OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 11, 1980

Dear Mr. Neal:

Presently Dr. Kissinger is out of the office and has, therefore, asked me to write to you on his behalf. At this time, Dr. Kissinger is heavily concentrating on completing the second volume of his memoirs as well as being committed to many engagements and feels that he cannot take on any further offers.

He wanted me to let you know that he appreciated your thinking of him and regrets that he must decline your kind invitation.

Mr. Malcolm Neal
451 Medina Drive
Lewisville, Texas 75067

Malcolm Neal

Canada

U.S.A.

451 MEDINA DRIVE
LEWISVILLE
TEXAS 75067
(214)436 4991

Productions

august 5th

1980

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Following up on conversations between your secretary and Peggy Taylor of the Peggy Taylor Agency in Dallas, I request you please consider participating in an upcoming television special on China. Your role will be that of special guest interviewer.

Recently, as you well know, China has begun to open her doors to the world and specifically to the West. One area of concern to the old government was Western Christianity. Mao threw out all missionaries and closed every church, but something quite incredible recently occurred. Christian churches have been permitted to reopen in a controlled manner in several major cities. Why has a communistic nation allowed this? What effect will the rise of Christianity have on an ancient Eastern philosophy? New technologies and a growing awareness of Western freedoms and material benefits have begun to affect even the common man's mind in China. Just how these changes will affect China no one yet knows.

The television special will deal with major historic events leading to the recent opening relations with China. Your role as special guest interviewer will be to interview Brother Andrew, known

Peru

Holland

Australia

Singapore

Hong Kong

Japan

New Zealand

India

Switzerland Israel Kenya England Jamaica Panama

Indonesia
Ireland
Germany
Brazil
Thailand
Korea

AUG 8 1980

around the world as "God's Smuggler." The interview will be the major portion of the one hour special, which will be intercut with recent original film footage produced especially for this production. Further, the special news-style documentary program will cover the activities of Brother Andrew and his organization, Open Doors, inside China. Open Doors has offices and bases in Europe, Africa, South America, the US and Asia.

The reasons we feel you are the right person to interview and question Brother Andrew are your knowledge and background related to China, along with your unquestioned ability for digging out the truth. The interview segment will involve about one hour of studio taping, which could be done almost anywhere to fit your schedule. It will then be edited into the overall format consisting of film segments, historical details, statements from Chinese within China, Hong Kong and the U.S. and narration in studio from the program host.

Since there is so much interest in China today, I believe this program with your involvement will prove to be provocative, stimulating and very informative.

My role is that of Producer/Director for the special which is being produced for Open Doors by Christian Resource Management of Orange California and is tied to overall promotion and fund raising for Project Pearl, information about which is enclosed.

We want you to question Andrew in areas of interest to you. In addition we will also provide questions for you that relate to the program theme. For example: What effect will new freedoms have on China's communism? How will China's rise to super power affect the global balance of power? Why is a communist nation permitting religious freedom? Questions you could easily answer, but this time the roles should be reversed with you asking the questions!

Since 1976 Open Doors has produced four one-hour prime time television specials which have been aired in the top 200 markets.

I know you must have a constant busy schedule and are at present working on a book, however I feel sure the content and scope of this program is of interest to you and as the production time for your part would be short, in all this will mean that you will be able to play a valuable part in the special.

The taping should be done as soon as possible and could be done in a location near you if that helped with your time availability.

Any further information or references you may require are yours for the asking. Naturally I will supply you with adequate background and support material for your interview.

Please give this your consideration and let me know your decision.

Thankyou,

yours sincerely,

Malcolm J. Neal

1619 Preston Road
Alexandria, Virginia 22302

14 November 1980

Henry A. Kissinger
Counsellor, Georgetown Center (CSIS)
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Currently I am a naval officer assigned in Washington, D.C. to the Strategic Systems Project Office. Previously I served as the first U.S. naval officer assigned to Jidda, Saudi Arabia, and before that I was stationed aboard a guided missile cruiser in the Pacific. I have a B.S. from the Naval Academy at Annapolis, with majors in Latin American Studies and American Political Systems, and a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California.

For many years I have maintained keen interest in political activity and international events. This has led to work in many local, state, and national elections. I was also an associate member of the Republican State Central Committee of California, and was elected to the California delegation to the 1972 Republican National Convention. Recently, my military service has precluded active participation in politics.

At present, I plan to leave the Navy at the expiration of my active obligated service in early June. I have passed the State Department Foreign Service Officer written and oral exams and maintain status on their rank order register awaiting release from military service.

I am in strong agreement with President-elect Reagan's goals of reversing tendencies of vacillation, weakness and inconsistency in national security and foreign policy. Having observed the Middle East first hand this past year, I would be honored to be a team member of an administration that will formulate a firm, global foreign policy rather than react myopically to individual events.

I understand you have a part in the formulation of President-elect Reagan's administration. I have the intellect, energy, creativeness, and philosophy that could make me of value in the areas of foreign policy and national security. I would enjoy speaking with you to explore the possibility of serving in the coming administration. My resume is attached. I look forward to hearing from you.

HUGH M. NEIGHBOUR, III

1619 Preston Road
Alexandria, Virginia 22302
(703) 998-6254
(202) 695-3770

1227 W. Santa Clara Avenue
Santa Ana, California 92706
(714) 542-4561
(714) 922-2679

EXPERIENCE:

**June 1980 to Present**
**Strategic Systems Project Office, Washington, DC.**
Duties as Head, Security and Communications Branch.
Supervise three GS-11 specialists and five other civilian and military employees administering personnel, industrial, information, and physical security programs for 500 employees at headquarters and partial responsibility for security for 1000 employees at other U.S. and U.K. field offices. Highly visible position. In addition:

* Formulate and modify security policy. Recently re-vamped system for public release of technical information, eliminating time consuming and costly delays.

* Miscellaneous duties associated with sale of TRIDENT I missile to the United Kingdom. Recently served as recorder for preliminary sessions of senior U.S. and U.K. officials, requiring familiarization with US/UK technical agreements.

* Supervise Communications Center, with US/UK teletype, secure voice phone, and message handling.

**May 1979 to May 1980**
**U.S. Military Training Mission, Jidda, Saudi Arabia.**
Served as Mission Relations Officer for Jidda Detachment.
Responsible for conducting and overseeing detachment relations and negotiations with Saudi civil and military authorities. First USN officer assigned to Saudi Red Sea Coast. Other responsibilities included:

* Navy Representative. Serving as "USN interest and presence" on the Red Sea. Conducting liaison, such as for fuel, mail, and crew liberty, for visiting USN ships. Advisor at sprawling King Faisal Naval Base under construction. Representing USN at U.S. Embassy and with other U.S. agencies since the U.S. did not have a naval attache asigned to Saudi Arabia.

* Protocol. Contacts and knowledge of procedures to ensure smoothly conducted visits of VIP guests of the command. Planning and assisting in directing and coordinating activities of the mission with political, social, or psychological impacts on operations.

* Compound Coordinator. Supervising ten Arab employees of various nationalities in operation and maintenance functions of U.S. military compound.

**December 1976 to May 1979**
**USS HALSEY (CG-23), Homeported San Diego, CA.**
Primary duty aboard ship was Communications Officer, supervising twenty Radiomen and Signalmen in operation

1976 to 1979 of HF/UHF voice, teletype, secure voice, NTDS, flashing light, and flaghoist electronic and visual communications systems. During overhaul in Long Beach, August 1977 to August 1978, emphasis shifted to duties as Engineering Training Officer. This entailed selecting and arranging instructors, classrooms, topics, tests, and program review for the 120 man engineering department. Other duties included:

* Junior Officer of the Deck; Combat Information Center Watch Officer; Officer of the Deck (Inport); Tactical Communicator.

* Educational Services Officer. Established college courses aboard ship. Duties also involved counseling and test administration/evaluation.

* Communications Material Security Officer. Responsible for use and administration of codes.

## EDUCATION:

June 1978 M.A., University of Southern California (USC). Major in International Relations. GPA: 3.57, no published class standing.

June 1976 B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. Majors in Latin American Studies and American Political Systems. GPA: 3.51, graduated 67th of 832. Validated 57 semester credits, and took numerous engineering and naval science courses in addition to major courses. Further:

* Language training in Mexico; Political Science study tour of South America; Summer intern at OP-613 (Western Hemisphere Branch, Political Military Bureau, Pentagon); Spanish Club President.

* Naval Order of the United States Prize; won once, runner up twice, in annual Academy current events competition. Ward Medal, best student of Spanish. National Society Daughters of Founders and Patriots of America Prize, for best senior class tactical essay.

High School Santa Ana High School, Santa Ana, CA. Student Body President; Commissioner of Finance; Eagle Scout; lettered in Cross Country, Track, and Tennis. Graduated 2nd of 725.

## NAVY SCHOOLS:

Surface Warfare Officer School; Combat Information Center Officer, Mods I and II; Naval Tactical Data System; Communications Officer; Nuclear Weapons Orientation; Communications Team Training; Navy Planning and Management Systems; Information Security Management; Supervisor's Role in Personnel Management; Submarine Missile System Orientation.

## MISCELLANEOUS:

**Navy Sub-specialty**
International Relations, Code 0020 P.

**Languages**
Fluent in Spanish; Working knowledge of Portuguese.
Widely traveled.

**Affiliations**
Saudi Arabian Natural History Society (Past Coordinator);
National Management Classification Society;
American Society for Industrial Security;
Ski Club of Washington.

**Hobbies**
Travel, reading, skiing, running, tennis, hiking, camping, diving.

## KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED:

**Mideast**
While in Saudi Arabia it was essential for me to practice patience and tact while dealing with people of a different culture and value system. In the process, I gained a greater understanding of the role the United States plays in the security and development of much of the world. I also acquired an understanding of the mechanics of how this is accomplished and the common obstacles encountered in the process. I found it necessary to develop ways to accomplish our day-to-day objectives, within a system and culture that does not share American priorities or standards.

In Jidda, as I was essentially my own boss, I prioritized objectives, set goals, and met deadlines. With no predecessor, I learned how to define a job and adapt to a new working environment. In my spare time, I studied the Arabic language and traveled extensively within Saudi Arabia and to the neighboring countries of North Yeman, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Djibouti. I learned how each region of Saudi Arabia, as well as each Arab country, was unique in its own culture, economy, geography, and political outlook.

**Washington**
At the Strategic Systems Project Office, I have acquired experience in working in an office with career civilians. I have enhanced my ability to work with people, directives, and policies in a complex organization with the command's mission always in the forefront. In the process, I have developed a more skeptical eye, learning to ask more incisive questions and consistently check on work progress. My interest and knowledge of our strategic situation has increased.

