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INTERVIEW WITH KISSINGER/SIDE A

Q: Dr. Kissinger you and Lu Doc Toe won the 1973 Nobel Prize jointly for your efforts in resulting in the Paris agreements, you accepted as I recall he did not. Does then the fall of Saigon two years later seem a particularly personal disappointment in the life of your own efforts and recognition for those efforts?

A: The Nobel Peace Prize as such an enormous honor, was not what made the collapse of South Vietnam such a searing aspect of that experience. I had joined the Nixon Administration from academic life. All of my friends were on the other side of the Vietnam debate almost without exception and one of my greatest objectives when I was in office was to

the President that we had to begin, we had to begin planning
fiori Vietnam, since
evacuation and of course all that time the Congress had cut
only
off aid to Cambodia so there it was, simply a question of time
as well.
until that collapsed though they fought very heroically and-
than after that having concluded that it would collapse, the
misdav it
problem was how to do this (in a manner that was most
felt through this period
compatible with American interests and that started another
and self-respect + with saving the measuring
number of lives of those who lost their life in un
horrendous debate within our country and within our government
with the Congress, with the media, with some extent with our
allies.

Q: Have you felt Dr. Kissinger that you inherited the
domino theory as enunciated by Dwight Eisenhower and John
Foster Dulles that if a small nation goes falls to communism
then neighboring nations will in turn fall and is that still a
theory that's operable today? I'd like to know what you
thought our purpose was?

A: Well there were two separate problems: one is what was
the view of President Nixon and myself in 69; the second is
what was the view of President Ford and myself in 75? Those
are two totally different events. In 1969 we inherited a war
in which on inauguration day we found 530,000 Americans in
Indochina and their number was still increasing on the basis

out. So that was the original domino theory and we believed, and I still believe, that it would have been absolutely dishonorable for the United States to accept the only terms that were available no matter what journalists are now saying.

The only terms we were ever offered until October 1972 were the overthrow of the South Vietnamese government with some helpful suggestions that assassination would do, it would not have to be a legal overthrow we just bumped off Thu and his group and the North Vietnamese would accept it. This was the sticking point on which we would not yield. And when that point was conceded we settled very rapidly. Now in 1975 the problem was entirely different. On April 1st 1975 which is the point at which I made a formal recommendation to President Ford that we should begin thinking of evacuation we knew Vietnam and Cambodia were going to fall. Whatever dominoes were going to fall were going to fall. But for President Ford, myself and Skocroft the problem was whether the United States should accelerate this process and in the last moment stab its allies in the back or whether we should try to hang on as long as possible and by as long as possible we were talking about wild differences in weeks. It was essentially out of our control, anybody could see the rate of the advance of the North

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4/19 Kissinger taped interview, second side

*(n).(n). made a horrible discovery, I thought that my next article wasn't due until two weeks from now and *(n).(n). especially journalistic license *(n).(n).

Q. You have written on this subject before but to go back at it. Can a pluralistic society with the leaks, the divisions, the strongly held moral positions added to strongly held political positions conduct foreign policy on a rational basis?

A. The answer is contradictory. As far as America is concerned in the last 15 years it hasn't. We can't change our

CYJ

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policy. The solution is to try to find some bipartisan
consensus again, but once you've set that that's much easier
said than done. Take the intellectual community. When I was a
young professor, we used to have seminars at Harvard and MIT
every Saturday on arms control. And if I may say so with a
perspective 25 years, we did very good work. In fact we
contributed to
created the intellectual framework that has lasted 20-25
years. None of us thought we'd ever be in government. All
of us thought we might supply to a government--which sometimes
we liked and sometimes we didn't like but that we didn't think
was inherently obnoxious-- a middle-term perspective on
problems they couldn't deal with. Today, the academic
community, the intellectual community is divided into groups: On the one
and the other, Presidential job applicants who are hanging around candidates and are
really no different from other contenders for power, and on the other side,
people who consider the system wrong and attack everything,
especially the
not merely as to motive, So there is no focal point outside.
In the media, the way it looks to me, when I came into
government there were journalists, I think of people like
Charles E. Roberts or Murray Maddux who really knew a lot about
foreign policy and whose analytical skill was at least as good
as that of some people at most people in government. Today the

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don't know, the solution but I know there is not going to be
some gimmick like delegating authority that's going to get us
out of it.

