Case: Joel Fletcher, Plaintiff in error, v. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Defendant in error
Abbreviation: Fletcher v. Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1847-01
Docket Number: 
Citation: 5 How. 540
Volume: 46
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Joel Fletcher, Plaintiff in error, v. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Defendant in error.
Judges: Mr. Justice NELSON concurred in the opinions delivered by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Catron.
Pages: 540–633

Head Matter:
Joel Fletcher, Plaintiff in error, v. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Defendant in error.
This case wag very similar to the preceding one. The principal difference was in the admission of the'fact, that the brandy, fox the sale of which the plaintiff in error was indicted, was duly imported into the United States, the duty upon it paid, and that it was purchased by Fletcher from the original importer.
The following admission of facts was'filed in 'the cáuse
“It is admitted, in the above case, that the liquors'alleged in said indictment to have been sold by the defendant, in violation of the act of this State, entitled, An act enabling town councils to grant licenses fot.the retailing strong liquors, and for other purposes,’ was brandy, the growth, produce, and manufacture of the kingdom of France ; which said- brandy was duly imported into the United States at the port of Boston, in the district of Massachusetts, for the purpose of sale in the markets of the United States, and the duties levied thereon by virtue of the-act of Congress of the United States, approved thb 30th day of August, A. D. 1842, entitled, 1 An act to provide revenue from imports, and to change and modify existing laws imposing duties on imports, and for other purposes,’ were duly paid to the collector of the said port of Boston ; that said- defendant bought said brandy of the importer thereof for the purpose of sale ; and, in pursuance of said purpose, did, at the times alleged in said indictment, sell the same, at said Cumberland, without license first had and .obtained from, the town council of the town' of Cumberland.
“It is further agreed that the town council of said town of Cumberland have refused to grant'any license for the year ensuing the Thursday next following the first Wednesday in April, A. D: 1845, for retailing strong liquors'in any quantities, having been instructed by the electors of said town, in town meeting assembled, not to grant any licenses for the purpose aforesaid.”
It is not necessary to recite the whole of the laws of the State, as they were very similar to those of Massachusetts. . The following one-will be sufficient: —
“ An Act in Addition to an Act, entitled, ‘ An Act enabling the Town Councils to grant Licenses, and for other Purposes.’
“ It is enacted by the General'Assembly as follows : —
“ Section 1. No licenses shall be granted, for the retailing of wines or strong liquors in any town or city in this State, when, the electors in such town or city, qualified to vote for general officers, shall, at the annual town or ward meetings held for the election of town or city officers, decide that no such licenses for retailing as aforesaid shall be granted for that year.”
Fletcher was indicted upon two counts. The first was for selling strong liquor, to wit, rum, gin, and brandy, by retail, in a less quantity than ten gallons, without license ; and the second, for selling, and suffering to be sold, in his possessions, ale, wine, and other; strong liquors, by retail, &c., &c.
Upon this .indictment he was convicted, and the case brought from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to this court. The assignment of errors by the counsel of Fletcher was as follows : ■—
Assignment of Errors.-
“ United States of America, Supreme Court: — Joel Fletcher, Plaintiff in error, v. State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Defendant in error.
“ On a judgment of the Supreme Court, begun and holden at Providence, within and for the county of Providence and State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, on the third Monday of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, wherein the' said State of . Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, by Joseph M. Blake, Attorney-General of said State, is prosecutor, and the said Joel Fletcher is defendant, the said Joel Fletcher, upon a writ- of .error upon said judgment, returnable to the next term of the Supreme Court for the United States, to be begun and holden at the city of Washington, in the ■District of Columbia, on- the first Monday of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, assigns for error in the records of process and judgment aforesaid, founded on certain statutes of the said State of Rhode .Island and Providence Plantations, and the. construction thereof by the said Supreme Court, the following, to wit: — That the judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of said State in this case, it being the highest court of law and equity of the said State in which a decision could be had in said case, should be reversed, for the reasons following, viz.:— That the act-of the General Assembly of said State .of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, entitled, £ An act. enabling town councils to grant licenses for retailing strong liquors, and for other purposes,’ and the act entitled, ‘ An act in addition to an act, entitled,. A.n act enabling town councils to grant licenses for retailing strong liquors, and for other purposes,’ and appended hereto and set out as a part of the record in the said cause upon which said judgment was founded, and also the opinion and judgment of said Supreme Court of said State' of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in the application and construction of said acts to the proof submitted in said cause, are void, the same being repugnant to that clause'of the eighth section of the constitution of the United States which provides, — ‘ That the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States ;■ but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ’ ; ■ and are also repugnant to that clause- of the said eighth section of said constitution which provides as follows-: —6 The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ’; .and are also repugnant to that clause of the tenth section of said constitution of the United States which- provides as follows :— ‘ No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports and exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,’ and the acts of Congress, in pursuance of- the aforesaid several clauses of said constitution of the United States now existing in full force, which objections were, at the trial of said cause before said court, taken by the said Fletcher-in bis defence, and were overruled by said court. There is error also in this, to wit, that, by the record aforesaid, it appears that the judgment aforesaid,- in form aforesaid given, was given for the said State of Rhode Island and- Providence Plantations against the said Joel Fletcher; whereas', by the law of the land, the sai d judgment ought to have been given for the said Fletcher agains.-, the said State ; and the said Joel Fletcher prays that the judgment aforesaid, for the errors aforesaid, and other errors in the record and proceedings, and the matters- herein set forth, may be reversed, annulled, and held for nothing-, and that he may be restored to all things which'he has lost by occasion of said judgment.
Joel Fletcher,
By John Whipple, and Samuel Ames,
His *attorneys.” -
The cause was argued by «Mb. Jlmes and «Mr. Whipple, for the plaintiff in error, and «Mr. R. W. Greene, for the State.
Jlmes and' Whipple, for the plaintiff in- error,
read and commented oh the various acts of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, in relation to the licensing of taverns, ale-houses, and the like, and the sale of spirituous liquors therein, commencing in the year 1647, and coming down to the year 1824, for the purpose of showing, that, from the earliest period in the history of the Colony to ¿be last-named period in the history of the State of Rhode Island, her policy bad been uniform op this' subject, and Similar to that of mostChristian and civilized countries, and of all the Colonies and States of the Union,- — that is, to. license and regulate the sale of spirituous liquors, that it might be consistent with the preservation of good order,-and with the Christian virtue of temperance, and not to inhibit it, in enforcement- of)' the Ma-hometan ■ rule df . abstinence. They shotfedv'that .the- licenses granted by the- municipal authorities of ¡the various towns of Rhode Island for the keeping of taverns and the retailing of strong liquors had been a source of revenue to the towns and to the State, to aid in .the maintenance of the police of the State ; and insisted, that, in the fair, construction óf the acts empowering the town officers to grant them, the words “ may grant ” were legally construed “ must or shall grant,” according to the well-known general rule of so eonstruing.the word “ may,” when used in a public act or municipal charter1 to impart an authority to public officers, in the exercise of which the public interest or private rights were concerned ; and that the practice of the authorities- of the- towns of Rhode Island -had always concurred with this well-known rule of legal construction.. To this point they.cited, Backwell’s case, 1 Vernon, 152; Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609 ; S. C., Oarthew, 29.3, 294; King v. -Inhabitants of Derby, Skinner,- 370 ; Magdalen. College case, 3 Atk. 166 ; King v. Mayor and Jurats of Hastings, I Dowl. St Ryl. 149 ; Newburgh Turnp, Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. C. R. 101, 113, 114 ; Ex parte Simopton, 9 Porter’s Ala. R. 390.
They then showed, that, under the influence of what is called the temperance reform,.a'new principle had been introduced.into the legislátion of Rhode Island on this subject, which, after numerous fluctuations, had, in January, 1845, settled the law, if indeed, it was settled, in the shape'.of the act of January, 1845, which ip substance forbids in any town the sale of all strong liquors in less quantities than ten gallons, without , license first had from the town council of the town, and provides, that if, on the day appoint» ed for the election of town officers, a majority of the electors of a town voting on the subject shall vote to grant, or not to grant, licenses for the ensuing municipal year,- the town council of thé town were irrevocably bound during the year to obey the instruction.
They admitted that a law regulating the sale of strong liquors Under á license for the sale, even though a bonus was required for the license, was valid ; but that a law like the present, in its purpose, end, and- operation, as well as in its form, substantially and practically prohibitory of the sale, was, in its application to the case at bar, — in which the liquor sold was' brandy imported from France, upon which, under the act of Congress of 1842, entitled, “An Act to provide revenue from imports, and to change-and modify existing laws imposing duties on imports, and for other purposes,” the duties had been regularly levied and paid, —;void, as repugnant to that act, both as a revenue measure upon which the expenditures of the government of the United States we.re based, and as a regulation of the commerce of the United States with France.
Though they maintained the exclusive power of Congress, under the constitution,, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, as well as among the' States and with the' Indian tribes, — as required by the - necessities of -the country at the time of its formation and adoption as new, — to preserve proper commercial relations abroad, and for the prosperity and peace of the several States, as well as that an adequate revenue might be derived from duties on imports, they waived the discussion of the exclusiveness of this power as an abstract power in Congress, in the present case, for a double reason : — because Congress had exercised it in the subsisting act of 1842, and because the act of Rhode Island could in no proper sense be said to be an exercise of the power to regulate foreign commerce.
They admitted that an act of a State, to come in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce, when not exercised, must of itself be an exercise of that power ; but maintained, that any law pertaining to the mere police of a State might come in conflict with a commercial regulation of Congress ; and, if it did, must, so far as it did, yield to the law of Congress, as the supreme law of the land, when passed in pursuance of the constitution. They were not aware, until the doctrine had been boldly advanced by the counsel for Massachusetts, in the preceding case, — tried with this by order of the court, — that it had been “a growing opinion,” and still less, that by the decision of this court in New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 139, 141, it had become “ the settled law ” of this court and of the land, that in all such cases of conflict the rule of the constitution was reversed, and that the law of Congress became subject to the law of the State, as to the supreme law of the land, and that the clause of the constitution asserting the supremacy of the constitution, and of the laws and treaties of the United States made under it, applied only to the case of concurrent powers ; nor did they so understand that case. They maintained, that the doctrine thus announced was little short of absurdity, since it admitted the supremacy of the law of Congress in the case of concurrent powers, —- in the exercise of. which the governments of the' States and the government of the United States enjoyed, as it were, a joint empire, and where, from the very fact that the powers were concurrent, they could never, in a constitutional sense, be said to conflict, and so there was no room for the supremacy in question, — and denied the supremacy of the United States in the legitimate exercise of its exclusive powers, making the United States the slave of the States in its own exclusive dominions, under a constitution which declared, without limitation or reserve, that its just power should be supreme, not only over the laws, but even the constitutions, of the States. Upon this question they appealed from conservative Massachusetts to democratic Virginia, and cited the 44tlq Paper of the Federalist, p. 183, Gideon’s edition, in which Mr. Madison, in commenting upon the clause of the constitution in question, concludes hi's de-fence against the only objection that was made to' it ■*— that it rendered the constitution, laws, and treaties of the Dnited States supreme over the constitutions of the States — with this statement of die re- suit if this supremacy had not been given : — •“ In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would. have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts ; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.” In this case, a supremacy over the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States was claimed for every, even the most petty, police law of a State, or even a town or city, when that constitution and those laws and treaties were made supreme over the constitution of the Stkte by which, or under the authority of which, the police law was passed. They commented upon the case of New York v. Miln, for the purpose of showing that the general language there used by Mr. Justice ■ Barbour in delivering the opinion, of the court, from which the strange doctrine in question had been inferred, should,- according to the rule in this respect laid down By Mr.. Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, be restrained to the case before the court, which, by the decision of the court, involved no conflict of the powers of the government of the State of- New York with those qf the government of the United States, and, by the illustrations given of the meaning of the language, could be fairly applied only to cases where no conflict existed. Upon this point, they cited also the opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, and of Mr. Justice McBean, in the subsequent case of Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 505, ’509, members of the court at the time the opinion in New York v. Miln was delivered, and concurring in that opinion, for the purpose of showing that they could not have understood .the language in question in the sense contended for.
(Mr. Justice .Wayne here declared his entire dissent from the general opinions expressed in the language in question, and even declared that- he had no. recollection that such language was in the opinion of the court in that case at the time it received his concurrence.)
They concluded upon this point, that if any persons really held ■the doctrine in question, upon the supposition that.it was necessary for the maintenance of certain peculiar institutions of some of the States, which, though guaranteed by the constitution, were at war with its whole spirit, as well as with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, which the constitution carried out as far as it could consistently with the existing condition of the country, they were guilty of £t a blunder,” — in the opinion of a great but unprincipled politician, in such matters, always worse than u a crime.” The clauses in the constitution guaránteeing these institutions were an anomaly in it. It was better, then, to treat those institutions and every thing fairly relating to them as anomalous, — to be governed by peculiar rules, —than, by converting an anomaly into a general rule, to pervert the whole spirit, and invert the whole order', of the constitution, and, by thus stripping the general government of all its powers, deprive the States, and especially the smaller States, of all the rights and protection guaranteed by the United States. They who were willing, and all sensible people- were, to stand by the compromises of the constitution, would do much to redeem the pledge thus given for them ; but it was both unjust and impolitic to require this of them.
They came, then, to the only real question in the cause, whether the law of Rhode Island in question was in conflict with the tariff law, as it was called, of 1842.
The act of Congress admits brandy by name to sale and consumption in the States, at one dollar, per gallon, both for revenue and as a regulation of commerce with France ; and they cited The Federalist, Pap. 12, j>. 46, to show that no inconsiderable revenue was originally anticipated from spirits.
Congress might have prohibited'the importation of brandy, as it did in the same act the importation of obscene prints, &c.; but it licensed the importation, and, by necessary intendment, the sale and consumption, of brandy by the above act, as the United States did, by the treaty of July 4, 1831, with France, the admission of wines at certain rates “ to consumption into the States.” Right or wrong, Congress had said, by the act in question, to the foreign producer, to the importer, retailer, consumer, pay us one dollar per gallon, and you shall have brandy from France, for sale and consumption. Upon this offer all parties had acted, producedj imported, bought of the importer, and in the price of the article had paid the duty ; and after this it was something worse than illusory, that we should be told that the importation only was licensed, or at most the sale in the original package or .cask, and that the States might destroy the whole value of the import by prohibiting its sale and consumption, and thus effectually countervail the legislation of Congress in one form, which it was agreed they could not do in another. This would be to make the constitution deal in mere forms and names, and not in things.
The law- of Rhode Island proceeds upon this formal distinction. It says to Congress, you may license the importation of brandy, but not a drop of it shall be sold or consumed in any town of ours, if the voters o.f the town choose to prohibit it. ' You may expect revenue from it; but so far as our citizens are concerned, not a penny shall they pay. We forbid it by law.
The-law in question is most skilfully devised to effect its purpose. It does not in form prohibit altogether the sale and consumption of foreign brandy, but only really and substantially. It says, you shall not sell in less-quantities than ten gallons, and might as well have said in less quantities'than twenty-eight gallons,' or one hundred gallons, or one thousand gallons! It cuts off, strikes out, one link be tween the importer and consumer, and might as well destroy, and does thus practically destroy, the whole chain ; for there can be no importation without sale, no wholesale without retail, — and these are arbitrary terms, — no retail without consumption.'.
In case of a direct prohibition of sale like thi6 there can be no metaphysical subtilty necessary to ascertain thé degree of conflict between the State law and the law of Congress ; whether it amounts to “ a possible or potential inconvenience,” or “ an extreme inconvenience,” or “ a direct repugnancy,” or “ plain incompatibility.” Incidental diminution of consumption from licenses, taxation, charters of temperance societies, prohibitions of sales to drunkards, children, slaves, -&c., is another thing. Here the prohibition is both direct and substantial. To prohibit and prevent the sale of the imported article is both the purpose and effect of the law; and upon the ground that, by the act of 1842, Congress had licensed what was wrong.
The very test proposed by this court in New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 143, is thus met precisely by the law in question.
It is said that the sale of liquor is immoral.' Then let Congress prohibit, not seek a revenue from its importation. Let reform in this respect begin constitutionally with Congress ; for in no cause, however sacred, can a State be said to act rightly, when acting unconstitutionally.
In application to any other article of commerce between the United States and foreign countries, or between the States, but liquor, it would be admitted that such a law was void, —as to rice, sugar,.cotton, tobacco, flour, cotton goods, French silks, woollen cloths, &c. What , is the ground for distinction ? It is as much within the police power of a State to pass laws to encourage or compel household manufactures, or the raising of certain agricultural products, by forbidding the sale-of cotton, woollen, or silk fabrics, in less quantities than ten, or twenty, or one hundred pieces, — or of cotton, rice, flour, tobacco, by forbidding the sale of these articles in less quantities than ten, twenty, or one hundred bales, casks, bundles, or barrels, — as to prevent the use of imported liquor, by forbidding the sale in less quantities than ten, twenty, or one hundred gallons ; and yet all ..will agree that a law like that supposed would be clearly void, in its application to siish articles imported from foreign countries, or another State. Let some casuist mark the difference between the. cases if he can.
The law in question is no more entitled to be called “ a police law” than the law supposed, if there was any thing in such a mere name. ¡Any law relating to the internal government or police of a ■ State or city is a police law, whether civil or criminal, and it-would be absurd to contend, that constitutionally one police law was more sacred than another ; since-the State or city is the sole judge of the necessity or fitness of either, provided always, that in passing such laws it does not interfere with those constitutions • or laws which control its powers of legislation.
They contended that the fact, that the sale in the case at bar was not of the article in the cask in which it was imported, could not affect the question ; the notion suggested obiter, not adopted, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, that the importation licenses the sale only in the original package, being false in theory, and destructive to the constitutional powers of Congress in practice. As the governments of the United States and of the States operate upon the same men and things, within the same territory, at the same time, it is obvious that all material barriers between them are broken down, and that in general we must look for the boundary line of the two jurisdictions in the relation and condition of the men and things upon which they operate. This is certainly true of the .power to tax imports, or things which have been • imported, and of the prohibition to tax exports, or things to be exported. It is obvious, that the States may and do every day tax residents for their personal property, whether in the form in which it has been imported, and even lying in the custom-house., or in •which it is td be exported, on the wharf, or in the vessel, just as if the import or export was confused with the mass of property in the State ; and no one deems such a tax as a tax upon imports or exports, in the sense of the prohibition of the constitution, or in any proper sense whatever. Nor would such a general exercise of the taxing power by the United States upon all personal property of its citizens, including imports and exports, be -a tax or duty, upon imports or exports, but merely a tax upon personal property, and upon the import c< export as such property. Any discriminating tax, however, upon a tning imported, as such, at any time, in. hny form, either of the law or the import, would certainly be a tax or duty upon imports forbidden to the States ; and any disHminating tax or duty upon a thing to be exported, as such, would be a duty .upon exports forbidden tc the United States, and to the States, except under the control of ongress, for the purpose of executing their inspection laws. There is nothing in the nature or form of an article which makes it an import, only something' in its history ; there is nothing in the nature oi form of an article which makes it an export, only something in its destination ; and if any thing be specifically taxed as imported, or to be exported, it is a tax upon an import, or upon an export, within the letter and spirit of the constitution. Once allow that the States may levy discriminating duties upon things imported from foreign countries, or other States, the moment they have lost their original form, or have been' taken out, as they must be for sale and use, of the package or cask, and the commercial power of Congress, and the revenues- of the United S ates from- this source, are lost together. Once allow- that the. United States may levy discriminating duties upon things to be exported from the States, as such,'in any form or package, or in the process of growth or manufacture, and it is obvious .that the agriculture and manufactures of the ..States are directly at the mercy of the general government. This “ package notion,” as it is called, is one of those vain but natural efforts of the mind to attach itself to something material to rest upon, even in matters which do not admit of such helps and.rests. -
The taxing power is a sovereign power, necessary for the support of government, and never in its nature or effect treated as a repugnant power. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 505. When exerted by the State over personal property in general, including imports, it cannot affect foreign commerce, or the revenues of the United States, since it bears equally upon all articles, and thus keeps their relative value the same. To become mischievous, either constitutionally or practically, to foreign commerce, a tax law must discriminate as to the subjects of it.
