Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan By BILL KELLER, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES OSCOW -- The last Soviet soldier came home from Afghanistan this morning, the Soviet Union announced, leaving behind a war that had become a domestic burden and an international embarrassment for Moscow. The final Soviet departure came on the day set as a deadline by the Geneva accords last April. It left two heavily armed adversaries, the Kremlin-backed Government of President Najibullah and a fractious but powerful array of Muslim insurgents, backed by the United States and Pakistan, to conclude their civil war on their own. Lieut. Gen. Boris V. Gromov, the commander of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, walked across the steel Friendship Bridge to the border city of Termez, in Uzbekistan, at 11:55 A.M. local time (1:55 A.M., Eastern time), 9 years and 50 days after Soviet troops intervened to support a coup by a Marxist ally. 'Our Stay Ends' "There is not a single Soviet soldier or officer left behind me," General Gromov told a Soviet television reporter waiting on the bridge.

"Our nine-year stay ends with this." Today's final departure is the end of a steady process of withdrawal since last spring, when Moscow says, there were 100,300 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. At the height of the Soviet commitment, according to Western intelligence estimates, there were 115,000 troops deployed. This morning, as the last armored troop carriers rumbled home across the border, a Soviet newspaper carried the first report of atrocities committed in the war by the nation's military forces. Massacre and Cover-Up The weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta described the killing of a carload of Afghan civilians, including women and children, and the order by a commander to cover it up. The article was a foretaste of recriminations expected in the months ahead. The war cost the Soviet Union roughly 15,000 lives and undisclosed billions of rubles. It scarred a generation of young people and undermined the cherished image of an invincible Soviet Army. Moscow's involvement in Afghanistan was often compared to the American experience in the Vietnam War, in which more than 58,000 Americans died.

The Soviet intervention, which received international condemnation, cast a pall over relations with China, the Muslim world and the West. It led to an American trade embargo and a Western boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Western reporters flown to Termez to witness the finale said the ceremony at the border was one of festive relief at the homecoming. Today, there were no obvious second thoughts expressed about the venture. "The day that millions of Soviet people have waited for has come," General Gromov said to an army rally in Termez, Reuters reported. "In spite of our sacrifices and losses, we have totally fulfilled our internationalist duty." Token of Official Esteem The official press agency Tass said the Defense Ministry presented all of the returning soldiers with wristwatches. Yet in contrast with the joy at leaving Afghanistan, Soviet press reports told of insurgents massing outside Kabul, the Afghan capital, and other major cities, and of Afghan Army regulars deserting in droves. The reports seemed intended to brace the public for the possibility that defeat would follow retreat.

Vadim Perfilyev, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, described the situation in Kabul today as "relatively calm" but said the guerrillas continued to gather reinforcements around the main cities and along the highway to the Soviet Union. Perfilyev said 160 trucks bearing food and fuel reached Kabul safely on Tuesday to relieve shortages in time for an expected siege. He added that aircraft were still ferrying supplies into airports at Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif. A Few Advisers and Guards An estimated 250 Soviet civilians were believed to have stayed on at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul after the troops left. Perfilyev said he did know how many military advisers, "if any," were still in Afghanistan. The official who negotiated the Geneva accords, Diego Cordovez of Ecuador, said at the United Nations today that he believed that fewer than 10 Soviet military advisers would remain in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, principally as embassy guards. Western diplomats and Soviet journalists speculate that the guerrillas will attempt a quick victory, perhaps in the vulnerable eastern city of Jalalabad, to break the Government's morale. This would be accompanied by a slow-death blockade of Kabul.