Q. I have one other question that's a little ambiguous, hard to phrase, but did the North Vietnamese believe that what was being negotiated would lead to a United States withdrawal from Vietnam with honor? And I ask because there are so many conflicting demands on a politician, domestic and foreign.

You've got to say one thing for your domestic audience. How does what you say domestically affect what your opponents think of you?

A. I suspect that the North Vietnamese thought that they, that would not give up their objective and they would see what would happen after peace and they would go out of the route of economic reconstruction or they'd go the route of military intervention and that this would depend in part on what their perception of our resistance would be. They would certainly not give up their objective of unifying all of IIndochina--that's all they had ever known. That whole top leadership of North Vietnam had never run a country; they had conducted wars since they were 16 years old. That's been their principal seminary experience. And I can only speak about my

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close associates and Nixon and myself. We did not think that
the North Vietnamese would subside and become sudden peace
lovers, but we did think that with the proper combination of

incentives and risks, we could gain enough time to give South
Vietnam the chance that Korea had. In 1952 it was axiomatic
that the Korean army was no good. I was in Korea in 1951.

Everybody was making fun of the so-called gooks, and yet today
Korea is a viable, energetic state. We thought we could gain
enough time to bring this about--and after all at some point
these old men in North Vietnam were going to die out and maybe
some basis of coexistence could then be found. But we thought,

we had no illusion that there wouldn't be a strenuous effort
required to maintain the peace, but having done it in Korea,
having done it in Europe, where we went wrong was to believe
that it could be done in Indochina. Maybe it could never have
been done. It certainly couldn't be done under Watergate
conditions.

C. Walt Rostow? is now arguing that even our failure in
Vietnam or our apparent failure had led to strains with
Southeast Asia that -

A. Well I think this is true, this is at least partly true.

I think that if Indochina had collapsed in '63 when the

Kennedy and Johnson people were ? that it is possible that
Indonesia, Malaysia, certainly Indonesia which was at the
razor's edge, might have followed. I think there's some merit
in that, although I don't claim that as an argument for the
'75. But '75 was a different issue from '69. The last two
months, the last three months ??, especially the last month
for us was a question of leaving with our self-respect and
saving as many Vietnamese and Cambodians as we could.

Q. Did Vietnam lead to the kind of domestic disarray that
makes foreign policy so hard to conduct, or did it just
intensify trends that were already there?

A. That's a very good question. I think that even without
Vietnam we would have had to reconsider the foreign policy of
the postwar period, which was really based on an atomic
monopoly and on a huge economic superiority over the rest of
the world so in the late 60s, early 70s, we would have had to
rethink those premises and there were already symptoms of that
when the Berlin Wall went up and in retrospect I would argue
that the Kennedy period was not the beginning of a new era,
but the last flowering of an old era, and that after the
Kennedy period, or maybe Kennedy could have in his second term
led the transition we'll never know this but that was

was really one of our problems. It didn't succeed but in this
respect Vietnam has to be seen in perspective.

10 CY2

Q: One last question if you have time for it cause you have
a lot...

A: Oh please.

Q: Secretary Weinberger seems to have taken --?-- Harry Summers book about Vietnam to mean that you can't ever involve yourself with a military action unless you have full support of the American public. A lesson from Vietnam apparently. Is that valid and you can edit this question if you think it's too off the wall.

A: I think the most important, see one grave problem for
democracy, I get to your cause I've seen it now in a number
of precedents. President is elected in a way to take care of
the future of the people and the people will not forgive him
for disasters even if the disasters correspond to their own
wishes. After all Chamberlain had 90% of the people at the
time of Munich with him and 18 months later this was
considered an epitom of Munich became an so what do you do
when a President and his closest advisors are deeply convinced
that something is in the overwhelming national interest and
they can't carry the Congress with them it creates a terrible

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