Hamas - Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Author: Zachary Laub , Senior Copy Editor/Writer Updated: August 1, 2014 See More of the Most Viewed Introduction Hamas is a Palestinian militant movement that also serves as one of the territories' two major political parties. A nationalist-Islamist spinoff of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was founded in 1987, during the first intifada, and later emerged at the forefront of armed resistance to Israel. The United States and the European Union consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Its rival party, Fatah, which dominates the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has renounced violence. The support Hamas garners among Palestinians largely owes to the foil it plays to Fatah, which many see as having grown corrupted by power while delivering little through its peaceful cooperation and negotiation with Israel. Hamas candidates won Palestinian elections in 2006, but their government was dismissed in 2007, resulting in the political bifurcation of the West Bank and Gaza. While Fatah reasserted its authority in the West Bank, Hamas has exercised de facto rule over the Gaza Strip in the years since.

Origins Hamas, an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya ("Islamic Resistance Movement"), was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian cleric who became an activist in local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood after dedicating his early life to Islamic scholarship in Cairo. Beginning in the late 1960s, Yassin preached and performed charitable work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, both of which were occupied by Israeli forces following the 1967 Six Day War . Yassin established Hamas as the Brotherhood's local political arm in December 1987, following the outbreak of the first intifada, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli control of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The following year, Hamas published its charter , calling for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic society in historic Palestine. Hamas first employed suicide bombing, a tactic with which it would later become identified, in April 1993, five months before PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords. The historic pact established limited self-government for parts of the West Bank and Gaza under the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Hamas condemned the accords, in which the PLO gave Israel its formal recognition. The United States designated Hamas a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997, but the movement nonetheless eclipsed armed factions of the nationalist organization Fatah as the vanguard of violent resistance during the second intifada, in the early 2000s. This uprising, unlike the first, was characterized by suicide bombings rather than civil disobedience, and claimed the lives of far more Israeli civilians . In both uprisings, Palestinian fatalities far exceeded Israeli ones. Leadership Hamas has a host of leadership bodies that perform various political, military, and social functions. According to the U.S. State Department, general policy is set by an overarching consultative body, often referred to as its politburo, which operates in exile. Local committees manage grassroots issues in Gaza and the West Bank. Khaled Meshaal has served as political chief since 1996. The former teacher has been based in Doha since Hamas fell out with Meshaal's previous host, Syria, as Palestinian refugees joined predominantly Sunni protestors in calling for reforms beginning in 2011, prompting a violent government backlash, and eventually, civil war.

He is Hamas' most frequent interlocutor with the PA and regional governments. Gaza's de facto prime minister is Ismail Haniyeh, who served as PA prime minister during the brief period between the 2006 legislative elections and his dismissal by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas the following year. Marwan Issa and Mohammed Deif command Hamas' military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Israeli forces assassinated the militia's founder, Salah Shehadeh, in a 2002 airstrike. Fifteen civilians were killed in the attack, focusing Israeli and international scrutiny on such tactics. Yassin, Hamas' founder, was assassinated in 2004. Salah al-Arouri is believed to direct Hamas' armed activities in the West Bank from overseas. Funding As a designated terrorist entity, Hamas is cut off from official assistance that the United States and European Union provide to the PLO in the West Bank. Historically, much of its funding came from Palestinian expatriates and private donors in the Gulf. In addition, some Islamic charities in the West have channeled money to Hamas-backed social service groups, prompting asset freezes by the U.S. Treasury.

Egypt and Israel largely closed their borders with Gaza in 2006–2007, restricting the movement of goods and people into and out of the territory. Israel also maintains a maritime blockade. Until recently, a sophisticated network of more than a thousand tunnels circumvented the Egyptian crossing, allowing staples such as food, medicine, and cheap gas for electricity production into the territory, as well as construction materials, cash, and arms. The illicit trade provided some material relief for Gazans, while Hamas levied a tax on the traffic, a major source of its revenue. Changing regional circumstances have not only isolated Hamas politically but also put severe strains on its coffers. With the ascension of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's military-backed government in 2013–14, Cairo is hostile to Hamas, which it sees as an extension of its chief domestic rival, the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army has shut down most of the tunnels entering into its territory in the course of waging a counterinsurgency campaign on its side of the border, in the Sinai Peninsula .

