Case: John L. Villalonga, appellee, v. The United States, appellants
Abbreviation: Villalonga v. United States
Decision Date: 1874-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 10 Ct. Cl. 22
Volume: 10
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: John L. Villalonga, appellee, v. The United States, appellants.
Judges: 
Pages: 22–36

Head Matter:
VILLALONGrA’S CASE.
(8 Court of Claims R., 452;
Wallace R., —.)
John L. Villalonga, appellee, v. The United States, appellants.
On the defendants’ Appeal.
4 cotton-factor in Savannah, during the years 1863 and 1864, receives cotton from various persons and makes advances thereon in Confederate money. The cotton was captured and the proceeds are in the Treasury. The factor brings his suit to recover the proceeds. Re does not make proof of the market value of Confederate money at the time of making the advances, hut seeks to recover the entire proceeds. The court below decides that a factor in possession, with a lien for advances made, having the right to hold the property or sell it, is the oxvner xvithin the meatxing of the Abandoned or captured property Act as construed by the'Supreme Court in a case where it teas held that an administrator in possession is the oxvner. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.
I. A factor in possession, with a lien on the property for advances made and the right to hold it or sell it and repay his advances, is not the general owner of the property within the meaning of the Abandoned or captured property Act, and cannot maintain a suit for the entire proceeds in the Treasury. But he may maintain a suit under the act for the amount of his advances.
II. Under the Code of Georgia a factor’s right to maintain an action for interference with the property does not extend his special property in the thing. Therefore, where cotton was captured in his possession and while he held it for advances made, he cannot recover under the Abandoned or captured property Act the whole proceeds in the Treasury, hut must he limited to the amount of his advances.
III. The “owner” spoken of in the Abandoned or captured property Act, (12 Stat. L., p. 820, § 3,) is he who has the legal interest in the proceeds. In the case of a factor in possession who has made advances on the property before capture, the legal interest is limited to the extent of his lien. In the case of an administrator from whom the property was taken after administration, the legal interest is complete in the property. His was the only title which existed at the time of capture, and no other person had a definite right.
IY. A recovery under the Abandoned or captured property Act by a factor for advances made in Confederate money must be reduced to the worth of the advances in the money of the United States at the time they were made.
"The Reporters' statement of the case:
The court below found the following facts, which fully present the two questions involved in the case:
Before the capture of Savannah the claimant was, and for a long time had been, engaged in business as a cotton-factor. At various times during the years 1863 and 1864 he received cotton as a factor from various persons, and made advances thereon in the money of the Confederate States. At the time of the capture of Savannah he thus held seventy bales of sea-island and two hundred and twenty-seven bales of upland cotton, on which he had made advances to the amount of $51,153.17 in the notes of the Confederate States. All of this cotton was seized by the Army of the United States, and subsequently sold, and the proceeds thereof paid into the Treasury; which proceeds, being $231.79 per bale for the sea-island and $175.33 per bale for the upland cotton, amount in the aggregate to $56,025.21. The claimant has failed to prove the intrinsic or marketable value of the Confederate notes at the time of making the advances.
Mr. Attorney-General Williams and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Goforth for the United States, appellants:
The court below erred in entering one judgment for two distinct claims; one claim as individual and one claim as representative. The court erred in entering judgment for more than the proceeds of the claimant’s own cotton and the value of his advances on the cotton belonging to others. The court erred in entering judgment for any part of the proceeds of the two hundred and ninety-seven bales without proof of the intrinsic value of the advances. A person cannot, in the same action, join a demand in his own right and a demand as representative of another, or autre droit. (Chitty on PL, 201.)
A man cannot join an action in his own right and an action as administrator or executor. (2 Vin. Abr., p. 47, part 8; Com. Dig., 139; Rogers v. Ooolc, 1 Salk., 10.)
That the character in which suit is brought determines the rights and responsibilities of the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of the' debt recovered, see 2 Yin. Abr., p. 47, part 65 Com. Dig., Actions, G. “Where the declaration states one debt due plaintiff as administratrix, and another debt without stating whether as administratrix or individual, it was held, after verdict, that all was due her as administratrix.”
“The remedy of agents for mere torts is confined to cases where their right of possession is injuriously invaded, or where they incur a personal responsibility or loss or damage in consequence of the tort.” (Story on Agency, § 416.)
The right of the factor to the possession of this property was limited by the amount of his advances; and to the extent of the interference with his “special” property the laws of Georgia gave him an action of trespass, while a concurrent right of action is given to the bailor for interference with the general property.
