Case: SINGER et al. v. UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Singer v. United States
Decision Date: 1945-01-02
Docket Number: No. 30
Citation: 323 U.S. 338
Volume: 323
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: SINGER et al. v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge join in this dissent.
Pages: 338–352

Head Matter:
SINGER et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 30.
Argued November 9, 10, 1944.
Decided January 2, 1945.
. Messrs. John W. Cragun and William Stanley submitted for petitioners.
Mr. James M. Mclnerney argued the cause, and Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Tom C. Clark, and Messrs. Robert S. Erdahl, Ralph F. Fuchs, and Leon Ulman were on the brief, for the United States.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are father and son. They and one Walter Weel were indicted in one count charging a conspiracy to aid Willard I. Singer in evading service in the armed forces. No overt act was alleged. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled which claimed that an overt act was necessary. Petitioners were tried before a jury, found guilty and sentenced. Petitioner Willard I. Singer received a sentence of one year and a day; petitioner Martin H. Singer received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied. 49 F. Supp. 912. The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 141 F. 2d 262. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, limited to the question whether the conspiracy charged constitutes an offense under § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 894-895, 50 U. S. C. App. §311.
The relevant part of § 11 reads as follows:
"Any person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules or regulations made or directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty, and any person charged with such duty, or having and exercising any authority under said Act, rules, regulations, or directions who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the making, of any false, improper, or incorrect registration, classification, physical or mental examination, deferment, induction, enrollment, or muster, and any person who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the making of, any false statement or certificate as to the fitness or unfitness or liability or nonliability of himself or any other person for service under the provisions of this Act, or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant thereto, or who otherwise evades registration or service in the land or naval forces or any of the requirements of this Act, or who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to evade registration or service in the land or naval forces or any of the requirements of this Act, or of said rules, regulations, or directions, or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this Act, or rules or regulations made pursuant to this Act, or any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere in any way by force or violence with the administration of this Act or the rules or regulations made pursuant thereto, or conspire to do so, shall, upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment . . ." (Italics added.)
The section does not require an overt act for the offense of conspiracy. It punishes conspiracy "on the common law footing." Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378. Hence the indictment is sufficient if the words "or conspire to do so" extend to all conspiracies to commit offenses against the Act. It is insufficient if the conspiracy clause is limited to conspiracies to "hinder or interfere in any way by force or violence" with the administration of the Act. If it is so limited then it would have been necessary to sustain the indictment under § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 88, which requires the commission of an overt act. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 86.
Though the matter is not free from doubt, we think the conspiracy clause of § 11 is not limited but embraces all conspiracies to violate the Act. That is the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (United States v. O'Connell, 126 F. 2d 807) as well as the court below. We think that construction is grammatically permissible and conforms with the legislative scheme.
Seven offenses precede the conspiracy clause. Each is set off by a comma. A comma also precedes the conspiracy clause and separates it from the force and violence provision just as the latter is separated by a comma from the clause which precedes it. The punctuation of the sentence indicates that the disjunctive conspiracy clause is the last independent clause of a series not a part of the preceding clause. A subject of "conspire" must be supplied however the conspiracy clause is read. It is true that the subject must be plural and that the subject of each of the preceding clauses is singular except "any person or persons" in the force and violence clause. But it does not follow that the conspiracy clause is hitched solely to the preceding clause. When read as applicable to all the substantive offenses, the verb "conspire" is proper since some of the subjects would be singular and some plural.
A question remains concerning the word "so." The structure of the sentence as a whole suggests that the reference is to all the offenses previously enumerated. The seven offenses which precede the conspiracy clause are substantive offenses. Each carries the same penalty and is punishable in the same manner. The conspiracy clause comes last and is separated from the preceding one by a comma. If the word "so" is read restrictively, then one type of conspiracy is set apart for special treatment. If our construction is taken, a rational scheme results with the same maximum penalties throughout — all types of conspiracies being treated equally, just as the substantive offenses are treated alike. No< persuasive reason has been advanced why the words "conspire to do so" should not carry their natural significance. The principle of strict construction of criminal statutes does not mean that they must be given their narrowest possible meaning. United States v. Giles, 300 U. S. 41, 48.
The legislative history throws only a little light on this problem of the construction of § 11. What appears is a brief statement by Senator Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, who explained the bill on the floor of the Senate. He stated that the section which later became § 11 of the present Act "contains the penalty provisions of the bill, which are substantially the same as those of the World War act. Experience with the World War provisions shows that they worked satisfactorily in providing the necessary protection." 86 Cong. Rec. 10095. The Selective Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 50 U. S. C. App. § 201 et seq., contained no conspiracy provision. And the penalties prescribed for the substantive offenses were milder than those contained in the present Act. Conspiracies to commit nonviolent offenses were prosecuted under § 37 of the Criminal Code which, as we have noted, requires an overt act. Conspiracies involving the use of force were prosecuted under § 6 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1089, 18 U. S. C. § 6, which punishes conspiracies "by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States." Sec. 37 of the Criminal Code provides a pun ishment of not more than two years' imprisonment or a fine of $10,000 or both. Sec. 6 of the Criminal Code provides a punishment of not more than six years' imprisonment or a $5,000 fine, or both. Sec. 11 of the present Act provides imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of $10,000 or both. Both § 37 and § 6 of the Criminal Code were in force when the present Act was adopted. The addition of the conspiracy clause of § 11 was a departure from the 1917 Act and a substantial departure at that. Moreover, the "World War provisions" which, according to Senator Sheppard, had provided "the necessary protection" were certainly not the provisions of the 1917 Act alone but the conspiracy statutes as well. Hence, we do not take his statement to mean that the penalty provisions of § 11 are substantially the same as those contained in the 1917 Act. We read his somewhat ambiguous comments as indicating that he was comparing the provisions of § 11 with the provisions of the 1917 Act plus the provisions of other statutes which were employed in enforcing that Act. Thus Senator Sheppard's statement suggests that § 11 was designed to catalogue the various offenses against the Act. It suggests that the purpose of including a conspiracy clause in § 11 was to furnish a single basis for prosecuting all conspiracies to commit offenses against the Act. That results in punishments for some conspiracies being increased. But there was likewise an increase in the penalties for substantive offenses. Yet under our interpretation the sanctions provided by § 11 are substantially the same as the sum of the various sanctions provided for the enforcement of the 1917 Act.
