TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: Dimensions of Student Involvement
by Seymour Martin Lipset

Chapter 1. Sources of Student Activism

Chapter 2. Polls and Protest

Chapter 3. Who Are The Activists

Chapter 4. The Historical Background: From
The Revolution to World War I

Chapter 5. Historical Background: The Twenties
Through the Fifties

Chapter 6. Faculty and Students: Allied and in
Conflict

Chapter 7. Some Political Consequences of Student
Activism in Comparative Perspective

Chapter 1
# Sources of Student Activism

Any effort to interpret the changing political
behavior of American students in recent years is subject
to the difficulty that it is dealing with a local
aspect of a worldwide phenomenon. Although the events
which precipitated student activism vary from country to
country, and the targets of student attack differ, there
are more common themes than differences in the tactics
and ideologies of the movements. Unlike the leftist
youth and student movements of the 1930s which were
linked to adult political parties, the dominant ones of the
1960s constituted a genuine youth rebellion, one which
was almost as much levied against the major parties of the
left, and the Soviet Union, as it was against the moderates
and conservatives. The lack of involvement in adult politics
gave free rein to the propensity of youth to adhere to
absolute principles, to engage in expressive rather than
instrumental politics. Relatively little concerned with the long-term
consequences of their actions, the New Left student movements
appeared ready to attack all existing structures, including
the university, and to use tactics which alienated the majority,
in order to make manifest their contempt, their total rejection
of the intolerable world created by their elders. This
rejection of "responsibility" has characterized student groups in
Japan, France, Germany, the United States and many other
countries.

Most recently, however, this situation has changed somewhat. The American New Left turned during 1969 to an endorsement of Marxism-Leninism. The currently dominant wing of the students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Worker-Student Alliance, is in fact the student movement of the Maoist Progressive Labor Party. The Young Socialist Alliance, affiliated to the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party, has also achieved an important position within the radical movement, particularly through its major role in the formation of the New Mobilization Committee Against the Vietnam War. Even the old Communist Party has begun to regain a position within the student left. And the emergence in strength of the various communist parties within the left-wing student movement has ironically made for a more responsible, less violent and adventurist movement. Each of these parties, desirous of winning adult non-campus support, has opposed aggressive confrontationist tactics which antagonize those outside of the movement. Only the so-called Weathermen faction of SDS, which remains unattached to an adult party, continues to advocate confrontationist tactics as a major activity of the student radicals.

Although many observers of the campus scene claimed the end of the "student revolution" as the sixties passed into history, the record of the 1969-70 school year would not warrant such a conclusion. The crisis of academic

authority which began in Berkeley in 1964-65, had permeated
into the high schools on a massive scale by 1968-69. Students
had learned that adult authority in the form of their teachers,
administrators, and parents, were usually willing to either
yield completely or at least compromise with student demands
in order to gain the peace. And consequently large numbers
of young people who are not radicals in any political sense
have learned to use the weapons of the demonstration and
strike to attain their immediate ends.

In spite of extensive effort to "cool" or "repress"
campus unrest, the early winter months of 1970 witnessed an
increase in the protest wave. The Urban Research Corporation,
which has been monitoring student demonstrations, reported
more "major" incidents" between mid-January and March 23, 1970,
than had occurred in a corresponding period in 1969.

Reports gathered for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest indicated that there were many more "disruptive" demonstrations in 1969-1970, before the Cambodian incursion, than in the two previous academic years. The Cambodian government and the killings at Kent State and Jackson State resulted in the first national student strike of long duration.⁵ The data from opinion polls, discussed later, indicated that close to half the undergraduate campus population was involved.

As the American educational system enters the 1970s,
it is clear that two characteristics are present which differ
largely from the beginning of the 1960s. There is much less
respect for authority of those at the heads of institutions,
whether public, private, or educational, and the large passive
majority of students are much more liberal in their social,
economic, and political values. Nevertheless, the bulk of

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politically active students support "liberal" political activities which basically accept the premises of the American political system. Thus the major student activities of 1968 and 1969 involved participation in the nomination campaigns of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, in the 1969 anti-war Moratorium, and in the 1970 strikes, all led by youth still committed to electoral efforts. It would appear that the dominant form of student activism in the 1970s will involve efforts to build reformist political tendencies and pressure group movements, that the resort to civil disobedience which characterized much of the sixties will be less in evidence. This prediction, of course, may go completely awry should American participation in the Vietnam War continue at a high level. As in the case of earlier protest and radical movements, the extent to which such groups accommodate to the rules of the game of a democratic political system will depend on how responsive the system seems to be, or as the radicals would put, how successful it is in coopting protest. Cooption and responsiveness are often used to describe two words about the same process. The more responsive the system, the more moderate, the leftist and trade-union groups have become. In the past; a similar reaction may be anticipated from the current "out" groups, the anti-war students and the black militants.

This prediction, of course, applies largely to the mass of politically concerned students whose political interests have been activated by the major issues of the sixties, racism and war, or who have been drawn into the "counter culture" of youth which has sought to deemphasize materialist goals. Many of them, like Sam Brown, the Harvard Divinity School student, who organized the movement which resulted in the McCarthy presidential campaign in 1968, and who also founded the anti-war Moratorium movement which precipitated large demonstrations in the fall of 1969, have been concluded to show that the undifferentiated anti-system attacks on extremist student groups which have gone outside of the regular pressure group and campaign tactics of American politics have been counter-productive, have actually reduced rather than increased the efficacy of the anti-war movement in accomplishing its objective of ending the war. In a long analysis to this effect, Brown quotes the statements made by the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh. She told a visiting delegation of anti-war leaders from the United States that many American student radicals appeared to be "reluctant to touch political power" and help end the war. By their aggressive tactics and personal life-styles, they have antagonized many older Americans who were not yet ready to support efforts to force the government to change its war policies.

But while the large majority show signs of returning to ends oriented politics as distinct from involvement in expressive forms of salvation oriented styles of life, a small almost infinitesimal minority has adopted terroristic tactics in frustration against failure to gain any effective base of support either on or off campus. The so-called Weathermen facsimile of EBS is perhaps the best known of a variety of such groups which are prepared to engage in terrorism, assassination, bombing, arson, and kidnapping. Since a few hundred determined terrorists can literally tie up a nation, the changes in the mood of the student population will not serve to moderate the ultra-militant groups. If anything, greater moderation by the mainstream activists may only inflame the terrorists. And the danger exists that such terrorism will give rise to counter-terrorism, to the use of repressive tactics by the police and other authorities. A struggle to wipe out urban guerrillas

who base themselves in campus communities could, of course, upset the trends pressing the American university to reject confrontation tactics

The Change From the Fifties

To understand the reasons why the relatively passive postwar generation was replaced by one which contains an activist minority of the "enraged," it is important to note the extent to which some of the conditions which dampened ideological controversy among intellectuals during the 40's and 50's were changed in the 60's. Essentially, the politics of the two earlier decades were dominated first by the Second World War and then by the cold war. Given a high degree of support among liberal intellectuals concerning these events, many who were deeply critical of various domestic institutions and practices found themselves defending the fundamental character of their societies as moral and decent against the totalitarian critics. For a brief period, historically speaking, Western democratic intellectuals found themselves engaging in actions which belied their role as critics. This period was broken by changes within Communist society, as well as increasing awareness of the social conditions existing in the third world. The breakdown of monolithic Communism, the rise of liberal opposition tendencies in various Eastern countries, the intensity of the Sino-Soviet split, all served to undermine the conviction that all men of good will and all non-Communist nations must unite to fight totalitarian expansion. In a real sense, as far as many intellectuals were concerned, the cold war came to an end.

This change had considerable impact on those members of the older generation who had remained liberal critics, but had kept quiet either because they agreed with the assumptions justifying unity against the Communist threat, or because they feared social or political sanctions from the supporters of anti-Communism. Many of them had been active when younger in various radical movements, and though publicly quiescent had continued their criticisms within private circles. As a group, they were concentrated among college-educated professionals and intellectuals, including, particularly, university faculties. Jews had been relatively heavily involved in radical activities in the 1930's and 1940's, a phenomenon which stemmed from continuity with the political vlaues brought over from the ghettoes of Eastern Europe, from experience with domestic anti-Semitism which was particularly strong in the United States until the end of World War II, and from an identification of Nazism with conservatism and militant anti-Communism. As ideological anti-Communism lost strength, the former radicals and left-liberals returned in some measure to their earlier beliefs. More significantly, however, was the emergence among younger intellectuals and students of widespread social criticism, sentiments which were often encouraged by their "liberated" elders. The new generations of liberals who knew not Hitler and Stalin, the 1948 Czech coup and the Hungarian revolution, from firsthand experience, found little reason to restrain applying their moral beliefs to politics.

This shift in ideological climate, as well as the
rather rapid escalation of protest from words to action,
was facilitated by the struggle for Negro rights which
emerged in the years following the Supreme Court's school
desegregation decision of 1954. This was the perfect
issue around which to create a new activist movement,
since it engaged the principal aspect of American society,
in which the system engaged in actions which were at
sharp variance with its manifest creed of equality and
democracy. Most Americans, and the university system
in toto, recognized that Negro inequality is evil, and in
principle approved all actions designed to reduce or
eliminate it. Hence race was the easiest issue around
which the new political criticism could mobilize. To
organize to fight segregation, particularly in the South,
was not a radical act. Yet the struggle contributed greatly
to radicalizing sections of the young. In this particular
situation, the conservative or traditionalist forces intro-
duced the tactics of civil disobedience, and even of
violence, the Southern segregationists refused to
accept the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and Congress,
and taught the advocates of civil rights, both the black
community and the white students, that the regular peaceful
methods of democracy would not work. The confrontationist
tactics of civil disobedience, which first emerged in the
South, were then diffused by the American student movement
to other parts of the country and the world, and to other
issues both inside and outside of the university.

The aggressive tactics of the civil rights movement were successful, as judged by the criteria of actions taken by different agencies of government to outlaw discrimination, and to foster economic and educational improvements. Whatever the profound limitations of these, the fact remains that more has been attempted by government to improve the situation of the Negro in recent years than in all the preceding years since Reconstruction. Many of these actions, by particularly/the Administration, Congress and local agencies, can be credited as responses to political militancy or the fear of ghetto riots. But though these efforts attest to the value of political action, they have not resulted in any major visible change in the position of the bulk of the Negroes. (Statistical gains are often invisible to all not directly involved.) They remain preponderantly poor, segregated and uneducated, securing the leavings of the labor market. To each group of civil-rights-concerned youth who have come to political consciousness during this period, the gap between what ought to be and what actually exists appears to have increased rather than decreased. They take for granted the existing structure, including the changes which had been made, and react with outrage against the continued sources of Negro deprivation. Older liberals, on the other hand, have often reacted with pleasure at the considerable progress that has been made within the past few years. Thus an inevitable age-related split has occurred.

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This division between the generations has been particularly acute within the Negro community. To younger *blacks*, the gains made since the 1950s appear empty, in face of the existing pattern of Negro social and economic inferiority. And on the major campuses of the nation, the growing minority of *black* students have found themselves in a totally white-dominated world, facing few, if any, black faculty, and a white student body whose liberal and radical wing turned increasingly after 1964 from involvement in civil rights protest to activity directed against the Vietnam *war*. The concern with black power, the Negro control over their own communities, and particularly civil rights organizations, has won growing support among black college students. Most recently, these students have played a major role in confronting university administrations with demands for more *black* students and faculty, and for changes in the curriculum. Black students have been among the major forces initiating sit-ins at schools as diverse and separated as Cornell University, San Francisco State College, Columbia University, Boston University, Northwestern University and many predominantly Negro institutions as well.

The issue of the acceptable pace of reform also has been affected by events abroad, particularly in Cuba and Vietnam. The triumph of the Castro movement, an event dominated by young men, produced an example of a revolution

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seemingly uncontaminated by Stalinism. Cuban events helped to generate the sense that revolution was both possible and desirable as a way to eliminate social evils. Again generational differences divided the liberal-left communities. The older ones had learned from experience that revolutions could lead to totalitarianism, to new intense forms of exploitation and to cynical betrayals of the popular will. To many youth, raising such matters seemed only to justify inaction against the intolerable aspects of the status quo.

The spread of opposition to the Vietnam war has, of course, become the dominant political issue affecting student activism. To the older generation, including initially most liberals, Vietnam was but the most recent episode in a two-decade-long struggle against Communist imperialist expansion. To the new generations of the children of liberals and former radicals, Vietnam became defined in terms which placed American actions at odds with certain basic American beliefs, those of anti-imperialism, of the right of self-determination of politically weak peoples. Given the existence of a poly-centric divided Communism, it simply did not make sense to perceive Vietnamese Communism as an extension of Russian or Chinese power. The very failure of the powerful United States quickly to defeat its small poor Vietnamese opposition has been evidence of the oppressive character of the war, of its being a war in which a foreign power seeks to impose its will by force over another people. The very values which led Americans to be suspicious of, and opposed to, the British, French and Dutch empires, which

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were called into play to justify World Wars I and II, and the
Korean War, have now been turned against the United States.

To comprehend the reasons for the special confrontationist
character of the student anti-war movement, it is necessary
to recognize the direct link between it and the lessons learned
from the civil rights movement. As Sam Brown put it well:

> In the early Sixties, young people learned that voting
> and precinct meetings were not the only effective forms of politi-
> cal activity, that extra-legal demonstrations worked in the face
> of a moral horror, and that American leaders often displayed both
> cowardice and hypocrisy in race relations. The civil rights move-
> ment, with all its implications about American politics, was
> almost a necessary [prior] condition for anti-war activism on
> the campus. 10

It was also important to understand that the passion
unleashed by the anti-war movement is strongly related to basic
aspects of the American value system. To decry wars, to refuse
to go is at least as American as apple pie. Sol Tax, of the
University of Chicago, who has attempted to compare the extent
of antiwar activity throughout American history, concluded that
the Vietnam War is only one of four least popular military conflicts.

The War of 1812 was intensely unpopular among the
merchants and other strata; some New England states threatened
to secede on the issue. 12 A vigorous peace movement emerged after
the war, whose success among students "was evidenced by the forma-
tion of peace societies at Amherst, Dartmouth, and Oberlin and
less organized student activities at Harvard, Union, Knox and
other colleges. 13 Abraham Lincoln and many Whigs denounced
the Mexican War. The abolitionists regarded it as an immoral
conflict fought to extend the domain of slavery, and innumerable
Catholics objected to fighting a Catholic country. Indeed,
the Mexican Army was able to form units composed of American
deserters. 17 By paying $3000, men could and did buy themselves

11a

[LC]

out of the Civil War, which, ironically, since Karl Marx enthusiastically supported it, is the only war regarded popularly as "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." The antidraft riots of 1863 were the bloodiest of our history. Professors and other intellectuals were vilified in the press and pulpit as traitors for their opposition to the Spanish-American War. Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed his disgust at the "self-righteous" anti-imperialist and antiwar talk" which has prevailed to some extent at Harvard College and elsewhere."

