Case: WILLIAM R. REAGAN v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Reagan v. United States
Decision Date: 1900-01-15
Docket Number: No. 20915
Citation: 35 Ct. Cl. 90
Volume: 35
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: WILLIAM R. REAGAN v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Pages: 90–106

Head Matter:
WILLIAM R. REAGAN v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 20915.
Decided January 15, 1900.]
On the Proofs.
The claimant, on the 25th of April, 1863, is appointed b.y the United States court for the Indian Territory commissioner under the Act May 2, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 98), and on the 1st day of March, 1895, he is one of the commissioners holding office under an existing appointment. April 17,1895, an order is entered that in accordance with an act of Congress approved March 1, 1895, he be continued in office. On the 31st January, 1896, a letter of the district judge is entered on the records of the court notifying him that he is no longer a commissioner, assigning specifically, as one of many reasons age and infirmity making him unfit; the letter is not sent to the claimant and no other statement of cause is made, neither is a hearing allowed him nor an opportunity to submit proof in his defense. He protests that the letter is insufficient to remove him, but a person designated by the district judge as commissioner in his place comes to the office with two armed deputy marshals and demands possession of the books, dockets, and papers belonging to the office.
I.The Act March 1, 189_5 (28 Stat. L., p. 695), increasing the number of commissioners provides “That the present commissioners shall be included in the number, and shall hold office under their existing appointments, subject to removal by the judge of the district where said commissioners reside, for causes prescribed by law.” The power to prescribe by law is legislative, and can not be conferred on judicial officers.
II.There are no causes prescribed by statute for the removal of commissioners in the Indian Territory.
III. By section 4 of the Act of March 1,1896 (28 Stat. L., 696), the general laws of Arkansas were put in force in the Indian Territory, but they do not extend to the commissioners of the United States courts.
IV. Though there is no provision in a statute applicable to the removal of commissioners, it is unreasonable to suppose that the intent was to make them irremovable or that it was its policy to keep them in office until future legislation should name specific causes for removal.
V.Where an act providing for the appointment and removal of commissioners specifies no causes for removal it imports that such causes will be adequate as would be elsewhere.
VI. United States commissioners are quasi judicial officers, performing their duties under the direction of the courts, and may, like referees or receivers, be removed without the formality of a hearing.
VII. A general power of removal given to a court by statute is discretionary, and its exercise can not be reviewed by another tribunal.
The Reporters' statement of the case:
The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
I. The claimant was, on the 25th day of April, 1893, appointed by the United States court for the Indian Territory United States commissioner within said Territory, under the provisions of section 39 of an act of Congress approved May 2, 1890, chapter 182 (1st Suppl. Rev. Stat., 737), and upon the 1st day of March, 1895, the claimant was one of the present commissioners, then holding office under an existing appointment. On April 17, 1895, the following order was entered of record in the United States court in the Indian Territory, southern district:
“ It appearing from the i’ecords of this court that the said William R. Reagan was a duly appointed, qualified, and acting-commissioner for the United States court for the third judicial division of the Indian Territory, located at Chickasha, on the 1st day of March, 1895, it is hereby ordered that in accordance with the act_of Congress approved March 1, 1895, the said William R. Reagan be, and he is hereby, continued in office, and the bond hereinbefore recited be, and the same is, in all things approved and confirmed.
“C. B. Kilgobe, Judge.”
II. He continuously performed the duties and received the salary of said office until the 31st day of January in the year 1896, when the following letter was entered upon the records of the United States court in the Indian Territory, in the southern district, by the Hon. Constantine B. Kilgore, judge of said court:
“IN Chambees,
“Ardmore, Indian Territory, January 31st, 1896. “Hon. William R. ReagaN,
“ United States Commissioner for the
“ Fourth Commissioner's JDistrict in and for
'•‘•the Southern District of the Incidan Territory.
“SiR: I feel it my duty to declare the office of commissioner in that district vacant, and to notify you that you are no longer United States commissioner for that district, and your successor will be named at once.
“There are many reasons which I could assign for my action in this behalf, but I will only suggest one now — that is, your age and the infirmities incident thereto render you, in my judgment, in many respects unfit for the office.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“C. B. Kilgore,
“Judge JJ. S. Dist. Goivrt, S. DistJ
The letter was not sent to the claimant or served upon him. No other statement of cause was made. The claimant was given no notice of any charge against him. No hearing was allowed the claimant and no opportunity to submit proof in his defense.
