Salamanca | Britain's Greatest Battles | Online Exhibitions | National Army Museum, London Legacy The Context The Peninsular War began with the French and Spanish invasion of Portugal in 1807. In 1808 Napoleon turned on his Spanish ally, placing his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. An expeditionary force commanded by Arthur Wellesley was despatched to Portugal and enjoyed initial success, defeating the French at Vimeiro in August 1808. By 1812 Wellington had secured Lisbon behind the Lines of Torres Vedras and then driven French troops from Portugal. The beginning of 1812 saw Wellington take the offensive into Spain. The town of Ciudad Rodrigo was taken on 8 January and, following a costly assault, the formidable fortress of Badajoz fell to the allied force of Britain, Spain and Portugal on 6 April. While there were 230,000 French troops in Spain at this time, they were divided between five armies and Napoleon’s imminent campaign against Russia meant that reinforcements were not available. Wellington had ensured French forces were held in place by Spanish regular and guerrilla actions that pinned them down throughout the peninsula.

Once General Rowland Lord Hill severed communications between Marshal Marmont and Marshal Soult, capturing the Tagus crossing at Almaraz in May, Marmont’s isolation made him Wellington’s prime target. Wellington marched on Salamanca and entered the city on 17 June. Ten days later he took three of the outlying forts in an attempt to force Marmont into action. With Marmont unwilling to commit, Wellington moved out to manoeuvre against him, probing for an advantage that would allow him to force a battle. Wellington’s intelligence reports, however, warned that Marmont was soon to be reinforced by troops sent by Joseph Bonaparte. Fearing he had lost the initiative, Wellington was forced to consider the abandonment of Salamanca and retreat back to Portugal. The Armies Marshal Auguste Marmont (1774-1852) was a skilled artillery officer who had been an aide to Napoleon in his 1796 campaign in Italy. Once Marshal Massena was defeated decisively by Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro (1811), Marmont replaced him as commander of the Army of Portugal.

By July 1812 this army consisted of 50,000 men and 78 guns. Lieutenant-General Arthur Wellesley (1762-1852), Earl of Wellington, had been appointed to command in Portugal on 6 April 1809, following the death of General Sir John Moore. He had made his name in a series of campaigns in India, including significant victories against Tipu Sultan in 1799 and at Assaye in 1803. He had already had success against the French in the peninsula, defeating them at Talavera in July 1809, for which he was given the title Earl of Wellington. At Salamanca, Wellington’s army was 48,000-strong and included contingents of both Portuguese and Spanish troops. He also commanded 60 guns. The Battle By 22 July 1812 the two armies were west of Salamanca. Skirmishes broke out around two flat-topped hills that dominated the area, known as the Greater and Lesser Arapiles. The British occupied the Lesser whilst the French had the Greater.

As the armies continued to move south-west, with Marshal Marmont attempting to block Wellington’s route to Portugal, Wellington’s forces remained hidden behind ridges north east of the Lesser Arapile. Marmont believed he knew his enemy. Wellington was a defensive general and would not be attacked on ground not of his own choosing. When Marmont noticed dust clouds created by Wellington’s baggage train, he believed his whole army to be in retreat. He instantly ordered three divisions to sweep quickly westwards to cut off Wellington’s escape. Wellington immediately seized his opportunity. Realising that Marmont had overstretched his forces, he launched a series of hammer-blows against the French columns. Major-General Edward Pakenham’s 3rd Division surprised Marmont’s left wing, which was shattered. Wellington then unleashed Major-General John Gaspard Le Marchant’s cavalry brigades, causing further havoc amongst French lines and accounting for ‘40,000 Frenchmen in 40 minutes’. Le Marchant himself was killed trying to break a French square. Early in the battle both Marmont and his second-in-command, General Jean Pierre Bonnet, had been injured.

Command passed to General Bertrand Clausel who launched a counter-attack against Wellington’s centre. Against a lesser commander, this might have saved the French army, but Wellington was equal to the task, bringing up reinforcements commanded by Major-General Henry Clinton to shore up his middle. By the end of the day, only General Maximilien Foy’s 1st Division remained intact. Five of the eight French divisions had been devastated. The Impact Marshal Marmont’s army lost at least 14,000 men and 20 guns, while allied losses were around half as many. The French defeat would have been even more disastrous had the Spanish garrison not abandoned the river crossing at Alba de Tormes. Much to Wellington’s annoyance, the French were allowed to escape to safety. Salamanca proved that Wellington had the ability to manoeuvre and attack in the open field. His reputation for being mainly a defensive general was destroyed. The outstanding victory gave the British and their allies a psychological superiority over the French that would last throughout the remainder of the war. Following the victory at Salamanca, Wellington was able to liberate Madrid.

