Case: United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee
Abbreviation: United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee
Decision Date: 1814-03-15
Docket Number: 
Citation: 8 Cranch 398
Volume: 12
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee.
Judges: (Marshall, Ch. J., being absent.)
Pages: 252–263

Head Matter:
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee.
Forfeiture. — Bond fide pm'chaser.
The forfeiture of goods, for violation of the non-intercourse act of March 1st, 1809, takes place upon the commission of the offence, and avoids a subsequent sale to an innocent purchaser, although there may have been a regular permit for landing the goods, and although the duties may have been paid.*
This was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for .the district of Maryland, which restored a quantity of coffee that had been seized and libelled for violating the non-intercourse act of March 1st, 1809, § 4, 5. (2 U. S. Stat. 529.)
The claimants in the court below alleged, by way of plea, that the coffee was regularly entered and the duties *secured according to law, after pog9 which, they beeame the purchasers for valuable consideration. They L also denied that it was imported contrary to law. The United States demurred to that part of the plea which states the purchase, &c., and took issue upon that part of the plea which denies the illegal importation. By the sentence of the district court the demurrer was overruled, and the coffee restored ; which sentence was affirmed in the circuit court, and the United States appealed to this court.
The case was elaborately arg'ued, by the Attorney-General, Pinkney, for the United States, and by Boyd and Harper, for the claimants, at last term, and again at this.
The words of the statute, which crea'.e the forfeiture, are : “ That whenever any articles, the importation of which is prohibited by this act, shall, after the 20th of May next, be imported, into the United States,” all such articles “ shall be forfeited.”
Pinhney, late Attorney-Gen eral,
for tbe United States. — Two objections have been made to tbe claim of the United States, for this forfeiture. 1. That the right of the United States does not vest, until seizure and condemnation : and 2. That the United States are bound by tbe act of their officer, in receiving the duties and permitting the goods to be entered.
1. The forfeiture occurs at the moment of committing the offence. The statute says, whenever the act is done, the thing shall be forfeited ; no other time is mentioned. The seizure is the consequence of the forfeiture, not its cause; the thing is first forfeited, and then seized. The forfeiture immediately follows the offence ; the seizure is merely to ascertain the fact. This is the plain construction, or rather the letter of the statute.
There is a distinction between forfeitures at common *law, and ... those aecuring under a statute. United States v. Grundy, 3 Cr. 351. *- In that ease, the Chief Justice said, “ Where a forfeiture is given by a statute, the rules of the common law may be dispensed with, and the thing forfeited may either vest immediately, or on the performance of somé particular act, as shall be tbe will of the legislature ; this must depend'upon the construction of the statute.” The reason why the court decided, in that case, that the right to the ship did not vest in the United States immediately upon taking the false oath, was, that the United States had an alternative, either to take the vessel, or its value, and until the United States had made their election, the right did not vest.
But there are two cases at common law, where the forfeiture relates back to the time of the offence and avoids intermediate alienations — deodand and suicide. So also, in the case of felony and flight. So also, in all cases where the punishment for the offence is the forfeiture of the thing by which the offence was committed, or where the punishment cannot be inflicted on the person. In treason and felony, the forfeiture of personal chattels is not the punishment, but a corollary or consequence of the disability imposed on the person. But in regard to lands, the forfeiture relates to the time of the offence committed. With regard to purchasers, the rule is caveat emptor. This is said to be a hard ease, but there are other cases equally hard, depending on the same rule. If goods are deposited with a merchant to keep, and he sell them, unless in market overt (and we have no market overt in this country), the sale is void, and the owner may recover them from the purchaser who bought them, without notice. This too is a hard case, but it is every day’s practice.
To show that the forfeiture attaches at the moment of the offence committed, he cited Wilkins v. Despard, 5 T. R. 112 ; Roberts v. Withered, 12 Mod. 92, and 1 Salk. 223 ; Lockyer v. Offley, 1 T. R. 252.
2. As to the second point, he said, it was impossible to contend, that the United States were bound by their officer’s ignorance of the fact of the forfeiture, when he received the duties and granted the permit.