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In August 1917, the *New York Herald* reported that "in New York City ninety out of the first hundred draftees claimed exemption." The War Department listed 337,649 draft evaders in World War I. The antiwar Socialist Party secured its largest vote in history in many cities in the 1917 municipal elections. Our entry into World War II was strongly opposed by an extensive mass movement. Had the United States entered World War II in any war other than through having been attacked, it is clear that a large segment of the country would have continued its opposition to the war after Congress declared it. Opinion surveys taken during the Korean War reported significant majorities of opposition to it among the population and among college students within two years of its beginning.

17

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The same Protestant propensity for moralistic crusades which has been expressed in various efforts to reform the rest of the world by war also underlies the endeavor of numerous Americans to resist immorality. For many Americans, wars must be moral or immoral; one must do God's work in supporting or opposing them. The United States is the only country in which the majority of the citizens have adhered to what the British called the "dissenting" or "non-conformist" denominations, rather than to groups that are

each war as

unfair.

or once were state churches. The values of moralistic dissenters, mainly the Baptists and Methodists, have deeply informed our political history, in terms of a propensity for domestic and international crusades against satanic enemies. 19

## The Sources of Student Unrest: Motivating Factors

A general analysis of the changing political climate as it has encouraged student dissatisfaction, of course, does not explain why students *qua* students have played such an important role in stimulating protest. Here it must be noted that students have almost invariably been more responsive to political trends, to changes in mood, to opportunities for social change than any other group in the population, except possibly intellectuals.
As a result students have played a major role in stimulating unrest and fostering change in many countries. The special role of students has been particularly noted in the *un* on *revolutions* of 1848; in the Russian revolutionary movement, which was largely a student one until 1905; in the various Chinese movements during the first quarter of the twentieth century; in the different *fascist movements* in Italy, Germany and Spain, before *they* took power; in a host of colonial and *underdeveloped states*; and in various communist countries since 1956. 20

Historically then, one would expect a sharp increase in student activism whenever events call accepted political and social values into question, in times particularly where policy failures seem to question the adequacy of social, economic and political arrangements and institutions. Although

it may be argued that student activism is the result, rather
than the cause of social discontent, it is important to
recognize that once activated, student groups have played
a major role in mobilizing public opinion behind the
causes and ideologies fostered by them. Social unrest
causes student unrest, but once they start expressing
their disquiet, students and intellectuals have been in
many ways the vanguard of political change.

Awareness of the important role of students has led
to efforts to detail those aspects of the situation of
students generally, as well as in specific times and places,
which press them to act politically. The factors to which
attention has been called in the growing literature on the
subject may be differentiated between those which *motivate*
students to action and those which *facilitate* their parti-
cipation.

Perhaps the most general hypothesis which has been repeatedly advanced to account for youth protest whenever it has reared its head suggests that is a result of a process which, set in motion by rapid rates of social change, by events which create a sharp discrepancy between the formative experiences of parental generations and those of a given generation of youth. Both Jaynes and experts on youth behavior have agreed with Kingsley Davis's proposition that "rapid social change ... has crowded historical meaning into the family time-span, has thereby given the off-spring a different social content from that which the parent acquired, and consequently has added to the already existent ... intrinsic differences between parent and youth, a set of extrinsic ones which double the chance of alienation."¹⁹ Or as Norman Birnbaum has put it more recently: "Generational dissidence and revolt are not a perpetual social problem, but assume acute forms only under conditions of extreme dissonance between generational experiences."²⁰

As the discussion of the sources of repeated periods of American campus unrest presented in Chapters 4 and 5 should make clear, any wave of discontent can and has been explained by the concurrent social changes which have upset the normal sources of youthful deference to older generations. While this approach may be valid in the sense that Kingsley Davis presented it, as accounting for greater youthful protest in "modern civilization," in contrast to

12 a

23a

most societies," It does not explain why certain epochs of rapid change lead to student activism, while others have not. An effort to do so derivative from Freudian analysis suggests that student movements occur whenever the elder generation, through some presumable historical failure, has become de-authorized in the eyes of the young.... They arise wherever social and historical circumstances combine to cause a crisis in loss of generational confidence, which impels the young to resentment and uprising.... Rapid social change in and of itself does not necessarily involve student unrest. The emphasis on the causal role of "de-authorization," however, suffers from the same methodological problem as the theory of "rapid social change", in that its advocates seek to demonstrate with the presumed presence of the causal process, and ignore circumstances in which the event, student unrest did not take place though one can point to indicators of rapid social change or de-authorization as did.

But though various historical sociological theories have been advanced to account for greater or lesser periods of youth based unrest, other hypotheses have been suggested to explain why youth generally, and students in particular, have shown a more intense commitment to and greater involvement in movements favoring radical social change and millenarian hopes, than their elders. Much of the writings on the subject by psychologists have been an insistence that youth

still resemble Aristotle's portrait of 2,500 years ago that they do "things excessively and vehemently," that they "have exalted notions, because they have not yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations." Some contemporary psychologists see a disposition toward excessive anxiety and commitment in the strains of adolescence, a period which in modern society with its prolongation of education and career preparation lasts into the twenties for college students. During this stage of personality development, the individual is faced with the need to establish a personal identity and select an adult role. The very openness, freedom to choose alternative paths, characteristic of modern society in this period, faces the modern adolescent with a more ambiguous, ego threatening, period, than that which confronted his predecessors, whom were much more likely to have an identity and career handed to them. The reaction of adolescents to this state of prolonged uncertainty has been described by Erik Erikson:

(12 b)

23 2

[LLO]

Clearly the adolescent looks most fervently for men and ideas to have faith in, which also means men and ideas in whose service it would seem worth while to prove oneself trustworthy....

The adolescent now looks for an opportunity to decide with free assent on one of the available or unavoidable avenues of duty and service, and at the same time is mortally afraid of being forced into activities in which he would feel exposed to ridicule or self-doubt.

... The adolescent's willingness to put his trust in those peers and leading or misleading, elders who will give imaginative, if not illusory, scope to his aspirations is only too obvious. XLS

Gordon Allport in analyzing the changes in personality that accompany "maturing" suggested that youth be inherently less able to handle ambiguity, to accept their weaknesses as well as strengths, tend to overreact to stimuli, and lack a high capacity for tolerance. 26

The sociological analysis has pointed to the same aspects as inherent in the fact that youth, and students in particular are marginal men. → They are in transition between having been dependent on their families for income, status and various forms of security and protection, and taking up their own roles in jobs and families. Studenthood is inherently a tension-creating period. The rapid growth in the number of students, almost eight million today as compared with one and a half million at the end of the 1930's, means both that the composition of the college population, as a group, has come from increasingly less privileged families, and that the value of a college degree for status placement has declined.

The university has become more meritocratic; it is
how well you do, rather than who you are that counts. Hence,
young people in a society in which education increasingly
determines how well they start in the struggle for place,
find themselves facing a highly competitive situation. The
pressures to conform to the requirements of the education
establishment begin for many middle class and aspiring
working-class youth in elementary school and intensify in
high school. Hard work and ability at each level only serve
to qualify the individual to enter an even more difficult
competition at the next rung in the educational ladder.
While some succeed, many must show up as mediocre or must
rank low.

A number of radical theorists in different countries have suggested that the growing protest movement among students reflects the fact that the student role in capitalist society has essentially become one of an apprentice low-paid member of the new class of professionals, who are essentially workers denied the opportunity for true self-expression in their work role. Society forces increasing numbers of youth to go to university to acquire the skills necessary for advanced industrial societies must fill. Hence, the student is increasingly a member of an exploited alienated sector of the powerless strata. His protests represent his increased awareness that he is coopted by the elite. As two Canadian Marxists put it:

[S]tudying has lost any trace of the self-directed activity that it may once have been and has become a form of labour.... The ideological mystification of student alienation ... is the idea that the student is investing in himself. Yet if he asks himself why he is in school, the student must honestly respond with answers that have little or nothing to do with his personal development and growth....

Student labour is alienated in the same sense that the product is for the future employer rather than for the student himself. Since the product is embodied in the skills of the student himself, he becomes alienated from himself. Thus modern education and technology, when continued in the capitalist mode, frequently gives rise to the individual psychological estrangement often confused with the conception of alienation.

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democracy, socialism, and the like. There is a maxim which exists in various forms in many countries: "He who is not a radical at (20) does not have a heart; he who still is one at (40) does not have a head." This statement is usually interpreted as a conservative one, assuming radicalism is an unintelligent response to politics. But the first part of the maxim may be even more important than the second, for it denotes a social expectation that young people should be radicals, that the older generation believes that youthful people should be radicals, that the older generation believes that youthful radicalism is praiseworthy behavior. It is the young conservative, the young "fogie," not the young radical who is out of step with social expectations. The emphasis on youthful reformism is even greater in the United States than in many other countries, for American culture places a premium on being youthful and on the opinions of youth. It tends in general to glorify youth and to deprecate age.

Many American adults are reluctant, even when they consciously disagree sharply, to call students or youth to task. Rather they may encourage youth and students to take independent new positions, rather than emphasize the worth of experience. This ties in with the part of the American self-image which assumes that the United States is a progressive country, one which accepts reform and change.

And the truism that the youth will inherit the future is linked with the sense that the youth are the bearers of the progressive ideas which will dominate the future, that youth will contribute to the enduring struggle to-make the American creed of equality more meaningful.

The real world, of course, necessarily deviates considerably from the ideal, and part of the process of maturing is to learn to operate in a world of conflicting values, roles, interests, and demands. Such compromises as this requires are viewed by youth as violations of basic morality. They have not established a sense of affinity with adult institutions; experience has not hardened them to imperfections. Their contact with the moral principles of society is abstract and pure; they are not yet tested by personal experience, by contact with reality. Students hang on to idealistic beliefs longer than others. They tend, as Max Weber suggested, to develop an ethic of "absolute ends" rather than of "responsibility." They tend to be committed to ideals rather than to institutions. Hence, those events which point up the gap between ideals and reality stimulate them to action.

Many observers of American behavior have pointed to the codification of equalitarian values in the American *Creed*. Americans are taught to believe "that all men are created equal," that they should be given equal opportunity to gain the good things of life, and that all are worthy of equal respect in inter-personal relations. This stress on equality presumably creates an inherent tension with the reality of inequality of income, respect, and power, particularly when it is linked to as obvious a violation of the *Creed* as racial inequality. Yet David Cohen has suggested that the heightened student discontent of recent years has been further stimulated by the fact that an important segment of society, those involved

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in education, communication, culture creating and diffusing,
and the social welfare occupations, and the schools to
which they send their children, increasingly since World
War II have favored an ethos which "resembles nothing so
much as that utopia which Marx and subsequent generations
of radical critics envisaged." This may be seen most clearly
in the private schools,
this academy which "stress spontaneity, creative-

ness, and a general freedom from rigid constraints in learning
Schooling, in short, is justifiable only when it
is playful. . . . This, then, is a situation in which all
the tables have been turned: the only acceptable work is
that which is play. . . ." And the values and practice
of such schools which are "efforts to create utopian enclaves
in the midst of capitalist society," enhance for the children
of the affluent intelligentsia of America the gap between
what is desirable and the need to conform to the class and
work ethos of a competitive capitalist society.
A similar
point has been made by Charles Hampden-Turner, who, in coming
to this country from England, was "struck by the strength
of developmental and humanist themes in American educational
and child rearing philosophers, and the relative weakness
of the same themes in commerce and politics. . . ." It has
long seemed to me only a matter of time before the develop-
mental themes in American life confronted the repressive
themes, and before those students nurtured in the better homes
and schools came to regard the opportunities offered by business
and government as an insult to their achieved levels of psycho-
social development.
This segment
of change
in this segment
sends
1/15

16

The strain between the emphases on equality, play, and lack of repression, which characterize many of the private and suburban public schools of the intelligentsia, and the onerous requirements of bureaucratic industrial society, is brought to a head by the requirement that they compete for success through working hard, while remaining sociological adolescents in the university. Their physical maturation which is not paralleled by increased power is another source of frustration for those reared in such families.

Although physiologically mature, and often above the age legally defined as adult, they are expected to refrain from full involvement in the adult world. The very nature of university education is seen as calling for a withdrawal by the institution from the mainstream of society into an ivory tower, free from the constraints of politics and religion. Although living in a society which stresses that adults should establish their own status based on their individual abilities and achievements, students are expected to maintain a status in limbo, or to remain dependent on their family status. Such a situation can be a source of bitterness, especially in a culture like the American, which places so much stress on individual achievement. Thus the student, in addition to the opportunity to acquire an education, also demands the chance both to experiment with adult roles, and to exhibit his ability to achieve a position on his own.

17

Dependency is, of course, built into the very essence of the university system. Students are dependent, as to the chances of their future placement, on their standing with the faculty. The faculty has the power of certification through its control over grades. This gives them the right to influence what students read, and how they spend much of their time. The American university, in particular, with its stress on frequent examinations and faculty judgments, emphasizes this dependent relationship even more than does The university in most other countries. Hence, the student who leaves home to attend a university finds that he has actually entered a highly controlled situation, while many aspects of the society urge him to become independent.

The constraints imposed on students living in university dormitories have proved to be particularly onerous. By acting in loco parentis, universities in America took on the role of constraining agent over the social life of individuals who increasingly have claimed the right to be autonomous. And in a world in which 18-year olds are eligible for the draft, the effort of the university to maintain these controls has been inevitably doomed to failure. With the decline in average age at which Americans reach sexual maturity from a physical point of view, and the accompanying changes in the accepted norms concerning sexual relations, the university has placed itself in the impossible position of seeking to enforce a status of social dependency which even middle-class parents have found difficult to maintain.

The youth culture as Motivating Force

It may be argued, however, that student activism in particular, is among other things, an expression of the need for a distinct youth culture. The student stratum, as such,

tends to create a whole array of age-group symbols, which sets it apart from others in society, and from adults in particular. These include unique patterns of personal appearance, peculiar modes of communication, and special styles of life (relatively low standard of living, but major expenditures on music or travel, or use of drugs as compared with adults' consumption of liquor). →

In their desire to demonstrate their rejection of the adult world, youth rebels have repeatedly engaged in forms of expressive behavior which have been noteworthy for their similarity. Some of those in the American past are presented in chapters 4 and 5, but it should be noted that descriptions of such activities in France, Russia, and Germany in the nineteenth century and the pre-World War I period read like contemporary accounts of the scene at Telegraph Avenue, Berkeley, or in Harvard Square. A report on the behavior of the young Bohemians in the left bank of Paris, on the same spot as the May 1968 riots, clearly has this effect.

