Case: LIVINGSTON & GILCHRIST v. THE MARYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
Abbreviation: Livingston & Gilchrist v. Maryland Insurance
Decision Date: 1813-03-15
Docket Number: 
Citation: 7 Cranch 506
Volume: 11
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: LIVINGSTON & GILCHRIST v. THE MARYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
Judges: Absent....Livingston, J. and Todd, J.
Pages: 506–548

Head Matter:
LIVINGSTON & GILCHRIST v. THE MARYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
Absent....Livingston, J. and Todd, J.
To cirtistitiito a representation (in make ing insurance) there should be an affirm a* tion or denial of some tact} “¿n"1 which" would plainly lead the mind IVciusionT ifbv the usage ^ured^ftbe necessaty fhat certain papers should be bn board, the com cealment of cannotaS3 the Plaintiff’s risht t0y0- ^
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of.Ma ryland, in an action of covenant upon a policy- of ins» ranee (against capture only) upon tlie cargo of the ship Herkimer, « from. Guayaquil, or her last port of departure in South America, to New-York,” “ warranted Jhneri.can property, proof of which to be required in the United States only,” « and warranted free from seizure for illicit trade.” The declaration was on a loss by capture.
In general, mounts to a ¡yaeh °^31_ A Spanish sub. ject -who came to the United ■ States in a of peace nníTercat'^ Britain, to aaya tracle between, this country a!u'the ?pj*SSdJJ1 Spanish «- confmuéíto" reside here ¡V,'df aay 0I‘. rerthe'tneai ing put of war Jjetween Great Spaw'Vw^be ponsideredas' toerehant^"though the |rade'couid be ried on bya" Spanish aubjeet only! •If the letter Submitted to |ers “orderi”' the'-insurance]! refer to anofeliwitfbfci fcre them, sontidned^iiiformation that the vessel hud traíít'pfoe* es’ tKe ml°" derwriters are Wnd tí> no-' and ufknow that the’vossei fte-íaí^ cessaiy etone" foake tiie yoyage 'legal. The usage of trade may bo eoi^aliboiHi* such usage'originated m a thegovcrn-°f íanme of the ^h£"miest¡o« vdiotborthe abandonment were made in due time, is not a question of-fact to be exclusively left to the jury, but to be. decided by them under the direction of the Court. No acts, justifiable by the usage of the trade, & done by the Plain** tiffs to avoid confiscation under the laws of Spain, can avoid the policy. If the Plaintiffs do any act. which increases the risk of capture- and detention according to the common practice of'the belligerent, it may avoid the policy. It is not necessary that the risk thus increased, should be the risk of rightiul capture according to the law of nations,
The case was stated as follows by Ma-rshaii, Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court:
i v» Julian Hernandez Baruso, a Spanish subject, haying obtained from the crown of Spain a license to import from Boston into the Spanish, provinces of Peru and Buenos Ayres, in Soutli America, in foreign vessels, a certain quantity of goods in the license mentioned, and to take bark the proceeds in produce on payment of half duties, came, to New York, in September, 1803, (Spain being then at peace with Great Britain,) for the purpose of carrying on trade under his said license. r JO
On the 24th of August, 1804, lie entered into a contract with a certain Anthony Carroll, for the transpontation of a certain quantity of goods to Lima, in Peru, under the said license. Carroll' died without carrying the contract into full effect. .
On the 25th of January, 1805, war having broke out. between Great Britain and Spain, B. Livingston, who had been bound as Carroll’s surety for the performancc of the contract* entered into a new contract with Baruso for the transportation of the same goods, 1 °
The preamble recites the license, and says, The Baruso has agreed with the said B. Livingston to make an adventure to Lima, on the conditions and stipulations following, to wit:
1. In consideration, &c. he agrees to the following partnership with tlie said B. L. in virtue of which he transfers to the said firm, all his powers, &c. (under the licensc) of sending an American vessel belonging to the saidL. or chartered, in winch vessel shall be embarked goods to the amount of 50,000 dollars, the funds and vessel to be furnished and advanced by said I- .
3. Baruso to obtain the necessary papers from the Spanish consul, and B. L. to pay the duties. Baruso answerable for detention or confiscation by the Spanish government or vessels on account of any defect of right to send under said license, &c.
3. L. agrees in four months to embark the goods ou a vessel to Lima, to proceed thither, and to return to the Unitqd States with a cargo.
4. L. to choose the supercargo and instruct him ; and as the adventure will appear on the face pf the papers to B, he- shali give the supercargo a power, and recognize him tbe master of the cargo, so that the consignees at Lima shall follow literally his orders, The consignees, who were partners qf B., to receive a commission.
6. The said L. and B. agree to divide equally, and Pa|ri an(* Part: a^cc’ the profits of the adventure. L. to haye commissions on sale, "
Optional in'L. to sell'in United States, or convey the return cargo io Europe. If he sells in the United Stales, 0* may take out, at the price of sales, as much as will be equal to his rights.
§■ If L. sends the cargo to Europe, lie is to choose suPercar&'°>- the consignees to be chosen jointly.
9. in case of loss B. to claim nothing, as his share *P the profits only accrues on the safe return of the vessel to the United States. Optional with L. to insure or B. not to be allowed for risk, if no insurance, .rnorf' than 15 per cent. No insurance to be. on the risks of the Spanish government.
12. It any loss accrues from causes not stipulated, B. t0 ,0Se °illy llis privilege. If loss on sale of return cargo, B. to sustain half,
_ Bivingstpn soon afterwards chartered the ship Her-timer for the voyage, and entered into a contract with ■ ^1C °*!!er -Plaintiff Gilchrist, one James Baxter, and Edward Griswold, for jointly carrying ou, with them, the said voyage. The cargo was purchased with their joint funds, and. was shipped to Lima, where, and at Guayaquil, a. return cargo was received, purchased with the proceeds of the original cargo.
On the 25th of March,. 1806, Mr. Gilchrist addressed to Alexander Webster & Co. at Baltimore, a letter containing an order for insurance.on the cargo of tlie ship Herkimer, from Guayaquil, or her last port of departure in South America, to New York, ¿gainst loss by capture only, warranted American property, and free from all loss on account of seizure for illicit or prohibited trade. It says, “ the owners are already in- “ sured against the dangers of t.he seas aiid all other “ risks, except that of capture.” “ You have already “ bad a description of the ship from Messrs. Church “ and Demmiil, the agent of Mr, .Jackson, and which “ I presume is correct.” “ I think proper to mention ‘“thatthe insurance wilt be on account of MtvBrock- “ hoist Livingston and myself. Mr. Baxter and Mr. “ Griswold arc also concerned, but the first gentleman “ thinks there is so little danger of capture, that in his “ letter from Lima he expressly directs no insurance to “ he made for him against this risk, and Mr. Griswold “ is not here, to. consult. Both these gentlemen, as well “ as those for whom you are desired to make insurance, “ are native Americans.”
The letter of Church and Demmiil was dated 13th Feb. 1806, and after describing the ship, adds, «she “ sailed from Boston the 12th of May last for Lima, “ with liberty to go to one other port in South America, “ not west of Guayaquil, and from thénce to New York. « She has permission to trade there”
This letter was laid before the board of directors, and the application atthattime rejected.
The letter from Gilchrist to Webster’and Co. was afterwards laid before the board, and the company made the insurance for the Plaintiffs at 10 per cent.
The Herkimer, on her return voyage, was captured near the port of New York, by the Leander, a British ship of wai*, and sent to Halifax, where she was con demned.
The Plaintiffs gave the underwriters notice of the capture, and obtained their permission to prosecute a claim for restoration without prejudice to their right to abandon. On receiving notice of the condemnation, they wrote a letter of abandonment, which was delivered to the underwriters, who refused to pay for the loss, whereupon this suit was brought.
On the return voyage, just after doubling Cape Horn, Baxter, who was supercargo and part owner, gave to Edward Giles, the third mate, a bundle of papers, partly in Spanish, telling him at the same time that in all probability they might fall in with privateers, who might overhaul the trunk in the cabin, and if they found the papers, it was probable the vessel might be detained as the papers were in Spanish, and they might not be able to translate them, Giles put the papers in his trunk.
After the capture, Giles was taken out of the Herkimer into the Leander, and on being asked if be had any objection to iiave his trunk searched, replied that he had not. The trunk was then searched, and this bundle discovered. It contained papers, covering the cargo as the property of Baruso; mixed with others' which showed that in fact it was the' property of the Plaintiffs and of Baxter aiyl Griswold. Evidence was given to prove, tiiat the usage of the trade made these papers necessary. There was also an estimate of the probable value of the cargo, if shipped to Europe.
The Herkimer arrived before the Leander; and Baxter, upon his examination on the standing interrogatories, described truly the character of the voyage, and stated correctly the property in the cargo, but denied his knowledge of any papers, other than those which were exhibited, as belonging to the ship.
Issue was joined on the plea, that the Defendants had not broken their covenant, and the jury found a verdict in their Favor.
