Case: Armitz Brown v. United States
Abbreviation: Brown v. United States
Decision Date: 1814-03-02
Docket Number: 
Citation: 8 Cranch 110
Volume: 12
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: Armitz Brown v. United States.
Judges: (Present, all the judges.)
Pages: 71–99

Head Matter:
Armitz Brown v. United States.
Confiscation of enemy's property.
British property, found in the United States, on land, at the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain, cannot be condemned as enemy’s propei’ty, without a legislative act, authorizing its confiscation. The act of the legislature declaring war, is not snch an act.
Timber, floated into a salt-water creek, where the tide ebbs and flows, leaving the ends of the timber resting on the mud, at low water, and prevented from floating away at high water by booms, is to be considered as landed.
The Cargo of The Emulous, 1 Gallis. 662, reversed.
This was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, which condemned 550 tons of pine timber, claimed by Armitz Brown, the appellant.
D. Davis, for the appellant.
This is an appeal from the circuit court of Massachusetts, in which court, the property, consisting of about 550 tons of pine timber, twelve thousand staves, and eighteen tons of lathwood, were condemned. The libel states, that this cargo was loaded on board the Emulous, at Savannah, April 9th, 1812 ; that the cargo belonged to British subjects ; that the ship departed for Plymouth, in England, April 18th, in the same year, and put into New Bedford for repairs ; and that the cargo was there unladen, and remained there, until seized by Delano, as well on his own behalf, as on behalf of the United States. As to some of the allegations in the libel, there is no evidence whatever to support them ; the ship never departed for Plymouth, never put into New Bedford for repairs. The facts are these :
The property in question was the cargo of the American ship Emulous, and was seized as enemy’s property, about the 5th of April 1813, nearly a year after the same had been discharged from the ship. From the transcript in the case, it appears, that the Emulous was owned by John Delano and others, citizens of the United States ; that in February 1812, the owners, by their *agent, chartered the ship to Elijah Brown, as agent for Chris- «... topher Ide, Brothers & Co., and James Brown, British merchants ; *- that by the charter-party, the ship was to proceed from Charleston, South Carolina, where she then lay, to Savannah, and there take on board a cargo of lumber, at a certain freight, stipulated in the charter-party, and proceed with the same to Plymouth, in England, to unload there, or at any other of his Britannic majesty’s dock-yards in England. The ship proceeded to Savannah, took on‘board the cargo mentioned in the libel, and was there stopped by the embargo of the 4th of April 1812. On the 25th of the same month of April, it was agreed between the master of the ship and the agent of the shippers, that the ship should proceed to New Bedford, where she was owned, with the cargo, and remain there, without prejudice to the charter-party ; which agreement is indorsed upon the back of the charter-party. The ship accordingly proceeded to New Bedford, and remained there until the latter part of May following, when the cargo was finally unladen and discharged from the ship. The staves and lathwood were landed and put on a wharf. The timber was put into a salt-water creek, which is not navigable, but where the tide ebbs and flows, and where the timber remained for safe-keeping until the time of the seizure. The timber was secured in this creek by booms extended across the entrance thereof, and fastened by stakes driven into the flats. On the 7th of November 1812, the property was sold to the claimant by E. Brown, the agent, in pursuance of the authority which he had for that purpose, as agent of the shippers, and in pursuance of the advice of Delano, who afterwards seized it, in the manner and for the purposes stated in the libel. This sale, the appellant contends, was made bond fide, for a valuable consideration, which has since been paid, and after notice thereof given to Delano, in whose possession the property then was. The seizure was not made until five months after the property had been sold to the present claimant, and nearly twelve months after it was discharged from the ship. The claimant, it is admitted, is a citizen of the United States. E. Brown, the agent, by whom the property was sold, is a citizen of the United States, and James Brown, one of the owners of the cargo, is also a citizen of the United States, but resides in London and carries on trade and commerce in that city.
