MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Peter Rodman

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Briefings of West Coast Businessmen and Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, Tuesday, October 20, 1970

You are now holding in your hand the following:

Tab A: Talking Points on Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Trip (which Lord/Rodman did for your meeting with labor leaders on October 13)

Tab B: Additional Material on Vietnam Initiative

1. Summary of President's Speech of Oct. 7

2. Q's & A's Prepared for Oct. 7

3. Two Memos from Smyser

Tab C: Additional Talker on the Middle East (prepared by Saunders for your Hartford briefing)

Tab D: Talking Points on the General Philosophy of the Administration

Tab E: Changes in the Strategic Balance since the Cuban Missile Crisis (DOD & ISS figures)

Tab F: Sen. Edward Kennedy's Speech at Worcester, August 21, 1968 (text)

and:

Tab G: Highlights of Kissinger Backgrounders, 1970.

On the opposite flap of this folder are backup reference materials on the Vietnam ceasefire initiative, prepared by Smyser and Lord for your October 7 briefings.

In a separate folder are transcripts of seven of your recent backgrounders -- San Clemente on June 26, San Clemente on Aug 24, Chicago on Sept 16, pre-trip Briefing on Sept. 25, two Vietnam Speech Briefings on Oct 7, and Hartford on Oct. 12.

TIMING OF CEASE-FIRE

**Question:** Why do you propose a cease-fire now when you have not proposed one for all this time?

**Answer:** Essentially, there are two reasons:

- We think the Paris talks are at such a deadlock that new types of proposals and a new framework for discussion could perhaps help move things forward.

- The military situation is now clearly more stable than it has been with less unit actions and lower casualties. A cease-fire in this situation may be useful because Hanoi may be more prepared now to recognize that it can no longer alter the outcome materially by the application of military force.

Q: Why are you surfacing this initiative now? Is it a political ploy to influence the election?

A: As I pointed out, preparatory work began on a ceasefire as early as February of last year. But even more importantly, at the time of his Cambodian decision the President directed an intense interdepartmental effort designed to develop new approaches to peace in Southeast Asia. As you know, Ambassador Bruce did not arrive in Paris until August but even more importantly, North Vietnamese Ambassador Xuan Thui did not arrive until September 3. We had originally planned to announce our initiative at the first appropriate Paris meeting following the arrival of both senior negotiators. Subsequently, the Middle East crisis intervened and the President determined to announce his initiative at the first suitable opportunity following the subsidence of the more urgent tensions in the Middle East. Certainly, there are those political pundits who could claim with some justification that today's time is premature for domestic political purposes.

[4]

Q&As RAISED BY RON ZEIGLER

1. **Question:** When was the final decision made on the President's initiative?

**Answer:** Studies on the ceasefire proposal were commenced interdepartmentally as early as last year but more precisely, preparatory work on the initiative was begun at the President's direction at the time of the commencement of our operations in Cambodia last spring.

2. **Question:** Who would we propose as international observers to supervise the ceasefire?

**Answer:** We have no specific proposal. This is a subject for follow-on negotiation. We do believe it is essential to get a better arrangement then that represented by the present ICC and we also want more Asian states in the supervisory mechanism.

3. **Question:** Would we accept application of the ceasefire only to South Vietnam?

**Answer:** No.

4. **Question:** Who would attend the Indochina Conference on Peace?

**Answer:** This is also a subject for negotiation. We feel generally that Asian states with an interest in the settlement should be represented as well as the major powers.

5. **Question:** What are the essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962?

**Answer:** The 1954 Accords covered Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and were only signed by the French and the Viet Minh. The 1962 Accords only dealt with Laos.

(continued)

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The 1954 Accords provided for the withdrawal of French and communist forces into regroupment zones provided at the 17th parallel. They also provided for mutual non-interference in the respective zones. The withdrawals and the subsequent maintenance of the Accords were to be supervised by joint commissions and the ICC.

The 1962 Accords also provided for withdrawal of forces and for the neutrality of Laos.

6.

**Question:** Why do you say this is something new, when you still refuse a coalition government and talk of mutual withdrawal?

**Answer:** If you define something new as being a simple acceptance of Hanoi's position, then these proposals do not represent something new. However, if you define something new as meaning the proposal of new avenues for exploration and negotiation, and as an effort to setforth new ideas which may break the deadlock by suggesting a new framework for discussion, then these proposals are indeed very new.

7. **Question:** Will the withdrawal timetable be for unilateral or mutual withdrawal?

**Answer:** As the President stated, our withdrawals will be based on principles established earlier. The specific occasion for the establishment of these principles was the President's speech on May 14, 1969. Essentially, we visualize withdrawing on a mutual basis.

8. **Question:** If we say a political settlement must take into account political realities why won't we accept a coalition government?

**Answer:** The establishment of a coalition government would, in effect, constitute an imposition of forces which do not represent political realities in South Vietnam.

9. **Question:** We say bombing must stop. Does this relate to supplies flowing down approaching the trail and to Cambodian troop movements and supply flows?

**Answer:** If the principles cited for the cease-fire are applied, all warfare would stop. This would include fighting in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam and all levels of conflict ranging from bombing to acts of terror.

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October 9, 1970

# THE MIDDLE EAST

## Where We Stand

The events of the last few weeks suggest that we take stock for a moment as to what the broad outlines are for the prospects of peace in the Middle East. Looking broadly at the picture there, let us examine both sides of the equation.

On one hand, since the acceptance of our peace initiative and the cease-fire/standstill in early August:

- We have had a cessation in fighting along the Suez.

- We continue to have agreement in principle by the parties to proceed with talks through Ambassador Jarring.

- We have -- as a result of the President's Mediterranean tour -- a greater first hand feeling of international support for our efforts to help the parties work out something durable in the Mid-East to bring an end to the two decades of bitter controversy.

These are elements of progress that we want to preserve.

On the other hand, in this period:

- There have been significant violations to the standstill agreement which have delayed the start of negotiations. Israel, as you know, has declined for the moment to participate in the Jarring talks until the situation as of the date of the cease-fire is restored.

- Jordan has gone through a virtual civil war, made all the more serious by Syrian intervention. The aftermath of that tension is still apparent.

- Finally, the UAR -- and the Arab world -- has seen the sudden death of President Nasser. The Egyptians can be expected, quite naturally, to pass through a period of sorting themselves out in the wake of President Nasser's death.

These are the elements which give us pause. They need not change our basic intention to help the Mid-East move toward a peaceful solution nor cause us to disregard the progress I have mentioned. They do remind us of the fragile character of the situation with which we are dealing.

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We have always recognized that no conflict of this age and bitterness can be solved overnight. We made this clear in launching our peace initiative.

On balance, we have those elements which I mentioned as representing movement from almost total intransigence to a first step. We also have those aspects of the picture which will still prevent us from taking a second step.

## Implications for How We Proceed

Having come to this point, it is worth reflecting on the implications of events over the last two months for future prospects for peace. The key question raised by these events is whether or not the parties to the Mid-East conflict are in a position to create an atmosphere that could produce a settlement.

**Cease-fire violations:** Any negotiation requires evidence of credibility of the parties who are involved. No negotiation can succeed without evidence of good faith. There is in this situation the question of good faith not only between the UAR and Israel but also between the USSR and the U.S. The standstill agreement was essentially an agreement to negotiate on the basis of the military balance that existed at the time of the cease-fire. The UAR/USSR violations were designed to put further military pressure on Israel despite the agreement not to. The violations of the standstill therefore at the very least create a political problem that must be resolved before talks can begin. It was quite evident on the President's trip all nations support the cease-fire concept. But good faith must underlie this and any extension of the cease-fire to rehabilitate the climate for talks.

**Jordan:** The events in Jordan raise another aspect of credibility. In this case the issue is confidence in the commitment of the parties to perform their obligations under any agreement that may be reached. It also raised questions about the ability and willingness of the international community to enforce international order. The Jordan situation points up the problems with regard to an individual party attempting to fulfill its commitments -- i.e. whether Hussein can still enforce a peace settlement in Jordan. With regard to the intervention by the Syrians, it pointed up the need for residual responsibility by other powers with influence to do what they can to restrain disruptive forces. Our readiness was an indication of assuming our responsibility in the event of a deteriorating situation.

There is one other aspect dramatized by the internal conflict in Jordan -- the voice of the Palestinians in any peace settlement. It has become fashionable

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in some quarters to say that the time has come to create a Palestinian state. This is not a decision for the U. S. to make -- it is a decision for the people of Jordan both Palestinian and non-Palestinian and for others who have a legitimate concern on the ground. We have always recognized that legitimate Palestinian grievances and aspirations must be met in a settlement or there will be no lasting settlement. The U. S. has no interest in a settlement that the parties themselves will not have an interest in making work.

## The UAR after Nasser

Nasser's death will create a period in the UAR when as a practical matter it would seem difficult to take bold steps toward peace. The key question here is whether the new leadership will judge that the UAR can no longer devote its resources so heavily to war and should seek a reasonable settlement with Israel or whether they will feel it necessary to press the war to consolidate their new positions.¹

Beyond the UAR's borders, the absence of Nasser's leadership may remove an inhibition against extremist pressures. It may be more difficult for Hussein, for instance, to come to terms with Israel.

HIGHLIGHTS OF KISSINGER BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS, 1970

First, last week the President made a major proposal on Vietnam. I will come back to that at the end of my remarks. But I would like to stress what seems to us to be its basic significance.

Earlier this summer we proposed a cease-fire in the Middle East. There were many who doubted whether that could work, and the initial reactions were anything but encouraging. But after about six weeks, the cease-fire came into being.

Last week we proposed a cease-fire in Vietnam. We cannot say that the initial reactions have been encouraging, but if you read the press briefing we gave before the speech was even delivered, you will see that we didn't expect the initial reaction to be encouraging.

This is the North Vietnamese negotiating method.

But the major point we would like to make is that if the cease-fire should come into being, we would have, for the first time since the end of World War II, no wars going on anywhere in the world. And it would, therefore, symbolize, initially primarily on a tactical level, what this Administration considers to be its primary goal. We have had a summer of crises, and we may have managed them reasonably well, but we don't want to be judged by how well we manage crises.

The task that this Administration has set for itself is to try to contribute to a lasting peace. Since the turn of the century, no generation has known a generation of peace in America, or, for that matter, in the world. The objective of this Administration is, therefore, of course, to avoid war if at all possible when a crisis arises, but, beyond that, to build a structure of peace so that crises do not occur, and so that the world can live increasingly with some sense of tranquility, so that the younger generation can look forward to building their lives with some expectation of continuity.

This is the primary objective of the Administration, and in order to do this, we have to pay attention both to our power as well as to the elements of negotiation and conciliation.

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There are many who have a tendency to say that we should found policy on either one or the other, that somehow or other strength is incompatible with generosity, and to deride what they call geopolitical approaches as against approaches of conciliation. But events over the last two months should have made clear that you cannot but have one with the other, that only the strong can be generous and restrained. But .. by the same token, strength cannot be an end in itself, and cannot become an obsession of national policy.

It is how to navigate this line that has been our concern, as I will try to show you when I talk about some specific issues. But, having set this general stage, let me go back to some of the structural problems of peace as we see it.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 5-6)

# I. The End of the Postwar Era

First, the general approach of this Administration: When the history of this period is written, I think it will appear that the big change in American foreign policy occurred not in the early 1960s when it was proclaimed, but in the late 1960s under this Administration when the claims for it were less vocal.