**Aboard Ship**
Aboard the HALSEY I gained experience working with officers and men of varied backgrounds under sometimes tedious conditions. I successfully managed expensive and sensitive equipment. While the HALSEY was in port for an extensive overhaul, I acquired my M.A. at USC during off-duty hours.

-3-

Institute of International Education

WASHINGTON OFFICE
11 DUPONT CIRCLE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 • (202) 483-0001

RESUME FOR:

Dr. Masaki MIYAKE
Professor of International Politics
Graduate School of Political Science and Economics
Meiji University
Toyko, Japan

PROGRAM OFFICER

Suzanne Chambliss Neil

Dr. Miyake is a participant in the International Visitor Program, International Communication Agency. Visiting the United States from March 30 through April 29, 1980.

**NATIONALITY**
Japanese

**PRESENT POSITION**
Professor of International Politics, Graduate School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University

**PAST POSITION**
Visiting Professor, Free University of Berlin, 1967-68

**ACADEMIC TRAINING**
Litt.D., Kyoto University, 1976
Doctoral Courses, University of Heidelberg, 1964-65
Doctoral Courses, University of Vienna, 1962-64
M.A., Graduate School of Literature (western history), Kyoto University, 1956-58
B.A., Department of Literature, (history), Kyoto University, 1956

**ORGANIZATIONS**
International Studies Association of the United States
British International Studies Association
Japanese Political Science Association
Japan Association of International Relations
Japanese Society of Western History

**PUBLICATIONS**
"Steps to the Conclusion of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970"
The Various Aspects of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1977
Thesis: Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical and Historical Consideration, 1979

**ENGLISH**
Good

**OTHER LANGUAGES**
German

**TRAVEL ABROAD**
Eastern and western Europe, U.S.S.R.
over

MIYAKE - 2

MARITAL STATUS Married

MAILING ADDRESS 2-35 Midorigahama, Chigasaki City, Kanagawa Prefecture 253, Japan

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Dr. Miyake's major interest while in this country is discussing civilian-military relations and their impact on world politics. He would like to talk with Americans knowledgeable about civilian-military relations in the United States and in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Germany, and Japan. He is especially interested in (1) the impact of the civil-military struggles in the People's Republic and the Soviet Union on the Sino-Soviet struggle and in (2) the impact of Washington-Moscow and of Bonn-Moscow relations on the Soviet civil-military complex. He would also like to discuss the theory of civil military relations, including smaller themes such as coups d'etat and military dictatorships.

Houston.

PAGE B-10

The San Diego Union

Editorials

WEDNESDAY MORNING, JULY 9, 1980

The Agee Loophole

Two years ago, a file clerk employed by the Central Intelligence Agency at its headquarters in Langley, Va. sold an operating manual for the top-secret KH-11 reconnaissance satellite to a Soviet agent for $3,000. The clerk was prosecuted for espionage, convicted, and sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Suppose, instead, that he had merely memorized key portions of the manual, resigned from the CIA, and then held a press conference to reveal the secret workings of the KH-11.

Under current law — or, more precisely, the absence of law — the clerk's act of treason might have been punishable by no more than a civil suit charging him with breach of contract for violating his oath of secrecy.

An implausible example? Not at all. At least one former CIA employee, Philip B.F. Agee, has made a career of divulging secrets he learned during his years as an American intelligence agent. Among Agee's specialties is the release of names of U.S. government employees said by him to be CIA agents operating under cover in foreign countries.

Even if Agee, a self-proclaimed "aspiring Communist," were to return to the United States from his home in Europe, the Justice Department would be unable to prosecute him for the very good reason that his display-

al behavior violates no existing criminal statute.

The absence of such a law constitutes an intolerable loophole.

By no coincidence, Agee serves on the board of directors of the Covert Action Information Bulletin, a Washington-based newsletter unashamedly dedicated to exposing U.S. intelligence operatives.

Last Wednesday, the Bulletin's co-editor, Louis Wolf, held a press conference in Kingston, Jamaica. Wolf released the names of 15 U.S. Embassy employees in Kingston he said were CIA agents. Among them, N. Richard Kinsman, reported by Wolf to be the CIA station chief in Jamaica.

For good measure, Wolf also disclosed the address of Mr. Kinsman's residence in Kingston, his unlisted telephone number, a description of his automobile, and the car's license plate number. The only items Wolf seems to have overlooked were a map showing the shortest route to the Kinsman home and an engraved invitation to Cuba's large, active intelligence mission in Kingston.

Two nights later, persons as yet unidentified attacked the Kinsman residence with automatic weapons and grenades. Miraculously, no one was hit. Mr. Kinsman's 12-year-old daughter escaped death only because she happened to be absent

from her bedroom when it was riddled with sub-machinegun fire.

For the record, Louis Wolf denies that Philip Agee or any other former CIA employee provided information released at the Kingston press conference. He also denies obtaining any information by illegal means. It was, he insists, a simple matter of studying official State Department biographies of the people involved for clues to CIA affiliation. That, of course, is what we would expect Louis Wolf to say.

Meanwhile, Congress continues to equivocate over legislation making it a crime for a former CIA employe to reveal the names of agents, or to release other top secret information with intent to compromise the security of the United States.

Some on Capitol Hill and in the Carter administration profess to see a conflict between such a law and the First Amendment. The potential conflict, we think, can be avoided by careful wording. Surely there must be a way to preserve both First Amendment guarantees and the minimum secrecy essential to an effective intelligence service.

Closing what might be called the "Agee loophole" has become a matter of life and death for American intelligence officers serving abroad. Any congressman who doubts that ought to have a chat with N. Richard Kinsman.

D 100

Columbia University in the City of New York

INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES

International Affairs Building
420 West 118th Street
New York, N.Y. 10027

September 5, 1980

Dr. Henry Kissinger
c/o The New Republic
50 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We met briefly after Hans Morgenthau's
funeral at the Stoessingers' home. I am
writing to tell you how much I enjoyed reading
your piece in *The New Republic*. Hans and I
taught at The Graduate Faculty and on our
way home Monday nights, often talked about you.
I always assured him that you were an apt pupil
of his, practicing the ideas he had formulated
so well in *Politics Among Nations*. He remained
perplexed. If this were so, why wasn't his
advice being sought?

As an admirer of you both, I am glad to
learn that you eventually became closer friends.
Your eulogy in *The New Republic* is beautiful
and accurate, and reflects the feelings of at
least one other person who knew him well.
Thank you.

SEP 18 1980

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTER
*David M. Abshire

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

Ray S. Cline
Alvin J. Cottrell
Amos A. Jordan, Jr.
Michael A. Samuels

SENIOR STAFF

Thomas A. Callaghan Jr.
Sevinc Carlson
Chester A. Crocker
Charles K. Ebinger
Roger W. Fontaine
Penelope Hartland-Thunberg
William G. Hyland
Robert A. Kiltmarx
Robert Kupperman
Michael A. Ledeen
Edward N. Luttwak
Francis X. Murray
Kenneth A. Myers
Robert G. Neumann
William V. O'Brien
Peter J. Rankin
Peter W. Rodman
Dimitri K. Simes
Sterling G. Slappey
M. Jon Vondracek
Overseas Representatives
Joseph Godson
Joyce R. Starr

ADVISORY BOARD

*Frederick Seitz
Chairman
Leonard H. Marks
Vice-Chairman
Frank R. Barnett
Charles L. Bartlett
Sen. Lloyd Bentsen
Rep. Don Bonker
Rep. Clarence Brown
L. Dean Brown
Carter L. Burgess
Horace Busby
Jack G. Clarke
Lester Crown
Thomas B. Curtis
Rep. DANIEL B. FASCELL
Rep. Millicent Fenwick
Rep. Paul Findley
W.H. Krome George
Kenneth O. Gilmore
Maurice R. Greenberg
Rita E. Hauser
Martin Hillenbrand
Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.
Max M. Kampelman
Donald M. Kendall
William F. Kieschnick
Ernest S. Lee
Walter J. Levy
Sen. James A. McClure
James S. McDonnell
R. Daniel McMichael
J. William Middendorf II
Sen. Robert Morgan
Robert Mosbacher
Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan
Thomas J. Murrin
Martha T. Muse
Robert Novak
Sen. Sam Nunn
Gerald L. Parsky
Ralph A. Pfeiffer, Jr.
Rep. John J. Rhodes
William D. Rogers
Arthur Ross
Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.
George T. Scharffenberger
William French Smith
John R. Stevenson
Hobart Taylor, Jr.
William C. Turner
Rep. Al Ullman
Richard W. Wheeler
George Will
Rep. Bob Wilson
Vincent A. Wolington
Rep. Clement J. Zablocki
Gordon B. Zacks
Stanley Zax
Harriet M. Zimmerman

*Member Executive
Board

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202/833-8595

Cable Address: CENSTRAT
TWX: 7108229583

COUNSELORS TO THE CENTER

Henry A. Kissinger
Robert J. Henle, S.J.

EXECUTIVE BOARD: Nathaniel Samuels, Chairman / Anne Armstrong, Vice-Chairman / William J. Baroody, Sr. / Leo Cherne / T. Byron Collins, S.J. / Donald G. Herzberg / Peter F. Krogh / Morris I. Leibman / Thomas H. Moorer / James R. Schlesinger / Ronald L. Smith

March 11, 1980

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

The State Department has called for an all-day discussion (classified) of Afghanistan for March 26 on the approximate subject of "How now brown cow?". The meeting has been postponed several times, as that shell-shocked bunch has more on its plate than it can handle.

With our respective schedules it may not be possible to meet before that time. Perhaps it might be more realistic if I could have an opportunity to call on you shortly thereafter to give you a brief report.

My reason for wishing to do so is that I sense a softening in the position of that glorious Administration of ours, and if that is so, I should get a whiff of this at that meeting. If my present perception is accurate, you may wish to consider some public statement at an appropriate occasion.

I do not wish to blow the events in Afghanistan out of proportion. The actual Russian invasion took place on April 27, 1978 and not on December 27, 1979. It was at that earlier date that the Russians connived in the takeover by a Communist government, whose members I know well, or I should say knew, since some of them are no longer among the living, and can therefore testify to the fact that they never deviated from the Moscow line, as well as prided themselves, even in conversations with me, on their close relations with Moscow and the Soviet embassy. Certainly all the surrounding countries, including Iran both under the Shah and under the present non-government, as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and interestingly enough, Iraq interpreted that event even then as a Soviet projection of force in their direction.

Of course Afghanistan is not Vietnam; there is no possibility of field armies facing one another, and I do not expect the Afghan insurgents to drive the Russians out. But I know those people thoroughly, I have spent many days and weeks in the tribal area, and I know that these people are determined, even eager to fight and lay their lives on the line to a degree difficult to grasp by western men.

