Contents

China Takes Off David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale 36

China has achieved stunning economic progress since the 1970s, thanks to aggressive
liberalization, a commitment to exporting high-tech goods, and a massive injection of
foreign investment. Although this unprecedented success is understandably unnerving
to China's neighbors and trading partners, it should not be cause for worry; China, the
United States, and the rest of the world still have lots of business to do.

Should Hezbollah Be Next? Daniel Byman 54

The radical Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah is fomenting violence in post-
war Iraq and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track
record makes it a natural target in the war on terror. But Washington's only option
is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help
change its focus from militancy to politics.

Reinventing the West Dominique Moïsi 67

During the Cold War, the ever-present Soviet threat helped keep the West united. More recently, however, attempts to mend the transatlantic rift by pointing to present dangers have only deepened the cultural divide. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must accept that "the West" has now split into European and American halves. But both sides still need each other—now more than ever.

Japan's New Nationalism Eugene A. Matthews 74

Ever since World War II, the slightest sign of nationalism in Japan has been widely
denounced, at home and abroad. Recently, however, discussions that were once
taboo—including whether to rearm or even develop nuclear weapons—have moved
into the Japanese mainstream. Yet the country's critics need not be alarmed; a little
healthy nationalism may be just what Japan, with its faltering economy, needs most.

America's Imperial Dilemma Dimitri K. Simes 91

The United States increasingly looks, walks, and talks like an empire. It should therefore heed the lessons of its predecessors, exercising strong and determined global leadership. At the same time, it must avoid the temptation to meddle when American interests are not at stake. This means, among other things, dropping the doctrine of universal democracy promotion.

The Next Prize Daniel Yergin and Michael Stoppard 103

The emerging global market in natural gas has the potential to meet rising demand for electricity worldwide. The United States' own gas supplies are dwindling, but elsewhere vast, unexploited resources are becoming ever more accessible now that gas can be liquefied, shipped, and used efficiently. New energy linkages will create new risks, but none that cannot be managed through proper diversification.

The Baby Trade Ethan B. Kapstein 115

The international adoption trade is booming, as more families in the West adopt more babies from developing countries. But it has spawned a sordid black market as well, in which children are bought or abducted and sold. The best way to stop the trafficking is not to ban adoptions from countries that tolerate corrupt rings, but to strengthen the underdeveloped multilateral legal regime that regulates adoptions around the planet.

[II] FOREIGN AFFAIRS · Volume 82 No. 6

Contents

Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy Michael O'Hanlon 126

Conventional wisdom holds that Bill Clinton presided over a disastrous downsizing of the U.S. military. But this claim is wrong. In fact, Clinton's Pentagon maintained high levels of readiness and enacted a bold military modernization program that bore fruit in Bosnia and Kosovo—and in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Reviews & Responses

Being Yasir Arafat Glenn E. Robinson 136

Two Israeli studies of the polarizing Palestinian leader don't shed much light on their subject. But they do make clear why his time may be past.

Remaking the World Joshua Micah Marshall 142

Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay take stock of the Bush revolution in foreign affairs. The neocons have been running the show—and we're all now paying the price.

The Other 9/11 Kenneth Maxwell 147

Thirty years after the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, *The Pinochet File*, a "dossier" of declassified documents, lays out the true U.S. role.

Recent Books on International Relations 152

Including L. Carl Brown on *Terror in the Name of God*; Robert Legvold on *Black Earth*; and Richard N. Cooper on Joseph Stiglitz and *The Roaring Nineties*.

Letters to the Editor 176

Baudouin Heuninckx and Eric Farnsworth on faulty trade assumptions.

