This review organizes a variety of phenomena related to emotional self-report. In doing so, the authors offer an accessibility model that specifies the types of factors that contribute to emotional self-reports under different reporting conditions. One important distinction is between emotion, which is episodic, experiential, and contextual, and beliefs about emotion, which are semantic, conceptual, and decontextualized. This distinction is important in understanding the discrepancies that often occur when people are asked to report on feelings they are currently experiencing versus those that they are not currently experiencing. The accessibility model provides an organizing framework for understanding self-reports of emotion and suggests some new directions for research. Emotions are momentary experiences that are intimately tied to the ebb and flow of everyday life, but people also possess generalized beliefs about their emotions. Because beliefs are abstract representations, whereas emotions are episodic occurrences, emotional experience and beliefs about emotion often diverge. This less-than-perfect correspondence has important consequences for understanding emotional self-report. In this article, we explore the discrepancies that can arise when people report on their current feelings versus on feelings that they are not currently experiencing. Our goal is to show how a handful of accessibility principles can explain many of the inconsistencies that appear in the self-report literature. We offer an accessibility model of emotional self-report as an organizational framework. The model is based on standard cognitive principles of accessibility and priming. According to this model, when data from current experience is inaccessible, selfreports of emotion will reflect other sources of nonexperiential information. These other sources of information include memory for the episodic details of an emotional event as well as semantic knowledge about one's emotions. Our review of relevant studies shows that the approach has broad explanatory power and numerous implications for future research. We focus on how this approach can advance the understanding of emotional reports by specifying the factors that contribute to different types of selfreport. Relevant issues are raised throughout the article, and new research designed to test the accessibility assumptions of the model is presented. Self-report is the most common and potentially the best (Clore, 1994; Diener, 2000; Watson, 2000) way to measure a person's emotional experiences. In addition to being convenient, it is also true that, unlike physiological measures of emotion, self-report measures are not limited to current emotions. In this respect, people can answer all kinds of questions about their emotional experiences, including how they felt in the past, how they think they will feel in the future, and how they would feel in a particular situation. Partly because of the ease with which people can make emotion ratings, it is a common practice to take the same emotion terms, the same set of instructions, and simply change the relevant time frame (e.g., past few weeks, right now, in general, if X happened, etc.) when asking people to rate their experiences. Regardless of the time frame involved, responses are generally reliable and, to a certain extent, valid. It is easy to assume that the same process or processes are involved in all types of emotional self-report. However, it would be a mistake to make this assumption. In this connection, the current article has at least two major aims. First, we wish to document emerging evidence for discrepancies among different types of emotional self-report. Second, and more important, we seek to understand why people often say different things about emotions that they are currently experiencing than about emotions that they are not currently experiencing. In both aims, our review is broader and more integrative than prior literature reviews. We propose that people access at least four types of knowledge when reporting on their emotions. These sources are ordered from the most specific to the most general. First, people could access their feelings directly (experiential knowledge). We argue that such access is limited to reports of current emotion. Second, people could attempt to retrieve specific moments from the past (episodic memory). Although past feelings in and of themselves cannot be recalled (in the sense of being reexperienced), they can Each source of information-experiential knowledge, episodic memory, situation-specific belief, and identity-related belief-provides a person with a potentially different answer concerning his or her emotions. This sets the stage for divergence between different types of self-report (e.g., online vs. trait), a point that is covered in detail below. For now, it is useful to discuss three important distinctions relevant to the four sources of information. Specifically, it is useful to distinguish experiential knowledge from memory-related sources of information, episodic memories from semantic ones, and situation-specific beliefs from identity-related beliefs. These distinctions are considered in turn in the next three sections. We assume that an emotional experience can neither be stored nor retrieved. For example, one can remember the fact that riding a roller coaster involved a thrilling sense of free fall, but one cannot retrieve that (or any other) actual experience from the ride. Indeed, if one could truly store and replay the actual experience of riding a roller coaster, there would be little point in riding it more than once. The