The Code of Georgia (1861) provides:
“ Sec. 2969. In cases of bailments, where the possession is in the bailee, a trespass committed during the existence of the bailment will give a right of action to the bailee for the inter-erence with his special property, and a concurrent right of action to the bailor for the interference with his general property.
1 Sec. 2970. A remainderman or reversioner of personalty may maintain an action against a wrong-doer for any injury going to destroy the existence or ultimate value of the property. In such cases the tenant in possession and remainderman or reversioner may sue jointly for the injury to the entire estate, the recovery being held under like limitations.” (Ed. of 1861, pp. 551, 552; ed. of 1873, p. 520, §§ 3030, 3031.)
But no right is given to the bailee or tenant in possession to recover, in an action in his own name, for the injury done to the rights of the general owner, remainderman, or reversioner.
The cotton having been taken under authority of law, by a force which the factor could not resist, he has incurred no personal responsibility from its seizure.
u For this reason (that he is chargeable to the bailor) he shall recover against a stranger who takes the goods out of his possession.” (Vide leading case in the Year Book, 21 Hen. VII, 14&, referred to in Story on Bailments, § 93; Edwards on Bailments, 34.) “ Unavoidable calamity or overwhelming force or accident, without any default of the agent, will excuse him from strict performance.” (Story on Agency, § 194.)
The personal loss or damage suffered by claimant of course is measured by the value of the advances.
Therefore, even if the statements by the court below and by appellee in his brief of the decision of the Supreme Court in Carroll’s Case, (13 Wall., 151,) to the effect that “ any one possessed of property upon which he. could maintain trespass or trover, and who at the time of bringing suit was entitled to receive the proceeds as the trustee or representative of parties not before the court, could maintain an action,” &c., are correct, the claimant’s right of recovery is limited by the extent of his special property, which is the amount of his advances.
But the statement is not sustained by Carroll’s Case. The decision of the court was that it was the loyalty of the admin-' istratrix, not of the decedent, that was to be inquired into. The right of the administratrix to sue was not questioned, and the Chief-Justice, in giving the reason for the decision, said that the title of the decedent had vested unforfeited in the administra-trix, “ and it was the only title subsisting at the time of the capture and sale and payment of the proceeds into the Treasury.”
With the right which a factor has to sue in his own name, on a contract in his own name, for the price mentioned in the contract, we have no concern, because (1) there was no contract; (2) the agency of the factor ceased when the property was legally taken from his control; (3) if a contract is to be implied, it is such a one as the factor could not have made expressly, and therefore ultra vires; (4) the implications of such a contract are to be found in the act of Congress.
At the time of the seizure of this cotton there were two distinct titles to.each bale: that of the general owner, which is the paramount title, and that of the special owner, which might have been divested at any time on payment of his lien for advances, &c. To each of these owners Congress has given a remedy:
“ And any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may * * * prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of said property, and of his right to the proceeds thereof, * * * to receive the residue of such proceeds,” &c. (12 Stat. L., 820.)
This court has held (Padelford, 9 Wall., 531; Klein, 13 Wall., 128) that the right of possession did not change until actual seizure by the proper military authority, and that such seizure did not divest the title to the property. With the seizure, therefore, the factors right of possession ceased, and also his ability to perform the duties imposed upon him.
No sale having been made under the power of agency, and the seizure not having divested his title, the real, general, paramount owner is an owner under the act of Congress. This agrees with the views of the relation of owner, factor, and the Government, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Montgomery’s Case, (15 Wall., 395.)
The existence and rights of the general owner are expressly recognized and distinguished from those of the special owner in section 2969, Code of Georgia, 1861, p. 551, 552.
