(Not printed at Government expense)

Congressional Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 89th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

U.S. Policy Toward China

SPEECH
OF

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY
OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, May 3, 1966

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I intend to address the Senate this afternoon on the subject of China. Before I do so, I wish to take notice that the distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota, who has made important contributions to the discussion of our foreign policy in many areas of the world, is on the floor and intends also to speak on this subject.

I look forward to hearing his address. I know from past discussions we share common views on many of these matters, including the need for a public commission to suggest new China policy. I know all Senators will listen carefully to his presentation because they know as I do, he speaks from broad experience and dedication.

Mr. President, the time has come for the American Government and the American people to make a major re-assessment of our policy toward China. Communist China today is an imposing presence in the world stage. She is not occupied solely with her own considerable domestic problems. She is a nuclear power. She is involved in intrigues and subversion around the world. She has replaced the Soviet Union in many areas as the spearhead of Marxist revolution. She is the chief backer of our adversaries in Vietnam. She is the only major power in the world that proclaims the inevitability of war with the United States.

Our Government has been striving toward a peaceful solution that preserves the independence of Vietnam. We are anxious to avoid more wars in Asia, and see the other nations of that area de-

velop in peace and freedom. But we cannot begin to seek a solution in Vietnam, or stability in Asia, or effective arms control or lasting peace without knowing what China will do. And the disturbing thing, Mr. President, is that we know so little. In March, the Foreign Relations Committee, in a significant series of hearings, asked the leading China experts in the country for their views. Even they were extremely hesitant to predict how Chinese communism and Chinese foreign policy would evolve. We do not have firm answers to some of the most critical questions, such as:

Are the Chinese serious in their proclamations of inevitable war with the United States?

To what lengths will they go to bring the rest of Asia under their influence?

Does their split with the Soviet Union make it easier or harder for us to deal with them?

What changes will take place in China, and Chinese foreign policy, after the first generation of revolutionary leaders passes from the scene?

How long will these changes take? Can we do anything to hurry them along?

And most important, are there any changes we can make in our policy toward the Chinese that will make her a more responsible nation and improve the prospects of peace and stability in Asia?

One of the reasons for our difficulty is that China herself has been so secretive. For many years, our efforts to send scholars and journalists to China on a reciprocal basis have been rebuffed. But the fundamental reason is that as a nation we are still unprepared to face up to the realities of China.

For almost 15 years, until Chinese power combined with Chinese intransigence forced her problems upon us, there was no meaningful political discussion in

this country of alternatives to our Chinese policy. The Communist victory over the Chinese people in 1949 was a traumatic experience for our country. It created such deep wounds and bitter divisions that all contacts were ended and effective political discussion became frozen. Men we recognize today as experts—men to whom we entrust important governmental responsibilities abroad—were pilloried during the 1950’s because they had had some small connection with the China policy of the 1940’s. As a result, the wellspring of respected scholarship, on which sound political discussion is based, began to dry. And today our universities produce only a handful of China scholars each year. Until the recent foreign relations hearings there has never been a thoroughgoing study by public figures of what our policy toward China should be.

On any foreign or domestic issue, there must be a long-term process of public education, leading to the public acceptance that is needed for effective Government policy. That is how our democratic process works. We have seen it in recent years as regards such issues as foreign aid, medicare, civil rights, aid to education, and many others that just a few years ago had little public support. On China and China alone, has the issue been so fraught with emotion that the normal workings of the democratic process have become stuck.

I believe sufficient time has passed for this to have changed. If for no other reason than China's increasing power and bellicosity, public interest and concern with China is great enough today for the American people to listen tolerantly to new approaches and realistic ideas.

To help bring this about, I think it would be extremely helpful if the President convened a blue-ribbon commission

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of distinguished men to make, publicly, recommendations for new directions in our China policy. Such a commission could be headed by an eminent citizen or past national leader. Its membership could be drawn from academic, business, labor and other leadership circles. It should have available to it the assistance of all intelligence sources on China within our Government, as well as the advice of the China experts in our universities, the results of the policy formulation work now being done in the executive branch, and the experience of both living former Presidents who have dealt with the China issue in their administrations.

Many times in recent years, when it became obvious that the American Government would have to make new endeavors or seek new directions, commissions have proved an effective vehicle for recommendations and public education. The Civil Rights Commission under President Truman paved the way for the greatest era of progress in Negro rights. The work of the Gaither Committee in 1958-59 convinced us of the need for a large increase in missile power to make our deterrent effective. The Rockefeller brothers reports laid the basis of public acceptance for many of the social and cultural programs we have initiated in recent years. The Coordinating Committee, prior to the 1962 trade act, and the Draper Committee in the field of birth control are other examples of the use of this approach.

The Commission I suggest would have the truly historic task of seeing if more normal relations with China could be established, consistent with the goals and principles of our foreign policy. It could lay a basis for new policies to deal with those who succeed Mao Tse-Tung and the aging group of revolutionaries who lead China today. It could, most important of all help to free the question of U.S. relations with China from the rigid emotional straightjacket which has encased it for so many years. It might also stimulate a greater desire by our young scholars to pursue China studies.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity to commend the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts for bringing this issue out into the open once again and getting it into the mainstream of American thought and concern.

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I do not know of anything that is more important than to get this issue properly before the public.

While I must confess that I am not sure as to the best vehicle, I think the Senator rendered a great service in the speech he is making today to help get more Americans conscious of this tremendous problem.

I wish to commend the Senator most highly.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I appreciate the comments of the Senator. The Senator is highly regarded for his contributions to matters of foreign affairs. He knows well the problems we face in Asia and the difficulties in arriving at foreign policy positions that will both serve our Nation and the cause of world peace. He is one of the foremost spokesmen in the Senate and I am proud to receive his kind and encouraging words.

The Commission could be asked to make recommendations on the following vital issues:

First. To make suggestions on how to increase informal and formal governmental contacts with Communist China.

The only link we now maintain with Communist China is through informal discussions between our Ambassadors in Warsaw. These have taken a rigid form, with fixed agendas, and formal procedures. So far they have been barren of real result. I do not think this single contact is adequate. We should try to establish more frequent contact with her diplomats, at various levels, in Paris and London and other national capitals in addition to Warsaw, and begin a diversity of discussions with them. I would expect the Commission to also give attention to the conditions necessary for future normal relations with China. I also believe we should not discourage other nations friendly to us from extending their own diplomatic contacts with China, as far as they desire.

