How did Idi Amin Dada lead a successful coup in 1971? (Part 1, by William Miles) | PublisHistory Blog How did Idi Amin Dada lead a successful coup in 1971? (Part 1, by William Miles) 0 Obote’s actions on the 24th January 1971 set in motion the coup d’etat which was to bring Amin to power. On this evening, Obote, realising that he must contain Amin, called up the officer’s mess at Jinja barracks to order the General’s arrest. However, the switchboard was unmanned and, instead, the message was picked up by Sergeant-Major Mussa who subsequently seized the armoury to prevent the Acholi and Lang’o tribes access to the weapons they needed. Upon hearing this, Amin was forced to act and on the 25th January at 2am, open fire began to be heard in Kampala. Civilians were chased off the streets, government buildings were seized and the airport was closed. By breakfast, the coup had been successful and General Idi Amin Dada had assumed control.

But how did Amin gain the popularity and support to achieve such a feat? In this essay I attempt to tackle this question by looking at certain threads of the same tapestry. To begin with I shall focus on the man himself, Amin, for without a powerful figurehead at its forefront, it is unlikely that there would have been any taste for or belief in a successful coup. Next I will look at the situation in Uganda during the run up to the coup as this highlights the development of an environment ripe for change. Finally, I will analyse Obote’s own actions in alienating the Buganda tribe and adding further resentment against himself and his government. So; what of Amin himself? From the outset, he portrayed himself as one of the people. Although the President, he was willing to listen and talk to the people, and all his actions were aimed at helping them. “I am not completely communism and I am not capitalism…I am only leader who is alone completely and following only Uganda…we want just to be free…but we are not going to adopt anything but we only choose what is best for Uganda…” This quote is from the French Documentary ‘General Idi Amin Dada – Autoportrait’.

Although one must take this documentary with a pinch of salt (it had Amin’s backing and will have been edited and portrayed in the way that Amin desired) it gives an insight into the man’s character and, by using material to back up what is portrayed, one can see how that gained him the support necessary to lead the 1971 coup d’etat. The quote portrays Amin as a man of the people who is following a policy he believes to be the best for Uganda and all Ugandan people. In the same film Amin says “I lead my country on my best way how I want them to be lead according to my democracy, according to my knowledge and according to my thinking what is the best way of leading them and then I lead them according to that way…direct contact between me and the people, no middle man ”. These quotes clearly highlight a message being put across by Amin that he has the people’s interests at the forefront of all policies he undertakes. Although the documentary was filmed after Amin came to power, this message was prominent during his rise to power as well.

In Listowel’s book; ‘Amin’, she first meets General Amin in 1969 when collecting information on the situation in Uganda for the BBC. Although at the time Amin was still just Commander of the Army and Airforce, he clearly commanded respect whilst also fraternizing with the troops; Listowel states “He was surrounded by soldiers – other ranks – drinking beer. His tie was loosened, his tunic unbuttoned and a good deal of back slapping was going on…the soldiers were Obote’s men…there was General Amin drinking and making merry with his men; making friends in the President’s camp” . Further, Listowel provides evidence that, during Obote’s time in office, Amin defended the rights of the people. She refers to a meeting in the summer of 1970 between Obote and Amin where Amin vented his fury at Obote’s and Adoko’s dictatorship, the people’ poverty and loss of freedom, and the corruption and high living of Obote’s men .

These examples show a man who, in the eyes of the people, had their best interests at heart and this helped him gain popularity amongst Ugandans even before he gained power in 1971. Amin himself realised the importance of having the people’s support; as he says in Auto portrait “And if they found that what you are saying it is not truth then they will never listen for you again and that you will lose confidence to the people but the people likes me very much and the reason why I am very popular because I always speak to them truth and if I don’t have anything to tell them I keep quiet” . For a man to achieve success in an event such as a coup, he must not only be popular but also command respect and Amin not only portrayed himself as a General who had the people’s interests at heart but, importantly, he also highlighted his strength and power by spreading tales of his physical achievements. We see this in the film when he explains how he ran the 100 metres in 9.8 seconds and when he is shown winning a swimming race .

Regardless of the fact that at the time of the film the world 100m record was 9.95 seconds and during the swimming race Amin is shown swimming across the paths of the other competitors, the message is clear; Amin was a man of physical superiority. Indeed, Amin was physically a big man; Listowel writes “He grew into a strong lad, six-foot four-inches tall, who was to outshine his contemporaries by his physical prowess and leadership qualities” but it was tales of his achievements that most helped him build this reputation of a physically superior general. Listowel recounts a story told to her about Amin concerning the regimental sports day in 1957. An Asian entertainer lay a huge concrete block on his chest and shouted “Who would like to come and break it with a hammer on my chest? I can promise no harm will befall me.” At this, the figure of Amin loomed up carrying a sledgehammer. Immediately the crowd went silent in apprehension as they knew Amin could do it. Amin brought the sledgehammer down on the concrete block, breaking it into several pieces.

