Case: INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SUPPLY COMPANY v. BRUCE
Abbreviation: International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce
Decision Date: 1904-05-31
Docket Number: No. 215
Citation: 194 U.S. 601
Volume: 194
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SUPPLY COMPANY v. BRUCE.
Judges: Mr. Justice . Peckham, dissenting'
Pages: 601–617

Head Matter:
INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SUPPLY COMPANY v. BRUCE.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 215.
Argued April 13, 14, 1904
Decided May 31, 1904.
Complainant as the owner of letters patent for a cancelling and postmarking machine brought suit against a postmaster to restrain him from using infringing machines which were in his post office used exclusively by his subordinates, employés of the United States, such use being in the service of the United States, the machines having been hired by the Post Office Department for a term not yet expired from the manufacturer at an agreed rental payable on the order- of the Department by whose order they were placed and used in the post, office.
Held, that the suit was virtually- one against the United States and the Circuit Court of the United, States, has not the power to grant an injunction against the defendant restraining the use of the machines pending the leased period.
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, followed.
This case came before the court on the following certificate for instructions :
“The complainant as the owner of letters patent of the United States for new and useful improvements in stamp cancelling and postmarking machines, brought a bill in equity against the defendant, who is postmaster of the United States post office at .Syracuse, New York, complaining of the use in said post office, of two machines, which infringe the complainant's letters patent, and praying for an injunction against the farther use of said machines. The defendant never personally used any stamp cancelling and postmarking machines; but the use of said two machines in said post office at Syracuse is by some of defendant’s .subordinates, who are employés of the United States government, such use being in the service of the United States.
“The machines so used were hired by the United States Post Office Department for a term,' which is as yet unexpired, from the manufacturer and owner of said- machines, at an agreed rental which is payable on the order of the Post Office Department, by whose orders, said machines were placed in the Syracuse post office and were and are now used' there.
“And the said United States Circuit.Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, further certifies, that to. the end that it may properly decide the questions in such cause, and presented in the assignments of error therein filed, it'requires the instructions of the.Supreme Court of the United States, on the following question, to wit:
“Upon the foregoing facts, has the United States Circuit Court the power to grant an injunction against the defendant, restraining the use of the machines? ”
Mr. Louis Marshall, with whom Mr. George W. Hey was on the brief, for appellant:
The government of the United States, by granting the letters patent on which the complainant bases its claim for relief, conferred upon it ah exclusive property therein which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself or by any’ of its officials without the complainant’s consent. Walker on Patents, § 167; 3 Robinson on Patents, § 897; United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246; James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Hollister v. Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 57; Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 348; Head v. Porter, 48 Fed. Rep. 481; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 15, 16.
The defendant having used an infringing-device against the complainant’s protest, hi£ tortious act cannot be made the basis of a suit against the United States in the Court of Claims, or in any other court. Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269; Morgan v. United States, 14 Wall. 531; Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341; United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1, 16, 18; German Bank v. United States, 148 U. S. 573, 579; Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593.
The United States is not liable to a suit for an infringement of a patent, since such a suit is one sounding in tort. Schil linger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163; United States v. Berdan Co., 156 U. S. 552.
.. The complainant would thus be remediless with respect to a conceded infringement of its rights,, unless relief by injunction is granted against the defendant for his continuing trespasses against the complainant’s property right, and it is believed • that such .remedy is available, notwithstanding the defendant’s official position.
The exemption of the United States and of the several States from judicial process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time of peace, from being personally liable to an action by a private person whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of the government which they represent. Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 169; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 198.
Actions of ejectment have been maintained against government officers in possession of land under government authority. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204. See also Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 446; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 684; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 518; Am. School &c sr. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94.
As to suits against government officials on patents, see Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U. S. 225, 234; James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Hollister v. Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 59; Head v. Porter, 48 Fed. Rep. 481. And see also Vavasseur v. Krupp, 9 Ch. Div. 351, 358.
