-18-

latest resolution, unanimously passed last January, calls on
South Africa to comply with the Court's conclusions; to
declare its acceptance of free elections under U.N. supervision
and control; and to respect the rights of Namibians and the
responsibility of the United Nations. The Security Council
decided to review South Africa's compliance on or before
today, August 31, 1976.

Namibia, like Rhodesia, contains the seeds of greater
conflict. There, too, time is running out. With thousands of
foreign troops north of the Namibian border and with intensifying
warfare in Rhodesia, a volatile situation is emerging.

And in South Africa itself, the recent outbreaks of racial
violence have underscored the inevitable instability of a

- 19 -

system that institutionalizes human inequality in a
way repugnant to the world's conscience.

Therefore, in Lusaka, Zambia in April, on
behalf of President Ford I put forward an American initiative
which addressed the full sweep of the crisis in southern Africa:

-- We promised that we would actively support

Callaghan's proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia
in two years or less. We urged the African parties
involved to pursue a negotiated settlement in
which black and white could coexist and cooperate.

We stated our readiness to assist a new Rhodesia --
Zimbabwe -- to overcome economic dislocations,

- 20 -

so that it could effectively take its place

in the community of nations.

-- We urged South Africa to set a date for
Namibian independence, and to broaden the political

- 21 -

process. In our view, all the political groups of
Namibia should be permitted to express themselves
freely, under U. N. supervision, and to participate
in shaping the constitutional and political future of
their country.

-- And I restated on African soil America's rejection
of the principle and practice of apartheid. I called
on South Africa to demonstrate its commitment to
peace and harmony on the continent by facilitating
early solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Unmistakable progress has been made since this
American initiative:

-- The character of our relationship with black Africa

- 22 -

has been transformed. Our dialogue with the
nations of black Africa has become close and
intensive. Mutual confidence and respect
between America and black Africa has grown
substantially. We are now seen as active
agents in the process toward independence,
self-determination, justice and human dignity in
Africa, not as passive observers.

-- Since my talks with Prime Minister Vorster
in June, South Africa has publicly proclaimed
its support for majority rule in Rhodesia -- an
important step forward.

-- In Namibia, the Constitutional Conference

- 23 -

organized by South Africa has recently proposed
a date of December 31, 1978 for Namibia's
independence, conceding the vital principles of
independence and majority rule. The means and
processes by which the country moves to independence
must still be worked out between the interested
parties, but the fact that Namibia will shortly
be independent is in itself, a major breakthrough.

These significant developments show that progress is
possible. But the obstacles to a negotiated settlement
remain formidable.

In Rhodesia, it is now vital to bring together the leaders
of black Africa, the various liberation movements, South Africa
and of the Rhodesian regime on a common program. Namibia

- 24 -

will not be removed from the world's agenda of crises
until a means and a forum are found for working out
Namibia's political future on the basis of participation
by all authentic groups.

The situation in South Africa continues to be highly
volatile; it poses a threat not only of intensified suffering
within that country but also to South Africa's ability to
assist constructively in solutions for Rhodesia and Namibia.

The task of diplomacy is to find the common ground among
the differing objectives of the multitude of nations and groups
involved. Our consultations have convinced us that there is
common ground. But all parties must overcome the legacy

- 25 -

of generations of mistrust; all must keep in mind that the
desire to achieve everything at once may frustrate the
significant progress which may now be attainable.

We shall be carrying this message:

-- The white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia
must recognize that majority rule is inevitable.
The only issue is what form it will take and how it
will come about. Will it be through protracted
and bloody conflict that will leave a heritage of
bitterness and destruction for generations? Or
will it come rapidly through the peaceful means
which offer hope for a just and cooperative future
in which majority rule is coupled with a guarantee
of minority rights?

- 26 -

-- South Africa has taken positive steps with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia. We hope that it will continue to recognize that now is the time to make a constructive contribution to Africa by committing itself to rapid progress towards independence in Rhodesia and Namibia.

-- Black African leaders in the states neighboring Rhodesia and Namibia have perhaps the most difficult challenge. They feel in their hearts the suffering of their brothers; they have themselves experienced the oppression of colonial rule; and they have seen past efforts of settlements fade away. All their instincts are for rapid solutions without the tedious give-and-take of negotiations. And yet violence will only

- 27 -

escalate bloodshed and lengthen, rather than
shorten, the road to their goal. The wisdom
and moderating influence of black African
leaders are essential if progress is to be
achieved. Their own suffering must have
taught that new injustice does not right old
injustice. They now have the opportunity to
break the vicious cycle of centuries of suffering
by seizing this opportunity not for conflict but for
reconciliation of the races.

-- Black nationalist groups competing for power must
bridge their differences if there is to be early
progress to majority rule. We will urge them not

- 28 -

to jeopardize everything by personal competition
for power. Those rivalries are certain to delay --
and may even defeat -- the realization of what they
have fought so long to attain.

A complex process of negotiation is underway on the urgent
issues of Rhodesia and Namibia. These issues are related but
we recognize that the requirement for solutions in each case
are substantially different. If circumstances so indicate,
each issue can be dealt with at the pace appropriate to it.
Depending on the desires of the many interested parties, we
are prepared to deal with each issue on its individual merits.

Most importantly, all parties must keep in mind that
lost opportunities can be irretrievable; there are now

- 29 -

conditions for settling *both* issues that did not exist
previously and may never do so again. It would be
ironic, to say the least, after years of struggle, hope and
disappointment, those who have the most to gain should
let the opportunity slip away because of internal disagree-
ments.

- 30 -

Public support for this effort will be a major factor
in the success and durability of any settlement that may
eventually emerge. Our goals -- to end the suffering
and violence of Southern Africa, to bring about majority rule
and minority rights -- reflect what is best in American
values. They are a firm foundation for our common
commitment; they are not confined to one party or
one branch of the government. They represent an American
effort.

South Africa's racial problems are more complex.

In Lusaka in April I pointed out that South African assistance
in bringing about rapid negotiated solutions in Rhodesia

- 31. -

and Namibia would be viewed positively by the community of nations as well as by the rest of Africa. And I must point out here that since then South Africa's role -- with respect to these two problems -- has been constructive.

As for conditions within South Africa, itself, the world, and most black African leaders, recognize South Africa as an African country. Its white settlers have lived on African soil for centuries. No one, including the responsible leaders of black Africa, challenges their right to remain there. Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government, as an outside colonial intrusion.

But South Africa's internal structure is incompatible

- 32 -

with any concern of human dignity. We are deeply saddened by
the recent and continuing clashes in black urban townships,
universities and schools throughout South Africa. They are
dramatic evidence of the frustration of black South
Africans toward a system which denies them status, equality,
and political rights. No system that leads to periodic
upheavals and violence can possibly be just or acceptable --
nor can it last.

The United States must be true to its own beliefs.
We urge South Africa to take account of the conscience of
humanity. We will continue to use all our influence to bring
about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic

- 33 -

human rights in South Africa. Our policy is based upon the
premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see
a clear evolution toward just internal arrangements. In our
talks with the South African Prime Minister, and in our
diplomatic efforts, we will impress upon South Africa the need
to make this premise a reality.

## Economic Progress

It is economic progress which ultimately will
determine whether Africa can fulfill the aspirations of its
peoples.

You here at this convention know that the economic dimension
is fundamental. You know full well, as a black Mississippi

- 34 -

politician said recently, that "it's no good being able to join
the country club if you haven't got the money to buy a drink."

And you are taking action.