*Upon these facts, the principal point which will be contended for by the counsel for the claimants is, that this property wa$ lawfully acquired, before the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain; and that, it being found here at the time of the breaking out of the war, under the faith of the government, it is not, by the modern law of nations, nor by any law of the United States, liable to confiscation.
This question ought not to be decided upon the rigorous jmnciples and the ancient practice of the law' of nations ; but according to the mitigated law o ’ war, sanctioned by modern usage in civilized nations : for when the government of the United States was organized and finally established, it was not only its true policy, but its duty, “ to receive the law of nations in its modern state of purity and refinementper Judge Wilson, in the case o£ Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 281. It is contended by the counsel for the claimant in this case, that the principle and the usage adopted and sanctioned by the modern law of nations, is this, “that enemy’s property, found in this country at the breaking out of a war, is not liable to confiscation.” A different practice, said to have prevailed in Great Britain with regard tc property in this situation, found afloat in their ports and harbors, will be hereafter considered.
The rule of the law of nations applicable to this case, is found in Yattel, p. 477. Ilis words are, “The sovereign declaring war, can neither detain the persons nor the property of those subjects of the enemy Avho are within his dominions at the time of the declaration. They came into his country under the public faith. By permitting them to enter and reside in his territories, he tacitly promised them full liberty and security for their return. He is, therefore, bound to allow them a reasonable time for withdrawing with their effects ; and if they stay beyond the time prescribed, he has a right to treat them as enemies, though as enemies unarmed. But if they are detained by an insurmountable impediment, as by sickness, he must, necessarily, and for the same reason, grant them a sufficient extension of the term.” In order to show the humane and liberal spirit with which the above rule is adopted by sovereigns *in modern times, the same author adds, ' J “At present, so far from being wanting in this duty, sovereigns carry their attention to humanity still further; so that foreigners who are subjects of the state against which war is declared, are frequently allowed full time for the settlement of their affairs.”
Are not these just and equitable rules of the modern law of nations of authority in the judicial courts of the United States? Upon what principle or policy, are they to be rejected, and those of an age, dark, and even barbarious in comparison with the present, adopted in their stead ? Does it comport with the interest and character of this government, to reject principles and usages, calculated to ameliorate and mitigate the state of war and to promote the interest of commerce, which it appears have been cheerfully adopted by all the monarchies of Europe ? The contract which was entered into by the agents of the parties in this case, was made upon the presumption that, in case of war, the property would be safe. This presumption arose from the uniform practice, in similar cases, in all countries upon which the law of nations is binding.
It has been suggested, that this rule in Yattel is applicable only to such persons as may. happen to be in the country at the time of the declaration of war. Such, indeed, is the letter of the rule: but when there is the same reason, there is the same law ; and no good reason can be assigned, why the property of an absent owner should not be protected, as well as that of those who may happen to be resident in the country declaring war. In addition to this, it may be observed, that the owners of this property were, in law, present, during the whole negotiation relative to this cargo, by their agent, E. Brown, by whom it was purchased, and who had the whole care and charge of it, at the time that war was declared.
If the coi’rectness or authority of Yattel should be questioned, he will be found to be supported by other writers of high character. In Chitty’s Law of Nations, p. 67, it is-thus written : “ In strict justice, the right of seizure can take effect *only on those possessions of the belligerent, which have come to the hands of his adversary, after the declaration of war.” And again, in p. 80, “ Such appears to be, at present, the law and practice of civilized nations, with respect to hostile property found within their dominions at the breaking out of war.” These opinions are not only fairly collected from modern writers upon the law of nations, but are entitled to particular respect as coming from a man of high character for his professional talents and legal science ; and who has done and written more to improve and reduce to system the common law of England, than any other writer upon that subject for the last thirty years.
