2020 Vision Campaign | Europe Italy With 23 new members in 2008 and 18 in the initial months of 2009 Italy has almost crossed the 300 threshold. It is expected that soon over 300 member cities and provinces, with dozens actively contributing to the 2020 Vision Campaign. On March 27 2008, the Italian Campaign “A Future Without Nuclear Weapons” delivered to the President of the Chamber of Deputies (Italian Lower House) the signatures collected by over 50 civil society organizations submitting draft legislation to have the country declared “nuclear weapon free”. With 23 new members in 2008 and 18 in the initial months of 2009 Italy has almost crossed the 300 threshold. It is expected that soon over 300 member cities and provinces, with dozens actively contributing to the 2020 Vision Campaign.

On March 27 2008, the Italian Campaign “A Future Without Nuclear Weapons” delivered to the President of the Chamber of Deputies (Italian Lower House) the signatures collected by over 50 civil society organizations submitting draft legislation to have the country declared “nuclear weapon free”. The Mayors of Ghedi and Aviano were the first to sign, and all the signatures (in the end over 80,000) were certified by an elected city or province official. It was a campaign that strengthened the collaboration between Mayors, City Councillors and activists for the abolition of nuclear weapons, with the active collaboration of Italian Mayors for Peace and supporters of the 2020 Vision Campaign. In 2008, Hiroshima/Nagasaki commemorations were organised in Vicenza, Ghedi and Aviano. US nuclear weapons are stored at the air-force bases of Aviano and Ghedi. Mayors, elected city officials and civil society representatives continue to work together to increase the membership and activities of Mayors for Peace in support of the 2020 Vision Campaign.

The 2009 Hiroshima/Nagasaki commemorations in Italy are being organized with the Mayor of Aviano and will be dovetailed to allow for audio or video conference links with the Mayors for PeaceGeneral Assembly in Nagasaki. In 2009, the Italian members of “A Future Without Nuclear Weapons”, of which Mayors for PeaceItaly is a main pillar, are planning to organize a Conference on the Vision of a World Free ofNuclear Weapons in the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House of Italian Parliament). The Coordinamento Nazionale Enti Locali per la Pace e i Diritti Umani supports the 2020 Vision Campaign. This Italian coordination with over 700 Italian local governments work for peace and human rights. To stress the importance of 2020 Vision Campaign in their overall strategy, the Coordinamento appointed the Mayor of Aviano as Vice-President. The small town of Coccaglio (near Ghedi) is donating space to establish a Museum, which will host materials from the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation. Italy’s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance For a King’s Ransom | A new placard at Ghedi Air Base implies that U.S.

nuclear weapons stored at the base have protected “the free nations of the world” after the end of the Cold War. But where is the evidence? By Hans M. Kristensen In December 1963, a shipment of U.S. nuclear bombs arrived at Ghedi Torre Air Base in northern Italy. Today, half a century later, the U.S. Air Force still deploys nuclear bombs at the base. The U.S.-Italian nuclear collaboration was celebrated at the base in January. A placard credited the nuclear “NATO mission” at Ghedi with having “protected the free nations of the world….” That might have been the case during the Cold War when NATO was faced with an imminent threat from the Soviet Union. But half of the nuclear tenure at Ghedi has been after the end of the Cold War with no imminent threat that requires forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. Instead, the nuclear NATO mission now appears to be a financial and political burden to NATO that robs its armed forces of money and time better spent on non-nuclear missions, muddles NATO’s nuclear arms control message, and provides fake reassurance to eastern NATO allies. Italian Nuclear Anniversary Neither the U.S.

nor Italian government will confirm that there are nuclear weapons at Ghedi Torre Air Base. The anniversary placard doesn’t even include the word “nuclear” but instead vaguely refers to the “NATO mission.” But there are numerous tell signs. One of the biggest is the presence of the 704th Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS), a U.S. Air Force unit of approximately 134 personnel that is tasked with protecting and maintaining the 20 U.S. B61 nuclear bombs at the base. The MUNSS would not be at the base unless there were nuclear weapons present. There are only four MUNSS units in the U.S. Air Force and they’re all deployed at the four European bases where U.S. nuclear weapons are earmarked for delivery by aircraft of the host nation. A satellite photo from March this year shows part of the nuclear infrastructure at Ghedi Torre Air Base. Click on image to see full size. Another tell sign is the presence of NATO Weapons Maintenance Trucks (WMT) at Ghedi. NATO has 12 of these trucks that are specially designed to enable field service of nuclear bombs at the storage bases in Europe.