Joseph Bonaparte’s authority in Spain was undermined and Spanish guerrillas were encouraged to increase their operations against the weakened French garrisons. The victory persuaded the British government that the war was worth pursuing, and the subsequent Battle of Vitoria in June 1813 showed the Russians, Prussians and Austrians that Napoleon could be defeated. When Wellington entered France in October 1813, Napoleon was soon forced to abdicate. Salamanca had been one of the key turning points. The Legacy As a visual and very personal response to the events in the peninsula, the Spanish artist Francisco Goya created a set of horrific etchings entitled ‘The Disasters of War’ (1810-20). Although not printed until 1863, the prints detail the horrors of war and show episodes such as the Battle of Salamanca without the traditional view of glory and honour. Goya also painted Wellington (National Gallery, London) who sat for him following the liberation of Madrid in 1812. Salamanca features in several novels including Leo Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’ (1869) and Bernard Cornwall’s ‘Sharpe’s Sword’ (1983).

Tours to Peninsular War sites like Salamanca are very popular today. As part of the 200th anniversary celebrations in July 2012 a group of serving and retired soldiers from The Rifles took part in a visit to the battlefield and city of Salamanca. The battle honour ‘Salamanca’ is shared by all the forming regiments of this unit. There they joined other British regiments in a parade with their Spanish army counterparts. The Mayor of Salamanca bestowed the Freedom of the City on The Rifles, only the second time in its history that Salamanca has presented this honour (the first being to Pope John Paul II in 1982). The field of Salamanca itself is largely unchanged from the time of the battle, although there is a commemorative monument located there. In nearby Arapiles there is also a museum describing the battle through dioramas, relief maps, video presentations and items recovered from the battlefield.

Talavera Battlefield Monument - Talavera de la Reina, Spain - History and Visitor Information Site information Talavera Battlefield Monument HISTORY The Talavera Battlefield Monument near Talavera in Spain, commemorates the Battle of Talavera, which took place on 27 and 28 July 1809 and was the Duke of Wellington’s - then Sir Arthur Wellesley’s - first major victory of the Peninsular War, part of the Napoleonic Wars. The Talavera Battlefield Monument is a large memorial on the battlefield itself, although much of the battlefield is now separated by a road. It is actually a new monument, the original now being located on private land. The Peninsular War 1808-1814 Europe in 1808 By the year 1808 France had achieved domination over the great majority of continental Europe. Through victories at Ulm (1805), Austerlitz (1805), Jena-Auerstädt (1806) and Friedland (1807) her armies had successively eliminated Austria, Prussia and Russia as military opponents.

Britain alone had withstood the power of France, achieving security against invasion through Nelson's victory over the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (1805). The tide began to turn in 1808 when Napoleon created a new enemy by usurping the Spanish throne in favour of his brother Joseph. The Spanish uprising that followed encouraged Britain to send an expeditionary force to the Iberian Peninsula. The ensuing war was to play a major part in Napoleon's downfall. The War: Consolidation, 1808-1811 The road to war began in the autumn of 1807 when Napoleon moved French troops through Spain to invade Portugal. After feeding more than 100,000 troops into Spain under the pretext of supporting the invasion, Napoleon deposed the existing Spanish monarch in April 1808 in order to place his own brother Joseph on the throne. Although the ensuing Spanish uprising can hardly have come as a surprise to Napoleon, he failed to see that the revolt could never be completely suppressed. Britain now had a new ally in Spain and in August 1808 landed an expeditionary force under the command of Lt.-Gen.

Sir Arthur Wellesley at the mouth of the Mondego river in Portugal. Moving south towards Lisbon, Wellesley defeated Delaborde at Roliça on 17th August before turning to the mouth of the Maceira river to protect the landing of reinforcements. On 21st August, Wellesley's position around Vimeiro Hill was attacked from the east by Junot. The Battle of Vimeiro was the first occasion on which Napoleonic offensive tactics combining skirmishers, columns and supporting artillery fire failed against the British infantry line and Wellesley's defensive skills. Junot was defeated, though an opportunity to inflict further damage on the French was lost as the out-ranked Wellesley was replaced first by Burrard and then by Dalrymple. Wellesley's victory was still sufficient to persuade the French to evacuate Portugal as part of a controversial agreement which became known as the Convention of Sintra. The departure of Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley to face criticism of the Convention in Britain left Sir John Moore in command of a British army of 30,000 in Portugal.

The scale of the war in the Peninsula escalated as a Spanish victory over Dupont at Bailén in July was answered by Napoleon's arrival in Spain at the head of 200,000 veteran troops. Moore struck towards Burgos and the northern flank of Napoleon's army, succeeding in drawing French forces away from southern Spain before being forced to retreat westwards. The retreat ended in the evacuation by sea of Moore's army at La Coruña in January 1809, and in the loss of Moore's own life. Napoleon meanwhile had transferred command of the pursuit to Soult and returned to Paris, never again to lead an army in the Peninsula. In April 1809 Wellesley, freed from criticism over the Convention of Sintra, returned to Portugal and assumed command of all British-Portuguese forces. Immediately, he implemented three innovations in army organization: the infantry were for the first time divided into autonomous divisions, each infantry brigade was provided with at least one company of riflemen, and - to mutual benefit - one battalion of Portuguese infantry was placed in each of five British brigades.

