Telcon
Mr. Kissinger
Jack Anderson
6/5/73; 9:08 a.m.

(Missed the first part of the sentence.)

A: but they did get it in time.

K: I didn't see that this thing was printed. Was it printed?

A: It was printed but as I told you it was buried and your name was just in a list of . . .

K: Well at any rate this was a meeting of the entire White House staff that took place every morning -- about twenty people.

A: Right. I put that out.

K: And I wasn't there more than once every three weeks and I am certain Watergate was never mentioned.

A: That's essentially the information that I put out and it did go to our papers.

K: Okay. Well, no, I appreciate it.

A: The POST didn't use it but no one picked it up so I don't think there is any great problem.

K: No, I appreciate it.

A: No great problem on that but it did go out. But something more serious has reached us and I wanted to catch you before you left for Paris on this because I understand there is going to be Grand Jury testimony on this on Friday. One of our sources in the prosecutors office say one of the key witnesses -- I know who XX it is but I have been asked by my own source not to mention it because he has only talked apparently to a couple of people at this point and if I mention that name and it gets back . . .

K: No, no, that's all right.

A: And it get back it will reveal the source. But this is one of the key figures in this Watergate -- one of the names that has been in the headlines. He has told prosecutors and they are going to take his testimony on Friday that -- and they are going to ask him about your role. And what he has told them -- not yet under oath -- is that after Ellsberg -- after the Pentagon Papers appeared that you had become almost hysterical and had gone to the President and had said that this could destroy our foreign policy and that it was you who had gotten the President all fired up about this and that it was as a result of your entreaties to the President and your expressions of grave alarm that the President when to Ehrlichman and asked him to take charge

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ED 12958
Date 6/2/73

P.O. Box 614

Telcon
Mr. Kissinger
Jack Anderso
6/5/73; 9:08 a.m.

-2-

of the plumbers and even thereafter both you and Mardian sought to take
control of the plumbers -- you through Young and Mardian through others
and that Ehrlichman was put in charge nevertheless.

K: Well let's separate the two & things.

A: Please.

K: Uh, first, very shortly after the Pentagon Papers were published I left
on my secret trip for China and I was of course concerned that the publication
of the Pentagon Papers -- this massive leaking -- could have disastrous
consequences on the conduct of our foreign policy. This is correct. I
said so publicly. Secondly, I never knew about the existence of the plumbers.
I never to my knowledge talked to Mardian about this so I -- about this
leakage problem -- in fact I didn't know what Mardian was doing. Thirdly,
Young had absolutely -- I didn't know, I repeat, that the plumbers existed --
Young joined Ehrlichman's staff while I was on my secret trip to China.
I didn't send him there. He made this arrangement with Ehrlichman himself.
The only thing that I knew that Young was doing was a classification study
on which I occasionally received memoranda signed by Latimer who is on
my staff and Young and Krogh -- that had to do with the declassification of
Government documents. I knew nothing of any of the other activities. I
have searched my logs, I never talked to Young on the telephone. I never
had an appointment with him. I had nothing nor did General Haig. Young
was an Ehrlichman staff member who happened to be paid out of our funds
and I had nothing whatsoever directly or indirectly to do with his operations.

A: Good. This business about your expressing your great alarm to the
President -- XX hysterically, it said. I can't imagine your . . .

K: You know when you put a word hysterically -- I would doubt -- I doubt
that anyone has seen me hysterical.

A: I was going to say -- it doesn't sound like . . .

K: I was concerned about the Pentagon Papers but that did not mean that . . .
Since I didn't know about the plumbers, you know, everything else is just
hypothetical. You know, of course, I was concerned as the National Security
Advisor about the XXXXX massive leakage of classified documents. And
of course as I was going off to China I was concerned about the impact of this
on something that people at that time did not know about.

DCC1SSTED

Autbority E012958

PAPD NAFADg 6/20

-3-

A: Had Ellsberg once worked for you years ago.

K: Yes, Ellsberg was a student of mine and in the very early stage of the Administration he participated in a review of Vietnam policy with me.

A: Did that have anything to do with your concern?

K: No.

A: Did you feel that he might be giving out things?

K: No. He didn't have any access to any inside information. This was an analytical study. I had no vendetta against Ellsberg.

A: I didn't mean it that way. I meant that this would explain why you should be more...

K: I wasn't hysterical. That's a sort of a judgment and it is totally wrong. It is a malicious lie to say that I tried to take control of the plumbers through Young when I didn't know a bloody thing about the plumbers.

A: Uh-huh. Would you have any reason to believe that the President's own alarm about the Pentagon Papers stemmed from his conversations with you or did you have a feeling that he was alarmed pretty much on his own?

K: I think he was alarmed on his own and I agreed with him.

A: Yeah.

K: We have two separate problems. This is not for a quotation, is it?

A: Only those parts that you wish.

K: Well, I would just as soon not have them quoted.

A: Okay.

K: See you have two problems. You have the problem, was there a serious situation. About that there is no question. But does that justify extra-curricular measures. That's a separate question. Or extra legal methods.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Ref: 6/2/09
Title PAP

-4-

A: And I presume that you don't feel that it does -- again that's not for quotation.

K: Not for quotation I believe one should operate within the legal framework.

A: Uh-huh! Henry, this is going to -- once there is testimony on this I think it is going to come out. I have no desire to use it to embarrass you but if it is going to come out, which it very likely will, I wonder if I might just try to put it in proper perspective and get it out.

K: Well, what would you say?

A: Well, the fellow who is talking is one of the people who is close to the President, is confering still in spite of his being out of the White House. . .

K: I guess I know whom you are talking about.

A: I don't mean to suggest that the President put him up to this but clearly he is -- there is a little ______ there that has decided to put this story out. For what purposes I haven't any idea. You may have a better inkling of that than me.

K: I have no idea.

A: I can't imagine him telling the prosecutors this story without having thought it out and discussed it previously over at the White House with somebody -- not necessarily that with the President but with perhaps one another. And for that reason I think that it will come out.

K: Well, that's fine with me. It is untrue.

A: If I go ahead and use something -- now the things that you have told me, you want not to be quoted at all. I can say friends of Jack Kissinger have told me these things. Or is there any portion of . . .

K: Well, if you read back to me what you would quote, I may let you quote it.

A: Well, that at the time you were -- at the time the plumbers were organized, you were on a secret trip to China; that you had indeed expressed alarm that the leak of the Pentagon Papers could have disastrous consequences; that certainly I have hadn't been hysterical about it -- you've been concerned about it; that you had never had any idea of even the existence of the plumbers; that Young joined Ehrlichman's staff while you were on your trip; that he made all the arrangements himself and that the only thing that you ever saw out of

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12958

P. #11 KARA DRE 6/2/04

6/5/73; 9:08 a.m.

that office had to do with the new classification system and that you had
searched your logs and that you had never made any appointments or never
talked to Young while he was a member of the plumbers.

