ITT World Communications Inc. subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation

1707 L St N W Washington D C 20036

Joseph J. Gancie Vice President

EXECUTIVE

26 June 1972

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Before too much time elapses I want to write you to express my appreciation for the splendid support rendered by the White House staff in assisting me in establishing telecommunications services for the official party, press, radio and television in China and again in the Soviet Union.

My month in the Peoples Republic of China was a great experience. Likewise, the two trips to the Soviet Union provided some of the finest communications arrangements I have ever seen on such a trip. Our old HOT LINE Ministry of Communications friends went all out to provide superior service in honor of the President and the importance of the summit meeting.

It was a pleasure and a privilege to be one of the group, and I shall long remember the fine cooperation and fellowship. Enclosed is a memento we had made up for the China visit. A similar item is being prepared for the Russian trip, and I will send you one of those as well. I hope you enjoy them.

JJG/j
Enclosure

RECEIVED

JUL 1 1 1972

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

April 7, 1969

Mrs. R. Geissenberger
3 Roberts Road
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

Dear Susie:

Yes, I did receive the package. I
have been so tied up with the office routine
that I haven't had a chance to thank you for
it.

As you can see, I don't have much
time at home to write personal letters but
at least I know I have the equipment to do so
when time permits.

Thank you very much for thinking
of me.

RECEIVED

APR 12 1969

CLERICAL FILES

CERTIFIED FILES
APR 1 S 1969
RECEIVED

Henry A. Klaesinger

Warm regards,

of me.

when time permits.
at least I know I have the equipment to do so
time at home to write personal letters but

if.
that I haven't had a chance to thank you for
have been so tied up with the office routine
Yes, I did receive the package. I

Dear Sales:

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
3 Roberts Road
Mrs. R. Ceisenerger

April 7, 1969

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

December 10, 1969

Dr. Henry Kissinger
c/o The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Under separate cover I am sending a little gift
to you. I hope this will brighten up your desk
a little bit.

On your next trip to Florida, please bear in
mind to contact us at the following address:

Presidential Towers
Apt. 1119
2501 South Ocean Drive
Hollywood-by-the-Sea

Hoping to hear from you very shortly. Best
regards..

Susan

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / Gifts / G *

11/25/70

Dear Susan:

Thank you for notebooks and necktie. The
former are very useful and the latter most
attractive and you are very kind to send
them to me. I am touched by your thought-
fulness and appreciate it very much.

Mrs. Susan Geissenberger
3 Roberts Road
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
07632

jlp:11/25/70

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

FEB 5 1971

Dear Susan:

Many thanks for your note of January 26 and
for the assortment of candied fruit you sent
to me. The sweets were greatly appreciated
by myself and my staff and it is always good
to hear from you.

The best suggestion I can offer for seeing the
Kennedy Space Center is to contact the Public
Affairs office there and find out what tours
are offered. I have been there only for launch-
es and don't know what the usual arrangements
for visiting the Center would be.

Mrs. Robert Geissenberger
2501 South Ocean Drive
Hollywood, Florida
33020

jlp:2/4/71

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEC 21 1971

Dear Dr. and Mrs. Ghorbal:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the book,
"Cairo." It is a most handsome volume and
one I will enjoy owning and reading. I appre-
ciate your thoughtfulness and wish you well
in this holiday season and for the coming year.

Dr. and Mrs. Ashraf Ghorbal
2301 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

jlp:12/21/71

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

NOV 4 1970

Dear Eli;

Many thanks for sending me the Fall, 1970 issue of "Columbia Forum." It arrived at just the right time -- I force myself to spend some time reading what I really want to read while I am with the President in San Clemente.

I am always interested in what you have to say and found your article on Sweden particularly absorbing. I will be passing it along to my staff when we return home.

Professor Eli Ginzberg
Conservation of Human Resources
Columbia University
New York, N. Y. 10027

jlp:11/3/70

NOV 6 1970

CONSERVATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10027

October 27, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

If you have a moment to read light
stuff I thought you might be interested
in the two attached pieces which I
recently published--one on Sweden,
one on American science policy.