Lurie's Foreign Affairs 178

*The articles in Foreign Affairs do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries Foreign Affairs can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

THE EDITORS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · November/December 2003

[III]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JAMES F. HOGE, JR. *Editor*
*Peter G. Peterson Chair*

GIDEON ROSE *Managing Editor*
JONATHAN D. TEPPERMAN *Senior Editor*

STÉPHANIE Giry, DANIEL KURTZ-PHELAN Associate Editors
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ANN R. TAPPERT *Acting Production Editor*
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ROSEMARY HARTMAN *Assistant to the Editor*
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Book Reviewers

L. CARL BROWN, RICHARD N. COOPER, LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN,
GAIL M. GERHART, STANLEY HOFFMANN, G. JOHN IKENBERRY, ROBERT LEGVOLD,
KENNETH MAXWELL, WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, LUCIAN W. PYE

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*Foreign Affairs* is published six times a year by the Council on Foreign Relations. © 2003. Visit www.cfr.org

## Review Essay

# The Other 9/11

## The United States and Chile, 1973

Kenneth Maxwell

*The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.* EDITED BY PETER KORNBLUH. New York: New Press, 2003, 528 pp. $29.95.

There are two types of what Theodore Draper called “present history.” The first is based on documents and testimony accessible to all historians: assertions and interpretations can be checked, verified, and contested on the basis of fact rather than speculation. Both Draper and, in his own way, I. F. Stone were brilliant practitioners of this kind of history and demonstrated that, despite the best (or worst) intentions of bureaucrats to hide or distort the record, much could be found in the public domain if diligently sought after. The second approach to writing about contemporary history is based on anonymous “sources” and self-interested

“leaks.” Here, much depends on the credibility of the authors; but in the right political climate, such writing can be powerful enough to bring down a president, as it did with Watergate. And over the past two decades, heavily redacted, “secret” government documents released under the Freedom of Information Act have been added to its menu.

Both approaches have their weaknesses, and neither is as new as might first appear. The Draper method—by abjuring the fragments exhumed from a government's dark places—risks underestimating the role of the clandestine actions that were often at the center of the ideological and geostrategic struggles of the Cold War. History by self-interested leaking of documents or the use of anonymous sources, however, tends to produce narratives that are self-justifying, on the one hand, or

KENNETH MAXWELL is Director of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His most recent book is *Naked Tropics: Essays on Empire and Other Rogues*.

[147]

Kenneth Maxwell

indictments, on the other, and to exag-
erate the importance of covert operations.
Again, there is a long history of both
genres: Winston Churchill the historian
was a master over many volumes at
preempting the assessment of Winston
Churchill the statesman, and Henry
Kissinger is doing what Churchill did
for his own epoch and his own historical
place within it by releasing weighty tomes
on his White House years and other topics.

But, as Isaac Newton taught us, actions
produce reactions. So it is entirely within
the established pattern that 30 years
after the Yom Kippur War and the bloody
coup in Chile—at just the moment when
Kissinger himself publishes a book about
his unquestionable diplomatic skill in
confronting grave crises in Southeast
Asia and the Middle East, grand stages
where issues of war and peace and nuclear
confrontation were handled—Kissinger's
critics have revived the case against him
over U.S. actions in Chile on his watch,
doggedly seeking out forensic linkages
to establish his role, as national security
adviser, and that of his president, Richard
Nixon, in undermining and engineering
the overthrow of a democratically elected
socialist president, Salvador Allende. Peter
Kornbluh, in his troubling dossier, sets out
to piece together this less elevated story.

THE CASE AGAINST KISSINGER

The crux of the case made against Kissinger
rests on three events in particular: the
assassination of Chile's chief of staff,
General René Schneider, in 1970; the extent
of U.S. complicity and active involvement
in the September 11, 1973, coup against
Allende; and the assassination in Wash-
ington, D.C., of Orlando Letelier, the
former Chilean foreign minister, in 1976.

The first and last cases, according to the
record Kornbluh has uncovered, have odd
similarities. Schneider's elimination three
years before the coup was regarded as
essential by the Nixon administration, since
Schneider was a strict constitutionalist
and therefore an obstacle to U.S. efforts
to promote a military intervention before
Allende could take office. The general
was killed in a kidnapping attempt that
the United States knew about, approved
of, and had even assisted in planning. A
week before the kidnapping was to take
place, however, Kissinger discouraged
the plot. As he told Nixon at the time,
he had "turned it off."