Hamas distanced itself from Iran, its primary benefactor, due to Tehran's support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his regime's repression of antigovernment activists beginning in 2011. Iran reportedly cut funding to Hamas in the fallout, and sought to bolster its ties to other resistance groups in the region, such as Islamic Jihad. Qatar's financial support largely dried up as well, collateral damage of the Gulf country's efforts to mend ties with its neighbors, with whom it had fallen out in part for backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The cumulative effect of these financial pressures helped push Hamas toward a reconciliation deal with Fatah in April 2014. Yet despite the deal, the Palestinian Authority has not provided salaries for the more than forty thousand Gazan public servants hired by Hamas, which many analysts believe was a contributing factor to the latest outbreak of violence. As Governing Party Hamas' primary base of operation is in the Gaza Strip, the coastal enclave of 1.7 million Palestinians, where it has remained the de facto authority since shortly after Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2005. The following year, Hamas surprised Western observers by winning a majority of seats by a narrow margin and forming a government.

It may have earned votes as a protest movement and for the social services it provided, but the win was likely more a rejection of the incumbent Fatah, which was widely perceived as having grown corrupt at the helm of the PLO and delivering little to Palestinians with its program of negotiation. The outcome was unacceptable to the PLO, which ousted Hamas from power in the West Bank. In Gaza, Hamas routed Fatah's militias in a week of internecine fighting, resulting in a political schism between the two Palestinian territories. As it took over the remnants of PA institutions in the strip, it established such governmental structures as a judiciary and put in place authoritarian institutions. Hamas restricts the Gazan media , the political opposition, and nongovernmental organizations, leaving few mechanisms of accountability. Meanwhile, most Gazans receive social services from UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. "Hamas remains more hard-line than the public it seeks to lead ," says Nathan Brown, a scholar of political Islam. The group suffers from relatively low support among Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank.

Palestinian pollsters found in early 2014 that in hypothetical legislative elections [PDF], Hamas would fall far short of the majority it won in 2006, including among its Gazan base. Fatah garners only marginally greater support. Both parties suffer from the absence of political legitimacy , says CFR's Robert Danin. Rather than a common political agenda, they entered into the reconciliation deal to facilitate new Palestinian elections and break the stagnation in Palestinian politics, he says. Palestinians have not voted for a president since 2008, nor a legislature since 2006, and the political bifurcation between the West Bank and Gaza is widely unpopular. As Armed Resistance The second intifada ended in early 2005 as Israeli security forces grew more successful at thwarting suicide attacks and moved against militant groups in the West Bank. Though Hamas gave up suicide bombing, it remained committed to armed resistance, and as it entrenched in the Gaza Strip, it took to launching rockets and mortars into Israeli territory.

The crude weapons are by nature indiscriminate, but also ineffective; ten Israeli civilians were killed between January 2009 and May 2014, according to the Israeli rights group B'Tselem. It has also attempted incursions into Israeli territory, most famously kidnapping Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. Five years later, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners to secure Shalit's release. Yet as Hamas consolidated its authority in Gaza, Israel came to rely on it to contain more radical resistance groups, such as Islamic Jihad. Since Operation Cast Lead, Israel's twenty-two day invasion in the winter of 2008–2009, long periods of détente between Hamas and Israel have been the norm, a state of mutual deterrence the Israeli government has described as " quiet for quiet ." But that state of deterrence is a fragile one , punctuated by intermittent volleys of rockets fired by Gazan militants into Israel and retaliatory Israeli air strikes to degrade their arsenals, a cycle Israelis have come to know as " mowing the lawn ." Periods of quiet allowed Hamas and other militant groups to expand and modernize their arsenals of rockets.

Egypt brokered a ceasefire that ended a round of fighting in March 2012. Israel effectively delegated to Hamas responsibility for enforcing it by withholding rocket fire and restraining more radical groups in Gaza. In 2013, sixty-three rockets were launched at Israel from Gaza, compared to 2,327 the year prior, according to the Shin Bet, Israel's security agency. In the West Bank, meanwhile, Hamas has been driven underground. Its social and military infrastructure has been dismantled, and many of its members arrested by PA and Israeli security forces . Many Palestinians saw Fatah's security cooperation as a cynical maneuver to crush its rivals. Negotiations between Israel and the PA have generally assumed Hamas would act as a spoiler. Not only would a final-status agreement likely violate its founding principles, but it would also marginalize the movement while vindicating its chief rival, Fatah. A Way Forward? The United States and European Union provisionally recognized the Palestinian reconciliation government, which the U.S.

