Abstract. We describe a new algorithm for masking look-up tables of block-ciphers at any order, as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Our technique is a generalization of the classical randomized table countermeasure against first-order attacks. We prove the security of our new algorithm against t-th order attacks in the usual Ishai-Sahai-Wagner model from Crypto 2003; we also improve the bound on the number of shares from n ≥ 4t + 1 to n ≥ 2t + 1 for an adversary who can adaptively move its probes between successive executions. Our algorithm has the same time complexity O(n 2 ) as the Rivain-Prouff algorithm for AES, and its extension by Carlet et al. to any look-up table. In practice for AES our algorithm is less efficient than Rivain-Prouff, which can take advantage of the special algebraic structure of the AES Sbox; however for DES our algorithm performs slightly better.
Coron REF introduced a method to mask look-up tables at any order.
Higher Order Masking of Look-up Tables
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Computer Science