A satellite image provided by Digital Globe via Google Earth shows a WMT parked near the 704th MUNSS quarters at Ghedi on March 12, 2014. An older image from September 28, 2009, shows two WMTs at the same location (see image above). These trucks will drive out to the 11 individual Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) that are equipped with underground Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vaults to service the B61 bombs. The WS3 vaults at Ghedi were completed in 1997; before that the weapons were stored in bunkers outside the main base. Once the truck is inside the shelter, the B61 is brought up from the vault, disassembled into its main sections as needed, and brought into the truck for service. It is during this process of weapon disassembly when the electrical exclusion regions of the nuclear bomb are breached that a U.S. Air Force safety review in 1997 warned that “nuclear detonation may occur” if lightning strikes the shelter.

NATO is in the process of replacing the WMTs with a fleet of new nuclear weapons maintenance trucks known as the Secure Transportable Maintenance System (STMS). The trailers will have improved lightning protection. NATO provided $14.7 million for the program in 2011, and in July 2012 the U.S. Air Force awarded a $12 million contract to five companies in the United States to build 10 new STMS trailers for delivery by June 2014. NATO’s new mobile nuclear weapons maintenance system is scheduled for delivery to European nuclear bases in 2014. Click image to see full size. The new trailers will be able to handle the new B61-12 guided standoff nuclear bomb that is planned for deployment in Europe from 2020. The B61-12 apparently will be approximately 100 lbs pounds (~45 kilograms) heavier than the existing B61s in Europe (see slide below) – even without the internal parachute. This suggests that a fair amount of new or modified components will be added. To better handle the heavier B61-12, each trailer will be equipped with hoist rails.

The new B61-12 bomb will be heavier than the B61s currently deployed in Europe. For pictures of actual B61-12 features, click here . The deployment to Ghedi 50 years ago was not the earliest or only deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to Italy. During the Cold War, ten different U.S. nuclear weapon systems were deployed to Italy. The first weapons to arrive were Corporal and Honest John short-range ballistic missiles in August 1956. They were followed by nuclear bombs in April 1957 and nuclear land mines in 1959. All but one – nuclear bombs – of these nuclear weapon systems have since been withdrawn and scrapped. Click table to see larger version. A decade ago, most B61s in Europe were stored in Germany and the United Kingdom, but today, Italy has the honor of being the NATO country with the most U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on its territory; a total of 70 of all the 180 B61 bombs remaining in Europe (39 percent). Italy is also the only country with two nuclear bases: the Italian base at Ghedi and the American base at Aviano.

Aviano Air Base is home to the U.S. 31st Fighter Wing with two squadrons of nuclear-capable F-16 fighter-bombers. One of these, the 555th Fighter Squadron, was temporarily forward deployed to Lask Air Base in Poland in March 2014. Click table to see larger version. The nuclear “NATO mission” that the 6th Stormo wing at Ghedi Torre Air Base serves means that Italian Tornado aircraft are equipped and Italian Tornado pilots are trained in peacetime to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons in wartime.

This arrangement dates back to before the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it is increasingly controversial because Italy as a signatory to the NPT has pledged “not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons…or of control over such weapons…directly, or indirectly.” The United States, also a signatory to the NPT, has committed “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons…or control over such weapons…directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to…acquire nuclear weapons…, or control over such weapons….” In peacetime, the B61 nuclear bombs at Ghedi are under the custody of the 704th MUNSS, but the whole purpose of the NATO mission is to equip, train and prepare in peacetime for “transfer” and “control” of the U.S. nuclear bombs to the Italian air force in case of war. The Nuclear Burden Maintaining the NATO nuclear strike mission in Europe does not come cheap or easy but “steals” scarce resources from non-nuclear military capabilities and operations that – unlike tactical nuclear bombs – are important for NATO.

