History - Corporate Profile - About Samsung - Samsung Corporate profile About our US divisions From its inception as a small export business in Taegu, Korea, Samsung has grown to become one of the world's leading electronics companies, specializing in digital appliances and media, semiconductors, memory, and system integration. Today Samsung's innovative and top quality products and processes are world recognized. This timeline captures the major milestones in Samsung's history, showing how the company expanded its product lines and reach, grew its revenue and market share, and has followed its mission of making life better for consumers around the world. * Samsung's History Menu Link 1938-1969 Samsung's Beginnings On March 1, 1938, founding chairman Byung-Chull Lee started a business in Taegu, Korea, with 30,000 won. At the start, his business focused primarily on trade export, selling dried Korean fish, vegetables, and fruit to Manchuria and Beijing.

In little more than a decade, Samsung-which means "three stars" in Korean-would have its own flour mills and confectionery machines, its own manufacturing and sales operations, and ultimately evolve to become the modern global corporation that still bears the same name today. 1938-1969 Samsung's Beginnings Black-and-white TV (model: P-3202) production started by Samsung-Sanyo 1969 Samsung-Sanyo Electronics established (renamed Samsung Electro-Mechanics in March 1975 and merged with Samsung Electronics in March 1977) 1966 Joong-Ang Development established (known today as Samsung Everland) 1963 DongBang Life Insurance acquired (renamed Samsung Life Insurance in July 1989) 1958 Ankuk Fire & Marine Insurance acquired (renamed Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance in October 1993) 1954 Samsung Moolsan established (now Samsung Corporation) 1938 Copyright © 1995-2016 SAMSUNG All Rights reserved.

Welcome to Samsung Sign up & get 10% off Sign up and get 10% off your first order of $100 or more! Shop Samsung.com to find the best tech at the best prices and recieve news on our latest technology and exclusive offers.* SUBMIT *Exclusion apply. Order must be a minimumm of $100 or more. Offer valid only for new Samsung.com customers. Must sign up for emails by 11/12/16. Promo code must be used by 11/19. Thanks for Check your inbox for a discount code for 10% off your first purchase. Welcome back. South Korea: Ground Zero for Food Sovereignty and Community Resilience - FPIF Foreign Policy In Focus South Korea: Ground Zero for Food Sovereignty and Community Resilience South Korea may be better known for its high-tech exports, but its small farmers are leading the way when it comes to food sovereignty and community agriculture. This commentary is a joint publication of Foreign Policy In Focus and TheNation.com . The bustling, fast-paced, wired metropolis city of Seoul is what most people know of South Korea.

Now the 15th largest economy in the world, South Korea’s economy is driven by the exports sector controlled by corporations like Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and Daewoo. These chaebols have significant global market share : 37 percent in LCD TVs, 33 percent in hand-held phones, and 9 percent in automobiles. The term “chaebol nation” aptly describes South Korea’s economy: the top 30 chaebols account for 82 percent of the country’s exports. It’s hard to imagine that just two generations ago, farming fueled the nation’s economy. In the 1970s, farmers accounted for half the population; today, they represent only 6.2 percent. South Korea’s rapid transformation from an agrarian economy to a highly industrialized one wasn’t accidental; it was the outcome of the central government’s development and trade liberalization policies that in the early 1980s began to see farming as part of Korea’s past, not its future.

The major blow to Korean agriculture fell in 1994, when South Korea joined the WTO and the Agreement on Agriculture, which effectively forced the government to eliminate quotas and tariffs even while major agriculture exporting blocs like the United States and European Union still gave billions in subsidies to their own farmers. The result of all this liberalization: South Korea is only 20-percent self-sufficient in grain production, compared with the 1970s when it was at 70 percent. If South Korean chaebols and the politicians that represent them had their way, small farmers—the majority of South Korea’s agricultural sector—would all but disappear under the logic that they are uncompetitive in the global marketplace. They argue that it would be far more efficient for the country to continue to import cheap food from less developed countries—including through the process of acquiring land outside of Korea, like in Africa and South East Asia. And yet, despite a series of domestic and international policies that have sought to systematically eliminate them, South Korean farmers and peasants are fighting back. They have protested the WTO and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) for two decades, inspiring peasant farmers throughout the global south to mobilize against the free trade regime.

At home, they are trying to build a domestic food sovereignty movement that is ecologically sustainable, socially equitable, and economically resilient by producing healthy food, creating dignified rural livelihoods, and reviving farming communities. Instead of being blinded by South Korean high-tech bling, our eyes should be on South Korea’s food sovereignty movement. It offers the rest of us robust alternatives to the highly consolidated, industrialized, energy-intensive, and chemical-dependent globalized food systems that dominate all of our lives. In August, we co-organized and participated in a Food First Food Sovereignty Tour where we visited South Korea’s leading organic farms and progressive farmer-consumer cooperatives. South Korea is now a leader in the Asian region in organic production, so much so that the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements set up its offices there. And while there were many inspiring organic farms and gardens, two organizations stand out: the Korean Women Peasants Association (KWPA) and Hansalim. Korean Women Peasants Association “The food that is being sold by capitalism is sold as a commodity instead of food that sustains us,” explained Jeong-Yeol Kim of My Sister’s Garden, a KWPA project.

