Case: James Edward CARLSON et al. v. James R. SCHLESINGER, Secretary of Defense, et al., Appellants
Abbreviation: Carlson v. Schlesinger
Decision Date: 1975-04-25
Docket Number: No. 73-2170
Citation: 167 U.S. App. D.C. 325
Volume: 167
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Parties: James Edward CARLSON et al. v. James R. SCHLESINGER, Secretary of Defense, et al., Appellants.
Judges: Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, TAMM, Circuit Judge, and RICHEY, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
Pages: 325–344

Head Matter:
511 F.2d 1327
James Edward CARLSON et al. v. James R. SCHLESINGER, Secretary of Defense, et al., Appellants.
No. 73-2170.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 13, 1975.
Decided April 25, 1975.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 19, 1975.
Robert S. Greenspan, Atty., Dept, of Justice, of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court for appellants. Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen., Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and Robert E. Kopp, Atty., U. S. Dept, of Justice, were on the briefs for appellants. Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., at the time the record was filed, and Michael A. Katz, Asst. U. S. Atty., entered appearances for appellants.
Joel M. Gora, New York City, with whom Melvin L. Wulf, New York City, and David Addlestone, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellees.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, TAMM, Circuit Judge, and RICHEY, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).

Opinion:
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
TAMM, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellees James Carlson, Richard Randig, and William Daniels, Jr., former servicemen who were stationed in Vietnam during the period of United States combat operations there, brought suit in district court for declaratory and equitable relief. They alleged: 1) that their arrests for circulating petitions on two Air Force bases in South Vietnam without permission were illegal and should be expunged because the operative Air Force regulations violated the first amendment; 2) that the refusal of their respective commanders to permit them to solicit signatures infringed upon their first amendment rights; and 8) that the regulations upon which the commanders relied were facially overbroad and unconstitutional. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found for appellees. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F.Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973). We reverse.
I
The facts of this controversy are fully described in the district court's opinion and need only be summarized here. Appellee Carlson, an enlisted member of the United States Navy, engaged in his challenged activity at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam, headquarters of the United States Seventh Air Force, occupied by over 10,000 American service personnel. Tan Son Nhut was heavily fortified and located amidst an area of substantial combat. A. 84 — 88.
On October 10, 1971 Carlson, off-duty but dressed in uniform, solicited signatures in front of the main post exchange for a petition to Congress expressing opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam war. A. 74. At approximately 3:00 p. m., three Air Force security policemen apparently acting upon an anonymous complaint, arrested Carlson. The petitions were confiscated, and Carlson was taken to the base police station where he was informed that he would be charged with "soliciting signatures for an unauthorized petition" in violation of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 30 — 1(9). A. 74-75.
Several days later, Carlson returned to the base to request permission to solicit signatures; he spoke with the deputy base commander, Colonel Jensen, who orally denied the request. A. 75. Carlson subsequently wrote to the base commander, Colonel Gunn, for authorization, but Colonel Gunn formally denied permission.
Appellees Randig and Daniels were stationed at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, Vietnam. The base, located on a peninsula, was the duty station of several United States Air Force units and served as a major port of entry and stockpile for ammunition and supplies. A. 93-95. The base had been the target for both enemy rocket and ground attacks. A. 95.
On December 4, 1971, Randig, off-duty and not in uniform, gathered signatures at the Air Force Hospital. A. 78. After phone calls by soldiers objecting to his activity, he was arrested by military police and confined for two hours. The base commander, Colonel Fitzgerald, told Randig that he was charged with "soliciting signatures for an unauthorized petition." Randig was informed that he would not be prosecuted and was released. A. 78.
Five days later, appellees Randig and Daniels addressed a letter to Colonel Fitzgerald seeking authorization to circulate the petition and setting forth a number of restrictions they volunteered to obey. A. 40-41, 69 — 70. In a written response, the commander denied the request. Thereafter, all three appellees, while still servicemen, instituted a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Relying substantially on this court's decision in Avrech v. Secretary of Navy, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 477 F.2d 1237 (1973) before its reversal by the Supreme Court, and before the Court decided Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), the district court, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, found for appelles. The court first held that the case was not moot, as while at that point appellees had left the service, "the constitutional violations complained of are capable of being repeated as long as the challenged regulations remained in force," 364 F.Supp. at 630. The court then held that appellees' arrests violated the first amendment in that AFR 30 — 1(9) was an impermissible prior restraint because the guiding standards of AFR 35-15 were vague and overbroad and permitted commanders to make arbitrary and capricious determinations. Id. at 632-33. Moreover, the court found an independent infringement of appellees' first amendment rights in that the commanders committed an "abuse of command discretion" in prohibiting solicitation. Id. at 637. Finally, both regulations were found to be unconstitutionally overbroad on their face as an infringement of legitimate first amendment activity. The court ordered the records of appellee Carlson's detention expunged. Id. at 640.
