Literal Translation of Carpe Diem and Habeas Corpus Carpe Diem and Habeas Corpus: Literal Translation of Common Latin Phrases written by: John Garger • edited by: Rebecca Scudder • updated: 9/13/2013 Carpe Diem and Habeas Corpus are two of the most common Latin phrases in English. Learn the literal translations and meanings of the Latin phrases Carpe Diem and Habeas Corpus. slide 1 of 4 There is no doubt that Latin carries with it a certain air of sophistication, education, and class. Ironically, this air is due to the use of the Latin language long after it was considered a dead language, i.e. one that was no longer spoken as a primary language of a people. The roots of Latin’s association with education and science began in the mid-second millennium, when knowledge started to proliferate to the masses through printed material and literacy was on the rise. About this time, the modern university was born, which eventually eliminated the mentorship model of education. Latin, the primary language of the church and all things academic, naturally became associated with education and science throughout Europe.

Today, Latin survives as a throwback to this tradition in the many phrases and mottoes used by universities and institutions. Many Latin phrases are also used in everyday language. slide 2 of 4 Carpe Diem This popular Latin phrase has been popularized in books, movies, and other media, but the original source of this phrase is ancient; It is from Horace’s (65-8 BC) Odes, a collection of his poems. The original line reads: Carpe diem quam minimum credula postero. (seize the day and place no trust in tomorrow.) From a student’s perspective, “Carpe diem" is a simple construction consisting of a verb in the imperative mood and a noun in the accusative case . “Carpe" is from the third conjugation verb “carpo" (carpere, carpsi, carptum) meaning to “pluck" or “divide." However, Horace’s use of the word, given the complete sentence above, was metaphorically intended to imply enjoyment or fulfillment. Hence, the word is often translated as “seize" to avoid confusion had a literal translation been used instead. Certainly “pluck the day" makes no literal sense in English.

Recall that third conjugation verbs form the present imperative simply by taking the present stem of the verb. In this case, the stem of the verb “carpo" is “carpe." To pluralize this phrase, recall that the plural imperative is formed by dropping the –e and adding –ite. In this case, we would have “carpite." (As a technical note, it is not that the –e is dropped as it is that the –e changes to an –i– with the addition of the –te to indicate that the command is intended for two or more people). “Diem" is simply the accusative singular of “dies" meaning “day." It is in the accusative case because it is acting as a direct object of the action of the sentence; it is indicating what the listener or reader should seize. Recall that since the imperative mood indicates a command, it is always considered to be in the second person. There are no first or third person imperative mood forms because commands are given directly to the listener or reader. What “carpe diem" is really saying is: Hey, you (singular)! Seize the day!

As a side note, the word “carpo" meaning to pluck or divide is the derivative of the word “carpal" in “carpal tunnel." The carpal tunnel is a passageway through which nerves of the hand pass. It is here that we see how the literal meaning of “carpo", to divide, also finds its way into English. slide 3 of 4 Habeas Corpus In legal terms, a habeas corpus is an action that protects an individual from unlawful detention. It prevents an agency from holding an individual without reason. Like many legal terms, habeas corpus is derived from Late (or New) Latin , not the Classical Latin most often taught in high schools and colleges. Nevertheless, its form is exactly like that of Classical Latin and serves to illustrate two important grammatical constructions.

A literal translation of habeas corpus found in many legal textbooks is “you (shall) have the body." Notice that “shall" is in quotes; this is because “habeas" is the second-person singular, present, active, subjunctive form of the word “habeo" (habere, habui, habitum) meaning “have." The signature –a– after the –e– in “habeas" is the indicator that this second-conjugation verb is in the subjunctive mood (as opposed to “habes" of the indicative mood ). A literal translation of “habeas" could be “may you have" or possibly “let you have." The “shall" in quotes is used to indicate a theoretical or ideal state for which the subjunctive is used in both Latin and English. “Corpus" is simply the accusative form of the word “corpus." Do not be confused by the fact that as a neuter noun, “corpus" has a similar form for both the nominative and accusative cases of the third declension .

