Case: BOWMAN v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Abbreviation: Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.
Decision Date: 1888-03-19
Docket Number: No. 798
Citation: 125 U.S. 465
Volume: 125
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: BOWMAN v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Lamar was not present, at the argument of this ease, and took no part in its decision.
Pages: 465–524

Head Matter:
BOWMAN v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OR THE UNITED STATES ROR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OR ILLINOIS.
No. 798.
Submitted January 10, 1887.
Decided March 19, 1888.
The question whether, when Congress fails to provide a regulation by law as to any particular subject of commerce among the States it is conclusive of its -intention that that subject shall be free from positive regulation, or that, until Congress intervenes, it shall be left to be dealt with by the States, is one to be determined from the circumstances of each case as it arises.
So far as the will of Congress respecting commerce among the States by means of railroads can be determined from its enactment of the provisions of law found in Bev.. Stat. § 5258, and Bev. Stat. c. 6, Title 48, §§ 4252-4289, they are indications of an intention that such transportation of commodities between the States shall be free except when restricted by Congress, or by a State with the express permission of Congress.
A State cannot, for the purpose of protecting its people against the evils of intemperance, enact laws which regulate commerce between its people and those of other States of the Union, unless the consent of Congress, express or implied, is first obtained.
Section 1553 of the Code of the State of Iowa, as amended by c. 143 of the acts of the 20th General Assembly in 1886, (forbidding common carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into the State from any other State or Territory, without being first furnished with a certificate, under the seal of the auditor of the county to which it is to be transported or consigned, certifying .that the consignee or person to whom it is to be transported or delivered is authorized to sell intoxicating liquors in the county,) although adopted without a purpose of affecting interstate commerce, but as a part of a general system designed to protect the health and morals of the people against the evils resulting from the unrestricted manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within the State, is neither an inspection law, nor a quarantine law, but is essentially a regulation of commerce among the States, affecting interstate commerce in an essential and vital part, and, not being sanctioned by the authority, express or implied, of Congress, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Whether the right of transportation of an article of commerce from one State to another includes by necessary implication the right of the consignee to sell it in unbroken packages at the place where the transportation terminates, qucere.
This action was begun in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, June 15,1886, on which day the plaintiffs filed their declaration, as follows:
“ George A. Bowman, a citizen of the state of Nebraska, and Fred. W. Bowman, a citizen of the State of Iowa, co-partnérs doing business under the name, firm and style of Bowman Bros., at the city of Marshalltown, State of Iowa, plaintiffs in this suit, by Blum & Blum, their attorneys, complain of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, a citizen of the northern district of the State of Illinois, having its- principal office at the city of Chicago, in said State, defendant ;jn this suit, of a plea of trespass on the case.
“ For that whereas the defendant, on May 20th, 1886, and for a long time previous thereto and thereafter, was possessed .of and using and operating a certain railway, and was á common carrier of goods and chattels thereon, for hire, to wit, from the city of Qhicago, in the State of Illinois, to the city of Council Bluffs, in the State of Iowa.
■ “ That said defendant was at said time and is now a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois, and that it'was and is the duty of said defendant to carry from and to all stations upon its line of railway all freight tendered it for shipment..
“ That upon May 20th, 1886, the plaintiffs offered to said defendant for shipment over its line of railway, and directed to themselves at Marshalltown, Iowa, five thousand barrels of beer, which they had procured in the city of Chicago, to be shipped from said city to the city of Marshalltown, in the State of Iowa, -which is a station lying and being on said de-' fendant’s line of railroad between said cities of Chicago and Council Bluffs, but the defendant then and there refused to receive said beer, or any part thereof, for .shipment, to the damage of the plaintiffs of ten thousand dollars, and therefore they bring their suit, «fee.
“ And for that the plaintiffs, neither of whom is a hotel-keeper, a keeper of a saloon, eating house, grocery, or confectionery, on the 7th day of July* 1884, and upon several occasions thereafter, ■ presented to the .board of supervisors of Marshall County, Iowa, a certificate signed by a majority of the legal electors of Marshalltown, Marshall County, Iowa, ■which stated' that said Fred. W. Bowman is a citizen of said, county; that both of said plaintiffs .possess a good moral character, and that they (said electors) believe said'plaintiffs to be proper persons, and each of them to be a proper person, to buy and sell intoxicating liquors for the purposes named in section 1526 of the Iowa Code; that at said time and upon several occasions thereafter' they and each of them, the said plaintiffs, filed a bond in the sum of three thousand dollars with two sureties, which bond was. approved by the auditor of said county, as is provided by section 1528 of the Code of Iowa ; that thereupon said board of. supervisors refused to grant such permission to either of said plaintiffs, or to them jointly.
“ And for that whereas the' defendant, on May 20th, 1886, and for a long time previous thereto and thereafter, was possessed of and using and operating - a certain . railroad and was a common carrier of goods and chattels thereon for hire, to wit, from the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, to the city of Council Bluffs, in the State of Iowa.
“That said defendant is a-corporation existing .under, and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois; that it was the duty of the said defendant to carry from and to all stations upon its line of railway all freight that might be. intrusted to it, and. that it was the duty of said defendant to transport. from said city of. Chicago to said city of Marshalltown the five thousand barrels of beer hereinbefore and hereinafter m¿ntioned, which plaintiffs requested it so to transport; that in the commencement of May, 1886, the plaintiffs purchased, at the city of Chicago, five thousand barrels óf beer, at $6.50 per barrel, which beer they intended to send to Marshalltown, Iowa, at which place and vicinity they could have sold said' beer at eight dollars per barrel, as the defendant was then and there informed; that on May 20th, 1886, said plaintiffs offered for shipment to said defendant railway company said five thousand barrels of beer, directed to said plaintiffs at the city of Marshalltown, in the State of Iowa, and requested said de fendant to ship 'said beer over its road, with which request the defendant refused to comply, and declined to ship or receive said beer or any part thereof for shipment as aforesaid, the said defendant, by its duly authorized agent, then and there stating that the said defendant company declined to receive ■'said goods for shipment and would. continue to decline to receive-..said goods or any goods of like character for shipment into the State of Iowa ; that on said day, to wit, May 20th, 1886, and for a long time theretofore and since, the plaintiffs' were unable to purchase beer in the State of Iowa; that said plaintiffs, at said time, could procure no other means of transportation, for said beer than said defendant, and that,. by reason of the defendant’s refusal to transport said beer, plaintiffs were compelled to sell said beer in the city of Chicago at $6.50 per barrel.
