Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes with truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium with truncations at the match point. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations admits one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be small. But examples exist such that the set of stable matchings with respect to a Nash equilibrium may contain more than one matching. Nevertheless, each Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. If, indeed, there is a true stable matching at a Nash equilibrium, then the only possible equilibrium outcome will be the true stable matching, no matter how players manipulate their equilibrium strategies and how many other unstable matchings are there at the Nash equilibrium. Thus, we show that a necessary and su±cient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibria by a direct revelation game induced by a stable matching mechanism is that every Nash equilibrium pro¯le in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching. Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation Numbers: C78, D71.
Ma REF analyzes the truncation in stable matching and the small core in nash equilibrium in college admission problems.
Stable Matchings And The Small Core In Nash Equilibrium In The College Admissions Problem
Economics