At the end of April of this year when the President announced a decision that American combat troops would clean out the sanctuaries in Cambodia, there were a number of people who stated that maybe the language of the speech was inappropriate to the conditions of this period. And I think that for this criticism to be made at all shows how far the mood has come from those early days in the 1960s when President Kennedy was inaugurated.

Nothing that this Administration has ever said can compare with the speeches in the early part of the Kennedy Administration, such as the remark in the inaugural address when President Kennedy said -- we will get you the exact quote -- but roughly like this:

> "We will pay any price, we will bear any burden, we will meet any hardship, we will support any friend, we will fight any enemy to assure the survival of liberty."

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[N]

This undifferentiated global approach to foreign policy really marked the early period of the previous Administration as the last flowering of the era that was started with the Marshall Plan.

Now, let me say, to begin with, that I am not saying this as a criticism of the Kennedy Administration. There were many of us who were moved by this approach at the time. I am citing it as an example of the changed conditions that have occurred since that period. I am sure that history will record that the early 1960's marked the last flowering of a period in which the United States found itself propelled into world affairs at the end of World War II against our tradition, even against our inclination, by conditions that had been brought about partly by the war, partly by the history prior to the war.

At the end of World War II, the United States was the only major non-Communist country in the world capable of conducting a global foreign policy. Every one of the traditional great powers, with the exception of Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the war. Every one of the traditional great powers, including Great Britain, had been weakened enormously by the war.

In major parts of the world, civil government became problematical, and projecting government abroad became almost unthinkable. The United States was the only non-Communist country with sufficient domestic cohesion, resources and vitality to conduct a consistent foreign policy.

In these conditions, it was natural to believe that, unless the United States made itself responsible both for security and for progress in every part of the world, that both . security and progress were unachievable. And this was also correct in the conditions of the late 1940's.

But it brought about a state of affairs in which, all over the world, the United States gradually slid into the position where we began to act as if the security of other countries was more important for us than it was for them, and where economic and political progress was a greater American interest than it was an interest of the countries concerned.

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[Y]

It brought about a situation also where many of
these countries could avoid the burden of difficult choices
by shifting to the United States the onus for complicated
decisions. In many parts of the world, countries avoided the
problems either of defense or of development by hiding behind
American prescriptions.

Now, I repeat: In the late 40's, throughout the
50's, maybe even in the early 60's, this was inevitable.
But as a permanent feature of international affairs, it was
extremely dangerous. It overtaxed partly our physical and
certainly our psychological resources. It created an attitude
of emotional dependence on us by other countries. It in-
jected the United States directly and immediately into the
domestic disputes of every country all over the world, and
it created temptations for interventions that perhaps. -- that
certainly should not become a permanent feature of American
policy.

Now, all of these conditions, all of these circum-
stances, became more and more apparent throughout the 1960's,
and the situation that this Administration inherited was not
caused, necessarily, by the failures of preceding policies, but
it was also caused in part by their successes.

(San Clemente, Aug. 24, pp.5-7)

Conditions have changed because, to take two
primary examples, the countries of Western Europe and Japan
have regained a great deal of their economic vitality.
Indeed, they have exceeded their pre-World War II economic
performance by a considerable margin. Those countries are
capable of acting on a much broader scale than they have, and of
shouldering much greater responsibilities than has been the
case previously.

The new countries have, most of them, gone through
the birth pangs of independence and have developed their
initial governmental structure, and they, too, would like to
and should play a more autonomous role.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 7-8)

[N]

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B. Transformation of the Communist World
1. Disunity

A second major change that has occurred as against the 40's and 50's is in the structure of the Communist world. In the 40's and 50's, one thought of the Communist world as monolithic, as inherently aggressive, comparable to Nazi Germany, as responding to a unified direction from a central authority.

Events since then have proved that that vision is no longer applicable. First of all, contrary to Communist theory, the spread of Communism has not brought unity to the Communist world or an era of peace, but quite the contrary. According to Communist theory, wars occur only because of the Capitalist structure of society and the spread of Communism allegedly would lead to the disappearance of international conflict.

The fact of the matter is that the Red army has been used four times since the end of World War II, always against allies. The Communist world has found it next to impossible to settle internal disputes by negotiation because it doesn't recognize that there should be internal disputes. It cannot apply the maxims of foreign policy to its internal disputes since they do not look at other Communist countries as foreign, but they cannot settle the matters as domestic issues because the countries retain a considerable measure of their sovereignty.

Probably the most intractable conflict in the world today is not between us and the Soviet Union, but between the Soviet Union and Communist China. That affects the structure of international relations in a way that was unforeseeable in the 40's and 50's.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 8-9)

In many ways, this is a conflict that is very difficult to resolve. It is probably impossible to resolve for a number of reasons. First, ideological. It is very difficult in a movement that claims to represent the truth to have two centers of orthodoxy, each of which claims that it has the infallible interpretation of the existing doctrine.

If you look back at the history of religious conflicts, you will see that this is not an easy matter to achieve.

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[Y]

Secondly, the control of the Communist parties around the world is a major concern in the state rivalries between those two countries. So both of these countries are being driven by their attempt to control the world Communist parties into positions that they might not necessarily otherwise want to take, and actually it is one of the reasons why there are limits on the conciliatoriness they can show towards us.

A Stalin who represented the only recognized central focus for communism could afford to advance and retreat. This is not so easy for either of the two big Communist centers now.

Thirdly, and most importantly, there is a brutal geopolitical fact, which is there are 800 million people sitting along a frontier of 4,000 to 5,000 miles which is populated on the other side by 30 million Russians. These 800 million people are showing in their history books in high school vast tracts of territory on the Russian side as belonging to China. The Chinese are claiming everything that was acquired by Russia in the 19th century as part of China, including all the maritime provinces on the Pacific, that is to say, Vladivostok and the whole stretch of territory there. You can imagine how we would feel -- actually, the Canada example wasn't so good.

A better example would be if Mexico had a population of 800 million and showed in its history books all the territories acquired by the United States in 1948 as part of Mexico, and started building nuclear weapons. We would get uneasy. (Laughter.)

Therefore, there has been a steady substantial buildup of Soviet military power on the Chinese frontier since 1965, not just in the last year. It has been going on since 1965 and there are more Soviet troops facing China now than there are facing Europe. They are much further forward in relation to the frontier than they are in relation to Europe.

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[Y]

This does not mean that with the death of Mao, who carries disputes to ideological extremes, there may be not an amelioration of some of the immediate tensions. Nevertheless, whoever rules in the Kremlin must be conscious of the fact that a Mao was possible once, and, therefore, can happen again, and that this basic fact which I have described is very difficult to eliminate.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 40-41)

## 2. Erosion of Ideology

The fact of the matter has been that the situation vis-a-vis the Communist world has become much more complex. First of all, without under-rating Communist aggressiveness, its preferred form is not the launching of massive military invasions against Western countries. Its preferred form is a combination of military, psychological and political pressures that always stop well short of the sort of total confrontation that Hitler produced, and which puts much greater strain on political leadership and on the cohesion of the non-Communist countries than an all-out onslaught would.

Secondly, the Communist world has proved to be no more immune to the erosion of time than other human institutions. First, within the Communist world, within each Communist country, there is a real structural problem.

I once visited Czechoslovakia and a high Communist said to me, "You can't imagine how we envy you, your system of elections." He said, "We don't care about elections, as such," he said, "but there is absolutely no way we have of getting rid of super-annuated personnel. We simply can't change our top leadership."

You look at Communist countries around the world and you will find that there is no mechanism short of some purge or some other violent upheaval of changing the top leadership. Most of them are getting older in every Communist country. The bureaucracies are getting more and more deadly and more and more entrenched, and the Communist parties, as such, are losing any real function.

The Communist parties were necessary, first, to make the revolution; then to enforce discipline during a period of industrialization. But in an advanced industrial state, there

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[N]

really isn't any role for an ideological, quasi-religious institution like the Communist party, which is not needed to run the Government, which is not needed to run the economy, and which, therefore, may develop a vested interest in foreign conflict, or at least in a certain level of foreign tension, just to prove a need for its eternal vigilance.

But in any event, there is this tension within every Communist country between the bureaucracies and one almost might be tempted to say in the priesthood represented by the Communist parties, which create a certain stultifying consequence.

(San Clemente, Aug. 24, pp. 8-9)

> The wildest public reception that I have ever seen for anybody was that received by the President in Stalinist Romania, in a Romania that is considered in many respects the hard line state in Eastern Europe, which indicated that even after thirty years or nearly thirty years of Communist rule, there is an enormous reservoir of faith in Western values.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, p. 8)

It can be said without any equivocation that there is no country in the world in which Western ideas have ever been more popular, than in those which the Communists have taken over, especially in Eastern Europe.

The one place in the world where Western liberal ideas tend to be essentially unchallenged is in the intellectual communities of Eastern Europe, who can't understand their confreres in the West at all.

(San Clemente, Aug. 24, p. 9)

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[x]

C. *The Strategic Balance*

Another crucial change that has occurred is the
change in the security situation, and that is not necessarily
working in our favor.

One reason why the United States in the immediate post-
war period could assume the burden or the responsibility for
the defense of almost the entire non-Communist world was because
the strategic military balance was overwhelmingly in our favor.

In as late as 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the
Soviet Union had around 40 ICBM's. We had over 1000 bombers
and over 200 missiles that could reach the Soviet Union.

In short, our strategic superiority was overwhelming.
The Soviet Union could not respond to our pressure on Cuba
by bringing pressure on areas where we were vulnerable such as
Berlin, because they had to be worried that we might do to them
what later the Israelis did to the Arabs; namely, launch a
preemptive strike.

Therefore, our strategic superiority defended not only
us but all our allies and even those countries that were not our
allies, but that were thought to be likely to trigger an
American response.

There were many people, including myself, who criticized
John Foster Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine in the 1950's.
But in historical retrospect, it was correct for the conditions
of that period.

But today, the Soviet Union has over 1,400 long-range
missiles. In other words, they have increased the number of
their missiles 30-fold since 1962. Indeed, they have more long-range missiles than we do today.

In these circumstances, this does not mean that they are
superior to us, or that they can defeat us. They cannot do this.
But it is a different decision for the President of the United
States to risk general nuclear war when the strategic equation
is this than it was throughout most of the post-war period.

Therefore, the possibility of defending other countries
with strategic American power alone has fundamentally changed,
and no amount of reassurance on our part can change these facts.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 9-10)

[N]

Let me say a word, first, about the general approach of the President. The President's basic concern has been that he did not want to administer chaos; that he did not only want to be known as someone who had handled crises more or less effectively. He gave his senior advisers the basic charge of trying to determine, first, where we ought to be going over a reasonable period of time, say five to ten years, and to try to put before him what kind of a world it was that we were trying to bring about, and then put before him the widest range of choices that could be assembled.

($San Clemente, Aug. 24, p. 10)

one of the basic charges that the President has given to all of his key associates, to all the members of the National Security Council, is he always wants to know where we are going before he is prepared to discuss individual tactics.

He does not like to be drawn into a discussion of great detail.

I had to learn this lesson very early in the Administration when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese started an offensive and, geared to the different style of operation of the previous administration, many of our military wanted to come rushing over to the White House and run the battle from the Situation Room.

