With the rapidly growing importance of multicast in the Internet, several schemes for scalable key distribution have been proposed. These schemes require the broadcast of H(log n) encrypted messages to update the group key when the nth user joins or leaves the group. In this paper, we establish a matching lower bound (Independently, and concurrently, Richard Yang and Simon Lam discovered a similar bound with slightly different properties and proofs. An earlier version of our paper appeared in Infocom 2001 while their result appears in [R. Yang, S. Lam, A secure group key management communication lower bound, Technical Report TR-00-24, Department of Computer Sciences, UT Austin, July 2000, revised September 2000].), thus showing that H(log n) encrypted messages are necessary for a general class of key distribution schemes and under different assumptions on user capabilities. While key distribution schemes can exercise some tradeoff between the costs of adding or deleting a user, our main result shows that for any scheme there is a sequence of 2n insertion and deletions whose total cost is X(n log n). Thus, any key distribution scheme has a worstcase cost of X(log n) either for adding or for deleting a user.
In REF , it is shown that Θ(log n) messages are necessary for an update in the worst case, for a general class of key distribution schemes.
A lower bound for multicast key distribution
Computer Science