Applicant (AP3): Mr. President, very briefly on the government's procedural objection concerning foreseeability, which also addressed one of the judges' questions, the government argued that the question of foreseeability of the FOCA falls outside the scope of the case, as the applicant allegedly did not claim at all, that he was not familiar with that legislation. This is not true, because even before the chamber, the paragraph 67 of his observation of 2nd May 2013, the applicant did, in fact, complain that he was unable to foresee the criteria for personal liability, since these criteria at the time were not laid down in the law. And even more importantly, in our view, the chamber dove in substance with a question of foreseeability at paragraph 90 to 96 of its judgment. And however unsatisfactory the chamber's assessment on this issue certainly brings it within the scope of the case before the Green Chamber in accordance with the set of case law on this point. About the lack of proportionality, we say that the system envisaged by the FOCA did not strike a fair balance between the public interest to protect creditors and the burden imposed on shareholders' rights. First, the system excessively affected the position of shareholders vis-a-vis the position of the company's creditors. Creditors got it all, while the liable shareholders got a zero. And in Beck versus Finland, these courts said that in order to strike a fair balance between creditors and debtors, an arrangement should take into account such factors as the market value of the claim, the risk of financial loss accepted by the creditor, and the public interest in affording debtors the possibility of seeking a debt adjustment. Now clearly none of these factors has been taken into account in the present case. Second, there were other less afflictive measures available in Slovenian legal system at the material time that could be used in order to tackle the problem of inactive companies and to offer a sufficient degree of protection to companies' creditors, such as the traditional institution of piercing the corporate bail, which was indeed provided by Article VI of the Companies Act of 1993, or the ex officio bankruptcy proceedings, again provided by the Companies Act proceedings which were never opened in the applicant case. Third, the shareholders had no possibility to be exonerated from personal liability once the striking of proceeding had been initiated, because they could not anymore apply for voluntary bankruptcy. And this is particularly troublesome in the applicant's case, as he actually sought to have the company wind up well before the entry into force of the FOCA. Fourth, the provision of shareholders joined in several liability allows the creditors to choose the shareholder against whom to enforce their claims under the FOCA. A minority shareholder can therefore be more attractive for a company's creditor, just because he or she has more assets to foreclose, irrespective of their actual role or influence in the company. And the other shareholders may even go free of any consequence if the creditor freely decides not to enforce his claims against them, as it happened for one of the shareholders of the LE company. Fifth, precisely because it departs from the universal principles of company law, the FOCA system is fundamentally unfair, also for the creditors of struck-off companies. Instead of creating a mechanism for the orderly repayment of companies' outstanding debt based on the principle of the par conditio creditorum, the FOCA gives precedence to the first creditor who takes action against the shareholders. And the consequence is that if the personal assets of individual shareholders are not sufficient to satisfy all the creditors of the company, some of them may be left without any protection at all. About one of the questions that was posed by the judges, we believe that it's not for the court to speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings would have been if the applicant had been made aware of the striking-off proceedings, or he had been allowed to effectively challenge the final decision on striking off. The applicant repeatedly asked the domestic court to be judged in accordance with Article 6 of the Companies Act. But as we said, no such an assessment was ever made by domestic court. The line to be drawn under the convention is that piercing the corporate vase should be allowed only in extreme cases where abuses have been committed and established by shareholders to the company's creditors' detriment. And the difference with the Courage case, it's very simple. In the Courage case, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia found that the domestic legislation was in breach of fundamental rights. In our case, the Constitution found that the convention standards did not apply to the FOCA. Thank you very much, Mr. President.