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# AN APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

Harrison Brown and Amrom Katz

## 1. Introduction

For over fifteen years the United States and the U.S.S.R. have each looked upon the other as being a threat. Since the end of World War II leaders of both nations have recognized that war between us is a possibility. Actions have led to reactions which in turn have led to new actions. The result has been the deadly arms race in which we are now locked, which is spiraling upward ever more rapidly, and which gives promise of destroying us both unless it is stopped.

The leaders of both nations recognize that stopping the arms race is in itself not enough -- that steps must be taken to greatly reduce the dangers which existing weapons systems present to us. Today's weapons are sufficiently powerful and they exist in adequate numbers to make it possible for our two nations to cause destruction enormously greater than anything experienced during World War II. It seems clear that not only must the arms race be stopped, but the possibility that any nation might launch a sudden annihilatory attack upon another nation should be eliminated.

More than fifteen years of the cold war have resulted in strong feelings of distrust in America concerning Soviet intentions and actions. One may argue endlessly as to the extent to which this distrust has been rightly or wrongly placed. And it can be further said that there is undoubtedly distrust in the Soviet

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Union concerning America's intentions and actions. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that any broad plan for the elimination of war, upon which our nations might agree, must take this distrust into account.

The element of distrust has probably been in part responsible for the difficulties which have ensued in the nuclear test negotiations as well as in earlier disarmament discussions. It has certainly led Americans to insist upon formalizing techniques of extensive inspection. It has probably led the Russians to resist measures in this area, which the Americans have believed necessary.

It is doubtful that the existing distrust can be eliminated quickly. Yet it is clear that agreements aimed at starting us on the path toward a world without war should be consummated very soon. Under the circumstances, it is important that we be frank with each other concerning our fears so that they can be taken into account in the formulation of possible agreements. Agreements should not await the dissolution of distrust -- they must be made assuming that the distrust exists. For this reason, each nation should be prepared to go somewhat further than it would like to go in its agreements, in the interest of mollifying the fears of the other.

Disarmament would appear to be an essential aspect of a world without the threat of war. But in the language of the mathematician, although it is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one. If we are to approach complete disarmament we must have some concept as to where we are heading. How will a world without

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armaments function? How will international disputes be resolved?

Will a World Court resolve disputes? If so, how will the laws governing the Court be made? Will the laws apply to nations alone, or will they also apply to individuals? What will be the nature of the international security forces? How will they operate?

Who will direct them?

These are some of the questions. They are questions which cannot all be answered before we take the first major steps toward disarmament. But they must be satisfactorily answered before total disarmament becomes a reality.

We must also keep in mind the interrelationships between disarmament agreements and agreements involving a number of troubled areas of the world. The destinies of such areas as Berlin, Taiwan, Laos and the Congo and problems such as disengagement in Europe clearly cannot be completely divorced from the broader problem of disarmament. Political agreements must go hand-in-hand with disarmament agreements. Although initial and major disarmament agreements need not await the solution of all of these problems, it would appear that solutions should be forthcoming as disarmament progresses. It may well be that agreements concerning these difficult areas should be an integral part of any comprehensive disarmament plan.

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## 2. The Problem of Negotiation

We are living in an age in which the technology of war is expanding with increasing rapidity. Yet the techniques we use in complex international negotiations are virtually the same as those which have been used for hundreds of years.

Today when we negotiate, our respective nations establish "positions" which are often both rigid and far apart. The lack of flexibility in the positions usually results in deadlock. And if agreement is reached at all, so much time may have been consumed during the process of negotiation that the world situation may well have changed dramatically during the intervening period. It is clearly desirable for us to devise techniques which can speed up the negotiating process.

Our failures in negotiation have often stemmed from lack of mutual understanding of each others' problems and of the subject matter involved. Further, the procedures and traditions of negotiations often make it difficult for the negotiators of one nation to educate those of another.

