Blitzkrieg - World War II - HISTORY.com Google Conventional wisdom traces blitzkrieg, “lightning war,” to the development in Germany between 1918 and 1939 of a body of doctrine using mobility to prevent repetition of the attritional deadlock of World War I . Soldiers such as Hans von Seeckt and Heinz Guderian allegedly perceived more clearly than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe the military potential of the internal-combustion engine combined with modern communications technology. Large formations moving on tracks and wheels, directed by radios, could rupture an enemy’s front and so disorganize its rear that countermeasures would be paralyzed. First tested in Poland, the concept reached perihelion in France and the Low Countries in 1940, when in less than six weeks the German army crushed the combined forces of four nations. Applied a year later against the Soviet Union, blitzkrieg purportedly brought the Wehrmacht to the gates of Moscow in six months. Some accounts insist that only Adolf Hitler’s incompetent interference tipped the war’s balance so far against Germany that even blitzkrieg’s most sophisticated refinements could do no more than stave off the Reich’s collapse.

Seldom in the history of military thought have such elaborate interpretive structures been built on a more limited foundation. The term blitzkrieg was in fact never used in the title of a German military manual or handbook. Nor is it to be widely found in the memoirs or correspondence of German generals. The word was used in the Wehrmacht during World War II but was commonly considered to be of foreign origin. Guderian wrote in Panzer Leader that “our enemies coined the word.” The first known use of the word blitzkrieg in an English publication occurred in an article in Time magazine in September 25, 1939, discussing the Polish campaign. From there the word came into general circulation as a shorthand description of a form of war that seemed to have no convenient existing frame of reference. From Western sources it expanded into German popular military literature, and from there into history. The transmission process was facilitated by the British theorists J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, who insisted that their concepts of mobile war were fundamental to the German victories of 1939-1941. Reality is at once more limited and more complex.

On one level, mobile warfare was a faute de mieux improvisation that arose from the restrictions on conventional forces stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles . The German high command in the 1920s and 1930s also sought inspiration for the future in its own past–specifically in the ideas of Helmuth Karl von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen. Tanks, aircraft, and motor trucks were regarded as force multipliers facilitating traditional operational approaches. The aim of German military planners in both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich was to achieve victory by enveloping enemy armies, threatening their lines of supply and communications, and forcing them to fight in an unexpected direction. The anticipated result would be quick, decisive victories for a state that since the days of Frederick the Great had been convinced of its inability to win a drawn-out war of attrition. These concepts remained tactical and operational. Grand-strategic and economic planning in Adolf Hitler’s Reich were not shaped by a doctrine of lightning war. A familiar argument is that Nazi Germany deliberately rearmed in breadth rather than depth, proposing to tailor its force mix to specific situations in the context of a diplomatic strategy designed to keep Germany’s enemies isolated from one another.

However, no significant data support such a grand design. Instead, the best evidence indicates that Hitler sought rearmament in both breadth and depth, with an economy oriented to military needs as completely as possible. Instead, far from coordinating their specific preparations, the army, navy, and air force competed so intensely for scarce raw materials that as early as 1938 their demands seriously overheated the ramshackle Nazi economy. Throughout the war the Wehrmacht’s inability to cooperate internally was one of Germany’s most significant military weaknesses–a far cry from the smoothly working machine that is the essence of blitzkrieg in popular myths. Revisionism must not be taken to extremes. German operational successes in the early years of World War II were by no means the product of sheer good fortune. But neither did they reflect a coherent, planned approach to the diplomatic, economic, and military challenges that after 1918 confronted a state unwilling to accept the consequences of its defeat in World War I. What are commonly called blitzkrieg operations developed out of experiences gained on the field between 1939 to 1941. In that sense blitzkrieg is best understood as a post facto construction for explaining a complex structure of events and ideas.

The Reader’s Companion to Military History. Edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. Copyright © 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. Tags Blitzkrieg - History Learning Site Blitzkrieg Citation: C N Trueman "Blitzkrieg" historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 14 May 2015. 16 Aug 2016. Blitzkrieg means “lightning war”. It was an innovative military technique first used by the Germans in World War Two and was a tactic based on speed and surprise. Blitzkrieg relied on a military force be based around light tank units supported by planes and infantry (foot soldiers). The tactic was based on Alfred von Schlieffen’s ‘Schlieffen Plan’ – this was a doctrine formed during WWI that focused on quick miliatry victory. It was later developed in Germany by an army officer called Heinz Guderian who looked at new technologies, namely dive bombers and light tanks, to improve the German army’s manoeuvrability. Guderian had written a military pamphlet called “Achtung Panzer” which got into the hands of Hitler .

