This paper studies hedonic coalition formation games where each player's preferences rely only upon the members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introduced which is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games and it is the strongest stability notion appropriate to the context of hedonic coalition formation games. The weak top-choice property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. It is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. Strong Nash stability under different membership rights is also studied.
Very recently, Karakaya REF proposed a new stability concept called strong Nash stability which is stronger than Nash stability and core stability combined.
Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion
Math. Soc. Sci.
Math. Soc. Sci.
Computer Science Economics