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These are some observations of conversations in Washington on September 13th and 14th, 1965. I will record these observations as they occur, but no doubt will change them with my views as I go along.

September 13. I spent the morning reading documents. It was obvious that the files that I was shown were rather meaningless, irrelevant or both. I had lunch with Bill Bundy, who as dapper and smooth and elegant as always. We discussed what I might usefully do in Vietnam. I told him that I would like to address myself to conceivable outcomes ranging from a de facto, unilaterally-imposed situation to a negotiated settlement. Bundy asked me which of those two solutions I preferred. I told him that I had not yet become sufficiently familiar with the material to make a judgment. My view, however, was that civil wars in which a rough equilibrium of power is maintained are not very suitable for negotiated settlement. It seems to me that people of the same culture, speaking the same language, do not engage in civil wars unless divisions are very profound. In that case, a formal settlement is likely to be simply the beginning of another conflict.

Bundy asked me whether I saw any room for negotiation or if I thought a de facto situation had to be created first. I told him that it was conceivable to me that a negotiation would concern the military status of South Vietnam after a South Vietnamese victory. The advantage for the North Vietnamese in such a negotiation would be to get a formal indication of American withdrawal and to remove the danger of a permanent American military base.

military phase.

of American withdrawal and to remove the danger of a permanent American
North Vietnamese in any a negotiation would be to get a formal indication
South Vietnam after a South Vietnamese victory. The advantage for the
conceivable to me that a negotiation would concern the military status of
thought a de facto situation had to be created first. I told him that it was
Bunbury asked me whether I saw any room for negotiation or if I
a formal settlement is likely to be simply the beginning of another conflict.
do not enduce in civil war unless divisions are very broad. In that case,
It seems to me that people of the same culture, abiding the same language,
prim of power is maintained are not very suitable for negotiated settlement.
s judgment. My view, however, was that civil war in which a rough edgless
him that I had not yet become sufficiently familiar with the material to make
ment. Bunbury asked me which of those two solutions I preferred. I told
ing from a de facto, militarily-imposed situation to a negotiated settle-
told him that I would like to address myself to conceivable outcomes rand-
elephant as always. We discussed what I might reasonably do in Vietnam. I
sant or both. I had lunch with Bill Bunbury, who was dapper and smooth and
opinions that the files that I was shown were rather meaningless, infefer-
September 13. I sent the morning reading documents. It was
occurn, but no doubt will change them with my views as I do so long.
September 13th and 14th, 1965. I will record these observations as they
These are some observations of conversations in Washington on

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We then discussed various negotiated outcomes, including the problems raised by ceasefire, free elections, and stoppage of infiltration. I asked Bunday what confidence he had in the intelligence reports. He said that he thought that they were off by a factor of three. I asked him whether we would have any means of knowing whether infiltration had stopped. He said that the only way we could know is guerrilla activity ceasing. I asked if he would have more confidence in international inspection that in our intelligence. He said that he would almost certainly have less confidence in international control. This seems to me to add up to the proposition that if the North Vietnamese offer to stop infiltration we would not really know whether the *quid pro quo* was being carried out unless the guerrilla activity ceases. The problem raised by this is what would happen if the Vietnamese slow down their guerrilla activity for a few years and then re-surface it when there has been substantial American withdrawal. I asked the question of Bundy and he was of the view that it was very hard for guerrilla activity to slow down and that there was a clear change in the North Vietnamese tactics--they were reverting back to small scale action--and we would soon be concerned with the problem of whether under those conditions we wanted to launch a major offensive to clear VC-held areas. The danger of not launching a major offensive was that there might be a *de facto* partition of the country.

was that there might be a de facto partition of the country.
to clear AC-held areas. The danger of not launching a major offensive
of whether under those conditions we wanted to launch a major offensive
to small scale action--and we would be concerned with the problem
clear chance in the North Vietnamese tactics--they were reverting back
was very hard for guerrilla activity to slow down and that there was a
withdrawal. I asked the question of Bumby and he was of the view that it
was a new and then re-arrange it when there has been substantial American
would happen if the Vietnamese slow down their guerrilla activity for a few
unless the guerrilla activity ceases. The problem raised by this is what
would not really know whether the fluid broiling was being carried on
the proposition that if the North Vietnamese offer to stop infiltration we
jeas confidence in international control. This seems to me to add up to
that in our intelligence. He said that he would almost certainly have
cessation. I asked if he would have more confidence in international inapplicable
stop stoppage. He said that the only way we could know is guerrilla activity
him whether we would have any means of knowing whether infiltration
He said that he thought that they were off by a factor of three. I asked
tion. I asked Bumby what confidence he had in the intelligence reports,
problems raised by cesarene, tree elections, and atobase of infiltrators
We then discussed various negotiated outcomes, including the

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I told Bundy that it seemed to me that the most useful thing to do would be to prepare a comprehensive paper stating possible outcomes with the advantages and drawbacks of each. At this point Bundy said that I had not really seen the significant documents since they were being kept in his office and not circulated in the Department. He instructed his assistant to get together the looseleaf notebooks which contained the crucial documents and to give me a chance to address myself to this properly.

After my meeting with Bundy I spent two hours at the Central Intelligence Agency. I first met with Messrs. Colby and de Silva. Mr. Colby is in charge of Southeast Asian Operations. Mr. de Silva was Station Chief in Saigon and was wounded during a bomb explosion in the Embassy. He is now the special advisor for Southeast Asia to the Director of the CIA. I received a full briefing about CIA operations in Vietnam, which lasted nearly an hour. My impression is that these operations have been effective, but that they are essentially pilot projects and that the real test will come when these operations are extended over a bigger area. It was striking that the comments about General Lansdale were uniformly hostile.

One of the curious aspects of the CIA program in Vietnam is the enormous number of personnel it requires. In order to carry it out I think a total of about 50,000 people would be needed, working in small

think a total of about 20,000 people would be needed, working in small
enormous number of personnel it requires. In order to carry it out I

One of the curious aspects of the CIA program in Vietnam is the
uniformly hostile,

sides. It was striking that the comments about General Landiside were
restated when these operations are extended over a longer
date effective, but that they are essentially pilot projects and that the
which isated nearly an hour. My impression is that these operations have
of the CIA. I received a full briefing about CIA operations in Vietnam,
Embsay. He is now the special advisor for Southeast Asia to the Director
Station Chief in Saigon and was wounded during a bomb explosion in the
Copy is in charge of Southeast Asia's Operations. Mr. de Silva was
Intelligence Agency. I first met with Meera. Copy and de Silva, Mr.
After my meeting with Bundy I spent two hours at the Central
proprioity.

the crucial documents and to give me a chance to address myself to this
ed his assistant to get together the loosest notebooks which contained
ing kept in his office and not circulated in the Department. He instruct-
that I had not really seen the significant documents since they were pe-
with the advantages and drawbacks of each. At this point Bundy said
do would be to prepare a comprehensive paper stating possible outcomes
I told Bundy that it seemed to me that the most useful thing to

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teams in provincial and district capital where they are completely exposed to Viet Cong infiltration and sitting ducks to Viet Cong physical attacks. I asked whether they could find enough trained and motivated personnel to carry out these hazardous duties and I got the flat answer that the difficulty was to weed out applications not to find qualified personnel. This seems amazing and improbable to me. When I asked the CIA people what motive Vietnamese would have to run the enormous risks which their program requires, they were exceedingly vague and said something like "pride in their group" or "pride in their locality". That cannot be correct since many of these teams are sent into areas other than those from which they are recruited.

After the briefing I happened to see Admiral Raborn, who is Director of the CIA. Raborn has a bluff, ruddy face. I am not sure he had been fully briefed about what he was supposed to discuss with me. He, therefore, began a *tour de horizon* of the international situation. His account was of almost incredible simplicity, about the level of a sophomore. When he reached South Africa he said there "they are trying to get us to take the country away from the Whites and turn it over to the Niggers who have demonstrated that they cannot run anything", and he did not see why "one would have to turn things over to the Niggers when there were white anti-Communists capable of running the country". I finally got him focused on Southeast Asia. When he discussed Vietnam he confused the

focused on Southeast Asia. When he discussed Vietnam he continued the white anti-Communist capable of running the country.". I finally got him why "one would have to turn things over to the Middies when there were who have demonstrated that they cannot run anything", and he did not see as to take the country away from the Whites and turn it over to the Middies more. When he reached South Africa he said there "they are trying to get account was of almost incredible simplicity", about the level of a socio- therefore, based on a four de horizon of the international situation. His had been fully briefed about what he was appraised to discuss with me. He, Director of the CIA. Rapoport has a plent, really face. I am not sure he After the briefing I happened to see Admiral Rapoport, who is are recruited.

many of these temas are sent into areas other than those from which they their group" or "bride in their locality". That cannot be correct since dures; they were exceedingly naive and said something like "bride in Vietnam" would have to run the enormous risks which their program re- amazing and inopportable to me. When I asked the CIA people what motive was to weed out applications not to find qualified personnel. This seems carry out these dangerous duties and I dot the flat answer that the difficulty asked whether they could find enough trained and motivated personnel to to Viet Cong infiltration and sitting ducks to Viet Cong physical attacks. I temas in provincial and district capital where they are completely exposed

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names of the major figures there; for example, he thought that General and that General Thi, who is first corps commander, Ky, who is Prime Minister, was first corps commander, / was the leading man in the Directory--this in turn happened to be General Thieu. He also did not know the name of the Buddhist leaders. In short, on one of the toughest foreign policy questions the Director of Central Intelligence was amazingly badly informed.

Raborn then said that he did not think that Vietnam had a military solution. Indeed, he thought that the military were the only organization in the government capable of engaging in long-range planning and that, therefore, they were outweighing all the other agencies in Vietnam put together--a situation which he thought was unhealthy. I am not sure whether this did not mean he thought CIA operations should be given greater prominence. He went on to say that CIA operations in Laos had been more effective than military operations, and that he would stack-up the CIA on a cost-effectiveness basis against the Marines. In deed, he insisted that some of the CIA operations in Laos were more cost-effective than a battalion of Marines. He instructed De Silva to give me a briefing on the Laos operations the next time I came to Washington. He then said that the problem of Southeast Asia should really be taken care of on an integrated basis and not on a country-by-country basis. What he would most like to see is a management-consultant-type of approach in which the component parts were studied and the whole puzzle put together.

and the whole puzzle but together.

ment-conulant-abe of approach in which the component parts were studied
on a country-by-country basis. What he would most like to see is a mansde-
Southeast Asia should really be taken care of on an integrated basis and not
tions the next time I come to Washington. He then said that the problem of
Marines. He instructed De Silva to give me a briefing on the Laos obers-
the CIA operations in Laos were more cost-effective than a patission of
effectiveness bases against the Marines. In deed, he insinuated that some of
tive than military operations, and that he would attack-up the CIA on a coat-
nence. He went on to say that CIA operations in Laos had been more effec-
tive this did not mean he thought CIA operations should be given greater promi-
dether--s situation which he thought was unhealthy. I am not sure whether
therefore, they were outweighing all the other agencies in Vietnam but to-
in the government capability of engaging in large-range blunting and that,
solution. Indeed, he thought that the military were the only organization
Raporn then said that he did not think that Vietnam had a military
was amazingly badly informed.

the thought foreign policy neations the Director of Central Intelligence
slao did not know the name of the Buddhist leaders. In short, on one of
man in the Directory--this in turn happened to be General Tu'en. He

Ky, who is Prime Minister, was that corps commander,\ was the leading
and that General Tu'en, who is that corps commander,
names of the major figures there; for example, he thought that General

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I told him that in general I agreed with the notion that an integrated approach was necessary, but that it seemed to me that when 200,000 American troops were engaged we could no longer wait until an integrated plan existed, but we had to have some concept of a favorable outcome. Raborn agreed in principle, but continued his harangue about the need to get an integrated plan and to use management consulting methods.

He then returned to the theme that in Southeast Asia there wasn't such a thing as an honest man; this was essentially the trouble in the Dominican Republic as well. He and J. Edgar Hoover agreed that the whole situation in the Dominican Republic was "a God-damn Mess"; and that the same thing was probably true in South Vietnam.

After I left Raborn's office I arranged with his associates to give me a briefing on Laos and also a briefing on the Communist side--something which had not been done. Before my next visit to Washington I will spend an afternoon or morning at the CIA.

**September 14th.** I started reading the looseleaf notebooks that Bill Bundy had prepared for me and for the first time I am beginning to have an understanding of the various approaches that have been made and the various issues that must be faced in the case of any particular outcome.

I then went to the Pentagon to see Adam Yarmolinsky, who is in the position of General Counsel to McNamara, though his name has not yet

the position of General Connael to McNamars, though his name has not yet
I then went to the Pentagon to see Adam Yarnolinsky, who is in
various issues that must be faced in the case of any particular outcome.
an understanding of the various approaches that have been made and the
Bill Bundy had prepared for me and for the first time I am beginning to have
September 14th. I started reading the loosest notebooks that

which had not been done. Before my next visit to Washington I will abend an
me a briefing on Laos and also a briefing on the Communist aide--something
After I left Raporn's office I arranged with his associates to give
same thing was properly train in South Vietnam.

 situation in the Dominican Republic was "a God-damn Messa"; and that the
 Dominican Republic as well. He and J. Edgar Hoover agreed that the whole
 such a thing as an honest man; this was essentially the trouble in the
 He then returned to the theme that in Southeast Asia there wasn't

integrated plan and to use management conawiting methods.

agreed in principle, but continued his parangone about the need to get an
existed, but we had to have some concept of a favorable outcome. Raporn
cau troops were engaged we could no longer wait until an integrated plan
abrosach was necessarily, but that it seemed to me that when 200,000 Ameri-

I told him that in general I agreed with the notion that an integrated
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been submitted to the Senate. I told Yarmolinsky what I proposed to do in
Vietnam and that I would appreciate any documents he might have or any
assistance he could give me. Yarmolinsky mentioned a report which Mc-
Namara had written for the President after his most recent visit to Vietnam
and also some recommendations which McNamara had made to the President
which had been rather closely held. He had a copy of them made for my own
personal use and after I study them I will return them to him.

As to possible outcomes, Yarmolinsky felt very strongly that we
should move toward a pause in our bombinb of North Vietnam and see what
we could get in return for that. We should also get clearer about just what
it is we are attempting to do and gear our military operations more closely
to that.

