ABSTRACT The password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is one of most practical cryptographic primitives for trusted computing, which is used to securely authenticate devices' identities and generate shared session keys among devices in insecure environments by using a short, human-memorable password. With the fast development of the Internet of Things (IoT), new challenges regarding PAKE have emerged. The traditional PAKE protocols are completely insecure in IoT environments, since there are many kinds of side-channel attacks. Therefore, it is very important to model and design leakage-resilient (LR) PAKE protocols. However, there has been no prior work on modeling and constructing LR PAKE protocols. In this paper, we first formalize an LR eCK security model for PAKE based on the eCK-secure PAKE model and the only computation leakage model. Then, we propose the first LR PAKE protocol by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, LR storage (LRS) and LR refreshing of LRS appropriately and formally present a security proof in the standard model. Leakage-resilience, password-based authenticated key exchange, side-channel attacks, trusted computing, internet of things.
In REF Ruan et al. designed a leakage-resilient (LR) eCK security model for the password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol.
Provably Leakage-Resilient Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model
IEEE Access
IEEE Access
Computer Science