*Boyd, contrá.
The demurrer admits that the coffee was properly entered, that the duties were paid, and that there was a bond fide sale and transfer of the coffee, for a valuable consideration, before seizure. A forfeiture cannot overreach a bond fide sale to third person. That this is the rule at the common law, is clearly proved by the very learned and elaborate argument of Judge Winchester in giving his opinion in the case of The Anthony Mangin (3 Cranch 356), and the principle has been recognised by this court in the same case (United States v. Grundy, 3 Cr. 350). A forfeiture by statute is not more operative than a forfeiture at common law. There is no expression in the statute to justify the distinction. The common law says, whenever a man shall commit treason or felony, he shall forfeit his goods and chattels to the king.
Bond fide purchasers are favored at common law. Exparte Edwards, 10 Ves. 104; 1 East 94, 95 ; 2 Esp. Í31 ; 12 Mod. 92 ; 2 Cranch 390 ; 3 Ibid. 356 ; 6 Ibid. 133 ; 5 Bac. Abr. 229. The forfeiture must be followed by seizure and condemnation, before the property can vest in the United States. This principle has been decided by this court, in the St. Domingo cases, where the law being temporary, and having expired, after condemna - tion in the court below, and before bearing in this court, the property was restored, which could not have been the case, if the property was vested in United States by the commission of the offence. If the title of the United States was complete at the time of the offence, and if the seizure was merely to ascertain the fact, the expiration of the law could not divest that, title out of the United States, and this court must have affirmed the sentence of con demnation. Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cr. 281. If the United States had not discovered the offence for three years, the act of limitations would have barred their claim. Adams v. Wood, 2 Cr. 336. If the coffee had been destroyed, the United States could not have recovered the duties, because the goods were not legally imported.
2. The United States are estopped from claiming the property, by the acts of their officer, in granting the permit *and receiving the duties, p. The acts of officers are to be favored. 16 Vin. 114, tit. Officers ; 17 •- Ibid. 153. The permit to land the coffee, and the receipt for the duties, are conclusive evidence to all the world, except the illegal importer, that the coffee was lawfully imported. If a claimant encourage the vendee to buy, his claim shall be postponed to that of the purchaser. Sugden on Vendors 480. Acceptance of rent is an admission of title. 18 Vin. 149. So here, acceptance of the duties is an admission of a lawful importation. A purchaser is only bound to use reasonable diligence ; he has only to ask whether there be a regular permit to land the goods, and whether the duties have been paid. If the officers were mistaken, and have given evidence of a good title, their mistake ought not to injure an innocent purchaser. 2 Bro. C. C. 389; 5 T. H. 118; 1 Ibid. 260 ; 3 Cr. 389, 390. The inconveniences of such a rule would be intolerable ; the utmost prudence could not prevent a man from loss. In personal chattels, possession is the criterion of title. 13 Ves. 121.
Harper, on the same side.
This is a case of bond fide purchase, for a valuable consideration, without notice. It is presumed to be without notice, because the contrary does not appear. The only case supposed to be against us is that of Roberts v. Withered, 5 Mod. 191; 12 Ibid. 92 ; 1 Salk. 223. That was a case of detinue against the wrongdoer ; there was no intervention of a purchaser without notice. The relation of the forfeiture to the time of the offence is never suffered to overreach an innocent purchaser, without notice. Relation is a fiction of law, which is never allowed to do injustice. Where a party not only conceals his claim, but gives out that the title is clear, he shall be postponed. The permit was evidence on which the claimant had a right to rely. No one can take advantage of his own act, to injure another.
As to the common-law doctrine of forfeiture, the *cases of treason p and felony furnish the general rule ; the cases of deodand, suicide *• and flight are exceptions. In treason and felony, the forfeiture is admitted not to relate to the fact committed. In the case of deodand, the exception to the rule is founded on the notoriety of the fact. In the case of suicide, the reason for the exception is, that there is no other mode of punishing the offence, and flight is an admission of the fact, and a withdrawing himself from punishment. Notoriety, confession, and the inability to inflict other punishment, are the grounds of these exceptions to the general rule. In treason and felony, if the goods are sold bond fide, without notice, the forfeiture relates back only to the conviction. Unimpeached possession is evidence of unimpeached title. This principle applies to forfeitures under a statute, as well as to those at common law. The rule caveat emptor, is never applied to secret liens.
