[XPERIA X10 Android Development] MrHassell:
Scuba Key Distribution

Thanks tryantar :) I worked with DRM in the 90's, again in the millennium. One day in Microsoft's office in London tinkering with Linux, thinking to myself what a waste of time it is to use DRM to encode music, it occured to me that all I need do was write a perl script to strip out the non-mpeg headers and extract a clean song... anyway it went a lot further than music, this is the latest incarnation of lucifer, Octopus! Because after all, we are all under the SE..

Common Test Keys (CTK) for Broadband: The Broadband CTK bundle includes a sample set of all Broadband cryptographic objects, including device keys, service keys, Trust Anchor certificates, and a variety of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL).

Note: If you are using the optional Seacert broadband bootstrap implementation, you may want the additional bootstrap file to assist you with testing. To download, click here.

Seacert-Bootstrap-CTK-Addendum-v1-16Aug07 : This document describes how Seacert has chosen to provide the CTK bootstrap hierarchy. The bootstrap process is an OPTIONAL part of the Broadband Delivery System. An Adopter may choose not to use Bootstrap keys. Likewise, an Adopter that would like a different implementation may perform the work in-house or hire a trust service provider.

Bootstrap CTK Set includes Company-specific Bootstrap TA (Trust Anchor), Client Bootstrap CA (Certification Authority), Bootstrap Server Signing and Encipherment Keys and Client Bootstrap Signing and Encipherment key pairs for each Device Maker. The Device Maker names are the same as used in the MTMO CTK set. All certificates SHALL be DER encoded and comply with RFC3280, [PKCS8] and [PKCS10].

The bootstrap servers/key pairs have a trust chain that links to a Company specific Bootstrap TA, rather than to a Marlin TA. Each company’s bootstrap hierarchy is unique and there is no interoperability between companies related to bootstrapping.

​

CTK is available with a small or large quantity of bootstrap device packets

a. In the “Bootstrap CTK Set”, subdirectories are provided with both 10 device packets and 1024 device packets. The 10 device packets are copies of the first 10 device packets from the 1024 subdirectory.

Each Client directory and Server directory will contain a Signing Key Pair and an Encipherment Key Pair. For a Client directory the public certificate of the Parent “session 110 key” is included (sig1.der). The Device directory is named with the “BID”. The BID is a unique bootstrap ID. It is the value after the last colon (:) in the Subject Name of the Device bootstrap keys. Both the Signing and Encipherment key pairs in the Device have the same BID in the subject name. BID is 4-8 hex characters and is created using the same format as @RID@.

The Server directory is named with the “ID”, the unique name in the Subject Name of the Bootstrap Service. The ID is the value after the last colon (:) in the Subject Name of the Service Certificate. Both the Signing and Encipherment key pairs in the Service have the same ID in the subject name. The public certificate and private key of the Bootstrap TA (co-ta.der, co-ta.pkcs8.der, profile #50) are provided. Likewise, the public certificate and private key of the Client Bootstrap CA (co-clientca.der, co-clientca.pkcs8.der, profile #51) are provided.

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[CORE] Marlin Core System Specification, Version 1.3

[BB] Marlin Broadband Delivery System Specification, Version 1.2

[PCKS8] PKCS #8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard, RSA Laboratories

[PKCS10] PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard, RSA Laboratories, May 26, 2000

[RFC2119] S. Bradner, Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.

[STARFISH] Starfish – Marlin Broadcast Encryption Scheme, Version 1.2

[X509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.

URI=“urn:marlin:organization:testpdc:@company@:bootstrap”

Subject Public Key Information

algorithm: rsaEncryption

modulus: 1024 bits

1.3.6.1.4.1.23727.1.1.1 = urn:marlin:sonyericsson:xperiapdc:seus:bootstrap

Extract from ROM not firmware. Then you have a root certificate. The certs on the firmware are output or cache for verification and can instantly be revoked. Assume that you managed to obtain one key - instantly revoked. There is a master key - it resides inside Octopus.

http://geohot.com/

Defendants George Hotz, “Bushing,” Hector Cantero, Sven Peter and “Segher”(collectively, “Defendants”) are computer hackers.