The Asian bruised, battered and badly-shaken, but alive staggered up, helped by Amin, who carried him off the field” . Throughout his career, Amin recognised the importance of the image of power. Once President, it became a rule in Uganda that only he could hold the title of ‘President’, as one senior doctor in the film Auto-portrait discovered to his cost when he mistakenly referred to ‘the President of the Uganda Medical Association ‘ whilst addressing Amin. The final element of Amin I will focus on is that of his military background. His position in the military was essential to his ability to seize power in 1971. Amin himself acknowledged when he was in power that he was a soldier at heart – “I am not a politician but a professional soldier. I am therefore a man of few words and I have been very brief throughout my professional career” . Amin was not an educated man; as he says in the film “I come from very poor family…my father has no money and I am to work, digging”. This is true.

Amin did receive at least two years of primary education but, as Mutibwa says in his book ‘Uganda since Independence’, “Amin, at the very best, was semi-literate and…he lacked, as Grace Ibingira has commented, “the sound foundation upon which to build [on his education]” . However, he was successful as a military man. Mutibwa writes “he possessed, in abundant measure, the qualities that appealed to the British when recruiting…the officers were looking for a strong physique, stamina, speed of reaction and an upright bearing. Amin fitted the bill exactly” . As British rule came to an end in Uganda, Amin found himself being promoted to positions a man of his background should never reach. The British were in a hurry to find officers to replace their own and they opted for traditional martial qualities rather than those of the educated. Thus, Amin found himself one of the first Ugandans to be given the Queen’s Commission as lieutenant . As he rose through the ranks, Amin began to command more and more power, even before being appointed as Obote’s Commander of the Army and Airforce. Not only did he gain power through this rise but also popularity.

Mutibwa again writes “Amin is the embodiment of a man who has made it big from humble, peasant beginnings without having to submit himself to the frustration of a formal education’s elite aculturation progress” . To adequately analyse the importance of Amin’s military background one must not overlook how his position protected him against sanctions which he might otherwise have suffered in regard to his behaviour. In 1964 Amin was sent by Obote to set up training camps for the rebels in the Congo whilst also being entrusted to bring out gold, ivory and coffee to pay for the arms and equipment provided to the rebels. However, in March 1965, Daudi Ocheng, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, produced evidence showing deposits in Amin’s bank accounts amounting to £17,000 in the month of February 1965 and in September of that year Ocheng proposed Amin should be temporarily suspended from his duties as Deputy Commander of the Army and his financial position officially investigated. However, requiring the support of Amin, Obote opposed the motion and so it was not passed.

Obote again defended Amin when he was accused by Ocheng of having been associated with secret military training groups of youths in eastern Uganda . Martin backs this view up in his book ‘General Amin’. He highlights the role played by Obote in exonerating Amin from the corruption charges – “a question mark was left against Amin’s name but in the space of nineteen days Amin had gone from facing the possibility of suspension to being promoted to Army Chief of Staff” . This act was a signal from Obote that the matter had been settled and Amin was innocent. Had Amin not had such a high position in the army, it is likely that he would have fallen from his position under such corruption charges. As it was, he was able to reach an even higher level. End of Part 1 How many people did Amin really kill? - Daily Monitor Uganda@50 How many people did Amin really kill? It is widely known that Idi Amin caused the killing and disappearance of scores of people during his eight-year rule in Uganda. The uncertainty however remains in the actual number of people slain by the country’s third president.

Friday September 28 2012 Idi Amin shares a light moment with Ian Wooldrige, a British sports journalist. PHOTO BY AGENCIES In Summary Footprints of death: Idi Amin used State organs and groups to eliminate his opponents or just unleashed terror on the population, as he sought to tighten his grip onto power. Advertisement By Harriet Anena It is widely known that Idi Amin caused the killing and disappearance of scores of people during his eight-year rule in Uganda. The uncertainty however remains in the actual number of people slain by the country’s third president. The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva estimate the number of people killed by Amin at between 80,000 and 300,000. Another estimate by exile organisations and Amnesty International, put the number of people killed at 500,000 out of the 12 million Ugandans at the time. Although it’s difficult to ascertain the actual number of people slain by Amin, what is clear is the legacy of bloodthirsty killings and economic bungling that has continued to persevere in varying magnitude.