III. The claimant protested that said letter was insufficient to effect his removal, and duly served such protest upon the Hon. Constantine B. Kilgore, judge of said court.
IV. On February 10,1896, one John R. Williams, who had been designated bjr said judge as United States commissioner in the claimant’s place, came to claimant’s office with two armed deputy marshals, and, presenting his order of appointment, demanded possession of the dockets, books, and papers belonging to claimant’s office as United States commissioner.
V. The order of appointment of said Williams is as follows:
“In'Chambers,
'‘‘‘Arcbnore, In&ia/n Territory, January 81st, 1896.
“JohnR. Williams, a resident of Ryan, southern district of the Indian Territory, is hereby appointed United States commissioner in and for the fourth district of the southern district of the Indian Territory.
“ Said appointment to take effect at once.
“It is further ordered that said commissioner shall reside at Ryan, and that he shall hold court at Ryan and at the town of Duncan, in said district, until further ordered, the time to be divided so as to dispose of the business at both points, which time shall be determined upon hereafter.
“ C. B. Kilgore,
“Judge U. S. Ot., So. DistJ
VI. The claimant protested and refused to recognize said Williams as his successor in said office, excepting so far as he was compelled thereto by the exercise of superior force on the part of the deputy marshals aforesaid and said Williams. Thereupon the claimant and said Williams joined in the following instrument of writing:
“Duncan, INDIAN TERRITORY, Southern District.
“ This instrument of writing witnesseth:
“ That whereas C. B. Kilgore, judge of the United States court for the southern district of the Indian Territory, on the 31st day of Jan’y, A. D. 1896, made, and caused to be entered upon the docket of his court at Ardmore, Ind. Ter., an order declaring my office of United States commissioner for the Ryan division of said district vacant; and at the same time appointing John R. Williams to bo my successor in said office, and the said Reagan having appealed to the courts of the United States from said order, on the ground that said order is contrary to the law:
“ Now, therefore, it is agreed by and between the parties hereto that said Reagan will turn over and surrender the dockets, books, and papers belonging to said office under protest, and that said Williams receives the same with the understanding that said Reagan yields no rights by so doing that he would otherwise have.
“ Witness our hands this 10th day of Feb’y, A. D. 1896.
“ Jno. R. Williams.
“Wm. R. Reagan.”
VII. The claimant received a salary of $1,500 per annum up to the 3d day of February, 1896, but since said date has not been paid said salary or any part thereof.
VIII. Claimant took no other or further action to assert his claim to said office or to obtain a reversal of the action of Judge Kilgore until the institution of this proceeding.
IX. From the 3d day of February, 1896, until the 7th day of October, 1897, John R. Williams, who was appointed by Judge Kilgore to said office in claimant’s stead, exercised said office and was paid the salary thereof. On said date one Horace M. Wolverton was appointed as the successor of said John R. Williams by Hon. Hosea Townsend, United States judge for said district, and since that time has exercised said office and has been paid the salary thereof.
X. From the 3d day of February, 1896, until the commencement of this action, the disbursing clerk of the Department of Justice paid to the persons who succeeded claimant to said office the salary of said office in the absence of any notice on the part of claimant that .he claimed to be lawfully entitled to said office and the salary thereof, or any claim or demand, on the part of claimant for the payment to him of such salary for said period of time or any part thereof.
Mr. William B. King, for the claimant:
Where an officer’s tenure is dependent upon good behavior, or where the power of removal is to be exercised only for causes named in the statute, then the courts have uniformly held that the power of removal must be exercised subject to the condition that charges are duly made, that notice of these charges is given to the accused officer, that a hearing is granted and that an opportunity is afforded to adduce evidence on behalf of the accused officer showing that the cause given by the officer attempting the removal is ill-founded in fact. A long line of decisions, both in England and in this country, enforces this principle. Page v. Ilardim (8 B. Mon. [Ky.], 648, 672); Dullam v. Willson (53 Mich., 392).
