NASA Apollo Mission Apollo-13 Odyssey (CM-109) and Aquarius (LM-7) Mission Objective: Apollo 13 was supposed to land in the Fra Mauro area. An explosion on board forced Apollo 13 to circle the moon without landing. The Fra Mauro site was reassigned to Apollo 14 . Launch: Saturday, April 11, 1970 at 13:13 CST. At five and a half minutes after liftoff, Swigert, Haise, and Lovell felt a little vibration. Then the center engine of the S-II stage shut down two minutes early. This caused the remaining four engines to burn 34 seconds longer than planned, and the S-IVB third stage had to burn nine seconds longer to put Apollo 13 in orbit. Days before the mission, backup LM pilot Charlie Duke inadvertently exposed the crew to German measles. Command module pilot, Ken Mattingly, turned out to have no immunity to measles and was replaced by backup command module pilot Jack Swigert.

Ground tests before launch, indicated the possibility of a poorly insulated supercritical helium tank in the LM's descent stage so the flight plan was modified to enter the LM three hours early in order to obtain an onboard readout of helium tank pressure. The No. 2 oxygen tank, serial number 10024X-TA0009 had been previously installed in the service module of Apollo 10 , but was removed for modification (and was damaged in the process of removal). The tank was fixed, tested at the factory, installed in the Apollo 13 service module. and tested again during the Countdown Demonstration Test (CDT) at the Kennedy Space Center .beginning March 16, 1970. The tanks normally are emptied to about half full, and No. 1 behaved all right. But No. 2 dropped to only 92 percent of capacity. Gaseous oxygen at 80 psi was applied through the vent line to expel the liquid oxygen, but to no avail. An interim discrepancy report was written, and on March 27, two weeks before launch, detanking operations were resumed. No. 1 again emptied normally, but No. 2 did not.

After a conference with contractor and NASA personnel, the test director decided to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in No. 2 by using the electrical heater within the tank. The technique worked, but it took eight hours of 65-volt DC power from the ground-support equipment to dissipate the oxygen. Due to an oversight in replacing an underrated component during a design modification, this turned out to severely damage the internal heating elements of the tank. Orbit: April 17, 1970 Mission Highlights: Third lunar landing attempt. Mission was aborted after rupture of service module oxygen tank. Classed as "successful failure" because of experience in rescuing crew. Spent upper stage successfully impacted on the Moon. The first two days the crew ran into a couple of minor surprises, but generally Apollo 13 was looking like the smoothest flight of the program. At 46 hours 43 minutes Joe Kerwin, the CapCom on duty, said, "The spacecraft is in real good shape as far as we are concerned. We're bored to tears down here." It was the last time anyone would mention boredom for a long time.

At 55 hours 46 minutes, as the crew finished a 49-minute TV broadcast showing how comfortably they lived and worked in weightlessness, Lovell stated: "This is the crew of Apollo 13 wishing everybody there a nice evening, and we're just about ready to close out our inspection of Aquarius (the LM) and get back for a pleasant evening in Odyssey (the CM). Good night." Nine minutes later, Oxygen tank No. 2 blew up, causing No. 1 tank also to fail. The Apollo 13 command modules normal supply of electricity, light, and water was lost, and they were about 200,000 miles from Earth. The message came in the form of a sharp bang and vibration. Jack Swigert saw a warning light that accompanied the bang, and said, "Houston, we've had a problem here." Lovell came on and told the ground that it was a main B bus undervolt. The time was 2108 hours on April 13. Next, the warning lights indicated the loss of two of Apollo 13 's three fuel cells, which were the spacecrafts prime source of electricity.

With warning lights blinking on, One Oxygen tank appeared to be completely empty, and there were indications that the oxygen in the second tank was rapidly being depleted. Thirteen minutes after the explosion, Lovell happened to look out of the left-hand window, and saw the final evidence pointing toward potential catastrophe. "We are venting something out into the- into space," he reported to Houston. Jack Lousma, the CapCom replied, "Roger, we copy you venting." Lovell said, "It's a gas of some sort." It was oxygen gas escaping at a high rate from the second, and last, oxygen tank. (by James A. Lovell, from Apollo Expeditions to the Moon , edited by Edgar M. Cortright, NASA SP; 350, Washington, DC, 1975 ) The first thing the crew did, even before discovering the oxygen leak, was to try to close the hatch between the CM and the LM. They reacted spontaneously, like submarine crews, closing the hatches to limit the amount of flooding. First Jack and then Lovell tried to lock the reluctant hatch, but the stubborn lid wouldn't stay shut.

Exasperated, and realizing that there wasn't a cabin leak, they strapped the hatch to the CM couch. The pressure in the No. 1 oxygen tank continued to drift downward; passing 300 psi, now heading toward 200 psi. Months later, after the accident investigation was complete, it was determined that, when No. 2 tank blew up, it either ruptured a line on the No. 1 tank, or caused one of the valves to leak. When the pressure reached 200 psi, the crew and ground controllers knew that they would lose all oxygen, which meant that the last fuel cell would also die. At 1 hour and 29 seconds after the bang, Jack Lousma, then CapCom, said after instructions from Flight Director Glynn Lunney: "It is slowly going to zero, and we are starting to think about the LM lifeboat." Swigert replied, "That's what we have been thinking about too." Ground controllers in Houston faced a formidable task. Completely new procedures had to be written and tested in the simulator before being passed up to the crew.

