TELECON

Ambassador Bush

10/6/71 9:15 a.m.

K: I'm calling you with a monumental Presidential breathing down on me. On page A-17 there is a story with a headline "Kissinger to explain U. S. Two-China Stand to Peking."

B: My God!

K: [HK reads section of article.] "... source was briefed by high U. S. officials."

B: Absolutely untrue. Who wrote it?

K: Astrican (?).

B: That's absolutely untrue.

K: [Reads again] If whoever did this wants to kill the trip, this is the way to do it.

B: Nothing like that is coming out of this shop. Dick Hotellet...

K: I know. He is a responsible guy and he must have talked to someone he believed.

B: I was over yesterday and we got a direct transcript of what I said. There is nothing like that.

K: You think the Secretary's staff did it?

B: I don't think so, but let me find out who Astrican talked to yesterday.

K: Could you?

B: Yes.

K: We know that you are our man. . . . But I know these guys. Hottelet is a decent fellow.

B: But he is convinced that we are going to lose.

K: But someone is feeding him that information. He doesn't make it up.

B: No one in our place knows anything like this and secondly it would be very unhelpful. What I am saying is that this is totally unrelated.

K: Exactly. Your quotes have been fine. The things we want out of this are only related to the President's visit. It doesn't affect any current tactical problem.

B: I'm upset about this. Please assure them it's not coming from this shop.

TELCON
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

9:17 a.m.

10/6/71

K: I have just been the object of a monumental Presidential rage of the Astrakan story on page 8 of the Times. Exactly what the President said not to do. You know that it couldn't have been sucked out of thumbs.

J: I saw ____.

K: You know what they will do to the Chinese.

J: What date?

K: The debate to start on the 28th and 29th. Some officials here thought HAK's trip will be earlier. They have taken a lot of guff from us but there's a limit.

J: I have asked Ted Eliot to check on it.

K: Someone had to talk. He was briefed from a high U.S. official.

J: Let me get the article out again. I asked Ted to call up there. I was also upset about it.

K: The President just dictated the following directive. "I hereby direct that no speculation on subjects of Dr. Kissinger's visit. No speculation on what's happening in China and Department heads are to be held responsible." He is fit to be tied.

J: I can understand he is. I don't know what to say.

K: It's malicious. It cannot help the U.S. on the vote. It can only ruin what we are trying to do. You understand.

J: I will see what Ted has found out. I have the Thai here now. Did Ushiba have anything on Kishi yesterday? No dates?

K: Around the 17th he thought things would break and would I be available.

J: Textiles.

K: Yes.

J: ONly?

K: He came in yesterday and I don't know why. He asked that on Monday. He asked if I am going to make a deal about Japan while in China. I said no and

-2-

give us a list of what you don't want discussed.

J: Then not textiles.

K: No.

J: I am concerned about what Kishi is or isn't doing. xkxwidd

TELECON
John Oakes (NYT publisher)

10/6/71 10:08 a.m.

K: I'm calling about your editorial about the trip to Peking. I don't know who wrote it, but do you really believe a trip like this can be laid on within 48 hours of the Secretary of State's speech?

O: Tell me what the . . .

K: [reads] Let me tell you. . . . This trip has been . . . the date of this trip was laid on two months ago. The date of the announcement was laid on one month ago. Yesterday's announcement, the text and date of it, was laid on for a month. The Secretary of State was fully aware of it when he made his speech. There is not the slightest connection between these two. And it is tremendously harmful. They will think we put this out of our power to force them into something we had already agreed upon. And whoever told you there was a connection between these two events is a total liar.

O: Between Rogers' statement and the announcement?

K: Yes. This was agreed to before these events started in China.

O: Yes. Well, I am very distressed by this.

K: This will be read in Ottawa and flashed to China. They will conclude that someone gave this to you. They already are puzzled by what Rogers said on Saturday which he claims was misinterpreted by Szulc.

O: I was going to ask, how would you explain the Rogers statement.

K: I think he was just talking off the cuff, and not thinking through the implications.

O: I'm not trying to get out of any responsibility for it, but I don't know the details of how this . . . of course, I see your point.

K: The Times is taken very seriously . . .

O: I do have to say, the Rogers statement . . . the coincidence of Rogers' statement and the announcement yesterday is really striking. Don't you feel that? The Rogers statement would have logically led anyone to believe . . .

K: Except if you think about the technical problem of communicating with the Chinese. We haven't agreed to anything in two days. I can document that the final agreement was made on September 12.

O: I don't doubt that for a minute what you are saying. I do say that it seemed to me . . . . I don't say I have any private information.

TELECON

John Oakes

10/6/71 10:08 a.m. p. 2

K: I know, this is not malicious or ill-intentioned on your part.

O: I would say for ninety-nine and a half percent certain that the subbestion in the press hasn't been prompted by anyone. It wasn't leaked to us, but I would say the inference seemed to be clear, the coincidence of the statement. The Rogers statement really was, to put it mildly, a foolish and inconsidered way of putting the thing.

K: I will take the last adjective. It was not a time we would have picked had we been wanting to make a formal statement. We know, he knew, everyone knew, the statement would be made on Tuesday.

O: Your fear is ...

K: My fear is ... in terms of our public image it doesn't matter. It doesn't hurt in this country. But they must think that in good faith they agreed to something weeks ago, and now they read I am going there to try to sell them the two-Chinas idea. Then your editorial says someone is in charge there after all and this is proved by the fact that Rogers made them jump. What they did in good faith was turned by us into an attempt to humiliate them. And since they must have trouble understanding how our government operates anyway ...

O: I do too. I see your point.

K: I doubt that you can do anything.

O: Let me think about that. I do reiterate that the coincidence of these two ...

K: I have never called when I objected to your opinion, which I often do. But this I don't take to be opinion but a statement of fact in which you make a point that would occur to reasonable men. If you had said this is insanity, it wouldn't bother me. But this has consequences which you don't intend. I would say a man, in perfectly good faith, could easily come to the conclusion that there is a relation. If I thought you were being deliberately unreasonable I wouldn't have bothered you. I don't call you to cry foul.

O: I know that. I am aware and appreciative of that.

K: One other thing which was on the boarderline between judgment and fact that I didn't bother you with. The pieces after the Berlin agreement suggesting that it had been extorted from the White House. If you had talked to Bahr and others they would have told you the White House made it possible. I didn't call you at the time because it was a boarder-line judgment case.

TELECON

John Oakes

10/6/71 10:08 a.m. p. 3

O: I'm trying to think. I think that was a Kleiman-signed piece.

K: I know, but what it suggests . . . I would be happy when you make a factual assertion, if you wanted to check it, to respond to it.

O: You don't mean to respond in writing, do you?

K: No, just to tell you whether it's right.

O: If you ever cared to write something for us . . .

K: I know, but I don't think that's my role. My concern on this China piece . . . normally one calls about something on an editorial page because he is concerned about its impact on America. In America this doesn't hurt. But in Peking this will have an unfortunate impact.

O: I wonder if there's anything I can do . . . if we made a statement or something like that in any way tryint to set this in the proper context. I think it would look as though this were a put-up job. What do you think?

K: I think the best thing is to get Ziegler to say it.

O: I think so.

K: You don't have to. I just wanted to point out that if you got that information from anyone, don't trust that source any more.

O: To the best of my knowledge it doesn't come from anything but common sense.

K: When you come down, let's have lunch.

O: Henry, thank you. I am planning to come around the first of November. Do you expect to be back by then.

K: Yes, or very shortly thereafter.

O: I had it in mind to try to get in touch with you. I would appreciate it if you would tell your secretary we would like to have a little time if you want to.

K: Of course. I would like to have lunch.

O: Okay, thanks. I'll be getting in touch with your office soon about this.

TELCONE
Zeigler/Kissinger

10:23 a.m.

10/6/71

K: We have another atrocity. NYTimes editorial. There's someone in charge
in Peking after all and acted quickly to the Secy.

Z: It indicates it was a spud (?) announcement.

K: That Rogers made it happen.

Z: It's absurd.

K: You try to convince the people in China that these two stories are
accidents. We Say you want to be clear that this announcement not in
response to anything said lately and has been fixed for 3 weeks.

Z: Date set for 3 weeks.

K: You can't say that.

Z: Trip in principle agreed to since July and announcement --when was it
decided you would go in latter part of October?

K: About the same time.

Z: Announcement in 3 weeks and trip in principle in July.

K: Trip in principle for several months and announcement for several
weeks. Not a sudden decision.

Z: Does not relate to events in China or as we say here, corrent detectable
problems.

TELECON

U. Alexis Johnson

10/6/71 10:25 a.m.

J: I talked to the Secretary and Ted talked to McCloskey. Bob said this line: "_______________" -- said this was a similar story in the Boston Globe that came from U Thant. He thought that's where that portion of the thing might have come from.