Second. The Commission would advise on how to increase scientific, education, cultural, athletic, and tourist contacts with Communist China.

So far China has refused our offer to permit reciprocal exchange of medical specialists and journalists. But what if a man like Dr. Michael DeBakey applied to go to China to help her physicians develop techniques for saving heart patients? What if Dr. Jonas Salk asked permission to help promote the use of his polio vaccine, in exchange for some of their leading scientists? It would be increasingly harder for China to refuse.

But even if they did, in what more dramatic way could we prove to the world that it is they, not we, who continue to insist on their isolation?

To keep trying, imaginatively, constructively, could eventually result in Chinese acceptance, just as in the Warsaw link. From this beginning could come a regular exchange of scientists, professors, artists, athletes, and eventually even ordinary tourists.

One of the many impediments to Chinese-United States relations is that the Chinese people's picture of our country is based entirely on the hate propaganda fed them by their Government. The value of exposing more Chinese to our society far outweighs, in my judgment, the risk that some may come to spy—a risk that our security agencies are well equipped to guard against in any event.

Third. The Commission would make recommendations on the problem of Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations.

For the last 10 years we have successfully opposed the admission of mainland China to the United Nations. Each year the vote has become progressively tighter. Last year the procedural question to consider this matter an important issue was sustained, 56 to 49, with 11 abstentions. On the resolution itself, to admit Red China at the expense of Formosa, the vote was 47 to 47, with 20 abstentions. It is uncertain how long the necessary majority will remain.

We have a fundamental commitment to preserve the presence of the Republic of China in the United Nations. We must continue to press in the U.N. toward this end. This commitment grows out of past loyalties, and out of the Republic's strong identity with our policies in many areas. But if a system of representation were devised which would allow a seat for mainland China and still preserve Taiwan's rights, it should receive serious consideration. In developing our policy on this matter, the advice and suggestions of the Commission would be most valuable to our Government and to our country. This matter should receive the Commission's highest priority.

Fourth. The Commission would look into how to increase Chinese participation in international arms control negotiations.

I think that all Americans agree that there can be no effective arms control without Communist China's participation. At present, China is the least interested in arms control of all the nuclear countries. We urged that she be

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invited to the Geneva negotiations. She refused to come, even though in 1963 she proposed a general disarmament plan of her own. We should continue to hold the door open for her, at every disarma-ment conference, in the hope that eventual-ly she will participate—and in the knowledge that at least the world will see which country it is that refuses to even consider abandoning the weapons of destruction.

Fifth. The Commission would reassess our present embargo on all trade with China, to see whether a limited trading relationship could be established on goods which could not be used to fuel the Chinese war machines. It is obvious that our trade embargo has, in recent years, been effective only as a symbol of hostility. What Communist China is denied by us, she can purchase from Eng-land, France, Germany, and Japan. Over half her trade is with non-Com-munist nations. The beginning of a trade relationship would be another source of increased contact which could yield dividends of peace in future years.

Sixth. Consider ways in which Taiwan can make the same progress in political institutions that she has made eco-nomically.

As an economic showcase, Taiwan stands as dramatic a contrast to main-land China as West Berlin is to East Berlin. Yet it is important that the 10 million native Taiwanese, who now have only 26 of the 2,900 delegates to the Na-tional Assembly, obtain a greater partici-pation in the island's political life. In any referendum the Taiwanese would overwhelmingly reject Communist rule, and show the world that the mainland's claim to their island is the most blatant kind of old-style colonialism. The United States stands for free institutions in South Vietnam, in Asia, and through-out the world. They should be en-couraged in Taiwan as well.

Most likely all of these initiatives di-rected toward mainland China, if offered by us, would be rejected by them this year, and perhaps for years to come. Few nations have ever been more hostile to the United States, more strongly sus-picious of our every act, more inclined to interpret every friendly gesture on our part as a plot or a sign of weakness.

If this is true, why would these in-itiatives be useful nonetheless?

Because they are in keeping with the patience and friendship that the Ameri-can people have historically held out to the people of China.

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Because our efforts, even if rebuffed, will improve the prospect of peace in Asia, if in no other way than by showing that any step toward war is China's step, not ours.

Because if offered patiently and imag-inatively and persistently enough, they might be accepted—not all at once, perhaps none immediately—but eventu-ally, through the steady effect of chip-ping away at China's self-imposed iso-lation.

And finally because no nation can stand still. The forces of change are at work in China just as they are in every country. There is a new interest in a higher peasant standard of living, as shown by the widespread use of birth control. There is going to be a leader-ship change, as shown by the fact that Mao Tse-tung has not been seen for months in public, and even was missing from Sunday's May Day celebration. Policies like these might accelerate this evolution of China toward a posture that would benefit world peace.

It was not too many years ago that war with Russia was also considered inevi-table. No two powers ever confronted each other with more opposite goals than the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet Stalin died and a change took place. The first rays of light were very small: a conference in Geneva in 1955; a trip by Khrushchev and Bulganin to Western Europe in 1956; a visit by Khrushchev to the United States in 1960. And eventu-ally there was a shift in attitude, powered by firmness with flexibility on our part; by the post-Stalin leadership's recogni-tion of the natural desire of the Russian people for peace and more normal rela-tions with other countries; and by the sobering effect that possession of a nu-clear arsenal seems to have on its pos-sessor. The evolution had many set-backs, such as the U-2 incident, the breakup of the Paris summit meeting, the Berlin crisis of 1961, and the Cuban crisis of 1962. Yet from the seed of minor contacts came the fruit of sig-nificant agreements, such as cultural ex-change and the nuclear test ban treaty.

We are not on the best of terms with Russia today. But we talk to them, we negotiate with them, and we are even taking some steps in certain fields of in-ternational cooperation. Our relations with Russia today are better than anyone could have expected 12 years ago. I hope, 12 years from now, that we can say the same thing about China.