“That’s why we believe that helping farmers thrive is the only way to fix this food crisis, and the pathway to do so would be to ensure that consumers and every citizen join us in the process of making this come true.” We visited My Sister’s Garden in the small village of Bongang, where 14 women peasant farmers collectively grow and distribute a weekly “gerubi”—similar to a community supported agriculture (CSA) box—comprised of organic produce they grow and packaged foods they make, such as pickled radish and pear juice. KWPA operates 26 of these producer communities throughout the country. On the day we visited, they were packaging and sending 141 boxes to the Bluebird Children’s Center in the city where parents come to pick up the boxes. “Children today have no connection to the rural land,” explains Jeong-Yeol. Unlike previous generations, many children today no longer have grandparents or relatives living in the countryside who are connected in any way to farming. “So part of the effort of this partnership is to expose children to food production.” According to Jeong-Yeol, My Sister’s Garden plots were started in response to the devastating impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on the rural economy.

“Just within ten years, 10 percent of farmers have fled to the cities here in Korea,” she explained. The reason? The globalized food production system. “We think that the solution to this crisis is to focus on small-scale farmers and give a solid foundation for each farmer to survive.” Each farmer takes on 15 consumer households, earning 1,500,000 won—approximately $1,400—per month. When more consumers wish to join, they encourage a new garden plot to be created so that more women peasant farmers also can earn a dignified income. Optimizing profits is not the goal; rather, sharing with both consumers and other producers is at the center of the project’s philosophy. They are seeking to bring as many people as possible into an economically viable and socially just system to reverse the decline of rural communities. Despite their prevalence in agriculture, Korean peasant women lack equal rights and opportunities, which makes a project like My Sister’s Garden an even more important empowered space for peasant women to make decisions on all aspects of their production and distribution. KWPA’s native seed supply (Sunyoung Yang).

In the small village of Uiseong, just a few hours away from Bongang, KWPA members started a native seed protection program to defend Korean native seeds against corporate takeover. “A lot of our native seeds are being bought up or taken by Syngenta or Monsanto. There are no national Korean domestic seed companies left,” laments Jung-mee Han, a plum, mung bean, rice, and garlic farmer and member of KWPA. “We are all farming different crops,” adds Jeong-mi Kim, president of the Uiseong Native Seed Protectors. “Because we couldn’t take care of all the seeds ourselves, each member is responsible for preserving and cultivating several crops.” They also distribute seeds to low-income farmers who cannot afford them. “We’re not just saving seeds,” explains Jeong-mi. “We are tracking, monitoring, and sharing seeds among farmers, and nationally, we sell them to increase consumption of native agriculture.” These KWPA projects seek to radically alter the structure of the Korean food system and to de-commodify the linkages between consumers and producers. It has not been in vain.

In 2012, KWPA was awarded with the Food Sovereignty Prize for their work to defend the rights of small-scale women farmers in Korea and preserve the cultural heritage of Korean native seeds. Hansalim In 1986, even before farmers’ markets and CSA programs became popular in the United States, South Korean farmers and consumers began Hansalim. “Han” in Korean means great, one, whole, and together, and refers to all living things on earth. “Salim” refers to domestic activities that must be managed to care for one’s home, family, children, and community, as well as to revive and give life. With 2,000 growers and 380,000 consumer members, Hansalim is among the world’s largest and most successful agricultural cooperatives, creating an alternative economy that supports organic farmers and local agriculture, producing healthy food and protecting the environment in the process. Despite the global financial crisis, its sales have been growing annually by 20 percent. “Farmers at the time realized that they would need to collaborate with consumers in the city,” explains Woon Seok Park, a Hansalim farmer.

“Hansalim was created from that point of view, that consumers and producers could make a movement that went beyond mere market transactions to one of understanding each others’ conditions.” At Hansalim, consumers and growers meet each year to select what and how much they will produce and deliberate on prices for the following season. The coordination on such a massive scale—navigating production, price, harvest, distribution, and processing—is, to say the least, remarkable. It deeply impressed one U.S. organic farmer: David Retsky of County Line Harvest , who reflected back to Hansalim growers, “I come from California where I am just trying to make my business work. We’re competing with other people, so for me to see so many producers in the way of a collective, I’m amazed to see it working quite well.” To further demonstrate their commitment to support Hansalim farmers, consumers established a product stabilization fund in case of bad harvests caused by multiple factors, including rising fuel costs and climate change. Unlike many farmers who have been forced to throw in the towel in recent years due to extreme weather, which has caused crop failures, this fund has been a lifeline to Hansalim farmers who have been able to stay on the farm.

Locally fed cattle (Christine Ahn). Hansalim farmers know that climate change poses a challenge to the viability of agriculture in Korea. That’s why “we only handle local food,” explains Woon Seok, because “using Hansalim products is a way to combat climate change.” Hansalim doesn’t exclude non-organic growers from the cooperative. While it encourages organic production, proximity is most important because of the high environmental costs of shipping food over long distances, including refrigeration. Hansalim also runs the only livestock feed factory in Korea that uses only local feed sources from nearby farmers. Unlike the majority of livestock farmers, Hansalim livestock is therefore not dependent on feed imports that make up the majority of South Korean grain imports. Hansalim also informs consumers about the environmental benefits of locally produced food. On each product, it lists the distance and carbon saved by consuming this locally produced good versus one that would have been imported. To make this figure relevant to the lives of consumers, the label also lists an equivalent energy savings, such as the number of hours of electricity used to watch television or to light a fluorescent bulb.