I told them, "Wait a minute and let me check with the President as to what he wants to do." I went in to him and said, "They want to come over." He said, "Is there any decision I need to make now, that I can make?" I said, "No." He said, "I don't want to see them until they are ready with a decision that I have to make. Then they should come back. But I don't want to be cluttered up with a lot of tactical considerations that aren't my business."

That is a very crucial aspect of the style of this Administration. The basic question that the President keeps asking is, "Where are we going?"

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 11-12)

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[N]

In almost every issue that has gone before the National Security Council, he has insisted that, first, we discuss the general philosophy of our approach before he would even entertain any tactical propositions.

When we developed our Latin American policy, for example, we spent three hours in the National Security Council defining just what it was that we were trying to accomplish in Latin America before any practical scheme was put forward. And he has consistently followed this approach in every area.

In implementing these approaches, of course, we face the problem that in every revolutionary period, vestiges of the old overlap with the new. It is only in the halls of academia, from which I come and to which I may or may not be able to return, (laughter) that you can segment events into nice little compartments and say, "This is the period of America adopting a lower profile." There is always going to be some vestige of one period while you move into the new period.

But, in general, the direction in which we have attempted to move has tried to take into account the fact that now there are other nations that can, and should, assume greater responsibilities, to take into account the changed facts of strategic relationships, to take into account the multi-polarity of the Communist system, and all of this has been wrapped together in what was called the "Nixon Doctrine," which was enunciated in Guam in July, 1969, at the beginning of the President's trip around the world.

The Nixon Doctrine advances three general propositions: One, that the United States will honor all of its commitments; secondly, that when a non-nuclear country is threatened by a nuclear country, the United States recognizes special responsibilities. It recognizes these special responsibilities because, if it did not, there would be an enormous incentive for other countries to develop a nuclear capability of their own and because there is no conceivable way non-nuclear countries can resist, unless there is some implicit backing, at least, from the nuclear countries.

Now, this is not a commitment of what we will do in all circumstances. It simply says that we recognize a special responsibility in those cases.

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[N]

Thirdly, that in other cases, both with respect to security and to development, the initial, indeed the primary responsibility for both security and development rests first with the country concerned, secondly with the region concerned. The United States will participate when its interests require it, where its participation can make a difference, but it will not engage itself as the primary country in the first line of defense, or as the first responsibility for development, unless there is a significant local effort.

We will not assume a position where we can be approached by other countries who tell us that, "if we are taken over, it is worse for you than it is for us." We do not accept that proposition.

So, this doctrine, which emphasizes greater local responsibility, and which encourages regional groupings both for development and defense, is what we have been trying to apply all over the world.

Now, we have to make clear that this is not an attempt for the United States to withdraw from the world. It is an attempt by the United States to establish a policy toward the rest of the world which we can maintain over an indefinite period of time. It is our way of remaining committed to the world in ways that we can sustain, rather than in projecting ourselves into huge efforts that then tear us apart domestically, and that cannot be sustained.

(San Clemente, Aug. 24, pp. 10-12)

In any event, too brutal changes have a tendency to shake. the confidence of other countries who can regulate their action to ours in part only by the steadiness of our performance.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, p. 11)

## C. Procedures and Purposes

If I could digress into making a personal observation for a moment, I am often asked, "What have you learned in your position that you did not know as a professor?" You cannot find a Harvard professor who will make an admission on that subject with great spontaneity. There is indeed one aspect of the sort of positions that we occupy such that your best reflection would best come after your period in office. But one thing has struck me very much, and it is this:

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[N]

When I was a professor, once I had identified a problem, I could usually give it as much time as it needed to do the best thing I could do with it. It was theoretically possible that I was wrong, though not many students passed my courses if they made that assertion.

But at any rate, I could do then the best of which I was capable. So identifying the problem was in a way tantamount to producing whatever solution I was capable of finding.

In the jobs that Joe and I occupy, identifying a problem is only the very beginning of the difficulty. There are many problems of which I am perfectly well aware, and for which I even think I have a solution, or for which I am quite confident that I could find a solution if I could ever get around to them.

One of the problems in the higher offices is to establish a priority among your challenges in such a way that hopefully you will solve the high priority ones before the middle priority ones hit you. But every once in a while these things get out of whack and you get hit by something which you simply never got around to dealing with, and then you gentlemen point out, quite correctly now, "Why in God's name was not there adequate planning?"

To make another digression, planning is a waste of time unless it is done by the people who have got to execute it. Unless you can get the attention of the top policy makers, you are just writing theoretical academic papers.

I made this digression only partly to prove how important I am, but primarily to point out that when you look at the top decision makers of the United States who have responsibilities for every part of the world at every moment of time, this priority problem which I described can become unmanageable. Therefore it is in our interest, and it is in the interest of other countries, that others bear partially the physical, but above all the psychological burden of making some of these initial decisions, if you will, of taking some of these priorities. And this is in a word the basic thrust of our foreign policy and the basic objective of the Nixon Doctrine.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 7-8)

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The same was true with the cease-fire proposal that was made last week. I have seen a lot of speculation of why now and how did it get made. And I will be glad to answer some of this in the question period. But the important thing to remember is that the analytical work on this began last December when the President ordered a detailed study, in a special study group that was set up within the National Security Council system, of the security situation in the provinces. We sent special teams to Vietnam to give us a map of what exactly the security situation was, province by province.

Later on in March we then analyzed the impact of three types of cease-fires on the security situation in the provinces, and from there we finally developed the models for the standstill cease-fire that we offered last week.

I am not at this point going into any detailed discussion of what it meant or what the significance of it is. But I want to point out that the process is directed at the purposes, and that the President insists on being presented with choices, and that we are trying to the greatest degree possible to reduce the tactical element and to concentrate on the long-term conceptual element.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, p. 12)

### III, Relations with the Soviet Union
*   **SALT**

The other course that we have attempted to pursue has been to regulate our rivalry with the Communist world in the interest of long-term peace. I have already mentioned to you some of the factors that produce a cautious optimism in this respect, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This policy was described by the President in his Inaugural Address as a policy of negotiation rather than confrontation.

Let me say first a few general things about it, and then I will illustrate it with a number of, or at least one example, the example from the SALT negotiations.

A great deal of our public debate tends to be, if I can use a fashionable word, "polarized" between those who say negotiation is an abstract exercise of good will, and others who say there is no point in trusting any Communists; the only way of dealing with them is through a pure exercise of power.

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Some people argue that any time you mention security considerations, it must mean that you like war, and that if you mention the fact that our allies might be dependent on certain raw material, that this indicates that you enjoy the study of geopolitics.

This Administration is of the view that one does not prove one's flexibility in negotiations by denying the realities of contemporary international politics. We have proved enormous flexibility on a number of issues. We renounced biological warfare altogether, which is more than any nation, any major nation, has done.

We have developed, on the issue of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the most generous position that was before the President.

But we also believe that, if the minimum security requirements of ourselves and our allies are not preserved, that then there will be nothing left to negotiate about. Therefore, we are attempting to keep those two in balance.

When this Administration came into office, we were confronted with the prospect of talks on strategic arms limitations, the so-called SALT talks. We were overwhelmed with recommendations that we immediately start those talks, and that we put a position before the Soviet Union.

The theory was that it is always better to talk than to continue to arm, and we don't object to this. In fact, we believe that the arms race should be brought under control, and we are making major efforts to bring it under control. But also, looking at the history of the last 10 years, we became convinced that, if you looked at the history of all previous arms control negotiations, you will find that the nuclear test ban, which was a relatively simple issue compared to what we are facing now, took us five years to negotiate, and our final position was so far away from our first position that you have to conclude that we entered it without knowing exactly what we were doing.

The Nonproliferation Treaty took four years to negotiate. It didn't even concern American weapons.

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Here we were going to enter the whole complex of offensive and defensive weapons, about which, within each government, there was a considerable amount of disagreement, and the great danger was that if we went into negotiations immediately, we would spend more time negotiating with ourselves than with the Soviets.

The traditional pattern had been that the United States would adopt a position, the Soviet Union would then adopt a position, we would then have to go back to our own bureaucracy and renegotiate the initial position within our government, a process which never took less than three to six months, go back to the Soviet and repeat this process for years. This is the history of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In this case, the President ordered the fullest study that has ever been made of all offensive and defensive weapons that could conceivably be the subject of negotiation. We analyzed what the implications of these weapons would be if there were no limitations, what confidence we had in our inspection system, what we could do in case we detected a violation, what the risk would be if we didn't detect a violation; in other words, how much cheating they could get away with. And having made all these preparations, we then entered the negotiations.

While it is premature to say anything about outcomes, we depend in part on the political conditions. We can say already that -- and all our negotiators agree with this -- the negotiations on the limitations of strategic arms that have been taking place in Helsinki and Vienna have been the best arms control negotiations that we have ever engaged in with the Soviet Union.

We have had a very flexible position; that is, we have been able, as a result of this exhaustive preparation, to take account of Soviet objections when they were legitimate, and adapt our position to what, in fact, went on in Vienna, so that at one point we could change our position within a two-week period, which was an unheard-of event previously.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has taken a soberer approach to these negotiations than to any others. They have not done the same sort of meticulous preparation that we did, but, on the other hand, their negotiating proposals, while tough and while of course geared to Soviet interests, have not been mischievous.

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So we are cautiously optimistic about the progress of the Strategic Arms Talks. We believe that in another session or two we ought to be able to tell whether a realistic agreement is possible, and in such other session -- meaning extending over a number of months, not one meeting -- in such circumstance if we should be successful we would have brought about a change in the strategic situation through negotiation which goes far beyond anything that has been done previously.

(San Clemente, Aug. 24, pp. 12-14)

Concurrently, in our relations with adversaries, we try to take account of the changed strategic relationships that I have pointed out. All of the canons of traditional international politics indicate that a sovereign country should take advantage of every position that it possibly can and that it should press its potential opponents for whatever gains, however marginal, because it can accumulate them over a longer period of time.

It is the belief of this Administration, with the weapons systems that have accumulated over the last two decades, that such a course must lead to disaster, that if the great nuclear powers adopt a policy where they will try to squeeze the maximum petty advantage out of every situation, where it is a settled axiom of their policy that they will try to put their opponent at a constant disadvantage, the end result must be sooner or later some sort of confrontation that can easily get out of control.

Under present circumstances, restraint is an essential aspect of foreign policy and the willingness to settle outstanding differences has to be an essential component of any foreign policy.

This is why the President, in his Inaugural Address, announced the policy of negotiation and not confrontation. This is why on disarmament, the Middle East, the whole host of other issues, we have been prepared to negotiate with the other side and why we believe that it is a wise negotiating practice to keep in mind the legitimate concerns of the other side.

At the same time we are not confusing foreign policy with psychiatry. We do not believe that the other side will settle with us because they think that our negotiators are nice guys. We do not think that it is doing justice to the seriousness with which others pursue foreign policy

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to believe that they will make concessions on the basis of
personalities and, therefore, we attempt to conduct our
negotiations precisely, correctly, with the most careful pre-
paration. And we insist that if we restrain ourselves, if
we do not attempt to achieve unilateral advantage, that the
same maxims must be applied to us. It will not do that other
countries attempt to take advantage of negotiations with us.