“Corpus" is accusative here because it is the direct object of the verb “habeas;" it indicates what should or may be “had." So, a translation of “habeas corpus" that follows more closely the rules of Classical Latin can be “may you have the body" or “let you have the body." slide 4 of 4 Latin phrases and mottos used in English are great practice for the student. They are relatively short in comparison to complete sentences, and nicely illustrate the use of proper Latin grammar. In addition, since they are usually familiar to the English speaker, their meaning is already known. It is just a matter of dissecting the phrase or motto to practice Latin on a smaller scale. ◄ ● ● ● ● ► A Dissection of Common Latin Phrases Found in English The Latin Language survives today not only in the English lexicon, but also in numerous phrases used in academic, legal, and scientific circles. This provides a wonderful opportunity for students of Latin to dissect these phrases, which demonstrate a variety of grammatical constructs. Translation of Habeas corpus in English Habeas corpus in English habeas corpus \ha"be*as corpus\ (?). [l.

you may have the body.] (law) a writ having for its object to bring a party before a court or judge; especially, one to inquire into the cause of a person's imprisonment or detention by another, with the view to protect the right to personal liberty; also, one to bring a prisoner into court to testify in a pending trial. habeas corpus n 1. a writ ordering a prisoner to be brought before a judge [syn: writ of habeas corpus] 2. right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as protection against illegal imprisonment More: English to English translation of habeas corpus A writ having for its object to bring a party before a court or judge; especially, one to inquire into the cause of a person's imprisonment or detention by another, with the view to protect the right to personal liberty; also, one to bring a prisoner into court to testify in a pending trial. More: English to English translation of habeas corpus Latin term meaning "you have the body." The writ of habeascorpus, known as the great writ, has varied use in criminal and civil contexts.It is a procedure for obtaining a judicial determination of the legality of anindividual's custody.

Technically, it is used in the criminal law context tobring the petitioner before the court to inquire into the legality of his orher confinement. The writ of federal habeas corpus is used to test theconstitutionality of a state criminal conviction. The writ is used in the civilcontext to challenge the validity of child custody and deportations. More: English to English translation of habeas corpus Lat. "you have the body" Prisoners often seek release by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison official ordering that an inmate be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or not that person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not he should be released from custody. A habeas corpus petition is a petition filed with a court by a person who objects to his own or another's detention or imprisonment. The petition must show that the court ordering the detention or imprisonment made a legal or factual error. Habeas corpus petitions are usually filed by persons serving prison sentences. In family law, a parent who has been denied custody of his child by a trial court may file a habeas corpus petition.

Also, a party may file a habeas corpus petition if a judge declares her in contempt of court and jails or threatens to jail her. In Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the court observed that the Supreme Court has "recognized the fact that`[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.' Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). " Therefore, the writ must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." Harris, 394 U.S. at 291. The writ of habeas corpus serves as an important check on the manner in which state courts pay respect to federal constitutional rights. The writ is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris v.

Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Because the habeas process delays the finality of a criminal case, however, the Supreme Court in recent years has attempted to police the writ to ensure that the costs of the process do not exceed its manifest benefits. In McCleskey the Court raised barriers against successive and abusive petitions. The Court raised these barriers based on significant concerns about delay, cost, prejudice to the prosecution, frustration of the sovereign power of the States, and the "heavy burden" federal collateral litigation places on "scarce federal judicial resources," a burden that "threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes." McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 467. The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties. `But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that are essential for civilization.' " McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 496 (quoting Brown v.

Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1952) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)) The predominant inquiry on habeas is a legal one: whether the "petitioner's custody simpliciter" is valid as measured by the Constitution. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). The purpose of the great writ is not to relitigate state trials. Dismissal of habeas petition under the "total exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (each claim raised by petitioner must be exhausted before district court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition). Jury exposure to facts not in evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to confrontation, cross-examination and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (introduction of extraneous prior bad acts evidence during deliberations constitutes error of constitutional proportions), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994). However, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the constitutional error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993). Whether the constitutional error was harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405; Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987).

