The participation of renewable energy sources in energy markets is challenging, mainly because of the uncertainty associated with the renewables. Aggregation of renewable energy suppliers is shown to be very effective in decreasing this uncertainty. In the present paper, we propose a cost sharing mechanism that entices the suppliers of wind, solar and other renewable resources to form or join an aggregate. In particular, we consider the effect of a bonus for surplus in supply, which is neglected in previous work. We introduce a specific proportional cost sharing mechanism, which satisfies the desired properties of such mechanisms that are introduced in the literature, e.g., budget balancedness, ex-post individual rationality and fairness. In addition, we show that the proposed mechanism results in a stable market outcome. Finally, the results of the paper are illustrated by numerical examples.
A proportional cost sharing mechanism that achieves budget balance, no-exploitation and fairness is proposed in REF .
Effect of bonus payments in cost sharing mechanism design for renewable energy aggregation
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Computer Science Mathematics