Nelson Mandela's Spear of the Nation: the ANC's armed resistance - Telegraph South Africa Nelson Mandela's Spear of the Nation: the ANC's armed resistance Nelson Mandela set up the African National Congress' armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), in 1961 when he lost hope that passive and non-violent resistance to the apartheid government would bear fruit. Nelson Mandela outside Westminster Abbey in 1962 Photo: REX Follow It was launched on December 16, the same day as the Afrikaners defeated the Zulus at the Battle of the Blood River 100 years earlier, not long after the massacre in Sharpeville of 69 unarmed protesters by the security police. With no military training himself, and in hiding from the government, Mr Mandela travelled abroad where he was offered financial and practical help by countries including Ethiopia and Algeria. Mr Mandela was adamant that MK, as the armed unit was called, would not kill people but its tactics would be aimed at sabotage. In his own words, the aim was to "hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom".

On his return to South Africa, Mr Mandela and his colleagues set up regional command units and set about training their army in bomb making and clandestine operations. MK carried out numerous bombings during the next 20 years and the pledge not to kill became redundant – in the whole campaign, at least 63 people died and 483 people were injured. Related Articles uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) | South African History Online South African History Online Jabulile Nyawose Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) logo On 16 December, 1961, Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) was launched as an armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC). The formation of the MK Umkhonto weSizwe ("Spear of the Nation") or 'MK' as it was more commonly known, was launched on the 16th December 1961. On the same day in 1838, the Afrikaners had defeated the Zulus at the Battle of the Blood River and it was perhaps significant that the armed struggle was launched on this particular day, more than one hundred years later.

The formation of MK followed a series of events that made it necessary for the national liberation movements in South Africa to move towards a more significant challenge to the white minority government. The African National Congress (ANC) , together with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the members of the Congress Alliance, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People’s Congress and the Congress of the Democrats, had been engaged in peaceful acts of resistance which aimed at forcing the government to eventually recognise the rights of Black people in South Africa. However, the 1950s and the early 1960s, showed the intension by the South African government to further isolate the country’s black people through various laws and severe repressive measures. In addition, in the face of repressive measures by the state, came the need to change tactics in the manner in which the ANC, SACP and the Congress Alliance had been approaching the struggle for freedom and equality.

Crowds fleeing from bullets on the day of the Massacre Changing tactics was not going to be a simple and easy thing for the ANC, because for a long time it had embraced the ‘non-violence’ approach, an approach favored by Chief Albert Luthuli , President of the ANC at that time. Apart from the ‘non-violence’ stance that the ANC embraced, there were other issues that did not support the idea of an armed struggle, for instance at the time when the decision was made to form the MK, the ANC was banned under the Unlawful Organisations Bill of 1960 therefore, if the decision to take up arms became the decision of the ANC as the organisation, that would have put its Congress Alliance in danger of being banned. Events leading to the decision to take up arms by the ANC In the 1950s it became clear to some members of the ANC and the SACP that passive resistance and non-violence were not working.

A factor that undoubtedly had an influence on the thinking of the ANC and the SACP, and which probably had a bearing on their shift towards political violence in 1961, was the general failure of the ANC directed campaigns of the 1950s to bring about meaningful political changes based on the policy of non-violence and moderation, following the moderate successes of the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the Western Areas Campaign. Some sources site that the reason for these ‘moderate’ successes were due to unproductive and unfocused meetings. The ANC also showed a shift in its policies during the Annual National Congress on 26 June 1955 in Kliptown where the Freedom Charter was adopted. The significance of the Freedom Charter, was that the perception of the ANC as an African-only organisation shifted to one that embraces a growing unity amongst all Black peoples. However this multi-racial ideology did lead to a split within the ANC by those members like Robert Sobukwe who espoused the Pan-Africanist view of “Africa for Africans”. He went on to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) .

The most significant catalyst that led to the taking up of arms was the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960 , where the government violently crushed a peaceful anti-pass demonstration organised by the Pan African Congress. This demonstration lead to the deaths of 69 people, with 186 wounded. Also in the Western Cape Township, Langa, 3 people were killed and 27 injured in clashes with police over the burning of passes. The states’ heavy-handed response to the peaceful demonstrations and the subsequent banning of the ANC and SACP the following month, dealt a serious blow to the ANC and its allies. Therefore, in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre and the banning of liberation organisations many more ANC and SACP members were convinced. The time had come to rethink the approach towards the struggle and move from ‘passive resistance’ to the ‘armed struggle’. “Mandela’s” proposal By the end of 1960, popular resistance seemed to be crushed. The flames of the burning passes had been put out by the bullets of Sharpeville and Langa.

The week long stay-away called for the 19 April 1960 failed to raise the spirit of a dejected people. Those liberation leaders who escaped the massive state clampdown slipped out of the country to begin re-organising resistance from abroad. For Mandela, this was the turning point. "If the government reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle," he told a gathering of local and foreign press in a safe house, "we will have to reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent policy." Various suggestions have been given on who and how the idea and the decision to take up arms came into being. One is that the proposal was first made to the ANC by Mandela in June, but Ben Turok suggests that it was in one private meeting between April and May 1960, which comprised of a handful of SACP activists, Yusuf Dadoo , Jack Hugson , Joe Matthews , Michael Hermal, Moses Kotane , Ben Turok, and Ruth First . Bram Fischer and Bartholomew Hlapane. At this meeting Michael Hermel presented a proposal of a move towards armed struggle.

