A multilevel security policy is considered in the scenario of mobile systems, and modeled within "pure" Mobile Ambients calculus, in which no communication channels are present and the only possible actions are represented by the moves performed by mobile processes. The information flow property of interest is defined in terms of the possibility for a confidential ambient/data to move outside a security boundary. In a previous paper, we gave a very simple syntactic property that is sufficient to imply the absence of unwanted information flows. In this paper, a control flow analysis is defined, as a refinement of the Hansen-Jensen-Nielsons's CFA, that allows to capture boundary crossings with better accuracy.
In particular Braghin et al. REF study 'explicit' information flow security in the scenario of pure Mobile Ambients by defining a control-flow analysis to detect security breaches arising as confidential data moving outside any Ö ¸ Ù Ð × Ò ×Ø Ò voundary protection.
Control Flow Analysis of Mobile Ambients with Security Boundaries
FMOODS
Computer Science