On the trial, 28 bills of exception were taken, partly by the Plaintiffs, and partly by the Defendants. Only those taken by the Plaintiffs are now before the Court.
The Plaintiffs .prayed the Court below to instruct the jury, that the letter, ordering the insurance, does not contain a representation that no person, other than the said- Livingston, Gilchrist, Griswold & Baxter, was interested in the return cargo of the Herkimer j nor that all the persons interested therein were native Americans. The judges were divided on this point, and the instruction was not given»
The 5th bill of exceptions stated, that the Plaintiffs prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that if they believed the testimony offered by them, then there was no such concealment of the said papers as can affect the right of -the Plaintiffs to recover in this action, which instruction the Court refused to give, but .directed the jury that if they should be of opinion, that from the usage and course of trade it was necessary to have the Spanish and other papers ¿elivered by Baxter to Giles, the 3d mate, as aforesaid, then the delivery by Baxter ib Giles, and the finding and taking of the said papers by the officers o'f the Leander, was not such a concealment as affects the right of the Plaintiffs to recover.
The 6th bill of exceptions states, that the Plaintiff's then prdyed the Court to instruct the jury, that Baruso having removed to New York, in the' United States, while Spain was neutral, for the purpose of carrying on, trade, and having' continued to reside in New-York until after the capture of the Herkirner, the said Bar'us o could not, at the time of the voyage, ho considered as a belligerent. This instruction the Court also refused to give, but did instruct the jury that if they should be of opinion that the said Baruso settled in New York before the war between Spain and Great Britain, and remained there domiciliated and carrying on trade generally until the capture of the Herkimer, he is to be considered as a neutral; but if they should be satisfied from the testimony that ho.went to New York for no other purpose but to carry on trade as a Spanish subject, which he could not engage in as a neutral, and that he was not engaged' in any other trade than as a Spanish subject, he cannot be considered as a neutral.
The 7th bill of exceptions states, that the Court then f on the prayer of the Defendants, gave to the jury the following opinion
“ The Court having already given an opinion, that “ Baruso was not a joint owner with fhe Plaint, ffs and “ Griswold and Baxter, in the return cargo of the Her- “ kimer, do, in compliance with the opinion of the “ Supreme Court, leave it to the jury to determine, whe- “ ther Baruso had an interest in the return cargo which “increased the risk of the said voyage, and if the risk was increased, that the policy was thereby viti- “ ated.” This opinion was given on the prayer of the Defendants to instruct the jury, that the non-commuhication to tlie underwriters of papers showing Baruso to have an interest, and to be a Spanish subject^ vitiated the policy.
The 8th bill of exceptions stated, that the Defendants theh prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that if they should be of opinion that the papers which were delivered to Giles by Baxter, or any of them, increased the. risk, and' that if any of the papei s which did so increase the risk were not necessary by the laws and usages of Spain, or the course and usage of trade between the United States and Lima, and that it was not communicated to the Defendants that such papers would accompany the cargo, then the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover. The Court gave the opinion.
The 9th bill of exceptions stated, that the Plaintiffs prayed an instruction to the jury, that in estimating the increase of risk on the return voyage of the Herkimer, they were to consider it as ^ a voyage which the Defendants were informed, in and by the letter of Church ana Dommiil, was carried on under a license from the Spanish government; and the question for •them to decide was, whether the risk of such a voyage, carried on under such a license, was increased by any of the circumstances relied on by the Defendants to show an increase of risk in this case. This opinion the Court refused to give.
The 11th bill of exceptions stated, that the Plaintiffs produced a witness to prove the usage of the trade, who said that by the laws, regulations and usages of the trade, it was necessary that the property imported into, or exported from the colony, by a foreigner, should be. under a Spanish license, and appeal* to be Spanish property. Whereupon the Defendants moved the Court to instruct the jury, that this evidence is not competent to prove the . municipal laws of Spain, or the usage and custom of trace established by their municipal laws. The opinion of the Court was, that “no parol evidence is admissible to the jury, or if given, can be regarded by them, to prove the legislative edicts or acts of the Spanish government, or to prove any usage, custom or course of trade conformable to such edicts or acts; but that such evidence is admissible to prove the general usage and course of trade that may depend on instructions to tlie government of Peru.”
The 13th bill of exceptions stated, that the Plaintiffs produced witnesses, ignorant of the laws of Spain, to prove tlicir understanding of the usage of the trade ; and the Defendants produced counter testimony on the tisage ; whereupon the Defendants moved, the Court to instruct the jury, that the testimony of the Plaintiffs, if believed, was not competent to show the usage or course of trade that the Herkimer, on her return voyage, should be accompanied, with papers giving the cargo the appearance of Spanish property. The • Court refused to give this opinion, but instructed the jury, that if they were of opinion that the usage or course of trade from or to the.province of Peru by foreigners, was to have a license from the king of Spain to trade, and to have Spanish papers on board, to show or give color that the cargo was Spanish property, the Defendants were bound to take notice of such course of trade; but if the jury should be of opinion that the trade was. prohibited by the laws of Spain, the Plaintiffs must prove that the Defendants had notice or information of such prohibition.
The 20th bill of exceptions is to an opinion of the Court, that whether the abandonment was in reasonable time or not, is not a fact to be exclusively left to the jury, but to be decided by them under the direction of the Court.
The 24th bill of exceptions stated, that the Defendants moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the insurers are not liable for any increase ot risk, in conseof any acts done by the insured to avoid seizure and confiscation under the laws and regulations pf the Which instruction the Court
The 25th bill of exceptions stated, that the counsel, for the Plaintiffs then moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the .right of the Plaintiffs would not be affected by any increase of risk produced by such acts as were stated in the preceding exception, if such acts were actíording to the course and usage of trade on the voyage insured. This opinion the Court refused to give.
The 28th bill of exceptions stated, that the Plaintiffs moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the increase of risk, by which alone the right ofthc Plaintiffs to recover in this action - can he effected, is an increase (by reason of some act or omission of the Plaintiffs, or their agents) of the danger of rightful capture or condemnation under tiie law of nations. The Court refused to give this opinion*
Tiie -verdict and judgment being against the Plaintiffs they sued out their writ'of error*
-Harper, for the Plaintiffs in error.
. 1. The 1st question is that upon which the Court below was divided in opinion, viz : whether the letter of Gilchrist to Webster & Co. ordering the insurance, contains a representation that ho other person than Livingston, Gilchrist, .Griswold and Baxter was interested in the retín n cargo, of the Herkimer, or that all the persons interested therein were native Americans. It certainly does not contain a direct affirmation of cither of those facts. It contains at most a negative pregnant ; an ambiguity of which the underwriters, if they deemed it important, should have required an explanation. Nothing can amount to a representation which is hot certain to a common intent,* so certain as not to admit of a doubt, provided the veracity of the party be hot questioned, and he be not under a mistake. There is no difference between a representation and a warran- ■ ty, except that the one is contained in the policy and the other is out of ir. They must both be equally certain.
Story, J. Do you admit this question to be relevant to the cause ? •
Harper; No, That is another branch of the árgnJnenf, 1 sha.ll contend that it was immaterial whether Baruso were a neutral or not; but that be was* quoad hoc neutral.
2. The 2d question arises upon the 5th bill of exceptions, which was the first taken by the Plaintiffs. It is to the refusal of the Court to instruct the jury that there was no such concealment of papers as could affect the Plaintiff’s right to recover; and to the opinion which the Court gave, whereby they made the effect of the concealment depend upon the question whether the papers were necessary according to the usage and course of the trade. The Plaintiffs object to the opinion given.
1 Because it makes the effect of Baxter’s .conduct relative to the papers depend on the usage and course of the trade; whereas, independently of any such usage, that conduct could not affect the right of recovery ; inasmuch as it did not amount to a concealment of papers ; and as the concealment of papers cannot affect such a right.
2. Because it requires that the usage and course of the trade; in order to make this conduct of Baxter innocent, should render it necessary to have those papers on board, whereas if the usage and course of trade permitted the having them, it was sufficient.
3. Because it extends to all the papers delivered by Baxter to Giles; many of which were perfectly immaterial and innocent in fheinselvcs, independently of any usage or course of trade.
The act did not amount to a concealment. It was only putting the papers from one trunk to another less liable to be searched. It must be such an act as would be likely to prevent discovery; and it must be done with intent to deceive the belligerent, and to defraud him of some belligerent right. When the prayer for an in-, struction is hypothetical, the fads constituting the hypothesis are to be considered as found by special verdict. If these facts had been found by a special verdict, they would not have been a finding of a concealment. But concealment of papers is not a- violation of neutrality. It is no ground for condemnation, nor even for detention. • The answer to the - Russian memorial expressly disclaims concealment and even destruction of papers as a legal ground of condemnation. It is only a ground to refuse costs or damages on restitution ; or to refuse further proof, where there is prima facie ground of' condemnation independent of the concealment — 1, Rob. append. 5, answer to the Russian memorial, 2, Rob, 88 — the Rising Sun., Evi-n spoliation of papers would affect Baxter's property only; and the Plaintiffs would be permitted to give further proof.