II
Were this case set in a civilian ^setting, the actions taken by the governmental authorities would run afoul of the first amendment. However, we are undeniably dealing with the military, and the Supreme Court has recently instructed that, "[wjhile the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the .First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." Parker v. Levy, supra, 417 U.S. at 758, 94 S.Ct. at 2563. See also Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F.Supp. 849 (D.S.C.1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981, 91 S.Ct. 1192, 28 L.Ed.2d 333 (1971). To strike the proper balance between legitimate military needs and individual liberties we must inquire whether "conditions peculiar to military life" dictate affording different treatment to activity arising in a military context. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013, 90 S.Ct. 572, 24 L.Ed.2d 505 (1970).
To approach plaintiffs-appellees' claims properly requires that we separate the two pairs of events in question. Appellees allege two independent infringements of their constitutional rights — their arrest or detention for soliciting signatures without the prior approval required by AFR 30 — 1(9) and the subsequent refusals of Colonels Gunn and Fitzgerald to grant such approval on the basis of AFR 35 — 15. Therefore, we must undertake to analyze each event against appropriate constitutional standards.
It is axiomatic that the Government may reasonably regulate the "time, place, and manner" of first amendment activity. See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). Moreover, the greater the government's legitimate interests, the greater must be the government's latitude to prescribe reasonable regulations. Compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963). Clearly beyond peradventure, that governmental interest is manifest in the context of a military combat zone — a condition peculiar to the military which justifies differing treatment. In such a context, we believe the requirement that a serviceman obtain his commander's approval before circulating a petition is eminently reasonable; the exigencies of the combat mission can yield no other result.
Hence, we must conclude that the arrests of the servicemen in this case did not violate the first amendment. The record reveals beyond dispute that both arrests occurred in Vietnam, a combat arena. Appellee Carlson was arrested at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, occupied by tactical and combat troops and the scene itself of enemy rocket, anti-aircraft, and combat attacks. A. 85-88. Similarly, appellee Randig was arrested at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, also a base for tactical and combat units and one that housed stockpiles of major stores of ammunition. In fact, the base had been directly attacked on several occasions, and the enemy had once succeeded in breaking through base defenses and destroying 75 percent of the stored ammunition. A. 93 — 96. Moreover, the record is clear that the reasons for the arrests were appellees' failure to obtain prior approval. Carlson himself testified that he was informed that he was charged with "soliciting signatures for an unauthorized petition;" appellee Randig was informed by the base commander of the identical charge the day of his arrest. We hold that AFR 30 — 1(9) was properly invoked against appellees and that the government's actions in detaining appellees abridged no cognizable first amendment interest.
The second pair of events relate to appellees' inability to obtain permission from the base commanders to circulate their petitions. Both Colonel Fitzgerald and Colonel Gunn denied the request to solicit on the basis of AFR 35 — 15 which required denial if they determined that "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with the accomplishment of the military mission" would occur. Appellees have asked this court to upset that determination, made in combat zone circumstances, and to find the commanders' refusal to be an unreasonable infringement of first amendment rights.
To make that determination, we must balance, as did the commanding officers, the legitimate combat zone needs of the military with the requested activity. In doing so, we are mindful that the first amendment has "never been thought to give absolute protection . to speak whenever or wherever [an individual] chooses." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). We must also recognize that the necessity for discipline "may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." Parker v. Levy, supra, 417 U.S. at 758, 94 S.Ct. at 2563. Further, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court has warned us against assuming the role that appellees advance:
judges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly' government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 540, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953).
