DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Haldeman

8/11/71 8:55 a.m.

H: Did you talk him out of the press conference/

K: Yes.

H: You did! Good for you.

K: Think I did at least. He promised me last night. I said the only thing he could say in foreign policy that wouldn't do damage. I said the best he could do is draw, and it just wasn't worth it.

H: And he bought it?

K: He said if he gave it it would be on domestic policy, but then he went to bed so I don't think he will.

H: He's got all day today.

K: My impression was that he wouldn't do it.

H: At all?

K: He first said it would only be on domestic policy then he said he wouldn't do/ it.

H: But he can't do it just on domestic policy. Half of the questions asked the last time were domestic. If that one had been just foreign he could do it that way. But he would have to both today.

K: Do you see any need for it?

H: No.

K: Unless he changed his mind this morning, which I doubt, he's not going to do it.

H: Very good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12368
By CIVILIAN Date 6-17-71

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

8/11/71

D: How are you after the helicopter home?

K: It was lucky we didn't make a date for 8:30 because we didn't come back until 10:00.

D: At night it's not pleasant to go on the helicopter.

K: I will give you our reaction next Tues. or Wed. The President was very positive. We would appreciate it until we make whatever announcement if its made that there be strict secrecy on this matter.

D: Of course.

K: There's this man Hammett.

D: I don't know him.

K: He is somebody that some branches of your embassy cultivate which I don't understand because he has no influence.

D: My people or your embassy.

K: IN NY. Dushev and Sakovich.

D: Sakovich is counsellor here and Dushev is his deputy.

K: They had lunch with him last week. NY industrialist who makes photographic equipment.

D: I don't know him.

K: Loganov of the NY mission. They are telling him that your people are working hard on President's trip to Moscow and Malik recalled to work on trip and preparing list for President.

D: I don't know what Sakovich knows but they deal with cultural matters and know nothing political.

K: This comes through our intelligence channels.

D: Your own man saying something to important himself.

K: I wouldn't exclude anything.

D: Sometimes your people trying to impress us or say they know you. You

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Follett
By CNAR Date 05/10/71

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:00 a. m. 8/11/71

-2-

should check with him.

K: I don't know him.

D: Malik doesn't know anything about the trip. So he couldn't because he knows nothing.

K: I will check on our side.

D: I will check with ______ but they know nothing.

K: Loganov I don't know.

D: From NY or our mission?

K: UN mission.

D: I will check because he knows nothing. I will check on the gentleman you mention because sometimes people on your agencies talk with our people and they don't answer nothing and then say somethings as an answer.

K: Hammett has no standing whatsoever. Some people make remarks that it comes to me.

D: It's myself and partly my deputy.

K: You wouldn't lie on this.

D: Not a single man, including Malik knows about this. If there's a leak then it comes from me.

K: You don't.

D: Nobody knows here including all people.

K: Let's keep it on our side only people who know about it.

D: No one here except me and Vorontsov.

K: On this our side the only people are the President, myself, Gen. Haig and Haldeman. That's all.

D: I can assure you that no one here knows anything.

K: No one in our bureaucracy will know anything.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012582
By: LO NARA Date: 08/11/71

Dbbrynin/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

8/11/71

D: You can look at that with full knowledge. I am used to carry my orders.

K: In our government its conceivable that people -- perhaps in your foreign office but perhaps intelligence in NY.

D: NO. It's different stuff. Only these two men.

K: OK.

D: Sometimes rumors and you say people talking at cocktail parties but I can't control these things.

K: As long as we have an understanding.

D: People talk on specific issues but no one knows what's going on.

K: I will call on Friday to fix a time. Perhaps Tues or Wed. for lunch. I am leaving Wed.

D: OK. I have to check and be back on the 20th of Sept. so I want to go home or I won't have leave. Maybe better for Tues.

K: Would you prefer lunch on Tues.?

D: That's okay with me.

K: Then let's have lunch.

D: Then I will go home on Wed.

K: People will think I insulted you!

D: Wed. it will be -- just a minute. Wed., the 18th.

K: We will get an answer through Vorontxov.

D: I prefer to do it myself. Could you give it by Friday so I could get an answer by Tues.? That will shorten the way. It's only question of discussion between us.

K: I will talk with the President about it.

D: Then it's on Tues. and I will wait until next Sunday. But latest. Otherwise, we couldn't do it next week. I am on my own pressing and not the govt.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101268
By LILIANA Date 6/16/71

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

8/11/71

-4-

K: I understand.

D: Would you suggest during this week then I will try to get answer Tues or Wed. about that. Then I will check my schedule. Nothing will be published.

K: Make a proposal about date and time of announcement when it's agreed to.

D: Try on Friday.

K: I will try.

D: Maybe approximately and get their reaction on this one. If on Wed. they will receive it on Thurs. and throw it into another week.

K: On Tues. they will have it Tues. night.

D: Then it's already in Moscow Wed.

K: Vorontsov could do it. It's primarily technical.

D: They are delaying me here because they want me to handle it. If it's possible to handle it. I am the one pressing it. If it can be speeded up okay. If not, it's all right. The President knows best. Call me tomorrow with a hint of where we stand.

K: Of course. I will call you tomorrow.

D: If it will be early, I will report it. I will expect a call from you tormowwor.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Fritz Kraemer

11:35 a.m., August 11, 1971

Kr: Before I leave this Saturday for Europe, I would like you to take note of a personnel matter concerning your close collaborator. I think the Chief of the Army here would be happy to be able to discuss privately what we can do but at the same time his career is to be safeguarded. We know that the man is valuable to you. I think the Army is trying to find a very nice way of doing it. It can only be discussed in a private conversation between you and the Chief. I am sure he had no time to speak with you for a moment yesterday.

K: I was in on the meeting.

Kr: But he had to make his pitch on the budget. I will simply say here that I have discussed the fact that the Chief would like to talk with you. He doesn't necessarily dare to approach you on his own. On this one matter, you would certainly be eager to see him.