Under the circumstances it would appear desirable that all official negotiations be preceded by detailed, informal and unofficial discussions which are aimed at clarifying the issues and problems involved. These discussions should be aimed at creating common areas of understanding and at delineating those areas where successful negotiation might be possible. They might well follow the pattern of the six Pugwash meetings of scientists

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which have thus far been held, except that the discussions would
be more frequent, of longer duration and of broader scope.

It is to be hoped that the proposed International Study Group
for the study of disarmament and arms control will make it
possible for substantial numbers of individuals from the East and
the West to discuss in detail the major problems of arms control
and disarmament, create common areas of understanding and designate
areas in which official negotiation might be possible. There should,
of course, be similar continuing discussions in the more political
and less technical areas.

One of the major barriers to disarmament today is our lack of
clear mutual understanding of how a world without arms will
function. Unless we achieve substantial understanding in this
area, really major disarmament agreements will be extremely
difficult to consummate. Clearly there should be substantial groups
of experts discussing problems such as world security forces,
international law, world courts and world organization on a
continuing basis.

As stressed earlier, these sessions should be unofficial, in-
formal and continuous. No nation should be bound by the con-
clusions. None should make use of the conclusions for propaganda
purposes. It would be hoped, however, that the conclusions would
be used by our political leaders as a basis for international
negotiation.

The establishment of such continuing discussions might well
be our first major step, and it could well be our most important
single step, leading to disarmament.

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### 3. Basic Principles

Let us assume, for the purpose of discussion, that the powers succeed in reaching a general meeting of the minds concerning the maintenance of peace in a disarmed world. Let us assume further that progress is made toward the solution of some of the more pressing and difficult political problems which now are major sources of conflict between East and West. Let us assume that within such an environment the Soviet Union and the United States were to attempt to consummate a detailed agreement which, when put into effect, would result in the virtual elimination of military installations and capabilities in the two countries, eventually to the relatively low levels of armaments required to maintain internal order. What form might such an agreement take?

Of course, any meaningful agreement on disarmament must eventually be world wide. But in view of the fact that the success of any world wide agreement would be dependent upon the adherence of the United States and the Soviet Union (the two major nuclear powers) it is useful to explore the possible nature of an agreement were it consummated by these two nations alone.

In the formulation of a proposed agreement on disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States, it is important that we first establish certain basic principles. It is also important that we state frankly the fears on both sides which must be taken into account.

The following basic principles would appear to be obvious:

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1. Disarmament cannot take place instantaneously. Time will be required, and it is likely that the elimination of arms will best be accomplished in "steps" or "stages."

2. Given the fact that some sort of military balance exists between East and West today, it is important that the balance not be greatly upset by the disarmament steps as they are taken.

3. The result of the changes, as they take place, must appear to both sides to be preferable to the continuation of the arms race, with its inherent serious dangers.

The fears which must be taken into account in the formulation of a possible agreement can be divided into current fears and future fears.

Most of the current fears are, in differing degrees, shared by both nations: the fear that mechanical or administrative accident will lead to an unintended war, the fear that nuclear capabilities will spread and lead to war, the fear that intended war will result from conflicts such as that over Berlin. But the Soviet Union and the United States each appears to have at least one fear which is important and which is not shared by the other.

The United States possesses a fear of the unknown -- and without more knowledge there is, for most Americans, much to fear in the military position of the Soviet Union. Might the Soviet Union actually be building the 100 megaton superbomb to which Premier Khrushchev referred recently? Are the remarkable Soviet achievements in space being exploited for military purposes, despite occasional statements to the contrary? Approximately how big is the Soviet missile force and could it be used, not in retaliation,

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but in a first attack on the West? Lack of moderately detailed knowledge concerning these and other factors breeds fear.

The Soviet Union, understandably concerned with its own security, tends to fear American attempts to gain information about its military position. She fears, for instance, that the loss of the invulnerability of her missile bases through intelligence (or "spying") could possibly lead to a planned attack by the United States.

The future fears are related to the current ones. The United States fears that as disarmament progresses, the Soviet Union might clandestinely retain sufficient arms to render considerable damage. Some Americans fear that, with major nuclear striking power eliminated, the Soviet Union might overrun areas such as Western Europe with conventional forces.

