45

WITNESS PLANNED TRIP TO CHINA

Senator Scott. There has been a lot of reporting in the press about your plans regarding a China trip. Can you enlighten us on that?

Mr. KISSINGER. My China trip, Senator, is now in abeyance. There is agreement in principle that it will take place and that the date will be set after my confirmation. But again, I cannot proceed with setting a date until I am confirmed.

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Senator Scott. To what extent do you support U.S. participation in international financial institutions, especially the International Development Association, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank? In other words, how vital to U.S. interests do you regard those operations?

Mr. KISSINGER. It has been the experience of foreign aid, and I believe it is the sense of many Members of the Congress, that American aid can now be more fruitfully channeled through multilateral institutions in many categories rather than through bilateral programs. And, therefore, I believe American participation in these institutions is extremely important.

Senator Scott. As you know, the committee is very much interested in pursuing an expansion of the multilateral approach wherever possible.

Mr. KISSINGER. This is consistent with my views.

INFORMATION CONCERNING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Senator Scott. As to the discussions had here on electronic surveillance, it occurs to me that while the committee should have whatever information it needs in order to make a judgment as to what was done, at the same time, it is essential to avoid ruining reputations or careers by the exposure of raw files. I have never known raw files to be used in a committee of the Congress since I have been here. They have always been carefully guarded. They were once unfortunately, offered by the Director and I was critical of that at the time.

It seems to me that this is a decision which ought to be made by the Attorney General. Is it not rather in his scope than yours?

Mr. KISSINGER. It is entirely in his scope. Senator. I have no files on this subject at all. And if I could respectfully suggest, perhaps one way to proceed would be for the committee to submit a list of questions to the Attorney General as to those issues that they believe relevant to my confirmation, and see whether in this way the information could be elicited, rather than by giving up the raw files that contain the conversations and other matters that may not be germane to my confirmation. But it is not in my control.

Senator Scott. That is what I am leading into, and it is my hope that the committee will be in touch with Attorney General Richardson. I will make a recommendation to him that he make himself available to the chairman, and that he be prepared to inform this committee, if necessary, in executive session, if it is sensitive, of whatever

21-172—73—pt. 1—4

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information they can properly request and that at the same time the
raw files be protected. I think that will be what some members of this
committee are very anxious to achieve.

Mr. KISSINGER. It is really a question that concerns the policy of how to handle FBI files and is in the province of the Attorney General. I will welcome the disclosure of any information that is relevant to this inquiry.

NECESSITY OF COMPLETING COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS

Senator SCOTT. Well, as you know, I have the highest regard for
you. I think it is essential that the committee complete its deliberations
as early as we can consonant with the obvious right of all the members
to satisfy themselves in order that you may be able to get on with the
duties of the Secretary of State, because I imagine that there is a
great deal in limbo or in nebulae right now which you would like to
attack and eliminate. Having tried to put myself in the intellectual
community, I had better close while I suspect I am ahead. But that is
necessary.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Scott. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.

EFFECT OF WITNESS' PAST ROLE ON POLICYMAKING PROCESS

Senator McGEE. Dr. Kissinger, I understand I have been selected for the hot spot here. I have to hold the fort here while my colleagues vote at the expense of my missing a vote. I am tired of playing yo-yo in this business. But I wanted to suggest to you, sir, that while you insist in your new role, in the wake of the role you have been filling, that you are not going to wear two hats, you would agree that you are going to be wearing a much larger hat than probably anyone has worn before.

This is a point of some concern among many of our former colleagues
in the academic world. That is, given your, I think, very distinguished
and brilliant success in the diplomatic field, as an adviser to the Presi-
dent, the fear is that the foreign policy mechanism in the Department
of State, as an illustration, may have atrophied in the process, and that,
therefore, either we have to develop a Dr. Kissinger in the future at all
times on a standby basis or our process of policymaking may really
suffer as a consequence. Does that give you any concern at all?

Mr. KISSINGER. When I was a professor, Senator, I wrote several
treaties on the subject that it was very dangerous to gear foreign
policy or policy in general to virtuoso performance. I believe, there-
fore, very strongly that there is a necessity to institutionalize the con-
duct of our foreign policy. One reason why I consider my nomination
as Secretary of State such a great challenge is because, as Secretary of
State I would really have a different role than as Assistant. As Assist-
ant you have a very small staff, and there is no other way to conduct
your affairs except by a great concentration of responsibility. As Secre-
tary of State, I would fail, even if I conducted the day-to-day business
effectively, if I did not create a commitment on the part of the Foreign
Service and a set of procedures within the Department of State, and a
promotion system within the Department of State, which made it pos-

47

sible for the ablest people to rise rapidly, and to participate in the shaping of foreign policy. So if I am confirmed, one of my principal objectives would be to try to remedy the situation that you have described and which I believe is in danger of existing.

## U.N. ROLE AS FOREIGN POLICY FACTOR

Senator McGEE. My second question has to do with the United Nations. I was voting when Senator Scott was talking to you about your forthcoming presence up there as Secretary of State, hopefully. It was commonly whispered around the United Nations, as I served there last year, that it was being downgraded by the Government of the United States, in particular by this administration. I wondered if you would care to comment on what you think the role of the United Nations is as a foreign policy factor.

Mr. KISSINGER. The role of the United Nations has to be seen in various categories: those things that the United Nations can do very well, and those things for which over the course of a period it has proved to be less useful.

The United Nations cannot settle disputes among the great powers because each of them has a veto in the Security Council, because each of them can muster enough votes in the General Assembly on most issues to prevent a two-thirds resolution, and because the United Nations lacks the effective power to make itself prevail against one of the great powers. The United Nations generally cannot settle disputes when one of the great powers backs other countries in opposition to another because then the same general condition exists.

The United Nations can be extremely effective in such situations as the Congo, in the early 1960's, and in areas where there is a general agreement that a settlement is desirable but in which it is better for international stability for the great powers to stay out of the dispute. There the United Nations can provide a mechanism by mediation, by peacekeeping forces, and through other methods, to help settle those disputes. The United Nations can play a significant and, in my judgment, perhaps increasing role in providing peacekeeping machinery and in some cases, peacekeeping forces.

Then there is the whole range of issues that I referred to in my statement, the new areas of human concern which over a decade or two may turn out to be more important than the tactical political and military issues of day to day: food, water, environment, problems that have no political content as such, problems that are global in nature and problems in which we must be practical to say that governments and, up to now, international organizations have not really done their most creative thinking. This is an area in which I believe new departures are absolutely essential, and in which, if I am confirmed, I would intend to make a major appeal to the United Nations.

Another area in which the United Nations can play a role is to contribute to the setting up of norms of international conduct. Now that, of itself, will not necessarily prevent illegal behavior, but it might put on a certain restraint that is produced by world opinion.

Finally, the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, is an excellent meetingplace for the exchange of ideas and gives a natural location for senior diplomats, foreign ministers, and even heads of state to meet, where to set up a formal meeting might raise

48

unnecessary expectations and where an exchange of views is highly essential. This is one reason why, if I am confirmed, I expect to spend a fair amount of time at the General Assembly.

Senator McGEE. I think the assurance that the United Nations would not be deliberately bypassed just because it was not convenient to use it is important. I think all of us are aware of the marginal factors present in the U.N., that is, people overexpect from it. It cannot do a great many things and never was intended to. Whenever we cannot solve any problem, we are impelled to say, let the U.N. do it. That puts it in an unfair position, but the assurance that its significance as one of the factors in the reduction of tensions in the world would be stressed in your regime, I think, would be a very important message to convey to them up there as well as here.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think that—if, hopefully, I can be there on September 24—my speech would express many of these sentiments.

## U.S. POSITION IN U.N. ON RHODESIAN CHROME ISSUE

Senator McGEE. The last thing that I mentioned bears upon that same question of the feeling of some that we have been downgrading the U.N. That is what started out as a very tiny kind of an issue and blossomed into a very large one in the minds of much of the rest of the world. That is the unanimous recommendation from this committee that we sustain the position that our Government took on the issue of Rhodesian chrome in the United Nations, when our colleagues in the Senate by their own initiative unilaterally took the United States out of that commitment even though we had gone into it as a multilateral commitment.

It shook the confidence of a great many countries, including the 41 African nations there and tended to freeze them into a bloc on issues in which we needed a few votes. I was wondering whether you could share with us your thoughts on the possibilities of our trying to redress a grievance such as this.

Mr. KISSINGER. The administration will support the repeal of the Byrd amendment.

Senator McGEE. That is precise and to the point.

I want to thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I do not know whether the term "Excellency" should be used before or after your confirmation vote.

Mr. KISSINGER. After.

Senator PERCY. We are all delighted to have you here, and we do not mind holding you because we know you have the stamina.

## COMMITTEE GUIDELINES CONCERNING AMBASSADORSHIPS

I draw attention to a sentence in your statement. You say, "This is why our international policies must enlist the contributions of our best people regardless of political persuasion."

I have been appalled at, you might say, the sale to the highest bidder through the years under both Democratic and Republican administrations, of ambassadorships, and I have talked at length with Secretary Rogers about it. Moreover, this committee, its members and staff, have prepared a set of guidelines on the subject which were

49

sent to Secretary Rogers. We hope that, with cooperative effort, guidelines can be adopted.

We have had some very good noncareer ambassadors and we have had some terrible ones, but we hope to achieve the level of excellence you yourself would like to have.

I would like to list a few of the points from the draft sent to Secretary Rogers to see if you have an immediate impression of these matters.

First, the nominees for an ambassadorship should have a clearly demonstrated foreign policy competence, and this committee will oppose confirmation of nominees whose primary qualification seem to be that they have made substantial political contributions.

Would you concur with that?

MR. KISSINGER. Senator, I will be glad to comment on each of them, but let me make first this general comment. It will be my intention, if I am confirmed, to appoint people of the highest excellence to every position, and to reflect this from the very beginning.

I think that sometimes it is difficult to express this in absolute guidelines. For example, while you no doubt can think of some ambassadors who had no foreign policy experience, and who did not acquire it in office either, I can think of some that had no foreign policy experience and have done a really distinguished job. I have found, as you must have, that if one picks somebody of true excellence, and true concern and true interest, he may be able to do an extremely distinguished job even if he has no particular expertise in a country or even in the general field of foreign policy. So I would place more emphasis on the quality of the man than necessarily on the foreign policy experience. So I agree more with the first part of your statement than with the second.

Senator PERCY. But you would agree with us if, on the record, it appears that the primary qualification of a nominee has been a substantial political contribution, the nomination should not have been made and should not be approved by this committee.

MR. KISSINGER. I think if there is no other qualification that that should weigh very heavily with you.

Senator PERCY. This committee also wishes to make certain that all ambassadorial nominees make a commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before duly constituted committees of the Senate. Do you support that principle?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have no trouble with that.

Senator PERCY. The committee also feels that we should require a confidential statement of a nominee's financial holdings, and we can now say this in good conscience since we have passed a bill requiring disclosure of our own financial holdings. An ambassadorial appointee should make such a statement available in a confidential form and eliminate, prior to approval of the nomination, any potential conflict of interest.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have no problem with that.

## GUIDELINES CONCERNING AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS

Senator PERCY. Finally, there would be an indication by the nominee that he or she has some knowledge of the history and current political and economic problems of the country to which he or she is being

50

accredited. I mention this particularly because I know that some nominees have been instructed by the Department on occasion to say as little as possible, respond as little as they can. Some have simply said they do not know much, but they will find out when they get there. I think an ambassadorial nominee's hearing is a chance to focus attention on the problems and the opportunities of a country and our relationship with it. Would you encourage nominees to brief themselves as well as possible, and appear well briefed, when they come before us and not simply say they know nothing about the countries to which they will be accredited if confirmed?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would encourage them to brief themselves to the fullest extent possible, and I would hope that our selections would be of sufficient quality so that that issue would not arise.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

## FILLING AMBASSADORIAL VACANCIES

Now, Dr. Kissinger, I do not have a complete list of our ambassadorial vacancies, but those with which I am personally familiar are the U.S.S.R., Portugal, Bangladesh and Sweden.

Have you considered filling those vacancies and the timeframe in which they will be filled?

Mr. KISSINGER. I intend to fill every vacancy within 2 months after my confirmation.

Senator PERCY. And that includes having an ambassador in Sweden.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, we will review our Swedish policy after my confirmation.

[Laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I think there may be other members who would want to review it before that. I will accept your first statement that all vacancies will be filled by November 15.

On behalf of Senator Saxbe who has just returned from Bangladesh, I would like to be sure that that also includes Bangladesh, that we will have an ambassador there by November 15.

Mr. KISSINGER. Definitely.

## PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES OF WIRETAPPED INDIVIDUALS

Senator PERCY. I would like to comment on the dialog between the chairman and Senator Case on the FBI report involving the wiretapping of 17 individuals. I am very concerned about the procedures that enabled this to happen—and I hope that we have learned a lot from this—but I am also very concerned about the civil liberties of the 17 individuals involved, some of whom still work for the Government, and I would like to clarify for the record that no decision has yet been reached by this committee that a request will be made of the Attorney General until such time as we have had a chance to discuss it and consider certain problems involving the 17 individuals, and in what form that information would be given to assure that the individuals' rights are protected. I would ask the chairman whether that is a correct understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I was discussing with Senator Case and others that we would request the executive meeting on Monday and I shall

51

ask the Attorney General if he is willing to make available the sum-
mary report to the committee in executive session. Then it is up to the
committee to determine what to do with it.

Senator PERCY. The Attorney General would be given an oppor-
tunity to expand on whatever concerns he may have about the civil
liberties of the individuals involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The civil liberties, such as they are, are already
compromised, if they are compromised by the publicity already given
to them. There have been many articles about the 17 named, including
the member of this staff. There is no secret about the people who were
wiretapped, many of whom bear little relation, if any, to what is
called national security. I cannot imagine that they could have been.
Why they were wiretapped is a great mystery to me.

Senator CASE. It seems to me a fundamental violation of a person's
civil liberties is involved in his being wiretapped.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in our knowing about it. It has already been
talked about. If there is any violation it took place at the time he was
wiretapped. One of these gentlemen, Mr. Halperin, I was told yester-
day, has already entered a suit against the nominee for $100 a day for
every day he was wiretapped when he was out of the Government. I
was told that yesterday.

Senator PERCY. I just want to be certain we have an opportunity to ascertain the consequences of those 17 names being officially revealed as suspects. It may jeopardize the rights of those individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator is fearful the chairman will release
them on his own authority, he can be assured on that.

Senator PERCY. I will leave it then for the moment.

ACTIVITIES OF MR. DAVID YOUNG

I think for the record, Dr. Kissinger, it would be well to have your
comments about a former employee of your own, Mr. David Young,
who has been indicted for conspiracy and burglary.

Did you, when he left your employment and was transferred to
Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time
that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities—burglary,
conspiracy to burglary, or whatever they might be.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I have no knowledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters.

Perhaps I should explain for the record my connection with David
Young. I hired David Young because I had met him in New York
when I was associated with Governor Rockefeller, and he was a mem-
ber of the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. When I
came to Washington, I was looking for a man of high moral standards,
whom I knew personally, who could work as a personal assistant and
appointments secretary. David Young worked in that capacity. He
was very highly recommended. I also knew his family, and I thought
extremely highly of him. And I must say that in my own experience
I never had any reason to change my mind.

52

He worked in this capacity as my appointment secretary for a year, from roughly January 1970, to January 1971. That position is one of the more exhausting ones in the Government, for both practical and I suppose psychological reasons. David Young therefore asked to be transferred to more substantive work. We could not find any substantive work for him immediately because all of his experience had really been in domestic affairs. So David Young worked in the files; he didn't even have an office from January 1971, through June 1971. He accompanied me occasionally to meetings, but basically he was no longer working in my outer office; he was working with people located in the files.

In June 1971, David Young—on his own initiative or Mr. Ehrlichman's, I don't know which—transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. David Young had met Mr. Ehrlichman because Mr. Ehrlichman and I sat across from each other on Air Force 1 and David Young sat next to me and Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant sat next to him. In fact, the transfer occurred while I was on my first secret trip to China.

At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for 3 months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government, a project that was publicly announced and which published a public report [Executive Order 11652, March 8, 1972]. After this project ended, I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that David Young would stay on his staff, and I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have high regard for him.

In short, I did not know either from him or anyone else about the existence of the “Plumbers,” as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event.

Senator PERCY. Thank you for that clarification.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie.

Senator MUSKIE. Dr. Kissinger, I am conscious of the fact that you have been under these lights for 3 hours and we have been throwing the platoon system at you while we have gone to vote. Many subject areas have been opened up that I would like to talk with you about, but I am under a time limitation.

## WITNESS' OPENING STATEMENT APPLAUDED

First, may I say with respect to your opening statement that I applaud it as a statement of philosophy to bring to this job. I cannot resist saying that if it had been reflected in the policies and actions of this administration in the last 5 years, we would not be here today discussing the problems that have been created by the lack of trust between us and the administration. So I hope your articulation of this philosophy expresses not only just your own personal attitude about the responsibilities you have been asked to assume but that it signals a change in the administration policies which have inhibited a free flow of information and free communication.

## ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY IN WIRETAP FIELD

On that point I would like to ask one specific question in the wiretap field. I do not know that I will ask further questions in that field.

53

today. I am not sure whether what you have said represents a change in policy by this administration concerning the authority of the President in the field of wiretaps.

Do I understand that the President now accepts the position that he has no right to legally wiretap without a court warrant in the national security field?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I do not believe that I am the proper spokesman for the President's view of the legal rights in this field. I never believed it was a judgment that was mine to make. I accepted the judgment of the then Attorney General and Director of the FBI in my fourth month in Government. It is generally understood that the Court has placed additional restrictions as compared to 1969 about the right to wiretap in national security cases. But I would prefer for the Attorney General to define exactly what these additional restrictions are.

In addition, of course, there is the question of the exercise of whatever rights may exist and the spirit in which this is to be conducted.

Senator MUSKIE. As I understand the situation with respect to court decisions, what we have had is a decision in domestic security cases but not in external security cases or national security cases.

Do I gather from what you have said that the Supreme Court decision on domestic security cases is having an impact upon administration policies in other cases?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, as I pointed out earlier, I have been essentially dissociated from any internal security matters since April 1970, and I therefore have not kept up to date with either the practices or the legal interpretations that are now applicable. It is my impression that the restrictions even in the field of national security are now more severe, and I seem to have in the back of my mind that some connection to a foreign government has now to be demonstrated before the national security principle can be invoked. But I am not absolutely sure about this, and I am simply not a sufficient authority on the subject.

Senator MUSKIE. The Attorney General's opinion to which you referred earlier was to the effect that wiretaps could be used in national security cases without a court warrant.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct. At that time the legal position seemed to be that the President could determine or delegate to the Attorney General the authority to use wiretaps when national security was involved.

## ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON WIRETAP AUTHORITY

Senator MUSKIE. There was some testimony in the Watergate case to the effect that the President could ignore provisions of law applicable to other citizens if he deemed it required by national security matters.

Now trying to bring to a focus what this discussion here this morning raises, there was the implication in the discussion this morning that when the Court defines what is legal or not legal, with respect to issuing wiretap orders without court warrant, that the administration will consider itself bound.

Is that your understanding?

Mr. KISSINGER. That is my understanding. But again, Senator, I would not make such a determination on my own; indeed, I would not

54

expect to be involved in any internal security matters in the position for which I am being proposed. That is, I would not expect to be involved in the policy being followed.

Let me state as a basic question: If there was some atomic bomb about to go off in some building—to put an absurd case—I could visualize that a President under those circumstances would disregard the legal framework and properly take steps to prevent this bomb going off. I am giving an extreme case, to say that if legal procedures are violated or ignored there is an absolute requirement, it seems to me, to be able to demonstrate to reasonable and concerned people that the necessity was in fact overwhelming, and that it cannot simply be done by using the words "national security." This has to be on demonstration of an overwhelming cause that would justify disregarding legal procedures.

Senator MUSKIE. You understand, of course, in putting these questions, I put them not only to you but to the administration and into the public domain because this is obviously one of the great controversial issues that has emerged out of the Watergate hearings.

Mr. KISSINGER. I understand your concern. It is simply that I am not familiar enough with the precise legal position to answer that.

### WITNESS' POSITION CONCERNING WIRETAPS

Senator MUSKIE. Then let me put one further question, and from what you said, I am sure we cannot resolve the issue in terms of administration policy generally. Let me put this one further question:

It was your desire—and I think an understandable desire and one to be applauded—to reassure this committee with respect to your attitude concerning wiretaps without court order, where the use of wiretaps would be considered illegal. It was your position—or it is your desire to indicate to us insofar as you were concerned—that you would stay within the constraints that have been laid down by court decision. What you are now saying is that regardless of what constraints this may impose upon your judgment as to what is right or wrong, you are not in position to state what the administration policy would be.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have no reason to suppose that the administration would ignore court decisions or refuse to respect court decisions with respect to wiretapping. In fact, my impression is, my conviction is, that it would respect it.

I simply am very reluctant to make a final statement on a matter which is so far out of my jurisdiction. The Attorney General or the Counsel to the White House may take a more modulated view of this. But my impression is what I have conveyed to you, and why do I not see whether we can get an expression from those who are better qualified to get it than I am?

### ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING WIRETAPS

Senator MUSKIE. I think it would be helpful because your appointment as Secretary is intended, I take it, to signal a new era in the relationships between the Presidency and the Congress in the field of foreign policy, and one of the sources of unease is the very area that we are touching.

I understand that as nominee for Secretary of State you cannot define overall administration policy. But I would think that as the nominee

55

for Secretary of State, you would feel it incumbent and important to undertake to clarify overall policy because it bears upon the climate that we can generate between your Office and this committee and the Congress.

Mr. KISSINGER. Let me see whether I can elicit a statement which we could either submit for the record or give in some other form that would satisfy your question.

[The information referred to follows:]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 1973.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the confirmation hearings of Dr. Kissinger, a question was raised as to this Administration's position concerning the power of the Executive to conduct electronic surveillance without warrant in the national security field. Dr. Kissinger said that he would try to elicit a statement for the record that would clarify our general policy on this matter.

I believe that there will continue to be situations which justify the conduct of electronic surveillance for the purposes of national security. This surveillance is carried out to meet the obligations of the President as both Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's instrument for foreign affairs. I will continue to attempt to ensure that a genuine national security interest is, in fact, involved whenever we invoke this power and that we operate within the limits set by Congress and the courts.

The Department of Justice scrupulously observes the law as interpreted by the courts. There may be questions as to what certain decisions mean and whether surveillance, such as that discussed by the committee, has been affected by later court decision. These and other issues are before the courts now and we expect any ambiguities to be settled within the normal judicial process. The policy statement that follows therefore refers to procedures for any surveillance that may be carried out at present.

A year ago in the *Keith* case (407 U.S. 297), the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Government may not carry on electronic surveillance in domestic security operations, as opposed to foreign intelligence operations, without first obtaining a judicial warrant. The Court pointed out that it was condemning warrantless electronic surveillance carried out in *domestic* security cases directed at a "domestic organization (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies." The *Keith* decision necessarily is Departmental policy and is being followed.

Although the *Keith* case did not address warrantless *national* security electronic surveillance, to date, the lower courts which have addressed this problem have agreed with the contention of this Department that a judicial warrant is not a necessary requirement for the Government's use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence or foreign policy information necessary for the protection of national security. E.g., *United States v. Clay*, 430 F. 2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), *reversed on other grounds*, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); *United States v. Brown*, 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La., 1970) *affirmed*, No. 72-2181 (5th Cir., Aug. 22, 1973); *United States v. Smith*, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Calif. 1971); *Zweibron v. Mitchell*, 42 U.S. L. Week 2054 (1973). Pending a decision on this issue by the Supreme Court, I believe that we are justified in relying on the case law as it is being developed in the lower courts to conduct national security electronic surveillance, without warrant, in a limited number of cautiously and meticulously reviewed instances.

When Congress enacted legislation in 1968 requiring a judicial warrant for the use of electronic surveillance in investigations of violations of certain criminal laws, it made clear that it did not intend to add or subtract from whatever measure of constitutional power the President may have to use electronic surveillance in the national security field. However, as a guide, it set forth a number of purposes, divided between the domestic and foreign aspects of national security, that it understood to be proper for the exercise of Presidential power. The *Keith* decision subsequently held that this power could not, in the absence of a warrant, be exercised for the *domestic* security purposes mentioned by Con-

56

gress. However, as a matter of policy, I shall keep in mind the contours of the President's power suggested by Congress in the 1968 law as it relates to foreign intelligence. In general, before I approve any new application for surveillance without a warrant, I must be convinced that it is necessary (1) to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; (2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or (3) to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. 18 U.S.C 2511 (3).

As the Supreme Court itself observed in *Keith*, it may well be difficult to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities directed against the United States where there are relationships in varying degrees between domestic groups or organizations and foreign powers, or their agents. All I can say is that, as the applications are presented to me, I will, together with my staff, try scrupulously to follow the guidance and instruction given to us by Congress and the courts, bearing in mind the importance of balancing individual privacy with the needs of national security.

In addition, there is ongoing in the Department a full-scale effort under my and Bill Ruckelshaus' immediate supervision, to derive new standards and guidelines for use of electronic surveillance in both domestic criminal matters, as well as for national security purposes. It is our hope that we will be able to give these standards precise public articulation and thus foster better understanding of the scope and nature of our limited use of electronic surveillance. Also, as I mentioned the other day, the new FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee will allow the Congress to be better informed about these activities.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON,
Attorney General.

Senator MUSKIE. I think there was some reference you made earlier in our discussion that you might supply for the record; I would like to go over that later and see if you could supply it for the record.

I think my time is up, Dr. Kissinger, but there are other areas that I would like to touch upon. I am sure we are going to have the opportunity to do so, including some substantive areas in the field of arms control, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will have to go down and cast a vote and I wasn't quite sure I ought to leave before my turn came. So I think you are going to be spared. I think we have a relatively short time to cast this vote.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Dr. Kissinger, first I want to commend you on not only your statement, sir, which is a brilliant statement of purpose and philosophy, but on your service to this country in the cause of international peace and understanding. I say that as one who has observed you for many years, both as a great professor and as a practitioner in the art of diplomacy.

Just a few direct questions.

## U.S. SUPPORT OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

You mentioned your support of multinational and multilateral institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank and others. The administration has not seen fit to make an investment in the African Development Bank even though there has been a commitment, I be-

57

lieve, for $15 million dollars, a very modest commitment, might I say, to a continent that holds for us much good or much evil in the days to come. It may be the treasure house of the world and to a nation like ours, depending on vast use of natural resources, this continent is important.

What would be your position on our support of the African Development Bank?

Mr. KISSINGER. I will have to review this, Senator. I do not know the circumstances that have caused us to delay. My instinct would be favorable.

## PLANS RELATING TO LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA

Senator HUMPHREY. My responsibility as chairman of the Consultative Subcommittee on African Affairs leads me to this question:

It seems to me that most of our attention, and understandably, in the field of national security and foreign policy has been placed upon the great powers, Western Europe, Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China. I do not think nearly enough attention has been placed on Japan, and I will come to that.

I think there is a need of some repair work there.

I would hope, Dr. Kissinger, that you might give some attention to two other areas of the world that in the long run need our cooperation and our understanding, Latin America and Africa.

These two continents represent vast resources and hundreds of millions of people. Do you have any plans in mind relating to these two areas?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes, Senator, I think you will see fairly quickly after my confirmation some initiatives in the Latin American field. As you may know, I took a trip to Mexico within 48 hours of my nomination, that had been planned but which I maintained despite many pressures, to meet with the Foreign Minister and the President of Mexico to discuss this very problem.

I agree with you also that we have not had the opportunity because of other pressures to give adequate attention to Africa. We intend to return to that also, but that may take a little longer than the Latin American field.

Senator HUMPHREY. I realize the African Continent does not seem to be in the news. It is not the drama of the day and it does not get the headlines, but I want to say as an American we are in vast need of the friendly cooperation of these countries and peoples. We are worried about Arab oil, but might I suggest that Africa has products that this country needs even more significantly than oil. If we do not take care of our relationships there we could end up by having mortal enemies, and that would be a singular economic and political tragedy to us.

## ACCESS TO INFORMATION AMENDMENT

Dr. Kissinger, are you familiar with the access to information amendment in the State Department appropriation or was this asked?

Mr. KISSINGER. This was asked.

Senator HUMPHREY. Then, I shall not burden you.

Mr. KISSINGER. Inconclusively discussed.

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Senator HUMPHREY. Fully discussed?

Mr. KISSINGER. Inconclusively.

Senator HUMPHREY. Inconclusively. I hope you will over the weekend have a chance to arrive at a conclusion and not recommend that the President veto this.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have reached a conclusion, but it is not exactly the same as the one you state.

## PORTION OF NSC STAFF TO BE SHIFTED TO STATE DEPARTMENT

How much of the National Security Council staff do you propose to shift, if any, to the State Department? Do you intend to trim it down, in other words?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think that the National Security Council staff will be somewhat reduced as a result of this change, and I intend to take some of its members to the State Department with me. But I do not intend to staff the State Department with National Security Council personnel. The primary staffing in the State Department will be done by Foreign Service officers, and officials brought in from the outside.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I want to go down and cast my vote. I believe I have a few minutes left, but I would like to yield to Senator McGovern and I will come back, if I may be permitted, to ask about two more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE IN TRUTHFULNESS OF U.S. LEADERS

Dr. Kissinger, I think you will be pleased to know that I will be the final interrogator, at least today. Senator Church referred in his questioning of you a while ago, to a constitutional crisis in the United States and other Senators have alluded to a related and, I think, equally important problem in the country today. That is the crisis of confidence in the truthfulness of our leaders. About 100 years ago one of our great scientists during the controversy over the doctrine of evolution, said if we want to make any progress in the field of science we have to quit lying to each other. I think to whatever extent that is true in the field of science it is certainly true in a democracy.

## PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 30, 1970, CONCERNING CAMBODIA

On April 30, 1970, after we had been bombing the sanctuaries in Cambodia for a period of about 14 months, as I understand it, in 1969 and 1970, at the end of those bombing missions which the Congress did not know about and the American people did not know about, the President went on television and said these words:

> For 5 years neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation.

Do you see any way to interpret that televised address by the President as anything other than a deception of the American people?

Mr. KISSINGER. What the President must have had in mind was ground operations against these sanctuaries, and by that time the

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notion that the territory that was occupied by the North Vietnamese in Cambodia really was not Cambodian territory in that sense, because the Cambodians had taken the position that they did not know what was going on there, had become so firmly fixed in everybody's mind that this must be the psychological basis for that statement.

REASON BOMBING INFORMATION WAS WITHHELD

Senator McGOVERN. Dr. Kissinger, what was the reason then? I know that you touched on this, but I am really not clear in my own mind yet as to the real reason why this information on the bombing was withheld both from the Congress and the American people. Do you find any constitutional authority for ordering American bombers into what the President had himself described as a neutral country, without informing the Congress or getting the authorization of the Congress for that action?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, as I pointed out in response to earlier questions, we were faced here with a situation in which the North Vietnamese for years had been using Cambodia as a corridor for supplies. For years they had been using sanctuary areas right across the frontier from which they were staging operations against American forces and into which they then withdrew. It has always been considered axiomatic in international law that neutral countries have an obligation to prevent the use of their territory for hostile actions against other countries. And, therefore, the principle that one belligerent has a right to use neutral territory while the other belligerent has no right—in the very limited areas that we are talking about, which were within a distance of some 10 miles from the frontier—to attack the forces of a third country that had invaded that neutral territory, and only those forces, the legal issue or for that matter the moral issue is at least not self-evident.

Second, we had a situation here in which the government of that country was either acquiescing or inviting this sort of pressure as a means of evicting these invading forces from its territory.

Senator McGOVERN. They were inviting what?

Mr. KISSINGER. They were at a minimum acquiescing in the bombing because it was in their power to protest at any point, which they never did.

Senator McGOVERN. But the Congress was not acquiescing.

Mr. KISSINGER. No.

Senator McGOVERN. We had no knowledge of it.

Mr. KISSINGER. No. The reason that it was not made public was to avoid a situation in which Prince Sihanouk would have to make a formal protest; we would then have been faced with a situation of terminating the attacks or formally spreading the war into Cambodia. You asked me for the rationale of why it was kept secret, and this is the reason that led to its being kept secret.

Senator McGOVERN. I have heard that explanation, but Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly said that that is not the truth, and that, as a matter of fact, he did protest to the U.N. and to the international community against such bombing.

Mr. KISSINGER. Why don't I supply to the committee, Senator, some of the communications of Prince Sihanouk to us during this period,

60

in which it was perfectly easy for him to have pointed out—letters he was writing to the President during this period, or a press conference which he gave on May 13, 1969, in which he specifically denied any knowledge of B-52 bombing, which is on the public record.

Senator McGOVERN. I would be interested in examining that evidence, Dr. Kissinger. But even if it bears out what you say about Prince Sihanouk, it does not speak to the question, as far as I am concerned, of why the Congress was bypassed on a military operation of this kind, without reference to the sensibilities of Prince Sihanouk. We would like to have a Constitution that lodges the war powers or at least a portion of it in the Congress of the United States. There must have been some recognition of that involved in the decision to inform certain selected Members of the Congress. Was there not at least a semblance of a recognition by the administration that somebody here in the Congress should know about the bombing?

Mr. KISSINGER. Of course, and that is why selectively Members of the Congress were informed about it. I did not myself select the Members. I was too new in Washington to know who were the appropriate people in Congress, but certainly they were informed about it.

## SELECTIVE INFORMING OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS QUESTIONED

Senator McGOVERN. In view of the fact that it was a fundamental foreign policy matter, do you not think it was curious, to say the least, that neither the chairman nor the ranking member of this committee were among those who were informed about the bombing, nor the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would say that if information in the future is given to Members of the Congress on any matter, the selection should be more systematic.

Senator McGOVERN. I would certainly agree with that.

## WITNESS' OCTOBER 25, 1972, POSITION AND LATER HEAVY AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

On another matter, Dr. Kissinger, last October 25 you held a celebrated press conference in which you reported that peace was at hand in Vietnam. You went on to explain, in answering reporters' questions, that there were a few minor differences yet to be worked out, some semantic problems and language difficulties, but that in all probability one more negotiating session would iron out these difficulties.

How would you explain that position in light of the subsequent decision, some 30 days after the election was over, to engage in very heavy aerial bombardment of North Vietnam, and also Cambodia and Laos? Did you anticipate that possibility at the time you were indicating that maybe one more negotiating session would end the war?

Mr. KISSINGER. What I said in that press conference was my sincere conviction. I believed that we had an agreement whose main outlines and most of whose details were essentially acceptable.

I believed also we had the problem at that time of preventing a situation similar to that which existed in 1969, in which, with the imminence of an election, one of the parties to this negotiation would begin and perhaps would end a negotiation that had gone on for 4

61

years. Therefore, in my press conference—which was entirely addressed to a foreign audience, and which was intended to convey to both Vietnamese parties, that we were determined to stick to the main outlines of this effort, that we were not going to reopen this entire settlement, and that it was senseless to ask us to reopen it either from Saigon or from Hanoi—it was my sincere conviction, based on the issues then outstanding, that we could settle it in one more session.

We then had another session, the first 2 days of which were perfectly consistent with my expectations. I believe now, Senator, incidentally, it was a tactical mistake from the point of view of the negotiations to have tied myself to this position of one session, because it put us into a straitjacket. But the first 2 days were consistent with it. Then there was a reversal of the North Vietnamese position, and there grew up the conviction that they were deliberately stone-walling a settlement. And they were beginning to introduce new issues, many of which had already been settled in October, that created the danger that the whole thing would disintegrate.

At the end of October we had no thought that there would be a resumption of military operations. Indeed we unilaterally stopped the bombing of the North, north of the 20th parallel, because we thought a settlement was imminent. That was our conviction. And as it turned out, once they went back to the conference table in earnest, it was settled in essentially one session, but the session was delayed until January.

Senator McGOVERN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey, I will return to you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; I will open up one or two other matters.

## AMBASSADORIAL POST IN SWEDEN

Dr. Kissinger, I was keenly interested in the ambassadorial posts and other posts you did not intend to fill. Just in case you do not know, I am very much interested in the ambassadorial post in Sweden simply because I think our inaction is an attempt at petulance. I hope our old friend will not continue to be chastised because of the remarks of the Prime Minister. On that basis we would have to break off relationships with an awful lot of other countries and so I shall press you on it rather heavily.

We have a little amendment up in the Senate which we hope to call up very shortly. I know you want to be very cooperative. You said so. So do I. So we will pick a neutral like Sweden to try this cooperation on.

Mr. KISSINGER. I agree to that.

## WITNESS' ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM REFORM NEGOTIATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. One of the points that has been emphasized in some of the commentary relating to your nomination, Dr. Kissinger, is your, well, to put it bluntly, lack of interest in international economic affairs. A couple of quotations have been cited to me, and I read about it before. It is my judgment, of course, that the international economic

21-172—73—pt. 1—5

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scene is at the very heart of our modern diplomacy. In fact, this may
be the new diplomacy to be engaged in. What role, if any, would you
be playing in the negotiations for reform of the international monetary
system?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, it is quite true that prior to my beginning
this present position, economic affairs had not been in the forefront of
my academic concern, and that is an understatement. In exercising my
present function I have learned by experience the crucial importance
of economic affairs and the intricate connection between the solution
of economic issues and of political issues. Therefore, I have over the
last 2 years taken major steps to increase the strength of my staff in
the White House in the field of international economics, and 6 months
ago I hired a Deputy Assistant to the President who was charged with
international economic policy.

Now, on the specific matter which you raised, the reform of the
monetary system is one of those issues which over the years has come
up again and again, and it has been brought home to me again and
again that it is as much a political as it is a technical economic issue.
I have met very frequently informally with Secretary Shultz. But
these informal meetings are no substitute for a regular relationship
and for a greater influence by the Department of State on the deci-
sions that are made in the international monetary field, because those
decisions really affect domestic policies and ultimately the interna-
tional position of all of the countries concerned. Therefore, it would
be my intention, if confirmed, to strengthen the economic side of the
State Department, and to work out arrangements by which it can
play a more active role in the formulation of our policies, both in the
international monetary field and in trade negotiations, and within the
State Department to bring the economic concerns into closer line with
the political objectives of the United States.

FRAGMENTATION IN CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY MATTERS

Senator HUMPHREY. I am very heartened by that and might I say
that I consider the fragmentation in the Congress of the United States
on matters of foreign economic policy one of the singular weaknesses
of our present governmental setup. There is no place in which the
responsibility is centered for trade or international monetary policy.
This committee ought to have something to say about this, if we are
going to have cooperation in the field of foreign policy and national
security.

I can think of no area more important than trade right now because
present allies can become new enemies on the basis of trade. And in
the field of international monetary policy it does not do very much
good to talk about national security if your international monetary
system is in chaos or if the American dollar is undervalued or over-
valued or constantly being devalued. I would, therefore, want to ex-
press at least my concern about this area, not being an expert at all.
I consider that this committee is derelict on this subject, and I say
very frankly, I think we ought to be more directly involved in all
matters of foreign economic policy. It is not just a matter of tariffs
any longer. The nontariff barriers are as significant as the tariff bar-
riers. They are diplomatic and they are political and we ought not just

63

to leave it to Ways and Means and Finance. I wanted to get that off in my 10 minutes and I have done it. I have nothing further to say.
[Laughter.]

QUESTIONS OF SENATORS CURTIS AND HANSEN

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, you have been very patient. It is unfortunate that this committee is so large and it takes so long. The Watergate committee has a greater advantage in those matters, as you can see. I have had submitted to me by Senator Curtis and Senator Hansen, two series of questions which they have requested. I submit to you to supply the answers and whatever you have to say for the record. You can supply them on Monday. [See Appendix.]

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

In view of the comments made, particularly by the Senator from Illinois and others, it seems to me that the proper procedure would be for the committee to have an executive session on Monday morning at 9:30 in S-116 to discuss the question which has been raised and about which there is some concern and then resume the open hearings at 10:30, if that is agreeable. That will give you time to consider these questions which have been submitted and the committee could decide what it wishes to do. I shall invite the Attorney General to meet with us at 9:30, if he is free, to discuss that matter and it could be disposed of, I would hope, one way or the other.

The hour is late, and we will recess now. There are, of course, a number of broad questions that I have in mind about your views about where we go from now on in such areas as, especially, Southeast Asia. I know it is a matter about which you are thoroughly informed, but we would like to know very much what you have in mind about the broader questions than some of the specific ones which have been raised this morning. I would hope that we could move along on Monday morning, if that is agreeable with you.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Monday, September 10, 1973.]

NOMINATION OF HENRY A. KISSINGER

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, Muskie, McGovern, Aiken, Case, Javits, Scott, and Pearson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We regret the delay which was occasioned by a meeting with the Attorney General over a matter which arose in the last hearing.

HEARING PROCEDURE

But we will resume this morning under the 10-minute rule as we did the other day. Will someone keep track of the time?

WAR POWERS

Dr. Kissinger, there are so many interesting aspects of your responsibility, both present and future, that it is difficult to select the proper questions. There are one or two that grew out of the last meeting, with which I thought I might start. As I recall, in answer to a question about the relations between the Congress and the Executive, you said there must be some way for Congress to associate itself with the decision to go to war. Then you referred to the warmaking power of the President. Is that correct? Did you not say something to that effect?

TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, NOMINEE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Dr. KISSINGER. That is substantially correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It raised in my mind the question that you seem to assume that the basic war power is in the President, not in the Congress. You put it that we had to find a way to associate ourselves with the President's power to make war. As a matter of constitutional practice, do you not agree that the basic power of making war, declaring war, is in the Congress?

(65)

66

Dr. KISSINGER. The Constitution, Mr. Chairman, has placed the
basic war powers in the Congress. However, recent experience has
shown that the need for rapid response, and the ambiguity in many
situations, may bring about a commitment of American forces in a
gray area that in at least two major instances has not been brought
under this particular provision. Those are the situations in which the
relationship of the executive and legislative branches should be stud-
ied, and I proposed a joint executive-legislative body to study this
issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Both Houses of Congress have already given con-
siderable study to this matter and there is a bill pending, as you know,
which is in conference presently on this subject. I do not accept your
premise that there have been any recent examples in which the urgen-
cy was so great that the Executive had to move without consultation
with Congress. I accept the proposition they have done so, but I
think they were not justified in doing so, such as the invasion of Cam-
bodia.

I think there was nothing urgent about that. I think it would have
been quite possible and feasible for you to have consulted the Con-
gress, and to have stated your reasons why you felt we should in-
vade Cambodia. It is possible they would have agreed with you. But
the fact is they were not consulted in any respect. In fact, it came as
a great surprise. I think the same could be said with regard to—well,
this is a little different from the Gulf of Tonkin. There was consulta-
tion, but with certain misrepresentations. It is true if you are going to
consult and misrepresent fact, consultation will not amount to much.
I am assuming you will not do that and you are agreeing?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have already expressed myself with
reference to misrepresentation.

With respect to the so-called invasion of Cambodia, I think the issue
should be considered from the point of view of the original engage-
ment in Indochina. The military operations in Cambodia grew out of
original commitment, which would be the most germane one for the
examination of the relationship between the Congress and the Execu-
tive in determining the proper role of each.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY BY COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. You said in one of your press conferences, I believe,
that you hoped the Committee on Foreign Relations could, and I
think this is a quote—if it is not correct you can correct it: "I plan to
see what I can do to bring the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
into the conceptual area of foreign policy so they do not have to make
ad hoc decisions." This was a statement taken, I believe, from Time.
How do you think we can conceptualize a policy without informa-
tion being given to us in advance about what the policy should be?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the exact quotation to
which you refer in front of me, and if it implies that the committee
has not engaged in conceptual thinking before, this certainly was not
the intent.

The point that I attempted to make in this press conference was
that the committee's role should not be confined to testimony by high
officials, or by officials, after an action had been taken. It is my belief,

67

Mr. Chairman, that it is important for the committee to understand the general design of our policy and to express its views about this design as it is being formulated. As I pointed out in my statement on Friday, I would request a meeting with you and Senator Aiken as soon as I am confirmed, to work out procedures by which this could be accomplished.

Now, with respect to your specific question, of course, the committee cannot make a contribution to this process unless it is given the relevant information. It would be my intention to make sure that the committee has the information it needs to arrive at a reasonable judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your feeling that the committee does not presently conceptualize our foreign policy, that we do not approach it in that term, if I understand the way you use that term?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think the administration has no reason to complain about inadequate conceptualization on the part of the chairman or of the committee. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you could give us your present conception of our policy in Southeast Asia. I wonder, since you have used this term, what your conceptualization is of our policy in Southeast Asia at the present time.

Mr. KISSINGER. If I could go back just 1 minute to the previous question, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would say that I would hope that we can achieve a closer rapport between the committee's thinking and the administration's thinking, or at any rate make certain that the committee feels that even if its views are not accepted, they have been fully considered before major decisions are taken. This is what is intended by that phrase.

## U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

With respect to your question, Senator, about Southeast Asia, the United States now finds itself in a transitional period, from a time when we were heavily involved militarily to a period in which the responsibility for the defense and for the further evolution of the area has been given largely to the governments and peoples concerned. So that the United States role in the years ahead will be primarily in carrying out the residual moral and other obligations to support by economic aid, on a declining scale, those countries with which we have been associated. The principal burden for their defense would be in the hands of those countries concerned. And in the larger scheme of things, Indochina, which had been viewed at the time from our perspective of a monolithic Communist world, will be seen in terms of the realities of the contemporary scene.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that concept envision our disengagement of all of our forces from the area?

Mr. KISSINGER. It depends, Mr. Chairman, on what countries you include in that area. The Nixon doctrine has always assumed, and in fact it has practiced, the gradual reduction of American forces and the shifting of the primary responsibility for defense to the countries primarily concerned. We are engaged at this moment in discussions with the Government of Thailand, for example, with a view

68

toward a gradual reduction of our forces in that country, and we
have already begun this process with a withdrawal of 3,500 military
personnel from that country.

The CHAIRMAN. I find it difficult to see any definite commitment
in your mind that we should withdraw and allow all these countries
to determine their own form of government. There is implicit in
what you say, I think, a continued presence, if not military at least
economic, to insure the continuation of the existing regime. Is that a
fair statement or not?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, when you speak of existing regimes
you have to look at it country by country. We believe we have an
obligation which has been created by 10 years of close association
to continue our economic support to the Government of South Viet-
nam. In other countries of the area this relationship differs from case
to case.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not be more specific as to what you
foresee our policy to be, what your concept is. When you used the
word concept, I assume you had some overall objective in mind for
the area, whether we continue to try to dominate it and to determine
its social and political order or whether we withdraw. Is that not a
concept as to the area? My concept is, if it is permissible to use that,
that we should allow these people to sift out their own problems and
to determine their own future without our patronage, so to speak,
and without our advice.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, our overriding approach is to per-
mit the countries of the area to determine their own future. I cannot
accept your characterization of our present policy as seeking to
dominate this area. In any event, it is not our policy in the future
that I foresee.

When we became involved in Indochina, Mr. Chairman, there was
an assumption that this was a test case of a global confrontation. The
events of the recent past have put Indochina into a more regional per-
spective, and our interest in Indochina is to see that the countries there
have a right to determine their own future. We have no national in-
terest in a predominant American position in this area and we will not
seek to achieve it.

PAYMENT OF MR. DAVID YOUNG AFTER LEAVING WITNESS' OFFICE

The CHAIRMAN. I have one last question growing out of your ques-
tioning the other day. I did not have an opportunity to ask you about
this. You testified that Mr. David Young left your office and went to
Mr. Ehrlichman's office in July, I believe, of 1971.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he continue on your payroll, carried as an em-
ployee of your office during the period that he was in Mr. Ehrlich-
man's office?

Mr. KISSINGER. As I was looking over the transcript, Mr. Chair-
man, I was tempted to add an explanation about that, and I am, there-
fore, glad that you give me the opportunity to add to this.

Mr. Young continued to be paid from National Security Council
funds for the technical reason that employees in the various organi-
zations in the White House are very often carried on payrolls of other

69

organizations. The Domestic Council at that time did not have independent funds and, therefore, an administrative arrangement was made for him to continue to be paid out of those funds. Also, there was the expectation that eventually he would return to the staff.

I must say that I was not aware of this until after about 7 months, when a routine request for promotion came into my office, and I wrote on it and asked what we were paying him for if he was working for Mr. Ehrlichman.

It was a technical, administrative arrangement. It had nothing to do with his obligations. And I must repeat what I said on Friday, that I was not aware even of the location of his office or his duties beyond the declassification exercise I mentioned yesterday, nor did I have any contact with him.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very unusual procedure, though, to have a man engaged in setting up an organization which has come to be called the plumbers being on the payroll of the National Security Council, is it not?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, it would be a very unusual procedure if he had been hired for that purpose. It is not such an unusual procedure if he is being transferred to another section of the White House, particularly, Mr. Chairman, if you keep in mind my perception of what he was doing. My understanding was that he would work for Mr. Ehrlichman on the new declassification system, which is, of course, a matter in which the National Security Council has an interest. That was publicly announced, and indeed, Mr. Young held a press briefing together with Mr. Ehrlichman on that subject.

The matter to which you refer is something I knew nothing about, and he would not have been paid from funds controlled by the National Security Council if I knew that he was engaged in any such activities.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am kind of impressed with the program that you announced sometime ago. I believe it was on April 23 that you made new proposals to the Atlantic partners.

## IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

What about other areas of the world? Would it be your purpose to try to develop similar programs as they might apply to other areas, for instance, Latin America? We often hear complaints that we neglect Latin America. Do you feel that that is a very important area so far as we are concerned, as well as Atlantic partners?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I agree that Latin America is an important area. And if I am confirmed, I would propose within a very short time to make clear both organizationally and substantively the major interests that the United States has in its relationship with its neighbors to the south. In fact, as I pointed out on Friday, within 48 hours of my nomination I paid a visit to Mexico, that had been scheduled before but with which I went through anyhow, and I consulted with both the Foreign Minister and the President of Mexico about their ideas of how our relations with Latin America could be strengthened.

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## IMPORTANCE OF OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD

Senator SPARKMAN. I simply mentioned Latin America because it is about our closest neighbor, but you attach the same importance to the various parts of the world.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think there are different areas of the world with different degrees of urgency, but we would hope not to neglect any area.

## TRADE AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you about a part of the function of the State Department, of which sometimes I am afraid we are likely to lose sight. That has to do with trade. That is, is it not, a very important function of the State Department?

Mr. KISSINGER. That, Senator, is an important part, and it will become increasingly important in the years ahead.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, the Department of Commerce has a very big hand in it. I suppose it calls for very close cooperation between the State Department and the Commerce Department.

Mr. KISSINGER. There are many agencies with an interest in trade and economic policy: Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, the Special Trade Representative, for example. And there is a necessity to make certain not only that the economic interests of the United States are protected but also that the political objectives of the United States and the economic policies of the United States are carried out in close harmony. The best way, Senator, to achieve this is to strengthen the State Department, in terms of the quality of its personnel that are dealing with these issues, and also organizationally, so that it can play a larger role in the deliberations in which these policies are forged. I have already had some preliminary discussions about this, and we attach considerable importance to this objective.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT AND COMMITTEE

Senator SPARKMAN. Now I want to ask you about, shall I say, better relations between the State Department and the Congress, the Foreign Relations Committee. I feel certain that you do favor that and will strive to develop adequate communication between the State Department and the Foreign Relations Committee as well as other parts of the Congress.

