Case: BOARD OF FIELD OFFICERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA TROOPS v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Board of Field Officers of South Carolina Troops v. United States
Decision Date: 1885-01-12
Docket Number: No. 12637
Citation: 20 Ct. Cl. 18
Volume: 20
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: BOARD OF FIELD OFFICERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA TROOPS v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: Drake, Ch. J., was not present at the trial and took no part in the decision.
Pages: 18–22

Head Matter:
BOARD OF FIELD OFFICERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA TROOPS v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 12637.
Decided January 12, 1885.]
On the Proofs.
The claimant is a corporation created for military purposes in 1809. Build- ’ ings owned by it are occupied by tbe Confederate government in carrying on tbe war. Consent is neither asked nor given. The claimant’s officers take partin the rebellion in their individual capacity. In 1865 and 1867 the United States occupy the premises.
I.If a body corporate did nothing in its corporate capacity to aid the-rebellion, it cannot be charged under Rev. Stat., § § 1072,1073, with-the offense of its officers in their individual capacity.
II.Where the government surrendered property in 1865 and reoccupied it in 1867, for a time paying rent, the relation of landlord and tenant was thereby established.
III.Where no time is fixed for the payment of rent, it must be deemed to-be payable as it accrues.
The Reporters’ statement of the case:
The following are the facts found by the court:
I. The Board of Field Officers of the Fourth Brigade of South Carolina Militia was a perpetual corporation created by the State of South Carolina in 1809. The said corporation was vested with power to purchase and hold land not exceeding 300 acres for the use of the militia in the parishes of Saint Philip and Saint Michael’s. On the 25th May, 1835, the said corporation became the owner by purchase of a parcel of lan d, with the building thereon, on Citadel Green, in the city of Charleston, known as the Picquet Guard-House, and on the 1st August, 1856, of another parcel of land, with a building thereon known as the Boylston House, in the city of Charleston.
II. When the rebellion broke out the Confederate forces took possession of the premises and continued their occupancy for war purposes -until they evacuated Chs rleston in February,. 1865. The United States troops then took possession of the premises and turned them over to the Bureau of Refugees, Ereedmen, and Abandoned Lands. In October, 1865, that. bureau surrendered them to the city of Charleston, and Charleston, in turn, delivered them to the claimant. Whether the officers of the claimant consented to the occupancy of the premises by the Confederate forces does not appear. They were themselves actively engaged in the rebellion.
III. August 20, 1867, the United States forces again took possession of the Picquet G-uard-Honse and of the Boylston House, and occupied the former until November 1,1874, and the latter until April 1, 1879. For this occupancy the United States paid rent to the city of Charleston until July 1,1868 — for the Picquet G-uard-House at the rate of $50 a month, and for the Boylston House at the rate of $92 a month. Since July 1,1868, no rent has been paid to the claimant and no express lease appears to have been made. The rate of rent paid prior to July 1, 1868, would be a reasonable compensation for the use of the buildings subsequent to that date.
IV. On the 8th June, 1877, the Board of Field Officers of the Fourth Brigade of South Carolina Volunteer State Troops was created a corporation by the State of South Carolina, and vested with the rights, franchises, and property of the Board of Field Officers of the Fourth Brigade.
Mr. James Lowndes for the claimant:
1. If the court finds the permissive use and occupation, the claimant is plainly entitled to recover.
Whatever may have been the character of the entry on the land by the defendant in August,-1867, the character of the possession became permissive when, in December, 1868, the United States paid rent for it.
In Provine's Case (5 O. Ols. B., 455) it was held that payment of rent converted a possession “jure belli” into a possession under contract even in time of war. In the present case the original possession was not “jure belli,” and the payment of rent was made after the war.
2, If the possession of the United States had not been permissive, still the claimant is entitled to recover.
It is the settled doctrine of this court that when the United States takes the property of an individual for public use, it is under an obligation to make compensation, and that this court bas jurisdiction of a suit to recover it. {Johnson's Case, 2 G. Ols. lb, 391; Langford v. U. S., 101 U. S., 341.)
If the United States held under a claim of right, it might be that this court would not have jurisdiction. But under the decision in the Arlington case that right could have beeu contested in another tribunal.
3. The statute of limitations does not apply. The implied contract to pay for the use and occupation is in effect a contract either to pay on demand or at the termination of the occupation. In either view the claimant is entitled to recover for the whole period.
Mr. John 8. Blair (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
1. There is no express lease in this case, nor is there any implied contract. The case in no respect differs from Bishop & Westeott (4 C. Ols. R., 448) and Dykes (16 C. Cls. R., 289).
