Abstract: User authentication in wireless sensor networks (WSN) is a critical security issue due to their unattended and hostile deployment in the field. Since sensor nodes are equipped with limited computing power, storage, and communication modules; authenticating remote users in such resource-constrained environments is a paramount security concern. Recently, M.L. Das proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in WSNs and claimed that his scheme is secure against different kinds of attack. However, in this paper, we show that the M.L. Das-scheme has some critical security pitfalls and cannot be recommended for real applications. We point out that in his scheme: users cannot change/update their passwords, it does not provide mutual authentication between gateway node and sensor node, and is vulnerable to gateway node bypassing attack and privileged-insider attack. To overcome the inherent security weaknesses of the M.L. Das-scheme, we propose improvements and security patches that attempt to fix the susceptibilities of his scheme. The proposed security improvements can be incorporated in the M.L. Das-scheme for achieving a more secure and robust two-factor user authentication in WSNs.
In the same year, Khan and Alghathbar REF found that Das's scheme is vulnerable to gateway ( )-node bypassing attacks, does not provide mutual authentication between the node and sensor nodes, is vulnerable to insider attacks, and does not have provisions for changing or updating registered users' passwords.
Cryptanalysis and Security Improvements of ‘Two-Factor User Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks’
Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
Engineering Medicine Computer Science