The proposal, according to Ben Turok, suggested that: “”¦peaceful methods of struggle were over; that one had to now look at alternatives; and that the alternative was armed struggle - violence. And it set this in the context of Marxist theory and communist theory, and revolutionary practice." This proposal was later presented to individuals within the ANC, and it therefore pre-dates the 1961 decision of the ANC to begin the armed struggle. At an ANC Working Committee meeting in June 1961 Mandela presented the proposal for a military wing, initially Moses Kotane disagreed. He argued that: "There is still room for the old methods if we are imaginative and determined enough." Eventually, however, Kotane agreed to the matter being raised with the National Executive. Later that month the National Executive met in Durban. Like all ANC meetings at the time, the meeting was secret and held at night in order to avoid the police. Mandela anticipated difficulties. There was no doubt that the timing was poor. At the Treason Trial, the ANC had contended that non-violence was an inviolate principle of the movement, not simply a tactic.

He knew, furthermore, that Chief Luthuli's commitment to non-violence was deeply moral and feared his opposition. However, Luthuli was ultimately persuaded. "If anyone thinks I am a pacifist", he said, "let him try to take my chickens, and he will know how wrong he is!" Luthuli’s suggestion was that the military movement should be a separate and independent organ, linked and under the overall control of the ANC but fundamentally autonomous. In this way the legality of the unbanned allies would not be jeopardised. The NEC agreed. The following night, the Joint Executive met in Durban including representatives from the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Congress of Democrats. Chief Luthuli opened the meeting by saying that even though the ANC had endorsed the decision on violence, "it is a matter of such gravity, I would like my colleagues here tonight to consider the issue afresh”. For Mandela, this was a sign that the chief was not one hundred percent convinced by his proposal. However, when the session opened at 8pm, Mandela presented his arguments once again.

Maulvi Cachalia pleaded with the ANC not to take up arms, arguing that the state would slaughter the whole liberation movement. "Non-violence has not failed us, we have failed non-violence", pleaded JN Singh. "We argued the entire night", recalled Mandela, but then suddenly MD Naidoo, a member of the South African Indian Congress, said to his Indian colleagues: "Ah, you are afraid of going to jail, that is all!" By dawn, Mandela had his authority. Nelson Mandela of the ANC and Joe Slovo of the SACP were mandated to form the new military organisation and its high command, separate from the ANC. The policy of the ANC would still be that of non-violence. They were authorised to join with whomever they wanted or needed to create this organisation and they would not be under the direct control of the mother organisation (ANC). “At the time when MK was formed a decision was taken that it should be an independent organisation. There is however, no certainty as to the precise terms in which the decision was formulated. This enabled the ANC and any of its leaders to deny any involvement in armed activity, while allowing those organising MK to do so in the ANC’s name”.

The name of the new organisation would be Umkhonto weSizwe, Zulu and Xhosa for the Spear of the Nation. Its short name would be the MK. The MK’s aim was to "hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom". Planning for the first phase The first phase of armed action was to be the December 1961 sabotage campaign against government installations. Instructions were issued to avoid attacks that would lead to injury or loss of life. Joe Slovo wrote: "No one believed that the tactic of sabotage could, on its own, lead to the collapse of the racist state. It would be the first phase of 'controlled violence' designed to serve a number of purposes. It would be a graphic pointer to the need for carefully planned action rather than spontaneous or terrorist acts of retaliation which were already in evidence ”¦ And it would demonstrate that the responsibility for the slide towards bloody civil war lay squarely with the regime". In the six or so months between making the decision to form the organisation (June) and the first acts of sabotage (December), the MK high command set up regional commands in the main centres.

The people chosen to be part of these commands were chosen either because they had the necessary technical or military skills or because they were members of the Congress Alliance organisations. Curnick Dlovu led the Natal region. Looksmart Ngudle (who died in security police detention in 1963) and Fred Carneson were leaders in the Western Cape. Washington Bongco (who was hanged for MK activities in August 1963) was Border regional commander. Vuyisile Mini (who was executed in 1964) was one of the key figures in the Eastern Cape command. Jack Hogson , Ahmed Kathrada , Arthur Goldreich and Dennis Goldberg were in Johannesburg. Ronnie Kasrils recalls his recruitment to the newly formed MK: "During July 1961, MP Naicker took me for a walk along the [Durban] beach front ”¦ 'I have been asked to approach you,' he said, above the roar of the surf smashing against the rocks, ' to sound you out. Are you willing to get involved?' "Theory apart" wrote Slovo, "this venture into a new era of struggle found us ill-equipped at many levels.

Among the lot of us we did not have a single pistol. No one we knew had ever engaged in urban sabotage with home made explosives ”¦" It was Jack Hodgson, appointed to the Johannesburg military command of MK, who showed them the ropes. A veteran of the Abyssinian campaign and a 'desert rat' during the early stages of the North African war, Jack Hodgson taught the cadres the rudiments. "Sacks of permanganate of potash were brought", wrote Slovo, "and we spent days with pestles and mortars grinding this substance to a fine powder". Kasrils continues: "He (Hodgson) placed a chemical mixture with icing sugar into a spoon and carefully added a drop of acid with an eye dropper. The powder burst into flame and we were as impressed as pupils in a science class. The problem, of course, was how to achieve the result without directly applying the acid. For that one required a timing device." "With a huge grin he produced a condom". First he placed a teaspoon of the chemical mixture into the condom.

