Case: SOUTH COVINGTON & CINCINNATI STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Abbreviation: South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Kentucky
Decision Date: 1920-04-19
Docket Number: No. 252
Citation: 252 U.S. 399
Volume: 252
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: SOUTH COVINGTON & CINCINNATI STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Tan Devanter and Mr. Justice Pitney concur in this dissent.
Pages: 399–408

Head Matter:
SOUTH COVINGTON & CINCINNATI STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
No. 252.
Argued March 18, 19, 1920.
Decided April 19, 1920.
A state law requiring interurban railroad companies to supply separóte cars or compartments for white and «colored passengers, and punishing failure to do so, is not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce as applied to such a railroad, owned by a local corporation and lying wholly within such State, while in control of an allied street car company and in practice operated as part of a streetcar system over which the cars are run to and from a city in another State (where such separation of races is illegal) and passengers are carried through to destination without change for a single fare, those traveling interstate greatly exceeding in number those traveling wholly within the State making the requirement. P. 403.
181 Kentucky, 449, affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Alfred C. Cassatt, with whom Mr. J. C. W. Beckham, Mr. Richard P. Ernst and Mr. Frank W. Cottle were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stephens L. Blakely, with whom Mr. Chas. I. Dawson, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was on the brief, for defendant in error. .

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McKenna
delivered the opinion of the court.
The Railway Company was .indicted for a violation of a statute of Kentucky which required companies or persons running or operating railroads in the State, to furnish separate coaches or cars for white and colored passengers.
The statute, as far as we are concerned with it, is as follows: all corporations, companies or persons "engaged in running or operating any of the railroads of this State, either in part or whole, either in their own name or that of others, are hereby required to furnish separate coaches or cars for the travel or transportation of the white and colored passengers on their respective lines of railroad. Each compartment of a coach divided by a good ánd substantial wooden partition, with a door therein, shall be deemed a separate coach within the meaning of this act, and each separate coach or compartment, shall bear in some conspicuous place appropriate words in plain letters indicating the race for which it is set apart." [Ky. Stats., § 795.]
It. is also provided that there .shall be no difference or discrimination in the quality of the coaches or. cars. A violation of the act is made a misdemeanor.
Interurban electric railroads are subject to the above provisions. We may say in passing that the railway company denies that it is interurban, but admits that the fact, has been decided against it and accepts the ruling. It will be considered, therefore, as interurban and being so it was within the law and the charge of the indictment. The charge is that the company at the time designated "then and . there had authority and was authorized to operate a line of railroad ten miles in length between Covington and Erlanger, and beyond, through.and by means of its control, ownership and lease of and from the Cincinnati, Covington and Erlanger Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, an interurban railroad company authorized to construct, arid operate an electric railroad ten miles in length in this County between Covington and Erlanger and beyond, and incorporated under the general railroad laws of this Commonwealth, said defendant then and there operating said line of railroad, the construction of which by the Cincinnati, Covington and Erlanger Railway Company had theretofore been authorized. " And having such authority .and control of the line of railroad, the company violated the law of the State by not' observing its requirement as to separate coaches.
. The defense to the action was, and the contention here is, not that the facts charged are not true, but that the statute so far as it is attempted to be made applicable to the company is an interference with interstate commerce, and that the defense, was made in the trial court in a motion to dismiss and for a new trial arid also in the Court of Appeals. •
In support of the contention it is stated that the company's principal business was interstate commerce — the carriage of passengers between Cincinnati and the Kentucky cities across the Ohio River, — that the car in question was an ordinary single truck street car solely engaged in interstate trips from Cincinnati, Ohio, through Covington, Kentucky, and a suburb about five miles distant, and that eighty per cent, of the passengers carried were interstate.
The reply made by the State, and expressed by the Court of Appeals, to the contention is that the railway company is a Kentucky corporation and by its charter was given authority "to construct, operate and manage street railways in the City of Covington and vicinity"; "and along such streets and.public highways in the city as the council shall grant the right of way to"; "and along such roads or streets out of the city as the companies or corporations owning the same may cede the right to the use of." And further "it may at any time, by agreement, purchase, lease, consolidate with, acquire, hold or operate any other street railway, or intersect therein, in Covington, Cincinnati, Newport or vicinity," etc.
The Court of Appeals further declared that the railway company became in some way the owner of all of the stocks of the Cincinnati, Covington and-Erlanger Railway Company, .and that the corporations are operated under the same general management, and "that the elder corporation operating in the name of the junior, actually constructed its road, and has been operating it from the beginning, being the owner of the cars, which are operated upon the road. The motive power is electricity and is the property of the elder corporation. The cars operated upon the road are such as are ordinarily used upon street railroads, and such as the elder corporation uses upon the street railroads of its system. A fare of five cents is charged for passage from any point upon the road of the Cincinnati, Covington and Erlanger Company, to any point on the system of the South Covington and Cincin nati Street Railway Company and from one point to. another upon the entire system of the latter company, and transfers are given for all connecting lines. Many persons, who take passage upon the line of the Cincinnati, Covington and Erlanger Railway Company, at its terminus, near Erlanger and at other places along its line, are transported'without changé of cars, into Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, as it connects with the lines of the South Covington and Cincinnati Street Railway Company, at its terminus, in the City of Covington." Separate coaches' were not provided as required by the law.
These being the facts the Court of Appeals decided that there was no interference with or regulation of interstate commerce. "Each of the termini," the court said, "as well as all the stations of the Cincinnati, Covington and Erlanger Railway Company's road is within the State of Kentucky." And it was concluded that "the'offense charged and for which the" railway was "convicted was the operation of the railroad, in an unlawful manner, within the State, and in violation of one of the measures enácted under, the police' powers of the State. "
In answer and in resistance to the conclusion of the -court, the railway company contends that it operates a railway between designated termini, one being in Kentucky and the other in Ohio, that the price of a fare may be the single one of five cents for the complete trip in the same coach taken at or terminating at the respective termini, and that therefore the car and passenger are necessarily interstate. Thus viewed they undoubtedly are, but there are other considerations. There was a distinct operation in Kentucky, — an operation authorized and required by the charters of the companies, and it is that operation the act in question regulates, and does no more, and therefore is not a regulation of interstate commerce. This is the effect of the ruling in South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537. The regulation of the act affects interstate' business incidentally and does not subject it to unreasonable demands.
The cited case points out the equal néc'essity, under our system of government, to preserve the power of the States within their sovereignties as to prevent the power .from intrusive, exercise within the National sovereignty, and an interurban railroad company deriving its powers from the State, and subject to obligations under the laws of the State, should not be permitted to exercise the powers given by the State, and escape, its obligations to the State under the. circumstances presented by this record, by runy,.; ning its coaches beyond the state lines. But we need not ' extend the discussion. The cited case expresses the principle of decision and marks the limitation upon the;power. of a State and when its legislation is ote is. not anintérférence with interstate commerce. And regarding its principle, we think, as we have said, the act in controversy does not transcend that limitation.
Judgment affirmed.