Case: UNITED STATES v. JU TOY
Abbreviation: United States v. Ju Toy
Decision Date: 1905-05-08
Docket Number: No. 535
Citation: 198 U.S. 253
Volume: 198
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: UNITED STATES v. JU TOY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Peckham concurred in the foregoing dissent.
Pages: 253–280

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES v. JU TOY.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 535.
Argued April 3, 1905.
Decided May 8, 1905.
Even though the Fifth Amendment does apply to one seeking entrance to this country, and to deny him admission may deprive him of liberty, due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial trial and Congress may entrust the decision of his right to enter to an executive officer.
Under the Chinese exclusion, and the immigration, laws, where a person of Chinese descent asks admission to the United States, claiming that he is a native bom citizen thereof, and the lawfully designated officers find that he is not, and upon appeal that finding is approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and it does not appear that there was any abuse of discretion, such finding and action of the executive officers should be treated by the' courts as having been made by a competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final and conclusive; and in habeas corpus proceedings, commenced thereafter, and based solely on the ground of the applicant’s alleged citizenship, the court should dismiss the writ and not direct new and further evidence as to the question of citizenship.
A person whose right to enter the United States is questioned under the immigration laws is to be regarded as if he had stopped .at the limit of its jurisdiction, although physically he may be within its boundaries.
The facts are_stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds for the United States:
Congress- by constitutional enactments has entrusted to executive officers as a special tribunal determination of all questions of fact — including a claim of citizenship — relating to the right of Chinese to enter the United States; and a bare allegation of citizenship is not enough to support a petition for habeas corpus by one denied admission.
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, settled that a Chinaman seeking admission into the United States because of alleged birth therein must in the first instance submit his claim to the determination of immigration officers. Such officers have a right to decide upon all questions of fact, including that of citizenship. The applicant may not ignore them and appeal directly to the courts for determination of his rights. A writ of habeas corpus should not be granted until he has prosecuted an appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor as provided by the statute. After the Secretary has, upon appeal, affirmed the action of immigration officers excluding a China-man a petition for habeas corpus should not be entertained unless the court is satisfied petitioner can make out a prima jade case; a mere allegation of citizenship is not enough.
Whether after final rejection by the Secretary, there ought to be a further trial upon habeas corpus upon a petition showing reasonable cause was not decided.
In behalf of Sing Tuck it was earnestly insisted that a claim of citizenship is a judicial question, determination of which is granted exclusively to the courts by Art. 3, § 2, of the Constitution, and Congress has no power to entrust it to executive officers; moreover, to require an applicant for admission to submit such a claim to an immigration officer violates the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. See also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 546; Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U. S. 193, 200; Japanese Emigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 97. As to due process of law not always requiring a proceeding before a court and power of Congress to delegate matters to executive officers see Murray v. Hoboken Co., 18 How. 272, 280; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 594; Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U. S. 97, 107; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508; Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684.
In both England and America the rule is that probable cause must first be shown to obtain the writ of habeas corpus, whether it be granted at common law or under the statute. Church on Hab. Corp., 2d ed., § 92; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 110; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 250; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 301.
Where the law has confided to a special tribunal authority to. hear and determine matters arising in the course of its-duties, a decision by it .within the scope of its authority as to- questions of fact is conclusive against collateral attack. Where the jurisdiction depends upon a question of fact which is the very gist of the controversy, the determination of that is generally final. Gonzales v. United States, 192 U. S. 1; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 729; Quimby v. Contan, 104 U. S. 420, 425; United States v. California &c. Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 43.
Where the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the head of a Department, his decision thereon is conclusive; and even upon mixed questions of law and of fact, or of law alone, his action carries a strong presumption of its correctness and the courts will ‘ not ordinarily review it, although they may have the power, and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing. Cases supra and Foley v. Harrison, 15 How. 447; Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 798; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 340; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 535; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 450; Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U. S. 25; Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 51; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 585; Burfenning v. Chi., St. P. &c. Ry., 163 U. S. 323; Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684; Gardner v. Bonesteel, 180 U. S. 369; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106.
Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal of special or limited authority may be said to depend upon the existénce of a certain state of facts which it must pass upon, its decision thereon, if there was any evidence on which to base it, must be held final and conclusive in all collateral inquiries. Cooley’s Const. Lim., 7th ed., 586, and authorities there cited; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency of Law, 2d ed., 1085, and authorities there cited; Church on Hab. Corp., 2d ed., 381, 517; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 568; People's Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I. 258; Evansville &c. R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Indiana, 395; Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 B. & B. 432; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 452; New Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U. S. 185; Wanzer v. Howland, 10 Wisconsin, 8, 16; Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 402; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 468.
A habeas corpus proceeding is collateral to one the validity of which is attacked thereby. In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 553; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193.