K: But how about the story that I'm going to brief them on the two-China situation?

J: That's the headline, but the story doesn't carry that out. [reads]

K: Then it says the source was briefed by a high U.S. official.

J: I know, and that we cannot account for. It's a mixed-up combination of stories. The Secretary said he was going to speak to Bush about the handling of this. Of course it's almost impossible to avoid all talk. Everyone asks about it and you have to say something.

K: But can't we just say all I will discuss is the President's trip?

J: Of course.

K: Have you seen the Times editorial.

J: No.

K: It said this was done in response to the Secretary's challenge on Saturday night.

J: The Secretary's challenge?

K: When he raised the doubt about the trip. You know your friend in Ottawa. He'll see these two stories and we'll never convince him. You know that is true.

J: Yes, we are going to have it.

K: We have to keep quiet now.

J: Yes, we can keep quiet, but this doesn't stop others, and it isn't going to stop the press.

K: Okay Alex, I appreciate this.

J: I've got Ushiba out here at the moment to see me. I will find out what he has.

TELECON

Ambassador Bush

10/6/71 10:35 a.m.

B: I'm trying to run this down. I'm sending you the facts; apparently Astrican was there, but I sent you the exact transcript of that press conference. I thought it was the right line, that there is no connection. Astrican... we haven't been able to find out who gave him this information on the 38th floor. Some friends here thought that know him think he would do this on his own as a cover to speculate on. He is the only one who has something like this. Generally, except for Hottelet who is honest but thinks we are going to lose, there's been none of this. The Japanese are very disturbed... I said this is unrelated, no connection. I saw that story; I looked at it right after we talked. It's just outrageous. It's the one thing... I at least know enough to avoid that. I will do everything I can to find this out, but it's so contrary to anything I said.

K: I thought the Albanians were quite defensive about it.

B: So did I. It's got a chance to cut the other way.

K: I think so too. What it proves is that you can have good relations with the Communist Chinese and be against them in the UN.

B: Have you got a minute?

K: Yes.

B: Let me read to you. [reads from transcript] I am not trying to sell them a line.

K: I wouldn't even admit that it could affect the vote.

B: Yes, well, that's what we are trying to do. The problem is that there is massive speculation on it.

K: There's no sense in denying that there's speculation. But I would take the position that you know ... and it doesn't affect what the vote is one way or another.

B: [reads again] Look at this thing and if there's something in the line I am using we can shift. I will be glad to have guidance. But I want you or Al to read my briefing and I'll continue to try to run down this Astrican thing guy.

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
10:45 a.m. 10/6/71

R: I thought your news conference went well yesterday.

K: It was low key and non-substantive.

R: I talked with Alex. I don't know the genesis of the story. It looks like it came from the Mission. I would appreciate if he would not send out edicts. I will talk with Bush. He has a problem and we don't want to get off the track.

K: Everything is fine except these stories and an unhelpful Times article that says this is in response to what you said on Sat. night.

R: They (made) the wrong story about what I said and they are trying to get out.

K: They should know you couldn't set it in 48 hours.

R: Let's not get the President steamed up. The Chinese will look at every story. They are doing a lot of talking too. Everytime we talk up here they go out and talk to the press and in total we are doing fine.

K: I have the edict here. I will hold it and when he calms down I will say I have talked with you and we can do it without an edict. I think we have to wait. If he insists I will call you first.

R: I think that both State and McCloskey have handled it well. I think it's the Mission.

K: You and Alex handled the consultation magnificently without dropping a stitch and without a leak.

R: We are going to have to say that it's not related to the vote and for different reasons. Part of preparation necessary for vote. I don't think it will have the effect on the vote. Papers say it might have a favorable effect.

K: We will only say that each country will make it based on the issues and ?? ? ? ? ?

R: Say it's a favorable development.

K: They will drive the Chinese crazy. No impact --

R: Even the papers are saying -- let me read one here. "Throughout the corridors it was saying U.S. trip will aid it."

Rogers/Kissinger

10:45 a.m

10/6/71

-2-

K: That's in the corridors. U.S. officials say it won't have any effect.

R: [illegible] Tell the President I don't want to have him smacking Geo. Bush. He has problems of arguing a position he doesn't like and it may be a losing course.

K: I will hold this the directive.

TELSON

Mrs. Boyer/Kissinger

11:20 a.m.

10/6/71

K: Wanted to ask -- going to take my travelling party to Hawaii for two days before going on. Final meetings, get used to the time change, etc. Problem of making reservations and the date of my trip will be known. I wondered if I could go to the Rockefeller place on the other island which I suppose I could do without giving names.

B: We can handle it.

K: I would want to know what the communications are between that and the main island.

B: Excellent. You have never been to Mona K'aia? How many in your party?

K: Just the senior people. I will leave the advance people at Hickam Field. 5 men and 2 girls.

B: Could some men double up? In connection with the hotel I could see out there Lawrence bought a house that's apart and separate which might be an ideal place for this. It's not down on the beach. It's in a lovely part above the hotel.

K: The beach is accessible?

B: Ten minute drive to the beach. If they couldn't carve out space in the hotel. Hard to do quietly and with these communications needs you have, easier to set up in separate area. If you are interested this house could be put at your disposal.

K: I have two communications problems -- telephones which the WH can do. Second, is the plane will have cable capability and we will have to get cables over to the other island. Classified messages. How could we do it?

B: The airport -- I don't know how big a jet can land but we landed two minutes from where I suggested the house is and there's another 15 minutes away.

K: Regular service between the island?

B: Several times a day. There's also an airport at Helo and you can shuttle over in a smaller plane. An airport right at Camuella, 15 mins. from the hotel. Almost like Dorado. Bigger airport and a regular one instead of being like Dorado. 10-15 mins. from the hotel but even closer to the hotel then I am suggesting.

K: How many people can you put in the house?

Boyer/Kissinger

11:20 a.m. 10/6/7b

-2-

B: I would have to find out.

K: Some of the people could be put in the hotel. Their names wouldn't attract attention.

B: You might enjoy the house.

K: If I don't have too many of my own people there where I can't escape from them.

B: Some there and some in the hotel. It's very comfortable.

K: I can get service from the hotel?

B: It would be set up. I don't know if I can do it.

K: I don't know if I can do it that way but it sounds like a great idea.

B: And security advantages.

(HAK receives a call from the President. Conversation resumed at 11:35 a.m.)

B: I have an attractive lady who wants me to send you her love. The wife of my boss.

K: Happy? Great.

B: I have spoken with ______ on the phone and if you are interested in the house I can organize it.

K: Let me talk with people who are making the technical arrangements. Can they get in touch with you?

B: Of course. I don't want information I shouldn't have but --

K: I have to tell you. Arriving the evening of the 16th and leaving the morning of the 18th and 19th. All day the 17th and 18th -- 3 mix nights and 2 days.

B: You talk about it there and have someone call me back with the exact number of people.

K: I wonder if the President's plane could land there. On the big airport.

B: They can land at Hilo and whether on the little one, I don't know.

K: They might pick me up there the day of the departure. We can work it out. No worry now. I will talk with Haig and the people arranging the trip and we

Boyer/Kissinger

11:20 a.m.

10/6/71

will be back to you tomorrow.

B: Make note of the name of the town the place is in and they can read it out.
Camuella (phonetic) on Hawaii and the house is in the town. That's where the
airport is.

K: Let me check it out. I do want to be away from people.

B: It would be wonderful.

K: No idea how many people it will hold?

B: The house -- has at least 5 double bedrooms.

K: I prefer not to have everyone with me.

B: You could be comfortable.

K: One or two key people and put the others in a hotel. Or is this a full season there?

(Connection broken. Mrs. Boyer said she thought she had it all and would wait for someone from HAK's staff to contact her. Her number in NY is 212/CI 7-3700.)

TELECON

The President

10/6/71 11:23 a.m.

P: Have you had a chance to give any more thought to that Amchitka thing?

K: My people think it is still possible that it will go on.

P: Despite the court decision?

K: Yes. It wouldn't go until about the 30th.

P: ... the damned circuit court of appeals gets into everything.

K: And it's totally non-judicial.

P: And this involving national security. One of these days they will enjoin the war on the grounds that it hurts the environment in Vietnam.

K: There is no limit to what they put before the courts. This cannot go on.

P: Well, we've just got to keep one jump ahead of them. People are still calling in interested in your China trip I imagine.

K: Oh yes, and the news stories couldn't be better. Front page on the Los Angeles Times, and just the way we want it, middle key.

P: And I think Peking will pay more attention to what you say than to the New York Times.

K: There was another mischievous editorial in the New York Times, saying Rogers triggered it.

P: What do you mean Rogers triggered it?

K: In response to Rogers' question about whether it might be cancelled it was laid on.

