Case: THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY CASES
Abbreviation: Employers' Liability Cases
Decision Date: 1908-01-06
Docket Number: Nos. 216, 222
Citation: 207 U.S. 463
Volume: 207
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: THE EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY CASES.
Judges: Mb. Justice Day concurs in this opinion.
Pages: 463–541

Head Matter:
THE EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY CASES.
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AND THE WESTERN . DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.
Nos. 216, 222.
Argued April 10, 11, 12, 1907.
Decided January 6, 1908.
In testing the constitutionality of -an act of Congress this court confines itself to the power of Congress to pass the act and may not consider any real dr imaginary evils arising from its execution.
Under the grant given by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce and the authority given -to use all means appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred, Congress has power to regulate the relation of master and servant to the extent that such regulations are confined solely to interstate commerce.
An act addressed to all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and imposing a liability upon- them in favor of any of their employés, without qualification or restriction as; t'o> the nature of the business at the time of the injury, of necessity includes subjects wholly outside of the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The legislative power of Congress over the District of Columbia and the Territories is plenary and does not depend upon the special grants of power, such as the commerce clause of the Constitution.
To restrict a general act of Congress relating to common carriers, by interpretation to interstate commerce so as to validate it as to the carriers in the several States, would unduly restrict it as to carriers in the District of Columbia and the Territories.
While it is the duty of this court to so,.construe an act of Congress as to render it constitutional if it can be lawfully done, an ambiguous statute cannot be rewritten to accomplish this result.
Where a statute contains some provisions that are constitutional and some that are not, effect may be given to the former by separating them from the latter, but this rule does not apply where the provisions of the statute are dependent upon each other and are indivisible, or where it does not plainly appear that Congress would have enacted the constitutional legislation without the unconstitutional provisions.
One engaging in interstate commerce does not thereby submit all his business to the regulating power of Congress.
While the act of Congress of June 11,1906, 34 Stat. 232’ known as the Em- . ployers’ Pliability Act, embraces subjects within the authority of Congress to regulate commerce, it also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and the two are so interblended in the statute that they are incapable of separation and the statute is therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States'and non-enforcible.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the act of Congress of July 11, 1906, relating to the liability of common carriers in the District of Columbia and Territories and common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to their employés, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William R. Harr for plaintiff in error in No. 216.
Mr. J. E. Torrance, with whom Mr. S. C, Bloss, Mr. Geo. Durelle and Mr. W. M. Smith were on the brief, for plaintiff in error in Ño; 222:
The act of June 11, 1906, is a regulation of interstate commerce. The Constitution is one of enumeration and not of definition; the power of Congress over interstate commerce is as extensive as that pf the legislative body of any sovereign state over its commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 187.
The power of Congress to regulate commerce extends to all the means, appliances, facilities and instrumentalities of commerce. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280; Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 344; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 16. And- this power extends to persons as well as property. Linn Sing v. Washburn, 20 California, 543; “Head Money Cases,” 18 Fed. Rep. 135; Memphis & Little Rock Ry. Co. v. Nolan &c., 14 Fed. Rep. 532. 'This power also extends to those internal concerns which affect the States generally. See Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 195.
A statute limiting a vessel owner’s liability is valid. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 577; Providence &c. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 589. See opinion of Harlan, J., sustaining an employers’ liability act of the State of Ohio. Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. Rep. 700.
State acts of this character have been held constitutional, as within the police powers of the State. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kansas, 298; S. C., 127 U. S. 205; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Zernecker, 59 Nebraska, 689.
But the State may enact certain legislation for a purpose that is lawful, as police or quarantine legislation, while Congress may enact the same measures for the purpose of regulating commerce or as war regulation. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. See Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137, upholding a state statute denying to common carriers a right to limit their common law liability. Freund on Police Powers, 1904, p. 66, and also Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321.
Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable; and as to whatever ground shall be covered by those directions, the exercise of the state power is excluded. Congress may establish police'regulations, as well as the States; confining their operations to the subject over which it is given control by the Constitution.' Cooley’s Const. Lim. (7th ed.), 856 and see Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215; Champion v. Ames (Lottery Cases), 188 U. S. 321: For the purpose of regulating commerce Congress can exercise the power of eminent domain. Luxtori v. Bridge Company, 153 U. S. 525.
Congress by the act of June 11,1906, has placed an additional burden on' interstate^ common carriers and thus, on interstate commerce and this brings the act clearly within the commerce clause of the. Constitution. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488. See message of President Roosevelt, December 5, 1906.
The Employers’ Liability Act is a regulation of interstate commerce. It places the cost of certain classes of injuries to employés uniformly upon the interstate common carrier. If each State is allowed to say for itself whether or not the cost is to be borne by the interstate common carrier or by the family of the servant, it is apparent that common carriers passing through certain States with no liability acts will have an unnatural advantage over those not so .situated. This uniformity is desirable. Railroad Company v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368.
There should be no unnatural elements such as might be created by particular state laws or constructions by state courts placed upon the fellow-servant rule to vary the element of liability for injuries to employés in the general problem of the costs of interstate commerce.
The Federal liability act will secure better and safer service. The fellow-servant doctrine was based in part on a view that the best service was obtained by placing the/ cost of certain negligence on the servant. Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Murray v. South Carolina R. R. Co., 1 McMull L. (S. Car.) 385; S. C., 36 Am. Dec. 286; Farwell v. Boston &c. R. R. Co., 38 Am. Dec. 339; Sullivan v. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 11 Iowa, 421; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Erickson, 41 Nebraska, 1.
' Congress now takes the view that better service will be secured by the rule of liability established by the act of June 11, which is similar in its scope to the Safety Appliance Act. 27 Stat. L. 531; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377. That is constitutional. Kansas City &c. R. R. Co. v. Flipps, 138 Alabama, 487. It has been construed in Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 462; affirmed 196 U. S. 1, and in Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Fed. Rep. 526; S. C., 116 Fed. Rep. 867.
The form of the rule or statute regulating interstate commerce-is within the discretion of Congress. To effect this end of uniformity Congress may use such means as it may deem appropriate. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 423.
An act of Congress to be within its power to regulate commerce need not upon its face, expressly prescribe a rule for • carrying on commercial intercourse among the States. The rule may be prescribed by implication. A law which may reasonably be calculated to further the freedom, uniformity and safety of commerce, oí its instrumentalities, prescribes a rule for carrying on commerce within the scope of the power to regulate commerce among the States.
The act shows by its title and in its body that it applies to interstate commerce, and it is not framed so that its provisions are applicable alike to all commerce.
'The court will not broaden the statute by construction to include an employé of an interstate common carrier, who is ■concerned wholly in that part of the carrier’s business which is intrastate, for the purpose of then holding the entire act .unconstitutional. It will rather hold in a proper case that such án employé is not within the view of the act. Kansas v. Smiley, 65 Kansas, 240; S. C., 196 U. S. 447.
State statutes relating to commerce which are in terms so general that interstate as well as intrastate commerce may be included are construed to include only what the legislature might lawfully include in them. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 76; Louisville &c. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587.
■ An act will be so construed f possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution although such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. The courts may resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it. Atlantic City Water Works Co. v. Consumers’ Water Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 427; 1 Sutherland, Stat. Const. (2d ed.), § 298, p. 584; Opinion of the Justices, 41 N. H. 555.
