Abstract-If a network is to operate successfully, its users need to collaborate. Collaboration takes the form of following a network protocol and involves some resource expenditure on the part of the user. Therefore, users cannot automatically be expected to follow the protocol if they are not forced to. The situation is exacerbated by the presence of malicious users whose objective is to damage the network and increase the cost incurred by the legitimate users. The legitimate users are, at least initially, unaware of the type (legitimate or malicious) of the other users. Our contribution is a model for the strategic interaction of legitimate and malicious users as described above. The model is based on repeated graphical games with incomplete information. We describe and analyze two specific instantiations, aiming to demonstrate the model's expressive power and tractability. The main benefit we see from using game theory for this essentially security problem is the ability to bound the damage caused by the malicious users.
A game theoretic model for the strategic interaction of legitimate and malicious players is introduced in REF , where the authors have derived a bound on the damage caused by the malicious players.
Game Theoretic Modeling of Malicious Users in Collaborative Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Computer Science