Case: Lowber v. Bangs
Abbreviation: Lowber v. Bangs
Decision Date: 1864-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 2 Wall. 728
Volume: 69
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Lowber v. Bangs.
Judges: NELSON, J., also dissented.
Pages: 730–761

Head Matter:
Lowber v. Bangs.
A stipulation in a charter-party that the chartered vessel, then in distant seas, would proceed from one port named (where it was expected that she would he) to another port named (where the charterer meant to load her), “with all possible despatch,” is a warranty that she will so proceed; and goes to the root of the contract. It is not a representation simply that she will so proceed, but a condition precedent to a right of recovery. Accordingly, if a vessel go to a port out of the direct course, the charterer may throw up the charter-party.
Ex. gr. 'A vessel,-while _on a voyage to Melbourne, was chartered at Boston for a voyage from Calcutta.to a port in the United States. The charter-party contained a clause that the vessel was to “proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch.” Before the master was advised of this engagement, the vessel had sailed from Melbourne to Manilla, which is out of the direct course between Melbourne and Calcutta, and did not arrive at Calcutta either directly or aá soon as the parties had contemplated. The defendants refused to load; and upon suit to recover damages for a breach of the charter-party, it was held that the charterers might rightly claim to be discharged.
Bangs & Son being owners of the ship Mary Bangs, then at sea, on her passage from New York to Melbourne, chartered her at Boston; on the 4th June, 1858, to Lowber, who was there, for a voyage from .Calcutta to Philadelphia, &c. The charter-party contained the following clauses:
“ Ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch. It is understood that the ‘ Mary Bangs’ is now on her passage from New York to Melbourne (sailed 3d day May last); that the owners will use the most direct means to forward instructions to. the master, with copy of this charter, ordering it to be fulfilled; but should it so happen that the ship should arrive at Melbourne before these instructions, and the master sho.uld have engaged his ship before receiving them, this charter mill be void.”
No provision, it will be observed, was made for the case of the vessel’s having left Melbourne ^engaged, or, indeed, for anything but for her arriving at Melbourne, and her engagement before receiving the instructions promised by Bangs & Son, to be sent. The vessel reached Melbourne on the 7th of August; she dischai’ged her cargo, and was ready to sail on the 7th of September.. She waited for the mail until the 16th of that month. It was due there on the 5th of September, but by an accident did not arrive until the 14th of October. The voyage from Melbourne to Calcutta, at that time of the year, usually consumed from forty-five to sixty-days. Had the vessel proceeded to Calcutta direct, she ought to have reached there before the middle of November. She went, however, to Manilla, much out • of the direct course from Melbourne to Calcutta, and arrived there on the 16th of November. She left Manilla on the 24th of January, and arrived at Calcutta on the 26th of February, more than three months after the time at which she oughl tó have arrived, if she had gone there directly from Melbourne. The owners addressed to the master five letters, of different dates, advising him of the charter-party, and directed them to Melbourne. The charterers/on the 23d of June, despatched an agent to Calcutta, who arrived there on the 25th of August. As soon as he learned that the vessel had not come direct from Melbourne, he declined loading her under the charter-party. Freights, it may be added, had largely fallen between the date when the charter-party was made, and that of the vessel’s arrival at Calcutta; and, also, that after the arrival of the Mary Bangs, and after she was ready and had offered to receive a cargo, the charterers engaged another vessel, of about the same tonnage, to take her place, and loaded her with a cargo purchased after the arrival of the Mary Bangs, with funds provided for her. The ease thus showed that the object of the voyage had not been frustrated.
On error from the Massachusetts Circuit, where the case had come before the court as a case stated, the question presented for the determination of this court was, whether the fact that the ship proceeded from Melbourne to Manilla and thence to Calcutta, instead of going to Calcutta from Melbourne directly, gave the charterers a right to avoid the charter-party; in other words, whether the clause, “ship to proceed from Melbo' :rne’ to Calcutta with all possible despatch,” did or did not make a condition precedent; whether, in short, it constituted a warranty, or merely a representation ? The court below considered that it was not a condition precedent, hut an independent stipulation, which gave the charterers a claim for damages on failure of performance by the owners, but did not give them the right to avoid the contract; the object of the voyage hot having been wholly frustrated. Judgment was given below accordingly.
