Case: United States v. Estudillo
Abbreviation: United States v. Estudillo
Decision Date: 1863-12
Docket Number: 
Citation: 1 Wall. 710
Volume: 68
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: United States v. Estudillo.
Judges: Messrs. Justices SWAYNE and DAVIS dissented.
Pages: 710–721

Head Matter:
United States v. Estudillo.
An appeal of a case originating below under the statute of June 14,1860, relating to surveys of Mexican grants in California, and in which the appellants appear on the record as The United States, simply (no intervenors being named), remains within the control of the attorney-general ; and a dismissal of the case under the 29th rule of this court is not subject to be vacated on the application of parties whose names do not actually appear in the record as having an interest in the case, even'although it is obvious that below there were some private owners contesting the case under cover of the government name, and that some such were represented by the same counsel who now profess to represent them here. Swayne and Davis, JJ., dissenting. Taney, C. J., and Gribe, J., absent.
2. "Where parties are permitted by the District Court under this act to appear and contest the survey and location, the order of the court permitting such appearance and contest should be set forth in the record. Only those persons who, by such order, are made parties contestant, will be heard on appeal. Miller, Swayne, and Davis, J J., dissenting. Taney, C. J., and Grier, J., absent.
8. Where, under this act, notice has been given to all parties having or claiming to have any interest in the survey and location of the claim, to appear by a day designated, and intervene for the protection of their interest, and upon the day designated certain parties appeared, and the default of all other parties was entered; the opening of such default with respect to any party subsequently applying for leave to appear and intervene, is a matter resting in the discretion of the District Court, and its action on the subject is not open to revision on appeal.
An act of Congress of June 14th, I860, authorizes the District Courts of California, on the application of any party interested, to make an order requiring the survey of any private land claims to be returned into court. The order is to be granted on the application of “ any party” whom the court “ shall deem to have sueh an interest in the survey and location .... as to make it just and proper that he should he allowed to take testimony, and to intervene for his interest therein.” If the objection to the survey and location is made on the part of the United States, the order to return the survey into court is to be on the motion of the district attorney, founded on sufficient affidavits. “ And if the application for such order is made by other parties claiming to he interested in, or that their rights are affected by such survey and location, the court, or the judge, in vacation, shall proceed summarily, on affidavits or otherwise, to inquire into the fact of such interest, and shall, in its discretion, determine whether the applicant has such an interest therein as, under the circumstances of the case, to make • it proper that he should be heard in opposition to the survey, and shall grant or refuse the order.”
But the act provides also, “ that all the parties claiming interest, &c., derived from the United States, shall not be permitted to intervene separately; hut the rights and interests of said parties shall be represented by the District Attorney of the. United States, intervening in the name of the United States; aided by counsel acting for said parties jointly, if they think proper to employ such counsel.” The act also provides that before proceeding to determine the validity of any objection to the location made by the surveyor-general, notice by newspaper publication shall be given to all parties in interest, that objection has been made, and admonishing them to intervene for the protection of their interest.
The present case — another case (United States v. Nunez), being just like it, and depending upon it — was one of these surveys and locations which had been certified into the District Court for the Northern District of California. The-record — a confused sort of document — showed that on the 3d* of October, 1860, “ the United States Attorney, E. ~W. Sloan, and «7. B. Williams appeared for the United States,” other counsel for the claimant, Estudillo, and K.. Simson for a certain' Castro, “ and on motion, it was ordered that he be allowed five days to make showing of his right to intervene herein, and no other party appearing, whereupon it is ordered that the' default of all parties not appearing as aforesaid be and the same is hereby entered.” Subsequently, to wit, October 31st, 1860, “ come the United States by their attorney, and except to thei official survey.” Subsequently to this “the petition of Thomas W. Mulford, by his attorneys, E. W. Sloan and J. B. Williams” set forth that he had an interest in the land claimed, and prayed the court to open the default entered on the preceding 3d, which motion the court, on the 20th of February, 1861, “ denied.” The case being here by appeal, as the- United States, appellant, and J. J. Estudillo, appellee, Mr. Bates, A. G., in behalf of the United States, and Mr. Laitham for J. B. Estudillo, appellee, signed an agreement at the last vacation that, the appeal should be dismissed; and the case was dismissed by the clerk accordingly; this agreement and dismissal purporting to be made under the 29th rule of this court, which provides that when the appellant and appellee in any appeal may, in vacation, by their respective attorneys, who are entered as such upon the record, sign and file with the clerk an agreement in writing, direct-' ing the case to be dismissed, it shall be the duty of the clerk to enter the case dismissed.
