Andrew Arbuckle: When unknowns outweigh knowns - The Scotsman Andrew Arbuckle: When unknowns outweigh knowns Donald Rumsfeld's comments could apply to new bill. Picture: AP Photo/Ed Wray ANDREW ARBUCKLE Have your say Long after everyone has forgotten who said it and in what context, former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s comment on there being “known knowns, known unknowns and worst of all unknown unknowns” is still applicable in some modern day situations. His complex strangulation of the English language could easily be applied to the land reform legislation currently going through the Scottish Parliament. Just before they departed on their Christmas holidays, MSPs held a debate on this extremely complex and multi-faceted bill which covers everything from creating a register of who owns land to far-reaching changes in agricultural holdings. Listening to the debate, it was easy to concur with the view of NFU Scotland and Scottish Land & Estates that it would have been better to split the proposed bill into two, with agricultural tenancy matters being dealt with separately.

READ MORE: Fears Land Reform Bill is being rushed through As it is, the whole clamajamphrie will be pushed through in the first 12 weeks of 2016 as this is also the last twelve weeks of a Parliament which closes down at the end of March with MSPs up for election in May. As some of the grey beard politicians who had dealt with the 2003 agricultural tenancy legislation warned, rushing through changes in complex laws needs time and consideration. Some of the errors in that earlier legislation are still bedevilling tenants, landlords and the government more than a decade later. Starting with the known knowns, there will be a Tenant Farming Commissioner to help resolve disputes between landlords and tenants. There is cross party support for establishing this post. There are other known knowns that do not have support across the political divide but which will be enacted courtesy of the government’s majority. Included in this category is the proposal to tax shooting estates. Now to the knowns but which contain unknown elements. Landlords listening to the pre-Christmas debate might have been chilled by the broadsword (sabre?) rattling by some MSPs calling for farm tenants to have an absolute right-to-buy their leased properties.

The unknown element here is just how broad-based is the absolute right-to-buy call. Another piece of the legislation to come under the positive/negative category is the right of a tenant to assign his lease to someone outwith the family or to sell the lease back to the landlord at a premium. These unheralded concepts shocked landowners who may have believed the cabinet secretary’s agricultural holdings review report would form the basis of the government’s position on farm tenancies. The consequences of both are in the unknown category as landlords are already referring to them as breaching their human rights. Then we come to the unknown unknowns. Some of those might emerge when the Scottish Government gets round to publishing its comprehensive response to the proposals in the legislation. Not only had it not managed to publish its views but the minister leading the debate confirmed some hefty pieces of law would be sneaked through as secondary legislation. OK, she did not use the word sneaked, but opposition MSPs took that interpretation. For clarity, the use of secondary legislation allows ministers to push through sections of law without bothering too much about debate.

Thus parts of the most radical changes to land holding in 100 years or more may come into being either through piecemeal additions such as the proposal to allow tenants to assign their tenancies, or it may pass undebated through the use of the legalistic device of secondary legislation. One of the fundamental reasons for establishing the Scottish Parliament was that it would allow time to debate purely Scottish matters. The land reform legislation is an ideal subject for thorough dissection and yet much of it will be decided either outwith the chamber or with limited time within it. Rumsfeld’s comments were uttered in 2002 during the Iraq war. More than a decade later, there are still many unknowns hidden in that warmongering expedition. Will Scotland still be unearthing unintended consequences from a not properly scrutinised Land Reform Bill many years down the line?

Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns, and Unknown Knowns in the South China Sea Disputes | Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns, and Unknown Knowns in the South China Sea Disputes Termsak Chalermpalanupap Former US Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld made semantic history on 12 February 2002 when he gave the profoundly perplexing explanation about “known knowns,” “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” in Iraq. I tend to agree with him that this is a useful conceptual framework for analyzing complex problems. NASA has actually been using it in planning space missions and preparing to cope with risks from known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. I am going to use his brilliant approach to illuminate the complexity of the disputes in the South China Sea. Known Knowns Known knowns are things we know that we know, our general knowledge. The year 2013 saw a relatively calmer situation in the South China Sea. ASEAN and China celebrated the 10th anniversary of their strategic partnership in 2013.

