Abstract-Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.
In addition, Trajanovski et al. REF found decentralized optimal protection strategies for the network system by proposing a game-theoretic framework and seeking its Nash equilibria and the Price of Anarchy.
Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks
ArXiv
ArXiv
Computer Science