Zimmermann Telegram - World War I World War I World War I: Zimmerman Telegram The Zimmermann Telegram. Photograph Source: Public Domain Updated February 02, 2016. Zimmermann Telegram - Origins: As World War I ground on, Germany began assessing options for striking a decisive blow. Unable to break the British blockade of the North Sea with its surface fleet, the German leadership decided to return to a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare . This approach, whereby German U-boats would attack merchant shipping without warning, had been briefly used in 1916, but was abandoned after strong protests by the United States. Believing that Britain could be quickly crippled if its supply lines to North America were severed, Germany prepared to reimplement this approach effective February 1, 1917. Concerned that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare could bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies, Germany began making contingency plans for this possibility. To this end, German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann was instructed to seek a military alliance with Mexico in the event of war with the United States.

In return for attacking the United States, Mexico was promised the return of territory lost during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), including Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, as well as substancial financial assistance. Zimmermann Telegram - Transmission: As Germany lacked a direct telegraph line to North America, the Zimmermann Telegram was transmitted over American and British lines. This was permitted as President Woodrow Wilson allowed the Germans to transmit under the cover of US diplomatic traffic in hopes that he could remain in touch with Berlin and broker a lasting peace. Zimmermann sent the original coded message to Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff on January 16, 1917. Receiving the telegram, he forwarded it on to Ambassador Heinrich von Eckardt in Mexico City via commercial telegraph three days later. Zimmermann Telegram - Mexican Response: After reading the message, von Eckardt approached the government of President Venustiano Carranza with the terms. He also asked Carranza to aid in forming an alliance between Germany and Japan. Listening to the German proposal, Carranza instructed his military to determine the feasibility of the offer.

In assessing a possible war with the United States, the military determined that it largely lacked the capability to re-take the lost territories and that German financial assistance would be useless as the United States was the only significant arms producer in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, additional arms could not be imported as the British controlled the sea lanes to Europe. As Mexico was emerging from a recent civil war, Carranza sought to improve relations with the United States as well as other nations in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. As a result, it was determined to decline the German offer. An official response was issued to Berlin on April 14, 1917, stating that Mexico had no interest in allying with the German cause. Zimmermann Telegram - British Interception: As the ciphertext of the telegram was transmitted through Britain, it was immediately intercepted by British codebreakers who were monitoring traffic originating in Germany. Sent to the Admiralty's Room 40, codebreakers found that it was encrypted in cipher 0075 which they had partially broken. Decoding parts of the message, they were able to develop an outline of its content.

Realizing that they possessed a document that could compel the United State to join the Allies, the British set about developing a plan that would allow them to unveil the telegram without giving away that they were reading neutral diplomatic traffic or that they had broken German codes. To deal with the first issue, they were able to correctly guess that the telegram was sent over commercial wires from Washington to Mexico City. In Mexico, British agents were able to obtain a copy of the ciphertext from the telegraph office. This was encrypted in cipher 13040, which the British had captured a copy of in the Middle East . As a result, by mid-February, British authorities had the complete text of the telegram. To deal with the code breaking issue, the British publicly lied and claimed they had been able to steal a decoded copy of the telegram in Mexico. They ultimately alerted the Americans to their code breaking efforts and Washington elected to back the British cover story. On February 19, 1917, Admiral Sir William Hall, the head of Room 40, presented a copy of the telegram to the secretary of the US Embassy, William Hall.

Stunned, Hall initially believed the telegram to be a forgery, but passed it on to Ambassador Walter Page the next day. On February 23, Page met with Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour and was shown the original ciphertext as well as the message in both German and English. The next day, the telegram and verifying details were presented to Wilson. Zimmermann Telegram - American Response: News of the Zimmermann Telegram quickly released and stories about its contents appeared in the American press on March 1. While pro-German and anti-war groups claimed that it was a forgery, Zimmermann confirmed the telegram's contents on March 3 and March 29. Further inflaming the American public, which was angered over the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare (Wilson broke diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3 over this issue) and the sinking SS Houstonic (February 3) and SS California (February 7), the telegram further pushed the nation towards war. On April 2, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. This was granted four days later and the United States entered the conflict.

