Ebert Foundation

April 27-28, 1978)

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Henry A. Kissinger, Außenminister der Vereinigten Staaten
(1973 - 1977):

Der Einfluß politischer Veränderungen auf die Weltwirtschaft

Mr. Mayor, Mr. Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen,

ich erlaube mir, erst einige kurze Worte auf deutsch zu sagen, dami
Sie alle verstehen, warum ich meinen Vortrag auf englisch halten
werde. Wie Sie wissen, bin ich in Deutschland geboren, aber mein
Vokabular ist das eines Fünfzehnjährigen; das ist wenigstens meine
Entschuldigung, wenn ich in Deutschland spreche. Was ich in Amerika
als Entschuldigung habe, will ich nicht sagen. Mir wurde gesagt, da
mein Akzent sowieso nicht als deutsch bezeichnet wird in dieser
Stadt, also hoffe ich, daß Sie verstehen, wenn ich hier auf englisc
spreche. Ich denke auf englisch, und wir würden beide die größten
Schwierigkeiten haben, wenn ich versuchen würde, komplizierte Dinge
auf deutsch zu sagen. Es gibt Leute in Amerika, die behaupten, daß
ich auch Schwierigkeiten habe, wenn ich komplizierte Dinge auf eng
lisch sage, aber sie sind zu höflich, um mir das später zu sagen.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to say first of all what a great pleasure and honour it
is for me to appear here in this city where over twenty years ago
I was introduced to your Chancellor who was then described as a pro-
mising young man who someday might go somewhere. I would like also
to say that I have had the great privilege of working with the
Chancellor before I was in office and when I was in office and I
consider him one of the great leaders of the West. On a number of
occasions in connection with international programs for energy, in
connection with economic policy where he came to Washington in 1974,
and our administration was having one direction and all our briefing
papers said we will be going to convince the Chancellor that he was

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What I would like to talk about today is not the specific policy
agreements or disagreements that may exist but certain fundamental
problems that concern all the nations of the Atlantic area. I am
trying to say that I believe that there are a number of fundamenta
structural problems. That there has been too much of a tendency to
avoid facing. And avoid facing not just in this American administr
ation but over too long a period of time.

So I would like to make some observations about problems in the
field of defence, problems of East-West-relations, problems of the
relationship to developing countries, something about East-West-
trade and some structural problems of Western economies. You may
notice. I speak about mostly political problems because some of my
colleagues in America use to say that my knowledge of technical
economics was one of the best arguments against universal suffrage
that they have ever known and -given the extraordinary sensitivi-
tiy of the Chancellor-I do not want to create another dollar-crisis by
explaining to you how I would solve the current economic difficul-
ties that may exist when we speak about the structural problems of
defence.

I just attended a conference in the United States of leading
Europeans and Americans. And I had the sense that I was hearing a
re-run of a debate that I had heard ten years ago and twenty years
ago: Is the United States decoupling its defence from the defence
of Europe, how can the United States give assurances that it will
defend Europe, how do we know that nuclear weapons will be used and
-frankly- how do we know that nuclear weapons wouldn't be used on
our territory? - All of these are problems that have been discussed
for twenty years, and the point I would like to make is this:
It is not a question of American assurances, it is not a question
of American promises, it is a question of confronting the realities
of the contemporary strategic situation. When NATO was formed
twenty years ago America had an overwhelming strategic superiority,
or thirty years ago. At that time the defence problem of the West
was to make sure that this overwhelming superiority would in fact

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be used in case of attack. And all the military arrangements on
the continent had the primary significance to produce a certain
automaticity in the American response.

We now face a different situation. Not caused by unilateral
American decisions but by the nature of modern technology. In
thirty years a country of the gross national product of the
Soviet Union inevitably had to develop a technology that narrowed
the gap between our nuclear capability and theirs. That was
unavoidable. It is in the nature of the technology: As this gap is
narrowed inevitably the dangers to the United States increase.
When a war produces a certainty of tens of millions of casualties
then it is senseless to pretend that reassurances can remove this.
But it is also senseless to pretend that an alliance whose gross
national product is three times that of the Soviet Union and whose
population is twice that of the Soviet Union cannot find a means
of defence within that reality. We have had a debate in recent
weeks about the neutron bomb. I have stated publicly that I did
not agree with the particular decision that was taken. But I do
not believe either that the neutron bomb as such is such a
decisive weapon. It is one of many weapons. And what made the
debate so difficult is that it was singled out for an individual
decision where what should be discussed is what we are going to do
with the nuclear establishment on the continent of Europe. How it
related to the conventional forces and how it relates to the
American strategic forces.

