Developers use cryptographic APIs in Android with the intent of securing data such as passwords and personal information on mobile devices. In this paper, we ask whether developers use the cryptographic APIs in a fashion that provides typical cryptographic notions of security, e.g., IND-CPA security. We develop program analysis techniques to automatically check programs on the Google Play marketplace, and find that 10,327 out of 11,748 applications that use cryptographic APIs -88% overall -make at least one mistake. These numbers show that applications do not use cryptographic APIs in a fashion that maximizes overall security. We then suggest specific remediations based on our analysis toward improving overall cryptographic security in Android applications.
The first methodical attempt that constitutes a key milestone in the specific domain is Manuel Egele's et al. study REF , the main purpose of which was to test whether developers use the cryptographic APIs in a fashion that provides typical cryptographic notions of security (e.g. IND-CPA security).
An empirical study of cryptographic misuse in android applications
CCS '13
Computer Science