Some .of the papers delivered to Giles were wholly unimportant, ano unnecessary to the prosecution of the voyage in safety, and yet the opinion of the Court, (to be in favor of tiie Plaintiffs) required that they should be necessary according to the usage and coarse of the trade. .Among those papers was an estimate of the value of flie cargo if re-shipp d from New York to Cadiz. . This certainly was not necessary by the usage of the trkde. There were several other papers equally unimportant. Yet in the opinion of the Court the concealment of these papers violated the warranty of neutrality.
■ S. The 3d question arose on the 6th bill of exceptions which was to the opinion of the Court which made Raruso’s character, as a-neutral or belligerent, depend upon-the kind of trade he carried on, as well as upon Ills domicil.
The Plaintiffs object to this opinion, 1st. Because the place of domicil acquired in tune of peace is the criterion of a man’s character as neutral or belligerent, and not. the nature of the trade. In the case of the Harmony, 2, Rob. 266, G. W. Murray residing in France, was considered as a belligerent, while his partners in the same adventure, residing in the United States w'Te considered as neutrals. '3, Rob. 21, the Indian Chief. 3, Rob. 37, the Citto. — 1, Rob. 323, standing interrogatories. 12th interrogatory as- to residence of the parties. — 5, Rob. Appendix, order in council of the 24th of Jane, 1.803, relating to inhabitants oí certain colonies. 8, T. R/ 31, Wilson v.' Marryat, 1, Caine’s cases in error, 2b, Duguet v. Rhinelander. The nature of the trade has nothing to do with the question, if neutral by domicil he may trade with belligerents, provi ded.it bé not in articles contraband^ war. His neutrality was not inconsistent' with his privilege as a Spanish subiect. He' does not lose his privilege by bécoroing a neutral American., As between him and the government of Spain, he was still a Spanish subjt ct. But as between him and the government of Great Britain, he was, according to the principles of the British prize Courts, an American merchant.
The Plaintiffs also object to the opinion of the Court because there was no evidence upon which the Court could ground the hypothesis, that Baruso came to this country to carry on that trade only. Although the fact might be that he carried on no other trade yet it does not follow that he came here for no other purpose.
4. The 4th question arises under the 7th bill of ex-ceptioris, which states that the Court (in compliance with the opinion of the Supreme Court ) left it tq the jury to determine whether Baruso had an interest in the return cargo which increased the risk of the voyage*! and directed the jury that if the risk was increased, the policy was thereby vacated.
The Plaintiffs object to this opinion of the Court,
4. Because it leaves it to the jury to decide a mere question of Jaw,, viz :• whether the contingent interest of Baruso in the voyage, could have the effect of defeating the Plaintiffs right tó recover, by increasing the risk ; instead of directing them, as ought to have been done; that, such an interest was not subject to capture | that the Plaintiffs were not bound to disclose it ,* and that therefore it could not in law affect their right to recover.
2, Because it does not, as it ought to have done, inak“ the effect of Baruso’s interest on the right of recovery, depend on his national character! it being clear, as the Plaintiffs contend, that if he was a neutral, and -not a'belligerent, his property was not liahie to capture, and no interest which he had in the voyage ■ could affect their right.
3. Because ii does not, as it ought to have done, make the effect of this interest on the right of recovery, depend on the usage and course of the trade ,• it being clear as they contend, that if the usage and course of the trade authorized the use of a Spaniard’s name to cover 'the voyage, a mere contingent interest of that Spaniard in the voyage could- not, nor could any inter-which he could have in it consistently with the warranty, affect the right of the Plaintiffs.
4. Because the Defendants, having protected themselves, by a warranty of neutrality, against the effect of any belligerent interest in the voyage, were not entitled to a disclosure of that of Baruso, even could it be considered as a belligerent interest.
The Court below misunderstood the opinion of this Court upon every point on which an opinion was given when this cause was before this Court on the former writ of error, (Arde, vol. 6, p. 274.)
Whether Baruso had an interest in the return cargo was a question of law dependent upon the construction of this contract.
The opinion of this Court was that if Baruso had an interest in the return cargo, the materiality of that interest to the risk of the voyage, was a fact to be decided by a jury under the direction of a Court. This Court did not decide that the question whether Baruso had such an interest, was to be left to the jury. The Court below ought to have directed the jury that Baruso had no interest. He wras not to share the loss unless that loss happened by a defect in his license. He was only to share in the profits after the vessel should arrive. It was only a contingent interest in the success of the voyage, like the interest of a consignee who is to have a commission on the sales. Suppose a consignee in a neutral country should be a subject of a belligerent nation, would his contingent interest vitiate the policy ? It would afford no just ground of interference by a belligerent. The question is not what would furnish a just pretext for rapacity, but what would be a just ground of detention under the law' of nations. I. Caine’s Cu-, in error, 25, Duguet v. Rhinelander. 9, East, 282, Baker v. Blakes.
The Court below-ought to hayo told the jury that Baruso, being domiciliated in the United States, \tfas to be considered as a neutral, and as such* his property was safe under the law of nations, whatever pretext his ñamé might have afforded to a rapádous cruizer.
The connexion of a belligerent interest with a neutral interest, docs not render void a policy on the neutral interest.
Resides the course of the trade made it necessary that the property should be in the name of Baruso, and tiiis was known to the underwriters.
But, with submission to any opinion which this Court may have given, the interest of Baruso was wholly immaterial to this case. The Defendants have guarded themselves by the warranty-of neutrality. If the property be neutral their mouths are stopped. When tíwy take a warranty, they wave-all questions of this kind. The premium was calculated upon the warranty. When a contract is reduced to writing all antecedent negotiations are merged in the conclusive act- The Plaintiffs were not bound to give notice of any belligerent inters est. As to every tiling against which the warranty is a protection, no disclosure was necessary. — Marshall, 475. If Bar use’s interest did not violate the warranty it was immaterial.
5. The 5th question arose upon the 8th bill of exceptions which was taken to the opinion of the Court, “that if the jury should be. of opinion that the papers “ which were delivered by Giles to Baxter,, or any of “ them, increased the risk, and that if any of the papers ■“ which did so increase the risk were not necessary by “ the laws and usages of Spain, or the course and usage “ of trade between the United States and Lima, and “ that it was not communicated to the Defendants that “ such, papers would accompany the cargo,, then the “ Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover."’
To this opinion the Plaintiffs object.
1. Because it requires that those papers, in orjier to be,considered as innocent, should bé necessary by the usage and course of the trade; whereas iüwas sufficient if the usage authorized, them, although it might not have rendered them necessary.
2. Because the Defendants having protected thcmselves by á warranty of neutrality against unneutral conduct, were not entitled to a disclosure of the fact that those papers would be on board.
The effect of the Spanish papers was neutralized by the real American documents on board, showing clearly the real state of the interest of the Plaintiffs, if the Spanish papers had stood alone they might have been a ground of detention, or perhaps of further proof; but they of themselves showed a neutral character, though not the same ownership. They showed the property to belong to Baruso, and that he was a resident of Boston. But the papers which accompanied them in the same bundle, showed the real ownership and clear neutrality of the cargo. The Spanish papers, therefore, did not prove the property to be belligerent; and if they did not falsify the warranty, they were perfectly immaterial.
6. The 6th question was upon the 9th bill of exceptions, which was taken to the refusal of the Court to instruct the jury that in estimating the risk they were to take info, consideration the circumstance that it was a voyage which the Defendants were informed was carried on under a license from the Spanish government, it is clear that the connexion of Baruso with such a voyage could not increase the risk.
7. The 7th question was upon the iith bill of exceptions, which was takan to the opinion of the Court that parol evidence was not admissible to prove any usage, custom, or course of trade, conformable to the legislative edicts or acts of the Spanish government. But-that such evidence was admissible to prove the general usage or course of trade that might depend upon instructions to the government of Peru.
The Plaintiffs object to this opinion because it pcecludcd them from parol proof of the usage and course of trade, in cáse that usage and course should have arisen out of, or even should happen to be in conformity with the-legislative, acts or edicts of Spain. ’Whereas the usage and course of trade are in ail cases facts capable of parol proof, and seldom susceptible of any other,
8.. The 8th question arose, upon the 13th bill of exceptions, which was taken to the opinion of the-.'Court that the .Defendants were bound to take notice Of the usage aud course of trade, but not of the laxos of Spain prohibiting the trade.
To the latter part of this opinion the Plaintiffs object j
1. Because, whether the trade was generally prohibited by the laws of .Spain, or not, was a matter wholly immaterial | and their right of recovery ought not to depend on the knowledge which the Defendants might or might not possess of an immaterial fact.
2.. Because if the. prohibition of this trade by the laws, of Spain was legally proved, aud was a material fact; the Defendants were bound to take notice of it.
