Case: Frederick Z. Salomon v. The United States
Abbreviation: Salomon v. United States
Decision Date: 1871-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 7 Ct. Cl. 482
Volume: 7
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Frederick Z. Salomon v. The United States.
Judges: 
Pages: 482–496

Head Matter:
Frederick Z. Salomon v. The United States.
On the Proofs.
The claimant has a written contract duly made for the sale and delivery of corn to-the Qna/rtermaster-Department, hat the time in which it should he performed has expired. A parol agreement is then made hy him with the chief quartermaster of a department, to the effect that he may deliver the balance remaining due wilder the contract. Se accordingly places go'od, sound, merchantable corn in a Government warehouse, and leaves it to await inspection. A clerk of the chief quartermaster examines it, and gives the claimant a receipt. The claimant presents the receipt to the chief quartermaster, and receives from him a vouchei' in the ordinary form, which ascribes the sale and delivery to the written contract. Some of the corn is then fed, to the Government teams, at the point of delivery, and some is carried to a post 150 miles distant. It is discovered that all of the corn was not needed at the post where it was delivered, and its maturity tohen delivered is a subject of dispute. The claimant loses all of the corn, andhrings his action for the agreed price under theioritten contract, and upon the voucher given to him.
A parole agreement ■with, tlie chief quartermaster of a military department for the sale and delivery of corn, there being neither previous advertisement nor a public exigency, is in direct antagonism to three acts of Congress, and void; and the contractor cannot recover for the corn delivered, even though it was accepted by the quartermaster’s agent, and a portion of it transported to another place; but he may recover for so much as was actually used -in the Government’s service.
Mr. T. J. D. Fuller for the claimant:
This suit is brought on a quartermaster’s voucher, delivered to the claimant by Captain Turnley, dated October 15, 1805, for the sum of $4,116.20.
The consideration of the voucher was the delivery of thirty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty pounds of corn at Camp Fillmore, at eleven cents per pound, about the 1st of October, 1865, in fulfillment of a contract made in July, 1864, between Captain Mullin, assistant quartermaster, and the claimant.
Under the rules of this court the claimant, by way of inducement merely, has set out this contract in his petition. But he relies and declares upon the voucher as the basis of his claim. The voucher upon its face expresses that it was given in fulfillment and in extinguishment of the contract.
Hananer, the agent of the claimant, informed Turnley, at the time of the demand, that he would have to deliver new corn, and there would be danger of its injury if piled in considerable quantities. Turnley replies, “No matter, as it is wanted for immediate use; and if I receive it, and receipt for it, it will keep Salomon harmless.”
The question is, did the claimant deliver such corn as his agent, Hananer, in his agreement with Turnley, promised to deliver, and did Turnley, by Ms agent, Butter, accept it, with the knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of the quality of corn delivered?
1. There can be no fraud imputed, or scienter shown, because claimant was in Europe. Hananer, his agent, never saw the corn.
2. The corn was delivered upon the new verbal agreement between Hananer and Turnley, made in 1865.
3. There was no warranty as to the quality of the corn delivered.
4. After the acceptance of the corn by the Government, and giving the voucher or receipt for it, claimant paid for the corn the same price the Government promised to pay him, without notice of any dissatisfaction upon the part of the Government.
5. The Government, by receiving the corn, using a part of, it, and hauling the balance one hundred and fifty miles from the place of its delivery, cannot rescind the contract, even if it should be shown the article delivered was inferior to the quality promised to be delivered.
The authorities distinguish between a warranty of quality and a description of quality. In the former case, the warranty is a part of the contract, continues after the delivery and acceptance of the article, and attaches to the subject-matter of the contract.
In the latter, the delivery and acceptance and use of the article, with due knowledge of its quality, discharges the contract by its acceptance.
■ 6. The Government is estopped by its own conduct from claiming a reduction in price, or refusing to pay for the corn delivered. Judge Kent says, (vol. 2, p. 376,) “a contract made and executed cannot be rescinded without mutual consent, if the circumstances be so altered, by a part execution, that the parties cannot be placed statu quo ; for if it be rescinded at all it must be rescinded in toto
The corn was placed by Faquín in the Government jacal. The title of the property did not vest in the Government until its acceptance. It had ample opportunity to examine the corn before accepting it. It did so; it used it, fed from it, hauled it away. Turnley had taken up the property, and made his return of it as returned property.
Subsequently, under these chan ged circumstances, it is sought to rescind and repudiate the contract, throwing the property back upon the hands of the claimant.
Under these circumstances it cannot allege fraud, for it does not exist. It cannot show failure of consideration. It does not show any warranty of quality. It was not a sale by sample.
If the money had been paid for the corn, it is contended, upon the facts here shown, the money could not be recovered back. Nor can the United States maintain successfully an action on a warranty of quality. Nor can,it now, in an action for the price, avoid payment or show failure of consideration in whole or in part; nor rescind the contract in part and affirm it in part. The giving the voucher is like the giving of a note, upon settlement of a bill of sale.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General MeMichael for defendants.
Finding of fact by the Court.
■ “ Of the corn thus sold and delivered, a portion was used in the military service of the defendants; a portion was transported by them during the month of December, 1865, to Denver, and the remainder was left at Camp Fillmore. After the arrival of that transported to Denver, some of it was found to be shrunken and shrivelled and some portions had rotted and others were mixed with dirt; whereupon the defendant’s disbursing officers refused to pay the vouchers held by the claimant, and the quartermaster tendered to him at Denver the portion of the corn transported there; but the defendants did not • return or offer to return the same to Camp Fillmore. The Government-storehouse at Camp Fillmore in which the corn was kept after the delivery, was defective and leaky and the corn was injured while there. But it was good merchantable corn when it was placed there by the claimant.”