State Department characterized as "technocratic," and said did "not include ministers affiliated with Hamas." A government including ministers from Hamas would have triggered a foreign aid cut-off, as Hamas has not recognized the three principles insisted on by the Quartet (the United States, EU, UN, and Russia): renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of prior international agreements. Hamas entered into the arrangement politically and economically weak. But in the weeks since, public support for Abbas and the PA has withered due to the collapse of nine months of intensive negotiations aiming to achieve a final-status agreement—the long-sought two-state solution—and the PA's security cooperation during the events that precipitated the current round of violence. In June 2014, Netanyahu accused Hamas of kidnapping and murdering three Israeli teens in the West Bank. Israeli security forces rearrested some of the Palestinian ex-convicts released in the Shalit deal, accusing them of recidivism. Indications that a rogue cell carried out the abductions highlighted that the movement's leadership is unable to control all those affiliated with it, analysts said. Israel responded militarily to the volley of rockets from Gaza that followed.

Netanyahu has said he seeks to degrade Hamas' military capacities and restore calm, while politicians on his right flank have called for a broader ground operation that might decisively defeat Hamas , but could result in Israel once again occupying Gaza. Meanwhile, negotiations that would vindicate Abbas' approach over that of Hamas are not in the offing. The most plausible off-ramp, some analysts say, is a deal in which Hamas would disarm in exchange for economic relief for Gaza. But Israeli security concerns have been heightened by revelations of a tunnel infrastructure under the Gaza-Israel border. Israel, then, is even less likely to permit transfers of the construction materials that are necessary to rebuild Gaza. It is unclear whether the reconciliation government can survive this round of violence, particularly if Hamas emerges from it politically empowered. If it survives, some argue, elections can integrate Gaza into Palestinian politics and provide the underpinnings of a more robust cease-fire. A terrorist designation precludes the United States and European Union from speaking directly with Hamas, but Washington has turned to Turkey and Qatar as interlocutors. Additional Resources The Economist's Nicolas Pelham discusses the economics of Gaza's illicit tunnel trade and the emergence of a Hamas-led bureaucracy regulating it.

Isolating Gaza has counterproductively entrenched Hamas, writes CFR's Robert Danin, who calls for Gaza's integration in the Palestinian economy and political institutions to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. This CFR Crisis Guide provides an in-depth, multimedia look at the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict . The Israeli NGO Gisha maps access to the Gaza Strip [PDF] and documents restrictions on the movement of people and goods enforced by Israel and Egypt. More on this topic from CFR Hamas Encyclopedia > History > Asia and Africa > Middle Eastern History Hamas Hamas (hämäsˈ) [ key ] [Arab., = zeal], Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist organization that was founded in 1987 during the Intifada ; it seeks to establish an Islamic state in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (the former mandate of Palestine ). An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood , Hamas operates mosques, schools, clinics, and social programs but is best known in the West for its military wing, which has carried out numerous terrorist attacks on Israelis.

Hamas opposed the 1993 accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which granted Palestinians gradual limited autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and called for complete Israeli withdrawal from both areas. After 1993 Hamas's military wing carried out suicide bombings in Israel in an attempt to derail both that agreement and further negotiations. Hamas supporters were prominent among those who challenged the Palestinian Authority (which was dominated by Al Fatah, the main faction of the PLO), and its leaders have been subjected to mass arrests. The organization opposed the 1996 elections held in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for the Palestinian Authority legislative council but did not call for a boycott; some Hamas sympathizers ran as independents. In 2004, Israel killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's spiritual leader, in retaliation for continued Hamas attacks, and subsequently Hamas military leaders based in Damascus, Syria, became more influential than the political leaders in Gaza.

In 2005 Hamas ran strongly in local elections in Gaza and the West Bank, besting Al Fatah in many areas, and in the Palestinian Authority (PA) legislative elections in Jan., 2006, it won a majority of the seats and then formed a government. Accelerating tensions between Hamas and Al Fatah threatened to dissolve the PA in chaos in the spring of 2006, but when Hamas forces captured (June) an Israeli soldier and held in him in the Gaza Strip it provoked a major Israeli incursion into N and central Gaza and renewed fighting. A political stalemate with PA President Mahmoud Abbas over recognizing Israel and other issues led to tensions with the PLO that erupted at times into fighting in 2006. In 2007 Hamas and Al Fatah agreed to form a national unity government, but continuing clashes led to Hamas's seizure of control in the Gaza Strip (June, 2007), which then led Abbas to install a new government without Hamas. Israel subjected the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip to a blockade.

