TELCORN
President Nixon and HAK

October 16, 1971 10:20 a.m.

(Due to a misunderstanding of who was taking this conversation, the
first half of the telcon was not recorded)

HAK: They even called the newsmen. They said this to businessmen
and then they called newsmen to Kosygin could repeat it.

RN: This must drive Harriman up the wall. They didn't do it to
past Administrations... even the Eisenhower Administration--of
course, that was a different period.

HAK: This just says that the approach in the course of........ in
Washington was positively received.

HAK: We had a long talk with the Middle East.

RN: You consider this position very significant?

HAK: Yes, I heard it said to me --

RN: Gromyko repeated it to me

HAK: They say they will make the commitment that will not organize
units and they will have a commitment on either an arms embargo or
... into Egypt and that this interim settlement should be stretched out and
that will keep the Egyptians quiet until the end of the year.

RN: Do you think the Israelis will squirm?

HAK: We have to keep Sisco shut off because he is stirring things up to
force settlement now and the Israelis won't do it. And Sisco's approach
will leave the Russians there. That is the decision we have to make in
December--we have to be tough on both sides.

RN: We can't give the Israelis the moon.

- more -

Page 2

HAK: I think this was due to the success of your outline on the 7th.

RN: Did you say that Jerry Smith is going fast on the SALT thing?

HAK: Yes

RN: Did he express concern about ... up?

HAK: He didn't deny it. So our relationship with them are better
than they have ever been. They are deluging us with messages on
the China trip--offering services.

RN: You leave at 12:00?

HAK: Yes:

RN: Where are you staying in Hawaii?

HAK: At the Rockefeller Hotel. I think that is the best place--L.
Rockefeller's house there on Canneal Bay.

RN: Is the house separate?

HAK: I will check on that and give you a report.

RN: That would be nice--a private beach and everything.

RN: Everything else is working on plan--terrific press on textiles.

HAK: and a good report on Charlotte--this has been a very successful
week.

RN: The textile thing really came in just a nick of time. Wilbur
Mills silenced them. This wouldn't have happened if I hadn't been
questioned at the Press Conference--it gave me a chance to make a
public commitment. -- You will be in Hawaii Sunday and Monday?
Call me before you leave Hawaii.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By LINDA Date 6-20-80

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin
10/16/71: 10:55 a.m.

D: Are you en route to China?

K: Not yet - in an hour and a half. I had a good dinner yesterday. Horrible for my waistline.

D: In Hawaii you will be as thin as a girl.

K: Hawaii doesn't make you thin. I want to see whether they give us caviar again. I have talked to the President and we are changing the letter. We are adding a paragraph.

D: I understand.

K: I think that will answer the oral note.

D: That is quite all right.

K: I referred very positively to the oral note. It reflects essentially the spirit with which he will approach it. There is a paragraph that picks up the suggestion you made.

D: OK.

K: I have also talked to the President about the other topic. He approves our proceeding in that way.

D: The dates we discussed.

K: Yes, we will try to get you an answer by November 20 and will proceed to talk about guarantees.

D: OK, fine.

K: What we all ought to try to do on the main business we discussed yesterday is to avoid things running normal course but not to introduce too many new ideas into other channels. There may be restlessness on our side but nothing in these ideas of private conversations will be known. It would be useful if you did not put into other channels.

D: No, No. Unless there was some kind of... but in any case I will let you know. But to my knowledge there is no intention. But from your side of course you will go second channel, but with understanding...

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012587
By CNAR Date 05/01/87

-2-

K: We will go ahead in the second channel because I can't get a grip on it until I get back. I don't see any new element that could bring about a change of position.

D: No, I understand.

K: I don't see what the new element is.

D: I understand now. Yes, quite right. I know, that is what you mentioned. We will look to the guarantees. Then it would have an interval to think it over once again.

K: Time for the interim and time for the final.

D: ... settle in our own minds and details could be worked out later on. Right.

K: I will be in touch with you.

D: What about this letter?

K: You will get a copy. I have read the paragraph. I will get an unsigned copy sent over to the Embassy this afternoon.

D: I am going this evening back to New York and I would like to send it myself. And then the signed one I will receive Monday or Tuesday. Have a nice trip, and take care about yourself.

K: I shall, and we will work together when I get back.

D: OK.

Telcon

Amb. Dobrynin

10/16/71: 10:55 a.m.

D: Are you en route to China?

D: I understand.

D: That is quite all right.

D: OK.

D: The dates we discussed.

D: OK, fine.

-2-

D: No, I understand.

D: What about this letter?

D: OK.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-01258
By LARA Date 04/10/71

TELECON

General Haig/Ambassador Dobrynin

10:55 a.m., October 19, 1971

H: Good morning, sir.

D: Did you get the message to Henry?

H: He did get it and he was appreciative for it.

D: I thought it would be useful for him.

H: I have a couple of things. First, I have the original signed text of the letter.

D: Send it to my Embassy, please

H: All right, sir. Second, Henry called late last night to raise one issue. He discussed it with the President -- the growing tension in the India/Pakistan situation. We are exercising maximum restraint on the Pakistanis to pull back their forces. The President felt...

D: In East Pakistan?

H: ...to get a lessening of forces along the border in both East and West Pakistan in a way that he hoped your side could exercise maximum restraint on the Indians. He is fearful this situation could develop despite our best intentions.

D: When I spoke to Henry, it was an appeal to both India and Pakistan at this moment from my government. I will confirm it with my government. At that time, the information from my government was we are doing the same as your President -- along those lines. I will send another message on what you just mentioned -- that your President is concerned. Basically I know as of Saturday my government recon- firmed doing this the same way as your President.

H: I will be sure the President knows that.

D: That is officially from my leadership. It is of mutual concern.

H: Then I will send this letter right over.

D: All right. Thank you.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folks
By CHNARA Date 01/25/71

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Haig

10/25/71; 1:00 p.m.

D: How are you?

H: Always busy.

D: Well, I would like to be advised on one point. You remember there was a letter which you gave me, with a proposal regarding one of your men going to my country in November. I now have received an answer in connection with the letter from the President. We are prepared to receive him, and we propose the week of Nov. 15...anytime during the week beginning from Nov. 15. I would need your advice or Henry's on how to proceed. We want to know whether you will inform your man, or whether we should issue an invitation to him, etc.

H: Yes, I understand.

D: I would like to verify this point because this is a delicate situation. So you will check when Henry is back?

H: We will have an answer for you by Wednesday. Is that satisfactory?

D: Or tomorrow?

H: Well, maybe tomorrow evening.

D: Wednesday will be all right.

H: Mr. Ambassador, while I am speaking to you I wonder if Henry mentioned to you the fact that Mr. Kendall wanted to discuss with you the visit of a trade group to the Soviet Union.

D: No, I don't remember it.

H: Do you know who Mr. Kendall is?

D: No.

H: He is the head of Pepsi Cola.

D: Ah, yes, he mentioned it to me, but rather long, long ago. He said there was a man who wanted to talk to me and he gave me some vague description. He has not discussed it with me in recent months. But if Mr. Kendall would like to speak with me there is no problem. Let him give me a call.