RESEARCH COUNCIL: Walter Laqueur, Chairman / Raymond F. Mikesell, Co-Chairman / B. Boutros-Ghali / Karl Brunner / Mel Croan / W. Phillips Davison / Curt Gasteyger / Stephen Gibert / Ernst Halperin / Pierre Hassner / David Hubbard / Fred Ikle / Charles Issawi / Daoe Joesoef / Jeane J. Kirkpatrick / J. Clayburn LaForce / Bernard Lewis / Richard Lowenthal / Laurence W. Martin / Klaus Mehnert / Alec Nove / Robert Osgood / Robert A. Scalapino / Paul Seabury / Hugh Seton-Watson / Andrew Shonfield / Gaston J. Sigur / Henri Simonet / S. Fred Singer / Roger Swanson / Jun Tsunoda / Richard L. Walker / Don Wallace, Jr. / Robert E. Ward / Murray L. Weidenbaum / Albert Wohlstetter / Roberta Wohlstetter / Aharon Yariv

March 11, 1980

Dr. Henry Kissinger

You have often stated that the Russian incursion into hitherto peaceful territory ought not to go without paying a price, and I believe in Afghanistan, with a little discreet help, not only by us, but by other countries as well, the price can be considerable, both physically and politically.

Of course this matter has not been helped by the manner in which this administration has "negotiated" with Pakistan, a word which is practically inappropriate to the occasion. Still, I believe that there are a number of things which we can and should do.

I will call your office after the meeting to see when you might be in town and have a moment to spare.

With best regards,

7/23/80

For The New Republic

Hans Morgenthau was my teacher. And he was my friend.

I must say that at the outset because so many obituaries
have stressed his disagreement with policies with which I
have become identified.

We knew each other for a decade and a half before I
entered office. We remained in sporadic contact while I
served the government. We saw more of each other afterwards.

It is not often possible that one can identify a seminal
figure in contemporary political thought or in one's own life.
Hans Morgenthau made the study of contemporary international
relations a major and separate discipline. All of us who
taught the subject after him, however much we differed from
each other, had to start with his reflections. Not everybody
agreed with Hans Morgenthau; nobody could ignore him. And on
a personal level he and I remained close through all the
intellectual upheavals and disputes of two and a half decades.

To establish international relations as a discipline

2

was not an easy matter in the United States. For the
temptation to treat the subject by analogy to our domestic
experience was overwhelming. There existed in America a
well-developed literature on international law that saw
international relations in terms of legal processes. There
was a pragmatic tradition of solving issues that arose "on
their merits." There was the belief in America's moral
mission that had produced both isolationism and later on
global involvement.

Morgenthau sought to transcend all these disparate tendencies. He
was passionately convinced that peace was a statesman's
noblest objective; but he did not believe that this yearning alone
would avoid war. He was a liberal in his political view but he
thought his convictions required not simply an affirmation
but sufficient stability at least to enable man's humane
aspirations to prevail. He was willing to confront the
political leader's fundamental dilemma that moral aims can be

3

reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect.

Morality provides the compass course, the inner strength to face
the ambiguities of choice.

So Hans set out to understand what he considered the
"real" world of international politics, not as he would like
it to be but as he found it. He wrote his seminal work on
*Politics among Nations*, analyzing international relations
in terms of power and national interest. He believed that
a proper understanding of the national interest would
illuminate a country's possibilities as well as dictate the
limits to which it could push its aspirations.

Hans was much criticized for his alleged amorality in
those days. His critics did not understand him. Being
himself passionate, he did not trust passion as the regulator
of conduct. Being committed to peace, he was prepared to enter
the cold world of power politics to achieve it.

In the Sixties Hans proved that he was beyond the

4

manipulation of military calculations. He opposed the war
in Vietnam when it was still supported by all fashionable
opinion. In 1966 he and I debated the issue in *LOOK*
magazine. He considered America overextended, the war
unwinnable, the stakes not worth the cost. I maintained
that the size of our commitment had determined our stake; that
we had an obligation to seek our way out of the morass
through negotiation rather than unconditional abandonment of
the enterprise. He was right in his analysis, probably in
his policy conclusions as applied to 1966. Three years
later--quite unexpectedly--I was faced with the problem as a
policymaker. We both stuck to our convictions.

I will not debate their ultimate merit in this space.

But I think it is important to understand that we shared
almost identical premises. We both believed America was
overextended; we both sought a way out of the morass. Hans
wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one dramatic move; I chose
a different route. But we were both in a way lonely among

[Y]

5

our associates. Hans is not correctly understood as a
protester. He was a teacher trying to bring home to his
beloved adopted country the limits of its power, just as
earlier he had insisted on its central role. Through all
these disagreements I never ceased admiring him or to remembering
the profound intellectual debt I owed him.

With the end of the war our paths became increasingly
parallel again, though I do not wish to burden Hans' memory
with the army of my critics. Hans remained always himself:
clear in his perception, uncompromising in his insistence on
getting to the essence of a problem. He meant much to me.

A word must be said about Hans as a human being. Few
eminent men correspond to their image. Hans made his reputation
as an analyst of power, but he was a gentle, loving man.
He was a great teacher, yet quite shy. He had a marvelous,
slightly sardonic sense of humor which never stooped to the
malicious. Yet he was slightly tentative--at least in his

6

dealings with me--in showing this side of himself. He would
make a witty remark with an absolutely straight face, peering
from behind his bushy eyebrows to see what the response would
be. Only when he saw that his sally had been understood
would his whole face crease in the smile of a slightly
mischievous little boy. He was a lovable man.

Hans Morgenthau was deeply conscious of his Jewish
heritage. He knew that no people was more likely to be the
victim of injustice and passion. He thus felt a special
obligation to resist intolerance and hatred. And he under-
stood that in this battle he must never stoop to the methods
he was combatting. He was a noble man.

I saw Hans for the last time at breakfast a few weeks ago.
He had grown quite frail, though mentally he was as alert as
ever. His professorship at the New School had just ended. He
spoke of how much teaching meant to him. Everyone must feel
he makes a difference to the world, he said. And his vocation

7

was teaching, which he hoped to continue. I told him that
he had already made a big difference to the world; he did
not have to prove himself constantly. He did not quite believe
it. His life was his work and as he said on another occasion,
he saw no sense in extending the one by cutting down on the
other.

We promised each other to meet regularly. It was not
to be. He settled our little dialogue by his sudden death.
There would be no gap between Hans Morgenthau's life and his
work; he had made a difference.

And the nature of that difference is best shown in the
sorrow of his friends and in the fact that all who remember
Hans Morgenthau recall his passion for justice, his fertile intellect,
his warmth and his honesty. It will be a lonelier world
without him.

DT-FYI

CYJ

8/5/80

INTERVIEW REQUEST FOR HAK

New Review - German Magazine

would like to interview HAK
either in NY or Washington,
on US politics and perspectives.

would need 45 minutes to an
hour.

Would pay an honorarium - would
like to talk to somebody to
see what amount would be appropriate.

The date is open - right now
they would just like to know
if HAK would be interested in
doing the interview sometime
in the next few months.

Contact: Marie Allison
International News Media
347-4575

FAXGRAM

via

Graphnet

99 WEST SHEFFIELD AVENUE ■ ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY 07631

201-569-7707

3E B171 1-18 0702 620 04/23/90 20:06 20006

DR. HENRY KISSINGER
C/O MS. SUZANNE MCFARLAND
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
SUITE 520
1000 K STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006

FOR ITS SUMMER READING ISSUE THE TIMES BOOK REVIEW IS PREPARING AN ANNOTATED LIST OF BOOKS, NEW AND OLD. THAT LEADING CITIZENS TURN TO AND RELY UPON FOR GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION IN ASSESSING THE COMPLEX POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THE UNITED STATES CURRENTLY FACES. COULD YOU PLEASE TELL US THREE OF THE BOOKS YOU WOULD RECOMMEND AS CATH-UP SUMMER READING FOR CONCERNED AMERICANS AND BRIEFLY SUGGEST WHY. WE NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU BY MAY 15 AT THE LATEST. HARVEY SHAPRI, EDITOR, NYKTIMES BOOK REVIEW, 229 WEYT 43RD ST., NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 (PHONE 212-556-1466). NNNN

APR 28 1980

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 (PHONE 212-226-1446). KIMM
HARVEY CHAPRI, EDITOR, MYKTIME BOOK REVIEW, 525 WEET 43RD ST.,
WHY, WE NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU BY MAY 12 AT THE LATEST.
SUMMER READING FOR CONCERNED AMERICANS AND BRIEFLY SUCCEED
TELL US THREE OF THE BOOKS YOU WOULD RECOMMEND AS CATH-UP
PROBLEMS THE UNITED STATES CURRENTLY FACES. COULD YOU PLEASE
DIRECTION IN ADDRESSING THE COMPLEX POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
LEADING CITIZENS TURN TO AND RELY UPON FOR GUIDANCE AND
IS PREPARING AN ANNOTATED LIST OF BOOKS, NEW AND OLD, THAT
FOR ITS SUMMER READING ISSUE THE TIMER'S BOOK REVIEW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004
1000 K STREET N.W.
SUITE 250
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
C/O MR. SUZANNE MCFARLAND
DR. HENRY KISSIMMER
SE BT71 1-10 0287 P58 04153100 58:0F 58007

[YJ]

HK:

The New York Times Book Review is preparing a list of books for people to read for guidance in assessing current political and economic problems -- for their summer reading issue.

They would like you to submit the name of 3 books you would recommend and, if possible, briefly suggest why. DEADLINE MAY 15

Have Peter work something up

Not interested

informed 5/5/80

# THE PROBLEMS OF ENERGY POLICY

November 21, 1979: The U.S. Nuclear Conundrum

Speaker: The Honorable Peter Bradford*
Respondent: Mr. Irving Kristol*

January 23, 1980: Energy Policy in the Political Arena

Speaker: The Honorable John Dingell*
Respondent:

February 20, 1980: Energy and Economic Policy

Speaker: Dr. Irwin Stelzer*
Respondent: Dr. Herman Kahn*

March 19, 1980: The Price of Energy Independence

Speaker: Mr. Robert Fri*
Respondent: Dr. Robert Stobaugh*

April 16, 1980: The Middle East: A Producer's Viewpoint

Speaker: The Honorable Ahmed Zaki Yamani
No Respondent

May 21, 1980: European Energy Policy

Speaker: Mr. Peter Jay
Respondent: Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski*

*confirmed

wuu
western union

Telegram

WJA139(1028)(1-008070A310)PD 11/05/80 1023

1980 NOV -5 AM 10:57

ICS IPMWGWD WSH
01431 11-05 1016A EST
ICS IPMWJ08
1-094017G310 11/05/80
ICS IPMIIHA IISS
IISS F M WUI 05 0956
PMS WASHINGTON DC
UWB4253 JPW610 HTI929 LAC484
UWWA BY JPTT 098
TOKYO 98/88 5 2044 PAGE 1/50
ETATPRIORITE
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUITE 520,1800 KST., N.W.
WASHINGTON DC(20006)
DEAR DR. KISSINGER,

SF-1201 (R5-69)

wuu
western union

Telegram

C103

PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS UPON THE ELECTION OF
A REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT.