After defeating Soult at Porto on 12th May, Wellesley crossed the border into Spain, joined forces with the Spanish general Cuesta, and marched eastwards. On 27th-28th July, French armies under Joseph attacked the allies north of Talavera. The British-Portuguese lines held throughout the Battle of Talavera , finally compelling Joseph to abandon the battlefield. The victory had, however, been costly and, with Soult threatening to cut the road to Portugal, Wellesley was forced to fall back. The latter months of 1809 saw Spanish armies crushed first at Ocaña and then at Alba de Tormes, while Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington of Talavera, concentrated on building defences astride the roads into Portugal and began construction work on the Lines of Torres Vedras , a deep defensive system protecting Lisbon. The value of Wellington's preparations was proved in the following year when Masséna led a French army through Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida in a fresh attempt to re-take Portugal.

Despite being repulsed on 27th September 1810 in his attacks against Wellington's position on the ridge at Buçaco , Masséna was able to force Wellington to seek safety behind the Lines of Torres Vedras. Masséna had no chance of breaking through with the forces at his disposal, and a stand-off ensued until a lack of supplies and the imminent arrival of British reinforcements in the spring of 1811 led Masséna to fall back. With one French army under Soult checked by Graham's victory at Barrosa on 5th March 1811, Wellington was able to push Masséna out of Portugal. Counter-attacks at Fuentes de Oñoro on 3rd and 5th May 1811 were repulsed after desperate struggles in the streets of the village. Masséna, having failed to re-take Portugal, was replaced by Marmont. A further bloody battle took place at Albuera on 16th May as Soult's move north was intercepted by a combined British-Portuguese-Spanish force under Beresford.

Although Beresford's handling of the battle - in which the French made the largest single infantry attack of the War - attracted much criticism, Soult was finally forced to retreat. French armies continued to threaten Wellington throughout the latter months of 1811, but at no time were able to catch him at a disadvantage. The turning point of the war had been reached. The War: Attack, 1812-1814 On 8th January 1812 Wellington began to advance through Spain. Ciudad Rodrigo fell on 19th January followed, after a costly assault, by Badajoz on 6th April. Wellington's ability to push on eastwards in the face of an enemy that was numerically far superior was made possible by Spanish regular and guerrilla forces pinning down French armies elsewhere in Spain. On 17th June, Wellington entered Salamanca with only Marmont's army in the vicinity. The two armies shadowed each other over the next few weeks until Marmont attempted to out-flank Wellington on 22nd July. Wellington seized the opportunity to attack and in the ensuing Battle of Salamanca won a crushing victory.

Wellington entered Madrid on 6th August and penetrated as far as Burgos before being forced to withdraw to Salamanca and then to Ciudad Rodrigo when threatened by a combined French force under Soult, Joseph and Suchet. Over the winter of 1812/1813 events moved further in Wellington's favour. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June 1812 had ended in disaster, and by March 1813 French armies in east Europe were falling back to the Elbe river. With Prussia re-entering the war against France on 16th March, Napoleon was unable to spare fresh troops for the Peninsula as he prepared to counter-attack in the east. At the same time reinforcements continued to be fed into Wellington's army. The difficulties facing the French commanders, Joseph and Jourdan, mounted as their armies became increasingly pinned down by allied regular and guerrilla forces. In May 1813 Wellington returned to the offensive, striking northwards towards Burgos without allowing the French armies the chance to concentrate. From Burgos, Wellington outflanked Joseph by wheeling through the mountains to the north.

Joseph finally took up a defensive position in the valley of the Zadorra river, only to see his forces routed on 21st June in the Battle of Vitoria . Vitoria essentially sealed Napoleon's fate. News of Wellington's victory not only rallied the Prussian-Russian alliance after defeats by Napoleon at Lützen and Bautzen, but contributed towards Austria's decision in August to re-enter the war against France. By mid-July, Wellington had reached the Pyrenees while Joseph and Jourdan had been replaced by Soult. Although a counter-offensive by Soult was briefly successful at Maya and Roncesvalles, Wellington's victory at Sorauren on 28th July restored the initiative to the allies. On 7th October Wellington crossed the Bidassoa into France; on 10th November the French defences along the line of the Nivelle were broken. Soult counter-attacked again on 10th December after Wellington had crossed the Nive. Fighting continued over four days before the allied army under Hill's command forced Soult back to the outskirts of Bayonne.

In the meantime, the continental allies were closing in on the French border from the east following victories at Dennewitz in September and Leipzig in October. On 27th February 1814, having succeeded in drawing Soult away from Bayonne, Wellington attacked and defeated the French Marshal at Orthez. Although the resolve of the continental allies was again tested by Napoleon's vigorous defence of France, Paris was entered by the allies on 31st March. The last battle of the Peninsular War was fought on 10th April as Wellington cleared the French from the Calvinet Ridge overlooking the city of Toulouse. On 12th April, news reached Wellington of Napoleon's abdication. After six years, the Peninsular War was over. An Appraisal It can well be argued that the seeds of Napoleon's defeat and abdication in 1814 were sown by the Emperor himself six years earlier when he usurped the Spanish throne for his brother Joseph and, in so doing, alienated the Spanish nation. The myth of French invincibility in battle was soon exposed by the defeats of Dupont and Junot at Bailén and Vimeiro in 1808.

