Case: NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. DIXON
Abbreviation: Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Dixon
Decision Date: 1904-05-16
Docket Number: No. 211
Citation: 194 U.S. 338
Volume: 194
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. DIXON.
Judges: the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting.
Pages: 338–356

Head Matter:
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. DIXON.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 211.
Argued April 13, 1904.
Decided May 16, 1904.
A local telegraph operator called upon specially by a train dispatcher to give information relative 'to the arrival of a train at his station, to enable the dispatcher to formulate orders for the movement of other trains, acts in the matter of giving such information as a fellow servant of train operatives in such sense that the master is not liable to train operatives who ' are injured by obeying an erroneous order of the dispatcher that was induced by. false information given by the local operator.
Negligence of a local telegraph operator and station agent of a railway company in' observing and reporting by telegraph to the train dispatcher the movement of trains past his station, which causes the injury or death of a fireman of the company without any fault or negligence of the train dis* patcher, is not the negligence of a vice principal for which the railway-company is liable in damages to the fireman or his personal representatives, but is the negligence of a fellow servant of the fireman the risk of which the latter assumes.
' This case is before us on questions certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The facts as stated are that Chauncey A. Dixon was employed on December 25, 1899, by the Northern Pacific Railway Company as a fireman in operating extra freight train No. 162, and while so .engaged was killed by means of a head-end collision of that' train with extra freight train No. 159. The company had made and promulgated time tables for its regular trains and had adopted reasonable rules for the operation of all its trains. The time tables did not and could not provide for the running of extra trains. The company had in its employ a train dispatcher at Missouja, Montana, who had general power and sole authority to make and promulgate orders for the running on the division of the road on which this collision occurred of those trains which were not governed by the time tables. A large proportion of its freight trains on this division were run as extra trains and the times of their arrival and departure were not shown on the regular time tables, but their movements were made upon telegraphic orders issued by the train dispatcher upon information furnished by telegraph to him by the station agents and operators along the line of the road. All these facts were known to Dixon. One of the rulés of the company was: "Operators will promptly record in. a book to be kept for the purpose and report to the superintendent the time of arrival and departure of all trains and the direction in which extra trains are moving.” The reports mentioned in this rule were made to the train dispatcher and he was vested with the authority of the superintendent to issue orders for the movement of trains. .
These two freight trains were running in opposite directions, train No. 162 going east. It arrived at Bonita at 12:35 a. m. and left there at 12:50 a. m. The local operator and station agent at that place was asleep and did not know of or report its arrival and passage to the dispatcher. None of the crew of that .train were aware of the fact that train No. 159 was coming west. The railroad had but one track. At 1: 05 A. M. No. 159 reached Garrison, about 48 miles east of Bonita, and' that' was reported to the train dispatcher. Thereupon ■ he asked the operator at Bonita, by telegraph, whether No. 162 had arrived there, and the operator promptly answered that it had not. This question was repeated, and the operator asked if he was sure that No. 162 had not passed Bonita, and he replied that he was sure that it had not. Thereupon the train dispatcher issued orders for the movement of these two .trains, which were sufficient to guard against collision if the. information received had been ■ correct, but as it was not correct, the movement of the trains resulted in a collision and the death of Dixon,' to recover damages for which this action was brought. Upon these facts the Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following questions:
“First. When a local telegraph operator is called upon specially by a train dispatcher to give information relative to the arrival of a train at his station, to enable "the dispatcher to formulate orders for the movement of other trains, does the local operator in the matter of giving such information act as a fellow servant of train .operatives in such sense that the master is not liable to train operatives who are injured by obeying an erroneous order of the dispatcher that was induced by talse information given by the local .operator?
“ Second. Is the negligence of a local telegraph operator and station agent of a railway company in observing and reporting by -telegraph to the train dispatcher the 'movement of trains past his station/ which causes the injury or death of a fireman of the company, without any fault or negligence of the ’ train dispatcher,. the' negligence of' á vice principal for which the railway .company is liable in damages to the. fireman or his personal'representatives, or is it the negligence of a fellow servant of the fireman the risk of which tlie latter assumes?”
Mr. C.' W. Bunn, Mr. Emerson Hadley and Mr. James B. Kerr for plaintiff .in error, submitted:
The question turns oh the character of the act rather than on the relation of the employés to each other. B. & O. Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 385; Nor. Pac. R. R. v. Petersen, 162 U. S. 346, 353.
In New England Railroad Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323, the court reviewing all its prior decisions overruled Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377. Harwell v. B. & W. R. R. Co., 4 Met. 49; Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375; Oakes v. Mase, 165 U. S. 363; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Poirier, 167 U. S. 48; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S, 359; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Camp, 31 U. S. App. 213, 236; C., N. O. &c. R. R. Co. v. Clark, 16 U. S. App. 17; Randall v. B. & O. R. R., 109 U. S. 478.