Mr. Curtis, for the owners.
1. The meaning of the clause is, that the owners would have the vessel at Calcutta “ seasonably.” She was so there, as is proved by the charterers having got another vessel after the arrival.and loaded her. The voyage was not frustrated, nor was even inconvenience felt-.' The charterers threw up their charter only because freights had greatly fallen, and it was for their interest to do so. The argument which gives to the expression in question its severest rqean-ing is unreasonable. If the master, after receiving his instructions at Melbourne, had stopped unnecessarily for but an hour, had gone to see a friend, had sailed by any but the shortest possible line, had not kept under the utmost press of sail, the charter would be void. The ship would not have proceeded from Melbourne to Calcutta with “ all possible despatch.” The argument makes the obligation to. sail dependent, not on the receipt of the instructions, but on her
actual • ability, at the moment, to sail. "Wbo, on this construction of tbe instrument, could settle whether the contract had or had' not been complied with? It might be confidently affirmed, that on this interpretation of such words no contract containing them ever had been, or ever would be, fulfilled. The more strict you make the construction, the more difficult you make it to he practically settled.. You are also drawing within its scope things of no real effect. Can it be supposed that reasonable men, making a contract reaching over half the globe, and having before their eyes the contingencies which were' certain to occur in distant seas and ports, could have thus contracted ? "Why give to a practical instrument a construction so impracticable ?
2. It has been decided, in a large number of English eases, that such clauses as “ ship to proceed with all convenient speed,” or “ in a reasonable time,” and similar clauses, are not, in charter-parties, conditions preceden, but are merely independent stipulations; and unless.the alleged breach goes to the whole root and consideration, it only gives a claim for damages. In Tarraboehia v. Hickie the charter contained a provision, that the vessel should “ sail with all convenient speed.” The jury found, in an action for refusing to .load, that.the vessel did not sail with all convenient speed; but the court held that this was no excuse for a refusal to load, because it did not appear-that the object of the voyage was wholly-frustrated by the breach of the stipulation. In Dimech v. Gorlett, the vessel was described as now at anchor in the port of Malta; and it was agreed-that “ she, being tight, stanch, and strong, and properly manned, and every way fitted for the voyage, should, with all convenient speed, proceed in ballast to Alexandria, in Egypt.” The ship was not then finished, and did not get ready to sail for more than a month. Held, that-the failure to sail “with, all convenient speed” was no answer to an action for a refusal to load, because the charterer had not shown that the object of the charter-party was frustrated by the delay; it not being “ shown that the charterer had taken Tip any other vessel or declined any cargoes, or in any way altered his position,, in consequence of the delay.” In Clipsham v. Vertue it was held, on demurrer, that a failure to perform a stipulation in a charter-party, to sail “ within a reasonable time,” was no answer to an action for not loading ; it not being alleged that the purpose of the voyage was frustrated. In Freeman v. Taylor, the charter contained a stipulation to proceed from the Cape of Good Hope to Bombay “ with all convenient speed.” The master wilfully deviated, and went to Mauritius, and caused a delay of six weeks.- The court directed the jury to find whether the deviation deprived the defendant of the benefit of the contract.
- In some eases, it has been’held in England that a stipulation in a charter to sail on or before a day certain was a condition precedent; and such stipulations were distinguished from those containing the words, “ all convenient speed,” “within a reasonable.time,” and “ with all possible despatch.” Such was Baron Pollock’s idea in Tarrabochia v. Hickiey but there appears to be no decision in which a clause similar to that in this case has been held to be a condition.- .
Mr. S. Bartlett, contra:
1. The contract is explicit and clear. “Ship to proceed from Melbourne,” — not from Manilla, or any other port in the Eastern seas, where she might at any time be found. “ With all possible despatch;” that is to say, direct from Melbourne to Calcutta. Do these words leave a doubt that both parties contemplated that the contract should apply only to a vessel at Melbourne ? How could the owners have been willing to bind themselves and their ship by a contract which should take effect after she left Melbourne, wheresoever notice reached the master, without making some provision in that contract for'a probable or possible state of things 'which might involve them in severe loss'? How could the charterer's have been willing, without making some limitation of time, to bind themselves to keep an agent and funds at Calcutta, ready to load a ship under a contract to take effect when notice should reach the master, it may be, in distant seas, and pending or after intermediate voyages ?