As a tactic it was used to devastating effect in the first years of World War Two and resulted in the British and French armies being pushed back in just a few weeks to the beaches of Dunkirk . It was also pivotal in the German army’s devastation of Russian forces when they advanced through Russia in June 1941 . Hitler had spent four years in World War One fighting a static war with neither side moving far for months on end. He was enthralled by Guderian’s plan that was based purely on speed and movement. When Guderian told Hitler that he could reach the French coast in weeks if an attack on France was ordered, fellow officers openly laughed at him. The German High Command told Hitler that his “boast” was impossible. General Busch said to Guderian, “Well, I don’t think that you’ll cross the River Meuse in the first place.” The River Meuse was considered France’s first major line of defence and it was thought of as being impossible to cross in a battle situation.

Blitzkrieg was based on speed, co-ordination and movement; the major science of this approach was the ability to get large mobile forces through weak points in the enemies defences and then cause damage when behind his static lines. With large formations cut off from communication and logistics, pressure could then be put on interior defences. Its aim was to create panic amongst the civilian population. A civil population on the move can be absolute havoc for a defending army trying to get its forces to the war front. With so much focus placed on the frontline, if this could be penetrated then the ensuing doubt, confusion and rumour were sure to paralyse both the government and the defending military. “Speed, and still more speed, and always speed was the secret……..and that demanded audacity, more audacity and always audacity.” Major General Fuller Once a strategic target had been selected, Stuka dive bombers were sent in to ‘soften’ up the enemy, destroy all rail lines, communication centres and major rail links. This was done as the German tanks were approaching and the planes withdrew only at the last minute so that the enemy did not have time to recover their senses when the tanks attacked supported by infantry.

Most troops were moved by half-track vehicles so there was no real need for roads though these were repaired so that they could be used by the Germans at a later date. Once a target had been taken, the Germans did not stop to celebrate victory; they moved on to the next target. Retreating civilians hindered any work done by the army being attacked. Those civilians fleeing the fighting were also attacked to create further mayhem. How effective was Blitzkrieg? In 1941 , a diary kept by an unknown French soldier was found.

In it are some interesting comments that help us understand why this tactic was so successful : “When the dive-bombers come down, they (the French) stood it for two hours and then ran with their hands over their ears.”“Sedan fell as a result of a bombardment……….it was a superb example of military surprise.” “The pace is too fast……it’s the co-operation between the dive-bombers and the tanks that is winning the war for Germany.” “News that the Germans are in Amiens………this is like some ridiculous nightmare.” All the above were written in a period of just 5 days : May 15th 1940 to May 19th 1940. Moreover, one of the key successes of the Blitzkrieg was its use of FM radios – these enabled the forces that had broken through the lines to inform support units as to their progress and relay information on what was behind enemy lines. This superior intelligence was a crucial tool at the German’s disposal and allowed them to perform far more organised assaults on the enemy. The communication technology promoted quick, decentralised decision-making that was key to this speed focused approach.

Why were the armies of Europe caught so badly prepared by this tactic? The Blitzkrieg was fundamentally about moving away from the tried and tested methods of modern warfare and creating a new, more effective doctrine. To that end, Hitler had given his full backing to Guderian . Ironically, he had got his idea for Blitzkrieg from two officers – one from France and one from Britain and he had copied and broadened what they had put on paper. In Britain and France, however, the cavalry regiments ruled supreme and they were adamant that the tanks would not get any influence in their armies. The High Commands of both countries were dominated by the old traditional cavalry regiments and their political pull was great. These were the type of officers despised by Hitler and he took to his Panzer officer, Guderian, over the old officers that were in the German Army (the Wehrmacht). In 1940 , Britain and France still had a World War One mentality. What tanks they had were poor compared to the German Panzers . British and French tactics were outdated and Britain still had the mentality that as an island they were safe as our navy would protect us.

Nazi Germany , if it was to fulfill Hitler’s wishes, had to have a modern military tactic if it was to conquer Europe and give to Germany the ‘living space’ that Hitler deemed was necessary for the Third Reich. It was used to devastating effect in Poland , western Europe where the Allies were pushed back to the beaches of Dunkirk and in the attack on Russia – Operation Barbarossa . Lightning war - definition of Lightning war by The Free Dictionary Lightning war - definition of Lightning war by The Free Dictionary n. A swift, sudden military offensive, usually by combined air and mobile land forces. [German : Blitz, lightning (from Middle High German blitze, from bliczen, to flash, from Old High German blekkazzen; see bhel-1 in the Appendix of Indo-European roots) + Krieg, war (from Middle High German kriec, from Old High German krēg, stubbornness; see gwerə-1 in the Appendix of Indo-European roots).] blitzkrieg (ˈblɪtsˌkriːɡ) n (Military) a swift intensive military attack, esp using tanks supported by aircraft, designed to defeat the opposition quickly [C20: from German: lightning war] blitz n.

