Case: HUBERT D. PAGE AND DAVID B. BRINTON, PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE OF PAGE & BRINTON v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Page v. United States
Decision Date: 1921-04-04
Docket Number: No. 32484
Citation: 56 Ct. Cl. 176
Volume: 56
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: HUBERT D. PAGE AND DAVID B. BRINTON, PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE OF PAGE & BRINTON v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: Campbell, Chief Justice,.concurs.
Pages: 176–218

Head Matter:
HUBERT D. PAGE AND DAVID B. BRINTON, PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE OF PAGE & BRINTON v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 32484.
Decided April 4, 1921.]
On the Proofs.
Contract; changes in location; changes in quantities and character of materials. — In a contract ior the construction of part of an irrigation canal there are three provisions: (1) that “the Quantities given in the proposal are for the purpose of comparing bids and are approximate only, and no claim shall be made against the United States on account of any excess or deficiency, absolute or relative ”; (2) that “ the right to make material changes in the quantities listed in the proposal is an essential part of the contract, and bidders must make their estimates accordingly” ; and (3) that “ the Secretary of the Interior reserves the right to make such changes in the specifications of work or material at any time as may be deemed advisable, without notice to the surety or sureties on the bond given to secure compliance with the contract, by adding thereto or deducting therefrom, at the unit prices of the contract, or at such allowances for changes of materials as shall be deemed just and reasonable by the engineer, whose decision shall be binding on both parties.” After the •contract for the work has been let at a unit price, the location of the canal, as shown by the plans, is changed, and one of the contractors is aware of the change, but makes no complaint concerning the same during the progress of the work. The grades of the canal are also changed from those in the original plans. The work as performed showed a great increase in the quantity and difference in. the character of the materials excavated from those shown in the estimates exhibited to bidders. The contractors make no claim for the extra work in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the contract. Held, that the contractors are not entitled to recover compensation for the work caused by such changes.
Same; classification of material. — The contract provides that “ upon all questions concerning the execution of the work the classification of the material in accordance with the specifications and the determining of costs, the decision of the chief engineer shall be binding on both parties.” Upon the complaint of the contractors, the Secretary of the Interior appoints a board of engineers to reclassify the materials excavated, and the findings of the board are affirmed by the chief engineer. Held, that there being no satisfactory evidence of fraud or mistake so gross as to amount to fraud,, the decision of the chief engineer is conclusive and is not subject to review by the court.
Same; breach by Government. — Where the Government orders water turned into a canal before the extension of time allowed the contractors has expired, and keeps it in said canal for six months, thereby preventing the contractors from completing the work, it is a breach of the contract, and the contractors are entitled to recover compensation for damages resulting therefrom.
Same; suspension by mistake. — Where a contract is suspended by mistake and the work is taken over and completed by the Government, the contractors are entitled to recover compensation for damages resulting from such suspension.
Graham, Judge, dissenting.
The Reporter’s statement of the case:
Mr. G. G. Gedhoun for the plaintiffs. Messrs. David B. Hendersonj J. Barrett Garter, and J. G. Broolce were on the briefs.
Mr. Horace 8. Whitman, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Franh Davis, Jr., for the defendant.
The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
I. On May 19, 1906, the plaintiffs, Hubert D. Page and D. B. Brinton, citizens of the United States, jointly entered into a contract in writing with the defendant whereby they agreed to construct and complete schedules 2 and 3 of the Payette-Boise Canal project, in the State of Idaho, pursuant to plans and specifications submitted by defendant with the advertisement for sealed bids, according to the provisions-of the act of June 17,1902, 32 Stat., 388. A copy of said contract together with copies of the advertisement and specifications are filed with the plaintiffs’ petition and by reference are made a part of this finding. The plaintiffs thereafter immediately began work.
