Case: HARRIMAN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION; KAHN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION; INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. HARRIMAN
Abbreviation: Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission
Decision Date: 1908-12-14
Docket Number: Nos. 315, 316, 317
Citation: 211 U.S. 407
Volume: 211
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: HARRIMAN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. KAHN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. HARRIMAN.
Judges: Mr. Justice Moody, not having been present at the argument, took no part in the decision.
Pages: 407–429

Head Matter:
HARRIMAN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. KAHN v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. HARRIMAN.
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 315, 316, 317.
Argued November 3, 4, 1908.
Decided December 14, 1908.
The primary purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to regulate interstate business of carriers, and the secondary purpose, that for which the commission was established, to enforce the regulations enacted by it, and the power to require testimony is limited, as is usual in English-speaking countries, to investigations concerning a specific breach of the existing law; this power is not extended to mere investigations by provisions in any of the amendatory acts in regard to annual reports of interstate carriers, or of the commission, or for the purpose of recommending legislation.
Qucere whether Congress has unlimited power to compel testimony in regard to subjects which do not concern direct breaches of law, and whether, and to what extent, it can delegate such power.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. John C. Spooner and Mr. John G. Milburn, with whom Mr. Robert S. Lovett was on the brief, for Edward H. Harriman:
Congress has conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to investigate, and in connection therewith compel the testimony of witnesses, only in aid of its duty to execute and enforce the provisions of the act to regulate commerce.
The commission is a body of limited powers derived exclusively from the act to regulate commerce. It is a purely administrative body charged with specific administrative duties and invested with specific powers. Kentucky Bridge Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 567. The restricted operation of the act limits the powers of the commission. Neither the province of the act or the commission is coextensive with interstate commerce or interstate transportation. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290.
An analysis of the act shows that the commission is merely an administrative agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce.
The act is primarily an enumeration of particular duties imposed upon common carriers; of particular acts on their part which are prohibited; and of particular duties and powers relating thereto conferred upon the commission. The duties it imposes and the acts it prohibits are the only duties and acts of common carriers with which the act is concerned. It is an act of details and not of generalities. Every duty it imposes is definitely specified, and a carrier which observes them complies with the act in full. The primary function of the' commission is to enforce the performance of those duties and prevent the doing of the prohibited acts, and to that end the necessary machinery of investigation, hearings on complaints, ,and judicial proceedings is provided. With respect to other duties or acts of carriers not regulated by the act, the commission has no function to perform and it is invested with none. Congress simply has not seen fit to regulate those acts and duties or to extend to them the functions of the commission. Having defined certain duties and prohibited certain acts the commission is created as an administrative body, not with a general supervisory power over common carriers subject to the act in all their operations, transactions, and relations, but generally speaking, with, a power of supervision limited to the specific requirements of the act, and with power to enforce those requirements and determine complaints made of violations of the act after notice, answer and hearing.
The business of a common carrier covered by the act is the business of transportation; — the movement of traffic; reasonable, equal and public rates; equal facilities; and the functions of the commission are limited to those aspects of its business. The language of the act is entirely inappropriate to the creation of a power of investigation with the'aid of compulsory testimony coextensive with a visitatorial power over all the acts, transactions and relations of a corporation, although a corporation engaged' in part in interstate transportation.
There- is nothing in § 20 or § 21 enlarging the power of the commission to investigate or warranting the contention that Congress has conferred upon the commission all the “inquisitorial powers of Congress” with respect to interstate commerce.
The cases cited in support of the claim of an inquisitorial power beyond the enforcement of the provisions of the act do not sustain it. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25; Interstate Commerce Commission v. C.-N. 0. & T. P. Ry.' Co., 167 U. S. 479; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, discussed and said nqt to sustain the power contended for by counsel for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Walker D. Hines, with whom Mr. Paul D. Cravath was on the brief, for appellant, Kahn:
The commission has no power to ask questions of persons not connected with carriers, except to ascertain whether or not the act has been obeyed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Beichmann, 145 U. S. 237, 242.
The general power of the commission to inquire into the management of the business of common carriers does not authorize these question^.
The questions related to the private business of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and not to the business of the Union Pacific.
The theory that under § 12 the commission has authority to go into the private side of transactions with a railroad company on the idea that both sides of the transaction — the railroad company’s side and the opposite or private side — are both the railroad company’s business, is opposed not only to the letter, .but to the spirit, of the statute, and to the policy of our government. It is natural to permit an administrative board, created to supervise grom'-public corporations, to inquire in a purely administrative way into the affairs and papers of such corporations; but it is preposterous to permit such mere administrative inquiry to be extended into the affairs and papers of those private institutions with which the railroad company may do business.