K: That is correct. I just don't want to have it as a direct quotation. You
can say Kissinger is understood to hold this view.

A: Okay. I can say you are in Paris where I presume you are going to
be for a little while.

K: Right.

A: And that this is what your friends say.

K: Right.

A: Okay. I am inclined to do it then and just to put this thing in to perspective
before it gets out of hand. I think it would in your interest, may I say that --
that would be my judgment.

K: I am rather fatalistic about the situation. We live in a town now where
anybody can say anything.

A: It sure is true.

K: And you are almost defenseless.

A: It is depressing.

K: I mean how can you prove that you didn't know something. It is almost
impossible.

A: Yeah, it is depressing and your name has an awful lot of journalistic sex
appeal so when anything like this comes out you know there is going to be
a great temptation on the part of the press to flag it.

K: Yeah.

A: You can be sure that I will handle it . . .

K: I appreciate the decency with which you are proceeding.

A: Fine. Have a good trip.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joseph Alsop
6/5/73; 9:42 a.m.

A: Henry.

K: Joe, I am on the way out.

A: On the way out for how long?

K: About four days.

A: Oh, God. I longed to see you before you go.

K: Joe, I've got two minutes.

A: Oh. How do things look to you?

K: In which respect.

A: On the foreign scene.

K: Well, I'll know when I get there how we are doing with the Vietnamese.

A: Where are you going now?

K: To Paris.

A: Oh, are you?

K: Yes. I am having dinner with Susan-Mary tomorrow night in case you don't know.

A: I didn't know that. I didn't know anything about it. Well, have a good time in Paris and all kinds of...

K: And I'll call you when I get back.

A: Okay. But be sure to call me. It has been so long since we've seen one another.

K: Well, maybe we can see each other over the weekend.

A: I'll be right here. And did you get the books.

K: Oh, yes. Thank you so much. The books -- they are unobtainable, Nancy tells me anywhere now.

A: They don't exist and so it is rather an uncommon present.

DECEASSED

Authority E012958
Date 6/2/73

P.O. Box 627

NAPLES

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 am, June 5, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello Henry, how are you.

K: I am fine.

D: You are just preparing to--how many time you crossed the Atlantic.

K: I hate to think of it.

D: But you deserve a medal, they have a medal for millions of miles who crossing the Atlantic.

K: I'm sure that's true. Anatol, I have to run. Let me raise a number of issues. I have been working last night and this morning on the communique with Somenfeldt and Hyland. And we will send you a new version later today which will incorporate many of the points you and I discussed yesterday.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Now, on the principles of coexistence, we will agree to list them, but we want them listed in the phraseology of the security conference which you also agreed to, and refer back to the security conference that way. They are almost the same.

D: It's not too much longer than

K: The only one we will add is the reference to human freedoms which you have agreed to, but not spelling them out.

D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, I will look into this.

K: And we will just put them in that language. I think there are six of them now.

D: I will look at them altogether because I have

K: Well, we have the text now and there are six or seven of them.

D: I will look at them.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012057
Date: 6-26-73
By: W.M. Paas

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MW

K: And in substance, they are the same as the others, but they have slightly different words.

D: Yeah, I think while you are away Voronsov could look with him to just maybe draft something.

K: And put back some of the rhetoric you like.

D: Okay.

K: And the points we disagree on we can try to settle next week.

D: Okay.

K: Okay, now, on the economic discussion. I have talked to Sonnenfeldt and if he absolutely has not blocked one single economic negotiation he tells me.

D: Well, what happen now for instance. You know we have this Canadian business. In the initial agreement it was just what kind of information we have to give of a guarantee of the government. It's enough. Now they are demanding, the reference to--you have to yield gold reservem maybe even before, you never ask, you never mention before, but now they say no beginning from this one

K: I just cannot believe it. I will check with them again about

D: What you use as this now. I have Alkimov here. He now asking to go--is this good thing to do or not.

K: Yeah, let him go to Shultz.

D: To discuss this matter, or the Sonnenfeldt, what do you

K: Sonnenfeldt is not blocking it, there's no sense talking to Sonnenfeldt about it. If Alkimov wants to see Sonnenfeldt, he'd be delighted. Why don't you send Alkimov to Sonnenfeldt and I will instruct Sonnenfeldt to go to the limit of what we can do.

D: Okay.

K: The only requirements we will inforce are the requirements that our law imposes on us. We will not impose any administrative

D: Yes, I understand. It is nothing really in this particular law about this one.

dont

K: Well, why/you have Alkimov see Sonnenfeldt.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EAI 2058
By: M.N. Patsy Date: 06/30/58

D: Okay, but you mention to Sonnenfeldt to

K: I will tell

D: You instruct him really.

K: I will tell Sonnenfeldt that anything that is within administrative discussion we should do.

D: Okay. Alhimov will then go to Shultz.

K: That's right. Now on agriculture, the situation is that I've now looked into it. Our negotiators told me he exceeded his instructions. Now what we want is simply some idea in order to help us since our domestic situation depends on acreage allotment and so forth. Depends to some extent on knowing how much you might have to buy. If you make a counter-proposal, we will break our back to accept it.

D: What counter-proposal?

K: Well, something off this sort of joint commission to exchange some types of information.

R: But what really, you really ask him. In three months to meet and discuss our quotes. You already said this, made it very clear, and --this is what you accepted and

K: That I understand.

D: So what kind of excuse we have.

K: Well, it's clear that you want agree to having our commission travel around the Soviet Union inspecting your crops. Couldn't one work out something in which you give us some information that--you see, I don't know the subject, this is my difficulty, in a way that is not inconsistent with your own position, say every six months.

K: This is really out. I don't--it is up to you to sell or not to sell. If you don't want to sell, you tell us. You are prepared to sell almost at cost. Because what you asking. You see result really a knowledge whether we are going to buy or not but we are obliged to give you information. This is rather--you never asked from Japan, you never ask from Europe. We are the only country we ask us to give you information. It's up to you to say no, we are not going to sell you until on this particular date, this I understand.

K: Okay, well Look, I will have my people look into it again this week. and we can still settle it next week if necessary.

4

D: Okay.

K: I would like to be here. It's too difficult for me to do it long distance.

D: I understand.

K: I understand your position.

D: Yeah. What I have to do is about--he will call me or not. Have to go to him or not.