same is true for emotional experiences. Although emotions can sometimes be generated by mentally reenacting a past situation (Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999) , the resulting experience is a new emotion created in the moment, not an old emotion called up from memory. Moreover, each emotional experience is subtly different, so much so that it might be said that a person never feels the same thing twice (Galin, 1994; James, 1890) . For this reason, any delay between an experience and its report necessarily means a loss of information. These considerations suggest that online reports (i.e., reports of current feelings) must be distinguished from memory-based reports. Because experiential knowledge is more or less exclusive to online reports of emotion, people often say different things about their emotions when actually experiencing them then when they are not actually experiencing them. So far, our approach overlaps to some extent with others (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996) . However, there are important differences as well. One of these lies in the critical distinction that we make between the contributions of episodic and semantic memory. In so doing, we are able to suggest fundamental similarities between a variety of types of self-report (e.g., retrospective, prospective, and trait) that can share semantic, but not episodic, memory. For example, it is reasonable to think that gender-related biases in retrospection (M. D. Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1998) and in response to hypothetical vignettes (M. D. Robinson & Johnson, 1997) occur for similar reasons (see below for a review), namely the intrusion of gender stereotypes. Prior accounts of retrospective biases are relatively mute on the similarities between retrospective and hypothetical reports of emotion. By positing different memory processes, we are also able to distinguish different types of memory biases in retrospection. In particular, the biases in episodic retrieval discussed by Kahneman (1999) appear to be quite different than the theory-based reconstruction discussed by Ross (1989) . We make sense of these distinct retrospective biases by proposing that biases due to episodic versus semantic memory have distinct consequences. Although we argue that emotional experiences cannot be retrieved or reexperienced after they occur, it is important to note that many of the supporting contextual details can be recalled. For example, minutes after a roller coaster ride, a person would be able to remember the relative speed of the roller coaster, the number of steep drops, and the extent of jostling. Many of these contextual details would be helpful in reconstructing one's emotional experiences during the ride. In addition, the person might remember that they had, at one point during the ride, said to themselves "This is pretty exciting" or "I'm too scared to put my arms up." In other words, to the extent that they labeled their feelings during the ride, such thoughts (but not the feelings on which they were based) would be available for retrospection. Finally, recalling contextual details may aid the accuracy of retrospection by allowing the person to recreate an emotional state that is compatible with the emotion experienced at the time of initial occurrence (Lang, Kozak, Miller, Levin, & McLean, 1980; M. D. Robinson & Clore, 2001) . The ability to recall contextual details, however, declines quickly with the passage of time. In this respect, emotion-related memory is no different from other forms of memory (Eich & Schooler, 2000) . With every moment that elapses between an event and its later recall, a predictable loss of detail occurs (for reviews, see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin & Wetzel, 1996) . With the loss of contextual details surrounding an emotional event, one would expect both random and systematic retrospective biases. Random biases would occur because one retrieves some event details but not others. Systematic biases would occur because, normatively, certain kinds of details (e.g., the most recent moments of an experience) are retrieved at the expense of other kinds (e.g., earlier moments of an experience). At a certain point, however, accessible episodic memories become too few and too irrelevant to support reports of emotion based on episodic recall. At this point, we claim, there is a shift to semantic memory. If we are correct, such a shift should create an entirely new set of retrospective biases-specifically, beliefconsistent ones. One major goal of this review is to document and explain these belief-consistent biases. Our ideas concerning the distinction between episodic and semantic memory are compatible with previous work by Tulving and others (Tulving, 1984; 1993b; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) . Episodic memory is specific to a particular event from the past. Semantic memory is not tied to any particular event but rather consists of certain generalizations (i.e., beliefs) that are rarely updated. Whereas episodic memory decays rapidly, semantic 935 EVIDENCE FOR AN ACCESSIBILITY MODEL OF EMOTIONAL SELF-REPORT memory does not. Table 1 lists some other qualitative differences between these two forms of memory. In general, there is good behavioral support for the episodicsemantic distinction (Begg & Nicholson, 1994; Dosher, 1984; Herrmann & Harwood, 1980; Neely & Durgunoglu, 1985; Shoben, Wescourt, & Smith, 1978) . In addition, there is neurological evidence that supports the distinction (see Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000, for a