Case: Ford v. Surget
Abbreviation: Ford v. Surget
Decision Date: 1878-10
Docket Number: 
Citation: 97 U.S. 594
Volume: 97
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Ford v. Surget.
Judges: 
Pages: 594–623

Head Matter:
Ford v. Surget.
X. The court reaffirms the doctrine in Williams v. Bruffy (96 V. S. 176), that an enactment oí the Confederate States, enforced as a law of one of the States composing that confederation, is a statute of such State, within the meaning of the act regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of the State courts.
2. A., a resident of Adams County, Mississippi, whose cotton was there burnt by B., in May, 1862, brought an action for its value against the latter, who set up as a defence that that State, whereof he was at that date a resident, was then in subjection to and under the control of the “ Confederate States; ” that an act of their congress, approved March 6, 1862, declared that it was the duty of all military commanders in their service to destroy all cotton whenever, in their judgment, the same should be about to fall into the hands of the United States ; that, in obedience to that act, the commander of their forces in Mississippi issued an order, directed to his subordinate officers in that State, to burn all cotton along the Mississippi River likely to fall into the hands of the forces of the United States; that the provost-marshal of that county was charged with executing within it that order; that A.’s cotton was likely to fall into the hands of the United States; that the provost-marshal ordered and required B. to burn it; and that B. did burn it, in obedience to the said act and the orders of that commander and the provost-marshal. Held, 1; That the said act, as a measure of legislation, can have no force in any court recognizing the Constitution of the United StateB as the supreme law of the land. 2. That it did not assume to confer upon such commanders any greater authority than they, by the laws and usages of war, were entitled to exercise. 3. That the orders, as an act of war, exempted a soldier of the Confederate army who executed them from liability to the owner of the cotton, who, at the time of its destruction, was a voluntary resident within the lines of the insurrection. *4. That the plea should, upon demurrer, be deemed as sufficiently averring the existence of such relations between B. and the Confederate military authorities as entitled him to make the same defence as if he had been such soldier.
Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.
Ford filed his complaint against Surget in the Circuit Court of Adams County, Mississippi, on the 2d of October, 1866, alleging that he, “ at his plantation in said county, on the fifth day of May, in the year 1862, was possessed, as of his own personal property, of two hundred bales of cotton, averaging in weight four hundred pounds per bale, and of the value of $600 per bale; and that he being so possessed, Surget, at the place aforesaid, and upon the day and year aforesaid, did wilfully and utterly, and against the consent and will of the plaintiff, destroy by fire the said two hundred bales of cotton,” to the plaintiff’s damage in the sum of $120,000.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, and also filed numerous special pleas.
The defence, although presented by the special pleas in different forms, is, in substance, embraced by the following allegations, namely: —
That, at and before the time the alleged trespasses were committed, the people, of Mississippi, and of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida,. Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, had confederated together for revolt against, and within their territorial limits had entirely subverted, the government of the United States, and in place thereof, and within and for their territory and people, had created a new and separate government, called the Confederate States of America, having executive, legislative, and judicial departments; that on the 6th of March, 1862, and from that date until the time when the alleged trespasses were committed, a war had been, and was then, waged and prosecuted by and between the United States and the Confederate States, and against each other, as belligerent powers and nations; that the Confederate States, for the prosecution of the war and the mainten anee of its powers, then and before had maintained in its service, in the State of Mississippi, an army of which General Beauregard was commander, whereby the territory, property, and inhabitants of<that State were held in subjection to and under the control of the Confederate States; that on the 6th of March, 1862, and by an act on that day approved and promulgated by the Confederate congress, it was declared to be the duty of all military commanders in the service of the Con-. federate States to destroy all cotton, tobacco, and other property that might be useful to the forces of the United States, whenever, in their judgment, the same should be about to fall into their hands; that afterwards, on the 2d of May, 1862, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces, in obedience to that act, made and issued a general order, directed to officers under his command in the State of Mississippi and in the service of the Confederate States, to burn all cotton along the Mississippi River likely to fall.into the hands of the forces of the United States; that before and at the date last mentioned, and afterwards, until the time the supposed trespasses were committed, Alexander K. Farrar was acting as provost-marshal of the county of Adams, charged with the duty, among others, of executing, within that county, the orders of military commanders in the State of Mississippi in the service of the Confederate States, and in pursuance thereof was commanded by the Confederate military authorities to burn all the cotton along the bank of that river likely to fall into the hands of the forces of the United States; that the cotton in the complaint mentioned was near the bank of the Mississippi within that county, and was, when burned, likely to fall into the hands of the Federal forces: that the defendant was then ordered and required by said Farrar, acting as provost-marshal under the orders aforesaid, to burn certain cotton, including the cotton in controversy; and that afterwards the defendant, in obedience to the act of the Confederate congress, and the orders of said military commanders and provost-marshal, did burn Ford’s cotton, which is the supposed trespass complained of.