Tracing Amin’s extermination schemes, historian Samwiri Karugire writes that when the Field Marshal took over power from Obote, he embarked on the elimination of his opponents “real or imaginary”. The Langi and Acholi army officers, whom Obote had relied on to embed his presidency, became the early victims of Amin’s wrath. However, even though the killings started a few months after the 1971 coup, Karugire says Ugandans did not give it the due concern, an attitude that could have silently tolerated the murders. “…because Ugandan societies were so deeply differentiated, these early ‘tribal’ murders did not appear alarming,” explains Karugire in his book, Roots of Instability in Uganda. Karugire cites Amin’s Public Safety Unit, the State Research Bureau and the Defence Council, as organs used to carry out a myriad of killings.

“These were the principal organs which were responsible for kidnapping and liquidation of countless Ugandans…their informers were to be found everywhere as their license to kill, maim, detain or extort was not subject to any restraint.” Phares Mutibwa, the author of Uganda since Independence, describes the exterminations during Amin’s first 20 months in office as massacres, citing the July 1971 attempted coup on Amin, where “…Acholi and Langi soldiers were massacred at Jinja, Moroto and Mbarara barracks”. The other mass killings, according to Mutibwa, were at Mutukula on the Uganda- Tanzania border in February 1972, the attempted coup in June 1972 and the September 1972 invasion. The killings which took place away from the city and free from cameras, would, despite reporting by journalists Nicholas Stroh and Siedle, not be believed by locals or foreigners, Mutibwa explains. “Foreigners as well as Ugandans tended to see the killings as no more than the normal ‘mopping up operations’ that follow a coup.

But the murders of the military officers and men were never reported, nor were they believed by Western diplomats based in Kampala, the British and Israelis openly ridiculing suggestions of mass killings.” However, in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, who offered refuge to Obote, insisted that his ousted colleague was the legitimate president of Uganda, while Amin was a murderer. “How can I sit at the same table with a killer? Jomo (Kenyatta) is speaking for his people who elected him. I am speaking for you. Whom will Amin be representing? I cannot sit with murderers,” Nyerere, addressing a rally in Dar es Salaam, says as quoted in General Amin by David Martin. By 1973, Amin had removed the thin gloves of civility or mask he had been wearing as his actions became visible and attracted condemnation on the international scene, including his cronies Britain and the Israelis. “By the beginning of 1973, Amin’s true nature was emerging –what Grace Ibingira has described as a combination of guile, buffoonery and utter ruthlessness in killing anyone even remotely suspected by him or his subordinates of being unfriendly.

The marriage between Amin and the population had not yet collapsed; no one was talking of divorce, but certainly the honeymoon was over,” elaborates Mutibwa. Idi Amin Dada: A dictator with no sense for economic management Idi Amin Dada: A dictator with no sense for economic management By EA Trade Review Reporter and Agencies "I do not want to be controlled by any superpower. I myself consider myself the most powerful figure in the world, and that is why I do not let any superpower control me." Idi Amin, president of Uganda, as quoted in Thomas and Margaret Melady's Idi Amin Dada: Hitler in Africa, Kansas City, 1977. For eight years, Idi Amin ruled Uganda with an iron fist. He killed, tortured and maimed tens of thousands of Ugandans. He had no respect for anybody but himself. Idi Amin contributed massively to the collapse of the East African Community in 1977. Prior to the eventual collapse, the dictator had recalled all Ugandans working in EAC organs and parastatals. His relationship with then Kenya’s President Jomo Kenyatta was at the lowest ebb.

At one time, Kenya government denied him channel to move kerosene he was given as gift by Iran from Mombasa to Kampala. However, Amin’s role in shaping the East African political landscape will remain the annals of history. To the Ugandans, his rule will remain a constant reminder of how one man can jeopardize the future of an entire population. But how did a man who boosted of never having gone to school at all take charge of a country and stay put for eight years doing all the unimaginable things in the eyes of the international community? Idi Amin Dada was born in 1925 near Koboko, in the West Nile Province.. Deserted by his father at an early age, he was brought up by his mother, a herbalist and diviner. He was a member of the Kakwa ethnic group, a small Islamic tribe that was settled in the region. He received little formal education in 1946 he joined the King’s African Riffles, Britain's colonial African troops, and served in Burma, Somalia, Kenya during the British suppression of the Mau Mau and Uganda.

As Uganda approached independence Idi Amin's close colleague Apolo Milton Obote, the leader f the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), was made chief minister, and then prime minister. Obote had Amin, one of only two high ranking Africans in the KAR, appointed as First Lieutenant of the Ugandan army. He began to strengthen his position within the army, using the funds obtained from smuggling and from supplying arms to rebels in southern Sudan. He also developed ties with British and Israeli agents in the country. President Obote first responded by putting Amin under house arrest, and when this failed to work, Amin was sidelined to a non-executive position in the army. However, on 25 January 1971, whilst Obote attended a Commonwealth meeting in Singapore, Amin led a coup d'etat and took control of the country, declaring himself president. Ironically, most Ugandans celebrated Amin‘s move though the celebrations were not to last. As a way to pacify the resident, he made plans to have the remains of King Freddie who had died in exile in 1969 brought back home for state burial.

