Case: Insurance Company v. Mosley
Abbreviation: Insurance Co. v. Mosley
Decision Date: 1869-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 8 Wall. 397
Volume: 75
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Insurance Company v. Mosley.
Judges: Mr. Justice NELSON also dissents from the opinion and judgment of the court, in this case, and concurs in this opinion.
Pages: 397–420

Head Matter:
Insurance Company v. Mosley.
J., The declarations of a party himself, to whomsoever made, are competent evidence, when confined strictly to such complaints, expressions, and exclamations as furnish evidence of a present existing pain or malady, to prove his condition, ills, pains, and symptoms, whether arising from sickness, or from an injury by accident or violence. If made to a medical attendant, they are of more weight than if made to another person.
2. So is a declaration made by a deceased person, contemporaneously or nearly so, with a main event by whose consequence it is alleged that he died, as to the cause of that event. Though generally the declarations must be contemporaneous with the event, yet where there are connecting circumstances, they may, even when made some time afterwards, form a part of the whole res gestae.
3. "Where the principal fact is the fact of bodily injury, the res gestee are the statements of the cause made by the injured party almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of the injury, and those relating to the consequences made while the latter subsisted and were in progress.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for tbe Northern District of Illinois, the case being this:,.
The Travellers’ Insurance Company of Chicago insured the life of one Mosley for $5000, in favor of his wife. .
“ Within ninety 3ays, after sufficient proof that the assured at any time within twelve months after the date of this policy shall have sustained personal injury, caused by any accident within the meaning of this policy and the conditions hereunto annexed, and such injuries shall occasion death within three months from the happening thereof.”
The policy among other provisos contained this one:
“ Provided always, That no claim shall be made under this policy by the said assured, in respect of any injury, unless the same shall be caused'by some outward and visible means, of which proof satisfactory to the company can be furnished, and this in sur anee shall not extend to any injury caused by or arising from natural disease.”
Mosley having died within the term for which his life was insured, his wife, who alleged that he had died from personal injury, caused by accident, demanded the $5000 of the company, which they declined to pay. She thereupon brought assumpsit on the policy. The declaration alleged, that on the 21st of July, 1866, the said Mosley “accidentally fell down a pair of stairs and was severely injured thereby, and that he, within three months after the happening of the said accident, to wit, &c., died from the effects of the said accidental fall, and that the death was occasioned by the said injury and accident, and that the defendant had sufficient proof of said accident and death ninety days befoi'e the commencement of this suit.” On a plea of the general issue and a trial before a jury, the main point in question was the cause of the death of Mr. Mosley; the plaintiff contending that it was the consequence of a fall that he met with in going into his back yard on the night between the 18th and 19th of July, 1866, and the defendant, that it was not.
It appeared that Mr. Mosley-was in his usual health until that night; that he and Mrs. Mosley had gone to bed; that between 12 and 1 o’clock he got up and went down stair’s; that he came up and complained to his wife and son of having had a fall; and that the symptoms were described by him at the time; that he continued ill until Monday, the 22d, when he died. There was testimony, medical and other, given of his mental and bodily condition from the time of the alleged accident up to the time of his death; there was also medical testimony given of his condition after death, aiid'of an examination of the cranium and brain, externally and internally. The plaintiff insisted that the evidence she introduced tended to show that Mr. Mosley died in consequence of the fall before referred to, and the defendant insisted that the evidence introduced by the company tended to show that death was not caused by any fall, but was in consequence of disease, (congestion of the brain,)
Mrs. Mosley testified in her own behalf, that on Wednesday night, the 18th of July, 1866, she and her husband had gone to bed. Between twelve and one o’clock he got up and went down stairs for the purpose of going out back; she didn’t know how long he was gone. When he came back he said he had fallen down the back'stairs and almost killed himself; that he had hit and hurt the back of his head in falling down the stairs which led out back. She noticed that his voice trembled, and she inquired into the matter at once. He complained of his head, and appeared faint and vomited; he threw up almost as soon as he got into the room; she got up, and he laid down on the sofa. He had nothing on but his pataloons and vest; she didn’t sleep any more that night, and was up with him all night. He complained and appeared to be in great pain. She asked him if she should send for Dr. Webster, who lived near, but he said no; he thought he should be better, and she did not then call the Doctor. On Thursday morning he said he felt bad, and there was a recurrence of fainting.