Next he produced a small, gelatine capsule ”¦ Opening the capsule, he added a few drops of acid, carefully put the cap back on the capsule and dropped it into the condom. He told us that it normally took up to 50 minutes for the acid to eat through the capsule ”¦” References: • Niemann, M. (1993). 'Diamonds are State's Best Friend: Botswana's Foreign Policy in Southern Africa'. • Africa Today, vol 40. No 1.Magubane, B. (1983). 'Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: South Africa's Hostages in Revolt'. (Eds) • Callaghy, T. M. South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence, Praeger: New York. • Urnov, A. (1982). South Africa against Africa, Progress: Moscow. • O'Meara, P. and Carter, G. M. (1982). 'Interchapter--Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: The Common Background and Links'. (Eds) • O'Meara, P.

and Carter, G.M. Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis (second edition), Indiana University Press: Bloomington. • ANC official website (history and documents section). anc.org.za • African National Congress (undated). The History of Umkhonto weSizwe, timeline. anc.org.za (accessed 12 December 2003). Project MUSE - Spear of the Nation Spear of the Nation Janet Cherry Publication Year: 2012 Umkhonto we Sizwe, Spear of the Nation, was arguably the last of the great liberation armies of the twentieth century&mdash;but it never got to &ldquo;march triumphant into Pretoria.&rdquo; MK&mdash;as it was known&mdash;was the armed wing of the African National Congress, South Africa&rsquo;s liberation movement, that challenged the South African apartheid government. A small group of revolutionaries committed to the seizure of power, MK discovered its principal members engaged in negotiated settlement with the enemy and was disbanded soon after. The history of MK is one of paradox and contradiction, of successes and failures.

In this short study, which draws widely on the personal experiences of&mdash;and commentary by&mdash;MK soldiers, Janet Cherry offers a new and nuanced account of the Spear of the Nation. She presents in broad outline the various stages of MK&rsquo;s thirty-year history, considers the difficult strategic and moral problems the revolutionary army faced, and argues that its operations are likely to be remembered as a just war conducted with considerable restraint. Download PDF p. 7 I should like to thank Howard Barrell, Mzolisi Dyasi, Kholi Mhlana, Madeleine Fullard and Ronnie Kasrils for their comments on the manuscript, as well as the South African... 1. Introduction Download PDF pp. 9-12 Hailed as heroes by many South Africans, demonised as evil terrorists by others, Umkhonto weSizwe, the Spear of the Nation, is now part of history. Though the organisation no longer exists, its former members are represented by the MK Military Veterans’ Association, which still carries... 2. The turn to armed struggle, 1960–3 Download PDF pp.

13-34 It is hard to find anyone in South Africa today who will argue with conviction that the armed struggle for liberation from apartheid was not justified. This was not always the case, especially among whites. Even so, most South Africans... 3. The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, 1967–8 Download PDF pp. 35-46 Those who left the country for military training in the early 1960s, including the young Chris Hani, who was later to become MK Chief of Staff, did not have an easy time of it. After receiving military training in various... 4. Struggling to get home, 1969–84 Download PDF pp. 47-84 Following the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, the ANC held a decisive national conference at Morogoro in Tanzania in 1969 to deal with the unprecedented level of criticism and dissatisfaction within the organisation. Survivors of the Rhodesian campaigns were... 5. Reaping the whirlwind, 1984–9 Download PDF pp.

85-112 The 1980s, the third decade of the armed struggle, opened up greater opportunities for MK and the ANC than ever before and, at the same time, greater challenges. The new decade began with exciting developments inside South... 6. The end of armed struggle Download PDF pp. 113-132 Underlying the desperate accounts of the battles, skirmishes and bombings, urban and rural, which we have described, is a great irony: that while MK cadres were being exhorted to ‘escalate the armed struggle’ in preparation... 7. A sober assessment of MK Download PDF pp. 133-144 There is a strong case to be made that MK’s armed struggle will be remembered as an example of a just war conducted with considerable restraint. The argument is all the more compelling if the South African liberation struggle... Sources and further reading Armed Resistance Movement - Nelson Mandela Armed Resistance Movement Process Paper In 1961, Nelson Mandela co-founded and became the first leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), also known as MK, a new armed wing of the ANC.

Under Mandela's leadership, MK launched a sabotage campaign against the government, which had recently declared South Africa a republic and withdrawn from the British Commonwealth. In January 1962, Mandela traveled aboard illegally to attend a conference of African nationalist leaders in Ethiopia, visit the exiled Oliver Tambo in London and undergo guerilla training in Algeria. On August 5, shortly after his return, he was arrested and subsequently sentenced to five years in prison for leaving the country and inciting a 1961 workers strike. The following July, police raided an ANC hideout in Rivonia, a suburb on the outskirts of Johannesburg, and arrested a racially diverse group of MK leaders who had gathered to debate the merits of a guerilla insurgency. Evidence eas found implicating Mandela and other activists, who were brought to stand trial for sabotage, treason and violent conspiracy alongside their associates.Mandela and other seven defendants narrowly escaped the gallows and were instead sentenced to life imprisonment during the so-call Rivonia Trial, which lasted eight months and attracted substantial international attention. In a stirring opening statement that sealed his iconic status around the world, Mandela admitted to some of the charges against him while defending the ANC's actions and denouncing the injustices of apartheid.