To each of the special pleas the plaintiff in error demurred, assigning numerous causes of demurrer. The demurrers were overruled and replications filed. The cause, being at iáfeue, was tried by a jury. Verdict for the defendant. Judgment having been rendered thereon, the plaintiff removed the cause to the Supreme Court of the State. Upon the affirmance of the judgment, he sued out this writ of error.
Mr. JR. JD. Mussey for the plaintiff in error.
This court has jurisdiction. The pleadings draw in question the validity of a statute, set up by the defendant as a justification for his destruction of the plaintiff’s property. Its validity, although assailed, upon the ground that its provisions violated rights, privileges, and immunities claimed by the plaintiff under the Constitution of the United States, was sustained by the decision of the court below.
The statute, so far as this case is concerned, derived all its force from the effect given to it as the law of the land in Mississippi, by her solemnly expressed sanction of the acts of the “ Confederate States,” of which she was a member. It must, therefore, be regarded as her statute, within the meaning of the provision which confers upon this court jurisdiction to re-examine upon error the judgment or decree of a State court. The defendant’s attempted justification rests upon tjvo grounds: —
1. An act of the Confederate congress.
The Confederate States were only the military representative of the rebellion, and were never recognized by the United States as a de facto government. Their enactments are, therefore, absolute nullities, and cannot be pleaded as a justification for the wrongful act of Surget. Hedges v. Price et al., 2 W. Va. 234; Caperton v. Martin, 4 id. 38; Franklin v. Vannoy, 66 N. C. 145; The Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688; Reynolds, Auditor, v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 434; Keppel's Adni’rs v. Petersburg Railroad Co., Chase’s Decisions, pp. 209, 210; United States v. Morrison, id. 525; Evans v. City of Richmond, id. 551; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 id. 570; Sprott v. United States,. 20 id. 459.
2. Belligerent rights.
The Confederate forces had no rights other than those expressly granted them; and.hence it is incumbent on the defendant to aver that the precise belligerent right set up by him as a justification had been granted. Such averment is wanting in his jileas. No such right as is invoked in the argument was ever granted by the United States to the insurgents, by any proclamation, order, or statute. The courts are concluded in this respect by the action of the political department. They cannot supplement or extend the grant.
This court, in passing upon such rights, has carefully excluded any enlargement of them, and confined itself to the definition of what was actually given. See, for instance, Coppel v. Hall, 7 Wall. 554.
Conceding that the orders in question were lawfully issued, they can only justify the military man who executed them.
It is not averred that the defendant had any allegiance to the Confederate forces as a volunteer or a conscript, or that there was any vis major compelling him to obey the orders.
It is even denied, by high authority, that an act of a' Confederate soldier, committed in violation of private rights as well as of public duty, can find a justification in the order of his commanding officer. Hedges v. Price et al., 2 W. Va. 234; Caperton v. Martin, 4 id. 138; Franklin v. Vannoy, 66 N. C. 145.