K: Why don't you have a talk with Butz. Just don't make a confrontation.

D: No, no, no I understand. Okay.

K: Now, the final thing is the SALT principle. Here I'll tell you we have a massive mass problem with Jackson and others. It you go through the principles the way they stand now, they just don't mean a God damned thing. Unless--the only one that means something is the first one and with the fourth one as it stands now; I've had a long talk with the President about this last night. He will just get into massive difficulty with allies screaming, and therefore we feel that we must have some reference to these equitable limitations.

D: We've already discussed. So this is really--I could go with what you propose

K: I mean if I tell you to transmit it as a presidential point to the Secretary General, you have no choice.

D: I have of course-----

K: The point is that as he is going through this now, he feels that the first sentence of the fourth principle is really giving you something which we have never agreed to before.

D: What really

K: Working out complete measures, account will be taken of all arms which discussion is necessary in accordance with the principles...

D: You are in second paragraph.

K: I'm talking about the fourth principle.

D: Oh, the fourth, thought you were talking about the second.

K: No, no, the second is all right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: W.M. Parry Date: 04/04/58

D: The fourth--discussion is necessary.

K: Yes.

D: Nobody really knows, you have your own, we have our own discussion.
What is really you

K: Well, what the hell does it say then. Of course all accounts should
be taken, all arms, this discussion is necessary. I mean, what's
the point of the principle.

D: It's just in a general form.

K: I mean, you will say that this includes forward base systems, we will
say it does not include forward base systems. So if we put in equitable
limitations. I mean, what is equitable.

D: No, equitable is provision of those in a count of three.

K: You remember that sentence I gave you last week. Equitable
limitations on ICBMs

D: This is out completely. Of course I will send, if you insist on this,
because this is

K: What have got against equitable limitations.

D: Because this system you are just saying, definitely, in this case
you definitely want to see this position

K: Why.

D: Because in the first place you say nobody ______ knows exactly how
you decide--we of course would ______ welcome this limitation. But if you
put this one then there is a emphasize on the things which ______ would
like.

K: Yeah, but will you explain to me what exactly we are not doing in
these principles. What are we saying.

D: Well, ______ take export limitations on the central system.

K: I'm sure "systems" is your phrase, it isn't ours.

D: Oh, no, it's your phrase.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012054
By: J. W. H. D.

5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058

By: MW, PAB 5004

K: Yeah, but we didn't put it in that sentence.

D: I know, but I'm just making

K: Le Duc Tho said that you are suspicious.

D: No, I am just taking with your Mr. Johnson and how he make it in
a sort of a race. He said this is

K: __________ will use the first sentence to prove that

D: It will __________ because your man say--he'll say so. But in
second place you keep it very clear this is so. Really, what really
I would like to comply really is

K: Why don't you do the short version then.

D: Well, I know but they accept what you proposed really.

K: Well, why don't you tell them that we would prefer the short version
unless they are willing to put in this new sentence.

D: But this is rather, it amounts to your having just __________ and
nothing else. What you requested really.

K: Unless they can come in with another approach. We are going to
get as a result of something that really, it's quite meaningless.
Can you imagine a domestic uproar over it.

D: I don't know, but I really would like it just you make proposal, they
accept it. That is what you propose. Now you say no, it's no good,
you take it or leave with the short one. This is what amounts to
what you are telling

K: No, you can put in another sentence.

D: No, but this is __________, I no you are telling, you are putting
on, but they don't absolutely know. This is the answer so demands
of such wisdom, nothing else. You don't like the whole thing, but
this short one. I don't like-- you could take just what you propose
or

K: In this case I have to discuss it with the President further. And I'll
have to do it by cable. We'll be back to you in a couple of days.

D: In a couple of days. All right.

6

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: N.W. Baran
Date: 05/04/74

7

K: TOMMY, NY Tuesday.

D: You mean Tuesday you will send a telegram.

K: Well, I have to leave for one thing, Anatol. My plane is supposed to leave at 10:00. It's already 10:00.

D: In what way you will do it.

K: I will leave the memorandum for the President, and I will get you an answer either tomorrow or the day after.

D: All right. The General will call me?

K: Yes, the General will call you.

D: All right.

K: Look, the legal man is in Paris with me. I think we'll be able to accept this, but let me check with him.

D: When I receive it, because

K: Tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow. Because

K: I will give you an answer tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow, don't forget about it, as in _?english?_ , yes.

K: Probably, but let me check it first.

D: Okay. Check it because I am going to sell on ______ of Europe now, A

K: Okay, good.

D: And -- frequencies

K: Scowcroft will get in touch with you.

D: And the last one, it bothers Europeans ______ the beginning ______. About you remember second and third, but Gromyko propose the tenth. He really ask if possible you help there. What you recommend to propose

K: Tell him to propose the tense.

D: Who.

K: Gromyko.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: N.M.aga, Dac 00304

D: No, he is ______ but you announce the 2nd or 3rd, but he is still

K: Rogers prefers the 2nd and 3rd, Gromyko prefers the tenth. I think that--the foreign ministers should fight that one ajt.

D: I understand, so, now present it to him. I could call him and say

K: Yeah.

D: To Rogers.

K: You know, he may hold a press conference on that subject.

D: What topic______

K: Let me get Scowcroft take one more crack at Rogers. Otherwise you have to call him.

D: Okay, he will call me back.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Good.

D: I will wait your telegrams.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: Bye bye.

9:45 am, June 5, 1973

D: Hello.
K: Anatol.
D: Oh, hello Henry, how are you.
K: I am fine.
D: You are just preparing to--how many time you crossed the Atlantic.
K: I hate to think of it.
D: But you deserve a medal, they have a medal for millions of miles who crossing the Atlantic.
K: I'm sure that's true. Anatol, I have to run. Let me raise a number of issues. I have been working last night and this morning on the communique with Somanfeldt and Hyland. And we will send you a new version later today which will incorporate many of the points you and I discussed yesterday.
D: Okay, thank you very much.
K: Now, on the principles of coexistence, we will agree to list them, but we want them listed in the phraseology of the security conference which you also agreed to, and refer back to the security conference that way. They are almost the same.
D: It's not too much longer than
K: The only one we will add is the reference to human freedoms which you have agreed to, but not spelling them out.
D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, I will look into this.
K: And we will just put them in that language. I think there are six of them now.
D: I will look at them altogether because I have
K: Well, we have the text now and there are six or seven of them.
D: I will look at them.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12958

Dated: NASA Date: 6/29/73

D: Okay.

D: Okay.