The commission’s authority to inquire into the management of the business of carriers is an authority to obtain information, from carriers themselves, but not from private persons.
The commission’s authority to require information from the carriers themselves does not extend to matters having no connection with the general subject-matter of the act to regulate commerce, and the questions asked Mr. Kahn have no such connection.
The commission has no power to make inquiries of private persons merely for the purpose of considering the propriety of recommending additional legislation when such questions have no relation to any inquiry as to violations of the act.
To create such a power in the commission is to give it, by unwarrantable implication, an inquisitorial power into private affairs over which it was never intended that thé commission should have any supervision. The commission’s investigating power is given “for the purposes” of the act. “The purposes” of the act are to be found alone in the requirements expressed in the act. Those requirements can be construed and understood and applied. To go beyond that is to go into a realm of endless speculation and uncertainty.
The commission’s duty and authority are sufficiently broad and sufficiently difficult of effective and impartial discharge when confined to the things which Congress has required, and should not be extended to those things which Congress did not require, but which the commission may assume that Congress hoped to accomplish.
Mr. Frank B. Kellogg and Mr. Cordenio A. Severance, with whom Mr. Henry L. Stimson was on the brief, for Interstate Commerce Commission:
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in making this investigation, had all the power of a congressional committee of inquiry, so far as interstate carriers are concerned, and could inquire into the management of such interstate carriers and all the financial operations and business thereof, not only for the purpose of regulating rates, fares and charges as provided by the Interstate Commerce Act, but for the purpose of recommending additional legislation. See §§ 12, 20, 21 of the Interstate Commerce Act; Interstate Com. Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 474; Interstate Com. Com. v. Railway Co., 167 U. S. 479, 506; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Colton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 438.
The end which Congress is seeking to obtain by the Interstate Commerce Act, namely, the proper regulation of interstate commerce, being indisputably within its constitutional powers, and Congress, by the sections of the act hereinbefore quoted, haying emphatically declared its opinion that an inquiry into the financial operations of the carrier is a necessary and proper means toward achieving such an end, the courts will effectuate and not hinder the purpose of Congress.
The situation is even more serious than when a court is called upon, to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute. In such a case the court will not set aside the statute unless the unconstitutionality exists beyond a reasonable doubti Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 531; Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. S. 96; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 514.
But the case now before the court goes even further. To uphold these appellants in their contumacy is -to prejudge Congress and' to hold that by no rational possibility could it legislate upon the subject-matter at issue; and-this without permitting Congress, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, to obtain the facts upon wrhich such legislation could properly be constitutionally based; and without permitting Congress itself after it shall have acquired such facts, within its constitutional powers of debate, to consider them. As to the power which entitles legislative committees to elicit information of the character here sought, see In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 668; People v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, and Fahey ■& Kilbourn v. Massing, 7 Wisconsin, 630, which lay down very clearly the rule.
This inquisitorial power of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been fruitfully used. An examination of the debates of Congress and decisions of the courts will show that it was upon information developed by the commission and reported to Congress, that the Elldns Law, the Safety Appliance Law, the Employers’ Liability Act, and the Hepburn Act, were successively based; in other words, the inquisitorial work of the commission has been the basis of all congressional legislation affecting interstate carriers during the past twenty years.
The contention that the inquiry involved the private business of the appellants is no answer to the right of the commission to have the inquiry answered.
Of course, .sales of property by directors to their railroad company are not their private affairs; and any inquiry tending to 'show that the price of the property so sold was inadequate or fraudulent is not an inquiry into' the private affairs of the directors. Nor is an inquiry into the reasons'of the directors for withholding publication of a dividend, while they were engaged in private speculation in the stock on which the dividend was declared, an inquiry into the private affairs of those directors. Such transactions are no more private than the business of the railroad company is private.
But even if the transactions under inquiry had not concerned men who hold official positions in the company, but were' transactions of purely private individuals, being, as they were, relevant to the subject-matter under inquiry by the commission, their privacy was no shield against the commission’s probe. Wigmore on Evidence, '§ 2192; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 46; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226.
Within the sphere of inquiry entrusted to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to investigate the truth has been deemed of such paramount importance to the public that even those privileges which usually maintain in' a court of justice have been abolished by statute. No-man can assert before the Interstate Commerce Commission or before a court, on an inquiry into matters within the purview of the Interstate-Commerce Act, that his answer would tend to incriminate or degrade him; and his refusal to answer inquiries before that commission not only subjects him to proceedings for contempt, but is expressly made a crime (act of February 11, 1893 ; 27 Stat. L. 443).