The killing of Schneider, it seems fair to
say, was not what the Americans wanted
(although the CIA had warned of such an
outcome), but was, as the saying now
goes, "collateral damage." The planned
assassination of Pinochet's critics living
abroad under Operation Condor—an
international state-sponsored terror
network set up by the Pinochet regime
(in consort with Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Bolivia, and, later, Brazil, Peru,
and Ecuador) to track and eliminate
opponents—was also known to U.S. in-
telligence operatives and reported to the
White House. Policymakers even knew
that a Chilean assassination team had
been planning to enter the United States.
Kissinger intervened a month before
the killing of Letelier, ordering that the
Latin American rulers involved be
informed that the "assassination of sub-
versives, politicians and prominent figures
both within the national borders of certain
Southern Cone countries and abroad ...
would create a most serious moral and
political problem." This démarche was
apparently not delivered: the U.S. embassy

[148] FOREIGN AFFAIRS · *Volume 82 No. 6*

[L.C.T.]

in Santiago demurred on the ground that to deliver such a strong rebuke would upset the dictator. The U.S. ambassador to Chile, David Popper, wrote to Washington, "In my judgement, given Pinochet's sensitivity regarding pressures by the USG [U.S. government], he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots." On September 20, 1976, the State Department instructed the ambassadors "to take no further action" with regard to the Condor scheme. Letelier and his American assistant, Ronni Moffitt, were killed the following morning.

As for the coup itself, there is no doubt that the United States did all that it could to create the conditions for the failure of Allende and his government. But, as in most such cases, it was the locals who made the coup itself. And although the United States did little to reign in Pinochet thereafter and certainly, as these documents make clear, knew much more about the atrocities committed in Chile than was admitted to at the time or later, the causes of the violence in Chilean society are to be found more in Chilean circumstances than in the intent of manipulators in Washington. What is truly remarkable is the effort—the resources committed, the risks taken, and the skullduggery employed—to bring a Latin American democracy down, and the meager efforts since to build democracy back up. Left to their own devices, the Chileans might just have found the good sense to resolve their own deep-seated problems. Allende might have fallen by his own weight, victim of his own incompetence, and not become a tragic martyr to a lost cause.

Kornbluh, who has put together several collections of declassified documents on key U.S. foreign policy crises, led the campaign

"A comprehensive proposal for addressing one of the most important issues of our day." —George Mitchell, Former Senate Majority Leader

"O'Hanlon and Mochizuki exhibit the strategic creativity and analytical depth badly needed by United States policymakers dealing with this strange and dangerous place." —Ash Carter, Professor, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

"By far the best book yet written on the challenge posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program." —Stephen J. Solarz, Former Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

McGraw-Hill

Available Everywhere Books Are Sold
Visit us at www.books.mcgraw-hill.com

The McGraw-Hill Companies

[149]

Kenneth Maxwell

to declassify more than 25,000 closely
held records on U.S.-Chilean relations
through the National Security Archives,
a nonprofit nongovernmental organization
that he helped establish with the support
of several U.S. foundations. This effort,
he says, is part of an ongoing international
campaign "to hold Pinochet and his mili-
tary responsible for the murder, torture and
terrorism committed during his regime."

These are not, of course, just matters
of historical curiosity. Pinochet, after all,
was held under house arrest in London
in 1998 under just such charges filed by
the Spanish investigating judge Baltasar
Garzón. In fact, the release of the docu-
ments in this book resulted from that
watershed event, a high point in the
campaign by human rights activists and
victims' families to hold repressive leaders
responsible for their actions. Now, law-
suits are pending or threatened against
Kissinger himself for complicity or fore-
knowledge of the plots that led to the
assassination of Schneider in Santiago in
1970 and, closer to home, the shocking car
bombing in 1976 that killed Letelier and
Moffitt 14 blocks from the White House.