2. How stands the case on authority ? In Graves v. Legg, the plaintiffs contracted to import and sell the defendant wools, to be laid down in certain ports of England The contract recited that it “was “to be deliverable at Odessa during August next, to be skipped with all despatch, the names of the vessels to be declared as soon as the’'wools were shipped.” The breach relied on in defence, as a condition precedent, was that the plaintiff, did not notify to the defendant the name of the vessel in which the wool was shipped as soon as it was shipped. The defendant threw up the contract. In the- argument and judgment the effect of the clause “to be shipped with all despatch,” as a condition precedent,- and forming part of the same clause, was discussed, and the requisition to give notice of the names of the vessels, held to be a condition, — on the ground; among other things, that the terms “to be shipped with all de-spatch,” in the same clause, clearly constituted a condition precedent. Thus Parke, B., asks, “ Could the plaintiff contend that the shipping the wools with all despatch is not a condition precedent?” and the counsel for the plaintiff-substantially admitted that it was. In its judgment, the court say the giving notice of the names of the ships “ was a condition precedent, quite as much, indeed, as the shipping of the goods at Odessa, with all despatch, after the end of August.” _
Cases have been cited on the other side, where charter-parties have provided that the ship should sail with “all convenient speed,” and in which the provision has been held not to be a condition precedent, entitling the charterer to repudiate the contract. The reason is that stated in .some of those cases, viz., that “what is a convenient speed or reasonable time, must always be a subject of contention. "Where terms are so lax and ambiguous as to lead to a difference of opinion, then the stipulation is not a condition precedent.” ' In the present case, the words “all possible despatch,” are not-equivalent to “ reasonable time,” and leave no ambiguity as to the intention of the parties, as is shown by the above case of Graves v. Legg.
The other side relies apparently on the supposed doctrine, that whether a stipulation in a charter-party constitutes a condition precedent or not, may be determined by proof that its violation had or had not the effect to frustrate the voyage, and that, as in this case, the charterers do not show that the voyage was frustrated, they are to be charged. It is not to be denied that some of the cases cited by Mr. Curtis assert the principle as stated. But the conflict in- the cases, and the obvious unsoundness of the doctrine, has led to its revision in the Exchequer Chamber, in Behn v. Burness. That case will be found to review the preceding cases, aqd to establish the following propositions:
1st. That whether a descriptive statement in a written instrument is a mere representation, and so “not an integral part of the contract” (unless fraudulently made), or whether it is a substantive part of the contract, is a question of construction by the court.
2d.. That the previous cases turn upon very nice distinctions, but that the true doctrine, as established by principle as well as authority, is, that, “generally speaking, if such descriptive statement was intended to be a substantive part of a contract, it is to be regarded as a condition, on failure or non-performance of which the other party may, if he is so minded, repudiate the contract in toto, provided it has not been partially executed in his favor.”
Bd. That if a party voluntarily receives the benefit of a partial execution, “ he cannot afterwards treat the descriptive statement as a -condition, but only as an agreement, for breach of which he may bring an action to recover damages.”
4th. That the doctrine of some of the cases relied on by the defendant in error, that a descriptive statement of this kind “ may be regarded as a more representation, if the object of the charter-party be still practicable, but may be construed as a warranty, if that object turns out to be frustrated,” is unsound, ‘‘because the instrument, it should seem, ought to. be construed with reference io the intention of the parties at the time it was made, irrespective of events which may afterwards occur.”
Mr. Bartlett referred also to Glaholm v. Hays Oliver v. Fielden, Orookewit v. Fletcher, and to Ollive v. Booker ; reading from and relying upon them.