Enclosures

158

REPORT ON SWEDEN

# Sweden: Some Unanswered Questions

ELI GINZBERG

THE stay-at-home American public knows Sweden as a country with a high suicide rate—a demographic tidbit given wide circulation by the late President Eisenhower; as a producer of movies that reveal more than they hide; and as the home of smorgasbord. The Swedes do have a high suicide rate—but it is probably no higher than our true rate, which social scientists estimate to be about double our reported rate. While they do produce many sexy movies, the “Romeo and Juliet” which is currently making the rounds of the Swedish pornographic circuit was produced in Hollywood. As for smorgasbord, it is put on the menu of a good Stockholm restaurant only with the advent of the tourist season. But even if the popular beliefs about suicide, cinema, and smorgasbord were correct, they would not provide an understanding of the most successful economy outside the United States or of a society that has been led by a Social Democratic government for the last three decades and which has neither urban slums nor rural poverty.

To understand Sweden requires attention to fundamentals. First, it covers a considerable area—it is about the size of California—but its population is no larger than that of New York City. Almost all of its people, about 85 per cent, are concentrated in the southern quarter; the forbidding north, with 25 per cent of the land area, has only 3 per cent of the people.

Geography creates climate, in this case rather forbidding. Even in the more benign south, there are only a few hours of sun and light throughout more than half the year. Small wonder that almost all factories and offices close down during July, when Swedes take off to the lakes and the countryside to bask in the summer sun.

Geography also creates, in this case, a certain degree of isolation. Sweden lies off the beaten track. Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen are major stops for the traveler by road or air. But Stockholm, which is off by itself, leads only to the Arctic north, the land of the Laplander and the reindeer.

So much for the influence of geography. A word about history and economics. Sweden fought its last war in 1814, and while some scholars believe that wars accelerate economic development, no one questions that Sweden's prosperity was speeded by her neutrality during World Wars I and II. In fact, her Nordic cousins are critical

REPORT ON SWEDEN

159

of her behavior, believing that she was more concerned with material well-being than with national honor. The other aspect of the Swedish past that must be put into place is her relatively late modernization. Her transformation into a modern industrial state took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and her democratic institutions are even more recent. It was only in the present century that employers were prohibited from beating their workers and all citizens were granted the franchise. If there is a Swedish miracle, it occurred in the twentieth century.

The "Swedish way of life" also contains the following elements: (1) The long-established and long-entrenched feudal system, with its rigid class structure, was not eliminated by revolution; it was politically transformed. One consequence has been that class differentiations have continued although social mobility has increased. (2) The homogeneity of the population, in terms of cultural identification, language, and religious persuasion, is striking. Except for the recent large immigration from Norway and Finland, and the smaller inflow of political refugees and imported laborers, Sweden has no minorities except for tiny numbers of Laplanders and gypsies. (3) Finally, Sweden is intimately tied to the world markets. It literally must export or die—and this fact has been imbued in the public's consciousness and helps explain many of its actions and reactions.

During the last thirty years, Sweden has built a large number of economic and social institutions which have had a twofold aim: to assure a steady and high rate of economic growth, and to provide generous social benefits and welfare services to the entire population.

With respect to economic policy, the Swedes can claim with justice that they were the first practicing Keynesians—and, in fact, that their economists, particularly Wicksell, were ahead of Keynes. They can also point to having taken the lead in the design and implementation of an active labor market policy which recognizes the need for large-scale government training and retraining efforts as a necessary precondition for full employment. Until the unexpected strikes of last year, it seemed that the Swedes had also discovered the key to collective bargaining without work stoppages. No matter what the future holds, the success of Swedish industrial relations over more than three decades warrants admiration.

On the social front, Sweden was less the innovator than the pace setter. She has provided more social services than any other country for the widest possible range of contingencies, from conventional types of social insurance—unemployment, old age, illness, and disability—to such elaborations as paid vacations for housewives, government purchase of homes for workers who want to relocate away from labor surplus areas, and the provision of "archival employment" for workers who cannot stand the pace of the competitive market.

In Sweden, Social Democrats lead the government; sophisticated economic theories are the foundation for a high employment, rapid growth policy; strong egalitarian trends are reflected in high taxes

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THE PUBLIC INTEREST

on the rich and high social benefits for the less affluent and the
handicapped. What more can one ask for in an imperfect world?