Create a free website Nelson Mandela - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com Google Nelson Mandela’s Childhood and Education Nelson Mandela was born on July 18, 1918, into a royal family of the Xhosa-speaking Thembu tribe in the South African village of Mvezo, where his father, Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa (c. 1880-1928), served as chief. His mother, Nosekeni Fanny, was the third of Mphakanyiswa’s four wives, who together bore him nine daughters and four sons. After the death of his father in 1927, 9-year-old Mandela—then known by his birth name, Rolihlahla—was adopted by Jongintaba Dalindyebo, a high-ranking Thembu regent who began grooming his young ward for a role within the tribal leadership. Did You Know? As a sign of respect, many South Africans referred to Nelson Mandela as Madiba, his Xhosa clan name. The first in his family to receive a formal education, Mandela completed his primary studies at a local missionary school. There, a teacher dubbed him Nelson as part of a common practice of giving African students English names.

He went on to attend the Clarkebury Boarding Institute and Healdtown, a Methodist secondary school, where he excelled in boxing and track as well as academics. In 1939 Mandela entered the elite University of Fort Hare, the only Western-style higher learning institute for South African blacks at the time. The following year, he and several other students, including his friend and future business partner Oliver Tambo (1917-1993), were sent home for participating in a boycott against university policies. After learning that his guardian had arranged a marriage for him, Mandela fled to Johannesburg and worked first as a night watchman and then as a law clerk while completing his bachelor’s degree by correspondence. He studied law at the University of Witwatersrand, where he became involved in the movement against racial discrimination and forged key relationships with black and white activists. In 1944, Mandela joined the African National Congress (ANC) and worked with fellow party members, including Oliver Tambo, to establish its youth league, the ANCYL.

That same year, he met and married his first wife, Evelyn Ntoko Mase (1922-2004), with whom he had four children before their divorce in 1957. Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress Nelson Mandela’s commitment to politics and the ANC grew stronger after the 1948 election victory of the Afrikaner-dominated National Party, which introduced a formal system of racial classification and segregation—apartheid—that restricted nonwhites’ basic rights and barred them from government while maintaining white minority rule. The following year, the ANC adopted the ANCYL’s plan to achieve full citizenship for all South Africans through boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and other nonviolent methods. Mandela helped lead the ANC’s 1952 Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws, traveling across the country to organize protests against discriminatory policies, and promoted the manifesto known as the Freedom Charter, ratified by the Congress of the People in 1955. Also in 1952, Mandela and Tambo opened South Africa’s first black law firm, which offered free or low-cost legal counsel to those affected by apartheid legislation.

On December 5, 1956, Mandela and 155 other activists were arrested and went on trial for treason. All of the defendants were acquitted in 1961, but in the meantime tensions within the ANC escalated, with a militant faction splitting off in 1959 to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The next year, police opened fire on peaceful black protesters in the township of Sharpeville, killing 69 people; as panic, anger and riots swept the country in the massacre’s aftermath, the apartheid government banned both the ANC and the PAC. Forced to go underground and wear disguises to evade detection, Mandela decided that the time had come for a more radical approach than passive resistance. Nelson Mandela and the Armed Resistance Movement In 1961, Nelson Mandela co-founded and became the first leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), also known as MK, a new armed wing of the ANC.

Several years later, during the trial that would put him behind bars for nearly three decades, he described the reasoning for this radical departure from his party’s original tenets: “[I]t would be wrong and unrealistic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and nonviolence at a time when the government met our peaceful demands with force. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle.” Under Mandela’s leadership, MK launched a sabotage campaign against the government, which had recently declared South Africa a republic and withdrawn from the British Commonwealth. In January 1962, Mandela traveled abroad illegally to attend a conference of African nationalist leaders in Ethiopia, visit the exiled Oliver Tambo in London and undergo guerilla training in Algeria. On August 5, shortly after his return, he was arrested and subsequently sentenced to five years in prison for leaving the country and inciting a 1961 workers’ strike. The following July, police raided an ANC hideout in Rivonia, a suburb on the outskirts of Johannesburg, and arrested a racially diverse group of MK leaders who had gathered to debate the merits of a guerilla insurgency.

Evidence was found implicating Mandela and other activists, who were brought to stand trial for sabotage, treason and violent conspiracy alongside their associates. Mandela and seven other defendants narrowly escaped the gallows and were instead sentenced to life imprisonment during the so-called Rivonia Trial, which lasted eight months and attracted substantial international attention. In a stirring opening statement that sealed his iconic status around the world, Mandela admitted to some of the charges against him while defending the ANC’s actions and denouncing the injustices of apartheid. He ended with the following words: “I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” Nelson Mandela’s Years Behind Bars Nelson Mandela spent the first 18 of his 27 years in jail at the brutal Robben Island Prison, a former leper colony off the coast of Cape Town, where he was confined to a small cell without a bed or plumbing and compelled to do hard labor in a lime quarry. As a black political prisoner, he received scantier rations and fewer privileges than other inmates.

