We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of modern railroads. We assume separate network territories, with an autonomous dispatch agent responsible for the ow of trains over each territory. Each train is represented by a self-interested agent that bids for the right to travel across the network from its source to destination, submitting bids to multiple dispatch a g e n ts along its route as necessary. The bidding language allows trains to bid for the right t o e n ter and exit territories at particular times, and also to represent indi erence over a range of times. Computational results on a simple network with straight-forward best-response bidding strategies demonstrate that the auction computes nearoptimal system-wide schedules. In addition, the method appears to have useful scaling properties, both with the number of trains and with the number of dispatchers, and generates less extremal solutions than those obtained using traditional centralized optimization techniques.
In REF , Parkes and Ungar presented an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling.
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
AGENTS '01
Computer Science