3. Because there was no legal evidence given in the cause, or stated in any of the bills of exceptions, that this trade was generally prohibited by the laws of Spain; the only evidence being that it could not, according to the usage and course of the trade, be' carried on to a foreign port, except under a special permission, a Spanish name, and Spanish papers, 'Therefore it ought not to have been left to the jury to'iind that this trade was prohibited by the laws of Spain, as a foundation for requiring the. Plaintiffs to prove that the Defendants had notice of the prohibition.
9. The 9th question ivas on the 20th bill of exceptions, which ivas taken to the opinion of the Court, that the question whether tlui"abandonment was or. was.not in reasonable time, was riot a question of fact to be exclusively decided by the jury, but was to be decided by them under the direction of the Court. The-Plainriffs contend-that'under the opinion of this Court in this case upon the former writ of error ('ante, voL 6, p. 27 ij it is a mere question of fact to be found by the jury. But as some doubt arose in consequence of what was said by this Court in the case of the Chesapeake In. Co. v. Starke, f ante, ml. 6, p. 268J this bill of exceptions was taken that the opinion of this Court may be fully understood.
Ch. J. said he understood that the Court might instruct, the jury that certain facts constitute reasonable notice; but that in a special verdict it must be stated whether the time was reasonable.
Barter.
10. The 10th question arises upon the 24th and 25th hills of exception. In which the Court instructed the jury in substance that the insurers were not liable for any increase of risk in consequence of any acts done by the insured to avoid seizure and confiscation under the laws and regulations of the Spanish government; although such acts were according to the usage and course of the trade on the voyage insured.
The Plaintiffs object to this opinion,
1. Because it is in vague and indefinite terms; whereas it ought to have specified the acts which were to have the effect in question; to the end that they might appear to be acts of which there was evidence before the jury, and which, if proved, were capable in law of producing that effect.
2, Because the effect of those acts on the right of. recovery. is not made to depend on the course and usage of the trade.
11. The 11th question was upon the 28th bill of exceptions, which was taken to the refusal of the Court to instruct the jury in substance that the only risk, the increase of which could affect the Plaintiff’s right to recover, was the risk of righifnl capture under the law of nations.
The Plaintiffs contend that what would give a mere .pretext for unjust capture, was not sufficient to charge the Plaintiffs with an increase of the risk insured against, so as to avoid the policy. Every thing was immaterial which did not increase the risk of rightful calpiure and condemnation 5* and which did not furnish at least a ground of condemnation which the belligerent has holden to be a rightful ground.
Baruso had no interest in the ship, and yet the ship as well as the cargo was condemned — no doubt on the principle that it was a trade in time of war, not permitted in time of peace. But the license diminished the risk because it showed that it was a trade permitted in' time of peace.
Pinkney, Attorney General, contra.
1. As to the division of opinion in the Court below.
It is true the letter ordering the insurance does not in direct terms deny that no other person had an interest in the cargo, but it contains a strong implication '-o that effect. If any transaction requires bona fules it is a representation for insurance. It is the act of the insured and they ought not to shelter themselves under an ambiguity. If it be calculated to mislead it is sufficient.
It is true that nothing is stated negatively. But why name others as concerned who were not to be insured, unless to inform the underwriters respecting the whole transaction with referened to the national character of all parties Concerned. It is calculated to excite in the minds of the underwriters a belief that it contains information on that subject. They who undertake to convey information must take care that it do not excite an idea which they did not mean to convey.
This point, however, is not considered as of very great importance.
2. The next question is much more important. This question arises on the 5th bill of exceptions.
- The Court gave, in substance, the instruction which the Plaintiffs prayed, and yet the Plaintiffs excepted be cause it was not exactly in their own words, The Plaintiffs had, among .other things, given evidence that the papers found in .Ciles’s trunk , were, necessary 'aCcording tb the usage and course of the trade,, and then prayed the Court to instruct the jury that if they belieyed the evidence so offered, then there was ;no such concealment of the said papers as could affect the right the Plaintiffs to recover; and this was in truth the direction which the’ Court gaye.
But the Court ought nof to have given the direction as prayed. The conccalmpnt of the papers was unneutralj although the parties were justifiable in using them to protect their illegal trade. - The whole transaction was unneutral: first, in concealing the papers, and secohdly, in denying a knowledge of them. The belligerent had a right to see the papers. It was a clear belligerent right flowing from the right of search.
' No .Court nf admiralty, however rapacious,, has ever.considered conccalmmt-of innocent papers as, per se, a ground of confiscation But this was not a concealment of. innocent papers. It was a concealment of papers tending to prove the property to be belligerent. It increased the suspicions already excited by other circumstances. ' Baxter was supercargo, and his acts bind the others, although lie was-a, partner. All the partners, are affected .by the fraud of-any ope of them, 1 Rob, 405, The ffelvaart. If this unneutral "conduct brought the property into suspicion it is sufficient. If it subjects the property to such detention as would authorize abandonment, 'the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the opinion prayed in the 5th exception. In á case where there was concealment of such papers as were calculated to induce such suspicion as. would require further proof, and this concealment followed by prevarication-, we could not expect a prize? Court to acquit, It would at least produce detention continued by an adjoqrnment of the case.
This concealment, connected with the other circumstances, justified the condemnation. ..There were documents showing the property to be in four Americans. Among the concealed papers was a copy of the royal Spanish license, authorizing a Spanish subject resident in Boston to import goods into the United States from the Spanish 'colonies..' The adventure appeared to be Spanish; It could only be carried on by a Spaniard. There was also concealed another paper of great, effect— a power of attorney from Baruso to Baxter, the supercargo, in which Baruso-says, the cargo “ is laden forme “ and on my account and risk99 It proved the property to be in Baruso, and that he was a Spanish subject. It calls him á Spanish merchant. It showed his national character to be belligerent, although he was resident in a neutral country.
It is not residence only which gives the national commercial character. Thé intention, the nature of the errand, the permanency of the residence, are all necessary ingredients.
The circumstances of suspicion were very strong, Baxter’s receipt, &c. states him to be the agent of Baruso. The letters from Baruso’s friends, the clearances, &c. &c. were all “on account of the royal-license,99 and Stated that the cargo Was to be delivered to Baruso. He was the cloak of the transaction, and he could only be a cloak by his Spanish character. When there are two sets of documents it is immaterial to the captors which they wished to conceal. All these circumstances created too strong a suspicion to justify an acquittal. The case might have heen explained but for the unfortunate conduct of 'the supercargo,* which induced a denial'of further proof. Ho, who could and ought to hate explained, the concealment, did pot. but increased the suspicions by his prevarication. There were only three alternatives before the Court — to acquit, to condemn, or to, allow further proof. The suspicion was, too strong to acquit — the prevarication precluded further proof. There, was nothing left but to condemn.
The first and most essential of all belligerent rights, is that of visitation and search. The right to see all the documents is a necessary consequence of that right,, or it would be nugatory. It was the duty of the supercargo, as a neutral, to show all the papers. Why did he show the neutral ■ papers only? The object of the. supercargo ivas to defeat an acknowledged belligerent right, and he endeavored, to deceive the adjudicating Court.
Story, J. I wish yoii to consider whether, if the trade be tlecessarilij belligerent, the concealment of these papers can be considered as material.
Pinkney. That is, whether they can make the case worse ? . Perhaps not.
S. The, 3d point is as to the neutral character of Baruso by reason of his residence in the United States.
Locality is somethings but not eVery thing. So is the tiirve of emigration.
The general principle of the law of nations is, that the belligerent character belongs to the subject of the hostile nation wherever found. Mere change of place does not alter the character. It is easier for a neutral to slide into the character of an enemy, than for an enemy to fall into that of a neutral. But even in such cases, that great expounder of the law of nations, sir VScott, examines all the circumstances of the case, time, of removal, permanency of residence, motive, and mature of his business. The case of CoUett ('8 T. It. 31, Wilson v. MarryatJ has no bearing upon this case. The. special verdict found Collett to be a citizen of the United States, and the case depended upon the treaty of 179-i.
The case of Mr. Johnson is not more to the point. His office of American consul prevented his residence jn London from affecting his national character. If he liad not had th‘e animus r'evertendi before the voyage of the Indian Chief was commenced, and had not departed before the arrival of the ship, the trade would have been adjudged unlawful.
The next case is that of G. W. Murray. Sir ->V. Scott not only forgot to administer justice in mercy, but pushed his principles of commercial law infinitely too far. The commissioners, under the 7th article of the British treaty, gave Murray compensation on the ground that the. decision of sir W. Scott was wrong. But, even upon the principles on which that case was ¡decided, residence alone does not constitute national character. The time of his removal and the nature of his employment were also considered.
So also in the case of the Citto, 3 Rob. 38, the nature of Mr. Bowden’s residence in Holland was examined.