I do not pretend that I can offer an answer here in the relatively
limited time we have available. But we have gone on now for decade.
with a hotchpotch of military forces on the continent. Who knows
honestly what the real conventional capability is of the various
units that are here. Who knows how long they can fight and under
what circumstances the various weapons will be used.

There is a theory which was first developed at Harvard University
with the brilliance characteristic of the academicians that were
trained there which argues that uncertainty is a factor of deterrence.
I agree with this. But it does not mean that we have to be uncer-

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tain; it means that they should be uncertain. We ought to have an idea of what we intend to do. Nor do I believe that we should publicly state exactly what our reaction will be in every circumstance that will arise. Because this gives a calculus of risks.

But I do believe that we should face explicitly some of the problems produced by the new technology and face it with the attitude that the United States cannot leave Europe because it would lead to our total isolation in the world. Nor can Europe leave the United States because it would lead to your impotence. And once this is understood we will be able to remove many of these insecurities.

We will soon have a debate in America which no doubt will be joined here about strategic arms limitations. And inevitably it will affect precisely those questions. We have to know exactly what is permitted and what is prohibited. And I will say now my view is that what is not explicitely prohibited must be treated as permitted. And that there cannot be any grey areas. But we will not be able to have a sensible discussion on this until we have had a quiet conclusion to some of the doctrina questions.

Now let me talk for a few moments on the problem of East-West-relations. We got in East-West-relations through alternating periods. When there is tension there is a tendency to accuse the United States of causing cold war. When there is detente there exists fear of a condominium. Whatever happens there are endless debates about what it is we should do with the Soviet Union. When there is tension some of our European friends have had a tendency to appear as peacemakers. When there is detente some of our European friends have had a tendency to try to make us more resolute.

There is often the argument that detente is an alternative to

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decades proceed. Nobody can observe the reactions of too many
Western countries taking refuge in the belief that there is no
danger or that somebody else will assume the responsibilities.
Without being worried what will happen -not this year or next
but over the decades- I do not say the Soviet Union aims at world-
domination as a grand strategy with a specific timetable. I am
saying that most political leaders are generally confused in
complex situations and react to opportunities. And the opportuni-
ties are bound to multiply. Five years ago there could have been
a Soviet intervention in Ethiopia regardless of the opportunities
because they did not have the means to transport that much
equipment in so short a time over such long distances. This is a
fact of life that we must deal with: In the long run the evolution
may be on our side. But in the medium term we may face grave
dangers.

Now in this context I have always believed that a policy of
detente, properly conceived, is essential:
One - because I believe the time is on our side.

Second - because the nature of modern weapons is a moral obligation on all of our leaders to demonstrate to their public that they have done everything to avoid the dangers of war. Or to put it another way: that if there is a confrontation it is not caused by their action. We need it for the cohesion of our societies and the cohesion of our alliances. And we have seen in Vietnam what happens when leadership gets too much out of step with public opinion.

But we also have to keep in mind certain other principles.

First is: If detente becomes a policy of peace at any price then
it is a device for the demoralisation of the West. And then it
will lead gradually to the giving-up of all positions.

Detente cannot be based on unilateral concession to evoke goodwill. If I may quote Bismarck at a social-democratic function - he once said: "a sentimental policy knows no reciprocity". I would say that nations do not pay for services already rendered, especially not the Soviet Union.

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Thirdly - there should not be permitted what I would call a "differential detente". That is where the Soviet Union makes a detente with some members of the alliance but not with others and where some members of the alliance pretend that they have a speci mechanism or relationship for dealing with the Soviet Union. Unde those conditions it will lead to a dissolution of Atlantic unity. But nor can there be a detente confined to one part of the world and not to another.

I have spoken in the United States, and I repeat it here about my profound concern with respect to Soviet actions in Africa. Twice three years the Soviet Union has introduced massive arms into Africa.- In Angola it introduced more arms in six months, in one little African country, than all the rest of the world introduced into all the other African countries put together, In Ethiopia last year the Soviet Union introduced more arms in an eight-moths period as the United states had introduced in 25 years of a military assistance program.