II. Prior to May 19, 1906, the plaintiffs entered into a contract in writing with each other whereby it was agreed that if as a firm they should be the successful bidders, and the contract for the work on the Payette-Boise Canal should be awarded to them, they would become and remain equally liable for the faithful performance of the contract; that Brinton for his full share of compensation therefrom should receive the sum pf $6,000; that Page should provide the necessary, capital, plant, equipment and labor for performing the work and have exclusive charge thereof, should control and attend to all business transactions with the Government relating thereto, and receive as his share of compensation whatever profit might be realized from the contract less the sum of $6,000 aforesaid, which agreement, including the payment of $6,000 to Brinton, was fully carried into effect.
III. In a general way the contract and specifications and the maps, plans, drawings, and profiles furnished to bidders by tbe defendant set forth the termini, location, dimensions, and proportions of the canal to be constructed.
IV. The total amount of material to be excavated on schedules 2 and 3 was shown in the estimates furnished plaintiffs to be 583,000 cubic yards, classified as follows: Class 1,475,000 cubic yards; class 2, 80,000 cubic yards; class 3, 22,000 cubic yards; class 4, 6,000 cubic yards. The total quantity of material actually required to be moved and handled by the plaintiffs exceeded largely the total quantity of the estimates submitted to the bidders, and was 773,823 cubic yards, classified as follows: Class 1, material amounting to 470,401 cubic yards; class 2, to 119,791 cubic yards; class 3, to 23,156 cubic yards; and class 4, to 60,475 cubic yards.
V. There was a material change in the amount and kind of work required to be and actually performed by the plaintiffs from that shown on the contract, plans, drawings, profiles, and specifications.
Tliere was a reduction of 1.46 miles in the length of the two schedules, the plans and specifications stating that the length of the two schedules was about 13 miles, but as they were required to be constructed the length was about 11.77 miles; there was a reduction from that indicated on the maps and drawings in the average depth of the material excavated from the prism of the canal of 1.76 feet on schedule 3 and 0.53 of a foot on schedule 2.
The final location of the canal differed from that shown on the maps and profiles. The plaintiffs knew of this final location when it was made, and knew that it differed from that indicated on the maps and drawings. They made no complaints as to the location when made and none during the progress of the work.
There was about 70 per cent more material moved by the plaintiffs than the proposal indicated, and the change of location necessitated more overhaul than was indicated by the plans and specifications. From the profile drawings it was indicated that there would be about 21,248 cubic yards of overhaul. There was actually handled by the plaintiffs 497,688 cubic yards of overhaul. More material was moved by the plaintiffs within the free-haul limit than was indi cated by the original specifications, profiles, etc. The plaintiffs were granted an extension of time of 121 days because of the excess amount of excavation and overhaul, and were paid the contract price for such excess overhaul.
VI. The several kinds of material required to be excavated by plaintiffs in the excavation of the work consisted of soil, sand, gravel, limestone, indurated material, cemented gravel, loose lava bowlders, lava rock bowlders cemented together, and solid lava rock. The limestone' strata varied in thickness and in number at different points along the line of the canal, and were invariably found above the indurated material. According to the specifications the material to be excavated was divided into four classes: Class 1, material as described in paragraph 42 of the specifications, was to be paid for at 15 cents per cubic yard; class 2, at 50 cents per cubic yard; class 3, at 80 cents per cubic yard; and class 4, at $1.40 per cubic yard.
J. B. Bond, a United States engineer, was in charge of the classification of materials for the first three months of the performance of the contract. His classification of materials was satisfactory to the plaintiffs. He was succeeded in this work by Engineer C. C. Fisher. His classification of material was objected to by the plaintiffs from almost the beginning of his work, and plaintiffs protested to the chief engineer, and finally protested to the Secretary of the Interior. Thereupon the Secretary of the Interior appointed a board of engineers to prescribe rules for the classification of material, which rules were to be observed by the engineer making the classification. The board consisted of three engineers not connected with the work. After a careful examination of the site of the work and the consideration of the complaints of the plaintiffs, and after making tests of the materials at the locations where it was claimed erroneous classification had been made, the board recommended rules for the classification of materials found. The board neither affirmed nor disapproved of the classification made before their appointment. These rules were approved by the chief engineer of the Beclamation Service. A reclassification from original notes and from examination of the banks of the-canal was ordered and carried out in accordance with the recommendation of the board. This reclassification was made by Fisher, the assistant engineer, by Edward Hedden, and by Gilbert, an assistant engineer, and by Bond, who had been oh the work at the beginning of the contract. Gilbert had been placed on the work to assist Fisher.