Africa's development needs are massive and your
OIC programs strike at their heart: vocational training to
teach the skills that Africa needs to realize its potential
regardless of changing political circumstances. A mechanic's
training or a carpenter's trade can be practiced in the most
turbulent times; political upheavals cannot diminish the
individual's sense of worth which your training instills. We
give you concrete support through the Agency for International
Development and will continue to do so. But it is
your initiative and energy which has turned that support into
something vital and alive.

- 35 -

Beyond its need for skilled manpower, Africa's
economic aspirations confront a wide range of other challenges.

Africa is blessed with immense natural wealth. The
ratio of population to resources is as favorable as that
of any region of the developing world. Agricultural
productivity can be vastly improved.

But no continent suffers so cruelly when crops fail
for lack of rain. No continent's natural economic regions
are so fragmented by borders drawn up -- often arbitrarily --
in the colonial era. And no continent bears such a crushing
burden of poverty and illiteracy.

Africa is doubly challenged -- by recurrent economic

- 36 -

catastrophes, and by the need for long-term growth. The
United States is dealing with the various dimensions of the
task:

-- To provide relief from natural disasters, drought and famine, we have, in the past five years, more than quadrupled emergency aid to African nations.

-- American trade and investment are crucial for Africa's development. While they are rapidly expanding, they are not enough, especially for the poorest countries. Therefore, we plan to increase development assistance for Africa substantially over the coming years -- especially for the least-developed countries.

- 37 -

-- Because Africa's needs frequently transcend the limits of national boundaries, we are now directing much of our assistance to support regional cooperation -- in transportation, agricultural development, health programs, and in collecting information by satellite on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and mineral extraction.

What Africa requires above all else is a strategy for development. For example, the Sahel, the chronically drought-ridden region on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, has been a major recipient of international relief assistance. The monumental suffering in that area has prompted the

- 33 -

generous contributions of many individual Americans, as well
as large-scale government relief efforts.

But the disasters which afflict the Sahel come in
recurrent cycles. They are altering the ecology across
central and western Africa; the desert is steadily
encroaching upon once-fertile lands.

The time has come to go beyond periodic measures
of relief and to take comprehensive steps. To this end the
United States, together with an international group of donor
countries is seeking to reverse the economic and ecological
decline of the Sahel and lay the foundations for future growth.
We have proposed developing major river basins to improve
water supply; increasing crop acreage by modern agricultural

- 39 -

methods: improving food storage facilities; and enhancing the transportation network of the area.

The long-term effort in the Sahel, and others needed elsewhere in Africa, will require intensified cooperation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. This is why the United States has endorsed the imaginative proposal of President Giscard of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts for Africa. And we are seeking within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development a more general coordination of development efforts among the industrial democracies.

- 40 -

Africa is heavily dependent upon the world economy.

No African nation can plan its future effectively if its income is buffeted by external economic forces over which it has little or no influence. The export earnings of many African economies rely upon global market conditions for a single commodity. And higher energy prices or inflation abroad can -- as they have -- raise to prohibitive levels the price of imports that Africa desperately needs.

One year ago, at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States presented a comprehensive series of proposals aimed at responding in a cooperative spirit to the needs of the developing countries. We have followed up these initiatives with major efforts at the Paris Conference

- 41 -

on International Economic Cooperation, at the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi, in many other

international institutions. Many of our proposals have been

implemented and have had a direct impact on Africa.

Substantial progress has been made in the past year in
shaping the long-term economic relationship between the
nations of the northern and southern hemispheres. The initiatives
which nowform the agenda for discussion are, by and large, proposals
made by the United States. But much work remains to be
done. The United States is prepared to move forward in areas
of great importance to the nations of Africa. For example:

-- We are prepared to address the crushing balance
of payments problems and debt burdens which

- 42 -

many poor African nations suffer as a result
of high oil prices, global inflation and the
recession-related downturn in export earnings.

-- We are prepared to join with producers and
consumers of key commodities to explore measures
to improve and stabilize markets. We are
ready to participate in producer-consumer forums
in ways that will benefit Africa.

-- We will seek satisfactory international arrangements
to foster the investment necessary for Africa's
growth -- arrangements which both respect national
sovereignty and assure predictability and fair
treatment for foreign investors;

-- We have proposed in the multilateral trade
negotiations to reduce tariffs for tropical products

- 43 -

which are of special interest to Africa.

-- We are seeking authorization from Congress to make an initial contribution of $15 million to the African Development Bank's Development Fund in order to foster industrialization.

-- And we will make major efforts to stimulate the flow of modern technology to Africa so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity.

The United States is committed to work constructively with the nations of Africa and with other developing countries to promote economic progress and fuller participation in the global economic system. But we must be frank to say that

- 44 -

rhetorical assaults and one-sided declarations undermine
the conditions for such cooperation. They weaken public
support for development in the industrial democracies
whose effective and sustained role is crucial. No other group
of countries -- least of all the Socialist countries -- is able
to provide the technology, the managerial expertise, or the
resources.

Many of the resolutions of the just concluded non-
aligned conference in Colombo were clearly anything but
non-aligned in content or phraseology. We reject such
one-sided proclamations and warn that to be effective
non-alignment must be true to its name. It cannot --
indeed it will not -- be taken seriously if it becomes

- 45 -

nothing more than a rigid grouping aimed at producing
automatic majorities and rhetorical attacks against the
industrial democracies.

The choice that all nations face is between cooperation
and chaos. America has made its decision for cooperation. We
invite others to join us in the same spirit.

## African Independence: Precondition for Progress

Africa's development will be impossible if the independence
and integrity of the continent are not maintained. Africa must
not again become an arena in which outside powers contest for
spheres of influence.

This is why the United States agreed with the Presidents
of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that non-

- 46 -

African nations should not deal directly with the liberation
movements of southern Africa -- to avoid the divisions and
the competition which led to the tragedies of the Angolan civil
war. We oppose those who would subject the African people to
outside domination. Western colonialism in Africa is
dying, it must not now be replaced by a new form of external
intervention more insidious because less familiar which
in the end may take generations to root out.

The United States seeks no African bloc of its
own, no paramount influence in Africa. We will oppose
all those who do. The United States calls on all nations to
affirm the principle that Africa's destiny is for Africa to determine.

- 47 -

The United States will not import great power conflict
into Africa. We will expect others to do the same.

There is no better guarantee against foreign intervention
than the determination of African nations to defend their own
independence and unity. Let us, therefore, not minimize the
importance of the security problems that some African nations
face. Economic development is certainly a crucial priority;
but by itself it cannot prevent outside pressure or threats to
African sovereignty. So let us not accept the facile proposition
that black African nations do not have the same need as other

- 48 -

nations to defend themselves against recognized dangers --
especially when they perceive serious and imminent threats
from nearby nations which have been heavily armed by the
Soviet Union. We are determined to avoid unnecessary arms races.
But when friendly and moderate nations like Kenya or Zaire make
modest and responsible requests for assistance to protect
themselves against belligerent neighbors possessing substantial
quantities of modern Soviet weapons, we owe them our
serious consideration.

## Africa and the World

One fact is clear: a time of change has come again
to Africa. Let us all take the opportunity before us to avoid
a future of bitterness, escalating war, and foreign intervention.

- 49 -

Let us all help a peaceful, and prospering, and just Africa
take its rightful place in the world.

What Africa needs now is not a return to the
exploitative or interventionist practices of decades past.
Nor does it need exuberant promises and vapid expressions of
goodwill. It requires concrete commitments to progress --
political and economic. It requires our readiness to
cooperate as sovereign equals on the basis of mutual responsibility
and mutual benefit.