He was only allowed to see his wife, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (1936-), who he had married in 1958 and was the mother of his two young daughters, once every six months. Mandela and his fellow prisoners were routinely subjected to inhumane punishments for the slightest of offenses; among other atrocities, there were reports of guards burying inmates in the ground up to their necks and urinating on them. These restrictions and conditions notwithstanding, while in confinement Mandela earned a bachelor of law degree from the University of London and served as a mentor to his fellow prisoners, encouraging them to seek better treatment through nonviolent resistance. He also smuggled out political statements and a draft of his autobiography, “Long Walk to Freedom,” published five years after his release. Despite his forced retreat from the spotlight, Mandela remained the symbolic leader of the antiapartheid movement. In 1980 Oliver Tambo introduced a “Free Nelson Mandela” campaign that made the jailed leader a household name and fueled the growing international outcry against South Africa’s racist regime.

As pressure mounted, the government offered Mandela his freedom in exchange for various political compromises, including the renouncement of violence and recognition of the “independent” Transkei Bantustan, but he categorically rejected these deals. In 1982 Mandela was moved to Pollsmoor Prison on the mainland, and in 1988 he was placed under house arrest on the grounds of a minimum-security correctional facility. The following year, newly elected president F. W. de Klerk (1936-) lifted the ban on the ANC and called for a nonracist South Africa, breaking with the conservatives in his party. On February 11, 1990, he ordered Mandela’s release. Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa After attaining his freedom, Nelson Mandela led the ANC in its negotiations with the governing National Party and various other South African political organizations for an end to apartheid and the establishment of a multiracial government. Though fraught with tension and conducted against a backdrop of political instability, the talks earned Mandela and de Klerk the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1993.

On April 26, 1994, more than 22 million South Africans turned out to cast ballots in the country’s first multiracial parliamentary elections in history. An overwhelming majority chose the ANC to lead the country, and on May 10 Mandela was sworn in as the first black president of South Africa, with de Klerk serving as his first deputy. As president, Mandela established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights and political violations committed by both supporters and opponents of apartheid between 1960 and 1994. He also introduced numerous social and economic programs designed to improve the living standards of South Africa’s black population. In 1996 Mandela presided over the enactment of a new South African constitution, which established a strong central government based on majority rule and prohibited discrimination against minorities, including whites. Improving race relations, discouraging blacks from retaliating against the white minority and building a new international image of a united South Africa were central to President Mandela’s agenda.

To these ends, he formed a multiracial “Government of National Unity” and proclaimed the country a “rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.” In a gesture seen as a major step toward reconciliation, he encouraged blacks and whites alike to rally around the predominantly Afrikaner national rugby team when South Africa hosted the 1995 Rugby World Cup. On his 80th birthday in 1998, Mandela wed the politician and humanitarian Graça Machel (1945-), widow of the former president of Mozambique. (His marriage to Winnie had ended in divorce in 1992.) The following year, he retired from politics at the end of his first term as president and was succeeded by his deputy, Thabo Mbeki (1942-) of the ANC. Nelson Mandela’s Later Years and Legacy After leaving office, Nelson Mandela remained a devoted champion for peace and social justice in his own country and around the world. He established a number of organizations, including the influential Nelson Mandela Foundation and The Elders, an independent group of public figures committed to addressing global problems and easing human suffering.

In 2002, Mandela became a vocal advocate of AIDS awareness and treatment programs in a culture where the epidemic had been cloaked in stigma and ignorance. The disease later claimed the life of his son Makgatho (1950-2005) and is believed to affect more people in South Africa than in any other country. Treated for prostate cancer in 2001 and weakened by other health issues, Mandela grew increasingly frail in his later years and scaled back his schedule of public appearances. In 2009, the United Nations declared July 18 “Nelson Mandela International Day” in recognition of the South African leader’s contributions to democracy, freedom, peace and human rights around the world. Nelson Mandela died on December 5, 2013 from a recurring lung infection.

Tags Spear of the Nation : Janet Cherry : 9780821420263 Add to basket Add to wishlist Description Umkhonto we Sizwe, Spear of the Nation, was arguably the last of the great liberation armies of the twentieth century-but it never got to \u201cmarch triumphant into Pretoria.\u201d MK-as it was known-was the armed wing of the African National Congress, South Africa's liberation movement, that challenged the South African apartheid government. A small group of revolutionaries committed to the seizure of power, MK discovered its principal members engaged in negotiated settlement with the enemy and was disbanded soon after. The history of MK is one of paradox and contradiction, of successes and failures. In this short study, which draws widely on the personal experiences of-and commentary by-MK soldiers, Janet Cherry offers a new and nuanced account of the Spear of the Nation. She presents in broad outline the various stages of MK's thirty-year history, considers the difficult strategic and moral problems the revolutionary army faced, and argues that its operations are likely to be remembered as a just war conducted with considerable restraint.

show more Product details 106.68 x 175.26 x 10.16mm | 113.4g Publication date Pretoria Presses Mandela's Group To Disband Army and Yield Arms - NYTimes.com Pretoria Presses Mandela's Group To Disband Army and Yield Arms By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN, Published: March 27, 1992 JOHANNESBURG, March 26— The policy of armed struggle against white minority rule that the African National Congress suspended more than 19 months ago, has re-emerged as the latest obstacle to negotiations between the Government and the congress. The Government of President F. W. de Klerk has intensified its insistence that the African National Congress renounce armed struggle altogether, disband its guerrillas and disclose its arms caches before an interim government now under discussion can be achieved. The congress agreed on Aug. 6, 1990, to suspend armed struggle, long dormant, to create a climate for negotiations. But it insists upon keeping its military wing, Spear of the Nation, intact until an interim government is in place.