■ “ That by reason of said refusal of said defendant to ship said beer plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of ten thousand dollars, and therefore they bring their suit, &c.”
To this declaration the defendant filed the following plea :
“Now comes the said defendant, by 'W. C. Goudy, its attor-,. ney, and defends the wrong and injury, when, &c., and says' aotio non, &c., because it says that the beer in said five thousand barrels in the plaintiffs’ declaration and in each count thereof mentioned was, at the several times in said declaration mentioned, and still is, intoxicating liquor, within the meaning of the statute of Iowa hereinafter set forth; that the city of Marshalltown in said declaration mentioned is within the limits of the State of Iowa: that the said city of Chicago in the said declaration mentioned is in the State of Illinois; that the said beer in said declaration mentioned was offered to this defendant to be transported from the State of Illinois to the State of Iowa.
“That heretofore, to wit, on the 5th day of April, a.d. 1886, the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, passed'an act entitled An act amendatory of chapter 143 of the acts of the twentieth General Assembly relating to intoxicating liquors and providing for the more effectual suppression of the illegal sale and transportation of incoxicating liquors and abatement of nuisances,’ which a^-t is chapter 66 of the laws of Iowa, passed at the twenty-first General Assembly of said State, and which is printed and published in the laws of Iowa for the year 1886, at page 81; to which act this defendant hereby refers and makes the same a part of this plea.
“ That in and by the tenth section of said act it was and' is provided as follows, to wit:
“ ‘ That section 1553 of' the Code, as amended and substituted by chapter 143 of the acts of the twentieth General Assembly, be, and the same is hereby, repealed, and the following enacted in lieu thereof:
“ ‘ Sec. 1553. If any express company, railway company, or any agent or person in the employ of any express company or of any common carrier, or any person in the employ of any common carrier, or if any person, knowingly bring within this State for any other person or persons or corporation, or shall knowingly transport or convey between points or from one place to another within this State for any other person or persons or corporation, any intoxicating liquors without first having been furnished with á certificate from and under the seal of the county auditor of the county to which said liquor is to be transported or is consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be conveyed from place to place, certifying that the consignee or person to whom said liquor is to be transported, conveyed, or delivered is' authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in such county, such company, corporation, or person so offending, and each of them, and any agent of such company, corporation, or person so offending, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one hundred dollars for each offence, and pay costs of prosecution, and the costs shall include a reasonable attorney fee, to be assessed by the court, which shall be paid into the county fund, and stand committed to the county jail until such fine and costs of prosecution are paid. The offence herein defined shall be held to be complete, and shall be held to have been committed in any county of the State through or to which said intoxicating liquors are transported, or in which the same is unloaded for •transportation, or in which said liquors are conveyed from place to place or delivered. It shall be the duty of the • several county auditors of this State to issue the certificate herein contemplated to any person having such permit, and the certificate so issued shall be truly dated when issued, and shall specify the date at which the permit expires, as shown' by the county records.’
“And the defendant avers that at'the several times mentioned in said declaration, and each of them, the aforesaid section was the law of the State of Iowa in full force and wholly- unrepealed, and that the said plaintiffs did not at any time furnish this defendant with a certificate from and under the seal of the county auditor of the county of Marshall, the same being the county in which said city of Marshalltown is located, and the county to which said beer was offered to be transported, certifying that the person for or to whom the said beer was to be transported.wa,s authorized to sell intoxicating liquors in said county of Marshall, nor was this defendant furnished with any such certificate by any person whatsoever.
“ And the defendant avers that it could not receive said beer for transportation in the manner named and specified in the plaintiffs’ declaration without violating the law of the State of Iowa above specified, and without subjecting itself to the penalties provided in said act* and that this defendant assigned, at the time the said beer was offered to it for transportation as aforesaid, as a reason why it could not receive the same, the aforesaid statute of Iowa, which prohibited this defendant from receiving said beer to be transported into the State of Iowa or from transporting the said beer into the State of Iowa.
“And this the said defendant is ready to verify. Wherefore .it prays judgment, &c.”
To this plea the plaintiffs filed a general demurrer, and for cause of demurrer assigned that the statute of Iowa referred to and set out in the plea was unconstitutional and void. The demurrer was overruled, and judgment entered thereon against the plaintiffs, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted.
Mr. Louis J. Blum and Mr. Edgar G. Blum for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. A. J. Baker, Attorney General of the State of Iowa, for defendant in- error.
' I. While it is conceded that Congress has the exclusive' power to regulate commerce among the States, it is equally true that the several States have the sole power to enact police regulations, and in the exercise of such power may do many things which more or less affect the transportation of persons and freight between the States. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99.
II. The police powers comprehend all those general powers of internal regulation necessary to secure peace, good order, health, comfort, morals, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property in the State. Congress cannot legislate on the internal police of a State, the power of a State over its police regulations being supreme. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. St. Tammany Water Works Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 194, 202; Ex parte Schrader, 33 Cal. 279; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 197; Toledo, &c. Railway v. Jacksonville, 67 Illinois, 37; Davis v. Central Railroad, 17 Georgia, 323; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 113.
The statute of Nevada imposing a tax upon merchandise brought into the State held constitutional. In re Rudolph, -2 Fed. Pep. 66.
.Tax imposed on sales of merchandise in Alabama held constitutional. The court says: “ The case before us is a simple tax on sales of merchandise, imposed alike upon all sales made in Mobile, whether the sales be 'made by citizens of Alabama or other States, and whether the goods sold are the product of that State or some other. There is no attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States, or the rights of their citizens, and the case is not therefore an attempt to fetter commerce among the States, or to deprive the citizens of other States of any privilege or immunity possessed by citizens of Alabama.” Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148.
The law of New York requiring a report as to passengers brought into . the State is a police regulation. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102.
Statutes like the statute of Iowa now under consideration are police regulations established by the legislature for the prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances, and are constitutional. Cooley Const. Lim. 581; Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cushing, 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97; Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Our House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Zumhoff v. ’ State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 526; State v. Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Indiana, 482; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 349.
■ It has been expressly decided by this court that as a measure of police regulation looking to the preservation oT public morals a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201.