In this spirit, the United States will do its part.
Let there be no mistake: Africa will take its destiny firmly
into its own hands, whether we like it or not. It will make
its contribution to the world community in its own way, whether

- 50 -

we cooperate or not. But the cause of freedom, not only for
ourselves, but for all mankind will be vitally affected by the
part America plays. We can turn our backs on one of the most
massive awakenings of a people in history, and in the process
desert our principles and help doom a continent to a future
of despair.

Or we can, as every generation of Americans before us,
make history ours.

I believe Americans will choose the course of hope
and heart. And by so doing we will once again have demonstrated
the vitality of our values and given the world a "new birth of freedom."

[L]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 31, 1976

NO. 404,

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION CENTER
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

AUGUST 31, 1976

PC 107

REVEREND SULLIVAN: I'll give you a minute of my time to start everything off because you are not interested in what I have to say. I will tell you something about OIC while we are here.

OIC started here in Philadelphia thirteen years ago. It was a self-help program in an old abandoned jail-house to help people to get jobs who had no skills. It came as the aftermath of a series of boycotts that we had organized for three years in the City of Philadelphia with four hundred black preachers to open opportunities to minorities where businesses had been discriminating.

And after the jobs became open, we found it important to train people for the jobs. As I said, integration without preparation is frustration.

So, in addition to opening doors, as we continued to and still continue to, we created a mechanism, a process in the inner cities and now in the rural areas, too, to train people for the many jobs that are becoming available more and more in our American society.

We have trained 300,000 people in jobs in America and put a quarter of a million people to work who were not

For further information contact:

PR #404

2

working. And so what you have here today, for those who are out of the City of Philadelphia, is a convocation of some 3,000 persons, representatives from all over America. We have OIC units now in all 50 states. And these persons have come to develop our process and our plans and our goals for next year.

It is our goal and aim in the next four years to train one million unemployed people and to put them in jobs in this country. And we have legislation in the Congress. We are trying to get the President to take more strident positions with respect to these kinds of unemployment legislation, as well as the Congress. Because we think that what the country needs now is more than a debate on full employment, although we need that, but something practical and pragmatic, to reach as many people as we can in the barrios and the ghettos of this country.

That is what OIC is about. We are not a civil rights organization, although most of us are involved in the civil rights process. But we feel the best way to implement civil rights is to get people prepared to take advantage of the jobs that open as a result of the efforts of civil rights.

So, it has been a very exciting process, and that is what the OIC convocation in America is about.

We also have these OIC programs now in Nigeria,

PR #404

3

Ghana, Ethiopia, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Togo, Sierra Leone, and developing in Liberia.

One reason that we asked Mr. Kissinger to come is because we have these programs actually operating or developing in these countries, so we have interests that are rather broad throughout the continent of Africa, as well as the Caribbean and other parts of the world.

Now, ladies and gentlemen of the press, we are pleased that you have come today, and we are pleased to have the Secretary of State with us, Dr. Kissinger, at this 13th year's observation of OIC training work in America and in the world.

Q Thank you, Reverend Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your upcoming talks, what specific recommendations will you make on behalf of the United States to make peace in South Africa and also Rhodesia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into the details of discussions that are about to take place this weekend. But I have laid out our views with respect to both Rhodesia and Namibia.

With respect to Rhodesia, we believe that there should be a rapid transition to majority rule, protection for minority rights, and a negotiation in which the black

PR #404

4

African states, the various movements in Rhodesia and the existing authorities of Rhodesia participate to find a solution within that framework.

With respect to Namibia, we believe that there should be a firm date for independence, a negotiation in which all the groups, all the relevant groups, participate, and establish a constitutional framework on the basis of majority rule.

Q Are you suggesting, perhaps, in your speech earlier, with economic help to Africa, a new Marshall Plan for Africa? Is that what you have in mind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the methods that were appropriate at the time of the Marshall Plan do not lend themselves exactly to the conditions in the 1970's. But we believe that Africa needs regional development because many of the nations are very fragmented. And we believe also that other industrial nations should cooperate with us in order to get the maximum impact.

We have to remember that Africa is actually -- it is a huge continent, but not too thickly populated. So that it is possible in Africa, with its substantial resources, to make considerable progress if coordinated efforts are developed.

Q On South Africa, you said, "Our policy is based on the premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see a clear evolution towards just internal

PR #404

5

arrangements."

Q Can you tell me first what you consider a reasonable period of time, and what you consider a clear evolution toward changes? And, failing these, what action would the United States take in regard to South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa this weekend, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go into details on these points now.

Q You said earlier in the speech that you believe the white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia should accept the concept of majority rule and you did not mention South Africa. Was that an intentional omission?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have also stated we do not accept the principles and practice of apartheid. We have made a distinction in all our public statements, not on the principle of majority rule but on the principle that South Africa does not, in our view, represent a colonial entity. It represents a legitimate government which carries out practices with which we disagree. And this is a different phenomenon from Rhodesia and Namibia, requiring a different sort of influence.

Q Does the United States support the concept of majority rule in South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States supports

PR #404

6

the principle of majority rule everywhere.

Q Mr. Secretary, does the United States plan to recognize Angola, and if not, why not? And also, can we expect economic aid to be forthcoming for Mozambique, as promised in the Lusaka speech?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to Angola, the United States has stated repeatedly that our objection to Angola is not the grouping that took power there. We recognized Mozambique immediately, even though its leadership also has a radical orientation.

Our concern with Angola is the influence -- it is the existence there of a large Cuban military force that permeates all aspects of that society.

In a speech in Monrovia, Liberia, last April, I indicated that if we were given some assurances about the removal of those forces, the road to recognition would be open.

A few weeks later, we were given some assurances through the Prime Minister of Sweden to the effect that Cuban forces would be removed over a period of time.

We have been watching this now since we received those assurances, and we have no clear-cut indication that Cuban forces are being removed. Some are leaving and new ones are coming in.

So the obstacle to our relations with Angola

PR #404

7

is the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force.

With respect to Mozambique, the Administration
has made its proposal to the Congress, and it is now in the
hands of the Congress.

Q You've been holding meetings with the black
movement for quite a number of weeks --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With whom? I didn't hear --

MR. FUNSETH: The black movement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The black movement, yes.

Q Yes. I was wondering how valuable the input
has been to you, and has it heightened your sensitivity to
the problem in South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is true that I have been
meeting with leaders of the black movement. And I think,
as Reverend Sullivan pointed out, this had not previously
been the practice of my predecessors, and therefore
both sides have had something to learn.

Many of the leaders of the black movement have
not in the past dealt at the policy level, and I had no
experience at dealing with black leaders, as I demonstrated
in my remarks to the Urban League in Boston a few weeks
ago.

But it has been extremely valuable to me in
giving me a sense of the mood of that part of our popula-
tion which has perhaps the deepest concern for these

PR #404.

8

problems. And these meetings are taking place regularly
now and will continue to be part of our policy considera-
tions.

Q Mr. Secretary, your speech today seemed to indicate a concern for perhaps a weakening of support among some black African leaders, and also a concern for the fragmentation of black nationalist leaders in Africa. This being the case, and along with some of the statements made recently by President Kaunda, is the situation worse today or better today, as you embark on your new efforts?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the situation has been improving, but as progress is being made, obviously the difficulties also become more apparent. Because as long as you are talking about an objective in the abstract, hard decisions do not have to be made. As an objective grows nearer, the decisions become more complicated.

So the reports of Under Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele were, on the whole, positive. But the issue of Rhodesia is extremely complicated, involving, as it does, the many parties of black Africa, of the various liberation movements of Rhodesia and South Africa. The issue of Namibia is separable from the issue of Rhodesia, and, as I pointed, out in my speech, need not be dealt with in the same timeframe.