Italy pays for the basing of the U.S. Air Force 704th MUNSS at Ghedi, for security upgrades needed to protect the weapons at the base, and for training pilots and maintaining Tornado aircraft to meet the stringent certification requirements for nuclear strike weapons. Moreover, the cost of securing the B61 bombs at the European bases is expected to more than double over the next few years (to $154 million) to meet increased U.S. security standards for storage of nuclear weapons. But these costs are getting harder to justify given the serious financial challenges facing Italy. The air force’s annual flying hours dropped form 150,000 in 1990 to 90,000 in 2010, training reportedly declined by 80 percent from 2005 to 2011, and training for air operations other than Afghanistan apparently has been “pared to the bone.” In addition, the Italian defense posture is in the middle of a 30-percent contraction of the overall operational, logistical and headquarters network spending.

The F-35 fighter-bomber program, part of which is scheduled to replace the current fleet of Tornados in the nuclear strike mission, has already been cut by a third and the new government has signaled its intension to cut the program further. Under such conditions, maintaining a nuclear mission for the Italian air force better be really important. Most of the costs of the European nuclear mission are carried by the United States. Over the next decade, the United States plans to spend roughly $10 billion to modernize the B61 bomb, over $1 billion more to make the new guided B61-12 compatible with four existing aircraft, another $350 million to make the new stealthy F-35 fighter-bomber nuclear-capable, and another $1 billion to sustain the deployment in Europe. This adds up to roughly $12.5 billion for sustaining, securing, and modernizing U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe over the next decade. Whether the price tag is worth it obviously must to be weighed against the security benefits it provides to NATO, how well the deployment fits with U.S. and NATO nuclear arms control policy, and whether there are more important defense needs that could benefit from that level of funding.

Fake Versus Real Reassurance The anniversary placard displayed at Ghedi Air Base claims that the U.S. non-strategic nuclear bombs have “protected the free nations of the world” even after the end of the Cold War. And during the nuclear safety exercise at Ghedi in January, the commander of the U.S. Air Force 52nd Fighter Wing told the U.S. and Italian security forces that “your mission today is still as relevant as when together our country stared down the Soviet Union alongside a valued member of our enduring alliance.” (Emphasis added). That is probably an exaggeration, to put it mildly. In fact, it is hard to find any evidence that the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe after the end of the Cold War has protected anything or that the mission is even remotely as relevant today. The biggest challenge today seems to be to protect the weapons and to find the money to pay for it. NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moreover, strongly suggests that NATO itself does not attribute any real role to the non-strategic nuclear weapons in reassuring eastern NATO allies of a U.S. commitment to defend them. Yet this reassurance role is the main justification used by proponents of the deployment.

In hindsight, the reassurance effect appears to be largely doctrine talk, while NATO’s actual response has focused on non-nuclear forces and exercises. To the extent that a potential nuclear card has been played, such as when three B-52 and two B-2 nuclear-capable bombers were temporarily deployed to England earlier this month, it was done with long-range strategic bombers, not tactical dual-capable aircraft. The fact that nuclear fighter-bombers were already in Europe seemed irrelevant. The same was done in March 2013, when the United States deployed long-range bombers over Korea to reassure South Korea and Japan against North Korean threats. No eastern European ally has said: “Hold the bombers, hold the paratroopers, hold the naval exercises! The B61 nuclear bombs in Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey are here to reassure us against Russia.” In the real world, the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe are fake reassurance because they are useless and meaningless for the kind of crises that face NATO allies today or in the foreseeable future. NATO pays a king’s ransom for the deployment with very little to show for it. President Obama has asked for $1 billion to reassure Europe against Russia.

But he could get a dozen non-nuclear European Reassurance Initiatives for the price of sustaining, modernizing, and deploying the non-strategic nuclear bombs in Europe. Doing so would help “put an end to Cold War thinking” as he promised in Prague five years ago. This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund and New Land Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. MilitaryINSTALLATIONS - U.S. Department of Defense Installation Overview Location Welcome to the 704th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (704 MUNSS). Ghedi AB is an Italian installation situated in the plains of the Lombardia Region in north-west Italy. Ghedi AB is located just outside the towns of Ghedi, Castenedolo, and Montichiari. We are on the north end of the Po River valley, which is the agricultural heartland of Italy. The Italian Alps is approximately 20 Km to the north and on a clear day is highly visible from the base. The area has small industries and rolling farmland. We are close to Lake Garda which is a tourist attraction for many around the world. Italy has four seasons with mild summers and mild winters.