This law has been decided to be constitutional, in its main provisions at least, by the Supreme Cc art of Iowa. Littleton v. Fritz, 22 N. W. Rep. 641.
"t is a well settled rule, that courts will not declare legislative enactments void by reason of their repugnance to constitutions, state or federal, except when the judicial mind is clearly convinced of such repugnancy.
The legislature cannot part with any of the police powers of the State which are matters that affect the public peace, public health, public morals and public convenience. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. v. Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 270; Allerton v. City of Chicago, 6 Fed. Rep. 555; In re Wong Yung Quy, 2 Fed. Rep. 624; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, supra.
It is well settled now that the States have the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors within the borders of the State. This prohibition must necessarily be a restriction upon the importation of such liquors from other States, and if the prohibition was made for the purpose only of preventing, such importation, it would be void, but when made for' the protection of morals, public health and good order, it is clearly within the power of the State.
The right to prohibit the bringing of certain articles into the State because such importation endangers the public safety, is not affected by the fact that the articles so prohibited may be articles of property and of value as property. - When' the public safety demands it the State has the right to prohibit the bringing of articles or property within the limits of the State, or to impose conditions or restrictions upon such importation for the protection of the public health, morality and good order. This right has always been exercised by the States without question. Certain articles of property deemed prejudicial to the morals of the people have been excluded by the laws of the States.
Revised Statutes of Illinois, c. 38, § 379, excludes certain books, pamphlets, engravings, models, casts, lithographs, photographs, etc.
See § 9289 Howell, Annotated Stat. Mich., p. 2248; § 4022, Statutes of Iowa; § 4590 General Statutes of Wisconsin: § 12, c. 100, General Statutes of Minnesota.
In nearly every State restrictions are laid upon the impoi cation of certain articles for the protection of the public health. Dynamite can be brought into Michigan and many other States only when packed and marked in a certain manner involving large expense.
Mr. James E. Munroe and Mr. W. G. Goudy also filed a brief for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Matthews,
after stating the -case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not denied that the declaration sets out a- good cause of action. It alleges that the defendant was possessed of and operated a certain railway, by means of which it became and was a common carrier of goods and chattels thereon' for hire, from the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, to the city of Council Bluffs, in the State of Iowa, and that, as such, it was its duty to carry from and to all stations upon its line of railway all goods and merchandise that might be intrusted to it for that purpose. This general duty was imposed upon it by the common law as adopted and prevailing .in the States of Illinois and Iowa. The single question, therefore, presented upon the record is,'whether the statute of the State of Iowa, set out in the plea, constitutes a defence to the action.
The section of the statute referred to, being § 1553 of the Iowa Code as amended by the act of April 5, 1886, forbids any common carrier to bring within the State of Iowa, for any person or persons or corporation, any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory of the United States, without first having been furnished with a certificate, under the seal of the county auditor of the county to which' said liquor is to be transported or is consigned for transportation, certifying that the consignee or person to whom said liquor-is to be transported, conveyed, or delivered is. authorized to sell intoxicating liquors in such county.
This statutory provision does not' stand alone, and must be considered with reference to the system of legislation of which it forms a part. The act of April 5; 1886, in which it is- contained, relates to the sale of intoxicating liquors within the State of Iowa, and is amendatory of chapter 143'of the acts of the twentieth General Assembly of that State "relating to intoxicating liquors and providing for the 'more effectual suppression of the illegal sale and transportation of intoxicating liquors and abatement of nuisances." The original § 1553 of the Iowa Code contains a similar provision in respect to common carriers. By § 1523 -of the Code, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors,- except as. thereinafter provided, is made unlawful, and the keeping of intoxicating liquor with intent to sell the same within the State, contrary to the provisions of the act, is prohibited, and the intoxicating liquor so kept, together with the vessels in which it is contained, is declared to be a nuisance, to be forfeited and dealt with as thereinafter provided. Section 1524 excepts from the operation of the law sales by the importer thereof of foreign intoxicating liquor, .imported under the authority of the laws of the United States regarding the importation of such liquors and in accordance with such laws, provided that the said liquor at the time of said sale by said importer 'remains in the original casks or packages in which it was by him imported, and in quantities of not less than the quantities in which the laws of the United States require such liquors to be imported, and is sold by him in said original casks or packages and in said quantities only. The law also permits the manufacture in the State of liquors for the purpose of being sold, according to the provisions of the statute, to be used for mechanical, medicinal, culinary or sacramental purposes; and for these purposes only any citizen of the State, except hotel-keepers, keepers of saloons, eating houses, grocery keepers, and confectioners, is permitted within the county of his residence to buy and sell intoxicating liquors, provided he shall first obtain permission from the board of supervisors of the county in which such business is conducted. It also declares the building or erection of whatever kind, or the ground itself in or •upon which intoxicating liquor is manufactured or sold, or kept with intent to sell, contrary to law, to be a nuisance, and that it may be abated as such. The original provisions of the Code (§ 1555) excluded from the definition of intoxicating liquors, beer, cider from apples, and wine from grapes, currants and other fruits grown in the State, but by an amendment that section was made to include alcohol, ale, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, and all intoxicating liquors whatever. It thus appears that the provisions of the statute set out in the plea, prohibiting the transportation by a common carrier of intoxicating liquor from a point within any other State for delivery at a place within the State of Iowa, is intended to more effectually carry out the general policy of the law of that State with respect to the suppression of the illegal manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor within' the State as a nuisance. It may, therefore, fairly be said that the provision in question has been adopted by the State of Iowa, not expressly-for the purpose of regulating commerce bet,-, een its citizens and those of other States, but as subservient to the general design of protecting the health and morals of its people, and the peace and good order of the State, against the physical and moral evils resulting from the unrestricted manufacture and sale within the State of intoxicating liquors.