But it also has its complications.

So, on the whole, I would say progress is being

PR #404

9

made, and as progress is being made, obviously the more
difficult issues remain for the last.

Q Mr. Secretary, Dr. Sullivan suggested that the United States should withdraw its diplomatic presence if the elimination of apartheid does not occur in South Africa within a reasonable time. What is your reaction to that, and also to his proposal that the United States Government use its influence to see that American businesses operating in South Africa end racial apartheid within their own organizations? What kind of influence can you exert on those businesses?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We strongly support the proposal that American businesses not practice apartheid, and practice the same policies that they do at home.

With respect to future measures about South Africa, our hope is still to promote a peaceful evolution. And we shall discuss the subject, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to set deadlines or to threaten prior to a meeting in which we will discuss issues which we hope will lead to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and will have a beneficial impact within South Africa.

Q How likely is a peaceful settlement in the entire South Africa -- southern African region?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is an extremely complicated issue. On the other hand, we also feel that time

PR #404

10

is running out on it, and that we have a moral and
political obligation to do what we can to bring about a
peaceful settlement, all the more so as violence will
delay achievement of these goals and may have serious con-
sequences for everybody.

We will do the best we can, but obviously we cannot
predict the outcome.

Q Mr. Secretary, today is the deadline, I
think, that has been set by the Security Council for some
positive action concerning Namibia's independence. Some
of us are waiting to hear what is going to be done or said
by South Africa. Can you anticipate what is going to be
done?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because of some of the
diplomatic efforts now underway, there has been a general
consensus to delay the debate in the Security Council until
later in the month of September, and the discussions will
take place at that time, and what will be done will
depend on the events that have occurred in the interval.

Q There is a rumor, Mr. Secretary, that you
have a crystal ball somewhere. Can you look into that
crystal ball and try to give us a hint as to what might
happen?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that a solution to the
problem of Namibia is possible since the principle of

PR #404

11

independence has now been accepted. But there are still
many thorny issues on the road to a settlement, and I
would reserve making a final prediction until the consul-
tations which I am starting this Friday -- or this
Saturday.

Q Mr. Secretary, in February you promised the
black caucus to hire more blacks in the State Department.
Has that been fulfilled yet, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me explain the situation
of hiring in the State Department.

I think it is fair to say that traditionally
the State Department has considered itself -- or has been
an organization which has been largely white, and it has
been extremely difficult to break that mold.

In 1973 when I became Secretary of State, there
were eight Ambassadors, most of them political -- eight
black Ambassadors, one principal officer in a Mission, and
one Deputy Chief of Mission.

Now we have still eight Ambassadors, but most of
them are career. We have one black Assistant Secretary --
the first in the Department's history; two Deputy Assis-
tant Secretaries; four Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and four
principle officers.

Now, the numbers aren't very large because the
whole Foreign Service is a relatively small organization

PR #404

12

of less than 5,000 members.

Secondly, the number of officers, of black offi-
cers, has risen from 250 to something like 361.

Now, it is a slow process because we have to do
two things. We have to get more black college students to
apply for the Foreign Service. And in order to change
the numerical balance in the direction of hiring more blacks,
we have started a system of what is called lateral entry
where people can enter the middle grades of the Foreign
Service without going through the whole process of pro-
motion. This system was only started in 1975, and we take
20 black officers a year under that system. We now have
300 applicants under that program.

We have also created an Office of Equal Opportunity
which has the -- has no other responsibility than to improve
the recruitment of minority personnel, and which can also
act as a grievance board for minority personnel.

We have made a special recruiting effort and have
allocated funds by going to 203 universities and 19 black
colleges in order to get more black applicants into the
Foreign Service. Since the law prohibits us from keeping
records on the basis of color, I cannot give you the break-
down of how many additional black officers are in fact
applying.

And, finally, we have now underway for a year

PR #404

13

two outside studies, one having to do with the problem of
lateral entry and one having to do with the problem of
recruitment under the equal opportunity system.

So, while we started very far behind in the
State Department, we are making a major effort to bring in
more black personnel by the various methods that I have
described and by the promotions that I have indicated.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you give us some idea
of what the factors are that will determine whether or not
you will personally visit South Africa, and whether the
extent of their cooperation in the Rhodesian effort will
be a factor in determining whether you go?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whether I personally visit southern Africa, you must mean.

Q No, South Africa.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first question is whether
I will -- there is no point in going to South Africa unless
I go to black Africa first. So, a great deal will depend
on my conclusions after some exchanges which we are now
engaged in with black African leaders and my discussions
with Prime Minister Vorster.

Then I will have to decide -- I do not believe
that it is possible to settle the Rhodesian issue within
a few weeks. That will take a more extended period of
time.

But if I am convinced that progress is possible

PR #404

14

on the Rhodesian issue, that would affect the decision.

The same is true of the Namibian issue which
is somewhat less complicated and perhaps lends itself
better to a solution.

But the judgment will be made on the basis of
whether significant enough progress is achievable, even
if no final solution is possible.

Q Mr. Secretary, why is it that the United
States has suddenly expressed such great interest in black
Africa after sort of ignoring it for decades? You are
now planning your second major trip there. There has been
fighting in Sudan and previously we ignored it. What has
changed to bring about this new U.S. interest? Is it
in the American political race at the moment, or is it
something else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that it was obvious
that my previous trip was not one of the -- was not a
political ten-strike.

We came to the conclusion that the conditions in
Africa would lead to -- if the United States did not play
a more active role -- would lead inexorably to great power
involvement, to a major risk of war, or to the radicalization
of the entire continent.

And we concluded that it was in the interest of
world peace, in the interest of security, and in the
interest of the United States and in the interest of Africa
that the United States make a major effort. Because otherwise

PR #404

15

we saw only a deteriorating situation.

Having made that decision, we felt that we
should make a major effort, because if it is worth doing,
it is worth doing with energy and conviction. [Applause]

MR. SULLIVAN: And there is another reason, because some of us in this country aren't going to let them sit and do nothing any more. It will never happen as long as fellows like me are around now. There is a change. And whatever happens, it will never be like it was before.

That is why we say there has got to be freedom
in Namibia. There has got to be majority rule for Rhodesia
and apartheid has got to come to an end sometime in South Africa. It is
a whole different ball game now. That's another reason why.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify on this point,
which you touched on in your speech from a different perspec-
tive.

In view of the recent spiral of violence in
South Africa itself, does this make it awkward for you
to visit, to contemplate visiting South Africa, or do you
believe, with some reason, that this makes it more necessary
for you to go?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Visiting South Africa is
not the purpose of the trip to Africa.

If I should go to South Africa, it would be with
the full support of the leaders of black Africa, in order

PR #404

16

to bring about objectives which we have jointly worked
out with the leaders of black Africa. Whether that is possible
will depend on talks first with the South African Prime
Minister, and afterwards, if I decide to go to Africa,
with the leaders of black Africa.

So, this is not a mission that the United States
undertakes as a protocol viist. [Applause[ It is a mission which we
would take in the closest cooperation and with the full
support of black Africa, or it would not be undertaken.

MR. SULLIVAN: Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Kissinger
has other appointments. Thank you, very much. [Applause]

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 31, 1976

No. 405

PANEL DISCUSSION WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
MEMBERS OF
THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA

AUGUST 31, 1976

MR. BODINE: Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. I am Bill Bodine of the World Affairs Council, and it is my most enjoyable mission to initially welcome you here and to say how delighted we are to have you with us, and then in the briefest time possible to get this program underway.

