Case: BRISTOL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Bristol Manufacturing Corp. v. United States
Decision Date: 1933-03-13
Docket Number: No. J-598
Citation: 77 Ct. Cl. 182
Volume: 77
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: BRISTOL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES
Judges: Williams, Judge; LittletoN, Judge; and GeeeN, Judge; concur.
Pages: 182–190

Head Matter:
BRISTOL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES
[No. J-598.
Decided March 13, 1933]
Mr. Robert T. Tedrow for the plaintiff. Mr. Allen H. Gardner and KixMiller, Boar <& Morris were on the brief.
Mr. Lisle A. Smith, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney* Generad Charles B. Rugg, for the defendant. Messrs. Charles R. Pollard and D. Lewis Bergeron were on the brief.

Opinion:
Whaley, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The only question involved in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled to have interest on the refund of certain income and profits taxes computed under the Revenue Act of 1921 or the Revenue Act of 1924.
The essential facts are as follows:
The Revenue Act of 1924 was approved by the President June 2,1924, at 4: 01 p.m. An appropriate schedule authorizing the allowance of refunds to plaintiff for income and profits taxes for 1917 to 1920, inclusive, was signed by the Commissioner on the same day (June 2, 1924) but prior to the hour when the President approved the Bevenue Act of 1924. The Commissioner computed and paid plaintiff interest on the basis allowable under the Bevenue Act of 1921, and it is not contended by plaintiff that the amount thus determined was incorrect provided it should be held that the 1921 act was applicable. What plaintiff contends is that the Bevenue Act of 1924 was applicable and therefore a greater amount, namely, the amount here sued for, should be allowed since the interest provisions of the 1924 act are more favorable to it than the corresponding provisions of the 1921 act.
The primary contention advanced by plaintiff is that the law does not take notice of fractions of a day and that a statute which takes effect from its enactment relates back and becomes effective from the first moment of the day of its enactment. As a rule of convenience and where no evidence is furnished as to the hour of the enactment of a given statute, the rule contended for by plaintiff is often applied, but it is likewise true that " whenever it becomes important to the ends of justice, or in order to decide upon conflicting interests, the law will look into fractions of a day, as readily as into the fractions of any other unit of time." Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U.S. 469, approving the rule declared in Grosvenor v. Magill, 37 Ill. 239. In the same case it was stated that " The rule (namely, disregarding fractions of a day) is purely one of convenience, which must give way whenever the rights of parties require it." In the most recent case we have been able to find on the subject (Nunn v. William Gerst Brewing Co., 99 Fed. 939, decided by Judge Taft who was then a circuit judge) the rule was stated to be that " in the absence of proof there is a presumption that the act was signed on the first minute of the day when it took effect, but that it was competent to show by proof the exact time when the law was approved by the President, and that when this was made to appear the law could only be given effect from that time." In other words, the time of the approval of an act is a question of fact. United States v. Iselin, 87 Fed. 194.
The Bevenue Act of 1924 provides (section 1104) insofar as material to this suit, that the act will take effect " upon its enactment." The túne of the approval of sucb act by the President is the earliest moment at which it could take effect. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 388. The Revenue Act of 1924 was not approved by the President until 4:01 p.m. on June 2, 1924, and was not a law until so approved under article 1, section 7 of the United States Constitution, and since we are satisfied from the preponderance of the evidence, and have so found as a fact, that the schedule of refunds, authorizing the payment of refunds on which interest is claimed, was signed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue June 2, 1924, but prior to the hour when the President approved the Revenue Act of 1924, it follows that the Commissioner was correct in applying the Revenue Act of 1921 as the basis for computing interest on the refunds in question.
The petition must be dismissed and it is so ordered.
Williams, Judge; LittletoN, Judge; and GeeeN, Judge; concur.
Booth, Ghief Justice, took no part in the decision of this case on account of illness.