Replacing Competition with Sharing Hansalim and KWPA are responses to government policies that have liberalized Korean agriculture and sacrificed farming to expand export markets for chaebols. And it’s about to get worse. South Korea has signed nine bilateral free trade agreements, and 12 more are under negotiation, including a trilateral one with China and Japan. The most significant pact is the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which, after massive protests in South Korea, passed in 2011. According to Doo Bong Han and Kyung Min Kim of Korea University, under the KORUS FTA, Korean agriculture will lose $626 million in production value. Estimates by the South Korean government also predict that 45 percent of Korean farmers will be displaced under the KORUS FTA. In recent weeks, South Korea has also signaled its interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership , the most ambitious free trade agreement the world has ever seen, which would account for 40 percent of the world’s economy. If Seoul joins, it would be the fourth largest economy in the pact, following the United States, Japan, and Australia.

These free trade agreements, it is argued, will strengthen global demand for the high-tech commodities that constitute the core of South Korea’s export-oriented economy—and as such, Korean agriculture must either adapt or perish. Hansalim and KWPA, however, demonstrate that competition is not inevitable, necessary, or the only path forward. More than 1 million households in Korea today are members of cooperatives like Hansalim, demonstrating the viability and growing interest in alternative food systems. By stressing instead the concept of sharing and the notion that “consumers and producers are one,” these cooperatives have shown that a different economy is possible. The fate of South Korea’s countryside remains to be seen, but if history is instructive, we know that Korean peasants have endured and resisted. In the legendary Donghak rebellion of 1894, peasant farmers rose up with their bamboo spears against the Chosun King for levying heavy taxes on them to grow Korea’s industrial might and bolster the monarchy’s power against foreign invaders like China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Donghak peasants were influenced by a philosophy that at its center argued for human equality, a radical notion during feudalism.

The rebellion was quashed with the help of the Japanese, but the idea that all humans are equal and all living beings are one prevailed—and continues to inspire today’s social movements. In Korean folklore, the mung bean, or nokdu, is symbolic of the resilient spirit of the Korean peasants. In the harshest conditions, nokdu sprouts and grows, feeding the hungry. In the face of domestic and international policies that have systematically undermined their livelihoods and depressed the countryside, Korean peasants and farmers are sprouting, growing, and inspiring Koreans and global citizens alike by demonstrating that another economy and food system can thrive—even under the harsh conditions of corporate trade regimes. FPIF columnist Christine Ahn is a founding board member of the Korea Policy Institute (KPI). Anders Riel Muller is a fellow with Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy and KPI. Silicon Mitus Silicon Mitus Home > Company > Executives Executives Team Dr. Huh is a leading figure in the Korean semiconductor industry with more than 30 years of experience.

He is Chairman of System Semiconductor Forum of Korea, Vice Chairman of KSIA (Korea Semiconductor Industry Association), and is a member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Council of GSA (Global Semiconductor Alliance). Dr. Huh is a senior member of the National Academy of Engineering of Korea (NAEK). In 2011, he was also honored as one of the principal contributors to the development of 100 Key Technologies during the last 50 years by the Government of Korea. In 2007, Dr. Huh founded Silicon Mitus Inc., and is its current CEO and Chairman of the Board. He has a wide breadth of experience in the semiconductor industry, serving as founding CEO of MagnaChip, Executive VP and General Manager of System IC of Hynix, Senior VP and CTO of Hyundai Electronics America, and VP of Computer Systems Business at Samsung Electronics where he led RISC CPU development in alliance with Hewlett Packard. Prior to that, Dr. Huh led the research on VLSI design automation and verification at the Stanford Center for Integrated Systems. Dr. Huh received his Ph.D. from Stanford University, M.S. from KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), and B.S.

from Seoul National University, all in Electrical Engineering. Youm Huh, Ph.D. Chief Executive Officer Mr. Chang is the Chief Financial Officer for Silicon Mitus. He joined the Company in 2012. Prior to that, he worked in the financial industry for 20 years as an investment banker in Hong Kong and Seoul with various firms, including Credit Suisse and Citi, where he advised Korean, Chinese, and Southeast Asian companies on IPOs and other capital raisings on NASDAQ, NYSE, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Korea Stock Exchange, and other various national markets. In Korea, Harold has advised Hynix Semiconductor, SK Telecom, Hyundai Motor, KT&G, Woori Financial, Korea Exchange Bank, and numerous other corporations and financial institutions. He has a B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, and a J.D. from Northwestern University School of Law. He is also a Chartered Financial Analyst. Harold Chang Chief Financial Officer Mr. Kim joined Silicon Mitus in 2013 as Chief Sales Officer. He oversees sales and marketing efforts both internationally and domestically. Mr. Kim has over 30 years of industry experience and held various key positions in leading semiconductor companies.

He was Senior VP of Brand Products at Dongbu Hitek, Executive VP of System IC Global Sales at MagnaChip, and VP of System IC Sales & Marketing at Hynix. Prior to that, Mr. Kim also worked in Sales & Marketing at LG Semiconductor. He holds a B.S. degree in Engineering from Hanyang University, Korea, and also finished the Intensive MBA Program at Drexell University, Pennsylvania in 1994. Dongchun Kim CHAEBOL OF SOUTH KOREA SAMSUNG: Samsung was once the largest of the chaebol. It was created by Lee Byung Chull, the son of a wealthy landowner. He grew up in a Korea occupied by Japan. He had a classical Chinese education in his early years, but when he was ten he was sent by his family to a primary school in Seoul. His university education was at Waseda University in Tokyo. He dropped out before completing his degree and returned to Seoul and did nothing for a few years. At 26 he used inherited money to start a rice mill in his home town.

