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VOICE: Linc, we haven't even standardized the Department of Defense.

COLONEL LINCON: Well, the Department of Defense has certain characteristics like Western Europe...

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III-20

FROM ALLIANCES IT WAS A SHORT STEP OVER TO BASES AND TO
WHAT EXTENT U.S. BASES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE VALUABLE. FROM
THE MINUTES OF A SESSION ON OVERSEAS BASES --

MR. NASH: I suggested that, as many of the SAC bases overseas
are relatively inaccessible to the Soviets and that in general they provide
excellent dispersion and are relatively inexpensive to build and maintain,
it was his view that, for all these reasons, a higher priority should be
given to the protection and extension of the overseas bases.

Mr. Johnson replied that the Soviet capability to attack our over-
seas bases is limited only by the amount of the available fissionable
material. In his view the Soviets have adequate numbers of short-range
aircraft for such a mission. On the other hand, it is much harder for them
to hit bases in the continental United States, to reiterate that same point
you used this morning.

On the assumption that both the Soviets and the U.S. must rely
on manned bombers during the next 10 years, Mr. Nash asserted that we
should increase our overseas base dispersal and should also use naval
aircraft carriers as a supplement to SAC.

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III-21

Mr. Gilpatric suggested that it was entirely feasible to revise a so-called back bases concept, running across South and Central Africa. He reaffirmed the need for overseas bases but he thought that they all need not be so far forward.

Dr. Teller suggested that the utility of a base would depend largely on warning time available. He thought that if the Soviets attacked, they would not hit the overseas bases first -- thus give warning to attack on the U.S. They would rather arrange for all blows to fall simultaneously. Mr. Nash asked whether the Soviets would be able to mount a massive atomic missile attack against our overseas bases within the next five years.

Dr. Johnson replied that their delivery capability would probably be adequate but that the requisite amount of fissionable material may be in doubt.

Mr. Gilpatric also asked whether or not there also might be doubt as to the reliability and accuracy of a Soviet missile vehicle.

Dr. Fisk thought the accuracy would be sufficient.

Mr. Hoopes asked Dr. Johnson whether his estimate of the Soviet capability against overseas bases meant their capability to strike at all such bases simultaneously. Dr. Johnson replied in the affirmative.

and pages simultaneously. Dr. Johnson replied in the affirmative. capability against overseas bases meant their capability to strike at all
Mr. Hoope asked Dr. Johnson whether his estimate of the Soviet
Dr. Pisk thought the accuracy would be sufficient.

Mr. Gilchrist also asked whether or not there also might be doubt
in doubt.

be adequate but that the requisite amount of favorable material may be
Dr. Johnson replied that their delivery capability would properly
in the next five years.

mount a massive atomic missile attack against our overseas bases with-
simultaneously. Mr. Nash asked whether the Soviets would be able to
attack on the U.S. They would rather arrange for all blows to fall
took, they would not hit the overseas bases first -- thus give warning
largely on warning time available. He thought that if the Soviets at-

Dr. Teiler argued that the utility of a base would depend
need not be so far forward.

He reaffirmed the need for overseas bases but he thought that they all
so-called pack base concept, running across South and Central Asia.
Mr. Gilchrist argued that it was entirely feasible to revise a

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EC

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III-22

Dr. Lands suggested that Mr. Hoopes' question was incomplete because it did not take into account the Soviet capability against the continental United States in the same five year period. And he thought this latter capability would be substantially smaller. But Dr. Teller suggested that our overseas bases may indeed impose caution on the Soviets with respect to taking local risks, but that it would not make much difference to calculations involving general war.

Mr. Halaby said that if we are five years behind in our construction of our overseas bases, then by the time that we get that part of the rug rolled up it will be 1962 and the missiles will be so much further developed that the value of the bases will be hardly worth our going ahead and trying to cut that deficit down . . .

If the free world alliance is fighting to hold together, if only for reasons of negation to keep it from falling into the Soviet orbit, as Italy and France almost did toward the end of the war, I know no better test of the strength of the alliance and the validity of the partnership than the willingness of the other fellow to have us on their geography and therefore make themselves prime targets and risk civilian annihilation within the area of those targets which are the bases from which we would strike and therefore the targets the enemy must try to knock out first.

the area of those targets which are the passes from which we would strike
force make themselves prime targets and risk civilian annihilation within
militia areas of the other fellow to have us on their geography and there-
the strength of the alliance and the validity of the partnership than the
and France almost did towards the end of the war. I know no better test of
reasons of negotiation to keep it from falling into the Soviet orbit, as Italy
If the free world alliance is fighting to hold together, it only for
and trying to cut that deficit down . . .

dechoed that the value of the passes will be largely worth our going ahead
and relied up it will be 1963 and the missiles will be so much further de-
tion of our overseas passes, then by the time that we get that part of the
Mr. Halpery said that if we are five years behind in our construct-
terence to calculations involving general war.

with respect to taking local risks, but that it would not make much difference that our overseas passes may indeed impose caution on the Soviets
this latter capability would be substantially ameliorated. But Dr. Teiler and
continental United States in the same five year period. And he thought
because it did not take into account the Soviet capability against the
Dr. Lands agitated that Mr. Hoopes' question was incomplete

III-55

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III-23

In other words, that was a test of the willingness of the U.K. to be not a limited partner but a real partner. Now Denmark, for example, has a contribution to make, very little in the way of military forces as such, but in the way of geography she has made Greenland available for our bases and other installations. This is her contribution, typical of what she could make.

Now, even if I accepted estimates that the Soviets have a super-
duper capability by their IRBMs and short-range bombers to knock out all
these overseas bases simultaneously, I would still maintain that our
having not only a piece of geography but by having planes there, with
men there, with weapons there, is as important a type of cement for our
alliance as any.

This business of can we depend upon these people abroad is
something that I think the American public is entirely too cynical about.
There are some places that are very wobbly and you can't rely on them.
There are some places that are, if anything, more solid than we are at
home in their determination in this matter. I think that we can make a
great mistake if we don't give a very high priority and an all-out effort
on this score for at least the next 10 years.

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III-24

It seems to me that a very high priority should be given to the quite low investment that would be required to maintain and further to expand the use of these bases abroad. They cost very little in some places they cost only the willingness of the country to work with us in a neutral security arrangement, nothing else, nothing else that wouldn't be given to anyone -- for example, Greenland which Denmark said was her contribution to NATO. It didn't cost us anything because we have given Denmark no economic assistance and practically no military assistance. It cost us quite a bit elsewhere, like in Morocco and Saudi Arabia, where we don't have the same mutual security common en-dowment. But it seems to me that a very high priority should be given to the development, holding and maintenance of the bases that we have abroad, if for no other reason than to make it necessary for the Russians to take a very large amount of what forces they have, to knock these bases out.

It may be we won't have SAC planes on the lift at the moment that the enemy hits us, but it's well known that a good part of SAC is always in the air and can always reach some of these bases where refueling is immediately available for them to go on.

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III-25

DR. JOHNSON: Well, Frank, I want to say again that the Soviet attack is limited only by the amount of fissionable material. For most of these bases, they have plenty of short-range delivery vehicles, vehicles providing them delivery of thermonuclear weapons on the United States has a different order of magnitude in expense and difficulty than on the short-range bases. They have a terrific medium range and medium range missile capability right now. Those bases are vulnerable to political and grab-action, and what you say may be true, but right now those bases represent a big fraction of SAC's retaliatory capability and should, therefore be preserved as long as possible. But they are on the way out. In contrast you can see coming into being the Navy capability in submarine-launched missiles which in effect will replace those without accompanying political difficulties and the requirements of defenses. If you look at the problem of overseas bases, they are geographically fixed in spacing. You know where they are and you can design a delivery system in place that can knock them off rather easily compared to a mobile based problem, such as a submarine or even a carrier . . .

DR. KISSINGER: I would like to make a point about forward bases as being good diplomatic instruments. It is very tough for non-industrialized

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III-26

societies even to visualize the mechanized plan, much less what a B-52 really represents. If we don't have some physical presence there, they will really have no conception of it, no matter what we say our power might be. Because strategic air concepts are not easy to grasp even for an advanced society.

I would also like to make one technical point. It seems to me that the Johnson-Teller thesis, about the unimportance of overseas bases, was based on the assumption that if they could all be hit simultaneously, together with our bases in the United States, then they would be useless.

If you look at it from a technical point of view, one or two things can happen. They can either arrange their war plans so that they can try to hit all bases simultaneously in which case our overseas bases would have the same warning time as our domestic bases, and we probably would be able to get some planes off them. Or if they hit the overseas bases first, in this case we'd get additional warning time in the U.S. So, even from the technical military point of view I am not so sure that this is so desirable.

some that this is so desirable.

U.S. So, even from the technical military point of view I am not so
useful here that, in this case we'd get additional warning time in the
pity would be able to get some planes off them. Of course they hit the over-
would have the same warning time as our domestic planes, and we crop-
try to hit all planes simultaneously in which case our overseas planes
can happen. They can either arrange their war planes so that they can
If you look at it from a technical point of view, one or two things
pe needs.

taneously, together with our planes in the United States, then they would
pass, was based on the assumption that if they could all be hit simu-
that the John-way-Teller thesis, about the minimportance of overseas

I would also like to make one technical point. It seems to me
even for an advanced society.

power might be. Because strategic sit concepts are not easy to draw
they will readily have no conception of it, no matter what we say on
B-23 really represents. If we don't have some physical evidence there,
societies even to visualize the mechanized plan, much less what a

III-36

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III - 27

THE SUBPANEL HEARD MUCH TESTIMONY FROM SPECIAL WITNESSES ON ACTUAL CONDITIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD AND ANALYSES OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES. TYPICAL OF THIS MATERIAL WAS A REPORT GIVEN TO THE SUBPANEL BY GENERAL COLLINS. THE FAR EAST CAME IN FOR A GREAT DEAL OF CONSIDERATION. AND TYPICAL OF THE MATERIAL INVOLVED WAS A SURVEY BY GENERAL LAUGHTON COLLINS OF MILITARY CONDITIONS IN EAST ASIA . . .

GENERAL COLLINS: Perhaps I may overweigh the importance of Japan in the Far East but I think that in any discussion of the Far East, aside from China, you have to pretty nearly focus on Japan. First of all from the geographic standpoint Japan bears a very close relationship to the Far East, comparable to that which the British Isles have always formed in Europe and just as Great Britain had to go to various places in the world to search for material, whether it was Egyptian cotton or what, so has Japan needed raw materials to manufacture into finished products to sell to the rest of the world. Personally, I don't see how Japan can possibly survive unless it can trade with China and unless it can trade with the mainland of Asia. Where else is it going to get its wherewithal?

with the mainland of Asia. Where else is it going to dot its wherever? Positively naiveive unless it can trade with China and unless it can trade to sell to the rest of the world. Personally, I don't see how Japan can so pass Japan needed raw materials to manufacture into finished products the world to search for materials, whether it was British cotton or what, formed in Europe and just as Great Britain had to do to various places in the Far East, comparable to that which the British Isles have already from the geographic standpoint Japan bears a very close relationship to England from China, you have to pretty nearly focus on Japan. First of all Japan in the Far East but I think that in any discussion of the Far East, GENERAL COLTRIN: Perhaps I may overemphasize the importance of IN FAR EAST VARIETY . . .

WAS A SURVEY BY GENERAL FAUGHTON COLTRIN OF MILITARY CONDITIONS DEV OF CONSIDERATION, AND TYPICAL OF THE MATERIAL INVOiced SUBMARINE BY GENERAL COLTRIN. THE FAR EAST GAME IN FOR A GREAT COUNTRIES. TYPICAL OF THIS MATERIAL WAS A REPORT GIVEN TO THE AND ANALYSES OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DELICITIES IN OTHER NESSES ON ACTUAL CONDITIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD THE SUBMARINE HEARD MUCH TESTIMONY FROM SPECIAL WIT-

III - 57

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III - 28

Unless we permit the Japanese to trade with China the day is going to come when the Japanese are going to say to us, "Now look here, you people can say all you want to about there being Americans in the hands of Chinese but it's our bread and butter. We live on some islands right off shore, we've got to trade with China." They have to trade with the mainland of China and nothing that we are going to do can stop it, in my opinion. I may be completely wrong but again I think we ought to get away from our emotional approach as if we are looking ahead five or 10 years. In my judgment unless you permit the Japanese to trade with China, I don't think they are going to be very enthusiastic about staying on our side. It's too close to the fundamental facts of life -- bread and butter.

Japan strategically has an extremely important position from a military point of view. But it sits off Vladivostok and North Manchuria, the most important area of the Far East from a raw material standpoint. It's therefore, a potential base for operations against the mainland, either from there or otherwise. So from a military point of view who-ever holds Japan will have a very predominant role in saying what is going to happen up at the northern end of the Far East.

doing to happen up at the northern end of the Far East.

ever holds Japan will have a very predominant role in saying what is
either from there or otherwise. So from a military point of view who-
It's therefore, a potential base for operations against the mainland,
the most important area of the Far East from a raw material standpoint,
military point of view. But it isn't off Medvedovok and North Manchuria,
Japan strategically has an extremely important position from a
title — bread and butter.

apart staying on our side. It's too close to the fundamental facts of
to trade with China, I don't think they are going to be very enthusiastic
sued five or 10 years. In my judgment unless you permit the Japanese
we ought to get away from our emotional approach as if we are looking
can atop it, in my opinion. I may be completely wrong but again I think
trade with the mainland of China and nothing that we are doing to do
islands right off shore, we've got to trade with China." They have to
in the hands of Chinese but it's our bread and butter. We live on some
here, you people can say all you want to say about there being Americans
going to come when the Japanese are going to say to me, "Now look
Unless we permit the Japanese to trade with China the day is

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50

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III - 29

Coming down the chain of Pacific islands, we have all spent a great deal of time and effort on Okinawa and the more I've thought about it since the introduction of the atomic and hydrogen weapons, my personal view with respect to Okinawa is that its value as a potential operating base will deteriorate tremendously. It's entirely too vulnerable to attack from the air. However, if Okinawa was in the hands of a potential enemy then it would be a real threat against the rest of our position both in the Philippines, Hawaii and even on the West Coast. I can't imagine if we ever got into a war with Russia that the Russians wouldn't plaster Okinawa right off the bat. And of course they would also shoot for our bases in Japan. But I think Okinawa is particularly vulnerable because it's small, it's congested and it's just a sitting duck, in my opinion.

Okinawa is worth more to us from a defensive point of view to keep the enemy from occupying it than it is for us to be there, particularly as you get greater range with missiles. Why do you have to be there right under the gun yourself if you can fire from the Philippines, and achieve the same end? On Okinawa you are not going to get any radar warning or anything like that at all of something coming up, even if it's a conventional, antiquated propeller driven airplane. And just visualize what Okinawa would look like if they were to drop a hydrogen bomb on it, everything on it would be afire.

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III - 30

VOICE: What is the acreage of Okinawa?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, say two hydrogen bombs!

I haven't touched on Alaska because I don't know if that is in the purview of this group or not. You can't really talk about the Far East without remembering that Alaska is really that upper handle, more important than Japan, in my opinion, more important offensively and defensively -- particularly defensively. Both defensively and offensively it is still of key importance to us in any operation out in the Far East.

Now, move down farther South. The business of holding in the southern half of Indochina from a political point of view is of tremendous significance. From the military point of view, I don't think it makes an awful lot of difference one way or the other. In my opinion we can do little or nothing about it other than what is being done now, and it's going to cost us a lot of money for a lot of years to achieve merely a holding action, for that is all we have there now.

I think the Philippines will still remain a very important key area for us. It's fortunately located, from a military point of view; it's back far enough from the mainland of China so if we have any kind of screen of naval forces and other forces out in front, we can get warning of attack and so on. It's a good base, much better than Okinawa in my opinion, safer and better adapted, both from a defensive and offensive point of view.

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I haven't said a word about China because we have too many
Chinese hands around this table -- from Mr. Luce on down -- for me
to venture an opinion as to what is going to happen in China. I will
commit myself to this extent. I think that if any of us have any ideas
that Chiang is ever going to return to the mainland of China, short of
a major war in which we put him there and then support him after he gets
there, I think we are doing a lot of wishful thinking and are being un-
realistic. I don't think Chiang has a chance of ever re-establishing
himself back on the mainland of China. I may be completely wrong
about that but that is my very firm conviction -- short of a general war
if we put him there, and then after we get him there, we would have to
support him there and support all of his operations.

MR. LUCE: From a sheer military point of view what do you
think about holding on to Formosa?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, first of all I think we've committed
ourselves to the point where we have got to go through with it. But
again Formosa has the same disadvantages as Okinawa. It's much big-
ger, of course, and therefore less vulnerable but it's still too close to
the mainland of China and less well-developed as a base. Politically

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III - 32

we have to do it but from a sheer cold-blooded military point of view,
it hasn't tremendous importance.

MR. DEAN: How concerned should we be, General, about the
apparent build-up in North Korea today, speaking of the airfields and
things in this category?

GENERAL COLLINS: I don't think they would necessarily, make
too much difference so far as Formosa and Okinawa are concerned. Of
course they are a direct threat to our position in Japan and then of course
so far as Korea is concerned, it would be almost impossible for us in a
major war to hold Korea or South Korea. You have only one port, Pusan.

MR. LUCE: You were saying that it will cost us quite a bit of
money for quite a while to continue our holding operations. I think the
same thing can be said about Korea and what we will do?

GENERAL COLLINS: I would say that it's 99% political and not
military. You can do everything from Japan -- from an air point of view
-- that you can from South Korea, and you can do it better; you've got
more dispersion, you have got your bases protected and so on.

wrote diaracterion, you have got your pages protected and so on.
--- that you can from South Korea, and you can do it better; you, we got
military. You can do everything from Japan -- from an air point of view
GENERAL COTTING: I would say that it's 30% political and not
same thing can be said about Korea and what we will do?

MR. RICE: You were asking that it will cost us quite a bit of
money for quite a while to continue our holding operations. I think the
major part to hold Korea or South Korea. You have only one port, Pusan.
so far as Korea is concerned, it would be almost impossible for us in a
sense they are a direct threat to our position in Japan and then of course
too much difference so far as economics and Okinawa are concerned. Of
GENERAL COTTING: I doubt if they would necessarily make
things in this category?

apparent build-up in North Korea today, appealing of the article and
MR. DEVIN: How concerned should we be, General, about the
it has, I think, tremendous importance.

we have to do it but from a sheer cold-blooded military point of view.

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III - 33

MR. LUCE: What about the value of the Korean army, the ROKs?

GENERAL COLLINS: The ROKs have no indigenous means of supporting themselves except from an ammunition standpoint or from transportation and the rest of the things. I'm trying to look at it with a minimum of emotion.

MR. LUCE: Are you looking at it from a point of view of a major or total war? What about the point of view of a small or little war?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, of course, if you are talking about just a small or little war, surely the ROKs can contribute mightily in holding Korea, and as long as you can limit it to a small war and we can use atomic weapons, I think we can still hold South Korea with bases in Japan and with what we have in South Korea. But in the interim it is going to cost us a lot of money, even more than it did in the Philippines. You know it took us pretty near 50 years to get out of the Philippines and give them their independence. I'm sure we'd all like to give South Korea hers and get out of supporting them and let them go on their own. I just don't see any possibility of that politically and economically at present.

at present.

own. I just don't see any hospitality of that POLITICALLY and ECONOMICALLY
South Korea here and get out of supporting them and let them go on their
buses and give them their independence. I'm sure we'd still like to give
buses. You know it took us basically near 20 years to get out of the British-
ness in Japan and with what we have in South Korea. But in the interim
can see atomic weapons. I think we can still hold South Korea with
poking Korea, and so long as you can limit it to a small war and we
just a small or little war, amenable the ROKs can contribute mightily in
GENERAL COLLING: Well, of course, if you are talking about
or total war? What about the point of view of a small or little war?
MR. RICE: You know looking at it from a point of view of a major
mm of emotion.

horror and the rest of the things. I'm trying to look at it with a mini-
bottling themselves except from an ammunition standpoint or from trans-
GENERAL COLLING: The ROKs have no indigenous means of sub-
MR. RICE: What about the value of the Korean army, the ROKs?

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LCC

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III - 34

DR. JOHNSON: How about the Chinese -- and not Korean -- use of atomic weapons including on Pusan itself? Could we then support the South Korean army? If we used tactical atomic weapons, why shouldn't they?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, I think they probably would, and then that being the case it would be exceedingly difficult for us to hold South Korea.

DR. JOHNSON: Would you agree then that in a limited war, tactical atomic weapons provide real difficulties for us as well as the other side, in terms of re-supply, in many of the countries where lack of ports and other facilities prevail?