To all that portion of the testimony of Mrs. Mosley which set forth the declarations of her husband about his falling down the back stairs and almost killing himself and hurting the back part of his head, the defendant’s counsel objected, and their objection being overruled, the defendant excepted.
A son of the assured, testified in behalf of the plaintiff, “ that he slept in the lower part of the building occupied by his father; that about 12 o’clock of the night before mentioned he saw his father lying with his head on the counter, and asked him what was the matter; he replied that he had fallen down the back stairs and hurt himself very badly.” The defendants objected to both the question and answer. An exception to their admission followed.
The same witness testified further, “ that on the day after the fall, his father said he felt very badly, and that if he attempted to walk • across the room his head became, dizzy; on the following day he said he was a little worse, if anything.” The admission of this testimony also was excepted to by the defendants.
There was no witness who testified' that he saw the deceased fall down stairs; though several did, that there were such back stairs as it was testified that he spoke of falling down.
Verdict and judgment having been given for the plaintiff, and the case being here, the questions as presented by the bill of exceptions were :
1. Whether the court erred in admitting the declarations of the assured as to his bodily injuries and pains ?
2; Whether it erred in admitting such' declarations to • prove that he had fallen' down the stairs ?
Mr. Sansum, for the plaintiff in error:
Without spending time upon the first of the questions presented by a technical division of the bill of exceptions — and a decision on which, adverse to our .view of law, does‘ not affect our main objections — we contend that the widow must show—
1st. That her husband died from injuries caused by accident, and,
2d. That the proof thereof was satisfactory to the insurance company.
The insurance is not against death generally, but against death from accidental injuries.
1. It is expressly provided that proof satisfactory to the company shall be made. It is the judge as to what proof shall be satisfactory. This may be a hard agreement, but it is the contract between the parties, and the court will enforce the contract that the parties have made. The company, by refusing to.pay, and by contesting the demand, says, that' the proof of the injuries and accident are not satisfactory. There is no allegation in the declaration that proof of the injuries and accident has been satisfactory to it.
2. As it is a part of the case, .that no witness was called to prove that the deceased fell down the stairs, it cannot be pre-i sumed that evidence was given to prove an accident. And supposing that the court shall go so far as to hold that the declarations of the deceased are admissible to establish the fact that he did fall, still there is nothing in them to show that it was an accidental fall.
The declarations of the deceased made to his wife and son four days before he died, ought not to have been admitted to establish the fact that deceased did fall down the stairs in question, because they are clearly hearsay, and they come not within any of the exceptions to the general rule that derivative or secondhand statements are not receivable as évidence in causa The reasons against admitting them are that the party against whom the evidence is offered has had no opportunity to cross-examine the original source; and, that assuming the original statement to be correctly reported, it was not originally made under the sanction of an oath; and, though it were made under the sanction of an oath in judicio, it is not admissible unless the party against whom it is offered had the right and opportunity to cross-examine, but neglected it.
The fact which defendant in error seeks to establish by mere declarations, is not one of reputation, nor of pedigree, or boundary. None of these established exceptions apply.
Nor as dying declarations were they admissible. This is plain.