K: I would be eager to see him.

Kr: And leave the rest to these people.

K: Absolutely. But I hope not before the election.

Kr: If I were you and they would say, 'we are to get this man back slowly into the Army'... If you were to say, for example, 'Fine, if that is a necessity, but please not before such and such a date.' As I judge these people they wouldn't say no. I can't explain it over the phone -- but Army would do it in this case. It would be much easier and would give you the sort of veto which is not so easy to get.

K: I understand. As I told you the other day, I want to take care of him.

Kr: I am only going to say, "Yes, indeed, Dr. Kissinger would be very happy and even delighted to see you on this matter," and leave it to them to get in touch with you.

K: That is exactly correct.

Kr: God be with you. I can't imagine that you have time to read but did you see that absolutely disgusting Reston interview.

By NARA, Date 5/27

11:35 a.m., August 11, 1971

- 2 -

K: I read it. Chou was all right. The restraint of Chou was almost unbelievable.

Kr: Chou is most adroit.

K: Not only that. Where it says 'Kissinger deceived you,'
Chou says, in effect, I won't comment on that. A sentence later,
he said, 'When we have complaints, we will make them.

Kr: He did it several times.

K: Two or three times Reston insisted I had deceived him.

Kr: He said, 'Didn't you feel that you might have been deceived. There were some other things in there.'

K: ...when he said the President has no courage.

Kr: He said, 'you must understand how I mean that. I am not here
abroad to criticize my President. I am trying to sketch the psychology
of the man.'

K: When Chou said we have time on Taiwan, he said, 'Let's settle it now.'

Kr: One thing -- if you ever have to discuss it, say 'Yes, Chou is a very intelligent Chinese Patriot with the zeal of Maoism.'
He must have despised this bourgeois before him. Psychologically, to see a man who can't stand up must be despicable for Chou En-lai -- this very adroit man. By the way, in 1967, I wrote this 2300-word analysis which had no Kraemer -- I took the paragraphs as a lawyer would do and made clear what the strategy was, from page 49 of the Peking review. Do you have it? Otherwise, I will send a copy.

K: Why don't you send it to me.

Kr: You can see how they are following the strategy through with absolutely unswerving fidelity to themselves. God be with you.

K: I hope to see you soon after your return.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01256
By CNAR Date 01/11/71

*

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:56 a.m.

8/11/71

D: I checked with you about this gentleman you talked to me about Loganov on UN. He left that day with Malik. So this information is nonsense. The ______ was taken day before yesterxay. So couldn't say anything. On Hammett, I looked through my own papers and now I recall and no particular --

K: He says he saw you for 5 mins. last year. I don't object to it but I wanted you to know he has no standing.

D: He sends you memos szying he saw me. I never saw him. It shows the source of the man.

K: Between you and me I didn't want pieces of papers floating around this town.

D: Take into account this gentleman. I can tell you 100% proof except on the slides business. Nothing else. In passing he mentioned that then and they didn't know I had spoken with you and he says he knows you and expects you on a Bar-B-Que next week.

K: (That's nonsense!) I saw him a year ago when he talked with you. I haven't seen or had anything to do with him. I think the situation is clear.

D: You have to take measures on your side to stop ? ? ?. Information on official sources where (?) we stop this business. (Or perhaps, "I will stop this..

K: Let's just leave it alone. It will attract attention. Anatol, let me think about it now that we know what we are talking about.

D: We will not be able because of our men don't know. Different kinds of stories going on and if he doesn't stop it we will have to stop business with him.

K: I will think about it. It may be a good idea. I will call you tomorrow to discuss it with you. I appreciate your meticulousness.

D: Could do it tomorrow about ______.

K: I will do my best. Don't want to give the wrong information. If possible by Friday I will do it.

By: NARA, Date: 5/27

TELCON
Mrs. Cramer/Kissinger
12:20 p.m. 8/11/71

Mrs. Cramer asked HAK if there was any chance of his staying the weekend with them the 20th-22nd of August. On the 21st there is a party at the Bistro for Doug -- a surprise -- and on 22nd, Doug's actual birthday, the Cramers are having a few people in. On the 20th the Mickey Zifferan's are having a beach party for Justice Irvin Kaufman of NY. HAK said he knew of him. Mrs. Cramer said that although HAK had not received an invitation it would be perfectly all right for her to invite him. She also said that the children are welcome to come and that her nurse would take care of them, thus eliminating the need for HAK's babysitter to accompany him. She said he could let her know anytime if there he could make it. HAK said he would love to do it and would let her know.

TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
4:42 p. m. 8/11/71

D: Once again. Do you see how I work hard now? Try to solve all our problems.

K: You have accepted 3 sites in return for half the Moscow system.

D: I will give you a short answer. You remember you raised the question of signing an agreement of lessening of war between our two countries. Our answer to you and the President is: we are prepared to initial it now with Semonov. We propose it should be signed on level of foreign ministers.

K: Right.

D: Two possibilities -- One, signed by end of Aug. in Helsinki.

K: We wouldn't like that.

D: Or sign it here when our foreign minister is in General Assembly in second part of Sept.

K: I will talk with the President but almost certainly we will accept the second. Let's do that.

D: May I give it as answer of the President?

K: I will call in an hour.

D: I haven't notified anyone else.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F01258
By NARA Date 6/1/71

By: NARA, Date: 5/27

TELCOM
Robert O. Anderson
4:52 p. m. 8/11/71

A: I have been invited to the Soviet Union on environmental committee. In past they have been diffident but they have come through loud and clear. Dr. Vishiany ? ? ?. ______ is my host. I go on the 6th of Sept. Just thought I would pass it along. Joe Slater and two scientists going with me. They have been very cordial. Atlantic Richfield has a process and I am going to see about an equity participation in Russia. Ford tried it. We know they want a license and the process but I thought I would text what they would think of an American joint venture in Russia.