From Yarmolinsky's office I went to see McNaughton, where again
I went over the basic charter of what I was trying to do and asked for his
assistance. McNaughton, it turned out, also had a file of looseleaf note-
books which are never permitted to leave his office and had never been
shown to the State Department. Indeed, the copies had only been seen by
Mac Bundy, McNamara, and McNaughton. It is not clear to me how one
can make national policy with each of the key sub-Cabinet officials guarding
their documents for their own personal use without sharing them either with
their staff or with the key department. At any rate, McNaughton said that
he felt that the situation in Vietnam was always fluid and that we could not
simply describe a theoretical outcome, since what might happen in Vietnam

simply describe a theoretical outcome, since what might happen in Vietnam
he felt that the situation in Vietnam was always fluid and that we could not
their staff or with the key department. At any rate, McNamhton said that
their documents for their own personnel were without sharing them either with
can make national policy with each of the key and Cabinet officials surrounding
Mac Bundy, McNamars, and McNushton. It is not clear to me how one
shown to the State Department. Indeed, the copies had only been seen by
books which are never permitted to leave his office and had never been
sausalatance. McNushton, it turned out, said he had a file of looseleaf notes-
I went over the basic charter of what I was trying to do and asked for his
From Yarmolinsky's office I went to see McNushton, where again
to that.

it is as we are attempting to do and dear our military operations more closely
we could get in return for that. We should also get clearer about what
should move toward a base in our pomp of North Vietnam and see what
As to possible outcomes, Yarmolinsky felt very strongly that we
personal use and after I study them I will return them to him.

which had been rather closely held. He had a copy of them made for my own
and said some recommendations which McNamars had made to the President
Usamars had written for the President after his most recent visit to Vietnam
assistance he could give me. Yarmolinsky mentioned a report which Mc-
Vietnam and that I would appreciate any documents he might have or any
been submitted to the Senate. I told Yarmolinsky what I proposed to do in

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would depend on many other factors. For example, it was his view that if
the India-Pakistan war became more intense, or if Communist China attack-
ed India, or if Sukarno died and a civil war started in Indonesia, or if Japan
started moving away from the United States, the United States might ask it-
self if it were really wise for it to tie up 200,000 troops and probably more
in South Vietnam. In other words, it was essential to write some scenarios
of other situations that might develop.

He showed me some papers which he had prepared for the contin-
gencies of cease-fire, of things which the VC might do and the things which
they could not do. I told him that my impression was that the package which
he called Compromise Package B-in effect amounted to a division of the coun-
try and the recognition of the NLF as a legitimate unit. He said that this
was so. He then showed me a paper which he had prepared in which he had
assigned probabilities to various outcomes at various force levels. In no
case and at no level of force did he give the probability of win of higher than
40%. In every case he gave the highest probability to a compromise outcome
which would then have the essential characteristic of recognized VC areas.

I told him that it seemed to me that the VC in these conditions
might well take over the country and that in any event the best we would be
able to do is a Laotian-type settlement. McNaughton said let's face it: At
some point on this road we will have to cut the balls off the people we are
now supporting in Vietnam, and if you want to do a really constructive study

now andporting in Vietnam, and it you want to do a really constructive study
some point on this road we will have to cut the palls off the people we are
able to do is a Maoist-type settlement. McNammon said let's face it: At
might well take over the country and that in any event the beat we would be

I told him that it seemed to me that the AC in these conditions

which would then have the essential characteristic of recognized AC areas.

40%. In every case he gave the highest propability to a compromisae outcome
caes and at no level of force did he give the propability of win of higher than
saidied propabilities to various outcomes at various force levels. In no

was ac. He then showed me a paper which he had prepared in which he had
try and the recognition of the NTF as a legitimate unit. He said that this

he called Compromisae Packade B-in effect anomoted to a division of the com-
they could not do. I told him that my impression was that the packade which
dencies of cesae-fire, of things which the AC might do and the things which

He showed me some papers which he had prepared for the contin-
of other situations that might develop.

in South Vietnam. In other words, it was essential to write some scenarios
set it it were really wise for it to tie up 300,000 troops and propely more
started moving away from the United States, the United States might sak it-
ed India, or it Smarino died and a civil war started in Indonesia, or it Isban
the Indis-Pakistani war became more intense, or it Communist China attack-
would depend on many other factors. For example, it was his view that it

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you ought to address yourself to the question of how we can cut their balls off. He thought, in sort, that some form of negotiated cease-fire was the most likely outcome. He recommended that some study be made of the following three questions:

(1) What in the case of a cease-fire can we do?

(2) What are the VC permitted to do?

(3) How can the population be brought into a useful relationship with the government?

McNaughton stressed to me that his notions of a compromise, while shared to some extent by McNamara, had to be extremely closely held because the Chiefs of Staff were violently opposed to any such notion and he, therefore, implored me never to mention anything like this to the military leaders.

On the way out of the Pentagon I ran into Larry Finkelstein, who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of Western Europe and NATO--a case of putting a goat in charge of the cabbage patch. Larry said that the major problem was what we could do to stop De Gaulle and how to save German democracy by giving them some satisfaction on the nuclear question. This led to a brief but rather intense argument in which I said that it seemed to me that the question was completely wrongly put. It was not a question of stopping De Gaulle, but of defining what it was that De Gaulle was doing that is so much against our interests. Secondly, I did not believe that the future of German democracy depended on access to nuclear

believe that the future of German democracy depended on access to nuclear
Ganille was doing that is so much against our interests. Secondly, I did not
not a question of stopping De Gansle, but of defining what it was that De
that it seemed to me that the question was completely wrongly put. It was
dQuestion. This led to a pret but rather intense argument in which I said
save German democracy by dividing them some ascituation on the nuclear
that the major problem was what we could do to stop De Gansle and how to
NATO--a case of butting a post in charge of the cappade batch. Lady said
now Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of Western Europe and
On the way out of the Pentagon I ran into Larry Finkelstein, who is
fore, implored me never to mention anything like this to the military leaders.
the Chiefs of Staff were violently opposed to any such notion and he, there-
said to some extent by McNamars, had to be extremely closely held because
McNaughton attracted to me that his notions of a compromise, while
the government?

(3) How can the institution be brought into a mutual relationship with
(3) What are the AC permitted to do?

following three questions:

most likely outcome. He recommended that some such be made of the
off. He thought, in sort, that some form of negotiated cease-fire was the
you ought to address himself to the question of how we can cut their path

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weapons, all the less so as the access we were arranging was bound to prove unsatisfactory in the long run. We went on on familiar lines for some time.

I had lunch with Hal Sonnenfeldt, who gave me a briefing on the Soviet side of the Vietnam crisis, including their assessment of the Kosygin-Harriman conversations, of which Bill Bundy had showed me a transcript.

In the afternoon I saw Walt Rostow, who was bubbling over as always. Nevertheless, for all his limitations, he strikes me as the most genuine of the senior State Department on the human level. Walt was extremely optimistic about the war in Vietnam. He felt the corner had been turned and that the important thing for us was to continue. The problem of Vietnam could be divided into three parts: (1) what we want the North Vietnamese to stop doing or, to put it another way, how to deal with North Vietnam; (2) how to deal with the organized, indigenous VC; and (3) how to develop the political process in South Vietnam. With respect to the first, that is the activities of North Vietnam, three matters had to be stopped: (1) the provision of supplies; (2) the provision of cadres; and (3) the provision of indigenous VC forces.

Walt's view was that the main forces had to be smashed and then the remainder could be dealt with through amnesty or permission to withdraw into the North. As for the political process in South Vietnam, Walt argued that this was the most difficult issue involving as it did also the problem of what to do with the National Liberation Front (NLF). Walt's view was that

must to do with the National Liberation Front (NLF). Mait's view was that
that this was the most difficult issue involving as it did also the problem of
into the North. As for the political process in South Vietnam, Mait argued
the remainder could be dealt with through amnesty or permission to withdraw
Mait's view was that the main forces had to be annihilated and then
AC forces.

of supplies; (2) the provision of cassettes; and (3) the provision of indigenous
tiles of North Vietnam, three matters had to be stopped: (1) the provision
cst process in South Vietnam. With respect to the first, that is the activi-
ty of the organized, indigenous AC; and (3) how to develop the politi-
cal stop going on, to put it another way, how to deal with North Vietnam; (3) how
could be divided into three parts: (1) what we want the North Vietnamee to
and that the important thing for us was to continue. The problem of Vietnam
fly optimistic about the war in Vietnam. He felt the corner had been turned
down of the senior State Department on the human level. Mait was extreme-
ly radical. Nevertheless, for all his limitations, he strikes me as the most
In the afternoon I saw Mait Roatow, who was bubbling over as
Harriman conversations, of which Bill Budy had showed me a transcript.
Soviet side of the Vietnam crisis, including their assessment of the Koakun-
It had lunch with Hsai Somnenteldt, who gave me a briefing on the
mastatactory in the long run. We went on familiar lines for some time.
mesbous, all the less so as the success we were surrounding was bound to prove

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the Communists in the South should be permitted to participate in the
political process of South Vietnam, but not as an organized group,
rather as individuals. Perhaps the most useful approach would be to
begin the democratic process at a low level, say by holding elections
at the local level and naturally working up through the districts and pro-
vinces before national elections were attempted.

When I asked Walt the reason for his military optimism, he said
that the problem was that the VC had never been a purely indigenous
force. On the contrary, they were being massively supplied from the
outside. They had direction entirely from the outside, which we could
note by monitoring the radio instructions. He, therefore, believed that
if we could get the North Vietnamese to cease their direction and supply,
the South Vietnamese guerrillas would eventually wither away--all the
more so as they had now become dependent on standardized supplies of
weapons.

Walt, too, gave me a file of documents from the Policy Planning
Staff, which I must study.

After I saw Rostow I had a long conversation with Ambassador
Unger, who is Deputy to Bundy and head of the Vietnamese task force
in the State Department. He struck me as an extremely able and unusually
thoughtful man. His view was that any negotiation would be extremely
difficult because the South Vietnamese government did not have enough

difficult because the South Vietnamese government did not have enough
thoughtful men. His view was that any negotiation would be extremely
in the State Department. He struck me as an extremely able and unselfishly
Under, who is Deputy to Bundy and head of the Vietnamese task force
After I saw Roatow I had a long conversation with Ambassador
State, which I must study.

Walt, too, gave me a file of documents from the Policy Planning
mesona.

more so as they had now become dependent on standardized supplies of
the South Vietnamese guerrilla would eventually wither away--all the
if we could get the North Vietnamese to cease their direction and supply,
note by monitoring the radio instructions. He, therefore, believed that
outside. They had direction entirely from the outside, which we could
force. On the contrary, they were beingmasaively supplied from the
that the problem was that the AC had never been a purely indigenous
when I asked Walt the reason for his military optimism, he said
vince before national elections were attempted.

at the local level and naturally working through the districts and bro-
begin the democratic process at a low level, say by holding elections
rather as individuals. Perhaps the most useful approach would be to
political process of South Vietnam, but not as an organized group,
the Communists in the South should be permitted to participate in the

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cohesion and because the Vietnamese mind was so complicated that they
would surely assume that this was the beginning of an American sell-out.
Under those conditions they would, without any doubt, make their own
arrangements. He reviewed with me various negotiating postures that
had been developed and explained to me some of the files that I had been
given. He felt that no clear idea existed. The operational people in
Washington were spending all their time on day-to-day matters and if we
were suddenly dragged into negotiations we would be in enormous difficulty.

After Ambassador Unger, I saw General Taylor, who was dapper
and shrewd as always. Taylor said that if we gave the existing program a
chance it would succeed. He thought the existing program had the follow-
ing components: aggressive military posture; an attempt to develop a
cohesive political structure in Vietnam; to adopt a correct attitude toward
negotiations internationally in order to take some of the pressure off.

I asked Taylor what he thought of the personnel of the Vietnamese
government. He said he thought the quality was very poor, but that they
were trying to do the right thing. The only thing to do at the moment was
to have patience and to work with them. There were some people, like
McNamara for instance, who wanted to take over the whole country. The
result of this would be that we would be involved in an imperial adventure
for an indefinite number of years with no hope of emerging from it and all
the while breaking the backbone psychologically of the Vietnamese effort.

the while presiding the packbone psychologically of the Vietnamese effort.
for an indefinite number of years with no hope of emerging from it and all
result of this would be that we would be involved in an imperialist adventure
McNamars for instance, who wanted to take over the whole country. The
to have patience and to work with them. There were some people, like
were trying to do the right thing. The only thing to do at the moment was
government. He said he thought the quality was very poor, but that they
I asked Taylor what he thought of the personnel of the Vietnamese
negotiations internationally in order to take some of the pressure off.

cooperative political structure in Vietnam; to adopt a correct attitude toward
ind components: aggressive military posture; an attempt to develop a
chance it would succeed. He thought the existing program had the follow-
and ahead as well as ways. Taylor said that if we gave the existing program a
After Ambassador Under, I saw General Taylor, who was dapper

were suddenly dragged into negotiations we would be in enormous difficulty.
Washington were spending all their time on day-to-day matters and if we
divided. He felt that no clear idea existed. The operational people in
had been developed and explained to me some of the files that I had been
arrangements. He reviewed with me various negotiating postures that
Under those conditions they would, without any doubt, make their own
would surely saame that this was the beginning of an American self-out.
coupeion and became the Vietnamese mind was so complicated that they

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He thought in any event that the Americans over-estimated what the psychological traffic would bear and he stressed again the imperative need of sticking to one policy and giving it a chance. He also urged me while I was in Vietnam to visit Bangkok and Laos in order to get an integrated picture of the area. He said that the Vietnamese army had greatly improved in recent months and he was in general quite optimistic about the military situation.

As to peace terms he was utterly opposed to a ceasefire, saying that any talk of a ceasefire in South Vietnam made his hair stand on end-- a policeman doesn't make a treaty with a bandit in a city. Moreover, once a ceasefire was arranged we would have the Chinese situation; that is, an area which was a recognized sanctuary. It would be impossible then to keep the war effort going with the necessary intensity. He felt that one major use of the bombing of North Vietnam was to give us a negotiating power because without the bombing North Vietnam might have no incentive to negotiate at all.

On the whole Taylor was, as always, intelligent and decisive, though I have always felt that he did not stand up for his views in the interdepartmental fighting. It was also apparent to me that Taylor had no seen any of the more recent documents on negotiating postures and since I did not know what his role was to be I did not enlighten him. However, I hope to see more of him before I leave and shortly after I return.

of the more recent documents on negotiating features and since I did not

I have always felt that he did not stand up for his views in the interdepert-

On the whole Taylor was, as always, intelligent and decline, though

that one major part of the bombing of North Vietnam was to give us a

apart the military situation.

greatly improved in recent months and he was in general quite optimistic
to the picture of the area. He said that the Vietnese army had

while I was in Vietnam to visit Bangkok and Laos in order to get an in-

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I asked General Taylor what he thought of the CIA program and he said that as an idea it was useful; however, there was an enormous shortage of qualified personnel for which every American agency was competing. In fact, it was General Taylor's view that American programs are far too elaborate for the availability of talent in Vietnam. I believe there is a great deal of merit in that. In fact, I had the impression that the CIA criticisms of the military program are part of a bureaucratic struggle. One of the arguments that Admiral Raborn made to me, which I think has validity, is that there is a total lack of an integrated plan and of criteria to determine success and failure. I asked whether any plan existed and he said yes, there existed pieces of paper; however, they were coordination among essentially autonomous operations and to prevent the worse cases of overlap they were not geared to a central concept. It was quite possible for different agencies to follow different philosophies and simply avoid overt competition.

cept. It was quite possible for different agencies to follow different
prevent the worse cases of overlap they were not desired to a central con-
they were coordination among essentially autonomous operations and to
and thus existed and he said yes, there existed pieces of paper, however,
plan and of criteria to determine success and failure. I asked whether
which I think has validity, is that there is a total lack of an integrated
cratic struggle. One of the arguments that Admiral Rapp made to me,
sion that the CIA criticisms of the military program are part of a pure
believe there is a great deal of merit in that. In fact, I had the impres-
ssions are far too elaborate for the availability of talent in Vietnam. I
competing. In fact, it was General Taylor's view that American pro-
shortage of qualified personnel for which every American agency was
he said that as an idea it was right; however, there was an enormous
I asked General Taylor what he thought of the CIA program and
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Day spent at CINCPAC, the headquarters in Honolulu

I arrived on Sunday evening, October 10th around midnight and went straight to my quarters. October 11th was spent in uninterrupted briefings from 9:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Many of the briefings dealt with highly classified matters having to do with operations and plans and, therefore, cannot be recorded here.