[They] held radical-sounding, erratic political ideas which somehow were never followed by practical action. According to Balzac they could be recognized by their off-center cravats, greasy coats, long beards, and a dirty fingernails. The Bohemians of the 1830's and 1840's were young, actually and ideologically; they claimed that youth itself was the collective expression of genius. It is exaggerating very little to say that Bohemians hoped to be seen as a band of intellectual raiders and freebooters, who routed convention everywhere and kept all contented souls in a state of dazzled alarm. . . In all accounts of the Bohemia of the Orleanist years, the first impressions have always to do with its ingenious techniques of social outrage. When Thackery first came on the Paris Bohemia, he was astonished enough to make a careful record of their appearance -- their ringlets, straight locks, toupees, English, Greek and Spanish nets, and the variety of their boards and jackets. 39

Similar modes of behavior occurred in Czarist Russia.

Among the students of the universities and the higher technical schools [there appeared] . . . a new and striking original type -- young men and women in slovenly attire, who called in question and ridiculed the generally received convictions and respectable conventions of social life, and who talked or reorganizing society . . . They reversed the traditional order of things even in trivial matters of external appearance, the males allowing the hair to grow long and the female adopts cutting it short, and adding sometimes the additional badge of blue

17 a

30 a

spectacles. Their appearance, manners and conversation were apt to shock ordinary people, but to this they were profoundly indifferent, for they had raised themselves above the level of so-called public opinion, despised Philistine respectability, and rather liked to scandalize people still under the influence of what they considered antiquated prejudices.

The kehaxixxer activities of the pre-World War I Germany youth move - ment have been, invidiously, described in similar terms.

Turbulent gangs of untidy boys and girls roamed the country, in bombastic words they announced the gospel of a golden age. All preceding generations, they emphasized, were simply idiotic; their incapacity has converted the earth into a hell.

The inflated verbiage of these adolescents was only a poor disguise for their lack of any ideas and of any definite program. They had nothing to say but this: We are young and therefore chosen; we are ingenious because we are young; we are the carriers of the future; we are the deadly foes of the rotten bourgeois and Philistines.

The effort to formulate a specific youth culture which rejected that of the adult world has also repeatedly taken the form of student political groups and ideologies which have little to do with those of the adult political world, often including the revolutionary parties. As the sociologist, Donald MacRae has generalized this analysis of these cultures.

Adolescent rebellion is older than the universities of the middle ages. It has constantly presented a pattern of temporary bohemianism and a defined and legitimated licence of behaviour. Since 1789, it has also involved experiment with radical politics - left and right, nationalist and internationalist...

And these experiments as S.N. Eisenstadt have often taken the form of "various youth and student movements,... which... aim to reform the society in terms of distinct, specific youth values."

The pure youth and student movements have tended toward an ahistorical rejection of a detailed worked out means-ends related form of radical politics. Rather as one description of Martin Luther's student followers reports, there is "an inclination to primitivism among students. Some of them carried their opposition to Aristotle and scholasticism to the point of rejecting all scholarship, and advocated the innocent simplicity of the Apostles." In the nineteenth century, the chief Marxist leaders, including Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, themselves, though recognizing that students had, for example, played a major role in all the French Revolutions, condemned as irresponsible the expressive politics and personal styles of revolutionary students. The desire of youth to make

Historians of youth movements have noted the similarities in
expressive style, in romanticism, in idealism, in commitment to actions,
which have ... occurred among groups which have varied considerably
in their social and political values. Walter Laqueur, the foremost student
of the pre-World War I German movement, has emphasized these common elements.

The idealism, spirit of sacrifice, devotion to one's people, and revolutionary fervor that marked the *Burschenschaft* [early nineteenth century nationalistic, anti-Semitic, terrorist student groups] have been an inherent part of all youth movements over the last hundred years. It is a mistake to assume the fascist youth movements were an exception to this rule.... To be sure, they preached a doctrine of violence, but as Mussolini said, "there is a violence that liberates, and there is a violence that enslaves; there is moral violence and stupid immoral violence" (compare Marcuse: "In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practices by the oppressed and the oppressors.")...

Youth movements have never been out for personal gain. Whoever describes a youth movement as idealistic only states the obvious. What motivates youth groups is different from what motivates an association for the protection of the interests of small shopkeepers. The fascist experience has shown the immense potential which inheres in every youth movement can be exploited in the most disasterous way....

Most of the basic beliefs and even the outward fashions of the present world youth movements can be traced back to the period in Europe just before and after the First World War. The German *Neue Schar* of 1919 were the original hippies: long-haired, sandaled, unwashed, they castigated urban civilization, read Hermann Hesse and Indian philosophy, practised free love, and distributed in their meetings thousands of asters and chrysanthemums. They danced, sang to the music of the guitar, and attended lectures on the "Revolution of the Soul." The modern happening was born in 1910 in Trieste, Parma, Milan, and other Italian cities where the Futurists arranged public meetings to recite their poems, read their manifestoes, and exhibit their ultra-modern paintings. No one over thirty, they demanded, should in future be active in politics.... The idea of a specific youth culture was first developed in 1913-14 by the German educator Gustav Wyneken. ...

For the historian of ideas, the back issues of the periodicals of the youth movements, turned yellow with age, make fascinating reading.... It is indeed uncanny how despite all the historical differences, the German movement preempted so many of the issues agitating the American movement of today, as well as its literary fashions.

Most recently, various commentaries on contemporary American unrest, such as those of Kenneth Keniston and Theodore Roszak, which are summarized and accepted in the 1970 *Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest*, emphasize in their causal analysis "the formation of a new youth culture that defines itself through a passionate attachment to principle and an opposition to the larger society. At the center of this culture is a romantic celebration of human life, of the unencumbered individual, of the senses, and of nature."

This subculture took its bearings from the notion of the autonomous, self-determining individual whose goal was to live with "authenticity," or in harmony with his inner penchants and instincts. It also found its identity in a rejection of the work ethic, materialism, and conventional social norms and pieties. Indeed, it rejected all institutional disciplines externally imposed upon the individual, and this set it at odds with much in American society....

30 d

The dedicated practitioners of this emerging culture typically have little regard for the past experience of others. Indeed, they often exhibit a positive antagonism to the study of history. Believing that there is today, and will be tomorrow, a wholly new world, they see no special relevance in the past.... The anti-rationalist thread in the new culture resists the careful empirical approach of history and denounces it as fraudulent....

Practitioners of the new youth culture do not announce their program because the movement is not primarily concerned with programs.... For many ... (not all) student activists and protestors, it is not really very important whether the protest tactics employed will actually contribute to the political end allegedly sought. What is important is that a protest be made - that the individual protestor, for his own internal salvation, stand up, declare the purity of his own heart and take his stand.✓1

The "counter-culture" of youth need not take a political form.

Indeed, much of the pre-World War I German youth revolt, as well as less similar manifestations in the United States, were not political. The youth culture has often evidenced itself in expressions of cultural renunciation of predominant adult values and behavior with respect to morality, dress, work orientations, achievement norms and the like. Sometimes, it has taken the form of youth based new varieties of religious expression. Various forms of "deviance" from the point of view of the adult world have served as anchorage points to bring large numbers of young people together in a solidaristic relationship. As Walter Laqueur has noted: "Whether a certain movement become political or unpolitical, whether it opted for the Left or the Right, depended on the historical context: it hardly needs to be explained in detail why youth movements were preponderantly right-wing after the First World War, while more recently most have tended to the left. But beyond the particular political orientation there are underlying motives which have remained remarkably consistent throughout."

Youth movements have always been extreme, emotional, enthusiastic; they have never been moderate or rational.... Underlying their beliefs has always been a common anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois denominator, a conviction that the established order is corrupt to the bones and beyond redemption by parliamentary means of reform. The ideologies of democracy and liberalism have always been seen as an irretrievable part of the whole rotton system; all politicians, of course, are crooks. Equally common to all youth groups is a profound pessimism about the future of present-day culture and an assumption that traditional enlightened concepts like tolerance are out of date. The older generation has landed the world in a mess, and a radical new beginning, a revolution, is needed. Youth movements have never been willing to accept the lessons of the past; each generation is always regarded as the first (and the last) in history. And the young have always found admiring adults to confirm them in their beliefs.✓2

## The University and Faculty as Sources of Unrest

In the modern developed world, particularly in the United States, the conditions of university life make politics a

particularly critical source of self-expression. Students
are given ample opportunity to discuss and study political
matters. The university, itself, in spite of its emphasis
on academic freedom and on being nonpartisan, is increasingly
involved in politics, as professors fulfill ever-growing
roles as party activists, intellectual commentators on
political events, advisors, consultants, and as researchers
on policy-relevant matters. Many students are thus in
centers of great political significance, but have little or
no share in the political status of the university. If it
is to express a sense of separate identity, student politics
as part of the student culture must be outside of and in
opposition to that of most of the adults.

Although the student protest is directed against much of the adult world, including the faculty, any analysis of the sources of student activism, per se, must recognize that student values and political concerns are often closely related to those of the faculty. Certainly in the United States, faculties have shown by their reaction to student protest, from the Berkeley events of 1964-65 to the demonstrations against the Cambodian incursion in May/June 1970, that large segments of the professoriate and student bodies stand closer to each other in political reactions than either do to the rest of the American body politic.

Intellectuals, that is, those concerned with the creation of art, culture, literature, science, and knowledge, whether academics or not, are involved with creation and innovation and are ideally partisans of the abstract and the ideal. Their occupational activities require them to value new discoveries and ideas. Originality, departure from what is established and officially accepted, is a central value in the outlook of the modern intellectual. More generally, in the tradition of the intellectual classes of Western society, there are important currents of long duration and great intellectual value which have set the intellectuals against established authority. These include scientism, romanticism, revolutionary apocalypticism, and populism. These traditions largely form the characteristic outlook of the intellectuals outside universities.

Universities have been institutions established by or supported
by the authoritative center of society¹⁻³ political and
ecclesiastical⁴⁻¹² and they have been integrated into the
tasks of training young persons for careers connected with
the central functions of society and culture. But they,
too, by their stress on scientific discipline, on creativity,
and on detachment from the idols of the market place, have
nurtured a critical attitude. Especially in the social
sciences has there been a tension between society's need to
affirm the dominant systems of practices and belief and the
intellectual's critical attitude toward all systems.

The American university increasingly has become a
major occupational outlet for many of the brightest people
who seek to be innovative and free of the ideological
restrictions and materialistic commitments which they believe are
inherent in the corporate and professional worlds. Once
liberal faculty become overtly political, their influence
has tended to be self-accelerating. Evidence drawn from a
variety of surveys of student attitudes indicates that
colleges have a liberalizing effect on young people, parti-
cularly in areas linked to universalistic principles, racial
equality, internationalism, peace, class relationships, as
well as in more personal beliefs such as religion and sexual
behavior. Samuel Stouffer pointed out over 15 years ago
that the conservatives who attack the universities for
"corrupting" young people are right from their political and
moral standpoints.

But if faculty help to create a climate of opinion
which presses students to the left, ironically, at least
some of the sources of student malaise stem from the
fact that changes in the role of the faculty have contributed
to making the situation of being a student less attractive
than it once was. With increasing size and greater pressures
on faculty to do research, publish, and take part in extra-
mural activities, inherently one should expect to find
poorer instruction, more faculty aloofness, and administrative
indifference to students. The research-oriented faculty
increasingly give a larger proportion of their limited
teaching time to graduate students. These activities are, of
course, not new; as noted later, students and administrators
have complained about faculty neglect of teaching and of
students since the last century. Yet the research-consulting
culture clearly spread far beyond its earlier boundaries
in the "golden" age of academe which began during World War II.

The very increase in the importance of the university as a center of influence and power, and as the major accrediting institution of the society, has reduced the informal influence of students within the university. The higher estates of the university, administrators and faculty, however, have sought to maintain their traditional authority and prerogatives, while reducing their own "responsibility" for the quality of the personal and intellectual lives of their students. This development is not simply or even principally a function of the growth of the university; it reflects even more the increased "professionalization" of the faculty, the

extent to which "teaching" as such has continued to decline
as the main identification of the role of being a professor.

The changes in the role of the faculty, their increased involvement in a national prestige system, based on evaluations of their scholarly achievements or extra-mural activities, the sharp increase in their income, derivative in large part from the fact that many schools are in competition for those who have or promise to attain general reputations, and the concomitant decline in faculty teaching obligations have not necessarily made for a "happier" professoriate. Faculty, like students, are in an increasingly competitive situation, one in which men see themselves being judged as to their position in national and local pecking orders. With the depreciation of the teaching function as a local source of economic reward and status, many faculty become deeply dissatisfied and anxious. Ironically, the better universities and colleges, which are increasingly competitive with each other in efforts at stockpiling distinguished scholars, are more likely to encourage such feelings among both their older and younger faculty, by individually rewarding, often in a very public fashion, those men who are most valuable in this race for institutional prestige. Such sentiments reinforce faculty propensities to oppose the administrations of these schools, as well as the dominant values and institutions of the large society. Hence, many distinguished professors find solace in student militancy directed against the forces they hold responsible for their felt sense of status insecurity.

The same faculty members who demand and secure lower teaching loads (especially after student revolts which further reduce the "bargaining strength" of the university) often tell their students that they are neglected and misused by the administration and trustees.

It may be argued that American students, as students, are subject to greater strains and less rewards than those of previous generations, with the exception of the Depression generation. Although the demand for "student power," for increased influence by students over the decision-making process in the university, tends on the whole to be raised by the left-wing activist group, the receptivity which this demand secures in wider circles of students may reflect the increased sense of grievance, that the more distinguished universities in terms of scholarly quality of faculty and students demand more, yet give less in the form of personal relations (informal influence) among students, faculty and administration. Thus, as in the case of workers and employees in bureaucratized industry, a sort of syndicalism has been in the offing for many decades which seeks to regain symbolically for students as a group the influence which they think they have lost individually as a result of changes in the organization of universities. Subjectively, of course, students as the "inferior" class in power and status terms would appear to have always complained bitterly about "unfair" treatment from the faculty. This has been the substance of complaint and often violent protest literally for centuries in American

colleges. As Lawrence Veysey argues, there is much in the professor-student relationship which produces "class" ideology and resentment, almost without regard to variation in objective condition.

the Berkeley sociologist, David Matza, One analyst of student protest has suggested that the repeated appeal of populism, of "the belief in the creativity and in the superior worth of the ordinary people, of the uneducated and the unintellectual," which has appeared in various student movements from nineteenth century Russia to the contemporary American glorification of the poorest blacks, is in part, at least, a way of attacking the moral position of their teachers.