Nor is it sensible to say that the Soviet Union suddenly emerged as the defender of the territorial integrity of African countries. It was Soviet arms that enabled the Somalis to attack, to begin with, and it is not that Somalia has made a secret of its aspirations Its flag which is composed of several stars has three stars that refer to provinces that unfortunately happened to be under the sovereignty of neighbouring countries. So giving arms to Somalia was to throw the match into the powder-keg, and there to switch sides is a sign of cynical power-politics.

And who has ever heard before of Cuban expeditionary forces. It cannot be accepted by the United States indefinitely or by other free countries that a little Caribbean country pursues in the name of the Soviet Union an imperial policy all over the world and that we have to tramp as where the Cubans for God's sakes will appear next. If 15 years ago anybody in America had said we must do this or that in Southern Africa because otherwise the Cubans will appear

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he would have been considered insane.

I say this is a problem for all of us. What the Soviets are doing in the Horn of Africa and what they are threatening to do in Southern Africa is of profound disquiet to all the countries in the Middle East and to all the countries that are moderate in Africa. And I am not saying that the Soviet Union has no right to conduct in African policy - I am saying they cannot have detente and pursue a military policy in Africa.

Whether we come to this realisation now or later - inevitably reality will impose it on us. And this cannot be left just to the United States. What happens in the Middle East or in Africa if the impression is created that the West - as excellent as it may be in economics - possesses no means of defending essential interests will affect all other countries.

I want to repeat: I have defended detente in the United States and as some of you may know I was attacked by some elements in the United States during our recent Presidential campaign. For that reason I hasten(?) to have more in my own party than in the then opposition party. I am saying that the Soviet Union must choose between adhering to the principles of conduct it has signed with us, with the Federal Republic, with France, with every major country or with an inevitable worsening of relationships which is not necessarily an act of policy but which will be imposed on us by necessity. And I say further that this is a matter that both sides of the Atlantic have to pursue jointly, and it is not a purely American problem nor is it a purely European problem - then it is subject for all of us to discuss.

Let me say now something about developing countries. In the last several years in a variety of forums we have heard demands for the renovation of international economic relations. In the name of a so called "new economic order" developing countries have claimed a greater voice in decisions that affect them and a more just share of the global prosperity. The industrial democracies in response have oscillated between lip-service to this principle and their dedication to an open economic system. The Soviet Union

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they share we could do more for our unity and more for the real
negotiations than anything else. Nor would this be in any sense
to the detriment of the producers. Because as the producers pile
up surpluses their own dependence on a healthy world economy and
on a growing world economy grows, And whether they understand it
yet or not - they need a growing economy in the industrial democr-
ies. And they cannot hold us up regularly because to the extent
that they do and to the extent that they produce a catastrophe
they will in fact destroy themselves-

We have lived in the strange situation with the developing
countries that they have exalted governmental assistance and
developed theories ridiculing or attacking private investment.
And yet governments possess infinitely greater means to manipulat
an influence on the policies of developing countries than multina
tionals whose supposed power of manipulation - without my warning
to be insulting - I have never seen matched in the political
knowledge of most of their chief executives or in the timidity of
their boards of Directors.

So when we talk about a new economic order we should face the
realities of where the capital has to come from. And much of it
has to be private capital; it cannot be all governmental capital.
If one looks at the domestic situations of all industrial demo-
cracies the fact is that none of them can increase their govern-
mental flows by significant amounts. And many of them will be
lucky if they can maintain what they are doing now. Certainly,
the developing countries have a right to insist on rules of
conduct for the multinational corporations or the national private
corporations. And I cannot believe that they do not have the means
of enforcing it.

But it is also an urgent task of the North-South-dialogue to make
clear that it is essential that there be some ground-rules for
foreign investment. And without these ground-rules, whatever they
are, the gap between the rich and the poor simply cannot be met.

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Nor is it possible for the developing countries to blackmail us in other commodities the way we are being pressed in energy because the specific conditions of energy-manipulation are that there are vast resources in countries with small populations that can regulate their production. But countries that have infinite needs of development cannot regulate their production to support the price and they therefore have to live in a world economic system.

I am not offering a solution to this problem which is lucky for you. I am suggesting that there are opportunities here where both sides of the Atlantic and Japan can discuss an agenda of fundamental longterm problems that far transcend the tactical issues of the day.

Let me in this spirit make a few observations about East-West-trade. That too has been the subject of intense debate - in our country at least. One school of thought holds that trade and finance automatically restrain Soviet policy and the more trade there is the more restrained the Soviets become. Others argue that any trade strengthens the Soviet system because given the tight possibilities of substitution on modern economies this is inevitably help in the military field.