I started the day by meeting Lieutenant General Emrick, the Chief of Staff of the Pacific Command. Admiral Sharpe, the Commander, was away in Saigon. General Emrick explained the operational plan along the same lines as General Goodpaster already had in the Pentagon. I asked him about what would happen if the Vietcong would not fight in battalion-size units. General Emrick said that in that case many of our dispositions would not be applicable; then the war in Vietnam would become a pacification problem. I asked him whether he thought the Vietnamese government would be any better to deal with now than in 1961, when it faced this problem before. General Emrick then said that all the soldiers in Vietnam were being trained to be good will ambassadors handing out candy and defending the villages. There was an enormous distinction between American soldiers and French soldiers since the French had a stand-offish colonial attitude, but the American soldiers came as friends. I suggested that perhaps the problem was not only friendship but physical security against assassination. Many people in American cities are paying for protection against gangsters. This doesn't mean that they love the gangsters; it simply proves that the police are not able to protect them. General Emrick agreed, but it is apparent that all his thoughts are taken up

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with completing our buildup, for which the target date is December 31st,
and to carry out the existing plan of operation. This is not to say that it
is unimportant to smash battalion-size units of the Vietcong, but from what
I have seen here, it is more a problem of assuring physical security, which
is not being dealt with at least by our military commanders.

I asked General Emrick about the bomb campaign in the North. He
expressed the view that its significance was not the introduction of supplies
into the South but that it absorbed North Vietnamese energies in reconstruction
and brought home to them the dangers of intervening in the affairs of their
neighbors. He described the difficulty of communications encountered in the
North. According to General Emrick it was practically impossible for vehicles
or trains or boats to move during the daytime. Enormous efforts were being
made to move at night. Vehicles were being camoflagged, the pontoon bridges
were being sunk in the daytime and raised at night, and even though a rudi-
mentary communication system was being maintained in the North, it was obvious
that it was absorbing resources which could otherwise be used to prosecute
the war in the South. In addition, the bombing campaign was harming China.
The connection between the Kumming Province in China and another province
closer to the sea, went by railway through North Vietnam. This railway has
now been interdicted at twenty places--incidentally without any Chinese attempt
to stop it. General Emrick expressed the view that to stop bombing simply
because North Vietnam has gone to the conference table would be militarily
extremely dangerous. The present bombing campaign has reduced the number of
forces either North Vietnam or Communist China could put into South Vietnam,
according to General Emrick's estimate, cutting the number in half to about
40,000 men. If the North Vietnamese were given a chance to restore the

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communication system, the danger of intervention with organized military units
in the South would again become very great.

I asked the General what they had learned militarily from the bombing
campaign. He said that they had been surprised by the effectiveness of the
anti-aircraft defenses and particularly of the ability of anti-aircraft guns
to hit high performance aircraft. Until the bombing campaign in the North,
it had been assumed that the traditional anti-aircraft guns would have had
great difficulty hitting high-performance aircraft. This has been proved
wrong. On the other hand, the surface-to-air missiles have proved less
troublesome than expected, and measures were being taken to reduce their
effectiveness even further by electronic counter devices.

After I saw General Emrick I spent the rest of the day, except for
lunch, with members of his staff, including Rear Admiral Gay, who is J5
in charge of plans and Brigadier General Brown, who is J2 in charge of
Intelligence. In addition I received a number of briefings about the
organizational structure of the Pacific Command and about the concept for
operations in Vietnam. The most impressive briefing probably concerned
Chinese military capabilities. A very briläant officer explained the Chinese
deployment in South China. The estimate is that there are some fifty divisions
and 400 airplanes, of which perhaps 25-30 divisions could be used in an all-out
attack on Southeast Asia and 8-10 in an attack if it were confined to South
Vietnam. In order to stop these units with conventional means one would require
one American division for every two Chinese. If nuclear weapons were used the
proportion would be substantially reduced. As for air operations, if there

brodown would be apuntably reduced. As for air operations, it there
one American division for every two Chinese. It nuclear weapons were used the
Vietnam. In order to stop these units with conventional means one would require
attack on Southeast Asia and 8-10 in an attack if it were confined to South
and 400 airplanes, of which perhaps 32-30 divisions could be used in an all-out
deployment in South China. The estimate is that there are some fifty divisions
Chinese military capabilities. A very brilliant officer explained the Chinese
operations in Vietnam. The most impressive briefing properly concerned
organizational structure of the Pacific Command and about the concept for
intelligence. In addition I received a number of briefings about the
in charge of planes and Brigadier General Brown, who is 13 in charge of
inch, with members of his staff, including Rear Admiral Goy, who is 12
After I saw General Emrick I asked the rest of the day, except for
effectiveness even further by electronic counter devices.

troublesome than expected, and measures were being taken to reduce their
wrong. On the other hand, the surface-to-air missiles have proved less
Great difficulty in hitting high-performance aircraft. This has been proved
it had been assumed that the traditional anti-aircraft guns would have had
to hit high performance aircraft. Until the pumping campaign in the North,
anti-aircraft defenses and particularly of the ability of anti-aircraft guns
campaign. He said that they had been embittered by the effectiveness of the
I asked the General what they had learned militarily from the pumping
in the South would again become very great.

communication system, the danger of intervention with organised military units

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were no sanctuary, the assumption is that one month's operations would wipe
out the Chinese air force. If there is a full-scale Chinese intervention
in Southeast Asia, additional American forces will have to be sent--maybe
something like five-six divisions. The estimate of the Chinese ability to
sustain operations was, however, very limited and most of those present were
of the view that the Chinese were extremely unlikely to engage in a full-
scale attack in Southeast Asia. The belief was that most of the energies
of the Chinese over the next year or two would be spent keeping the war going
in South Vietnam at something like its present scale of intensity.

I had lunch with General Vogt, a former Fellow at the Center who is
now in charge of plans and operations of all the air forces in the Pacific.
He explained the command structure of the Pacific Air Forces to me and the
method of operation. He elaborated on the views already expressed by General
Emrick to the effect that our bombing campaign was making communications within
North Vietnam extremely difficult. He thought also that the casualty figures
that we gave were probably on the low side. The casualty figures were based
on an actual physical body count. On this basis no casualties had ever been
claimed for B-52 raids. On the other hand no B-52 raid was scheduled unless
there had been intelligence indicating the presence of Viet Cong forces. It was
extremely unlikely, according to General Vogt, that our B-52s hit absolutely
nothing. Vigt also argued that the B-52 raids represent some of the cheapest
methods of using our power. The bombs were in practically unlimited supply;
the B-52s would be on training missions of similar duration anyway and this
gave them extremely good practice in targeting under nearly perfect conditions.

Gave them extremely good practice in targeting under nearly perfect conditions. the B-23a would be on training missions of similar duration anyway and this methods of using our power. The pompe were in practically unlimited submity; nothing. Aigt also argued that the B-23 raids represent some of the cheapest extremely unlikely, according to General Vogt, that our B-23a fit absolutely there had been intelligence indicating the presence of Viet Cong forces. It was claimed for B-23 raids. On the other hand no B-23 raid was scheduled unless on an actual physical body count. On this basis no casualties had ever been that we gave were probably on the low side. The casualty figures were based North Vietnam extremely difficult. He thought also that the casualty figures Emrick to the effect that our pumping campaign was making communications within method of operation. He elaborated on the views already expressed by General He explained the command structure of the Pacific Air Forces to me and the now in charge of planes and operations of all the air forces in the Pacific.

I had launch with General Vogt, a former Fellow at the Center who is in South Vietnam at something like its present scale of intensity.

of the Chinese over the next year or two would be absent keeping the war going scale attack in Southeast Asia. The belt was that most of the energies of the view that the Chinese were extremely unlikely to engage in a full-sustain operations was, however, very limited and most of those present were something like five-six divisions. The estimate of the Chinese ability to in Southeast Asia, additional American forces will have to be sent--maybe out the Chinese air force. If there is a full-scale Chinese intervention were no sanctuary, the assumption is that one month's operations would wipe

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No B-52s had been lost except on the first day when two planes collided. In other words, for supporting the Vietnam war SAC was paying no more than it would have to pay for its training anyway.

Vogt felt that it was absolutely out of the question to stop bombing North Vietnam at the beginning of a conference. In his view the bombing would have to be maintained until there was an iron-clad settlement. But he said that he recognized that the political situation in Washington and in the world might make this impossible. He also pointed out that our air forces were growing. By December 31st we will have double the number now available and the number of sorties which can be mounted against the Vietcong will increase. He believed that the morale of the pilots was very high, partly because of very efficient rescue methods, which assured pilots that if they were shot down every effort would be made to pick them up. His estimate was that about 50% of the pilots shot down were in fact being recovered. Vogt thought that the Chinese could mount a powerful blow if they used their airforce; particularly as they have increased air field protection in the South of China and moved about a third of their total fighter force into the area. However, in any long, drawn-out war, particularly one in which no sanctuaries were granted, the Chinese airforce would be used up in less than a month and after that the United States would be able to do in South China what it had been doing in North Vietnam--that is, interrupt communications nearly at will. Vogt, therefore, did not believe that the Chinese would intervene in South Vietnam with organized military forces.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Vogt thought that the present ambassador in Saigon, Lodge, is a great improvement over Taylor. There were two reasons: (1) Taylor was almost exclusively focused on military operations and he therefore neglected the crudially important problem of establishing a stable government; and (2) Taylor was so conscious of hierarchy that he had become insensitive to the psychological requirements of the local situation. Vogt told me of a situation where Taylor called in all the ruling generals in Vietnam and gave them a dressing down as if they were a group of school boys, pointing out that he was a general already when most of them were lieutenants and that they had better follow his advice.

General Vogt explained the command structure in the Vietnam air war for me. The Second Air Division under General Moore with headquarters in Saigon is responsible for air strikes in South Vietnam. In this capacity General Moore reports directly to General Westmoreland. The SAC bombers on Guam--used in South Vietnam--are controlled from Washington. The bombing of Laos is under General Moore and indirectly under General Westmoreland. The bombing of North Vietnam is conducted mostly from Thailand or from Guam. This is directly under CINCPAC. Thus, according to General Vogt, the bombing of North Vietnam is not really designed to support the immediate tactical situation in South Vietnam but to achieve the political objective of forcing the Vietnamese to the conference table and bringing home to them the risks of supporting wars of liberation in neighboring territories.

General Vogt also told me that as the Vietnamese ground war was turning against the Vietcong main force units they were resorting increasingly to

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terrorism. He told me that the losses to the terrorist activity in Saigon were much greater than was being announced because they did not wish to demoralize or upset the family. He told me about a group of airmen that were standing outside a Saigon restaurant and were hit by hand grenades thrown by passing bicyclists. He urged me not to move into a hotel but to stay in an American installation that can be protected and if possible to stick to my plan to stay with Ambassador Lodge. He thought that any other course would simply be asking for trouble. For other areas he didn't have anything very helpful to suggest.

Some General Observations

1. I was impressed by the single-mindedness with which the plan for the current concept of operations is being carried out. The planned deployment of American forces is extremely impressive and I have no question that it will succeed in preventing the Vietcong from operating in large, organized military units. It is less clear to me that this concept is useful if the Vietcong go back to the Stage II type of guerrilla activity that is, assassinations, and company-sized units. It does not seem to me there is any concept for pacification or any clear focus of responsibility. In fact there is a distinct difference in approach between the Marines and the Army. The Marine concept is to secure an area absolutely and then gradually start probing out, but create a very compact and tight base first. The Marine division at Danang is essentially in this posture. The Army concept is to organize a reasonably secure base with a much smaller circumference and then keep probing deeply out from there in order to try to draw the Vietcong into combat and use up their forces in this manner.

nd their forces in this manner.

deeply out from there in order to try to draw the Vietcong into combat and use
reasonably secure passes with a much smaller circumference and then keep bugging
Danang is essentially in this posture. The Army concept is to organise a
out, put create a very compact and tight pass first. The Marine division at
Marine concept is to secure an area adequately and then gradually start bugging
is a distinct difference in approach between the Marines and the Army. The
concept for pacification or any clear focus of responsibility. In fact there
assassinations, and company-sized units. It does not seem to me there is any
if the Vietcong go back to the Stage II type of guerrilla activity that is,
organsised military units. It is less clear to me that this concept is meaningful
that it will succeed in preventing the Vietcong from operating in large,
deployment of American forces is extremely impressive and I have no question
the current concept of operations is being carried out. The biannned

I. I was impressed by the single-mindedness with which the plan for
Some General Observations

concern would simply be asking for trouble. For other areas he didn't have
stick to my plan to stay with Ambassador Lodge. He thought that any other
stay in an American installation that can be protected and it possible to
thrown by basing pickaxes. He urged me not to move into a hotel put to
were standing outside a Saigon restaurant and were put by hand grenades
demoralize or abase the family. He told me about a group of men that
were much greater than was being announced because they did not wish to
terrorism. He told me that the losses to the terrorist activity in Saigon

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2. I was impressed by the fact that no one could really explain to me how even on the most favorable assumptions about the war in Vietnam the war was going to end. After the main Vietcong unit forces were smashed, the general assumption was that some kind of pacification would take place. However, the Intelligence people agreed that it would be impossible at this moment to identify the Vietcong. The assumption was that after victory had been achieved, the population would assist in identifying them. But there is clearly a circular argument. If the population does not help in identifying them, we cannot move against them; if we cannot move against them, we cannot have victory.

3. Another area in which our present thinking is defective is with respect to infiltration. At CINCPAC no more than in Washington was I able to determine just how the infiltration from North Vietnam is being conducted. The consensus now seems to be that most of the supplies do not come in through the so-called Ho Chi Min trail, but rather by sea. The reason is that many arms dumps are found not in the mountains through which the Ho Chi Min trail comes, but close to the sea. And also that it is not easy to explain how the arms supplies could be transported over land into the deepest part of the South, where apparently a large supply exists.

