Case: LANKFORD AND OTHERS, COMPOSING THE STATE BANKING BOARD OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, v. PLATTE IRON WORKS COMPANY
Abbreviation: Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co.
Decision Date: 1915-01-05
Docket Number: No. 381
Citation: 235 U.S. 461
Volume: 235
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: LANKFORD AND OTHERS, COMPOSING THE STATE BANKING BOARD OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, v. PLATTE IRON WORKS COMPANY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van Deyanter and Mr. Justice Lamar, dissenting.
Pages: 461–496

Head Matter:
LANKFORD AND OTHERS, COMPOSING THE STATE BANKING BOARD OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, v. PLATTE IRON WORKS COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
No. 381.
Argued October 14, 15, 1914.
Decided January 5, 1915.
The decision of state tribunals in regard thereto is an important element to be considered in determining the interest which the State has in a fund administered by a state board.
The state courts of Oklahoma having held that the statute creating the State Banking Board intended to give the State a definite title to the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund, the fact that the fund is to be used to satisfy claims of beneficiaries does not take its administration from the officers of the State or subject them to judicial control. This court will not assume that the fund will not be faithfully managed and applied. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.'S. 151.
A suit by a depositor in a bank in Oklahoma against members of the State Banking Board and the Bank Commissioner of Oklahoma to compel payments, from, distribution of, and assessments for, the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund, is. a suit against the State, and, under the Eleventh Amendment, cannot be maintained in the Federal court.
The facts, which involve the application of the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought in the Federal courts against the members of the State Banking Board of Oklahoma to compel payments from, and distribution of, the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund of that State, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, for appellants:
The action is against the State of Oklahoma. Defendants are sued in their'official capacity. The relief sought is such as-could only be granted against them as officials of the State. They have no personal interest in the litiga tion. Were they not officers of the State they could not in any way . comply with the decree rendered. The bill seeks payment of the plaintiff’s claim out of the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund or if the cash available be insufficient to issue Depositors’ Guaranty Fund Warrants in payment óf same.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, that the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund is a fund of the State, and that the- State had a first lien - on the failed bank’s assets to discharge whatever the State should advance for it. State v. Cockrell, 27 Oklahoma; 630; Lankford v. Oklahoma Engraving Co., 130 Pac. Rep. 278.
The object of the law is to' serve public not private rights. Whether or not the Oklahoma Act served a private or a public purpose was the basis of the decision of this court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 XL S. 104; S. C., 219 XJ. S. 575.
The,essence of the law is not to establish a private right but to conserve püblic welfare; and, as such, no justiciable rights in the depositors are to be presumed to arise; the law was not primarily enacted to return to the depositor his money, but more properly to prevent the public iijury by-bank panics. Nowhere is there .language used showing an intent to give to a depositor the right to sue. See § 1, eh. 22, Sess. Laws, 1913 ; § 6, ch. 22, Sess. Laws, 1913.
With the exercise of a high, executive discretion, the .courts will not interfere. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497.
An action to compel state officers to pay a claim from a state fund in their charge, which they, in the exercise of an executive discretion, refused to pay, is an action against the State. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 123; Smith v. Reeves, 178 XJ. S. 436.
An action to compel payment by the Treasurer of the State of a sum unlawfully collected as taxes is one to compel the State to pay out money from its funds and therefore one against the State. See Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Ry., 109 U. S. 446.
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 150, is conclusive of the issue here. The State has placed the management of a state fund in the hands of a board of state officers; and, as in that case, the purpose of the fund is to pay certain claimants; the State has selected that board, .and no other tribunal to determine what claims shall be paid. The courts have no jurisdiction.
The case is not one in which it is sought to move the officer through the State but on the contrary the State is sought to be moved through its officers. Of this, the court has no jurisdiction, as it is in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.