But be this as it may, the exemption from individual and jjersonal liability does not extend to a citizen who, not directly connected with the Confederate forces, committed, acts of private wrong in aid of the rebellion. Cochran & Thompson v. Tucker, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 186; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 651; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459, 465.
Mr. W. T. Martin for the defendant in error.
A preliminary question of jurisdiction arises. To give jurisdiction here, it must affirmatively appear from the record not only that a Federal question was raised, but that it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered by the State court could not have been given without deciding it. Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327; Armstrong et al. v. Treasurer of Athens County, 16 Pet. 281; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Company, 1 Wall. 116; Murdoch v. City of Memphis, 20 id. 690; Railroad Company v. Maryland, id. 643; Cockroft v. Vose, 14 id. 5.
If the judgment might have proceeded upon some ground of general law, indejjendently of the Federal question, the juris diction fails. Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257; Commercial Bank v. Rochester, 15 id. 639; Rector v. Ashly, 6 id. 142; Gibson v. Choteau, 8 id. 317; Steines v. Franklin County, 14 id. 15; Kennebeck Railroad v. Portland Railroad, id. 23; Caperton v. Boyer, id. 216.
A plea of not guilty, and several special pleas all ultimately leading to issues of fact, were filed. The jury found for the defendant, and judgment was rendered in his favor. There was no bill of exceptions embodying the evidence or the instructions of the court. The judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming, in general terms, that of the subordinate court, having been, for aught that the record discloses, rendered irrespectively of any matter of law which might have been raised upon the special pleas, presents nothing which justifies the conclusion that a Federal question was actually decided. Neither the published opinion of the Appellate Court, nor the assignment of errors there filed, constitutes a legitimate part of the record; and, therefore, although incorporated in it, furnishes no aid in determining whether jurisdiction exists here. Medberry et al. v. State of Ohio, 24 How. 413.
So far as the record is concerned, the whole case may have turned solely upon the insufficiency of the evidence to maintain the issue for the plaintiff upon the plea of not guilty.
If, however, this court tabes jurisdiction, and considers that the validity of the special pleas is a subject of discussion here, it is submitted that they are sufficient to bar the action.
The property of the plaintiff alleged to have been destroyed at his residence in Mississippi, May 5, 1862, was cotton, an article which each belligerent regarded as possessing a special character, and treated, even in the hands of non-combatants, differently from ordinary private property. “ It is well known,” said this court in Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton (2 Wall. 420), “that cotton has constituted the main reliance of the rebels for means to purchase the munitions of war in Europe. It is a matter of history, that, rather than permit it to come into possession of the national troops, the rebel government has everywhere devoted it, however owned, to destruction.” The regulations established by the Federal government, the acts of its officers, — military, naval, civil, — and the decisions of its courts, show what importance it attached during the war to that species of property, and how it would be disposed of if found in the hands of a resident of a State in rebellion. It was treated by the respective belligerents as contraband of war, and was by each the subject of special governmental con trol and action, whether for its preservation, seizure, confiscation, or destruction.
The Confederate States, in prosecuting the war, had the right to destroy such property found within the limits of their military occupation, in order to prevent its seizure by tbe United States. Being a de facto government, its statutes and orders must have been necessarily obeyed by all persons residing within those limits. By acts of obedience in submission to a power which they could not resist, such persons did not become responsible as wrong-doers. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, citing United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, and Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603.
The plaintiff insists that the statute in question was a nullity, having no binding force in law;.that the Confederate States were founded upon an usurpation of the authority and jurisdiction of the United States, and were not recognized by the latter even as a de facto government.
The authorities are not consistent upon the subject. While, therefore, a decree confiscating the property of a non-resident of the Confederate States, or sequestering a debt due to him or to the United States, would, although rendered in accordance with a statute, be held inoperative to pass the title to the property or to extinguish the debt, no decision can be found affirming that, in such a case as this, the statute in question would not afford a complete justification to the defendant.