P: Christ Almighty!

K: I called John Oakes and said 'do you think this could be done in 48 hours?' This was laid on four weeks ago. I said we don't suffer by it but ... what will Peking think? I said 'don't you have any sense of responsibility to the country?'

P: What did he say?

K: He said it was a funny coincidence. . . .

TELECON

The President

10/6/71 11:23 a.m. p. 2

P: For Christ's sake. Funny coincidence! He knows very well this couldn't have been done. It's good you called him.

K: They can't stand it. It's the part of this game we have talked about. If they have got to give you credit they have got to find someone else in the Administration who did it, not you.

P: For Christ's sake. Rogers did it. Hmm. You think someone in State did it?

K: It might have been Pedersen. Rogers knows better.

P: They seem to have a phobia for that.

K: It sounds like Pedersen to me

P: It's a good reason not to talk to those bastards.

K: This has been bad for us, but the total impact has been tremendous.

P: Good. As the Dodgers used to say, wait till next week.

K: Right.

P: I saw Brzezinski in Newsweek: he got off on a good wicket. I marked it for you. He is in for a surprise. He's whining around about all of this.

K: And of course we have in mind moving with the Europeans when this is over.

P: Did you get Byrd?

K: I talked to MacGregor. He is seeing him this morning and wanted me to wait until after that. I will call him by the end of the day.

P: If he can do it, don't you bother with it.

K: They think they can kill it in committee.

P: Hmmmm. But Byrd should be reassured. We don't want the conservatives to think we screwed them on this issue. The nut group is behind this too. We don't want to be with them ever, but we shouldn't take hell for it when we happen to be, and I just happen to agree with them on this. Don't you think?

TELECON
The President

10/6/71 11:23a.m.

K: Absolutely. Incidentally, I saw that Newsweek had good coverage
of this thing too.

P: Good.

K: They said if anyone can bring it off it's you and I.

P: Good. If you have anything else, I'll be here between 3:00 and 4:00 and can talk to you. I won't have a draft until 4:00.

TELECON

Harry Schwarts

10/6/71 11:40 a.m.

S: I wanted to tell you -- we're not supposed to tell who writes the Times editorials -- but you might not have had to make a phone call this morning if we had been in better communication earlier.

K: I understand.

S: We just thought there was art and artifice in what Rogers said on Saturday.

K: There was petulance.

S: When we have only our own newspaper to go by and no exception was taken to the lead editorial on Monday we have nothing else to say.

K: I didn't see the editorial on Monday.

S: It took Secretary Rogers seriously. He is the Secretary of State after all. And by the way, Bob Kleiman doesn't write all the editorials in the New York Times.

K: Harry, you know what I think of you.

S: That's what made this so embarrassing this morning.

K: Let me ask you personally, did anyone lead you into what you wrote?

S: No. On Sunday I wrote the editorial taking Rogers seriously, speculating about what the hell might be going on in China and so on. I assume that when the Secretary of State speaks, especially on this delicate subject, he should be taken seriously.

K: All I can tell you -- I don't want to get into that issue -- but the announcement was agreed to on September 16, and this was known by the Secretary.

S: Well, no one tried to lead me in this direction.

K: Right. But Harry, when a statement of opinion is made, that I don't even want to know about. But when a statement of fact is made and you call me to check it, that I will return within a few hours.

S: Okay. My apologies.

K: No, that's okay. We'll take care of it from here. I think that's the best way.

S: Okay, and best of luck to you.

K: Thank you.

TELCORN

M. Frankel /Kissinger

morning

10/6/71

K: I was so mad I called Oakes and complained to him.

F: I am glad you did. It was nonsense.

K: Here we are trying to do something historic. How do you think China will read this. Rogers knew about this when he talked. Announcement set for 3 weeks and trip for 7 weeks. So Chinese will think we are trying to humiliate them. They won't believe we didn't do this. We couldn't set up a trip in 48 hours for the English.

F: What are you ______.

He
K: What said sorry, there's a coincidence. I said sure but you are the leading newspaper and who not check with us?

F: It's silly.

K: It will do us a hell of a lot of damage.

F: The Chinese have their own experiences and we know we are not infallible.

K: And the Post story that I am going to explain two China policy. I won't get wonton soup.

F: You haven't gotten a cancellation today.

K: Not yet.

F: And you are not taking me with you.

K: Are you blackmailing me?

F: Not on editorials.

K: And we are not in the ______ business.

F: I can't corrupt you.

TELCON
President/Kissinger'
12:50 p. m. 10/6/71

P: How about the Pakistan thing? I notice they are chraging the Indians with starting the war.

K: I think the Indians are trying to sharpen the conflict.

P: Are we playing all our cards?

K: We are trying. Getting a message from Yahya at 6:00. Seeing the Indian Ambassador on Friday and I will send the wood to him. I think we are doing all we can.

P: Fine.

TELCONE
Zeigler/Kissinger
1:00 p. m. 10/6/71

Z: I wasn't asked the question so I volunteered it.

K: You were supposed to start the session by not asking the question.

Z: Not tied to tactical problems or UN decision and debate.

K: You made that.

Z: I used all those. I also said not an immediate decision. Agreement made
several months ago and agreement on announcement several weeks ago. They
said he was just there several months ago. I said nothing on that and left the
impression that it was made after that. Did you make it there?

K: Yes.

Z: Don't say it, for my credibility. They said you mean he will not talk about
the two-China policy? I said yes. And what about the last time there? I said
I won't talk about that. What about the reactions to the PRC reactions to the
UN debate?

K: Some asked me about the two China policy and if Chou surprised. I said
it would be the first question I asked them.

Z: You shot me down on the UN. You weren't going to say anything. You
were joking? They laughed?

K: Yes.

Z: They took it that way?

K: Yes, they all laughed.

TELCONE
Kleiman/Kissinger
2:41 p.m. 10/6/71

K: How's your Maddarin?

HAK: I am brushing it up.

K: It's quite a coup. I saw Mark Childs piece that said you were going in Oct.

HK: He thought it was the President. He had no information at all. He would be the first to admit this.

K: What does this mean in terms of the President's trip? Some weeks afterwards or quickly?

HAK: Not quickly. We will settle it there.

K: What's your feel for it?

HAK: I don't want to speculate.

K: Usually advance men trips are close to the trip.

HAK: There may be another of a more technical nature.

K: John told me you wanted to talk with me. Zeigler is making a remark on it?

HAK: He was not referring to your editorial. Just said the announcement set for several weeks. My concern isn't that the editorial did any damage to us in this country.

K: I didn't write it.

HAK: I know you didn't. I didn't like your Berlin editorials.

K: If I can't talk with you there's nothing I can do. Can I see you before you go?

HAK: I doubt it but after I get back.

K: Well, Zeigler did make a statement. It will drop out of sight.

HAK: The principle of the trip settled many months ago. The actual details were made several weeks ago as was the announcement and so was (Huang?) when he said something to Tad Shultz.

TELCONE
Peterson/Kissinger
4:58 p.m. 10/6/71

P: I really need 10 mins. with you to review Japan situation. It's getting messed up.

K: I am sure but -- I don't know. I am slightly occupied. The President is counting on someone to pull it together and it's you.

P: I am pulling it together.

K: Are you selling it to the industry?

P: We are trying to get Taiwan and Korea.

K: Where does Japan stand?

P: You indicated from talking with Johnson that Kishi wants to come over.

K: That's off know.

P: Oh, it is?"

K: I don't understand who is doing what to whom.

P: That's the problem. Can I have 5 minutes with you?

K: I am meeting with people on my China trip. How about 6:30?

P: I have a dinner. 6:00? I only need 5 mns.

K: I will try to get over my meeting early.

P: If I don't hear from you I will be over at 5:55. It's really getting to be a mess.

K: I believe it.

Kleiman/Kissinger

2:41 p. m.

10/6/71

-2-

K: Funny he said it.

HAK: I said Shultz misread him. That's between him and Shultz. This announcement has been set for 3 weeks.

K: Why was it held up so long?

HAK: The announcement was set then there was some back and forth for the most (effective?) date. Even that has been set for 10 days.

K: Was it set before the planes stopped flying?

HAK: About the same time. I wouldn't begin to speculate on that.

K: One thing we could use would be to bring up the question of the situation in the UN. It seems clear that they have separated these two things -- bilateral and --

HAK: The less we say about it the best off we are. The more we say they must think we are putting out these stories.

K: We thought we would try to do something to set the record straight on the arrangements of the trip.

AHK: That would be helpful.

K: In connection with Roger's --

HAK: If you could say no connection that would be help.

K: Zeigler made that clear?

HAK: Yes.

K: No connection with the UN thing. They are going on in separate channels in a sense.

HAK: Really no connection.

K: I presume you told them we would go on the route.

HAK: I don't want to go into what I discussed with them.