An exactly similar doctrine is held in Pennsylvania in the cases of Commonwealth v. Slifer (25 Pa. St., 23) and Field v. Commonwealth (32 Pa. St., 478, 481). In each of these cases removal of an officer for cause was authorized by law, and in each case it was held that notice, hearing, and an opportunity for defense were necessary, although the statutes wholly failed to declare any limitation upon the power of the removing officer, except the existence of the facts constituting sufficient cause.
The same doctrine is also announced in the case of State v. St. Louis (90 Mo., 19). (See also Appeal of Willard, 4 R. L, 595, 597.)
One of the earlier English cases on this subject, relied upon in the Michigan case and others just cited, is Pamshcvy's Case (18 Ad. & El. [N. S.], 172, 190).
In the case of Queen v. Arelibislioj) Canterbury (1 El. and EL, 545) it appeared that, upon the revocation of a license to act as curate, an appeal was given to the archbishop, “who shall confirm or annul such revocation as to him shall appear just and proper.” It -was held that the appeal could not be exercised merely upon examination of the petition for appeal and the original record before the bishop, but that an actual hearing upon the charges must be given upon the appeal.
A similar doctrine is announced in Capel v. Child (2 Cromp-ton & Jervis, 558,574) and in King v. Gaskin (8 T. R., 209).
The principle relied upon in all these cases is stated per Bay ley, J., in Williams v. Bagot (3 B. & C., 781, 786), and by Chief Justice Marshall in Meade v. Deputy Marshal (1 Brock, 321; 16 Fed. Cases, 1291).
This line of decisions establishes as a fixed principle of construction that if cause for removal is required, it is not enough that a 'cause be stated by the removing power; unless notice of the charge is given and an opportunity for defense afforded, the order of removal is wholly void. That rule of interpretation thus fixed in English-speaking jurisprudence, founded on its fundamental principles, salutary in its effect, is to be upheld by the courts until a direct legislative command changes the rule thus sanctioned.
Sound reasons for the rule are given in the opinions cited. It would, indeed, be a naked right of no value to declare that an officer should be removed only for cause, and then to permit his removal summarily upon a mere allegation of cause without the substantial protection afforded by an opportunity to answer the charges. It does not diminish the discretion intended to be granted to the removing power by the legislature by requiring a notice and hearing, since, as is seen by the decisions cited, there is no interference with the decision of the removing power as to the pertinency and weight of the evidence adduced in the hearing. The power to decide is left where granted by law, but it is to be exercised only under due forms of law.
On the reason and authority here given the claimant contends that the summary letter of removal, although stating a ground for justification, is void because no notice and hearing was given; that the attempted removal was invalid, and that the claimant still holds the office to which he was originally appointed and is entitled to its salary.
This statute does not attempt to detail the specific causes for which a commissioner can be removed. It refers to them as “causes prescribed by law.” The right to remove is dependent upon the allegation and proof of a “cause prescribed by law. ” The affirmative is upon-the removing officer to show that the cause which he alleges is one prescribed by law. The claimant may, therefore, wait until some law is produced which prescribed “age and the infirmities incident thereto” as sufficient cause for removal. United States judges (R. S., § 714) have a rig'ht to retire at the age of 70, after ten year’s service, but conspicuous instances have occurred in the Supreme Court and in this court of valuable service long after that age. It has not been shown, and indeed is not the fact, that the claimant is yet 70 years of age. While the claimant does not consider it incumbent upon him to show what are “causes prescribed by law,” 3ret he ventures some suggestions on this point. There is no direct declaration in the Federal statutes of any cause for removal of a United States commissioner. The principles governing removal must be sought in adjudged cases.
Various cases have come before the courts relating to the removal of United States commissioners. In the case In re Eaves (30 Fed. Rep., 21) it was declared that habitual drunkenness, intoxication on active duty, active partisanship, and sitting in judgment in interested cases were sufficient cause for the removal of a commissioner from office.
In re Gilbert (31 Fed. Rep., 277) presented a case where the commissioner had encouraged prosecutions set on foot by a professional witness. The commissioner was given notice of the charges against him, an order to show cause was issued and the case referred to an examiner, by whom testimony was taken. The commissioner was not removed, but the court stated that hereafter such encouragement would be considered cause for removal.