By the seizure of the cotton under the act of Congress the Government took that possession which was in the factor, and, as to the owners, took the place of the factor, thus terminating the agency of the factor, and becoming the agent of the owners for the sale of the property and their trustee of the proceeds. The effect is the same as though the principal substituted a new factor. The new factor would be liable to the old only for his lien, and would deal immediately with the principal. With these views the difference in principle between an adminis trator, to whom alone- the personal property of an intestate descends by law, and a factor, whose right of possession is for the purpose of enforcing his lien, which was not observed by the court below, becomes very obvious. That several and conflicting suits for their respective interests would have been in accordance with the practice of the Court of Claims is evident from the case of Woodruff et al., (7 O. Cls. R., 605,) where the respective conflicting interests of five claimants, who filed as many petitions, were adjudicated. That the failure of the owners to file their petitions confers no additional rights upon this claimant, who must stand or fall on his own merits, see Fain’s Case (4 C. Cls. R., 237) and O’Keefe's Case, (5 C. Cls. R., 674.) Certainly the liability to an action for money had and received, which might be imposed upon the claimant by recovery, confers on him no rights. That a j udgment for the interest of Villalonga in the proceeds of the cotton held by him as factor, whether the owners have preserved or lost their right to file claims, would have been properly entered, see Mrs. 8ylce’s Case (8 C. Cls. R., 330) and Burns’ Case, (12 Wall., 246.)
Judgment should not have been entered for any part of the two hundred and ninety-seven bales without evidence showing the amount of claimant’s interest therein. (Headman’s Case, 5 C. Cls. R., 640.) Claimant’s interest cannot be determined without proof of the value of Confederate notes at the time the advances were made.
Messrs. Hughes, Denver & Pede and Mr. John 0. Ferrill for claimant, appellee:
It is alleged by the appellant that the court erred in giving judgment in favor of the claimant for the proceeds of the cotton held by him as factor.
In the-case of Carroll v. The United States, (13 Wall., 153,) cited by the Court of Claims, it was held that any one possessed of property, upon which he could maintain trespass or trover, and who at the time of bringing the suit was entitled to receive the proceeds as the trustee or representative of parties not before the court, could maintain an action in the Court of Claims under the Abandoned or captured property Act.
It is not denied that Villalonga held this cotton as factor, nor is it alleged or shown that it is or has been before the court in any other suit. It is shown that he held it in trust for others, subject to charges for storage, commissions, and advances.
The laws of Georgia bearing on this subject are as follows:
“Aeticle II. — Other liens.
“ Sec. 1987. The lien given by the common law to attorneys, factors, inn-keepers, pawnees, carriers, and others, under special circumstances, (except the vendor’s lien,) are recognized by and may be enforced under the law of Georgia.” — Code of Georgia, 1861, p. 393.
“Article IV. — Of deposits.
“ Sec. 2090. A factor’s lien extends to all balances on general account, and attaches to the proceeds of the sale of the goods consigned, as well as to the goods themselves. Peculiar confidence being reposed in the factor, he may, in the absence of instructions, exercise his discretion according to the general usages of the trade. In return, greater and more skillful diligence is required of him, and the most active good faith.” — Code of Georgia, 1861, p. 410.
“Article II. — Of injuries to personalty generally.
“ Sec. 2965. The owner of personalty is entitled to the possession thereof. Any deprivation of such possession is a tort for which an action lies.
“ Sec. 2966. Mere possession of a chattel, if without title or wrongfully, will give a right of action for any interference therewith, except as against the true owner or the person wrongfully deprived of possession.
“ Sec. 2967. Trover may be used as a form of action to recover the possession of chattels, an alternative verdict in damages to be discharged on delivery of the property being taken; but it shall not be necessary to prove any conversion of the property where the defendant is in possession when the action is brought.
“ Sec. 2968. Any abuse of or damage done to the personal property of another unlawfully is a trespass for which damages may be recovered.
“ Sec. 2969. In cases of bailments, where the possession is in-the bailee, a trespass committed during the existence of the bailment will give a right of action to the bailee for the interference with his special • property, ancl a concurrent right of action to the bailor for the interference with his general property.
“Sec. 2970. A remainder-man or reversioner of personalty may maintain an action against a wrong-doer for any injury going to destroy the existence or ultimate value of the property. In such cases the tenant in possession and remainder-man or reversioner may sue jointly for the injury to the entire estate, the recovery being held under like limitations.” — Code of Georgia, of 1861, pp. 551, 552.
Under these laws of the State of Georgia there could be no doubt of the right of the factor to maintain an action of trover or trespass for property taken out of his possession.
But it has been asserted that the action of trover or trespass would not lie against the United States or against their officers who made the seizure in this case. That is true; for there was no law authorizing such suits to be brought in that form against the Government, and the Government had assumed and adopted the acts of its officers as its own, and no such suit could be brought against them. But a way had been provided by the Government in the Abandoned or captured property Act, approved March 12, 1863, by which persons could go into the Court of Claims and assert their right to the net proceeds in the Treasury resulting from the sales of such property; and this court has said in the case of Carroll, before cited, that any one who could maintain trespass or trover could maintain an action in the Court of Claims. The right of a factor to maintain such an action in Georgia for property taken from him will not be controverted-, and therefore the decision of the Court of Claims was in strict accordance with the laws on the subject.