A statute will not be held unconstitutional merely because there may be persons to whom or cases in which, it cannot constitutionally apply; but it is deemed constitutional and to be construed not to apply to the latter persons or cases, on the grounds that courts are bound to presume that the legislature did not intend to violate the Constitution. And see The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82. The attempt to justify •the act under the commerce clause was an afterthought; but in this case the phraseology of the act plainly indicates under what clause of the Constitution Congress assumed to act. Illinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree can also be distinguished.
The construction of the Liability Act now contended for here has been given the Safety Appliance Act in Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1. The wording of this act is open to all the objections that counsel urge against the act under consideration. If the car or engine in a particular case is not engaged as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, then the Safety Appliance Act will not be enforced •
But in the cases at bar, all the employés and trains concerned were engaged in interstate commerce, and' the right of the plaintiff to recover is clearly within the terms of the act.
The “fellowrservant” rule as followed by the, Federal courts is a rule of judicial decision and construction. The act of June 11, 1906, changes this rule of determining liability. The 1 lower to determine such rules as the Federal courts shall fellow has always been exercised by Congress.
The Attorney General as amicus curiae by leave of the court upon the constitutionality of the Employers’ Liability Act, with whom Mr. William R. Hair, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on the brief:
The act was a natural and logical step from the Safety Appliance Act, which required interstate railroads to equip their cars with certain described appliances and abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk on the part of employes in the case of their failure to do so. The acts of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1446; of June 30,1906, 34 Stat. 838; of March 4,1907. 34 Stat. 1415, all relating to the.relation of employers and employes engaged in interstate commerce are all part of a general scheme by Congress to lessen the dangers of railroad transportation to those engaged in or connected therewith. If this statute is unconstitutional, it is difficult to see how, on principle, the other measures referred to can be sustained. See also the President’s annual messages of December 6, 1904, 39 Cong. Rec. 11; of December 5, 1905, 40 Cong. Rec. 93; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1.
'As to the question of public policy involved in maintaining the fellow-servant rule see McKinney on .Fellow Servants, § 10; Priestley v. Fowler, 1837, 3 M. & W. 1; Hutchinson v. York &c. Ry. Co., 1850, 5 Exch. 341; McMurray v. So. Car. R. R. Co., 1838, 1 McMullan, *385; Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R. R. Co., 1854, 23 Pa. St. 384; Farwell v. Boston &c. R. R. Co., 1842, 4 Mete. 49, 57. But see also Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 1; 2 Labbatt on Master & Servant, chaps. 36-40, and the acts of Parliament of 1881, 1897 and 1902; Cooley on Torts, 542, 545.
The Parliament of England and many of the state legislatures of this country, however, have not acquiesced in the views as to the requirements of public policy entertained by the courts that have created and extended the fellow-servant doctrine, so far, at least, as the more hazardous employments, and particularly railroading, are concerned. It also appears that other European countries, including France, Germany and Austria, are in accord with the more enlightened views on this subject.
Many States have legislated, on the subject, modifying the common law rule. See the acts of Georgia of 1855; of Iowa in 1862; of Kansas in 1874.
The English Employers’ Liability Act of 1880-1881 has been followed, more or less closely, by Alabama in 1884; Massachusetts in 1887; Colorado in 1893; Indiana in 1893; New York in 1902. The statutes of these States do not limit the amount of recovery.
The following States have also materially modified or abolished the fellow-servant doctrine: Ohio in 1890; Mississippi in 1890; Texas in 1891; Arkansas in 1893; South Carolina in 1895; North Carolina in 1897; Utah in 1875; Wisconsin in 1889.
And see sustaining this legislation: Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 382; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5th ed.), § 178. See also Lovell v. Howell, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 161, 167; Ziegler v. Danbury &c. R. R. Co., 52 Connecticut, 543, 556; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516, 528.
As the enforcement or abrogation of the rule is a matter of public policy, and necessarily a matter for the. consideration and control of the legislature under our governmental systems, to 'whom matters of public policy are primarily committed, Congress is the proper authority to determine what public policy requires with reference to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
State legislation modifying or abolishing the common law doctrine of common employment and assumption of risk has been uniformly sustained by the state and Federal courts, as a proper exercise of the police power. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 208; Minneapolis Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498; McGuire v. C., B. & Q. Ry., 108 N. W. Rep. (Iowa) 902, 908; Hancock v. Railway Co., 124 N. Car. 222, upholding fellow-servanc law of that State; Pittsburgh &c. Railway v. Montgomery, 152 Indiana, 1, sustaining act of that State. And see also Baltimore &c. Railroad v. Little, 149 Indiana, 167; Baltimore &c. Railroad v. Peterson, 156 Indiana, 1; Indianapolis &c. Railroad v. Houlehan, 157 Indiana, 494; and Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western, 175 U. S. 348. The Georgia fellow-servant act has been held to be constitutional. Railroad Co. v. Thompson, 54 Georgia, 509; Georgia Railroad v. Ivey, 73 Georgia, 499; Georgia Railroad v. Brown, 86 Georgia, 320; Georgia Railroad v. Miller, 90 Georgia, 574. As to labor statute of Missouri, see St. Louis &c. Railway v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1, 25; of Utah, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391, 397; of Arkansas, St. Louis & Iron Mountain R. R. Co. y. Paul, 173 U. S. 404. See also Atchison &c. Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96.
The liability of common carriers for injuries to their employés is a- proper subject of .governmental regulation, and a State in the exercise of its police powers may make such reasonable regulations on the subject with respect to all carriers operating within its limits as the legislature thereof may deem necessary. Being a. proper subject of governmental regulation, Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, may regulate the liability of such common carriers as are engaged in that commerce.
See the definition of the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce given in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (p. 197). From the foundation of the Government the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce has been construed to extend to the regulation. of the instrumentalities by which such commerce is conducted, and the regulation of such instrumentalities to include control oyer the person operating the same. Concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, of Johnson, J., 9 Wheat. 229; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203; Pomeroy on Const. Law, §§ 379 et seq.; Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 179, upholding: the power of Congress to legislate for protection of seamen by act of December 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 755, 763. See also Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9; Bowman v. Chicago &c. Railway, 125 U. S. 465; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 58; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 587; Stockton v. Baltimore &c. Railroad, 32 Fed. Rep. 9. In California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U. S. 1, 39, the power of Congress.to provide for interstate roads was sustained; as to the Panama Canal see Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24; for a review of legislation in regard to interstate commerce and regulations see In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 578; The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 352; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505, 569.
As to the claim that if this commerce is subject to regulation at all it can only be by the States, the answer is that the regulation of interstate commerce has been committed by the Constitution to Congress; and while state legislation, passed in the exercise of its police power, may control the liability of common carriers within their limits, even though they be engaged in interstate commerce, yet such legislation must yield to the plenary and paramount authority of Congress over interstate commerce'whenever it chooses to exercise it. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 320; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455, 463; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 100; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 662; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 317; New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 631; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 200; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137.
The power of Congress to regulate the liability of common carriers and others engaged in interstate commerce for injuries to persons or property having beén distinctly recognized, it is difficult to see why it may not regulate their liability to their employés, the protection of interstate commerce being as much involved in the one case as in the other. Mo. Pac. Railway v. Mackey, supra; Pierce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. Rep. 693, 698.
The liability of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries to their employés occasioned by their negligence is a matter that vitally enters into and affects such commerce. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368.