A new cycle of Hamas-Israeli fighting that began in Nov., 2008, led to another Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip in Jan., 2009. Human rights groups accused both Hamas and Israel of committing war crimes during the fighting. Attempts since 2007 to reestablish a unified Palestinian Authority government including both Hamas and Al Fatah have proved unsuccessful so far. See studies by Z. Chehab (2007), J. Gunning (2008), and P. McGeough (2009). The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. Hamas Israel & the Middle East Hamas Hamas is a Palestinian Islamic extremist terrorist organization based in the Gaza Strip and West Bank that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel. Both theUnited Statesand the European Union have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. Following internecine fighting between Hamas and Fatah in June 2007, Hamas controls the Gaza Strip.

Hamas (the Arabic acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Islamiya fi Filistin, or the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine) was established in 1988 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, then a preacher with the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state ruled by Islamic theocratic law in place of the State of Israel. The Hamas covenant, issued in 1988, is replete with anti-Semitism, and echoes the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion charging Jews with an international conspiracy to gain control of the world. In Hamas’ world-view, Islamic precepts forbid a Jewish state in the area known as Palestine, and they assert the Jewish people have no legitimate connection to the land of Israel. As its covenant proclaims, “Theland ofPalestine is an Islamic trust... It is forbidden to anyone to yield or concede any part of it...Israel will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it...” To this end, the leaders of Hamas have denounced compromise withIsrael as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

Funding and support for the group has traditionally come from Muslim charities around the world, sympathetic sources in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and most importantly from Syria and Iran, although in recent years, both have stepped back somewhat due to Hamas’ support for the rebels in the Syrian civil war. Hamas is both a terrorist organization and a mass social, political and religious movement. It operates schools, medical clinics and youth groups. The division of Hamas into military and political/social wings has led some observers to erroneously assume that the social wing of Hamas is completely separate from its military wing. To the contrary, funds raised for the social programs of Hamas free up other funds for the military wing. Moreover, Hamas’ military wing utilizes the organization’s social wing for indoctrination and recruitment. The social, cultural, religious and educational institutions of Hamas, including youth groups and summer camps are well-known venues for anti-Israel and anti-Jewish hatred and have served as recruitment centers for suicide bombers. Since 1994, Hamas has been the main organization perpetrating terrorist attacks in major Israeli cities with targets including shopping malls, cafes, buses and hotels.

Its most deadly attacks include the March 2002 suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya, killing 30 and injuring 140 during their Passover seder; the August 2001 suicide bombing of the Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem killing 15 and injuring 130; and the June 2001 suicide bombing at the Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv, killing 21 and injuring 120, most of them youths. Following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Hamas has been behind the thousands of rocket attacks that have targeted Israel’s population centers. Hamas entered the Palestinian political arena and secured nearly half of the municipal seats up for grabs in the January 2005 Palestinian elections. In the January 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas had tremendous success and won 74 seats in the 132-seat legislature, with Fatah earning a disappointing 45 seats.

Following the 2006 election, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh became Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority while Mahmoud Abbas remained President, creating a so-called “unity government.” The international community established a policy of isolating Hamas, and suspended financial aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority until it met three conditions: recognizeIsrael’s right to exist, renounce the use of violence and terrorism and accept previously negotiated Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas continues to refuse to comply with these conditions. In June 2007, tensions between Hamas and Fatah reached a boiling point and violence broke out between the two groups in Gaza. Within a few days, Hamas prevailed. Palestinian Authority President Abbas dissolved the Hamas-led government and declared he would govern based on emergency powers. As a result, Gaza is administered by Hamas, and continues to be isolated by the international community. TheWest Bankis under the sole administration of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which enjoys international support. Over the years there have been a number of efforts to reconcile Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. In April 2014, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas announced a surprise reconciliation deal which included the formation of a Palestinian unity government.