The action is for mandamus, not ancillary to a prior judgment. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Jones, 105 Fed. Rep. 459. Not being ancillary to any judgment previously obtained, the Federal District Court had no jurisdiction thereof. Covington &c. Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U. S. 109; Knapp v. Lake Shore Ry., 197 U. S. 540; Fuller v. Aylesworth, 75 Fed. Rep. 694. See also Jábine v. Oats, 115 Fed. Rep. 861; Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 246; Large v. Consul, 137 Fed. Rep. 168; Pensacola v. Lehman, 57 Fed. Rep. 324; Denton v. Barber, 79 Fed. Rep. 189; Burnham v. Fields, 157 Fed. Rep. 248; Gares v. Northwest Bldg. Assn., 55 Fed. Rep. 210; Indiana v. Lake Erie &c. Ry., 85 Fed. Rep. 3.
This rule'applies to district courts as well as circuit courts. In re Forsyth, 78 Fed. Rep. 301.
The petition sets forth no cause of action.
Mr. Charles A. Loomis and Mr. Allen McReynolds, with whom Mr. Howard Gray and Mr. John W. Halliburton, were on the brief, for appellee:
A proceeding to obtain a judgment against officials in a representative capacity, payable out of a specific fund in their charge and control, is a proceeding to obtain a judgment for money not otherwise secured, within the meaning of the Federal Judiciary Act and confers jurisdiction upon the United States court. And this is true although it may'be necessary to resort to mandamus to enforce collection of the judgment when obtained. Jor dan v. Cass Co., 3 Dill. 185; Cass Co. v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360; Davenport v. Dodge Co., 105 U. S. 237; and see also Aylesworth v. Oratiott, 43 Fed. Rep. 340; S. C., aff’d, 159 U. S. 40; Fuller v. Aylesworth, 75 Fed. Rep. 694; Heidekoper v. Hadley, 177 Fed. Rep. 1.
. This is not a suit against the State. An action against a state officer to compel him to perform duties prescribed by law, is not an action against the State. An officer who refuses to obey the law does not stand for the State, within, the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
A sovereign State must be presumed to be willing that its laws shall be obeyed. Through its laws it speaks to its servants, and commands them to do something. Thissüit therefore, instead of being against the State, is against its servants to compel the performance of duties, which by their acceptance of the office, they obligated themselves to perform. Heidekoper v. Hadley, 177 Fed. Rep. 1; Lank-ford v. Oklahoma Engraving Co., 130 Pac. Rep. 278; State v. Cockrell, 27 Oklahoma, 630; Ralston v. Missouri Fund, 120 U. S. 390; Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248; Taylor v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 88 Fed. Rep. 350; Smith v. Ames, 169 U. S. 518; Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123.
The fact that the complainant may have a remedy in ¿n original proceeding in mandamus in the state court for the cause of action alleged, will not deprive the complainant of the right to sue in equity in the Federal court. Smith v. Ames, 169 U. S. 518.
The Oklahoma depositors’’guaranty fund is not a part of the general state funds and is not under the control of, and cannot be used by, the executive or legislative branches of the state government for general state purposes, or for any-purpose whatever. The fund is in the possession and control of the State Banking Board, and can be used solely for the purpose of paying depositors of failed banks. Danby v. State Treasurer, 39 Vermont, 92; Sess. Laws, Oklahoma, 1911, ch. 31, § 6; Id., Í913, ch. 22, § 6.
Depositors in failed banks have a justiciable right to enforce payment out of the depositors’ .guaranty fund. Danby v. State Treasurer, 39 Vermont, 92.
This is not a suit on a certificate of deposit, as a negotiable instrument, but is a suit for money actually deposited. The fact that a certificate of deposit was accepted as evidence of-the deposit, will not deprive the depositor of the right to be paid out of the depositors’ guaranty fund.
The holder of a time certificate of deposit is a “depositor” within the meaning of the State Bank Guaranty Law of Oklahoma. Tiffany on Banks, 75; Williams v. Rogers, 77 Kentucky, 776; Wilkes & Co. v. Arthur, 74 S. E. Rep. 361; Lamar v. Taylor, 80 S. E. Rep. 1085.
The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of the state laws in cases between citizens of different States, coordinate with and not subordinate -to that of the state courts and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those laws.
