An operator-assisted user-provided network (UPN) has the potential to achieve a low cost ubiquitous Internet connectivity, without significantly increasing the network infrastructure investment. In this paper, we consider such a network where the network operator encourages some of her subscribers to operate as mobile Wi-Fi hotspots (hosts), providing Internet connectivity for other subscribers (clients). We formulate the interaction between the operator and mobile users as a two-stage game. In Stage I, the operator determines the usage-based pricing and quota-based incentive mechanism for the data usage. In Stage II, the mobile users make their decisions about whether to be a host, or a client, or not a subscriber at all. We characterize how the users' membership choices will affect each other's payoffs in Stage II, and how the operator optimizes her decision in Stage I to maximize her profit. Our theoretical and numerical results show that the operator's maximum profit increases with the user density, and the profit gain can be up to 50% in a dense network comparing with a pricing-only approach with no incentives.
Khalili et al. REF considered a network where the operator encourages some of its subscribers to operate as mobile WiFi hotspots (hosts), providing internet connectivity to other subscribers (clients).
Incentive design and market evolution of mobile user-provided networks
2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)
2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)
Mathematics Computer Science