Abstract-In this paper we consider several Software as a Service (SaaS) providers, that offer a set of applications using the Cloud facilities provided by an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provider. We assume that the IaaS provider offers a pay only what you use scheme similar to the Amazon EC2 service, comprising flat, on demand, and spot virtual machine instances. We propose a two stage provisioning scheme. In the first stage, the SaaS providers determine the number of required flat and on demand instances by means of standard optimization techniques. In the second stage the SaaS providers compete, by bidding for the spot instances which are instantiated using the unused IaaS capacity. We assume that the SaaS providers want to maximize a suitable utility function which accounts for both the QoS delivered to their users and the associated cost. The IaaS provider, on the other hand, wants to maximize his revenue by determining the spot prices given the SaaS bids. We model the second stage as a Stackelberg game, and we compute its equilibrium price and allocation strategy by solving a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) problem. Through numerical evaluation we study the equilibrium solutions as function of the system parameters.
A multi-SaaS/single-IaaS problem with flat, on demand and on spot VM instances is faced in REF , where a two stage provisioning mechanism is proposed.
Optimal Pricing and Service Provisioning Strategies in Cloud Systems: A Stackelberg Game Approach
2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cloud Computing
2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cloud Computing
Computer Science