This was an auspicious time for China to show some moderation in the South China Sea. At the same time, ASEAN also celebrated with Japan their 40th anniversary of dialogue partnership. The year-long celebration culminated in the Second Commemorative ASEAN-Japan Summit in Tokyo, 13-14 December. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wanted ASEAN support for its new proactive security role. He did not quite get it when he met ASEAN Leaders at the Tokyo commemorative summit. Most ASEAN Leaders seemed very cautious and wished to see Japan gradually develop its new proactive security role without alarming any of its neighbours in Northeast Asia, particularly China and the North Korea. Nevertheless, the Abe Administration is proceeding with a new strategic plan of “proactive pacifism,” which includes increasing military spending, closer military alliance with the US, and new security ties with ASEAN countries. Japan will extend yen loans to support the strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the acquisition of 10 made-in-Japan coastguard patrol boats to boost the Philippine naval presence in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, the credibility of the US rebalancing to Asia suffered a setback when President Barack Obama had to cancel his trip to Southeast Asia in October because of budget problems in Congress and subsequent government shutdown. However, Congress has recently agreed to a bipartisan budget deal, which will prevent a government shutdown in 2014. This will enable him to go to Myanmar (the Chairman of ASEAN in 2014) for the Second ASEAN-US Summit and the Ninth EAS in Naypyidaw in early November 2014. Myanmar is eager to show that while it is a good neighbour of China, it can also be a new good friend of the US. Myanmar is representing ASEAN in coordinating the ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership from 2013-2015. The growing US military presence in the South China Sea will increase the risk of confrontation with China. The latest near collision incident happened on 5 December involving the USS Cowpens and a Chinese tank-landing ship after the USS Cowpens ignored Chinese demands to stop monitoring a naval exercise led by Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning.

To counter the US rebalancing to Asia and the new Japanese proactive security role, China has stepped up its charm offensive in Southeast Asia, which includes an offer (accepted by ASEAN) to upgrade the 2010 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, and a new treaty on good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation. Known Unknowns More troublesome are things we know that we don’t know, or we don’t know their potential risks. Perhaps the ultimate known unknown is the mind-blogging mystery of our solar system; how it was formed, the origin (or origins?) of life on earth, and where the solar system is heading in the vast cosmos. In the South China Sea, a new known unknown is the Philippines’ legal challenge against China’s 9-dash u-shape line of massive but controversial claims. Without prior consultations with its fellow ASEAN Member States, the Philippines launched in January a legal case against China in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. An arbitral tribunal of five judges has been formed to examine the case, even though China has refused to participate. Several minor or short-term known unknowns can be identified in this legal case. One may not know whether the tribunal will agree it has jurisdiction to further hear the case.

If the tribunal rules that it has no jurisdiction, does it mean China wins and no new legal challenges can be made against China’s 9-dash U-shape line? On the other hand, if the tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction, how it will decide on the several requests made by the Philippines remains unclear. Since China has never officially clarified what its 9-dash U-shape line represents, the tribunal may be unable to pass any judgment on it. Even if the tribunal finds that China has indeed violated the Philippines’ maritime zones or has encroached on islands and reefs that are within the EEZ of the Philippines, how will any decisions against China be carried out? The 9-dash U-shape line is one of the most irritating known unknowns in the South China Sea. Chinese Officials included 11 dashes in the South China Sea on a map published in 1947. Apparently they paid little attention to cartography details by not identifying the broken 11 dashes with any geographical coordinates. If they were intended to be a maritime boundary, then the 11 dashes should be joined into a continuous line with precise geographical coordinates at all key sections.

After 1949, China adopted the South China Sea map of the RoC containing the 11 dashes. Subsequently, two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin were removed after settlement with North Vietnam on maritime delimitation in the early 1950s. As things stand now, China has the upper hand in its calculated strategic ambiguity by keeping other claimants in doubt about what its 9-dash U-shape line actually means. Another known unknown involving Taiwan is the military occupation of Taiping/Itu Aba, which is the largest disputed island in the Spartlys. China tolerates the Taiwanese military presence for no known reason. This may be a manifestation of One China policy. What will be the consequences if China prevails in its claims of historic rights over disputed areas in the South China Sea? This is a worrisome known unknown. The first major casualty could be the unravelling of UNCLOS. Other major powers might be tempted to grab disputed territories and maritime zones elsewhere, based on their claims of historic rights. How far back in history can one rightfully base a claim on? After all, if we go back far enough, we were all from the same human clan.