But Soviet officials and some recent Western visitors say they believe that Najibullah's forces may prove sturdier than expected. They control vast arsenals of Soviet-supplied weapons, and are motivated by the fear of rebel reprisals if they lose. A Government statement on the troop withdrawal said the responsibility for a blood bath in Afghanistan now would largely rest on the guerrillas' suppliers. Onus for Further Conflict "Whether the Afghan situation will develop along the lines of national accord and the creation of a broadly based coalition government," the statement said, "or along the lines of escalating war and tension in and around the country, depends to a large degree on those who have, over all these years, aided and abetted the armed opposition, supplying it with sophisticated weapons." The Soviet Government renewed its appeal to Pakistan and the United States to join in a cutoff of military aid to the warring parties. The United States, which a year ago was pressing such an arrangement on the reluctant Soviets, now argues that it is too late. The rebels insist that they will not take part in a coalition that retains Najibullah or his Communist political grouping, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

But their own efforts to coalesce have faltered over issues of ideology and power sharing. At home, the Soviet Government now faces a period of reckoning with the roots and consequences of the war. In Pravda, the authoritative Communist Party newspaper, a commentator insisted today that the intervention was carried out with the best intentions -including maintaining the security of the Soviet Union's southern border. But he said that the war was characterized by the mistakes and misjudgments of previous leaders. "One can question the Brezhnev leadership's assessment of the military threat," the commentary said. "One can say that in the future such vital issues as the use of troops must not be decided in secrecy, without the approval of the country's Parliament." What Has Been Learned? Other commentators, who have been constrained while Soviet soldiers were still fighting on Afghan territory, can now be expected to question more pointedly how the Soviet Union got into Afghanistan, what it did there, why it stayed so long and what lessons it has learned. The account today in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a dark essay on the corrupting power of the war, was a sample of the gloves-off analysis that is likely to find its way into the press.

The article, by Gennadi Bocharov, who has written extensively from Afghanistan since 1979, told of Soviet troops firing on a carload of civilians after they refused to stop at a border checkpoint and ignored a warning shot. The troops then opened fire on the vehicle, killing a young woman and wounding three others. An old woman and two children were not hurt. When the soldiers radioed to their commander to ask for further intructions, he replied according to the account, "I don't need captives." The commander, who was identified only as Rudykh, told them to eliminate the evidence. "So they did," Bocharov reported. "The passenger car was smashed by an armored vehicle and buried in the earth." The commander was reportedly sentenced to six years' imprisonment, but freed almost immediately in an amnesty. History of the Struggle The first Soviet troops parachuted into Kabul on Dec. 27, 1979, to assist Babrak Karmal, who had become President in a coup within the Communist leadership. The Soviets have always insisted that they came in response to a plea for help from a legitimately constituted Karmal Government.

However, most Western analysts say the Soviets engineered the coup as a pretext to replace the Afghan leader who had lost their trust, Hafizullah Amin. The next day, four motorized rifle divisions crossed the Amu Darya River on pontoon bridges, and Moscow announced that its "limited military contingent" would stay as long as necessary to repel outside aggression. This they did for years; along the way, in 1986, Najibullah, the former chief of the Afghan secret police, replaced mr. Karmal in a purge. The Soviet-backed Kabul Government has generally kept a firm grip on the cities, but throughout the war has been unable to rout the rebels in the countryside, where the conservative populace was antagonized at the outset by changes in social and land policies that offended Muslim tradition. After 1986, the Soviet Air Force was rendered largely useless by advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles supplied by the United States to the rebels. Overture From East Bloc Peace talks moderated by the United Nations bore little fruit until early last year, when Gorbachev and Najibullah offered a nine-month withdrawal timetable if Pakistan and the United States agreed to curtail their aid to the guerrillas.

The arms embargo never materialized, because President Reagan demanded that Moscow stop supplying Najibullah as part of the bargain, and the Soviets refused. In the end, Moscow's withdrawal was in effect unilateral. The Geneva accords introduced United Nations observers to watch the troops depart, but the agreements' other painstakingly negotiated provisions, promising an end to all outside intervention in Afghanistan, were generally ignored. The Bush Administration has indicated that it plans to continue arming the rebels after the Soviet withdrawal. Afghan Pullout: Last Soviet Soldiers Leave - latimes Afghan Pullout: Last Soviet Soldiers Leave February 15, 1989 |From Times Wire Services KABUL, Afghanistan — Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov, commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, became the last Soviet soldier to leave the embattled country when he crossed into the Soviet border town of Termez at 9:55 a.m Moscow time today, the official Soviet news agency Tass reported. Today was the deadline for troop withdrawal under a U.N.-sponsored accord designed to end the nine-year Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Earlier, Soviet officials said the last Red Army soldiers in Kabul, the capital, climbed aboard giant military transport planes and flew home Tuesday night.