The Soviet Union in turn apparently fears that inspection schemes will be used for purposes of "spying" and will result in decreasing the invulnerability of her bases. Also, she fears the consequences of the rearming of Germany.

Any plan for disarmament must take these principles and these fears into account. Certain aspects of a plan which might appear to be essential to one side, might easily appear ridiculous to the other. In this respect, it is of the greatest importance that both sides be tolerant.

It is clear that a detailed disarmament treaty could not be negotiated overnight. Given the most perfect world environment (which we do not enjoy now) many months would be required. In the presence of world tensions, and given some situations which

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are potentially explosive, it is important that those major groups,
claiming an interest in changes leading to world peace, take
stabilizing measures designed to reduce dangers of accidental
and unintended war, especially during the process of negotiation
of longer-range steps. An unwillingness to come to grips with
partial measures cannot possibly produce the kind of world en-
vironment conducive to the acceptance of more general agreements,
which are bound to carry each state into unfamiliar areas, and
which will likely appear to be more dangerous than the prior or
current situation.

Confidence in peace-keeping and peace-attaining machinery can
come only from successful experience and competence. We must
develop competence in devising and using peace-keeping machinery,
and this can be done in part via partial measures. If such
measures fail, or if one side finds them intolerable, return to
the status quo ante is feasible. It is not possible to contemplate
construction, execution or maintenance of agreements which one
state, or a major group of states find (or believe) is to their
immediate and obvious (or long term and possible) disadvantage.

4. A Possible Approach

Although there are many approaches to the problem of dis-
armament, there are actually very few approaches which can satisfy
the basic principles outlined above and which would, at the same

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time, alleviate the current and future fears possessed by both sides. If the United States and the Soviet Union could agree upon the basic principles, as outlined -- as well as upon the fears, as listed -- then the possible solutions upon which we might agree are limited in number and kind. One such solution is outlined in general terms below.

This proposal (or approach) is designed to illuminate problem areas and to suggest possible solutions. It does not pretend to be a model of a possible treaty. It is the purpose of this proposal to stimulate comment and discussion, out of which will come better understanding, and hopefully, the bases for formal, more detailed, and negotiable proposals.

The participants from both East and West are urged to examine the proposed stages as objectively as possible and to avoid discarding any specific point until it is viewed in the light of the principles and fears described in the previous section.

It is envisaged that the powers would sign an agreement which would lead to general and complete disarmament in three specified stages and in an agreed-upon period of time. At any time, depending upon the belief of one nation that another is not acting in good faith, and depending upon the progress which is made on the solution of the major political problems confronting us, a major power may elect to void the agreement.

The first stage would involve the construction and deployment of two nuclear forces, one in the East and one in the West, which are as nearly equivalent as possible and which are subject to identical stringent constraints. These forces would be as

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invulnerable as modern technology permits us to build them. Each
would be of sufficient size to inflict serious damage upon the
cities of the opposing nation, were it used. For the purpose of
our discussion, as an illustrative example, we will assume that
these two striking forces would consist of specified numbers of
nuclear propelled submarines, each carrying a certain number of
missiles with warheads of specified size, and operating from
known bases. In this simple schematic proposal we will ignore,
for the present, the very real considerations which argue for
a mixed force, including systems other than submarines.

At the end of this first stage (at time t₁ which would be
specified in the agreement) the nuclear striking force of the
Soviet Union would then consist of the nuclear submarine fleet
(of known size to the West, but of high invulnerability) and of
her land-based planes and missiles (of unknown size to the West).
The nuclear striking forces of the United States would consist of
the nuclear submarine fleet (of known size to the East) and of
her land-based planes and missiles (of fairly-well known size to
the East).

With relatively invulnerable and sizeable striking forces
available to both nations at sea, it would then be possible to
begin the process of demilitarizing the land areas, as well as that
of removing military activity at sea, other than that of the two
nuclear submarine forces.

