In this paper, we propose a multi-agent negotiation model for the wholesale price contract (price: W, quantity: Q) in a supply chain with a retailer buying from several subcontractors. We assumed that the retailer stocks up from several subcontractors in order to face a market with fixed demand. Each subcontractor has a normal production capacity (CN) which can be increased until a maximal capacity (CM) but with an additional cost. The demand is superior to the sum of normal capacities and inferior to the sum of maximal capacities. Thereby, the negotiated and agreed price between the retailer and each subcontractor relies on the ordered quantity and the extra cost generated by any excess capacity (above the CN level). Under asymmetric informational context, we propose a multi-agent model which is a duplication of the considered supply chain; subcontractor agents negotiate a combination (price, quantity) in order to maximize their benefits and a retailer agent negotiates several combinations (price, quantity) with the different subcontractor agents in order to satisfy demand, allocate quantities and maximize its margin. Experimental results shows that the objective of reaching agreements and establish a long-lasting "win-win" partnership is totally reached but repartition of benefits is not so fair.
Kallel and others REF propose a multi-agent negotiation model for a particular contract type of a specific supply chain.
Multi-Agent Negotiation in a Supply Chain - Case of the Wholsale Price Contract.
ICEIS
Computer Science Business