Kornbluh's bill of particulars and the
supporting documents he has uncovered
confirm the deep involvement of the U.S.
intelligence services in Chile prior to and
after the coup. In outline, this story has
been known for many years and will be
no surprise to Chileans. The extent of
the involvement was originally hinted at
during the Senate hearings conducted by
the late Frank Church in the mid-1970s.
The scope and nature of these clandestine
activities are significantly amplified by
the documents released in the extensive
declassification ordered by President Bill
Clinton in 1999 and 2000 and reprinted in

Kornbluh's book. These documents in-
clude: transcripts of top-secret discus-
sions among President Nixon, Kissinger,
and other cabinet members on how "to
bring Allende down"; minutes of secret
meetings chaired by Kissinger to plan
covert operations in Chile; new documen-
tation of the notorious case of Charles
Horman, an American murdered by the
Chilean military and subject of the movie
*Missing*; comprehensive documentation of
the Letelier case and the extensive *CIA*,
National Security Council, and State
Department reports surrounding it; and
U.S. intelligence reporting on Operation
Condor. All these sources, however, are
extensively redacted—that is, sensitive
parts of them, especially those from the
*CIA*, have been blacked out.

WHAT THE BOSS WANTED

Kissinger's response to Kornbluh's charges will undoubtedly be twofold. On the general level, he will argue that Chile and its problems were marginal to the larger concerns the Nixon administration was facing in the Middle East and South Vietnam, not to mention Watergate: Nixon and his would-be Metternich were fully engaged elsewhere with "big" events. On the narrow, legalistic level, the claim will be that the dots in the Schneider and Letelier cases cannot be joined because of the undelivered démarche, in the case of Letelier, and Kissinger's counterorder, in the case of Schneider. These are arguments best left to lawyers, not historians. On the question of the impact of "larger" concerns, however, there is one inconvenient detail: chronology. War broke out in the Middle East on October 6, 1973, almost a month after the overthrow of Allende on September 11. As late as October 5, as

[150] FOREIGN AFFAIRS · *Volume 82 No. 6*

The Other 9/11

Kissinger points out in his new book, *Crisis*, the CIA had reported to Nixon: "The military preparations that have occurred do not indicate that any party intends to initiate hostilities." So it can hardly be argued that Allende's downfall came as a surprise to policymakers in Washington because their attention at that particular moment was focused elsewhere.

On Kornbluh's side, what is lacking in the forensic approach (and it is a weakness of much writing on U.S. diplomatic history) is location in time and space. We see only the U.S. side of a story that is at least two-sided, if not multifaceted. The pursuit of declassified documents tends to exaggerate this tendency, so that intra-mural bureaucratic paperwork takes on a life of its own. Very little of the complex political and social history of Chile in the 1970s enters here; nor do we see the roles of many other actors beyond the Chilean military, U.S. clandestine operatives, and their political masters. Chilean society was at the time highly mobilized on the left as well as the right. All the Chilean political parties—from Communist to Christian Democrat—received and welcomed outside support, much of it clandestine. The Soviets and the Cubans had their own involvements, and the international left held Chile as a potential model. So it was not only Nixon and Kissinger who looked into the Chilean mirror and saw what they wanted to see; others did too, and from different angles.

If anything, both sides were guilty of knee-jerk reactions prompted by Cold War phobias. U.S. methodology in Chile was not that different from the tactics used to remove regimes from Guatemala City to Tehran deemed dangerous to the geo-political status quo. Kissinger defenders

may be right in asserting that this was not high on his agenda. But the outcome might have been better if he had paid greater attention to the details instead of leaving them to "old hands." In the end, what have persisted through the decades to haunt him are the "marginal" cases: Timor, Angola, and Chile; the old triumphs against the Soviet Union are barely remembered by a generation for whom the days of Cold War threats are long gone.