Among students, the appeal of populism is not simply an outgrowth of traditional radical propensities. Just as the apocalyptic mentality has a special appeal to youth, so, too, does populism. Students have a special liking for populism because it is a vehicle for an effective attack on the professional authority and a way of defending against unflattering assessment of themselves. For the radical and the bohemian, too, a belief in populism allows students who perceive themselves as avant-garde to deflect the contrary judgments of academic elders.

The unconceptualized sense of grievance with their situation, a sense which in many cases is often directed against the university, also may make many students, particularly those with a politically critical background, more receptive to political action directed against trends in the larger society. The two sources of activism thus reinforce one another: the more directly political uses campus discontent to create a set of issues around which to build a movement, while campus discontent may express itself in wider political issues. These are general aspects of student motivation to activism. There are many aspects in the situation of the group which facilitate mass activity, which make it easier to recruit them for such action.

36 a

1960

Facilitating Factors

Young people are more available for new political movements than adults. As new citizens, as people entering the political arena, they are less committed to existing ideologies, they have few or no explicit political commitments, they have no previous personal positions to defend, they are less identified with people and institutions which are responsible for the status quo. Inherently, they know less recent history than adults. For this current generation, as noted earlier, the key formative events in foreign policy terms

have been the Vietnam war, and domestically, in the United
States, heightened awareness of the oppressed position of
the American Negroes.

Students are also more available because of the lesser
commitments they have to their "occupational" role as compared
to adults. Max Weber, many years ago, pointed out that
political activity is to a considerable extent a function of
the extent to which job requirements are dispensable or not.
In his terms, those who could take time off from work without
suffering economic consequences are much more likely to be
active than those who have to punch a time clock. Students
(and professors) have perhaps the most dispensable job
requirements of all. Students may drop out of school, may
put off their studies for short or long periods, without
paying a great price. They may often delay taking examinations.
The numbers who dropped their books to take part in the
McCarthy primary campaigns are a recent illustration of this.

Linked with this is the factor of "responsibility."
As compared to other groups, students simply have fewer
responsibilities in the form of commitments to families
and jobs. Thus, the existence of punitive sanctions against
extremist activism is less likely to affect students than
those with greater responsibilities to others, or to a career
ladder. Moreover, as noted earlier, students remain adoles-
scents or juveniles sociologically, and they are often
implicitly treated as such legally, particularly when they
violate the law. In many societies, a number of the students
involved in politically or otherwise motivated infractions

are literally the children of the elite, a fact which serves
to reduce the will to punish them. In addition, universities
are generally run by liberal individuals who are not
inclined to invoke severe sanctions against students.
Students, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit has pointed out, are under
less pressure to conform than other groups. 60

Another factor which facilitates student political
involvement is the physical situation of the university
which makes it relatively easy to mobilize students who are
disposed to act politically. The campus is the ideal
place in which to find large numbers of people in a common
situation. Many universities have over 30,000 students
concentrated in a small area. New ideas which arise as a
response to a given issue may move readily among the students,
and find their maximum base of support. Only a small per-
centage of these massive bodies can often make large demon-
stration. Thus in 1965-67, although opinion polls indicated
that the great majority of American students supported the
Vietnam war, that anti-war sentiment within the group was
no greater than in the population as a whole, the campus
opposition was able to have a great impact because it could
be mobilized. The anti-war student minority could and did
man impressive anti-war demonstrations.

Although there can be little doubt that the current
period of student unrest has had more impact on the body
politic than any previous epoch in American history, the evidence
is not conclusive, thus apart from the demonstrations of

and
May/June 1970 against the Cambodian incursion, that a greater
percentage of students have shown antagonism to the society
or the university than in some earlier periods of unrest.
The sheer magnitude of the educational establishment, the
greater ease of communication across distances, and the
presence of certain common issues, has made it possible to
mobilize large-scale demonstrations. Beyond this, the intro-
duction of the tactics of civil disobedience and confront-
ation, stemming in large part from the civil rights movement,
has given protesters a weapon through which a small per-
centage of the student body can bring entire universities
to their knees. And the inability of universities to handle
such situations except by relying on outside force (with
rare exceptions) often brought to the support of the demon-
strators the majority of the campus population, both
student and faculty, who were outraged by the violation of
the historic norms of university autonomy, and by the sight
of student-police clashes which almost never occurred
without some blood being spilt.

The larger explanation for the rise of activism
during the past half decade or so must lie in political
events: the emergence of the civil rights and Vietnam issues
in a particular post-Stalinist political epoch. These gave
to the more radically disposed students the issues; their
social situation gave them the stimulus; and the campus
situation furnished them with the means to build a movement.

Any effort, therefore, to understand the weight and impact of the activist groups must be placed within the context of an analysis of the opinions of the student population as a whole. Fortunately, a variety of surveys conducted between 1965 and 1970 permits this to be done. The next chapter reports on them.

Footnotes

Notes

Chapter I Sources of Student Activism
S.M.H.

1. There is a very extensive literature dealing with student activism comparatively as well as in assorted individual countries. See Philip Altbach, *A Select Bibliography on Students, Politics and Higher Education* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, 1967); and the *Bibliography* in S.M. Lipset and Philip Altbach, eds., *Students in Revolt* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 528-533. Articles dealing with a variety of countries are included in that volume, see also S.M. Lipset, ed., *Student Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Donald Emerson, ed., *Students and Politics in Developing Countries* (New York: Praeger, 1968); and Julien Nagel, ed., *Student Power* (London: Merlin Press, 1969). The most comprehensive single effort to treat student movements historically and comparatively is Lewis Feuer, *The Conflict of Generations* (New York: Basic Books, 1969),

2. To evaluate the American New Left it is necessary to read various periodicals representing different moderate and extreme leftist groups. These include *New America (Socialist Party)*, *The Guardian* (unaffiliated, pro-New Left), *New Left Notes* (two versions put out by different factions), *The Militant* (Socialist Workers Party-Trotskyist), *Challenge* (Maoist), *International Socialist (Draperite-Revolutionary Marxist)*.

3. See, for example, Robert Nisbet, "Who Killed the Student Revolution?" *Encounter*, 34 (February 1970), pp. 10-18.

4. Wayne Kind, "Campus Protests Reported on Rise," *New York Times*, March 29, 1970, p. 53. For a report on the previous academic year see Urban Research Corporation, *Student Protests 1969: Summary* (Chicago: 1970). Garth Buchanan and Joan Brackett, *Summary Results of the Survey for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, September 1970), pp. 9-11.

5. See Urban Research Corporation, *On Strike*. . . Shut It Down. *A Report on the First National Student Strike in U.S. History* (Chicago: May 1970) and Buchan and Brackett, *op.cit.* for statistical data on extent of strike.

6. Sam Brown, "The Politics of Peace," *The Washington Monthly*, 2 (August, 1970), pp. 24-46, see especially, pp. 24-25.

Ernest Gellner, "The Panther and the Dove: Reflections on Rebelliousness and its Milieux," in David Martin, ed., *Anarchy and Culture: The Problem of the Contemporary University* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 133-134; Alberto Martinelli and Alessandro Cavalli, "Toward a Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Student Movements," (Paper Presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, September 1970), pp. 3-4.

Many have written on this phenomenon. See especially Nathan Glazer, *The Social Basis of American Communism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 130-168; Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956); Werner Cohn, "The Politics of American Jews," in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 614-626. Charles Liebman, "Toward a Theory of Jewish Liberalism," in Donald R. Cutler, ed., *The Religious Situation 1969* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 1034-1061; Nathaniel Weyl, *The Jew in American Politics* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1968); Milton Himmelfarb, "Is American Jewry in Crisis?", *Commentary*, 47 (March 1969), pp. 33-42; S.M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1970), Chapter 10.

See articles in James McEvoy. and Abraham Miller, eds., *Black Power and Student Rebellion* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 222-306, 379-418.

10. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 27

11. Sol Tax, "War and the Draft," *Natural History*, 76 (December 1967, Supplement), p. 56. Actually Tax concluded that there were seven wars less popular, but these included Indian wars, the Revolutionary War and the Confederacy.

12. Samuel Eliot Morison, "Dissent in the War of 1812," in Samuel Eliot Morison, Frederick Merk and Frank Freidel, *Dissent in Three American Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 3-31.

13. Alice Felt Tyler, *Freedom's Ferment* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 407.

14. Frederick Merk, "Dissent in the Mexican War," in Morison, *et al*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-63; Edward S. Wallace, "Notes and Comment - Deserters in the Mexican War," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 15 (1935), p. 374.

15. David Donald, "Died of Democracy, in David Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), pp. 85-89; James McCague, *The Second Rebellion: The New York City Draft Riots of 1863* (New York: The Dial Press, 1968); Basil L. Lee, *Discontent in New York City, 1861-65* (Washington: Cathojic University of America Press, 1943).

16. Frank Freidel, "Dissent in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection," in Morison, *et al, op. cit.*, pp. 65-95, especially p. 77.

17. H.C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), pp.39,123-135, 234; Daniel Bell, "The Background and Development of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons, eds., *Socialism and American Life, Vol. I*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 314-315

18. Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake ?", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (1970), pp. 138-141; Edward Suchman, *Rose K. Goldsen and Robin Williams, Jr.*, "Attitudes Toward the Korean War," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (1953), pp. 173,182.

19. I have discussed these elements in the relationship of American Protestantism and American political morality elsewhere. See S.M. Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1967), pp.184-187; S.M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp.255-258, 299-303; S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in the United States, 1790-1970* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 61-67.

20. See especially Feuer, *op.cit.*; Lipset and Altbach, eds., *op.cit.*; and Nagel, *op.cit*.

21. Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (August, 1940), p.535 and *passim*; for more recent versions of this approach see Margaret Mead, *Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap* (Garden City: Natural History Press, Doubleday, 1970), especially pp.51-76; Kenneth Keniston, "The Fire Outside," *The Journal*, 9 (September-October 1970), pp.5-7.

22. Norman Birnbaum, *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 148.

23. Feuer, *op. cit.*, p. 528; Edward Shils, "Comments," in François Duchêne, ed., *The Endless Crisis. America in the Seventies* (& New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 171-172.

24. The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1941), in "Rhetorica," p. 1404.

25. Erik H. Erikson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), pp. 128-129

26. Gordon W. Allport, *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), pp. 283-304; Erikson, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

97 See especially the recent works of Alain Touraine, *Le mouvement de mai ou le communisme utopique* (Paris: Seuil, 1968), esp. pp. 14-15; *La société post-industrielle* (Paris: Denoel, 1969), p. 26 and *passim*.

29 John and Margaret Rowntree, "The Political Economy of Youth," *Our Generation*, 6 (May-June-July 1968), pp.173.

39 Ernest Mandel, "The New Vanguard," in Tariq Ali, ed., *The New Revolutionaries* (New York: William Morrow, 1969), p.47.

30 For a summary, see S.M. Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, "Student politics and Higher Education in the United States," in Lipset, ed., *op.cit.*, pp.234-237.

31 "Prudence is really a hateful thing in youth. A prudent youth is prematurely old." Randolph S. Bourne, *Youth and Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p.10.

32 I have developed this point at length in my book *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963; Doubleday-Anchor Books 1968).

33 *May Weber,*)
*From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. Gerth and W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.120-128.

34 David K. Cohen, "Public Education: The Coming Decade," (Cambridge: Harvard University, April 30, 1970), pp.7-9.

35 Charles Hampden-Turner, *Radical Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1970), p.364; for a similar analysis to those of Cohen and Hampden-Turner, see Richard Flacks, "Who Protests: The Social Bases of the Student Movement," in Julian Foster and Durward Long, eds., *Protest: Student Activist in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1970), pp.151-152.

36 N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp.163-166.

37 David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., *Culture and Social Character* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp.244-247.

38 N. Eisenstadt, "Archetypal Patterns of Youth," *Daedalus*, 91 (Winter 1962), pp. 28-46; and Eisenstadt, "Changing Patterns of Youth Protest in Different Stages of Development of Modern Societies," *Youth and Society*, 1 (December 1969), pp.135-148; Talcott Parsons, *Social Structure and Personality* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp.150-153; 172-180; Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (1942), pp. 64-66; Bennett M. Berger, "On the Youthfulness of Youth Cultures," *Social Research*, 30 (Autumn, 1963), pp.319-342.

39. Cesar Graña, *Modernity and Its Discontents* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 73-74.

40. D.M.W. (Donald Mackenzie Wallace), "Nihilism," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, eleventh edition (New York: The Encyclopedia Britannica Corp., 1911), vol. 19, pp. 686-688.

41. Ludwig Von Mises, *Bureaucracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 94-95.

42. Donald G. MacRae, "The Culture of a Generation: Students and Others," in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., *Education and Social Structure in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 7-8.

43. Eisenstadt, "Changing Patterns of Youth ...", op. cit., p. 13b.

44. Herbert Moller, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10 (April, 1968), p. 238.

45. Feuer, op. cit., p. 511.

46. Engels to Marx, April 25, 1870, as quoted in Shlomo Avineri, "Feder on Marx and the Intellectuals," *Survey*, no. 62 (January, 1967), p. 154.

47. D.M.W., op. cit., pp. 687-688.

48. Daniel Guerin, *Fascism and Big Business* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1939), pp. 47-50, 62-63; Karl Bracher, *Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik* (Villingen, Schwarzwald: Ring Verlag, 1964), pp. 146-149.

49. Letter from Max Weber to Herman Baumgarten, July 14, 1835, in Max Weber, *Jugendbriefe* (Tubingen: Mohr, 1930), p. 174, as presented in Guenther Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

50. Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on Youth Movements," *Commentary*, 47 (June 1969), pp. 34,35,36.

51. "Report of Commission on Campus Unrest," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 5 (October 5, 1970), pp. 7, 8-9. Other recent variants of this position may be found in Edgar Friedenberg, "Current Patterns of Generational Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, no. 2 (1969), pp. 21-38; Friedenberg, "The Generation Gap," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 382 (June-March 1969), pp. 32-42; B. Myerhoff, 1 (1969), pp. 151-177; John Seeley, "Youth in Revolt," *Britannica Book of the Year*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 313-315.