Selected Sources Zimmermann Telegram published in United States - Mar 01, 1917 - HISTORY.com Zimmermann Telegram published in United States Share this: Zimmermann Telegram published in United States Author Zimmermann Telegram published in United States URL Publisher A+E Networks On this day in 1917, the text of the so-called Zimmermann Telegram, a message from the German foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German ambassador to Mexico proposing a Mexican-German alliance in the case of war between the United States and Germany, is published on the front pages of newspapers across America. In the telegram, intercepted and deciphered by British intelligence in January 1917, Zimmermann instructed the ambassador, Count Johann von Bernstorff, to offer significant financial aid to Mexico if it agreed to enter any future U.S-German conflict as a German ally. If victorious in the conflict, Germany also promised to restore to Mexico the lost territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson learned of the telegram’s contents on February 26; the next day he proposed to Congress that the U.S. should start arming its ships against possible German attacks. He also authorized the State Department to make public the Zimmermann Telegram.

On March 1, the news broke. Germany had already aroused Wilson’s ire—and that of the American public—with its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare and its continued attacks against American ships. Some of those in the United States who still held out for neutrality at first claimed the telegram was a fake. This notion was dispelled two days later, when Zimmermann himself confirmed its authenticity. Public opinion in the United States now swung firmly toward American entrance into World War I. On April 2, Wilson went before Congress to deliver a message of war. The United States formally entered the conflict four days later. Related Videos Zimmerman Telegram : Wikis (The Full Wiki) The Full Wiki More info on Zimmerman Telegram Wikis Zimmerman Telegram: Wikis Advertisements Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles .

Related top topics (Redirected to Zimmermann Telegram article) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Zimmermann Telegram as it was sent from Washington to Mexico Map showing Mexican territory in 1917 (dark green), territory promised to Mexico in the Zimmermann telegram (medium green), and portion of US territory once controlled by Mexico (light green). The Zimmermann Telegram (or Zimmermann Note; German : Zimmermann-Depesche; Spanish : Telegrama Zimmermann) was a coded telegram dispatched by the Foreign Secretary of the German Empire , Arthur Zimmermann , on January 16, 1917, to the German ambassador in Washington , Johann von Bernstorff , at the height of World War I . On January 19, Bernstorff, per Zimmermann's request, forwarded the Telegram to the German ambassador in Mexico , Heinrich von Eckardt . Zimmermann sent the Telegram in anticipation of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the German Empire on February 1, an act which German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg feared would draw the neutral United States into war on the side of the Allies .

[1] The Telegram instructed Ambassador Eckardt that if the United States appeared likely to enter the war he was to approach the Mexican government with a proposal for military alliance . He was to offer Mexico material aid in the reclamation of territory lost during the Mexican-American War (the southeastern section of the area of the Mexican Cession of 1848) and the Gadsden Purchase , specifically the American states of Texas , New Mexico , and Arizona . Eckardt was also instructed to urge Mexico to help broker an alliance between Germany and Japan . The Zimmermann Telegram was intercepted and decoded by the British cryptographers of Room 40 . [2] The revelation of its contents in the American press on March 1 caused public outrage that contributed to the United States' declaration of war against Germany and its allies on April 6. Contents The Telegram Zimmermann's message was: [3] On the first of February, we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace.

We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement... You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months. Zimmermann (Secretary of State) Mexican response Mexican President Venustiano Carranza assigned a general to assess the feasibility of a Mexican takeover of their former territories[citation needed]. The general concluded that it would not be possible or even desirable for the following reasons: Attempting to re-take the former territories would mean certain war with the United States. No matter how "generous" it was, Germany's "financial support" would be worthless.

Mexico could not use it to acquire arms, ammunition, or other war supplies, because the United States was the only sizable arms manufacturer in the Americas . The Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic sea lanes, so Germany could not possibly supply any quantity of arms. Even if Mexico had the military means to re-take the territory it would have had severe difficulty accommodating and/or pacifying the large English-speaking population. Mexico had even cooperated with the ABC nations to prevent a war with the United States, generally improving relations. If Mexico were to enter war against USA it would strain relations with ABC nations—who would later declare war on Germany. Carranza formally declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14, by which time the U.S. had declared war on Germany. British interception A portion of the Telegram as decrypted by the British Naval Intelligence codebreakers . Because Arizona had only been admitted to the United States in 1912, the word Arizona was not in the German codebook and had therefore to be split into phonetic syllables . The Telegram was transmitted by radio and also across two telegraph routes under the cover of diplomatic messages by two neutral governments, Sweden and the United States.