GENERAL COLLINS: Yes, that would be bad enough in Europe but less the case than it would be in South Korea. Unfortunately South Korea is relatively shallow, with only one port -- Pusan -- that can really handle any equipment to amount to anything. Inchon, as you well know, is just a little bit of a thing and the other ports around there are a very minor character.

MR. HALABY: You spoke of Chiang's only chance of getting back to the mainland as part of a general war and that set me wondering what

MR. HAYLEY: You abuse of Chinese's only chance of getting back
minor character.

It just a little bit of a thing and the other bors around there are a very
handle any equipment to amount to anything. Incidentally, as you well know,
it relatively shallow, with only one port -- Pratt -- that can really
less the case than it would be in South Korea. Unfortunately South Korea

GENERAL COTTING: Yes, that would be ped enough in Europe put
and other facilities brevet?!

Side, in terms of re-annually, in many of the countries where lack of borts
of atomic weapons provide real difficulties for us as well as the other

DR. JOHNSON: Would you agree then that in a limited war, tactics
Kores.

that being the case it would be exceedingly difficult for us to hold South
GENERAL COTTING: Well, I think they properly would, and then
there?

South Korean army? If we need tactical atomic weapons, why shouldn't
of atomic weapons including on Pratt itself? Could we then support the

DR. JOHNSON: How about the Chinese -- and not Korean -- same

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[5c]

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your mind would be the evolution of a general war in the Far East. Your
statements sounded as though you felt that a general war might develop
in Asia, somewhat as it did in World War II -- by an American-supported
operation, let's say, on Chinese land.

GENERAL COLLINS: No, I didn't intend that. I meant that if it
did come to a general war -- and I don't think I am telling you anything
new -- my judgment is that the first phase of it will be a very ruthless
exchange of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. And I think whichever
side wins that will ultimately win the war; the side that loses that is
sunk. Assuming that we win this interchange, or exchange of weapons,
then it is conceivable that the second phase might last for some time.
My personal guess is that it won't last too long, but I may be completely
wrong on that. If it lasts for some time then it might be very well worth-
while if Chiang is still going, to put him on the mainland of China, and
it could be done perhaps, although it would be still difficult; but if we
had won the opening phase of the war, then it's conceivable that we
could put him back on the mainland, and if we had genuine support from
the Chinese people on the mainland, we could probably keep him there.
That is what I had in mind.

That is what I had in mind.

the Chinese people on the mainland, we could properly keep him there.
could but him back on the mainland, and if we had genuine support from
had won the opening phase of the war, then it's conceivable that we
it could be done baroque, although it would be still difficult; but if we
while it Chiang is still doing, to put him on the mainland of China, and
wrong on that. If it lasts for some time then it might be very well worth-
My personal guess is that it won't last too long, but I may be completely
then it is conceivable that the second phase might last for some time.
such. Assuming that we win this interphase, or exchange of weapons,
side mines that will ultimately win the war; the side that loses that is
exchange of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. And I think whichever
now — my judgment is that the phase of it will be a very nonplus-
did come to a general war — and I doubt think I am telling you anything
GENERAL COLLINS: No, I didn't intend that. I meant that it is
operation, let's say, on Chinese land.

in Asia, somewhat as it did in World War II — by an American-subordinated
statements sounded as though you felt that a general war might develop
your mind would be the evolution of a general war in the Far East. Your

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[SFC]

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III - 36

MR. HALABY: Presumably a particular phase would be an ex-
change of airborne nuclear weapons, both in Europe and Asia, so that
the Soviet Union's armed forces and the Chinese Communist forces
would, as you say, plaster Okinawa, Formosa and Japanese bases and
we would be striking at Chinese Communist and Siberia and other Soviet
bases. And the result of that initial air battle is the one that you feel
would be decisive of the ultimate result . . .

DR. JOHNSON: I'd like to be clear in this view. Do you believe
that the initial exchange would involve Japan?

GENERAL COLLINS: If Russia has fewer weapons than perhaps some of our friends say they have, if they are short, then I don't think Japan would be involved -- except on our airbases from which we could strike against them and I do think they would probably hit those bases. It wouldn't be too high a priority target for them, but if they have ample numbers of weapons I definitely think that they would attack our bases in Japan from which we could strike them.

DR. JOHNSON: I'm thinking of Japan as a whole.

GENERAL COLLINS: I wouldn't worry about that. Why should they waste bombs in destroying the productive capacity of Japan if they

they waste poms in destroying the productive capacity of Japan if they
GENERAL COLLING: I wouldn't work that way. Why should I?

in Japan from which we could strike them.
numbers of weapons I definitely think that they would attack our bases
If I couldn't be too high a priority target for them, but if they have ample
strike against them and I do think they would properly hit those bases.
Japan would be involved -- except on our airwaves from which we could
some of our friends say they have, if they are short, then I don't think
GENERAL COLLING: It isn't easy for fewer weapons than perhaps
that the initial exchange would involve Japan?

DR. JOHNSON: I'd like to be clear in this view. Do you believe
would be decisive of the ultimate result . . .

And the result of that initial air battle is the one that you feel
we would be striking at Chinese Communist and Siberian and other Soviet
would, as you say, blaster Okinawa, Formosa and Japanese bases and
the Soviet Union's armed forces and the Chinese Communist forces
aspire of airborne un集体 weapons, both in Europe and Asia, so that

MR. HALEBY: presumably a particular phase would be an ex-

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[sc]

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can win this first exchange? Their objective would be to try to protect
Russia and prevent us from clobbering them. They would have time later
to go back and destroy factories and that sort of thing.

DR. JOHNSON: Wouldn't that be their world-wide pattern to
knock us off economically and otherwise, and just get our military bases?

GENERAL COLLINS: I think, generally speaking, that Japan, her
industrial production and the will of the Japanese people to fight, is less
important from their point of view than the will of the Frenchman or the
Germans or the Italians to fight them in Europe, and both would be less
important than their objective of getting our SAC bases, and our other
bases, both naval and air. I think these would be the primary targets
to start with but I think they would also go after Europe psychologically
and Britain and to a less extent here, I think Washington might be a hot
spot and New York would be a little warm.

MR. LUCE: In a comparatively short time -- within the next five
years -- how is a conflict likely to develop in Asia? It probably would
have to do with the capabilities of the Chinese Communists -- short of
a general war -- and their power of control. Now, how can this conflict

a general war -- and their power of control. Now, how can this conflict
have to do with the capabilities of the Chinese Communists -- short of
years -- how is a conflict likely to develop in Asia? It probably would
not be long before the Japanese would be a little warm.

and Britain and to a less extent Europe. I think Washington might be a hot
to start with but I think they would also do better Europe psychologically
because, both naval and air. I think these would be the primary targets
important than their objective of getting our SVC passes, and our other
germans or the Italians to fight them in Europe, and both would be less
important from their point of view than the will of the Frenchman or the
industrial production and the will of the Japanese people to fight, is less
GENERAL CORINTH: I think, generally speaking, that Japan, per
knock us off economically and otherwise, and just get our military passes?

DR. JOHNSON: Wouldn't that be their world-wide pattern to
to be pack and destroy factories and that sort of thing.

Russia and prevent us from clopping them. They would have time later
can win this first exchange? Their objective would be to try to protect
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III - 38

be countered by us? How is a conflict likely to develop and what can
be done about it in the sense of a broad military strategy?

GENERAL COLLINS: That is on the basis that the Chinese Com-
munists would be the aggressors, I take it.

MR. LUCE: Well, I'm speaking about that area now, of trying
to get global communists.

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, the only way something less than
global conflict will develop in the Far East, in my judgment, would be
something initiated by the Chinese Communists. I can't imagine us
initiating something that would lead to general war. I don't think we
want a general war; I don't think the Russians want a general war. Now
the Chinese Communists would be silly to try to do it, but they might
assay an operation against Thailand, but I don't believe they can do it.
It would be crazy.

MR. LUCE: What about Burma and Thailand?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, now that is the other area, the exten-
sion of the Asian mainland to the South and Southeast. Again, in my
personal judgment, the Chinese would have everything to lose by

betrayal judgment, the Chinese would have everything to lose by
action of the Vanian mainland to the South and Southeast. Again, in my
GENERAL COLLIING: Well, now that is the other area, the exen-
MR. LUCE: What about Brunei and Thailand?

If would be easy.
asasy an operation against Thailand, but I don't believe they can do it.
the Chinese Communists would be able to try to do it, but they might
want a general war; I don't think the Russians want a general war. Now
initiating something that would lead to general war. I don't think we
something initiated by the Chinese Communists. I can't imagine us
diplomatic conflict will develop in the Far East, in my judgment, would be
GENERAL COLLIING: Well, the only way something less than
to get global communists.

MR. LUCE: Well, I'm abating about that area now, of trying
communists would be the address area, I take it.

GENERAL COLLIING: That is on the basis that the Chinese Com-
be done about it in the sense of a broad military strategy?
be countered by us? How is a conflict likely to develop and what can

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initiating military operations. Personally I think that they will continue
to try to do it by infiltration and not by open conflict. They still have a
lot to do on the mainland of China itself and I can see no point in their
initiating military operations anywhere on the continent. They would
have more chance of success on the continent than they would against
Formosa, in my judgment.

MR. LUCE: Except for political and total infiltration, you don't
see any of those sharp conflicts developing?

GENERAL COLLINS: Any threat, or any small war, that threatens
the vital interest of the United States or the vital interest of Russia --
we never can tell that it isn't going to lead to general war. I certainly
think that, as I understand our broad policy, we've decided that we are
not going to let the Russians do any longer what they did right after the
war and what Hitler did, grab up a chunk here, though not enough to
cause a general war, and let them get away with it. And then after they
have digested that, then grab up another chunk somewhere else. My
understanding is we have said: "Look, boys and girls, this is as far
as you are going to go, or else it means general war." If we don't mean
that then I think we are in a bad, bad way. There is only one way to stop
this military aggression of imperialistic communism. And that is to say,
"if you move in one more that means war."

"If you move in one more that means war."

this military aggression of inapplicable communism. And that is to say, that then I think we are in a bad, bad way. There is only one way to stop as you are doing to do, or else it means general war." If we don't mean understanding is we have said: "Look, boys and girls, this is so far have defeated that then push up another chunk somewhere else. My came a general war, and let them get away with it. And then after they war and what Hitler did, drop up a chunk here, though not enough to not going to let the Russians do any longer what they did right after the think that, as I understand our broad policy, we've decided that we are we never can tell that it isn't going to lead to general war. I certainly the vital interest of the United States or the vital interest of Russia --

GENERAL COLLING: Any threat, or any small war, that threatens see any of those start conflicts developing?

MR. LUCE: Except for political and total infiltration, you don't formosan, in my judgment.

have more chance of success on the continent than they would against initiating military operations anywhere on the continent. They would lot to do on the mainland of China itself and I can see no point in their to try to do it by infiltration and not by open conflict. They still have a initiating military operations. Personally I think that they will continue

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MR. LUCE: I think it is very important for us to get clear on that.

VOICE: How would we respond, General, to an attack if it should
come from Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam or from North Korea again?

GENERAL COLLINS: In many ways that would be a more serious
threat than the one now because after all we have South Korea under the
aegis of the United States. We still have some troops there, whereas in
Vietnam, we have no troops, never have had any, and have said that we
were not going to put any troops on the mainland of China. I support
the view, so I don't say that if Ho Chi Minh made an attack against
Vietnam it would necessarily lead to major war. Let me say that to hold
South Vietnam by air action alone would be just as impossible as it would
have been to have held Korea by air action alone. You just cannot hold
ground unless you put some troops on the ground. Maybe you all think
I am an old-fashioned army man but I'll defend that stand any time any-
where. It is not old-fashioned; it's just being plain realistic.

MR. LUCE: General, where you throw me off is by saying that
you think the situation in Vietnam would not lead to general war.

GENERAL COLLINS: I did not say that. I say that I don't know
whether it would. I said that one need not necessarily lead to war for

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III - 41

this reason, Mr. Luce; that I don't think that would strike at anything
of vital concern to the security of the United States.

MR. LUCE: But would we put up any military opposition to that
kind of attack?

GENERAL COLLINS: I don't know, that would depend on the judgment of our political leaders at the time. The only thing we could do would be to support them by air, and that would not prevent the over-running of South Vietnam, not in my opinion.

VOICE: Why couldn't we support them with ground troops?

GENERAL COLLINS: We couldn't get them there fast enough and
once again you'd have the same trouble that you would have in Pusan,
there is only one port and that is Saigon. Saigon would be terribly vul-
nerable to the attack by atomic weapons.

MR. HOOPES: Well, I think one of the assumptions underlying
all limited war is that there have to be sanctuaries, mutually, tactically
accepted sanctuaries. Now just for hypothetical purposes, let's assume
that the communists agreed not to attack the forts if we didn't attack by-
yong 50 miles in the northern area.

long 50 miles in the northern area.

that the communists agreed not to attack the force if we didn't attack pho-
 accepted sanctuaries. Now just for hypothetical babbooe, let's assume
 all limited war is that there have to be sanctuaries, mutually, tactically
 MR. HOOKES: Well, I think one of the assumptions underlying

there is only one port and that is Saigon. Saigon would be fairly anti-
once again you'd have the same trouble that you would have in Paris,

GENERAL COLTRIN: We couldn't let them there fast enough and

would be to support them by air, and that would not break the over-
ment of our political leaders at the time. The only thing we could do

GENERAL COLTRIN: I don't know, that would depend on the ing-
king of attack?

MR. RICE: But would we but up any military opposition to that
of vital concern to the security of the United States.

the reason, Mr. Rice: that I don't think that would strike at anything

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III - 42

GENERAL COLLINS: If we are going to participate in this we ought to do it with our eyes open and not half-heartedly. In other words, if we are going to do it this time, we have the wherewithal now which we did not have in Korea. And if we decide to support the defense of South Vietnam, if our political leaders, our national security council, decides that this is of vital concern in the United States, then we ought to go after the bases from which Ho Chi Minh gets his wherewithal. And that isn't in North Vietnam, that's in China. Not that there would be any hesitation then, but we would know ahead of time that we are taking the chance of major war. So if we are going to war, for God's sake, let's not do it half-baked; let's go after it. That is not a criticism of what was done in North Korea but I draw a sharp distinction between the conditions existing today and those which existed at the time of North Korea.

MR. HALABY: Shouldn't we draw the conclusion from that, that the line which you feel that we have drawn at the 38th parallel in Korea, if crossed by communist forces, should initiate our own attack on their own bases? But no such line has been drawn at the border between North and South Vietnam.

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III - 43

GENERAL COLLINS: We've got a far greater political commitment in Korea than we have down below. This is general war. On a new aggression in Vietnam, I have not made up my mind, needless to say I would not have the decision. It is a very complicated thing. A great deal would depend upon what led Ho Chi Minh to make the attack and so on. To me, you really cannot discuss questions of this character this way in the vacuum just sitting around here. You have to know what is behind the scenes, just who is behind them, who persuaded Ho Chi Minh to do it. He is not going to do it on his own unless the Chinese or Russians had egged him on to do it. If this union between Russia and China is firm, then it means general war.

MR. NASH: I would pursue this one step further. If a situation arose of such vital interest it would invoke our bombing either Chinese bases or Soviet bases that I take it, you would total it up like this: that an attack on Japan would be ...

GENERAL COLLINS: I think that any more moves by Russia to Japan is a threat to the security of the United States and would call for complete and all-out effort on our part.

Japan is a threat to the security of the United States and would call for
GENERAL COLLINS: I think that any more moves by Russia to

an attack on Japan would be . . .

pases or Soviet passes that I take it, you would total it up like this: first
arise of such vital interest it would invoke our pumping either Chinese
MR. NASH: I would assume this one step further. If a situation

then it means general war.

He is not going to do it on his own unless the Chinese or Russians had
scenes, just who is behind them, who berated Ho Chi Minh to do it.
A vacuum just sitting around here. You have to know what is behind the
You really cannot discuss questions of this character this way in the
debate how what led Ho Chi Minh to make the attack and so on. To me,
not have the decision. It is a very complicated thing. A great deal would
decade in Vietnam. I have not made up my mind, needless to say I would
in Korea than we have down below. This is general war. On a new ad-

GENERAL COLLINS: We are not a great power in political commitment

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VOICE: Certainly Alaska? Certain South Korea?

GENERAL COLLINS: Alaska, yes. Strictly from a military point of view I don't think South Korea is vital to the interest of the United States. Politically, though, we've made a commitment to the U.N. We have made commitments to our people, we have lost thousands of Americans lives in obtaining freedom in South Korea, and if we should walk out on it, I just think that we would be sunk so far as the rest of the world is concerned. If we walk out on South Korea, won't we walk out on France, on Italy, on Turkey, on anybody else? So I think while it is not to our vital interest from a strictly military point of view, I think it would be to our vital interest from a broad political point of view. We just could not let them get away with it, that is all. If you did, then what is our word worth in the world?

MR. HALABY: Then the next down the scale, as I read your remarks, would be Formosa. There we don't have the United Nations commitment, but we do have a public commitment to the Nationalist Chinese and it would therefore, largely for political reasons, be a situation of vital interests.

vital interests.

and it would therefore, largely for political reasons, be a situation of
situation, but we do have a public commitment to the Nationalist Chinese
mandate, would be Lomami. There we don't have the United Nations com-
mitment, as I read your re-
MR. HALARY: Then the next down the scale, as I read your re-

Just could not let them get away with it, that is all. If you did, then what
it would be to our vital interest from a proper political point of view. We
is not to our vital interest from a strictly military point of view. I think
on France, on Italy, on Turkey, on anybody else? So I think while it
world is concerned. If we walk out on South Korea, won't we walk out
on it? I just think that we would be sunk so far as the rest of the
came lives in obtaining freedom in South Korea, and if we should walk
have made commitments to our people, we have lost thousands of Ameri-
States. Politically, though, we've made a commitment to the U.N. We
of view I don't think South Korea is vital to the interest of the United

GENERAL COFFMAN: Alaska, Lee. Strainy from a military point
VOICE: Certainly Alaska? Certain South Korea?

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ECC

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GENERAL COLLINS: I just don't believe that public opinion in the United States would support our launching a war there, but I may be completely wrong. I personally would be opposed to it. Fortunately I don't think it is going to happen. The Chinese Communist would be silly if they started something here. We probably would take local defensive actions. All we have to do is act defensively and they can't get away with it. We could probably limit that one to just a local proposition and the protection of Formosa.

MR. HALABY: Then with respect to the rest of the area of South-east Asia -- Indochina, Burma, Thailand -- any attack in those areas you would not feel was an attack on our vital interests justifying our retaliation.

GENERAL COLLINS: That would be my judgment. I think that we could support these areas in a lot of ways. And of course, to operate large forces down from China to one of those countries isn't the easiest thing in the world by a long shot, they could not do it rapidly; they would get involved in lines of communications, would be subject to sabotage, attacks and all sorts of things like that. It is a completely different picture from Europe, and it would be a different picture from the Korean business.

II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

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MR. HALABY: But with respect to an attack on Okinawa, that
would be, in fact, an attack on U.S. forces, I take it?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, it would be technically an attack on the United States.

MR. HALABY: Would the same apply to the Philippines?

GENERAL COLLINS: Yes, yes, definitely. Why in the world should the Russians take any interest in the Philippines unless they are aiming at us from a military point of view? If they attack the Philippines, it would mean general war in my judgment. It would have to be.

GENERAL McCORMACK: This raises the question in my mind, the
places that look to military analysis to be among the most vulnerable --
South Korean and Okinawa -- in case somebody really was to plaster them,
are the places in which we have the most overt, the most obvious commit-
ments. Is there available to us strategy that has some sense of being for-
ward moving in the Far East? Or must we depend on what we have and
hope for the better there and hope the long-term struggle will be won else-
where?

where?

probe for the better there and hope the long-term attraction will be won else-
wise moving in the Far East? Or what if we depend on what we have and
mentals. If there available to us strategy that has some sense of being for-
the places in which we have the most overt, the most obvious commit-
ment, Korea and Okinawa -- in case somebody really was to blaster them,
places that look to military analysis to be among the most vulnerable --

GENERAL MCCORMACK: This states the question in my mind, the

mean general war in my judgment. If I would have to be.

nausea from a military point of view? If they attack the Philippines, it would
the Russians take any interest in the Philippines unless they are aiming at

MR. HALEBY: Would the same apply to the Philippines?

United States.

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, it would be technically an attack on the
would be, in fact, an attack on U.S. forces, I take it?