That is right, is it not?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I feel very strongly about this, and not simply as a tactical device but as something that is imperative in the present state of America and of America's relations with the rest of the world.

Senator SPARKMAN. I can remember in former administrations and former times when there was a much closer relationship between the State Department and the Congress, and primarily the Foreign Relations Committee.

I can remember various administrations in which frequently our committee or certain subcommittees or certain individuals would be asked to come down to the White House or go over to visit the Secretary of State according to the problems that were uppermost, I may

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say, at that particular time. It seems to me there has been a very sad
dropping off of that over recent years.

I remember Presidents and Secretaries of State during the time that I have been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee calling us in frequently, coming up, asking for a conference with us to talk about various matters of interest that developed.

I remember a rather high level of bipartisanship that was developed
in large part when Senator Vandenberg was chairman of the commit-
tee, even at a time when his party was in the minority. I remember that
President Truman called on John Foster Dulles to carry out a very
important program, that is, to represent him in developing and pro-
mulgating the Japanese Peace Treaty. Many similar instances could be
mentioned.

I think I know what the answer is, but I want to ask anyway. Can
we reasonably expect that type of cooperation and collaboration and
bipartisanship under your administration as Secretary of State?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Sparkman, I am very glad you asked that question. You can reasonably expect it, and a very major effort will be made on my part and that of my associates to bring about exactly that degree of cooperation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

ACTION ON NOMINATION WITHOUT MUCH DELAY RECOMMENDED

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I have before me a list of 37 ques-
tions which could be asked of Dr. Kissinger. I doubt that such a multi-
plicity of questions is required or advisable.

We have received a large number of requests from persons who want to testify, either for themselves or as representatives of their organizations. There are undoubtedly innumerable persons who could be called in to testify in the same direction. But to ask him to answer all the questions that might be raised or to listen to all persons in the United States who might wish to testify against him would certainly keep this committee in session until after the United Nations General Assembly session begins, certainly after the 24th of September, when our Secretary of State is supposed to address them. Undoubtedly the hearings could be prolonged until after the United Nations adjourns for the season.

I do not regard Henry Kissinger as a saint. I feel sure that sometime
during his life he has committed sins but, on the other hand, it is
simply a matter of degree. And I do not believe any Member of Con-
gress can qualify as the president of the stonecasters association at this
time because everybody is guilty.

What I am concerned about is the record he has made, whether he
is a sinner or not, in reducing warfare throughout the world. Nobody
can question the part that he has played in bringing about more peace
at present than the world has seen for a long time. I am not the least
bit interested in getting even with anyone. I am not interested in en-
hancing anyone's political ambitions by the action which we may take
on this nomination.

My interest is not particularly in Henry Kissinger or Richard
Nixon, but in the United States. And that means that if we are

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interested in the welfare of the United States we have to have a Secretary of State without delay. We certainly have to have one before the United Nations meet. Therefore, I think instead of prolonging and prolonging these hearings, as some who have written in would like to do, I believe we should take action on this nomination without much delay.

Certainly, those who have legitimate protests against his nomination should be heard to a reasonable degree, but not to the point of indefinitely postponing action. So, Mr. Chairman, I think that I have explained my position, and I hope that the United States would not lose any respect among the nations of the world by interminable delay in making a decision as to whether we approve this nomination or not.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. When did we receive this nomination, Mr. Marcy?

Mr. MARCY. When the Senate reconvened last Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN. We only received it last Wednesday. Under the rules of the committee we have to wait 6 days. I do not know why the Senator thinks there is going to be undue delay.

Senator AIKEN. I did not say there had been undue delay. I said we should come to a decision before we are expected to participate in international conventions and I believe the first one is the 24th of September. That gives us 3 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no disposition to delay.

Senator AIKEN. No, I did not say there was any disposition.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think Dr. Kissinger requires the title of Secretary of State to function. He has been functioning forcefully without it.

Senator AIKEN. The chairman knows the large amount of mail which we have received which, if we complied with the requests contained in it, would delay the final action on his nomination for a long, long time.

We have 15 witnesses who have already asked to testify. I believe all are in opposition. It seems to me there were a couple more this morning, but I am not at all sure about that. Undoubtedly that sort of thing could continue and continue, and that is something that I do not believe we should tolerate.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## PROCEDURE CONCERNING SUBMISSION OF TREATIES

Dr. Kissinger, Senator Mansfield was obliged to leave in order to open the Senate. He asked me if I would please ask you the following question. It is in written form and I will read it to you. Senator Mansfield says: "I wish to read the following section from 'Jefferson's Manual on Parliamentary Practice,' section 752.5, which reads as follows:

"It has been the usage for the Executive when it communicates a treaty to the Senate for their ratification to communicate also the correspondence of the negotiators. This having been omitted in the case of the Prussian Treaty was asked by a vote of the House on February 12, 1800, and was obtained, and in December 1800 the convention of

73

that year between the United States and France, with a report of the negotiations by the envoys but not their instructions, being laid before the Senate, the instructions were asked for and communicated by the President.'"

Senator Mansfield asks, "Will you, as Secretary of State, adhere to this procedure without reservation?"

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Church, I frankly do not know what the practice has been after the period of Jefferson when treaties were submitted to the Congress, or to the Senate, for ratification.

I believe, in any event, that when a treaty is submitted to the Senate, the essential elements of the negotiations should be discussed with the committee, and the degree of the general availability of this should then be determined.

The practice of diplomacy now is somewhat more complex than it was at that period. But if a treaty is submitted, I would expect to meet with the chairman and with the ranking member and explain the general status of the negotiation, and respond to any requests for additional information, and then I think we should determine what can be made or should be made available in the common public interest. I do not know what the precise practice has been with treaties that have been submitted, say, in this century.

## GUIDELINES CONCERNING TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Senator CHURCH. Let me follow up on Senator Mansfield's question by asking you this, Dr. Kissinger:

What guidelines will you follow in deciding which instruments should take the form of treaty and thus be made subject to the ratification of the Senate, and which should take the form of Executive agreements?

I say this because, as you know, the number of Executive agreements has not only grown very large, but has come to embrace agreements of great consequence with foreign nations. Historically, it has been the practice to submit agreements of great consequence in treaty form in order to comply with the constitutional provision that requires Senate ratification.

Mr. KISSINGER. The borderline between Executive agreements and treaties has never been very clearly defined. It is a problem that in my present position I have not had to study with the care with which I propose to study it if the committee and the Senate confirm my nomination.

Therefore, let me make a general comment. I would say that any treaty or any instrument that implies or involves a commitment by the United States to go to war, or to come to the assistance of other countries and therefore might lead to war, should be submitted to the Congress, to the Senate, in treaty form.

Senator CHURCH. When you say any agreement that might lead to war, would you include in that agreements establishing or extending major American military bases in foreign countries?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think that in the past this has not been considered subject to ratification in a manner appropriate to a treaty. As a general rule I would not see any reason to change that practice.

Senator CHURCH. Well, from time to time we—

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Mr. KISSINGER. But then I would have to say again that this depends on the circumstances, because frequently bases are established in countries with which we already have a treaty.

Senator CHURCH. Yes; I have in mind the base agreements with Spain which have been the subject of some argument between the committee and the administration. These bases are not only major, but they come up for renewal from time to time. We have had testimony, or have seen written statements of one of our topmost generals, to the effect that the existence of these bases constitutes a more solid commitment to the defense of Spain than any possible treaty could.

Therefore, we have reason to feel that an extension of the Spanish bases is an illustration of a case where such an agreement should take the form of a treaty, and thus be made subject to Senate confirmation.

I recognize there are minor military bases that may not fall into this category, but it is certainly my view that major military bases that could, as you say, expose the United States to a danger of involvement in a foreign war are of sufficient importance to be submitted to the Senate for its ratification.

Mr. KISSINGER. Of course, the issue of the bases in Spain is somewhat different from the issue of a new base agreement in another major country, because we already have the bases there. The issue here would be the extension of agreements on bases that already exist and that have come into being under one form of agreement, and then the transformation of such an agreement into something different. I think that it is a distinguishable case from new major bases that might be established.

I would say as a general proposition that it should be the objective of any administration to make certain that when the United States is involved in war, it will be on the basis of procedures that are generally perceived by Congress, the Executive, and the country as representing a popular will. I would approach the study of the question which you raised with that attitude.

## NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION

Senator CHURCH. Your answer to that question suggests another to me, Dr. Kissinger.

You are aware, I know, and perhaps have had a chance to study the national commitments resolution which has been passed by the Senate. Are you in general agreement with the thrust of that resolution?

Mr. KISSINGER. That resolution was passed several years ago and has not been, to my knowledge, actively pursued recently, and I would like to reserve my answer and give it to you in writing, or reserve it for another day.

Senator CHURCH. Very well. If you will review that resolution carefully, it is one that we take seriously in the Senate, and it has to do with the necessity for some form of legislative participation in order to create a formal commitment to a foreign nation. I think we should have a precise answer from you as to your views, with respect to that resolution.

Mr. KISSINGER. I will submit it to this committee.

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DR. KISSINGER'S COMMENTARY ON THE "NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION"

[Supplied by Executive Office of President]

The term "National Commitments" as used in S. Res. 85 is subject to varying interpretations. Insofar as it means the placing of the United States in a relationship with another state which could foreseeably involve the United States in a defense commitment to that nation, then I believe that such a commitment should require the fully informed participation of Congress.

I share the concern underlying S. Res. 85 that Congress should strengthen its participation in the policy-making process. This was a principal theme of my opening statement and my testimony during the hearings. If I am confirmed I intend to meet with the Chairmen and Ranking Minority members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees at the earliest opportunity to take concrete steps toward this objective.

In addition, I have recommended that a joint Legislative-Executive Commission be appointed to study and report on the war powers, a problem in which "national commitments" is a fundamental element.

WITNESS' PARTICIPATION IN SALT II NEGOTIATIONS

Senator CHURCH. With the publication in 1957 of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," you became something of an authority in this field, Dr. Kissinger. Also; you were subsequently instrumental in finalizing the SALT I agreements in 1972.

How actively will you participate in the SALT II negotiations?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have very actively participated in the evolution of our position in the SALT II negotiations, and I have been engaged in exchanges on this subject with the Soviet Union. This is a major interest of the administration, and I will expect to pursue it extremely actively.

Senator CHURCH. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS TO ACCOUNT FOR MIA'S IN LAOS

Dr. Kissinger, I have been advised by our staff that a Mr. Walter Wojcicki representing 38 MIA families in New Jersey has called and asked that you be asked two questions which I would like to ask you now.

First, given the fact that the United States was not a party to the Laos cease-fire agreement and that the agreement says very little on accounting for MIA's, what does the administration plan to do to get an accounting for MIA's in Laos?

Mr. KISSINGER. With respect to the missing in action in Laos, this matter was covered first in the Paris agreement between the United States and North Vietnam and it was the subject of subsequent negotiations in the June negotiations between the United States and Hanoi. We have a commitment from the North Vietnamese that they will take an active interest in this question, and that the provisions for an accounting for the missing in action will be scrupulously observed.

The North Vietnamese know very well that the normalization of our relations with them, and any further consideration of economic aid, depend on a satisfactory resolution of the issue of the missing in action, not just in Vietnam but throughout Indochina.

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I expressed on Friday our substantial dissatisfaction with the way in which the North Vietnamese have carried out the provisions of the agreement as they apply to Vietnam, and, of course, we have not had any fulfillment of them with respect to Laos. But we make no distinction between Laos and Vietnam, and we will press all parties equally throughout Indochina.

Now, after the agreement is concluded in Laos, there is supposed to be a central government established, headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. It may be easier to get that government to implement the provisions to account for the missing in action than has been the case with respect to the North Vietnamese. But it is a major objective of the administration, especially in Laos where the ratio of prisoners to missing is much less satisfactory than it is in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

## ICCS MEMBER TO LOOK AFTER U.S. MIA CONCERNS

The second question is what member of the ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] can the United States count on to look after its concerns about the missing in action, given the fact that in December 1970, in the U.N., Hungary voted against and Indonesia abstained on the vote in the U.N. on the resolution—as a matter of fact, our colleague, Senator Pell, was very active in this particular matter, I recall, which called for respect for human rights in armed conflicts.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Case, we have been extremely dissatisfied with the performance of Hungary and Poland on the ICCS, and therefore we would have to look to Iran and Indonesia—Iran having replaced Canada—to present our case. But in addition to the ICCS there is the Four-Party Joint Military Team, which is charged with looking after the missing in action. On that group we are represented, and we intend energetically to look after our interests in that group. That group is composed of the South Vietnamese Government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the North Vietnamese, and ourselves.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

## TERRITORIAL SEAS AND SEABED PROBLEM

I have two questions at this point on the territorial seas and seabed problem.

What is your attitude toward unilateral action by the United States or by American companies exploiting the resources of the seabed beyond the 12-mile limit before an international agreement has been reached about the management of the seabed beyond the territorial seas?

Mr. KISSINGER. The United States has submitted a proposal which would, in fact, establish three areas: A 12-mile limit, then a limit which is not exactly defined, but which would be approximately 200 miles—it is the coastal seabed and environment—and then the area beyond.

In the second zone, the one between the 12-mile limit and the 200-mile limit, the adjoining country has a predominant economic in-

77

fluence, subject to certain restrictions and certain contributions to the international community from the results of its exploitation. Beyond that 200-mile limit the exploitation of the seabeds should be subject to international jurisdiction.

There is not, I am frank to say, Senator, complete unanimity within the Government with respect to the position I have outlined to you, but it reflects our very serious consideration and it is a position that we have up to now adopted.

Senator CASE. Have you a personal judgment on that matter?

Mr. KISSINGER. At the risk of jeopardizing my relations with some other departments of the Government, I lean toward the position that I have outlined to you.

Senator CASE. And that would mean, I take it, that pending a reasonable chance for adoption of our proposal as an agreement we would not encourage or look with happiness upon exploitation in this area.

Mr. KISSINGER. Exactly, Senator. This was going to be my concluding point. We would take our position, and we would hope that until the conference meets in Chile next year, no actions are taken inconsistent with our position, and we would certainly not encourage them.

Senator CASE. My second question in this general area is: What is your attitude, your feeling, with regard to the standard of liability for pollution or other damage caused by unilateral action of a coastal State through use of the seabed before this international agreement is reached other than the 1958 convention about free use of the seas by all nations?

That is the only agreement governing it now, I believe, as a matter of international law. But what is your general attitude about pollution and damage?

Mr. KISSINGER. My general attitude is that the question of pollution, and environmental concerns in general, are principal issues to be settled by the international community. It is one of the issues that we propose to put before the United Nations at this General Assembly as being peculiarly necessary of settlement on an international basis.

Senator CASE. You would not be happy about any effort to get grandfather rights in an area by undue activity right now?

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

## U.S. POLICE TRAINING PROGRAMS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Senator CASE. On another matter—do I still have a little time, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. In the foreign aid economic bill we have language prohibiting the training of police with our funds in foreign countries, and the explanation, the rationale for that is that training police has resulted, in a good many cases, in identifying in the minds of many people the United States with every act of police brutality that occurs in a foreign country. Can I have your views on U.S. police training programs?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would like to study that particular clause and submit an answer to you for the record. As a general proposition, subject to exceptional circumstances, the police functions of foreign countries

21-172—73—pt. 1—6

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are best left to those foreign countries and should not involve a major commitment by the United States.

Senator CASE. I think that is an admirable position frankly and a proper qualification.

DR. KISSINGER'S COMMENTARY ON SECTION IN SENATE BILL 1443 (COVERING POLICE ASSISTANCE)

As promised, I have studied Section 2502(b) of Senate Bill 1443 which would prohibit the funding of foreign police assistance programs.

As I said in my testimony, I believe as a general proposition that the development of national police forces should be the responsibility of the nations concerned and should not involve a major commitment by the United States. But there are unusual circumstances in which we should provide some assistance in the efforts of countries to develop civil security institutions that are responsive to the needs of the people and that help provide the framework necessary for economic and social growth in a climate of freedom. Therefore I believe the proposed provision goes too far.

We are confident that our police assistance programs have made and continue to make a genuine contribution to development. However, the Administration is mindful of the many criticisms of this program in recent years. Accordingly, we believe that each of the police assistance programs should be reviewed to determine its desirability and utility. Moreover, each country program should be evaluated to determine whether it makes a positive contribution in terms of current U.S. foreign policy objectives and interests and whether it should be continued, modified, or eliminated. We are prepared to undertake such an evaluation.

INADEQUACY OF CONSULTATION CONCERNING CAMBODIA

Senator CASE. I have some further questions about the matter of information which you have answered quite satisfactorily in general terms on many matters, and in this connection, I am not putting this to you but I am illustrating my unhappiness with a situation that has existed in the past. I am not even asking you to comment, but I want to make the point that on this question of information General Wheeler and Admiral Mooer in testifying before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate revealed that the only Members of Congress given accurate information about Cambodia were the following: the late Senator Russell, the late Senator Dirksen, Senator Stennis, the late Representative Mendel Rivers, Representative Gerald Ford of Michigan and Representative Leslie Arends of Illinois. I am not in any way suggesting that these may be the only individuals, but it is obvious that, except perhaps for Senator Stennis, most of these people were enthusiastic supporters of the Indochina war. When the President talks about Members of Congress having the right to know, if this were intended to be an all-inclusive group I just frankly don't agree and I don't think that notification on that issue of those Members of the Congress constituted adequate consultation. I just make that statement and I don't ask you to comment on it. I would rather perhaps that you shouldn't and let that just stand for itself.

I would say further that I don't regard it as likely that you would agree that it was adequate consultation, and I am assuming that.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with the Senator's question, Senator Abourezk has submitted a similar question. [See Appendix.]

The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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SPENDING FOR AND INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Dr. Kissinger, my questions this morning have to do primarily with
national intelligence, apparently the basis for many actions in Gov-
ernment and certainly for the expenditures of more billions of dollars
of the taxpayers' money than any other field. It is no secret that some
of us, for years, have been worried about the nature and the degree
of congressional review of the many billions expended each year on
intelligence alone. This information, as recently noted in the press, is
most influential on matters which require heavy monetary support,
discussions and decisions incident to Soviet and other nations' military
capacity, arms control policy, SALT discussions and so forth; also
United States policy when it comes to crises in the Third World, and
on and on.

The President recently recommended no reductions in the defense
budget. The House of Representatives and the Senate Armed Services
Committee at this time are recommending substantial reductions in
said budget. It is from this background that I would ask a few
questions.

COMMUNICATION OF NSC AND/OR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE TO CIA

How are directives from the National Security Council and/or the
President communicated to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. KISSINGER. First of all, to answer your question, directives
from the President or National Security Council directives tend to be
transmitted through my office and tend to be signed by me as Presi-
dential directives.

NSC SUBCOMMITTEES CHAIRED BY WITNESS

Senator SYMINGTON. I have a list of the National Security Council subcommittees. There are seven of them; first, the Washington Special Actions Group. I understand you chair that; correct?

Senator SYMINGTON. And then the Senior Review Group. I under-
stand you chair that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, a Verification Panel, National Security
Council, I understand you chair that.

Senator SYMINGTON. And the Defense Program Review Committee,
I understand you chair that.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Under Secretaries Committee, you could
not chair; that is chaired by Under Secretary Rush, correct?

Senator SYMINGTON. The Intelligence Committee, you also chair?

Senator SYMINGTON. And the Forty Committee, you also chair?

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the difference between the Intelligence
Committee and the Forty Committee?

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Mr. KISSINGER. May I, before I answer this question, explain that this listing of committees may give a slightly misleading impression. The membership of these committees is substantially the same, and the only difference is the number of people that participate. The core membership is the same in each case, that is to say, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The differences is that if it is a Senior Review Group meeting, for example the membership is somewhat larger. If it concerns defense matters, the membership is somewhat different. If it deals with SALT, then the membership, in addition to that core group, will include the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other agencies directly concerned. So it is not that there are five or six committees that are constantly working, all of which I chair; it is that depending on the subject matter the basic interdepartmental coordination which has been my responsibility is carried out by this core group, plus one or two or three additional members, and that will determine the name by which that core committee operates.

## DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND FORTY COMMITTEE

Now, to answer your question—and I think the committee will recognize that I will not in open session be able to go very deeply into the Forty Committee—the Forty Committee deals exclusively with what are called covert operations. It is composed of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and myself. There are no other members. It has existed under various names with this basic composition ever since 1948. At first it was composed only of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of State, but the basic membership as it is now constituted goes back at least to the mid-1950's. This committee reviews the so-called covert operations and it recommends operations for Presidential approval. But I do not think I can go into greater detail in an open session.

The NSC Intelligence Committee sets the general policy for the intelligence community. It has a larger sphere. It discusses the adequate of the reporting mechanisms of the intelligence community and it sets general policies. It does not approve individual actions.

## ACCURACY AND INDEPENDENCE OF CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. The primary reason I ask this is that in the years, at least one, I have been a member of the CIA Subcommittee, with but one exception, I have never seen an estimate by the services about the strength of the possible enemy that was not considerably higher than the estimate of the CIA, and that in—

Mr. KISSINGER. It has been my experience also.

Senator SYMINGTON. It has been your experience, too. Interesting. In almost every case the Central Intelligence Agency's estimate turned out to be correct. The Secretary of Defense who was the most promilitary once said if you leave it up to the services they would want the moon, the whole Gross National Product, if they could get it. In recent

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correspondence I have had with a member of the Joint Chiefs about our recommending a relatively minor reduction in personnel, he wrote men a letter which concluded by his saying, "If you do this to us you will make the United States a hostage of Soviet goodwill." I thought that a pretty silly statement, but what I am getting at is, if the independence of the Central Intelligence Agency is in any way affected by your two-hat position, which we discussed previously, there is no real reason for having a Central Intelligence Agency.

A subcommittee of this committee looked into it several years ago and felt perhaps the greatest waste of the taxpayers' money was in the intelligence field. I certainly want as much as any American to see us have an adequate defense, but do not believe some of the proposed new weapons systems are necessary in any sense, for the security of the United States. The National Security Council is an advisory body to the President, and from what I read in the papers I am beginning to worry about the independence of the CIA. As you know, a general was transferred from the Pentagon to the CIA. Recently there have been a lot of military people, civilians and others, transferred into the White House from the Pentagon. This general wrote an article in which he said he did not think anybody should make intelligence estimates except the military. I protested and was to read his speech. After reading it I was more worried than before, because it seemed every intelligence agency except the services themselves and the Pentagon would be downgraded. As I see it, we ought to abolish the CIA if it is to be just a tool for furthering the wishes of Pentagon.

### AUSPICES OF STUDY LEADING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP REORGANIZATION

Could I ask under what auspices was the study conducted which led to the reorganization of intelligence community leadership in early November of 1971?

Mr. KISSINGER. That study, Senator, was conducted under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget, although my office was represented on that study. May I make a brief comment on what you said before?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate it.

### INDEPENDENCE OF CIA SUPPORTED

Mr. KISSINGER. Anyone concerned with national policy must have a profound interest in making sure that intelligence guides, and does not follow, national policy. There is in all intelligence agencies a great temptation, and sometimes a considerable incentive, to gear their estimates to what they think the political trend may be. Therefore, I strongly support your view that the estimating process of the Central Intelligence Agency should be independent of any outside influence.

Now, we in the White House never attempted to influence this process. On two occasions since I have been in my present job, when the differences of opinion between the Central Intelligence Agency and the military services were so large that it was difficult to understand how they could be operating from the same body of factual material, I requested the analysts from both agencies to come to the White House and had each of them present his case, so that I could understand the

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process by which they had arrived at their conclusions. But I think it
would be very wrong, and very dangerous, for anybody at the White
House or the Secretary of State to attempt to dictate, even by inference,
the conclusions that the intelligence community should reach, and
especially the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from New York.

YEAR OF EUROPE

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, you are charged with the statement
that this is the year of Europe. I do not say that invidiously. Is it still
the year of Europe?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes, Senator, it is still the year of Europe.

Senator JAVITS. Has anything happened at home or abroad to change
your view as originally expressed, I think, in April 1973 that this
would be the concentration of highest priority of the administration?

Mr. KISSINGER. The so-called year of Europe has our concentration
and very high priority, indeed the highest priority of the administra-
tion.

In understanding the progress that can be made with respect to it,
one has to understand that there are several processes going on
simultaneously.

There is the change in strategic relationships that is produced by
the growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal. There is the change in the
economic relationship between Europe and the United States, from
a position of dominance by the United States to a situation in which
the Europeans are becoming more cohesive and more assertive. There
is the process of European integration, in which the Europeans are at
one and the same time dealing with us as individual nations and yet
attempting to form a unified European identity that can speak with
one voice.

And finally, there is the problem of how to relate any discussions
that we undertake with the Europeans to the discussions that may be
going on with the Japanese and the Canadians.

Now, all of these processes are being handled simultaneously, and
that requires some rather complex orchestration. The Europeans de-
cided, after initially dealing with us on a bilateral basis, that they
wanted to use the occasion of our initiative to crystallize also their
own unified view of the political future of the Atlantic community.
As a result, for about 2 months we have not publicly pressed them, in
order to give them an opportunity to crystallize those views.

The Foreign Ministers of the European Community are meeting
today and tomorrow in Copenhagen, and I think you will find, Senator
Javits, that after this meeting the process of the so-called year of
Europe will begin to accelerate.

Senator JAVITS. I assume this will be your personal highest priority,
in view of your marked success in China and the Soviet Union.

Mr. KISSINGER. You are correct, Senator Javits; this will be my
highest priority.

Senator JAVITS. So, you will be the top man in charge of this par-
ticular effort?

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Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct. But I would include Japan and Canada in that process.

Senator JAVITS. Very much; I will come to that in a minute.

Senator CASE. Excuse me, you say you include Japan in that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think the relationship really has to be trilateral. It has to include Japan, the United States, Canada, and Europe.

Senator JAVITS. Exactly, I thoroughly agree with that.

## U.S. POLICY CONCERNING ATLANTIC CHARTER

It is said that our policy of uniting under one heading—a so-called Atlantic charter—security, economics, and social affairs, and that the European policy is not a charter but a declaration which will deal with economic and social affairs separately from security affairs.

Has U.S. policy, or in your judgment should U.S. policy, change in that regard or should we stand solid by the proposition that whatever arrangements we make with Europe should be a package?

Mr. KISSINGER. Our interest, Senator, is in the reality, not in the procedure or in the name you give to the document. As to whether it is called a charter or a declaration. We have no overwhelming preference.

Also, as we have studied the problem more deeply with the Europeans, it has emerged that some of the problems are handled in one set of institutions and other problems are handled in other institutions, which makes it more difficult to come up with an all-embracing document. Secondly, Japan can join in certain aspects of these deliberations but would find it more difficult, for example, to adhere to a document that included various defense discussions.

Therefore, the direction in which we may be going is a document that deals with the economic and political matters in relation to the Nine; a document as far as defense is concerned that includes the NATO countries, with the Japanese perhaps joining the political and economic document; and finally, there could be a brief all-embracing declaration which relates all these documents to each other. This is the general direction in which we seem to be going right now.

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, would you not say that that represents a marked concession to the European view as depicted by the Nine, and particularly France?

Mr. KISSINGER. It does not represent a concession to the French point of view because the French were very resistant at first to any dealings with the Nine as a unit.

But since these documents make sense only if they produce a conviction on both sides of the Atlantic that they reflect the realities of the new era, it is necessary that both sides make concessions, and, above all, it is essential that this not be approached in a confrontation spirit on either side of the Atlantic.

## MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCES REDUCTIONS

Senator JAVITS. One element of the negotiation is the mutual force reductions as the Russians called it, or the mutual and balanced forced reductions as we call it.

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Do you envision within the next year any material reduction in the U.S. troop strength in Europe unless there is an agreement?

Mr. KISSINGER. The negotiations for mutual force reductions will start on October 30, and we hope that very substantial progress can be made during the course of the next year, which will then produce some reduction of U.S. forces.

We would be opposed to the unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in the absence of such an agreement.

## PER CAPITA INCOME GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED NATIONS

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, the widening gap between the developing nations in terms of per capita income and the developed nations is a matter of marked concern to the world and to our country and to our Government.

Could you tell us, as you look forward to your perspective as Secretary of State, what you believe we should pursue as a policy in the effort to close that gap. And tell us please why should we be interested as a country in closing that gap?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, the second question, Senator Javits, is easier to answer than the first. The importance that the United States must attach to closing the gap, or at least to improving the conditions of the less-developed countries, is derived from the fact the world cannot possibly be stable if the part of the world that contains most of its population feels itself excluded from the technological progress and the industrial advance of the rest of the world. If you have an enormous gap in a global society in which nations are now closer really to each other in terms of communication than most nation states were in the previous century, and if this gap continues to grow, revolutionary upheavals in the world that will profoundly affect international stability are inevitable.

Now, what can be done? That has been a matter that has proved much more elusive, because the progress of these countries depends in part on assistance by the more developed countries but also on the willingness of the less-developed countries to organize themselves domestically to utilize their resources to foreign aid, and we have never satisfactorily solved the problem. So, at this point, I think the best I can say is to express the fact that the problem is urgent, and that international stability will depend upon our ability to make some contribution.

## NONALINED NATIONS PLEA FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, are you prepared to give us any indication of your response to the plea of the nonalined nations, who represent the primary developing nations of the world. They are reported this morning as expressing their view that they wish more intimate consultation before the world makes decisions, like, for example, the decision on monetary matters, which determines their fate for perhaps decades ahead. What is your response to that plea?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, let me say two things: First, in principle those whose fate will be affected by major decisions such as in inter-

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national monetary policy should have an opportunity to express their
view and should be heard. So with that proposal as a principle I have
no difficulty.

There is, however, one problem: That if the nonalined countries start forming a bloc, then they become a bloc like any other bloc. The mere fact that they are not part of an existing alliance and that they define their grouping as having been formed by being nonalined does not change the basic situation. And I would, therefore, hope that if these countries want to profit from their nonalinement they will look at each issue on its merits, rather than form a unit which operates in international affairs as a unit and then becomes subject to bloc politics.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## HUMAN RIGHTS BEHIND IRON CURTAIN

Dr. Kissinger, since last Friday when we discussed our concern about human rights of people behind the curtain, the American Academy of Sciences came out with their statement concerning the same point. In the other body, Mr. Mills said he thought before we went ahead with MFN and other trade negotiations we ought to pay some concern to the human rights behind the curtain. In this regard, could you give us an overview of specific moves the United States might make or specific concerns regarding human rights behind the curtain you intend to initiate or press.

Mr. KISSINGER. As I pointed out Friday, there is no question about where we stand on this issue morally and individually. Nor is there any question about where we stand as a government. We favor the exercise of human freedoms by all countries. The difficulty arises as to what the United States as a government should do in the conduct of our foreign policy, and to what extent we should make specific results dependent on essentially domestic developments in various countries.

This is a hard question to answer in the abstract. But on the whole, our principle has been that we should focus our first attention on the exercise of the foreign policy of the countries with which we are dealing.

Now, this did not exclude and has not excluded that in our individual capacities—individual capacity obviously enhanced by our official position—we could point out to Soviet leaders the impact of certain developments in their country on their relations with the United States, and on the public conscience in the United States. These representations have had some considerable success, with respect, for example, with the exit visa tax, and other instances which I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to mention here.

So, at a minimum, you can be certain that even when we do not make official representations, our views as senior officials and as private citizens will be communicated. However, we attempt to do it in a way which makes it easier to achieve results, rather than to promote a confrontation.

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Senator PELL. I wonder if you could be a little more specific, though, about the types of concern that we could express and would be well advised to express.

One thought I have is that our representative on the Human Rights Commission could be a more conspicuous person. I can't recall who it is. Can you recall?

Mr. KISSINGER. Frankly, I do not.

Senator PELL. That is an example, an excellent example, of the point I am driving at.

If you put a man of tremendous prestige in that job, if a man like your predecessor could be persuaded to take it, that in itself would elevate the position.

I was wondering if you had any ideas.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think that is a very good suggestion, which very frankly did not occur to me, and I will look into it very carefully.

Senator PELL. Thank you, sir.

## WEATHER MODIFICATION

The Senate on July 11 of this year passed by an 82-to-10 vote, legislation which had passed the North Atlantic Assembly earlier expressing the view that the United States should seek a treaty prohibiting the development or use of environmental or geophysical techniques as weapons of war. I was wondering if you would express to us what action the administration plans to take in response to both the Senate and the North Atlantic Assembly resolutions.

Mr. KISSINGER. I confess, Senator, that I am not familiar with these resolutions, but I would say that anything endorsed so overwhelmingly by these two bodies would be taken extremely seriously.

Senator PELL. One of the problems we have had is obtaining from the Defense Department U.S. military activities in weather modification even when that information was directly relevant to legislation pending before this committee. I am wondering if you believe that the State Department has obtained all the information that it has requested or should request from the Defense Department in this field.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think, Senator Pell, that the State Department will have little difficulty in obtaining national security information in the new arrangement.

Senator PELL. I believe you will find, if you check back, that this was not the case in the past. I would hope that it is a point you would remedy in this field of weather modification.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think it would be difficult to avoid remedying it.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

## LAW OF THE SEAS

In connection with the law of the sea, which I am very glad you have touched on, and are as familiar with it as you are, will you support a strong American position for minimizing national claims to control the high seas and seabeds?

Mr. KISSINGER. With the qualification, Senator Pell, that I made before, that this is a subject that still has to be reviewed again by the President, I would say that my own personal thinking with regard to seabeds is tending in that direction.

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Senator PELL. Thank you.

In this regard, would you support the U.S. position strongly in favor of an effective United Nations oceans authority, a United Nations or international sea guard as proposed in our draft treaty?

Mr. KISSINGER. I am not familiar with the details of that treaty, but it is an inevitable corrollary of the position which I have outlined that the seabed area beyond the coastal seabed area should be under some form of international resource machinery for which the United Nations would be an appropriate place.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

A current shortage throughout the world of protein food has underscored the importance to all of us of the necessity of guarding our fishery resources. In my part of the country, in New England, we are very concerned as we see many fish, particularly the haddock, absolutely vacuumed from the so-called area of economic exploitation. Have you any thoughts with regard to actions we could take now in order to protect our fishery resources prior to the conclusion of the treaty we hope will come out of Chile.

Mr. KISSINGER. The United States has made some compromises with countries in South America that have claimed a 300-kilometer limit, as long as this was not considered territorial sea but was for the exploitation of a natural resource. We could certainly consider applying the same principle to ourselves.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

## ASSISTANT SECRETARYSHIP FOR OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

In the State Department authorization bill there is a proposal for a new Assistant Secretaryship for Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs. Do you support this concept and if, by chance, the President vetoes the State Department authorization bill, would you recommend that this asisstant secretaryship be created by executive fiat?

Mr. KISSINGER. I am not sure that assistant secretaryships can be created by executive fiat.

Senator PELL. Forgive me for interrupting. This is the only one that is created by legislative fiat and that is why the Executive is annoyed about it. All the others are done by Executive fiat.

Mr. KISSINGER. If that can be done, I favor it. I strongly support this concept and I think it is a very important step.

## DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. Excuse these random questions, but our time is so limited. With regard to Cuba, it would seem to me the time has come to open up relations with that country. It is generally agreed that the strategic, even the tactical importance, of Guan tanamo is practically nil. Will you support the idea of opening up diplomatic relations with Cuba?

Mr. KISSINGER. First, as you pointed out, one of our first moves will be to try to strengthen our relationships with Latin America. We would like to have this exchange of views with Latin America progress to a certain point before we can judge the views of other countries with

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respect to Cuba, and also the attitude of Cuba toward its relationships
in the hemisphere.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

## CHANGE IN INFORMING OF CONGRESS

Senator MUSKIE. Dr. Kissinger, I enjoyed the discussions in certain areas and I would like to open up some myself. Before I do, I would like to ask one or two questions in the area of communication, information and secrecy. I understand to some extent all you can do is testify as to your own attitude, but I think it would be helpful to try to pin it down sufficiently to give us some evidence there will be a change.

You have indicated that you intend to establish a better climate with the committee with respect to developing policies and with respect to policy decisions taken.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct. I cannot guarantee we will always be able to accept the views of the committee, but we will certainly discuss our views fully and listen very carefully to the views of the committee.

Senator MUSKIE. In other words, we will know in advance of foreign policy decisions, what decisions are being considered, what decisions are pending, and what the options are of the bases for the consideration of them.

Mr. KISSINGER. That would be the intention. Except in cases of really overwhelming national security considerations, which I cannot now foresee, that will be the practice, yes.

Senator MUSKIE. Let me seek to illustrate that. Could we see, in similar circumstances, a repetition of the secret bombing in Cambodia without advance information to the Congress beyond that which it is alleged was given in the instance of which we are now aware?

Mr. KISSINGER. As I testified on Friday, the circumstances that produced that situation were nearly unique. It was almost inconceivable that they could be repeated. However, should they be repeated, I would expect that the relations between the executive and legislative branch would have reached a point of trust where your committee would know about it.

Senator MUSKIE. In other words, you expect—

Mr. KISSINGER. Or at least, the chairman would be consulted.

Senator MUSKIE [continuing]. You expect to work to develop a climate in which there would be more consultation with more Members of Congress in such situations than there was in that instance?

Mr. KISSINGER. Than there has been in the past, that is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you say the same with respect to the tilt on Pakistan?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Muskie, the "tilt" toward Pakistan, whatever its shortcomings in your view, was certainly not a secret.

Senator MUSKIE. Eventually.

Mr. KISSINGER. It was expressed very vocally. But in any event, in a situation such as the India-Pakistan War I would expect to meet with this committee or with its appropriate subcommittee and explain our thinking.

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Senator MUSKIE. With respect to informing Members of the Congress, including this committee, can we expect—and I think you have implied that we can—a regularized reporting and consultation process so that the committee would not have to try to anticipate on the basis of peripheral information when it ought to be consulted?

Mr. KISSINGER. Not only can you expect it but immediately after my confirmation I propose to meet with your chairman and ranking member to work out a very concrete procedure on how to achieve this.

## WIRETAPPING POLICY

Senator MUSKIE. There is one other doubt in this area that occupied the committee this morning. This is the wiretapping area. I think we all understand—as I said this morning to the Attorney General—that there are gray areas of authority and responsibility between the Executive and the Congress that are rarely, if ever, precisely defined, and that a precise definition in these areas might not necessarily be in the national interest. Yet, there is evidence that some of those restraints have been abandoned by some people in secret. And when such restraints are abandoned in secret, then we establish a pattern or a habit that is a threat to our fundamental liberties. So we need to know what the policy is. That is what this whole talk about the wiretap controversy is about. We need to know what the policy is. And how we can get that knowledge is in question. If you are confirmed as Secretary of State—and I have no reason to believe you will not be—I would like to know what your attitude is about wiretaps such as those that were instituted in the celebrated cases of the 17 or whatever number. Do you view wiretaps in such circumstances as being in the national interest? Would you expect in similar circumstances to approve their use?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have asked the Attorney General to submit to this committee his opinion on the legal view of the Government with respect to wiretapping in national security cases. He has promised to do this, and I would, of course, strictly abide by his view of the legal situation. But beyond this, the issue of wiretapping raises the issue of the balance between human liberty and the requirements of national security. I would say that the weight should be on the side of human liberty and that if human liberty is to be ever infringed, the demonstration on the national security side must be overwhelming. That would be my general attitude.

## SHOULD WIRETAPPING JUDGMENTS BE SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE CHECK?

Senator MUSKIE. That leads me to what I think is the key question: Should that judgment be made only by the Executive or should it be subject to an established check by the legislative branch of the Government?

Mr. KISSINGER. Of what constitutes—

Senator MUSKIE. In particular cases, whether or not the authority has been abused. Should that be wholly an Executive judgment or should it be subject to a legislative judgment as well?

Mr. KISSINGER. If there is a concern that the authority had been abused, then I think the legislative branch will want to look into this charge of abuse.

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Senator MUSKIE. But we cannot know whether there is a basis for concern unless there is a regularized procedure for bringing these cases to our attention.

Mr. KISSINGER. At least in the areas with which I am concerned, I cannot foresee now circumstances in which this is a very likely even-tuality.

As I pointed out at the hearing on Friday, I can conceive of circum-stances—and I gave a very extreme one—where the President may have to decide to override legal restraints when the threat to the na-tional security is overwhelming. But that should be very rare, and it should be fully explicable to the Congress and to the public when it occurs.

How you establish this relationship, I have frankly not thought through. But my attitude would be governed by the general prin-ciples that I gave you.

Senator MUSKIE. In any case, would you agree that even in such cases there should be a requirement and established procedure for second-guessing purposes?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think in these cases the demonstration of necessity is a reasonable requirement.

## WITNESS' PARTICIPATION IN SALT II NEGOTIATIONS

Senator MUSKIE. I would like to ask two or three questions about arms control. I do not know how much more time I have or whether it is useful to open it up, but I assume that you will actively participate in the SALT II negotiations, Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes. The principal negotiations of course will take place in Geneva, but the major policy decisions, and, I daresay, some of the negotiations designed to break deadlocks, will have my heavy involvement.

## ACDA RECOGNITION, RESPONSIBILITY, AND AUTHORITY

Senator MUSKIE. I have just one more minute and will ask one more question in this field. I will wait another round to get into other ques-tions.

To what extent will ACDA be given recognition, responsibility, and authority in this field?

Many of us in the Congress are concerned that it has been emascu-lated and downgraded by the administration. We have been looking for months for some evidence that our fears and our suspicions are not well founded. I would like to give you this opportunity to at least express your initial opinion.

Mr. KISSINGER. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, is an extremely thoughtful scholar whom I have known for many years. In order for us to formulate reasonable positions, it is very important that those whose principal responsibility it is to think full time about the problem of arms con-trol have an opportunity to formulate their views and to present their views at the highest level. The participation of the officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is absolutely essential if we are going to have broad-based, informed policies; they will have my

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full support and they will be actively engaged in the formulation of
our position.

As to their personnel, I have not reviewed personally their top per-
sonnel except the Director. But if what you say is correct, they will
certainly have my support in attracting the best people that are
available.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern?

COVERT ACTIVITIES OF CIA AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Senator McGOVERN. Dr. Kissinger, earlier in your colloquy with Senator Symington when you were commenting on the responsibilities of the Committee of Forty, you referred to the covert activities of the CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Government. I presume that those covert activities would include such things as the overturning of at least one Latin American government some years ago, a feat that I understand the Director of the CIA later confirmed; the training of paramilitary forces in Laos, even possibly the assassination of political leaders abroad that we see as unfriendly in the Phoenix program.

Do you think that a society such as ours that is committed to self-determination and ordinary standards of decency should be involved in clandestine efforts of that kind? Would it not be better to take the CIA and other intelligence agencies out of these operations areas and confine them entirely to the gathering and assessment of intelligence?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator McGovern, it is extremely difficult to discuss that area of activity in an open session, and I think it should be done in a more restricted grouping.

In this administration, some of the activities which you mentioned, such as assassinations and overthrowing of governments, were not, in fact, carried out. I am not saying that assassinations were ever carried out by this committee or approved by this committee. But in order to answer you fully, I would have to explain what it is and what the operations are that tend to be conducted by this committee.

I would say that our genius does not reside in clandestine activities on a broad scale.

On the other hand, I would think that there are certain types of
these activities, difficult to describe here, that it would be dangerous
to abolish.

Senator McGOVERN. I would like to pursue that more at a later time,
but I do want, because of the constraints of time, to move on to two or
three other matters.

SEPARATION OF FOREIGN POLICY CLAIMS FROM DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS
QUESTIONED

You told the committee on Friday that, while you regretted the per-
secution of respected Soviet scientists and intellectuals and writers,
you thought American foreign policy should confine itself to influenc-

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ing the foreign policy of other countries and should not become in-
volved in their internal affairs.

I think you were saying in effect that the so-called détente between
ourselves and the Soviet Union should go forward without reference to
what they are doing to their own people.

I wonder if we can really separate the claims of foreign policy from
 domestic considerations.

For example, in the 1930's, when the Nazi Government was persecut-
ing and slaughtering the Jews in Germany, do you think American
foreign policy should have ignored that fact provided only that we
could have worked out some kind of a foreign policy deal with the
German Government?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, again, Senator, one has to ask oneself under
the contemporary circumstances whether a return to the cold war
would improve the situation of the people concerned. In the 1930's of
course, I was a part of that persecuted minority, so I am rather sensi-
tive to that situation.

I must say I could have understood it, and I could understand it
now as a historian, though the consequences would have been rather
painful, if other countries had concentrated primarily on preventing
military aggression by the Nazis and had attempted through a policy
of preventing that aggression to change the system over a period of
time. There is reason to believe that if deprived of foreign adventures,
the Nazi system might have changed over a period of time.

What one has to balance in the case of the Soviet system is not that
we can ever approve repression, or that we should not use our influ-
ence where we can to mitigate it. But we have to ask ourselves whether,
by reducing the danger of war and forcing the Soviet system into a
cooperative relationship with the rest of the world in the field of for-
eign policy, that will not over a period of time mitigate their system.

But it is a fine line which we have to walk here.

Senator McGOVERN. Dr. Kissinger, I am not suggesting that we stop
efforts to reach a more acceptable détente with the Soviet Union. I
am certainly not suggesting military intervention on our part, but it
does seem to me at a time when we are in effect dealing with their
internal problems through such things as the massive sale of our
wheat, one quarter of our crop a year ago, that that in itself brings us
into a relationship with the internal affairs of that society, which
might also open the way for us to influence other things that we think
are important, including human freedom.

DÉTENTE AND HUMAN LIBERTY IN SOVIET UNION

I don't always agree with Senator Jackson, as you well know, but I
wonder if you saw the piece he wrote in yesterday's morning Times
entitled, "First Human Détente".

Mr. KISSINGER. I did not see the piece, but I am familiar with his
views.

Senator McGOVERN. I think it is a very thoughtful and provocative
piece. I will quote you one line from it: "A regime that denies the
rights of man can never be reconciled to membership in the community
of civilized nations."

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He goes on to quote the distinguished Soviet scientist, Sakharov, who says, "Détente has to take place with simultaneous liquidation of isolation. Détente without democratization would be very dangerous. That would be cultivation and encouragement of closed countries where everything that happens goes unseen by foreign eyes behind a mask that hides its real face," and he concludes on this line, "No one should dream of having such a neighbor and especially if his neighbor is armed to the teeth."

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, we don't disagree about the human problem, nor do we disagree as to the objective. The difficulty we face is, confronted with the capability on both sides of exterminating mankind, whether we should pursue measures to reduce the danger of war and begin a more civilized discourse with a system of government whose internal methods we cannot approve, or whether we should delay this until they commit themselves to a change in their own system—which they may consider so intolerable in the short term that they will not pursue the measures of détente that we are intending to carry forward.

It is very hard to determine this in the abstract. We cannot be indifferent to the denial of human liberty, but we cannot, at the same time, so insist on transformations in the domestic structure of the Soviet system that we give up the general evolution that we are hopefully starting.

## U.S. GOVERNMENT SIGNALS TO MOSCOW

Senator McGOVERN. Can I break in there, Dr. Kissinger, to ask a related question? Have you or other members of our Government signaled Moscow that, in effect, we are willing to overlook the persecution of their writers and thinkers and scientists in return for continued negotiations on arms and other diplomatic matters?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator McGovern, the opposite is true. The only reason why I do not go into greater detail about what we have discussed on a semiofficial basis is that that would then deprive it of its semiofficial character. But I can assure you that not only have we not signaled to them that we are prepared to overlook it, but we have signaled them exactly the opposite—but in a context in which we believe we have a better chance of bringing about the result.

Senator McGOVERN. Just one final brief question.

## REQUIRING COURT ORDER TO AUTHORIZE WIRETAP ON U.S. CITIZENS

Do you think it would be a prudent requirement that no wiretaps ever be authorized in this country on any U.S. citizen without a court order or a court warrant?

Mr. KISSINGER. That, as a general rule, I believe to be the position, and I would just like to leave a little scope for areas of absolutely overwhelming danger which I cannot now define. But I personally have no difficulty with such a rule.

Senator McGOVERN. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the time has arrived when perhaps we will have to recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

21-172—73—pt. 1—7

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FOREIGN CRITICISM OF U.S. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

May I ask you one question with regard to the last question of the
Senator from North Dakota? In your negotiations with so many dif-
ferent people, have any of the countries with whom you have discussed
these matters ever raised questions about the infallibility of our own
system or do they all agree that we are the only good people in the
world and never make any criticism of any of our domestic affairs or
conditions in this country?

Have you ever been confronted with any such criticism?

Mr. KISSINGER. I must say I have occasionally been subjected to
criticism of our domestic situation but I have refused to accept it from
a foreign government.

The CHAIRMAN. You have insisted we are the only perfect society?

Mr. KISSINGER. No; but I have insisted that foreign governments
have no standing in a negotiation to comment on our domestic situa-
tion.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think it would be acceptable to the Con-
gress if some of them insisted that we make reforms of various kinds,
in our electoral system or some of our social problems, do you?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think it would be rather difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be difficult, too.

Thank you very much.

We will meet at 9:30 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
9:30 a.m., Tuesday, September 11, 1973.]

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1973

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, Humphrey, Aiken, Case, Javits, Scott, Percy, and Griffin.

PAST BASIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONED

Dr. Kissinger, the other day I referred to a remark of yours. I hope if I misstate it you will correct me. But I took it to mean that you hoped that this committee might be capable of conceptualizing foreign policy. Your remark has continued to interest me. It seemed to be a kind of a challenge in a way. I recall your remark to me in 1969 that you did not expect to follow the foreign policy of the Johnson administration in Vietnam, which I took to be encouraging assurance.

It seems to me there are many bases on which to look at our foreign policy in any given area of the world: the particular policy in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. But for the moment, I wonder if in this year of cooperation, we could try to conceptualize our policy. It seems to me for many years since the Johnson regime, if not as long before as Truman, that our Government has in effect followed a policy based upon the assumption that military force and economic power together could construct what they were pleased to call a structure of peace. I remember Dean Rusk used to use this phrase, as I believe you have, and it seemed to be based primarily upon these elements: Foreign aid in very extensive ways, military and economic, and direct military force; primarily the use of our resources and manpower for military purposes.

As you know, we have bases all over the world, virtually. I think the majority leader stated the other day that we had nearly 2,000 large and small bases, over 300 of them considered major bases with over 500 people. We have some 625,000 men under arms outside of our borders, and we subsidize with arms and money more than 50 nations.

The President urged restraint, for example, just yesterday, on all of our expenditures except military. He is adamantly opposed to any reduction in our military expenditures. He also opposes reduction in

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our foreign aid, military or economic. The administration also sup-
ports the continuation of such cold war activities as Radio Free Europe.

Yesterday, Mr. Schlesinger asked for $150 million additional money
for ammunition alone to continue the slaughter in Cambodia.

In short, this concept of force to achieve our ends is a kind of a pax Americana based upon a military power with economic subsidies which we were able to furnish. This is quite similar, it seems to me, to the concepts, if you like, of the British Empire. They used both the combination of economic subsidies and military force for a long time, and it was successful for quite a while, but it seems the complete bankruptcy of our policy is the clear lesson of our disastrous war in Indochina. Rather than strengthening our country, we have, I believe, weakened it by that exercise and by the other exercises in the last 10 years. The war in Vietnam, it seems to me, has done more to undermine this national security, about which we speak all the time, than anything that the Russians could have done or have done or that the dissidents here at home have done or the students have done. Our economy is in a shambles and our people are divided and confused. One only needs to read the newspapers every day. There is great confusion in our economy, and people are very apprehensive about the future.