H: OK, Mr. Ambassador. And I will talk to Henry when he returns and give you an answer either tomorrow evening or Wednesday.

[Sherry Netherlands Hotel,
New York El 5-2800]

TELCORN

Robert Evans/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., October 26, 1971

E: Welcome home! You had a nice little journey.

K: It was fascinating.

E: I am dying to hear about it.

K: It was very fascinating.

E: You are busy in Washington.

K: I have really got my hands full right now. How are you?

E: My private life is coming along fine. The headlines have all been
about you.

about
K: I found out these goddamn hollywood stories.

E: Disgusting, isn't it?

K: It's the most humiliating thing that has happened to me.

E: There is something to be learned from it.

K: I barely know this girl!

E: All you need is one bad apple.

K: There is no sense talking about it.

E: Henry, that should be the least thing that should bother you.

K: When are you coming east?

E: I am in New York now. Staying at the Sherry Netherlands.

K: You're in New York now, I see.

E: My plans are one of two things. This will be a very rough weekend for you and if it is I totally understand.

K: How would next weekend be?

E: I will be back in California. This weekend would be unfair since you just got back.

TELCORN

Robert Evans/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p. m., October 26, 1971

K: I am jammed through Saturday night. In fact I might come up.

E: You are coming up, that's marvelous. Can we get together for dinner Saturday night?

K: That doesn't solve the problem of getting you down here.

E: We will come down in December.

K: Let's plan for dinner Saturday night.

E: When shall we check?

K: I will call you this time tomorrow.

E: Going to an (Adlee ?) star of the year award party tomorrow night. Could you call me maybe say 4:00 p. m. tomorrow afternoon?

K: How about around 12:00?

E: Maybe I should call you.

K: How about in the morning?

E: We are leaving in the morning.

K: How about Friday morning?

E: Friday morning at 9:00.

K: Right.

E: We will plan to have a marvelous dinner.

K: Definitely count on it, it's just a question of working out the details.

TELCORN

Governor Reagan/Mr. Kissinger

7:40 p.m., October 26, 1971

K: I just wanted to bring you up-to-date on what we have done today.
The President issued a public blast against the behavior of the
Delegation.

R: I have only seen the news carrying Bill Rogers' statement which
made me urp.

K: You should have seen the first version! The President issued a
blast against the undignified, gleeful behavior ........ will affect the
American attitude. We finally got Rogers to say something at a
Congressional hearing that it is going to be harder to get money.

R: What else?

K: There are a number of things which we won't announce which I want
you to know about but not announce but which will become apparent.
We are cutting the UN Development Fund back from $____ to $50 million
and we will shift more and more of our support to bi-lateral rather
than multi-lateral.

R: The things that are not going to be announced -- I am out here where
the people are, doing things behind the scenes isn't going to impress
the people. The people are really pee'd off. They are mad. They
want to know why the hell are we even staying in the UN. I go to
bat on the Peking business but how can I continue doing that without
getting into the UN thing?

K: We don't mind you blasting the UN thing.

R: What can I say when my own Republicans say "What is the President
going to do about it?"

K: Some of these things are going to become apparent within the next
few months.

R: Why don't we stand up and say what we are going to do; that it is
no longer an effective body? I am not doing it for me, Henry.

K: I understand that. I can tell you what we are doing ______ we are going to
do in a quiet way. Bush is to give us a list of the countries that
behaved most badly. If they are getting any CIA funds or anything
like that, we are going to cut the be-Jesus out of them and we are going
to cut the UN Development Fund money.

R: Even if he doesn't want to get into specifics, the President has got
to say we are reviewing the nations --

TELCORN

Governor Reagan/Mr. Kissinger

7:40 p.m., October 26, 1971 -- page 2

K: That's what the President said today -- on these nations that behaved
as they did, we are going to have a much harder time now trying to
get Congressional help.

R: He should just say he is not going to try to get Congressional help for them. I will be before a group Friday night speaking and I know their mood. These people come to me and say we don't agree about the Peking visit but have been going along because you have been saying things are all right. They have just said about this latest, "We are sorry." I am talking about solid citizens, staunch citizens. This scared the hell out of them. They would like to say unequivocally, "Look, fellows, I have asked the Congress to review this."

K: Yeah. I understand your point. I understand it. I will call you again
before Friday evening.

R: I realize ...... All I am trying to say is that I am out here where the hot line is trying to convey the mood back there. I don't understand all your options. I would never suggest walking out of the UN. No President wants to be the man who may have to say I blew up a chance for peace but he can say it is immoral and dishonest and we are going to react accordingly. I will be harassed by the press wherever I go asking "Are you satisfied with what the President has done about this?"

K: Let me raise this with him again. We are doing almost all of the things you want. There is a slight chance they might send a Delegate this year and the situation might be even worse if a Delegate shows up in New York. One thing we would appreciate is your blasting the hell out of UThant. He issued a statement today saying that if they hurried they might be able to get the presidency of the Security Council.

R: .... the United States veto the fact that they can sit on the Security Council.

K: That would be the opposite to what we said.

R: .... Taiwan. Anything you can relay to him (the President) -- I know the heat in Washington with the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* poses but there is a little America out here that thinks the UN stinks to begin with.

K: (laughter) Let me talk to him again.

R: I bet you are not on our sleeping schedule yet.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Martin Mayer
10/27/71; 6:20 p.m.

M: Thank you for calling me.

K: Thank you for sending me a copy of the article.

M: I hope you weren't too unhappy.

K: No, not at all since it is fairly favorable. I think it is a good article. I have a few things I want to point out. The disagreement with the Kennedy Administration was not over how to defend Europe but about the relationship between the U. S. and Europe. Actually more in the political -- I was not opposed to a self-reliant Europe

M: No problem about that.

K: The other thing -- if I said Christina Ford is a great fan of mine I must have meant it as a joke. It would be very embarrassing thing.

M: Okay, okay, very good. I understand.

K: On the other quote about Richardson -- this I did say but I said it in relation to something -- the implication that he was better than I would make him worse. I was trying to explain to you why two committees with the same membership why one of them worked out better under my chairmanship than his. What I was trying to say from every respect he was just as good as I. If I would have made a comment about his quality this would have been an arrogant statement. I frankly don't believe he is better than I in foreign policy. Nor do I deny that I am vain.

M: Let me look into that. I don't want to promise you that. Vanity is not the same as arrogance -- vanity is a self-image. I am not going to give up on this one because I think it is a characteristic that many people who know you find in you and I do too, but it doesn't bother us but it does get mentioned.

K: I would not deny that it is true. Except in this case it would not prove your point. I have two other ones which concern the same person. Gloria Steinem -- you will just trigger that maniacal girl into protestations. If you just mention Barbara Howar. Especially the second time you use her name.

M: The second one -- oh, yes.

-2-

K: I am mentioning this for your information -- on page 5 where you speak about the President and after the JCS and Defense Department have made their presentations -- as it happens on that sort of issue, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX yes. It never happens that we would make a decision in which they then don't get called in.

M: I see.