The plaintiffs complained that Fisher ignored the recommendations of the board and continued to classify the material in the same manner as he had done before the board was convened, and they protested orally and in writing to the defendant’s engineer in charge against the continuance of Fisher on the work. The defendant refused to remove Fisher. The plaintiffs in January, 1908, employed an engineer to examine and revise the classification of materials in accordance with the findings of the defendant’s board of engineers. The engineer so employed was on the work for three months, and after being on it that length of time the plaintiffs employed three other engineers to go over the work and determine how the materials should be classified, and requested that there should be a conference between the engineers of the plaintiff and a board of Government engineers in order that a joint examination might be made. The defendant thereupon appointed W. H. Sanders to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ engineers. Sanders had been a member of the defendant’s board which had prescribed the rules for the classification of the material to be excavated.
When the joint examination was made there was a foot of water in the canal. The joint examination lasted about two and one-half hours. Sanders, during this examination, differed with the plaintiffs’ engineers, declining to discuss the matter with them, and stating that he knew what the material was and how it ought to be classified. He after-wards submitted a report to the Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service, in which he sustained the classification made by the board of engineers of the defendant.
Some months after the work had been completed the plaintiffs employed two engineers to make an examination of the classification of materials made by the Government engineers, and also that made by the engineers of the plaintiffs. These engineers spent about a month on this work, and submitted a report to the plaintiffs showing what, in their opinion, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive as a result of their classification of materials. Under their estimate the plaintiffs were entitled to receive on both schedules the sum of $312,588.12. The plaintiffs réceived from defendant the sum of $248,261.07, leaving a balance due according to the estimates of the .plaintiffs’ engineers of $64,-322.08.
The complaints and protests of the plaintiffs as to erroneous classification of material by Fisher, who was not a graduate engineer, and as to his bad faith were investigated from time to time during the progress of the work by Edward Hedden and F. C. Horn, who succeeded him as project engineer; by D. W. Ross, supervising engineer in charge of the project; by W. H. Sanders, engineer sent to .the project to review the classification; and by A. P. Davis, Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service. All of these engineers approved the reclassification and the classification made by Fisher subsequent to the report by the board of engineers referred to above. The plaintiffs’ claim for classification of material was rejected by the chief engineer whose decision was made binding on both parties by the provisions of the contract.
VII. By order of the supervising engineer, Ross, Fisher, the assistant engineer, refused to furnish the plaintiffs with his field and cross-section notes according to which the work was required to be performed, and from which the number of yards of the respective classes of materials allowed at the different stations and substations could have been ascertained. • The board of engineers appointed by the Secretary of the Interior in April, 1907, directed that the cross-section notes be furnished the plaintiffs, and they were furnished the plaintiffs from that time as long as the plaintiffs were on the work.
VIII. The defendant withheld from the plaintiffs the sum of $5,247.42, which amounted to 3£ per cent of the total amount earned up to January 14, 1908. This amount was held out because the plaintiffs did not finish the work as they progressed with the contract. This amount was released to the contractor in June, 1908.
IX. The Government was under contract with the New York Canal Co. to secure the passage of the water for irrigation purposes during the irrigating season. To this contract these contractors were not parties. During the years 1906 and 1907 while the work under the contract progressed water was run through the New York Canal. The work being done by the plaintiff in the spring of 1908 was on the New York Canal, and if water was to be run for irrigating purposes it was necessary that certain work should be completed before April 15,1908, the beginning of the irrigation season. The plaintiffs were notified that the water must be run in the Government canal during the irrigating season of 1908. On April 14, 1908, the defendants placed a force on the work for the purpose of expediting the work so as to open the channel by April 15, and on April 18, 1908, the defendant turned the water into the canal. For the forces employed for this purpose the plaintiffs were charged by the defendant with the sum of $2,266.10, which sum was deducted by the defendant from the plaintiffs’ compensation.