K: Politically we don't want to go over board on economic thing so it doesn't look like collusion.

A: If you don't think equity thing is good, we could turn it off.

K: xing. If you could keep it exploratory.

A: I will just see if they are interested and if they are we will come back and talk.

K: You might come back and talk. Check with me about Aug. 23. Will you?

A: I will call the 23 or 24th.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F01287
By CNAR Date 01/11/87

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
8/11/71; 7:00 p. m.

K: I just talked to the President about the subject you raised. We would prefer to sign it here in Washington, preferably the first week of October if that's equally good with you.

D: Not at the end of September?

K: At the end of September -- what do you mean by the end of September?

D: Around the 20th to 25th or 29th.

K: I will tell you what our problem is -- he will be on the West Coast from about the 24th to 28th and then we have a State visit here that has not been announced yet of the Brazilian president.

D: I don't know when he has to leave because of his visit to France. The 20th - 22nd are not alright?

K: It has simply to do with the announcement of the other matter we discussed which we will have to do during that period. We don't want to have too many things the same week.

D: I will say that from the 30th, anytime within the week.

K: It would be the best for us but, of course, if he has to leave . . .

D: The 30th or anytime in that week.

K: What day is the 30th?

D: It will be a Thursday.

K: Of course, when the Foreign Minister comes here the President would like to see him. Let me ask one other thing: how is this thing to be surfaced concretely? Semonov (sp.?) will just accept it?

D: He will probably receive a telegram now.

K: So he will be told to go ahead?

D: As of now he will only receive instructions to initial. As of now he doesn't know anything about it.

K: I better tell Rogers then.

8/11/71; 7:00 p.m.

-2-

D: If you tell him maybe I will -- okay, you just tell him. I will drop in tomorrow, what do you say?

K: Let me notify him. I'll tell you what I will do. I will tell him tomorrow or Friday that I said to you tentatively September 30 with all the details to be worked out between you and him.

D: At the same time you said Gromyko will have a chat with the President on that date or the afternoon before.

K: On the occasion of his visit to Washington. Exactly!

D: I will wait to hear from you tomorrow on the other one.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOLASSER
By CNARA Date 9/10/71

By NARA, Date 5/97

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Debryin
8/11/71; 7:00 p. m.

K: What day is the 30th?

D: It will be a Thursday.

K: Of course, when the Foreign Minister comes here the President would like to see him. Let me ask one other thing: how is this thing to be surfaced concretely? Somewhat (sp.?) will just accept it?

K: I better tell Rogers then.

By NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
8:15 p.m., August 11, 1971

R: Henry, did you get word about textiles in the morning?

K: No, I --

R: Peterson called. John Mitchell called. He is very eager to
take this to the President.

K: I do not understand how to do these things.

R: I understand but I think you or Al should be there. He said
that he might go in to see the President afterwards.

K: The President mumbled something to me. In fact, I was hoping
he didn't know what he was talking about.

R: What did he mumble?

K: Something about they were going to come in to him. I urged
him not to do that. He was hoping for this other meeting. He
is not inclined to apply the national security clause.

R: Go for quotas.

K: Think he will go for quotas. At least it is a manly thing to do.
I talked to him about your doing negotiations with Fukuda [Minister
of Finance, Japan]. He is willing to go along with that.

R: Let's not say anything to anybody about that. I'll see what can
be worked out.

K: He would be willing to do something along that line but don't
think he should be willing to get kicked in the teeth again. Think
the way you wanted to do it is the best way of doing it.

R: Okay, Henry.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Dated

TELCORN

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger

8:25 p.m., August 11, 1971

K: You are a mind reader -- you know Nancy is coming and wishes to use your swimming pool this weekend.

B: I am delighted! But I will be here alone.

K: Then I had better not leave you alone.

B: Muffy is going up to Plymouth tomorrow but I will be here.

K: Is Saturday all right?

B: Anytime you want to. I won't be able to provide you with the kind of meal Muffy would provide --

K: Can't we bring something?

B: Our cooker will be here.

K: Besides I think your cook likes me better than you anyway.

B: Yes, you are one of her best customers. I had just drinks with a devoted ... (couldn't hear) ..

K: Who? ?

B: I said I just had drinks with a devoted friend of yours, the Japanese Ambassador.

K: Sarcastic of me personally?

B: The poor chap is meeting everybody everywhere explaining away the situation that has developed and does it with considerable charm.

K: What situation has developed?

B: The embarrassment his government reflects over your weekend trip.

K: That reminds me of -- what's Freeman's wife's name?

B: Catherine.

K: Catherine Freeman. She protests very much that he is not a heel.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger

8:25 p.m., August 11, 1971 -- page 2

B: (laughter)

K: And that she has had long suffering but is forgiving.

B: (laughter) Very true. Yes; well, Henry --

K: Did you call me?

B: Yes, I called you because you said we might be able to get
together sometime this week.

K: Yes.

B: I don't want to mix business with pleasure this weekend.

K: Let me call you tomorrow. Maybe we can get together Friday
sometime. I have an NSC meeting that will take much of my
time.

B: Afternoon or morning?

K: Morning.

B: Tell me, do you think that the Mid-East initiative of Sisco's is
still alive or not?

K: (laughter) I think we can control it -- I mean we can control
the situation from getting out of hand. I think it is sort of alive,
yes.

B: I don't know yet what I am going to write about this week but this
is a possibility.

K: I'll tell you this, you won't be overtaken by events.

B: The Israelis are taking a pretty negative attitude. A question of
whether I will follow it up with Egyptian.

K: Don't think I can in its present form -- but I think we can keep
situation quiet anyway.

B: If you can keep it quiet also in East Pakistan.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Packard/Kissinger
8/12/71 10:03 a.m.

K: That was some set of presentations the other day. I will be damned if the President had asked the AF what they wanted I wouldn't have known on what issue.