K: There is no doubt that I have more of a chance to present my view than they do. It is also true that I go to extraordinary lengths not to push my view.

M: From the point of view of people sitting in the departments this is the way it looks to them which I think is the context here.

K: It doesn't bother me. I merely do this out of a sense of accuracy. On Eliot maybe he held a job in Geneva but that's the first I heard about it

M: I will check that further tomorrow morning. This is a recollection I had -- before you had a class with him.

K: The impact he made on me was because of Washington not Geneva. On page 9 my relations with the Rockefeller brothers came through Nelson not through David and I met Nelson when he called me back in 1955 when he was an advisor to Eisenhower on "where to go in our foreign policy after the first Geneva Summit." On page 10 I have a problem. I know doubt said what you have and my enemies no doubt will use this.

M: That's where you say I could make a mistake but . . .

K: . . . the reason I like Nelson so much . . . Take Nixon out of the paragraph. If you can say my heart is . . . -- take that out.

M: That's very human . . .

K: On page 12, a purely accuracy point -- I don't get a formal briefing every morning. I get a written briefing every morning and in crisis periods I do get an oral briefing.

-3-

M: About how often in a week?

K: In crisis situations, every day during the week and then I could go without getting any. So, if you say on the average, about two a week. On the picture phone while this makes me look good, they were all removed including mine. The only other point I have is about alleged failure to take people into see the President. I don't know what I would do if this were another President. The President just will not see other people. If I told him I wanted to bring a staff member he just doesn't function this way.

M: Kennedy never wanted to see people nor did McNamara -- but you can force them.

K: You can force different views on Nixon by paper. To confirm his views you don't have a case to bring someone in.

M: I've been told Haig goes in quite often.

K: Yes, I now have gotten him to accept Haig. Haig goes to 30% of the meetings now so Haig has a lot of access to him.

M: People have told me Haig has access.

K: Haldeman doesn't take anyone in. Ehrlichman doesn't. Cabinet members complain they can't get in.

M: I will see what I can do.

K: You mention it twice.

M: This is something that many people bring up.

K: Right. On the other hand more papers go in than ever before. Otherwise, I thought it was a sensitive article.

M: That's a good point. I like to read it so carefully.

K: I have not read it -- never!

M: Wild horses cannot draw it out of me.

-4-

K: Will in appear in December?

M: It will be the January issue and will appear in December.

K: I hope to see you sometime.

M: I am coming to Washington again. When I come I will drop you a note. But you probably won't have the time.

K: I will certainly have time on some of your trips.

M: It was great doing the piece.

TELCORN

Alice Palmer (New York Times)/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., October 28, 1971

P: Hello. We are working on a story of famous people's sleeping habits.

K: How many people does that interest?

P: I beg your pardon.

K: How many people in the world are interested in that?

P: We hope a lot of people are. I have a few questions to ask you, do you mind?

K: What are the questions?

P: Do you have an secrets for a good night's sleep?

K: I think I am a lousy subject for this sort of question.
No, I have no secrets.

P: Do you eat anything before you retire at night?

K: Give me all the questions and then I will decide if I want to answer any of them.

P:
Do you sleep in a special bed?
Do you sleep in anything special to insure a good night's sleep.
Do you go to bed late or early?
Do you get up early or late?
Do you dream?
Do you ever take pills to go to sleep?

K: The questions are simple but I will answer only one of them, "When do you go to bed and when do you get up?" I go to bed about midnight or 1 o'clock and I get up around 7:00.

P: You don't have a midnight snack before you go to bed?

K: Laughter

P: You would be surprised how many do.

K: I don't doubt it. What section of the paper will the article appear in?

P: The family circle section.

K: Are you the editor?

TELCONE
Alice Palmer/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., October 28, 1971 -- page 2

P: No, I am assisting the gal writing the story. She has a terrific
list of about 45 people she is calling and I am just helping her out.
You don't eat anything before you go to bed?

K: I have already answered the only questions I will answer. I hate
to be so uncooperative.

P: Thanks so much.

K: Nice to talk to you.

P: Thank you.

********

9:15 p.m. Miss Palmer called again (see attached note). Mr. Kissinger asked that she be called and told she had made an excellent impression but that he just doesn't answer those sort of questions. Coleman called and relayed the message at 11:15, Oct 28.

9:45 p.m., October 28, 1971

Mr. Kissinger:

Alice Palmer called again. She said you were kind enough to call her back before but you were the most famous person she has talked to and she was very nervous and afraid she didn't make a very good impression with you. She is assisting Charlotte Curtis but has done some writing herself. She wonders if you would reconsider answering some of the questions she asked you and they are as follows:

1. If you have any secrets for a good night's sleep.

2. Do you eat anything before retiring?

3. Do you sleep in a special bed or bed clothes?

4. Do you sleep in pajamas?

5. Do you ever sleep in anything to insure a good night's sleep? (For example, ear plugs or eye shades.)

6. Do you go to bed early or late? (You answered this one)

7. Do you ever take pills to go to sleep?

8. Do you ever dream? If so, what about? (You may think this one is invading your privacy but hopes you will answer.)

"Please tell him I can't go to sleep unless he answers the questions."

Wilma

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Eolaser
By CNARA Date 9-20-71

TELECON

Secretary Stans/General Haig

12:20 p.m., October 28, 1971

H: Mr. Secretary, I was trying to get you yesterday on your upcoming visit to the Soviet Union. I talked to Dobrynin in Henry's absence, and he is anxious to move on this.

S: Me, too, because of the weather situation.

H: Henry asked me yesterday to tell you to call Dobrynin sometime today. He is receptive and ready -- it's a question of launching this ship. We have Sonnenfeldt who -- once you have talked to Dobrynin -- can help you a great deal on the modalities.

S: Will he go on the trip [President's]?

H: Yes. He is very good and very capable. But I would like to confirm that Henry has actually told Dobrynin that you would be calling.

S: There must be something going on. I got a cable through the State Department from Moscow that 'Secretary Stans is contemplating a visit to Moscow,' so it's all through the State and Commerce Departments today.

H: We will move today, and I will call you right after lunch to tell you whether you are clear to call Dobrynin.

S: I would like to see Dobrynin today or tomorrow to make arrangements and confirm the date.

H: We don't want to get the Department into it until you are comfortable with your arrangements.

Ids

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Bobrynin

1:11 p.m., October 28, 1971

K: Anatoliy, how are you?

D: Fine, thank you. How are you? When did you get back?

K: Tuesday night. I'm trying to get adjusted to the time change.

D: I understand. It's difficult.

K: I plan to see you early next week.

D: Next week?

K: To continue the discussion we had just before I left. If you want to meet before then on my trip, perhaps we can do it Saturday morning.

D: What o'clock?

K: 10:00?

D: 10:00. At the usual?

K: The usual. Two other things: (1) On the Stan's visit, I am going to tell Stan's to get in touch with you to work it out. On our side, it is all set. He will have generous instructions.

D: I didn't know how to handle it.

K: I should have been more explicit before I left. But it is all set. Either you call him or he can call you.

D: Then maybe I will call him tomorrow -- either by visit or by telephone -- to be moving.