D: Okay.

dont

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 1298
DATE: MAR 16 1989

K: I will tell

D: You instruct him really.

D: What counter-proposal?

E: But what really, you really ask him. In three months to meet and discuss our quotes. You already said this, made it very clear, and --this is what you accepted and

K: That I understand.

K: Well, it's clear that you want agree to having our commission travel around the Soviet Soviet Union inspecting your crops. Couldn't one work out something in which you give us some information that--you see, I don't know the subject, this is my difficulty, in a way that is not inconsistent with your own position, say every six months.

K: This is really out. I don't--it is up to you to sell or not to sell. If you don't want to sell, you tell us. You are prepared to sell almost at cost. Because what you asking. You see result really a knowledge whether we are going to buy or not but we are obliged to give you information. This is rather--you never asked from Japan, you never ask from Europe. We are the only country we ask us to give you information. It's up to you to say not are not going to sell you until on this particular date, this I/understand.

4

D: Okay.

D: I understand.

with Butz

D: Yeah. What I have to do is that--he will call me or not. Have to go to him or not.

D: I have of course--

D: What really

DELEGATED

Authority EO 12958

5

K: Yes.

D: No, equitable is provision of those in account of three.

K: Why.

D: Because in the first place you say nobody ______ knows exactly how
you decide--we of course would like to welcome this limitation. But if you
put this one then there is an emphasize on the things which ______ would
like.

D: Oh, no, it's your phrase.

DEC 1 ASIGNED
Authority E012958
DATED 12/6/79
N/A DUE 6/2/79
P:1

6

K: Le Duc The said that you are suspicious.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958

Dated: 6/2/04

7

K: TOMORROW Tuesday. Tuesday.

D: All right.

D: When I receive it, because

K: Tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow. Because

D: Tomorrow, don't forget about it, as in _?english?_, yes.

D: Okay. Check it because I am going to sell on ______ of Europe now, (

K: Okay, good.

D: And -- frequencies

D: And the last one, it bothers Europeans ______ the beginning ______? About
you remember second and third, but Gromyko propose the tenth. He
really ask if possible you help there. What you recommend to propose

D: Who.

K: Gromyko.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EO 12958
Dated: 6/2/04
PAP:

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:05 am, June 5, 1973

D: Yes.

K: Anotol. Two things. After we send the rewritten communique to you this afternoon, maybe Sonnenfeldt and Veronsov ought to get together again.

D: I think so. They will go through before I send it home with--because up to now I send anything, but maybe tomorrow when we look through they will send to him.

K: Good. Get Voronsov to call Sonnenfeldt.

D: Yeah. Why don't we call him when we get the text.

K: Right, you'll get the text late this afternoon.

D: Okay.

K: Now, one other possibility that has occurred to me which would like to the President is perhaps we drop paragraph 4 altogether out of the principles.

D: Really--

if

K: It doesn't say anything anyway because we accepted yours, we would have to interpret it diametrically opposite from you. That's the only way it makes any sense. We will say it does not include--we don't consider ______ is necessary for the discussion, you will say you consider it necessary for the discussion, so we've written an article that says we'll continue the discussion. For that we don't need an article.

D: Ooohhh, this is article--just a minute--Henry, Voronsov is here, he says what you yesterday, I'm thinking about the new one, you remember.

K: Yeah.

D: You just in this one, tense which is not quite correct. I mean in the sense, there is a--I mean use the word put in security council or the United Nations, but I need you to confirm of and visit so to speak and this in the text you put United Nations. You will tell them, all right.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E101265
By: W.W.APAR, D.S.O.

2

D: Otherwise, of course, you (end of tape)

(begin new tape)

K: Well, then we will-- it will be longer than the short version, and shorter than the original long version.

D: Really, nothing will do

K: No, but nothing will be left of that 4th principle anyway. Because the 4th principle is totally meaningless. It's either meaningless or dangerous.

systems

D: Well, council was taken of all things such as arms, if necessary

K: Anatol, in practice what does that mean. In practice it either means-- we'll continue arguing what's necessary. Nobody is disputing that we should discuss those systems who's discussion is necessary. Has anyone said that we should not discuss the systems which are necessary. The argument is which systems are necessary, You say it involves forward base systems, we say it doesn't include forward base systems. I mean, you say use central systems only.

D: Well, I know it wasn't there discussion was really here now already. There is some terms of recognition for your side, so this question whether you will face a ______ whenever you say it is necessary. So it is rather in a vague way already because you are going to discuss it one way or another. This is *position of your delegation* by the way. You use phrase about circumvent.

K: Anatol, I'm beginning to think you don't want peace in Vietnam.

D: (Laughter) I rather more think of the principles because they already reach, Brezhnev sign, and now say it's all right, so here now feeling of everything grand, but today I'm going to present you a major

K: But just a minute, remember once or twice Gromyko pulled back from something that Brezhnev had said. This is a case where the President pulls back from something that I have said.

D: Well it's rather-- well what you would like to

K: What I suggest is just to get Gromyko's

D: And now it's Gromyko and Brezhnev because, you go to far really. If you

K: If you are willing to drop article 4, we don't have to have a big hullabaloo here. If you do not want to drop article 4, then we have

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FA 12958
By: N.M.ala 5-70-0434

two possibilities. You can either put in the phrase "equitable limitations" after "mature reflections", and concluding that as usual I'm right. You can also put in something about the destruction of SS-9s which would ease matters.

D: Yeah, this is in article 4

K: You can drop article 4, or we can leave it open until next week and see whether we can come up with something that satisfies everybody's thirst for ambiguity. Standing by itself now, we will get a violent attack from Jackson. And get absolutely nothing for it. What we get for it is that you dropped an article whose existence we can't admit. We can't say you drop article 9 since no one will ever see an article 9.

D: Quote, unquote. What you said two days ago

K: I know but

D: Brezhnev said that if you go this one, we will go this. This is exactly--so two days pass, something changed, what changed, nothing really.

K: Brezhnev's mature reflection of the subject. Like the 15 percent aperture opening last year.

D: This is exactly what

K: Remember when Brezhnev agreed to something and then Gromyko pulled it back.

D: Well, I don't recall any of this.

K: Brezhnev said the holes could not be changed in any sense.

D: What would change.

K: Nothing could be done to the dimensions of the silo, and then Smyrnov and Gromyko insisted that it had to have a 15 percent latitude.

D: It's a different kind of

K: I agreed to that, now you put in new missiles in.