¥e have had recent occasion to consider state legislation of this character in its relation to the Constitution of the United States. In the case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 657, it was said: " That legislation by a State prohibiting the manufacture within her limits of ' intoxicating liquors to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, is made clear by the decisions of this court rendered before and since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . These cases rest upon the acknowledged right. of the States of the Union to control their purely internal affairs, and in so doing to protect the health, morals, and safety, of their people by regulations that do not interfere with the execution of the powers of the general government or violate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States." In The License Cases, 5 How. 504, the question was whether certain statutes of Massachusetts, Ehode Island, and New Hampshire, relating to the sale of spirituous liquors, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States by reason of an alleged conflict between them and the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign countries and among the several States. The ¡statutes of Massachusetts and of Ehode Island considered in those cases had reference to the sale within those States respectively of intoxicating liquor imported from foreign countries, but not sold or offered for sale within the State by the importer in original packages. The statute of New Hampshire, however, applied to intoxicating liquor imported from another State, and the decision in that case upheld its validity in reference to the disposition by sale or otherwise of the intoxicating liquor after it had been brought into the State. That judgment, therefore, closely approached the question presented in this case. • The justices all" concurred in the result, but there was not a majority which agreed upon any specific ground for the conclusion, and it is necessary to compare the several opinions which were pronounced in order to extract the propositions necessarily embraced in the judgment. Chief Justice Taney was of. the opinion that Congress had clearly the power to regulate such importation and sale under the grant of power to regulate commerce among the several States; " yet, as Congress has made no regulation on the subject," he said, " the traffic in the article may be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the policy which thé State may suppose to be its interest or duty to pursue."' p. 586. Mr. Justice Catron and Mr. Justice Nelson agreed-with the Chief Justice that the statute of New Hampshire- in question was a regulation of commerce, but lawful, because not-repugnant to any actual exercise of the commercial power by Congress. Mr. Justice McLean seemed to think that the power of Congress ended with the importation, and that the sale of the article after it reached its destination was within the exclusive control of the State. He said : " If this tax had been laid on the property as an import into the State, the law would have been repugnant to the Constitution. It would have been a regulation of commerce among the States; which has been exclusively given to Congress. . . . But this barrel of gin, like all other property within the State of New Hampshire,' was liable to taxation by the State. It-comés under the general regulation, and cannot be sold without a license." p. 595. Mr. Justice Daniel denied that the right of importation included the right to sell within the State,"contrary to its law's. He impliedly admitted the exclusive power of Congress to regulate importation, and maintained, as equally exclusive, the right of the State to regulate the matter of sale. Mr. Justice "Woodbury conciirred in the same distinction. He said (p. 619): " It is manifest, also, whether as an abstract proposition or practical measure, that a prohibition to import is- one thing, while a prohibition to sell without license is' another and entirely different." The first ,he thought was within the control of Congress, the latter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State. He said: " The subject of buying and selling within a State, is one as exclusively belonging to the power of the State over its internal trade as that to regulate foreign commerce is with the general government under the broadest construction of that power. . . . The idea, too, that a prohibition to sell would be tantamount to a prohibition to import, does not seem to me either logical or founded in fact. For even under a prohibition to sell, a person could import, as he often does, for his own consumption, and that of his family and plantations; and also if a merchant extensively engaged in commerce, often' does import articles with no view of selling them here, but of storing them for a higher and more suitable market in another State or abroad." He also said (p. 625): " But this license is a regulation neither of domestic commerce between the States, nor of foreign commerce. It does not operate on either, or the imports of either till they have entered the State, and become component parts of its property. Then it has by the Constitution the exclusive power to regulate its own internal commerce and business in such articles, and bind all residents, citizens or not, by its regulations, if they ask its protection and privileges; and Congress, instead of being.opposed and thwarted by regulations as to this, can no more interfere in it than the States can interfere in regulation of foreign commerce." Mr. Justice Grier concurred mainly in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice McLean, and did not consider that the question of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to regulate commerce was necessarily connected with the decision of the point that the. States had a right to prohibit the sale and' consumption of an article of commerce within their limits, which they believed to be pernicious in its effects, and the cause of pauperism, disease, and crime.
From a review of all the opinions the following conclusions are to be deduced as the result of the judgment in those cases:
1. All the Justices concurred in the proposition that the statutes in question were not made void by the mere existence of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
2. They all concurred in the proposition that there was no legislation by Congress in pursuance of that power with which these statutes were in conflict.
3. Some, including the Chief Justice, held that the matter of the importation and sale of articles of commerce was subject to the exclusive regulation of Congress, whenever it chose to exert its power, and that any statute of the State on the same subject in conflict with such positive provisions of law enacted by Congress would be void.
4. Others maintained the view that the power of Congress to regulate commerce did not extend to or include the subject of the sale of such articles of commerce after th¿y had been introduced into a State, but that when the act of importation ended, by a delivery to the consignee, the exclusive power over the subject belonged to the States as a part of their police power.
From this analysis it is apparent that the question presented in this case was not decided in The License Oases. The point •in judgment in them was strictly confined to the right of the States to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor after it had been brought within their territorial limits. The right to bring it within the States was not questioned; and the reasoning which justified the right to prohibit sales admitted, by implication, the right to introduce intoxicating liquor, as merchandise, from foreign countries, or from other States of the Union, free from the control of the several States, and subject to the exclusive power of Congress over commerce.
It cannot be doubted that the law of Iowa now under examination, regarded as a rule for the transportation of merchandise, operates as a regulation of commerce among the States. "Beyond all question, the transportation of freight, or of the subjects of commerce, for the purpose of exchange or sale, is a constituent of commerce itself. This has never been doubted, and probably the transportation of articles of trade from one State to another was the prominent idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when' to Congress was committed the power to regulate commerce among the several States. A power to prevent embarrassing restrictions by any State was the thing desired. The power was given by the same words and in the same clause by which was conferred power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. It would be absurd to suppose that the transmission of the subjects of trade from the State to the buyer, or from the place of production to the market, was not contemplated, for without that there could be no consummated trade, either with foreign nations or among the States. . . . Nor does it make any difference whether this interchange of commodities is by land or by water. In either case the bringing of the goods from the seller to the-buyer is commerce. Among the States it must have been principally by land when the Constitution was adopted." Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 275, per Mr. Justice Strong. It was, therefore, decided in that case that a tax upon freight transported from State to State was a regulation of interstate transportation, and for that reason a regulation of commerce among the States. And this conclusion was reached notwithstanding the fact that Congress had not legislated on the subject, and notwithstanding the inference sought to be drawn from the fact, that it was thereby left open to the legislation of the several States. On that point it was said by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for the court, as follows (p. 279): " Cases that have sustained state laws, alleged to be regulations of commerce among the States, have been such as related to bridges or dams across streams wholly within a State, police or health laws, or subject's of a kindred nature not strictly of commercial regulations. The subjects were such _ as in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, it was said, 'can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operations to such localities respectively.' However this may be) the rule has been asserted with great clearness thht whenever the subjects over which a power to rfegulate commerce -is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature a s' to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299; Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 42. Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of this nature. It -is of national importance that over that subject there should be but one regulating power, for if one State can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation, every other may, and thus commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may be destroyed. The produce of Western States may thus be effectually excluded from Eastern markets, for though it might bear the imposition of a single tax, it would be crushed under a load of many. It was to guard against the possibility of such commercial embarrassments, no doubt, that the power of regulating commerce among the States was conferred upon the Federal government."