P: We will put that in context but that Navy --

K: That was so crooked. It wasn't fair to the other chiefs.

P: It wasn't and we will have to work it out. I have just talked with Anaconda Co on Chile. They can't get anywhere with State. I was wondering if you could see them. Mr. Place and Mr. Quigley.

K: Have their offices call Coleman Hicks, my assistant.

P: A time at your convenience. They will come down at your convenience. Six within the next week or so. Things moving fast. A deadline of 90 days on expropriation. Ambassador is a lame duck. It's a mess.

K: As long as I have you on the phone, what the President would like to do is on the Defense budget he will not make a decision tomorrow. He would like you, Shultz, and I to get together next week and tell you what he wants in capabilities and you work it out. If army can get two divisions out of 500 million and if they are important if we can get more divisions by other things.

P: The air sorties level to the requirements. On presentation, yesterday Mel and I talked and he thinks he should make the presentation tomorrow. Broader strokes then I outlined to you. If you and George and I could get together after that. We can lower figures after force level. Budget scrub and shifting we can do from first of year to . . . . . . . We ought to come out at the level we start from in terms of planning for (about) 79.6. Get it below. Not 75 but perhaps 77.

K: I think the President will go along with 79.6. With George has of 2 billion he can move from one year to the other.

P: Where we should come out in terms of force levels or 79.6 or 80 or 81. Make adjustments with 79.6.

K: OK. Let's get together on Tuesday.

P: I will have Mr. Place call Hicks for an appointment.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE

Flanigan/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. - 8/12/71

K: Hello

F: Henry. Dave Hillenbrand is having a tough time with this Northern Ireland thing. The Irish Prime Minister is asking that we urge the delay of the air ______.

K: Why are they down?

F: Because of what is happening in Northern Ireland. We delayed this damn thing for 12 years. They want us to delay it for a week. Hillenbrand said State won't take a position.

K: Why can't we delay it a week?

F: I think we can, but no more. This Northern Ireland thing has been going on for months, but if you would like to delay it a week, we can.

K: I have no objection. Has the President approved this?

F: I sent you a memo on Tuesday enclosing the memo to the President asking his approval of the action and he approved it. Well, I will call and say we will delay it a couple of days, but no longer than a week.

K: I have no view on the subject. I am willing to go along with it.

F: Well, perhaps you would like to take a look at the memo I sent you.

K: OK.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM

Marshall Shulman/Kissinger

10:22 a. m.

8/12/71

S: Sorry to say I lost my father this week.

K: I am distressed to hear thst.

S: I leave for Moscow Sunday. Paul has left and asked me to check on
next main ______. I can do it by phone or come down.

K: I am jammed up the next few days.

S: Maybe phone call sufficient.

K: Not much to add to what I told you when we met. I think we will shape
up our relations with Russia rather well. I can only warn against orgies of
xix self-flagellation.

S: You saw the Arbatov piece.

K: That expresses their concern. Let's make progress in areas where
we are working. No sense in going into orgies. What can we do with
Chinese to offend them? We will be meticulous and not harrass them or
do petty things.

S: I will be in Conn. until Sunday. I will give your secretary the number.

K: When are you coming back?

S: The following Sunday.

K: I will be on the West Coast. Call when you can.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger

11:15 a.m. - 8/12/71

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Thanks, Bill, for throwing me into a meeting with all those political people.

R: I didn't do it deliberately, Henry. How did it go?

K: Well, predictably much less than if you could have been there.

R: I had a little eye problem and the thing was hemorraging. It looks like hell.

K: Well, you have had that red spot on it. One could see something was wrong.

R: It's just a matter of rest, but I look as if I had been slugged in the eye. How did the meeting go?

K: You didn't miss a great deal. Mitchell and Harlow are all screaming for a national security clause in the name of politics. In my view, I don't know a damn thing about politics.

R: Did you meet with the President about it afterwards?

K: No, I am just afraid they will get in there without you around and he doesn't really want to do it but on the other hand. . . when the State Department isn't there. . . I am pulling your leg, actually I called you on another matter.

Dobrynin called this morning and then I couldn't get you about this accidental war thing which they are initiating in Helsinki next week and they think it ought to be signed on the Foreign Minister level on the occasion of his visit here. I checked with the President and he said it was all right so I called Dobrynin back and said to work it out with you. So I just want you to know he is going to be calling you. The only thing he said after checking with Haldeman was anytime after September 30, anytime after the Brazilian visit.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

R: I think we ought to get the President into the act. Maybe I can go in and see the President before I go.

K: It could be a signing ceremony with you and Gromyko signing and he could just go over for the ceremony, make a few remarks and . . .

R: Fine. You know another possibility, which in a way would be more dramatic, would be to do it like the Okinawa thing. Have it in Moscow and here at the same time, using INTELSAT, and then have the President on.

K: That might drive the Chinese crazy. You know he doesn't actually insist on participating. My own personal view is that he would like you to come up with some scheme to make him participate.

R: Well, I do think the credit should go to him.

K: But I think it is entirely up to you to work out. It might be good to sign it at the Department rather than the White House. This would give the State Department some . . .

R: That would be fine.

K: But anyway, the way you want to work it out. He didn't think it at all inappropriate if you came up with a plan whereby Gromyko signed it at the Department on October 1 and he would come to the Department the same way he came for INTELSAT.

R: I will come up with something along that line. I am sorry my statement with Ojibwa (sp.?) came up.

K: He was unhappy about that.

R: Tell him I am very sorry. It wasn't meant to.

K: No, he didn't mind your doing it, but he was sorry it got leaked.

R: Well, no, it really didn't get leaked. We had this meeting with congressionals, etc. and you have to say something.

K: Well, I thought it was pretty low key.

R: It was low key. It didn't make the *Times*.