Political prisoners, many of whom were his followers were freed and the Ugandan Secret Police was disbanded. However, at the same time Amin had 'killer squads' hunting down Obote's supporters. In August 1772, Amin had a dream. “I have dreamt,” he told a gathering in Karamoja, northeastern Uganda, “that unless I take action, our economy will be taken over. The people who are not Ugandans should leave.” He left Karamoja by helicopter and stopped at the Tororo airstrip in eastern Uganda. He had sent word that he wanted to address the army. There, he announced the dream again to a hurriedly organised parade by the Rubongi military unit. Some Asians were thrown into a panic. Others thought Amin was bluffing. Mr P. K. Kuruvilla had just bought a building in Kimathi Avenue in downtown Kampala, the capital. It was a home for his insurance company, United Assurance.

In summary Idi Amin Dada was born in 1925, near Koboko, West Nile province, Uganda He died in 16 August 2003, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where he had lived in exile He referred himself as “His Excellency President for Life, Field Marshal Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin, VC, DSO, MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea, and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular." “We invested all the money into buying the building. We took a loan from the bank, I had a house in Kololo and I mortgaged it to raise money for the building, he says” Then President Amin announced the expulsion and he thought the president was not serious. “I had put all my money plus a loan into the United Assurance property. We had confidence that we were going into a new era,” he says” But Amin meant every word and Ugandan-Asians had to leave in 90 days. Kuruvilla first sent off his family and lingered around just in case Amin changed his mind.

But Amin’s “economic war” was real. Many Ugandans celebrated and lined the streets daily to chant, “Go home Bangladeshi! Go home Bangladeshi!” The then British foreign secretary, James Callaghan, came to plead for the Asians, but Amin refused to change his mind. However, reality came to hit the Ugandans. The Asians were importers, and most of the imported goods they had imported got stuck in Mombasa, the Kenyan seaport. Nobody claimed the goods and Kenyans got them for peanuts. Uganda was hit by an acute shortage of essential goods. What saved the country was that coffee had the highest value ever at the time. One wagon of coffee was $1.8m. “I remember 22 August 1977,” recalls Etiang, “that time we were acutely short of paraffin. Iraq gave us paraffin – from one Muslim brother to another – but Kenyans refused to allow it to transit. ‘This is very bad indeed,’ said Amin.

Then he told me: ‘Go to your boss and see if he can allow it to transit through Dar es Salaam [Tanzania]’.” Etiang, the then foreign minister, went to see President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who agreed that the paraffin should transit through Mutukula – all two million litres. Lastly Idi Amin who became known as the 'Butcher of Uganda' for his brutal, despotic rule was removed from power by rebels assisted by Tanzanian government under President Nyerere. It is estimated that over 100,000 of his opponents were killed, tortured, or imprisoned. War Crime: Why Did Idi Amin Never Face Trial? - The Student Lawyer The Student Lawyer Facebook Twitter General Idi Amin Dada has been commonly ranked as one of the world’s most evil men along with Adolf Hitler, Osama bin Laden and others. He has been often described as a very eccentric character based on his buffoonery behaviour. The dictatorship of Idi Amin began in 1971 when he appointed himself as President of Uganda after a military coup d’etat, which forced President Milton Obote out of the country.

The regime under Idi Amin lasted for eight years and resulted in an estimated massacre of 400,000 people. In his time of ruling, Idi Amin committed numerous human rights abuses and war crimes. Tanzanians and Ugandan exiles eventually took over the capital city of Uganda, Kampala and managed to defeat Idi Amin. He was forced to flee the country and lived in Saudi Arabia until 2003 when he died of organ failure. Idi Amin was never held accountable for the horrific crimes he committed. Technically, Idi Amin should have been prosecuted in the International Criminal Court for the war crimes he committed. The International Criminal Court was set up by the international community to prosecute people like Idi Amin who abuse their authority and commit the most serious and unthinkable crimes. The International Criminal Court is governed by the Rome Statute treaty which was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002.

The list of what are considered to be war crimes are listed in the Rome Statute under Article 8, these include: • Wilful killing • Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to bodily health • Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities • Committing outrages personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment. There is an extensive list outlining the range of war crimes, this is only a glimpse of some of the war crimes listed under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. From what has been documented in history, it is more than clear that Idi Amin violated most of these crimes. Brief account of atrocities committed by Idi Amin During the time of his rule, he ordered the public execution of anyone that he suspected was against his regime. He supposedly kept the heads of his victims that he had ordered to be killed in his fridge and allegedly ate some of their body parts. There was also an eradication of the Asian population within Uganda and cruel methods of slaughter were used, such as using sledgehammers to kill people. Most of the murders were done in public and executions by firing squad were displayed on television.