Some of our economists anticipate a recession. There is no dissent about the inflation. These are, I believe, the direct result of this over-extension and overreliance upon force.

NEW CONCEPT STARTED BY ABM TREATY

In the signing of the ABM Treaty, and I give you great credit for
that, although I am bound to say that members of this committee, par-
ticularly Senator Gore and others on his subcommittee, made a great
contribution in the background of your achievement in signing the
ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union. But it seems to me that that was
a kind of a watershed where the United States and the Russians agreed
that they have no credible defense against ICBM's. Together with the
existence of the enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, this suggests
to me a different concept, if I may use that word, the concept which
I believe will strengthen our society rather than weaken it. The essence
of this concept is to maintain a nuclear deterrent as provided by the
interim agreement which again you negotiated—and then I could not
understand why the administration backed off from it and accepted
the Jackson amendment. I was, as you know, completely in accord with
your interpretation of the interim agreement and the ABM agreement.
You recall that, and yet, there is an ambivalence in all this, and we
backed off.

ADMINISTRATION'S DEVOTION TO NEW CONCEPT QUESTIONED

In any case, I think that marked a new era and the beginning of a
new concept which I think is appropriate. But what bothers me very
much is whether or not this administration really is devoted to its own
concept. The ABM Treaty, I think should start a new concept and that
should entail the gradual reduction by about one-half, at least, of the
foreign military bases. I do not recommend they all be withdrawn
tomorrow, but this is another matter which this committee, especially

97

the majority leader and others have supported: That we gradually bring home these military forces from around the world, and that we emphasize at every opportunity the collective diplomatic efforts of adjusting whatever controversies arise.

I do not think we emphasize it. We certainly have neglected it in the United States. We have never brought it into play in anything important. We have not attempted to refrain from intervening in the internal political and social affairs of other countries, particularly by supporting political regimes subservient to us. In short, this structure of peace, if I may use that phrase, would be a collective structure based upon cooperation and diplomacy rather than upon competition for the position of military dominance in all areas of the world.

Of course, I anticipate that you may say, as is often said, that it is a very naive concept to expect anyone to cooperate in good faith on the international scene.

I can only respond that I do not think you know that. I do not think anybody knows it because it has never been tried in good faith.

This other policy has been tried by the British, by the Germans, and by others and especially by us in the last 20 years. It seems to me it has failed and it has resulted in a seriously weakened United States.

## CREATION OF EXEMPLARY U.S. SOCIETY SUGGESTED

I suggest that while retaining our deterrents, we withdraw our intervening forces and concentrate our efforts upon the creation here in America of a society of which we can be proud, a humane and just government that serves our people. We would exercise by the force of this example a far greater influence than we can possibly by the force of arms in which we have placed so much confidence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

I do not believe we can in the long run dominate the world by force; nor can we buy its compliance with economic aid. In fact, we do not have the resources in any case, even if that were a viable concept.

But I think that we can set an example, and I think we were an example up until about 30 or 40 years ago, of a society which most of the world did seek to emulate. Even Mr. Khrushchev in his very crude way announced a policy of emulation of the United States. He said he was going to outdo us. I think his phrase that he intended to bury us was misinterpreted. What he intended to say, as he explained when he came to this committee, was that he intended to outstrip us, to outdo us in the same way in which he thought we had succeeded so well, which was to give good life to the people of this country.

## CONTINUITY IN U.S. POLICY QUESTIONED

What worries me most of all is the seeming continuity in policy. We get started in this country in one direction and every regime always refers to its predecessors. President Johnson said he was only doing what his predecessors did. President Nixon has, I believe, on many occasions, said, "I am only doing what President Johnson, President Kennedy, President Eisenhower, President Truman did."

98

What I would suggest is we ought not to do what we all have been
doing in the past because I do not think the results are very happy.
Would you agree those are conceptualizations of policy and would
you care to comment on them?

## TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, NOMINEE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have made a rather ex-
tensive statement which has many aspects, and I will try to respond
as best I can.

### INTENT OF WITNESS' OBSERVATIONS

First, at the beginning you referred to two observations I made, one
in a press interview and one in a private conversation with you 4 years
ago. The one in the press interview was not a challenge to the com-
mittee to engage in conceptualization as if I were criticizing what had
been done before. It was rather a challenge to the executive branch to
make certain that the committee would have the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the design of foreign policy, rather than have to wait until
something had been accomplished and then ask for testimony. It was
not a recommendation to the committee; it was a statement of the in-
tention with which I would propose to conduct the Office of Secretary
of State, if I am confirmed by this committee and the Senate—a state-
ment of my intention to bring the committee into the early stages of
policy design, which I described in an excessively professorial term as
“conceptualization.”

The CHAIRMAN. I interpreted the other way. I thought it generally
was interpreted to mean that this committee was inceptable of con-
ceptualization.

Mr. KISSINGER. My intent was as I have described. I do not have the
exact quotation, but at any rate the intention was as I have described
it. It was not a challenge to the committee.

## PURSUIT OF DIFFERENT VIETNAM POLICY

The second point to which the chairman has referred, both in his
introductory statement on Friday and again today, was my comment
that we would pursue a policy different from that of our predecessors
with respect to Vietnam. Now, the historical record will have to stand
on that. We withdrew 550,000 troops from Vietnam, where our pred-
essors had put them into Vietnam. We committed ourselves to nego-
tiating a settlement, and we achieved that. I admit that the process
took longer than all of us had hoped, for many reasons. But the direc-
tion of our policy was the one that we indicated to you, Mr. Chairman.
The difference was the rate at which it was accomplished, and that
was slower than any of us had hoped.

Now, with respect to your general observations—

### INTENT TO DISENGAGE FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave that, what disturbed me yesterday
is that you have not yet made up your mind to disengage. I mean this
request for the $150 million just for ammunition for Cambodia. I

99

thought your answer to my very tentative request about your view of that was that it is a pursuance of the same kind of policy that Johnson had. It is true you have been forced to stop the bombing by legislation. But I am not at all reassured that you are going to disengage from Southeast Asia. By other means, by surrogates, by this enormous input of ammunition and arms, by economic aid, you still seem to wish to dominate that area. I wonder whether it is in our interest to do this, because we cannot afford this kind of policy.

Mr. KISSINGER. With respect to disengaging from Indochina, this administration negotiated an end to the military operations in Vietnam and Laos before there was any legislation, and we offered a precise method and deadline for ending the bombing of Cambodia, an offer that was under active consideration at the time that the Congress acted to cut it off by legislation decision.

So we do not disagree with the objective. This is now beyond demonstration, but our conviction was that our course would enable us to negotiate a cease-fire just as we had already negotiated a cease-fire in Vietnam and Laos.

With respect to the request for ammunition for Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk announced only a few weeks ago that the North Vietnamese, and I believe the Chinese, had resumed supplying ammunition to his forces, and it seems to us not inequitable to supply ammunition to indigenous forces that are trying to defend themselves, particularly as we have stated that we would not intervene militarily.

## BASIS FOR U.S. POLICY

Now if I might perhaps make a general observation on your philosophical remarks, Mr. Chairman:

As I understood your remarks, you were saying that American policy is based on power, either physical or economic, and that it should be animated instead by a spirit of cooperation, and that it should concentrate primarily on its domestic problems, and once again be an example to humanity as it was, say, prior to the end of World War II. I say that, judging from your timespan of 30 years.

There is no question that the United States should in its behavior seek to be an example to the rest of the world. I said in my opening statement that the foreign policy of the United States should epitomize the best in America, and it is also clear that a society that means nothing to itself can mean nothing to others.

So I am in agreement with you on the general proposition, Mr. Chairman.

However, the world has changed enormously. Prior to World War II we were secure behind two oceans. Other nations had to be threatened long before the American security could be affected. Therefore, we could afford to wait until dangers became unambiguous, until some overwhelming threat had developed, before we committed ourselves.

Now we are in a world in which the traditional safety margin we had has been considerably reduced. We live in a world in which, due to the power, range, and complexity of modern weapons, we are immediately affected by many developments, in many parts of the world. Therefore, for the first time in our history, we have had to address the problem of security in peacetime and in a systematic way.

100

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that we have not satisfactorily solved that problem. We have tended to oscillate back and forth between various conceptions of security.

Now, if we differ, Mr. Chairman, it is not over the positive part of your observations, which I share, but in my conviction that a nation cannot choose between security and cooperation but must do both, and that for the United States now that the question of our security and the security of those who count on us is a matter of very major concern.

Nevertheless, the elements of security are constantly changing, both in terms of weapons and in terms of the political environment in which security has to be maintained. What we have not fully solved in our country is to adapt our thinking to these changing conditions.

Now, you have referred to the fact that every administration has invoked its predecessors. To some extent this is true; to some extent there is a continuity in the foreign policy of the United States in the postwar period. Indeed, I have invoked it in my opening statement. But, at the same time, this administration has made some very major departures—in relations with China, in putting the central armaments of the major countries for the first time under international control, in attempting to create a global system of peace, one that is less geared to crises and more geared to cooperation.

So I would say, Mr. Chairman, that we will attempt to achieve the world which you described, a world in which the participants are animated by a spirit of cooperation, but we also feel that the question of security plays a role in this.

The CHAIRMAN. What is security? Of course it comes down to what is security. You did not mention the ABM. I may attribute more to it than I think I should.

It seems to me the existence of the weapons, with the acceptance of the view that we have no defense, that we are not capable of making a defense, is the significance of both sides saying there is no use proceeding with building ABM's, they are not an effective defense. In many ways this is a more stabilizing element than the oceans are now, certainly with the airplanes and rapid transit. This is a new element to which we have not adjusted.

I do not think with the existence of the present stockpile of nuclear weapons on both sides that there is any probability of either side attacking the other. There will be small quarrels of course in the local areas, but we should not become involved in all of those. This is the lesson of what you yourself have done, to which you do not seem to attribute the same significance I do, and that this committee did when it made such a strenuous effort to stop the ABM some time ago.

## SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY BY PRESENT POLICE

This morning or yesterday there is an article by Mr. Zorza about China, a very disturbing article. We have all given you and the administration credit for this move, but apparently because of the delay in any progress on our part in withdrawing our forces from Taiwan, the Chinese are becoming very impatient that we do not really intend to adhere to what they thought were our obligations in your first initial negotiations with them. In any case, the reporter is a very reputable observer and it is a very disturbing comment upon it, and the same way with the Russians.

101

I mean if our trade bill bogs down over the Jackson amendment, we will have a similar situation there. It seems to me it may be coming apart. I said this and others did in the debate last year when we made the interim agreement. To go back on it by qualifying it indicates a lack of cooperation with these countries. It is a very disturbing development in both cases.

The two major steps forward that we have all acclaimed do not seem to be progressing in the way they were intended.

This together with emphasis—and I again emphasize the word "emphasis"—that the President puts upon the military appropriations. He was so positive that he wants the Congress to cut everything except the military, and not only not cut it, but with the type of request of Mr. Schlesinger, increase it, which indicates an attitude that the only reliance we can have is more military force, more economic aid. This is the same policy which I think the lesson of Vietnam shows is not very productive. They are not really supporting our national security.

## NEW CONCEPT WARRANTED

I do not like that term because it has come to be a kind of a coverall for anything we wish to do. I am not sure at all what it means, but I do not think that our strength relative to the Russians and the Chinese or the world is anything like today what it was 20 years ago, and in reviewing the results of these policies, I must say it is not very encouraging. So I think some concept of a new approach is warranted, and something that we have never tried.

The only thing I can say in favor of this suggestion is it has not been disproved, whereas I think your continuing policy has been clearly disproved. It does not any longer have any validity, it strikes me.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, you are grouping together a number of disparate elements of different factors and programs; I could make a brief comment about each of them.

## SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF ABM TREATY

First, the ABM Treaty. You will remember that you and I had many discussions about this, and my recollection of these discussions is that we were in essential agreement about its significance.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, and it was the most encouraging thing I thought happened last year.

Mr. KISSINGER. So the question that is raised, therefore, is, what is the impact on the strategic equation over the long-term of the absence of ABM on both sides?

You are quite right, Mr. Chairman, that with the current levels of forces on each side, it makes a first-strike attack very unlikely because it should make it possible for the opponent always to retaliate in an unacceptable way.

Nevertheless, we have to note that the Soviet Union is working on four new missile systems right now. It is an interesting question why they think that should be necessary when neither side has this ABM. But assuming the present balance holds, and granting the strategic significance of what we had both agreed upon, the increasing difficulty of conceiving of a rational objective for general nuclear war makes it, therefore, less risky to engage in local adventures. And this is a prob-

102

lem—apart from Southeast Asia, which is a different issue—which we are facing, for example, in our relationships with NATO. NATO is an organization built for 20 years on the assumption of overwhelming massive retaliation, and that now has to be adapted to the precise conditions which you correctly described, in which a first strike by either side becomes extremely difficult to conceive.

## RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SOVIET UNION

Now, with respect to some of the other issues that you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman—relations with the People's Republic of China, for example, and relations with the Soviet Union. I would welcome after confirmation, if the Senate is so disposed, an executive session with this committee in which I could discuss in greater detail some of the aspects of our relationships with China.

I have the highest regard for Mr. Zorza, and very often his analysis has shown exceptional insight.

In this particular case, while I believe it is correct that there have been serious domestic debates in the People's Republic, I do not believe that the issue of Taiwan is the principal factor in this or has played a very large role. If anything was said with respect to Taiwan, I believe it is a symptom rather than a cause of whatever problems may exist.

Moreover, it is our impression that the domestic debates which were taking place in China at the end of July and through part of August have now been essentially terminated, and that the main lines of the policy that we have established are on course.

Mr. Zorza made much of the repeated delays of my visit, for example. One of the delays was caused by my nomination to this office, and is totally unrelated to Chinese developments. It simply seemed inappropriate to visit China before I had been confirmed, although a date had already been tentatively set. So I do not agree with his judgment.

With respect to the Soviet Union. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I share your views on the importance of granting most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, and I believe it would be a setback to the design of our foreign policy if the Congress did not grant that authority. However, it is to be expected in a very complex situation, with governments such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic that are enormously suspicious of each other, where every time we make an agreement with one it raises doubts in the mind of the other, and where there is what has been described as triangular diplomacy which is a very complex matter, that there will be some ups and downs, all the more so since the internal dynamics of their systems are substantially out of our control.

But I do not believe that the difficulties which may have existed with the People's Republic have very much to do with our policy, or anything to do with our policy, toward Taiwan.

## U.S. CONCEPTION OF SECURITY

I can agree with you that our conception of security has to be adjusted to changing conditions. I cannot agree with you that our policy has been as unsuccessful on a global scale as one might deduce from some of your remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, whether you agree or not—

103

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator PERCY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Are we operating under a 10-minute rule so members of the commit-
tee can plan their time? This is an extremely interesting dialog, but
I wonder how we should plan our time.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be through in just one moment. I want to
make one observation.

INTERACTION BETWEEN UNITED STATES/SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Regarding your reference to the Soviet's developing four new mis-
siles, some years ago, the Senate passed a resolution, I believe spon-
sored by Senator Brooke, asking that the administration freeze the
development of new missiles, particularly the MIRV's, at the time.
This was rejected.

I believe the record will show that new weapons and new initiatives
on significant and large new weapons have usually come on our part.
We have been more imaginative, I guess if you would like, more ex-
perimental and developed more new big weapons than they have.

We are now undertaking the Trident and other weapons of that
kind. This interaction between the two nations is an old ritual. Every
year at appropriation time we hear about these dramatic new develop-
ments, that the Russians are about to do something unprecedented. I
remember a short time ago someone developed a theory that the Rus-
sians were digging big holes—nobody knew what they were—
enormous holes for enormous new weapons. As soon as the appro-
priations were passed, the holes were forgotten and they decided they
didn't amount to anything. The CIA was brought into the discussion. I
don't remember whether you played a part in it or not.

This is an old ritual every year in order to keep up the support for
the appropriation process. And I think that is aside from the major
thrust of what I was seeking to elicit from you. If there was no pros-
pect of some initiative in the other field of diplomacy, the utilization
of such organizations as the United Nations and its subsidiary orga-
nizations or regional organizations, it about comes to just a difference
of emphasis between always relying on more money and economic
and military affairs rather than diplomacy. I have a feeling that this
continuity goes on and on because politically they have been success-
ful. I mean each predecessor has always been elected on this kind of a
policy. At some point, some change and adapting to the existence of
nuclear weapons and the ABM and all that, their significance, it seems
to me, would be in order, but I detect very little tendency or indica-
tion on the part of this administration to recognize that.

MR. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, whatever recommendations will be
made by the Department of State, if I am confirmed, will not be in-
fluenced by political considerations. They will reflect our best judg-
ment of what is in the national interest and in the interest of the peace
of the world.

With respect to stopping the interaction between Soviet and Ameri-
can weapons programs—an interaction which is a reality—we are
making a very serious effort in the SALT II negotiations to tackle
this problem.

Now, this, in effect, means we must obtain some restraint on qualita-
tive improvements and qualitative improvements, as you will recog-

104

nize, are much more difficult to bring under control than quantitative ones. They are more difficult to inspect, and it is more difficult to know what one's objectives should be. But we have been working extremely hard on this problem. We are engaged in many exchanges with the Soviet Union in an effort to go a considerable way towards the objective that you have described.

Second, we do believe that many problems in the world today are so global in nature that they require a larger role for the United Nations or for some of its subsidiary organizations, and our ultimate goal is to bring about a world at peace which is animated by a spirit of cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't question your goals. What I am questioning is the way to achieve them, as you know.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be very glad to yield to Senator Aiken. I was late coming in.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

## NUMBER AND WHEREABOUTS OF U.S. FORCES IN SPRING 1969

Senator AIKEN. I have two or three questions to supplement the opening statement of our chairman. Shall I go ahead with them? It will only take but a minute or two. First, can you tell us the total number of military personnel in the U.S. forces in the spring of 1969, approximately?

Mr. KISSINGER. It was approximately 3½ million, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. 3.5 million. How many of these were in Vietnam?

Mr. KISSINGER. About 545,000.

Senator AIKEN. How many in Korea?

Mr. KISSINGER. In Korea, about 60,000, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. How many in Thailand?

Mr. KISSINGER. In Thailand, I don't have the exact figure. It is about 45,000.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

## PRESENT MILITARY STRENGTH AND LOCATION

What is our total military strength now?

Mr. KISSINGER. It is about 2.2 million or 2.3 million, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. 2.3 million.

Mr. KISSINGER. I may be wrong by some hundred thousand.

Senator AIKEN. About one-third reduction in 4 years?

Senator AIKEN. Approximately one-third.

How many of our military personnel are now in Vietnam?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think we have 200 military personnel in Vietnam right now.

Mr. KISSINGER. In Korea, we have about 40,000.

Senator AIKEN. Now?

Mr. KISSINGER. And we have withdrawn about 20,000 from Korea. We have withdrawn 20,000 of our forces from Korea, a little more than 20,000.

105

## Senator AIKEN. And how many in Thailand?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, we withdrew some forces in 1969 and 1970 and then we put some forces back during the North Vietnamese attack in 1972. Now we have just recently withdrawn 3,500, and we expect to withdraw more.

## REDUCTION IN MILITARY POSTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator AIKEN. About 2 years ago, I believe the committee was advised that we contemplated giving up about 25 percent of our military posts in other countries of the world all combined—a lot of them in South America.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is substantially correct.

Senator AIKEN. Is that correct? Has that been done?

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't have the exact figures here, Senator, but I know there has been a substantial reduction. All together, I think we have brought back about 700,000 troops from abroad since this administration came into office.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

## COST OF MAINTAINING MILITARY FORCES

The question has been raised as to why the costs of maintaining our military forces do not go down. How does the cost of a volunteer army compare with the cost of draftees?

Mr. KISSINGER. One reason why our defense budget is staying at a high level is that 56 percent of our defense budget right now, Senator, goes for personnel, as compared to, I think, something like 45 percent 10 years ago. Senator Symington would have those figures more accurately than I do. At any rate, the percentage is much higher than it used to be.

Senator AIKEN. There has been a very substantial increase in the pay of members of our military personnel.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know how that increase compares with the increase in salaries for Members of Congress and employees of the executive branch? Is it comparable?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have the impression that military pay has risen faster than that of civilian Government employees.

Senator AIKEN. It has risen faster than Government employees?

Mr. KISSINGER. That is my impression.

Senator AIKEN. Than some Government employees—let's put it that way.

## FURTHER DEDUCTION IN MILITARY STRENGTH

The question has been raised as to what further reductions may be expected by 1976. Do you see any further significant reductions between now and that time in our military strength?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Aiken, on October 30, we are going to start the negotiations leading to the mutual reduction of forces in Europe. We are in the process now, within the executive branch, of reviewing our strategic posture and our national interests in many parts of the world in the light of new conditions, and our constant effort is going

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to be to adjust our military posture to the realities of the situation. So I would expect that some further reductions are possible, but I cannot now say just what form they will take.

### RISE IN COST OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Senator AIKEN. And the cost of equipment and supplies have risen accordingly.

Mr. KISSINGER. With respect to the expenditure on our forces, especially in Europe, we are engaged in negotiations with the Europeans to reduce and, in fact, to eliminate the balance-of-payments drain that is produced by these forces.

Senator AIKEN. What was the cost of maintaining the military strength of our country in the spring of 1969? Have you any idea? I realize that is not easy.

Mr. KISSINGER. If I remember correctly, it was around $78 billion. It was about the same as it is today.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, the cost of maintaining two-thirds of as many military personnel have been rather consistent with the increase in the cost of living?

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all. I did not want the impression to go out that we were maintaining the same personnel that we did 3 years ago or 4 years ago. I think that is all the questions I have now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

### NEWS ITEM REGARDING CHOU EN-LAI COMING TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be very brief.

Earlier, when the chairman was asking you questions, I believe there was some reference made to an article this morning regarding China and Russia. I have not read the article, but I believe I read a small news item in the paper yesterday to the effect that Chou En-lai was coming to the United States probably this year sometime, or next year, rather.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, there are always stories that Prime Minister Chou En-lai is coming to the United States. I do not believe that that is likely to happen, certainly not this year. There are no discussions going on at this moment leading to his visit to the United States. We would be delighted to receive him, but he has not engaged in any foreign travel recently, and there is the additional complication that he is reluctant to come to Washington while there is the Embassy of Nationalist China located here. But this has always been the case, and it is no reflection on the state of our relationship, which, I believe, is now moving toward the normalization that we have set as our objective, and which is essentially uninterrupted.

### CHOU EN-LAI'S COMMENTS AT JULY CONFERENCE

Senator SPARKMAN. As you may know, not too long ago, I believe in July, Senator Griffin, Senator McGee, and I were included in a group that went to China and spent a couple of weeks over there. We had a conference with Chou En-lai. It went along fine except one thing, and that was the—of course, the thing that tipped it off was the bomb-

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ing of Cambodia that was still going on. But then he came right out and said that he was not going to accept President Nixon's invitation to come to the United States so long as we maintained an embassy in this country of Taiwan. Then he went on regaling us somewhat about our relations with Russia and what a threat that was to his country. He referred to the million men who were stationed on their frontier, a million Russians. So I just wondered when I read that article if there had been any reversal of that.

By the way, I remember he did say this and I wonder what the real meaning was. He said they were not in any hurry about the Taiwan situation. He felt certain they could work that out in time. So I did not know just what he meant by it. I do not believe it calls for any comment, but if you have any comment I would be pleased to receive it.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I have been accused of perhaps excessive admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai, and it is true that I have very high regard for him. But with all respect for him, we will not gear our foreign policy to the prospect of his visiting the United States, and we will base it on more permanent factors than a visit.

Now, with respect to Taiwan, I think they know both what we can do and the limit of what is possible. While, of course, we expect them to maintain their position, and while they have to do this, I can only repeat what I said to the Chairman: I do not believe that this is a fundamental obstacle at this time to the normalization of our relationship.

The Chinese, as anyone who has visited the People's Republic knows, do have a great concern about what they like to call their "northern neighbor." We are staying out of this dispute, and we are developing our bilateral relations with both sides according to our conception of what is desirable and without reference to their own dispute, which we are in no position to influence on one side or the other. I think that the spirit that you perceived in this conversation, that they are patient and that they can wait on the issue of Taiwan, correctly reflects the status of our relationship.

STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION CONCERNING EXPORT CONTROLS

Senator SPARKMAN. One thing I mentioned to you yesterday, I believe, something about the State Department's role in trade, economic matters generally. When it comes to export controls, do you participate in that or is that wholly within the Commerce Department?

Mr. KISSINGER. No. When it comes to export controls, this is one of the areas in which the State Department must participate extremely actively. As I pointed out in a previous session, our whole foreign agricultural policy has been based on the assumption that we wanted a free market in agricultural products, and many other nations have geared their economies to the assumption of regular supplies from the United States. If suddenly we reverse this policy and put controls on what we had previously insisted should be sold to the maximum extent possible, it would, first of all produce enormous dislocations in the countries concerned, which would in itself be a political factor of the first magnitude. Second, it would affect those people's judgment of the consistency of America's policy generally if one of the cardinal aspects of our foreign agricultural policy can be changed so rapidly.

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Now, it sometimes happens, and I think it happened in the case of soybeans, that a decision is taken on economic grounds and it is taken so rapidly that the foreign policy agencies do not get either adequate warning or adequate opportunity to express themselves.

When that happens, it is a mistake, and I will do my best to prevent this as Secretary of State. I believe very firmly that the concerns of foreign policy must be brought to the attention of the President before he decides on it.

## EFFECT ON JAPAN OF U.S. CONTROLS ON SOYBEANS

Senator SPARKMAN. You mentioned the matter of soybeans and, of course, they are not in adequate supply yet at this time in this country. When we put in the controls not too long ago, did that not have quite an adverse effect on Japan?

Mr. KISSINGER. It had an adverse effect on Japan, and I must say candidly, Senator, that sometimes you have to do things even though you know they have an adverse effect. But in that case, I will have to admit that it happened and that the adverse effect was not fully taken into account.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

## INFORMATION TO WHICH COMMITTEE HAS BEEN DENIED ACCESS

Dr. Kissinger, further on the matter of information, there are a couple of items of information to which I would like to draw your attention which the committee has been denied access to in the past. I may not get your answer now on it, but I wish to ask urgently that you reconsider it. Once in 1971 the committee asked for the 5-year plan for military aid in connection with our consideration of the aid bill. That was denied. That has always seemed to me to be rather inconsistent. I would hope some way could be worked out in which this kind of document could be made available to help us in our planning cooperatively with the administration.

And then executive privilege was invoked by the administration against the committee's being allowed to see the USIA's country program memorandums. This again, I think, ought to be able to be worked out under proper conditions and with proper safeguards against damage from the use of it. I don't press you for comment beyond your acknowledgement that you will consider the matter and that is all that I ask at this time.

Mr. KISSINGER. I will do that, Senator.

## EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS

Senator CASE. Then I did want to call your attention to what I think is a rather interesting evidence of an attitude toward the Congress and the committee on the part of an administration in foreign policy matters. When Secretary Dulles was Secretary the record shows

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that he appeared five times before the committee between July 2 and July 27, 1954. I don't make a point of the number of times or suggest that there ought to be any contest between you and the late Secretary on the grounds of endurance or anything of that kind though you both are very durable people. I think this is one quality, among many others, that you have in common with Secretary Dulles. But he evidenced actual concern about making the committee feel that it was a part of what was going on, and I think it helped to create and maintain a very wholesome atmosphere of the sort that you have, I think, so rightly expressed you were going to work for.

On July 12, 1954, he went from the committee to the airport on a conference in Paris—this sounds like Dr. Kissinger almost—and on July 16 he was back before the committee saying:

"I didn't have time to explain the reasons why I took the trip so if I may I would go back and pick up the threads of affairs again."

On July 16 of that same year he met with the committee and read the important parts of the negotiating instructions to Under Secretary Bedell Smith in Geneva. For instance he said, "you will avoid this sort of thing, participations in negotiations in any way which would imply," and so forth, taking the committee rather closely into his confidence. I would be glad to have your comment in general terms on that.

MR. KISSINGER. Senator Case, as I pointed out at a previous session, within a few days of my confirmation and swearing in I will propose, if it is agreeable to them, to meet with the chairman and the ranking member and tell them what I see coming up in the conduct of international affairs, say, over the next 3 or 6 months. And I would propose then to work out with them a method by which the committee can be informed about what we are planning before these events happen and by which we could report to the committee after these conferences have taken place or the particular events have occurred.

I think we should do it on a systematic basis rather than on an ad hoc basis, so that the committee can know what is coming up and can plan its deliberations accordingly. I would be prepared, if it fits into the schedule of the chairman and of the committee, to make a tentative program, say, over a 3- to 6-month period, that would provide for consultation before and after the events that can then be foreseen.

This is without any prejudice to any particular concerns that the committee might have and on which the committee might wish to initiate the process of consultation.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

## NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE COMMENTING ON "COLD DAWN"

On the question of executive privilege in general my attention was called, a couple of days ago, to a piece that apparently appeared in The New Republic of June 30 commenting on a new book called "Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT" by John Newhouse. If time permits I would like to give you a chance now for the record to comment on this.

[The article follows:]

This is the only publicly available account of the two-and-a-half years of negotiations that led to the 1972 Moscow agreements. The United States and the U.S.S.R. had agreed that the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—would be conducted in secrecy, in order to encourage candor and flexibility. On the whole

21-172—73—pt. 1—8

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(tc)

the rule of privacy was carefully observed, except for occasional brief reports that appeared in the American press. (The Russians were irritated by these leaks, but seemed to understand such American eccentricities are to be expected.) What makes Cold Dawn important are the detailed revaluations of discussions that took place behind closed doors in Helsinki and Vienna, and the equally tough negotiations between the various satrapies of the American bureaucracy in Washington. (Will we ever learn of the parallel conflicts within the Kremlin?) Mr. Newhouse has been the chosen instrument for the publication of a vast array of official data still very closely held—indeed some of it is unknown even to members of the delegation staff. He names, summarizes and dates National Security Council studies and decisions. He has access to notes of private tete-a-tetes, telegrams and telephone conservations. For the next 50 years his book will be a primary source for historians.

It is difficult to criticize Newhouse's accuracy or judgment, since he is dealing with arcane material not available to other scholars. But the reader can get his bearings rather quickly; he is seeing the procession from the viewpoint of Henry Kissinger at the White House rather than that of Gerard Smith at the SALT delegation; he notes that the important talks are in the "black channel". The conference is less important. Coming at a time when all documents remain highly classified and the participants are under a pledge of silence, when the government has yet to issue basic descriptions of the negotiations, the agreements or their verification procedures, save for the few pages of turgid bureaucratese that appear in annual reports and collections of documents, the publication of Cold Dawn demonstrates that monopolistic control of history is a considerable executive privilege.

Senator CASE. I should be glad to have your comments at this time or you can develop any response you would like to make now later for the record.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator, I am glad you asked that question. I did not see the New Republic story, but I saw a newspaper article which made much the same point.

Senator CASE. I guess that is the one that Senator Symington perhaps mentioned yesterday as having been appearing in New England somewhere. It may not have been the same one.

Mr. KISSINGER. I do not recall Senator Symington's mentioning it. Senator SYMINGTON. I did not mention it.

Mr. KISSINGER. But, in any event, as a former Harvard professor I still get the Boston Globe, and while I am not free of vanity I could have done without that particular story.

I frankly believe that that story indicates some of the difficulties of public service at this time, when it seems almost imperative for every motive to be questioned.

BOOK ENTITLED "COLD DAWN" BY JOHN NEWHOUSE

Let me say what I know about this book "Cold Dawn." First of all, I think it is an outstanding book. Second, I have the highest regard for John Newhouse, who has written some outstanding treatises on NATO and other matters, and who is in any event familiar to this committee.

As long as I have been in office, I have never given classified documents or authorized them to be given, to any member of the press. I have been very accessible to the press in explaining the background of public positions and in explaining to them our thinking with respect to our positions. When John Newhouse started his book on SALT, he came to see me, and we spent about half an hour together. He explained his project to me, and I told him that when it had advanced to a certain point he could see members of my staff and check

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his judgments with them. I gave instructions to members of my staff which laid down very strict guidelines as to what they could and could not discuss with him. These guidelines prohibited them from discussing national security decision memoranda, any current negotiating position, and any internal memoranda that bore on the subject of SALT. I did authorize them to explain to him positions that were more or less publicly known, that had already been presented to the other side, and to explain our thinking with respect to positions that had already been given to the other side. They were emphatically not authorized—and I have a written record to prove this—to discuss any of my discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin. And I carried this to the point where, when Mr. Newhouse requested permission to see the records of the negotiations conducted by the Johnson administration in 1967 and 1968, which were completely dated and totally irrelevant to our discussion, I refused permission to let him see those documents, as I also refused to permit access to national security documents for any reason, and for any purpose.

I did authorize my staff, with respect to that last request, to discuss verbally with Mr. Newhouse the content of the proposals made by President Johnson to the Soviet Union which were already known to the Soviet Union, and which had been described in other ways.

When Mr. Newhouse's book was completed, he asked a former staff member of mine, Mr. Barry Carter, whether Mr. Carter would review his galleys for accuracy. Mr. Carter, although he was under no obligation to do this, but knowing my extreme sensitivity on the subject, checked with me as to whether I would object to his reviewing the galleys. I told him that I would far prefer it if he did not read the galleys, and if my office did not assume any responsibility for the final conclusions of Mr. Newhouse. And, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Carter never reviewed the galleys.

I, in turn, never saw Mr. Newhouse again after the original conversation we had had. He was not my "chosen instrument." I have enormous respect for him. I think it is a distinguished book. But if he was given any information by any member of my staff or any other individual in the administration about current negotiations, if he was given any documents, this was totally against the spirit of my policies, and against my specific written instructions which I would be glad to let you see on a private basis.

## WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. NEWHOUSE

Senator CASE. Thank you very much. My time is up. I would just make this one comment, I appreciate this. I think it is a very important contribution to the whole atmosphere in which we are trying to deal with each other. I would be happy to see this privately and I would be glad to ask the committee to permit the instructions, properly excised, to be included in the record.

Mr. KISSINGER. They are considered National Security Council documents. But I will be glad to show them to the chairman and to you, and perhaps if we can excise them we can include the relevant portions.

Senator CASE. I think it would be useful, if I may just say this: I think it would be a useful contribution to the general knowledge

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of procedures that ought to be followed in very important matters
of this kind for the sake of history, for the sake of academic work,
and for the sake of your operations.

Mr. KISSINGER. Why don't I show you these documents and then we
can jointly decide how to introduce them in the record. I also would
like to check with our counsel simply on the general principle whether
I can do this. But I am prepared to show you that memorandum.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

PROTECTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS FROM POSSIBLE
TAMPERING

Senator CHURCH. Dr. Kissinger, of all the horror stories connected
with the Watergate scandal, the one that concerned me the most was
a report that appeared in the newspapers, related in great detail, of
an agent of the White House, I think it was Howard Hunt, who se-
cured a large number of secret telegrams from the State Department,
reputedly for the purpose of doctoring these telegrams in a way that
was alleged to have had as its objective implicating President Ken-
ney with the assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam.

Now, if these reports—widely circulated in the press—are true, they
are the gravest of all of the sins that have been committed, because
such forgeries would constitute a deliberate attempt by an agent en-
gaged at the highest level of Government to rewrite history. The only
comparable cases I have ever read about have occurred in the Soviet
Union and other extreme totalitarian societies.

Now, as Secretary of State, what steps will you take to protect
the integrity of such information in the files of the State Depart-
ment, even as against requests that might come from the White House
itself?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, first, Senator Church, let me say that as a
historian, and without knowing anything about the particular allega-
tion that you have repeated here, I feel very strongly that it is a
very dangerous business for one administration to begin investigating
its predecessors. I think this makes it very difficult for a Govern-
ment to continue with the requisite confidence.

I did not in my present office ever participate in such an effort,
and I would not make available State Department documents for
such a purpose or for any other purpose that is not directly related
to the conduct of foreign policy of the United States.

Senator CHURCH. Do you believe procedures should be established
in the State Department to protect against any possible tampering
with documents so, if such an effort were ever made again it would
come to your attention and you could take the necessary corrective
action?

Mr. KISSINGER. It is inconceivable to me, Senator Church, if I am
confirmed as Secretary of State, that large numbers of State Depart-
ment documents will be made available to other agencies without
my knowing it.

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U.S. POSTWAR POLICY IN ASIA

Senator CHURCH. Yesterday, and possibly to some extent today, there has been some exchange between the committee and you on conceptions of foreign policy for the future, and I would like to know what your conception of American foreign policy in Asia may be in the postwar era, particularly as it relates to the continued maintenance of American military bases on the mainland. Is it your hope and purpose that we may find it possible to withdraw all of our remaining troops from the mainland of Asia or is it your conception that a residual force should be retained on the mainland?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator, the only country to which that applies, unless I am mistaken, is Thailand.

Senator CHURCH. Thailand and Korea.

Mr. KISSINGER. Thailand and Korea.

We would like to review the requirements for defense of both of these countries, with both of which we have treaty relationships, in the light of changing circumstances. It is our intention, if détente develops, and if peace returns to Southeast Asia, and if relations between North and South Korea progress as we hope, that substantial reductions of American forces may be possible.

Senator CHURCH. Well, apart from further reductions in forces, what I am trying to elicit from you is the long-term objective of American policy in Asia. It is contemplated that we should maintain some residual force on the mainland as the British or the Dutch or the French used to do in Asia, permanent bases of some kind, for the ostensible purpose of preserving stability?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Church, I think our position is different from that of the Dutch, French, and British, who were there to defend imperial possessions. Our purpose in those countries where we are is to shore up the capacity of indigenous countries to protect themselves against the danger of overwhelming attack. To the degree that the danger is reduced, either through foreign policy or through the growth of indigenous strength, the presence of American forces becomes unnecessary. We do not have forces there for any abstract purpose of constituting a bridge into Asia for the United States. Therefore, I would prefer to tie my answer to a study of the security situation, and to say that is my judgment that very substantial reductions over a 5- to 10-year period are probable.

Senator CHURCH. Can you foresee a time when it would be no longer necessary, for the reasons that you have indicated, that we should continue to maintain American forces on the mainland?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would say, first, that we have no abstract desire to maintain American forces on the mainland of Asia. I can foresee such a time if the conditions I have described can be met.

Senator CHURCH. During the period of the cold war in its most intense years, as you know, we distributed around the world vast quantities of arms and equipment to scores of foreign governments. But even in more recent years, as the intensity of the cold war has tended to dissipate—in a significant measure by virtue of your own efforts—this military assistance program continues in large part unabated. For

114

example, during the period from 1962 to 1972, the United States provided free of charge about $28 billion in military weapons to foreign governments. As you know, this has become a contentious issue between this committee and the administration, and even in the present budget something over $1,300 million is requested in grant aid for foreign governments.

I recognize that, with regard to Korea where the price for the withdrawal of our own forces seems to be the modernization of the South Korean Army, and in places like South Vietnam and Cambodia where it is thought that past policies have imposed a continuing obligation, that a case may be made for grant military aid. But is there any longer a need, in your judgment, for grant aid to countries scattered all over the world or for the maintenance of conspicuous American military advisory groups in the capitals of so many nations?

What is your general view, looking ahead, toward the question of military grant aid?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator, you have to remember that in my present position I have addressed primarily issues that require Presidential action, and, therefore, I have not looked at each military aid program in every country with equal care. Therefore, I find it difficult to give you a conclusive answer right now.

There are some countries that have come to my attention, such as, for example, Jordan, in which stability is importantly dependent on our being able to continue some military assistance programs. There I believe they are on the order of $40 million and therefore not very large, but nevertheless, the stability of the whole area is related to the stability of that government, which in turn requires a certain amount of military assistance. So what I would prefer to say is that there is no doctrinaire reason to give military assistance on a general basis. Each case should be justifiable on its own merits, in relation to the security situation of the area, the national interest of the United States, and also the general objective of reducing military commitments where it is consistent with our national security.

Senator CHURCH. My concern has not been against a discriminating program but one which, in my view, has tended to become bureaucratized and is perpetuated on its own momentum. I would hope that you would take a very discriminating look at it, particularly the grant aid program in the future.

Mr. KISSINGER. The danger, as you know, Senator Church, in all governments, and which I fear will affect me at some point, is that it is easier to continue things than to terminate them. But I agree with you that a discriminating look ought to be taken at these programs.

Senator CHURCH. I wonder, at times, if it is possible to terminate anything that is once started here.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. One final question:

## JURISDICTION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Do you regard the decision for either giving or not giving military weaponry, arms, and equipment to a foreign government, primarily to be a foreign policy decision or a decision to be made by the Defense Department?

115

Mr. KISSINGER. I think it is a decision in which foreign policy considerations ought to be controlling.

Senator CHURCH. And does it follow, then, that you would feel that military assistance ought to remain within the jurisdiction of this committee rather than to be turned over to the Armed Services Committee?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think the present procedures should be continued, but that need not exclude a role for the Armed Services Committees, which also, of course, have a legitimate interest.

Senator CHURCH. And would you favor the restoration of jurisdiction of this committee, now that the fighting is over, for the military assistance program in such countries as South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am frankly somewhat torn on that subject. I think ultimately, as peace is restored, these programs should become unified under the jurisdiction of the same committees.

## QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, I have requests, from several Senators for specific questions, which I would like to submit for the record. You can provide answers to them for the record at your convenience before the record is completed. The questions are from Senator Kennedy, Senator Abourezk, Senator Hughes, Senator Saxbe, and Senator Pearson. [See Appendix.]

Some of them are repetitious, but in any case they can be answered.

Mr. KISSINGER. We will submit answers for the record.

Senator AIKEN. May I add Senator Buckley?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, anyone who has one; Senator Buckley. [See Appendix.]

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, you have been asked about most of the countries in the world. I want to ask you about one other.

I have just returned from Africa and there is much talk there about what will be the U.S. policy toward Africa should you be made Secretary of State, especially as the impression there is that the United States has left it to Europe, particularly questions respecting the area south of the Sahara. Could you tell us anything, as you look forward, regarding the policy of the United States. What ought it to be toward those areas and is any change contemplated?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Javits, it is true that over recent years the United States has let Europe play the leading role in many of the African countries, partly because of their historical ties, partly because of our preoccupation with other areas of the world, and partly because of the judgment that in many of these countries the primary process going on was the formation of a national identity, a process in which we could not participate directly.

As our attention can shift from Southeast Asia, which consumed so much of our energies in the first term of President Nixon, and as we are beginning to help construct a more global international system, inevitably our concern with Africa south of the Sahara will increase.

It is difficult now to foretell what precise measures we can take. I am asking some of our Ambassadors to be brought back from the countries south of the Sahara in order to give me their judgment on what the

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best United States philosophy should be in that area. We have begun
studies in the National Security Council machinery on various parts
of Africa which happily have been coming to fruition at this point.
So I think one will see more energy devoted to these problems from
now on.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

As you approach the end of your hearings, and the time for action
by the Senate arrives, I would like to ask you two things which, to me,
represent wrap-up questions.

## CONCERN ABOUT AMBIVALENCE OF U.S. POLICY

First, there is great concern about the ambivalence of American
policy. On the one hand, the State Department is against the
Rhodesians being free of U.N. sanctions. Congress has taken a
different view so far.

On the other hand, you have testified to your fortitude in believing
that, notwithstanding what we consider to be gross violations of
human rights in the Soviet Union, we nonetheless have to do busi-
ness with the Soviet Union on economics—I am not talking about
arms matters but rather trade, et cetera.

Going back to other periods, there has been a deep feeling about
the way in which we have done business with the military dictator-
ships for bases in Spain, for maintaining our representation in Greece
and providing military assistance notwithstanding deep feeling about
the overthrow of democracy, the retaining, as it were, our fidelity to
the adherence of Portugal, notwithstanding Angola and Mozambique,
to the North Atlantic Alliance and, even in respect to an ambivalent
policy about apartheid in South Africa. On the one hand, not counte-
nancing the barring of blacks from your Embassies, something I had
a good deal to do with myself and, on the other hand, not being
willing to go all the way with sanctions against South Africa because
of Southwest Africa, et cetera.

## BASIC PRINCIPLE AND DIPLOMATIC NECESSITY OF U.S. POLICY

In this whole complex of seemingly conflicting approaches, can
you now synthesize, as you face this enormous responsibility, some
basic principle by which American policy ought to be guided in re-
spect of human rights versus, or parallel to, what is considered to be
diplomatic necessity and statecraft?

Mr. KISSINGER. This, Senator Javits, is a rather profound and very
difficult question, because it is very hard to draw a clear line.

The general principles, as I can improvise here, would be as
follows:

First, the United States stands always for human liberty, for in-
dividual rights, for freedom of movement, and for freedom of the
person. And wherever it is an appropriate international question, such
as in the Human Rights Commission or the European Security Con-
ference, as an agenda item, the United States will be on the side of
those principles.

On the other hand, the United States has to conduct foreign policy
with many nations around the world, the fewest of which have do-

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mestic structures exactly compatible with our own. When that question arises, we have to ask ourselves what the precise role of the United States should be.

If we take the position, for example, with respect to the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union is so profoundly offensive to us that we will do no business with it, and that we are willing to pay the price, if that should happen, of terminating or slowing down other negotiations, then we have to be prepared to pay the price of increased defense budgets and a policy of confrontation. This is what Secretary Dulles represented in the 1950's, incidentally, who advertised his policy as a means of transforming the internal structure of the Soviet bloc.

But getting away from the Soviet Union, we have to ask ourselves, first, what is our capability of changing the domestic structure of other countries; second, what price are we going to pay for it; and third, what is the consequence of getting ourselves so directly engaged, not only in terms of a possible increase in tension, but in the sort of obligations we might assume toward other countries if we succeed?

From this I draw the conclusion that in the Soviet case our first objective should be to reduce the danger of international war, but at the same time we have an obligation never to leave any doubt about where we stand with respect to the principle of human liberty. With respect to Senator McGovern's question of yesterday, we can never imply that we are acquiescing in the suppression of human liberty.

As these contacts increase, we have the possibility, with which you are familiar, of using our influence in a way that is not so public to bring about an improvement in the human conditions as well.

With respect to other countries, if their domestic policies are morally offensive to us, we should avoid gratuitous associations which cannot be seen as affecting international peace or serving some other overriding international interest; and we should confine our relationships with those countries to relationships that can prove to be in the overwhelming American national interest.

But I do believe that it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy, because we will then be stuck with protecting the consequences of what we have brought about.

So these would be the general principles I would propose to follow. The dividing line is very hard to draw. If a country does something that is so repugnant to human morality—if extermination camps are constructed—then this certainly will affect the degree of cooperation in which we can engage with such a country.

## STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY CONCERNING MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS

Senator JAVITS. There is only one point omitted from your answer and that is what will be the policy of the State Department respecting multilateral actions taken by nations in an area or in the world respecting sanctions against nations which offend human rights.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have indicated that we will support the repeal of the Byrd amendment, if this is what you are referring to.

Senator JAVITS. Right, that is a case in point.

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Mr. KISSINGER. And we would tend to follow the consensus of
humanity on those issues.

Senator JAVITS. On those matters.

THREE-PART U.S. POLICY

Is it fair then, if I may rephrase your answer, to say that our policy
will be in three parts. One, on the international level, we will loyally
cooperate and advocate enforcement of human rights.

Two, on the bilateral or national level we will follow a pragmatic
policy of degree. If it is not so offensive that we cannot live with it,
we will try to work out whatever we can in peace or trade with coun-
tries so we can get more rather than less influence.

And, third, we will avoid or refrain from dealing with countries
where what they do is so offensive that we just cannot take it and that
involves also generally speaking, our willingness to adhere to inter-
national sanctions when adopted to which we are a party.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is an excellent summary.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you.

WITNESS' CONTRIBUTION AS SECRETARY OF STATE

Now, the last question I have is this, Dr. Kissinger. We have a feeling
in our country, that if a fellow is going to get a top job he has got to
want it, and we politicians understand that very well. We kill our-
selves in the process. The first requirement is that you have got to
want it real bad. Now, I see a headline in front of me saying "Mail
Opposes Kissinger Nomination." Your nomination has flushed out a
lot of criticism, including not some very admirable criticism about
your religious faith, and ethnic origin, the fact that you are a natu-
ralized American, immigrant, and so forth. Do you believe, Dr. Kis-
singer, and, if so, why, it will be good for this country to have you
as Secretary of State?

[Laughter.]

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I have seen many newspaper reports refer-
ring to a fairly highly developed ego that I am supposed to possess,
and that is associated with Harvard professors. But as a historian I
have always believed that the exercise of power is very transitory,
and the important contribution that any of us in public life can make
is to leave something behind that would be valid and permanent and
that people can believe in.

I believe that I can make such a contribution. I would not have ac-
cepted the President's nomination, flattering as it was, unless I be-
lieved it. And I hope, with the cooperation of the legislative branch,
that we will all be able to say at the end of my term in office that some
even small step was taken in the direction of peace.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Doctor, no one has more respect for your abil-
ity than I. You know that. Perhaps I have known you longer
than anybody in this room, but I know also that you will agree this
is the time to ask the basic questions. After you disappear behind the

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fort of the bureaucracy, regardless of your good will you report to the
President and I know you understand the spirit in which these ques-
tions are being asked.

CAMBODIAN BOMBING, WIRETAPPING, AND INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

We discussed Cambodian bombing. I have reread the record and believe your assurances are satisfying about it will not happen in the future along those lines, regardless of whose fault it was in the past.

It is also my understanding that the wiretapping problem is being
worked out, the problems incident thereto. We have also discussed the
structure of the intelligence apparatus, in which, in effect, you keep
two jobs. In effect, also, you will be the most powerful person in the
intelligence field except, of course, the President. You have assured us
you are going to see that intelligence estimates, on which a majority of
the money in the budget is being spent, will be independent of the
Defense Department. I am correct in that; am I not?

MR. KISSINGER. Well, the Defense Department, Senator Symington, has an important role to play.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

Mr. KISSINGER. But the CIA will have the right to make an in-
dependent judgment that cannot be vetoed.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you clarified the question.

SALT TALKS AND U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS

Let me talk a bit with you this morning about the SALT talks.

When you finished those superb negotiations in Moscow on SALT I, you made a statement. When they asked you why you would allow the Soviets 1,618 ICBM launchers and us only 1,054, and allow them 950 submarine launchers and us only 710, you replied in an open press conference that we had our strategic bombers and our forward-based aircraft. I thought that just about summed it up and was completely for the deal. But others did not agree. They said, "No, sir, we will not take any position inferior in any way on any basis to the Soviet Union."

The administration agreed to change; so we demanded equality on ICBM's and equality on submarine launchers. The administration, instead of backing the position you took in Moscow, backed that new position.

Today we have thousands of planes in Europe. Now, the force of the
Hiroshima bomb was 14 kilotons. Today a fighter bomber out of Frank-
furt could drop on the capital of the Soviet Union and return hun-
dreds upon hundreds of kilotons, one plane; so it is impossible for me
to see how the Soviets will agree on any formula that does not recog-
nize these FBA's in SALT II. I said at the time you would never get
a deal on this basis. They know what we have. What we are asking for
now is not equality, which I felt you, Dr. Kissinger, gave us in Mos-
cow, on a fair basis for both sides, but superiority. You mentioned a
figure of 56 percent for personnel. Actually, Defense personnel cost
is closer to two-thirds, if you add it all in. Despite the fact a long war
is over, people are paying unprecedented high prices, inflation con-
tinues, but we are asking for many billions of dollars more for defense,
most of which is needed, some of which, in my opinion, is not needed.