By NARA, Date 5/27

K: So I will tell Dobrynin to call you and on the other thing I will hear from you whatever your proposal is.

R: How did you leave the textile thing?

K: Peterson is going to do a memo for the President. Mitchell is pressing for a decision by the time the textile meets on August 15. My question is what are they going to do to win it? They siad they would go to Mills, but what the hell can he do. I think we would be better off having a quota bill than apply the national security clause; at least the quota bill puts the blame on Congress.

R: Who was on our side?

K: Peterson, in a sort of ambiguous way. Finch was and so it was pretty well I alone. I was screaming for State Department participation and they didn't come.

R: I am sorry I couldn't be there.

K: They told me you were trying to set me up for a quarrel with Mitchell.

R: I am not that shrewd.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsinger
By: CARA Date: 5/10/71

TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

12:00 noon

8/12/71

K: Two things. One on the matter we discussed yesterday on accidental war thing. I talked with Rogers and told him to work with details with you. One option is a signing in Washington when your foreign minister is here. Sept. 30 or one or two days afterwards. I said you would get in touch with him. I saw Semonov has talked with Smith about initialling part of it. That's fine. It's working just right.

D: I forgot to mention to you about that we are proposing to you through him a ? ? ? maybe while the signing of agreement we can make a simultaneous announcement that we invited the others for likewise.

K: During the ceremony on the 30th.

D: By the two ministers. By ______ I would not mention it.

K: We don't have to worry about that.

D: Its for you to know.

K: You are absolutely right. I looked over provisions yesterday. No problems I can see. They are initialling it tomorrow.

D: I don't know when.

K: Either tomorrow or next day.

D: Gromyko should be back in Moscow today and we will have an answer about the 30th. So tomorrow or Sat. I will have an answer on 30th.

K: On other thing we have all the people of President working on these things on NSC meeting on Defense budget and it's hard to give a final answer before Tues. Informally I can say there will not be surprises. We are looking at May dates rather than June. Second half of May. I would rather wait until lunch Tues.

D: In Moscow I said I would have to reply on Tues.

K: Do you want to come for lunch on Tues.?

D: If convenient for you. You will be back?

K: I will. Lunch at 1:00 Tues.

D: OK, then.

-2-

K: We will have meeting tomorrow. Then announcement sometime afterwards. If we agree on a date.

D: My understanding. No additional information. We give you two months' and two months you gave us and a more precise date.

K: I will be specific on ____.

D: Have a nice trip.

K: x____ You are the only one in town who knows.

D: You can rely on this.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01287
By CHNARA Date 09/12/71

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

12:15 p.m., August 12, 1971

L: Something came up over here... I haven't cut in all the people at State -- Sullivan hasn't been briefed as far as the logistics build-up in Vietnam. Dave was in the WSAG meeting the other day and didn't think he should point out we were transferring the A-1's by September.

K: You can't do that. That was not to be done!

L: The President's order that I received said transfer those aircraft programmed by 1972.

K: It was not the intention to take them away from Laos.

L: You are sure of that?

K: I am positive, but I will check.

L: These are in Thailand.

K: I am positive this was not his intention.

L: I interpreted it... but it needs no interpretation... that all those planned for delivery to South Vietnam...

K: I am sure the President didn't focus on this. He meant equipment in Vietnam.

L: Only equipment in Vietnam? We are transferring a lot of stuff from the U.S.

K: That's all right -- but not from Laos.

L: I have 22 ships loading. But Dave felt he shouldn't discuss it with the WSAG group.

K: That was good of Dave, but I am sure he didn't mean taking away from Laos. You had better cancel that part of it.

L: We better get to the Vietnamese. I think we should sit down and go over the logistics movements I am making.

K: We better do that. Let me get back to you this afternoon.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
President/Kissinger
2:20 p.m. 8/12/71

P: I think Ehrlichmans thing went well.

K: I haven't seen the tickers on it.

P: Ron and John gave me a report. Very positive. We will vacuum in the news this way.

K: I think the way it was worked out this morning was positive.

P: I don't know.

P: and lays foundation for later.

look like

K: We shouldn't like we are starting a civil war. I haven't seen the way it came out but the way it merged this morning was good.

P: What was the general feeling after the textile thing?

K: It's a bad straight division between political people and others. Rogers didn't come. I recommended it later, but rather than force your choice (?) on those ground to have Peterson put it in a memo to you with both sides and I think you will be able to manage it by overruling straight political arguments as we have ? ? ? .

P: What's your recommendation?

K: Not to apply the national security clause but to threaten legislation.

P: We have done that before. We can try it again.

K: That's right and can say what we come to. Negotiation this time on higher level.

P: Seeing your Japanese friend again?

K: Next Friday in San Clemente and Rogers can see Fokuda. Other route will be too cynical and open you up for pressure from other interest groups.

P: That's my feeling.

K: Your instinct is very good.

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Phil Farley
2:55 p.m., August 12, 1971

[Following preliminary conversation between General Haig and
Phil Farley, Mr. Kissinger talked with Mr. Farley]

F: I was just explaining to Al that all I believe this is OK was
that it was raised in the sessions in Vienna. Gerry said it was the
first he had heard of it and he would get back to them.

K: But why should anything change at the precise moment when
the occasion rises to implement the instruction.

F: A separate telegram is coming -- which I have not yet received --
and I am confident he is going to say, 'I assume that is the line I follow.'
He is gun-shy now. He feels that basically he's been following instructions
and now there is doubt and misunderstanding on both sides. This is
political.

K: The main thing is we don't want the Russians to think any new
instructions were issued. We want it clear -- any country can accede
to the wishes... that we will not join in an appeal to third countries
together with the Soviet Union.

F: The instructions are clear on that point.

K: We should tell the Russians we want to consult NATO and put
it to the latter part of the week. We won't have problems with NATO.

F: You don't want to do more than give NATO formal notification.
It's tricky giving them time to look at it and come back a couple of
weeks later.