At time t₁ inspectors would be placed at all submarine
bases, as well as at all potential bases, for the purpose of
ascertaining that only those submarines listed in the agreement
were active. This, the first inspection activity under the

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agreement, would thus be confined strictly to coastal areas.

During the second stage of the agreement, beginning at time $t_2$ there would take place a complete demilitarization of the land areas, in agreed-upon steps. At the beginning of this stage, each nation would provide a list giving the size, nature and approximate location of all military installations, quantities of bombs and nuclear materials, numbers of planes of various types, missiles and ships, as well as the nature and locations of factories for the production of military equipment.

Cutoff of production of specified items such as planes, missiles and nuclear materials would take place at time $t_1$ and inspectors would be placed in all plants to ascertain that this had been done. This would be followed by progressive elimination of delivery systems, warheads, nuclear materials and ground forces according to an agreed-upon procedure which could have any one of a number of forms. As the process of dismantling and elimination of weapons progressed, the system of inspection would be extended further. As national ground forces were eliminated, world security forces would come into existence.

By time $t_2$ the process of demilitarizing the land areas would be completed and the continuing system of inspection would be in operation. This might include a number of insurances against the clandestine production of weapons -- aerial reconnaissance, checks on movements of materials, a network for detecting nuclear explosions, as well as so-called "peoples inspection".

At time $t_2$, then, the only remaining military forces would be the two identical nuclear submarine fleets, the comings and

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goings of which would have been under surveillance during the interval $t_1$ to $t_2$. Starting at time $t_2$ there would be a progressive removal of these submarines on a one-for-one basis. By some time $t_3$ the submarines would be eliminated and general and complete disarmament would be in effect.

Clearly the time $t_3$ is intrinsically more difficult to specify than are $t_1$ and $t_2$. The interval between $t_2$ and $t_3$ would be heavily dependent upon the maintenance of the schedules defining $t_1$ and $t_2$. Further, and of greater and critical importance, each side must believe, with high confidence, that the important and difficult clandestine weapons problem has been satisfactorily solved.

Such a program, which has of necessity been over-simplified, would appear to satisfy the conditions established in the previous section. It could lead to comprehensive disarmament. It would appear to quiet many of the fears voiced by both East and West. Under the circumstances it might provide a reasonable basis for negotiation.

The negotiators would have to answer many questions. How many submarines should there be? Would the system be sufficiently invulnerable? What should the time scales be for the three stages? What should be the specific formulae for demilitarizing the land areas and introducing inspection? It seems likely, however, that these questions, although not simple, could be answered, were these principles and this schematic outline accepted.

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## 5. The First Stage

It should be emphasized that our assumption that the Soviet Union and the United States would both be willing to rely upon known nuclear forces based upon nuclear-powered submarines is probably an oversimplification. For example, one or both of the powers might not have sufficient confidence in its technological ability to build sufficient invulnerability into its own system; one or both might have doubts concerning its ability to endow the system with adequate operational efficiency.

It may well be that the powers would have more confidence in extremely hard land-based missile forces, placed at known locations. This system would have the complication that inspectors would have to be placed at known locations on land during the first stage (and excluded from other areas), and that the particular known missile sites would then have to be excluded during the land demilitarization steps taken during the second stage. Although this would be a complicating factor, it does not appear to present insurmountable difficulties.

Similarly, it might be that neither power would wish to rely upon a single system and would prefer to establish a "mixed system" involving some nuclear submarines and some land-based missiles. Plausible arguments against exclusive reliance on one system can be made and are well understood by military analysts. It would appear that this situation, although complicating matters still further, could likewise be handled.

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In this case, inspectors would be placed both in the designated
land areas and at the submarine bases.

One consideration which would determine in part the precise
choice of system is the time factor. For many reasons it would
be desirable that the first stage be passed through as quickly
as possible, consistent with the establishment of systems of
high reliability. Although the precise duration of the first stage
can be a matter for some debate, for the purpose of more specific
discussion and orientation, we suggest three years. This does
not appear to be an unreasonably long time when we consider other
concurrent steps which should be taken during the first stage and
the magnitude of some of the critical political problems which
must be solved.