No one can successfully question the correctness of the court’s statement that the liability of a commón carrier engaged in interstate commerce for'injuries to its employés is a question in which the whole country is interested, and should be governed by a uniform rule. But simply holding that the question is one of general law, which a Federal court .may determine for itself in the absence of a state statute on the subject, does not tend to secure the desired uniformity, but only causes greater complexity of decision. Besides, most of the States have legislated on the subject and their statutes are conflicting. Uniformity of decision, it is manifest, .can only be secured by National legislation.
As to power of Congress to provide this -uniformity see Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Martin v. Pittsburg &c. Railroad, 203 U. S. 284 and cases cited supra.
The acts of Congress limiting liability of shipowners, §§4283, 4289, Rev. Stat., rest on the power of Congress to' regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541; The Katie, 40 Fed. Rep. 480; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; The Lottawanna, 21. Wall. 558, 576; Butler v. Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527. The Limited Liability Act was passed by Congress for the purpose of fostering and encouraging the American merchant marine and the American foreign carrying trade. Such also was undoubtedly the purpose of. the Harter Act, approved February 13, 1893, 27 Stat. 445, which has been liberally construed and applied by this court in a number of cases. Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 170 U. S 272; The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655; The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462; Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69; International Nav. Co. v. Farr &c. Mfg. Co., 181 U. S. 218.
It is for Congress to determine what public policy requires with respect to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce by land or water. Possibly the rule established by Congress is unwise, possibly it is extreme, but neither of these, considerations justifies the interference of the judiciary or is an argument against the existence of the power. United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 569, 571, 573; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 363; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 55.
The power of Congress to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce is not dependent upon their mode of creation. It is not limited to corporations created by Congress itself.
While a corporation may get from a State its franchise to engage in interstate commerce, it can only exercise that franchise subject to the regulations which Congress may make for the protection of interstate commerce. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 75; Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197; New York & New Haven Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361.
' The situation is similar to that with respect to the power Of Congress to regulate bridges across the navigable waters constructed under the authority of the States. The franchise granted by the State is held subject to the paramount authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1; West Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 506, 524; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364.
Congress by this act has established a' rule oi conduct and the statute imposes exactly the same rule of conduct upon carriers .with respect to employés as is to be imposed by the common law with respect to passengers and strangers.
Congress has the same power to alter the common law rule as to non-survivorship in cases affecting interstate commerce of actions ex delicto as a State has to change the rule of nonsurvivorship of such actions.
In this respect thfe act of Congress creatés no innovation, as such statutes exist in most, if not all, of the States. Amd see Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, as to power of State.
So also Congress has power, to,'alter rule as to effect of contributory negligence. While there is no question of contributory negligence in. this pase it is proper to refer to it in connection with the act.
The common. law rule that contributory negligence bars a recovery, like the fellow-servant doctrine, is founded upon' the supposed interests of public policy, and it is for Congress to determine in regulating this subject whether public policy requires the modification of both rules.
The rule which Congress has adopted in the present statute is, theoretically at least, ideal. If it should operate harshly or unjustly, the parties concerned must apply to Congress and not to the courts for relief.
The statute simply provides that contributory negligence on the part of an employé shall not bar a recovery where it Was slight and that of the employer gross in comparison;, but'it also provides that the damages shall be diminished in propor- ' tion to the amount of negligence attributable to the employé.
The aim of Congress was to-do exact justice. The wisdom of such a rule as applied to marine torts was recognized in The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1.
The same doctrine was applied to The Mystic, 44 Fed. Rep. 399; The Frank & Willie, 45 Fed. Rep. 405, 497; The Nathan Hale, 48 Fed. Rep. 700; The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. Rep. 279; The Serapis, 49 Fed. Rep. 396, 397; The J. & J. McCarthy, 55 Fed. Rep. 86; The Cyprus, 55 Fed. Rep. 333; Wm. Johnson & Co. v. Johnson, 86 Fed. Rep. 888. All except the first were cases in which an injured employé, himself at fault, was allowed to recover divided or partial damages for injuries received through the negligence of his employer.
For modifications of the strict rule of contributory negligence see 2 Labbatt on Master and Servant, 782, citing statutes of Tennessee, Georgia and Ohio. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
■As to the construction of the act, it is limited to subjects within the control of Congress and does not affect any matters not within such control.
Whether a particular carrier is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the act is a question to be determined as the occasion arises.
As the States, in the exercise- of their police powers, may enact legislation of the kind here in question, although it may ihcidentally affect interstate commerce, by a parity of reasoning, Congress, in the exercise of its authority to regulate interstate commerce, may enact such legislation, although it incidentally affects state commerce.
There is an essential difference between the power of Congress over an article or commodity which ceases to be a subject of interstate commerce the moment its interstate transportation ceases, and the instrumentality by which such commodity may be transported. Johnson v. Southern Pacific, 196 U. S. 1; Voelker v. Chicago &c. Railway, 116 Fed. Rep. 867; S. C., 129 Fed. Rep. 522, 528; United States v. Great Northern Railway, 145 Fed. Rep. 438.
It is not contended that Congress can regulate the exclusively local business in which a common carrier may be engaged. If a railroad' company operating an interstate road were also operating a purely local line, this act w‘ould not apply to such line, because, in respect thereto, the railroad company would not be a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. The act would no more apply to a purely local line of the company than to any other business—the mining of coal, for instance—in which it might be engaged. The Trademark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, can be distinguished as the present statute discloses on its face that it is intended as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, being expressly confined to common carriers engaged in such commerce. The “main purpose” of the act is not “to establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to commerce at all points,” but simply' to regulate an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It is not “designed to govern commerce wholly between citizens of the same State,” but simply to protect interstate commerce. Local commerce, if affected at all, is affected only indirectly and incidentally. It has never been held that Congress was divested of control over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce simply because local commerce might incidentally be affected by its regulations. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25; The “Beef Trust Case,” Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; New York & New Haven v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361.
On its face this statute relates only to interstate commerce. It seeks only to regulate the liability of a common carrier engaged in such commerce to its employés—that is, the persons employed by it for the purpose of carrying on its business, and the only business referred to is trade and commerce between the several States. It is a remedial statute and should, therefore, be liberally construed so as to accomplish the end in view. If to construe the statute to extend to employés of such carrier not engaged in or connected with the interstate business of the carrier would render the statute unconstitutional, such construction manifestly ought • to be rejected. The elementary rule that a statute should not be construed so as to render ifunconstitutional when a constitutional construction is open to the court hardly needs to be argued. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127; The Trade-Mark Cases, distinguished. The statutes there involved were, on their face, plain attempts to regulate matters beyond the control of Congress, and so also in Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514.
This case falls under McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 112; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 563.
Nor does the fact that the act extends to all employés of common carriers- engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, irrespective of the danger of their particular employments, vitiate it. • The business of common carriers forms a proper basis of classification and special legislation. It is not necessary for the legislature to go further and differentiate between the different classes of employés of such carriers according to the degree of danger to which they may be subjected,. although possibly it may do so. As is well known, there is every variety of risk in the conduct of such carriers and the power of the legislature to distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation necessarily has a wide range of discretion, and it is sufficient' to satisfy the demands of the Constitution if the classification is practical and not palpably arbitrary. Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 175 U. S. 352, 353, referring to Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. The law is equitable, but were it otherwise, the injustice or harshness of the rule would be no just cause for declaring it invalid. • In that case, as. has been often held, the remedy lies not with the courts, but with-the legislature. If necessary, under Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; the general language of the statute might be restricted’ to those employés of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce whose business is of a hazardous nature, as it was the dangers of transportation which were intended to be remedied. And see Jones v. Guaranty and Indemnity Co., 101 U. S. 626.