52. Laqueur, "Reflections on Youth Movements," op. cit., pp. 36-37.

53. For a summary of the many studies dealing with the politics of faculty see S.M. Lipset, "The Politics of Academia" (New York: Washington, D.C.).

54. in David C. Nichols, ed., *Perspectives on Campus Tensions* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970), pp. 85-118. See chapter 6, pp. 00-00 of this book for an elaboration on some of the themes in that article.

54.. Kenneth A. Feldman and Theodore M. Newcomb, *The Impact of College on Students*, Vol. I (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969); especially pp. 8-10, 19-28, 30-32, 99-100, 101-102; and Feldman and Newcomb, Vol. II, pp. 19-36, 49-56, for summaries of results of the large number of separate studies.

55.. For a detailed description of these processes which predicted a student revolt directed against faculty neglect of undergraduates see Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

56.. See Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 236-250, 531-535.

57. Lawrence Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 295-299.

58. David Matza, "Position and Behavior Patterns of Youth," in Robert E.L. Faris, ed., *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 210.

59. From Max Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

60. Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), p. 47. The student, at least, in the modern system of higher education, still preserves a considerable degree of personal freedom, if he chooses to exercise it. ... He can, if he so chooses, take extreme political positions without any personal danger; in general, he is not subjected to formal sanctions or even reprimands. ✓

Chapter 2
# Polls-and-Protest

Much of the discussion of the wave of protest which emerged in the late 1960s has presented it as a "Youth Revolt." It is important to recognize that the increasing opposition of American college students towards the war and the concomitant growth in radical-left sentiments among them does not represent an age-group phenomenon. There are other generation-units, to use Karl Mannheim's term, among American youth who have highly disparate sentiments. Idealism among a large segment of non-college youth has been reflected heavily in a show of patriotic feelings, support for the wars, and even disproportionate involvement in backing George Wallace's presidential candidacy in 1968. ✓ Opinion surveys dealing with the relationship of age as such to opinion towards the Vietnam War indicate that from 1966 to 1969, those in the lowest adult age group, 21-29 years old, were consistently less likely to oppose the war than their elders. In fact, those (50) and older, ✓ were most likely to think participation in the war a mistake. This report, of course, includes both students and non-students, who are quite different in their views.

Table 71

Percent in Different Age Groups Who Consider American
Intervention in the Vietnam War A Mistake
1966-1969

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Nationalize Gallup Poll results:</th><th colspan="3">Percent Considering the Vietnam War a Mistake</th></tr><tr><th>21-29 Years</th><th>30-49 Years</th><th>50 Years and Over</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1966: March</td><td>21%</td><td>23%</td><td>30%</td></tr><tr><td>May</td><td>29</td><td>32</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>September</td><td>37</td><td>28</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>November</td><td>21</td><td>30</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>1967: May</td><td>31</td><td>34</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>July</td><td>32</td><td>37</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>October</td><td>43</td><td>43</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>1968: February</td><td>40</td><td>46</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>March</td><td>46</td><td>47</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>April</td><td>38</td><td>46</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>August</td><td>48</td><td>48</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>October</td><td>44</td><td>49</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>1969: February</td><td>49</td><td>49</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>October</td><td>58</td><td>54</td><td>63</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War A Mistake," Public Opinion Quarterly, 34 (Spring, 1970), p. 134.

There is no question that young people turned against the war as the conflict continued, but so did older ones. And those (50) and over remained the most anti-war age group through the end of 1969. This "is even more surprising in view of the propensity of older people not to express opinions. Those under (30) averaged only about 8 percent with no opinion on the question over the years, as compared with an average of 15 percent without opinions among the (50)-and-over. This leaves positive war backing among youth even stronger than the preceding table would indicate. These conclusions are based on a review of

3

the data collected by the Gallup Poll. Two senior researchers of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan report that the results of their national surveys point in the same direction. "This V-generation gap✓ that one would have expected wherein the young oppose the war and the old support it, simply failed to appear. |. |. |. |✓

The many national inquiries of student opinion since campus activities secured national attention in the fall of 1964 have documented a gradual shift to the left in the thinking of the student population, constant increases in opposition to the war, and growing expressions of criticism of the content of teaching and the internal organization of the academic establishment. The results of these surveys have also shown the increased activism of the black students, their resentments, and the heightened sympathy for their goals among the large majority of whites.

The survey data permit comparisons with dominant attitudes among non-Jewish youth, and with the adult population. In general, the non-Jewish college youth have been much more conservative on domestic, foreign policy, and cultural issues than the students. There is clearly a gap in opinions and behavior between the average reaction of college students and others, but the gap is not generational one; rather it is between those on and off campus regardless of age. Faculty who have also been surveyed in some detail, are clearly much more opposed than students to militant activism and campus politicization. Yet on substantive

5

The non-college population, on the other hand, has gradually moved in a more conservative direction over the past half-decade. Increasing numbers of them identify themselves as conservatives rather than liberals, so that by 1970 many more citizens described themselves as conservatives (52 per cent), than as liberals (34 per cent).⁴ Non-college youth, whether over or under 21, have also differed consistently from the college students. On a number of issues, not only on Vietnam, the non-college youth have been more conservative than their campus peers and their elders. Three surveys, taken within a few months of each other, of national samples of students, faculty, and the U.S. adult population as a whole, point up the considerable differences between opinion on and off the campuses of America.

Although massive demonstrations against the Vietnam war began in 1965 in some large high-quality schools such as Berkeley (Vietnam Day), Ann Arbor (Teach-Ins on the War), and Madison, the survey data, as noted earlier, indicate that the majority of students supported the war until 1968. In 1965, for example, the Harris Survey reported that only 24 per cent of those with opinions on the war favored negotiations and American withdrawal from Vietnam.⁵ Samuel Lubell concluded in the Spring of 1966 that "two thirds of the students interviewed continue to back our Vietnam policy which is about the same proportion of support one finds in the country as a whole."⁶ Another national survey of students taken by the Gallup Poll in May and June 1966, indicated that 47 per cent of college youth endorsed the way "Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam," while 23 per cent disagreed because they thought the U.S.

6

47
[10]

should be more aggressive, and another 16 per cent opposed the
President's policies for being "indecisive" or "inconsistent."
A Gallup survey of student opinion on Vietnam taken a year
later in 1967 "showed 49 per cent of students in favor of a
policy of escalation compared to 35 per cent who wanted military
activity to be reduced." Not until the Spring of 1968 did the
proportion of students who thought that the United States had
made a mistake in getting involved in Vietnam reach 50 per cent.

At the time, 48 per cent of the public, but only 38 per cent of the entire 21-30-year-old age group, gave the same response, suggesting the existence of a rather large opinion gap on the war between college and non-college youth. This difference has continued in succeeding years.

Lubell, who interviewed students through the 1967-68 school year, essentially agreed with the Gallup findings that that was the year in which the campus turned against the war. Lubell credited the shift to concern over the draft spurred on by the fact that "Congress had changed the law [dropping deferments for graduate students] so that graduate students and seniors, on graduation, would be taken first." He concluded at the start of the 1968-69 school year that the unrest would grow, that "real stability is not likely to be regained until the unresolved crisis outside of the universities is broken." Yet despite the increasing opposition to the war, only 7 per cent of a 1968 Gallup sample of students stated that they would refuse to serve if drafted.

Opposition to the Vietnam War, the perception that it was a mistake, continued to grow once the bombing of North Vietnam stopped in April 1968 and subsequent negotiations began in Paris.

7

In effect, once the U.S. government gave up the goal of defeating the Communists on the battlefield, it became impossible to prevent a steady erosion of support for the war, particularly, though obviously far from exclusively on campus. Two Gallup samples of students taken two and a half years apart dramatically point up the change in opinion.

Table 3

Proportion of Students Identifying Themselves as "Hawks"* or "Doves," 1967 and 1969 (percent)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Spring 1967</th><th>Fall 1969</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Dove</td><td>35</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>Hawk</td><td>49</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>No Opinion</td><td>16</td><td>11</td></tr></tbody></table>

* In response to the question: "People are called 'hawks' if they want to step up our military effort in Vietnam. They are called 'doves' if they want to reduce our military effort in Vietnam. How would you describe yourself?" as a 'dove'?

Source: Gallup Poll Release, December 21, 1969

Other survey organizations which compared views over shorter periods after the President's announcement about negotiations found a continuing growth in "dovish" or withdrawal sentiments. In reviewing changes in attitudes which had occurred between his two student surveys, one conducted in October 1968 and the other six months later in March/April, 1969, Daniel Yankelovich concluded: "On college campuses, pacifist sentiments have spread from the more liberal students to the more moderate and conservative students."

Harris found that the proportion

8

of students who, when asked whether a man's refusal to be drafted
because of opposition to the Vietnam war, led them to respect
him more or less, indicated "more respect" had jumped from 29
percent in Spring 1968 to 48 percent in Spring 1969. ¹³

Comparing attitudes in the Fall of 1969, between late September and the end of November, during which time the two massive Moratorium and Mobilization protests occurred, the Gilbert Youth Poll reported "an increase, from 28 percent in the first poll to 43 percent in the second, among those who feel the only proper action would be complete and prompt withdrawal of American troops."

Yet though most students opposed the war, the survey data
would suggest that a majority accepted the new Nixon administration's
policy of Vietnamization as a means of getting out. The administration was able to coopt some of the campus opposition. Thus
a Gallup survey of college students taken in May 1969 reported
that when asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nixon
is handling his job as President?" that 57 percent approved,
27 percent disapproved and 16 percent had no opinion.¹⁵ A second
1969 Gallup national student poll taken in the fall found that
students were seemingly losing interest in the protest, though
they remained heavily against the war. *Newsweek*, in reporting the
survey, concluded, "the mood of the American campus is apparently
undergoing a striking change: militancy and violence are in good
measure giving way to passivity and personal introspection, and
the revolutionary impulse seems...for a while, at least,...to have
largely spent itself."¹⁶ When asked specifically what they thought

more students (50 per cent) approved than objected (44 per cent).

The interviewing for this survey was done in October, at a time when organized efforts to mobilize campus opposition to the war were at a height, ~~between~~ the October 15 Moratorium demonstration and the November 15 Mobilization which culminated in a massive Washington March, the goals of which were heavily supported by the same students (69 per cent).

The reaction against the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, of course, produced the largest and most extensive student protest movement the United States has ever experienced. It involved more students at more campuses than in earlier years. And the survey data document the extent of participation, as well as the fact that the attitudes of students in general moved to the left, not only with respect to the war, itself, but on other issues as well. A Harris survey taken late in May caught the full flush of this discontent. With respect to the war, Harris found that 54 per cent now favored stopping the fighting and bringing the boys back home, as compared with 34 per cent for a phased withdrawal, and 9 per cent who wanted to expand the war. This finding may be contrasted with the results of a 1965 survey of students conducted for Playboy, which reported that 6 per cent were for immediate withdrawal, 35 per cent supported continued fighting in South Vietnam, and 56 per cent wanted to escalate by invading North Vietnam. The antagonism to the Cambodian events naturally led to a drastic decline in student opinion of the way President Nixon was handling the war. (59) per cent gave him a rating of "poor," 17 per cent said fair, and only 22 per cent would say pretty good or excellent. Only 27 per cent of the students interviewed thought the President was right in ordering troops into Cambodia. And 60 per cent said the action had increased their opposition to American policy in Indo-China.

The increased participation in protest activities has been documented by the Harris Survey. The data presented in Table 4 clearly indicate a considerable escalation in the numbers who took part in demonstrations over a five-year period.

Table 4
Student Participation in Activism (Percent)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1965</th><th>1969</th><th>1970</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Sign Petition</td><td>72</td><td>84</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>Demonstrated</td><td>29</td><td>40</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Picketed</td><td>18</td><td>18</td><td>29</td></tr></tbody></table>

Sources: "The Harris Survey," The Washington Post, March 25, 1965; "The Harris Survey," June 30, 1969; Report of the late May 1970 Harris Survey of Students, pp. 155, 157.

The same pattern of escalation of campus protest has been reported in a survey of the presidents of colleges and universities conducted during the summer of 1970 for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest. As indicated below in Table 5, the per cent of schools with significant incidents more than doubled from the academic year 1967-1968 to the pre-Cambodian part of the school year 1969-1970. Strikingly, the proportion again increased by more than two-fold for the protests against the Cambodian incursion. The results of this survey underestimate the extent of the protest since administrators were asked to only report on "incidents which resulted in the disruption of the normal functioning of the institution."

A questionnaire sent to administrators by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education concerning the May-June 1970 events inquired as to all forms of protest, including non-disruptive "essentially peaceful demonstrations," and reported that there "was some form of organized dissent on 57 per cent of the campuses."

One of the most striking aspects of the anti-war protests is the extent to which they have reached into relatively moderate political sectors among students. Thus a nationwide study of 5,000 students by two psychologists, Kenneth and Mary Gergen, taken in 1969-70, before the Cambodian incursion (sample somewhat overweighted to schools towards the middle and higher levels of academic) reports that "over 42 per cent." had demonstrated against the war. . . . The data indicate that in an average group of 100 anti-war demonstrators, one might find 13 Republicans, 20 Democrats, 62 Independents, and only 5 persons who identify themselves as Radicals. The overwhelming majority of the demonstrators place a high value on traditional American ideals."

The 1970 post-Cambodian incursion Harris Survey reported a heterogeneous mix as well. Thus, though almost all self-described far leftists (91 per cent), and most liberals (74 per cent) took part, over one third (37 per cent) of the middle-of-the-road students did as well.

The Spread of Political Discontent

Although anti-war protest has been the most striking feature of student activism in recent years, the survey data document the extent to which the # campus has moved to the left politically over the years. Since 1968 the proportion describing their politics as radical or extreme left has increased from 4 to 11 per cent. More striking perhaps is the fact that in June 1970, the proportion of students who identified in this way was not much smaller than those who looked upon themselves as conservatives.

12

The Gergens' 1969-70 survey of 5,000 students in 39 schools also reported a significant shift in student general political sentiment which they linked to opposition to the war. "Over 40 percent of the sample indicate that the war has altered their political affiliation, and of these, only 7 percent have increased their commitment to one of the two major parties. The remaining 93 per cent of this group [or 37 percent of the total sample] became more 'liberal,' 'radical,' 'disillusioned with party politics,' and otherwise alienated from party politics."