D: Yeah. It comprise some

K: So now they are blaming me for having permitted new missiles in your silo.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 125750
By: W.M. 5-74-50

3

4

D: What is

K: You have two possibilities. You can either suggest to them to drop article 4, altogether, and in return we will drop our demand for immediate dismantling of SS-9s. Or you can tell them that I'll let you know Thursday, or you can tell them to add that sentence.

D: What you want to tell me Thursday.

K: Thursday I will see-- there's probably no chance that we can accept article 4 just as it is.

D: As of now, I do not really want--if you use this position to ______ the final, then I will tell him, but in two days you may change again.

K: No, no, we won't change again. If you -- I promise you, if you drop article 4--

D: No, they don't want--they would like for them to phrase now to make a major decision about the whole document. What I don't want to them have another version in two days. I am quite prepared to send Brezhnev same. It is really up to you to decide whether you going to have document business, or not. I don't want to come back and then you say no, now it is this one. So if it's final decision of President, I'm quite prepare to send this to Europe. Rather ______ and nothing else really. But I am prepared to send it, and I hope it is small argument of you and President. You

K: All right, then wait until Thursday. On Thursday I will tell you what the choices are.

D: So for time being, I will send them nothing. Just saying that you still considering, and will give them an answer.

K: Exactly.

D: Thursday, all right.

K: All right.

D: And I don't want to make a mess any more. Make a final of it. I am prepared to make it final, and maybe they will not have--but with the knowledge that this is final position of the President.

K: Right.

D: So you will get it over then.

K: Right. D: Okay, thank you. K: Bye D: Bye

10:05 am, June 5, 1978

D: Yes.

D: Okay.

D: Really--

if

K: Yeah.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

2

(begin new tape)

D: Really, nothing will do

systems

K: Anatol, in practice what does that mean. In practice it either means-- we'll continue arguing what's necessary. Nobody is disputing that we should discuss those systems who's discussion is necessary. Has anyone said that we should not discuss the systems which are necessary. The argument is that systems are necessary, You say it involves forward base systems, we say it doesn't include forward base systems. I mean, you say use central systems only.

D: Well, I know it wasn't there discussion was really here now already. There is some terms of recognition for your side, so this question whether you will face a ______ whenever you say it is necessary. So it is rather in a vague way already because you are going to discuss it one way or another. This is position of your delegation by the way. You use phrase about circumvent.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012958
Dated: 6/2/04
PAP

3

D: Yeah, this is in article 4

K: I know but

D: This is exactly what

D: What would change.

D: It's a different kind of

D: Yeah. It comprise some

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
Dated 6/2/94
N/A

4

D: What is

D: As of now, I do not really want--if you use this position to the final, then I will tell him, but in two days you may change again.

D: No, they don't want--they would like for them to phrase now to make a major decision about the whole document. What I don't want to them have another version in two days. I am quite prepared to send Breshnov same. It is really up to you to decide whether you going to have document business, or not. I don't want to come back and then you say no, now it is this one. So if it's final decision of President, I'm quite prepare to send this to Europe. Rather prepared to send it, and I hope it is small argument of you and President. You

K: Exactly.

D: Thursday, all right.

K: All right.

D: And I don't want to make a mess any more. Make a fight of it. I am prepared to make it final, and maybe they will not have--but with the knowledge that this is final position of the President.

K: Right.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E012958

10:50 am, June 10, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you.

D: Welcome back. I watched you on TV yesterday.

K: I see, what did I say--I mentioned Brezhnev.

D: Yes, are you going back on Tuesday.

K: Well, it depends--if I do it will be just for one day. I leave Monday night and come back Tuesday night.

D: Because, really, Gromyko and Brezhnev have some corrections we have to discuss.

K: The only problem we have is with those maniacs in Saigon now.

D: Well, I understand.

K: Can I explain what the problem is to you.

D: Yes.

K: Have you got a good mind. So that I can explain it. When we started the US proposed that Hanoi and Washington sign a joint declaration, recommending certain things to the other parties, right.

D: Right.

K: Hanoi recommended that Hanoi and Washington sign with the concurrence of the other parties. And Saigon wanted all four parties to sign.

D: I understand.

K: We then accepted the four-party signing, whereupon Saigon accepted the two-party signing without the concurrence. So as a compromise we proposed the Hanoi signing with a two-party concurrence, whereupon Hanoi now wants what Saigon wants, Hanoi now rejects its position. So now we are in this position. Saigon wants out of this new position, Hanoi wants Saigon for this new position, and we want Hanoi's original position.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F012058
By: WW
Date: 06/30/73

2

D: It's a merry-go-round.

K: So, we are willing to sign anything.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: And there are a number of other issues which—even Gromyko would understand. Now look, let me raise a number of questions. First, on the SALT principles. I don't give a damn whether we say serious or urgent. So let's not make a federal case out of that.

D: Yeah.

K: So, if you haven't gone to Moscow yet, let's just say "serious".

D: I understand.

K: We would prefer to say '74, really only for the reason of the nuclear agreement.

D: When you went away, I received a telegram and it was from the man you know, and it was a rare case, but it was a—he was a little bit angry with all these things because it was another principle, another—you—he said, I accept revision to number 4 and I'm finished, don't bother me anymore with this.

K: Well, we can leave it until he gets here.

D: So— but this is the only question he was

K: Well we accept the word "serious", so let's leave to the two of them whether it should day '74 or '74-75.

D: On this one. All right. As for the others, there is nothing

K: No, everything else we agree to except the clause about SS-9's.

D: Yes, well this we accepted too.

K: Look, I have one problem though that upsets the President quite honestly. This is the San Clemente stuff.

D: Well, I, yesterday, quite frankly, I rather think it is better to do as originally, to go to

K: Because I tell you, in all our conversations we had always discussed this.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01 2958
By: N.W. Dake
Date: 06/04/95

D: This is true and

K: And the President had made a house available for him on his compound and he now rather takes it as a personal affront. I tell you that as a friend.

D: I understand. And I will send today another one, okay.

K: Because, we don't, you know, it's not a world

D: I do understand the situation because this could be much more beyond actual things.

K: Do you think you are being wiretapped out there. You're not on my staff, why should we wiretap you.

D: (Laughter) Exactly.

K: That's only for staff members.

D: I understand. This is--I hope not. So, I already send yesterday really and put my own, as you said, it was rather close

K: Really, because I just talked to the President and he was a little bit offended. I tell you this is not an official communication.

D: Oh, no, no, no. I understand. That was my impression really.

K: And frankly, it isn't worth it.

D: But I will mention it and

K: But you know, we've arranged a yacht and everything will now be known that there was a cancellation, and you know how our press is right now.