MR. HALEBY: But with respect to an attack on Okinawa, that

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ESC

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GENERAL COLLINS: Any military preparation now is so costly I don't think we could afford anything more than we are already doing in the Far East. Certainly the proportion of money we are spending on military matters these days is far beyond anything that any of us visualized even 10 years ago. I say that very frankly. I don't see from a territorial standpoint that we need anymore than we now have. And maybe we're so powerful we will not need do anything more from that point of view.

MR. GAYLORD: Assume some highly theoretical facts; one, that you had all the airlift that you wanted, that you had highly trained, dispersable, rapidly moving forces equipped with tactical atomic weapons and that you announced that in the isolated spots of the world, where your vital interests were, you would move in with this type of force and that you would use tactical atomic weapons -- what chance do you think there would be that the struggle could be limited to small war? Assuming your enemy grabs off something of vital interests.

GENERAL COLLINS: In my judgment if it was of vital interest to the United States it would mean general war. The real use of the forces you are talking about now is in the small wars that might occur

forces you are talking about now is in the small war that might occur to the United States it would mean general war. The real use of the GENERAL COLLING: In my judgment it was of vital interest war? Assuming your enemy drops off something of vital interests.

do you think there would be that the struggle could be limited to a small force and that you would use tactical atomic weapons -- what chance where your vital interests were, you would move in with this type of one and that you announced that in the isolated areas of the world, diabetesable, rapidly moving forces equipped with tactical atomic weapons that you had all the air force that you wanted, that you had highly trained, MR. GAYLORD: Assume some highly theoretical fact: one, point of view.

maybe we're so powerful we will not need do anything more from that territorial standpoint that we need anymore than we now have. And saluted even 10 years ago. I say that very frankly. I don't see from a military matters these days in far beyond anything that any of us van- in the Far East. Certainly the proportion of money we are spending on I don't think we could afford anything more than we are already doing GENERAL COLLING: Any military preparation now is so costly

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[c]

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that you could prevent from turning into a general conflagration. For
example, I think that it would be possible if we decided to operate down
in South Vietnam if that should be the place, that it is within the bounds
of possibility that it would be limited to a small war because for one
thing, it's of vital interest to Russia and I don't think that it is enough
to our world-wide vital interest that we would launch atomic warfare or
that they would. So I think in a case of that sort you might very well
have a small war and it would be pretty hot too, but it still would not
be a general war. Many of the other places in the world are potentially
of the same sort. I think Indonesia for example. They have cotton down
there and if Australia decided, "My God, we just can't let something de-
velop in Indonesia." Under our treaties we come to the aid of Australia,
with something that might possibly be limited to a small war, and in
Indonesia also.

It's easy to say that we ought to have a policy which is not one
merely of reacting to the Soviet, but just what should we do differently
and where is always a tough nut. I am not doing to try and answer that
one but I do have this thought which is not new but does distress me at
times when we go through many of our operations. I think we have to
pay more attention to winning the battle of ideas than we do, and I think we

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III - 49

are by no means winning that. Various attacks on the Voice of America,
for example, cutbacks in the USIS programs, things of that character,
lead us away from the things that we ought to be doing. Now, I don't
say that everything that the USIS or that the Voice of America is doing
is perfect, and I would like to see some constructive suggestions as to
how it can be improved. But I am confident that the most threatening
thing about communism is its phony religious and spiritual characteris-
tics which do have an appeal, a gross appeal to underprivileged people
around the world.

The root of all of this comes down to the question, as I see it,
of personal human responsibility and dignity. I think that we must keep
hammering on that. You can't pass the responsibility of what each of
us is to do to a group of people sitting at the head, telling what is the
right thing for other people to do, deciding what is good for Johnny
rather than Johnny himself deciding what is good for him and the rest of
the people around him. In other words, I think that the attack on that
basic phony religion of communism is the thing at which we are failing,
and I think we must do something about it if we really are going to get
ahead with checking the fight on it.

ahead with checking the light on it.

and I think we must do something about it if we really are going to get
radicalized by the thing at which we are failing, the people around him. In other words, I think that the attack on that rather than Johnny himself deciding what is good for him and the rest of right thing for other people to do, deciding what is good for Johnny
is to do to a group of people sitting at the head, telling what is the
hypothesis on that. You can't base the reasonability of what each of
the human reasonable and integrity. I think that we must keep
the root of all of this comes down to the question, as I see it,
around the world.

that do have an abash, a gross abash to underprivileged people
which do have an abash, a gross abash to underprivileged people
to whom communism is its prony religions and spiritual characteristics
how it can be improved. But I am confident that the most threatening
is perfect, and I would like to see some constructive suggestions as to
say that everything that the U212 or that the Voice of America is doing
lead us away from the things that we ought to be doing. Now, I don't
for example, outposts in the U212 programs, things of that character,
are by no means winning that. Various attacks on the Voice of America,
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5CC

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III - 50

MUCH TESTIMONY WAS ALSO TAKEN ON WHAT CONDITIONS WERE WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF OUR ALLIES, HOW WELL THE UNITED STATES WAS HANDLING FOREIGN PROBLEMS AND HOW WELL SUPPORTED U.S. POLICIES WERE ABROAD. TYPICAL OF THESE EXAMINATIONS WERE REPORTS ON ASIA BY WILLIAM HENDERSON OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND KARL BENDETSEN, FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY---

MR. HENDERSON: I have prepared about a fifteen minutes talk on how Southeast Asians react to what they think American Military policy is. I hope to try to state a little about what Southeast Asians think. And as a background and as an assumption which may or may not be valid; the area of Southeast Asia, like any comparable geographic area in the world is so important to the United States as to be almost vital to our national interest. And because of this -- I will try to defend that view in a moment -- it is incumbent upon this country to contemplate its defense whether from aggression or subversion if its security should in any way be seriously challenged. It seems to me that Southeast Asia, like comparable areas, is vital to our security not so much for conventional reasons which are normally assigned, such as its raw materials or its

reasons which are normally assigned, such as its raw materials or its
comparable areas, is vital to our security not so much for conventional
seriously challenged. It seems to me that Southeast Asia, like
from aggression or supervision, it its security should in any way be
ta incompetent upon this country to contemplate its defense whether
because of this -- I will try to defend that view in a moment -- it
United States as to be almost vital to our national interest. And
any comparable geographic area in the world is so important to the
which may or may not be valid; the area of Southeast Asia, like
Southeast Asia think. And as a background and as an assumption
Military policy is. I hope to try to state a little about what
talk on how Southeast Asia think to what they think American

MR. HENDERSON: I have prepared a statement a fifteen minutes

OF THE CONCIT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND KRF BENDETSEN,
EXAMINATIONS WERE REPORTS ON ARIY BY WILLIAM HENDERSON
SUBMITTED U.S. POLICIES WERE ABROAD. TABULAR OF THESE
UNITED STATES WAS HANDLING FOREIGN PROBLEMS AND HOW WELL
WERE WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF OUR VILLES, HOW WELL THE
MUCH TRIBUNAL WAS VISO TAKEN ON WHAT CONDITIONS

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50

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III - 51

food surpluses which are very important, or its markets, (Southeast Asia is a principle source in dollar exchange to Great Britain, for example), or even for its strategic position. I would suggest that it comes close to being vital because its loss, or the loss of any significant portion of it, would be a profound moral and psychological shock.

Take Southeast Asia for a moment. It is made up of nine very weak, disorganized countries whose civilizations are in disarray. It is caught between the twin colossi of India and China where, since the withdrawal of the Colonial powers there exists an almost complete vacuum of power. While there is little concern about Indian tensions in the foreseeable future, there are grave fears about the possible directions of Communist Chinese policy, grave fears even while there is unspoken admiration and envy for the material accomplishment of the Peiping government. China has always been a menace. And historically the countries of Southeast Asia have sought to save themselves from this menace by accommodation with Communist China.

It is my view that another significant loss of territory in that area would result in all of these countries running to seek some kind of political accommodation with Communist China in the form

kind of political accommodation with Communist China in the form
that area would result in all of these countries running to seek some
If it is my view that another significant loss of territory in
dation with Communist China.

Yale have sought to save themselves from this menace by sowing-
always been a menace. And historically the countries of Southeast
the material accomplishment of the British government. China has
grave fears even while there is unbroken admiration and envy for
fears about the possible directions of Communist Chinese policy,
about Indian tensions in the foreseeable future, there are grave
almost complete vacuum of power. While there is little concern
where, since the withdrawal of the Colonial powers there exists an
disney. It is caught between the twin colossal of India and China
very weak, disorganised countries whose civilisations are in
Take Southeast Asia for a moment. It is made up of nine
shock.

significant portion of it, would be a profound moral and psychological
it comes close to being vital because its loss, or the loss of any
example), or even for its strategic position. I would suggest that
Yale is a plausible source in dollar exchange to Great Britain, for
to food Ambassadors which are very important, or its markets, (Southeast
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of a neutralist posture or even the acceptance of some degree of
satellite status. (Now, there is no doubt that the force of my
observations would be greatly weakened if a doctrine of limited
warfare and limited political laws were accepted in the world by
the United States or Southeast Asia or any other part of the world
but in the absence of such a doctrine which is only in its initial
stages of evolution and acceptance, I think the point that I am
making has some relevance.)

I conclude therefore, that Southeast Asia comes close to
being a vital interest. In order to safeguard it, many policies are
necessary. I say this simply to defend myself against criticism
later that to defend Southeast Asia one must engage in many political,
economic and psychological policies of surpassing importance and I
purpose only to address myself to military lollcy as Southeast Asians
see the problem. The attempt by the United States to devise a
military policy designed to promote the security of Southeast Asia,
either from aggression or subversion, is I would say, almost fatally
impeded by what seems to me to be a paradox inherent in Southeast
Asian politics.

In the first place, there exists throughout the area a deep,
little understood, but a deep resentment toward the United States for

little understood, put a deep re investment toward the United States for
in the first place, there exists throughout the area a debt,
Yemen politics.

imbeded by what seems to me to be a paradox inherent in Southeast
either from aggression or supervision, if I would say, almost fatally
military policy designed to promote the security of Southeast Asia,
see the problem. The attempt by the United States to device a
burden only to address myself to military policy in Southeast Asia
economic and psychological policies of surrounding importance and I
intend to defend Southeast Asia one must engage in many political,
necessary. I say this simply to defend myself against criticism
put a vital interest. In order to safeguard it, many policies are
I conclude therefore, that Southeast Asia comes close to
making use some relevance.)

stages of evolution and acceptance. I think the point that I am
put in the absence of such a doctrine which is only in its initial
the United States or Southeast Asia or any other part of the world
warfare and limited political laws were accepted in the world by
operations would be greatly weakened if a doctrine of limited
satellite status. (Now, there is no doubt that the force of my
of a neutralist doctrine or even the acceptance of some degree of

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what they conceive to be a military bias of American policy. There
is no doubt that we have emphasized military measures in Southeast
Asia in an effort to strengthen the area against communism. Take
for example, the three succession states of IndoChina where between
75% and 90% of American aid is really military assistance in one form
or another. The principle element, the principle instrument of
American policy in Southeast Asia at least appears to be a military
defense alliance. The grand strategy of the United States in the
present juncture of world affairs, whether rightly or wrongly, is
interpreted to be something that is called and little understood in
Southeast Asia, a doctrine of massive retaliation. We are accused
of being sabre rattlers of talking about fighting when they would
prefer to talk about negotiation and economic progress. They
remember, as I remarked in my paper, that whether it is relevant or
not, that the only time atomic weapons have been used in warfare is
by the United States against a nation's power. Hence they resent
our military policy, even to defend themselves. But paradoxically,
while they resent it, they doubt very much simultaneously the
sincerity of our purpose to defend them and the extent of our
capability of doing so. They doubt our sincerity.

South Korea, for example, they forget that we stopped an

South Korea, for example, they forget that we adopted an
capability of doing so. They doubt our sincerity.
sincerity of our purpose to defend them and the extent of our
while they resent it, they doubt very much simultaneously the
our military policy, even to defend themselves. But paradoxically,
by the United States against a nation's power. Hence they resent
not, that the only time atomic weapons have been used in war is
remember, as I remarked in my paper, that whether it is relevant or
prefer to talk about negotiation and economic progress. They
of being as great ratters of talking about fighting when they would
Southeast Asia, a doctrine of massive retaliation. We are accused
interpreted to be something that is called and little understood in
present juncture of world affairs, whether rightly or wrongly, is
defense alliance. The grand strategy of the United States in the
American policy in Southeast Asia at least appears to be a military
or another. The baneful element, the baneful instrument of
72% and 90% of American aid is really military assistance in one form
for example, the three succession states of Indochina where between
Vietnam in an effort to strengthen the area against communism. Take
is no doubt that we have emphasized military measures in Southeast
what they conceive to be a military phase of American policy. There

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aggression; they remember that we knuckled under in the face of
what they conceived to be superior Chinese power. We backed down.
Korea is not a victory; Korea is a defeat in the eyes of most articulate
Southeast Asians. They look at the Manilla Pacts and they see that
the nature of its commitments is less automatic than is the comparable
clause to the NATO. They remember the President's unfortunate
statement about letting Asians fight Asians. Hence they doubt
whether we are sincere in our intentions.

They also doubt whether we are able to defend Southeast
Asia. Here may I say again that I touch on problems of military
strategy where I am completely incompetent and therefore I wish
to emphasize that what I say is how Southeast Asians, as far as I
am able to understand the situation, look upon our military capability,
whether or not their analysis is correct. They say, how would you
defend Southeast Asia if you wanted to? By all-out nuclear war?
They don't have any interest in this for this seems to them to be the
way to destruction. They are not satisfied that we would ever use
nuclear weapons. For they remember about the Dien Bien Phu, if
they remember anything about it, one fact; one of the arguments why
we did not intervene in the spring of 1954, was somebody's assertion
that nuclear weapons would be of no use. The kind of warfare that was

that nuclear weapons would be of no use. The kind of warfare that was
we did not intervene in the spring of 1984, was somebody's assertion
they remember anything about it, one sort: one of the arguments why
nuclear weapons. For they remember about the Dien Bien Phu, it
way to destruction. They are not satisfied that we would ever use
they don't have any interest in this for this seems to them to be the
defend Southeast Asia if you wanted to? By all-out nuclear war?
whether or not their analysis is correct. They say, how would you
am able to understand the situation, look upon our military capability,
to emphasize that what I say is how Southeast Asia, be it as I
strategically where I am completely incompetent and therefore I wish
Asia. Here may I say again that I touch on problems of military
They also doubt whether we are able to defend Southeast
whether we are sincere in our intentions.
statement about letting Asia tight Asia. Hence they doubt
clause to the NATO. They remember the President's unorthodox
the nature of its commitments is less automatic than is the comparable
Southeast Asia. They look at the Manila Facts and they see that
Korea is not a victory; Korea is a defeat in the eyes of most articulate
what they conceived to be superior Chinese power. We packed down
addressator they remember that we knuckled under in the face of

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fought at Dien Bien Phu was a likely kind of warfare, all over Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. Hence they wonder as to the efficacy of these weapons. They are not satisfied to be liberated at the end of a long occupation and they wonder where is the ability to defend, by limited means, on the borders of northern Southeast Asia, which is the only place they care to be defended and by means that would not encompass their destruction. And even more, how are we to defend them against subversion and, believe me they worry about subversion. In Laos, for example, where it is a very present danger and in Indonesia where a plethora of rebellion gives to the communists the best opportunity they have had since 1948, of advancing their cause.

Whether or not they understand correctly they think they see aggressive withdrawal of American power from the Far East, I have been told, although I do not know, that to move a division from Japan would take 15 days under optimum circumstances and perhaps 10 days from the Philippines. Southeast Asians don't know the details but their impression is that in case of open warfare we could not act quickly enough. I have been informed that it would take the communists as long to conquer all of South Vietnam as it would take to walk from the 17th parallel south and the same situations apparently prevails in Laos and Cambodia.

situations abnormally brevile in Java and Cambodia.
would take to walk from the 13th parallel south and the same
take the communists as long to conduct all of South Vietnam as it
could not act quickly enough. I have been informed that it would
the details put their impression is that in case of open warfare we
perhaps 10 days from the Philippines. Southeast Asia can know
from Japan would take 12 days under optimum circumstances and
I have been told, although I do not know, that to move a division
see aggressive withdrawal of American power from the Far East.
Whether or not they understand correctly they think they

advancing their cause.
communists the best opportunity they have had since 1948, of
danger and in Indonesia where a plethora of rebellion drives to the
suppression. In Java, for example, where it is a very present
defend them against suppression and, believe me they worry about
not encumber their destruction. And even more, how are we to
be the only place they care to be defended and by means that would
be limited means, on the borders of northern Southeast Asia, which
of a long occupation and they wonder where is the ability to defend
of these weapons. They are not satisfied to be liberated at the end
Asia for the foreseeable future. Hence they wonder as to the efficacy
brought at Dien Bien Phu was a likely kind of warfare, all over Southeast

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All these considerations, incidentally, it seems to me to
explain why the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has been an
inadequate instrument for collective security in Southeast Asia.
I do not explore whether or not, Mr. Chairman, SEATO was a wise or
unwise step. It exists. And thus one must evaluate it on its own
terms. It carries little, if any, conviction to anyone, including the
Filipinos who are its most ardent champions. Ask a Filipino and his
heart is in the bilaterial defense agreement of 1951. I once had a
most revealing conversation with the President of South Vietnam, a
country which is, as you know, covered by the protocol attached
to the Manila Pact and presumably, therefore, with respect to which
we have a commitment to defend it. He said to me that a speech
with Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson had given a few days
before for the American friends of Vietnam in Washington, I believe
it was, carried more conviction and meant more to him that the
entire panoply of SEATO. Operation "Firm Link" which has often
been cited in this country as living proof of the strength of SEATO
was a joke to people in Southeast Asia, a living demonstration of
the feebleness of the alliance. What is the matter with SEATO? It
lacks strength and it does not carry conviction. Our commitment is
not generally persuasive; how much more so the commitments of

not generally persuasive how much more so the commitments of
laws attain and it does not carry conviction. Our commitment is
the weakness of the alliance. What is the matter with SEATO? It
was a joke to people in Southeast Asia, a living demonstration of
been cited in this country as living proof of the strength of SEATO
entire banality of SEATO. Operation "Tim Link" which has often
it was, carried more conviction and meant more to him that the
before for the American friends of Vietnam in Washington, I believe
with Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson had given a few days
we have a commitment to defend it. He said to me that a speech
to the Manila Pact and presumably, therefore, with respect to which
country which is, as you know, covered by the protocol attached
most revealing conversation with the President of South Vietnam, a
heart is in the bilateral defense agreement of 1981. I once had a
Filipino who saw its most urgent champion, Ask a Filipino and his
terms. It carries little, if any, conviction to anyone, including the
unwise step. It exists. And thus one must evaluate it on its own
I do not explore whether or not, Mr. Chairman, SEATO was a wise or
insufficient instrument for collective security in Southeast Asia.
explain why the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has been an
VII these considerations, incidentally, it seems to me to

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Great Britain and France. Where are the divisions, to use Mr. Churchill's phrase, "visible on parade" that would be used to implement commitments of SEATO? Southeast Asians do not see them and they are not persuaded.

If the thesis is accepted that the security of Southeast Asia is a vital interest, then as far as Southeast Asians are concerned, the United States has not faced up to this problem and has not undertaken measures which are persuasive to validate the interest suggested there upon them. We have given much aid over the past years to many countries in the area in the form of military assistance. I would suggest that not one of them could successfully withstand a determined aggression not merely from China but let us say from the Vietnam or even from the Pathetlas, if they made a serious effort to take over the country. Moreover, granted existing conditions of political and economic instability, problems of subversion is very great indeed and there exists, so far as anyone knows, no capacity to meet it. Since no other nation is capable of undertaking the role to defend these areas, since the nations themselves are, in some cases, not alive to the danger and in all cases, incapable of meeting it, I would suggest that the task falls to the United States.

Now to implement this task, to meet the responsibility that is

Now to implement this task, to meet the responsibility that it is, I would suggest that the task falls to the United States.

cases, not alive to the danger and in all cases, incapable of meeting to defend these areas, since the nations themselves are, in some to meet it. Since no other nation is capable of undertaking the role great indeed and there exists, so far as anyone knows, no capacity political and economic instability, problems of supervision is very take over the country. Moreover, granted existing conditions of Vietnam or even from the Philippines, if they made a serious effort to determined aggression not merely from China but let us say from the I would suggest that not one of them could successfully withstand a years to many countries in the area in the form of military assistance. suggested there upon them. We have given much aid over the beat undertaken measure which are berausative to validate the interest the United States has not faced up to this problem and has not is a vital interest, then as far as Southeast Asia are concerned. If the thesis is accepted that the security of Southeast Asia them and they are not beraused.

implement commitments of SEATO? Southeast Asia do not see Communists' presence, "available on bazares" that would be used to Great Britain and France. Where are the divisions, to see Mr.