Yet another known unknown is China’s strategic intention in becoming more assertive in the South China Sea. China would insist that overflight and freedom of navigation in the area has never been a problem to any country exercising the legitimate right of innocent passage. But China would object to military activities of foreign warships and aircraft within its 200-nm EEZ, and sometimes even try to interrupt them. Soon China may even impose its unilateral air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, perhaps starting from the Paracels, and extending southward to the Spratlys when its aircraft carrier force is ready for force projection deployment. US Secretary of State John Kerry, during his visit to the Philippines on 17 December 2013, cautioned China against imposing any ADIZ over the South China Sea. The uncertainty surrounding the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty is also a known unknown. The US is increasing military assistance to the Philippines, including another US $40 million announced by Kerry in Manila on 17 December. But the US has been quite ambiguous about its possible response should there be a serious armed clash between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea.

This could be a part of the US policy of strategic ambiguity. Just keep China guessing, not knowing where is the red line in the South China Sea that it should not cross. How the rivalry between China and the US will develop is a serious known unknown. There is no comfort in seeing that the rivalry is already fueling an implicit arms race in Southeast Asia. What lies ahead if the rivalry escalates? A new Cold War in our part of the world? Unknown Unknowns Unknown unknowns are the worst kind of risks; we don’t even know that we don’t know they exist and they can hit us with serious unexpected impacts. In some instances, one side may see a risk as known unknown, but the other side maybe completely unaware of it, an unknown unknown. The surprising Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour was one such case. The attack was an unknown unknown to the US, chiefly because Japan broke international laws and diplomatic norms. At the same time, Japanese army knew what it was doing, but it could not foresee the consequences of its attack, or their eventual disastrous loss in the Second World War. In the South China Sea, it is difficult to come up with any examples of unknown unknowns.

By definition, we do not know they exist, let alone foresee their consequences. Unknown Knowns Slavoj Zizek, a Slovenian Marxist philosopher, says that what is most important to mankind is what he calls “unknown knowns.” These are things that exist and have been influencing our life and our approach to reality, but we are unaware of knowing them, or we do not realize their value, or worst we refuse to acknowledge knowing them. At the national level, individual ASEAN Member States may be pro-China, or pro-US, or sitting on the fence. But when they come together as a group in ASEAN, they say they will try to keep ASEAN neutral and constructive. They want ASEAN to be the centre of dialogue and cooperation, friendly to all major powers. ASEAN has made China, Japan, the RoK, India and the US its “strategic partners.” Goh Chok Tong, when he was Prime Minister of Singapore, once described this ASEAN flirtation as “virtuous promiscuity.” How effective can ASEAN neutrality and centrality be? And for how long? Will the China-US rivalry cause a serious split in ASEAN, or worse a breakup of the 47-year-old organization?

This is a concern that most ASEAN Member States do not even want to think about, an unknown known. Another unknown known is the continuing failure of EAS Leaders to help address the various island disputes. Apart from the South China Sea case, there are disputes between China and Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku, between Japan and the RoK over Takeshima/Dokdo, and between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories/Kurils. These island disputes are sources of tensions, which can create instability. But they seem to be an unknown known to most of the EAS Leaders. Conclusion Based on the known knowns, the South China Sea disputes remain a risky problem to our region. Settling them fairly will take time and political goodwill. But through dialogue and cooperation and working with ASEAN, all the parties concerned can increase mutual confidence and avoid new tensions. A good ASEAN-China code of conduct in the South China Sea will be a gigantic step forward in the right direction. If all the parties approach the disputes in the South China Sea with unselfish intention, they can explore practical and fair solutions together, in a spirit of give and take. They can then minimize the risks of known unknowns.

Their failure to act sensibly now will continue to expose our region to a possible catastrophic surprise in the South China Sea, an unknown unknown, that could erupt one day and destroy peace and prosperity. To avoid such a dreadful future, a crucial new beginning now is for all the parties concerned to admit that there are still unknown knowns in the South China Sea disputes that they cannot endlessly pretend not knowing, or keep them on the back burner indefinitely. The time to act is now. And time is running out. Termsak Chalermpalanupap Dr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap is a visiting research fellow at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore. Previously, he had served nearly 20 years at the ASEAN Secretariat, where his last post before retirement was Director of Political-Security Directorate of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Department. Views expressed in this article are his personal opinions. Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. Issue 15 (March 2014).