We have experienced some snow but that is not the normalcy in this local area. The nearest U.S. military facility is Army Garrison Vicenza, approximately 1 hour 15 minutes away. For more information and questions, many current and former Ghedi AB members frequent the Facebook page . Also, for more information about the nearest base please review the USAG Vicenza site on MilitaryINSTALLATIONS . History In 1962 the 2187 Communication Group was established at Ghedi AB. In the following year, 1963, the 7232 Munitions Maintenance Group was activated collocated with Italian Air Force’s 6th STORMO 154th GRUPPO. Through the next 43 years the MUNSS unit here at Ghedi AB sustained six squadron designators until finally being designated the 704th Munitions maintenance Squadron in 2004. Since 2007, the 704th MUNSS has been assigned to the 52d Fighter Wing, Spanqdahlem AB, Germany. Organization Ghedi is assigned to the 52d Munitions Maintenance Group - 52 FW for ADCON.

Support responsibilities belong to 31 FW (Aviano AB, Italy) and USAG Vicenza provides DoDDS, AAFES/DECA and medical services. Mission The 704th MUNSS is a Geographically Separated Unit responsible for receipt, storage, maintenance and control of U.S. war reserve weapons committed to NATO's 6th STORMO Italian Wing (PA-200 Tornado Aircraft). The squadron directly supports NATO and its strike mission. Population Served and Resources The 704th MUNSS has approximately 134 active duty military, Department of Defense and local national civilians. The 704th MUNSS is responsible for maintaining US resources with an annual budget of $200K. The Italian Air Force, through a bi-lateral agreement between the U.S. and Italian Governments, provides and maintains property occupied by USAF personnel. Ghedi Air Base does not have personnel support facilities or billeting for U.S. forces. Please note there is also no child care facility/CDC located on Ghedi AB.

Housing Base housing is not available at Ghedi so our Unit Housing Manager will be the liaison between you and local landlords to get you into a house and explain the billing system. You can also venture out and work with a local realtor. Please keep in mind that the realtor fee will be not refunded. The majority of assigned personnel live in or around Montichiari, Lonato, or Desenzano del Garda. The other nearby locations for finding housing are in Ghedi, Castiglione, and Calcinato. Your vehicle and Household Goods will be delivered to USAG Vicenza . The 704 MUNSS Housing manager can be reached by calling 011-39-030-905-3472 or DSN 314-632-3472. Please note: there is a "waiting list" and housing cannot be obtained prior to your arrival at Ghedi AB. Feel welcome to inform our housing manager of any special needs (i.e. large family or pets) prior to your arrival. Medical Services Ghedi has two Independent Duty Medical Technicians (IDMT) to provide limited medical services for military members.

We receive the majority of our medical support from Vicenza or Aviano Air Base . During inprocessing the IDMTs will take your medical records for filing. Family members will mainly use local Italian medical services. Schools Ghedi AB is part of the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP; there are unique opportunities and a wide variety of options for school-aged children whose families are stationed at Ghedi AB. These include access to international schools with instruction in English and Italian, local national schools with instruction in Italian (asilos), the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) schools at US Army Garrison Vicenza, as well as home school options. For more information, please contact either the Ghedi School Liaison Office (SLO) at DSN 314-632-3533 or 011-39-030-905-3533, or the Mission Support Flight at DSN 314-632-3531 or 011-39-030-905-3531.

Adult Education We have a University of Maryland University College (UMUC) representative on site offering various online courses and a couple face to face classes on base each semester. For those students who wish to get college credit by exams (CLEPs/DANTEs), they can do so by having the UMUC Field Representative schedule exams either in Aviano Air Force Base or Vicenza Army Base. The UMUC Representative can be reached by calling 011-39-030-905-3544. Ghedi also has an Education Office with a General Academic Advisor (GAA) on site. The GAA can provide academic advisement, information and guidance associated to military and civilian education. The GAA can be reached at 011-39-030-905-3542. Arrival The most convenient airport to fly into is the Verona Airport . There is also Malpensa Airport in Milan but it is further away. Please keep your sponsor informed of your arrival info so pickup can be arranged, and travel in civilian clothes. AAFES We have a small AAFES Shopette on the base to provide a variety of grocery and houseware items.