The precise negligence of the operator was his failure to observe and report to the dispatcher the passage of a train by his station, which resulted in the dispatcher giving orders for another train to move in the opposite direction. The operator was as much a fellow servant of the fireman in the performance of the duty of observing the passage of trains by his station and reporting to the dispatcher, as in communicating orders of the dispatcher to trainmen. Indeed in communication of orders, an operator seems more nearly a vice principal than in. this case, 31 U. S. App. 240. Trainmen know that in the ordinary course of business the dispatcher in directing'the movement, of trains must necessarily rely upon the observation and report of station operators, and they know that if an operator is .negligent and fails to observe and report correctly' the natural and probable result is wrong orders and a. collision. In entering the employment they therefore assume this risk.
See Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Bentz, 40 C. C. A. 56, where a failure of the telegraph operator to keep the train dispatcher advised as to the whereabouts of á train was, as in this case, the cause of .wrong orders resulting in a collision. See also Railroad Company v. Frost, 44 U. S. App. 606; Reiser v. Pennsylvania Co., 152 Pa. St. 38; Sutherland v. Troy & Boston Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 737.
Mr. A. M. Antrobus for defendant in error,
cited as to obligation to provide orders and schedules of trains: B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Andrews, 1 C. C. A. 639; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Poirier, 15 C. C. A. 52; Lewis v. Seifert, 11 Atl. Rep. 514; Railroad Co. v. Camp, 13 C. C. A. 233; Oregon Short Line v. Frost, 21 C. C. A. 186; Danigan v. Railroad Co., 56 Connecticut, 285; Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 213, 226; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 660.
Local operators and the train operators are not fellow servants. Bentz v. Railroad Co., 99 Fed. Rep. 657; 40 C. C. A. 56, distinguished, and see cases cited in that opinion; Dana v. Railroad Co., 92 N. Y. 639; Shehan v. Railroad Co., 91 N. Y. 332; Flike v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 549; Booth v. Railroad Co., 91 N. Y. 38; Ell v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 12 L. R. A. 97; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mix, 121 Fed. Rep. 476.
The local operator is a vice principal. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 42 C. C. A. 188; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 627; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Camp, 13 C. C. A. 233; Hankins v. Railroad Co., 142 N. Y. 416; Harrison v. Railroad Co., 79 Michigan, 407; Hall v. Galveston &c. R. R. Co., 39 Fed. Rep 18; Price v. Railroad Co., 145 U. S. 651.

Opinion:
Me. Justice Beewee,
after making the foregoing state ment, delivered the opinion of the court.
A servant is entitled to recover damages for injuries suffered through the personal fault or misconduct of his employer, but when the employer has been personally free from blame and the injury results from the fault or misconduct of a fellow servant it would seem reasonable that the wrongdoer should be alone responsible, and that one who is. innocent should not be called upon to pay damages. And such is the. general rule. But where the employer is a railroad or other corporation having a large number of employes, sometimes engaged in different departments of service, certain limitations or qualifications of this general rule have been prescribed. Perhaps no question has been more frequently considered by the courts than that of fellow servant, and none attended with more varied suggestions and attempted qualifications. It has been discussed so often that any extended discussion in the present case is unnecessary, and it is sufficient to state the principal suggestions and consider their applicability to the case at bar.
In a recent case in this court, New England Railroad Company v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323, it was said (p.,328):
"We have no hesitation in holding, both upon principle and authority, that the employer is not liable for an injury to one employé occasioned by the negligence of another engaged in the same general undertaking; that it is not necessary that the servants should be engaged in the same operation or particular work; that it is enough, to bring the case within the general rule of exemption, if they are in the employment of the same master, engaged in the same common enterprise, both employed to perform duties tending to accomplish the same general purposes, or, in other words, if the services of each in his particular sphere or department are directed to the accomplishment of the same general end."
Tested by this, it is obvious that the local operator-was a fellow servant with the fireman. They were "engaged in the same general undertaking," the movement of trains. They were called upon "to perform duties tending to accomplish the same general purposes," and "the services of each in his particular sphere or department were directed to the accomplishment of the same general end." The fireman who shovels coal into the fire-box of the engine is not doing precisely the same work as the engineer, neither is the conductor who signals to the engineer to start or do stop, nor the operator who delivers from the telegraph office at the station to the engineer orders to move, and who reports the coming and the going of trains, arid yet they are all working each in his particular sphere towards the accomplishment of this one result, the movement of trains.