In the interest of permitting the distinguished members of our media panel seated here on the stage to the right of the Secretary and you knowledgeable Philadelphians in the audience maximum time to present your questions directly to our guest of honor, the Secretary has decided to make only a brief opening statement, with no lengthy formal remarks, and then to permit us to go on to the questions.

If I may, let me very briefly explain the procedure we will follow.

While the panelists are directing questions to the Secretary, in a "Meet the Press" format over the next thirty minutes or so, will those of you in the audience who have questions please write them on the pads that have been provided at your table. Those notepapers will be collected by members of the staff of the World Affairs Council moving amongst you, and the questions will be screened so that we can eliminate the duplication and then returned to the questioner to be asked by him or her by using the standing mikes on the ballroom floor. And thus, will you kindly place your name and your table number at the top of the paper when writing your question, in order that we may get it back to the proper person.

Now for the members of the panel, very quickly, whom we assume are familiar to all or most certainly most of you. Creed C. Black, a true son of the South; a distinguished World War II military record as a combat infantryman; served as senior newspaper executive in Savannah, Wilmington and Chicago before being called to Washington as Assistant Secretary of HEW for two years. He came to Philadelphia six years ago as Vice President and Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, and promptly established himself as a semi-professional golfer of tenacious ability.

(Laughter and applause)

On his right is Chuck Stone, U. S. Air Force Navigator; a respected educa-
tor who has lectured widely; astute observer of international affairs as
CARE Representative in Egypt, Gaza and India; and with the American Com-
mittee on Africa. He is President of the National Association of Black
Journalists. He is a Board Member, I hasten to add, of the World Affairs
Council, and a valued member of our Declaration of Interdependence
Program Committee.

He has just been appointed in the last few days by the Washington Star
as their next writer in residence for a period of eight weeks this fall.
TV Talk Show Host on Channel 48, and a distinguished columnist of the
Philadelphia Daily News. (Applause)

-2-

PR 405

Jessica Savitch, a native of Kennet Square, not very far from where we meet this evening. She, too, has boxed the compass in her professional association with the broadcasting industry, having served in Atlantic City, Rochester, New York City, and Houston. Just four years ago, she joined KYW-TV, and by her high degree of professional skill and extremely attractive style of presentation has become firmly established as a widely admired Eye Witness news reporter and distinguished co-anchorwoman. (Applause)

And then a fighting Marine, John G. McCullough, who has been Editor of the Evening and Sunday Belletin's editorial page over the past decade. Before that, he served in his newspaper's Washington Bureau and as the paper's national political editor.

He is immediate past-President of the National Conference of Editorial Writers and is known far and wide as a fine Philadelphia gentleman. (Applause)

In mid-March of 1972, when serving as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and just after returning from the initial Presidential visit to Peking, and while preparing for the Moscow visit which would follow shortly, Dr. Kissinger appeared before our World Affairs Council for an off-the-record exchange. And you would want me to say to him on your behalf how absolutely delighted we are to have him back again. (Applause)

No American is better known to you in this audience than our guest of honor, since he has served not only our country but in fact the entire world for almost eight years at the highest levels of our national Government. It would appear unnecessary and a little ridiculous, therefore, to introduce him to you. And I thought, Mr. Secretary, rather than that, I would like to present this distinguished audience of knowledgeable Philadelphians to you, who on very short notice have turned out to pay their respects and to discuss with you some of the pressing foreign affairs problems of the day.

So, members and friends of the World Affairs Council, it is a great pleasure and a very distinct honor to introduce you to the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger. (Applause)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, let me say, to begin with, how glad I am to be back in Philadelphia and to express my admiration to an audience of 200, before whom I could give an off-the-record talk from which nothing leaked. I could not do that with 200 Washingtonians that have a top secret clearance. (Laughter and applause)

I am here partly to exhibit my masochism in exposing myself to the questions of this distinguished and fearsome panel that you have assembled, and secondly to tell you that we have conducted a brilliant foreign policy. (Laughter and applause)

The Chairman was kind enough to ask me to make a few brief introductory comments. He forgot that as a former professor my normal speaking time is 50 minutes, and having been brought up in the German language, I don't get to the verb until the 25th minute. (Laughter and applause)

-3-

PR 405

But in order to enable the panelists to destroy me, let me quickly make
a few general observations.

First, the foreign policy of a great nation is not the invention of its
President or of its Secretary of State. The foreign policy of a nation
is determined very importantly by the objective circumstances in which
it finds itself, by the values of its people, and only to some extent
by the ability of its leaders to discern these trends and to shape them
for their own ends.

One therefore should not believe that foreign policy can be changed dramat-
ically at regular intervals. Indeed, a well-considered foreign policy
at some point in the nation's history must achieve some level of stability
and must in its main lines be fixed.

On the other hand, there occasionally are periods of great change. And in
the last eight years, the United States has undergone very important changes
in the international environment in which we find ourselves.

It is not only that we had to end a war, which we found when coming into
office, in a rather painful and difficult way, and that America had to
adjust to this traumatic experience. It is also that the many elements
in the international environment, as we have known it throughout our
modern history, had radically altered.

First, this is the period in which the growth of nuclear weapons on both
sides has created the unprecedented fact that there are two nations in the
world that can destroy each other and destroy humanity. And therefore
many of the traditional patterns of international relations, many of the
risks that in the past could be run, are no longer applicable. Whoever
is President will sooner or later be driven to the realization that was
first expressed by President Eisenhower -- that there is no alternative
to peace.

How to create a stable peace and how to control the nuclear arsenals of
both sides becomes an overriding task of our diplomacy.

Throughout history, it was inconceivable that a nation could possess too
much power. Almost any additional increment of power you acquired could
be put to political use. We live in a period in which an upper limit
of destructiveness is reached beyond which civilization, having already
been destroyed, the additional accumulation of at least strategic power
is no longer relevant.

What conclusions one draws from this in the field of negotiations or in
the field of day-to-day diplomacy, we can perhaps discuss with the panel.
I simply want to point out the new fact of international relations.

The second new fact is that for the first time in history, foreign policy
has become truly global. Never before have the continents been in daily
contact with each other. Never before have there been power centers in
every part of the globe. And never before has it been necessary to
construct an international community out of so many diverse elements.

And this is compounded by the rapidity of communications -- so that not
only is policy global, reaction has to be nearly instantaneous.

-4-

PR 405

Now, when one speaks of peace, one has to speak of a world which the majority of the nations considers just or at least just enough so that they do not feel that they can achieve their ends only by overthrowing it.

The great upheavals of our period have been caused because there have been countries which assaulted the international order as it then existed. And the great challenge of our time is to build a peace in which the majority of nations will have a sense of participating.

This is why I have greatly welcomed the efforts made here in this city, that have taken the form of a declaration of interdependence, because interdependence is the cardinal fact of our period and is one of the novel features of our period.

And as Americans, we are living for the first time since our early days under conditions in which we do not have overwhelming power. Our influence for good or ill is decisive for security and for progress. But we can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources. We no longer have the margin of safety that permitted us to wait until threats became overwhelming before we reacted, or that enabled us to solve the economic problems of a continent as we did at the time of the Marshall Plan with unilateral American decisions.

So much more depends on our understanding and on our sophistication and on our public support than ever before in our history.

And this means that we have to face one of the fundamental problems of statesmanship, which is that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has very often disappeared.

In 1936, it would have been very simple to deal with the threat represented by Hitler. But the world would still be debating today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination.

By 1941, everybody knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. But it was a knowledge acquired at the price of tens of millions of lives, and, therefore, we have to face the fact that our most important actions have to be based on assessments that cannot be proved true when they are made. And foreign policy therefore requires a greater degree of public understanding and a greater degree of support than has ever been the case in our history.