The South China Sea Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns: The predicament of ev… Nenhuma nota no slide Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns: The predicament of evidence-based policy 1. Known Knowns, Known Unknowns,Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns: The predicamentUnknown Unknowns: The predicament of evidence-based policy.of evidence-based policy. Ray Pawson University of Leeds UK r.d.pawson@leeds.ac.uk 2. “There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we do not know we don’t know”. [Donald Rumsfeld, Former United States Secretary of Defence, 2002.] 3. 1.1. Systematic review (realist synthesis) in oneSystematic review (realist synthesis) in one slideslide 2.2. The synthesisThe synthesis (thanks to ESRC)(thanks to ESRC) – evidence– evidence for a legislative intervention?for a legislative intervention? 3.3.

Ever-expanding policy questionsEver-expanding policy questions 4.4. Corresponding uncertainties in the evidenceCorresponding uncertainties in the evidence 5.5. Uncertainties resolved.Uncertainties resolved. 6.6. Two Minor Theses –Two Minor Theses – handling uncertaintyhandling uncertainty 7.7. Major ThesisMajor Thesis – Popper on uncertainty– Popper on uncertainty 8.8. Discussion – wistful plea for the two-armedDiscussion – wistful plea for the two-armed policy-maker?policy-maker? 4. 1. Realist Synthesis.1. Realist Synthesis. The favoured method of evidence-based policy is to assemble all previous research on a particular family of interventions in order to review the available evidence on which initiatives are the most fruitful. Realist synthesis begins by eliciting the core programme theory. It then gathers and synthesises previous research to refine programme theory. It seeks understand what has worked for whom in what circumstances and what respects 5. 2. Is there a case for legislation?2. Is there a case for legislation? 6. 3. Building a3. Building a legislativelegislative ‘logic model’‘logic model’ 1. How significant is the risk?

(Evidence base: Toxicology) 2. Is there public support? (Evidence base: Survey Research) 3. Will it survive lobbying? (Evidence base: Political Science) 4. Is it enforceable? (Evidence base: Policing Evaluation) 7. Extending the model ….Extending the model …. 8. firstfirst iterationiteration 1. What is the evidence on risk?1. What is the evidence on risk? Toxicity – small particulate levels per cigarette? Ventilation – what difference does it make? Relativities – comparisons with other risky environments? Exposure – in-car time as compared to home, … , etc? Benchmarks – comparison with air quality standards? 9. secondsecond iterationiteration 2. What is the evidence on public2. What is the evidence on public support?support? Magnitude of support? Demographics of support? Support from smokers? Stability of support (words versus deeds)? Reasons for support? …… And so on for theory 3 and 4 >>>And so on for theory 3 and 4 >>> 10.

Questions withinQuestions within questionsquestions CORE THEMES SUB- THEMES SUB-SUB THEMES “evidence can pursue but never quite capture unfolding policy problems.” 11. Evidence glimpses …Evidence glimpses … THE EVIDENCE.THE EVIDENCE. How firm is the evidence across these different theories and disciplines? THE UNCERTAINTIES.THE UNCERTAINTIES. Does synthesis end in ‘hard facts’ or ‘dodgy dossiers’? Some examples from programme theoriesSome examples from programme theories 1 and 21 and 2 12. Theory 1a: Is it possible to show that children’sTheory 1a: Is it possible to show that children’s exposure to smoking in cars causes ill health?exposure to smoking in cars causes ill health? ‘Youth exposed to smoking in cars also reported missing substantially more days of school compared to youth not exposed to smoking in cars. For example, amongst youth exposed to smoking in cars, 5% missed more than a week of school and 10% missed three to five days of school due to ill health.

In comparison, amongst youth not exposed to smoking in cars, only 2% missed more than a week and of school and only 5% missed three to five days of school due to ill health’ Canadian Public Health Survey on Asthma Symptoms ‘Youth exposed to smoking in cars also reported missing substantially more days of school compared to youth not exposed to smoking in cars. For example, amongst youth exposed to smoking in cars, 5% missed more than a week of school and 10% missed three to five days of school due to ill health. In comparison, amongst youth not exposed to smoking in cars, only 2% missed more than a week and of school and only 5% missed three to five days of school due to ill health’ Canadian Public Health Survey on Asthma Symptoms These data, perforce, do not follow and monitor unfolding disease pathologies. They are a snapshot relying on self-report of different events at different times. • Systematic exposure misclassification bias. Respondents with active respiratory symptoms and a formal diagnosis have much more cause to recall exposure to second hand smoke. • Complexity itself.