These matters relate to the application of the statute to particular cases, and do not affect its constitutionality.
The act in question has recently been held to be constitutional by several Federal courts. Plummer v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., Circuit Court, Western District of Washington, Hanford, J., decided March 2, 1907; Spain v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co., District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Trieber, J., decided March 13, 1907; Kelley v. Great Northern Railway Co.f Circuit Court, District of Minnesota, Morris, J., decided March, 1907; Snead v. Central Georgia Railway Co., Circuit Court, Southern District of Georgia, Eastern Division, Speer, J., decided March 25, 1907.
Mr. J. M. Dickinson, with whom Mr. Charles N. Burch and Mr. Blewett Lee were on the brief, for defendants in error in No. 216:
The Employers’ Liability Act is not a regulation of commerce and is, therefore., -unconstitutional and void. The Government' of the United States is one of enumerated powers, and unless authority can be found in the National Constitution for the enactment of any particular legislation, then such authority does not exist. The Constitution of the United States specifies what powers Congress has and it has those ^powers therein specified and none other, except such as are necessarily implied to carry into effect those which are granted. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195; Veazie & Young v. Moor, 14 How. 568; Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; Tucker on Const, of U. S., §250; Cooley’s Const. Lim. (7th ed.), 11; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 278.
This power of Congress must be exercised in a constitutional way. It is riot destructive of the rights and guaranties which are to be found in other sections of the Constitution and the amendments thereto. The power to regulate commerce cannot be so exercised as to deprive a citizen of property without due process of law, but must be exercised in subordination to the limitations and guaranties of the Constitution. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312.
The Employers’ Liability Act prescribes no rule for the regulation of commerce, whether commerce be understood to be either traffic or intercourse. It defines the liability of an interstate carrier to his employés, creates new rights of action in favor of such employés, and takes away from the common' carrier defenses heretofore available. Such legisla-? tion is not a regulation of commerce, and Congress has no more power to define the liability of common carriers, engaged in interstate' commerce, to their employés, than it has power to legislate on the_domestic relations of merchants engaged in interstate commerce. The argument that this act is a constitutional regulation of interstate commerce proceeds upon the fundamentally erroneous theory that Congress has power to regulate persons engaged in interstate commerce in all the relations of life,—whereas, the power conferred by the Constitution is only the regulation of the commerce itself.
No argument to sustain the constitutionality of the act in • question can draw any support from the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, April 1,^1896 and March 2, 1903.
Those acts definitely apply to instrumentalities of interstate cominer ce.
While undoubtedly • Congress has power to enact laws to carry into effect and to execute other laws, which it, may constitutionally enact; but the laws to be carried into effect must be constitutionally enacted; the laws which carry into execution the constitutional powers of the Government, must be necessary and proper; that is they must be appropriate. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423.
It is a general rule, that what cannot be done directly from defect of power, cannot be done indirectly. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 50.
The court will determine, for itself whether or not-merely giving a right of action against common carriers of interstate commerce to their employés is of itself a regulation of commerce. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299.
State statutes giving rights of action for torts against interstate carriers have been held not to be regulations of interstate commerce. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103. A Federal statute, therefore, giving similar rights of action is not a regulation of interstate commerce.
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, does not hold that giving a right of action for injury is a regulation of commerce, and references in Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. Rep. 693, and other cases cited by plaintiff in error, as to the power of Congress'to legislate in regard to that subject, are obiter.
' The act embraces both interstate and intrastate commerce, proposes to exercise an; unconstitutional power over intrastate commerce, the police power of the States, the power of the States to regulate the rights of their citizens inter sese in matters not directly affecting interstate commerce, is inseparable as to its interstate commerce features, and, therefore, must fail in toto.
As to what interstate commerce is, see Sutherland on U. S. Constr. 95; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Addyston Pipe Case, 175 U. S. 211, 241; License Cases, 5 How. 504, 574, 620, 625; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 400; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564; As. to the coexistence of both interstate and intrastate • commerce see Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 277; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541; Wabash Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Sands v. Manistee River Imp’t Co., 123 U. S. 288; Covington Bridge Case, 154 U. S. 204; Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12, in which this court said commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it. And see Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578; Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611; Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 350.
The act interferes with the police power of the State and while there is an intrastate commerce which Congress cannot regulate, there is also equally removed from the control of the United States the police power of the States which affects commerce and other relations in life, some related to commerce, and others entirely disassociated from it.
Although the limitations of the police power have never been fully defined, the police power of the States falls directly within the effect of this act and will, if the- act is con stitutional, have limitations imposed upon it entirely inconsistent with the exercise of that power as hitherto recognized. The act seeks to control the relations between carriers of interstate commerce and their employés, .no,t merely in matters that affect,, but do not burden, interstate commerce, but also in matters which can have no direct' bearing upon interstate commerce.
This court has ever been equally careful to, preserve the rights and powers of the States as well as those of the National Government. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650; Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21; Louisville &c. Railway Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; 591; C. & O. Railway v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 393.
So the police power of' the State has been sustained where it. operated upon articles of commerce after their interstate character had ceased. The States of the Union have the undoubted right to control their purely internal affairs, in doing which they exercise powers no|t surrendered to the National Government. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 123; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Escanaha Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 40; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133.
The statement in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, that Congress coúld legislate on the subject'of engineers’ examinations was said only in respect of interstate commerce, and can be no authority for the contention that because it was asserted ■ that Congress could in the .particular matter legislate in respect of interstate commerce, it could also regulate the carrier in its strictly intrastate commerce activities, and in those matters having no. direct relation to commerce. Sp also Western Union Telegraph Company v. James, 162 U. S. 650; Nashville &c. Railway v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 59; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 489. In Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, it was held that a state statute prohibiting consolidation of two railroads was not an inter ference with interstate commerce. As to reasonable exercise of state police power, see Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; Cleveland &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 519; Lake Shore Railway v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 303; Lake Shore Railway v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 689; Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 382; B. & O. Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, distinguished.
The act is bad in that it proposes not merely to give a right of action for injuries to employés, but determines who the beneficiaries shall be. The beneficiaries are different from those under the law of the State where the death occurred. Congress has no power to regulate the measure of damages or who the beneficiaries shall be. This is within the reserved power' of the States.’
The cases cited in the brief of the United States as to the rule of damages in the case of injuries on vessels fall under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and not under, the commerce clause. They have no application to the rules established by this statute. The statute, if constitutional as to any part, is unconstitutional as to other parts and as it is inseparable it is entirely unconstitutional. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 98; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; Illinois Central v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 686; Ballard v. Cotton Oil Co., 81 Mississippi, 507. The rule is the same whether the case be civil or criminal. Conolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565. And on this point see also Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80; Sprague v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 94; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 635, from which it appears that an act of Congress covering legitimate as well as illegitimate fields of legislation in a single provision cannot be rendered effective by holding it invalid as to the field wherein Congress had no power to legislate. To reject the legislation so far as it is invalid and enforce the remainder would amount to substituting legislation-by the court for 1¿hat by Congress.