Mr. J. B. Williams, of California, he being the same Mr. “ J. B. Williams” already mentioned as appearing in the District Court there, now came into court (Mr. Carlisle being of counsel), and presenting himself as attorney of “ Thomas W. Mulford and others,” moved the court “ to vacate the stipulation, made under the 29th rule of this court, dismissing the appeal of the United States herein (which stipulation,” the motion ran, “ was made without their consent, or the consent of their attorney, or the consent of the District Attorney of the United States for the Northern District of California, and was made to their great prejudice and injury as settlers upon the public land of the United States); and that no mandate may issue upon said stipulation, but that the cause may stand to be heard in its order or otherwise as this court may direct; and that the attorney for Mulford and others be allowed to enter his appearance in this court, and be heard in their behalf, in the manner provided by the third section of said act of June 14, 1860.”
Mr. J. B. Williams and Mr. Carlisle, in support of the motion:
The act of June 14th, 1860, subjects the work of the surveyor-general to the revision of the District Courts, and enables all contestants to file objections, and have the survey examined and corrected if found to be erroneous. By obliging the surveyor-general to give notice, by publication, whenever he has made a survey of any private land claim, and by requiring all parties in interest to appear and intervene, a survey when finally approved is not only conclusive between the United States and the claimant, but is conclusive as to third parties, and the patentee can rely upon his legal title against all the world.
It is clear, from the provisions of' the act, that Congress did not intend to allow each, settler the privilege to intervene in his own name, with a separate right of appeal; its intention was to give them those rights jointly, and the use of the name of the United States. And if they can be heard jointly by their own counsel in the court below, why not in this court on appeal ? Where does the Attorney-General of the United States find his authority for dismissing an appeal taken by the district attorney in behalf of the settlers ? The 29th rule of this court applies only to the appellant and appellee by their attorneys. The attorney-general is not the attorney of those claiming under the laws of the United States. He is the attorney of the United States — not of the settlers. The appeal was taken in the name of the United States, but it was taken in behalf of Mulford and others, appearing jointly, and represented by their counsel. The attorney-general might well refuse to appear for the settlers, but he can have no right to dismiss their appeal when they stand ready to prosecute it by their counsel.
Mulford and other settlers on the lands under the laws of the United States, claim that if the confirmed tract be properly surveyed and located, they will be gainers. The District Court decided against them. They ask to be heard here by their counsel. If the decision of the District Court •had been in their favor, and the claimant had appealed, they would have been compelled to defend themselves as appellees. The attorney-general would not have appeared in their behalf, for his action in dismissing the appeal shows that he would have considered a decision against the survey as unjust. They do not ask the attorney-general now to appear in their behalf, but to let them appear and be heard by their own counsel, leaving him to express the views of the United States, as proprietors of vacant public land, if he thinks proper.
The right of the attorney-general to dismiss appeals in general, where the United States is the appellant, is not questioned. Where the suit is strictly one between the United States and the claimant, in which neither the alienees of the claimant, nor those claiming under the United States, nor adjoining proprietors, can intervene, the right and duty of the attorney-general to desist from the prosecution of an appeal which only works ruin to the claimant under a genuine and valid title, is clear. But the location and survey of a confirmed claim almost always involves the interests of parties with whom the government has no concern. Here they are made to intervene. Does any one doubt if this case stays dismissed, and Mulford were hereafter to bring ejectment, that the record of this ease would be used against him?