In 1862 the war was in progress. Ford and Surget resided in Mississippi, and were there justly regarded and treated as having, by their own voluntary act, rendered themselves subject to the Confederate government. They were alike in rebellion, and in its cause risked person and property. The rebels, as between themselves, or as between themselves and the Confederate government, must be held to have acquiesced in its authority, and to have incurred no liability by rendering obedience to its enactments.
Ford was, in judgment of law, a party to the acts of that government. 1 Kent, 63. He might perhaps have claimed compensation from it if the rebellion had been successful, but certainly not from Surget, acting under its order. They, and many thousands besides, established and recognized it as the government of their choice. It has perished; and Ford now asks that Surget be compelled to indemnify him for losses he sustained in their common attempts to maintain it and displace the authority of the United States. No court will sanction such an unreasonable and unjust demand. Vattel (ed. 1855), 402, sect. 232.
But rejecting as surplusage the allegation of the pleas touching the statute, they are a valid bar. The United States, from sound policy as well as humanity, conceded to the organized military forces of the Confederate States the same status and rights as if they had been engaged in warfare on behalf of a lawfully existing and independent power. The Federal army, in extending its sphere of successful operations, seized all cotton found within the insurgent States, and the proceeds of the sales of that species of property were paid into the treasury. The United States thus increased its resources for the prosecution of the war. Wherever, therefore, such property was liable to capture by that army, the Confederate commanders, in the absence of any statute of their government on the subject, had, by the laws of war, the same right to destroy it as if it had formed part of their public stores or munitions of war. The history of that eventful period renders it certain that the orders in the pleas mentioned would, at every hazard, have been carried into execution.
It is said, however, that Surget does not aver that he was in the military service. The allegation is that the provost-marshal was charged with the execution of those orders, and that by him Surget “ was ordered and required to burn ” the cotton for the loss of which this suit was brought. He was, therefore, subjected to the military power, and his obedience to its commands would have been undoubtedly enforced by the same means of coercion as if lie had been an enlisted soldier. The doctrine of vis major, therefore, applies.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Harlan,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
We can notice only the ground of demurrer, which suggests that the defendant in his pleas sought to rely " for justification of the trespass committed by him upon matters in themselves wholly illegal, against peace and good policy, and contrary to the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land, and the government thereof."
In view of the decision in Williams v. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176), but little need be said upon the preliminary question of the jurisdiction of this court. What is there decided would seem to be conclusive, in this cáse, upon the point of jurisdiction. That was an action of assumpsit for goods sold in March, 1861, by citizens of Pennsylvania to one Bruffy, a citizen of Virginia. The administrator of Bruffy claimed that the estate was not liable for the debt sued for, because, pending the recent war, his intestate paid the debt to a receiver of the Confederate States, in pursuance of a decree of a Confederate district court in Virginia, rendered in conformity with the provisions of an act of the Confederate congress, passed Aug. 30, 1861, sequestrating the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, rights, and credits within the Confederate States, and of every right and.interest therein, held by or for any alien enemy after May 21,1861. That defence was sustained in the State courts, and, upon error, it was insisted that this court had no jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Referring to the provision in the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction upon this court, " where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; " and referring also to the provision conferring such jurisdiction, " where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against tbe title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority," — this court decided that its right to review that judgment could be maintained upon both of those clauses of the amended Judiciary Act.
Some of the grounds of our decision are thus stated in the opinion of the court: —
" The pleas aver that a confederation was formed by Virginia and other States, called the Confederate States of America, and that under a law of this confederation, enforced in Virginia, the. debt due to the plaintiffs was sequestrated. Now, the Constitution of the United States prohibits any treaty, alliance, or confederation by one State with another. The organization whose enactment is pleaded cannot therefore be regarded in this court as having any legal existence. It follows that whatever efficacy the enactment possessed in Virginia must be attributed to the sanction given to it by that State. Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this court. . . . .By the only authority which can be recognized as having any legal existence, that is, the State of Virginia, this act of the unauthorized confederation was enforced as a law of the commonwealth. Its validity was drawn in question on the ground that it was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the court below was in favor of its validity."