"Approximately a half hour in, the team revealed their new PS3 secrets, the moment we all were waiting for. One of the major highlights here was, dongle-less jailbreaking by overflowing the bootup NOR flash, giving complete control over the system. The other major feat, was calculating the public private keys (due to botched security), giving users the ability to sign their own SELFs Following this, the team declared Sony’s security to be EPIC FAIL! "

HERE IS WHAT SONY REALLY THINK ABOUT DEVELOPER COMMUNITY AND HOW THEY RESPOND TO INNOVATION

"Sony's core arguments — that it can silence speech that reveals security flaws using the DMCA and that the mere fact of a terms of use somewhere gives a company permanent and total control over what you do with a device under pain of criminal punishment — are both sweeping and frightening, and not just for gamers and computer researchers. Frankly, it's not what we expect from any company that cares about its customers, and we bet it's not what those customers expect, either. " - Co-authored by Corynne McSherry and Marcia Hofmann - EFF.COM (EFF is the leading civil liberties group defending

your rights in the digital world.)

Sony Computer Entertainment and those who believe they have any right to breech consumer privacy, without informing the public, your customers of your illegal software processes and activities, to circumvent people from utilizing your hardware to load their own software or operating system as they should be allowed to do. The members of this forum are mobile phone users, software developers, hobbyists, enthusiasts and people who work with computers and as information technology professionals. As far as I can see within this open source community, not one person has violated any law by looking inside the content of their mobile phones, purchased with no knowledge of an encrypted DRM being placed over the device at power on, to thwart any attempt at using the phone as a phone, without your malevolent spy ware or identity tracking techniques. I purchased this Sony Ericsson - Xperia mobile phone with my own money, gained by honest work. To be deceived in my purchase, is infuriating and

had I been properly informed, I would not have purchased this phone.

"Android was originated by a group of companies known as the Open Handset Alliance, led by Google. Today, many companies -- both original members of the OHA and others -- have invested heavily in Android, typically in the form of allocating significant engineering resources to improve Android and bring Android devices to Market.

We created Android in response to our own experiences launching mobile apps. We wanted to make sure that there would always be an open platform available for carriers, OEMs, and developers to use to make their innovative ideas a reality.

We wanted to make sure that there was no central point of failure, where one industry player could restrict or control the innovations of any other.

"

Thank's Sony Ericsson for ruining the chance to develop with and for this device. Q: What purpose does this DRM serve anyone who owns an X10 handset?

NO BENEFIT AT ALL!​

All information provided here in is open source and freely accessible from joining the Marlin Development Community - http://www.marlin-community.com/

https://www.eff.org/files/Sony_Complaint.PDF

DOES THIS LOOK FAMILIAR TO ANYONE?

HMAC for the service mode dongle: 46DCEAD317FE45D80923EB97E4956410D4CDB2C2

erk: C0 CE FE 84 C2 27 F7 5B D0 7A 7E B8 46 50 9F 93 B2 38 E7 70 DA CB 9F F4 A3 88 F8 12 48 2B E2 1B

riv: 47 EE 74 54 E4 77 4C C9 B8 96 0C 7B 59 F4 C1 4D

pub: C2 D4 AA F3 19 35 50 19 AF 99 D4 4E 2B 58 CA 29 25 2C 89 12 3D 11 D6 21 8F 40 B1 38 CA B2 9B 71 01 F3 AE B7 2A 97 50 19

R: 80 6E 07 8F A1 52 97 90 CE 1A AE 02 BA DD 6F AA A6 AF 74 17

n: E1 3A 7E BC 3A CC EB 1C B5 6C C8 60 FC AB DB 6A 04 8C 55 E1

K: BA 90 55 91 68 61 B9 77 ED CB ED 92 00 50 92 F6 6C 7A 3D 8D

Da: C5 B2 BF A1 A4 13 DD 16 F2 6D 31 C0 F2 ED 47 20 DC FB 06 70