The airlift apparently left Afghan armed forces to defend the capital alone for the first time in nine years. Just hours before, Muslim guerrillas fired five rockets into Kabul, killing four children and an adult, according to official reports. The airport also was hit for the first time in several weeks. Kabul Radio said the fatalities occurred after one of the rockets exploded in a bazaar where dozens of people were lining up to buy bread in a city desperately short of supplies. At the airport, reporters watched as at least 80 Soviet soldiers boarded Il-76 transport planes. Earlier, it had been thought that only about 40 Soviet troops remained in Kabul on the day preceding today's pullout deadline. Lt. Col. Pytor Sardarchuk declined to say exactly how many troops were leaving. "All those who are left" were going, he said. Then he turned to watching reporters, shook their hands and said "Goodby." Envoys to Remain About 140 Soviet diplomats and five Soviet journalists planned to stay behind in the capital.

About 5,000 Soviet soldiers had remained on Afghan soil on Tuesday, according to the official Tass news agency, out of an estimated 115,000 during the height of Soviet intervention. Many of those troops were crossing the 1,056-yard-long Friendship Bridge over the Amu Darya River during the day into Termez, Tass said, after rolling north along the Salang Highway. The departure of the troops complied with the Feb. 15 withdrawal deadline set by the U.N.-mediated accords signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan in April. A ceremony was planned in Termez to mark the end of a war that began with the Soviet intervention in December, 1979, to stabilize a Communist government besieged by Muslim rebels and internal political conflicts. Gromov, 47, who supervised the withdrawal by land, had vowed to be the last soldier out of the country, where at least 1 million Soviet soldiers in all have been involved and 15,000 killed. Today, he walked alone across the Friendship Bridge linking the Afghan town of Khairaton to Termez.

Warning Letters In Kabul, it was generally quiet, but residents said letters--unsigned and delivered the past few nights--warned people to stay off the streets today. Many residents believed the letters came from the guerrilla forces believed bearing down on the city, but some foreign diplomats suggested that the letters might be the work of the Najibullah government's secret police. Written in the local Dari language, the letters warn residents to stay off the streets, close their shops and keep away from the airport. MORE: 1989: Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan | History.info 1989: Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan Photo Credit To On this day in 1989 the process of withdrawing Soviet military forces from Afghanistan was officially declared complete. The Soviets had held Afghanistan since 1979 (towards the end of that year they conducted an invasion of Afghanistan, killed the Afghan president and captured his palace). At the peak of the occupation, the USSR deployed over 100,000 soldiers to Afghanistan. Seeing the situation is untenable, the Soviets started withdrawing from the country in May 1988. The complete withdrawal of around 100,000 people took around 10 months.

On this day in 1989 Soviet general Boris Gromov became the last to symbolically cross the bridge on the border between Afghanistan and the USSR. Specifically, the bridge is located on the Amu-Darya river, today the border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (the latter was once part of the USSR). Over 14,400 Soviet soldiers died during the occupation of Afghanistan, and over 53,000 were wounded. Facebook Comments MAN IN THE NEWS - Boris V. Gromov - Afghanistan - Last Man Out - NYTimes.com MAN IN THE NEWS: Boris V. Gromov; Afghanistan: Last Man Out By BILL KELLER, Special to the New York Times Published: February 16, 1989 MOSCOW, Feb. 15— Soviet officials had repeatedly vowed that their men would not leave Afghanistan in disarray, like the last Americans clambering onto helicopters from the roof of their embassy as Saigon fell around them. This morning, at least, Lieut. Gen. Boris V. Gromov did not disappoint them.