WE KNOW THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT LEADERSHIP, COURAGE
AND DETERMINATION WHICH MR. REAGAN IS EXPECTED TO DEMONSTRATE.

I AM SURE THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
COL 520,1800 WASHINGTON DC(20006)
LAC484 DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER PAGE 2/38
JAPAN AND THE UNITED

STATES UNDER A NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO WITNESS
INCREASINGLY FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS, AND THAT YOU WILL PLAY
NO SMALL ROLE IN REALIZING IT.

SINCERELY
SUSUMU NIKAIDO

NOV 6 1980

SF-1201 (R5-69)

wuu
western union

Telegram

C103

CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIVE PARTY.

RETR MSG
0958 EST
NNNN

SF-1201 (R5-69)

Tokyo, October 17, 1980

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520, 1800 K St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

We would like you to know how much we appreciated
the enlightening discussion with you when we visited New
York recently.

We feel that the horizon of our view had been further
widened by your informative explanation and assessment of
the world situation today.

We are sure that you will continue to play a vital
role in formulating enlightened view on international
situation among influential leaders of the United States.
It is, therefore, gratifying to find your ever lasting
interest in further consolidating relations between Japan
and the United States.

It is our firm belief that the continued strong tie
between our countries is the foundation of the solidarity
of the free world.

OCT 29 1980

Paul H. Nitze

STRATEGY IN THE
DECADE OF THE 1980s

Reprinted From

FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

FALL 1980

OCT 14 1980

[LC]

Paul H. Nitze

An important element in recent European criticism of U.S. foreign policy is the claim that neither the Administration nor its critics has presented a coherent strategy for the decade of the 1980s. Responsible Europeans suggest that American statements on foreign policy have stressed the value of good personal relations, the importance of goodwill, and the desirability of shared aims, but have offered little in the way of practical guidelines as to how we should deal with the growing power of the Soviet Union. These critics ascribe the erratic nature of U.S. policy to the lack of a sound strategic concept. They are not, however, much happier on this score with the Administration's domestic critics than with the Administration.

It is timely, therefore, to outline an approach to a more coherent Western strategy. By way of introduction, I offer some comments on basic concepts, on the evolution of the correlation of forces, and on Soviet strategy.

II

Clausewitz uses the word "strategy" to describe an approach to war which links the outcomes of a number of military engagements in space and in time. Its object is to achieve a favorable overall position in which your opponent has no remaining courses of action open to him reasonably likely to reverse the course of the war. He must, therefore, accommodate to your side's political will.

Since Clausewitz's time, much thought has gone into expanding his concept into something broader than military strategy, often called "grand strategy," in which all factors bearing on the evolving situation—including economic, political and psychological factors as well as military—are taken into account over long periods of time, including times both of peace and of war. The Soviet leaders are careful students of Clausewitz and his successors

Paul H. Nitze was Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State from 1950 to 1953, Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense in the 1963-69 period, and a member of the U.S. SALT delegation from 1969 to 1974. He is currently Chairman, Policy Studies, of the Committee on the Present Danger. This article reflects his personal views.

[lc]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 83

and pay much attention to questions of doctrine, policy, strategy and tactics. Doctrine includes principles that are virtually unchanging over time, such as the primacy of the Communist Party over the state, the high importance of maintaining the security of the Soviet Union as the base of the Soviet Communist Party's power, the historical inevitability of progress toward world communism, and the Party's duty to assist that progress by exploiting class tensions and the tensions resulting from colonialism.

Policy deals more specifically with what should be the general aims and lines of action in a given era and thus changes somewhat over time depending on basic changes in the world situation. The Soviets view strategy as being considerably more flexible and fluid, the better to capitalize on new opportunities for exploitation as they may arise.

One of the basic Soviet guidelines for action is that there must be a careful and continuously updated appraisal of what they call the correlation of forces. When the correlation of forces has evolved significantly in the Soviets' favor, their doctrine calls upon them to exploit that change to nail down permanent gains for their side. Having once achieved what they intend to be a permanent gain, the Brezhnev Doctrine, in effect, calls on them to defend the permanence of that gain with Soviet armed forces, if necessary. In the correlation of forces, they include the political, psychological and economic factors bearing on the situation, as well as the military factors, but the balance in military factors plays a particular and fundamental role in their appraisal. In assessing the military balance, they examine all its components concurrently—ground, air, and sea, nuclear and non-nuclear—in all potential theaters.

Nothing about the Soviet approach is particularly surprising. It is, however, different from the U.S. approach or that of any other non-Soviet regime. It is unique in its demand for ideological purity and discipline within the Party, the primacy of the Party over the state, in its opposition to all potential centers of power and influence the Soviets do not control, and the subordination of all other goals or principles to the security and expanding influence of the Soviets' own group and the groups which they do control.

### III

How has the correlation of forces evolved since the period immediately following the end of World War II?

It was in the economic field that the United States' position,

[L.C.]

84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

after World War II, was clearly dominant. We capitalized upon this economic strength by initiating the Marshall Plan and building a strong international economic structure which included the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and the technical assistance program known as Point Four. These helped in the building of a political structure strong enough to assure for many years the political containment of Soviet expansionism.

Even today, the strength of the economic position of the so-called Western nations represented in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (principally the United States, the nations of Western Europe, and Japan) is four times that of the U.S.S.R. and its associates, if measured in terms of the aggregate of their gross national products. In combination, their economies provide a strong and flexible structure, which has been able to cope with the enormous increase in payments to the Persian Gulf oil-producing nations over the last six years—but at the cost of serious inflation and growing imbalances in the flows of earnings, of payments, and of debts between member nations, and reduced growth with accompanying political strain. The temptation for individual nations to adopt selfish competitive policies is constantly growing.

Similarly, the economic progress of the developing countries, never adequate, has been retarded, and a special problem is now presented by the net borrowing requirements of the non-oil producing developing countries, which will amount to over $50 billion in 1980 and may exceed that amount in 1981. These deficiencies have been met to a major extent by the Western private banking system, but there is grave question as to how long individual banks will carry the increasing risks involved. The result is to increase the difficulties of the developing countries and their vulnerability to external threats.

The Soviet-controlled group of states, what the Soviets call the "camp of peace and freedom," also has serious problems, but their system is already tightly managed from the center. Their economies are less productive but may be better able to weather a storm.

A key to economics, however, is politics, both domestic and foreign. Politics are affected by many things, including swings in public attitudes and therefore by propaganda, by the spread or atrophy of ideologies, by changes in class structure, and by the impact of events reflecting changes in the world power structure.

In the world political arena the influence of the United States

[Lc]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 85

has diminished. All is not roses for the U.S.S.R., either. Fear of
Soviet expansionism has been latent in the world ever since the
Winter War against Finland in 1940. During the long period of
the so-called cold war, from 1947 to 1970, Soviet expansionism
was contained and the world breathed somewhat more easily.
Many governments felt it was safe to make tactical gains through
indiscriminate attacks on the United States. Over the last few
years, many have begun to see again that the real danger to their
security and integrity comes from the U.S.S.R. and that a weak-
ened United States adds to their danger. Furthermore, the Soviet
version of communist ideology appeals to far fewer, particularly
among the young, than it once did.

What can be said about the evolution of the military strategic
position of the United States? Ever since the end of World War II
it has been U.S. policy to support the independence of Western
Europe and Japan from Soviet control. It was also early recognized
that the security of the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia,
and Africa could have a bearing on the security of Europe, of East
Asia, and of the United States as well. This being the case, it was
important to defend as close to the perimeter of the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies as feasible.

At all times since World War II, the Soviet side has had
potential superiority in the capability of the conventionally armed
forces which could be brought to bear on that perimeter. The
United States, however, had superior force projection capabilities
supported by a superior navy and a worldwide base and logistics
structure. This gave it the ability to reinforce at any point on the
perimeter. We also had, for a time, a nuclear monopoly. The
potential military effectiveness of nuclear weapons, which were
for many years very few in number, may have been largely
exaggerated in the public mind. Nevertheless, these weapons did
contribute to the West's strategic posture.

Subsequently, when the Soviets had developed a nuclear capa-
bility of their own, they demonstrated by the surprise attack by
North Korea against South Korea that they were prepared ac-
tually to use military power under their control in support of their
political aims. As a result, it became necessary for the United
States greatly to increase its military defense effort. We did so
beginning in 1950, rapidly increasing our defense expenditures
from $12.5 billion to $40 billion per year (in 1950 dollars). We
and our allies strengthened our conventional forces, including the
power of our naval forces, added a substantial number of theater
nuclear systems, and completely rebuilt our intercontinental nu-

[L]

86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

clear forces. As a result, we were able to continue the containment of Soviet military expansionism for another two decades.

It was in 1968, 1969 and 1970, as a result of the setbacks and frustrations of the Vietnam War, that many came to the conclusion that such efforts at containment beyond NATO and Japan were not worth the cost and that we were perhaps carrying too great a share of the burden even with respect to Europe and Japan. The European members of NATO, and Japan, Korea and Taiwan, had prospered beyond all expectation. Could not they bear a greater share of the burden? Mainland China had broken with Moscow. Didn't that significantly alter the strategic balance in favor of the West? Wasn't there hope that détente with the Soviet Union would alleviate tensions worldwide and reduce the possibility of serious crises between the two countries?

The developments leading to and following the Middle East crisis of 1973 demonstrated that these hopes were not well founded. The Soviet Union had a major role in encouraging the surprise attack on Israel and the subsequent OPEC oil squeeze. Despite the European and Japanese economic strength they could bring little positive contribution to containing the crisis. The principal burden fell on the United States.

The subsequent events in Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, and Zaïre, though not all to Soviet advantage, gave evidence of Soviet determination (with the aid of Cuban and other proxies) to expand the sway of Soviet influence across Africa and the routes of access to the Persian Gulf. The revolution in Iran, and later seizure of U.S. hostages, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated much more convincingly the depth and extent of the problem.