K: He knows that the technicalities of the visit will be handled between him and you.

D: Tomorrow I will call with the understanding that he knows.

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

1:11 p.m., October 28, 1971

- 2 -

K: The President said he hopes the reports out of Paris that we were colluding with the Chinese to end the Vietnam war are not...

D: It is just press interpretation. Nothing else. Not a single word was said. They are just saying that behind the scene it shouldn't be done.

K: I called the President's attention to the actual text I saw that was different from what the television reported.

D: So many times they imply and then interpret and give in the press and television things that were never said.

K: The text I saw didn't say China and the United States.

D: Without an even looking, I am sure.

K: I saw something in the Washington Post -- that wasn't so bad. But what I heard on television and in the news summaries -- that is what the President saw. I have already pointed out to the President that what was in the Post was not so bad.

D: The Post was much better than television.

K: I said publicly that we will settle it with Hanoi and not Peking.

D: The same position taken before on this issue.

K: I will see you at 10:00 Saturday morning. I have nothing very world-shaking to tell you.

D: But just as we discussed.

K: Yes.

D: Thank you very much. Good-bye.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsinger
By: CARA Date: 9-1-71

1:11 p.m., October 28, 1971

D: Without *that* even looking, I am sure.

D: But just as we discussed.

K: Yes.

lds

TelCon: 2:30 - 10/28/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. George Shultz

K: Score one for the home team. You got me on first.

S: I think I will have to give my Secretary hell and tell her not to let it happen again.

K: I think it is better if we met alone first. We should agree first on the base line - the figure you, Haig, Smith and I agree on. So I think we should go to the shorter figure first and then if the President questions to go to a higher figure. Otherwise there is no way Packard will agree without losing enormous face with his people. His composition is wrong.

S: We will have to tell him sooner or later.

K: And also we shouldn't have figures just to have figures.

S: I have done some work on that and I will . . .

K: You bring anyone you want and I will bring Wayne and Haig. Let's agree first on what makes sense and the composition. Don't you agree.

S: Yes.

K: I have studied the figures and I think we can live with . . .

S: I think under the circumstances that meeting went well yesterday. I would have been at a loss if I hadn't been briefed.

K: You handled it with great tact and I think by Monday or Tuesday say . . . We can agree on something.

S: What about 5:30 this afternoon.

K: It concerns mostly foreign policy.

S: But I at least have to understand what is going on. I think probably the President should fill you in with Connally and I.

K: Yes, he already has.

S: I am inclined to think Peterson is exploring all kinds of way to change the price of gold and I think it should be shut off. We are not going to change - and the President should cut him off.

K: Lets meet soon after my meeting with the President and Connally.

TELECON

George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., October 28, 1971

S: Bob Haldeman raised the problem of whether I should be in the meeting with you, Connally and the President. He indicated it would concern personnel in the Japanese Embassy and certain things with regard to Okinawa. But if it is of a purely international nature, there is no reason to my getting into it.

K: If any of that is raised, I will ask to have you called in.

lds

TELECON

Mr. Haldeman

10/28/71 2:55pm

K: There was something I wanted to raise with you. When we got everyone together, it turned out that State had already offered a compromise.

H: To whom?

K: I would strongly like to urge -- he can put ______ out front as much as he likes, but legislative strategy must be run out of MacGregor's shop.

H: Yes.

K: Will you talk to the President about this?

H: Yes.

K: Good.

H: On the announcement on the 23rd, can we shift that to 7:30 instead of 4:00?

K: For a news conference?

H: Yes.

K: Probably.

H: He wants to go for live television.

K: Of course, they haven't agreed to it yet. He would have to follow the words we agreed to.

H: Yes, he'd read it and then do a press conference.

K: That would make it 7:30 in the morning for them. I don't see why that would be a problem.

H: Why don't we see if we can.

K: Of course, their ambassador is . . . okay, let me see what I can figure out.

H: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you.

TELECON

Dr. Kraemer

10/28/71 4:30 p. m. (approx.)

FK: Kraemer speaking. This damnable journalist . . .

K: I have no objection to your talking to him.

FK: He phoned just 10 minutes ago and he said he had talked to you.

K: That's true.

FK: But he said he had talked to you today!

K: Yes.

FK: I want that in writing because . . .

K: Oh come now Kraemer. I won't do that.

FK: Then don't do it and I will tell him I have no authorization to speak to him.

K: Come now Kraemer. I talked to him; he said he wanted to talk to you.

FK: How did he know my name?

K: From articles and interviews and other things written about me.

FK: I am not an unfriendly man, but I will simply tell him that I have no written authorization, and I will not talk to him. You can tell him you have an impossible man on your hands, namely me, and this is the way this will happen.

K: Okay, we will have to do that if I can't deal with you on the phone.

FK: Henry, I have dealt with you on the phone, and then the article is written and you forget what we have said. I sit here in a highly nervous state . . . I don't want to talk in such a situation.

K: That's okay. On balance, I am not sure he would use this sympathetically. He might use it to show fascist sympathies and all that.

FK: I am old and tired, and you remember Kraft used this that way. You haven't fully registered that.

K: I have registered it completely. My view is that it is a close decision as to what comes out of it.

FK: Henry, nothing will come out of it. I have talked like a Dutch uncle.

K: Then, I wouldn't do it.

TELECON

Dr. Kreamer

10/28/71 4:30 p.m. p. 2

FK: And I have done this exclusively in your interest. You can dictate
a note to your secretary in just a few minutes.

K: It's the principle that I don't think I should have to deal with you by written
notes.

FK: We have done so for years. I don't know what you have said to this man.

K: I haven't said anything to him.

FK: They ask me questions. I have always succeeded so far in giving
the right answers, somewhere in the middle.

K: Look Kraemer, I don't think was ill the whole week before we went away.

FK: I understand. But I know.

K: You don't know have any idea what goes on here any more.

FK: I am not so naive. I swear to you.

K: But what went on before is child's play compared to.

FK: I am convinced that from what went on two days ago a new era will be counted.

K: And you know why they voted. Because that son of a bitch at Stated wanted to take the headlines from my return.

FK: We tried.

K: By that time it was too late. The whole thing was geared to the publicity, not to what should be done. It was a fraud from the beginning to the end because if you look at the votes against us, you can't tell me there were 4 or 5 that couldn't have been switched.

FK: To my mind it was a counter-productive from the moment that [names many small nations] ... [began voting].

K: It should have been done in a more low-key to begin with.

FK: I agree with you, and more elegantly.

K: More elegantly you can't expect.

FK: But even from the smallest ... from the Maldive Islands, who
didn't have anyone there because they couldn't afford it ... we said, 'send

TELECON

Dr. Kraemer

10/28/71 4:30 p.m. p. 3

somebody, and don't worry about the cost.'

K: Kraemer, I told Haig months ago that they wanted to throw the vote, that they were deliberately miscounting and concentrating on the wrong countries. And then in the last two weeks they went into a buckshot approach which threw countries into domestic chaos.

FK: The only ones who had some promise were none of the bigger ones.

K: There were a number of them that could have been gotten -- I disagree with you on that.

