The President's Office in Washington, D.C.
the State of the Republic of Israel

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

XREX TELECON

Senator Javits

4/3/72 8:05 a.m.

J: ... trying to reach you because the gentleman who is visiting in Washington has asked to see me. He came to the Foreign Relations Committee for coffee -- was questioning everybody including me. Then he sent word through mutual friends at XM State . . .

K: Isn't he in Miami?

J: No, he's in Walter Reed. He wants to see me this morning.

K: I think you should.

J: I am in Westchester. But I'll be down in a few hours.

K: I think you should listen to his peace proposal -- don't say anything but then let's you and me get together later this week.

J: He intimated that there's plenty of things to talk about. So my question is if that is true, why set any preconditions yourself? All the preconditions are on the record. The other side has got theirs. . . . . . . I understand what that means, but nonetheless that was his reply. Either because of who I am or because of the nature of the question . . . . There are a number of hypotheses as to why he initiated this.

K: Why don't you give me a call after you have talked to him?

["H. E. T. H. T. H. H. T. H. H. T. H. H. T. H. H. T. H. H. T

The President's Office in the Senate
the Senate of the Republic
President's Office

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KVLW NAVA Date: 5/12/04

L: Yes, as a matter of fact we put 20 more out there. They have been part of the SIOP and are on their way but they can search now any way. They couldn't maintain the search without having the 20 birds out there.

K: Why don't we try to get them to do that?

L: We have. We sent them a message last night.

K: Good.

L: Now the weather thing I can't do anything about.

K: Well Mel, you get blamed for a lot of things, but you will never be blamed for the weather.

L: I understand the briefing this morning was not good. Maybe I should send John over there.

K: Good, because then if the President gets in I could walk him over there.

L: Well, I will have Johnny Vogt come over tomorrow morning. You know these guys get nervous and...

K: Right and John was one of my students and he knows I am just a bag of wind. Good, Mel, and I will call you for a time with the President this afternoon. And let's talk for 15 minutes either before or after the President.

Re: question about the report in
right, Son, or 'comical'
MacPro 8.0

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM

Roland Evans/Kissinger

11:34 a.m. - 4/3/72

E: Could you give me 2 minutes?

K: Yes, but it's got to be very fast.

E: What shape is this thing taking right now?

K: Frankly, there is no way of telling. They have made a massive
attack in the DMZ. They are going across with elements of 4
divisions. They didn't all come across the DMZ; some came from
the West. And almost all of the tanks that are used have come across
the DMZ.

E: They are much better equipped than we thought.

K: Well, no, they had these tanks last time in Lam Son but they used
the sanctuaries in North Vietnam and pushed down. So they have
had a 3 to 1 superiority against the North Vietnamese Division
and we have had the _________ that if we bump in the North this
is . . .

E: Is it a point to improve their ground position?

K: I think it is not impossible that they will talk but don't ascribe
that to me.

E: This could only be if they could take over the I Corps.

K: It could be in any case.

E: Finally, Henry, would you say they are going to move into the
highlands?

K: I would expect them to move in the highlands.

E: Do you know whether the "324" is near Huan (?) at this point?

K: I think...

E: Would you object if I talked to Bill Stanford (?) He has been very
helpful to me but obviously is not talking without a say-so from you.

K: I have given you more than he is going to be able to.

H. E. T. D. (HON. CIVIL ENGINEER)
Serving S. C. of C. U.
Majors' Court?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NAFU Date: 5/12/84

E: OK, you would rather I didn't.

K: I would rather not have too many speculations by people who don't have the whole picture.

E: How long do you think it will go on?

K: For months.

E: The timing of this thing is not political so why would they wait so long?

K: That we don't know.

E: You don't think it was because of Peking and Moscow?

K: I think it could have something to do with it. They may be getting ready to talk.

E: You are not too worried about it at this stage?

K: No, but they are going to make gains. They are going to take some provinces.

E: Yes, but not Huan (?).

K: They could take __________, __________, __________. I don't consider this a sign of strength. There is one uncertain factor.

E: You don't want me to talk to Bill.

K: No, I would rather you didn't.

E: OK.

I have been very so from you.

Re: [insert telephone number here]

To: [insert name here]

From: [insert name here]

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

12:15 p.m. - 4/3/72

D: About these additional rooms. As it is now there is set rooms for the President, his wife and 8 additional men. All those other accommodations we will discuss later. In addition you have been given 6 other rooms where you may use them as you like for work and so on. I will receive the plans of the apartments within a week. I will give it to you but at the same time we expect ______ in the middle of April as to who is where.

K: Marvelous. Very good. Now how about that other thing we mentioned to you.

D: This I receive yesterday. I don't want to call you because it was a Sunday. I will call you by tomorrow evening.

K: I wanted to see you on another matter. Could you come over at 5:30?

D: I will come at 5:30. Usual place?

K: Usual place.

Hegemonikos Nkei eipen hie
isika, Sika at' eikonomikai
PolitekNIKIS Naikai

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sept. 3.6

By: KHL NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Kissinger

12:22 p.m. - 4/3/72

DK: I am in Milwaukee for the Primary.

HK: Now I hope you don't think I mislead you. I gave you what I had.

DK: Not at all.

HK: It now looks as if all of the tanks and heavy artillery have come across the DMZ.

DK: But the Division is still there

HK: And elements (?) are coming across.

DK: This is what I want to ask you in terms of my plans here. I want you to provide guidance as to whether the story is going to develop to such a magnitude that I would better serve my paper if I were there.

HK: Today there is nothing big developing but if I were you I would get back Wednesday.

DK: I'll be back Wednesday night. Is that too late?

HK: Check with me tomorrow.

DK: You think there will be some significant action by Wednesday?

HK: I don't see the action changing within 24 hours but I can't see further ahead than that.

DK: But with this additional element coming across the DMZ do you see a major battle shaping up in Duang Hua (?) ?

HK: It could happen that way.

DK: You think I should be back Wednesday morning?

HK: There is nothing spectacular. I don't want to mislead you.

DK: Nothing happening in II Corps?

HK: No.