This, however, is not true of prohibitory laws, like the law in question. If practically such a law forbids the sale, destroys the vendible character of an imported article, which constitutionally it cannot do, it does not help the law in relation to such articles, that it also destroys the vendible character of the like article manufactured in the State, which ■ constitutionally it may do. It is void pro tanto imports, in any form or shape.
There is also this plain distinction between such a law and an ordinary license law : that the latter does not, like the former, destroy the vendible character of the article, but, admitting this, restricts the power of sale to certain selected persons licensed to sell .the article ; and practically the difference is just as great as the different terms license and prohibition importi
No one denies the right of the States to regulate the sale or punish the improper use of any article, domestic or imported, within their territories, under such customary and proper restrictions as substantially leaves to the. article its vendible character. It is the taking away of this character from imported brandy, upon which the duties have been levied and paid, of which we complain in this case.
Thus, the States may and do prohibit sales of all articles on the Lord’s day, in enforcement of a divine command ; of liquor to drunkards, children, &c., to prevent riot and intemperance ; and they tax and license hawkers and peddlers, and auctioneers of all articles, and retailers of things dangerous in their use, to prevent fraud, regulate domestic trade, raise revenue, and insure public safety and social order. All this, so far from injuriously affecting the sale of things, aids and assists it, by making it safe, regular, profitable, and consistent with the well-being of the' community. The same remark applies to quarantine laws, and sanitary regula tions in general. They may delay the infected- ship, or stop the infected person, or even destroy the infected article ; yet who does not see that in this very way they aid foreign commerce, by-making, it safe to the community which carries it on,, and promote traffic in imports, by preventing all danger in handling, using, or -consuming them ? Even these, however, may be so needlessly restrictive, or, still worse, totally prohibitory in their character, as obnoxiously to interfere with foreign commerce,'and in such case would merit no more favor, on account of the professed purpose of the law, than.if avowedly passed to prevent foreign commerce in certain articles, or to prevent it altogether.
The point where regulation ends and prohibition commences may in some cases be difficult to determine, as many practical questions are. The cases must be decided as they arise, and,-as Mr.. Chief Justice Marshall suggests in Brown v. Maryland, experience will assist and develop the true tests of decision.
It is sufficient that in the case at bar there is no such difficulty, the design, end, and effect of the law in question beinguo prohibit the sale of an article made vendible in the States by a law -of Congress.
The law is deemed more objectionable because in effect it pro? hibits the sale of the same article in some towns in the State, and .licenses it in others;-thus making the law. of Congress operate unequally within the territory of the same State.-
Finally, the record shows that the only proof against the plaintiff in error was of the sale of brandy imported into .Boston, .upon .which the duties had been duly levied and paid. He-.was-willing to take a license and to pay for it, or to sell-his import .through; any person who was licensed to sell it; but the law forbade all sale in any practicable shape in the town in which he lived, in derogation of the right of sale attached to an article imported under the laws of the United States. In its application to his case the law is .void, inasmuch as it derogates from a right secured to him by a law of Congress.
Mr. R. W. Greene, for the State.
The law of Rhode Island is strictly a police law, having for its object the suppression of drunkenness. It was not intended, to • carry out any object of commercial policy. : It was not intended to secure to the citizens of Rhode Island, within her awn territory, qr elsewhere, any advantages of commerce or manufactures beyond what are enjoyed by the citizens of-all the other States. It. was not intended to countervail any-commercial policy of the-federal government.
It is a law intended to aid in the accomplishment of a great moral reform, and indispensable to its success. The federal government have adopted .similar views with the General Assembly of'Rhode Island, in a case coming within the. sphere of their constitutional power. An act of Congress authorizes the substitution of tea and coffee for the spirit rations both in the army and navy.
I shall endeavour to show that the Rhode Island law does not present a ca^e of conflict, upon any sound construction of the constitution. What, are the provisions of the Rhode Island law ? It allows importation,- and sale by the importer, and every body else, in bulk, as imported. It goes further, it allows a retail trade to the importer and every body else in the article • after bulk broken, and that as low as ten gallons. It . goes still further, and vests in the towns a discretionary power to decide at their April town meetings, whether they will grant licenses to sell in quantities under ten gallons for the coming year. The inhabitants of the towns are most interested in the decision, and most able to decide right. Not by caprice, but by sober and enlightened judgment. There is a propriety in leaving the decision to the towns.
An objection to the law is*, that practically, it is said, the prohibition of sales under ten gallons is a' total prohibition. The object in fixing this amount was to prevent sale by the glass.
It is said by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that this law is prohibitory. But it is not necessarily so, nor probably so. Discretion implies not only the power to decide either way, but the probability. of such decisions. If' all the towns had been opposed to granting licenses, then tL« General Assembly would have passed a .general prohibitory.law.
It is agreed, that, if a conflict results from the practical operation of a law, it must be decided as if such conflict had been intended by the legislature. But the necessary effect must be to conflict, and not the possible, or even the- probable effect.
" ’ There»' is .no evidence before the court that .every town in the State, except Cumberland, has not granted licenses, which are now in full effect.. And yet the court is called upon to pronounce ihis law unconstitutional, upon the ground of this possible prohibition, when the prohibition may not exist in any town in the State, except' Cumberland. - The power vested in the towns under this. law is the same as that vested in the town councils under previous laws; A power to grant licenses is a political power in town councils'; and not at all analogous to the cases cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error. Those were cases of private right, where a mandamus would go -to enforce it. • Would such a proceeding lie against a town council by a party to whom a license had been refused ? "But erase from the statute the entire provision vesting any power in the towns to grant licenses, and leave the prohibition upon all sales under ten gallons absolute. This would not be .a case of conflict, because it allows of sales at retail as low as ten gallops.
It is admitted that States have a right to pass license laws. AH had license laws when the constitution was adopted; no change took place. What is a license law but a prohibition upon every body else, except the party licensed ? The difference between a license law and the Rhode Island law is in the degree of prohibition, not the principle. Both are prohibitory; the Rhode Island law may become and probably would become more prohibitory than an ordinary license law. Does this difference render the one law void,' when the other is valid ? How much more prohibitory must a law be than an ordinary license law, in order to render it void ?
What rule or principle can the court adopt in relation to such a subject. ? How much must be the restriction upon sales, after the article is broken up, and out of the hands of the importer, in order to render the law void ? What means has the court to ascertain the practical effect of restrictions ? And yet it is said the effect is to determine the law.
All license laws, like the law tinder consideration, diminish importations and revenue by checking sales. Their object, like the object of the Rhode Island law, is to prevent drunkenness. In other'words, to prevent consumption. The check upon importation, and the diminution of the publjc revenue, is a consequ'ence of both laws, but- not their object..
If we were to’ coñipare the-amount of sales, there being no regulation by license, and the. amount of sales under a well-guarded license law, it would be very great, undoubtedly; but no one can ascertain it with any accuracy, — certainly this court cannot. A plain, case of conflict must be proved.
This court, in the exercise of its high authority, has always acted upon this subject with caution. It has always requited a plain case of unconstitutionality to be made out.
The plaintiff in error says,, the question of con diet is a question of fact; but it is not shown that any town, except Cumberland, has refused to grant licenses. .
Again ; to render a license law valid, how many licenses must it provide for ? One in each . town,, or how many, or one in each county ? All license laws materially checl$ importation, by diminishing consumption. What degree of check and restriction will render the law void, on the ground of conflict ? Suppose the Rhode Island- law prohibited sales as low as five" gallons, or one gallon, or a quart; what principle will the court adopt ?
License, laws were in force in all the States at die time-of the adoption of the constitution. No alteration of these laws has been made by the States, and they have never been, and are not now, complained of by the federal government. This shows that, by the understanding of all die parties to’ that instrument, these laws do not .iñterfere with any of the powers of the federal government.
The true rule as to conflict is, not a partial check upon sales, or a partial diminution of the. revenue. This involves the inquiry, how much check, how much diminution ? Conflict is a prohibition of all sales. It is said the importation and payment of duties imply the right to sell, that the retail sale is indispensable to give value to ■ &e wholesale trade, and therefore a prohibition of the retail sale is CVoid. Payment of duties gives no greater right than importation of a free article, tea or coffee.
But a license law prohibits the retail sale to every body but the party licensed, and this is agreed to be valid. The fact of prohibition, therefore,' does not render the law void, but the extent of it. What must that extent be ? Hpw can the court ascertain the effect upon sales and importations, except the effect which is a necessary consequence of the law ? or, in other words, how can they judge, except of an absolute prohibition of all sales ? What means have they to ascertain the difference between the practical effects of one law and another, both being prohibitory,, but prohibitory in different degrees ?
In Brown ■». State of Maryland, the true rule is laid down. When an import has been broken up, or has passed from the hands of the importer, it ceases to be an import. It has then passed into the mass of property of. the State, and is subject to its authority for purposes of police, internal trade, and taxation.
.Unless this be so, Congress may prescribe the police regulations of the States. They may prescribe the extent to' which a restrictive regulation maybe carried, in order to be constitutional:
We cannot overrate the importance of police powers to the States. The means of social improvement, the success of all institutions of learning and religion, depend on the preservation of •this power. We look to the States for the exercise of their authority in aid of all institutions which tend to improve and elevate the moral and intellectual character of the people.
The doctrine of conflict must be expounded with reference to the principle of compromise on which the • constitution is founded.
Congress may authorize the importation of am article which is very injurious to the ■ health or morals of a State. The importer may perhaps sell in bulk ; then the power of Congress is exhausted, and the power of the State begins. Upon such sale the property is mingled with the mass of the. other property of the State, and subject to the State power, either to tax, to prohibit, or regulate, • as its purpose of police or internal trade may require.
What does the internal trade consist in ? In its own products, products of other State’!, and products of foreign nations. If the doctrine is true with regard to foreign products, it is equally so with regard to products of other States. Then the State power over the property of its own citizens, within its own territory, is limited to products of its own. There will be two kinds of property ; one subject to the power of the State, and the other exempt from it.
Unless this be done, it is said the policy of Congress may be countervailed. We answer this by saying that, on the other hand, the police power of the States and the powe^over internal trade will be destroyed. ■ It is not to be. supposed that the States will countervail 'the policy of Congress merely to countervail it. The compromise of, die constitution goes upon a different principle, and at all events the limit of the power of Congress cannot be ex-céeded in order more effectually to carry out its own policy. If this were a consolidated government, the difficulty would not exist. But it is a confederation of States-, external relations are confided .to federal government, whilst all domestic relations belong to th.e States. External policy .may be affected by regulations of internal trade or police of the States. 'This results from the confederacy. Foreign commerce must be affected by internal commerce. Property becomes, the subject of internal commerce when it has become incorporated with the mass of the property of the State. Regulations of internal commerce may affect foreign commerce, and foreign commerce may affect internal commerce. Both are valid, nevertheless. Regulations of internal- trade may check importation of ‘foreign goods, and the introduction of foreign goods may affect the internal trade-and' policy of the State. If both governments keep within their constitutionál limits, there can be no collision or conflict. The laws- of one may affect the operation of the laws of the other. Thus, the police laws of. the States in restraining and partially -prohibiting the salé of-; spirituous liquors may affect the operation of the act of Congress ulider which they are admitted. But this is no conflict. On the other hand, the-act of Congress admitting-spirituous liquors may countervail the policy of the States. But still there is no conflict. A case of conflict must arise from one government or the other exceeding its limits, and then the law-of that government must yield which has exceeded, its authority,, whether federal or State. The provision of the constitution.as to, its supremacy, and the laws passed under it, is confined, to laws passed in conformity tó its powers..
Andrew Peirce, Junior, and Thomas W. Peirce, Plaintiffs in error, v. The State of New Hampshire.
This case originated in the Court of Common- Pleas for the county of Strafford, and was carried to the Superior; Court of Judicature for the First Judicial District of New Hampshire. The plaintiffs in error were indicted, for that they did unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully, and without license therefor from the selectmen of; said- Dover, the same being the town where the defendants then resided, sell'to' one Aaron Sias- one barrel of gin, .at and for- the price of ‡ 11.85, contrary to' the form of.die statute, &c.
The counsel for the State introduced evidence to prove the sale of the gin, as set forth in the indictment; and it was proved, and admitted by the defendants, that they sold to said Aaron Sias, on the day alleged in the indictment, one barrel of American gin, for the price of $ 11.85, and took from said Sias his promissory note, including that sum. It appeared that it was part of the regular business of the defendants to sell ardent spirits in large quantities.
To sustain the prosecution, the counsel for the State relied, on the statute of July 4, 1838, which is in these words, viz. : —
“ An Act regulating the Sale of Wine and Spirituous Liquors. •
‘‘Sect. 1. Be it.enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened, That if anj person shall, without license from the selectmen of the town or place where such person resides, sell any wine, rum, gin, brandy, or other spirits, in any quantity, or shall sell any mixed liquors, part of which are spirituous, such person, so oilending,, for each and every such of-fence, on conviction thereof, upon an indictment in the county Wherein the offence may be committed, shall forfeit and pay a sum mot exceeding fifty dollars, nor less than twenty-five dollars, for the-use of such county.
“ Sect. 2. And be it further, enacted, that ‘the third section, of an act, passed July 7, 1827, entitled, ‘ An. act regulating licensed houses,’ and other acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be, and the same hereby are, repealed.
• “ Approved July 4, 1838.”
The counsel for the defendants moved the court to instruct the jury, that if the law of 1838, under which the respondents were indicted, was constitutional, the sale here was contrary to law, and the note of Sias was void, and that such a payment by note was no payment, and therefore there was no sale. But the court refused so to instruct, the jury, but directed them, that, on the supposition the defendants could not recover the contents of the note, .they might notwithstanding- have .violated the statute. The defendants’ counsel then introduced evidence that the barrel of gin was purchased by the defendants in Boston,- in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,’ brought coastwise to the landing at Piscataqua Bridge, and from thence to the defendants’ store, in Dover, and afterwards sold to Sias in the same barrel and in the same condition in which it.was purchased in Massachusetts. And the defendants’ counsel contended that’the aforesaid statute of July 4, 1838, was unconstitutional and void, because the same is in violation of ce tain public treaties of the.United States with Holland,’France, and other countries, containing stipulations for the admission of spirits into the United States, and because it is repugnant to the. two following clauses in the constitution of the United States, viz. : — .
“ No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.” “ The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”
And the-defendants’ counsel contended that the jury were the judges of the law as well as the fact in the case; that it was their duty to judge of the constitutionality of the act of July 4, 1838, and to form their own opinion upon that question ; and that the court were not to instruct the jury relative to questions of law, as in civil cases, but were merely to give advice to the jury in matters of law. The court instructed the jury, that the position that the ja-w were judges of the law as well as of the fact, as contended for 'by the defendants’ Counsel, was not correct,' to the extent of the general terms in which it was stated ; that the sáme rule existed in this respect' in criminal cases which prevailed in civil cases ; that it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury in relation to questions of law, and that the court was responsible for the correctness of the instructions given; and in case of conviction, if the instructions were wrong, the verdict might be set aside for that Cause ; but that the jury had the power to overrule the instructions of the court,- and decide the law contrary to those instructions, through their power to give a' general verdict of acquittal; and that if they did so, and acquitted the defendants, the court could not correct the matter if the jury had erred, because the defendants could not in such case be tried again; and that the circumstance, that the jury had thus the power to overrule the . instructions of the court, in case of an acquittal, did not show that they had a right to judge of the law. The court .further instructed the -jury, that the statute of July 4, 1838, was not entirely.void, -if' it might have an operation constitutionally in any case ; and that, as far as this case was concerned, it could not be in violation of any treaty with .any-foregn, power which had been referred to, permitting the introduction of foreign spirits into the United States, because the liquor in question here was proved to be American gin. .The.court further instructed the jury that this statute, as it regarded this case, was not repugnant to the clause in the constitution of the. United States providing that no -State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on imports or exports, because the gin in this case was not a foreign article, and was not imported into, but had been manufactured in, the United States. The court further instructed the jury, that this State could not regulate commerce between this and other States ; that this State could not prohibit jthe introduction of articles from another State with such a. view, nor prohibit a sale of them with such a purpose, but that, although the State could not make such laws with such views and for such purposes, she was not’ entirely forbidden to legislate in relation to articles introduced from foreign countries or from other States ; that she might tax them the same as other property, and might regulate the sale to some extent; that a State might pass health and police laws which would, to a certain extent, affect foreign commerce, and . commerce between the States ; and that this statute was a regulation of that character, and constitutional. And the court further said, in conclusion (the sale being admitted, and the instructions of the court that the law, as applicable-to this case, was constitutional, having been given), that nothing farther remained in this particular case, unless the jury saly fit to exercise-the power that they possessed of overruling the instructions of the court, and giving a verdict contrary to those instructions ; and that if they did so, and acquitted the defendants, the court could not set aside the verdict, even if an error had been committed.
The jury having-returned a .verdict, that the' defendants were guilty, the defendants excepted to the foregoing instructions, and to what is said in conclusion of the charge as aforesaid, and filed this bill; which was sealed and allowed.
Joel Parker.
This judgment having been affirmed .by the Superior Court of Judicature, a writ of error brought the case up to this court.
It was. argued at a prior term, by Mr. Hale, for the plaintiffs in error;, and Mr. Burke, for the State, and held until now under a curia advisare vult.
Mr. Hale, for the plaintiffs in error.
As the questions relating to the several interrogatories which were propounded to the jurors, and those which the court below refused to have put to them, and the question whether, in criminal cases, the jury are judges of the law as well as the fact, and every other question raised in the bill of exceptions to tire ruling of the judge who tried the case, save the single one of the constitutionality of the law of New Hampshire, entitled “ An act regulating the sale of wine and spirituous liquors,” passed July 4, 1838, belonged appropriately to the superior court of that State finally to adjudicate upon, and are not supposed in this case to appertain to the jurisdiction of this court, I shall pas.s them over entirely, and proceed at once to the consideration of the only question which this case presents to_ this tribunal for decision. That question is, — “ Is the act of the legislature of New Hampshire, above mentioned, in accordance with, or in contravention of, the constitution of the United States ? ”
The plaintiffs .in error contend that it is repugnant to that clause of the constitution of the United .States which provides that “no State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its. inspection laws ” ; also, because it is repugnant to that clause which declarés that “ the Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian tribes.”
Believing that the whole ground covered by this case has been more than once considered by this court, fully and ably argued by eminent and distinguished counsel on both sides of the question, and so palpably and distinctly decided in divers cases, especially in Brown v. Maryland, 1.2 Wheat. 419, that it is not in the power of sophistry even to withdraw this law from that - sphere of legislation which the decision jn that case prohibited to the States, I trust I shall be considered as having fully discharged my duty to my clients, when I have briefly adverted to a very few of the many palpable reasons assigned by the court for the ground they then assumed, and which, it is confidently believed, will avail to the plaintiffs in error in the present case.
If this, barrel of gin had been imported from a foreign country, could the State of New Hampshire have prohibited its introduction into their territory ? The answer to this interrogatory is obvious and palpable. It will not for a moment be contended, that, while the constitution prohibits any State from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, the right is left to the several States to prohibit importations altogether. The power of regulating imports from foreign countries falls so directly and inevitably under the power to regulate commerce, that it has never been denied to be? long to Congress. I shall proceed upon.the assumption, that no one can controvert this plain proposition. If the State could not prohibit its importation from a foreign country, could the State prohibit its sale ?' Clearly not. Justice Story, in his Commentaries (vol. 2, § 1018), says: — There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the sale of an article and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold:”
• Chief Justice Marshall (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 446), says : —“If this power reaches the interior of a State, and may be there exercised, it must be capable of authorizing the salé of those articles which it introduces. Commerce is intercourse. -; one of its most ordinary ingredients is traffic.- It is inconceivable that the power to authorize this traffic, when given in the m,ost comprehensive terms, with the intent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the point where its continuance is indispensable to its value. To what purpose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorize á sale of the thing imported ? Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse of which importation constitutes .a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of' the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce..' Congress has a' right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell.”
