Applicant (AP2): Thank you, Mr. President. I will address some other questions posed by the judges in a joint fashion, and I will start dealing with the entry into force of Chapter 3 of the FOCA. According to Article 41 of the FOCA, the new law entered into force on 23 July 1999. According to Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the FOCA, a company is presumed as having no asset if it makes no payment through its bank account for 12 consecutive months. Therefore, the Chamber's finding and the government's contention that Chapter 3 entered into force after one year by gas alleges, thus providing inactive and solvent companies with sufficient time to institute appropriate proceedings in order to have the company dissolved, is, to say the least, simply wrong. Chapter 3 entered into force on 23 July 1999, as the rest of the FOCA. It was Article 25 itself that stated that the condition for a company to be presumed inactive depended upon the absence of transactions through its bank account for 12 consecutive months. And against this background, it transpires that the company in which the applicant held his minority share was among the first limited liability companies to be struck off pursuant to Chapter 3 of the FOCA. Indeed, the 12 months provided for under Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the FOCA, expired on 23 July 2000. The striking off proceedings of the company in which the applicant held a minority share were initiated on 19 January 2001. That is to say, less than six months from the date Chapter 3 became applicable. And that was even before the beginning of the proceedings that eventually culminated in the Constitutional Court's judgment, number 135 of 2002. And this further corroborates the argument that the applicant could not foresee the consequences of the implementation of the new legislation. And I will also use this short time at my disposal to deal on a separate note with the nature of Article 27, Paragraph 4 of the FOCA. As we pointed out earlier, presumptions are crucial in this case. Both the violation of Article 6 and the violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ultimately stem from a chain of legal presumptions introduced by the FOCA. As a matter of fact, Mr. Leckage suffered the effects of a chain of presumptions which virtually deprived him of any opportunity to challenge the measures complained of. First, the company was presumed as having no asset because it did not make any payment through its bank account for 12 consecutive months. Second, the company having no asset was presumed to be inactive and therefore subjected to striking off proceedings. Third, shareholders, including the applicant, were presumed to have knowledge of the striking off proceedings owing to the service of the relevant decisions on the company's premises. Fourth, shareholders were presumed to have filed a certified statement accepting personal liability for the struck off company's debt. And fifth, shareholders were presumed to be active if they held at least a 10 percent share of the company. None of these presumptions was rebuttable in law, nor was the applicant able to effectively challenge them in practice in order to avoid personal liability. Similar situations have already been found to be in breach of the Convention. In Papakellas v. Greece of 1999, the ground chamber held that a legally irrebuttable presumption contravenes Article 1 of Protocol 1. In the subsequent case of Estatillo and Mikailidis v. Greece of 2003, the Court came to the same conclusion, even though the national courts had in the meantime accepted that the presumption in question was no longer irrebuttable. The case of Mr. Leckage is even more serious because we're not talking about just one presumption. We're talking about five combined presumptions leading up to the imposition of a sanction. Thank you, Mr. President.