Case: John Young, assignee of Alexander Collie, v. The United States
Abbreviation: Young v. United States
Decision Date: 1876-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 12 Ct. Cl. 648
Volume: 12
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: John Young, assignee of Alexander Collie, v. The United States.
Judges: 
Pages: 648–702

Head Matter:
COLLIE’S CASE.
John Young, assignee of Alexander Collie, v. The United States.
On the Proofs.
A non-resident alien, during tlte rebellion, runs the blockade, carrying merchandise and munitions of toar into southern ports, buying and bringing out cotton. He also sends presents of cannon and ammunition to the Confederate authorities, and a gift of $30,000 to aid those made needy and suffering through the war. A portion of the cotton purchased by his agents with funds derived from blockade-running remains in Savannah and is captured. He brings Ms suit for the proceeds.
Where a non-resident alien engaged in blockade-running during the rebellion sent gifts of cannon and ammunition to the Confederate authorities, and of money for those made needy and suffering through the war, and bought cotton with money derived from blockade-ruuning which he left in the country till its capture, he cannot recover the proceeds thereof under the Abandoned or captured property Aot, (12 Stat. L., 820.)
The Reporters’ statement of the case:
This is the same case reported in 9 C. Gis. R., 431. Judgment was then rendered for the claimant. An appeal was taken by the defendants. While it was pending in the Supreme Court, they moved in this court for a new trial under the statute, (Rev. Stat., § 1088,) on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The motion was granted, hut, no opinions having been delivered, it is not reported. The distinctive facts brought in by the second trial are understood by the Reporters to be: 1st, that the claimant sent in cannon and munitions of war in his blockade-running adventures, as well as goods not contraband of war$ and, 2d, that he made gifts of cannon, ammunition, and money to persons engaged in the rebellion. It will be observed that a majority of the court were not agreed upon the grounds of the decision, though concurring in the judgment. The following are the facts as found by the court:
I. Alexander Collie, on whose behalf this suit was instituted, and in the name of whose trustee in bankruptcy the same is prosecuted, was a subject or the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, at one time residing in Manchester, England, as a member of the firm of Alexander Collie & Co., but in the years 1862, 1863, and 1864 residing and doing business, in his own name, in London, England, and he has at no time been in the United States.
II. In the year 1862 the said Collie engaged in fitting out, lading, and sending steamships to run the blockade of the ports in States which were then in rebellion against the United States, and for about two years he continued engaged in that business, sending a large number of such vessels for that purpose, which succeeded many times in running the blockade, in and out, and carried into some of those ports general merchandise which was there sold, and also munitions of war, to wit, arms, gunpowder, armor-plates for war-vessels, army clothing, cannon, shot, ammunition, and quartermaster and medical stores, which were purchased in England by said Collie, or by agents of the so-called Confederate States of America, to whom, in aid of such purchases, the said Collie made large advances of money, and when said munitions of warwere run into said ports they were delivered to the government of said Confederate States. The vessels so engaged in running the blockade took back from said ports to said Collie large quantities of cotton, partly received from said government in payment for the munitions of war and other things received from him, and partly bought for him by his agents in those States with moneys derived from the sales there of the cargoes of merchandise taken into said ports by the ships of said Collie. The cotton, for the recovery of the proceeds of which this suit was brought, was purchased by said Collie’s agent in the said Confederate States with moneys so derived.
The said Collie on the 1st of October, 1863, addressed the following letter to John White, special commissioner for the State of North Carolina, then in England:
“ No. 1.] 22a Austin Uriahs, London,
“1st October, 1863.
“John White, Esq.,
“ Special Oom’r for North Carolina;
“Dear Sir : Being desirous of aiding in any way in my power the government of your State in its present struggle, it seems to me that the time has come when this can be done very efficiently, and, with this view, I now ask your careful consideration of the following propositions:
“ From all I can learn, the chief requirement of your country at the present moment, as far as concerns business here, is to receive supplies of railway-iron, rolling-stock, and a few other articles, with regularity, expedition, and economy. To effect this I propose—
“First. To furnish, with as little delay as possible, four steamers, of the most suitable description for blockade-running, in each of which your State will own one-fourth interest, the other three-fourths being held by myself and friends.
“Second. To give up to the government of your State, when required, the entire inward carrying-power of such steamers from the island to the Confederacy at a moderate rate, to be fixed hereafter.
“Third. That the government of your State be entitled to one-fourth space of the outward carrying-power of each steamer, for cotton or other produce; and this arrangement will, I estimate, yield to your State funds sufficient to pay cost and all charges on inward cargo, cash of its share of outward cargo, and (if cotton of good quality be sent out) a very large surplus will be left at the credit of your State on each trip. If at any time there should be a deficiency of cargo for Government or other account, freight will be taken,'if procurable, from other parties, and a due share of any freight so carried will be credited to the State. In a business such as that now sought to be inaugurated, it is manifestly impossible to provide for all contingencies which may arise;
all I can at present do is to indicate the chief aims, objects, and conditions. The rest must be left to the good faith and honorable dealing of the government of your State on the one part, and of myself on the other. I need hardly add that any propositions from your government for altering or amending any of the conditions you and I may agree to will be met by me in the most liberal spirit, and that I place the same implicit confidence in the good faith of the governor and government of your State I ask them to place in me.
“I remain, dear sir, yours faithfully,
(Signed) “ ALEX. COLLIE.”
On the 27th of October, 1863, the said Collie and the said White entered into the following agreement:
“ With the view of carrying out the business indicated in the • preceding letter of 1st instant, it is hereby agreed by Alex. Collie, for himself and friends, on one part, and John White, of North Carolina, for the governor of that State, on the other part, that Alex. Collie will furnish four steamers of suitable construction' and speed as soon as practicable; that one-fourth interest in each of these steamers will belong to the government of North Carolina, three-fourths owned by Alex. Collie and friends. The government will pay their share of the costs and outfit of such steamers by cotton-warrants (Manchester issue) at par, and the working expenses of such steamers will be paid by therespective owners, in their due proportion; that is, one-fourth of the working expenses will be paid by the government of North Carolina, and three-fourths by the other owners, and if from any sufficient cause it should be deemed prudent to sell any of the steamers, the net proceeds of such sale, or any money earned, in the shape of freight, will be duly credited in like proportion. Under this contract the Hansa and the Don, both most excellent boats, now running between Wilmington and the islands, will, on next arriving at the islands, be made over to the State, in’ the proportion of one-fourth interest in each, and these steamers will be charged, £20,000 sterling for the Hansa and £20,000 sterling for the Don, this being estimated total cost price of each at the islands, and considerably under the estimated value. Another screw-steamer, similar to the Ceres, will be ready for sea. in about four weeks, and in about two months the fourth ■will be dispatched. By this arrangement the chief objects sought to be obtained are—
“First. To supply railway-iron and rolling-stock, and such other articles as may be needed by the State, at a moderate rate of freight, and in regular quantities.
