We show how to leverage the RKA (Related-Key Attack) security of blockciphers to provide RKA security for a suite of high-level primitives. This motivates a more general theoretical question, namely, when is it possible to transfer RKA security from a primitive P 1 to a primitive P 2 ? We provide both positive and negative answers. What emerges is a broad and high level picture of the way achievability of RKA security varies across primitives, showing, in particular, that some primitives resist "more" RKAs than others. A technical challenge was to achieve RKA security even for the practical classes of related-key deriving (RKD) functions underlying fault injection attacks that fail to satisfy the "claw-freeness" assumption made in previous works. We surmount this barrier for the first time based on the construction of PRGs that are not only RKA secure but satisfy a new notion of identity-collision-resistance.
Bellare et al. REF explore the possibilities of transferring RKA security from one primitive to another (while preserving the class Φ of related-key deriving functions).
Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Computer Science