The navigation problem had to be solved; essentially how, when, and in what attitude to burn the LM descent engine to provide a quick return home. With only 15 minutes of power left in the CM, CapCom told the crew to make their way into the LM. Fred and Jim Lovell quickly floated through the tunnel, leaving Jack to perform the last chores in the Command Module. The first concern was to determine if there were enough consumables to get home? The LM was built for only a 45-hour lifetime, and it needed to be stretch to 90. Oxygen wasn't a problem. The full LM descent tank alone would suffice, and in addition, there were two ascent-engine oxygen tanks, and two backpacks whose oxygen supply would never be used on the lunar surface. Two emergency bottles on top of those packs had six or seven pounds each in them. (At LM jettison, just before reentry, 28.5 pounds of oxygen remained, more than half of what was available after the explosion). Power was also a concern. There were 2181 ampere hours in the LM batteries, Ground controllers carefully worked out a procedure where the CM batteries were charged with LM power.

All non-critical systems were turned off and energy consumption was reduced to a fifth of normal, which resulted in having 20 percent of our LM electrical power left when Aquarius was jettisoned. There was one electrical close call during the mission. One of the CM batteries vented with such force that it momentarily dropped off the line. Had the battery failed, there would be insufficient power to return the ship to Earth. Water was the main consumable concern. It was estimated that the crew would run out of water about five hours before Earth reentry, which was calculated at around 151 hours. However, data from Apollo 11 (which had not sent its LM ascent stage crashing into the Moon as in subsequent missions) showed that its mechanisms could survive seven or eight hours in space without water cooling. The crew conserved water. They cut down to six ounces each per day, a fifth of normal intake, and used fruit juices; they ate hot dogs and other wet-pack foods when they ate at all.

The crew became dehydrated throughout the flight and set a record that stood up throughout Apollo: Lovell lost fourteen pounds, and the crew lost a total of 31.5 pounds, nearly 50 percent more than any other crew. Those stringent measures resulted in the crew finishing with 28.2 pounds of water, about 9 percent of the total. Removal of Carbon Dioxide was also a concern. There were enough lithium hydroxide canisters, which remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft, but the square canisters from the Command Module were not compatible with the round openings in the Lunar Module environmental system. There were four cartridge from the LM, and four from the backpacks, counting backups. However, the LM was designed to support two men for two days and was being asked to care for three men nearly four days. After a day and a half in the LM a warning light showed that the carbon dioxide had built up to a dangerous level. Mission Control devised a way to attach the CM canisters to the LM system by using plastic bags, cardboard, and tape- all materials carried on board.

One of the big questions was, "How to get back safely to Earth?" The LM navigation system wasn't designed to help us in this situation. Before the explosion, at 30 hours and 40 minutes, Apollo 13 had made the normal midcourse correction, which would take it out of a free-return-to-Earth trajectory and put it on a lunar landing course. Now the task was to get back on a free-return course. The ground computed a 35-second burn and fired it 5 hours after the explosion. As they approached the Moon , another burn was computed; this time a long 5-minute burn to speed up the return home. It took place 2 hours after rounding the far side of the Moon , The Command Module navigational platform alignment was transferred to the LM but verifying alignment was difficult. Ordinarily the alignment procedure uses an onboard sextant device, called the Alignment Optical Telescope, to find a suitable navigation star. Then with the help of the onboard computer verify the guidance platform's alignment. However, due to the explosion, a swarm of debris from the ruptured service module made it impossible to sight real stars. An alternate procedure was developed to use the sun as an alignment star.

Lovell rotated the spacecraft to the attitude Houston had requested and when he looked through the AOT, the Sun was just where it was expected. The alignment with the Sun proved to be less than a half a degree off. The ground and crew then knew they could do the 5-minute P.C. + 2 burn with assurance, and that would cut the total time of our voyage to about 142 hours. At 73:46 hours the air-to-ground transcript describes the event: Lovell: O.K. We got it. I think we got it. What diameter was it? Apollo 13 returns to Earth - Apr 17, 1970 - HISTORY.com This Day In History: 04/17/1970 - Apollo 13 Returns to Earth On this day in 1970, with the world anxiously watching, Apollo 13, a U.S. lunar spacecraft that suffered a severe malfunction on its journey to the moon, safely returns to Earth. On April 11, the third manned lunar landing mission was launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, carrying astronauts James A. Lovell, John L. Swigert, and Fred W.

Haise. The mission was headed for a landing on the Fra Mauro highlands of the moon. However, two days into the mission, disaster struck 200,000 miles from Earth when oxygen tank No. 2 blew up in the spacecraft. Mission commander Lovell reported to mission control on Earth: "Houston, we've had a problem here," and it was discovered that the normal supply of oxygen, electricity, light, and water had been disrupted. The landing mission was aborted, and the astronauts and controllers on Earth scrambled to come up with emergency procedures. The crippled spacecraft continued to the moon, circled it, and began a long, cold journey back to Earth. The astronauts and mission control were faced with enormous logistical problems in stabilizing the spacecraft and its air supply, as well as providing enough energy to the damaged fuel cells to allow successful reentry into Earth's atmosphere. Navigation was another problem, and Apollo 13's course was repeatedly corrected with dramatic and untested maneuvers. On April 17, tragedy turned to triumph as the Apollo 13 astronauts touched down safely in the Pacific Ocean.

Lead Story Apollo 13 returns to Earth Share this: Apollo 13 returns to Earth Author Apollo 13 returns to Earth URL Apollo 13 oxygen tank explodes - Apr 13, 1970 - HISTORY.com Apollo 13 oxygen tank explodes Share this: Apollo 13 oxygen tank explodes Author Apollo 13 oxygen tank explodes URL Publisher A+E Networks On April 13, 1970, disaster strikes 200,000 miles from Earth when oxygen tank No. 2 blows up on Apollo 13, the third manned lunar landing mission. Astronauts James A. Lovell, John L. Swigert, and Fred W. Haise had left Earth two days before for the Fra Mauro highlands of the moon but were forced to turn their attention to simply making it home alive. Mission commander Lovell reported to mission control on Earth: “Houston, we’ve had a problem here,” and it was discovered that the normal supply of oxygen, electricity, light, and water had been disrupted. The landing mission was aborted, and the astronauts and controllers on Earth scrambled to come up with emergency procedures.