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Now, the President, in effect, says, "If you add more to my budget, I will veto it. But don't you touch my military budget."

One can only wonder what is going on, because the final SALT agreement, not yours, the final agreement, would appear an invitation to accelerate the arms race at the expense of the many, billions upon billions more. Many of these programs are just the camel's nose under the tent. We have a little program, SAM-D, only a few tens of millions now, but if approved it will run into many billions before it is over. That system is primarily for the defense of Europe, but they do not participate, another subject. What I would ask you this morning, is based upon the modification of the final agreement made with Moscow. What chance do you think we have to achieve a really meaningful agreement? If we do not have much chance, does this not mean that, despite all our current economic problems, we are going to see a tremendous acceleration in the arms race?

EFFECT OF INTERIM AGREEMENT

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator, before I answer the question, could I make a comment on the first part of your statement?

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would.

Mr. KISSINGER. Where you said that in Moscow "granted them" 1,600 missiles to our 1,000, and 950 submarine missiles to our 710, this is how the critics of the agreement often phrase it. I know you are not a critic of that agreement. But it is really a misleading way of putting it, because we did not grant them anything that they did not already have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me say acceded to.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is right. We did not accede to anything that they did not have or have the capacity of acquiring. Nor did we stop anything that we were going to do. Therefore the idea that but for that argument that gap would not exist, is wrong. Indeed but for that agreement, the gap would be larger. The Soviet Union was producing eight submarines a year; this agreement limited them to 62. Maybe they would have stopped there anyway. But if they had built up to their capacity they could have had between 80 and 90 by the end of the period of the Interim Agreement.

This agreement froze their missiles. In fact, it reduces them from 1,600, because in order to get 950 submarine missiles they would have to give up about 200 land-based missiles.

They were the ones who had an active program of missile deployment, not we. So simply for the record—I know it is not your view, but simply for the record—it is important for the public to understand that the administration did not create this gap and that the agreement did not create this gap. The gap existed. We froze it, and at the time that we froze it we had no program for narrowing it.

Senator SYMINGTON. We know about the freezing.

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SALT II AND THE ARMS RACE

Mr. KISSINGER. You want to know about the future?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, because we are going broke.

Mr. KISSINGER. I agree with you, Senator, about the crucial importance of SALT II. As you know from our discussions, there is almost no subject to which I have given more time and, I hope, thought, than the problem of strategic arms limitation. And I agree with you that in the absence of a SALT II agreement, a permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, a spiraling of the arms race is inevitable. Because we will be driven to reply to the new Soviet developments in MIRV's with some modifications in our own strategic programs, and then the situation to which the chairman referred in his first question is going to arise, in which the interaction is going to be almost impossible to stop.

Now, the issues in the SALT II negotiations are complex and difficult.

First, about equivalence. It is not our position that we must be equal in every single category. If that were our position, it would be unattainable.

It is our current position that the total aggregates, including heavy bombers—in other words including the considerations that I raised in my press conference in Moscow—should be roughly equal. And there are many other factors to consider. For example, the Soviet missiles are much larger than ours and therefore they have more throw weight.

You raised two questions: First, the forward-based systems in Europe, and, second, the general prospects for SALT II. On the issue of the forward-based systems: Since they have been raised in the negotiations, I would prefer not to go into the details of our position. I would express as a personal view now, Senator, the fact that numbers of missiles are not the only decisive factor here. Total numbers of warheads are at least as important, and in calculating the final figures attention must be paid to the warheads that each side can accumulate. And it is in this context that the MIRV potential in the Soviet throw-weight advantage is significant.

How to design qualitative restraints is a very hard question. But I can assure you of this: We are giving maximum attention to this problem. We have a commitment from the Soviet Union to make a great effort; in fact we have a commitment to achieve an agreement during 1974. All our plans are made on that assumption. That agreement, as the President said in his press conference last week, should include restraints on MIRV's and other qualitative restraints, and should take account on both sides of the reality that if we don't stop the arms race now, we are going to get into a whole new realm of technology in which it will be very difficult to put the genie back into the bottle.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate your answer.

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STATE DEPARTMENT BROCHURE CONCERNING UNITED STATES AND SOVIET
WARHEADS

A little over a year ago, the State Department, which you will now direct, slipped up from the standpoint of some people in Government, because while the usual fright-and-scare program was being developed as the military budget came up, State put out a pamphlet which said the Soviets had 2,500 warheads, and by 1977 would have 4,000.

At that time we had 6,000 warheads, by 1977 would have 10,000. Would you be good enough to analyze that brochure as it was put out by State, and give the committee the benefit of your opinion as to its accuracy or where the ratio has changed, if it has changed?

Mr. KISSINGER. During the 1970's the United States should remain ahead in the number of warheads. According to our estimates, the new missiles that the Soviet Union is now testing, and the multiple warheads that they are now testing, should not be ready for production for another 2 to 3 years, and then would not be fully deployed until the end of the 1970's.

If the arms race is not checked, however, then the greater throw weight of the Soviet missiles can be translated either into more warheads or into warheads of larger yield. Then by the end of the 1970's, and in the 1980's, the Soviet Union could wind up with both more warheads and more destructive warheads than we will possess.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. What worries me are changes that may be justified against the presentation of that chart. I checked it at that time and found it accurate.

The total amount of TNT that we dropped, Germany, Japan, and everywhere else, in World War II, was just over 2 million tons. Now we have three nuclear stockpiles, one in foreign countries, one with the fleet, and the one we have back here. These stockpiles, ready to drop tomorrow, run into billions upon billions of tons of the equivalent of TNT. And we are running into thousands and thousands of economic problems.

So, it is very easy to sort of keep this thing going. If you would take that particular presentation by the State Department and let us know, based on your vast experience in this field, how it has changed in the last year.

Mr. KISSINGER. I frankly am not familiar with that presentation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will be sure you get it.

Mr. KISSINGER. But I will be sure to get it.

[News release from Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Aug. 1, 1972]

PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Since World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union combined have produced nearly $20 trillion in gross national product—approximately $15 trillion in the United States and more than $4 trillion in the Soviet Union. Of this amount, more than $2 trillion has been spent on defense (approximately $1.3 trillion by the United States, and an estimated $1 trillion by the Soviet Union).

If the two societies continue to grow as projected to the end of the century, and if both continue to spend the same proportion of GNP on defense, the two countries together, by the year 2,000 A.D., could spend another $5 trillion or more to maintain national security.

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In both countries there are other pressing needs for capital, and both countries have long recognized a mutual advantage in first stabilizing the level of spending and ultimately moving to the stage where both countries can safely scale it down.

When President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the SALT agreements in Moscow, May 26, 1972, the first stage was completed. Agreement was reached to limit ABMs to very low levels, including a commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense or the base for such a defense. Both sides thus forego a defense against retaliation, and, in effect, have agreed to maintain mutual deterrence.

Agreement was also reached to stabilize the level of strategic offensive missiles for five years, giving both sides an opportunity to proceed to the second stage of negotiations in which further limitations and controls will be pursued.

The freeze on strategic offensive missiles leaves the Soviet Union with more missile launchers and the United States with more warheads and bombers. (See Missile Balance Sheet below.) A great many factors were balanced off on both sides, but the most important consideration—probably the factor that made the Interim Agreement feasible—is the recognition (given concrete form in the ABM Treaty) that with any conceivable or current or future deployment of nuclear weapons, neither side can expect to attack the other without receiving a retaliatory strike that would destroy the attacker as a modern nation-state. Out of this fact grows the assurance of national security for both sides. This, in turn, now makes it possible to negotiate additional mutual limitations—hopefully including reductions of forces on both sides.

However, if the United States were to make unilaterally a substantial reduction in strategic strength, the other side might lose incentive to continue at the bargaining table. Similarly, if either side were somehow able to make a substantial jump in its strategic forces, we can only anticipate that the other side would undertake to redress the balance.

President Nixon said in his Foreign Policy Report of February 1971 that any Soviet attempt to obtain a large advantage "would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless." The President added that "both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance."

The Interim Agreement limits for up to five years the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) for the Soviet Union and the United States. Some might argue that the Soviet Union gained an advantage because it is permitted larger total numbers of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and modern ballistic missile submarines.

However, it is also argued that the United States gained an advantage because no current U.S. offensive arms program is limited whereas limitations are placed the three most active Soviet programs. Furthermore, although the Soviet Union will have more missile launchers, the United States has a considerable lead in numbers of warheads and intercontinental bombers, and in qualitative factors—including weapon dependability and general weapons sophistication—which are not limited by the agreements.

The central fact is that both sides find advantages in the limitations. We have reached levels where neither side can start a nuclear war without triggering its own destruction. There are simply too many launchers, too many warheads that would survive a surprise attack.

More importantly, both sides can benefit enormously from additional strategic arms limitations. An important process has, however, been started. Both the United States and the USSR are investing in this process, and we expect will want to preserve the investment and build upon it. It is not a question of "winning" or "losing". Both sides—and the world—gain from what has been achieved without compromising the basic security interests of any nation.

## ECONOMICS

The long-range effect of the arms race on the economics of the United States and the Soviet Union is difficult to gauge precisely, but it is obviously enormous. The United States is currently spending about eight percent of GNP on defense—approximately $80 billion in FY 1972. The Soviet Union is spending in the range of 11–14 percent of GNP—some $45–60 billion in 1972, depending on the method of evaluating the cost. As noted above, if both countries were to continue to spend at these levels of GNP to the end of the century, the aggregate defense costs for the United States and the Soviet Union combined might total more than $5 trillion.

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Both countries find defense spending a substantial burden on the economy, but the effect probably is more serious in the Soviet Union, because the high level of defense spending is believed to reduce substantially the available growth capital badly needed for expansion of the Soviet economy.

Efforts to compare the Soviet defense burden with that of the United States are difficult because neither the costs nor the distribution of GNP in the two countries are comparable. What is clear is that given the economic resources of the Soviet Union and its relatively lower level of economic development, the arms race places a comparatively greater burden upon the Soviet economy than on the U.S. economy. Therefore, in economic terms the Soviet Union has even greater reason than the United States to develop meaningful weapons controls through negotiation.

The SALT agreements are an important step toward achievement of the kinds of controls that over time can substantially reduce expenditures on both sides, although the goal has not been reached in the initial stage. The agreements signed in Moscow do, however, provide the foundation for negotiations which will, hopefully, lead to important cuts in the level of defense spending on both sides.

Both the United States and the USSR could well continue to spend at approximately current levels while negotiating additional limitations, with the funds devoted chiefly to qualitative improvements. One of our goals will be to avoid this.

MISSILE BALANCE SHEET

ICBM launchers.—Current strength: U.S. 1,054; USSR 1,618. The United States has no new ICBM construction program underway; the Soviet Union has been building new ICBMs. Without the agreement, if recent construction rates were continued for five years, the United States would still have 1,054 ICBMs and the Soviet Union, which has been building at a rate of up to 250 a year, could have more than 2,800 land-based ICBMs. Under SALT both sides are frozen at current levels.

SLBM launchers.—The United States currently has 656 Polaris and Poseidon missile launchers; the Soviet Union has approximately 650-700 SLBMs. The United States has no missile submarines under construction; the Soviet Union has an on-going program of some eight new submarines a year. Without SALT, in five years the United States missile-launching submarines would not have increased, while the Soviet total could have risen to 80 or 90. With SALT, the United States has the right to increase to up to 44 submarines.

The Soviet union may add modern ballistic missile submarines up to the number of 62 operational, but only provided that they retire 209 older land-based missiles and 30 older SLBM launchers. This would leave the USSR with no more than 950 modern SLBM launchers.

Total ICBMs and SLBMs consistent with the terms of the agreement: United States, 1,710; USSR, 2,419. Warheads: The difference in numbers of missiles is offset by the kinds of warheads they can carry. Currently, with the new MIRV warheads, the U.S. strategic missiles and heavy bombers carry 5,900 nuclear warheads; the Soviet missiles and heavy bombers carry an estimated 2,200 warheads. The Interim Agreement sets no limit on the number of warheads for either side, and both of these figures could rise substantially in five years. The implications of the warhead figures are enormous. They mean that currently, in the event of a surprise nuclear attack, if half of the U.S. strategic capability was wiped out, the United States could still strike more than 2,500 separate targets in the Soviet Union. This reinforces the recognition on both sides that there can be no winner in a nuclear war. The U.S. expects to continue to hold a substantial warhead lead during the Interim Agreement, sufficient to more than compensate for the numerical edge the Soviet Union has in missile launchers. The number of U.S. independently targetable warheads is planned nearly to double in the next five years, and will remain far ahead of the Soviet total.

Megatonnage: The agreement does not limit megatonnage as such. Both sides are free to make warheads as large or as small as they wish. On the average, Soviet Missile warheads are larger than U.S. warheads. It should be noted, however, that the radius of damage does not increase proportionately to the increase in yield. If the explosive power is doubled, the radius of damage increases by approximately one-third. Moreover, accuracy is more important than yield.

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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The first major theme is that the arms competition places significant burdens on the economies of both the U.S. and USSR, that the initial SALT agreements reduced that burden to some extent, and that we should hope and expect further SALT Agreements to do even more in this regard.

I concur in this thesis with one qualification: as onerous as the burden of national defense may be, it is the one burden that we cannot unilaterally drop and expect to survive as a nation.

With this said, however, there is a responsibility, if we wish to build a peaceful world, to ease the burden of defense through international negotiation and agreement. SALT has been quite successful in this respect. The United States is no longer building a nation wide ABM system nor undertaking the new programs that would have been necessary if Soviet missile deployments continued completely unchecked. The ABM Treaty alone contributed more than a half a billion dollar savings in this year's budget and though it is hard to be precise, the savings from having the Treaty in force and from keeping ABMs low could well run into billions over the next decade.

I also believe that our future arms control efforts should produce further savings. As a result of the SALT principles agreed last June between the President and Secretary Brezhnev, both countries will be seeking to limit the qualitative aspects of strategic arms programs and to control the process of modernization and replacement. Success in this area should provide further economic savings since qualitative improvement, modernization and replacement are the major categories of strategic expenditure.

Although agreeing with these broad economic themes in the State Department paper, I would take issue with any effort to draw the conclusion that the SALT Agreements enable us to reduce our efforts in areas not covered by these initial accords. The reasons our efforts must continue are related to the strategic consequences of the SALT Agreements.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

As important as the economic consequences of SALT may be, the major objective of these negotiations is to strengthen peace by enhancing strategic stability. If either side is perceived to have gained a substantial aggregate advantage then deterrence is no longer stable and the political consequences would be dangerous. The State Department paper explains that the Interim Agreement on offensive arms balances the advantages of one side against those of the other. The result is an agreement that is equitable for the five years of its term but not symmetrical. The Soviet advantages in the number of strategic missile launchers and their 4 to 1 lead in throw-weight are balanced against U.S. advantages in MIRV, heavy bombers and the quality of our systems. That was the case least year when the State document was published; that is the case today, and as the State paper indicates, we expect to retain an edge in these areas until 1977 when the Interim Agreement expires.

It is important to recognize, however, that the Interim Agreement does not solve the problems of strategic stability for all time. Key aspects of the strategic arms competition are not limited. This includes qualitative improvements such as MIRV, modernization and replacement. In time, the Soviet Union, through such actions, can exploit its numerical and throw weight advantages to achieve an advantage in areas where we now have the edge.

This is one reason we were prepared only to enter into the Agreement for a specified period. Moreover, it is the reason that the Agreement calls for more complete limitations to be negotiated in SALT II.

A principal concern is that imminent developments if unchecked, will raise the spectre of a credible Soviet Union first-strike capability against our Minuteman ICBMs. We must recognize that the Soviet Union is pressing forward with four new missile systems and we must be prepared to deal with the consequences, even as we urgently seek to avoid these developments in SALT.

Minuteman ICBM vulnerability which could occur, due to Soviet ICBM and MIRV programs, is not likely until the late 70s and early 80s. The result, however, would be that our deterrent would rely more heavily on our bomber and submarine missile force. Yet bomber and submarine missile forces are potentially vulnerable to Soviet developments in Air Defense and ASW, on which the Soviets could then concentrate. Therefore, the possibility of Minuteman's vulnerability makes it all the more important that our bombers and SLBMs can deal with potential threats to their effectiveness.

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(c)

## CONCLUSIONS

I concur in the basic conclusion of the Department of State paper that the SALT Agreements protect and enhance our security. But that paper was not intended as a careful analysis of the requirements for our national security beyond the period of the Interim Agreement. More important, it did not address the problem of what strategic programs are required during a transitional period when we are seeking to replace competition in strategic forces with cooperation to curb them, but have not yet fully done so. This is the key question we faced in the Defense Budget, and we believe the programs we have proposed provide a responsible answer which deserves the support of the Congress.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

## WITNESS' OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT RECORD

Senator SCOTT. Dr. Kissinger, the witnesses who will follow you represent diverse points of view. The witnesses I know on that list are responsible people. I do not know them all. It may be, however, that some of those witnesses will make statements which warrant a reply. I would judge from the organizations indicated that some come from the far right spectrum of ideological points of view and some come from the far left spectrum. Undoubtedly some of those witnesses will hold their views very strenuously. I don't believe we will have any hate witnesses. If we have hate mail, I assure you I will be able to take care of that. I have been an expert in expressing my opinion against hateful thoughts for some years.

However, I hope that should any statements be made which are in themselves factually inaccurate that you will be good enough to supply us with a reaction for the purpose of keeping the record balanced. Would you be willing to do that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would certainly be willing to do this. I don't think I will reply on opinions that may be expressed.

Senator SCOTT. I want you to confine it to alleged facts which in your opinion are not accurate statements.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would appreciate it if you would give me the opportunity to correct the record and I will do that.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Doctor.

## NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN SOCIETY

I have heard in some of our discussions of your nomination a thought advanced which I would like to explore. That is, while the interests of national security conflict with an open society that national security should give way to the need for a completely open society.

I do not agree with that concept because I do not feel that there exists an inevitable conflict. I believe that an open society can only be maintained by a true respect for genuine national security as distinct from the unjustified attempt to include within national security definitions of matters which ought not, of course, to be included. I would like your reaction as to how you reconcile the need for national security with the desirability of an open society.

Remember this interdependency and what is your philosophy about it?

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MR. KISSINGER. My philosophy, Senator Scott, is that in the over-
whelming majority of cases, as you pointed out, there should be no-
conflict between the requirement of national security and the require-
ments of human liberty, because the two really depend on each other.
Without security for this country, there can be no freedom for its
citizens.

There may, however, be borderline cases, and in those situations I
believe the Executive has a responsibility to be sure that when it in-
vokes the requirement of national security it can make a demonstra-
tion to reasonable and fair-minded people of why its action was re-
quired in the overwhelming national interest, and why certain es-
tablished procedures might have had to be disregarded under the
pressure of necessity.

But that would have to be decided from case to case. If it is a border-
line case, human liberty should weigh very heavily, maybe a little more
heavily. But there are situations in which national security considera-
tions will have to predominate, and in that case the executive branch
owes it to the public and to the legislative branch to be able to make a
convincing demonstration that the necessity in fact existed.

Senator Scott. I thank you, Doctor, very much.

TERMINATION OF U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

This final question may well have been asked, but are you prepared
to state in your opinion that our military involvement, that is in the
use of any kind of combat force whatever, in Southeast Asia is finally
terminated?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would state that it is terminated so far as executive
action is concerned. If an overriding necessity should occur that in the
judgment of the President would require military action, the President
would return to the Congress for authority to undertake such action.

Senator Scott. I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

CONTRIBUTION TO LAST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

I think, as a matter of procedure in this period of time when there
are other people coming up for confirmation and the question is often
raised as to the relationship between a contribution and the appoint-
ment, this committee should ask all of its witnesses up for confirma-
tion what amount of money they contributed in the last presidential
campaign. So I would like to ask you that question, Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. I made no financial contribution to the last campaign.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. KISSINGER. Or any other campaign.

[Laughter.]

Senator Scott. Or to mine.

REGULATION CONCERNING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator PELL. In connection with the tentative rules that this com-
mittee is considering adopting, one of them is that recommendation to
the Senate for confirmation will be withheld from any individual who

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has contributed more than, say, $10,000 to a political party. What would be your reaction to that regulation or that rule?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think, Senator Pell, this would be a mistake. I believe that each nominee should be judged on his merit even if he made a contribution to a political campaign. But I recognize the principle that merely to have contributed to a political campaign should not be the grounds for appointment.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

## LOW U.S. PROFILE IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD

Yesterday we were talking about this question of human rights, and the American emphasis or lack of emphasis on it, as we move along with détente. Then neither you nor I could remember the name of the man who was the United States representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission which showed, I think, the denigration with which we have regarded this kind of push that we should make.

I discovered his name. It is Mr. Phillip C. Hoffman, but it is neither in Who's Who nor in the State Department Biographical Register, which shows a rather low profile in this field of human rights.

Mr. KISSINGER. I took your point on this, Senator Pell, and I think it is a very good point.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

## CALIBER OF U.S. DELEGATES TO U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Along that same line comes the question of the appointment of our delegates to the United Nations. I have the list here in front of me, showing the very high caliber of those who were appointed to the first, second, and third General Assemblies and then a gradual deterioration in fame.

I know when I served there I liked my colleagues very much, but they did not have national or State or even citywide reputations. I would ask the chairman's permission to put in the record at this point a list of the delegates for the last 27 General Assemblies, showing the steady deterioration in their caliber and related materials.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES AND ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES TO THE REGULAR SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

First Part of the First Session; London, January 10-February 14, 1946.

Representatives:

James F. Byrnes.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S. Representative.

Tom Connally.

Arthur H. Vandenberg.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Alternate representatives:

Sol Bloom.

Charles A. Eaton.

Frank Walker.

John G. Townsend, Jr.

John Foster Dulles.

Second Part of the First Session; New York, October 23-December 16, 1946.

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Representatives:

Warren R. Austin, Rep. Designate at seat of U.N. & Chairman.

Tom Connally.

Arthur H. Vandenberg.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Sol Bloom.

Alternate representatives:

Charles A. Eaton.

Helen Gahagan Douglas.

John Foster Dulles.

Adlai E. Stevenson.

Second Regular Session; New York, September 16-November 29, 1947.

Representatives:

George C. Marshall, Chairman of Delegation.

Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative & Vice Chairman.

Herschel V. Johnson.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

John Foster Dulles.

Alternate representatives:

Charles Fahy.

John H. Hilldring.

Willard L. Thorp.

Francis B. Sayre.

Adlai E. Stevenson.

Third Regular Session (First Part); Paris, September 21-December 12, 1948.

Representatives:

George C. Marshall, Senior Representative.

Warren R. Austin, Alternate Senior Representative.

John Foster Dulles, Acting Senior Representative.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Philip C. Jessup.

Benjamin V. Cohen.¹

Alternate representatives:

Ray Atherton.

Willard L. Thorp.

Ernest A. Gross.

Francis B. Sayre.

Dean Rusk.²

Third Regular Session (Second Part); New York, April 5-May 18, 1949.

Representatives:

Warren R. Austin, Senior Representative.

John Foster Dulles.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Philip C. Jessup.

Benjamin V. Cohen.

Alternate representatives:

Ray Atherton.

Willard L. Thorp.

Dean Rusk.

Francis B. Sayre.

Erwin D. Canham.

Fourth Regular Session; New York, September 20-December 10, 1949.

¹ Mr. Cohen was originally appointed Alternate Representative. He was appointed Representative on Nov. 19, 1948, when Mr. Dulles was appointed Acting Senior Representative upon Senator Austin's departure.

² Mr. Rusk was appointed Alternate Representative on Nov. 19, 1948, when Mr. Cohen became Representative.

132

Representatives:

Dean G. Acheson.
Warren R. Austin, U.S. Rep. to the U.N. & Security Council.
Philip C. Jessup.
Mrs. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt.
John Sherman Cooper.

Alternate representatives:

Benjamin V. Cohen.
Charles Fahy.
Wilson M. Compton.
John D. Hickerson.
Mrs. Ruth Bryan Rohde.

Fifth Regular Session; Lake Success, September 19-November 5, 1950.

Representatives:

Dean Acheson.
Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative.
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
John J. Sparkman.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
John Foster Dulles (served as Representative in the absence of the Secretary of State).

Alternate representatives:

Benjamin V. Cohen.
John S. Cooper.
Ernest A. Gross.
Mrs. Edith S. Simpson.
John C. Ross.

Sixth Regular Session; Paris, November 6, 1951-February 5, 1952.

Representatives:

Dean Acheson.
Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative.
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Michael J. Mansfield.
John M. Vorys.
Philip C. Jessup (serves as Representative in the absence of the Secretary of State).

Alternate representatives:

John Sherman Cooper.
Ernest A. Gross.
Benjamin V. Cohen.
Anna Lord Strauss.
Channing H. Tobias

Seventh Regular Session; New York, October 14-December 21, 1952.

Representatives:

Dean Acheson.
Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative.
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Theodore Francis Green.
Alexander Wiley.
Ernest A. Gross.

Alternative representatives:

Philip C. Jessup.
Benjamin V. Cohen.
Charles H. Sprague.
Edith Sampson.
Isador Lubin.

Eighth Regulation Session; New York, September 15-December 9, 1953.

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Representatives:

John Foster Dulles.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
James F. Ryrnés.
Frances P. Bolton.
James P. Richards.

Alternate representatives:

Archibald Carey, Jr.
James D. Zellerbach.
Henry Food, II.
Charles W. Mayo.
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Ninth Regular Session; New York, September 21-December 17, 1954.

Representatives:

John Foster Dulles.³
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Rep. to UN and Security Council.
H. Alexander Smith.
James W. Fulbright.
C. D. Jackson.
Charles H. Mahoney.

Alternate representatives:

James J. Wadsworth.
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.
A. M. Ade Johnson.
James P. Nash.
Roger W. Straus.

Tenth General Assembly; New York, September 20-December 20, 1955.

Representatives:

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,⁴ Perm. Rep. to the UN:
Brooks Hays.
Chester E. Merrow.
John O. Pastore.
Colgate Whitehead Darden, Jr.

Alternate representatives:

Robert Lee Brokenburr.
Laird Bell.
Jacob Blaustein.
James J. Wadsworth.
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Eleventh Regular Session; New York, November 12, 1956-March 8, 1957.

Representatives:

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Perm. Rep. to the UN.
William F. Knowland.
Hubert H. Humphrey.
Paul G. Hoffman.
Ellsworth Bunker.

Alternate representatives:

James J. Wadsworth.
Richard Lee Jones.
Frank C. Nash.
Edward S. Greenbaum.
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

³ At such time as the Secretary of State served as Senior Representative, one of the Representatives served as an Alternate and one of the Alternates served in an advisory capacity.

⁴ The Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles, served as Senior United States Representative Ex Officio during his presence at the Session.

134

Twelfth Regular Session; New York, September 17, 1957.

Representatives:

A. S. J. Carnahan.

Walter H. Judd.

George Meany.

Herman B. Wells.

Alternate representatives:

James J. Wadsworth.

Irene Dunne.

Philip M. Klutznick.

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Genoa S. Washington.

Thirteenth Regular Session; New York, September 16, 1958.

Representatives:

Michael J. Mansfield.

Bourke B. Hickenlooper.

Herman Phleger.

George McGregor Harrison.

Alternate representatives:

James J. Wadsworth.

Marian Anderson.

Watson W. Wise.

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Irving Salomon.

Fourteenth Regular Session; New York, September 15, 1959.

Representatives:

Christian A. Herter.⁵

James J. Wadsworth.⁶

James G. Fulton.

Clement J. Zablocki.

George Meany.

Walter S. Robertson.

Alternate representatives:

Charles W. Anderson, Jr.

Erle Cocke, Jr.

Virgil M. Hancher.

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Harold Riegelman.

Fifteenth Regular Session; New York, September 20, 1960.

Representatives:

James J. Wadsworth, Perm. Rep. to the UN.

George D. Aiken.

Wayne Morse.

Francis Wilcox.

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Alternate representatives:

Zelma Watson George (Mrs. Clayborne George).

Arthur F. Lamey.

Frederick Blake Payne.

Charles Rosenbaum.

Frances E. Willis.

⁵ Served as Chairman of the Delegation ex officio when present.

⁶ Headed the Delegation during Mr. Lodge's absence from New York.

135

Sixteenth Regular Session; New York, September 19, 1961.

Representatives:

Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman and Perm. Rep. to UN.

Omar Burleson.

Marguerite Stitt Church.

Francis T. P. Plimpton.

Arthur H. Dean.

Alternate representatives:

Charles W. Yost.

Clifton R. Wharton.

Philip M. Klutznick.

Jonathan Brewster Bingham.

Gladys Avery Tillett (Mrs. Charles Tillett).

Seventeenth Regular Session; New York, September 18, 1962.

Representatives:

Adlai Stevenson, Perm. Rep. to the UN.

Albert Gore.

Gordon Allott.

Francis T. P. Plimpton.

Arthur H. Dean.

Alternate representatives:

Charles W. Yost.

Philip M. Klutznick.

Jonathan Brewster Bingham.

Carl T. Rowan.

Marietta P. Tree (Mrs. Ronald Tree).

Eighteenth Regular Session; New York, September 17, 1963.

Representatives:

Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman and Perm. Rep. to the UN.

Edna F. Kelly.

William S. Mailliard.

Francis T. P. Plimpton.

Charles W. Yost.

Alternate representatives:

Mercer Cook.

Charles C. Steele.

Jonathan Brewster Bingham.

Sidney R. Yates.

Jane Warner Dick (Mrs. Edison Dick).

Nineteenth Regular Session; New York, December 1-February 18, 1965.

Representatives:

Russell B. Long.

Frank Carlson.

William C. Foster.

Francis T. P. Plimpton.

Alternate representatives:

Charles W. Yost.

Franklin H. Williams.

Richard N. Gardner.

Charles P. Noyes.

Twentieth Regular Session; New York, September 21, 1965.

Representatives:

Arthur J. Goldberg, Chairman and Perm. Rep. to the UN.

Charles W. Yost.

Barrett O'Hara.

Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen.

William C. Foster.

136

Alternate representatives:

James M. Nabrit, Jr.

James Roosevelt.

Eugenie M. Anderson (Mrs. John P. Anderson).

William P. Rogers.

Frances E. Willis.

Twenty-First Session; New York, September 20, 1966.

Representatives:

Frank Church.

Clifford P. Case.

James M. Nabrit, Jr.

William C. Foster.

Alternate representatives:

James Roosevelt.

Patricia R. Harris.

George L. Killion.

Harding F. Bancroft.

Twenty-Second Regular Session; New York, September 19-December 19, 1967.

Representatives:

William B. Buffum.

L. H. Fountain.

William S. Broomfield.

Adrian S. Fisher.

Alternate representatives:

I. W. Abel.

Robert S. Benjamin.

Hector Garcia.

Patricia R. Harris.

Herbert O'Conor, Jr.

Twenty-Third Regular Session; New York, September 24, 1968.

Representatives:

James Russell Wiggins, Chairman and Perm. Rep. to UN.

Stuart Symington.

John Sherman Cooper.

William C. Foster.

Brewster C. Denny.

Alternate representatives:

William B. Buffum.

Raymond D. Nasher.

Jean Picker.

Louis Stulberg.

Marvin L. Warner.

Twenty-Fourth Regular Session; New York, September 16, 1969.

Representatives:

Charles W. Yost, Chairman and Perm. Rep. to the U.N.

William B. Buffum.

Dante B. Fascell.

J. Irving Whalley.

Shirley Temple Black.

Alternate representatives:

Christopher H. Phillips.

Glenn A. Olds.

Rita E. Hauser.

William T. Coleman.

Joseph E. Johnson.

137

Twenty-Fifth Regular Session; New York, September 15-December 19, 1970.

Representatives:

Charles W. Yost, Perm. Rep. to the U.N.

Christopher H. Phillips.

Jacob K. Javits.

Claiborne Pell.

Glenn A. Olds.

Alternate representatives:

Seymour Maxwell Finger.

Helen G. Edmonds.

Richard H. Gimer.

Aloysius A. Mazewski.

Twenty-Sixth Regular Session; New York, September 15-December 17, 1971.

Representatives:

George H. Bush, Perm. Rep. to U.N.

Christopher H. Phillips.

Charles C. Diggs, Jr.

Edward J. Derwinski.

Daniel P. Moynihan.

Alternate representatives:

Alan B. Shepard.

Arthur A. Fletcher.

Gladys O'Donnell.

W. Tapley Bennett.

Bernard Zagorin.

Twenty-Seventh Regular Session; New York, September 19-December 19, 1972.

Representatives:

George H. Bush, Perm. Rep. to the U.N.

Christopher H. Phillips.

Gale W. McGee.

James B. Pearson.

Mrs. Jewel Lafontant.

Alternate representatives:

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

Julia Rivera de Vincenti.

Gordon H. Scherer.

Robert C. Tyson.

Bernard Zagorin.

Senator McGEE. I take exception to that, Mr. Chairman, since I was there in the last delegation.

Senator PELL. Wouldn't you agree with me about general caliber?

Senator McGEE. We had a pretty cracking good group last year. [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. The record will show—

Senator McGEE. The other 26 years you have my support.

FILLING EMPTY AMBASSADORSHIPS RECOMMENDED

Senator PELL. In 5 days there is going to be an election in Sweden. I would hope that in perfect good humor you would carry out your idea of pressing ahead to fill the empty ambassadorships because 6 days from now whether or not we withhold appointing an ambassador is not going to make any difference to the fortunes of Mr. Palme. He either will have been reelected or will have been defeated.

138

RECOGNITION OF OUTER MONGOLIA

Have you any views with regard to the recognition of Outer Mongolia?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes. We are in the process of negotiating on the recognition of Outer Mongolia, and it is at this moment hung up on the rather abstruse procedural point of the sequence in which announcements should be made. It is an issue which we will solve fairly quickly once I am confirmed.

Senator PELL. I realize it has been under discussion for some time and I am very glad it is moving to a head.

PROPOSED STUDY OF AND POSSIBLE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM SEATO

What would be your reaction to the proposed study of SEATO and the possible United States withdrawal from it?

Mr. KISSINGER. I believe that the withdrawal of the United States from SEATO would be given a symbolic significance which might have consequences out of proportion to the problem. There is a meeting of SEATO Ministers at the end of next week in New York, part of whose purpose is to try to shift the emphasis of SEATO away from some of the military to some of the humanitarian concerns, and we strongly support that.

NEW GREEK DECISIONS AND U.S. HOMEPORTING ARRANGEMENTS

Senator PELL. In connection with Greece, where there have been apparently some changes of late, general release of political prisoners, apparently some improvement, do you see this tendency continuing?

Do you have any views with regard to the stationing of our fleet near Athens and the bolstering of the regime as we have done in the past?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have not had an opportunity to review the exact implications of these new Greek decisions since Greece has become a republic. On the surface they seem encouraging, and they seem to reflect some of the recommendations we made when Ambassador Tasca called on the Greek Government prior to the referendum. Therefore I see no reason not to proceed with the homeporting arrangements that now exist.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

DIVISION OF WITNESS TIME BETWEEN NSC AND STATE DEPARTMENT

Finally, how do you propose to divide your own time between being Chairman of the National Security Council and in being Secretary of State?

Will it be a 75-percent Secretary of State, 25-percent NSC or how do you see the body of your time going?

Mr. KISSINGER. As I pointed out in a previous session, Senator Pell, some of the activities that I conducted in the White House previously will move with me to the State Department. My role as negotiator, for example, was dependent on my White House position only insofar as this enabled me to reflect with precision the President's thinking, and that can be achieved from either position. My advisory role toward the

139

President is not dependent on my position as Assistant; that is, that will move with me.

So I would expect that the division of time that you outlined, of 75 to 25 percent, is a reasonable one. Until I have begun operating, it is hard to predict. But this would be my intention. The State Department will require a great deal of my time, in invigorating the Foreign Service, giving it essential participation, and making sure that after I leave office a certain style of policymaking has been established. This will require a fair amount of time and leadership.

PRACTICE OF HAVING PART-TIME AMBASSADORS

Senator PELL. I was struck by your statement yesterday that there should be full-time people working on these important functions of arms control and other U.S. activities. I would hope that the practice of having part-time ambassadors, while occasionally necessary, would be one that would be looked at very carefully and with reservation, particularly in the arms control field.

Mr. KISSINGER. We do not have a part-time ambassador.

Senator PELL. No, but I think there is a question about the future of our representation in Geneva.

Mr. KISSINGER. Our arms control negotiations, especially in SALT, will always be carried on by a full-time ambassador.

Senator PELL. Good, that is good news.

EIGHTY-THREE IDENTIFIED MIA'S

In connection with the previous questions concerning the missing in action, the question was not posed concerning the 83 Americans who have been identified in either pictures or by those who returned home. Can any extra effort be made to try to find out what happened to them, and then perhaps move on to the question of the majority of the others as being legally dead.

Mr. KISSINGER. Those are the Americans whose files we turned over to the North Vietnamese.

Senator PELL. These 83.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes, about whom I made personal representations to Prime Minister Phan Van Dong in Hanoi and once again to Le Duc Tho when I met him in May and June in Paris—but I regret to say with very little success. You can be sure that those about whom we have good evidence that they have been identified are the ones about whom we can be most vocal and most convincing.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I am very glad you have been nominated for this job and I look forward to supporting your confirmation.

Mr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

FURTHER MEETINGS

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask Senator Symington to act as Chairman this morning. I have another appointment. I will announce that the public witnesses, I believe, will be heard on Friday. That is those who asked to be heard. We will schedule an executive hearing of the committee with Dr. Kissinger on Monday and an executive commit-

140

tee meeting on Tuesday with an opportunity, at least, to vote on Tuesday if the committee is so disposed.

Senator Percy.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS' STATEMENT

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I reread this morning your opening statement, and I would commend it to be read by any American. I really feel it was a remarkable statement, and I share your hope, as you have expressed at the end of it, that "by working together we can speed the day when all of us will be able to say we were 'present at the creation' of a new era of peace, justice, and humanity."

## STEPS TOWARD IMPROVING U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS

We know that in the last quarter century all wars have been fought on the developing nations, and in South Asia we have seen some of the most tragic bloodshed of our time. It has been widely understood, or reported at least, that the administration in the past has tilted toward Pakistan. That has ruptured our relationships to a degree with India.

Now that a very remarkable accord has been reached, between these three countries, Pakistan and India, with the concurrence of Bangladesh, and they are beginning a process of working together now, what steps can we take to improve our relationships with India. I think we have taken one step in the appointment of Ambassador Moynihan, an outstanding appointment, but what steps do you see that can be taken by the United States and by India—this is a two-sided street—to improve the relationships that both governments have clearly expressed should be improved, and do so without injury, harm or offense to our friends in Pakistan?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Percy, during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 we opposed the methods that India used, although we favored the objective of self-determination. Indeed one of the reasons we opposed India was because we believed they should have understood that we were working towards the same objective—the self-determination of what was at that time East Bengal and is now Bangladesh—and because we believed that military action was unnecessary.

I do not think it will do much good to rehearse all the arguments of that time, which, as far as we were concerned, had to do with international standards of conduct, and with the impact of acquiescence in the use of force to settle disputes on the Middle East and on other relationships.

The fact is that, now that Bangladesh exists, our objectives and those of India with respect to it, are quite parallel. We want a Bangladesh that is prospering, that is stable, that is democratic, and that is not a source of unrest for the whole area. And that we believe is what India wants.

Second, with respect to India, one of the, perhaps, beneficial long-term consequences of the difficulties that arose in 1971 is that it has enabled both sides to move toward a more mature relationship.

On the American side, especially in our intellectual community, there was a perhaps romantic conception of India. And on the Indian side there were also excessive expectations towards the United States.

We recognize India as one of the major forces in the developing world, and as a country whose growth and stability are absolutely

141

essential to the peace and stability of South Asia. And during the last year, and especially during the last 6 months, relations with India have developed in an undramatic but very steady manner.

Ambassador Moynihan has of course played a very major role in this.

Our effort with India right now is to remove many of the irritating legacies of the 1971 period, as well as some of the concrete difficulties that have arisen independently of the 1971 misunderstandings—to solve, for example, the problem of the accumulation of Public Law 480 funds in India so that they can be disposed of in a manner acceptable to both sides. We are very close to reaching an agreement on this.

We will then turn to the question of the long-term economic relationship between India and the United States.

Senator PERCY. Will the rupee agreement require any congressional action?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think certain aspects of it have to be submitted to the Congress in some form.

Senator PERCY. I see.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am not absolutely sure about that. But we will certainly keep you fully informed of it. I do believe, however, that it requires some Congressional involvement.

## IMPROVING U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS

We will then turn to the question of our long-term economic relationships. We both want to get away from the traditional aid pattern and ask ourselves what, over a longer period of time, makes some sense, so that the aid pattern can be liquidated and at the same time we can be helpful to the development process in India.

What we want from India in return—and what India ought to want also—is some contribution to stability in the area, so that there is not the sense on the part of some of its neighbors that they are in danger of attack. And we have every reason to suppose that India is prepared to do this.

We have engaged in many talks with Indian officials. The Indian Ambassador tells me that when he was in Minneapolis a few weeks ago he went on television to endorse my appointment and to indicate that relations between our two countries were improving. The former I do not think is central to the deliberations of this committee, but the improvement in our relations is real, and it is going on on a very serious basis.

At the same time, we are trying to help Pakistan to find its new role, it having lost half of its country, and to adjust to its new reality. We have not judged it wise to resume a permanent military supply relationship with Pakistan. So I believe, actually, that our relations with the subcontinent are on a more mature basis, and for the long term are more hopeful, than they have been at any period since this administration came into office.

## U.S. ARMS POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, what will our arms policy be with respect to South Asia?

21-172-73—pt. 1—10

142

Mr. KISSINGER. We believe we should not be a principal arms supplier in that area.

Our present arms policy is that we will give spare parts for equipment that we have already sold to Pakistan, but that we do not engage in new deliveries of any lethal equipment, and we have not engaged in military deliveries to India at all. There may be some minor modifications of this because both sides want some very specialized technical equipment. But with respect to the central issue, if another war breaks out in that area, it will not be fought with American weapons.

## USE OF U.S. ARMS SOLD TO IRAN

Senator PERCY. Lastly, in that vital area, there is some concern expressed in Afghanistan and India about our large-scale arms sales to Iran. What assurances can we provide that those sales are for the self-defense of Iran and would not ever be used in any of the internal problems and affairs involving the subcontinent?

Mr. KISSINGER. It would be against the intent of our policy if Iran used these weapons for aggressive purpose or to intervene in the affairs of other countries. Therefore, they are for self-defense.

## RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY BROADCASTS

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, the Senate has just passed a Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Authorization bill. It has been said that continuation of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty destroys our ability to really develop a détente with the Soviet Union and improve our relationships there, and yet during the whole period that relations have improved in recent years. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts have been carried on. Do you look upon these as detrimental in any way to your continued improvement of relationships with the USSR?

Mr. KISSINGER. No; the Soviet Union obviously does not like Radio Free Europe, and they do some things which we do not like. But it has not interfered with the détente.

## ROLE OF TRADE

Senator PERCY. And lastly, would like very much to have your judgment on the role of trade. As I look back on the most-favored-nation problem that we now face, the original policy that was adopted in 1923, which was called "most-favored Nation treatment" was granted to every trading partner, and every country had it. Therefore it really ought not be to be called MFR or a most-favored-nation policy, it is more an NTR, a normal trading relationship policy in my judgment. Then in 1951 we initiated an era of tariff discrimination and the Congress directed the President to withdraw or suspend most-favored-nation status of all countries "under the control of international communism."

In your judgment, was this a wise policy for us to have adopted when the countries of Western Europe and Japan have developed huge markets, multibillion-dollar markets, in trade with communist

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countries? Trade is not beneficial to just one side generally. It is supposed to benefit both sides. Has this been in retrospect a wise policy for us to have adopted all through the period of the fifties and sixties?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Percy, you are quite right. The phrase "most-favored-nation" is misleading because it gives the impression that a particular concession is being made, whereas the original meaning was only to say that we would grant equal status to all nations that granted us equal status.

As to the circumstances of 1951, I do not want to pass a judgment on the conditions of that period. The intention there clearly was to cut the communist countries off from normal trade relations with the West, in a period of confrontation. Whether this was the best method for doing it or whether some other course should have been devised is hard to say in retrospect. I would say, however, that in the conditions of this period, the granting of most-favored-nation status is an important ingredient of our general policy of relaxation of tensions. And moreover, it should be seen in exactly the terms that you have outlined, that it only permits normal two-way trade, and this can flourish only if we can sell to the Soviet Union in return for whatever they may sell here. It is independent of any credits which would give the Soviet Union any special consideration, which can be put under whatever restrictions the Congress deems necessary.

But to pursue discriminatory policies against the Soviet Union and other communist countries as an organic principle of legislation, without giving the President the authority to abolish it, would not be consistent with the trends of the period.

## EMIGRATION RIGHTS

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much. I do not want to imply by my question at all that I am not deeply concerned about emigration rights from the Soviet Union and all Eastern European countries. I think a great many of us in the Senate have spent a good deal of time trying to help individuals and families who wish to leave and need assistance. It is extremely difficult to get families out of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, for instance, and the Soviet Union is not the only country from which it is difficult to emigrate. It is certainly a contradiction of United Nations principles that these countries have adhered to and I would hope that we could at some future time discuss what we can do to help move forward the implementation of these basic rights as granted in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.

Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator McGee.

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Senator McGEE. Dr. Kissinger, I have fallen heir on this committee to a subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. You have already had occasion to respond to questions about upgrading the role of Latin America, giving it a higher priority consideration, devoting more attention to it. I think that is very heartening. I wanted to proceed, specifically, however, to our current policy position with Cuba for a real reason. In hearings that our committee has been conducting on our

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overall Latin American policy, we are up against a very intransigent policy position on the part of the Department of State in regard to Cuba. When asked what the conditions are or about rolling with the changing times, we are given the same criteria as we were given a year ago, 5 years ago, and 7 years ago, two conditions.

One, that the Cuban Government must refrain from its meddling in the governments in the Caribbean, and, two, it must cease its heavy dependence upon the Soviet Union.

In the course of the hearings, it developed very fully that not all, but a majority of our Caribbean neighbors have already reestablished, if they ever broke, relations with Cuba and thus, the first criteria is not keeping them up nights, at least, in deep concern.

In the second instance, the more we seek to isolate Cuba, I would suppose the more they must depend upon somebody, any old friend in a troubled time, and thus, they lean ever more heavily upon the Soviet Union.

Our concern in the committee has now become quite a different one. That in our intense and understandable drive in the earlier years to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere, may we not be approaching an isolating of the United States on this very question, because not only have seven or eight of our fellow members in the OAS recognized Cuba, but another half dozen are in the process of proceeding along those lines?

So with that circumstance confronting us, what do you see as the possible range of initiatives that we ought to have a look at as American policy in this hemisphere vis-a-vis Cuba?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, Senator McGee, you are aware of the fact that at the nonalined conference at Algiers, Quaddafi of Libya, whose admiration for us is under firm control—[Laughter]— asked that Cuba be expelled because it was just an appendage of the Soviet Union and could not be properly characterized as a nonalined country. That is at least germane to the second point.

As I pointed out in the hearings yesterday, we will begin as soon as possible a discussion with our other friends in Latin America about how they envisage the future of the OAS and the future of the Western Hemisphere relationship. In the course of this, ideas may emerge with respect to Cuba. We do not insist that Cuba make a whole step all at once. But it would be helpful to have some indication of the general perception of Cuba that would make it less an appendage of another country and more an autonomous force.

Senator McGEE. Is there anything to be said for not leaving that initiative up to the Cubans because of our interrelationships between another 19 or so of our friends in this hemisphere. Let the Cubans turn it down or let the Cubans isolate themselves from thought if they choose not to move. I raise a doubt as to whether we should be held in suspension by the whims of the Castro Government in that connection.

Mr. KISSINGER. We will certainly discuss this problem when we talk to the other 22 nations.

## U.S. PARTICIPATION IN EFFORT TOWARD EASTERN ASIAN STABILITY

Senator McGEE. The second area I want to touch on quickly has to do with the dimensions of the possible new balance of Asia, perhaps some kind of an American conference there. I project this against the

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backdrop of the developments in the last couple of years through the President's and your initiative with regard to the Peking Government. Is there a role for the United States that does not run against the directions you seek in Chinese relations? In other words, from the Chinese point of view, do you sense an interest in any kind of an American conference, participation, joint effort in the search for greater stability in Eastern Asia?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think the Chinese attitude is ambivalent. Ideologically they are opposed to the American presence in Asia. Practically, and looking at necessities that may arise for them, they are limiting the conclusions they are drawing from their ideology, and are deriving perhaps some reassurance from it. But this is a difficult matter to discuss here.

Senator McGEE. I understand there is more delicacy in either conversations or diplomatic effort, but it is bandied about in somewhat public ways that they are very deeply concerned, in fact bitter vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the border problems they share of many thousands of miles, and their concern about the meaning of the new Japan in light of the new Japan, in the light of their own history with Japan in the last 35 years.

Mr. KISSINGER. They have always reacted.

Senator McGEE. Is there any basis for that, that you know?

Mr. KISSINGER. They have always reacted rather strongly to speculation in this area by the legislative branch, and I think they would take an even dimmer view of speculation by the executive branch.

Senator McGEE. I will respect the wisdom of that reluctance at this stage.

### INQUIRY INTO CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY MECHANISM SUGGESTED

The last point that I wanted to raise with you is really to express some misgivings of my own on this larger question of the executive branch and the Congress, particularly the Senate, in the initiatives in foreign policy, a thing that has engaged us all for so long here.

My misgiving, if that does not overstate it, is that in the overwhelming action that the Congress has now taken and voted on that question I have the lurking fear that much of what we did is another patch on our operating mechanism that may be out of date in this regard. Perhaps we were so overwhelmed with mistakes and emotions and feelings about Vietnam that we may have overreacted in trying to prevent another Vietnam, which may never be a real problem to face again.

One of our problems in the past has been to try to prevent a preceding crisis without addressing ourselves to the next. Is it not important that we inquire structurally into our mechanism, constitutional and statutory, in this new real world in which, as a world leader, we hope to survive?

A constitution that was drawn by men of great vision could not have envisaged the United States as a world power or as one of two poles of power for a long interval of time. The Founding Fathers could not have envisaged a nuclear age. They did not see a world in which wars might be waged without being declared, and maybe necessarily so, in a nuclear age. What are your ponderings in that direction?

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MR. KISSINGER. Senator McGee, I expressed my concern that in the desire to achieve a new balance, a situation could be created in which doubt might arise in the mind of the potential aggressor, and therefore war could be made more likely. This supports the general observations which you have made.

I believe it would be very useful if there could be a joint legislative executive examination of that problem, that takes into account the legislative concern for a sense of participation, but that is geared also to the realities of the present period. Then we can look at the whole mechanism in this era, when there are so many gray areas of decision-making that could not be foreseen by the Founding Fathers.

Senator McGEE. My time is up. Thank you for the reasons.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Griffin?

Senator GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Dr. Kissinger, Senator Javits said a little while ago you were ending your testimony before this committee and when you reach the most junior member of the minority party there is hope that maybe you are getting close to the end.

I must say that making this observation, I think, that these hearings have been useful, and I have followed them although I was not able because of my floor responsibilities and other responsibilities to be here all the time. But I doubt that they were really necessary in some respects because I think that most of the members of this committee, if not everyone of them, were well satisfied about your qualifications to be Secretary of State without the hearings.

Your performance speaks for itself, and I think the country owes you a great debt of gratitude for what you have already accomplished, your brilliance and the way you have demonstrated through your action and your record, your great qualifications to be Secretary of State.