But though there is no question of the shift to the left among the students, it is curious that the various attempts to estimate the proportion of students who are alienated or supportive of radical activism, have agreed since 1968 on a figure of about 10 percent, of whom perhaps one third are reported to have revolutionary views. Thus in 1968, Samuel Lubell classified students on the basis of their responses to 10 items and concluded that with "only one in every 10 students interviewed did these 10 items link up to a pattern of general revolt or 'alienation.'"28 A Roper study in the Winter of 1968-69 asked students to evaluate four basic institutions: political administration of justice, business and industry, and higher education. It found that "9 percent of the seniors are very critical of our basic institutions generally; 18 percent are very favorable," and while large majorities thought all four were "basically sound," the same majorities thought they "need improvement."29

13

The most comprehensive effort to specify types of responses, the Yankelovich-CBS study based on Spring 1969 data, established five types of "Revolutionaries," who held all of a five-belief index affirming that the American social system is "too rotten for repair," that destroying property and assaulting police are justifiable tactics, etc.; "Radical Dissidents," who held one or more of these beliefs, but not all of them; "Moderate Reformers," who agreed with six or more statements about the need for specific reforms; "Moderates," who agreed with less than six of these statements; and "Conservatives," who held a coherent set of beliefs about the need for more law and order, the American Way of Life being superior to all others, and so forth. Among the college students, 3 per cent were identified as "Revolutionaries," 10 per cent were grouped as "Radical Dissidents," 39 per cent were classified as "Reformers," 37 per cent were described as "Moderates," and only 11 per cent were defined as "Conservatives." Conversely, however, among the non-college youth interviewed by Yankelovich, 50 per cent were located in the "Moderate" category, and 21 per cent were "Conservative" as defined by attitude responses.

The Gilbert Youth Poll interviewed a national sample in the Spring of 1970, but did not ask as explicit questions as the others, thus not permitting a direct comparison. Its results also suggested, however, that the "alienated" were still a minority, since when faced with a choice between agreeing that the U.S. form of government "needs considerable change" or that it is "just about right," 60 per cent chose the latter statement.

In examining the results of various national surveys of students from 1965 to 1970, it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions concerning the depth of and enduring quality

14

of the grievances felt by American students and their portent for continued tension between a significant portion of them and the government. The approximately 10 per cent who show up as "radicals," "alienated," or "dissidents," in the surveys completed during 1969-70 may be contrasted with those who identified "socialism" (24 per cent), or "communism" (6 per cent) as positive terms in a 1936 Roper-Fortune national student survey.32 Those who advocate fundamental changes in the American system today (75 per cent in a post-Cambodia Harris Poll) compare with the 68 per cent who favored "a revision in our attitude about property rights" in the 1936 report.33 At the other end of the spectrum, Harris reported that in 1969 and 1970 the percentage of students who identified their politics as "conservative" were 16 and 15, (Table 6) figures which are identical with the 15 per cent who told Roper in a 1936 national student survey that they felt positive about the term "conservatism."

Table 6

Political Self—Identification of American College Students
(Percent)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1968</th><th>1969</th><th>1970</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Radical or Far Left</td><td>4</td><td>8</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Liberal</td><td>39</td><td>44</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>Middle-of-Road</td><td>33</td><td>32</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>Conservative and Far Right</td><td>24</td><td>16</td><td>15</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: "The Harris Survey," June 30, 1969; Report of the May 20-28, 1970, Harris Survey of Students, p.3

15

A variety of polls conducted between 1965 and 1970 have indicated considerable support for diverse aspects of American society other than those linked to foreign policy, the war, and racism. During the Spring of 1965, in the first year of large-scale protest, a national sample expressed confidence in the policies of dominant American domestic institutions, particularly those linked to economic and professional elites. The majority voiced a "great deal" of confidence in the medical profession, banks and financial institutions, higher education, and big corporations. Students as a group were much less favorable to the arts, the United Nations, the civil rights movement, religion, and the labor movement (run or as indicated in Table 7 below.

Table 7

How Students View the World Around Them; Responses to the Question "How Much Confidence Do You have in These Institutions?" (Percent)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Great Deal</th><th>Only Some</th><th>Hardly Any</th><th>Not Sure</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Scientific community</td><td>76</td><td>20</td><td>2</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Medical profession</td><td>73</td><td>22</td><td>5</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>Banks & financial Inst.</td><td>66</td><td>29</td><td>3</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. Supreme Court</td><td>65</td><td>28</td><td>6</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Higher education</td><td>64</td><td>32</td><td>4</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>Big corporations</td><td>52</td><td>40</td><td>7</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Executive branch of Federal government</td><td>49</td><td>42</td><td>9</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>The Arts</td><td>46</td><td>43</td><td>5</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Psychiatric field</td><td>44</td><td>44</td><td>7</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Congress</td><td>39</td><td>52</td><td>8</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

table 7 contd......

16

Table 7 continued

<table><tr><td>The military</td><td>38</td><td>43</td><td>17</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>The United Nations</td><td>35</td><td>49</td><td>14</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Organized religion</td><td>34</td><td>46</td><td>18</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Civil rights movement</td><td>33</td><td>47</td><td>19</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>The Democratic party</td><td>22</td><td>63</td><td>10</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>The press</td><td>20</td><td>57</td><td>21</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Advertising</td><td>16</td><td>38</td><td>44</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Organized labor</td><td>13</td><td>55</td><td>29</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Television</td><td>13</td><td>46</td><td>39</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>The Republican party</td><td>12</td><td>53</td><td>29</td><td>6</td></tr></table>

Sources: "Campus '65," Newsweek (March 22,1965), p.45, from The Harris Survey.

Perhaps more significant than the positive responses reported in the above table in indicating how little alienation existed from American institutions among students in general in 1964-65, the academic year of the Berkeley Revolt and the emergence of mass demonstrations against the war, is the very small percentage who indicated "hardly any confidence" in the dominant economic organizations. A year later in the Spring of 1966, Samuel Lubell found that 60 percent of the students he interviewed praised the role of business, while only 15 percent were critical. Lubell also reported that an unspecified majority were for "a stronger Federal government but against a guaranteed annual income," and for "a more rapid extension of civil rights but against radical intermarriage." He concluded his analysis by commenting that in "their political thinking, far from being 'alienated,' the students remain basically like the rest of the country. . . ."

17

Two surveys of student opinion in the Winter and Spring of the 1968-69 academic year also point up the limitations on any judgement that American college students as a stratum had become alienated from dominant institutions or the body politics. The relevant findings from a Roper survey of freshmen and seniors are contained in Table 8 below.

Table 8

Attitudes Toward Four Institutions of a National Sample of Freshmen and Seniors (Winter 1968-69)
(Percent)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Basically Sound<br>Essentially<br>Good</th><th>Basically Sound<br>Needs some<br>Assistance</th><th>Not Too Sound<br>Needs Many<br>Improvements</th><th>Basically<br>Unsound<br>Needs Funda-<br>mental<br>overhauling</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Business</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seniors</td><td>39</td><td>48</td><td>7</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Freshmen</td><td>48</td><td>37</td><td>9</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Political System</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seniors</td><td>10</td><td>72</td><td>15</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Freshmen</td><td>11</td><td>70</td><td>16</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Administrative Justice</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seniors</td><td>20</td><td>54</td><td>21</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Freshmen</td><td>23</td><td>50</td><td>21</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Higher Education</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seniors</td><td>19</td><td>56</td><td>19</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Freshmen</td><td>32</td><td>49</td><td>15</td><td>2</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Roper Research Associates, *A Study of The Beliefs and Attitudes of Male College Seniors, Freshmen, and Alumni*, May 1969, pp. 56, 60,

The results of the Roper survey clearly do not suggest that the bulk of American students were hostile to American institutions in the Winter of 1968-69, although they had turned decisively against the Vietnam War. A somewhat similar picture of the sentiments of the national student stratum was presented in a subsequent poll completed for Psychology Today in the Spring of 1969. This survey found that 64 percent disapproved of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 39 percent indicating strong feelings, and 26 percent mild ones. On most other questions, however, they were much less critical of American institutions and policies.

Table 8

Attitudes Toward A Variety of American Institutions--Spring 1969

<table><caption>(Percent)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>SA* MA</th><th>DK</th><th>MD</th><th>SD</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Universities</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1. On the whole, college has been a deep disappointment to me.</td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>2</td><td>26 56</td></tr><tr><td>2. The university environment has helped me find out about myself.</td><td>43</td><td>42 5</td><td>7</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>3. I don't feel I am learning very much in college.</td><td>4</td><td>13 1</td><td>28</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>4. American universities have largely abdicated their responsibility to deal with vital moral issues.</td><td>9</td><td>30 18</td><td>33</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Social Issues</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1. Negroes would be better off if they took advantage of the opportunities available to them rather than spending so much time protesting.</td><td>20</td><td>35 7</td><td>23</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>2. Those who knock free enterprise misunderstand what made this a great nation.</td><td>26</td><td>41 11</td><td>15</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>3. The events of 1963 prove that it is futile to work within existing political structure.</td><td>8</td><td>25 11</td><td>34</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>4. There is no point in trying to change existing political structures: if one is interested in change he must work outside these structures.</td><td>3</td><td>11 7</td><td>42</td><td>35</td></tr></tbody></table>

18

Source: "A Study of the Inward Generation," Special Report published by Psychology Today, October, 1969.

SA=Strongly Agree; MA=Mildly Agree; DK=Do Not Know; MD=Mildly Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree

The Psychology Today survey reaffirmed the findings of the Roper poll that the large majority of American students were not antagonistic to American institutions. The Yankelovich-CBS survey of 4,000 youth, half of them in college, taken in March and April 1969, supplied further evidence that college students, though more alienated and radical than the sample of non-college youth aged 17 to 23, still favored working within the democratic system. Though the large majority of white students agreed that America is to some degree a "racist nation," only 21 per cent said they would welcome "more vigorous protests by blacks," 59 per cent said they would disapprove of such protests. 88 per cent of the white students believed that the "American system can respond effectively" to the need for change. 89 per cent agreed that the radical left is as much a threat as the radical right. Close to three quarters of the entire student sample (72 per cent) "believe that competition encourages excellence," and "that the right to private property is sacred." (75 per cent).

A fourth national survey organization, the College Poll, which regularly queries samples of students for newspapers and NBC, also reported that the dominant mood on campus during 1968-69 was liberal, sympathetic to civil rights demands, and anti-war. Its results also portrayed a student population which was far from extremism in its views. Thus 63 per cent said they believed that "the ROTC belongs on campus" during the year in which ROTC

19

was under sharp attack from SDS and antif war groups. When the concept of a voluntary ROTC was introduced, the proportion approving of ROTC on campus rose to almost 80 per cent. When asked "Do you object to your university or college participating in general projects to aid the national defense" only 23 per cent said "Yes," they disapproved; 76 per cent indicated they had no objection. Although 78 per cent favored "Afro-American" courses being offered at their school, 68 per cent were opposed to black student control over the selection of the faculty in these courses. The College Poll also reported that over three fifths (62 per cent) said they are "getting tired of all the campus unrest," 80 per cent felt "that students who break the law in campus fights should be arrested and expelled."

Two national student surveys taken in the spring 1970 semester before the Cambodian incursion still revealed a preponderantly nonalienated student population. The Gilbert Youth Poll found that only 16 per cent stated that they thought equal rights for minority groups could not be achieved under our present form of government. Two thirds were opposed to control over business profits; about the same proportion rejected paying for medical bills through public taxation; 60 per cent were against a government guaranteed minimum income. The second study completed by Gallup just before the Cambodian incursion in late April unfortunately asked few questions which way on bore in any degree of alienation from American values. One did inquire as to whether "you think people who are successful get ahead largely because of their luck or largely because of

20

their ability?" Only 9 per cent of the students said "lucky";
fully 88 per cent thought that success is a result of "ability."
And in spite of the widespread endorsements of the legalization
of marijuana, only half the students interviewed thought that
the "use of marijuana should be made legal."

A third set of 1970 polls of college students, limited
to those on eighteen campuses in Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan,
and Kentucky, yielded comparable results to the national ones
by Gilbert and Gallup. The University Index found overwhelming
opposition to the war and to Nixon's "handling of his job,"
before the Cambodian incursion among this regional group. Forty-
five per cent reported demonstrating against the war in May and
June. Yet only 19 per cent gave an "unfavorable" rating to the
"competitive free enterprise system" in comparison with alter-
native economic systems." Three quarters of them said they did
not "feel that a person's disagreement with a particular law
justified his disobedience to it."

The obvious question arises to what extent the events
surrounding the Cambodian incursion, the killings at Kent State
and Jackson State, and the mass involvement in the various forms
of protest during May and June of 1970 increased the alienation
from the American political system. Clearly, no study made during
those events could answer this question. In the heat of the re-
action to these occurrences, students and others made judgements
about the President and the operation of the national political
system, some of which were explicitly challenged by events af-
ter the school year ended. A Harris survey conducted in late

21

May reported that the confidence expressed in the President's
Vietnam policy or in his general activities had almost totally
vanished among students as a result of these events. Thus, as
noted earlier, 59 per cent said his handling of the war was
"poor" in their judgment; 67 per cent said they thought he had
not "been frank and straightforward about the Vietnam war;" more
believed the military operation in Cambodia would lengthen the
war (37 per cent) than thought it would shorten it (21 per cent);
and only 19 per cent accepted the President's statement that
our troops would stay in Cambodia less than eight weeks. Over
half (52 per cent) thought U.S. troops would remain in Cambodia
for six months or more.

Some of the questions asked students during this period produced much larger proportions than in previous surveys, showing the need for fundamental changes (75 per cent), being that demonstrations are an effective form of protest (58 per cent), and feeling that social progress is more likely to come about through radical pressures (44 per cent) as many thought through institutional reforms (45 per cent). And while more students said that the May events had brought students and faculty closer together (54 per cent) than those who said they separated them (20 per cent), more of them were also inclined as seeing these events separating students and university administrations (42 per cent) than bringing them together (28 per cent). Most students (67 per cent) believed that student protest would speed up needed changes, although close to four-fifths of them (79 per cent) thought that radical

22

pressures would have their greatest impact through institutional
changes rather than through efforts to overthrow the system (10
per cent).