K: Our position was stated prior to this. He said prior to the visit that we would not abandon Taiwan. They took their positions knowing where we were. We have

Kleiman/Kissinger

2:41 p. m.

10/6/71

come out where they expected.

HAK: We have tried to be scrupulously honest in everything we have done.

K: This comes up here in this sense that a number of countries have been claiming that to vote one way or another will interfere with bilateral relations with Peking and since the U.S. has gone there everyone can go there and should protest their rear at the UN. Nothing is clearer then that both items are separate.

HAK: That's correct.

K: Other countries could take a lesson from us in this regard. Would that help? We have been told said it clearly but now it's clear that within a day -- the real connection or disconnection is that within hours of Roger's speech the trip is on no matter what's on in NY.

HAK: Get in touch with me when I am back and we will get together sometime after. On Berlin, you were one of two cases where you were 180 degrees off. Talk with the Germans.

K: It came from the Germans.

HAK: Not from the Germans that know.

K: I will be glad to write a reverse direction if I know.

HAK: I don't usually complain but it never would have happened without WH pressure.

K: I would be glad to do something about it.

HAK: Let's do it in ______.

K: One problem I do have. I remember ran into a gap this time because of changes in your staff --

HAK: Let's talk about it later. There is your relationship with me and our relationship with the Times.

K: When I am there there are people who feel that they cannot talk with me without your ok, like Negraponte and Sonnenfeldt.

HAK: Let's talk about it next time.

TELECON

Dr. David

10/6/71 5:20 p.m.

K: I have just been looking through your paper on China and I need to have it in a different format, and with me going now it's important to do it that way.

D: I've got a draft on my desk which I have read. I'm not sure it's in the format you want because I don't know what that is.

K: What I want is something that explains in each category what the issue is, then what is the specific proposal, hot it would work, what we can do unilaterally, what can be done bilaterally.

D: I see.

K: If you would work with Winston Lord and John Holdridge.

D: What time scale?

K: The sooner the better -- Friday?

D: Sure, we can make that.

K: Good.

KWXTELECON

Bill Safire

10/6/71 5:35 p.m.

S: The President is making a speech tomorrow about the Phase Two economic policy. He had something he wanted me to run by you. It says "1972 can be a great year for America and the world. It can be a year for the first time in 15 in which we achieve our goal of prosperity and peace."

K: Is it true? Didn't we have prosperity for any year under Eisenhower?

S: Yes, 1955 and 1956 (?). That's what he's saying, the first time in 15 years.

K: What he's promising is peace in Vietnam.

S: He hedges that with the word "can." "Can be a year . . ."

K: That's all right.

S: Then I'm off and running.

K: Is it a good speech?

S: It's a ring-a-ding speech.

K: You wrote a good article in the Washington Post.

TELCON
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger'
5:50 p. m. 10/6/71

K: Is Kishi coming or not?

J: I have just dictated a telegram saying we are not going to try to make future appointments until -- I have WH clearance on it. The last message said 10th or 11th. I am going bakc to say we will not make an appointment for Kishi with the President until we have a firm date of arrival. Assure him he is most welcome but for a Presidential appointment a firm date with arrival date is necessary.

K: Do we know he will talk about textiles?

J: Ushiba says no. He wants to wait until Tanaka finishes first.

K: If there's no agreement, he shouldn't come until there is one.

J: That's what he says he wants to wait until there is one. There's an optimistic view on Japan. Jurich is on his way to Tokyo tonight and we should know no later then Tues. Tanaka is trying to firm up an agreement and get it approved by Tues, the 12th.

K: If the industry doesn't come along, what happens?

J: Dave Kennedy is dealing with the industry.

K: Their industry.

J: That's their problem. They will impose it. He misread Tanaka on this. He is grabbing hold and doing something. What we hear is they are reconciled to an agreement.

K: I don't know where the negotiations stand and I don't want to get into it but my firm impression is that the President will do something if there is no agreement

J: That's accepted.

K: He was ready last week. He is raging about Kishi. He thinks they are trying again to do him in. He will use trading with the enemy act as much as he dislikes it. I hate it but he will use it and I want you to know.

J: Everyone accepts that. We have Taiwan on board. Hong Kong and Korea are still wavering. If we can ? ? ? . We have Taiwan so if we can get one other we can use 204 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act instead of a trading with the enemy act which is more astringent. I will keep in touch with David. It looks fairly hopeful and Kishi won't come until there is a textile agreement.

Johnson/Kissinger

5:50 p.m.

10/6/71

K: If he is under the impression that the President is dying to see him and is doing a favor by coming -- I hear Jurich believes that Kishi believes that he is coming for a favor because the President wants him.

J: Might be some element of that. The President said he would like to see Kishi. Nice polite phrase. Also it was mentioned in Anchorage?

K: I don't remember it but I understand that.

J: When he met with Fududa --

K: Fukuda introduced it. It may read that the President got it into his head from one of these innumerable emissaries that Kishi wanted to be asked.

J: It's been on the burner for months.

K: In the President's frame of mind he is not volunteering meetings with Japanese.

J: I think Kishi feels that the President will see him if he shows up after a textile agreement.

K: That's right but he shouldn't come if there's no agreement.

J: I will introduce this to Armin. Ushiba said today that Kishi won't come unless there's an agreement. Armin thinks the textile will be settled before arrival. Tanaka is upset with Kishi getting involved. Kishi has always taken the position as he did today that he will not go to Washington before the textile issue is resolved or he could bring good news to the President. I will insert that we entirely agree.

K: Good.

J: If the textile issue is resolved the President will be willing to see him.

K: That's exactly right. Our lives will be empty if this is ever settled. We'll have to turn to Cambodian Map.

J: I met with the Thai today.

K: Are we going to get it done?

J: They are not happy at all.

Johnson/Kissinger

5:50 p.m. 10/6/71

-3-

K: Even with the new program?

J: I know. I told them. We thought they would earlierly grasp it. The problem is that they cannot make a change in the budget. Don't like stringent conditions. We should have more confidence in them. No need to get in to that with you.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Plimsoll
10/6/71; 6:50 p.m.

P: I have had a reply from my Prime Minister on the matter we discussed on the visit. He appreciates the problem of timing, gladly agreed to a working visit, notes the possibility of the West Coast about November 28 and is attracted by that if it is suitable to the President.

K: I have started to look into the week of the 15th which you said was his most -- one or the other, I hope we can work it out.

TELCON
Len Garment/Kissinger

6:25 p.m.

10/5/71

G: Quick word. You are right on concerns and I will proceed on it. Any objection to speaking with John Mitchell?

K: No, he is aware of it.

G: Bring attention to bear. I would recommend it.

K: Talked with me at lunch.

G: Things are bubbling. Helpful for details. They will do it on their own. They have talked with Max. I will proceed on that and have a good trip.

K: Do you want to come? There are only 8,000 people who want to come.

G: You know who wants to come? Borsteen at the Maxx Smithsonian.

K: I admire him.

G: It's an area of real interest on his part. I will drop over to you a letter from him.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mike Wallace
10/6/71; 8:20 p.m.

W: I am sorry to trouble you -- we are talking about the possibility -- more of the Kissinger possibility -- and this may be absolutely asinine -- we would like to do, if it is possible, an hour special -- 60 Minute version of Kissinger-China trip.

K: You said that yesterday already!

W: We did not talk about our interest in doing an entire hour on that. Is there any way in which we can go about it?

K: Then you would have to come along on the trip?

W: We would try to do that -- only, how? I think CBS is having a difficult time with China because Maury Safer went in on false pretenses. Everybody else is going in. Cronkite has made an application, etc. I have not because the politics of CBS -- they want Walter to do it.

K: What do you want from me -- an answer whether we could . . .

W: If you could tell me anybody with whom I could most strategically and quickly get in touch.

K: In the White House?

W: In the White House and with the Chinese

K: With the Chinese I can't help you. In the White House Haldeman would be the best.

W: Alright, sir.

TELECON
Amb. Jakobson

(Amb. to Finnish UN Mission)

10/7/71 11:45 a.m.

212/755-8800

J: I'm sorry I can't meet you on Friday. I understand Secretary Rogers was against my coming to Washington because it might somehow appear to . . .

K: I didn't know about it.

J: We had a meeting with him on Tuesday and he said he had heard I was supposed to go to Washington and I shouldn't.

K: [laughs] Some day I'll write a book.

J: But I was wondering if there was a chance of Hyvarinen seeing you for a moment in the next few days.

K: Where?

J: He can come to Washington.

K: Sure.

J: At a time that might be convenient to you.

K: Maybe next week.

J: Yes.

K: We'll call you this afternoon. Any particular subject?

J: You know what we are interested in of course, and on China he might have something of interest.

K: Good.

J: So we'll hear from you?

K: Yes.