K: But we have to go through the motions of briefing them. I am
thinking of a delay of three to four days -- not more than a week. It
won't affect them at all. It's the sort of thing on which it
pays to be meticulous.

F: Okay.

K: Right. Thank you. Godd-bye.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

Mrs. Johnx Sherman Cooper/Kissinger

8/12/71

C: Congratulations. Carol Laise called me yesterday afternoon and had an idea which might help our relationship to India. I wonder if you could see them.

K: Bunker?

C: They live just down the road. The don't know I have called you. I am awfully concerned about this and I am sure you are more. It gives the Soviets what they want. The ______.

K: They won't get them. I will talk with both Bunker and Carol.

C: Could you call them?

K: Certainly. I will see them anyway and will call them.

C: They asked about everything except who they talked to.

K: I will talk before the end of the day. I will call them.

C: Wonderful. Their point of view. What Carol was talking about may be cancelled by Soviet/Krix/India statement today. Urge political solution be ? ?

K: I will be talking with them. Have a good trip.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCON
McNamara/Kissinger
8:40 a.m. 8/13/71

M: I am leaving today for 3 weeks and before going wanted to speak on India/ Pakistan. I am delighted to see what the government is doing. Roger's Statements are good. The handling of refugees in India is miserable. I talked with two people who just came back yesterday. They have such a problem with their budget and they are not giving aid to refugees. They won't look ahead that this is a permanent problem. It's just swamped them. They want to stem the tide by making conditions so bad but it's having a bad effect on their development and ______ programs. No one has gone to Canada, the British or the U.S. to say what can off set them. It's costing about 1/2 billion dollars a year.

K: The world has given about ______ million.

M: Effect on politics is damn serious. I know something cna be done. Japan has a surplus of rice and the U.S. has PL 480. I think that can be done.

K: Right.

M: Second point is gratuitous. Farland is most unrealistic about this. He doesn't see how serious this is economically. Completely unrealistic about external aid to Pakistan. He thought the International Monetary Fund could give ______ dollars to Pakistan for standby. I said it's not possible.

K: Why should multi ______ get into politics?

M: Fund would give money if it didn't go down the drain. But there's no place to put the money over there.

K: It's a hell of a position to take -- take that consortium. ? ? ? ? ? .

M: Let's talk about (the fund). Farland is unrealistic in that Fund would make standby credit and I said he was wrong. Today Hilaly spoke with Schweitzer, believing the same thing. He told Hilaly no chance. Fund would like an excuse but it would be wasted. It's an economic problem. Development money, not relief monty. You can't put money in effectively. The moment we can do it ______ we will, and recommend to others. So I am saying that Farland has an overly optimistic view and it's a serious weakness.

K: I didn't know anything about IMF idea. We are not basing anything on it.

M: Don't want him to spread it around the government.

K: Again our view is this. We cannot turn on Pakistan and I think it would have disastrous consequences with China that after they gave us an airport we

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

massacre them. Pakistan also thing as a ______ Taiwan and Tibet.
We won't support Pakistan but we want a sense of balance. We think that
orgy here -- people who urged us to ignore Biafra are asking us to brutalize
Pakistan.

M: But situation in East -- India and Pakistan needs more help.

K: We are sending a relief program out. Murry Williams going out there
next week.

M: Very desirable. Put more effort on relief side on India. UN people aren't very effective here. 9-5 and haven't gone to get systems that can be gotten. In East Pakistan more can be done to stop flow of refugees out of Pakistan. I am afraid India will act in a way that will force Pakistan to act unreasonably. Damn little done on these factors by UN.

K: Problem here with bureaucracy is unbelievable. Those on side of
India will do nothing for Pakistan and making Pakistan more radical.

M: If you want to be pro-Indian here, is to solve problem in Pakistan.
The pro-Indians don't look at it this way. I will leave my number with
the WH.

K: I will be on the West Coast. If anything brings you to the West Coast --

M: Dought it. Another point is that no one to work on this.

K: God has punished me by putting all crises in Joe Sisco's area.

M: What you need is a Republican Cy Vance. They are around.

K: I wish I could find him.

HAK Called McNamara immediately back:

K: Another thing -- I have discussed it with Connally and President and
nothing here whatsoever. We thought it would be nice for him to call you in.

M: You are nice.

K: Schedule problems. Formalities will be done when we are back.

M: On Pakistan problem, I don't want to be ______ but China trip will be
screwed up.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM

Alex Johnson/Kissinger

9:30 a.m. - 8/13/71

K: I hear that you and Irwin will be at the meeting this morning.

J: No, Irwin will be there alone. I won't be as I have a speech to give at 10:00.

K: Is Irwin well prepared?

J: Yes, he is well prepared. We have gone over it very carefully and he is going to say this morning what you and I talked about. I was hoping Ron Spiers could be there?

K: Is Irwin the only one from State?

J: Yes, no way Ron . . .

K: That will be OK. Let Ron come. What I am going to do is start with a presentation saying the President told me to get the budget into this one, but we have absolutely failed to do it. There will be questions to which there will be no answers and if we are to have an effective foreign policy this can't be. Laird will present the budget and then after that we are off to the necessary.

J: Well, Jack and I have carefully gone over what he is going to say.

K: How is the Secretary?

J: He just called in this morning and said he isn't coming in today.

K: Well, I will call him at home.

J: I am afraid it's this eye of his; that's what I am afraid about.

K: OK, I will call him at home.

By: NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
9:40 a.m. - 8/13/71

R: Hi.

K: I just wanted to check how you are.

R: Fine, I just look like I've been hit by Cassius Clay.

K: You can say you had free expressions of opinion.

R: People say we aren't getting along.

K: That's it. I did it. You know we ought to step into the press room and say we had a meeting.

R: The doctor said it was just a matter of letting the damn thing go away.

K: I guess rest is the best way; I mean resting the eye, not reading.