A factor who sues does so in his own right and not in a representative capacity. He sues because the right of action vests in him. He is the owner of the property for the purposes of the suit. In the case1 of Mrs. Carroll v. The United States, (13 Wall., 153,) where the action was under this statute, the court said her title was one under which she could maintain trespass or trover, and therefore sustained her right.
Was it ever heard that if a factor was deprived of property held by him for a dozen different owners, he must bring thir teen different actions of trover, trespass, or replevin, one as the representative of-each different owner and one for his own actual interest in the property ? The appellant cites Chi tty on Pleading as an authority that a person cannot, in the same action, join a demand in his own right and a demand as representative of another, of autre droit. The case put by Ohitty is, that a plaintiff cannot join in the same action a demand as an executor with another in his own right. The reason for this rule is given in Bacon’s Abridgment, title Executors and Administrators:
“For the rights being of several natures, there must be several judgments. The funds, too, to which the money and costs, when recovered, are to be applied, or out of which the costs are to be paid, are different; and the damages and costs being entire, it cannot be distinguished how much the plaintiff is to have as executor and how much he is to take as his own.”
It will be observed that this rule has no application to a suit brought by a factor. If he has the right of possession, the judgment is always given in his name. It is rendered as if he were the principal, and is not given in a representative capacity.
This defense, if well founded in the technical rules of law, could not be interposed here. In the Court of Claims those rules have no place. In the case of Burns v. The United States, (12 Wall., 254,) this court held that the Court of Claims was not bound by any special rules of pleading, and that the technical rules of the common law relating to the forms of action had no force in that court.
The case of Burns was much more open to criticism than the one at bar. The United States had agreed to pay one Sibley a patent fee of $5 on each tent of his invention made for the ftse of the Army. Sibley gave Burns a half interest in his contract, and soon afterwards engaged in the rebellion. Burns brought suit for his half of the contract-price, ignoring his former associate Sibley. As the very right and justice of the matter lay with Burns, this court held he should not be defeated by any technical rule of pleading. The Court of Claims has always acted upon this principle, and has never permitted the right and justice of a cause to be defeated by the technical rules and forms of common-law pleading. (Bamsdell v. The United States, 2 C. Cls., 518; Benton v. The United States, 5 O. Cls. B., 695.)
It is objected that if the claimant was entitled to judgment, bis recovery must be limited to Ms own interest as factor. The brief of Mr. Ferrill shows that, by the law of Georgia, the factor is regarded as the owner of the property held by him as against those taking it from his possession. If the defendant was a natural person, no doubt.could exist as to the suit having been properly brought, either under the Georgia Code or the common law. Why should a difference of form be introduced because the United States is the defendant? The reason given by the appellant is that the taking by the Government was not originally tortious. The theory of the Abmdoned or captured property Acts, as explained by this court, is that property found by armies in the South was gathered and preserved from destruction for the purpose of awaiting such action as the political department of the Government might see fit to take; that no title or right was divested by the seizure; but this was an incipient step by which the United States might afterwards acquire title through appropriate confiscation proceedings in the courts. But if.no such proceedings should be taken, and in lieu thereof amnesty should be granted to the offending parties, (or in those exceptional cases where no offense had been committed and no pardon was needed,) full restitution should be made. (The United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531; The United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128.)
It so happened that a complete amnesty was granted in all these cases before any confiscation proceedings were taken. The United States therefore became bound to make restitution. Is there any violence done to the course of law or to the cause of justice because, in a court not governed by common-law forms, the factor from whose possession the cotton was taken obtains a decree that restitution be made to him 1 The justice and equity of the case (and that should govern in these proceedings, irrespective of form) is that the factor should recover the entire proceeds and make his own settlement with his principals; otherwise the Court of Claims would be compelled to decide between them the questions of commission, storage, amount of advances, rate of interest, &c.; and that court was never intended to adjust controversies between individuals, in-which the Government has no interest. The principals in this case, having clothed the factor with a special ownership in the property, have léft him to assert the title for their use and benefit. There are no conflicting suits. They have seen fit to continue the factor as tbeir representative, and are now awaiting a settlement at bis hands as soon as he shall receive the proceeds of the property intrusted to him. This objection has been urged to the form of the proceeding’, because, if the factor should fail to recover for his principals, the statute of limitations has long since barred separate actions by them. This would result in a grievous wrong. The United States Avould retain the money, to which it has no claim of right, and the owners of the cotton would be mulcted in this enormous sum because they had permitted their factor to pursue for them the property which they had placed in his hands. We submit that no question of law is involved in this case which calls for such injustice. The appellant assumes that if the principals could maintain their action here, then the factor cannot recover for their interests. This is a mistake. There are many cases in which an election is given. Either party may bring the action, but one only can recover.