So let us take a fresh look. We cannot concede in areas of vital interest. We must honor our commitments to our friends in South Vietnam, Korea, Malay-sia, Thailand, Burma, Taiwan, and the other free nations of Asia. We must realize that any basic progress in our relations will depend, in the end, on China's willingness to renounce force as a means of international change, her willingness to negotiate and to accept compromises, and to give up her aim of destroying the United States. It takes two sides to make a lasting peace, but it only takes one to make the first step.

For over 100 years, the United States has taken a deep interest in the welfare of the Chinese people. Our missionaries worked there. Our clipper ships traded there. We fought together in the great-est war in history. The warm feeling that developed over this period remains in the hearts of our people and, I believe, in the consciousness of the people of this great and civilized land. It will be diff-cult to rekindle this feeling to a point where it can lead to better relations. But it will serve the deepest traditions of our country and the highest aspira-tions of the world to try to make the effort.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I join with the Senator from Washington in commending the distinguished Sena-tor from Massachusetts on the very wel-come and helpful and enlightening ad-dress he has delivered.

There is no question that this is an area which is most controversial and most difficult to discuss. It is a question on which we need considerably more light.

I ask the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts if he does not think that the pending study of the Red Chinese economy before the Joint Economic Committee would be very useful. It seems to me that it could help from the standpoint of our military policy. There is a great deal of controversy as to whether the Chinese would be able to engage in a full-scale war in South Viet-nam and elsewhere.

The kind of inquiry which the Joint Economic Committee is capable of conduct-ing would be helpful, and in a far more positive and constructive manner in ascertaining the trade potentiality

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and determining whether we would have
a basis for extensive trade.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I agree with the Senator. I believe that that kind of study is indicative of an awakening of interest and concern within this country with regard to our relations with China.

I believe that study could unquestionably be very helpful to all of us in trying to appraise what our attitude should be. I certainly hope that the Commission that has been proposed today would be able to study that material, as well as the material that would be available within the Government and universities and come forth with some solid recommendations, suggestions, ideas, proposals, to assist us who share a deep concern over what our attitude should be and can be toward China.

I believe that the contribution that would be made by such a commission would be certainly consistent with a number of things that have been proposed today.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I agree wholeheartedly with the Commission idea. It would be a good start, particularly with the high level, thoroughly competent Commission which the Senator from Massachusetts recommends.

What concerns the Senator from Wisconsin is the consistent lack of any positive response on the part of China. They seem to have a limited vocabulary on U.S. proposals. The answer is always "No," delivered emphatically and abusively. It is my understanding that we have not only tried very hard to persuade the Chinese to permit our reporters, educators, scientists, and others to visit China, but also have gone so far recently as to invite China to send virtually any kind of scientists or other personnel to this country, with no reciprocal arrangements.

It seems to me that we have been extremely generous so far, and we have not had a response. I am speaking of the last few weeks. I do not mean to say that there are not other things that we could do. I ask the Senator whether he would not agree with me that we have made a very considerable effort along this line.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I mentioned in my speech the points that the Senator from Wisconsin has covered.

We could expect that many of the initiatives which are put forth by any such Commission would be rejected not only today but also for years to come.

The fact that we speak today demonstrates our very deep concern over our

relations with the Far East and the fact that Communist China is today and is going to be the fundamental focus of our problems in the Far East with regard to the stability and peace of that area.

As I mentioned, we can make a number of proposals and we can and should expect that they will be rejected. However, we should realize that this will demonstrate to our friends throughout the world the true nature of Communist China's isolation, and that the rejection of these proposals will be a sign of strength for U.S. policy, rather than a sign of weakness.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Certainly one of the most difficult proposals is the question of the admission of Red China to the United Nations. The case has been argued stronger than the biggest nation in the world should be a member of the United Nations if the United Nations is going to be an effective world peace force.

But a big problem appears to be that China would insist on coming into the United Nations as China, that is, as a permanent member of the Security Council with a veto power, and in view of China's attitude toward the settlement of international disputes as enunciated by the Senator from Massachusetts so clearly today, what would happen to the Security Council?

The other conditions laid down by Red China, including expulsions from the U.N. and charter revision, would make it virtually impossible for her admission into the United Nations to be accomplished.

I believe that the suggestion of the Senator could be very helpful because it is clear that this problem must be solved over, probably, a long time and by some kind of compromise. This can best be achieved by the kind of painstaking and competent study that the Senator proposes.

A number of suggestions have been made as to how to solve the problem, but they are all fraught with difficulties, and the more we probe and examine the difficulties and the more we debate the subject, the more likely it is that we will reach a more enlightened decision in this very important area.

Another important area concerns nuclear proliferation. That is a most dangerous situation, and, unless Chinese refusal to cooperate can be solved in some manner, the slow, painful progress including the test ban treaty is likely to go for naught, and we may have the kind of holocaust which, as the distinguished Senator and his brother, the junior Sen-

ator from New York, have stated so well, could engulf mankind.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts on his thoughtful, imaginative speech suggesting the setting up of a blue ribbon commission to considering new directions in China policy.

Such an action certainly is needed, as the effects in the State Department of the McCarthy holocaust followed by complete stagnation in our China and Far Eastern policy ever since can, I believe, only be removed by the winds of change from outside. One result of our Foreign Relations Committee's hearings was the establishment of the fact that the executive branch of the Government—in fact our country as a whole—is pretty sterile when it comes to actual knowledge of Communist China today.

The problem has been that we have left this responsibility over the years entirely to the executive branch. And, today, it appears to be the legislative branch that is probing for possible change.

Accordingly, I would hope that such a blue ribbon commission might, just as it would invite participation from the executive branch of Government, also draw on the views developed by the Foreign Relations Committee in the course of its China hearings and even on our committee.

I have read, too, Senator McGOVERN'S speech which endorses Senator KENNEDY's idea of such a blue ribbon commission to examine China policy and which goes on to show his imagination and his willingness to pioneer in fighting for peace.

Let us remember that when Senator McGOVERN talks of peace he talks as an old bomber pilot who knows the horror of war.

It is an interesting thought, that while in the United States less than 1 percent of us have heard a shot or bomb go off in anger, virtually every person over 25 in Europe north of the Pyrenees has had this experience. And, now, so has virtually every citizen of Vietnam.