## COST OF SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE

I would focus on one particular area which I know was touched on the first day, but I do not think it was discussed quite adequately, considering the importance and the role that Congress can play in it. I refer to the efforts that you and the administration are making to negotiate some kind of an agreement concerning the level of troops in Europe.

There is great concern, I know, about the costs to the United States of our maintaining troops in Europe at the present level, in terms of dollars, in terms of our balance-of-payments deficit and the extent to which that contributes thereto.

I would like to ask you whether or not there would not be a rather important cost to the United States and to the world if we were to unilaterally and significantly cut back our troop strength in Europe without achieving some kind of an agreement.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Griffin, a significant unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe would have a significant—

Senator GRIFFIN. Would have what? I did not hear you.

Mr. KISSINGER. A significant unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe would have a disastrous effect on our whole struc-

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ture of our Atlantic relationships, which we are in the process of redefining in this so-called Year of Europe—at a moment when, as the newspapers report today, the Europeans, for the first time, have produced a united answer to our proposal of last April. It would have very serious consequences.

I believe—and we are in the process of doing this, that we must assess NATO strategy. Within the framework of NATO, we must ease our financial burden. But in the absence of agreed reductions, we cannot reduce our forces unilaterally; we should not reduce our forces unilaterally.

Senator GRIFFIN. And in terms of helping you and the administration to achieve such an agreement, for the Congress to take the action which is suggested and advocated by some certainly would not be helpful, to say the least.

Mr. KISSINGER. It would be very unhelpful.

Senator GRIFFIN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

I think that most of the questions that I had planned to ask, indeed all of them, have been asked at least once up until now and I am glad to allow the other junior member on the other side of the committee to have an opportunity.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see that relaxed smile on the face of Dr. Kissinger. He now knows he has come to the end of his ordeal, at least for today.

## SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Dr. Kissinger, I shall not keep you very long. I have a special interest in trade and economic policy.

I repeat what I said the other day. I think that this is a very significant dimension of what we call national security and foreign policy. If it is true that we are leaving a period of confrontation and entering into the era of cooperation, then we have to think in terms of economics and trade and resources. It is my judgment that this is going to be one of the toughest areas for our country in the coming months and years.

We are very short of natural resources, and at the present time, because of the devaluation of the dollar, there is a drain on American resources. It is a good buy if you can get everything you can from the United States.

## SIGNIFICANCE OF ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF FOOD AND FIBER

My special field of endeavor in the past year or so has been in the food area. I am of the opinion that the administration still does not realize the significance of the adequate supplies of food and fiber to national security, and to our foreign policy.

## MEETING OF EXPORTING AND IMPORTING NATIONS CONCERNING FAMINE

Not long ago I wrote a letter to the President in which I suggested, in light of the fact that there is about a 400 million bushel shortage of wheat worldwide which precipitates an international food crisis, that there ought to be a meeting of the key exporting and importing nations

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In cases involving other types of aggression, we will provide military and economic assistance when required in accordance with our commitments and when in the national interest. However, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine we will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense.

### ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE INTERRELATION OF U.S. AND FOREIGN FORCES

In regard to this question, I would like to defer to former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who said in his FY 72 Budget Statement that in planning our forces we need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirement of Free World security. This approach—Total Force—includes both active and reserve components of the U.S. and of our allies. In addition, we take into account those capabilities of our allies that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs. As I have pointed out in my testimony this approach has already resulted in substantial reductions of our overseas forces.

### THE REQUIREMENTS ON WHICH SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS BASED

These requirements are a combination of: 1) the national security and foreign policy considerations of the U.S.; 2) the military needs of each recipient country depending on its existing military inventory and need for modernization, the amount of economic resources available to that country, and the degree of both the external and internal or insurgency threats facing it; 3) the need, in certain countries, to supply some level of assistance in order to accomplish essential politico-military objectives, such as preserving access to essential military rights and facilities; and 4) the will of the country to defend itself and to contribute appropriate resources to that defense effort.

[From the desk of DON DuMONT—founder—God's Own People of U.S.A., Chicago, Ill.]

ARTHUR M. KUHL,
Chief Clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for the record my name is Don DuMont and my mailing address is simply Chicago 60647. This statement follows my request of August 24th covering the salient points of my testimony in opposition to the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, the letter acknowledging same of August 31st from your Acting Chief of Staff and telegram of September 10th from your Chief Clerk denying, unfairly I believe, a personal appearance before your Committee in Public televised hearings; but suggesting that you would be "glad to receive a statement of reasonable length for inclusion in the record".

As a Christian I do not swear in absentia, nor would I do so if present before your Committee to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God" as did the nominee very casually and unconvincingly prior to his questioning; but in accordance with instructions in the Word of God for those who love and try to serve Him and in accordance with the laws of this American Republic under God I do so affirm for the record.

As a very brief personal statement for background information on myself, I submit copies of to whom it may concern dated Dec. 5th, 1949 and the greatest day . . . for me dated July 22nd, 1970 and story on the Chicago Today editorial page May 29th, 1973 with my comments as part of this record for the glory of God and our Republic—incidentally a word I have heard mentioned not once by anyone on either side of the witness table as applying to this country but only to the phony so-called "People's Republic of China", whose subjects have nothing to say concerning any "watergates" developing in that land where God is officially excluded as in Communist Russia as well.

May I suggest before getting to the issue at hand of Dr. Kissinger that a republic without Godly leadership and strict adherence to its restraining Constitution is just as bad and probably worse than the democracy everyone seems to think this country is erroneously would be without a Godly citizenry. Democ-

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racy without God is a formula for anarchy and let's not forget it, and would be satisfactory only in a genuinely Christian country which we have not yet arrived at because of our resistance to God's instructions to His created beings.

Now for the record, it is my considered opinion publicly expressed that consideration of President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security, who never received "security clearance" to the best of my knowledge due to typical "Tricky Dick" maneuvers at the time of his appointment, to become in addition the Secretary of State is the utmost of folly unless the Foreign Relations Committee is prepared to embrace without reservations the One New World envisioned by the Nix-inger policies (short form of Nixon-Kissinger) without God in their deliberations. Frankly, their highly publicized "detente" with the Communist slave masters in Russia, China and elsewheres—with Castro nearby as a possible next target for detente—indicates a complete lack of spiritual perception on their part and on that of our citizens who seemingly fail to realize that this "detente" is just another way of spelling "surrender" of our basically Christian principles to enemies of God and humanity under Satan's direction, and certainly not pleasing to the God of this nation so tremendously blessed under Him.

In a world where God's restraining but unseen hand is the only real deterrent to an atomic holocaust, it would seem that at long last His plans for eternal peace here and hereafter should receive some consideration from the staid Foreign Policy Committee, which under its present and previous leadership has been too often endorsing the misguided efforts for "Peace in our time". of every President to my personal knowledge since Franklin Roosevelt started the "detente" with Russian Communists in 1933, against the advice of most all responsible contemporaries. Surely our current world mess is of our own doing, not His.

Incidentally, two prepared speeches on this subject considered dishonoring to God by many of God's people because of their "humanistic" character were never delivered because President Roosevelt died the day in 1945 he was scheduled to deliver it, and President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas in 1963 the day before it was to be given. The Nixinger team I believe is treading on similar shaky ground, and the Committee might well help in their best interests by denying the suggested nomination along with the disapproval of "peaceful coexistence" deals and "favored nation" status for our newly discovered "friends".

Another well-prepared and delivered speech by former President Herbert Hoover on the occasion of his 80th birthday at West Branch, Iowa which I attended August 10th, 1954 during the Eisenhower Administration contained a very significant paragraph concerning the Communists which very mysteriously was omitted from his otherwise meticulously followed text and ignored by the press in their news items. I called it to the attention of the U.S. Senate via its then Vice-president Richard Nixon, had acknowledgements from his personal secretary Rose Mary Woods and officially from his staff that the material would be laid before the Senate when the 84th Congress convened and that a notice to this effect would appear in the Congressional Record and the Senate Journal at that time—so its on the record. Because it challenged administration policies concerning Russia since 1933 and preceded by only a few weeks the appointment of Herbert Hoover, Jr. by President Eisenhower, with whom the ex-President had gone fishing in the Rocky Mountains right after his speech spoken in his words in "the spirit of St. Paul", as Assistant Secretary of State, I believe it is fruitful to bring to light even at this late date for consideration belatedly of the wisdom of the eliminated paragraph which read as follows—"Sooner or later a new line of action will become imperative. What the free world needs above all things is a spiritual mobilization of the nations who believe in a Supreme Being against the Red tide of atheism. No appeasement, no compromise, no agreement can dam back this tide. Nor can such devices long endure".

I have never been able to get a satisfactory explanation for these missing words of wisdom especially after an additional 19 years of experience with the complete lack of reliability of Communist promises. It would seem that President Hoover would not look favorably on Dr. Kissinger's appointment as he appears in many ways to be a better representative for a Communist slave world rather than an ardent advocate for a free world under God—as does also his mentor in the White House whether he's in Washington, San Clemente or Key Biscayne in his seeming campaign to become the First President of the World.

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There are millions of Americans—yes Republicans—who believe the Kissinger appointment might be far more catastrophic than other top level Presidential appointees of Watergate "fame" for whom the President is accountable. Surely any confirmation should be withheld, regardless of Kissinger's and Nixon's desire for speedy action, until the Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities completes its work.

When a humble candidate for President as was this writer during the 1972 campaign, who prays every night for the salvation of his incumbent President, and writes to him in deep Christian concern on many occasions for his country, was treated as a "security" risk on several occasions during the campaign and again recently on August 10th when Presidential top domestic affairs adviser Melvin Laird visited the National Legislative Conference in Chicago, as covered in a Sun-Times story and my letter to the columnist, it is high time to have a clearer understanding of what SECURITY stands for. Security for whom and for what?

Every member of your Committee and every other U.S. Senator received copies of The Republimerican Retort of which I am Editor during 1969 & 1970 covering many subjects and reviewing a few highlights in my ministry starting in 1949 for the glory of God and the salvation of our Republic and except that I "know that all things work together for good for those who love God and are called for His purposes", I am not too happy about being denied an opportunity to present this statement in person and *request again* a hearing where I may be questioned to your hearts content on these matters and the Christian approach to solve the many problems before this country domestically and internationally?

Knowing of our Presidents propensity for and the Committees interest in tapes of all kinds, I am enclosing a tape (in Committee files) of a WIND program called for the record of August 19th past—which was sent to the President's Deputy Press Secretary on August 26th for comment—which may be of interest. A recording of this statement is on the other half of the cassette for your convenience and information.

In closing with thanks for your rapt attention to this written message or tape recording, may I put a little different twist to something the President said in his State of the Union message of September 10th. He said "There can be no monopoly of wisdom on either end of Penn Ave—and there should be no monopoly of power". May I say there can be no wisdom in these places without supplementing our human knowledge with a fear or better a love of God—and remind you all in love that Jesus Christ said that all power was given Him by the Father. Fact or fantasy? If anyone amongst you are watching the prophetic clock with any regularity, especially as it applies to Israel, His time is very near.

Sincerely,

DON DU MONT.

AN OPEN LETTER TO: FRIENDS OF ISRAEL IN THE U.S. SENATE—REJECT KISSINGER'S NOMINATION AS U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, TO BAR HIS BEING FORCED TO "BEND OVER BACKWARDS": FAVOR KREMLIN-ARABS; ALSO BECAUSE HE CANNOT BE PRESIDENT, SHOULD NOT BE IN THIS OFFICE

Friends of Israel must act quickly to block Senate approval of Kissinger's nomination, because as Secretary of State he would be forced to "bend over backwards" in favor of Kremlin-Arab interests (in order to avoid the appearance of favoring Israel) due in part to the oil situation and to the other factors noted below—besides the grave question as to the illegality, if not unconstitutionality, of a naturalized citizen being placed in line of succession to the Presidency which is barred to him by the Constitution; per a statement issued today by a former New York lawyer (retired) now of Philadelphia. The points in his statement are as follows:

1. *The Question of illegality, if not unconstitutionality, raised by others, as to any such naturalized citizen being placed in this office—* 4th in line of succession to the U.S. Presidency under U.S. Code Title 3, Sec. 19—is so grave as to be a bar to the nomination's being approved; the country's best interests being paramount so that the burden of proof in this connection must be satisfied completely by those supporting the nomination, else it fails. Only a native is permitted by the Constitution to be President (Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 4); so the purpose of the Succession Law will be defeated by making Kissinger Secretary of State.

2. *In his News Conference Aug. 23rd, Professor Kissinger made it clear he is aware that his being a Jew and a naturalized citizen (born in Germany) raises*

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questions in this regard: he stated he would conduct foreign policy "regardless of religious or national heritage." One aspect was highlighted in Bernard Gwertzman's article in the Washington Post of Aug. 26th in which he observed that heretofore Kissinger has left the Middle East to the State Department to handle: "partly because Mr. Kissinger was sensitive to the possibility that, as a Jew, he could be suspected of partiality to Israel." As the N.Y. Times reported—dispatch by Juan de Onis from Jidda, Saudi Arabia—on August 25th, Arab oil for the U.S. is questionable:

"A conservative ruler with strongly anti-Communist views, King Faisal has been showing increasing displeasure with the large degree of American support for Israel in the Middle Eastern conflict, which he feels is not moving toward a just settlement.

## "LIMITATION ON OIL EXPORTS

"He has indicated to the United States that Saudi Arabia may be prepared to limit the amount of oil she will export to meet Western needs, and particularly the increasing United States demand, if there is not a 'correction' in American policy in the Middle East."

This inclination of Arab countries to cut oil production and shipment to the USA is increased greatly by their already having huge quantities of declining dollars and do not like many more.

3. King Faisal and other Arab leaders will be increasingly inflamed against the USA each day that passes with Professor Kissinger in office as Secretary of State; always suspicious he is secretly playing his favorite game of power-politics so as to favor Israel—no matter how much he “bends over backwards” to give the opposite impression. He will be suspect by everyone.

4. Professor Kissinger's being Secretary of State will play into the Kremlin's hands in every way, particularly in its secret manipulations internationally—especially in Arab lands in seeking to use oil etc. against USA interests and to make the USA-Israel tie a loss to both. In his above-mentioned Press Conference, Kissinger commented that: "The President has repeatedly stated that the Middle East is an important area, perhaps the most dangerous area ..." Kremlin leaders are gloating over the "4 Aces hand" dealt them by the President in nominating as head of the State Department—spokesman for the USA to all the world—this vulnerable Professor; and they will play their power-politics cards with infinite skill, guile, to our disadvantage.

5. These developments will further disadvantage Israel, make her role more difficult—compounding the disfavor toward her in the USA and elsewhere; for instance the Washington Post commented in its lead editorial on Aug. 26th against "Israeli Annexation" of war-captured lands in violation of: "the principle of 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,' as so defined in the 1967 Security Council Mideast resolution which the United States sponsored." American and world opinion has also condemned Israel for her official air-piracy in the recent past. Professor Kissinger's being Secretary of State will add a great burden of practical difficulties for both Israel and the USA—always to the Kremlin's gain and delight. The N.Y. Times lead editorial of Aug. 28th states:

"American policies toward the Middle East involve far more than oil; it is conceivable that sound reasons will arise in the months and years to come for modifying the strong military and diplomatic support which Israel has long enjoyed from the United States."

This "modifying" will come easily, in the face of such "sound reasons," because this support by Presidents from Truman to Nixon has been due primarily not to love of Israel but to get votes and big money from Jews in the USA—as the New York Times and Washington Post have repeatedly reported over the years; for instance the latter published on May 6, 1973 excerpts from the diary of Eddie Jacobson (the late business partner and intimate of Truman) revealing that Truman backed Israel's creation etc. in 1948 to get Jews' votes, win his re-election. As to Nixon, these newspapers published in 1972 various accounts of Nixon's similar vote-bids. The same applies to strong support of Israel by most members

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of Congress: vying for Jews' votes. This cynical support of Israel—so inflam-
matory of Arabs' hostility toward the USA—has been carried to the extent over
the years of Israel's being classified as "The 51st State" as in the article pub-
lished in the N.Y. Times (Op-ed page) June 5, 1971 reprinted below.

6. *Kissinger's joking about "Watergate" and the Constitution*—N.Y. Times Aug. 23d—exemplifies his notorious lack of any capacity for moral leadership; per his reported statement: "The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer." Elitist, professorial "humor" such as this disqualifies for high office because it reflects callous disregard for basic American values—notably the integrity of constitutional government and traditional principles—which Kissinger (with his Old World background and related code and values) knows little about and cares less; including the American people's deep aversion over the generations to anti-moral, destructive Old World balance-of-power politics which is his chief love, field of expertness and main claim to fame—all utterly repugnant in the eyes of The American Ideal of 1776 and the Constitution, barring the USA from such a role, partly because it is always war-breeding endlessly, per the BRITISH-American policy since 1939.

7. *Kissinger will wholly lack credibility and moral standing with foreign governments*, as the operating Executive for years (to continue while Secretary of State) of the National Security Council: officially responsible for policy and actions of the CIA's "dirty tricks" operations including overthrow of foreign governments—including Prince Norodom Sihanouk's in Cambodia per his new book: *My War With the CIA* reviewed in Washington Post Aug. 26, 1973, mass murders and tortures in Vietnam per the “Phoenix” project; assassinations of government leaders—indirectly of course—such as Diem in Vietnam and Mossadeq in Iran; etc., etc. “NSC-CIA Kissinger” is his inescapable character and label. As William V. Shannon's article N.Y. Times Aug. 28th, Op-ed page, states, Kissinger has been Nixon's “closest confidant” as to foreign policy featured by “four years of ruthless war, secret bombing and false reports, of shameless deceit of ordinary citizens and open contempt for the constitutional authority of Congress, of crafty manipulation of the press and wiretapping of his own staff . . . all these brutalities, illegalities and deceits . . .” Kissinger's public character is inescapably fixed.

8. *No professorial Elitist should be Secretary of State*, least of all this worst one, characterized by unlimited arrogance (of which he has boasted), amorality, scorn for all of America's basic values traditionally especially in foreign affairs, evil record officially. Philadelphia, Pa. August 28, 1973

HAMILTON A. LONG.

ISRAEL—THE 51ST STATE?

(By David G. Nes)

OWINGS MILLS, Md.—A Middle East settlement as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242 will depend very largely upon the degree of influence the U.S. is willing to apply to persuade Israel that her ultimate survival depends on acceptance by her neighbors and international guarantees, rather than on any specific frontiers secured by continuing military superiority.

All reports from our diplomatic missions abroad indicate that the world community—including Britain, France, and our other NATO allies—look to the United States to exercise toward this end the leverage inherent in our “special relationship” with Israel. A full understanding of this relationship is essential in considering the great responsibility Secretary of State Rogers has borne in his attempts to achieve an Arab-Israeli negotiated settlement.

When President Truman said in October of 1948, "We are pledged to a State of Israel, large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure," the stage was set for the gradual establishment of an association between the U.S. and another country unique in our history. Today, that association is far closer in all areas—defense, economic collaboration, intelligence exchange, common citizenship, and mutual diplomatic support than enjoyed, for example, between the U.S. and Great Britain. Unique also is Israel's almost total immunity from criticism in this country.

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(lc)

In dollars and cents, our assistance to Israel through the years, both governmental and private, has been prodigious. During the period between 1948-1969, United States Government economic aid totaled $1.3 billion, while dollar transfers from private sources amounted to $2.5 billion, a total of $3.8 billion, or $1,500 per capita on a current population of 2.5 million. This greatly exceeds, on a per capita basis, our assistance to any ally and compares to $35 per capita to the peoples of thirteen neighboring states. Since 1969, our assistance to Israel has greatly increased. Dollar transfers in 1970 reached $800 million and in 1971, will approximate $1.5 billion. A further increase is anticipated for 1972.

Until 1967, we assured Israel a continuing supply of modern military equipment through West Germany and France and thus were able to avoid Arab hostility on this score. However, with the conclusion of German "reparations" and de Gaulle's change in Middle East policy, we have—since 1967—become the exclusive purveyor of arms to Israel. Of greater significance is the fact that qualitatively, we have provided aircraft, missiles, and electronic systems in some cases of greater sophistication and greater strike-capability than those furnished our NATO and SEATO allies.

A few months ago, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Defense Procurement Bill giving the President "open-ended" authority to transfer military equipment to Israel without total cost limitation. As former House Speaker McCormack remarked, "... I have never seen in my 42 years as a member of this body, language of this kind. ..." The Senate on Dec. 15 last, by a sixty-to-twenty vote, killed the Williams' amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, which would have restricted the President—as with Cambodia—from sending U.S. troops into Israel without Congressional permission.

In the area of nuclear weaponry, the United States has also pursued an exceptional position vis-à-vis Israel. During the years when we were pressing over one hundred nations in the world community with whatever diplomatic, economic and military leverage we might have to adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Israel alone was exempted from strong representations. Meanwhile, Israel reportedly has produced nuclear weapons designed for Phantom aircraft delivery.

In the exchange of intelligence, our cooperation with Israel is unprecedented. During the months prior to the June 1967 hostilities, the military intelligence requirements levied by Washington upon the Cario Embassy, C.I.A. and military intelligence staffs were very largely based on Israeli needs. The effectiveness of the Israeli air strikes on June 5, 1967, was assured in part, at least, by information on Egyptian air fields and aircraft disposition provided through U.S. sources. With respect to political and economic information, it was State Department practice at that time to provide the Israeli embassy in Washington with copies of those Middle East embassy reports considered of interest.

On the question of dual citizenship, Israel also enjoys an exceptional position. Under the Israel Law of Return, an American Jew entering Israel for permanent residence is automatically extended Israeli nationality. Consequently, there are now some 25,000 residents of Israel who possess both American and Israel citizenship and are entitled to the protection of the United States Government in the event of war.

Last summer, in a series of White House statements we would seem to have extended our commitments to Israel to include the "occupied territories," her continued military superiority, and the preservation of her "Jewish character."

Only history can render a total explanation for this very special U.S.-Israel relationship. Suffice to say, it has now reached a point where Israel's security and welfare is not only considered vital to our own, but where our reaction to its possible compromise is more intense than would be evident with any of our NATO or SEATO allies. In essence, Israel has become our 51st state. As one State Department wag put it, "Where Israel's survival to be seriously threatened, we would be in World War III in two minutes—with Berlin, it might take several days!"

It is because of this frightening reality that the Administration has assumed world leadership in seeking a negotiated settlement, and Secretary Rogers has been concentrating on reopening the Suez Canal as a first step.

(David G. Nes, now retired from the Foreign Service with the personal rank of Minister, was chargé d'affaires in Cairo before and during the June war of 1967.)

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STATEMENT OPPOSING HON. HENRY KISSINGER BY KILSOO HAAN

Honorable Chairman Fulbright and Honorable members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

As per request of Mr. Kuhl, the Senate Committee Chief Clerk I hereby submit my opposing view against Honorable Kissinger appointment as the new Secretary of State based upon the following 4 specific reasons.

REASON NO. ONE

Based on my 38 years of underground intelligence experience, the U.S.-Soviet "Detente on Soviet Terms" is pregnant with grave contingencies in the foreseeable future, the second half of this decade.

Mr. Kissinger played the significant role as prelude to the consumation of the President Nixon signing of the "No Inspections" SALT Treaty, the "detente on Soviet terms." In essence, was an official act, tantamount to un-American official act against the best interest of America. President Nixon gave away, he deliberately gave away 564 ICBM's and 240 submarine long-range missiles more to Red Russia and less to Pentagon.

The most alarming fact is that Mr. Kissinger, the Chief official on National Security Affairs and President Nixon obviously knew of the advance reports and information which disclosed the Soviet 30 Year Master Plan, How to Defeat and Destroy America; The Soviet 1973-1976 plan, the final phase of Soviet war preparation and the Soviet plan which calls for the Stockpile of Ample Essential Food Supplies for the preparation for an atomic war against America.

Despite of these advance reports and information related to the Soviet war plans and war preparations, Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon pushed the United States-Soviet "detente on Soviet terms."

On Sept. 19, 1971, at the height of Mr. Kissinger's secret negotiations with the Communist regimes. Secretary of Defense Laird warned, "I cannot give you assurance that United States will not fall into second place behind Russia in the 1973, 1974, 1975 period." It seems obviously clear that Mr. Kissinger, if he becomes the new Secretary of State he may be in official position to make America "Fall into second place behind Russia in 1973, 1974, 1975 period."

As an American citizen, I pray and hope the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations will not fall into Kissinger-Nixon conspiracy and help the Nixon Administration to place America in the second place under Soviet Sphere of Influence, in the name and spirit of Peace In Our Generation.

REASON NO. TWO

Upon the return of President Nixon to Washington, based on the alleged secret agreement or understanding, the Secretary of Defense Laird, ordered the "Cancellation" of U.S. "Laser" Ballistic Missile Defense Program. Was this necessary? In Aug. 1973, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger admitted that Red Russia too had tested the "Multiple Missile Warheads." Furthermore, our report revealed that the Soviet Laser Weapons For Military "will be" militarily operational by late 1975." Honorable Senator, please picture the balance of this decade when Red Russia will have converted 564 ICBM's and 240 Submarine long-range missiles into 704 Nuclear Multiple Missiles with big warheads aimed at America.

Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon are the two officials who have made it possible to bring about the United States-Soviet "detente on Soviet terms."

REASON NO. THREE

Honorable Senators, did you know Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon had advance information that Red Russia had adopted the plan to stockpile essential food supplies which must be protected from atomic radiation in time of an atomic war?

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The Soviet High Command explained that, "An atomic war is impossible without an ample reserve of essential food supplies and these food supplies must be protected from radiation."

Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon, as the prelude to the secret negotiation of the United States-Soviet grain deal, had "Kill" Congressman Neal Smith's House bill, "To establish a strategic commodity reserve of wheat and grains," in the Senate in late 1971.

Soon after, the United States-Soviet grain deal secret negotiations began. Hence, by July and August 1972, the United States-Soviet grain deal was consumated and approved by President Nixon.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon were less concerned with the future need of food supplies of the U.S. citizens and more concerned and pre-occupied to help Red Russia's plan to stockpile essential food supplies and to please Red Russians.

### REASON NO. FOUR

Based upon Jack Anderson's July 1, 1973 news column; early in 1973, White House cut off the heart of navigation and communications of U.S. Nuclear Submarine Fleet and U.S. Air Force, 600 planes including B-52's, the "Loran" authorizations, the 1973 Pentagon budget and thus cripple the U.S. First Line of National Defense.

To understand the significance of this White House conspiracy, may I once again call your attention to the United States-Soviet detente on Soviet terms, under it, President Nixon gave Red Russia 564 ICBM's and 240 submarine long-range missiles more than to the United States. Why?

It seems this spirit of "detente on Soviet terms" prevailed over the White House budget cutters, hence the White House conspired to cripple the smooth and efficient operation of the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet and the U.S. Air Force, operation of 600 planes, including B-52's.

Ask yourself this revealing and telling question. Why was it necessary for "The Joint Chiefs, without informing the White House, quietly dispatched the mysterious 'Captain Marvel' and three other top emissaries in civilian clothes to spread the alarm in Congress?"

The article further stated, "In such cloak and dagger fashion, Murphy, (Congressman Murphy's Coast Guard Committee which handles Loran authorizations) was tipped off what information to request from the Joint Chiefs ..."

Thank God Congressman Murphy's Committee restored the 1973 Pentagon budget, the "Loran Authorization."

In concluding my opposition to Mr. Kissinger's appointment as the new U.S. Secretary of State to replace Honorable Rogers, may I be permitted to point out this ominous advise, which is to have been said by the Soviet military, Master General Grecko who is at present one of the most powerful influences, who advocates war, an atomic war against America in the Soviet Politburo, (Reader's Digest Oct. 1970 issue.)

"The Americans are fooling themselves. The only war to fight to win is an atomic one, and that is what we shall be prepared for." On August 22, 1973, the Soviet physicist Andri Sakharov dared to warn the Western Powers, "detente on Soviet terms could lead to a disarmed world facing a Soviet Union armed to the teeth and dangerous." God help America!

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1973

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room S-116, Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, Muskie, McGovern, Aiken, Case, Javits, and Scott.

Also present: Mr. J. T. Smith, Department of Justice.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are meeting in executive session to discuss the availability of what I think is called a summary of the study made by the FBI on the question of taps of various members of the executive branch plus some members of the press. It is the matter which arose in the hearing the other day. It seems to me to be quite relevant to the nominee, Dr. Kissinger's procedures, which he has followed in his present position and which presumably he could or would follow in his new position as Secretary of State, in addition to being the director or the head of the National Security Council. I am never quite clear what Mr. Kissinger's title is in the National Security Council. Is it proper to call him the Director of the National Security Council?

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL;
ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, I don't think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. The head of it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is the President's National Security Advisor. Indeed he is staff director to the Council itself.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the report which we have requested is not a summary of the wiretaps as such. We do not ask for the raw material, but it is a comprehensive report on the origin and discussion of the 17 taps. It contains simply a summary of the results of the taps. It is also my understanding from the other day that there were no compromises of national security really revealed. That is not particularly the point that is interesting to me. What interests me is the procedure which is followed in these cases by the

(263)

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executive branch. It seems to me that all of this is quite relevant to
Mr. Kissinger's role and his new role as Secretary of State.

## PRECEDENT OF MR. BOHLEN

We had a precedent for this type of thing when Mr. Bohlen, I
believe, was nominated as Ambassador. The question was raised, I
believe, about what the FBI files showed about him. He was rumored
at least in the press to have had some unusual or unorthodox habits.
We resolved it by appointing a subcommittee of this committee to
look at the raw files as I recall it. Senator Sparkman, I believe was a
member of that and Senator Taft.

They were delegated to look at the files themselves. That resolved
that particular question and, as you know, everything worked out all
right.

It was against that background that it seemed to me quite proper
for the committee to be given the benefit of an examination of the
summary. That is about all I have to say.

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S POSITION

Mr. Attorney General, what is your position on this matter?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, speaking for the Department of
Justice, my approach to this is that we would like to be as helpful as
possible to the committee with respect to the question of the pro-
cedure followed by the executive branch as you put it a moment ago.
We recognize that this procedure and more especially Dr. Kissinger's
role in it is clearly relevant to the deliberations of the committee with
respect to his nomination.

It is necessary, however, to point out that the report to which you
referred does, in fact, contain summaries of the so-called raw data
found in certain of the wiretaps with respect to individuals. This
information, we believe, could prove embarrassing to them without
being material to the question of Dr. Kissinger's own role.

Senator JAVITS. May I ask you about one word? You now use the
word "material"; you used before the word "relevant"; now which is
it? You said this procedure is clearly relevant to the confirmation of
Dr. Kissinger. Now you said material.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sorry to have to confess, Senator Javits, that
although I may be a lawyer I used the word interchangeably.

Senator JAVITS. OK. They mean the same thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They did certainly in this context.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What I am really trying to say is that we would
like to give the committee all the information that the report contained
and that Bill Ruckelshaus and I possess with respect to Dr. Kissinger's
role. We would like, however, to draw a line at information that has
to do solely with individuals who were tapped and which derives
from those taps. The best way to do this it seemed to us to be, there-
fore, to prepare a memorandum to the committee based on the report.
This memorandum should be available in a few minutes. It is being
reproduced at the moment, and in anticipation of that perhaps it
would be useful if I gave the committee some background information
as to the origin of the report and what its full scope is.

265

ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF REPORT

Now, as you recall when Bill Ruckelshaus was appointed as the interim director of the FBI there arose a question in the course of the Ellsberg trial then proceeding in California as to the possible tainting of evidence in that case by information obtained through wiretaps that had just become known to the court, and that led to the instituting of a comprehensive search by Mr. Ruckelshaus to discover what records could still be found of those wiretaps.

The report in question was a report to him summarizing all the information that was eventually rounded up. It was meant to be a summary of all 17 taps, including who requested them, their duration, and what information was discovered.

The report contains the names of the individuals tapped and some information about them that, as I mentioned earlier, could prove embarrassing to them. In this connection it has long been firmly established policy of the Justice Department that this kind of material should not be disclosed unless an overriding public interest makes it essential.

BOHLEN PRECEDENT

The chairman referred a few moments ago to the Bohlen precedent under which a subcommittee was empowered to look at the actual FBI file. That would be analogous to creating a subcommittee in this instance to look at the FBI file on Dr. Kissinger himself. We are not aware of any consideration that does make it a matter of overriding public interest for the committee to see those portions of the report that have to do only with information about individuals that was found as a result of the taps.

On the other hand, as I say, we have sought to extract from the report and make available to the committee all that the report reflects with respect to the procedures followed, and Dr. Kissinger's role in these procedures.

Perhaps I might pause here, Mr. Chairman, before giving a summary of what the report shows. I anticipate distributing the memorandum to you and seeing what questions the committee may have at this stage.

ACCURACY OF LIST PRINTED BY NEWPAPERS

Senator AIKEN. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, was the list of 17 printed in some of the newspapers an accurate list?

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have never confirmed or denied the accuracy of the list, Senator Aiken, and we think there are grounds of official concern in doing so. It is a matter essentially of whether or not by a process of inclusion and exclusion in cases of this kind we do or do not by implication confirm in some instances because we failed to deny.

OPINION OF 17 PEOPLE LISTED CONCERNING RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Senator AIKEN. But my question really amounts to this: Of the 17 names, I believe, that were listed in some of the newspapers, whether accurate or complete or not, have any of those 17 people expressed any opinion as to whether what the FBI learned should be released or not or given to the committee? Have you heard from any of those 17 people, including the members of the press?

266

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is a lawsuit that is presently pending on the part of Mr. Halperin against—

Senator AIKEN. Of whom?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Morton Halperin.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was, had been, a member of the National Security Council staff. He has brought a suit against Dr. Kissinger and General Haig, and I think others, in which the Justice Department is now representing the Government officials who are named as defendants. There have been other cases in which there has been some communication directly by individuals who have seen themselves named with Mr. Ruckelshaus, and I would like to ask him to comment on that.

Senator AIKEN. I really want to know if any are opposed to divulging any information which was learned as a result of tapping their wires or are they perhaps in favor of it?

## BACKGROUND OF WITNESS' DECISION NOT TO DIVULGE RESULTS

Mr. RUCKLESHAUS. Senator, maybe I can give you some background of my own thinking.

Prior to divulging the results of the investigation that the FBI had that led to the discovery of the records involved in these 17 wiretaps I had myself given consideration to the revealing of the names. One of the documents which we will submit to the committee as soon as the memorandum arrives is a transcript of a statement that I made at a press conference in which I described the investigation and what we discovered from it on May 14 of this year. In that I stated to the press that I had decided not to reveal the names because of the potential harm to the individuals involved and that I simply could not anticipate and I was finally persuaded not to do so because it was clear to me that if the Government authenticated that these individuals had been in fact tapped and some unknown harm was done to an individual because of his name being associated with the Government's suspicion of him in the past of having been the source of leaked information there is no way that I could undo that, no way the Government could undo that. If, on the other hand, we made a mistake for not releasing the names for one reason or another we could always rectify that by releasing them.

I have since become convinced that I was correct in not releasing the names because some of the individuals involved still work for the Government. As you pointed out, there have been press stories stating who the names were from citing unnamed sources, but there never has been any Government authentication that these names were in fact the subject of wiretaps, and I am convinced that there is no way we can tell what the impact is going to be on an individual if there is an official statement by the Government, yes, this person was tapped.

Now, in the case of Halperin, the Justice Department does provide to the court the names of—in camera for the judge sitting in camera— the names of individuals who may be defendants or associated with the defendant against whom a wiretap by the Government was instituted or who was overheard. The court then makes the judgment as to whether these names should be given to the defense or whether

267

they should be released. But in this instance, the release of the names themselves does not seem to serve any purpose such as that of releasing them to a court in the public interest.

## WHO GAVE LIST TO PRESS?

Senator AIKEN. Do you know who gave the list to the press?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not know. [Deleted.]

## RELEVANCY OF KNOWING PROCEDURES NOMINEE FOLLOWED

The CHAIRMAN. Under our system when we are asked to approve a nomination of a man—whom most of us, including myself, greatly respect for his personal ability and his personal charm and everything else that goes with it—the procedures which he has followed in his role as the head of the National Security Council, and now Secretary of State, seem to me to be very relevant to our estimate of his future conduct of this office. It does not necessarily mean at all, in my opinion, if he ordered all the taps and asked for them that he should not be confirmed, but at least we would know where we are. I think we ought to be a party to the knowledge of the way the procedures are carried on.

I would not see any reason, really, why the committee should not know how the nominee has operated. We gather from what we have already read in the paper that Mr. Kissinger did request these taps. He gave the reason the other day in public session that he thought the national security was involved and that it was in that respect that he thought they were justified. There were 17 different taps. One of them, of course, as we all know, is now a member of the staff of this committee who was at that time a member of the staff of Dr. Kissinger.

This does not, in my opinion, reflect upon [deleted]. He does not seem to be very offended about it. It is a practice that has grown up. I don't think many of you approve of it as a procedure, but it seems to me the committee ought to know about it and go on from there as we we did with the Bohlen case. Senator Sparkman, you were one of the participants in that incident. It was resolved and we went ahead. Mr. Bohlen was confirmed. But from the point of view of the committee it would seem irresponsible for us to move on in the dark without resolving the question of whether this was a procedure which has been followed. It may be that the taps are justified, and that this is something we can look forward to in the future, that we will all be tapped. Maybe the members of the committee have been tapped. I don't know, but, I think, we ought to know just how we run our Government.

## WHAT COMMITTEE IS ASKING FOR

Senator SCOTT. I think we are entitled to know Mr. Kissinger's role in it. I am very leery about looking at those raw files.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not asking to look at the raw files. We are asking to look at the study which was prepared by Mr. Ruckelshaus as to the nature of the operation. We are pretty well informed that nothing violating or seriously violating, if at all, the national security was discovered in these taps. I don't know that there is anything that is, going to compromise them, but it is a procedure involved in how

21-561-73-2

268

we are going to run our Government that seems to me to be very interesting.

Senator Scott. Could the Attorney General break down the categories of these wiretaps? Are they all alike, all 17 of them, or did they fall into different categories?

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield, may I respectfully suggest as always we follow some procedure. I would like to question the witnesses very closely and I await on the ruling of the Chair as to how we should go about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was waiting for the Attorney General to proceed with his statement and then we will have the usual questioning.

Senator JAVITS. All right.

BOHLEN CASE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you move on, you referred to the Bohlen case. You remember we were at an impasse on that when the Chair appointed Senator Taft and me to go down and check.

I don't know just what may be implied by the term, "the raw files." We saw everything that was in that and I suppose that was it. We came back and reported to the committee. Senator Taft made a very strong statement on the Senate floor. I made a mild one, but we both came up with this feeling that we would never want to be investigated by the FBI on the basis of the supposed facts that they had in their files. Much of it, I think, was utterly ridiculous, and the statement was made to the committee and on the floor of the Senate, and we promptly moved to approve Mr. Bohlen's confirmation.

REVEALING INFORMATION SUPPORTED

I don't see that there would be anything hurtful in revealing this information. I would like to know if all of his aides that were connected with the—I understand this was connected with the National Security Council, wasn't it, and involved leaks that were given. In fact we saw those leaks in the papers ourselves at that time. They thought it was highly important. But if they were all tapped why then we might be concerned with all of them, all of us as a general principle. We are particularly concerned with one who is now on the staff of our committee and it seems to me we would be entitled to have full information on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Attorney General.

INFORMATION'S IMPORTANCE TO COMMITTEE AGREED WITH

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is certainly no disagreement between the committee and Mr. Ruckelshaus and myself with respect to the importance to the committee of the information about the procedure followed and Dr. Kissinger's role in it. The memorandum which has just been distributed to you in effect embodies all the information that can be gleaned from the report in that respect and it might be useful if I proceed from page 2 of this memorandum before we resume questioning.

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## SPECIAL PROGRAM OF WIRETAPS

In order to find the source of the leaks that have become of concern to the administration in the spring of 1969, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969 and terminated in February 1971. The information thus obtained was made available to senior officials responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further leaks.

Mr. Ruckelshaus, as he said earlier, in a press conference on May 14, 1973, elaborated further on this background. In all, 17 individuals were tapped as part of this special program. In each case a request for authorization was submitted to Attorney General Mitchell by the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. All the requests for authorization were signed by J. Edgar Hoover and approved by John N. Mitchell.

The individuals tapped fell into three categories.

1. Governmental employees who had access to sensitive information;

2. Newsmen who had printed leaked information;

3. Governmental employees who were discovered from the taps themselves as possibly involved in the leaks.

Thirteen of the taps were governmental employees and four were newsmen. The first taps were installed in May 1969 and the last were taken off in February 1971. They ranged in length from 1 to 21 months.

The FBI report to Mr. Ruckelshaus reflects the concern over the leaks of sensitive information transmitted to the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI in early May 1969 by the President and Dr. Kissinger. The FBI records on which this report was based do not, however, reflect all the deliberations that led to any given wiretap or the relevance to the leaked information of all the taps placed. Some names to be tapped were generated by consultation between the NSC staff and William Sullivan, the FBI Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence. When the NSC supplied a name the request for authorization to the Attorney General recited that fact with little elaboration by the FBI. This reflected the FBI's traditional role as the sole agency in the Federal Government that conducted national security wiretaps.

## DR. KISSINGER'S ROLE

As best can be determined from the FBI records, Dr. Kissinger's role included expressing concern over leaks of sensitive material and when this concern was coupled with that of the President and transmitted to the Director of the FBI, it led to efforts to stem the leaks, which efforts included some wiretaps of Government employees and newsmen. His role further involved the supplying to the FBI of names of individuals in the Government who had access to sensitive information and occasional review of information generated by the program to determine its usefulness. Any further elaboration of his role would have to come from Dr. Kissinger himself.

This is all that can be found in the report. The rest of the report deals with the summary of information obtained about these individuals from the taps themselves.

I should elaborate a little, I think, because Mr. Ruckelshaus and I have talked to Dr. Kissinger in order to supplement our own under-

270

standing of what occurred. Dr. Kissinger was, as he pointed out, new to his role of the National Security Council staff and totally unfamiliar with the uses of electronic surveillance of any form.

He did, however, feel deep concern, as did the President, and indeed those of us in the Department of State, I having happened to be there at the time, over the leaks. According to Dr. Kissinger, what originated here really was apparently a proposal by the director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, to employ in this instance a technique that had been used in other comparable instances, and so the question then was who will be tapped. Well, an obvious prospect for this were the reporters who had printed leaked information, and we thought that this might turn up someone who over the phone transmitted additional information. [Deleted.]

The other likeliest prospect so far as the White House staff were concerned with the members of the National Security Council staff themselves who had access to the information that had been disclosed, and so Dr. Kissinger was asked to furnish the names of those individuals and undoubtedly the furnishing of those names led to the fact that in certain instances they were made the subject of electronic surveillance. But it does not appear that he had other than one, a sharing of the concern over the leaks, and, two, an originating role in supplying SC staff names, any direct part in the process whereby these wiretaps were instituted.

Senator MANSFIELD. It does not appear you say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It does not appear.

ORIGIN OF REQUESTS FOR TAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Does it appear that Dr. Kissinger went to the President and asked for these taps?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not initiate the idea of asking for the taps?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, unless it is fair to say that you have to take together the report which undertakes to reflect what the records show, and Dr. Kissinger's own recollection of what occurred as to which, of course, he is a better witness than we are, but the FBI records indicate that there were requests for wiretaps of identified individuals, in one case by Dr. Kissinger and in two instances, on his behalf by then Colonel Haig.

[Deleted.]

SEPTEMBER 10, 1973, MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL

Senator AIKEN. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, is this statement clas-
sified?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

Senator AIKEN. OK.

[The document referred to follows:]

Washington, D.C., September 10, 1973.

MEMORANDUM

To: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

From: Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General.

Subject: Role of Henry A. Kissinger in placing of wiretaps to stem leaks of sensitive material affecting our national security in the period May 1969 to February 1971 as reflected in Justice Department records.

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The report which a member of the staff of this Committee requested from the Justice Department just prior to Henry Kissinger's confirmation hearing last Friday and which was alluded to in the hearings themselves was not written for the purpose of discovering the role of Dr. Kissinger in the placing of the questioned wiretaps. The report requested by then FBI Acting Director William D. Ruckelshaus was meant to be a summary from the FBI files of all seventeen taps including who requested them, their duration and what information was discovered. The report contains the names of the individuals tapped and some information about them that could prove embarrassing to them. It has long been Justice Department policy that this kind of material should not be disclosed unless an overriding public interest makes it essential.

It is hoped that this memorandum, which attempts to glean from the report in question Dr. Kissinger's role in the placing of the wiretaps, meets what we perceive to be this Committee's legitimate concern for that role.

## BACKGROUND

On May 22, 1973, the President made the following statement with respect to the rationale for the taps in question:

> By mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam, achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved highly secret diplomacy. They were closely interrelated. Leaks of secret information about any one could endanger all.

In order to find the source of the leaks, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969 and terminated in February, 1971. The information thus obtained was made available to senior officials responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further leaks.

I also attach for your information the opening statement in a press conference held by William D. Ruckelshaus on May 14, 1973 which elaborates further on the background of this matter. In all, 17 individuals were tapped as part of this special program. In each case a request for authorization was submitted to Attorney General Mitchell by the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. All the requests for authorization were signed by J. Edgar Hoover and approved by John N. Mitchell.

The individuals tapped fell into 3 categories:

1. Governmental employees who had access to sensitive information.

2. Newsmen who had printed leaked information.

Thirteen of the taps were governmental employees and four were newsmen. The first taps were installed in May of 1969 and the last were taken off in February of 1971. They ranged in length from one to 21 months.

## THE KISSINGER ROLE

The FBI report to Mr. Ruckelshaus reflects the concern over the leaks of sensitive information transmitted to the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI in early May, 1969 by the President and Dr. Kissinger. The FBI records on which this report was based do not, however, reflect all the deliberations that led to any given wiretap or the relevance to the leaked information of all the taps placed. Some names to be tapped were generated by consultation between the NSC staff and William Sullivan, the FBI Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence. When the NSC supplied a name the request for authorization to the Attorney General recited that fact with little elaboration by the FBI. This reflected the FBI's traditional role as the sole agency in the Federal Government that conducted national security wiretaps.

As best can be determined from the FBI records, Dr. Kissinger's role included expressing concern over leaks of sensitive material and when this concern was coupled with that of the President and transmitted to the Director of the FBI, it led to efforts to stem the leaks, which efforts included some wiretaps of government employees and newsmen. His role further involved the supplying to the FBI of names of individuals in the government who had access to sensitive information and occasional review of information generated by the program to determine its usefulness. Any further elaboration of his role would have to come from Dr. Kissinger himself.

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WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI, PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 14, 1973, 2:00 P.M.

Mr. CONMY. Good afternoon. This is an on the record news conference with William D. Ruckelshaus, Acting Director of the FBI. Mr. Ruckelshaus has a brief statement, after which he'll be pleased to respond to any questions. There are hand microphones on the sides of the room so I suggest it will be easier for all of us to hear if you use those when you do ask your questions. There is a background paper on wiretapping that's available to you. You may use it as you see fit. There is also a text of Mr. Ruckelshaus' statement and a full transcript of the entire news conference will be available, hopefully, later today.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Gentlemen, I'd like to read this statement, in its entirety so that we have this problem in context before your questions.

Shortly after assuming this job, my attention was drawn to several newspaper and periodical accounts of electronic surveillances, better known as wiretaps, having been placed on telephones of government employees and newsmen in an effort to stem the leaks of information related to highly sensitive foreign policy issues. Upon inquiry, I was informed by FBI employees that these surveillances had been performed and that the records relating to them were missing from the FBI files. Also the question had been raised in the Ellsberg trial whether information from these alleged taps had been used by the prosecution in any way and thus tainted the evidence.

As a result of this information, I immediately ordered an investigation into the facts surrounding the taps and the missing records. The investigation was started Friday, May 4, 1973, and was conducted under my personal supervision by highly skilled FBI personnel at Headquarters. Forty-two separate interviews were conducted, all by Headquarters personnel, and included travel to Phoenix, Arizona; Tampa, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; New York City; and Stamford, Connecticut.

The investigation revealed that from May, 1969, to February, 1971, based on consultations between the Director of the FBI and the White House, certain wiretaps were instituted in an effort to pinpoint responsibility for leaks of highly sensitive and classified information which, in the opinion of those charged with conducting our foreign policy, were compromising the Nation's effectiveness in negotiations and other dealings with foreign powers.

There was a total of 17 wiretaps placed for this purpose. Four were placed on newsmen as the potential recipients of leaks and thirteen on government employees as the potential sources. The taps were on for varying lengths of time during the period in question; two for as little as 30 days and one for as long as 21 months.

These requests were handled in the same way as other requests involving national security for a number of years and in prior Administrations. When a government agency or the White House requests surveillance the request is studied by the senior officials of the FBI, and if the Director approves, authority is then requested from the Attorney General. If he approves, as was done in this case, the surveillance commences, summaries are prepared from the logs, which are transmitted to the interested agency, or as in this case, the White House.

Because of the sensitivity of these particular surveillances, the records were very closely held; first in the Director's Office and then on the Director's orders under the custody of Mr. W. C. Sullivan who was an Assistant to the Director.

The investigation indicates that sometime in the summer of 1971, after the taps were all taken off, Mr. Sullivan contacted Mr. Robert Mardian, who was then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division, and informed him of the nature of these records and recommended that they be transferred to The White House. According to Mr. Mardian, the recommendation was made on the claim by Mr. Sullivan that Mr. Hoover might use the records in some manner against the Attorney General or the President. Mr. Sullivan does not affirm Mr. Mardian's claim. There is certainly no proof that Mr. Hoover had such intention but the charge had its desired effect. According to Mr. Mardian, he informed Mr. Mitchell, who in turn informed The White House. The records were taken from the files by Mr. Sullivan, who ordered them given to Mr. Mardian, who delivered them to The White House.

When the FBI discovered the records were missing upon Mr. Sullivan's retirement in the fall of 1971, it commenced an inquiry which ended when Mr. Hoover was informed by Mr. Mitchell that the records had been destroyed. It should be noted that Mr. Mitchell has denied making such a statement to Mr. Hoover. This conflict cannot be resolved because of Mr. Hoover's death. Mr. Mitchell, however, confirmed that the records were moved to The White House.

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In any event, the FBI accepted the premise that the records had been destroyed, and when I assumed my present position, I had no reason to believe that the records were still intact. It was not until last Thursday night that our investigation revealed, during an interview with Mr. Mardian in Phoenix, that the records probably still existed and might be in The White House.

The next day the records were located in The White House, having been filed in a safe in Mr. Ehrlichman's outer office.

Unfortunately, the records were not located in time to respond to Judge Byrne's inquiries about the potential taint of evidence in the Ellsberg trial. The interception of Ellsberg's conversations all occurred when he was either a guest of Morton Halperin, National Security Council, or conversing with him. It was one of those conversations of Mr. Ellsberg which I had informed the Judge on Wednesday, May 9, 1973, had been remembered by one of our employees who had monitored the tape. Of course, whether the location of the records would have had any effect on the Judge's decision is not for me to say.

On Saturday an FBI Agent and I went to The White House, identified and retrieved the records and they now rest in the FBI files.

The investigation was conducted with skill, speed and effectiveness by the FBI and resulted in the full retrieval of the records. I believe it is in the public interest to reveal these facts so that this story can be put in proper perspective.