Nor are they res gestee. lies gestee are the surrounding facts of a transaction, and may bé submitted to a jury provided they can be established .by competent means, sanctioned by the law, and afford any fair presumption or inference as to the question in dispute. And again, declarations accompanying an act, explanatory of that act, are res gestee. They are the surrounding facts, explanatory of an act, or showing a motive for acting. But the principal fact must be first established, and until it is established, surrounding facts are not admissible — and, certainly, exhibiting surrounding facts is not establishing a principal fact. For example: A merchant leaves his place of residence or denies himself to his creditors. That he left his place of residence,, or denied himself to his creditors, upon an issue of bankruptcy, are material facts; and one of these being proven, his decía rations made to others explaining why he left it, or denied himself, are admissible as res gesté; but it would not be competent to show what he said, unless it were first made to appear that he has denied, or left his place of residence.
Mr. Peck, contra, relied on Aveson v. Kinnaird as decisive of the case.
Reply.
The counsel for the.widow cite Aveson v. Kinnaird, and it is relied upon. But that case makes against the plain•tiff. The issue there was, whether the insured was in good health at the time the policy then in.question was effected on her life by her husband. A few days after the physician examined her, and made inquiries of her about her health. She was seen in bed at II o’clock in the forenoon; and a witness was called to testify to the fact that she saw the deceased in bed at the time mentioned, and that the deceased then said she was not in good health, and that she was afraid she would die before the policy could be delivered. The fact that deceased was in bed was established by the witness. This was a material fact to be established upon the issue made in the case, viz., whether the deceased was in good health at the time; and doubtless the declarations of the deceased were admissible, explaining why she was in bed. Upon an issue as to whether the deceased was-well or ill at the time in question, her declarations were admissible; for one’s feelings while suffering from any malady are the true indicators of that malady, and how the deceased in the case cited’felt could only be ascertained by what she said. The case was one of necessity as well as res gestee. The very nature of that case made it necessary to show what the deceased said as to how she felt; and being found sick in bed, her declarations why she was there is a surrounding fact, explanatoi’y of the material fact — being found in bed.
The declai’ations of the deceased, in the case at bar, as they show how he felt in the presence of the witnesses, ai’e res gestee so far as they are explanatory of the other facts that were occurring then. But as evidence of his fall down the stairs, they are not competent.
The fact that deceased declared to his wife that he had fallen down the back stairs and hit his head, is not the point here in controversy. The point in controversy is, did the deceased fall down the stairs in question, and was the fall accidental? The declaration of the deceased, made to his wife, as she says, several days before he died, is all that we have upon the facts in question. If not competent to prove the fall, how is it enough to prove the accidental character of it ?
Mima v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch, 290; King v. Inhabitants of Eriswell, 3 Term, 707; Ellicots v. Pearl, 10 Peters, 412.
Ib.
6 East, 188.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice SWAYNE
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The action was upon a policy of insurance. It insured Arthur H. Mosley against loss of life, or personal injury by any accident within the meaning of the instrument, and was issued to Mrs. Arthur H. Mosley, the wife of the assured, for her benefit. The declaration was in assumpsit. The defendant pleaded, the general issue, and the cause was tried by a jury. The plaintiff recovered. During the trial, a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiff in error, by which it appears that the contest between the parties was upon the quéstion of fact, whether Arthur H. Mosley, the assured, died from the effects of an accidental fall down stairs in the night, or from natural causes.
The defendant in error was called as a witness in her own behalf, and testified, " that the assured left his bed Wednesday night, the 18th of July, 1866, between 12 and 1 o'clock; that when he came back, he said he had fallen down the back stairs, and almost killed himself; that he had hit the back part of his head in falling down stairs; . . . she noticed that his voice trembled; he complained of his head, and appeared to be faint'and in great pain."
To the. admission of all that part of the'testimony which relates'to the declarations of the assured, about his falling down stairs, and the injuries he received by the fall, the counsel of the defendants objected. The court overruled the objection, and the defendants excepted.
William H. Mosley, son of the assured, testified, in behalf of the plaintiff, "that he slept in the lower part of the building, occupied by his father; that about 12 o'clock of the night before-mentioned, he saw his father lying with his head on the counter, and asked him what was the matter; he replied, that he had fallen down the back stairs and hurt himself very badly." The defendants objected to both the question and answer. An exception to their admission followed.