This Palestinian Authority’s decision effectively put an end to the nine-months of US-led negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and soured relations with Israel. To date, however, the reconciliation agreement has not progressed and has had little impact on the ground. According to the U.S. State Department and human rights NGOs, Hamas has restricted freedom of speech and press inGaza. The Hamas security apparatus attacks, tortures and detains those who publicly criticize its authority. Hamas affiliates have attacked journalists and other individuals, who publicly criticize their authority. Since 2007, only pro-Hamas broadcast media and PFLP-affiliated radio outlet Voice of the People have operated in Gaza. Hamas television broadcasts children’s shows which glorify suicide bombings and defame Jews, spreading anti-Semitism and hatred. Hamas also imposes its religious extremism on its people, with a “morality police force,” which monitors women’s dress. Gender segregation is also strictly enforced – couples walking together are often stopped and asked to prove that they are married, men are not allowed to work in women’s hair salons and women are discouraged from patronizing certain cafes. Since 2000, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, have launched thousands of rocket and mortar attacks.

In early years, Hamas rockets reached vulnerable southern Israeli cities such as Sderot, Ashkelon, Netivot and nearby environs, landing in or near private homes, schools and day care and recreation centers. In recent years, Hamas rockets have reached well beyond the south, reaching Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Be’er Sheva, and even as far north as Haifa, a distance of over 85 miles from Gaza. Two-thirds of Israel’s civilian population (equivalent to over 200 million Americans) – Jews, Muslims, Christians and others –have been directly threatened by missiles from Gaza. Hamas has constructed hundreds of smuggling tunnels underneath the border with Egypt and stockpiled an enormous cache of weapons and associated supplies. In June 2006, Palestinian terrorists, including members of the military wing of Hamas, tunneled under the border fence in the southern Gaza Strip and attacked an Israeli military installation inside Israeli borders, killing 2 Israel soldiers, and kidnapped Cpl. Gilad Shalit, age 19. Shalit was eventually released in October 2011 after over five years of Hamas captivity in exchange for over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.

In addition, in 2014 it was revealed that Hamas has constructed dozens of “terror tunnels” which enabled its operatives to reach inside Israel to carry out terrorist attacks and kidnappings. On December 27, 2008, following the lapse of an agreed six month Israel-Hamas “period of calm,” and in response to renewed rocket attacks, Israel initiated a military operation in Gaza, entitled Operation Cast Lead . The three-week air and ground operation was intended to stop the rocket attacks on southern Israel and end Hamas smuggling of arms and related supplies. Four years later, on November 14, 2012, Israel initiated Operation Pillar of Defense in response to intensifying rocket attacks from Gaza. The aerial military operation targeted Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist leadership and rocket launching and storage sites. During the 8 day operation, Hamas launched 1,506 rockets at Israeli targets. The Iranian-made and supplied Fajr-5 rockets reached as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On July 7, 2014, following weeks of unceasing missile, rocket and mortar fire from Gaza on civilian centers in Israel, the IDF launched Operation Protective Edge targeting Hamas facilities, tunnels, weapons and leadership.

The conflict lasted 50 days, with a series of short-lived cease fires breached by Hamas. Israel initially attacked Hamas targets by air, however, on July 17, Israel sent ground forces into Gaza for a period of just over two weeks in order to destroy Hamas’s infrastructure, including rocket storage sites and infiltration tunnels which Israel was unable to destroy by aerial attacks. During the conflict, 4,700 missiles, rockets and mortars were fired by Hamas into Israeli cities and towns, including Sderot, Ashkelon, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, and even as far north as Haifa, a distance of over 85 miles from Gaza. The Syrian made M-302 missile, modeled after the Chinese WS-2, which has a range of almost 100 miles, was fired at Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. Two-thirds of Israel’s civilian population (equivalent to over 200 million Americans) – Jews, Muslims, Christians and others – were directly threatened by missiles from Gaza. An open-ended cease fire was reached on August 26. Related Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, it has intensified its activities to impose an Islamic social code.

Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, it has intensified its activities to impose an Islamic social code. Issued on: 31/08/2007 Type: Article Hamas’ Executive Force, the movement’s main enforcement arm. Its operatives also function as "morality” police to impose Islamic social codes on the population in the Gaza Strip. Overview 1. Following the Hamas takeover of mid-June 2007, the Gaza Strip has in effect become a radical Islamic political entity with the trappings of a sovereign state. It is ruled by Hamas, whose ideology is radical Islam and which it aspires to impose on the entire Palestinian populace. 2. During the takeover itself senior Hamas figures made statements supporting Islamic rule and victory over the infidels. 1 That caused not only Abu Mazen and Fatah to be apprehensive, but Egypt as well, which shares a common border with the Gaza Strip, is afraid radical Palestinian Islam will invade its territory. 2 3. For the time being senior Hamas figures are careful to make it clear that they have no intention of establishing a radical Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip. They have even sent soothing messages to Egypt , stating that they do not mean to Islamize the Gaza Strip.