The principles and practice of the modern law of nations here advocated,' will also be found conformable to the common law. In Magna Charta, that venerable foundation of English law and liberty, it is provided, that merchant strangers, in the realm of England, at the beginning of a war, shall be protected from harm in body and goods, until it shall be made known to the high authorities of the-nation, how British merchants should be treated in the enemy’s country, and they were to be dealt with according to such treatment. Magna Charta, chap. 30. These provisions are commented upon, and emphatically eulogised by Montesquieu, vol. 2, p. 12.
Of similar character were the provisions of an ancient English statute, passed 27 Edw. III., stat. 2, c. 17, in which it is enacted, “ that in case of war, merchants shall not be sent suddenly out of the kingdom, but may go ■ out of the kingdom freely, with their goods, within forty days, and shall not be in anything hindered or disturbed in their passage, or to make profit of their merchandise, if they wish to sell them ; or, if in default of wind or ship, or any other adverse cause, they cannot go, they shall have other forty days, within which time they shall pass with their merchandise, or sell the same as before.”
It is respectfully contended, that no actor measure of the American government has ever indicated a disposition adverse to those humane and liberal provisions and usages of the common law, and of the law of nations. On the contrary, so far as the disposition and policy of *the govern- „ ■ ment may be discerned by implication, it has manifested its entire L aequiescence in, and its readiness to adopt them upon all proper occasions. The spirit and disposition of the government upon this subject, is apparent from the provisions in (I believe it may be said) every treaty which has been entered into since the establishment of the government. Articles for the protection and removal of the property of enemies found in this country at the breaking out of a war, are found in our treaties with France, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Prussia, Morocco, England and Algiers. It will not be contended, that the provisions of these treaties, especially that with England, can be binding, when the treaties themselves are not in force ; but the uniform practice of those governments, in agreeing to these provisions, is evidence of the highest nature, that the government of the United States have adopted, and mean to adhere to the modern law ..of nations in this respect; that it approves the liberality of the modern usages, and rejects, and, I hope, I may add, abhors the rigorous rules and contracted principles of the ancient jurists ; that the spirit of the government, and the character of its policy, is to che’.ish and carry into practice every principle and every custom and usage, which is found favorable to commerce, and which will mitigate the evils incident to a state of war.
In the proceedings and measures of the government, since the war, there can be found no expression of its will, that property in the situation of this cargo, should be confiscated or claimed for the use of the government; on the contrary, there are indications of another and more benign complexion. By the act of July 6th, 1812, § 6, the president was authorized, within six months from the date of the act, “ to give passports for the safe transportation of any ship or property belonging to British subjects, then within the limits of the United States.” Nothing, therefore, can be more clear, than that it was not the wish or intention of government, to claim or confiscate property, belonging to the enemy, then in the United States. If such had been its policy, instead of the liberal provisions of this statute, px-ovision would have been made in this statute, or in the act declaring wax-, not ^ , only expx-essive *of the public will upon this subject, but expx-essly J declaring British property then within the United States liable to confiscation.
By the provisions of this statute, it is apparent, that if this pi’operty had been on board a British ship, or if a British ship had been found in which to transport it, it would have come directly within the authority of the president, as to its safe transportation. Surely, then, it could never have been the intention of congress to have it confiscated, upon the ground that it had been lawfully on board an American ship, in the regular course of trade, was there arrested by the embax-go, and then, for the convenience of all parties, discharged from the ship, and placed in a proper situation for safekeeping, to abide the events of the embargo and the wax’.
The court will also notice, that, previous to the expix’ation of the six months allowed by the act of congx-ess, above quoted, for the exportation of British property, this cax-go had been sold, with the knowledge and approbation of the libellant. This transfer having been made bona fide, eonfen-ed other and new rights upon a thix-d party, viz., the present claimant. The principle quoted and relied upon, that that tx-ansfer was void, upon the ground that it was made by an alien enemy, in time of war, was px-obably never contemplated or known by the parties to the contract; and this may furnish a satisfactox-y, though, perhaps, not stx-ictly a legal reason, why this property was not exported under the president’s passport. At any x-ate, if the court should be satisfied, that this property is not liable to confiscation, either by the law of nations, or by any act of congress, they will not tx-ouble themselves about the effect of the transfer, but leave the parties intex-ested to settle that matter among themselves.