R: Well, apparently they think it is ultraviolet rays which caused it. I do get a lot of sun. The doctor said I have to be careful about wearing glasses outside and you know, I've never worn glasses outside.

K: Well, you could see it even on Wednesday.

R: It's just as if I got hit in the eye with a helluva wallop. I could come in except it looks so bad so I decided to stay home a day.

K: We have an NSC meeting this morning. The way we are going to present it is ... well, the President asked me two weeks ago to get the budget put into it which we have failed to get out of the military - Laird. He is asking me to cut forces in the Pacific to 100 positions total, but with our relations with Japan right now, if we cut our forces down in Japan to 1/3 we are going to be in bad trouble psychologically and politically and if we have only 1-1/3 divisions, no one will realize we are there.

R: I didn't realize that. I know he wanted to reduce the forces in Korea

K: He wants to have only one division in Hawaii and that is all for the whole Pacific. This is a very bad thing for us, don't you agree?

By NARA, Date

R: Well, in the first place the Koreans would go right up the wall, the Japanese would go up the wall and no telling what the North Koreans will do.

K: And if we want to put ground forces in its just a very bad picture of the United States. And he wants to cut that down to less than 10.

R: We can't do that.

K: I think we would have a blowup with the Koreans.

R: They would be convinced that we had sold them to . . .

K: And also if we sold this to the Chinese over a period of four years we wouldn't have to . . . but in one year it's ridiculous. I told you the line we had with Alex.

R: No. That would totally undercut the Nixon Doctrine. The suspicion is that it is a device to get the hell out of the Pacific.

K: Well, that's my view.

R: I think Jack is going to take that line.

K: I will give him a call.

R: OK, Henry. You aren't going on the political trip with the President?

K: No, I am taking my children out to California on Wednesday, but I am not going on the trip.

R: That business thing is a mess, isn't it?

K: Well, it was brought on by one town - Dallas.

R: Did you see Wallace last night. That sob is clever.

K: I frankly think we can't be like a puncher reacting to every move. It makes it all so political that we lose even those who are for it.

R: Really I think the White House should stay out of it and let Mitchell take care of it.

K: He can just say he is enforcing the law.

R: OK, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/McGeorge Bundy

12:12 p.m., August 13, 1971

K: Mac, how are you?

B: You were brilliant the other night.

K: Aren't you nice?

B: Diebold is a good guy.

K: I found it interesting and helpful from my point of view.

B: Our man, Staples, who's very shrewd, knows Mr. Nixon -- he was on the Latin America tour with him 12 years ago -- just came back from Pakistan and India and has expressed great concern at that evolving situation. Staples has been in Washington, and I thought I would give you this informal report which he confirmed with McNamara. It's not so much policy but organization of parties. U Thant's people are a broken ankle for organizing -- this is our man's view. Williams -- Hannah's deputy is knowledgeable but bureaucratic -- he can't call Ambassadors and Cabinet Officers, but he has the competence. This is so familiar to me because we couldn't get AID to do anything when I was there. The Bank is not anxious to get into the act. Bob is feeling diffident about it -- he doesn't think the Bank could move in on the UN. We concluded if Americans are to take the lead as was indicated at that dinner...

K: And quite committally.

B: If we do that kind of thing, we will have to have a man who is Richard Nixon's guy, he has to have free-wheeling powers and who can, in effect, do the job for U Thant himself.

K: How do we set him up bureaucraticly?

B: I would think, since it's not a "forever assignment..." you could use a Frank Murphy type, with real executive energy whom the President could ask to do this. He tells everybody, 'I am in charge of aid to the refugees in the subcontinent.' Get a guy whom U Thant will let push him around, I am really saying that with the best will in the world, according to the people Staples talked with it won't go from where it is.

By

NARA, Date 5/27

Mr. Kissinger/McGeorge Bundy

12:12 p.m., August 13, 1971

K: I have come to the same conclusion. I was talking to the President this morning about it but not that concretely. One maddening thing is the pro-Indians in the State Department won't let us do a God-damn thing -- they are fighting a guerrilla war even on relief. They don't know the best way to help the Indians is to stop the refugee flow.

B: It has to be equally energetic on both sides and it has to be through U Thant in the sense that they would be UN teams. In order to raise hundreds of millions of dollars... Nobody with the skill in Washington has the time -- the Secretary of State can't make the phone calls, and you certainly don't have the time. It has to be a guy for a 24-hour-a-day job.

K: Have you thought of anyone?

B: Franklin Murphy -- to the President he is well-known. He could leave the LA TIMES job for two or three months.

K: He talks incessantly.

B: Cy Vance could do it, but I don't think the President would like that. Jim Perkins could do it.

K: That is a good idea. It would be good to rehabilitate him and he deserves rehabilitation. I like Franklin Murphy also as an idea. He is well thought of by the President, but he is a trial with his talking and he's time-consuming. But we must do something.

B: Another guy the President knows is William Eberley.

K: We know him and think well of him.

B: It has to be a sufficiently deep executive team.

K: This has been tremendously helpful. I had come to the same conclusion -- but really to the negative side of the conclusion. But if you pick somebody like Eberley who has no past... or even Roy Ash.

B: Right -- who has no record.

By CCO

NARA, Date 5/27

Mr. Kissinger/McGeorge Bundy

12:12 p.m., August 13, 1971

K: Also Murphy has no record there -- or Roy Ash. Any one of those names would be good. Let me see what I can do by early next week.

B: But Hannah himself could do it, if you took him out of that job and put him on the other one. He may have been ground down by the last two years. He's on vacation at the moment which is wrong with this problem where it is. I can promise you that McNamara told Staples yesterday that the Banks would put everything quietly at the disposal of such a guy.

K: It's clearly the right thing to do. We are heading into a disaster. Every cable takes a week and then it's not enough. They are talking of $100 million for both sides of the border -- it's ridiculous. The Indian side alone will be a half-billion over a year.