I believe, too, that this experience—or lack of experience—has an effect on public opinion in every country.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] for his observations and supporting remarks. Senator PELL, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, speaks with an experience and

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5

understanding that I welcome here today.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, earlier today it was my good fortune to read the speech we have just heard by the thoughtful Senator from Massachusetts. I have heard some of the comment which has followed. The bad comment encompasses all that it occurred to me I would want to reassure myself was on the record; hence, I shall restrict myself to saying that I think this sort of suggestion, voiced by one to whom America quite properly pays a great deal more heed than to some of the rest of us, comes at just the right time.

The form, as the Senator from Rhode Island suggests, could be of such nature as to build in the experience of the past and potential contributions that we could draw from our own Committee on Foreign Relations; and I would hope thought would be given to that.

Lastly, Mr. President, when we go home, we are asked a series of questions wherever we go: "What about Vietnam? How much money should we spend for defense? When are you going to try a new equitable tax program? What is the relationship between the total spent on space and the total spent on education, and is it consistent with our obligations in both areas?"

We could go on and list innumerable questions, to none of which anybody short of God could pretend he knew the answers, but with respect to all of which, including questions concerning China, all of us have an obligation to inform ourselves.

Unfortunately, we have been unable to appropriate additional hours to each day. Therefore, it is desirable that there be available to each of us this sort of resource, so that hopefully we may be able more effectively to allocate the hours which are ours, if we cannot do anything about increasing them, to seeking answers to all of the questions which crowd us for answers.

One of the questions now often asked is, "What about China?"

As a member of the generation which went to school when China was represented by about two pages in a geography book, and a place to which I would never go unless I happened to find myself a foreign missioner, I find it necessary to do a great deal of homework on such a question. I should be grateful to such a

commission for its help, and to the Senator from Massachusetts especially.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I appreciate the views of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I join my fellow Senators in congratulating the Senator from Massachusetts on a very thoughtful speech. Since we have opened up the subject of China, I think it is extremely important for thoughtful Senators such as the Senator from Massachusetts—and I know the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN] also has a speech along the same lines—to keep the subject alive.

This is a new subject. Most of the time since I have been in the Senate, it has been rather taboo, in that it was not considered proper and certainly not safe politically to discuss it.

I think the Senator is entirely correct in raising these questions, and I also like his idea about a commission to study the subject. It may be said by some, as indeed it has been said heretofore, that the Committee on Foreign Relations should make these studies.

We can only do so much on a particular subject, because other necessary legislation crowds it out. We now have foreign aid, a most controversial and troublesome subject. We also contemplate the necessity of giving some attention to Europe. So I think it is a very fine supplement to the work of the committees to continue the discussion of this matter.

I know of no subject upon which there is more misunderstanding, misinformation, or just plain ignorance than China. I know that that has been true of myself and other members of the committee. Our hearings were, I thought, a good start, because we had some well-informed scholars and students of China—about as good as our staff could locate in this country. But I am sure there are many others.

Also, a commission such as that suggested by the Senator from Massachusetts would, I think, be freer from the inhibitions that naturally afflict all of us in public office, because these are controversial matters, and some are loath to become involved in controversial matters.

As I understand it, the Senator is not seeking to have such a commission appointed; he is simply throwing out the

idea for consideration. I believe it is his point of view that we would then hope to attract some of the best minds in the country on such a study. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. The Senator is correct. I think the Commission could well be appointed by the President of the United States, to consist of leading, thoughtful people such as those who appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee.

As the Senator from Arkansas has mentioned, this matter has been a taboo question for discussion in Congress and in the Senate for many years. I think it is true that the very effective hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee really were the opening shots of the struggle for information, and reasoned study of this issue. I think all of us in the Senate owe a considerable debt of gratitude to the chairman and the members of that committee for conducting those hearings, which I think were extremely productive and constructive in their approach.

As the Senator from Arkansas has mentioned, the idea is to have this Commission appointed by the President of the United States, to consist of persons of high caliber and expertise from our universities, from people active in public affairs and past national leaders. Those who could bring wide and varied backgrounds and experience to bear upon the subject, and make public their recommendations, are the people I have in mind.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will yield further, there is one further advantage to that that I can think of, among others: There is a tradition in our committee not to have foreign nationals appear in open session. We often consult them in executive session.

This tradition, I think, is probably soundly based. I have considered breaching it. But in these highly controversial areas, I do not wish to embarrass any foreign national; and they might be subjected to embarrassment. In any case, that is the precedent, according to our staff, and I do not recall any exceptions, particularly involving a matter of this kind. I think perhaps in certain technical areas and certain other aspects, there have been some who appeared, particularly some Canadians.

But such a commission would be free of any such traditions—not that that is a bad one, under the existing political circumstances. A great deal of valuable information as to the situation since the revolution could be contributed by peo-

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ple who are foreigners. There have been
very few Americans there. There have
been a number of Canadians, Dutchmen,
Frenchmen, of course, and British,
among others, who have been there. So
the Commission would have that ad-
vantage.

While I am on my feet, may I say, with
reference to the matter just discussed, as
to the question of whether or not the
Chinese would react favorably to an in-
vitation to the United Nations, the testi-
mony before the committee seemed to
indicate quite clearly that the best ex-
perts did not believe they would immedi-
ately react favorably, but they thought
this is no reason at all not to withdraw
our objection. As I recall, not many of
them, if any, said that it was our duty to
recommend or to promote their inter-
ests, but the least we could do would be

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withdraw our opposition. It is generally
believed, and I believe it, that the ex-
clusion of China has been a result of
our very firm and vigorous opposition.
So we do not have to take the responsi-
bility for promoting it, although per-
sonally I do not see any great distinction;
I mean that if we change our policy,
which I hope we are in the process of
doing with regard to China, that distinc-
tion is rather more a matter of form and
perhaps of good taste than anything else.
I do not see anything of any great sub-
stance.

The same is true with respect to the
offers as to students, doctors, or profes-
sional men. I do not think there is rea-
son to expect them to make an immedi-
ate response, in view of the very serious
and at times vitriolic and bitter differ-
ences which have existed since 1949. So

I think this is a matter of deliberate
policy, expecting that they are not likely
to fall all over themselves in gratitude
for our sudden change of policy.

But that is quite immaterial to the
point the Senator makes. I agree with
him on that, too. The Senator has made
a great contribution which will help to
keep this subject developing.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr.
President, I appreciate the comments of
the Senator from Arkansas. The Sena-
tor has added another reason for the for-
mulation of such a commission; namely,
access to foreign nationals, which had
not occurred to me.

