Abstract-It has been suggested that light regulation in the form of etiquette protocols, device design and bargaining amongst users will suffice to mitigate a tragedy of the commons in unlicensed spectrum. In this paper we propose a game theoretic model to examine this claim. In this game, each user decides whether or not to set up an access point, which operates on a particular (single) band. The effect of regulation is modeled in reduced form through transfers. A user who sets up an access point, provides payments to each neighbor who does not and suffers a disutility depending on the number of interfering access points. A user who does not set up an access point, receives payments from each neighbor that does. For a suitable model of payoffs, the game is a potential game and best response updates converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. For any interference parameters, there is a suitable transfer resulting in a Nash equilibrium which is efficient. However, all Nash equilibria may not be efficient.
Besides, authors in REF build a game theoretic model to investigate whether light regulation in the form of etiquette protocols, device design and bargaining amongst users can avoid the tragedy of common in unlicensed spectrum.
Incentives and Resource Sharing in Spectrum Commons
2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
Economics