The crippled spacecraft continued to the moon, circled it, and began a long, cold journey back to Earth. The astronauts and mission control were faced with enormous logistical problems in stabilizing the spacecraft and its air supply, and providing enough energy to the damaged fuel cells to allow successful reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. Navigation was another problem, and Apollo 13‘s course was repeatedly corrected with dramatic and untested maneuvers. On April 17, with the world anxiously watching, tragedy turned to triumph as the Apollo 13 astronauts touched down safely in the Pacific Ocean. Related Videos Professionalism/Apollo 13 - Wikibooks, open books for an open world Professionalism/Apollo 13 Jump to: navigation , search Damaged Apollo 13 Service Module Apollo 13 was a manned mission to explore the Fra Mauro region of the moon. It was the seventh manned flight of the Apollo Program . Liftoff occurred on April 11, 1970 at 13:13 CST with astronauts James Lovell, John Swigert, and Fred Haise. However, these men never reached the moon. On April 13, an oxygen tank exploded, damaging the spacecraft's Service Module.

The next few days were focused on returning them safely. On April 17, the Command Module "Odyssey" splashed down in the South Pacific Ocean and was picked up by the USS Iwo Jima. [1] While the mission itself was a failure, the astronauts' safe return made it one of NASA's most "successful failures." [2] The recovery of the Apollo 13 crew can be attributed to the technical and professional skill of the controllers and engineers at Mission Control. Several individuals displayed exceptional professionalism, but a general culture that promoted excellence had developed over the years at NASA. Issues of professionalism during Apollo 1 resulted in disaster , but they provided a valuable lesson that would set the tone for Apollo 13. Contents Organizational Culture[ edit ] In 1915, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was established to institutionalize aeronautics research. At the time, NACA was an aggregate of personnel and facilities from the Army and Air Force, research universities, and other government-sponsored labs and generated thousands of scientific publications annually.

In 1958, after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, NACA was dissolved and President Eisenhower established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the federal agency which would oversee the development of all civilian space technology. In its early years, NASA took its identity from NACA; however, as the size and budget grew and developing space technology diverged from aeronautics research, the new organizational culture it developed paved the way for future success. Competition[ edit ] At first, NACA held two competing ideologies for how to manage its manufacturing and research and development practices. The arsenal concept, adopted from the Army, established in-house production capabilities so that work done by contractors could be compared and assessed on cost and quality. [3] In contrast, the Air Force relied almost exclusively on contractors, demonstrating more confidence and trust in outsiders. From the beginning, NASA valued competition, making even the most well-respected companies "re-compete" for contracts rather than issuing automatic extensions, thus guarding against complacency. [4] Believing that competition bred excellence, NASA also encouraged rivalry between research laboratories and maintained a rigorous hiring process to attract the most qualified individuals.

Automatic responsibility[ edit ] All NASA employees were expected to embrace responsibility. Philip Tompkins, an intern at the Marshall Space Flight Center during the Apollo program, described the concept of automatic responsibility: "Despite the obvious and constant hazards involved, they courageously faced each new task with quiet confidence in the thousands of support personnel, systems, and components whose expert functioning they relied upon." [3] Management assumed that individuals would identify and address problems within their areas of expertise and get the attention of more qualified colleagues if the issue lay outside their range of skill. Everyone was treated as an expert in some sphere, and each placed the utmost confidence in his or her peers. Werhner von Braun Balance[ edit ] Safety, cost, and time were NASA's three primary constraints. [3] In 1961, President Kennedy issued a directive to land a man on the moon and return him safely before the end of the decade. [5] As a result, NASA prioritized staying on schedule and had a 5.2 billion dollar budget in 1965, 5.3 percent of the federal budget.

[6] Monetary cost was therefore not an issue, but the Apollo 1 accident reminded NASA that human lives were at stake in every mission. Following this catastrophe, NASA tightened its testing standards, replacing time with safety as the primus inter pares, or "first among equals." [3] Throughout the Apollo program, however, NASA successfully balanced these competing factors to operate efficiently. Redundancy[ edit ] To maintain a "safety first" mentality, NASA practiced redundancy in research and testing. Wernher von Braun , the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center during the Apollo years, practiced a policy called "five neins," which required confirmation from 5 independent experts that a part or procedure would not fail. He was once quoted, "It’s a matter of making every possible human effort to avoid a failure in a part and then taking steps to avoid the effects of a failure if one should develop anyway." [3] Communication[ edit ] The size of NASA, which had reached 367,700 contracted employees in 1965, made constant communication necessary. [6] To promote communication of successes and failures, NASA adopted a culture of openness.

Wernher von Braun instituted weekly meetings to provide feedback and hear suggestions from everyone in his division, ignoring hierarchy. [3] The discipline of regular communication ensured that problems were addressed promptly, suggestions could be offered, and even fostered a healthy attitude toward conflict. With the understanding that risk and failure were commonplace in their work, individuals were provided an atmosphere in which these things could be discussed honestly. Mission Control[ edit ] While organizational culture can help during crisis, it is individuals within that culture who affect outcomes. There was no such thing as a bystander during Apollo 13; controllers and engineers rushed to Mission Control even when they were not supposed to, ready to start work. [7] The challenges required these individuals to trust in their technical expertise, and while many people acted as professionals, there are a few standout characters from the control room floor to whom the success of the mission can largely be attributed. Gene Kranz of the White Team Eugene "Gene" Kranz[ edit ] Gene Kranz was Lead Flight Director for Apollo 13, and his team, "White Team," was on duty during the explosion. [1] Immediately, his focus shifted to getting the crew home.