Despite the withdrawal from La Coruña, Britain - through her navy's domination of the seas - was able to take advantage of an alliance with Portugal and Spain to gain a foothold on Continental Europe. By 1810-1811, 300,000 French troops had been sucked into the Peninsula, and yet only 70,000 could be spared to confront Wellington; the remainder were pinned down elsewhere by the threat of local insurrections and the actions of guerrillas. With the French unable to concentrate their forces against the British-Portuguese army, Wellington was able to move on to the offensive. Although the outcome of Napoleon's 1812 invasion of Russia may not have been decided by events in the Peninsula, the course of the 1813 German campaign almost certainly was. Not only was the absence of some 200,000 French troops still locked into the Peninsula pivotal, but also Wellington's crushing victory at Vitoria served to rally the Prussian-Russian alliance that was wavering after setbacks at Lützen and Bautzen.

Napoleon is said to have exclaimed that it was absurd "que quarante mille Anglais gâtent toutes les affaires d'Espagne." Alongside their Portuguese and Spanish allies they surely accomplished considerably more. Further Reading "Wellington in the Peninsula 1808-1814" by Jac Weller, published by Greenhill Books 1999, ISBN 1853673811. Highly recommended. "A History of the Peninsular War, Volumes I-VII" by Sir Charles Oman, published by Greenhill Books 1995-1997. The definitive history of the War. "Wellington's Peninsular War" by Julian Paget, published by Pen & Sword 1992, ISBN 0850526035. Less substantial than Weller, though useful for its notes on the battle sites as they exist today. "The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War" by David Gates, published by Pimlico 2002, ISBN 0712697306.

Recently reprinted, this book gives a more complete account of the War than most. "The Man Who Broke Napoleon's Codes" by Mark Urban, published by Faber and Faber 2001, ISBN 0571205380. A very readable book which gives a critical overview of Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula as well as an account of George Scovell's deciphering of the grand chiffre. Prospective travellers to Spain might like to read our Travel Journal . Battle of Talavera - Napoleonic Wars Battle of Talavera - Peninsular War Battle of Talavera Napoleonic Wars: Battle of Talavera Napoleonic Wars: Battle of Talavera Duke of Wellington. Photograph Source: Public Domain By Kennedy Hickman Battle of Talavera - Conflict: The Battle of Talavera was fought during the Peninsular War which was part of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Battle of Talavera - Date: The fighting at Talavera occurred on July 27-28, 1809.

Armies & Commanders: General Gregorio de la Cuesta 20,641 British 46,138 men Battle of Talavera - Background: On July 2, 1809, British forces under Sir Arthur Wellesley crossed into Spain after defeating the corps of Marshal Nicolas Soult. Advancing east, they sought to unite with Spanish forces under General Gregoria de la Cuesta for an attack on Madrid. In the capital, French forces under King Joseph Bonaparte prepared to meet this threat. Assessing the situation, Joseph and his commanders elected to have Soult, who was then in the north, advance to cut Wellesley's supply lines to Portugal, while the corps of Marshal Claude Victor-Perrin advanced to block the allied thrust. Battle of Talavera - Moving to Battle: Wellesley united with Cuesta on July 20, 1809, and the allied army advanced on Victor's position near Talavera. Attacking, Cuesta's troops were able to force Victor to retreat. As Victor withdrew, Cuesta elected to pursue the enemy while Wellesley and the British remained at Talavera.

After marching 45 miles, Cuesta was compelled to fall back after encountering Joseph's main army at Torrijos. Outnumbered, the Spanish rejoined the British at Talavera. On July 27, Wellesley sent forward General Alexander Mackenzie's 3rd Division to aid in covering the Spanish retreat. Due to confusion in the British lines, his division suffered 400 casualties when it was attacked by the French advance guard. Arriving at Talavera, the Spanish occupied the town and extended their line north along a stream known as the Portina. The Allied left was held by the British whose line ran along a low ridge and occupied a hill known as the Cerro de Medellin. In the center of the line they built a redoubt which was supported by the General Alexander Campbell's 4th Division. Intending to fight a defensive battle, Wellesley was pleased with the terrain. Battle of Talavera - The Armies Clash: Arriving on the battlefield, Victor immediately send forward the division of General François Ruffin to seize the Cerro even though night had fallen. Moving through the darkness, they nearly reached the summit before the British were alerted to their presence.