The United States suggests that if the conspiracy clause of § 11 is construed so as to apply only to conspiracies to obstruct the Act by force and violence it would merely duplicate § 6 of the Criminal Code and have no effect except to decrease the maximum imprisonment for the offense from six years to five. It is said in reply, however, that under the earlier Act it was uncertain whether conspiracies contemplating the use of force in interfering with its administration could be prosecuted under § 6 of the Criminal Code. Cf. Reeder v. United States, 262 F. 36, with Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 799. And it is argued from that fact that the conspiracy clause of § 11 was added to dispel the uncertainty. That is left to conjecture. Though we assume that it was a reason for adding a conspiracy clause to § 11, we cannot conclude that the conspiracy clause which was fashioned is so limited. And where another interpretation is wholly permissible, we would be reluctant to give a statute that construction which makes it wholly redundant. Only a clear legislative purpose should lead to that result here.
Nor do we find force in the suggestion that the conspiracy clause was added merely to fill in gaps left by § 6 of the Criminal Code which covers only conspiracies to obstruct by force "the execution of any law of the United States." It is said that United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, established as a principle of federal criminal law that a provision which only punishes violations of a "law" does not cover violations of rules or regulations made in conformity with- that law. It is therefore argued that § 6 of the Criminal Code does not embrace violations of rules or regulations and-that § 11 filled that gap by adding "rules or regulations" to the force and violence clause. Here again the legislative history leaves that question wholly to conjecture. United States v. Eaton turned on its special facts, as United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518-519, emphasizes. It has not been construed to state a fixed principle that a regulation can never be a "law" for purposes of criminal prosecutions. It may or may not be, depending on the structure of the particular statute. The Eaton case involved a statute which levied a tax on oleomargarine and regulated in detail oleomargarine manufacturers. Sec. 5 of the statute provided for the keeping of such books and records as the Secretary of the Treasury might require. But it provided no penalty for non-compliance. Other sections, however, laid down other requirements for manufacturers and prescribed penalties for violations. Sec. 20 gave the Secretary the power to make "all needful regulations" for enforcing the Act. A regulation was promulgated under § 20 requiring wholesalers to keep a prescribed record. The prosecution was for non-compliance with that regulation. Sec. 18 imposed criminal penalties for failure to do any of the things "required by law." The Court held that the violation of the regulation promulgated under § 20 was not an offense. It reasoned that since Congress had prescribed penalties for - certain acts but not for the failure to keep books the omission could not be supplied by regulation. And Congress had not added criminal sanctions to the rules promulgated under § 20 of that Act. The situation here is quite different. Sec. 11 of the present Act makes it a crime to do specified acts, either by way of omission or commission, in violation of the Act or the rules or regulations issued under it. Thus it is a felony for a person to "fail or neglect to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this Act, or rules or regulations made pursuant to this Act." Sec. 11 is therefore a law of the United States which imposes criminal sanctions for disobedience of the selective sérvice regulations. Since Congress has made the violation of regulations a felony, it can hardly be contended that those regulations are not a "law" for the purposes of § 6 of the Criminal Code. But though we assume that United States v. Eaton was a reason for adding a conspiracy clause to § 11, we cannot assume that the one which was added had the narrow scope suggested. Whatever the reason, words mean what they say. And if we give the words "conspire to do so" their natural meaning, we do not make the Act a trap for the innocent.
We have been advised that Martin H. Singer died on October 1, 1944. The writ is accordingly dismissed as to him (Menken v. Atlanta, 131 U. S. 405; United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503, 520) and the cause is remanded to the District Court for such disposition as law and justice require. United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279, rev'd 164 F. 324; United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254.
The judgment as respects Willard I. Singer is
Affirmed.
That section provides:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
The 1917 Act punished various substantive offenses of the kind covered by § 11 of the present Act by imprisonment for not more than one year. See § 5 and 6.
See United, States v. McHugh, 253 F. 224; Anderson v. United States, 269 F. 65; O'Connell v. United States, 253 U. S. 142; Goldman v. United States, 245 U. S. 474.
See Enfield v. United States, 261 F. 141; Reeder v. United States, 262 F. 36. But see Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795.
Conspiracies were also prosecuted under § 4 of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 219, 41 Stat. 1359, 50 U. S. C. § 34, which like § 37 of the Criminal Code requires an overt act. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239. But that section is applicable only in time of war and hence was not operative when the present Act became the law on September 16, 1940.
Whether, as assumed in United States v. Offutt, 127 F. 2d 336, there may be conspiracies to violate § 11 which can still be prosecuted under §37 of the Criminal Code is a question we do not reach.
If only one of the statutes is applicable to a conspiracy to violate § 11, the latter under which petitioners were convicted is controlling, as it is a later statute prescribing precise penalties for specified offenses. Callahan v. United States, 285 U. S. 515, 518.