2. The claimant gave very substantial aid and comfort to the rebellion, and therefore can have no status in this court. (§ § 1072, 1073, Rev. Stat.; Regina v. Great North of England II. 'W., 9 Q. B., 315; United States v. Insurance Companies, 22 Wall., 104; Young v. The United States, 97 U. S., 39.)
3. Section 1069, Rev. Stat., limits any recovery to compensation for occupation since July 21, 1874.

Opinion:
Scofield, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The claimant is a corporation created for military purposes by the State of South Carolina in 1809. In 1857 the corporation became the owner of a certain piece of land in Charleston on which were two buildings, one known as the Piccjuet GuardHouse and the other as the Boylston House.
During the rebellion the premises were occupied by the Confederate government to aid in carrying on the war. So far as appears, consent to such occupancy was neither asked of nor given by the corporation.
In February, 1865, the United States forces took possession of the premises and turned them over to the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.
In October following the premises were turned over to the city of Charleston, and subsequently 'by that city turned over to the claimant.
August 20, 1867, the United States again took possession, without objection on the part of the claimant. From this date to July 1,1868, the defendants paid rent to the city of Charleston for the Picquet Guard-House at the rate of $50 a month, and for the Boylston House at the rate of $92 a month. No rent was paid after that date, for what reason does not appear.
The United States continued the occupancy of the Picquet Guard-House until November 1, 1874, and of the Boylston House until April 1,1879, at which dates they were respectively surrendered to the claimant.
The defendants contend that under sections 1072 and 1073 of the Revised Statutes the claim cannot be considered in this court.
Those sections provide that the petition of any claimant who voluntarily aided, abetted, or encouraged the rebellion shall be dismissed. Since the President's proclamation of pardon and amnesty, promulgated December 25, 1868 (15 Stat., 711), and the effect given to it by the Supreme Court, the loyalty of citizen claimants under those sections has not been a subject of inquiry in this court. (Klein's Case, 13 Wall., 128, 7 C. Cls. R., 240; Armstrong's Case, 13 Wall., 154, 7 C. Cls. R., 280; Carlisle & Henderson v. The United States, 16 Wall., 147, 8 C. Cls. R., 153; United States v Insurance Co., 22 Wall., 99.)
Now, it is argued that a corporation having abstractly no moral qualities, assistance rendered by it to the rebellion involves no turpitude, and being incapable of committing treason, derives no benefit from the general amnesty. The claimant's officers took part in the rebellion in their individual, not in their corporate, capacity. As officers of the coporation they were guilty of no offense, unless non-action is an offense. They did nothing, to be sure, to protect the property of the corporation from Confederate occupancy, but it is quite certain that all efforts in that direction would have been futile.
These officers have been pardoned. Oblivion is thrown over all their disloyal acts. It is as if such acts had never been committed. (Knote's Case, 10 C. Cls. R., 407; Armstrong's Case, 13 Wall., 154.) Since these acts cannot be invoked against the person who committed them, can they be invoked against a corporation of which they were the officers? If the corpora tion is to be charged with the offense of its officers, should it not be credited with their pardons ? The sin óf the officers works a legal effect in the corporation. The sin is pardoned, but the effect, say the defendants, is not. The sinners can come to this court, but the corporation, sinless, because devoid of moral qualities, cannot. We tibiuk the position involves a question in ethics too subtile for practical adjudication.
It is claimed that the facts disclose no contract, either expressed or implied, upon which to base an action in this court.
The defendants certainly had the use and occupation of the premises. The surrender of them in October, 1865, terminated the military occupancy. In resuming the occupancy in August, 1867, they set up no claim of right. By paying rent for the first year they acknowledged the relation of landlord and tenant. It does not appear that the relation thus begun was subsequently changed. The rent was not paid, but the right of the claimant to demand it was not denied. In these facts a contract to pay a reasonable rent is implied.
We agree to the position taken by defendants' counsel that so'much of the claim as originated prior to July 21,1874, is cut off by the statute of limitations (B. S., 1069). As no time was fixed for the payment of the rent it must be deemed to be payable as it accrued. The petition was not filed until July 21, 1880.
The defendants occupied the Picquet Guard-House until November 1, 1874, three months and ten days subsequent to July 21, 1874. The rent amounts, at $50 a month, to $166.12.
The Boy 1st on House was occupied subsequent to July 21, 1874, for four years eight months and ten days, to April 1,1879. The rent, at the rate of $92 a month, amounts to $5,181.67. The two items of rent amount to $5,347.79.
Judgment will be entered for that sum.
Drake, Ch. J., was not present at the trial and took no part in the decision.