The distinction between cases in which Congress has exerted its power over commerce, and those in which it has abstained from its exercise, as bearing upon state legislation touching the subject was first plainly pointed out by Mr. Justice Curtis in the case of Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, and applies to commerce with foreign nations as well as to commerce among the States. In that case, speaking of' commerce with foreign nations, he said (p. 319): " Now, the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation." It was, therefore, held in that case that the laws of the several States concerning pilot-age, although in their nature regulations of foreign commerce, were, in the absence of legislation on the same subject by Congress, valid exercises of power. The subject was local and not national, and was likely to be best provided for, riot by one system or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem appli •cable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits; and to this it may be added that it was a subject, imperatively demanding positive regulation. The absence of legislation on the subject, therefore, by Congress, was evidence of its opinion that the matter might be best regulated by local authority, and proof of its intention that local regulations might be made.
It may be argued, however, that, aside from such regulations as these, which are purely local, the inference to be drawn from the. absence of legislation by Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Taws which concern the exterior relations of the United States with other nations, and governments are general in their nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation. The organization of our state and Federal system of government is such that the people of the several States can have no relations with foreign powers in respect to commerce or any other subject, except through the government of the United States and its laws and treaties. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 273.
The same necessity perhaps does not exist equally in reference to commerce among the States. The power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among the States is indeed contained in the same clause of the Constitution which confers upon .it' power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The grant' is conceived in the same terms, and the two powers are undoubtedly of the same class and character and equally extensive. The actual exercise of its power over either subject is equally and necessarily exclusive of that of the States, and paramount over- all the powers of the States; so that- state legislation, however legitimate in its origin or object, when it conflicts with the positive legislation of Congress, or its intention reasonably implied from its .silence, in respect to the subject of commerce of both kinds, must fail. And yet in respect to commerce among the States, it may be for the reason already assigned, that the same inference is not. always to be drawn from the absence of congressional legislation as might be'- in the case of commerce with foreign nations.. The question, therefore, may be still considered in each case as it arises, whether the fact that Congress has failed in the particular instance to provide by law a regulation of commerce among the -States is conclusive of. its intention that the subject shall be free from all positive regulation, or that, until it positively interferes, such commerce may be left to be freely dealt- with by the respective States.
We have seen that in the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, a tax imposed by one State upon freight transported to or. from another State was held to be void as a regulation of commerce among the States, on the ground that the transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, was in its nature national, so that it should be subjected to one uniform system or plan of regulation under the control of one regulating power. In that case the tax was not imposed for the purpose'of regulating interstate commerce, but in order to raise a revenue, and would have been- a legitimate exercise of an admitted power of the State if it had not been exerted so as .to operate as a regulation of interstate commerce. Any other regulation of interstate commerce, applied-as the tax was in that case, would fall equally within the rule of its decision. If the State has not power to tax freight and passengers passing through it, or to or from it, from or into another State, much less would it have the power directly to regulate such transportation, or to forbid it altogether. If in the present case the law of Iowa operated upon all merchandise sought to be brought from another State into its limits, there could be no doubt that it would be a regulation of commerce among the States and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.' In point of fact, however, it applies only to one class of articles of a particular kind, and prohibits their introduction into the State upon special grounds. It remains for us to consider whether those grounds are sufficient to justify it as an exception from .the rule which would govern if -they did not exist.
It may be material also to state in this connection that Congress had legislated on the general subject of interstate commerce by means of railroads prior to the date of the transaction on which the present suit is founded. Section 5258 of the Revised Statutes provides that " every railroad company in the United States whose road is operated by steam, its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any State to another State, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other States so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination." In the case of Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, this section, then constituting a part of the act of Congress of June 15, 1866, was considered. Referring to this act and the act of July 25, 1866, authorizing the construction of bridges over the Mississippi River, the court say: " These acts were passed under the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and were designed to remove trammels upon transportation between different States which had previously existed, and to prevent .a creation of such trammels in future, and to facilitate railway transportation by authorizing the construction of bridges over the navigable waters of the Mississippi. But they were intended to reach trammels interposed by state enactments or by existing laws of Congress. . . . The power to regulate commerce among the several States was vested in Congress in order to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating state legislation." p. 589.
Congress had also legislated on the subject of the transportation of passengers and merchandise in chapter 6, title 48 of the Revised Statutes; § 4252 to 4289, inclusive, having reference, however, mainly to transportation in vessels by water. 'But § 4278 and 4279 relate also to the transportation of nitro-glycerine and other similar explosive substances by land or water, and either as a matter óf commerce with foreign countries or among the several States. Section 4280 provides' that " the two preceding sections shall not be so construed as to prevent any State, Territory, district, city or town within the United States from regulating or from prohibiting the traffic in or transportation of those substances between persons or places lying or being within their respective territorial limits, or from prohibiting the introduction thereof into such limits for sale, use, or consumption therein."
.So far as these regulations made by Congress extend, they are certainly indications of its intention that- the transportation of commodities between the States shall be free, except where it is positively restricted by Congress itself, or by the States in particular cases by the express permission of Congress. On this point the language of this court in the case of County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697, is applicable. Eepeating and expanding the idea expressed in the opinion in the case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, this court said: " The subjects, indeed, upon which Congress can act under this power are of infinite variety, requiring for their successful management different plans or modes of treatment. Some of them are national in their character, and admit and require uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States; others are local, or are mere aids to commerce, and can only be properly regulated by provisions adapted ,to their special circumstances and localities. Of the former class may be mentioned all that portion of commerce with foreign countries or between the States which consists in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Here there can of necessity be only one system or plan of regulations, and that Congress alone can prescribe. Its non-action in such cases with respect to any particular commodity or mode of. transportation is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce in. that commodity, or by that means of transportation, shall be free'. There would, otherwise, be no security against conflicting regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products' and against the-products of citizens' of other States. And it is a matter of public, history that the object of vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States was to insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state legislation." Also, (p. 702 :) "Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. For the regulation of commerce as thus defined, there can be only one system of rules, applicable alike to the whole country ; and the authority which can act for the whole country can alone adopt such a system. Action upon it. by separate States is not, therefore, permissible."
