Case: THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad v. United States
Decision Date: 1885-02-02
Docket Number: No. 14464
Citation: 20 Ct. Cl. 49
Volume: 20
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: Draiie, Ch. J., sat in this case, but took no part in the decision.
Pages: 49–70

Head Matter:
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 14464.
Decided February 2, 1885.]
On the Proofs.
The Postmaster-General transmits to the court, under the Revised Statutes (§ 1063), a claim for mail-transportation, services in Virginia rendered between January 1 and June 1, 1861.
I.Virginia “ engaged in war against the United States," within the meaning of the Act 3d March, 1877 (19 Stat. L., 362), on the 17th April, 1861.
II.The government may prescribe limitations and conditions within and under which its executive officers must deal with those who have been, in contemplation of law, alien enemies.
III. One effect of the Non-intercourse Act 13th July, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 255) was to postpone and determine the time when commercial intercourse between the loyal and insurrectionary States should become unlawful.
IV. The Act 2d March, 1867 (Rev. Stat., § 3480), expressly prohibits the executive officers from paying claims which existed prior to the war in favor of persons who promoted or encouraged the late rebellion; and, by implication, prohibits them from paying claims which originated after the war began.
V. The Act 3d March, 1877 (19 Stat. L., 362), hy implication, prohibits the executive officers from paying for mail-transportation services’ rendered after the State in which they were performed “ engaged in war against the United States.”
VI. A corporation controlled hy the enemy, located and operated within his jurisdiction, and employed in carrying on the war must he regarded, so far as its contracting power is concerned, as a person who promoted, encouraged, and sustained the rebellion.
VII.Where the Postmaster-General is prohibited by law from paying a claim, he is prohibited from referring it to this court under the Ke-vised Statutes (§ 1063), and the court acquires no jurisdiction from the reference.
The Reporters’ statement of tbe case:
The court, after finding an unpaid balance due the claimant for mail-transportation service up to April 17,1861, of $4,622.85, found the following facts in relation to the discontinuance of the mail service by the United States and the assumption of it by the Confederate government:
The following general orders discontinuing the postal service in Southern and border States were issured by the Postmaster-General, under authority of the act of Congress approved February 28, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 177, 178):
“Postal service southern section.
“ Mat 27th, 1861.
“ Ordered, All postal service in the States of Yirginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas to be suspended from and after the 31st inst. Letters for offices temporarily closed by this order will be forwarded to the Dead Letter Office, except those for Western Yirginia, which will be sent to Wheeling.”
“ JDiscontinumee of the mail service entire in Middle and West Tennessee.
“ July 10th, 1861.
“Ordered, That the entire postal service embracing post-offices, post-routes, and route agencies in Middle and West Tennessee be discontinued from and after this date. No mails will be hereafter made up for any offices in those districts until such service shall be restored and notice given, nor will prepaid postage thence be recognized.”
“ Order of the Postmaster-General dated 21st December, 1861.
“Beingsatisfied that the postal service cannot safely be continued, or the post-office revenues collected, or the postal laws maintained on the foregoing [following] routes in the State of Missouri, discontinue mail service on the same, in pursuance of the authority conferred by the act of Congress approved February 28th, 1861, till the same can be safely restored.”
The routes embraced by the order are as follows: 10408,11, 12, 1421, 93, 10535, 36, 39, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 74, 75, 10579, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 10598, 9, 10600, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,11,12, 13, 14,16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 10622, 24, 25,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43,10644, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 76, 10679, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 10703, 9, 20, 21, 10723, 27, 30, 32, 44, 58, 65, 71.
The following special order was issued in regard to the aforesaid route of the Virginia Central Eailroad Company:
“Mat 27, 1861.
“ Discontinue service from and after 31st May, 1861, till the same can be safely restored (per P. M. General’s printed notice of this date, acting under law of Congress of Feb. 28, 1861).”
In accordance with the above orders said mail service of the United States- was discontinued on said railroad after May 31, 1861.
“ Extract from report of the Confederate Postmaster-General, April 29,1861.
“ Post-Ofeice Department,
“ Montgomery, Ala.,- April 29,1861.
“ To the President :
“ Sir : I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the post-office department:
^ ^
“ Soon after entering on my duties I received letters of inquiry from postmasters, mail contractors, and others as to whether they were to continue to act under their appointments and contracts as the officers and contractors of the government of the United States, or were to hold themselves responsible to the government of the Confederate States. In reply to the inquiries of contractors I prepared and sent them circular letter No. 2, a copy of which is hereto annexed (marked Appendix D), advising them that this government would not interfere with existing contracts between the contractors and the government of the United States until it should assume the entire control of its postal affairs, and that it would not assume any liability for the contracts of the United States. In answer to postmasters, circular letter No. 3, a copy of which is also hereto annexed (marked Appendix E), was prepared and sent to all the postmasters in the Confederate States, directing them to continue to perform their duties, render their accounts, and pay over all moneys to the government of the United States which might come into their hands as postmasters until this department should assume the entire control of the service.
