Case: THE UNITED STATES v. THE GREAT FALLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Abbreviation: United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co.
Decision Date: 1884-12-22
Docket Number: 
Citation: 20 Ct. Cl. 522
Volume: 20
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Parties: THE UNITED STATES v. THE GREAT FALLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Hablan delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, December 22, 1884.
Pages: 522–523

Head Matter:
THE UNITED STATES v. THE GREAT FALLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
(16 C. Cls. R., 160; 112 U. S. R., 645.)
On the defendants' Appeal.
The claimants are a body corporate of Virginia, holding land on both the Maryland and Virginia shores of the Potomac. Congress authorize and appropriate money for the Washington Aqueduct, subject to the consent of Maryland. That State passes an act of consent, which, provides legal means for assessing the damages. Proceedings are instituted between the government and the claimants. While pending, they voluntarily agree to submit the whole subject of damages to a commission. The Secretary of War then has control and direction of the work, and enters into the stipulation of reference. Four plans for taking different quantities of water are submitted to the commission, which assesses damages upon each. There is no formal ratification of the award, but the government proceeds to build the necessary dams substantially according to one of the plans, and takes the water of the river from the claimants.
The court below decides—
(1.) Though an officer may not be authorized in terms to submit a matter to arbitration, yet if he be specially authorized by Congress to act in regard to the subject-matter of the submission, so that he will have power to carry into effect the decree which the award may direct, he has power to submit the matter to arbitration.
(2.) Ratification of an award will be presumed, on the part of Congress, from, subsequent appropriations of money, to use and utilize the subject-matter of the award.
(3.) Where an agreement provides that the Attorney-General shall decide whether the owners of private property have a valid title thereto, it may be a condition precedent to the payment of the purchase-money; but if the government proceed to take and use the property, they waive the condition.
(4.) The right of eminent domain exists in the government, and the exercise thereof by the United States cannot be curtailed, nor the manner • prescribed by the State wherein the property is.
(5.) Where an officer of tho government, duly authorized by statute, exercises its right of eminent domain, an action against the government for property taken is ex contracta and not ex delicto.

Opinion:
The judgment of tbe court below is affirmed on the following grounds: (1) Where property is taken by officers or agents of the United States, pursuant to an act of Congress, as private property, for the public use, the government, if it asserts no title in itself, is under an implied obligation to make just compensation to the owner. (2) Such an implication being consistent with the constitutional duty of the government, as well as with common justice, the owner's claim for compensation is one arising out of implied contract, within the meaning of the statute defining the jurisdiction of- the Court of Claims, although there may have been no formal proceedings for the condemnation of the property to public use. (3) The owner may waive any objection he might be entitled to make, based upon the want of such formal proceedings, and, electing to regard the action of the government as a taking under its sovereign right of eminent domain, may demand just compensation, for the property.
Mr. Justice Hablan delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, December 22, 1884.