If the object of this exercise were to weigh Sweden in the scale
of nations, the verdict would be easy: she has done well; she is doing
well; and she is likely to continue to do well in comparison with the
other major industrial nations, large and small. However, we are
concerned here with juxtaposing her achievements, which are well
known, with her emerging problems, which are only now beginning
to surface.

SWEDEN is one of the most thoroughly organized societies in the world. Everybody belongs to many different organizations. Membership in an organization in Sweden means that the individual looks to the organization to make important and binding decisions, which he then follows. Americans also belong to many organizations, but for the most part their membership is for social or civic purposes. But even if economic memberships are compulsory, American employers and employees do not expect or permit their trade associations or their trade unions to make critical and binding decisions that shape an individual's destiny.

The Swedes acknowledge that they are enmeshed in a web of
institutions but they are quick to add that the system works: the
economy prospers; the society is attentive to welfare. The outsider,
however, may raise questions. Those now in leadership positions have
played a major role in creating many of the present institutions and
in getting them to work. When I asked Arne Geijer, the President of
the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, whether he is satisfied with
the Swedish Labor Market Board, he said that he could hardly be
dissatisfied because most of the ideas on which the Board operates
originated in his shop. Many leaders are similarly gratified. But
what of the younger generation who find these institutions in place,
who know nothing of the struggles that preceded their establishment,
and who played no part in bringing them into existence?

When the iron miners in the north found that their local union was
repeatedly unresponsive to their complaints they broke with tradition
and went out on an unauthorized strike which lasted several months.
The facts that their employer was the government, that they were
near the top of the wage scale, that the nation's balance of payments
could ill afford the loss of ore exports, that "responsible unionism"
required respect for the nonstrike clause in their contract—all these
arguments were unavailing in the face of the unresponsiveness of
management and the union to their grievances. Some observers
believe that the iron miners' strike was an exception to the usually
pacific Swedish labor relations. They even count as an exception the
strike at the Volvo plant. But other students of the Swedish scene are
less certain about this, and wonder whether the future will be more
exceptional than not.

When we ask how this over-organized society succeeds in func-
tioning, the answer is readily apparent. The leadership group is
relatively small and many ties hold them together. There is, then, a

REPORT ON SWEDEN

161

small and powerful Establishment. The Minister of Justice is the former attorney for the white collar union. The president of that same union has just been tapped to head the TV and radio monopoly. Key professors sit on the boards of the major companies. The trade unions and the government have overlapping leadership. The construction unions work both sides of the street: they are also major builders. University graduates are helped on their way to the top by their teachers who sponsor them, and in time they call on their teachers to act as consultants. The members of the same small leadership group meet each other in a great many different decision-making settings. They get to know each other well and they understand the need for amicable relationships. When problems arise, they are usually settled between friends on the phone and only later is the agreement committed to paper. And this male Establishment is strengthened and reinforced by ties of blood and friendship on the distaff side.

Query: How long will the new generation of young people accept the Establishment and permit it to continue to make all of the critical decisions? This question is not easy to answer. Even if answers were forthcoming, it would be difficult to know whether they will prove to be right. Yet this much appears clear: the more education a people acquires, the more affluent it becomes, the more it has access to a free press and other communication media, the less likely it will follow without criticism or challenge the policies and programs developed by its leaders. Here is a second reason to wonder whether this highly organized society may not soon face more of a challenge than an occasional wildcat strike.

IF future challenges to the Swedish Establishment will probably result from nascent dissatisfaction on the part of the young, let us consider them. Sweden has long had and continues to have a "drug problem." One hears conflicting reports about the numbers who are involved and the extent to which they use addictive drugs. But there is sufficient restiveness among the educated laity to suggest that the use of drugs is widespread among the young.

What are the attitudes and behavior of youth toward such values as sex, work, and religion? Once again, hard facts are difficult to come by, but a few tentative generalizations can be ventured. Once one allows for the generally high average of education, income, and urbanization, it is not surprising to find a relatively accepting attitude toward premarital sex, reinforced by the ease with which contraceptive devices can be purchased through vending machines. As one Swedish friend put it, "Sex in Sweden is no different from sex in the United States except that we don't have any guilt about it." This much is certain: There is much less touching, fondling, kissing among Swedish couples in public than among American couples. Since the sauna is an established institution, mixed bathing in the nude is widespread.