1. a sudden, swift, and overwhelming military attack, usu. using tanks and aerial bombardment. 2. the Blitz, the intensive aerial bombing of British cities by the Germans in 1940–41. 3. any swift, vigorous attack, barrage, or defeat. 4. Football. a direct charge upon the passer as soon as the ball is snapped. 5. a shutout in gin rummy. v.t. Blitzkrieg | Define Blitzkrieg at Dictionary.com blitzkrieg noun, verb (used with object) 1. blitz (defs 1, 2, 5). Origin of blitzkrieg 1935-40; < German, equivalent to Blitz lightning + Krieg war Dictionary.com Unabridged Examples from the Web for blitzkrieg Expand Contemporary Examples Or, in Professor Gates' case, I can't decide whether to politely ask you to leave my house, or threaten to blitzkrieg your career. Shock and Awe Harlan K. Ullman British Dictionary definitions for blitzkrieg Expand noun 1.

a swift intensive military attack, esp using tanks supported by aircraft, designed to defeat the opposition quickly Word Origin C20: from German: lightning war Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition © William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © HarperCollins Publishers 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012 Word Origin and History for blitzkrieg Expand n. "rapid attack," 1939, from German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz "lightning" (from Middle High German blicze, back-formation from bliczen "to flash," from Old High German blecchazzen "to flash, lighten" (8c.), from Proto-Germanic *blikkatjan, from PIE root *bhel- (1) "to shine, flash, burn;" see bleach (v.)) + Krieg "war" (see kriegspiel ).

Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2010 Douglas Harper Urban Dictionary: BlitzKrieg BlitzKrieg "Lightning war" Blitzkrieg was used by the German war machine in the 1930's where the enemy's military power is assessed and then bettered. Blitzkrieg starts with air raids, followed bylong range artillery, which is closely followed by mobilzed armour divisions. Foot soldiers then progress and swarm the enemy, intimidating them to give up. Focus would go onto a particular point of weakness in the enemies' lines, and the point would be ceaselessly hounded until broke, so that the full force could rush it and destroy command lines and use automatic weapons on all those that ran to aid this breakage. The fundamentals of blitzkrieg were -for everyone to follow their instinct, rather than accept orders from the highest and go down the chain, which allowed the warfare to be -highly momentous, unlike World war one, where a stalemate was reached. Blitzkrieg relied heavily on communication, and exploited the radio fully. BlitzKrieg is adapted and used today against the enemies of industrialised nations.

blitzkrieg When one partner is crouched atop another during sexual intercourse, a third party enters the room in an erect state and quickly enters and exits the anus of the person on top. Before the blitzkrieged person can turn around, the third party has disapeared from view. The partner on top is left in a confused state wondering what hit her/him, very similar to the powers of Poland, Holland, Belgium, France and Russia at the outset of the Second World War. Jess was riding Dave when suddenly she felt a violent and intense splitting of her butt cheeks as if a division of Panzers charged through. She paused for a moment, noticed her and Dave were alone in the room, and continued sex without bringing it up. Jake walked away after the most successful blitzkrieg yet. blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg is a type of pornographic videos that begins with a minute of conversation between three to half dozen women in a room. All of a sudden approximately 30 burly naked men enter the room from all entrances yelling 'Blitzkrieg' and proceed to pillaging the women to the music of heavy metal.

Certainly there are more penises than orifices so it often involves simultaneous penetrations, prodding and rapid-fire ejaculations. This lasts an average of about 2 minutes and 35 seconds to the point when the women are usually passed out in a pool of their own blood. The mob of men then storm out the room onwards to their next conquest. This type of porn usually recreates historical battles. Blitzkrieg type porn are fun and educational. Blitzkrieg Used by the German military and later used by Allied Forces. The name means "lightning war". The concept of Blitzkrieg is "the art of concentrating strength at one point, forcing a breakthrough, rolling up and securing the flanks on either side, and then penetrating like lightning deep into his rear, before the enemy has time to react" (Erwin Rommel). This type of military attack involves mainly armor. Air supremacy is also required for blitzkrieg and many generals such as Erwin Rommel are well known for perfecting this type of battle. On May 10, 1940 1940 German forces invaded through the Low Countries and the Ardenne Forest completing surrounding Allied Forces.

The German blitzkrieg forced the Allies to surrenderer on June 22, 1940 astounding the world at the defeat of France and Britain. Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg The successful German tactic of rapidly advancing armored forces and massive air support In German, Blitzkrieg means lightning war (Blitz-Krieg). Blitzkrieg was named so because it included surprise attacks, "Lighting fast" rapid advances into enemy territory, with coordinated massive air attacks, which struck and shocked the enemy as if it was struck by lightning. The German military in World War 2 achieved most of its great victories with the Blitzkrieg tactic. The development of Blitzkrieg World War 1 (1914-18) was a long static trench war in which artillery and machine guns made mobile ground warfare almost impossible, suicidal, for both infantry and Cavalry. The element of fire, from the machine guns and artillery, totally neutralized the element of maneuver, at least for the vulnerable infantry and Cavalry. But during the war, two new revolutionary weapon systems were invented and saw initial combat use, the armored tank, and the combat aircraft.