“ Second. To run out regularly a quantity of cotton for the State, to enable it to benefit from the very high prices ruling here.
“Third. To reduce the risk of capture as much as possible by dividing the interest of the government over four or more steamers. In order to secure the greater economy, and the more efficient working facilities, the working management of the steamers will rest in the hands of Alex. Collie & Co., who, as representing the larger proportion, will appoint the captains, and officers; but no important steps, such as disposing of any of the steamers, or replacing any of them, or adding to their number will be undertaken without the full knowledge and consent of Mr. White, the special commissioner here. Under this arrangement the parties interested will have the benefit of a well-trained and experienced staff of men, at all points, and the government of the State on its part will give all the aid in its power to the efficient working of the business now inaugurated. It will give all the aid it can do to get transportation of cotton from the interior when required, and it will guarantee the undertaking from any restrictions or impediments being thrown in the way of full cargoes being obtained for each steamer of cotton or other produce with the least possible delay. The inward carrying-power of the steamers from the islands will be at the service of the State, at the rate of £5 per ton, payable at the islands, for railway-iron and rolling-stock, (one-fourth of which will be duly credited to the State as its interest,) and arrangements will be made immediately to lay down 1,000 tons of railway-iron at the islands for this purpose. For fine goods, the rate will be £30 per ton.
“ The government of the State will be the owners of outward cargo to the extent of one-fourth. Their cargoes will be purchased by the agents of Alex. Collie & Co., subject to the inspection of the government of the State, who will be debited for one-fourth of the amount, and on safe arrival in England one-fourth of the proceeds will be duly credited tO\the State. The commission chargeable on this business will be the usual one of two and a half per cent, on purchases and realizing, and five per cent, on ships’ disbursements, in addition to the usual brokerage, and such charges as incurred at the islands for transshipment and storing. The government will of course have the option of putting on board their own shares of the cotton, but; for many reasons this is hardly desirable. If they do so, however, the buying commission of two and a half per cent, will be avoided. In cases when Alex. Collie & Co. come under cash advances for account of the State, (in place of putting the cotton-warrants in the market,) Alex. Collie & Co. will be entitled to a further commission of two and a half per cent, for the amount of such advance — interest at the rate of five per cent., to be charged, and the same rate to be allowed when there is cash in hand. This agreement to be in force till the steamers are sold, captured, or destroyed.
(Signed) “ALEX. COLLIE.
(Signed) “JOHN WHITE,
“ Commissioner for the State of North Carolina.
“ Manchester, 27th Oct, 1863.”
In pursuance of this agreement the said Collie sent out to Wilmington, N. 0., four steamers loaded with shoes, army clothing, and other supplies, which he bought for account of the State of North Carolina; and he received back cotton from said State, in payment as well for the goods so sent as for the share of said State in said steamers.
In the year 1863 the said Collie sold in London for the State of North Carolina obligations of that State, delivered to him for that purpose by the said John White, known as North Carolina cotton-warrants ; which were obligations for the delivery of cotton at the port of Wilmington, or at other ports then in possession of the Confederate States; and the said Collie disposed in England of large amounts of said obligations, giving with them his agreement to hold himself personally responsible to the parties to whom he sold them for their payment by the State of North Carolina; and he also took some of said obligations in payment for the goods which he shipped to that State.
On the 13th of June, 1864, the said Collie entered into the following written contract with Colin J. McRae, agent of the government of said Confederate States:
“ Memorandum of agreement between Alexander Collie, of London, on the one part, and Colin J. McRae, as representing the government of the Confederate States of America, on the other part.
“ 1. Alexander Collie agrees to provide four large and powerful new steamers, to carry out the following arrangements, with the least possible delay.
“ 2. Alexander Collie will at once cause to be purchased, under Colin J. McRae’s directions, quartermaster’s stores to the value of one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, and ordnance or medical stores to the value of fifty thousand pounds sterling, the one subject to the inspection of Major J. B. Ferguson, the other to that of Major 0. Huse.
“3. The delivery of such purchases to extend over a period of about six months, in proportionate quantities, and shipment to be made to the Confederate States with as little delay thereafter as practicable.
“ 4. Inland carriage and packing expenses to be charged in the invoice, and 2J per cent, commission to be chargeable also.
“ 5. Colin J. McRae on behalf of his government, agrees that on arrival in the Confederacy of any goods purchased and shipped by Alexander Collie, under this agreement, such goods will be immediately claimed and taken over by the government. Fifty per cent, advance will be added to the English invoice, and Alexander Collie, through his agent, will immediately receive in exchange cotton at the rate of 6d. (sixpence) sterling per pound.
“ 6. Such cotton to class ‘ middling,’ and to be delivered alongside the steamers, as required, compressed, packed, and in good merchantable condition.
“ 7. Full cargoes of cotton, received in exchange for goods delivered under this agreement, may be shipped by Alexander Collie, through his agent, free from any other charge or restriction whatever beyond the now-existing export-tax of £ of a cent per pound.
“8. Eo steamers to have priority in any way over those employed by Alexander Collie, in this service, and more than the four above mentioned may be used, if Alexander Collie can arrange to put them on.
“ 9. Colin J. McRae further agrees that, to cover the expense of Alexander Collie’s agencies abroad, he (Alexander Collie) is to have the privilege of providing and bringing out other cotton than that received under this agreement, to the extent of one-tenth part of the cargo-space of the respective steamers, and such cotton (or tobacco) may be shipped on same terms as indicated for government cotton, viz, free from all other charges or restrictions whatsoever, excepting the before-named export-duty now existing.