FK: But Henry...

K: No, I don't agree with you. We could have gotten Ecuador and Guiana.

FK: You would have been amazed at what's been happening with Ecuador. And two countries simply defected -- Cyppus and ...

K: I told my staff two months ago that Cyprus wouldn't vote with us.

FK: British put strong pressure on Uganda and other countries. Hold on, here, again! My secretary just put before me a note that Collier is calling. I don't want to see the man!

K: Then just tell him that.

FK: No, I will tell him I don't have a written authorization and can't take it by phone.

K: Okay, tell him that.

HK: Because I don't know what you have said to the man. If you were to see me you would know something has happened to me in the last few days. I am not the man you left four weeks ago. Something has happened. I am not sleeping; I even take sleeping pills. You have not been getting cables, not because I have been ignoring them...

K: No, no Kraemer -- you wouldn't do that.

FK: I am carefully arranging them for a post-mortem for you so that you can just flip through them and see what happened, country by country. But it took me days to do, so you don't think I did it intentionally.

TELECON

Dr. Kreamer

10/28/71 4:30 p.m. p. 4

K: I know you don't.

FK: I need to talk to you Henry.

K: We will talk in the next 10 days.

FK: You must yourself be desperate, more than I am.

K: Let me see whether Haig can come over tomorrow.

FK: And I beg you to tell this man that you don't want me to . . . I have now talked to everyone who has written about you and please get him off my neck.

K: Okay, ask him to call me.

FK: And see that someone sees me here.

K: I will get Haig to come over tomorrow.

FK: Please do that, and call this man and say you have thought about it and feel since I have talked so much to people who write the same stuff that you feel he wouldn't get anything out of me.

K: Okay, tell him to call me. Or I will call him. I will do that; I will take care of him.

TELCOM

Al Jenkins/Kissinger

5:14 p.m. 10/28/71

K: I wanted to tell you what I told your boss on what was discussed so you are aware of it. I k had a general discussion of the kind of think that could be in a communique and nothing else and that you didn't know about it and shouldn't discuss it with you.

J: I went to lunch in the dining room and the Secy. asked me to lunch with him. He said that items that would be of concerns I feel sure were discussed but we are completely in line on this.

K: What? the reation of *thk* your colleagues?

J: Marshall and Alex? I saw Alex at lunch. They didn't react. They just listened. I gave some atmospherics of the trip and acupuncture. Said often we had 3 meetings *gak* going at once and I don't know about it but I was more then content with the manner he used and hoped I was of some hep and it went as I thought it should and I didn't ask questions except where I thought I needed information. So I think they are satisfied that I didn't know a lot.

K: I hope to work more with you on this. *anok* Hap to work

J: I certainly enjoyed it and I think you.

K: I thank you and look forward to getting with you again.

TelCon:6:40:10/28/71

Mr. Kissinger/
General Pursley

K: Hello.

P: Yes sir. How are you Henry.

K: I am calling you because I don't think Al has managed to convey to you the urgency we are asking for the draft paper. Now we have got to have it. I am not going into the President's office again to be asked why I do not have it. Why is Defense stonewalling us? Do you have it or don't you.

P: I have to confess to you I don't have it now. We are working on it.

K: I'm telling you you will get a unilateral order from us. Why don't you have it. What is holding it up. We need that paper - phased over a time period. What does the draft call have to be. Residual forces - December 1st - January 1st. Why is it so hard to do.

P: It is just simply not a simple task.

K: Do you want the President to call you. What is taking so much time?

P: To tell you sir is we don't have that kind of background. We can give it to you in order of magnitude - in terms of two to three . . . but we don't have the precision. We have never operated in this area at all.

K: When will we have it.

P: I will give you a paper tomorrow morning.

K: I am telling you the President was so furious. I just got out of his office. He thinks you are trying to avoid giving us a paper so you can play with us.

P: That is not true. We don't want to give him a paper to find that he will be constrained next year.

K: But at least give me enough so that it eases him.

P: We are not doing it with any alternative motive.

K: Yes, but we have asked for it before.

- 2 -

P: We gave you three papers before.

K: Yes, but they never amounted to much. That is why we are asking again.

P: We just have no way of knowing how many volunteers we will get. How many volunteers a month - not any.

K: You can't tell the President . . . .

P: That is what we are going to do now.

K: If you can do that he will take full responsibility. He is so mad he is just going to order it and hang you with it.

P: Would it help if I just give you an LDX of the best draft to date.

K: That would help and if I yell at you I am getting yelled at and I just yell back at Al.

P: It is terribly frustrating - with the people I am working on it with.

K: Could you at least do a paper by tomorrow night. The range of uncertainties - December 1st - January 1st. What it is you don't know.

P: That is what we are trying to deal with. It is just horribly exasperating and we are just running into stone walls. I will send the best draft we have on the LDX right now.

K: But give me another paper by tomorrow night. The range of uncertainties. You are doing a good job but I tell you the President was really beside himself twice today.

P: I understand Henry. And that is alright, I have been yelled at before and I can take it.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
10/28/71; 6:50 p.m.

P: Were you able to get that fellow?

K: Yes. And he appreciated that very much.

P: It just did not strike me who they were. I was thinking of something else. I said hello to Shelly and nodded to Holdridge. How did you explain it.

K: I said the President asked me who was in my office when he called. I said it was the Chinese Foreign Minister. He said good God that must have been the people sitting out in the hall and I just want them to know that I don't forget my old friends.

P: Maybe you could have told them about the defense thing.

K: I told them it would be done next week.

P: Say that I approved it.

K: I did.

P: Don't you think they know this is the way it had to come out?

K: Oh, yes, but this doesn't make it less painful. Arthur Burns has been calling me saying that you told him to discuss something with me.

P: This is part of this whole deal and I don't want you to do it until next week. But, on Monday or Tuesday when you are rested up -- set it up for Tuesday. I would like for you to talk to Shultz first. Burns has this idea that we have to move quickly with Europe. I told him you know about political problems. I indicated that Brandt has more to say what happens in Germany than banker(?). Pompidou has more to say than ________. Play a mysterious game. What he wants -- says that the French are the key to it -- that the French won't make a deal unless we raise the price of gold. It will basically be a modification of the old. It is my view that we can't. I don't want you to say that to him but just remember that Arthur is pushing for cutting a deal with the French. It would get us back into it like the old one. Shultz and I feel that that would be a mistake. We have to keep free. But see Arthur. I think

you can say that you would like to see him and set up a time. He is very
much worth your seeing. The other fellow you have to talk to is Peterson.
He takes so much time. Don't worry too much. The first thing to do is
talk with George a little. I would like to get it where you, George, Connally
and I -- would make this decision. I want to put Burns, McCracken and
Peterson off.

Another phone call at 7:00 p.m.

P: Are you going to New York tomorrow?

K: I was going to New York tomorrow afternoon.

P: I was thinking about going up to the mountains -- Camp Hoover.
But you should go to New York. Get away from all this.

K: I was going to go up and see some of my family.

P: Do you have to go out tonight? Have you had anything to eat? Just
pot luck -- come on over.