B: The Indians will be difficult according to Staples. We may be heading into another of those situations where we have to prevent a permanent enclave of refugees. Their return to Pakistan is preferred.

K: I think we could sell Yahya on a refugee settlement, but we cannot sell him something called political accommodation.

B: Public opinion is out of control on this one -- certainly abroad and increasingly here.

K: We have to get the refugee flow stopped.

B: If you get people to work on the refugees...

K: I think the Indians are quite deliberately steering toward it.

B: Did you read the Soviet action as a seriously restraining one?

K: They are in on something they don't really want but don't want to pay the price of stopping.

B: I believe so far -- at least from our own reports -- that Indira doesn't want it.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Mr. Kissinger/McGeorge Bundy

12:12 p.m., August 13, 1971

K: But she may start so many things in motion, and we don't know what the Pakistanis will do out of frustration.

B: None of this seems to do anything but accentuate it.

K: Everybody has been pushing for three weeks for a simple relief program for East Pakistan, but just to get these cables run around the bureaucracy takes forever. Today I said it is going out tonight and if it doesn't come out of the bureaucracy, I am going to send it backchannel. I am supporting what you are saying.

B: Your international organization is no good. And the bank is diffident.

K: I will do my damndest to have someone by the end of next week. This has really been very helpful.

B: I call out of sympathy. I will tell you sometime how it took me three years to get a man in Vietnam.

K: All right. Mac, thank you.

lds

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:30 p.m. 8/13/71

K: You called me.

L: I was calling about -- there was some note we might not be meeting this afternoon. Is it still on?

K: I will check it.

L: I brought these guys in for it. Two were on leave. No difference if President has something else.

K: I will let you know in a few minutes.

L: I think I should let them know. They are bringing them in. Getting tied up on Korea thing isn't the issue.

K: 11 or 13 divisions is the issue. We have to have one in Hawaii.

L: There will be a swing division in Hawaii. Whether it's in Hawaii or Korea isn't a budget issue.

K: I understand. One issue is a division in Hawaii plus no reduction in Korea.

L: If we have 13 divisions there will be one in Hawaii. No problem with that. But a funding problem from 13 to 11 divisions. I didn't want to get into CIOP discussion. We are making changes but not a budget issue. You could tell I didn't know whether to discuss it. I let it slip in my presentation.

K: Right.

L: I did bring them all back.

K: Right.

L: Of course if the President is busy we will do it another time.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Don Oberdorfer/Kissinger
4:00 p.m. 8/13/71

O: We were just following up on situation I discussed with you a couple of months ago about possible reorganization of intelligence and you indicated at that time that something in July or thereafter something more might be towards decision and we had notion this now active. I understand Ellender pushing something to be done on appropriations.

K: We haven't made any final decisions.

O: Is it getting near to stage of decision one way or another?

K: Nox Not for next few weeks.

O: At the time we talked before you strongly steered me off idea -- one big agency with Helms coming into the WH.

K: That's wrong.

O: Does it look like something in works but not at decisional stage?

K: That's correct.

O: Am I right about Ellender?

K: I haven't heard it but rumors all along.

O: That he was pushing on this ____.

K: Yes.

O: If we write anything it will be to the effect that reorganization of intelligence community is under study and might mention some things mentioned by various people and decision not made and should be made in the next couple of months.

K: That's about right. Maybe in the next month but that's about it.

O: Going to California?

K: Yes.

O: Like to see you out there.

K: I am much more relaxed out there.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Amb. Plimsoll/Kissinger
5:37 p. m. 8/13/71

K: With respect to letter you sent me my only thought here is whether it could be delayed until after the election there.

P: I will send something back on that straight away. I knew nothing about this until I got the letter. I personally would handle it differently.

K: Our moral positions are now ? ? ? . If you could make suggestion it would help us.

P: Apparently we have told them.

K: It's one thing to tell them and another to announce it.

P: I will send something off.

K: Should I show this letter to Rogers?

P: Yes. I have told the State Dept. about it.

K: Then it's in the press.

P: You think so?

K: Yes. I will send the letter to State and tell them to avoid leaking it.

P: I didn't regard this as --

K: It's not this sensitive. I prefer you do it as you did. I will try to get them to restrain their natural exuberance.

P: I made point there of no leak. I will get it right off.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE

6:55 p.m., August 13, 1971

K: Bill, I just wanted to tell you the Australian Ambassador sent over here a letter from McMahon to the President which says that the Australians are going to withdraw their forces from Vietnam this year. He called me about it. My personal opinion is that they shouldn't do it until after the Vietnamese election but that the Department would be in touch.

R: Does the Prime Minister say when?

K: Yeah -- you mean when they would start?

R: Yeah.

K: I think in October.

R: Did they say when they would announce it?

K: No, that he doesn't say. When he calls me, I will give him my personal opinion.

R: Yeah. I talked to the President on the other thing.

K: Oh, good.

R: I have a feeling he will make some decision Tuesday (?). Think that should do and I will have my people available so we can move quickly.

K: Right.

R: I think Govenor Wallace is a miserable bastard but think he is funny. Did you hear him today?

K: No, I didn't.

R: He was talking about busing. He says he agrees with everything we are doing; that he is trying to support the President. He said (Rogers using a heavy Southern drawl) I am just trying to help the Administration. Mitchell is against busing; Mrs. Mitchell is against busing. The newspaper guys almost cracked up. He is really a scoundrel.

K: The problem is going to be if somebody comes along with his intelligence but who is more presentable.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

6:55 p.m., August 13, 1971

R: Huey Long, if you remember him, used to speak before the Senate. He was a masterful speaker. I never heard anybody as good; better than Mahon. He was the kind of Democrat that might make it in this country. I'm not sure with television.

K: My bid with the political future is that the Right Wing rather than radicals who is going to make it.

R: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Bill, I just wanted to let you know.