Case: WADDY B. WOOD ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Wood v. United States
Decision Date: 1913-12-01
Docket Number: No. 30679
Citation: 49 Ct. Cl. 119
Volume: 49
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: WADDY B. WOOD ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Pages: 119–125

Head Matter:
WADDY B. WOOD ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 30679.
Decided December 1, 1913.]
On the Proofs.
Waddy B. Wood and otters, trading as Wood, Donn & Deming, in 1906 entered into a contract with the Navy Department to furnish and deliver plans and specifications for officers’ quarters at the naval station, New Orleans, to be constructed by contract within the sum of $32,375. The plans and specifications furnished by plaintiffs were changed by the defendants, both before and after they were accepted, increasing in both instances the cost of construction to a figure estimated beyond the available appropriation. The advertisement for bids based upon the changed plans did not state the available appropriation. No bids were received and the plaintiffs, architects, were instructed to revise their work and advised that the cost of construction, by certain suggested changes, could be brought within, the appropriation, with which revision they proceeded to the point where the changes suggested by themselves received verbal approval when the Bureau of Yards and Docks notified them their plans would not be used.
I. It has been often decided in this, as well as in the Supreme Court, that the forms of pleading in the Court of Claims do not preclude a plaintiff from recovering that which is justly due him upon the facts stated in the petition and proven, although there be no amount in the petition on the implied contract.
II.A parol agreement wholly or partly executed on one side gives the party performing the right to recover the fair value of his property or services as upon a quantum meriut.
III.Where it clearly appears that the suspension of the plaintiffs’ work was caused not by any unwillingness on their part to meet the terms of the contract, but because of the direct action of the defendants, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
The Reporter’s statement of the case:
The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
. I. On the 8th day of January, 1906, claimants entered into a contract in writing with the United States Navy Department, by which they agreed to furnish and deliver the necessary plans, specifications, and details for four officers’ quarters at the naval station, New Orleans, La., to be constructed by contract within the sum of $32,375, including the cost of Government inspection, at a compensation of 3| per centum' of the contract price tor said buildings, payment to be contingent upon the receipt of an acceptable bid within the sum named.
II. Upon entering into said contract preliminary sketches of plans for said buildings were prepared by claimants under the supervision of the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department and in accordance with suggestions made from time to time by the officers of that bureau, including some modifications necessary to be made on account of the climate. From said sketches drawings were made and preliminarily approved by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and claimants proceeded with the working drawings and specifications.
III. The specifications as originally prepared by claimants were changed by the addition of certain conditions which would tend to increase the cost of construction and these provisions were inserted in the specifications without the knowledge or advice of claimants.
IV. The plans and specifications, as thus amended and changed at the direction of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, were approved by said bureau as satisfactory and same were accepted.
V. After accepting said plans and specifications as aforesaid, the Bureau of Yards and Docks further changed, altered, and amended said specifications without the knowledge or consent of claimants. Said changes, alterations, and amendments still further increased the cost of construction of said buildings.
VI. The Navy Department advertised for bids based upon the plans and specifications as so changed, altered, and amended, which said specifications were not the specifications prepared by claimants. In said advertisement, plans, or specifications no mention was made of any limit of price.
VII. Under and in accordance with the plans and specifications as prepared by the claimants and without the changes, alterations, and additions made in the specifications by the Bureau of Yaids and Docks, buildings of the number and kind suitable for the purpose intended could have been constructed within the appropriation available.
VIII. On September 24, 1906, the Navy Department advised claimants in writing that no bids had been received and that an expert of the department had estimated that the cost of construction under the plans and specifications as advertised would exceed the appropriation available and that claimants would be advised of certain contemplated changes whereby the cost of construction could be brought within the amount available.
It does not appear that the particular changes suggested by the expert of the department were communicated to plaintiffs, nor does it appear that the department advertised a second time for bids, or made any efforts to get bids.
IX. Subsequently in conversations with the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the claimants were instructed to proceed with the work of revision so as to bring the cost within the appropriation available, which claimants proceeded to do.
X. Claimants had proceeded with the work of revision to a point where the changes suggested by them had received the verbal approval of one of the officers of the Bureau of Yards and Docks when they were notified by the bureau verbally and by letter that their plans would not be used, but that the bureau would prepare plans of its own. Thereupon claimants suspended their work of revision.
XI. The reasonable value of the work done by claimants in the preparation of said plans and specifications up to the time they suspended work as aforesaid is $809.37, no part of which has been paid.
CONCLUSION OF LAW.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides as a conclusion of law that plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the value of their services as upon an implied contract for quantum meruit the sum of eight hundred and nine dollars and thirty-seven cents ($809.37).
Mr. L. Randolph Mason and Mr. Hugh B. Rowland for the plaintiffs. Mr. Benjamin S. Minor was on the brief.