Now I have two more points that I want to make, gentlemen. One is that I recognize how very emotional the question of wiretaps is in our society, and I asked at the time this investigation started that a history of the use of electronic surveillances or wiretaps in the FBI or by the FBI be prepared. The handout that you now have or is available is the result of that inquiry. I felt that the history was informative and good enough that it warranted being handed out at this press conference so that again these taps can be placed in that historical perspective. Secondly, since I am sure it will be one of the first questions, I want to touch on the reasons why I have not revealed the names of the 17 people who were placed under electronic surveillance during the course of this effort to stem the leaks. At first I felt it was probably a good thing to reveal these names in the interest of openness and letting the public know precisely what happened. And upon reflection I concluded that the potential harm to be done by the release of these names outweighed the good that could result in the openness of revealing them. The potential harm is clear to the employees of the Government in that their positions in the Government since they were at least once under suspicion and most, if not all of them, have since been exonerated, might be jeopardized. It's less clear as to the newsmen as to why the names would not be released, but again, upon reflection and a certain degree of agonizing I concluded that the potential was still there for some harm to be done by revealing their names to the public. And I was finally persuaded by the realization that if I made a mistake in releasing the names there was nothing I could do about it, but if I make a mistake in not releasing them I can always rectify that mistake by doing so later. So in response to any of your questions as to what these names are, or who is involved, my answer will be the same and that is that I will neither confirm nor deny that any of the names that you request are the subjects of this surveillance. I'll now attempt to answer your questions.

## LEAKS RESULTING IN SUBMISSION OF PARTICULAR NAME

The CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate what leaks, for example, occurred that resulted in the submission of a particular name? Does this occur in the summary?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, it does not. The summary only contains the sort of general background that was described by Mr. Ruckelshaus in his May 14 statement and later by the President in his May 22 statement.

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUESTS FOR TAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Does the summary indicate whether or not the Attorney General requested any names to be tapped?

Mr. RICHARDSON. There are two instances—I want Bill to hear this—the chairman's question was does the summary indicate any

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instance in which the Attorney General requested or originated a request for a wiretap, there are two.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Yes, there are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In every other case his role simply appears to have been that of approving the use of the wiretap.

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DENIAL OF ASKING FOR TAPS

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that the Attorney General had said at sometime or another that he had never asked for specific names to be tapped?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Mr. Chairman, I think I can answer that question. There had been stories that appeared starting in Time Magazine back in February of 1972 indicating the existence of these taps. There had been denials by Attorney General Mitchell of the existence of these taps starting then, and as the press conference record indicates this denial was, in effect, belied by the existence of the signed authorizations by the Attorney General himself on all 17 of these taps that were installed.

## APPROVAL OF AUTHORIZATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Did he sign the authorizations in blank and allow Mr. Kissinger to fill in the names?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Mr. Kissinger never had anything to do with the authorizations themselves. That would be a request form that was sent from the director of the FBI requesting authorization to install a given wiretap to the Attorney General. On the bottom of that form would be a line for approval by the Attorney General.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not approve them in blank?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. No, I am sure he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. In batches of three or four, is that not true?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. I am sure he did not approve these in blank. Mr. Chairman. But in fact signed them as he would receive them from the director of the FBI.

## INITIATION OF TAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that all but maybe one or two were initiated by Mr. Kissinger?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. No, I don't think that is fair to say that he initiated the taps themselves. I think the names were generated from a number of sources, including the members of the NSC staff who might have access to the information that was leaked. I think also some of the names were generated by the FBI when they overheard in the given wiretap names of people who might have been the source.

## JUSTIFICATION OF AND RATIONALE FOR TAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Take [deleted] who was [deleted] to [deleted]. What in the world would be the excuse for tapping his phone? What could be the justification? This puzzles me as a matter of procedure. I am not particularly interested in what they found out, but it seems very odd to me that they would initiate a tap, and especially if Mr.

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(c)

Kissinger initiated the tapping, of a [deleted]. If he would do that I don't know that he would not tap any member of this committee or the Majority Leader or anybody else. What is the excuse for it? This is what bothers me. What is the rationale?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. I think again, Mr. Chairman, the rationale would have to be access to information. The question of whether that justified it or not, I think is a question that we are not really equipped to answer. But the rationale was he would fit into the categories that are named in the memorandum, category 1.

### OBSESSION WITH SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. What this indicates is such an obsession with security that there is no limit in our Government. I am puzzled by it. Take the concern about the Pentagon papers. I read the Pentagon papers. They were an awful bore. Why you cared about them being published is beyond my comprehension and it seems silly to me why you care. You brought the suit.

Senator SCOTT. I would like to second that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what puzzles me. Parts of this don't bother me.

### PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN TAPPING QUESTIONED

It is the procedure that you follow. Our Government has come to where all of us are going to look at each other and wonder if we are going to be tapped. I used to be asked, "are you being tapped." I always said that I have no reason to think I am tapped because I am not important enough. I sort of passed it off as a joke. I did not think it was worthwhile for anybody to tap my phone and I never believed it was. When I had a conversation with you I asked you and you said none of our members had been tapped. I did not have any reservations that you did not tell me the truth about it because why should we be. But this is most peculiar. I can see why maybe [deleted] who worked for him was not loyal or even [deleted] but you go over here to the Department of Defense. You have [deleted] over in the State Department who was a [deleted] and I think [deleted]. Why in the world were such people tapped? If you had that kind of suspicion, I would think you would fire them. There is something about the procedure that seems very peculiar to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there was a question of specific suspicions attached to any individual. It was a question of their access to the information. In the case of NSC members the names were chosen solely on the basis that they had seen the information in question in the case of [deleted] it was they had access to the NSC process.

Senator CASE. On what basis do you make that assertion, on your own knowledge?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, I base it on the FBI records indicative of the fact that there are certain common denominators among the names and one common denominator is a role which on its face entailed access to the information. This accounts for the names of NSC staff and of [deleted] not any grounds of suspicion per se.

21-561-73-3

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## STORIES CONCERNING SALT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER BEECHER BYLINE

One of the, the Chairman touched on the question of concern with leakage, I remember vividly myself as a member of the State Department, the concern we had to certain stories under the Beecher byline with respect to SALT negotiations. This is as simple a problem as the kind of situation the homeowner faces in trying to sell his house. He would just as soon not have a neighbor tell a prospective buyer what his fallback price is, and we were in a what we thought was a highly critical and even portentous negotiation with the Soviet Union, and to find that information which we believed to have been held by very few people in the executive branch was being printed with a high degree of accuracy in Beecher's stories was considerably worrisome.

Senator CASE. This was an earlier experience of yours?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. And one of the consequences of this, Mr. Chairman, is that it tends to inhibit the kind of free discussion within the executive branch that ought to exist in the evolution of policy. The result of the leaks was progressively over time to narrow the group of people who participated in policy deliberations. In the case of SALT, for example, the size of the group shrank and shrank. The result of SALT, I think, has been good, but it meant that people in the State Department who would ordinarily, and I think desirably have been involved were not involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sparkman.

## COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, as I understand while we may be concerned and interested in all of the names on this list, the one we are particularly concerned with right now is a member of the staff of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted]. I hoped you would ask that.

Senator SPARKMAN. [Deleted] was a member of Mr. Kissinger's staff, as I understand, or a member of the staff of the Security Council. What was his position at that time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was [deleted] in a position such that all NSC written material, incoming or outgoing went through him.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that was the reason that he was included in the list of 17?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That certainly would have been a reason for his name to be furnished among the staff named?

Senator SPARKMAN. Was there anything found that was objectionable so far as he was concerned?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing in any information available to Mr. Ruckelshaus or to me indicates any finding at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. What about the other 16?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you finish that, was the tap discontinued when he came on this committee? Did it continue beyond?

Mr. RUCKELSHaus. Mr. Chairman, as I related to you in our earlier conversation that you alluded to a moment ago there has never been in the case of any staff members that were on the letterhead that you supplied to me or any members of this committee any wiretap placed on them by the FBI.

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The CHAIRMAN. Did the tap already placed continue beyond his employment in the NSC?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. It was not continued or there was not a tap on [deleted] while he was a member of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. This committee?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. This committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. It was discontinued then when he left the NSC?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman. May I make an off-the-record statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

## GUARDING AGAINST LEAKS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, you say you are walking a very narrow line. I think all of us ought to because we don't like to see these leaks that really concern important matters in the SALT talks, which were important, and other things that at that time were important. So far as I am concerned I have been asked lots of times if I felt my telephone was bugged and I said I had no idea and I did not care. They can bug mine any time they want to, but I do think we ought to be very careful. I am just saying this; it may not even be pertinent to the hearings this morning. But I hope we will get out of this situation and at the same time I know we have this job of guarding against leaks that might prove harmful to our country. That is all I care to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

## LEAKING NEWS TO ACHIEVE STATUS IN DISTRICT

Senator AIKEN. I used most of my time, Mr. Chairman. I simply would like to say I have noticed during the years I have been here that leaking classified or important news to certain newspapers appears to be one way of achieving status in the District. That is all I have.

DID DR. KISSINGER INITIATE ANY REQUEST FOR TAPS?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ruckelshaus and Mr. Richardson, to the best of your knowledge did Dr. Kissinger initiate, I repeat, initiate, any request for taps?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only answer I can give you to that insofar as we can construct the picture as a whole, no. It is true, on the other hand, that he or Colonel Haig on his behalf are identified in three instances in the formal requests for authorization submitted to Attorney General Mitchell as having requested taps.

The total picture, however, as reconstructed is one in which a decision was made as a result of a deliberative process involving the President and Kissinger and the director of the FBI that individuals on the NSC staff who had, or others who had access to this information should be the subject of taps, so that the decision that this would be done was not a Kissinger decision, even though for purposes of the form submitted to the Attorney General he is in some cases identified as the originator.

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The CHAIRMAN. To the best of your knowledge he did not originate any of these requests?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Although he is identified in the FBI records as having requested taps directly or through Haig, my discussions with Dr. Kissinger have convinced me that he was not the originator, in the fundamental sense of the word, of any of these taps.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Senator, in the President's statement of May 22 of this year in which he discussed this series of taps, he specifically states that he authorized the program among which were included wiretaps on certain individuals to try to stem these leaks and I think it was this authorization under which Dr. Kissinger was operating in supplying names either himself or through Colonel Haig to the FBI that resulted in taps.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

NECESSITY OF COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE SEEING FBI REPORT

Mr. Chairman, I would like, if I could, to find some way in which we can reconcile this matter, but I can't find any way in my mind in which we can do it without a representative of this committee who is responsibly chosen, whomever the Chairman wants, perhaps one on each side, seeing the FBI report. This I think would be true in any event, and I think it be particularly true that we would be regarded and I would regard myself as negligent if we did not insist on the best evidence, and this is not impugn either the Attorney General or Mr. Ruckelshaus in any way.

They are giving us, I am sure, and they have given me privately, the best information about this, but I think we ought to see it or have it seen by a representative of this committee as the best evidence because we will be regarded as not doing our job if we don't and the public won't be satisfied unless we do this. Against the background of the misrepresentations that have been made to us in oral testimony by the highest officials of our Government, I think we would be just wrong with anything less, and while this is not exactly the same as seeing the files of a man under consideration for appointment himself or the files regarding him, it is, I should think, although somewhat less of an extreme concession to congressional prerogatives for us to see this, how the executive branch of the Government works. The purpose, as we all know, is to find out not only what has been done but what is likely to happen in the future, chiefly for two reasons: One, to give the American public as good an idea as they can get of the extent to which officialdom has the right to pry; and, two, and more particularly this new department or department new to this man, wonders what it must expect in all of its branches as far as supervision goes.

EFFECT AND USE OF WIRETAPS

Now, certainly it is not necessary to make an argument on behalf of wiretaps. All I can say is on that score, whether a person minds it or not, the device is one which potentially gives one man authority over another, control over another, and renders that second person, a person tapped, in case of any kind of thing that may be harmful to

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him, of which he may be afraid or something of that sort, puts him in
the control of the person who has that information to a degree which
is intolerable and therefore it is something never to be used except in
the most extreme circumstances. We have, as a committee, the duty on
this occasion to make that point.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the point I am trying to make myself.

COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVES NOT REQUIRED TO PASS JUDGMENT ON 17

Senator AIKEN. May I ask one question there. Would the representatives of this committee be required to pass judgment on the guilt or innocence of the 17 people?

The CHAIRMAN. No; that is not involved. It is the procedure that
is involved.

Senator AIKEN. But if one of them was found—

PROCESS OF INITIATING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I make one comment, Mr. Chairman, in
reply to Senator Case's statement. It should be clear both with respect
to the past and certainly the future that the Secretary of State or the
adviser to the President for national security affairs would not have
in any event the power unilaterally to initiate electronic surveillance
of any individual.

It should be reemphasized that in each instance here the specific
request for authorization came from the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation who himself obviously bears responsibility
with respect to techniques of investigation employed in the U.S.
Government and in each instance, the request for authorization was
approved by the Attorney General, and certainly as far as the future
is concerned, any situation which was deemed by Dr. Kissinger to
potentially justify, and I am not sure there would be any, given the
history of this situation, but if it were to arise, the Secretary of State
would come either to the Director of the FBI, Chief Clarence Kelly
or to me, and we would have to exercise independent responsibility
as to whether or not this technique would be employed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

NO COURT ORDERS OBTAINED FOR 17 TAPS

Senator CHURCH. In connection with any of these 17 taps, I take
it that no court order was ever obtained?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

CHANGE IN LAW CONCERNING WIRETAPS

Senator CHURCH. Has there been a change of the law in this respect
as a result of subsequent court decisions or does it still lie within the
power of the Attorney General himself to sign off a request by the
Director of the FBI and wiretap anyone who may be thought suspect?

Mr. RICHARDSON. There has been a change in the law since the
wiretaps in issue here. This was reflected in a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in so-called *Keith* case, the *U.S. v. United
States District Court* handed down in June of 1972. That decision held
that the Constitution forbade the use of electronic surveillance

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without a court order against citizens of the United States in situations involving a threat only to the internal security of the United States. In other words, a situation involving concern with domestic violence or subversion.

The case did not reach the situation of the American citizen in a context involving a concern with national security. The position of the Government is that where the national security is involved there is still authorization for electronic surveillance without a court order against a U.S. citizen.

At any rate, as a result of the *Keith* decision in June of last year there were, there were then in effect six or seven wiretaps against U.S. citizens or organizations in situations not involving national security, and those wiretaps were removed and, there are none now in effect in that type situation.

DID COURT UNDERTAKE PRECISE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY?

Senator CHURCH. In the *Keith* case, did the Court undertake to set forth a precise definition of national security?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, they did not.

They recognized in a good deal of the language of the opinion that the Omnibus Crime Control Act adopted in 1968 I think, did contain a recital to the general effect that the Congress did not intend one way or another by creating provisions for the Court authorized wiretaps in certain types of criminal cases to affect one way or another whatever inherent power the President might have to obtain electronic surveillance in national security cases; that issue has been dealt with in a number of lower court decisions which have invariably sustained the power of the executive branch to use electronic surveillance in national security and foreign intelligence situations. This authority was confirmed most recently in the decision 2 or 3 weeks ago here in the District of Columbia by Judge Pratt, *Zweibon v. United States*. This issue is, of course, presented in the lawsuit brought by Morton Halperin against Dr. Kissinger and others.

HEARING PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, unfortunately we have an open meeting at 10:30. Dr. Kissinger I presume is over there. I don't know what to do about the procedure because it is obvious if we hang around we are going to go far over the time. I wonder if we should perhaps recess until, say, 4 o'clock this afternoon when we will have time to go into this matter. What does the committee wish to do about it?

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, my feeling is if we limited each of us to 5 minutes it is very important to know what we are going to question Dr. Kissinger about.

The CHAIRMAN. What can I do? Shall I go over and start the hearing with Dr. Kissinger?

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Senator PELL. Or five—
[Discussion off the record.]

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest we each have 5 minutes.

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Senator CHURCH. I have completed my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you notify Mr. Kissinger we will be a little late.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Is Senator Church through? Thank you.

COULD WITNESSES BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY CONCERNING FBI
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE?

Mr. Attorney General, do you believe that you could be compelled
to testify in a relevant case to what you know and what Ruckelshaus
knows about these FBI electronic surveillances?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You mean in an individual case?

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Conceivably. I think it is a question hard to
answer in the abstract but there could certainly be circumstances
which justified it.

WHY IS INFORMATION DIFFERENT FROM OTHER SECRET MATERIAL?

Senator JAVITS. Well now do you consider that we, in our official
duty, which is what we are questioning you about, are in any different
situation from either you or Mr. Ruckelshaus, considering the fact
that we too represent an independent branch of the Government with
a reason for knowing? You have lots of things that are secret that are
given to us now. Why should this be put in some different class from
any other secret material? We are entitled to secret material as much
as you are, you know about it, why shouldn't we?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No question, of course, Senator Javits, as to the
right of access of this committee to secret materials. The issue here,
however, is simply whether or not the committee does have a real
reason to see information with respect to the individuals who are
wiretapped or information obtained as a result of those taps as dis-
tinguished from any information that we have with respect to Dr.
Kissinger's role.

PROCEDURE CONCERNING NAMES AND DR. KISSINGER'S ROLE
SUGGESTED

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Attorney General, would you, therefore, see
any objection to the following procedure: Give us the names, the 17
names; we examine Dr. Kissinger in executive session under oath, as
to his initiation or any connection with those surveillance requests or
anything else related to them, and based upon that testimony, for us
to see whatever, in the opinion of the chairman of our committee and
the ranking minority member and the Attorney General, becomes
relevant by virtue of Dr. Kissinger's testimony under oath on indi-
vidual names?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would have to give some further thought to that,
Senator Javits. It had been my view that we should seek to establish
a line between whatever we could furnish or Dr. Kissinger could
furnish directly with respect to his role, on the one side, and the cor-
roboration officially of the list of names or the specific information

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developed with respect to an individual, on the other. And if we are to
depart from that distinction, I would have to do so only as the result
of a little more deliberation than is possible here.

Senator JAVITS. Well, Mr. Attorney General, if I may explain my-
self further, the Attorney General has already said that this particular
inquiry, line of inquiry, is material. He said material equals relevant to
Dr. Kissinger's confirmation. We cannot begin to make inquiry with-
out the names. Certainly we have a right to know the names in order
to find out from Kissinger what he did or did not initiate and what he
did or did not practice respecting a given name. All I say is we want
that first. We have a right to it. When we have it then we question
him, that is the next step. Then we must again prove relevance, if we
wish to go further, and it seems to me that that will depend upon
Dr. Kissinger's testimony.

I proceed upon the theory that there is nothing in this, in my judg-
ment, that will stop his confirmation. But I also proceed from the
theory that members of this committee with legitimate concern, have a
right to know, and I have a right to know. So I say let us start with
what is an essential beginning. We can't question him. All we know is
the name of Mr. Halperin. Other than that we know nothing. We
can't question him about his relationship to these taps without a list
of the names of the people tapped. It seems to me, Mr. Attorney
General, that if you are protected, or to whatever extent you are pro-
tected, insofar as the list is concerned, only, that is a proper first start-
ing point. We are protected, too.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I certainly would not want to reject out of hand
that possible method of procedure; and if the committee were to
conclude that that is the procedure it wishes to follow, I would give
the committee a very prompt response to it from our point of view.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Missouri.

TIME PERIOD OF COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER'S TAP

Mr. Ruckelshaus, in your statement you say, "The taps were on
from May 1969 to February 1971." In early 1969 [deleted] came with
the committee and left Dr. Kissinger's employ September 1969 and
joined this committee in October 1969. As a result of what the Attorney
General said, was the tap taken off very quickly?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. I think—

Senator SYMINGTON. If it went from May of 1969 to May of 1971
and he went to work for the committee in October 1969, inasmuch as
he was the one I dealt the most with on certain matters, I am interested.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. As the Attorney General related, Senator
Symington, there was in respect to this member of the committee
staff a very short period of time in which a tap was on, and this was an
instance of about a month starting in May of 1969 so that he was not
subject to any electronic surveillance while he was a member of the
committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Javits' question is pertinent because
we would like to know why the tap was put on and why it was taken
off so quickly.

283

Mr. RICHARDSON. The reason it was put on was simply that papers flowed through his hands. It was not a question of the existence of any suspicion.

Senator SYMINGTON. He resigned, was not discharged.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is true.

REASONS WITNESS KNOWS MR. EHRLICHMAN DOES NOT HAVE TAPS

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you know Mr. Ehrlichman has not a copy of these tapes? It is easy to copy a tape.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Well, the records are fairly voluminous, Senator, and what I think Mr. Ehrlichman did simply—Mr. Ehrlichman simply held the tapes as custodian from the White House after they were transferred from the FBI to the White House.

HAS ACTION BEEN TAKEN AS RESULT OF TAPS?

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you taken any action against anybody as a result of information you received on these taps?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. The FBI has taken no action at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I may quote my colleague from New York, they may be raw to us but they are not raw to you. You know the facts; we don't. Based on the information in the tapes, has any action been taken with respect to anybody who was tapped?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. I think Dr. Kissinger would be the best witness to that, Senator, because the purpose of the taps themselves was to discover whether any of these individuals was the source of leaks and there could be no way you could tell from that information just exactly how it could be put together with other information that could lead to that conclusion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. [Deleted.]

VIEWERS OF RAW FILES AND POSSESSORS OF FBI REPORT

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you file for the record, Mr. Attorney General, those people in the Government who have seen the raw files in this particular case, and also the names of anybody outside the Government who has a copy of the FBI report?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I certainly can't do the latter because no one outside the Government should have seen it. We do not know how the names have been disclosed.

Senator SYMINGTON. That would be my next question, do you know who released the names of those tapped?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ruckelshaus mentioned it in the statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He has a suspicion, I think.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. I don't know. I have no firsthand information as to who put out the names.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you give us a list of all people who have seen the raw files, in the Government and outside?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the raw files I don't know that we can, this would be hard to reconstruct. We could identify some names.

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Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. The problem is, Senator, I am not trying to be evasive; there are a number of employees in the FBI who are mechanically involved in any wiretapping operation who might have information that we would not necessarily know about. They might have bits and pieces of the information because of their monitoring responsibilities or transcription responsibilities.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Sullivan was obviously opposing his chief, Mr. Hoover. Inasmuch as Mr. Mitchell denies what was supposedly said by Mr. Hoover, et cetera, it would be interesting to find out all the people involved, a list of those you think have seen the raw files.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

INITIATOR OF MONITORING NEWSMEN

Senator SCOTT. I think I will save time by asking one question and that is on the newsmen. The newsmen, of course, would not be within the category of the governmental employees with access to sensitive information. Is there anything in the files that would indicate that the monitoring of the newsmen was initiated in the first instance by Dr. Kissinger?

Mr. RICHARDSON. [Deleted.]

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. The answer is somewhat ambiguous. There is— and I think that we best be very clear on that and again because of the manner in which the authorization was originally made by the President to institute this program to stop the leaks the transmissions by the FBI of requests to the Attorney General for authorizations sometimes contained the request as having come from either Colonel Haig or Dr. Kissinger when this may be—may have been a form that was agreed upon for getting authorization from the Attorney General to make a given wiretap. This may not reflect exactly what happened or how an individual name came up. It may be impossible to reconstruct Dr. Kissinger's role from the FBI records. This does not mean the FBI records are deliberately inaccurate or are meant to cover up the true facts. In order to satisfy this committee, I think you would have to ask him that question personally. The Attorney General and I are just really not in position to be able to answer that with assurance.

[Deleted.]

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. However, having been a Director of the FBI for 75 days, I know that the general procedure in the FBI was that, where a given national security wiretap was originated by information the FBI had, there was a very elaborate request made of the Attorney General justifying his authorization for a given tap, but where the FBI received a request from the National Security Council, this elaboration was not, as a rule, made.

Senator CASE. Could that elaborate procedure be avoided by having a Director get Henry Kissinger to say "Let me have the dope?"

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Sure.

Senator CASE. In other words, the authorizing document does not necessarily, in itself, tell the full story.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. That's possible.

285

Senator CASE. I think we ought to know if Mr. Kissinger is going to lend himself to that kind of a practice. It is a matter of some relevance, too.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As Mr. Ruckelshaus has pointed out, the answer to Senator Scott's question about newsmen is ambiguous, in that newsmen who printed stories containing leaked information fell into one of the originally designated categories. I think it is clear from the record that the idea of doing that did not originate with Dr. Kissinger.

Senator SCOTT. That is what I was really trying to get at. That he is not the person who thought of the idea of tapping the newsmen. That is all I wanted to get at.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

SECURITY VIOLATION NOT INDICATED BY TAP

Did the tap on [deleted] in any way indicate that he had violated security?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. The answer is "No."

NO MEMBER OF COMMITTEE HAS BEEN TAPPED

Senator PELL. Also, Mr. Attorney General, I wanted to confirm this again. Is it correct to say that no member of this committee, to the best of your knowledge, has been tapped?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, none has.

Senator PELL. Is that your view?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. That is true, Senator, but because a similar request was made by the chairman when I was in the FBI and I made a search and I can state categorically that is true.

KEITH DECISION'S LIMITATIONS ON WIRETAPPING

Senator PELL. Thank you. Somewhat further afield the Keith decision cited earlier, saying that no citizens of the United States can be tapped, still leaves in the field of national security, foreign embassies, or foreign people.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the decision is not, does not necessarily exclude U.S. citizens who are involved in some situation of foreign intelligence or national intelligence or espionage. What it says is you can't use taps without a court order in situations involving domestic subversion, violence and the like.

Senator PELL. Does this mean now you cannot use taps going after the Mafia or organized crime?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, but you can't do so without a court order. In other words, in going after organized crime we do seek and obtain court orders under title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act.

Senator PELL. And would you have to have that court order in order to put one on?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.

286

LIST OF NAMES REQUESTED FROM MR. KISSINGER

Senator McGEE. Do I recollect correctly about Friday's hearing that in response, in essence, to some of these questions about Mr. Kissinger's role that Dr. Kissinger replied, as I remember, that when the FBI, the President, Mr. Kissinger, whoever was involved, maybe the Attorney General, made the decision collectively, that Mr. Kissinger was asked to submit the names of those who would have had access in his agency to the leaked information for purposes of checking it out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator McGEE. Is that a correct recollection?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator McGEE. That should remind us, at least of one of the factors present in the Kissinger position. Whether he would modify it in an executive session we would have to find out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was the only list of names as to which he would have information not equally available to other people.

Senator McGEE. He was asked to submit that list to determine their relationship, if any, to specifically leaked information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator McGee. Were there any factors associated with the leaks but not associated with the sensitive diplomacy that entered into the decisions that were made?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, certainly not as to that list. It is possible with respect to two or three names on the list as to which there is no obvious relationship to National Security Council staff or the distribution of National Security Council papers. In any event these are individuals, and I think this is clear from all the information available to us as to whom Dr. Kissinger was entirely unaware that there was any tap at all.

Senator McGEE. Is there anyone on the list of 17, obviously other than the 4 newsmen, who did not have known access to the leaked material?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Could you repeat that?

Senator McGEE. Yes. Is there anyone on the list of 17, except for the 4 newsmen obviously, who did not have access to the known leaked material?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, there were in two or three instances and these are the same individuals to whom I referred in response to your earlier question.

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REQUEST FOR TAP

The CHAIRMAN. Did [deleted] request the tap on [deleted].

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Kissinger?

Senator CASE. He can't answer that question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not sure—I don't think his name figures.

Senator CASE. Who did ask for the tap on [deleted]?

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. All of these people with access to the information were generated, those names were generated pretty much the same way.

287

Senator CASE. But it is very odd that [deleted] would not have asked—it is very odd that Dr. Kissinger would have asked for a tap on [deleted].

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Mr. Chairman, I think what would have happened would be that the request would come from the President or the director of the FBI—there are people who would have access to this information could have been the source that [deleted] name may have been generated in that fashion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was the principal point of contact for [deleted] with the National Security Council staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie.

## ABANDONMENT OF PAST RESTRAINTS

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Attorney General, I won't try to belabor any points that were made. I have always believed there are certain gray areas in the relationship between the Presidency and the Congress that are better left undefined, areas such as the impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and classified information. We have been able to avoid precise definitions over the years because of the practice of restraint on the part of both the Presidency and the Congress.

What troubles many of us is that there is so much evidence that the restraints that have been honored in the past have been abandoned by some and that abandonment could lead to a society in which some men are more equal than others. That is really what is at the heart of our inquiry here. I do not detect in this discussion this morning any real revulsion against the notion that in national security, there must be a guideline for the use of this technique. But when restraints are abandoned in secret, then there is no check against the abandonment. This is what Senator Case is speaking about. This is what all of us are speaking about. So I express that as a matter of philosophy and I think it underlies this whole discussion.

For instance, in this list of 17, and I have not verified it—I have no way of verifying it—at least two are names of people who were closely associated with me in a foreign policy advisory role throughout 1970 and most of 1971. I am naturally curious and interested as to whether or not when they became associated with me and were no longer associated with the executive branch, they were still subject to electronic surveillance. If they were, there is a possible inappropriate purpose as well as the continuance of an appropriate purpose. So the line becomes very obscure. And I think as a society we have a right to know whether that line is slowly being breached and undermined to the detriment of the credence of all of us. So I am interested in Senator Javits' suggestion. I am not sure it is the only one, but it is a specific one, and I think we need to resolve some pertinent questions that were put this morning. I am not going to repeat them or try to find another set of words to put them in, but simply state the philosophical view and illuminate the point.

## INITIATIVE FOR PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION OF WIRETAPS

I will make this one point. Mr. Ruckelshaus emphasizes that these wiretaps were originated under the President's authorization. I would be curious to know whether or not that authorization was the result of some initiative taken by some person other than the President.

288

Somebody must have recommended to him that this technique be used. Who was the one person? Was it several? Did it include Dr. Kissinger? It is of concern to us to know where these ideas originate, what their motivation is, and whether or not there are greater responsibilities of people whose inclinations are in this direction.

## PROCEDURES FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I comment briefly, Senator Muskie, because I think you have, as have others, including Senator Case, appropriately touched on the fundamental issues involved here. First, I would like very briefly to assure the committee that so far as Mr. Ruckelshaus and the present director of the FBI and I are concerned we are dedicated to seeking to assure that the policies, procedures, guidelines employed in this area are as clear and as communicable as possible and that they restrict the use of electronic surveillance to as narrow an area as possible, and that they demand as clear as possible a showing of justification. We share the feeling that this is a technique that should never be used except on a very compelling showing, and we regard it as our responsibility to make sure that the procedures require that showing and that the showing is properly evaluated up to and including an evaluation by myself.

## CHECKING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE THROUGH LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Senator MUSKIE. Could I put a question to you? The separation of powers doctrine represents an approach to government never previously taken. That is, the way to avoid abuse of authority is to divide it into compartments and then to provide an additional check.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator MUSKIE. It seems to me that the possibilities of electronic surveillance are so great unchecked that we must find a way to check it. The only way to check it is through the legislative branch. Would you agree with that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, in principle I would, and this is why Mr. Ruckelshaus and I encouraged Mr. Kelly in his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee to express a generally affirmative approach, respond to the idea of establishing an oversight subcommittee for the FBI. He did this and in fact the subcommittee has now been established, and one of the reasons why we felt, and Chief Kelly agrees, that this is desirable is that it is a way of providing an element of check on the exercise of this power that heretofore has not been in existence.

I believe also we have been exploring how best to make communicable the policies and procedures that are followed, and I hope that we are continuing with that idea at some point we could make these more widely understood [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGOVERN.

289

## PLACEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY DEMAND AHEAD OF OPEN SOCIETY

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time just with one observation. I think not only in this case but in many others it is now clear that we have placed the demands of national security ahead of the requirements of an open society. I think it is something that is going to have to be gone into much more thoroughly, not simply with reference to Dr. Kissinger's confirmation but many things that have come to light in the last few months. That is all I want to say at this time.

## PUBLICATION OF STATEMENTS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MR. RUCKELSHAUS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this question. Are the Attorney General's statement and that of Mr. Ruckelshaus to be published in the transcript after editing?

The CHAIRMAN. He stated that the statement he made, written, is not classified. It can be given to the public.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. We have not—

The CHAIRMAN. So far as the executive hearing, it always has to be sanitized and the usual procedure will be followed in that case.

Senator SPARKMAN. I said after being edited.

## COMMITTEE ACTION CONCERNING DENIAL OF SUMMARY

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the situation is that the Attorney General has declined to make available the summary. Now what the committee does about that will have to be decided in executive session later. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey. I am not satisfied to accept the statement made without having a sub-committee at least of this committee take a look at the summary.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to make a motion whenever we get into executive session to follow the procedure which I outlined to the Attorney General. He says that if we do agree that that is what we want that he would then give us, an immediate, relatively immediate, answer. Senator Muskie has suggested, very kindly, that my suggestion is a good one but maybe there will be others. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that the Chair will get the committee together this afternoon so that we may in the regular way move whatever anybody wants to.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to do that this afternoon.

Senator JAVITS. We can meet at 4 o'clock if you would like. We ought to go over there. I hate to keep Dr. Kissinger waiting. Is 4 o'clock about right. We will meet here in executive session at 4 o'clock.*

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the committee recessed.]

* [Committee business meeting; unpublished.]

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1973

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Pell, McGee, Muskie, Humphrey, Aiken, Case, Scott, and Griffin.

Also present: Senator Goldwater.

Also present: Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased to have you, Dr. Kissinger. I would say just by way of preliminary, and then I want to call upon Senator Sparkman and especially Senator Case and then the rest of the members, that the discussion that we have had really, if I can try to summarize it, is that it is the procedure of decisionmaking, particularly with regard to wiretapping in which we are interested. It is not the substantive material which you discovered in wiretapping. But I think I speak for the committee in saying that the procedure of wiretapping without the most stringent, if I could use the proper word, restrictions upon its being used is what concerns the committee more than anything else. I believe I speak for everybody and that is the consensus.

One other thing that concerns us very much is the combination of the two offices of head of the National Security Council, and of the State Department. I believe most of us feel that this also is a precedent which will narrow the bases on which future decisions are made and the number of people who participate in important decisions even further. Those are the two, I believe, outstanding questions. That is by way of preliminary explanation of the nature of the discussion here this morning in the committee.

Senator Sparkman, would you like to start the questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I will ask him one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESS' ATTITUDE TOWARD PRACTICE OF WIRETAPPING IN FUTURE

Based upon the principle of the discussion we have had this morning relating to this question of when and under what conditions we will have wiretapping, the committee, I think, is unanimous in its feeling

(291)

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that such a thing ought to be used only in extreme circumstances. The Attorney General has, for instance, given a statement—you have seen that statement that he made—

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. Of the conditions under which he would invoke wiretapping. I think the whole committee indicated its desire to know from you not so much what has been done in the past—we have gone over that several times—but what you propose with reference to this practice in the future.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, the issue of wiretapping is one about which I feel rather strongly, which has given me a great deal of personal anxiety and, therefore, I am very glad to answer this question. As I have attempted to point out on a number of occasions, a great deal depends not only on the form and procedures but on the attitudes.

I would like to make two points. First, I never recommended the practice of wiretapping. I was aware of it, and I went along with it to the extent of supplying the names of the people who had had access to the sensitive documents in question. Despite some newspaper reports, I never recommended it, urged it, or took it anywhere. Indeed, the thought that I might be in a position to do this in the fourth month of a new administration which I joined as an outsider is in itself inconceivable.

Second, while I confess I thought it was necessary, in the light of the explanations that had been given to me by both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General, to the effect that this was a common practice, of which I had no independent knowledge but which I accepted, I nevertheless disassociated myself from all further internal national security matters as soon as I could. And if you will look at the history of what has come to be known as the Watergate affair, I did not participate in any discussions or have knowledge of any of these activities, nor did I read the reports of these wiretaps, even those confined to national security matters, after the early spring of 1970.

Now then, what will be my attitude in the future? I cannot conceive a circumstance in which I would recommend a wiretap on a subordinate in the State Department. If there were some great security matter and if the constituted law enforcement authorities would recommend such a thing, then my tendency would be to adhere strictly to the criteria set out by the Attorney General. I cannot now foresee a circumstance in which I would recommend a wiretap, and certainly not for newspaper leaks.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will not pursue that further. We did want a statement from you as to what your policy would be.

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICYMAKING ROLE

I hope that in handling the State Department you will do what I believe you would, and that is put new life into the Department, and make it truly the alter-ego of the President in our international relations.

293

tions. I have a feeling that we may have lapsed into a kind of easy-
going-along with the State Department, and not played as vigorous a
role as we might. That is my own personal hope. I believe you will
do it. Of course, I would follow the assurance you have given us in
working closely with this committee.

Mr. KISSINGER. In three administrations, Senator, it is true that the State Department has gradually declined in its policymaking aspect. There are a variety of reasons for it. Some of them have to do with the fact that it is easier to make decisions rapidly in a small circle. It has to do also with the internal organization of the State Department, which is more geared to clearing cables than to making long-range policy; therefore, whenever there is a major decision to be made, the tendency of the State Department has been not to make it, for the State Department has not had the quality of producing the policy options but has rather confined itself to drafting the instructions.

Now, it is my firm intention to restore the State Department to its
policymaking role. I have a number of personnel changes in mind. One
of the most important will be to reinvoke the policy planning staff and
give it a central role also in the development of policy, in making
sure our day-to-day policy is geared to our long-range policy. One of
the reasons why I accepted the President's nomination is my hope of
turning the State Department into a principal policymaking adviser
to the President.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, would you like to ask questions?

LEAKS WHICH LED TO WIRETAPPING

Dr. Kissinger, I would like to ask you for the record to answer as
specifically as you can, what the leaks were that disturbed you and
when they occurred.

Mr. KISSINGER. That led to the wiretapping?

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER. First, Senator Case, you have to remember that
this happened 4 years ago, and that chasing down leaks was not my
central preoccupation. The leaks that I now remember—the first that
I remember—rather graphically concerned the substance of a National
Security Council meeting on the Middle East.

Senator CASE. When was that?

Mr. KISSINGER. Since it happened when President Eisenhower was
still alive, it must have been in February 1969.

Senator CASE. You remember it quite specifically?

Mr. KISSINGER. I remember it quite specifically.

Senator CASE. That was the one you referred as to having—

Mr. KISSINGER. Because I was not aware of the fact that President
Eisenhower could use such graphic language. Having visited him in
the hospital, I thought he was in a rather weakened state, and when
I heard that language on the telephone and the way it was expressed,
it left a rather deep impression on me.

Another leak that I remember had to do with the deliberations
concerning the shootdown of the EC-121, the reconnaissance plane
off the shores of North Korea.

294

Senator CASE. When was that?

Mr. KISSINGER. That was in April 1969.

Senator CASE. What was the nature of that leak?

Mr. KISSINGER. As I remember it now, and I do not remember it very well, it had to do with the internal deliberations of the President and his advisers as to the courses of action that might be taken including the consideration of military actions that had been planned and then rejected.

Senator CASE. Was this a matter that was discussed in a wide circle within this group?

Mr. KISSINGER. It was discussed in a small circle within the National Security Council.

Senator CASE. One, three, four, five people?

Mr. KISSINGER. That would have been discussed among the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and my office. We had a small working group meeting at the White House with the deputies of all these individuals, working out a scenario of the diplomacy and the military actions that could be taken, and so forth.

Then, of course, I remember the Cambodian leak.

Senator CASE. When was that?

Mr. KISSINGER. Early May 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the Cambodian leak? What do you mean by that?

Mr. KISSINGER. The leak about the bombing of Cambodia.

The CHAIRMAN. Early 1969?

HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATMOSPHERE OF LEAKS

Mr. KISSINGER. Early 1969. Let me say another thing about that. First, when one is new in Government, leaks take on an extraordinary significance, because one has a sort of a tendency to think that a top secret paper is inviolate, and when one suddenly sees the essence of it in the newspaper there is usually a rather strong reaction. I have talked to members of previous administrations who have described their similar reactions to me.

One has to be candid. This is sometimes out of proportion to the intrinsic damage that this particular leak may do, looked at in the long view. But it tends to have an effect on confidence.

In the interval of the changeover between administrations, some of our predecessors told us that one of the things we should be particularly careful about was leaks, by which those who had disagreed with policies would try to lobby against them afterward.

So I would, first, say that there was certainly a necessity, but second, that there was also probably perhaps a heightened consciousness of leaks that was not always related to the long-term damage that the particular leak might do. And this was coupled with the fact that the divisions in the country were profound on some of these issues. It created a certain civil war atmosphere that would not be appropriate under current conditions.

Senator CASE. That was only true, was it not, in regard to Cambodia? There was no real division within the country about the Middle East.

295

Mr. KISSINGER. That is true. There was on the Korean thing, and there were a whole series—

Senator CASE. Not that it was not serious but I just meant—

Mr. KISSINGER. There were a whole series of other leaks that I just do not remember today, that would constantly be called to one's attention.

[Committee staff note: Thirty-nine and one-half pages of the verbatim transcript were deleted at the request of the Department of Justice and the Executive Office of the President. The pages deleted contain Senator Case's discussion with the witness of each instance of electronic or other surveillance described in the FBI report.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

## SITUATION CONCERNING FAO MEETING IN ROME

Senator AIKEN. I had two or three questions sent down in writing by request relative to the influence of the military in formulating State Department policies. But I have had one request, an oral request this morning, that relates to the action of United Nations affiliated agencies. The story I had was that the FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization] had called a meeting in Rome rather prematurely. The report indicated that they, in view of the very large food crop we are producing in this country, plan to dispose of it as long as it is at our expense, and that the Administration is not pleased with the situation and is not sending any high level representatives to that meeting contrary to their usual custom.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Aiken, I am not familiar with that event.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER. But I can tell you that I intend, if I should be confirmed in time, to appear before the United Nations General Assembly to state the United States position with respect to the agricultural problem on a worldwide basis, and that my proposal would include giving the United Nations a significant role in determining the needs on a comprehensive basis. But I do not know this—

Senator AIKEN. This would not be the first time that the United Nations had itself attempted or offered to dispose of U.S. resources, including financial resources.

Mr. KISSINGER. That would not be the first time.

Senator AIKEN. No, it certainly would not. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

## RECOMMENDATION OF CHARLES TOM HUSTON

Dr. Kissinger, the Dean papers were given to Judge Sirica and he gave them to the Armed Services Committee. At that time I was acting chairman. In those papers was a document signed by Tom Charles Huston, which was an extraordinary document.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have never seen it.

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Senator SYMINGTON. It was a memorandum, copy to the President and Mr. Haldeman. It recommended surreptitious entry. I think you know the document I am referring to.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have read it in the paper.

Senator SYMINGTON. The document appeared a clear fascistic effort to overcome the law. That is the way I read it.

Later the President referred to it as a plan which went into effect for 5 days, then was withdrawn under the protests of Mr Hoover. In the handwriting of Mr. Hoover were his noted objections on the paper that we had.

Then, there was a document from the Central Intelligence Agency Director. "I was astonished the Attorney General knew nothing about it." It is my guess that what happened was that Hoover demanded the President put it in writing, and then it went to the Attorney General, to whom he reported at least in theory, and said "I demand it in writing because it is breaking the law" and then the Attorney General told the President he could not write the letter because it would break the law.

## AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM WITNESS AFTER CONFIRMATION

I have been on the National Security Council and think I understand its functioning. If you stay in the two positions, you are going to be in a position where you will have unprecedented authority never before granted to anybody but the President.

Are we going to be able to get adequate information from you? You have assured us on the wiretapping. You have assured us on the executive privilege. And this is our last chance.

Are we going to be able to handle this in the American way of the past or is there going to be additional effort made to handle it on the basis as recommended by the Huston memorandum.

Mr. KISSINGER. First of all, Senator, let me say something that I feel very deeply about. What I have said to this committee about co-operating with this committee is not a device to get confirmed. Under any projection, we are going to have a very rough time over the next 3½ years in terms of both domestic and international problems. I believe that it is absolutely essential for the legislative and executive branches broadly to restore confidence in government, and in the purposes of this country, so that our successors will be able to operate within the framework of public trust and long-term conditions. So this is not your last chance at me. Indeed, I hope that if the committee confirms me, we can take up very rapidly a close and confident association. So you will not depend on the individual questions asked around the table, but you will know constantly what I am doing.

## HUSTON MEMORANDUM

Now, to get first to the Huston memorandum, after May 1970 I was disassociated from any internal security matters. I did not know there was such a thing as the Huston memorandum. I know newspapers are making fun of these statements of mine. They happen to be true. I did not know there was such a memorandum. I did not know there was such a committee studying these problems, and my first

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knowledge of all these matters was when I read about them in the newspapers where they were revealed. So in all candor, with the fullest access to me, you still would not be able to find out about the Huston memorandum. I took the position, after I had understood the workings of the internal security process, that my office was not equipped to handle it, because, as Senator Sparkman pointed out, one thing leads to another, and we were in no position to follow it up. And after that I felt that the agencies that had the primary responsibility for internal security should deal with it, and that the National Security Council should confine itself to foreign policy, to the relationship between military policy and foreign policy, and CIA activities and not FBI activities. This was not any reflection on the FBI; it was just a matter which I wanted the FBI strictly to handle, and I did not wish to handle it. Frankly, Senator Symington, I would propose to continue this policy.

WITNESS' INTENTION VIS-A-VIS COMMITTEE

But with respect to my intention vis-a-vis this committee, as I have pointed out, the only thing that I would feel should be excluded from the discussions are personal conversations with the President, actual deliberations within the National Security Council—to which I could not testify even as Secretary of State—and the Forty Committee, which you, however, have access to in your capacity as a member of the intelligence subcommittee. Upon all other matters I believe this committee should inquire into, specifically including the relationships between military and foreign policy decisions and all intelligence matters that are part of the work of this committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Yours is a reassuring statement.

LACK OF SUPERVISION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

I have one more question, about the Forty Committee. When I first went on this committee, I became distressed about the fact the committee was making decisions and recommendations against facts presented by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Armed Services Committee. So I urged Senator Russell to put some members of this committee on the joint committee, and gave him the reason why, and he did, by invitation: Senator Fulbright, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Mansfield, and others. Later that was abandoned and no members of this committee were included.

There is no secret about the fact the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency has not been consistent. The subcommittee of the Central Intelligence Agency, Oversight Committee, ceased to function in the Armed Services Committee and the matter was passed over to the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee of which the chairman of Armed Services Committee was a member, as was the ranking minority member.

On the floor when it came up with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, some 2 years ago, he said he did not know what they were doing with the money and did not want to know. That is not proper Senatorial review.

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OBTAINING SAME INFORMATION CIA GIVES ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUGGESTED

From the standpoint of this background, I think we could have avoided several bad mistakes. In any case, as you know, the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the National Security Council. The National Security Council is an advisory body to the President and you chair every important committee on the National Security Council.

Mr. KISSINGER. There is really only one committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. The two intelligence committees are broken down and you chair both of them. Is there any reason why, in your position, you cannot come before this committee and give us the same type and character of information given to the Armed Services Committee by the Central Intelligence Agency head?

Mr. KISSINGER. I frankly have never considered that question. I have no personal reluctance to do this. May I discuss this with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the President to see what the implications are?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in effect reports to you, but you might discuss it with the President. My point, I have seen several cases where I am confident that we would not have done what we did if this committee had been in on the information in question. You will be the Secretary of State and you will also be the chief intelligence officer in the executive branch, as chairman of these committees. You are saying you want to have a relationship with us. As the chairman of this committee knows, this has been a matter of grave apprehension to me for at least 5 years if not more. I am not talking about detailed intelligence functioning because we do not get into that any more than we get into war plans in the Armed Services Committee. But I am talking about broad policy approaches and decisions.

Take the case of Chile today. Chile is a very serious situation. [Deleted.] We are not at war with Chile. I would think it was as much the prerogative of this committee to know what was going on down there from the standpoint of a major intelligence agency than it would be the Armed Services Committee unless we plan to send a fleet down there to support the generals.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator Symington, I frankly do not know what it is that is being given to the Armed Services Committee, and therefore it is hard for me to know the reasons for or against giving it to you. My inclination would certainly be to tell the committee what the general policies are.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you not get these reports from the CIA as head of the NSC intelligence committee?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, I get reports, but I do not know what they testify to. This is what I do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you be willing to give us the same information they give the Armed Services Committee?

Mr. KISSINGER. That is what I would like to check on. As I say, I have no personal reason not to do it. Now, there may be intelligence reasons why the information should be kept to one particular sub-committee. In that case it might be possible to add a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in addition to yourself to that sub-committee. I just do not know how it can be worked out in practice.

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Senator SYMINGTON. I would make one more observation for the record.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am in favor of giving this committee the same information.

COMMITTEE ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Senator SYMINGTON. In my opinion, the country is going bankrupt under present policy. It is only a matter of time, babysitting the world with necessary as well as unnecessary expenditures. Nobody wants to see the country more secure than I.

Mr. KISSINGER. I know that.

Senator SYMINGTON. You get into this question of what the possible enemy has, what we are building against, where there are tremendous differences of opinion; and then the diplomatic aspect. You go to China, you go to the Soviet Union; so does the President. Yet, this year we are asking for $7 billion more for military than we did 2 years ago. Inasmuch as with the premise we badly need money here at home, not your primary field or that of the President, certainly not mine, but I notice in this afternoon's paper all the oil companies are demanding a lot more money for oil, a big headline. I think we should know more about this and the economic situation in general. This committee is noted for not leaking despite what people have said. I have been on it some 12 years. There have never been any serious leaks. I do not see why therefore the Committee is not cut in on this intelligence information. You are the intelligence head man. Why should you not come up here before this committee, which considers economic, military, and political policy with relation to countries with which we are not at war.

MR. KISSINGER. I would have no hesitation in a closed session, which we would have to work out with the chairman, to give you what I know of the intelligence estimates. I think, I did not know you were not getting those.

Senator SYMINGTON. We get little of real value before this committee. Laos is the best illustration.

Mr. KISSINGER. To discuss those with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have done my best to understand the accelerated production of Trident and do not think it is justified. I say that as a shopman in my youth. There is nearly $1,000,000,000 involved. Build it, but build on a regular basis, what they originally said they wanted to do. Fly before you buy was the slogan. The Committee on Armed Services listens to it all and rejects the recommendation for the accelerated production, primarily the result of Rickover's lobbying the Congress. There are other reasons too, but that is the primary reason. The full committee listens carefully to the recommendation of the subcommittee and supports the unanimous recommendation of the subcommittee by one vote.

Then a request is made for a Central Intelligence Agency review on the latest Russian position on weapons, and as a result a Senator reverses his vote, and the American people are stuck in my opinion, for the extra cost incident to a totally unnecessary and unbusinesslike acceleration. The Foreign Relations Committee, under its charter, deserves to have comparable information.

21-561-73-6

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ACCELERATED TRIDENT PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Since the question has arisen, do you think there
are developments justifying an accelerated program of Trident?

Mr. KISSINGER. I believe that in the light of the Soviet systems that are now being built, I would hate to see a unilateral change in our existing programs until we have had an opportunity to negotiate further in SALT II. But I would think that as part of that negotiation we could well consider slowing down the Trident program.

The CHAIRMAN. But as of now, you do favor the accelerated program?

Mr. KISSINGER. As of now, but I have not studied it as fully as Senator Symington has.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISCUSSION WITH WITNESS

Senator Scott. First of all, this is really not the last chance for the committee to exchange views with and to continue to receive the cooperation of Dr. Kissinger because, of course, he will be submitting a number of names up here for confirmation and each of those offers its own forum for discussion of these matters we have already discussed and new matters.

[Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR SURVEILLANCE
WITHOUT WARRANT

Senator Scott. I would ask you whether you associate yourself with the Attorney General's letter to the chairman of this committee of the 12th of this month and the guidelines he sets out as to new applications for surveillance without a warrant. He says "In general, before I approve any new application for surveillance without a warrant, I must be convinced that it is necessary (1) to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; (2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or (3) to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. 18 United States Code 2511 (3)."

Do you associate yourself in general with that as the guideline which would guide you in the administration of the Department of State?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would associate myself fully with this. Of course, the determination would be left to the Attorney General and to the President. I would not expect on my own to take the initiative in any event.

Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE

Senator PELL. I was struck with Senator Symington's line of questioning. I remember the illustration of the difficulties the members

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face and the committee faces in the question of what nations have nuclear weapons stored on their territory. For us to do our job intelligently we ought to know those nations. It obviously makes a difference in our arrangements there and the only way I was able to find out, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what countries have American nuclear weapons was that Senator Symington was kind enough to recall it from his memory and was able to inform me of it. I think that is not a correct procedure. I think we should know within this committee. I would hope you would give us similar information.

[Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, it is getting late. I have several questions that will take some time. Do you wish to ask now?

Senator McGEE. I cannot come back, Mr. Chairman, because I am the chairman of a House-Senate conference on agriculture, including Arkansas. It will not take me long but I do have some questions which I think I can—

The CHAIRMAN. You can come back at 2:30?

Senator MUSKIE. I had some plans, but they have been shattered.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and then we will come back at 2:30.

Senator McGEE. If that is agreeable, I appreciate the chance to work this in.

As you would appreciate, Dr. Kissinger, I have been besieged with questions on Chile inasmuch as I am Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee which met last week.

Mr. KISSINGER. Which I am aware of.

## DECISION TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY CONCERNING CHILEAN SITUATION

Senator McGEE. As we pursued the collection of information with the Assistant Secretary so we might better understand the situation, invariably the line of questioning would stop with his suggestion that that is all he knew, that he was not in on the final decisions. So the first questioning that comes to mind obviously, is the intimation he made that after the coup was planned that somewhere at the top there was a conscious decision made by somebody to insure non-involvement, neutrality? At what level would that take place?

Mr. KISSINGER. First, Senator, you have to remember that when any crisis occurs, there is total confusion even in the White House. Though most people would expect that intelligence information puts one ahead of the information curve, you can generally assume that in the middle of a crisis the newspaper reports may be slightly ahead of the intelligence information. So the first thing we confronted, whenever it was, Tuesday morning or Wednesday morning—

Senator McGEE. Tuesday morning.

Mr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Tuesday morning, was total confusion as to what was really going on down there, and who was doing what to whom.

The decision to maintain neutrality, or whatever its significance is, was taken at a meeting of what is called the Washington Special Actions Group—I will be damned if I can remember how it got that name, it happened 4 years ago—which meets automatically whenever there is a crisis. It is chaired by me and it has the Deputy Secretaries

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from all of the departments. Our decision, frankly, was sort of a
holding decision until we could see more clearly. The only complete
decision we made was to turn our fleet around and move it north so
it would not be within—it was intended to be about 150 miles from
the Chilean coast but then come around at the Falkland Islands.

[Deleted.]

We took the decision that we would not say anything that indicated
either support or opposition—that we would avoid what we had done
in Brazil in 1963 where we rushed out by recognizing the government.
We instructed the Ambassador that he could not establish diplomatic
contact and that if he were approached he would send his military
attaches to maintain the contact.

Now, then, when we make these decisions, they tend to get very
literally applied, so everyone was afraid even to express sorrow at the
personal fate of Allende, which we rectified the next morning. But
that decision would have been taken in the Washington Special
Actions Group and approved by the President.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP AND TASK FORCE ON CHILE

Senator McGEE. Is the Washington Special Actions Group the
group that is sometimes, in the press in this case, alluded to as the
task force on Chile?

Mr. KISSINGER. No.

Senator McGEE. That is not it?

Mr. KISSINGER. No; the Washington Special Actions Group gen-
erally operates in an emergency. It meets almost automatically in
an emergency. Then there would be a task force headed by the Depart-
ment of State that works out the concrete details. The Washington
Special Actions Group might say "we will take a hands-off policy for
24 hours or 48 hours. We have to get an analysis of what sort of
proposals have been made."

In this case we had to find out, for example, what supplies were
going into Chile, so that it did not look as if we were suddenly pouring
in supplies. We had to shop around to various departments to find
out whether, in the routine delivery of existing programs, something
might be planned for those 2 or 3 days that would create problems.
That sort of thing. We would give the instruction and then the task
force on Chile would work out the concrete details. We have got
them right now working on a study of what the various dimensions of
humanitarian and other assistance might be, and at the same time we
are having them study what the various expropriation issues are,
because we do not want to be hit by 10 companies suddenly filing
claims for expropriated property and making it look as though this
whole exercise was designed by us in order to get compensation for
expropriation, although that is one of our long-term objectives.

This is just to give you the feel of how we operate.

RETURN HOME OF AMBASSADOR DAVIS WEEKEND BEFORE COUP

Senator McGEE. Ambassador Davis was home the weekend before.
There are those who jumped to the conclusion that there must be a
cause and effect relationship.

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Mr. KISSINGER. I can explain to you exactly how that happened. In fact, if it proves anything it proves the opposite. When I was nominated I called back—among the first group that is—Ambassadors whom I knew well and trusted, like Ambassador Sullivan. I asked each of them to tell me in each area of the world those ambassadors whom they liked, whom they thought most highly of, so that they could advise me (a) about the area, and (b) about personnel in the Department that they might have met in the area. Ambassador Davis was on two lists that were given to me. I had only met him fleetingly and for all practical purposes did not know him. [Deleted.]

When I mentioned his name I was told that there was turmoil in Chile. I then asked the Department to instruct Ambassador Davis to come back in whatever 48-hour period he thought was least likely to cause difficulty, and he himself chose that weekend.

We did talk about the situation in Chile for about 5 minutes. I asked him about coup reports. He said they were endemic, and I said, "Just make sure that none of our Embassy personnel has anything to do directly or indirectly with any of the plotters, if there are plotters, in response to any approaches." He said he had given those instructions. There was no talk about the coup except the rumors that had been around for weeks and months.

## SUGGESTION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN CHILEAN AFFAIRS

Senator McGEE. As you listen to some of the comments here this morning, there is a suggestion that the CIA has been deeply involved in Chilean affairs over a period of time in one way or another. This came out in the ITT hearings, for example. Was the CIA deeply involved at this time?

Mr. KISSINGER. The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who without instructions, talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it. [Deleted.]

## INTIMATION THAT U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES CONTRIBUTED TO ALLENDE REGIME COLLAPSE

Senator McGEE. The intimation has been rather strong from some quarters that our economic policies contributed directly to the collapse of the Allende regime, that is, cutting off credits with the Western Hemisphere Bank and a few other programs like that.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, first of all, it is incorrect to say that we cut off the credit. Most of the credits that were cut off were cut off as the result of the basic policies of the Allende government. Mr. McNamara gave a speech or press statement last summer in which he explained that the World Bank does not extend credit if there is an expropriation without compensation, if the economic policies of the country do not make it a good credit risk, and a third reason which I have now forgotten.

Second, the export-import credits were cut off after Chile defaulted on the loans that it had already had, and the bilateral aid was affected by the Hickenlooper amendment.

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It is one of the curious aspects, however, of the way economic aid is given that by defaulting on its debt payments a country can, in effect get its economic aid indefinitely. Rescheduling $250 million worth of Chile's debts over the last 2 years had the same practical effect as giving it $250 million in economic aid, in addition to the fact that it got $85 million in disbursements from existing multi-lateral loans that had been approved prior to the shutdown of credit. And I think it got about $25 million of humanitarian aid from the United States during the period of the Allende government. Therefore, I think that the judgment of the New York Times editorial yesterday is correct that it was the policies of the Allende government, its insistence on forcing the pace beyond what the traffic would bear much more than our policies that contributed to their economic chaos.

[Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. I was going to say, Senator McGee, that the political parties did not know anything about this coup, to our knowledge, and I do not have the impression that there was any organized labor support for it.

Senator McGEE. It was only the protests from the working group types, including the basic political groups that supported Allende as well as those who were opposed to him?

## QUESTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY

Senator McGEE. That is all I want to take time for, Mr. Chairman. We speculated in here before you arrived this morning about the legitimate areas of confidentiality in government policymaking in critical times because we have seen the over-extension of that, and if I may say so, the prostituting of the real intent of confidentiality as in the case Senator Muskie was developing here this morning. He carried here a protest from a man highly respected by you and me in the academic world, Ruhl Bartlett, who was no friend of the administration policy on Southeast Asia. He raises the point, in regard to Ellsberg, that the tragedy was that somebody in the government blew the Ellsberg case. There was a legitimate case that had to be made for confidentiality and yet they loused it up through over-extension and the like. The case was rightfully dismissed. Is there a legitimate area there where we ought to be concerning ourselves as we look down the road ahead?

Mr. KISSINGER. In all candor I have to say I consider what Ellsberg did an extremely dangerous thing, which cannot be deduced from the intrinsic merit of individual papers. When thousands of governmental papers suddenly appear in the newspapers, and when then the Government has to prove that the papers individually do not threaten national security one had a prescription for a situation in which foreign governments may simply wonder to what extent they can deal with us in candor. So I think the question of confidentiality is a very serious one. But there has to be a relationship between the concern and the actions that are taken, and I have stated publicly at a press conference, and I will repeat here, that I think there was no justification for the break-in into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. [Deleted.]

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As for my relationship with this committee, I have expressed many objectives to this committee and said what I intended to do. In all candor, though, it depends on the spirit with which we implement it, and on the conviction both of the committee and that I would have about what the country really needs. And we can work partly in an adversary and partly in a collegial relationship.

As I said before, I am profoundly convinced that the greatest problem we have now in the country is to restore our national faith in ourselves, and it is that attitude which is a better guarantee for how we work together than any abstract commitments I now might make during confirmation hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until 2:30, then.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, would 3 o'clock also be possible, or would that be—

The CHAIRMAN. All right, if it is all right.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have somebody who is here from out of town.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, then, 3 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m., this same day.]

## AFTERNOON SESSION

I will start the questioning to indicate what my concern is. It is very serious, as you well know. For the record, I will say a few words.

This morning, Senator Symington made reference to an article which he since gave me. I am not sure that you have seen it.

Before I start, I want the record to show that at approximately 12:05, Senator Goldwater left the committee. Senator Scott asked me to say that for his own reasons.

## CONCERNS REGARDING DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES

As I indicated this morning and as I indicated before, it is the procedures of decisionmaking, and particularly the role of this committee and the Congress in decisionmaking, that concern me most.

My interest in the tapping was not in the substance of the tapping or what was thought to be found out or whether you found it out or not. It is simply the procedure of employing these methods in arriving at decisions.

## DIFFICULTY OF RECONCILING VOTE WITH PAST POLICY POSITIONS

Those are the things with which I am concerned and also the effect upon my own attitude toward the policies that have been followed, not only in the previous 4 years but the preceding 4 years. I have a good deal of difficulty in reconciling the position that I have taken with a vote which would appear to be an endorsement of the policies which I had opposed.

As a little background I want to read you two or three excerpts and hopefully to give some background as to what concerns me.

306

This is the way the New Yorker article of September 17 begins:

Henry Kissinger is a prodigiously intelligent, articulate, talented, witty, captivating and imposing man.

I won't read it all, but, skipping down, the author is describing the hearing the other day:

The Senators, in effect, were being asked to ratify a series of actions that should never have taken place without their approval and most of them had a part in protesting. But what the Senators were forced to pass judgment on was a whole new way of government, how we had been governed in recent years and how we would be governed from now on.

I will put the whole article in the record. I agree with the first sentence about your personal qualities, but it is the series of actions in this country with which you have been associated and the way the Government is carried on which concerns me most.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the New Yorker, Sept. 17, 1973]

## THE TALK OF THE TOWN

### NOTES AND COMMENT

HENRY KISSINGER is a prodigiously intelligent, articulate, talented, witty, captivating, and imposing man. He is quite unlike most of the people President Nixon surrounded himself within the White House. He has style, he has intellectual finesse, he has warmth and humor, he speaks the English language, he is without pretension, he is not mean-spirited, he seems instinctively drawn to telling the truth, and he clearly wants to serve his country well. He also appears to have a historical vision, shared by the President: that by maintaining our military preeminence and by standing fast wherever we think we are challenged, as we thought we were in Indo-China, we may avoid a nuclear confrontation with, first, Russia and, second, China, and thus preserve a relatively peaceful world for many decades. Now he has come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the President's choice for Secretary of State. In the questioning that took place on the first day of the confirmation hearings, last Friday, the senators displayed a mixture of admiration, respect, and bewilderment. Obviously, Kissinger was not a man to be lightly rejected. Yet there was a profound uneasiness in the air. It was as if two Henry Kissingers sat before them in the hearing room; the Henry Kissinger who had the highest possible qualifications for the post to which he had been named—who had the makings of a great Secretary of State—and the Henry Kissinger who had been intimately bound up with the conduct of our foreign affairs for the past five years. It was as if a third man, too, sat before them: President Nixon. For if the President had an alter ego on the world stage it was Kissinger. The actions of the two men could not be separated. Together, for five years, they had dictated our foreign policy.

To confirm Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State was to ratify what he had done, and what the President had done, for those five fateful years. And what had that been? Together, they had established relations with China, improved our relations with Russia, and successfully completed the first phase of SALT—and for these immense achievements most Americans are grateful. Together, also, they had planned the undisclosed bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and 1970; they had initiated the unauthorized wiretapping of members of Kissinger's staff and of newsmen in 1969; they had planned the invasion of Cambodia in 1970; they had planned the use of American air power to support the invasion of Laos in 1971; in 1971, too, they had “tilted” in favor of Pakistan in the India-Pakistan War, though at the time Pakistan was carrying out mass murder of Bengali subjects in East Pakistan; in early 1972, they had planned the mining and blockading of North Vietnamese harbors; later in 1972 they had planned the “Christmas bombing” of North Vietnam—all this done in secrecy, and without congressional consent. The senators, in effect, were being asked to ratify a series of actions that should never have taken place without their approval, and that most of them had abhorred and protested. Try as they might, the senators could not escape this nightmarish five-year history. While the President and the men of Watergate were, it now appears, undermining our democratic system of govern-

307

ment in domestic affairs, the President and Henry Kissinger were undermining the system in foreign affairs. Last Friday, Kissinger gave the senators assurances that he would mend his ways. There were even subtle overtones of remorse. But what the senators were forced to pass judgment on was a whole new way of government: how we had been governed in recent years and how we would be governed from now on.

They had to think about the dark side of the Kissinger record: how he, together with the President, had violated the Constitution, defied Congress, and contemptuously ignored the will of the nation's people. The senators were presented with a dilemma. They could have this charming, brainy, penitent-seeming man as Secretary of State if they would forget the last five years of history, including the millions of victims of an un-Constitutional and unnecessary prolongation of a war, and if they would overlook the curious fact that the nominee had by no means been joined in his expressions of regret by his present and future superior, the President. In happier times, Kissinger—the same man, with the same extraordinary qualities—might have walked into the hearing room with a record that was unmarred. Today, Kissinger is not so fortunate. After five years of close collaboration with President Nixon, after acting with him in secrecy and without the legal and moral sanction of Congress or the American people, he walked into the hearing room with a burden that must be anguishing both to him and to his judges. One could only look on in sorrow as the senators, the President, and Henry Kissinger faced one another in these tragic circumstances.

## WITNESS' SEMINAR ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING

The CHAIRMAN. Following that, there is a very interesting excerpt from a seminar which you gave at the University of California in 1968 in this morning's paper. I am sure you recall that. I don't know whether you read this morning's article or not.

Mr. KISSINGER. I glanced over it.

The CHAIRMAN. You glanced at it. I think it is relevant to this same problem that concerns me. I will quote the part which raises the same type of questions that is raised by these other articles. This is a quote from your statement. I assume there is no doubt about the statement having been made.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am sure it is correct. I haven't verified it.

The CHAIRMAN. This was given at the University of California, by Dr. Kissinger in 1968. It says:

Also, research and intelligence organizations, either foreign or national, attempt to give a rationality and consistency to foreign policy which it simply does not have. I have found it next to impossible to convince Frenchmen that there is no such thing as an American foreign policy, and that a series of moves that have produced a certain result may not have been planned to produce that result * * *.

Once the American decisionmaking process has disgorged an answer, it becomes technically very difficult to change the policy because even those who have serious doubts about it become reluctant to hazard those doubts in an international forum. There is no telling what would come out of a reevaluation of existing measures. If one wishes to influence American foreign policy, the time to do so is in the formative period, and the level is the middle level of the bureaucracy—that of the assistant secretary and his immediate advisers. That is the highest level in which people can still think.

That is the end of that particular quote. This suggests, of course, the very problem we run up against time and time again with regard to the State Department, the Defense Department, the USIA and all others, about the access to information. At the very level, as you

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say, of the formative period, we have generally been confronted with the statement that this is at the working level and no decisions have been made. Therefore, we have been denied the benefit of any of the working papers.

I am skipping in order to save time. Further on it says:

There is no such thing, in my view, as a Vietnam policy; there is a series of programs of individual agencies concerned with Vietnam. These programs are reconciled or not, as the case may be, if there is a conflict between the operating agencies. In the areas where there is no conflict between agencies, it would be very unusual to get a high level consideration of a problem. When conflict exists, the environment becomes receptive. For example, when General Westmoreland asked for 200,000 troops, that forced a high level review. But the day to day operations of a war or of an alliance diplomacy will not generally engage the President and the Secretary of State.

Then a little further down:

Our governmental process works reasonably well in relation to specific technical issues and also when there is an adversary procedure. If one department is strongly for something and another department opposed, then the President or cabinet officer has a chance of elaborating an overall purpose. The system goes awry if you have a small, dedicated, unopposed group.

Because of this gap between expertise and decision-making, a great deal of communication occurs by means of a briefing. Now, briefings reward theatrical qualities. They put a premium on the ability to package information and to present a fore-ordained result. Every briefer worth his salt says, 'Interrupt me at any point with a question.' Usually the victim of the briefing is very proud if he can formulate a question. The briefer has heard the question a hundred times before and it is like throwing a fast ball across the middle of the plate to Mickey Mantle. He gives a glib response which is overwhelming. All this creates a state of mind where the policymaker may have the uneasy feeling of knowing he is being taken, even though he doesn't quite know how. This magnifies the sense of insecurity.

Some of the key decisions are kept to a very small circle while the bureaucracy happily continues working away in ignorance of the fact that decisions are being made, or the fact that a decision is being made in a particular area. One reason for keeping the decisions to small groups is that when bureaucracies are so unwieldy and when their internal morale becomes a serious problem, an unpopular decision may be fought by brutal means, such as leaks to the press or to congressional committees. Thus, the only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out.

## QUOTES FROM WITNESS' SEMINAR ON POLICYMAKING PROCESS

I think this is a very interesting article. The last part I want to read is this:

> If you do not know how this process operates, it is very difficult to predict on the basis of abstract rationality how it is going to come out. The reason why this particular problem is magnified is, it seems to me, that only in the rarest cases is there a relationship between high position and great substantive knowledge.

Mr. KISSINGER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN.

Most of our elective officials had to spend so much of their energy getting elected that they can give relatively little attention to the substance of what they are going to do when they get elected. And therefore you get the curious phenomenon of people deciding to run for high office first and then scrambling around for some intellectuals to tell them what their positions ought to be. In many cases it is not that the intellectuals are used merely as speech writers that the policy makers already have; it is literally the case that you are starting with a *tabula rasa*, and that the position the political leader takes is much influenced by the type of intellectual that sometimes quite accidentally winds up in his entourage.

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The typical political leader of the contemporary managerial society is a man with a strong will, a high capacity to get himself elected, but no very great conception of what he is going to do when he gets into office. This is true of many of the cabinet officials as well, and in this sense . . . I am pessimistic about the ability of modern bureaucratic society to manage a world which is quite discontinuous with its previous experience. . . .

That, together with the President's statement of September 10—
do you wish to comment upon this statement?

Do you go along or not?

Mr. KISSINGER. Could I just make two quick comments?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sure.

Mr. KISSINGER. Two or three comments.

## CONFIRMATION WOULD NOT REPRESENT ENDORSEMENT OF PAST POLICIES

First, with respect to the New Yorker piece which I haven't seen, I don't believe that confirmation by this committee would represent an endorsement of the policies that have been pursued by this administration. I think they would represent an expression of my fitness to perform in the office to which the President has nominated me.

One would expect that the Senators would maintain the positions that they had maintained before, some of which were in strong opposition to administration policies, and others in support of administration policies, and the necessity of a dialog between the committee and the administration is not based on the assumption of agreement but on the necessity of making sure that the points of view are adequately represented before the decision is taken.

## WITNESS' 1968 SEMINAR ON PROCESS OF CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT

With respect to the second piece that you just read, Mr. Chairman, it is obvious from this piece that I had no expectation whatever in the spring of 1968 of being appointed to any office in Government, and certainly not to this office. It is intended as an analytical piece on how I had observed from the fringes the Government to be operating and on my judgment on elective officials in the executive branch that I had seen perform up to that point.

It was my impression in the administrations that I had seen up to then that the adversary proceedings were extremely important.

In my present job I have made a major effort to make sure that varying choices are presented to the President. Curiously enough, one of the elements resisted by the bureaucracy has been the development of options. The secret dream of most big departments is to present to the President a paper to which he can only say yes or no, and since he doesn't know what to do if he says no, he almost always is forced to say yes. My experience has been that it is very difficult to get governmental departments to present genuine options to the President.

My role, rather than restricting options, has been to try to expand them. But, what I believed then I still essentially agree with, as an analytical description of the process, not as a desirable way of conducting Government.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, what you were stating there was the way it was actually run not the way you think it ought to be run. Is that correct?

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Mr. KISSINGER. Exactly, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement about keeping decisions to a very small group and that these others should be excluded—you don't still believe that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I didn't believe it was desirable then.

The CHAIRMAN. It is just the way it was then.

Mr. KISSINGER. I had in mind then the Tuesday lunches that President Johnson had, in which no records were kept, and which were the essential method of Government in the last 18 months of the then administration.

I believe that it is essential to present every significant point of view to the President, recognizing that there may be debates about what may be significant.

## PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 10 STATE OF UNION MESSAGE

The CHAIRMAN. This is by way of background as to procedures. The next point is the President's own statement, which is the most disturbing of all, of September 10, 1973. I would assume you did, but I will leave it to you to say if you participated in the preparation of that statement.

Mr. KISSINGER. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with it?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The special State of the Union address.

Mr. KISSINGER. No; I had not seen it before it was given. My office may have seen it for a routine review.

The CHAIRMAN. I am bound to say I am very surprised he would make such a statement without having cleared it with you or your not having participated in it. I assumed on matters particularly relating to foreign relations that was the case.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is almost invariably the case. In this special instance it was not the case.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I want to read the part that disturbs me, at least following the question this morning that the Senator from Missouri put to you. I quote from the President's State of the Union address on September 10. That was just about a week ago. He says and I quote:

> The House has already cut about 25 percent from the military aid program and the Senate has cut it by one-half. Not only have extraordinary cuts been made in the funding, but restrictive amendments have been added in committee and others may be suggested on the floor. I cannot stand by while these crucial programs are gutted in haste and reaction.

> Current foreign aid programs are being funded through a continuing resolution which ends on September 30. This approach is unsatisfactory, especially in light of demands resulting from North Vietnamese truce violations in Cambodia. Yet the Congress continues not only to provide smaller dollar amounts but also to make unreasonable requests for access to sensitive information and impose counter-productive conditions on specific programs. Such demands are unacceptable; they would badly compromise our ability to maintain security around the world.

> I intend to make every effort to increase the funding for fiscal year 1974 security assistance requirements. I shall also strongly resist efforts by the Congress to impose unreasonable demands upon necessary foreign policy prerogatives of the executive branch. A spirit of bipartisan cooperation provided the steel which saw America through the cold war and then through Vietnam. We must not jeopardize the great potential for peace and progress in the post-Vietnam era by losing this strong bipartisan spirit.

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It seems to me to be short of a declaration of war on the part of the President against the Congress. Part of the congressional actions those that he mentioned, of course, have already been agreed to by this committee and the Senate. That is the part relating to the provisions in the State Department Authorization Act. I assume you support his views about them, whether you had anything to do with his statement or not. Is that correct?

Even though you didn't participate in the statement, I assume that you support it?

Mr. KISSINGER. You have to assume that, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do assume that.

## PARTICIPANTS IN PREPARATION OF STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

Who would have participated in the preparation of the State of the Union message? Do you know?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this is one area where I should not comment on the internal advisory system within the White House. But in general this State of the Union statement was conceived largely, or exclusively, I would have thought, on domestic matters.

The CHAIRMAN. But the view of some of us, including myself, is that what we believe to be unnecessarily large expenditures in the very field in which he objects to any cut, are the principal reason for domestic difficulties, as the Senator from Missouri pointed out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Chair yield for a question in context?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

## JUSTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUEST

Senator SYMINGTON. Everybody knows of your interest in Europe and the desire to perpetuate our position over there. But in Southeast Asia the war has been over several weeks, yet the administration is asking for $7 billion more than 2 years ago for national defense. How can that be justified?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, the reason is partly inflation, partly increases in personnel costs which we discussed in open session, partly the fact that many acquisition programs had been delayed by the necessity of funding the Vietnam War. I think it is a combination of these factors that has produced the request.

Let me say one general thing. The chairman referred to a declaration of war, and I have mentioned bipartisanship. This, of course, led to implications that these two statements may not be fully consistent with each other.

As I said in my opening statement to this committee, I cannot guarantee that either the administration or I personally will always agree with the dominant view of this committee, and bipartisanship cannot be interpreted to mean that either side must accede to the other in order to have cooperation. But I do believe that it must mean that both sides should deal in the most candid way with each other, and explain their reasoning well before they make the decision. And on the military budget, I think it ought to be possible either to demonstrate or to fail to demonstrate what the rationale is in terms of

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strategic doctrine and foreseeable Soviet programs, so that at least
the issue can be clearly drawn. That would be my firm intention.

But the short answer to your question is that the reason is a com-
bination of all the factors which I mentioned.

LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER POLICY BECAUSE OF SECRECY

The CHAIRMAN. But we don't have an opportunity to consider, one
way or the other, what the policy is because it has been made in the
past in such secrecy.

EXAMPLE OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION

The best example of all is the Cambodian incursion. I won't recall
all of the incident, but we know both you and the Secretary of State
met with this committee, you informally and he formally, shortly
before the incursion. We were given no opportunity to express our
view that that was an improvident move. You admit that.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are two issues: One is
the meeting that I had informally at your house.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. KISSINGER. A week before the President's speech.

The second and more fundamental issue is whether a decision of
this magnitude should be taken without this committee having an
opportunity to express its views.

With respect to the first, the fact of the matter is that when I met
with you that you remember that evening I was called to the tele-
phone four or five times by the President.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember you were. I don't remember how many
times. You didn't tell us what he said, but anyhow I remember that.

Mr. KISSINGER. No, but I am telling you now.

That was the first time that he was beginning to consider the
incursion that took place a week later. It had been discussed in only
the most general way before, only to be rejected. So I was in no
position to tell the committee then something that had not only not
been decided but hadn't even been considered.

The intensive discussion of the incursion started the next morning,
and the phone calls were primarily to instruct me to get that process
of consideration started. The final decision was not made until Mon-
day or Tuesday of the next week.

So, simply from the point of view of my personal relationship with
this committee, I think you should understand I was in no position
to tell you something that was at that point not even under active
consideration.

However, the more fundamental point which you raised should be the
United States engage in a significant military move—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go to that, was the Secretary of State
aware of this?

Mr. KISSINGER. On Thursday night or later?

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S AWARENESS OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION

The CHAIRMAN. Was he aware of it when he came to this committee, which was about 3 days before the incursion. It was after the meeting with you. I am just curious. Did he know about it or didn't he? We have been wondering ever since. Did he know and didn't tell us or did he not know about it?

Could you tell us that, if you know? Was he consulted?

Mr. KISSINGER. He was consulted.

[Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. I would have thought, Mr. Chairman, on any significant military move, unless it was of such enormous sensitivity that the whole future of this country might be imperiled—in which I would not include the incursion in Cambodia—I would expect that there would be discussion initially with the chairman and the ranking member, and then one would have to see what other discussion would be necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

COMMITTEE POSITION CONCERNING CAMBODIA

Senator AIKEN. Secretary Rogers came up to discuss with us on the 27th of April, and I think we made our position rather plain informally. We took no formal vote at that time. He said he would report our position to the President. I hope he did.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am sure he did.

Senator AIKEN. You probably were there. Our position was informally very much opposed to extending the fighting over Cambodia as a whole, but not necessarily in opposition to the elimination of the sanctuaries along the border.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that record primarily was concerned with the extension of aid. I read that record not long ago and I don't believe it was ever brought to the attention of the committee that you were contemplating a physical invasion by U.S. forces of Cambodia. I don't think that even came up in the hearings.

Senator AIKEN. Well, the strip along the border was costing us something like 100 lives a week.

EXCLUSION OF COMMITTEE AND SENATE FROM ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is not really your justification of the incursion, but the procedure by which these decisions are made and the exclusion of this committee and, in a sense, the Senate, from any knowledge of the decisions in advance and any opportunity to express an opinion, which we feel is the function of the committee and of the Senate.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, as I have said this morning, I believe that the very unusual circumstances that existed at that time and the internal dissention that had developed, produced a number of

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decisions which should not be the normal pattern of the relationship
between the executive and the legislative branches. And given the
state of the country right now, I do not believe that major decisions
should be taken in foreign policy that cannot enlist a wide public
following, and which do not have support in the legislative branch.

COMMITTEE'S ACCESS TO INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. But it seems to me to be inconsistent with this
statement of the President, with which you say you associate yourself,
that you resist very strongly this committee's access to information
amendment.

This gives me the feeling even now of a continuity of the same
attitude toward congressional participation. How can we possibly
have an opportunity to have an input, as they say, to have our views
even considered, if you resist so positively the access to information
amendment.

That is all we wanted out of that.

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't think it resists positively the access to
information, Mr. Chairman. As I understand the amendment, any
communications to and from the Department should be considered to
be submitted to the committee, and this should be considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Only if requested by a majority of the committee.
I, or Senator Case, or Aiken, can't call up and then say, "Send me a
document."

It would have to be a formal action by the committee concerning
something we would like to know. We had several instances where
information was refused on this basis. The whole committee requested
it. It wasn't just my request. This would indicate, as of 2 weeks ago,
this same attitude—that it is so sensitive that it cannot be given to us.

There are things that are not connected with the Vietnam war to
which we think we should be entitled, such things as the plans of what
we intend to do in foreign aid. We are not seeking battle information
in any on-going war, but those things that relate, I think, to the formu-
lation of policy.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is so generally
drawn that it really imposes no restriction. As I said, I would make a
major effort, and I have already had preliminary discussions with
your staff on seeing to it that members of the committee would be
informed through access to the appropriate junior officials, Assistant
Secretary and below, through discussions with me and my immediate
associates, and by whatever other means we can work out, about the
trend of our policy in general and in specific areas prior to the time
that decisions are taken.

I have mentioned to your staff, for example, my desire to meet
with the committee, or with the appropriate subcommittee, to lay
out the issues as we see them now in SALT before we formulate a
position which would lead to concrete negotiations, including our
current position. [Deleted].

So the principle of it, I agree with. The right to produce every
document, or to demand every document, is what is at issue in this
amendment.

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The CHAIRMAN. Then I regret that we could not have received a
counter proposal for use in rewriting the amendment in some fashion
which would be acceptable to you and would still be acceptable to us.
Instead of that we now have a situation in which it has been taken
out on a point of order in the House.

ADMINISTRATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF JACKSON AMENDMENT

You mention SALT. When you briefed us on what you had done
in SALT, I agreed with you, if you will remember. We had talked
about it and we supported you. I was very embarrassed and I think
some of my colleagues were, after we went all out insofar as we could
in support of your position, as explained in detail to us at the White
House and I think in other meetings only to find ourselves undercut
in the last minute by the administration saying, "Well, we really
don't have any objection to the Jackson amendment."

Senator Symington put a great deal of time on this as I did and
others. We were going all out in support of what you had persuaded
us was a good agreement and then, I think we were undercut in that
position by having it altered in a very substantial way as several of
us said, in the acceptance of the Jackson amendment.

FUTURE INTENTIONS CONCERNING SALT

I bring it up only because you mentioned the SALT talks. What
do you intend to do in the future? I thought it was a most unfortunate
development.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, my impression is that the issue of
the permanent agreement in SALT is going to evoke an extremely
lively debate within the executive branch and perhaps between
various committees of the Congress. It is my intention, at a time to
be worked out between us, to give you a full description of where
we stand, what I believe the outstanding issues are, and where the
negotiations might take us.

My only prediction is that for the next 6 weeks it will be sort of
an exploratory conversation in Geneva and that the big decisions
will not have to be made until November and December, when
perhaps this committee will not be in session. Therefore, I would
welcome an opportunity sometime in October, at your convenience,
to explain either to your Subcommittee on Disarmament or to the
entire committee where we stand and what the issues are. Because I
think that some of the debates that happened with the interim
agreement are a pale forecast of what is going to await us with a
permanent agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was appropriate to mention it. It
is one example in which many of us were in thorough accord with what
was originally the position of the administration.

CONSOLIDATION OF FUNCTIONS OF NSC HEAD AND SECRETARY OF STATE

One other thing and then I will try to reserve some of my further
questions until after the members who didn't get an opportunity to
ask questions this morning. I think one of the questions that concerned

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the committee prior to the discussion this morning was your twin
positions as head of NSC and Secretary of State.

Many of us were inclined in the first instance when it was an-
nounced you would be Secretary of State, and therefore willing to come
to the committee, that this was a good thing.

But I think I reflect at least the views of a number of us that con-
solidating these functions narrows further the base of policymaking to
you alone. There will be no Secretary of State who has any input into
the National Security Council, and the converse of that, because you
wear two hats. That bothers us very much. It is a situation which I
think sets a precedent which I assume in the future would be very
likely to be followed. I am bound to say I have grave reservations
about this.

Is that essential, do you think? Is that necessary? With your ex-
perience and prestige, it would seem to me you could do without being
the head of the National Security Council.

MR. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think the words "head of the
National Security Council" give a somewhat misleading impression.
The criticism that has been often made of the National Security
Council operation is that its staff has expanded excessively and that
it became a rival of the Department of State as the principal adviser
to the President on foreign policy.

Now as things develop in this administration, as I pointed out
previously, I performed three principal functions: one was the manag-
ing of the NSC system. The second was to negotiate on sensitive
matters of direct concern to the President. The third was as adviser
[deleted] to the President on matters of foreign policy and national
security policy.

Now, two of those functions are really personal functions, in the
sense that the President will select whomever among his advisers he
believes can best fulfill those functions of adviser and negotiator.
They are not dependent on the position of head of the National Se-
curity Council machinery.

Those two functions will move with me to the State Department
in that sense.

Second, my move to the State Department will bring about a
reduction of my current NSC setup, especially in its operational
capacity, and will confine its role primarily to the management of
interdepartmental machinery.

Now then, with respect to the management of interdepartmental
machinery, the direct role is not that of producing a particular solu-
tion and, therefore, gaining particular inputs. The correct role is to
present as many of the choices as can be generated to the President,
and the best check on the adequacy with which it is performed is
whether the other agencies feel that their views have received an
adequate hearing.

If the positions are separated, then the management of the inter-
departmental machinery will be conducted obviously in different
capacities, and that range of activity would again be withdrawn from
congressional discussion. My advisory role would not be particularly
affected. The thinking was that this would better reflect the operation
of the Government as it is now to do it by combining these two ele-
ments, and it would not produce a disproportionate influence toward
the narrowing of the circle.

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WITNESS' OCCUPANCY OF TWO POSITIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see how you can help it. It is contrary, it seems to me, to your statement that our governmental process worked reasonably well in relation to specific technical issues and also when there is an adversary procedure.

When you occupy both positions, I don't know how you can take one position on an issue as Secretary of State and another position in the National Security Council. These are two of the most important institutions.

Mr. KISSINGER. The National Security adviser is not supposed to take a position, and as National Security adviser I never take a position, at the National Security Council. When issues are presented there, they are presented as they have emerged through our interdepartmental machinery in terms of options.

WITNESS' REFERENCE TO ALWAYS ACTING ALONE

The CHAIRMAN. I was handed your statement in another interview in which you say, "What do I care? After all the main point stems from the fact that I have always acted alone."

What do you mean by that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I suspect that it is from the Fallaci interview. By the time Miss Fallaci, who is a somewhat exalted personality, grasped what I had said, put it into Italian, and then got it retranslated from the Italian into English, something must have been lost.

Mr. Chairman, if I wanted to conduct policy alone, then the institutional positions would really be not very crucial, and if what I said is correct about the national need, then the last thing anyone should attempt to do is to conduct foreign policy alone.

The CHAIRMAN. I am bound to say this is not personal.

Mr. KISSINGER. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I felt President Johnson was inclined to conduct policy with three people. The few times I went down there before he strongly disagreed with my position, it was usually he, McNamara, and Rusk. Sometimes McGeorge Bundy was called in to answer a question about a paper, but there were three people. I had the distinct impression that that was all there was to the decisionmaking process. You described in your article the way bureaucracy developed. You described it without approving it and you inherited these other procedures. Looking toward the future this bothers me.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, with all respect, our procedures, whatever their other failings, are much more systematic than those of President Johnson. Our procedures operate through a series of committees, each of which requires officials at every level to give the maximum number of options. So that by the time it reached the President, either in written form or before the NSC, it has been gone over by at least two committees whose primary instruction—this is what the NSC machinery does—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Whose primary instruction is to lay out the options for the President. And as I pointed out, one of the most difficult things is to get the bureaucracy to produce choices. One of my efforts in the Department of State, apart now from the added

318

positions will be to get the Department to think in terms of policy choices rather than in terms of particular advocacy.

## WITNESS' VIEWS ON CONGRESS

The CHAIRMAN. In this article of yours, which I mentioned earlier, where you were describing the way the system works, there is almost no mention of Congress whatever—other than the one time where it refers to "election to Congress," which you deplore, apparently, and another time to "elected officials don't know anything about substance." Were you describing a situation?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, Mr. Chairman, my ignorance about Congress at that time was total. I meant elected officials.

Senator CASE. Such ignorance is bliss.

Mr. KISSINGER. I beg your pardon?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, I have no complaints about my relations with Congress.

But, Mr. Chairman, I think if you read other things I have written at the time, my experience with elected officials was with the Presidential candidates, and I was referring to elected officials in the executive branch.

The CHAIRMAN. There are only two.

Mr. KISSINGER. Or aspirants to election to the Executive.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point I come back to is this. I can see an ongoing struggle as the President states it in the State of the Union message. The one place that I felt and still believe where different demands could be reconciled is in the Congress. You have said on other occasions you are not an economist. In a sense you don't seem to feel it is your responsibility to be concerned about this question of priorities within the Government—that is the demands or the necessity for domestic requirements weighed against foreign.

That is somewhat similar, I think—I am not trying to be unfair to you—to some of the military attitude. They feel it is not their job to assess the strength or weakness of the economy as a whole. All they assess is what they consider to be their requirements of an adequate defense. I have a feeling that your concentration upon foreign policy is somewhat the same. But it is the Congress, I think, under our system which will with its collective judgment—granted it is very difficult for it to make its decisions—finally reconcile these conflicting requirements. We are not given an opportunity by the administration, in my opinion, as a body, whether it be this committee, the Senate or the Congress, to perform this function.

For many reasons we are simply not able to perform that function properly, I think, because of the lack of information, the overwhelming power to lobby and to influence Members with the resources at their command, and the great number of specialists. Of course, this could lead to saying maybe with such a big country this system is inadequate. I would be willing to discuss that at another time. It is a very serious question.

It may be that we are no longer capable of performing the function the Constitution sets out for us and maybe it is your impatience or others' with our inadequacy which leads to this situation, but so long

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as we have it, we have to try to make it work. But, I am trying to say, it doesn't work unless there is some opportunity for the Congress to know what the policy is and to have an opportunity to express its view.

Some of us believe the collective view of a lot of people, even though they are not outstanding experts and not great geniuses, does have a kind of a validity in that it avoids serious mistakes such as I think were made by President Johnson under conditions we are all aware of. This I think is fundamental to how this process is going to work with you occupying two of the most significant positions in the Government.

That is what I was trying to say. I will ask some questions about other policies later on.

Mr. KISSINGER. I could say one thing, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. But before I yield would you care to comment on that?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, you are quite correct that prior to my coming into the government I was concentrating my own academic thinking entirely on the executive-branch aspect of policy-making. I had next to no contact with the Congress. My only contact with the Congress, curiously enough, was an appearance before your committee to testify about the MLF in 1963 or 1964, and except for that I had to all practical purposes no contact with the Congress except one or two personal friendships.

After coming to Washington, I came to understand increasingly the role of the Congress and the importance of the Congress, and within the constraints of my office I tried my best to establish communication with the Congress. I would say that what you said in your statement about the collective wisdom of the Congress, the necessity that the Congress participate in policymaking and by which at a very minimum it can avoid serious mistakes, I would subscribe to completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand, did the majority leader wish to ask a question at this point?

Senator MANSFIELD. I want to make a few comments.

Dr. Kissinger, I don't think I will ask many questions but I will throw out some thoughts which I would hope and would expect you would give serious consideration to.

## CONSULTING YOUNGER STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES

I note, for example, that you have been meeting with a number of the older men in the Department, ambassadors and the like. I would hope that when you are confirmed and in office, you would likewise meet with some of the younger people in the Department because I think that they still have open minds, they are liable to have ideas, and they aren't too set in their ways.

## RESTORING SUPREMACY OF STATE DEPARTMENT

I would hope also that you will be very much aware of the fact that in the Department which you administer you have CIA personnel as attachés at the various embassies, that you have Defense attachés at the various embassies. I would hope that their first loyalties would be

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to the State Department rather than to the CIA or the Defense De-
partment from which they come.

I make that suggestion on the basis of the fact that when Mr. Ken-
edy was President he issued a directive which made very plain, if
adhered to, that the ambassador was the No. 1 man in each country.
If he is going to be the No. 1 man he has got to have control of his staff
no matter from where they come.

This question of attachés is something to which I think you ought
to give some consideration.

[Deleted.]

Senator MANSFIELD. What this committee wants to see is the
supremacy of the Department of State restored. It is first among its
peers, and we think for too long it has not been given the recognition
which it deserves.

As a matter of fact, it has the smallest budget by far of any of the
regular departments of the Government. I am not in favor of a higher
budget unless it can be brought about through a reduction in these
other areas where I think the funds are entirely too high.

NEWS ITEM FROM THE PHILIPPINES

I note in the Washington Post of yesterday the headline "U.S.
Helps Manila Fight Insurgents." It is taken from the Manchester
Guardian datelined Manila. The first paragraph reads:

U.S. Special Forces teams are being used in remote Philippine areas in an effort to aid the government's counter-insurgency efforts.

And further down another paragraph:

With a reputation such as the Green Berets acquired in Vietnam, suspicions
about their role in the Philippines are rife. Knowledgeable Filipinos point out that
the Special Forces operations are financed by U.S. aid in Manila, a not infrequent
euphemism for the CIA.

I would hope that the differences between the U.S. aid program
and the State Department would be corrected in some degree. If
my memory serves me correctly, the aid program gets about four
times the budget that the State Department gets, and with all that
money to play around with, they can do an awful lot of things that
create suspicion.

CHILE

Lastly, Dr. Kissinger, is the question of Chile. May I say that I
am somewhat disturbed at the events which occurred in Chile last
week. It isn't a case of having sympathy for Allende as a Marxist,
but it is a case of Allende being elected not by a majority, but a plu-
rality of the Chilean people in a constitutional election and being con-
firmed by the Congress. Then we find out in the past year or so that
the CIA was quite interested in the election before Allende was
installed, that the ITT was quite interested in the election before he
was installed, in the Government before he was installed, and that
it even went so far as to raise funds or to offer to raise funds to par-
ticipate in that election.

The thing that disturbs me is that for the first time in many decades,
the Chilean Armed Forces which have been a bulwark for democracy

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in that country and a strict adherent to constitutional rule, have now brought about a change in the Government.

But the important factor is what is the effect of this going to be in our relationship with the other countries of Latin America.

I note, for example, that Mrs. Allende has now been given refuge in Mexico, that there are demonstrations against us in Argentina, even though we all recognize that Peron is not too friendly toward this country, and perhaps other situations will arise which will be tied in with what happened in Chile last week.

I only hope, Dr. Kissinger, and I am assuming that in all these geographic areas you will move carefully and cautiously, that you will do what you can to bring about an upgrading of the Department of State, and that in so doing you will restore to the State Department its supremacy among peers as far as the Departments in this Government are concerned.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESS' CONSULTATION WITH SENIOR AND JUNIOR PERSONNEL

MR. KISSINGER. Senator, one of my principal objectives is to return vigor to the State Department, and to make it the primary organ in the formulation of policy, because this is the only way we can have permanence in our approach to foreign policy.

Most of my consultations with ambassadors have concentrated on the question of who the best people in the Department are, and I have collected a thick book now of the ablest people in each category—Career Minister, FSO-1, 2, and 3; I can't go further down than that because below that it becomes a more general process—and if I am confirmed, I think you will find that within the first 6 months, some rather drastic moves will be made to bring younger men into key positions more rapidly.

Now, one difficulty with the news reporting is that well-known ambassadors get reported and the younger people I see do not get reported. You can be sure I have seen individuals from each category, including the officers of the Foreign Service Association, all of whom are FSO-2's and FSO-3's, and I asked all of them the same questions that I am asking the senior ambassadors; namely, who are the best people, and how can we rejuvenate the Foreign Service.

Now, in this connection, I have a number of tentative conclusions and a number of concerns with respect to the Foreign Service, which at an appropriate time perhaps the Chairman would want me to discuss with the committee. Because I think, for example, that many Foreign Service officers prefer to serve abroad and prefer to be ambassadors rather than assistant secretaries. I think you gentlemen will agree that the position of Assistant Secretary is much more vital, except in a few cases, for the conduct of American foreign policy than is the position of ambassador.

So we have a problem of how we get a scale of values by which the younger men will want to contribute to the making of national policy here in Washington. There are a whole range of questions like that, which at an appropriate time should be determined by the Chairman of the Committee, and I would like to put that before him.

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Now, secondly, the question of INR. This is a problem about which I have been doing some thinking, and I am not sure I have yet come to a conclusion.

Right now the State Department has, as Senator Mansfield pointed out, something like 335 spaces. I think they are trying to get 390, if I understand the figures correctly. Some of these spaces are used for liaison functions with the other agencies, and part of it is used for the production of intelligence.

Now, the issue is whether it is possible to have a separate intelligence funct on in the State Department separated both from the geographical bureaus and from the other intelligence agencies that can ever compete with the other agencies, no matter how you fill them up. I am sharing with you my perplexities. I have not made up my own mind on this question. You could argue, for example, that the political counselors that report from all over the world really ought also to be reporting intelligence information. Right now they have the tendency to report whom they talk to at lunch or at an office. For policymaking, it is much more important to understand what the trends are, where the country is going, what the intangibles of political leadership are, and that is more in the intelligence evaluation field than it is in the tradi- tion of political reporting. I feel very strongly that the Foreign Service officers ought to be taught to report trends rather than to say we report only what the head of this party told us at a meeting and then let the intelligence people make the evaluation.

They ought to be trained to do some of the evaluation itself. As it is now, Senator, when you are in Washington, some of the State Department reporting about countries you don't know is almost inexplicable because they give you a very accurate account of the conversation but they rarely tell you what it means.

Now, that suggests to me, first of all, that INR ought to be much more closely related to the geographic bureau and ought to be able to levy requirements on the geographic bureaus. That is, they ought to be able to say that in order to produce intelligence they must learn from the diplomats what the trends and developments in their area are.

Secondly, I think that in the coordination role with the other intelligence agencies, the most useful thing that the State Department can do is to create a body of people who would ask the tough questions and conceive of their role as being that of the devil's advocate, rather than try to produce intelligence, and keep firing questions into the other agencies and see what answers they get back.

But whether it is possible to have a separate intelligence organiza-
tion that produces its own intelligence within the Department of
State and still be able to compete with the other agencies, that I
have a question about. But I grant you that from what I have seen
of the intelligence product of the State Department, the present func-
tion is not satisfactory. As to how it can be improved, I would like to
wait until I can get over into the Department and discuss it with Ray
Kline and some of the people who have been working on it.

Senator MANSFIELD. You must understand that these are just
suggestions for the future. I am glad you have given attention to them
already.

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## RELATIONS WITH AID AND USIA

Mr. KISSINGER. First, with respect to AID and USIA and other agencies, one of the difficulties, as I have observed them, of the agencies which are technically under State Department supervision but have some sort of independent status, is that State Department supervision has not been aggressively exercised.

I have had some preliminary discussions with possible recruits on this, and I intend to assign each of these agencies to an Under Secretary who has a specific responsibility to follow what they are doing rather than to wait for a policy issue to emerge.

## GREEN BERET ACTIVITIES IN PHILIPPINES

I did not know there were special forces teams active in the Philippines. Our posture should be of noninvolvement in civil war around the world, except in the most unusual circumstances, which do not obtain in the Philippines. Nor do they obtain in Chile. And my impression is that we were not involved in any of the coup planning or any other matters. But I do agree with you that the impact of events in Chile on the hemisphere can be very considerable.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Doctor.

The CHAIRMAN. I am amazed, if I may say so, that you didn't know about the Philippines. We raised this question at the time of Sullivan's confirmation. That this is just what I feared would be the result.

Are you saying you really didn't know that the Green Berets were operating in the Philippines?

Mr. KISSINGER. I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Forty teams are there.

Mr. KISSINGER. I know that there is a public safety program in the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN. They call it all sorts of things.

But this is exactly what I raised about Sullivan—that we hoped he wouldn't be sent to the Philippines to start the same procedure over there we have just had in Southeast Asia. Now this article that Senator Mansfield has just read looks like the beginning of the same thing.

Are you saying you will do everything you can to stop that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would say that Americans—

Senator MANSFIELD. In all honesty, I should read more of the article:

The activities of these Green Berets are designed as civic action and professional development programs and are presented as an attempt to assist rural Filipinos.

"We go out in the mountains, and—I hate to use the term—we do good. This is the only job I know where I get paid for doing good," said Major Jay Brunner, a Special Forces spokesman.

Civic Action teams help the mountain people to dig wells or clean up springs; they conduct veterinary work such as injecting pigs and show films on health and sanitation. They inspect and extract villagers' teeth.

I think that is a good side, but they are Green Berets.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they were doing good in Southeast Asia, according to all the reports we had. They were building Sunday schools, I remember McNamara saying, when I said something derogatory way back. He said, our boys are giving candy away to children

324

and building Sunday schools on Sunday and doing all that good. That has been a stock description of our activity.

Senator MANSFIELD. I didn't mean to interrupt, doctor; go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you really feel we should now inject Green Berets into the Philippines?

Mr. KISSINGER. I do not believe that American personnel should engage in military activities in the Philippines, or paramilitary activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Paramilitary. If they are going to do that they ought to have civilians do it—not Green Berets—just for appearances.

Mr. KISSINGER. If they are going to do civil actions.

Senator MANSFIELD. It may interest you, Mr. Chairman, that the Green Berets were out in Montana in the last couple of summers doing a lot of good work, such as helping the Indians build bridges.

The CHAIRMAN. I am all for them, say, in Montana and not in the Philippines.

The Senator from Maine didn't have an opportunity and he is prepared to do it now.

## QUESTIONS RAISED IN MAIL

Senator MUSKIE. I have been enlightened. I know it is toward the end of the day and I don't want to plow over the same ground if I can avoid it. But there are some questions I would like to put within the context of what has already been discussed.

The questions which have been raised in my mail fall into two categories: One, there is concern that your confirmation would in effect constitute approval of policies, attitudes, techniques, and so on of which so many, including members of this committee, have been critical.

The second category has to do with what the foreign policy of the administration under you as Secretary of State would be. Those expectations have to be measured against what we have experienced in the last 5 years. I think it is in that category that the questions on wiretapping fall.

## WIRETAPPING QUESTIONS

We have covered wiretapping considerably and yet it seems to me there are some gaps in the testimony at this point.

I think I would be inclined to agree that those who vigorously supported the wiretaps in the past would probably support them in the future, whatever is said in the record here.

There is no way of making a general commitment in these hearings stick if the man who makes it does not believe in it.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I will object to the statement that I vigorously supported them in the past.

Senator MUSKIE. No, I am not suggesting it. We don't know who vigorously supported them. It isn't clear. I am not putting that monkey on your back. I am simply trying to explain why it is that questions continue to be pursued and why it is that I continue to be asked by people how I can support this nomination given the ambiguity of Dr. Kissinger's role with respect to wiretapping.

The questions that I put are put for the purpose of clarifying that role further to the extent that I can.

[Deleted.]

325

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.] The origin of this particular program was a meeting in the President's office which I have described to you, and in which the President ordered the use of wiretaps, and in which my contribution was to describe leaks that had occurred. I would sum up the problem at the time as follows—and I had asked myself this question very much: Did I have any reason to suppose that the Government was doing anything wrong? And second, was I, in executing orders that I thought were legal, doing anything that was wrong or illegal?

I can say that the idea that this was not common practice or that this was in any sense illegal, simply never crossed my mind. I believed, when the Director of the FBI said this had been common practice in every previous administration, that it was a distasteful program that was being reinstituted in this administration. I do not from my own knowledge know that this program was carried out in previous administrations.

I have been told since, again by many people who should know, that it was carried out in previous administrations.

As to my own role, I think, what you have seen will support that I confined my participation scrupulously to individuals who had had access to the information, and that nobody was penalized as a result of this. On the contrary, many of the people who were part of the program became my closest associates, and others who had been part of this program had been kept on my staff against very strong opposition from many quarters. [Deleted.]

And after this one program I did not participate in any other internal security program of the administration so none of these memorandums to which Senator Symington referred to this morning, the Huston program, the Plumber program, or whatever else was done, or the approach to Mr. Helms in the Watergate episode, was conducted with any knowledge of my office or of me personally. I think this is what the committee should keep in mind when it assesses the degree of my own propensity to use such tactics.

Senator MUSKIE. When the experience of previous administrations was described, was it described as being used to uncover leaks?

Mr. KISSINGER. It was described as having been used to uncover leaks and to protect national security information. But I might have been remiss in not inquiring further into it.

Senator MUSKIE. I am not making that judgment necessarily.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is how it was described to me.

Senator MUSKIE. You see, I make a distinction between national security as a justification, and leaks. To close leaks and sources of leaks would require a surveillance effort that could be as wide as the 2½ million civil servants of this Government. If the closing of leaks is a sufficient justification, there is no limit. I gather, of course, from your testimony that there were limits to this in actual fact. But if you establish it as a principle, then the principle is pretty hard to contain.

[Deleted.]

## BASIS FOR INITIATING WIRETAPS

Senator MUSKIE. Now with respect to each wiretap initiated as a result of the name that you provided, was that related to a specific leak of specific information? I know you couldn't recall. But was it your impression that it was a specific leak of specific information or a fishing expedition?

326

Mr. KISSINGER. It was not a fishing expedition. My recollection is that if there was a leak of a complex of documents, the names of those who had access to these documents would be given.

Senator MUSKIE. All of them?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, it was on a rather restricted basis, because if we had followed this literally we could have given 50 names. If we had followed our instructions literally we could have given, as I am sure [deleted] can confirm, many more names on my own staff. What we in fact did was to interpret the instructions to mean the top individual in charge of that particular department. I do not recall any name being given on a fishing expedition.

Senator MUSKIE. And the guidelines that were laid down or in-
structions as you refer to them, was anything there to indicate what
the time frame of the tap was to be? The law provided, I think,
a review after 90 days. That is my understanding.

Mr. KISSINGER. No, to the best of my knowledge. [Deleted.] It was not a procedure with which I was then very familiar, and it was partly because it became clear as it developed that there was no systematic way or indeed fair way I could handle this procedure that it was decided to separate my office from these activities. We did not give a time limit. I do not know whether that 90-day time limit refers to national security wiretaps or whether that is a requirement for court ordered wiretaps. The Attorney General would know this.

SAFEGUARDS ON WIRETAPS

Senator MUSKIE. I think it relates to court ordered wiretaps. But it suggests that a safeguard to an indefinite continuation of a wiretap should have been in the direction itself.

Mr. KISSINGER. In retrospect it does now appear to me that in any
intelligence operation one should apply such a safeguard, which I
must say I instituted in the Forty Committee, where any operation
that is not specifically renewed in the Forty Committee in 6 months
lapses. I think it is dangerous to start a process which doesn't have an
automatic cutoff date because somebody may just forget to cut it off.

Senator MUSKIE. What disturbs me is that a wiretap started
according to national security procedures ought to be terminated
under the guidelines by the same persons and with the same considera-
tions. Otherwise [deleted] the wiretap initiated for perfectly proper
purposes under whatever guidelines it operated can be continued for
any purpose—for national security or political purposes or what not.
It is clear from what you said this morning when I raised a certain
point that you were unaware what considerations governed the
termination of wiretaps.

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.] I never pressed the question explicitly.
I assumed that a wiretap which proved unproductive was terminated.

[Deleted.]

Senator MUSKIE. [Deleted.] Let me ask this question—there are
so many details I could go into but I will not—but to put the pertinent
question, you studied the Attorney General's letter of September 11th?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes.

[Deleted.]

327

PENALTIES FOR LEAKING AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Senator MUSKIE. Let me ask another question relating to something that is not covered in the Attorney General's letter. The administration sent up a new codification of the criminal code which includes recommendation of criminal penalties for the leaking of classified information. Classified information is supposed to be very clearly related to national security. But there is a violation of public policy on the side of overclassifying rather than underclassifying. Yet, the administration proposes criminal penalties for leaking classified information, including leaks to newspapermen and others.

The Attorney General does not address himself here to the question of how his letter applies if that should become law. If that should become law, then you do not have to have national security, as defined in this letter, to justify wiretaps—because you have domestic legislation to do it. So what we are curious about is the overall policy, and I think the committee is disposed to accept what you say at face value. But what we are trying to probe in addition is whether there is an administration policy past, present or in the future. There seems to be a paranoia about all of this because we are doubtful about the principal motivation behind such programs. I do not know how we erect safeguards in a confirmation hearing. We certainly can get you committed so far as your own intention and philosophy are concerned, but what is your reaction to this kind of thing? Should we press for a further clarification of what the policy will be?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I have the impression if what I have been told is correct and what I have experienced, that the phrase "national security" has been used in a rather wide discretionary way in a number of administrations for wiretapping, and I would not be at all offended if criteria were established for the definition of national security in the use of wiretaps, as long as they keep in mind that there may be some genuine cases in which some discretion must be left. Nor would I be offended if there were some provision for legislative oversight and a special committee for the FBI, or whatever else Congress may choose to do. But clearly, it seems to me to be the case that national security wiretaps in a number of administrations, unless I have been profoundly misled, have been used in a rather discretionary manner and that this area of discretion should be more strictly defined.

With respect to the issues you raised, you were kind enough also to raise it with me once in private conversation—

Senator MUSKIE. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have not had an opportunity to study this in that depth. But there seems to me to be two issues. One is, there is no question that documents at this time are being overclassified, and that the low classifications have almost no significance any more. Because when you see something that is stamped confidential it almost means it is not even worthy to discuss with newsmen, and therefore, the higher classification really sets up a psychological block not to further discuss with newsmen. But when you see a confidential document cross your desk you throw it away, and if it is not top secret you do not read it. So that is overclassification.

On the other hand, I am very worried about the doctrine that where somebody leaks a document, the Government then has to establish

(ie)

328

that it threatens national security. Because, first of all, it is not easy to prove; second, it may be possible to prove only by revealing other things, and, therefore, setting in motion a chain of declassifications that are not desirable. How you strike a balance between preventing the Government from hiding behind the classification system and second, leaving it to the individual to decide that the Government is hiding behind the classification system, that I frankly have not thought through. I would be very sympathetic to an attempt to look at the classification system in a very serious and searching manner. But then, once the classifications have been established—clearly with periodic declassifications, because that should also have a terminal point to it—then what the penalties should be I have not thought through. But I would not leave it up to the individual's discretion and then force the Government to have to prove actual damage from case to case. This is my philosophical reflection on it.

Senator MUSKIE. I think that covers my questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator?

## GEORGE WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

Senator AIKEN. I would like to point out this is the 177th anniversary of George Washington's farewell address and from reviewing that speech of George Washington, I find the situation has not changed too much in the last 177 years. I might read a couple of short sentences from his address:

> The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism,

> And a little later he says,

> If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates but let there be no change by usurpation, for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.

Farther down in his speech he warns against enacted legislation discriminating against any particular country that refuses to comply with our wishes and policies and threatening them with loss of trade if they do not comply with us, and of course, some of our amendments had not even been thought of at that time.

But I think George Washington had some pretty good ideas. I do not know if it is pure coincidence that the Post printed what it did this morning, but, personally, I think it should be required reading in all our educational institutions. Actually, the author, although he may have been critical of those who were newly elected to the Congress, apparently failed to realize how fast they learn after they have once gotten in. That is all I have to say. [Laughter.]

## SAFEGUARDS CONCERNING DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. I was not really contesting the substantive allegations that those who are elected do not know about a lot of things. I do not contest that. Again, my interest is in the procedure by which

329

they participate if we are to follow a procedure and have anything to do with it. There are one or two things you discussed with the Senator from Maine that I wanted to follow. You say the safeguards. I do not see any safeguards in the way of definition of what is national security that can be written, but it does seem to me our system is based on the idea that more than one on a very restricted number decide. In the case of the Attorney General's letter, I take it to mean he would decide what is national security.

Surely it ought to be possible that in a rare case, and you say it is rare, you cannot conceive of the recurrence of some of these situations that some mechanism by which someone other than the Attorney General would be consulted, and it is similar, but it does not have to be the same, as in the domestic cases where they have to go through a court. It is true you can find judges who will not be independent and so on, but nevertheless, it is a procedure that is followed. Is it not possible for us, that is, working together, to decide that so many, in these rare cases—I hope they are rare—that someone else be brought into the decision of whether it is national security or not to guard against some of the cases here that were gone over by Senator Case, certainly some of them you had nothing to do with but they are included in the list which clearly appear to be beyond national security as we usually think of it, and they with people—

Dr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

INITIATIVE FOR WIRETAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at any time specifically make a clear initiative, take the clear initiative yourself on any tap on even a single one?

Mr. KISSINGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You never did?

Mr. KISSINGER. Not in the sense that I said "tap this individual." I carried out the criteria of a previous decision. There could have been, as I pointed out, a different perception by the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. No single tap. The criteria?

Mr. KISSINGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated time and again about the criteria that were used, but you never did yourself initiate a specific tap?

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. But not after May 1970, you did not receive the reports, as I understood it?

Mr. KISSINGER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that time you did receive some reports.

WITNESS' APRIL, 1970 DISASSOCIATION FROM CASES

Senator MUSKIE. Could I ask what you meant when you said you disassociated yourself from these cases in April 1970? What did that disassociation mean?

Mr. KISSINGER. The disassociation meant that it was decided that it would be best if my office confined itself to the foreign policy aspects of national security rather than the internal security aspects. This was not in itself a value judgment of the basic principle. It was simply a

330

judgment that as I received information, for example, I was in no
position to do anything with it, and that second, I was simply not set
up to handle internal national security matters. Therefore, it was
decided from that time on that while I had some relationship to that
program informally, through my deputy, General Haig and Director
Sullivan of the FBI, that reports would no longer go to me since there
was nothing I could do with them. Second, any other internal security
program would be handled by the internal security agencies of the
Government rather than by the National Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. The criteria—

Senator MUSKIE. General Haig was in your office continually?

Mr. KISSINGER. But only for that part. He too was not connected
with any part of it, except that as Director Sullivan of the FBI
received a report that seemed to him particularly egregious, he would
then informally notify Haig, but only in the wiretap program. On none
of the other programs did we receive even any information.

Senator MUSKIE. General Haig received such reports?

[Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

REGULATIONS ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO MR. NEWHOUSE

Senator CASE. I did not mean to interrupt, but at some time before
Dr. Kissinger left I did want to raise with him the matter we had
before about your regulations on dissemination of information.

Mr. KISSINGER. What I have done, Senator Case—since I do not
think a selective showing of documents is fair to the committee—is
to bring back everything in my files for you to look at, of which I can
leave copies of everything except the internal NSC paper, because I
am told that those should not be left as a matter of principle. But you
can look at them all and you can keep them all except one.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, this relates to the Newhouse book
and a couple of comments, one I think in the Boston paper and the
New Republic, as I recall it, that complained that he had received
favored treatment from Dr. Kissinger and his office.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, they had received—

Senator Case. That is what I was inquiring about and what I
had been hopeful we could put on the public record so that everybody
would know just what the rules of the game were with respect to
such matters. It was not a matter of my personal interest.

Mr. KISSINGER. Why do we not make an extract of the rules?

Senator CASE. If you could do that.

Mr. KISSINGER. If you do not need the whole document. I just
brought the whole document because I did not want to extract from
it myself.

Senator CASE. I am not interested in inquiring into this for any
personal reason at all. I wanted to make public whatever the rules
are so that everybody can know the way he stands.

Mr. KISSINGER. He received favored treatment in the sense that he
was the only one doing a book, but we would have given that sort of
help to others. We wanted to make sure that what he said was
essentially correct. I barely knew Newhouse at the time, and as you

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will see, and as I already testified, I saw him only once and never
saw him again.

Senator CASE. There is no complaint about Newhouse at all. I think he used to work for the Committee at one time and is generally a highly respected writer and analyst. The only thing that I wanted to get out of this was, if I could, a better understanding from the standpoint of the Security Council and everybody's standpoint as to what the ground rules were in regard to the release or access to material that in a sense is classified. We do not have access to this kind of information. We often cannot get it as a matter of right even in Congress, and I wanted to be sure there was not something in the nature of a leak. But beyond that and more importantly, to get into the public domain what the ground rules are. And if that can be done, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that it be made—I am not making this a condition of my action or the Committee's action but just to be sure it gets into the record so we can get it out.

The CHAIRMAN, How do you propose we do it?

## GUIDELINES IN DEALING WITH MR. NEWHOUSE

Senator CASE. Dr. Kissinger suggests we make a statement about what the policy is in this and any other case he has.

Mr. KISSINGER. I will let you read the document, and I can read my guidelines into the record. The document itself concerned a request to me by Phil Odeen, who was the head of my program analysis staff—and they in turn were dealing with Newhouse—about whether he could show him the documents dealing with the 1968 negotiations. I refused that. I told him he could do that verbally with him but he could not show him the documents, as I testified before the committee. I will show you the document, the whole document. But the three principles were: First, no access to specific NSDM's or internal memorandum. NSDM's are national security decision memorandum, which lay out specific policy decision. Second, very limited discussion of current issues, since the information was very sensitive. Third, no discussion of the negotiations leading up to the May 20 announcement. The May 20 announcement is the May 20, 1971, announcement which I negotiated with Dobrynin and which was the breakthrough in the SALT negotiations. These were the three basic guidelines.

Then, in addition, he asked for permission to read the documents of the 1968 negotiations, and I refused to let him look at the document but said they could talk to him orally about them. They were totally dated at that point, but I do not believe in letting national security documents be shown.

In addition, I have a letter here from Mr. Barry Carter, in which he asked me for permission to read the galleys of Newhouse's book. He had already left my staff so he did not need my permission.

Barry Carter had been a member of my program analysis staff under Odeen and had been the contact with Newhouse. Carter asked me for permission to read the galleys of Newhouse's book. I can let you read the whole letter and make that part of the record. And I refused him permission. I have another letter from Carter in which he pointed out to me that he told Newhouse he would not read the galleys of his book for factual accuracy.

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This week I received another letter from Carter in which he said that he had been asked by several newsmen about my testimony, and he made the following statement. I have not been in touch with Carter: this was what he volunteered.

Senator CASE. He is not a member of the staff now?

Mr. KISSINGER. No; he resigned from my staff a year and a half ago, 15 months ago.

Senator CASE. The substance of his statement is—

Mr. KISSINGER. [Reads:]

I have read the transcript of Dr. Kissinger's remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday. It is a fair and accurate statement regarding the instructions to the NSC staff about assistance to John Newhouse. In his testimony Dr. Kissinger says that to the best of his knowledge, I did not read the galleys of John Newhouse's book. He is correct, I did not read the galleys. Any further questions regarding Dr. Kissinger's instructions should be referred to him. I can assure you that I carried out his instructions to the letter.

All of these you can make part of the record, if you want.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I will leave that to you.

The CHAIRMAN. We can make it part of the record and give you an opportunity to—

Mr. KISSINGER. I have no interest in making them part of the record. But these are unclassified.

The CHAIRMAN. From that you can make whatever public statement you agree on with Dr. Kissinger.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

## CRITERIA FOR WIRETAPS

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.] This would apply to myself, to nearly everyone on the committee who has lunch with or sees or receives in the committee, in their offices, almost any member of the Russian Embassy, for example. We have access, in other words, to people who are connected with or a part of a foreign government with whom we may have problems.

This is what bothers me about this criteria we are talking about and how you apply the principles as written in the Attorney General's letter. This is very broad, indeed. I expect all of us have been called upon by various members of the staffs of some foreign government.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, as Senator Case knows, this was not connected with my office,

The CHAIRMAN. But it comes up in connection with it.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And in connection with the criteria we are to follow?

Mr. KISSINGER. And, therefore, I am really in no position to explain it with any precision.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are going to be in a very neutral position concerning any effort to bring this rather casual manner in which they tap people under control. That is all I mean.

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.] I do not have the report any more myself.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mr. KISSINGER. But secondly, I would not, as Secretary of State, agree that the fact that someone knows a member of the Soviet

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Embassy, even if that member of the Soviet Embassy has an intelligence connection, would justify the use of wiretaps.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a well-known gentleman, whom I am sure you know, Mr. Arbatov. He comes over here once or twice and he usually calls on a number of people.

Mr. KISSINGER. Including me.

The CHAIRMAN. Including you, and, of course, there is no problem about knowing, I suppose, who he calls on, but this again brings me back to the question of who is going to decide what is national security. If connections with or knowledge with or meeting with someone who is part of an intelligence service, and I suppose anyone in an embassy could be—it is very difficult to ascertain. You really have no check at all presently unless someone other than the Attorney General or one person like that makes a decision as to whether or not a wiretap is justified.

Mr. KISSINGER. As you know, Attorney General Richardson testified that at present and for some considerable period, nobody is being tapped simply because of social contact with Soviet citizens, and I would see no reason for changing this situation.

WITNESS' RELATIONS WITH MR. YOUNG AFTER ASSIGNMENT TO MR. EHRLICHMAN'S STAFF

The CHAIRMAN. There is one other question that I have been asked for you to comment upon. It is the apparent discrepancy, if I may use that word, between your testimony about Mr. Young and your relations with him after he was assigned to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, although, as I understand the former testimony, he remained on the payroll of the National Security Council.

[Deleted.]

COMPILATION OF RECORD OF EVENTS RELATING TO VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. There is one other matter that you might throw some light upon growing out of the May 22 statement of the President in which he said:

I also assign the unit of other investigatory matters dealing in part with compiling an accurate record of events relating to the Vietnam war on which the Government's records were inadequate. Many previous records have been removed with the change of administrations which bore directly on the negotiations then in progress. Additional assignments included tracing down other national security leaks including one that seriously compromised the U.S. negotiating position in the SALT talks.

I think in this connection you have stated that you have denied knowledge of any activities of the so-called Plumbers prior to their revelations in the press?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware of any group in the White House charged with preparing records of events related to the Vietnam war for use in connection with negotiations in progress in 1971?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I was not aware of the fact that there was a unit that was charged with this responsibility. I think the record has made clear there were a number of individuals in the

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White House who occasionally made requests of various kinds, which, as a matter of principle, I refused. On two or three occasions I was asked to supply historical documents for this or that purpose, and I invariably refused. I have written records to prove that I always refused them.

[Deleted.]

But I was not aware that there was a formal unit.

[Deleted.]

## UNIT TO BE ASSIGNED INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS BY PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Can you enlighten us as to whom the President was referring when he said "I will assign the unit a number of other investigative matters"? Could that have been the Plumbers?

Mr. KISSINGER. It may have been the Plumbers, but I do not know which one.

The CHAIRMAN. They were assigned the duty of the time—

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

I have always taken a very absolute view that national security documents entrusted to me will not be released.

The CHAIRMAN. The matters were not entrusted to you for any studies in progress?

Mr. KISSINGER. I occasionally had studies prepared in my shop, when a specific issue arose, on the legislative history on that issue, but that has nothing to do with that and is not relevant to that problem.

[Deleted.]

## ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON TEAR GAS AND HERBICIDES

The CHAIRMAN. One or two other things. The President has not yet replied to this committee's letter of April 1972 concerning the Geneva protocol. Now that the Vietnam war seems over, is there some chance that the administration might review its position on tear gas and herbicide and permit the committee to act on its protocol?

Mr. KISSINGER. We have an interdepartmental study of that underway and we should come up with a position very soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rogers promised to provide to this committee the NSC studies on herbicides and tear gas when they were completed. Are they now completed?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think they are in the stage of being completed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that we can anticipate receiving a recommendation in the near future?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would expect so, Mr. Chairman.

## QUESTION OF USE OF FORCE IN FOREIGN POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you the other day in open session about the policy in Vietnam and you were asked by others about the policy in the Middle East. I realize it is a little late to open this up again, but I would like a little bit of enlightenment about this real question of the

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use of force in foreign policy. In the press recently Senator Stennis was quoted as saying that he would have no hesitancy in approving a reopening of the bombing of North Vietnam. I think I am correct in that.

Mr. KISSINGER. I did not read this, Mr. Chairman.

## FUTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give, very briefly, if you can, your attitude now about what the future is in Southeast Asia, Indochina?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that the military issue should be left to the people of the area, and that, therefore, short of an event I cannot now foresee, the President would not come to the Congress and ask for approval to resume military operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Say that again, I did not get that.

Mr. KISSINGER. Short of an event I cannot now foresee, I would not expect the President to come to the Congress and ask for approval to renew any military operations. In any event, as I said in the public session, he would not renew military operations in Indochina without the approval of the Congress, and I do not think it is necessary for him to tie his hands ahead of time about whether he plans to make a request of the Congress.

As far as the political evolution in the area is concerned, we have now a political settlement in Laos, as you know. In South Vietnam there is a good possibility of stability; it will never be in any very clearcut way. It is an uncertain situation, but one that seems to be stabilizing. In Cambodia, it frankly depends on whether the local forces can establish some equilibrium.

The CHAIRMAN. Supposing they do not?

Mr. KISSINGER. If the local forces in Cambodia do establish an equilibrium, I would expect negotiations to take place.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. It would not?

Mr. KISSINGER. By itself, no.

## AUTHORITY TO RESUME BOMBING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel you have authority to resume the bombing without congressional authority?

Mr. KISSINGER. No. I have made clear, Mr. Chairman, that we will not resume military operations in Indochina without congressional approval.

The CHAIRMAN. Even though—

Mr. KISSINGER. Under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was trying to make very precise, even though things did not go well in Cambodia?

Mr. KISSINGER. If we thought of resuming military operations we would return to the Congress for authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was what I wanted to make very clear.

Mr. KISSINGER. We think that the Congress has spoken on that issue, and while we disagreed with the decision, we will abide by it strictly.

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AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO INCIDENTS SUCH AS EC-121

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say you would come to the Congress concerning, for example, the incident mentioned the other day, and you mentioned it today, the EC-121 or something being shot down in Korea. Do you feel that the President has authority to respond to that by bombing without authority from Congress?

Mr. KISSINGER. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that in such a situation we would certainly feel that we should discuss it with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee before making a decision.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not quite responsive. Do you feel you have the authority to do it without congressional approval?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes. I think that the President has the authority to protect American lives. I would not like to draw a clear line between where he must go to the Congress—

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, suppose the plane carrying half a Cabinet got hijacked and got forced down in Cambodia, would the President then have to come to Congress to get authority to try to rescue them?

Mr. KISSINGER. When there are clearly emergency conditions, where American lives are at stake, he has the power.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a hypothetical condition that is quite different. I clearly give you a case.

Senator CASE. This is a hypothetical world.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not a hypothetical issue. [Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason for bringing it up is that question of how far you think the President has authority to act in this manner without congressional approval.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, at the time of the Korean incident I was in Government about 2½ months, and at that time I was not a primary adviser on policy. My job at that time was to act as the President's agent in collecting the views of the various departments and in making sure that the views of various people were fully represented to him with all their implications.

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, you have clarified the point, however valid or invalid it may have been.

Let me take just one moment to see if there is anything I have overlooked.

QUESTION OF POPULATION CONTROL

General Draper called me this morning at 7 o'clock and requested that I perhaps not to ask you so much as urge you to give sympathetic consideration to the question of population control. I was just barely back from my walk when the phone rang and I thought an emergency was pending.

Could you express your views about population growth? [Deleted.]

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say something?

Mr. KISSINGER. I have always taken his views seriously and we will give very serious attention to them.

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U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. You testified the other day that there is no change in our policy in the Middle East, this being one of the very critical positions at the moment.

Does that mean that we will not do anything more than we have done to encourage the negotiations of that war?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the issues on which if I am confirmed, and when we have a discussion on how to work out a relationship between the committee and the Secretary of State we should find a form of communicating that has the minimum possibility of getting into the public record. [Deleted].

I will say for the record here that a combination of concerns with energy, the long-term danger to the peace that are inherent in the area, and our interest in a better relationship with all the nations in the area, will make this one of the regions of great interest. But I would be glad to discuss this with you in a form that can be worked out.

The CHAIRMAN. It is becoming and will become, apparently, much more critical in view of the recent action only yesterday in Vienna and the dire prophesies of shortages this winter, I would think.

Mr. KISSINGER. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubts about that?

Mr. KISSINGER. No doubts whatsoever. But I think the tactics have to be rather carefully thought through. That involves the relationships with the Arabs, with Israel, with the West European countries and with Japan, and all of these have to be synchronized together with our own domestic programs for research and development. So there is no question but that the Middle East is one of the key areas requiring our attention.

POSITION COMMITTEE IS IN

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, I will reiterate what I stated in the beginning, which was raised also by Senator Muskie, concerning the position we are in, in view of our differences on policy in Vietnam and also the policy as expressed in the passage I read to you from the President's statement only 2 weeks ago on the 10th of this month, of appearing to endorse that. It is very troublesome because, as you well know, I don't endorse it. I mean I have a very deep feeling about our using the procedures of force in places where I do not regard our security as being involved and in addition to that there is this question of balancing the priorities. That statement of the President strikes me as laying down a very firm challenge to the Congress about reducing expenditures in the military area. The Trident was mentioned, and the area that Senator Symington has so well described. As I told you, I subscribe to that initial statement that I read to you from the New Yorker, but I still have a very strong disagreement with the policies. It leaves me, and I think some others, in a very great quandary about this matter. We would be in the position of endorsing those particular policies.

338

Mr. KISSINGER. Of course, Mr. Chairman, the decision of whether to confirm my nomination is for the chairman and for the committee to make. Let me say that I would not construe confirmation as endorsement of policies which you have opposed, nor would I construe it as a commitment on the part of the chairman in any sense to give up views that he has strongly held in the past.

I would construe it as a statement of your belief that I am qualified to carry out the Office of the Secretary of State, and as an obligation on my part to deal with the committee and with the chairman on the basis of respect and total candor. I would fully expect that there are issues on which we would continue to differ, but within a framework of mutual respect.

Senator AIKEN. George Washington had the same trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. I am quite sure there is nothing new about some of these problems, but the differences that have arisen between the Congress and the executive branch before you entered it have been almost unprecedented since the Civil War.

There certainly was nothing in World War II or World War I or the Korean war comparable to it. You are a historian; do you agree with that?

Mr. KISSINGER. I agree, Mr. Chairman, that there are these differences whether or not you confirm my nomination. Those difficulties have to be overcome to the greatest extent possible, and hopefully removed, because our functioning as a democracy is at stake.

The CHAIRMAN. As we said, there is a question of whether the democracy is capable of dealing with this problem.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, if we can't deal with these problems as a democracy, we can't deal with them at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Deal with them as an authoritarian government, I guess.

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't think that is our national genius.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it is, either.

Senator Case, have you anything else you would like to say?

Senator CASE. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, would you like to say anything further before we adjourn at this late hour?

Senator AIKEN. Amen.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think, Mr. Chairman, that I have expressed my views, and I think these hearings have been conducted with fairness. I appreciate the opportunities that you gave me to express my views in the executive session as well.

I can only reiterate, assuming confirmation, that everything will depend on the spirit in which this relationship is carried out, and that on my side a very major effort will be made.

## SANITIZATION OF RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very important if you and your staff could cooperate with our staff to sanitize this executive record. There is much in this that I think you will agree is not sensitive. There are obviously certain things which we both agree should not be published, but would it be agreeable to you for it to be submitted in the immediate future for that purpose because I think many such statements such as your last one would be very beneficial.

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Mr. KISSINGER. Sanitize which?

The CHAIRMAN. Sanitize this record. In other words, take out the references.

Mr. KISSINGER. Of the executive session you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Of the executive session.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes, I agree to that, if we can leave out the references to individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean; that is what I have in mind. We have had the other public record and this is a matter of such great significance there is great public interest, that I think you and your staff working with our staff should sanitize the record. Then we will, of course, review it before it is published. I thought it would be understandable and I thought you would agree.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You take out whatever you feel is of a personal nature, those names that you felt should be omitted.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, it is understood that this action of the staffs working together to get this executive meeting straightened out would not hold up the confirmation proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it should take very long, I don't know when you think the confirmation proceeding will take place.

Senator AIKEN. That is set for the committee vote tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. I think a report on a matter of this consequence ought to be available. We have to have a report; that is normal and I don't anticipate any great delay. I don't think we would have much difficulty in deciding what you wish to take from the record.

Senator AIKEN. The hearings would be available tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think the committee would make a report in its recommendation to the Senate, which is normal practice. I am not suggesting we do not proceed with the committee meeting tomorrow to vote on it. I was suggesting that Mr. Kissinger has made some, I think, very useful, in his own behalf, statements today which would be very useful to be included in the record.

Mr. KISSINGER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Mr. KISSINGER. The general philosophical statements or anything else I said on substance today I have no hesitation to include in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I had in mind.

What do you say?

## PUBLICATION OF HEARINGS

Senator CASE. That is fine. As a matter of expediting it, would it save any time not to publish the wiretap portion until later?

Senator AIKEN. As I understand it the hearings up to now are virtually ready for the printers.

Could the hearing of today, if it is going to cause 2 or 3 days' delay, be printed as a supplement which would be available before the full Senate if called on to vote on the nomination?

The CHAIRMAN. I would think that is all right.

Mr. MARCY. Sort of volume 2.

The CHAIRMAN. As soon as they get it ready.

(w)

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Senator AIKEN. Before the vote on the floor the hearing of today could be published.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think there would be any problem.

Mr. KISSINGER. My only concern—but that is entirely up to the judgment of the Senate—is a visit to the U.N. next week in which there are very many foreign ministers who want to discuss MBFR.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't need to worry about that; you are talking about the 24th.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MARCY. I just want to point out the fiscal problem. We are in pretty good shape if we do it as Senator Aiken has suggested, have two volumes and make this supplementary. Then you will be actually able by about Wednesday morning to get the full—

Senator AIKEN. Could the full 4 days of hearings be published sometime tomorrow?

Mr. MARCY. I should say we are having a little bit of a problem getting the hearing with the Attorney General sanitized. You will remember we had that.

The CHAIRMAN. This is much more important than that one. I am not worried about that one.

Senator AIKEN. That ties in more with today than it does with the formal hearings on the nomination.

Mr. MARCY. If we run into a problem, we will let you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

If not, the committee is adjourned.

Thank you very much.

Mr. KISSINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

# APPENDIX

[The following statement was inadvertently omitted from the public hearings.]

STATEMENT BY IRENE T. HARTER, SEPTEMBER 7, 1973

I thank the Chair—and the Committee—for the opportunity to speak at this confirmation hearing.

It is difficult, after all the White House inspired fanfare, proclaiming the logic and brilliance of Dr. Kissinger's nomination, to question it.

Selected journalists and politicians have become accustomed to accepting Dr. Kissinger's confidential briefings (tailored to their individual biases) as proof of his achievements.

But fortunately, independent thought is not dead in this republic. Mary McGrory, William V. Shannon, and others have raised questions. Does Dr. Kissinger have the bone-deep sense of morality, compassion, and judgment needed in our Secretary of State at this watershed of history? Can he rebuild and manage the Department of State after he has done so much to weaken it?

Thank God for the professors, insulated by objectivity and distance from Dr. Kissinger's gloppy unctuousness. Their apprehension is deep. They object to his Bismarckian vision of power, his pompous treatises on political-military systems, his preoccupation—at least prior to 1969—with Europe, and his contempt for international economic issues and the United Nations.

Analysts in Japan, Europe, the Arab states, and Latin America consider Dr. Kissinger's views inimical to their interests.

On the other hand, the Communist leaders seem eager to see this nomination confirmed. Perhaps they fear any other Secretary of State would be worse than the devil they think they know.

Even so, Dr. Kissinger remains a sacred cow of the National Security Establishment. Some who distrust him curb their criticism, fearing reprisals, once his power has been secured.

We should ask much from those in high office. We need leaders who respect the law, individual rights, and human dignity. Secretary Rogers said at a press conference August 20—"It is very important for the United States not to become so obsessed with security matters that laws are freely violated... One of the things that provides security for Americans is the fact that we are a law-abiding nation, and that means protection for all individuals and a protection for individual rights."

This seems to be the antithesis of Dr. Kissinger's philosophy. So far, the American people have seen only the iceberg tip of the Kissinger foreign policy—the part that has been in the limelight for four and a half years. The bulk of his business has been sub rosa, deliberately shielded from public scrutiny. Under the glamorous banner headlines were the deceptions and ugly deeds authorized by the Forty Committee, headed by the dark side of Dr. Kissinger. The words "National Security" have camouflaged crime, confusion, corruption—and Dirty Tricks—around the world.

To comprehend Dr. Kissinger's total role, one must examine his participation in the secret bombing of Southeast Asia, the protracted withdrawal of U.S. forces during four long years of death, destruction, and "negotiation," the spread of War into Cambodia and Laos. And one must perceive the damage done to the ideals of a nation under the law by the full pardon granted in the Green Beret case early in 1969, on the ground that its public examination would harm "The National Security."

Clearly the Viet-Nam War absorbed much of Dr. Kissinger's energy since 1969. Those who shared his assumptions were rewarded. Critics became White House "enemies." Whatever their rank or station in life, they were harassed and discredited. Public opinion was manipulated to portray to the world a facade of support for all his presumed diplomatic triumphs.

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Lee Harvey Oswald case. Mr. Thomas also rendered important service in Haiti and as a representative to UNESCO—only to see less skilled, less diligent, and perhaps less independent-minded diplomats promoted ahead of him.

The Committee also knows of John Hemenway's complaints regarding his Selection-Out from the Foreign Service, but has not yet chosen to examine his well-documented allegations.

The Committee's records also include selected documents reflecting John Harter's successful 1971 skirmish with Mr. Macomber over employee rights.

There are many, many other examples of injustice in recent Foreign Service personnel operations—at all levels—but these three are especially well documented. If the Committee should ask its staff to examine some of these careers in detail, it would see why the Foreign Service deteriorated in the Kissinger-Macomber years. It would also grasp why many Foreign Service Officers are alarmed that Dr. Kissinger aspires to be simultaneously in command of the Department of State and de facto head of the CIA.

The uneasiness of the professionals is magnified by ugly rumors that Dr. Kissinger intends: to shrink the size of the Foreign Service, to bring more of his proteges and spooks into its ranks, to destroy its management function, to reduce its capacity for independent judgment, and to insure its "loyalty"—meaning absolute subservience—to his person. The rumors are plausible because of his known distrust and contempt for the Foreign Service.

Undoubtedly the entire foreign affairs community could benefit from skillful redesign. Some functions of the Cold War Machine should be cut. Others eliminated.

But the problems are too big and too complicated to solve overnight. To impose surgery without careful forethought would invite disaster. The essential prerequisite to reform is a better public grasp of the problems.

Once there is this understanding in the public domain, the blue-ribbon Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy might be able to devise suitable recommendations for effective long-range reform.

The Ervin Committee has exposed grievous abuse of the public trust. But the Alice in Wonderland World of "National Security" blocks its probe into the Great Political Tragedy of 1972.

The spear carriers caught at the Watergate were found guilty of burglary. They said their mission was to safeguard "The National Security" from ill-defined radicals and subversives. Their misjudgment was more than excess of zeal. At least Hunt, Liddy, and Barker seem to have had a distorted view of "The National Security" as the point at which domestic politics and foreign affairs intersect.

Those who manipulated the spear carriers bear a much greater guilt for the many Watergate crimes. They have not yet been publicly identified. We do not yet know who was responsible for the hallucination that "The National Security" required such crimes, which were tantamount to subverting the American political process.

The Ervin Committee has provided irrefutable evidence of a surrealistic and paranoid White House mood, at least from 1970 on. The Administration saw itself as a fortress besieged. Experts in the "proven" methods for dealing with the threats were needed. Recourse to CIA techniques, equipment, and personnel was natural.

Mr. Chairman, the Foreign Relations Committee must not shirk its duty. It should thoroughly examine the role of Dr. Kissinger—as President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—in creating the mood—the paranoia—and the suppression. It should examine—as it has never ever examined any nominee—the interests, attitudes, and actions of Dr. Kissinger, to determine whether he has the qualities to occupy the seat of Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and their distinguished successors.

Thorough public hearings on the mythology of "National Security" should make it clear *why* Watergate happened—and what Dr. Kissinger did to *cause* it to happen. He may have been unaware of the interactions between his personal approach to world affairs and the responses of numerous pragmatists and opportunists in the White House, the Committee to Re-Elect the President, and the Department of State. But he may have been a vital missing link in the puzzle which baffles the American people in 1973.

The example of the Watergate Committee is before you. You are the only public agency which can complete its analysis, because of the pervasive interconnections between foreign affairs, a perverted concept of "The National Security," and domestic politics which led to the unfortunate events of 1972.

347

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Covert activities of CIA, intelligence agencies</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>Criminal penalties for leaking classified information</td><td>327</td></tr><tr><td>Cuba:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Diplomatic relations with</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. policy toward</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>Decisionmaking, concern regarding procedures on</td><td>305</td></tr><tr><td>Détente:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Effect on Soviet and Romanian citizens</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>With Moscow and Peking</td><td>223</td></tr><tr><td>Doctrine of noninterference</td><td>198</td></tr><tr><td>Eastern Asia, U.S. effort in stability of</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td>Economic aid and military legislation, separation of</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Economic negotiations, cranking concern for human rights into</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Electronic surveillance:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Compelled to testify on</td><td>281</td></tr><tr><td>Information concerning</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Process of initiating</td><td>279</td></tr><tr><td>Emigration</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>Europe:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cost of unilateral troop withdrawal</td><td>146</td></tr><tr><td>Year of</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>Executive, closer relationship between legislative branches and</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Executive agreements:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Furnishing of to Congress</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Guidelines concerning</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>Executive branch:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Broader based participation within</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Enhancement of concentration of power in</td><td>160</td></tr><tr><td>Executive privilege, narrowness of use</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Export controls, State Department participation concerning</td><td>107</td></tr><tr><td>False information, giving to Congress</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>Famine, meeting of nations concerning</td><td>147</td></tr><tr><td>FAO meeting in Rome</td><td>295</td></tr><tr><td>FBI files on wiretaps:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Attorney General's position</td><td>264</td></tr><tr><td>Bohlen case precedent</td><td>264, 265</td></tr><tr><td>Committee right to examine</td><td>264, 265</td></tr><tr><td>Origin and scope of</td><td>265</td></tr><tr><td>Five-power world, Kissinger doctrine of</td><td>217</td></tr><tr><td>Food exports, suggestion of curtailing</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Food and fiber, supplies of</td><td>147</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign country's internal affairs, risk of becoming involved in</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign policy:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Administration's attitude toward Congress on</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td>Conceptualization by committee</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Participation by Congress and public opinion in</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Separation from domestic considerations</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>United Nations role in factor of</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Relations Committee, relations between State Department and</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Forty and Intelligence Committees, difference between</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Fulbright, Senator J. W.:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Examination of witnesses:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kissinger, Dr. Henry A</td><td>1, 3-6, 11-15, 23, 27, 37, 50, 51, 63, 65-69, 72, 78, 93-94, 95-104, 115, 130, 139, 291, 294, 300, 301, 305-313, 314-319, 323-324, 328-330, 331, 332-340.</td></tr><tr><td>Richardson, Hon. Elliot L</td><td>263-264, 267, 268, 270, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 286, 289</td></tr><tr><td>Ruckelshaus, William D</td><td>274-275, 276, 277, 278</td></tr><tr><td>Genocide, U.S. position on</td><td>195</td></tr><tr><td>George Washington's Farewell Address</td><td>328</td></tr><tr><td>Global structure, changes in promising more peaceful world</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Government, seminar on process of conducting</td><td>309</td></tr><tr><td>Hanoi, U.S. presence in</td><td>183</td></tr><tr><td>Greece, homeporting arrangements</td><td>138</td></tr><tr><td>Green Beret activities in Philippines</td><td>323</td></tr></tbody></table>

349

Mansfield, Senator Mike:
Examination of witnesses: Page

<table><tr><td>Kissinger, Dr. Henry A</td><td>319-324</td></tr><tr><td>Richardson, Hon. Elliot L</td><td>270</td></tr></table>

McGee, Senator Gale W.:

Examination of witnesses:

<table><tr><td>Kissinger, Dr. Henry A</td><td>46-48, 137, 143-146, 301-305</td></tr><tr><td>Richardson, Hon. Elliot L</td><td>286</td></tr></table>

McGovern, Senator George:

Examination of witnesses:

<table><tr><td>Gruening, Ernest</td><td>187-191</td></tr><tr><td>Kissinger, Dr. Henry A</td><td>58-61, 91-93</td></tr><tr><td>Richardson, Hon. Elliot L</td><td>289</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Middle East, U.S. policy and position concerning</td><td>39, 213, 337</td></tr><tr><td>Military aid, intent of furnishing to Lon Nol government</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>Military assistance, jurisdiction for</td><td>114</td></tr><tr><td>Military and economic aid legislation, separation of</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Military equipment and supplies, rise in cost</td><td>106</td></tr></table>

Military forces:

<table><tr><td>Cost of maintaining</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><td>Informing congressional committees on use of</td><td>31</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Military posts, reduction of foreign</td><td>105</td></tr></table>

Military Strength:

<table><tr><td>And location at present</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>Further reduction in</td><td>105</td></tr></table>

Missing in action:

<table><tr><td>Accounting for</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>Administration's plan to account for in Laos</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>Eighty-three identified</td><td>139</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Further steps to secure North Vietnamese compliance with provision of</td><td>23</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Pursuit of information concerning</td><td>43</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Mollenhoff-Kissinger standoff</td><td>199</td></tr><tr><td>Morale, State Department</td><td>152</td></tr><tr><td>Moscow, U.S. signals to</td><td>93</td></tr></table>

Most-favored-nation:

<table><tr><td>Extending privilege of</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Question of and Soviet denial of rights</td><td>40</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Multilateral reconstruction; committee view on</td><td>182</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Multilateral sanctions, State Department policy concerning</td><td>117</td></tr></table>

Muskie, Senator Edmund S.:

Examination of witnesses:

<table><tr><td>Kissinger, Dr. Henry A</td><td>52-56, 88-91, 324-330</td></tr><tr><td>Richardson, Hon. Elliot L</td><td>287-288</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Mutual and balanced forces reductions</td><td>44, 38</td></tr><tr><td>National commitments resolution</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>National defense, justification for request</td><td>311</td></tr><tr><td>National intelligence, spending for</td><td>79</td></tr></table>

National security:

<table><tr><td>Did court set precise definition of</td><td>280</td></tr><tr><td>Peace and the SALT agreement</td><td>122-128</td></tr><tr><td>Placed ahead of open society</td><td>289</td></tr><tr><td>Safeguards concerning definition of</td><td>328</td></tr></table>

National Security Council:

<table><tr><td>Consolidation of functions with Secretary of State</td><td>315-16</td></tr><tr><td>Portion of staff shifted to State Department</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>Studies on food and fuel</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Studies in general</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Subcommittee chaired by</td><td>79</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>New concept, administration's devotion to questioned</td><td>96</td></tr></table>

Newhouse, John:

<table><tr><td>Book</td><td>330</td></tr><tr><td>Discussions with</td><td>110-111</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Guidelines in dealing with regulations on dissemination of information to</td><td>330</td></tr></table>

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT
AND
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

AT THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER AS SECRETARY OF STATE

THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:05 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you today to this ceremony in which Dr. Henry A. Kissinger will be sworn in as Secretary of State.

The Chief Justice of the United States will now administer the oath of office.

(The Chief Justice of the United States administered the oath of office.)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Secretary of State, Members of the Cabinet, Members of the House and the Senate, and all of our other distinguished guests:

I know all of you will want to hear from the new Secretary of State speaking for the first time in that capacity and my remarks therefore will be brief before presenting him to you.

First, I am aware of the fact that during the process of his hearings that you have learned much about him that perhaps you had not known before, but certainly during the process of his hearings you learned *that* here is a man who has the poise, the strength, the character to serve in this great position, and that he can handle himself under considerable fire. As a matter of fact, Dr. Kissinger used to come in my office during the days of the hearings. He had not been through such an experience before, and I said, "You are going to go through it for a long time, do you still want the job?" But I kept reassuring him and I told him the vote would be very, very good, and it was.

And I am sure he must have felt like Winston Churchill, who once wrote that the most exhilarating thing in life is to be shot at without result. (Laughter)

Now, much has been written about Dr. Kissinger's background and the significance of his appointment. All of you know, and members of the press are aware of the fact that I like to refer to things which happen to be first in this Administration. I suppose that is the right of every President.

MORE

(OVER)

Page 2

But in Dr. Kissinger's case, we are very proud and
it is very significant in these days when we must think
of America as part of a whole world community, it is
very significant that for the first time in our long history,
a naturalized citizen is the Secretary of State of the
United States.

It is also significant to note that this is the first
Secretary of State, who, before assuming that office, had
traveled on official business both to Peking and to Moscow.
I was trying to think of something else that had not been
written, and nothing occurred to me until yesterday, when
very late in the day, I thought I had better get a haircut
before appearing on television again, and so my barber, who
is also Dr. Kissinger's barber, said he had been looking at
some pictures of Secretaries of State, and he said, "I bet
I know something about this man that you don't know."

I said, "I am sure you do. What is it?"

He said, "He is the first Secretary of State since
World War II who doesn't part his hair." (Laughter)

So I began to think back and I said, "Secretary Acheson,
yes, that is right, he parted his hair; Secretary Dulles
parted his hair; Secretary Rogers parted his hair."

But then my barber, who is a very wise man and seldom
wrong, I said, "But what about Secretary Rusk?" (Laughter)
And he said, "Well, Mr. President, he didn't have much hair,
but what he had, he parted." (Laughter)

That little story about the parting of hair has no
relevance to the functions of Secretary of State. I would
say on a serious vein simply that Dr. Kissinger assumes
this office at a watershed time in American foreign policy,
at a time when America is at peace for the first time in
12 years, at a time when we recognize that the only thing
more difficult than getting peace is keeping it, at a time,
therefore, when building the structure of peace is so
important.

And he also recognizes another fundamental fact. There
is a tendency these days to personalize every activity in,
particularly, foreign policy: the exciting secret trips of
Dr. Kissinger to Peking, to Moscow, to Paris; what a
President does, what a Secretary of State does, what his
advisors do.

But Dr. Kissinger knows, as I know, and as everybody
in this audience knows, that successes in any area, and
particularly in foreign policy, do not come simply from the
activities of one person. It requires a dedicated team of
people, men and women working together. And, in now having
achieved peace, in keeping the peace and building the structure
of peace, he has the function and, I am sure, will meet that
responsibility of getting the cooperation of the people in the
State Department and the other agencies of government, so
that working together and working with the Congress of the
United States, we will not miss that historic opportunity
to build a lasting peace for America and the world. This is
certainly his charge. It is one that he welcomes and it is one
for which he is superbly qualified.

Ladies and gentlemen, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. President, the Chief Justice,
distinguished guests:

Nearly five years ago, shortly after the President had
been elected, he invited me to call on him at the Hotel
Pierre in New York. I had never met the President at the
time, and he described to me, in a conversation which
eventually led to my appointment as his Assistant for
National Security, what he hoped to achieve in his Presidency.

He told me that no goal could be more noble than to bring
mankind closer to its eternal hope for a lasting peace. He
said that we should not be hampered by any preconceptions,
that we should not avoid any new departures and that we should
enlist the ablest people in the departments and in the
country to help in this enterprise.

In the five years that have passed since then, we have
gone through many turbulent times, but the objective has never
wavered, and the major progress has been made in easing many
of the tensions that existed in the world when the President
assumed office.

A few weeks ago in San Clemente, the President spoke
to me again about his hopes for his second term, and asked
me to assume this position, and he again stressed to me that
the only objectives that are worth achieving in foreign policy
are those that transcend Administrations and go beyond parties,
and he spoke to me then about the structure of peace.

When we speak of a structure of peace, we mean a world which
there has not just eased tensions, but overcome them; a
world not based on strength, but on justice; a relationship
among nations based on cooperation and not an equilibrium of
forces alone. That kind of a world is the task, as the
President has pointed out, of all Americans, and it is the
reason why the President has charged me here with achieving
it in the closest cooperation with the Congress and with the
great departments of the Government.

Mr. President, you referred to my background, and it
is true, there is no country in the world where it is conceivable
that a man of my origin could be standing here next to the
President of the United States. And if my origin can contribute
anything to the formulation of our policy, it is that at an
early age I have seen what can happen to a society that is
based on hatred and strength and distrust, and that I experienced
then what America means to other people, its hope and its
idealism. And therefore, in achieving a structure of peace
under your leadership, Mr. President, we will strive not just
for a pragmatic solution to this or that difficulty, but to
recognize that America has never been true to itself unless
it meant something beyond itself.

And as we work for a world at peace with justice, compassion
and humanity, we know that America, in fulfilling man's deepest
aspirations, fulfills what is best within it.

Thank you very much.

END.

(AT 11:19 A.M. EDT.)