Abstract. Transient faults are single-shot hardware errors caused by high energy particles from space, manufacturing defects, overheating, and other sources. Such faults can be devastating for security-and safetycritical systems. In order to mitigate these problems, software developers can add redundancy in various ways to their software systems. However, such redundancy is hard to reason about and corner cases are easy to miss, leaving these systems vulnerable. To solve this problem, we have developed a logic, based on Separation Logic, for reasoning about faults as resources. We show how to use this logic as a language of assertions and incorporate it into a Hoare Logic for verifying imperative programs. This Hoare Logic is parameterized by a formal fault model and it can be used to prove imperative programs correct with respect to that model. In addition to developing this basic verification platform, we have designed a modal operator that abstracts away the effects of individual faults, enabling modularization of proofs and greatly simplifying the reasoning involved. The logic is proved sound and studied through a number of examples, including a simplified version of the RSA Sign/Verify algorithm.
REF propose a sub-structural logic for reasoning about fault tolerant programs.
Faulty Logic: Reasoning about Fault Tolerant Programs
ESOP
Computer Science