“ 10. This agreement is to be construed by both parties in a spirit of confidence and liberality. The one will purchas ® and send forward the supplies indicated, with the least possible delay; the other will deliver cotton as required, in the same way; and neither party will withhold necessary supplies on account of any temporary shortcomings on th¿ part of the other.
“11. Alexander Collie’s agents, with the necessary staff for attending to this business, are to be allowed the privilege of residing in the Confederacy, free from liability to conscription, and every reasonable facility is to be allowed them for effectually carrying out the terms of this agreement.
(Signed) “ALEX. COLLIE.
“O. J. McKAE,
"Agent C. S. A.
“ London, 13í/í. June, 1864.”
Under this contract, in the winter of 1863-’64, and the spring and summer of 1864, divers steamers were supplied, and importations of supplies and munitions of war for the Confederate government were run by them into Wilmington, and return cargoes of cotton on account of that government and of said Collie were run by them out of that port to England.
In March, 1864, the said Collie sent, as a present to the Confederate authorities at Wilmington, on one of his steamers engaged in running the blockade into that port, a Whitworth gun for field-service, with carriage, caisson, limbers, and all other customary appendages, together with a large quantity of shot of the proper caliber for the gun, in regard to which he wrote to the governor of North Carolina as follows:
“I have shipped on board the Edith a new kind of gun which is reported to be particularly destructive, and I have to ask the authorities at Wilmington to accept it as a ‘ substitute’ for some of our people, who, but for our business, would have been doing business in another capacity.”
This gun was received by the Confederate authorities in Wilmington and used in defense of that port, and in aiding the entry into it of blockade-running steamers, by repelling the vessels of the United States engaged in pursuing those steamers.
In the year 1864, the said Collie sent on one of his blockade-running vessels to the government of said Confederate States, as a gift from himself, two Whitworth guns, which were received by that government and used in its service.
In the same year the said Collie made a donation to that government of $30,000 to aid the needy and the suffering in the insurgent States, aud more particularly those who had been made so through the war.
III. In the years 1862,1863, and 1864, the said Collie, through an agent in the insurgent States, sent out by him in 1862, purchased with money derived from sales of cargoes run through the blockade into ports in those States, in said Collie’s steamers, 3,096 bales of upland cotton and 1,757 bales of sea-island cotton ; all of which was stored in Savannah at the time of the capture of that city by the military forces of the United States in December, 1864, and was there seized and taken by those forces, and thence shipped to New York, where it was sold by an agent of the United States, and the proceeds thereof, amounting to $944,297, were paid into the Treasury of the United States.
Mr. J. Hubley Ashton (with whom was Mr. W. W. McFarland) for the claimant:
First. Before considering the particular questions of (1) the ownership of this cotton by Alexander Collie, the original claimant, and (2) his right to recover its proceeds under the Abandoned or captured property Act, it will be important to develop certain general doctrines of the public law, in the light of which those, questions must be determined by the court, which, in this case, is practically sitting as a court of the law of nations. (Lamar v. Brown, 2 Otto, 195; The Swedish Convoy, l Rob., 349.)
1. The legal character of the late southern rebellion as a geographical or territorial civil war, as distinguished from a mere insurrection or unorganized war, possessing the characteristics and attended with tbe incidents and consequences of. a public war between independent nationalities, is a political and juridical fact, attested by tbe doctrine of international law, recognized formally, or otherwise, by all the great powers of the world and adjudged by every department — executive, legislative, judicial — of the Government of the United States. (Yattel, Bk. Ill, § 292,- Bello, Principios de Derecho. Internacional, cap. X, 267'; Hautefeuille, Droits et Devoirs de Nations Neutres, vol. 1, 237; Bluntsckli, Revue de Droit International, 1870, 455, 458, 461; Twiss, Law of Nations, War, 72; British Proclamation of Neutrality, May 14, 1861, and Letters of Historicus, 132; Woolsey, Int. Law, 459; The Prize Oases, 2 Black, 695, 670; Mauran v. Ins. Go., 6 Wall, 14; Thorington v. Smith, 8 id., 10; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 id., 532; Matthews v. MeStea, 1 Otto, 7; The Treaty of Washington: the Three Rules.)
2. Such being the undisputed and indisputable character of that contest, under the public law, according to the practice of nations and the solemn and repeated declarations of the Government of the United States itself, it necessarily follows that the rights of trade and intercourse between neutral countries and the Confederate States were the same as subsist, under the law of nations, between neutral and belligerent cquntries inordinary international wars, and that such trade and intercourse were subject to be affected by the United States only in the exercise, and within the limits, of the rights which war, according to the lawnations, gives to public enemies against each other.
This proposition embraces not only trade and intercourse between private individuals, being subjects or citizens of neutral countries, and inhabitants of the Confederate States, but also transactions between the former and the de facto government of tbe Confederate States; and it includes, also, as well, dealings between that government and the subjects or citizens of neutral countries in the implements and materials of war, and in money, and the representatives of money, as transactions in relation to other kinds of merchandise and property. (Hall, Rights and Duties of Neutrals, 15; Dana’s Wheaton, Note on Recognition of Belligerency, Wh., 37, 41; Letters of Historicus, 13; Opinion of Count Sclopis, Geneva Arbitration, vol. 4, 72.)
3. This right of trade and intercourse, which neutral subjects are entitled to exercise and enjoy in a civil war to the same extent and upon the same footing as in international wars, in- eludes not only traffic iu articles of commerce of whatever kind (and whether with the citizeus or with the governments of both belligerents) within the neutral territory, but also the exportation and transportation of the implements and materials of war, as well as other merchandise and property, from the neutral territory to the territory of either of the belligerents, whether the same were sold in the neutral territory, or are carried from that territory for sale to, or for the use of, one of the belligerents, subject, of course, to the application upon the high seas to such property of the rights of war on the part of the other belligerent. (United States v. Bice, 4 Wb., 253; Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 614; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall., 10; Case of the Georgiana and IAz-zie Thompson, 9 Opinions, 140.)