Before the coxxrt will condemn this propex-ty, they will search for some proof of a decided intention, on the part of the govex-nment, that such property should be confiscated. It appears, that all the acts of congress, so far as they can be intex-preted with x*eference to this question, manifest a con- * trary spirit. The act declaring *war, speaks no language advex-se to ■* the claim of the appellant. The prize act of the 26th of June 1812, does not even glance at property in this situation. Will the coux-t assume the power, by implication, to condemn the property ; and this, too, against the most explicit declarations of the public will, so far as they can be collected from measures of an analogous nature ? Why is this case singled out ?
Why do not the district-attorneys enter the warehouses in the numerous sea-perts, and hunt for booty of this description ? Such a proceeding would be as legal and as liberal as the present, though, probably, attended with serious mischief to the country, if retaliatory proceedings and measures should be adopted by the enemy ; for it is a well-known fact, that the amount of American property in England,' at the commencement of the war, was immensely greater than that of English property in America at the same period.
It was stated, in the argument below, that the question relative to the confiscation of debts, or choses in action, is illustrative of that which relates to the confiscation of goods. The modern usage and law of nations, and of our own country, relative to the confiscation of debts, are equally favorable to the claimant'in this case'
In the first place, it is distinctly denied, that there exists any power to confiscate the private debts of the enemy, excepting by a positive act of congress. What figure would the attorney of the United States make, with a libel in the judicial courts, praying for a confiscation of a private debt ? The exclusive right of this kind of confiscation, and even of goods, is in the legislature ; per Chase, Justice, in the case of Ware v. Hylton, S Dall. 281. The question which has been discussed by the writers upon the law of nations, is, whether it be lawful for the sovereign thus to confiscate. And although it is admitted that he may do it, yet, “ in regard to the safety of commerce, all the sovereigns of Europe have departed from this rigor ; and as this custom has been generally received, he who would act contrary to it, would injure the public faith ; for strangers trusted his subjects upon the presumption that the general custom would prevail.” Yattel, lib. 3, ch. 5, § 77. *The laws and customs of the United States ought to be so p-jig expounded as to conform to the modern law of nations, which is L adverse to the confiscating of debts. Indeed, the confiscation of debts has become disreputable ; and it has been feelingly observed by a late learned judge of this court, that “ not a single confiscation of this kind stained the code of any European power engaged in the war which our revolution produced.” 3 Dal;. 281.
It will be admitted, that the question relative io the confiscation of debts, or choses in action, is illustrative of the question relative to the confiscation of the private property of an enemy, found here under the faith of government, at the breaking out of the war. Indeed, the law and practice is, and ought to be, the same in both cases ; and until a law of congress shall be produced, confiscating property of this description, the judicial courts will not only proceed to do it, with great reluctance, but will never assume an authority of that kind, unless furnished with it by a legislative act, any more than in the confiscation of a private debt. In addition to all this, it seems to be now perfectly settled by the modern law and practice of nations, that debts are never to be confiscated ; that it has become a disgraceful act in any government that does it; that these debts are suspended, and the right to recover them necessarily taken away by the war; but that upon the return of peace, the debts are revived, and the right to recover them perfectly restored.