In the sharp, confused fight that followed, the British were able to throw back the French attack. That night, Joseph, his chief military advisor Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, and Victor plotted their strategy for the next day. Though Victor favored launching a massive assault on Wellesley's position, Joseph decided on making limited attacks. At dawn, the French artillery opened fire on the Allied lines. Ordering his men to take cover, Wellesley awaited the French assault. The first attack came against the Cerro as Ruffin's division moved forward in columns. Moving up the hill, they were met with heavy musket fire from the British. After enduring this punishment the columns disintegrated as the men broke and ran. With their attack defeated, the French command paused for two hours to assess their situation. Electing to continue the battle, Joseph ordered another assault on the Cerro while also sending forward three divisions against the Allied center. While this attack was ongoing, Ruffin, supported by troops from General Eugene-Casimir Villatte's division were to attack the north side of the Cerro and attempt to flank the British position. The first French division to attack was that of Leval which struck the junction between the Spanish and British lines.

After making some progress, it was thrown back by intense artillery fire. To the north, Generals Horace Sebastiani and Pierre Lapisse assaulted General John Sherbrooke's 1st Division. Waiting for the French to close to 50 yards, the British opened fire in one massive volley staggering the French attack. Charging forward, Sherbrooke's men drove back the first French line until being stopped by the second. Hit by heavy French fire, they were forced to retreat. The gap in the British line was quickly filled by part of MacKenzie's division and the 48th Foot which was led into place by Wellesley. These forces held the French at bay until Sherbrooke's men could be reformed. To the north, Ruffin and Villatte's attack never developed as the British moved into blocking positions. They were handed a minor victory when Wellesley ordered his cavalry to charge them. Surging forward, the horsemen were stopped by a hidden ravine that cost them around half their strength. Pressing on, they were easily repulsed by the French. With the attacks defeated, Joseph elected to retire from the field despite requests from his subordinates to renew the battle.

Battle of Talavera - Aftermath: The fighting at Talavera cost Wellesley and the Spanish around 6,700 dead and wounded (British casualties: 801 dead, 3,915 wounded, 649 missing), while the French incurred 761 dead, 6,301 wounded and 206 missing. Remaining at Talavera after the battle due to a lack of supplies, Wellesley still hoped that the advance on Madrid could be resumed. On August 1, he learned that Soult was operating in his rear. Believing Soult to only have 15,000 men, Wellesley turned and marched to deal with the French marshal. When he learned that Soult had 30,000 men, Wellesley backed off and began withdrawing towards the Portuguese border. Though the campaign had failed, Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington of Talavera for his success on the battlefield.

Selected Sources Battle of Talavera, 27-28 July 1809 Battle of Talavera, 27-28 July 1809 Books The battle of Talavera of 27-28 July 1809 was the first of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s great victories in Spain during the Peninsular War . The campaign that led to Talavera had begun as an attempt to push Marshal Victor’s 1st Corps away from the Portuguese borders, but as Victor had retreated, first to Almaraz, and then to Talavera, the Allies realised that they had a real chance of capturing Madrid before the French could concentrate their armies to defend the city. By 27 July this chance had been missed. Marshal Victor had been reinforced by General Sebastiani’s 4th Corps and by King Joseph with the Royal reserve, and so at Talavera 55,000 French troops faced 20,600 British and 35,000 Spanish troops. The Armies (also see article on the armies of Talavera ) The French army was made up of four separate components.

Marshal Victor’s 1st Corp, 19,310 strong, had spent most of the spring in Estremadura, before a lack of supplies had forced it to retreat to the Tagus, and then east to Talavera. While in Estremadura they had won a major victory at Medellin , but had been unable to advance any further. General Sebastiani’s 15,500 strong 4th Corps had been based in La Mancha, defeating the Army of La Mancha at Ciudad Real. The two corps had been joined by the reserve cavalry, eleven regiments of dragoons and one of hussars, and by King Joseph, with the King’s Guard and every spare soldier to be found at Madrid. Together these forces contributed 11,000 men to the French force. They were facing Sir Arthur Wellesley’s British army, and the Spanish Army of Estremadura. Wellesley’s 20,600 men had just expelled Marshal Soult from the north of Portugal , and were confident of their abilities to beat the French.

In contrast Cuesta’s Army of Estremadura had been the defeated force at Medellin, where it had suffered very heavy casualties. Most of the 34,800 men he brought to Talavera was thus raw recruits. The Battlefield and the Allied Deployment During the short time Wellesley had been at Talavera, he had searched the local area looking for a suitable position for a defensive position. He had quickly dismissed the line of the Alberche River, for the ground east of the river was higher than that to the west, so the Allies would have been overlooked by the French. Instead he had chosen a position than ran north from Talavera itself, roughly following the line of the Portiña stream, to the hill known as the Cerro de Medellin. This hill ran from west to east, rising to its highest point where it overlooked the Portiña. To the north of the hill was a narrow valley, also running from west to east, and to the north of that valley was another line of hills, the Sierra de Segurilla.

