Abstract-Device-to-device (D2D) computation offloading has recently been proposed to enhance mobile edge computing (MEC) performance by exploiting spare computing resources in proximity user devices, thereby alleviating computation burdens from the network infrastructure and enabling truly pervasive edge computing. A key challenge in this new mobile computing paradigm is how to provide self-interested users with incentives to participate in D2D computing. Although incentive mechanism design has been intensively studied in the literature, this paper considers a much more challenging yet much under-investigated problem in which user incentives are complexly coupled with security risks, which is extremely important since D2D-enhanced MEC systems are vulnerable to distributed attacks, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, due to its autonomous nature. In this paper, we build a novel mathematical framework incorporating game theory and classic epidemic models to investigate the interplay between user incentives and security risks in D2D-enhanced MEC systems under infectious DDoS attacks. A key result derived from this analysis is a phase change effect between persistent and non-persistent DDoS attacks, which is significantly different in nature from classic epidemic results for nonstrategic users. Based on this, we determine the optimal reward in a contract-based incentive mechanism that the network operator should offer to users in order to maximize the operator's utility. The optimal solution exhibits an interesting "Less is More" effect: although giving users a higher reward promote more participation, it may harm the operator's utility. This is because too much participation fosters persistent DDoS attack and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve. Our novel model and analysis provide new and important insights and guidelines for optimizing the incentive mechanism for D2D-enhanced MEC systems as well as combating distributed attacks in the presence of strategic users. Finally, extensive simulations are carried out to verify the analytic conclusions.
The authors in REF build a novel mathematical framework based on game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks (DDoS) in mobile edge computing.
Less is More: Participation Incentives in D2D-enhanced Mobile Edge Computing under Infectious DDoS Attacks
ArXiv
ArXiv
Mathematics Computer Science