The Flight Mission Rules state that "the Flight Director may, after analysis of the flight, choose to take any necessary action required for the successful completion of the mission," [8] and Kranz was aware of his responsibilities. As the situation unfolded, he announced to the control room, "Let's solve the problem, but let's not make it any worse by guessing." [1] When his shift finally ended, he and members of White Team remained in the control room to assist Black Team as they started their shift. Kranz would pull members of White Team aside for consultations. He eventually pulled White Team into a conference room so they could frame and solve an aerospace engineering problem that would bring the astronauts home; they would not take another regular shift in the control room. Kranz himself never left the Control Center, instead taking short naps in the VIP room. [1] Kranz's loyalty was not to the original mission objectives or any individual. He was dedicated to making sure he fulfilled his professional duties. Seymour "Sy" Liebergot[ edit ] Sy Lierbergot , a White Team EECOM , monitored the Command and Service modules.

Following the explosion, he checked the oxygen tanks' readouts, which appeared abnormal, but might have just been an instrumentation error. He refused to diagnose the situation and prescribe a solution until he had figured out the problem. [9] Leibergot fulfilled his role professionally: by abstaining from reporting uncertainties with certainty he avoided exacerbating the situation. His actions reflected prudence in the face of repeated demands from superiors and colleagues. Glynn Lunney[ edit ] Glynn Lunney was a "plerker," one who views work as play. His shift as Flight Director with the Black Team was supposed to start after Kranz finished, but he was in Mission Control early looking around, even before the explosion. Eventually, Kranz called Lunney to the control room floor to get a more complete picture. [1] By being immersed in the control room activities, he was better equipped than anyone to relieve Kranz. Lunney made several important decisions during his shift, including how to keep the crew alive and bring them home. However, he was poised and epitomized trust in his controllers. In several instances, he had to rely on their expertise and deferred to their judgement, but he always ensured that he understood their proposals.

[1] His ability to operate under pressure and rely on others was crucial to the successful return of Apollo 13. Public Relations[ edit ] In the wake of the Apollo 1 disaster, NASA changed its public relations strategy and painted the outcome of Apollo 13 in a positive light. NASA became more open leading up to Apollo 13. Prior to Apollo 1, NASA did not grant the media direct access to communications between spacecraft and mission control. [10] Instead, NASA set a seven-second delay to censor transmissions if necessary. However, NASA changed its policy following Apollo 1 and allowed the media to directly access astronaut-mission control transmissions, abandoning the seven-second delay and censorship. [10] During Apollo 13, statements that may have generated poor publicity, such as Jim Lovell claiming "Well, I'm afraid this is going to be the last lunar mission in a long time," reached the public. [11] In addition, NASA was forthcoming with information at press conferences and allowed one reporter to observe the proceedings of Mission Control. [10] The impacts of NASA's open public relations strategy were positive and wide-ranging.

The US Information Agency claims that the splashdown of Apollo 13 in the South Pacific was one of the most heavily observed media events in history. [10] The media's take on NASA's handling of Apollo was clear: TIME Magazine stated in the aftermath of the event, "The total and instant access to bad as well as good news of U.S. space shots underscored the openness of American society." [12] By being open to the press and the public, NASA turned Apollo 13 into a public relations success. Although the incident resulted in a failure to achieve the mission's goals, NASA was able to portray Apollo 13 as a "successful failure." Whether intentional or not, NASA's actions during Apollo 13 upheld its integrity. NASA also avoided the tendency of large organizations to be paternalistic during disasters. Unlike BP, which hid the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill from the public, or the United States State Department, which took a long time to clarify the situation surrounding the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi in September 2012, NASA was forthcoming with information related to the incident. They allowed the public to judge the magnitude of the case; in return, NASA gained the public's trust.

Conclusions[ edit ] The Apollo 13 case shows that organizational culture impacts how professionals behave. Leading up to Apollo 13, NASA created an institutional framework that encouraged professional conduct. Ethical standards were institutionalized, with many individuals in upper management leading by example. The mission highlighted the importance of integrity and openness in public relations. By being honest and providing timely and accurate information to the media to allow the public to judge the situation for themselves, NASA gained the public's trust. The actions of Glynn Lunney, Gene Kranz, Sy Liebergot, and others at NASA during the successful return of Apollo 13 also showed that the professional success of an organization depends ultimately on the ethics and behavior of individuals in that organization. References[ edit ] ↑ a b c d e f Lovell, J., Kluger, K. (1994). Lost Moon. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company. ↑ Lovell, J. (1975 July 28). "Houston, We've Had a Problem." In E.M. Cortright (Ed.), Apollo: Expeditions to the Moon. ↑ a b c d e f Tompkins, P.

(2005). Apollo, Challenger, Columbia: The decline of the space program. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company. ↑ Levine, A. (n.d.). A summary of NASA contracting philosophy. In Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (The NASA Acquisition Process: Contracting for Research and Development). Retrieved from ↑ Gilruth, R. (1975). “I believe we should go to the moon.” In Apollo Expeditions to the Moon (Chapter 2.1). Retrieved from ↑ a b Barry, B. (2004). Project Apollo: A retrospective analysis. Retrieved from ↑ Lunney, G. (Publication Date Unknown). Apollo XIII. NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project: Apollo 13 Narrative. Retrieved from ↑ NASA Flight Control Division. (1969 May 16). Final Flight Mission Rules. ↑ NASA. (1970). Audio from the EECOM Loop During Apollo 13. Retrieved from ↑ a b c d Kauffman, J. (2001). A successful failure: NASA's crisis communications regarding Apollo 13. Public Relations Review, 27: 437-448.