3 However, during the few months since the Hamas takeover it has increasingly imposed a compulsory radical Islamic life-style which influences the daily life and routine of all the residents of the Gaza Strip . 4. The process of Islamization is caused both by the steps taken by the Hamas government and the tendency of the local residents, both male and female, to adjust themselves to conform with Hamas' radical Islamic worldview . In addition, Hamas controls all social, welfare, educational, religious and media institutions, 4 whose activities have a long-term effect on the nature of Gazan society. 5. The continuing Islamization of the Gaza Strip inhabitants, some of whom observe Islamic precepts in their daily lives, emphasizes the growing polarization between the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, and Judea and Samaria, controlled by Abu Mazen and Fatah, whose orientation is national-secular. Manifestations of Islamization in daily life in the Gaza Strip 6. Since the Hamas takeover the media have reported manifestations of Islamization in the Gaza Strip's daily life. Since Hamas controls the media, in our assessment the reports do not tell the whole story . 7. One of the most visible signs is the increasing number of bearded men .

Gaza Strip residents who were interviewed said that they were growing beards for religious reasons and not out of vanity. Some of them said they were doing it because they were afraid of Hamas, whose operatives were detaining and interrogating everyone who looked secular (commentary by Suleiman al-Shafi, Israeli TV Channel 2, July 20, 2007). 8. The owner of a clothing store told a correspondent from alarabia.net that during the first days after the Hamas takeover he saw that many women had sought, clearly out of fear, stores where it veils could be bought . A female Al-Azhar University student said that no one had stopped her in the street in Gaza City to ask her why she was wearing western clothes and that no one had instructed her to cover her head. However, she added, she was still afraid that in the future Hamas would impose Islamic law since in its essence it was a religious Islamic movement (alarabia.net, June 28, 2007). 9. The Executive Force commander announced that a division had been set up for religious instruction and guidance in the prisons in the Gaza Strip, and that it was headed by an expert in Islamic religious law ( sharia ').

According to another report, the administration of Al-Saraya prison in Gaza announced that the sentences of all prisoners who learned five Qur'an sections by heart would be reduced by one year . A senior member of the prison administration said that a committee had been formed to supervise the issue. He said that many prisoners had responded to the idea of studying the Qur'an (Firas Website, August 6, 2007). 10. Felesteen printed an article about life in the Gaza prison run by Hamas' Executive Force. The warden noted that the prison administration was distributing copies of the Qur'an to every inmate and "organizing periodic lessons, sermons, spiritual guidance, correct Qur'an-reading instructions, the study of religious law, and much more...” He also said that the administration had promised that the sentences of all prisoners who learned five Qur'an sections by heart would be reduced by one year. One of the prisoners said that most of the time they prayed under the direction of sheikhs, "who direct workshops and give us additional lessons...” (Felesteen, August 29, 2007). 11.

Ynet correspondent Ali Waked quoted a young Palestinian named "Ahmad” who said: "Who would believe that once some of the guys could organize a party with girls dancing in a hall, or even just in the street. So help me, dancers in the streets of Gaza . It all disappeared with the intifada and now it is inconceivable, it's a dream. Once we would go to the Square of the Unknown Soldier to watch girls who dared to wear tight pants and go with their heads uncovered, but not any more...” (Ynet, August 15, 2007). The Executive Force's use of Islamic law as a source of authority 12. Hamas' Executive Force imposes Islamic social codes on the local populace of the Gaza Strip. Actions are carried out not according to secular law (where the legal system did exist in the Gaza Strip, it has been completely paralyzed) but according to Islamic religious law ( sharia ') . On July 22, Islam Shahawan, a spokesman for the Executive Force, announced that an Islamic legal committee had been formed to replace the district attorney's office because lawyers did not appear for work.