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involved, is a very great one. I would suggest that there are four major obstacles which prevent us fully from validating it. The first two are the ones which I will briefly touch upon. They have been, I am sure, fully discussed in this room. As far as the Southeast Asians know, there is no local means to retaliate against the kind of aggression that might be expected in Southeast Asia or the kind of subversion that is likely to take place. This suggests necessity for the strengthening of local defense forces, construction of American capacity to limited war. The second point which I am sure has been fully discussed as well, does not exist so far as I am aware, political and military doctrine would enable us to defend Southeast Asia in the only way that is meaningful to Southeast Asians. Our reluctance to use force except in a last resort and then having used force are reluctant to limit it, prevents us, it seems to me, from engaging in the kind of action the defense of Laos would entail.

Certainly I would say that the American people are not aware and certainly not prepared to accept the kind of responsibilities and commitments which the defense of Southeast Asia would inevitably entail. Fourthly, I would emphasize that the kind of military policy which is capable of providing an adequate defense for the area

which is capable of providing an adequate defense for the area
which is capable of providing an adequate defense for the area
entail. Particularly, I would emphasize that the kind of military policy
commitments which the defense of Southeast Asia would inevitably
and certainly not prepared to accept the kind of responsibilities and
Certainly I would say that the American people are not aware
would entail.

seems to me, from engaging in the kind of action the defense of Laos
then having need force are reluctant to limit it, prevents us, it
Vietnam. On reluctance to use force except in a last resort and
Southeast Asia in the only way that is meaningful to Southeast
as aware, political and military doctrine would enable us to defend
sure has been fully discussed as well, does not exist so far as I
American capacity to limited war. The second point which I am
for the strengthening of local defense forces, construction of
of supervision that is likely to take place. This suggests necessity
of aggression that might be expected in Southeast Asia or the kind
Values know, there is no local means to retelliste against the kind
I am sure, fully discussed in this room. As far as the Southeast
two are the ones which I will briefly touch upon. They have been,
major obstacles which prevent us fully from validating it. The fact
that is a very great one. I would suggest that there are four
involved.

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against aggression or subversion would run up against the most
overwhelming political difficulties in the area itself. Inevitably
we would stir up a hornet's nest! I would suggest that any kind
of American policy to defend the area comes up against this liability
and there are ways to minimize the problems.

What are the advantages to be gained? The advantages are
that you would provide for Southeast Asia a sense of security which
is now absent, and without which, I am convinced, there will never
be significant political or economic progress in the area. If they
knew in their hearts that they had a friend on whom they could rely,
they sense now that perhaps they will have to make accommodation
with communists, especially with Communist China. This sense
would lose its urgency and adequate military posture in the area
would be welcomed with relief by the Philippines, by Thailand
wavering in its commitment, by South Vietnam, to mention only
three. Even those who are most vigorous in their opposition would
be more comfortable. I shall never forget, with this I shall conclude,
a comment that the present Prime Minister of Indonesia made when,
after spending in rather vigorous language, some 10 or 15 minutes
denouncing SEATO, America, and our military posture, I said, "But
how would you like us to withdraw from Southeast Asia?" "For

How would you like us to withdraw from Southeast Asia? "For denouncing SEATO", America, and our military presence, I said, "But after spending in rather vigorous landings, some 10 or 12 minutes a comment that the present Prime Minister of Indonesia made when, be more comfortable. I shall never forget, with this I shall conclude three". Even those who are most vigorous in their opposition would waverin in its commitment, by South Vietnam, to mention only would be welcomed with relief by the Philippines, by Thailand would lose its agency and adequate military presence in the area with communists, especially with Communist China. This sense they sense now that perhaps they will have to make accommodation known in their hearts that they had a trend on whom they could rely, be significant political or economic problems in the area. If they is now afloat, and without which, I am convinced, there will never that you would provide for Southeast Asia a sense of security which what are the advantages to be gained? The advantages are and there are ways to minimize the problems. of American policy to defend the area comes up against this inequality we would stir up a hornet's nest! I would not attest that any kind overwhelming political difficulties in the area itself. Inevitably against address or supervision would run up against the most

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heavens make, no, I just don't like the way you do it." And it
seems to me this is the touchdown of the whole thing!

MR. WILSON: In terms of specifics, if we had a tactical
doctrine and organization and so on for conducting limited war with
the symbolism of a division or a unit or whatnot stationed in the
area have a lot of meaning if it were coupled with an appreciation
that it was a practical instrument to use?

MR. HENDERSON: This is one that I have turned over in
my mind a thousand times. In Indonesia, I could only speak of
the actions and specific places, I often asked the question, "Would
you like division in Jakarta?" They said, "Heavens, no!" "What
about in Thailand?" And the usual reply was not "good heavens, no",
the usual reaction was that Thailand is so far away, after all, it is
their business, not ours. We think that they make a mistake, but it
is their business. On balance I probably wouldn't put a division in
Thailand. But there are other places. There is the Philippines;
there is Northwestern Australia. I see no reason why there could
not be a first-class base in standby condition just outside of
Bangkok, sufficiently for outside Bangkok, so the city would not
be blown apart if it were bombed. It seems to me, in other words,
that you can reach a compromise between the inevitable political
opposition which would be stimulated by stationing a division, a

opposition which would be stimulated by stationing a division, a
that you can reach a compromise between the inevitable political
be blown apart if it were pumped. It seems to me, in other words,
Bangkok, sufficiently far outside Bangkok, so the city would not
not be a first-class base in any way, after all, it is
about in Thailand?" And the usual reply was not "good heavens, no",
you like division in Laos?" They said, "Heaven, no!" "What
the actions and specific places, I often asked the question, "Would
my mind a thousand times. In Indonesia, I could only ask of
MR. HENDERSON: This is one that I have turned over in
that it was a practical instrument to use?
areas have a lot of meaning if it were coupled with an abhorrence
the sentiment of a division or a unit or whatnot stationed in the
docility and organisation and so on for conducting limited war with
MR. WILSON: In terms of specifics, it we had a tactical
seems to me this is the touchdown of the whole thing!
heavens make, no, I just don't like the way you do it." And it
is

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compromise between that opposition and its utility by better putting it in Singapore, putting it in Northwest Australia or in the Philippines or something of that sort. Building standby bases and so on.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: This is a question which has been hauled around with the practical aspects on many occasions. It bears directly on rather strong feelings which have come up in our group consistently that we should have mobile tactical forces made up at our responsibility in little places here and there...

MR. BENDETSEN: I want to describe the backdrop in one country that we call a region. I think the most fatal mistake we make politically, both domestically and it makes it more complicated internationally, is to take a regional approach. What is good for the Thailander is acceptable to the Filipinos. This to my mind is literally untrue. It sure is not true in the United States. When we discuss military dispositions in these countries as a precedent to deciding how to go about having them there at all, in a secure way for the long term, you have to have conditions which make it possible. No military base is worth anything if it is on a shifting foundation of political tides or adverse to any country. You can't generalize by regions about that, in my opinion, we always try too much. Now, our massive retaliation doctrine, I agree with you, alienates Southeast Asian facts, current facts. When I say this, I think we have to back

Valian facts, current facts. When I see this, I think we have to pack
masative reconciliation doctrine. I agree with you, elenates Bongbeat
regions about that, in my opinion, we always try too much. Now, on
of political tides or adverse to any country. You can't generalise by
No military base is worth anything if it is on a shifting foundation
for the long term. You have to have conditions which make it possible
deciding how to do about having them there at all, in a secure way
discuss military dispositions in these countries as a precedent to
literally nature. It same is not true in the United States. When we
Thatlander is acceptable to the Philippines. This to my mind is
internationally, to take a regional approach. What is good for the
make politically, both domestically and it makes it more complicated
country that we call a region. I think the most fatal mistake we
MR. BENEDICTEN: I want to describe the backdrop in one
np at our reasonableness in little pieces here and there...
group consistently that we should have mobile tactical forces made
parte directly on rather strong feelings which have come up in our
played around with the practical aspects on many occasions. It
GENEVA MCCORMICK: This is a question which has been
or something of that sort. Building a stand-by base and so on.
it in Singapore, putting it in Northwest Australia or in the Philippines
compromise between that opposition and its utility by better putting

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up a minute. Political leadership in Southeast Asia does not repre-
sent any mass thinking. It is whoever happens to be at the apex of
a pyramid and you can draw the horizontal line in most of these
countries near the tropics. As far the vast bulk of the people,
communications are not there. But those who do condition political
posture are much further advanced in their understanding of massive
retaliation than the people of the United States are, in my opinion.

We have nothing to sell over there today. Not a thing! We
have nothing to sell, regionally. SEATO? And we have nothing to
sell to them in our present military posture. When it gets down
to the specific that you were mentioning, Mac, about what should
we station there, I would like to suggest that you consider how we
go about stationing anything even if you might make a decision in
advance of what it is to be. The sands of time are running out.
We can lose the Philippines and if we do, it will be a sad day in
Southeast Asia. I didn't talk about the keystone of the origin in
a strategic line which you can draw any place in military planning,
but you are drawing it in a vacuum unless you are dealing with a
political reality that is playing them. Whether you adopt a tactical
nuclear capability or order warfare, dispositions of the budgets and
whatnot would have to be changed to do all that or whether you

whatnot would have to be changed to do all that or whether you
nuclear capability or order warlike, diepositions of the budgets and
political reality that is playing them. Whether you adopt a political
but you are drawing it in a vacuum unless you are dealing with a
a strategic line which you can draw any place in military planning,
Southeast Asia. I didn't talk about the keystone of the origin in
We can lose the Philippines and if we do, it will be a sad day in
advance of what it is to be. The sense of time are running out.
do about stationing anything even if you might make a decision in
we station there, I would like to suggest that you consider how we
to the specific that you were mentioning, Mac, about what should
sell to them in our present military posture. When it gets down
have nothing to sell, regionally. SEATO? And we have nothing to
We have nothing to sell over there today. Not a thing! We
realization than the people of the United States are, in my opinion,
posture are much further advanced in their understanding of massive
communications are not there. But those who do condition political
countries near the tropics. As far the vast bulk of the people,
a barbuda and you can draw the horizontal line in most of these
sent any mass thinking. It is whoever hashene to be at the ahex of
up a minute. Political leadership in Southeast Asia does not repre-
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adhere to conventional warfare.

The Filipinos, for example, and even the little Filipino who gets no communications, knows about the day when the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, visiting Magsaysay had a glittering fine dinner at Malacanan and got a top secret message that things were going to happen in the Straits of Formosa. He left the dinner and we had a fleet in Manila Bay and they know it sailed out and went into the Straits and they think that was wonderful. They thought that was a tactical disposition of great significance and they talk about it day in and day out. But they are not very happy about having us because they think that the United States is a generous but a very thoughtless nation and unless and until we can convince them that we are there for mutual defense, they really don't want us.
And if we mean mutual defense, then there is nothing in the record that convinces them that we do, they wonder why we are so niggardly about the status of forces. We don't put up with it here when a foreign soldier is on our soil; we don't say that he is going to be exempt from our criminal jurisdiction when he goes into a beer hall on his own fun. And the NATO multilateral is merely a basic compromise of the minimum that could be agreed to between 12 nations, later 14, that didn't trust each other and some of them never even dealt together. And the greatest political stumbling block, the greatest single one I know of, is the United States' domestic-political

greatest single one I know of, is the United States' domestic-political
debt together. And the greatest political stumbling block, the
later 14, that didn't trust each other and some of them never even
combrowse of the minimum that could be agreed to between 15 nations,
on his own fun. And the NATO multilateral is merely a palsa
exempt from our criminal jurisdiction when he does into a poor hell
foreign soldier is on our soft we don't say that he is going to be
apart the statute of forces. We don't but up with it here when a
that convince them that we do, they wonder why we are so mindlessly
And if we mean mutual defense, then there is nothing in the record
that we are there for mutual defense, they really don't want us.
very thoughtless nation and unless and until we can convince them
us because they think that the United States is a generous but a
apart it day in and day out. But they are not very piddly about having
that was a tactical disputation of great significance and they talk
into the Strait and they think that was wonderful. They thought
we had a fleet in Manila Bay and they know it sailed out and went
going to happen in the Strait of Hormos. He left the dinner and
dinner at Melanesia and got a top secret message that things were
in-Chief of the Pacific, visiting Masayasu had a dittering tune
dets no communications, knows about the day when the Commander-

The Philippines, for example, and even the little Philippine who
square to conventional warfare.

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policy on status of forces. Whatever kind of bases we have,
whether tactical, massive retaliation, conventional or whatnot,
the sands of time are running out on us by reason of our domestic
political view regarding status of forces. This is the greatest
single issue that is alienating everybody on every front. I'd
question just what is the status of GI Joe and his family in the
host country when he is not on official business. The U. S. policy
is alienating every nation that I know of. In these countries where
there is no middle class and no communications really as we know them,
the little people can't articulate themselves very well. But here at
the base of the pyramid of power -- what happens when GI Joe
goes down a sidewalk or a road and has an unfortunate accident
that kills three or four peasants. Their own tradition and their own
custom is that something should be done right then and there. But
the GI is exempt and the peasants don't understand why that should
be.

We say the GI is there involuntarily and he ought to be exempt
but when they come to the case where he is on his own mission,
there is great political resentment, just as it would be over here,
just as if a foreign soldier or the wife of a foreign soldier committed
some offense against the laws, mores or customs of this country.
That's brush fire stuff. This is a stumbling block to the maintenance

That's a bad thing to do. This is a sampling book to the maintenance
some offense against the law, more or less, of this country.
Just as if a foreign soldier or the wife of a foreign soldier committed
there is great political retribution, just as it would be over here,
but when they come to the case where he is on his own mission,

We say the GI is these inviolability and he ought to be exempt
be.

the GI is exempt and the bespect don't understand why that should
becom that something should be done right then and there. But
that kills three or four bespect. Their own tradition and their own
does down a sidewalk or a road and has an unorthodox accident
the pace of the pyramid of power -- what happens when GI Joe
the little people can't arborulate themselves very well. But here at
there is no middle class and no communications readily as we know them,
the alienating every nation that I know of. In these countries where
host country when he is not on official business. The U. S. policy
discussion just what is the status of GI Joe and his family in the
single issue that is alienating everybody on every front. I'd
political view regarding status of forces. This is the greatest
the same of time are running out on us by reason of our domestic
whether tactical, massive retaliation, conventions orETOGETHER,
policy on status of forces. Whatever kind of force we have,

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of any bases, in Southeast Asia particularly.

MR. FLOBERG: A substantial body of American sophisticated thought feels that this is a fundamental question of the American Bill of Rights and is not waived by the transportation of a soldier to an overseas station.

DR. SMITHIES: This is not purely American. It is a Western attitude toward the Far East.

MR. BENDETSEN: It doesn't matter where it is. We are in the same hassle with Britain; we have the same hassle with France; we have it wherever we go.

The second great stumbling block to the maintenance of bases overseas is our insistence as people that we put an American community down with all the traffic, wherever we are. We insist on it and we spend billions to do it, and it alienates everybody.

If we assume that we must have a status and a posture in these countries, that is, a mutual effort to maintain freedom, they have to be with us. There has to be a well of consent, and not just a shifting one that can be jeopardized by the shifting tides of surface.

Look at the Philippines, for instance. We have a military bases agreement for 99 years. It obligates us to do nothing. We

pase agreement for 60 Years. If obligates us to do nothing. We
Look at the Philippines, for instance. We have a military
surface.

Just a shifting one that can be leashed by the shifting tides of
have to be with us. There has to be a well of consent, and not
these countries, that is, a mutual effort to maintain freedom, they
If we assume that we must have a status and a posture in
and we spend billions to do it, and it alienates everybody.

community down with all the traffic, wherever we are. We insist on it
pase overseas is our insistence as people that we put an American
The second great stumping block to the maintenance of
we have it wherever we do.

the same base with Britain; we have the same base with France;
MR. BENDETTEN: It doesn't matter where it is. We are in
Western attitude toward the Far East.

DR. SMITHIES: This is not purely American. It is a
to an overseas station.

Bill of Rights and it is not waived by the transportation of a soldier
thought telegraph that this is a fundamental question of the American
MR. LROBERG: A substantial body of American sophisticated
of any pase, in Southeast Asia particularly.

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III - 66

don't have to station _one_ unit to go to their defense, or do anything.
We can abrogate the mutual defense treaty in one year's notice. We
wonder why they doubt our intentions?

We broadcast to the world that we want the Philippines to
build up their forces so that the degree to which we must station
forces for their defense, our mutual defense, would recede. We
announce this as our policy from the beginning of military assistance.
Well, in the Philippines, for instance, we have a military bases
agreement, which in nine paragraphs of its preamble says that this
is mutual defense and we will give them military assistance designed
jointly to build up their defenses in our mutual defense. But whenever
they want to talk about it jointly or want to relate military bases,
military assistance, or whenever we want, to any joint military
planting, we won't do it.

We've said that we were helping the Indochinese -- and we
were helping them -- but the aid went through France. That gave us
an opportunity in the uncounted millions to whom we don't talk and
the Soviet sphere does, that we were supporting a colonial power.
So they doubt that we are non-colonial too. They are beginning to
change in Vietnam, but there is a big hangover.

And qualitatively, we do not make the degree of effort we
should make to select, train and orient our representatives. They

should make to select, train and orient our representatives. They
and qualitatively, we do not make the degree of effort we

change in Vietnam, but there is a big handover.
So they doubt that we are non-colonial too. They are beginning to
the Soviet sphere does, that we were supporting a colonial power.
an opportunity in the uncounted millions to whom we don't talk and
were helping them -- but the aid went through France. That gave us

We've said that we were helping the Indochinese -- and we
planning, we won't do it.

military assistance, or whenever we want, to any joint military
they want to talk about it jointly or want to relate military phases,
jointly to build up their defences in our mutual defense. But whenever
is mutual defense and we will give them military assistance designed
agreement, which in nine paragraphs of its preface says that this
Well, in the Philippines, for instance, we have a military phase
announce this as our policy from the beginning of military assistance.
to build up their forces so that the degree to which we must station
We broadcast to the world that we want the Philippines to
wonder why they doubt our intentions?

We can approve the mutual defense treaty in one heart's notice. We
don't have to station one unit to do to their defense, or do anything.

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50

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III - 67

don't know about local problems. They don't know about local
traditions and the sands of time are running out because we are
alienating them daily by the preposterous degree to which we make
fools of ourselves. Not deliberately. I'm not criticising people because
they don't work hard. They do. k They just don't know anything about the
country they are in. And they don't work at personal diplomacy.
When the horizontal line in the pyramid of population in any country
is near the top, personal diplomacy is one of the most important
practices in our defense that we can possibly generate. We are
sad. We are awful. We are terrible!

DR. SMITHIES: I personally think that for our military inter-
vention to be acceptable we must cooperate with their forces.
Possibly the thing to do from a purely military standpoint is to
act individually. It seems to me from a political standpoint, any
intervention that we make in this area must be a joint operation.
I would like to put this as a question and secondly, if you disagree
with this and say we should act unilaterally in the matter of to what
degree we should act jointly, then I'd like to raise the question of
what form this cooperation of indigenous forces should take.

MR. HENDERSON: I couldn't agree with you more; not
only do we not apparently have the strategy to defend this area --

only do we not abhassently have the strategy to defend this area --

MR. HENDERSON: I couldn't agree with you more! not
what form this cooperation of indigenous forces should take.

degree we should act jointly, then I'd like to raise the question of
with this end in view we should act simultaneously in the matter of what
I would like to but this as a question and secondly, if you disagree
intervention that we make in this area must be a joint operation.

act individually. It seems to me from a political standpoint, any
possibly the thing to do from a purely military standpoint is to

attention to be acceptable we must cooperate with their forces.

DR. SMITHIES: I personally think that for our military interest, we are wrong. We are wrong. We are terrible!

practices in our defense that we can possibly generate. We are
in near the top, perhaps diplomacy is one of the most important

When the horizontal line in the pyramid of population in any country
country they are in. And they don't work at personal diplomacy.

they don't work hard. They do, but they just don't know anything about the
tooles of our lives. Not deliberately. I'm not criticizing people because
alienating them slightly by the preponderant degree to which we make
institutions and the same of time are running out because we are
don't know about local problems. They don't know about local

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III - 68

we don't have the political structure base. The educated class of Vietnam is French; one out of 20 Americans sent there can speak French. I was told that 5% of the American community in Saigon speaks French. I would believe there would be three who could speak Vietnamese, one, two, three, not percent.

