Case: LORETO GALLEGOS v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NAVAJO INDIANS
Abbreviation: Gallegos v. United States
Decision Date: 1903-12-07
Docket Number: 5977
Citation: 39 Ct. Cl. 86
Volume: 39
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: LORETO GALLEGOS v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NAVAJO INDIANS.
Judges: Wright, J., had not been appointed when this case was tried and took no part in the decision.
Pages: 86–97

Head Matter:
LORETO GALLEGOS v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NAVAJO INDIANS.
[Indian depredations,
5977.
Decided December 7, 1903.]
On the claimant's Motion.
The petition is verified and filed by the attorney in ignorance of and shortly after the death of the claimant. After the expiration of the Jurisdictional period for bringing such suits the administrator comes in and moves to be substituted.
I.The jurisdictional condition imposed by the Indian depredation act, 3d March, 1891 (26 Stat. L., 851, sec. 2), is that “all claims shall he presented to the court by pietition, as hereinafter provided, within three years.”
II.A claim “presented to the court by petition” within the jurisdictional period by the attorney in ignorance of the death of the party is not a cause pending, and can not be used as a basis for reviving the case in the name of the administrator after the expiration of the jurisdictional period. Nolt, Ch. J., dissenting.
III.The common-law rule that a suit begun in the name of a dead man is a nullity is applicable to cases under the Indian depredation act. Nolt, Ch. J., dissenting.
The Reporters’ statement of the case:
The facts of the case and the grounds of the claimant’s motion appear in the opinion of the court.
Mr. W. II. Robeson for the motion:
Perhaps nothing’ is better settled in the law of pleading than that questions going to the jurisdiction of the court, the disability of the parties plaintiff or defendant, or to the abatement of the writ or declaration must be availed of bj^ pleading in abatement.
The suggestion that the claimant was dead at the date of the filing of his petition is a suggestion of the disability of the plaintiff and is therefore the subject of a plea in abatement.
The rules of pleading require that pleas in abatement must be filed before pleas in bar or to the merits, and a plea in abatement is waived by pleading to the merits. (Baltimore v. Harris, 12 Wall., 65; OooTc v. Burnley, 116 Wall., 859; Jones v. Railroad Co., 14 Ind., 89; State v. Ruhlman, 111 Ind., 17; Louis v. State, 65 Miss., 468; Oil/more v. Ilowlcmd, 26 Ill., 200; Mills v. Bland, 76 111., 381.)
JEfy reason of the peculiar nature of the case and the infrequency with which suits are brought in the names of dead persons, the authorities upon the exact point are not numerous. But ip the last above-cited case (Mills v. Bland) a suit had been brought in the name of a dead person. The defendant had pleaded the general issue. Then the death of the plaintiff was suggested, the personal representative substituted, and the declaration amended. In this case the court said, having reference to the action of the court in refusing to permit the defendants to avail themselves of the death of the claimant prior to the bringing of the suit:
“We do not perceive any error in the action of the court in denying the application. At most it was addressed to the discretion of the court, and had the fact been shown, defendants were in no position to take advantage of it, as the fact, if it existed, could only be pleaded in abatement, and this plea defendants could not interpose, for the reason that thej1- had already filed a plea in bar.”
In the case of R. R. Qo. v. Harris (12 Wall., 65, 84), the court said:
“In the proper order of pleading, which is obligatory, a plea in bar waives all pleas, and the right to plead in abatement.”
In the case of Cools v. Burnley ) 12 Wall., 659, 668), the plea in abatement was stricken from the record on the ground that it was put in after the defendants had pleaded to the merits. The judgment of the court below was affirmed.
It results, therefore, that it is now too late to set up the fact that.the plaintiff was dead at the time the suit was instituted, and the administrator should be admitted for the purpose of- the further prosecution of the suit.