At the time the water was turned into the canal the plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of time which gave them until June 30, 1908, to complete the work. The work of excavation would have been completed in a few days had the water not been turned in. By turning the water into the canal the defendant made it impossible for the plaintiffs to continue the work. The water remained in the canal for six months thereafter, during which time no work could be done. The extension of time granted the plaintiffs was of no use to them, as by the action of the defendant they could not utilize it.
X. After the contract was completed the Secretary of the Interior stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of time of 120 days from June 20, 1908, which would have given them until October 28, 1908, in which to complete the work; and the Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service on June 3,1909, stated that the United States caused the delay in the completion of the work by turning the water into the canal in April, 1908.
On October 5, 1908, while the water was still in the canal, the plaintiffs were notified in writing to put on the work a specified force within five days or steps to suspend the contract. At the time this notice was given, the work was 97^ per cent completed. At the time this notice wa;s served Page, the active partner, was absent and did not receive the notice until October 10, when he immediately took steps to assemble his force and to get ready his plant to go to work as soon as the water was turned out of the canal, which was not done until October 18. Some work was done by the plaintiffs from October 13 to October 27, and they were at work when on October 29, 1908, the Acting Secretary of the Interior suspended the contract and took over the work and the plant of the plaintiffs. The information upon which the Acting Secretary acted when he suspended the contract was given by officers in the field, and the information so given was not accurate and did not give to the Acting Secretary the facts as they were. The canal was not in condition to permit the resumption of work. Had the plaintiffs been allowed to complete the work they would have finished it within two months, which would have been within the time to which they were entitled, and of which they were deprived by the action of the defendant in turning the water into the canal on April 18, 1908.
■XI. The plaintiff Page during the period the water was' running in the canal was compelled to remain idle for 150 days. A reasonable compensation for this loss of time by the plaintiffs was at the fate of $20 per day, or the sum of $3,000.
The rental value of the plaintiffs’ plant during the period it was compelled to remain idle by the action of the defendant was $138.20 per day or $3,593.20 per month of 26 days, or $21,559.20.
The cost of maintaining the plant during the time it was idle was the sum of $4,200.
The appraised value of the plaintiffs’ plant when it was taken over by the defendant on the suspension of the contract on October 29, 1908, was $17,117.07, and the appraised value when it was returned on January 14, 1909, was $14,-974.23, a depreciation of $2,142.84.
The plant of the contractor was seized by the defendant on October 29, 1908, and remained in its possession for two and one-half months. Its rental value during that time was the sum of $8,983.
XII. The cost of completing the work to the Government after it suspended the contract and took over the work was the sum of $11,553.21. Had the plaintiffs been allowed to do the work they could have completed it for the sum of $6,-752.36, which leaves an excess charge against the plaintiffs of $4,800.85. There was charged against the plaintiffs by the Government $7,677.79, which included the cost of extra equipment which the Government owned. There was, therefore an overcharge against the plaintiffs of $3,276.94.

Opinion:
Hat, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a suit brought by the plaintiffs against the United States for the sum of $325,931.97.
On May 19, 1906, the plaintiffs entered into a contract in writing with E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary of the Interior, .acting in behalf of the United States, which contract was made in pursuance and by virtue of the act of Congress approved June 17, 1902, and known as the reclamation act. The plaintiffs in said contract undertook to construct and complete the work provided for in Schedules Nos. 2 and 3 of main canal, Payette Boise project, Idaho, in accordance with the terms of the advertisement, proposal, and specifications attached to the contract, and made a part of the same. For this work the plaintiffs wei'e to be paid as provided in the specifications.
It was provided that the work should be commenced within thirty days after the contract was signed by the Secretary of the Interior, and that the same should be completed by March 1, 1908. The work was not completed by the plaintiffs, and on October 27, 1908, the contract was annulled.
