II - Report

August 7, 1957

# A WORD ABOUT THE REPORT

This report is the result of a group effort by Subpanel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although all the members of our Panel have not subscribed to every detail of the report, it nevertheless, reflects our substantial agreement.

We were charged with explaining the International Security Objectives of the United States, the strategies most likely to attain these objectives and, generally, the problems and opportunities in this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years. Recognizing the imponderables in our task, we are pleased that it has still been possible to make our report fairly specific. Where our report is less than specific we wish it could be more so, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. But to have tried to make our conclusions sharper would have required going into detail uncomfortably beyond the extent to which we can trust the durability of our judgments since so much of the raw material for our consideration will be shaped by events in science and human affairs, which has yet to happen. Thus we have not tried to specify the weapons systems which will give the country maximum military power at minimum cost.
We have sought to develop the considerations which should underlie the decisions which will determine the nature and composition of our forces, and outlined some.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security policies and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept lags behind

II - Report

August 7, 1957

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foreseeable developments in technology and in the world political situation.

Defense organization in major ways is unrelated to critically important military mission. The U. S. system of budgets and appropriations is painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating tempo of military developments.

The members of our group have had a reasonable amount of experience in security affairs. Also, we have had the benefit of the thoughts of numerous others, expert in the relevant fields, through the media of many conversations and specially prepared papers.

From the same background of experience, we realize how great is the gap between what is ultimately desirable and what it is feasible to change now. Nevertheless, we cannot help hoping that our report may catalyze a genuinely deep review of some of the basic policies and the practices which affect the security of the country.

We are convinced that sizeable corrective steps can be taken now.

It will come as no surprise that our explorations have not been held to strictly military matters. For military power is not developed, much less does it come into play, in isolation from the other major realities of the times. We would like to stress, what is surely unnecessary, that our criticism concerns concepts and procedures, not with individuals. We know how very much competence and dedication is found among the government officials and military officers concerned with the national security. Indeed, we are sure that even our most adverse comments will find support among many responsible officials of government who know what needs doing and are trying to accomplish it.