At the start of the battle the Allied line ended at the Cerro de Medellin, but it would soon be extended into the valley and onto the southern slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla. The Portiña stream was not a defensive position itself – across most of the battlefield it was too shallow to be an obstacle, although it did mark part of the Spanish second line. Despite being completely flat the southern part of the line was very strong. Talavera was surrounded by olive groves, separated by stone walls, which made it into a virtual fortress. Already aware that his Spanish allies were might not be reliable in the open, Wellesley had offered Cuesta this part of the line. The Spanish front line was positioned in a sunken road and protected by stone walls, while the Spanish right was anchored in Talavera itself, which was still surrounded by medieval walls. Of no use in a regular siege, they made perfect battlefield defences. The Spanish second line followed the line of the Portiña, and was also protected by the stone walls. Even the skirmishers were able to find strong positions protected by more stone walls.

The French would recognise the strength of this part of the line, and concentrate most of their attacks on the Allied left. The British line began in the stone walls at the Spanish left, where Wellington had posted the 4th Division (Campbell’s). At the southern end of the British lines was a small knoll, the Pajar de Vergara, topped with a British artillery position. The only weak point in the line was a gap between the northern end of the enclosures and the southern slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. Here there was no cover for either the British defenders, or the French attackers. The right of the First Division (Sherbrooke’s) held this part of the line, with the rest of the division on the lower slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. The Second Division ( Hill’s ) held the top of the hill, with the Third (Mackenzie’s) Divison in reserve.

The Night Actions: 27-28 July Battle of Talavera, the night attack, 27-28 July 1809 The fighting began on the afternoon of 27 July, with the combat of Casa de Salinas , which saw the leading French troops ambush Mackenzie’s division, nearly catching Wellesley. Once Wellesley had extracted himself and the division from this trap, the Allies took up their positions along the battle line in the expectation that the fighting was over for the day, but Marshal Victor made sure this would not be the case. The first appearance of the French on the battlefield did not bode well. As seven in the evening of 27 July Victor’s leading units arrived in front of the Allied lines. He decided to begin an artillery bombardment of the Allied lines, and at the same time sent some light cavalry towards the Spanish lines, in an attempt to discover their positions. Well before the French were within range, the Spanish infantry responded with a massed volley of musket fire. Four entire battalions of infantry, some 2,000 men, cried “treason” and then broke and fled.

The only reason Wellesley could give for this behaviour was that they had been frightened by their own volley! Cuesta’s cavalry soon brought most of them back, and the French were unable to take advantage of their retreat, but it was not a promising start to the battle. Victor’s next move was to make a night attack on the strongest point on the British lines, the summit of the Cerro de Medellin. The nine battalions of Ruffin’s division were chosen to launch this attack, but only three, the battalions of the 9th Léger, would play a major part in the attack. If the British had been in the correct positions, then Ruffin’s attack could have ended in total disaster. Low’s brigade was on the lower slopes of the hill, while the crest of the hill should have been held by the two brigades of Hill’s division (Richard Stewart’s and Tilson’s), but these last two brigades had actually camped half a mile behind the lines, leaving the crest of the hill unguarded. While the other two French regiments missed their targets, the 9th Léger smashed their way through Low’s brigade, and actually reached the crest of the hill.

If they had been able to hold that position, then the Allies may well have had to abandon their lines, for the French would have overlooked the entire position, but the 9th Léger was not strong enough to hold off a counterattack by Richard Stewart’s division, and the French were soon forced back to their starting positions. That ended the serious fighting for the night, but neither side had a restful night, and on a number of occasions the Allied line had to stand to arms in the belief that a new French attack was on its way. Each case turned out to be a false alarm, and the next French attack would not come until after dawn on 28 July. The Morning Attack: 28 July Battle of Talavera, the morning attack, 28 July 1809 Despite the failure of his night attack, Victor was still convinced he could capture the Cerro de Medellin without help from Sebastiani or King Joseph. The French army now had three heads – Marshal Victor, King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan , the king’s chief of staff.

Joseph and Jourdan had not yet decided to attack, for the Allies were in a strong position and they knew that Marshal Soult was approaching from the north. All they had to do was wait for a few days, and the Allies would be forced to retreat. Victor did not share this opinion. He informed King Joseph that he would attack at dawn unless he received orders not to, and neither Joseph nor Jourdan were ready to issue those orders. This was the first time Victor had faced British troops, and he clearly did not expect them to pose much of a threat, for he decided to make his attack with only one of his three divisions. After a preliminary artillery bombardment, Ruffin’s division, 5,000 strong, made an attack in three columns. They reached to within 100 yards of the skyline before the 4,000 men of Hill’s division stood up and fired their first volley. French column clashed with British line, and as would so often happen, the line won. The first volley halted the French advance. For a few minutes the two sides exchanged volleys of musket fire, and then the French column began to waver.

Seeing this, Sherbrooke, who was not being attacked, attacked the left flank of the Ruffin’s column. The French began to retreat, and seeing this Richard Stewart’s division charged. Ruffin’s column broke and fled. The British chased them back down into the valley of the Portiña before returning to their starting positions. Ruffin’s division lost 1,300 men during their attack on the Cerro de Medellin. Victor’s other divisions had not yet been seriously engaged, but despite this he would still use Ruffin’s division to spearhead his part of the main afternoon attack. Hill’s division suffered 750 casualties, amongst then Hill himself, who suffered a head wound. The Main Battle: 28 July After the repulse of Victor’s attack, the French commanders met to decide what to do next. At first Joseph and Jourdan were in favour of going onto the defensive. They were still expecting Soult to appear behind the Allied lines in the next couple of days, a move that would force the British and Spanish to retreat. Victor in contrast was still determined to attack, and promised to break the Allied left if Joseph attacked in the centre.