4. One of the anomalies of the present situation is the fact that in the most populous region and the one that has the largest concentration of population and the largest surplus of rice there are no American troops and only very few air bases. When I asked the briefing officer why this was, he replied that the South Vietnamese had very large forces in this area. I then

replied that the South Vietnamese had very large forces in this area. I then
only very few air planes. When I asked the briefing officer why this was, he
bustulation and the largest airplane of rice there are no American troops and
the most populous region and the one that has the largest concentration of
4. One of the anomalies of the present situation is the fact that in
South, where apparently a large subbasry exists.

army subbasies could be transported over land into thedeepest part at the
comea, but close to the sea. And also that it is not easy to explain how the
army queue are found not in the mountains through which the Ho Chi Min trail
the so-called Ho Chi Min trail, but rather by sea. The reason is that many
The consensus now seems to be that most of the subbasies do not come in through
to determine just how the infiltration from North Vietnam is being conducted.
respect to infiltration. At CINCPAC no more than in Washington was I able
3. Another area in which our present thinking is defective is with
them, we cannot have victory.

identifying them, we cannot move against them; if we cannot move against
there is clearly a circular argument. If the population does not help in
had been achieved, the population would assist in identifying them. But
this moment to identify the Vietcong. The assumption was that after victory
However, the Intelligence people agreed that it would be impossible at
the General assumption was that some kind of pacification would take place.
which was going to end. After the main Vietcong unit forces were eliminated,
we now even on the most favorable assumptions about the war in Vietnam the
5. I was impressed by the fact that no one could really explain to

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pointed out to him that on his own deployment chart the South Vietnamese forces in the delta area were exactly of the same strength as in every other corps. This indeed makes sense, because command of the corps is a politically important position and no corps commander would willingly have his rivals for power command more troops than he does. At this point the briefing officer took refuge in the argument that it was against the interests of the Vietcong to mount too many activities in the South because it would simply bring American troops in and they needed the South for recruiting and for rice supplies. But if this is true, should we not be in the South in order to prevent this? This is a matter that I must look into further when I go to Vietnam.

A Few Comments about Personalities

General Emrick is smooth, skillful, analytical. A good product of the McNamara era. What worries me about him is that he seems too intellectual and I am not sure how he would stand up under real stress. This too seems to be a drawback of the McNamara era.

Among the staff officers I was impressed by General Brown, the
Intelligence man, who was a leat and &n top of the job. He clearly did
not tell me more than he wanted to tell me.

There was also a splendid junior officer, Major Armstrong, who
explained the command structure and deployment of American forces in the
Pacific.

Pacific.

explained the command structure and deployment of American forces in the
There was also a splendid junior officer, Major Armstrong, who
not tell me more than he wanted to tell me.

Intelligence man, who was a smart and can do the job. He clearly did
Among the staff officers I was impressed by General Brown, the
This too seems to be a drawback of the McMurray era.

intellectual and I am not sure how he would stand up under real stress.
of the McMurray era. What worries me about him is that he seems too
General Emrick is smooth, skillful, analytical. A good product

## A Few Comments about Personalities

in the South in order to prevent this? This is a matter that I must look
recruiting and for rice subplies. But if this is true, should we not be
it would simply bring American troops in and they needed the South for
interests of the Vietcong to mount too many activities in the South because
the briefing officer took refuge in the argument that it was against the
pave the rivals for power command more troops than he does. At this point
a politically important position and no corba commander would willingly
other corba. This indeed makes sense, because command of the corba is
forces in the delta area were exactly the same strength as in every
pointed out to him that on his own deployment chart the South Vietnamese

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General Vogt has gained weight and has become much more mature than when I knew him as a Colonel. He is no longer so aggressively on the make as he was then, but he doesn't need to be, having achieved a great deal.

I was not particularly impressed by RADM Gay, the plans officer.
His concept of planning seemed to me to be a projection of the present into
the future.

When I get to Vietnam I must look into three problems: (1) How many forces it will take to maintain the present favorable situation; (2) Under what circumstances one can foresee withdrawing some American forces; (3) What we will do with our present force structure in Vietnam, if the Vietcong go back to the stage II type of guerrilla action.

I am quite convinced that too much planning in the government and a great deal of military planning assumes that the opponent is stupid and that he will fight the kind of war for which one is best prepared. However, I am struck by the recent long statement of the Chinese Communist leaders in which they emphasize that the essence of guerrilla warfare is never to fight the kind of war your opponent expects. Having moved very many large units into Vietnam, a course with which on the whole I agree, we must not become prisoners now of a large-unit mentality. Otherwise I think that we will face the problem of psychological exhaustion.

To sum up, I don't object to the present concepts; in fact, I think they are extremely intelligent. Our build-up has been conducted in a masterly way technically. No doubt as these enclaves are established along the coast, we will begin connecting them and have an unbroken protected area going from Saigon north. My concern is that all of our plans are based on the theory that

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

once the Communists have moved from stage II to stage III--that is, from
company 5 action to regimental-type actions--they can never revert back to
stage II. The massive build-up we are undertaking is very useful against
battalion and regimental-type units, but it makes no allowance for the fact
that the enemy may be clever and may not be playing our game. For example,
I asked Admiral Gay what would happen if American patrols went out day
after day without making contact with the Vietcong, but if on the way home
one or two Americans would be killed because the roads were booby-trapped
or perhaps there was an isolated sniper hidden away. He said that this
would present an enormous problem and he did not know how long we would stand
that kind of a situation politically. However, I would expect that this is what
would happen. At the same time there is a great deal of confidence that the
Communists will stand and defend their underground supply dumps. This indeed
is the big hope for forcing a destruction of the main forces units. Again
it may work out this way, but I am not sure. If the Communists are going
to lose their supply dumps anyway, I do not see why they should throw their
main force units into a hopeless battle and compound their losses of material
by losing their manpower. Moreover, until about a year ago we did not even
know about the existence of these supply dumps, thinking that most of the
supplies came in from the outside. Finally, in the recent year, the main effort
of Vietcong activity has moved from the Mekong Delta to the area north of Saigon,
or a distance of some 300 miles. In other words, the Communists cannot possibly
be so dependent on previously established supply dumps or they must have a
capability to move these supply dumps. I asked General Brown what would happen

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mind. He was taking an enormous amount of opium. If Diem had let Nhu go both of them would still be alive today. He told me that he would show me his dispatches for the whole month of October 1963 and then let me decide for myself whether he acted rightly. I must say that I find Lodge's behavior here rather admirable. He is gruff and he does not have the highest IQ. But he is an extremely honorable and straightforward person.

A word about the weather here. The temperature is always like Washington in August and it never goes down even at night. The temperature is close to 80. At the same time the humidity is very high though for some reason it does not have quite the enervating effect that it does in a heat wave in the United States. There is something soft and all enveloping about the heat here. Almost as if you could feel the air physically. But it does not produce the extreme discomfort of a heat wave in the United States. On the other hand, one is never really cool except in an air conditioned office. The constant alteration between air conditioned individual offices and the slightly steamy atmosphere outside causes almost everybody to suffer from a cold.

After breakfast I went to see General Lansdale. We discussed the general situation. Lansdale said that he found conditions in Vietnam infinitely worse than he had expected. The spirit had gone out of the people who had been fighting for twenty-five years and most of whom simply wanted to be left alone. The Vietnamese government could not be called a government in any normal sense. They were trying to do some things but their writ ran hardly outside of Saigon and they lacked the technical competence and the drive to carry out their programs. Moreover, the constant American pressure for reform was beginning also to have a demoralizing effect. Matters had to be handled much more

tighting for twenty-five years and most of whom simply wanted to be left alone.

situation. I am sorry I did not say it earlier, but I was in a hurry and had been

After breakfast I went to see General Lamdale. We discussed the General

Vimost as if you could feel the air physically. But it does not produce the

here rather admirable. He is gruff and he doesn't have the highest IQ. But

mind. He was taking an enormous amount of obituaries. Itrem had let me go

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tactfully than heretofore. An American should not force the Vietnamese to
move faster than they were capable of moving. He thought that the pacification
problem was fantastic and of a magnitude that the Army simply did not understand.
The report of pacification by the Army were based on an entirely formalistic
criteria having to do with a number of incidents and large unit engagements.
However, the real problem was the existence of a highly organized Vietcong
political aparatus which penetrated every aspect of Vietnamese life and which
existed in every village as a de facto government. This was true even in the
areas of major American concentrations. For example, in the Danang area where
the Marines had been operating now for several months, one could not really
speak of a governmental authority. Indeed, the situation was so uncertain that
the government was reluctant to make a major political effort there because it
was afraid that its officials would simply be assassinated if they appeared
in this area.

Another complicating feature is that anything that the government
undertakes is viewed in the light of its own internal rivalries. The first
corps commander is General Thi who is widely considered as a possible claimant
to leadership of the country. Therefore, the ruling Directory is not too
eager to strengthen its position in the Danang area because they are afraid
that he will merely use it as a base to take over Saigon some day.

Lansdale then showed me a book that had been prepared in one of the
provinces where, as a particularly good province chief, in which a complete
survey had been made of the available personnel of the existing Vietcong of
the resources and he showed me a rather moving letter which the province chief

the resources and he showed me a rather moving letter which the province chief
survey had been made of the available personnel of the existing Vietcong of
provinces where, as a particularly good province chief, in which a complete
Lanadale then showed me a book that had been prepared in one of the
that he will merely use it as a base to take over Saigon some day.

eager to strengthen its position in the Danang area because they are afraid
to leadership of the country. Therefore, the ruling Directory is not too
corba commander is General Th who is widely considered as a possible claimant
undertakes to view in the light of its own internal rivalries. The first
Another complicating feature is that anything that the Government
in this area.

was afraid that its officials would simply be assassinated if they appeared
the Government was reluctant to make a major political effort there because it
asked of a Governmental authority. Indeed, the situation was so uncertain that
the Marines had been operating now for several months, one could not really
areas of major American concentrations. For example, in the Danang area where
existed in every village as a de facto Government. This was true even in the
political apparatus which penetrated every aspect of Vietnamese life and which
However, the real problem was the existence of a highly organised Vietcong
criteria having to do with a number of incidents and large unit engagements.

The report of pacification by the Army were based on an entirely formalistic
problem was fantastic and of a magnitude that the Army simply did not understand.
move faster than they were capable of moving. He thought that the pacification
tactfully than heretofore. An American should not force the Vietnamese to

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had written to him to the effect that only a positive program could make all their sufferings and sacrifices seem worthwhile. He promised to have a copy made of this book and I hope to study it.

As an example of the demoralization of the Vietnamese life, Lansdale told me of a senior official who said to him at dinner the other day: "We're an empty piece of paper, please write on us, please tell us what to do." He said it would take a minimum of five years to break the Vietcong political apparatus. The situation was incomparably more difficult than in the Philippines. I asked him whether he thought that his effort could substitute for the Phase II build-up. He said absolutely not. This was a pet idea of Lodge's but that it was asking too much of him. Phase II forces were needed and even with them it would be very difficult.

From Lansdale I went to see Mr. Jorgenson, the CIA station chief and two of his assistants. They made an assessment of the situation very similar to that of Lansdale's. They said official reports indicated that only 25 % of the population were under Vietcong control. This was absurd. 50% of the population were under substantial Vietcong control in the sense that the Vietcong were operating in the villages at night and were in the position to impose their will selectively. Of the remaining 50% another substantial portion was under varying degree of Vietcong influence. They agreed with Lansdale that the real impact of the Vietcong derived from their political organization and until the political organization was broken in the villages, the military operations could not be decisive. I asked them whether they had any indications that in the areas where the United States had established base areas the hold of the Vietcong was being broken. They said they had no proof of it yet, not even the proof of an increase of intelligence. They were setting up a number of test cases, however,

an increase of intelligence. They were setting up a number of test cases, however, was being probed. They said they had no brood of it yet, not even the brood of where the United States had established base areas the hold of the Vietcong

not be decisive. I asked them whether they had any indications that in the areas political organization was broken in the villages, the military obstructions could impact of the Vietcong derived from their political organization and until the varying degree of Vietcong influence. They agreed with Lamedale that the real will selectively. Of the remaining 20% another substantial portion was under were operating in the villages at night and were in the position to impose their population were under substantial Vietcong control in the sense that the Vietcong the population were under Vietcong control. This was absurd. 20% of the to that of Lamedale's. They said official reports indicated that only 22% of two of his assistants. They made an assessment of the situation very similar from Lamedale I went to see Mr. Jorgenson, the CIV station chief and it would be very difficult.

it was asking too much of him. Phase II forces were needed and even with them build-up. He said absolutely not. This was a bad idea of Lodge's put that I asked him whether he thought that his effort could supplant for the Phase II abparatus. The situation was incomparably more difficult than in the Philippines. said it would take a minimum of five years to break the Vietcong political an empty piece of paper, please write on me, please tell me what to do." He told me of a senior official who said to him at dinner the other day: "We're As an example of the demoralization of the Vietnamese life, Lamedale made of this book and I pobe to study it."

their antecedents and sacrifices seem worthwhile. He promised to have a copy had written to him to the effect that only a positive program could make all

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in order to find out whether this might be the case. They had selected four provinces, one in each corps area and in a few months they would know whether there had been any change in the situation. However, if there was a change it certainly was not very dramatic and very obvious.

The CIA assessment of the military operations was that the military were too pedantic and had not really learned from the French experience. They were operating much too slowly and much too carefully and from the Vietcong's point of view much too predictably. Moving out from base areas in small concentric circles had the practical effect of tiping off their operations. It was the assessment of this group also that we would find less and less contact with large Vietcong units. Indeed, they would not be surprised if the Vietcong would move into some kind of a negotiation phase.

I asked whether they agreed with the assessment that I had heard so frequently in Washington that it was impossible to go back from stage III to stage II guerrilla operations. They absolutely rejected this notion. First of all the Vietcong had gone back from stage III to stage II in 1951 at the time of the war against the French. If the Vietcong did this they would lose a lot of hangers-on but the cadres would remain essentially uneffected. If the political battle was not won in the villages through careful tough detailed operation, the Vietcong would emerge as the strongest force. The fear of this group was that if the Vietcong stood down their operations and if the number of incidents on our charts dropped, the American military effort would slow down as well. If then we began withdrawing troops the Vietcong would be able to use this as a demonstration to the population that the American presence was ephemeral; the government would draw its own conclusion and the whole house

was ephemeral; the Government would draw its own conclusion and the whole house to use this as a demonstration to the population that the American presence down as well. If then we began withdrawing troops the Vietcong would be able of incidents on our charts drobed, the American military effort would slow group was that if the Vietcong stood down their operations and if the number operation, the Vietcong would emerge as the strongest force. The fear of this political battle was not won in the villages through careful tough detailed a lot of hangers-on put the cadres would remain essentially unetacted. It the time of the war against the French. It the Vietcong did this they would lose of all the Vietcong had gone back from stage III to stage II in 1921 at the stage II guerrilla operations. They absolutely rejected this notion. First frequently in Washington that it was impossible to go back from stage III to I asked whether they agreed with the assessment that I had heard so surprised if the Vietcong would move into some kind of a negotiation phase. less and less contact with large Vietcong units. Indeed, they would not be operations. It was the assessment of this group also that we would find in small concentric circles had the practical effect of tibing off their Vietcong's point of view much too predictably. Moving out from base areas they were operating much too slowly and much too carefully and from the were too bedantic and had not really learned from the French experience.