J: Will you be in New York soon?

K: Only very briefly, but I hope to see you when I come some time in the next few weeks.

TELECON
U. Alexis Johnson
10/7/71 11:37 a.m.

J: The Secretary is seeing the Pakistani Foreign Minister this afternoon -- you said anything to him about what you received?

K: No, and it came directly from Yahya and he shouldn't mention to the Foreign Minister.

J: No, but if he raises it . . .

K: I have not talked to the Secretary.

J: I think I ought to let him know.

K: Oh yes. But our policy is not to bring pressure on the Pakistanis.

J: I understand that and he does too. I just think he should know this exists.

K: Oh absolutely, b all means.

J: And we'll talk about it this afternoon.

["TELECON\nHamilton Fish Armstrong", "10/7/71 11:45 a.m.", "A: When are you off?", "K: When?", "A: Yes, pretty soon?", "K: Yes.", "A: This is our 50th Anniversary year, and next October will be my last issue under my editorship.", "K: Right.", "A: I want to make it notable and one of the articles I am most anxious to get is from Chou En-lai. I wrote to him and, not surprisingly, have had no direct answer, but have had encouragements. Scotty Reston took a copy of my letter over and talked with someone there. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCOM

Shirley Temple Black/Kissinger

2:22 p.m.

10/7/71

B: You have been busy travelling.

K: Not yet but I will be.

B: I want you to know of a couple of things I have done. Last Nov. while in Romania I talked about going with Manescu to China. He chuckled and made no commitments. When he was there in July he talked with Deputy Minister Macavescu and formaly requested them to assist me in going to China on a confidential basis. I am sure this won't come up but I thought if someone mentioned it when you are over there it would be best if you know that I have done this.

K: OK. I hope you get in there.

B: I thought it might be appropriate at sometime because of my job in the UN on human environment and to talk with their neurologists on multiple sclerosis.

TELCON

Secy. Connally

4:02 p.m.

10/7/71

K: I understand you are getting into the act tomorrow, Mr. Secy.

C: I had to do it. I am sorry. I couldn't stand you going off to China with
such a commanding lead on me.

K: Just don't be surprised if I get back into it again next week.

C: I am leaving town.

K: Have you met with the Time-Life group?

C: Yesterday.

K: I called only to say what I told them about you.

C: What did you say?

K: What? They were weeping about the monetary situation and tactics. Settle in some months? I said I have known you for years. I said honestly would anything like other than shock tactics have worked with you or would you have ? ? ? ? . Now that we have worked the details and we have no interest in imposing it on you. As for deadlines, we have no interest in it but we feel it's better to work it out.

C: We are not delaying it and prepared to meet at anytime beginning today. We are not trying to keep it open and create problems. We are trying to solve some of ours.

K: We have an idea of a western summit to which we will invite Japan in mid-December and if this is good for you, we could put monetary things on the agenda too so it doesn't look like collusion ? ? ? things.

C: We can be ready by then.

K: Good.

TELECON
Attorney General

10/7/71 4:32pm

K: Have you had a chance to talk to the President about the Middle East?

M: No, we had a bunch of politicans around us.

K: ... the Israelis will never accept it. They are starting climbing the walls now.

M: I'm seeing him in the morning and expect to have some time with him on it.

K: ... if the Russians think we are using their overture as a means of squeezing them out...

M: ...

K: Are you going to be over here?

M: Yes, in the morning.

K: You want to come in before and read my memcon with Gromyko?

M: Yes, I think I might do that. My appointment is at 10:00; I'll come at about 9:30.

K: Okay, and Al will have it for you.

TELECON
Secretary Labrd
10/8/71 11:20 a.m.

L: I know you're busy with all your other things. And I don't want to bother you, but I thought we should visit a little if you have a minute.

K: Certainly.

L: One thing: I am getting ready to go to the nuclear planning group meeting. I have had exchanges with Helmut. I think I can hold his hand.

K: What is he screaming about?

L: He thinks we are holding back on him on the mutual balanced force reductions . . . and without national security interests in mind. And also he is having trouble with his cabinet now, but he'll be okay. He is the best we have got over there. That foreign minister isn't worth a damn.

K: No, he's awful.

L: One concern we should try to push through -- and I've talked to Bill about this but didn't do very well -- we have got to get someone appointed as Ambassador to NATO.

K: They recommended Stoessel, but the President vetoed that. He is looking for a political person.

L: They are sending out of the foreign affairs committee on McArthur.

K: He vetoed that too.

L: Fulbright did too. But I don't want to give him any business in vetoing this Ambassador anyway.

K: Exactly.

L: State is now talking about Graham Martin. But I think that would be a great mistake.

K: He's not even considered.

L: That would be real bad.

K: He's not even considered. They are thinking about Tex Thornton. What do you think of that?

L: He wouldn't be bad. They are thinking about Mansfield Sprague too. He wouldn't be bad either. He is a friend of Rockefeller's-you should know him.

TELECON

Secretary Laird

10/8/71 11:20 a.m. p. 2

K: What are you talking about; who's Rockefeller? You can't get any-
where if you remember your friends. No, I'm just kidding; I have great re-
spect for Rockefeller.

L: So do I.

K: But I don't know Mansfield Sprague.

L: He's a long-time active Republican. He was head of ISA under
the ______ Administration. Irwin got his start with him. We can
break someone in there, but with all these meetings coming up . . .

K: Oh yes, we've got to move on it in the next two weeks.

L: I think you can help on this.

K: I shall.

L: Second, I have gotten this order, and I am implementing it. . .
they signed my 7 percent reduction as far as personnel is concerned. I
can do it and I will, but I can't do some of the other things cutting back jobs
over here when they want more jobs in Texas and California. I just wonder
who's coordinating it from the political standpoint. Do you follow?

K: Very well.

L: I'm not going to go to the President on this because they gave me
my extra two percent on some ______, but they gave me a big slice on
personnel. I can produce, but it always seems the impact of this will be
in areas where it has to be. We have still got 300 thousand to get rid of
between now and July 1. You add this on and it makes a considerable number.

K: Who can you talk to?

L: But The only person to talk to is the President, but I don't
want to . . .

K: Who about John Mitchell. Talk to him.

L: All right.

K: He is the guy who would understand.

L: Okay. We are not getting that kind of input from George. He is
not looking at 1972 as compared with '73 and 1974. We've got a lot we want to do but
we want to be in a good position in November too.

TELECON
Secretary Laird

10/8/71 11:20 a.m. p. 3

K: That's right. Raise it with Mitchell, and then call back and let me know what he said.

L: I don't want to be krying about it...

K: No, I wish we had done this before...

L: We've already gotten rid of two million, five hundred thousand, did you know that?

K: No, I didn't. I appreciated your note.

L: Oh good. I like to send you pleasant things now and then.

K: I like to hear from you.

TELCONE
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:30 a. m.

10/8/71

K: About this message to Dacca. I thought the President made clear a
million times he doesn't want to squeeze the Pakistanis this way. The Mid
East bureau -- one day I will drag one into the President's office and force
a showdown,

J: I didn't see it.

K: They act as if the President isn't in existence.

J: I will see these messages in the future.

K: This sex is a hell of a response to Yahya.

J: While I have you, I have a call into Al. ______ and DOD are hell bent for
the VP to see Franco and senior Spanish officials when he re-fuels on Law
of the Sea Matters. There's no harm, unless you see some reason that the
President' wouldn't be receptive to his seeing someone there this time.

K: Take him in from the airport?

J: He has 2-3 hours.

K: I don't see how we can stop it. We are not eager to give them more
(comfort). My instinct is against it but let me talk with the President.

J: I can't see how it can harm.

K: But not much good. I know your formal position is to go along with it.

J: Not much good, but not much harm.

K: How long will this exercise be in NY? Through the week?

J: He is coming back tonight and going up tomorrow. He has 20-odd more
ministers. Some 70-odd he will have seen. A real text of physical stamina.

K: And psychological balance.

J: Will you talk with OMB on the 10% on ? -----

K: I am against it. I am seeing Shultz tonight. I am keeping the President
waiting.

TELECON
Secretary Connally

10/8/71 12:17pm

K: I wanted to tell you, there is an article by Ben Welles in the New York Times today which the Chileans fed him. They claim I said we'd not interfere with Chilean access to investment in this country. It's complete nonsense; there were two others there and I'm sending you the memcon. He said that it was not completed yet. I said we'd be watching it to see how it is completed and that we don't care how it is arrived at as long as it is satisfactory, and we will reserve our position until we see what the level of compensation is. But my view, and I know you agree with this, is that we should get awfully tough with them.

C: I agree with you.

K: I just wanted you to be aware of it.