Uganda literally turned into a bloodbath during this time, dead bodies were notoriously found in the Nile having floated there from Uganda. There was clearly enough evidence to summon Idi Amin to face prosecution in the International Criminal Court. Article 5 of the Rome statute states that the court only holds jurisdiction for ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’. In this case it was beyond doubt that the crimes that Idi Amin committed constituted as serious. Furthermore, the massive death toll surely raises moral obligations on other states to take some sort of action. According to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977, it is the primary responsibility for the state in question to prosecute people for war crimes. In that sense, the International Criminal Court is only to be used as an alternative when that primary responsibility fails. In this case, at the time of Idi Amin’s reign it would have been impossible for the state of Uganda to put him on trial; his behaviour instilled fear upon his citizens, they would not have taken the risk of taking a stand against him. Even after Idi Amin had fled Uganda, national prosecution proceedings would have only taken place once he was back on Ugandan soil.

Furthermore, the country was still in an emotionally volatile state and in physical ruins. The judicial system would have been in no stable state to carry out these proceedings. Therefore, since the primary responsibility of the state failed, this would mean that the International Criminal Court had the duty to take action. The function of the International Criminal Court as a complementary authority was to take over the prosecution of Idi Amin for his war crimes. The other alternative would have been to bring grounds for prosecution at the request of the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is inexcusable that Idi Amin was never prosecuted given the fact that there were a number of different options to bring him to trial. Idi Amin spent the rest of his life in sanctuary in Saudi Arabia while his victims and their families were left with trauma and, a long journey of recovery. The nature of his crimes provides conclusive evidence that he was more than guilty. Instead it seems that he got a free get out of jail card. A case like this places great pressure on the future for the International Criminal Court and Rome Statute to work effectively to prevent similar outcomes.

The International Criminal Court is currently being questioned about why the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has not being prosecuted for his war crimes. This is the right time for the International Criminal Court to use it functions and fulfil its purpose. Exclusive email insights, members-only careers events, insider tips and more. Truth Commission: Uganda 74 | United States Institute of Peace Truth Commission: Uganda 74 Truth Commission: Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January, 1971 Duration: 1974 Charter: Commission of Inquiry Act 1914 Commissioners: 4 Report: Not made public Truth Commission: Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January, 1971 Dates of Operation: 1974 (6 months) Background: In 1971, a junior army officer named Idi Amin Dada ousted the authoritarian president Milton Obote from power. While Amin was initially welcomed enthusiastically, he quickly dissolved parliament and altered the constitution granting himself absolute power. Subsequently, Ugandan state forces carried out an organized campaign of repression that included killings and disappearances.

Strong public pressure mounted for an inquiry to be conducted into disappearances occurring during the early years of the Amin government. President Amin established the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda in June 1974. However, it did little to affect the continued brutality of his eight-year rule. Charter: Commission of Inquiry Act 1914 (87KB-PDF), June 30, 1974, in presidential legal notice no. 2. It can also be found in Appendix 8 contained in section 5 of the report (pages 115-118 of the PDF). Mandate: The Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda was to investigate and report on disappearances in the first years of the Amin government from January 25, 1971 until 1974. Commissioners and Structure: The commission was comprised of four members, all men. It was chaired by an expatriate Pakistani judge, and included two Ugandan police superintendents and a Ugandan army officer. Report: Although most hearings were public, a report was never published. A confidential copy was handed over to Idi Amin.

Conclusions 308 cases of disappearance were presented to the commission. The commission concluded that the Public Security Unit and the National Investigation Bureau, both of which had been set up by President Amin, bore the main responsibility for the disappearances. Recommendations The commission recommended reforming the police and the armed forces. It suggested that law enforcement officials be trained in human rights standards. Subsequent Developments: The four commissioners were targeted by the state in reprisal for their work. Special Notes: The commission is known as the first truth commission. Sources: Carver, Richard. "Called to Account: How African Governments Investigate Human Rights Violations." African Affairs 89, no. 356 (July 1, 1990): 391-415. Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. "Justice in Perspective - Truth and Justice Commission, Africa - Uganda." Available at (accessed June 25, 2008). Hayner, Priscilla B. "Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study." Human Rights Quarterly 16, no.

4 (1994): 597-655. Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New York: Routledge, 2002. Peterson, Trudy Huskamp. Final Acts: A Guide to Preserving the Records of Truth Commissions. Washington, D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. Available at (accessed October 26, 2008). TRIAL (Track Impunity Always). "Truth Commission in Uganda." Available at (accessed June 11, 2009). Share This Article: Facebook Twitter June 30, 1974 January 18, 2017 - 11:00am Washington Ambassador Donald Booth is completing almost two and half years as the U.S. special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. He will discuss the lessons learned from recent international initiatives to end violent conflict in both countries, and the road ahead for that effort and for the U.S. role. To receive the latest updates sign up for USIP's newsletters.