The condemnation of this property is demanded upon the ground that the embargo of the 4th of April 1812, arrested and detained it, until the act of congress took place declaring war; and that that act had a retroactive effect, and justifies the condemnation of this property. But to this it is answered, the embargo of the 4th of April' was not a hostile, but a civil embargo ; and no such construction was ever given to an embargo, not of a hostile character. That this embargo was not of this character is most manifest, from this, that express provision was made for the departure of any foreign ships or vessels, either in ballast or with the goods, wares and merchandise, on board of such foreign ship or vessel, when notified of the act. It was, therefore, the *being laden on board a vessel of the United States, that prevented the departure of this property. If it had been on board a foreign, even a British, ship, it would not have been detained. That it was actually laden on board, at the time of the notice of the embargo, manifestly appears from the record. This, it is conceived, is a sufficient answer to the claim of tbe government to this property, upon the ground, that it was stopped by the embargo, and liable to confiscation by the retroactive operation of the act of congress declaring war. The authorities in support of the principles here contended for, respecting the difference between hostile and civil embargoes, must be familiar to the coin-t, and need not be cited.
But the practice of the British government is relied upon, as a rule by which the court are to be governed in the present case. It is admitted, that the English courts of admiralty have condemned vessels detained in port by an embargo, and found there at the breaking out of hostilities : but it is explicity denied that they have ever condemned property found on land, in that situation. 1 Rob. 228.
If, however, the English courts of admiralty have done wrong, and proceeded against the modern law of nations in these cases, this honorable court will not, for that reason, adopt so unjust a practice. The condemnation of property, arrested in the ports of Great Britain by an embargo, to which a hostile character is afterwards given by a subsequent declaration of war, appears to be a departure from the modern usages of nations, and cannot be justified by or reconciled with the spirit of those usages. But as they have never condemned property in this situation, except such has been found not only afloat, but in vessels detained in their ports by an embargo, their decisions can form no precedent in this case ; for the property which is the subject of this prosecution, was either on land, or in such a situation as that it could not be the subject upon which an embargo could operate ; or, in other words, the staves and lathwood were literally on the land ; and the pine timber so discharged from the ship, and so deposited, as to be entitled to the same protection as if actually landed and stored.
*The rule adopted in the English court of admiralty, as laid down in 2 Rob. 211, is this : “All vessels detained in port, and found there, at the breaking out of hostilities, are condemned, jure coronce, to the king ; and all coming in, after hostilities, not voluntarily by revolt, but ignorant of the war, are condemned as droits of admiralty. This rule, both in its import and application, has been adopted, it is conceived, only in cases of vessels and their cargoes found in the ports of Great Britain. There can be no reason for their application in this country, to property found on the land, or to property although water-borne yet, in the same situation, in reason and in fact, as if found literally on land.
Of this description is the property in question. By referring to the record, particularly the depositions of E. Brown and of Silas Allen, the condition of this property, from the time it was discharged from the ship to the time it was seized by Delano, may be learned, from whence it will appear, that the allegation in the libel, that the property was on the high seas, is wholly without foundation. The staves and lathwood were landed and on a wharf. With respect to these, there can be no doubt. The timber was discharged from the ship, in the month of May, previous to the declax-ation of war ; it is of such description that it did not admit of being stored ; it would have been injured by lying on the land ; and the only place proper to keep it in was the one selected, a creek, or small cove, where the tide ebbs and flows, but which was not navigable even for boats or scows ; for it seems it was necessary to clear it oxxt to admit a scow into it. Moreover, it was necessary to secure the entrance of this creek by booms or timber laid acx-oss its mouth, fastened by piles or stakes dx-iven into the flats. This timber' was thus secux-ed and stored in the usxxal way in which property of this description is managed ; and was, to all intents and pux-poses, as much lodged and impounded in this place, xxnder a bailment, and in civil hands (1 Rob. 228), asif .it had been in a ship-yard. It must, therefore, be a gx-eat stretch of power and prerogative, to extend the reason of the practice of Great Britain in condemning propex-ty foixnd in its harbox-s and on board vessels, to propei’ty in the situation of that in questioxx : and unless the practice of Great Bx-itaiu has extended to the seizure *and condemnation of enemies’ property foixnd on land, at the time of break- *- ing out of hostilities, no sanction can be derived from her practice in favor of the confiscation of this px:operty.