The deadlock, while primarily symbolic, has nonetheless complicated the negotiations under way on South Africa's future, as each side maneuvers to wring new concessions. 'Here and Now' The Government contends that that no participant in transitional arrangements can maintain a private army. The Minister of Defense, Roelf Meyer, said on Wednesday that "disbanding of M.K. cadres is something that should be attended to here and now." Spear of the Nation is popularly called M.K., a phonetic abbreviation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, its name in Xhosa. The congress has accused the Government of seeking excuses to delay multi-racial transitional rule. "The A.N.C. is not going to abandon Umkhonto we Sizwe," said the congress's spokeswoman, Gill Marcus. Curiously, the Government's public pressure on the African National Congress has coincided with private progress reported at talks on the fate of Spear of the Nation. "Things are going so well that we are confident that agreement will be reached soon," Cyril Ramaphosa, the congress's secretary general, said Monday. And Mr.

Meyer told journalists Wednesday that "I think it can be resolved." Armed Struggle Began in 1961 The African National Congress began its armed struggle from exile in 1961 under conditions that did not favor a war of liberation. Its bases lay far beyond South Africa's borders, and guerrillas infiltrating back were routinely intercepted by South African security forces. Many guerrillas ended up fighting for the congress's friends in Angola and Zimbabwe, as the campaign inside South Africa turned to random terror bombings. The armed struggle, in effect, died out long before the congress announced its suspension. The agreement reached between the Government and the African National Congress in Pretoria in 1990 stipulated that "no further armed actions and related activities by the A.N.C. and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe will take place." The Government defines "related activities" to include the stockpiling of arms and the recruitment of new guerrillas. The congress says these fall outside the agreement's scope. At its national conference last July, the African National Congress vowed to keep its guerrillas "combat ready" until they were integrated into South Africa's armed forces and a nonracist constitution was enacted.

Several thousand guerrillas remain in Uganda, Tanzania and several other African countries, where they are being retrained as a conventional army. Symbol of Resistance For many black South Africans, the armed struggle symbolizes their resistance to apartheid, and it has been accorded near mythic dimensions in the rhetoric of the African National Congress. If the congress disbanded its military wing to accommodate the Government, it would lose support in the townships, particularly among militant youth, and would become vulnerable to criticism from more radical groups like the Pan-Africanist Congress. The Government has not made clear why it is hammering publicly at an issue that is under private discussion with the congress. President de Klerk may want to show whites, who gave him an overwhelming mandate in a national referendum last week to negotiate change, that he is not giving in to the African National Congress. Or the Government may have adopted a more aggressive stance to counteract the congress's threat last week to unleash crippling new "mass action" -- strikes, boycotts and other protests -- unless the Government repeals a tax on basic foodstuffs and yields to an interim government in the next few months. The Government is also feeling pressure from the Inkatha Freedom Party, the congress's leading rival among blacks.

Inkatha's chairman, Frank Mdlalose, said his party would not agree to an interim government until political violence ended and Spear of the Nation was disbanded. Inkatha has accused the guerrillas of causing some of the violence. The congress blames Inkatha and Government security forces. The ultimatums apparently have not halted progress in the working groups of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, as the negotiating forum that began last December is titled. The convention will likely consider arrangements for an interim government at its next full session, probably at the end of April. Night of the generals | Article | Africa Confidential Night of the generals 1st April 2016 Increasing surveillance of ANC dissidents and burglaries of journalists and activists point to paranoia at the top A veteran of the pre-liberation African National Congress armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK, Spear of the Nation), General Siphiwe 'Gebuza' Nyanda doesn't scare easily. Yet when a well armed hijacker decided on 23 March to make off with his Porsche luxury car, he didn't offer any resistance. Nyanda survived without a scratch and the car was found without serious damage a few hours later. Another random hijacking?

Perhaps, but it has emerged that Nyanda is the spokesman for a group known as Senior Commanders and Commissars of the ANC's former military wing. Just days before the attack, this group published a memorandum highly critical of President Jacob Zuma 's style of government (AC Vol 57 No 6, Gordhan and Zuma slug it out ). It ran through the familiar charge sheet: December's damaging and arbitrary sacking of Nhlanhla Nene as Finance Minister; the orchestrated harassment of current and previous Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan by the Hawks, the specialist police unit. Then the group declared its support for Mcebisi Jonas, who said that the Gupta family had offered him the post of Finance Minister before Zuma sacked Nene (AC Vol 55 No 11, A loyalist cabinet and Vol 57 No 4, Zupta Inc. ). Then came the coup de grâce which removed any ambiguity about the group's intentions.

