Case: UNITED STATES v. HOLTE
Abbreviation: United States v. Holte
Decision Date: 1915-02-01
Docket Number: No. 628
Citation: 236 U.S. 140
Volume: 236
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: UNITED STATES v. HOLTE.
Judges: Me. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.
Pages: 140–151

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES v. HOLTE.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.
No. 628.
Argued January 8, 1915.
Decided February 1, 1915.
A woman who is transported in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 may be guilty of conspiracy with the person transporting • her to commit a crime against the United States under § 37 of the Penal Code of March 4, 1899.
The facts, which involve the construction of the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 and of § 37 of the Penal Code, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for the United States:
The woman subjected to an unlawful interstate transportation may, if a guilty participator, be indicted as a conspirator with the person causing her to jae transported.
The court below misapplied the doctrine that, where a concert of action or a plurality of agents is essential to complete an offence, such agents cannot be indicted for a conspiracy to commit that offence. See' Wharton’s Criminal Law, 11th ed., § 1502.
Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. Rep. 236; Dietrich v. United States, 126 Fed. Rep. 664, and United States v./ N. Y. C. & H. R. R.,. 146 Fed. Rep. 303, are decisive against the application of that doctrine to this case. See also Ex parte Lyman, 202 Fed. Rep. 303, construing § 138, Penal Code; The Queen v. Whitchurch, 24 L. R. Q. B. Div. 420; State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa, 478; State v. Heugin, 110 Wisconsin, 189, 244; Hannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. St. 226; Thomas v. United States, 156 Fed. Rep. 897, 903; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, holding that it is perfectly possible to enact that a-.conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do shall be a crime.
Concursas necessarius is not an essential to the offence defined by § 2 of the White Slave Act. See H. R. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 320; Bennett v. United States, 194 Fed. Rep. 630; S. C., 227 U. S. 333; United States v. Westman, 182 Fed. Rep. 1017.
The offence of conspiracy to commit the main offence is not legally identical with that offence as defined by § 2 of the White Slave Act. As it is not identical, the woman transported may he punished, if a guilty party to a criminal plan for her own unlawful transportation. See Gañeres v. United States, 220 U. S. 342; Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131,144; United States v. McAndrews Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 836.
The case is not within the exception of concursus neces-sarius. The rule of diversity of offences, and not the above exception, must be applied. The case at bar responds completely to every test under the diversity'rule.
As the law stood before the White Slave Act, any person, man or woman, who wilfully planned to commit any offence against the United States was subject to punishment under § 37, Penal Code. In creating the new offencé under § 2 of the White Slave Act, Congress had no purpose to amend the conspiracy statute so that it should read “any offence against the United States, save only that defined by the White Slave Traffic Act;” nor any purpose to give the woman transported a license to plan with others to devote her body to prohibited sexual uses; nor any purpose to give her in advance a full pardon for any such after conspiracy.
Section 37, Penal Code, automatically operates on new offences from time to time, United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 202; Curley v. United States, 12>0 Fed. Rep. 1, and will punish persons planning for the commission by another person of an offence against the United States.
The indictment here contains the essential averment of a plan and agreement by both defendants that one should commit the offence of unlawfully transporting defendant— an averment that would have no place in an indictment against the former for unlawfully transporting her. And had the indictment omitted the first, third, and fourth overt acts (showing actual after transportation), the second (the ticket purchase) alone would have completed the conspiracy offence. On trial none other than the second overt act need be proven. If the others were proven, the later consummation of the main offence by Laudenschleger could not swallow up, or give immunity to, the earlier completed crime of conspiracy. Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 144; Curley v. United States, 130 Fed. Rep. 1; United States v. Stamatopolous, 164 Fed. Rep. 524; Solander v. People, 2 Colorado, 48; State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa, 478.
Though the penalty provisions of the crime punished by § 2 were limited exclusively to procurers, no corresponding limitation is to be found in § 37, which, being aimed at every person, must apply to the woman transported. United States v. Pórtale, 235 TJ. S. 27; United States v. Lewis, 235 U. S. 282.
