Case: KEAN v. CALUMET CANAL AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY
Abbreviation: Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co.
Decision Date: 1903-05-04
Docket Number: No. 8
Citation: 190 U.S. 452
Volume: 190
Reporter: United States Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: KEAN v. CALUMET CANAL AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY.
Judges: with whom concurs Mr. Justice McKenna,
Pages: 452–507

Head Matter:
KEAN v. CALUMET CANAL AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 8.
Argued January 9, 12, 1903.
Decided May 4, 1903.
The common law, as understood by this court, and the local'.law of Indiana as to the effect of conveyances of land bordering on non-navigable waters are the same.
Where the State of Indiana acquired land from the United States under the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, the patent describing the whole of certain fractional sections enumerated and bordering on non-havigable • water between Indiana and Illinois, it acquired all the land under water up to the line of the State, such being the local law of Indiana. The making of a meander line has no certain significance and does not necessarily import that the tract on the other side of it is not surveyed or will not pass by a conveyance of the upland shown by the plat to border on the lake. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, followed.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. William P. Fennell for plaintiffs in error.
Under section 2396, U. S. Rev. Stat., the original survey of 1834 did in fact and-in law stop at the “ water course.”
A survey made by proper officers of the United States and confirmed by. the Land Department cannot be shown to be inaccurate by collateral attack in the courts. Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Oo., 158 U. {•>. 253.
The fact that the survey under which the patents issued was contested at every step by the interested parties and was finally decided after six months’ consideration by the Secretary of the' Interior affirming the decision of the land office affords strong evidence of its correctness and honesty. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Go., 125 U. -S'. 273.
Wolf Lake must be taken as a, whole, not in sections. It is a lake between two States. •’
This case is identical in law and in fact with Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 379, only the rule of property is different in In diana from what this court assumed to. be the law in Illinois. State v. Portsmouth Bavvngs Panic, 106 Indiana, 459.
The defendant in error must recover on the strength of its own title, just as in Hardin v. Jordan.
By reference, a plat of a section becomes a part of the conveyance, as much so as if it had been copied into the patent deed. Piper v. Gonnelly, 108 Illinois, 646 ; Louisville & Hashville Railroad, Go. v. Koelle, 104 Illinois, 455 ; MoGormich x. Huse, 78 Illinois, 363, citing MoGlvntock v. Rogers, 11 Illinois, 279,
If defendant in error has not the paramount.title to the land in question it is a mere intruder without title.
But the success of appellant in this case does not depend upon' a construction of the swamp land- act of September 28, 1850. Whether or not that act operated as a grant imprcesenti to the various States of all the swamp land within their borders is not the question before this court, unless it finds also that the title passed to the appellees as riparian owners, because, if appellees have no title to the water,- they are mere Intruders, and ás to them, the patents .issued under the new survey are conclusive “ that the lands were of the, character which by the patents they were represented to be.” Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488; Eberhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S. 67. All presumptions are to be indulged in support of proceedings upon which a patent is issued, and the patent is not open to collateral attack in an action óf ejectment or to quiet title. Eberhardt v. Hogar boom, 115 IT. S. 67; The Iowa Rail/road La/nd Company v. Antoine, 52 Iowa, 429.
Kiparian rights have nothing to do with' the title to land under the water. Diedrich v. The H W. Ry. Co., 42 Wisconsin, 262.
It was evidently the intention of both the National and state governments to convey the border lands to the edge of the ■pond, and according to the general rules. of conveyancing if there is a discrepancy between the meander line as indicated.on the map and the actual water line, the natural monument which was intended by the parties to.-be the boundary, would be the boundary and not the artificial meander line.
Nothing could be clearer than that the Indiana Supreme Court has held in this case that the deeds of the border lands did not convey the bed of the lake to defendant in error. And the court is not the less explicit upon the question of riparian rights. State of Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rép. 389 ; Boorman v. Sunnuchs, 42 Wisconsin, 233; State v. GUmcmton, 9 New Hampshire, 461; Seaman v. Bis, 24 Illinois, 521; Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vermont, 257; Mansur v. Blake, 62 Maine, 38; Wheeler v. Spinola, 4 New York, 377; Angelí on Water Courses, section 41.; Paine v. Wood, T08 Massachusetts, 160 ; Died-rich v.. Forth- Western By. Go., 42 Wisconsin, 248. ■
The action of the Land Department in issuing a patent is conclusive in all courts and in all proceedings where by the rules of law the' legal title must prevail. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wallace, 83 ; Warner v. Van Brunt, 19 Wallace, 653 ; Shepley et al. v. Cowan et al., 91 U.- S. 340; Moore v. Rdbins, 96 U. S. 530; Marquez w. Frisb'ie, 101 U. S. 473; Vance v. Van Bru/nt, 101 U. S. 519 ; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 401; Smelting Oompamy v. Kemp, 104 IT. S. 646 ; State v. Smelting Company, 106 IT. S. 447 ; Quinn v. Conlon, 104 U. S. 421; Baldwin' v. Stark, 107 U. S. 465 ; Cornell v. Lammers, 21 Fed. Rep. 200; Cragin v. Pop:ell, 128 IT. S. 593; Gazzam v. Lessee of Elam Phillips et al., 20 How. 374.'