In this respect, we are perhaps at a crucial
point in our policy of negotiations in which it will have to
be tested whether we will be met in the same spirit as the
one with which we propose to proceed. This spirit recognizes
existing realities, and recognizes that the preservation
of peace must be a principal objective in the foreign policy
of all countries, that it is inconsistent with such a policy
to apply the old maxims of pure power politics, and that the
greatest advantage that can be achieved for any country
in the achievement of a peace which gives real security.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 14-15)

## IV. The Middle East
### A. The Problems of Peace

Let me say one word about the Middle East which
Secretary Sisco will also, of course, cover in much greater
detail.

When we came into office, the overwhelming national
c concern was with Vietnam, and even today there are periodic
outbursts of popular manifestations on the issue of Vietnam.
Yet, the problem of Vietnam, as I will explain to you in a
minute, is one which we believe is not unmanageable.

At any rate, it is not a problem which is likely
to lead to general war. We believe our policy will succeed.
We are confident that it will succeed. But if it should not
succeed, in that sense the probability of its leading to
expansion of hostilities is very low.

In the Middle East, we face a much more difficult
situation. We face local rivalries which involve the great
nuclear powers on opposite sides, but which they cannot
necessarily control. No great power planned the hijacking
that occurred. No one can be sure that some local group may

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not generate a sequence of events which may engage the
nuclear powers even against their will. And this is why we
have, with urgency, and with great emphasis, pushed the peace
offensive with which Secretary Sisco is so notably
associated.

The issues are extraordinarily complex. Somebody
said in the 19th Century with respect to an issue then,
the Schleswig-Holstein question, that only three people
had ever understood it: One had died, the second had gone
mad, and he was the third, and he had forgotten it. (Laughter)

Joe Sisco has understood the Middle East problem..
I won't tell you into which category he fits. (Laughter)

The complexity of the issue is that a solution
totally satisfactory to all sides is probably unattainable.
The best that is attainable is a solution with which each
side is equally dissatisfied, so that you spread the
dissatisfactions fairly. Much of the editorial comment has
gone in waves of what I frankly consider excessive optimism
and excessive pessimism. The situation was never as good
as it was described at the end of July, and it is not as bad
as it is often described today. Joe and I often talked
about the euphoria at the end of July and said to ourselves
we have just started what is relatively the easiest part,
namely, getting a cease fire and getting the agreement on
negotiations. Whatever problems this creates are nothing
compared to the complexities that will emerge when the
parties get down to serious negotiations, which I must
remind you, gentlemen, they have yet to do.

Similarly, in the despondency that one sometimes
detects now in some of the editorial comments, one finds
the reverse side of the previous euphoria. No one should
ever have expected that the road from the beginning of this
initiative to the conclusion of a peace settlement would be
smooth. The passions are too deep. The war has gone on too
long. The distrust is much too profound to be able to
avoid periodic blow-ups.

The parties have to make their record. They have
profound domestic pressures on them. Those elements on
every side that do not want a settlement have a high
incentive continuously to create a new crisis. It is not
clear yet whether every great power and specifically the
Soviet Union is always clear about what it really wants in

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[Y]

the Middle East, whether it really wants to make a
settlement. But what is clear is that there will be no
settlement unless everybody is willing to make some
sacrifices. There can be no settlement in which all the
demands are made on one side, or in which the United States
is asked to supply all the solutions, to come forward with
all of the proposals, deliver all the parties and bear all
the onus for every step along the way.

All the great powers, and especially those who may
get involved, have a responsibility to make their contribution
and if they make it, then I think we have no reason at
this moment to be pessimistic. What we may be seeing are
the birth pains of what may turn out to be yet a possible
settlement of a very complex situation, and if not of a
settlement, at least of a substantial defusing.

It is interesting to note that the cease fire still
is in effect with all the uproar of the last few weeks.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 14-15)

B. Crisis in Jordan

Three weeks ago we faced a crisis in Jordan. And
as always with dangers avoided, it is not easy in retrospect
to prove how close to the brink one really came.

But the United States faced an enormously difficult
problem. We faced the problem that if the radical elements
from the outside had succeeded in taking over Jordan,
another Mid-East war could easily have developed, and what-
ever our position at the outset, another Mid-East war with
the Soviet Union so firmly established in Egypt contained
an enormous risk of a great-power confrontation.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, pp. 16-17)

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we deliberately kept our options open in carrying out the principles which I described in my presentation, to do enough to discourage irresponsibility but not so much as to give the sense of irreversibility to what was going on, to restrain outside forces that had already intervened, but not to a point where we were triggering a whole set of other outside forces when it wasn't necessary, and to make sure that the Soviet power in that area would not be used in Jordan.

Here we are in the area of conjecture. We believe that the action in Cambodia, where the President in effect did what he said he would do if the war would be spread and if the other side escalated its action, did help establish the credibility of his action in Jordan. But this cannot be proved. But it is our judgment that it helped.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, p. 39)

We, therefore, faced the problem of doing enough to discourage outside intervention but not so much as to give the other parties concerned the feeling that our moves were inevitable. We had to make sure that the countries that were most concerned would contribute to stability, but not at a level that turned it into more than a purely local contest. And we believe that the outcome of the Jordan crisis has at least given us a time to go back to a more long-range policy, a long-range policy in which all the parties of the region really are given another opportunity to ask themselves what their long-term purposes are to be.

The Soviet Union should have seen how precarious the balance in the Middle East is, whatever temporary gains may be achieved by this or that tactical move.

The Egyptians could have seen that things can easily get out of control, and Israel could have learned or could have seen the dangers of another Mid-East war.

So that when we go back to our diplomatic efforts, as we undoubtedly shall, we can perhaps do so in a more realistic atmosphere on the part of some of the other countries than was the case previously.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, p. 17)

Of course, Vietnam
is the most anguishing problem we face. We realize -- I hope
we realize -- what it does to many of our young people. No
one can be indifferent to the division in our society that is
partly reflected as a result of the war.

But we also believe that precisely because we are not
here only to liquidate one war, but because we have a larger
responsibility to try to create what we hope is to be a more
lasting peace, that what we do in Vietnam has to be measured
in terms larger than Vietnam itself, and history teaches us that
people do not forgive their leaders for producing disasters,
even if what they do seems to reflect their immediate wishes.

(San Clemente, June 26, p. 13)

There is a liturgical quality about the
Vietnam debate that causes the participants to take fixed
positions, that causes people to take fixed positions, and
makes it very difficult to have a meaningful debate. I recognize
that the concerns that have been expressed by many of our
critics are based on very thoughtful analysis. Let me
therefore state briefly where we think we are going, and why
we do what we are doing.

(New Orleans, Aug. 14, p. 12)

Let me say that this Administration understands
the anguish that produces much of this concern. We understand
that many are impatient about a war that seems to have no
conclusion. But we have, I believe, also a right to ask for
understanding of the problem that we have faced. We
inherited a war that had gone on for five years. We found
540,000 Americans engaged in war. We did not have a choice
of deciding in the abstract of whether we should be in Vietnam
or not. When we came in, we were in Vietnam. We had to
measure our decisions against the impact both internationally
and domestically of a collapse of an American effort that
had been conducted for such a long period of time.

We have yet to find -- you can joke about the
domino theory as much as you want to and as much as is
fashionable in my former circles -- but it is striking
that in all the travels that the President has taken, among

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all of the leaders who have come through the Oval Office, and I have sat in on almost all of these conversations, we have yet to see the foreign leader who tells us, 'For God's sake, get out of Vietnam. It isn't worth it.' Most of the foreign leaders, in fact I would say almost all, no matter what they say publicly, tell us exactly the opposite.

Therefore, a precipitate collapse of the American effort in Vietnam could lead to such a collapse of confidence in the American word around the world that it would accentuate the difficulties, rather than diminish them. Wherever you look around the world today, you see most notably in the Middle East today, but it is true in Europe and in other parts of the world, a great deal of the peace and of the stability depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise, and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgments of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their area.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 15-16)

Domestically, too, the President has often said we have an obligation not only to those who demonstrate, but to those who do not, and also to the mothers of those who have suffered and often died there. And so we have not believed that we will ease our domestic -- not our domestic situation, but the domestic conditions in this country by yielding to street demonstrations: If you look back on our Vietnam performance, you will see that we have kept every promise that we have made. We will have reduced the American presence in Vietnam by next May 1 by over 260,000 men. We have reduced our air operations in Vietnam by a significant amount. We have embarked on a program of a significant strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces that will enable us to continue reductions of the American presence. The operations in Cambodia have been followed by a reduction in the level of combat in South Vietnam, just as we said that they would, so that combat casualties in South Vietnam in July and August, and the first half of September, have been at the lowest level since late 1955.

In late 1965, the total number of Americans there was still lower, so that the percentage of casualties is at the lowest level since there has been a significant American military involvement there. So we believe we are on the way to achieving our objective.

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[N]

Let me answer a few questions that always come up in this connection. I understand the trauma of many of the people who were associated with the policy that got us into the war, who now feel that they must prove that they no longer associate themselves with it. I know also that in the fifth year of the war, the sixth year of the war now, no brilliant solutions are open to us. So that it is, of course, possible for anyone taking the negative to point out certain weaknesses in any approach. But if you look, for example, at the recommendations that were made in 1968 by many of our critics about what they considered a new, bold, daring policy, you will see that we have carried out almost all of these measures, and in every case, I would say, almost without exception, exceeded them.

When Senator Kennedy in August 1968 made a speech in which he said he was picking up the fallen banner of his brother, and pronounced the declaration of conscience against President Johnson on the Vietnamese war, he associated with that a program for action which we have far exceeded since then.

Many people will say that Vietnamization dooms us to staying there forever. This is not the record of the last few years, and we have no reason to believe that it will be the record of the next few years. Then some people will say we should negotiate rather than build up the South Vietnamese. Let me make one observation with respect to this. Of course, we would prefer to negotiate. We know that the quickest way to get out of Vietnam is through negotiations. Maybe it is the most reliable way. But we also know this. The North Vietnamese have not fought for 25 years to give up now to mere expressions of American goodwill what it has been impossible to extract from them on the battlefield. Unless the North Vietnamese find a situation which makes it in their interest to negotiate, they will never negotiate. Over the last four years we have been told again and again that only one more measure would bring about fruitful negotiations. It has been one of the great North Vietnamese skills to present the negotiations in Paris as if they were a detective story in which they throw out vague clues and we have to guess at the answer.

Hordes of well meaning Americans have passed through Paris and have been fed little tidbits of information which make them believe that if only one more step were taken by the United States, the millennium would have arrived, or at least fruitful negotiations.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, pp. 17-18)

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[N]

The chief problem in negotiations is not lack of ingenuity on our part in coming up with a formula. The chief problem in negotiations is that we are confronting a country that has fought for 25 years with great courage, but whose very quality of courage may not make it capable of visualizing a compromise.

We have paid for the beginning of negotiations five different times. First we were told that if there were a bombing halt there would be substantive negotiations. Then we were told if we talked to the NLF there would be substantive negotiations; if we made a symbolic withdrawal of troops, if we announced the withdrawal of 100,000 troops, if we made the withdrawal of 100,000 troops, if we announced a new senior negotiator in Paris.

We have done every one of these things. There have not yet been substantive negotiations, and that for one simple reason. The last convinced Leninists in the world may be the North Vietnamese, and the sharing of political power is not the most obvious conclusion to which you are driven by the study of Leninism. Indeed, the opposite is true.

Secondly, Vietnamese, North or South, find it very difficult to visualize anything else but total victory. As soon as North Vietnam indicates that it is ready for serious negotiations, it will not be lack of ingenuity on our part that will start the negotiating process. Of this I can assure you flatly.