The case, was sxxbmitted by the Attorney- General, upon the argument contained in the opinion of the honorable Judge Story, in the circuit court, which came up in the transcript of the record.
Wednesday, March 2d, 1814.
(Present, all the judges.)
Conrad v. Waples, 96 U. S. 279.

Opinion:
Marshall, Ch. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court, as follows : — The matei-ial facts in this case are- these :
The Emulous, owned by John Delano and others, citizens of the United States, was chartered to a company can-ying on tx-ade in Great Britain, one of whom was an American citizen, for the pux-pose of carrying a cax-go from Savannah to Plymouth. After the cargo was put on boax-d, the vessel was stopped in port by the embax-go of the 4th of April 1812. On the 25th of the same month, it was agreed between the master of the ship and the agexxt of the shippers, that she should proceed with her cargo to New Bedford, whex-e her owners resided, and remain there, without prejudice to the charter-party. In pux-suance of this agreement, the Emulous proceeded to New Bedfox-d, where she continued until after the declaration of wax'. In October or Novembex-, the ship ivas unloaded, and the cargo, except the pine timbex-, was landed. The pine timber was floated up a salt-water creek, where, at low tide, the ends of the timber rested on the mud, whex-e it was secure I fx-om floating out with the tide, by impediments fastened in the entx'ance of the creek. On the Vth of November 1812, the cax-go was sold by the agent of the owners, who is an American citizen, to the clainant, who is also an American citizen. On the 19th of April, a libel was filed by the attorney for the United States, in the district court of Massachusetts, against the said cargo, as well on behalf of the United States of America as for and in behalf of John Delano and of all other persons concerned. It does not *1221 aPPear ^hat this seizure was made under any instructions from the J president of the United States ; nor is there any evidence of its having his sanction, unless the libels being filed and prosecuted by the law-officer who represents the government, must imply that sanction. On the contrary, it is admitted, that the seizure was made by an individual, and the libel filed at his instance, by the district-attorney, who acted from his own impressions of what appertained to his duty. The property was claimed by Armitz Brown, under the purchase made in the preceding November.
The district court dismissed the libel. The circuit court reversed this sentence, and condemned the pine timber, as enemy property, forfeited to the United States. From the sentence of the circuit court, the claimant aj>pealed to this court.
The material question made at bar is this : Can the pine timber, even admitting the property not to be changed by the sale in November, be condemned as prize of war ?
The cargo of the Emulous having been legally acquired and put on board the vessel, having been detained by an embargo, not intended to act on foreign property, the vessel having sailed before the war, from Savannah, under a stipulation to reland the cargo in some port of the United States, the re-landing having been made with respect to the residue of the cargo, and the pine timber having been floated into shallow water, where it was secured and in the custody of the owner of the ship, an American citizen, the court cannot perceive any solid distinction, so far as respects confiscation, between this property and other British property found on land at the commencement of hostilities. It will, therefore, be considered as a question relating to such property generally, and to be governed by the same rule.
Respecting the power of government, no doubt is entertained. That war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded. The mitigations *1231 *0^ ^is rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times -* has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right itself. That remains undiminished, and when the sovereign authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will shall be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the court.
The questions to be decided by the court are : 1st. May enemy's property, found on land at the commencement of hostilites, be seized and condemned as a necessary consequence of the declaration of war ? 2d. Is there any legislative act which authorizes such seizure and condemnation ?
Since, in this country, from the structure of our government, proceedings to condemn the property of an enemy, found within our territory at the declaration' of war, can be sustained only upon the principle 'that they are instituted in execution of some existing law, we are led to ask — Is the declaration of war such a law ? Does that declaration, by its own operation, so vest the property of the enemy in the government, as to support proceedings for its seizure and confiscation, or does it vest only a right, the assertion of which depends on the will of the sovereign power?