TELCOM

M. Bundy/Kissinger

12:40 p. m. 10/8/71

B: We have such problems of scheduling that only time I can get to this place so it doesn't surface which would be the breach of prior plan of what's he doing would be too late. The 27th. That doesn't give you a time to strengthen your hand where you are. I know it's interfering in your business but the guy who has proved he understands this and who has confidence of all parties is Williams and let him go out and then he could go and reinforce. I would.

K: Has a lot of merit.

B: Send me in with the main job and I could disappear from Hong Kong for a couple of days but you need someone who can discuss the next phase and no way a one shot artist can do that.

K: I will find out about Maury. Can I reach you?

B: My office or backchannel guy can look me up. The day I can do it least conspicuously is from New Delhi on the 27th.

B: Alice Boyd here will know how to reach me at every stage. The number of balls you have in the air the cutting of Chili foreign ministers ______ in half must have been ? ? ? ? . But half of too much is still too much. He has confiscated so much.

K: I was astonished. I said you have realities and so do we. He said Chile interests have 49% of it. I said yes and take it off of them and he said he would.

B: When you see that money I will buy you a drink. Let me know if I can help.

Kx

TELECON
Attorney General
10/9/71 12:45pm

K: You didn't stop in.

M: No, I didn't have time. As a matter of fact, they cut the meeting down; he had to get away. I only had a chance to suggest that the Middle East situation is being screwed up and other avenues are being approached and work in the UN should be called off.

K: Do you know what that maniac did now?

M: No.

K: The Egyptians are sending a secret emissary to New York and Sisco is to get the Israelis to do the same and Sisco will send messages back and forth for the next 10 days. They are going to come and ask us to squeeze and Israelis. The Russians will think we are screwing them. The Egyptians will think we are screwing them. There we are with this maniac with not one word to us. I who knowx knows the President's views, have never sent a message to anyone without first clearing it with the President.

M: Can't you take this up with him directly?

K: I tell you this will kill the Administration. Everyone knows that State is not checking with us. The insolence, incompetence, and frivolity of this exercise is beyond belief. Leave aside the Russians, would you ask for a secret emissary to come and put your prestige on the line as an intermediate when there is nothing to believe that anything is going to happen?

M: It's an exasperation of the program he's been on all along with no results.

K: One doesn't move in such a situation without first knowing what the parties are willing to give.

M: We're getting deeper and deeper without the ability to deliver.

K: George Bush said to keep these guys from going wild.

M: I wonder if he knew about this.

K: I doubt it.

M: Yes, he'd have been on the horn immediately.

K: No one knows. The insolence of treating the President this way is beyond belief. It would be like your appointing a Supreme Court Justice without consulting him.

TELECON
Attorney General
10/8/71 12:45pm p. 2

M: Can you have Al prepare a memo for you and forward it in to the President?

K: I just don't know how to handle Rogers.

M: The President has got to understand what is going on.

K: Okay. I'll a memo to him.

M: I wish you would.

K: He wants me to tell Dobrynin to ignore State. I can't do this.

M: I know you can't. That's my point. Not only Dobrynin but your other channels will be screwed up.

K: The Israelis will crack him in the teeth.

M: They have before. They know the limb he's sitting out on.

K: Okay. When you get a chance to say a word it will help.

M: I will. I am going to have a word with him when I get back into town and he does.

TELECON

Joe Sisco

10/9/71 12:50 p.m.

K: Joe, I wanted to tell you something so that you will be the first to be told by me. I have been reading with mounting concern the cables coming from New York which we didn't didn't have even the slightest courtesy of being informed of.

S: We are doing what the Israelis have wanted for three years, bringing it to direct negotiations.

K: But if this fails, you will come to us and ask us to beat the Israelis over the head.

S: What do you mean 'if it fails'?

K: You say you are not going to be the mailman any longer, which I don't understand.

S: It's more semantics than anything else.

K: Well, the next time a cable goes out in violation of Presidential directives that they must be cleared, I will take the originator into his office and one of us will come out without his job. I will insist that the originator be fired or I will resign. I like you; I think you are the most creative Assistant Secretary we've got. And I don't want you to be a victim.

S: I'm afraid I will be. But I want you to know, I am no longer the principle prime mover on this Henry.

K: Who drafts the cables?

S: Oh, of course, I have to draft them... I know how you feel about this, but I can't help you. Honestly, I can't, I have tried for weeks to create a dialogue between you, the President, Secretary Rogers and myself. I have tried to create a White House discussion and I can't do it. It is something you and the Secretary have got to resolve.

K: We are not going to do it. He has got his directives. I am going to create a showdown.

S: I can't advise you on that Henry. Frankly, I am no longer calling the shots.

K: If you try to run around between these two parties without knowing where the President will back you, you'll kill yourself.

S: I know. There has been one basic rule in the problem: if you don't have the backing of the President you don't have anyone. He insists that

TELECON

Joe Sisco

10/9/71 12:50 p.m. p. 2

he has his backing. I don't want to get between you and Rogers on this.
Is there any way . . . I have done everything I can to create a dialogue
between you.

K: If you can, on an informal basis, let him know what's being cooked up . . .

S: Ahead of time?

K: Yes. I think what will happen is the President will start squeezing
Rogers out of this like he has on everything else.

S: At some point we will have to call the President in, and if he doesn't agree . . .

K: He doesn't know what you are doing. How can he agree if he doesn't know?

S: Are they in touch?

K: No.

S: What can I do?

K: Well, first I want you to know what I am going to do, and I don't bluff.
I would hate to have you end up as the fall guy.

S: I am going to. I am going to be the fall guy.

K: I will do my best to see that you don't.

S: I am going to.

K: And second, if we can get some advance information . . .

S: I don't imagine the Secretary feels this is any new departure. He
feels -- and I am not arguing, I just want you to know -- he is trying to
produce the kind of negotiation that the Israelis have wanted. He feels he
has carte blanche to do this as he sees fit. He tells me he has an understanding
with the President to do this.

K: Well, that could be . . .

S: He feels he has a clear line from the President. I wrote a paper four
weeks ago to try to create a dialogue. It never got beyond his desk. Not
that I am lily white. I have never been comfortable in this job unless the President,
the Secretary and you have all known what's being done. I have lost sleep over this.

K: I think we are producing a war the way we are going.

TELECON

Joe Sisco

10/9/71 12:50 p.m. p. 3

S: No, I don't think it is the wrong direction but...

K: No, but without coordination everyone ends up furious.

S: Is there any way that you can produce a Presidential dialogue?

K: Not before I go to China.

S: When are you going?

K: About 10 day s.

S: Then let's see afterward.

K: Can you slow things down until then?

S: I don't know. The Secretary sees Eban on Thursday. Sadat is going
to Moscow around ______.

K: You could let me have the reporting cable of the conversation between
the Secretary and Riad.

S: That was sent to you last night.

K: I never saw it.

S: It was sent last night; it goes automatically to you.

K: No it doesn't.

S: We can't send a cable that way without it going to the Situation Room.

K: You did a pretty good job of it on the UN speech.

S: Oh well, that's another... I know that problem. I'm glad you called;
I have been very uneasy.

K: You have every reason to be. It is going to lead to a showdown.

S: And let's say that we never talked today. I don't want to report this.

K: Oh Joe, you know, I never talk to anybody.

S: Okay.

TELCORN

Sen. percy/Kissinger

2:30 p. m.

10/8/71

P: I had two conflicting pieces of information on your participation in Chicago on Wed. and I thought you should straighten it out with you what the schedule is so they can button it down. I left it with you that you would stay through dinner but no political comments but a comment on a personal basis. They were very pleased. A couple of days ago someone from your office said you couldn't stay for dinner. That's causing consternation.

K: You are probably right. My recollection was that I would brief at the reception but not the dinner.

P: You made it clear that you could not discuss foreign policy openly but something about (personal comments).

K: If I stay for dinner, how long would the miserable thing last?

P: If you have a time problem they understand if you say a few things and then had to leave --

K: Aren't there two separate rooms?

P: There are. You could do them immediately. One promptly at 7:00. You could go promptly after that to the other room and then on. Dinner will be over at 9:00. No later. The Senators are coming back immediate on a charger plane and it's room on board. Scott, Griffin, Taft and ______. If you could be there. Sharon will be there and Jay couldn't so we thought we would have you with her. I said to her that we will have you sitting next to Dr. Kissinger and she said she would come anyway but she would be delighted to sit next to you and Jay would be so jealous.

K: I will call you Monday morning. I will try to make it possible.

P: You will be marvelous to do this. With your trip it's asking a tremendous amount.

K: It turns out to be in the middle of preparations. No one who I would rather do it for.

P: You should be back at 10:00. You lose one hour. You can leave from Miegs Field and an hour and twenty-five mins. You should be here at 10:15.

K: If not too late and let me check once more. I have taken a firm stance no to speak at political dinner. Maybe I can put this on the basis of old acquaintance I will call you first thing Monday morning but I am going to try to do it. Black tie? P: No, informal.