As the object in giving the national courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the St¿tes in controversies between citizens of different States, was to institute an independent tribunal which would not be supposed to be affected by local prejudice or sectional views it would be a dereliction of their duty not to exercise an independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 30; Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555; Julian v. Central Trust Co.., 193 U. S. 93; Stanley Co. v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437; Kuhn v. Fair-mount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 360; Oats v. .First National Bank, 100 U. S. 239; Pana v. Bowler, 1(37 U, S. 529.
■ In respect to the doctrine of commercial law and general jurisprudence the courts of the United States will exercise their own independent judgment. In respect to such judgment they will not be controlled by decisions based upon local statutes or local usage, although if the question is balanced with doubt, the United States court, for the sake of harmony, “will lean to an agreement of views with the state courts.” Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 19; Presidio Co. v. Noel-Young Co., 212 U. S. 58; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 30.
When the law of . a State has not been settled it is not only the right but the duty of the Federal court to exercise its own judgment in construing state statutes, as it also always does when the case before it depends on the doctrine of commercial law and general jurisprudence. Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co'., 215 U; S; 349, 360; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 19.
This action is not an action against the State. The defendants cannot seek shelter behind the State for the abuse of their discretion in office. See § 55, Art. 5, Const, of Oklahoma, the purpose of which is to control the method in which public money or state funds should be disbursed. •The word “appropriation” has a definite and certain meaning in law and is generally, defined as the setting apart from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such maimer that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money and no more, for that object and no other. State v. Moore, 50 Nebraska, 88; Ristine v. State, 20 Indiana, 328; Clayton v. Barry, 27 Arkansas, 129; Stratton v. Greene, 45 California, 149; State v. LaGrave, 23 Nebraska, 25; State v. Wallichs, 12 Nebraska, 407; Proll v. Dun, 80 California, 220.
As applied to the general fund in the treasury of a State, “appropriation” is defined to be an authority from the legislature, given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officer, to supply sums of money, out of that whieh may be in the treasury in a given year, for specific objects or demands against the State. State v. Lindsley, .3 Washington, 125; State v. King, 67 S. W. Rep. 812; Ristine v. State, 20 Indiana, 328; Shatteck v. Kincaid, 31 Oregon, 379.
Nothing in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, warrants the conclusion that the guarantee fund is one of the State. See § 7919.
Administrative or ministerial officers with duties prescribed by law for their performance may be compelled to perform those duties by those who may be directly interested in their performance. Board of Liquidation v. McCornb, 92 IT. S. 531; Rolston v. Missouri, 120 IT. S. 390; Graham v. Folsom, 200 IT. S. 248; Taylor v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 88 Fed. Rep. 350; Madison v. Smith, 83 Indiana, 502; Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 IT. S. 1; State Board v. People, 191 Illinois, 528; State v. Bourne, 151 Mo. App. 104; State v. Adcock, 206 Missouri, 556.
The money in the guarantee fund is not subject to appropriation by the legislature for any purpose it may see fit. On the contrary it is collected from a special source for a limited purpose. The credit of the State is not loaned, simply the credit of this fund. Ipso facto it follows that this is hot a suit against the State.
Under our system of laws there is no wrong without a remedy, and yet to deprive the appellee in this case of its money and deny it judicial relief with the barren statement that this action could not be maintained because against the State would certainly work a wrong, and no less certainly find appellee without a remedy.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McKenna
delivered the opinion of the court.
Suit in equity brought by appellee against appellants, constituting the Oklahoma State Banking Board. The Platte Iron Works Company, appellee, is a Maine corporation and a citizen of that State and became the holder of two certain time certificates of deposit issued by the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Sapulpa. Appellants are members of the State Banking Board, and the appellant J. D. Lankford is the State Bank Commissioner.
On September 10, 1912, the Bank Commissioner took charge of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank and of all its assets and proceeded to wind up its affairs. Demand for the payment of the certificates was made upon the Banking Board and the Commissioner out of the Depositors' Guaranty Fund of the State, but payment was refused.