Also it is to be borne in mind that this objection (raised by the court) was not raised until after the expiration of the statutory period in which amendment might have been made or a new suit instituted by the personal representative, iipon a suggestion of plaintiff’s death properly made by plea in abatement. This fact is one which has appealed to the court in other jurisdictions, as for instance in the case of Cowan, where suit was brought by an infant as an heir, by his guardian, and the defendants raised no objection until after a new action would be barred by the statute. The court declared in that case that it would save the just rights of the infant by joining the administrator as coclaimant. (Cowarts case, 5 C. Cls. R., 106.)
Counsel readily admits that in a court bound by the technical rules of pleading the prosecution of a suit and a judgment in the name of a dead claimant is a nullity, but it is also true that in such jurisdictions suits maj'- not be brought, fox-instance, by estates, or by the widow, or by heirs regarding-pex-sonal • property, Iiere it has been decided many times that this court is not bound by the technical rules of pleading-. It is unnecessary to do more than cite some of the- cases in which such decisions have been made. (Thomas v. TJ. 8., 15 C. Cls. R., 335; Little v. District, 19 C. Cls. R., 323; Murray v. U 8., 8125 Ind.; Garcia v. U. 8., 37 C. Cls. R., 213.)
, In the jurisdiction conferred upon the court by the act of 1883 (the Bowman Act), it is permissible to prosecute the suits in the names of the estates, or in the name of an heir or heirs, even though it be finally necessary to bring in an administrator to whom to award judgment.
Following the line of these authorities, the court in Indian depredation cases has permitted amendments where the suit was brought by an heir of the owner of the property, though such a suit had been brought by heirs in an ordinary court common law jurisdiction it would have been dismissed for the reason that an action of that character must be brought a pei-sonal x-epresentative; and the court has held that if suit be brought by one partner it may be amended so as permit the addition of other partners. (García-v. U. S., C. Cls. R., 213.) And the amendments in both these cases were permitted notwithstanding the expiration of the statutory period.
Mr. Lincoln B. Smith (with whom .was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Thompson) opposed.

Opinion:
Peelle, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The question in this case ax-ises on the motion of counsel suggesting the death of the claimant and asking leave to prosecute the action in the name of the administrator of his estate.
While that motion was pending- the case was submitted on the merits for final action; but as the motion, as well as the certificate of the appointment of the administrator filed therewith, failed to disclose the date of the claimant's death, and the evidence indicated that it was prior to the time of the filing of the petition herein, the case was remanded for more specific evidence on that point.
The motion to revive the case in the name of the administrator was argued and submitted January 19, 1903. In the argument the counsel for the administrator conceded that at the time of filing the original petition herein, December 5, 1891, the claimant, Loreto Gallegos, was dead.
The petition was verified and filed — no doubt in good faith— by one Isaac K. Hitt, who was then, as recited in his affidavit to the petition, acting as the "agent and attorney in fact for petitioner."
The action was sought to be prosecuted under the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. L., 851), the second section of which, so far as material to this case, reads:
' ' That all claims existing at the time.of the taking effect of this act shall be presented to the court by petition, as hereinafter provided, within three years after the passage hereof, or shall be thereafter forever barred."
Section 3 of the act provides:
"That all claims shall be presented to the court by petition setting forth in ordinary and concise language, without unnec-sary repetition, the facts upon which such claims are based, the persons, classes of persons, tribe or tribes, or band of Indians by whom the alleged illegal acts were committed, as near as may be, the property lost or destroyed, and the value thereof, and any other facts connected with the transaction and material to the proper adjudication of the case involved. The petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the claimant, his agent, administrator, or attorney, and shall be filed with the clerk of said court. It shall set forth the full name and residence of the claimant, the damages sought to be recovered, praying the court for a judgment upon the facts and the law."
The question therefore is, Can the petition thus filed in the name of a dead man bo made the basis of an amendment for' reviving- the action in the name of the administrator of his estate?
