Abstract-We present composition theorems for security protocols, to compose a key exchange protocol and a symmetrickey protocol that uses the exchanged key. Our results rely on the computational model of cryptography and are stated in the framework of the tool CryptoVerif. They support key exchange protocols that guarantee injective or non-injective authentication. They also allow random oracles shared between the composed protocols. To our knowledge, they are the first composition theorems for key exchange stated for a computational protocol verification tool, and also the first to allow such flexibility. As a case study, we apply our composition theorems to a proof of TLS 1.3 Draft-18. This work fills a gap in a previous paper that informally claims a compositional proof of TLS 1.3, without formally justifying it.
In REF , the authors present composition theorems for security protocols, to compose a key exchange protocol and a symmetric key protocol that uses the exchanged key.
Composition Theorems for CryptoVerif and Application to TLS 1.3
2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Computer Science