It is not the policy of the law to suffer people to, with impunity, jointly plan the commission of crime. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432. It is often but a step from plan to performance, and if people could, without risk, jointly plan, such plans would-be more frequent, and when developed, might appear so inviting as to themselves induce performance. Where, as here, the large purpose of the law was to reach those systematically conducting the traffic — and system always demands plan — there could have been no thought of making this particular crime an exception to the general prohibition of the conspiracy statute.
This view is strengthened by the thought that because practically the same language is found in §§ 2 and 3 of the Immigration Act as amended March 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 263, the application of the -principle here contended for would materially aid, through the enforcement of that act also, in the 'accomplishment of the results sought by the Paris Conference treaty of July 25, 1902, 35 Stat. 1979.
No appearance or brief filed for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an indictment for a conspiracy between the present defendant and one Laudenschleger that Lauden-schleger should cause the defendant to be transported from Illinois to Wisconsin for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to the act of June 25, 1910, c. 395; 36 Stat. 825. As the defendant is the woman, the District Court sustained a demurrer on the ground that although the offence could not be committed without her she was no party to it but only the victim. The single question is whether that ruling is right. We do not have to consider what would be necessary to constitute the substantive crime under the act of 1910,. or what evidence would be required to convict a woman under an indictment like this; but only to decide whether it is impossible for the transported woman to be guilty of a crime in conspiring as alleged.
The words of the penal code of March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 37, 35 Stat. 1088, are "conspire to commit an offence against the United States" and the argument is that they mean an offence that all the conspirators should commit ; and that the woman could not commit the offence alleged to be the object of the conspiracy. For although the statute of 1910 embraces matters to which she could be a party, if the words are taken literally., for instance, aiding in procuring any form of transportation for the purpose ; the conspiracy alleged, as we have said, is a conspiracy that Laudenschleger should procure transportation and should, cause the woman to be transported. Of course the words of the penal code could be narrowed as we have suggested, but in that case they would not be as broad as the mischief and we think it plain that they mean to adopt the common law as to conspiracy and that ' commit ' means no more than bring about. For as was observed in Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, a conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do may be a crime, Reg v. Mears, 4 Cox. C. C. 423; 2 Den. C. G 79; Reg v. Howell, 4 F. & F. 160, and even more plainly a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person. We will assume that there may be a degree of cooperation that would not amount to a crime, as where it was held that a purchase of spirituous liquor from an unlicensed vendor was not a crime in the purchaser although it was in the seller. Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick. 476. But a conspiracy with an officer or employé of the government or any other for an offence that only he could commit has been held for many years' to fall within the conspiracy section, now § 37 of the penal code. United States v. Martin, 4 Cliff. 156, 164; United States v. Bayer, 4 Dillon, 407, 410; United States, v. Stevens, 44 Fed. Rep. 132, 140; State v. Huegin, 110 Wisconsin, 189, 246. So a woman may conspire to procure an abortion upon herself when under the law she could not commit the substantive crime and therefore, it has been held, could not be an accomplice. The Queen v. Whitchurch, 24 Q. B. D. 420, 422; Solander v. The People, 2 Colorado, 48, 63; State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa, 478, 480.
So we think that it would be going too far to say that the defendant could not be guilty in this case. Suppose, for instance, that a professional prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was the man, should suggest and carry out a journey within the act of 1910 in the hope of blackmailing the man, and should buy the railroad tickets, or should pay the fare from Jersey City to New York, she would be within the letter of the act of 1910 and we see no reason why .the act should not be held to apply.. We see equally little reason for not treating the preliminary agreement as a conspiracy that the law can reach, if we abandon the illusion that the woman always is the victim. The words of the statute punish'the transportation of a woman for the purpose of prostitution even if she were the first to suggest the crime. — The substantive offence might be committed without the woman's consent, for instance, if she were drugged or taken by force. Therefore the decisions that it is impossible to. turn the concurrence necessary to effect certain crimes such as bigamy or duell-ing into a conspiracy to commit them do not apply.
Judgment reversed.
Me. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.