K: Thank you, Mr. President.

P: Can you come now?

K: In five minutes.

P: Fine.

TELCORN

Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger

6:59 p.m., October 28, 1971

K: For three weeks we've been trying to get out of the Secretary's office at the urgent request of the President an estimate of what would happen in various timeframes if no more draftees are sent to Vietnam.

P: I don't understand, Henry.

K: Supposing the President announces on January 1, May 1 or on any other date that no longer are we going to send draftees to Vietnam. What are the implications for draft calls, etc. The President is getting so mad, he is just going to order it.

P: ......

K: I can't get it through Pursley. The President is almost irrational at the moment. It started out as a request, now it is an obsession.

P: Why didn't you come to me sooner?

K: Because Haig was dealing with Pursley!

P: Okay, Henry.

TELCORN

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

7:01 p.m., October 28, 1971

S: If we can get a chance next week to get together, I would like to get together with you before the President meets with Indira Gandhi. I would like to give you some personal thoughts.

K: Good, good.

S: And there are a couple of other things which I would like to discuss with you. I really want to talk to you about the Middle East but let's leave it at India-Pakistan. There are some rather immediate things in terms of New York. Once the Chinese Communist arrive if there is any real activity on the India-Pakistan and there well might be after the President's visit with Indira Gandhi. There are questions such as what does one do with the Big Four -- put an end to the Big Four and make it the Big Five. We need a Big Five. There are some real policy issues on this. I would like to have a preliminary chat with you and get your guidance and put things down on paper. There are some real issues we are going to have to face up to.

K: Right. Good. We need to I will fix something next --

S: That's all right, I am pretty flexible.

K: Right, right.

9:45 p.m., October 28, 1971

Mr. Kissinger:

4. Do you sleep in pajamas?

Wilma

TELECON

Robert Evans

10/29/71x 9:15 a.m.

(HK placed call)

E: I hope I didn't get you up.

K: What? !

E: I hope it's not too early for you.

K: No, I get up at 7:00.

E: I thought so. Are you coming tomorrow?

K: Yes, as soon as we get rid of Tito. We have him on our hands until tomorrow afternoon. So there are excruciating State affairs.

E: You want to meet at the hotel? Are you staying over?

K: Yes, I'm staying over.

E: You need a place?

K: No, I'll be staying at the apartment of a friend on East 61st Street.

K: Sure.

E: Do you have any interest in going to the theater tomorrow night?

K: Sure. I don't know . . .

E: I don't either. We could have a quiet dinner and . . . have you seen "The Follies?"

K: Yes.

E: Oh you have.

K: Yes. It's quite good. Or maybe we could just have dinner.

E: Whatever you prefer.

K: Frankly I haven't given it too much thought. If there were anything outstanding . . .

E: Let me get the paper and check. Hold on just a minute. . . . . .
The only thing that's open is __________, a play that's supposed to be quite good.

TELCONE
Barbara Walterx/Kissinger

10:08 a.m.

10/29/&71

W: Where have you been and what have you been doing? I never read about you!

K: I need a new publicity agent.

W: Are you tired?

K: Ax Yesterday I was broken up. Today is better.

W: How long?

K: From Peking about 20 x hours.

W: I saw pictures of you at the Wall today.

K: Where are they?

W: Inside of the Daily News. With your staff. Now that you have had your press conference and have nothing more to say, you are still exciting.

K: You want to expose me to publicity.

W: It's sad. I met with Arthur Schlessinger last night and he said you are going back to Havard after this part of the Administration.

K: Harvard is not ? ? ? ? .

W: I almost saw you today. I was coming in to talk with Haldeman.

K: I am free for lunch but you are not in town.

W: No. He has never done a TV interview and I gather that he might want to and if he does he would like me come and film it as we did you. People think of him as spooky because they don't no anything about him. But then you came hom and threw it all. Can you come with us one day? What the war was like and what your own feelings as a ______.

K: et me check what the people here think about it.

W: One on live or talk informally, that's easier.

K: It would have to be in Wash.

W: Whether live or not. If live in the studio, or filmed in you office.

Walters/Kissinger

10:08 a.m.

10/29/71

-2-

K: If I do it, I want to do it with you.

W: When?

K: I will talk with Haldeman. He makes these *dixxx* decisions.

W: This case it would be non-political. Just a *dixxx* kind of --

K: 10 mins?

W: That would be fine. We would run it a little longer maybe -- 10-15 mins.

How long does it take and how to get there and the personality of Chou En-lai.

K: Let me raise it and if I do it with anyone I will do it with you.

W: Other things I have to chat with you about so call back.

K: I will call you this afternoon.

TELCON

Vice-President/Haig

10:20 a.m. 10/29/71

VP: Good morning, Al.

H: Good morning, Sir.

VP: I have just been talking to Mike about this message which he discussed and read to you. The difficulty, however, with the situation is that I have personally talked to Bill Rusher of the National Review and promised him a message. My instructions from the President are to keep lines open with these conservatives. I tried to avoid any mention of the UN at all. Now if I don't send this message after indicating that a message would be coming, it will probably do more harm than sending this innocuous message.

H: I didn't know you had made a commitment on it. We were worried about it being a condemnative action.

VP: My message really doesn't say anything. It goes along with that side. You know, this is not fair to the President. The problem with the UN has been building for many years and has nothing to do with the President, but I really feel it would be a bad mistake not to send it.

H: Well, I didn't realize you had a commitment.

VP: There is really nothing in it at all. It just mentions the progress the country has made, etc.

H: No, I didn't think there was anything in the message at all that was troublesome.

VP: Well, unless you thought there was something. . . .

H: No, Sir.

VP: All right, Al.

H: Good-bye, Sir.

TELCON
Robert Kleiman/Kissinger

12:42 p.m. 10/29/71

K: How was the Chinese chow?

HAK: I gained weight when I am afraid.

K: One minor point. Hugh Scott was at the China Conference dinner last night. He said that the shop where some of your people went was the Anti-Imperialist Shop in July which was changed to the Friendship Shop.

HAK: I understand that they have changed all the anti-imperialist to friendship signs.

K: I heard there were signs there saying anti-imperialist when you arrived at the airport.

HAK: There weren't when we left.

K: Did I tell you about the Brandt/Brezhnev visit last year. Brandt said stop your ? ? ? ? ? ? . Brezhnev said don't worry about it, in our elections we have 99% of the vote.

HAK: Don't write it in any way that's attributable to us.

K: The mainthing I want to ask you is on reading your press conference that bilateral matters were all to be discussed. Did Semple get it wrong?

HAK: I said that. It's a little narrow but only bilateral questions will be settled.

K: Only related to bilateral.

HAK: I don't want to say. Where we can move towards a settlement.

K: And questions that can be discussed but not settled, that's wider. Is that the distinction?

HAK: Yes.

K: You said no discussion of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union/China problem.

HAK: We don't intend to discuss that with either side. That's special because we are not involved in that.

K: I wanted to be sure we are not excluding all questions like VN, Korea, and whether future of Japan and security of Asia. Is Not ruling that out?