In a habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court generally "will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991). This doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has declined to address the petitioner's federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural requirements. Id. at 2254; see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 119 L. Ed. 2d 326, 337 (1992). Thus, the independent state grounds doctrine bars the federal courts from reconsidering the issue in the context of habeas corpus review as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for its decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 264 n.10 (1988). Habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994-95 (1995). It is the responsibility of the court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the judgment. If the court is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. Id. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, like the standard of review for a claim of judicial misconduct, is " 'the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.' " Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)).

"The relevant question is whether the prosecutor['s] comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' " Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). A federal court has no supervisory authority over criminal proceedings in state courts. The only standards we can impose on the states are those dictated by the Constitution. Daye, 712 F.2d at 1571. Objectionable as some actions might be, when considered in the context of the trial as a whole they are not "of sufficient gravity to warrant the conclusion that fundamental fairness has been denied." Id. at 1572. See Gayle v.

Scully, 779 F.2d at 807 (trial judge's caustic, sarcastic comments and offensive conduct, although perhaps inconsistent with institutional standards of federal courts, did not violate due process); Daye, 712 F.2d at 1572 (trial judge's skeptical attitude toward defendant's testimony, and his reinforcement of identification evidence by government witnesses, "approached but did not cross the line that permits [a ruling] that the Constitution has been violated"). The fact that a jury instruction is inadequate by Federal Court direct appeal standards does not mean a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas relief from a state court conviction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). In habeas proceedings challenging state court convictions, relief is available only for constitutional violations. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

at 147 (constitutionality determined not by focusing on ailing instruction "in artificial isolation" but by considering effect of instruction "in the context of the overall charge."). See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977) (recognizing that "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law" and, therefore, a habeas petitioner whose claim of error involves the failure to give a particular instruction bears an "especially heavy" burden). Shackling, except in extreme forms, is susceptible to harmless error analysis. Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d at 669. In a habeas case dealing with a state court sentence, the question is whether the shackling "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993)). If we are in "grave doubt" whether the error affected the verdict, the error is not harmless.

O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995). The risk of doubt, however, is on the state. Id. at 996 (rejecting language in Brecht v. Abrahamson which places on defendant burden of showing prejudice). See Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d at 149 (finding shackling at trial harmless error because defendant only wore waist chain that could not be seen by jury). More: English to English translation of habeas corpus Habeas corpus in Greek (Latin).

να έχεις, έχε το σώμα· θεσμός του αγγλοσαξονικού δικαίου, που αποσκοπεί στην προστασία της ατομικής ελευθερίας του πολίτη έναντι της αυθαίρετης σύλληψης και κράτησής του· το habeas corpus ψηφίστηκε το 1679, την περίοδο του Καρόλου του Β΄. Το habeas corpus έχει επίσης ενσωματωθεί στο Σύνταγμα των ΗΠΑ.

Habeas corpus legal definition of habeas corpus Habeas corpus legal definition of habeas corpus Also found in: Dictionary , Thesaurus , Medical , Financial , Acronyms , Encyclopedia , Wikipedia . Habeas Corpus [Latin, You have the body.] A writ (court order) that commands an individual or a government official who has restrained another to produce the prisoner at a designated time and place so that the court can determine the legality of custody and decide whether to order the prisoner's release. A writ of habeas corpus directs a person, usually a prison warden, to produce the prisoner and justify the prisoner's detention. If the prisoner argues successfully that the incarceration is in violation of a constitutional right, the court may order the prisoner's release. Habeas corpus relief also may be used to obtain custody of a child or to gain the release of a detained person who is insane, is a drug addict, or has an infectious disease. Usually, however, it is a response to imprisonment by the criminal justice system. A writ of habeas corpus is authorized by statute in federal courts and in all state courts. An inmate in state or federal prison asks for the writ by filing a petition with the court that sentenced him or her.