Again it does appear to me that the exception of the Philippines, the likelihood of building up indigenous forces in this area is very slight indeed. I gather they are having a great deal of trouble. Anything more than general security and even there is a question. They are having a great deal of trouble in South Vietnam in building up an army that is capable of much except against rather disorganized bandit groups. They have been so strong or have appeared so strong because since the Geneva Conference, the communists have made no effort whatsoever in South Vietnam. I would question very much whether the Laoist army, which we have been supporting 100% since the Geneva Conference, could get out of its own way in case of a shooting match with anybody, and I would say that to a considerable extent that possibly applies to Cambodia, and hence, I come to this entirely inexpert conclusion that if you are going to defend these areas, certainly in case of any kind of an aggression, probably in the case of really concerted subversion, one must rely on American forces.

forces.

The case of really concerted supervision, one must rely on American
area, certainly in case of any kind of an examination, properly in
effectively included conclusion that if you are doing to defend these
extent that positively smoke to Cambodia, and hence, I come to this
shooting match with anybody, and I would say that to a considerable
the Geneva Conference, could get out of its own way in case of a
whether the looting army, which we have been supporting 100% since
effort whatsoever in South Vietnam. I would finance very much
because since the Geneva Conference, the communists have made no
pandit trouble. They have been so strong or have abided so strong
up an army that is capable of much except against rather disorganised
They are having a great deal of trouble in South Vietnam in building
Anything more than general security and even there is a creation,
alright indeed. I gather they are having a great deal of trouble.
the likelihood of building up indigenous forces in this area is very

Again it does abest to me that the exception of the Philippines,
abest Vietnam, one, two, three, not percent.

abeesk French. I would believe there would be three who could
French. I was told that 2% of the American community in Saigon
Vietnam is French; one out of 30 Americans sent there can abest
we don't have the political structure base. The educated class of

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III - 69

DR. SMITHIES: Is there any way to integrate indigenous forces?
Would you agree that this is an important question? Would the sense of
national participation be greater if we could succeed? If the local army
is unreliable, is there any way of integrating local people into American
tactical units?

MR. BENDETSEN: Individually in these countries? No -- this
would be an assault on their pride and posture. It would only work as
it worked in Korea and South Korea. The great stumbling block of indige-
nous forces in the Philippines is twb-fold and very simple. Their pay
scale for privates, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and up
through the rest, are the same as ours and they cannot afford it. They
are stuck with it. We can't lose the Philippines Constabulary. It's a
great thing. They kept the same grades and ratings, and they can't af-
ford to pay the price. The second thing is they don't want square di-
visions; they don't want jets. They want the means for local security.
We don't do it under today's program statutorily. They are supposed to
be ready to accept the equipment we offer. We offer the equipment.
They haven't got the budget to be ready to accept and use it, so if it
doesn't come they doubt our promise. It is all mixed up and managled
and confused and they think we promise something that we don't deliver.

and confined and they think we promote something that we don't deliver.
don't come they don't come out because. It is all mixed up and misaligned
They haven't got the budget to be ready to accept and use it, so it is
be ready to accept the equipment we offer. We offer the equipment.
We don't do it under today's program statistically. They are supposed to
visually they don't want jets. They want the means for local security.
to be ready to accept the equipment we offer. They are supposed to
be ready to accept the equipment we offer. We offer the equipment.
They haven't got the budget to be ready to accept and use it, so it is
disagreemont thing. They kept the same grades and ratings, and they can't at-
are attack with it. We can't lose the Philippines Constabulary. It's a
tough the rest, are the same ones and they cannot afford it. They
are able for privileges, corporals, soldiers, lieutenants, captains, and up
none forces in the Philippines is twopold and very simple. Their bay
it worked in Korea and South Korea. The great atumping block of indi-
would be an assault on their bridge and boatne. It would only work as
MR. BENEDKE: Individually in these countries? No -- this
sactical units?

is unustable, is there any way of integrating local people into American
national participation be greater if we could succeed? If the local army
World you agree that this is an important question? Would the sense of
DR. SMITHIES: Is there any way to integrate indigenous forces?

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III - 70

They don't want what we have offered them -- they can't afford them. But they do want participation. They do want streamlined units, and it is feasible to do it. We have to be ready to pick up the tab for some time to come in order to do it.

MR. HOOPES: What is the present status of the Philippine military forces, Karl? What do they consist of ?

MR. BENDETSEN: They have 20 battalion combat teams. They are pretty good. They are doing a fine job of building farm-market roads because we finally put the engineering equipment in first, which is what they really wanted. We built them a great service shop which could do a lot of maintenance and repair for the vast maintenance and reapirs of logistics in Southeast Asia, and having just built the shop, they haven't any business. They wonder why we don't give them some of that. Their navy is a very small one in relationship between naval forces, and microscopic as they are, are wonderful. Their air force is largely of piston engines. I think they have about 10 squadrons of mustangs, one jet. They are due to get maybe 20 or 30 more.

They are due to get maybe 30 or 35 more.

engine. I think they have about 10 a.s. of mu-
tants, one let.
scopic as they are, are wonderful. Their air force is largely of bioton
navy is a very small one in relationship between naval forces, and micro-
any business. They wonder why we don't give them some of that. Their
logistics in Southeast Asia, and having just built the shop, they haven't
a lot of maintenance and repair for the vast maintenance and repairs of
they really wanted. We built them a great service shop which could do
because we finally but the engineering equipment in fits, which is what
are pretty good. They are doing a fine job of building farm-market roads
MR. BENDETTSEN: They have 30兵 station combat teams. They
inary forces, Karl? What do they consist of ?

MR. HOOPE'S: What is the present status of the Philippine mil-
some time to come in order to do it.
and it is feasible to do it. We have to be ready to pick up the tap for
them. But they do want participation. They do want streamlined units,
They don't want what we have offered them -- they can't afford

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III - 71

MR. GILPATRIC: Karl, at one time the Philippines scouts were
pretty effective militarily!

MR. BENDETSEN: They are wonderful when they are properly
led. To build a force in the Philippines, there has to be -- and I think
there could be -- a political response. They would want tactical capa-
bility to reassure them of what they need. We would have to articulate
our intentions through a mutual defense treaty in a more satisfactory
way than we have. We only agree to consult through our constitutional
process and then we can give them one day's notice. They doubt our
intentions. So do they all doubt our intentions in Southeast Asia. It is
entirely feasible, I think, and it wouldn't take a great deal more than
we are spending to hold the Philippines to us. They are vital and the
kind of defenses they want are something besides massive retaliation.
We do have a great naval force which is the one thing in the forest which
is the key thing that holds them to us. I mean in a tangible sense; in-
tangibly, the great masses of Filipinos yearn to be part of our system.

The effort that we've made in the Philippines, however you ap-
preciate it in dollars, has been very poor, in my opinion. We have not
dealt with them as we would deal with a wayward son. We've talked the

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III - 72

game, but the substance isn't there. We did not return the military
port of Manila when we said we would. We did not return these mil-
itary installations when we said we would. We did not revive our
military aid program in consultation with them. We did not create a
joint board to review economic aid as we have done in Formosa. So
no wonder you have trouble persuading the plenipotentiaries in the
general assembly. And I think we could do many of these things speak-
ing specifically of the Philippines, if you feel that it is important and
if you decide in your recommendation that you need one kind of posture
versus another. I say that we can't afford to fail politically in the
Philippines, if we think Southeast Asia is important. If it is Fortress
America, I would hate not to have an island of strength in that key
position. But it may interest you to know that one of the complaints
of our military commanders about this cessation of extra territoriality
is that the sentences are too light.

We have many cases of GIs that have committed crimes against
good discipline in which the local courts have given them such a light
sentence that our discipline was really imperiled. This is literally true
statistically and can be proven. But it will vary by country. What we
have to know is something about their traditions, something about their

have to know is something about their traditions, something about their
statistically and can be proven. But it will vary by country. Must we
sentence that our discipline was really imperiled. This is literally true
good discipline in which the local courts have given them such a light
We have many cases of GIs that have committed crimes against
is that the sentences are too light.

of our military commanders about this cessation of extra territoriality
position. But it may interest you to know that one of the complaints
America, I would hate not to have an island of strength in that key
Philippines, if we think Southeast Asia is important. If it is Fortuna
versus another. I say that we can't afford to tell politically in the
it you decide in your recommendation that you need one kind of bovine
ing a specifically of the Philippines, if you feel that it is important and
general as a result. And I think we could do many of these things a back-
no wonder you have trouble berating the phenobötontisaries in the
joint board to review economic aid as we have done in Formosa. So
military aid problem in consultation with them. We did not create a
itsary installations when we said we would. We did not revive our
port of Manila when we said we would. We did not return these mil-
dame, put the substance isn't there. We did not return the military

III - 73

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ECC

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III - 73

practices if we are going to live there. We hear a lot of fine, high-
sounding speeches about creating understanding between the people
of the United States and Vietnam or the Philippines. This to me is
pure rot. The people of Emporia, Kansas, don't understand the people
of Brooklyn; they never will, but they make no pretenses about it but
they get along because when they come to each other's communities,
they have an element of trust between them. They don't trust us be-
cause we don't show any pretense of living in their community in their
way. This is the core of the problem.

MR. HOOPES: The strongest impression I have of this in all
this testimony, in relation to our problem, is that it confirms our gen-
eral view of the need to come to grips with limited response to a limited
challenge and to have firm allies on the ground by making known our
common cause with them.

common cause with them.

challenge and to have firm allies on the ground by making known our
east view of the need to come to terms with limited reason to a limited
this testimony, in relation to our problem, is that it confirms our den-
MR. HOOPES: The strongest impression I have of this in all

cause we don't show any sensitivity of living in their community in their
they have an element of trust between them. They don't trust us pe-
they get along because when they come to each other's communities,
of Brooklyn they never will, but they make no pretenses about it put
bare rot. The people of Emboros, Kasea, don't understand the people
of the United States and Vietnam at the Philippines. This to me is
sounding a speech about creating understanding between the people
braces it we are going to live there. We hear a lot of fine, high-

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IV - 1

IV. BACKSTOP TO STRATEGY: DOMESTIC MILITARY PROBLEMS

THE CHAIN OF MILITARY SECURITY BEING ONLY AS STRONG AS
ITS WEAKEST LINK, SUBPANEL II WAS CONSTANTLY INCLUDING DOMESTIC
CONSIDERATIONS AS PART OF ITS STRATEGY CALCULATIONS.

GIVEN THE TREMENDOUS UPSURGE IN WEAPONS NEEDS AND
COSTS, WOULD THE WEIGHT OF INCREASED MILITARY BUDGETS BE TOO
HEAVY A BURDEN ON THE U. S. ECONOMY?

GIVEN THE INCREASE IN COMPLEXITY OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
STRATEGIC CHOICES, AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF FUTURE CONFLICTS,
DID THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROVIDE ADEQUATE MACHINERY
AND AN EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION TO FULFILL U. S. SECURITY NEEDS?

AND ABOVE ALL, RECOGNIZING THE DAMOCLEAN THREAT OF
NUCLEAR WAR, WOULD THE CIVILIAN POPULATION FACE UP TO THE
CHALLENGE AND COULD THIS POPULATION BE PROTECTED AGAINST
INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES AND AGAINST THERMONUCLEAR ANNI-
HILATION BY CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS?

ON THIS LAST QUESTION THERE WERE EXTENDED SUBPANEL
DISCUSSIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS AND COSTS OF THE TWO
APPROACHES TO DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR: ACTIVE DEFENSE,
THE DETERRENT OF READY, WILLING AND ABLE U. S. STRATEGIC

THE DETERRENT OF REVENUE, MILITARY AND VARIETY U. S. STRATEGIC
APPROACHES TO DEFENSE AGAINST INCREASES: ACTIVE DEFENSE,
DISCUSSIONS ON THE COMBATIVE MERITS AND COSTS OF THE TWO
ON THIS FAST QUESTION THERE WERE EXTENDED SUBMISSION
HIGHLIGHTS BY CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS?

INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES AND AGAINST THERMOMONTECERI UNIT-
CHALLENGE AND COULD THIS POPULATION BE PROTECTED AGAINST
INCREASES? WOULD THE CIVILIAN POPULATION FACE UP TO THE
AND ABOVE VILLAGE RECOGNIZING THE DEMOCRATIC THREAT OF
AND IN EFFICIENCY ORGANIZATION TO FULFILL U. S. SECURITY NEEDS?
DID THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROVIDE ADEQUATE MACHINERY
STRATEGIC CHOICES, AND THE VMSIGNIFICANCE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS?
GIVEN THE INCREASE IN COMPLEXITY OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
HEAVY A BURDEN ON THE U. S. ECONOMY?

COSTS? WOULD THE WEIGHT OF INCREASED MILITARY BUDGETS BE TOO
HIGH? THE TREMENDOUS UPBURGE IN WEAPONS NEEDS AND
CONSIDERATIONS AS PART OF ITS STRATEGY CALCULATIONS.

ITS WEAKEST THING, SUBMISSION, IS CONSISTENCY INCLUDING DOMESTIC
THE CHAIN OF MILITARY SECURITY BEING ONLY AS STRONG AS

## IV. BACKSTOP TO STRATEGY: DOMESTIC MILITARY PROBLEMS

IV - 1

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[Ltr]

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IV - 2

STRIKING FORCES; AND PASSIVE DEFENSE THE CREATION OF A PRACTICAL
PROTECTIVE U. S. CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM ---

MR. LUCE: The person who first challenged us on this subject of passive defense was a very great atomic scientist, Dr. Teller, who was discussing the overall questions of possible future atomic war. Envisioning the whole problem he came to the conclusion that as a part of the problem of atomic war, we should have much more passive defenses than we have. Here is a very great atomic scientist who does not think that it is silly to talk about this kind of defense. . .

MR. WILSON: Dr. Johnson, you stated a very important assumption which relates to the relative role of passive versus active defense, presumably one of the assumptions on which we are functioning here.

DR. JOHNSON: I agree on the importance of passive defenses but I think this is true more and more of all the people concerned with the problem of meeting the changing threats. One of the difficulties we have in this whole area is that there is a tendency to think in terms of data that's three to five years old. The problem against manned bombers was one kind of problem but the problem against sumarine launched missiles and intercontinental missiles is quite a different problem. The

[LC]

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IV - 3

possibility of an active defense was really quite good against manned
bombers, not three to five years ago, but you could see that we could
provide a really terrific, effective defense against the manned bombers
if we spent about one dollar for every three dollars spent by the Russ-
ians in the Polish systems. We could price them out of the market by
an active defense that was so good that they could not be certain that
they could destroy the United States.

But this is reversed, unfortunately, for the intercontinental and
submarine launched missiles. In the case of the bombers we have some
where between two to six hours warning. The United States right now is
spending $5 to $7 billion a year on an active defense which is probably
going to be pretty ineffective compared to passive measures. But the
fact of the matter is that we are spending $5 to $7 billion dollars a year
to do something that will be less effective than this. The country as a
whole is spending a lot of money to accomplish essentially the same
purpose. It is now in the process of deciding that because a new weapon
system is coming into being with a warning time between zero to 10
minutes -- if any -- that we are going to have to go in the passive
direction if we are to have any defense against the Soviet thermonuclear
attacks. The problem isn't to accept the present, conservative attitude

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IV - 4

that you can't do it -- but find out how to do it if we are going to have
a defense or its equivalent for the $5 to $7 billion a year that we are
spending now.

A passive defense is the best defense; and the cheapest one.
Let's put it this way: a good active defense that will do the same thing
against intercontinental missiles is going to cost you $15 billion a year.
You've got your choice -- you can make an active defense at a much higher
cost if that's the way you want to spend the country's dough. But if you
want to get a timeless defense which has a terrific capability of reduc-
ing the casualties of the U. S. population, then you can find a way to
solve the difficult problems you have outlined and you can do it at about
one-tenth of the cost. If you prefer to spend 10 times as much to do it
and with less probability -- fair enough. But let's agree whether or not
we are going to try to protect the population or not. And if we do agree,
then let's try to use the best and more economical method. But the tran-
sit time for the new missiles is about half an hour. Even with the most
extreme extrapolations of existing technology and detection, we can't
hope for much more than 10 to 15 minutes warning and we're not sure we
can get that. Thus we may have a warning time reduced somewhere be-
tween zero and 10 minutes.

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IV - 5

That makes it very difficult indeed for an active system to come
to being and also makes it difficult for a passive system to come into
being. For example, in New York, I don't think you could empty any of
the big buildings in 10 or 15 minutes. You couldn't get the people down
into shelters.

But the important thing about future active defenses that are
coming up is that the exchange rate is reversed: it is going to cost about
three dollars or more for defense for every dollar spent in offense. That
means the Russians can price us out of the market in defense on an active
basis.

This does not mean to me that we do not want an active defense
because that kind of military economic exchange rate is valid only if you
consider it had a defense situation out of context to the whole strategic
posture on both sides. I prefer to think of the whole problem in context
to the strategic posture of military power, the economic power, the
political power of the two countries and the basis on which the Soviet
Union would make a decision to attack the United States with a thermo-
nuclear attack. Now that certainly involves their defensive system, their
passive and active measures and our attack system, as well as their
attack system and our defense system. Also the chance that they and we

attack system and our defense system. Via the chance that they and we
passive and active measures and on attack system, as well as their
nuclear attack. Now that certainly involves their defensive system, their
Union would make a decision to attack the United States with a thermo-
political power of the two countries and the basis on which the Soviet
to the strategic posture of military power, the economic power, the
posture on both sides. I better to think of the whole problem in context
consider it had a defense situation out of context to the whole strategic
because that kind of military economic exchange rate is valid only if you
This does not mean to me that we do not want an active defense
basis.

means the Russians can price us out of the market in defense on an active
three dollars or more for defense for every dollar spent in offense. That
coming up is that the exchange rate is reversed: it is going to cost us
But the important thing about future active defenses that are
into shelters.

the pig buildings in 10 or 12 minutes. You could get the people down
being. For example, in New York, I don't think you could empty any of
to being and also makes it difficult for a passive system to come into
that makes it very difficult indeed for an active system to come
into shelters.

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IV - 6

might take active measures which are not necessarily related with a
thermonuclear air war. When I speak of thermonuclear war, I mean our
own submarine missile attack system which is coming into being, our
own ICBM, our own carrier attack and so forth.

The role of passive defense has to be related to the overall eco-
nomic capabilities of the two countries -- insofar as this limits the mili-
tary budgets -- and what we want to achieve. If we go on the assumption
that U. S. brings into being a military system which is good enough across
the board so that the Soviet Union will not feel sure that they can win an
all-out war they initiate, that will mean we must produce a system they
will be convinced is good enough so they can't be certain of winning.

Mr. Bascom has stated properly that one of our great resources
is our population. We can protect our people at a rather low cost compared
to the active defenses necessary to protect the physical structure of a
country. I don't agree with him in his costing, quite. I think that there's
uncertainty as to whether or not the total cost may not be in the area of
as much as $40 or $50 billion altogether. Perhaps it may be as low as
$20 billion, depending on the chances you want to take.

But the cost -- say $20 to $40 billion for a complete system to
provide a very high assurance that most of the population will survive --
will be a one-time cost. Now compare that with the active defenses.

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Active defenses will not be a one-time cost. They must meet a technology which is changing so rapidly that there is no stability between offense and defense in the foreseeable future. The best estimate that can be made as to cost of the active defense -- in terms of being sure that not more than 30% of the physical structure of the United States is destroyed -- is that it will cost around $15 billion a year. And we still need to add passive defense measures which would cost at least $5 billion for the first 10 years.

We've thought of this in black and white as though the costs were separable, but it may be that we should think of it in terms of a mixed system in the sense that if the costs appear to be prohibitive or too difficult for New York, New York might take its chances with a very great active defense way out of proportion to a small city in a non-important area where you might use passive measures more freely. In the outer suburbs of New York where it's cheap, you might use passive measures. But for the center, where you really want to protect the great physical investment, you might add very greatly to the active defenses and take your chances on the passive measures. Thus you can have active defenses where it is most profitable, you can have passive defenses where it is most profitable because there are many places where, although there are lots of human lives to protect, the physical plant is more easily

lots of human lives to protect, the physical plant is more easily
most profitable because there are many places where, although there are
where it is most profitable, you can have passive defenses where it is
your chance on the passive measures. Thus you can have active defenses
investment, you might add very easily to the active defenses and take
But for the center, where you really want to protect the great physical
amphora of New York where it's a cheap, you might use passive measures.
area where you might use passive measures more freely. In the outer
active defense may out of proportion to a small city in a non-important
difficult for New York, New York might take its chances with a very great
system in the sense that if the costs appear to be profitable or too
separable, but it may be that we should think of it in terms of a mixed
We've thought of this in black and white as through the costs were
pillion for the first 10 years.

need to add passive defense measures which would cost at least $2
destroyed -- is that it will cost around $12 billion a year. And we still
that not more than 30% of the physical structure of the United States is
can be made as to cost of the active defense -- in terms of being same
offence and defense in the foreseeable future. The best estimate that
technology which is changing so rapidly that there is no stability between
Active defenses will not be a one-time cost. They must meet a

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IV - 8

replaceable.