The CIA assessment of the military operations was that the military it certainly was not very dramatic and very obvious.

there had been any change in the situation. However, if there was a change provinces, one in each corbe area and in a few months they would know whether in order to find out whether this might be the case. They had selected four

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of cards would come tumbling down. They estimated that it would take a
minimum of three years to break the Vietcong political apparatus.

I asked whether they knew who the Vietcong were so that our demand
that the Vietcong surface be given some concrete meaning. They said they
knew the Vietcong at the province level but they did not know the names of
the Vietcong at the district and fighting level and that in many cases they
knew only the code names.

I asked about the NLF and what they knew about it. They said that
penetration of the NLF was something that had to be handled in the closest
cooperation with the Vietnamese government. Anything that looked to the
Vietnamese like an independent American operation would arouse suspicions
and cause the Vietnamese to make their own approaches. I had to remember
that the Vietnamese were the most devious people in the world. Compared
to the Vietnamese the Chinese were models of straightlacedness and
directness.

I asked whether in the judgment of this group there were any elements
of the NLF that could be split away and whether approaches to the NLF might
prove fruitful. The group's judgment was that all key positions in the NLF
were held by Communists and that it would be futile to attempt to deal with
the NLF as a unit. It might be possible to split off an occasional individual
but this would not effect the major orientation of the NLF. Moreover, if we
dealt with the NLF directly without the South Vietnamese government, the NLF
would have a high incentive to inform the South Vietnamese government and,
therefore, demoralize it. If we tried to deal with the NLF through the South

therefore, demoralise it. If we tried to deal with the NLF through the South
would have a high incentive to inform the South Vietnamese Government and,
desist with the NLF directly without the South Vietnamese Government, the NLF
but this would not effect the major orientation of the NLF. Moreover, it we
the NLF as a unit. It might be possible to split off an occasional individual
were held by Communists and that it would be futile to attempt to deal with
broke fruitful. The Group's judgment was that all key positions in the NLF
of the NLF that could be split away and whether abroaches to the NLF might
directness.

to the Vietnamese the Chinese were models of straight-lacedness and
that the Vietnamese were the most deviant people in the world. Compared
and cause the Vietnamese to make their own abroaches. I had to remember
Vietnamese like an independent American operation would arise an abolicive
cooperation with the Vietnamese Government. Anything that looked to the
penetration of the NLF was something that had to be handled in the closest
knew only the code names.

the Vietcong at the district and fighting level and that in many cases they
knew the Vietcong at the province level but they did not know the names of
that the Vietcong surface be given some concrete meaning. They said they
I asked whether they knew who the Vietcong were so that our demand
minimum of three years to preck the Vietcong political abrogation.

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Vietnamese government it might collapse. We simply have to face the fact
that the existing political structure in South Vietnam was tender and did not
permit much experimentation.

I asked about a cease fire. They thought it was possible that the
DXW would at some point propose a withdrawal of its so called volunteers
--that is to say the 25th division--and an end of infiltration if we would
stop bombing. This would be a very bad deal for us because (1) we have no
way of knowing whether the infiltration had stopped and (2) because the
DVR would be simply stopping something that they should never have done in
the first place and that has had no major impact on military operations in
the South. As for a cease-fire within the South, this would have disastrous
consequences particularly if the Vietcong were permitted to remain in
possession of their base areas. I might add here that this was also General
Westmoreland's view though I did not record it in my conversation.

The group then told me about their program with the Montagnards which
had been designed to establish a check on infiltration at the Laos and
Vietnamese border. There attempt had been to operate in small groups and
to establish a deep security belt. This program had been to all practical
purposes defeated by two events: (1) the almost pathological distrust of
the Vietnamese of the Montagnards. They had the impression that the Vietnamese
would prefer to have the Montagnards go Communist than to be dependent on
them militarily. At the same time they also believe that the Montagnards
were substantially infiltrated by the Vietcong. I asked the group what they
thought about this and they said there were several indications of it including
the fact that the Vietcong had left the Montagnards alone and had not committed

the fact that the Vietcong had left the Montagnards alone and had not committed
thought about this and they said there were several indications of it including
were напатially infiltrated by the Vietcong. I asked the group what they
them militarily. At the same time they also believe that the Montagnards
would prefer to have the Montagnards go Communist than to be dependent on
the Vietnamese of the Montagnards. They had the impression that the Vietnamese
burboase defeated by two events: (1) the almost pathological automat of
to establish a deep security belt. This program had been to all practical
Vietnamese border. There attempt had been to operate in small groups and
had been designed to establish a check on infiltration at the base and

The group then told me about their problem with the Montagnards which
Weatmoreland's view though I did not record it in my conversation.

bassistance of their base areas. I might add here that this was also General
consequences particularly if the Vietcong were permitted to remain in
the South. As far a cease-fire within the South, this would have diatrasms
the first place and that has had no major impact on military operations in
DAR would be simply stopping something that they should never have done in
way of knowing whether the infiltration had stopped and (2) because the
stop pumping. This would be a very bad deal for me because (1) we have no
--that is to say the 23rd division--and an end of infiltration if we would
DMK would at some point brooke a withdrawal of its so called volunteers
I asked about a cease fire. They thought it was possible that the
permit much experimentation.

that the existing political structure in South Vietnam was tender and did not
Vietnamese government it might collabes. We simply have to face the fact

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any assassinations in that area. (2) The second factor that had defeated their program in the highlands was the insistence by General Taylor that it be put under the military as part of the Special Forces. As a result the Montagnards' organization was changed from small mobile units into battalions spaced at distances of more than fifty miles apart and charged with patrolling the area in between. The practical consequence was, however, that they would send out one patrol. This patrol might then get sniped at by the Vietcong. It would then return to camp, come back with heavier equipment and pretty soon all the posts were busy defending themselves and could not perform their primary mission of attempting to check on infiltration.

I asked whether there was any possibility to create in Vietnam a structure similar to what had happened in Laos. They argued that first of all that what happened in Laos was not too brilliant. It had come off better than we had had a right to expect because Vietnamese energies had been absorbed in South Vietnam not because of the intrinsic merit of the operation. Secondly, there was no neutralist element comparable to Souvanna Phouma that could be used as the nucleus. They reiterated the enormous danger of putting too much strain on the existing political structure. The United States should stick to what it was doing and keep it going or all the sacrifices of the last year would be in vain. I suggested that the group might prepare an estimate of the situation in Vietnam on the hypothesis of various negotiating positions. This should be done well in advance of the need for it so that these problems would not have to be faced under stress. They promised to address themselves to it as soon as possible.

They browned to address themselves to it as soon as possible.

the need for it so that these problems would not have to be faced under stress.
of various negotiating positions. This should be done well in advance of
Grobh might prepare an estimate of the situation in Vietnam on the pythons
all the sacrifices of the last year would be in vain. I suggested that the
The United States should stick to what it was doing and keep it going or
enormous danger of butting too much strain on the existing political structure.

Bonvanna Bionna that could be used as the nucleus. They reiterated the
operation. Secondly, there was no neutralist element comparable to
been absorbed in South Vietnam not because of this intrinsic merit of the
better than we had had a right to expect because Vietnamese energies had
of all that what happened in Laos was not too brilliant. It had come off
a structure similar to what had happened in Laos. They argued that first
I asked whether there was any possibility to create in Vietnam
infiltration.

and could not perform their primary mission of attempting to check on
equipment and pretty soon all the boats were ploy defending themselves
by the Vietcong. It would then return to camp, come back with heavier
that they would send out one patrol. This patrol might then get sniped at
with patrolling the area in between. The practical consequence was, however,
pattitions spaced at distances of more than fifty miles apart and charged
to the Montagnards, organisation was changed from small mobile units into
it be but under the military as part of the Special Forces. As a result
their program in the highlands was the inductence by General Taylor that
anyissions in that area. (3) The second factor that had defeated
the second factor that had defeated

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I asked about the RAND Report about the complete demoralization of the Vietcong prisoners, about the great impact of air operations, which seemed to indicate that the Vietcong were on the verge of military defeat. The judgment of the group was that these were widely optimistic. Their impression was that the RAND group had come out with preconceived notions to prove that military operations were successful. The RAND study seemed to the CIA too much influenced by the military pre-dispositions and they were essentially telling the military what they wanted to hear. Moreover, the sample of prisoners was much too small; that is, those people taken prisoner were most likely to say what they thought was wanted. In any case, it did not address itself to the main problem, which was VC political control of the countryside through a superb organization which was very difficult to shake.

In the afternoon I went to the Circle Sportif which is what passes for the exclusive swimming club in Saigon. Like everything else here it is run down and somewhat dilapidated. It permits some relief from the heat in its swimming pool.

Before going out to dinner with Lodge I had a quick drink with him. He told me that he had just completed his part in the oral history project on the Kennedy administration, and had described his experiences in the months preceding the Diem overthrow. He said that he had been told that Sorenson and Schlesinger had claimed that Kennedy knew nothing about the plan to overthrow Diem. He said this was complete nonsense. Lodge knew the plan exactly and he knew the day which it would occur. The only thing he did not know was the exact hour. He said that he had informed Kennedy of the fact and he again offered to show me his dispatches to prove it. He also asked me to read

again offered to show me his dispatches to prove it. He also asked me to read
the exact hour. He said that he had informed Kennedy of the fact and he
he knew the day which it would occur. The only thing he did not know was
Diem. He said this was complete nonsense. Lodge knew the plan exactly and
Schleisinger had claimed that Kennedy knew nothing about the plan to overthrow
preceding the Diem overthrow. He said that he had been told that Borenao and
on the Kennedy administration, and had described his experiences in the months
He told me that he had just completed his part in the oral diatary project
Before going out to dinner with Lodge I had a quick drink with him.

swimming pool.

down and somewhat dilapidated. It permits some relief from the heat in its
down and somewhat dilapidated. It permits some relief from the heat in its
the exclusive swimming club in Saigon. Like everything else here it is run
In the afternoon I went to the Circle Club which is what bases for
through a superb organization which was very difficult to shake.

itself to the main problem, which was AC political control of the countryside
likely to say what they thought was wanted. In any case, it did not address
bribery was much too small; that is, those people taken prisoner were most
telling the military what they wanted to hear. Moreover, the sample of
much influenced by the military pre-dispositions and they were essentially
military operations were successful. The RAND study seemed to the CIA too
was that the RAND group had come out with preconceived notions to prove that
judgment of the Group was that these were widely optimistic. Their impression
to indicate that the Vietcong were on the verge of military defeat. The
Vietcong prisoners, about the great impact of air operations, which seemed
I asked about the RAND Report about the complete demoralization of the

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over the transcript of his oral history project to see what I thought of
it. He asked how it was possible for Professors to be as dishonest as
Schlesinger was. This repeated a question which he had already asked me the
previous day about the teach-in professors. Lodge who has a rather rough
manner has a touching faith in intellectuals and is sincerely puzzled. After
the drink, Lodge and I went to the residence of the political counsellor of
the Embassy, Phil Habib, where the Vietnamese Foreign Minister had been
invited to dinner. Tran Van Do is a slight man with delicate and almost
ethereal features of the educated Vietnamese. One almost felt like a
barbarian with these three Americans towering over this little fellow and
lecturing him.

The conversation was conducted in French which handicapped me. After
some initial chit chat Tran Van Do began to speak about the domestic situation.
He said that the most serious difficulty of Vietnam was the split in its
population. It was next to impossible in South Vietnam to get Southerners
and Northerners working together. Even though he himself was a Northern and
was one of the few that was acceptable to both sides, he had failed in every
effort to make Southerners and Northerners work together. What the country
needed, was no a facade of democratic process but an organization like the
Congresparty in India which managed to unit individuals of the most diverse
points of view of different races and even of language into one party united
by nationalistsfeelings. Until this was done, it was futile to speak of free
elections. How could you have free elections when you had fifty different
parties? I asked him what would happen if the war ended and elections were
held. He said the concept of free elections has no meaning in Vietnam. The
villager would vote either for somebody he knows or for somebody that he thinks

villager would vote either for somebody he knows or for somebody that he thinks
help. He said the concept of tree elections has no meaning in Vietnam. The
parties? I asked him what would happen if the war ended and elections were
elections. How could you have free elections when you had fifty different
by nationalist feelings. Until this was done, it was futile to ask of tree
points of view of different races and even of language into one party united
Congress party in India which managed to unit individuals of the most diverse
needed, was no a fad of democratic process put an organisation like the
effort to make Southerners and Northerners work together. What the country
was one of the few that was acceptable to both sides, he had failed in every
and Northerners working together. Even though he himself was a Northern and
population. It was next to impossible in South Vietnam to get Southerners
He said that the most serious difficulty of Vietnam was the split in its
some initial chit chat Tran Van Do began to ask about the domestic situation.
The conversation was conducted in French which handicapped me. After
lecturing him.

partially with these three Americans towering over this little fellow and
etherial features of the educated Vietnamese. One almost felt like a
invited to dinner. Tran Van Do is a slight man with delicate and almost
the Embassy, Phil Hapip, where the Vietnamese Foreign Minister had been
the drink. Lodge and I went to the residence of the political counselor of
manner has a touching faith in intellectuality and is sincerely puzzled. After
brevious day apart the teach-in professors. Lodge who has a rather rough
Schlesinger was. This repeated a question which he had already asked me the
it. He asked how it was possible for professors to be so dishonest as
over the transcript of his oral history project to see what I thought of

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he is expected to support or for somebody whose name has a certain prestige
or simply whose picture he likes. Moreover, if the shooting stopped and
the Vietcong returned to their villages they would be the best organized
group and they would certainly win an election--maybe not a majority but
certainly a plurality.

I asked him whether he thought that the NLF contained some nationalistic
elements that could be won over. He said the NLF are the Vietcong; there is
no distinction between them. I asked whether there might be any sense in
talking to them anyway.. Tran Van Do utterly rejected this notion and said
that this would be the end of Vietnam. These remarks were made to me when
I was standing to one side with him and the Ambassador was not listening so
that these remarks cannot be ascribed to his desire to please the Embassy.