TelCon:2:55-10/9/71

Mr. Kissinger/

Mr. Haldeman

K: I just wanted to tell you what I have done. I talked to Dobrynin. If I can get control of the cable, I think I can slow it down -- until they see what the President wants.

H: How are you going to control the cable.

K: I have told Sisco the next time a cable goes out that has not been cleared with us someone will go into the President's office with me. He says Rogers has a _back door_ into the President's office. He is troublesome, uneasy and very worried (Sisco).

H: We have to hit the President don't we?

K: I am telling you, you are going to get into a first class crisis with me. I am not going to let this happen. Now Rogers is back here for three days. The next guy he will see is Eban. The Israelis will be meeting for three weeks and then the meeting will deadlock. I haven't seen a cable. I don't know what Rogers said to Riad. I have just ordered the cables from State and they are now going to send them to me now.

H: What is the next step?

K: I am just going to make an issue.

H: How are you going to do it?

K: I am going to go into the President and tell him we have to play it this way or go without me, when they go wild on the Middle East again.

H: Why not make the issue before they go running wild again.

K: OK. Let's talk to him on Wednesday. Nothing will happen before Thursday. Rogers will be here.

H: OK. I think you should not wait until a big flap but go in now when things are somewhat calm.

K: OK, I will go into him on Wednesday.

H: You don't think anything will happen before Wednesday.

- 2 -

K: I will have to keep on doing what I have been doing for over a year - keep things under control.

HK: OK. You want me to say anything to him?

K: If you want to tell him I am extremely concerned about the daily things that have happened. What he doesn't know is that I have been saving him for a year and a half now.

H: Yes.

K: If we had let things run their course there would have been three big blowups in the past year. Just like I have quieted it down now for two weeks.

H: I sure wouldn't let it go on though.

K: I will talk to him on Wednesday. Incidentally, Dwight is doing a superb job.

H: He will do a good job I think. Be sure you give him all the guidance on this.

K: Dwight is just what we need.

H: It would be a good idea to mention it to the President I think.

TELCAN
Graubard/Kissinger
4:00 p. m. 10/8/71

G: I wanted to tell you two things. One, I finally heard from the Soviet
Academy.

K: What did they say?

G: It's a letter in Russian from Korniev. Do you know him?

K: Yes.

G: I am told he is chief policy officer x from the academy. I have followed
through and I am not ungrateful. We will probably invite them but whether
they come -- it's not their thing. The idea of their going out of the country
and talking about research systems in the country is a slight. One of my
former students has a friend going to Peking to visit his brother, John
Downing.

K: Oh, yeah.

G: You know about it?

K: Yes.

G: Anyone who's been a prisoner from 1945 you would know about.

K: Tell him I have it very much in mind and I am working on it.

G: Thank you on this Soviet thing.

K: Give them an answer.

G: I will. Keldish is coming over and of the month and I will see him at lunch
and I will show him the letter. Dick who is my interpreter says it's jumping
up and down. Someday I will show you some very interesting correspondence
from me and Mac.

K: On what?

G: Pentagon Papers.

K: When Mac comes to see me things are very bad or pretty good. He came
yesterday and things aren't bad so they must be good.

G: Hpe to see you when you get back.

TELECON
Ambassador Mosbacher

10/8/71 4:20pm

M: It is indeed an honor to hear from you.

K: I don't often call subordinates, but I wanted to so you could call
Trip this evening and tell him you had a call.

M: He's in Washington now, so you could call him yourself.

K: You told Pat about his letter, didn't you?

M: Yes, she was most delighted.

K: Bus, I had the Indian Ambassador in a while ago, and he has the
impression, which I assured him is unjustified, that the Protocol people
have some instructions not to extend themselves for Mrs. Gandhi.

M: Where in the world . . . !

K: He is very eager to make it a warm visit. I told him there are
many things going on that we don't like, but we would like the visit to be
as cordial and warm as possible, and to perhaps turn some things around.

M: The only thing on which we didn't agree fully is that we are under
instructions not to go to college campuses. They arranged on their own
to go to Georgetown, and to the thing at the Washington Cathedral. The
Secret Service thought the Cathedral thing was much better.

K: He mentioned that. I don't want to get into the individual arrange-
ments, which I am not competent to make . . .

M: Oh sure you are.

K: No, I'm not . . .

M: I didn't think there was anything . . .

K: But if you could tell your people to go out of their way to be helpful,
we would appreciate it.

M: I certainly will. I can't think of anything . . .

K: He is not complaining about any one thing, just a general impression
which is probably more generated by political involvement than anything else.

M: The only other thing is that they wanted to come down the morning of
the arrival and we suggested the night before, because of weather and possible
delays . . .

TELECON
Ambassador Mosbacher
10/8/71 4:20 p.m. p. 2

K: Yes, and she can stay at Blair House?

M: Yes.

K: And there will be accommodations for the rest of her party?

M: Yes, up to a limit. Our instructions limit it to a small official party we can pay for.

K: Are you going to be in New York this weekend?

M: Yes, are you?

K: I think so. If I am I will call you on Sunday.

M: Good. I'm in White Plains now, will be here all weekend and so will Patricia.

K: Will you come back with me?

M: Love to.

K: Then we can have a chance to talk.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
10/8/71 5:25 p.m.

R: Did the President see Moro?

K: No, he's seeing him on Monday.

R: Let me say, we are going to have a hell of a time winning this vote. It seems that some of the delegates are using your visit as an excuse to vote against, and secondly, some don't think the President has his heart in it. They know I'm working like hell but . . .

K: You want him to say something?

R: I think he's got to.

K: Okay.

R: If we can shift three or four votes we might win. I think it will be damned important for the President. The conservatives are not making much of it now, but if we lose they will.

K: Moro will be here Monday and we will make sure he says something.

R: Italy, Turkey, and Ireland . . .

K: Ireland, we are told, has switched against us.

R: They indicated that, but I gave him a hard pitch. He was shaken and said he'd think about it. Britain is hurting us; they are lobbying against us. I don't think Alex Home is, but the Mission is.

K: Is Home still there?

R: No. Stories here come out cockeyed. They say the debate is starting the 15th; it isn't, it's starting the 18th or 19th and the vote will be on the 25th (?) or something like that.

K: Well, the newsmen are opposed to it. We can appeal directly to Home.

R: I think I . . . I have had George Bush handle it with their ambassador here. We may want Home to abstain on the priority vote. If we can get a slight leaning in our direction on their part it might help.

K: The President told me that. He is totally non-committal.

R: Well, somewhere along the line the President will have to say something himself. About coming out against expulsion, that we think it important not to expel any member nations.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

10/8/71 5:25 p.m. p. 2

K: You will be back when?

R: I'll be back tonight and be there through Tuesday and back up here Wednesday and Thursday.

K: I was going to suggest it would be important if you were here on Tuesday.

R: How was the speech received? Pretty well?

K: Pretty well. I don't think anyone understands it.

R: I don't either.

K: I myself can't imagine how it will work.

R: But it was delivered well.

K: Oh yes, very effective.

R: He delivered it very well.

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
6:40 p. m. 10/8/71

VP: I just got a reply to our last communication on the matter we talked about. The Embassy wants to scrub the whole reception.

K: My view is it's wrong.

VP: The Govt. indicates they will walk out if the others are there. My judgment is let the govt. have caveat over the list.

K: That's my view.

PP: I think to scrub it would be embarrassing.

K: They will leak it that we scrubbed it rather than you having opposition party there.

VP: This way they willleak it that the govt. had caveat over the list.

K: You can't take too much more heat then you are.

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

9:45 a.m.

10/11/71

R: On this Announcement that's going to be made -- when?

K: Tomorrow at noon. I was going to call you. I mean to see if Alex
could come over.

R: He said you talked to him about it. He will be there at 12:00. I want
to be there. They asked at the backgrounder when the other fellow was here
whether any decision about it and I said no.

K: Sure. He is having a leadership meeting after that. We will not be in
the room. Just Ron.

R: I will be there. This has worked out well too.

K: Beautiful. And I think it will be a great surprise.

R: I do too. Moro coming in this afternoon? "

K: 11:30.

R: Will you mention to the President --

K: I will be sure it gets raised.

R: I think we can win this thing. It will be tough but we have a chance.

K: You have bled for it. It's not a course the press has given you a break.

R: The President will have to get involved himself. Haile Selassie --

K: He is coming over?

R: It looks like he will vote the wrong way. Maybe when he gets back from
his trip he will vote differently. Mexico and Argentina too.

K: ? ? ?

TELCONE

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

10:11 a.m.

10/11/71

K: I notice your staff is complaining about my trip in the news summary.