The right of special counsel — counsel acting for the individual claimants, though appearing to act for the United States — has never been questioned below; where the ease is managed almost wholly by them, and where the question whether appeal shall or shall not be taken is left to their view of what their interests may suggest. There should be no different rule here, after the parties are brought, at an immense expense, a distance of six thousand miles.
Messrs. Bates, A. G., Black, and Johnson, contra.
10 Stat. at Large, 33

Opinion:
Mr. Justice FIELD
delivered the opinion of the court.
The appeal in this ease was dismissed during the last vacation, by stipulation of the parties, under the twenty-ninth rule. A motion is now made on behalf of one Thomas ~W. Mulford and others, that the stipulation be vacated, the mandate of the court be withheld, and their attorney be allowed to enter his appearance and be heard on their behalf.
The case was brought before the court on appeal from the decree of the District Court of the Northern District of California, approving a survey of a confirmed private land .claim, under the act of June 14th, 1860. After, the survey was returned into the District Court, a monition was issued to the marshal requiring him to notify all parties having, or claiming to have, any interest in the survey and location of the claim, to appear on a day designated and intervene for the protection of their interests. The only parties who appeared in pursuance of the notice given by the marshal were the United States, the claimant, and one Castro; and the court ordered the default of all other parties to be entered. Subsequently, Mulford, who now appears in the motion before us, applied to the court to open the default and to allow him to intervene, alleging an interest in a portion of the land embraced by the survey under a patent from the State of California ; but his application was denied. The action of the court in this respect is not subject to revision, the opening of the default being a matter resting in its discretion.
The motion is on behalf of Mulford and others, but who are included by the term " others" we are not informed by the record. Their names are not given, nor is their interest stated, except in the very general and loose terms with which it is designated in the argument of counsel as that of settlers on the land under the laws of the United States.
The act of 1860 is liberal in the permission it gives for interposing objections to the surveys of confirmed claims made by the Surveyor-General of California; but at the same time it limits with special care the permission to those who aré in fact interested in malting a contest. It authorizes the return of surveys for examination and adjudication only upon the application of parties who, in the judgment of the court or district judge, have such interest as to make it proper for them to intervene for its protection. It provides that, when objections are interposed by the United States, the application shall be made by the district attorney, and be founded on "sufficient affidavits;" and that when application is made by " other parties claiming to be interested in, or that their rights are affected by," the survey and location,, there shall be a preliminary examination into the fact of such alleged interest. " The court, or the judge in vacation," says the statute, " shall proceed summarily on affidavits or otherwise to inquiré into the fact of such interest, and shall in its discretion determine whether the applicant has such an interest therein as, under the circumstances of the case, to make it proper that he should be heard in opposition to the survey, and shall grant or refuse the order to return the survey and location as shall be just."
The proceedings upon this examination, or at least the order of the court or judge thereon, should appear in the record; for we can only know by the order whether the parties have been permitted to contest the survey before the court. When the interest of parties applying is shown and the order is made, those who claim under the United States by " pre-emption, settlement, or other right or title," must intervene, not separately, but collectively, in the name of the United States, and be represented by the district attorney, and any counsel employed by them co-operating with him.
In the present case, it does not appear that any of the precautionary steps required by the act in question were pursued by the nameless " others" for whom the present motion is made. No presentation, so far as the record discloses, was made of the interest of any persons against the survey besides those we have named. And it is not permissible for parties to appear in this court and be heard in opposition to the survey approved, who have never participated, or asked to participate, in the proceedings upon the survey in the court below.
These views also dispose of the motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal in the case of United States v. Nunez.
The motion in both cases is
Denied.
Messrs. Justices SWAYNE and DAVIS dissented.