Yet if the responses to these questions point up the
extensive academic reaction to the Cambodian events, some other
replies suggest that even at the height of the protests, student
reaction expressed less than total alienation. In spite of the
increased hostility to the military and the war, only 25 per
cent of the Harris respondents were in favor of not having ROTC
on campus. Thirty-seven per cent favored continuing it as a
credit course, while another 33 per cent supported an on-campus
non-credit ROTC. Only 30 per cent said that individual pro-
fessors should not "be allowed to undertake research projects
for the military," as contrasted with 62 per cent who supported
their right to do so. Demonstrations against companies doing
defense business recruiting on campus were frequent from 1968
on. Yet even in late May 1970, only 22 per cent opposed such
activities, while almost three quarters (72 per cent) said that
companies engaged in defense work should be "permitted to re-
cruit at college." When asked after the Kent State killings
who has been more responsible for the violence at college pro-
tests, the demonstrators or the authorities, only 17 per cent
replied the "authorities," an equal proportion blamed the
"demonstrators," while 64 per cent said "both." The large
majority of students (69 per cent) thought that "school
authorities are right to ask the police for help when students
threaten violence," as compared with but 21 per cent who con-

sidered it wrong to do so. While most of the students (50) per cent) believed that it was wrong to seek help from the National Guard in such situations, almost as many (42 per cent) said that the "National Guard has acted responsibly in most cases" as thought they were irresponsible (46 per cent).

The findings that the great majority of American students were not alienated or sympathetic to radical causes even at the height of major well publicized nation-wide demonstrations have also been reported for other countries characterized by major student protests. Surveys of French youth and students after the May 1968 events, perhaps the most potent student protest wave in a western country, indicated that the great majority were opposed to a "radical transformation of society" in September 1968, four months after the great strike. Only 12 percent of a representative sample of students indicated that they agreed with this objective, as contrasted with 54 percent who said their personal concerns with reforms were limited to education, and 31 percent who were only interested in passing their exams.

Subsequent French surveys provided an impression of "reasonable youth"; almost 90 percent said they were personally "happy." 52 More recently, a survey of student opinion in the spring of 1970 at Nanterre, the suburban Parisian University at which the 1968 revolt started, which is generally recognized as the most radical school in France, found one quarter (24 percent) in favor of revolution. 53 In Italy, second only to France in the extent of the 1968 strikes, and which has had the most potent and widespread pattern of student strikes and violence in Europe during 1969 and 1970, a national student survey completed in 1969 also points up the minority status of militant student activism. As one report of this survey indicates, its results lend "weight to the hypothesis of the so-called 'silent majority'." Only 9 percent of the student sample approved of the methods of the activists; 16 percent supported "revolution;" but when asked to state their favorite country only 4 percent listed a Communist or Third World one,

64b

the great majority gave western democratic ones with England
in the lead (20 percent) and the United States, second
(15.5 percent).⁵⁴ The results of a 1966 national survey of
Japanese students, who have had the longest history of militant,
often violent, student protest since World War II coincide
with the American and European findings concerning the relative
moderateness of the views of the large majority. Only 22
percent of a national sample of 1769 Japanese students disagreed
with the statement "Students should not strike for political
matters (6 percent strongly); and even fewer, 15 percent,
rejected the conservative "student movements are run only
by a few activists" (4 percent strongly).⁵⁵

Attitudes to the University

The information about student attitudes towards the
university also presents a mixed picture as to the extent to
which structural characteristics or academic policies are a
source of student unrest. A leading historian of education,
Lawrence Veysey, has suggested that student complaints about the
policies of faculty and administration have always been widespread
in American academe, that they are rooted in a kind of "class ten-
sion," in the reactions of the students to being the inferior
social class in the system.⁵⁶ A prominent British sociologist,
Bryan Wilson, has also suggested that "student unrest has,

65

thus, been . . . inherent in the student situation. . . .
[M]odern universities are institutions almost inviting
disruption. . . . Discipline in universities was less
exacting than that expected of citizens in city streets.
And yet, these were large institutions, bringing together
large numbers of energetic young people who experienced a
relatively common circumstance that might, by a Marxist,
readily be defined as 'dependent' and 'underprivileged, '
imposed by an identifiable 'opposing' class of dons.
Had not younger members been socialized to academic values
and university allegiance, universities would long ago,
have been places almost ready-made for a class struggle

The first major eruption of the current wave of stu-
dent protest, that in Berkeley in 1964-1965, has been inten-
sively studied by various social scientists. One of the earli-
est analyses based on interviews with Berkeley students con-
cluded that the "data do not suggest that dissatisfaction with
the education process played any role at all." Robert Somers
found large majorities agreeing with statements that the ad-
ministration and faculty were doing a very good educational
job. For example, when asked "how well satisfied they were
with 'courses, examinations, professors, etc.'" only 17 per-
cent expressed any degree of dissatisfaction." But as Somers
noted, more important than the fact that the large majority

["24", "were \"satisfied\" was the finding \"that the minority of students who are dissatisfied with the courses, examinations, or professors are little more likely to be found among the militants than those who are satisfied.\"⁵⁸ A second survey of Berkeley students taken in the spring of 1965 also reported that unhappiness with the University as an educational institution \"...was on the whole unrelated to support for the FSM.\"⁵⁹ The campus militants did differ considerable from those not involved in the Free Speech Movement (FSM) protest in their political ideologies. That is, what distinguished student reaction to this supposedly first great revolt against the multi-versity,¹/₈¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹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student unrest to inadequate educational programmes, the Berkeley campus had also been engaged in considerable education experimentation designed to involve students in the planning of courses, to heighten the social "relevance" of their education, and to increase personal relationships between faculty and students. The educational experience of Berkeley students ~~should have~~ clearly improved as judged by the criteria raised by movement-oriented critics, both faculty and students. Yet Somers found a decline over the years in the proportion satisfied with courses, etc., from 82 per cent in the fall of 1964 to 69 per cent in 1968. Seemingly, if answers to the surveys are taken as reflections of objective quality, teaching and other aspects of education had worsened somewhat as a result of the reforms. 61

The trends reflected in the data from national surveys bearing on student attitudes towards the university and educational reform tend to resemble those from Berkeley. A Harris survey conducted in the spring of 1965 during the first year of large-scale student demonstrations, which inquired into "confidence in various institutions" (Table 7), found the two institutions with lowest negative percentages (4 per cent) were "higher education", and the "scientific community." As at Berkeley, the heightened student discontent generally produced increased complaint about specific institutions, including particularly higher education. The Roper student poll conducted in winter 1968-1969, reported that 23 per cent of the seniors and 17 per cent of the freshmen stated that higher education was "not too sound" or "basically unsound," while only 19 per cent

26

about of the seniors and 32 per cent of the freshmen thought it was "basically sound and essentially good." These answers represented a considerable decline in support for higher education as compared to the Harris 1965 findings, but it should be noted that comparable changes occurred with respect to student views towards the political system, business and industry, and the system of administering justice (see Tables 7 and 8). The Gergens' 1969-1970 survey results also indicate that the increased criticism of the university is part of a general anti-establishment syndrome dictated by concern about the war. There is some indication in their analysis that draft policies and the general disruptive effects of the war on personal plans continued to play the causal role Lubell attributed to them in 1967-1968 in stimulating anti-war sentiment.

Approximately one out of every three students has altered his career plans as a result of the war. The modal student is seeking a draft-exempt occupation, while many others indicate extreme confusion over their future... In some schools, over a third of the students have altered their course of study as a result of the war. More than one of every five students traces his dissatisfaction with his curriculum and rules governing student life to the war. Emotional upheaval is particularly prevalent. Between 60 and 70 per cent of the students have experienced increased anger, worry, and depression as a result of the war.

Different studies suggest, however, that higher education has remained in better esteem among students than other institutions. The results of Roper's inquiries as to how much confidence they had in various categories of "leaders" indicated much more trust in "leaders in education" than in those in politics or other institutions. Only 7 per cent of the seniors replied "not much confidence" in education leaders. In another

27

study conducted early in 1969, Yankelovich differentiated students between "practical-minded", those going to college to earn more money, who comprised 57 per cent of his sample, and "forerunners," generally from more affluent backgrounds in better schools and studying liberal arts subjects, for whom college means something more intangible, including "the opportunity to change things."⁶⁴ The latter were naturally more reform minded than the former, but both groups placed the university lower on their list of six "areas which need fundamental reform" with the one exception that more forerunners favored reforming the universities than trade unions.⁶⁵ A Gallup student poll taken in the fall of 1969, while reiterating the comparative findings of Roper's 1969 and Harris's 1965 results that students had less confidence in universities than had been true for four years earlier, also reported, similar to Yankelovich, that universities received the largest vote of approval among nine institutions rated by the students. The per cent "favorable" to universities was 68, as compared to 56 for business and Congress, 46 for the courts, 37 for high schools, and 33 for organized religion.⁶⁶

The clue to the increased complaint in 1968–1969 lay in another finding, that the educationally dissatisfied students are much more likely to be among the political pro-testers than in 1964–1965. That is, political orientation is now closely related to educational ideology. Those students who are disposed to the left now describe the university as a bad place; more conservative students are much less hostile.

Two independent surveys of the characteristics of institutions involved in the May 1970 protests against the Cambodian incursion also reiterated the results of the earlier studies. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, each sent out questionnaires to the presidents of all college and universities (the government one also wrote to the chairmen of faculty senates and of student governments) inquiring as to the nature, extent, and "causes" of demonstrations. The Carnegie study found that the more selective the student body and the larger the institution, the more likely it had been to have had a significant protest activity. Identical results were reported by the staff of the President's Commission. 28

Many of the respondents to the President's Commission questionnaire, particularly the student body presidents suggested that increased involvement of students in university governance would reduce the likelihood of major outbreaks in the future. These assumptions, which, of course, are popular with many commentators on the subject are challenged by Hodgkinson's findings that "an increase in student control in institutional

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(Parenthetically it should be noted that non-college working youth, including the blacks among them, were much less militant or critical of various policies and institutions than the white college students.

The black working youth, who, of course, comprise the large majority of black young people, repeatedly rejected the use of aggressive protest tactics, often by large majorities, while the black college students were the most militant of the four youth groups, i.e., white college, white non-college, black college, black non-college. (21)

The indications that black college youth are extremely militant, but were relatively low in participation in the anti-Cambodian incursion demonstrations, can probably be explained as a consequence of the growing gap which exists between black and white students. The black students tend to abstain from protests led by white radicals or liberals. They keep their distance even when they agree. But the fact that they are visibly non-present at white-run anti-war rallies clearly does not imply a lack of opposition.

The evidence from a variety of investigations definitely indicates that black college students are much more discontented than whites. (22) And they are much more likely to continue to press for major changes when the Vietnam War ends. (22) Since the far left as well as the more liberal white students are disposed to back race-related demonstrations, the probabilities are great that the major campus issues once the war ends will be linked to civil rights.

### Image and Size: Determinants of Protest-Proneness

The evidence presented thus far would suggest that the propensity of a given institution to sustain protest is largely a consequence of the type of students who are attracted to, or more properly speaking, allowed into it. Faculty surveys strongly indicate that the more intellectually prestigious a school in the United States, the more liberal to left the political outlook of its faculty.

10

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(mother's "stand on most issues") clearly has a considerable impact on the availability of students for protest activities. What is perhaps more impressive than the variations among the different background traits is the extent to which protest had spread during May-June, 1970 into environments which had previously been unreceptive, such as relatively low-quality schools, or those controlled by religious denominations. Southern students remained resistant, but even among them, 38 per cent of those in schools that had protests, report personal involvement in them.

Table 11

Perhaps the most interesting finding included in Table 1 is the difference in the behavior of white and black students. Fewer of the latter were at schools which had protests¹, presumably these were largely segregated black colleges in the South. But even among students who were at demonstrating institutions, black students were less likely to have taken part in these actions than whites. This discrepancy in racial behavior was not a function of greater support for the war among the blacks. If anything, the Harris data indicate that the black students were more hostile to the conflict than the whites. Fully 72 per cent of the blacks thought President Nixon was doing a "poor" job in handling the war as compared with 58 per cent among the whites; 65 per cent of the blacks would bring the soldiers home as soon as possible, while only 52 per cent of the whites had the same opinion. The black students also reported a greater propensity than whites to having engaged in protest activities *before* Cambodia. Thus, 41 per cent of the former and 29 of the latter had been on a picket line; and 31 per cent of the blacks and 24 per cent of the whites had visited a public official.²⁰ The Yankelovich-CES survey completed in the Spring of 1969 pointed to similar racial differences. Black students in general were much more critical of the war and the social system, and more supportive of demonstrations and of militancy than whites.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Per Cent Participated<br>If School Had Protests</th><th>Per Cent At Schools<br>With Protests</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>Religion</strong></td></tr><tr><td>None</td><td>80</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Other</td><td>66</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>Jews</td><td>73</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics</td><td>60</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>Protestants</td><td>36</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>Mother's Ideology</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Far Left</td><td>80</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>Liberal</td><td>69</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>Middle-of-Road</td><td>62</td><td>84</td></tr><tr><td>Conservative</td><td>51</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Far Right</td><td>49</td><td>78</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Report of Harris Survey of Students, May 20-28, passim

The findings of the Harris poll conducted during the 1970 national strike wave on the whole reiterate the results of earlier studies dealing with characteristics of activists. They do not permit, of course, any statistical specification of the relative effect of the different factors in a multi-variate context, since all that is available is the percentage distributions. The very low rate of participation of the self-described Protestants is quite difficult to explain.

In part, it is linked to the low involvements of those at denominationally controlled schools, and of Southerners. Other data in this survey indicate that the children of farmers are far more conservative than those from other occupational backgrounds, and almost all of them are Protestants. The low rate may also reflect the fact that many birthright Protestants who become radicals report their religion as "none." Family political background

7

scholarly prominence, o.g., California, Michigan, and Wisconsin, are also
schools which have become the most important centers of confrontationist
politics. These schools attract a disproportionate number of intellectually
oriented students, including many Jews. The same finding occurs among
predominantly black colleges and universities in studies of factors related
to protest participation among their students.

Specifically, the greater the proportion of students from high socio-
economic status (SES) homes, the greater is the rate of participation. The
association can be explained by other variables that are related to the
proportion of high SDS students. For instance, schools of high quality
generally have a higher proportion of students from high SES backgrounds and
also have higher rates of student participation. (18)

Participation in the 1970 Striketo Wave

The Harris Poll of student behavior and opinion during the protest wave
against the Cambodian incursion differentiated among respondents with respect to
many of the factors which had been investigated in earlier studies of activism.
It distinguished the kinds of academic backgrounds which were more or less
likely to have led students to participate in the demonstrations.
Eighty-five per cent of those interviewed reported that demonstrations had
taken place at their schools. Fifty-eight per cent of the students at
schools which had demonstrations indicated that they had taken part. (19)
This means that about half the college population in the United States (49
per cent) actually were involved in protests during the Cambodian incursion.
The relevant characteristics of those so engaged at schools with protest
are reported in Table 1.