↑ NASA (1970). Apollo 13 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Transcription: p. 260 ↑ (1970). Apollo's Return: Triumph over failure. TIME Magazine, 95: 17. Astronauts land safely in crippled Apollo 13 - UPI Archives Astronauts land safely in crippled Apollo 13 By AL ROSSITER JR. | April 17, 1970 Comments ABOARD THE IWO JIMA, April 17, 1970 (UPI) - America's brave but jinxed Apollo 13 astronauts came safely back to earth today, their stricken spaceship coaxed a quarter million miles home by the lander meant to have put them on the moon. The Odyssey command module bearing James A. Lovell, John L. Swigert and Fred W. Haise plopped down in the South Pacific four miles from this pickup ship at 1:08 p.m. EST and jet helicopters moved into snatch up the bone weary men.

Millions around the world held their breaths as they watched on television the happy ending to a space-age drama that almost ended in tragedy when one whole side of the service module was blown away by a mysterious explosion Monday night. The astronauts radioed they were OK as they splashed down about 600 miles south of the Samoa Islands. With power, oxygen and fuel for the command ship snuffed out 205,000 miles from earth the three astronauts had to turn to their awkward four-legged lunar lander Aquarius. They cut it free only an hour before they plunged into the fiery cauldron of re-entry in the earth's atmosphere at more than 25,000 mph. "Farewell, Aquarius and we thank you," Lovell said as their live-saver drifted away. "She sure was a good ship," said Swigert, the rookie who joined the crew as a substitute when Thomas K. Mattingly was exposed to the German measles and grounded two days before launch. The spacecraft landed upright, floating on its broad, flat bottom, and recovery helicopter one reported it was "riding comfortably." Swimmers were deployed in the water near the bobbing capsule.

At splashdown controllers and the Mission Control Center in Houston burst into applause as they did earlier when the command ship was first sighted. A closeup TV view of the capsule showed it was charred black by the re-entry, but it appeared in excellent condition. Its conical side gleamed silver in the bright sun. Apollo 13 entered the earth's atmosphere at 12:53 p.m. EST. "I know all of us here want to thank all of you guys down there for the very fine job you did," said Swigert. "Welcome home," Mission Control told the crew just before Apollo 13 hit the atmosphere. Tracking stations reported losing communications signals from Apollo 13 at 12:53 p.m. EST, about a minute earlier than planned. This radio "blackout" was caused by the buildup of electrically charged gases around the spacecraft at it sliced into the top fringes of the air. The spaceship's deceleration as it dived into the thicker layers of the atmosphere built up an estimated force on the astronauts equal to more than five times the pull of gravity. The astronauts first words after the radio blackout ended came from Swigert at 12:59 p.m. EST.

"OK, Joe," he said when the Control Center told Apollo 13 ground forces were standing by. Two 16-foot diameter nylon drogue parachutes popped out of the cone-shaped end of the seared spacecraft at 1:02 to begin its final landing sequence. Apollo 13 was about 23,000 feet above the ocean at the time. "We can see the drogues," said Swigert. The capsule's three big orange and white main parachutes were deployed at 1:03 p.m. to lower the charred spacecraft into the sea. Three minutes before the spacecraft hit the ocean, a cloud of orange smoke was emitted from the spacecraft. This was fuel dumped overboard as planned. The three astronauts, on exact course but "damned fatigued" after four days of coaxing a crippled spaceship a quarter million miles from the moon, cut free at 11:43 a.m. from the Aquarius whose power, oxygen and engines had saved them. Earlier they jettisoned that shattered section and saw in astonishment one entire side had been blown off in the near-disaster that had spoiled America's third attempt to put men on the moon.

"There's one whole side of the spacecraft missing," Navy Capt. Lovell reported. "The whole panel is blown out." Added Haise: "It's really a mess." Lovell said "A lot of debris" was hanging on to the side of the service module. Its big engine appeared damaged. The commander revealed all the men had taken a stimulant, dexedrine, before the final hours of split-second operations. "Well, you can't say this week hasn't been filled with excitement," Lovell told ground controllers. "Yeah, James," Joe Kerwin replied. "If you can't taken any better care of spacecraft than that, we may not give you another." The day began on an optimistic note for the spacemen. They switched on the batteries of their chilled re-entry capsule and they worked. That was at 6:30 a.m. and 50,783 miles to go. With their lunar lander Aquarius still attached and supplying live-saving oxygen, the astronauts swiftly built up to a speed of 24,385 mph before slashing into the earth's atmosphere.

Lovell told communicator Jack Lousma: "I'm looking out the window now, Jack, and that earth is really moving in like a high speed freight train." Lovell also looked back wistfully at the shrinking moon. "I'm still looking for Fra Mauro (the scheduled moon landing site) and Cone Crater (the crater the astronauts had hoped to inspect)," he said. "You're going the wrong way, son," said Chief Astronaut Donald F. Slayton. Ten hours before re-entry, the astronauts reported the spacecraft was so cold that it was hard to sleep. Ground controllers urged them to try anyway so they would be rested for the critical return. "Well, we'll take it easy and we'll try to sleep, but it's just awful cold," replied Swigert. "It's just too cold to sleep." "We'd like to figure a way to get a cup of coffee up to you," said Slayton. "It would taste pretty good wouldn't it?" In Capetown, South Africa, Apollo 13 was visually sighted easily today from the 40-inch Royal Observatory telescope, a science officer said.