“In the case of a general as well as special property, the action may in most cases be brought either by the general or special owner, and judgment obtained by one is a bar to an action by the other.” (I Ohitty on PL, 141.) And to the same effect, Ibid., p. 51, and numerous authorities there cited. And this principle is applicable to actions ex contractu, as well as to actions founded in tort. (1 Parsons on Con., ch. 3, § 6.)

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Strong-
delivered the opinion of the court:
The third section of the Act March 12, 1803, (12 Stat. L., 820,) which alone authorizes a suit against the United States for the recovery of the proceeds of sale of captured or abandoned property, enacts that " any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and, on proof to' the satisfaction of the court of his ownership of said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of said proceeds after the deduction of any purchase-money which may have been paid, together with the expense of transportation and sale of said property, and any other lawful expenses attending the disposition thereof."
Under this enactment, the claimant in the court below sought to recover the proceeds of four hundred and ninety-three bales of cotton which were seized by the Army of the United States at Savannah, in December, 1864. After its seizure the cotton was turned over to the agents of the Treasury Department and sold, and the proceeds of the sale were paid into the Treasury. Of the whole number of bales captured, one hundred and ninety-six-belonged to the claimant, but the remainder he had received as a cotton-factor from various persons, and had made advances thereon in money of the Oonfederate. States. The aggregate of these advances was $51,153.17. It does not appear from the finding of facts who these different owners were, how much had been advanced to each, or what was the value of the advances, in money of the United States. Upon this state of facts the Court of Claims gave judgment in favor of the claimant, not only for the proceeds of sale of the cotton which belonged to him in his own right, but also for the entire proceeds of that which he had received as a factor and upon which he had made advances. Whether this judgment was correct on such a state of facts is the question now presented, and the answer to it must depend upon the antecedent inquiry whether, as to the cotton upon which the claimant had made partial advances as a factor, he can be considered the owner thereof and having a right to its proceeds, within the meaning of the act of Congress. No doubt a factor who has made advances upon goods consigned to him may be regarded, in a limited sense and to the extent of his advances, as an owner. Tet in reality he has but a lien, with a right of possession of the goods for its security. He may protect that possession by suit against a trespasser upon it, and he may sell the property to re-imburse advances, remaining ,however, accountable to his consignor for any surplus. But after all he is not the real owner. He is only an agent of the owner for certain purposes. The owner may, at any time before his. factor has sold the goods, reclaim the possession upon paying the advances made, with interest and expenses. He has hot lost his ownership by committing the custody of the goods to a factor and by receiving advances upon them. He is still entitled to the proceeds of any sale which may be made, even by his agent, the factor, subject only to a charge of the advances and expenses. A factor, therefore, notwithstanding he may have made advances upon the property consigned, to him, has bub a limited right. That right is sometimes called a special property, but it is never regarded as a general ownership. At most it is no more than ownership of a lien or charge upon the property. Such is unquestionably the doctrine of the common law. And there is nothing in any statute affecting this case that changes the doctrine. Certainly the statutes of Georgia, whence this case comes, have no such effect. In the Code of that [State of 1861, while a factor's lien is recognized and declared to extend to all balances on general account, and to attach to the proceeds of sale of goods consigned as well as to the goods themselves, (Code, p. 410,) there is nothing that declares he has anything more than a lien protected by his possession. Injuries to that possession may indeed be redressed by action in his name, and it may be assumed that upon contracts of sale made by him he may sue, but all this is perfectly consistent with the continuance of the general ownership in his consignors until he has made a sale. And there is a very significant clause in the statutes of the State, which shows that a factor there has not the general property. In section 2969 of the article respecting injuries to personalty generally, (Code of 186.1, p. 552,) it is enacted that " in cases of bailments, where the possession is in the bailee, a trespass committed during the existence of the bailment will give a right of action to the bailee for the interference with his special property, and a concurrent right of action to the bailor for interference with his general property." If this applies to the case of bailment to a factor, as is supposed by the defendant in error, it is a clear declaration that the factor's right does not extend beyond a special property, a mere right to hold for a particular purpose, and that it does not amount to ownership of the property consigned to him. And there is nothing in the new Code of Georgia or in any of the decisions of the Supreme Court that is variant from this. Admit that a factor may maintain an action when his possession is disturbed, still it is a question what may he recover? Under the statutes of Georgia he can recover only for the injury which his special property, namely, his lien, has sustained. For all beyond that the general owner may sue. ' The property of that owner is not vested in his factor.