The act is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution' of the United States.
.Arbitrary and capricious classification, by which a class of persons is subjected to unusual burdens, is obnoxious either to the Fifth or to the Fourteenth Amendment. If a state statute, it is obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment; if a Federal statute, it is obnoxious to the Fifth Amendment. , Both Amendments protect corporations, as well as natural persons, from being deprived of property without due process of law, and, therefore, protect against arbitrary classification-. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 Fed. Rep. 145, 150.
The act violates the Fifth Amendment because: It subjects common carriers, engaged in interstate commerce, to different and greater liabilities than others engaged in interstate commerce; it takes away from'common carriers defenses available to others engáged in interstate, commerce; it limits the powers of contract of - common carriers,' when others engaged in interstate commerce are not so limited in their contracts with their employés; it subjects employés of such, common carriers to a disability in contracting which does not attach to employés of others, engaged in interstate commerce, who render á like service under similar conditions.
The right to contract is as well recognized as the right to property and .the. courts'protect it against unlawful restriction. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163; Gillespie v. People, 188 Illinois, 176; State v. Kreutsberg, 114 Wisconsin, 530; People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, holding state, statutes limiting right to contract in' regard to labor invalid. ' See also Wallace v. Georgia &c. Railway Co., 22 S. E. Rep. 579; Brewster v. Miller’s Sons Co., 101 Kentucky, 368; Hundley v. L. & N. R. Co., 105 Kentucky, 162; State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. R. 478; Railroad Company v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584.
The burdens cast upon carriers by the act are cast upon all common, carriers engaged in interstate commerce without distinction or discrimination. There are many classes of common carriers, as by rail, by water, by telephone, by telegraph, by pipe line, by, wagon and otherwise.
There are not the same reasons for the abolition of the fellow-servant rule as to clerks in the auditor’s office as there are for its abolition as applied to train operatives.
By due process of law' is meant, that if a particular class is to be given particular benefits or subjected to particular burdens or disabilities, there should be some good reason for such classification. Stratton v. Morris, 89 Tennessee, 497, 534.
There is no natural basis for the classification which has been made, but the basis is purely arbitrary and capricious. In order for a classification to be constitutional, it is not only necessary that all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions, but it must bring within its influence all who are under the same conditions, and not bring within its influence those who are under different conditions. Mo. Pac. Railway v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Johnson v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R. Co., 8 L. R. A. 419; Ballard v. Oil Co., 81 Mississippi, 507.
Some of the state courts have held employers’ liability acts constitutional, even though couched in general.language, and applicable to all characters of business, whether hazardous or not,’ this result being attained in most instances by construing such statutes, notwithstanding their general language, to apply only to hazardous occupations; but such construction is not countenanced by the Federal authorities. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 59.
This court, when not bound by a limiting state court" construction, will investigate for itself the reasonableness of a classification, .made by a state legislature, and unless the classification is natural and reasonable, will hold the act void. It will undoubtedly exercise the same power when an act of Congress is before it. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé R. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Atchison &c. Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96.
The importance of this case cannot be overstated. The act raises constitutional questions of the utmost gravity. No one would question that a decision sustaining it must necessarily extend the power of the Federal Government over a field hitherto not contemplated as within its jurisdiction. A decision holding’the act unconstitutional, would not destroy any generally prevailing’ understanding as to the relations between the several States and the United States; nor would such a decision open up any wide field for serious conjecture or apprehension.
No one, however versed in the science of government and the teachings of history, can forecast the changes that the establishment of the principle, involved will work in our state and National life, or what kind of government we will have, when these principles thus sanctioned shall hereafter be invoked and applied.
From the account of the debates in Congress it appears that in both Houses it was understood that the act applied to all commerce: See Record, January 30, 1906, Vol. 40, Pt. 2, 1747; Pt. 5, 4602 et seq.
Mr. Alexander P. Humphrey, with whom Mr. R. S. Lovett and Mr. Maxwell Evarts were on the brief, for defendant in error in No. 222:
The Employers’ Liability Act is unconstitutional. It is not competent for Congress to regulate'’all the”.commerce of a common carrier whether interstate or intrastate. If the line of a carrier is wholly within a State it carries on intrastate commerce, but may in connection with other carriers carry on interstate commerce. C., N. O. & T. P. Railway v. Int. Com. Comm., 162 U. S. 191. The power which Congress has is to regulate commerce and there is a marked distinction between that power and a power to regulate the affairs of an individual or corporation engaged in interstate commerce. If Congress has power to pass this law it. derives it from §.3 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the commerce clause. As to the limit of this power, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 96; Wabash Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 565. And see the cases cited in the brief for defendant in error in No. 216, holding that a carrier engaged generally in interstate - commerce is subject to state control as to its intrastate business. See' also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Louisville Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Ches. & Ohio v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, holding that it is competent for a State to separate the races into separate compartments or cars so long as such state regulations are confined to intrastate points. As to power of the State to require railroad trains to stop at state stations, see Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 430; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142; Lake Shore Railway v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; C. C. C. & St. L. Railway v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514.
As to power of States over rates see Louisville & Nashville v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503; Louisville de Nashville R. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27.
If determining the liability of a carrier to its employés is a regulation of commerce at all, Congress can only determine it so far as it relates to interstate commerce.
The Employers’ Liability Act is not a regulation of commerce at all. It relates simply to one of the ordinary relations of life—and the legal rules affecting such relations are within the control of the States. Under the common law there is no remedy where an individual having been injured through the negligence of another dies after the hurt. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754; The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 204. Every State, however, has passed laws giving the personal representatives of the injured employé an action against the employer—and this has been done as a matter of purely domestic concern. The States have also, as they have the right to do, passed statutes as to the effect of negligence by fellow-servants; Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schoer, 114 Fed. Rep. 466, 470; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 206; Minn. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 210; Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Ry., 175 U. S. 348; also as to the fencing of tracks and prevention of fires by interstate carriers, all of which have been sustained by this court. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 513; Minneapolis Railway v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1.
When cases have come to this court involving the question whether a particular state law is a regulation of interstate commerce, the question has been: Does the state law put a burden on interstate traffic? Examples of these cases are found in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 420; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby, 120 U. S. 489. Or the question has been: Does the state law place a burden on interstate transportation? Examples of this class are found in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189, 196; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Wabash R. R. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.
The act is simply a bold attempt to regulate one of the ordinary relations of life, that' of master and servant, a relation hitherto supposed to be entirely within the control of the State. If Congress can thus take hold of the relation of master and servant, it can with equal power take hold of the relation of guardian and ward and other domestic relations.
This law is different from the Anti-trust Law, the Meat Inspection Law and the Pure Food Law, the Interstate Commerce Law, and the Safety Appliance Law, in that those laws regulate the instrumentalities of commerce and not domestic relations, and this act does not prescribe any rule by which ■it is to be governed or intercourse carried on.
Although some of the cases sustaining congressional legislation as to liability of shipowners have been based on the commerce clause the real basis of power in that respect is the admiralty and maritime clause of the Constitution. See Ex parte Garnett, 141 U. S, 1; The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 640; People v. Knight, 171 N. Y 354, 364; S. C., affirmed 192 U. S. 21, and see cases in briefs of other counsel. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, distinguished.