In re Commissioners of Circuit Court (65 Feb. Rep., 314) was an application by the district attorney for the summaiy removal of all the commissioners of the district. The court affirmed its former decision. {In re Eaves, 30 Fed. Rep., 21.) See also Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall., 505.
In view of these decisions, it can not be said that the words “causes prescribed by law” are without a sufficiently definite meaning. The causes so prescribed are those causes which within existing law would have warranted the removal of the commissioner. As it is uniformly held that notice must be given and an opportunity for hearing, it necessarily follows that the charges constituting the cause alleged for removal must be of a nature susceptible of proof or of disproof. No mere general statement of incompetency, immorality, or fraudulent practice is a sufficient cause. A legal cause must be such cause as will permit a legal hearing and a 1 egal decision.
Testing the order of removal in this case by any of these principles, it is clear that the charge brought against the commissioner was not one which would have been recognized in any United States court as sufficient ground for the removal of a commissioner. It wholly fails to state any case to which a defense could be made, and finally reduces itself to a simple statement that it is the will of the judge that the commissioner should no longer hold this office. But the very object of this law was to prohibit such an arbitrary rule, and the order consequently must be considered null and void.
Still another meaning may be, with great propriety, attached to these words, a meaning deriving great strength by an examination of the material parts of the acts of 1890 and 1895 under which commissioners are authorized.
By § 31 of the act of 1890 (1 Supp. E. S., 733) the laws of the State of Arkansas appearing in Mansfield’s Digest are put in force in the Indian Territory, according to chapters relating to different subjects specified in this section.
By § 39 commissioners are authorized who shall exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas upon justices of the peace and the provisions of chapter 91 of the same laws, regulating the jurisdiction and procedure before justices of the peace, are hereby extended to the United States commissioners so created for the Indian Territory. By the act of 1895, § 4 (2 Supp. E. S., 395), these provisions are reenacted and additional chapters of Mansfield’s Digest, 45 and 46, are extended to the Indian Territory.
The effect of these provisions is to make the commissioners the equivalent of justices of the peace in Arkansas. Consequently, when the removal of the commissioners is forbidden except for “causes prescribed by law,” the commissioner has a right to examine the laws of Arkansas contained in Mansfield’s Digest, there being no Federal statute prescribing specific cause for removal of commissioners, in order to find what causes are prescribed by law for the removal of justices of the peace from office. Such examination shows many causes for their removal.
If a cause is found against a commissioner in the Indian Territory which would, within the laws of Arkansas, have been cause for tbe removal of a justice of the peace, he maj'-then be removed. Otherwise, protected by this provision of the statute, he is not subject to the power of removal on the part of the United States court.
It1 is, therefore, insisted that the cause for removal alleged in this case is not a cause prescribed by law, since it neither conformed to the causes recognized as sufficient by the decisions of the United States courts nor is it one of the causes prescribed by the statutes of Arkansas.
The language of Simonton, C. J., in In re Commissioners of Circuit Court, 65 Fed. Rep., 319, is especially applicable to this case:
“Commissioners are officers of the court, clothed with large powers and grave responsibilities. Necessarily, they are exposed, from the nature of their duties, to hostile criticism, and they are entitled to the support of the court. Above all, they should be assured that the faithful performance of duty will be recognized and rewarded by continuance in office. This assurance can not be given if there be sudden and capricious removal without reasons.”
If our position be not correct, then the statute means that these officers hold subject to the discretion of the judges only, which construction eliminates most important parts of the statute. This is not to be tolerated in construing statutes; every word must be held to mean something and be useful.