I wish to thank the Senator. He has
summarized very well the principal rea-
sons for the development of such a com-
mission, and I want to express my ap-
preciation to him for his comments.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966

FROM: SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

AS YOU MAY KNOW, I RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A TWO-WEEK VISIT
TO VIETNAM, UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES.

ON MY RETURN I DELIVERED TWO MAJOR ADDRESSES OUTLINING MAJOR
IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. I HAVE ENCLOSED THESE STATEMENTS IN
THE HOPES THAT YOU WILL FIND THEM TO BE OF SOME INTEREST, AND I
WOULD, OF COURSE, APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE.

United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Senator Edward M. Kennedy on Vietnam

False Optimism About Vietnam

REMARKS
OF
HON. THRUSTON B. MORTON
OF KENTUCKY

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, false optimism and self-delusion continue to dominate official reports from both Washington and Saigon as to the effects of the onslaught being carried out by the Vietcong in major cities and provincial capitals of Vietnam.

The devastating attacks mounted by the insurgents—with the acquiescence or the complicity of many whose hearts and minds Ambassador Komer boasts are secure—cannot be dismissed as the enemy's death rattle.

Yet today General Westmoreland tells us that heavy enemy losses "may measurably shorten the war." I am sure that many Senators would like to know precisely what measurement the general is using. Has he determined, for instance, how many thousands of innocent civilians are included in those impressive body counts that flow from official quarters with nauseous regularity?

Mr. President, the tragic history of U.S. intervention in Vietnam is replete with Government declarations that we have at last "turned the corner." Seldom it is that the American public hears the unvarnished truth about a war that has been described by my esteemed friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, RICHARD RUSSELL, as "one of the great tragedies of our history."

And seldom has a Member of this body done the physical and mental spadework about the sickening complexity that is Vietnam as has the senior Senator from

Massachusetts, EDWARD M. KENNEDY. He has, with candor and objectivity, thoroughly analyzed the interplaying tragedy of millions of Vietnamese refugees whose plight is made the more desperate by indiscriminate American military operations and the bottomless corruption of the Saigon government.

Since his recent return from an exhaustive trip to Vietnam, Senator KENNEDY has examined the human cost of the war in terms of the homeless and the destitute. He has also put into proper perspective the damage being done the true interest of the Vietnamese, and U.S. objectives as well, by the self-serving clique that can only profit by our actions and the suffering of its people.

Senator KENNEDY speaks of the necessity of a "confrontation" with the Government of South Vietnam in order that they be made to realize that the present conflict is basically theirs to win or lose, and that reasonable conditions are going to be placed upon further American involvement unless they take immediate steps to put their house in order.

I might add, Mr. President, that the American people ought to demand a similar confrontation with the administration so that President Johnson can state in no uncertain terms what ends we now seek in Vietnam, in view of the limited means available to us. I would hope that this "new look" at a deteriorating situation there might offer the opportunity to lower our objectives, and raise the hopes of millions for an earlier rather than later termination of the war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two addresses by the senior Senator from Massachusetts be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the addresses were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF
BOSTON ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO SOUTH
VIETNAM, JANUARY 25, 1968

It is a pleasure for me to have this opportunity to appear before the World Affairs Council, to discuss my recent trip to Vietnam.

Vietnam is not the only nation in Southeast Asia that presents us with dangers in our foreign policy. We know of the continued insurgency in the Northeast corner of Thailand, of the invasion of Laos by North Vietnamese forces, and the increasing bellicosity of the North Koreans that resulted this week in an almost unprecedented seizure of an American Naval vessel. These must be matters of concern to us all and they are situations to be watched with care and treated with sound judgment. But Vietnam is where we have tied down so much of our manpower, our resources, our energies, and our hopes.

As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I went to Vietnam to investigate our progress, or lack of progress, in both our refugee and our civilian casualty programs. Within the next two or three weeks, I expect to make a detailed report to the Senate of my findings within the area of these specific responsibilities. Today, I wish to be more general.

I certainly did not go to Vietnam expecting suddenly to find the solution to the war. I return with no blueprint for immediate success, no scheme for peace that others have missed.

But I believe I do return with a greater sensitivity, with greater feeling about our total efforts there. These I wish to share with you.

I last visited Vietnam in 1965, at the beginning of the massive buildup there of American presence. At that time, the Viet Cong threat was at a peak. The danger was imminent that they would take over the country, destroying in the process whatever free institutions the people enjoyed. The decision was made by the United States during this period to revise significantly our role in Southeast Asia. We have held to that decision with little change since then.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

At that period in the struggle we took every claim of progress as a strong sign of hope—perhaps because the situation was so dismal. One left Saigon in 1965 feeling things were going to get better, simply because they could not get worse. I left at that time not with any hope of victory in the near future but at least with the hope that some real progress was on the horizon, that some real improvement, some easing of pain was in store for the people of Vietnam who had suffered so long—and for our people too.

On my return this year from Vietnam, I am forced to report to you, and to the people of the Commonwealth, that continued optimism cannot be justified. I am forced to conclude that the objectives we set forth to justify our initial involvement in that conflict, while still defensible, are now less clear and less attainable than they seemed in the past.

And I believe that if current policies relating to the nature of the war are not changed, and the assumptions underlying civilian programs are not revised, then the prospects for individual freedom and political stability in Vietnam in the foreseeable future are dim.

In essence, I found that the kind of war we are fighting in Vietnam will not gain our long-range objectives; that the pattern of destruction we are creating can only make a workable political future more difficult; and that the government we are supporting has given us no indication, and promises little, that it can win the lasting confidence of its own people.

The war in Vietnam is unlike the traditional wars in our history in which we were prepared to act alone. Our country was not attacked, our cities were not threatened. We do not seek to overthrow an enemy government, capture ground, or achieve an unconditional surrender. We seek only to allow the people a free choice. For these reasons the war is more nebulous, more vague in its ends, than the conflicts of our past. And for precisely these reasons, there is always the chance that our actions, if not fully considered, can exceed our needs. That is why we must be careful in applying the traditional canons of patriotism, or the cliches of the past, in judging this war. As our military effort must be more sophisticated than any other in the past, so must our views as citizens on the policy questions before us.