["1-1. position 1. from the left to the right. 1.1. 1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4. 1.1.5. 1.1.6. 1.1.7. 1.1.8. 1.1.9. 1.1.10. 1.1.11. 1.1.12. 1.1.13. 1.1.14. 1.1.15. 1.1.16. 1.1.17. 1.1.18. 1.1.19. 1.1.20. 1.1.21. 1.1.22. 1.1.23. 1.1.24. 1.1.25. 1.1.26. 1.1.27. 1.1.28. 1.1.29. 1.1.30. 1.1.31. 1.1.32. 1.1.33. 1.1.34. 1.1.35. 1.1.36. 1.1.37. 1.1.38. 1.1.39. 1.1.40. 1.1.41. 1.1.42. 1.1.43. 1.1.44. 1.1.45. 1.1.46. 1.1.47. 1.1.48. 1.1.49. 1.1.50. 1.1.51. 1.1.52. 1.1.53. 1.1.54. 1.1.55. 1.1.56. 1.1.57. 1.1.58. 1.1.59. 1.1.60. 1.1.61. 1.1.62. 1.1.63. 1.1.64. 1.1.65. 1.1.66. 1.1.67. 1.1.68. 1.1.69. 1.1.70. 1.1.71. 1.1.72. 1.1.73. 1.1.74. 1.1.75. 1.1.76. 1.1.77. 1.1.78. 1.1.79. 1.1.80. 1.1.81. 1.1.82. 1.1.83. 1.1.84. 1.1.85. 1.1.86. 1.1.87. 1.1.88. 1.1.89. 1.1.90. 1.1.91. 1.1.92. 1.1.93. 1.1.94. 1.1.95. 1.1.96. 1.1.97. 1.1.98. 1.1.99. 1.1.100. 1.1.101. 1.1.102. 1.1.103. 1.1.104. 1.1.105. 1.1.106. 1.1.107. 1.1.108. 1.1.109. 1.1.110. 1.1.111. 1.1.112. 1.1.113. 1.1.114. 1.1.115. 1.1.116. 1.1.117. 1.1.118. 1.1.119. 1.1.120. 1.1.121. 1.1.122. 1.1.123. 1.1.124. 1.1.125. 1.1.126. 1.1.127. 1.1.128. 1.1.129. 1.1.130. 1.1.131. 1.1.132. 1.1.133. 1.1.134. 1.1.135. 1.1.136. 1.1.137. 1.1.138. 1.1.139. 1.1.140. 1.1.141. 1.1.142. 1.1.143. 1.1.144. 1.1.145. 1.1.146. 1.1.147. 1.1.148. 1.1.149. 1.1.150. 1.1.151. 1.1.152. 1.1.153. 1.1.154. 1.1.155. 1.1.156. 1.1.157. 1.1.158. 1.1.159. 1.1.160. 1.1.161. 1.1.162. 1.1.163. 1.1.164. 1.1.165. 1.1.166. 1.1.167. 1.1.168. 1.1.169. 1.1.170. 1.1.171. 1.1.172. 1.1.173. 1.1.174. 1.1.175. 1.1.176. 1.1.177. 1.1.178. 1.1.179. 1.1.180. 1.1.181. 1.1.182. 1.1.183. 1.1.184. 1.1.185. 1.1.186. 1.1.187. 1.1.188. 1.1.189. 1.1.190. 1.1.191. 1.1.192. 1.1.193. 1.1.194. 1.1.195. 1.1.196. 1.1.197. 1.1.198. 1.1.199. 1.1.200. 1.1.201. 1.1.202. 1.1.203. 1.1.204. 1.1.205. 1.1.206. 1.1.207. 1.1.208. 1.1.209. 1.1.210. 1.1.211. 1.1.212. 1.1.213. 1.1.214. 1.1.215. 1.1.216. 1.1.217. 1.1.218. 1.1.219. 1.1.220. 1.1.221. 1.1.222. 1.1.223. 1.1.224. 1.1.225. 1.1.226. 1.1.227. 1.1.228. 1.1.229. 1.1.230. 1.1.231. 1.1.232. 1.1.233. 1.1.234. 1.1.235. 1.1.236. 1.1.237. 1.1.238. 1.1.239. 1.1.240. 1.1.241. 1.1.242. 1.1.243. 1.1.244. 1.1.245. 1.1.246. 1.1.247. 1.1.248. 1.1.249. 1.1.250. 1.1.251. 1.1.252. 1.1.253. 1.1.254. 1.1.255. 1.1.256. 1.1.257. 1.1.258. 1.1.259. 1.1.260. 1.1.261. 1.1.262. 1.1.263. 1.1.264. 1.1.265. 1.1.266. 1.1.267. 1.1.268. 1.1.269. 1.1.270. 1.1.271. 1.1.272. 1.1.273. 1.1.274. 1.1.275. 1.1.276. 1.1.277. 1.1.278. 1.1.279. 1.1.280. 1.1.281. 1.1.282. 1.1.283. 1.1.284. 1.1.285. 1.1.286. 1.1.287. 1.1.288. 1.1.289. 1.1.290. 1.1.291. 1.1.292. 1.1.293. 1.1.294. 1.1.295. 1.1.296. 1.1.297. 1.1.298. 1.1.299. 1.1.300. 1.1.301. 1.1.302. 1.1.303. 1.1.304. 1.1.305. 1.1.306. 1.1.307. 1.1.308. 1.1.309. 1.1.310. 1.1.311. 1.1.312. 1.1.313. 1.1.314. 1.1.315. 1.1.316. 1.1.317. 1.1.318. 1.1.319. 1.1.320. 1.1.321. 1.1.322. 1.1.323. 1.1.324. 1.1.325. 1.1.326. 1.1.327. 1.1.328. 1.1.329. 1.1.330. 1.1.331. 1.1.332. 1.1.333. 1.1.334. 1.1.335. 1.1.336. 1.1.337. 1.1.338. 1.1.339. 1.1.340. 1.1.341. 1.1.342. 1.1.343. 1.1.344. 1.1.345. 1.1.346. 1.1.347. 1.1.348. 1.1.349. 1.1.350. 1.1.351. 1.1.352. 1.1.353. 1.1.354. 1.1.355. 1.1.356. 1.1.357. 1.1.358. 1.1.359. 1.1.360. 1.1.361. 1.1.362. 1.1.363. 1.1.364. 1.1.365. 1.1.366. 1.1.367. 1.1.368. 1.1.369. 1.1.370. 1.1.371. 1.1.372. 1.1.373. 1.1.374. 1.1.375. 1.1.376. 1.1.377. 1.1.378. 1.1.379. 1.1.380. 1.1.381. 1.1.382. 1.1.383. 1.1.384. 1.1.385. 1.1.386. 1.1.387. 1.1.388. 1.1.389. 1.1.390. 1.1.391. 1.1.392. 1.1.393. 1.1.394. 1.1.395. 1.1.396. 1.1.397. 1.1.398. 1.1.399. 1.1.400. 1.1.401. 1.1.402. 1.1.403. 1.1.404. 1.1.405. 1.1.406. 1.1.407. 1.1.408. 1.1.409. 1.1.410. 1.1.411. 1.1.412. 1.1.413. 1.1.414. 1.1.415. 1.1.416. 1.1.417. 1.1.418. 1.1.419. 1.1.420. 1.1.421. 1.1.422. 1.1.423. 1.1.424. 1.1.425. 1.1.426. 1.1.427. 1.1.428. 1.1.429. 1.1.430. 1.1.431. 1.1.432. 1.1.433. 1.1.434. 1.1.435. 1.1.436. 1.1.437. 1.1.438. 1.1.439. 1.1.440. 1.1.441. 1.1.442. 1.1.443. 1.1.444. 1.1.445. 1.1.446. 1.1.447. 1.1.448. 1.1.449. 1.1.450. 1.1.451. 1.1.452. 1.1.453. 1.1.454. 1.1.455. 1.1.456. 1.1.457. 1.1.458. 1.1.459. 1.1.460. 1.1.461. 1.1.462. 1.1.463. 1.1.464. 1.1.465. 1.1.466. 1.1.467. 1.1.468. 1.1.469. 1.1.470. 1.1.471. 1.1.472. 1.1.473. 1.1.474. 1.1.475. 1.1.476. 1.1.477. 1.1.478. 1.1.479. 1.1.480. 1.1.481. 1.1.482. 1.1.483. 1.1.484. 1.1.485. 1.1.486. 1.1.487. 1.1.488. 1.1.489. 1.1.490. 1.1.491. 1.1.492. 1.1.493. 1.1.494. 1.1.495. 1.1.496. 1.1.497. 1.1.498. 1.1.499. 1.1.500. 1.1.501. 1.1.502. 1.1.503. 1.1.504. 1.1.505. 1.1.506. 1.1.507. 1.1.508. 1.1.509. 1.1.510. 1.1.511. 1.1.512. 1.1.513. 1.1.514. 1.1.515. 1.1.516. 1.1.517. 1.1.518. 1.1.519. 1.1.520. 1.1.521. 1.1.522. 1.1.523. 1.1.524. 1.1.525. 1.1.526. 1.1.527. 1.1.528. 1.1.529. 1.1.530. 1.1.531. 1.1.532. 1.1.533. 1.1.534. 1.1.535. 1.1.536. 1.1.537. 1.1.538. 1.1.539. 1.1.540. 1.1.541. 1.1.542. 1.1.543. 1.1.544. 1.1.545. 1.1.546. 1.1.547. 1.1.548. 1.1.549. 1.1.550. 1.1.551. 1.1.552. 1.1.553. 1.1.554. 1.1.555. 1.1.556. 1.1.557. 1.1.558. 1.1.559. 1.1.560. 1.1.561. 1.1.562. 1.1.563. 1.1.564. 1.1.565. 1.1.566. 1.1.567. 1.1.568. 1.1.569. 1.1.570. 1.1.571. 1.1.572. 1.1.573. 1.1.574. 1.1.575. 1.1.576. 1.1.577. 1.1.578. 1.1.579. 1.1.580. 1.1.581. 1.1.582. 1.1.583. 1.1.584. 1.1.585. 1.1.586. 1.1.587. 1.1.588. 1.1.589. 1.1.590. 1.1.591. 1.1.592. 1.1.593. 1.1.594. 1.1.595. 1.1.596. 1.1.597. 1.1.598. 1.1.599. 1.1.600. 1.1.601. 1.1.602. 1.1.603. 1.1.604. 1.1.605. 1.1.606. 1.1.607. 1.1.608. 1.1.609. 1.1.610. 1.1.611. 1.1.612. 1.1.613. 1.1.614. 1.1.615. 1.1.616. 1.1.617. 1.1.618. 1.1.619. 1.1.620. 1.1.621. 1.1.622. 1.1.623. 1.1.624. 1.1.625. 1.1.626. 1.1.627. 1.1.628. 1.1.629. 1.1.630. 1.1.631. 1.1.632. 1.1.633. 1.1.634. 1.1.635. 1.1.636. 1.1.637. 1.1.638. 1.1.639. 1.1.640.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3, 6

The President's Office of the Vice President
for the Bay Area of California
Public Service Staff

6/21/72 NASA Data 5/12/74

T ELECON

Bob Pierpoint

4/3/72 ca. 2:45 p.m. p. 2

P: Before this. I appreciate this. At the moment you are
saying it is too early to say/ for sure how serious it is.

K: Exactly. It could go either way. I would expect them to be
able to make some further progress.

P: For a while.

K: Yes, but I have not seen enough to be able to make a final
judgment.

P: Okay, thank you Henry.

The position of Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee
is being vacated by Mr. Kissinger.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM

McMullin/Kissinger

3:05 p.m. - 4/3/72

K: I received your letter and I thought it would be better if I called you. First of all, I appreciate your writing to me.

M: It's very kind of you to call.

K: Not at all. What I thought when I was talking about our negotiations - when we negotiate we have a tendency to see ourselves split the difference. They have a tendency to stick to whatever position they maintain; they insist they represent whatever version of ______ they hold. This doesn't mean they won't change their position. They move from one to the other. I was talking of style and it was not a criticism of the United States.

M: Well, I was wondering. You were compressing a bit and...

K: That's what I meant to convey.

M: I wondered as you ______ if we compromised in any way.

K: No, I think as a matter of practice it is heard to say, but I think they gave up more of their basic position than we did. For example, they have always said Taiwan was an internal problem but we stated various things which pushed Taiwan as being an international problem. But the main point I wanted to make was for us there were 5 common principals and to the Chinese this was a significant part. To the Americans it wasn't.

M: I think in general you made an excellent speech. What you gave us was the Administration point of view.

K: It is an extremely sensitive point and if I didn't take it seriously I wouldn't have called you.

M: Good, I appreciate that. I am opposed to off-the-record things of this sort but that's another whole issue.

K: I can say that it's awfully hard for me to go around giving public speeches.

M: Thank you for calling, Mr. Kissinger.

Re: [insert telephone number]

To: [insert name]

From: [insert name]

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

4:50 p.m. - 4/3/72

K: Hello.

L: Yes, Henry.

K: Mel, I have had a brief talk with the President. He is tied up this afternoon. I have reviewed all the memos and there is absolutely no question you made the recommendation you indicated. I have written a memo to the President which reviews all of this and I will send a copy to you.

L: I don't care about that. You don't need to review any of that.

K: I am assuming all responsibility because. . .

L: No, that's not what I am interested in. The important thing in this town is trust. Trust between you and me, between you and the President, between me and the President and so on. I have a certain degree of trust with the people here. Now when I took the heat over here I didn't tell anybody the President had turned down the request. I said I turned it down. The boys here were all saying Laird turned it down. Now I thought it was better and so did you that I take the heat. Of course I didn't tell the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs about a memo I got. Everybody thought I was going to Puerto Rico until Thursday. The idea that someone is withholding information from him and we are not withholding information.

K: Well, Mel, we are arranging a meeting tomorrow but you have worked with the President and you know he gets excited.

L: But you don't need to send me a memorandum about it. I will talk to him on other things tomorrow.

KXXXXXXWXXAAXGXXXXXAVEXXGXXXXEX

K: We don't want to stir up things. . .

L: We have got to have a greater degree of trust. And I just don't understand that kind of thing when I get ______ by Ken Rush and Tom Moorer about the things they say he said.¹

Re: [goddesses] Why are the open lines
green, and not a solid line?

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE?

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: Well, when you come over here I will talk to you for a few minutes alone but I just want you to know that as far as I am concerned and the President is concerned, when the chips are down. . .

L: And this idea - hell, we will stand on our heads to assist him.

K: Well, we will get it straightened out tomorrow.

U. S. Air Force

U. S. Air Force

U. S. Air Force

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.B

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

6:20 p.m. - 4/3/72

By: KHLW . NAFU Date: 5/12/04

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. You finished with your meeting?

K: Yes, are you in your office?

P: No, I'm over at the residence. I will be over there in a half hour or so if you want to wait until then.

K: Well, no. I told him what you said and he said, 'Isn't it amazing what a little country can do to wreck well-laid plans.'' I said, "The President wants you to know we will under no circumstances accept a defeat there and we will do what is necessary not to." He said, "What do you want us to do?" I said, "First to show restraint and secondly you have to ask yourselves whether this isn't the time to bring an end to the war. There is, after all, when I look around the world I see no areas where we should be in conflict." He said he did not either - not even in Vietnam. Then I brought up the Berlin thing. I said, 'Look, here we are. We get the ratification thing coming up in Germany, the President has been asked to write to Brandt, but he can't under these circumstances and he wants you to know if we should lose in Vietnam that is the last concession we will make this year.'' He said, "You aren't going to lose. In our assessment you can't lose."

P: I think he's right.

K: I think we are going to see this through. However, the Evening Report says that we destroyed 27 tanks.

P: Who?

K: We have.

P: You mean they started to fly?

K: They started to fly.

P: Are these South Vietnam or American reports?

K: The American - well, I am reading from both. We have also damaged the bridge across which these things [tanks] are coming.

Re: [insert telephone number]

1st Lt. Don A. Johnson

Operations Staff

By: KHLY
NWSR, Date: 5/12/04

P: They should knock the bridge out - not just damage it.

K: We have advisers who claim we knocked out ______.

P: Our advisers?

K: Yes, our advisers so I think we just have to . . .

P: We don't yet know that the weather has broken, do we?

K: We don't know yet, but we know there have been more air strikes flown than the day before.

P: That's because we did it then.

K: That's right.

P: Is there any way they can get the ones we are using in Laos over there?

K: You mean the gunships? That's an interesting question.

P: They are out of the Sam Range?

K: No they are still in the Sam Range, but it could start in a couple of hours because it is beginning to be daybreak there now.

P: You are reading from the report, are you?

K: Well, no I am assuming this.

P: But in any event they should know what the weather is.

K: Exactly and I was going to check with Admiral Moorer just as you called. I will do it when we hang up.

P: OK, then I will call you back.

We have also damaged
some are coming.

The President's Office is open 12 hours a day, 7 days a week.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV NAVAQ Data: 5/12/84

TELCOM

Moorer/Kissinger

6:30 p.m. - 4/3/72

K: Tom, I was just talking to the President. He wanted me to run a check with you before I continue the discussion. What's the weather situation over there?

M: It appears that it might lift some but I doubt that it's going to be ready for Tuesday, maybe Wednesday.

K: No, we are talking about. . .

M: In Military Region I?

K: Yes.

M: The weather has lifted somewhat. There will be fog early but we ought to get some good strikes.

K: How about the DMZ?

M: I am going to have a briefing shortly and I'm getting the latest on the weather, but it will be better than it has been.

K: On the 48-hour thing, wait until you have optimum conditions. But how about the Sam threat?

M: It's just beginning and I think they're going to be able to get after some of the Sams now.

K: Right and they will go after the logistics.

M: The logistics south of the Lam 1735.

K: Right which includes Strong Hoi (?)

M: I will get after those but right now I will give priority to the area where the troops are in contact, but the only thing that will keep them out of there is weather.

K: Right, we just want to make sure these Sams get occupied.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/13/04

- 2 -

M: We all do. Look, that was quite a conversation we had this morning. I made a chronology of the whole thing; the requests for authorities, and what was done. Sometime I just would like to show you the sequence of events from 20 January as to what request were made, how they were handled and the final result because what the Secretary did on occasion was send recommendations to you. I didn't see them. He did receive a reply back from the White House on the 18th and then on the 22nd he disapproved my request and we didn't get any action until you and Ken and I had that discussion on Thursday. We had an interesting lunch today talking it all over. You know Abrams has requested authority himself. . .

K: But in the Lam Son operation we were getting a lot of optimistic reports. For three days we had no reason to suppose this was more than a major probe. Then Saigon put out the situation was critical. The newsmen were 12 hours ahead of us.

M: That part is absolutely right.

K: That is the part he was complaining about, not the request for authority.

M: Also if the President wants a briefing at any time, Vogt and I should do that.

K: That's right.

M: I think Ken Rush is going to make a big difference over here.

K: I'm sure he will. So our major concern is not can we get authorities granted as we know what they are supposed to be but we have to get some accurate reports and then make sure things are carried out figuratively and imaginatively.

M: I only have one comment on your directive. You should have said "All reports from the commanders."

K: Well, that's what I meant.

M: I'm going to send them (all the reports) over.

K: I think that's a wise thing to do.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

The President has opened up the
Bogota, Colombia,
Militia Unit!

By: KMLV NAVAQ Data: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/3/72; 7:10 p. m.

K: I talked to Moorer and the weather is lifting. It will be better than it has been.

P: I was just wondering how they claimed to have gotten those tanks -- just by accident.

K: They got it partly with naval gunfire.

P: Naval gunfire -- that's safe enough for our boys.

K: I think we ought to use naval gunfire in North Vietnam right up to Dong Hoi area.

P: Absolutely. Let's authorize it immediately. I don't see any reason to wait. Bring the Navy up.

K: I have moved a crusier in and several destroyers.

P: Tell them to put naval gunfire along the whole road -- it's by the sea.

K: It is parallel to the sea.

P: About 40 miles. I am -- let's not get ourselves -- is the weather lifting -- is this a MKLXXXIX false report.

K: I think if the ceiling gets up to 4,000 feet we can do a good job. No, no, the weather j has been bad.

P: This message -- that you have -- they claimed they knocked out 25 tanks.

K: 27 tanks -- cut it in half and we still have 15 tanks -- and trucks.

P: Trucks. Tanks are something!

K: If the weather lifts early enough so that we can get it then they are going to pay a hell of a price.

P: We will take out their tanks and artillery and they are going to have a hell of a time.

H. J. Kissinger, The President

The State of the Union

July 5, 1968

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/3/72; 7:10 p.m.

-2-

K: We are going to have two weeks now that's going to be tough. In many ways this is a blessing.

P: If the weather lifts it won't take two weeks.

K: I think it will take a week or two. I think we may get a settlement out of this. My nightmare was that they would come in August. I am actually relieved they are doing it now.

P: If they could do this now they sure as hell could do this in August.

K: And we would have less flexibility in August.

P: Is Moorer talking in an aggressive way?

K: Oh, yes, Mr. President. Laird has been crying all day. He wants to come over. I think we ought to let him come over tomorrow.

P: Is he going to support this?

K: Yes.

P: He should come with Moorer. He should be worked over before he gets here. He has to be told we cannot lose here! I will do everything necessary including taking out Haiphong.

K: The more we shock them the better.

P: Is there anything we could do in the Haiphong area?

K: I think it is still too early. I think the Russians will do something. They are not going to risk everything.

P: They will risk Summit, Berlin, German treaty -- correct.

K: That's right. I told Dobrynin. We can't consider sending a message to Brandt under these conditions.

P: I won't.

K: I don't think you should send it anyway -- so any excuse. I think if we don't hear from them about Poland tomorrow we should just do it.

By: KHL, NASA Date: 5/12/72

- 3 -

P: That I am sure about. Why do you think they delayed on it.

K: They may not have had a chance to have everyone together -- or they may just be cute. They may be going to Poland now.

P: I don't think our going to Poland will change anything. Tell them tomorrow. We can't hold it any longer -- it's starting to leak. I will be over early tomorrow. When will you be finished briefing that bastard?

K: By 8:30.

P: Okay, I will see you at 9:00.

K: Fine, Mr. President

**********

4/3/72; 7:25 p. m.

P: I wanted to be sure that you realize I think the idea of the Navy is good -- that means going in 40 miles.

K: About 35 miles.

P: I think that is a very good idea. The Navy does know how to do some things. Moorer will love the idea. Just tell him to get every damn ship out and bring that thing from the Indian Ocean. They can also send their carrier aircraft in and bomb that road.

K: If they can get carriers and destroyers in there they can help Quang Tri.

P: Also, a huge naval movement would be noticed. Call Moorer right now. You don't have to send that through Laird.

K: We will let him know.

P: Okay, just let him know. Bombard the hell out of that place.

K: We need another carrier out there.

P: Do we have any more?

Re: phone tree call to Bill to confirm if
he has any other calls at the same time.
Please call back

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293, Sept. 3.6

By: KMLW NASHA Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/ Joe Kraft

4/4/72 6:35 a.m.

HAK: Joe, I am going out to have drinks. If I get back at a reasonable hour, maybe we can have dinner. I will call you around 8:15. Where

JK: Rive Gauche or Sans Souci--Where are you?

HAK: Any where downtown.

JK: Sans Souci?

HAK: Any place. I will call you around 8:15 p. m. tonight

Re: [insert telephone number]

Mr. Smith, or a co-worker?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCONE

Laird/Kissinger
9:54 a.m. - 4/4/72

By: KMLW NAVA Date: 5/13/04

L: Henry, I wanted to get the word to you - in the last three hours of daylight over there we got about 100 strikes in that area.

K: On top of the 132?

L: Yes, the last three hours of daylight they had everything ready to go. You understand the 132 was in the battle area and in the last three hours they were able to run that to 230.

K: Well, the President wants key ______ to be used in the B-3 area.

L: ______ over 500 in that area.

K: Oh, good. Now the President called Moorer himself and he said 132 so he wants to know where the 400 came from.

L: We will give Vogt all the dope but in the battle area there were 500. Now John will come over tomorrow. I don't want this to get off the track over there.

K: OK, Mel. The President I think will see you around noon. You will get word.

L: Good.

H. W. REED, COL, USA, CHIEF OF staff

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/4/72 9:55 a.m.

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: One thing I forgot to mention to you. We are concerned to stop the speculation about what we will do when the weather lifts. If we can just put a lid on it . . . If there is massive speculation about air strikes we will start taking heat before we have done anything.

L: I know it. The word on the carriers got out.

K: You couldn't avoid that. If we could get these briefers to shut up especially in Saigon -- say they don't know what we are going to do.

L: If they said anything again today I don't know why.

K: No, I am not sure they have today.

L: ____________ on the carrier.

K: You couldn't avoid that because that carrier was visible.

L: Okay, I'll get on it.

Re: [insert telephone number]
and [insert name of recipient]
Re: [insert document title]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.6

By: K.M.Y. NASA Data 5/13/84

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
4/4/72 10:45 a.m.

R: This is not on the subject of most important at the moment. I read the memorandum of your meeting on the European Security Conference and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

K: Did I have one?

R: Yes, the SRG.

K: Oh yes, I thought you meant something else.

R: I hope the President doesn't decide this in a new and specific way. I think up to now it's been just right. I am well aware of the problems of the different departments and agencies, but I think the way we have played it in the past is just right. Suppose for instance the President said no linkage -- we would be in an impossible position in NATO.

K: I'll talk to you before we send the memo. He wants some linkage, but he'll leave it loose how to do it.

R: The Russians . . . with the K European Security Conference -- they don't want it.

K: I think Defense is wrong in this.

R: I do too. So leave it loose.

K: Let me check. He may not want it completely loose, but not as rigid as Defense wants it.

R: Not to say that no direct linkage discussions will take place, but say that before any decisions are made it ought to come back to me.

K: Before he sends out a directive why don't I read it to you and see if you can live with it.

R: Fine. I think the other thing went well the other day.

K: Very well and all the departments are doing beautifully.

R: Okay.

K: And I think McCloskey did an excellent job.

R: He is more sure-fotted than Bray. Today we'll just repeat, and tomorrow if there's anything that comes up we'll let McCloskey do it... K: Okay.

Hanoi, June 12, 1976

U.S. Army Signal Corps

P.O. Box 139

TELCOM

Kraslow/Kissinger

12:03 p.m. - 4/4/72

By: K.M.L. NAVAQ Date: 5/12/76

DK: I am calling as you advised.

HK: Well, Dave I can't tell you anything more than what I said yesterday. I don't see anything dramatic happening but the pace of military operations is out of my control so I don't exclude that if the weather clears this or that may step up, but it won't be anything of a qualitative magnitude. Your problem is should you come back tomorrow morning or night.

DK: Or today.

HK: I don't know what your judgment of news is. I don't expect anything like a Presidential statement or anything like that.

DK: Do you expect a dramatic change in Vietnam?

HK: I don't expect it. From what I know now it is midnight there so the fighting won't start up for another 8 hours. They would have to cross a river.

DK: Does it look like they are going for ______ rather than Quang Tri?

HK: They're going for both. They're making a very massive effort.

DK: All in I Corps?

HK: Up to now, but they still have this very large concentration on the B-3 front.

DK: Are the ARVN's fighting? They seem to be giving a good account of themselves.

HK: Well, what happened they hit about 3 divisions. The new ARVN division . . . . . . and rolled it back. Now in those conditions you never look brilliant. They don't seem to be panicking. I don't think the ______ three division is in brilliant shape right now and I would like to reserve judgment. The other units are moving their reserves.

DK: They are moving significant reserves into action.

HK: That is right.

The Senate of the Republic of Vietnam

Approved for Distribution

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sept. 3-6

TELCONE

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger

2:28 p.m. - 4/4/72

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: Fine, I just wanted you to know your friends are back and thinking of you.

K: Delighted you're back.

R: How are things?

K: Well, we are getting hit in Vietnam.

R: Just what you have been predicting. Has the weather cleared up?

K: Not yet. You know we have a great Air Force. They can only fly over a desert in July. We tried to have them fly in November and they couldn't; in December and they couldn't and now it's April and they can't do it.

R: What do they have?

K: I tell you in the new term we need a new Secretary of Defense and redo our military establishment. This is a disgrace. I tell you before the two weeks are up the North Vietnamese will know they had a war.

R: Good. I am waiting for Hai Phong.

K: Well, we are thinking along those lines.

R: Good for you, Henry. Now is the time - everybody is really worried.

K: Are you coming down this week?

R: We are coming down I believe and I wondered if we could see you Thursday night for cocktails or dinner.

K: There is a slight chance I will have to go with the President to Key Biscayne. If I don't, I would love to do one or the other.

R: Well, I will drop in if we don't do that.

The President's Office
Attn: S. O. & C. of C.
Receives All?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KML V NASA Date: 5/13/04

- 2 -

K: I had a long conversation with the President about some political things which I would like to talk to you about and bring you up to date on the general situation but we have got to bring our rebellious bureaucracy into line again.

R: I want to tell you I've been dealing with mine on strikes and so forth.

K: Yes, I think it's a lot more dangerous to cross you than my leader.

R: We're going to use every possible law we find.

K: Did you have a good vacation?

R: I had a marvelous time, Henry. Good rest and I lost 9 pounds.

K: I wish I had that strength of character.

R: It's easier to do on a beach than in your office. Let me ask you one problem - the Chinese want to rent the Music Hall for one evening for table tennis.

K: Sure, no problem.

R: You don't mind.

K: No, but let them know it was my intervention that was instrumental in getting it for them.

R: Good, I'll do it on that basis.

K: Marvelous. Nelson, I will call you no later than tomorrow. When are you coming down?

R: Thursday morning.

K: I will call you tomorrow and suggest a time.

R: Let Ann know and we will do anything that is convenient for you.

K: It will be good to see you.

R: You're great, Henry. And give my best to the President. I have a lovely picture of him that he signed.

Re: phone calls from the report office
to the State or to the command
Operations Room

TELCOM

Von Hoffman/Kissinger
2:30 p.m. - 4/4/72

By: K.L. NASA Date 5/12/72

V: Hi, Henry.

K: We have a date for tomorrow, is that right?

V: That's right.

K: OK, where shall we meet?

V: Why don't you pick it?

K: No, you pick it. You're the expert on domestic affairs.

V: Oh, Henry, how about the Jockey Club?

K: OK.

V: Let's see. What is a good hour for you?

K: 8:30.

V: Splendid. And I will bring a civilized female along.

K: It's up to you. I may not bring anybody or maybe I will ask Barbara Howar if she is free.

V: I will bring one that won't throw the dishes at you.

K: I don't object to the other one. She was sort of fun. Good, will you make the reservation?

V: Sure.

K: Good, or should I do it?

V: You probably have more clout.

K: OK, I will make a reservation for 3 or 4 at 8:30.

V: Fine, Henry.

This message has not been read or answered.
Please read the original message.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sect. 3.5

TELCONE
Irving Lazar/Kissinger

2:55 p.m. - 4/4/72

K: Irving, how are you?

L: I'm fine. I feel as if I am imposing upon you.

K: Not at all.

L: Two things. One is we are giving a large party on the night of the Academy Awards in New York. If you are free maybe you could come. It's at the 21.

K: I'd love to, but I don't think I'll be in town.

L: Many of your friends are going to be there. Let me say this, if you are in town and can make it, just drop in. It's upstairs in the Hunt Room.

K: I would love to.

L: Now the other thing is you said you could tell me after the China trip if there was any way I could speak to someone of Richard Brooks' going to Shanghai.

K: Write me a letter explaining what he wants to do and then I will call you.

L: Good, I will do that. The point is you thought our ______ at the State Department wouldn't mind his making a motion picture out of ______.

K: You see that's the sort of thing that would be very helpful if you had in the letter.

L: I'll send it in a few days. About the party, you don't have to call just come. We are going back to California the 12th and 13th and we will watch the newspapers to see if you will be coming out.

K: It doesn't look like we will be back there until July and then it will be for about three weeks.

L: We'll be off to Europe but will be back there in July too, so I will contact you then.

Higby/Kissinger
3:02 p.m. - 4/4/72

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.5

TELCOM

H: The President is going to Florida on Thursday.

K: What time?

H: He is going up to Philadelphia first, then down from Philadelphia to Key Biscayne so we would leave somewhere in mid morning.

K: Be in Key Biscayne by dinner?

H: That's the tentative plan.

K: I'm only going down for 24 hours. I'm planning to fly back Friday but don't worry your charming heads on that subject.

H: I shan't worry a minute. Suppose the war blows up in Key Biscayne on Saturday morning?

K: That's why I have to be back Saturday morning. No, my parents are coming here.

H: OK.

Re: phone tree from the open line
1st floor, 3rd or 4th floor
Publicity Dept.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sect. 3.6

By: KMH/L NASA, Data: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Moorer/Kissinger

3:03 p.m. - 4/4/72

K: Tom, the President would like to move those 36 Marine planes rather than the Air Force planes and you will get the authority later this afternoon. It's 36 isn't it? Two squadrons.

M: I think that's right. We can make it 36 or thereabouts.

K: Right, as soon as possible.

M: All right. You get us the statement and in the meantime I will make the arrangements.

K: Right and in the meantime I ...... get the total number of sorties in there.

M: We got 12 and there are 8 in there now. As a matter of fact I was just talking to ________ about that now.

K: Why can't we keep that bridge under constant bombardment?

M: It's a little too far to the West but I'll check on it.

K: We will probably give you authority to 18 and ask you to hold up on the 48-hour thing. That's what you want, isn't it?

M: Right.

H. W. WORLD

U.S. DEPARTMENT

MAY 13, 1972

MAY 13, 1972

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

TELECON
Amb. Porter
4/4/72 5:17 p.m.

By: KML
RE:NAU Date: 5/12/72

K: We are not going to ask for a meeting on the 13th.

P: I thought that.

K: We notified them that we would be just not going to do it.

P: Of course.

K: What is your judgment -- inform them we are not going to ask for one or just not ask for one.

P: They will get the point if we just don't ask. But for future reference I would inform them and tell them the reason why. You may want to use it in the future.

K: When would you have asked for it?

P: I was going to let the situation develop between now and next week and then make a recommendation to you.

K: But if you had asked for a meeting on the 13th . . .

P: When would I have put it through?

K: Yes.

P: Probably on Monday morning.

K: So if we ask to see them Monday that is time enough?

P: That is plenty of time.

K: When are you coming back?

P: I was planning to come down tomorrow unless the boss has not decided to see me.

K: Right. Have we fixed an appointment for you?

P: They have asked for one, but none has come through yet.

K: When are you going out?

P: I was planning to go Thursday.

H. W. Taft, Pres. of the Republic of China

President's Office

TELECON
Amb. Porter

4/4/72 5:17 p.m. p. 2

By: K.L.Y
NARA. Data: 5/12/72

K: . . . . . we won't ask for a meeting next week under any condition.

P: You will have to withdraw the agreement in view of the present conditions. I think they will get the pitch.

K: Oh here. We've got an appointment for you at noon tomorrow, but we can switch it to Monday I am sure if you prefer.

P: If you can I will accept the first leave I have had with great pleasure.

K: It will be Monday unless you hear from me.

P: Right. I would do it and tell them why, just for the record.

K: But not until Monday.

P: Right.

K: We want to hit them first, frankly, before we make the announcement.

P: I'm glad to hear that.

K: They will know they've been in a war before they are through with us. We haven't got anything to lose now.

P: Have you heard that they are saying they like the negotiations in Paris but don't like negotiating with me.

K: That means you must be doing your job.

P: But it gives you a chip later.

K: What, to move you out?

P: Yes.

K: We are not going to let them play that game.

P: I know that. But if you thought you could achieve something . . .

K: We won't get rid of a good man. I don't like Xuan Thuy either.

P: But I know it's not a personal matter.

K: You are doing a great job and they will pull you out over my dead body.

Re: Doug Cramer's phone call
from San Francisco
Publicity File

TELCONE

Doug Cramer/Kissinger

4:35 p.m. - 4/4/72

K: Hello.

C: It's Doug Cramer.

K: Where are you?

C: In California. I talked to Joyce in Madrid. She's getting ready to come home and we wondered if there was any way we could get you to come for the Academy Awards.

K: With this Vietnam business I can't even consider it.

C: That's a shame. You know Joyce went all over asking people and what started out to be a party of 12 people is now a party of about 40.

K: I would love to come. There is no one I would rather watch them with. First, I really can't do it but even if I did, for me to go out to the West Coast for the Academy Awards while the offensive is going on would make a very bad impression.

C: I understand. Are you coming by on your way to Japan?

K: I'm not sure, but if I do you can be sure I will call you.

C: Joyce will be coming back this week and I'm sure she will call you.

K: Good and if she doesn't call me I will call her on Friday or Saturday.

C: OK.

Re: phone tree from the open line
1st floor, 5th or 6th floor
McDonnell Aircraft

By: KHL V

NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Scotty Reston/Kissinger

5:40 p.m. - 4/4/72

R: Henry, I don't know the sensitivity at the moment about talking. At some point I would like very much for you to meet my son who was the Los Angeles correspondent in Moscow for 4 years and 2 years in London. He has just come back to be diplomatic correspondent here. I would like you to meet him.

K: I'd be delighted to meet him.

R: Would it be all right if I bring him along?

K: It's up to you. You will establish the right ground rules with him, won't you? I assume he is as honorable as his father.

R: He understands.

K: I will be about 15 minutes late. Make it at 6:45.

R: OK

Reclassified from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

TELCON
Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger
8:11 p.m., April 4, 1972

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

HAK: If you want to have a relatively quick bite at a quarter till nine.

K: A quarter till nine. Where do you want to go? I can meet you somewhere.

HAK: Why don't you come here. We can eat at the Sans Souci or we can go to the Rive Gauche.

K: Are you going back to the office?

HAK: No, I am going home. I would like to get a good night's sleep.

K: Why don't we meet at the Rive Gauche at 8:45?

HAK: Will you make the reservation? If I make a reservation for two and show up with a man, my reputation will be ruined.

K: I will make the reservation and in case there is a problem, I will call your girl.

HAK: Okay.

Re: phone tree from the open line
1st floor, 3rd floor, 4th floor
Publicity Dept.

By: KVL WASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:41 p.m., April 4, 1972

K: I am leaving the office and I have to talk to the President. Any weather reports?

P: No; not since I left the office at 7:00.

M: Same thing that has happened. A little better but about the same as yesterday. Around noon possibility to get in through holes.

K: When are you going to start shelling?

M: Doing it right now. Gave orders. First reports show first shelling done tonight.

K: Up North?

M: ... I have now 4 ships. Sending 4 more to the area. Looking into the possibility ... more from the West Coast. Have changed the authorities.

K: Good.

M: I talked to Abrams.

K: Abrams understands that we want him to be tough and imaginative. His whole position is handing on that line.

M: I will bring over the messages I have sent to him.

K: The President is calling me ---

Mr. Kissinger's office

By: K.L. W. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:45 p.m., April 4, 1972

P: Wondered if you had had any reports on the weather?

K: I was just calling Moorer. His report was it would be like today. with some holes opening up in the afternoon. It is heart-breaking. They have got the authorities; they've got the toughest President they are going to have and the bastards can't go! They have started the shelling tonight.

P: That will get a little shot across the bow but that's about all. It is night out there.

K: No, it's day there. It just started.

P: How about the ground action?

K: About the same.

P: No projection?

K: No.

P: They think it is going to break any time.

K: Clear a little in the afternoon. Whenever it breaks, it's going to break!

P: All hell will break loose. That's the time to give it to them. We can't do anything about it, Henry.

K: Got this thing at the breaking point.

P: I want you to go forward with the Haiphong thing. It intrigues me very much. Popping a couple in there would be useful. The weather up there is all right, isn't it?

K: Yes.

P: How about hitting that?

K: I think it would be better if we waited. When other bombing --

P: I agree but if we are going to be stuck here too long --

K: Not much more than 24 more hours. Do something dramatic.

The President of the Republic of Vietnam

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Secl. 3.5

By: K.M.L. NAVAQ Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., April 4, 1972 -- page 2

P: We will run it out and talk about it in the morning but if you hit Haiphong, it would raise all hell diplomatically.

K: I am getting a list of all the ships.

P: I made a little note on the Confidential Summary you sent in. Thieu's South Vietnamese ambassadors are condemning North Vietnamese actions. I want our ambassadors to do the same; to go start talking to people. Run a huge diplomatic offensive in this respect.

K: I know. It will raise a spasm for better or worse.

P: It can't be worse.

K: If we could just get these Air Force guys to fly.

P: It's the equipment; not the men. We have brave men.

K: They have bought the wrong equipment; not the men.

P: Well, how about concerting in the B-3 area.

K: That they are doing.

P: Since it is closed in, give a strike to the B-3 area.

K: They are hitting it in the MR 1.

P: 53s are being used there.

K: 52s are being used in MR 1.

P: Use the B-52s ...... You have given authority above DMZ, haven't you?

K: For 35 miles.

P: That's right.

K: They want one day of SAM suppressors.

P: Because of the danger. They have got all the authority they need. Moorer doesn't have any complaints on that does he?

The President of the Republic of the Philippines

Admiral Moorer's Office

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.5

TELCOM
Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:51 p.m., April 4, 1972

By: KHLW NAVA Date: 5/12/04

K: I was just talking to the President. He wanted to make sure -- and I know it needs no reiteration -- that anything that doesn't go into MR 1 goes into B 3 area.

M: We don't have any planes that are not flying. He raised that with me today.

K: I know; I was there.

M: Tell him, 'don't worry about that.'

K: How about ground action? I neglected to get the report.

M: Ground action was quiet overnight. Nothing since you called me. I checked once more and there were no reports of any. I told Haig about the intercept -- he probably told you about that. Possibility of attack on Nancy. The area between Quang-tri and Hue. I called Abrams and he hadn't seen the message. I gave it to him. He was on his way up to MR 1 & 2. I asked him to please give me his impressions of what he saw as soon as he got back.

K: Okay.

M: If anything happens of significance, I will let you know.

K: You can use B-52s up to 1735.

M: He wants to take a look at it. ... when we can simultaneously hit those missile launchers.

K: We want to give them the sense that we are on the verge of going beserk.

M: I laid it on the line.

K: I won't plague you any more tonight. You call me if anything else happens that I should know about.

M: Okay.

Re: phone calls from the open office
in the States or in Canada
Please call back

TELCOM

Lady Gowrie/Kissinger

10:05 a.m. - 4/5/72

K: Hi, I didn't wake you up, did I?

G: No, you absolutely didn't, but your nice fellow Coleman Hicks called me.

K: Oh, did he tell you about the appointments?

G: Yes.

K: Am I going to see you for lunch?

G: You know I am feeling absolutely miserable. I'm going to see the doctor. I will call you after I see him.

K: Don't overdo yourself if you're not feeling well. I wanted to ask if you were going to leave tonight?

G: Feeling like I do, I don't know if I should.

K: Because I'm having dinner with one of the radical newsman in town and I thought you might like to join me.

G: I'll see. I'll call you in an hour. Is everything all right?

K: Yes, everything's fine.

G: It's good about McGovern. He is such a fine man.

K: It's good for us.

G: What do you mean?

K: He's the one man out of ten who can't possibly defeat us.

G: Then it is good for you.

K: I like him personally but . . . I will be hearing from you.

Hiroo Tanaka
President of the Japan
of the United States of America
Publicity Office

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

T ELECON
Vice President
4/5/72 11:02 a.m.

V: What is the situation. . . I'm trying to get the schedule straightened out.

K: We would like you to go to Okinawa Reversion Ceremony, but not stop anywhere else.

V: Just stop there.

K: That's right. We appreciate that very much.

V: Good. How about the delegation?

K: Any suggestions you have we would be grateful for.

V: Does State have some suggestions?

K: Let me check.

V: I'll check that out -- don't you bother. But just Okinawa?

K: Yes.

V: All right, good.

4/5/72 11:05 a.m.

V: I just want to be clear about this -- you mean the entire program, Okinawa and the one in Tokyo?

K: Yes, that's what I meant.

V: The ceremonies set up by the Japanese.

K: Yes.

V: All right. Thank you.

["H. E. T. U. T. A. T. U. T. A. T. U. T

["H. E. T. Ito, a. p. s. o. h. c. k. c. c. c. c. c. c. c. c. c. c. c.

The name and title of the person to whom the communication is addressed

The title of the official responsible for making the communication

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

TELCONE

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

11:42 a.m. - 4/5/72

S: Hello.

K: Gerry, I have just had a call from Dobrynin saying that they will make a proposal tomorrow or the day after in Helsinki on ABM and I think you ought to wait with making ours until you have seen theirs.

S: Well, this is certainly a bad one.

K: I don't want to tell you how to run your business. I sent you a cable last night authorizing you to go ahead and in the absence of this call from Dobrynin, which is personal, they informed us that within the next 48 hours they will make one to you.

S: The ______ I have is that if they make a proposal like one-to-one it will make it harder later to make a proposal for two-to-two and it will make us look like we are ______ it, but if it's got to be done we can hold out.

K: What do you think?

S: My personal feeling is we expected they would make their proposal tomorrow but instead of that all hands agreed we would have this exchange take place simultaneously.

K: If they propose one-to-one and we come two-for-two, does it make any difference?

S: Except if they propose one-to-one it would be different. Then it wouldn't happen simultaneously.

K: Why don't you let them go first and depending on their proposal make yours. Who speaks first?

S: This is going to be an informal session in our office and my feeling is he will speak first. . . . . . but he may say you indicated you had some specifics and I would like to hear yours.

K: Look, on tactics I have to let you run it the way you want. If you think - if I find anything out about the proposal where can I reach you?

Re: phone calls to the press office
11:00 a.m. or 11:00 p.m.
Publicity Office

By: K.L. V. NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Laird/Kissinger
12:16 p.m. - 4/5/72

L: Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

L: We got a bit of a problem. Bob Craven (?) and a group of Republican senators want a military briefing to tell them what's going on.

K: That's fine.

L: We also have Stennis and Fulbright who want . . . . . . their comments at 2:00 tomorrow and I thought I would have Vogt do it. put

K: I think we should do it but/emphasis on massive infiltration.

L: John can do that.

K: I talked to Rush and the President called Moorer so I am assuming you are up on these things. He wants to send an experienced Air Force commander and wants your recommendation.

L: My recommendation is John Vogt.

K: If that is your recommendation, we will accept it.

L: Well, let me talk to the Chairman.

K: The Chairman was asked to come up with a recommendation.

L: But the problem is we got John going to NATO but . . .

K: Well, he'll still get his 4-star this way, won't he?

L: Right.

K: Can you let us know within the hour.

L: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

It appears that there is some confusion in the
recording of some of the confidential
Disciplinary Hearings.

By: K.M.L. NASA Data 5/12/04

T ELECON
Admiral Moorer

4/5/72 12:30 p. m.

K: ...

M: ... Lt. General Simler -- has been Chief of Operations in Saigon and is familiar with the operations.

K: But is he familiar with our thinking?

M: Also, John Vogt. He's the first choice. I haven't discussed this with Laird.

K: I have, and his recommendation is the same as yours.

M: Second, Vogt already has an assignment as Chief of Staff in NATO to Goodpaster approved. Third, I think Johnny would be walking into a difficult environment, because he would think he was coming in to look over his shoulder.

K: Wouldn't that be true of the other?

M: It would be less true.

K: Where is he now?

M: ...

K: You want to talk to Laird and call me back? I have talked to Laird. I won't tell him I have got your recommendations. I will tell him I want your joint recommendation.

M: K I am going to tell him I recommend Vogt.

K: That's probably the way we'll go.

M: I'll talk to Laird right away.

Hq. General Staff College, South Carolina

1st Class Publicity Officer

TELCONE

Gen. Vogt/Kissinger

1:55 p.m. - 4/5/72

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Before this week is out you will regret having briefed me this morning.

V: In many way, heh?

K: But you will be informed officially but I think we are going to move along the line we discussed.

V: Very good. We will do our best.

K: So now there will be no excuse for not doing what we want.

V: We will see you get it but before you go I want to talk to you. I definitely will have a problem at the other end.

K: We will make heads roll. You do what is wanted and he's got to get out of the way.

V: . . . . . . . mention my problems with 3 squadrons.

K: What's the problem?

V: When we originally talked 3, one was going to DaNang. Now we are putting the ______ in there. That leaves 2 there so we got to be talking 3 where. . . . . .

K: Do you think that Marine move is correct?

V: I think it is all right. We should have done it with ______ had we got the Air Force. It's my feeling everybody should be sharing in this thing.

K: That's what the President thought. We don't have to worry about the Commander.

The President's Office in the Senate
The Senate of the Republic of the Philippines

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

TELCONE
Kraslow/Kissinger

3:15 p.m. - 4/5/72

NASA Date 5/12/04

HK: Am I giving you private briefings every day now?

DK: That's right. I just flew into town. What a weird primary. I think I could run for office and win.

HK: In my view it means the people who stand for something whether it is peace or race are attractive and the people who compete for the middle ground are going to get clobbered. The electorate wants somebody who stands for something. It makes sense.

DK: Yes, it does make sense. Clear identification with a cause. Henry, I haven't caught up on the Vietnam thing. Any guidance you can give me. What seems to be . . .

HK: We expect the offensive to continue and they have all their units except one division outside the country.

DK: Where is the 325?

HK: Around Hanoi.

DK: And that's all they have. I'll be damned.

HK: This may break it one way or another.

DK: How long do you think they will continue?

HK: About 6 weeks.

DK: Do you think you are going to be able to block it?

HK: I will know more in a week.

DK: I keep hearing somebody else's favorite word - options. What options do we have?

HK: I didn't use that phrase. The right phrase is we are reviewing the situation.

DK: So what we are talking about is increased air activity.

HK: Well, I just don't want to speculate on that.

DK: Any guidance on whether there may be something else?

The content of this document is a state secret

U.S. Department of Defense

By: K.M.L. /NASA. Date: 5/12/84

- 2 -

HK: No, I just don't want to speculate about what might be done, but 'all options open' is not the phrase I would use.

DK: Again privately, is there anything we might get back to the pre'68 bombing halt?

HK: I don't want to get into it.

DK: When do you think we will know?

HK: In another 10 days.

DK: I am talking about our response.

HK: Within 4 or 5 days. It depends upon the situation.

DK: Is WSAG still meeting?

HK: Well, that's not unusual - we meet every morning. As a matter of fact I am going to stop making special announcements every time. That happened during India/Pakistan. . .

DK: The entire North Vietnamese army is out of the country with the exception of one division. Where are they all, in Indochina?

HK: Two divisions in Laos and something like 12 in South Vietnam.

DK: How many in Cambodia?

HK: Well, I am counting the Cambodia divisions. They have moved to North Vietnam. There are 3 in Cambodia - they are the ones fighting in Saigon.

DK: Are they part of the 12. . . ?

HK: Part of it.

DK: So 14 divisions are in Indochina outside of North Vietnam. What do you figure, about 8 or 10 thousand per division?

HK: About 10 but then you have to add supply troupes. I can't do it in terms of numbers.

DK: This is the greatest number of armed forces they have had outside the country for years.

["Hanoi, September 12, 1969\n\nSra. Sena of U. of California\n\nTranscript of oral答", "DECLASSIFIED", "E.O. 12998, Sept. 3.6", "By: KMLV NARA Date: 5/12/04", "- 3 -", "HK: Since Tet.", "DK: How is the battle going?", "HK: Not much change in the last few days and I frankly can't tell you whether it is the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese or it could be the North Vietnamese regrouping.", "DK: And you still think they are going for Quang Tri?", "HK: Certainly and probably for Huai (?) and I wouldn't be surprised if we lost Quang Tri.", "DK: But only temporarily.", "HK: Right. In this phase.", "DK: No movements of any significance?", "HK: No actions of any significance.", "DK: Henry, do you have any idea on what. . . if we just focused on air power.", "HK: XIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIXIX

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Secr. 3-6

T ELECON
Senator Mansfield

X 4/5/72 3:25 p.m.

K: I've been following your trip. Everything seems to be in good order -- we will get to them the suggestion of the three cities to replace

M: I'm sorry we can't go there.

K: In a personal conversation once you get there you might explain why you were interested in going. Anything you say will be reported to Chou.

M: That's good to know.

K: We have put together a book for you in my office on the Chinese position on various issues and analyses. These are things we had done only for the President and hadn't shown to anyone else. We are reluctant to let it out of this office. Is there any chance of your seeing it over here?

M: Yes.

K: It is for you and . . .

M: And Scott?

K: And Scott of course. I am not so much concerned about your security as for . . .

M: I understand and approve, and we are glad you have got this fellow, Pillsbury . . .

K: Lord, outstanding.

M: He's been working with Calloway.

K: Is it a terrible inconvenience to you if we do this here?

M: Not at all -- I don't know when I can do it though.

K: You don't have to suit yourself to anyone's convenience except yours. If that is agreeable to you I don't have to worry about someone inadvertently getting a glimpse at it.

U.S. Marine Corps
Admiral Moorer
Operations and Operations and Operations and Operations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Secl. 3.6

T ELECON
Admiral Moorer
4/5/72 after 4:00pm

By: K.M.S. NARA. Date: 5/12/64

K: Two things -- you noticed the PRG is holding a press conference tomorrow. If they come in now with a peace offer before we hit them we'll look awful.

M: We are hitting all we can.

K: The President asked, unless they have moved Route 1 we ought to know where it is.

M: We know. They are shelling it.

K: Why can't we bomb up and down it by instruments?

M: We can.

K: But we are not.

M: We have got good control, so bombs are going against troops firing at South Vietnamese generally speaking.

K: But there must be a tremendous tail.

M: We can run them down the road -- sure. You want us to?

K: No, we can't run the war from here.

M: We checked and they feel they have good control, and the targets are bonafide ____ targets on the ground.

K: Since they must have some assets they are not using, why not run up and down that road?

M: They have the __s__ about saturated. With nearly 200 sorties you just about have air __s__s.

K: There's no law against going into North Vietnam along Route 1 either.

M: No, we can do that. But if they do make a peace offer . . . Jesus Christ we have been hit on that enough.

K: No, we have been. We have to start working them over.

M: We shouldn't agree on a peace offer . . .

K: We won't but we want to be in a position of starting our actions. We have to give the North Vietnamese a big clout.

H. W. SHERMAN
Admiral Moore
Receives oral report
of day's work
of Marine Corps.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: JML V NASA Date: 5/12/72

T ELECON
Admiral Moorer

4/5/72 after 4:00pm p. 2

M: We could do plenty like we did between Christmas and New Years. Everyone is standing by itching to go if they get a chance. Can go on instruments if we have reason for doing it.

K: We have no more ______ forecast?

M: I think after 24 hours it's going to improve, certainly tomorrow night (daytime there) -- it will give us a chance to go strongly.

K: We'll let it go and John Vogt is going to be ready to go Friday?

M: Yes.

K: If he doesn't know what's wanted we have got to get a civilian in there. He sure knows what we need. I just mean to get it into their heads out there.

M: You are taking my right arm, but I will survive.

K: You think he's the best man?

M: I do.

K: Good, let's see how it goes.

M: We watch it by the minute . . . if they ______ we just have to stall them off.

K: We will; we won't even send Porter back till next week.

M: Both of us can play the same game.

September 13, 1969, at 9:45 a.m. Central Time

Re: Meeting with President Nixon and Vice President Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.5

By: K.H.Y. NASA Date: 5/12/69

TELCOM

Sen. Scott/Kissinger

4:40 p.m. - 4/5/72

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Hugh, I understand your trip is going along all right.

S: It seems to be moving along nicely.

K: We have put together a briefing book here which is a condensation of things writeen for the exclusive use of the President and which is available for you to read over here anytime at your convenience.

S: We will try to do it. I don't know when.

K: I've talked to Mansfield about it and he is agreeable to doing it on this basis.

S: I suppose the best time is when we come to see the President.

K: Anytime you want. Anytime of the day or night.

S: Good, I will try to get down there.

K: And we will definitely have an appointment before you go.

S: Good.

Hanoi, 12 November 1969

Approved 11/11/72

TELCOM

Gov. Reagan/Kissinger
6:35 p.m. - 4/5/72

By: KMLV
NASA Data 5/12/72

R: Henry.

K: Governor, how are you?

R: I'm pretty good, but the purpose of the USO is to keep up the troops morale and you are my personal USO. What's happening to the war? All I get is what's in the newspaper.

K: The North Vietnamese made a massive attack across the DMZ.

R: That part they have been factual about.

K: And they attacked the newest South Vietnamese division which was just formed last August and drew it back. Unfortunately all of this happened while the area is socked in in a way it hasn't been in weeks. Therefore, we can't hit into the North because it's all socked in and we don't have any airplanes that can fly in this sort of weather.

R: Isn't that awful.

K: It's revolting. We made them fly 15 days before Christmas and New Year's and they were behaving for weeks afterwards. Now let me tell you as soon as it lifts they will get hit in a way they have never been hit since '68.

R: Just at the front or strategic bombing?

K: Initially we are going 60 miles north until we clean out the area. We have to get all the supplies until we clean out the offensive. It's not going to be just one day, it's going to be several. This I am telling you confidentially.

R: Oh, I'm not going to make any speeches about it.

K: We have given permission for the Naval Department all the way up the coast in that area. We have moved in 72 more Phantoms and 20 B-52's. We have moved 2 more carriers in there. When this thing starts going they will know they have been in a war. They have their whole army out of the country except one division. This will break it one way or the other. They will either make the South Vietnamese collapse or we will punish them until they quit. We changed our air commander today because we want to get a more aggressive guy.

R: Are we still confident of the success of Vietnamization?

The Official Story of the Vietnam War

U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps?

By: KVLW
NARA, Date: 5/12/04

- 2 -

K: They have not yet hit a good Vietnam division so I can't tell. If they hold, then I think we will break their back with air bombardment.

R: I feel better.

K: I tell you we are going all out. We pulled 36 Phantoms out of Japan today. We have all the airfields full to capacity and they literally cannot take one other airplane. All we have to do now is wait for the weather to lift. They are socked in until the winds change but that's a question of a day or two days.

R: Oh boy, this can make or break us nationally.

K: We recognize this. You know I said to the President this is the story - it's one way or the other. He said to me it's one way - it has to tell the story one way.

R: You know I hope if it has to go on to a counter attack I would like to see the South Vietnamese attack and ______ the demilitarized zone.

K: If it rolls back that will mean they have shot their wad. Then it's over.

R: Well, you have brightened my day.

K: Well, we may still lose but it won't be without making a gigantic effort.

R: You know you look at the papers and watch the television and you can't help see these guys hailing the enemy.

K: There are a lot of people with vested interests in our defeat. OK. Good to talk to you as always.

R: Good to talk to you. I knew you were busy but I couldn't resist it.

K: Any time.

H. J. Kissinger, President
the President
Reagan, Mr. Kissinger, and I are in touch.
Please read this.

OEGCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12959, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLW
NASA Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/5/72; 7:00 p.m.

P: When is Vogt going out there?

K: Friday night. We could have him come down to Key Biscayne.

P: Why can't we have him do that. I would like to have him come down and I should talk with him before he goes.

K: Just to present the other side, it ties you directly to the air operations.

P: Well maybe I better see him here. I just think he needs to get the word.

K: He will be over for a WSAG meeting at 9:30.

P: I have to leave. In any event what I was going to say -- I really want him worked over, dressed down. Tell him the whole future of his profession is involved here -- not his own personal profession . . .

K: We could have him come down to Key Biscayne.

P: Suppose I am tied in. I am supposed to know about these things. Have him come down for a report. Then I can have him away from Moorer.

K: Good, we will do it Friday.

P: In the papers, I noticed that they both refer to a widening offensive. How about one more B-3 strike or something. I just have a feeling if there is no concentration of forces any place -- despite the fact they had up to 500 sorties. We dropped enough bombs to destory Europe several times.

K: I was on the phone with Moorer three times today.

P: I noticed that Thieu . . .

K: He is actually quite concerned.

P: Isn't he really saying get off your ass and help us.

K: Reagan just called and said he hopes we will do something.

P: You told him the problem about the weather.

K: I gave him some idea of what we were planning.

By: KHLW NAFU Date: 5/12/64

-2-

P: I think we are in the position where we could hit the Haiphong area. The public attitude may be such that we go now -- they asked for it. I believe we could give it to them good.

K: The first thing we should do is cripple this area so that we tie up the supplies into the battle zone. Then we should give one goddamn shot to Haiphong.

P: Can I ask you to do one thing immediately. The restriction with regard to the 19th Parallel doesn't include naval gunfire. Have naval gunfire take the road clear up to Haiphong. It is precise -- it hits the road.

K: Right now they don't have enough ships. They have about six of them south of the DMZ because that is where the fighting is. I think it is important to get the ______ area of the battle zones cleared up.

P: So that they cannot reinforce.

K: The 18th Parallel -- on the passes that go to Laos and Vietnam.

P: You call Moorer -- get one Destroyer -- tell him to get his ass up to the 20th - 21st Parallel and shell the roads up there. Let's do that. That isn't bombing the road. But it will be a signal. Do you agree with it or not, Henry?

K: They haven't really shelled anywhere north of the DMZ yet.

P: Don't do it in a half-ass way like Johnson. If we are going to do it we are going to do it good. Get the goddamn ship above the DMZ and above the 18th Parallel. Just so they fire shells on the road high up. Bombing is a problem -- not naval shelling.

K: We will pay the same price. My recommendation is to get something started that we can sustain.

P: Yes, but right now there is a need for psychological ______, too. We are waiting here and saying we want something we can sustain, wait until the weather clears, etc. In the meantime the psychological effect goes down. We need it tomorrow. You tell Moorer to get off his ass.

K: I think we should shell Dong Hoi. That's about 40 miles up.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KVL NASA Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/8/72; 7:00 p.m.

-3-

P: They have not done it yet?

K: They have not.

P: I want a report. Naval ships can fire in the night -- I know! Get up and shell Dong Hoi and I want them to report to me in the morning. Shell it now!

K: That I will do.

P: I know the psychological effect of this.

K: I could not agree more. Dong Hoi I am strongly for. Because that's where they have POL and supply depots.

P: Get the crusier in. I want massive power and I want the place destroyed and do it now. Thieu needs it. The American public needs it. I want a report in the morning.

["A. M. E. T. C. T. S. E. C. S. O. F. O. R. C. S. O. F. O. R. C. S. O. F. O. R. C. S. O

H. G. W. Bush, President
of the United States
of America

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3, 6

By: K.J. Ly NAVA Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
4/5/72; 7:45 p.m.

K: I just had a raging call from the President. He has talked to Reagan and Rockefeller and a number of others. No one can understand why we are not doing anything. (Laird started to speak) I just want to tell you what his view is first. His view is that the military has been screaming that they have been hamstrung for a number of years. I don't want to hear from Abrams that he is Field Commander because he (President) is Commander in Chief. He is ordering tonight a naval bombardment of Dong Hoi and he wants it done by 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

L: Where does he want this?

K: Dong Hoi. Somebody better get it into Abrams' head or he may not be Field Commander much longer.

L: We can get naval bombardment into seven miles there.

K: We want storage areas and airfields bombarded.

L: No problem on that. The airfield is no problem.

K: Where is it? Well, you better get it done!

L: No problem.

K: He wants to go up to Haiphong but I talked him out of that.

L: We will just tell them to do it regardless of what the consequences are.

K: Just stay away from populated areas.

L: Bombing that way we will hit some population -- but what the hell. We can do it. It will be done.

K: When is Vogt leaving.

L: He is leaving Friday night.

K: Do you think the President should see him before

L: The President can see him tomorrow after that briefing. We are going to have a ceremony for Vogt on Friday morning.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sec. 3.5

The President has the authority to issue orders to the President.

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/13/72

-2-

K: The President won't be here. Is he going straight out or stopping in Hawaii.

L: Straight out. If we had had 24 hours you would be proud of that Air Force.

K: What do you mean 24 hours.

L: Clear weather. The A-6 is the only all weather plane we have (?) It is a lousy way to operate. As far as Dong Hoi is concerned, we can hit the damn thing. The President has the idea that the naval -- like bombing those islands in the Pacific during World War II -- we can go some 7 to 11 miles. But it is only every ten rounds because it burns out the guns. But what the hell, we can do it and we will do it.

K: I would stay away from civilian casualties.

L: We will have some but they can take the heat on that for a while. It will be forgotten in a couple of months.

K: Look, Mel, we have to start on a longer campaign.

L: There will be some. The only way you can be sure is with air.

K: We are talking about gunfire.

civilian

L: There will be some casualties. I have all the statistics on that but I won't bother you with that. We can do it. Let's do it.

K: I called only because -- I will let you see the tape tomorrow if you want to.

L: I don't need that Henry.

K: We want some effective action.

L: You will get all you want if you give me 12 hours -- I have been praying.

K: I will go back to the President.

L: No, no. Don't go back to the President.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NAVAQ Data: 5/13/64

4/5/72; 7:45 p.m.

Re: Question: Time the open line is open, and time of conclusion of meeting.

-3-

K: But don't have civilian casualties.

L: I can't guarantee you that, Henry!

K: I may call you back. If you don't hear from me in five minutes.

L: All I need is the word of what he wants and not in a confused fashion -- it can be done. I sent you the two plans -- the reason I sent you the questions is so that you have these questions.

K: Yes, I have seen them. This won't be done immediately.

L: We need 12 hours. This is a great opportunity when they are out in the open.

K: But I don't think it is understood that we want to give a good ______ in the north.

L: But according to my notes we must be sure it is massive.

K: Okay, let me get back to you.

L: Abrams didn't understand the cancellation of the other authority. He does now.

K: I don't want to hear requests of authority when these guys aren't doing anything. They keep yakking about authority and are not using what they have.

L: But do you know why.

K: Why not what?

L: Because they have to watch out for civilian casualties -- and massive.

K: Okay, Mel.

The following are the open lines
of the Pacific Ocean
Properly called the Pacific
Ocean itself

By: KVLW NAVA Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., April 5, 1972

M: I just got a report -- laid out targets for four destroyers. 713 rounds were fired up until __________ -- that would be our time noon today -- up above the DMZ and now moving up the Coast. They have hit CD sites and coastal surveillance radars. They went charging in on Dong Hoi. Took on 17 targets -- 3 SAM sites, 6 OD sites, barracks, POL, ammo. Coastal defense batteries were active and they had to ziz zag at high speed. Heavy coastal fire. Confused the enemy. The closest splash was 1/2 mile or so. Now they are plotting their targets again. Moving up and down the coast again. There are long range for inland and the short range will be suppressing along the coast.

K: Don't do any more.

M: 1200 rounds fired --

K: That's great! You just stay with your existing orders.

M: We'll send them back in again. I know the young man in charge of this. He has never let them go inside coastal ....

K: Good.

M: Let me tell you about the weather. Looks like about noon or afternoon -- will be about 1:00 a.m. here -- they've got a chance of getting a window. In the meantime, more destroyers arriving tomorrow. Will send them up coast and pound the hell out of them. I have no real readout of the damage yet. The enemy put up star shells to try to illuminate them. We will have to get some photographs to see what happened. I will send message to you when it comes over.

K: That's all we need. Thank you.

M: We need 8-10 hours to open.

K: Keep it at that. Just stick with the existing orders and I will talk to Laird.

M: Have you talked to Laird?

K: And I will talk in this sense with Laird now that I have got the picture.

The President's Office in the Senate
the Senate of the Republic
Publications Staff

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

TELCONE
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 5, 1972

NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Apparently they are already doing these things. I will take
the responsibility --

L: Here's Tom now on the phone.

K: I will take it up with the President.

L: But Henry --

K: I know you are willing to do it.

L: We are doing everything we can. I want a clear day --

K: We don't want to do anything stupid.

L: We are shore bombarding against that shore now. We will put
a massive attack in there tonight.

K: Mel, if the conditions are right --

L: We will keep the casualties to a minimum.

K: No one asked for that type of operation.

L: I think the President would feel better if we ran one.

K: I think he will feel fine . . . . . . . . . we can support it. If tomorrow
night it is the same, we will reconsider it.

L: Hell, Henry, we have to keep cool and calm.

K: That's why I am saying keep with the existing things.

L: I had them lay it on tonight. That's exactly what they were going
to do. They thought it was going . . . . . . . There is no one that
wants it to succeed more.

K: Mel, I will take the responsibility.

L: Henry, I don't want you to take the responsibility.

K: We will share it jointly.

L: Okay, Henry.

Re: telephone conference
1st floor, 2nd floor, 3rd floor
Publicity Dept.

By: KHLW NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
8:20 p.m., April 5, 1972

K: I talked to the President and he feels in the light of what's being done, we shouldn't send out any new orders.

L: We are sending a copy of that message to you.

K: If there is a window, make sure one substantial part of it gets used against the North.

L: I will guarantee it!

K: You get a lot in the battlefield but also so they know there are no rules now.

L: Henry, we will do the best we can now.

K: Okay, Mel.

Re: [insert telephone number]
11:00 AM, Oct. 5, 1972
Publicity Sound

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/5/72; 8:20 p.m.

By: KWL WASH. Date: 5/12/04

K: We are really burning a fire under them now. I had a talk with Moorer. He had just gotten a report from his destroyer that lobbed 783 shells in on the ______.

P: North of the DMZ?

K: In North Vietnam. They took out POL, radar stations, missile sites all the way up and down the line. They took 17 targets in Dong Hoi under fire.

P: Good.

are

K: And they are going in again tonight. They/having intensive shore battery fires. He says tomorrow four more destroyers are coming in there.

P: What about shore batteries. Are they going to knock one out.

K: There is just no way with naval gunfire to fail to hit one of those. Tomorrow it also looks that they are going to get a window and they are going to go with everything.

P: If that weather clears -- but he says there are clear indications it is clearer?

K: It looks as if they will have four hours tomorrow afternoon which would be from Midnight on here.

P: And they probably have the targets ready.

K: I think we have the American public ready for doing something. I talked to Rollie Evans today. He said he talked to Senior Democrats and he said that the Democrats said it would be very dangerous to take a dovish stand now because this would raise the hawkish instincts.

P: Because the other side is the aggressor. I think we are playing it right.

KK: So I don't think we should give another command.

P: I just want to be sure they are doing something.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Seci. 3.6

The President of the Republic of China

Receives State visit of the President of the Republic of China

By: K.H.Y. NAFU Data: 5/12/04

-2-

K: Additional destroyers are being put in there. They are going north of the DMZ.

P: And they have some good commanders.

K: He says he has his best.

P: Feels he has all the destroyers and crusiers he could . . .

K: He is pulling them in there.

P: What about these attacks in the other areas.

K: We are getting that new carrier that is coming in. It is going to supply air support for III Corps. So I think, Mr. President, we should wait another 24 hours before I force them to this stance.

P: Let's still ______ the fellow down there. He has to know how much is on the line.

K: If I could suggest, Mr. President, it might be better for you to see him five minutes tomorrow before you go.

P: Yes.

K: I will bring him in to you about 9:15.

P: Fine, 9:15.