(New Orleans, Aug. 14, p. 15)

This is not the way it will be settled. The war will be settled when Hanoi becomes convinced, one, that our terms are fair to them as well as to us -- in other words, that they can live with them -- but, secondly, that time is not necessarily on their side. We are not making an attempt to gain at the conference table what has not been achieved on the battle field.

On the other hand, the only issue that is now left in the negotiations is whether Hanoi is willing to have anything other than a total turn-over of political power to its side.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, p. 18)

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[N]

If Hanoi negotiates with us, it will be in part because of Vietnamization. If Hanoi negotiates with us, it will be because they are convinced that time is no longer on their side, that on the contrary, the longer the war continues, the stronger South Vietnam becomes, and that as Vietnam becomes stronger, they will find it increasingly difficult negotiating further.

This is why many of us believe that the efforts in Cambodia have helped negotiations in the long run: rather than hurt them. But we are not saying that negotiations will succeed. I am saying that Vietnamization is the means to make negotiations succeed, and if Vietnamization succeeds, negotiations may succeed.

But in any event, we are determined to reduce our presence in Vietnam consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, either through negotiations or through Vietnamization, and if we meet next year, you will see that we will have kept that promise as much as we have kept every other promise that we have made in Vietnam. Of 161,000 men, our withdrawal of 100,000 men came as a result of a new ambassador to Paris. We have: Some people say we are too much dependent on the Government in South Vietnam. I would try to impress you and say we are completely independent of the government in South Vietnam. But you could not take me seriously if I said this. When you are fighting in an allied country with an army that is over 500,000 men strong now, of course they have an influence over our action. What we are trying to do is to bring about a situation in which they can increasingly stand on their own feet. We are trying to bring about a situation consistent with the Nixon Doctrine in which we can pass over the burden of responsibility to them, and when that point is reached, then we will indeed be much freer of their actions than we are today.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, p. 18).

Secondly, on the issue, there are many proposals, some of which have found their way into editorial pages, to the effect that we should put a deadline on our withdrawals. First of all, no one really knows whether we have an internal deadline or not. Secondly, whether we should announce a deadline raises a whole series of questions.

One reason we don't announce a deadline is because we want to beat any of the deadlines that I have seen written about. The reason we think we want to beat it is because we still have not given up on negotiations.

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[N]

Once you have committed yourself irrevocably to getting out on a certain date, regardless of consequences, the other side has no conceivable interest left in negotiation. At that time, their only task is to hold on until that deadline is reached.

(New Orleans, Aug. 14, pp. 13-14)

In this time, it is absurd to have a political debate on the desirability of peace. No one has a monopoly on the desire for peace. Nor has anyone a monopoly on anguish about lack of peace. That is something we all start from. The problem though is whether we can build something, area by area, and internationally, which will move us forward towards a real relaxation of tension and not just towards an illusory progress for which we have to pay dearly after a year or two.

Peace depends not only on the desire for it, but on the willingness to face the fact that it has a security aspect, that it has a moral aspect, and that it must accommodate the conflicting interests of many diverse peoples. That is what we are attempting to work on, and hopefully, thoughtfully.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, p. 20)

Are we polarizing this country by carrying out our policy? To some extent what happened in May was extremely painful and extremely difficult. And I am not saying that no mistakes were made. But I am talking about the major thrust of our policy.

Can we abdicate our best judgment of where we ought to go in order to prevent demonstrations by a minority, a minority which very often refuses to engage in any dialogue, and which does not have a program, but only profound emotion, which I nevertheless respect?

Now this depends on an analysis of where we think we stand in our country right now. Is the war in Vietnam the cause of our torment, or are there deeper reasons? Even if the war in Vietnam caused it, is it now the principal reason?

(San Clemente, June 26, pp. 18-19)

-28

[N]

But if you would look around the world, you will have to come to the conclusion that the turmoil is not caused primarily, or at least exclusively, by the causes that are ascribed to it. There are student riots in Berlin, where the students participate in government, and there are student riots in Paris where they don't participate in it. There are student riots in Oxford, which has a tutorial system, and there are student riots in Rome, where there are huge lectures. There are riots in this country because of Vietnam, race and slums, allegedly, and there are riots in Holland which has no Vietnam, no race problem, and no slums. In other words, we are dealing with a problem of contemporary society, of how to give meaning to life for a generation, for a younger generation in states that are becoming increasingly bureaucratic and technological.

(Chicago, Sept. 16, p. 19)

Therefore, you could conclude that what we are facing in this world is not capricious students -- I will not say anything as pat as this -- but a resolve against a condition of modern society which is much deeper than any policy issue -- a state of mind which, precisely because it will not grapple with specific issues, and just with a mood, is very hard to deal with -- which leads to a rebellion against authority of any kind, not just the authority of this President, but the authority of any President, whether he be president of a university or the President of the United States.

(San Clemente, June 26, p. 19)

But we believe that it is important for this country, not just because of the war of Vietnam, that a war that has caused so much anguish, and so much division, should be ended in a way in which the greatest number of Americans can feel that they have had a sense of participation.

We believe it is important that it be ended as an act of governmental decision and not in response to demonstrations in the streets or other pressures.

So that we can at least then, after the war is behind us, turn to the more constructive tasks with a feeling that as a people we have managed this transition together and in a manner of which we can be somewhat proud.

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[N]

This is why earlier this year, painful as it was, we felt we had no choice but to resist some of the types of pressures that were put on us, because we believe that the public will not forgive its leaders if the leaders produce a disaster even if the disaster is in response to seeming public pressures.

In 1938, Chamberlain was the most popular man in England. Eighteen months later he was totally discredited even though he had 85 percent of the public behind him in 1938.

(Hartford, Oct. 12, p. 21)

> Nor do we believe that the answer to our domestic difficulties is to yield to any group that smashes the china and then says, "Look what you have made me do."

(New Orleans, Aug. 14, p. 16)

What we have to attempt to do, really, all of us, is to preserve some vestige of authority in this country, if we are ever going to move with confidence and competence toward a better future. What we have to do in Vietnam inevitably has some elements of ambiguity.

We have to convince the American people that we will pull out our troops, but we have to convince Hanoi that the withdrawal is not independent of their actions, so that they have an incentive to negotiate. We have to do many things which cannot be done unless the intermediary leadership in this country does not support every detail of our policy that is irrelevant -- but hopefully it will at least support the proposition that there is only one man who can bring peace in Vietnam, and that is the President of the United States. If confidence in him and in all institutions is systematically destroyed, we will turn into a group that has nothing left but a physical test of strength and the only outcome of this is Caesarism.

We suffer from the illusion that by not yielding to this trend we constitute the best protection to the very people who are often out on the streets against us. The very people who shout "Power to the People" are not going to be the people who will take over this country if it turns into a test of strength.

[N]

Upper middle-class college kids will not take this country over. Some more primitive and elemental forces will do that, if it happens. This is why we have spent an enormous amount of time in the White House in recent months talking to the college students.

But at the same time, while we have believed that we have a course which we believe will bring peace to Vietnam. In any event, the difference between us and others who share this objective, except for those who want to get out today, is so relatively narrow that it is not worth tearing the country apart over. Moving out of Vietnam, which we will do, at our own pace, as an exercise of a planned policy, is essential not just for foreign policy reasons, but even more importantly, for the vitality and future of the American society.

(San Clemente, June 26, pp. 19-20)

We cannot permit the political contests to be fought out by rival groups of demonstrators. We think this is terribly important, to conclude, because we are at a point where except for the war in Vietnam, there are possibilities of bringing about a more reliable peace in the world than we have known in the whole post-war period.

We are at a point where we can re-define the American position with respect to the world, where, for whatever reasons, it may be that even the Soviet Union has come to a realization of the limitations of both its physical strength and of the limits of its ideological fervor.

But none of these possibilities can be realized except by an American Government that is confident that it knows what it is doing, that can respond to its best judgment; and by an American public that has enough confidence in its leaders so that they are permitted the modicum of ambiguity that is sometimes inseparable from a situation in which you cannot, at the beginning of a process, know completely what all the consequences are.

The tragic aspect of policy-making is that when your scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which you can base this action is always at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared. This is

the problem that we face. This is why no society can operate
without confidence. But the reason despite this turmoil is
because in any new creation one is very conscious of the symptoms
of the turmoil. One is very aware of the things that are being
changed. It is always a painful process to see it come about.
But we think there is a very good chance that by the end of this
term we will have laid the foundations for a period to which many
of those who were most worried a few months ago can not only
reconcile themselves, but can support and in which the whole
American public will feel that this was the beginning of an era
of constructive peace.

(New Orleans, Aug. 14, p. 16)

Dr. Kissinger (through Mr. Young)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing for Midwestern Editors and Broadcasters
September 16, 1970
4:45 p.m.
Embassy Room, Blackstone Hotel, Chicago, Illinois

I. PURPOSE

This will be a background briefing for 60 Midwestern editors and broadcasters on foreign policy. You will close the briefing in which Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Sisco have briefed and answered questions.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Four regional briefings have been scheduled. This is the third. The first was in New Orleans for Southern editors August 14; the second in San Clemente for Western media August 24. The final briefing has very tentatively been scheduled for Eastern editors and broadcasters October 12 in Bridgeport, Connecticut.

B. A list of the 60 attending is attached at Tab A. Emphasis in the selection of editors and broadcasters has been placed on the states in which there are key Senate races although other states in the region are included in order that the list not look overly political.

C. A small White House press corps writing pool will also attend the briefing.

2

### III. POINTS OF DISCUSSION

Suggested talking points prepared by Dr. Kissinger and approved by Mr. Keogh are attached at Tab B.

### IV. ACTIONS REQUIRED

A. Following the conclusion of your remarks at 5:00 p.m., you will return to your suite.

B. At 5:20 p.m., you will go to the Crystal Ballroom of the hotel where you will receive those who attended the briefing plus additional media leaders from the local area. The White House press corps may also be invited to attend.

A list of the local media leaders invited is attached at Tab C. The reception will conclude by 6:00 p.m.

