Case: UNITED STATES, Appellee v. ROCKY SUTTON, Private, U. S. Army, Appellant
Abbreviation: United States v. Sutton
Decision Date: 1972-04-21
Docket Number: No. 25,182
Citation: 21 C.M.A. 344
Volume: 21
Reporter: Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals
Court: United States Court of Military Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee v ROCKY SUTTON, Private, U. S. Army, Appellant
Judges: Judges Quinn and Duncan concur.
Pages: 344–345

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES, Appellee v ROCKY SUTTON, Private, U. S. Army, Appellant
21 USCMA 344, 45 CMR 118
No. 25,182
April 21, 1972
Colonel George J. McCartin, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Donahue, Captain John D. Lanoue, and Captain James L. Powers were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.
Captain Richard L. Menson was on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion:
Opinion of the Court
DARDEN, Chief Judge:
Of the several offenses to which the appellant pleaded guilty, specification 1 of Charge IV alleges a violation of Article 130, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 930, in that appellant Sutton "did, at Katterbach Kaserne, . . . on or about 29 May 1970, unlawfully enter a track vehicle, the property of the military of the United States, with intent to commit a criminal offense, to wit: larceny, therein."
Article 130, Code, supra, provides:
"Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
In United States v Gillin, 8 USCMA 669, 25 CMR 173 (1958), this Court considered and rejected the contention that an automobile could be the object of an unlawful entry. For purposes of Article 130, a track vehicle is indistinguishable from an automobile. Specification 1, Charge IV, therefore, does not state an offense.
The finding of guilty as to specification 1, Charge IV, is set aside and dismissed. The decision of the Court of Military Review is reversed and the record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. The Court of Military Review may reassess the sentence on the basis of the remaining findings of guilty.
Judges Quinn and Duncan concur.