Upon these authorities, I take, it to be clear, that, if this barrel of gin had been imported from a foreign country, the. State of New Hampshire neither could have prohibited its introduction into their territory, nor its sale while it remained in the situation in which it was imported;
The next question is, whether, it being an importation from a sister State instead of a foreign country, it is not equally protected by the constitution and laws of the Union ; or, in other words, is commerce with foreign nations put on a better foundation by the constitution than’ commerce between the several States ? There surely is nothing in the words of the constitution, nothing, in the manner in which the constitution is expressed, to warrant such a position. The provisions applicable to both species of commerce are found in the same sentence, the one immediately following the other. ’ But we are not left to conjecture on this subject. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in the case (Brown «. Maryland) before cited, says : — “ It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a'sister State.” Justice Story, in his Commentaries (vol. 2, § 1062), says “ The importance of the power of regulating commerce among the States,-for the purposes of the Union, is scarcely less than that of regulating it with sovereign States. The history of other nations furnishes the same admonition. In Switzerland,-where the unión is vpry slight, it has been found necessary to provide, that each canton snail be obliged to allow a passage to merchandise through its jurisdiction, without an augmentation of tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the empire, that the princes shall not lay tolls on customs or bridges, rivers or passages, without'the consent of the emperor and Diet. But these regulations are but imperfectly obeyed, and great public mischiefs have followed. Indeed, without this power to regulate commerce among the States, the power of regulating foreign commerce would be incomplete and ineffectual. The very laws of the Union in regard to the latter, whether for revenue, for restriction, for retaliation, or for encouragement of domestic products or pursuits, might be evaded at pleasure, or rendered impotent. In short, in a practical view, it is impossible to separate the regulation of foreign commerce and domestic commerce among the State.s from each other. The same public policy applies to each ; and' not a reason can be assigned for. confiding the power over the one, which does not- conduce to establish'the propriety of■ conceding .the power over , the other.”
If these authorities can establish a position, then. is an importation like the one in the case under consideration entitled to the same privileges’ and immunities, including, of course, the right to. sell, that would have belonged to it if it had been an importation from a foreign country.
This law of New Hampshire has sometimes been supposed to be saved from the operation of the constitutional principles, as laid down by the court in the case of Brown v. Maryland, by the decision in New Yorka. Miln, 11 Peters, 102. An attentive examination of that case, so far as any analogy is found' to exist between that and the present, will furnish no foundation upon which to base any such conclusion. Instead of overruling the doctrines sanctioned by the court, in the cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, and Brown v. Maryland, the court say, that the question involved in the case of New York v. Miln is not the very point decided in either of the cases above referred to ; but, on the contrary, the prominent facts, of that case were in striking contrast with those which characterized the case of Gibbons v< Ogden ; nor, say the court, is there the least likeness between the facts of this case and those of Brown v. Maryland. And the reasons upon which the decision in the last-named case rests are repeated and reaffirmed in the case of New York v. Miln. The court, in stating the difference between the two cases, say : — u Now it is difficult to perceive what analogy there can be between a case where the right of the State was inquired into, in relation to a tax imposed upon the sale, of imported goods, and one where, as in this case, the- inquiry is as to its right over persons within its acknowledged jurisdiction ; the goods are the subject of ‘ commerce, the persons are not. The court did, indeed, extend the power to regulate commerce, so as to protect the goods imported from a State tax áfter they were landed, and were yet in bulk ; but why ? Because they were the subjects of commerce, and because, as the power to regulate commerce, under which the importation was made, implied a right to sell, that right was complete, without paying the State for a second right to sell, whilst the bales or packages were in their original form. But how can' this apply to persons ? They are not the subject of commerce.; and not being imported goods, cannot fall, within a ¡rain of reasoning founded upon the construction of a power given to Congress to regulate commerce, and the prohibition to the States from imposing a duty on imported goods.” Keeping this palpable and most obvious distinction in view, and ascertaining what were the points raised arid settled in the case of-New York v. Miln', there is no danger of the mind being misled by any of the remarks of the court in delivering their opinion in that case. The State qf New York passed a law, requiring, the master of every vessel arriving in New York from any foreign port, or from a port of any of the States of the United States other than New York, under certain penalties, to make a report in writing, containing the names, ages, and last legal settlement of every person who shall have been on board the vessel commanded by him during the voyage. Ii was contended by the defendant in that case, that “ the act of the legislature of New York aforesaid assumes to regulate trade and commerce between the port pf New York and foreign ports, and is unconstitutional antÚVoid.”
The court decided that it was not a regulation of commerce ; that persons were not a subject of commerce, and that it did not come within the principles settled in Gibbons jj. Ogden, or Brown v. Maryland.
Nor can a distinction be found between this case and that of Brown v. Maryland, from the fact, that in Maryland the importer was compelled to pay fifty dollars for his license, and in New Hampshire it does not appear that he is compelled to pay any thing. Chief Justice Marshall, in stating that case, says : — “ The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of a State can constitutionally require the importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the State before be shall be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported.”
To that inquiry the court by its decision gave a negative answer ; and when they add, as the constitution most palpably authorized them to, that “ the principles laid down in this case apply equally to importations from a sister State,” it seems that they decided 'every principle involved in tl^e case at bar, unless there be something peculiar in the subject-matter upon which the legislature of New Hampshire has legislated, viz. wine and spirituous liquor : upon which I propose to submit a few suggestions presently. The question was not as to the amount to be paid for thé license, nor whether any thing was to be paid, but as to the right of the State to require it under any circumstances.
Now let us see what this act of the legislature of New Hampshire undertakes to do. It assumes that the State may prohibit, under-severe penalties to every one within her limits, the entire commerce in wines and ardent spirits. .No matter that we have treaties with foreign powers authorizing their importation and sale into the country ; no matter that Congress have admitted them into the country under the general laws of the whole Union, and, to encourage the manufacture, have made such as are produced from certain specified substances entitled to debenture upon exportation ; no matter that the government of this Union at this moment derives no inconsiderable portion of its revenue from the duties levied upon these proscribed articles of commerce ; this act of New Hampshire subjects every individual who sells a barrel, hogshead, cargo, or any quantity, great or small, without a license from the selectmen of some one oí her towns, to the ignominy and expense of a criminal prosecution, conviction,, and fine or imprisonment.
Is there any thing in the nature of the object concerning which New Hampshire has legislated to constitute it an exception from these general provisions ? It is worthy of notice, that a large proportion of the articles for the sale of which the laws of Maryland required a license, and which laws this court pronounced unconstitutional, consisted of various kinds of distilled spirituous liquors ; and it did not occur to- the distinguished counsellors engaged in that casd? that there was any thing in that circumstance to call for the, application of a rule of construction different from what was.applied to other subjects of commerce.
The. court below, in the case at bar, admit that the State of New 'Hampshire cannot regulate commerce between that and the other States ; that they cannot prohibit, the introduction.of articles from another State, w:th such a view, nor prohibit the sale of them for such a purpose ; but that a State might pass health’and police laws, which wouldv to a. certain extent, affect' foreign commerce-, and commerce between the States ; and that this statute was a regulation of that character, and constitutional.
The doctrine of the right of a State to pass health and police laws, carried to the extent here claimed, would be a virtual abroga-, tion of the constitution, and a total nullification of that power in the general government to regulate commerce, which was one of .the' chief objects proposed to be attained by the establishment of the federal constitution. Let us test this principle by some subject other than wine and ardent spirits. Many .philanthropists and physicians contend that the use of tobacco is as injurious as that of intoxicating drink. Will it for a moment be supposed that therefore a State, or any number of States, may prohibit the introduction of tobacco within their borders, and make the selling of it an indictable offence ? May one or more of the wool-growing States of this Union, under the right to make health and police regulations, prohibit .the introduction of cotton into their limits, and make him who would sell it a felon, and then escape the condemnation so justly due to such an unwarrantable assumption of power, on the-ground that it was more healthful for their citizens to be clad in woollen than in cotton garments ? Not a few reformers of the present day believe and affirm that the use of tea and coffee is, in all cases, injurious ; and if such a sect should momentarily acquire the ascendency in any of the State legislatures, may they render, commerce in those articles criminal ?
Another sect of reformers, by no means despicable in point of numbers or talents, honestly believe, and strenuously assert, that the use of animal food is an evil which ought not to be tolerated; but may a State, a majority of whose citizens entertain such an opinion, punish with fine and imprisonment the act of selling beef and pork, imported from a sister State ?
May a State engaged in the whale fishery prohibit the introduction of tallow candles, and make the salé of them criminal on any such pretence, or a. State interested in the manufacture of the latter article prohibit the introduction of oil, or sperm candles ?
It may be urged that no such abuse of this power is to be appre hended. But an answer to such a suggestion is found given by that eminent and learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court in the case of Brown v. Maryland, where he says, — “ All power may be abused. It might with equal justice be said, that no State would be so blind to its own interest as to lay duties on importation which would either prohibit or diminish its trade. • Yet the framers of our constitution have thought this a power which no State ought to exercise.” And Justice Story, in his Commentaries (vol. 2, § 1066), lays down this express limitation to the power of a State to pass inspection laws, health laws, &c., — “ that they do not conflict with the powers delegated to Congress.” And Chief Justice Marshall says expressly, cc that it cannot interfere with any regulation of commerce.”
Let it not be forgotten that the oppressed and degraded condition of commerce was one of the most urgent and pressing reasons which induced the formation'of the constitution. “ Before that time each State regulated it with a single view to its own interest ; and our disunited efforts to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by a want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties ; but the inability of the federal government to enforce.them had become so apparent as to render that power, in a great degree, useless. Those who felt the injury arising from this state of things, and those who were capable of estimating die influence of commerce on the prosperity of nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important'subject to a single government. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise, that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, ánd should comprehend all foreign commerce, and all commerce between the States.” — 2 Story’s Commentaries, § 1054. This power, if it be permitted to the States, will be abused. There is no safety for the whole people in placing it anywhere save in those hands where the constitution has placed it. If, on any pretence, howéver specious, for the purpose of advancing any causé, however popular or praiseworthy, this function of the general government, so vital to its character, may be usurped by „a State legislature, the barrier between the two powers is broken down, and the purposes ■ of the Union itself defeated.- Fanaticism never proposed a measure so wild and absurd, that specious and plausible arguments have not been devised to sustain the measures by which it would effect its object.
. This case finds that the plaintiffs in error purchased this barrel of gin in Massachusetts. No law of any State, or of the Union, was violated.by that act. They were, thus far, in the pursuit and prosecution of a lawful commerce. They brought it coastwise to the landing at Piseataqua Bridge (in New Hampshire), and from thence.to their store in Dover. No law is yet broken. And then, in the same barrel, and in the same condition in which it was pun- chased in Massachusetts, and in which they imported it from a sister State, they sold it to Sias. If, as this court has already decided, the same principles apply to commerce between the States that apply to commerce with foreign nations, may it not, without arrogance or presumption, be asked, if human ingenuity can honestly distinguish this case from the one already decided by this court, and so often referred to ?
Perhaps I owe an apology to this honorable court for urging upon them arguments so familiar and principles so well settled; but believing, as my clients do, that, instead of receiving, as they were entitled to, the protection of the government in their lawful business, they have been branded as criminals, their property taken, and their constitutional rightsátrampled upon, they have, in the last resort, appealed to this tribunal for that redress and protection against unconstitutional State legislation, to afford which so eminently belongs to this honorable court.
They rely with'confidence upon the assurance that here, at least, law may be administered, right defended, and justice maintained, uncontaminated by the breath of a • local and temporary diseased sentiment,'which, in its misguided and abortive attempts at reform, essays to eradicate physical and moral evil from society, and corruption from the human heart, by the wondrous efficiency of legislative enactment. They rely with confidence upon that protection to commerce which this court, on divers occasions,'have extended, though, in so doing, they have been under the, necessity of pronouncing the legislation of more than one State invalid and unconstitutional. It'was to protect commerce that this Union was established. . Take away that power from the general government, and the Union cannot long survive.
Having thus referred the court to the positions which I suppose sustain my clients, — positions occupied and illustrated by the profound learning, deep research, and luminous reasoning of Marshall and Story, in their expositions of this branch of the constitution, —- I leave this case, in the confidence that my clients, in common with all .the other citizens of this whole country, will ever find (as they ever have in. times past) in this court, a full and ample protection for their constitutional rights, against which the waves of fanaticism, as well as of faction, may beat harmlessly.
Mr. Burke, for the State.
(The argument upon the two first points, respecting the rights of the jury, is omitted.)
III. The third and last point raised in this case is the following, viz. :—
That the court by whom this cause was tried instructed the jury that the act of the legislature of the State of New Hampshire, approved July 4, 1838, under which the plaintiffs in error were in- dieted, was not repugnant to the constitution of tbe United States, nor to any treaty between the United State's and foreign nations.
The provisions of the constitution of the United States, to which the law of the State of New Hampshire is alleged to be repugnant, are in the following words : —
1. “ No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.” Art. 1, § 10, part of 2d clause. ■ -
2. “ The Congress .shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” Art. 1, § 8, clause 3.
The act before mentioned is also alleged to be repugnant cc to certain public treaties of the United States with Holland, France, and other countries, containing stipulations for the admission of spirits into the United States.”
By the admission of, the plaintiffs in error on the trial, it appears .that the “ gin ” alleged in the indictment to have been sold by them was “ American gin.”
Therefore, taxing the gin, or prohibiting its sale, except upon the terms of the act of the State of New Hampshire, before referred to, did not conflict with the clause of the constitution of the United States first cited above ; because it was not an “ import,” nor an “ export,” in the sense of that provision of the constitution.
And for the same reason, taxing, or restricting its sale, did not conflict with the first member of the second clause of the constitution, above cited, which clothes Congress with the power “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations” ; nor with .the last member of the clause, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce “ with the Indian tribes ” ; nor with the public treaties of the United States with foreign nations.
If it conflict with any provision of the constitution, it is with the second member of the second clause above cited, which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce “ among the several States ” ; and that, it is apprehended, is the only question of which this tribunal has cognizance in this case. But, before proceeding to the argument of this question, the supposed ground on which the plaintiffs in error rely will be briefly examined.
It is anticipated that the plaintiffs in error will rely mainly on the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, reported in 12 Wheat. 419; 6 Cond. Rep. 554. It therefore becomes necessary to compare the facts of thac case with the present, and to examine the principles laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in giving the opinion of the court.
That case was an indictment for selling “ one package of foreign dry goods,” contrary to an act of the legislature of the State of Maryland, requiring all “ importers” of “ foreign goods and commodities,” selling the same by wholesale, in bulk, to take out a li cense, under a penalty of one hundred dollars, and the forfeiture of the amount of the license tax, which was fifty dollars, for a neglect to comply with the. pro visions .of the act. The act of the legislature of Maryland was a revenue law, and a tax imposed upon the importer under the form of a license tax, a revenue tax, and not a police regulation to restrain the sale of an article which was deemed injurious to the health and morals of the people of that Staté. The persons taxed were the importers of foreign goods, and not the dealers in articles of domestic manufacture or production. The case, therefore, of Brown v. The State of Maryland is different in all its features from the case at bar. It differs from it in. two most prominent features: —
1. The act of the legislature of New Hampshire, under which the plaintiffs in error were indicted, was a police regulation, and hot a revenue law.
2. The commodity sold was not an article of foreign production, nor an “ import,” but was an article of American manufacture.
These two' circumstances distinguish 'the case at bar widely from the case relied on by the plaintiffs in error. . The reasoning, therefore, of the court in Brown v. Maryland will not apply to this case:
But it is apprehended, that, if. the “ gin ” sold by the plaintiffs in error had. been imported, themselves not being the importers, they could not sustain their side of the case on the principles laid down by the court in Brown v. Maryland. Chief Justice Marshall says, the article is exempt from the taxing power of a State “ while remaining the propert3r of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported.” “ Tbi's state of things,” he adds, “is changed if he [the importer] sells them, or otherwise mixes them up' with the property of the State, by breaking up the packages and travelling with them as an itinerant peddler.” In which case “ the tax 'finds the article already incorporated with the mass of property by the act of the importer.” He “ has himself mixed them up in the common mass ; and the'law may take thém as it finds them.”
From these principles two deductions follow : — •
1. That the article is exempt from the taxing power of the State while it is in the possession of the importer in bulk, and has not become incorporated with the general mass of property in the State.
2. When it has thus become incorporated with the mass of property in a Stale, it is subject to all the laws, restrictions, regulations, and burdens to which other descriptions of the mass of property are subject.
In the case at bar, on the supposition that the gin was originally imported, the sale of it by the- importer to the plaintiffs in error, and its subsequent-transportation into New Hampshire, was such an incorporation of it with the mass of property in the State of New Hampshire as to subject it to the taxing powder and police regula- tians of the State, in the same manner and to the same extent to which all property within its jurisdiction was subject.
Again, it is admitted by .the court in Brown v. Maryland, that the “police power ”'remains with the States. The act of the legislature of New Hampshire, under which the' plaintiffs in error were indicted, is a. portion of the police system of that State, and, according to Chief Justice Marshall, is not repugnant to- the constitution of the United States.
But the plaintiffs in error may rely upon the obiter dictum of the court b Brown v. Maryland, that “we [the court] suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State.” It cannot be supposed, however, that a remark thus casually arid loosely expressed can be regarded as authority in the case at bar. If the gin had been foreign gin, and had been purchased by the plaintiffs in error in Massachusetts, and carried to New Hampshire, would it have been such an “ importation from a sister State ” as to exempt it from the taxing power or .police regulations-of the State of New Hampshire ?' And can the fact of its being “ American gin,” and of havrng been purchased in Massachusetts (whether manufactured there or not does not appear), give it greater privileges and exemptions in the State of New Hampshire, than if it had been manufactured in New Hampshire, carried to Massachusetts, and there purchased by the plaintiffs in error, and brought back by them to New Hampshire, and sold in the same vessel in which u was originally put up by the manufacturer? But this point will be more fully considered hereafter.
It. may also be said,'that the “ gin ” was purchased in Boston in the same barrel in which it was afterwards transported from Massachusetts to New Hampshire, and there sold. ’ In other words, it was sold by the plaintiffs in error- “ in bulk,” and therefore comes within the principles of the case of- Brown v. Maryland, and could not. be. taxed by the laws of, New Hampshire, nor its sale' in any way regulated ot restricted.
This; position is not believed to be tenable. If it were, it would be impossible to prevent the evasion of the license laws of the State of New Hampshire. Ardent spirits could not be purchased in Massachusetts in vessels containing a less quantity than one barrel, — in vessels containing no more than a gallon, a quart, or a pint, and in that form carried into the State of New Hampshire, and sold in spite of the laws regulating the sale of spirituous liquors. It is believed that no such quibbling with, or evasion of,.the laws of a State, can shelter itself under the provision of the constitution which grants to Congress the power “ to regulate commerce among the,several States.”
■But the case of Brown v. Maryland does not turn on the principle contended for. The taxing power of Maryland in that case seized' hold of the commodity while it retained the character of an “ import,” and before it became incorporated with the genera, mass of property in the State. In that state of the commodity, ,the court held that the taxing power of Maryland could not reach it. And one of the reasons assigned for the decision was, that the importer, by paying the duty, upon the article to the United States, had purchased the right of selling it, of which he could not be deprived by the legislation of a State. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs in error had purchased no right to sell their gin by the payment of duties upon it; and, furthermore, it had become incorporated with the general mass of property in the State of New Hampshire.
But the true and only question involved in the case, and which is presented for the decision of this tribunal, is now approached.
Is the act of the legislature of New Hampshire regulating the sale of spirituous liquors, Approved July 4,. 1838, repugnant to that provision of the constitution of the United States which clothes Congress with the power.“ to regulate commerce among the several States ” ?