How large should the two nuclear forces be? This, also, can
be a matter for some debate. Again, for the purpose of discussion,
we would suggest that the two forces might possess a minimum of
100 megatons of striking power. However, plausible arguments
can be made to the effect that the forces should be larger than
this, and perhaps even as high as 1000 megatons. The exact power
of the two forces can only be negotiated in the light of detailed
discussions concerning the natures and efficiencies of the systems
which are adopted. Obviously the smaller the power which will
reasonably allay the fears of both East and West, the better off
we will be.

Striking power in the range of 100 to 1000 megatons appears
extremely high to most persons -- and indeed it should. But

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we should remember, that were we to reduce nuclear weaponry to that level, a _great deal_ of nuclear disarmament would be involved. Indeed, were the United States and the Soviet Union to disarm to that level, it would mean decreasing world-wide nuclear stockpiles perhaps 25-fold. Although this would be an inadequate reduction in the long run, it should not be looked upon as a negligible achievement.

We have emphasized that progress toward desirable goals cannot be made in a vacuum. The likelihood of reaching each phase, of progressing smoothly toward the goal, of achieving mutual confidence in the value and significance of the effort, will depend upon our maintaining concurrent stability in the world. For this reason, it is desirable to consider certain measures, concurrent with the first stage, which are designed to reduce the danger of accidental or unintended war, to prevent the militarization of space, to promote continuous and joint research and development exercises on inspection technology. These are obvious suggestions which need be part of a longer list, and which are aimed at providing a firm base of experience and confidence from which to take the large step into stage two.

The establishment and training of an inspection force, which cannot spring into effective operation overnight, and the establishment of adequate communications systems, would be desirable before the second stage begins. Confidence in inspection forces and technology is more likely to result from the development and testing of techniques and personnel during a period preceding

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their use than from sudden deployment without such experience.

Further, realism demands that problems of possible evasion of the agreements be faced. Ignoring problems of evasion will hardly be expected to yield systems which take them into account. These problems cannot be worked on effectively if efforts are confined only to committees or to study groups, but should be worked on by realistic simulation in inspection field exercises.

The purpose of concurrent and partial measures, such as the few briefly noted above, is to reinforce the velocity and confidence with which the second stage is reached and entered. We have given a fixed, but arguable, time period for the first stage; but it is hardly conceivable, and in fact contrary to the principles discussed earlier, that either side will enter the second stage if it is completely dissatisfied with the situation at the end of the first stage.

## 6. The Second Stage

The length of the actual disarmament process envisioned in the second stage is arguable and negotiable. Because we believe that a stated time is a good beginning point for discussion, we suggest that the second stage should last approximately four years.

With inspection and monitoring of the two symmetrical nuclear forces already operating at the beginning of the second stage, the simultaneous introduction of disarmament and inspection over the remaining forces would begin.

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There are various methods by which this process could proceed over the four year period and there is no apparent preference herein indicated. Whether the process should proceed by complete disarmament of successive areas, whether gradually and simultaneously over the entire area, whether by successive classes of weapons (e.g., nuclear weapons, conventional weapons), whether by type of delivery vehicle (missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, ground vehicles), whether by production plants or stockpiles of various types -- are all discussable and important questions. Any detailed proposal must meet the criteria advanced earlier, and in addition should meet further criteria, such as being inspectable and minimizing the total inspection effort.

Agreement on, and confidence in, the inspection forces deployed in the first stage should minimize fears and concern with the inspection system which is activated during the second stage. We have proposed that aerial surveillance systems will be fully operational by the end of the second stage. Their rate of introduction, their extent of use, their phasing with the other inspection and disarmament processes, are discussable and not herein specified.

What is important is that each state must act in such a way as to convince the other states that it is desirable to continue the agreement and the disarmament process. Were the reverse the case, a state might find that its interests demand abrogation of the agreements and cessation of the process.

Although the major problems to be encountered during the