“These circulars containa statement of the reasons which induced the department to issue them;
“ It was hoped this course would have beneficial effects by removing all doubts as to the duty for the time being of those engaged in the postal service, and by showing to the government at Washington that so long as it continued to hold itself liable for the mail service in the Confederate States it should receive all the revenues derived from that service. It was supposed, too, that it was greatly to the interest of that country, as well as to the interest of those of our own, to avoid a sudden suspension of the postal communication between the people of the two countries, and to avoid being brought at once to practical non-intercourse, which it was supposed would occur if this department had been required to assume the control of the service before its organization, and before any time had been given to provide the means of passing the mails across the frontier And when that policy was determined on it was not known that actual hostilities would occur; but it was then supposed to be possible that our separation from the United States might be peaceably effected, and that all questions relating to the public property and to pecuniary liability between- the two countries might be settled by negotiation on terms of equality.
“While that government has not yet suspended the mail service in this, it. is yet believed that its control of the service for some time past has been used more to annoy and harass the mail contractors and postmasters in the Confederate States than for the purpose of affording mail facilities, and with a view of rendering them discontented, if possible, with the existing political condition of the country. I have no power under existing laws to assume control of our postal service before the suspension of it by the United States. If I had possessed that power I should before this have exercised it. And now that active hostilities have commenced, and as we need not anticipate being separated from our sister Southern States, or having our cor respondence with them interrupted for any great length of time by being under different governments, 1 recommend that the congress give this department authority at once to assume' the control of our postal service, and that it forbid the continuance of such service under the authority of the United States.”
“Extract from report of the Confederate Postmaster-General, 29 . April,1861.'
“ In this connection I should say that it is not deemed advisable at this time to relet the mail service for the Confederate States, but it is thought better to continue existing contracts whenever it is agreeable to the contractors. The reasons for this are that it may be doubtful whether contracts could now be made extending beyond the duration of the provisional government, and to let them for a time not extending beyond that would probably increase rather than diminish the cost of the service for such period. But by waiting until the permanent government shall go into operation to let new contracts the department will have gained time to thoroughly examine the present schedules of mail-routes, and to readjust them so as greatly to abridge the present expense. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to do this in a satisfactory manner in time to make new contracts this summer; and if other States should be added to the Confederacy during the existence of the provisional government, which is probable, this course will give the department more time and better opportunity to arrange satisfactorily the whole service; and if the power be given to discontinue and curtail the service in proper cases, the expense of the service can be greatly reduced during the year without reletting the contracts. A thorough examination of the service of the various States is now being made by the department, for the purpose of ascertaining what routes may be discontinued and what curtailed with propriety, and also for ascertaining the number of routes the revenue of which do not equal one-third of their cost. This examination, so far as it has gone, shows that there are many of these unproductive routes; and it cannot be doubted that a proper regard for economy, and in some cases even for propriety, will require some of them to be wholly discontinued, and many others to be curtailed to a less expensive service. This report, embracing the contracts in the States of Alabama,. Louisiana,'Mississippi, and Texas, is herewith submitted (marked Appendix F). A similar report cannot now be made for "the States of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, for the want of present information of the cost of the service in those States.”
"Extract from the report of the Confederate Postmaster-General, April 29th, 1861.
“ [Circular letter No. 2.] '
■ “ Post-Geeice Department,
“ Montgomery,-, 1861.
“ Sir : The government of the Confederate States will not interfere with any existing contracts entered into between the government of the United States and the present contractors until it assumes the entire control of its postal affairs. This course is rendered necessary by the utter impracticability of mixing the employés of the two governments in the same service.
“ The question as to whether the government of the Confederate States will assume any liability to present contractors before it assumes the control of our postal affairs involves the idea of liability on the part of this government for the obligations of the United States, which cannot be entertained by this department. But if the government of the United States should abandon the mail service in the Confederate States before the department shall be organized and ready to enter into new contracts, I am authorizéd to continue existing contracts provisionally, by proclamation, until new contracts can be entered into.”
“ Extract from the report of the Confederate Postmaster-General, April 29th, 1861.
[Circular letter No. 3.1
“ Post-Ofeice Department,
“ Montgomery,-, 1861.
“Sir: All postmasters and other employés in the postal service are directed to continue the performance of their respective duties as such, and render all their accounts and pay all moneys to the order of the government of the United States, as they have heretofore done, until the government of the Confederate States shall be prepared to assume the entire control of its postal affairs.