The venture was not particularly successful and he moved to Taegu and started a trucking and real estate business which he named Samsung, which means "three stars." The business went bankrupt in a credit squeeze that resulted from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. But Lee went back into business and by the end of the war in 1945 Samsung was flourishing. He added domestic and international trading to the trucking and real estate business that he had started in. Samsung Trading Company was one of the ten largest trading companies in Korea when the Korean War broke out. Lee escaped from Seoul after the North Korean invasion and set up operations in Pusan. The business grew by leaps and bounds due to the war. In 1953 Lee started the first sugar refining company in Korea, which he called Cheil ("first") Sugar. Cheil Sugar was highly profitable and in 1954 Lee setup Cheil Wool Textile Company. Samsung's companies benefited from the import-substitution policy that the government pursued. Domestic producers were encouraged and imports were discouraged. By the end of the 1950's Lee had acquired control of several commercial banks and insurance companies.

In 1961 Park Chung Hee carried out a military coup d'etat and immediately staged an anticorruption campaign. Lee was in Japan at the time and initially refused to return to South Korea because he knew he, as the richest man in South Korea, would be a prime target of Park's campaign. Later Lee returned to Seoul and struck a deal with Park that became the model for South Korea's chaebol. Samsung would be allowed to remain in business but it would have to be the vehicle for carrying out the development projects that Park wanted. Park was somewhat of a puzzle when he siezed power. When American government officials found that Park in his younger days had not only joined a communist cell, but had been, in fact, the organizer of the cell, they thought that the Communists had taken control of South Korea. Park had a fondness for collectivist-type slogans such as "Enrich the Nation and Strengthen the Army!" and "Steel is National Power." Lee offered to donate most of his wealth to the government and accept expropriation of his bank shares. Also he agreed to gain the cooperation of other businessmen in promoting Park's development projects.

The chaebol benefited greatly from this arrangement but the nature of the economic system of South Korea was closer to a centrally planned socialist state than the capitalism that it purported to be. The success of Samsung or any of the other chaebol in selling products cannot be taken to be proof of their success in profit making. It could just as well be a result of the South Korean government subsidizing in one way or another a money-losing venture. Samsung however has been a well managed and economically successful business. By the late 1960's Lee chose electronics to be the focus of Samsung's manufacturing. In 1977 Samsung put Korean engineers to work dismantling color television sets from the United States, Europe and Japan to see how they could be copied. It took about three years for Samsung to to go into production of color television sets. In 1979 Samsung started making VCR's and in 1980 microwave ovens. HYUNDAI: Hyundai is probably the largest chaebol. Hyundai was started by Chung Ju Yung who came to Seoul as a teenager in the 1930's. He worked on the docks and as an errand boy for a rice mill.

By 1940 he was able to buy an auto repair shop. After WWII he developed business relations with the U.S. military and won construction contracts from them and the government of Syngman Rhee. In the 1960's Chung came to the attention of the ruler of South Korea, Park Chung Hee, when he bid one won to reconstruct a bridge over the Han River that runs through Seoul. Park was impressed with his patriotism and his ability to finish a job ahead of schedule. In the late 1960's Hyundai was given the contract to construct the 260 mile highway between the capital Seoul and the second largest city of South Korea, Pusan, on the southern coast of the Korean peninsula. Hyundai also was constructing highways in Thailand and dredging facilities for the U.S. military in Vietnam in the late 1960's. Chung shared many of the values and goals of Park and they had a close personal relationship over the years. When Park decided that South Korea should build ships he chose Chung and Hyundai to create a ship-building company.

Not only did Chung not have any experience in building ships, there was no one in South Korea that had built a ship larger than 10,000 tons and Chung was intending to build 260,000 ton oil tankers. Chung needed a loan of $60 million to build the ship yard. European bankers which Chung approached for this loan turned him down. Even the Korean Shipbuilding Association told prospective lenders that Chung's project was impossible. Nevertheless Chung eventually got the loan from British bankers and immediately got an order from a Greek shipper for two larger tankers. The tankers were to be copies of ships that were being produced by a shipyard in Scotland. Chung bought the design and started construction of one of the ships as the shipyard was being constructed. Hyundai completed the ships by 1973 but the OPEC oil price increase depressed the oil transport business and the Greek firm refused to take delivery. Other customers also refused delivery. Only through considerable effort on the part of Hyundai and the South Korean Government were alternate buyers found for the ships. Hyundai was also involved in overseas construction projects.

Chung wanted to expand this construction work to the Middle East but his younger brother, Chung In Yung, disagreed after the company lost $50 million on a highway project in Indonesia. Chung forced this brother out of the company as a result of this disagreement. Hyundai won $1.4 billion of construction contracts in the Middle East. DAEWOO: Daewoo was founded by Kim Woo Choong, whose father had been the teacher of Park Chung Hee. Kim Woo Choong, who was born in 1936 in Taegu, is one of the youngest of the heads of the major chaebol. Kim started his company on what might be best described by the Yiddish word, chutzpah. Kim was a salesman for a trading company that imported yarn and fabric. On one trip to Singapore he picked up fabric samples in Hong Kong and Saigon which he told potential clients were the product of Korean manufacturing. He got $300,000 worth of orders and went back to South Korea and had the samples duplicated and the order filled. At age thirty Kim borrowed $5,000 and started his own trading company with an total investment of $18,000.