Mr. Jolvn W. Trainer (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Pradt) for the defendants:
The words “prescribed bylaw” do not mean any cause that courts have considered sufficient for a removal. The use of such words look to actual legislation upon the subject. The power “to prescribe by law” is legislative and can not be conferred on judicial officers. (Exeline v. Smith et al., 5 Cal., 112; Burgoyne v. Supervisors, 5 Cal., 9.) Congress, which created the office, has never seen proper to exercise this power or to provide any method to be pursued in effecting such removal, except that it shall be made by the judge of the district where said commissioner resides. Where the statute gives a power of removal “for cause,” without any specification of tbe causes, this power is of a discretionary and judicial nature',1 and, unless the statute otherwise specially provides, the exercise thereof can not be reviewed by any other tribunal, with respect either to the cause, or to its sufficiency or existence, or otherwise, etc. Even in some cases where the statute specifies the cause of removal it has been ruled that the removing authority is the sole and exclusive judge of the cause and the sufficiency thereof; and that the court can not review its decision in any case where it had jurisdiction. Throop, P. O. Par. 396. (People ex rel. v. Stout, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 17; S. C. 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 171; People v. Bearfield, 35 Barb., 254; Patton v. Vaughan, 39 Ark., 211; City of Hobokeen v. Gear, 25 N. J. L., 265; Peoples. Hill, 7 Cal., 97; Smith v. Brown, 59 Cal., 672; People ex rel. v. Higgins, 15 Ill., 110.)
If, however, the court should be of the opinion that the claimant was entitled to a review of the action of Judge Kil-gore, a complete remedy was provided him under the Arkansas procedure, adopted by the Federal statute for Indian territory, 2d Supp. E. S. U. S.; Secs. 1263-1265 Mansfield’s Dig. And title to the office could have been determined in a direct proceeding against the incumbent by a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.
Claimant stood by and permitted others to exercise said office and receive the salary thereof for nearly two years ■ without attempting to assert his claimed right. Now he seeks to have such right determined in this proceeding. He is barred by his own laches. Mansfield’s Dig., Secs. 1270, 4971, 4972.
His letter to the district attorney can not avail to save him any alleged right, and the agreement between him and Williams is incompetent and irrelevant to the issue herein.

Opinion:
Howky, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
This action is for the recovery of a certain amount of salary alleged by plaintiff to be due to him as United States commissioner for the Indian Territory, by virtue of an original appointment to that office under section 39 of the act of May 2, 1890 (1 Supp. E. S., 737), and his reappointment to the same office under a subsequent act, approved March 1, 1895 (2 Supp. R. S., 394), but from which office plaintiff was removed by an order of the judge of the court for the division in which he was serving as commissioner without any cause prescribed by law. The amount sued for is $5,375, being at the rate of $1,500 for each year, beginning at the time plaintiff surrendered the office under protest to the person named as his successor.
On January 31, 1896, the following order or notice was made and entered upon the records of the United States court for the Indian Territory, in the southern district thereof, by the Hon. Constantine B. Kilgore, judge of said court:
"To Hon. W. R. Reagan,
" United States Commissioner for the Fourth Com/mis sioneds District i/n amd for the Southern District of the Indñam, Territory.
"Sir: I feel it my duty to declare the office of commissioner in that district vacant, and to notify you that you are no longer United States commissioner for that district, and your successor will be named at once.
"There are many reasons which I could assign for my action in this behalf, but I will only suggest one now; that is, your age and the infirmities incident thereto render you, in my judgment, in many respects unfit for the office.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"C. B. Kilgore."
When knowledge of this order was brought to plaintiff's attention, he protested that it was insufficient to effect his removal under the law, and he accordingly made protest to the judge through the United States attorney for the district of his action. Thereupon John R. Williams, who had been designated as commissioner in plaintiff's place, came to take possession forcibly of the office and books of which plaintiff was possessed as commissioner, being accompanied by two deputy marshals for the purpose of enforcing the order of the judge. Plaintiff refused to turn over said office or papers or to recognize his successor in said office, but finally yielded to the exercise of superior force, joining with his successor in an agreement duly reduced to writing by which the books and papers of the office were surrendered to the person designated by the judge as successor, the removed official yielding with the understanding that no rights were waived by him. -
Since the time named in the petition plaintiff alleges that he has not been paid any part of the salary justly due to him, nor has he attempted to perform any of the duties of the office, but' he maintains that he has legally continued to hold said office and is entitled to its emoluments.
Section 4 of the act of March 1, 1895, which increased the number of commissioners, is in the following language:
" That the present commissioners shall be included in that number and shall hold office under their existing appointments, subject to removal by the judge of the district where said commissioners reside, for causes prescribed by law. "
The contentions here arise from the use of the words " for causes prescribed by law" in the foregoing act,.the claimant contending (1) that these words require notice and a hearing-before the order of removal could become effective, and (2) that the letter of removal having stated no cause prescribed by law, plaintiff's title to the office was not affected by the order.
