Case: COSMOS CLUB v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Cosmos Club v. United States
Decision Date: 1930-06-16
Docket Number: No. H-218
Citation: 70 Ct. Cl. 366
Volume: 70
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: COSMOS CLUB v. THE UNITED STATES
Judges: GeeeN, Judge, did not hear this case and took no part in its decision.
Pages: 366–374

Head Matter:
COSMOS CLUB v. THE UNITED STATES
[No. H-218.
Decided June 16, 1930]
Messrs. John F. McCarron and George E. Hamilton for the plaintiff.
Mr. Fred K. Dyar, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Herman J. Galloway, for the defendant. Mr. McClure Kelley was on the brief.

Opinion:
LittletoN, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue is whether the plaintiff is a social club within the meaning of section 801 of the revenue act of 1921, 42 Stat. 291, and section 501 of the revenue acts of 1924 and 1926, 44 Stat. 92. Those acts impose a tax of a certain percentage of any amount paid as dues or membership fees (where the dues or fees of an active resident annual member are in excess of $10 per year) to any social, athletic, or sporting club or organization; or as initiation fees to such a club or organization, if such fees amount to more than $10, or if the dues or membership fees (not including initiation fees) of an active resident annual member are in excess of $10 per year.
Article 4 of Treasury Regulations 43, part 2, revised, provides that " The purposes and activities of a club and not its name determine its character for the purpose of the tax on dues " and article 5 provides
"Any organization, which maintains quarters or arranges periodical dinners or meetings for the purpose of affording its members an opportunity of congregating for social intercourse, is a ' social club or organization ' within the meaning of the act, unless its social features are not a material purpose of the organization but are subordinate and merely incidental to the active furtherance of a different and predominant purpose, such as, for example, religion, the arts, or business."
Whether the dues or membership fees of a club or organization are subject to the tax as those of a social club within the meaning of the acts is primarily a question of fact. The facts in this case show that the predominant purposes of the plaintiff club were educational and for the advancement of its members in science, literature, and art, and that its main activities were conducted with the view of accomplishing such purposes. Its very few social features were but incidental to its predominant purposes.
Upon these facts plaintiff can not be held to be a social club within the meaning of the statutes and the regulations. Aldine Club v. United States, 65 C. Cls. 315; Chemists' Club v. United States, 64 C. Cls. 156; Bankers Club of America v. United States, and Washington Club v. United States, decided by this court February 10, 1930 [69 C. Cls. 121, 621].
Plaintiff is entitled to recover and judgment will be entered in its favor for $26,532.05, with, interest from the dates of payments on the amounts aggregating this sum, as provided by law. It is so ordered.