We use NATO gas coupons to get gas on the economy. You are authorized 400 liters per month. AAFES also provides a Barber who is available every Thursday from 10:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. The Shopette can be reached at 011-39-030-905-3483. Critical Installation Information DSN from the States: 314-632-XXXX Commercial from the States: 011-39-030-905-XXXX Local Commercial: 030-905-XXXX Defense Service Network (DSN) Dialing Instructions The DSN is the provider of long-distance communications service for the Department of Defense (DoD). Every installation has a special DSN number and the numbers vary by world-wide location. In order to place a call using DSN, the caller must be using a military phone on an installation. Cell phones cannot dial DSN numbers. When dialing a DSN number from a United States installation to another United States installation, it is unnecessary to dial the DSN 312 area code.

When dialing a DSN number to/from overseas locations, the DSN area code must be included. The operator can be reached at commercial (719) 567-1110. Please note that long distance charges may be incurred. Key Phone Numbers/Links Reports: US nuclear ′upgrades′ in Europe | News | DW.COM | 23.09.2015 Incirlik, close to war-torn Syria, has been used in recent months for US-led airstrikes on jihadist IS militants in Syria. Those activities have coincided with a Russian military buildup via Tartus, a Soviet-era naval base in Syria's coastal Mediterranean region of Latakia. 50 estimated at Incirlik Kristensen estimated that Incirlik's vaults currently held 50 B61 nuclear weapons. For the anti-IS operation, US F-16 jets had been relocated from Aviano, Italy to the Turkish NATO base under a "unique" arrangement. "The Turks have declined US requests to permanently base a fighting wing at the [Incirlik] base," he wrote.

Range depends on aircraft The FR said the B61 nuclear bomb - first devised in the 1960s - had been "modernized" so it could be set to explode at various strengths of up to ten-times the devastation inflicted at Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. It also has the capability to be steered toward a target placed it between short-range "tactical" and long-range "strategic" atomic weapons, the FR said. US believed to store 20 B61s at Germany's Büchel base "It now comes down to the range of the carrier aircraft," it said.adding that congressional papers pointed to the development of a so-called B61-13 from 2038. Refurbished runway at Büchel BITS author Orfried Nassauer said investments by Gemany's Bundeswehr were scheduled at Büchel, widely believed to be the sole US nuclear-equipped air base in Germany. The base's runway - located in Germany 's hilly, western Eiffel region - was to be fully refurbished and fitted with a modern instrument-landing system next year, he said.

A member of German federal parliament's defense committee, Social Democrat (SPD) Thomas Hitschler recently told the Rhein-Zeitung newspaper that the German government planned to invest 120 million euros at Büchel. German public ZDF broadcasting's investigative magazine "Frontal 21" reported on Monday that the US planned to stationed new atomic bombs at Büchel. Removal long demanded In 2009 and again in 2011, Germany's then foreign minister Guido Westerwelle demanded the removal of all US nuclear weapons presumed to be at Büchel. The demand, made for decades by peace activists, was backed in a 2010 Bundestag resolution. A "Wikileaks" paper showed later that Chancellor Angela Merkel's foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen distanced Berlin from such calls in talks with Washington. The FR said Germany had never been allowed by the US to have access to the B21s. During the Cold War, German Tornado jets located at Büchel had trained with mock metal devices.

Upgrades also in Belgium and Italy The FAS's Kristensen said security upgrades were also under way or planned at the US' Operations Center-Command at Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium and a nuclear weapons vault support facility at another air base in Ghedi., Italy. In July, Italian prosecutors said two arrested IS adherents, a Pakistani and a Tunisian, were suspected of listing Ghedi among their potential targets. The prosecutors said, however, that the site was "never in danger" because the pair, based in Brescia in northern Italy, had not set their plans in motion. ipj/rg ( AP,EPD, ZDF) Upgrades At US Nuclear Bases In Europe Acknowledge Security Risk | Posted on Sep.10, 2015 in NATO , Nuclear Weapons , United States by Hans M. Kristensen By Hans M. Kristensen Security upgrades underway at U.S. Air Force bases in Europe indicate that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have been stored under unsafe conditions for more than two decades. Commercial satellite images show work underway at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and Aviano Air Base in Italy. The upgrades are intended to increase the physical protection of nuclear weapons stored at the two U.S.