We conclude that in a combat zone situation, a commanding officer must be afforded substantial latitude in balancing competing military needs and first amendment rights. The Supreme Court recognized long ago that "[a]n army is not a deliberative body." In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153, 11 S.Ct. 54, 55, 34 L.Ed. 636 (1890). Because judges are ill-equipped to second guess command decisions made under the difficult circumstances of maintaining morale and discipline in a combat zone, cf. Goldwasser v. Brown, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 417 F.2d 1169, 1177 (1969), we should not upset such determinations unless the military's infringement upon first amendment rights is manifestly unrelated to legitimate military interests. See Dash v. Commanding General, supra. In the case sub judice, we cannot find that this nexus was absent.
The commanders determined that the solicitations of signatures would pose a danger to discipline and morale, and thus withheld permission on the basis of AFR 30 — 15. See notes 4, 6 supra. In doing so, they were not using only the facts contained within the four corners of the petition, but were drawing upon their experience as military commanders and upon their position in the field — advantages which we obviously do not possess. Moreover, they were able to gauge the potential reactions to the petitioning by their experiences when appellees attempted previously to solicit signatures without approval. In both cases, other servicemen registered objections to the military police. The inference that further activity would invoke further objections, possibly in a stronger manner, seems manifest. Cf. Dash v. Commanding General, supra.
We must point out that the commanders' decisions did not eradicate totally the first amendment rights of the servicemen involved. Permission to solicit signatures was denied under authority of a regulation dealing only with the distribution or posting of material. The petition could have been read aloud or its contents discussed at informal group sessions. In fact, each serviceman who signed the petition was perfectly free to communicate the exact sentiments by letter to Congress. This right of petition is protected both by statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1970), and by Air Force Regulation 30 — 1(9). What has happened here is that in a combat zone context the military has reasonably regulated the time and manner of protected first amendment activity.
In sum, after affording their decision due and proper deference, we cannot conclude that the balance struck by the field commanders between military needs and first amendment rights was improper or represented an abuse of discretion. In doing so, we recognize, as did Professor Emerson, that:
To a certain extent, at least, the military sector of a society must function outside the realm of democratic principles, including the principle of freedom of expression.
Certainly, members of the armed forces, at least when operating in that capacity, can be restricted in their right to open discussion.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 935-36 (1963).
Ill
The district court also struck down both AFR 30 — 1(9) and 35 — 15 as being facially overbroad. We also entertain significant doubts about the breadth and scope of the regulations. However, because we find that the regulations as applied in this case resulted in no viola tion of the first amendment, we do not believe, under applicable Supreme Court doctrine, that we may reach the question of the facial validity of the regulations on overbreadth grounds.
A basic principle of constitutional adjudication is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Admittedly, a traditional exception to that rule has been carved out in the first amendment over-breadth area. See id. at 611 — 15, 93 S.Ct. 2908 and cases cited therein. However, the exception is a limited one and should only be invoked if the overbreadth is substantial when "judged in relation to the statute's plainly, legitmate sweep." Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2918.
In Parker v. Levy, supra, the Supreme Court applied these principles to a military context. The Court recognized that "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it. Doctrines of First Amendment overbreadth . . . are not exempt from the operation of these principles." 417 U.S. at 758, 94 S.Ct. at 2563.
Consequently, the limited nature of the overbreadth exception to the ban on asserting vicarious constitutional rights when read with its even more limited application in a military setting appears to preclude its invocation in this case. Any potential overbreadth to the regulations at issue is not sufficiently substantial in comparison with its legitimate sweep so that servicemen in a combat zone situation accused of violating them may test their facial constitutionality.
IV
Our holding today is a modest one. We find that a prior approval requirement for petitioning activities is reasonable in a combat zone setting. Hence, appellees' arrests were valid, and the district court's order of expungement must be reversed. We also conclude that the commanders in this situation exercised reasonable discretion in denying appellees' requests to conduct their first amendment activity. However, we reach no conclusions as to the facial validity of the regulations, as we are precluded from reaching that issue on the record before us. We reverse the grant of summary judgment for appellees and remand with instructions that summary judgment be entered for appellants.
So ordered.
. The text of the petition read:
We, the undersigned American Servicemen on duty in Vietnam, wish to express our opposition to further United States military involvement by air, sea, or land forces in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or other countries in South East Asia. We petition the United States Congress to take whatever action necessary to assure an immediate cessation of all hostilities in South East Asia; to set a near date for final and complete military withdrawal; to insure a rapid and peaceful return of American Prisoners of War; and to assume and assert its responsibility for determination of future American Foreign Policy.