Germany lacked direct telegraphic access to the Western hemisphere because the British had cut the German cables in the Atlantic and shut down German stations in neutral countries. This forced Germany to use British and American cables instead, despite the risk of interception. The Zimmermann messages passed over cables that touched on British soil, and as a result were intercepted there by British intelligence. President Woodrow Wilson had granted the German diplomats the privilege of sending their messages under the cover of U.S. diplomatic traffic in hopes that this would enable Germany to remain in touch with the United States and further Wilson's aims of ending the war. The message passing through this way was sent from Berlin to the German ambassador in Washington , Johann von Bernstorff , for re-transmission to von Eckardt in Mexico. What was a privilege provided to further peace actually brought war. The Telegram was intercepted as soon as it was sent. The codebreakers in Room 40 at the Admiralty received a copy and decrypted enough to get the gist of it. The German Foreign Office encrypted the Telegram with cipher 0075, which Room 40 had partly broken.

The British government wanted to use the incriminating Telegram, as it provided a splendid opportunity to draw the United States into World War I on the Allied side. Anti-German feeling in the United States was particularly strong at that moment, due to the German policy of "unrestricted" submarine warfare. But the British had two problems: they had to explain to the Americans how they got the ciphertext of the Telegram, without telling the Americans about the British intelligence operation monitoring neutral diplomatic traffic; and they had to have a public explanation of how they had the Telegram's deciphered text without revealing to Germany that they had broken the German code. The British solved the first problem by also getting the ciphertext of the Telegram from the telegraph office in Mexico. The British guessed that the German Embassy in Washington would relay the message by commercial telegraph, so the Mexican telegraph office would have the ciphertext. "Mr. H.", a British agent in Mexico, bribed an employee of the commercial telegraph company for a copy of the message ( Sir Thomas Hohler , then British ambassador in Mexico, claims to have been Mr. H in his autobiography). This ciphertext could be passed to the Americans without embarrassment.

The retransmission was enciphered using cipher 13040, which Britain had captured a copy of in Mesopotamia , so by mid-February the British had the complete text. The second problem was solved by a cover story that the Telegram's deciphered text had been stolen in Mexico (The U.S. was informed of the deciphering, but backed up the cover story). The German government refused to consider a possible code break, and instead sent von Eckardt on a witch-hunt for a traitor in the embassy in Mexico. The Telegram, completely decrypted and translated . British use of the Telegram On February 19, "Blinker" Hall , the head of Room 40, showed the Telegram to the secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Britain, Edward Bell. Bell was at first incredulous, thinking it was a forgery, then enraged. On February 20 Hall informally sent a copy to U.S. ambassador Walter Page . On February 23, Page met with Foreign Minister Balfour , and was given the ciphertext, the message in German, and the English translation.

Then Page reported the story to President Woodrow Wilson , including details to be verified from telegraph company files in the U.S. Effect in the United States Popular sentiment in the United States at that time was anti-Mexican as well as anti-German, while Mexico was anti-American and in some cases, anti-European.[citation needed] General John J. Pershing had long been chasing the revolutionary Pancho Villa , who had carried out several cross-border raids. News of the Telegram further inflamed tensions between the U.S. and Mexico. At first, the Telegram was widely believed to be a forgery perpetrated by British intelligence. This belief, which was not restricted to pacifist and pro-German lobbies, was promoted by German and Mexican diplomats, and by some American papers, especially the Hearst press empire. However, first on March 3, 1917 and later on March 29, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann himself admitted that the Telegram was genuine. On February 1, Germany had resumed "unrestricted" submarine warfare, which caused many civilian deaths, including American passengers on British ships. This caused widespread anti-German sentiment. The Telegram greatly increased this feeling. Besides the highly provocative anti-U.S.

proposal to Mexico, the Telegram also mentioned "ruthless employment of our submarines." [4] United States declares war against Germany Wilson responded by asking Congress to arm American ships so that they could fend off potential German submarine attacks. A few days later, on April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. On April 6, 1917, Congress complied, bringing the United States into World War I. The telegram was not the only reason for the U.S. entry into the war. Previously, German U-boats had sunk US ships or ships which carried US citizens, of which the most well known was the RMS Lusitania , torpedoed off the coast of Ireland in May 1915. US ships sunk, less well known, were the SS Housatonic in February 1917 in the Bay of Biscay . [5] and the SS California off the Irish coast. [6] It was perceived as especially perfidious that the Telegram was sent to the German embassy in Washington via the U.S.