Another qualification suggested is where the one guilty of the- negligence has such general • control and occupies such relation to the work that he in effect takes the place of the employer — becomes a vice principal, or alter ego, as he is sometimes called. If an employer, whether an individual or a corporation, giving no personal attention to the work, places it in the entire control of another, such person may be not improperly regarded as the principal and his negligence that 'of the principal. That thought'has in some cases been carried further, .and' when it appeared that the work in which the employer was engaged was divided into separate and distinct departments, the one in charge of-each of those'departments has been regarded as also a vice principal. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 383, we said:
"It is only carrying the same principle a little further and with reasonable application,- when it is held that, if the business of the .master and employer becomes so vast and diversified that it naturally. Separates itself into departments of service, the'individuals placed by-him in charge of those separate branches and departments of service, and given entire and absolute- coritrol therein, are properly to be considered, with respect to employes' under them, vice principals, .representatives of the master, as fully and as completely as if the entire business of the master was by him placed under charge of one superintendent. It was this proposition which the court applied in the Róss case, holding that the conductor of a train has the control and. management of a distinct department. But this rule can only be fairly applied, when the different branches or departments of service are in and of themselves separate and distinct."
So also in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, it was held that the foreman of a gang of laborers em ployed in putting in ties and keeping in repair a part of the road, although he had the power to hire or discharge any laborer and exclusive control and management in all matters connected with their work, was a fellow servant with the men .in the gang, and on page 355 the rule was thus stated:
"The rule is that,in order to form an exception to the general law of non-liability^the person.whose neglect caused the injury must be 'one who was clothed with the control and management of a distinct department, and not a mere separate piece of work in one of the branches of service in a.department.' This distinction is a plain one, and not subject to any great embarrassment in determining the fact in any particular .case."
Obviously there is nothing in this qualification which has application here. The negligent person was a local operator' and station agent, and in no reasonable sense of the term a vic¿ principal or in charge of any department.
Another suggestion is, that the doctrine of fellow servant does not apply where the servant injured and the servant' guilty of the negligence are engaged in separate departments of service. In Northern Pacific Railroad v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, a common laborer was employed under the direction of a section.boss in building a culvert on the line of defendants railroad, and while so employed was struck and injured by a moving passenger train, the. injury resulting solely through the misconduct and negligence of the conductor- and engineer of the train. It was held' that they were fellow servants, and • in respect to this suggestion it was said (p. 357) :
"As a laborer upon a railroad track, either in switching trains or repairing the track, is constantly exposed to the danger of passing trains, and bound to look out for them, any negligence' in the management of such trains is a risk which may or should be contemplated by him in entering upon the service of the company. This is probably the most satisfactory test of liability. If the departments of the two servants are so far separated from each other that the possi bility of coming in contact, and hence of incurring danger from the negligent performance of the duties of such other department, could not be said to be within the contemplation of the person injured, the doctrine of fellow service should not apply."
Applying this to the case before us, manifestly the work of, the fireman and the operator brought the parties closely together in the matter of the movement of the trains. Dixon knew that any negligence on the part of the operator might result in injury to him, and must have contemplated such possibility when he entered the service of the company.
It is urged that "it is as much the duty of the company to give correct orders for the running of its trains so they would not collide as it was to see that their servants had reasonably safe tools and machinery with which to work, and a reasonably safe place in which to work," and hence, that one who is employed in securing .the .correct orders for the movement-, of trains is doing the personal work of the employer, and not to be regarded as a fellow servant of those engaged in operating and running the trains. But the master does not guarantee the safety of place or of machinery. His obligation is only to use reasonable care and diligence to secure such safety. Here the company had adopted reasonable rules for the operation of all its trains. No imputation is made of a want of competency in either the train dispatcher or the telegraph operator. So far as appears, they were competent and proper persons for the work in which they were employed. A momentary act of negligence is charged against the telegraph operator. No reasonable amount of care and supervision which the master had taken beforehand would have guarded against such unexpected and temporary act of negligence. Before an employer should be .held responsible in-' damages it.should appear that in some way, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, he could have avoided the injury. He cannot be personally present everywhere and at all times, and. in the nature of things cannot guard against every temporary act of negligence by one of his employés. As said in Whittaker v. Bent, 167 Massachusetts, 588, 589, by Mr. Justice Holmes, then a member of the Supreme Court, of Massachusetts:
"The absolute obligation of an employer to see that due care is used to provide safe appliances for his workmen is not extended to all the passing risks which arise from short-lived causes. McCann v. Kennedy, ante, p. 23. See also Johnson v. Boston Towboat Co., 135 Massachusetts, 209; Moynihan v. Hills Co., 146 Massachusetts, 586, 592, 593; Bjbjian v. Woonsocket Rubber Co., 164 Massachusetts, 214, 219."
Without discussing more at length the various forms and phases of the question of fellow servants, or the many suggestions which have been made to qualify or limit the general doctrine, we answer the questions presented as follows:
First. The telegraph operator was, under the circumstances described, a fellow servant of the fireman.
Second. The negligence of the telegraph operator was the negligence of a fellow servant of the fireman, the risk of which the latter assumed.