C

L

(18)

(19)

Not surprisingly, the black student activists do not resemble either the white militants or the ronunciators in their social background and aspirations. As suggested earlier, their principal objectives are not to change the fundamental character of the society or to engage in expressive personal protest, but rather to improve the position of the blacks within the larger society generally, and inside the university in particular.

Although to achieve their objectives, they often find it necessary to engage in militant, sometimes violent forms of protest, their goals are similar to the instrumental ones of the less privileged, sometimes racist white youth. They want a better life, more money, a job with higher status, social dignity. The black student activists are less aspiring for personal advantages than other black youth, seeing themselves as leaders of their people, but they clearly differ from the white activists. A study of 264 black student activists in fifteen colleges and universities in 1969 indicated that the blacks came from much poorer families than the whites. Only 11 percent had college graduate parents. While most white activists are undecided about future careers, 76 percent of the black militants "said they were fairly certain!" (17)

The political character of certain schools also may be linked to other sources of selective recruitment and the resultant political orientation of their students. Those with a large number of well-to-do Jewish students, or currently, with the rise of Negro militancy, of black students, tend to be centers of activism. High-level liberal arts colleges with an intellectual aura attract students oriented to becoming intellectuals. Thus we may account for the pattern of student protest at schools like Reed, Swarthmore, Antioch and others. The best state universities, as judged in terms of faculty

5

California at Santa Barbara taken about the same time as the Oregon one
"suggests that children from the more affluent professional (and business)
families are more militant," i.e., leftist. (15) More significantly, perhaps,
the Harris Survey of student opinion in May 1970 asked respondents to describe
their general political stance among five choices, ranging from "far left" to
"far right." Almost half (42) per cent) of those who described themselves
as far left reported their fathers' occupation as "professional," as contrasted
to 26 per cent among the far right students. (16)

(3)

These findings are related to those concerning academic interests, since
studies of students in different disciplines suggest that those who major in
the liberal arts subjects and have an intellectual or scholarly bent have
well-educated parents, while first-generation college students of working-
class origins tend to be vocationally oriented in a narrow sense. They
are more likely to be found among those preparing to become engineers,
businessmen, and the like. They come disproportionately from that segment
of the less well-to-do which is strongly oriented towards upward mobility
and the values of the privileged. Their strong concentration on professional
objectives, plus the need of many of them to hold a job during school term,
also results in these students being less available for political activities
than those from more affluent families. These findings may help to explain
the fact that colleges attended by large numbers of less well-to-do students,
apart from blacks, were less likely to be strongholds of left-wing groups
during the 1960s than those which educated the scions of the upper-
middle class.

that the left-wingers come from somewhat more affluent backgrounds than the rightists. The majority of the latter are the children of conservative businessmen and professionals, but they include a significant proportion, one-fifth, from working-class origins, a group almost unrepresented among the SDS delegates. In a follow-up study which included samples of students from a number of universities, Braungart found that 39 per cent of the YAF members and 17 per cent of those belonging to SDS were of working-class backgrounds. Comparing members of these two groups with those belonging to the Young Democrats and Young Republicans, as well as indicated that a larger proportion of SDS members came from upper-middle-class families (55 per cent) than was true of the other three groups, or a control group of students who did not belong to political groupings.

The continued validity of these relationships, as radical student protest has spread out through the campuses of the country and enrolls in places and strata not reached in early years, has been challenged by Riley Dunlap.
Reporting on a study of different types of 43 activists (SDS and YAF) at the University of Oregon in the Spring of 1969, he found that those involved in SDS were not "higher in socio-economic status" than a random sample of the Oregon student body, while those in YAF did not include a disproportionate number from lower-strata backgrounds. Dunlap concluded that a change in the social class character of left student activists accompanies growth. While his argument makes logical sense, data from other universities and from a national sample of students taken in late May 1970, suggest that the earlier pattern is still prevalent, that is, the committed left students come from higher status families than those involved in right-wing campus politics. A survey of campus opinion among students at the University of

or who aspire to intellectual pursuits after graduation, are also much more
prone to be on the left and favorable to activism than those inclined to
business and professional occupations. (82)

Among both faculty and students, there are clear-cut correlations
between disciplines and political orientations. On the whole, those involved
in the social sciences and humanities, or in the more pure
theoretical fields of science, in that order, are more likely to be on
the left than those in the more practical, applied, or experimental fields. (9)
Such variations, however, would appear to be more a product of selective
entrance into different disciplines than of the effects of the content
of the fields on those pursuing them as students or practitioners.
Thus studies of entering freshmen have reported similar relationships
between intended college major and political attitudes as found among
seniors, graduate students and faculty. (10) Morris Rosenberg, who con-
ducted a panel study (repeat interviews with the same people two years apart)
of students, reported that political orientation proved to be a major
determinant of shifts in undergraduate major. (11) A large proportion of
the minority of conservatives who chose liberal (in political terms)
majors as freshmen changed to subjects studied by most conservatives, while
many liberals who had selected conservative majors tended to shift to
fields which were presumably more congenial with their political outlook.

The relationships between academic fields and political sympathies are
also linked to the finding that the leftist activists within American
universities tend to come from relatively well-to-do backgrounds as
compared to the student population generally. A comparison by Westby and
Braungart of the delegates to conventions of SDS and YAF also indicated

2

Studies of earlier movements, both leftist ones in the United States before World War I and in the 1930s, and fascist groups in Europe, suggest a similar pattern of generational continuity. Bruno Bottelheim, who has observed the growth of student support for Nazism in Germany before 1933, and for the New Left in the United States, has commented on these similarities:

> It is mainly the children of leftist parents who become student revolutionaries in our society, just as in other places and other times the children of conservative parents, under similar emotional conditions, were headed right wing radicalism. It was the children of conservative German parents, for example, who felt a need to lay their bodies on the line for ideas their parents had only lukewarmly held. They felt, too, that this was a means of rebirth, a way to revitalize an ossified society, to create a new society; with little patience for the voice of reason, they asked for authenticity and confrontation. All those were the main tenets of Hitler's academic youth, as they are now those of our own student left.

> Thus, while the emotional constellations which make for very different student revolts are strangely similar, the specific political content of a student revolt depends to a large degree on the beliefs of the students' parents. For in many ways rebellion represents a desperate wish by youth to do better than their parents in exactly those beliefs in which parents seem weakest. (6)

#>

In the United States, intellectuals, academics, writers, and so forth tend to disproportionately support the left for reasons which are discussed elsewhere. They are predominantly liberal Democrats, or supporters of left-wing minor parties. And various surveys indicate that students who are intellectually oriented, who identify themselves as "intellectuals,"

## Social Background

The major conclusions to be drawn from the large number of studies of student activism (particularly those of Kenneth Keniston and Richard Flacks) in the United States and other countries is that leftist students are largely the children of leftist or liberal parents. The activists, particularly, are more radical or activist than their parents, but both parents and children are located on the same side of the spectrum. (1) In the United States, where left-wing radical parties or consistently liberal orientations with respect to race relations, foreign policy, and socioeconomic egalitarianism have relatively little support among the less educated and poorer strata, such orientations have found the bulk of their backing among a well-educated segment of the affluent engaged in intellectual and welfare occupations, and among members of traditionally progressively disposed religious groups, particularly the liberal Protestant denominations and the Jews. (2) In other countries, in which leftist socialist and communist parties have heavy backing from workers, leftist students are more likely to come from less privileged families.

In countries as diverse as Japan, the Netherlands, Chile, Germany, and Britain, the available evidence would suggest that leftist tendencies secure disproportionate backing from the less-well-to-do among the university student population.

And it seems clear, that the variations between the pattern in the United States and these other countries is related to generational continuity. As Klaus Allerbeck puts it, these results suggest "that the affluence-radicalism correlation in the US is no causal relation, but a by-product of the relations of political ideology and social stratification which are not the same in the US and in Germany." What emerges from the studies of student political behavior in various countries "is the importance of the political orientations of parents for the political behavior of their children." In the United States, the members of Young Americans for Freedom and other conservative and right-wing youth groups come from conservative family backgrounds. Students are more idealistic and committed than their parents, but generally in the same direction.

72 See Chapter 1, p. 0.

73 Gilbert Marketing Group, 1970, op. cit., Tables 20A and 27A.

74 Kenneth Keniston, "Heads and Seekers," The American Scholar, 38 (Winter, 1968-69), pp. 97-112.

75 A Study of the Beliefs, Research-Associates, op. cit., p. 193.

76 "The New Mood on Campus," op. cit., p. 44.

77 Foley and Foley, op. cit., p. 66.

78 "Special Report on the Attitudes of College Students," op. cit., p. 26.

79 Yankelovich, Profile of a Generation, op. cit., pp. 74, 77.

80 Ibid., p. 151.

58. Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin, eds., *The Berkeley Student Revolt* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 549-550.

59. Kathleen Gales, "A Campus Revolution," *British Journal of Sociology*, 17 (March 1966), p. 14.

60. Glen Lyonns, "The Police-Car Demonstration: A Survey of Participants," in *ibid*., pp. 525-527.

61. Robert H. Somers, "The Berkeley Campus in the Twilight of the Free Speech Movement: Hope or Futility?" in James McEvoy and Abraham Miller, eds., *Black Power and Student Rebellion* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969), p. 427.

62. Gergen and Gergen, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

63. *A Study of the Beliefs*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

64. Daniel Yankelovich, "The Generation Gap: A Misleading Half Truth," (unpublished mimeoed paper; New York, Spring 1970), pp. 10-11.

65. *Ibid.*, Table 4.

66. "The New Mood on Campus," *Newsweek*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

67. *Gallup Poll* / Release on student survey, May 25, 1969.

68. Yankelovich, *op. cit*.

69. Marshall W. Meyer, "Harvard Students in the Midst of Crisis," (Mimeographed paper, New York State School of Industrial Relations and Department of Sociology, Cornell University, 1970), p.43, *Table 8*.

70. Robert B. Smith, "Campus Protest and the Vietnam War," (Mimeographed Article: Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1970), pp. 1, 46-47; for a summary of evidence from various studies at different institutions which comes to similar conclusions see, Riley Dunlap, "A Comment on 'Multi-versity, University Size, University Quality, and Student Protest: An Empirical Study,'" *American Sociological Review*, 35 (June 1970), pp. 525-528.

71. Richard Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1967-68* (Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1968), pp. 10-11; Alan E. Bayer and Alexander W. Aston, *Campus Disruption During 1968-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, American Council on Education, ACE Research Reports, August, 1969), pp. 22-23; Urban Research Corporation, *Student Protests 1969. Summary (Chicago: 1970)*, pp. 4, 6-8; Wayne King, "Campus Protest Reported on Rise," *New York Times*, March 29, 1970, p. 53; Garth Buchanan and Joan Brackett, *Summary Results of the Survey for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest*

52. See Philippe Béneton and Jean Touchard, "Les Interprétations de la Crise de Mai-Juin 1968," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 22 (June, 1970), p. 520, for summary of and references to various French surveys.

53. F. Netzler and J. La Brousse, *Diverses Opinions et Attitudes des Etudiants de la Faculté des Lettres de Nanterre* (Paris: Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, June, 1970), p. 20.

54. Enzo Montillo, "Italy: The Youth of the Opinion Surveys," *SIPE* (International Student Press Service), 2 (July 1, 1970), pp. 13-14.

55. Michiya Shimbori, "The Sociology of a Student Movement - A Japanese Case Study," in S.M. Lipset and Philip Altbach, eds., *Students in Revolt* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1949), footnote 12 on page 309.

56. See report on nineteenth century student conflicts in chapter 5; Veysey's analysis is discussed on pages 00-00.

57. Bryan Wilson, *The Youth Culture and the Universities* (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 227.

16. "The New Mood on Campus," *Newsweek*, December 29, 1969, p. 42.

17. "Results of a New Gallup Survey of College Students," *The Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 55 (January 1970), p. 16.

18. Gilbert Poll, *op. cit.*

19. Report of the May 1970 Harris Survey, p. 49.

20. *Playboy* Student Poll news release, November, 1965.

21. Harris 1970 survey, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

22. *Ibid*, p. 35., *23. Ibid*, p. 51.

23. Anthony Ripley, "Survey Finds Spring Campus Protests Were Greatest in History," *New York Times*, October 3, 1970, p. 35.

25. Kenneth Gergen and Mary K. Gergen, "Vietnam and the Students: A Brief Summary of Research Results," (Mimeographed Report, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, June, 1970), p. 2.

26. Harris Survey of Students, May 20-28, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 140; See Table in Chapter IV, p. 00.

27. Gergen and Gergen, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

27. Samuel Lubell, "Unresolved Crises Causes Youth Dissension," *Boston Globe*, October 9, 1968,

29. *A Study of the Beliefs and Attitudes of Male College Seniors*. Freshmen, and Alumni (New York: Roper Research Associates, May 1969), p. 5.

30. Yankelovich, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

35. Gilbert Marketing Group, February 1970 Omnibus Youth Survey, Table 22.

32. A report on this study was published as "Youth in College," *Fortune*, 13 (June, 1936), pp. 99-102, 156-162. The data reported here, however, are from the unpublished report prepared by the Roper Poll. I am indebted to Burns Roper for a copy of this report.

53. Report of Harris, May 1970, Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of youth backing for Wallace and racism see S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-wing Extremism in America 1970* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 367-371, 372, 394, 418, 513.

2. Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Spring, 1970), p. 134.

3. Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities" and the Vietnam War," The Scientific American, 222 (June 1970), p. 22. See also *The American People*, edited by Sidney Verba and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harcourt and Row, 1976), pp. 5-33.

4. "The Student Revolution" (A Special Report," *The Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 66 (June 1970), p. 15.

5. "Campus '65," *Newsweek*, March 22, 1965, p. 53.

6. Samuel Lubell, "The People Speak," (news releases reporting on a study of American college students).

7. Gallup Poll Release, July 1966.

8. "Results of a New Gallup Survey of College Students," *The Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 55 (January 1970), p. 16.

9. "Special Survey of College Students," Gallup Poll Release, June 29, 1968.

10. Samuel Lubell, "Where the New Left dissidents come from," *Boston Globe*, October 10, 1968, p. 26.

11. Gallup Poll Release, June 29, 1968.

12. *Profile of a Generation* (New York: Daniel Yankelovich, April 1969 prepared for CBS News), p. 158.

13. The Harris Survey, "Aversion to Vietnam War Reaches High Among College Students," (June 30, 1969).

14. National Gilbert Youth Poll, "Young Hawks on Decrease," (Newspaper Release through Newspaper Enterprise Association, December 12, 1969).

15. "Special Report on the Attitudes of College Students," *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 48 (June 1969), p. 42.