In this paper, we address the low efficiency of cluster-based communication for the crossroad scenario in the Vehicular Cyber-Physical System (VCPS), which is due to the overload of the cluster head resulting from a large number of transmission bandwidth requirements. After formulating the issue as a coalition formation game, a coalition-based clustering strategy is proposed, which could converge into a Nash-stable partition to accomplish the clustering formation process. In the proposed strategy, the coalition utility is formulated by the relative velocity, relative position and the bandwidth availability ratio of vehicles among the cluster. Employing the coalition utility, the vehicles are denoted as the nodes that make the decision whether to switch to a new coalition or stay in the current coalition. Based on this, we can make full use of the bandwidth provided by cluster head under the requirement of clustering stability. Nevertheless, there exist selfish nodes during the clustering formation, so as to intend to benefit from networks. This behavior may degrade the communication quality and even destroy the cluster. Thus, we also present a reputation-based incentive and penalty mechanism to stop the selfish nodes from entering clusters. Numerical simulation results show that our strategy, CG-SECC, takes on a better performance for the tradeoff between the stability and efficiency of clustering communication. Besides, a case study demonstrates that the proposed incentive and penalty mechanism can play an important role in discovering and removing malicious nodes.
Also, the authors achieved cluster-based content sharing for the crossroad scenario in VANETs based on a coalition formation game in REF .
Coalition Game-Based Secure and Effective Clustering Communication in Vehicular Cyber-Physical System (VCPS)
Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
Medicine Engineering Computer Science