A more subtle aspect of heterosexual relations is the new concern, at least among an aggressive minority, with women's rights. For all

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THE PUBLIC INTEREST

of Sweden's touted liberalism and socialism, Swedish women are not treated equally—any more than women are in the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other industrialized country. It is likely that the steadily growing efforts with respect to women's rights may in the long run contribute substantially to a recasting of many established institutions.

One indication of what lies ahead can be found in the realm of work. Many employers complain about the rising curve of absenteeism, and of resistance to overtime work, which is new among a population that has long been imbued with a strong instinct of workmanship. The employers frequently overlook the fact that, with more and more young married women in the labor force, and with marked shortages of child care facilities, it is inevitable that many young women will be forced to miss a day's work and that many young husbands prefer to spend their free hours with their wives and children than to work overtime. The old order is changing in Sweden as elsewhere, once people are given effective options between more income and more free time.

DESPITE its enlightened economic and social policies, Sweden has been slow to modernize its educational system, and in particular to broaden access to the university, even though an academic degree is generally a prerequisite for entrée into preferred jobs and careers. Nowhere does the class bias of Swedish society show more clearly than in the family backgrounds of university graduates. The constraints until now have been cultural, institutional, economic. The sons and daughters of blue collar workers did not consider the university within their purview. The *gymnasium* (i.e., the academic high school, on the German model), until now the only route to the university, had a limited number of places and the curriculum was heavily weighted towards traditional subjects. And while tuition at the university is free, and students receive a small government stipend, most of those from lower-income homes must take out sizable loans to cover their living expenses away from home.

Educational reform is now the watchword. The Swedes have opted for a comprehensive secondary school with three tracks—academic, technical, vocational—each of which can lead to the university. The number of university places is being substantially expanded. Yet a general uneasiness prevails. Even with the—by American standards —restricted numbers, many graduates are unable to obtain desirable positions. The fear is that this problem will worsen as the number of university graduates increases. In the United States, a university graduate is willing to contemplate taking over his father's motel or gas station. In Sweden, as in other European countries, this is to think the unthinkable.

Sweden has recognized the importance of reforming its system of higher education in order to increase occupational mobility. But responsible planners are concerned about the possibility that larger public and private expenditures for university education may be reflected, not in increased economic productivity, but in greater

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163

social tension. It is not easy to reconcile a strong drive toward egalitarianism with a continuing respect for the elitist quality of higher education. If good jobs depend on higher education and if higher education is both costly and difficult, then more equality can be achieved with respect to access—but not necessarily with regard to outcome.

THE trade union leadership is consciously developing policies and programs aimed at narrowing the gap between classes, and also between high and low-paid workers within the working class. It has used its influence both in collective bargaining and in the design of public tax and expenditure policy toward its avowed goal for some time. The recent revision of the tax laws to permit husband and wife to report their incomes separately, and thereby to take advantage of a lower rate, has improved the position of families with two earners. Nevertheless, the leadership may confront difficulties as it moves to restrict the gains of workers at the top of the scale while accelerating the improvement of those at the bottom. (The wildcat strikes in the iron mines in the north and in the automotive plants in the south were started by workers who were at the top, not at the bottom, of the wage scale.) The record of the last year is not encouraging. As long as there is a significant minority of professional men and businessmen who earn 100,000 Kroner ($20,000) or more a year, a worker who clears Kr. 40,000 does not consider himself well off; nor does he agree that his wages should be frozen so that workers in the Kr. 20,000 to 30,000 range can have an opportunity to improve their standard of living. An American family with an income of $10,000 is more aware of the things it doesn't have and cannot purchase—things that are within the reach of families with incomes of between $15,000 and $20,000—than of the fact that it is better off than a family with an income of $7,500. Swedish families are not significantly different from American in this respect. And it is worth noting that the distribution of private income in Sweden today is not much different from that in the United States— in both countries, the top fifth and the bottom fifth get about the same proportions of the national income.

One consequence of the recent focus on wage differentials in Sweden has been to call attention to a group at the bottom who have no income or formal means of support. A preliminary estimate released by the Commission on Low Income Investigation puts this group at 2.5 per cent of the population. In addition to this "poverty group," the Commission found that about 45 per cent of all persons who worked last year (2 million out of a total of 4.5 million) had an income which was only half the median of the regularly employed, full-time work force. (This median was $6,000.) The group who worked short time did so because of illness, unemployment, or for family or personal reasons.