embassy in Berlin and the U.S.-operated cable from Denmark (in fact, that was the only relatively sure channel left to the Germans to communicate to their diplomats in Mexico). Once the American public believed the Telegram to be real, it was all but inevitable that the U.S. would join the Great War. Historical post-script In October 2005, it was revealed that an original typescript of the deciphered Zimmermann Telegram had recently been discovered by an unnamed historian who was researching and preparing an official history of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The document is believed to be the actual telegram shown to the American ambassador in London in 1917. Marked in Admiral Hall's handwriting at the top of the document are the words: "This is the one handed to Dr Page and exposed by the President." Since many of the secret documents in this incident had been destroyed, it had previously been assumed that the original typed "decrypt" was gone forever. However, after discovery of this document, the GCHQ official historian said: "I believe that this is indeed the same document that Balfour handed to Page."[citation needed] References Bibliography Sources Beesly, Patrick (1982).

Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914—1918, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. ISBN 0-15-178634-8 Bernstorff, Count Johann Heinrich (1920). My Three Years in America, New York: Scribner’s. pp. 310-311. Friedman, William F., and Mendelsohn, Charles J. [1938] (1994). The Zimmermann Telegram of January 16 1917 and its Cryptographic Background, Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press . Tuchman, Barbara W. (1958). The Zimmermann Telegram, Ballantine Books . ISBN 0-345-32425-0 West, Nigel (1986). The SIGINT Secrets, William Morrow & Co/Quill. ISBN 0-688-09515-1 London Daily Telegraph, 17 October 2005. Telegraph.co.uk ound , "Telegram that brought US into Great War is Found". Article by Ben Fenton.

Massie, Robert K. (2004). Castles of Steel, Vantage Books, London, 2007. ISBN 978-0-099-52378-9 Further reading Dugdale, Blanche (1937). Arthur James Balfour, New York: Putnam’s. Vol. II, pp. 127-9. Hendrick, Burton J. [1925] (July 2003). The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Kessinger Publishing . ISBN 0-7661-7106-X Kahn, David [1967] (1996). The Codebreakers, New York: Macmillan. Katz, Friedrich (1981). The Secret War in Mexico, University of Chicago Press . ISBN 0-226-42589-4 Link, Arthur S. (1965) Wilson, Vol. 5, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press . Pages 433-5.

Winkler, Jonathan Reed (2008) "Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I," Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press . ISBN 978-0674028395 Notes Arthur Zimmermann | Military Wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia Edit He was born in Marggrabowa , East Prussia , then in the Kingdom of Prussia (present-day Olecko , Mazury , Poland), and died of pneumonia in Berlin. He studied law from 1884 to 1887 in Königsberg, East Prussia, and Leipzig. A period as a junior lawyer followed and later he received his doctorate of law. In 1893, he took up a career in diplomacy and entered the consular service in Berlin. He arrived in China in 1896 (Canton in 1898), and rose to the rank of consul in 1900. While stationed in the Far East, he witnessed the Boxer Rebellion in China.

Later he was called to the Foreign Office, became Under Secretary of State in 1911, and on November 24, 1916, he accepted his confirmation as Secretary of State, succeeding Gottlieb von Jagow in this position. Actually, he had assumed a large share of his superior's negotiations with foreign envoys for several years prior to his appointment because of von Jagow's reservedness in office. He was the first non-aristocrat to serve as foreign secretary. Kronrat Edit As acting secretary he had also taken part in the so-called Kronrat, the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , in which the decision was taken to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, which ultimately was to lead to the outbreak of war. He later disavowed the name Kronrat since it was the Kaiser's opinion that was decisive in the discussion, but with which Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann concurred. Irish rebellion Edit In late 1914 Zimmermann was visited by Roger Casement , the Irish revolutionary.

A plan was laid to land 25,000 soldiers in the west of Ireland with 75,000 rifles. However, the German general staff did not agree. In April 1916 Casement returned to Ireland in a U-boat and was captured and executed. A German ship (the SMS Libau ) renamed the "Aud", flying Norwegian colours, shipped 20,000 rifles to the south Irish coast but it failed to link up with the rebels and was scuttled. Planning on this support, a minority of the Irish volunteers launched the Easter Rising in Dublin. Though the Rising failed, its political effect led on to the Anglo-Irish war in 1919–1922 and the formation of the Irish Free State. Zimmermann telegram and resignation Main article: Zimmerman Telegram On August 6, 1917, he resigned as foreign secretary and was succeeded by Richard von Kühlmann . One of the causes of his resignation was the famous Zimmerman Telegram he sent on January 16, 1917.