D: I know, this is the point. I understand. I will try to do it today once again.

stop

K: We can cancel the intermediate as a matter of fact because it happens on that day it's the splashdown of the skylab, so Houston is really the best place to be that day.

D: Yes, it quite coincides.

K: So we could use that as an excuse (end of tape)

4

D: ............Sunday

K: No, we'll have a quiet reception.

D: Yes. Exactly. Nobody will be there, I mean, he will just be able

K: Just one armored division.

D: (laughter) All right.

K: We'll be very quiet. We'll have some protocol there.

D: Protocol, that's all.

K: Well, as an old friend maybe I'll go out, but

D: I think it will be very nice of you.

K: That has no protocol status. And we won't tell anybody, because if I go out, then a lot of others will go out. I'll go out with you.

D: Okay.

K: And I'll come up to Camp David for half an hour on Sunday.

D: Yes, I think it will be

K: Just in case he wants to talk. If he doesn't want to talk, I'll just be there.

D: He will definitely want to talk, but not discuss anything, just throwing around, it will be very nice. He will appreciate.

K: Good, whatever he wants.

D: Yes, okay, this will be very nice.

K: Good.

D: Tomorrow at 1:00 o'clock. What we have, really, communique.

K: Basically we just have the communique.

D: Oh, the communique. Yesterday I received something and I ask what I'm-- I don't know what they meant.

K: Well, primarily, a social lunch then.

D: Oh, no, no, no. I ---------------- the Mediterranean.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 010255404
By: W.W.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: J.W. Pagen De

K: Well let's just cancel lunch.

D: (laughter) Okay, I will bring my own, all right.

K: I have

D: I will bring my own.

K: Okay. I also want to add one more clause to that nuclear thing.

D: The best. I mention this to Bcezknev, he will blow up.

K: You tell him that's inconcrete.

D: I understand. So tomorrow at one o'clock we look at these other things and we would like very much for you to look at these alternate clauses but, in the ________ agreement, and other things.

K: Yeah, I'll handle all of that tomorrow. How are we doing on that peaceful nuclear agreement. It is that all right.

D: It's quite all right with us. So, raging because State Dept say it ________ have it from White House. What ________ I think participation Israeli ________

K: Well, I'll get it all straightened out tomorrow.

D: Because the only thing we have ________ and do something, you understand.

K: Okay, Anatol.

D: Okay, so one o'clock at usual place.

K: Right.

D: Okay, thank you very much Henry.

K: Bye.

D: Bye bye.

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:50 am, June 10, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you.

K: I see, what did I say--I mentioned Breshnev.

D: Because, really, Gromyko and Breshnev have some corrections we have to discuss.

D: Well, I understand.

D: Yes.

D: Right.

D: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
DATE NARA Dts 6/2/73

2

D: It's a merry-go-round.

D: Yeah, I understand.

not

K: And there are a number of other issues which—even Gromyko would understand. Now look, let me raise a number of questions. First, on the SAKT principles. I don't give a damn whether we say serious or urgent. So let's not make a federal case out of that.

D: Yeah.

D: I understand.

D: When you went away, I received a telegram and it was from the man you know, and it was a rare case, but it was a--he was a little bit angry with all these things because it was another principle, another --you -- he said, I accept revision to number 4 and I'm finished, don't bother me anymore with this.

K: Well, we can leave it until he get's here.

D: So-- but this is the only question he was

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/20/94

3

D: This is true and

D: (Laughter) Exactly.

D: But I will mention it and

stop

K: We can cancel the intermediate/snow as a matter of fact because it happens on that day it's the splashdown of the skylab, so Houston is really the best place to be that day.

D: Yes, it quite coincides.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
P. Att. NARA Doc 61204

4

D: ............Sunday

K: Just one armored division.

D: (laughter) All right.

D: Protocol, that's all.

K: That has no protocol status. And we won't tell anybody, because' if I go out, then a lot of others will go out. I'll go out with you.

D: Okay.

D: Yes, I think it will be

K: Good, whatever he wants.

K: Good.

D: Oh, no, no, no. I .................... the Mediterranean.

CLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
DALLARA DRE 6/20/94

DELEGATED

Authority EO 12958

Dated: N/A

6/2/04

K: I have

D: I will bring my own.

D: The best. I mention this to Beesknev, he will blow up.

K: Yeah, I'll handle all of that tomorrow. How are we doing on that peaceful nuclear agreement. Is that all right.

K: Okay, Anatol.

K: Right.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

D: Bye bye.

HAK/President

11:05 10 Jun 73

HAK: I just got off the phone with Dobrynin, and he said that this is one of these Moscow things. He's already made a strong appeal; he's going to make another one today. And he should have an answer tomorrow.

RN: Well, he didn't say that it was the lack of confidence in him or anything like that did he?

HAK: Mr. President, there is no lack of confidence in you whatsoever. The trouble is that some of these Democratic senators are making these things an issue between foreign government and themselves.

RN: Well, they did that at the time of Cambodia, etc., etc., etc., didn't they?

HAK: That's right. There is not an iota lack of confidence. He's got seven agreements ready to be signed.

RN: Well, how does Dobrynin sound about the meeting? Hex Is he still for it?

HAK: Totally. We have the SALT principles all agreed.

RN: Is Brezchnev looking forward to it?

HAK: Enormously, Mr. President. The problem is that these bastard traiters we have in this country.

RN: What do you think the damage is when you talk with them.

HAK: People are causes. They are warned that may be the trade bill won't go through and things like that. But he thinks it's going to work out.

RN: Well, if it doesn't, you understand, we can say we have so much business we can make acid out of adversity.

HAK: Oh, absolutely.

RN: We must meet in Washington.

HAK: He thinks it is going to be worked out, and we can scrub the Houston stop, Mr. President, because the Skylab is blasting down that day.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA Dkt 6/20/73

2

RN: If he wants to scrub that that's fine.

HAK: They don't want us there anyway because they'll be busy all day.

RN: Don't let this harping discourage you, Henry, you know. You hear from all of these people, and don't let it discourage you.

HAK: Mr. President, you and I have been through a lot of things together. It's always the same things and these bastards are now trying to deprive you of any success. This has nothing to do...

RN: The real problem is this. They're trying to fight over all the things we beat them on. We beat them on China, we beat them on Russia, we beat on the war, and they said that none of those things would work, Henry, and they all worked and now they are dying.

HAK: It has not a thing to do with Watergate. Watergate just enables them to do those things they would have done anyway.

RN: Yes, they wanted to fight us. Well, the way they've tried to knock everything we've done, but we've had an enormously successful policy.