Air Force Bases. The upgrades indirectly acknowledge that security at U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Europe has been inadequate for more than two decades. And the decision to upgrade nuclear security perimeters at the two U.S. bases strongly implies that security at the other four European host bases must now be characterized as inadequate. Security challenges at Incirlik AB are unique in NATO’s nuclear posture because the base is located only 110 kilometers (68 miles) from war-torn Syria and because of an ongoing armed conflict within Turkey between the Turkish authorities and Kurdish militants. The wisdom of deploying NATO’s largest nuclear weapons stockpile in such a volatile region seems questionable. (UPDATE: Pentagon orders “voluntary departure” of 900 family members of U.S. personnel stationed at Incirlik. ) Upgrades at Incirlik Air Base Incirlik Air Base is the largest nuclear weapons storage site in Europe with 25 underground vaults installed inside as many protective aircraft shelters (PAS) in 1998. Each vault can hold up to four bombs for a maximum total base capacity of 100 bombs.

There were 90 B61 nuclear bombs in 2000, or 3-4 bombs per vault. This included 40 bombs earmarked for deliver by Turkish F-16 jets at Balikesir Air Base and Akinci Air Base. There are currently an estimated 50 bombs at the base, or an average of 2-3 bombs in each of the 21 vaults inside the new security perimeter. The new security perimeter under construction surrounds the so-called “NATO area” with 21 aircraft shelters (the remaining four vaults might be in shelters inside the Cold War alert area that is no longer used for nuclear operations). The security perimeter is a 4,200-meter (2,600-mile) double-fenced with lighting, cameras, intrusion detection, and a vehicle patrol-road running between the two fences. There are five or six access points including three for aircraft. Construction is done by Kuanta Construction for the Aselsan Cooperation under a contract with the Turkish Ministry of Defense. A major nuclear weapons security upgrade is underway at the U.S. Air Force base at Incirlik in Turkey. Click on image to view full size.

In addition to the security perimeter, an upgrade is also planned of the vault support facility garage that is used by the special weapons maintenance trucks (WMT) that drive out to service the B61 bombs inside the aircraft shelters. The vault support facility is located outside the west-end of the security perimeter. The weapons maintenance trucks themselves are also being upgraded and replaced with new Secure Transportable Maintenance System (STMS) trailers. The nuclear role of Incirlik is unique in NATO’s nuclear posture in that it is the only base in Europe with nuclear weapons that doesn’t have nuclear-capable fighter-bombers permanently present. Even though the Turkish government recently has allowed the U.S. Air Force to fly strikes from Incirlik against targets in Syria, the Turks have declined U.S. requests to permanently base a fighter wing at the base. As such, there is no designated nuclear wing with squadrons of aircraft intended to employ the nuclear bombs stored at Incirlik; in a war, aircraft would have to fly in from wings at other bases to pick up and deliver the weapons. Upgrades at Aviano Air Base A nuclear security upgrade is also underway at the U.S. Air Force base near Aviano in northern Italy.

Unlike Incirlik, that does not have nuclear-capable aircraft permanently based, Aviano Air Base is home to the 31st Fighter Wing with its two squadrons of nuclear-capable F-16C/Ds: the 510th “Buzzards” Fighter Squadron and the 555th “Triple Nickel” Fighter Squadron. These squadrons have been very busy as part of NATO’s recent response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and some of Aviano’s F-16s are currently operating from Incirlik as part of strike operations in Syria. A nuclear security upgrade appears to have been nearly completed at the U.S. Air Base at Aviano in Italy. Click on image to view full size. A total of 18 underground nuclear weapons storage vaults were installed in as many protective aircraft shelters at Aviano in 1996 for a maximum total base storage capacity of 72 nuclear bombs. Only 12 of those shelters are inside the new security perimeter under construction at the base. Assuming nuclear weapons will only be stored in vaults inside the new security perimeter in the future, this indicates that the nuclear mission at Aviano may have been reduced.

In 2000, shortly after the original 18 vaults were completed, Aviano stored 50 nuclear bombs, or an average of 2-3 in each vault. The 12 shelters inside the new perimeter (one of which is of a smaller design) would only be able to hold a maximum of 48 weapons if loaded to capacity. If each vault has only 2-3 weapons, it would imply only 25-35 weapons remain at the base. NATO Nuclear Security Costs Publicly available information about how much money NATO spends on security upgrades to protect the deployment in Europe is sketchy and incomplete. But U.S. officials have provided some data over the past few years. In November 2011, three years after the U.S. Air Force Ribbon Review Review in 2008 concluded that “most” nuclear weapons storage sites in Europe did not meet U.S.