There followed blank boxes for Name, Rank, Service, and Unit; the petition was signed on the bottom with "Vietnam Veterans Against the War." A. 64.
. Carlson has stated that one of the policemen informed him that he was suspected of "passing out anti-war material." A. 75.
. AFR 30-1(9) provides in part:
Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and civilian employees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However, the public solicitation or collection of signatures on a petition by any person within an Air Force facility or by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign country is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander.
Reference: AFR 35-15.
. The letter read:
On 17 October 1971 my deputy, Colonel Sigurd L. Jensen, Jr, acting in my absence, considered the application of SK3 Edward Carlson to circulate the petition in question on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. After examining the petition, and considering all of the circumstances, he denied the application to circulate the petition. After careful consideration of your letter of 18 October 1971, I adhere to that determination. A. 68.
Colonel Gunn made an additional explanation in connection with this litigation which stated in part:
I had to consider that we are located in a war zone and, thus, any activity which may affect the morale of the personnel here or interfere with the mission must be closely scrutinized. Considering that when Seaman Carlson was originally soliciting signatures, a complaint, though anonymous, was made to the Security Police, I could not take any chances. I felt I had to deny the request in order that no possible difficulties with morale or discipline would arise within my command. A. 82.
. Apparently no record was kept of Randig's arrest.
. Colonel Fitzgerald's response stated:
Having carefully reviewed, pursuant to paragraph 9, AFR 30-1, your' request for permission to solicit signatures on a petition at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, and having carefully reviewed the contents of the petition, I hereby deny your request. A. 71.
In two affidavits, Colonel Fitzgerald elaborated on his reasoning. In the first, he stated:
It was obvious to me that a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, and morale of military personnel assigned to this base in the Republic of Vietnam existed from the circulation of a petition urging a precipitous, final withdrawal from our United States commitment. Their solicitation presented a clear danger of material interference with the accomplishment of the military mission in Vietnam by seeking disaffection on the part of military personnel in Vietnam with the effort they were here to support. This was made even more obvious by the fact that the first solicitation came to light as a result of two anonymous phone calls to the Security Police by personnel of the 483rd USAF Hospital who voiced their objection to those petitions in a war zone. A. 91.
In a later affidavit, Colonel Fitzgerald opined:
I had to consider the potential adverse affect on morale of circulating an anti-war petition. To officially permit dissident individuals to circulate a petition which advocated disregard and disrespect for the U.S. mission in Vietnam, would, in my judgment have seriously lowered the morale and status of discipline in the command, jeopardized security, and adversely affected fulfillment of our mission. I was particularly concerned about the probable affect on the approximately 1000 security police who were responsible for guarding the base from enemy attack 24 hours a day. . . . Should these security forces have become disenchanted with their overall mission . it was obvious to me that the security of Cam Ranh Bay Air Base would have been directly and seriously jeopardized. A. 98-99.
. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that:
it is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time of the Revolution until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 187 (1962). Nowhere should that rule of non-interference have more vitality than when dealing with a combat zone situation.
. The district court referred to AFR 30-1(9) as vague, but defined that what it meant in that context was that "by reason of such vagueness [it became] overly broad in [its] application." 364 F.Supp. at 633 n. 12 (citation omitted). The discussion infra adequately disposes of that holding. The court also held that the operative language of AFR 35-15, "morale", "loyalty", and "discipline" are also ambiguous and vague. Id. at 633, 639-40. However, as we noted above, the district court opinion issued before the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). We think Parker adequately disposes of the vagueness issue, at least in the combat zone context, and that, for similar reasons as we set out above for overbreadth, we need not reach the question in other contexts.
. The Government urges us to dismiss the case as moot. Clearly, Carlson may contest the propriety of his arrest as collateral consequences may as yet flow from the record-keeping emanating from it. See United States v. Battle, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 397, 510 F.2d 776, 777 (1975); Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 478 F.2d 938, 962, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 51-55, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). We must also agree with the district court that the alleged constitutional violations (albeit not in identical circumstances) "are capable of being repeated as long as the challenged regulations remained in force. This situation appears to fit neatly into the category of cases which present questions 'capable of repetition yet evading review.' " 364 F.Supp. at 630, citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1964). Our conclusion is buttressed by our realization that if we found that the regulations as applied violated the first amendment, there was a substantial possibility that the regulations were facially invalid because of their overbreadth.