He named his company Daewoo (great universe). In its first year, 1967, Daewoo exported $580,00 in textiles and in 1968 Daewoo opened its first textile factory, in the city of Pusan. By 1970 Daewoo was exporting $8 million worth of fabrics. Kim perceived that the U.S. was likely to establish quotas on textile and clothing imports from South Korea. Kim increased Daewoo's sales to the U.S. as much as possible. When quotas were established in 1972 Daewoo received one third of the South Korean quota. Daewoo began acquiring other companies and by 1975 it included 23 companies with 35,000 employees and had annual sales of $250 million. Kim's agressive business success attracted the attention of Park Chung Hee and Park encouraged Daewoo's entry into heavy industry. Daewoo acquired Hankuk Machinery, a company originally setup by the Japanese to build submarines. Daewoo also revived a joint venture with GM for producing automobiles which had not been successful under another company Shinjin.

President Park then order Kim to take over another failure, the Okpo shipyard project. The Okpo shipyard was a government sponsored project that couldn't be completed by the company that it was assigned to and was only one fourth completed and swamped with debt. As a result of Daewoo's takeover of these failed government projects Daewoo became a company of heavy industry rather than the light industrial company it started out as. Kim Woo Choong became an icon, an ideal entrepreneur, a role model for Korea. He was reputed to work 100 hours per week, getting by on four hours sleep per night. He never took a vacation. The only time off he took was one morning for his daughter's wedding. His fatal flaw, however, is that he does not distinguish between expansion and profitability. He strove to expand his company into new industries and new markets, but often that expansion was not profitable. When his companies did not earn a profit he relied upon borrowed funds for expansion. The concepts emphasized at Daewoo were creativity, challenge and sacrifise.

Kim, rather than talking about profit, talked about a company creating coprosperity, which meant that the company should create benefits for its workforce, its suppliers, its customers and its government. Kim emphasized that Daewoo was fexible and innovative, ready to adjust to changing circumstances. Although this might sound like a virtue, it is only a virtue is its innovations and adjustments are subject to constraint that they need to be profitable, at least in the long run. When hard times came to Daewoo laying off workers was not an option Kim considered acceptable. The other side of coprosperity was that in times of trouble the community of interests would support each other and that included the notion of the government supporting the company. SSANGYONG: The SSangyong chaebol had its origin in 1939 as a textile company founded by Kim Sung Kon. (The name means twin dragons; the initial S was doubled to correspond to the twinness of the name.) Later it went into cement production which became its core business. Cement was a strategic industry during South Korea period of rapid growth. But SSangyong, as is the case with all the chaebol, invested in many different industries.

This expansion into other industries generally has not been motivated by a desire to diversify in order to spread risk. Instead it seems to be driven by the company leaders desire to parlay their success into new and more interesting industries. SSangyong, in addition to its stake in cement, is engaged in petroleum refining, trading, construction, financial services and unhappily vehicle production. SSangyong is about the sixth largest chaebol in South Korea. In 1996 SSangyong had total sales of $25 billion but suffered a loss of $137 million. The losses of SSangyong Motor were $284 million. The other SSangyong businesses besides SSangyong Motor had a profit of $147 million. SSangyong has tried to cut losses but South Korean laws make it difficult if not impossible to layoff workers. SSangyong tried in 1996 to sell SSangyong Motor to Samsung but Samsung decided to built its own automobile factories. There is generally an overcapacity of the world's automobile industry so it is not easy to find a buyer for SSangyong Motor.

The German auto firm of Daimler invested in SSangyong Motor in 1991 but is not interested in buying the passenger car business. The losses and increased borrowing have resulted in SSangyong having an extremely high leverage (debt/equity) ratio. When times are good a high leverage results in extraordinary rates of return on equity. But when times are only moderately bad such high leverage results in a catastrophically low (even negative) rate of return on equity. The founder, Kim Sung Kon, died in 1975 and leadership of SSangyong fell to his 29-year-old son, Kim Suk Won. This was an extraordinarily young age for a business leader in Korea and most doubted he would be able to handle the responsibility. Kim Suk Won was educated in economics in New England at Brandeis University. When he returned to Korea he joined the Marines and later volunteered to serve in Viet Nam. After Viet Nam he served as an auditor in SSangyong but was ill at ease and left to pursue more exciting ventures. After his father's death he rose to the challenge of managing SSangyong.

He expanded the company through vertical integration, entering the paper packaging, petroleum refining and the transportation industries, all field involved in the production and distribution of cement. He also made a personal investment in new ventures such as building a ski resort 130 miles east of Seoul called Yongpyeong (Dragon Valley). It was a world-class ski resort but its profitability was a different matter. SSangyong expanded into the leisure industry on the basis of the future market from South Korea's growing middle class. Kim Suk Won also began to develop subsidiaries in the financial services industry. SSangyong Investment & Securities Co. earned a good profit in 1996 as the Korean public became more interested in stock investment. Other chaebol are involved in construction, particularly in the Middle East. SSangyong also entered the construction field but concentrated on Southeast Asia. It was the general contractor for a $400 million complex in Singapore. Kim Suk Won entered the automobile industry despite Government disapproval. The SSangyong vehicles were technically notable but profitability was a different matter from technical excellence. Its specialty vehicles such as a four-wheel drive station wagon were considered the most promising division of SSangyong Motor.