The question always is, whether he has become, not a citizen or subject, but a merchant of that country; i. e. a general merchant. But did Baruso become a general American merchant? Was his trade American? Was it neutral ? No. He carefully wrapped himself up in the folds of his license, and fenced himself round to exclude the American character.
The case of Buguet'v. Rhinelander is not more applicable than the others. The Plaintiff was a naturalized citizen, had been long resident and was embarked, in the general trade of the country.
As to the Plaintiff’s 2d objection to the opinion, because there was no evidence upon which the Court could raise the hypothesis that Baruso came to this country for no other purpose than to carry on that particular trade — the fact is otherwise. There was evidence from which the jury might infer the fact supposed by the Court; and they have found it.
.4. The 4th question arises upon the 7th bill of exceptions, and is whether the Court ought to have left it to the jury to decide whether Baruso had an interest in the cargo;
Perhaps it was a question of law dependent on the construction of the contract, and ought to have been de - cided by the Court.' But the Plaintiffs cannot complain that the Court left it to the jury to decide a question of law which the Court ought to have decided against him. Baruso had an interest. He was a partner. The written contract says “ he agrees to the following partnership.” It is not contended that they are hound by the word “partnership” if the contract does not 'in law amount to a partnership. But the term may explain other doubtful expressions. Livingston was to contri bute vessel and funds — Baruso the license, and services? as far as his services were necessary to give effect to the license. Here was a joint contribution for common benefit. It was not necessary that the losses should be equally borne, nor. the profits equally divided. Here was also a participation of profits, evert in an equal degree, in a certain event. So there was a contribution in loss. If the expedition failed Livingston would lose his goods, and Baruso the use of his license for a certain time; The suffering, in their own estimation, would be equal. In case of loss upon the sales, Baruso was to contribute., and if the cargo should be lost by reason of a defect in the licen'se, the whole loss would fall upon him. He is guarrantee also for the consignees .in.South America. He had also an interest in the specific goods. In a*certain case he was fo have a right tor.take’ a portion of the goods themselves. The policy was underwritten while the vessel was on her return vbyage, and while he had this interest. It was not a mefh'contingency, but a vested interest.
It is contended that if the usage and course of the trade authorized the’use of a Spanish cover, areal Spafiish interest would not increase the r:sk. But the warranty of American property forbids a mixture of a feelligéirrit interest; at least it would in a Court of admiralty.
- 5. The 5th question was upon the 8th bill of excepiio&S.
This opinioh will not bear the construction which the. Plaintiffs have put upon it. It does not mean to say that the papers to be innocent must be necessary according to the usage of the trade; but if it was the usage of the trade, to have such papers, then they were'innocent.
6. The Plaintiffs were not-entitled to the instruction prayed for in the 9th bill of exceptions, because it was an instruction as to a fact; viz. that the-Defendants had notice that tiie voyage was to be carried on under a roval Spanish license. .Whether they bad such notice depended upon the question whether they recollect-ed the letter of-Church and Demmill, and whether they knew it. was the same ship and the same voyage;
7. The 7th question was upon the 11t h bill of exceptions, and was whether parol evidence could be given of an usage. Which grew out of a law, inasmuch as the law itself was not-proved by competent evidence.
It was supposed that the law should be first proved before evidence could be given of the usage dependent on that law.
8. The 8th question anise on the 13th hill of exceptions, and,was whether the. Defendants were bound to take notice of the Spanish laws of trade.
There is no adjudged case which requires, underwriters to take notice of'such laws, although they aré. bound to know the usage of the trade, if there was no evidence of the law, the opinion was immaterial and could not injure the Plaintiffs.
9. The 9th question arose upon the 20th hill of exceptions, and was whether reasonable notice was a question exclusively for.the jury.
The Plaintiffs had no right to exqept to this opinion.
Reasonableness of time is a matter of fact to-be found by a jury under the direction of a Court. And. the Court may direct them from certain facts, whether it be reasonable. . In the same manner as, in trovep, the Court may instruct the, jury that a demand and refusal are evidence of a conversion.
10. The 10th question arises upon the 2&th and 25th exceptions, and was whether the Defendants were liable for an increase of risk iri consequence of any acíá done by the Plaintiffs to avoid seizure and confiscation by the Spanish government for illicit trade — the Plaintiffs having taken that risk upon, themselves.
The principal objection to this opinion seems ,to be that it is too abstract, and does not state the facts which were supposed to increase the risk. But there were facts enough stated in the bill of exceptions to ground the instruction upon. All the paraphernalia of the Spanish garb, were acts done to protect the cargo from confiscation by the Spanish government for illicit trade, and certainly increased the,risk of capture by the British, which was the only risk which the Defendants took upon themselves. 1 Marshall, 416, Condy’s edition. l JV. Y. T. B. 549.
11. The 11th question arose upon the 28th bill of exceptions, and was whether the risk, the increase of which could affect the Plaintiff’s right to recover, could be any other than the risk of rightful capture under the law of nations.
It was not necessary that the risk should be of just condemnation under the law of nations. It was sufficient if it increased the risk of condemnation upon any principle recognized by the Courts of the captor.
The Court was not bound to give an opinion unless prayed; and if thé opinion prayed be not correct the Court is not bound to give any other. 1 Marshall, 473, Candy’s .American edition, Sterry v. Delaware Insurance Co.
Harree, in reply*
1. Even if the letter orderingthe insurance did contain the intimations Supposed, yet it did not amount to a tqpfe&entflfian; which must always be a positive affirmance or denial of some fact — see the opinion of tjiis Court in this canse Jlnte, vdl. 0, p. 274^ and Marshall/ S3.
2. As to the, 5th exception, it is said that the Court gave in substance, the opinion prayed j yet if the prayer and opinion were both wrong, the Plaintiffs had a right'to except. But it is not in substance the samej Perhaps if taken alone it might b,e so considered, but when taken in connection with the refusal to give the instruction a* prayed it is, or muht be understood as being different.
It was not merely the delivery of the papers to Giles, hut it was also the cbnduci, of Baxter in denying the ex-, istence of .the pa pers, &c. which was insisted upon by the Defimdahts as constituting the concealment. The Defendants were still at liberty to argue to the jury that the concealment by Giles, in connexion with the conduct of B'xrier, was such a concealment. Byre-fusing the Plaintiffs prayer and giving the instruction as they did, the inference was plain that it did amount to such a concealment.
But there is another more important objection to the opinion. The concealment, even of criminal papers, is not a ground - even of detention — nor even to deny further proof. Spoliation alone has that effect, (gee the answer to the Prussian memorial in the case of the Silesia loan.) If the papers are found and produced,- it excites only a slight suspicion that other important papers may be concealed. But even if it did authorize a denial of further proof, yet it is only in a case where so strong a suspicion exists from other circumstances that the Court cannot acquit. But here no such suspicion was raised by the other circumstances. The concealed papers themselves proved the neutrality of the property.
The case did not need further proof. The power of attorney of Bar uso was iri’e vocable — if not expressly, yet by implication.
There is no case which decides that concealment of papers is a ground to refuse further proof. There is a great 'difference between concealment and spoliation ol’ papers, as to the degree of suspicion excited. When the papers are destroyed, the mind is left to conjecture and the strongest suspicion may be justified. But when the papers are found and produced, the whole extent of their criminality appears at once.
It is true that the act of an agent binds his principal— but civiliter, not criminaliter.
Spoliation is a criminal act in the eye of a Court of admiralty. Upon the whole then,
This was not a case which réquired further proof. 2. Concealment even of criminal papers is not a ground to refuse further proof if the case required it; and 3. Tin-papers were innocent.
This trade was within the exception of the order in council of the 24th June, 1802, and therefore the proper - ty was not liable to condemnation on account of Raruso’s-. being a Spanish subject, he being an inhabitant, of a neutral country, and sq stated to be upon the face of the papers. It was a trade from an enemy’s colony to a neutral country. The papers therefore, in the eye of a Court of admiralty, were perfectly innocent. The king in council has a right to relinquish part of the belrights which the ^nation might claim according to the law of nations, lie has done so.-. He --has said that the property of a Spanish subject, being an inhabitant of . a heitvial country, shall not be liable to confiscation.
. If the papers, liad. been destroyed, suspicion might have been thrown upon the transaction, because their innocente could hot appear.. But when found they showed Báruso’s interest to be as free from capture as Livingston’s,
3. As to the 6th exception.
We. admit that something more than mere residence is necessary .to constitute national character. . We admit there must be an intent to trade. ' Time also is a necessary ingredient. But no particular length of time is required. The residence must be so long only as to show* his real intention.- It is not necessary that lie,should embark in ali the trade of the country. It is sufficient if he carry on a part of it. it. is sufficient to make it the trade of this country, if the benefits of it belong to this country -and not to- Spain. He employed oiir ships, our seamen and our merchants, all of whom were to make a profit. It was a trade between a Spanish^ colony and-the United States. Great Britain ncveiOcbipplained of such á commerce as this. She complained only of a commerce between the colony and the mother country. If he liad come to this' country with a view to. the war, and to carry on a trade belligerent in it’s nature, or not usual in time of peace, there might be s<rm ground for the objection. But this commerce was neutral in it’s nature. The Jjourt meant to say that if the trade was such that a neutral could not carry it on, tlieii, &c. There was no evidence that he came to carry,on a trade which, as a .neutral, he could uojt carry on, it'is true it was a trade which, as an American.) he could not carry on ;but that did not make, the trade belligerent. The Spanish government might have permitted an American to carry it on, and it would-still have been a neutral trade.