He described the sighting as a "large pinpoint of light." The three astronauts were eager to get back home, and the latest plans called for them to arrive by Air Force jet at Houston Sunday morning after spending tonight on the Iwo Jima. "Are the flowers in bloom yet in Houston?" Lovell asked during a little moment interrupting preparations for the crucial re-entry process. Controllers replied they were not. Lovell, 42, is the first man to venture into space four times and the first to make two trips to the moon. He said before launch Saturday that this was to be his last space flight. Astronaut Jim Lovell: Apollo 13 Commander Astronaut Jim Lovell: Apollo 13 Commander By Elizabeth Howell, Space.com Contributor | March 20, 2013 03:27pm ET MORE Jim Lovell, commander of the Apollo 13 mission, flew into space four times. Credit: NASA For years, Jim Lovell was the world's most-traveled astronaut. Lovell flew into space four times in the Gemini and Apollo programs, racking up more than 700 hours in space.

His record stood until the Skylab space station's first crew surpassed it in 1973. A Navy astronaut, Lovell was actually turned down for the space program initially due to a minor medical issue. But he was accepted in plenty of time to participate in NASA's quest to reach the moon in the 1960s and 1970s. Lovell's most famous mission was Apollo 13 , which saw the spacecraft crippled by a devastating explosion while en route to the moon. From aviator to astronaut Lovell, a Cleveland native, began his career in the U.S. Navy doing night landings in jets on aircraft carriers. A colleague once nicknamed him "Shaky" as a joke, knowing the moniker held negative connotations for a pilot. But Lovell was actually quite steady-handed. Famously, Lovell once made a landing in a dark F2H Banshee near occupied Japan after accidentally shorting out the lights in his cockpit. He found the carrier by following the churn of plants in the carrier's wake.

In 1958, Lovell graduated from the Navy's test pilot school, beginning several years of testing fighter aircraft and other jets before the types were authorized for use by less experienced aviators. The job was dangerous, and casualties were high, but it was among test pilots that NASA first looked for astronauts in the early 1960s. Lovell was turned down because of excess bilirubin, a byproduct of liver function. When Lovell protested, according to his biography, "Lost Moon," the response he received was: "I have five men out there won't don't have a bilirubin problem, and 26 more on the way who probably don't." Fortunately for Lovell, he had a second try for NASA when another astronaut selection opened up; he was chosen in 1962. Endurance and moon missions At NASA, Lovell served as a backup for Gemini 4 — the second flight of the Gemini program — before being assigned as a "prime" crew member on Gemini 7. That flight launched in 1965. The flight was an endurance mission, in almost every sense of the word.

Lovell and his commander Frank Borman spent more than 330 hours — nearly two weeks — in a spacecraft that was similar in dimensions to a phone booth. While they did have experiments to keep them busy, monotony and close quarters made the spaceflight a challenge. Lovell distinguished himself on this mission, though, earning a command position on Gemini 12. He oversaw the last flight of Gemini, which included spacewalks by Buzz Aldrin (who later became the second man on the moon.) The next step for Lovell was the moon. In December 1968, Lovell was reunited with Borman and crewmate Bill Anders on Apollo 8 for a Christmastime journey to orbit Earth's closest large neighbor. It was the first time any human had journeyed so far, and millions watched the astronauts deliver a Christmas address where they read a Biblical passage and described the scene unfurling beneath them. Attempting a moon landing Lovell's last mission was Apollo 13 in April 1970. He was in command of two rookies, Jack Swigert and Fred Haise .

The spaceflight got off to a challenging start when just days before launch, crewmember Ken Mattingly was pulled due to exposure to the German measles. Lovell had misgivings, but after spending more time training with the capable Swigert was satisfied that the mission could proceed. Apollo 13 was the third targeted moon landing. All appeared normal until the evening of April 13, when the astronauts were just a day away from landing on the moon. A stray spark ignited an oxygen tank within the command module, heavily damaging the spacecraft. The three men huddled in the undamaged lunar module — a spacecraft designed for two men to land on the moon — for most of the next four days. To save energy, only the most essential systems were kept powered up. The men were cold, uncomfortable and dealing with constant minor crises. But with the help of Mission Control, they arrived safely back on Earth on April 17, 1970. Lovell retired from NASA and the Navy in 1973 and held a series of industry positions afterwards.

He also provided guidance for the movie"Apollo 13," based on his biography "Lost Moon." Now retired, Lovell still travels for space events and sometimes gives interviews. Tourists in Chicago can check out Lovell's extensive space memorabilia collection in Lovells of Lake Forest, a steakhouse just north of the city run by his son Jay. — Elizabeth Howell, SPACE.com Contributor 1000+ images about Apollo 13 on Pinterest | Fred haise, Jim lovell and Astronauts Forward Apollo 13 - Astronaut John L. Swigert, Jr., Apollo 13 Command Module Pilot, holds the “mailbox”, a jerry-rigged arrangement which the Apollo 13 astronauts built to use the Command Module lithium hydroxide canisters to purge carbon dioxide from the Lunar Module, an operation critical in ensuring safe passage back to Earth.

See More Apollo 13 | NASA Apollo 13 "Houston, we have a problem..." Crew 6/13/69 - S-IVB ondock at Kennedy 6/29/69 - S-II ondock at Kennedy 6/16/69 - S-IC ondock at Kennedy 7/7/69 - S-IU ondock at Kennedy Launch April 11, 1970; 1:13 p.m. CST Launch Pad 39A Duration: five days, 22 hours, 54 minutes, 41 seconds Distance: 622,268 miles Recovery Ship: USS Iwo Jima Mission Objective Apollo 13 was supposed to land in the Fra Mauro area. An explosion on board forced Apollo 13 to circle the moon without landing. The Fra Mauro site was reassigned to Apollo 14. Mission Highlights At 5 1/2 minutes after liftoff, John Swigert, Fred Haise and James Lovell felt a little vibration. Then the center engine of the S-II stage shut down two minutes early.