But what is very clear in all of this is that the coup in Chile is exactly what Kissinger's boss wanted. As Nixon put it in his ineffable style, "It's that son of a bitch Allende. We're going to smash him." As early as October of 1970, the CIA had warned of possible consequences: "you have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. ... We provide you with a formula for chaos which is unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate the U.S. involvement will be clearly impossible." The Pinochet dictatorship lasted 17 long and brutal years. According to the Chilean Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, its victims numbered 3,197. Thirty years after its initiation, the coup of 1973 remains deeply etched in collective memory. It is unlikely that this book will be the end of the story.®

[151]

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

*The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century.* BY ROBERT COOPER. London: Atlantic Books, 2003, 156 pp. £10.49.

The United States has Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kagan as its prophets of the coming world order. Who does Europe have? The answer is Robert Cooper, a former adviser to Tony Blair and an EU diplomat. This small book of essays offers a sweeping interpretation of today's global predicament. Cooper argues that two revolutionary forces are transforming international relations: the breakdown of state control over violence, reflected in the growing ability of tiny private groups to wield weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of a stable, peaceful order in Europe that is not based on either the balance of power or the sovereignty of independent states. In this scheme, the Westphalian system of nation-states and power politics is being undermined on both sides—by a postmodern Europe and a premodern world of failed states and post-imperial chaos.

Cooper makes a good case that the
growing threat of terrorism necessitates

new forms of cooperation and a recon-
structed international order that goes
beyond the balance of power or hegemony.
Stable order in the new age must be built
on legitimate authority and more inclusive
political identities. But apart from these
postmodern urgings, Cooper's vision
remains sketchy.

Cooper is most interesting in his
explorations of how the West should
cope with the encroachment of pre-
modern violence. The American approach
to such threats is hegemonic—to control,
through military force if necessary, the
foreign policies of threatening states.
The European community, meanwhile,
aims to expand outward to absorb
threatening societies on its periphery.
In Cooper's view, neither approach is
sustainable, and he seeks a synthesis
that would allow the United States and
Europe to confront threats together
over the long haul. The defensive in-
terventionism displayed in the West's
response to Afghanistan is one model,
and the U.N. protectorate in Bosnia and
Kosovo is another. Cooper's provoca-
tive call for a new Western imperialism
that is compatible with human rights
and cosmopolitan values is fraught
with unexamined peril but worthy of
serious debate.

[152]

Contents

Trouble in Taiwan Michael D. Swaine 39

George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead.

How to Build a Fence David Makovsky 50

Israelis and Palestinians must be separated for the Middle East to achieve some semblance of peace. At this point, that will take a fence. The good news is that Israel is already building a sensible barrier. The bad news is that the Sharon government may construct it in a way that spurs future conflict rather than ends it. The United States thus needs to step in to make sure that the right kind of fence gets built, in the right place—or else both sides will face more fighting in the future.

America's Crisis of Legitimacy Robert Kagan 65

Europeans accuse the United States of acting like a bully: aggressive, self-interested, and disrespectful of rules. That charge is hypocritical. Still, it must be taken seriously, for as a liberal democracy with a global vision, the United States needs the approval of other nations that share its ideals. The American project is in Europe's interest, too—whether the Europeans understand that or not.

Foreign Economic Policy for the Next President

C. Fred Bergsten 88

Even in a time of terrorism and war, no successful foreign policy can neglect the global economy. The next U.S. administration will therefore need to balance the country's books, liberalize trade, and reduce its reliance on foreign energy. Above all, Washington must shore up domestic and foreign support for globalization, so that it can continue to benefit the United States and the rest of the world.

The Rise of the Shadow Warriors Jennifer D. Kibbe 102

U.S. special forces are enjoying unprecedented fame—and not just thanks to their exploits in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wants to use them for secret antiterror missions around the globe. But that could endanger all Americans in uniform and let the Pentagon run covert operations without proper oversight. Congress must ensure that someone guards the guardians.