Now, I think it would be better to respond to specifics of our foreign policy in the form of answers to questions. But it is important to keep in mind the permanent goals of American foreign policy -- for peace, for progress, for justice, for international order, for relating these scores of new nations that have come into being to a new system, for strengthening our ties with our traditional friends, and for bringing about a safer and progressive world than the one we found.

And with this, I will be glad to answer questions.

PR 405

-5-

**MR. BODINE:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will start off with Creed Black.

**MR. BLACK:** Mr. Secretary, as the first media representative speaking, I suppose I should join in the welcome. You certainly have made our lives more interesting over the last eight years. And I would ask you to extend our special regards to that highly placed source that usually travels with you. If he isn't with you tonight, we will tell him how helpful he has been. (Laughter)

It is true, as you say, that in the last years there have been some dramatic changes in our policy. And you have, despite what you say about the formation of foreign policy, been the architect of many of these changes.

In Kansas City, a couple of weeks ago, the Republican Party adopted an amendment to the foreign policy plank which was generally regarded as a repudiation of many of these policies.

One of our Washington colleagues just this very morning, who I think is very well informed, that is, Marquis Childs, wrote a column in which he quoted one of your associates as saying that, just as you left for Kansas City, you described this as the most searing experience of your life.

I wonder if you could tell us if that is an accurate description of your reaction to the action of your own party in Kansas City?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You know, one of the attributes of high office is that none of one's associates is ever willing to admit that he doesn't know what he is talking about. (Laughter)

The so-called morality plank in the Republican platform has to be seen in terms of the internal maneuvering of the Republican Party of the Convention, and not as an expression of well-considered substantive sentiment.

There was an intention to force a fight between the Ford camp and the Reagan camp, after the Ford camp had won the Rule 16c.

President Ford and his associates decided, in my view wisely, not to fight on a plank which in itself was really quite unexceptionable.

The phrases in that plank can be subscribed to by anybody, including myself, by about 90 percent. To be sure, we are not children, and we know that the few words were put in there in order to result in some needling.

But if you say, should we make unilateral concessions, nobody can say we were making unilateral concessions. And the basic principles that were stated there are principles that I don't object to -- in fact, that I subscribe to. And the maneuvering with respect to that platform

- 6 -

PR 405

had much more to do with lining up delegates for the final nominating vote
than with the substance of the foreign policy. And I stayed out of it.
And I consider that the decisions of that week were not decisions in
which I should get myself involved.

**MR. STONE:** Mr. Secretary, in your public utterances, you have consistently drawn a moral distinction between Rhodesia and Namibia, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other. For example, in a speech at noon today before the OIC, you said, "The white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia must recognize that majority rule is inevitable." And one of my colleagues from the _Inquirer_ suggested you deliberately omitted South Africa.

Later in the speech, you said, "Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa
cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government."

Do you think that black Africa's leaders and South Africa's disenfran-\chised blacks agree with your assessment of South Africa as a legitimate
government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that most of black Africa's leaders -- and I would say all of the ones that I know -- would agree that there's a big difference between South Africa and Namibia and Rhodesia.

They consider Namibia and Rhodesia a colonial structure. They consider
South Africa an African government that has an unjust domestic structure
that must be changed.

But they are not talking about expelling the white population from South Africa. And, therefore, I would think that the problem of South Africa is a different problem from the problem of Namibia and Rhodesia, even though in my speech this afternoon I also condemned the practices of the South African Government with respect to its domestic legislation.

**MR. STONE:** Would you (inaudible) say that majority rule in inevitable in South Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would believe that the practice of apartheid must end.

**MR. STONE:** I didn't ask that question.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that majority rule must also come to South Africa. But I would say the way of achieving it is a different way than the way in Namibia and Rhodesia.

**MS. SAVITCH:** Mr. Secretary, getting back to Mr. Black's question on what happened in Kansas city. During the Nixon years, it seems as though you acted as a personal emissary to the President, while in the Ford Administration it seems as though foreign policy is implemented on a much wider level.

What are your own future plans past January 26, or whenever Inauguration
Day is?

- 7 -

PR 405

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, in the Nixon Administration, except for the last year, I was Assistant to the President. And through all of the Ford Administration, I have been Secretary of State. And those are two different functions.

As Assistant to the President, you act primarily as an extension to the
President. As the Secretary of State, you have to conduct the foreign
policy of the United States through a well-established apparatus.

As far as my own personal plans are concerned, I am constantly asked
that question. I believe it is important to keep in mind that we have
to conduct foreign policy, even during this election, in a rather dangerous
and complicated period. And I don't want to add any more uncertainty
to it.

I have said repeatedly that after President Ford is re-elected is the
time to discuss this, and that it would be presumptuous for me to say now
what I will do.

**MS. SAVITCH:** Has it hurt us diplomatically, or has it hurt you as a
diplomatic negotiator, and has anyone perceived you as possibly being
a lame-duck negotiator?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as you know, it is not always easy to get a
word in edgewise with me, so I am not absolutely sure how people have
reacted to me. (Laughter)

An election year in the United States is often unsettling to foreign
nations because they hear very many extreme statements that are being
made by various candidates.

The impression is always created that everything that has been done is a
disaster and that everything that will come after will be a radical
change.

And while foreign nations are becoming more sophisticated about the
exuberance of our rhetoric, it nevertheless tends to create a period of
some uncertainty.

I must say that on the major issues with which I have dealt, I have not
found that the election year has significantly affected our foreign
policy, but it does tend to produce a certain slowdown in the conduct
of some of the issues.

**MR. MCULLOUGH:** Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the need for public support
of foreign policy, and I take that to mean a foreign policy with which
the people feel comfortable. I like to talk for a moment about Korea
and the fact that --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** About what --

**MR. MCULLOUGH:** About Korea. Even during the midst of the crisis on the
truce line, the Government of South Korea has imprisoned 18 quite
respected dissenters. Some of the people were formerly in the govern-
ment there. Some were clergy, others teachers. And it seems to some

- 8 -

PR 405

of us that the Government of South Korea is not above using the tragic
death of the two American officers to bring the United States into
even closer support of the regime there.

And my questions -- two of them -- do you feel comfortable about the
level of civil liberties in the Republic of South Korea? And if not,
is there anything we in the United States can do about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are several aspects to this problem. One
is, do we feel comfortable about the level of civil liberties in South
Sorea? The answer is, no; South Korea does not have standards of human
rights comparable to our own. And only this Monday we presented a formal
note to the Korean Government expressing our view on this matter.

Secondly, we are not in Korea because of the practices of the Korean
Government but because of the importance that Korea has for the stability
of Northeast Asia. And we believe that if the communists, if they were
to take over South Korea -- as did several Presidents did before this
Administration -- this would have an enormously unsettling effect on
the stability of Northeast Asia, particularly of Japan.

Therefore, we have to balance our security necessities against some of
the feelings with respect to certain governmental practices. And we
are trying to do our best to improve those practices.

But, at the same time, we have an important commitment, not only legally
but strategically, to the security of Northeast Asia that impels certain
actions on our part.

MR. BLACK: Mr. Secretary, I would like to get back to this question of
the continuity of our foreign policy and the public understanding of it,
because one of the problems, it seems to me, is that many differences
are too often too subtle and too sophisticated to be understood by
the public.

We are now in this election compaign, and Mr. Carter: is being briefed by a
number of people trooping down to Plains, Georgia, who have been critics
of your foreign policy -- George Ball, Zbiganiew Brzezinski, and others.

Surely there must be some differences between the policies of the two
parties.