In most states, and in federal courts, the inmate is given the opportunity to present a short oral argument in a hearing before the court. He or she also may receive an evidentiary hearing to establish evidence for the petition. The habeas corpus concept was first expressed in the Magna Charta , a constitutional document forced on King John by English landowners at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. Among the liberties declared in the Magna Charta was that "No free man shall be seized, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or injured in any way, nor will we enter on him or send against him except by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." This principle evolved to mean that no person should be deprived of freedom without Due Process of Law . The writ of habeas corpus was first used by the common-law courts in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England.

These courts, composed of legal professionals, were in competition with feudal courts, which were controlled by local landowners, or "lords." The feudal courts lacked procedural consistency, and on that basis, the common-law courts began to issue writs demanding the release of persons imprisoned by them. From the late fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the common-law courts used the writ to order the release of persons held by royal courts, such as the Chancery, admiralty courts, and the Star Chamber . The only reference to the writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. Constitution is contained in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2. This clause provides, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ in 1861, when he authorized his Civil War generals to arrest anyone they thought to be dangerous. In addition, Congress suspended it in 1863 to allow the Union army to hold accused persons temporarily until trial in the civilian courts. The Union army reportedly ignored the statute suspending the writ and conducted trials under Martial Law .

In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 [codified in title 28 of the U.S.C.A.]), which granted to federal courts the power to hear the habeas corpus petitions of federal prisoners. In 1867, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of February 5 (ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 [28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241 et seq.]). This statute gave federal courts the power to issue habeas corpus writs for "any person … restrained in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean that federal courts may hear the habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners as well as federal prisoners. The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy because it gives a court the power to release a prisoner after the prisoner has been processed through the criminal justice system, with all its procedural safeguards and appeals.

For this reason, the burden is initially on the petitioning prisoner to prove that he or she is being held in violation of a constitutional right. If the petitioner can meet this burden with sufficient evidence, the burden then shifts to the warden to justify the imprisonment. Rubin "Hurricane" Carter Federal courts grant writs of habeas corpus only when grave constitutional violations have occurred. The granting of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter's habeas petition in 1985 freed him from almost 20 years of imprisonment for a crime he maintains he did not commit. Carter was a top-ranked middleweight boxer when he and John Artis were arrested in 1966 and charged with murdering three people in Paterson, New Jersey. Carter and Artis were African American; the victims were white. Carter and Artis claimed they were the victims of racism and a police frame-up, but they were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Carter fought his conviction in state court, but the verdict was upheld. In 1974 he published The Sixteenth Round: From Number 1 Contender to Number 45472. The book became a national best-seller and drew attention to his case.

In 1975 Bob Dylan wrote and recorded the song "Hurricane," which recounted Carter's arrest and trial and characterized Carter as an innocent man. This publicity, along with an investigation by the New Jersey public defenders' office, led to a motion for a new trial. The motion was granted, but Carter and Artis were convicted again in 1976. Carter remained imprisoned; Artis was paroled in 1981. After all state appeals were exhausted, the only remaining avenue for relief was to file for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In November 1985 Judge H. Lee Sarokin ruled that the second murder trial convictions were unconstitutional because the prosecution had been allowed to imply that guilt could be inferred by the defendants' race and because the prosecution withheld Polygraph evidence that could have been used to impeach the credibility of their "star witness" (Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 [D.N.J. 1985]).