The principle thus announced has a more obvious application to the circumstances of such a case as the present, when it is considered that the law; of the State of Iowa under consideration, while it professes to regulate the conduct of carriers engaged in transportation within the limits of that' State, nevertheless, materially affects, if allowed to operate, the conduct of such carriers, both as respects their rights and obligations, in every other-State into or through which they pass in the prosecution of their business of. interstate transportation. In the present case, the defendant is sued as a common carrier in the State of Illinois, and -the breach of duty alleged against it is a violation of the law .of that State in refusing to receive and transport goods which, as a common carrier, by that law, it was bound to accept and carry. It interposes as a-defence a law of the State of Iowa, which forbids the delivery of such goods within that State. 'Has the law of Iowa any extra territorial force which does not belong to the law of the State of Illinois % If the law of. Iowa forbids the delivery, and- .the law of Illinois requires the transportation, which of the two shall prevail ? How can the former make void the latter % In view of this necessary operation of the law of Iowa, if it be valid, the language of this court in the case of Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488, is exactly in. point. It was there said : " But we think it may safely be said that state legislation, which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce; or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his- conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. Iiis disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up within and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use .of whites without the State must, when the bpat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards-, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi ' passes through or along the borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of national concern. If each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay, more; it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the State, in respect to passengers and property brought from Avithout. ' On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required' to observe one set of rules, and on the other 'another. Commerce cannot-flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business Avith satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by Avhich he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity, in his business, and to secure it, Congress, which is untrammelled by state lines, h«,s been invested Avith the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be."
Ifc is impossible to justify this statute of Iowa by classifying it as an inspection law. The right of the States to pass inspection laws is expressly recognized in Art. 1, .§ 10, of the Constitution, in the clause declaring that " no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." . . •. " And all such laws shall be subject to. the revision and control of the Congress." The nature and character of the inspection laws of the States, contemplated by this provision of the Constitution, were very fully exhibited in the case of Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38. " The object of inspection laws," said Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbpns v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, "is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a' country.; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject, before it becomes an article of foreign commerce,- or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose." They are confined to such, particulars as, in the estimation of the legislature and according to. the customs of trade, are deemed necessary to fit the inspected article for the market, by giving to the purchaser public assurance that the article is in that condition, and of that quality, which makes it merchantable and fit'for use or consumption. They are not founded on the idea that the things, in respect to which inspection is required, are dangerous or noxious in themselves. As was said in Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 55: " Recognized elements .of inspection laws have always been.— quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds — all these matters being supervised by a public officer having authority to pass or not pass the article as lawful merchandise, as it did or did not answer the prescribed requirements. It. has never been regarded as necessary, and it- is manifestly not necessary, that all of these elements should coexist in order to make a valid inspection law. Quality alone may be the subject of inspection, without other requirement, or the inspection may be made' to exténd to all of the above matters."' It has never been regarded as within the legitimate scope of inspection, laws to forbid trade in respect to any known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the injurious consequences of its use or abuse.
For similar reasons the statute of. Iowa under consideration ca.nnot be regarded as a regulation of quarantine or a sanitary provision for the purpose of protecting the physical health of the community, or a law to prevent the introduction into the State of disease, contagious, infectious, or otherwise.' Doubtless the States have power to provide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction into the States of articles of- trade, which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags of other substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or consumption. Such articles are not merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the immediate sources and causes of destruction to human health and life. The self-protecting power of each State, therefore, may be rightfully exerted against their introduction, and such exercises of power cannot be considered regulations of commerce prohibited by the Constitution. Upon this point, th¿ observations of .Mr. Justice Catron in The License Gases, 5 How. 504, 599, are very much to the point. Speaking of the police power, as reseived to the States, and its relation to the power granted to Congress over commerce, he said: " The assumption is, that the police power was not touched by the Constitution, but left to the States, as the Constitution found it. This is admitted; and whenever a thing, from character or condition,-is of a description to be regulated by that power in the State, then the regulation may be made by the State, and Congress cannot interfere. But this must always depend on facts subject to legal ascertainment, so that the injured may have redress. And the fact must find its support in this, whether the prohibited article belongs to, and is subject to 'be regulated as part of, foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States. If, from its nature, it (Joes not belong to commerce, or if its condition, from putrescence or other cause, is such, when it is about to enter the State, that it no longer belongs to commerce, or, in other words, is not a. commercial article, then the .state-power, may exclude its introduction. And as an incident to this power, a State may use means to ascertain the fact. And here is the limit between the sovereign power of the state and the federal power.. That is to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State ; and that which does belong to commerce is within .the jurisdiction, of the United States. And to this limit must all the general views come, as' I suppose, that were suggested in the reasoning of this court in the cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. The State of Maryland and New York v. Miln. What, then, is the assumption of the state court? Undoubtedly, in effect, that the State had the power to declare what should be an article of lawful commerce in the particular State; and having declared that ardent spirits and wines were deleterious to morals and health, they ceased to - be commercial commodities there, and that then the police power attached, and consequently the powers of Congress could not interfere. The exclusive state power is made to rest, not on the fact of the state or condition of the article, nor that it is property usually passing by sales from hand to hand, but on the declaration found in the state laws, and asserted- as the state policy, that it shall- be excluded from commerce. . And by this means the sovereign jurisdiction in the State is attempted to be crea ted, in a case where it did'not previously exist. If this be the true construction of the constitutional provision, then the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to a very material limitation,; for it takes from Congress, and leaves with the States, the power to determine. the commodities, or articles of property, which are the subjects of lawful commerce. Congress may regulate, but the States determine what shall or shall not be regulated. Upon this theory the power to regulate commerce, instead of being paramount over the subject, would become subordinate to the state -police power; for it is obvious that the power to determine the articles which may be the subjects of commerce, and thus to circumscribe its scope and operation, is, in effect, the control» ling one. The police power would not only be a formidable rival, but, in a struggle, must necessarily triumph over the commercial power, as the power to regulate is dependent upon the power to fix and determine upon the subjects to be regulated. The same process of legislation and reasoning adopted by the State and its courts could bring within the police power any article of consumption that a State might wish to exclude, whether it belonged to that which was drunk, or to food and clothing; and with nearly equal claims to propriety, as malt liquors and the produce of fruits other than grapes stand on no higher ground than the light wines of this and other countries, excluded, in effect,.by the law as it now stands. And it would be only another step to regulate real or supposed extravagance in food'and clothing."