A decree was prayed adjudging appellee owner of the deposits and certificates of deposit and that it was entitled to have the same paid out of the Depositors' Guaranty Fund created under'and by virtue of the laws of the State. If there should be not sufficient funds available therefor, that the Banking Board be required to issue to appellee certificates of indebtedness for the amount of the deposit, to be known as "Depositors' Guaranty Fund Warrants of the State of Oklahoma" bearing 6% interest as provided by § 3, Article 2, Chapter 31, Session Laws of Oklahoma, . 1911, as amended by Senate Bill No. 231, passed at the last session of the State Legislature, and that the Banking Board be required to levy an assessment against the capital stock of each and every bank and trust company organized and existing under the laws of Oklahoma for the purpose of increasing such Depositors' Guaranty Fund and pay the deposits and the "Depositors' Guaranty Fund • Warrants of the State of Oklahoma." General relief was also prayed.
Defendants in the suit, appellants hére, moved to dismiss the bill on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the action or of the persons of the defendants, the suit being one against the State of Oklahoma without its consent, in violation of the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The motion was.denied and defendants were given thirty-days to answer. No answer appears in the record but the decree recites that one was filed. The court entered a decree as prayed for in the bill and this appeal was then prosecuted.
The assignments of error in this court are: (1) The suit is an original action in mandamus and the District Court had no jurisdiction, the' same not being ancillary to any judgment theretofore obtained; (2) the suit is one against the State, "the defendants [appellants] having no personal interest therein and being sued in their official capacity as agents" of the State; (3) the amended bill upon its - face states no cause of action for relief.
Is the suit one against the State? The appellee earnestly contends that the answer should be in the negative. "An action," counsel say, "against a State officer to compel him to perform duties prescribed by law is not an action against the State. An officer who refuses to obey the laws does not stand for the State, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution."
These contentions depend upon the meaning of the law; they assume its commands are disobeyed by the officers of the Staté; in other words, that the default of the officers is personal, in opposition — not in conformity — to the law of the State. But another and seemingly broader contention is made.' It is asserted that the Depositors' Guaranty Fund is not under the executive and legislative control of the. State and cannot be used by either for any purpose whatever, but "can be used solely for the purpose of paying depositors of failed banks." Two questions, therefore, are presented, one of power and one of interpretation.
This court, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, sustained the constitutionality of the act as an exercise of the police power of the State. The law in its general purpose was there presented and passed on. The relation of the State to the fund did not come up for consideration, but necessarily this is but a detail in administration not one affecting legality of the law. The creation of the fund was said to be justified by its purpose, and the power of the State was declared adequate to accomplish it. "The purpose of the fund," it was said, "is shown by its name. It is to secure the full repayment of deposits."
Where the State should vest, the title to the fund for the purpose of its administration was immaterial to the essence of the power to create the-fund. Whether the State should commit it to the mere ministerial administration of the Bank Commissioner and Banking Board and subject them to controversies with depositors or draw around them the circle of its immunity, was a matter within its competency to determine,,and we are brought to the question of interpretation: — which has the State done?
By the statute, the Banking Board is composed of the Bank Commissioner and three other persons, to be appointed by the Governor; and it is provided that the "Board shall have supervision and control of the Depositors' Guaranty Fund, and shall have power to adopt all necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent, with law for. the management and administration of said fund." The fund is created by levying "against the capital stock of each and every bank organized and existing under the laws" of the "State an annual assessment equal to one-fifth of one per cent., and no more, of its average daily deposits during its continuance as a banking corporation," the fund to be "used solely for the pur pose of liquidating deposits of failed banks and retiring warrants próvidéd for" in the act. If at any time the fund be insufficient for such purpose or to pay "other indebtedness properly chargeable against the same, the Banking Board shall have authority to issue certificates of indebtedness to be known as 'Depositors' Guaranty Fund Warrants of the State of Oklahoma,' in order to liquidate the deposits" or such other indebtedness. It is provided that the depositors shall be paid in .full, and' when the cash available or that can be made immediately available is not sufficient to discharge the obligations of the bank or trust company "the Banking Board shall draw from the depositors' guaranty fund and from additional assessments, if required, as provided in § 300, the amount necessary to make up the deficiency; and the State shall have, for the benefit of the depositors' guaranty fund, a first lien upon the assets of said-bank or trust company, and all liabilities against the stockholders, officers and directors of said bank or trust company and against all other persons, corporations or firms. Such liabilities may be enforced by the State for the benefit of the depositors' guaranty fund."
