Routing protocols are key elements for ad hoc networks. They are in charge of establishing routes between network nodes efficiently. Despite the interest shown by the scientific community and industry in converting the first specifications of ad hoc routing protocols in functional prototypes, aspects such as the resilience of these protocols remain generally unaddressed in practice. Tackling this issue becomes critical given the increasingly variety of accidental and malicious faults (attacks) that may impact the behavior exhibited by ad hoc routing protocols. The main objective of this paper is to deepen the methodological aspects concerning fault injection in routing protocols. As a result, we will design and implement a framework based on the injection of accidental and malicious faults to quantitatively evaluate their impact on routing protocols. This framework, called REFRAHN (Resilience Evaluation FRamework for Ad Hoc Networks), can be used to (i) reduce the uncertainty about the sources of perturbations in the deployment of ad hoc routing protocols, (ii) design fault tolerance mechanisms that address and minimize such problems, and (iii) compare and select which is the routing protocol that optimizes the performance and robustness of the network.
Friginal et al. REF proposed a security framework named Resilience Evaluation Framework for Ad Hoc routing protocols (REFRAHN) based on the insertion of malicious faults and quantitatively evaluated their effect on routing protocols.
REFRAHN: A Resilience Evaluation Framework for Ad Hoc Routing Protocols
Comput. Networks
Comput. Networks
Computer Science