Separating the contribution of the spasmodic history of hundreds of car journeys from the irregular exposure to many equally complex air quality environments 13. Theory 1b – pollutant levels from SHS in cars?Theory 1b – pollutant levels from SHS in cars? In-car air quality measures (child substituted by portable air quality monitor) After three cigarettes (fine particulate levels – PM2.5) Peak PM2.5 = 3645 ug/m3 Mean PM2.5 = 2926 ug/m3 Ambient Air PM2.5 = 4 ug/m3 Highly significant, valid and reliable evidence on poor air quality. BUT evidence relates only to a single instance under experimental conditions. Health impact depends on actual prevalence, actual exposure, metabolic sensitivity in real conditions (the dose/response chain). Pollutant Prevalence Exposure Sensitivity Health Impact 14. Theory 1c – does ventilation make a difference?Theory 1c – does ventilation make a difference?

Speed Windows AC/Ventila tion Max PM2.5 Mean PM2.5 20 closed AC Max 3184 1113 20 Passenger window fully open AC off 371 97 60 Passenger window open 3" AC off 608 119 60 closed Vent off 3212 1150 Highly significant, valid and reliable evidence that ventilation does make a difference to particulate levels. BUT evidence relates only to a single instance under experimental conditions. Still unanswered - whether ‘reduced’ levels are still dangerous? How commonplace are ventilation activities? Will other safeguards mitigate risk? Would allowing for such exceptions create fatal ambiguities in any legislation? 15. Theory 1d – what are the precedents?Theory 1d – what are the precedents? UK pubs 2005 (before the ban). Rather as with in-car measures, studies uncovers large variations in air quality according to pub location, usage, time of week, time of day, etc. The mean PM2.5 across all sites was 285.5 ug/m3 .

In the worse cases (pubs in deprived areas) the mean was 399.4 with a range of 54.1 – 1395.1 ug/m3 . A crucial difficulty is the matter of duration of exposure. Much of the evidence reports on ‘mean prevalence’ and thus refers to quite different time intervals and circumstances. In-car, this mean typically registers air quality during the smoking of a single cigarette. In-pub, the mean records the contributions of many smokers over an extended period of time. Much of the argument for banning smoking in such venues was that high levels of contaminants persisted over the entire shift or indeed the work-life of the bartender 16. RESOLUTION?RESOLUTION? The evidence does not uncover an absolute risk threshold. A whole range of environmental, biological and social factors contribute to the risk equation. THESIS.THESIS.

The evidence base produces partial and conditional (if-then) truths: i) because of the confined cabin space, and ii) under the worse ventilation conditions, and iii) in terms of peak contamination, the evidence permits us to say that smoking in cars generates fine particulate concentration that are, iv) very rarely experienced in the realm of air-quality studies, and that will thus constitute a significant health risk because, v) exposure to smoking in cares is still commonplace, and vi) children are particularly susceptible, and vii) are open to further contamination if their parents are smokers 17. Theory 2: Evidence glimpses on publicTheory 2: Evidence glimpses on public support?support? Increasing support?Increasing support? 1994 - ‘Do you think it should be illegal to smoke in cars when travelling with children?’ as follows: ‘of the 1461 adult responders, 72% agreed, 27% disagreed and 1% were undecided’. (Australia) 2009 ‘Do you think smoking should be allowed in cars with preschool children in them ‘… 95.9% disagreed and only 3.0% agreed with this question’.

(New Zealand) Support amongst smokers?Support amongst smokers? 2007 ‘A smoking ban should be introduced ASAP’ 74.2% non-smokers agree, 61.7% smokers agree (Australia) Increasing support?Increasing support? 1994 - ‘Do you think it should be illegal to smoke in cars when travelling with children?’ as follows: ‘of the 1461 adult responders, 72% agreed, 27% disagreed and 1% were undecided’. (Australia) 2009 ‘Do you think smoking should be allowed in cars with preschool children in them ‘… 95.9% disagreed and only 3.0% agreed with this question’. (New Zealand) Support amongst smokers?Support amongst smokers? 2007 ‘A smoking ban should be introduced ASAP’ 74.2% non-smokers agree, 61.7% smokers agree (Australia) 18. ‘faking good?’ Uncertainties in the Evidence?Uncertainties in the Evidence? • Sensitivity to question wording. e.g.