If, then, it be, as was said by the-Chief-Justice in Klein's Case, (7 C. Cls., R., 240, 13 Wall,, 128,) that the Government con stituted itself tbe trustee of captured or abandoned property for tbe original owners thereof, it is bard to see bow tbe trust can exist for the benefit of tbe owner of a special property therein beyond the extent of bis interest, which, as we have seen, in case of a factor, is measured by the amount of bis advances and expenses.
For all beyond that, by tbe law of Georgia, tbe original owner who consigned the goods to tbe factor might sue, and for that original owner tbe Government became a trustee of all beyond tbe factor's interest, according to tbe doctrine of Kleiv/s Case.
In this view of tbe case in band it is clear that tbe claimant is not tbe "owner of the" captured "property," "having a right to the proceeds thereof," within tbe meaning of the Abandoned or captured property Act. He owns of tbe cotton consigned to him nothing but a lien for bis advances and expenses, and he is therefore not entitled to tbe entire proceeds of tbe sale of tbe property.
There are other considerations that support this conclusion. Plainly it was the intention of Congress, manifested in tbe statute, that no person should be permitted to recover out of tbe Treasury any of the proceeds of sale of tbe property captured or abandoned except those who bad given no aid or comfort to tbe rebellion. But if a factor who has made advances, no matter bow small, may recover the entire proceeds of a consignment made to him, not only what be has advanced, but tbe share of bis principal, tbe intention of tbe law may be wholly defeated. He may have received consignments from persons most active in promoting the rebellion, and be may have-advanced only one dollar on each bale of cotton consigned. If, now, be can recover tbe entire net proceeds of tbe sale of such cotton paid into tbe Treasury, bis consignors, through him, using him as a cover, escape entirely from tbe operation of tbe provision of the statute, that no one shall have a standing in tbe Court of Claims who has given aid and comfort to tbe rebellion. A construction of the law which admits of such a consequence cannot be correct. The intention of Congress is not thus to be evaded.
There is yet another consideration not to be overlooked. Under tbe Act March 3,1863, (12 Stat. L., 765,) amending the act to establish the Court of Claims, that court has power to consider and determine all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other claims which the Government may have against any claimant in the court, and render judgment against such claimant if he be found indebted to the Government. Gan a debtor to the United States evade his liability to a judgment against him by consigning his property to a factor and obtaining some advances ? May the factor recover all that is in the Treasury, though the Government may have large claims against his principals, who are the real parties in interest ? We cannot think the acts of Congress admit of such an interpretation. These considerations show that the " owner," spoken of in the third section of the Abandoned or captured property Act, u having a right to the proceeds thereof," is he who has the legal interest in those proceeds, and that a factor who made advances before the capture can at' most recover only to the extent of his lien.
The court below rested their judgment upon Carroll's Case, (13 Wall., 151; 7 O. Gis. R., 255;) but that case, in our opinion, has little analogy to this. There an administratrix of a deceased persou was the claimant, and it was held to be no bar to the suit that the decedent gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, the property having been taken after his death from the administratrix and not from him, and the administratrix was declared to be the owner within the meaning of the statute. Undoubtedly she was the full legal owner, entitled, both in law and in equity, to the entire property. Hers was the only title which existed at the time of the capture. Through whom she acquired it was deemed immaterial. It was sufficient that no other person had a definite right. This is no such case. Here there are owners, both in law and in equity, other than the claimant, and the statute has opened the Court of Claims for them if they have never given aid or comfort to the rebellion. The present claimant, at most, is entitled to no moré than the net proceeds of sale of his own cotton — one hundred and ninety-six bales — and the amount of his advances on the other cotton, reducing those advances to their worth in the money of the United States at the time the advances were made.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remitted with instructions to proceed in conformity with this opinion.