Weak Ugandan Democracy, Strong Regional Influence Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s reputation is weakened by his unwillingness to leave office: he was elected for a fifth term of office in February 2016 in an election that drew international criticism. This report, a joint publication of USIP and the Institute for Security Studies, explores... What it Takes: Youth Working for Peace and Equality It was a startling discovery five years ago that prompted then 21-year-old Shubey Nantege of Uganda to found Go Girl Africa. The organization has provided financial literacy skills to 2,500 girls and young women, helping them make positive changes in their... International Election Fraud Alerts May Spark Violence Condemnations of election fraud by international monitors have become staples of global efforts to advance democratic practices and honor the will of a country’s citizens. But what if these denunciations actually make things worse? That was the finding from three years of research conducted by... Q&A: Uganda’s Troubled Election Political polarization is high in the East African nation of Uganda, following the February 18 elections in which President Yoweri Museveni has claimed a victory that will extend his 30-year rule of the country.

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وحظيت الدراسة، التي تُعد جزءًا من مشروع الممتد على مدار ثلاث سنوات (PISU) معهد السلام الأمريكي بشأن سيادة القانون خلال الفترة الانتقالية لمرحلة ما بعد الربيع العربي في اليمن، بدعم من مكتب شؤون المخدرات وإنفاذ القوانين الدولية التابع لوزارة الخارجية الأمريكية. وبموجب تصريح من وزارة الداخلية ومصلحة السجون اليمنية، قام فريق البحث - المكون من المؤلفتين فيونا مانغان وإيريكا غاستون التابعتين لمعهد السلام الأمريكي، وأيمن الإرياني وطه ياسين التابعين للمركز اليمني لقياس الرأي العام، والاستشارية لميس الحميدي -بزيارة سبعة وثلاثين مقر احتجاز في ست محافظات لتقييم الأداء التنظيمي والبنية التحتية ووضع السجناء والأمن. How did Idi Amin Dada lead a successful coup in 1971? (Part 2, by William Miles) | PublisHistory Blog How did Idi Amin Dada lead a successful coup in 1971?

(Part 2, by William Miles) 0 The second strand I wish to analyse is that of the conditions in Uganda prior to the coup itself. For a successful coup, there must be discontent amongst the people of the nation and a desire for change. “Surtaxes have left the common man of this country poorer than ever before. Here are some of the taxes which the common man has to bear: development tax, graduated tax, sales tax, social security fund tax. The big men escape these taxes or pass them on to the common man. The prices which the common man gets for his crops like cotton and coffee have not gone up and sometimes they have gone down; whereas the cost of food and education have always gone up” This quote is from the radio broadcast delivered immediately after the coup had taken place and reflected the people’s discontent but the situation in Uganda was a complex one and I am going to use Obote’s address to the national assembly on the 20th April, 1970 to aid me in analysing it. In this speech, Obote highlighted the key problem present in Uganda in the lead up to the coup, stating “We are all aware of the heavy incidence of job seeking in towns.

This is partly a phenomenon which comes from development” . This condition is key to understanding the problems which affected Ugandans at the time. Obote was indeed correct that there was rising unemployment in Uganda.. This had been as a result of the increasing education in the country, a policy adopted enthusiastically by Obote. As Listowel shows, 28% of the budget was devoted to education which had resulted in an increased number of children receiving it; primary education rose from 435,000 in 1962 to 636,000 in 1969, secondary school education from 9,500 to 42,000 and university students from 1,500 to 3,400 . However, although this was a sign of increased development in the nation, it was achieved too quickly for employers who didn’t have enough openings in urban areas to accommodate the sudden increase in size of the labour force. Education “not only led to congested urban areas, with thousands of unemployed hands, but also increased both social and physical mobility, resulting in intense competition for jobs, promotions, appointments and scholarships” .

Unsurprisingly, this bred discontent as many young educated Ugandans were left in limbo, unable to find work in the towns but at the same time alienated from the traditional agricultural way of life. Simultaneously, the revenue received by Ugandan farmers had been reducing due to falling prices of the main cash crops of Uganda, cotton and coffee. Obote tried to argue differently in his speech; “coffee production has more than doubled and cotton production has gone up more than 50%. The solid work done by the Uganda farmers in these two crops and in food production has since expanded” . The evidence, however, is against him. Gukiina in ‘Uganda: A case study in African Political Development’ highlights this decline, stating “Coffee fell in price from 21 cents per pound in 1955 to 11 cents per pound in the early 60s and as low as 4 cents per pound in 1968. This happened at a time when prices generally had been increasing” .