The case is one of first impression under a very peculiar statute and presents some novel features. Precedents directly in point are entirely wanting and the issues must be determined without those guides which relate to other officers where the right to hold against an order of removal is the question.
If plaintiff's contentions are correct, then his indefinite tenure of office has been nominal and attended with no responsibilities or duties; and while the defendants should not be. heard to say that by the unlawful act of one of their officers plaintiff has not performed these duties or continued to have these responsibilities, it is to be noted that if the plaintiff has not been legally removed from office, the statute under which he claims gave him a tenure not accorded to his official superiors in the persons of the judges of the courts for the Indian Territory and virtually made him a commissioner for life. Practically he would hold except for such misbehavior as would be cause for'the impeachment and removal of the judges of some of the courts of the United States. In this respect the statute under which he claims is most extraordinary if it be what is claimed for it.
Reversing the order of presentation of plaintiff's contentions, it is first to be stated that there are no causes defined by any statute of the United States for the removal of commissioners in the Indian Territory. The researches of counsel have not been able to exhibit to us any statute designating causes for such removals, nor have our own investigations enabled us to find any rule on the subject. The act of 1895 contains nothing more specific than the general words quoted, and nothing more definite has since that time been enacted.
It is contended that if a cause is found against a commissioner in the Indian Territory which would, within the laws of Arkansas, have been cause for the removal of a justice of the peace, the commissioner may then be removed; otherwise, protected by this provision of the statute, he is not subject to removal by the courts of the United States.
By section 31 of the act of 1890, supra, the laws of the State of Arkansas, appearing in Mansfield's Digest, are put in force in the Indian Territory according to the chapters relating to different subjects specified in this section.
By section 39 commissioners were authorized to be appointed, and when appointed to have within the district to be designated in the order of court appointing them all the powers of commissioners of the circuit courts of the United States. The provisions of chapter 91 of said laws of Arkansas regulating the jurisdiction and procedure before justices of the peace in Arkansas were extended over the Indian Territory.
By section 4 of the act of 1895 (28 Stat. L., 696) the provisions of chapter 45 of Mansfield's Digest of the general laws of Arkansas, entitled " Criminal law" (except as to the crimes and misdemeanors mentioned in the proviso of this section), and chapter 46 of said laws of Arkansas contained in said digest, entitled " Criminal procedure," and chapter 91 of said general laws, regulating the jurisdiction and procedure before justices of the peace in civil cases, were extended to and put in force in the Indian Territory.
The effect of this provision, according to plaintiff's contention, is to make the commissioners the equivalent'of justices of the peace in Arkansas; that is.to say (to state the matter in anotaer form), tbat as no Federal statute prescribed specific causes for removal of commissioners, in order to find what causes are prescribed by law for their removal resort must be had to those causes defined by the laws of Arkansas for the removal of justices of the peace.
An examination of the criminal law and procedure of Arkansas extended to and put in force in the Indian Territory shows that Congress did not specifically apply to the removal of commissioners in the Territory the sole causes for which justices of the peace might be removed in Arkansas. The effect of the construction for which plaintiff contends would be to hold the commissioners in office for life unless some of the causes defined by the laws of Arkansas become operative upon them. Incapacitjq old age, removal from one district into another, and reasons which might otherwise be regarded as good causes for removal, could not affect the commissioners under the laws of Arkansas, as those laws do not include the things just mentioned among the causes for removal. The reasons are clear. Justices of the peace are elected in Arkan - sas for terms of short duration. Their tenure of office being-for two years only, Congress could not have intended to apply the rules applicable to the removal of elected officials in Arkansas within their short period of service to commissioners in the Indian Territory who held by appointments for uncertain and indefinite periods of time. The contrary view would be in restriction of the causes for removal to a degree not contemplated by Congress in any event.
What, then, is the meaning of the act of 1895 when it apparently attempted to differentiaté the manner of removal of commissioners in the Indian Territory from the way commissioners in the circuit courts of the United States are usually removed?