The brief contains an elaborate analysis of the act, section by section.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court.
These are appeals; on the one side, from an order of the Circuit Court directing the appellants, Harriman and Kahn, to answer certain questions put during an investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and, on the other, from a denial of a like order as to two other questions, answers to which the commission had required.
In November, 1906, the Interstate Commerce Commission, of its own motion, and not upon complaint, made an order reciting the authority and requirements of the act to regulate commerce (Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379), and proceeding as follows: "And whereas it appears to the Commission that consolidations and combinations of carriers subject to the act, arid the relations now and heretofore existing between such carriers, including community of interests therein, and the practises arid methods of such carriers affecting the movement of interstate commerce, the rates received and facilities furnished therefor should be made the subject of investigation by the Commission to the end that it may be fully informed in respect thereof, and to the further end that it ¡nay be ascertained whether such consolidations, combinations, relations, community of interests, practises, or methods result in violations of said act or tend to defeat its purposes; It is ordered that a proceeding of investigation and inquiry into and concerning the matters above stated be, and the same is hereby instituted." A time and place was set for the first hearing, and the inquiry thus begun was continued for about two months, resulting in the report of July, 1907, entitled "Consolidations and Combinations of Carriers," etc. 12 I. C. C. R. 277.
In the course of the inquiry the appellant Harriman was called by the commission and testified as a witness. At the time of the transactions referred to he was a director and also the president and the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The relations between the Union Pacific and other connecting roads, parallel or not, were under investigation and are set forth in the commission's report. It is enough to say that the Union Pacific Railroad Company is incorporated under the laws of Utah, and, as has been asserted and assumed, has power under the state laws to purchase the stock of other railroads, a power that it has exercised on a large scale. Among other things, it bought 103,401 shares of the preferred stock of the Chicago and Alton Railway Company. These shares had been deposited with bankers, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, by their owners, under an agreement authorizing the bankers to sell them to any purchaser at such price and upon such terms as should be approved by Messrs. Stewart, Mitchell and the witness, Harriman. He was asked whether he owned any of the stock so deposited, and how much, if any. These questions, under the advice of counsel, he declined to answer.
Next he was asked with regard to stock of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad Company, bought by the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, another Utah corporation, the stock of which was owned by the Union Pacific, whether it was part of the stock that had been acquired previously by him and two others, and whether it or any part of it was owned by any of the three. After answering the first question, "I think not," he was stopped by his counsel and refused to answer further. Again, it appearing that the Union Pacific, in July, 1906, purchased 90,000 shares of Illinois Central Railroad stock from Messrs. Rogers, Stillman and the witness, he was asked whether that stock was acquired by a pool of the three, whether it was acquired with a view of selling it to the Union Pacific, and whether it or any part of it was bought at a much lower price than $175 a share with the intent just mentioned. These questions the witness declined to answer. It appearing further that Kuhn, Loeb & Company, who were the fiscal agents of the Union Pacific, had sold to it 105,000 shares of the Illinois Central stock on the same date, he was asked if he had any interest in these shares, and whether they were acquired by a pool for the purpose of selling them to the Union Pacific. These questions the witness declined to answer. Again, it appearing that the Union Pacific had purchased stock of the St. Joseph and Grand Island Railroad Company from the witness since the last-mentioned date, he was asked when he acquired the stock and what he paid for it, and again de- dined to answer. Finally, after it had been shown that since-July, 1906, the Union Pacific had bought a large amount of New York Central Railroad stock, the witness was asked whether any of the directors of the Union Pacific were interested directly or indirectly in this stock at the time when it was sold. An answer to this question also was declined. All these refusals to answer were persisted in after a direction to answer from the commission. The Circuit Court ordered them to be answered and Harriman appealed.
The petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission set forth two other questions which the witness refused to answer, and on which it asked the order of the Circuit Court. One was a general one, whether he was interested in any stocks bought between the nineteenth of July and the seventeenth of August that appreciated, and another, more specific, was whether he or any director bought any Union and [or] Southern Pacific in anticipation of a certain- dividend, the suggestion- being that announcement of the dividend was delayed for the directors to profit by their secret knowledge and that they did so. With regard to these the petition was denied, and the Interstate Commerce Commission appealed. '
The appellant Kahn was a member of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company. He also was asked whether any of the directors of the Union Pacific were the real owners of any of the shares of the Chicago and Alton Railroad deposited, as has been stated, with Kuhn, Loeb & Company, and sold to the Union Pacific. He was asked further in various forms whether the before mentioned 105,000 shares of Illinois Central stock, or any part of them, really belonged to or were held for any of the directors of the Union Pacific. And again, whether at the same time that he bought these shares he bought for Messrs. Harriman,. Rogers and Stillman the stocks they sold at the same -time that he sold his. Finally he was asked whether the 105,000 shares, and the 90,000 shares turned in by Stillman, Rogers and Harriman, were all bought through his instrumentality for a pool of which they and he were members, that was operating in Illinois Central stocks for some months before July, 1906. All these questions he was directed by the' commission to answer, but refused. The Circuit Court ordered him to answer, and he appealed.