Relative to the infantry and Cavalry, both were almost invulnerable to machine gun and artillery fire. In addition to that, their growth potential as powerful motorized vehicles was about to revolutionize warfare. After the war, various military establishments gave various levels of attention to further study and developing these new powerful weapons, and to the new possibilities of combining their potential with other weapons. In maritime powers the aircraft was integrated with large ships to create the aircraft carrier, which thanks to its much greater strike range totally outclassed the big guns battleships which dominated the seas for centuries. In Russia, with its vast distances, a gigantic force of paratroopers was established to give infantry a whole new mobility, and a huge fleet of light fast tanks was established to give the military new mobility over the vast land. In Britain, well armored "Infantry tanks" were developed to provide the infantry with mobile fire support, and lighter "Cruiser tanks" were developed to replace the obsolete Cavalry. Other armies, like in France and Poland, remained conservatively stuck in the previous war. France spent its defense budget on building a mighty line of super-trenches, the Maginot line, with huge fortifications, underground bunkers and tunnels, and heavy but totally stationary artillery.

The Polish army's main mobile force remained the obsolete Cavalry. Both spent much too little budget and thought on their air forces. The German military, bound by severe post-war limitations, was practically forced to develop the most efficient new tactics, which naturally involved using tanks and aircraft for mobile ground warfare. It also learned from and improved over the ideas of British military theoreticians, mainly Basil Liddell-Hart, which openly published their new ideas about fast and deep armor advancement as the future combat tactic. Very early in the 1920s, General von Seeckt, the head of the German military, wrote that the future of warfare will be in operating smaller but highly mobile high quality forces which would be made even more efficient by support from aircraft. In 1929, a German infantry officer, Heinz Guderian, was assigned to the common German-Russian tank school in Kazan, which was established to allow the Germans to bypass the post-war limitations by training in operating tanks in Russia.

Guderian read the British books about the new principles of tank warfare, and while in Britain Liddell-Hart's ideas were given little military attention, Guderian practically developed them over several years and demonstrated them to his superiors in military exercises and war games. There were two factors which helped Guderian's tactical ideas become dominant in the German military more than in any other military. The 1st factor was that after the defeat in World War 1 there were enough open minds in the German higher ranks ready to examine new ideas. The 2nd factor was that while so many countries conveniently believed in pacifism after the bloodshed of World War 1, Germany's new leader since 1933, Adolf Hitler, intended to go to a major war again, and as soon as possible, and he pushed the German military back in full shape, ignoring the peace treaty's limitations and spending a huge portion of the budget on re-armament. Hitler needed the right tool for his grand war plans, something that would make his future war very different from World War 1, and will fully exploit the German advantages in military professionalism and industry.

Although he was just a Corporal in World War 1, Hitler had good and creative military perception, both tactical and technical, and so when he observed a combined exercise of tanks and motorized infantry led by Guderian shortly after he came to power, he immediately understood that he found his military tool. He said "That's what I need, That's what I want to have". With Hitler's strong support, the tiny German tank and motorized forces began to rapidly expand, and tank development and production was strongly boosted. Guderian himself was rapidly promoted to be the commander of one of the new "Panzer" (armor) divisions, in 1938 he became the commander of the 1st German Panzer Corps, and later that year he became the "Chief of mobile forces", with direct access to Hitler. With his spirit and training, and with large amounts of new modern Blitzkrieg weapons, the German military was getting ready to implement Blitzkrieg in the battle field. The elements and weapons of Blitzkrieg The elements of Blitzkrieg directly obey all the principles of war. That's what made it so successful.

Armor concentrations - the dense concentration of strong firepower, the high mobility, and the survivability of rapidly advancing large groups of tanks were far more than anything seen before it in any ground battlefield in history. It made Cavalry totally obsolete, and made infantry quite helpless in an open battlefield unless they were massively equipped with efficient anti-tank weapons which were developed only in response to Blitzkrieg and really matured only near the end of World War 2. The German tank units were highly trained. Many of them were considered elite units and provided the best soldiers and commanders. The German tanks were the first really efficient battle tanks. In addition to tanks, there were mechanized infantry units which allowed the infantry to advance together with the tanks, providing them better protection from enemy infantry and anti-tank units where they were more vulnerable to it. When infantry fighting vehicles were not available, the infantry used to simply ride over the tanks. Massive precise air support - the effective precision destructiveness made possible by precise aerial bombardment left common artillery far behind. Artillery was also too slow to follow the rapidly advancing tank groups.

So in addition to ordinary artillery, the German military was aided by a very large number of Stuka dive bombers which could quickly and efficiently destroy the enemy obstacles in the tanks path (artillery units, fortifications, infantry concentrations, bridges, convoys, etc). Paratroopers were another type of air support, which could be used were key targets had to be quickly captured, not destroyed. One of their common tasks in Blitzkrieg was capturing key bridges, in order to prevent the enemy from destroying them, and allow the advancing tanks to reach them and rapidly cross without delay. Radio - while the French High Command in 1940 was not even equipped with radio, it was radio communications in each tank each aircraft and each unit which allowed the German commanders to control their forces so effectively, and to utilize their air support so destructively and efficiently. Radio allowed German Blitzkrieg commanders to rapidly advance with their forces, see the battlefield with their eyes, not just on the map, and achieve much greater control of the situation and much better use their forces. Radio also enabled the German senior commanders to efficiently control huge mobile forces, more than ever before in history, allowing large scale cooperation and effective unity of command.

