Today peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks help tens of millions of users to share contents on the Internet. However, users' private files in their shared folders might become accessible to everybody inadvertently. In this paper, we investigate this kind of user privacy exposures in Kad, one of the biggest P2P file sharing networks, and try to answer two questions: Q1. Whether and to what extent does this problem exist in current systems? Q2. Are attackers aware of this privacy vulnerability and are they abusing obtained private information? We build a monitoring system called Dragonfly based on the eclipse mechanism to passively monitor sharing and downloading events in Kad. We also use the Honeyfile approach to share forged private information to observe attackers' behaviors. Based on Dragonfly and Honeyfiles, we give affirmative answers to the above two questions. Within two weeks, more than five thousand private files related to ten sensitive keywords were shared by Kad users, and over half of them come from Italy and Spain. Within one month, each honey file was downloaded for about 40 times in average, and its inner password information was exploited for 25 times. These results show that this privacy problem has become a serious threat for P2P users. Finally, we design and implement Numen, a plug-in for eMule, which can effectively protect user private files from being shared without notice.
Liu et al. REF studied the problem of privacy in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, using honey files.
How many eyes are spying on your shared folders?
WPES '12
Computer Science