Reply: 'The case of Behn v. Burness, in the Exchequer Chamber, does not apply. There the words, “ now in the port of Amsterdam,” in a charter-party, were held to be a condition. The court, however, did not question the decisions in Tarrabochia v. Hickie, Bimech v. Corlett, and Clipsham v. Vertue, or question any other eases in which it was held that a stipulation that a vessel will sail with all convenient speed, or within a reasonable • time, is only an agreement, and not a condition. The court held only that there was a distinction between “stipulations that some future thing shall be done, or shall happen,” and “ statements in a contract, descriptive of the subject-matter of it, or of some ma--erial incident thereof.” The decision was based upon the ground that the statement that the vessel “was now in the port of Amsterdam,” was of a definite fact at the date of the contract, and was not a stipulation as to the future. In the charter-party of the Mary Bangs, the clause “ ship to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible de-spatch,” is merely a stipulation that a future thing should be done-, and cannot, according to any of the principles stated in tbe opinion in JBehn v. Bum ess, in the Exchequer Chamber, amount to a condition.
1 Hurlstone & Norman, 183.
12 Moore, Privy Council, 199,
5 Adolphus & Ellis, N. S. 265.
8 Bingham, 124.
Glaholm v. Hays, 2 Manning & Granger, 257; Ollive v. Booker, 1 Exchequer, 416.
9 Exchequer, 709.
8 Law Times, 207, Aprii, 1863.
2 Manning and Granger, 257.
4 Exchequer, 135.
1 Hurlstone & Norman, 912.
1 Exchequer, 416.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice SWAYNE
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question is, whether it was a condition precedent, that the ship should proceed directly from Melbourne to Calcutta; or, in other words, whether these clauses constitute a warranty, or are merely'-a representation.
" The construction to be put upon contracts of this sort depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the language of the individual instrument. Whether particular stipulations are to be considered conditions precedent, or not, must, in all cases, solely depend upon that intention, as it is gathered from the instrument itself." "All mercantile contracts ought to be construed' according to their- plain meaning, to men of sense and understanding, and not according to forced and refined constructions, which are intelligible only to lawyers, and scarcely to them." " The rule has been established, by a long series of adjudications in modern times, that the question whether covenants are to be held dependent or independent of each other, is to be determined by the intention and meaning of the parties, as it appears' on the instrument, and by the application of common sense, to each particular case, and to which intention, when once discovered, all technical forms of expression must give' way; and one of the means of discovering, such intention has been laid down with great accuracy by Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Ritchie v. Atkinson, to be this: that when mutual .covenants go to the whole consideration, on both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other; but where the covenants go only to a part, then a remedy lies in the covenant to recover damages for the breach of it, but it is not.a condition precedent."
Buies have been elaborately laid down, and discussed in many cases, for determining the legal character of covenants, and their relations to each otherbut all the leading authorities concur in sustaining these propositions.
Contracts, where their meaning is not clear, are to be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties when they were made, and the practical interpretation which they, by their' conduct, have given to the provisions in controversy.
This charter-party bears date on the 4th day of June, 1858. The vessel was then on her way to Melbourne. The agreed facts warrant the conclusion, that the owner believed confidently that she would reach Melbourne in advance of the mail, which would carry to her master advice of the charter-party. It was also probable that she might engage her freight before the master could receive the advice. On the other hand, it was improbable that she would have discharged her cargo and have left Melbourne before the mail arrived. Hence, no provision was made by the owners for any other contingency than that she should have become engaged. In that event, they were not to be bound;'and the charterers required it to be stipulated, simply, that if not engaged, she should proceed with all possible despatch from Melbourne to Calcutta.
Promptitude in the fulfilment of engagements is the life of commercial success. The state of the market at home and abroad, the solvency of houses, the rates of exchange and of freight, and various other circumstances which go to control the issues of profit or. loss, render it more important in the enterprises of the trader than in any other business. The result of a voyage may depend upon the day the vessel arrives at her port of destination, and the time of her arrival may be controlled by the day of her departure from the port whence she sailed. We cannot forget these considerations in our search for the meaning of this contract. That the parties could have intended that when the vessel left Melbourne she might wander in any direction over the Indian seas, and that whenever and wherever she should receive intelligence of the contract, she might proceed to Calcutta and claim its fulfilment by the charterers, strikes us as incredible. So to hold, we think, would be to make a new contract for the parties, and not to execute the one they have made. We cannot give any other construction to the language, "the ship to proceed from'Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible despatch," than that she -was to proceed direct from one place to the other, and that to this extent, at least, time was intended to be made of the essence of the contract. We lay out of view the state of things at Calcutta when the vessel arrived there. To allow that to control our conclusion, would be to make the construction of the contract depend, not upon the intention of the parties when it was entered into, but upon the accidents of the future.