Flexibility - the German armor commander didn't have to follow a particular road or path. Their tactical freedom, provided by their superior mobility and quick response air support, allowed them to rapidly advance along the path of least resistance, much like water do in a flood, or to produce one, with the superior firepower of their tank guns and air support. This also allowed them to press on with little casualties, allowing them to maintain their thrust and effectiveness and advance further. Initiative and surprise - the sheer speed and power of rapidly advancing forces and heavy bombardment in its territory, especially when it comes without warning, can easily shock every enemy. Persisting with that is even more devastating, and that's what the Germans did. They rapidly encircled massive enemy forces, cut supply lines, and made other large units collapse and lose their morale. Simplicity - there was nothing complex in Blitzkrieg. It was a simple tactic made possible thanks to revolutionary modern weapons which made this type of warfare possible - the tank, the aircraft, and the radio.

As with many other weapons and tactics, it could be greatly intensified with quality, and indeed with Cavalry-spirit commanders like Guderian and Rommel, with highly trained or combat experienced soldiers, and with excellent weapons as the Panzer IV and the Stuka dive bomber, the Germans were able to achieve amazing victories with Blitzkrieg. Later during the war the Germans were eventually matched by equal armor commanders like Patton and Zhukov. Their tanks were outclassed by the Russian T-34 which was perhaps the best tank in World War 2. And the Stuka dive bomber was matched by superb tactical support aircraft like the Russian Il-2 Sturmovik which was the most armored aircraft in World War 2, and later by a new breed of American and British multi-role fighter-bombers. Air superiority - is a supporting element, but a critical one. If the enemy has it, Blitzkrieg becomes impossible, as Rommel and other German commanders found out later during the war. Logistics - is another critical supporting element which the Germans neglected, and it was the element which eventually crippled their military.

A relatively short-range and short-time Blitzkrieg in good weather, as the invasions of Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece were, is one thing, and the Germans excelled there. But when they invaded Russia in 1941, the logistical needs they knew before were dwarfed by Russia's huge distances, terribly bad roads, and extreme winter conditions. Instead of so many horses and not enough trucks, the German military greatly needed many tracked vehicles capable of keeping with the tanks, moving both infantry and supplies, but they had much too few of them. Air supply by a fleet of cargo planes could also be helpful, but the Germans lost many of them in their airborne invasion of Crete, and lost many more in an arrogant and futile attempt to air-supply a whole army encircled in Stalingrad instead of allowing it to retreat. In addition to the classic logistic problem of supplying a moving army with large quantities of food water and ammunition, the tanks also required large amounts of fuel and spare parts, and this problem greatly intensified for the Germans as the war progressed and crippled their armor.

Later German tanks, the Tiger and King Tiger, were very technically complex and consumed much more fuel than the earlier Panzers, and so many of them were stuck or even lost because of technical faults and lack of fuel, not by enemy fire. So Blitzkrieg demanded not just tanks but also that they will be highly reliable, have long range, and be properly accompanied by a following mobile fleet of support vehicles of all types. The Germans neglected that less glorious side of war and paid heavily for that. At the later stages of the war the Russian army improved its mobile logistical support so much that its tank units could advance hundreds of miles almost non-stop, sometimes even refueling on the move, and of course relying on the very high technical reliability and simplicity of their vehicles. Blitzkrieg in world World War 2 Blitzkrieg is the basis of modern warfare in the age of the tank, aircraft, and radio, simply because it makes the best military use of their natural advantages in speed and firepower. It obviously achieved the best results against a less modern or less prepared army, but it could also defeat equally equipped armies which used lesser tactics.

In 1939 Blitzkrieg defeated the Polish army, which had obsolete Cavalry instead of tanks and an obsolete Air Force. In 1940 it defeated the French army, which had the necessary weapons (tanks, aircraft, radio), but of lesser quality, and it didn't know how to use it because it totally neglected mobile warfare after World War 1 and didn't have fighting spirit either. In 1941 it defeated the Yugoslav and Greek armies which had the fighting spirit but not the needed weapons for mobile warfare. In 1941 it also defeated the huge Russian army all the way to Moscow, but because of the logistic neglect it was defeated by Russia's endless size and extreme weather. The Russian army had great numbers of tanks and aircraft when the Germans attacked, but most of the tanks were obsolete, and the political mass murder of most senior officers by Stalin's brutal Communist regime before the war and the extreme rigidness it enforced on the surviving officers had paralyzing results. This rigidness also meant that the Russian Air Force totally neglected air superiority in favor of dedicating everything to tactical air support, but this resulted in its almost total destruction, on the ground and in the air.

