Case: FLORINE A. AUSTIN, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Austin v. United States
Decision Date: 1894-12-17
Docket Number: 
Citation: 30 Ct. Cl. 484
Volume: 30
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: FLORINE A. AUSTIN, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Pages: 484–485

Head Matter:
FLORINE A. AUSTIN, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. THE UNITED STATES.
[25 C. Cls. R., 437, 155 U. S. R., 417.]
On the claimant’s Appeal.
In 1883 Congress passed an actreferring a cotton claim “with full jurisdiction and power” to render judgment for the amount realized from the cotton, but with a proviso “however, that it be shown to the satisfaction of the court that neither Sterling T. Austin, sr., nor any of his surviving representatives gave aid or comfort,” etc. The principal question in the case is whether the loyalty is established within the intent of this act by the proclamation of general amnesty.
The court below decides:
1. In a private act passed subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Klein’s Case (13 Wall., 128) an express proviso “ that it be shown to the satisfaction of the court that neither Sterling T. Austin, sr., nor any of his surviving representatives gave any aid or comfort to the late rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal to the Government” means something more than the condition of legal loyalty derived from the proclamation of general amnesty. The intent of Congress must have been that the claimants should show “to the satisfaction of the court” that they were loyal in fact.
2. A report of a committee unanimous in its character, submitting and accompanying an amendment to a bill, may be considered in a case of doubtful interpretation.
3. Where a claimant’s rights, if any, are created by the statute ■which refers the claim, it is within the constitutional authority of Congress to specify as a condition to relief that he be found loyal in fact.
4. If in legislating upon a gratuitous right created by the act Congress should impose a condition which would be unconstitutional if a vested right were involved, the whole act must fail; the prohibited part is not severable in the former case.
5. Where a person at the beginning of the war began new business operations largely dependent upon the success of the rebellion, avoided opportunities of remaining within the Union lines, removed his slaves and business farther and farther within the Confederate lines carried his slaves to an important military strategic point, where they were liable to be and in fact ivere employed on fortifications, and remained with his business and slaves in Confederate territory until the very end of the rebellion, the expression of loyal sentiments and failure to render direct voluntary aid to the rebellion are insufficient to establish loyalty.
6. A person residing m the Southern States before the rebellion was not eompeiled to jeopard his life or the safety of his family, but was bound to submit to and accept the protection of the Federal power as soon as that could be done with safety.
7. Where a person struggling to maintain his legal right to his slaves voluntarily continued his domicile within the territory of the power devoted to the maintenance of slavery it may be inferred that he desired its success.
The decision of the court below is affirmed on the same grounds.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Fullee,
delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, December 17, 1894.