The True Worth of Air Power Robert A. Pape 116

Precision air weapons have revolutionized modern warfare, but not by making it easier to kill enemy leaders. Decapitation alone still doesn't work; wars are still won by pummeling troops in the field. The new weaponry makes it easier to hammer the enemy's forces from the air—but only when they are kept in place by ground forces.

Smart Power Suzanne Nossel 131

The Bush administration has hijacked a once-proud progressive doctrine—liberal internationalism—to justify muscle-flexing militarism and arrogant unilateralism. Progressives must reclaim the legacy of Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy with a foreign policy that will both bolster U.S. power and unite the world behind it.

[11] FOREIGN AFFAIRS · Volume 83 No. 2

Contents

## Reviews & Responses

<table><tr><td><strong>Illusions of Empire</strong> G. John Ikenberry</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">From Washington to Baghdad, the debate over American empire is back. Five new books weigh in, some celebrating the imperial project as the last best hope of humankind, others attacking it as cause for worry. What they all fail to understand is that U.S. power is neither as great as most claim nor as dangerous as others fear.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Recent Books on International Relations</strong></td><td>155</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Including Walter Russell Mead on Zbigniew Brzezinski; L. Carl Brown on Henry Kissinger; and Kenneth Maxwell on <em>Opening Mexico</em>.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Letters to the Editor</strong></td><td>178</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Peter Samson on unhelpful giving; Richard Marshall on diplomacy in East Asia; and others.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Lurie's Foreign Affairs</strong></td><td>182</td></tr></table>

THE EDITORS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · March/April 2004

[III]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JAMES F. HOGE, JR. *Editor*

Peter G. Peterson Chair

GIDEON ROSE *Managing Editor*

STÉPHANIE Giry, DANIEL KURTZ-PHELAN *Associate Editors*

BENJAMIN MOXHAM *Assistant Editor*

TRACI C. NAGLE *Production Editor*

Book Reviewers

DAVID KELLOGG *Publisher*

TOM DAVEY *Web Producer*

Board of Advisers

MARTIN FELDSTEIN *Chairman*

**READER SERVICES:** www.foreignaffairs.org/readerservices. Replacement copies are available to subscribers at no charge until the next issue is published. Thereafter, back issues are $12.00 each. GST number 127686483RT.

**SUBSCRIPTIONS:** www.foreignaffairs.org/subscribe. Call (800) 829-5539 or (386) 447-2441 (outside the U.S.), or e-mail foraff@palmcoastd.com.

**ACADEMIC RESOURCES:** Call (800) 716-0002 or (212) 434-9524 (outside the U.S.), fax (212) 434-9807, or e-mail lhammes@cfr.org.

**ADVERTISING:** Call Melsha Winchester at (212) 434-9526, or visit www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising. *Foreign Affairs* is a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations and the Magazine Publishers of America.

**REPRINTS AND PERMISSIONS:**

**NOTICE:** The contents of *Foreign Affairs* are copyrighted. To protect the magazine and its authors against unlawful copying, it is our policy, as provided under U.S. law, to move vigorously against any individual or company engaging in the reproduction or distribution of the contents, by any means, without first obtaining written permission.

*Foreign Affairs* is published six times a year by the Council on Foreign Relations. © 2004. Visit www.cfr.org

## Letters to the Editor

As Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel elucidate in the same issue of *Foreign Affairs* (“China’s New Diplomacy”), China is developing a more sophisticated foreign policy. Beijing may, in fact, recognize that Tokyo’s approach to its modern security interests makes sense, given Japan’s global stature and the growing threat to the region posed by North Korea. China may also realize that, although Japan appears to be slightly more comfortable with a greater military role, its electorate is unlikely to allow the fiercely nationalistic Japanese soldier to reappear any time soon.

RICHARD MARSHALL

Honolulu, Hawaii

## ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT

*To the Editor:*

In “Clinton’s Strong Defense Legacy” (November/December 2003), Michael O’Hanlon acknowledges that U.S. military morale suffered during the Clinton presidency, but he does not fully explain why.

