66

Troubled - Kissinger 9731 11 Baskerville 24-13 E-4

tional tensions focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to restore Germany to a respected place in the international community, it is unfair to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the 17 million people in East Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify the uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy—a change of fronts toward the East—is extremely unlikely; but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany thought that its national aspirations were being thwarted by the Alliance. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

Any policy on Germany must deal with three problems: (1) relations with the Soviet Union, including the complex of issues involved in any relaxation of tensions, (2) relations with the East German satellite regime and (3) relations with the East European governments. In all three respects the interests of the Western Allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

With respect to the detente, German concerns are often met with the argument that almost any measure that eases tensions also promotes German unification. According to this theory, once a policy of co-existence is firmly established, Eastern Germany may grow dispensable in Soviet eyes. As the Soviet Union begins to pursue more national policies, the ideological impetus for maintaining a Communist regime in Eastern Germany may decline.

However, it is dangerous to arouse German expectations that are not likely to be fulfilled. Arguments that a detente automatically furthers the cause of German unity must be balanced against others which, on the whole, seem more likely. A statesman can always escape his dilemmas by making the most favorable assumptions about the future. A wise policymaker will also consider the consequences if his hypothesis should turn out to be wrong. The Soviet Union, even if it becomes less committed ideologically, is unlikely to relinquish-its hold on Eastern Germany simply as a result of an improvement in the international atmosphere. On the contrary, to the degree that a detente with the West exists, Soviet leaders may well calculate that concessions on the unification of Germany become unnecessary. The German con-

an improvement in the international atmosphere. On the contrary, to the degree that a detente with the West exists, Soviet leaders may well calculate that concessions on the unification of Germany become unnecessary. The German concern that a detente may freeze the status quo in Germany is, therefore, not wholly unjustified.

Granting that the problem of German unification cannot be left to the more or less automatic operation of a detente', the question becomes how German unity is to be promoted: is it a task for the Alliance as a whole or should the primary initiative come from the Federal Republic? Many leaders in both Washington and London seem to favor a more active role for the Federal Republic. They wish to avoid constant criticisms and to induce the Federal Republic to assume greater responsibility for its future.

But toward whom is the Federal Republic to assume these responsibilities? It would be highly desirable for the Federal Republic to participate more actively within the Alliance in formulating common policies on Germany's future. Some American and British officials go further, however. They argue that the Federal Republic should take the lead in dealing with the East, principally with the East German satellite. They are convinced that increased contacts between the two Germanys will promote the erosion of the East German regime. According to this school of thought, the superior cohesiveness and strength of the Federal Republic will give it by far the stronger bargaining position. At a minimum, such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East German population. In time, the East German regime would become more humane, comparable perhaps to the Kadar government in Hungary.

Such reasoning has caused Western proposals for reunification gradually to move toward enhancing the status of the East German regime. In 1955, the Western plan still called for unification through free election. In 1959, a new plan called for a technical commission composed of twenty-five West and fifteen East Germans to engage in preliminary negotiations for a year. Decisions were to be taken by a majority of three-fourths, giving East Germany an effective veto. In the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been removed. Also in 1962, the West proposed an International Access Authority to Berlin, in which the East German regime was given equal status with the Federal Republic.

This policy has in recent years found support even in the Federal Republic. The West German government has accepted—albeit reluctantly—the principle of technical commissions in which East and West Germany would enjoy parity. Others in Germany have begun advocating a "policy of little steps" toward the East German regime. By this they mean agreements between the two German states leading to expanding cultural and perhaps economic ties. They argue that contacts between the two Germanys will carry the

67

Troubled - Kissinger 9731 11 Baskerville 24-13 F-4
"bacillus of freedom" into the East and thus "infect" the East
German satellite with Western values.

But enhancing the status of Eastern Germany is a danger-
ous course. It could lead to a situation where two German
states will be competing for adherents all over the world; it
could defer indefinitely any hope for unification. It is risky
also because the bargaining position of the Federal Republic
is precarious. In all such contacts, humanitarian concerns will
outweigh political considerations. Even if these negotiations
do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western
ties, they may produce a serious political split in the Federal
Republic.

Germany's Allies should not contribute to the already
considerable confusion between three partly incompatible
objectives: improvement of conditions in Eastern Germany,
consolidation of the East German regime and progress to-
ward German unification, Ameliorating conditions in East-
ern Germany is desirable for humanitarian reasons. At the
same time, it is likely to help the East German regime con-
solidate itself and thus make unification more remote except
on East German terms. As the respectability of the East Ger-
man regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintain-
ing the division of Germany is diminished. As the East Ger-
man regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Repub-
lic will almost surely mount.

This process is likely to be gradual. While the East Ger-
man regime is striving to establish its international status, its
demands may be moderate. But once it is recognized—or even
if its international status is substantially enhanced—it will
have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Re-
public. It will, in fact, be driven to do so by its precarious
position. National feelings in Eastern Germany, unlike those
in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia patriotism can lead to
the conclusion that the national interest is best served by
liberalizing the existing governments. They seem to have be-
come permanent; no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In
East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with
the existence of a Communist regime. A prosperous, demo-
cratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus the
East German regime has every incentive to seek to weaken
the Federal Republic, and it can use its own population as a
hostage.

The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position—which is postulated by some American policymakers—may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recognition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to be

deciding at what point an accumulation of decisions, all
inal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn,
every West German concession to the German Democratic
Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recog-
nition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to be
that two hostile, competing German states will become per-
manent than progress toward unification.

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make certain that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And we should do nothing to promote policies that may lead to a growing demoralization of the Federal Republic. In 1962, the United States encouraged an "opening to the Left" in Italy that was supposed to isolate the Communist Party. Instead it has undermined the center and opened the way to respectability for the Communists. The same role could be played in Germany by the policy of "technical contacts" or of "little steps" and with much more dangerous results.

Those in Washington and London who believe that the so-called "flexible" Germans will always follow their lead may, moreover, be in for some unpleasant surprises. The German version of flexibility could become indistinguishable from traditional nationalism. This mood was expressed by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party. Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests.

»Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP minister for all-
German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are
handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic,
such an attitude carries within it the seeds of serious
misunderstandings.

Finally, as German activity toward the East increases, the
fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Ger-
many's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they
may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding
up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the
interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long
run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well,
because it may lead to its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the
issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp
conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic
ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essen-
tial not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member
of the Alliance, but also for the peace of Europe as well. It is
against all probability that a large and dynamic country can

INSERT 1 TO GALLY 468

While the Allies should show greater understanding for the anguish of a divided country, the Federal Republic has to face the fact that German unity can become an active policy only if it is embodied in a concrete program. Heretofore Bonn has demanded support for German unification, but it has recoiled from encouraging a specific scheme to achieve it. It has feared that any proposals might involve provisions about Germany's frontiers and about limitations on German arms which would amount to unilateral concessions. Understandable as these concerns are, they run the risk of turning the issue of German unity into a largely rhetorical enterprise. Serious negotiations on German unity presuppose the willingness of the Alliance to develop a specific set of proposals.

A precondition of any negotiating program is an agreed strategy toward Eastern Germany. Specifically, should the West seek to ameliorate conditions in the so-called German Democratic Republic by increasing contacts with it or by isolating it? The latter course seems the most promising and the one most consistent with a long-term policy on German unification. This presupposes, however, an orchestration of the policy of the Allies with those of the Federal Republic toward the countries of Eastern Europe.