If it should be regarded as a law whose object was revenue alone, it is believed then not to be repugnant to the- provision of the constitution just cited. But, before proceeding further, it becomes necessary to inquire into the meaning of this provision of the constitution, and the extent of the power ■ which it delégates to Congress. And, in order to comprehend it clearly, it will be necessary to recur to the circumstances in the history of the country, prior to the adoption of the present constitution, which led to the investment of this power in Cpngress. Previous to that time, it is well known that the States comprising the Union had separate and independent systems of revenue,, commerce, and navigation. One of their sources' of revenue was the. levying of duties on foreign imports. They had the same power over the products of other States, when imported into their jurisdictions. Each,..State legislated for itself, in relation to duties, tonnage, and navigation. Of course the exercise of this right to regulate commerce, which each State then possessed, led to numerous conflicts with the legislation and the interests of other States, which did not fail to engender deep and malignant animosities, as the history of the times abundantly proves. Trade was restricted betwéen the States, and the interchange of commodities, so essential to the interests and advancement of all, was greatly embarrassed. Hence was there an inoperative necessity to wrest this dangerous power from the indi-, vidual States, and vest it in' the general government, in order to secure a uniformity of its exercise. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, this power is assumed by the court to be exclusively vested in Congress. . The exte.pt, therefore, of the power embraces the whole of it, subject, however, to the inspection laws, health laws, police regulations, &c., &c., which the court, in the case last cited, admit belong to the great mass of general legislation reserved to the States.'
But this powrer extends only to the transportation and introduc tion of articles of commerce from one State into the limits of an-, other. When a commodity is introduced within the jurisdiction of another State, it becomes subject to the laws of that State. In other words, each State has the power to regulate the internal traffic within its limits. This position1 is sustained in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ; Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 ; City of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102.
The power to regulate commerce among the States is supervisory. It was designed by the framers of the constitution to secure to the several States of the Union a free interchange of their products, and their transit through the territories of each, unencumbered with any burdens, duties, or1 taxes, except such as grow out of the inspection, health, and police regulations of the respective States. In other words, it was designed' to secure free trade among the States. And in accordance with- this view of the power of. Congress to regulate commerce between the States is that provision in the constitution which prohibits to. the States the power “ to lay any duty on tonnage ” ; and also that provision of the constitution which prohibits any “ regulation of commerce or revenue, which shall give preference to the ‘ ports of one State. over those of another.’ ” Thus it is the.manifest intention of the constitution that the power of Congress over commerce between the States shall be supervisory merely, and exerted only to secure perfect freedom-of trade and intercourse between the States. (See the Federalist, No; 42, p. 182, Wash, edition, 1831.) With this view, Congress has passed navigation laws, which sefcure to the vessels of one State the same privileges in the ports of another State which the vessels of‘the latter enjoy in its own. ports.
But does the act of the legislature of New Hampshire interfere with this power of Congress, “to1 regulate commerce amotig the States,” as above defined? Does.it prevent the unrestricted introduction of articles from other States into the State of New Hampshire, or their free transit through its territories ? It may be safely affirmed that it does not.
It is stated in the bill of exceptions, that the gin sold by the plaintiffs in error was brought from Boston, the place-of its purchase, “ coastwise to the landing at Piscataqua Bridge, and from thence to the defendants’ store in Dover.” But can the mode by which the article was transported from Massachusetts, and- introduced into the territory of New Hampshire, secure to it any constitutional protection ? It will not be pretended. The gin would have been entitled to the same privileges and immunities if it had been transported ‘by railroad, or by one of the numerous baggage-wagons which run to and from Massachusetts and New Hampshire. It cannot be a privileged article, because it was carried “ coast-wise ” into the State of New Hampshire. But it- may be confidently affirmed that Congress, under the general power1 “ to reg ulate commerce among the several States,” cannot secure to the productions and manufactures of, one State, imported into another State for sale and consumption, greater privileges and exemptions than the productions .and manufactures of the latter would enjoy, within its own jurisdiction. Congress cannot give to the productions and manufactures of Massachusetts, which are carried into New Hampshire fpr sale and consumption, greater privileges and exemptions than the productions and manufactures of the latter State would possess within the limits of its own territories. The-“barrel of gin” purchased by the plaintiffs in error in Massachusetts, and carried to New Hampshire for sale and consumption, could not claim greater privileges and exemptions than a “barrel of gin ” manufactured in the State of New Hampshire. The former must, be subject to the same laws and regulations to which the latter would be'subject. And it will hardly be pretended that the legislature of New Hampshire could not pass laws regulating the sale, within its own limits, of spirituous liquors, or of any other article manufactured within its own jurisdiction. And if Congress should attempt to interfere in such a case, it would be a most gross and palpable invasion of the.reserved rights and the internal police of New Hampshire.
But it may be contended that the license law of the State of New Hampshire conflicts with the provision of the constitution which gives Congress power to regulate commerce among the States, because it is general and sweeping in its provisions, and prohibits the sale of wines and spirituous liquors in any quantity. Such a position, if assumed, cannot be maintained by any sound argument. It would make the constitutional question involved in this case depend upon the quantity of liquor sold, and not the thing itself. And where should be the limit of the law as to the quantity the sale of which it would be constitutional to prohibit ? Would it be confined tó a pint, a quart, or a gallon ? And could the grave constitutional question raised in this case depend upon an absurdity so palpable, not to say ridiculous ?
But the subjection of the productions of one State, when introduced for the purpose of sale and, consumption within the territories of another, to the internal laws arid regulations of the latter State, finds an analogy in the case of the citizens of one State going into the jurisdiction of another.
The constitution provides,, that. “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States.” Citizens of o"ne State,- going into the jurisdiction of another’ State, can claim no exemption from jts laws under this clause. If they énter the territory of another State merely to pass through it, the power of the láw surrounds them to protect them from'violence and to restrain them from crime. If they violate the laws of the State into .whosé territory, they pass, they are subject, like .all the citizens óf that State, to all the penalties which the laws impose. If they rémain in the State, they become subject to the taxing power, and all the burdens and restraints which its laws impose upon its own citizens. Can an article of commerce, produced in one State and carried into another for salé and consumption, claim greater privileges and exemptions in the latter State than citizens of the same State passing into another can claim ? Such a position will hardly be ventured upon.
But, finally, it is contended for the State of New Hampshire, that the act of July 4, 1838, under which the plaintiffs in error were indicted, is a police regulation, which it was wuhin the competency of the legislature of that State to enact, and is therefore not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,.9 Wheat. 203, the court say, that “ inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws, of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike-roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of that immense mass of legislation which embraces every thing within the territory of a State not surrendered to the general government.”
The law of the legislature of New Hampshire under consideration is a police regulation. Its design and object are to preserve the public morals and health of the State, and it is clearly within the recognized constitutional authority of the legislature of that State to enact. This povrer,' it is admitted by the court, in- the cases of Brown v. Maryland, Gibbons v. Ogden, and The City'of New York v. Miln, all before cited, the States may exercise, even if it interfere with foreign commerce. The States may pass Jaws regu-' lating the sale of gunpowder, which is clearly a police regulation, and necessary for the safety of the people, particularly in large cities. They may, also, by their health laws; intercept and prohibit the sale of an infectéd article, notwithstanding the duty may have been paid on it, and it may yet remain in the hands of the importer, in bulk, in the character of an import ; a fortiori may they intercept and prohibit, the sale of an infected article, produced in another State, and transported within the jurisdiction of the former, for sale. For the same reason may the States, by their police regulations, prohibit the sale of obscene books, imported from a foreign country, notwithstanding the duty may have been paid on them, and they may remain in the original package. So, also, may they prohibit thé sale of an obscene- book written in this ebuntry, on which the copyright has been secured from the government of the United» States, notwithstanding the fee required in such cases has been paid. Such cases, it is believed, would be analogous'in principle to the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors. On this point the following cases are relied on : Lunt’s case, G Greenleaf’s (Maine) Rep. 412 ; Beal, plaintiff in error, v. The State of In- dianaj 4 Blackford, 107 ; King v. Cooper, plaintiff in error, 2 Scammon, 305.
And in confirmation of the authorities .cited on this point, it may be observed that the license system was adopted in England at a very early period .of her history, and has ever since- composed a part of the police system of that kingdom. See Crabbe’s History of English Law (London edit.), p. 477 ; see also the different enactments of .the British Parliament, in 7 Evans’s Statutes, pp. 1 — 32, title Jlle-homes. Many of the English statutes relate to the- sale of imported, as well as domestic liquors. They, of course, conflict with the import as well as excise systems of that government ; and yet, it is believed, they never have been called in question.
License regulations were also ádopted by the provincial legisla- • tore of New Hampshire at an early period. See Provincial Laws of New Hampshire (edit, of 1761), pp. 64, 143.'
Similar legislation, it is-believed, has been adopted in nearly, every State in the Union.
But if the law of the legislature of New Hampshire, now- under consideration, shall not be. regarded as a police regulation, it is clearly a law-regulating the internal commerce of the State, and therefore constitutional, according to the. doctrine laid down in Gibbons v. Ogden,, before cited. It may also claim analogy with the laws relating to hawkers and peddlers, which, it is believed, have been enacted in some form in every State in the Union.
And, in conclusion, the remark will-be ventured upon (although,, perhaps, not appropriate in a mere argument), that the people of the State of New Hampshire, almost without distinction of age, sex, or condition, feel a deep and absorbing interest in the final issue of this question. Their sentiments concur with the sense of nearly the whole civilized world, which now concedes that the traffic in intoxicating liquors is a crime against society. It is disapproved by man, arid stands condemned by the great moral Judge of the universe, whose purity cannot countenance such manifest and admitted wrong. It is the-foul parent of immorality and crime, and die prolific source of unspeakable misery and sorrow to innumerable individuals and families. And is it to be contended that.it is repugnant to the constitution of the United States to restrain and prohibit such inhuman traffic ? — to extirpate a moral crime, which grows blacker and more hideous.the longer it is contemplated, and the more its horrible effects become visible ? And deeply anxious are the people' of New Hampshire that this vicious trade shall receive no countenance from the judgment of the august and enlightened tribunal to whose arbitrament this, cause.is now most respectfully submitted.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY.
In the cases of Thurlow v. The State of Massachusetts, of Fletcher v. The State of Rhode Island, and of Peirce et al. v. The State of New Hampshire, the judgments of the respective State courts are severally affirmed.-
The justices of this court do not, hQwever, altogether agree in the principles upon which these cases are decided, and I therefore proceed to state the grounds upon which I concur in affirming the judgments. The first two of these cases depend upon precisely the same principles ; and although the case against the State of.New Hampshire differs in some respects from the others, yet there are important -principles common to all of them, and on that account it is more convenient to consider them together. Each of the cases has arisen upon State laws, passed for the purpose of discouraging the use of ardent spirits within their respective territories, by prohibiting their sale in small quantities, and without licenses previously obtained' from the State .authorities. And the validity of each of them has been drawn in question, upon the ground that it is repugnant to that clause of the constitution of the United States which confers upon Congress the' power, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.
The cases have been separately and fully and ably argued, and the questions which they involve are undoubtedly of the highest importance. But the construction of this clause in'the constitution has been so fully discussed at the bar, and in the opinions delivered by the court in former cases, that scarcely any-1 thing "can be suggested at this day calculated' to throw much additional light upon the subject, :or any argument-offered which has not heretofore been considered, and commented on, and which may not be found in the reports of the decisions of this court.
It is not my purpose to enter into a particular examination of the various passages in different opinions of the court, or of so,me of its members, in. former cases, which have been-referred to by counsel, and relied upon as supporting the construction of the constitution for which they are respectively contending. And I am, the less inclined to do so bécause I think these controversies often arise from looking to detached passages in the opinions, where general, expressions are sometimes-used, which, taken by themselves, are susceptible of a construction that- the court never intended should be given to them, and which in some instances would render different portions of the opinion inconsistent with each other. It is only by looking to the case under.consideration at the time, and taking the. whole opinion together, in_all its bearings, that we can correctly understand the judgment of the court.
The constitution of the United States declares that that .constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-- stance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. It follows that a law of Congress regulating commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, is the supreme law ; and if the law of a State is in conflict with it, the law of Congress must prevail, and the State law cease to operate so far as it is repugnant to the law of the United States.
It is equally clear, that the power of Congress over this subject does not extend further .than the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States ; and that beyond these limits the States have never surrendered their power over trade and commerce, and may still exercise it, free from any controlling power on the .part of the general government. Every State, therefore, may regulate its own internal traffic, according to its own judgment and upon its own views of the interest and well-being of its citizens.
I am not aware that these principles lave ever been questioned. The difficulty has always arisen on their application'; and that difficulty is now presented in the Rhode Island and Massachusetts cases, where the question is how far a State may regulate or prohibit the sale of ardent spirits, the importation of which from foreign countries has been authorized by Congress. Is such a law a regulation of foreign commerce, or of the internal traffic of the State ?
It is unquestionably no easy task to mark by a certain and definite line the division between foreign and domestic commerce, and to fix the precise point, in relation to every imported article, where the paramount power of Congress terminates, and that of the State begins. The constitution' itself does not attempt to define these limits. They cannot be determined by the laws of Congress or the States, as neither can by its own legislation enlarge its own powers, or restrict those of the other. And as the constitution itself does not draw the line, the question is necessarily one for judicial decision, and depending altogether upon the words of the constitution.
This question came directly before the court for the first time in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, lá'Wheat. 419. And the court there held that an article authorized by a law of Congress to be imported continued- to be a part of the foreign -commerce of the country while it remained in the hands of the importer for sale, in the original bale,- package, or vessel in which it was imported ; that the authority given to import necessarily carried with it the right to' sell the imported article in the form and shape in which it was imported, and that no State, either by direct assessment or by requiring a license from the importer before he was permitted to sell, could impose any burden upon him or the property imported beyond what the law of Congress had itself imposed ; but that when the original package was broken up for use or for retail by the im porter, and also when the commodity-had passed from bis hands, into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased to be an import, or a. part of foreign commerce, and became subject to the laws of the State,- and might be taxed for State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State, like any other property. This I understand to ,be substantially the decision in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, drawing the line between foreign commerce, which is subject to the regulation of Congress, and internal or domestic commerce, which belongs to the States, and over which Congress can exercise no control.
I argued the case in behalf of the State, and endeavoured to maintain that the law of Maryland, which required the importer as well as other dealers to take out a license before he could sell, and for. which he was to pay a certain sum to the State, was valid and constitutional; and certainly I at that time persuaded myself that I was right, and thought the decision .of the court restricted the powers of the State more than a sound construction of the consti-. tution of the United States would warrant. - But further and more mature reflection-has convinced me that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court is a just and safe one, and perhaps.the best that could have been adopted for preserving the right of the United' States on the one hand, and of the States on the other, and preventing collision between-them. The question^ I have already said, was a very difficult one for the judicial mind. In the. -nature of' things, the line of division is in some degree vague and indefinite, and I do- not see hovv it could be drawn more accurately and correctly,. or more in harmony with the • obvious intention and object of this provision in the constitution. Indeed, goods imported, while they remain in the hands of the importer, in thé form and sh^pe in which they were brought into the country, can in no just-sense be' regarded as a part of that mass of property in the State-usually-taxed for the support of the State government. The immense, amount of foreign products used and consumed in this country are imported, landed, and offered for sale in a' few commercial cities, and a very small portion of them are intended or expected to be used in the State in which they are imported. A great (perhaps the greater) part imported, in some of the cities, is not owned or brought in by citizens of the State, but by citizens of other States, or foreigners. And while they are in the hands of the importer for sale, in the -form- and shape in which they were introduced, and in which they are intended to be sold, they may be regarded as merely in transitu, and on their way to the distant cities, villages, and country for which they are destined, and where they are expected to be used and consumed, and for the supply of which they were in truth imported. And a tax upon them while in this condition, for State purposes, whether by direct assessment, or indirectly, by requiring a license to sell, would be. hardly more justifiable in prin ciple than a transit duty upon the merchandise when passing through a State. A tax in any shape upon imports is a- tax on the consumer, by enhancing the price of the commodity! And if a State is permitted to levy it in any form, it will put it in the- power of- a maritime importing State to raise a revenue for the support of its own government from citizens of other States! as certainly and effectually as if the tax was laid openly and without disguise as a duty on imports. Such a power in a State would defeat one of the principal objects of forming and adopting the constitution. It cannot be done directly, in the shape of a duty on imports, for that is expressly prohibited. And as it cannot -.be done directly, it could hardly'be a just and sound construction of the constitution which would enable a State to accomplish precisely the same thing under another name, and in a different form.
Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon' its citizens in proportion to the amount they are respectively worth; and the importing merchant is liable to this assessment like any other citizen; and is chargeable according to the amount of his property, whether it consists of money engaged in trade, or of imported goods which he proposes to sell, or any other property of which he is the o wner. .But a tax of this description stands upon a very different footing from a tax on.the thing imported, while it remains a part of foreign commerce, and. is not introduced into the general mass of property in the State. Nor, indeed, can it even influence materially the price of the commodity to the consumer, since foreigners, ás well as citizens of other States, who are not chargeable with the tax, may import goods into the same place and offer them for sale in the same market, and with whom the resident, merchant necessarily enters into competition.
Adopting, therefore, the rule as laid down in Brown v. The State of Maryland, I proceed to. apply it to the cases of Massachusetts and Rhode Islánd. The laws of Congress regulating foreign commerce- authorize the importation of spirits, distilled liquors, and brandy, in casks 6r vessels not containing less than a certain quantity, specified in the laws upon this subject. Now, if the State laws in question came in collision with those acts of Congress, and .prevented or obstructed the importation or sale of these articles by the importer in the original cask or vessel in which they were imported, it would be the duty of this court to declare them void.
It has, indeed, been suggested, that, if a State déems the traffic in ardent spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to introduce immorality, vice, and pauperism, into the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its importation, notwithstanding the laws of Congress ; and that a State may do this upon the same principles that'it may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence, or pauperism from abroad. But it must be.remembered that disease, pestilence, and pauperism are not' subjects of com- meree, although sometimes among its attendant evils. They are not things to be regulated and trafficked 'in, but to he prevented, as far as human foresight or hupian means can guard against them. But spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore, subjects of exchange, barter, and traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of property exists. And Congress, under .its general power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, may prescribe what article of merchandise shall be admitted,. and what excluded; and may therefore admit, or not, as it, shall deem best, the importation of ardent spirits. And inasmuch as the laws of Congress authorize their importation, no State has a right to prohibit their introduction.
But. I do not understand the law of Massachusetts .or Rhode Island as interfering with the trade in ardent spirits while the article remains a part of foreign commerce, and is in the hands, of the importer for sale, in the cask or .vessel in which the laws of Congress authorize it to be imported.. These State laws act altogether upon the retail or domestic traffic within their respective borders. They act upon the article after it has passed the line of foreign commerce, and become a part of the general mass of property in the State. These laws mayj indeed, discourage imports, and diminish the price which ardent spirits would otherwise bring. But although a State is bound to receive and to permit the sale by the importer of any article of merchandise which Congress authorizes to be imported, it. is not bound to furnish a market for it, nor to abstain .from the passage of any law which it may deem, necessary or advisable to guard the health or morals of its citizens, although such law may discourage importation, or diminish the profits of the importer, or lessen the revenue of the general government. And if any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated, to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the constitution of the United States to prevent it .from regulating and restraining the traffic, -or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper.-. Of 'the wisdom of this policy, it is'not my province or my purpose to speak. Upon that subject, each State must decide for itself. I speak only of'the restrictions which the constitution and laws of the United States have imposed- upon the States. And as these laws of Massachusetts and Rhode Island are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and do not come in conflict with any law of Congress passed in pursuance of its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, there is no ground upon which this court can declare them to be void.
I come now to the New Hampshire case, in which a different principle is involved, — the question, however, arising under the same clause in the constitution, and depending on its construction.
The law .of New Hampshire prohibits the sale of distilled spirits, in any quantity, without a license from the selectmen of the town in which the party resides. The plaintiffs in error, who were merchants in Dover,- in New Hampshire, purchased a barrel of gin in Boston, brought it to Dover, and sold it in the cask in which it was.imported, without a-license from the selectmen of the town.. For this sale they were indicted, convicted, and fined, under the law above mentioned.
The power to regulate .commerce among the several States is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the. same words, as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it. And, according to the doctrine in Brown v. Maryland, the article, in question, at, the time of. the sale, was subject to the- legislation of Congress.