Perhaps it was because of fundamental opposition to nation-building and peacekeeping among the Pentagon leadership. These criticisms harked back to the Vietnam War and to the “Weinberger Doctrine,” outlined in 1984, which argued against nonessential military intervention. Colin Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried the anti-intervention argument forward in the early 1990s, even getting into a public spat with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over whether to intervene in the Balkans. In the late 1990s, General Wesley Clark was fired by the Pentagon leadership for arguing too passionately for U.S. involvement in Kosovo.

Such attitudes had a direct effect on military morale, because soldiers were

told by their leaders that peacekeeping missions such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans were wrongheaded and would erode the military’s war-fighting capabilities. Given this explanation, it is no wonder that troops in the Balkans felt misused and overworked.

The Pentagon’s recent attempt to close the Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks suggests that the Army is not getting any more serious about low-intensity missions, such as counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. In Iraq, meanwhile, we are again witnessing the negative effects on morale when soldiers do not support an operation. A change of attitude is desperately needed.

ALFRED R. BARR

Washington, D.C.

## CRISIS PREVENTION

*To the Editor:*

Kenneth Maxwell’s bias is clear in his reply to my criticism of his review of *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (“Fleeing the Chilean Coup,” January/February 2004). He finds a “cruel coincidence” between a September 20, 1976, State Department cable and Orlando Letelier’s murder at the hands of Chilean intelligence agents the very next day. This “cruel coincidence” leads Maxwell to conclude that “this was a tragedy that might have been prevented.”

By whom, one might ask? Who does he think could have “prevented” Letelier’s killing? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger? Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman? Me? The implication is outrageous, and the facts are otherwise. Maxwell misreads the cable: it was not an instruction to ambassadors in the field, but a cable from Shlaudeman, then in Costa Rica,

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to the State Department in Washington. And it had no consequence. The State Department sent no instruction to the field implementing it. Even if it had passed Shlaudeman's message on to Santiago, it could not conceivably have "prevented" the murder. The bomb was already strapped to Letelier's car.

Furthermore, Shlaudeman counseled "no further action," thus suggesting— the message to which he was responding is nowhere to be found—that the embassy in Santiago had already carried out Kissinger's order to warn the Chileans about political assassinations. And finally, the notion that an assistant secretary of state—particularly one as distinguished and responsible as Shlaudeman—would have had the temerity to countermand a direct, personal instruction from Kissinger, and to do it behind his back (Kissinger and I were in Africa trying to end the role of the white regime in Rhodesia) bespeaks no sense of Kissinger's stewardship at the State Department. Such are the absurdities of this myth—but they are absurdities that strike at the heart of character and reputation.

I was assistant secretary of state from 1974 to 1976. Late 1976 was the time of the Letelier murder and Operation Condor. Kissinger brought me into the State Department aware of my background in human rights and civil liberties. So I found Maxwell's reference to the existence of Operation Condor on my

watch gratuitous. I would like to assume that he did not mean to imply that I was therefore somehow responsible for Condor or that the United States was complicit in that appalling program. But the bias and distortions in Maxwell's reply to my critique of his book review do not give me great comfort in that quarter. One would hope at least that Maxwell's views are understood to be his own and not those of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is a senior fellow.

WILLIAM D. ROGERS

Retired Senior Partner of a Washington, D.C., law firm and Vice Chair of Kissinger Associates, Inc.

*Foreign Affairs* (ISSN 00157120), March/April 2004, Volume 83, Number 2. Published six times annually (January, March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. Subscriptions: U.S., $44.00; Canada, $54.00; other countries via air, $79.00 per year. Canadian Publication Mail-Mail # 1572121. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 420235, Palm Coast, FL 32142-0235. From time to time, we permit certain carefully screened companies to send our subscribers information about products or services that we believe will be of interest. If you prefer not to receive such information, please contact us through Palm Coast Data at the address indicated above.

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