“ The congress of the Confederate States has, by an act approved March 15th, 1861, provided ‘that the Postmaster-General shall have power to issue circular instructions to the several postmasters and other officers still performing service under the appointment of the United States, in order to enforce the rendition of the proper accounts and payment of the moneys collected by them per account of the United States, until the Postmaster-General shall have issued his proclamation announcing that the former service is discontinued and is replaced by the new service organized under the authority of this government.’
“In order that you may be enabled to comply strictly with the foregoing direction, issued in conformity with the authority conferred by said act, your attention is specially directed to the regulations of the Post-Office Department of the United States, embraced in chapters 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 26 of the volume of laws and regulations issued 15 May, 1859.
“The post-office department of the Confederate States will be organized as soon as practicable; but the causes of delay incident to its organization are such as to place it out of my power to determine definitely when the new service will be substituted for the old.
“Any attempt to mix the employees of the two governments in the same service would be wholly impracticable, and no removals or appointments of postmasters or others in the postal service will be made by this department, nor will it receive returns relating to or moneys derived from the postal service, until it shall assume the entire control of the service.
“If the government of the United States should cease to carry on this service before this department shall be organized and prepared to take charge of it, no great shock to the public interests will be produced by such a course, as the postmaster-general is authorized to continue provisionally, by proclamation, the present postmasters and others in the postal service in ofSce, and to continue existing contracts for carrying the mails until new appointments and new contracts can be made.
“We must regard the carrying of our mails at this time by that government as a great public necessity to the people of both governments, resulting from their past intimate political, commercial, and social relations, and alike important to the preservation of the present interests of the people of both countries; and while that government, by its action, consults such considerations, our government and people should act with the same high regard for great public interests. Such a course on our part, springing from such motives, will preserve the character of our people without impairing the dignity of our government, and may lead to the transfer of our postal service from the control of the old to that of the new government with far less injury to the people of both than would necessarily flow from precipitate and inconsiderate action on the part of either.”
“ Extract from, report of the Confederate Postmaster-General, 27 Nov., 1861.
“POST:OEElCE DEPARTMENT,
■ “ Riehmond,, Va., Nov. 27,1861.
“ Sir: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the business of the post-office department:
“On the 29 th day of April .last I had the honor of submitting to you a report of the condition and progress of organization of the post-office department, and of presenting a plan for the organization of its several bureaus and of the office of auditor of the treasury for the post-office department, and of suggesting such changes and modifications in the laws relating to the postal service as our new condition required, and of asking for authority to assume the entire control of the postal service in the Confederate States.
“Under the provisions of the first section of the act of Congress of May 9th, 1861, ‘ to amend an act vesting certain powers in the postmaster-general, approved March 15th, 1861,’ the requisite authority was given to him to issue his proclaimation fixing a day on which he would assume the control of the postal service. Pursuant to that authority, the following proclamation was issued on the 13th day of May, fixing the first day of June for the commencement of the service, to wit:
“‘Whereas by the provisions of an act approved March 15, 1861, and amended by the first section of an act approved May 9,1861, the postmaster-general “is authorized, on and after a day to be named by him for that purpose, to take the entire charge and direction of the postal service in the Confederate States,” and all conveyance of mails within their limits from and after such day, except by authority of the postmaster-general, is hereby prohibited:
‘“Row, therefore, I, John H. Reagan, Postmaster-General of the Confederate States of America, do isstie this my proclamation notifying ■ all postmasters, contractors, and special and route agents in the service of the post-office department and engaged in the transmission and delivery of the mails, or otherwise in any manner connected with the service within the limits of the Confederate States of America, that on and after the first day of June next I shall assume the entire control and direction of the postal service therein. And I hereby direct all postmasters, route agents, and special agents within these States, and now acting under the authority and direction of the Postmaster-General of the United States, to continue in the discharge of their respective duties, under the authority vested in me by the congress of the Confederate States, in strict conformity with such existing laws and regulations as are not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the Confederate States of America, and such farther instructions as may hereafter be issued by my direction. And the said postmasters, route agents, and special agents are also required to forward to this department, Without delay, their names, with the names of the offices of which they are postmasters (giving the State and county), to be directed to the “'bhief of appointment bureau, post-office department, Montgomery, Alabama,” in order that new commissions may be issued under the authority of this government; and the postmasters are hereby required to render to the Post-Office Department at Washington, D. C., their final accounts and their vouchers for postal receipts and expenditures up to the 31st day of this month, taking care to forward with said accounts all postage-stamps and stamped envelopes remaining on hand belonging to the Post-Office Department of the United States, in order that they may receive the proper credits therefor in the adjustment of their accounts 5 and they are further required to retain in their possession, to meet the orders of the Postmaster-General of the United States for the payment of mail' service within the Confederate States, all revenue which shall have accrued from the postal service prior to the said 1st day of June next.