If you proceed along these lines, then estimates for both active
and passive defenses are bound to come down below our values because
the combination will be cheaper than either one alone or both of them.
At any rate, if you compare the $15 billion a year with $5 billion a year
-- the $5 billion is about the same as we spend in military aid -- the
cost per family is about the same as buying one car for the life of the
family.

Looked at from that point of view, the costs are not really out
of this world compared to what we will have to face if we want to bring
the probability of a war not happening to a very low value. If the govern-
ment can feel that this is important, then the problem is to inform and
persuade the public and to do it with a good public information program
which has enough pressure to bring action into being but not enough pres-
sure to put everyone into hysteria. Surely, we know enough about public
information programs so that with the skill of the people doing it, we can
bring it in the inbetween region -- enough to get action and not enough
to get everyone so scared he rejects action . . .

MR. DEAN: One question I want to ask you, Ellis, in your prior-
ities on protecting ourselves you put deep shelters ahead of the dispersal

ities on protecting ourselves you but deep shepherds speed of the diabetic
MR. DEAN: One question I want to ask you, Ellis, in your prior

to get everyone so acrobatic he rejects action . . .

printing it in the inbetween region --- enough to get action and not enough
information programmes so that with the skill of the people doing it, we can
sue to but everyone into materials. Surely, we know enough about public
which use enough pressure to print action into being but not enough pre-
ferance the public and to do it with a good public information program
ment can feel that this is important, then the problem is to inform and
the inclusivity of a war not hindering to a very low value. If the govern-
ment of this world compared to what we will have to face if we want to print
looked at from that point of view, the costs are not really out
family.

cost per family is about the same as paying one car for the life of the
-- the $2 billion is about the same as we spend in military aid -- the
At any rate, if you compare the $12 billion a year with $2 billion a year
the computation will be cheaper than either one alone or both of them.
and baseative defenses are bound to come down below our values because
If you proceed along these lines, then estimates for both active
replacements.

IV - 8

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IV - 9

of SAC in priorities. Is that correct? I wonder why you do this, because
it seems to me that the high priority would go to your retaliatory capability.
If the Russians really knew not that the people were hiding down in shelters but that SAC was completely dispersed -- airplanes perhaps in underground shelters and a lot of other things -- it would be more of a deterrent than if they knew that we had dug ourselves as civilians holes in the ground.

DR. JOHNSON: The probability of a viable act of defense of the
SAC bases in the next seven years is remote.

DR. TELLER: I disagree.

DR. JOHNSON: We can provide a passive defense that will be
timeless against ICBMs, IRBMs and so forth, and the population of the
United States is the single most valuable asset that we have. This is
our nation, this is what we want to protect, and I would prefer to save that
in a priority system against the lower probability that we can get an effective active defense of the SAC bases for the same money.

MR. DEAN: I agree with you as to value, that a person is worth
more than an airplane, but I am most concerned about keeping the deterrent
effect. It seems to me that if I had $20 billion to spend, my priority would
go to complete dispersal of SAC, and let the Russians know that it is so
dispersed that they couldn't catch up with it.

diapered that they couldn't catch up with it.

go to complete disassembly of SAC, and let theKRatans know that it is so
effect. It seems to me that if I had $30 billion to spend, my priority would
more than an airplane, but I am most concerned about keeping the deterrent
MR. DEAN: I agree with you so to value, that a person is worth

the active defense of the SAC base for the same money.

in a priority system against the lower propensity that we can get an effect-
our nation, this is what we want to protect, and I would prefer to save that
United States is the single most valuable asset that we have. This is
timeless against ICBMs, IRBMs and so forth, and the population of the
DR. JOHNSON: We can provide a passive defense that will be

DR. TEETER: I disagree.

SAC passes in the next seven years is remote.

DR. JOHNSON: The propensity of a simple act of defense of the
than if they knew that we had dug ourselves as civilians holes in the ground.
dround shelters and a lot of other things -- it would be more of a deterrent
tate put that SAC was completely disassembled -- subordinates because in under-
If the KRatans really knew not that the people were hiding down in a hole-
it seems to me that the high priority would go to your retaliatory propensity
of SAC in priorities. Is that correct? I wonder why you do this, because

IV - 9

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IV - 10

DR. JOHNSON: We can afford to do both. The $100 billion figure is for a really complete defense, not only of population, but of the physical plant of the United States and SAC. The costs for passive protection of the population and of SAC is a much lower figure and spread over a few years is something that is not unreasonable.

MR. WALKOWICZ: May I just say why I think they are equally obsolete on this subject of defense. The trouble with this business is that it moves so fast if you believe something tonight you had better re-think it in the morning. The business of assigning priorities is as obsolete as the mobilization base was three years ago, for the simple reason that the only protection for your strategic force today lies in dispersal. And it so happens that if you disperse you'll have to disperse the existing airfields which are all located near large cities. Therefore, if you take the recent and very necessary SAC dispersal plan into account, it turns out that if you are defending the people you are defending SAC; to try to make priorities between the two has become obsolete. And this essentially means that if you defend the people you will defend the maximum number of airfields. Therefore, you will gamble on the hope of first-blow capabilities.

DR. JOHNSON: But to do that is going to cost too much. You can just do the dispersal with passive protection more or less timeless in its effect, and spend only about one-fifth of the money...

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IV - 11

MR. WILSON: Let's say, suppose you have an effective shelter program and are sure of a much higher survival probability than we have today. You might then have demonstrated that you have increased the survival probability by a substantial margin. People might then have a more stiff-backed attitude at times of crisis. Mr. Luce, do you want to comment on this great gap between knowing what we ought to do and how you get people to want to do it?

MR. LUCE: I should think that most people in this country have some realization that the nuclear attack would result in simply huge casualties. I think the trouble is that they don't think that anything can be done about it. I think there is always something that you can do. I don't think you can solve anything by scaring people. The sound reason for doing something, for doing quite a lot about passive defense, is by fixing it so that people have a reasonable chance of not being individually destroyed. If so, the country as a whole, and the people in it, are free of the black-mail of the threat of atomic war. For instance, during the Korean War, there was always the question of whether or not you should go to the Yalu, and whether the arguments made were good arguments is not what I'm talking about. One of the general arguments that stuck most in the mind of the average man was whether going to the Yalu might start atomic war.

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IV - 12

The most recent case, and it goes back now quite a way, almost three
years, to the two little islands off Formosa and the question of whether
we were going to take a strong hand about it. Well, are you going to
stop atomic war for two little rocks? Perhaps the most recent case was
the case of Hungary.

The important thing is to have a certain freedom of action and
not have the question of what we should do, dominated by the fear that
if we take this step, that we endanger atomic war which would involve
the destruction of this nation. That's what I see as the important thing
of doing something toward giving people incentives, that they will have
a pretty reasonable chance of themselves and their families surviving
atomic war . . .

MR. HALABY: We don't have the facts to reduce to some authori-
tative form and we are not presenting them. We've got a Federal civil
defense program of stirrup pumps, stretchers and all of the outmoded
thinking and paraphenalia of World War II. Now I'm exaggerating! That
is not entirely true. There are a lot of people in that effort who are up-
to-date, who are striving to put this program out front but the core is
not thinking in those terms, or acting in those terms. Now for the City
of New York, which is 10% of the United States in terms of numbers of

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IV - 13

people, they do not even have the data reduced and documented that would
indicate whether they could shelter a million, a hundred thousand, or four
million of the day-time population. There is no such data. . .

DR. SMITHIES: I think that one easily arrives at an estimate of
say between 500 and 1,000 dollars per head for a shelter. I can't be pre-
cise about it, but I've talked a good deal to people about it. And I'm
advancing another point of view; if one thinks of sheltering the whole
population, I personally hate the idea of a discriminatory selective ser-
vice shelter. It seems to me everyone must be in them; and there must
be shelter for everyone. It is easy to get to a shelter program that would
cost a capital sum of perhaps $100 billion. . .

MR. BASCOM: There are two things which have been said in this
meeting which I have written down: "any shelter program is unworkable"
and "we will just have to live with this problem." I would suggest we
will just have to die with this problem if we don't do something about it.

My ideas are not quite so visionary as I may have sounded, with
respect to the fiberglass shelter which I have proposed. You might pass
around a copy of this report which has a drawing of a fiberglass shelter
which might give you some idea of what is involved. The total overall
length of the shelter is about 13 feet and roughly five feet in diameter.

length of the shelter is about 13 feet and roughly five feet in diameter. which might give you some idea of what is involved. The total overall around a copy of this report which has a drawing of a tiperdlass shelter respect to the tiperdlass shelter which I have proposed. You might have My ideas are not quite so revolutionary as I may have sounded, with will just have to die with this problem if we don't do something about it. and "we will just have to live with this problem". I would suggest we meeting which I have written down: "any shelter program is unworkable." MR. BVCOM: There are two things which have been said in this cost a capital sum of berthing $100 billion...

be shelter for everyone. If it is easy to get to a shelter program that would vice shelter. If it seems to me everyone must be in them; and there must population. I personally hate the idea of a discriminatory selective advancing another point of view if one thinks of sheltering the whole case about it, but I've talked a good deal to people about it. And I'm easy between $200 and $1,000 dollars per head for a shelter. I can't be sure DR. SMITHIES: I think that one easily arrives at an estimate of million of the day-time population. There is no such data...

indicate whether they could shelter a million, a hundred thousand, or ten people, they do not even have the data reduced and documented that would

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IV-14

The estimates were made for me by people in the plastics business in California and they are something like this: In the Pacific proving grounds, I made use of some fiberglass boats to make measurements of the various effects of the bombs out there and I was impressed by how well these boats stood up in relation to the big bombers. I also was aware of the fact that swimming pools are being made and put in the ground of the same fiberglass in California on a routine basis. They are fairly inexpensively, as a matter of fact, the pool part of them -- if you don't buy the fancy water filtration system -- you can get it for something like six or eight hundred dollars.

So I went to the people who made the fiberglass boats and I said, "look, what I want to do is to make a special shaped boat which can be split down the middle and shipped and can be assembled in the locality, waterproofed again, and dropped in a hole in the ground. What will this cost". And they said, "now each half of this is roughly equivalent to a boat which we make wholesale for $125; so if we put two of them together this ought to be about $250". Of course, their estimate was not this rough, they actually calculated the figures. Then we decided it would take about $50 worth of miscellaneous equipment like hand air pump and benches, and so forth. We were talking about these costs and mass production basis, building thousands.

E2C3

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IV - 15

And then we say, "what will it cost you to dig a little hole alongside of your house and break through into the basement?" We calculated that if you were going to do a series of houses on one street -- and I realize it's different everywhere; some of it might have to be done by hand, but you can do a big chunk of it with some kind of special trenching machine and you finish it off by hand and break through the basement, I think you might be able to do four or five in a day if you had a team out there working on it, anyway we estimated, it would cost about $100 to put this in.

The average population in a home in the United States is 3.82 people and if you divide this out, it comes to something like $100 a person for such a shelter or a little bit more than, maybe $150. So in my estimates, I allowed $150 per person for putting in the shelter. It's that simple.

Now I should say something about the volume of the shelter. The interior of this particular shelter is roughly 120 cubic feet so if you allow three cubic feet for a man and three for a woman and a half of that for a couple of kids, it comes out at the ratio of the volume of the people to the volume of the shelter, it is something like one to 12 or 15. The ratio of the people to the living space in a submarine in the living compartments is one to 17, a pullman berth is one to 25 or 28,

living compartments in one so 17, a bullion pert in one to 12 or 13.
12. The ratio of the people to the living space in a subterrane in the
the people to the volume of the auditor, is something like one to 12 or
of that for a couple of kids, it comes out at the ratio of the volume of
you allow three cubic feet for a man and three for a woman and a seat
The interior of this baroque auditor is roughly 150 cubic feet so it
Now I should say something about the volume of the auditor.

It's that simple.

So in my estimates, I allowed $150 per person for butting in the auditor.
per son for each a auditor a little bit more than that, maybe $150.
people and if you divide this out, it comes to something like $100 a
The average population in a home in the United States is 3.82

day if you had a team out there working on it, anyway we estimated,
through the basement. I think you might be able to do it or five in a
special trenching machine and you finish it off by hand and then
be done by hand, but you can do a big chunk of it with some kind of
--- and I realize it's a different everywhere; some of it might have to
 calculated that if you were going to do a series of homes on one street
around side of your house and break through into the basement?" We
And then we say, "what will it cost you to dig a little hole

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something like that. So we're in the same order of magnitude with
facilities that were arranged for people on a more or less long-term
basis. We're not a long way off on the floor space, even though it
sounds very cramped.

As for the extra facilities which are needed such as drinking
water, food, sanitary facilities, blankets, and so forth, my thought
is that one of the greatest advantages of having this thing contiguous
with the house is that you could simply dash back in the house for a
short period of time and snatch what you needed in the way of food
and water and blankets. Or perhaps if you're willing to go as far as
the hot water heater and tank in the cellar. You can drain off a few
gallons of water from that for drinking water.

Sure it's a makeshift business and I think we should not plan
to set up fancy living facilities for people in emergency times. And
if we stockpile food, it ought to be something completely unpalatable
like K-rations so nobody would be tempted to eat it.

Now, as for the air in the shelter, you can quickly calculate
how long people will survive on the air that is in there and what it
would take to put more air into it. A man at rest uses about half of the
air; air is about 21% oxygen. You can breathe down, using air from the

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IV - 17

level of say 21% to 15%, you can allow CO2 increase from about 300% of the three percent, carbon monoxide -- that's CO, and can go up to perhaps 350% or 340%. If you calculate this out on the basis of consumption of people at rest, it comes out that a full grown male at rest uses up one cubic foot of air in about three minutes. So this means that you have roughly 35 cubic feet per person in the shelter and you can last for 90 minutes out there without doing anything. Now with the bellows device which I propose to use I calculate that if a man, every hour, stopped and pumped for about four minutes, he could very quickly change the air completely inside the shelter device.

As far as the radioactivity in the air is concerned, I do not consider this to be a problem. We believe that you shouldn't get real excited about the problem of breathing air that has radioactive material but perhaps there should be a very simple filtering device that might be changed from time to time on the outside of this building so that if you were concerned about dust you could filter it out. You also don't want to get it inside where you would be exposed to gamma radiation in addition to particles you would get in the shelter, such as dust.

Now to the question of political feasibility. This is a point

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IV - 18

on which I am in doubt. I think that civil defense is probably not
politically feasible under present circumstances. And what this means
is that there must be a very carefully thought-out program of information
and education before you get into socking them with the real dough.

We shouldn't expect that the public would leap forward to support any
program that we might mention simply because it involves a lot of people
and it gets right down to specific things -- which person does what
and this always starts a fight. However, I think with the proper ex-
planations and perhaps some of these new motivations that I have
mentioned, so that you are not asking only for survival in a radioactive
wasteland but you are offering these people something which is good
for them in time of peace too. And with a carefully planned bi-partisan
effort I think civil defense can become politically feasible but it's
going to take a lot of political courage. I prepared some notes here
which I entitled "If it's not raining why should we worry about the hole
in the roof"? And I started off with the same two assumptions: First
of all that war involving the continental United States is possible and
that if it comes, an appropriate protective system would be a major factor
in assuring the continuity of the United States as a going concern.

So our problem is to establish a balance between the likelihood
of war and the inconveniences of creating this protective system. Now

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IV - 19

nobody can foretell if and when the protection will be needed, how much
of it or where. So what we have to do is take some sort of calculated
risk which of course, we are already doing, and the extent of this risk
is inversely proportional to the cost of protection on these things --
dollars against percent of protection. We never kid ourselves that we're
going to protect 100% of the people. We may protect somewhere between
75 and 90%. But as we now stand, there is virtually no civil defense
worthy of mention in the United States and I am not deliberately trying
to be insulting about it. It's just what I consider to be a fair statement
of the situation. Our civil population stands virtually naked before
what could be an enemy attack; it has been that way for some time.

The sort of minimum that we could hope for I think, is that the
government could create an atmosphere in which a person could at least
prepare for his own family's defense without being considered an absolute
idiot by the people next door, which is what the situation is now. The
few people who build shelters in this country, for example, do not noise
it around. They keep it quiet for they're worried that their friends will
think they are crazy, scared, or warmongers or something.

It's very difficult to conceive of what powers a nuclear war might
bring to the U. S. because the human mind cannot very well grasp the
biggest fires, the most destruction, millions of casualties, perhaps

[LC]

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IV - 20

happening at night in the winter time, under terrible circumstances.

To bring it more home to us here, you might visualize a room like this under different circumstances. One might be, say 25 years ago when people were ready for Christmas, stockings were there and the Christmas tree and big rugs on the floor, and displayed presents and so forth. This is very easy to see. Or you might consider the same room, 10 years from now, jammed to the hilt with refugees from somewhere down the river, wondering whether it's radioactive outside, and so forth.

Now in a half hour whereas you may still have some concept of the first you will have forgotten the second one as much as possible: You just can't retain these things in your mind. So it is very difficult to keep people alert for the difficulties of preparing some sort of defense.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?

It may be a rhetorical question. I listened to Mr. Bascom and his picture of the Christmas tree in this room and then seeing how many of us can picture this as being filled with refugees and so on and I'm wondering who's doing that job, or what plan is being made to do that job. If that picture was disseminated, it might help a great deal to influence a lot of us fellows who have to do the work of making provisions for dispersal, etc.

[LC]

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IV - 21

MR. BASCOM: I can't answer that.

MR. ROCKEFELLER: May I ask a question? Is Russia doing anything at all in that area? Is there any knowledge of whether they have even considered the problems? It is irrelevant in a sense but it has some interest for us. The Russians haven't done anything at all.

MR. BASCOM: I don't know. Perhaps someone here does.

DR. FISK: Well, one piece of information which I think is relevant and I do know about -- I don't know the extent to which it is being done -- but I think it is two years old now, that in their new buildings in big cities, in Moscow in particular, the basements are purposely being built with this in mind.

MR. HARR: The thing that emerges most clearly to me is that nothing is going to shake human nature, whether it's settled habits, greeds, rejection of horrible concepts and all the other things that lead to problems with which C.D. administrators are confronted, except a major trouble -- we do shake it in time of war. We do get people to fight. None of them would do such a thing on a voluntary basis. So in order to achieve a climate, country-wide, which is capable of supporting

[LC]

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IV - 22

the tremendous cost, material and personal, that are involved in putting
through a program of this magnitude, there would have to be a major
effort from somewhere. It would have to scare the wits out of people
one way or another.

We also have to relate this to our total national policy, our
foreign affairs and also our will to conduct ourselves. What are your
alternatives? If you go out and say, "now look, wake up, America!
these are terrible times and unless you get into shelters and pay for
them and build them and sacrifice the things you have to do to do that,
you aren't going to be around any more". All kinds of unpredictable
effects could arise from that, in terms of popular reaction. All kinds
of head scratching would go on in the Kremlin, I think, the day we
decided to do that, too. If anything, it would look like we were getting
ready for something important and that might be it. It's a question of
how you accomplish a major enough, basic enough change in the
philosophy of the American people. Now they won't even disperse with
any industry, if there's a five cent freight rate increase involved. How
do you get from there to really useful, meaningful shelter programs?
That would take a major, major traumatic experience. Now that major
traumatic experience could blow the lid off!

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VOICE: You're saying you must have sharp therapy and yet you don't say reactive.

DR. BRONK: I think there is one attitude of the American people and probably all people, which is relevant to this and relates to both sides of the discussion. I think most people feel that there are worse things than death and to completely change our way of life and our whole American customs would be worse than being killed.

VOICE: And I think perhaps they translate a meaning of this problem as being such a profound change in our habits that it would be wholly unacceptable and here's an area in which education and enlightenment is needed.