The present casé, however, differs' from Brown v. The State of Maryland in this, —that the former was one arising out of commerce With foreign- nations, which- Congress had regulated by law; whereas the present is a case of commerce between two States, in relation to .which Congress has not exercised its ptiwer. Some acts' of Congress have indeed been'referred to in relation to the coasting trade. . But they are evidently intended merely to prevent smuggling, and .do not regulate imports or exports from one''-State to another. This case differs also from the cases of Massachusetts and Rhode Island; because, in these two cases, the laws of the States, operated upon the articles after they had passed beyond .the limits of foreign' commerce, and. consequently were beyond the control and power of Congress. But the law of New Hampshire acts directly upon-an import from one State to another, while in the hands of- the importer for sale, and' is therefore a regulation of commerce, acting upon the article while it is within the admitted jurisdiction of the general government, and subject to its control and regulation.
The question, therefore, brought up for decision is, whether a State is prohibited by the" constitution of the United States from making any regulations of foreign commerce, or of commerce with, another State, although such regulation is confined to its own territory, and made for its own convenience or interest, and does not come in. conflict with any law of Congress. In other words, whether the' grant of power to. Congress is of itself a prohibition to the States, and renders all State laws upon the subject null and void. This is the question upon which the case turns ; and I do not-see how it can be decided upon any other ground, provided.we adopt the line of division between foreign and domestic commerce as marked out by the court in Brown v. The State of Maryland. I proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon it.
It is well known that upon Jthis subject a difference of opinion has existed, and still exists, among the members of this court. But with every , respect for the opinion of my brethren with whom I do not agree, it appears to me to be very clear, that the mere grant of power to the general government cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States. The controlling and supreme power over commerce with foreign nations and the several States is undoubtedly conferred upon Congress. Yet, in my judgment, the Stale may nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the' health of its citizens, make regulations, of commerce for its own ports and har-bours, and for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress. Such evidently 1 think was the construction which the constitution universally received at the time of its adoption, as appears from the legislation of Congress and of the several States ; and a careful examination of the decisions of this court will show, that, so far from sanctioning the opposite doctrine, they recognize and maintain the power of the States.
The language in which the grant of power to the general government is made certainly furnishes no warrant for a different construction, and there is no prohibition to the States. Neither can it be inferred by comparing the provision upon this subject, with those that relate to other powers granted by the constitution to the general government. On the contrary, in many instances, after the grant is made, the constitution proceeds to prohibit the exercise of the same power by the States in express terms ; in soine cases absolutely, in others without the consent of Congress. ' And if it was intended to forbid the States from making any regulations of commerce, it is difficult to account for the omission to prohibit it, when that prohibition has been so carefully and-distinctly inserted in relation to other powers, where 'the action of the State over the same subject was intended to be entirely excluded. But if, as I think, the framers of the constitution (knowing that a multitude of minor regulations must be necessary, which Congress amid its great concerns could never find time to consider and provide) intended merely to' make the power of the federal government supreme upon this subject over that of the States, then the omission of any prohibition is accounted for, and is consistent with the whole instrument. The supremacy of the laws of Congress, in cases of collision with State laws, is secured in the article which declares that the laws of Congress', passed in pursuance of the powers granted, shall be the supreme law ; and it is only where both governments may legislate on the same subject that this article can operate. For if the mere grant of power to the general government was in itself a prohibition to the States, there, would seem to be no necessity for providing for the supremacy of the laws of Congress, as all State laws upon the subject would be ipso Jacto, void, aircFthere could therefore be. no such thing as conflicting laws, nor any question about the supremacy of conflicting legislation. It is only where both may legislate on the subject, that the question can arise.
I have said that the legislation of Congress and the States has conformed tó this construction from the foundation of the government. . This is sufficiently exemplified in the laws in relation to pilots and pilotage, and the health and quarantine' laws..
In relation to the first, they are admitted on all hands to belong to foreign commerce, and to be subject to the regulations of. Congress, under the grant of power of which we are speaking. Yet they have been continually regulated by-the,maritime States, as fully and entirely since the adoption of the constitution as they were before ; and there is but one law of Congress making any specific regulation upon the subject, and that passed as late as 1837, and intended, as it is understood, to alter only a single provision.-of the New York law, leaving the residue of its provisions entirely untouched. It is true, that the act of 1789 provides that pilots shall continue to be regulated by the laws of the respective States then in force, or which' may thereafter be' passed, until Congress shall make provision on the subject. And undoubtedly Congress had the power, by assenting to the State laws then • in force, tó make them its own, and thus make the previous regulations of the States the regulations of the general government. But it is equally' clear, that, as to all future laws by the States, if the constitution deprived them of the power of making .ahy regulations on the subject, an act of Congress could.not restore it. For it will hardly be contended that an act-of Congress can alter the constitution, arid confer upon a State a power which the constitution declares it shall not possess. And if the grant of power to the United States to make regulations of commerce is a prohibition to the States to make, any regulation upon the subject, Congress could .no more -restore to the States the power of which it was thus deprived, than it could authorize them to coin money, or make paper-money a tender in the payment of debts, or to do any other act forbidden to them by the constitution. Every pilot law in the comrriercial States has, it-is believed, been either modified or passed since the act of 1789 adopted-those then in force ; and the provisions since made are all void, if the restriction on the power of. the States now'contended. for should bé maintained ; and. the regulations made,-the duties imposed, the securities required, and penalties inflicted by these various Slate laws are mere nullities, and could not be enforced in a court of justice. It is hardly necessary to speak of the mischiefs which such a construction would produce to those who are engaged in shipping, nayigation, and -commerce. Up to this time their validity has never been questioned. On the contrary, they have been repeatedly recognized and upheld by the decisions of this court; and it will be difficult to show -how this can be done, except upon the construction of the constitution which I am now maintaining: So, also, in regard to health and quarantine laws. They have been continually passed by the States ever since the adoption of the constitution, and the power to pass them recognized by acts .of Congress, and the revenue officers of the general government directed to assist.in their execution. Yet all of these health and quarantine laws are necessarily, in some degree, regulations of foreign commerce in the ports- and harbours of the State. They subject the ship, and cargo, and crqw to the inspection of a health-officer appointed by the State ; they prevent the crew and cargo from landing until the inspection is made, and destroy the cargo if deemed dangerous to health. And during all this time the vessel is detained at the place selected for the quarantine ground, by the State authority. The expenses of these precautionary measures are also usually, and I believe universally, charged upon the master, the owner, or the ship, and the amount regulated by the State law, , and not by Congress!- Now, so far as these-laws interfere with shipping, navigation, or foreign commerce, or impose burdens upon either of them, they are unquestionably regulations of commerce. Yet, as I have already said, the power has been continually exercised by the States, has been continually recognized by Congress ever since the adoption of the constitution, and constantly affirmed and supported by this court whenever the subject came before it.
The decisions of this court will also, in my opinion, when carefully examined., be found to sanction the construction I am maintaining. It is not my purpose to refer to all of the cases in which this question has been spoken of, but only to the principal and leading ones; and, —
First, to Gibbons v. Ogden, because this is the case usually referred to and relied on to prove the exclusive ppwer of Congress and the prohibition to the States. It is true that one or two passages in that opinion, taken by themselves, and detached from the context, w'ould seem to countenance this doctrine. And, indeed, •it has always appeared to me that this controversy has mainly arisen out of that case, and that this doctrine of the exclusive power of Congress, in the sense in which it is now contended for, is comparatively a modern one, and was never seriously put forward in any case until .after the decision of Gibbons v. Ogden, although it has been abundantly discussed since. Still, it seems to me to be clear, upon a careful examination of that case, that the expressions referred to do not warrant the inference drawn from them, arid were not used in the sense imputed to them ; and that the opinion in'that case, when taken altogether and with reference to the subject-matter before the court, establishes the doctrine that- a State may, in the execution of its powers of internal police, make regulations of foreign commerce; and that rsuch regulations are valid, unless they come, into collision with a law of Congress, Upon examining that opinion, it will be seen that the court, when it uses the expressions' which are supposed to countenance the doctrine of exclusive power in Congress, is commenting upon the argument of counsel in favor of equal powers on this subject in the States and the general government, where neither party is bound to yield to the other ; and is drawing the distinction between cases of concurrent powers and those in which the supreme or paramount power was granted to Congress. It therefore very justly speaks of the States as exercising their own' powers in laying taxes for State purposes, although the same thing is taxed by Congress ; and as exercising the powers granted to Congress when they make regulations of commerce. In the first case^ the State power is concurrent with that of the general government, — is equal to it, and is not bound to yield. In the second, it is subordinate and subject to the superior and controlling power conferred upon Congress. And it is solely with reference to this distinction, and in the midst of this argument upon it, that the court uses the expressions which are supposed to maintain an absolute prohibition to the States. But it certainly did not mean to press the doctrine to that extent.. For it does not decide the case on that ground (although it would have been abundantly .sufficient, if the court had entertained the opinion imputed to it), but, after disposing of the argument which had been offered in favor of concurrent powers, it proceeds immediatelyj in a very full and elaborate argument, to show that there was a conflict between die law of New York and the act of Congress, and explicitly puts its decision upon that ground. Now the whole of this part of the opinion would have been unnecessary and out of place, if the State law was of itself a violation of the constitution of the United States, and therefore utterly null and void, whether it did or did not come in conflict with the law of Congress.
Moreover, the court distinctly admits, on pages 20.5, 206, that a •State may, in the execution of its police and health laws, make regulations of commerce, but which Congress may control. It is very clear, that, so far as these regulátions are merely internal, and do not operate on foreign commerce, or commerce among the States, they are altogether independent of the power of the general government and .cannot be controlled by it. The power of control, therefore, which the court speaks of, presupposes that they are regulations of foreign commerce, or commerce among the States. And if a State, with a view to its police or health, may make valid regulations of commerce which yet fall within the controlling power of the general government, it follows that the State is not absolutely prohibited from making regulations of foreign commerce within its own territorial limits,'provided they do not come in conflict with the laws of Congress.
It has been said, indeed, that quarantine and health laws are passed by the States,.not by virtue of a power to regulate commerce, büt by virtue of their police powers, and in order to guard the lives and health of their citizens. This, however, caimot.be said of the pilot laws, which are yet admitted to be equally valid. But what are the police powers of a State ? They are nothing more or less than the. powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dcSñiiiions. And whether a'State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own'limits, in every case it exercises the same power ; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits- of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates ; and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the constitution of the United 'States. -And when the validity, of a State law making regulations of commerce is drawn into question ip a. judicial tribunal, the authority to pass it cannot be made to depend upon the motives that may be supposed to have influenced the legislature, nor can the court inquire whether it was intended to guard the. citizens of the State from pestilence and disease, or to make regulations of commerce for the interests and cónveniénce of trade.
Upon this question the object and motive of the State are of no importance, and cannot influence the decision. It is a question of power. -Are the States absolutely prohibited by the constitution from making any regulations of foreign commerce ? If they are, then such regulations are null and void, whatever may have been the motive of the State "w whatever the real, object of the law; and it requires no law of Congress to control or annul them. Yet the case of Gibbons v. Ogden unquestionably afiirms that such regulations may be made by a State, subject to the controlling power of Congress. And if this may be done, it necessarily follows that the grant of powewto the federal government is not an absolute and entire prohibition to the States, but merely confers upon Congress the superior and controlling power. And to expound the particular passages herein before mentioned in the manner insisted upon 'by those who contend for the prohibition.would be to make different parts of that opinion inconsistent with each other, — an error which I am quite sure-no one will ever impute to the very eminent jurist by.whom the opinion was-delivered.
And that the meaning bf the court in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden was such as I have insisted on is, I think, conclusively proved by the case of Willson et al. v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Peters, 251, 252. In that case a dam authorized by a State law had been erected- across a navigable -creek, so as to obstruct the commerce above it. And the validity of the State law was objected to, on the ground that it was repugnant'to the constitution of the United States, being a regulation of commerce. But the court says, — " The repugnancy of thd law of Delaware to the constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States ; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question " , and then proceeds to decide that the law of Delaware could not be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant State, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject." ?
• The .passages I have quoted show that the validity of the State law was maintained because it was not in conflict with a law of Congress, although it was confessedly within the limits of the power granted. .And it is-worthy of remark, that the counsel for the plaintiff in error in that case relied upon Gibbons v. Ogden as conclusive authority to show the unconstitutionality of the State law, no doubt placing upon the passages Í have mentioned the construction given to them by those who 'insist upon the exclusiveness of the power. This case, therefore, was brought fully to the attention of the court. And the decision in the last case, and the grounds on which it was placed, in my judgment show most clearly what was intended in Gibbons v. Ogden ; and that in that case, as well as in the case of Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, the court held that- a State law was not invalid merely because it made regulations of commerce, but that" its invalidity depended upon its repugnancy to a law of Congress passed hr pursuance of the power granted. And it is worthy, also, of remark, that the opinion in both of these cases was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall; and I consider his opinion in the latter one as an exposition of what he meant to decide in the former.
In the case of the City of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 130, the question as to the power of the States upon this subject.whs very fully discussed at the bar. But 'no opinion was expressed upon it ,by the court, because the case did not necessarily involve it, and there' was great diversity of opinion on the bench. Consequently the point was left open, and has never been decided in'any subsequent case in this court.
For my own part, I have always regarded the eases of Gibbons v. Ogden, and Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, as abundantly sufficient to sanetion the qonstruction of the constitution which ill my judgment'is the true one. Their correctness has never been questioned ; and I forbear, therefore, to. remark on the other cases in which this subject has been .mentioned and discussed.
It may be well, however, to remark, that in analogous cases', where,.by the constitution of the United States, power over a particular subject is conferred on Congress without any prohibition to the States, the same rule of construction has prevailed. Thus, in the case of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, it was held, that the grant of power to the federal government to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia did not preclude the States from legislating on the same subject, provided the law of the State was not repugnant to the law of Congress. And every State in the Union has continually legislated on the subject, and I am not aware that the validity of these laws has ever been disputed, unless they came in .conflict with the law of Congress.
The same doctrine was held in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 196, under the clause in the constitution which gives to Congress the power to establish uniform laws on.the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United' States.
And in the case of Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 269, which arose under the grant of power to. establish a uniform rule of naturalization, where the court speak of the power of Congress as exclusive, they are evidently merely sanctioning the argument of counsel stated in the preceding sentence, which placed the invalidity of the naturalization under the law of Maryland, not solely upon the grant of power in the constitution, but insisted that the Maryland law was " virtually repealed by the constitution of the United States, and the act of naturalization enacted by Congress." Undoubtedly it was so repealed, and the opposing counsél in the case did not dispute it. For the law of the United States covered every part of the Union, and there could not, therefore, by possibility be a State law which did not come in conflict with it. And, indeed, in this, case it might well have been doubted whether the grant in the constitution itself did not abrogate the power of the States, inas.much as thé constitution also provided, that the citizens of eabh State should be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States ; and it would seem to be hardly consistent with this provision to allow any pne State, after the adoption of the constitution, to exercise a power, which, if it operated at all, must operate beyond the territory of the State, and compel other States to acknowledge as citizens those whom it might not be willing to receivé.
In referring to the opinions of those who sat here before usj it is but justice to them, in expounding their language, to keep in mind the character of the case they weré deciding. And this is more especially necessary in cases depending upon the construction of the constitution of the United States ; where, from the great public interests which must always be involved in such questions,'this court have usually deemed it1 advisable to state very much at large the principles and reasoning upon which their judgment was founded, and to refer to and cominent on the leading points made by the counsel on either side in the argument. And I am not aware of any instance in which the court have spoken of the grant of power to the general government as excluding all State power over the subject, unless they were deciding a case where the power had been exercised by Congress, and a State law came in conflict with it. In cases of this kind, the power of Congress undoubtedly excludes and displaces that of the State; because, wherever there is collision- between them, the law of Congress is supreme. And it is in this sense only, in my judgment, that it has been spoken of as exclusive in the opinions of the court to which' I 'have referred. The cáse last mentioned is a striking example ; for there the language of the court, affirming in the broadest terms the exclusiveness of the power, evidently refers to the argument of counsel stated in the preceding sentence.
Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hampshire is,'in my judgment, a. valid one. Fof, although the . gin sold was an import from another Státe, and Congress have clearly the power to regulate such importations, under the grant.of power to regulate commerce among the several States, , yet, as Congress'has made no regulation on'the subject, the traffic in the article may be lawfully regulated by the Staté as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale áltbgether prohibited, according to the policy which the State may suppose to be its 'interest or duty to pursue.
The judgment of the State courts ought, therefore, in my opinion, to be affirmed in each of the three cases before us.
Mr. Justice McLEAN.
Thurlow v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts.— Error from the State Court.
The plaintiff was indicted 'and. convicted under the Revised Statutes of. Massachusetts, chapter 47, and the act of 1837, chapter 242, for selling foreign spirits, in 1841 and 1842, without a license.
The third section of the revised act provides that no person shall presume to be. a retailer Of seller of wine, brandy, rum, or other spirituous liquors, in a less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, and that delivered and carried away all at one time, unless he is first licensed as a retailer of wine and spirits, u under the penalty of twenty dollars." The seventeenth section authorizes the county commissioners to 'grant licenses ; and the second section of the act .of 1837 provides, that nothing contained in that act,'or in the forty-séventh chapter of the Revised Statutes, shall be so construed as to require the county commissioners to grant any licenses, whep in their opinion the public good does not require them to be granted."
. On the trial in the Court of Common Pleas it was objected that a part of the .spirits sold were foreign ; but the court instructed the jury that such sale was in violation of the statute, which was not inconsistent with the constitution of revenue laws of the United States. On this ruling' of .the court an; exception was taken, and the cause was removed to the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, which overruled the exception, and entered a judgment on the verdict against the defendant.
The acts of Congress authorize the importation of spirits in casks of fifteen gallons, and wine in bottles.
The great question in this case is, whether the license laws of Massachusetts are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, or the revenue laws which have been enacted under it.
And,-first, it is insisted that they are unconstitutional, as they prohibit the importer from selling an article that he is authorized to import, without the payment of an additional duty, or impost, which the. State cannot-impose.
The case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, is supposed to be conclusive upon this point. This may be'admitted, and yet it does not rule the' case before us.
Brown was charged with having imported and sold a package of dry goods without a license. An act of Maryland required all importers, before the sale of.their imported articles, to take out a license. And the court held, " that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax on- the article itself" ; — " that the importation» gave a right to the importer to sell the package in question free from any charge by the State, and consequently that the act of Maryland was unconstitutional and void, as being repugnant to that article of the constitution which declares, that no' State shall lay an impost or duties on imports or exports." -
The act was also held to be repugnant to that clause in the constitution which " empowers Congress . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
In Brown's case the reasoning of the court and their decision turned upon the fact, that he,, being the importer pf the package, had a right to sell it; that this right continued so long as the package was unbroken, and remained the property of the importer..
The plaintiff, Thurlow, asserts no right, as an- importer of the article sold. He purchased it in the home market; consequently neither the general reasoning nor the ruling of the court in Brown's, case can control this one.
.The tenth amendment of the constitution declares, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,- are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Before the adoption of the constitution, the States possessed, respectively, all thé attributes of sovereignty. In their organic laws they had distributed their powers of government accofding to their own views, subject to such modifications as the people of each State' might sanction. The agencies established by the articles of confederation were not entitled to the dignified appellation of government
Among the delegated functions it is declared, that "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." This, investiture of power is declared by this court, in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, and also in Brown v. The State of Maryland, " to be complete'in itself, and to acknowledge no limitations other than are prescribed by the constitution."
There may be a limitation on the exercise of sovereign powers, but that State, is not sovereign which is subject to the will of another. This remark applies equally to the federal and State governments. The federal government is supreme within the scope of its delegated powers, and the State governments are equally supreme in the exercise of those powers not delegated by them nor inhibited to them. From this it is clear, that while these supreme functions are exercised by the federal and State governments, within their respective limitations, they can never come in conflict. And when a conflict occurs, the inquiry must necessarily -be, which is the paramount law ? And that must depend upon the supremacy of the powet by which it was enacted. The federal government is supreme in the exercise of powers delegated to it, but beyond this its acts are unconstitutional and void'. So the acts of the States. are void when they do that which is inhibited to ,them, or exercise a power which they have exclusively delegated to the federal government.