“ ‘All contractors, mail messengers, and special contractors for conveying the mails within the Confederate States, under existing contracts with the government of the United States, are hereby authorized to continue to perform such service under my direction from and after the day last above named, subject to such modifications and changes as may be found necessary, under the powers vested in the postmaster-general by the terms of said contract and tne provisions of the second section of an act approved May 9th, 1861, conformable thereto. And the said contractors, special, contractors, and mail messengers are required to forward without delay the number of their' route or routes, the nature of the service thereon, the schedule of arrivals and departures, the names of the offices supplied, and the amount of annual compensation for present service, together with their address, directed to the “chief of the contract bureau, post-office department, Montgomery, Alabama.”’
“Until a postal treaty shall be made with the government of the United States for the exchange of mails between that government and the government of this Confederacy, postmasters will not be authorized to collect “ United States postage on mail matter sent to or received from those States; and until supplies of postage-stamps and stamped envelopes are procured for the prepayment of postage within the Confederate States,” all postages must be paid in money, under the provisions of the first section of an act approved March 1st, 1861.”
In accordance with the above-cited circular and proclamation, the Confederate government took charge of the postal service on said Yirginia Central Eailroad June 1, 1861.
The court also found the following to be the facts raising, a presumption of payment by the Confederate States:
“AN ACT to collect, for distribution, tlie moneys remaining in the several post-offices of the Confederate States at the time the postal service was taken in charge by said government.
“ The congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That it shall be the duty of the postmaster-general to collect all moneys due from the several postmasters within the Confederate States, and which they had not paid over at the time the Confederate States took the charge of the postal service, and the several postmasters are hereby required to account to the general post-office of this government under the same rules, regulations, and penalties that were prescribed by the law under which said moneys were received.
“ Sec. 2. The moneys so received shall be kept separate and distinct from the other funds of the post-office department, and shall constitute a fund for the pr-o rata payment of claims for postal service which accrued before the postmaster-general took charge of the postal service in the States respectively comprising this Confederacy, as may hereafter be provided.
“ Sec. 3. It shall be the duty of the postmaster-general to make proclamation that all persons who are citizens of the Confederate States of America, and who may have rendered postal service in any of the States of this Confederacy, under contracts or appointments made by the United States government before the Confederate States government took charge of such service, shall present their claims to this department, verified and established according to such rules as he shall prescribe, by a time therein to be set forth, not less than six months, and requiring the claimant to state, under oath, how much has been and the date of such payments on account of the contract or appointment under which said claim occurred, and what fund or provision has been set apart or made for the further payment of the whole or any portion of the balance of such claim by the government of the United States or of any of the States; and they shall also state, on oath, whether they performed fully the service according to their contracts or appointments during the time for which they claim pay, and if not, what partial service they did perform, and what deductions have been made from their pay, so far as they know, on account of any failure or partial failure to peform such service; and the postmaster-general shall, as soon as he shall have collected such moneys from said postmasters, and ascertained the amount of claims against the post-office department and the amount received respectively by the claimants as aforesaid, and the provision, if any, for future payment, make a report of the same, so that future action may be taken thereon as respects the distribution.
“ Sec. 4. All claims for postal service required to be presented by this bill shall be barred as against this fund unless presented within six months after the proclamation of the postmaster-general shall have been made.
“ Approved August 30, 1861.”
“AN ACT to provide for the payment of sums ascertained to he due for postal service to citizens of the Confederate States by the postmaster-general.
“ The congress of the Confederate States of America do enaet, That the postmaster-general of the Confederate States do proceed to pay to the several persons, or their lawfully authorized agents or representatives, the sums respectively found due and owing to them for postal service rendered in any of the States of this Confederacy under contracts or appointments made by the United States government, before the Confederate States government took charge of such service, as the said sums have been credited and ascertained by him under the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act to collect for distribution the moneys remaining in the several post-offices of the Confederate States at the time the postal service was taken in charge by said government,’ approved the thirtieth day of August, 1861; but the sums authorized by this act to be paid are only the balances found due after all proper deductions shall have been made on account of previous payments made by the United States or any of the States, or of available provisions made in whole or in part for such payment by said government or of any of the States, and after making all proper deductions for failures or partial failures to perform the service according to their several contracts or appointments during the time for which they claim pay: Provided, That the provisions of this act shall only extend to loyal citizens of the Confederate States.
“Approved September 27,1862.”