Land cannot pass as appurtenant to land.
In Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 396, it is held: “A conveyance of one acre of, land can never be made by any legal construction to carry another acre' by way of incident or appurtenance to the first.” Such is the. doctrine laid, down in 2 Met. 147; 8 Met. 260 ; 10 Pet. 25 ; 15 John. 447.
If this were an action of ejectment it would be barred by the statüte of limitation on account of the twenty years’ adverse possession. Vandugan v. TIepner, 45 Indiana, 589. But this being, a suit to'quiet title is.barred by the fifteen .years’ statute. Caress v. Foster, 62 Indiana, 145; Milner v. 'Hyland, 77 Indiana, 458. . •
That unnavigable lakes and ponds have always had a legal status distinguished from swamp lands, see Huberus, ‘Book 2, tit. 1, par. 25, p. 104; 1 Huber. Book 2, tit. 1, par. 25, p. 10.4; Roman Law, Digest, Lib. 41, tit. 1, De aq. A. R. D., section 12; Callistratus, Lib.-.2, .Institutes; Ulpian, Digest, Lib. 43,, tit. 14, sec. 4'; French Law:, section 1566, arts. 5.56,-558, Code Civ.; Traite du Domaine Publique Frangais; Treatise of Proudon & Dumay on' the Public' Domain of France, Book 4, § 1566; Barrett’s Code Napoleon, § 558; German Law, Frederieaii Code, § 35, Book 1, art. 7, p. 45 ; Bracton, Ed. 14,1569, Book 2, chap. 2, p. 2, fol.- 9;: Fleta, Lib. 3, chap. 2, §§ '8, 9; Lib. 3, chap. 2, p. 8; Grótius, Lib. 2, chap. 3, §§ 9, 16; chap..8, § 12; 1 Huberus, 123, § 33, and pi 104;, Roman Civil Law, Dig. Lib. 41;, tit. 1, § 16; Heinnecius Jus. Nat. & Gen. Lib. 1, chap. 9, § 25;. Heinnecius Elementa Juris. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 358.
Mr. Frederick S. Winston, with whom Mr. James F. Meagher, Mr. Silas H. Strawn and Mr. G. E. Hamilton were on the brief, for defendent in error.
I. The Supreme Court of Indiana; having held that all of the land involved in this suit was in fact included in the survey of 1834-35, this court will not disturb that finding of fact.' Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 TJ. S. 362; Egan v. Hart, 165 TJ. S. 188; Bower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Hedrick v. A., T. efe 8. F. B. H., 167 TJ. S. 673; Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas. Pae. R. R., 92 TJ. S.-315.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, not only in the opinion in the case at 'bar, but also in the opinion of Kean v- Roby, 145 Indiana, 221, has held, as a matter of fact, that all of the land in question was surveyed by the Federal Government in 1834-35.
II. All of the land in question having been included in the survey of 183L-35,-the1 United States having conveyed it all under that survey to the State of Indiana in 1853, and defendant in error holding under mesne conveyances from the State, by the same description, the survey of 1875 was void, and plaintiffs in error acquired no rights thereunder, as held by- the Supreme Court of Indiana in Kean v. Calumet Canal ds Improvement Co., 150 Indiana, 699; Kean v. Roby, 145 Indiana, 221; following,. Tollesthn v. State, 141. Indiana, 197, and as held by this court in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, and Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406.- See also Bavis v. TViebold, 139 U. S. 507.
The facts in the case at bar are much more favorable to the defendant in error than were the facts-in the Hardin and Mitchell cases to the prevailing party in those cases. Here we have a finding by the Supreme Court of Indiana that, as a matter of fact, all the land in .question, whether in the bed of - the lakes or elsewhere, was actually surveyed in 1834-35. More than that, the defendant- in error' in our case holds under a patent from the Federal Government all the land in question, made pursuant to and after the passage of the swamp act in 1850, while Hardin holds under a patent issued by the Govern-. ment in 1841, prior to the passage of the swamp act. In this case, also, there is no question of- any interest of ■ the State-or of the United States in and to the land in question. And that is just as true with respect to the land in the beds of "Wolf. Lake and Lake George as it is. with respect to the upland. On this ■point'see further, Moore v. .Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; Smelting Vo. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640; Wright v.. Roseberry, -121 U. S: 488; ..Doolam, v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618.