The debate had not ended when two items of news reached the French commanders. The first came from the Governor of Toledo, who reported that General Venegas’s Army of La Mancha had appeared outside the city. If true, then Madrid was in danger and Joseph would need to move to defend his capital. The second came from Marshal Soult. He confirmed that he was moving south, but not as fast has had believed. He would not be able to threaten the Allies in time to save Madrid. If Joseph was to save his capital, then he needed to defeat Wellesley and Cuesta as quickly as possible, and then turn back to the east to deal with Venegas. The French had no choice but to attack the Allied lines. The French decided to launch four attacks on the British lines. Ruffin’s division and half of Villatte’s division was to attack around the British left. Lapisse’s division was to attack the southern flanks of the Cerro de Medellin. Sebastiani’s division from his 4th Corps was next in line, and was to attack the Guard’s Brigade and part of Cameron’s brigade. Finally Leval’s German division was to attack the British right, and part of the Spanish left.

We will deal with these attacks in the order they began. Leval’s attack went in first, at around 2.30pm, followed by Sebastiani and Lapisse at around 3.00 and finally Ruffin and Villatte at 4.00. Leval’s Attack In the original French plan, Leval was to attack second, but his troops had to advance through the olive groves north of Talavera, and he soon lost sight of the rest of the French lines. Believing his advance had taken longer than it really had, Leval attacked early. His columns had been broken up in the advance through the trees, and emerged into the open ground in front of the Allied lines in some disorder. His right hand regiment was facing British troops, his left hand regiment Spanish troops and his central regiment the gun battery on Pajar de Vergara. For some time his left and right regiments made some progress, but then the central regiment broke under the impact of the artillery fire. Seeing this, the 7th, 40th and 53rd Regiments charged the French right, which broke and fled. Leval’s left was forced to retreat to avoid being isolated.

The British captured six French guns, spiked them, and then returned to their lines. In a fight that had lasted 45 minutes, Leval had lost close to 700 men. His division returned to the fight for a second time at 4.00pm, in an attempt to support Sebastiani’s attack. This second attack was less successful than the first. Once again Leval lost guns, and was forced to retreat. By the end of the day his division had lost 1,007 men. This second attack also saw the Spanish cavalry have their best moment of the battle, when the Regimiento del Rey charged the retreating French battalions. Sebastiani’s and Lapisse’s Attack In the centre Sebastiani’s and Lapisse’s division attacked Sherbrooke’s division. Eight British battalions faced twenty four French battalions, in two lines. The first French attack ended in disaster. The British waited until the twelve French battalions were only 50 yards away, then all eight battalions fired simultaneously. The French attack stalled, and then the British charged. The French front line turned and fled, having suffered very heavy casualties.

Unfortunately, Sherbrooke’s men did not show the same restraint as those on the British right. Six of his eight battalions chased the French first line took far, and came under attack from the intact French second line. It was now the turn of the British to retreat in disorder. One of Sherbrooke’s battalions lost half of its men in the retreat. This was the crisis of the battle. Sebastiani and Lapisse’s men advanced towards a gap in the British lines. Mackenzie’s division advanced to fill the right hand side of the gap, facing Sebastiani, but there was no reserve to face Lapisse. Wellesley responded by sending the 1/48th Foot down from the Cerro de Medellin. They managed to hold the line for long enough for the retreating troops from the front line to reform and take their place in the line. The British Line Holds Sebastiani’s men were first to retreat. They had inflicted 632 casualties on Mackenzie’s division, and had killed the general, but they had lost 2,100 men themselves. Their retreat did not stop until they were a mile behind the lines.

Meanwhile Lapisse’s columns had been halted by the musketry of the 1/48th. After a prolonged musketry duel, in which both sides suffered equal losses, Lapisse’s men suffered two blows – Lapisse himself was killed, and they saw Sebastiani’s men retreating, and they too fell back. Both sides suffered around 1,600 casualties on this part of the battlefield. Ruffin’s and Villatte’s Attack The failure of the attack in the centre meant that Villatte never launched his attack on the Cerro de Medellin. Instead, the two sides became involved in an artillery duel, which caused light casualties on both sides. The main fighting on the British left was in the valley north of the Cerro de Medellin. Wellesley had realised that the French were intending to outflank his line before the first attack was made, and had moved Fane’s and Anson’s cavalry into the valley north of the Cerro de Medellin He also asked Cuesta for assistance, and the Spanish general responded by sending Bassecourt’s division to reinforce the British left.