The power to tax is common to the federal and State governments, and it may be exercised by each in taxing the, same property ; but this produces no conflict of jurisdiction. The conflicts' which have arisen are mainly attributable to the want of an accurate definition and a clear comprehension of the respective powers of the two governments. ' In a system of government so complex as ours, it, may be difficult,, perhaps impracticable, to prescribe the exact limit, in particular cases, to federal and State.powers.
The powers expressly prohibited to the States are few in number, and,are specified in the constitution. .Those which are exclusively delegated to the federal government, and consequently, by implication, áre prohibited'to the States, are more numerous.
The' States, resting upon their original basis, of sovereignty, •subject only to the exceptions' stated, exercise their powers over every thing connected with their social' and internal condition. A State' regulates its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon all internal matters which relate to its moral' and political welfare. Over these subjects the .federal government has no power. They appertain to the State .sovereignly as- exclusively as powers exclusively delegated appertain to the general government.
The license acts of Massachusetts do not purport to be a regulation of commerce. They are essentially police laws. 'Enactments similar in principle are common to all the States. Since the adoption of its constitution they have existed in Massachusetts. A great moral reform, which enlisted the judgments and excited the sympathies of the public, has given notoriety to this course of legislation, and extended it, lately, beyond its former limit. And the question is now raised, whether the laws under consideration trench upon the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce.
These laws do not in terms prohibit the -sale of foreign spirits, but they require a license to sell any quantity less than twenty-eight gallons. Under the decision of Brown v. Maryland, it is admitted that the license acts cannot operate upon the right of the importer to sell. But, after the import shall have passed out of the hands of the importer, whether it remain in the original package or cask, or be broken up, it becomes mingled with other property in the State, and is subject to its laws. This is the predicament of the spirits in question.
A license* to sell an article, foreign or domestic, as a merchant, or innkeeper or victualler, is a matter of police and' of revenue, within the power of a State. It is strictly an internal regulation, and cannot come in conflict, saving the rights of the importer to sell, of any power possessed by Congress. It is said tp reduce the amount of importation, by lessening the profits of the thing imported. The license is a charge upon the business, or profession, and not a duty upon the things sold. . The same price is charged to evéry retailer of merchandise', or spirits, at the same place, without regard to the amount.sold. This charge is in advance of any sales. It would be difficult to show that Such a regulation reduced the amount of imported goods. But, if this were the effect of the license, would that make the acts unconstitutional ?
The acknowledged police power of a State-extends often- to the destruction, of property. A nuisance may be abated. Every thing prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be removed. Merchandise from a port where a contagious disease prevails, being liable to communicate the disease,, may be excluded ; and, in extreme cases, it may be thrown into the sea. This comes in direct conflict with the regulation of commerce ; and yet no one doubts the local power. It is a power essential to self-preservation, and exists, necessarily,- in every organized community. It is, indeed, the.law of nature, and is possessed by man in his individual capacity. He may resist that which does him harm, whether he be assailed- by an assassin, or approached by poison. And it is the settled construction of every regulation of commerce, that, under the sanction of its general laws, no person can introduce into a community malignant diseases, or any thing which contaminates its morals, or endangers its safety. And this is an acknowledged-principle applicable to all general regulations. Individuals in the enjoyment of their own rights must be careful not to itijure the rights of others.
From the explosive nature of-gunpowder, a city may exclude it. Now this is an' article of commerce, and is not known to carry in- factious disease ; yet, to guard against' a contingent injury, a city may prohibit its introduction. These exceptions are always implied in commercial regulations, where the general government is admitted to have the exclusive power. They aré not regulations of commerce, but acts of self-preservation. And although they affect commerce to some extent, yet such effect is the result. of the exercise of an undoubted power in the State.
The objection is strongly and confidently urged, that a license may be refused under these laws, which would, in effect, prevent importation, as importation is'omy made to sell.
It is admitted that a State law which shall prohibit importations of foreign spirits, being repugnant to the commercial power in the federal government, and contrary to the act of Congress on that subject, would be void. The object of such a law would,-upon its face, be a regulation of commerce, which is not within the powers of a. State. But a State has a right to regulate the sale of this, as of every other imported article, out of the hands of the importer
Thé license system, as adopted in all the States, restrains pety pons from selling by retail, who have not taken a license ; and a license to retail spirits is granted by the c ourt, or some othér body,, at its discretion, and on certain conditions. This is the character of the law under consideration. The applicant .to obtain a license must be recommended by a majority of the selectmen of the town, ás a person of good moral character. Should this recommendation be refused improperly or unjustly, an appeal is given to the com-, missioners of the county. But the commissioners are not required to grant any licenses, " when, in their opinion, the public good does not require them to be granted."
There is no evidence in the record of a refusal to grant a license in this case. The plaintiff is charged with selling without.a license ; but it nowhere appears that be ever applied for one. This would seem, tó be conclusive. For if a State have a right to regulate the retail ef foreign spirits, no one can retail them where a lic.-mse is required without it, Now, that, a State may do this no one doubts. And it is equally clear, if the plaintiff rests upon a prohibition to sell, it must be shown-. This does not appear on the face of the law, and if, in the exercise of their discretion, the commissioners have refused all licenses, that is a matter of fact which must be established. On this ground alone, admitting the force of the arguments for the plaintiff, his case must fail.
But, not to rest, the decision of so important a question on a dev feet of1 proof, we will consider the case as if the fact of refusal to grant the license were in the record.
The necessity of a license presupposes a prohibition of the right to sell as to those who have no license. For if a State may require a license to sell, it may, in the exercise of a proper discretion, limit the number of such licenses as the public good may seem to require. This is believed to have been done under every system of licenses to retail spirits which has been adopted in the different States. And this limitation may, possibly, lessen the'sale of ihe article. This may be the result of any regulation on the subject. But it constitutes no objection to the law. An innkeeper is forbidden to allow drunkenness in his house, and if this prohibition be observed, a less quantity of rum is sold.' Is this unconstitutional, because it may reduce the importation of the article ? Such an argument would be so absurd as to be át once rejected by every sound mind. No one could fail to see that the injunction was laid for the maintenance of good order and good morals. To reject this view would make-the excess of the drunkard a constitutional duty, to encourage the importation of ardent spirits.. -
Such an argument would be, advanced by no one, and. no one would question either the constitutionality Or expediency of the law-which prohibits an innkeeper from encouraging drunkenness. And yet in this simple proposition's the argument answered against the constitutionality of the laws in question.
A discretion on this subject must be exercised somewhere, and it can be exercised nowhere but under the State authority. The State may regulate the sale of-fpreign spirits, and such regulation.is valid, though it reduce the quantity of spirits-consumed. - This -is admitted^ And how can this discretion be controlled. The powers of the general government do not extend to it.; It is in every aspect a local regulation, and relates 'exclusively to the internal police of the State.,
It is said that the object of these Jaws is to prohibit the importation of foreign spirits. This is an inference which their language does not authorize. A license is only required to sell, in less:quantity than twenty-eight gallons. A greater quantity than this may be sold without restriction. But. -it is said, if the legislature may require a license for twenty-eight gallons, it may extend the limitation to three hundred gallons.
' In answer to this it is enough to say, that the legislature has not done what is supposed by the plaintiff's counsel it might do. But if the legislature cannot' extend the license to twenty-eight gallons, what shall be the constitutional limit ? By what rule shall it be ascertained. ? Shall a gallon, a quart, or a pint be the limit ? This is altogether arbitrary, and must depend upon the discretion of the lawmaking power, — the same discretion that imposes a tax, defines offences and prescribes their punishment, and which controls the internal policy of the State. Will it be contended that the legisla-, ture cannot exercise the power, as it may be exercised beyond' the proper limit ? This logic is not good when applied to the practical operations of the government. The argument is, power may be abused, therefore it cannot be exercised. What power dependent on human agency may not be abused?
In all matters of government, and .especially of police, a wide discretion is necessary. It is not susceptible of an exact limitation, but must be exercised under the changing exigencies of society. In the progress of population, of wealth, and of civilization, new and vicious indulgences spring up, which require' restraints that can only be imposed by the legislative power. When this power shall be exerted, how far it shall be carried, and where it shall cease, must mainly depend upon the evil tó be remedied. Under the pretence of a police regulation, a State cannot counteract the commercial pqwer of Congress. And yet, as has been" shown, to guard the health, morals, and safety of the community, the laws of a State may prohibit an importer from landing his goods, and may sometimes authorize their destruction. But this exception to the operation of the general commercial law is limited to the existing exigency. Still, it is clear that a law of a State is not rendered ain-constitutional by ah incidental reduction of importation. And especially is this not the case,-when the State regulation has a salutary tendency on society, and is founded on the highest moral considerations.
The police power of a State and the foreign commercial power of Congress must stand together. .Neither of them can be so exercised as materially to affect the other. The sources and objects of these powers are exclusive, distinct, and independent, and are essential to both governments. The one operates upon our foreign intercourse, the other upon the internal concerns of a State. The former ceases when the foreign product becomes commingled with the other property in the State. At this point the local law attaches, and regulates it as it does other property. The State cannot, with a view to encourage its local manufactures, prohibit the use of foreign articles, or impose such a regulation as shall in effect be a prohibition. But it may. tax such property-as it taxes other and similar articles in the State, either specifically or in the form of a license to sell. A license may be required to' sell foreign articles, when those of a domestic manufacture are sold without one. And if the foreign article be injurious to the health or morals of the community, a State may,,in'the exercise of that great and' conservative police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit the sale of it. No one doubts this, in relation to infected goods or licentious publications. Such a regulation must be made in good faith, and have for its sole object the preservation of the health or morals of society. If a foreign spirit should be imported containing deleterious ingredients, fatal to the health of those who use it, its sale may be prohibited.
When in the appropriate exercise of these federal and State powers, contingently and incidentally their lines of action run into each other ; if the State power be necessary to-the preservation of the mórals, the health, or safety of the community, it must be main tained. But this exigency is not to be founded on any notions of commercial policy, or sustained by a course of reasoning about that which may be supposed to affect, in some degree, the public welfare. The import must be of such a character as to produce, by its admission or use,- a great physical or moral evil. Any diminution of the revenue arising from this exercise of local power would be more than repaid by the beneficial results. By preserving, as far as possible, the health, the safety, and the moral energies of society, its prosperity is advanced.
In McCullough v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428, this court say, —" It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable,, to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure' of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation."
" The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence, of the constituents over their representatives, to guard them against abqse." -
Believing the laws of Massachusetts to regulate licenses for the sale of spirituous liquors to be constitutional, I affirm the judgment in this case.
Andrew Peirce, Jr., and Thomas W. Peirce, v. The State of New Hampshire.
This-is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,' on a judgment given by that court, sustaining the validity of the act of that State, " regulating the sale of wines and spirituous 'liquors," " approved 4th July, 1838 " ; which is alleged to be in violation of' the constitution of the United States, and the revenue acts of Congress made m pursuance thereof.
The first section provides, " that if any person shall, without license from the selectmen of the town, &c., sell any wine, rum, gin, brandy, or -other spirits, in any quantity, &c., such person, so offending, for each and every such offence, &c., shall pay a sum not exceeding fifty dollars," &c. The indictment charged the defendants in the State court with having sold one barrel of gin without a license.
On the trial, if was proved that the barrel of gin was purchased by the defendants in Boston, brought. coastwise to the landing at Piscataqua Bridge, and thence to the defendants' store in Dover, and afterwards sold in the same barrel.
The views expressed by me in the case óf Thurlow v. The State of Massachusetts, at the present term, as regards the power of a State to require a license for the sale of spirituous liquors, apply equally to the present case. A State may require a license to sell ardent spirits of domestic manufacture, as well as foreign. And the only difference between this case and the one above cited is, that the defendants imported this barrel of gin from the State of Massachusetts to that of New Hampshire, where they sold it; and they claim- the right of importers to sell without a license.
In the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 449, after sustaining the right of the importer to sell a package of foreign goods without a license, which an act of Maryland required, the court say, — "It may be proper to.add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case -to apply, equally to importations from a sister State."
This remark of the court was incidental to the question before it, and the point was riot necessarily involved in the decision. Whilst the remark cannot fail to be considered with the greatest respect, coming as it did from a-most learned and eminent chief justice,-yet it cannot be received as authority. It must have been made with less consideration than the other points ruled in that important case.
The- power to regulate commerce among the several States is given to Congress in the same words as the power over foreign commerce. But in the same article it is declared, that " no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue-tp the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another." And it is supposed that the declaration, " that no. State, without the consent of Congress, shall Iky any impost or duties on imports- or exports, except what may be absolutely-necessary for executing its inspection laws," refers to foreign commerce.
A revenue to the general government could never .háve been contemplated from any regulation of commerce among the severa] States. Countervailing duties, under the Confederation, were'im-. posed by the different States to such an extent as to endanger the confederacy. But this cannot bev done under, the constitution by Congress, in whom the power to regulate commerce among the States is vested.
The word import, in a commercial sense, means the goods or other articles brought into this country from abroad, — from another' country. In this sense an importer is a person engaged in foreign commerce. And it appears that in the acts of Congress which regulate, foreign commerce he is spoken of in that light. In Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 443, the court say, the act of Maryland " denies to the importer the right of using the privilege which he has purchased from the United State.s, until he has •purchased it from the State." ' And it was upon the ground.that .the tax was an additional charge or impost upon the thing imported, which a State could not impose, that the above act was held to be unconstitutional.
But neither the facts nor the reasons of that case apply to a person who transports an article from one State to another. In some cases, the transportation is only made a few feet or rods, and generally it is attended with little risk ; and no duty is paid to the federal or State government. And why should property, when conveyed over a State line, be exempt from taxation which is common to all other property in the State ?
There is no act of Congress to which the license law, as applied to this case, can be held repugnant. And the general " power in Congress to regulate commerce among the several States," under-the restrictions in the constitution, cannot affect the validity of the law. -The constitution prohibits impost duties on a commercial-interchange of commodities among the States. The tax in the form of a license, as here presented, counteracts no policy of the federal government, is repugnant to no. power it can exercise, and is imposed by the exercise of an undoubted power in the State. The license system is a police regulation, and, as modified in the State of New Hampshire, was designed to restrain and prevent immoral indulgences, and to advance the moral and physical welfare of society.
The owner of the property, who purchased it in Massachusetts and transported it to New Hampshire, is not an importer in the sense in which that term is used in the case of Brown 'v. The State of Maryland. And there is nothing in the general reasoning of that case, or in the facts, which can bring into doubt the constitutionality of the New Hampshire law.
If the mere conveyance of property from one. State to another shall exempt it from taxation, and from general State regulation, it will not be difficult to avoid the police laws of any State, especially by those who live at or near the boundary. If this tax had been laid on the property as an import into the State, the law wOuld have been repugnant to the constitution. It would have been a regulation of commerce among the States, which has been exclusively givén to Congress. One of the objects in adopting the constitution' was, to regulate this commerce, and -to prevent the States from imposing a tax on' the commerce of each other. If this power has not been delegated to Congress, it is still retained by the States, and may be exercised at their discretion^ as before the adoption of the constitution. For if it be a reserved power, Congress can neither abridge nor abolish it. ,<
But this barrel of gin, like all other property within the State of New Hampshire, • Was liable to taxation by the State. It comes under the general regulation, and cannot be sold without a license. The right of an importer of foreign spirits to sell in the cask, without a license, does not attach to the plaintiffs in error, on account of their having transported this property from Massachusetts to New Hampshire. I affirm the judgment of the State court.
Joel Fletcher v. The State of Rhode Island.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 'under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of-1789. Fletcher was .indicted for selling strong liquor, to wit, rum, gin, and brandy, in less quantity then ten gallons, in violation of the law of Rhode Island. From the evidence, it appeared that the brandy which 'he sold was purchased by him at Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, that it was imported into the United States from France for sale, and that the duties had been regularly paid at the port of Boston. The sale of the liquor was admitted by the defendant, as charged in the indictment.
In the defence it was insisted, that the license act was void, it being repugnant to that clause of the 8th section of the constitution, of the United States which provides, " that the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports, and excises, to pay debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States " ; and is also repugnant to that clause of the 8th section which provides, " that Congress shall have power to'regulate commerce with-foreign nations, and among the -several States, and with the Indian tribes " ; and also repugnant to that clause which declares, that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, arid the acts of Congress in pursuance of the aforesaid several clauses of said constitution," Stc.
The Supreme Court of the State -maintained the validity of the State statute, and tb reverse that judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.
The opinions given by me in the cases of Thurlow v. The State of Massachusetts, and Peirce et al. v. The State of New Hampshire, decide, so far as I am concerned, -this case. The first case related to the sale of spirits of foreign importation, not in the hands of ihe importer; the second, to domestic spirits transported from one State to ^another. And the indictment now under consideration relates to the sale of foreign spirits, purchased in Massachusetts and transported to Rhode Island. There is, however, one point made in this case, which was not embraced by the facts contained in either of the others. It was " agreed, that the town council of Cumberland, in Rhode Island, refused to grant any license for retailing strong liquors for a year from April, 1845, having been instructed to that effect by a town meeting." The effect of this proceeding was to prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors in the town of Cumberland in less quantities than ten gallons.
There is no constitutional objection to the exercisé of this discretion under the- authority of the State law. In the first place, no system of licenses to retail spirits has authorized the grant, except upon certain conditions. No one, it is presumed, can claim a license to retail spirits as a matter of right. Under the law of the State, a discretion, is to be exercised, not only as regards the' individuals who apply, but also as to the number that shall be licensed .in each town. And, if it shall be determined that a certain town is not entitled to a license, it is not perceived how such a decision can be controlled. In the case of Fletcher, it seems that the town council, who have the power to make the grant, were influenced to refuse- it by the popular vote of the town. A more satisfactory mode of instructing public officers,' it would seem, could not be adopted.
This produces no restriction on the sale of spirits in any quantity exceeding ten gallons. And there is nothing in' the record which shows that licenses are not granted in the adjacent towns within the State. But if this did appear, it would not avoid the force of the act. I think this regulation is clearly within the .power of the State of Rhode Island, and, consequently, that the act is not repugnant to the'constitution-of the United States, orto any act of Congress passed in pursuance of it. I therefore affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice CATRON.
Peirce and another v. New Hampshire.
Andrew Peirce and two others were indicted for selling one barrel of gin, contrary to a statute of New Hampshire, passed in 1838, which provides, that if any person shall, without license from the selectmen of the town- where such person resides, sell any wine, rum, gin, brandy, or other spirits, in any quantity, or shall sell any. mixed liquors, part of which are spirituous, such person so offending, for each offence, on conviction upon an indictment, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, nor less than twenty-five .dollars, for the use pf the county.
The barrel of gin had been purchased by the defendants at Boston, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and was brought coastwise by water near to Dover, in New Hampshire, where it was sold in the same barrel and -condition that it had been purchased in Boston. Part of the regular business of the defendants was to sell ardent spirits in large quantities.
The defendants' counsel contended, on the trial, that the statute of 1838 was-unconstitutional and void, because the same is in violation of certain public treaties of the United States with Holland, France, and other countries, containing stipulations for the admission- of spirits into the-United States, and because it is repug nant to the two following clauses in the constitution of the United States, viz.: —
" No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
In answer to these objections, the court instructed the jury, that the statute of July 4, 1838, was not entirely void, if it might have an operation constitutionally in any case; and that, as far as this case was concerned, it could not be in violation of any treaty with any foreign power which had been referred to, permitting the introduction of foreign spirits into the United States, because the liquor in question here was proved to be American- gin.
The court further instructed the jury, that this statute, as it regarded this case, was not repugnant to the clause in the constitution of the United States providing that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on imports or exports, because the-gin in this case was not a foreign article, and was not imported into, but had been manufactured in, the United States.
The court further instructed the jury, that this State could not regulate commerce between this and other States ; that this State could' not prohibit the introduction of articles from another State with such a view, nor prohibit a sale of them with such a purpose ; but that, although the State could not make such laws with such views and for such purposes, she was not entirely forbidden to legislate in relation to articles introduced from foreign countries or from other States ; that she might tax them the same as othev property, and might regulate the sale to some extent; that a State might pass' health and police laws which would, to a certain extent, affect foreign commerce, and commerce between the States ; and that this statute was a regulation of that character, and constitutional.