The function of habeas corpus is to' test the legality of confinement, and unless that appears contrary to law the writ should not be granted. Immigration officers are required to excludé every Chinaman who fails to show before them a right of entry. The detention necéssary to secure return of an excluded one can not be illegal unless the exclusion resulted from fraud or mistake or from some illegal or unwarranted action by the officers in the proceedings before them.
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the confinement, and unless the court finds such confinement contrary to law the writ should be dismissed. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 662; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 375; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 571; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 381. Unless the return to a writ of habeas corpus is in some way traversed the facts therein stated- must be taken as true. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 94. The writ of habeas corpus, can not properly be used to perform the function of a writ of error or appeal. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 201; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 571.
Mr. Hayden Johnson with whom Mr: Henry C. Dibble and Mr. Oliver Dibble were on the brief, for appellee:
It appears that the District Court found as a fact, upon evidence taken contradictorily with the United States that appellee was born in the United States and is a citizen óf the United States.
The legal presumption is that this judgment was based upon sufficient legal evidence and that the judgment is valid, assuming that the'court had jurisdiction to. issue the writ and was not concluded from trying the matter by the previous adverse decision of the immigration officials, as contended by the Government.
Such persons as the appellee áre citizens of the United States and are entitled to all the rights of citizenship. The Chinese exclusion and restriction laws do not apply to them. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 653. As citizens, they have the right to travel abroad and to return to the United States. If the contention .of the Government in this behalf is sustained,, they must do so at the peril of being excluded and deported by immigration officers appointed to deal with objectionable aliens, and they must be denied the right of appeal to the courts for a judicial determination of the claim of citizenship.
Citizenship is a right of incalculable value. It is a right of which a man cannot be deprived, constitutionally, except by. due process of law; In this connection it is the exact equivalent of the right of liberty. Due process of law, in this regard, is judicial process — the right and opportunity to be heard in a judicial tribune of competent jurisdiction.
. No act of Congress can be construed or understood to be a bar to a judicial hearing and determination of the question of citizenship. Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146.
The act of August 18, 1894, under which it is asserted by the Government in this proceeding that the immigration officials, may finally pass upon the claim of a native. Chinese to the right of citizenship, applies in terms to aliens only.
This court held in the case of Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 160, that the immigration officials, must determine in the first instance the claim of nativity when preferred by an arriving Chinese and that a writ of habeas corpus should not issue until such claim has been passed upon in an orderly manner by the Department of Commerce and Labor. The Government now seeks to obtain a decision that the determination by the Department as to the claim of nativity is and must be final. But Congress has not said that such decision shall be final. The act relied upon applies to aliens only, as already said. There is no rule of law under which it can be contended that such a decision is final. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 83.
Due process of law in a matter affecting the right of a man to be free — the claim of the right, to be and remain in one’s native land and not to be deported therefrom, certainly involves the right of pérsonal liberty — due process of law in this regard- implies the right to have that right determined in a judicial proceeding by a constitutional court óf justice. The proceeding may be never so summary, still, these fundamental rules and rights must be recognized and accorded.'
Citizens of Chinese descent constitute a class of persons —a class of citizens. Can it be contended that Congress has the constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or to deny the right of the writ to any class of citizens?
Habeas corpus is the proper and the only remedy in these cases. In re Jew Wong Loy, 91 Fed. Rep. 240; In re Jung Ah Lung, 25 Fed. Rep. 141, aff’d 124 U. S. 621.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes here on a certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals presenting certain questions of law. It appears that the appellee, being detained by the master of the Steamship Doric for return to China, presented a petition for habeas corpus to the District Court, alleging that he was a native-born citizen of the United States, returning after a temporary departure, and was denied permission to land by the collector of the port of San Francisco. It also appears from the petition that he took an appeal from the denial, and that the decision was affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. No further grounds are stated. The writ issued and the United States made return, and answered showing all the proceedings before the Department, which are not denied to have been in regular form, and setting forth all of the evidence and the orders made. The answer also denied the allegations of the petition. Motions to dismiss the writ were made on the grounds that the decision of the Secretary was conclusive and that no abuse of authority was shown. These were denied, and the District Court decided seemingly on new evidence, subject to exceptions, that Ju Toy was a native-born citizen of the United States. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals alleging errors the nature of which has been indicated. Thereupon the latter court certified the following questions:
"First. Should a District Court of the United States grant a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held for return to China by the steamship company which brought him therefrom, who having recently arrived at a port of the United States made application to land as a native-born citizen thereof and who, after examination by the duly authorized immigration officers, was found by them not to have been born in the United States, was denied admission and ordered deported, which finding and action upon appeal was affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, when the foregoing facts appear to the court and the petition for the writ alleges unlawful detention on the sole ground that petitioner does not come within the restrictions of the Chinese exclusion acts, because born in and a citizen of the United States and does not allege or show in any other way unlawful action or abuse of their discretion or powers by the immigration officers who excluded him?
