Case: Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg and Corning Railroad
Abbreviation: Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg & Corning Railroad
Decision Date: 1873-10
Docket Number: 
Citation: 20 Wall. 137
Volume: 87
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg and Corning Railroad.
Judges: Mr. Justice FIELD concurred ip this opinion.
Pages: 137–152

Head Matter:
Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg and Corning Railroad.
1. Where, in a judicial proceeding,-the matter passed upon is the right under the language of a certain contract to take receipts on a railroad, the judgment concludes the question of .the meaning of the contract on a suit for subsequent tolls received under the same contract.
2. The highest courts of New York, construing the statutes of limitations of that State, have decided.that a foreign corporation cannot availitself of them; and this, notwithstanding such corporation was the lessee of a railroad in New York, and had property within the State, and a managing agent residing and keeping an office of the company.
3. These decisions upon the construction of the statutes are binding upon this court, whatever it may think of their soundness on general principles.
4. No error can be assigned on a general finding.
Error to the' Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York.
The Tioga Railroad Company was a corporation duly organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and was the proprietor of a railroad extending from Blossburg, a town in •that State, a little south of the line between Pennsylvania and New York,'up to that said line. The Blossbhrg and Corning Railroad Company was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, and was the proprietor of a railroad connecting with the abovementioned road at the State line and extending thence to Corning in New York; the^two roads forming a complete line of railroad from Blossburg to Corning. The latter company had acquired its part of the road by purchase in 1855, succeeding to the rights of a former company called the Coining and Blossburg Railroad Company. By contract maáe in 1851 the Corning or New York end of the line was'leased to the Tiogá Railroad Company under certain terms-and stipulatiou&J amongst vlhich was the following:.
“For the use of the said railroad of the said-Corning and Blossburg Railro- 4 Company, and the use of their depots, engine-houses,- machine-shops, .grounds, water-stations, &e., the Tioga Railroad-iCompany agrees to pay to the Corning and Blossburg Railroad Company two-thirds, of the receipts for passengers, mails, and freights which shall be taken' for the said Corning and Blossburg Railroad, the expenses charged customers for the loading and unloading coal, lumber, find other freights, and for the warehousing, and such additional charges, by way of discrimination, as-'shaU'be made for short distances for motive power, not to ■ be included in the term receipts, as abovementioned.”
The parties soon disagreed- as to the meaning of the words italicized. The lessees asserted that they were entitled to keep any excess of way-fares and freights for intermediate places and short distances abo.ve the through rates for those places, and did-qot account for, b'ut retained the-same; and for this difference, running through many.years, the Blossburg and Corning company, on the 6th of May, 1864, sued the other company in the court below.
Previously to the bringing of this, the present suit, that is to sa.y, in January, 1855, the. Blossburg company had brought a suit in the Supreme Court of New York against the Tioga company on the contract in question, in which this question of difference was litigated. The record of that case, which went to final judgment (see 1st Keyes, 486), was given in evidence in this one.
The present suit was brought for the same class of receipts which had accrued since the commencement of the former action. Besides the defence abovementioned, the Tioga company in this case pleaded the statute of limitations as to all receipts which accrued more than six years before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff replied that the defendant was a Corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and not created or existing under the laws of the State of New York, aud that when the supposed cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant (the Tibga company) was out of the State of New York, and so remained' until this action was commenced. The defendant denied that at or since the commencement of the action it had been out of the State.
The significance of these pleadings was derived from the New York statute of limitations. The period limited for bringing an action of this kind is six years. But by the one hundredth section of the Code of Practice it is enacted as follows:
“ If, when the cause of action shall accrue against any person, he shall be out of the State, such action may be commenced within the terms herein respectively limited after the return of such person into this State; and if, after such cause of action shall have accrued, such, person shall depart from and reside out of this State, the time of his absence shall not be, deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for, the commencement of such action.”
The Blossburg company insisted that as the Tioga com pauy was .a Pennsylvania corporation, it, could have no legal residence or existence in any other State than Pennsylvania, and hence that it was not in the State oí New York when the action accrued, and had not been therein at any timé since; and, therefore, could not claim 'the benefit of the statute of limitations. ' This the Tioga company disputed; and its counsel relied on certain sections of the Code of Practice of New York, which showed that foreign corporations might be sued in New York under certain circumstances, as where they had property in the State, or where their officers, agents, or directors are found within it, and were' served with process. Thus, by act of 1851 (§ 184 of the' Code), after providing for service of process on a corporation by delivering a copy to the president, secretary, treasurer, director, or managing agent, it is said
“Such'services can be made in respect to a foreign corporation only where it has property within this State, or'the cause of action arose therein.”
Or, by the act of 1859,
.“ Where such service shall be made within this State person•ally upon the president, treasurer, or secretary thereof.”
The case, according to the New York practice, in cases which it is anticipated may involve the examination of long accounts, was referred to and tried by a referee.
Evidence was given which, as the counsel of the defendant asserted, showed — what he alleged was not denied— “ that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the Tioga compauy had property within the State of New York, an office at Corning, directors, officers, and agents, constantly within that State and at all times amenable to the process of its courts, and in fact, in 1855, that the Blossburg company availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portiou of the demand claimed under the contract now in controversy, recovered judgment and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a 'summons upon the defendant’s agent at Corning.”