But before I elaborate on these points, let me share with you some of my personal impressions after observing the war in Vietnam.

First, I was deeply impressed by the American servicemen who are serving there. I had hours of discussion with them, from the Delta in the south to Danang in the north. The man who serves there today is in the tradition of his father who fought in the South Pacific and his brother who walked the length of the Korean Peninsula. Because of the greater opportunities he has had at home, he is perhaps more professional, more intelligent and more aware of his own capabilities as a man and as a soldier. He is there to do a job, and he does it well.

Criticism of the war is not criticism of these individuals. They do not make policy; but no policy makers ever had better men to carry out their objectives. If bravery, skill and sheer force could win this war, these men would win it. But it is these very characteristics that should give us pause—these men whose lives are too precious to sacrifice endlessly or needlessly. We owe much to our fighting men. Our responsibilities to them are great and grave. To interpret criticism of our policies as a lack of support for our men is to suggest that we blindly abandon them to policies without an intelligent consideration of alternatives that may be open to us.

The valor of our troops is one impression I brought back with me from Vietnam. A second strong impression was radically different: the paradox of the city of Saigon.

Saigon has grown over the past three years by almost two million people. The contrasts there are painful. A small, privileged segment of Vietnamese society is thriving in this center of war economy. These privileged individuals are content with the status quo.

But those who have been driven in from the countryside and must now live in the streets and the hovels present a different picture. These people are not doing well in this war, and they know the price of the conflict very well. Vietnam is a nation in which reverence for the dead is the highest trait of character. Yet I saw people in Saigon who are forced to live in graveyards, and have even hollowed out tombs to find shelter. This is a city where thousands of young men 18 and 19 years old flash about the streets on their motorbikes, wearing cowboy hats and leather gloves, exempt from the war and oblivious to the sacrifices of others. Yet this is also a city where 40 per cent of the death toll is accounted for by children under two years of age, children killed primarily by dysentery or pneumonia.

The contrasts of the major city are reflected as well in the countryside. From the air, Vietnam is a beautiful land, but when you descend from the sky you see clearly the pockmarks of war, and when you walk through the villages you see the ravages of war in the faces of the sick and wounded children. Beyond the villages abandoned fields stretch to the horizon, and scorched outlines of houses burned to the ground sometimes cover more than half the land area of a province. Whole areas which have been bulldozed to the ground are commonplace, and so are wide corridors of defoliated forests, and fields that once produced food. Here and there are compounds of long sheds with shiny tin roofs—the refugee camps where thousands upon thousands of people have been herded together, uprooted from all they ever knew or wanted.

These are the people of Vietnam, the peasants of Vietnam. They are not a demanding people. Their simplicity is overwhelming, their wants meager. I had the opportunity to visit more than 25 refugee camps and talk to hundreds of their people. I was struck with the fact that they—and their fellow peasants who make up the vast majority of the population—have no ideological commitment to

anything beyond their own families, and perhaps their hamlets or villages. The provincial government, and the central government in Saigon, are nothing but far-away titles to most of them. The debate over communism and freedom has little meaning.

I do not mean to suggest that the peasant of Vietnam would be unresponsive to any form of government. But I do suggest that their concerns and their hopes should not always be considered identical to ours. As a leading intellectual in Vietnam told me, "The peasant may have no political notion of democracy, but he does carry a strong desire for justice." The form of government they want, according to him, is a just government. And none of the governments they have seen in their lifetime have been just to them. To them, the promises of the United States and the promises of the Viet Cong make little difference, even if ours are real and the others propaganda. What they are interested in is the way of life which causes the least further disruption in their already disrupted lives.

We tend to think of refugees as a small minority of people who have been caught in a passing conflict. But when I discuss the refugees in Vietnam, I am talking about literally 25 per cent of that nation's population, all of whom are disaffected, all of whom hold a strong resentment for whatever side tore them away from the simplicity of their lives to the squalor and the bureaucracy of the camps. Most of these people are totally disenchanted with the powers on both sides responsible for their fate. Vietnam today is a land of disenchanted people.

I found a great deal of resentment toward the United States among these people. I asked all of those to whom I spoke how and why they became refugees. The vast majority—I would judge over 80 per cent—claimed they were either deposited in camps by the Americans or fled to camps in fear of American airplanes and artillery. Only a handful claimed they were driven from their homes by the Viet Cong.

The French, one leader told me, committed many sins in Vietnam. But the French did not wipe out their villages, or burn down their homes, or herd them into enclosures in the name of security, when many felt more secure, with more food and less disease, where they were.

It is apparent to me that it is the refugees of Vietnam, and their brothers in the hamlets, whom we must win over for any policy to succeed. But all too often this task may be almost impossible, because of that one forgotten and seemingly insignificant act in a fast-moving war, the destruction of a home or a hamlet—and that most significant fact, that we displayed no compassion thereafter.

One further impression—and perhaps the strongest and most depressing—is the impression of the Viet Cong themselves. I spoke to Vietnamese and Americans alike who have either known the enemy from years of experience or have encountered him in the dark of night. The determination of the Viet Cong is awful to behold. They are capable of great cruelty. They often attack positions