We will now advert to the authorities to which our attention has been directed. Tarrabochia v. Hickie, Dimech v. Corlett, Clipsham v. Vertue, and Freeman v. Taylor, are in point for the defendants in error, and seem to sustain the views of their counsel. In these cases it was held, that unless the delay was so great as to frustrate the object of the charterers in making the contract, it was not material to the rights of-the parties. In two of them the delay was produced by the deviation of the vessel from the. direct course to the port where she was to receive her lading.
The authorities relied upon in behalf of the plaintiffs in error are' equally cogent. In Glaholm v. Hays, the language of the cliarter-partjr was, " the vessel to sail irom England on or before the 4th day of February next." This was held to be a condition precedent. Chief Justice Tindal said this language imported the same thing as if it had been " conditioned to sail," or "warranted to sail on or before such a day." In Oliver v. Fielden et al., the contract, as set out in the declaration,- was that " the ship called the Lydia, . then on the stocks at Quebec, to be launched and ready to receive cargo in- all the month of May, 1848, and guaranteed by the owners to sail in all June, A. D. 1848," &c.,should be loaded by the factors of the charterers, &c. It was held that the readiness to receive a cargo in all May was a warranty, and that in an action for not loading the vessel, a plea stating that the ship was not ready to receive a cargo " in all May," was good on general demurrer. Pollock, Chief Baron, said, " The stipulation as to the vessel being ready to receive a cargo in May is not mere description, but part of the contract, and forms a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to recover." Crookewit v. Fletcher presented the same point, and was ruled in the same way. In Ollive v. Booker, the vessel was described as " now at sea, having sailed three weeks ago, or thereabouts." It was held, that the time at which the vessel sailed was material, and that the statement in the charter-party amounted to a warranty.
The most recent and most important authority brought to our notice is Behn v. Burness. It was agreed by the charter-party, in that case, that the ship then " in the port of Amsterdam . . . should, with all possible despatch, proceed to Newport, in Monmouthshire;" and there: take in cargo. At-the date of the contract the ship was not at Amsterdam, but at another place sixty-two miles distant from there. Being detained by contrary winds, she did not reach Amsterdam until the 23d of October. She discharged her cargo as speedily as possible, and proceeded direct to Newport, where she arrived on the 1st of December. The defendant refused to load her. ' The plaintiff sued for damages, and the defendant pleaded that the ship was not at Amsterdam at the time of the making of the contract. The Queen's Bench ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and he recovered. The defendant took the case, by a writ of error, to the Court of Exchequer, and that court reversed the judgment of the Queen's Bench. The opinion of the reversing court is characterized by force and clearness, and the leading authorities on the subject are examined. The court say: "We feel a difficulty in acceding to the suggestion that appears to have been, to some extent, sanctioned by high authority (see Dimech v. Corlett), that a statement of this kind in a charter-party, which may be regarded as a mere representation, if the object of the charter-party be still practicable, may be construed as a warranty, if that object turns out to be frustrated, because the instrument, it should seem, ought to be construed with reference to the intention of the parties at the time it was madcy irrespective of the events which may afterwards occur." Referring to Freeman v. Taylor, Tarrabochia v. Hickie, and Dimech v. Corlett, they say: "But the court did not, we apprehend, intend to say that the frustration of the voyage would convert a stipulation into a condition, if it were not originally intended to be one." They evidently felt embarrassed by the prior adjudications, which take a different view of the subject, and an effort is made to reconcile them with the decision they were- about to pronounce. Here we have no such embarrassment, and we think we shall settle wisely the important principles of commercial law involved in this controversy by following the case of Behn v. Burness.
Upon reason, principle, and authority, we are of opinion that the stipulation before us is a condition precedent, and not a mere representation, nor an independent covenant, and that it goes to the entire root of the contract.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion.
Seegur v. Duthie, 8 Common Bench, N. S., 63.
Crookewit v. Fletcher, 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 912.
10 East, 295.
Stavers v. Curling, 3 Bingham's New Cases, 355
Simpson v. Henderson et al., 1 Moody & Malkin (22 English Common. Law), 313; Hasbrook v. Paddock, 1 Barbour S. C. 635; French v. Carhart, 1 Comstock, 105.