### V. SCHEDULE

The schedule which the editors and broadcasters will follow is as follows:

<table><tr><td>1:30 p.m.</td><td>Briefing opens -- Mr. Klein</td></tr><tr><td>1:45 p.m.</td><td>Dr. Kissinger briefs</td></tr><tr><td>2:45 p.m.</td><td>Secretary Sisco briefs</td></tr><tr><td>3:15 p.m.</td><td>Coffee break</td></tr><tr><td>3:45 p.m.</td><td>Q and A -- Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Sisco</td></tr><tr><td>4:45 p.m.</td><td>Briefing closes -- the President</td></tr><tr><td>5:00 p.m.</td><td>Reception begins</td></tr><tr><td>5:20 p.m.</td><td>President arrives at reception</td></tr><tr><td>6:00 p.m.</td><td>Reception concludes</td></tr></table>

HERBERT G. KLEIN

BRIEFING

Illinois

Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Today, Chicago

John H. Sengstacke, Chicago Defender, Chicago

Roy M. Fisher, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

James F. Hoge, Jr., Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago

John McCutcheon, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

William K. Todd, Rockford Star, Rockford

J. P. Clarke, State Journal, Springfield

August C. Meyer, WCIA, Champaign

John Severino, WLS, Chicago

Bob Lemon, WMAQ, Chicago

Leon Drew, WBBM, Chicago

Don Sider, Pioneer Press, 1232 Central Avenue, Wilmette

William F. Blackburn, Joliet Herald-News, Joliet

Charles L. Dancey, Peoria Journal-Star, Peoria

Robert Hartley, Lindsay-Schaub Newspapers, P. O. Box 311, Decatur

Phil Nolan, WIND, Chicago

Charles Harrison, WGN, Chicago

Indiana

Ernest E. Williams, Ft. Wayne News-Sentinel, Ft. Wayne

Walter T. Ridder, Gary Post-Tribune, Gary

Frank H. Crane, Indianapolis Star, Indianapolis

M. Stanton Evans, Indianapolis News, Indianapolis

Phillip H. Ault, South Bend Tribune, South Bend

John F. Dille, WKJG, Ft. Wayne

Iowa

Harry Boyd, Cedar Rapids Gazette, Cedar Rapids

Kenneth MacDonald, Des Moines Register, Des Moines

Erwin Sias, Sioux City Journal, Sioux City

Kentucky

Vance H. Trimble, Kentucky Post, Covington

Barry Bingham, Louisville Courier-Journal, Louisville

T. Ballard Morton, Jr., Orion Broadcasting Co. Box 1000, Louisville 40201

Michigan

Frank Angelo, Detroit Free Press, Detroit

Glen A. Boissonneault, Flint Journal, Flint

Louis A. Weil, Jr., State Journal, Lansing

- 2 -

## Michigan (continued)

Harry J. Reed, Pontiac Press, Pontiac

Robert McBride, WJBK-TV, Detroit

Don DeGroot, WWJ-TV, Detroit

## Minnesota

Orville E. Lomoe, Duluth News Tribune, Duluth

Bower Hawthorne, Minneapolis Tribune, Minneapolis

Robert W. Smith, Minneapolis Star, Minneapolis

Glenn Ickler, St. Paul Pioneer Press, St. Paul

Stanley S. Hubbard, KSTP-TV, St. Paul

Lawrence Haeg, WCCO-TV, Minneapolis

Bob Fransen, WTCN-TV, Minneapolis

## Nebraska

Keith Wilson, Omaha World-Herald, Omaha

## North Dakota

John D. Paulson, Fargo Forum, Fargo

Jack Hagerty, Grand Forks Herald, Grand Forks

Richard R. Dobson, Minot News, Minot

William Ekberg, KFYR, Bismarck

## Ohio

Brady Black, Cincinnati Enquirer, Cincinnati

Thomas Guthrie, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland

Thomas L. Boardman, Cleveland Press, Cleveland

Preston Wolfe, Columbus Dispatch, Columbus

James M. Cox, Jr., Dayton News, Dayton

Irving L. Mansell, Youngstown Vindicator, Youngstown

John Murphy, WLWT-TV, Cincinnati

Ray Rosenblum, WMOA, Marietta

William Feest, WJW, Cleveland

## Wisconsin

Lawrence Fitzpatrick, State Journal, Madison

Richard H. Leonard, Milwaukee Journal, Milwaukee

Loyal Meek, Milwaukee Sentinel, Milwaukee

Wayne Barrington, WISN, Milwaukee

CJ

1. Henry Kissinger and Joe Sisco have given you a very thorough presentation of our foreign policy in this important period. You can see from their presentations that we have a broad overview and historical perspective on what is happening in the world.

- For, in my view, foreign policy means more than reacting to events. It means having a deep understanding of basic historical trends in the world. And, most importantly, it means having a clear sense of purpose.

- Our policies in different areas of the world are all part of an integrated approach. We have a new concept of American leadership, suited to a new era of international relations.

2. You have heard Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Sisco discuss the major issues of today -- the Middle East, Vietnam, and SALT.

- In the *Middle East*, we have addressed both the urgent issue of hijacking and the underlying problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

  - On hijacking, we devoted every effort to secure the release of all passengers, and we announced a comprehensive program of preventive measures.

  - The standstill cease-fire, which is an American initiative, offers a precious chance for breaking out of the vicious cycle of military conflict.

- In *Vietnam*, it's clear that our strike against the enemy's bases in Cambodia set them back significantly and has improved the

[N]

prospects for successful Vietnamization.

* This has increased the other side's incentive to negotiate seriously.

* In the meantime, it has helped reduce our side's casualties (as I promised).

* It has improved our ability to disengage gradually and successfully.

— In SALT, we have recently completed the Vienna stage of talks, and we go now to Helsinki again in November. We have high hopes of reaching an agreement on limiting these powerful weapons.

* If we had halted our Safeguard unilaterally while they are still building SS-9s, the Soviets' incentive to negotiate would no longer exist.

3. These briefings have been very valuable to us as opportunities to meet with distinguished members of the journalistic fraternity outside of Washington. I hope this one has been helpful to you as well. I look forward now to meeting with you individually in the other room at the reception.

[N]

RECEPTION

T. A. Oakley, Quincy Herald-Whig, Quincy

Loring C. Merwin, Bloomington Pantagraph, Bloomington

Edgar A. Shipley, Moline Daily Dispatch, Moline

Warren L. Taylor, Aurora Beacon-News, Aurora

Ed F. Jenison, Paris Beacon-News, Paris

D. Ray Wilson, Elgin Daily Courier News, Elgin

Charles M. Morrow, Galesburg Daily Register Mail, Galesburg

Mitchell L. Milavetz, Decatur Herald and Review, Decatur

Lan H. Small, Kankakee Daily Journal, Kankakee

Paul Harvey, Chicago, Illinois

James Linen IV, Calumet Publishing Co., Lake & William St., Lansing

Jameson Campaign, The Daily Calumet, 9120 S. Baltimore, Chicago

Alvin Orton, Associated Press, 188 W. Randolph, Chicago

Frank Merrick, Time Magazine, 401 N. Michigan, Chicago

Frank Maier, Newsweek, 430 N. Michigan, Chicago

Frank Spencer, United Press International, 430 N. Michigan, Chicago

Henry K. Wurzer, The Trib, 765 N. York Rd. Hinsdale

Walter Jacobson, WBBM, 630 McClurg Court, Chicago

John Madigan, WBBM, 630 McClurg Court, Chicago

Lloyd Dobyns, WMAQ, Merchandise Mart, Chicago

John Mies, WLS-TV, 190 North State, Chicago

Phil Hayes, WLS-Radio, 360 North Michigan, Chicago

Meyer Proctor, ABC Midwest Bureau Chief, 190 N. State, Chicago

Charles Harrison, WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 2501 W. Bradley Place, Chicago

Charles Cleveland, WIND-Radio, 400 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago

Mike Rollins, WCFL-Radio, 300 N. State, Chicago

Dwight Bischel, WFLD-TV, 300 N. State, Chicago

Yale Roe, WSNS-TV, 430 W. Grant, Chicago

Leonard Chess, WVON-Radio, 3350 S. Kedzie, Chicago

Ed McElroy, WJJD-Radio, 8 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago

Jim Vesley, Paddock Publications, 217 W. Campbell, Arlington Heights

John W. Carroll, Pickwick Publishing Co., Inc., 29 S. Fairview Ave., Park Ridge

Jerry Healey, Editor and Publisher Newspaper, 360 N. Michigan, Chicago

Herman A. Herzog, Des Plaines Suburban Times, 1000 Executive Way, Des Plaines

Elmer W. Lysen, Midlothian Messenger, 3840 W. 147th St., Midlothian

John F. Kubik, Sr. Berwyn Life (Life Printing and Publishing Co., Inc.), 2601 S. Harlem Ave., Berwyn

Floyd T. Fulle, Suburban Progress, 9950 W. Lawrence Ave., Schiller Park

Elmer Johnson, Enterprise Publishing Co., Inc., 8694 W. 47th St., Lyons

[N]

- 2 -

Hubert F. Messe, Leader Papers, 3112 N. Central Ave., Chicago

Gus Savage, Citizen Newspapers, 7931 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, Chicago

Raymond J. Peacock, Peacock Newspapers, 2319 Milwaukee, Chicago

* William Chapman, Hammond Times, 417 Fayette St., Hammond, Ind.

Lou Lerner, Lerner Newspapers, 7519 N. Ashland, Chicago

Sheldon Hoffenberg, Lerner Newspapers, 7519 N. Ashland, Chicago

Kenneth McArdle, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

Charles Nicodemus, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

Daryle Feldmeir, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

Mike Royko, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

Bailey K. Howard, Chicago Daily News, Chicago

Robert Kennedy, Chicago Sun Times, Chicago

David Murray, Chicago Sun Times, Chicago

Irv Kupcinet, Chicago Sun Times, Chicago

Tom Fitzpatrick, Chicago Sun Times, Chicago

H. F. Grumhaus, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

George Tagge, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

Frederick A. Nichols, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

Tom Moore, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

David Halvorsen, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

William Anderson, Chicago Tribune, Chicago

Luke P. Carroll, Chicago Today, Chicago

Maxwell McCrohon, Chicago Today, Chicago

George Estep, Chicago Today, Chicago

Arthur H. Weiss, Herald Publishing Co., 1123 N. Ashland Ave., Chicago

F. Ward Just, Waukegan News-Sun, Waukegan

James M. Godbold, Paddock-Crescent, 200 Main St., Lemont

Emmett Dedmon, Field Enterprises, 435 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago

Herbert Nipson, Ebony, 820 South Michigan, Chicago

Robert Johnson, Jet, 820 South Michigan, Chicago

John Johnson, Ebony and Jet, 820 South Michigan, Chicago

Fred G. Tuttle, Jr., Citizen Publishing Corp., 111 W. Harris, LaGrange

John McWethy, Wall St. Journal, 711 W. Monroe, Chicago

* Julian Colby, WJOB, Hammond, Indiana

Charles Armstrong, Chicago South Suburban News, 14717 South Page Ave., Harvey

Jim Smith, Chicago Gazette, 8024 S. Cottage Grove Ave., Chicago

Ben H. Potter, Rock Island Argus, Rock Island

Paul S. Cousley, Alton Telegraph, Alton

All addresses in Illinois unless otherwise marked by an asterisk *

Draft 9 -- 10/7/70

[N]

VIETNAM TV SPEECH

Tonight I would like to talk to you about a major new initiative for peace.

When I authorized operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last April, I also directed that an intensive effort be launched to develop new approaches for peace in Indochina.

In Ireland on Sunday, I met with the chiefs of our delegation to the Paris talks. This meeting marked the culmination of the Government-wide effort begun last spring on the negotiation front. After considering the recommendations of all my principal advisors, I am tonight announcing new proposals for peace in Indochina.

This new peace initiative has been discussed with the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and has their full support. It has been made possible in large part by the success of the Vietnamization policy over the past 18 months. Tonight I want to tell you what these new proposals are and what they mean. I want to discuss five points.

-2-

First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina
cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold.

This would be a "ceasefire-in-place." It would not in itself be an
end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have
been working toward: an end to the killing.

I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a ceasefire in
a guerrilla war where there are no front lines. But an unconventional
war may require an unconventional truce; our side is ready to stand
still and cease firing.

I ask that this proposal for a ceasefire-in-place be the subject
for immediate negotiation. My hope is that it will break the logjam
in all the negotiations.

-3-

This ceasefire proposal is put forth without preconditions.

The general principles that should apply are these:

**A ceasefire must be effectively supervised** by international observers, as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a ceasefire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the ceasefire will be maintained and any local breaches of it quickly and fairly repaired.