Mr. W. F. Norris, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson, for the defendants.

Opinion:
Howry, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs are architects and as such contracted in writing to furnish and deliver the necessary plans, specifications, and details for four officers' quarters at the naval station of the United States at New Orleans, La. Their compensation was stipulated to be 3J per cent of the contract price, but payment was to be contingent upon the receipt of an acceptable bid for the quarters within the sum of $32,375, including the cost of inspection by the United States. Plans and specifications as originally prepared by the plaintiffs were changed by the addition on the part of the defendants of provisions tending to increase the cost of construction, and these provisions were put into the specifications without plaintiffs' knowledge. After accepting the plans and specifications, alterations and amendments further increased the cost of construction of the buildings. The advertisement for bids based upon the changed plans and details did not set forth any limit as to the cost of construction, nor were bidders warned that the price of erecting the buildings should be within the available appropriation. No bids having beenreceived the architects were advised that the cost of construction could be brought within the appropriation by certain suggested changes, and they were instructed to revise their work. This they proceeded to do to the point where the changes suggested by the architects themselves had received verbal approval. At this stage of the matter the Bureau of Yards and Docks notified the plaintiffs that their plans would not be used, and the revised work was thereupon suspended.
Defendants demurred to the petition on the ground that as payment by the terms of the contract was to be contingent upon the receipt of an acceptable bid the contingency upon which payment was to be made never arose. This demurrer was overruled for reasons set forth in the report of the cause, 46 C. Cls., R., 478. Since then the proof has made clear matters which at the outset seemed obscure, and we now proceed to consider the merits of the cause.
The findings -show that plaintiffs undertook to perform their part of the agreement by preparing the necessary plans and specifications. But defendants continue to insist that the Government did its part by advertising for bids and as none were received no recovery can be had on the contract. The defendants further insist that a recovery for anything can not be had on grounds presented in argument but not more clearly set forth in the petition.
Plaintiffs do not sue on the contract nor is it urged by them that the contract can be enforced. They do claim that the Government would' not permit them to perform, because they say that the Bureau of Yards and Docks changed the specifications in such manner as to largely increase the cost, of the construction and that many of these changes were made without their knowledge or consent after the specifications had been submitted and accepted; and, secondly, that under the circumstances they should have been given an opportunity to revise their plans and specifications in order to bring the quarters within the appropriation available.
The petition is not as definite as it might have been made at the outset. But it has been frequently decided in this as well as in the appellate court that the forms of pleading in the Court of Claims do not preclude a claimant from recovering, as on an implied contract, what is justly due him upon the facts stated in the petition and proven, although there be no count in the petition on the implied contract.
In Clark v. United States, 95 U. S., 539, it was held that even though the contract had not been reduced to writing and signed by the contracting parties and for that reason in effect prohibited and rendered unlawful any other mode of contracting, nevertheless a parol agreement wholly or partly executed on one side gives the party performing the right to recover the fair value of his property or services as upon an implied agreement for a quantum, meruit.
While plaintiffs did not guarantee a bidder for the work on the plans and specifications prepared by them, and it was their duty to provide for the construction of the buildings within the available appropriation, they did undertake to do so. Their plans and specifications were accepted by the proper officers of the Government under the supposition that the architectural work had been duly performed under the terms of the contract. But the necessary bid was not received presumably because the plans and specifications submitted to bidders did not admit of a price low enough for anyone to bid. Then it was that the Navy Department informed the plaintiffs in writing that no bids had been received and that an estimate had been made of the cost of construction which rendered necessary a revision of the plans to the end that the plaintiffs might comply with the terms of the original agreement. When instructed to proceed with the work of revision so as to bring the cost within the available appropriation and the work of revision was in actual progress, plaintiffs were not aware that changes had been made by the Government which tended to increase the cost of the work of construction. Nor did plaintiffs know that the specifications upon which bids were invited had been so changed, altered, and amended as to probably prevent contractors from making bids.
In any event it would seem to be but fair for the defendants to have given their architects opportunity to complete other and different plans and specifications to meet the exigences of the situation. This was not done. Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to complete their undertaking. For some unexplained reason whilst the work of revision was in progress and changes had been suggested by agents of the Government which had received the approval of the proper officers, plaintiffs were notified that the officers of the Bureau of Yards and Docks would prepare plans of their own. So it clearly appears that the suspension of the plaintiffs' work was caused not by any unwillingness on their part to meet the terms of the contract but because of the direct action of the defendants. In Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns, N. Y., 527, the court declared that it was a sound principle that he who prevents a thing being done shall not avail himself of the nonperformance he has occasioned. And in United States v. Peck, 102 U. S., 64, it was declared that the conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other from performing his part excuses the failure to perform.
The action being for the reasonable value of the work done to the time of the suspension of the contract, the court directs that judgment be entered for the sum of $809.37 in plaintiffs' favor.