Judge Sarokin therefore granted habeas corpus, overturned the convictions, and ordered "Immediate release from custody with prejudice." The State of New Jersey appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, asking to reverse Sarokin's ruling and requesting that Carter remain incarcerated until a final ruling. The Third Circuit rejected both appeals. New Jersey appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which also refused to overturn. The state chose not to attempt a third prosecution of Carter and Artis. Carter moved to Canada where he headed the Association for the Defense of the Wrongly Convicted. A prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the sentencing court only after exhausting all appeals and motions. Federal courts may receive a petition from a state prisoner, but not until the petitioner has attempted all available appeals and motions and habeas corpus petitions in the state courts. Federal prisoners must exhaust all available appeals and motions in the federal sentencing court and federal appeals courts before filing a habeas corpus petition with the sentencing court. If the first petition is denied, the inmate may petition the appeals courts. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil action against the jailer. It is neither an appeal nor a continuation of the criminal case against the prisoner.

It is not used to determine guilt or innocence. Rather, the purpose is solely to determine whether the confinement is in violation of a constitutional right. This is significant because it limits the scope of complaints that a petitioner may use as a basis for the writ. Violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the most common basis for a writ of habeas corpus. Prose-cutorial misconduct, juror malfeasance, and ineffective assistance of counsel are common due process grounds for the writ. Fifth Amendment grounds include failure of the police to give Miranda warnings before in-custody questioning, in violation of the right against Self-Incrimination , and multiple trials, in violation of the Double Jeopardy prohibition. The Eighth Amendment right against Cruel and Unusual Punishment is another common ground for habeas corpus relief, especially in cases involving the death penalty or a lengthy prison term. There are several notable restrictions on the writ's application. Fourth Amendment violations of the right against unreasonable Search and Seizure cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. Prisoners are not entitled to a court-appointed attorney for habeas corpus petitions.

Newly developed constitutional principles will not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases except where doubt is cast on the guilt of the prisoner. Delay in filing a habeas petition may result in its dismissal if the government is prejudiced (i.e., made less able to respond) by the delay. In addition, the petitioner must be in custody to request a writ of habeas corpus. This rule prevents a prisoner from challenging a conviction through habeas corpus after serving out a sentence for the conviction. The law of habeas corpus is ever changing. In the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court took steps to further limit the writ's application. In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1992), the Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court unless she or he can show two things: a reason for failing to develop evidence at trial, and actual prejudice to the prisoner's defense as a result of the failure. In Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993), the Court held that a claim of actual innocence is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. This means that newly discovered evidence alone does not entitle a petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief. The availability and import of habeas corpus in state courts is also subject to change through judicial decisions and new laws. For example, in 1995, the Texas Legislature passed a law that made the habeas corpus process concurrent with appeals (Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 11.071). This law effectively limited the number of times that a Texas state prisoner could challenge the disposition of a criminal case. Significantly, the law applied to all criminal defendants, including those facing the death penalty. Under the legislation, a death row inmate has only one round of review in Texas state courts before seeking relief in federal court. In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (Pub. L. No.

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214). Congress sought to streamline post-conviction appeals proceedings and to curtail the time that prisoners could use to seek habeas corpus relief. Since the enactment of the law, the U.S. Supreme Court has been called upon to interpret a number of the AEDPA provisions; these rulings primarily have addressed technical details of the workings of the new law but the Court has endorsed the AEDPA and removed jurisdiction from the lower federal courts to hear many habeas petitions. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the AEDPA in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996). The habeas corpus provisions represent a major shift in federal-state judicial relations, for Congress directed that federal courts generally defer to state court judgments on questions of federal Constitutional Law in criminal cases. The AEDPA established a "deference" standard, which mandates that the federal courts, in reviewing state court convictions, defer to a state court ruling on the merits of any habeas corpus claim.

This deferral includes questions of fact and of law, as well as mixed questions of fact and law. A federal court must defer unless the state court adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court; or if the state conviction resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. The AEDPA also contains a number of specific rules for habeas corpus review. The act provides for a one-year filing deadline for non-capital habeas corpus petitions. The time starts running at the conclusion of direct review or expiration of time for seeking such review. The law requires a certificate of appealability from a circuit judge or justice before a petitioner may appeal from denial of relief. The petitioner must make a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right, and the certificate must be issue-specific. The AEDPA also allows federal courts to deny relief with respect to unexhausted claims but may not grant relief if the claim is unexhausted.