Two-and a half years into World War I, the United States had maintained a status of neutrality while the Allied armies had been fighting those of the Central Powers in the trenches of northern France and Belgium. Although President Woodrow Wilson had been re-elected – winning the election on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war" – it became increasingly difficult to maintain that position. After the Royal Navy had been engaged in a successful naval blockade against all German shipping for some time, the German Supreme High Command concluded that only a total submarine offensive would break the stranglehold. Although the decision was made on January 9, 1917, the Americans were not informed of the operation until January 31. The Germans abrogated their Sussex pledge (not to sink merchant ships without due warning and to save human lives wherever possible) and began an unrestricted U-boat campaign on February 1, 1917. Since it was obvious that US shipping would also come under attack in the course of this operation, it became just a matter of time before the USA was drawn into the conflict. The US was very angered by this and was surprised that Germany would plan such an attack on them.

Background Edit Germany had been pursuing various interests in Mexico from the beginning of the 20th century. Although a latecomer in the area, with Spain, Britain, and France having established themselves there centuries earlier, the Kaiser's Germany attempted to secure a continuing presence. This entailed many different approaches to the Mexican Republic and its changing, often revolutionary, governments as well as assuring the United States (most of the time) of Germany's peaceful intentions. German diplomacy in the area depended on sympathetic relations with the Mexican government of the day. Among the options discussed during Arthur Zimmermann's period in office was a German offer to improve communications between the two nations and a suggestion that Mexico purchase German submarines for its navy. After Francisco Villa 's cross-border raids into New Mexico President Wilson sent a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue the raiders. This encouraged the Germans to believe (mistakenly) that this and other US concerns in the area would tie up US resources and military operations for some time to come, sufficiently to justify the overtures made by Arthur Zimmermann in his telegram to the Venustiano Carranza government. His proposals included an agreement for a German alliance with Mexico, while Germany would still try to maintain a state of neutrality with the United States.

If this policy were to fail, the note suggested, the Mexican government should make common cause with Germany, try to persuade the Japanese government to join the new alliance, and attack the US. Germany for its part would promise financial assistance and the restoration of its former territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico. Sending Edit On 16 January 1916 Foreign Secretary Zimmermann sent the telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff , who in his turn forwarded it secretly to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt . British intelligence intercepted it on 17 January, but were unable to decipher it at that stage as it had been sent in a new code which neither the British cryptographers nor the German embassy in Mexico possessed. It was only when it had been transcribed for von Eckardt into the old code, which too was duly intercepted, that the British were able to compare the two codes and so were able to read the latest code and learn the contents of the message. It was at this stage that British intelligence realized that to transmit the telegram without delay to President Wilson would indicate to the Germans that Britain was able to decipher their codes , a fact which would jeopardize British intelligence operations.

A British agent then obtained a copy of the Mexican version of the cable, with slight variations in the text, and thus rendered it plausible how Britain knew of the telegram. Effect Edit On February 24, the telegram was finally delivered to the US ambassador in Britain, Walter Hines Page , who two days later retransmitted it to President Wilson. On March 1, the United States Government passed the text of the telegram to the press. At first, some sectors of the US papers, especially those of the Hearst press empire, questioned whether the telegram was a forgery made by British intelligence in an attempt to persuade the US government to enter the war on Britain's side. This opinion was reinforced by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as pro-German and pacifist opinion-formers in the United States. However, on March 29, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram and so put an end to all speculation as to its authenticity. By that time a number of US ships had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life, and on April 2, President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress complied.

The United States had entered World War I on the Allied side. Arthur Zimmermann's speech Edit The speech was intended to explain his side of the situation. He began that he had not written a letter to Carranza but had given instructions to the German ambassador via a "route that had appeared to him to be a safe one". He also said that despite the submarine offensive, he had hoped that the USA would remain neutral. His instructions (to the Mexican government) were only to be carried out after the US declared war, and he believed his instructions to be "absolutely loyal as regards the US". In fact, he blamed President Wilson for breaking off relations with Germany "with extraordinary roughness" after the telegram was received, and that therefore the German ambassador "no longer had the opportunity to explain the German attitude, and that the US government had declined to negotiate". Thinking that the USA would remain neutral while their ships were being attacked does indicate extreme naivety on Arthur Zimmermann's part. However, it is possible he was hoping (in an equally naïve way) the world would see the desperate situation Germany had found itself in during the blockade of German shipping, and it would bring some understanding to that situation.