Iu view of these doctrines, the G-overnment never attempted, during the war, to affect commerce between foreign countries and the insurgent States by any municipal regulations; and it relied, as it was bound to do, exclusively upon its belligerent rights under the public law in regard to such commerce. Congress, by the act of July 13, 1861, purported to authorize the President to close any or all ports of entry in which duties could not be collected effectually by the means provided by law, and to declare any vessel forfeit which should attempt to enter such port after it should be so closed. The United States did not assume to put the act of 1861 iuto operation, but established and maintained a maritime blockade iu pursuance of the law of nations; and by the application of the established principles of internacional law in regard to such blockades, and by that means alone, was the general commerce of neutrals with the Southern States attempted to be interfered with during the period of hostilities.
4. It is a necessary corollary of the foregoing propositions that the Government of the United States could have had no authority, under the law of nations, by legislation or otherwise, to change or modify the belligerent rights of that Government, as to neutral nations or their subjects, in the prosecution of hostilities against the Confederate States;”or to change or modify the international rights of neutral states, or their subjects, in regard to the belligerents, or either of them, in the civil war; or to prescribe or enforce any penalties whatever, iu addition to those provided by the law of nations for such acts ou the part of the subjects of a neutral state, as the United States were authorized to repress and prevent by the proper and legitimate exercise of their belligerent rights under the law of nations.
It is necessary that this proposition should be stated firmly and clearly, and that it should be distinctly understood that, if by any possible construction of the acts of Congress in regard to captured and abandoned property it can be supposed that Congress intended to appropriate the property of neutral subjects, domiciled in their own country, found or captured on land in the enemy’s territory, for or on account of any acts done by such persons in the course of trade or intercourse with the Confederate States, such legislation must be held and deemed a direct and flagrant violation of the law of nations.
We shall see, however, that it is not susceptible of any such construction. That Congress never intended by that legislation to violate the plain principles of the law of nations in this regard is manifest from the slightest examination of the history and language of the statute; but if there were, as there is not, a doubt as to the intention of Congress, such doubt would be judicially resolved in favor of an interpretation of the statute which would place it in harmony with the public law in regard to the relative rights of belligerents and neutrals; for the United States are to be presumed to have intended by every public act of their. Government to fulfill, and not to violate, their international obligations to friendly foreign nations and their subjects. (The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 118.)
5. The rights of trade and intercourse between neutrals and belligerents, in a civil war, being, therefore, identically the same as in international wars, we come now to consider the general principles of the law of nations relative to commercial intercourse on the part of the subjects of neutral states with the belligerents in an international war.
And, first, in regard to commercial intercourse, on the part of neutrals, with the belligerent, within the territory of the belligerent, the rule of international law is absolute and universal, that while the state of war precludes commercial intercourse between members of the hostile communities as inconsistent with its very nature, the subjects of neutral states, having no jus belUcum themselves, are entitled to the continuance of their ordinary jus pads: with certain modifications, (relating chiefly to contraband of war and blockade,) which flow from the altered state of the general relations of countries in time of war. (Yattel, bk. Ill, oil. vii, §§ 110, 111; 3 Pliill., Int. Law, 202; Manning, Law of Nations, ed. 1875,255.)
6. Snoli being the undoubted rule as to commercial transactions by neutrals within the territory of the Confederate States, whether with the defacto government or inhabitants, what are the doctrines of public law relative to trade with that belligerent, on the part of neutrals, within their own country, and trade carried on upon the high seas between the neutral country and the Confederate States ?
In this case we have to consider the doctrines of the public law in regard to the sale and carriage of articles contraband of war and in regard to the carriage of goods to places under blockade.
No American publicist, statesman, or jurist has ever denied the absolute right of neutral subjects to sell and deliver to a belligerent articles contraband of war within the neutral territory, or to export and transport such articles from the neutral territory to the belligerent territory for sale to, or for the use of, the belligerent, subject only, in the latter case, to the conflicting right of the other belligerent to capture the peccant property while in transitu on the high seas.
The accepted doctrine of the law of nations is that laid down by Chancellor Kent, almost in the language of Vattel, that “ the right of the neutral to transport and of the hostile power to seize are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.” (Vattel, bk. Ill, chap, vii, § 103, et seq.;
I Kent, 142; Dana’s Wheaton, § 444; Twiss, Law of Nations, War, 232; 3 Pliill.,' ed. 1870, 410; Seton v. Low, 1 Johns. Oases, 1; Richardson v. Marine Ins. Co., 6 Mass., 113; The San-tissima Trinidad, 7 Wh., 340; Éx parte Ghavasse v. Grazebroohe,
II Jurist, N. S., pt. I, 400; The Helen, ib., 1025, S. C. L. R., 1 A. & E., 5; Am. L. E., Jany., 1871; 3 Jefferson’s Works, 557; 1 Am. State Papers, F. E., 100; 6 Webster’s Works, 452; Ex. Doc., 27th Cong., 1841-’42, vol. 5, Doc.266; Message of President Pierce, Dec., 1854; Mr. Seward to Mr. Romero, Dec. 15, 1862; Lord (-rfanville’s circular letter of Aug. 11, 1870; Noah Webster’s Writings, 42; Speech of Mr. Layard, solicitor-general of England, cited byMr. Lawrence, Lawrence’s Wheaton, 813.)
As topecuniary transactions involving trade and money, between neutral subjects and a belligerent community, and other transactions involving services rendered by neutral subjects to the belligerents, the law of nations was distinctly stated by Mr. Webster during the civil war between Texas and Mexico, and by President Pierce during the war in the Crimea.
In the former war Mr. Webster said :
•‘As to advances, loans, or donations of money or goods made by individuals to the government of Texas, or its citizens, the Mexican government hardly ueeds to be informed that there is nothing unlawful in this so long as Texas is at peace with the United States, and that these are things which no government undertakes to restrain.” (Ex. Doc. 27th Cong., 184l-’42, vol. 5, 266.)
President Pierce, in his message of December, 1854, affirmed the rights of neutrals iu these words:
“ The laws of the United States do not forbid their citizens to sell to either of the belligerent powers articles contraband of war, to take munitions of war or soldiers on board their private ships for transportation; and although, in so doing, the individual citizen exposes his property to some of the hazards of war, his acts do not involve any breach of national neutrality, nor of themselves implicate the Government. Thus, during the progress of the present war in Europe, our citizens have, without national responsibility therefor, sold gunpowder and arms to all buyers, regardless of the destination of those articles. Our merchantmen have been, and still continue to be, largely employed by Great Britain and France, in transporting troops, provisions, and munitions of war to the principal seat of military operations, and in bringing home the sick and wounded soldiers; but such use of our mercantile marine is not interdicted either by the international or by our municipal law, and, therefore, does not compromise our neutral relations with Bus-sia.”