[*124 The universal practice of forbearing to seize and confiscate detts and credits, the principle universally received, that the right to them revives on the restoration of peace, would seem to prove that war is not an absolute confiscation of this property, but simply confers the right of confiscation. Between debts contracted under the faith of laws, and property acquired in the course of trade, on the faith of the same laws, reason draws no distinction ; and although, in practice, vessels, with their cargoes, found in port, at the declaration of war, may have been seized, it is not believed, that modern usage would sanction the seizure of the goods of an enemy on land, which *were acquired in peace, in the course of trade. Such a proceeding is rare, and would be deemed a harsh exercise of the rights of war. But although the practice in this respect may not be uniform, that circumstance does not essentially affect the question. The inquiry is, whether such property vests in the sovereign, by the mere declaration of war, or remains subject to a right of confiscation, the exercise of which depends on the national will: and the rule which apjfiies to one case, so far as respects the operation of a declaration of war on the thing itself, must apply to all others over which war gives an equal right. The right of the sovereign to confiscate debts being precisely the same with the right to confiscate other property found in the country, the operation of a declaration of war on debts and on other property found within the country must be the same. What then is this operation ? -
Even 'Bynkershoek, who maintains the broad principle, that in war everyr thing done against an enemy is lawful ; that he may be destroyed, though unarmed and defenceless ; that fraud, or even poison, may be employed against him ; that a most unlimited right is acquired to his person and property ; admits that war does not transfer to the sovereign a debt due to his enemy ; and therefore, if payment of such debt be not exacted, peace revives the former right of the creditor ; " because," he says, " the occupation which is had by war consists more in fact than in law." He adds to his observations on this subject, " let it not, however, be supposed, that it is only true of actions, that they are not condemned ipso jure, for other things also belonging to the enemy may be concealed and escape condemnation."
Yattel says, that " the sovereign can neither detain the persons nor the property of thoge subjects of the enemy who are within his dominions at the time of the declaration." It is true, that this rule is, in terms, applied by Yattel to the property of those only who are personally within the territory at the commencement of hostilities ; but it applies equally to things in action and to things in possession ; and if war did, of itself, without any further exercise of the sovereign will, vest the property of the *enemy in the ^ sovereign, his presence could not exempt it from this operation of *• war. Nor can a reason be perceived, for maintaining that the public faith is more entirely pledged for the security of property trusted in the territory of the nation in time of peace, if it be accompanied by its owner, than if it be confided to the care of others.
Chitty, after stating the general right of seizure, says, " But, in strict justice, that right can take effect only on those possessions of a belligerent which have come to the hands of his adversary after the declaration of hostilities." The modern rule, then, would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an enemy and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confiscated ; and in almost every commercial treaty, an article is inserted stipulating for the right to withdraw such property. This rule appears to be totally incompatible Avith the idea, that war does of itself vest the property in the belligerent government. It may bo considered as the opinion of all who have written on the/ms belli, that war gives the right to confiscate, but does not itself confiscate the property of the enemy ; and their rules go to the exercise of this right.
The constitution of the United States was framed at a time when this rule, introduced by commerce in favor of moderation and humanity, was received throughout the civilized Avorld. In expounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted, which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country, it does not possess elsewhere, and which would fetter that exercise of entire discretion respecting enemy property, which may enable the government to_ apply to the enemy the rule that he applies to us.
*126] If we look to the constitution itself, Ave find this general reasoning much strengthened by the words of that instrument. That the declaration of war has only the effect of ^placing the two nations in a state of hostility, of producing a state of war, of giving those rights which war confers ; but not of operating, by its own force, any of those results, such as a transfer of property, which are usually produced by ulterior measures of government, is fairly dcducible from the enumeration of powers which accompanies that of declaring war. " Congress shall have power " " to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." It would be restraining this clause Avithin narrower limits than the Avords themselves import, to say, that the power to make rules concerning captures on land and water, is to be confined to captures Avhich are extra-territorial. If it extends to rules respecting enemy property found within the territory, then Ave perceive an express grant to congress of the power in question, as an independent substantive power, not included in that of declaring war.