This caused the remaining four engines to burn 34 seconds longer than planned, and the S-IVB third stage had to burn nine seconds longer to put Apollo 13 in orbit. Days before the mission, backup lunar module pilot, Charles Duke, inadvertently exposed the crew to German measles. Command Module Pilot Ken Mattingly had no immunity to measles and was replaced by backup command module pilot, John Swigert. Ground tests before launch indicated the possibility of a poorly insulated supercritical helium tank in the lunar module, or LM, descent stage, so the flight plan was modified to enter the LM three hours early in order to obtain an onboard readout of helium tank pressure. The No. 2 oxygen tank, serial number 10024X-TA0009, had been previously installed in the service module of Apollo 10, but was removed for modification and damaged in the process. The tank was fixed, tested at the factory, installed in the Apollo 13 service module and tested again during the Countdown Demonstration Test at NASA's Kennedy Space Center beginning March 16, 1970. The tanks normally are emptied to about half full. No. 1 behaved all right, but No.

2 dropped to only 92 percent of capacity. Gaseous oxygen at 80 pounds per square inch was applied through the vent line to expel the liquid oxygen, but to no avail. An interim discrepancy report was written, and on March 27, two weeks before launch, detanking operations resumed. No. 1 again emptied normally, but No. 2 did not. After a conference with contractor and NASA personnel, the test director decided to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in No. 2 by using the electrical heater within the tank. The technique worked, but it took eight hours of 65-volt DC power from the ground support equipment to dissipate the oxygen. Due to an oversight in replacing an underrated component during a design modification, this turned out to severely damage the internal heating elements of the tank. Apollo 13 was to be the third lunar landing attempt, but the mission was aborted after rupture of service module oxygen tank. Still, it was classified as a "successful failure" because of the experience gained in rescuing the crew. The mission's spent upper stage successfully impacted the moon.

During the first two days, the crew ran into a couple of minor surprises, but generally Apollo 13 was looking like the smoothest flight of the program. At 46 hours, 43 minutes Joe Kerwin, the capsule communicator, or Capcom, on duty, said, "The spacecraft is in real good shape as far as we are concerned. We're bored to tears down here." It was the last time anyone would mention boredom for a long time. At 55 hours, 46 minutes, as the crew finished a 49-minute TV broadcast showing how comfortably they lived and worked in weightlessness, Lovell said, "This is the crew of Apollo 13 wishing everybody there a nice evening, and we're just about ready to close out our inspection of Aquarius and get back for a pleasant evening in Odyssey. Good night." Nine minutes later, oxygen tank No. 2 blew up, causing the No. 1 tank to also fail. The command module's normal supply of electricity, light and water was lost, and they were about 200,000 miles from Earth. The message came in the form of a sharp bang and vibration at 9:08 p.m. April 13.

Swigert saw a warning light that accompanied the bang and said, "Houston, we've had a problem here." Lovell came on and told the ground that it was a main B bus undervolt. Next, the warning lights indicated the loss of two of three fuel cells, which were the spacecraft's prime source of electricity. With warning lights blinking, one oxygen tank appeared to be completely empty and there were indications that the oxygen in the second tank was rapidly depleting. Thirteen minutes after the explosion, Lovell happened to look out of the left-hand window and saw the final evidence pointing toward potential catastrophe. "We are venting something out into the... into space," he reported to Houston. Capcom Jack Lousma replied, "Roger, we copy you venting." Lovell said, "It's a gas of some sort." It was oxygen gas escaping at a high rate from the second, and last, oxygen tank. The first thing the crew did, even before discovering the oxygen leak, was try to close the hatch between the CM and the LM. They reacted spontaneously, similar to a submarine crew, closing the hatches to limit the amount of flooding.

First Swigert, and then Lovell, tried to lock the reluctant hatch, but the stubborn lid wouldn't stay shut. Exasperated and realizing that there wasn't a cabin leak, they strapped the hatch to the CM couch. The pressure in the No. 1 oxygen tank continued to drift downward; passing 300 pounds per square inch, then headed toward 200 pounds per square inch. Months later, after the accident investigation was complete, it was determined that when the No. 2 tank blew up, it either ruptured a line on the No. 1 tank or caused one of the valves to leak. When the pressure reached 200 pounds per square inch, the crew and ground controllers knew they would lose all oxygen, which meant that the last fuel cell also would die. At one hour, 29 seconds after the bang, Lousma said after instructions from Flight Director Glynn Lunney, "It is slowly going to zero, and we are starting to think about the LM lifeboat." Swigert replied, "That's what we have been thinking about too." Ground controllers in Houston faced a formidable task. Completely new procedures had to be written and tested in the simulator before being passed up to the crew.

The navigation problem had to be solved; essentially how, when and in what attitude to burn the LM descent engine to provide a quick return home. With only 15 minutes of power left in the CM, Lousma told the crew to make their way into the LM. Haise and Lovell quickly floated through the tunnel, leaving Swigert to perform the last chores in the command module. The first concern was to determine if there were enough consumables to get home. The LM was built for only a 45-hour lifetime and it needed to be stretch to 90. Oxygen wasn't a problem. The full LM descent tank alone would suffice. In addition, there were two ascent-engine oxygen tanks and two backpacks full of oxygen that would never be used on the lunar surface. Two emergency bottles on top of those packs each had six or seven pounds in them. At LM jettison just before re-entry 28.5 pounds of oxygen remained, more than half of what was available after the explosion. Power also was a concern. There were 2,181 ampere hours in the LM batteries. Ground controllers carefully worked out a procedure where the CM batteries were charged with LM power.