7. If it should be conceded, however, that the supplying of articles of contraband of war by neutrals is inconsistent with the duty of neutrality, and, therefore, a breach of neutrality, and consequently an offense against the neutral sovereign, it would not follow that the belligerent injured thereby would have the right to punish or affect the ueutral subjects engaged in such transactions by the seizure and forfeiture of any property belonging to them that might be found within the jurisdiction of the belligerent or in the territory of its enemy.
The principle is universal and without exception in the law of nations, that for any non-neutral act the only penalty that a belligerent has the right to inflict is the forfeiture of the pec-cant property involved in the particular transaction, if it should be captured on the high seas.
The neutral cannot be visited by the belligerent with personal puuishment, nor can his other property, under the control of the belligerent, be seized, captured, or confiscated for his non-neutral acts. The neutral subject who commits a breach of neutrality, or a non-neutral act, violates the law of his own country, and he is amenable for his offense to the law of his own country alone, except when actually taking part in the war as a combatant, when he is liable to be dealt with according to the laws of war. (Hall on Rights and Duties of Neutrals, 26-, G-rotius, De J. B. et P., lib. iii, c. 1, § 6; Case of Analogues to Contraband, The Friendship, 6 Rob., 420; The Orozembo, ib., 430; The Atlanta, ib., 440; Dana’s Wheaton, note, 637.)
As to the ownership of this cotton, in the light of the foregoing principles of the public law, a few observations only need be made. The cotton in question was purchased by Theodore Anderae, as the agent of Alexander Collie, a neutral subject, domiciled in his own country, for Collie, and on his account, and held subject to his order, and he was, therefore, the sole owner of the property. If it were true that the cotton was purchased by Anderae with funds received from the Confederate government for property, contraband or otherwise, sent into the Confederate States by Collie, and delivered by him to the Confederate government, through Anderae, the fact would not invalidate, or in any manner affect, the right and title of the petitioner to the cotton.
Mr. Collie’s contracts with the Confederate government, with reference to the sale and transportation and delivery of arms and. munitions of war, were valid and unimpeachable transactions, under the law of England and the law of nations. He had a right to receive the stipulated price from that government, and to invest it, in any manner he saw fit, in cotton and other property in the territory of the Confederate States.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the great case of the Santissima Trinidad, (7 Wheat., 283,) affirmed the absolute right óf a neutral, who has safely transported over the high seas to an enemy’s country an armed' ship or other con traband, to sell the property to the belligerent; and the right and title of the neutral to the proceeds of the sale of the con-' traband property, and to any property into which such proceeds may have been converted, is as indefeasible as his ownership of any other property belonging to him in h;s own country or in the territory of either belligerent. The maxim of the public law is that, in contraband, the offense is deposited with the cargo.
It is manifest that the existence of the blockade cannot invalidate or affect the title of Collie to this cotton. The question of his title and ownership is determinable solely by the application of the principles of the law of nations; and it has never yet been supposed that, under the public law, infra-territorial-transactions on the part of neutrals, in the blockaded territory, were invalidated or in any wise affected by the existence of a maritime blockade. The law of blockade confers upon the belligerent only the right to capture and conSscate neutral property taken on the high seas in the act of violating the blockade; and the law is settled that the effective blockade of a port is not violated even by shipments forwarded by inland navigation from that port to an unblockaded port. (The Stert, 4 Bob., 65.) This doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court, in the late war, in the case of British vessels captured in trade between London and Matamoras; and, following the-“lessons of the masters of international jurisprudence,” the court held that such trade, with intent to supply the markets of Texas, could not be declared unlawful. (The Peterhoff., 5 Wall., 57.)
Commercial blockades are opposed to the general policy of the law of nations, and no court has the right to extend them by construction. (Westlake’s Commercial Blockades, 6; Mr. Cass to Mr. Mason, June 27,1859; President’s Message, 1859-60, 31.)
To declare the title of this property invalid for any reason founded on the existence of a blockade of the southern ports would be, in effect, to revive the doctrines of the Berlin and Milan Decrees and the British Orders in Council, which have met the universal condemnation of all international jurists.
The next question, as to petitioner’s right to recover the proceeds of this cotton, now in the Treasury, depends on the construction and effect to be given, in the light of the settled doctrines of public law, to the third section of the Abandoned, or captured property Act of March 12,1863.
The terms of the third section of the act of 1803, “ has never given aid or comfort to the rebellion,” are words of technical signification in the jurisprudence of the United States, and import the political crime of treason, as known to the criminal law of the United States.
Chief-Justice Marshall said, in Burr’s case : “ So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by whom they are employed mast be considered as employing them in that ascertained meauing, unless the contrary be proved by the context.” (2 Burr’s Trial, 401.) It was by this process that the Ohief-J ustiee ascertained the meaning of the terms “levying war,” in the Constitution of the United States, to be identical with their meaning in the statute of 25 Edward III. Thepvords in the third section of the act of 1863 are the same words as those employed in the second section of the Act July 17, 1862, which defines and punished the crime of giving aid or comfort to rebellion against the United States. They must be understood to be used in the Abandoned or captured property Act in the same sense in which they are employed in the Act July 17, 1862. They describe, in both statutes, criminal offenses, and offenses known as treason against the United States. As the mere act of “ giving aid or comfort” is not punishable under the statute of 1862, so the mere act of “giving aid or comfort” is not sufficient to prevent a recovery, or ,to work a forfeiture of the proceeds of captured property under the act of 1863.
It is the offence of “ giving aid or comfort ” to the rebellion which must appear in order to authorize a conviction under the act of 1862, and to bar a recovery of the proceeds under the act of 1863.