We do not perceive that this case, upon the question of jurisdiction, can be distinguished from Williams v. Bruffy. The defendant, Surget, justifies his burning of the cotton under military orders, issued by a Confederate general, in pursuance of authority conferred by an act of the Confederate congress. If we regard substance rather than mere form or technical accuracy, the defence rested upon that act, the validity of which was, in terms, questioned by the several demurrers to the special pleas. The general orders of the State court overruling the demurrers must be accepted, in every essential sense, as an adjudication in favor of the validity of an act of the Confed erate congress, recognized and enforced as law in Mississippi, and which act, according to the rule laid down in that case, must be, therefore, regarded by us as a statute of that State, within the meaning of the provisions of the act declaring the appellate jurisdiction' of this court. It results that we have power to review the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
We come now to the consideration of the merits of the case, so far as they seem to be involved in the demurrers to the special pleas.
The principles of public law, as applicable to .civil and international wars, have been so frequently under discussion here, that we shall not avail ourselves of the opportunity now afforded to renew that discussion, or enlarge upon what has been heretofore said. The numerous decisions of this court, beginning with the Prize Cases (2 Black, 635), and ending with Williams v. Bruffy (supra) and Dewing v. Perdicaries (96 U. S. 193), render any further declaration as to these principles wholly unnecessary for the purposes of the present case. Without attempting to restate all the reasons assigned in adjudged cases, for the conclusions therein announced, we assume that the following propositions are settled by, or are plainly to be deduced from, our former decisions: —
1. The district of country declared by the constituted authorities, during the late civil war, to be in insurrection against the government of the United States, was enemy territory, and all the people residing within such district were, according to public law, and for all purposes connected with the prosecution of the war, liable to be treated by the United States, pending the war and while they remained within the lines of the' insurrection, as enemies, without reference to their personal sentiments and dispositions,
2. There was no legislation of the Confederate congress which this court can recognize as having any validity against the United States, or against any of its citizens who, pending the war, resided outside of the declared limits of the insurrectionary districts.
3. The Confederate government is to be regarded by the courts as simply tbe military representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United States.
4. To the Confederate army was, however, conceded, in the interest of humanity, and to prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation, such belligerent rights as belonged under the laws of nations to the armies of independent governments engaged in war against each other, — that concession placing the soldiers and officers of the rebel army, as to all matters directly connected with tbe mode of prosecuting the war, " on the footing of those engaged in lawful'war," and exempting " them from liability for acts of legitimate warfare."
5. The cotton for the burning of which damages are claimed in this civil action was, as to the United States and its military forces engaged- in the suppression of the rebellion, not only enemy, but hostile property, because being the product of the soil, and, when burned, within the boundary of the insurrectionary district, it constituted also, as we know from the history of the insurrection it did, " the chief reliance of the rebels for means to purchase the munitions of war in Europe." Young v. United States, supra, p. 39; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404. It was therefore liable, at the time, to seizure or destruction by the Federal army, without regard to the individual sentiments of its owner, whether the purpose or effect of such seizure or destruction would have been to strengthen that army, or to decrease and cripple the power and resources of the enemy.
It would seem to be. a logical, deduction from these doctrines — a deduction strengthened by considerations of humanity and public necessity — that the destruction of the same cotton, under the- orders of the Confederate military authorities, for the purpose of preventing it from falling into the hands of the Federal army, was, under the circumstances alleged in the special pleas, an act of war upon the part of the military forces of the rebellion, for which the person executing such orders was relieved from civil responsibility at the suit of the owner voluntarily residing at the time within the lines of the insurrection. We do not rest this conclusion upon any authority conferred or attempted to be conferred upon Confederate commanders by the statute of the Confederate congress, recited in tbe special pleas. As an act of legislation, that statute can have no force whatever in any court recognizing the Federal Constitution as the supreme law of the land. It is to be regarded as nothing more than a declaration upon the part of the military representative of the rebellion, addressed to Confederate commanders, affording evidence to those adhering to the rebellion of the circumstances under which cotton within the lines of the insurrection might be destroyed by military com-, manders in the service of the Confederate States. It, however, assumed to confer upon such commanders no greater authority than, consistently with the laws and usages of war, they might have' exercised, without the previous sanction of the Confederate legislative authorities, as to any cotton within their military lines likely to fall into the hands of the Federal forces. They had the right, as an act of war, to destroy private property within the lines of the insurrection, belonging to those who were co-operating, directly or indirectly, in the insurrection against the government of the United States, if such destruction seemed to be required by impending necessity for the purpose of retarding the advance or crippling the military operations of the Federal forces. Of that mode of conducting the war, on behalf of the rebellion, no one .could justly complain who occupied the position of an enemy of the United States, by reason of voluntary residence within the insurrectionary district.