In pursuance of these acts the Confederate government settled and paid up to September 30,1863, claims of the character described to the amount of $502,017.19. It does not appear from the evidence thereon whether the claim of the Yirginia Central Railroad for the transportation of the United States mails from January 1 to April 17, 1861, was or was not paid by the Confederate government. It does appear that the offices of the said company were in Richmond, Va., during the rebellion, and located within five blocks of the Confederate capitol and the Confederate post-office department ;■ that the said company steadily promoted, encouraged, and sustained the rebellion and was largely engaged in transporting troops, freight, and mails for the Confederate government, and received large and frequent payments for its services from time to time; and that the president of the company was in the habit of keeping himself informed of the public acts of the Confederate government concerning postal matters.
The court also found the following facts tending to rebut the presumption of payment:
The books and accounts of the Virginia Central Railroad Company were kept in accordance with the above-mentioned discontinuance of the postal service by the United States Post-Office Department on May 31,1861, and its resumption by the Confederate post-office department on June 1, 1861; and all postal service to the 31st of May, 1861, was charged to the United States Post-Office Department, and all postal service from and after the 1st of June, 1861, was charged to the Confederate post-office department. The books of said Virginia Central Railroad Company during the entire period of the war were ■ regularly kept, and show continuous transactions with the Post-Office Departments of the United States and of the Confederate States, as well as' other financial transactions with the Confederate States. They contain no entries or other evidence showing- any payments by the Confederate States government or by any State in rebellion for mail service performed prior to June 1,1861. Said books have been produced before the court, verified by the oath of the treasurer of the claimant, who was also treasurer of the Virginia Central Railroad Company before and during the war, and of said Virginia Central Railroad Company and its successors, including the present claimant, continuously since the war. It appears from the evidence that the account-books of the company between June 1, 1861, and April 30,1865, contain a full and correct exhibit of receipts and payments, and they.show payments by the Confederate government for services rendered subsequent to the 31st May, 1861; but the books show no evidences of payment made by the Confederate government on account of mail service rendered to the United States prior to June 1, 1861, and the treasurer of the company was in such position in 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, and 1865 that if the company had been paid by the Confederate authorities he would probably have known it, and would have known all the money that came into the hands of the company; and no payment was made, to his knowledge, for services rendered the United States prior to June 1. No evidence of any payment by the Confederate States government of any of the moneys claimed in this case has been found on the files of the Post-Office Department of the-Uni ted States or the War Department of the United States, although such files have been searched for a record of such payment. No ' witness has testified to any such payment having been made, nor has any book, record, account, or document showing any such payment been produced. And the court, from the foregoing facts and circumstances, and without other or more positive evidence, finds the ultimate fact that the claim set up in this action was not paid by the Confederate government.
Mr. George A. King and Mr. W. W. Bellcnap for the claimant:
If the Postmaster-General in 1874 had referred the claim to this court under section 1063 of the Eevised Statutes, or had the case in any other form come before the court free from the bar of the statute of limitations, the court would have given a judgment in favor of the company for all its mail service to the 31st of May, 1861, inclusive, just as was done in Fulenweider v. United States (9 C. Cls. E., 403).
The act of March 3, 1877, was an enabling, not a disabling, statute. It placed a sum of money at the disposal of the postal authorities for the payment of mail service in the various Southern States before each State respectively “engaged in war”— words which have been construed by this court, in considering this very claim, as meaning in the case of Virginia before the passage of her ordinance of secession, April 17, 1861. As to that portion of the claim extending from April 17 to May 31, 1861, the act of March 3, 1877, left it precisely where it was before. Undoubtedly the Postmaster-General could examine , that part of the claim and decide it. He could certify it to the Sixth Auditor for settlement, and the Auditor could, if there was no appropriation applicable to its payment, report it to Congress as a claim upon an exhausted appropriation, and it would then be for Congress to appropriate or not appropriate the money for its payment. In this case the Postmaster-General lias seen fit to take a different course. After the passage of the act of March 3,1877, the application for payment of the claim was renewed, first in 1877 and again in 1884; and in both instances full compensation was claimed down to the 31st of May, 1861. The Postmaster-General, upon consideration of the claim thus made, decided to refer it to this court — as well that part which accrued after April 17,1861, as that which accrued before.
It is true that, so far as the evidence shows, the claim was never presented to the Postmaster-General till 1874, at which time any suit in this court, on the voluntary petition of the claimant, would have been barred by limitation; but this does not in the slightest degree affect the right of the Postmaster-General, in his discretion, to refer the whole claim here. It has been again and again decided by this court that the limitation of six years prescribed by section 1069 of the Eevised Statutes, in no manner and to no extent whatever applies to claims referred by heads of departments under section 1063. To construe section 1069 as applying to such claims would be in opposition to its plain grammatical construction as well as to its intent, which, as conclusively shown in Winnisimmet Go. v. United States (12 C. Cls. E., 319), was to fix a limitation upon claims brought into this court, either by the voluntary petition of the claimant or by transmission by , the Secretary of the Senate or Clerk of the House of Eepresentatives.
