Case: New Orleans v. The Steamship Company
Abbreviation: New Orleans v. Steamship Co.
Decision Date: 1874-10
Docket Number: 
Citation: 20 Wall. 387
Volume: 87
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: New Orleans v. The Steamship Company.
Judges: Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and BRADLEY did not hear the argument of this case, and did not participate in the judgment.
Pages: 387–403

Head Matter:
New Orleans v. The Steamship Company.
1. This court has no power to reverse, on appeal, the imposition of .a fine decreed by the Circuit Court for contempt of it.
2. A lease made July 8th, 1865, during the military occupation of New Or-' leans, in the late rebellion, by the army. of the United Statos, by the mayor of New Orleans (appointed by the general commanding the department), pursuant to a resolution of the boards of finance and of street landings (both boards appointed in the same manner), by which a lease of certain water-front property in the said -city, for ¿en years — whibh . lease called' for large outlays by the lessee, and was deemed by this court otherwise a fair tinp — sustained for its whole term, although in less than one year afterwards .(that is to' say,, on the 18th of March,. ■ 1866), the government of the city was handed back 'to the proper pity . .authorities.
8. \J?he fact, that on the 9th of February, 1866, — seyen months after the-lease was made-r-a “ general order ” from the military department of Louisiana, forbiddjng'the several bureaus of-, the municipal government of the-city, created by military authority, from disposing of any of-the-city property for a term extending beyond a period when the civil government of the city might be reorganized and re-established, in conformity to the constitution and laws of the-State, held not to have altered the case.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana; the case being thus:
On the 1st of May, 1862, the army of the United States captured the city of New Orleans. It was held by military occupation until the 18th of March, 1866, when its government was handed over to the proper city authorities.. The condition r>f things which subsisted before the rebellion, was then restored. During the military occupation, it was gov-r erued by a mayor," a board of finance, and a board of street landings, appointed by the commanding general of the department. On the 8th of June, 1865, Hugh Kennedy was thus appointed mayor. On the 8th of July, 1865, as such mayor,- pursuant to a resolution signed by the chairman of the board of finance and by the chairman of the board of street landings, both boards having been' appointed in the same manner as himself, Kennedy executed to the appellees a leAse of certain water-front property therein described. .The lease made the following provisions:
The city granted to the company the right to inclose and occupy for their exclusive use the demised premises'for the term of ten years.
The company was at its own expense to build a new wharf in front of the landing, as designated, with new bulkheads to retain the levee earthworks throughout the whole extent- of the front assigned to them, they furnishing,the requisite labor and materials; to keep the structure'in complete 'order and repair until the termination of the lease, and then to deliver it to the city authorities in that condition, natural wear and tear only excepted. The company was to have the right, at its .own cost, to construct buildings and Nsheds within the inclosed space as should be required for the transaction of their shipping and freighting business. •The wharves were to be completed within a year from the date-.of the lease, of new materials, in a workmanlike manner, and to be protected by a-line of heavy fender-piles in front, of sufficient size and strength to. enable the largest of the company’s ships to land and load at the-wharf without damage. All the improvements, consisting of w'harves, bulkheads, fender-piles, sheds, buildings, and inelosures, were to be kept in good repair by the company until the expiration of the lease.
The lease was not to be transferred without the city’s consent, and, in case of default by the company to fulfil its engagements, the city had the.right to annul it. .At the expiration of the lease all the improvements made by the company were to become the property of the city. The company agreed to pay an. annual rent of $8000, in monthly instalments, for which it gave its promissory notes, one hundred and twenty in number.
The company expended more than $65,000 in making the improvements specified in the lease, and duly paid its notes as they matured down to the 11th of April, 1866, including the'one then due.
On the 18th of that month the city surveyor, aided by a 'number of laborers, acting under an order of the city council, approved by the mayor, destroyed the fence or inclosure erected by the company.’ It'had cost them $7000. -The( company filed a bill and supplemental bill whereby they prayed for an injunction and damages. The notes for rent given by the' company and then unpaid were .delivered by the military, authorities to the proper city authorities when the government of the city was .transferred to the mayor and council. Those unpaid when this litigation was begun were held by the city then and for several months afterwards. They were tendered to the company by a supplemental answer in this case and deposited in court, where they, still remained. The note last paid matured and was paid before the inclosure, was destroyed. The city had not tendered back the money so paid, nor had it disclaimed .the validity of the payment, nor had it tendered back the amount or any part of it, expended by the company in making the improvements, nor made any offer touching the subject.-
In the process of the litigation the then mayor, .Clark, applied to the Third District Court of the city for an injunction to restrain the company from rebuilding the inclosure which had been destroyed, and an injunction was granted accordingly-
The company thereupon served a rule upon Clark to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in taking such action in another tribunal. At’the final hearing of the • case the city -offered in evidence order No. 11 of Major-Q-eneral' Canby, commanding the military-department of Louisiana. The order was dated at New Orleans, February ' 9th, 1866, and wa¡s thus:
“ The several bureaus of the municipal government of the ' city of New Orleans, created.by and acting under military au- ’ ■thority, are enjpified and prohibited from alienating, or in any manner disposing of, the real estate or other property belonging to the city, or granting any franchise or right to corporations or individuals for a term extending beyond such period as the civil government of the city 'may be reorganized and re-established under and in conformity to the constitution and laws of the State; and any alienation,.disposition, or grant will be subject to any rights and interest of the General Government which may be involved, and shall not extend beyond the time when the questions relative to those rights and interest may be determined by competent authority.”