The jury found the defendants guilty, and the Court of Common Pleas fined them thirty dollars ; from which they prosecuted their writ of error to the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, where the judgment was affirmed. The present writ of error is prosecuted, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to reverse the judgment of tne State court of New Hampshire, on the grounds above stated. And the question and the case presented for our consideration are, whether the State laws, and the judgment founded on them, are repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The court below having decided in favor of their validity, this is the only question that comes within our jurisdiction, although divers others were presented to and adjudged by the State court.
The importance of this case, as regards its bearing on the com- iderce among the States, and on the relations and rights of their citizens and inhabitants, is not to be disguised. To my mind it presents most delicate and difficult considerations.
The first objection, that the statute of New Hampshire violated certain treaties with Holland, France, &c., providing for the admission of ardent spirits, has no application to the- case, as the spirits sold were not foreign, but American gin.
The second objection relies on the first article and tenth section of the constitution, which provides, that "no State shall lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, nor any duty on tonnage," unless with.the assent of .Congress, &cv These áre negative restrictions, where the constitution operates by its own force ; but as no duty or tax was imposed on the gin introduced into New Hampshire from Massachusetts, either directly or indirectly, these prohibitions on the State power do not apply
The third objection proceeds on the clause, that "the Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes," to which it is insisted the State statute is opposed. The power given to Congress is unrestricted, and broad as the subjects to which it relates ; it extends to all lawful commerce with foreign nations, and in the same terms tn all lawful commerce among the States ; and "among" means. Detween two only, as well as among more than two ; if it was otherwise, then an intermediate State might interdict and obstruct the transportation of imports over it to a third State, and thereby impair the general power. The article in question was introduced from one State directly into another, and the first question is, Was it a subject of lawful commerce among the States, that Congress can regulate ? That ardent-spirits have been for ages, and now are, subjects of sale and of lawful commerce, and that- of a large class, throughout a great portion of the civilized world, is not open to controversy ; so our commercial treaties with foreign powers declare them to be, and so the dealing in them among .the States of-this Union recognizes them to be. ' But this condition of the subject-matter was' met by the State decision on the ground, and,On this only, "that the State might pass health and police laws which would, to a certain extent, affect foreign commerce and commerce between the States ; and that the statute [of New Hampshire] was a regulation of that-character, and constitutional."
This was the charge to the jury, and on it the verdict and judgment are founded, and which the State court of last resort affirmed. The law and the decision apply equally to foreign and to domestic spirits, as they must do on. the principles assumed in support of the law. The assumption is, that the police power was not touched by the constitution, but left to the States as the constitution- found- it. This' is . admitted ; and whenever a thing-, from character, or condi tion, is of a description to be regulated by that power in the State, then the regulation may be made by the State, 'and Congress cannot interfere. -But this must always depend on facts, subject to legal ascertainment, so that the injured may have redress. And, the fact must find its support in this, whether the' prohibited article belongs to, and is subject to be regulated as part of, foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States. If, from its nature, it does not belong to commerce", or if its condition, from putrescence or other cause, is such when it is about to enter the State that it no longer belongs to commerce, or, in other words, is not a commercial article, then the State power may exclude its introduction. And as an incident to this power, a State may use means to ascertain the fact. And here is the limit between the' sovereign power of the State and the federal power. That is say, that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State ; and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States. And to this limit must all the general views come, as I suppose, that were suggested in the reasoning of this court in the cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. The State of Maryland, and New York v. Miln.
Whait, then, is the assumption, of the State court ? Undoubtedly, in effect, that the. State had the power to declare what should, be an article of lawful commerce in the particular State ; and, having declared that ardent spirits and wines were deleterious to morals and health, they ceased to be commercial commodities there, and that then the police power attached, and consequently the powers of Congress could not interfere. The exclusive State power is made' to rest, not on the fact of the state or condition of the article, n.or that it is property usually passing by sale from hand to hand, but on the declaration found in the State laws, and asserted as the State, policy, that it shall, be excluded from commerce. And by this means-the sovereign jurisdiction in the State is attempted to be' created, in a case where it did not previously exist.
If this be the true construction of the constitutional provision, then the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to a very material limitation ; for it takes from Congress, and leaves with, the States, the power to determine the commodities, or articles of property, which are the subjects of lawful commence. Congress may regulate, but the States determine what shall or shall not be regulated.
Upon this theory, the power to regulate commerce, instead of' being paramount over the subject, would become subordinate to the State police power ; for it is obvious that the power to determine the articles which may be the subjects of commerce, and thus to circumscribe its scope and operation, is, in efFect, the controlling one. The police power would not only be a formidable rival, but, in a struggle, must necessarily triumph over the commercial power, as the. power to regulate is dependent upon the power to fix and determine upon the 'subjects to be regulated.
The same process of legislation and reasoning adopted by the State and its courts could bring within the police power any article of consumption that a State might wish to exclude, whether it belonged to that which was'drank, or to food and clothing ; and with nearly equal claims to propriety, as malt liquors and the produce of fruits other than grapes stand on no higher grounds than the light wines of this and other countries, excluded, in effect, by the law as it now stands. And it would be only another step to regulate real or supposed extravagance in food and clothing. And in this connection it may be proper to say, that the three States whose laws are now before us had in view an entire prohibition from use of spirits and wines of every description, and that their main scope and object is to enforce exclusive temperance as a policy of State,, under.the belief that such a policy will best subserve the interests of society ; and that to this end, more than to any other, has the sovereign power of these States beett exerted ; for it was admitted, on the argument, that no - licenses are issued, and that exclusion exists, so far as the laws can produce the result, — at least, in some of the States, —and that this was the policy of the law.' For these reasons, I think the case cannot depend on the reserved power in the State to regulate its own police.
Had the gin imported been " an import" from a foreign country, then the license law prohibiting its sale by the importer would be void. The reasons for this conclusion are given in my opinion on the case of Thurlow v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and need not be repeated, and are founded on the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland. The next inquiry is, did it stand on the foot of " an import," coming, as it did, from anpther State ? If it be true, as the State courts held it was, that Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the States (the States having none), and the gin introduced being an article of commerce, and the State license law being a regulation of commerce (as it was held by this court to be in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland), then the State law is void, because the State had no power to act in the matter by way of regulation to any extent.
This narrows the controversy to the single point, whether the. States have .power to regulate their own mode of comiiier.ee among the States, during the time the power of Congress lies dormant, and has not been exercised in regard to such commerce.
Although some regulations have been made by Congress affecting the coasting trade, requiring manifests of cargoes where 4hey- exceed a certain value, to prevent smuggling, and for .other-purposes, still, no regulation exists affecting, in any degree, sucli- an' impoi't as the one'under consideration. It must find protection against tlie State law under the.constitution, or it can have none. • This is also true as respects similar articles of commerce passing from State to State by land. Congress has left the States to proceed in this regard as they were proceeding when the constitution was adopted.
Is, then, the power of Congress exclusive ? .The advocates of this construction insist, that it has been settled by this court that the power to regulate commerce is exclusive, and can be exercised by.Congress alone. And the inquiry in advance- of further discussion is, Has the construction been thus settled ? The principal case relied on is that of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, in support of the assumption. In that case a monopoly had be6n granted to the inventers of machinery propelled by steam, whidi, when applied to vessels, forced them'through the water. The law of' monopoly of New York extended to the ti'de-waters, and for navigating these with two steamboats belonging to Gibbons, a bill was filed against him, and he was' enjoined by the State- courts of New York; and in his answer he reHed on licenses granted under the-act of 18th February, 1793, for, enrolling and -licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade, and for regulating the same. This was the sole defence. The court first held that the power to regulate.commerce included the power to -regulate navigation also, as an incident to, and part of, commerce.
After discussing many topics connected, with, or supposed, to be connected with, the subject, the power of taxation was considef-v ed by the court, and the powers to tax in the States and the United States compared with the power to regulate commerce, and in tins connection the chief justice, delivering die opinion of the court, said, — "But, when a State proceeds to regulate commerce-with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do. There is no analogy, then, between the power of taxation .and the power of regulating commerce. In discussing the question, whether this power is still in the States, in the case under consideration, we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered by the mere grant i -Congress., or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss that inquiry, because it has been exercised, and the regulations Congress deemed proper to make are.now in full operation. The sole question is, Can a State -regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the SMes, while Congress is"regulating it ? "
And then the court proceeds to discuss the effect of the licenses set up in Gibbon's answer, and gives a decree of reversal, on that sole, question, in his favor. The decree says, — " This court is of opinion, that the several licenses to the steamboats the Stoudinger and the Bellona to' carry on the coasting trade, which are set up by the appellant, Thomas Gibbons, in his answer, which were granted under an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or otherwise, for the pur-, pose of carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State of New York to the contrary notwithstanding." And then the State law is declared void, as repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. 9 Wheat. 240.
This case, then, decides that navigation was within the commercial power of the United States, and that a coasting license granted pursuant to an act of Congress, in the exercise of the power, was an authority under the supreme law to navigate the public waters of New York, notwithstanding the State law'granting 'the monopoly. This decision was made in 1824. Three years after (1827) the case, of Brown v. The State of Maryland came before the court. 12 Wheat. 419.
Brown, an importing merchant, had been indicted for selling packages of dry goods in the form they were imported, without taking out a- license to sell by wholesale. To this he demurred., and the demurrer was sustained, on the ground that " imports " could be sold by the importer regardless of the State law, on which the indict-mént was founded. Two propositions were stated by the court, and the decision of the cause proceeded on them both, and was favorable to Brown : — First, The provision of the constitution which declares, that " no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties'on imports or exports." And, second, That which declares Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
The first proposition has no application to the controversy before us, as here no tax'or duty was imposed.
2. The court proceeds (p. 446) to inquire of the extent of the power, "and says, it is complete in itself, and acknowledges no limitations, .and is coextensive with the subject on which •it operates.". And for this Gibbons v. Ogden is referred to, as having asserted the same :postulates. Thé opinion then urges the necessity that Congress should have power over- thé whole subject, and the power to protect the imported article in the hands, of the importer,- and proceeds to say, — "We think it cannot be denied what can be the meaning--of an act of Congress which authorized importation, ánd offers the privilege for sale at a fixed.-price to every person who chooses to become a purchaser." " We think, then, that if the power.-to-authorize a sale exists in Congress, the conclusion that the right' to sell -is connected with the law permitting importation, as. an inseparable incident, is inevitable." ' •
'Two -points were deciced on the second proposition : — 1st. That a fx on the importer was a tax on the import.
2d That " an import," which had paid a tax to .the United. States according to the regulations of commerce made by Congress, could'not be taxed a second lime in the hands of the importer.
Neither of these cases touch thé question of exclusive power, nor do I suppose it was intended - by the writer of the opinions to approach that question, as he studiously guarded the opinion in the leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden against such an inference; and professedly followed the doctrines there laid down in Brown v. The State of Maryland. :
The next case -that came before the court was that of Willson et al. v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, in 1829, 2 Peters, 257. The chief justice again delivered the. opinion-of the court, as he had done in the.' two previous cases. The company was authorized to make a dam across the creek under a State charter. The creek was a navigable tide-water; the dam was constructed, and the licensed sloop of Willson not being enabled to pass, be broke the dam, and the company sued him for damages ; to which he pleaded, that the creek was a navigable highway, where the tide ebbed and flowed, and that he only did so much damage as to allow his vessel to pass. The plea, was demurred to, and there was a judgment against Willson in the. State court. . It was insisted on. his behalf in this .court fhat- the.pja-wsf/to' regulate .commerce included navigation ; and tflat* aivigable Streams are the waters-of the United-States, and subject to" the power of Congress ; and the casé of Gibbons a. Ogden was relied on. The chief justice in the opinion said : — " The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that it comes in conflict with the powers of the United States to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.
" If Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case', any act in execution of the power to regulate -commerce, the object qf which was' to control State legislation over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows, and which abound throughout the' lower country of the Middle and Southern States, we should feel not much difficulty in saying, that a State law coming in conflict with such act would be-void. But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the constitution is placed entirely on -its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States ; a power which has not beyn so exercised as to affect the question.
" We do not think'that the'act empowering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek1 can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to. the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject."
Here the adjudications end-. But judges, who were of the court when the three cases cited were determined, differ as .to- the- true meaning of the chief justice in the language employed in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, in illustrating the constitution in aspects supposed to bear more or less on the questions before the court ; such, for instance, as that the commercial power was a unit, and Covered the entire subjectrmatter of commerce with foreign nations and among the States ; and that navigation was included in the power. In the case of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102, Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Justice Story differed entirely as to what the language employed in the opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden meant, in regard to the true exposition of the constitution ; — one contending that the language used had reference to the power of Congress, and to a case where it had been fully exercised ; the other insisting that the opinion maintained the exclusive power in Congress to regulate commerce, and that the States had no authority to legislate, but were altogether excluded from interfering. This was Mr. Justice Story's opinion. I think it must be admitted that Chief Justice Marshall understood himself as Mr. Justice Thompson understood him, otherwise he could not have held as he did in the last case, in 1829, of Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company. And as this case was an adjudication on the precise question whether the constitution of the United States, in itself, extinguished the powers of the States to interfere with, navigation on tide-water, and as it was adjudged, in the case of. Gibbons v. Ogden, that the power to regulate commerce included navigation as fully as if the clause had expressed it in terms, it is difficult to say that this case does not settle the question favorably to. the exer'cise of jurisdiction on the part of the States, until Congress shall act on the same subject and suspend the State law in its operation. But, owing to the conflicting; opinions of individual judges, it is deemed proper to treat the^question as though it was an open one, in the aspect that this case presents-it; and then the consideration arises, — Can a State, by. its general laws, operating on all persons and property within its jurisdiction, reguláte articles coming into the State from other States, and prohibit their sale, unless a license is obtained by the person bringing them in ; and where no táx or duty is demanded of the person, or imposed on the article.?
In this proposition, it is not intended to involve the consideration, that where ' Congress regulates a particular commerce- by general laws, as .where a tax is levied on some articles on being- introduced from abroad,, and others permitted to come in free, that all are regulated ; this I admit in the-instance put, and in all others of a like character. But as no general law of Congress has regulated commerce among the States., such' a rule cannot apply here.
To a true understanding of the power conferred on Congress to regulate commerce among the' States, it may be proper briefly to refer to their-condition and acts before the constitution was adopted, in this respect. The prominent evil was, that they taxed the commerce of each other directly and indirectly ; and to secure themselves from undue and opposing taxes, the constitution first provides, that Congress shall lay no tax on articles exported -from any State second, that no State shall -lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports; nor, third, lay any duty on tonnage, without the consent of Congress, except so much as may be necessary for executing its inspection laws. These are prohibitions, to which the States have conformed.
But, as many general and all necessary local regulations existed when the constitution was adopted, and this, in all the States, affecting the end of commerce within their respective limits, the local regulations were continued, so far as the constitution left them in force. And they have been added to and accumulated to a great extent up to this time in the maritime States, not only as regards commerce among the States, but affecting foreign commerce also ; the States, within their harbours and inland waters, have' done almost every thing, and Congress next to nothing. So minute and complicated are the wants of commerce when .if reaches its port of destination, that even the State legislatures have been incapable of providing suitable means for'its regulation between ship and shore, and therefore charters, granted by the State legislatures, have conferred the power on city corporations. Owing to situation and climate, every port and place where commerce enters a State must have peculiarity in its regulations ; and these it would be exceedingly difficult for Congress to make ; nor could it depute the power tb corporations, as the.States do. , Thé difficulties standing in the way of Congress are fast increasing with the increase of commerce and the places where it is carried on. And where it enters States through their inland borders, by land and water, the complication is not less, and especially on the large rivers. There, too, Congress hás the undisputed power to regulate commerce'coming from State to State; but as every village would require special legislation, and constant additions as it grew and-- its commerce increased, to deal with the subject on the part of Congress would be next to impossible in practice., I admit that this condition of things. does not settle the question of contested power ; but it satisfactorily shows that Congress cannot do what the States have done, are doing, and must continue to do; from a controlling necessity, even should the exclusive'power in Congress be maintained by our .decision. And this state of things was too prominently manifest for the convention to. overlook it. Nor do I suppose-they did so, for the following reasons.
The general rules of construction applicable to the negative and affirmative powers of grant in the constitution are commented on in the 32d number of the Federalist, in these terms: — " That, notwithstanding the affirmative .grants of general, authorities, there has been the most pointed care, in those cases where it was. deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise, of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions. -This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the -convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced, and refutes' every hypothesis to the contrary." That is, in favor of the State power. These remarks were made to quiet the fears of the people, and to clear up doubts oh the meaning of the constitution, then before them for adoption by the State conventions. And it is an historical truth, never, so far as I know, denied, that these papers were received by the people of the States as the true exponents of the instrument submitted for their ratification.' Proceeding on the principle of construction applicable to affirmative statutes, — that they stood together as a general rule, if there were no negative words, — and taking the doctrine laid down in the Federalist to be the true rule of interpretation, — that where the States were intended tó be prohibited negative words had been used, — the States continued to do what they had previously done, and were not by negation prohibited from doing'; that is to say, to exercise the powers conferred on Congress in' arming, and organizing, and disciplining the militia, to pass bankrupt laws, and to regulate the details of commerce within their limits, coming from other States and foreign countries.
The exercise of the powers to regulate the militia, and to pass bankrupt laws, has not the approval of this court in the cases of Houston v. Moore, and in Ogden v. Saunders.
As to' the existence, of the power in the States in these two instances, there is no further controversy here or elsewhere.
And in regard to. the. third, Congress has stood by for nearly sixty years, and seen the States regulate the commerce of the whole country., .more or less, at the ports of .entry and at all their borders, without objection, and for this court now to decide that the power did not. exist in the States, and that all they had done in this respect Was void from the beginning, would overthrow and annul entire codes of State legislation on the particular subject. We would by our. decision expunge more State laws and city corporate regulations than Congress is likely to make- in a century- on the same subject, and-on no better assumption than that Congress and the State legislatures had .been altogether, mistaken as-to their respective powers: for-fifty,-years and inore. If long usage, general acquiescence, and the absence of complaint can settle the .interpretation-of the clause .in question, then it should be deemed as settled in conformity to the usage by the courts.
And as Congress and the courts have conceded that the States may pass laws regulat-ing..the militia, and on the. subject of bankruptcies,: and- that the affirmative grants of power to Congress in these instances did not deprive the States from exercising the power until Congress acted, it is now too late, under existing circumstances, for this court to say that the similar affirmative • power to regulate .commerce with foreign nations and among the States shall be held an exclusive power in Congress ; as it coüld no more be done with consistency of interpretation, than with safety to the existing state of the country.
In proceeding on this moderate, and, as I think, prudent and proper construction, all further difficulty will be obviated in regard to the admission of property into the States ; this the States may regulate, so they do not tax ; and if the States (or any one of them) abuse the - power, Congress can interfere at pleasure, and remedy the evil; nor will the States have any right to . complain. And so the courts can interfere if the States assume to exercise an excess of power, or act on a subject of commerce that is regulated by Congress. As already stated, it is hardly possible for Congress to deal at all with the details ,of this complicated matter.
The case before us presents a fair illustration of the' difficulty ; all venders of . spirits produced in New Hampshire are compelled to be licensed before they can lawfully sell; this is not controverted;, and cannot be. To hold that the State license law was void, ás-respects Spirits coming in from other States as articles of commerce, Would open the door to an almost entire evasion, as the spirits, might be. introduced in the smallest divisible quantities that the retail trade would require ; the consequence of which would be, that the dealers in New Hampshire would sell only spirits produced in other States,^ and that the products of New Hampshire would find an.unrestrained market in the neighbouring States having similar license laws to those of New Hampshire.
For the sake of convenience, the views on which this opinion, proceeds will bé briefly restated.
1. It is maintained, that spirits and wines are articles belonging to foreign commerce and commerce among the States ; and that Congress can regulate their introduction and transmission into and through the States so long as they belong to either class of such commerce, but no further.
