BITO-ONO: ï¿½If you go there, thereï¿½s no more rocks, itï¿½s just become turned into sandï¿½. CAMPBELL: [boarding a boat in the night] ï¿½Okay well itï¿½s just an hour before high tide and weï¿½re about to head over the reef overnight to the most important part of where we want to get to and thatï¿½s Ayungin Shoal. That is a Filipino marine base on a scuttled ship on a submerged reef and itï¿½s been very highly contested by China. Now if indications of the last few months are anything to go by, it seems Chinese coastguard vessels will try to stop us. So now comes the hard partï¿½. The Chinese Coast Guard has blocked the last three supply boats trying to make this journey. Weï¿½ll be taking a smaller faster boat to try to evade them.

ï¿½Whatï¿½s going to happen if they do chase us? What will the captain do?ï¿½ CREWMAN: ï¿½They will not hurt us, if we keep goingï¿½ we donï¿½t stopï¿½. [crew then prays] CAMPBELL: By late morning weï¿½re in sight of the disputed reef, which the Filipinos call Ayungin Shoal. Our one advantage is that the Chinese ships are stationed on the other side of the reef, ready to block supply boats coming from the mainland. By the time their radar spots us, they have to move right around the reef to stop us. ï¿½We have just seen two Chinese vessels bearing down on us so the Captainï¿½s asked us to stay out of view and weï¿½ll try just to pass ourselves off as a fishing boat and pass on throughï¿½ weï¿½ll seeï¿½. We can now see our destination, a scuttled ship called the Sierra Madre. The Coast Guard vessel continues to race towards us, billowing exhaust as it tries to close the gap. But itï¿½s too late.

ï¿½Well it looks like weï¿½ve made it because while the Coast Guard vessel is still coming towards us at speed, the reef here now is so shallow that I donï¿½t think they can follow usï¿½. [Cheers from crew having made it] At first glance Sierra Madre looks like it belongs in a wrecking yard. On closer inspection, it looks even worse. The US built ship carried tanks in World War II and last saw service in Vietnam. It was in bad shape when the Philippines scuttled it here in 1999, now itï¿½s literally falling apart. The marines are making the best of it. Theyï¿½ve caught enough reef fish that morning to welcome us with a banquet, but a military unit canï¿½t survive on fish. It needs generator fuel, maintenance equipment, medicine and above all else, water. Second Lieutenant Earl Pama is the detachment commander. After lunch, he shows me what happened when they tried to come here with supplies a month earlier. It took two attempts to break through.

SECOND LIEUTENANT EARL PAMA: ï¿½They moved close to us, about 20 metres, 20 metres so we couldnï¿½t get in. They stop us by fronting the bow of our boat. The problem was, if we got hit, probably our boat would be damaged and the lives of my men would be in dangerï¿½. CAMPBELL: The Chinese ships circle the reef like sharks, coming to within 200 metres of the Sierra Madre. China claims itï¿½s the Philippines breaking the law, occupying the reef it calls Renï¿½ai in the islands it calls Nanï¿½sha. SECOND LIEUTENANT EARL PAMA: ï¿½They want to move the ship out and they want to claim that the Ayungin Shoal belongs to the Peopleï¿½s Republic of China. But the truth is, Ayungin Shoal is the territory of the Philippinesï¿½. CAMPBELL: Lt Pama and his men are combat veterans from the war against Islamic insurgents in Mindanao. Their main operation now is finding food.

Every morning they head out to spear fish under the watchful eyes of the Chinese. Their other battle is keeping busy. Thereï¿½s not much to do on the ship and you have watch where you walk. Injuries from falling through the deck are common. SECOND LIEUTENANT EARL PAMA: ï¿½The Government has plans to repair the ship. They sent supplies and equipment for repair but were unable to get through because they were stopped by the Chinese Coast Guards. So itï¿½s not been repairedï¿½. CAMPBELL: Once a month thereï¿½s a small relief mission that China hasnï¿½t worked out how to block. The parcels are dropped as close as possible to the ship ï¿½ sometimes even on it. Staff Sergeant Alan Sisneros heads out on a small raft to collect the strays. ï¿½So are you getting a bit sick of fish?ï¿½ STAFF SERGEANT ALAN SISNEROS: ï¿½No. By and by.... ah... every day we eat fish, so I need another...ah... to have on my tongue.

CAMPBELL: ï¿½Fish for breakfast, fish for lunch, fish for dinnerï¿½. STAFF SERGEANT ALAN SISNEROS: ï¿½All fish, all fishï¿½. CAMPBELL: ï¿½Got to love those fishï¿½. STAFF SERGEANT ALAN SISNEROS: Yes. Maybe inside this box thereï¿½s meat or beef.... Moments like this are a rare break in the monotony of life on a ship that never moves. ï¿½Do you ever wish the Philippines would give you a slightly better ship to live on?ï¿½ STAFF SERGEANT ALAN SISNEROS: ï¿½I cannot answer you, Sirï¿½. CAMPBELL: Up in the mess room, the parcels are opened greedily. The contents appear aimed more at morale than blockade busting. Itï¿½s telling what passes for luxury. STAFF SERGEANT ALAN SISNEROS: ï¿½Spam bacon! This Spam bacon...

good.ï¿½ CAMPBELL: Thereï¿½s even Jolibee Fried Chicken from the Philippinesï¿½ very own junk food chain. One small package provokes the most intense reaction, it has letters and drawings from school children on the mainland. FILIPINO MARINE: ï¿½I feel sad, lonely, but Iï¿½m proud to be here to defend our territoryï¿½. [reading letter from school child] ï¿½My Dear Soldiers, Thank you for heroically guarding our territory. You are our inspiration. We love you all, Jun Louis Garciaï¿½. CAMPBELL: This is on so many levels an absurd dispute. The reef could be a marine park and a diving magnet. Or if all the nations could agree, it could be a properly managed oil field that didnï¿½t destroy the environment. Instead, itï¿½s closed to outsiders with a small band of marines stuck on a ghost ship surrounded by Chinese ships patrolling day and night. In the meantime, the reefs are being destroyed on an industrial scale. We left the next morning before dawn hoping to again escape unscathed.

The Coast Guard let us pass but in the days that followed the dispute over the South China Sea worsened, with anti-Chinese riots breaking out across Vietnam. This conflict has been lying dormant and unseen for a generation. Now it threatens to erupt as a rising China turns its power to the sea. Search

Question: Part or all of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are claimed by how many different countries?
Answer: 6