HAK: Mr. President. It will be a success. We have all the agreements done - nothing can go wrong. With all principles said with a commitment to have an agreement next year, we have to do a little negotiating on that with Brezhnev. They want to say 74 75 but you can get them to say 74 I'm sure.

RN: Right. Well, it doesn't make any difference anyway.

HAK: Well, it makes it look a little better.

RN: Yes, look a little better.

HAK: Makes it look

RN: We can put it at 74 and then postpone.

HAK: That's right. That's what we left for you and Brezhnev but otherwise.

RN: What I was concerned about in view of your earlier statement that may be the Russians were thinking about not coming at all.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date 6/2/8
P.O. Box 614

HAK: Oh, no. That's one thousand percentsaid.

RN: They need us as much as we need them.

HAK: Mr. President, that's no problem. No problem on substance whatsoever.

RN: The Russians may think it may hurt the people and try to create the impression that if he doesn't go to Houston or Los Angeles that the visit is not successful.

HAK: No, what it proves is that he came on an official visit and he didn't put any special.

RN: I prefer it that way.

HAK: He'll come to Los Angeles.

RN: And if he doesn't, fine.

HAK: He'll come.

RN: We'll be up in Camp David for two days. That makes it pretty unofficial.

HAK: Well, he'll come all right.

RN: What if he does or doesn't. The main thing don't be anxious

HAK: Mr. President, it's going to be as successful as last year.

RN: You bet your life. Getting back to the Saigon thing. You just whip any message off that you think will do any good, Henry. I don't know. I think one thing you can say is that I'm -- the old ploy -- I'm meeting with Congressional leaders Tuesday on this thing or Wednesday, and I know that it will be a shocking reaction because they've been led to believe that we're going to carry out the agreement, and if it appears that while -- well, you know, words to that effect, would that help?

HAK: That will help, and I'll stick that in there.

RN: We've done this before with them and it hasn't worked.

HAK: Well, we've done it before and it has worked.

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

Dated NARA Ref 6/2/07

HAK: Well, I think it's going to work at the last minute.

RN: We haven't got much time, have we. Then put in strong assurances that I am his friend and I just need this in order to keep the Congressional leaders on track for the aid program for South Vietnam, and that's my primary interest.

HAK: I'll put that in the letter immediately. But I'm sorry now I mentioned it to you because the summit is in perfect shape. There is nothing to be concerned about. Every document that needs to be signed is agreed to word for word.

RN: Haig said he had a very good talk with Rogers before he took off and he has him on board.

HAK: Everything is on track.

RN: And boy -- that's going to be a good one. Some Europeans will squeel, but we'll write it for all it's worth.

HAK: We've got the Europeans pretty much

RN: Incidentally, you probably didn't notice it over there we had quite a good week here. We got the Haig, Laird, and Ziegler announcement went very well, The announcement of the FBI guy went very well. I got an enormously friendly reception at a college in Florida.

HAK: And you are in very good fexior shape over there, Mr. President.

RN: These people -- it is traitorous, isn't it? You've said that often before in that old philosophy (?), Henry.

HAK: And it was true.

RN: When we went through Cambodia, after the election when you were trying to negotiate abroad. I think the most treacherous thing they did was in January when you were going back there to negotiate and they passed the Senate caucus resolution. That to me I'll never forgive them for.

HAK: They passed them just before I went over this time.

RN: I know. As I've been telling Democrats and Republicans, we've got a lot of problems to work on. Kissinger's legs off before he gets there. We can't do that. But we've survived before and we can do it again. The whole peace

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
Dated 6/2/04
P.O. Box

of the world. What's going to happen if we fail. Let's face it. If they
come in, well that's a little while off. Let's suppose we, well I'm not
considering resignation, but taking their arguments at its best. Nixon
and Agnew should resign and the Congress should name a President.
It's unbelievable.

HAK: Mr. President, a resignation will be a national catastrophe.

RN: It's never going to come.

HAK: It would take a new President many months to get the feel of things and other countries to feel him, and by that time there'd be an election. It is out of the question.

RN: Oh absolutely. It's a catastrophe -- not only internationally,
but domestically. It has such a shocking impact on the people.

HAK: I think, Mr. President, what you can do in the remaining three
years.

RN: Oh, for crying out loud, when Harry Truman was 20% to 23%
in the polls, he was still pulling off Marshall Plans, and that's
what we're in for.

HAK: Mr. President, you can go down in History as a man who brought about the greatest revolution in American foreign policy ever.

RN: We have already.

HAK: You have already and now it's time

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

Dkt NARA Doc. 6/2/94

HAK/Lord Cromer

11:30 - 6/10

LK: Hello, Henry, how are you?

HAK: Okay, how are you?

LK: Not too bad.

I made a brief report on

HAK: / ... my conversation with Mr. Bryan (?) which I think is
finally beginning to make some sense.

LK: Oh, good.

HAK: Could I turn it over to you for transmittal to Burt Krom?

LK: Oh, sure, yes.

HAK: And I think what we agreed on is that we'd instead of talking
endlessly. First of all, he agreed to withdraw his opposition
to the Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting, making it conditional
only on the progress of the bilateral talks and talks in other
forums.

LK: And that will be on a NATO ____.

HAK: No, NATO, or at home.

LK: Depending on the progress of the Baresch (?).

HAK: And of whatever goes on in NATO.

LK: Yes.

HAK: Which is fair enough.

LK: Well, I think that sounds quite good. Presently we want another ____.

HAK: He is coming over in two weeks. And he said we could begin to
work with us on drafting a declaration of principles.

LK: I see.

HAK: In fact, he would draft one section himself.
... Relation of the U.S. to United Europe as well as to the individual
European countries. And he said he would not object if others
drafted other sections.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/89

2

LK: Now would it be constructive or not constructive if we and
~~Richard Trumbust~~, I suppose, to meet before he comes over?

HAK: He had no objection to that.

LK: That is whatever or however they'd like to play it.

HAK: I think that might be a good idea. The only thing is he doesn't want individual sections assigned as the property of individual European countries.

LK: Oh I'm sure I don't think anyone would want to contract on that basis.

HAK: That's fair enough.

Absolutely. Finally, if you could send it up there I'm here at the Embassy, I'd be most grateful.

HAK: Good, fine.

LK: And if I have any queries on it, could I also come back to you on the phone?

HAK: Good, excellent.

LK: Many thanks.

HAK: Thanks, bye.

DECI ASSIGNED

Authority EO 12958

*

HAK/Sonnenfeldt

12:10 June 10

HAK: Hello, Hal, how are you?

S: Okay and you. Did you have a good flight back?
Are you going back again on Tuesday.

HAK: I may, if we can get our maniacs in Saigon under control.