We therefore say that the cases cited by the plaintiffs in error,' upon the proposition that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior is res adjudicata, are not in point.
III. The rights of the owners of land bordering on inland non-navigable lakes are settled by the law of the State wherein the land lies.
This principle has been so frequently laid down by this court that we'believe any extended comment superfluous. Notwithstanding the difference of opinion'in the Hardi/n and Mitchell cases upon other points, the court has always been' unanimous on this question. ■
Since the decisions in the Hardin and Mitchell' cases this court has- repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, particularly in the cases of Lowndes v. Huntington, 153 U. S. 1, 19 ; Grand Rapids Indiana- R.-R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87; Water 'Pmcer Co. v. Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349, 363.
IY. What then is the law of the State of Indiana respecting non-navigable lakes, and particularly respecting Wolf Lake .and Lake George % ■ '
In Ross et al. v. Faust et al., 54 Indiana,. 471, decided in 1876, the court held that the title of riparian proprietors on "White River, in said State, extended to the thread of the stream, regardless of the facts that the survey lines of the United States surveyors meandered the banks and did„not include the bed thereof; and that such bed was not, in terms, sold to, nor .paid for by, purchasers of the lands bordering on such river. ■See also Bidgway v. Ludlow, 58 Indiana, 248; Edwards v. Ogle, 76 Indiana, 302; State v. Po?'tsmouth Savings Bank, 106" Indiana,,435 ; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. State, 141 Indiana, Í97; State of Indiana v.-MilJc, ;11 Fed. Rep. 389; Stoner v. Bice, 121 Indiana, 51; Brophy V. Bicheson, 137 Indiana, 114; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. plough, 146 Indiana, 93; Kéa/n v. jRoby, 145 Indiana, 221.
It appears therefore to be the settled law in the State of Indiana that, where an inland non-navigable lake covers a subdivision of land and the government survey designates the dry land in such subdivision as a fractional subdivision, or lot, the purchaser from the Government of such subdivision or lot takes the title to all that .portion of the "bed of. the lake contained within the subdivision. That is to say,' he takes as a riparian owner, his title includes, and he owns, the, land beneath the lake far enough beyond the meander line and water’s edge to make out the full subdivision in which his land is' so situated. The decision in this case is the latest expression of the Supreme Court of that State, and is. in no sense dictum. Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 499. See also Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Fairfield ■ v. Gallatin .County, 100 U. S. 47..
V". If the common law of Indiana were as found by this court, in Hardin v. Jordan, to be the common law of Illinois, then the defendant in error, as a riparairi owner of bordering lands, owns" to the center of the lakes, and, consequently, ail of the land in controversy.
For the sake of the. argument, let us assume, contrary to tho fact, that the survey made in 1834-35 of township 37 north, range 9, and township 37 north, range 10, did not include Wolf Lake and Lake George. Then we submit that, under the rule of the common law, as stated by this court in Hardin v. Jordan,, defendant in error, as the owner of the land hordering •on these lakes,, would take tO' the center thereof. Forsythe v. ■ Srnale, 7 Biss. 201Fuller {filar din)-\. Shedd, 161 Illinois, 462.
VI. Counsel for plaintiffs in error would impose upon this court the burden of examining the reeord to ascertain whether or not the defendant in error in the prosecution of this suit is barred by the statute of limitations of the .State of Indiana. 'This was a question of fact, which has- been decided adversely to the plaintiffs in error, both by the nisi jrrius and the Supreme- Courts of the State of Indiana.