This involves the question as to whether the claim was, in the language of section 2, "presented to the court bjr petition," verified by the claimant, his ag-ent, administrator, or attorney.
As the claimant was not alive when the petition was verified and filed, he could not, of course, act by agent or attorney, for whatever authority he may have conferred in that respect terminated with his death.
It follows- that unless there was once a cause pending, brought within the jurisdictional period, there could be no basis in law or equity for reviving the case in the name of the administrator of the deceased claimant.
When the petition was filed in the name of the dead man it was a nullitj!- — as if no suit had been brought — and could not, therefore, form the basis of any amendment whatever, either as to the parties or the subject-matter. This is unquestionably the rule at common law, and ever has been, and we are aware of no decision of any court to the contrary, nor of any provision of any statute making an exception to the common-law rule in this respect.
In the case of Clay v. Oxford (L. R., 2 Ex., 54), the same question was involved. There an action was commenced in the name of the plaintiff, who, it was afterwards discovered, had died before the date of the writ, and thereafter a summons was taken out to substitute the name of his executrix. The question there was as to whether or not, under the common-law procedure act of 1852, the court had power to make the amendment; that is to say, whether or not the act had made such change in the common law as authorized them to permit the amendment to be made. The court held, all the judges concurring, that they had no such power. That the power of amendment was "limited to cases where there was originally a party suing, possessed, though with a variety in legal description, of the same interest with the party to be substituted." But it is hardly necessary to cite authorities in support of so elementary a proposition.
When the statute, as in the present case, provides that all such claims "shall be presented to the court by petition within three years after the passage hereof," that, of course, means that such petition shall be presented, not in the name of a dead man, but in the name of the party in interest as recognized by the rules of law, so that to allow the administrator to file a petition under the guise of an amendment would be to defeat the purpose of the act in respect of the time within which such action must be brought thereunder.
When the Congress conferred upon the court jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of citizens for property taken or destroyed by Indians, they thereby intended that the court should be governed by the established rules of law applicable to the cases presented under the act, and as the statute itself contains no exception in respect of such amendments, the court has no power to engraft one upon it by way of construction.
In law, therefore, the question is precisely the same as though no petition had ever been filed, and hence the petition of the administrator now sought to be filed is barred by the sections of the statute quoted; and to permit the petition to be filed so as to give the administrator standing in this court would be the exercise of arbitrary power, as the court is without discretion in the premises. The Congress by the act defined the conditions upon which the citizen may maintain an action against the Government and the Indian, and these conditions must be complied with, both as to parties plaintiff and defendant, before, the court can acquire jurisdiction.
The only case seemingly in favor of the claimant's contention is that of Duran (31 C. Cls. R., 353). In that case a new Indian defendant was allowed to be substituted after the time fixed by the act within which to bring suits, on the ground, as stated by the court, that "this suit is brought against the United States and the Apache Indians. It should have been brought against the United States and the Navajos. The error was an oversight of the attorney, for it appeared on the face of the evidence in the Department of the Interior that the alleged depredation was committed by the Navajos and not the Apaches."
It will tbus be seen that before the action in that case was commenced in this court the proof filed in the Interior Department, which was transmitted to the court under section 13 of the act, disclosed the real party committing the wrong; so, conceding that there was some foundation for allowing the amendment in that case, it should not be extended to a case liké the present for the reason that here there is no case in court, while there there was, as the United States as well as the Indians are defendants under the act. By the act the United States assumes the liability shown to exist against the tribe for its wrongful acts, but only on condition that such claim shall be presented to the court by petition within three yeai's after the passage of the act.
In our view of the case, therefore, the question is one of jurisdiction, and not of discretion; and as the proceeding in the name of a dead man is a nullity, and so recognized by all courts, it must be held that as the time within which to file petitions under the act long since expired, the motion to revive the action in the name of the administrator bjr way of amendment must be denied and the petition so far as it appears upon the records of the court is therefore dismissed,