This paper presents a new method for specifyiny and analyzing cryptographic protocols. O u r method offers several advantages over previous approaches. O u r technique is the first to allow reasoning about nonmonotonic protocols, which are needed for systems that rely on the deletion of information. Tltere is no idealization of protocols; we specify at a level that is close t o the actual implementation. We show how our method uncovers the known p a w in the Needham and Schroeder protocol. We then upply the method to our khat protocol. TILE analysis reveuls a serious, previously undiscovered flaw in our nonmonotonic protocol f o r long-ruitning jobs.
It is one of the �rst approaches to allow reasoning about nonmonotonic protocols REF .
Nonmonotonic cryptographic protocols
Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII
Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII
Computer Science