There was honesty in his speech since he would have had occasion to reflect on the impact of the telegram and its aftereffects in the meantime, yet still was prepared to present its original ideas. However, it also revealed he was seriously misinformed about the real strength of the United States vis-à-vis its southern neighbour, but that was the fault of the German intelligence services. Mexico's reply Edit Later, a general assigned by Carranza to assess the realities of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces came to the conclusion that it would not work. Taking over the three states would almost certainly cause future problems and possibly war with the US; Mexico would also be unable to accommodate a large Anglo population within its borders; and Germany would not be able to supply the arms needed in the hostilities that would surely arise. Carranza declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14. The fact-finding mission of Nuncio Pacelli Edit At the end of June 1917, Zimmermann found the first real opportunity for paving the way to peace negotiations during his period of administration.

At several meetings with the Bavarian Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli (later to become Pope Pius XII ) and Uditore Schioppa, who were on a fact-finding mission, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann outlined their plans. There would be no annexations of territories, no border adjustments with Russia, Poland was to remain an independent state, all occupied areas of France and Belgium were to be evacuated, and Alsace-Lorraine would be ceded to France. The only exception in return was to be the restitution of all former German colonies to Germany. None of these plans came to fruition because neither of the two German participants would be very much longer in office. As an afterthought, it was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's belief – unlike that of the General Staff's – that once the United States entered the war, the prospects for Germany would indeed be bleak. Nurse Edith Cavell's execution Edit Arthur Zimmermann as foreign secretary also felt called upon to comment on Edith Cavell 's execution by firing squad on October 12, 1915. The incident had caused a sensation in the UK and US press and political capital was being made out of it.

He began by saying that "it was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed", but that it was necessary. He continued by saying that although it was a terrible thing that the woman had been executed, consideration should be given to the consequences if a state, particularly one at war, were to leave women unpunished after they had committed crimes aimed at the safety of its armies. No criminal court in the world – least of all one with jurisdiction over the laws of war – would make such a distinction (as man and woman are equal before the law), etc. He had before him the court's verdict and was "convinced that no court in the world would have given any other verdict", and so on. Looked at in those days, although it was part of his office to defend the indefensible, to the world it would have been easy to condemn him for this, especially since these crimes in peacetime almost certainly would have been no crimes at all. But with hindsight, we have gained some understanding of some of the processes which caused these "miscarriages" of justice, especially since the offence of "cowardice before the enemy", for example, was punishable by firing squad in most armies.

[2] Peace in the East Edit In March 1917, with the imminent collapse of the Russian front, Zimmermann took steps to promote Peace in the East with the Russians, a proposal that was of immense importance to Germany at the time. The foreign secretary set forth the following: regulations for frontline contacts with the opposite side; reciprocal withdrawal of the occupied areas; an amicable agreement about Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland; and a promise to aid Russia in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. Last not least, Lenin and the émigré revolutionaries would be allowed to pass through Germany to Russia by train. These proposals once carried out, would free Germany's armies in the east and allow them to be concentrated in the west, a master-stroke that would reinforce the German western front vastly. Zimmermann thus contributed to the outcome of the October Revolution . References Arthur Zimmermann : definition of Arthur Zimmermann and synonyms of Arthur Zimmermann (English) 8 External links Career He was born in Marggrabowa , East Prussia , then in the Kingdom of Prussia (now called Olecko , Mazury , Poland ), and died of pneumonia in Berlin.

He studied law from 1884 to 1887 in Königsberg , East Prussia, and Leipzig . A period as a junior lawyer followed and later he received his doctorate of law. In 1893, he took up a career in diplomacy and entered the consular service in Berlin. He arrived in China in 1896 ( Canton in 1898), and rose to the rank of consul in 1900. While stationed in the Far East , he witnessed the Boxer Rebellion in China. Later he was called to the Foreign Office, became Under Secretary of State in 1911, and on November 24, 1916, he accepted his confirmation as Secretary of State, succeeding Gottlieb von Jagow in this position. Actually, he had assumed a large share of his superior's negotiations with foreign envoys for several years prior to his appointment because of von Jagow's reservedness in office. He was the first non-aristocrat to serve as foreign secretary.