The court refused to receive the order in evidence, and the city excepted.
The follpwing facts were agreed on by the parties: “ From the execution of the lease to the 18th of April, 1866, the company had been in peaceable possession of the demised premises, and had performed all its obligations under the lease. No notice was given by the .city of the intended demolition of the inclosure, and it was done early in the morning.. Under its charter of 1856 the city had, before the war, leased portions of its wharves to individuals and companies, and had, in one instance, farmed out the collection of levee dues upon all the wharves by sections. The damages resulting from the destruction of the company’s buildings, &c., and the- necessary employment, in consequence of this destruction, of additional watchmen, amounted to $8000.”
At the hearing the court decreed that Clark, the mayor, should pay a fine of $300 for the. contempt of the court wherewith he was charged; tnatthe city-should .be enjoined from interfering with the possession aud enjoyment of the demised premises by the company during the life of the lease, and that the company should recover from the city $8000 for damages, and that the city should pay the costs of .the suit.
It was from this decree that the present appeal was taken.
Mr. W. H. Peekham for the appellant:
I: The imposition of afine o/'$300 imposed on the mayor was error. His action was-the assertion of a right, and in no sense violated the injunction issued in this cause. Possibly he- mistook the court to which he should have applied. But if he had applied to the court below, the application wobld have been, not to dissolve or modify the injunction already issued, but for another injunction against the company, and in ihvor of the city, whether such application, were made by motion or petition in this suit, or by filing a cross-bill, as' might be appropriate under the practice adopted in Louisiana.
If the application to the court below would not have been a contempt, nor an application to dissolve or modify the existing injunction, neither can it be a contempt when fiiade; to a State court.
Perhaps a suit for that purpose would be regarded as ancillary to, the first suit, within the doctrine'of Freeman v. Howe, or, perhaps, as a distinct.proeeeding within the dbetrine of Buck v. Colbath, but in neither case can it be called a contempt.
II. The refusal of the court below to admit the order of General Cdnby, No. .11, was error. Mayor Kennedy’s authority depended on martial law, and was restricted by the terms' of General Butler’s proclamation. He was always subject to. the directions of the military officers. These disapproved of, and virtually reversed his .action. - The fact that the date is after that of the lease, is immaterial. ■ Martial law is hot guided or controlled by constitutions. The apparent injus*tice t& individuals of its decrees is a matter of no weight.
III. The lease cannot stand.
1. It was void of truth. Neither-the military nor the civil government had power to make it. It was of property held by the city in trust for the public, for public use; and ultra vires. No power other than that of .the State itself could' alien the rights of the public, and transfer them to an individual, or company,'to the exclusion of the public. In Municipality No.-2 v. New Orleans Cotton Press, the court.says:
“ The city is not proprietor of a locus publicus, but only administrator. It belongs as much to the citizen of Ohio as to a citizen of New Orleans. It 'is'a plan left ojien for the convenience of commerce, and for the use-of the whole world — a thing hors du commerce.” 2. The military mayor and boards had no authority to make such a lease. Whatever rights or powers they possessed terminated with the termination of hostilities, and they could no more create an interest to last beyond that time than could a tenant for years create one to last beyond his term.
Mr. James Emott, contra.
24 Howard, 450.
3 Wallace, 334.
18 Louisiana, 127, and see People v. Kerr, 27 New York, 188.
Halleck on International Laws and Laws of War, pp. 446, 447, and 448, chap. 19, 2, 3, 4, and 5; chap. 35, 8 and 9, chap. 32, §§ 1 and 2, pp. 776-777, § 4, p. 781; Twiss on the Laws of Nations, and Eights and Duties in time of War, chap. 4, § 66, p. 126; Phillimore, vol. 3, p. 863, §§ 583 and 584, Digest, title “Rights,” “Private Rights,” “ Restitution Eights of Captors.”

Opinion:
Mr. Justice-SWÁYNE
(having stated the ease) delivered the opinion of the court
The questions presented for our consideration are questions of law. The facts are undisputed. Our remarks,will be confined to the several objections to the decree taken by the counsel for the appellant.