DR. BRONK: Well, I spent a long time trying to get a chairman for the committee of the civilian defense activity of which Mr. Bascom was such a tremendously effective executive secretary, and as Bill knows, I was turned down by leading scientist after leading scientist who would have no part of it because he said he preferred to use his efforts in the prevention of the conditions which would make a civil defense program useful. I know the other side that a good civil defense program is a major deterrent to attack and I think this is a very pertinent

problem is a major deterrent to attack and I think this is a very pertinent
defense problem useful. I know the other side that a good civil defense
efforts in the prevention of the conditions which would make a civil
who would have no part of it because he said he preferred to see life
knows, I was turned down by leading scientist after leading scientist
was an extremely effective executive secretary, and so forth for
the committee of the civilian defense activity of which Mr. Beacon
DR. BRONK: Well, I spent a long time trying to get a chairman
enlightenment is needed.

be wholly unacceptable and here's an area in which education and
problem as being such a problem change in our habits that it would
VOICE: And I think because they translate a meaning of this
and our whole American customs would be more than being killed.
are more things than death and to completely change our way of life
to both sides of the discussion. I think most people feel that there
people and properly all people, which is relevant to this and relates
DR. BRONK: I think there is one attitude of the American

You don't say resolute.

VOICE: You're asking you must have a hard thereby and yet

You don't say resolute.

VOICE: You're asking you must have a hard thereby and yet
you don't say resolute.

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LRC

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IV - 24

issue. But I am trying to present the two sides of the picture, as I see it, and so many people are thoroughly aware of the hazard but just said that they preferred to do everything that they could to prevent the conditions arising to make the civil defense program of any use.

MR. ROCKEFELLER: I would like to make two brief comments. President Eisenhower has spoken on this subject and his feeling is that civil defense is a tremendous force for peace. His argument is that the capacity to break the enemy's will to resist is one of the strong objectives of any aggressive force and the fear of attack is the best way to break the American will to resist if the Russians should attack. Therefore, if they know they have adequate protection even though the physical things may be destroyed, if their lives are protected, their will would be much stronger. So he comes out in his own mind and has a very strong attitude of the need for and the usefulness of the civil defense program.

The other point I want to make is that I didn't get from Mr. Bascom's presentation the feeling that he proposes a major change in our way of life. It seems to me that he presented it as an indeterminate question. It seemed to me that that was one of the interesting features of this presentation, that it was an extremely reasonable

features of this presentation, that it was an extremely reasonable
discussion. It seemed to me that that was one of the interesting
in our way of life. It seems to me that he presented it as an indeterminate
Bacon's presentation the feeling that he proposes a major change
The other point I want to make is that I didn't get from Mr.
civil defense program.

has a very strong attitude of the need for and the usefulness of the
will would be much stronger. So he comes out in his own mind and
physical things may be destroyed, if their lives are protected, their
therefore, if they know they have adequate protection even though the
way to break the American will to resist it the Russians should attack.
objectives of any aggressive force and the test of attack is the best
that the capacity to break the enemy's will to resist is one of the strong
that civil defense is a tremendous force for peace. His argument is
President Eisenhower has spoken on this subject and his feeling is
MR. ROCKETTELLER: I would like to make two brief comments.

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thing which did not involve any major disruption of our whole presently
known way of life.

MR. WILSON: In other words, not "going underground" and
living there and destroying the values we know!

MR. ROCKEFELLER: It is true in that people don't think about
this subject, don't want to think about it, but that's because the people
of this country think in terms of action and up to date this has been a
field where they did not know what action was possible. Therefore,
it was frustrating that they couldn't think about it, because it was too
devastating. Now, what is exciting to me about Bascom's approach on
this is that I feel that he has a reasonable program that doesn't
devastate our whole concept of life as we've known it, that is within
our means financially, that is realistic, and that really does give some
exciting promise that puts us in a new position.

I don't think that you have to frighten the American people into
this thing. I think you have to let them know that by going step by step,
this thing can be done, it is simple and realistic. I think the American
people would respond to such a simple, positive approach as can come
out of this.

out of this.

people would respond to such a simple, positive approach as can come
this thing can be done, it is simple and realistic. I think the American
this thing. I think you have to let them know that by doing step by step,
I don't think that you have to tighten the American people into
exciting bromides that put us in a new position.

um means financially, that is realistic, and that really does give some
devotesate our whole concept of life as we've known it, that is within
this is that I feel that he has a reasonable program that doesn't
devastating. Now, what is exciting to me about Bacom's approach on
it was illustrating that they couldn't think about it, because it was too
field where they did not know what action was possible. Therefore,
of this country think in terms of action and up to date this has been a
this subject, don't want to think about it, but that's because the people
MR. ROCKETTER: It is true in that people don't think about
living there and destroying the airlines we know!

MR. WILSON: In other words, not "going underground," and
known way of life.

thing which did not involve any major disruption of our whole presence
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ONE OF THE LARGEST AREAS EXPLORED IN THE PANEL'S DELIBERATION WAS THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ITS BUDGETS AND ITS METHODS OF OPERATION, DECISION AND ORGANIZATION. THE PANEL WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE ANTICIPABLE AND UNAVAILABLE RISING LEVEL OF DEFENSE COSTS...

GENERAL McCORMACK: I think the United States is now in the most extensive area of the military bill than it will ever be; or at least will ever need be in -- for a number of reasons. One of which is that we do not have a concerted strategic concept around which to build forces, so we are still building forces against eventualities that are not neatly arranged in order of priority. A second reason is that we are in an extensive period where we cannot do without effective air power and there are two roads to it. One is the road that we have been on and will stay on for a while longer because it's the only road that we have got to be on 10 or 20 years from now, and we know that we can't just switch over to it. A third reason I would stress on our extraordinarily military budgets is that we are still finding out how to get off the defensive. And the defensive is always more expensive than the offensive, regardless whether you have a good strategic concept it's just more expensive to be on the defensive.

have a good strategic concept, it's just more expensive to be on the defensive. It's always more expensive than the alternative, regardless whether you're still funding out how to get off the defensive. And the defensive reason I would areas on an extraordinarily military budget is that from now on, and we know that we can't just switch over to it. A thing because it's the only road that we have got to be on 10 or 30 years from the road that we have been on and will stay on for a while longer do without effective air power and there are two roads to it. One is second reason is that we are in an extensive period where we cannot eventuallities that are not neatly arranged in order of priority. A which to build forces, so we are still building forces against which is that we do not have a concerted strategic concept strong or at least will ever need be in -- for a number of reasons. One of the most extensive areas of the military plan thus it will ever be;

GENERAL MCCORMACK: I think the United States is now

COSTS...

THE ANTICIPABLE AND UNAVAILABILITY RISING FROM OF DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION. THE PANEL WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY
SUGGESTS AND ITS METHODS OF OPERATION, DECISION AND
DEFERIBUTION WAS THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ITS
ONE OF THE FARGEST AREAS EXPLORED IN THE PANEL'S

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MR. WALKOWICZ: I don't think that it necessarily follows that new weapons will increase defense costs. I think that we are in a transitionary period. Given the time, some years hence, when the ICBM system is reliable, I think it is pretty clear that it is going to be a lot less expensive to operate than a man bomber system.

The trends I think are pretty clearly these: the B-52 cost a quarter of a billion dollars to develop roughly, and, it is costing this country roughly five billion dollars a year to maintain. I think the ICBM will reverse the proportions: developing the first ICBM is a five billion dollar proposition but its annual cost is a lot cheaper than the annual cost of a B-52.

MR. JOSEPH JOHNSON: I certainly would agree with what you have to say about the possibility that new weapons will be less expensive over the long run.

MR. WALKOWICZ: What I've said about the prospective reduction in costs of the strategic, counter-economy, deterrent systems does not lead one to look forward to lower defense budgets. There are a great many things we should be doing today we are not doing. If you have a reliable strategic deterrent system that costs you less than the B-52 system you can look forward at some point

You less thus the B-83 system you can look forward at some point
going. If you have a reliable strategic deterrent system that costs
there are a great many things we should be doing today we are not
systems does not lead one to look forward to lower defense budgets.

MR. WATKOWICZ: Must I've said about the bioactive
expensive over the long run?

You have to say about the bioactivity that new weapons will be less
MR. JOSEPH JOHNSON: I certainly would agree with that.

than the annual cost of a B-83.

five billion dollar prohibition put its annual cost is a lot cheaper

country roughly five billion dollars a year to maintain. I think the
decades of a billion dollars to develop roughly, and, it is costing this

The trends I think are pretty clearly three: the B-83 cost a
to be a lot less expensive to operate than a man bomber system.

the ICBM system is reliable. I think it is pretty clear that it is going

MR. WATKOWICZ: I don't think that it necessarily follows

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IV - 28

to having that part of your military establishment cost you less than
it does now, and thereby release some money for some of the other
essential things that are not being done now. This does not mean
that you are going to operate at a lower overall military budget.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: At present budgetary support levels, four major elements in our military power suffer from certain weaknesses and deficiencies: Namely, (a) retaliatory forces; here the area needs to be bolstered up with resources of the base structure, particularly doing what is necessary to harden up SAC's base support, the Research and Development effort, and the provision of sufficient aircraft procurement so that the present modernization rate of 10% or 20% heavy and light equipment will be built and maintained on into the 1960's; (b) active defense; there is evidence here of lag to budget cuts and stretchouts in early warning and the entire missile defense system; (c) passive defense; and some kind of a shelter program; (d) theatre forces -- to deal with local war situations but also those required to support our commitments under alliances. The principal deficiency in this general area is the equipment needed to back up and supply the mobility element, airlifts and sea transports.

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IV - 29

MR. HALABY: Dick Lindsay mentioned just before we broke up that a 15 billion dollar annual increment of cost for the U. S. defense budget would be needed beginning about 1961 in order to maintain the force levels which are at present called for by the President's budget. That would mean, then, in 1961 a 52 to 53 billion dollars military budget. The import of this is that leaving civil defense out of the picture for the moment, maybe three or four billion dollars more each year would do the job.

DR. JOHNSON: What I'm concerned about is the juxtaposition of this very large budget over a period of years coupled with a feeling that somehow or other we have reached a stalemate, and if we can clobber them and they can clobber us, there is no danger. So why not cut our own budget, etc., and start a parade towards disarmament of a unilateral character. See my point?

MR. DEAN: All the things we've discussed point in that direction. It's a very serious picture because nobody else is taking the other side of the subject.

DR. JOHNSON: I feel the point that Gordon Dean brought up is a very important one. One of our really great assets is our larger stockpiles; the Soviet Union is going to be stockpile limited for some appreciable time. Just as they'll match us for every bomb we give the allies,

spite time. Just as they'll match us for every bomb we give the allies,
bills; the Soviet Union is going to be stockpile limited for some asblect-
a very important one. One of our really great assets is our larger stock-
DR. JOHNSON: I feel the point that Gordon Deen brought up is
of the subject.

It's a very serious picture because nobody else is taking the other side
MR. DEAN: All the things we've discussed point in that direction.
character. See my point?

own pugget, etc., and start a parade towards disassembly of a unitalien
them and they can clopper us, there is no danger. So why not cut on
somehow or other we have reached a stalemate, and if we can clopper
this very large pugget over a period of years coupled with a feeling that
DR. JOHNSON: Must I be concerned about is the lmtabposition of
time or four billion dollars more each year would do the job.

this is that leaving civil defense out of the picture for the moment, maybe
then, in 1961 a 25 to 23 billion dollars military pugget. The import of
which are at present called for by the President's pugget. That would mean,
would be needed beginning about 1961 in order to maintain the force levels
a 12 billion dollar annual increment of coat for the U. S. defense pugget

MR. HAYBY: Dick Lindsay mentioned just before we broke up that

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etc., one of our ways of pressing them out of the market is to fix it so that they have to match around the perimeter, and on that basis we could use our stockpile to crash them out of an actual war. This goes against the argument for disarmament.

MR. GILPATRIC: By 1960 or 1961, if we took the presently authorized projective force levels, and took out the military departments and estimate what those will involve in the way of expenditures, three or four years hence, you would come out with this 15 billion dollar increment over our present 38 million dollar spending.

Now there are at least two hundred installations in the United States -- military installations, spread among the Army, Navy and Air Force, and I am including everything from Air Force depots, to Navy Air Stations and Army Supply Centers -- which could and should be eliminated were it not for the political opposition of Congress. Some of these excess installations date back to the Civil War or before. If you bring up the question of cutting out a rope walk or a Navy paint factory, or shutting down an Air Training Center in Meridian, Mississippi, or a minor installation up in New Hampshire, or wherever it happens to be, if you do it on a piecemeal basis, you get absolutely nowhere with Congress today. They talk about cutting the budget but you can't get through to them. . .

to them...

They talk about cutting the budget but you can't get through
these days. You do it on a piecemeal basis, you get absolutely nowhere with Con-
minor installation up in New Hampshire, or wherever it happens to be,
amputating down an Air Training Center in Maryland, Mississippi, or a
up the duction of cutting out a robe walk or a Navy paint factory, or
excess installations date back to the Civil War or before. If you print
nated were it not for the political opposition of Congress. Some of these
Stations and Army Supply Centers -- which could and should be elimi-
force, and I am including everything from Air Force debots, to Navy Air
States -- military installations, abroad among the Army, Navy and Air
Now there are at least two hundred installations in the United
ment over our present 38 million dollar spending.

from here on, you would come out with this 12 billion dollar incre-
estimate what those will involve in the way of expenditures, three or
fiveed protective force levels, and took out the military departments and
MR. GILPATTIC: By 1960 or 1961, it we took the presently author-
the argument for disassembly.

use our stockpile to crash them out of an actual war. This does against
that they have to match around the perimeter, and on that phase we could
etc., one of our ways of pressing them out of the market is to fix it so

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[50]

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IV - 31

FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SUBPANEL MEETING - - -

There followed a brief presentation by Mr. Gilpatric on the decision-making process in the Defense Department, with particular reference to the military budget. Mr. Gilpatric said the problem involves two built-in impediments: (a) the organization of the Defense Department; and (b) the rigidity of the budget-making process. . .

Mr. Ellis Johnson addressed himself to three questions about the Department of Defense, all bearing on the need for greater efficiency in the process of decision-making and implementation. These related to:
(1) the general necessity to improve the efficiency of our decision-making process, in light of evidence that the Soviet Union has made appreciable improvements in this respect, (2) the time lag between a good conclusion reached at the working level and the policy approval of this conclusion, and (3) the delay between policy approval and implementation, with special reference to research and development projects . . .

Mr. Gilpatric opened the evening session with a brief presentation on certain aspects of civilian control in the Pentagon. Relating to the military budget, he felt that there is excessive civilian control over the military budget and there is a limit to the applicability of "business concepts" to military affairs.

conceives" to military affairs.

the military budget and there is a limit to the applicability of "business
the military budget," he felt that there is excessive civilian control over
tion on certain aspects of civilian control in the Pentagon. Relating to
Mr. Gilbaric opened the evening session with a brief presentation-
special reference to research and development projects . . .
and (3) the delay between policy approval and implementation, with
rescued at the working level and the policy approval of this conclusion,
improvements in this respect. (5) the time lag between a good conclusion
process, in light of evidence that the Soviet Union has made appreciable
(1) the general necessity to improve the efficiency of our decision-making
the process of decision-making and implementation. These related to:
Department of Defense, all bearing on the need for greater efficiency in
Mr. Ellis Johnson addressed himself to three questions about the
the rigidity of the budget-making process. . .

in impediments: (a) the organization of the Defense Department; and (b)
to the military budget. Mr. Gilbaric said the problem involves two built-
ton-making process in the Defense Department, with particular reference
There followed a brief presentation by Mr. Gilbaric on the deci-

FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING --

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He thought there were other important areas in the Pentagon where civilian control should be strengthened, including the matter of strategic planning generally and the equipping of tactical forces. He believed the present trend was to limit civilian control to budgetary and administrative matters, leaving the vital subjects of strategy, force levels, and roles and missions entirely in military hands. He thought there were a number of extremely important matters having wide political implications with respect to which civilian officials in the Pentagon should not accept "self-denying ordinances." He thought the situation called for substantial reorganization of the Defense Department.

Mr. Halaby followed with an exposition of his proposal for the creation of a new civilian post -- Under-Secretary of Defense for Planning -- to be supplemented by an Advisory Council composed of both military and civilian people, which would advise on strategy, force levels and equipment. Mr. Halaby noted that the NSC, as originally conceived, was to be the focus for the formulation of grand strategy, but that it had not developed in this way. In the early days it was staffed by a small group of extremely good minds who understood one another intimately and were able to canvass the entire world situation informally and with only small regard for the parochial interests of the departments which they represented. Today in the NSC decisions are reached by compromise

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IV - 33

reflecting the relative bureaucratic weight of the participating depart-
ments. Moreover, there appears to be no integrated relation between
political objectives, military forces and budget. In fact, the normal
process seems inverted; that is, first the budget is determined, then
the forces which this budget will sustain and, finally, "the rational-
ized policies."

He expressed some concern over the fact that the Budget Bureau
and the Congressional Committees have come to act as boards of review
for military research programs and even for the introduction of new weap-
ons systems. He doubted that these bodies were competent to perform
the function, but that the task had fallen to them because of default at
the Pentagon. He suggested that the NSC should present the President
with a choice of perhaps three alternative military budgets, with a clear
indication of the forces and policies that each could support. He suggested
that the Secretary of the Treasury should _not_ be a member of the NSC
because his presence there tends to inhibit the development of such
alternative budgets.

DR. SMITHIES: As we all know too well our budget situation at
the present time is very much on a feast-to-famine basis. If you have
crises like Korea, it gives you an opportunity not only to fight the Korean

crtizes like Korea, it gives you an opportunity not only to fight the Korean
the present time is very much on a least-to-tameleats. If you have
DR. SMITHIES: As we all know too well on our budget situation at
alternative budgets.

because his presence there tends to inhibit the development of such
that the Secretary of the Treasury should not be a member of the NRC
indication of the forces and policies that each could support. He suggested
with a choice of perhaps three alternative budgets, with a clear
the Pentagon. He suggested that the NRC should present the President
the function, put that the task and fallen to them because of default at
our systems. He doubted that these bodies were competent to perform
for military research programs and even for the introduction of new tech-
and the Congressional Committees have come to act as boards of review
He expressed some concern over the fact that the Budget Budge-
ted policies."

the forces which this budget will sustain and, finally, "the rational-
process seems inverted; that is, that the budget is determined, then
political objectives, military forces and budget. In fact, the normal
ments. Moreover, there appears to be no integrated relation between
reflecting the relative pseuonomic weight of the participating depart-

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war but to build up the total armed forces. Then after the crisis is over, or after you get used to the crisis, one has campaigns for tax reductions and cutting the budget. Feast and famine budgeting is precisely not the kind of budgeting one needs in order to strengthen and carry out the program of the kind we are trying to recommend. We would like, as an ultimate outcome, to see a system of budgeting that would correspond more closely to the general strategic philosophy of this report. For instance, we had tried to draw a distinction in the report between strategic activities and tactical activities. One possible cut on the budget would be to have a strategic part of it and a tactical part. However, as we discussed that point, we felt that this simple division was probably not feasible.

Another division might be on the lines suggested by General McCormack: a segment of it called native defense of the United States, another segment called, "support of garrison forces abroad", and a third segment called, "support of mobile tactical units." We are not prepared to make a definite recommendation about a budget that really expresses the budget in terms of the missions that the armed services have, but we feel that that ought to be the ultimate goal of budget improvement.

One further subject. I would like to make one or two remarks on the question of dollar comparisons between what we are doing and what

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IV - 35

the Russians are doing. That can be completely misleading. If you compare dollar figures and ruble figures I am quite convinced that you get a distorted view of the picture. Let me pick one illustration -- aircraft factories. We pay many aircraft technicians ten thousand dollars a year; they may pay them two. For these comparisons to be meaningful, our aircraft technicians have to be five times as good as theirs. Ours may be better, but it is doubtful whether they are five times as good. And so I just want to make this negative remark that I think it is very dangerous indeed to be complacent about Russian-American dollar-ruble expenditures on military effort. My own impression is that if you do make quantitative comparisons they are probably more than we are, though their total national income is less than ours.