This question was considered in the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, in which this court declared an act of the legislature of Missouri, which prohibited driving or conveying any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle into the State,, between the 1st day of March and the 1st day of November of each year, to be-in conflict with the constitutional provision investing Congress with power to regulate commerce among the several States, holding that such a statute was more than a quarantine regulation and not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. In that case it was said, (p. 472:) "While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals, suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or intestate commerce. . . -. The reach of the statute was far beyond its professed object, and. far . into the realm which is within, the exclusive jurisdiction of- Congress. . . . The police, power of a State cannot obstruct foreign commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise; and, under color of it, objects not within its scope, cannot- be secured at the expense of the protection aiforded by the Federal Constitution. And as its range sometimes comes very near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion."
The same principles were declared, in Henderson, v. The Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275. In the latter case, speaking of the right of the State to protect itself from the introduction of paupers and convicted criminals from abroad, the court said, (p. 280:) " Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its, exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity." " It may also be admitted," as was said in the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, " that the police power of a State justifies the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a state may legislate to prevent the spread, of crime, or pauperism, .or disturbance of the peace. It . may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become -a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded, as intimated in The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, by Mr. Justice drier, in the sacred law of self-defence. Vide 3 Sawyer, 283. . The same principle, it may also be conceded, would justify the exclusion of property .dangerous, to the property of citizens of the State; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases. All these exertions of power are in "immediate connection. with the protection of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or such a use of- property as is injurious to the property of others. They are self-defensive. But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a State, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution. It cannot invade the domain of the national government.....Neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers properly conferred upon Congress' by the Constitution."
It is conceded, as we have already shown, that for.the purposes of its policy a State has legislative control, exclusive of Congress, within its territory, of all persons, things, and transactions of strictly internal concern. For the purpose of protecting its people against the evils of intemperance it has the right to prohibit the manufacture within its limits of intoxicating liquors; it may also prohibit all domestic commerce in them between its own inhabitants, whether the articles are introduced from other States or from foreign countries; it may punish those who sell them in violation of its laws; it may adopt any measures tending, even indirectly and remotely, to make the policy effective until it passes the line of power delegated to Congress under the Constitution. It cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied, regulate commerce between its people and those of the other States of the Union in order to effect its end, however desirable such a regulation might be..
The statute of Iowa under consideration falls within this prohibition. It is not an inspection law; it is not a quarantine or sanitary law. It is essentially a regulation of commerce among the States within any definition heretofore given to that term, or which can be given; and although its motive and purpose are to perfect the policy of the State of Iowa in protecting Its citizens against the evils of intemiperance, it is none the less on that account a regulation of commerce. If it had extended' its provisions so as to prohibit the introduction into the State from foreign countries of all importations of intoxicating liquors produced abroad, no one would doubt the nature of the provision as a regulation of foreign commerce. Its nature is not changed by its application to commerce among the States.
Can it be supposed, that by omitting any express declarations on the subject, Congress has intended to submit to the several States the decision of the question in each locality of What shall" and what shall not be articles of traffic in the interstate. commerce of the country ? fIf so, it has left to each State, according to its own caprice and arbitrary will, to discriminate for or against every article grown, produced, manu-' factored, or sold in any State and sought to be introduced as an article of commerce into any other. . If the State of Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors from all other States, it may also include tobacco, or any other article, the use or abuse of which it may deem deleterious. It may not choose, even, to be governed by considerations growing out of the health, comfort, or peace of the community. Its policy may be directed to other ends. It may choose to establish a system directed to the promotion and benefit of its own agriculture, manufactures or arts of any description, and prevent the introduction and sale within its limits of any or of all articles that it may select as coming into competition with those which it seeks to protect. The police power of the State would extend to such cases, as well as to those in which it was sought to legislate in behalf of the health, peace,, and morals of the people. In view of the commercial anarchy and confusion that would result from the diverse exertions of power by the several State's of the Union, it cannot be supposed that the Constitution or Congress have intended to limit the freedom of commercial intercourse among the people of the several States. " It cannot be too strongly insisted upon," said this court in Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 572, "that the right of continuous transportation from one end of the country to the other is essential in modern times to that freedom of commerce from the restraints which. the States might choose to impose upon it, that the commerce clause was intended to secure. This clause, giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations, as this court has said before, was among the most important of the subjects which prompted the formation of the Constitution. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 574; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446. And it would be a very feeble and almost useless provision, but poorly adapted to secure the entire freedom of Commerce among the States, which was deemed essential to a more perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if, at every stage of the transportation of goods and chattels-through the country, the State, within whose limits a part of the transportation must be done, could impose regulations concerning the price, compensation, or taxation, or any'other restrictive regulation interfering with and seriously embarrassing this commerce."
In Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 630, it was declared that the power of Congress over commerce among the States "is certainly So far exclusive that no State has power to make any law or regulation'which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade between the States, as Congress has left it, or -which will impose any discriminating burden or tax upoil the citizens or products of other States, coming or brought within its jurisdiction: All laws and regulations are restrictive of natural freedom to some extent, and, where no regulation is imposed by the government -which has the exclusive power to regulate, it is an indication of its will that the matter shall be left free. So long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate commerce among the several States, it thereby indicates its will that that commerce shall be free and untrammeled'; and any regulation of the subject by the States is repugnant to such freedom.' This has frequently been laid down as law in the judgments of this court."
The present case is concluded, we think, by the judgment of this court in Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, In that case an act of the legislature of the State of Michigan, which imposed a tax upon persons who, not residing or having their principal place of business within the State, engaged there in the business of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be shipped- into the State from places without it, but did not impose a' similar tax upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors manufactured in the State, was declared to be void on the ground that it was a regulation in restraint of commerce, repugnant to the Constitution of. the United States. In that case it was said. (p. 459): " It is suggested by the learned judge, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan in this case, that the tax imposed by the act of 1875 is an exercise, by the legislature of Mich igan, of the police power of the State for the discouragement of the use of intoxicating liquors, and the preservation of the health and morals of the people. This would be a perfect justification of the act, if it did not discriminate against the citizens and products of other States in a matter of commerce between the States, and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national legislature. The police power cannot be set up to control the inhibitions of the Federal Constitution, or the powers of the United States government created thereby."