The trim 45-year-old commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan hopped off his armored personnel carrier and strode calmly across the bridge to Soviet territory, where he was met by a Soviet television crew. General Gromov has probably enhanced an already meteoric career by neatly executing one of the most difficult, though not the most satisfying, of military maneuvers: retreat. He extricated more than 100,000 soldiers from a costly and unsuccessful nine-year venture in Afghanistan with the kind of self-confident flare much admired in the Kremlin of Mikhail S. Gorbachev. To Head Military District Backtracking gracefully is a skill likely to be much in demand in a military that has entered a period of retrenchment. The official press agency Tass reported today that after more than five years in Afghanistan General Gromov would assume command of the Kiev military district, one of 16 regional subdivisions of the Soviet armed forces. In the face of growing domestic criticism of the war, General Gromov has steadfastly maintained that the military fulfilled its duty completely, while acknowledging that Afghanistan exposed major inadequacies in the Soviet Army, especially training in countering guerrilla tactics.

At a news conference in Kabul last May, as the first stage of the withdrawal was beginning, the general bristled at a suggestion that the return home meant failure. Withdrawal 'Not a Defeat' ''The troop withdrawal is not a defeat; it is the completion of an internationalist mission and the fulfillment of the Geneva accords,'' he said. ''None of our units, even the smallest one, have ever retreated. That is why there is no talk of a military defeat.'' He has never publicly judged the political decision to send the troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. ''He seemed to be a no-nonsense guy with a good head for the political significance of his command,'' said a Bush Administration official who follows Afghan affairs closely. While Soviet diplomats tried to create suspense about the Soviets' intentions, hoping this would put pressure on the guerrillas to settle, this official observed, General Gromov was never coy about plans to meet the withdrawal deadlines. Father Killed in World War II Recently the general vowed that the Soviet Union would not send bombers from Soviet air bases to help the Afghan Army after the withdrawal, and although other officials have since obscured the issue, American officials are inclined to believe General Gromov.

Boris Vsevelodovich Gromov was born on Nov. 7, 1943, to a working-class family in the city of Saratov, on the Volga River. His father was killed a few months later fighting Nazi invaders on the Dnieper River. He entered the Suvorov Military Academy in 1962 and was a company commander by the age of 24. After attending the Frunze Military Academy, he went on to a variety of command and staff appointments, including a tour as a colonel in Afghanistan in 1980. A rapid series of promotions made him a major general at the age of 39. Back to Afghanistan After studying at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, he returned to Afghanistan in 1984 as the commander of forces there, Tass reported. He was awarded the highest military honor, Hero of the Soviet Union, for commanding an operation to end the siege of the eastern garrison town of Khost in January 1988. He is credited with developing tactics for use against guerrillas.

General Gromov told Tass that his wife died in a 1985 air crash in the Carpathian Mountains. He has two sons, one of whom, Maksim, 14, greeted him with an emotional embrace and a fistful of carnations today at the bridge home from Afghanistan. Boris Gromov | Military Wiki | Fandom powered by Wikia Soviet war in Afghanistan Awards Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov (Russian: Бори́с Все́володович Гро́мов; born 7 November 1943 in Saratov, Russia) is a prominent Russian military and political figure. From 2000 to 2012, he was the Governor of Moscow Oblast. Biography Edit He graduated from a Suvorov military cadet school, the Leningrad Military Commanders School and later from the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, as well as the General Staff Academy .

During the Soviet war in Afghanistan , Gromov did three tours of duty (1980–1982, 1985–1986, 1987–1989), and was best known for the two years as the last Commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan. Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, crossing on foot the Friendship Bridge spanning the Amu-Daria river on 15 February 1989, the day the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan was completed. He received the highest military award – the golden star of the Hero of the Soviet Union after Operation Magistral had lifted the siege of the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan. After the Afghan war, he was chosen as a candidate for Vice President by the Communist Party in the Russian presidential election of 1991 (the candidate for President was former Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov ). He served as First Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation. In 1994 Gromov retired from the Russian Military Forces, and was soon appointed deputy Interior Minister. He was elected in 1995 to the State Duma, lower house of Russian parliament.

In January 2000 he was elected governor of the Moscow region and re-elected in December 2003.