response patterns change if question refers to ‘banning’ or ‘allowing’; ‘children’ or ‘pre-school children’ etc. • Social desirably effect. Conversations (or interviews) between strangers tend to reflect the ‘politically correct’. • Gap between attitudes and behaviour. People don’t always practice what they preach. • Sampling the committed. Surveys mainly conducted in Australia, New Zealand, Canada. Modest response rates reflect the views of the fervent. 19. RESOLUTION?RESOLUTION? THESIS:THESIS: The most authoritative attitudinal evidence to support policy is not a matter of taking contemporary, error-free snapshots of public opinion but derives from building and testing explanatory theories of how public attitudes are shaped. RESOLUTION?RESOLUTION? THESIS:THESIS: The most authoritative attitudinal evidence to support policy is not a matter of taking contemporary, error-free snapshots of public opinion but derives from building and testing explanatory theories of how public attitudes are shaped. 20. So WHY is public sentiment in favour?So WHY is public sentiment in favour? • The ‘near universal expression of regret’.The ‘near universal expression of regret’.

90% of respondents in a four country survey respond ‘agree / strongly agree’ to the following question: ‘If you had to do it over again, you would not have started smoking’. • The ‘invincible sub-text’ of child vulnerability.The ‘invincible sub-text’ of child vulnerability. Many (quantitative and qualitative) studies report that smokers already modify in their behaviour in the presence of children under the consideration that … ‘children were particularly at risk because they were still developing’. • The steady march of ‘denormalisation’.The steady march of ‘denormalisation’. Very high percentages of smokers agree with the statement that ‘there are fewer and fewer places I feel comfortable smoking’. An identical percentage agrees that: ‘society disapproves of smoking’. 21. Popper on uncertaintyPopper on uncertainty. “The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles.

The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.” 22. One-armed scientists? Many years ago veteran US senator Edward Muskie, tired of hearing punctilious scientists muttering: ‘… on the one hand this … but on the other hand that’, was prompted to make the wistful plea that policy advisors should henceforth number only ‘one-armed scientists’. One-armed scientists? Many years ago veteran US senator Edward Muskie, tired of hearing punctilious scientists muttering: ‘… on the one hand this … but on the other hand that’, was prompted to make the wistful plea that policy advisors should henceforth number only ‘one-armed scientists’. Two-armed policymakers?

Tired of hearing that policy-makers will only listen to simple messages on one-side of A4, veteran UK academic Ray Pawson, makes the wistful plea that evidence-based policy will only have meaning if the research community mange to persuade the policy community that evidence is partial, conditional, and contingent BUT still useful. Two-armed policymakers? Tired of hearing that policy-makers will only listen to simple messages on one-side of A4, veteran UK academic Ray Pawson, makes the wistful plea that evidence-based policy will only have meaning if the research community mange to persuade the policy community that evidence is partial, conditional, and contingent BUT still useful. The Shadowland Journal: Iran: Known Knowns, Known Unknowns... The Shadowland Journal From Christopher Dickey, the author of "Our Man in Charleston: Britain's Secret Agent in the Civil War South" and "Securing the City," this site provides updates and footnotes on history, espionage, terrorism, fanaticism, policing and counterinsurgency linked to Dickey's columns for The Daily Beast and his other writings; also, occasional dialogues, diatribes, and contributions from friends.

Sunday, April 30, 2006 Iran: Known Knowns, Known Unknowns... An effort to put in perspective the run-up to war -- or not: Newsweek Magazine: Iran: A Rummy Guide , 30 April 2006 To borrow a phrase used for Iraq, there are 'things we now know we don't know.' NEWSWEEK sorts it out. May 8, 2006 issue - Back in June 2002, as the Bush administration started pushing hard for war with Iraq by focusing on fears of the unknown—terrorists and weapons of mass destruction—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that when it came to gathering intelligence on such threats, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Elaborating, Rumsfeld told a news conference: "There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't know." Now there's a crisis brewing with Iran.