There is no statute requiring claims to be filed in a department within six years from the time they first accrue. The department itself is at perfect liberty to receive, consider, and decide them as well after as before the lapse of six years. And if the department can itself hear and decide them, why should it not refer them to this court for trial and adjudication as well as adjudicate them itself?
Inasmuch as this claim is founded directly on the contract of the Virginia Central Eailroad Company to carry the mails in .1861, and as this court has already held, in this very case, that “ June 1, 1861, the United States were indebted to the Virginia Central Eailroad for carrying the mail in the State of Virginia from January 1, 1861, to May 31, 1861, over and above all credits, in the sum of 17,239.54,” the claimant is entitled to recover that entire amount independently of and without any assistance from the act of March 3, 1877.
Under the very strictest rule as to limitation, the claimant would be entitled to a judgment under the act of Marcn 3,1877, as its claim was presented to the department within a very few days after the passage of that act.
Mr. George L. Douglass (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
1. If the case rests upon the act of March 3,1877, alone, then any possible recovery is clearly limited to that part of the claim which, accrued prior to April 17, 1861, the date at which Virginia must be taken to have “ engaged in war against the United State's;” But the claimant’s counsel seeks to take the case entirely out of the act of 1877, and to place it upon its own merits as a valid legal claim, subsisting prior to and not dependent upon this statute in any' way for its vitality.
To this there is one insuperable objection. If the court has jurisdiction of the present case it is obtained solely by virtue of the reference from the Post-Office Department, for the claim is otherwise barred from all consideration by section 1069 of the Eevised Statutes. But such a reference in the present case, independently of the act of 1877, could (so far as the greater-part of this claim is concerned) confer no jurisdiction whatever, for the reason that, independently of this act, the department itself has no jurisdiction, and it cannot confer what if does not possess. (Hart’s Case, 15 C. Gis. E., 414.)
It is evident that so much of the present claim as accrued prior to April 13, 1861, is hopelessly defunct, unless revived and rehabilitated by the act of 1877. If, therefore, the claimant could altogether ignore the act of 1877 — as its counsel seems desirous of doing — the claim would only be in a worse plight, since the larger part of it would be cut off by section 3480. It is also clear that this part of the claim accruing prior to April 13,1861, can have no legal standing in this court by virtue of the reference from the Post-Office Department save what it derives from the act of 1877 alone.
2. The claim in this case is alleged to have accrued during the period from January 1 to June 1, 1861. Section 3480 destroys the vitality of all that part which lies back of April 13, 1861 y the act of 1877 revives all lying back of April 17, 1861. Without dwelling upon the small fraction which accrued in the four intervening days, the question arises, What becomes of that part of the claim which is alleged to have accrued after April 17, 1861, and which is not covered by the provisions of either statute ? Evidently, from the considerations already mentioned, the claimant will be forced to rely upon the act of 1877 to save the first branch of the claim, and to rely upon the original legal merits of the claim itself, if it has any, to save the second branch of it. It becomes material, therefore, to inquire what are the merits of this second branch of the claim which is alleged to have accrued subsequent to April 17, 1861.
I submit that in legal contemplation it has none. The principles of international law negative the possibility of such a claim.
The corporation of the Virginia Central Eailroad Company was a creature of the State of Virginia, and on the 17th of April, 1861, Virginia engaged in war against the United States.” The corporation thereupon became, in contemplation of law, an "alien enemy,” and as such incapable of sustaining any contract relations with the United States.
It is of course well settled that debts between citizens of belligerent States contracted before the breaking out of war are not extinguished by the war; the remedy only is suspended, and the right to enforce payment revives with the restoration of peace. But it seems equally well settled that a debt between enemies, contracted during war, cannot be sued for when the war is over. (Willison v. Petersen, 7 Taunton, 439; The Hoop, 1 Eob. Adm. Eep., 201; see also, for general discussion of this point, Wheat. Int. Law, 2d Eng. ed., 354 to 378; Phil-limore’s Int. Law, vol. 3, 134 to 149.)
3. Aside from these considerations, and upon the facts of the case, the defendants contend that there can be no recovery whatever, because the claimant has failed to overthrow the presumption (to the benefit of which the court holds the defendants entitled) that this claim was paid by the Confederacy.

Opinion:
Scofield, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The Chesapeake and Ohio Eailroad Company, the claimant, carried the United States mail from 1859 to June 1, 1861. The service was all within the State of Virginia. There was no express contract, but the company was allowed and paid down to January 1, 1861, at the rate of $21,408.33 a year.