It is insisted with much earnestness that Surget should, not be allowed to take shelter under these doctrines, since it is not averred in the special pleas that he constituted any part of, or held any official relations to, the military forces of the rebellion. But such a technical, narrow construction of the special pleas should not be allowed to prevail in a case like this. It is distinctly alleged that the Confederate government was, at the time of the burning of the cotton, exercising all the functions of civil government within the State of Mississippi, and over its property and inhabitants. It is further alleged that the defendant was an inhabitant and citizen of Mississippi, subject to Confederate power, authority, and jurisdiction, and that he was ordered and required by the provost-marshal — charged by the Confederate department commander with the execution of the order to burn the cotton in Adams County likely to fall into the possession of the Federal forces — to burn the cotton on Ford's plantation, and that it was so burned in obedience to the act of the Confederate congress and the orders of the military authorities. These allegations seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to admit evidence that the defendant* acted under duress or compulsion. Taking into consideration the extraordinary circumstances in which the people of Mississippi were then placed, especially the absolute authority which the Confederate government and its military commanders were then exercising over that portion of the territory and people of the United States, the special pleas should be deemed, upon demurrer, as sufficiently averring the existence of such relations between Surget and the Confederate military authorities as entitled him to make the same defence as any soldier, regularly enlisted in the Confederate army, acting under like orders, could have made. Whether Surget was, in fact, required to execute the order of the provost-marshal does not appear. No bill of exception was taken,' and in view of the explicit averment that Surget was required by military authority to burn Ford's cotton, we cannot assume upon demurrer that he was a mere volunteer to aid in its destruction.
It will be observed that we have assumed, from the pleadings, as we think we are justified in doing, that Ford resided on his plantation in the insurrectionary district at the time his cotton was burned. The contrary is not alleged, and was not claimed in argument. He does not pretend that he resided in a loyal State, or adhered to the government of the Union in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. There is no intimation that his residence in Mississippi was, in any degree, constrained or temporary. Whether the redress here sought could, consistently wdth the provisions of the Federal Constitution, be denied to one who, by the laws of war, is to be deemed an enemy to the lawful government, solely by reason of residence within the insurrectionary district pending the struggle, but who, in point of fact, was a loyal citizen, adhering to the United States, giving no voluntary aid or comfort to the rebellion, it is not necessary for us now to decide. No such question is here presented, and we forbear any expression of opinion upon it. It will be time enough to consider and determine that precise question when it arises.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the act of the Confederate congress, recited in the special pleas, was of no validity as an act of legislation ; and while the demurrers could not have been overruled upon the ground that such unauthorized legislation afforded protection to Surget, nevertheless, the general facts set out in the special pleas, considered in connection with the. belligerent rights conceded to the rebel army by the government of the United States, do constitute a defence to this action, and upon this last ground the demurrer might have been properly overruled.
Whether the State court, in its instructions to the jury, correctly expounded the law of the case, we cannot, upon this review, determine. No bill of exception was taken, either as to the evidence or the instructions, and we cannot, therefore, determine what errors, if any, were committed in the trial of the ease. We have limited our investigation altogether to the Federal questions raised by the demurrer to the special pleas.
Judgment affirmed.