The contention of appellee is that the law has created a fund for the payment of depositors and directs that they shall be paid in full from the fund or "from additional assessments." If the fund be insufficient for such purpose, it is further contended, the Board is required to issue guaranty fund warrants in order to liquidate the deposits. Such, it is insisted, are' the plain commands of the statute to which obedience is imposed and is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the law, which is to secure the full repayment to depositors. And, therefore, a-suit by depositors is not a suit against the State but a suit to compel submission by' the officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose.
There is strength in the contentions and we are not insensible to it, but there may be more complexity in fulfilling the scheme of the statute than the language of counsel exhibits and it may be embarrassed if not defeated by subjecting the Banking Board to incessant judicial inquiries of its administration. We certainly cannot assume that it will not do its duty and provide the •ultimate payment of all depositors. To this result the State makes itself an active agent. It is given a hen upon the assets of insolvent banks and upon all liabilities against their stockholders, officers, directors, and against other persons, which may be enforced by the State for the benefit of the fund which its law has created.
In Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, there is analogy to the case at bar.' The State of South Carolina in the year 1892 assumed the exclusive management of all traffic in liquor. It subsequently abandoned the scheme and passed an act called "the State Dispensary act" to provide for the disposition of ah property of the instrumentality it had created and to wind up its affairs. A commission was appointed for that purpose. A part of the duties of the commission was to dispose of the property, collect all debts clue and pay "from the proceeds thereof all just liabilities at the earliest date practicable." Any surplus was to be paid to the State Treasury. A duty, therefore, was imposed upon the commission to collect the assets of the dispensary and pay its debts and it was as directly expressed as was the duty imposed upon the Banking Board in the pending case. .
The Wilson Distilling Company contended that the Winding-up Act of the State created a .trust, and the funds in the hands of the commission were a trust fund held for the benefit of the creditors of the State dispensary and the suit a plain suit in equity brought by a ceetui que trust to compel a trustee holding property for his benefit to perform the duties imposed upon him. The suit, therefore, it was contended, was not to require the commissioners to do that which the law of the State forbade, but to do what jhe law of the State commanded, and the State was not a necessary; nor an indispensable party. The contentions received the approval * of the Circuit Court of Appeals, but this-court took a different view of them and decided that there was "no just ground for the conclusion that the State, in providing by that legislation for the liquidation of the affairs of the State dispensary, intended to divest itself of its right of property in the assets of that governmental agency, and to endow the commissioners with a right and title to the property which placed it so beyond the control of the State as to authorize a judicial tribunal to take the assets of the State out of the hands of those selected to manage the same, and by means of a receiver to administer such assets as property affected by a trust, irrevocable in its nature, and thus to dispose of the same without the presence of the State." (213 U. S., p. 170.) The case, it is true, has some differences from that at bar. There the State was the owner of the property committed to the commissioners for disposition and was also the original debtor. Here the property is that of the contributing banks and is accumulated in a fund for the security of their respective depositors. These are differences, but there are substantial resemblances. In that case officers were appointed to administer the property and liquidate and pay the demands against it, and this was the specific direction of the law, marking the beneficiaries and apparently making them the exclusive parties in any proceedings to enforce the law. In this case officers are appointed having even a greater power. They are not only empowered to liquidate the deposits or other indebtedness of failed' banks, but to levy assessments on other banks to make up any déficiency. Therefore, as the State was said to be a necessary party in the cited case, the State can, be said to be a necessary party in the pending case because of its interest that the fund which it has caused to be created in pursuance of its policy shall be administered by the officers it has appointed rather than by judicial tribunals. Certainly this construction can be given to the Oklahoma statute; and, granting that it may admit of dispute, an important element to be considered is the decision of the state tribunals.