The acts of congress furnish many instances of an opinion that the declaration of war does not, of itself, authorize proceedings against the persons or property of the enemy found, at the time, Avithin the tenitory. War gives an equal right over persons and property : and if its declaration is not considered as prescribing a law respecting the person of an enemy found in our country, neither does it prescribe a laAV for his property. The act concerning alien enemies, which confers on the president very great discretionary powers respecting their persons, affords a strong implication that he did not possess those poAvers by virtue of the declaration of war. The " act for the safe keeping and accommodation of prisoners of war," is of the same character. The act prohibiting trade with the enemy, contains this clause : "And be it further enacted, that the president of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to give, at any time within six months after the passage *of this act, passports for the safe transportation of any -* ship or other property belonging to British subjects, and which is now Avithin the limits ob the United States." The phraseology of this law shows that the property of a British subject was not considered by the legislature as being vested in the United States by the declaration of war ; and the authority which the act confers on the president, is manifestly considered as one which he did not previously possess.
The proposition that a declaration of war does not, in itself, enact a confiscation of the property of the enemy, within the territorry of the belligerent, is believed to be entirely free from doubt. Is there in the act of congress, by which war is declared against Great Britain, any expression which would indicate such an intention ? That act, after placing the two nations in a state of war, authorizes the president of the United States to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the Avar into effect, and " to issue to private armed vessels of the United States, commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal against tire Aressels, goods and effects of the government of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the subjects thereof." That reprisals may be made on enemy property found within the United States at the declaration of war, if such be the will of the nation, has been admitted ; but it is not admitted, that in the declaration of Avar, the nation has expressed its will to that effect.
It cannot be necessary to employ argument in showing that when the attorney for the United States institutes proceedings at laAV for the confiscation of enemy property found on land, or floating in one of our creeks, in the care and custody of one of our citizens, he is not acting under the authority of letters of marque and reprisal, still less under the authority of such letters issued to a private armed vessel *The "act concerning r*,2o letters of marque, prizes and prize goods," certainly contains noth- *- ing to authorize this seizure.
There being no other act of congress which bears upon the subject, it is considered as proved, that the legislature has not confiscated enemy property, which was within the United States at the declaration of war, and that this sentence of condemnation cannot be sustained.
One view, hoAvever, has been taken of this subject Avhich deserves to be further considered. It is urged, that, in executing the laAVS of war, the executive may seize, and the courts condemn, all property which, according to the modern law of nations, is subject to confiscation, although it might require an act of the legislature to justify the condemnation of that property which, according to modern usage, ought not to be confiscated. This argument must assume for its basis the position, that modern usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself, by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This position is not alloAved. This usage is a guide Avhich the sovereign follows or abandons at his xvill; the rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign ; and although it cannot be disregarded by him, without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.
The rule is, in its nature, flexible ; it is subject to infinite modification ; it is not an immutable rule of laxAr, but depends on political considerations which may continually vary. Commercial, nations, in the situation of the United States, have always a considerable quantity of property in the possession of their neighbors. When war breaks out, the question, what shall be done with enemy property, in our country, is a question rather of policy than of law. The rule which we apply to the property of our enemy, will be applied by him to the property of *our citizens. Like all other ,* questions of policy, it is proper for the consideration of a department L wbicb can modify it at will; not for the consideration of a department which can pursue only the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.
It appears to the court, that the power of confiscating enemy property is in the legislature, and that the legislature has not yet declared its will to confiscate property which was within our territory at the declaration of war. The court is, therefore, of opinion, that there is error in the sentence of condemnation pronounced in the circuit court in this case, and doth direct that the same be reversed and annulled, and that the sentence of the district court be affirmed.