Department of Defense security standards, James Miller, then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, informed Congress that NATO would spend $63.4 million in 2011-2012 on security upgrades for munitions storage sites and another $67 million in 2013-2014. In March 2014, as part of the Fiscal Year 2015 budget request, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that NATO since 2000 had invested over $80 million in infrastructure improvements required to store nuclear weapons within secure facilities in storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Another $154 million was planned for these sites on security improvements to meet with stringent new U.S. standards. The following month, in April 2014, Andrew Weber, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, told Congress that “NATO common funding has paid for over $300 million, approximately 75 percent of the B61 storage security infrastructure and upgrades” in Europe.

Elaine Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, added that because host base facilities are funded through individual national budgets, “it is not possible to provide an accurate assessment of exactly how much NATO basing nations have contributed in Fiscal Year 2014 toward NATO nuclear burden sharing, although it is substantial.” Bunn provided additional information that showed funding of security enhancements and upgrades as well as funding of infrastructure upgrades (investment) at the specific European weapon storage sites. This funding, she explained, is provided through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) and there have been four NATO weapons storage-related upgrades (Capability Package upgrades) since the original NATO Capability Package was approved in 2000: In addition to the security upgrades underway at Incirlik and Aviano, upgrades of nuclear-related facilities are also underway or planned at national host bases that store U.S. nuclear weapons. This includes a new WS3 vault support facility and a MUNSS (Munitions Support Squadron) Operations Center-Command Post at Kleine Brogel AB in Belgium, and a WS3 vault support facility at Ghedi AB in Italy. Implications and Recommendations When I obtained a copy of the U.S.

Air Force Blue Ribbon Review report in 2008 under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and made it available on the FAS Strategic Security Blog, it’s most central finding – that “most” U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Europe did not meet U.S. security requirements – was dismissed by government officials in Europe and the United States. During a debate in the Dutch Parliament, then Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop dismissed the findings saying “safety and security at Volkel are in good order.” A member of the U.S. Congressional delegation that was sent to Europe to investigate told me security problems were minor and could be fixed by routine management, a view echoed in conversations with other officials since then. Yet seven years and more than $170 million later, construction of improved security perimeters at Incirlik AB and Aviano AB suggest that security of nuclear weapons storage vaults in Europe has been inadequate for the past two and a half decades and that official European and U.S. confidence was misguided (as they were reminded by European peace activists in 2010).

And the security upgrades do raise a pertinent question: since NATO now has decided that it is necessary after all to enhance security perimeters around underground vaults with nuclear weapons at the two U.S. bases at Incirlik and Aviano, doesn’t that mean that security at the four European national bases that currently store nuclear weapons (Büchel, Ghedi, Kleine Brogel, and Volkel) is inadequate? Ghedi reportedly was recently eyed by suspected terrorists arrested by the Italian police. Just wondering. This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Post navigation Tactical Nukes in Europe a "Tiny Fraction" of Cold War Arsenal, Report Says | Analysis | NTI Tactical Nukes in Europe a "Tiny Fraction" of Cold War Arsenal, Report Says Donate Tactical Nukes in Europe a "Tiny Fraction" of Cold War Arsenal, Report Says The United States maintains between 150 and 200 B-61 gravity bombs at bases in Europe, a "tiny fraction" of its top deployment of 7,300 tactical nuclear weapons on the continent in 1971, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported in its newest edition (see GSN , Dec. 2, 2010). "The current level represents a tiny fraction of the 1971 peak of 7,300 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Since then (with the exception of a period in the mid-1980s), the Europe-based arsenal has been shrinking. The most dramatic reductions occurred in 1986-87, when the United States withdrew nearly 2,000 weapons from European soil," wrote analysts Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen.

"The 150–200 bombs now deployed in Europe are stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey," the report states. Aviano Air Base in Italy hosts roughly 50 weapons and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey houses 60-70 bombs, the report's authors asserted. Büchel Air Base in Germany, Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy, Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium, and Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands each hold between 10 and 20 of the weapons, they said. "Although the nuclear weapons are deployed at specific bases in specific countries, it is important not to think of the European deployment as fixed; a potential nuclear strike originating from a particular base would not necessarily be limited to aircraft stationed at that base," the article notes. "Aircraft from several bases and countries usually participate in nuclear loading and strike exercises, such as the annual Steadfast Noon.