4. As to tne 7th bill of exceptions..
If the question of Baruso’s interest be a question of law, then we contend that he had no such interest as could falsify the warranty.
lie was not a partner. To constitute, a partnership there must. be an universal participation in gain and loss in all events. But in some events he was not to participate, in either. In one event only was he to share the gain, and in one only was he to participate in the loss. He was not. a joint owner of the cargo. In trover or replevin, he could not have proved an interest. If he had sold the cargo the vendee would have had no title. If he had given a noté in the name of all, he only would have been bound. This interest was merely contingent, like that of a consignee in his commissions.
5- As to the 8th hill of exceptions.
The. warranty of neutrality was a protection to the Defendants against all belligerent interests and belligerent appearances, and therefore it was not necessary to disclose the.belligerent cover of the real neulral interest. Tt is sufficient that the property insured was strictly and really neutral.
8. .As to the 9th-exception..
The letter of Church and Demmill, stating that the vessel was to trade under á license., was referred to in the letter which ordered the insurance and which was laid before the' Defendants. It is a principle of. law that they are supposed to know what, they bad the means of knowing and what it was their interest to know. It was proved that the letter of Church and Demmill had been laid before them on a former day, and when they were again referred to it, they ought to have recollected its contents, or have asked for it again.
7. As to the 11th bill of exceptions.
An usage cannot be against law, and yet we were prevented from proving it, because it was conformable to law. According to the opinion of the Court, we were bound to prove that the usage was contrary to law, before we could prove it by parol.
8. As to the 13th bill of exceptions.
The defendants were as much bound to know the laws of the trade, as the usages of the trade.
40. As to the 34th and 35th bills of exceptions.
The knowledge which the Defendants had of the trade and jts usage at the time of underwriting the. policy, authorized -the Plaintiffs to yse all the means necessary to make the voyage legal.
11. As to the 38th hill of exceptions.
The case cited is, that if there be art edict under which. the belligerent does condemn, although unlawfully, it ought to he disclosed,
But here was no such edict, the condemnation was not only unlawful but unauthorized.
The Court ought not wholly to reject the opinion, prayed, if it be not exactly correct; because it leaves, the jury to infer that no part of it is correct. They ought to go on and state what the lav/ is.
March 15th....
See Ante, vol. 6, p. 274:
Of whom Mr. Pinkney was one

Opinion:
Marshall, Ch. J.
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the Court as follows :
This perplexed and intricate case, which is rendered still more so by the manner in which it has been conducted at .the circuits, hás been considered by the Court. Their opinion on the various points it presents will now be given.
If theijiiestion on which the Court was divided he considered literally, the answer must undoubtedly he, that the letter of the 35th of March, 18D.6, contains no averment that no person other than Livingston, Gilchrist, Griswold and Baxter, were interested in the return cargo of the HerkirAer, nor that all the persons interested therein were native Americans. This would be perceived from an inspection of the letter itself, and there would be no occasion for an application to the Co Oft concerning its contents. But the real import of the question is this. Is the language of the letter such as to be equivalent to an averment that the owners named In it are the sole persons who were interested m the return cargo ? If it does amount to such an averment* then it, is a representation, and if it be untrue, its materiality to the risque* must determine its influence on the policy. A false representation, though no breach of the contract, if material, avoids the policy on (he ground of fraud, or because the insurer has been misled by it.
Upon reading the letter on which this insurance was ihade, the impression would probably be that the four persons named in it were the sole owners of the return cargo of the Herkimer. The inference may fairly be drawn from the expressions employed. Such was probably the idea of the writer at the time. The writer' however might have, and probably had other motives for his allusion toother owners, than to convey the idea that there were' no others. The premium might in his opinion be affected in some measure by stating the little apprehension from capture, which was entertained by others* and especially by that owner who was the supercargo. If* however, it was not supposed by Mr. Gilchrist, that the persons named in his letter were the sole owners of the cargo, or if in fact they were not the sole owners, lie has expressed himself in so careless a manner as to leave his letter open to misconstruction* and, in the opinion of some of the judges, to expose his contract to. hazard in consequence pf. it.
But that part of the Court which entertains this opinion, is also of opinion,that theletter oughtnqtto beconstruedinto a representation of any interest to grow out of the voyage distinct from actual ownership of the cargo. « The owners* says Mr. Gilchrist, are already insured against the dangers of the seas," &c. His application was for the owne' S$ and when he proceeds to state, that others were concerned, he must be understood to say that they were concerned as owners. Consequently if the lette. implies an averment, that lio has named all the owners- it implies nothing further, and ought not to be construed into a representation, that there'were no. other persons interested in the safe return of the cargo.
Others are of opinion, that to. constitute a represen* tation there should be an affirmation or denial of some fact, or an allegation which would plainly lead the mind to the satne conclusion. If the expressions are ambiguous, the insurer ought to ask an explanation, and not substitute his own conjectures for an alleged representation. Ih this opinion the majority of the Court is understood to concur. The instruction then applied for by the counsel for the Plaintiffs, on which the Circuit judges, were divided, ought to have been given:
5th. A majority of the Court is also of opinion, that, ¿he instruction prayed for as stated in the 5th exception ought to have been given. If the jury believed the facts offered in evidence by the Plaintiffs, which were that by the usage of the trade to Peru from any foreign port, it was necessary for t.hc ship to have on board, on her return voyage, the Spanish and other material papers delivered by Baxter to Giles, - then there was no such concealment of said papers as can affect the right of the Plaintiff to recover in this action. In general concealment of papers amounts to a breach, of warranty. But when the underwriters know, or, by the usage and teou rse of the trade insured, ought to know, that certain papers ought to be on board-for the purpose of protection in one event, which* in another, might endanger the property^ they tacitly consent teat the papers shall be sO used as to protect the property. The use of the Spanish papers was id give a Spanish character to the properfy in the Spanish ports ; and, of the, American pa-peps, to prove the American character of the property to other belligerents. But to have exhibited the Spanish papers to a British cruizer and thus to induce a suspicion that, the property was belligerent, would have been not less improper .than to have exhibited the proofs of American property in a port of Peru, and thusio defeat the sole object for which Spanish papers were necessarily taken on board.
6th. A majority of the Court is also of opinion, that .under all the evidence ii) the cause, Baruso, was to be considered as an American merchant, whether he.carried on trade generally, or confined himself to a trade from the United S'ates to the Spanish provinces. .The,Circuit Court therefore erred in making the neutral character of Baruso to depend on the kind 'of (rade in which he was engaged, instead of its depending on residence and trade, whether general or limited;
7th. The instruction of the'-Circnit Court to- which the 7th exception was taken, is ol.wiously formed on a plain and total misconstruction of the former opinion* of this Court. In no part of that opinion has the idea been indicated, that the interest of Baruso was a question solely for the consideration of the jury unaided by .the judge. It is certainly a question on wdiich it was-proper for the judge to instruct the jury. The opjnion, given by this Court, was, that «if the jury should be of opinion that the Spanish papers, mentioned in the case, were material to the risk, and that it -was not the regular usage of trade to take such papers on board, the non-riisclo? e of the fact, that they would be on board, would vil7 te the policy * but if the jury should be- of opinion that they were not material to the risk, or that it ivas the regular usage of the trade to lake such papers on board, that they would not vitiate, the policy," The instruction of the Circuit Court to the jury ought to have conformed to this direction. Instead of doing so, those instructions were to-exclude entirely from the consideration of the jury the regular usage of trade. They refuse to allow any influence to a fact, to which this Court attached much importance. It is the unanimous opinion of this Court, that in giving this instruction the Circuit Court erred.
8th. The Circuit Court seem also to have varied from the directions formerly given by this Court, in the opinion to which the 8th exception is taken. This Court placed the innocence or guilt of having on board the Spanish papers, mentioned in the case, cm the regular usage of trade; the Circuit Court has made their innocence to depend on their being necessary.
The.counsel for the Defendants contends, that this . is a distinction without a difference but it is impossible to sav what difference this distinction might make with the jury. It is also the opinion of this Court that# in estimating the materiality of the papers to the risk, their effect, taken together, should be considered, not the effect of any one of them taken by itself.
9th. The opinion which the Cornrt refused to give, to which refusal the 9th exception is taken, depends on >se- - veral distinct propositions which must be separately considered.