The habeas petitioner can avoid exhaustion only if there is no available state remedy or the remedy is ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights. If there is no state remedy because of a procedural default, federal review is still prohibited. The AEDPA also places restrictions on the ability of a petitioner to obtain an evidentiary hearing on a claim where the prisoner failed to develop the factual basis. Because state court fact-findings are presumed to be correct, the petitioner must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. To obtain an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must show that the claim relies on a new rule made retroactive by the U.S. Supreme Court or that the factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence. Moreover, in all cases, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for the alleged error for which a hearing is sought, no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty of the underlying offense. This is a steep hurdle for a habeas petitioner to overcome. The AEDPA also seeks to prevent the abuse of habeas corpus by limiting the number of times a prisoner may ask for a writ.

A successive habeas petition may not be filed in district court unless the petitioner is authorized to do so by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Felker, characterized this provision as an acceptable "gatekeeping" mechanism. If petitioners make a Prima Facie showing that they satisfy the exceptions against successive petitions they may proceed; otherwise the court must dismiss the petition. If a successive claim was presented in a prior petition, it must be dismissed; no exceptions are authorized by the AEDPA. Though the AEDPA provides some narrow exceptions to this rule, any claim must establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the error no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense. In habeas petitions from death row inmates, the AEDPA imposes additional rules beyond those already described. The rules apply to states that establish certain standards for competence of counsel. For states to benefit from these additional limitations, they must provide a mechanism for appointment and compensation of competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings or for appointment of counsel to handle the appeal and post-conviction remedies in a unitary proceeding.

Once the state court has made an appointment of counsel, a federal court that would have jurisdiction over the case may enter a stay of execution. The stay expires if a timely petition is not filed, if the prisoner properly waives the right to pursue federal habeas relief, or if relief is denied at any stage of federal review. Once a stay vacates under any of those circumstances, a new one may not be imposed unless the petitioner can overcome the presumption against successive petitions. The AEDPA sets a time limit for habeas petition in capital cases: The petition must be filed within 180 days after final state court affirmance on direct review. In addition, the AEDPA requires that capital habeas cases be given priority over all non-capital matters, and it imposes time limits on resolution. These include a decision by the district court within 180 days after the petition is filed, although the court may extend its time by no more than 30 days. Failure by the district court to act within the time limits may be enforced by a petition for writ of mandate.

More importantly, a court of appeals must decide the case within 120 days after the reply brief is filed; any petition for rehearing must be decided within 30 days after the petition is filed, or 30 days after any requested responsive pleading is filed. If rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, the case must be decided within 120 days after the order granting such rehearing. In addition, the time limits are applicable to all first petitions, successive petitions, and habeas cases considered on remand from a court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court.The AEDPA has changed the legal landscape for prisoners seeking writs of habeas corpus. Petitioners must act within set deadlines, and they must attempt to place all issues in dispute before the first habeas-reviewing federal court or risk the chance of being rejected in a successive petition. Further readings Freedman, Eric M. 2001. Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty. New York: New York Univ. Press. Harrington, James C., and Anne More Burnham. 1995.

"Texas's New Habeas Corpus Procedure for Death-Row Inmates: Kafkaesque—and Probably Unconstitutional." St. Mary's Law Journal 27 (fall). Jones, Andrew A. 1994. "Federal Habeas Corpus Evidentiary Hearings: Has the Court Deliberately Bypassed Section 2254(D)?" Wisconsin Law Review (January-February). Morse, Charles R. 1993. "Habeas Corpus and 'Actual Innocence': Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993)." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 16 (autumn). habeas corpus (hay-bee-us core-puss) n. Latin for "you have the body," it is a writ (court order) which directs the law enforcement officials (prison administrators, police, or sheriff) who have custody of a prisoner to appear in court to help the judge determine whether the prisoner is unlawfully in prison or jail. The writ is obtained by petition to a judge in the county or district where the prisoner is incarcerated, and the judge sets a hearing on whether there is a legal basis for holding the prisoner.