**A ceasefire should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength** by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

-4-

A ceasefire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

A ceasefire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we seek is to widen the peace.

And finally, a ceasefire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A ceasefire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it has always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

[Y]

-5-

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

The second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

**I propose an Indochina Peace Conference.** At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam -- they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. This war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those states.

-6-

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina Peace
Conference, we will continue negotiations in Paris. Our proposal
for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as
through other diplomatic channels. The Paris talks will remain
our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such
time as a broader international conference produces serious
negotiations.

The third part of this United States peace initiative has to do
with United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past twenty months, I have reduced our troop ceilings
in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year these
withdrawals will total more than 260,000 men -- about one-half
the number in South Vietnam when I took office.

As the American combat role and presence have decreased,
so have American casualties. Their level since the completion of

-7-

[N]

the Cambodian operations was the lowest for a comparable period
in the last four and one half years.

We are ready to negotiate an agreed timetable for
complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement. We are
prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based
on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am
making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join us in a search for a
political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South
Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach:

-- We seek a political solution that reflects the will of
the South Vietnamese people.

- 8 -

-- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces.

-- We will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: The other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities. They want to dismantle the organized non-communist forces and insure the takeover by one party, and they demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government.

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the

-9-

South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want.

We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the reasonable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. We recognize that the only kind of settlement that will endure is one both sides have an interest in preserving.

Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners.

They and their families have already suffered too much.

I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice.

[Y]

-10-

I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well.

The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity.

But it could even be more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus improve the prospects for negotiation.

We are prepared to discuss specific procedures to complete the speedy release of all prisoners.

The five proposals which I have made tonight can open the door to an enduring peace in Indochina.

-11-

Ambassador Bruce will present these proposals formally to the other side in Paris tomorrow. He will be joined in that presentation by Ambassador Lam representing South Vietnam.

Let us consider for a moment what the acceptance of these proposals would mean.

Since the end of World War II, there has always been a war going on somewhere in the world. The guns have never stopped firing.

By achieving a ceasefire in Indochina, and holding firmly to the ceasefire in the Middle East, we could hear the welcome sound of peace throughout the world for the first time in a generation.

We would have some reason to hope that we had reached the beginning of the end of war in this century. We might then be on the threshold of a generation of peace.

The proposals I have made tonight are designed to end the

-12-

[N]

fighting throughout Indochina and to end the impasse in negotiations in Paris. Nobody has anything to gain by delay and only lives to lose.

There are many nations involved in the fighting in Indochina.

Tonight, all those nations but one announce their readiness to agree to a ceasefire. The time has come for the government of North Vietnam to join its neighbors in a proposal to quit making war and to start making peace.

As you know, I have just returned from a trip which took me to Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, England and Ireland.

Despite very wide differences in political systems and national backgrounds, hundreds of thousands of people cheered as I drove through the major cities in these countries.

They were not cheering for me as an individual.

1. They were cheering for the country that I represented -- the United States of America.

(1) For millions of people in the free world, the non-aligned world and the communist world, America is a land of freedom, of opportunity and of peace.

-13-

In my talks with leaders all over the world I find that there are
those that may not agree with all of our policies.

1. But no world leader to whom I have talked fears that the United States will use its power to dominate another country or destroy its independence.

2. We can be proud that this is the cornerstone of America's foreign policy.

There is no goal to which this nation is more dedicated, and to which I am more dedicated than to build a new structure of peace in the world where every nation including North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam can be free and independent with no fear of foreign aggression or domination.

I believe every American deeply believes in his heart that the proudest legacy the United States can leave during this period when we are the strongest nation in the world is that our power was used to defend freedom, never to destroy it; to preserve the peace, not to break the peace.

-14-

It is in that spirit that I make this proposal for a just peace in
Vietnam and in Indochina.

I ask that the leaders in Hanoi respond to this proposal in the same
spirit. Let us give our children what we have not had during this
century, a chance to enjoy a generation of peace.

**********

WHAT IS NEW

Question:

The President said yesterday that this is the most comprehensive peace plan ever presented and you have labored at it for many months. But so far as I can tell, there seems to be very little that is new, particularly on the crucial questions of political settlement and troop withdrawal. Will you tell us what is new?

Answer:

The most important new element is our proposal for a cease-fire throughout Indochina. We had previously indicated our readiness to discuss a cease-fire in Vietnam, but we had not proposed one. Nor had we spelled out our governing principles or applied any proposal to all of Indochina.

Another important new element is the proposal for an Indochina conference.

Nor have we ever proposed complete and unconditional release of POW's.

As for the principles governing the withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces, our last comprehen-

[N]

sive proposal on this was made on May 14 of
last year, when we proposed withdrawing the
bulk of these forces and having the remainder
concentrated in base camps. The President's
proposal today goes beyond that because it deals
with the negotiated withdrawal of all forces.

On the political side, we are reiterating previous
principles, but even here we hope that the new
framework of the discussion created by our
proposal will enable negotiations to take a more
fruitful course.

In short, we think that the speech contains a
number of important new proposals. They cover
the full range of problems and should - in the
President's words - hopefully break the log-jam.

[Y]

U. S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS

**Question:** If a cease-fire is established, will you continue to draw down the number of American forces in Vietnam?

**Answer:** The Vietnamization program will continue, in accordance with the criteria frequently stated by the President. Obviously, the decline in enemy activity accompanying a valid cease-fire could open up opportunities for greater U.S. withdrawals, but it is premature to speculate on what these might be.

Our position on complete and negotiated withdrawal remains what it has been: We will withdraw all our forces in accordance with a negotiated settlement under the terms which the President cited in his speech of May 14, 1969.

[N]

FORCE LEVELS

**Question:**

Aren't you loading the dice by saying that there
can be no increase in foreign forces in any of the
nations of Indochina? This would stop North
Vietnamese infiltration but would enable the
Cambodians and the South Vietnamese, for example,
to continue to build up their forces.

**Answer:**

We do not think this is an unfair proposition. After
all, there would be no more deterrence to a build
up of Viet Cong or Cambodian Communist forces
than of any government forces.

Moreover, the South Vietnamese and Cambodian
forces are essentially in defense positions against
North Vietnamese expeditionary forces. If the
latter were to cease infiltrating, there would
obviously be less desire to expand the former.

[N]

CONSULTATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

**Question:**

There have been reports that President Thieu may be displeased with this proposal and that it may not have been fully coordinated with him. Does that mean that we are finally taking some steps on our own without letting Saigon tell us what to do?

**Answer:**

The reports regarding President Thieu's unwillingness to talk to Ambassador Bunker at some reception in Saigon on Monday night are simply the product of somebody's fertile imagination. Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu have been consulting on the subject of this initiative for several months and have seen each other frequently during the past few weeks. President Thieu fully concurs with our initiative and, in fact, has even suggested some of the steps which are included in it.

We have also been in touch with Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia and Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos. They are fully aboard. They are as interested in getting a settlement as we are. We have also consulted our allies in Vietnam.

[N]

GVN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

**Question:**

What do you mean by your claim that the other side wants to dismantle "the organized non-Communist forces"? All they are asking is for the removal of three men. Why do we consider this unacceptable?

**Answer:**

There are several points which are important here:

- First of all, the Communist position is that the top leadership of the Government of Vietnam has to be replaced by us before they will even talk seriously with that Government. This is obviously prejudicial to any political settlement, and it is not something that we are asking of them.

- Secondly, you will note that they now claim that Thieu-Ky-Khiem are unacceptable whereas they previously claimed Thieu-Ky-Huong. This shows that they are not interested in any individual as such but in whoever is at the top in Saigon and whoever thus represents

[Y]

the organized nationalist and non-Communist forces.

- Third, they keep saying that the elements of a coalition should be the PRG and others who favor what they term "peace, independence and neutrality." This is also prejudicial, since they define the terms.

- Fourth, we must not forget that the Government of South Vietnam was legally elected in an election involving a vast majority of South Vietnamese voters, and that many other elections have taken place under the same constitution which governed the Presidential elections. The other side knows full well that replacement of an elected leadership would be a direct derogation of the constitution under which they were chosen.

- Last but not least, they have never said that they will accept the result of a political process. Instead, they insist that this process must conclude in a coalition. This is pre-determination rather than self-determination.

[N]

POW RELEASE

Question:

Would release of POW's mean release of all Viet Cong and political prisoners in South Vietnam?

Answer:

We hold no prisoners in South Vietnam. Only the South Vietnamese Government holds them. They are fully agreed to the mutual release of POW's and I am sure that they would be prepared to release all the men that fall under that category. I am unable to speak to the specific point of categories of prisoners but I can assure you that our proposal is not a sham and that our side is fully prepared to act upon the release of prisoners of war.

[Y]

POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION OR PARTITION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

**Question:**

Does our proposal of a "cease-fire in place"
mean that we are prepared to accept political
accommodation in South Vietnam, and perhaps a
permanent partition along cease-fire lines?
Isn't this what happened in Laos?

**Answer:**

The situation in South Vietnam is very different
from Laos. There everybody was prepared to
accept partition because the government was
interested mainly in the lowlands and the North
Vietnamese were interested mainly in the Ho
Chi Minh Trail. In South Vietnam, both sides
are contesting for control of all the territory.

Therefore we think that what would result from a
cease-fire would not be permanent partition but a
different framework in which the political discussion
and competition would be conducted. It remains to be
seen whether a framework can be established which
neither side will believe has diminished its chances.

[N]

COMMUNIST REJECTION IN ADVANCE

**Question:**

Isn't it silly to make a cease-fire proposal when we know the Communists won't accept it? Are we just doing it for propaganda?

**Answer:**

As a matter of principle it would be very difficult for us to conduct any negotiations at all if we decided in advance that we would only propose things which Hanoi would be prepared to accept with alacrity. Obviously, we have to think also in terms of other considerations, such as our own interests and what we think would be useful to provoke discussion.

With regard to the Communist attitude toward cease-fire, their recent eight point statement does not reject cease-fire in advance and certainly does not preclude discussion of the subject. It says that a cease-fire should not be implemented until an agreement is signed. We think that this leaves a great deal of room for a discussion of a cease-fire, and we also think that the topic of cease-fire in itself can provide a useful frame-

[N]

LAOS AND CAMBODIA CEASE-FIRE

Question:

What do you think the chances are of making a cease-fire stick not just in Vietnam but in Laos and Cambodia, where there are even thicker problems of supervision such as the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

Answer:

We think that with good will these problems could be worked out. We have no illusions about the problems involved in supervising and even in establishing a cease-fire of this kind. It will be extremely difficult to do in any of the nations of Indochina, but we still think it is worth trying.

COMPOSITION OF PEACE CONFERENCE

Question:

Whom do you envisage inviting to a peace
conference? Do you think that all the participants
in Laos and Cambodia are really prepared to sit
down with each other at the same table?

Answer:

On this point, as on any others, we think the
problems should be resolved in negotiations.
We do believe that any valid international con-
ference should have a larger Asian participation
then previous international conferences dealing
with Indochina. But we are flexible on specifics.
As for the participation of conflicting claimants to
legitimacy, we think this must also be handled in
negotiations and we certainly do not want to impose
a formula.

I think, however, as the President said, the real
problem is between the states of the area and the
North Vietnamese regime.

[Y]

SUPERVISORY PARTIES

Question:

Have we any thoughts on the supervisory mechanism?