Kronrat As acting secretary he had also taken part in the so-called Kronrat, the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , in which the decision was taken to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo , which ultimately was to lead to the outbreak of war. He later disavowed the name Kronrat since it was the Kaiser's opinion that was decisive in the discussion, but with which Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann concurred. Irish rebellion In late 1914 Zimmermann was visited by Roger Casement , the Irish revolutionary. A plan was laid to land 25,000 soldiers in the west of Ireland with 75,000 rifles. However, the German general staff did not agree. In 1916 Casement returned to Ireland in a U-boat and was captured and executed. A German ship renamed the "Aud", flying Norwegian colours, shipped 20,000 rifles to the south Irish coast but it failed to link up with the rebels and was scuttled.

Planning on this support, a minority of the Irish volunteers launched the Easter Rising in Dublin. Though the Rising failed, its political effect led on to the Anglo-Irish war in 1919-1922 and the formation of the Irish Free State . Zimmermann telegram and resignation On August 6, 1917, he resigned as foreign secretary and was succeeded by Richard Von Kühlmann . One of the causes of his resignation was the famous Zimmerman Telegram he sent on January 16, 1917. Two-and a half years into World War I, the United States had maintained a status of neutrality while the Allied armies had been fighting those of the Central Powers in the trenches of northern France and Belgium . Although President Woodrow Wilson had been re-elected – winning the election on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war" – it became increasingly difficult to maintain that position. After the Royal Navy had been engaged in a successful naval blockade against all German shipping for some time, the German Supreme High Command concluded that only a total submarine offensive would break the stranglehold.

Although the decision was made on January 9, 1917, the Americans were not informed of the operation until January 31. The Germans abrogated their Sussex pledge (not to sink merchant ships without due warning and to save human lives wherever possible) and began an unrestricted U-boat campaign on February 1, 1917. Since it was obvious that US shipping would also come under attack in the course of this operation, it became just a matter of time before the USA was drawn into the conflict. The US was very angered by this and was surprised that Germany would plan such an attack on them. Background Germany had been pursuing various interests in Mexico from the beginning of the 20th century. Although a latecomer in the area, with Spain, Britain, and France having established themselves there centuries earlier, the Kaiser's Germany attempted to secure a continuing presence. This entailed many different approaches to the Mexican Republic and its changing, often revolutionary, governments as well as assuring the United States (most of the time) of Germany's peaceful intentions. German diplomacy in the area depended on sympathetic relations with the Mexican government of the day.

Among the options discussed during Arthur Zimmermann's period in office was a German offer to improve communications between the two nations and a suggestion that Mexico purchase German submarines for its navy. After Francisco Villa 's cross-border raids into New Mexico President Wilson sent a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue the raiders. This encouraged the Germans to believe (mistakenly) that this and other US concerns in the area would tie up US resources and military operations for some time to come, sufficiently to justify the overtures made by Arthur Zimmermann in his telegram to the Venustiano Carranza government. His proposals included an agreement for a German alliance with Mexico, while Germany would still try to maintain a state of neutrality with the United States. If this policy were to fail, the note suggested, the Mexican government should make common cause with Germany, try to persuade the Japanese government to join the new alliance, and attack the US. Germany for its part would promise financial assistance and the restoration of its former territories of Texas , New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico.

Sending On 16 January 1917 Foreign Secretary Zimmermann sent the telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff , who in his turn forwarded it secretly to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt . British intelligence intercepted it on 17 January, but were unable to decipher it at that stage as it had been sent in a new code which neither the British cryptographers nor the German embassy in Mexico possessed. It was only when it had been transcribed for von Eckardt into the old code, which too was duly intercepted, that the British were able to compare the two codes and so were able to read the latest code and learn the contents of the message. It was at this stage that British intelligence realized that to transmit the telegram without delay to President Wilson would indicate to the Germans that Britain was able to decipher their codes , a fact which would jeopardize British intelligence operations. A British agent then obtained a copy of the Mexican version of the cable, with slight variations in the text, and thus rendered it plausible how Britain knew of the telegram.

Effect On February 24, the telegram was finally delivered to the US ambassador in Britain, Walter Hines Page , who two days later retransmitted it to President Wilson. On March 1, the United States Government passed the text of the telegram to the press. At first, some sectors of the US papers, especially those of the Hearst press empire, tried to claim that the telegram was a forgery by British intelligence in an attempt to persuade the US government to enter the war on Britain's side. This opinion was reinforced by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as pro-German and pacifist opinion-formers in the United States. However, on March 29, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram and so put an end to all speculation as to its authenticity. By that time a number of US ships had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life, and on April 2, President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress complied. The United States had entered World War I on the Allied side. Arthur Zimmermann's speech The speech was intended to explain his side of the situation.