I wonder if you could explain to us what differences you see, as you
understand Mr. Carter's foreign policy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, I basically believe that the political
defense of our defense of our foreign policy is not the primary
responsibility of the Secretary of State; and therefore, I don't
volunteer comments like this. But to answer your question, first of all
I would have to say that the formal statements of Governor Carter have
not been characterized by excessive precision. (Laughter)

MR. BLACK: Perhaps they will be now.

PR 405

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** So, it isn't easy, as I said, to get a hold of them.

Now, in answers to questions, he has indicated some directions with which we would strongly disagree. He has indicated, for example, that he would save $7 million from the Defense budget by bringing home troops from abroad.

Now you can't save those $7 million by bringing home troops from abroad unless you also disband them, because they cost as much in the United States as they do abroad. So that would have to mean an objective reduction in our strength.

We have a disagreement as to his assessment about the American reaction to communist parties coming to power in West European governments, though I seem to have detected a certain evolution in his position.

We disagree with respect to military assistance for South African countries as Kenya and Zaire. And we disagree with respect to his view about some aspects of the role of covert intelligence.

I am sure that as the campaign develops, other disagreements will emerge. But these, from the record that now exists, are some of the important disagreements.

We have also conducted -- he seems to imply that the Middle East should be settled by a prior agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which afterwards is presented to the parties. Our view is that the negotiations in the Middle East should be conducted by the parties, with some assistance from the United States, though, if there is a final settlement, the Soviet Union can participate in guaranteeing it.

These are some of the differences that I see now.

**MR. STONE:** Mr. Secretary, your Department estimated that in the last three years, you made approximately thirty heartland speeches around the country.

This month was sort of a record. In your Administration, like Jimmy Carter, you were born again and you addressed two black groups for the first time, in one month -- the Urban League on August 2nd and today the OIC.

Traditionally, black communities have been very weak in its impact and influence on foreign policy; it's had very little involvement. This audience is a good example -- there are only three or four blacks here tonight.

What do you expect to gain by talking to black groups who have so little influence at the higher councils of policy, of which you have been a part in denying them in your three years as Secretary of State?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, I didn't solicit these invitations.

**MR. STONE:** The OIC said you did.

- 10 -

PR 405

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is absolutely incorrect.

Dr. Sullivan came to my office -- first of all, he wrote me a letter and then he invited me to speak there. And I have not solicited either invitation. But I thought it was important to explain to these audiences what our policy with respect to Africa was.

Now, I have, in fact, had the practice to meet with the Black Caucus from the early days of my incumbency in Washington. And I believe I am the first Secretary of State who has done so.

My basic responsibility is to create understanding for our foreign policy, and to get as much advice from leaders of various groups as I can.

The purpose of these visits is not political, because all of the experts have a pretty good estimate as to what the likely voting line-up is going to be in the various communities.

But I believe that it is important, as long as we are engaged on a major new initiative in Africa, that we get the views of the black leaders and that we convey our thinking to black audiences.

As I said, I was meeting with the Black Caucus even at the time when we thought the opportunities for American initiatives in Africa did not yet exist over the last two years.

**MS. SAVITCH:** It has come to my attention that the Rand Corporation recently completed a study for the State Department on terrorism and that between 1965 and the present there have been almost 1,000 terrorist acts recorded.

Now, we in the media are constantly being criticized in that if we cover these terroristic events, we are somehow promoting them. If we do not, we are censoring, and it is a news black-out.

Is the State Department in much the same position, untenable position? In other words, if you ignore terrorist acts, you are knucking under; if you use force, you can escalate to larger armed confrontation.

What is your policy going to be with regard to terrorism?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The problem of terrorism is novel in international diplomacy. And there aren't really any good rules, and there may not be any rules unless we can get an international convention that bans terrorism and in which all the nations agree that nobody will give any assistance to terrorists, no matter what they think of their political views.

We believe that the use of innocent people for political purposes which they cannot effect, and in decisions in which they have no part, is unconscionable. (Applause)

Now, the problem of terrorism reaches the Department of State when

- 11 -

PR 405

American citizens are kidnapped or most frequently when American officials are kidnapped, and when we have been asked to negotiate with the terrorists.

We have adopted the painful and difficult policy of refusing all negotiations with terrorists. The reason we do this is because no matter how successful any one negotiation may be, there are so many Americans spread all over the world that once it is known that the United States is prepared to negotiate, then all Americans will be continually in jeopardy.

As long as terrorists know that American Ambassadors have no authority, or no hope of any authority, for negotiating about terrorist acts, there is at least a lowered incentive.

Now, in any one case, it produces the most anguishing decision for us.

I must say that this policy of not negotiating has worked in a number of cases. For example, there were a number of Americans that had been kidnapped in Eritrea. There were several attempts to contact us and to negotiate with us. We refused all substantive negotiations. And after several months, these kidnapped Americans were released.

It doesn't always work, but often nothing works in these cases.

We believe that is the best policy, the one that will save most lives and that will protect most Americans abroad. However, we believe that the ultimate solution must be an international convention in which all nations pledge themselves to give no assistance of any kind to terrorists, and in which those nations which refuse to join are ostracized from international air service and other measures. And we are going to push this strongly at the General Assembly at the United Nations. (Applause)

MR. MCULLOUCH: Mr. Secretary, many of the individuals in your audience tonight are people in business, and some have spoken out in support of a proposal apparently gaining support in Congress that would block the cooperation by US business in the Arab League boycott against Israel.

Senator Ribicoff sponsored it and said this is the only realistic way of dealing with what he thinks is an illegal and immoral type of economic warfare.

Secretary Simon, who I think is the last member of the Cabinet to speak out on this, said that such a law would make matters worse and would harden Arab attitudes.

I wonder if you would talk about that tonight and give us your view on it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not willingly. (Laughter) Can I talk about it on November 3rd? (Laughter)

- 12 -

PR 405

Now that you have asked me -- and I wish that the Chairman had stopped
before this -- I agree with Secretary Simon. I am against a boycott.
I think it is wrong for American firms to participate in it. I also
believe that we have important interests in some of the countries
concerned. Saudi Arabia can have a major impact on the oil prices,
which in turn can have a major impact on developing of the American
economy.

Many of these countries are needed for progress toward peace in the
Middle East. We believe that the way to deal with the boycott is
through the Executive Orders and through the actions of the Attorney
General that the Administration has already done. And we are afraid
that some of the legislation that is now being considered is going
to produce confrontations and disadvantages from which everybody will
suffer.

And therefore I support Secretary Simon's opposition to this amendment.
(Applause)

MR. BODINE: Thank you, panelists, very much indeed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to give an opportunity to those
on the ballroom floor who wish to question the Secretary.

Will those of you who have questions, which have been returned, be kind
enough to go two or three at a time to each of the two standing mikes --
I can see one mike; I am told there is another there; I am blinded a
bit from it right now -- and there to ask your question in a voice
sufficiently loud for all to hear, so that it need not be repeated.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But not intimidating. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind that in 1956 we had the Hungary crisis and in 1968 the Czechoslovakia business took place, predominately during the National Democratic Convention week, my question to you is this: Is there any evidence that either the Soviet Union or the Republic of China has a preference as to which candidate wins this year? And if so, do you expect either to manipulate a crisis to help effect that end?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, neither of the two countries has as yet communicated its preference. (Laughter) And I am not absolutely sure that I would know how it would come.

But I think it is exaggerated to believe that in 1956 and in 1968, the
Soviet Union organized these actions in order to affect our political
campaign.

It happened that there were uprisings in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary
that the Soviet Union considered incompatible with the stability of its
own domestic structure.