The same witness testified further, " that on the day after the fall,.his father said he felt very badly, and that if he attempted to walk across the room, his head became dizzy; on the following day, he said he was a little worse, if anything." The admission .of this testimony also was excepted to by the defendants.
This statement presents the questions which we are called upon' to consider. They are, whether the court erred in admitting the declarations of the assured, as to his bodily injuries and pains, and whether it was error to admit such declarations, to prove that he had fallen down the stairs.
It is to be remarked, that the declarations of the former class all related to present existing facts at the time they were made.
Those of the latter class were made immediately,,or very soon after the fall; the declarations to his son, before he- returned to his bed-room; those to his wife, upon his' reaching there.
Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are original arid competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural reflexes of what it might be impossible' to show by other testimony. If there be such other testimony, this may be necessary to set the facts thus developed in their true light, and to give them their proper effect.. As independent explanatory or corroborative evidence, it is often indispensable to the due administration of justice. Such declarations are regarded as verbal acts, and are as competent as any other testimony, when relevant to the issue. Their truth or falsity is an inquiry for the jury.
In actions for the breach of a promise to marry, such evidence is always received to show the affection of the plaintiff for the defendant while the engagement subsisted, and the state of her feelings after it was broken off; and in actions for criminal conversation, to show the terms upon which the plaintiff and his wife lived together before the cause of action arose. Upon the same ground, the declarations of the party himself are received to prove his condition, ills, pains, and symptoms, whether arising from sickness,'or an injury by accident or violence. If made to a medical attendant, they are of more weight than if made to another person. But to whomsoever made, they are competent evidence. Upon these points, the leading writers upon the law of evidence, both in this country and in England, are in accord.
There is a limitation of this doctrine that must be carefully observed in its application.
Such evidence must not be extended beyond the necessity upon which the rule is founded. It must relate to the present, and not to the past. Anything in the nature of narration must be excluded. It must be confined strictly to such com-' plaints, expressions, and exclamations, as furnish evidence of " a present existing pain or malady." Examined by the standard of these rules, the testimony to which this exception relates was properly admitted.
The other exception requires a fuller examination.
Was it competent to prove the fall by the declarations of the assured made under the circumstances disclosed in the bill of exceptions ?
In Thompson and Wife v. Trevanion, the action was for the battery and wounding of the wife. Lord Chief Justice Holt " allowed, what the wife said immediately upon the hurt received, and before that she had time to contrive or devise anything for her own advantage, to be given in evidence." The reporter adds: " Quod nota. This was at nisi prius, in Middlesex, for wounding the wrife of the plaintiff." This case was referred to by Lord Ellenborough with approbation in the case before him of Aveson v. Kinnaird. In that case, Lawrence, Justice, in answer'to the objection, that such evidence was hearsay, said: "It is in every day's experience iri actions of assault, that what a man has said of himself, to his surgeon, is evidence to show what, he has suffered by the assault."
The King v. Foster was an indictment for manslaughter, for killing the deceased by driving a cab over him. A wagoner was called as a witness for the prosecution. He stated that he saw the cab drive by at a very rapid rate, but did not see the accident, and that immediately after, on hearing the deceased groan, he went to him and asked him what was the matter. The counsel for the prisoner objected, that what was said by the deceased, in the absence of the prisoner, could not be received in evidence.
Gurney, Baron, said, that what .the deceased said- at the instant, as to the cause of the accident, was clearly admissible.
Park, Justice, said, that it was the best possible testimony that, under the circumstances, could be adduced to show what knocked the deceased down. Mr. Justice Patterson concurred. The prisoner was convicted.