.We submit that, if anything is settled by the long line of adjudications of the Supreme Court, under the Abandoned or captured property Act, it is that the act was intended to preclude only those who had committed treason, or treasonable offenses, against the United States, during the rebellion, from a recovery of the proceeds of their property captured on land in the insurgent States. (Mrs. Alexander’s Case, 2 Wall., 422 ; PadeJford’s Case, 9 Wall., 537; Klein’s Case, 13 id., 136; Armstrong’s Case, ib., 155 ; Pargoud’s Case, ib., 128; Carlisle’s Case, 16 Wall.; 153; Kay craft’s Case, 22 id., 99.)
The Supreme Court has said, in construing this statute, that “ all general terms in statutes should be limited in their application so as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or any unconstitutional operation, if that be possible. It will be presumed that «exceptions were intended which would avoid results of that nature.” (Carlisle's Oase, 16 Wall., 153.) ‘That court, speaking-through Chief-Justice Marshall, said also, at an early day, that “ an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the lato of nations, if any other possible construction remains.” (The Charming Betsy, 2 Or., 118; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 id., 43.) And, in the Piracy Cases, the same great judge declared that “ general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the State, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them.” (The United States v. Palmer, 3 Wh., 631; The United States v. Wiltberger, 5 id., 97.)
If Congress has assumed by this statute to appropriate the private property of this neutral subject, captured on land in the enemy’s country, for or on account of any acts done by him during the war in the way of trade and intercourse with the Confederate States, the statute is a palpable and flagrant violation of the public law. The court, in giving construction to the statute, must therefore start with the presumption that Congress did not intend to withhold from him a remedy, but did intend to constitute the United States a trustee of the proceeds of this property. It has been already shown that while the law of nations gives a belligerent the right to arrest and capture, when found on the high seas, the high road of nations, munitions of war destined and in the act of being transported in a neutral ship to its enemy, this right, given by the law of nations to a belligerent for his protection, does not involve as a consequence that the act of the neutral subject in so transporting munitions of war is a personal offense against the belligerent state, and that it has no right to constitute such act a ground of complaint against the neutral subject, or to inflict any punishment on him whatever, or to visit his act directly or indirectly with any penal consequences beyond the judicial condemnation of the property involved in the transaction. This is the settled doctrine of the international law of contraband; and no belligerent state could assume by its municipal regulations to change or modify that law, directly or indirectly, to the injury or disadvantage of neutral subjects, without violating its international obligations and rendering itself responsible to'the neutral state whose subjects might be affected by such legislation.
The Supreme Court has construed the Abandoned or captured property Act as recognizing “ to the fullest extent the humane maxims ot the modern law of nations which exempt private property of non-combatant enemies on laud from capture as booty of war.” (Mrs. Alexander’s Case, 2 Wall., 419; Klein’s Case, 13 id.-, 137.) It cannot be supposed that Congress, in any legislation “concerning captures on laud,” intended to authorize the appropriation of the private property of a neutral subject, resident and carrying on trade in his own country, which could not be at all, under the public law, the lawful subject of capture and confiscation, or appropriation, on the part of the United States.
If, however, any act of the petitioner during the war, in connection with the transactions in which he was engaged, and complained of by the Government, constitutes or could constitute an offense against the United States, or i’f Congress, in the statute of 1863, has taken cognizance of any act done by him, in the course of those transactions, as au offense against the ■ United States, (as it has done if this property cannot be restored under the statute of 1863,) then the petitioner is relieved by the President’s proclamation of amnesty and pardon of the 25th of December, 1868; and the proceeds of the property must be restored by the judgment of this court.
It would shock the moral sense of all Christendom if it should be deterpnned that the proceeds of this neutral-owued private property cannot be restored, when the Government of the United States afforded its rebel enemies the means whereby they were enabled to recover the proceeds of all private property belonging to them captured on land during the late hostilities. The law of nations would tolerate uo such discrimination against the subjects of a neutral power; and it must be assumed that Congress intended by this legislation to place neutral subjects at least upon an equal footing with the rebel enemies of the United States, who by the operation of the statute and the amnesty have secured “restoration' of all rights of property.”
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the defendants:
I. The cotton in question was a lawful capture, jure belli. Otherwise, its seizure would be a tort which would oust the jurisdiction of the court. (Gibbons’s Case, 7 O. Gis. R., 105.) If lawfully captured, the Abandoned or captured property Act prescribes the sole remedy. (Hay or afVs Case, 8 O. Cls. R., 483, and 10 id., 95.) ' The petition proceeds upon the assumption of a lawful capture. Private property may be liable to capture by its ownership, or nature, or use; and be so under ordinary rules of warfare, or by express legislation. It is authorized by our Constitution, (Art. 1, sec. 3, ch. 11,) and not opposed to international law. (No. Am. Rev. for April, 1872, page 399; Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 2 Wall., 420; Padelford’s Case, 7 G. Cls. R., 144; Miller v. The United Slates, 11 Wall., 305; Sprott’s Case, 10 O. Cls. R., 11; Lamar v. Brown, 92 U. S., 127.)
II. The effect of such capture is to vest the whole title in the captor. (Brown v. The United States, 8 Or., 131; 92 U. S., 187; The Flsehe, 5 C. Rob., *181-2; The French Guiana, 2 Dodson, 151; Phillim. Int. Law, 2d Eng. ed., sec. cxxx.) Thus, Mr. Collie’s right and title as purchaser was extinguished by capture, though the Government has chosen to make the proof of original purchase one of the couditions-precedent to recovery, as it might annex any condition whatsoever that it pleased to the disposition of property which (by capture) had become its own. Klein’s Case, 7 C. Cls. R., 244, and the kindred decisions do not antagonize this position. A* careful examination and comparison of them shows that it is only after proof of all the facts, the establishment of which is required by statute, that any trusteeship in the United States arises. “That expresses all there is of the trust.” (iUayeraft’s Case, 10 O. Cls. R., 111.) Evidently, all captured cotton was not held in trffst; nor was every owner entitled to recognition ; but only a portion of the cotton, and some of its owners, were within the purview of the statute. Prima facie, all cotton taken belongs to the United States. The burden of proving the contrary rests on the claimant, and till such proof is made no trust arises.