The memo concluded, '…in the light of the many challenges facing the ANC and the state, we further call for the leadership of the ANC to urgently convene a special National Conference.' In today's febrile political climate, the idea of a special ANC conference would have but one aim: to sack Zuma from the presidency, a rerun of the recall of ex-President Thabo Mbeki at the Polokwane National Elective Conference of 2007. Fighters fight back The call had special weight, given Nyanda's history as an MK commander. The other signatories had their standing, too, both as liberation fighters and security apparatchiks who had fallen foul of Zuma. Riaz 'Mo' Shaik , former MK fighter and then head of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), was a long-time Zuma ally. Indeed, his brother Schabir Shaik was a close business ally of Zuma's and was gaoled for involvement in 1999's US$6 billion arms procurement scandal (AC Vol 52 No 25, High unit costs ).

Also among the signatories was another former NIA boss, Gibson Njenje (AC Vol 52 No 14, Zuma and the securocrats ). Both Shaik and Njenje split with Zuma after they had tried to block what they saw as the Gupta family's growing power. Amid the rising chorus of Zuma critics, Nyanda's group is the most forthright and probably carries the most political weight. For some, that could mean that the theft of his car was the first warning shot. There's no sign that he and his battle-hardened friends are ready to back off. A more prosaic sign of skulduggery was a break-in at the Helen Suzman Foundation on the afternoon of 20 March (AC Vol 44 No 9, Looking down the line ). Again, the timing was important: it was three days after the Foundation had filed an application with the Pretoria High Court for the suspension of Lieutenant General Berning Mthandazo Ntlemeza as Director of the Hawks anti-corruption unit. Among the claims in the application is that Ntlemeza was found to have lied under oath by Judge Elias Matojane in the Gauteng High Court.

As Ntlemeza is a key ally of Zuma's and has played a leading role in the Hawks' bizarre pursuit of Gordhan for setting up an 'illegal fiscal monitoring unit' at the South African Revenue Service, the Foundation's application has great resonance currently. This month's robbers padlocked the Foundation's security guard to the railings outside the building, then carried away several computers, hard disk drives and paper files. They seemed to have a clear objective. Come in Number One Accusations and suspicions extend far beyond these two cases. Senior ANC officials have told Africa Confidential that their telephones are bugged. Some National Executive Committee members said they believed conversations were being monitored by State Security Agency (SSA) officials who pass the information to Zuma's office. 'Senior ANC members are so paranoid that Number One [Zuma] is listening to them that they prefer not to have conversations on their cell phones,' said a former intelligence officer. An ANC provincial leader said that 'the preferred communication is via WhatsApp. That is the safest. No one can really monitor that.' There is also a long-held belief that state security officers have been used as proxies to settle internal battles in the governing party.

Several senior South African Communist Party members, including Blade Nzimande , have complained bitterly that their telephones are being monitored. The State Security Minister, David Mahlobo, insists that that the interception of citizens' phone calls 'is lawful and South Africa's intelligence services can only bug people when there is good reason to do so'. Having headed the ANC intelligence organisation during the struggle against apartheid, Zuma knows a lot about surveillance. The training and assistance ANC intelligence operatives received from East Germany's State Security Ministry, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, commonly known as the Stasi, instilled a lasting ethic. Zuma takes a close interest in the intelligence chiefs: he ensures they are part of his inner circle, either from KwaZulu-Natal or people who owe him politically. The reputation of the intelligence services is suffering in other ways. Last Christmas, there was a series of burglaries at the SSA headquarters in Pretoria. At least 50 computers were stolen from Defence Intelligence Headquarters at the same time, the local press reported. On 26 December, more than 50 million rand (US$3.2 mn.) in cash was stolen from a safe on the premises.

Two agency officials were arrested and on are on bail but there is no news of the missing millions. An SSA insider said that the case was not as 'clear-cut' as it seemed and heads were likely to roll in the coming months. 'For now, no one inside the Agency is saying anything and we are watching the next move in the state's case and want to hear what the arrested officials will be arguing in court.' At the same time, there is a crisis in the parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services. Zuma has been eager to appoint another old ally, Cecil Burgess, as Inspector General of Intelligence (IGI), a post which is meant to hold the services to account and report to Parliament. It was soon clear that the opposition to his appointment meant that it would not receive the necessary two-thirds support in the House. Accordingly and at the last minute, the ANC Chief Whip withdrew the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence's report supporting the appointment. Earlier, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete , had written to all parties, pleading with the opposition to put aside their differences and fill the important post. This was the ANC's third attempt to have the report adopted and the second to end in a withdrawal.

The IGI oversees the SSA as well as military and police criminal intelligence, investigates illegal espionage and keeps a check on intelligence operatives both at home and abroad. The post has been vacant for a year and the list of uninvestigated complaints is piling up. State Security Minister Mahlobo had left it to Mbete and the new acting Chief Whip, Dorris Eunice Dlakude, to get cross-party support for their candidate as he has been too busy keeping tabs on the President's detractors before next year's bruising ANC leadership battle. In January. it emerged that Zuma had met members of the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and had made it clear he wanted to see former ANC MP Cecil Burgess appointed as IGI. While the Committee recommends a candidate for this powerful post to the President, Zuma has the final say before the recommendation goes to Parliament for ratification or rejection.