The May 2010 Steadfast Noon exercise at Aviano AB, for example, included more than 20 aircraft from seven countries." The base in Belgium includes 11 underground storage vaults with a maximum capacity of four bombs each, the report says. Brussels has not determined how it would obtain delivery vehicles to succeed its fleet of F-16 fighter jets, which could be retired around 2020, the document notes. "A series of intrusions at Kleine Brogel by unauthorized personnel in recent years has raised serious questions about security there and how the weapons are stored at the base," according to Norris and Kristensen (see GSN , Oct. 22, 2010). Weapons stored at Büchel Air Base in Germany would be carried to targets by "German PA-200 Tornados of the 33rd Fighter Bomber Squadron; the weapons are under custody of the U.S. Air Force 702nd [Munitions Support Squadron]," the analysts wrote.

"As at Kleine Brogel, 11 shelters at Büchel are equipped with underground vaults for the bombs, with a maximum capacity of 44 weapons." Bombs at Italy's Aviano Air Base would be delivered by F-16 aircraft belonging to the U.S. Air Force's 31st Fighter Wing, according to the report. The Aviano base could hold up to 72 weapons in its 18 underground structures, it says. "Another 10-20 B-61s are believed to be stored at Ghedi Torre AB, for delivery by Italian PA-200 Tornado aircraft of the 6th Fighter Wing; the weapons at Ghedi Torre AB are under custody of the U.S. Air Force 704th [Munitions Support Squadron]. A decade ago, the base stored 40 bombs, but it is likely that the inventory has been reduced to match the deployment at other national bases," the report states. Bombs at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands are overseen by the U.S. Air Force's 703rd Munitions Support Squadron and would be dropped by Dutch F-16 jets, the document says.

The configuration of B-61 bombs at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey is "unique in NATO," says the report. "Most of the bombs (approximately 50) are for delivery by U.S. aircraft, but the U.S. Air Force does not have a fighter wing based at Incirlik. Requests to deploy a wing there have been turned down by Turkey, so the NATO nuclear posture at Incirlik is more of a half-posture. In a crisis, U.S. aircraft from other bases would have to first deploy to Incirlik to pick up the weapons before they could be used," the document says. In the last 10 years, the United States has withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons from two European air bases and the Air Force "has reduced its tactical fighter wing capacity in the United States," says the report. The NATO Strategic Concept devised last year places less emphasis on the alliance's nonstrategic nuclear deterrent than the document's 1999 predecessor, the analysts wrote (see GSN , Nov. 24, 2010). "Gone is the previous message that these weapons provide an essential military and political link between Europe and North America.

Instead, the new Strategic Concept states that it is the strategic forces of the United States, in particular and to some extent Britain and France that provide the 'supreme guarantee of the security of the alliance,'" the article states. "The new document commits to some form of U.S. nuclear presence in Europe by designating 'the broadest possible participation of allies in collective defense planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements.' "But the new language is much more vague than that found in the 1999 document, and could simply be met by the allies participation in Nuclear Planning Group meetings, deployment of some U.S. dual-capable aircraft in Europe (without weapons), and the allies' continued involvement in the SNOWCAT program," the document states. The Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics program "enables NATO countries to participate in the nuclear strike mission even if they do not have nuclear weapons on their territory or aircraft tasked to deliver the U.S nuclear weapons," the report notes earlier. "Unfortunately, the new Strategic Concept makes further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe conditional on Russian reciprocity.

'In any further reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons,'" the NATO document states. Russia is believed to hold roughly 2,000 deployed tactical nuclear weapons within its borders. The Obama administration has said it hopes before long to begin talks on drawing down the former Cold War rivals' tactical nuclear arsenals (see GSN , Jan. 14). "While there are many good reasons for wanting reductions to the Russian tactical arsenal and increased transparency, NATO has in fact -- on several occasions since the end of the Cold War -- been willing to unilaterally reduce the number of U.S. weapons in Europe without making it conditional upon Russian reciprocity. NATO has done so while arguing that its weapons were not directed against Russia. Arguing now that a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is suddenly dependent on Russian reductions after all seems to turn back the clock to a time when the Soviet Union was the enemy and NATO looked to the east when sizing its

Question: Ghedi and Aviano are towns in which European country?
Answer: Italy