Abstract-An The basic service offered by every node in an ad-hoc network is that of routing pockets from their source to their ultimate destination. In general, routing protocols are susceptible to a wide variety of attacks. For example. a malicious node may perform a denial of service attack by selectively jamming some areas of the network. A great deal of work has been done in terms of guaranteeing. practical security considerations in existing network protocols. In practice, adversarial attacks observed and documented in ad hoc networks might not be overly sophisticated. The ease of access to the medium has allowed extremely basic attacks to cause a great deal of damape. Consequently, such attacks can be thwarted by simple yet effective methods. Existing work in the literature considered a number of strong adversary models. For example, [l] considers a random fault pattern; 121 deals with a static fault pattern and [31 deals with an obbvioiis (non-adaptive) pattern. Our goal is to design routing protocols for networks that are provably tolerant of arbitrary adaptive DOS atlacks. The adversary that we will consider selectively attacks packets on 2 given node or link. This adversary benefits from knowledge of the traffic pattern (including packet contents); this includes alI current traffic and all past traffic history. As a result, the algorithms and analysis techniques used in the previous work will not apply. Existing methods that do It may appear that our adversarial routing model may lead to impractical algorithms in benign (non-adversarial) settings. However, routing algorithms similar to the one studied here were developed and tested in real network environments by British Telecomm and NTT for both wired and wireless networks with superior results E61, [ZOI, [91, [71, [171, [181, Our contriburion: We propose a new algorithm for adaptively selectifig routing paths in a network with dynamic adversarial edge failures. and we give a rigorous mathematical analysis of this algorithm, proving that its packet loss will match the minimal cumulative loss of any path, up to an additive error which is sublinear in the number of trials. The general framework we propose is appropriate for analyzing routing protocols for networks operating under the extremely strong adversarial model specified above. Such strong models have not been considered in the literature to the best of our knowledge. In fact, adaptive dynamic denial of service attacks are sufficient to break most existing algorithmic work. (In Section HI, we briefly explain why DOS attacks are so devastating.) What distinguishes the present work is our insistence on proving that under cotnpletel? arbitmp adversarial behavior. with essentially no assumptions about the network, the packet Ioss of our protocol will essentially match the minimal cumulative loss (i.e.: sum of losses of individual links) of any path. While it may seem counter-intuitive that such a goal can be achieved, the key is h a t although we assume an arbitrary dynainic adversary, we compare the algorithm against the best sratic path; if the adversary works hard to damage 631 0-7803-
A competitive routing scheme in terms of the number of failed routes in the setting of ad-hoc networks is presented in REF .
Provably competitive adaptive routing
Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
Computer Science