In a general way the contract and specifications and the maps, plans, drawings, and profiles furnished to bidders by the defendant set forth the termini, location, dimensions, and proportions of the canal to be constructed. The specifications (par. 12) provided: "Bidders must satisfy themselves as to the nature of the material and as to all local conditions affecting the work, and no information derived from the maps, plans, specifications, profiles, or drawings, or from the engineer or his assistants; will in any way relieve the contractor from any risks or from fulfilling all the terms of his contract. No bid on work depending on local conditions will be considered unless the bidder, his representative, or his engineer has visited the work and made himself familiar with the conditions." The plaintiffs complain that there was a change in the final location of the canal, and that this final location differed from that shown on the maps and profiles. It is true that the location was different, but it is shown by the evidence that the plaintiffs knew of this final location when it was made, knew that it differed from that indioated on the maps and drawings, but they made no complaints as to the location when made and none during the progress of the work.
The total amount of material to be excavated on schedules 2 and 3 was shown in the estimates furnished plaintiffs to be 583,000 cubic yards, classified as follows: Class 1, 475,000 cubic yards; class 2, 80,000 cubic yards; class 3, 22,000 cubic yards-; class 4,. 6,000 cubic yards. The total quantity of material actually required to be moved by the plaintiffs exceeded largely the total quantity of the estimates submitted to bidders, and was 773,823 cubic yards, classified as follows: Class 1, 470,401 cubic yards; class 2, 119,791 cubic yards; class 3, 23,156 cubic yards; class 4, 60,475 cubic yards. For moving and hauling this material the plaintiffs Avere paid in accordance with the terms of the contract, and under the terms of the contract can not base a claim against the defendant, by reason of the fact that the estimates of quantity of material submitted to bidders differed largely from the quantity of material which they were required to recover and handle. The contract in this connection is as follows: " The quantities given in the proposal are for the purpose of comparing bids, and are approximate only, and no claim shall be made against the United States on account of any excess or deficiency, absolute or relative, in the same " (par. 24). It may be well to state here that the Secretary of the Interior extended the time of the contractors, when they asked for it, basing his action upon the fact that the amount of material to be removed was more than had been estimated for, and that there was a change in the amount and kind of work actually required of the plaintiffs and that showed in the estimates. But this did not give to the plaintiffs any right upon which to base a claim against the defendant, especially as the contract further provided: " The right to make material changes in the quantities listed in the proposal is an essential part of the contract, and bidders must make their estimates accordingly" (par. 25).
There was a material change in the amount and kind of work required to be and actually performed by the plaintiffs from that shown on the plans, drawings, profiles, and specifications. There was a reduction of 1.23 miles in the length of the two schedules, the plans, etc., stating that the length of the two schedules was about 13 miles, but as they were, required to be constructed the length was 11.77 miles; there was also a reduction from that indicated on the maps and drawings in the average depth of the material excavated from the prism of the canal of 1.76 feet on schedule 3, and 0.53 foot on schedule 2. But the contract provided: " The Secretary of the Interior reserves the right to make such changes in the specifications of work or material at any time as may be deemed advisable, without notice to the surety or sureties on the bond given to secure compliance with the contract, by adding thereto or deducting therefrom, at the unit prices of the contract, or at such allowances for changes of materials as shall be deemed just and reasonable by the engineer, whose decision shall be binding on both parties " (par. 25).
The plaintiffs complain that they were greatly damaged by reason of the large increase of overhaul made necessary by the change of location, and they undertake to show what that damage was in dollars and cents. But there is no evidence as to this, which can be relied upon. At most, it could only be claimed for as extra work, and this was not done at the time, nor were the terms of the contract complied with which set out specifically what steps the contractor was to take in the event he claimed for extra work. It is true that the change of location did necessitate more overhaul than was indicated by the plans and specifications, but the paragraphs of the specifications above quoted provided for this, and the plaintiffs can not now maintain a claim for doing work for which they were paid the unit prices of the contract.