Many broad questions were discussed in the argument before us, but we shall confine ourselves to comparatively narrow ground. The contention of the commission is that it may make any investigation that it deems proper, not merely to discover any facts tending to defeat the purposes of the act of February 4, 1887, but to aid it in recommending any additional legislation relating to the regulation of commerce that it may conceive to be within the power of Congress to enact; and that in such an investigation it has power, with the aid of the courts, to require any witness to answer any question that may have a bearing upon any part of what it has in mind. The contention necessarily takes this extreme form, because this was a general inquiry started by the commission of its own motion, not an investigation upon complaint, or of some specific matter that might be made the object of a complaint. To answer this claim it will be sufficient to construe the act creating the commission, upon which its powers depend.
Before taking up the words of the statute the enormous scope of the power asserted for the commission should be em-phasised and dwelt upon. The legislation that the commission may recommend embraces, according to the arguments before us, anything and everything that may be conceived to be within the power of Congress to regulate, if it relates to commerce with. foreign nations or among the- several States. And the result of the arguments is that whatever might influence the mind of the commission in its recommendations is a subject upon which it may summon witnesses before it and require them to disclose any facts, no matter how private, no matter what' their tendency to disgrace the person whose attendance has been compelled. If we qualify the statement and say only, legitimately influence the mind of the commission in the opinion of the court called in aid, still it will be seen that the power, if it exists, is unparalleled' in its vague extent. Its territorial sweep also should be noticed. By § 12 of the act of 1887, the commission has authority to require the attendance of witnesses " from any place in the- United States, at any designated place of hearing." No such unlimited command over the liberty of all citizens ever was given, so far as we know, in constitutional times, to any commission or court.
How far Congress could legislate on the subject-matter of the questions put to the witnesses was one of the subjects of discussion, but we pass it by. Whether Congress itself has the unlimited power claimed by the commission, we also leave on ohe side. It was intimated that there was a limit in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 478, 479. Whether it could delegate the power, if it possesses it, we also leave untouched, beyond remarking that so unqualified a delegation would present the constitutional difficulty in most acute form. It is enough for üs to say that we find no attempt; to-make such a delegation anywhere in the act.
Whatever may be the power of Congress, it did not attempt, in the act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, to do more than to regulate the interstate business of common carriers, and the primary purpose for which the commission was established was to enforce the regulations which Congress had imposed. The 'earlier sections of the statute require that charges shall be reasonable, prohibit discrimination and pooling of freights, require the publication of rates, and so forth, in well-known provisions. Then, by § 11, the Interstate Commerce Commission is created, and by § 12, as amended by later acts, the commission has "authority to inquire into the management of.the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was 'created; and the commission is hereby authorized and required to execute and enforce the provisions óf this act." District attorneys to whom the commission may apply are to institute and prosecute all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the act and for the punishment of violations of it; and "for the purposes of this act the commission shall have power to require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation." Then comes the provision to which we already, have called attention, by which a witness could be summoned from Maine to Texas, and then'follow clauses.for enforcing obedience to the subpoena by an order of court and for taking depositions, which do not heed statement.'
The commission it will be seen is given power to require the testimony; of witnesses "for the purposes of this Act." The argument for the commission is that the purposes of the act embrace all the duties that the act imposes and the powers that it gives the commission; that one. of the purposes is that the commission shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the business of the carriers^ is conducted, as required by.§ 12; that another is that it shall recommend additional legislation under § 21, to which we shall refer again, and that for either of these general objects- it may call on the courts to require any one whom it may point out to attend and testify if he would avoid the penalties for- contempt.
y/ We are of opinion on the contrary that the purposes, of the act for which the commission may exact evidence embrace only complaints for violation of the act, and investigations by the commission upon matters that might have been made the object of complaint. /As we already have implied the main purpose of the act was to regulate the interstate business of carriers, and the secondary purpose, that for. which the commission was established, was to enforce the regulations enacted. These in our opinion are the. purposes referred to; in other words the power to require testimony is limited, as it usually is in English-speaking countries at least, to the only cases where the sacrifice of privacy is necessary — those where the investigations concern a specific breach of the law.