SSangyong has had notably better labor relations than the other chaebol. This is largely due to the personality of Kim Suk Won and his openness. He communicates very well and delegates authority to his chosen managers. He has administrative ability. There has been some sentiment for getting Kim Suk Won to enter politics. His father was a member of the national assembly and the leading fundraiser for the Democratic Republican Party during the Park Chung Hee era. Kim Suk Won was once considered for the mayorship of Taegu, the third largest city of South Korea. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit SSangyong sold off some of its subsidiaries such as its paper, petroleum refining and securities business. It also sold half of its ski resort and half of SSangyong Cement. Despite the past successes and seeming strengths of SSangyong Business Week in January of 2001 labeled SSangyong Cement Industrial as a money losing dinosaur not worth saving and SSangyong as one of South Korea's worst managed chaebol. SSangyong has had to rely upon Government aid to stave off collapse and Kim Suk Won has resigned as head of the chaebol.

LUCKY-GOLDSTAR, now LG: Lucky Goldstar (LG) was founded in 1947 by Koo In Hwoi. Its first products were toothpaste, face cream and soap. For a while in the 1970's LG was the top chaebol in terms of sales volume when it began producing consumer electronic devices but now is number three, behind topranked Hyundai and second ranked Samsung. But being number three still involved enormous sales revenue, above $60 billion per year. The founder Koo In Hwoi turned management of the conglomerate over to his son, Koo Cha Kyung, and in 1995 the son of Koo Cha Kyung, Koo Bon Moo, took over the management of LG. Also in 1995 LG purchased controlling interest in Zenith, the last of the U.S. television manufacturers. The company decided in about 1995 to abandon the Lucky Goldstar name which it feared was too much identified with cheapness and Korea and adopted LG which was felt to be less identifiable as Korean. The change in identification was thought to assist the company in entering the higher scale market.

Kia Motors Corporation Kia Motors Corporation Kia Motors Corporation Kia Motors Corporation Kia Motors Corporation was founded in 1944 and is Korea’s oldest manufacturer of motor vehicles. From humble origins making bicycles and motorcycles, Kia now produces more than three million vehicles a year from 14 manufacturing and assembly operations in five countries. These vehicles are sold and serviced through a network of distributors and dealers covering around 180 countries worldwide. Globally, Kia has over 50,000 employees and annual revenues of nearly US$44 billion. Global research, development and production In the company’s homeland of South Korea, Kia operates three major vehicle assembly plants at Hwasung, Sohari and Gwangju, as well as a world-class research and development centre employing around 12,000 vehicle development engineers and staff at Namyang. Kia’s Eco-Technology Research Institute near Seoul is working on next-generation hydrogen fuel-cell powertrains. Kia spends around 6% of its annual revenues on R&D, and also operates research centres in the USA, Japan and Germany. Kia operates a global network of manufacturing bases outside Korea, with advanced production facilities in the USA, Slovakia, China and Mexico.

Kia has a global production capacity of 3.5 million cars per year. Vehicles are built on flexible assembly lines which can manufacture several different models simultaneously to adapt to global changes in buying trends. In addition, Kia has a long history of building locally in a number of markets to meet the specific needs of local customers, with assembly operation using ‘car kits’ (supplied from Korea) in Ecuador, Iran, Malaysia, Russia, Uruguay and Vietnam. Design-led transformation Design forms a key part of Kia’s long-term plan to become one of the world’s leading automotive brands. The last decade has seen a design revolution at Kia, a shift which has fundamentally altered the way in which consumers around the world perceive Kia and its cars. Kia’s global network of design studios – in Korea, Germany and the USA – allow the company to keep in touch with consumer needs and trends. Headed by Peter Schreyer, President and Chief Design Officer of Kia Motors Corporation, the brand has established its own clear identity and has produced a number of modern, progressive new car designs as the Kia model line-up has expanded and developed.

A Different Beat: Kia brand awareness Kia has witnessed significant growth in the strength of its brand in recent years, the result of design-led product development and company-wide efforts to cultivate a more emotional attachment to Kia and its cars. According to the Interbrand’s 2016 ‘100 Best Global Brands’ study, Kia is now the 69th most valuable brand in the world, and is recognized by consumers all around the globe for its vibrant, distinctive and reliable range of cars. Official partnerships with the world’s most high-profile sporting events have provided additional momentum to the growth of the Kia brand. Sponsorship arrangements with FIFA, UEFA, NBA, LPGA and the Australian Open tennis championship allow the company to engage with young-at-heart target customers throughout the year. The Power to Surprise From its earliest days, Kia established a reputation as Korea’s automotive pioneer. The company was established in 1944, produced its first small car in 1974 and the first Korean-designed car in 1992. In 1993, Kia manufactured its three millionth vehicle – in 2016 alone, Kia produced and sold over three million cars.

Today, Kia Motors is a global force in the automotive industry, and is part of the Hyundai Motor Group, the fifth largest automotive manufacturer in the world. Kia’s brand slogan – ‘The Power to Surprise’ – represents the company’s global commitment to surprise the world by providing exciting and inspiring experiences that go beyond expectations. New production base in Mexico In 2016, Kia Motors opened its latest new production facility in Pesquería, Mexico, representing a US$1 billion investment by the company. The new manufacturing plant has an annual production capacity of up to 300,000 cars per year, taking Kia’s global manufacturing capacity to around 3.5 million vehicles. The high-tech Mexico production facility is capable of producing one car every 53 seconds, with 420 robots serving to automate a number of processes in the press, body and paint shops, as well as on the assembly line. By the end of 2017, the number of workers employed at the Pesquería facility will have risen to 3,000, with an additional 7,000 jobs created by supplier firms.