The act embraces employés of all kinds, and it being separable was the evident intention of Congress not to confine the act to-any class of employés, but to embrace all of the employés of a carrier within thé terms of the act. This brings it under the rule that statute's partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional, are entirely void unless the unconstitutional can be plainly separated from the constitutional provision. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 304; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Illinois Central v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514; Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82.
Docket titles, No. 216, Damselle Howard, Administratrix of Will Howard, deceased, v. Illinois Central Railroad Company and The Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad Company; No. 222, N. C. Brooks, Administratrix of Morris S. Brooks, deceased, v. Southern Pacific Company.
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court. See p. 489.
Mr. Justice Day concurred with Mr. Justice White. See. p. 504.
■ Mr, Justice Peckham delivered a separate opinion, with which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brewer agreed, concurring in result and in the proposition that as to traffic or other matters within the State the act is unconstitutional and it cannot be separated from that part which is claimed to be valid as relating to interstate commerce, but stating that he was not able to agree with all that is stated in the opinion of the court as to the power to legislate upon the subject of the relations between master and servant. See p. 504.
Mr. Justice Moody delivered a separate 'opinión, agreeing with the opinion of the court in respect to the power of Congress to regulate the relation between common carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their employés, but dissenting from the result and conclusion that the act embraces subjects not within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate. See p. 504.
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice McKenna concurred, delivered a separate opinion, agreeing with that part of the opinión of the court which held that it was within the power of Congress to prescribe, as between an interstate carrier and its employés, the rule of liability established by the act, but dissenting as to the result and as'to the interpretation given to the act in the opinion of the court and concurring in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Moody as to the scope and interpretation of the act. See p. 540.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered a separate dissenting opinion expressing the view that the words of the act could be read in such a way as to save its constitutionality by limiting its scope where necessary and that as so construed the act is valid in its main features under the Constitution. Sec p. 541.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the court.
To dispose of these cases it is necessary to decide a fundamental question which is equally decisive as to both. They were argued at the bar together, and because of their unity have been considered at the same time.
As stated in the declarations as finally amended, recovery was sought in each case of damages occasioned by the death of the respective intestates while serving as a fireman on a locomotive actually engaged in moving an interstate commerce train. In each of the cases it was alleged that the intestate met his death through no fault of his, but solely through the fault of employés of the company, who were his fellow servants. In both the right of action was expressly based upon the act of Congress of July 11, 1906, entitled "An Act relating to liability of common Carriers in the District of Columbia and Territories and common carriers engaged in commerce between the States and between the States and foreign nations to their employés." By demurrer in each of the cases the act relied upon was assailed as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In both cases the Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, asked to be allowed to intervene for the purpose of supporting the constitutionality of the act. In the first (the Howard) ease this request was granted. In the second (the Brooks) case the court, while denying the request upon the ground that it knew of no law authorizing such an. intervention simply because, the validity of an act of Congress was drawn in question, nevertheless permitted the United States to be heard as a friend of the court. In both cases the act was held to be unconstitutional, the demurrer was sustained and the declarations dismissed. These direct writs of error were then prosecuted, and at bar the cases have been argued, by printed brief and orally, not only by the parties in interest, but on behalf of the United States through the Attorney General as a friend of the court.
As the issue to be decided is whether the courts below were right in holding that the act of Congress, which was the basis of the respective causes of action, was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, we reproduce the text of that act in the margin.
Before coming to consider the contentions concerning the constitutionality of the act, we notice certain suggestions which proceed upon the assumption that they may concern the issue for decision. It is said that the statute inordinately extends the power of Congress and unduly diminishes the legislative authority of the States, since it seeks to exert the pouc of Congress as to the relation of master and servant, a subject hitherto treated as being exclusively within the control of the States, and that in practice its execution will cripple the State and enlarge the Federal judicial power, since its effect will be to cause every action concerning an injury to a servant employed by a common carrier who may engage, in interstate commerce to cease to be a matter of state jurisdiction and to be cognizable in the Federal courts. Moreover, it is said, the statute will create confusion and uncertainly as to the rights of those dwelling within the States, that it will operate injuriously upon all who choose to engage in interstate commerce as a common carrier, since those who so do will become subject to the liability which the statute creates, to be tested by the rules of negligence which the statute embodies, although such rules be unknown to the laws of the several States. Besides, the. statute, it is urged, discriminates against all who engage as- common carriers in interstate commerce, since it makes them responsible without limit as to the amount to one servant for an injury suffered by the acts of a co-servant, even in a case where the negligence of the injured servant has contributed to the result, hence placing all employers who are common carriers in a disfavored and all their employés in a favored class. Indeed it is insisted the statute proceeds upon contradictory principles, since it imposes the increased responsibility just stated upon the master presumably in order to make Kim more careful in the selection of his servants, and yet minimizes the necessity for care on the part of the servant by allowing recovery, although he may have been negligent.
But, without even for the sake of argument conceding the correctness of these suggestions, we at once dismiss them from consideration as concerning merely the expediency of the act and not the power of Congress to enact it. We say this since, in testing the constitutionality of the act, we must confine ourselves to the power to pass it and may not consider evils which it is supposed will arise from the execution of the law, whether they be real or imaginary.
All the questions which arise concern the nature and extent of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. That subject has been so often here considered and has been so fully elaborated in recent decisions, two of which are noted in the margin, that we content ourselves, for the purposes of this case, with repeating the broad definition of the commerce power as expounded by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,196, where he said:
"We are now arrived at the inquiry, What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over' commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the'same restrictions, on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States."
Accepting, as we now do and as has always been done, this comprehensive statement of the power of Congress, we also adopt and reiterate the. perspicuous statement made in the same case (p. 194},.of those matters of state' control which are not embraced in the grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce:
"It is not intended to say that these woxus comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . The genius and character of the whole Government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the Nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with wdiich it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the Government."
We think the orderly discussion of the question may best be met oy disposing of the affirmative propositions relied on to establish that 'the statute conflicts with the Constitution.
In the first place, it is asserted that there is a total want of power in Congress in any conceivable aspect to regulate the subject with which the act deals. In the second place it is insisted the act is void, even although it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that some phases of the subject with which it is concerned may be within the power of Congress, because the act is confined not to such phases,, but asserts control over many things not in any event within the power to regulate commerce.
While it may be, if we indulged, for the sake of argument, in the hypothesis of limited power upon which the second proposition rests, it would result that a consideration of the first proposition would be unnecessary because the act would be found to be repugnant to the Constitution, because embracing provisions beyond such assumed and restricted authority we do not think we are at liberty to avoid deciding whether, in any possible aspect, the subject to which the act relates is within the power of Congress. We say this, for if it be that from the nature of the subject no power whatever over the same can, under any conceivable circumstances, be possessed by Congress, we ought to so declare, and not by an attempt to conceive the inconceivable assume the existence of some authority, thus it may be, misleading Congress and giving rise to future contention.
.1. The proposition that there is an absolute want of power in Congress to enact the statute is based on the assumption that as the statute is solely addressed to the regulation of the relations of the employer to those whom he employs and the relation of those employed by 'him among themselves, it deals with subjects which cannot under any circumstances come within the power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce.