Habeas corpus is a protection against illegal confinement, such as holding a person without charges, when due process obviously has been denied, bail is excessive, parole has been granted, an accused has been improperly surrendered by the bail bondsman, or probation has been summarily terminated without cause. Historically called "the great writ," the renowned scholar of the Common Law, William Blackstone called it the "most celebrated writ in English law." It may also be used as a means to contest child custody and deportation proceedings in court. The writ of habeas corpus can be employed procedurally in federal district courts to challenge the constitutionality of a state court conviction. habeas corpus What does "habeas corpus" mean? | Reference.com What does "habeas corpus" mean? A: Quick Answer Habeas corpus literally translates as "That you have the body." In United States law, state and federal courts issue writs, or legal actions, of habeas corpus to determine the legality of an individual's imprisonment. They do not guarantee protection from unlawful arrest, but from indefinite, illegal detention.

Full Answer Article One, Section Nine of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of prisoners to writs of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion where the public safety requires its suspension. President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War. In 1942, eight German saboteurs were captured on American soil and ruled to be enemy combatants by the Supreme Court, making them ineligible for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus - English to English Translation habeas corpus hEnglish - advanced version habeas corpus \ha"be*as corpus\ (?). [l. you may have the body.] (law) a writ having for its object to bring a party before a court or judge; especially, one to inquire into the cause of a person's imprisonment or detention by another, with the view to protect the right to personal liberty; also, one to bring a prisoner into court to testify in a pending trial. habeas corpus n 1. a writ ordering a prisoner to be brought before a judge [syn: writ of habeas corpus] 2.

right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as protection against illegal imprisonment Latin: a court petition which orders that a person being detained be produced before a judge for a hearing to decide whether the detention is lawful. - (read more on Habeas corpus) Habeas corpus (; Medieval Latin translating roughly to "You should have the body") is a recourse in law whereby a person can report an unlawful detention or imprisonment before a court, usually through a prison official. See more at Wikipedia.org... 1. a writ ordering a prisoner to be brought before a judge (synonym) writ of habeas corpus (hypernym) writ, judicial writ (classification) law, jurisprudence 2. the civil right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as protection against illegal imprisonment (hypernym) civil right, civil rights (classification) law, jurisprudence 1.any of several common-law writs issued to bring a party before a court or judge 2: the right of a citizen to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as a protection against illegal imprisonment. turkish definition:ihzar emri eg:They were suspiciously very ready with the Patriot Act as soon as we were hit.

Ready to lift habeas corpus, due process, the attorney-client privilege. They were ready. Which means they have already got their police state. Just take a plane anywhere today and you are in the hands of an arbitrary police state. The Devil's Dictionary Habeas Corpus A writ by which a man may be taken out of jail when confined for the wrong crime. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) A writ having for its object to bring a party before a court or judge; especially, one to inquire into the cause of a person's imprisonment or detention by another, with the view to protect the right to personal liberty; also, one to bring a prisoner into court to testify in a pending trial. Law Dictionary Latin term meaning "you have the body." The writ of habeascorpus, known as the great writ, has varied use in criminal and civil contexts.It is a procedure for obtaining a judicial determination of the legality of anindividual's custody. Technically, it is used in the criminal law context tobring the petitioner before the court to inquire into the legality of his orher confinement. The writ of federal habeas corpus is used to test theconstitutionality of a state criminal conviction.