Honours and awards 2nd class (6 November 2003) - for outstanding contribution to strengthening Russian statehood, and socio-economic development of the region 3rd class 4th class (7 November 2008) - for outstanding contribution to the socio-economic development of the Moscow region and many years of fruitful work Hero of the Soviet Union Medal "For merits in perpetuating the memory of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland" (Russian Ministry of Defence, 2008) - for his great personal contribution to the commemoration of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland, the establishment of names of the dead and the fate of missing servicemen, displaying high moral and business qualities, diligence and intelligent initiative, to assist in the task of perpetuating the memory of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise , 5th class (Ukraine, 7 November 2003) Medal "10 Years of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" Order of Friendship of Peoples (Belarus) (22 November 2005) - for his significant contribution to the development of economic, scientific-technological and cultural ties between Belarus and Moscow Oblast of the Russian Federation Medal

 "In memory of the 10th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan" (Belarus, 13 February 2003) - for his great personal contribution to the development and strengthening of cooperation between movements of Afghan War Veterans of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation [56] [57] Medal "Fidelity" (Afghanistan, 17 November 1988) Order of St.

Prince Vladimir Equal , 1st class (Russian Orthodox Church, 2008) - in consideration of special services for the Moscow diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church and the 65th anniversary of the birth Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal November 02, 2009 11:31 AM Share Email to a Friend Print Twenty years have passed since the Soviet Union ended its disastrous military venture in Afghanistan. Some Soviet veterans were traumatized by the war and refuse to talk about it, others reflect on the experience and draw lessons they say apply to NATO forces that have been fighting Afghan rebels since 2001. On February 15, 1989, Commanding General Boris Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, walking across the Friendship Bridge that connected that war-torn country with what was then Soviet Uzbekistan. Nearly 15,000 soldiers, advisors, and other Soviet officials died during the war that Moscow launched in December 1979. Today, Gromov is convinced there are no military solutions to political problems in Afghanistan. He spoke at a recent Moscow news conference.

Gromov says force will accomplish nothing in Afghanistan, and notes that increasing or decreasing troop strength will only bring a negative result. The general says the best way to deal with Afghans is to reach an agreement with them. General Gromov says the mission of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was never to achieve a military victory, but to help that country's pro-Soviet leaders fight drug trafficking and to defend Afghan pipelines, roads and cities against terrorist attacks. It is a justification rejected by the United States and much of the international community, which saw the invasion as aggressive attempt to expand Moscow's influence. And independent observers note the Afghanistan's drug trade did not affect the USSR, nor did the country have any pipelines that needed protection in 1979. Anti-Soviet Afghan rebels, known as the Mujahedeen, received some of their weapons from the United States. The irony that some of those rebels joined the Taliban and now fight against U.S. forces is not lost on General Gromov, who especially condemns America's Stinger missile. The Mujahedeen used this shoulder-fired weapon to devastating effect against Soviet aviation.

Independent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer notes that unlike the Mujahedeen, the Taliban today are not supplied by any foreign government, which could have a bearing on NATO's chances to reach an agreement with their enemy. Felgenhauer says the Mujahedeen fielded the fighters, but were backed by China, Saudi Arabia and primarily the United States, which supplied them with modern weapons. The Taliban, he says, are not supported by any major country, but rather by certain non-state elements in Pakistan and by al-Qaida. He notes that General Gromov fought on a Cold War military front, which precluded victory or an agreement with his Afghan enemy. Felgenhauer says agreement is now possible, but warns it will not necessarily happen. A complicating factor today, he says, is Afghanistan's burgeoning drug trade, which is funding the Taliban. This, he says, forces NATO to fight opium farmers and increases popular opposition to the alliance. Dmitri Popov fought during the last two years of the Afghan War, beginning as a private and ending as a master sergeant. Today, he heads an Afghan veterans group in Moscow.

He says that despite excellent armaments and troop morale, Soviet forces could not overcome the psychology of ordinary Afghans. Popov says Afghans had a different mission - to defend their liberty against all others. The Afghans, he says, think, "We have lived here for ages; many have tried to conquer us, to impose their faith or culture on us - but we do not need that. We want to live the way we have lived. We want to plow with oxen. We do not need technology or tractors." Dmitri Popov and General Gromov are skeptical of NATO success in that country. The general says it would be better if Russia, the United States and other countries cooperated on a peaceful solution to Afghanistan. Gromov says good relations with Afghanistan should be developed by an entire coalition of countries, including the United States. He says that together, all sides can pursue relations in Afghanistan that would end military fighting and give the country a chance to develop. But analyst Pavel Felgenhauer says Moscow's offer comes at a price.