For more information, please go to South Korea: Ground Zero for Food Sovereignty and Community Resilience – Resilience This commentary is a joint publication of Foreign Policy In Focus and TheNation.com . The bustling, fast-paced, wired metropolis city of Seoul is what most people know of South Korea. Now the 15th largest economy in the world, South Korea’s economy is driven by the exports sector controlled by corporations like Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and Daewoo. These chaebols have significant global market share : 37 percent in LCD TVs, 33 percent in hand-held phones, and 9 percent in automobiles. The term “chaebol nation” aptly describes South Korea’s economy: the top 30 chaebols account for 82 percent of the country’s exports. It’s hard to imagine that just two generations ago, farming fueled the nation’s economy. In the 1970s, farmers accounted for half the population; today, they represent only 6.2 percent.

South Korea’s rapid transformation from an agrarian economy to a highly industrialized one wasn’t accidental; it was the outcome of the central government’s development and trade liberalization policies that in the early 1980s began to see farming as part of Korea’s past, not its future. The major blow to Korean agriculture fell in 1994, when South Korea joined the WTO and the Agreement on Agriculture, which effectively forced the government to eliminate quotas and tariffs even while major agriculture exporting blocs like the United States and European Union still gave billions in subsidies to their own farmers. The result of all this liberalization: South Korea is only 20-percent self-sufficient in grain production, compared with the 1970s when it was at 70 percent. If South Korean chaebols and the politicians that represent them had their way, small farmers—the majority of South Korea’s agricultural sector—would all but disappear under the logic that they are uncompetitive in the global marketplace. They argue that it would be far more efficient for the country to continue to import cheap food from less developed countries—including through the process of acquiring land outside of Korea, like in Africa and South East Asia.

And yet, despite a series of domestic and international policies that have sought to systematically eliminate them, South Korean farmers and peasants are fighting back. They have protested the WTO and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) for two decades, inspiring peasant farmers throughout the global south to mobilize against the free trade regime. At home, they are trying to build a domestic food sovereignty movement that is ecologically sustainable, socially equitable, and economically resilient by producing healthy food, creating dignified rural livelihoods, and reviving farming communities. Instead of being blinded by South Korean high-tech bling, our eyes should be on South Korea’s food sovereignty movement. It offers the rest of us robust alternatives to the highly consolidated, industrialized, energy-intensive, and chemical-dependent globalized food systems that dominate all of our lives. In August, we co-organized and participated in a Food First Food Sovereignty Tour where we visited South Korea’s leading organic farms and progressive farmer-consumer cooperatives. South Korea is now a leader in the Asian region in organic production, so much so that the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements set up its offices there.

And while there were many inspiring organic farms and gardens, two organizations stand out: the Korean Women Peasants Association (KWPA) and Hansalim. Korean Women Peasants Association “The food that is being sold by capitalism is sold as a commodity instead of food that sustains us,” explained Jeong-Yeol Kim of My Sister’s Garden, a KWPA project. “That’s why we believe that helping farmers thrive is the only way to fix this food crisis, and the pathway to do so would be to ensure that consumers and every citizen join us in the process of making this come true.” We visited My Sister’s Garden in the small village of Bongang, where 14 women peasant farmers collectively grow and distribute a weekly “gerubi”—similar to a community supported agriculture (CSA) box—comprised of organic produce they grow and packaged foods they make, such as pickled radish and pear juice. KWPA operates 26 of these producer communities throughout the country. On the day we visited, they were packaging and sending 141 boxes to the Bluebird Children’s Center in the city where parents come to pick up the boxes.

“Children today have no connection to the rural land,” explains Jeong-Yeol. Unlike previous generations, many children today no longer have grandparents or relatives living in the countryside who are connected in any way to farming. “So part of the effort of this partnership is to expose children to food production.” According to Jeong-Yeol, My Sister’s Garden plots were started in response to the devastating impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on the rural economy. “Just within ten years, 10 percent of farmers have fled to the cities here in Korea,” she explained. The reason? The globalized food production system. “We think that the solution to this crisis is to focus on small-scale farmers and give a solid foundation for each farmer to survive.” Each farmer takes on 15 consumer households, earning 1,500,000 won—approximately $1,400—per month. When more consumers wish to join, they encourage a new garden plot to be created so that more women peasant farmers also can earn a dignified income. Optimizing profits is not the goal; rather, sharing with both consumers and other producers is at the center of the project’s philosophy.

They are seeking to bring as many people as possible into an economically viable and socially just system to reverse the decline of rural communities. Despite their prevalence in agriculture, Korean peasant women lack equal rights and opportunities, which makes a project like My Sister’s Garden an even more important empowered space for peasant women to make decisions on all aspects of their production and distribution. KWPA’s native seed supply (Sunyoung Yang). In the small village of Uiseong, just a few hours away from Bongang, KWPA members started a native seed protection program to defend Korean native seeds against corporate takeover. “A lot of our native seeds are being bought up or taken by Syngenta or Monsanto. There are no national Korean domestic seed companies left,” laments Jung-mee Han, a plum, mung bean, rice, and garlic farmer and member of KWPA. “We are all farming different crops,” adds Jeong-mi Kim, president of the Uiseong Native Seed Protectors. “Because we couldn’t take care of all the seeds ourselves, each member is responsible for preserving and cultivating several crops.” They also distribute seeds to low-income farmers who cannot afford them. “We’re not just saving seeds,” explains Jeong-mi.