As it is patent that the act does regulate the relation of master and servant in. the cases to which it applies, it must follow, that the act is beyond the authority of Congress if the proposition just stated be well founded. But we may not test the power of Congress to regulate commerce solely by abstractly considering the particular subject to which a regulation relates, irrespective of whether the regulation in question is one of interstate commerce. On the contrary, the test of power is not merely the matter regulated, but whether the regulation is directly one of interstate commerce, or is embraced within the grant conferred on Congress to use all lawful means necessary and appropriate to the execution of the power to regulate commerce. We think the unsoundness of the contention, that because the act regulates the relation of master and servant, it is unconstitutional, because under no circumstances and to no extent can the regulation of such subject be within the -grant of authority to regulate commerce, is demonstrable. We say. this because we fail to perceive any just reason for holding that Congress is without power to regulate the relation of, master and servant, to the extent that regulations adopted by Congress on that subject are solely confined to interstate commerce, and therefore are within the grant to regulate that commerce or within the authority given to use all means appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred. To illustrate: Take the case of an interstate railway train, that is, a train moving in interstate commerce, and the regulation of which therefore is, in the nature of things, a regulation of such commerce. It cannot be said that because a regulation adoptéd by Congress as to such train when so engaged in interstate commerce deals with the relation of the master* to the servants operating such train or the relations of the servants engaged in such operation between themselves, that it is not a regulation of interstate commerce. This must be, since to admit the authority to regulate such train, and yet to sáy that all regulations which deal with the relation of master and servants engaged in its operation are invalid for want of power would be but to concede the power and then to deny it, or at all events to recognize the power and yét to render it incomplete.
Because of. the reasons just stated we might well pass from the consideration of the subject. We add, however, that we think the error of the proposition is shown by previous decisions of this court. Thus the. want of power in a State to interfere with an interstate commerce train, if thereby a direct burden is imposed upon interstate commerce, is settled beyond question. Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 203 U. S. 335, 343, and cases cited; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Wharton et al., Railroad Commissioners, 207 U. S. 328. And decisions cited in the margin, holding that state statutes which regulated the relation of master and servant were applicable to those actually engaged in an operation of interstate commerce, because the state power existed until Congress acted, by necessary implication, refute the contention that a regulation of the subject, confined to interstate commerce, when adopted by Congress would be necessarily void because the regulation of the relation of master and servant was, however intimately connected with interstate commerce, beyond the power of Congress. And a like conclusion also persuasively results from previous rulings of this court concerning the act of Congress, known as the Safety Appliance Act. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1; Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester &c. Ry., 205 U. S. 1.
2. But it is argued, even though it be conceded that the power of Congress may be exercised as to the relation of master and servant in .matters of interstate commerce, that power cannot be lawfully extended so as to include the' regulation of the relation of master and servant, or of servants among themselves, as to things which are not interstate commerce: From this it is insisted the repugnancy of the act to the Constitution is clearly shown, as the face of the act makes it certain that the power which it asserts extends not only to the relation, of master and servant and servants among themselves as to things which are wholly interstate commerce, but em braces those relations as to matters and things domestic in their character and which do not come within the authority of Congress. To test this proposition requires us to consider the text óf the act.
From the first section it is certain that the act extends to every individual or corporation who may engage in interstate commerce as a common carrier. Its all-embracing words leave no room for any other conclusion. It may include, for example, steam railroads, telegraph lines, telephone lines, the express business, vessels of every kind, whether steam or sail, ferries, bridges, wagon lines, carriages, trolley lines, etc. Now, the rule which the statute establishes for the purpose of determining whether all the subjects to which it relates are to be controlled by its provisions is that any one who conducts such business be a " common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory of the United States, or between the several States," etc. ' That is, the subjects stated all come, within the statute when the individual or corporation is a common carrier who engages in trade or commerce between the States, etc. From this it follows that the statute deals with all the concerns of the individuals or corporations to which it relates if they engage as common carriers in trade or commerce between the States, etc., and does not confine itself to the interstate commerce business which may be done by such persons. Stated in another form, the statute is addressed to the individuals or corporations who are engaged in interstate commerce and is not confined- solely to regulating the interstate commerce business which such persons may do— that is, it regulates the persons because they engage in interstate commerce and does not alone regulate the business of interstate commerce.
And the conclusion thus stated, which flows from the text of the act concerning the individuals or corporations to which it is made to apply, is further demonstrated by a consideration of the text of the statute defining the servants to whom it relates.
Thus the liability of a common carrier is declared to be in favor of "any of its employés." As the word "any" is unqualified, it follows that liability to the servant is coextensive with the business done by the employers whom the statute embraces; that is, it is in favor of any of the employés of all carriers who engage in interstate commerce. This also is the rule as to the one who otherwise would be a fellow servant, by whose negligence the injury or death may have been occasioned, since it is provided that the right to recover on the part of any servant will exist, although the injury for which the carrier is to be held resulted from " the negligence of any of its officers, agents or employés."
The act then being addressed to all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and imposing a liability upon them in favor of any of their.employés, without qualification or restriction as to the business in which the carriers or their employés may be engaged at the. time of the injury, of necessity includes subjects wholly outside .of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Without stopping to consider the nu.merous instances where although a common carrier is engaged in interstate commerce such carrier may in.,the nature of things also transact business npt interstate commerce, although such local business may indirectly be related to interstate commerce, a few illustrations showing the operation of the statute as to matters wholly independent of interstate commerce will serve to make clear the extent of the power which is exerted by the statute. Take a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, having a purely local branch operated wholly within a State. Take again the same road having shops for repairs, and it may be for construction work, as well as a large accounting and clerical force, and having, it may be, storage ele.vators and warehouses, not to suggest besides the possibility of its being engaged in other independent enterprises. Take a telegraph company engaged in the transmission of interstate and local messages. Take an express company engaged in local as well as .in interstate business.. Take a trollev line moving wholly within a State as to a large part of its business and yet as to the remainder crossing the state line.
As the act thus includes many subjects wholly beyond the power to regulate commerce and depends for its sanction upon that authority, it results that the act is repugnant to the Constitution, and cannot be enforced unless, there be 'merit in the propositions advanced tó show that the statute may be saved.
On the one hand, while conceding that the act deals with all common carriers who are engaged in interstate commerce because they so engage, and indeed, while moreover conceding that the act was originally drawn for the purpose of reaching all the employés of railroads engaged in interstate commerce to which it is said the act in its original form alone related, it is yet insisted that the act is within the power of Congress, because one who engages in interstate commerce thereby comes under the power of Congress as to all his business and may not complain of any regulation which Congress may choose to adopt. These contentions are thus summed up in the brief filed on behalf of the Government:
" It is the carrier and not its employés that the act seeks to regulate, and the carrier is subject to such regulations because it is engagéd in interstate commerce.
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" By engaging in interstate commerce the carrier chooses to subject itself and its business to the control of Congress, and cannot be heard to complain of such regulations.
". . . It is submitted that Congress can make a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce liable to any one for its negligence who is affected by it; and if it can do that, necessarily it can make such carrier liable to all of its employés."
On the other hand, the same brief insists that these propositions are irrelevant, because the statute may be interpreted so as to confine its operation wholly to interstate commerce or to means appropriate to the regulation of that subject, and hence relieves from -the necessity of deciding whether, if the statute could not be so construed, it would be constitutional. In the oral discussion at bar this latter view was earnestly insisted upon by the Attorney General. • Assuming, as' we do, that the propositions are intended to be alternative, we disregard the order in which they are pressed-in argument, and therefore pass for a moment the consideration of the proposition that the statute is constitutional, though it includes all the subjects Which we have found it to embrace, in order to weigh the contention that it is susceptible on its face of a different meaning from that which we have given it, or that such result pan be accomplished by the application of the rules of interpretation which are relied upon.