It took a long time and millions of casualties before Zhukov finally persuaded Stalin to permit reasonable tactical flexibility, in order to allow him, and a new breed of young and tough battle-hardened surviving commanders to fight properly, and by then they were also properly equipped with excellent new weapons like the T-34. In North Africa, Erwin Rommel, which already excelled in the Blitzkrieg invasion of France in 1940, used the same tactics in the desert campaign, but he was crippled by lack of fuel and supplies, by superior enemy air power, and by having too few tanks. In 1944 in France, Patton demonstrated American-style Blitzkrieg, with levels of air support and mobile logistics beyond Guderian's wildest dreams. At the end of 1944, the Germans tried Blitzkrieg one last time, almost at the same place as they did in 1940, but this was just a shadow of their past Blitzkrieg. They had much less tanks, their formidable King Tiger tanks were very short on fuel, they had almost no air support, and they were totally dependent on bad weather to avoid being decimated by allied fighter-bombers.

They advanced, but not significantly, and when the sky finally cleared they were smashed by allied fighter-bombers. Related essays: Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg ▼ Primary Sources ▼ Blitzkrieg The German military strategy of using of fast-moving tanks, with motorized infantry and artillery supported by dive-bombers, and concentrating on one part of the enemy sector, became known as Blitzkrieg (lightning war). The strategy was first put forward by Colonel John Fuller , the chief of staff of the British Tank Corps. Fuller was disappointed with the way tanks were used during the First World War and afterwards produced Plan 1919. This included a call for long-range mass tank attacks with strong air, motorized and artillery support. These ideas were developed in more detail in his books, Reformation of War (1923) and Foundation of the Science of War (1926). Fuller's ideas were ignored by the British Army but was studied in Germany and in 1926 leaders of the the German Army asked the government to commission the production of new tanks that would enable them to use Blitzkrieg tactics in any future conflicts.

As a result of the terms of the Versailles Treaty these new experimental tanks were called tractors. The Light Tractor weighed ten tons and carried a 37mm gun and the Heavy Tractor was a 20-tonner with two turrets, one forward with a 77mm gun, and one at the rear carrying a machine-gun . The Versailles Treaty limited the German Army to a strength of 100,000 men and General Hans von Seeckt , as Chief of Army Command he had the difficult task of maintaining morale of the armed forces. Disliking traditional theories of mass armies and trench warfare, he remolded the army as a mobile shock force of thirty-five divisions. In 1928 Seeckt published Thoughts of a Soldier (1928). In the book Seeckt questioned the value of huge conscript armies. He argued that it was technical science and tactical skill that would win the wars of the future.

He predicted that "the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in the simultaneous mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the attack or for home defence." The Panzer IV Tank played an important role in Blitzkrieg. After Adolf Hitler obtained power in 1933, the German government was open about its tank production. In the spring of 1934 the German Army began developing the Panzer tank. Over the next few years the Panzer I, Panzer II, Panzer III and Panzer IV were produced. During the invasion of Poland in September, 1939, it became clear that the Panzer I was insufficiently armed for battle conditions. Panzer II and Panzer III tanks were reliable but were outgunned. The outstanding performer was the Panzer IV as it had the perfect combination of speed, agility, firepower and reliability. Over the next few years it became the backbone of Blitzkrieg and over 9,000 of these tanks were produced.

However, the the successful resistance of the Red Army in the Soviet Union in 1942 showed that the Panzer IV was no longer invincible. This resulted in the production of the Panther and it eventually became the most popular tank used in Germany. The greatest exponents of Blitzkrieg were the German commanders, Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel . ▲ Main Article ▲ Primary Sources (1) Tom Wintringham fought against the German Army during the Spanish Civil War . He wrote about German military tactics in his book New Ways of War (1940) Blitzkrieg tactics and strategy are almost entirely developed with the idea of escaping from the trench deadlock that held the armies between August, 1914, and March, 1918, and held them again from September, 1939, to April, 1940. We can only grasp the essence of the Blitzkrieg if we realise that it is an opposite to, a reaction against, the war of trenches that otherwise condemns armies to practical uselessness.

From October, 1914, to March, 1917, on the Western Front, position warfare became more and more rigid, immovable, and futile. To "attack" meant to lose twice or three times as many men as your opponent, with no considerable gain in ground, and no decisive effect on anything except, your own cannon-fodder. The armies were locked in solid and continuous lines of trenches, in which they were pounded and obliterated by an even heavier hail of shells. From March, 1917, to March, 1918, position warfare was in full flower, but some of the factors that must lead to its partial decay, its change into a new shape, became apparent. One factor was the tank; another, more important, was a new method of defence - which inevitably developed into its opposite, a new tactical method for infantry advance.

The defensive method was known as "elastic defence" or "defence in depth"; the second developed from it, and adopted because it was a success, was called the tactic of "infiltration in attack." (2) General Hans von Seeckt , Thoughts of a Soldier (1928) In this way a military mass is constituted which, though unsuited to take part in a war of movement and seek a decision in formal battle, is well able to fulfill the duty of home defence, and at the same time to provide from its best dements a continuous reinforcement of the regular, combatant army in the field. In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in the simultaneous mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the attack or for home defence. (3) Major General Sukhov was a tank commander in the Red Army who fought against the German Army during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In their war against the Soviet Union the Germans have applied the methods of mobile attack - a method which has taken root in Fascist tactics.