The referee refused to íhid as facts what is above stated in regard to the- Tioga company, and' found-generally in favor of the plaintiff'. Judgment being entered’oh the finding the case was now here on error.
Mr. J. II. Reynolds, for the plaintiff in error (after arguing the case on merits):
I. The same matter disposed of in the Court of Appeals of New York, in 1355, does not come-in question here. No portion of theclaim there made is- embraced in'this action. It is true that the claim arises under, the same contract, but that circumstance is not of consequence if this court is not concluded by its construction in the courts of New York, which it clearly is not under the decision in Swift' v. Tyson and Chicago v. Robbins. Moreover, it is not easy to see that the same question was decided in the New York’ courts. A reference to the cases will show this.
II. The antiquated rule that a corporation cannot migrate must now be regarded as a legal fiction rather than a substantial reality. In actual practice, corporations created by the laws of one State do travel into other States, carry their property, establish offices, locate agents, transact business, and accumulate money, and they are recognized outside of the territorial limits of their creation as legal beings, having legal rights.
It was at one time questioned in this court, whether a corporation created by the laws of a State, made the corporate body a citizen of the State creating it, when the corporators actually resided beyond its territorial jurisdiction, within the meaning of the act of Congress in respect to the removal of causes from a State to a Federal court for trial. It is now the settled law of this court, that a corporation is a citizen of the State creating it, and entitled to all the rights and immunities accorded to a citizen by the Constitution and the law.
: If it be, as it must be, assumed that a corporation is a Oitizen of th.e State by which it is created, then it must.be accorded the rights of a citizen in all courts and places. •
We are aware of certain decisions in. New York not in accordance with'these views. But'there is no greater reason •for this court’s following the decision of State courts in respect to the limitation of actions, than for its following the’ .laws and decisions respecting the validity of bonds in aid of railroads or any other local improvements. These, certainly, it has not followed.
It was proved and conceded that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the defendant had property-within- the State of New York, an office at Corning, New York, directors, officers, and agents co'nstantly within this State, aud at all times amenable to the process of its courts; áhd in fact in 1855 the plaintiff availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portion of the ¡demand claimed under the contract now in controversy, recovered judgment, and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a summons upon the defendant’s agent at Corning. It is, therefore, apparent that the Tioga company has been at all times subjectlto a suit at law, for any debt-it owed to the Blossburg company, or any other party.
Mr. D. Ramsey, contra.
16 Peters, 1.
2 Black, 418-428.
Railroad Company v. Letson, 2 Howard, 497; Stevens v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 41 New York, 154.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice BRADLEY,
havingstated the case, delivered .the opinion .of the court.
. Some attempt .has been made to show that in the suit brought in January, 1855, in the Supreme Court of New York by the Blossburg company against the Tioga company, on the contract now iu question, the matter of the difference for which the present suit is brought was not a question decided. But we have looked at the record and proceedings therein, which were in evidence in this case; and are satisfied that it was decided. The report of the, case in 1st Keyes, 486, showk that it was the only question before the Court of Appeals, to which court the case was carried. This point, then, is res judicata between the parties. It cannot be litigated again on the same contract.
We pass, then, to the matter of the statute of limitations.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error (the defendant below) insists " that it was proved and conceded that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the defendant had property within the State of New York, an office at Corning, New York, directors, officers, and agents, constantly within this State, and at all times amenable to the process of its courts; and, in' fact, in. 1855, the plaintiff availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portion of the demand claimed under the contract, now in controversy, recovered judgment' and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a summons upon the defendant's agent at Corning; and that it is, therefore, apparent that the Tioga company has been, at all times, subject to a suit at law for any debt it owed to the Blossburg company or any other party," and he argues that the statute.óf limitations is therefore a defence.
If the facts appeared as stated-by the counsel, it could not avail the plaintiff in error. The courts of New York have decided (and two of the decisions were made upon the case of this very company), that a foreign corporation cannort avail itself of the statute, of limitations of that State. And this, notwithstanding .the defendant was the lessee of a railroad in New York, and had property, within the State, and a managing agent residing and keeping an office of the company at Elmira, within the State. These decisions upon the construction of the statute are binding,upon us, whatever we may think of their soundness on general principles.
But the facts on which the plaintiff in error relies are not spread upon the record in such a manner that the court can fake cognizance of them. They are not found specially by the referee; he refuses to find them. He finds generally in favor of the plaintiff, namely, that the statute of limitations ,was hot a bar to the action. No error can be assigned upon such .a fiuding.
Judgment is affirmed.
Beloit v, Morgan, 7 Wallace, 622; Aurora City v. West, Ib. 94; Freeman on Judgments,§ 256.
Thompson v. Tioga Railroad Co., 36 Barbour, 79; Olcott v. Same Defendant, 20 New York, 210.
Rathbuh v. The Northern Central Railway Co., 5b Id. 656.
Harpending v. Dutch Church, 16 Peters, 493.