Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.
Besides the Canetti-Krawczyk key exchange model REF for security analysis of key exchange protocols, other models and tools have been proposed in the literature.
Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Computer Science