Felgenhauer says Russia is prepared to help Americans, but only its own terms, in other words, the United States would need to recognize Moscow's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region. The analyst says this would include a Russian veto on Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, and would require Moscow's approval for developing Western military infrastructure in Romania and the Baltics or deploying a U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden told the Munich Security Conference on February 7th the United States would not recognize any Russian sphere of influence. At the same time, Biden noted that Russia warned long ago about the rising threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. He added that NATO and Russia can and should cooperate to defeat this common enemy. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama says the United States will continue to work for a stable Afghanistan that is not a haven for terrorists. He plans to increase U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan and has ordered a strategic review to make sure American goals in that country are clear and achievable. Among those goals is a broader policy that does not focus solely on the military aspect.

Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal By Peter Fedynsky Moscow 11 February 2009 Twenty years have passed since the Soviet Union ended its disastrous military venture in Afghanistan. Some Soviet veterans were traumatized by the war and refuse to talk about it, others reflect on the experience and draw lessons they say apply to NATO forces that have been fighting Afghan rebels since 2001. On February 15, 1989, Commanding General Boris Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, walking across the Friendship Bridge that connected that war-torn country with what was then Soviet Uzbekistan. Nearly 15,000 soldiers, advisors, and other Soviet officials died during the war that Moscow launched in December 1979. Today, Gromov is convinced there are no military solutions to political problems in Afghanistan. He spoke at a recent Moscow news conference. Gromov says force will accomplish nothing in Afghanistan, and notes that increasing or decreasing troop strength will only bring a negative result. The general says the best way to deal with Afghans is to reach an agreement with them.

General Gromov says the mission of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was never to achieve a military victory, but to help that country's pro-Soviet leaders fight drug trafficking and to defend Afghan pipelines, roads and cities against terrorist attacks. It is a justification rejected by the United States and much of the international community, which saw the invasion as aggressive attempt to expand Moscow's influence. And independent observers note the Afghanistan's drug trade did not affect the USSR, nor did the country have any pipelines that needed protection in 1979. Anti-Soviet Afghan rebels, known as the Mujahedeen, received some of their weapons from the United States. The irony that some of those rebels joined the Taliban and now fight against U.S. forces is not lost on General Gromov, who especially condemns America's Stinger missile. The Mujahedeen used this shoulder-fired weapon to devastating effect against Soviet aviation. Independent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer notes that unlike the Mujahedeen, the Taliban today are not supplied by any foreign government, which could have a bearing on NATO's chances to reach an agreement with their enemy.

Felgenhauer says the Mujahedeen fielded the fighters, but were backed by China, Saudi Arabia and primarily the United States, which supplied them with modern weapons. The Taliban, he says, are not supported by any major country, but rather by certain non-state elements in Pakistan and by al-Qaida. He notes that General Gromov fought on a Cold War military front, which precluded victory or an agreement with his Afghan enemy. Felgenhauer says agreement is now possible, but warns it will not necessarily happen. A complicating factor today, he says, is Afghanistan's burgeoning drug trade, which is funding the Taliban. This, he says, forces NATO to fight opium farmers and increases popular opposition to the alliance. Dmitri Popov fought during the last two years of the Afghan War, beginning as a private and ending as a master sergeant. Today, he heads an Afghan veterans group in Moscow. He says that despite excellent armaments and troop morale, Soviet forces could not overcome the psychology of ordinary Afghans. Popov says Afghans had a different mission - to defend their liberty against all others.

The Afghans, he says, think, "We have lived here for ages; many have tried to conquer us, to impose their faith or culture on us - but we do not need that. We want to live the way we have lived. We want to plow with oxen. We do not need technology or tractors." Dmitri Popov and General Gromov are skeptical of NATO success in that country. The general says it would be better if Russia, the United States and other countries cooperated on a peaceful solution to Afghanistan. Gromov says good relations with Afghanistan should be developed by an entire coalition of countries, including the United States. He says that together, all sides can pursue relations in Afghanistan that would end military fighting and give the country a chance to develop. But analyst Pavel Felgenhauer says Moscow's offer comes at a price. Felgenhauer says Russia is prepared to help Americans, but only its own terms, in other words, the United States would need to recognize Moscow's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region.