The letter, on .which this insurance was made, contains a direct reference to a previous letter written by Church and Demmill, which was laid before the confpany, for a description of the ship. The first question to be considered is, did this reference make it the duty ,of the directors to see that letter, and are they, without further proof, to be considered as having read it. The letter ivas addressed to, and it is to be presumed remained in the possession of, the agent who made this, insurance.
It is a general rule, that a paper, which expressly refers to another paper within the power-of the party, gives notice of'the contents of that other paper. No reason is perceived for excepting this case, from the rule. It is fairly to be presumed that, on reading the letter of Gilchrist. the board of .directors required the agent of the Plaintiffs to produce the "letter of Church and Demmill, unless they retained a recollection of it. In that letter they were informed that the vessel had sailed for Lima, with liberty to go to one other port in South America, and that « she had permission to trade there."
What was tile amount of the information communicated by this letter 2
The permission to trade 'was unquestionably a permission granted by the authority of the country. It was a permission from the Spanish government. But whether this permission was evidenced by a license, or by other means, was to he doci led by other testimony; whether it conveyed notice to the underwriters that such a license was on hoard, the ship, depends, in the opinion of part of the Court,- on the usage of the trade. Those, who entertain this opinion, think, that as this was submitted to the jury, the Court committed no error in refusing to say that the Defendants were to be considered as knowing that the Herkimer sailed with a Spanish license on board. In estimating the increase of risk, it was certainly the duty of the jury to consider it ás a Yoyage known to tlje underwriters tó be carried on for the purpose of trading to Lima, and. that the Herkimer had such papers on board as were, usual in such a trade, but whether the license be such a paper or not, the jury hereto judge as of other facts.
A majority of the Court, however, is of a different opinion. The underwriters, having full notice that the voyage was permitted, might fairly infer that it was licensed by the Spanish government; because in no other way would it be permitted. The whole question turned upon the construction of a wriitcn document which it belonged to the Court to make.
11th & 13th. The 11th & 13th exceptions may properly be considered together, since they are taken to opinions given on the same,subject, and do not essentially vary from .each other. The Circuit Court appears to have supposed that the general usage and course of trade could not be given in evidence, or, if given in evinence, ought to be disregarded, if the jury pliould be of opinion that such usage was founded on the laws or edicts of the government of the country where the usage prevailed. That is not the opinion of this Court. The . usage may be proved by parol, and the effect of the usage remains , the same, whether it originated in an .edict or in instructions given by the government to its officers. Any conjectures, which the jury or the witnesses may, make on this subject, can be of no importance, and ought to have no influence on the case. Neither can it be more necessary to give notice of a usage founded upon statute, than of a usage founded on instructions. The Circuit Court therefore erred in directing the jury that the underwriters W'ere not bound to take -notice of the usage of trade, if they should he of oni- . nion that the trade was prohibited I»v the law of Spain.
20th. The opinion of the Circuit Court to which the 20tli exception was taken, appears to be "entirely cor reel.
24th & 25th. The 24th .& 25th exceptions are to the same opinion somewhat varied in form, and rendered more explicit, on the application of the Plaintiffs, than it had been in the instruction given on the motion of the Defendants. It is essentially the same with that to which the 7th exception was taken, and appears to have been founded on a total misapprehension of the • former opinion given by this Court. In that opinion it was expressly stated, that such papers as, conformably to the regular usage of trade, were to be taken on board a vessel, would not vitiate the policy. "The acts,done by the insured to avoid seizure.and confiscation mnder the laws and regulations of the Spanish governhv.'fit," which are mentioned in the application made tb the Court by the counsel for the Defendants, comprehend these papers. This • questing therefore wag decided by this Court on the former argument of this cause, and the' Court is now unanimously of opinion, that the Circuit Court erred, both in granting the prayer of the Defendants, and refusing that of the Plaintiffs.
28th. In the opinion, to which the 28th exception was taken, this Court concurs,with the Circuit Court. The direction, asked by the counsel for the Plaintiffs, ought not to have been given. It is expressed in terms which, if assented to, might misguide'the jury. Rightful capture according to the law of nations might be construed to rnean capture for a cause which would justify condemnation according to the law of nations as construed in the United States. But capture will always be made on suspicion .of what the belligerent construes to be cause of forfeiture, and capture authorizes abandonment. Such apts or omissions therefore, of the Plaintiffs, as would induce, a capture and detention according to the /common practice of the belligerents, are proper for t'hé consideration of the jury in estimating the risk.
This Court is of opinion, that there is error in the proceedings of the Circuit Court in this cause, in refusing to give-'the opinion on which that Court was divided ; am! also in the opinions to which the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, i)th, 11th, loth, 24t)i and 25th exceptions are taken. This Court .doth therefore reverse and annul the judgment, rendered, by the Circuit Court, and doth remand tho- pause to the. said Court that a venire facias de ncrvQ may be awarded, and other proceedings had therein according to law.
STORY, J.
I,Concur in the judgrnent of reversal,which has just been pronounced. But as in some instances f differ from the opinions expressed by the majority, and others 1 concur upon grounds somewhat variant, I have ventured, to express my own views at large upon the important points which have been so fully and ably argued.
. The first question which presents itself is on the certificate of . division. • To constitute , a representation, there should be ah explicit, affirmation or denial of a fact, or such an allegation as Would irresistibly lead the mindvto the. same conclusion. If the expressions are ambiguous, or such as the parties might fairly use without intending to authorize a particular conclusion, the insumí ought not to be bound by the conjectures, or calculations of probability, of the underwriter. The lat-'". ter, if'in sucli,case he deems the facts material, ought to rnahe further inquiries. In the letter, of the 26th .of March, 18016, there áre no words negativing the existence of other interests than those of the Plaintiff's and Messrs. Griswold and: Baxter. .
The negative, if any, is to be made out by mere inference or probable conjecture, ánd as there is no rea-, sOn to suppose that the statement was made with that intent, I am satisfied that it did not amount to a representation negativing the existence of such interests.-' The.Couj't below ought therefore tó have given the direction prayed for by the Plaintiffs' counsel.
But, even admitting that the letter did contain the re-, presentation' contended for, I am well satisfied that it was ' substantially true.. It is not pretended, that any pther person except Baruso had any interest in the cargo; and it is very clear that, whatever might be his contingent interest in' the possible profits of the voyage, he hatl no vested interest in the cargo itself. He was not $ partner, for he wanted one of the essential characteristics of partnership, a direct vestetl interest in the joint funds. He possessed a mere possibility which, in the successful termination of the voyage, might entitle him to a right of action for a proportion of the profits ; or, in a specified case of election, to take a proportion of tlie property itself. But it was not such an interest as was liable fo capture, or such as could be claimed or condemned in a prize Court. It was less certain than even a respondentia or bottomry interest, which have been allowed to be asserted before' the prize jurisdiction. Tlie commissions of a supercargo upon the sales might, w ith as much propriety, be deemed a vested interest in tlie cargo consigned to his care.
I pass over, for the present, the fifth exception.
The sixth exception points to the national character of Baruso. As Baruso emigrated from Spain to the United States during a time of peace, no question arises as to the ability of a belligerent subject to change his national character [flagrante bello.
It is clear by the law of nations that the national chare .'ter of a person, for commercial purposes, depends upon his domicil. But this must be carefidly distinguished from the national character of his trade.' For the party may be a belligerent subject and yet engaged in neutral trade; or he may be a neutral subject and yet' engaged in hostile trade. Some of the cases respecting the colonial and coasting trade df enemies have turned upon this distinction.
But whenever a person is bona fide domiciled in a particular country, the character of tlie country irresistibly attaches to him. The rule has been applied with equal impartiality in favor and against neutrals and belligerents. It is perfectly immaterial what is the trade in which the party is engaged, or whether he be engaged in any. If he be .settled bona fide in a country with tlie intention of indefinite residence, he is, as to all foreign countries, to be deemed a subject of that country. Without doubt, in order to ascertain this domicil, it is proper to take into consideration the situation, the employment, and the character of the individual. The trade in which he is engaged, the family that he possesses, and the transitory or fixed character of bis business, are ingredienls which may properly be weighed in deciding on the nature of an equivocal residency or domicil. But when once that domicil is. fixed" and ascertained, all other circumstances become immaterial,
The prayer of the Plaintiffs (which was refused by the Court) in effect asked that if Baruso was bona jide settled in .New York, and liad no domicil •elsewhere, he was not to be considered as a belligerent. The Court in effect declared that the character of his trade, arid not his mere domicil, fixed his national character. There was thp'rfore error both in the refusal and in the direction of the Court.