The plaintiffs lay great stress upon what they allege to be erroneous classification of material made by the Government engineers. They allege that by reason of this erroneous classification they have been damaged in the sum of some $64,000. The several kinds of material required to be excavated by the plaintiffs consisted of soil, sand, gravel, limestone, indu-rated material, cemented gravel, loose lava bowlders, lava rocks cemented together, and solid lava rock. According to the specifications the material to be excavated was divided into four classes. Class 1 was to be paid for at 15 cents per cubic yard; class 2, at 50 cents per cubic yard; class 3, at 80 cents; and class 4, at $1.40 per cubic yard (par. 42). Engineer C. C. Fisher did most of the work, and his classification was objected to by the plaintiffs from the beginning of the work. The plaintiffs made protest to the chief engineer, and finally to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary appointed a board of engineers to prescribe rules for the classification of material. The board consisted of three engineers connected with the work. This board recommended rules for the classification of materials. These rules were approved by the Chief Engineer of the Eeclamation Service. A reclassification of the material already classified was ordered and carried out in accordance with the recommendation of the board. This work was done by Fisher, by Edward Hedden, by Gilbert, an assistant engineer, and by Bond, an engineer who had been on the work at the beginning of the contract.
During the entire progress of the work complaints were made by the plaintiffs that the classification of the Government engineer was erroneous. These complaints were investigated from time to time by Edward Hedden and F. C. Horn, who succeeded him as project engineer; by D. W. Eoss, supervising engineer in charge of the project; by W. H. Sanders, engineer sent to the work to review the classification; and by A. P. Davis, Chief Engineer of the Eeclamation Service. The plaintiffs' claim for classification of material was rejected by the chief engineer, and the classification made by Fisher, as well as the reclassification made by him, was approved by all of the engineers. And the chief engineer of the Reclamation finally rejected all claims of the plaintiffs as to classification and reclassification, including the claim made some months after the work had been completed, this last claim having been based upon a report of two engineers employed by the plaintiffs. These engineers submitted a report to the plaintiffs showing what, in their opinion, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive. The amount which they were entitled to receive, according to the opinion of these engineers, was the sum of $312,583.12. According to the estimate made by the Government engineers, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive and did receive the sum of $248.261.07. Paragraph 8 of the specifications provided: " Upon all questions concerning the execution of the work, the classification of the material in accordance with the specifications, and the determination of costs, the decision of the chief engineer shall be binding on both parties." This provision of the contract is identical with the provision of the contract passed upon by this court in the case of Brinck v. United States, 53 C. C. 170, 176. In that case the court reviewed the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the decisions of this court and said: "Where there is a provision in a contract making the decision of an engineer officer or other officer final as to quality and quantity, distance to be ascertained, classification of material, or any other subject matter in the contract which may be matter of dispute and which may arise during the execution of the work, the decision of the engineer or other officer will be treated as final by the courts, and will not be subject to review by them in the absence of fraud or such gross error as implies bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment in the premises." In this case a provision of the contract was that the decision of the chief engineer as to the classification of the material should be final. It is hardly credible that six Government engineers, including the Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service, should have united »to defraud the plaintiffs, or that they all should have been guilty of bad faith, nor does the evidence tend to show that such was the case. This court, therefore, will not undertake to go back of the judgment of the engineer and to revise his action by substituting its own views in place of his.