As the 1970s came to a close, there was wide recognition that the hopes of the early portion of the decade had been disappointed. Even though the West had rejected hostility to the Soviet Union, had reduced its military programs, and had sought to alleviate East-West issues while pursuing a constructive approach to North-South issues, Soviet expansionism continued, and Soviet leaders began to state with growing confidence that the correlation of forces had shifted in their favor. The question now to be answered is: How should we cope with the challenges of the coming decade? What are those challenges likely to be?

IV

Soviet strategic ideas are worked out in the Politburo and its subsidiary committees. No one in the West has access to those

[L]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 87

deliberations. The Soviet system lends itself to effective secrecy. But the Soviet system is not wholly silent. The word must be gotten down to the cadres and to the troops. There is a high degree of continuity and persistence in their strategic approach. It therefore is not a useless exercise to try to judge what the main elements of that approach may be.

Let me outline some of the main Soviet strategic objectives for the 1980s. I would put high on the list the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States. A second aim is to increase Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf. A third is the encirclement and neutralization of China. A fourth is to stimulate trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean. A fifth is the ability to deal successfully with the contingency of a direct Soviet military confrontation with Western military forces. A sixth is to build the image of the Soviet regime as a responsible, legitimate, peace-loving participant in the international community.

Each one of these aims warrants a separate Soviet strategy for its support. All six strategies are interrelated and mutually supportive.

Looking at the NATO European scene, I should think the Soviet side would judge West Germany, closely followed by France, to be the states on which to concentrate. They are the key states economically, militarily, and politically. Without them, NATO Europe is capable of nothing.

West Germany, in the Soviet view, could be particularly vulnerable to a carrot-and-stick approach. The Federal Republic's economy depends on exports, on raw material imports (particularly energy—oil and natural gas), and on its earnings from overseas investments. A significant portion of its exports go to the Warsaw Pact countries. Much of its natural gas comes from Russia, and most of its oil from the Middle East. West German banks have made extensive loans to the Warsaw Pact countries and to countries in the Middle East or immediately adjacent to it, such as Turkey. Much of the Warsaw Pact's military power is poised as a direct threat to NATO's central front in Germany.

Given these West German vulnerabilities, what carrots might the Kremlin hold out to Bonn? The Kremlin can offer to continue and to expand its deliveries of natural gas. The Warsaw Pact countries can continue to service their debt obligations. The German Democratic Republic can expand permitted contacts between its citizens and those of the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union can offer unilaterally to place limits on its and the Warsaw

[L]

88 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Pact's military buildup facing Germany.

Each of these factors has been evident for some time. What may be less recognized is the now-emerging possibility that the Soviet Union may offer to join West Germany and France in joint negotiations with Persian Gulf suppliers for long-term oil-purchase contracts in adequate volume and at stable prices. Already the Soviet Union and the East European countries can use Middle East oil, and most estimates conclude that this need is likely to increase. Thus, the Soviet Union can urge a common interest with West Germany and France in securing oil purchase contracts on favorable terms. Such contracts would tend to be at the expense of those countries not covered. Fear of Soviet pressure can already be seen in the actions of certain of the Persian Gulf countries. It might therefore not be unrealistic on the part of West Germany and France to see advantages in negotiating in partnership with the Soviet Union rather than as an opponent. Whether or not the Germans and the French agree to such a negotiation, the very suggestion thereof can cause misunderstanding between them and the United States and serve the purpose of weakening the links between them.

If the above are important carrots the Soviet Union can offer to the Germans and the French, the stick would be the implied or actual threat to do the reverse of all those things, and in particular to use its power in the Persian Gulf area in a manner inimical to West European interests.

The Russian ambition to have direct access to the Gulf goes back some 200 years. Stalin renewed that aim. Immediately after World War II the West's initial confrontation with the Soviet Union was over the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. For the last 20 years much of Soviet foreign policy has been devoted to increasing its influence in the area—acquiring access, overflight, base or treaty rights from African and Middle Eastern states whose geographic position bears upon Soviet or U.S. access to the Persian Gulf area by land, air or sea. The thrust into Afghanistan advances the Soviet base structure by 500 miles so as to outflank Iran and bear directly on the Arabian Sea. Soviet strategy exploits the fears caused by a realization of Soviet military preponderance in the area, political tensions between the Arab states and Israel and between feudal regimes or narrowly based successor regimes and other groups desiring themselves to monopolize power, and every possibility that presents itself for disliking the United States. The so-called militant students who seized the American hostages have acted in a manner which appears to be competently controlled and directed. The official and clandestine broadcasts from

[LC]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 89

Soviet soil have encouraged and urged them on. From photographs it can be seen that some are beyond normal student age. It is said that some have been identified with the Moscow-oriented Tudeh Party. Regardless of the extent of Soviet control, their activities, and the U.S. reaction which they stimulate, serve to poison U.S.-Iranian relations.

Military or political domination of the Persian Gulf states would not only dramatically support the Kremlin's European strategy but also the Kremlin's third strategy, the encirclement of China. That strategy concerns Pakistan, India, Southeast Asia, Japan and Korea.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the movement of over a million Afghan refugees into Pakistan increase both the immediacy and power of the military threat to Pakistan and provide an opportunity and excuse to provoke and exploit tribal differences and incidents. It is quite evident that Pakistan's rulers have understood the message: they have transferred their most highly regarded ambassador from Washington to Moscow, and have rejected the U.S. offer of military assistance, at least in the absence of a firm U.S. security commitment. As the situation stands, Pakistan apparently is relying on its ties to Islamic and nonaligned nations to deter direct Soviet military pressure.

India many years ago adopted a position of neutrality. Mrs. Gandhi now appears to have moved closer to collaboration with the Soviet Union and away from the West. In any case, the relations between India and China have long been strained.

In Southeast Asia the military success of the North Vietnamese, with Soviet support, against South Vietnam, then against Cambodia and Laos, and finally in defending against the 1979 Chinese incursion, has given the Soviets a strong ally and a useful base structure in that part of the world. North Korea has long been a Soviet client. The key to Soviet encirclement of China is Japan, which is dependent upon the Middle East for almost 80 percent of its oil. The Soviet Union can hardly hope to enlist Japan as an ally against China. They could hope, if Middle East oil were to fall under their influence, that Japan would, in effect, be neutralized.

Soviet strategy in the Western Hemisphere has long been oriented toward the support of subversion and guerrilla groups. Its outstanding success, of course, has been in Cuba. Attempts to exploit that success fully were checked by the U.S. handling of the Cuban missile crisis and the frustration of Che Guevara's subsequent attempts to spread the movement in Colombia, Bolivia and other parts of Latin America.

[L]

90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

But 18 years later we see a renewal of the threat in a different form. There is acknowledged to be a Soviet training brigade in Cuba. Fifty thousand trained Cubans are now estimated to be in Africa, actively supporting Soviet strategy in that area. Another 50,000 are estimated to be trained and available for similar activity in the Western Hemisphere. Cuban influence is already strong in Nicaragua and Jamaica. With Cuba operating under effective Soviet control, there is the grave possibility of a whole series of disruptive developments. These could drain American attention and resources, even if they do not result in additional cases of direct Soviet military presence in this Hemisphere.

A central concern of the Kremlin, however, has been, and must continue to be in the 1980s, the fifth strategy—the Soviets' ability to deal with the contingency of a direct confrontation of Soviet military forces with Western military forces. The Kremlin leaders do not want war; they want the world. They believe it unlikely, however, that the West will let them have the world without a fight.

Accordingly, they wish to maximize the possibility that at no single point of progress toward the attainment of Soviet aims will the gain appear so great and the prospects of successful Western resistance so strong that the West will use military force to confront directly Soviet military forces. The Soviets have for some time had reason to believe that their conventional forces on the Soviet-Warsaw Pact perimeter are superior in capability to those that might oppose them. They are developing and deploying non-nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces which can be projected to considerable distances beyond that perimeter. These will expand the range of circumstances under which they could expect to achieve local military superiority. They believe such a capability minimizes the prospect of direct Western-Soviet military confrontation.

If there nevertheless is such a confrontation, they further believe that, the stakes being vital, rather than accept their loss the West may escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviets are driven to put themselves into the best position they can to achieve military victory in such a war while assuring the survival, endurance and recovery of the core of their party and as much as possible of their power base in the Soviet Union.¹

¹ More detailed discussion of the Soviet view of the importance of strategic nuclear power in local confrontations will be found in Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 207-32, and "Deterring Our Deterrent." *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-77, pp. 195-210.

[L]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 91

It is for that reason that they have put such a large percentage of their military effort into their nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. Whereas the U.S. government estimates that, overall, the Soviet military budget exceeds that of the United States by some 50 percent, the cost of their strategic nuclear programs has, for some years, been triple ours.

The sixth Soviet strategy—building the image of their regime as responsible, legitimate and peace-loving—is of a different type from the other five but of almost equal importance. When the Soviets decide that their other strategies require a given action, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, considerations of the sixth strategy give way. But immediately thereafter the full panoply of propaganda, diplomatic and economic tools return to the effort to restore and advance the desired image.

Finally, as a tactic amounting almost to a seventh strategy, the Soviets use every variety of covert operation on a scale far greater than the West has ever done. Today this focuses on the training, organization, and support of terrorist activities designed to break down the confidence of groups not under their control. The evidence, although often difficult to come by, supports the view that the Soviet Union has been, and is, a principal supporter of terrorism, both with material aid and in its politics and propaganda. For example, it appears probable that the Red Brigades in Italy, the assault on the Mosque at Mecca, and the seizure of the American hostages in Iran were supported and perhaps instigated by agents of the Soviet bloc.²

V

What then is an appropriate strategy for the West? Immediately after the close of World War II, most Americans thought that the West's policy should be wholly positive and constructive; it was hoped that the wartime alliance with the U.S.S.R. could be continued indefinitely into the peace. By the spring of 1947 it was clear that this was a false hope, that in addition to building a constructive system of political and economic order in the world under the aegis of the United Nations structure, the West must be prepared to defend that order against the quite different ambitions of the Kremlin.

As one looks into the 1980s, it is clear that the Soviet threat has increased and that the adequacy of Western means to resist it has

² See, for example, the detailed evidence concerning Soviet complicity in the Tehran Embassy takeover and in the attack on the Mecca Mosque, presented by Robert Moss largely on the basis of Western intelligence sources. "What Russia Wants," *The New Republic*, January 19, 1980, pp. 23-25.