All noncritical systems were turned off and energy consumption was reduced to 1/5, which resulted in having 20 percent of LM electrical power left when Aquarius was jettisoned. There was one electrical close call during the mission. One of the CM batteries vented with such force that it momentarily dropped off the line. Had the battery failed, there would have been insufficient power to return the ship to Earth. Water was the main consumable concern. It was estimated that the crew would run out of water about five hours before Earth re-entry, which was calculated at around 151 hours. However, data from Apollo 11, which had not sent its LM ascent stage crashing into the moon as in subsequent missions, showed that its mechanisms could survive seven or eight hours in space without water cooling. The crew conserved water. They cut down to six ounces each per day, 1/5 of normal intake, and used fruit juices; they ate hot dogs and other wet-pack foods when they ate at all.

The crew became dehydrated throughout the flight and set a record that stood up throughout Apollo: Lovell lost 14 pounds and the crew lost a total of 31.5 pounds, nearly 50 percent more than any other crew. Those stringent measures resulted in the crew finishing with 28.2 pounds of water, about 9 percent of the total. Removal of carbon dioxide also was a concern. There were enough lithium hydroxide canisters, which remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft, but the square canisters from the command module were not compatible with the round openings in the lunar module environmental system. There were four cartridges from the LM and four from the backpacks, counting backups. However, the LM was designed to support two men for two days and was being asked to care for three men for about four days. After a day and a half in the LM, a warning light showed that the carbon dioxide had built up to a dangerous level. Mission control devised a way to attach the CM canisters to the LM system by using plastic bags, cardboard and to tape all materials carried on board.

One of the big questions was, "How to get back safely to Earth?" The LM navigation system wasn't designed to help in this situation. Before the explosion at 30 hours, 40 minutes, Apollo 13 had made the normal midcourse correction, which would take it out of a free-return-to-Earth trajectory and put it on a lunar landing course. Now the task was to get back on a free-return course. The ground computed a 35-second burn and fired it five hours after the explosion. As they approached the moon, another burn was computed; this time a long five-minute burn to speed up the return home. It took place two hours after rounding the far side of the moon. The command module navigational platform alignment was transferred to the LM, but verifying alignment was difficult. Ordinarily the alignment procedure uses an onboard sextant device, called the Alignment Optical Telescope, or AOT, to find a suitable navigation star. Then with the help of an onboard computer, it verifies the guidance platform's alignment. However, due to the explosion, a swarm of debris from the ruptured service module made it impossible to sight real stars. An alternate procedure was developed to use the sun as an alignment star.

Lovell rotated the spacecraft to the attitude Houston had requested and when he looked through the AOT, the sun was just where it was expected. The alignment with the sun proved to be less than 1/2 a degree off. The ground and crew then knew they could do the five-minute P.C. + 2 burn with assurance, cutting the total time of their voyage to about 142 hours. At 73 hours, 46 minutes into the mission, the air-to-ground transcript describes the event: Lovell: OK. We got it. I think we got it. What diameter was it? Haise: Yes. It's coming back in. Just a second. Lovell: Yes, yaw's coming back in. Just about it. Haise: Yaw is in.... Lovell: What have you got? Haise: Upper-right corner of the sun.... Lovell: We've got it! If we raised our voices, I submit it was justified. Flight Director Gerald Griffin, a man not easily shaken, recalled: "Some years later I went back to the log and looked up that mission. My writing was almost illegible, I was so damned nervous.

And I remember the exhilaration running through me: My God, that's the last hurdle - if we can do that, I know we can make it. It was funny because only the people involved knew how important it was to have that platform properly aligned." Yet Griffin barely mentioned the alignment in his change-of-shift briefing - "That check turned out real well" is all he said an hour after his penmanship failed him. The trip was marked by discomfort beyond the lack of food and water. Sleep was almost impossible because of the cold. When the electrical systems were turned off, the spacecraft lost an important source of heat. The temperature dropped to 38 degrees Fahrenheit and condensation formed on all the walls. The most remarkable achievement of mission control was quickly developing procedures for powering up the CM after its long, cold sleep. Flight controllers wrote the documents for this innovation in three days, instead of the usual three months. The command module was cold and clammy at the start of power-up. The walls, ceiling, floor, wire harnesses and panels were all covered with droplets of water. It was suspected conditions were the same behind the panels.

The chances of short circuits caused apprehension, but thanks to the safeguards built into the command module after the disastrous Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, no arcing took place. Lovell recalled the descent to Earth, "The droplets furnished one sensation as we decelerated in the atmosphere: it rained inside the CM." Four hours before landing, the crew shed the service module; mission control had insisted on retaining it until then because everyone feared what the cold of space might do to the un-sheltered CM heat shield. Photos of the service module showed one whole panel missing and wreckage hanging out, it was a mess as it drifted away. Three hours later, the crew left the lunar module Aquarius and then splashed down gently in the Pacific Ocean near Samoa. After an intensive investigation, the Apollo 13 Accident Review Board identified the cause of the explosion. In 1965, the CM had undergone many improvements that included raising the permissible voltage to the heaters in the oxygen tanks from 28 to 65 volts DC. Unfortunately, the thermostatic switches on these heaters weren't modified to suit the change. During one final test on the launch pad, the heaters were on for a long period of time.

This subjected the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high temperatures (1000 F), which have been subsequently shown to severely degrade teflon insulation. The thermostatic switches started to open while powered by 65 volts DC and were probably welded shut. Furthermore, other warning signs during testing went unheeded and the tank, damaged from eight hours of overheating, was a potential bomb the next time it was filled with oxygen. That bomb exploded on April 13, 1970 - 200,000 miles from Earth.

Question: Which journey by James Lovell, John Swigert and Fred Haise in 1970 almost ended in disaster?
Answer: Apollo 13