Robert Kleiman/Kissinger

12:42 p.m.

10/29/71

-2-

HAK: No. But that's on deep background or whatever is the most sensitive.

K: In the Chou Enlai/Reston Interview it kept coming out that he is more concerned about military withdrawal from Asia then he is with military presence. What Japan might do in Korea.

HAK: Distinction of what they affirm as a principle and what they want in a brief time.

K: Withdraw in principle but not rush out and leave a vacuum.

HAK: Right.

K: On Taiwan I have been seeing that it is clear they are willing to put Taiwan aside and answer other questions. A latter settlement but not necessary right away.

HAK: I don't want to go into substance. I nearly was in tears about what the editorial board of the NYT wrote today. I didn't know Taiwan was such a good old friend of the Times. Which European country would have gone differently no matter how much consultation had taken place? Do you know?

K: They all shifted in the last year.

HAK: For their own reasons.

K: Whole context of relations.

HAK: One is their own conditions and second is our trip to Peking. I don't say we are the President's decision to go to Peking would effect some votes but consulted or not played no role. See the difference?

K: Don't you see that if there had been a common strategy --

HAK: There would have been no trip. What common strategy would they go with? Who? France, Britain, Belgium, no. The only one conceivable was the Netherlands from abstention to positive. In process of recognizing PRC --

K: What we started was a race to Peking.

HAK: We got into a lead of one going on. Belgium, France, Scandinavia, Italy all proceeded us.

K: I didn't know.

HAK: I am talking about Europe. I am making a distinction between price we play for going to Peking and that for no consultation. For latter we paid nothing.

Kleiman/Kissinger

12:42 p. m.

10/29/71

-3-

K: You don't think consultation would have helped?

HAK: Prior to the first trip? no. There would have been no trip. We will discuss it another time.

K: It's not limited to 7 Europeans.

HAK: But that's what you made a cade of.

K: I am talking about the impact of other countries. Britian.

HAK: We couldn't have effected them. We are closer to them then anything on these things.

K: Just couldn't move them. Is it possible that going down with strategy this is where we come out.

HAK: It would have been better if it hadn't happened so rapidly.

K: That's my feeling. In a year or so. Several feelings here. I wonder if they will read it and [redacted] especially the close vote in the Senate yesterday as indicating no support for Taiwan. They voted for authroization for Taiwan Defense Treaty. 43-40. Close.

HAK: They may get --

K: Foreign Relations Committee [redacted] attempted to (reapeal?) 1955 treaty.

HAK: I didn't know that. I have to go.

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

1:10 p.m. 10/29/71

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry. A couple things. What progress have you made on this POW question? I think it is important to get an answer out.

K: Which POW question?

R: The one with CIA and Defense.

K: Oh yes, we got it out this morning.

R: OK, that's fine. When can we get together? Do you have anything I can read before we talk? It would be helpful to me.

K: OK. I talked to the President last night. You will get any memos he gets. I have now finished one on atmospherics which I can get to you right away. There isn't one yet on where we stand on the com-munique. I have to discuss that with you.

R: Did you keep a memorandum of the full conversations like you did the other time?

K: That is what is being worked out. That will be done by tomorrow and, of course, you will get that.

R: I haven't had a weekend off for a long time so I am going to try to get away to Bermuda. I will be back on Monday.

K: Look, I think the atmospherics paper which I can give you will give you a feel about how they did it, but by Monday I will have the other memo for you. The last thing we can afford is to have any divergence between the various agencies.

R: That is my point and I think it is essential that the President, you and I get together because regardless of what anybody else knows, there are going to be some tough decisions to make although it has great potential for success.

K: On the other hand, there are some things that are totally unacceptable on Taiwan, but I would like to go over those with you personally. Nothing will be done about them for weeks.

X What is our position on the subsidiary agencies?

-2-

R: Well, they vary. Most of the Special Agencies they are not going to remain in because most of them have the same membership the UN has. IMF is doubtful. There are others like the ILO where there may be a fight and Meany says he will walk out if Taiwan is expelled. But there are also going to be a lot of problems about the kind of performance (?) they are going to have. For example, Canada and Latin America. They are thinking of establishing centers in some of the countries and branch out from the center to handle their commercial activities. They will be in competition with the Communists. We were just double-crossed.

K: Yes, and I think those who double-crossed us should be punished.

R: Oh yes, I had a call from Belgium who wanted to invite me to a dinner in my honor and I said nothing doing.

K: That's right.

R: Back to China - I do think it is important to work together closely on the plans. I would like to be in on the sessions with Haldeman, too. That is, on the ones where we all are going to be involved. As you say, we are going to have trouble enough.

K: They are going to be damn well prepared and any slight tension they notice among us will be bad. They are going to be the most impressive people you have met. They are extremely well-prepared, well disciplined, and so forth so to give them any indication of playing around among us is just punishing ourselves for nothing.

R: Well, they won't have that chance.

K: Well, I mean if there are gaps between us in conversation, etc.

R: No, we can't have that and we have to discuss this fully ourselves. We have to be damn thorough. Well, we have a little time for that.

K: I will call your office first thing Monday morning. I will send over this afternoon this atmospherics paper.

R: Good. I will fill you in further on how my discussions went with the Foreign Minister of China. I think we got off pretty well with the communique

K: Yes, I think so. Of course, they complained, but now they are quiet.

R: Everytime you get licked you got to look at the reasons why. Now in this case everyone said we did everything we could possibly have done.

-3-

The conservatives have a complaint against the UN, but not us. I am
sure the result would have been close in any event. If not this year, next.

K: Oh yes, next year. In fact my private judgment is that I didn't think
you would get this close this time.

R: Well, I will see you next week. I think the Tito visit is going all right.

K: Yes, See you next week.

Telcon
Governor Reagan
10/29/71; 5:15 p.m.

K: I just wanted to tell you what is happening. We feel we have to do it in our own devious way. Getting list together of every country that voted against us that didn't have an overpowering reason. Within the next month they are going to know what happened. We already have the Moroccans squealing. We will take the position it is unrelated. Re-examining whole approach to multilateral institutions. Have to separate into two things: Public relations side and what we actually do. For example there is Paul Hoffman's operation of $75 million and was slated for $100 this year. We are cutting that down to $50.

R: That is good.

K: Within the next month or two I think blood will flow. But we want to make the blood flow and not done all ganged up. Do each on the merits of the issue.

R: Yes, but I still feel that frankly, Henry, we are missing a great political opportunity and not just in the area of politics. Out here the letters to the editors are being ignored. The paper editorially thinks it is horrible that we should think of being bad sports in not accepting the vote or how it came out.

K: This is like a sporting event when a sovereign nation votes against you, take the consequences.

R: Letters to the editor range from why the hell aren't we getting out. These are to the LA Times. The Oakland Tribune ran an editorial "Day of Infamy", a well-done article. It set the stage for what this situation really was and that is why I just feel there was a chance to stand up and have gathered an awful lot of Americans around him. I think what he did say the second day helped even though it did set off the liberal press.