Are we satisfied with the ICC?

Answer:

We have no specific thoughts as to the best final
arrangement which could be reached. Our recent
experience in the Middle East and our historic
experience in Indochina have persuaded us that we
need a really effective supervisory mechanism.

For example, we would certainly want a mechanism
which would be more effective then the ICC has
been in the past. We also think it might be good
to get additional participation of Asian states.

[N]

# PRESIDENT'S MAY 14, 1969 SPEECH

## U.S. Proposals

- As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

- Over a period of twelve months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U. S., Allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this twelve month period, the remaining U. S., Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

- The remaining U. S. and Allied forces would complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

- An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

- This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised ceasefires in Vietnam.

- As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

- Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

- All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

## U.S. Objectives

- We seek no bases in Vietnam.

- We seek no military ties.

- We are willing to agree to neutrality for South Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

[Y]

- 2 -

-- We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

-- We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

-- We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.

-- We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

Peace Proposal by President Thieu of South Vietnam - July 11, 1969

1--All political forces, including the organization called the NFLSV, which is holding weapons to oppose us, can participate in the elections, provided that they renounce violence and pledge to recognize the election results.

2--To insure that the elections are correctly held, an electoral committee, in which various political forces, including the organization called the NFLSV, are represented, can be set up. The electoral committee will insure that equal opportunity is provided for every candidate in the electoral campaign.

The electoral committee will be entitled to observe the polling and the counting of ballots in order to see that the voters enjoy full freedom to vote and that the counting of ballots is completely genuine.

3--An international organization will be set up to observe the elections and to insure that the elections are duly held for everyone.

4--We are ready to discuss, with the other side, the schedule and procedures for holding elections.

5--There will be no reprisals or discrimination in the post-electoral period.

6--The Republic of Vietnam Government pledges to respect the election results, no matter how they turn out. We challenge the other side to pledge likewise.

PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON
STATEMENTS ON CEASE FIRE IN VIETNAM

News Conference of January 27, 1969

Q. Mr. President, do you consider it possible to have a cease-fire in Vietnam so long as the Vietcong still occupy Vietnamese territory?

The President: I think that it is not helpful in discussing Vietnam to use such terms as "cease-fire" because cease-fire is a term of art that really has no relevance, in my opinion to a guerrilla war.

When you are talking about a conventional war, then a cease-fire agreed upon by two parties means that the shooting stops. When you have a guerrilla war, in which one side may not even be able to control many of those who are responsible for the violence in the area, the cease-fire may be meaningless.

I think at this point this administration believes that the better approach is the one that Ambassador Lodge, under our direction, set forth in Paris--mutual withdrawal of forces on a guaranteed basis by both sides from South Vietnam.

Radio/TV Address to the Nation--May 14, 1969

This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease-fires in Vietnam.

News Conference of June 19, 1969

Q. Mr. President, several prominent Americans have urged you to propose a cease-fire in Vietnam as a means of reducing American casualties. Why does that idea not commend itself to you?

The President. Well, the idea of a cease-fire, Mr. Lisagor, does commend itself to me. But I do not want us to cease and have the other side continue to fire, because, basically, as I have pointed out in a previous press conference, where we have a conventional war, cease-fire is very relevant; then we know that the guns have stopped firing.

In the case of a guerrilla war, unless you have an international force or some outside force to guarantee it, a cease-fire is a grave disadvantage to those forces that are in place.

I should point out, however, that in my May 14th speech, I advocated supervised cease-fires. That is the position of this administration. It is the position of Mr. Thieu.

We want cease-fires, but we want them supervised. We don't want us to cease fire and the other side to continue to kill our men.

## Radio/TV Address to the Nation -- November 3, 1969

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

## TV Interview of July 1, 1970

Second, we have offered to have cease-fires throughout the country, and have those cease-fires again internationally supervised.

2. Main Points of Geneva Agreements of 1954

a. Four Documents

Three agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, signed July 20 by military commanders

One overall unsigned "Final Declaration" - signed July 21, 1954

b. Provisions of Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities

Military cease-fire

Regrouping of military forces

Provisional division of Vietnam into two zones

Establishment of DMZ

Free movement of population between zones within a period of 300 days

General elections to settle unification question

ICC to supervise and control

c. Provisions of Final Declaration

- Took note of the three agreements on cessation of hostilities

- Hope for achievement of political settlement in Vietnam

- Establishment of democratic institutions through general elections by secret ballot to be held in July 1956 with ICC supervision of elections

- Purpose/to be worked out between representative of the two zones from July 20, 1955 onward

d. South Vietnam Statement - July 21, 1954

- Rejected Accords, refused to sign, protested partition, requested armistice and UN provisional control over all of Vietnam with free elections.

e. U. S. Statement - July 21, 1954

- Will not use force or threat of force to disturb settlement

- Would review any renewal of the aggression of the agreements with grave concern and as serious threat to international peace and security

- Seek unity through UN supervised free elections

[Y]

4. Main Points of Geneva Conference of 1962

- Neutralization of Laos

- Removal of foreign forces

- Establishment of an International Control Commission which shall supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos. The Commission will also set up inspection teams.

- Introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops prohibited

- The introduction into Laos of armaments except what the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited

7. <u>Vietnamization Rate</u>

-- U. S. Troops in South Vietnam at beginning of 1969: 542,500

-- U. S. Troop Withdrawals

June 8, 1969 - Announcement of withdrawal of 25,000 troops
by end of August 1969

September 16, 1969 - Announcement of withdrawal of 35,000 troops
by December 15, 1969

December 15, 1969 - Announcement of withdrawal of 50,000 troops
by April 15, 1970

April 20, 1970 - Announcement of withdrawal of an additional
150,000 troops by April 30, 1971

June 3, 1970 - Announcement that 50,000 of 150,000
would be out by October (5,1970)

MADAME BINH'S SEPTEMBER 17 EIGHT POINT PROPOSAL

To respond to the deep desire for peace of broad sectors of the people in South Vietnam, in the United States and in the world, on the instructions of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, I would like to further elaborate on a number of points in the 10-point overall solution as follows:

1) The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Vietnam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

In case the U.S. Government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp by June 30, 1971, the people's liberation armed forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussions on:

- The question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

- The question of releasing captured military men.

2) The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.

3) The warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, an instrument of the U.S. policy of aggression, are frantically opposing peace, striving to call for the intensification and expansion of the war, and for the prolongation of the U.S. military occupation of South Vietnam, and are enriching themselves with the blood of the people. They are serving the U.S. imperialist aggressors who massacre their compatriots and devastate their country. They have stepped up the "pacification" campaigns to terrorize the people and hold them in the vice of their regime, set up a barbarous system of jails of the type of "tiger cages" in Con Dao and established a police regime of the utmost cruelty in South Vietnam. They carry out

- 2 -

ferocious repression against those who stand for peace, independ-
ence, neutrality and democracy, regardless of their social stock,
political tendencies and religions. They repress even those who
are not of their clan. They increase forcible pressganging and
endeavour to plunder the property of the South Vietnam people so as
to serve the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. The
restoration of genuine peace in South Vietnam necessitates the
formation in Saigon of an administration without Thieu, Ky and
Khiem, an administration which stands for peace, independence,
neutrality, which improves the people's living conditions, which
ensures democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom
of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, etc., and
releases those who have been jailed for political reasons, and
dissolves concentration camps so that the inmates there may
return to and live in their native places. The Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared
to enter into talks with such an administration on a political
settlement of the South Vietnam problem so as to put an end to the
war and restore peace in Vietnam.

4) The South Vietnam people will decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through really free and democratic general elections, elect a national assembly, work out a constitution of a national and democratic character and set up a government reflecting the entire people's aspirations and will for peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and national concord.

The general elections must be held in a really free and democratic
way. The modalities of the elections must guarantee genuine free-
dom and equality during the electoral campaigns and vote proceedings
to all citizens, irrespective of their political tendencies, including
those who are living abroad. No party shall usurp for itself the right
to organize general elections and lay down their modalities. The
general elections organized by the U.S. puppet administration in
Saigon at the bayonets of the U.S. occupying troops cannot be free
and democratic.

A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for
the organization of really free and democratic general elections and
also for ensuring the right to self-determination of the South Viet-
nam people during the transitory period between the restoration of
peace and the holding of general elections.

- 3 -

5) The provisional coalition government will include three components:

-- Persons of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

-- Persons of the Saigon administration, really standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy.

-- Persons of various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy including those who, for political reasons, have to live abroad.

The provisional coalition government will implement the agreements reached by the parties.

The provisional coalition government will carry out a policy of national concord, ensure the democratic freedoms of the people, prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal, and discrimination against those who have collaborated with either side, stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people and organize general elections to form a coalition government.

The provisional coalition government will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, practice a policy of good neighborhood with the kingdom of Laos and the kingdom of Cambodia, respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of these two countries. It will establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their political regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

6) Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people is one. The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones without coercion or annexion from either side, without foreign interference. The time for reunification as well as all questions relating to the reunification will be discussed and agreed upon by both zones. Pending the peaceful reunification of the country, the two zones will re-establish normal relations in all fields on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and will respect each other's political regime, internal and external policies.

7) The parties will decide together measures aimed at ensuring the respect and the correct implementation of the provisions agreed

- 4 -

upon.

8) After the agreement on and signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire in South Vietnam.

To attain a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam declares its readiness to get henceforth in touch with the forces or persons of various political tendencies and religions in the country and abroad, including members of the present Saigon administration, except Thieu, Ky and Khiem.

## Comparison Of The 8 And 10 Points

### U.S. Withdrawal

#### 10 Points

**Point 2--**"The U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, arms and war material, and all troops, military personnel, arms and war material of the other foreign countries of the U.S. camp without posing any condition whatsoever; liquidate all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam; renounce all encroachments on the sovereignty, territory and security of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

**Point 5--**"The Provisional Coalition Government is to have the following tasks:

a) To implement the agreements to be concluded on the withdrawal of troops of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp, etc."

...

**Point 10--**"The parties shall reach agreement on an international supervision about the withdrawal from Vietnam of the troops, military personnel, arms, and war material of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp."

#### 8 Points

**Point 1--**"The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of 'Vietnamization' of the war, totally withdraw from South Vietnam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

- The question of releasing captured military men."

3

Exclusion of Thieu-Ky Leadership (Cont'd)

10 Points

8 Points

in the vice of their regime, set up
a barbarous system of jails of the
type of 'tiger cages' in Con Dao
and established a police regime of
the utmost cruelty in South Vietnam.
They carry out ferocious repression
against those who stand for peace,
independence, neutrality and demo-
cracy, regardless of their social
stock, political tendencies and
religions. They repress even those
who are not of their clan. They
increase forcible pressganging and
endeavour to plunder the property of
the South Vietnam people so as to
serve the U.S. policy of 'Vietnami-
zation' of the war. The restoration
of genuine peace in South Vietnam
necessitates the formation in Saigon
of an administration without Thieu,
Ky and Khiem, an administration
which stands for peace, independence,
neutrality, which improves the people's
living conditions, which ensures
democratic liberties such as freedom
of belief, etc., and releases those
who have been jailed for political
reasons, and dissolves concentration
camps so that the inmates there may
return to and live in their native places.
The Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Vietnam
is prepared to enter into talks with
such an administration on a political
settlement of the South Vietnam pro-
blem so as to put an end to the war
and restore peace in Vietnam."