Obote was responsible for the general higher prices because, aware that he required the support of the army to stay in power, he invested heavily in it; “he had to increase their salaries as a means of keeping them satisfied and loyal to his government, hence a defence budget of $17,025,000 in 1966, which is 10.2% of the national budget and nearly as large as the combined defence budgets of Kenya and Tanzania” . This increased expenditure meant higher taxes which resulted in higher prices of sugar, salt, rice, meat, medicine and clothing whilst farmers became poorer through falling coffee and cotton prices. Such a situation would inevitably breed resentment, something Gukiina emphasises when he says “The peasantry remained unhappy with the national government and Obote because the coffee and cotton prices had been on a gradual decline since independence” . However, this is not the whole story. Whilst admitting unemployment, Obote sought justification by claiming general success achieved in Uganda since independence, saying in his address “One of the most popular and leading labels often put on developing countries by their detractors is that the Governments of such countries are unable to deliver the goods.

That label, certainly does not apply in the case of this Government ” and in a speech on the 31st December 1969 “the last ten years have been years of unqualified success and unprecedented development” . There was truth in this as shown by the education stats above and, as Listowel states, the fact that “by 1969 eighty percent of the civil service was manned by Africans; all agricultural production and distribution, including various marketing boards, were in African hands; forty-five percent of the retail trade belonged to Africans, and they had begun to play a part in commerce and industry” . Further, as Gukiina highlights, under Obote “medical services have more than tripled…the GNP was increasing at a rate of 10 to 12% per year compared to less than 4% before independence” . However, what Obote failed to recognise in is address was the seriousness of the failings which Uganda experienced since independence. The rising unemployment and falling crop prices affected the Ugandan peasantry and therefore the majority of Ugandans. For them, conditions had deteriorated under Obote. They had been promised a better way of life but their President had failed to deliver.

The main problem for Obote was that the peasantry did not understand the complexity of economic trade and felt that if crop prices were falling then Obote must have been to blame; “The peasantry did not understand the economic world and merely saw Obote as the one who fixes the price whilst 100% of US exports amounting to $5.62 million was paid by profits of coffee and cotton. The farmers came to view Obote as corrupt and responsible for the low coffee and cotton prices” . Therefore, although Obote did make deserved claims to the successes of his government, he failed to recognisee the extent of the unrest and this unrest built as conditions worsened and offered Amin a population keen on an alternative government. “Dr Obote was bound to remain in the eyes of most Ugandans, a ruthless, cold, morally corrupt power grabber. All possibilities considered, Obote was destined to hold on to power for as long as the police and the army were prepared to enforce his authority” . In other words, he had lost the support of the people. The third and final strand I will analyse is how Obote alienated the Buganda tribe and added to the resentment towards his government.

For this, I will refer to a series of newspaper articles from the Times, reporting the events of the Battle of Mengo Hill on May 24th 1966, the climax of a growing tension between the Buganda, Uganda’s largest tribe, and Obote. As one of the articles explains, “The tension has gripped Uganda since Frederick Mutesa was deposed in February from the office of President of Uganda by Dr.Milton Obote” . This was indeed the case. When Uganda gained its independence, Obote came to power only through an alliance with the Buganda. The Buganda, as Ibingira says in his book ‘The Forging of An African Nation”, had “concession granted to the Kingdom of Buganda in respect to certain legislative powers which the Lukiiko was to exercise independently of the Uganda Parliament…the Government have no constitutional power to determine the fate of the royal throne” . It was through this U.P.C/K.Y partnership that Uganda emerged as an independent nation. However, to understand the mindset of the people it is important to understand where the root of their beliefs lay. The Buganda believed that these concessions were theirs of right and not something which could be taken away.

This is highlighted by Gukiina who recalls a speech given by Apolo Nsibambi, a lecturer in political science, who said “Buganda felt that since Buganda as a whole was never conquered by the British and that since the British were freely invited by the Buganda to protect them, the Buganda retained their natural sovereignty and that they had the right to renounce British protection at anytime and regain the responsibility of protecting the nation of Buganda” . The attack of Mengo Hill was a clear removal of the Bugandan people’s rights, rights they believed to be sacrosanct. And which were promised at the time of independence. One article highlights the reaction when it states “Tribal leaders are shocked and angry at the merciless attack on the Ruler’s palace by Government troops, in which it is believed that more than 1,000 people died” . However, this attack was only the beginning of Obote’s war against the Buganda. On 8th September 1967 a new constitution was adopted confirming the abolition of the Kingdoms, dividing Buganda into four districts with the same status as those elsewhere in Uganda and considerably tightening the central government’s control over the districts, removing their autonomy.

