Case: James Filor, et al., Appellants, v. The United States, Appellees
Abbreviation: Filor v. United States
Decision Date: 1871-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 7 Ct. Cl. 119
Volume: 7
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: James Filor, et al., Appellants, v. The United States, Appellees.
Judges: 
Pages: 119–121

Head Matter:
(3 Court of Claims, p. 25; 9 Wallace R., p. 45.)
James Filor, et al., Appellants, v. The United States, Appellees.
On the claimants' Appeal.
•On the 21st May, 1861, Tift, a citizen of Florida, appoints Ms brother Ms attorney, with poxoer to sell real estate, and goes xoithin the Confederate lines to aid the rebellion. The agent sells the property at Key West, in December, 1861, to the claimants, residents at Key West. They give their notes for the purchase-money, which, are held by the agent until the end of the war. On the lZth January, 1862, the commanding officer at Key West orders that the property “ be taken possession of for tbe use of tbe Quartermaster Department.” On the2ilh Janxiary the claimants enter into an agreement to lease the property to the guax'termastw. The eommaxidmg officer approves this lease and “ cancels” .his previous order. The Government remains in possession for five years. No rent is ever paid, nor does the Qnax'termaster-General ever approve the lease. The action is brought to recover the agreed rent. The Court of Claims decides that the deed from the agent to the claimants was between enemies and void, axid that the defendants’ officers had xio authority to bind the Government upon a lease of realty, where the title to the property xvas xmlaxvfully acquired, in violation of the law of nations and thepxibliapolicy of the United States. Judgment for the defendants. The claimants appeal.
X No lease of premises for tbe use of tbe Quartermaster Department is binding upon the Government until approved by tbe Quartermaster-General.
II. Tbe premises of a loyal citizen within an insurrectionary State must be deemed to have been " appropx-iated” by tbe army engaged in tbe suppression of tbe rebellion, and not to have been acquired by contract, where tbe lease was executed by a quartermaster, with tbe approval of tbe commanding officer of tbe post, but without tbe approval of tbe Quartermaster-General. In such a case tbe lessor is without judicial redress, even though tbe Government retained possession under tbe lease for five years before tbe Quartermaster-General disapproved of it.
■III. Tbe term “appx’opriation” in tbe Act ith July, 1864, (13 Stat. D.,p. 381,) is of tbe broadest import, including all taking and use of property by tbe Army and Navy, permanent or temporary, with or against tbe consent of tbe owner, resulting in destruction or mere injury, and extending to all cases where tbe right to tbe property is not obtained by valid contract.
Mr. Thomas Wilson for tbe appellants.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Talbot (with whom was the Attorney-General) for the United States.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Field
delivered tire opinion of the court:
The determination of this case does not depend upon the validity or invalidity of the title of the petitioners to the property in question. The difficulty with their claim does not arise, as the court below appears to have considered, solely from the-supposed invalidity of their title.' There is a difficulty from another quarter. We do not find in any legislation of the Army, or in any act of Congress, that the acting assistant quartermaster at Key West was invested with any power to-bind the United States to the agreement or lease produced, even though his action was taken by direction of the military commander at that station, and the instrument was approved by him. No lease of premises for the use of the Quartermaster's Department, or any branch of it, could be binding upon the Government until approved by the Quartermaster-General. Until such approval the action of the officers at Key West was as ineffectual to fix any liability upon the Government as if they had been entirely disconnected from the public service. The agreement or lease was, so far as the Government is concerned, the work of strangers. The obligation of Government for the use of the property is exactly what it would have been if the possession had been taken and held without the existence of the agreement. Any obligation of that character cannot be considered by the Court of Claims. The jurisdiction of that court, says the act of Congress of July 4th, 1864, u shall not extend to, or include any claim against the United States, growing out of the destruction or appropriation of, or damage to, property by the Army or Navy, or any part of the Army or Navy engaged in the suppression of the rebellion, from the commencement to the close thereof." — (13 Stat., 381.) The premises of the iietitioners were thus appropriated by a portion of the Army. It matters not that the petitioners, supposing that the officers at Key West could bind the Government to pay a stipulated rent for the premises, consented to such appropriation. The manner of the appropriation, whether made by force or upon the consent of the owner, does not affect the question of jurisdiction. The consideration of any claim, whatever its character, growing out of such appropriation, is excluded. The term " appropriation" is of the broadest import: it includes all taking and use of property by th'e Army or Navy, in the course of the war, not authorized by contract with the Gov- eminent. The use may be permanent or temporary, and it may result in tbe destruction of or the mere injury to the property. If the right to the property, or to its use, is not obtained by valid contract with the Government, the taking or use of it is an appropriation of it within the meaning of the act of Congress.
The learned counsel of the petitioners is correct in stating that leasing and appropriation are different acts, but he errs when he assumes that the instrument in this case has any greater validity as the act of the Government than if it had been signed by himself.
The doctrine of estoppel, which the counsel invokes, has no application. There is no place where the doctrine can come in. The officers at Key West did not represent the United States, except in their military capacity, though assuming to do so. In signing the agreement, and in taking possession of the premises claimed by the petitioners, they acted on their own responsibility. Their unauthorized acts cannot estop the Government from insisting upon their invalidity, however beneficial they may have proved to the United States. If the petitioners are entitled to compensation for the use of the property they must seek it from Congress. The Court of Claims can award them none.
Judgment aeeirMed.