[1c]

92 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

become more uncertain. It is important to continue with the
constructive task of adapting the system of political and economic
world order to changed circumstances, but the reactive, defensive
aspects of Western strategy must again play a more important
role. The principal task of the early 1980s must be to check, blunt,
and, as far as possible, frustrate the interrelated Soviet strategies
while the energies of the many nations similarly threatened have
an opportunity to become mobilized and linked so as to reverse
the currently adverse trends in the correlation of forces. Until not
only those trends have been reversed, but also the actual correla-
tion of forces has become more favorable than it is today, the
United States and the West must play for time in many threatened
areas, employing their resources with prudence and fortitude,
while making a major effort to build up their overall strength.

If this is a correct analysis of the present situation and of the
multiple threats posed by Soviet strategy, there can be no doubt
that the situation is the gravest that the United States and the
West have faced at least since the Soviet threat to Berlin in 1958-
62 and possibly at any time since the end of World War II. Both
the executive branch of our government and those aspiring to the
presidency in the current political campaign should be frank and
explicit in explaining to the American people the seriousness of
the threat and the need for effort, energy and sacrifice to turn the
situation around. Providing for the common defense now requires
the kind of priority that it had in 1950, and it is a disservice to the
American people to pretend that this can be accomplished without
a major adjustment of national priorities, in which, of course, an
equitable sharing of the burdens must be a central feature.

We must rid our minds of the fallacy that the concepts of
détente and deterrence absolve us from concern with the possibil-
ity of military confrontations and the probable outcomes of such
confrontations. We should seek to end the alienation of the U.S.
middle class from our military. We should lessen the degree to
which we conduct our foreign and defense policies in response to
the public mood created by yesterday's television programs and
guided by today's public opinion polls. Instead, our leaders should
adopt a strategic view of foreign and defense policy—one which,
even when dealing with specific problems, takes into account the
entire world chessboard and the correlation of forces five and ten
years from now, not just today's hot issue.

Above all, we must submit to enough discipline to cope with
our economic problems realistically, even as we undertake an
enlarged defense effort. In the 1950s and in the period that

[Lc]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 93

extended to roughly 1971, energy was cheap and readily available, the productivity of our economy was high and inflation was minimal. Today we must undertake an increased defense effort at a time when our total economic output is far greater, but when we must cope with serious energy, productivity and inflation problems. Unless all four are tackled in tandem, the overall program will remain ineffective. Without seeking to spell out all the policies necessary, let me note some of the highlights.

In the case of energy, the short- and medium-range problem is to reduce our dependence on Middle Eastern oil—both to strengthen our hand in the Middle East and to reduce the serious frictions with our major allies that arise from what they rightly perceive as excessive American oil consumption and oil import requirements that contribute directly to their own economic and political problems. In the effort to reduce our oil dependence, increased efficiency and conservation, conversion to coal, synthetic fuel production, and resumption of the construction of fission nuclear power plants must all play their part. Conservation is painful. It must be stimulated by strong economic incentives including increases in the price of oil and gas. Substantial shifts in the patterns of urban and suburban living will be necessary. Choices must be made between degrees of economic growth and progress in environmental protection.

Moreover, we must never lose sight of the long-term problem of developing national policies for the use of energy and for the development of alternative sources that will put us eventually in a strong and largely self-sufficient position in the changing conditions that loom in the next century. Fusion energy deserves maximum support, along with the development of other widely available and renewable energy sources.

On the economic front, the control of inflation and the restoration of American productivity gains are at the core of our problem. Both trace in large part to excessive consumption and an inadequate rate of capital formation: at 4.5 percent of disposable personal income, the current American rate of saving is drastically lower than the 15 to 17 percent rates of our three largest NATO allies, Britain, France and West Germany, and even further below Japan's 20 percent rate.³ Although our proportion of investment to GNP is somewhat better in relative terms, there is no escape from the conclusion that as a rough measure we need to reallocate some five to seven percent of our GNP to increasing our rate of savings—thus permitting those investments necessary

³ U.S. Department of Commerce, *International Economic Indicators*, June 1980, Table 12.

[Lc]

94 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

for improved productivity and job creation. The burden of such
reallocation will be substantially relieved as productivity gains are
realized. Many current inefficiencies and disincentives in and out
of government must be reversed, tax policies must be revised to
promote productive capital investments, and rates of wages and
other financial rewards to individuals, instead of being fully
indexed for inflation, must be adjusted downward to reflect the
need to increase savings, productivity and defense.

All of these efforts are essential in any circumstances. But alongside them, to deal with the fifth Soviet strategy—that of the Soviets being prepared, if necessary, to use predominant military force in support of their expansionist objectives—it is necessary for the West, and the United States in particular, to reverse current adverse military trends. To do so we will need to increase somewhat the size of our current naval and other general purpose forces; we should not have to denude our forces in Europe and the Far East in order to deal with a crisis in the Middle East. However, it is even more important to restore the fighting quality of our forces. This will require an improvement in their operational readiness, the procurement of modern operational equipment, an immediate and substantial pay increase for military personnel to improve retention, and the prompt institution of a democratic and equitable Selective Service system.

During the 1970s, a major objective of U.S. policy and its
principal hope in dealing with the strategic nuclear problem was
to limit the threat through the negotiation, ratification and entry
into force of an effective SALT II treaty. Whatever the merits of
that treaty might have been—I came to the conclusion they were
almost entirely illusory—there is virtually no possibility that it
can be considered by the Senate until the summer of 1981. By
that time the Protocol would have only a few months to run and
the treaty would have only four years or so before it too expired.
Four years is far too short a time for such a treaty to have any
significant effect. Therefore, the sensible course would be to skip
SALT II and prepare now for negotiation of SALT III, with an
expiration date further in the future, say 1995 to 2000. The
prospect of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a treaty in a form
which would meet our needs and those of the West is, however,
low unless we have earlier demonstrated that we are prepared and
able to handle our strategic security without a SALT treaty.

We should always be prepared to negotiate, but we should also
never forget that when we are negotiating with the Soviet Union
we are negotiating with an adversary.

[LC]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 95

Concurrently with building our conventional capabilities, the United States therefore should do what is necessary to deny the Soviet Union strategic nuclear superiority. This means curing the inadequate survivability of our land-based ballistic missiles and enhancing the power of those that can be expected to survive, proceeding with the modernization of the submarine-based component of our strategic deterrent, replacing our aging B-52s, rebasing our bombers at greater distances from our coasts, equipping them with high performance cruise and self-defense missiles, and assuring the survivability and endurance of our command, control, communication and wartime intelligence facilities.

In their entirety, these general purpose and nuclear programs would call for increased expenditures, after taking into account practicable increases in efficiency, of some $40 billion to $50 billion a year, in 1981 dollars.⁴ This is approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of our GNP. How these costs will be met, in view of the budgetary, inflation and energy issues which must be dealt with concurrently, is not clear. There is, however, a change in public attitudes in the United States toward the need to restore its power, including its military power, as a necessary support toward a constructive foreign policy.

In terms of overall effort, the scale of defense spending now required would therefore amount to 6.5 to 7 percent of our GNP, as compared to the present level of 5 percent. This compares to a level of defense spending that stood at approximately 10 percent throughout the 1950s and at 5.9 percent in 1973, when our involvement in Vietnam ceased. To say that such an effort—in relation to the present basic strength and size of the American economy—cannot be undertaken seems to me nonsense. But, to repeat, it must be meshed with comprehensive and much more effective attacks on our energy, productivity, and inflation problems. I believe we can carry out this kind of increase on an equitable basis, in which the level of sacrifice that is required of every segment of our society is fairly distributed and proportioned to economic status. What is required, above all, is a sense of national discipline and resolve that flows from clear understanding of the gravity of the situation.

And here the heart of the matter is that both the government and candidates for office, during the current campaign and afterwards, must give full publicity to the facts as we know them and

⁴This estimate derives from the detailed proposals published by the Committee on the Present Danger, which call for added defense spending amounting to $260 billion over a six-year period. CPD, "Countering the Soviet Threat—A U.S. Defense Strategy in the 1980s," May 9, 1980.

[Lc]

96 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

not obscure them for short-term political reasons. During the
1970s, a tendency developed to play down the facts concerning,
and the significance of, a number of Soviet actions. In general,
this was done on the theory that if one did not find an excuse for
Soviet actions the hope for a reasonable accommodation with the
Soviet Union would be endangered; more specifically, it was done
to avoid harming the prospects of Senate ratification of the SALT
agreements.

These problems are not unique to the United States; they affect
other countries as well. It is not only in the United States that the
growing penetration of Africa with support of Cuban military
forces was given little significance. It is not only in the United
States that developments in Afghanistan were underplayed prior
to the Soviet invasion, and indeed now are still being underplayed.
Furthermore, it is not surprising that the campaign to discredit
the United States is given comprehensive support in many coun-
tries.

Despite its many and manifest shortcomings, the Soviet system
does, in certain ways, "work." Most notably the Soviet system
imaginatively designs, centrally coordinates, and widely dissemi-
nates a powerful and effective propaganda line. The targets of
that propaganda line shift from time to time. At one time the
Federal Republic of Germany was the principal target of scorn;
at another time it was the leadership of communist China; today,
it is the United States. In the internal politics of foreign countries
the usual target is the party most closely following the social
democratic line; it can switch, however, to the party following a
conservative line, and communist parties are not exempt, if insuf-
ficiently subservient to Moscow. Often the central accusation is
designed to shift attention from some comparable but more serious
Soviet action. Coordination of a Western response is often difficult
to reconcile with freedom of the press. The Soviet propagandists
thus have extensive opportunities effectively to divide their op-
ponents and cover their own actions in a fog of conflicting
assertions. Nevertheless, a prime task of the Western strategy in
the 1980s, and of U.S. strategy in particular, must be to assure
that the facts get out and are understood despite the obfuscations
of Soviet propaganda.

VI

Obviously, if the United States mounts an overall program such
as that described above—as I believe it must—it will take time for
its material effects to become real and usable. There are those who

[Lc]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 97

argue that if the Soviet Union sees the United States acting in
such a way as to reverse what they see as a strong current trend in
favor of the Soviets in the correlation of forces, the temptation
will be all the greater for the U.S.S.R. to step up its efforts to stir
up new opportunities and to consolidate tentative gains of recent
years.

There are also those who, for one motive or another, would seek
to depict the United States as starting up a new "arms race." In
my judgment, the facts are exactly contrary to any such claim. It
is the Soviet Union that failed to respond to the more relaxed
policies pursued by the United States in the 1970s, but instead
moved relentlessly forward, first to build up its military power
and then to extend its whole pattern of expansionist activity
culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan. What is needed now
is a redressing of the balance, undertaken not for the sake of any
expansion of American influence or power, but to prevent further
Soviet assaults on the national independence of individual coun-
tries and on the security of key regions of the world. Seen in this
light—as I believe it can and should be—the picture of the United
States pulling itself together should be understood, and welcomed,
by all threatened nations whether or not allied with the United
States. The object of the effort—as must be made clear at every
point—is to *reduce* the threats to peace in the world and to advance
the universal cause of a world in which nations can develop as
they see fit. That such a free and plural world is also the one most
conducive to the national interests of the United States is simply
a reflection of the profound difference between American and
Soviet national objectives.

