Abstract-CSMMCA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMNCA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules, This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; hy doing so. a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. We use B game-theoretic approach to investigate the prohlem of the selfish behavior of nodes in CSMAKA networl, specifically geared towards the most widely accepted prutocol in this class of protocob, IEEE 802.11. We characterize two families of Nash equiIibria in a single stage game, one of which always results in a network colIapse. We argue that this result provides an incentive for cheaters to cooperate with each other. ExpIicit cooperation among nodes is clearly impractical, By applying the model of dynamic games borrowed from game theory, we derive the conditions for the stable and optimal functioning of a population of cheaters. We use this insight to develop a simple, localized and distributed protocol that successfully guides muItiple selfish nodes to B Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium.
The authors of REF derive the conditions for the optimal functioning of the selfish transmitters in CSMA/CA.
On selfish behavior in CSMA/CA networks
Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
Computer Science