This was followed by a long and rather pointless discussion of how one
could promote the emergence of a two party system in Vietnam. The reason for
it was Lodge's insistence that the American system of elections was equally
applicable to Vietnam and that even a North-South split was notunnheard of in
the United States. Tran Van Do was sitting there with a resigned face while
Lodge and Habib were arguing whether the Massachusetts system of election or
the Korea system of election was more applicable in a country where the Vietcong
happen to control over 50% of the population. Tran Van Do finally got the
floor back and suggested that the best next step in Vietnam might be the
creation of a Consultative Assembly. Perhaps half of its members might be
appointed by the provincial governors and the other half by the various groups
composing the countries such as the Buddhists, Catholics, labor and so
forth.

fifth.

combining the countries such as the Buddhist, Catholic, Japon and so
appointed by the provincial Governors and the other half by the various groups
creation of a Constitative Assembly. Perhaps half of its members might be
floor pack and agitated that the best next step in Vietnam might be the
happen to control over 20% of the population. Tran Van Do finally got the
Korea system of election was more applicable in a country where the Vietcong
Lodge and Hapip were arguing whether the Massachusetts system of election or
the United States. Tran Van Do was sitting there with a resigned face while
applicable to Vietnam and that even a North-South split was not numberhead of in
it was Lodge's insistence that the American system of elections was equally
could promote the emergence of a two party system in Vietnam. The reason for
This was followed by a long and rather pointless discussion of how one
that these remarks cannot be ascribed to his desire to blesse the Embassy.
I was standing to one side with him and the Ambassador was not listening so
that this would be the end of Vietnam. These remarks were made to me when
talking to them anyway... Tran Van Do uttersly rejected this notion and said
no distinction between them. I asked whether there might be any sense in
elements that could be won over. He said the NLF are the Vietcong; there is
I asked him whether he thought that the NLF contained some nationalistic
certainly a plurality.

Group and they would certainly win an election--maybe not a majority put
the Vietcong returned to their villages they would be the best organised
or simply whose picture he likes. Moreover, if the shooting stopped and
he is expected to abdort or for somebody whose name has a certain prestige

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Tran Van Do was of the view that the experience of working together
might help to bridge the schisms in the society particularly if the initial
responsibility of the Assembly was relatively unimportant. Tran Van Do
insisted that Americans had no idea how inexperienced and irresponsible
Vietnamese politicians were. They had no staff, no real leadership and
simply existed for the personal advancement for a few individuals.

He said that it was highly unlikely that such a consultative assembly
would be created because the ruling generals thought that the more people
there were at a meeting the more talk there was and then more talk there
was the less likely that anything be accomplished. Whenever Tran Van do
mentioned the ruling Directorate he spoke as if he did not belong to the
government. It was a rather strange experience to hear a Foreign Minister
of a country speak in so detached a way of the people whom he was serving.
This was very similar to the experience I made with Buy Diem, the Secretary
of State in the Prime Minister's office who took the same position the night
before.

I asked Tran Van Do whether he shared the view of some Americans that
the call for a general strike on Friday, October 15th, had been designed to
paralyze life in Saigon and whether he agreed with the assessment I had heard
to the effect that the failure of the strike had broken the psychological
back of VC morale. Tran Van Do said that Vietnamese were much more complicated
than to believe that any single dramatic gesture would be decisive. He believed
that the general strike had been called in order to embarrass the labor movement

that the General strike had been called in order to emplace the labor movement
than to believe that any single dramatic feature would be decisive. He believed
pack of AC morale. Tran Van Do said that Vietnamese were much more complicated
to the effect that the failure of the strike had broken the bayological
barrelize life in Saigon and whether he agreed with the assessment I had heard
the call for a General strike on Friday, October 12th, had been designed to
I asked Tran Van Do whether he shared the view of some Americans that
before.

of State in the Prime Minister's office who took the same position the night
This was very similar to the experience I made with Buy Diem, the Secretary
of a country beak in so detached a way of the people whom he was serving.
Government. It was a rather strange experience to hear a Foreign Minister
mentioned the ruling Directorate he spoke as if he did not belong to the
was the least likely that anything be accomplished. Whenever Tran Van Do
there were at a meeting the more talk there was and then more talk there
would be created because the ruling Generals thought that the more beable

He said that it was highly unlitely that such a consultative assembly
simply existed for the personal advancement for a few individuals.

Vietnamese politicians were. They had no staff, no real leadership and
invented that Americans had no idea how inexperienced and irrationable
reasonability of the Assemply was relatively unimportant. Tran Van Do
might help to bridge the schism in the society particularly if the initial
Tran Van Do was of the view that the experience of working together

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led by Mr. Buu. If the labor movement supported the general strike it would be tainted with Communism and get into even greater difficulty with the government than it already was. If it did not support the strike it would do some extent discredit itself. In any event, since the labor movement had been speaking of calling a strike, it was now precluded from doing so because the VC had made the first move. Tran Van Do thought that this was the real reason, not to score a spectacular success.

Tran Van Do felt that in order to have security in the villages, it was essential that in each village there be constituted a group of people whose task it was to vet the Vietcong from the rest of the population. I asked him where he would get these people from. He said that the demobilized veterans of the army might be a good nucleus. They had fought against the Communists and they had seen their atrocities and they would have a high motivation; there were about 400,000 people who had served in the armed forces over the last decade who would be able to perform this job. After a little further conversation it became apparent, however, that of the 400,000, 80% lived in the towns and not in the villages where they were most needed. The reason they lived in the four major towns was that the Vietcong made returned soldiers one of their high priority targets when they returned to the villages. Thus indicating again the extent of Vietcong control in the countryside.

I then brought the subject around to possible outcomes of the war. I asked Tran Van Do how he visualized the war ending. He said that this was absolutely not the time for negotiations. The country was not ready for it and that the South Vietnamese government could not stand facing the organized

and that the South Vietnamese government could not stand facing the organized
absolutely not the time for negotiations. The country was not ready for it
I asked Tran Van Do how he visualized the war ending. He said that this was
I then brought the subject around to possible outcomes of the war.

Soldiers one of their high priority targets when they returned to the villages.

reason they lived in the four major towns was that the Vietcong made returned
lived in the towns and not in the villages where they were most needed. The
further conversation it became apparent, however, that of the 400,000, 80%
over the last decade who would be able to perform this job. After a little
motivation; there were about 400,000 people who had served in the armed forces
Communists and they had seen their atrocities and they would have a high
veterans of the army might be a good nucleus. They had fought against the
asked him where he would get these people from. He said that the demobilized
whose task it was to vet the Vietcong from the rest of the population. I
was essentially that in each village there be constituted a group of people
Tran Van Do felt that in order to have security in the villages, it
the real reason, not to score a spectacular success.

because the VC had made the first move. Tran Van Do thought that this was
had been shaking of calling a strike, it was now preceded from doing so
would do some extent discredit itself. In any event, since the labor movement
the Government than it already was. It did not support the strike it
would be tainted with Communism and get into even greater difficulty with
led by Mr. Bum. If the labor movement subordinated the general strike it

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Vietcong in a political contest. They needed many years in order to resurrect the whole structure of the society which had been smashed. He was not only opposed to any negotiations with the NLF he was even opposed to an amnesty for the Vietcong. He thought that the only safe procedure would be to regroup all members of the Vietcong to the North. If the Vietcong were permitted to go back to their villages having previously hidden their arms they would soon become the paramount political force. He kept stressing the fact that the Vietnamese government required time to resarrect their society.

And, he felt that all talk of negotiations at this moment was extremely dangerous.

This fear of being left alone was also noticeable at the dinner at Zorthian house last night. On that occasion one of the Vietnamese present said that when peace is achieved you will suddenly lose interest in us and you will leave us to our own devices; you will reduce your aid; you will bring back your people, and then what are we going to do. It is tragic and pathetic that a country that has now been torn by war for thirty years cannot face the prospect of peace.

A few other vignettes: I spoke yesterday at the Circle Sportif to a French girl who is a secretary at the Italian Embassy. French people can move more freely than others and she occasionally can go on roads through Vietcong territory, though she doesn't like to do it because she comes from a former colonial family from Hanoi. I asked her whether there were any beaches nearby and whether it wasn't more fun to swim at beaches than at swimming pools. She said that there was a magnificent beach at Cape St. Jacques; however, it was impossible to get there even though it is only twenty

Jacques: however, it was impossible to get there even though it is only twenty swimming booms. She said that there was a magnificent beach at Cape St. beaches nearby and whether it wasn't more fun to swim at beaches than at a former colonial family from Hanoi. I asked her whether there were any Vietcong territory, though she doesn't like to do it because she comes from move more freely than others and she occasionally can go on roads through a French girl who is a secretary at the Italian Embassy. French people can A few other vignettes: I spoke yesterday at the Circle Shortit to the brosrecht of peace.

that a country that has now been torn by war for thirty years cannot face
pack your people, and then what are we going to do. It is tragic and pathetic
you will leave us to our own devices: you will reduce your aid; you will bring
said that when peace is achieved you will suddenly lose interest in us and
Sovietian house last night. On that occasion one of the Vietnamese present
This fear of being left alone was also noticeable at the dinner at

fact that the Vietnamese Government required time to resurrect their society.

permitted to go pack to their villages having brevionally hidden their arms

regroup all members of the Vietcong to the North. It the Vietcong were

obobeed to any negotiations with the USA he was even opposed to an amnesty

the whole structure of the society which had been ameaessed. He was not only

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miles away because the road is always blocked. There is another beautiful beach at Nha Trang. The beaches here are some of the most spectacular in the world--very wide and very long. If one is on the beach at Nha Trang one can often see a few miles in the distance dark figures swimming up the beach. These are Vietcong because Nha Trang, in addition to being used as a resort area for those Westerners willing to brave the roads, is also used as a rest and recuperation area for the Vietcong. I asked my Embassy escort whether the girl was kidding me and he said no, that he himself had been on that beach and had seen the Vietcong a mile or so up the beach and that neither side had bothered the other.

Another vignette: I have been thinking about the difference between the atmosphere here and that of other combat zones with which I am familiar. I would think that the difference is as follows: When I was in combat during World War II, or when I visited Korea for the Department of the Army in 1951, one knew precisely when one was in a danger zone and while one was in the danger zone the chances of attack were more or less constant, say 10-20%. In Saigon and throughout Vietnam, one is in a way constantly in a danger zone but there is no appearance of physical danger whatever. At the front in World War II or in Korea one heard the guns and one could almost sense the physical approach of danger. In Saigon everything appears perfectly normal and there is really no choice except conducting one's business as if one were in downtown New York. If danger should ever materialize, it will be sudden, unexpected, and would have an almost 100% certainty of success. The result is, curiously enough, that there is never any particular fear. I have noticed, however, that

enough, that there is never any particular fear. I have noticed, however, that
and would have an almost 100% certainty of success. The result is, curiously
New York. It danger should ever materialize, it will be sudden, unexpected,
is really no choice except conducting one's business as it one were in downtown
abroad of danger. In Saigon everything abhors perfectly normal and there
War II or in Korea one heard the guns and one could almost sense the physical
but there is no absence of physical danger whatever. At the front in World
In Saigon and throughout Vietnam, one is in a way constantly in a danger some
the danger some the chances of attack were more or less constant, say 10-30%.
1931, one knew precisely when one was in a danger zone and while one was in
World War II, or when I visited Korea for the Department of the Army in
I would think that the difference is as follows: When I was in combat during
the atmosphere here and that of other combat zones with which I am familiar.
Another vignette: I have been thinking about the difference between
had pothered the other.
and had seen the Vietcong a mile or so up the beach and that neither side
the girl was kidding me and he said no, that he himself had been on that beach
and reciperation area for the Vietcong. I asked my Embassy escort whether
area for those Westerners willing to prove the roads, is also used as a rest
These are Vietcong because Uba Trang, in addition to being used as a resort
can often see a few miles in the distance dark figures swimming up the beach.
the world--very wide and very long. If one is on the beach at Uba Trang one
beach at Uba Trang. The beaches here are some of the most spectacular in
miles away because the road is always plocked. There is another beautiful

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when cars stop at intersections people look around into adjoining cars and start tensing when people walk up to their cars, because it would, of course, be an easy matter to drop a grenade into the car and one would never know whether the Vietnamese driver had not brought one to an ambush deliberately. Except for this slight tensing when vehicles slow down, I have noticed no sign of insecurity and as far as I can tell, in my job, I don't feel any particular sense of insecurity. Still it is a curious atmosphere. Last night, for example, I was awakened by a fusilade of shots. What had happened was that one of the Marine guards stationed in one corner of the house had accidentally discharged his rifle; whereupon all the guards, and above all the Vietnamese on the outside of the compound, began firing like mad, even though there were no targets. I did not go down because I knew the Marine at the head of the stairs would tell me what to do in case anything happened. Lodge told me this morning that the Marine who had discharged his rifle was a sheepish young man indeed.

In addition to the extraordinary precautions around the house, there is the anamoly that all the security precautions are concentrated on the most obvious routes of access, while others are left completely unguarded. I have already mentioned that at the Circle Sportif, which has heavy security guards at the entrance for cars, there are no guards in the adjoining woods which go up to the edge of the swimming pool. Similarly at the Embassy compound ghdfe saf heavy guards on the approach to the house by street and around and inside the house, as I have already described. However, yesterday afternoon when I was taking a walk, I walked to the other end of the street, which is a dead end and found a graveyard there. There are no guards at the end of that

a dead end and found a graveyard there. There are no guards at the end of that
when I was taking a walk. I walked to the other end of the street, which is
inside the house, as I have already described. However, yesterday afternoon
shipped a heavy guard on the approach to the house by street and around and
which go up to the edge of the swimming pool. Similarly at the Embassy compound
guards at the entrance for cars, there are no guards in the adjoining woods
have already mentioned that at the Circle Shortit, which has heavy security
most obvious routes of access, while others are left completely unguarded. I
is the anomaly that all the security precautions are concentrated on the
In addition to the extraordinary precautions around the house, there
man indeed.

this morning that the Marine who had discharged his rifle was a sheehan young
actress would tell me what to do in case anything happened. Lodge told me
no targets. I did not go down because I knew the Marine at the head of the
on the outside of the compound, began firing like mad, even though there were
discharged his rifle; wherein all the guards, and above all the Vietnamese
that one of the Marine guards stationed in one corner of the house had accidentally
for example, I was awakened by a fusilade of shots. What had happened was
particular sense of insecurity. Still it is a curious atmosphere. Last night,
sign of insecurity and as far as I can tell, in my top, I don't feel any
except for this slight tening when vehicles slow down. I have noticed no
know whether the Vietnamese driver had not brought one to an ampush deliberately.
course, be an easy matter to drop a grenade into the car and one would never
and start tening when people walk up to their cars, because it would, of
when cars stop at intersections people look around into adjoining cars

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street and there are no patrols in the graveyard. Nothing would be easier
than to set up a mortar and start shooting at the house. As it happened, Lodge
mentioned this to me this morning and he said that he wanted to get the roof
of the residence reinforced so that the shells would explode on the roof rather
than penetrating into the first floor rooms and exploding there.

of the residence reinforced so that the shells would explode on the root rather
mentioned this to me this morning and he said that he wanted to get the root
than to set up a mortar and start shooting at the house. As it happened, Lodge
street and there are no patrols in the graveyard. Nothing would be easier

street and there are no patrols in the graveyard. Nothing would be easier
than to set up a mortar and start shooting at the house. As it happened, Lodge
as it happened, Lodge