He began that he had not written a letter to Carranza but had given instructions to the German ambassador via a "route that had appeared to him to be a safe one". He also said that despite the submarine offensive, he had hoped that the USA would remain neutral. His instructions (to the Mexican government) were only to be carried out after the US declared war, and he believed his instructions to be "absolutely loyal as regards the US". In fact, he blamed President Wilson for breaking off relations with Germany "with extraordinary roughness" after the telegram was received, and that therefore the German ambassador "no longer had the opportunity to explain the German attitude, and that the US government had declined to negotiate". Thinking that the USA would remain neutral while their ships were being attacked does indicate extreme naivety on Arthur Zimmermann's part. However, it is possible he was hoping (in an equally naïve way) the world would see the desperate situation Germany had found itself in during the blockade of German shipping, and it would bring some understanding to that situation. There was honesty in his speech since he would have had occasion to reflect on the impact of the telegram and its aftereffects in the meantime, yet still was prepared to present its original ideas.

However, it also revealed he was seriously misinformed about the real strength of the United States vis-à-vis its southern neighbour, but that was the fault of the German intelligence services. Mexico's reply Later, a general assigned by Carranza to assess the realities of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces came to the conclusion that it would not work. Taking over the three states would almost certainly cause future problems and possibly war with the US; Mexico would also be unable to accommodate a large Anglo population within its borders; and Germany would not be able to supply the arms needed in the hostilities that would surely arise. Carranza declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14. The fact-finding mission of Nuncio Pacelli At the end of June 1917, Zimmermann found the first real opportunity for paving the way to peace negotiations during his period of administration. At several meetings with the Bavarian Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli (later to become Pope Pius XII ) and Uditore Schioppa, who were on a fact-finding mission, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann outlined their plans.

There would be no annexations of territories, no border adjustments with Russia, Poland was to remain an independent state, all occupied areas of France and Belgium were to be evacuated, and Alsace-Lorraine would be ceded to France. The only exception in return was to be the restitution of all former German colonies to Germany. None of these plans came to fruition because neither of the two German participants would be very much longer in office. As an afterthought, it was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's belief – unlike that of the General Staff's – that once the United States entered the war, the prospects for Germany would indeed be bleak. Nurse Edith Cavell's execution Arthur Zimmermann as foreign secretary also felt called upon to comment on Edith Cavell 's execution by firing squad on October 12, 1915. The incident had caused a sensation in the UK and US press and political capital was being made out of it. He began by saying that "it was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed", but that it was necessary.

He continued by saying that although it was a terrible thing that the woman had been executed, consideration should be given to the consequences if a state, particularly one at war, were to leave women unpunished after they had committed crimes aimed at the safety of its armies. No criminal court in the world – least of all one with jurisdiction over the laws of war – would make such a distinction (as man and woman are equal before the law), etc. He had before him the court's verdict and was "convinced that no court in the world would have given any other verdict", and so on. Looked at in those days, although it was part of his office to defend the indefensible, to the world it would have been easy to condemn him for this, especially since these crimes in peacetime almost certainly would have been no crimes at all. But with hindsight, we have gained some understanding of some of the processes which caused these "miscarriages" of justice, especially since the offence of "cowardice before the enemy", for example, was punishable by firing squad in most armies.

[1] Peace in the East In March 1917, with the imminent collapse of the Russian front, Zimmermann took steps to promote Peace in the East with the Russians, a proposal that was of immense importance to Germany at the time. The foreign secretary set forth the following: regulations for frontline contacts with the opposite side; reciprocal withdrawal of the occupied areas; an amicable agreement about Poland , Lithuania , and Kurland ; and a promise to aid Russia in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. Last not least, Lenin and the émigré revolutionaries would be allowed to pass through Germany to Russia by train. These proposals once carried out, would free Germany's armies in the east and allow them to be concentrated in the west, a master-stroke that would reinforce the German western front vastly. Zimmermann thus contributed to the outcome of the October Revolution . References Barbara W. Tuchman , The Zimmermann Telegram, 1958. External links

Question: The contents of "The Zimmermann Telegram" of 16 January 1917 revealed a German plan to offer Mexico what territory in return for a military alliance against the USA?
Answer: Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona