We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides a set of players that are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: Fence Monotonicity, Stability of the allocation and Validity of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Consequently, Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes closing an important open problem. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has arbitrarily poor budget balance.
Pountourakis and Vidali REF recently gave a complete characterization of group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms and thereby settled a major open problem.
A Complete Characterization of Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-Sharing
Algorithmica
Algorithmica
Mathematics Computer Science