Hitler relied on the crushing force of his tank divisions accompanied by large numbers of motorized infantry. One hundred and seventy divisions were concentrated in the east for this purpose, of which 60 divisions were composed of mobile troops. The latter included as many as 25 tank divisions. The fact that the Nazi mobile troops were nearly three times the number put in the field against France show that the Nazis intended to rout the Red Army with a lightning blow and achieve a rapid victory. Taking advantage of their surprise attack they gained certain territorial successes, but their calculations on crushing force and the sweeping movement of armoured groups have not been justified. In subsequent operations the movement of these groups was completely stopped in certain directions, and in others it was retarded. During the first days of the war the Red Army used skilful manoeuvre to destroy small and large groups of German tank and motorized troops which had become cut off from their infantry units. One such group of 300 tanks was destroyed by the co-ordinated efforts of Soviet infantry and artillery. It is significant that in this complex operation the destruction of the Fascist tanks was accomplished without the participation of Soviet aircraft or tanks.

Having made a study of the enemy's tactics and knowing his vulnerable spots, the Red Army is in each case using the weapons within its reach. The 39th German Tank Corps engaged in a decisive battle was routed by a powerful blow from Soviet air and tank forces. Tanks, supported by infantry and artillery, participated in the destruction of the 20th Tank Division. Usually the enemy pushes forward large tank units in the directions of major operations. This move is preceded by the operations of general infantry troop formations or by tank troops jointly with motorized infantry, supported by artillery and aircraft to make a breakthrough in the defence lines. Tank divisions are followed by motorized formations. Mobile groups of troops push ahead as far inland as possible, and in their sweeping movement they neither look back nor pay attention to their flanks, irrespective of whether the rest of their troops are following along. Lately the German tank forces have adopted the following method : When the tank units which have pushed on far ahead run short of fuel they dig themselves into the ground, leaving only the gun turrets above the surface. Thus while waiting for the arrival of fuel the tanks are transformed into a kind of fortified post, and the district occupied by the tank unit becomes something of a fortified district.

(4) Hasso Manteuffel was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Heinz Guderian after the war for his book The Other Side of the Hill (1930) Guderian favoured from the beginning the strategic use of panzer forces - a deep thrust into the enemy, without worrying about a possible threat to his own unprotected and far-extended flanks. That was why he planned to transport all supporting elements of the panzer forces (infantry, artillery and engineers) in a similar way - that is, on tracks - and why the supply services (petrol, ammunition, food) were organically incorporated with the fighting troops. This enabled them to accompany, and keep up with the tank core until fused with it - at the same tune assuring Guderian's own supplies for three to five days. It was Guderian - and at first he alone - who introduced the tank to the Army and its use as an operative weapon. It was certainly not the General Staff. During my term in the War Ministry (in the Inspectorate of Panzer Forces) I was well acquainted with Guderian's struggle on behalf of the use of this weapon.

In the best sense of the word, this new weapon bears the stamp of his personality. Its successes during the war are due to him. In peacetime he at first stood alone when he insisted that the 'break-through' of tanks should be pressed long and deep, and at first without regard to exposed flanks. On countless journeys and in countless conferences he injected this idea - even into the actual tank commanders. If Guderian was not always successful in carrying out his theories everywhere during the war, it was due to the struggle against the mistrust of so many elderly officers who knew nothing, or little, about tanks. He was the creator and master-teacher of our Armoured Forces - and I lay particular stress on the word 'master'. (5) Wilhelm von Thoma , commander of 2nd Panzer Division, claimed that there were five main reasons why German tactics were so successful at the beginning of the Second World War . 1. The concentration of all forces on the point of penetration in co-operation with bombers. 2. Exploiting the success of this movement on the roads during the night - as a result, we often gained success by surprise deep in, and behind, the enemy's front. 3.

Insufficient anti-tank defence on the enemy's part, and our own superiority in the air. 4. The fact that the armoured division itself carried enough petrol for 150-200 kilometres - supplemented, if necessary, with supply of petrol to the armoured spearheads by air, dropped in containers by parachute. 5. Carrying rations sufficient for three days in the tanks, for three more days in the regimental supply column, and three more days in the divisional supply column. (6) Tom Wintringham , New Ways of War (1940) One thing admitted by all observers of the German attacks is that they use most of their bombers as a flying artillery. The second thing that enters into the German formula of warfare, all observers agree, is the use of heavy tanks, so powerfully armoured that they are not vulnerable to light anti-tank weapons. The third main factor in the success of the German tactics and strategy is that they have employed and developed the tactics known as "deep infiltration." This means that their army does not attack strung but in a line, and maintaining contact all the time between its advanced units and its main forces.