In this suit the claimant seeks to recover' compensation at that rate from January 1, 1861, to June 1,1861.
The case - comes to this court by transmission by the Postmaster-General under section 1063 of the Eevised Statutes.
We will first consider the claimant's right to recover under the provision of the Act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. L., 362). That act is as follows:
" That the sum of $375,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be appropriated to pay the amount due to mail contractors for mail service performed in the State of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Kortli Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia in the years 1859,1860,1861, and before said States respectively engaged in war against the United States; and the provisions of 3480 of the Revised Statutes of the United States shall not be applicable to the payments therein authorized: Provided, That any such claims which have been paid by the Confederate States government shall not be again paid."
In order that the claims embraced in this appropriation might be paid pro rata in case it should be found insufficient to cover them all, the Secretary of the Treasury directed that none should be paid until all should be received and adjusted. In consequence of this order no claims were paid within two years. The whole appropriation, as the law requires, was therefore returned to and covered into the Treasury.
This court has repeatedly held "that the rights of parties provided for in this appropriation were not lost by its return to the Treasury, but remained subsisting rights, which the court had jurisdiction to enforce. (Hukill's Case, 16 C. Cls. R., 562; Huffman's Case, 17 id., 55; George's Case, 18 id., 432.)
HukilPs Case also decided that the legislation of the Confederate States in favor of these claimants (finding iv) created a presumption that carriers of the mail within the insurrection-ary States were paid by that government, which presumption the claimants were bound in some measure to rebut.
The facts tending to overthrow the presumption of payment in this case are set forth in finding iv. From these facts the court has found that the claim presented was not paid by the Confederate government.
The court therefore holds that the claimant is entitled to recover for services rendered subsequent to December 31, 1860, and prior to the time when "Virginia engaged in war against the United States."
At what time Virginia "engaged in war against the United States" is more a question of fact and history than of law.
In January, 1861, the legislature passed an act providing for the assembling of a convention to consider the question of secession. The convention assembled February 13,1861, and on April 17, 1861, passed thfe ordinance of secession, with this pro vision: "This ordinance shall take effect and be an act as of this day when ratified by a majority of the votes of the people of this State cast at a poll to be taken on the fourth Thursday in May." It was ratified on that day. April 16,1861, the governor of the State refused to furnish its quota of volunteers called for by the President, and concluded his letter of refusal as follows: "You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and having done so we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South." April 17, 1861, the convention passed an ordinance requiring the governor to "call out as many volunteers as might be necessary to repel invasion and protect citizens of the State." In pursuance thereof the governor, on April 17, 1861, did issue a proclamation reciting the supposed grievances against the United States, and ordering "all volunteer regiments and companies to hold themselves in readiness for immediate orders, and to report at once to the adjutant-general their organization and numbers, and prepare themselves for efficient service." On the same day the State authorities took possession of the custom-house at Eichmond, and soon after of the navy-yard at Norfolk and the arsenal at Harper's Ferry. April 24, 1861, the convention placed the military forces of the State under the control of the president of the Confederacy, and on the next day adopted the provisional constitution of the Confederate States. By the subsequent ratification of the ordinance all these preparations for and declarations and acts of war and seizures of United States property were also ratified.
From thesefacts thecourtisof theopinion that Virginia should be held to have " engaged in war against the United States" April 17, 1861.
The amount earned by services in carrying the mail prior to April 17, 1861, and subsequent to December 31, 1860, over and above payments and proper deductions, as appears in finding ii, is $4,622.85.
The court further holds that the claim for services rendered after April 17,1861, is not properly before us. At that time the claimant became, in contemplation of law, an alien enemy, and as such the government may prescribe limitations and conditions within and under which it must be dealt with by the executive officers. (Prize Cases, 2 Black, 666; Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404; United States v. Insurance Co., 22 Wall., 104; Willison v. Peterson, 7 Taunton, 439; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U. S. R., 7.)
The case last cited (Matthews v. McStea), at first supposed to support the claimant's position, will be found, upon a careful examination of the several principles therein announced and decided, to rule strongly against it.
The question involved in the case was whether a partnership, some of whose members resided in Louisiana and some in New' York, was dissolved by the war prior to April 23, 1861, so as to render void partnership transactions of that date. The court said :
" It must be conceded, as a general rule, to be one of the immediate consequences of a declaration of war, and of the effect of a state of war even %ohen not declared, that all commercial intercourse and dealings between the subjects or adherents of the contending powers is unlawful and interdicted."
And the court said:
" That the civil war (the war of the rebellion) had an existence commencing before that date (April 23,1861) must be accepted as an established fact."