B: What's happening is that there's a big diplomatic problem with Gen. Romulo and the Thai guy unloaded on us at the meeting yesterday. Whether good or bad -- my concern is cutting the other way. It's more uncertainty. When you sit and explain it to them, they are all right. Romulo laid into me and so did ______ and the guy from Thailand and ______. I said here's a positive explanation of our statement and the trip goes on. I said it has nothing to do with the UN.

K: I saw it in the news summary today. I don't doubt it's a liability.

B: In the long run it will work out. I was there yesterday at the church service and the President said Panama and Venezuela giving us a hard time. He said god-damn the small countries who don't do as we want and I said we are leaning on them. I thought on the Moro visit --

K: I have already agreed.

B: I had Lupez in here and he said he could get the Italians on it. Lupez says he got the Italians on the ______ vote for us and he thinks we can get the Italians on the Important Question. The English, Canadians and Italians are killing us.

K: You damn can't do anything with the English and Canadians and it has nothing to do with my trip.

B: If we can get them to lay off of Batar, Bharein, ______ and Oman, etc. The trip hasn't given us much trouble and if we don't win this thing we can't blame the trip. It would be unfair and untrue. I would be misleading if I said it's not true. But if the President could intervene on Moro it would help with what Romulo is doing. We will continue to give diplomatic push here.

TELCONE
Fred Brisson/Kissinger

12:57 p.m. 10/11/71

Brisson said that Mamie Eisenhower had been very disappointed when his
wife, Rosilind Russell, couldn't get down for the birthday party, as she
had been a good friend. Miss Russell was thinking of coming down for
the opening for the Eisenhower Theater at the Kennedy Center, if HAK
would be available to escort her. The opening is next Monday night.
HAK said he may be away, but would be honored to escort her and would
let Brisson know tomorrow.

HAK then mentioned that he was hoping to give a dinner sometime in the
near future and hoped to have the Brisson's there.

Then Mr. Brisson said that Lance would be in town the 25th - 30th and HAK
said if he goes next week, he would be back by then. He reintereated that
he would let Brisson know tomorrow.

TELCORN

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

6:16 p. m.

10/11/71

C: About the UN. I thought you would like to know I talked with Downing-Crow
and he and ________ saw Bush this morning and he thanked them for not
lobbying on these two characters and not lobbying at all. So communications
are not (as they should be).

K: I don't mind our ambassadors deceiving others but I don't like them
deceiving me.

C: I told Downing-Crow to have a word with Bush and I would with you.
These characters don't lobby. Some Scandinavians did lobby but we have
refused to have anything to do with them.

K: That's for calling.

C: I just wanted to set the record straight.

TELCOM

C. Weinberger/Kissinger

6:40 p.m. 10/11/71

W: I have just got a call from Gov. Reagan's entourage. They have a cable from the WH suggesting going to Saigon.

K: That's right.

W: He wants to know what the tact is he should take with Thieu and why the change.

K: Because reports that he's not going is a sign of WH displeasure.

W: Any special line? He will be calling in the next couple of hours.

K: We will deliver some talking points to him through Bunker.

W: Before he has to meet with <u>Bunk</u> Thieu? All right.

TELCONE

Amb. Watson/Kissinger

6:45 p. m.

10/11/71

K: I sent you a message today and I wanted to be sure you didn't deliver it
before tomorrow.

W: I won't because I haven't gotten it. We just had a dinner with John Irwin.

K: It's a backchannel message.

W: Thank you so much -- you were great on the (Parliament?) group.

K: They deserve it and you have been great to us.

W: I sent you a note.

K: I got it today. We sent out a message today and you should get it soon.

W: I appreciate the forewarning.

K: It's about the same general area as last week. Same client.

W: To the top guy.

K: You will get formal notification also and this will require delicacy, which
we will leave to you.

TELECON

U. Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

6:50 p.m., October 11, 1971

J: Your Russian friends have done it to us now -- when they do something wrong, they are your friends. Ushiba just called and said, "Is it true the President is going to make a visit to Moscow the latter part of May?" The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo told them an announcement would be made tomorrow. How many others they have told I don't know. I stammered around with Ushiba and said I would try to be in touch with him tomorrow.

K: Well, there's nothing to be done now.

J: The understanding was clear; they really aren't playing the game in Japan.

K: Is there any sense in my talking to Dobrynin?

J: If you have a basis for it, I would tick him off. The Charge did this.

K: Let me call Dobrynin. I will call him this minute.

J: It takes the play away from us with respect to the Japanese.

K: I will call Dobrynin right away.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

By: C. NARASIMHA RAO

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

6:52 p.m., October 11, 1971

K: Anatoliy, we seem to be having some problem with leaks out of your Foreign Office. Your Charge called on the Japanese and told about the announcement tomorrow, and they are asking us.

D: Our Charge d'Affaires? I don't know about it.

K: I haven't told the President -- he will climb walls. With regard to our understanding, we have not told anybody.

D: Our Charge d'Affaires told it to whom?

K: To the Japanese Foreign Office.

D: I don't know anything about that.

K: That the announcement would be at noon tomorrow.

D: Officially?

K: Apparently. Their Ambassador asked us whether it was true. It creates two problems: (1) we haven't told the Japanese yet because we were to tell them two hours before.

D: I don't know anything about it. I can check it with Moscow and...

K: If you tell anything to the Japanese Foreign Office, you might as well call in the press and tell them. Just for your information, this is going to drive the President absolutely wild. He wanted to make it himself.

D: I don't know anything about it. It's news to me. I can check with Moscow.

K: Why don't you. It would help if it leaks, I can tell the President how it happened.

D: I won't be able to get an answer until tomorrow. There was no intention for us to make a leakage in Japan. What is the purpose?

K: It embarrasses us with the Japanese because it means they heard it from you before us. We are their allies.

6:52 p.m., October 11, 1971

- 2 -

D: This was not the case; how it happened I don't know.

K: Okay.

D: I will check with them. I just received confirmation that everything is all right for 12:00 here and 7:00 in Moscow.

K: I think it will leak. We have never yet told the Japanese anything that didn't leak.

D: All right.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E0125E
By: CNARA Date: 01/10/71

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
10/11/71; 7:05 p.m.

K: (Missed the first part of this sentence -- re Soviets telling the Japanese about upcoming visit) . . . He (Dobrynin-?) says he doesn't know anything about it and he can't believe it. It's a cheap shot. These sons-of-bitches -- that's the difference between them and the Chinese. They gain a nickle and lose a million dollars worth of goodwill. What did you tell Ushiba?

J: I told him I did not know anything about it but that I would be in touch with him tomorrow about it. I could go back and confirm it and ask him to treat it carefully until . . . I don't know, Goddamn it! You see, it has gone to the Foreign Office in Tokyo which is so leaky. We were dealing with Sato alone and we had no problem. I can go back and -- I in effect confirmed it -- I gave an impression that there was something up.

K: Then I think it would be better to say we were having a message sent to Sato and I want them to keep it absolutely confidential and it would be very serious if they leaked it.

J: Yes -- they are leaking from the Soviets not from us. I can do that. I am just a little hesitant. I said to him I just don't know anything about it and I probably will be in touch with you tomorrow --

K: Okay, well let's just leave it then. Let's get those cables out.

J: They will be sent in the morning.

K: Even to the Japs?

J: That's right because of the time difference. If I up that time then -- oh, God! This is really messed up!

K: Cheap shot.

J: And I can't think of any really good answer -- I could -- I can confirm it to Ushiba -- in fact I half did that.

K: But the problem is if they already know it and we don't do it for another 12 hours what are we doing?

J: Doggone -- uh, I, uh, maybe have our man go in in the morning -- maybe have him go in the next few hours and confirm it to Sato. But all we will be doing is confirming what the Soviets have already told them.

- 2 -

K: Was it an official notification?

J: Said E Soviet Embassy in Tokyo told them -- whether they call it
official or not does not make much difference -- they have already told
them. If this a clear violation of a clear understanding?

K: Oh, yes! and Dobrynin confirms that! Let's put it this way, the
Chinese have never violated it and it always has been perfectly clear to
them.

J: We must assume if they told the Japs the have told others also.

K: I would not let the other cables go -- the time is against us already.

J: I think maybe the thing for me to do is -- I need to keep honest with Ushiba.

K: Let's not worry about Ushiba, let's worry about Sato. The Foreign Office has done nothing but screw us. My concern is if we can that we notify Sato. I don't give a damn what the Foreign Office does.

J: We can notify Sato this morning Tokyo time.

K: I think I would do that.

J: The more I think about it, I think that is the thing to do -- have Armand go during the course of the day in Japan to Sato -- but that puts us way ahead...

K: We have a good reason.

J: I think what I will do is notify Armand to see Sato as soon as is feasible and I will say nothing further to Ushiba.

K: That's right.

J: Then I will tell Ushiba later tomorrow just before the announcement.