III. Proof that Collie did not render aid and comfort to the enemy is a condition-precedent to his recovery. (Rev. Stat., § 1074.) Congress had a right to impose this condition. (Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 349; The Vrow Anna Gatharina, 5 C. Rob., 163; Carroll v. The United States, 13 Wall., 151, and other ■cases.) The question is one of jurisdiction. (Hayoraft’s Case, 10 C. Cls. R., 109.) Therefore, without such proof, this court can give no judgment in favor of the claimant. (Lopez v.Burslem, 4 Moore’s Priv. Co. Cas., 305.) Collie cauuot make it, because running the blockade is itself giving aid and comfort to the enemy. (Sprott’s Case, 10 O. 01s. R., 11,12.) But he also established an agency for trade in the Confederacy’after hostilities commenced, which would subject the property procured in such trade to capture. (Ann Green, 1 Gall., 287; Grossmeyer’s Case, 7 C. Cls. 11., 129; Mary Clinton, Blatchf. Pr. Gas., 509; San José Indians, 2 Gall., 290; 1 Duer on Ins., 527; Vroiv "Anna Catharina, 4 0. Rob., *119.) And was allowed to conduct a privileged trade, free from the. export duty to which all others were subjected. (Bendsborg, 4 C. Rob., *139.) He became a part owner of vessels which ran the blockade with supplies, jointly with the State of North Carolina and with the Confederacy, concealing their true character by false documents, &c. In addition to these acts of trade, he gave heavy guns to those governments and large sums of money expressly to relieve the distress caused by our blockade. Collie thereby became himself a belligerent. (1 Duer on Ins., 755, top; Levi’s Int. Law, Introd., xlv; Whiting’s War Powers Under Const, 337, § 1; Miller v. The United States, 11 Wall., 312; 2 Twiss’s Law of Nat., 435, § 215.)
IY. Though we do not consider it pertinent to ásk whether or not the claimant thereby violated “public law,” yet, as his counsel do ,we observe that even running the blockade was such violation, for which that law prescribes the punishment of seizure. (1 Kent, *143; 3 Phillim. Int. Law, cclxxxv; Kerr’s Essay, in 2 Jurid. Soc. Papers, 635; 1 Duer on Ins., 750; Levi’s Int. Law, Introd., xlv.) This limitatiou of the right of seizure does not apply to property taken upon land in a hostile territory, over which the laws of the captor are entitled to be supreme, and become so by occupation of the territory, but only to a maritime capture upon the common highway of nations, outside our own peculiar jurisdiction.
Y. It may be remarked,.ere passant, that Collie also violated the neutrality act of his own country by his connection with the vessels owned by the Confederacy and the State of North Carolina, they being “ transports,” mentioned in the seventh section of that act. (1 Phillim. Int. Law, 2d Eng. ed., 572, 573; id., Ap., 569; Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat., 283.)
YI. A fortiori, has this country, against which these acts were directed, the right to capture and confiscate the property acquired here solely by means of such illegal action. The United States were both belligerent and sovereign. (Prise Oases, 2 Black,- 673; Miller v. The United States, 11 Wall., 308, and cases there cited; Lamar v. Brown, 92 U. S., 195; Hose v. Himsly, 4 Or., 272.) They had authority to declare and define by legislation the status of property throughout the extent of our territorial jurisdiction, and enforce such laws wherever our arms subjected insurgent localities and states to rightful sway.
Whoever comes into this country, in time of peace, subjects himself,pro tem., to our municipal jurisdiction. {Exchange v. HcIPaddon, 7 Or., 144.) Whoever, in time of war, sends through our blockade munitions to be exchanged for cotton, and that cotton is stored in the blockaded port, within our territorial jurisdiction, though held temporarily by our domestic enemies, tabes the hazards and chances of war¿is to that property, and of losing it by its being captured by our forces, its capture being authorized by legislation entitled to obedience in those places where the cotton is so purchased and stored, and enforced pari passu with the advance of our army and the extension of our lines. (JheJcelman’s Case, 11 C. Ols. It., 438; Santissima, &c., 7 Wheat., 283 ; Westlake’s Essay, 1 Jurid. Soc. Pap., 184.) The principles-to be applied to property captured from the enemy within our own territorial limits are not identical with and hardly analogous to those which control the disposition of prizes made upon the ocean, outside our peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction. So far as this court is concerned, the sole rule of judicial actiou is the language of the statute. (Lopez f.Burlsem, 4 Moore’s P. 0., 305.) Prize, cases have only a remote (if any) bearing on this subject; yet our opponents cite no other iu support of their arguments, which are elaborate and masterly discussions of prize law', and of little else.
VII. If not an enemy generally, Collie was so to be treated sub modo — i. e., as to this particular property — which is all that concerns us here. (1 Kent, *74, *80; Halleok’s Int. Law, 715, § 25, and 720, § 3; Whiting’s War Powers, &c., 346, 356, 357 ; Bentzon v. Boyle, 7 Or., 199; San Jose Indians, 2 Gall., 285-’7; The My. Clinton, Blatchf. Pr. Oas., 560; Phenix, 5 0. Rob., 21; Vroio Anna, id., 161; Jonge Klassina, id., 297; Vrendschap, 4 id., 166; Ann Oreen, 1 Gall., 286, and various other cases and authorities hereinbefore mentioned.) These citations and decisions refer to cargoes taken as prize at/sea; but if the pro duce of a hostile soil, though owned by a neutral, is there liable to seizure aud condemnation, after it has left the country of its production, a-fortiori must it be so liable when captured within the territory of a domestic enemy, especially where the product bears such a relation to the war as cotton did to the rebellion.
VIII. Collie’s acts, by which he claims title, were against our publie policy. (1 Story on Con., §§ 674, et seq.; Totten v. The United States, 110. Cls. R., 182; Kenneit v. Chambers, 14 How., ; Ann Creen, 1 Gall., 287.) Therefore, he not only cannot recover through our courts, but he originally failed to acquire title under our laws. (Whitfield's Case, 11 0. 01s.'R., 460; Sprotfs Case, 10 id., 12; QrossmeyeSs Case, 7 id., 129; Querouzo’s Case, 7 id., 202; Desmare v. The United States, 93 U. S., 612.) Collie cannot claim to stand in any better position than our own citizens. (93 ü. S., 612.)
IX. Amnesty proclamation did not reach non-resident aliens. It was issued as an act of sovereignty, addressed only to residents, and “ to recall revolted subjects to allegiance.” (92 U. S.r 195.) Collie never owed allegiance. The pardon was personal, granted only to those liable to be criminally prosecuted for “offenses against the United States.” The capture was as a belligerent; the amnesty was as a sovereign. Collie did array himself in belligerency with our enemies; he never subjected himself to our sovereignty.
