In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy. Index Terms-Cooperation enforcement, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), indirect reciprocity, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), packet forwarding game. under the supervision of Prof. X. Li. His current research interests include EGT and game-theoretical optimization on vertex cover. Xiang Li (M'05-SM'08) received the B.S. and Ph.D. degrees in control theory and control engineering from Nankai University,
Authors in REF propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on a gametheoretic solution to enforce cooperation among nodes.
When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
Mathematics Computer Science Medicine