2. That any State law whose provisions- are repugnant to the existing regulations of Congress (Within the above limit) is void, so far as it is opposed to the legislation of Congress.
3. That the police power of the Stajtes was -reserved to the States, and that it is beyond .the reach of Congress ; but that such •police power extends to articles only which do not belong to foreign commerce, or to commerce' among the States, at the time the police power is exercised in regard to them ; and that the fact of their condition is a subject proper for judicial ascertainment.
4. That the power to regulate commerce among the States may be exercised by Congress at pleasure, and the States cut off from regulating the 'same commerce at the same time it stands regulated by Congress.; but that, until such regulation is -made by Congress, the States may exercise the power within their respective limits.
5. That the law of New Hampshire was a regulation of commerce among the States in regard to the article for selling of which the defendants were indi.cted and convicted ; but that the State law was constitutionally passéd, -because of the power of the State thus to regulate ; there being no regulation of Congress, special or general, in existence to which the State law was repugnant.-
And, for these reasons, I think the judgment of the-State court should be affirmed.
Thurlow v. Massachusetts.
The statute of Massachusetts provides, that no person shall presume to be a retailer .or seller of wine, brandy, rum, or other spirituous liquors, in a less quantity than twenty-.eight gallons, and that delivered and carried away all at one time, unless he is first licensed as a retailer of wine and spirits, as is provided in this chapter, on pain of forfeiting twenty dollars for each offence.
The plaintiff, Thurlow, was found guilty by a jury for violating this law, on which verdict the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced judgment; and from which a writ of error was prosecuted to this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judi-. diciary Act of 1789. The bill of exceptions shows that some of the sales charged, in the indictment were of foreign liquors ; in regard to which the court directed the jury that the license law applied as well to imported spirits as to.domestic. It was proved that the defendant below had sold in-quantities of gallons, quarts, and pints, And the question submitted for our consideration is, whether the State law, and. the judgment founded on it, are repugnant to the acts of Congress authorizing the importation of wines, brandies, and other foreign spirits ; and it is proper to remark, that our jurisdiction and power to interfere involve the question merely of repugnance or no repugnance ; if repugnance is found to exist, we must reverse, and if not, we must affirm. • It follows, that the judicial ascertainment of the fact will end the controversy:
For the plaintiff in error it is insisted, that the State law and the judgment founded on it are repugnant to the acts of Congress aur thorizing- the importation of foreign wines and spirits, and to their introduction into the United. States on paying a prescribed tax. That the laws of the States cannot control the retail trade in such liquors ; that if they can to any extent, they may prohibit their sale altogether, and by this means do that indirectly which cannot be done directly, that is to say, prohibit their introduction ; that the purposes of wholesale importation being retail distribution, the.two must go together ; if not, the first ,s of no value ; that importations reach our country in large masses for the sole purposes of diffusion and consumption, and unless Congress has the control of distribution until the imported article reaches the consumer, the power to admit and to regulate commerce in regard to it will be worthless, and little better han a barren theory, leaving us where we began, in 1789. That any law, therefore, that' prohibits consumption necessarily destroys importation ; and the retail process being the ordinary means to consumption, and indispensable to it, to refuse this means would wholly defeat the end Congress has protected ; that is to say, consumption. 'On the soundness of this reasoning, the result' of the controversy depends.
To. this argument we answer, that under the power to regulate foreign commerce, Congress can protect every article belonging to foreign commerce, so long as it does belong to it, from the operation of a tax or a license, imposed by a'State law, that obstructs or hinders the commerce. But the true inquiry here is, how long does the imported article so continue ? The acts of Congress protect "imports," and prescribe the quantity and measure in which they.shall be made ; the question of more or less is within the competency of Congress, but how long the imported article continues to be "an import".is a different question-, for so sopn as it ceases to be so, then it is beyond the power conferred on Congress " to regulate foreign commerce," and that power cannot afford it further protection. This is the line of jurist iction where the powers of Congress end, and where the powers of the States begin, when-dealing respectively with the imported article. And such is the limit established in the casé of Brown v. The. State of Maryland. I do not mean to say that Congress may not protect an import for the purposes of transmission over land, in the form it was imported, from one State to another, for the purposes of distribution and sale by the importer, as this 'can be done under the power to regulate commerce- among the States. The question under examination is, not what Congress may do, but what it has done; It has not permitted spirituous liquors .to'be imported in the quantities that they were sold by the plaintiff in error. \nd when the article passes by sale from the. hands of the importer into the hands of another, either for the purposes of resale or of consumption, or is divided into smaller quantities, by breaking up the casks, packages, &c., by'the importer, the article ceases to be a protected " import," according to the legislation of Congress as it now, stands, and therefore the liquors sold in this instance did not belong to " foreign commerce," when sold at the retail bouse by single gallons, quarts, &c. When thus divided and sold in the body of the State, the-foreign liquors became a part of its property, and were subject to be taxed, or to be regulated by licenses, like any other property owned within the State.
But while -foreign liquors, imported according to the regulations of Congress, remain in the cask, bottle, &c., in the original form, then the importer may sell them in that form at the port of entry, or in any other part of the United States, nor can any State law hinder the importer from doing so ; nor does it make any difference whether the imported article paid a tax on its introduction, or was admitted as a free article ; until it passes from, the hands of-the importer, it is " an import," and belongs to regulated " foreign com-, merce," and is protected.
It follows from the principles stated, that the spirituous liquors sold by the defendant stood on no higher ground thail domestic spirits did, and that domestic spirits are subject to the State authority as objects of taxation, or of license in restraint of their sale, is not a matter of controversy,.and certainly cannot be here, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act,
I admit as inevitable, that, if the' State has the power of restraint by licenses to any extent, she has the discretionary power to judge of its limit, and may go to the length of prohibiting sales altogether, if such be her policy ; and that if this court cannot interfere in the case before us, so neither could we interfere in the extreme case of entire exclusion, except to protect imports belonging to foreign commerce, as already defined. The reasons are obvious. We have no power to inquire into- abuses (if such there be) inflicted by State authority on the inhabitants of the State, unless such abuses are repugnant to the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
For the reasons above set forth, I think the judgment of the Stale court should be affirmed.
And as the case of Joel Fletcher against the State of Rhode Island depends on the same principles,- to every extent, I think it must be affirmed also.
Mr. Justice DANIEL.
In the decision of the court, so far as it establishes ' the validity of the license laws of the States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, I entirely concur; and had the opinions of judges in forming that decision been limited strictly to an inquiry into the compatibility of those laws with the constitution of the United States, or with a just exercise of State power (the only inquiry, in my apprehension, regularly before the court), I should have been spared the painful duty-of disagreement with my brethren. To. this inquiry, however, those opinions, -according to my apprehension, are by no means restricted. The majority of the judges, in fulfilment of their own convictions, have seemed to me to go beside the questions regularly before them, and in this departure have propounded principles and propositions, against which, whensoever they may be urged as motives for action on my part, I shall feel myself bound most earnestly to protest'. It has been said, that the principles here objected to have been already solemnly and fully adjudged and established, and should therefore be no longer assailed. The assertion as to the extent in which these principles have been ruled, or the solemnity with which they have been fixed and settled, may in the first place be justly questioned. 'It is believed that they have been directly adjudged in a single case only, and then under the qualification of an able dissent.
But should this assertion be conceded in its greatest latitude, my reply to it must be firmly and unhesitatingly this, — that in matters involving the meaning and integrity of the constitution, I never can consent that the text of that instrument shall be overlaid and smothered by the glosses of essay-writers, lecturers, and commentators. Nor will I abide the decisions of judges, believed by me to be invasions of the great lex legum. I, too, have been sworn to observe and maintain the constitution. I possess- no sovereign prerogative by which I can put my conscience into commission. I must interpret exclusively as that conscience shall dictate. Could I, in cases of minor consequence, consent, in deference to others, to pursue a different course, I should, in instances like the present, be especially reluctant to place myself within the description of the poet,— " Stat magni nominis umbra."
The doctrines which to me appear to have been gratuitously brought into this case are those which have been promulged in the reasoning of this court in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, reported in 12 Wheaton, 419, — doctrines (and I speak it with all due respect) which I conceive cannot, by correct induction, be derived from the constitution, nor even from the grounds assumed for their foundation in the reasoning of the court in that case ; but which, on the contrary, appear to be wholly illogical and arbitrary. The doctrines adverted to are these. That under the operation of that' provision in the constitution which confers on Congress- the power of regulating commerce with foreign nations, &c., &c., and by the farther provision which prohibits to the States the power of levying imposts or duties on imports, merchandise, or property imported from abroad, — however completely its transit may have been ended, however completely it shall have passed beyond all agencies and obligations in reference to the federal government, and however absolutely, exclusively, and undeniably it shall have become the property, and passed into the possession, of the citizen resident within the State, and protected both in person and 'property by the laws of the State, — shall never become subject to taxation, in common with other property of the same citizen, whilst it shall remain in the bale, package, or form in .which it shall have been imported, nor until (to use the language of the court) it shall have been " broken up and mingled with the general mass of property."
With regard to this phrase, " broken up and mingled with the mass of property," so often appealed to with the view to illustration, it .may be worth while to remark, in passing, how often words introduced for the purpose of explanation are themselves the means of creating doubt or ambiguity! With respect to the phrase above mentioned, it may be retorted, that a person may import a steam-engine, a piano, a telescope, or a horse, and many other subjects, qbuch could not be broken up in order to be mingled with the general mass of property. If, then, this phrase is to be apprehended as signifying (and this alone seems its reasonable meaning) the appropriation of a subject imported in absolute private right and enjoyment, either positively or relatively, it surrenders- the whole matter in dispute, and admits that all the property of the citizen, who is himself protected in his person and in the enjoyment of his property, is bound to contribute to the support of the government which yields this protection, whether he shall have imported that property, or purchased it at home.
By the 6th article and 2d clause of the constitution it is thus declared : — " That this constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance. thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land-. "
This provision of the constitution, it is to be feared, is sometimes applied or expounded without those qualifications which the character of the parties to that instrument, and its adaptation to the purposes for which it was created, necessarily imply. Every power delegated to the federal government must be expounded in coincidence with a perfect right in the States-to all that .they have not delegated ; in coincidence, too, with the possession of every power •and right necessary for their existence and preservation ; for it is impossible to believe that' these ever were, in intention or in fact, ceded to the general government. Laws of the United States, in order to be binding, must be within the legitimate powers vested by the constitution. Treaties, to be valid, must be made within the scope of the same powers ; for there can be no " authority of the United States," save what is derived mediately or immediately, and 'regularly and legitimately, from the constitution. A treaty, no more than an ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away any one right of a State or of any citizen of a State. In cases of alleged conflict between a law of the United States and the constitution, or between the law of a State and the constitution or a statute of the United States, this court must pronounce upon the validity of either law with reference to the constitution ; but whether the decision of the court in such cases be itself binding or otherw:se must depend upon its conformity with, or its warrant from, the constitution. It cannot be correctly held, that a decision, merely because it be by the Supreme Court, is to override alike the constitution and the laws both of the States and of the United States. Let us test by these principles — believed to be irrefragablethe power over foreign commerce vested in Congress by the constitution ; and also the positions sought to be deduced 'from that grant of power by the argument in Brown v. The State of Maryland. By art. 1, §8, clause 4,'of the constitution, it is declared, 'that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with -foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." !T is with the first of the grants in this article that we- have now to deal. The commerce here spoken of is that traffic between the people of the United States and foreign nations, by which articles are procured by purchase or barter from abroad, or by which the like subjects of traffic are transmitted' from the United States to foreign countries ; keeping in view.always the essential characteristic of this commerce as stamped upon it by the constitution, namely, that it is commerce with foreign nations, or, in other words, thaf it is external commerce. By this, however, is not meant that it should be external in reference to . geographical or territorial lines, but in reference to the parties, and the nature of their transactions. The power to regulate this commerce may properly comprise the times and places at which, the modes and vehicles in which, and the conditions upon which, it may as foreign commerce be carried on ; but precisely at that point of. its existence- that it is changed from foreign commerce, at" that point this power of regulation in the federal government, must cease, the subject for the action of this power being gone. Independently of an express prohibition upon the States to lay duties on imports, this power of regulating foreign commerce may correctly imply a denial to the States of a right to' interfere with existing regulations over subjects of foreign commerce ; but they must be continuing, and still in reality, subjects of foreign commerce, and such they can no longer be after that commerce with regard to them has terminated, and they are completely vested as property in- a citizen of a State, whether he be'the first, second, or third proprietor ; if this were otherwise, then, by the same reasoning, they would remain imports, or subjects of foreign commerce, through every possible transmission of title, because they had been once imported. Imports in a political or fiscal, as well as in-common practical acceptation, are properly commodities brought in from abroad which either have not reached their perfect investiture or their-alternate destination as property within the jurisdiction of the St'ate, or which still are subject to the power of the government for a fulfilment of the conditions upon which they have been admitted to entrance ; as, for instance, goods on which duties are. still unpaid, or which are bonded or in public warehouses. So soon as they are cleared of all control of the government which permits their introduction, and have become the complete and exclusive property of the citizen or resident, they are no longer imports in a political, or fiscal, or common sense. They are' like all other property of the citizen, and should be equally the subjects, of domestic regulation and taxation, whether owned by an importer or his vendee, or may have been purchased by cargo, package, bale, piecé, or yard, or by hogsheads, casks, or bottles. I can perceive no rational distinction which can be taken upon the circumstance of mere quantity, shape, or bulk; of on that of the number of transmissions through which a commodity may have passed from the. first proprietor, or of its- remaining still with the latter. The objection, that a tax upon an article in bulk (the property of a citizen) is forbidden because it is a burden on foreign commerce, whilst a similar burden is permissible on the very same bulk or on fragments of the same article in the hands of his vendee, it would appear difficult to reconcile with sound reasoning. Every tax is alike a burden, whether it be imposed on larger or smaller subjepts, and in either mode must operate on price, and consequently on demand and consumption. If, then, there was any integrity in the objection urged, it should abolish all regulations of retail trade, all taxes on whatever may have been imported.
It cannot be correctly maintained that State laws which may remotely or incidentally affect foreign commerce are on that account to be deemed void. To render them so, they must be essentially and directly in conflict with some power clearly invested in Congress by the constitution; and, I" would add, with some regulation actually established by Congress in virtue of that power. In the case of Brown, v. The, State of Maryland, it is said by the court, that liberty to import implies unqualified liberty to sell at the place of importation. In the argument of this case, the proposition just mentioned does not, in all its amplitude, seem broad enough for counsel, who have contended that liberty to import implies on the part of the States a duty to encourage, if not to enforce, the consumption of foreign merchandise ; arising, it is affirmed, from a farther duty incumbent on the States to regard a priori the acts of the federal government as wisest and best, and therefore imposing an obligation on the States for cooperation with them. These very exacting propositions, it is believed, can hardly be vindicated, either by the legitimate meaning of words, or any correct theory of the constitutional powers of Congress. It cannot be necessary here to institute a criticism upon the words importation, sale, consumption, in order to show either their etymological or ordinary acceptation, or in order to expose the fallacy of the aforegoing new and startling theory. Goods, moreover, may be imported into a country as into a commercial entrepot, for reshipment to other markets, and not for consumption at all. But where importation may have been made with the direct view to sell, it does not follow, by necessary induction, that permission for the former implies permission for the latter, nor the power of granting the former the power, of conferring the latter ; much less, that it implies the power or the obligation on the part of the government to command or insure a sale. Whatever might be the case under governments in which power is either absolute or single, it is wholly otherwise undei- our system of confederated sovereignties. Here the power of the general government is emphatically delegated and limited, although it is paramount so far as it has been delegated ; and when we look for this power of the' government in relation to this matter in the constitution, we find--if the power to .regulate commerce with foreign nations ; it being the foreign character of that commerce alone which, confers on Congress any power whatsoever with respect to it. It has been urged, that the importer pays a duty to the government for permission to introduce and vend his merchandise ; that it would be unjust, therefore, to deprive him of the power of vending, as he never would have imported except with the expectation of selling. To this it may, in the first place, be replied, as has been remarked in the argument at the bar, that the question here is one of constitutional power ; and if the federal government shall have transcended its legitimate powers, I ask, can it be right, in any view, to compensate those who may have suffered by the transgression, by authorizing unlimited reprisals upon the States ? But in truth no such right as the one supposed is purchased by the importer, and no injury in any accurate sense is inflicted on him by denying to him the power demanded. He has doubtless in view the profits .resulting from the sale of his commodities ; but he has not purchased and cannot purchase from, the government that which it could not insure to him, a sale independently of the laws and polity of the States. He has, under the. legitimate power of the federal government to regulate foreign commerce, .purchased the right to import, or introduce his merchandise, —the right to come in with it in quest of a market, and nothing beyond this. The habits, the tastes, the necessities, the health, the morals, and the safety of society form the. true foundation of his calculations, or of any power or right which may be conceded to him-for the sale of his merchandise, and not any supposed right in the federal government, in contravention of all these, to enforce such sale.
The want of integrity in the argument under examination is farther exposed, by showing that it will not cover the conclusion sought to be drawn from it. If the right of the importer to vend, and his exemption from taxation, are1 made to rest on the payment of duties to the federal government, on what foundation must be. rested his right and his exemption, in reference to articles on which duties are neither paid nor exacted ? Are these to be left exclusively the subjects of State regulation and State taxation ? That they must be so left is a logical and inevitable conclusion from the proposition' that .the right to vend flows from the payment of duties. And then this argument involves the palpable absurdity, that .'merchandise wjbich the government does not so strongly favor as to admit without duty shall remain intact and' sacred-, whilst merchandise which is so much preferred as to be admitted freely — nay,' whose introduction is in effect invited and solicited by the. federal government — may be burdened by the States at pleasure.
It has been insisted, that, as by treaty stipulations articles of foreign merchandise have been admitted for consumption (and much stress is laid upon this expression) in certain specified quantities, consequently by such stipulations, forming the supreme law of the land, the free, sale of these articles must be an absolute right. In what instances a treaty is or is not the supreme law, or is no law at all, I have already endeavoured to distinguish. Passing, therefore, that investigation, it seems very clear that the proposition just adverted to involves a great fallacy. The treaty stipulations here exemplified mean this, and nothing more, namely, that whereas certain enumerated commodities could heretofore be imported only in greater quantities, for the use of those who might choose to buy and consume thém, they may hereafter be imported in lesser quantities. These. stipulations no more signify that commodities shall be circulated and used free of all internal regulation, than they convey a positive mandate for their being purchased and consumed, eaten and drunk, nolens volens, or at all events. Every State that is in any sense sovereign.and independent possesses, and must possess', the inherent power of controlling property held and owned within its jurisdiction, and in virtue and under the protection of its own laws, whether that control be exerted in taxing it, or in determining its tenure, or in directing the manner of its transmission; and this, too, irrespective of the quantities in which it is held or transferred, or the sources whence it may haye been .derived. Such a power differs entirely from an authority essentially extraneous in its character, — an authority limited and specific, by the very terms which confer it; restricted to action upon the progress of property on its way to complete investment under the laws of the State)
The license laws of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, now under review, impose no exaction on foreign commerce. They are laws simply determining the mode in which a particular commodity may be circulated within the respective jurisdictions of those States, vesting in their domestic tribunals a discretion in selecting the agents for such circulation, without discriminating between the sources whence commodities may have been derived. They do not restrict importation to any extent; they do not interfere with it, either in appearance or reality ; they do not prohibit sales, either by wholesale or retail ; they assert only the power of regulating the latter, but this entirely within the sphere of their peculiar authority.
These laws are, therefore, in violation neither of the constitution of the United States, nor of any law nor treaty made in pursuance or under the authority of the constitution. Viewing them in this character, my cooperation is given in maintaining them, whatever differences of opinion may exist in relation to their policy or necessity. But since, whilst extending to these laws their sanction and support, there have been advanced by others principles and opinions which to me appear to have their source not in the fountain of all legitimate power in this or any other department of the federal government, I cannot by silence seem to assent to those principles and opinions, nor put from me the Obligation of declaring my dissent from them.
Mr. Justice NELSON concurred in the opinions delivered by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Catron.
See 12 Wheaton, 449, the opinion of Thompson, Justice.