X. He cannot recover, because he has not truly stated his interest, since he had numerous associates whose legal interests were identiSal with his own. (Rev. Stat., § 1072.)

Opinion:
Drake, Ch. J.,
delivered the following opinion:
This case was very ably argued on behalf of the claimant as if it were pending before an international tribunal, organized for its decision on the principles and by the rules of public law. \V ere this court vested with jurisdiction so to decide it, it would be difficult to resist, the force of the arguments presented by the claimant's counsel. But, in any view I can take of the matter, the court is not authorized to base its decision for or against either party on those principles and rules. We have no jurisdiction except that conferred by statutes of the United States, and public law cannot be held to enlarge the powers so conferred, and much less can it operate to take them away, modify, or limit them.
This action was brought under the Abandoned or captured property Act of March 12, 1863, and by the terms of that act the claimant's right of recovery must be decided. Aside from that act the claimant would have no possible right to sue in this court, though he could demonstrate that every principle of public law justified his right to seek through his own government the payment to him by the United States of the value of the cotton seized and taken by their military authorities.
The Abandon ed or captured property Act declared that "any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims; anil on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given • any' aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of said proceeds, after the deduction of any purchase-money which may have been paid, together with the expenses of transportation and sale of said property, and any other lawful expenses attending the disposition thereof."
Within those few lines the claimant must find his right to recover in this case, or not find it at all. If he finds it there he has no need to invoke aid from international law; if he cannot find it there that law cannot aid him.
The petition seeks redress under that act, and is framed to meet the requirements of the twelfth section of the Act March 3,1863, (12 Stat. L.,765,) which imposes the foliowinglimitation:
"Provided, however, That in order to authorize the said court to render a judgment in favor of any claimant, if a citizen of the United States, it shall be set forth in the petition that the claimant, and the original and every prior owner thereof where the claim has been assigned, has at all times borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States, and, whether a citizen or not, that he has not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the said Government, which allegations may be traversed by the Government; and if on the ti ini such issue shall be decided against the claimant, his petition shall be dismissed."
That prescribes a condition-precedent to the exercise by this court of its power to render a judgment in favor of any claimant. This court always, after the enactment of that proviso, enforced its requirement, until the Supreme Court, by its repeated decisions, compelled us to abandon it in every case where the claimant was either a citizen of the United States, or an alien resident within the United States. That court decided that either a special pardon, or the general amnesty of December 25, 1868, obliterated the offense of treason involved in giving aid and comfort to the rebellion, so far as persons of either of those descriptions were concerned; and that the. fact.oí their having given such aid and comfort was, after the pardon or amnesty, no longer an obstacle to their obtaining a judgment in this court. But to this day the question has never been submitted to that court whether an alien residing in a foreign-country, who gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, may prosecute a suit here for the proceeds of his property captured in the rebel States during the war.
The petition avers that Alexander Collie had not in any way • voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the Government of the United States; and the Government took issue upon the averment. The facts found show that he did voluntarily give very great and efficient aid to the rebellion, by running through the blockade into the ports of the rebel States large quantities of munitions of war, and running out from those ports to England large quantities of cotton, which, sold in England, furnished the rebel authorities large credits there; and also by sending presents from himself of cannon and ammunition to the rebel authorities; and also by a gift of $30,000 from, himself to those authorities to aid the needy and the suffering in those States, particularly those who had been made so through the war.
And now the question arising on these facts is not whether, under the principles of international law, he had a just claim against the United States for the value of his cotton captured in Savannah, but whether under the Act March 12, 1863, he is authorized to prefer his claim in this court for the proceeds of that cotton and obtain a judgment therefor.
It will be instantly observed that, by the principles of international law, he would be entitled to insist upon restitution of the full value of his cotton; while in this court he can recover only the net proceeds of the sale thereof, after deducting all expenses. If, therefore, he should recover here those proceeds, he might, through his government, still demand the difference between the proceeds and the value of the cotton, with interest on that value from the date of capture till that of the payment to him, under the judgment of this court, of the proceeds, and interest on the balance until paid. If, however, we deny his right to prefer his claim here, we do not thereby pass upon the merits of his claim, much less would that action operate a forfeiture or confiscation of his property, but it would simply withhold from him one of two modes of redress, leaving the other fully open to him. Most assuredly this Government is not bound by international law to furnish him a judicial remedy; and when it does provide, by statute, a court where claims for captured property can be preferred, neither he nor any other person can come into that court for that purpose on any other terms than thoes the statute prescribes.
The real question in the case, then, is, whether Alexander Collie, a non-resident alien, who voluntarily gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, is entitled to prefer his claim here for the proceeds of his cotton. Beyond doubt, the terms of the act exclude hi m, justas they did all men who had given aid and comfort to the rebellion, until the Supreme Court held that pardon or amnesty obliterated the act of treason as well as its guilt, and so the act could never be set up as a bar to recovery.
Beyond controversy, neither pardon nor amnesty applies to him who has not been guilty of a criminal offense against the sovereign or state.
Equally beyond controversy, Alexander Collie's sending munitions of war from the country of his domicile to the rebel States was not an act which subjected him to punishment under the laws of the United States. The worst that could befall him was the capture in transitu of those munitions.
Hence it follows, as a clear, inevitable conclusion, that he was not the subject of amnesty, and therefore can claim nothing through it.
As the decisions of the' Supreme Court which dispensed with averment and proof of loyalty to the United States did not deny the constitutional right of Congress to require such averment and proof, but merely affirmed that the effect of pardon and amnesty was to do away with the necessity of them, and as Collie was not the subject of amnesty, it follows that there is nothing which does or could relieve him from the obligation to aver and prove, not his allegiance to the Government of the United States, which he never owed, but that he " had not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the said Government." He so averred, but failed to sustain the averment by proof. On the contrary, the evidence most completely disproved the averment. Such being the case, no matter how valid and just a claim he may have, in the view of public law, he has no right to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, which can be exercised only in conformity with the statutes conferring its powers.
The claimant's petition, therefore, should be dismissed.