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October 18th

I started the day with breakfast with Lodge. He asked me what my impressions were of the various agencies that briefed me up to now. I told him that it was hard for me to judge, because everyone had told me how successful they were. Indeed, if I listened to everybody's description of how they were succeeding, it was not easy forme to see how the Vietcong were still surviving. He asked me what in particular I thought of the CIA. I said that I needed to get a fuller briefing on the four kinds of teams that they are trying to set up, in particular the political action teams, counter terror teams, and census of grievance teams. He said that he had serious doubts about the CIA operations. He thought that they were getting no useful intelligence about the Vietcong and the NLF. As long as he has been here they have told him nothing of any consequence or anything he could really use. Because their intelligence about the NLF was so poor, they were spending their time on what was really a job of rural reconstruction in order to justify their existence. He said that this was all the more disappointing because Saigon and Berlin are the two most sought-after jobs in the CIA. He said the CIA Station Chief had told him that Saigon is the Court of St. James' of Intelligence. If this was true then he really was worried about what they were doing elsewhere. When he had come here in 1963 he had tried to get the Station Chief of the CIA replaced by Lansdale. He had been indignantly refused because this was cutting across bureaucratic lines. He turned to me and said how stupid can you get. I've been in elected office so long I don't know how the bureaucracy works. So far, while Lodge has been opinionated, he has actually been much more impressive than I had

He has been complimented, he has actually been much more impressive than I had office so long I don't know how the bureaucracy works. So far, while Lodge lines. He turned to me and said how stupid can you get. I've been in elected He has been indignantly refused because this was cutting across bureaucratic 1963 he had tried to get the Station Chief of the CIA replaced by Lamegabe. worried about what they were doing elsewhere. When he had come here in Court of St. James, of Intelligence. It this was true then he really was in the CIA. He said the CIA Station Chief had told him that Saigon is the disabounding because Saigon and Berlin are the two mostmfought-after joes in order to justify their existence. He said that this was all the more really one. Because their intelligence about the NLF was so poor, they been here they have told him nothing of any consequence or anything he could no useful intelligence about the Vietcong and the NLF. As long as he has serious doubts about the CIA operations. He thought that they were getting counter terror teams, and censures of Grievance teams. He said that he had that they are trying to set up, in particular the political action teams, I said that I needed to get a fuller briefing on the four kinds of teams were still surviving. He asked me what in particular I thought of the CIA. of how they were succeeding, it was not easy forms to see how the Vietcong how successful they were. Indeed, if I listened to everybody's description told him that it was hard for me to judge, because everyone had told me impressions were of the various agencies that briefed me up to now. I I started the day with breakfast with Lodge. He asked me what my October 18th

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expected him to be. He runs the Embassy with an iron hand, but that is
essential. He has a certain patrician quality which I think is needed in
this situation, but he is dedicated and he is not given to tricky maneuvers.
He is overly impressed by intellectuals and simply cannot understand how
intellectuals can be writing things in which they do not have sufficient
vision and information.

After breakfast I attended a staff meeting of the political section, which lasted all morning. The political section is composed of Philip Habib, a number of analysts, and eight provincial reporters. The provincial reporters are young foreign service officers who have learned Vietnamese and are traveling, each of whom is assigned four or five provinces, which they visit regularly. Their job is to report on the overall situation.

I find their reports the best to come out of Saigon. They are young, dedicated, and very able. The subject today, however, had less to do with the situation in the provinces than with the subject of negotiations. Lodge has called a meeting of the Mission Council for tomorrow morning (October 19th) at which the subject of negotiations will be discussed and he wanted the view of his subordinates. Lodge had called this meeting partly because I had told him that it was senseless for him to wait until a position was taken in Washington and then to write protesting telegrams. It was essential that Saigon make its views known, so that in any consideration of possible outcomes the Saigon point of view would be clearly understood. My experience in government has been that once a government position has jelled, the local station was asked to come up with an alternative and would always be accused

station was asked to come up with an alternative and would always be accused
Government has been that once a Government position has been, the local
the Saigon point of view would be clearly understood. My experience in
Saigon make its views known, so that in any consideration of possible outcomes
Washington and then to write protesting telegrams. It was essential that
told him that it was senseless for him to wait until a position was taken in
view of his superordinates. Lodge had called this meeting partly because I had
at which the subject of negotiations will be discussed and he wanted the
has called a meeting of the Miaaton Council for tomorrow morning (October 19th)
the situation in the provinces than with the subject of negotiations. Lodge
dedicated, and very able. The subject today, however, had less to do with
I find their reports the best to come out of Saigon. They are young,
they visit regularly. Their job is to report on the overall situation.
and are traveling, each of whom is assigned four or five provinces, which
reporters are young foreign service officers who have learned Vietnamese
Hindi, a number of languages, and eight provincial reporters. The provincial
which lasted all morning. The political section is composed of Philip

After breakfast I attended a staff meeting of the political section,
vision and information.

intellectuals can be writing things in which they do not have sufficient
He is overly impressed by intellectuals and similarly cannot understand how
this situation, but he is dedicated and he is not given to tricky maneuvers.
esential. He has a certain patrician quality which I think is needed in
expected him to be. He runs the Embassy with an iron hand, but that is

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of lacking the requisite perspective. Also, it seemed to me that to spring
negotiation on the Vietnamese government unexpectedly might have very bad
consequences. Therefore, the Mission ought to get clear in its own mind
what outcomes it considers tolerable or desirable from an imposed victory
to negotiated settlements.

At the meeting Habib explained the fact that a Mission Council meeting
would take place the next day and then he asked me to state my views with
respect to it. I, in effect, repeated in somewhat more diplomatic fashion
what I had already told Lodge. And I stressed that it was absolutely
senseless for Saigon to sit there ringing their hands or to complain bitterly
about the lack of comprehension in Washington. The only thing to do was for
Saigon to come up with an intellectually valid document, which, because of
its intrinsic merit, could not be rejected in Washington. Moreover, I urged
that the document be as non-contentious as possible and that it systematically
address the major issues that would arise either in case of a military victory
or in case of another outcome. Unhappily, as always happens, the discussion
very soon degenerated into a bull session at which various people advanced
various ideas. We never did get around to systematic discussion of the various
options before the United States.

However, several trends became obvious. Every member of the political
section was absolutely horrified by the prospect of any negotiation on any
terms. They felt that the proposal of negotiations could easily wreck and,
indeed, probably would wreck, the South Vietnamese government. Since the
South Vietnamese never believe anything that they were being told and always

South Vietnamese never believe anything that they were being told and always
informed, properly would wreck, the South Vietnamese Government. Since the
terms. They felt that the proposal of negotiations could easily wreck and,
section was absolutely horrified by the prospect of any negotiation on any
However, several trends became obvious. Every member of the political
options before the United States.

various ideas. We never did get around to systematic discussion of the various
very soon degenerated into a full session at which various people advanced
or in case of another outcome. Unhappily, as always happens, the discussion
address the major issues that would arise either in case of a military victory
that the document be as non-contentions as possible and that it systematically
its intrinsic merit, could not be rejected in Washington. Moreover, I urged
Saigon to come up with an intellectually valid document, which, because of
about the lack of comprehension in Washington. The only thing to do was for
senseless for Saigon to sit there ringing their hands or to complain pitter-patter
what I had already told Lodge. And I stressed that it was absolutely
respect to it. I, in effect, repeated in somewhat more diplomatic fashion
would take place the next day and then he asked me to state my views with
At the meeting Lodge explained the fact that a Minton Council meeting
to negotiated settlements.

what outcomes it considers tolerable or desirable from an imposed victory
consequences. Therefore, the Minton ought to get clear in its own mind
negotiation on the Vietnamese Government unexpectedly might have very bad
of lacking the requisite herewith. Vice, it seemed to me that to bring

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assumed that there was some devious reason, The mere fact of negotiation would inject a new element into the situation. The view of the provincial reporter covering Saigon was that if Ky tried to negotiate there would be a coup within seventy-two hours. He said the coup may be composed of three elements: those who do not want to negotiate because they want to prosecute the war to victory; those who think that negotiation means eventual Communist takeover, and want to put themselves into a position in which they can deal with the Communists; and those who simply want to get into office and use the coup as an excuse to move. It was always easier in South Vietnam to get people to agree on what to oppose than what to support.

I asked whether it was the consensus of the group that the government could not survive negotiations on any terms. The answer was yes. Habib asked whether they could conceive any conditions in which we might stop our bombing. The consensus was that unless there was a dramatic demonstrable and visible change in the military situation, the cessation of bombing was too dangerous. The minimum trade for it would be the withdrawal of organized North Vietnamese military units, an end to infiltration, and a reduction of terrorism. I asked whether there was any way of knowing that infiltration had stopped. The answer was that over land infiltration could be monitored if there was something like a two division force on the Laotian border. This would prevent the movement of heavy units, but would not prevent the movement of cadres. As for sea infiltration, we were in very bad shape. Junks usually proceed about eighty miles out to sea where they could not be stopped. By the late afternoon they had moved to a position sixty miles off the coast,

the late afternoon they had moved to a position sixty miles off the coast, proceeded about eighty miles out to sea where they could not be stopped. By about dawn. As for see infiltration, we were in very bad shape. Junke usually would present the movement of heavy units, but would not prevent the movement if there was something like a two direction force on the Lorient border. This had stopped. The answer was that over-land infiltration could be monitored terrorism. I asked whether there was any way of knowing that infiltration North Vietnamese military units, an end to infiltration, and a reduction of too dangerous. The minimum trade for it would be the withdrawal of organised and viable change in the military situation, the cessation of pumping was our pumping. The consensus was that unless there was a dramatic demonstrable asked whether they could conceive any conditions in which we might stop could not survive negotiations on any terms. The answer was yes. Happy I asked whether it was the consensus of the group that the Government what to export.

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then moving at ten miles an hour they went into one of the innumerable inland water ways, which they reached at midnight and where they moved under camouflage netting so that by the morning they were invisible.

I then pointed out to the group that they simply would not be able to support a position against negotiation in Vietnam in the abstract unless they could specify more precisely what they opposed and what the consequences of certain conditions were. I mentioned six items which would be the subject of any discussion, explicit or tacit: (1) the cessation of air attacks on the North; (2) the cessation of military operations in the South; (3) the internal status of South Vietnam; (4) the international status of South Vietnam; (5) the policing machinery for any of the above; and (6) the eventual position of American forces.

I suggested that we discuss each item so that we would know precisely what was objectionable. We never got around to discussing each item, but we did pick one, namely, the internal status of South Vietnam. I raised the problem of the future of the NLF. It was the consensus of the group that if the NLF was formally recognized it would take over the government in a very short time. As one of the provincial reporters said, South Vietnam has the functionaries, but the Communists have the cadres. Any VC participation in the government, indeed, any amnesty of VC with freedom to participate in the political process, would lead to collapse. The minimum condition was a period of nine months with clear military victories before the government would be strong enough to consider negotiations. Even then it would have to make extreme conditions in order to survive. These conditions would include (1) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops; (2) the end of terrorism;

(1) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops; (2) the end of terrorism; make extreme conditions in order to survive. These conditions would include would be strong enough to consider negotiations. Even then it would have to a period of nine months with clear military victories before the Government in the political process, would lead to collapse. The minimum condition was tion in the government, indeed, any amnesty of VC with freedom to participate has the functionaries, put the Communists have the cadres. Any VC particula- in a very short time. As one of the provincial reporters said, South Vietnam that if the VC was formally recognised it would take over the Government the problem of the future of the VC. It was the consensus of the Group we did pick one, namely, the internal status of South Vietnam. I raised what was objectionable. We never got around to discussing each item, but I suggested that we discuss each item so that we would know precisely of American forces.

the policing machinery for any of the above; and (3) the eventual position
status of South Vietnam; (4) the international status of South Vietnam; (2)
North; (3) the cessation of military operations in the South; (3) the internal
and discussion, explicit or tacit: (1) the cessation of air attacks on the
certain conditions were. I mentioned six items which would be the subject of
could acutely more precisely what they obsoled and what the consensus of
substitute a position against negotiation in Vietnam in the abstract unless they
I then pointed out to the Group that they imply would not be able to
netting so that by the morning they were unable.

water make, which they reached at midnight and where they moved under camouflage
then moving at ten miles an hour they went into one of the innumerable inland

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E1

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(3) the cessation of infiltration; (4) the dissolution of the Communist Party of South Vietnam; (5) the cessation of the Liberation radio; (6) the end of the transmission of coded military instructions from the North; (7) insistence that local communications be in the clear; (8) that the cadres of the Vietcong which had been infiltrated from the North be withdrawn.

The assessment of the North Vietnamese expert was that the only condition the North Vietnamese would conceivably accept is a temporary end of terrorism.

I asked about what we knew about the Vietcong and whether there was any degree of penetration. The answer was that we knew a fair amount on the provincial level, but penetration was negligible. I asked what would happen if the Vietcong were amnestied and permitted to participate in the political life of the country as individuals. The consensus was that this would lead to a Communist takeover.

Habib then presented the Acheson plan not as such but mentioning its key elements. The consensus was that this would lead either to a coup d'état or to a collapse of the government. There would be Vietcong flags in Saigon, huge demonstrations, and all kinds of provocations that would lead to an end of the ceasefire under conditions of maximum embarrassment.

I asked whether they could conceive of any circumstances in which negotiations were bearable. The consensus was that it would take at least nine months to have a government stable enough so that one could mention the idea of negotiations and that it would take three-five years to strengthen the political structure enough to be able to compete with the Communists peacefully.

idea at negotiations and that it would take three-five years to strengthen

nine months to have a Government stable enough so that one could mention the

negotiations were possible. The consensus was that it would take at least

of the cessefire under conditions of maximum emparaisement.

urge demonstrations, and all kinds of provocations that would lead to an end
or to a collaboration of the Government. There would be Vietcong flags in Saigon,
key elements. The consensus was that this would lead either to a coup d'état
or a restoration of the North Vietnamese regime presented by the North Vietnamese
party that had presented the Achseon plan not so much put mentioning its
would lead to a Communist takeover.

political life of the country as individuals. The consensus was that this
happened if the Vietcong were amnestied and permitted to participate in the
the provincial level, but penetration was negligible. I asked what would
any degree of penetration. The answer was that we knew a fair amount on
I asked about what we knew about the Vietcong and whether there was
of terrorism.

withDRAWN.

cables of the Vietcong which had been illigitrated from the North pe

(1) insistance that local communications be in the clear; (8) that the

party of South Vietnam; (2) the cessation of the Liberation radio; (6)

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When I say "consensus" I really should say "unanimous opinion" because there was no one who disagreed in a room of about twenty people.

From this meeting I went to have lunch at General Lansdale's with General Tang and Colonel Lok. General Tang is Minister for Rural Reconstruction, which in effect means restoring civil authority. Colonel Lok is his deputy and one of the vestiges of the Diem regime. Colonel Lok had been in charge of the strategic hamlet program for Nhu. General Tang is tall for a Vietnamese with the brusque, rather decisive manner of Vietnamese army officers. He smiles easily and is very fluent. Tang said that at first he had been reluctant to take on pacification in addition to his job as chief planner of the army, but he had been convinced that pacification was the most important problem before his country and he would, therefore, give it all he had. The problem was that the Vietcong had started ten years earlier to infiltrate the countryside and had built up an infra-structure throughout the country. It was now necessary for the government to begin where the Vietcong had been ten years ago and try to win back the country from the Vietcong.