Pinkney, in reply.
The letter of the act of congress is plain and express. The forfeiture is. the necessary and immediate consequence of the offence. No other time is mentioned. He did not mean to say, that the title of the United States is consummated, until condemnation. But the forfeiture attaches by the commission of the offence, and overreaches all intermediate acts. This doctrine is necessary for the public good, otherwise the rights of the United States would be defeated by fictitious sales, the fraud of which it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to detect. The forfeiture of the thing by which the offence is committed, is the punishment itself, not a mere consequence of a disability. It passes to the purchaser cum onere. Where legal rights have attached, the rule caveat emptor always applies, but never to equitable liens, without notice.
As to real estate, the relation in treason and felony was to the offence committed ; why did not the argument ab inconvenienti control the rule in that case ? Plowd. 260, 290. In the ease of deodand ; a horse kicks a man : before the man dies, the horse is sold ; the man dies, the horse is for-*4041 ns deodand. *Where is the notoriety ? The true reason is, that J it is a forfeiture of the offending thing. In felony, nothing but sale in market overt can prevent the relation of the forfeiture to the time of the offence. If felo de se give himself a mortal wound, and before his death convey his estate, and die, the conveyance is void. So, in the ease of flight, after felony. The law looks principally to the thing for punishment. The general rule of the law of England is, that a purchaser of personal goods is not safe, unless he purchased in market overt.
If the United States could bo estopped by the acts of their officers, the plea is as good in behalf of the illegal importer, as of the innocent purchaser. The purchaser was as much bound to know of the offence as the collector. But the collector had no authority to waive the penalty, and therefore, cannot be presumed to have waived it. If he had even given a i’elease of the forfeiture, it would have been void.
The argument ab inconvenienti, is rather an argument ad misericordiam. If there be hardship in the case, application should be made to the secretary of the treasury, who has power to relieve.
In the St. Domingo cases, the law had expired, without any provision being made to enforce the penalty in existing cases. After the expiration of the law, the court had no authority to condemn ; and the appeal annulled the sentence of the court below.
March 15th, 1814.
(Marshall, Ch. J., being absent.)
February 15th, 1814. Absent, Washington, Justice.
s. p. The Mars, post, p. 417; The Florenzo, 1 Bl. & H. 61; Fontaine v. Phoenix Ins. Co. Johns. 298; Kennedy v. Strong, 14 Id. 128.

Opinion:
Johnson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: — This case has been ax-gued very elaborately, and has been a long time under consideration. But from the decision which the court has at length come to, its merits are brought within a vex-y limited compass.
We are of opinion, that the question rests altogether on the wox-ding of *, 05-i the act of congress : by which it is *expressly declared, that the ' J forfeiture shall take place, upon the commission of the offence. If the phraseology wex-e such as, in the opinion of the majox-ity of the court, to admit of doubt, it would then be proper to resort to analogy, and the doctrine of forfeiture at common law, to assist the mind in coming to a conclusion. But from the view in which the subject appears to a majority of the court, all assistance derivable from that quarter becomes unnecessary.
It is true, that cases of hardship and even absurdity may be supposed to grow out of this decision, but on the other hand, if, by a sale, it is put in the power of an offender to purge a forfeiture, a state of things not less absured will certainly result from it. When hardships shall arise, provision is made by law for affording relief, under authority much more competent to decide on such cases, than this court ever can be. In the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice, enterprise and combinations of individuals, on the one hand, and the power charged with the administration of the laws, on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry into effect the measures of policy adopted by the legislature. To them belongs the right to decide on what event a divesture of right shall take place, whether on the commission of the offence, the seizure, or the condemnation. In this instance, we are of opinion, that the commission of the offence marks the point of time on which the statutory transfer of right takes place.
The decree of the circuit court of Maryland on the demurrer, is, therefore, reversed, and the cause remanded, that the issue in fact may be tried.