By the time Ruffin and Villatte made their attack, Bassecourt had taken up a position on the slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla. The Duke of Albuquerque’s cavalry division was also moved north, arriving after the fighting had started. The French attack in this area never really developed. By the time Ruffin and Villatte reached the valley, they were facing the cavalry of Anson, Fane and Albuquerque and the infantry of Bassecourt, as well as a flanking fire from the British artillery on the hill above. The French advanced cautiously into the valley, but were never in a position to launch the planned attack. They would however be handed a minor victory. Wellesley ordered Fane and Anson to attack the French infantry. They responded by forming squares, but before the British cavalry could even reach them, the charge came to grief. The valley was crossed by a hidden ravine, ten feet deep and fifteen feet wide at its northern end. The British cavalry discovered this feature by charging into it. This cost them half of their strength, as horses were injured, and men dismounted, but they still insisted on carrying out their attack, suffering a predictably heavy defeat.

One of Anson’s two regiments, the 23rd Light Dragoons lost 207 of their 459 men in the attack. Despite this success, Victor’s two divisions were no longer in any position to launch an attack. They now knew that the attack in the centre had failed. They were facing Hill’s intact division on the Cerro de Medellin, Bassecourt’s infantry, Albuquerque’s cavalry division and Fane’s cavalry. Ruffin and Villatte realised that they were no longer capable of launching a decisive attack, and withdrew. The Aftermath This effectively ended the battle. The French still had 5,000 men in reserve, and Victor wanted to make yet another attack. Joseph was wavering, when he received news that Cuesta was on the move. This was not actually true, but even the rumour convinced Joseph not to risk another attack. Encouraged by Jourdan and most of his staff, Joseph ordered a retreat back to the Alberche. By the end of the day the 4th Corps had begun its retreat. Victor was furious.

He refused to retreat from his position opposite the Cerro de Medellin until 3am on the following morning, and in the aftermath of the battle he would continue to claim that one last push would have won the battle, despite his three previous attacks have gained no ground at all. Both the British and French suffered heavy casualties at Talavera. The British lost 801 killed, 3915 wounded and 649 missing. Two generals – Mackenzie and Langwerth – were amongst the dead. Over a quarter of the British infantry were out of action at the end of the day. The French suffered even more heavily, with 761 dead, 6,301 wounded and 206 missing, with General Lapisse amongst the dead. Cuesta reported his casualties as 1,201, normally considered to be an unrealistically high figure, for very few of his men were engaged on the right. Unfortunately no detailed casualty figures were produced, so it is unclear where these casualties were meant to have been suffered. Jean-de-Dieu Soult For some time after the battle the British were immobilised by a lack of supplies.

During this period Wellesley still believed that there was a chance he could reach Madrid, for he did not yet known that a second large French army under Marshal Soult was approaching from the north. On the evening of 1 August Wellesley finally learnt that Soult was in his rear, although he still did not realise that he was at the head of 50,000 men. The advance on Madrid had to be abandoned, and Wellesley’s attention turned west to deal with the new threat. When it did become clear how big Soult’s army actually was, Wellesley and Cuesta were forced to retreat south across the Tagus, and eventually back to the Portuguese border. The French forces repulsed at Talavera were soon broken up. Victor was left to watch Wellesley and Cuesta, while Sebastiani and King Joseph moved towards Toledo to deal with General Venegas and the army of La Mancha. On 11 August the French defeated Venegas at Almonacid , effectively ending the Talavera campaign. Wellesley had won his first great victory in Spain.

He had successfully ended the threat to Portugal, but for a moment it has seemed possible that the Allies would liberate Madrid, and so the campaign is generally judged to have been unsuccessful. Despite this, Talavera confirmed that the British line could defeat French columns on a major battlefield and Wellesley was confirmed in his belief that he could beat the French. Books Talavera 1809, René Chartrand. A good shorter history of one of Wellington's first victories in Spain, the defeat of King Joseph and Marshalls Victor and Jourdan at Talavera. Good on the problems within the French command, the difficult relationship between Wellington and his Spanish allies, and more generous to the Spanish than many English-language accounts of the battle. [ read full review ] A History of the Peninsular War vol.2: Jan.-Sept. 1809 - From the Battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera Campaign, Sir Charles Oman . Part two of Oman's classic history falls into two broad sections.

The first half of the book looks at the period between the British evacuation from Corunna and the arrival of Wellesley in Portugal for the second time, five months when the Spanish fought alone, while the second half looks at Wellesley's campaign in the north of Portugal and his first campaign in Spain. One of the classic works of military history. The Spanish Ulcer, A History of the Peninsular War, David Gates . An excellent single volume history of the Peninsular War, which when it was published was the first really good English language history of the entire war since Oman. This is a well balanced work with detailed coverage of those campaigns conducted entirely by Spanish armies, as well as the better known British intervention in Portugal and Spain. Wellington: A Military Life, Gordon Corrigan . This in an excellent military biography of the Duke of Wellington. It focuses very heavily on Wellington the general, allows Corrigan to describe the wider campaigns in some detail, giving a good idea not only of what Wellington did, but also why he did it. [ see more ]

Question: The battles of Talavera and Salamanca took place during which war?
Answer: Peninsular War