Yet the danger that the Soviets might seek to exploit their
temporary advantages in terms of military power cannot be
dismissed. Crises may indeed arise a little sooner than they would
otherwise have done, just as an always latent Soviet threat to
Berlin ripened into direct threats in 1958 when the Soviets (as it
turned out, mistakenly) thought that they had achieved a
superiority in ballistic missiles. But what is clear beyond doubt is
that if the United States does *not* act along the lines proposed here,
the kind of Soviet gains and threats to world peace that have
arisen in the last five years will multiply inexorably and perhaps,
in the end, irretrievably.

Let us look, then, at the first four objectives of Soviet strategy,
outlined earlier. To prescribe detailed American and Western
counter-strategies for each would require more than a single
article. But a few key points can be noted.

[LC]

98 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

With respect to NATO Europe, the proposed program should, almost at once, help to restore a confidence that is now shaken concerning the defense of Western Europe itself. Existing plans for strengthening NATO, including the plans for deployment of theater nuclear weapons, should go forward—subject only to the unlikely prospect of reaching effective agreements for mutual reduction of forces. And our European allies, as well as Japan, can reasonably be asked to take on greater shares of the burden of their own defense.

Similarly, the picture of a United States getting its house in order on the energy and economic fronts can only have a heartening impact, and should specifically, and soon, help to reduce the frictions that have arisen in these areas. There, and in respect to the Middle East and Africa, the United States could adopt the general line that we are prepared to do as much as, and more than, our allies, but that we are not prepared to act alone or with only one or two of them. We are therefore not only prepared fully to consult but insist upon consultation and agreement as a pre-condition to U.S. action. With respect to the Germans and the French in particular, we ought to be quite frank with them as to Soviet strategy as we see it, but willing to modify our views on the basis of the additional evidence they can bring to bear on the question.

The situation in the Middle East is obviously dark. The key American interests there are, as always, the independence of individual nations, preserving access to oil on an equitable basis, and the special American commitment to the survival of a healthy Israel roughly within the pre-1967 boundaries. Iran presents special problems, including the threat of a Soviet-oriented leftist takeover, and for the time being there is little possibility of effective U.S. influence there. But those nations seeking to retain their independence should have our quiet support on all fronts, and the United States cannot avoid the responsibility for furthering any possibility of peace between the Arab states and Israel, and for balancing its relationships with Israel and with moderate Arab nations.

Meanwhile, the all too likely prospect that the Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan—where they are embarked on an apparent campaign of total destruction of villages—and the continuing Soviet threat to Pakistan may at any time present acute problems. I see no prospect, at least until there has been a substantial improvement in the military balance, for the successful use of U.S. military force in that area except in circumstances

[L]

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 99

where a majority of Muslim states as well as Israel, our European allies, Japan and China join in resisting the expansionist pressure of the Soviet Union. The principal task, therefore, is to help foster the emergence of a consensus among them. I believe it more feasible for such a consensus to be found in support of the principles of nonaggression and collective defense of the United Nations Charter than merely in support of U.S. leadership.

The encirclement and eventual dismemberment of China appears to be a more formidable task for Soviet policy. There are, however, opportunities. The Soviets could, for instance, stimulate a Vietnamese attack on Thailand, thus raising the possibility of Chinese action against Vietnam, followed by Soviet pressure on the province of Xinjiang and eventually Tibet. I believe the United States is right to emphasize its existing commitment to Thailand as a deterrent to any such chain of events, and that the existing U.S. relationship with China is about right, stopping short in present circumstances of any direct military ties. But if such a sequence should come about, the United States and other major nations will be faced with an extremely grave threat to world peace, and the result could easily be a cementing of the very ties between China and the West that the Kremlin apparently fears.

The problems of the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere differ qualitatively from those of the Eurasian landmass and of Africa. The interests of our NATO European allies and Japan are less, our own more direct. Soviet conventional military power projection capabilities play a smaller role. But in Latin America the political disposition toward antagonism to a powerful neighbor is substantial. In the short run, the United States must seek to identify and support moderate elements wherever possible, and must expand its resources for economic aid and, in selected cases, military assistance. And, in the longer run, what is required is a long and patient effort at building a group of Americans interested, knowledgeable, and professionally competent in the fine structure of the myriad facets of a most difficult set of psychological, economic and political problems.

VII

Even if the United States were not only to adopt but fully to carry out a strategy for the 1980s of the type and magnitude here proposed, that would not in itself assure the containment of Soviet expansionism. Success in restraining the Soviet Union requires a significant degree of parallel action and cooperation by substan-

[L.C.]

100 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

tially all those threatened. Otherwise they can be isolated and picked off one by one. To call such cooperation a "coalition of the free" is an oversimplification. Not all countries threatened by the Soviet Union enjoy much internal freedom, but all are freer both from external influence and internally than are members of the communist "camp of peace and freedom." What they share above all is the glue that has bound all coalitions in the past: the realization of a common danger.

Given the unifying force of a common danger, there are still many centrifugal forces and many grounds for rationalizing individual rather than common approaches to the problem. In the United States there is a deep tendency toward isolation from the hard facts of international conflict and escape into easy moralism. In Europe the provisions of the NATO treaty limiting the commitment of the participants to common action only in the case of threats to the NATO area are rationalized as absolving all participants but the United States from responsibility for dealing with threats outside that area. In the case of Japan, the limitations of the Japanese Constitution are used as a rationale to justify defense expenditures no larger than one percent of the GNP. The Chinese government argues that it is an underdeveloped country and will require 20 years before it will be in a position to play a role in the common defense commensurate with its position in the world. The Federal Republic of Germany notes its unique position as a divided country between East and West.

In the face of these obvious difficulties, how does one go about fostering the parallel and coordinated action which is necessary? Again, there is no easy formula for success but certain guidelines do suggest themselves.

More than half the task will be accomplished when others in the world sense that the United States is pulling itself together internally, that it is achieving a degree of control over its energy and economic-fiscal problems, and has settled on a responsible and consistent general line for its foreign and defense policies. The task will be further eased if a high measure of bipartisan support for that policy in and out of the Congress can be developed.

Fostering the necessary parallel and coordinated actions will require a persistent and flexible U.S. effort in many forums and through many channels. The North Atlantic Council is an appropriate forum for the discussion even of issues arising outside the NATO area. The U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council are other necessary forums. But the real work must be done through bilateral channels. In the past it has been wise to give

STRATEGY IN THE 1980s 101

special consideration to bilateral coordination with the British, the Germans, the French, the Japanese and the Canadians. But, depending on the issue, a wide range of other countries must also be consulted. The volume of work required is so large that the President must divide the burden with his executive branch subordinates and his diplomatic officers. The necessary subdivision, articulation and delegation of the task can only be successfully accomplished if there is a common understanding of the main lines of a consistent strategic approach.

The United States no longer enjoys the unquestioned primacy in the non-Moscow-controlled world which it once enjoyed. We succeeded in the positive task of assisting many of today's developed and developing nations to achieve the positions of strength and influence they now enjoy. Today, they must be expected to decide for themselves those actions which they believe are necessary for their continued well-being and security. The principal hope for the success of a U.S. strategy for the 1980s lies in its being consistent with the long-range interests of our allies and potential allies and being so perceived by them.

In the short run we must expect that local, narrower, more petty interests will result in action by them which will appear to us in the United States not to be in the general interest. In the long run the essential soundness of our position and the deceptive techniques, the brutal means, and the hegemonic aims of the Soviet Union will tend to force them back to actions more in the general interest. To buy time and to use it well is therefore of the essence.

If any of us are to survive the decade of the 1980s we must keep our eyes on the essential decency and goodwill of our associates. It is always tempting to find fault with others. It is important to avoid mutual recrimination. The best antidote for recrimination about the past is to concentrate on doing what needs to be done now to assure the future.

THE WASHINGTON POST, MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1980

R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr.

# The Worst Book Of the Year

Every year I review the best-seller list and after prayer and meditation lob the garland toward that writer who, by virtue of bad character, tastelessness, artless stupidity or some other minor defect, has written the worst book of the year. I call it "The Harold Robbins Award," though I am sure that if our president wrote books I would be calling it "The Jimmy Carter Award."

This year, as in the past, the competition has been furious. Savorless prose alone, incidentally, will not earn one this award. Nor will weak conception, a drunken public-relations agent or an implausible or asinine subject. These attributes help, but to win the worst-book-of-the-year award one must rise above the flotsam and jetsam and produce a book that states unclearly and unmemorably a thesis that ranges from the untenable to the imbecilic. In 1979 William Shawcross' "Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia" fulfilled these high standards. Not only did the author fail to prove his thesis; he actually disproved it. This is art.

The thesis here is that the policies of Nixon and Kissinger directly led to the

> "In the end, Shawcross leaves Kissinger looking intelligent and, as politicians go, humane. This staggers me."

Cambodian holocaust. Based on Shawcross' own evidence, it is apparent that, of all those involved in Cambodia, these men were probably most benign in their intentions. They are about as responsible for the destruction of Cambodia as Roosevelt and Eisenhower were for the World War II damage to Holland. "Sideshow" is Shawcross' attempt to diabolize Kissinger. In the end, he leaves Kissinger looking intelligent and, as politicians go, humane.

The writer is editor-in-chief of The American Spectator.

This staggers me. I began the book harboring a profound and well-informed disrelish for the Georgetown Metternich. Upon ending it, I was reluctantly sympathizing with him. I pray Shawcross will write no more on Kissinger; another attempted assault and I will be raising funds for a Kissinger monument.

The book is a mere tract of laughable intensity and shoddiness. It would take a special kind of genius to prove Shawcross' case that the people who fought communism in Southeast Asia were responsible for its ravages, and Shawcross is no genius. Despite his earnest conjuring with documents and the bugaboos of his fellow believers, no intelligent reader will doubt that the party preeminently responsible for Cambodia's destruction is the party that invested eastern Cambodia with troops, coerced the Cambodian army to truck supplies to them and then brought in hostile American fire by regularly attacking Americans from these enclaves.

Of course, I speak of the communist Vietnamese: ethnically an ancient Cambodian enemy, an enemy that launched an all-out attack against Cambodia beginning March 29, 1970, four weeks before the American incursion into Cambodia. The attack continues. The Vietnamese still slaughter and starve Cambodians. The Americans left the scene of the crime on March 29, 1973.