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["4", "CONGRESSIONAL RECORD", "report to the people of this state on my im-\npressions on the war would be complete\nwithout some personal conclusions.", "I do not wish to engage in speculation on\nwhether or not we have been aggressive\nenough in grasping offers to negotiate an\nend to the war, but I would question the wis-\ndom of some who feel that a great deal of\nthe negotiations for peace must be carried\nout before the negotiating table is ever\nreached.", "Admittedly, we are confronted with cun-\ning men in Hanoi. But I have sufficient\nfaith in our own ingenuity and bargaining\nability to believe that we can discuss settle-\nment before many major military issues are\nresolved. Negotiations will not be a quick or\npainless solution to the Vietnam war, but\nthe sooner they begin, the sooner men of\npeace, rather than those concerned solely\nwith military victory, will begin bringing\ntheir influence to bear on the ultimate\nresult.", "But if negotiations are not forthcoming, or\nif they face a great delay, we must ask our-\nselves whether the gains we can achieve are\nworth the staggering costs we now incur.\nAmerican officials I talked to in Vietnam are\nemphatic that we must not expect too much\nfrom the central government, that the effort\nto win the people and discourage the VC\nwill go slowly, and that we cannot hope for\nan end to our involvement for another five\nor ten years. It is easy to accept five to ten\nyears in the abstract, but it becomes more\ndifficult when years are translated into dol-\nlars—another $150 to $300 billion at the cur-\nrent level of spending. And I find it impos-\nsible to talk of our future in Vietnam in\nterms of another 50,000 to 100,000 young\nAmericans dead. Last year, 9,000 boys died:\nthis year we will lose 10,000. Unless we\nchange the way we fight in this war, the\ndeath toll will grow even larger while the\ngains, computed by often meaningless statis-\ntics, will merely creep along, to mock the\noffering of this, the most precious gift we\nhave.", "And so it is that the rising cost of Ameri-\ncan lives and the damage, both political and\nphysical, that we inflict on the people, cause\nme to view current military actions with\ngreat dismay. As a result, I believe that if we\ncannot achieve negotiations in the very near\nfuture, we should begin immediately to\nmoderate significantly our military activities\nin South Vietnam to levels more tolerable to\nall and more commensurate with our limited\naims. Our overriding goal should be to maxi-\nmize the safety and security of the Viet-\nnamese people and our own soldiers, rather\nthan to search out the enemy in his terri-\ntory and on his terms. To produce a flow of\nstatistics of enemy killed, roads opened, ham-\nlets secured, is not our goal in Vietnam, and\nit is not worthy of our effort. To seek to\njustify a war by such meaningless numbers\nis not only new to the American experience—\nit is unbecoming to a great nation.", "The adoption of a more defensive military\nposture, one designed to protect and hold\nareas of heavy population rather than to", "seek out the enemy, has, I found, some sup-\nport among our military leaders in Vietnam.\nAnd at the same time—as essential to this\nstrategy—we would have to demand more\nfrom the South Vietnamese government in\nthe basic political effort of gaining the alle-\ngiance of the people who would be under the\nprotection of the U.S. and other free world\nforces.", "This task can only be successfully fulfilled\nby the government of South Vietnam. But\ngiven our expenditure of lives and treasure,\nand the threat of Vietnam to our own domes-\ntic tranquillity, it is largely our responsibility\nto see that they accomplish this task. For too\nlong we have tolerated not only government\ncorruption but government indifference to\nthe people. We have refused to confront Sai-\ngon with the same determined fury we have\nunleashed on Hanoi. But they too must face\nthe hard demands of war—and those de-\nmands should be placed before them by us in\nclear and concrete terms.", "I would urge a confrontation between our\ngovernment and the government of South\nVietnam on the entire question of corrup-\ntion, inefficiency, waste of American resources\nand the future of \"the other war\". They\nshould be told in terms that will leave no\ndoubt that if they find it impossible to at-\ntract the people of Vietnam to their own\nconstitutional government, the American\npeople will rightfully demand serious altera-\ntions in the nature of the United States\ninvolvement.", "We can have an enormous influence over\nthe government of South Vietnam if only\nwe choose to use it. They know that if we\nwere not there they would collapse. We came\nto their aid because their people were in\ndanger of a communist takeover. But today\nmany of their officials believe that, because\nof our fear of China and of our deep con-\ncern about communist advances in South-\neast Asia, we are tied to Vietnam irrevocably.\nAs a result, I believe they feel they can act\nas they wish towards the war and towards\ntheir own people, confident we will fill the\ngaps they will leave.", "They must be disabused of the belief that\nAmerican men and American money are a\nCHAIRMAN: A MENTION OF THE\n

6

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

strued. There were no attempts made to de-
ceive; no progress report was given without
some basis in fact. What I did feel was that
the conclusions of progress were drawn from
chosen facts-facts that did not represent
the total war in Vietnam. Those who talked
to me of progress were talking of military
things. Most of their estimates of success
were based on military gains and losses, mil-
itary hopes and military promises for the
future.

But I had spent long days in the field talk-
ing with the Vietnamese peasant, with frus-
trated American civilians who share the dan-
ger of the night with the people—and they
spoke of political things. They spoke of po-
litical promises that were never fulfilled, of
VC propaganda that attacked a corrupt gov-
ernment in Saigon, of terrorism by the
enemy and the political impact of villages
bombed, and of supplies and funds that were
destined to assist the people in times of
hardship and pain—supplies and funds that
never got to the people but simply enriched
the holdings of many Vietnamese officials.

Those in the field told me that the vast
population of Vietnam could give their po-
litical allegiance and support to no one, for
no one had earned it. But in the turmoil of
this war the one who came closest to hold-
ing the grudging respect of the people was
the enemy himself. I realize it would be most
difficult to record these impressions in a
computer, for they are not as easily meas-
ured as body counts and miles of road. They
are, however, political indications of people,
and nothing could be more important in
Vietnam.

For the war in Vietnam is a political war. It is a war that is being waged over which formula of government will control the lives of 16 million people. As such, while military activities can surely kill the proponents of one formula or another, such actions alone can never eradicate the idealism and the ideology from which the formula springs. As no nation, however powerful, could tear the spark of democracy from the American people, no force, however strong, will ever change the minds of those committed to communism. Only example, only deeds that demonstrate compassion, concern, and the best interests of the people, will attract a society to the government in power.

We have long recognized that the war in
Vietnam was different from American in-
volvement of the past. We never at any point
set out to meet the usual goals of war—the
overthrow of a government, the capturing of
land in any other nation or the uncondi-
tional surrender of our foe. But while we
have in theory viewed the war as different
from wars of the past, I believe we have re-
acted to and evaluated progress in Vietnam
mostly in military terms. This past week, for
example, our first reaction to the raids on
the cities was that the enemy had failed to
take Saigon or most of the provincial capi-
tals and hence they suffered a military de-
feat. We have stressed the numbers of enemy
dead—a staggering total, yet unconfirmed, of
15,000 Viet Cong killed and four to five thou-
sand captured—as another indication, that

they failed. We have even implied that those
in Hanoi or in the VC command in the South
are in for another blow to their morale once
they tally up the staggering losses of the
week.

