Case: CHAMBERLAIN MACHINE WORKS v. UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Chamberlain Machine Works v. United States
Decision Date: 1926-03-01
Docket Number: No. 123
Citation: 270 U.S. 347
Volume: 270
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: CHAMBERLAIN MACHINE WORKS v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Pages: 347–349

Head Matter:
CHAMBERLAIN MACHINE WORKS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 123.
Argued January 12, 13, 1926.
Decided March 1, 1926.
Mr.. Raymond M. Hudson, with whom Mr.' Burton-JE'. Sweet was on the brief, for appellant;
Assistant to the Attorney General Donovan, with whom Solicitor General Mitchell was on the brief, for the United States.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Sanford
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Chamberlain Machine Works filed its petition in the Court of Claims to recover compensation for the partial performance • of a war contract for the machining of steel shells, which had been cancelled by the United States before completion, pursuant to the terms of the contract. The petition was dismissed on demurrer, without opinion. 59 Ct. Cls. 972. The appeal was allowed in June, 1924.
The petition and an exhibit thereto disclosed that the claim was originally prosecuted in the War Department, under the Dent Act, in. yarious proceedings before the Ordinance Section of the Claims Board, the Board of Contract Adjustment, and the Appeal Section of the Claims Board; and that the Secretary of War made an award to the petitioner of $41,300.05, " in full adjustment, payment, and discharge " of the contract, which was accepted by the petitioner, in writing, in " full satisfaction of any and all claims or demands " which it had or might have pertaining to, growing out of, or incident to the contract..
The petition sought to recover on the original contract, despite the settlement made more than three years, before. It alleged, broadly, that this settlement was iniquitous and unjust, and not the voluntary act of the petitioner, but was secured by "frahd" of the officers of the War Department in the handling of the claim, by " continued brow-beating," and by "coercion" through which they " literally forced " the petitioner to take the sum offered.
The general allegations of "fraud" and "coercion" were mere conclusions of the pleader; and were not admitted by the demurrer. Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 127. To show a cause of action it was necessary that the petition state distinctly the particular acts of fraud and -coercion relied'on, specifying by whcfen and in what manner they were perpetrated, with such definiteness and reasonable certainty that the court might see that, if proved, they would warrarit the setting aside of the settlement. See Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 818, 829; Perkins-Campbell Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 213, 218; Cairo Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 350, 352. The petition contained no such specific allegations; and since its vague and general averments did not overcome thet effect of the release', the demurrer was properly sustained. See St. Louis Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 346, 350.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is
Affirmed.
6 Dec. War Dept. 242.
8 Dec. War Dept. 298.