In the Commonwealth v. Pike, the indictment, as in the preceding case, was for manslaughter. The defendant was charged with killing his wife. Jt appeared that the deceased ran up stairs from her own room, in the night, crying murder, and bleeding. Another woman, into whose room she was admitted, went, at her request, for a physician. A third person, who heard her cries, went for a watchman, and, on his return, proceeded to the room where she was. He found her on the floor, bleeding profusely. She said the defendant had stabbed her. The defendant's counsel objected to the admission of this declaration in evidence. The objection was overruled. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held, that the evidence was properly admitted. It was said that the declaration was "of the nature of res gestee," and that the time when it was made was so recent, after the injury was inflicted, as to justify receiving it upon that ground.
It is not easy to distinguish this ease and that of The-King v. Foster, in principle, from the case before us, as regards the point under consideration.
In Aveson v. Kinnaird, it was said by Lord Ellenborough, that the declarations were admitted in the case in Skinner, because they were a part of the res gestee.
To bring such declarations within this principle, generally, they must be contemporaneous with the main fact to which they relate. But this rule is, by no means, of universal- application. In Rawson v. Haigh, a debtor had left England and gone to Paris, where he remained. The question was* whether his departure from England was an act of bankruptcy, and that depended upon the intent by which he was actuated. To show this intent, a letter written in Prance, a month after his departure, was received in evidence. Upon full argument, it was held that it was properly received. Baron Park said: " It is impossible to tie down to time the rule as to the declarations. We must judge from all the circumstances of the case. We need not go the length of shying, that a declaration, made a month after the fact, would, of itself, be admissible; but if, as in the present case, there are connecting circumstances, it may, even at that time, form a part of the whole res gestee."
Where a peddler's wagon was struck and the peddler injured by a locomotive, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said :We cannot say that the declaration of the engineer was no part of the res gestee. It was made at the time — in view of the goods strewn along the road by the breaking up of the boxes — and seems to have grown directly out of and immediately after the happening of the fact." The declaration was held to be " a part of the transaction itself."
In the complexity of human affairs, what is done and what is said are often so related that neither can be detached without leaving the residue fragmentary and distorted. There may be fraud and falsehood as to both; but there is no ground of objection to one that does not exist equally as to the other. To reject the verbal fact would not uufrequently have the same effect as to strike out the controlling member from a sentence, or the controlling sentence from its context. The doctrine of res gestae was considered, by this court, in Beaver v. Taylor. What was said in that case need not be repeated. Here the principal fact is the bodily in- jury. The res gestae are the statements of the cause made by the assured almost contemporaneously with its occurrence, and those relating to the consequences made while the latter subsisted and were in progress. Where sickness or affection is the subject of inquiry, the sickness or affection is the principal fact. The res gestae are the declarations tending to show the reality of its existence, and its extent and character. The tendency of recent adjudications is to extend rather than to narrow, the scope of the doctrine. Nightly guarded in its practical application, there is no principle in the law of evidence more safe in its results. There is none which •rests on a more solid basis of reason and authority. We think it was properly applied in the court below.
In the ordinary concerns of life, no one would doubt the truth of these declarations, or hesitate to regard them, uncontradicted, as conclusive. Their probative force would not be questioned. Unlike much other evidence, equally cogent for all the purposes of moral conviction, they have the sanction of-law as well as of reason. The want of this concurrence in the law is often deeply to be regretted. The weight of this reflection, in reference to the case under consideration, is increased by the fact, that what was said could not be received as " dying declarations," although the person who made them was dead, and hence, could not be called as a witness.
JUDGMENT AEEIRMED.
1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 102; 1 Phillips on Evidence (last ed.) p. 183; 1 Taylor on Evidence, 478, § 518.
Bacon v. The Inhabitants, &c., 7 Cushing, 586.
Skinner, 402.
6 East, 197.
6 Carrington & Payne, 325.
Ib. 191.
3 Cushing, 181.
2 Bingham, 99.
Hanover Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pennsylvania State, 402.
1 Wallace, 637.
Appleton on Evidence, ch. 11, 12.