Contradictions abound. On page 109 Shawcross mentions a captured enemy document's references to a 1969 North Vietnamese spring offensive. On the next page he claims there was no North Vietnamese offensive eight months into Nixon's first term. Elsewhere he says that the American bombing gained Cambodian acceptance of the Khmer Rouge. At other points he says they gained their popular strength through their alliance with Sihanouk.

Moreover, I sense there is an overpowering impulse to bamboozle here. Shawcross claims the American "incursion" forced the Vietnamese to go deeper into Cambodia. Yet the historical record shows clearly that the 1970 incursion came four weeks after the

North Vietnamese began their own offensive against the new Lon Nol regime. By the time of the American incursion, the North Vietnamese were already reported a mere 40 kilometers southeast of Phnom Penh. Surely Shawcross, with his thousands of Pentagon documents, knows this.

On page 130 he mentions that before the American incursion "the North Vietnamese moved westward into Cambodia with the apparent intention of securing their lines of communication." Ah, but what were North Vietnamese lines of communication doing lying across "neutral" Cambodia? Here is another of Shawcross' botched theses: Cambodia was neutral ground, not to be violated by the Americans who were being assaulted from it.

Throughout history timorous men have contrived to enter into alliance with the dark and horrifying forces they deem in control of the universe. Thus we see man, through prayer and ritual, forever attempting to placate the gods and thereby dissuade them from gobbling him up, raining fire on him, liberating him with a hammer and sickle, and so forth. All the invincible and inscrutable forces that have clanked and goose-stepped through this century have at first been conjured with in this way. In the '20s many pols and profs attempted to sweeten the Fascisti with suave gestures and soothing rhetoric. More recently, the same kind of snivelers have tried to work such miracles on the Marxist bone-crushers.

This voodoo does not work, and Shawcross' attempt to poultice the conscience of those who tried it in Southeast Asia deserves the praise only of the faithful.

FEB 4 1980

THE CONTINUING CRISIS

JUN 5 1980

* March 7 to April 4, and it is now numbingly apparent that America is governed by an imbecile. Did you note his flummoxing of the UN vote condemning Israel? Did you note his March 29 letter to Iran? How about the goofball March 4 address where he inadvertently yet blithely overlooked two key pages? How about that interview with the *Washington Post's* Meg Greenfield wherein he states that, notwithstanding an 18 percent inflation rate and 20 percent interest rates, "the people are prosperous and at ease"? Verily he is an imbecile. He entered office as a pert ignoramus. He has now evolved into dithering imbecility. His anthem, axiom, panacea, and political first principle is "There is nothing that can be done about it"; and the galoots around him applaud.

* During the Watergate Spectacle there were the episodic Watergate Revelations, each one followed by a "firestorm" in the press. Today there are the White House Blunders. They grow ever more frequent and possibly ever more idiotic. Yet there follows no Firestorm, no outburst of indignation. Is the press in a stupor? Are the boys stationed at the Washington Press Club bar as imbecilic as the dolt in the Oval Office? There should be a howl from every editorial column. There should be a Firestorm accorded every blunder. What has happened to our venerated Fourth Estate?

* The Carter administration's UN vote was an egregious breach of faith with a responsible and reliable ally. All the world knows that. Still a lawfully constituted government simply does not renounce its vote by saying ever so vulpinely that it resulted from a "failure in communications." All the world knows that, too. And that sniveling, idiotic epistle that the Wonderboy sent to Iran, that was an almost unimaginable blunder. But to turn around the next day and disown the letter—that was the blunder that set all Europe agog. Where is the Firestorm?

* Europe is shocked. It is more shocked by these White House Blunders than by any of the Watergate Revelations. When will our press report their shock and their steady drift away from their North American ally? When will the domestic Firestorms begin? In terms of international relations the Wonderboy's Blunders are more dangerous than the Watergate Revelations. One merely has to read the foreign press to grasp this terrible fact.

* Another contributor to the classified section of the *New York Review of Books* may be in trouble. Police in Leeds, England, have discovered a mass grave containing at least 25 pet cats and dogs. In sports news, the Carter constituency fell into the Mulligrubs when Mr. Rip Howell, a 23-year-old geology major from the University of Southwestern Louisiana, failed halfway through his attempt to spend 34 hours seated in a tub of ketchup. A frankly gleeful

story in from the New China News Agency reports that a Marxist-Leninist telephone operator in northeast China has completed her 590,000th call without error or complaint. A microphone in Stockholm, Sweden, sprang to life and electrocuted the Rev. Kaarlo Toivo as he was about to begin a full-immersion baptism. According to reports from Latin America, one of the most highly regarded gate-crashers in the world, Mr. José Antonio Valencia, came a cropper when he smuggled himself into that ill-starred reception at the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. Not 30 minutes after Mr. Valencia had grasped his first canapé, the Embassy was overrun by the heroic urban guerrillas of the April 19 Movement. At this writing the suave Mr. Valencia, along with nearly 20 ambassadors, languishes in their stern grip, and no one, not even Senator Kennedy, seems to care.

* Otherwise Senator Kennedy cares deeply. Throughout the month he continued to whine and to blubber across America, maundering over the plight of the poor and fuliginous and threatening retribution to the privileged few—that is to say, to the taxpayers. Wherever he does go he conjures up scenes of squalor and destitution: chimney sweeps hornswopped by tycoons, children orphaned for the fun of it, the aged driven from their homes by smirking bankers, cabals of white supremics oppressing woebegone darkies. It is a sad tale. Dickens could scarcely improve on it.

* In Aberdeen, Scotland, justice was served when Mr. Alexander Webster, estranged husband of Mrs. Irene Webster, was fined 50 pounds by Sheriff Philip Love. It was Mr. Webster who, during a family tiff last May, perpetuously heated up a skillet coated with lard, and, in the presence of Mrs. Webster and her friend, Miss Janice Morrison, brazenly sautéed the family hamster. "I had a few drinks and was feeling a bit low so I just fried the thing," Mr. Webster admitted. The terror ended when he heaved the unfortunate *Cricetus minimus* from the verandah of his top-floor flat. It was never seen again. Back in the States, the sexual harassment of women is reaching crisis dimensions, so much so that the editors of *Ms.* are losing faith in the system. On March 12, another female coal miner, Mrs. Eleanor R. Bowen of Mingo County, West Virginia, died in the line of duty; and in Moline, Illinois, John Deere & Co. summarily fired Miss Jodi Sturz when it was discovered that she in her innocent curiosity had used the company's new Xerox machine to photocopy her naked rump. Finally in Detroit, Michigan, those two policewomen who had chastely refused to assist a male colleague when he was attacked by a nude man burning money were dismissed from the force—the first dismissals for cowardice in the city's history.

* Consumerists in Abilene, Texas, were sing-

ing "I Told You So" when it was learned that the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company had inadvertently listed the Elliott-Hamil Funeral Home in its yellow pages under "Frozen Food—Wholesale." Mr. Robert E. White, America's newly-appointed Ambassador to El Salvador, engauded the legend of the Carter administration with a stupefying speech to the San Salvador-American Chamber of Commerce. There he accused the assembled capitalist roaders of funding the rightist terrorists who he hypothesized were responsible for the March 24 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero. He then declared in stirring dudgeon that leftist leader Mr. Juan Chacon had also just been assassinated. Here was a memorable instance of Carterism with its grinning face; within hours of Mr. White's sermonics a robust and inflamed Mr. Chacon held a lively press conference, and the Yankee Colossus was again wearing grease paint and baggy pants.

* Mr. Angelo Bruno, a penniless immigrant who rose to become one of the most powerful and prosperous vending-machine salesman of all time despite almost constant harassment from the FBI, died of acute lead poisoning on March 21. Though never accepted by Philadelphia's polite society—such as it is—Mr. Bruno's funeral brought out over a thousand mourners. "He was a nice man, a good man," said Mrs. Amelia Rubolina; and Dr. Joseph Fiorello, cousin to the deceased, stated categorically, "He was one of the finest people I have ever known." Finally, the long-concealed truth is leaking out about "humane societies." In Boise, Idaho, the indigenous humane society is being sued for $261,500 for its barbarous treatment of Pup, the priceless German shepherd of Mrs. Richard Millington, a local dowager.

* Proof that champions of traditional societies can provide fresh solutions to contemporary problems comes from the remote parts of India's Uttar Pradesh state, where much concern has been registered over the lascivious ways of those local police covering sex crimes. Now the Hijra (Eunuch) Association of Basti District has formally proposed that the Uttar Pradesh state government recruit eunuchs for this sort of police work, a proposal that will doubtless inspire many a feminist on our side of antiquity.

* Finally, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, has been found the Wonderboy's ideal Supreme Court nominee: Judge Richard Braithwaite, a confessed kleptomaniac who has pled guilty to shoplifting charges and who will be allowed to remain on the bench thanks to an understanding Circuit Court. Is it not time that kleptomaniacs too be represented on the High Court? After all, thieves now appear before the Court out of all proportion to their number in society at large.
—RET

2

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR MAY 1980

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 27, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

It was most generous of you to send me an
inscribed copy of *The Real War*, which arrived
today. I am honored and grateful.

Dr. Kissinger, I know, has sent you copies
of letters that he and I wrote to *Commentary*
protesting its grudging review of your book.
I have been informed by Norman Podhoretz that
my letter will be published, with an answer
by the book reviewer and possibly by Podhoretz
himself. (Dr. Kissinger's letter was not for
publication.) Podhoretz takes the position
that he has publicly recanted his error in
opposing your Vietnam policy; therefore, you
and Henry owe him a confession of error over
detente before an alliance can be struck!
Obviously we have touched a sensitive nerve,
and I do not recommend taking his advice.

Again, many thanks.

President Richard M. Nixon
26 Federal Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10278

**SHOEMAKER:** ...former President Richard Nixon has been writing memos to Ronald Reagan. What role would you see Mr. Nixon playing in a Reagan administration?

**KISSINGER:** I think everybody has to understand that I am not an intimate advisor of Governor Reagan. Ah, he asks me questions from time-to-time, I meet with him from time-to-time, and I say this only so that people don't get the idea that I am here, giving you the inside information of what Governor Reagan is likely to do. My guess would be that Richard Nixon who in foreign policy has one of the best minds in this country and one of the widest experiences, would have an opportunity to express his views on specific subjects. I do not believe that he would play a regular assigned role. But, I think he is definitely ah, a national asset in terms of his knowledge of foreign policy and I would think I would not be surprised if Governor Reagan called him from time-to-time and asked his judgment on specific problems.