On the surface it would seem very unreasonable to say that nothing was meant by this statute. Generally speaking, it is not for the courts to hold a statute meaningless if a reasonable construction can give meaning or force to its provisions. In the consideration of the particular statute in question it should, like all other statutes presumably enacted for a purpose, be given such meaning as its language fairly implies and to the full extent of the accomplishment of its supposed objects. But having no clear meaning- for want of specific statutory prescription for causes of removal, the displacement of these commissioners (it is again contended) must either be referred by the act of 1895 to such causes as would be recognized in courts as a just ground for removal, or if no present effect be given to the words, removal must await legislative definition of the causes.
It would be an unsafe guide to follow if we should adopt the suggestion that the words of the act under construction refer to such causes as the courts, in the attempt to prescribe statutory causes, might recognize as just grounds for removal. What would seem to be just grounds for removal by one court would perhaps seem to be unjust grounds bjr another tribunal, and the results such as to lead to uncertainty and confusion. No uniform rule could exist until the court of highest authority could lay down some certain cause or causes under the statute by which the inferior courts could be imperatively governed. But aside from this, the power "to prescribe by law" is a legislative function and can not be conferred on judicial officers. (Exline v. Smith, 5 Cal., 112; Burgoyne v. Supervisors, 5 lb., 9.)
It seems most unreasonable, however, to say that Congress passed this law with the intention of making these Territorial commissioners, irremovable. Commissioners in other parts of the country are subject to removal, and we can not adopt • the view that by this legislation it was the policy to keep those in the Indian Territory in office until the legislative function of naming the special causes should at some future time follow the general statute. It can not be ascribed to Congress the intention of defining causes by future legislation, thereby holding up the matter in continued derogation of ordinary judicial right. The words used do not say that commissioners shall be removed for causes to be prescribed, but for causes prescribed — that is, in the ordinary import of words, that the causes were already established by law. As the causes were not in fact already prescribed, we must view the act of 1895 as incomplete and importing nothing more than causes such as would, according to the practice of the courts (not purely arbitrary), operate to secure the removal of those officers elsewhere.
The question of the right of plaintiff to notice and a hearing is not involved unless the statute affords him that protection and right. As the statute does not do this, plaintiff must be regarded as subject to removal in the same manner as others " of his class. All commissi oners'are quasi judicial officers, who perform their duties under the direction of the courts, and in effecting their removal the courts are not bound to accord to them any higher or greater consideration than is accorded to auditors, referees, and receivers, who may be removed without the formalities of a hearing and a trial. Their removal is not subversive of any fundamental principle of official tenure and responsibility as in those English cases where the right to hold the office was either by prescription or other tenure, or those cases in this country where the official was in commission by virtue of an election by the people or for a fixed term by virtue of Executive appointment and confirmation at the hands of an advisory body.
Where the statute gives a power of removal " for cause," without any specification of the causes, this power is of a discretionary and judicial nature, and unless the statute otherwise especialty provides, the exercise thereof can not be reviewed by any other tribunal, with respect either to the cause or to its sufficiency or extent, or otherwise. Even in some cases where the statute specifies.the cause of removal it has been ruled that the removing authority is the sole and exclusive judge of the cause and the sufficiency thereof, and that the courts can not review the decision in any case where jurisdiction existed. People ex rel. v. Stout, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 17; S. C., 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 171; People v. Bearfield, 35 Barb., 254; Patton v. Vaughan, 39 Ark., 211; People v. Hill, 7 Cal., 97; City of Hoboken v. Gear, 25 N. J. L., 265; Smith v. Brown, 59 Cal., 672; People ex rel. v. Higgins, 15 Ill., 110.
This is not a case where the power of a judicial tribunal is invoked to ascertain and enforce the legal rights of an individual against the act or authority of other individuals or of the legislative or executive departments, but involves the function of 'deciding upon the validity of the removal by order of another judicial tribunal. If there was discretionary power in the judge, or if his act was made conclusive as to the right involved, as we think it was, it is not within the province of this court to inquire into the propriety or impropriety of the act.
These views render unnecessary any consideration of the question raised in the argument that payment of the salaiy of an office bjr a public body to a defacto officer is a defense to an action l;y a de jure officer for such salaiy; and that title to an office can' be determined only in a direct proceeding-instituted for that purpose and can not be determined in an action to recover the salary thereof on any other collateral proceeding.
The petition is dismissed.