And the same basic problem applies: what is known, what is suspected, what can be only guessed or imagined? Is danger clear and present or vague and distant? Washington is abuzz now, as it was four years ago, with "sources" talking of sanctions, war, regime change. In 2002, despite a paucity of hard evidence, Iraq was made to seem an urgent threat demanding immediate action. "We don't want 'the smoking gun' to be a mushroom cloud" is the memorable phrase used by the then national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Given the results of Washington's rush into the Iraqi unknown, concern is growing about U.S. policy toward Iran. Yet the Iranian case is very different—and more dangerous. The latest report from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency, released last Friday by Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, makes it clear that Tehran is defying U.N. demands that it freeze its nuclear activities. European and American diplomats are considering resolutions calling for unspecified consequences—and, according to European sources, they have contingency plans for sanctions outside the United Nations if they're blocked by Russian or Chinese vetoes.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, lest there be any doubt about his stand, said, "The Iranian nation won't give a damn about such useless resolutions." With the confrontation raising questions about future oil supplies, and fears growing that a seemingly crazy regime may soon acquire atomic bombs, the IAEA and Western intelligence agencies are working overtime to separate fundamental facts from guesswork and propaganda.... Posted by Simulation, Human Factors and Quality of Care: Experts and their unknown knowns Simulation, Human Factors and Quality of Care Thoughts, musings and information from the staff at the Scottish Centre for Simulation and Clinical Human Factors, Larbert. Pages Thursday, 18 April 2013 Experts and their unknown knowns On the 12th February 2002, Donald Rumsfeld uttered his most memorable words as US Secretary of Defence: "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because, as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns.

There are things we do not know we don't know" (1) Wikipedia has a nice article on this statement , including the missing pair: unknown knowns. Rumsfeld does not mention it, perhaps because there is some confusion about what an "unknown known" is. The Wikipedia article calls it "the most dangerous type of unknown" but then (at the time of writing and with an understanding that Wikipedia is constantly edited) goes on to make a bit of a hash trying to explain it. There is a suggestion that an "unknown known" is the claim that weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq, or the Abu Ghraib scandal or things we refuse to acknowledge that we know. Personally I prefer to think of "unknown knowns" as things we didn't know we knew. This is what Dörner, in his book Logic of Failure , is talking about when he says he knew a doctor who could diagnose a disease with great certainty but this doctor didn't know how he did it. Dörner explains it as a type of intuition and goes on to comment that experts often display this type of intuition.

This integrates very nicely with a 4-stage framework (first developed by Noel Burch) for looking at expertise: Unconsciously incompetent: unknown unknown (The total beginner who has no idea what he doesn't know and is oblivious to the breadth and depth of possible knowledge. This is a dangerous place to be and a scary person to be looking after you in an emergency) Consciously incompetent: known unknown (The novice who has become aware of how little he/she knows. A somewhat less dangerous place to be and now, instead of having a scary person looking after you, you have a scared person looking after you.) Consciously competent: known known (The journeyman who knows a lot but has to spend a lot of time thinking about what he/she is going to do.) Unconsciously competent: unknown known (The expert who has a sixth sense about things which are about to go wrong or can stop a situation from escalating without telling you how they knew what to do.) In many ways then the extremes of the framework are the most untroubled places to be; at one end ignorance is bliss and at the other end ignorance is due to the achievement of expertise.

This 4-stage competence framework allows us to see how a learner may progress and implies that moving through the 4 stages is beneficial without drawbacks. However, later on in his book Dörner goes on to explain how more information (loss of the unknown) may be detrimental: "Anyone who has a lot of information, thinks a lot, and by thinking increases his understanding of a situation will have not less but more trouble coming to a clear decision... We realize how much we still don't know, and we feel a strong desire to learn more. And so we gather more information only to become more acutely aware of how little we know..."(p. 99) In terms of how the framework relates to simulation-based education, I would like to think that it can help us understand at which stage a participant is. This knowledge should allow the course faculty to tailor the course to the participant.

I would also like to think that simulation lends itself well to the little-known 5th stage of competence: Consciously aware of unconscious competence: known unknown known (An ability to reflect on and examine the behaviours and actions one is carrying out as an expert.) The Elaine Bromiley case involved a number of experts in anaesthesia and ENT surgery who failed to do the right thing. Partly due to an underdeveloped final stage of competence, these experts were not able to reflect in situ and realise what the correct sequence of actions should be. Simulation with debriefing allows experts to watch how they make mistakes and learn to develop mechanisms for preventing them. Unfortunately it is experts (consultants) who we see least often in the simulation suite as participants and this needs to change. Posted by

Question: In 2002, which Secretary of Defence explained about "known knowns", "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns" in a speech referring to terrorism?
Answer: DONALD RUMSFELD