That this is the' true view appears, we think, sufficiently from the original form- of § 14. That section made it the duty of the commission, "whenever an- investigation shall .be made," to make a report in writing, which was to "include the findings of fact upon which the conclusions of the Commission are based, together with its recommendation as to what reparation, if any, should be made by the common carrier to any party or parties who may be found to have been injured; and the findings so made shall thereafter, in all judicial proceedings,. be deemed prima facie evidence as to each.and every fact found." As this applied, in terms, to all investigations, it is plain that at that time there was no thought of allowing witnesses to be summoned except in connection with a complaint for contraventions of the act, such as the commission was directed to. "investigate" by § 13, or in connection with an inquiry instituted by the commission, authorized by the same- section, "in the same manner and to the same effect as though complaint had been made." Obviously such an inquiry-is limited to matters that might have been the object of a complaint.
The plain limit to the authority to institute an inquiry given by § 13, and the duty to make a report with findings of facts, etc., in the section next following, with hardly a word between, hang together, and show the purposes for which it was intended that witnesses should be summoned-. They quite exclude the inference of broader power from the general words in § 12, as to' inquiring into the management of the business Of common carriers, subject to the provisions of the act, the commission keeping itself informed, etc. They equally exclude such an inference from § 21, the other section on which most reliance is placed. That, as it now stands, requires' an .annual report, containing "such information and data collected by the Commission-as may be considered of value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of commerce, tor gether with such recommendations as to additional legislation relating thereto as the Commission may deem necessary." Act of March-2, 1889, c. 382, § 8, 25 Stat. 855, 862.
It is true that in the latest amendment of § 14, findings of fact are required only in case damages are awarded. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 3, 34 Stat. 584, 589. But there is no change sufficient to affect the meaning of the words in § 12, as already fixed. If by virtue of § 21 the power exists to summon witnesses for the purpose of recommending legislation, we hardly see why, under the same section, it should not extend to summoning them for the still vaguer reason that their testimony might furnish data considered by the commission of value m the determination of questions connected with the regulation of commerce. If we did not think, as we do, that the act clearly showed that the pqwer to compel the attendance of witnesses was to be exercised only in connection with the gwasvjudicial duties of the commission, we still should be unable to suppose that such an unprecedented grant was to be drawn from the counsels of perfection that have been quoted from §12 and 21. We could not believe on the strength of other than explicit and unmistakable words that such autocratic power was given.for any less specific object of inquiry than a breach of existing law,-in which, and in which alone, as we hate said, there is any need that personal matters should be revealed.
In § 15 and 16 are farther provisions for the enforcement of the act, not otherwise material than as showing the main purposé that Congress had in mind. The only other section that is thought to sustain the argument for the commission is § 20, amended by act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 593. • This. authorizes the commission to require annual reports from all the carriers concerned, with details of what is to be shown, to which the commission may add in certain particulars, and-further "to require from such carriers specific answers to all questions upon which- the Commission may need information." The commission may require certain other reports, and is to have access to -all accounts, records and memoranda. The section now deals at length with this matter and how ac counts shall be kept and the like. It seems to us plain that it is directed solely to accounts and returns, and is imposing a duty on the common carrier only from whom the returns come.
/All that we are considering is the power under the act to regulate commerce and its amendments to extort evidence from a witness by compulsion. What reports or investigations the commission may make without that aid but with the help of such returns or special reports as it may require from the carrier, we need not decide,/ Upon the point before us we should \infer from the later action of Congress with regard to .its resolution of March 7, 1906, 34 Stat. 823, directing the commission to investigate and report as to railroad discrimination and monopolies in coal and oil, that it took the same view that we do. For it thought it advisable to amend that resolution on March 21 by adding a section giving the commission the same power it then had to compel the attendance of witnesses in the investigation ordered. 34 Stat. 824. The mention of the power then possessed obviously is intended simply to, define the nature and extent of the power by reference to § 12 of the original act. The passage of the amendment' indicates that without it the power would be wanting. The case is not af-flcted by' the provision of § 9 of the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 9, 34 Stat. 595, extending .the former acts relating to the attendance of witnesses and the compelling of testimony to "all proceedings and hearings under this Act." If we felt more hesitation than we do, we still should feel bound to construe the statute not merely so as to sustain its constitutionality but so as to avoid a succession of constitutional doubts, so far as candor permits. Knights Templar & Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205.
Order in 315 arid 316 reversed.
Order in 317 affirmed.
Petition denied. .
Mr. Justice Moody, not having been present at the argument, took no part in the decision.