TLS has been formally analyzed with the OTS/CafeOBJ method. In the method, distributed systems are modeled as transition systems, which are written in terms of equations, and it is verified that the models have properties by means of equational reasoning. TLS is the latest version, or the successor of SSL, which is probably the most widely deployed security protocol. Among the results of the analysis are that pre-master secrets cannot be leaked, when a client has negotiated a cipher suite and security parameters with a server, the server has really agreed on them, and client cannot be identified if they do not send their certificates to servers. Abstract machines as well as abstract data types can be specified in CafeOBJ 1 [1] , which are mainly based on hidden and initial algebras. CafeOBJ has two kinds of sorts: visible and hidden sorts denoting abstract data types and the state spaces of abstract machines. CafeOBJ has two 1 See www.ldl.jaist.ac.jp/cafeobj/.
REF show secrecy of the pre-master secret and liveness properties for the Handshake protocol using the OTS/CafeOBJ tool.
Equational Approach to Formal Analysis of TLS
25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'05)
25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'05)
Computer Science