If this court would go into the record to determine this question, its conclusion must necessarily, we submit, affirm that of the state courts. A jury was waived, the cáse tried before the' court, and the finding and judgment- of the trial court having been affirmed by the state Supreme Court, the question as to whether or not the defendant in error complied with the statute of limitations of the State of Indiana cannot be here reviewed* It is not a Federal question. Gardnetr v. Bonestell, 180 II. S. 362; 310; Bi/oer Bridge Go. v. Kansas Pacific By. Go., 92 TI. S. 315; Bower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Egan v. Hcurt, 165 N. S-. 188; Hedrick v. A., T. <& S. F: B. B., 161 U. S. 673 ; Murdoch v. City of Memphis, 87 U. S. 590.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding to-, quiet title brought by the Calumet Canal and Improvement Company in a court of the State of ' Indiana. The company got judgment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, 150 Indiana, 699, and the ease is brought here by writ of error. The land in question is land .borderingon and extending under certain- non-navigable water up to the state line, the Illinois side of which was the subject ' of the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, and Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406. But the facts in this ease are somewhat different. The Calumet company claims title through mesne conveyances from the State of Indiana. The State of Indiana got its title under the Swamp Land Act, September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 520; Rev. Stat. § 2479 et seq., and patents of the United States dated 1853, purporting to bejn pursuance of that act, and referring to the official plat of survey, which was made in 1834. The patent set forth describes " the whole of fractional sections " enumerated and bordering on the water, in which sections lies the disputed land. The State afterwards conveyed by the same description-. It is not denied that the company got the land above the waterline, as shown in the plat referred to, but it is denied that it got'more. The water has been receding and drying up, so that the question is important. The defendant set up a later survey in 1815 of the land which was covered by water in 1834, and is covered, to a less extent, still, and patents from the United States in pursuance of the same, for tracts below the original water line. They deny that the State ever owned this land, or, if it did, that it conveyed it, and they allege the later survey to be conclusive.
On general principles of conveyancing the State would have acquired the land .in controversy here by a conveyance from the United States describing the upland according to the survey, because the local law of Indiana and the common law as understood by this court are the same, so far as this case is concerned. Stoner v. Rice, 121 Indiana, 51; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371. The case is stronger if the land passed under the Swamp Land Act, as has been held by the state court with Legard to this and similar patents. Mason v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 150 Indiana, 699; Kean v. Roby, 145 Indiana, 221; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. Clough, 146 Indiana, 93; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. State, 141 Indiana, 197. See Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414.
The making of a meander line has no certain significance. French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47, 52. It does not necessarily import that the tract on the other side of it is not surveyed or will not pass by a conveyance of the upland shown by the plat to border on the lake. It is not always a boundary. Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 380; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414; Horne v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40, 43; Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 93. In this case its immediate import -was only to indicate the contour of the lake. It would seem, to be sure, that the settled understanding of the land department has been that in cases like the present the meander line marked the limit of the grant. But probably the cases are comparatively rare in which that understanding was acted on by an attempt subsequently to convey the land under water on the further side of the line at dates before the transactions with which weffiave to deal. The title to such land was not considered of much importance in the early days or worth the trouble of an independent survey. See Newsom v. Pryor, 7 Wheat. 7, 11. The United States was more anxious for settlers than for revenue from that source. It is not necessary to consider how we should decide, the case with our present' light if the question were a new one. It is not new. For twelve years the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan and Mitchell v. Smale have stood as authoritative den larations.of the law. Probably in most cases the statute of limitations has cured the defects of title which those cases may have shown. Meantime many titles must have passed on the faith .of those decisions. The United States can meet them by the form of its conveyances. It seems to us that it would be likely to do more harm than good to allow them to be called in question now.
It is said that the land under water was not embraced in the survey of 1834. It Would seem from the plat and the field notes that the sections and dividing lines were clearly marked off and posts set. The case is similar to Kean v. Roby, 145 Indiana, 221, where the survey was pronounced sufficient.. No difficulty was felt on the ground that the survey did not cover the submerged land in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371. But furthermore, the land was selected as " swamp and overflowed lands " by the State. It not appearing otherwise, the selection must be pre..'sumed to have included the land overflowed, and if so it was confirmed to the State by the act of March 3, 1857, c. 117, 11 Stat. 251; Rev. Stat. § 2484. The confirmation encounters none of the difficulties of cases like Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240. The land surrounding the water, at least, was surveyed, so that the identification of the submerged portion was absolute. We are of opinion that the State of Indiana got a title to the whole land in dispute.
If the State of Indiana got a title, it gave one. There is not much controversy on this point. We should follow the decision of the state court in this case so fa,r as this question is concerned, if there was no other evidence of the state law. But the'láw of Indiana is shown by the other cases cited above to be clear on this point. >
The resurvey by the' United States in 1874 does -not affect the Calumet company's rights. As the United States already had conveyed the lands, it had no jurisdiction to intermeddle with them in the form of a second survey. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 400; Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 94, 95; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289.
Of course, we shall hot undertake to revise the finding of the state courts that the statute of limitations had not run in favor, of the plaintiffs in error, and that, if any one is to profit by it, the Calumet company would prevail.
Judgment affirmed.