In State v. Cockrell, 112 Pac. Rep. 1000, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had occasion to define the duties of State Examiner and Inspector. It decided that the office was constituted, by the constitution of the State and was independent of the control of the Governor, and passing upon the authority of the Examiner and Inspector over the accounts of the Bank Commissioner it decided that "the funds and assets" of án insolvent bank are ."under the management of the State" and "that the depositors' guaranty fund and the funds of a failed bank in the hands of a Bank Commissioner for the purpose of reimbursing the depositors' guaranty fund is as much a fund of the State as the common school fund."
It was further decided that the act creating the fund was sustained as an exercise of the police power for the public welfare of the people of the State and, having been so exercised, the assessment levied, by it upon deposits for the purpose of protecting the depositors of the banks is the exertion of the same power "which levies or causes to be levied, a tax upon the prQperty within the State for the maintenance aiid support of the common schools and educational institutions." And it was said, "The title of such depositors'- guaranty fund vests in the State just as much so as the common school lands or the proceeds of the sale of the same, and the taxes levied ahd collected for the maintenance and support of said schools, all of- which are held in trust by the State for a specific purpose. Even if it were not a state fund, it would at least be a fund under the management, of the State."
From this decision it appears that the law intended to give to the State as definite a title to the Depositors' . Guaranty Fund as to the common school fund, as definite, therefore, as the title of South Carolina to the assets of the State dispensary, which was the subject of decision in Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company. In both cases there were ultimate beneficiaries — in the pending case, the bank depositors; in the other case, the creditors of the dispensary. And the purpose of the law — or, if you will, the command of the law — in each cáse was or is the satisfaction of the claims of those beneficiaries. The fund having this ultimate destination does not take its administration from the officers of the State or subject them to judicial control. We cannot assume that it will not be faithfully managed and applied.
In Lovett et al., County Commissioners of Creek County, v. Lankford et al., composing the Banking Board of the State of Oklahoma, 145 Pac. Rep. 767, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided, citing the Cockrell Case, that the defendants in error in the case composing the Banking Board were "executive officers of the State, and in performing their duties in administering the law under consideration (the Guaranty-Fund Act), do so as such officers, and the property entrusted to their control and management by the law is property owned by the State, or property in which the State has an interest," and that therefore a suit against them to compel their administration of the depositors' guaranty fund "is, in fact, a suit against the State; and in the absence of the consent of the State, the same cannot be maintained." The court further said that "the law has specifically confided to the Banking Board and the Bank Commissioner the duty and authority to determine the validity of claims against the depositors' guaranty fund," and, also that "it is not only their duty to determine when a claim is valid against the bank, but they must further determine whether such claim is protected and required to be paid from the depositors' guaranty fund. Lankford v. Oklahoma Engraving and Printing Co., 35 Oklahoma, 404." Any other view, the court in effect said, would not only substitute the judgment of á court for that of the officials, "but would harass and create confusion, the, effect of which would destroy the efficiency of such board." That case and Columbia Bank and Trust Company v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 33 Oklahoma, 535, give special emphasis to the principle announced. Both were suits to recover deposits respectively of county and state moneys deposited as general or special deposits.
It yvill serve no purpose to review the cases cited by appellee in which state officers were- enjoined from doing unlawful acts, prescribed, it may be, by unconstitutional ' laws, or commanded by valid laws to perform specific duties. Examples of such cases are reviewed and distinguished in Murray v. Wilson, and there is a later example in Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636.
The foundation of appellees' argument is,, as we have said, that the Oklahoma statute imposed the duty upon the Bank Commissioner of paying depositors of insolvent banks and that "this suit, therefore, instead of being against the State, is against its servants to compel the performance of duties, which, by their acceptance of the office, they obligated themselves to perform." A duty being prescribed, it is further contended, the officers "cannot seek shelter behind the State for the, abuse of their discretion in office." But these contentions and the arguments based upon them all depend upon an incorrect version of the statute, as we have seen.
Decree reversed.