The writ is used in the civilcontext to challenge the validity of child custody and deportations. The 'Lectric Law Library Lat. "you have the body" Prisoners often seek release by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison official ordering that an inmate be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or not that person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not he should be released from custody. A habeas corpus petition is a petition filed with a court by a person who objects to his own or another's detention or imprisonment. The petition must show that the court ordering the detention or imprisonment made a legal or factual error. Habeas corpus petitions are usually filed by persons serving prison sentences. In family law, a parent who has been denied custody of his child by a trial court may file a habeas corpus petition. Also, a party may file a habeas corpus petition if a judge declares her in contempt of court and jails or threatens to jail her. In Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the court observed that the Supreme Court has "recognized the fact that`[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.' Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). " Therefore, the writ must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." Harris, 394 U.S. at 291. The writ of habeas corpus serves as an important check on the manner in which state courts pay respect to federal constitutional rights. The writ is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Because the habeas process delays the finality of a criminal case, however, the Supreme Court in recent years has attempted to police the writ to ensure that the costs of the process do not exceed its manifest benefits.

In McCleskey the Court raised barriers against successive and abusive petitions. The Court raised these barriers based on significant concerns about delay, cost, prejudice to the prosecution, frustration of the sovereign power of the States, and the "heavy burden" federal collateral litigation places on "scarce federal judicial resources," a burden that "threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes." McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 467. The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties. `But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that are essential for civilization.' " McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 496 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1952) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)) The predominant inquiry on habeas is a legal one: whether the "petitioner's custody simpliciter" is valid as measured by the Constitution. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). The purpose of the great writ is not to relitigate state trials. Dismissal of habeas petition under the "total exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (each claim raised by petitioner must be exhausted before district court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition). Jury exposure to facts not in evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to confrontation, cross-examination and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (introduction of extraneous prior bad acts evidence during deliberations constitutes error of constitutional proportions), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994).

However, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the constitutional error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993). Whether the constitutional error was harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405; Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987). In a habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court generally "will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991).

This doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has declined to address the petitioner's federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural requirements. Id. at 2254; see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 119 L. Ed. 2d 326, 337 (1992). Thus, the independent state grounds doctrine bars the federal courts from reconsidering the issue in the context of habeas corpus review as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for its decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1988). Habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994-95 (1995). It is the responsibility of the court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the judgment.

If the court is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. Id. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, like the standard of review for a claim of judicial misconduct, is " 'the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.' " Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). "The relevant question is whether the prosecutor['s] comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' " Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). A federal court has no supervisory authority over criminal proceedings in state courts. The only standards we can impose on the states are those dictated by the Constitution. Daye, 712 F.2d at 1571.

Objectionable as some actions might be, when considered in the context of the trial as a whole they are not "of sufficient gravity to warrant the conclusion that fundamental fairness has been denied." Id. at 1572. See Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d at 807 (trial judge's caustic, sarcastic comments and offensive conduct, although perhaps inconsistent with institutional standards of federal courts, did not violate due process); Daye, 712 F.2d at 1572 (trial judge's skeptical attitude toward defendant's testimony, and his reinforcement of identification evidence by government witnesses, "approached but did not cross the line that permits [a ruling] that the Constitution has been violated"). The fact that a jury instruction is inadequate by Federal Court direct appeal standards does not mean a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas relief from a state court conviction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). In habeas proceedings challenging state court convictions, relief is available only for constitutional violations.

Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 147 (constitutionality determined not by focusing on ailing instruction "in artificial isolation" but by considering effect of instruction "in the context of the overall charge."). See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977) (recognizing that "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law" and, therefore, a habeas petitioner whose claim of error involves the failure to give a particular instruction bears an "especially heavy" burden). Shackling, except in extreme forms, is susceptible to harmless error analysis. Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d at 669. In a habeas case dealing with a state court sentence, the question is whether the shackling "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct.

1710, 1714 (1993)). If we are in "grave doubt" whether the error affected the verdict, the error is not harmless. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995). The risk of doubt, however, is on the state. Id. at 996 (rejecting language in Brecht v. Abrahamson which places on defendant burden of showing prejudice). See Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d at 149 (finding shackling at trial harmless error because defendant only wore waist chain that could not be seen by jury).

Question: What does ‘Habeas corpus’ translate to in English?
Answer: You have the body