We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.
In REF , the authors consider customers' decisions in observable and unobservable queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch services.
Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study
Games Econ. Behav.
Games Econ. Behav.
Economics Computer Science