But, to answer your question, it is probably true that most foreign
governments always prefer the Administration in office because they know
it, they have worked with it, and they know what to expect. And that
would be generally the case.

- 13 -

I don't know whether that is the case with respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

I think that any country would make a major mistake to create a crisis in order to affect our national election, because I am confident that there would be united support for the policy of the Administration on a non-partisan basis in resisting foreign pressures. (Applause)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, with respect to the Law of the Sea Conference now going on in New York, what can the United States do to redirect some of the efforts of the non-aligned countries that are restricting progress in Committee One negotiations with respect to the deep seabed resources?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am goind, in fact, from here to New York in order to see whether we can bring about more rapid progress on the Law of the Sea negotiations.

The Law of the Sea negotiations now is organized in three major committees.

The first committee deals with the deep seabeds. The second committee deals with the so-called economic zone; that is, the exploitation of the 200 mile zone off the coast. And the third deals with scientific research.

With respect to Committees Two and Three, while they are still unsolved issues, I am reasonably optimistic that, by the end of the conference in two and a half weeks, substantial agreement will have been reached.

With respect to the Committee One on the deep seabeds, progress has been less rapid.

The deep seabeds have a great deal of mineral wealth. The United States, at this moment, is probably the only country with the technology to mine this wealth, although over a period, but even the United States cannot really begin operating before 1983 and 1984, in that time frame.

By the end of the 1980's, many other countries will be in a position to do so.

So the problem is to create a regime for the deep seabeds in which business can operate in a legal framework and in which we avoid on the oceans the sort of colonial rivalry or the sort of rivalry that led to colonial disputes in the 19th century.

Some of the disagreements in Committee One have to do with the intrinsic difficulty of the subject. And we will make some proposals tomorrow and the next day that we hope will break some of the deadlocks.

Other difficulties are caused, as you correctly pointed out in your question, by the attitudes of some of the radical, non-aligned countries that are trying to put all of the deep seabeds under international control, which would mean that our exploration would be the subject of majorities in which we have no decisive influence, even though we are the only country that has the capacity to engage in this mining.

That proposition we cannot and will not accept.

We are prepared to divide the exploration of the oceans between an area that is generally available for private enterprise and an area that is generally available for international enterprise.

The problem now will be, how to find the means to regulate this. And I am going up there for the next two days in the hope of making some progress by making some new proposals on some of the more reasonable demands that have been made. But the extreme demands, we cannot possibly meet.

- 14 -

PR 405

And therefore, if no agreement is reached, we will have to proceed unilaterally, reluctant as we are to do that.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, some observers have remarked that you personalized the position of the Secretary of State. Would you care to comment on the extent to which you feel your personality has influenced the course of international events during your tenure?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, you know, many of my associates will tell you that humility is one of my most outstanding traits. (Laughter)

I don't think I am the best judge of the degree to which my personality influences foreign policy. I think my father could give you a much more objective opinion on the subject. (Laughter)

But I was in office during a period when a number of dramatic initiatives took place, with some of which I was associated.

The secret trip to China, the secret negotiations with the Vietnamese, the beginning of negotiations with other countries, the breakthroughs in the Middle East -- all of them lent themselves to a series of dramatic events.

And then during the period of Watergate, more attention focused on the Secretary of State than would normally be the case, regardless of the qualities of the Secretary of State.

I believe that in general, foreign policy -- the reason these dramatic events took place was because of the revolutionary changes in the international environment that I described in the beginning. But it would be a mistake to believe that this sort of event can happen regularly or can be the normal style of foreign policy.

It was a combination of circumstances, both international and domestic.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the United States is now the greatest supplier of arms in the world. The last figure I read was some 136 nations.

What concerns me is the amount and the sophistication of arms being sold to countries in the Middle East, especially to Iran.

With billions of arms going to Iran, some 26,000 technicians there, I understand, are we not creating a hostage in that country? What would happen, for instance, if Iran went to war with any nation? Would we not then be very much involved? Would you be good enough to comment on this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, let me do it in two parts.

First, the general problem of the arms sales -- and there the growing resources of many countries to buy arms, coupled with the competition between various countries, does create a problem. And we are setting up machinery which we hope to announce within the next few weeks to have a more systematic review of various arms requests than has always been possible.

- 15 -

PR 405

At the same time, the case of Iran is not the best case for your argument, if I may say so.

Iran is a country whose independence has been considered important to the United States since the days that President Truman warned the Soviet Union about its occupation of Azerbaijan.

Iran is one of the larger oil producers in the Middle East. It has pursued a foreign policy very parallel to our own. It has not joined any embargo. It has never used its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never threatened to use its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never transferred its weapons to any other country, much less to any country of which we didn't approve.

It is threatened by the Soviet Union to the north. It has as its neighbor Iraq, which is one of the most radical Arab states and which in relation to per capita is armed much more extensively by the Soviet Union than we are arming Iran.

So, I would believe that Iran's willingness to defend itself, and to defend itself by paying cash for its arms, is a positive development.

Now, as for the American in Iran: I have read this figure of 23,000 Americans that are in Iran. But it is important to break down the figure.

Of these 23,000 Americans, 1,000 are in the military advisory group; 3,000 are with defense-related activities -- that is, they are advisers for equipment which we have sold to Iran and in which they are training Iranians, and they will leave within a period of one or two years -- 7,000, no, 5,000 are connected with the oil industry; 2,000 are connected with other private enterprise; and the rest are dependents.

So, even if you took out all the Americans connected with military activities, you still would have some 15,000 Americans in Iran. And if we therefore advanced the proposition that we cannot have Americans in any country abroad because it would be too risky, then we will finally wind up with having no Americans in any country but also no influence in any country, and with a severe undermining of our economy.

In general, I recognize the concern about arms sales. But one has to keep in mind also that some countries -- for example, there are countries in Latin America, which for diplomatic reasons I do not wish to mention -- that were denied arms by the United States many years ago with the argument that they should put their resources into economic development. They then put their resources into Soviet arms. And now the Soviet Union has a military establishment in those countries, or at least has trainers in those countries in a greater degree than they otherwise would have had.

So, nobody is pursuing a policy of selling arms for their own sake, but especially in the case of Iran -- a country, I repeat, that did not join the embargo; that is selling oil to Israel; that has declared that it will not join any other embargo; and that has been a great friend and supporter of the United States on almost all objectives of foreign policy.

- 16 -

PR 405

I think it is, on the whole, in the American interest to enable it to
defend itself. All the more so as it is done entirely with its own
resources. (Applause)

MR. BODINE: Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have made a commitment to the Secretary to
adjourn at approximately 9:15 so he can get his flight to New York where
he has additional meetings this evening -- if you can believe it.

May we have therefore one more question, and maybe we can go to the
mike over here.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Taiwan -- are we progressing towards a solution?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't hear you.

QUESTION: Taiwan. In light of the Shanghai memorandum, are we progressing towards a solution?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Shanghai Communique states as an objective the normalization of relations. The United States stated that we believe -- we also stated that the Chinese on both sides of the China straits assert that there is only one China, and we do not contest that proposition.

We differed with the People's Republic of China on the method in which the one China should be achieved. And we stated in the Shanghai Communique that the United States believed that the methods should be peaceful.

We are prepared to normalize relations with the People's Republic of
China. We have not, however, up to now, been able to agree on the
modalities by which this should be achieved, and therefore this is a
matter that is still open.

MR. BODINE: Members of the panel, we thank you very much, indeed; the dinner guests, we most appreciate your willingness to come. We are terribly sorry that we must terminate this. And most particularly, our profound gratitude to the Secretary for his time, his patience, and his most able leadership. (Applause)

* * * * *