K: We are not concerned about the liberal press. What bothers us is to get ourselves to do a confrontation which won't change the result and we need in which we then may be driven gradually everything construed as backing off. If we do what countries will really feel and accumulate them over a period of weeks and then don't care if it leaks out, we can do ourselves more good in future events.

R: The Republican paper with front page editorial said they believe the whole timing of the Peking thing, the announcement of his visit, really set the stage and made some of his opponents feel it was all right to do what they did.

-2-

K: Yes, that wasn't true, but I can see how the public came to that conclusion.

R: I think when he goes to Peking he ought to visit Taipei also.

K: We don't mind at all having some outraged conservatives around here.

R: They are outraged.

K: We don't mind your giving expression to your views.

R: What I am concerned about is a week later the press says OK the President hasn't done anything. How do you feel about the President? It reduces my credibility in his behalf.

K: I understand your problem.

R: The hell of it is I can't divorce that problem from his. Circumstances have put me into a position to affect the outcome of the upcoming race and I want to affect it and not suddenly find I am not any use any more.

K: I think when you add it all up in terms of what we have done for defense and the things we have prevented -- they had Thieu on the ropes in September and we saved him and you had a not inconspicuous part in that.

R: You let me down on this Peking thing because I took your word and assured those guys in closed meeting we weren't giving anything away.

K: Sometime I want to tell you the tactics which got us into this situation. I can assure you we gave nothing away.

R: That's what I have been telling them.

K: The problem is we have a bureaucracy that's been Democratic for 30 years. The things we do out of this office we can do all right. The things that come from elsewhere we have trouble with in the execution.

R: I have been here four years and still have that in my own shop. When you do something at one end you run around to the other end of the pipe to see how it comes out.

K: If it ever comes out.

R: I know. Eventually somebody has to take them on.

K: If we don't do that in the second term we don't deserve to get elected.

-3-

R: There is a wonderful thing in this lame duck thing -- you can say screw everybody, I am going to do what I think is right. I shall do my best.

K: There Are you going to be East in the next few weeks?

R: I am trying to fix up a time to see the President and report on the trip.

K: Why don't we do it in the next week?

R: I can't do it next week.

K: I can't do it from this office anyway. Let me get the appointments people to get with you as quick as possible.

R: We were trying about November 17 when I have to go to Indiana for the Governors conference to get into Washington. My people told me that was bad for the President.

K: Let's see if we can get that reconsidered. Can we save an hour k or two to get together?

R: All right.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Shen
10/29/71; 6:30 p.m.

K: (missed the first part of the sentence) The President said he must have walked by you and the Foreign Minister in the lobby and he wanted me to extend his warm personal regards to the Foreign Minister. He that that it was inadvertent.

S: I will tell the Minister about it.

K: He wants me to extend his own personal regards to both of you.

S: Thank you.

TELCONE
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

1:37 p. m.

10/30/71

K: One thing that I may not have made exactly clear. When I was talking about the possible outcome of the trip -- restricted vs. the general one.

D: With Haig?

K: No. You asked me what I thought could come out of the first trip we are taking next year? This is only for Brezhnev. Not for any one.

D: I will make exclusively for him.

K: Particularly that point and as far as the President and I are concerned we would very much desire to go in that direction and it's where we have put our emphasis. The more restrictive approach. Bilateral issues.

D: I understand.

K: If they say that other thing should succeed then that is definitely the way it will go. This is for information.

D: I understand. It's very clear. Several things you mentioned to me I only say to him.

Anything

K: Meeting on my recent trip should be made only to him and not to anybody.

D: It's clear.

K: My host will take it ill --

D: On this it will be handled. Because of the country to the south of where it was. It was handled in a most unusual way. Very unusual things and Moscow made some warning for our high guest who was there. First time a special telegram saying being careful about what's to be discussed. I will specifically mention to Brezhnev. I can give you assurances.

K: Frankly we have not -- for your information, we have not let it out of the WH.

D: We can give you assurances.

K: This is our desire. One which we can succeed in.

D: In both ways. What we are engaged in.

K: Our discussions and previous discussions. Both aims to be realized.

TEL CON
President/Kissinger

1:55 p.m. 10/30/71

P: Have not left for NY yet?

Kissinger; This afternoon. Had a long session with Dobrynin. God will punish me for the things I am saying. He wanted to know what went on in Peking so I told him generally about the great reception and just a forerunner of what you will get. He asked what will come out of this. This is strictly for Brezhnev. Our ideal was that we wanted to go to Moscow first all along. We would like to see a communique out of the Soviets showing global interests and a communique from Peking showing bilateral issues. With VN going on we will be talking about it and since VN discussed all other international talks. If VN is over by Feb. we could go the restrictive route. He said very well received in Moscow and Their concerns. I know he will go that way. He said I will tell you something.

P: We have talked with the Vietnamese.

K: He said in the first two years we have kept our hands off but now it's time to settle.

P: Did you tell Akalovsky to get back to you?

K: Yes. I said it disturbs us to do politically and militarily to do things we don't want to do. I will tell you what the President told Tito. It's a tragedy because we will end it anyway. On the M.E. he said this is a tremendous offer. We are willing to cut off all arms.

P: Keep your eyes on the big plays and not worry about the little things like foreign aid and UN.

K: Foreign aid is like the Pentagon Papers. In the long run good for us. Javits called here to say they are calling an emergency meeting. Let them get out of the mess.

P: Isreal, Greece, Cambodia are all in there.

K: We can help them when they mobilize the troops. They will panic.

:P Did you tell Akalovsky for you only? When will he have it for you?

K: In the afternoon. I will wait until he gets it tied up.

P: You will find it very interesting. Never been so tough.

K: (As helpful for him as Dobrynin).

P: He talked to everyone. It will feed to our State people that we are not the

President/Kissinger
1:55 p.m. 10/30/71

-2-

weak guy. State is trying to cater to them. Nixon Doctrine is peace at
any price and I said they are not right.

K: Haid had that argument with Irwin a little while ago. He wanted to say
we are getting out of many countries and therefore we need aid. We took
it out. We don't want to say we are getting out.

Kx P: They want out.

K: They have made Nixon Doctrine instead of aiding the world as we get out
of the world. ON VN we have them all excited. Peking doesn't want you
there with the war going on. Moscow is worried about Peking if you go there
and the war isn't settled.

P: Wait until you read this Tito memo.

TELCOM
Haldeman/Kissinger
3:00 p.m. 10/30/71

K: We have a message from the Chinese that their fellow we are using as a channel in Paris will be out of town until the 15th and during that period the channel will be closed and leaving Monday. So it is important to get messages to him before that. We should agree on the 22nd or 23rd on the tripart announcement. Unless you want it made in Calif.

H: That's not necessary.

K: 23rd on Tuesday.

H: I think so, no problem.

K: I think we should tell them Mrs. Nixon is coming.

H: Did he decide?

K: He told her last night. And also say we are accepting Hangchow.

H: No opposition on that anyway.

K: So that means 7 day trip.

H: He is set with that. Everything I have heard him say we will figure on.

K: Can you I get it to them?

H: Sure.

K: It helps to set it in their mind. I will not say anything about the plane. That can wait.