The seventh exception arose from a misconception of tire opinion of'the Supreme Court.. The Court did not mean to intimate that whether an interest increased the risk or not was a mere question of fact for the jury. On the contrary, the Court considered that it was a mixt question of law and fact on which the Court were hound to direct the jury as to the law. As the Court below were of opinion that Baruso was not a joint owner of the cargo, (in which opinion I concur) the question ought not to have been left to the jury in the broad and unqualified terms which are used. Strictly and legally speaking, Baruso had ho interest in the cargo ; and therefore « his interest could not be material to, the riskand if the point, meant to have been left to the jury, was, whether the concealment of the name or the possibility of interest of Baruso increased the risk it should have been left with proper directions as to the effect of the usage of trade and neutral character of Baruso in settling that question. If the usage of trade allowed or required such cover, or if Baruso were a neutral, l am not prepared to say that, in point of law, the risk could thereby have been increased. It would have been a mere inquiry into the possible hazards from the rapacity of belligerents, or the possible effects rtf one Spanish tame instead of another. Men reason differently upon such speculations.
Nor am I prepared to say that it is ever necessary for the assured to declare the national character of other distinct interests engaged iff the satpe adventure, unless called for by the underwriter. If such interests' are not warranted or represented to be. neutral, the underwriter must be considered as calculating upon the possible existence of belligerent interests, or as waving any inquiry.
The fifth and eiglith exceptions may fie considered together as they are founded upon, the legal effect of the taking on board and the concealment of tlic papers, by'Baxter, from the belligerent. cruiser. The prayer the Plaintiffs in the fifth exception was for a direction that under all the circumstances of the ease there was no such concealment as would avoid the Plaintiff^; right to recover. And if, in point of law, the Plaintiff's were entitled to such direction, the Court erred in their refusal, although the direction, afterwards given by thjs Court might, by inference land argument, in the opinion of. this Court, be pressed to the same extent. For the party has a right to a direct and positive instruction $ and the'jury are not to be left to believe in distinctions where none exist, or to reconcile propositions by mere argument and inference, it would be a dangerous practice, and tend to mislead instead of enlightening a jury.
The opinion of the Court in effect was, that the concealment- of any papers; which were necessary to be' on board by the usage ibid course of. the trade, did not affect the Plaintiff's right to recover. But .(in-conformity with -the prayer of the Defendants in the eighth exception^ that if 'any of the papers increased the risk, and were hot necessary by the usage , and course of trade, and the fact, that such papers,would .accompany the'cargo, was. not disclosed to the underwriters, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
It is undoubtedly true that the .warranty of neutrality extends, not barely to the fact of the property being neutral, but that the conduct of the'voyage shall be such as to protect and preserve its neutral character. It mast also be conceded that the acknowledged belligerent right of search draws after it a right to the production and examination of the ship's papers. And if these be denied, and the property is thrown into jeopardy1 thereby, there can be no reasonable doubt that such conduct constitutes a breach of the warranty.
' Concealment and even spoliation of papers, do not ordinarily induce- a condemnation of the property; but they always afford cause of suspicion, and justify capture and detention; In many cases the penal effects extend in reality, though indirectly, to confiscations For if the cau,se labor under heavy doubts, if the conduct be not perfectly fair, or the character of the parties are not fully disclosed upon the papers before the Court* the concealment or spoliation of papers is made the ground of refusing further próof to relieve the ofascuri-, ty of the cause j and all the fatal consequences of a hostile taint follow on the denial;
But the question must always be whether there be it. concealment of papers material to the preservation of the neutral character. It would be too mm h to contend that every idle and accidental, or even meditated, concealment of papers* manifestly unimportant in every view before the prize tribunal, should dissolve the oblrgation of the policy. And if by the usage and course of trade it be necessary or allowable to have oh board spurious papers covered with a belligerent character, whatever effect it may have upon the rights of the searching cruizer, it would be difficult to sustain the position, that the concealment of such papers, which, if disclosed, would completely coinprumit or destroy the neutral character, would be a breach of the warranty. In such case the disclosure of the papers produces the same inflamed suspicions, the same legal right of capture and detention, the same claim for further proof* and the same right to deny it, as the. concealment would, if the concealment would induce the conclusion that the interest was enemy's covered with a fictitious neutral garb, the disclosure wotdd not- in such a casé less authorize the same conclusion. In such case it Svould depend upon the sound discretion of the Court* tinder all the circumstanccs -of the case, to allow tbe veil to be. drawn aside, and admit or deny the Claimant to assume his real character. Whenever, therefore, the underwriter has knowlege and assents to the cover of neutral property under belligerent papers, (as he does in all cases where the usage of the..trade demands it) he necessarily waves his pights under the warranty, so far as the visiting cruizer may demand the disclosure of such papers. In other words, he authorizes the concealment in all cases where it is not necessary to assume the belligerent national character for the purpose of protection.
If this view be correct it is clear that the Court ought to have given the direction prayed for by the Plaintiffs. Sitting here under, a clause in the policy which enables us to look behind the sentence of candemnation, we See that the property was really neutral 5 and if the jury believed the evidence, the concealment was of papers which were authorized by the course of trade for the voyage, and so far from giving a hostile character, was the only means of-preventing a strong presumption of that character. If we but consider the known course of decisions in the British. Courts on questions of this nature, we shall find that, independent of the question of the neutral or hostile character of the ostensible owner, the trade between the belligerent mother country and its colony affects with condemnation the property engaged in it, although such property be neutral, and there be an interposition of a neutral port in the course of the voyage. . On examining the papers in this case it will be found that they point, though obscurely, to such an ultimate destination. And at all events the existence of contradictory papers, one sett' American, the other Spanish, would, in a Spanish trade, afford an almost irresistible inference in a prize Court that the property was really Spanish — J\Toscitur ab origine. It would take its character from its origin.
But it is immaterial, in my view, whether a prize Court would under such circumstances acquit or condemn. When, the'cover of a Spanish character Was allowed, it was allowed for the purposes of protection! and the disclosure of it was not required elsewhere than in the Spanish dominions. One of the risks against •which the insured meant to guard himself was, in my judgment, a loss on account of the use of the Spanish character: a loss which might have been more plausibly resisted, if there had been a disclosure instead of a concealment of it.
The Court also erred in declaring (in the eighth exception) that the taking on board of any of the papers, which were not necessary by the usage of the trade, if the risk thereby were increased, avoided the Plaintiffs' right to recover. Tiie effect of the whole papers should have been taken together. The evidence did not authorize the Court to consider and separate the, effect of each single paper. . If one unnecessary paper might have increased the risk, if singly considered, and yet, if accompanied by the others, it would not have had that effect, certainly the existencé of that paper with the others would hot have destroyed the right of the Plaintiffs. Yet the opinion of the Court would have authorized the jury to draw a different conclusion.
The Court should have directed the jury that if the papers w'ere authorized by the usage and course of the trade, the concealment of them, under the circumstances, did not vitiate the policy; and that if some wrere authorized and others not, yet the possession or concealment of the latter with the former did not vitiate the policy, •unless the unauthorized, so connected with the authorized, papers increased the risk.
The question, presented by the 9th exception, is whether the Defendants are to be considered as having notice that the voyage insured was to be pursued under a Spanish license. The letter of the 26th March, 1806, expressly refers to the letter of 17th of February, 1806, which had been laid before the underwriters; and they must therefore be deemed conversant' of all the facts therein stated. A party shall be taken ,to have notice of all facts of which he has the means of knowledge in his own possession; or is put directly upon inquiry by reference to documents submitted to his inspection. In the letter of the 17th February the ship is declared to have a permission for the voyage, which in this trade can be understood in no other sense than a license. The Court ought'therefore to have given the direction prayed for by the Plaintiffs.
The Court erred in the opinion expressed in the 11th. exception. The course and usage of trade may in all cases bo proved by parol, whether such' course and usage of trade arise out of the edicts or out of the instructions of the government, and whether the trade be allowed or prohibited by sucli edicts or instructions.
The Court erred also in the latter part of their direction to the jury under the 13th exception. It was immaterial whether the trade was or was not prohibited by the laws of Spain. In either case the underwriter^ were bound to take notice of the usage and course of the trade. The public laws of a country, affecting the course of the trade with that country, are considered to be equally within the knowledge and notice of all the parties to a policy on a voyage to such country.
The'30th exception cannot be supported. The opi? of the Court was entirely correct.
The 24th and 25th exceptions ought to be considered. together in order t<> present the opinion of the Court below with its full fleet. It is clear that any acts done by the assured in tin' voyage according to the course and usage of the trade, although such.acts may increase the risk, do not vitiate the policy, This opinion was pronounced by this Court on the former argument of this case, in refer- nee to the Spanish papers to which, the present appli-atiou of the Defendants obviously pointed. The Court therefore err d in granting the prayer of the Defendants, and in refusing that of the Plaintiffs.
The last (the 28fch) exception cannot be sustained. The proposition is conceived in too general terms, and ¡might mislead the jury, Any acts or omissions of the insured or his agents which, according to the known edicts or decisions of the belligerents, though not; acr cording to the law of nations, would inhance the danger of capture or condemnation, might, if such acts or omissions were unreasonable, unnecessary or wanton, form a sound objection to the right of recovery. The insured can have no right to jeopardize the property by any conduct which the fair objects of the voyage,, or the usage of the trade do not justify.