The diversity of tlie opinions in tbis case, renders an analysis of the decision exceedingly difficult. The point stated by tbe reporters may be an imperfect and incorrect exposition of the ease.

Opinion:
Drake, Ch. J.,
delivered the following opinion :
Upon the facts found by the court, my views are as follows:
The claimant's case is presented ,on two theories, one contained in his petition, and the other in the brief of his counsel.
The former proceeds upon the contract of July 28, 1804, entered into between the claimant and Captain Mullin, assistant quartermaster, and annexed to and made part of the petition; under which the claimant's petition avers "that he delivered at Camp Fillmore, in tbe month of September, 1864, sis hundred and forty-nine bushels of corn, of the weight, character, and quality specified in said contract, in sacks, to the proper officer at said post authorized to receive it for the United States, and the same was duly examined and inspected by a proper officer of the United States, and found to be conformable to said contract, and was accepted by the United States in fulfillment of said contract. And the officer not having funds in his hands at the time of delivery to pay for the same, on the 15th day of October, 1865, a voucher, in the customary form of quartermaster's voucher, was made out by Captain F. T. Turnley, of the United States Quartermaster's Department, for the sum of $4,116.20, in payment for said corn, and delivered to petitioner, whereby the United States became liable to pay the amount of said voucher to petitioner."
The other theory of the claimant's ease, as stated in his counsel's brief, is, that the contract was set out in the petition by way of inducement merely; that he relies upon his voucher as the basis of his claim; that the voucher was issued in pursuance of a new and independent agreement; and that the defendants cannot now, after the delivery of the corn, set up the old contract.
Upon neither of these theories, in my opinion, can the claimant recover the amount of that voucher.
If his case is rested on the theory of a new and independent agreement, in pursuance of which the voucher was issued, such agreement is in direct antagonism to three acts of Congress, viz: 1. The tenth section of the Act March 2d, 1861, (12 Stat. L,, 220,) requiring all contracts for supplies to be made after advertising therefor, unless "immediate delivery is required by the public exigency;" 2. The fourth section of the Act July 4th, 1864, (13 Stat. L., 396,) vesting in the commanding officer of an army or detachment the power to order the chief quartermaster thereof to procure the supplies to meet an emergency requiring their immediate procurementand 3. The first section of the Act June 2d, 1862, (12 Stat. L., 411,) requiring all contracts to be reduced to writing, and signed by the contracting-parties.
It is clear that if the corn in question was delivered by the claimant outside and independent of the written contract sued on, then it was delivered under a parol agreement with an assist ant quartermaster, without any authority from the commanding officer of the army or detachment with which he was connected, and without any emergency being shown, and without the contract being reduced to writing. The contract was therefore void. {Renderson1 s Case 4 C. Cls. B., 75; McKinney's Case, ibid., 537.) The second theory is, therefore, la my opinion, untenable.
I hold, therefore, that the corn, if delivered at all, was delivered under the written contract sued on. But in my view there was no delivery in accordance with the terms of that contract. Though it was put into the G-overnment store-house at Camp Fillmore, yet it was not delivered to, nor received or inspected by, the commanding officer at that post, or by any officer of the United States, before it was placed therein; and its deposit there by the claimant or his agent, without the authority, inspection, or knowledge of the commanding officer of the post, or any other officer, imposed per se no liability upon the Government for it or its custody.
Therefore, whichever theory is. relied on, no action exists against the Government for the whole quantity of 37,420 pounds of corn mentioned in the voucher.
The claimant,however, insists that the execution and delivery to him of the quartermaster's voucher for that quantity concludes the defendants. This court has not at any time ac-accorded to such vouchers any greater weight and effect than as prima-faeie evidence that their statements are true. This view was taken in Parish's Case, (2 O. Cls. B., 341,) and, in my opinion, is the true view.
As such evidence, it is, I consider, wholly overthrown by the other evidence in the case. In point of fact, as has been shown, the corn was not delivered in conformity with the contract, and the voucher was issued upon the faith of the receipt given for the corn by the quartermaster's clerk, and presented to the quartermaster by the claimant or his agent; and the quartermaster, when he issued it, was ignorant of the facts which have appeared here, and which afterward became known to him, and upon learning which he ordered the voucher to be canceled. The voucher, therefore, concludes nothing against the defendant.
If, therefore, the claim were to be decided upon as a whole, it ought to be rejected as a whole.
But it was held by this court in Lindsley's Case, (4 C. 01. B., 359,) andin BxireMel's Oase, (ibid., 549,) that tbe actual delivery of goods to, and acceptance and use thereof by, tbe Government, under a void contract, created an implied obligation to pay tbe value of tbe goods so delivered and used; and I bave no doubt as to the correctness of that view. I therefore consider that tbe claimant ought to recover the value of so much of tbe corn placed in tbe Government store-house at Camp Fillmore as was actually used by tbe Government.
That quantity appears only in tbe voucher jbr 5,991 pounds, which was made out and offered to claimant, and which he refused to receive. The defendants have admitted the use of that much, and the claimant has not proved the use of more. For that quantity, at the admitted price of eleven cents per pound, amounting in the aggregate to $659.01, judgment should be entered.