Another claim, insisted upon by the plaintiffs was that they were greatly damaged by the turning of water into the canal for irrigation purposes, and that they were erroneously charged with the expense of getting the canal ready for that purpose, the Government having added its own forces to those of the plaintiffs for that purpose. The facts were that the Government was under contract with the New York Canal Co. to secure the passage of the water for irrigation purposes during the irrigating season. The plaintiffs were not parties to this contract and were in no way bound by its terms. The work being done by the plaintiffs in the spring of 1908 was on the New York canal, and if water was to be run for irrigating purposes during the irrigating season of 1908 it was necessary that certain work should be completed before April 15,1908, the beginning of the irrigation season, and the Government notified the plaintiffs that water must be run in the Government canal during the irrigation season of 1908. But the plaintiffs were not bound by their contract to complete the work for this purpose, more especially as their time to complete the contract was extended to June 30, 1908. The Government made the contract with the New York Canal Co. and took upon itself the obligation of supplying water for irrigation purposes, and it could not transfer that obligation to the plaintiffs. It is true that specification 52 attached to and made a part of the contract provided : " When necessary in the prosecution of the work to interrupt or obstruct the natural drainage of the surface or the flow of artificial drains or irrigation ditches, the contractor shall provide for the same during the progress of the work in such a way that no damage will result to either public or private interests. He shall be held liable for all damages that may result from failure to provide therefor during the progress of the work." But this specification does not apply to the work of excavation necessary to complete the work, nor does it appear that any damage would have resulted to either public or private interests had the plaintiffs been allowed to complete the excavation work, which it would have taken them only a few days to finish. If there is any doubt as to the construction of the specification above quoted that doubt must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, as both the Secretary of the Interior and the Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service, when this case was pending before the Auditor of the Interior Department for settlement, decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of time of 120 days by reason of the action of the Government in turning the water into the canal, which, in effect, is to say that the Government acted wrongfully in so doing. By the provisions of the contract the opinion of the chief engineer, approved by the Secretary of the Interior, is to govern both parties in determining extensions of time. However, the Government insisted upon turning the water into the canal, and on April 14, 1908, placed a force on the work for the purpose of expediting it so as to open the channel by April 15. For the forces employed for this purpose the plaintiffs were charged by the defendant with the sum of $2,266.10, which sum was deducted from the plaintiffs' compensation. This amount we think the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. The work was done by the Government in its own interests and for the purpose of carrying out a contract with which the plaintiffs had nothing to do, and they can not be required to pay for it.
The water was turned into the canal by the Government, and on April 18, 1908, the plaintiffs were compelled thereby to cease work. At the time' the water was turned into the canal the plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of time which gave them until June 80, 1908, to complete the work. By turning the water into the canal the defendant made it impossible for the plaintiffs to continue the work, and as the water remained in the canal for six months no work •during that time could be done. The defendant by its action breached the contract, and the extension of time granted the plaintiffs was of no use to them and was rendered of no use to them by the action of the defendant. We think the plaintiffs are entitled to any damages which they suffered by reason of this action of the defendant, and those damages are set out in Finding XI.
On October 5, 1908, before the water was out of the canal the plaintiffs were notified in writing by one of the Govern ment engineers to put on the work a specified force within five days or steps would be taken to suspend the contract. At the time this notice was given the work was 97-J per cent completed, and by the action of the Government the plaintiffs had been prevented from doing any work on the canal since April 18, 1908, and had been unable to utilize the time to which they were admittedly entitled. At the time this, notice was served Page, the active partner, was absent, and did not receive the notice until October 10, when he immediately took steps to assemble his force to get ready his plant, and to go to work as soon as the water was turned out. of the canal, which was not done until October 18. The plaintiffs were at work on the canal when on October 29 the Acting Secretary of the Interior suspended the contract and took over the work and the plant of the plaintiffs. The. information upon which the Acting Secretary acted was given by officers in the field, was not accurate,' and did not give the facts as they actually existed. When this notice was given the canal was in no condition to permit the resumption of work; the plaintiffs w;ere really entitled to at. least the time they had lost by reason of the action of the. defendant from April 18 to June 30, 1908. For six months the defendant had prevented the plaintiffs from doing any work, and the contract was suspended upon a statement of facts which is not sustained by the record, and no effort was made by the Acting Secretary to acquaint himself with the true facts in the case. We are of opinion that the contract, was not suspended in accordance with the terms of the contract and that the plaintiffs are entitled to any damages which they sustained by reason of such suspension. We are further of opinion that in this case the plaintiffs were delayed to their injury in the performance of their- contract by a breach of the contract by the defendant, and if the suspension of the contract was caused by that breach then the damages resulting therefrom must be responded to by the defendant. One party can not prevent the other from performing and then annul the contract because he has not performed. The damages incurred by the plaintiffs by reason of the suspension of the contract are set out in Finding XII, and these sums will be allowed.
Other items are claimed by plaintiffs, but they are not supported by the evidence adduced, or they are such as can not be allowed under the law of the contract.
For the foregoing reasons the court is of opinion that the •plaintiffs are entitled to recover under Findings IX, XI, and XII, the sum of $50,228.93. It is so ordered.
Campbell, Chief Justice,.concurs.