The analyst says this would include a Russian veto on Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, and would require Moscow's approval for developing Western military infrastructure in Romania and the Baltics or deploying a U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden told the Munich Security Conference on February 7th the United States would not recognize any Russian sphere of influence. At the same time, Biden noted that Russia warned long ago about the rising threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. He added that NATO and Russia can and should cooperate to defeat this common enemy. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama says the United States will continue to work for a stable Afghanistan that is not a haven for terrorists. He plans to increase U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan and has ordered a strategic review to make sure American goals in that country are clear and achievable. Among those goals is a broader policy that does not focus solely on the military aspect.

NEWSLETTER Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal - Wikisource, the free online library Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal From Wikisource 1041658Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet WithdrawalVoice of America2009 Twenty years have passed since the Soviet Union ended its disastrous military venture in Afghanistan. Some Soviet veterans were traumatized by the war and refuse to talk about it, others reflect on the experience and draw lessons they say apply to NATO forces that have been fighting Afghan rebels since 2001. On February 15, 1989, Commanding General Boris Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, walking across the Friendship Bridge that connected that war-torn country with what was then Soviet Uzbekistan. Nearly 15,000 soldiers, advisors, and other Soviet officials died during the war that Moscow launched in December 1979. Today, Gromov is convinced there are no military solutions to political problems in Afghanistan. He spoke at a recent Moscow news conference. Gromov says force will accomplish nothing in Afghanistan, and notes that increasing or decreasing troop strength will only bring a negative result.

The general says the best way to deal with Afghans is to reach an agreement with them. General Gromov says the mission of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was never to achieve a military victory, but to help that country's pro-Soviet leaders fight drug trafficking and to defend Afghan pipelines, roads and cities against terrorist attacks. It is a justification rejected by the United States and much of the international community, which saw the invasion as aggressive attempt to expand Moscow's influence. And independent observers note the Afghanistan's drug trade did not affect the USSR, nor did the country have any pipelines that needed protection in 1979. Anti-Soviet Afghan rebels, known as the Mujahedeen, received some of their weapons from the United States. The irony that some of those rebels joined the Taliban and now fight against U.S. forces is not lost on General Gromov, who especially condemns America's Stinger missile. The Mujahedeen used this shoulder-fired weapon to devastating effect against Soviet aviation. Independent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer notes that unlike the Mujahedeen, the Taliban today are not supplied by any foreign government, which could have a bearing on NATO's chances to reach an agreement with their enemy.

Felgenhauer says the Mujahedeen fielded the fighters, but were backed by China, Saudi Arabia and primarily the United States, which supplied them with modern weapons. The Taliban, he says, are not supported by any major country, but rather by certain non-state elements in Pakistan and by al-Qaida. He notes that General Gromov fought on a Cold War military front, which precluded victory or an agreement with his Afghan enemy. Felgenhauer says agreement is now possible, but warns it will not necessarily happen. A complicating factor today, he says, is Afghanistan's burgeoning drug trade, which is funding the Taliban. This, he says, forces NATO to fight opium farmers and increases popular opposition to the alliance. Dmitri Popov fought during the last two years of the Afghan War, beginning as a private and ending as a master sergeant. Today, he heads an Afghan veterans group in Moscow. He says that despite excellent armaments and troop morale, Soviet forces could not overcome the psychology of ordinary Afghans. Popov says Afghans had a different mission - to defend their liberty against all others.