The only way that Sweden has been able to stay out in front has been to keep its export industries competitive through improved organization, technology, labor. Smaller firms are continually being

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THE PUBLIC INTEREST

merged with larger ones, and even while new firms are formed and small ones grow larger, other firms both small and large are forced to close down. As a consequence of this ceaseless dynamism, many workers over 50 lose their jobs. While most of them get reabsorbed, a significant minority—perhaps as many as 1 in 5—do not. This problem has surfaced only recently but the authorities are concerned about the future because the Swedish labor force has an increasing number of workers who will soon pass 50. The "sheltered work shops" which the government has expanded so that these redundant workers will be able to make at least a limited contribution to the nation's output are not an adequate answer to the problem of the older worker, partly because they are so costly to run.

Another unresolved problem where low income, unemployment, and redundancy intersect is presented by the north. The authorities have been making efforts to develop a regional policy for this area, where unemployment and underemployment run relatively high among the agricultural and forestry workers. Although nationalization has proceeded apace in agriculture, lumbering, and mining, the growth of new jobs has been insufficient to absorb both those who have been displaced and the new entries who are seeking employment. So far, the Labor Market Board has relocated large numbers of northerners before or after training. At the same time, other branches of government have pursued policies aimed at encouraging the location and expansion of industry in the north in an effort to prevent further depopulation. The two policies have not yet been reconciled. Nor have the costs of a regional development policy been added up. In fact, no careful estimate has been made of the prospect of success of such a policy even if it were supported by large-scale subsidies to private enterprise and large governmental investments. At present, the largest of the three urban communities in the north is Luleå, which has 60,000 inhabitants. The critical question is whether a city of that size, or smaller, can be transformed into a growth center. It may well be that the regional policy will founder on the critical issue of density.

This brings us to the last and probably the most tantalizing of Sweden's unsolved problems; how much scope does a modern society have to correct the imperfections of the market place, to improve the social environment, and to facilitate the development of human potential? The answer would seem to be: a great deal but not unlimited scope. By the time government extracts—as the Swedish government does—about two-fifths of the national income by way of direct and indirect taxes, it is likely to be creating disincentives to work. And in an economy such as Sweden's, which must export to grow, a further constraint is introduced: Sweden's costs, including her labor costs, must stay in line with those of her major competitors. There are no domestic palliatives that can correct an adverse competitive position in the international market.

We find, then, that Sweden's margins for maneuvering are restricted both because of taxes at home and competition abroad. What does

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165

this imply for the next stage in the evolution of this highly successful
social democracy?

The answers depend, first and foremost, on the adaptability of the institutions to meet the challenges of the international market place while facilitating the realization of domestic objectives. In assessing the potential of the corporate and political structures to respond effectively to the pressures and opportunities that lie ahead, it would be well first to sum up the principal lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the last several decades.

The Swedish Social Democrats almost completely ignored the dogma that a "progressive" state should assume ownership and control of basic industry. With a few minor exceptions, such as starting a steel mill in the north as a regional recovery effort, the government has until recently left the entrepreneurial structure largely intact. The only important sector where a change occurred was in the construction of new homes, where government and nonprofit organizations increased their share of new output from around 10 per cent to over one-third. Stockholm's Enskildabank, in Some Data About Sweden, 1969-70, stated that government ownership "is primarily limited to a few special sectors, such as iron ore mining, public utilities, and transportation, where government owned enterprises account for over half of the produced goods and services. In 1968, about 200,000 people were employed by government owned companies. This was 6.5 per cent of total business employment."

Thus, the private sector was not threatened by government takeovers and it was largely immune from threats to limit its freedom with regard to mergers and consolidations, pricing policy, and foreign investment. In fact, the government encouraged mergers in the belief that if Sweden were to continue to compete successfully in foreign markets—its exports account for about one-fifth of its output—it had to rationalize and remain in the forefront of the technological race.