The fine of three hundred dollars imposed upon the mayor is beyond our jurisdiction. Contempt, of court is a specific criminal offence. The imposition of the fine w'as a judgment in a criminal case. That part pf the clecree is as distinct from the residue as if it were a judgment upon an indictment for perjury committed in a deposition read at the hearing. This court can take cognizance of a criminal case only upon a certificate of division in opinion. In Crosby's Case, Mr. Justice Blackstone said: "The sole adjudication for contempt, and the punishment thereof, belongs exclusively and without interfering to each respective court." The Circuit, Court having first acquired possession of the original case was entitled to hold it exclusively until the case was finally disposed' of. Any reliéf to which the city was entitled should have been sought there, and that court was competent to give it, either- in the original or in an auxiliary case. As to any other court the matter was ultra vires. It was unnecessary, unwarranted in law, and grossly disrespectful to the Circuit Court to invoke the interposition of the State court as to anything within the scope of the litigation already pending in the Federal court.
The order of General Canby, No. 11, was issued seven months after the lease was made. The rights it conferred upon the lessees, whatever they were, had then become fully vested. The order did not purport to annul the lease. It prescribed a rule of conduct as to giving such leases in the future, and concluded as follows: " And any alienation, disposition, or grant will be subject to any r'ghts and interest of the General government which may be involved, aud shall not extend beyond the time when the questions relative to those rights and interest may be determined by competent authority." It does not appear that the govern, ment ever took any action touching this lease. The order could not, therefore, in any view, affect the rights .of the parties. The court did not err in refusing to receive it jn evidence.
It has been strenuously insisted that the lease was made by Kennedy without authority, was, therefore, void ab initio, and, if this was not so, that its efficacy, upon the principle of the jus post liminium, wholly ceased when the government of the city was surrendered by the military authorities of the United States to the mayor and council elected under the.city charter.
Although the city of New Orleans was conquered and taken possession of in a civil war waged on the part of the United States to put down an insurrection and restore the supremacy of the National government in the Confederate States, that government had the same power and rights in territory held by conquest as if the territory had belonged to a foreign country and had been subjugated in a foreign war. In such cases the conquering power has a right to• displace the pre-existing authority, and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all-the necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller, according to its pleasure. It.may prescribe the revenues to .be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit. to the powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in- the laws and usages of war. These principles hive the sanction of all publicists who have considered .the -subject.
They have been repeatedly recognized and applied by this court. In the case last cited the President had; by proclamation, established in New Orleans'a Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, and defined its jurisdiction. This court held the proclamation a rightful exercise of.the power of the executive, the court valid, and its decrees binding upon the, parties brought'before it. In such eases the laws of war take the place of the Constitution and laws of the United States as applied in time of peace. It follows as a corollary from these, propositions that the appointment of Kennedy as mayor and of the Boards of Finance and of Street Landings was valid, and that they were clothed with the powers and duties which pertained to their- respective positions.
It can hardly be doubted that to contract for the use .of a portion of the water-front of the eity during the coutiuuance of the military possession of the United States was within the scope of their authority. But, conceding this to be so, it is insisted that when the military jurisdiction terminated the lease fell with it.- . We cannot take this view of the subl ject. The question arises whether the instrument was a fair and reasonable.exercise of the authority under which it was made. A large amount of money was to be expended and was expended by the lessees. The lease was liable to be annulled if the expenditures were not made and the work done within the limited time specified. The war might last many years, or it might at'any time cease and the State and city be restored to their normal condition. The improvements to be made were important to the welfare and prosperity of the city. The company had a right to use them' only for a limited time. The company was to keep them in repair during the life of the lease, and at its termination' they were all to become the property of the city. In the meantime the rental of eight thousand dollars a year was to be paid.
When the military authorities retired the rent notes' unpaid were all handed over to the city. The city took the place of the United States and succeeded to all their rights under, the contract. The company became bound to the city in all respects as it had before be$u bound to.the covenantees in the lease. The city thereafter collected one of the notes subsequently-due, and it holds the fund, without; an offer to return it, while conducting this litigation. . It is also to be borne in mind that there has been no offer of adjustment touching the lasting and valuable improvements made by the company, nor is there any complaint.that the company has failed in any particular to fulfil their contract.
We think the lease was a fair and reasonable exercise of the power vested in the military mayor and the two boards, and that the injunction awarded by the court below was properly decreed. They ms post liminium and the law of nuisance have no application to the case.
We do not intend to impugn the general principle that the contracts of the conqueror touching .things in conquered territory lose their efficacy when his dominion ceases.
We decide the. case upon its own peculiar circumstances, which' we think are sufficient to take it out of the rule.
We might, perhaps, well hold that the city is estopped from denying the validity of the lease by receiving payment of one of the notes, but we prefer to place o.ur judgment upon the ground before stated.
Judgment affirmed.
Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and BRADLEY did not hear the argument of this case, and did not participate in the judgment.
Crosby's Case, 3 Wilson, 188; Williamson's Case, 26 Pennsylvania-State, 24; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheaton, 41.
Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wallace, 370; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Peters, 400; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 Howard, 584.
Freeman v. Howe, 24 Howard, 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wallace, 334.
The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 636; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace, 417; Mauran v. The Insurance Company, 6 Id. 1.
Cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard, 164; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 Id. 176; The Grapeshot, 9 Wallace, 129.
The United States v. McRae, 8 Law Reports, Equity Cases, 75.