The logical and necessary Sequence of these positions is that commercial intercourse was unlawful and interdicted from the beginning of the war, which beginning was prior to April 23, 1861. Had there been no subsequent action by Congress affecting the question, the court must necessarily have held that the partnership was dissolved prior to April 23, 1861.
Congress, however, July 13, 1861, authorized the President " to declare that the inhabitants of such State are in a state of insurrection, and thereupon commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the United States, shall cease and' be unlawful." The President issued the proclamation August 16,1861. The effect of this law in postponing and determining the time when commercial intercourse should become unlawful is thus stated by the coúrt:
" The enactment that it (commercial intercourse) should not be permitted after a day then in the future must be considered an implied affirmation that up to that day it was lawful; and certainly Congress had the power to relax any of the ordinary rules of war,"
In the case at bar there has also been an interference by acts of Congress, but in their effect quite in an opposite direction.
The Act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. L., p. 571), re-enacted in the Revised Statutes as section 3480, provides as follows :
" Sec. 3480. It shall be unlawful for any officer to pay any account, claim, or demand against the United States which accrued or existed prior to the thirteenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, in favor of any person who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained the late rebellion, or in favor of any person who during such rebellion was not known to be opposed thereto, and distinctly in favor of its suppression; and no pardon heretofore granted, or hereafter to be granted, shall authorize the payment of such account, claim, or demand, until this section is modified or repealed. But such section shall not be construed to prohibit the payment of claims founded upon contracts made by any of the departments, where such claims were assigned or contracted to be assigned prior to the first day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, to the creditors of such contractors, loyal citizens of loyal States, in payment of debts incurred prior to the first day of March, eighteen hundred and sixty-one."
It cannot be supposed that Congress would prohibit government officers from paying claims existing prior to the beginning of the war in favor of citizens who were loyal when the claim accrued, although they subsequently became involved in the. rebellion, and still leave such officers at liberty to pay claims which originated after the war began. This enactment must be considered an implied affirmation that the war began when Fort Sumter was fired upon, April 12, 1861, and that the payment of all claims originating after that date was prohibited by the rules of war.
Again, the Act of March 3,1877, above cited, authorizes the payment of " amounts due to mail contractors for services performed in the Confederate States before said States respectively engaged in war against the United States." Is not a prohibition to pay claims originating after that time clearly implied ? Congress prohibited the payment of the one because it was not prohibited by the laws of war, and omitted to prohibit the payment of the other because it was already prohibited by the laws of war.
It is contended that a corporation is not subject to this law of nations. To this we do not assent. A corporation controlled by the enemy, located and operated entirely within his jurisdiction, and constantly employed in carrying on the war must be regarded, so far as its contracting power is concerned, as a person who " promoted, encouraged, and sustained the rebellion."
Whether such a claim by such a claimant is declared void by the statute, not in express terms, but by necessary implication, we do not now decide.
Much can be said on each side of that question, and if the claimant had brought its action within six years that question would have been before us now.
But it is plain, we think, that the Postmaster-General was prohibited from paying it, and hence was prohibited from transmitting it to this court, which is a process toward obtaining payment. (Hart's Case, 15 C. Cls. R., 414; Green's Case, 18 id., 93; McClure's Case, 19 id., 30.) It follows that in this action the court has no jurisdiction of any claim except such as the Postmaster-General might lawfully transmit, and the only claim which he could transmit was a claim founded on the act 1877 and subject to the limitations of that statute, one of which was that the cause of action should be only for services rendered before the State of Virginia engaged in war. To that extent we have jurisdiction, and can adjudicate the case upon its merits. As to any subsequent cause of action, we must hold that it is not properly before the court.
It is objected by the defendants that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. So far as that portion of the claim which is covered by the act of March 3, 1877, is concerned, we do not concur in the objection. The claim was presented to the Post-Office Department soon after the passage of that appropriation, and was pending there until September 25, 1884, when it was transmitted to this court. In Lippitt's Case (100 U. S. B., 663) the Supreme Court decided that this court can take jurisdiction of a claim more than six years old when it was presented to the department within the six years, although transmitted to the court after six years had elapsed. This court has decided several cases in accordance with this rule. (Winnisimet Case, 12 C. Cls. R., 319; Lippitt's Case, 14 id., 148; Green's Case, 18 id., 93.) For the portion of the claim extending from April 17 to June 1,1861, no demand appears to have been made in the department until 1874, more than six years after it accrued. Whether that 'fact would deprive this court of jurisdiction need not now be considered, inasmuch as it is deprived of jurisdiction for the minon above stated.
Judgment will be entered in favor of the claimant for the sum which appears to be due for services rendered prior to April 17, 1861, amounting to $4,622.85.
Draiie, Ch. J., sat in this case, but took no part in the decision.