Gukiina writes “To the masses in other kingdoms, the downfall of the Kabaka did not mean a downfall of an enemy but a downfall of a great symbol of traditional rule. Since Obote could dethrone a King so powerful as was the Kabaka of Buganda, then the masses reasoned, their own leaders were in real danger from Obote” . His actions not only invoked fear from other tribes but also anger from the Bugandans. After the attack on Mengo Hill, the Bugandan people were encouraged to wage civil war on the government; “Buganda chiefs and political leaders were today urging two million ardent supporters of the Kabaka to civil war against President Obote and his central Government. Leaflets were scattered throughout Buganda telling the people to enforce the Kabaka’s ultimatum to Dr.Obote that the central Government must move from Buganda soil by May 30th” . This was a clear separation of the tribe from the Ugandan government, something which worsened throughout the following years as Obote continued to tighten his control on them, culminating in Obote being shot outside the national convention of the UPC at Christmas in 1969. Although he survived, the message was clear.

He had lost the support of the Bugandan tribe, providing an alternative leader with a large support base in the centre of the nation, a concept that Listowel supports when she writes “The mishandling of the Buganda made it certain that any well-organised coup effort would have the automatic support of the heartland of Uganda” . Although only touching the tip of an iceberg, through the factors we have analysed we can see how Uganda was primed for a new lease of life. The people wanted change and they needed a powerful personality to bring about these changes. When these two requirements coincided, the success of the coup d’etat was without doubt.

In this essay, I have ignored other factors surrounding Amin’s rise to power such as the argument made in Martin’s book that the critical factor which turned the tide against Obote was the involvement of at least 500 Southern Sudanese Anyanya guerillas and the fact that, at the time of seizing power, Amin had the support of Britain, as seen in newspaper articles from the Spectator “If a choice is to be made between quiet military men and noisy civil dictators then I prefer, in Africa at least, the military” or the New Statesman “So far as Britain is concerned, Amin will undoubtedly be easier to deal with than the abrasive Obote” for I just don’t have the space to analyse it all. However, the three factors I have chosen are, I believe, the integral ones to his rise to power for without the character of the man himself and the desire for change within the people, a coup would never have been successful. As it was, when Amin gave his first speech, he did so knowing he was addressing a nation in support of change.

Obote had managed to turn the people against him and his government, be it through his severe oppression of the Bugandan people and his removal of their traditional rights of self rule by actions such as on the 26th February 1966 suspending the 1962 Constitution or his inability to provide for the Ugandan peasantry the better way of life they had been promised at independence. Therefore, a man like Amin, physically strong, politically powerful, and supported by the people had been provided an opportunity through which a successful coup could be led, and on the 24th January 1971, he did just that. Bibliography Primary Sources: • Obote, Milton, Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly on 20th April, 1970, ‘The Common Man’s Charter (Uganda, 1970) • Schroeder, Barbet, General Idi Amin Dada – Autoportrait (Les Films du Losange, 1974) Websites: Home Page Home Page INTRODUCTION TO IDI AMIN: HERO OR VILLAIN?

Did you know that Idi Amin has two grown twin sons by a Former Female Israeli Secret Service Agent? Did you know that there are people who think Idi Amin was framed for the murders he allegedly committed in Uganda? Did you know that some people think Idi Amin was “set up” and “slandered” because he couldn’t be controlled by "super powers?" Did you know that Idi Amin’s father was a Police Officer and not a peasant as told by many people and he served as a soldier in the First World War? Did you know that Idi Amin was guarded by a snake as an infant while being subjected to an unusual paternity test practiced by ancient Kakwa? Did you know that Idi Amin wrestled a crocodile in Somalia during a tour of duty when he was in the Kings African Rifles? Did you know that Idi Amin disobeyed orders from his British Superiors to shoot Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta on sight during colonialism and saved his life instead? Did you know that Idi Amin’s superiors held him in high regard during his time in the Kings African Rifles?

Did you know that Idi Amin was forced to become the President of Uganda at gun point? Did you know that Idi Amin had a “rock solid” relationship with Israel before he crossed over to the Palestinian side? Did you know that Idi Amin gave a 10,000 dollar tip to a Black American cleaning lady while on an official trip to New York City, to ease her suffering from racism? Did you know that the novel and film "The Last King of Scotland" is fictional? Did you know that during the war that led to his ouster, Idi Amin travelled to the war frontline and waved to the opposing soldiers and they excitedly waved back instead of shooting him? Did you know that Idi Amin’s Presidential Guards “wrestled him to the ground” to get him out of harm’s way because he wanted to die in Uganda like a true soldier during the war to overthrow him?

Question: Where did Idi Amin rule from 1971 -1979?
Answer: Uganda