A passive attacker can compromise a generic anonymity protocol by applying the so called disclosure attack, i.e. a special traffic analysis attack. In this work we present a more efficient way to accomplish this goal, i.e. we need less observations by looking for unique minimal hitting sets. We call this the hitting set attack or just HS-attack. In general, solving the minimal hitting set problem is NP-hard. Therefore, we use frequency analysis to enhance the applicability of our attack. It is possible to apply highly efficient backtracking search algorithms. We call this approach the statistical hitting set attack or SHS-attack. However, the statistical hitting set attack is prone to wrong solutions with a given small probability. We use here duality checking algorithms to resolve this problem. We call this final exact attack the HS*-attack.
A more efficient approach to obtain the exact solution, the Hitting Set Attack was proposed in REF .
The Hitting Set Attack on Anonymity Protocols
Information Hiding
Computer Science