In this paper, we study a broker-based TV white space market, where unlicensed white space devices (WSDs) purchase white space spectrum from TV licensees via a third-party geo-location database (DB), which serves as a spectrum broker, reserving spectrum from TV licensees and then reselling the reserved spectrum to WSDs. We propose a contract-theoretic framework for the database's spectrum reservation under demand stochasticity and information asymmetry. In such a framework, the database offers a set of contract items in the form of reservation amount and the corresponding payment, and each WSD chooses the best contract item based on its private information. We systematically study the optimal reservation contract design (that maximizes the database's expected profit) under two different risk-bearing schemes: DB-bearing-risk and WSD-bearing-risk, depending on who (the database or the WSDs) will bear the risk of over reservation. Counter-intuitively, we show that the optimal contract under DB-bearing-risk leads to a higher profit for the database and a higher total network profit. Our numerical results show that the proposed optimal spectrum reservation contract improves the total network profit up to 5%, compared with the scheme without information sharing. Index Terms-TV white space networks, spectrum reservation, contract theory, game theory. 2332-7731
In REF , a broker-based spectrum reservation market model for TV white space network is proposed for the database's spectrum reservation under demand stochasticity and information asymmetry.
Spectrum Reservation Contract Design in TV White Space Networks
IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Mathematics Computer Science