S: What would you like?

HAK: Well, what I would like is to find out where the hell we stand
if that isn't infringing on your prerogatives.

S: No, I tried to send you a stream of messages.

HAK: No, I got the messages, but I would like to have put together --
you'd be glad to know that even the Doberman speaks well of you
now.

S: Okay, that's terrible.

HAK: I've agreed to a series other than the "urgent".

S: Well, did you get my messages on that.

HAK: Well, I won't let Jackson (?) spook you.

S: Well, those series are their things anyhow.

HAK: But I think we could have 74.

S: Well, it's a very narrow sort of thing. I don't think they'll
accept it but if they do, it's not the disaster either way.

HAK: What 74?

S: Yes.

HAK: I think it's a slight advantage.

S: ] Well, as I said in my messages the main disadvantage of it is
that people will think it means something.

HAK: Oh, nonsense. I disagree with that. Jackson is moving to the
right no matter what we do.

S: Well, it isn't just he.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

Dated NARA No. 6/2/04

2

HAK: And the other Democrats move to our right. It is the same thing they did in '69. We

S: Well, I think it's a very marginal thing one way or the other. My feeling is that if they don't accept, we shouldn't struggle.

HAK: Well, where do we stand now with this communique?

S: I sent you one message which outlined the areas where we still have problems.

HAK: I never got that. When did you send it?

S: I sent that early yesterday. They should have the outgoing there. Anyway, what do you want to do. Do you want to do something this afternoon.

HAK: No, but can you have waiting for me first thing in the morning. Just put me an annotated copy.

S: I have that waiting for you anyway. But I sent you a message saying that the four or five areas of problems where we have problems. In the beginning, we still have this peace agreement and equal security problems. We have a Cambodia, they wanted to knock out that agreement.

HAK: Oh, yes, I did get message.

S: Of course, we have the disagreement area in the CSCE/MBFR business. And that we'll have to do more work on this week. We pulled that stuff out of the letter we sent because of the British...

HAK: Look, my judgment is that they agreed to an MBFR start anytime this year; that's good enough. Don't you?

S: Well, it may be good enough for us. I think we have an alliance problem.

HAK: Why should the Allies object whether it starts December 31 or November 1.

S: Well, who knows. The Allies are on their high horse. They take the position we sold this once back in September, and the Russians are making us sell it the second time and their linkage with the CSCE. Everybody is reluctant to accept the terminal date with the CSCE because they somehow think that puts us under time pressure.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated N/A
Text 6/2/97

HAK: That I can understand, but what if the Russians unconditionally accept it.

S: If the Russians unconditionally accept some date this year, I think that's all right, but if they accept it with a matrix (?) then I think we have a problem.

HAK: No, but didn't they communicate that to say that it would begin before the end of '73?

S: I think we have to check it with the allies. I personally think that's all right. I think the difference between 30 October and end of the year is not significant.

HAK: Well, why couldn't we accept that communique?

S: They have not given us a date. They gave us this thing in Vienna, but they relayed it to the CSCE communique. They would privately agreed by the end of the year but they would also privately insist that the other thing was finished by the end of the year.

HAK: Well, I have to get together with you in the morning to decide also where we move.

S: We have the consultation problem on the sensitive document but also the other one which we really have to think through carefully. The thing that I wrote you about..

HAK: They have the SALT <u>rinciple</u>.

S: Yes. The thing we Rogers went -- unless he does something behind the scene -- I think it went very well. The question now is really to work with Rogers. Nobody else is here. Everybody else has gone out to NATO. This Schlesinger thing was a disaster.

HAK: A total disaster, but why did you agree to it?

fault

S: It's my part partly because I didn't pay all that much attention to it, and I accepted the judgment of our people, and it's a double disaster because it's arragance on the burdensharing side and it is complacent on the strategy side.

HAK: Well, Loomtz was beside himself.

S: And you know for Schlesinger to travel around with Kaufman is another just another insensitivity. You know it looks all

DELEGATED
Authority EO 12958
DATE 6/26/89
Dated: 6/26/89
P.O. Box 12958

*

4

like McNamara again.

HAK: It's not acceptable.

S: If you parse this things it comes out all right. But the effect of that section on how well things look is very, very bad.

HAK: Loomtz was beside himself. Loomtz said that considering what America imposes already on the world to impose it a totally Defense Secretary is too much.

S: Well, I think that's unfair to him.

HAK: I'm just telling you what Carrington said.

S: But he's got, you know he's in the hands of Kaufman and I think Phil didn't use good judgment on it either, and it just got past me. Of course, the Getler story on top of it on this Pentagon study is just undermines the whole thing we're trying to do.

HAK: Okay.

S: Well, what would you like to do, get together the first thing or if you had some time tomorrow.

HAK: Well, it's about 9:30 or so. But I would like to have all the documents in their correct form.

S: Yes, the SALT thing -- it's all over there someplace, but I'll pull it all.

HAK: Look, we've gone through this a hundred times, either you work out with Scowcroft that just dropping them in the office just doesn't seem to get them to me. Could I get them in a book or some coherent form that we could look through them together.

S: All right. I'll make up another book.

HAK: Look, I'm having lunch with Dobrynin tomorrow.

S: Your main problem there is the schedule business, really.

HAK: Yes, I think it's Watergate.

S: I don't know, it's very strange.

DELEGATED
AUTHORITY E.O. 12958

DEPT. NARRATED 6/2/04

HAK

S: I don't see the logic of that and staying in town. Very, very strange.

HAK: But it won't do -- tie themselves to the President on this trip around the country. Here it's an official visit.

S: I'm glad you've got Robert coming. I think that's important

HAK: Well, that's basically now straightened out. They agreed to a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting except to the Prior consultation. And they agreed to begin drafting on a declaration of principle. But we have to start some drafting on our side.

S: Well, I'll have to talk about now. You don't know anything more about your own personal situation?

HAK: No, what about yours.

S: My confirmation thing looks somewhat better. We have to get a ____ for it.

HAK: I'm going to talk to Haig about that tomorrow.

S: Of changing that to something to that of something else. We have to move on that.

HAK: Yes.

S: Well, I'll get all this stuff ready for the morning. I think we're in good shape, the bilateral stuff is moving along well also.

HAK: Good. Then you'll have it that I'll know what to take up with Dobrynin tomorrow?

S: We conformed really both texts, both the principles and the other one, so I don't think there should be -- except for the 74/75 -- and that is the only thing left.

HAK: Okay, but let's make sure I have the exact text. Okay, fine.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority ED 12958

D/AH NMEA DRE 6/204

*