The committee is headed by a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Marwan Abu Ras, who today serves as chairman of the Palestinian Scholars' League (an organization affiliated with Hamas which provides it with religious legal support). 13. Hamas asks clerics for their religious opinion regarding various governmental issues (a custom also observed before the movement took over the Gaza Strip). For example: A. The Palestinian Scholars' League issued a Islamic religious edict ( fatwa ) stating that the health workers' strike in the Gaza Strip was not legal according to Islamic law (Pal-media and Palestine-info Websites, August 26). B. Marwan al-Ras called upon Ismail Haniya's government to oppose a dialogue with "those whose financial and administrational corruption has been proven.” C. Marwan al-Ras allowed homes to be searched and telephones to be bugged with some qualifications (interview with the newspaper Felesteen , August 17). D. Palestinian clerics were positive regarding the establishment of "the women's police force” (See below). Imposing Islamic social codes on the Gaza Strip populace 14. The following are examples of how the Executive Force imposes Islamic social codes: A.

The Executive Force also operates as the "morality” police force . 5 For example, a couple walking in the street in Gaza City was asked by Executive Force operatives what the relation between them was. When they said they were engaged the young woman was taken to her parents' home to verify the statement. A Hamas-affiliated Palestinian news Website reported that an Executive Force squad had caught a senior Fatah figure in a clinic in the center of the Gaza Strip in intimate circumstances with one of the secretaries (Filastin al-‘An Website, August 24, 2007). B. The Executive Force operates along the Gaza Strip coastline and prevents young men from congregating in places where there are many women. Hamas' newspaper Felesteen printed an editorial attacking mixed bathing at Gaza beaches, which might lead to infractions of Islamic law (Felesteen, August 13). C. The Executive Force disrupts weddings where, it claims, songs are played which "inflame passions.” At least two popular singers were detained by the Executive Force after they appeared at events of important figures affiliated with Fatah, and were charged with singing immoral songs.

The Executive Force uses force to disperse a wedding in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip (Palestinian TV, August 10). D. On August 1 the Executive Force deployed to seize wine and alcohol (drinking alcoholic beverages is forbidden by Islam) . Establishing the women's police force 15. Hamas announced the establishment of a women's police force in the Gaza Strip, which would carry out missions preserving respect for women and would conduct itself according to Islamic law . Ihab al-Ghusayn, a spokesman for the interior ministry, said that hundreds of women had applied and that 100 had been chosen (Al-Bayan, the UAE, August 10). Muhammad Awad, the secretary general of Ismail Haniya's government, said that the women's police force would begin operating in the near future (Qudsnet Website, August 26). 16. A reporter for Hamas' daily Felesteen met with and was favorably received by clerics and experts in Islamic law, who gave their imprimatur to all aspects of the women's police force (Felesteen, August 10): A.

Sheikh Abd al-Karim al-Kahlut , a member of the high Palestinian fatwa committee, agreed that there was a need for a women's police force. He said that such a force existed in most countries of the world, including Islamic states. 6 In his opinion, it would be best if the women were unmarried and middle aged. B. Dr. Maher al-Susi , a lecturer in comparative religious law in the department of religion and law at the Islamic University in Gaza City , said that Islamic law allowed women to work for the police. He said that Islam particular attention to how women are treated, and thus the country had to permit the establishment of a women's police force. C. Dr. Hassan al-Juju , chairman of the religious appeals court, noted that "it is important to have a women's police force to take care of women' s issues, but naturally they will have to be veiled and subject to all the moral rules and behavior of Islamic values...” The deeper layers of Hamas Islamization 17. Beyond its imposition of Islamic social codes on daily life, Hamas controls the social, educational and religious systems which indoctrinate the Gaza Strip populace with radical Islam according to Hamas's worldview.

Those systems, whose influence is long term , include: A. The formal educational system (kindergartens, schools and universities) and informal education system (summer camps, after school activities). The educational system in the Gaza Strip, which is under Hamas influence, is, in our assessment, also undergoing a process of Islamization. B. The mosques in the Gaza Strip , where sermons and speeches are delivered by clerics and political figures affiliated with Hamas. The mosques also serve as focal points for Executive Force social activity. For example, Executive Force meetings with local residents are held in the mosques despite the fact that the topics discussed at the meetings are not religious. 7 C. Hamas' civilian network (the da'wah ), which is based on Islamic charitable societies, deals, among other things, with cultural, educational and religious matters. The societies are controlled by Hamas and other radical Islamic forces. D. Hardcopy and electronic media , which have been controlled by Hamas since it took over the Gaza Strip. That is manifested by the radical Islamic contents published and broadcast by the newspapers, television and radio under Hamas control. 18.

