In wireless ad hoc networks, routing requires cooperation of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to cooperate. However, most existing studies of the incentivecompatible routing problem focus on individual nodes' incentives, assuming that no subset of them would collude. Clearly, this assumption is not always valid. In this paper, we present a systematic study of collusion resistance in incentive-compatible routing schemes. In particular, we consider two standard solution concepts for collusion resistance in game theory, namely Group Strategyproofness and Strong Nash Equilibrium. We show that achieving Group Strategyproofness is impossible while achieving Strong Nash Equilibrium is possible. More specifically, we design a scheme that is guaranteed to converge to a Strong Nash Equilibrium. In addition, we give a cryptographic method that prevents profit transfer between colluding nodes, as long as they do not fully trust each other unconditionally. This method makes our scheme widely applicable in practice. Experiments show that our solution is collusion-resistant and has good performance.
REF designs a collusion-resistant routing scheme for non-cooperative wireless networks.
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
MobiCom '07
Computer Science