Zuma is set on appointing Burgess, who showed his loyalty to him and the ANC when he used his lawyer's wit to steamroll the controversial Protection of State Information Bill – widely derided as the 'secrecy bill' – through Parliament in 2013 (AC Vol 55 No 16, Jobs for the boys – and girls ). Burgess is a former ally of the Cape Town Mayor, Patricia de Lille, and was an MP for her now-defunct party, The Independent Democrats. Burgess defected to the ANC in 2005 and rose quickly up the ranks, chairing Parliament's special ad hoc committee on the Information Bill. He also chaired the ad hoc committee that found no wrongdoing on the part of the President when it looked into the spending of taxpayers' money on upgrading his homestead at Nkandla (AC Vol 56 No 5, No-fly zone for legal eagles ). Burgess is Zuma's favourite for the post on a shortlist of eight that included former MK veterans such as Clinton Davids. In June, the ANC could not get Parliament's approval.

Not everyone in the party was happy with the choice: some saw Burgess as a pro-Zuma hawk and others said he had no history in the ANC's underground structures. The Intelligence Committee denied that Zuma has applied pressure over the appointment. Zuma's special pleading was reported in the Committee's confidential proceedings. The Intelligence Committee is one of the few that meets behind closed doors. Cornelia 'Connie' September, the veteran trades unionist and former Human Settlements Minister who chairs the Committee, argues that opposition politicians don't understand the sensitive nature of the Committee's work. The Democratic Alliance's John Steenhuisen lambasts the selection process, arguing that Burgess isn't qualified for the job. He wants legislation to ensure the post is filled by a retired judge. That would 'prohibit the back-alley lobbying, cadre deployment and political interference', he says. The sudden resignation on 2 March of the ANC Chief Whip, Stone Sizani, pointed to the high stakes in the row over the IGI. He was seen as not supporting Burgess's appointment and therefore as hostile to Zuma. The ANC has now referred the matter back to the Committee to 'ensure there is sufficient consultation around the candidate'.

Mahlobo on the rise Politicians across the political divide were shocked by the 2014 appointment of Mahlobo, an unknown civil servant from Mpumalanga who was parachuted in to head the powerful SSA and who, says the SSA website, 'was sent by the ANC to China for Political Education'. In the past, senior ANC National Executive members, such as Lindiwe Sisulu and Ronnie Kasrils, held the portfolio. Mahlobo worked under Kasrils as a Director at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry from 2002 until Kasrils left in 2004, and for two years thereafter. He is now seen as one of Zuma's closest lieutenants and staunch defenders on the National Executive Committee and shielding Zuma from the Nkandla homestead fiasco. Mhlobo has been vocal about the ANC leadership battle. In 2015, Mahlobo came under fire for jamming mobile telephone and internet services during the opening of Parliament (AC Vol 56 No 4, A rowdy state of the nation ).

He travels abroad regularly with Zuma and was one of the few ministers to accompany him to Russia in 2014 to meet President Vladimir Putin. Those meetings are understood to have included discussions about Russia's multi-billion dollar bids for contracts to expand South Africa's nuclear power industry, an issue of great sensitivity to international intelligence agencies. Copyright © Africa Confidential 2017 Umkhonto we Sizwe | South African military organization | Britannica.com South African military organization THIS IS A DIRECTORY PAGE. Britannica does not currently have an article on this topic. Alternative Title: Umkonto we Sizwe Learn about this topic in these articles: in South Africa: Resistance to apartheid ...of their white sympathizers came to the conclusion that apartheid could never be overcome by peaceful means alone. PAC established an armed wing called Poqo, and the ANC set up its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), in 1961. Although their military units detonated several bombs in government buildings during the next few years, the ANC and PAC did not pose a... in South Africa: Security ...However, from the 1970s an increasing number of black troops were recruited.

Compulsory military service, formerly for white males only, ended in 1994. Guerrillas of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), and of the PAC’s military have been incorporated into a renamed South African National Defence Force. This integration has not been entirely... in African National Congress (ANC): Move toward militancy ...the PAC. Denied legal avenues for political change, the ANC first turned to sabotage and then began to organize outside of South Africa for guerrilla warfare. In 1961 an ANC military organization, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), with Mandela as its head, was formed to carry out acts of sabotage as part of its campaign against apartheid. Mandela and other ANC leaders were sentenced... in Nelson Mandela: Underground activity and the Rivonia Trial ...acts of sabotage against the South African regime. He went underground (during which time he became known as the Black Pimpernel for his ability to evade capture) and was one of the founders of Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), the military wing of the ANC.

In 1962 he went to Algeria for training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage, returning to South Africa later that... in Britannica Remembers Nelson Mandela ...of the African National Congress (banned since 1960). He was actively engaged in the defiance campaign against apartheid in 1952 and was a founder (Nov. 1961) of the sabotage organization known as Umkonto we Ziswe (“Spear of the Nation”). Mandela was one of the accused in the South African treason trial which, with preliminary hearings, lasted from Dec. 1956 to March 1961. He...

Question: Spear of the Nation was an armed wing of which group?
Answer: ANC