"Second. In a habeas corpus proceeding should a District Court of the United States dismiss the writ or should it direct' a new or further hearing upon evidence to be presented where the writ had been, granted in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held by the steamship company for return to China from, whence it brought him, who recently arrived from that country and asked permission to land upon the ground that he was born in and was a citizen of the United States, when the uncontradicted return and answer show that such person was granted a hearing by the proper immigration officers who found he was not born in the United States, that his application for admission was considered and denied by such officers, and that thé denial was affirmed upon appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and where nothing more appears to show that such executive officers failed to grant a proper hearing, abused their discretion, or acted in any unlawful or improper way upon the case presented to them for determination?
"Third. In a habeas corpus proceeding in a District Court of the United States instituted in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held for- return to China by the steamship company which recently brought him therefrom to a port of the United States and who applied for admission therein upon the ground that he was á native-born citizen thereof but who, after a hearing, the lawfully designated immigration officers found was not born therein and to whom they denied admission which finding and denial, upon appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, was affirmed — should the court treat the finding and action of such executive officers upon the question of citizenship' and other questions of fact as having been made by a tribunal authorized to decide the same and as final arid conclusive unless it be made affirmatively to appear that' such officers, in the case submitted to them, abused the discretion .vested iri them or in some other way in hearing and determining the same committed prejudicial error?"
We assume in what we have to say, as the questions assume, that no abuse of authority of any kind is alleged. That being out of the case, the first of them is answered by the case of United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 170. "A petition for habeas corpus ought not to be entertained, unless the court is satisfied that the petitioner can make out at ldast a prima jade case." This petition should have been denied on this ground, irrespective of what more.we have to say, because it alleged nothing except citizenship. It disclosed neither abuse of authority nor the existence of evidence not laid before the Secretary. It did not even set forth that evidence or allege its effect. But as it was entertained and the .District Court found for the petitioner it would be a severe measure to order the petition to be dismissed on that ground now, and we pass on to further considerations.
The broad question is presented whether or not the decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor is conclusive. It was held in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 167, that the act of August 18, 1894, c. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. 372, 390, purported to make it so, but whether the statute could have that effect constitutionally was left untouched, except by a reference to cases where an opinion already had been expressed. To quote the latest first, in The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U. S. 86, 97, it was said: "That Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States; prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may come to this country; establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as come here in violation of law; and commit the enforcement of such provisions, conditions and regulations exclusively to exécutive officers, without judicial intervention, are. principles firmly established by the decisions of this court." See also Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 290, 291; Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U. S. 193, 200. In Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 304, 305, it was held that the decision of the collector of customs on the right of transit across the territory of the United States was conclusive, and, still more to the point, in Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, where the petitioner for habeas corpus alleged facts which, if true, gave him a right to enter and remain in the country, it was held that the decision of the collector was final as to whether or.not he belonged to the privileged class.
It is true that it may be argued that these cases are not directly conclusive of the point now under decision, it may be said that the parties concerned were aliens, and that although they alleged absolute rights, and facts which it was contended went to the jurisdiction of the officer making the decision, still, their rights were only treaty or statutory rights, and therefore were subject to the implied qualification imposed by the later statute, which made the decision of the collector with regard to them final. The meaning of the cases and the language which we have quoted is not satisfied by so narrow an interpretation, but we do not delay upon them. They can be read.
It is established, as we have said, that the act purports to make the decision of the Department final, whatever the ground on which the right to enter the country is claimed — as well when it is citizenship as when it is domicil and the belonging to a class excepted from the exclusion acts. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 167; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 546, 547. It also is established by the former case and others which it cites that the relevant portion of the act of August 18, 1894, c. 301, is not void as a whole. The statute has been upheld and enforced. But the relevant portion being a single section, accomplishing all its results by the same general words, must be valid as to all that it embraces, or altogether void. An exception of a class constitutionally exempted.cannot be read into those general words merely for the purpose of saving what remains. That has been decided over and over again. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 98, 99; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 84; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641, 642; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 305; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 685-689; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 455. It necessarily follows that when, such words are sustained they are sustained to their fuál extent.
In view of the cases which we have cited it seems no longer open to discuss the question propounded as a new one. Therefore we do not analyze the nature of the right of a person presenting himself at the frontier for admission. In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464. But it is not improper to add a few words. The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there while his right to enter was under debate.. If, for the purpose of argument, we assume that the 'Fifth Amendment applies to him and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of opinion that with regard to him due process of law does no.t require''a judicial trial. That is the result of the cases which we have cited and the almost necessary result of the power of . Congress to pass exclusion laws. That the decision may be entrusted to an executive officer and that his decisión is due process of law was affirmed and explained in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 660, and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713, before the authorities to which we already have referred. It is unnecessary to repeat the often quoted remarks of Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the whole court in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 280, to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does not prevail in every case. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 546, 547; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508, 509.
We are of opinion that the first question should be answered, no; that the third question should be answered, yes, with the result that the second question should be answered that the writ should be dismissed, as it should have been dismissed in this case.
It will be so certified: