DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Gene Rostow
5/22/70 12:50 p.m.

K: I see now some of the heat you people were taking for years.

R: I woke up this morning with a thought. You don't have to comment. I wondered if there were any room in Libya that would permit us to stay or enforce Wheelus--say we'll get out when you get out. You don't have to answer.

K: I have to give you a lesson on the nature of our current bureaucracy some time.

R: I know. I understand.

K: It depends on whether your judgment is that you should play a strong game or not. I know your judgment and think you called the right person.

R: I don't know what Dobrynin responds to.

K: Charm. I will keep it in mind, but I'm not optimistic. But you can be sure I will mention it to the boss. How are you?

R: Fine. The atmosphere here is better than one would think. The students come and talk to me. My colleagues are polite, but don't talk about foreign policy with me. The students are intensely interested. I have a story for you: When Marshall was Secretary someone said to him 'how can you be so calm when things are so bad?' He said 'Oh I've seen it much worse.'

K: Thank you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
V. P. /Kissinger
1:00 pm 5/22/70

VP: I'm getting ready to leave for Houston. I saw the discrepancy on the report this morning.

K: It's a statistical error. What happened was that that estimate was based on that boxes of a certain kind if packed flat would be of a certain quantity. But it turned out that they were packed in round containers. The Defense Dept. has already distributed it around town.

VP: How do we protect ourselves from our friends?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Frankel/Kissinger

6:20 pm

5/22/70

PART I

K: What have we been bombing now? You always know before I do.

F: The printer's union --

K: Lately you have pulled ahead of the Washington Post in objectivity.

F: Mr. Agnew is taking care of that. He is saying he won't pipe down until
others pipe down. ______, ______, ______, and Sidey.

K: What did Sidey say?

F: Sidey attacked Agnew. "Agnew has ? ? ? ? ? ? ?"

K: Somebody just handed me a copy of the Agnew speech.

F: It will say everything in your heart and dreams about us. You can tell the President the Sunday worship service may be one of thanksgiving because the printers may close us down and we are teetering on the brink of shutting down. Bob Smith is writing a story and having trouble getting information from your people. His information runs roughly "Henry A. Kissinger's NSC staff is leaving. Two members and perhaps three others. Larry Lynn and Roger Morris ? ? ? ? ? While it's understood that Lynn is leaving for personal reasons, it's known that others are leaving because of disagreements with current policy."

K: Are we going through that again?

F: These follow ______ by 6 others last year.

K: Our average rate is decreasing. That's down 18%. Now I'm really going to impress you. The President is calling me. May I call you back?

F: Of course.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

5/22/70 6:20 p.m.

P: I forgot to ask you about that Cooper-Church thing, to be sure everyone is in line. There is to be no compromise. That's a false report of Scott claiming the House is going to . . . The House is not about to turn around.

K: I talked to Harlow about it and while he prefers a compromise . . .

P: He always wants a compromise. But that would have a bad effect. Then it looks like the result of the Senate slapping our wrists.

K: He doesn't know what you are planning to do in June. You want the Senate in a position of responding to you. If they speech "in concert with the President's declared intent," that's one thing. If they do it before that's another.

P: Make sure he has the word. Say there are sensitive diplomatic reasons for it. I will announce the speech early. I could announce it on Thursday of next week to do the following Thursday.

K: So we will have had to stagger through four days, which we can do. No problem.

P: Another thing. I was heartened by the meeting today in terms of the Rogers thing. Schultz and others were saying that there was a credibility gap . . . But Rogers, who's the most sensitive, said it's not true.

K: Schultz has been agonizing about it for a year. He's too sensitive. Rogers is very sensitive to the situation.

P: He's sensitive to those hard hats.

K: I've sent Bill your plan, an extension of your order to Laird.

P: I wanted to be sure they thought they were determining it. This meeting they thought they were deciding the whole thing.

K: Good. Actually Bill agrees on the bombing, which surprised me. It was Laird who disagreed.

P: Yes. He also agreed with letting the ARVN run loose. And that's exactly the right line. If they should take Sihanoukville, then we will let the ARVN do the mining.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

The President

5/22/70 6:20 p.m. page 2

K: Somebody may have to provide protection for them if the Russians decide to challenge them.

P: That's right, but it's a long way down the road. I think you should shape up the staff and cabinet. They are all too shell-shocked. We should say 'good God, we've done something good.'

K: I think so too and that's why the debate is shifting to "what will happen to the ARVN after July 1"

P: What happens then -- what Bill said is good. We can't object to Asians definding their own interests.

P: The thing is for Ron to quote it. Will you give that to Ron tomorrow? Have him say that tomorrow.

K: Absolutely.

P: On the process thing--in the end we're going to look good on that. Why don't you talk to Howard Smith and see that he knows. It's more important to have the TV men know. One column doesn't make any difference. I'm glad Alsop is going to write that one, and he'll probably write a good one.

K: Yes, he will. I always give them all the meetings. I don't say who said what, but I give them the sequence of the meetings.

P: I think Stewart would have been impressed. Did you show him the yellow page?

K: Yes.

P: Was he impressed?

K: Yes, he was very impressed. He said 'you can say what you want, but there isn't one argument the President hasn't thought of 3 days before/ it came up.'' He was very impressed.

P: Ernest Lindley wrote me a letter. You remember him? He was for it. He was very liberal, but he'd all for what we did. The true liberals are. Eban--he's a very emotional man and an awfully decent man, and very concerned about the little school children, and I would be too. I would want to kill them. And I was glad to see Bill was-- . . . When you look at the whole situation . . . we really have a ploy going where we, in supporting Israel, are doing what is in our interest because it screws the Russians.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

5/22/70 6:20 p.m. page 2

Eban came up to me and said--of course he won't say it in public and neither will she--but he said we support what you are doing in Cambodia and we understand it. We don't want the U. S. to become a helpless giant.

K: They've worked behind the scenes, we've found that out from intercepts.

P: The guy who would say it publicly would be Rabin. He's very tough. I wish he were our general. I think the whole staff should be affirmative. They shouldn't be apologetic about the credibility gap--there is none. Why are they so defensive? Or are they so?

K: When they come to you it's with a problem. And some are just shell shocked by the violent attack that's been launched.

P: When we look back on these two or three weeks, people say if only Kent State hadn't happened, or if only Sihanouk hadn't left. But maybe it's best to have it all happen at once. Only then can we develop a coherent policy for things as they are going to be.

K: People are feeling sheepish over the emotional binge after Kent State.

P: What about your call from Vance?

K: McNamara had said he had been trying to quiet him down and didn't succeed, but he said there's a limit to what I can back off from. He said what can I say.

P: Did you tell him not to say anything for a change?

K: I said if there's a conflict between the students and the hard hats, the hard hats are going to win.

P: Good.

K: Then I had to took a crack at Kingman Brewster. I said 'I thought your policy was a disaster, but I never said anything against it. I tried to help you.' He said w the only thing he would say in the next months would be on ceasefire.

P: That's okay. I'm not as pessimistic as I was.

K: I think it's going to be the next thing making of your Administration.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
The President
5/22/70 6:20 p.m. page 4

And if we go to the peace offensive in July and if we go to the Summit . . .

P: Which nobody knows about . . .

K: And which may not happen.

P: But if it doesn't, we won't beg, you can be sure of that.

K: Without this we would have died from a thousand cuts. Cambodia
would have gone; people would say 'how can Vietnamization work with Cambodia
gone?'

P: At least Cambodia won't go for the next three or four months,
will it?

K: No.

P: After hearing Helms today, after November he goes. He
doesn't have any character. Why don't people stand up and say what they
believe?

K: First they have to believe in something.

P: Well, look hard at Rush, he may be the man.

Part 2

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Max Frankel
Mr. Kissinger
6:50 p.m., May 22, 1970

F: Hello Henry.

K: If I told you it was against the national interest to attack me in your paper, would you take me seriously?

F: Of course. There is no one attacking you here but the story clearly points to unrest and dissatisfaction with working conditions. Lynn . . .

K: Lynn, why don't you ask Lynn? Why don't you ask them all?

F: They all mutter. They all say the same thing - that they are not to be quoted.

K: I will tell Lynn to tell you why he is leaving. I don't think it has anything to do with conditions on the staff.

F: I think that is clearly not the reason. But the sources say the others are leaving for personal reasons. What about Morris? He won't talk to me.

K: If they were absolutely disgruntled with me, they would talk wouldn't they?

F: No - not entirely. A man doesn't really want to sound off in the newspapers unless he wants to end up like Allen.

K: Anyone who wants to say why they are leaving is alright. I would rather have them say than have you speculate.

F: What about Tony Lake? Is he leaving too?

K: I suggest you call all of these people themselves and I will remove any restrictions that they think they owe me because otherwise you will just speculate. These are all people with whom I have worked closely and for whom I have the highest regard. So I will not engage in any speculation of why they are leaving or when they are leaving.

By NARA, Date 5/26

F: Who is leaving. Can you help me on that if I can't reach them. There are supposed to be 5 in all. Can you help me on that - Lake, Lynn, Morris and someone threw in Watts but I am not going to do anything with that. And Bob Osgood is leaving anyway.

K: Yes, but Bob Osgood told me in December he was going to leave.

F: That was my understanding. One other question - my Wall Street reporter asks me when and with whom you are going up to Wall Street. Are you scheduled to go up and talk to the Board of Governors of the Stock Exchange?

K: There, you have me. I am supposed to go up Wednesday. That must be it.

F: Apparently it is coming up in the context of how frantic everyone is about the stock exchange.

K: Just off-the-record, I will not go if it is going to be in the paper. Do you have my office bugged? I did leave you alone ten seconds when you were in here once.

F: Seriously, how is it going out there?

K: Militarily, very well. Diplomatically, as it was to be expected.

F: It is a big problem.

K: It is really the big national problem now and no one can afford a victory. I ran into Tom Wicker the other day and said we have killed 3 Presidents - we can't afford to kill another.

F: Okay thank you Henry.

mlh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon

Elliot Richardson

5/22/70 6:52 p.m.

R: How did things go with Eban today?

K: Joe Sisco was there.

R: Yes, I have some impressions from him, but . . .

K: I have been trying to convey to this group--the President repeated again that there would be no interruption in delivering the aircraft. He made it pretty clear that there would be no stoppage in July. At some time he made a strong plea about diplomatic moves and prepared the ground to that extent.

R: As far as planes go I gathered from Joe . . .

K: He made a strong statement that there should be no problem. And I think if we give them an interim answer of 3 months that would give him time for a more comprehensive approach. Is that Joe's impression? The way he talked to them they had reason to believe it was a long-term deal. He promised them an answer before June or July? 15. He made it clear that there would be no interruption. And he threw in tanks with no number. He said he wanted the bombs expedited. And about the ordnance he said he didn't want any discussion.

R: The key problems I take it are to develop political options that make sense.

K: That's right.

R: And to consider the manner of handling the response and the aircraft.

K: That's right, and we should work together on this. He is practically committed to a positive response.

R: I'm prepared for that.

K: But we can couple it with your scenario.

R: It's wide open to that?

K: Yes, and I would support that.

R: Okay, I think the only unhappy people on this will be EOD. There's a problem of handling the matter in a way that doesn't produce any more impact in the Arab world than necessary and timed in a way to give us a chance to

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

5/22/70 6:52 p.m.

launch a diplomatic initiative. The scenario Joe and I are working on is
vit worth the time, but we should keep going on the premise that we'll be
likely lucky if it works.

K: I have no doubt about what you are trying to achieve. Whether it's best achieved by going to Nasser or the Soviets I'm not so sure about. I think this is something we should discuss over lunch some time.

R: Yes, I think we should discuss this.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
S. Loory/Kissinger

7:20 pm

5/22/70

L: I wanted to come in and talk to you about Cambodia. I'm going through statements by high government officials, Laird, and the President and I see variations. What's going on?

K: Maybe we are confused. Each is perfectly clear in our minds but we are
disagreed.

L: Is there a disagreement?

K: No.

L: ? ? ? ? air support and logistical support. Laird also this morning and last week left open the possibility that we will continue to give support in Cambodia. There's a flat contradiction here. When I read your briefing it seems you are mor in accord with Laird than the President.

K: Every senior official seems to be in a split with the President.

L: Can you give me any help? That's what I wrote.

K: Rose Woods goes in and makes the decisions with the President. What's the problem.

L: The President is asked on May 8 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and he says no they dod't. He would expect the SVN would come out approximately when we do. When we come out air and logistics support will come out. Then read Laird. This morning on TODAY SHOW he was asked if American advisors will stay in Cambodia with SVN. He says no. Then he goes on to say that the President has made it clear with the Nixon Doctrine to give these countries assistance. Air and sea support. A long passage on how the SVN and Cambodians must and will cooperate to fight off the enemy in Cambodia. I see a contradiction there.

K: You want us to write a precise scenario. The NVN will march into Phenom Penh and everyone will be glad that we gave a precise scenario. We don't want them to have a plan of what's going to happen.

K: You have already gone so far.

K: That's where we are going to stay.

L: In the meantime there's some validity.

K: We know what we are going to do and there's no contradiction. They will

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Loory/Kissinger

7:20 pm

5/22/70

-2-

K: (cont) come out at approximately the same time.

L: From the sancuaries. But you go on to say that after that phase of the
operation is completed there will be new developments and they will wait
to see what happens. That could mean SVN aid to the Lon Nol Government in
it's efforts to fight off a war of national liberation.

K: Any number of things. It could be an attempt to establish sanctuaries along the border.

L: What do you have in mind?

K: The above. Our primary concern is SVN.

L: Once again there's a slight variation between that and what Laird says.
He says this is the first test of the Nixon Doctrine.

K: That's on the Cambodian level. We have always said we would give materiel
support.

L: He is talking about air and sea support. It's more than bullets and mosquito
netting.

K: We will not give air support to Cambodia or to SVN in Cambodia fighting for
Cambodia. we are talking for background.

L: I understand, with the usual rules "WH officials."

K: No, I don't want to be involved at all.

L: Government officials.

K: I'm explaining it to my friend Stewart Loory.

L: OK. One other thing on the same basis. After June 30 it seems to me there
are going to have to be a whole set of new decisions on S. E. A. Can you define
the type of decisions that have to be made?

K: Why so many new decisions? We will pursue the ones we have all along.
Withdrawal and Vietnamization. The program the President announced on
April 30.

L: But for the time being this program is suspended. When can we look
forward to a resumption?

K: In this year we will have substantial withdrawals and this is maintained.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Loory/Kissinger

7:20 pm

5/22/70

-3-

L: What about the Lon Nol request for military aid? Has this been dealt with?

K: Small arms and light equipment but not a foreign aid program.

L: That's firm?

K: As firm as it can be. I would be amazed if this were changed during the summer.

L: What about the renunciation of American troops in Cambodia? Does that come up for review later? Is it firm and unchangeable?

K: That's a big word but I can't see where it will arise.

L: Six What about continued use of air power after June 30.

K: We will see.

L: That decision has to be made. What about the use of artillery from XXXX SVN?

K: I don't want to go through the whole exercise. We will have to go through the whole tactic. We are going to try to continue the efforts to end the war. That's our objective all along. We have kept every promise we have made and we plan to continue to.

L: OK.

K: I don't know if that helps.

L: Every little bit helps. Have you gotten the copies of stories I'm sending you?

K: One of them astonished me. I didn't know the WSAG membership had changed.

L: Is it not true that Vogt and Doolin now sit in the meetings?

K: Vogt always has and every senior member can bring in people to sit in the room. I never attached any importance to it.

L: This I didn't know.

K: I had not noticed Doolin. From where I sit I see no change in the operation. Vogt has been at every meeting but I could be wrong. It's true that during the 3 or 4 days before the operation started we had principals only but that was for security reasons. But M. Green has always been present.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Loory/Kissinger

7:20 pm 5/22/70

-4-

L: I said that.

K: He did too. The membership is roughly the same. I can't swear that
these departments have not reorganize themselves. It's true that State has
a Cambodian Task Force. They always have a task force for something.
That quote from a senior State Dept. official was very interesting. I thought
it was carefully researched. If I didn't respect your work I wouldn't call you.
It might even be true from the point of view of departments. I don't know how
departmental handle these papers that go into committee. One secretary
may be dissatisfied with what goes into committee. But I don't know how they
handle it internally. But there's no change in the committee that I notice.

L: I can't get a clear picture of what the WSAG does.

K: Takes decisions that the NSC makes that have a political-military com-
ponent so when you do something like three weeks ago it gives assignments
on who does what, when.

L: What in a general way.

K: We decide to go into "Fish Hook" at 10:00, April 30. Then we say on
H hour minus -- some decision point forward -- D plus 1 -- usually H minus --
Who does what. Order ______ notified. What intelligence reports. What press
briefings, when. Then each government dept. knows what the others are doing.

L: What about military actions.

K: The group doesn't second guess Abrams on his plans.

L: It does transmit his orders?

K: Absolutely not!

L: That's from the WH to the Joint Chiefs?

K: It goes from the WH to the Secy. of Defense. No order has ever gone to
the Joint Chiefs that has not gone through the Secy.

L: It may have ______ in the bombing of NVN.

K: I have the President calling. Come in sometime and I will explain it to
you more fully.

L: Can I ask Muriel for an appointment?

K: Sure.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
The President

5/22/70 7:34 p.m.

P: Do you recall you spoke to me when Sidey talked with you and he said Grunwalt was surprised we had more support than he realized?

K: That's right.

P: Did it reflect in the article next week?

K: It was a half-baked article saying does the President know
womething we don't? And some people sayd yes; some said no--the
general conclusion was he probably didn't.

P: But you weren't able to get anything out of Sidey?

K: No.

P: Isn't that too bad.

K: It is too bad. He's a decent guy. It was much more balanced
than the week before.

P: Newsweek came out better with their poll?

K: Yes. It didn't reflect the mood Sidey reflected to me.

P: It proves they don't care what the people think. Well, let them
sweat a bit. Let them find out what the country is thinking. It seems to
me that the paper coverage of the hard-hat thing in New York is very important.
Would you call Klein and say it's rather important that that be adequately
reported. Bill Middendorf said--he may not be accurate, because he's so
in favor of us--they gave more time to the left-wing lawyers than to the
hard hats.

K: I'm sure that's right.

P: It may not be, but if Klein would work on Newsweek and Time--
that would help.

K: I'll call him immediately.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Herb Klein

8:00 p.m., May 22, 1970

K: The President called and said he wanted to make sure the news magazines covered the construction workers' business in New York.

K1: I think it's important that they do this, too. He was talking about the 150,000?

K: Yes. Secondly, may I make a suggestion? Rogers said you called him and suggested that the President should see Palme.

K1: No, I didn't. What happened was the Ambassador came by and said he was sorry he threw stones at our Ambassador. He called a couple of times -- I said he should talk to you and Rogers. I sent a note to Bill Rogers in which I said the Ambassador called, and asked him about this question. I said the President shouldn't see him.

K: By the time he got through, he said you told him you would use your influence with the White House for the President to see Palme. He wasn't confident enough to tell the President himself, so he told me; trying to line me up. I knew how the President MANKIND disliked that guy. I think it's a lousy idea. He came over on his own to receive an honorary degree. Have you been invited to the Swedish Embassy? We are trying to discourage White House people from going.

K1: Yes, I got an invitation.

K: I think it's better for no White House people to go.

K1: I'm glad you mentioned this. Incidentally, I am going on "Face the Nation" on Sunday. I think it's important that I talk to you tomorrow before I do this.

lds

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jack Horner

8:20 p.m., May 22, 1970

H: I guess Jerry Warren told you what I was after.

K: No, not really.

H: Mary McGrory said five members of your staff are quitting: William Watts, Anthony Lake, Roger Morris, Laurence Lynn and Robert Osgood.

K: Osgood told me in January that he was going to leave in September at the beginning of the new academic year. Laurence Lynn told me in January he was leaving for personal reasons. He has been a key member of my staff, and he is absolutely exhausted by five years of high-level government service. The other three should speak for themselves. They, too, told me they were going to leave this year.

H: Before Cambodia came up?

K: Yes, but without setting definite dates for departure.

H: Are they all still working?

K: Right now, yes.

H: When are they scheduled to leave?

K: Osgood: September, back to Johns Hopkins University where he was a professor. Lynn is going to Stanford -- he thinks it will be quieter at a university.

H: The other three -- is their leaving at this time because of their dissatisfaction with Cambodia?

K: They told me long before Cambodia they were going to leave. Whether the timing was influenced by these events you should ask them yourself.

H: When are they leaving?

K: We haven't really discussed it.

H: Have they submitted formal resignations?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Jack Horner

8:20 p.m., May 22, 1970

K: Watts hasn't submitted a formal letter of resignation. Lake and Morris worked on a special group and put in extensive hours. They decided they wanted a more normal life. These are all men of strong views and great abilities. I think it is only right if Presidential staff can't support him, they should feel free to leave. Lynn and Osgood had nothing to do with it. [Mr. Kissinger gave Horner home phone numbers so he could check personally with the individuals.] Is Mary McGrory doing a column?

H: I don't know whether or not she is. She told the national editor and he called me saying he understood Max Frankel was going to print a column tomorrow. He wanted me to check on it.

lds

By

NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELECON

Don Oberdorfer/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., May 22, 1970

O: How are you? We are catching up with our brothers on 43rd Street on a story of people leaving the NSC staff -- Watts, Tony Lake, Roger Morris, Osgood, Laurence Lynn. I have talked to everybody except Watts and Osgood so far. I may catch up with them tonight.

K: What did they tell you?

O: Various things. Lynn: his decision was made in February or early March to go to Stanford University Business School -- entirely for personal reasons.

K: That is correct.

O: Tony and Roger -- that they are leaving for reasons they don't want to specify but it had nothing to do with regard to XXX Henry Kissinger or working conditions. They implied it had to do with policy reasons, though they didn't say so explicitly. I gather Watts is in somewhat the same category. Osgood I am told has planned to leave before.

K: Osgood had planned to leave at the beginning of the academic year.

O: Are the three other guys leaving because of Cambodia?

K: You would have to ask them. That is not what they told me. These were all people for whom I have the highest regard and have valued my association with them.

O: They have made a contribution to the work of the NSC? Do you know of any others who are leaving?

K: Not that I am aware of. You can look at this from another point of view -- it is a reduction of 18% of the rate of withdrawals last year.

O: How many left last year.

K: Six -- this is an 18-2/3 % reduction

By NARA, Date 5/26

Don Oberdorfer/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., May 22, 1970

O: Do you feel this is a revolt by members of your staff?

K: No one revolts against me -- that's an inconceivable thought. The figures you gave yourself indicat it isn't a revolt.

O: We got a tip on this about a week to ten days ago from
Cambridge, Mass. But we didn't know names. We started checking
around but didn't find anything. Is there anything else you could
usefully say?

K: When you have a group of able, dedicated people working
as intensely as my ~~K. R. MCKAY~~ associates do, they tend to burn
themselves up. I don't want to go into it. I can only say I respect
them.

O: You feel policy differences were factors?

K: In a number of cases, certainly not. Anyone who leaves for
policy reasons ought to speak for himself. I think Presidential staff
if they differ from the President should leave. We are not speaking
for the record, but you can quote my high regard for them.

O: Did these guys say they were leaving for policy reasons?

K: They all had said long before this happened that they were
going to leave because they wanted to get back to more normal lives.
I don't want to speculate... I have been preoccupied in recent weeks
and haven't been able to be my usual delicate, thoughtful self. I
can't go into that -- they should speak for themselves. There is no
ill will. I don't think it is correct to make this a revolt of the staff,
but any journalist should draw his own conclusions.

O: Have you had any meetings with the staff?

K: Yes -- two meetings recently. One was on the evening of
the President's speech to explain the reasons for the decision. One
was last week. These were at my initiative; not because any of
the staff members asked for it. I haven't had a rebellion. I told
them what was being done and why. There were one or two questions
of a factual nature. Don't quote me on anything except my respect
for and opinion of these staff members.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Packard/Kissinger

9:45 am

5/23/70

P: Two matters to touch base with you on. You are familiar with this proposal for gear machinery for the Russians. That's been brought for review by Commerce and State.

K: The President is still against it.

P: My proposal is that we approve the license but make it subject to review in three months. If the Soviets cannot help us on negotiations then we could turn it off.

K: I still don't think the President would agree.

P: What do you think of trying it?

K: You can but he won't while the war in VN is going on.

P: I have talked to the company. We could do that.

K: If you cancel a license all hell breaks loose.

P: I don't think so. The company is willing to do this.

K: Mel said he is opposed to it.

P: We are generally opposed to it because it's a bad time to offer them a plan when they are sending trucks to VN. But the plant won't be ready until '72 or '73. We have to have some forthcoming posture. I don't know if it will work.

K: You can send over a memo. Is Mel aboard on this?

P: No. He is away. Mel didn't object to having the machinery authorized but he thinks it will be a bad public image. He won't feel badly if it's overruled. He would judge the President's views as you have. But I think if we are going to do it we should try to get a little quid pro quo and not be afraid to force the issue.

K: Last time I was passed on it without a recommendation and the President took a tougher line than anyone.

P: It might or might not work.

K: I will take it up with him.

P: The seabeds issue. NSSM 62 looks fine. The problem is to present it

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Packard/Kissinger

9:45 am

5/23/70

-2-

P: (cont) properly to the public and particularly to the international community.
I sent a memo to Elliot so we present it that we are relinquishing authority
from the ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . International states act as trustees. If we don't
make it clear that we are relinquishing it × it may seem like another gap. I have
sent a copy of my memo to you and if you agree, get it in the hands of your
public relations people in the WH.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
9:52 am 5/23/70

K: I'm just going to make-sure to get that paper.

R: I would. I let Alex see it.

K: That's fine. The President will probably approve something like that today.

R: I gather that Mel's comments are inaccuracies. It's about 40 km. to the river.

K: I took his word for it.

R: He says things so carelessly.

K: That's being kind.

R: It's not argumentation but letting the President know what we are talking about. The shaded area is pretty big and the thing that troubles me is not Abrams but the AF people. They can figure out targets.

K: By holding down the total sorties whatever they hit there they can't hit another place.

R: They have been hitting the Ho Chi Minh trail so much this will be new training exercise. Marshall Green sent up a great thing that ______ x____ kept emphasizing was the number of domesticated animals they captured. been

K: Vogt kept saying it's/in the planning for months -- in the briefing (on the Hill?).

R: Mel keeps saying it's his plan. On this one I think it's really not the policy but the effects that are important. If they find concentrations of the enemy, they should hit them, there's no question.

K: Let me see if I can find something in the approved.

R: Yesterday I got the feeling the President felt there's a disagreement about policy. There hasn't been. How was the one who stated the greatest restrictions on the SVN.

K: He and I talked briefly after the meeting and he understood where they came from and not from you. ? ? ? ? ? We can't find targets and I thought we should get together to sort it out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

9:52 am

5/23/70

-2-

R: I think it's important not to look frenetic. On things of this kind once we know what we are doing our comments can be the same.

K: He didn't have a sense of disagreement.

R: Not at the end but in his initial comments he did. It was just confusion.

(was good?)

K: I thought that the summary that you had and we have instructed Zeigler to that effect about the ARVN should have been used at the beginning. We should keep our mouth shut. Zeiglerx feels he has to go into something every day.

R: Bob McCloskey has been great during this.

K: He is an old pro. You are leaving tomorrow. You can be sure that nothing will happen without our first getting in touch with you. Of course, I can't think of anything that would happen.

R: ? ? ? ?

K: What you said to the Governors -- tone and attitude --

R: The business advisor thing -- I gave them the whole line. I will try to get publicity in Europe on how well it's going.

K: That would be good. Have a good trip.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

GELCON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:55 pm

5/23/80

S: I just wanted to check with you on option D and the necessity of presenting the proper ______ at an early date. Have you seen the message #94 of today?

K: I don't think so. You don't want to do it?

S: I don't want to fight this problem in it's fall back position but when the Soviets have done nothing and we present our fall back position --. Then later we won't have anything. There's no real negotiation going on.

K: Let me review this and if I have any other view I will call you Monday.

S: I don't want you to think we are bucking against the word. Everyone on the delegation agrees.

K: If you agree, I will suspend it and after reviewing it if I don't have any problems we will leave it. Your son came to hear me the other day.

S: Glad to hear it.

K: I couldn't have missed him. He looks just like you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
5/25/70 10:20 a.m.
(Secure Phone - couldn't hear HAK)

You had thought that would be Sunday? ... All right. ... But this
is an order? ... It's better to have Abe ... McCaine isn't as close
to the situation you know. We put him in SINCPAC just to put him away
I just extended him for another two years just last week. Abe and McCain
are two different things ... I know that the I know McCain. He used to
be in my office at least an hour a day when he was lobbying on the Hill.
If the President is going to talk to anybody he should talk to Abe . . .
All right. . . . Yes, yes, I can take him out Saturday . . . . . . Yes.
. . . . . No . . . right, all right. We could leave here Saturday after-
noon probably. We can do that, leave Saturday afternoon. Some of these
guys have to give Memorial Day speeches, but as soon as they get through
with that we will be on our way. . . . . I cannot talk to him about that.
We will do it. I will make the arrangements for places for them to stay.
We'll probably stay at the Marine base. Henry, I trust you 100 %, you
know that.

About that other matter I called you about. We have got to talk about that.
I don't see how these things happen that way. We've got to talk about
this sort of thing. We cannot let that happen. If I get an order like that--
I'm not going to carry out every order without having some kind of appeal.
I can't carry it out until I've talked to the President. I can't do those
things . . . Yes, I will . . . I need to talk to you. This poor
Johnny is shaking to the bottom of his boots over here. . . . That's what
we're doing. And we're saying we're going to let the faculty run the schools
instead of the administration.

I picked up the paper and found that the President is trying to put this
gas in Alaska. And now that governor from Alaska is in here on my ass. . . .
Oh sure, no complaint on that. But here they go through on the domestic
thing on the gas. We could have gotten something on the god damned ABM
out of Jackson. I could have gotten something on that. And now here we
give it away for nothing. The President was talking to him at the B______.
He shouldn't do that. I know that's how life is, but let's try to live a little
better.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Howard Stein/Kissinger

12:10 pm

5/25/70

S: I was talking to a mutual friend who suggested I call you.

K: She thought that before I met with your colleagues I should get your views on the situation. Now, my own views on economics are primitive. The only thing that worries me is that economists have the same problem.

S: Certain things are really not working. I'm not sure everyone realizes why it isn't working.

K: Will you be here this week?

S: I plan to be there Wed.

K: I will be in NY.

S: I will be there Wed. evening.

K: Could you be here Thurs.?

S: Will you be there for the dinner Wed. evening at the WHZ

K: No, I will stay in NY. Maybe we could have breakfast Thurs. morning. How about 8:00 in my office. It's awful food but it gives us a chance to talk and be close to the phone.

S: That's a necessity.

K: That's better than discussing it on the telephone. I'm not apt to say anything on economics that's worth anything. I'm going to discuss foreign policy and where we stand at this moment.

S: I would be interested in hearing your thoughts. I'm not an economist either.

K: I would like to meet you and our mutual friend has been urged it.

S: I will look forward to seeing you.

K: 8:00 in my office at the west basement.

S: See you then.

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/General Hughes

May 25, 1970

12:20 p.m.

(Missed first part of conversation)

**Gen. Hughes:** I wanted to touch base with you. Packard is taking a look at where we go from here. ? ? ? ? Whether we can get some idea of a date as to when they can get that stuff off Okinawa. I want you to know that I am asking Packard what he is going to tell the Army to do and I'll get back to you as soon as I can. Is that acceptable?

HAK: Of course.

**General Hughes:** Who should I touch base with? I don't want to bother you. How about Al Haig?

HAK: Fine, get in touch with Al on this.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Secure Phone
Dr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

May 25, 1970

2:25 p.m.

(I could only hear Laird end of conversation.)

**Laird:** Everything is all set. I think I ought to bring Dave for one meeting because I am going to the Nuclear Planning Group the first weekend in June and Dave should be present as XXXXX, XXXX, XXX, XXXX long as I am bringing Tom Moor. I am bringing Dave because I will be out of town for about 2 weeks there. I really think I should bring him for this one because he should be completely aboard while I am gone.

HAK: ? ? ? ?

**Laird:** All right. Tell him that it is an urgent recommendation, particularly because I have the NPG and the other meeting that you know about and I just feel that Dave should be fully abreast on the whole thing. I really think he is doing a hell of a job.

HAK: ? ? ? ? ?

**Laird:** Anything else Henry? I'll have this paper over to you. We've got some time on that, haven't we. Did you get to talk to the President today about what he did say to Jackson. / I've got to find out some place along the line. I am a little in doubt about it because we haven't made the arrangement in Alaska and XXXX I've got to move that gas out of Denver and if we have to rent it out on a domestic program basis, that gas is going to be dangerous to me and I don't think the White House should get involved in every gas shipment.

OK.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Peter Flanigan
5/26/70 9:00 a.m.

F: I talked to Lasker last night. He said that because they are coming down on Wednesday and are now getting organized to come down, he doesn't think Wednesday noon will be necessary.

K: Okay, but does the President understand this?

F: The President is trying to do what Lasker wants. I will inform him of this. They are coming down Wednesday night.

K: What is going on here Wednesday night?

F: A stag dinner for leaders of business and finance, with a heavy leavening of finance. He will try to explain Cambodia and then gracefully accept their views.

K: When was that set up?

F: The invitations went out Saturday.

K: Well, this changes all my plans for Wednesday.

F: Now, Henry, you told me you were going to have to go to New York anyway.

K: I'm not involved in the dinner am I?

F: Not at the moment.

K: Good. Don't push it.

F: Okay. Henry, Maury suggested, and I do not promote this, that I join you today.

K: You're more than welcome.

F: I feel we have to move on this or we are going to be very embarrassed on the Hill.

K: I've explained that it them, which is all we can do. It certainly isn't a lact of communicating it to them.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Galbraith/Kissinger

9:10 am

5/26/70

K: I wanted to talk to you about the meeting between Suharto and the President. His plan was to do it like in Djakarta. The President's man interpreting from USIA and Suharto's interpreter. He doesn't want the Indonesian Ambassador there. He wanted me to get your impression.

G: That's perfectly all right. That's right. If I were present the other man would have to be and there are one or two subjects he would probably want to discuss without the other man.

K: He wanted you to know he has been very much impressed with x what you've done.

G: I appreciate that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

9:40 am

5/26/70

L: I think that we ought to get together and discuss my gas problems. The governors of Oregon and Washington called last night. They are mad.

K: Because ______ took the credit? They are right.

L: They are calling me an S. O. B. for not letting them know. We don't get a thing for it. Based on Friday's conversations I sent out word to Abrams for a plan after June 30. There's so much talk about what's happening after June 30. Yesterday at State they said we might go back in July 2.

K: Who gave it?

L: Bartch. They don't know enough about it. Then they get it screwed up because they play Zeigler against State. I told Abe that in his plan we should make the primary emphasis the interdiction of supplies.

K: That's correct.

L: I think Al has other instructions with his conversations with Abe. He thinks the President wants Abe to fly support for Cambodian forces. I don't think that's so and he isn't up to speed. He has Abe confused.

K: He wants to fly them in the name of interdiction but if it can help Cambodian forces, we should do that.

L: It will but you don't have that kind of targetting. But in the plan -- you can't keep that undercover. That's out if you use close air support.

K: Is that what Al thinks?

L: Yeah. We can help The Cambodians get their planes in shape but the NVN are very a very small force now. We think they will use it at a maximum 10,000 troops. We can use SVN sorties. They have done well with their MIG's. If we get into close-in air support we have trouble covering keeping the cover.

K: That's essential. No question.

L: I'm going to tell Abe we have to keep that cover -- American presence in SVN and materiel that will hurt American forces. The President has made it clear publicly.

K: We can straighten that out with Abe. Your understanding is correct.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Joseph Alsop

May 26, 1970

2:25 p.m.

<u>Alsop:</u> How are you. How is everything going?

<u>HAK:</u> Very well.

<u>Alsop:</u> Except at home and in the stock market. I thought I might go back to ??? writing about ??? toward the end of the week. The Cambodian thing looks more and more hopeful and I want to write more about it. I would like to talk to you -- how about breakfast Friday morning. I'm going out of town Friday afternoon.

<u>HAK:</u> I can't make it for breakfast but let's do it sometime Friday morning.

<u>Alsop:</u> Has there been any vote in the Senate today?

<u>HAK:</u> I don't know but that is not the final one anyway. That is just an amendment to an amendment.

<u>Alsop:</u> When will the final vote occur?

<u>HAK:</u> Next week or two weeks. It won't happen this week.

<u>Alsop:</u> The other thing is I did leave a message for you asking you to dine with ??? on the 17th.

<u>HAK:</u> Yes, I got the message but I am not yet sure if I will be in the city. I was playing with the idea of going to Mexico City. But can I keep it open.

<u>Alsop:</u> Yes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

5/26/70 4:00 p.m.

S: You were spotted this noon with a beautiful blonde.

K: Redhead is what I thought.

S: Maybe two, huh?

K: You shouldn't do a cover story on me every 6 months. Say that was a pretty catty thing you had on the equipment. You won't get any rice now.

S: I've got enough trouble. Don't blame it on me. It came from there. Is it inaccurate?

K: In a word, yes.

S: Totally wrong?

K: You do it by category. We got about 92 percent of their rice supply, which will probably take two to three months for them to build back up. In ammunition, we have 60 percent; in weapons much less. But that's because they carry their weapons on them. It's a stupid comment to say that they have their weapons with them in the Delta--of course they do. The question is how long does it take to replace them.

S: I am going to point that out in a gentlemanly way.

K: You always do things in that way. What was that about lunch? Were you following me?

S: No, someone came back and said I just saw Henry Kissinger with a beautiful blonde at Le Provencal.

K: That's why I went to Le Provencal . . . Oh well.

S: This is just to look at the White House complex, how it works
There will be four on the cover: Mel, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and you.

K: I was just joking. I didn't know you were going to do that.

S: Well we are. What it is is the men around Nixon. I wanted to get some idea on the NSC structure, which I guess I've never talked with you about.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Hugh Sidey

5/26/70 4:00 p.m. page 2

K: You want to come in?

S: If it's possible. I know how busy you are and we've got this
deadline.

K: Are you trying to tell me you are coming in today?

S: Don't make me feel worse than I do.

K: Let's aim for 6:00 today or 10:00 tomorrow morning. Can I call you back?

S: Yes.

K: Let's me give you a call within an hour.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mankowitz/Kissinger

7:05 pm 5/26/70

M: From all I read in the paper you are understaffed.

K: It has improved 18.33%. Last year 6 left and this year only 5.

M: It's up 1/6.

K: I guess it's 16.6%. But still measurable.

M: but quantifiable. Are you free for a quiet lunch, dinner, or breakfast?

K: Are you trying to compromise me. All the journalists I like have integrity. It may have to slip to next week. Breakfast. How about Wed.?

M: June 4.

K: The 3rd. We can meet x in my office. Or I may have to choose the Metropolitan Club. That may be better.

M: At the Metropolitan Club. Will they let me in?

K: Say I sent you.

M: Are you the member? I'm not.

K: I am ex officio. They let me in before Cambodia. Be careful or I won't give you any rice. I'm going to give all my friends rice pudding.

M: Maybe Uncle Ben's would store it for you.

K: I don't know who they are.

M: America's largest rice company. Or you could start your own -- COSVN rice.

K: 10,000,000 pounds of rice and I can't impress my friends.

M: I want to talk about after Cambodia. Either for the record, off the record, near the record, under the record or however you will have it.

K: Off the record would be better.

M: OK. 8:00 on Wed at the Metropolitan Club.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
7:20 pm 5/26/70

Z: Severeid just outlined your NSC meeting.

K: Laird did that.

Z: It ways from highest authority.

K: It scoops the President.

Z: The NYT called me for aixx clarification. I said everything is on time and proceeding well. Are you still with Col. Kennedy?

K: No, but I have to get to something.

Z: I have to get some guidance. Are you going to that dinner tonight?

K: Yes.

Z: Maybe I will see you there and we can cover a couple of things.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Haldeman

5/26/70 7:30 p.m.

(IO--didn't get beginning of conversation)

K: I thought he was doing an article on Bob Haldeman.

H: He is, but we have a rule not to see anybody from Time, Post or New York Times.

K: I thought this was an exception.

H: We don't have exceptions. Ehrlichman and I aren't going to see him. You can explain that one to the boss.

[K hung up.]

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Secy. Richardson/Kissinger

9:40 am

5/27/70

K: I have an instruction from the President which he wants in writing but which I don't think I should on which he wants no further discussion and speculation when combat ? ? ? ? will stop and withdrawal of troops. Everything.

R: The thing in the Post this morning?

K: I didn't want to put it in writing for the reaction you have just had.

R: Withdrawal schedules and combat role. Right?

K: Can you do it without looking like a slap in the face?

R: I guess so.

K: He doesn't see how we gain by making that announcement now. He should make it when it's made. If Hanoi is in trouble, why give them an opening now? And if they are not, they will only be more determined.

R: I think he thought it was said before.

K: It had been by Ladr d.

R: I will give a little thought to the communication process.

K: And make it sure within the Dept. He told me yesterday and I have tried to put it in writing but I think it's best this way.

R: I have to go to the Hill to testify on seabeds.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

9:45 am

5/27/70

K: You had yesterday a number of things. I have one thing from the President. He doesn't want any more discussions of when the American combat role will end. He will announce it later on, if at all.

L: We have not gotten into much of that. Bill testified on the Hill that it would be over the 30th of June next year. I have tried to hedge that because there are a lot of people who think we will not have combat or casualties. Even at that level you will have. They will be moving around and not just sitting at a base camp. I back off on a firm position on that. On Mon. I was asked on the Hill on that. It's a firm statement that it will be the 30th of June.

K: Right but we will stop that. That's all.

L: There's a story in the NYT that was written today by Beecher which goes back to the speech in announcing the Cambodian operation. It might increase withdrawals.

K: He doesn't want that discussed.

L: I think the President should make that statement. We have a continuing dialogue with Abrams -- I don't know where that came from.

K: I was asked today if you had asked for an excalation of the withdrawals. I said no. I don't see what we gain now by a faster withdrawal schedule. I would do that later this summer.

L: I wouldn't do it anyway. Just announce the next 6 months but not a new end strength. If we can beat what we have, great, but we shouldn't put it out. There's a story of so many home by Christmas. I could do that. But we shouldn't discuss the end figure now.

K: Exactly my thinking.

L: The 284 wouldn't get into that. If the President wants to give his report say several thousand in August and Sept. but no more. We have to bring some home on budget problems.

K: This morning someone said Mel Laird is always working at 8 levels simultaneously. I said I have discovered 10.

L: I had lunch with 8 people yesterday and each has a different story. Eric Severeid, __________, __________. I said if there was more to be done after the work was done but not beyond the 30th. They

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer

May 27, 1970

12:30 p.m.

Moorer: I just finished a two-hour talk with our friend.

HAK: They also came to see me.

Moorer: They were anxious to help.

HAK: It is an unbelievable situation. They told our Ambassador three
weeks ago that they wanted to do something and I have never heard about it
or seen anything. They said they want to equip 10 battalions. I have never
seen anything to that effect. Have you?

Moorer: No. Zumwalt said he was working on this. They are very anxious to get in the act.

HAK: Will you staff this and give us some idea of how much it will cost and how much it will take. Of course, we will replace it.

Moorer: Yes, I will.

HAK: We are going to start moving on this now.

Moorer: Can I call you on the secure phone? I have something else to discuss.

HAK: Yes, Of course.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Laird/Kissinger

12:32 pm 5/27/70

L: Happy Birthday. I was going to mention that this morning.

K: Aren't you nice.

L: By the time we got through we had gone on to something else.

K: I appreciate this.

L: I told them it wasn't important. That's what I called back about.

K: Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Wm. Buckley

12:35 pm 5/27/70

B: Dacxx Thank you for your nice letter.

K: I'm learning the meaning of ______ watching my academic friends.

B: It was funny in London on your getting tecture from you academic colleagues. As you know, my brother is running for Senator here and is going to the Far East. I know that people running for office have routine briefings. A word from you to the State Dept. would make all the difference on the kind of briefing he would get.

K: That's true, but I don't know in which direction. I can get him a briefing from my staff.

B: That would be wonderful.

K: Does he want State too?

B: He is going to the Far East and I think -- ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: What's his first name?

B: James L. He is an old friend of Macomber. That maybe a help.

K: I will do my best.

B: Is there someone I should call?

K: No. I will take care of it.

B: The briefing from your staff next week? Who shall I call on that?

K: David Young.

B: How's your morale?

K: Great.

B: Are we going to bring it off?

K: If our domestic opponents will let us. Militarjy it's greater than we thought I don 't know why the conservatives don't come out.

B: You have pretty good support from critical columnists. You will have back-
lash but not until it's over and I guess x we can't consumate Cambodia in the
next couple of weeks.

K: Thxxx That's right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Adm. Moorer/Kissinger
12:45 pm 5/27/70

(This was on the secure phone. The stenographer could only hear Adm. Moorer and came in on the conversation about mid-way.)

M: As far as they need. If the President in his final/Moorer/Kissinger with Suharto understands that the arrangements are being made on the missile and he (Suharto?) appreciates this (so it doesn't have to be worried about.) They don't want this to be a part of the bargaining or military aid. They want it as part of cooperation with the U.S. We have made arrangements and the President needn't be bothered. He understands. Andhe is pleased.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger
4:50 pm 5/28/70

S: Before you go off, I'm quickly becoming the villain.

K: I think these guys at DOD are smoking pot.

S: I will develop the full scenario based on strategy 2.

K: It will have to have strategy 1 elements. We are working on producing a M.E. war.

S: We are anice indecisive country.

K: ?? ?? ?? ?? ??

S: Let me crank in part of 1 xxx and 2 in a section called "How to be Nasty to the Soviet Union."

K: Hold that prospect out anyway.

S: Have a good time.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Len Garment

5/29/70 2:05 p.m.

[Had to answer another line--didn't get very beginning.]

G: Which part of it?

K: The first part.

G: I took the change of events last night to indicate
that that was the case.

K: I raised it the next morning.

G: Thank you. That was most useful.

K: It's now recognized that it would have been a disaster
to have had two conflicting speeches.

G: The two would have been run side by side on TV and
it would have been terrible.

K: I'm doing my best on the subject of our discussion.
The disposition is for it at the point of impact.

G: It would be received in a favorable way, by those
communities and constituencies who affect the governing process.
In terms of all political and psychological considerations it
would be a very useful and human thing to do.

Telecon

Billy Graham

5/29/70 2:25 p.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: I'm sorry I didn't get to see you.

G: I missed having a chance to talk to you.

K: I wanted to tell you what a great experience it was and how moving I found it.

G: It was very interesting for us to have you there.

K: I found the end particularly moving when they came forward.

G: Thank you very much. You'll be interested to know that in Germany we tied up ______ cities with closed circuit television and every hall in which it was shown was packed every night. We had an audience of about 175,000 people every night.

K: That's very interesting. It shows the spiritual hunger is one of the deepest phenomena of our times.

G: And it's so reassuring that it turns in the right direction.

K: Yes, that it doesn't take the nihilistic turn those demonstrators show.

G: That's why it's so important to reach young people.

K: You do a very great service, and one that is greatly needed.

G: Well, thank you for calling.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Jerry Warren

5/30/70 ca. 12:00

W: The participants are coming in this afternoon and evening and there's already speculation about a dramatic announcement to be made by the President in June.

K: Jesus Christ, you people drive me crazy.

W: I'm sorry. I just talked to Haldeman about it. If the speculation could be guided our way it would be helpful. All we've said is just that the President will meet with these people.

K: What does the President think?

W: I haven't talked with him. These people know how to handle themselves.

K: But how do people know they are arriving?

W: It goes out from the military bases when they come in.

K: I want to dampen speculation on a dramatic announcement. There will be none, and it is killing us to have all this business.

W: There's a thing today in the Washington Daily News saying the President has told Congressional leaders there will be a dramatic announcement, that 150,000 will be out by the end of this year.

K: Baloney.

W: Right.

K: Why doesn't Ron stop these things? He thinks there's going to be one and doesn't want to be caught short.

W: I will say this was planned before the President came here.

K: Say it's a briefing on Cambodian operations and the future course of the war. There will be no dramatic announcement. It's a briefing the President wants as he makes preparations for the next phase.

W: Okay. About withdrawal from Cambodia. We're firm on being out by June 30.

K: I don't want to hear that question again. We are not pulling a fast one on you. There is nothing new. By

By NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon
Jerry Warren

5/30/70 ca. 12:00

page 2

June 30 American forces will be out. There will be no new announcement.

W: There will be questions on a speed-up of withdrawals.

K: Just turn these all away. Say the President's decision stands.

W: Okay. Why isn't Rogers represented?

K: This is only a military meeting and he's in NATO. He's been fully briefed on this meeting and it's still a military briefing. There are no new decisions to be made. No new decisions will be made.

W: The two military gentlemen from Washington and the man from Defense and the man from the rice paddies--is that all?

K: No, the one from Hawaii will be here too. And Wheeler and Moorer. But underline that it's still a military briefing--no decisions will be made. There will be no dramatic announcement. For your information, we are going to announce tomorrow that the President will make a statement on Wednesday.

W: Do you know the time yet for the meeting tomorrow?

K: 2:00 in the President's office.

W: Shall I wait until tomorrow to announce the time?

K: Why not announce it?

W: Okay, I'll do it.

K: What we don't want is endless speculation before the President speaks.

W: We'll say he had a full military briefing--he was very encouraged and he will address the nation. They're going to say why the first part of June when he had said it would be toward the end?

K: Because he wants to give a report on what he heard from Abrams.

W: Okay. I'll report to you about how it goes.

K: Yes, do that.

Telecon
Jerry Warren

5/30/70 1:25 p.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

[Warren began conversation by reading excerpts from the transcript of the briefing.]

W: What I said was the meeting was not called to make a dramatic decision, but called for a military briefing.

K: That's good. That explains why Rogers is not there. Of course we could say "Is he ever there when we make big decisions?"

W: There's a rumor going around that you had a meeting with a businessman the President had met with. Is that true?

K: I met one of them.

W: You were quoted as saying the success of the Cambodian operation could lead to our withdrawal from South Vietnam in six to eight weeks.

K: Absolute total nonsense and baloney. Eight to ten weeks is more like it.

W: Eight to ten weeks?

K: You don't appreciate my sense of humor. It was a very informal meeting and I would never say anything like that. I'm getting the President not to say anything about a new deadline next year.

W: You don't know what would have given that impression?

K: No, I may have said either Cambodian operations or results of them will be clear in 6 to 8 weeks.

By _________ NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Governor Reagan
Mr. Kissinger
4:30 pm - 5-30-70

K: How are you Governor?

R: Fine, how are you.

K: I just wanted to check in with you to tell you how much we appreciated all the support you have been giving us and to tell you the operations in Cambodia are going well.

R: Like you, I am praying for rain. I have been excited to read about the possibility that we have captured their headquarters.

K: We have a lot of their communication facilities. There have been many periods in the last three weeks when their headquarters has been off the air completely for several days at a time. No doubt we have disrupted their communication. The figures are large. Well over 40,000 mortar rounds. Altogether, mortars and rockets, we have 70,000. We think we have up to 70% of their ammunition supply. 75% of their rice supply. On military grounds, everything has been an enormous success. In South Vietnam, the scale of operation has been falling. Have you seen in the paper today - that one of the Presidents at Berkeley wrote a letter to Thailand Government asking them to get the murderous Americans out of there?

R: Yes, and I was very happy to see the Thai answer. The faculty has just brainwashed our kids. They have been given a view but I believe some of them are now beginning to find out that there is another side. How did we ever let this happen without waking up to it?

K: Well, that is a long story. I have been seeing a lot of students the last few weeks. When I see students alone, I am doing well but when I see faculty, it turns into a nightmare. We had quite a reception in Tennessee- They were showing Viet Cong flags to the President and calling him dirty names and yet the audience of about 75,000 just shouted them down.

R: I know we are right and we are on the right side, and as far as the people are concerned also.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

K: We are going to see if there are any funds we can cut off from the department of that professor that wrote the letter to Thailand.

R: But from the standpoint of my being Governor, if I question this the whole faculty rises up. I think one of the answers is to get rid of tenure.

K: Yes.

R: Let me ask you something. Our briefing at the White House - was that taped? I had one sentence to say to the President at the end when he took off for about 15 minutes and capsuled the whole international situation starting with Russia. My statement to him was, "film it." I think it would do a great deal for us, particularly for those to whom it has been a mystery.

K: It was quite a speech. I remember it very well.

R: It was a great finish. I have tried to relay it to groups out here. Everyone else's reaction is the same. Why doesn't he go on television and say the same thing to us?

K: We are having a meeting tomorrow here, just for your information, to review the military situation. At some point, the President will undoubtedly report to the American people. I will have to see if they did a tape on it.

R: When I teed off myself -

K: You were terrific.

R: I was upset when those governors indicated all the President has to do is go out to campuses and make friends. I came back here and got the Chancellor of the State College System and ______ on a conference call and told them I wanted them to close the schools Friday, Saturday and Sunday and went on state-wide television and urged the students to go home and give it some thought and come back and see if we could find answers together. I did this because on that Wednesday all our information was that there was going to be a snowball. These kids are suddenly expressing

By NARA, Dato 5/26

a desire to hear other viewpoints. They are more
and more against continued violence. I have been
having meetings with small groups of students. I
believe it is the start of a new era. I think in
the fall, they will do their best to blow the elections
up. But I think we have passed a milestone.

K: I think so. I met with a group of students the other
day and their temperature has gone way down.

R: I told a bunch of kids from Stanford the other day
that I had a professor for four years but looking
back now, I am totally unable to tell you what
political party he belonged to. They were thunderstruck.

K: That is absolutely right. Well, it is quite a period
we are living through. When you come to Washington, give
me a call. I have always enjoyed talking with you.
I will get you a briefing.

R: On the Middle East situation. Is this true that
the Russians now have personnel at SAM sites.

K: That is right.

R: If we are trying to play a chess game with the
Russians, are we not in a better position if we
sell Israel those jets and let the Russians know we
will match them move by move?

K: Well, some people think we should but there is a
lot of opposition in the State Department.

R: I have never been able to figure out what side they
are on.

K: I think we are going to move on that just for your
information. One thing about this President, he
moves slowly but when he moved he moves. We are
going to do something in the Middle East. This is
for your information.

R: Yes, I know.

K: We would not suffer any pains if you expressed your
opinion on the situation.

R: Of course, I have another one on the aircraft contracts.
I have talked to the President about them.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

K: Actually that is out of my area. I am sure the
President is very much aware of that.

R: Could you in conversation with the President, if you
had a moment, if one or both of those contracts are
announced, it would be most helpful if George
Murphy announced it. I think he could get the most
out of it.

K: Good, I will talk to him. Nice to talk to you
Governor. I will try to keep you informed.

R: Tell him the tough side is the best side.

K: I will tell him that. We could stand a few more like
you around.

R: Well, I do what I can to help.

K: Thank you Governor.

mlh

R:

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Admiral Moorer

5/31/70 9:45 a.m.

K: I read the memo from the Secretary about the budget and also I've got some of his ideas on what to do about Vietnam. I don't want to tell you what position to take, but I would like to plead with the uniformed people to give their professional judgments, and not what they think the traffic will bear. Let us decide what the traffic will bear.

M: I understand.

K: If you can't go along with anything, say that. But we want to have your honest professional judgment.

M: I understand.

K: I want you to know that it's a pleasure to know that you're going to be in the position you're going to be in the next couple of years.