[Security Discussion] CHEF-KOCH:
Open source isn't a guarantee for security. I'm tired to saying this over and over again here on xda and in other forums. And no, it's not open source since most devices comes with own stock android builds which may use other hardware/drivers and maybe other or touched encryptions. There is also no guarntee that it hold what it promise as long nobody can proof or deny it.

Once is more than enough, to get infected by faked Xposed Installers or other possible attacks. You scenarios are very unrealistic, nobody only use root only for one single module - You can't tell me that. Attackers don't need to mount data if you installed apps on external sdcard which isn't encrypted.

Incoming connections are not necessary, outgoing is more important to send data to a eg. C&C.

Sure but it's unrealistic too, I will use the phone and not use encryption which can be attacked or bypassed except the phone is offline.

Please give me the source, thanks. According to this normal userdata not getting any wipe on encryption fail and on other systems then EXT4 or F2FS nothing will be done (no access). And as long /data is not mounted there is also no access, that's the reason android temporary mount /data each time to promt for passwords, other processes and such (for more look in the documents)

I didn't know that but nvm it's unimportant since the master key is still on the device itself - which will definitely not erased and as said it not protect against privacy data stealing which is more important, nobody want you android files, only you passwords etc ...

Iptables are not installed on every system and not working anymore since Android 5 need some extra flags like -pie and to replace the system own or installing them needs root too - oh, and to fix possible startup data leaks also needs root for init.d.

I'm not saying other stuff but you are the one which said that the performance impact is minimal and I'm the one which said encryption should work out of the box for all on any device - sure it's definitly an implementation thing, but as a workaround older devices may just simple lower the encryption e.g. 256 -> 128 Bit.

I'm not comparing cars I only compare the encryption algos which haven't much changed over the years (just some fixes here and there but under the hood the car still needs 4 wheels).

We talked about encryption and possible attacks and you still can't deny them all. You try to find some excuses but under the line it will be cracked - and not in 10 years, this or next year I promise because of this reasons:

- Cracking the pins normally takes only seconds: they are simply to short or follow patterns due to being the same as the lock screen password. Practically speaking, the security of this entire story depends on the passphrase the user sets. If it is very long, it makes brute forcing difficult. But most people would set a 4/6/8 digit PIN, because who would want to enter a 20 digit password with alphabets and special characters every time you want to make a call or send a message?!

- Cracking Encryption in general -> Encrypted Master Key + Salt stored in footer and they are usually stored at the end of the partition or in a footer file on other partitions

- OEM's may use a different key management module

- Some forensic boot images are available which makes it possible to start early in the boot chain before the whole system loads ->

- Keyloggers or memory catcher allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data -> including encryption keys and passwords for non encrypted content

- If the device is already compromised with malware it will be possible send things into the internet

- Some root kits already breaking most of all hard disk encryption such as the "Stoned" bootkit on TrueCrypt

- A factory reset also resets the master key