review). Finally, there are functional reasons for these distinct types of memory (McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995) . In particular, one sometimes needs to learn new information quickly, a capacity of episodic (but not semantic) memory. On the other hand, one wants to develop relatively stable expectations about the world, a capacity of semantic (but not episodic) memory. To be able to learn quickly, it is important that forgetting also occurs quickly. For this reason, episodic memory is very time dependent. The two memory systems interact to a certain limited extent, but by and large they function independently. Before concluding here, it is important to distinguish our model from Bartlett's (1932) notion of schematic memory. Schematic memory occurs when people recall episodic details from an event that are congruent, rather than incongruent, with their schemas. Available evidence suggests that this memory bias is not robust (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Zuroff, 1989) . Indeed, people often recall more episodic details that are incongruent, rather than congruent, with their beliefs (Stangor & McMillan, 1992 ). In the context of our model, we do not assume that semantic memory biases episodic memory. Rather, we assume that people abandon episodic retrieval when emotion-related details are inaccessible. In this respect, our view of semantic memory is highly compatible with that of Dooling and Christiaansen (1977) who, in the context of text memory, stated: "With the passage of time, subjects have increased difficulty in retrieving passagespecific episodes. They compensate by using related information from semantic memory" (p. 428). There are multiple types of self-report (e.g., hypothetical, trait) that discourage the use of episodic emotion knowledge (see below for an analysis). In such cases, we propose that people access semantic emotion knowledge instead. People possess two types of semantic emotion knowledge. On the one hand, they have beliefs about how particular situations are likely to influence their emotions (i.e., situation-specific beliefs). On the other hand, they have beliefs about their emotions in general (i.e., identity-related beliefs). We highlight these different types of semantic emotion knowledge because different ratings may be obtained depending on which source(s) of belief an individual accesses when reporting on noncurrent feelings. An emotional situation is inherently episodic and contextual. Situation-specific beliefs, on the other hand, are not episodic in nature, but rather generalized (i.e., semantic) theories of how situations are likely to influence emotion. As an example of this distinction, Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, and Wetzel (1989) compared estimations of how people would feel on their birthdays with how people actually felt on their birthdays. Within the present framework, the former type of hypothetical prompt triggers beliefs related to the influence of birthdays (i.e., they are good), whereas the latter prompt triggers the appraisal of current life details, many of which are likely to be unrelated to birthdays. In short, situationspecific beliefs, when compared with emotional situations, are relatively static and stereotyped. When a given situation is not strongly associated with a given set of situation-specific beliefs, more general, identity-related beliefs are likely to be accessed. Such beliefs include those related to personality, as well as those related to social norms. As an example of the latter type of belief, Sprecher (1999) found that intact relationship partners had a tendency to report that their love for each other had increased since the last reporting period, despite the fact that online reports of love from the relevant time frames were not different. In our culture at least, a healthy romantic relationship is perceived as one that deepens and progresses over time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) . Such a normative belief leads happy relationship partners to perceive progress even when none exists and to reconstruct past feelings to be consistent with this belief (Ross, 1989) . In summary, situation-specific beliefs are beliefs about how a particular situation is likely to influence one's emotions. By contrast, identity-related beliefs are beliefs about one's emotions in general (i.e., across situations). Having presented this last distinction, we are now ready to say more about our model. We have discussed four sources of information that are used in emotional self-report: experiential knowledge, episodic memory, situation-specific belief, and identity-related belief. We propose that people prioritize these sources of information, preferring to use the most specific source of information that is relevant to the judgment at hand. In this respect, although people would prefer to base all of their self-reports on experiential knowledge, this is not possible. The given type of self-report (e.g., retrospective) may render such information inaccessible. In such cases, people access the next most specific source of information, namely episodic memory. However, either because of the passage of time (e.g., retrospective reports) or because of a lack of availability (e.g., prospective reports), such episodic memories may be relatively inaccessible. In such cases, people access the next most specific source of information, namely situation-specific beliefs. However, not all situations are associated with emotional beliefs. In addition, the given type of self-report may not be particular to a given situation at all (e.g., trait reports). In such cases, people access the most general source of information, namely identity-related beliefs. Figure 1 depicts these processing priorities. As indicated in the left column of Figure 1 , both experiential knowledge and episodic memory are episodic. That is, both knowledge sources pertain to particular events that occur in real time. By contrast, both situation-specific beliefs and identity-related beliefs are semantic. That is, both knowledge sources pertain to generalizations about emotion that are decontextualized, conceptual, and largely independent of daily experiences. The right column of Figure 1 , finally, presents the type of self-report that we think is likely to be based on that source of information. For example, experiential knowledge is accessible only for online reports of emotion. In addition to Figure 1 , it is useful to characterize our model in terms of the following three principles. Relative accessibility. The relative contributions the four sources of information-experiential knowledge, episodic memory, situation-specific belief, and identity-related belief-to emotional self-reports depends on their relative accessibility with respect to the judgment at hand. Dominance. If more specific (e.g., episodic memory) and less specific (e.g., situation-specific belief) sources of information are accessible and relevant, the more specific source of information is used instead of the less specific source of information. Thus, experiential knowledge dominates episodic memory and episodic memory dominates semantic memory. Evanescence. Experiential information cannot be stored in memory and episodic memory declines quickly with the passage of time. In the body of this article, we use these three principles to understand discrepancies between different types of emotional self-report (e.g., online vs. trait). As a helpful overview of findings, we first apply our model somewhat generally to the different types of self-report that have been used in the literature. Investigators have examined a number of different reporting formats and content areas in understanding emotional experience. A broad distinction can be made between online reports and those that are not online, and we aim to show how the relative accessibility principle is important to understanding this distinction. We also review research on self-reports of physiological symptoms, reports that share important features with both online and noncurrent reports. When considering retrospective reports, we make the distinction between retrospective biases that are due to episodic memory versus those that are due to semantic memory. Finally, we discuss the difference between situation-specific and identityrelated beliefs. The distinction has special relevance to retrospective, prospective, and hypothetical self-reports. An analysis of each type of self-report reveals differences in the accessible information that the reporter can draw on, as well as documents how these differences can be understood as special cases of our general accessibility model. Online emotion reports. An assumption of our model is that emotions are multifaceted phenomena that include distinctive subjective experiences. Hence, even when emotions are elicited by stimuli and concerns that are not focal in awareness, people generally have access to them through the subjective experience component (Clore, 1994) . In arriving at online emotion reports, these emotional experiences usually overwhelm prior beliefs about one's emotion, as indicated by the dominance principle. Online reports of physiological symptoms. People are sometimes asked to report on their physiological processes and symptoms. For example, the experience of arousal, an important contribution to emotional experience, is sometimes thought to be based on activation of the sympathetic nervous system (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) . However, research has demonstrated that people have comparatively poor access to their bodily reactions (Pennebaker, 2000) . For this reason, they often make inferences about their bodily processes by using shared as well as idiosyncratic theories of how situational factors affect the body (i.e., situation-specific beliefs). The lack of direct access to bodily processes also allows for identity-related beliefs about emotion to play a role. The relative reliance on situation-specific versus identity-related beliefs depends on the sufficiency of situational cues for making inferences. When clear-cut cues exist in the environment (e.g., the person is viewing an intense stimulus), situation-specific beliefs are used. When clear-cut situational cues are lacking, more general identity-related beliefs are used. Retrospective emotion reports. Across a wide variety of tasks, memory for specific episodic details declines as a power function Figure 1 . Four sources of information in emotional self-report. The left column notes that both experiential information and episodic memory are episodic in nature, whereas both situation-specific and identity-related beliefs are semantic in nature. The middle column depicts the processing priorities. The right column indicates the type of self-report that is most likely to be based on a particular source of information.
While episodic memory "is specific to a particular event from the past, semantic memory is not tied to any particular event but rather consists of certain generalizations (i.e. beliefs) that are rarely updated" REF .
Belief and feeling: evidence for an accessibility model of emotional self-report.
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