The Afghans, he says, think, "We have lived here for ages; many have tried to conquer us, to impose their faith or culture on us - but we do not need that. We want to live the way we have lived. We want to plow with oxen. We do not need technology or tractors." Dmitri Popov and General Gromov are skeptical of NATO success in that country. The general says it would be better if Russia, the United States and other countries cooperated on a peaceful solution to Afghanistan. Gromov says good relations with Afghanistan should be developed by an entire coalition of countries, including the United States. He says that together, all sides can pursue relations in Afghanistan that would end military fighting and give the country a chance to develop. But analyst Pavel Felgenhauer says Moscow's offer comes at a price. Felgenhauer says Russia is prepared to help Americans, but only its own terms, in other words, the United States would need to recognize Moscow's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region.

The analyst says this would include a Russian veto on Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, and would require Moscow's approval for developing Western military infrastructure in Romania and the Baltics or deploying a U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden told the Munich Security Conference on February 7th the United States would not recognize any Russian sphere of influence. At the same time, Biden noted that Russia warned long ago about the rising threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. He added that NATO and Russia can and should cooperate to defeat this common enemy. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama says the United States will continue to work for a stable Afghanistan that is not a haven for terrorists. He plans to increase U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan and has ordered a strategic review to make sure American goals in that country are clear and achievable. Among those goals is a broader policy that does not focus solely on the military aspect. Former Soviets Left Behind in Afghanistan | Far Outliers Former Soviets Left Behind in Afghanistan The Argus links to a poignant story on IWPR about Soviet soldiers who remained behind in Afghanistan.

On February 15, 1989, General Boris Gromov was officially the last Soviet soldier to stand on Afghan soil before he crossed the Termez bridge into the USSR, drawing a close to the long and brutal campaign that Russian politicians were later to call “a tragic mistake”. But Gennady, and more like him, were still there. As Russians, Ukrainians and the rest began shutting off from the Afghan war as a nightmare best forgotten, those who were left behind faded from memory, too. Many would find it hard to go back – some were deserters, while others converted to Islam after being captured and held by the mujahedin. In the interim, the Soviet Union they had known collapsed into 15 different countries. A few achieved some fame – notably the two Russian citizens known as Mohammadi and Islamuddin who served as bodyguards to the famous commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. As late as 1996, they were rumoured to be at the front line, fighting with Massoud’s Northern Alliance against the Taleban. Since then the two men are said to have left Afghanistan, going back home to Russia. But others remain.

During a recent trip to Kunduz, a taxi driver tipped me off about someone called Ahmad, a former Soviet soldier now living as an Afghan. This was far more than a rumour – I was given the address of the building where he rents a small room with his family. Only half an hour later, I was sitting in a local store talking to a man in the typical flat “pakol” hat, with all the mannerisms and dialects of a native Afghan – but still looking like a Russian. He looked so intimidating that I didn’t dare speak to him in Russian, switching over only after an initial conversation in Dari. When I asked him what name his parents had given him, his face remained immobile as he whispered an Islamic invocation. But after a long conversation in the dark, mud-walled room, Ahmad relaxed, and gradually revealed some of the characteristics of the young man he had once been – Private Alexander Levenets. The incongruousness of the situation was accentuated by the music he put on – Alexander Rosenbaum’s Soviet-era ballads of army life. The 19-year-old Alexander, from the Ukrainian village of Melovadka, joined the Soviet army in April 1983.

He thought his troubles were over, that he had a ticket out of a hard life of providing for his blind widowed mother and an elder brother with diabetes. At first army life was good, as his unit was transferred around the USSR and eventually deployed at an airbase in Kunduz. But things took a turn for the worse as – like many Soviet conscripts – he was subjected to beatings and other forms of humiliation by other, more senior soldiers in his unit. Eventually he could bear it no longer, and deserted. One cold October night in 1984, Alexander fled into the night. His life was saved by a kindly old Afghan, who took pity on him and allowed him to hide at his house. The man introduced the deserter to some mujahedin, who fortunately for him belonged to one of the more moderate factions. They listened sympathetically to his story, and treated him with a respect he had not had from his countrymen. “I stayed in the group,” he said. “And after a month, I accepted Islam.” So Alexander became Ahmad, serving under guerrilla commander Omir Ghulam – but not expected to take up arms against the army he had once served in.

The Afghans’ acceptance of him grew into respect as he became a more observant Muslim than most of them. Share this:

Question: General Boris Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave where in 1989?
Answer: Afghanistan