So far as the face of the statute is concerned, the argument is this,' that because the statute says carriers engaged in commerce between the States, etc., therefore the act should be interpreted as being exclusively applicable to the interstate commerce business and none other of such carriers, and that the words "any employé" as found in the statute should be held to mean any employé when such employé is engaged only in interstate commerce. But this would require us to write into the statute words of limitation and restriction not found in it. But if we could bring ourselves to modify the statute by writing in the words suggested the result would be to restrict the operation of the act as to the District of Columbia and the Territories. We say this because immediately preceding the provision of the act concerning carriers engaged in commerce between the States and Territories is a clause making it applicable to "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia or in any Territory of.the United States." It follows, therefore, that common carriers in such Territories, even although not engaged in interstate commerce, are by the act made liable to "any" of their employés, as therein defined. The legislative power of Congress over the District of Columbia and the Territories being plenary and not depending upon the'interstate commerce clause, it results that the provision as to the District of Columbia and the Territories, if standing alone, could not be ques tionecL Thus it would come to pass, if we could bring ourselves to modify the statute by writing in the words suggested; that is, by causing the act to read "any employé when engaged in interstate commerce," we would restrict the act as to the District of Columbia and the Territories, and thus destroy it in an important particular. To write into the act the qualifying words, therefore, would be but adding to its provisions in order to save it in one aspect, and thereby to destroy it in another; that is, to destroy in order to save and to save in order to destroy.
The principles of construction invoked are -undoubted, but are inapplicable. Of course, if it can be lawfully done, our duty is to construe the statute so as to render it constitutional. But this does not imply, if the text of an act is unambiguous, that it may be rewritten to accomplish that purpose. Equally clear is it, generally speaking, that where a statute contains provisions which are constitutional and others which are not, effect may be given to the legal provisions by separating them from the illegal. But this applies only to a case where the provisions are separable and not dependent one upon the other, and does not support the contention that that which is indivisible may be divided. Moreover, even in a case where legal provisions may be severed from those which are illegal, in order to save the rule applies only where it is plain that Congress would have enacted the legislation 'with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated. All these principles are so clearly settled as not to be open to controversy. They were all, after a full review of the authorities, restated and reapplied in a recent case. Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, and authorities there cited.
As the act before us by its terms relates to every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and to any of the employes of every such carrier, thereby regulating every relation of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce with its servants and of such servants among themselves, we are unable to say that the statute would have been enacted had its provisions been restricted to the limited relations of that character which it was within the power of Congress to regulate. On this subject the opinion in the Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, where an act of Congress concerning trade-marks was held to be unconstitutional, because too broad in its scope, is pertinent and instructive. The court said (p. 99):
"If we should, in the case before us, undertake to make by judicial construction a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to do; namely, make a trade-mark law which is only-partial in its operation, and which would complicate the rights which parties would hold, in some instances under the act of Congress, and in others under state law. Cooley, Const. Lim. 178, 179; Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray (Mass.), 482."
3. It remains only to consider the contention which we have previously quoted, that the act is constitutional, although it embraces subjects not within the power of Congress to regulate commerce, because one who engages in interstate commerce thereby submits all his business concerns to the regulating-power of Congress. To state the proposition is to refute it. It assumes that because one engages in interstate commerce he thereby endows Congress with power not delegated to it by the Constitution, in other words, with the right to legislate concerning matters of purely state concern. It rests upon the conception that the Constitution destroyed that freedom of commerce which it was its purpose to preserve, since it treats the right to engage in interstate commerce as a privilege which cannot be availed of except upon such conditions as Congress may prescribe, even although the conditions would be otherwise beyond the power of Congress. It is apparent that if the contention were well founded it would extend the power of Congress (o every conceivable subject, however inherently local, would obliterate all the limitations of power imposed by the Constitution, and would destroy the authority of the ¡States as to all conceivable matters which from the beginning have been, and must continue to be, under their control- so long as the Constitution endures.
4. Reference was made to the report of a committee submitted to the House of Representatives on the coming in of the bill which finally became the act in question. We content ourselves on this subject with saying that that report, we think, instead of adding force to the argument that the plain terms of the act should be disregarded, tends to the contrary. And the same observation is appropriate to the reference made to the text of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, which, it is insisted, furnishes a guide which, if followed, would enable us to disregard the text of the act. We say this because the face of that act clearly refutes the argument based upon it. It is true that the act, like the one we are considering, is addressed to every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, but this direction is followed by provisions expressly limiting the scope and effect of the act to interstate commerce, which are wholly superfluous if the argument here made concerning the statute before us be sound;
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the merits of the contentions "concerning the alleged repugnancy of the statute, if regarded as otherwise valid, to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, because the act classifies together all common carriers. Although we deem it unnecessary to consider that subject, it must not be implied that we question the correctness of previous decisions noted in the margin, wherein state statutes were held not to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, although they classified steam railroads in one class for the purpose of applying a rule of master and servant. We further deem it unnecessary to express an opinion concerning the alleged repugnancy of the statute to the Seventh Amendment, because of the provision of the act as to the power of the jury. In saying this, however, we must not be considered as intimating that we think the provision in question is susceptible of the construction placed on it in argument, or that- if it could be so construed it would be constitutional. •
Concluding, as we do, that the statute, whilst it embraces subjects within the' authority of Congress .to regulate commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and that the two are so interblended in thé statute that they are incapable of separation, we are of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute to be repugnant to the Constitution and non-enforcible; and the judgments below are, therefore,
Affirmed.
Mb. Justice Day concurs in this opinion.
See note at foot of page 164, ante.
Chapter 3073. An act relating to liability of common carriers in the • District of Columbia and Territories and common carriers, engaged in commerce between the States and between the States and foreign nations to their employés. 32 Stat. 232.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That eyery common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory of the United States, or between the several States, or between any Territory and another, or between any Territory or Territories and any State or States, or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, shall be liable to any of its employés, or, in the case of his death, to his personal representative for the benefit of his widow and children, if any; if none, then for his parents; if none, then for his next of kin dependent upon him, for all damages which may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employés, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways or works.
Sec. 2. That in all actions hereafter brought against any common carriers to recover damages for personal injuries to an employé, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employe may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery where his contributory negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross in comparison, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employe. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.
Sec. 3. That no contract of employment, insurance, relief, benefit, or indemnity for injury or death entered into by or on behalf of ¡my omployé, nor the acceptance of any such insurance, relief, benefit, or indemnity by the persou entitled thereto, shall constitute any bar or defense to any action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death of such e.mployé: Provided however, That upon the trial of such action against any common carrier the defendant may set off therein any sum it has contributed toward any such insurance, relief, benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employe, or in case of his death to his personal representative.
Sec. 4. That no action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within one year from the time the cause of action accrued.
Sec. 5. That nothing in this act shall be held to limit the duly of common carriers by railroads or impair the rights of their employes under the safety-appliance act of March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, as amended April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, and March second, nineteen hundred and three.
Ipproved, June 11, 1906.
Lottery Case, 138 U. S. 321, 345 et seq.; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 335, and cases cited.
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. R., 175 U. S. 348.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209.