“We are tracking, monitoring, and sharing seeds among farmers, and nationally, we sell them to increase consumption of native agriculture.” These KWPA projects seek to radically alter the structure of the Korean food system and to de-commodify the linkages between consumers and producers. It has not been in vain. In 2012, KWPA was awarded with the Food Sovereignty Prize for their work to defend the rights of small-scale women farmers in Korea and preserve the cultural heritage of Korean native seeds. Hansalim In 1986, even before farmers’ markets and CSA programs became popular in the United States, South Korean farmers and consumers began Hansalim. “Han” in Korean means great, one, whole, and together, and refers to all living things on earth. “Salim” refers to domestic activities that must be managed to care for one’s home, family, children, and community, as well as to revive and give life. With 2,000 growers and 380,000 consumer members, Hansalim is among the world’s largest and most successful agricultural cooperatives, creating an alternative economy that supports organic farmers and local agriculture, producing healthy food and protecting the environment in the process.

Despite the global financial crisis, its sales have been growing annually by 20 percent. “Farmers at the time realized that they would need to collaborate with consumers in the city,” explains Woon Seok Park, a Hansalim farmer. “Hansalim was created from that point of view, that consumers and producers could make a movement that went beyond mere market transactions to one of understanding each others’ conditions.” At Hansalim, consumers and growers meet each year to select what and how much they will produce and deliberate on prices for the following season. The coordination on such a massive scale—navigating production, price, harvest, distribution, and processing—is, to say the least, remarkable. It deeply impressed one U.S. organic farmer: David Retsky of County Line Harvest , who reflected back to Hansalim growers, “I come from California where I am just trying to make my business work.

We’re competing with other people, so for me to see so many producers in the way of a collective, I’m amazed to see it working quite well.” To further demonstrate their commitment to support Hansalim farmers, consumers established a product stabilization fund in case of bad harvests caused by multiple factors, including rising fuel costs and climate change. Unlike many farmers who have been forced to throw in the towel in recent years due to extreme weather, which has caused crop failures, this fund has been a lifeline to Hansalim farmers who have been able to stay on the farm. Locally fed cattle (Christine Ahn). Hansalim farmers know that climate change poses a challenge to the viability of agriculture in Korea. That’s why “we only handle local food,” explains Woon Seok, because “using Hansalim products is a way to combat climate change.” Hansalim doesn’t exclude non-organic growers from the cooperative. While it encourages organic production, proximity is most important because of the high environmental costs of shipping food over long distances, including refrigeration. Hansalim also runs the only livestock feed factory in Korea that uses only local feed sources from nearby farmers.

Unlike the majority of livestock farmers, Hansalim livestock is therefore not dependent on feed imports that make up the majority of South Korean grain imports. Hansalim also informs consumers about the environmental benefits of locally produced food. On each product, it lists the distance and carbon saved by consuming this locally produced good versus one that would have been imported. To make this figure relevant to the lives of consumers, the label also lists an equivalent energy savings, such as the number of hours of electricity used to watch television or to light a fluorescent bulb. Replacing Competition with Sharing Hansalim and KWPA are responses to government policies that have liberalized Korean agriculture and sacrificed farming to expand export markets for chaebols. And it’s about to get worse. South Korea has signed nine bilateral free trade agreements, and 12 more are under negotiation, including a trilateral one with China and Japan. The most significant pact is the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which, after massive protests in South Korea, passed in 2011. According to Doo Bong Han and Kyung Min Kim of Korea University, under the KORUS FTA, Korean agriculture will lose $626 million in production value.

Estimates by the South Korean government also predict that 45 percent of Korean farmers will be displaced under the KORUS FTA. In recent weeks, South Korea has also signaled its interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership , the most ambitious free trade agreement the world has ever seen, which would account for 40 percent of the world’s economy. If Seoul joins, it would be the fourth largest economy in the pact, following the United States, Japan, and Australia. These free trade agreements, it is argued, will strengthen global demand for the high-tech commodities that constitute the core of South Korea’s export-oriented economy—and as such, Korean agriculture must either adapt or perish. Hansalim and KWPA, however, demonstrate that competition is not inevitable, necessary, or the only path forward. More than 1 million households in Korea today are members of cooperatives like Hansalim, demonstrating the viability and growing interest in alternative food systems. By stressing instead the concept of sharing and the notion that “consumers and producers are one,” these cooperatives have shown that a different economy is possible. The fate of South Korea’s countryside remains to be seen, but if history is instructive, we know that Korean peasants have endured and resisted.

In the legendary Donghak rebellion of 1894, peasant farmers rose up with their bamboo spears against the Chosun King for levying heavy taxes on them to grow Korea’s industrial might and bolster the monarchy’s power against foreign invaders like China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Donghak peasants were influenced by a philosophy that at its center argued for human equality, a radical notion during feudalism. The rebellion was quashed with the help of the Japanese, but the idea that all humans are equal and all living beings are one prevailed—and continues to inspire today’s social movements. In Korean folklore, the mung bean, or nokdu, is symbolic of the resilient spirit of the Korean peasants. In the harshest conditions, nokdu sprouts and grows, feeding the hungry. In the face of domestic and international policies that have systematically undermined their livelihoods and depressed the countryside, Korean peasants and farmers are sprouting, growing, and inspiring Koreans and global citizens alike by demonstrating that another economy and food system can thrive—even under the harsh conditions of corporate trade regimes. FPIF columnist Christine Ahn is a founding board member of the Korea Policy Institute (KPI).

Anders Riel Muller is a fellow with Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy and KPI.

Question: What nationality (at 2012, and at founding) are the corporations Samsung, Hyundai and LG?
Answer: South Korean