I asked what was necessary to achieve this. He said the first requirement was military security. He was a military man, but he was afraid that the soldiers were too much concerned with fighting in large units and not sufficiently interested in providing the physical security for the villages, without which nothing could be done. His concept of pacification was to try to get cadres into every village, to protect the village from the Vietcong, and gradually gain information and take the villages away from the Communists. These cadres

gain information and take the villages away from the Communists. These cadres
into every village, to protect the village from the Vietcong, and gradually
nothing could be done. His concept of pacification was to try to get cadges
interested in providing the physical security for the villages, without which
soldiers were too much concerned with fighting in large units and not sufficiently
was military security. He was a military man, but he was afraid that the

I asked what was necessary to achieve this. He said the first requirement
Vietcong.

Vietcong had been ten years ago and try to win back the country from the
country. It was now necessary for the Government to begin where the
to infiltrate the countryside and had built up an intra-structure longstanding
he had. The problem was that the Vietcong had started ten years earlier
important problem before his country and he would, therefore, give it all
of the army, but he had been convinced that pacification was the most
relevant to take on pacification in addition to his job as chief blaster
amiable easily and is very fluent. Tang said that at first he had been
with the prunelle, rather decisive manner of Vietnamese army officers. He
the strategic hamlet program for Vinh. General Tang is tall for a Vietnamese
and one of the vestiges of the Diam regime. Colonel Lok had been in charge of
which in effect means restoring civil authority. Colonel Lok is his deputy
General Tang and Colonel Lok. General Tang is Minister for Rural Reconstruction,
From this meeting I went to have lunch at General Landale's with
there was no one who disagreed in a room of about twenty people.

When I say "conscientias" I really should say "unanimous opinion", because

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were supposed to supply social services and win over the Vietcong by their support performance.

I asked where he was going to get these cadres. Again, like most Vietnamese I have met, he was great on theory, but rather vague on specifics. He said the cadres could be obtained by training the existing cadres more fully. I told him that I was not aware of the fact that there were cadres in each village. He said that he could scrape them together from some of the CIA projects and other activities. I asked him how long he thought it would take. He said that in the past the difficulty had been that anyone asked to submit a plan immediately proceeded to demonstrate that pacification would be completed within a year. He was honest enough to admit that if he could pacify ten villages in one province within the next six months, he would have done a successful job. He would start in three provinces and take ten villages in each province and he would estimate that it would take him a minimum of six to nine months to show results in these villages. Then the teams could move on to other villages, but militia would have to be left behind to achieve security. As the project gathered momentum, there would of course be a snowballing effect.

I told him that over the years there had been many plans to pacify Vietnam--all of which seemed very plausible, but somehow progress had been slow. What did he think had gone wrong? He said that he thought the previous plans had been too theoretical, but that his plan was going to be closer to the people. I asked Colonel Lok to tell me in which way this plan differed from the plan that Nhu had developed in the last year of Diem's rule. Lok with great dignity said that this was too painful a subject for him to comment upon, but the past in any event did not matter. What mattered was that something be done in the future so that all the suffering of the last twenty years was not in vain.

years was not in vain.

something be done in the future so that all the antiseeming of the last twenty
upon, put the best in any event did not matter. What mattered was that
with great dignity said that this was too beautiful a subject for him to comment
from the bias that Mmm had developed in the last year of Dism's rule. Lok
the beeble. I asked Colonel Lok to tell me in which way this bias differed
bias had been too theoretical, but that this bias differed

I told him that over the years there had been many bias to biasity
of course be a snowpalling effect.

besiding to achieve security. As the project gathered momentum, there would
team could move on to other villages, put militia would have to be left
minimum of six to nine months to show results in these villages. Then the
villages in each province and he would estimate that it would take him a
have done a successful job. He would start in three provinces and take ten
could batch ten villages in one province within the next six months, he would
would be completed within a year. He was honest enough to admit that it he
asked to submit a plan immediately proceeded to demonstrate that pacification
would take. He said that in the beat the difficulty had been that anyone
the CIV projects and other activities. I asked him how long he thought it
in each village. He said that he could scabe them together from some of
fully. I told him that I was not aware of the fact that there were cadres
He said the cadres could be obtained by training the existing cadres more
Vietnamese I gave met, he was great on theory, put rather vague on specifics.

I asked where he was going to get these cadres. Again, like most
suboptimal performance.

were abdicated to subly social services and win over the Vietcong by their

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Tang then explained that he needed about 200 people per district to carry out his plan and that the total requirement was something like 24,000 people.

Tang impressed me as well-meaning, decisive, but perhaps suffering from the notion that you can plan political construction like a military campaign.

After General Tang said good-bye, Colonel Lok came back on some pretext and said that he just wanted me to understand clearly that the important thing at this time was to get something done. He had seen too many plans. He had not meant to be impolite when he had evaded my question of what had happened two years previously, but the Vietnamese could sometimes not bear the burden of their own past and he simply wanted to reiterate how crucial it was to face the future and to work together.

Of the meetings with the Vietnamese which I have had up to now, the one with General Tang was handled in the most sensitive and human fashion. The typical behavior of Embassy personnel is to lean all over these Vietnamese and to get them to say what is expected of them, or else to go into long monologues of American reliability, etc. Lansdale really put the Vietnamese into the center of the discussion; in fact, he intervened only rarely and then in a very human way. I had not seen these qualities in Lansdale when I met him in Washington, but I like them very much.

I next called on Ambassador Porter. One of the results of my status here is that I must talk to every senior official of the Embassy at least once, which is a rather time-consuming process. However, in the case of Ambassador, Porter, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the talk was worthwhile. He is at first a rather stiff, slightly self-important foreign service officer, who has had many

rather stiff, slightly self-important foreign service officer, who has had many
Porter, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the talk was worthwhile. He is at present a
which is a rather time-consuming process. However, in the case of Ambassador,
here is that I must talk to every senior official of the Embassy at least once,
I next called on Ambassador Porter. One of the results of my status
met him in Washington, but I like them very much.

then in a very human way. I had not seen these qualities in Lansdale when I
into the center of the discussion; in fact, he intervened only rarely and
monologue of American reliability, etc. Lansdale really but the Vietnamese
and to get them to say what is expected of them, or else to go into long
The typical behavior of Ambassador Lansdale is to lean all over these Vietnamese
one with General Tang was handled in the most sensitive and human fashion.
Of the meetings with the Vietnamese which I have had up to now, the
was to face the future and to work together.

the burden of their own past and he simply wanted to reiterate how crucial it
happened two years breviously, but the Vietnamese could sometimes not bear
had not meant to be impolite when he had evaded my question of what had
at this time was to get something done. He had seen too many blanes. He
and said that he just wanted me to understand clearly that the important thing
After General Tang said Goodbye, Colonel Lok came back on some bretext
the notion that you can blan political construction like a military campaign.
Tang impressed me as well-meaning, decisive, put perhaps antlering from
people.

to carry out his blans and that the total requirement was something like 34,000
Tang then explained that he needed about 200 people per district

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fascinating assignments, including one of Algeria. When I met him for the first time at lunch he gave me a standard lecture which would go well with visiting congressmen about the non-colonial nature of our effort in Vietnam. On this occasion he spoke more realistically. I asked him about the pacification problem. He said that there were about six or seven programs going on simultaneously and it was next to impossible to tell who was doing what, with what personnel, and how. It was extremely difficult to get technical equipment and even harder to get some coordination. General Lansdale had been brought in to bring about this coordination and he had to be given a chance. Admittedly he was an unorthodox figure and his method of operation had done nothing to endear him to the more bureaucratic elements of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the situation was so difficult that it could not be dealt with bureaucratically.

Porter said that we had no idea in Washington of how fragmented and complicated the Vietnamese political life was. Every senior official, indeed, any official with any area of responsibility, tended to treat it as a private fief. He knew of several instances where a district capital was being attacked from an adjoining province yet regional forces are not permitted to move from one province to another without the permission of the other province chief. One reason for this is to avoid coups. On a number of occasions it had either taken so long to get the approval of the other province or the other chief had flatly refused to give his permission. Porter took this as an example of what happens all the way through Vietnamese society right from the top.

society right from the start.

Porter took this as an example of what happens all the way through Vietnamese
other province or the other chief had firsty refused to give his benediction.
number of occasions it had either taken so long to get the approval of the
the other province chief. One reason for this is to avoid conbat. On a
permitted to move from one province to another without the benediction of
being attacked from an adjoining province yet regional forces are not
a private fleet. He knew of several instances where a district capital was
indeed, any official with any area of reasonability, tended to treat it as
complicated the Vietnamese political life was. Every senior official,

Porter said that we had no idea in Washington of how fragmented and
it could not be dealt with pueramenteally.

of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the situation was so difficult that
of operation had done nothing to endear him to the more puerocratic elements
be given a chance. Admittedly he was an unorthodox figure and his method
Lansdale had been brought in to bring about this coordination and he had to
technical equipment and even harder to get some coordination. General
what, with what personnel, and how. It was extremely difficult to get
going on simultaneously and it was next to impossible to tell who was doing
facilitation problem. He said that there were about six or seven programs
On this occasion he aboke more realistically. I asked him about the

visiting congressmen about the non-colonial nature of our effort in Vietnam.
first time at lunch he gave me a standard lecture which would go well with
tascinating assignments, including one of Alberta. When I met him for the

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I then asked Porter about the political stability of the Saigonese government. Porter said that at the moment it was stable; however, he could sense discontent building up. It was really not so much a question of discontent as the natural opposition tendencies of the Vietnamese and it would not take much to get another series of upheavals started. The discontent was sparked in part by worsening economic conditions produced by the tremendous influx of Americans and in part by the irresponsibility of political leadership. There were fifty political parties in Vietnam, some of which represented no more than coffee-clubs, but if the political process were permitted to operate entirely freely, the only result could be chaos. In his opinion, the military were still the chief element of hppe in Vietnam.

I asked him what would happen if there was an upheaval. He said that the problem would be to build another government with a few civilians around the military, but if the military ever lose grip on the government, the situation would be absolutely hopeless. He did not see any possibility of negotiation that would not wreck the Saigon government, nor did he see any hope of permitting the Vietcong free participation in the political life of South Vietnam without wrecking whatever stability existed.

After I had seen Ambassador Porter, I went to my office for the first time in three days. Lodge had sent me a file of all the cables of his first few months in office in 1963, that is, from the time of his arrival until the assassination of Diem and Nhu.

I spent the rest of the afternoon with the CIA man responsible for analyzing the Vietcong in the South and with a girl who was responsible for analysis of North Vietnam.

analysis of North Vietnam.

analyzing the Vietcong in the South and with a girl who was reasonable for
I absent the rest of the afternoon with the CIA man reasonable for
the assassination of Diem and Mhu.

few months in office in 1963, that is, from the time of his arrival until
time in three days. Lodge had sent me a file of all the capes of the岛 first
After I had seen Ambassador Porter, I went to my office for the first
South Vietnam without wrecking whatever stability existed.

pope of permitting the Vietcong free participation in the political life of
negotiation that would not wreck the Saigon Government, nor did he see any
situation would be absolutely useless. He did not see any feasibility of
the military, put if the military ever lose grip on the Government, the
the problem would be to build another Government with a few civilians around
I asked him what would happen if there was an upheaval. He said that
military were still the chief element of ppb in Vietnam.

operate entirely freely, the only result could be chaos. In his opinion, the
more than coffee-clique, put if the political process were permitted to
There were fifty political parties in Vietnam, some of which represented no
influx of Americans and in bart by the irreconcilability of political leadership.

was sparked in bart by worsening economic conditions produced by the tremendous
would not take much to get another series of upheavals started. The discontent
discontent as the natural opposition tendencies of the Vietnamese and it
sense discontent building up. It was really not so much a question of
Government. Porter said that at the moment it was stable; however, he could
I then asked Porter about the political stability of the Saigonese

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The CIA man explained to me the organization of the National Liberation Front and of the Communist Party of South Vietnam. First of all, according to his analysis, the belief of some Westerners that the NLF was a nationalist movement separate from the Communist Party is absurd. Every key position is held by a Communist and even when there is occasionally a non-Communist in a key position, he has a Communist at his side. Secondly, at the lower levels below the national level, the Liberation Front is really a small adjunct of the Communist Party. The Communist Party in South Vietnam takes its direction from the central committee of the Communist party of Hanoi, and has organizations on the region, province, district, village and hamlet. Each region has a regiment of military forces: each province has a battalion, each district has a company; each village has a guerrilla platoon; and each hamlet has a self defense squad. Each village chapter is organized to include an element of the National Liberation Front, which has subdivisions for peasants, youth, women, students and labor. In addition, there is a parallel organization of the Communist Party in which each village chapter has the following committees: an economic and financial committee; a village farmers association; propaganda; cultural and indoctrination; village women's association; military prosethylizing committee; village youth association, each of which has a hamlet sub-division. This means that a large percent of each village is in some way or another connected with the Vietcong, and it makes the task of routing them out almost impossible. The estimate of the CIA man about control was as follows: all statistics showed that the government controlled about 40% of the population. This was absurd and depended on formal statistics. His estimate was that 85% of the population in the Delta and 80% of the population outside of the Delta were outside governmental control in the sense that the

Vietcong

outside of the Delta were outside governmental control in the sense that the
estimate was that 82% of the population in the Delta and 80% of the population
the population. This was apportioned and debended on formal statistics. His
follows: all statistics showed that the Government controlled about 40% of
out almost imponderable. The estimate of the CIV man apportion control was as
or another connected with the Vietcong, and it makes the task of routing them
and division. This means that a large percent of each village is in some way
broachifying committee; village youth association, each of which has a hamlet
broganda; cultural and indoctrination; village women's association; military
committees; an economic and financial committee; a village farmers association;
of the Communist Party in which each village chapter has the following
South, women, students and labor. In addition, there is a parallel organization
element of the National Liberation Front, which has subdivisions for beans, and
a self defense ad unit. Each village chapter is organised to include an
has a company; each village has a guerrilla bluet; and each hamlet has
regiment of military forces; each province has a battalion, each district
on the region, province, district, village and hamlet. Each region has a
from the central committee of the Communist party of Hanou, and has organisations
the Communist Party. The Communist Party in South Vietnam takes its direction
below the national level, the Liberation Front is really a small adjunct of
a key position, he has a Communist at his side. Secondly, at the lower levels
held by a Communist and even when there is occasionally a non-Communist in
movement separate from the Communist Party is apportioned. Every key position is
to his analysis, the policy of some Westerners that the ML was a nationalist
Front and of the Communist Party of South Vietnam. First of all, according
to his analysis, the policy of some Westerners that the ML was a nationalist
Front and of the Communist Party of South Vietnam. First of all, according
to his analysis, the policy of some Westerners that the ML was a nationalist
The CIV man explained to me the organization of the National Liberation
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