It does not hit like a fist, but like long probing fingers with armoured finger-nails. Each separate claw seeks a weak spot; if it can drive through this weak spot, it does not worry about its flanks, or about continuous communications with the forces following it. It relies for safety upon surprise, upon the disorganisation of its opponents due to the fact that it has broken through to the rear of their position. (7) Arthur Harris , Bomber Command (1947) The Germans had won their victories in circumstances entirely different from any that we could contemplate for our own forces; they had used their air force against armies which had scarcely any air protection or air support and were very ill-provided with anti-aircraft guns, but this would not be the case if we encountered the German army in the future. Admittedly the specialised army co-operation types of aircraft might be rather more suitable on special occasions than the general-purpose bombers and fighters we were proposing to build, but they could not by themselves gain or maintain air superiority. The German dive-bombers were a case in point.

They were no doubt accurate and alarming when used against undefended troops, but they were so easily shot down by efficient anti-aircraft fire, or, of course, by any normal fighter. (8) Colonel Korotkov of the Red Army , wrote about the German Army and its Blitzkreig tactics in the book, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War (1943) The Soviet Command is countering the German tactic of wedges and pincers by the tactic of flank blows. It is applying the method of crushing one side of the wedge as a result of which the other side loses its force. This is vividly demonstrated in the counter-blow delivered by the Soviet forces on the German 39th Tank Corps. The Nazi corps suffered a defeat and the operation of the German 3rd Tank Group, of which this corps was a part, was deprived of its striking force. Compared with the fighting in France in 1940, what we see here is the reverse process. French resistance weakened as the enemy advanced, whereas the resistance of Soviet troops grows continuously, and their counter-blows become more effective. The result is that the Germans suffer tremendous losses.

In the fighting in the western direction alone over 20 German infantry, panzer and motorized divisions have been smashed or have suffered considerable losses up to August. As the war develops. Soviet troops devise new and successful methods of combating the Fascist tank wedges. A brilliant example of this is provided by the defeat and complete annihilation of some 300 enemy tanks by one Soviet rifle division. Having studied the enemy's tactics, the commander of the division ordered a sham retreat on one sector of the front, boldly allowed the German tank column to advance through his lines and then surrounded and destroyed it by concentrated artillery fire. (9) Lieutenant-General Mishulin of the Red Army fought against the German Army during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. During recent attacks the German tanks have been attempting to operate mainly in small groups: in forces ranging from a company to a battalion, and very rarely in large numbers. This allows them greater flexibility in their operations, permits them to manoeuvre and ensures the possibility of passing rapidly from one form of fighting to another. At the same time, however, this weakens the blows of their tank troops.

Only rarely now does the German Command concentrate larger forces in a frontal attack for a decisive thrust with a large number of mobile forces (several tank divisions) as was the case, for instance, in the Briansk direction. The speed of German tanks has also slowed down. The former tactics of deep "wedges" are practically no longer practised. This is explained by the fact that German tank units now forge ahead of their infantry less resolutely than they did in the early part of the war. They prefer to operate in closer co-operation with the infantry, supported by strong artillery and mine-thrower fire and aircraft. PPT - German Military Tactics- Blitzkrieg PowerPoint Presentation - ID:5084347 -Hitler wanted to conquer whoever he felt was inferior to the “Aryan race” -He wanted “living space” for the Germans, especially in Eastern Europe. War gets declared Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Canada declares war on Germany, Septemeber 10, 1939 Italy declared war on France and Britain on June 10, 1940.

“Blitzkrieg” In German blitzkrieg means “lightning war”. Hitler used blitzkrieg during his invasion of Poland. Blitzkrieg included surprise attacks, rapid advances into enemy territory, and massive air attacks that struck and shocked the enemy. Germany achieved most of its victories in World War II with the Blitzkrieg tactic. Blitzkrieg Britain sent troops to wait with the French down behind the Maginot Line. Reporters called this quiet time of not much action the “phony war” Hitler knows of Maginot line so attacks through Belgium Maginot Line The Maginot Line was a defensive for France against an invasion of Germany. The Maginot Line was established after WW1. The line showed to be little use in 1940 when Germany invaded France for the third time. “Blitzkrieg: German soldiers being parachuted into Holland - May 10, 1940” Early Axis Triumphs In April 1940 the quiet time of the war exploded into action. Hitler launched a series of blitzkrieg. Norway and and Denmark both fell. Germany had overrun the Netherlands and Belgium. Germany along with Italy forced France to surrender.

World War II in 1939/1942 Fall of France Hitler’s Major Blunder The Germans invaded France in May 1940. Retreating Allied forces made it to Dunkirk and found themselves trapped between the advancing Nazis and the English Channel. The British sent every boat they could get across the English Channel to pick up troops off the beaches of Dunkirk. Miracle at Dunkirk The event at Dunkirk is called a miracle because the retreating allies had lost hope and then the British pulled through for them and rescued 338,000 men. June 22, 1940 On June 22, 1940 France signs an armistice (truce) with Germany in occupied France. The Franco-German Armistice divided France into two zones. One zone was under German military occupation and the other was under French control. In 1942 Germans occupied all of France

Question: What German military tactic means "lightning war"?
Answer: Blitzkrieg