It would be error to. lay any stress on the fact that -the statute passed'upon in that case made a discrimination between citizens and products of other States in favor of those of the State of Michigan, notwithstanding the intimation oh that point in the foregoing extract from the opinion. This appears plainly from what was decided in the case of Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489. It was there said (p. 497): '"It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign drummers — -'those of Tennessee and those of other States ; that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of. tax should be laid on domestic commerce,, or that which is carried on solely within the State. This was decided in. the case of The State Freight Tax 15 Walk 232."
In answer to another suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan, that the regulation contained in the act did not amount to a prohibition, this court said: "We are unable to adopt the views' of that learned tribunal" as here expressed. It is the power to regulate commerce among the several States which the Constitution in- terms confers upon Congress; and this power, as we have seen, is exclusive in pases like the present; where the subject of regulation is one that admits and requires uniformity, -and where any regulation afr fects the freedom of traffic among the States."
The relation of the'police powers of the State to the powers' granted to Congress by the Constitution over foreign and interstate commerce, was stated by this court in the opinion in the case of Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 493, as follows: " It is also an established principle, as already indicated, that the only way in which commerce between the States can be legitimately affected' by state laws, is when, by virtue of its police power, and its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a state provides for the security of the lives, limbs,' health, and comfort of persons, and the protection of property; or when it does those things which may otherwise incidentally affect commerce, such as the establish:ment and • regulation of highways, canals, railroads, wharves, ferries, and other commercial facilities; the passage of inspection laws to secure the due quality and measure of products and commodities; the passage "of laws to regulate or restrict the sale of articles deemed injurious tp the health' or morals of the community; the imposition of taxes upon persons residing within the State or belonging to its- population, and upon ^avocations and employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce, or with some other employment or business exercised under authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States;' and the imposition of taxés upon all property within the State mingled with and .forming part of the great mass of property therein. But in making such internal regulations, a state cannot impose taxes upon persons passing through the State, or coming into it merely for a temporary purpose, especially if connected with interstate or foreign commerce; nor can it impose such taxes upon .property imported into the State from abroad or from another State, and not yet become a part of the common mass of property therein; and no discrimination can be made by any such regulations adversely to the persons or property of other States; and no regulations can be made directly affecting interstate commerce. Any taxation or regulation of the latter character would be an unauthorized interference with • the power given to Congress over thé subject. . In a word, it may be said that in the matter of interstate commerce the United States are but one country, and are and must be sub ject to one system of regulations, and not to, a multitude of' systems. • The doctrine of the freedom of that commerce, except as regulated by'Congress, is so firmly established that it is unnecessary to enlarge further upon this subject."
The section of the statute of Iowa, the validity of which is drawn in question in tliis case, does not fall within this enumeration of legitimate exertions of the pofice power. It is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the State over persons and property within its limits. On the contrary, it is an-attempt to exert that jurisdiction over persons and property within the limits of other States. It seeks to prohibit and stop their passage and importation into its own limits, and is designed as a regulation for the conduct of commerce before the merchandise is brought to its border. It is not one of those local regulations designed to aid and facilitate commerce; it is not an inspection law'to secure the. due quality and measure of a commodity; it is not a law to' regulate or restrict the sale of an article deemed injurious to the health and morals of the community; it is not a regulation confined to the purely internal and domestic commerce of the State; it is not a restrict tion which only operates, upon property after it has become mingled with and forms part of the mass of the property within the State. It is, on the other hand, a regulation directly affecting interstate commerce in an essential- and vital point. If authorized, in the present instance, upon the grounds and motives of the policy which have dictated it, the same reason would justify any and every other state regulation of interstate commerce upon any grounds and reasons which might prompt in particular cases their adoption. It is, therefore, a regulation of that character which constitutes an unauthorized interference with the power given to Congress over the subject. If not in contravention of any positive legislation by Congress, it is nevertheless' a breach and interruption of that liberty of trade which Congress ordains as'the national policy, by willing that it shall be free fpom restrictive regulations.
It may be said, however, that the right of the State to restrict or prohibit sales of intoxicating liquor within-its limits, conceded to exist as a part of its police power, implies the right to prohibit its importation, because the latter.is necessary to the effectual exercise of the former. The argument is that a prohibition of the sale cannot be made effective, except by preventing the introduction of the subject of the sale ; that if its entrance into the State is permitted, the traffic in it cannot be suppressed. But the right to. prohibit sales, so far as conceded to the States, arises only after the act of trans-' portion has terminated, because the sales which the State may forbid are of things within its jurisdiction. Its power over them does not begin to operate until they are brought within the territorial limits which circumscribe it. It might be very convenient and useful in the execution of t-he policy of prohibition within the State to extend the powers of the State beyond its territorial limits. But such extra-territorial powers cannot be assumed upon such an implication. On the contrary, the nature of the case- contradicts their existence. Bor if- they belong to one State, they belong to all, -and cannot be exercised severally and independently. The attempt would necessarily- produce that conflict and confusion which it was the very purpose of the Constitution by its delegations of national power to prevent.
It is easier to think that the right of importation from abroad, and of transportation from one State to another, includes, by necessary implication, the right of-the importer to sell in unbroken packages at the place where the transit terminates ; for the very -.purpose .and motive of that branch of commerce which -consists in transportation, is that other and consequent act of commerce which consists in the sale and exchange of .the commodities transported. Such, indeed, was the point decided in the case of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, as to foreign commerce, with the express statement, in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, that the conclusion would.be the same in a case of commerce among the-States; But it is not necessary now to express any opinion upon the point, because that question does not arise in the present case. -The precise line which divides the transaction, so far as it belongs to-foreign or interstate commerce, from the internal and domestic commerce of the State, we are not now called upon to delineate. It is enough to say, that the power to regulate or forbid the sale of a commodity, after it has been brought into the State, does not carry with it the right and power to prevent its introduction by transportation from another State.
For these reasons, we are constrained to -pronounce against the validity of the section of the statute of Iowa involved in this case. The judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois is therefore
Reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the plea, and to take further proceedings ' therein in conformity with this opinion.