In Judea and Samaria , Salam Fayyad's government, supported by Fatah and the security forces, is making an attempt to control the educational system, the media, the da'wah and even the mosques. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, Hamas is tightening its grip on those systems and thus increasing even more the polarization between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank . Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip | Gisha Reports & Data » Publications » Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip November 2011 Watch “Gaza Reels” – who is in control of Gaza »Executive Summary In recent years, the Gaza Strip has been the focal point of a legal debate which has growing ramifications for the political reality in the region and for the lives of Israelis and Palestinians. The debate revolves around the question of Gaza’s legal status after the removal of Israeli army bases and settlements in the September 2005 “disengagement”.

Israel’s official position is that this marked the end of the occupation that began in 1967 and that the law of occupation ceased to apply to Israel’s relationship with Gaza at that point. According to this position, Israel’s sole obligations to residents of the Gaza Strip are those mandated by the law of armed conflict, which continues to apply, so long as the violent conflict between the Israeli military and armed groups in Gaza continues. In 2007, Gisha published “Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza”, a position paper in which it argued that the law of occupation continues to apply to all Israeli actions toward the Gaza Strip due to the significant control it still exercises over Gaza. “Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip” updates our previous legal analysis and adapts it to reflect the changes on the ground and in the patterns of control exercised over the Gaza Strip by the various actors since 2007, including as a result of the Hamas movement’s takeover of internal control in Gaza. This position paper illustrates how despite recent developments, Israel continues to control Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters, the Palestinian population registry and passage of goods and people to and from Gaza.

Israel still collects customs and value added tax for goods entering the Gaza Strip and maintains some physical presence in the Strip. Israel also controls Gaza’s infrastructure by virtue of its control over supply of electricity and other inputs to the system. Does this mean Israel is still occupying the Gaza Strip? In this position paper, we refer to the “end of occupation” both in Gaza and in the West Bank as a process that takes place over time. We are currently located somewhere on the spectrum between occupation and the end of occupation, that is, a situation in which Israel has already relinquished some governmental powers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and allows Palestinian authorities to exercise them, yet continues to exercise other governmental powers, to the exclusion of others. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to say that the occupation of the Gaza Strip has ended and therefore, the international law of occupation continues to apply to Israel in the spheres in which it continues to exercise control over the lives of Palestinian residents. In the spheres in which Israel has transferred or relinquished powers and allows others to exercise them, its responsibility toward the civilian population is diminished or extinguished.

In addition, for a transitional period, Israel continues to owe obligations in spheres in which it relinquished control, until the representatives of the Palestinian people are able to exercise their sovereignty independently. These obligations are owed according to the post -occupation doctrine which provides protection to the civilian population during the transition from occupation to fulfillment of lawful sovereignty. Israel also has obligations under human rights law wherever actions by its official agents have a significant and direct impact on Gaza’s residents. Despite the fact that the Palestinian authorities are non-state actors (and recognition of a Palestinian state as such will not turn them into state actors), they owe obligations in the spheres they control under human rights law and the law of armed conflict. Israel currently interprets its obligations toward residents of the Gaza Strip (and to a lesser degree, the West Bank as well) as limited to the “minimum” standard required under the law of armed conflict. As a result of this position, Israel allows passage of people only in “exceptional humanitarian cases” and has restricted passage of goods to those “essential for the survival of the civilian population”. In contrast, we argue that under the law of occupation and post-occupation, Israel is obligated to allow the movement of people and goods at the level required to maintain normal life.

Israel may restrict movement only in order to meet concrete security needs, and even then while balancing the restrictions against the needs and rights of Gaza’s residents. Israel must fulfill its obligations under international law by allowing free passage of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip, subject to individual security checks and subject to arrangements that meet both Israel’s security needs and its obligation to facilitate normal life in the Gaza Strip. Because social and economic development, family unification and access to education and proper medical care largely depend on the ability to travel and transport goods, Israel must allow freedom of movement at a level that extends beyond survival and allows for prosperity, development and the realization of individual rights. Although this paper focuses on the Gaza Strip, the analysis offered here may assist in understanding Israel’s obligations regarding the Palestinian territory in general, particularly in light of possible future changes in the elements of control, including as a result of international recognition of a Palestinian state. Whether it concerns a state or any other entity – control creates responsibility. The scope and nature of the responsibility are determined by the scale of control.

Question: What political organization has controlled the Gaza strip since 2007?
Answer: Hamas