. The government does not aver payment of rent in advance so an injunction against using the machines would not be a source of pecuniáry loss,. Even if the rental had been paid in advance of. an injunction issued based on the establishment of an infringement, the government could recover any rental paid in advance, on the theory of a failure of con sideration. The granting of an injunction would be equivalent to an eviction by title paramount. Tomlinson v. Day, 2 B. & B. 680; Neale v. McKenzie, 1 M. & W. 747; Fitchburg Manufactory Co. v. Melven, 15 Massachusetts, 268; Simers v. Saltus, 3 Denio, 214; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 46 N. Y. 370; Walker on Patents (3d ed.), §307, citing White v. Lee, 14 Fed. Rep. 791; McKay v. Smith, 39 Fed. Rep. 557; Pacific Iron Works v. Newhall, 34 Connecticut, 67; 3 Robinson on Patents, § 1251; Herzog v. Heyman, 151 N. Y. 587; Standard Button Co. v. Ellis, 34 N. E. Rep. 682.
Since Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, see Dashiell v. Grosvenor, 162 U. S. 425; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 108; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164. These and other cases relied on by appelee are not applicable and can be distinguished.
Mr. W. K. Richardson, with whom Mr. J.' C. McReymlds, Assistant Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellee:
Appellee relies on Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, and appellants have failed to distinguish that case.
As to the rights of the lessee, who is practically for the time the owner, see United States v. Shea, 152 U. S. 178; The Jersey City, 51 Fed. Rep. 529; Smith v. Plomer, 15 East, 607; Muggridge v. Eveleth, 9 Met. 233; Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 Pick. 535; Wade v. Mason, 12 Gray, 335.
The Federal courts have always recognized the hardships arising from an injunction against the use of the alleged infringing machines and it would be an interference with the government’s prerogative. Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650, 658; Morris v. Lowell Mfg. Co., 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 67; Bliss v. Brooklyn, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 596; Ballard v. City of Pittsburg, 12 Fed. Rep. 783, 786; Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Burton Stock-Car Co., 70 Fed. Rep. 619; and on appeal 77 Fed. Rep. 301; Huntingdon Dry Pulverizer Co. v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 534. See also The Davis, 10 Wall. 21, as to possession of the government.
Besides Belknap v. Schild, see Thompson v. Sheldon, 98 Fed. Rep. 621; Head v. Porter, 48 Fed. Rep. 481; Heaton v. Quintard, 7 Blatch. 73; James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U. S. 225, 234; Dashiell v. Grosvenor, 62 Fed. Rep. 584. Cases on appellant’s brief can be distinguished.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is governed by Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10. There an injunction was sought against the Commandant of the United States Navy Yard at Mare Island, California, and some of his subordinates, to prevent the use of a caisson gate in the dry dock at that place, contrary to the rights of the plaintiff as patentee.' The case was-heard on pleas setting up that the caisson gate was made and used by the United States for public purposes, and, as they were construed, .that it was the property of the United States. The pleas were held bad as answers to the'whole bill, because the bill also sought damages and the defendants might be personally liable, but it was held that an injunction could not be granted, and the bill was dismissed without prejudice to an action at law. Vavasseur v. Krupp, 9 Ch. D. 351, was cited for the proposition which was made- the turning point of the case, that the court' could not interfere with an object of property unless it had before it the person entitled to the thing, and this proposition wrás held to extend to an injunction--against the use of the thing as well as to a destruction, of it or to a- removal of the part .which infringed. It was pointed out that the defendants had no personal interest in the . continuance of the" use, and that, so far as the injunction was .concerned, the suit really was against the. United States. Of course, if those defendants were enjoined other persons attempting to use the caisson gate would be,- and thus thé-injunction practically would work a .prohibition against its use by the United States.
Belknap v. Schild differed from United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; and Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, and also from American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S, 94, relied on by the appellant, in the fact, among others, that the title of the United States to the caisson gate, was admitted, and therefore the United States was a necessary party to a suit which was intended to deprive it of the' incident of title, the right to usé the gate. As the United States could not be made a party the suit failed. In the case at bar the United States is not the owner of the machines, it is true, but it is a lessee in possession, for a? term which has not expired. It has a property, a right in rem, in the machines, which, though less extensive than absolute ownership, has the same incident of a right to use them while it lasts. This right cannot be interfered with behind its back and, as it cannot be made a party, this suit, like that of Belknap v. Schild, must fail: The ánswér to the question certified must be no. Whether or not a renewal of the lease could be enjoined is not before us.
The question is answered in the negative, and it will be so certified.