All of these evaluations may have some
merit. But I suggest that we would be wiser
as a nation to recognize that during the
past week the Viet Cong and their allies
from the North achieved an outstanding
political victory. Such recognition would
not be a sign of weakness on our part. It
would be a most prudent act at this time
of decision. A refusal to recognize the events
of this week for what they were carries with
it the possibility that our national reaction
to these events may be inappropriate, waste-
ful, and perhaps dangerous.

The people of Vietnam now know better
than we that there is no haven from the VC.
To the people of Saigon the eventual an-
nouncement that our Embassy was secure
did not mean as much as the fact that for
hours it was not in our hands. And to the
Vietnamese who look upon the City of Hue
as the very symbol of their heritage it mat-
ters little that the enemy is finally being
driven from the city. What is politically im-
portant is that the VC held it for a week
and in its liberation one of the last monu-
ments to Vietnam's past was all but
destroyed.

I believe that to fully face up to the fact
that what we and the South Vietnamese ex-
perienced was a heavy political blow will
cause us to recognize that our response
must be more political in nature than
military.

I am sure there will be strong pressures
upon the President and his Administration
at this time to undertake some retaliatory
steps that would match the heat of the
moment. There are those who feel that the
brazen acts of the enemy call for the com-
mitment of additional American troops, or
a more intensive use of our air power against
the North, or even the encouragement for
some ground actions beyond the borders of
South Vietnam. This reaction is normal
among a people that have been told of sub-
stantial progress in Vietnam—a nation that
was told as recently as three months ago by
the commander of our forces in Vietnam
that the situation was "very, very
encouraging."

The real fact of the matter appears to be
that the Viet Cong did nothing last week
that could be considered beyond their usual
capabilities. They could have performed this
act at any time in the past, and there is
some likelihood that they will be able to do
it again, regardless of the size of our commit-
ment. For history has shown us before, and
it has now been made painfully clear in
Vietnam, that there is no foolproof military
defense against an offense undertaken for
pure political impact. The fact that our na-
tion was taken aback by the ferocity of
their actions stems more perhaps from our
own optimistic evaluations of progress than
from any increased strength of the enemy.
We have, in essence, been relying on barom-

eters that were measuring the strengths and
weaknesses of the wrong storm.

Another difficult fact to be faced is that
what the VC accomplished last week they
could not have accomplished without the
complicity of a sizeable share of the popula-
tion. Major assaults were made on 26 pro-
vincial capitals, countless numbers of dis-
strict headquarters, villages and U.S. bases
with sophisticated weapons and sophisti-
cated planning. Thirty-five thousand men
were involved in an operation that must
have demanded months of coordination.
Prior to the attacks these men had to mass
together, stockpile weapons and ammuni-
tion, eat, sleep and keep in communication.

Yet while we knew that plans were in
effect for some kind of an offensive, we did
not know where or when. This could not
have been accomplished if there were a
population of South Vietnamese that felt
even a reasonable allegiance to its own gov-
ernment. Unless we assume that the enemy
has the strongest internal security system
known, it would have to be said that there
was no one in those 26 cities and Saigon who
felt compelled to inform the central govern-
ment of the time and place and extent of
even one of the attacks. The government
was so unaware, it was reported, that in the
capital city of Saigon fewer than half of
the Vietnamese troops were in barracks and
50 per cent of the police were enjoying the
holiday.

When I returned from Vietnam I reported
the contempt of many Vietnamese for a gov-
ernment that was corrupt and ineffectual. I
stated that the people we are fighting for
do not fully have their hearts in the strug-
gle, and the government that rules them does
not have its heart in the cause of the people.
I was simply reporting broadly-held senti-
ments that I encountered. I am convinced
that we have felt the full weight of those
sentiments in the past eight days.

What then of our response? I would urge
that our reaction to the current crisis be
one that attacks the deadly apathy of the
people toward their government. The offen-
sive of the near future must come from the
government of Vietnam. If that government
would set about the task—not in word but in
deed—to reform itself, to make itself worthy
of the respect of the people of South Viet-
nam, their response would be the equivalent
of 100,000 or even 300,000 additional young
Americans to police every street, house and
structure of importance.

But I am afraid that if the government of
South Vietnam cannot be a government of
the people, if it cannot find a way to broaden
its political base and eliminate its highly
tuned corruption network, if it cannot stir
the motivation of the people and what little
is left of their idealism, then another mil-
lion Americans cannot secure that country.
It should be plain now to those who have
lived off corruption that the good life can
be wiped out. Unfortunately it also will be
plain to those who look to Saigon for pro-
tection that as Saigon now stands, they will
receive little.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

7

Two years ago our government met with the government of South Vietnam in Hawaii. A year and a half ago there was a meeting in Manila, and ten months ago a gathering in Guam. It may well be timely for the powers in question to come together again—not simply for another meeting, but for a serious confrontation. The crisis of the moment, the increases in the losses of American lives, and the amount of national treasure flowing to Vietnam with a dangerous impact upon our own domestic tranquility demand such a confrontation.

It should be clearly stated to those with whom we have allied ourselves, those to whom we have given so much, that they cannot ask for additional American men to expedicate them from a situation that only they can solve. They should be told that unless they have sufficient interest in the survival of their own country to mobilize that country

for war, to draft their own young men at 18 and 19 years of age, to stop the sale of deferments, to place themselves on a seven-day week as do the members of the American mission and to eliminate the system of buying positions of military and political power—unless they have this kind of interest, they cannot long expect us to maintain ours.

I also firmly believe they should be informed that, should they fall to be an ally worthy of our efforts and our lives, we cannot, we will not, continue to be the only people in Vietnam that fully support the present government of South Vietnam. They should be fully aware that, if they are unwilling to accept their responsibilities, then the American people, with great justification, may well consider their responsibilities fulfilled.

The Secretary of Defense in a report to the Congress during the past week stated: "No matter how great be the resources we commit to the struggle we cannot provide the South Vietnamese with the will to survive as an independent nation, with a sense of national purpose transcending the claims of family, friendship or regional origin; or with the ability and self-discipline a people must have to govern themselves. These qualities and attributes are essential contributions to the struggle only the people of South Vietnam themselves can supply."

That is the essence of the struggle in Vietnam. A timely indication by the government of South Vietnam that they are willing to render such a contribution would be the only meaningful and lasting answer to the challenge of the past week.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968