Case: MACHINERY AND METALS SALES COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
Abbreviation: Machinery & Metals Sales Co. v. United States
Decision Date: 1922-04-03
Docket Number: No. 34446
Citation: 57 Ct. Cl. 197
Volume: 57
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: MACHINERY AND METALS SALES COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: Graham, Judge.; Downev, Judge/ Booth, Judge; and Campbell, Chief Justice, concur.
Pages: 197–200

Head Matter:
MACHINERY AND METALS SALES COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 34446.
Decided April 3, 1922.]
On the Proofs.
Contract; implied promise; jurisdiction. — Where a company engaged-in the exportation of caustic soda is accused by a committee of the War Trade Board of a number of violations of the rules and regulations of said board adopted in pursuance of law,. ' and afterwards enters into an unauthorized contract with a United States district attorney to pay the United States $100,000, and at the time of the execution of said contract pays $10,000 as the first payment of said amount, and there is no-provision in said contract for refunding such payment, there can be no implied promise on the part of the Government to-refund such money, and an action can not be maintained in. the Court of Claims for its recovery.
The Reporter's statement of the case:
Mr. William E. Humphrey for the plaintiff. Mr. William C. Prentiss was on the briefs.
Mr. Fred K. Dyar, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Lovett, for the defendant.
The following are the facts of the case as found by the. court:
I. The plaintiff, the Machinery & Metals Sales Company,, a corporation, which sues to the use of Maurice C. L. Shaine, duly appointed receiver thereof, was organized and existed under the laws Of the State of Massachusetts, and was engaged prior to October 25, 1918, in the exportation of caustic soda from the United States. Exportation of caustic soda was regulated by rules adopted by the War Trade Board, which issued licenses for the exporting of caustic soda. These rules were authorized by the act of Congress of June 15, 191T, and by the act of Congress of October 6,' 1917, and by the proclamation of the President of the United States of November 28, 1917, and the Executive order of said President dated October 12, 1917.
II. In the course of the business of exporting caustic soda the plaintiff made, through its president, certain representations as to the amount of its previous exports of caustic soda. The violations committee of the War Trade Board alleged that the plaintiff had committed thirty-eight violations of the law.
III. On or about October 25, 1918, subsequent to said alleged violations of the law, the president of the plaintiff corporation entered into a contract in writing with John E. Laskey, attorney of the United States in and for the District of Columbia, which contract provided for the payment by the plaintiff to the United States of the sum of $100,000, a copy of which contract is filed as Exhibit A with the petition of the plaintiff and is made a part hereof by reference. This contract was not submitted to Or approved by the Secretary of the Treasury.
IV. At the time of the execution of said contract, to wit, on October 25, 1918, there was delivered to John E. Laskey, United States attorney as aforesaid, by the president of the plaintiff corporation, a check for $10,000 signed by the vice president of said corporation, and representing the initial payment, of $10,000 provided for in the contract aforesaid, a copy of which check is filed as Exhibit B with the petition of the plaintiff and is made a part hereof by reference. The check was sent to the solicitor of the Treasury by the United States attorney for the District of Columbia, and by said solicitor covered into the Treasury of the United States. The said check was collected by the United States and the proceeds thereof on or about November 9,1918, covered into the Treasury of the United States.
Appealed.

Opinion:
Hay, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff brings this action to recover the sum of $10,000 which it paid into the Treasury of the United States under the circumstances set out in the findings of fact.
The plaintiff asserts as the basis for its right of action that the contract which it entered into with the United States district attorney was without consideration^ and that the money which it paid into the Treasury was received and is still held by the United States to the use of the plaintiff, and may be recovered back by it; and the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this suit is based by the plaintiff upon an implied contract on the part of the United States to repay the money which the plaintiff has paid into the Treasury.
The question is, Has this court jurisdiction to entertain this suit, which is brought by the plaintiff to recover money which it has voluntarily paid into the Treasury of the United States? Whether this money was paid through mistake of law, or under duress exercised against the plaintiff by the United States officers, or in consequence of the unauthorized acts of the officers of the Government, this court has no jurisdiction.
The Government can not be held liable to individuals for the unauthorized exercises of power by its officers and agents.
If the plaintiff paid its money into the Treasury of the United States in the belief that it was making such payment by virtue of the authority exercised by the Government's officer or officers in making the contract above cited, and that it made a mistake in so doing, yet this court can give no relief. For ignorance of law will not excuse any mistake, and the plaintiff was bound to take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity.
It is not possible to imply a contract to repay money when it. is sought to base such implication upon a written contract which sets out fully the terms under which the money is paid, and which precludes the idea of repayment.
There may be an apparent hardship in this case, as there are in many cases, but what may be a hardship does not authorize the court to stretch its jurisdiction to meet such cases. The jurisdiction exercised by this court is unusual, and being so, it is necessary, in its exercise, that the court should not undertake to give a remedy which Congress has not provided.
The petition is dismissed.
Graham, Judge.; Downev, Judge/ Booth, Judge; and Campbell, Chief Justice, concur.