The post-war trade-off between government and business created optimal freedom for business to improve its productivity and its profits while permitting government to obtain an ever larger share of the gains for public investment and consumption. Just prior to the outbreak of World War II, the central and local government share of GNP amounted to about 15 per cent; in 1969, it was more than double that figure. Private consumption declined from two-thirds to just over 50 per cent of the total. But since total consumption in current dollars increased twelvefold, this meant that (a) the consumer enjoyed large increases in disposable income while (b) government was able to provide a corresponding increase in public goods and services, and (c) private investment in this period increased its share from 10 per cent to 12.5 per cent of GNP. Between 1950 and 1967 expenditures on welfare programs increased over sixfold in current dollars; in 1967, these expenditures accounted for 17 per cent of net national income.

So much for a highly successful past. What about the future? We can begin by noting that the special advantages of a high

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THE PUBLIC INTEREST

demand in the international markets for Swedish products, and the absence of strong competition, both of which characterized the 1950's and which led to high corporate profits, are probably gone for good. For Sweden to hold its own, and particularly to improve its position, it must move into and strengthen its position in fields of advanced technology that require large organizations with access to large capital.

In a speech on March 24, 1970 before the Swedish Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Kristen Wickman, the Swedish Minister of Industry, sketched the steps that have been initiated and the direction of the changes that will be taken to enable Sweden to meet these new challenges. He called attention first to the newly created Investment Bank for Sweden which is in a preferred position to make large risk-taking investments. It has already helped to modernize the critically important paper and pulp and steel industries; and it has recently entered the international capital markets to assist Swedish industry in financing investments abroad. The Swedish government is exploring new ways of exchanging information with business so that, together, they will be in a better position to determine the best prospects for innovation in the production and marketing of "new products, methods, and systems." Then Minister Wickman tipped his hand about a major departure: a move to direct government equity participation. He believes that such action is desirable, even necessary, on the following grounds: to speed development in backward regions, to take advantage of situations where "social profits" may be substantial but private capital is loath to take the risk, and to seize those occasions when a profitable business emerges on the basis of public funds previously invested in research and development.

the basis of public funds invested in research and development.

Such a program might work if Swedish society holds together. This is the critical question. Can the overt alliance between the elitist groups who have dominated business, government, the professions, and the trade unions be maintained? Will young people coming of age be willing to fit themselves into the elaborate organizational structures which they had no part in fashioning and in the leadership of which they have no say? What will happen if they balk? If income redistribution has gone about as far as the working population will tolerate before they disown their leaders, what will take its place in the drive toward equality? Finally, how does one reconcile the imperative for excellence in science, technology, and industry with a society that, after years of Social Democratic leadership, is becoming restive about the persistence of class distinctions?

These are the questions to which answers must be found. It does not denigrate economics to say that successful reconstruction of the business and corporate sector is much easier to foresee than the adjustments which would be required to enable a high-income, well-educated, nonreligious people to find the new goals that will give meaning and direction to their individual lives and institutions.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

OCT 23 1970

Dear Guido:

Just a short note to tell you how fobishly
generous you are and how much your gener-
osity is appreciated. I hate to have deprived
you of your Olitski, even temporarily, but
I must say I am enjoying it. You have an
open invitation to come and visit it any time.
(You have always had the same to come and
visit me.)

Now if I can only get the interior decorators
to redo the office so that it measures up to
the painting.

Come to Washington again soon. It is good
to see you.

Mr. Guido Goldman
1010 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, Massachusetts

jlp:10/22/70

Guido Goldman

October 4th, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I hope that you had a very good trip to Europe.

I have made preliminary arrangements to have the Olitski
(large purple-hued) painting delivered to the White House
on Friday, October 16th between 1-2. It will be delivered
by Lebron Bros. (57-19 32nd Avenue, Woodside, New York),
who are the best for moving and hanging large paintings.
Perhaps David could have them cleared into the White House.

I will also come down that day and will come to the White
House before the Lebron truck arrives. There will be two
men, a driver and an assistant, on the truck. It should
take them less than thirty minutes to hang the painting
and I hope that between 1-2 is a convenient time for you.
If not - or if the day is bad perhaps you could let me
know.

The painting is 81" x 52" and should look very well in your
office.

The Spiegel rang last week. They're doing a long piece on
you, I gather and asked whether I'd be willing to see Hermann
Schreiber. He's scheduled to come up for lunch with Stanley
and me on this Friday. Please let me know if you feel for
any reason that we shouldn't see him.

I hope that there might be a chance to see you on the 16th.

With warm regards, I am

As ever,