I think both approaches are to some extent onesided. There is no necessary relationship between increased trade and a responsible foreign policy. After all, world war once broke out in Europe under conditions of substantially free trade. But similarly it is also not true that we cannot use trade for purposes of foreign policy. In my opinion there is no question that communist nations are prepared to pay some price for increased economic activity, but it is important to understand what this price is. And it is important that we do not think we can exact it in every field. Public concessions are more likely, in the field of international conduct with respect to which foreign countries have a defined interest and a legal standing than with respect to matters traditionally considered the subject of domestic policy.

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I would argue for the following principles: I remember in 1974 our country passed the so-called "Jackson Amendment" which was supposed to limit credit and trade with the Soviet Union in return for certain Soviet domestic actions. When we cut off our credit, Europe and Japan between them -we were talking about hundreds of millions- lent 10 billion dollars, and Europe and Japan are in a much worse position to make political conditions than we are.

I would therefore state a number of principles:

First - with respect of the developing countries we should insist somewhat more on the market. With respect to the Soviets we have to understand that unless we interrupt the market to some extent we cannot get political benefits. If the Soviet Union can operate in our market simply as another economic factor we cannot get political benefits.-I would therefore say: East-West-trade cannot be completely free. It must be subject to some political control and some political conditions. And all of the industrial democracies have to agree to this principle, and if they don't none of them will gain any advantages.

Second - it seems to me the responsibility of governments to make certain that these controls make sense and that they do not just reflect the political necessities of individual groups in individual countries. I would argue that uniform standards must be applied. It would be on the whole desirable that credits should not be opened but tied to specific projects and that the projects should be sufficiently longtermed so that there is a serious penalty in their termination.

And finally - the conditions I am talking about should be related to foreign policy actions and not to demands that sovereign nations will never accept as a result of public pressure from foreigners. In the agenda the Atlantic nations have to conduct there is, of course, above all the problem of the economic relations of the industrial democracies to each other about which -at least in my experience- no one has spoken more profoundly and

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eloquently than your Chancellor and I do not dare in his presence
to make specific suggestions.

I want to raise a few particular points. We face a number of
structural problems and not only of policy problems. In too many
countries demands for real increases in wages coupled with in-
sistent pressures to expand public services and public sector
expenditures have generated increasingly complicated inflationar-
pressure. At the very moment when the cost of imported energy has
added its own impetus to both inflation and recession these de-
mands cannot possibly be met simultaneously. And any attempt to
do so is bound to undermine and to disrupt and to demoralise the
political system. We face the structural problem that growth has
now a different significance than in the past in the sense that:

First - investment does not necessarily produce a commensurate
increase in consumption and so as a result growth depends on many
more complicated factors.

Secondly - unemployment is not longer related entirely to the
business-side. There is a structural unemployment that results in
part from new technology so that paradoxically new investment does
not bring with it the same degree of increase in employment that
was the case in the past and may in fact produce a decrease in
employment.

There is the problem that I would state with only the greatest
diffidence and only because I remember an experience I had when I
entered public service, when I attended a meeting in the office
of the then Secretary of the Treasury, and there was talk about
inducing the Federal Republic to revalue. And I -being more humbl-
than I am now- said: Why don't we devalue?- And I was treated as
I had told a dirty joke in church. It was explained to me that it
was technically impossible for the United States to devalue, poli-
tically impossible and morally indefensible. Two years later we
devalued once, and four years later we went to permanent deva-
luation.

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I would raise the question which this distinguished group will
explain to me as a symptom of my ignorance: I have serious
doubts whether the system of floating exchange-rates is politi-
cally sustainable. I am sure it has many things to recommend it
economically. In my view it creates too many temptations to export
one's problems to other countries and removes the inherent disci-
plines by which political leaders can excuse themselves towards
their domestic constituencies.

Now, Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have offered many more problems than solutions and I leave it
to you to imagine whether I have solutions or not, and you will
never know.

But I have done it in part to indicate that the disputes that
form the headlines of the day are not a decorum of our relationship;
I have tried to define issues everyone of which can only be
solved by the nations of the Atlantic together. I have tried to
say that among friends which we are and among leaders dedicated
to the West, as all of our leaders are there is an enormous task
to perform. In this task - if we are to speak of history - we can
be very confident. We are in the fortunate position that we have
great problems but also enormous resources. We are lucky to be
able to say that whether or not we solve our problems depends
almost exclusively not on outside forces but on us. - Thank you
very much.