Comparative comparisons they are properly more than we are, though their taxes on military effort. My own impression is that if you do make assumptions about Russian-American dollar-ruble expenditures I just want to make this negative remark that I think it is very dangerous to better, but it is doubtful whether they are five times as good. And so aircraft technicians have to be five times as good as theirs. Ours may be better, but it is doubtful whether they are five times as good. And so they may pay them two. For these comparisons to be meaningful, our factories. We pay many aircraft technicians ten thousand dollars a year; distorted view of the picture. Let me pick one illustration -- aircraft bare dollar figures and rupie figures I am quite convinced that you get a the Russians are doing. That can be completely misleading. If you com-

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IV-36

FROM ITS BUDGETARY DELIBERATIONS THE PANEL MOVED INTO THE RELATED AREA OF WHAT HAPPENS TO DEFENSE FUNDS AFTER THEY ARE APPROPRIATED AND WHETHER THESE MONIES GUARANTEED DEPENDABLE MILITARY SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES. AND THIS LED DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION: IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRESENTLY ORGANIZED TO DO ITS JOB? TO THIS QUESTION, THE PANEL COULD AGREE ON A FIRM "NO" BUT WHEN IT CAME TO THE SECOND QUESTION, "HOW SHOULD THE PENTAGON BE REORGANIZED?" THERE WAS NO EXTENSIVE AGREEMENT AS TO THE MOST DESIRABLE RECOMMENDATIONS---

MR. JOHNSON: The Department of Defense is concentrated on the short-range problems of 3 to 5 years from now, with very little attention to the long-range problem. From what I've said, then, I would suggest that the principal problem we're faced with is that of long-range planning. On the technical level we have so many alternative courses of action that I can't do anything but agree with Halaby that the main problem is: can we make a reasonable forecast of the trouble to come in the long-range future?

There is no agency in the U. S. Department of Defense at

There is no agency in the U. S. Department of Defense at
reasonable forecast of the trouble to come in the long-range future?
agree with Helsby that the main problem is: can we make a
many alternative courses of action that I can't do anything but
is that of long-range planning. On the technical level we have so
then, I would suggest that the principal problem we're faced with
little attention to the long-range problem. From what I've said,
on the short-range problems of 3 to 5 years from now, with very

Mr. JOHNSON: The Department of Defense is concentrated

RECOMMENDATIONS---

NO EXTENSIVE AGREEMENT AS TO THE MOST DESIRABLE
"HOW SHOULD THE PENTAGON BE REORGANIZED?" THERE WAS
LIRM "NO" BUT WHEN IT CAME TO THE SECOND QUESTION,
JOB? TO THIS QUESTION, THE BANEF CAN'T AGREE ON A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRESENTLY ORGANIZED TO DO ITS
STATES". AND THIS FED DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION: IS THE
GUARANTEED DEPENDABLE MILITARY SECURITY FOR THE UNITED
ALTER THEY ARE APPROPRIATED AND WHETHER THESE MONEYS
INTO THE RELATED AREA OF WHAT HAPPENS TO DEFENSE FUNDS
FROM ITS BUDGETARY DELIBERATIONS THE BANEF MOVED

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Etc

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IV-37

the service level or at the national security level that attempts to
make such a forecast. There is no long-range planning group.
There is no group that makes forecasts or comparisons of the
possible courses of actions and innovations that might be used to
solve the problem. There is no group to select from the many
alternatives which one should specifically be adopted as DOD
policy and as national policy.

There still exists not only the security problem between
ourselves and our allies who have half the inventive capability
in the free world, but there is a serious communication problem
inside of the Department of Defense. Last month one Service
refused information to another Service on things that were in the
second Service's cognizance, but in which there was competition.
This was finally defeated at the Department of Defense level but
it indicates a real difficulty in communications which prevents DOD
from putting together the forecast of the overall situation and
deriving from it some kind of long-range planning that would form
a reasonable basis for the people in high authority to choose from in
this welter of alternatives.

These alternatives have been proliferating from 1 in the 1930's

These alternatives have been proliferating from I in the 1930's to this writer of alternatives.

a reasonable basis for the people in high authority to choose from in deriving from it some kind of long-range planning that would form from butting together the forecast of the overall situation and it indicates a real difficulty in communications which prevents DOD This was finally detected at the Department of Defense level but second Service's coexistence, but in which there was competition. refused information to another Service on things that were in the inside of the Department of Defense. Last month one Service in the free world, put there is a serious communication problem ourselves and our allies who have lost the inventive capability There still exists not only the security problem between policy and as national policy.

alternatives which one should specifically be adopted as DOD solve the problem. There is no group to select from the many possible cases of actions and innovations that might be used to There is no group that makes forecasts or comparisons of the make such a forecast. There is no long-range planning group. the service level or at the national security level that attempts to

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to 10,000 by the 1960's. Let me illustrate what the consequences of
these increasing numbers of alternate choices are in practical terms.
We spent a half billion dollars on Bomarc and completely neglect
ECM which would cost a tenth of a billion a year. We completely
neglect low altitude defense against bombers. This is not because
of negligence but because we haven't taken the proper organizational
steps to see what troubles are to come. We put a large effort in
carriers and in strategic submarines and we neglect the whole
anti-submarine problem. We put our emphasis on SAC atomics,
but York at Livermore says to the Army: you can either have a
research project on a gun-type weapon or a rocket-type weapon --
just one, no more. We neglect tactical mobility as well as
strategic mobility, and we prepare for a post-D-Day mobilization
rather than for a pre-D-Day mobilization.

Our greatest need is really to face up to the modern problem
in technology, and that is to organize and take into account the
fact that we're going from 2 to 4 alternatives in the 40's, to 10,000
in the 60's. That takes specific organizational effort, not only at
the DOD level but at the service levels, at State and at NSC level.
If we do that, we have a chance of finding out what the service roles
are, and we might have a better chance of finding out what the balance

are', and we might have a better chance of finding out what the balance
If we do that, we have a chance of finding out what the service roles
the DOD level put at the service levels, at State and at NSC level.
in the 60's. That takes a specific organizational effort, not only at
tact that we're doing from 3 to 4 alternatives in the 40's, to 10,000
in technology, and that is to organize and take into account the
Our greatest need is really to face up to the modern problem
rather than for a pre-D-Day mobilization.

strategic mobility, and we prepare for a boat-D-Day mobilization
just one, not more. We neglect tactical mobility as well as
research project on a gun-fiber weapon or a rocket-fiber weapon --
put York at Livermore says to the Vvyui: You can either have a
anti-submarine problem. We put our emphasis on SAC atomics,
cameras and in strategic submarines and we neglect the whole
steps to see what troubles are to come. We put a large effort in
of negligence put because we haven't taken the proper organizational
neglect low altitude defense against pampers. This is not because
ECM which would cost a tenth of a billion a year. We completely
We spent a half billion dollars on Bomars and completely neglect
these increasing numbers of alternate choices are in practical terms.
to 10,000 by the 1960's. Let me illustrate what the consequences of

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is between the services.

For example, Edward Teller talked about the need for many
small tactical weapons. I agree with him, but you need a large
production of fissionable material to do that because if you're
going to have ready tactical weapons. I agree with him, but you
need a large production of fissionable material to do that because
if you're going to have ready tactical weapons to use in this war
of dispersal and movement, you will have to produce somewhere
between 10 to 20 times as much fissionable material as you'll ever
use. And that will require a considerable expansion of our fissionable
production systems. JCS doesn't face up to that because they don't
come to an agreement on the amount of fissionable material needed
by the Department.

MR. HALABY: (Reporting on a subcommittee's deliberation on
the organization of the Defense Department) The first point is that
we would not as a group favor a revolutionary solution to the
organizational problems, rather an evolutionary one. In other
words there are some trends and forces at work now that we think
should be nurtured on their way toward a closer integration of the
armed services. The continued emphasis on a unified command
which has been a major integrating factor (an international command

which has been a major integrating factor (an international command armed services). The continued emphasis on a unified command should be maintained on their way toward a closer integration of the work there are some trends and forces at work now that we think organizational problems, rather than an evolutionary one. In other we would not as a group favor a revolutionary solution to the organization of the Defense Department). The fact that is that MR. HALBY: (Reporting an a subcommittee's deliberation on by the Department.

come to an agreement on the amount of flusonable material needed
production systems. IC8 does, face np to that because they don't
use. And that will require a considerable expansion of our flusonable
between 10 to 20 times as much flusonable material as you'll ever
of diabatral and movement. You will have to produce somewhere
it you're going to have ready tactical weapons to use in this war
need a large production of flusonable material to do that because
going to have ready tactical weapons. I agree with him, but you
production of flusonable material to do that because
since tactical weapons. I agree with him, but you need a large
for example, Edward Teller talked about the need for many
is between the services.

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such as SHAPE) we feel is a healthy trend. Wherever there is a trend to "blur" departmental or service lines and distinctions -- we feel this moves in the ultimately correct direction, namely, a highly unified armed forces establishment. Those who are present this morning, felt that we should move toward a much more highly integrated organization.

Another trend which we cited as an example would be to give the Secretary of Defense greater freedom to select, promote, and permit transfer of officers between services. Another trend which we would favor is toward graduate education in such institutions as the National War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the NATO War College and Harvard Business School. We feel this tends to blur the sharp service line that is in the right direction.

With respect to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we all felt that the trend toward diffusion of the Secretary's responsibility among numerous civilian appointees should be reversed, and that in particular, we should try to reconcentrate in a smaller number of civilian employees some of the Secretary's delegated powers. This would call for a reduction in the number of Assistant Secretaries and a broadening authority of the remaining Assistant Secretaries, more direct contact with the military staffs and more feed-up as well as

direct contact with the military establishment and more feed-up as well as
a proceeding authority of the remaining Assistant Secretaries, more
would call for a reduction in the number of Assistant Secretaries and
civilian employees some of the Secretary's delegated powers. This
particularly, we should try to reconciliate in a smaller number of
among numerous civilian appointees should be reversed, and that in
all felt that the trend toward dilution of the Secretary's responsibility
With respect to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we
to put the sharp service line that is in the right direction.
NATO War College and Harvard Business School. We feel this tends
as the National War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the
which we would favor is toward graduate education in such institutions
and permit transfer of officers between services. Another trend
give the Secretary of Defense greater freedom to select, promote,
Another trend which we cited as an example would be to
integrated organization.

this morning, felt that we should move toward a much more highly
highly united armed forces establishment. Those who are present
we feel this moves in the ultimately correct direction, namely, a
trend to "plur" departmental or service lines and distinctions --
such as SHAPE) we feel it is a healthy trend. Wherever there is a

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feed-down of information, ideas, policies, etc. We think this
kind of reconcentration would make for more effective civilian
control; would certainly arrest the trend toward overlaying of the
military forces and would reduce the tendency for drawing sharper
and sharper lines between civilian and military officials.

With respect to the staff of the Secretary of Defense, I
think we all agreed that there should be a mixed civil and military
staff and that it should be strengthened; particularly, there should
be increased emphasis on the planning function and the coordination
of the strategy formulation, weapons systems development and the
NSC-State Department formulated national security policy--more
cohesion, in other words, between strategy, weapons systems
development and politico-military policy.

Another area of strengthening in the Secretary's staff, we
feel that the controls over programming in support of the strategy--
in particular a review of the ground rules for setting the tables of
organization and equipment, establishing the so-called division
slice, flying hours, etc. In other words, we can see budgeting by
strategic force, or tactical force, or committed force a little more
clearly than we could see organizing in such a way.

clearly than we could see organizing in such a way.
strategic force, or tactical force, or committed force a little more
alice, flying hours, etc. In other words, we can see padding by
organization and equipment, establishing the so-called division
in particular a review of the ground rules for setting the tables of
feel that the controls over programming in support of the strategy--
Another area of strengthening in the Secretary's staff, we
development and politico-military policy.

cooperation, in other words, between strategy, weapons systems
NAC-State Department formulated national security policy--more
of the strategy formulation, weapons systems development and the
be increased emphasis on the planning function and the coordination
staff and that it should be strengthened; particularly, there should
think we all agreed that there should be a mixed civil and military
With respect to the staff of the Secretary of Defense, I
and another line between civilian and military officials.
military forces and would reduce the tendency for drawing another
control; would certainly arrest the trend toward overlying of the
kind of reconnaissance would make for more effective civilian
feed-down of information, ideas, bo, ideas, etc. We think this

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Another strengthening of the Secretary's staff and function we felt would be a fairly frequent and periodic review of the roles and missions and combat assignments.

Comming to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we feel that we should temper the criticism with the observation that this with the committee organization and the adversary procedure, it is amazing how well the men trying to make this machinery work have done. We would try, in some way, of which we can cite a couple of examples, to strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and let it evolve into a planning organization as distinguished from a committee process. Perhaps the most important thought we had on that was that the Joint Chiefs should be relieved of their management functions, their daily routine of solving minor operational problems and that those management functions should be clearly fixed in the Secretaries of the three services with the advice of their service chiefs, as distinguished from dumpting them in the JCS as a convenient place to get them settled or compromised. We feel that the Joint Chiefs' efforts should be concentrated on the formulation of strategy and the coordination of military plans implementing strategy.

strategically.

of strategy and the coordination of military plans implementing
the Joint Chiefs' efforts should be concentrated on the formulation
convenient place to get them settled or compromised. We feel that
chiefs, as distinguished from dumbing them in the ICS as a
Secretary of the three services with the advice of their service
and that those management functions should be clearly fixed in the
functions, their daily routine of solving minor operational problems
that the Joint Chiefs should be relieved of their management
process. Perhaps the most important thought we had on that was
into a planning organization as distinguished from a committee
strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and let it evolve
try, in some way, of which we can cite a couple of examples, to
the men trying to make this machinery work have done. We would
organisation and the adversary procedure, it is amazing how well
temper the criticism with the observation that mix with the committee
Complaint to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we feel that we should
and missteps and combat assignments.

we felt would be a fairly frequent and periodic review of the roles
Another strengthening of the Secretary's staff and function

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We feel in line with this that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs might well be designated as the chief strategy advisor to
the Secretary of Defense. His authority as coordinator of the views
of the three service chiefs should be clearly fixed, and he should
be acknowledged as the director of that portion of the Secretary of
Defense's staff involved with the formulation strategy and military
planning.

DR. SMITHIES: I think it was the unanimous feeling of
our group that if public support is to be obtained for the kind of
program that we are advocating in this Report, then the budget should
give some indication of what those programs intend to accomplish.
That seems to be a very elementary fact, but the fact remains that
the budget does not do that at the present time.

The budget consists of about six major categories for each
service. The first category is military personnel, the second is main-
tenance and operation, the third is major procurement, the fourth
is major construction, the fifth is research and development and
the sixth is the grab-all category of "general". From this, for
example, it is quite impossible to determine how big SAC is, for
instance, or how much tactical air strength we have. In fact, it

instance, or how much tactical air attendance we have. In fact, it
example, it is quite impossible to determine how big SAC is, for
the sixth is the drop-all category of "general." From this, for
its major construction, the fifth is research and development and
tenance and operation, the third is major procurement, the fourth
service. The first category is military personnel, the second is main-
the budget consists of about six major categories for each
the budget does not do that at the present time.

That seems to be a very elementary fact, but the fact remains that
give some indication of what these programs intend to accomplish.
program that we are advocating in this Report, then the budget should
our group that it public support is to be obtained for the kind of
DR. SMITH? I think it was the unanimous feeling of
planning.

Defense's staff involved with the formulation strategy and military
be acknowledged as the director of that portion of the Secretary of
of the three service chiefs should be clearly fixed, and he should
the Secretary of Defense. His authority as coordinator of the views
Chiefs might well be designated as the chief strategy advisor to
We feel in line with this that the Chairman of the Joint

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is quite impossible to discover from the Defense budget how big the forces are (that is now being debated so vehemently) what military strength it represents in terms of anything but dollars. It does not reveal anything about effective military units. Of course, a good deal of this comes out in testimony before Committees, but it is still impossible from the testimony to relate the strength of the use given to the dollar figures expenditure. Consequently, the defense budget doesn't appear to the public as a kind of amorphous magnitude that you can cut. It seems to me that it is almost an invitation for the budget-cutters of the Congress to cut it.

As we all know too well our budget situation at the present time is very much on a feast-to-famine basis. If you have crises like Korea, it gives you an opportunity not only to fight the Korean War but to build up the total armed forces. Then after the crisis is over, or after you get used to the crisis, one has campaigns for tax reductions and cutting the budget. Our feeling is that a feast and famine budgeting is precisely not the kind of budgeting one needs in order to strengthen and carry out the program of the kind we are trying to recommend.

Our sub-committee would like, as an ultimate outcome, to see a system of budgeting that would correspond more closely to

see a system of budgeting that would correspond more closely to
Our sub-committee would like, as an ultimate outcome, to
trying to recommend.

in order to strengthen and carry out the program of the kind we are
tampering budgeting is precisely not the kind of budgeting one needs
reductions and cutting the budget. Our feeling is that a feast and
over, or after you get used to the criteria, one has campaigns for tax
war put to build up the total armed forces. Then after the criteria is
like Korea, it gives you an opportunity not only to fight the Korean
time is very much on a feast-to-tamme basis. If you have criteria
As we all know too well our budget situation at the present
the budget-cutters of the Congress to cut it.

that you can cut. It seems to me that it is almost an invitation for
budget doesn't appear to the public as a kind of smorgon magnitude
given to the dollar figures expenditure. Consequently, the defense
still impossible from the testimony to relate the strength of the use
desire of this comes out in testimony before Committees, but it is
reveal anything about effective military units. Of course, a good
strength it represents in terms of anything but dollars. It does not
forces are (that is now being debated so vehemently) what military
is quite impossible to discover from the Defense budget how big the

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the general strategic philosophy of this report. For instance we had
tried to draw a distinction in the report between strategic activities
and tactical activities. One possible cut on the budget would be
to have a strategic part of it and a tactical part. Another division
might be on the lines suggested by General McCormack: a
segment of it called native defense of the United States, another
segment called "support of garrison forces abroad" and a third
segment called "support of mobile tactical units". We are not
prepared to make a definite recommendation about a budget that really
expresses the budget in terms of the missions that the armed services
have, but we feel that that ought to be the ultimate goal of budget
improvement.

MR. FLOBERG: I think that you've done a wonderful job
here, but among the things that I most emphatically disagree with
is the section that deals with the organization of the Department
of Defense from which I dissent, completely, entirely, one hundred
per cent, in toto and absolutely. I disagree entirely with the
provisions in forces of strategic attack, and strategical force. I
think this is a major blunder of concept. I think this is a major
step backwards. My point is that it has been popular for some
time to say that because the three members of the Joint Chiefs

time to say that because the three members of the Joint Chiefs
step backwards. My point is that it has been popular for some
think this is a major blunder of concept. I think this is a major
provisions in force of strategic attack, and strategic force. I
believe, in toto and absolutely. I disagree entirely with the
of Defense from which I dissent, completely, entirely, one hundred
is the section that deals with the organization of the Department
here, but among the things that I most ambuscally disagree with
MR. FLOERGEN: I think that you've done a wonderful job
improvement.

have, but we feel that that ought to be the ultimate goal of budget
expresses the budget in terms of the missions that the armed services
prepared to make a definite recommendation about a budget that really
segment called "support of mobile tactical units." We are not
segment called "support of garrison forces abroad," and a third
segment of it called native defense of the United States, another
might be on the lines suggested by General McCormack: a
to have a strategic part of it and a tactical part. Another division
and tactical activities. One possible cut on the budget would be
tried to draw a distinction in the report between strategic activities
the general strategic philosophy of this report. For instance we had

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{cc}

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wore different colored uniforms, they don't agree on anything as regards strategic concepts. This is a gross exaggeration.

I think there is much more integrity of strategic concept among its chiefs than has been given credit for. I think this has grown more and more with the years and within the individual services.

GEN. McCORMACK: With regard to the clear distinction between strategic and tactical forces, strategic and tactical atomic weapons, I would say, let us tread with real care, for the reasons Jack Floberg gave, and for others, some of which seem even more persuasive to me. This missions are not so clearly distinguishable one from the others as one might like to think. The means to a certain degree are interchangeable. This indeed poses a dilemma, that you have fundamentally different strategic missions to perform yet the overlap of interchangeability of means is there and these are the facts of life...

COL. LINCOLN: I will make three comments. First, our colleague, Jack Floberg, is a little worried about "staffs" of the Secretary of Defense and I just mention that because to a Navy man, the word "staff" means something quite a lot different than it does to people in the other services. I think that our whole group would

to people in the other services. I think that our whole aim would
be to get something like a lot different than it does
the word "staff" means something quite a lot different than it does
Security of Defense and I just mention that because to a Navy man,
colleagues, Jack Klopert, is a little worried about "staff" of the
COR. LINCOLN: I will make three comments. First, on the
the facts of life...

the overload of interchanges/ity of means is there and these are
you have fundamentally different strategic missions to perform yet
degrees are interchanges/ple. This indeed poses a dilemma, that
one down the other one might like to think. The means to a certain
bassivative to me. This missions are not so clearly distinguished
Jack Klopert gave, and for others, some of which seem even more
measurable. I would say, let us trend with real care, for the reasons
between strategic and tactical forces, strategic and tactical atomic
GEN. MCCORMACK: With regard to the clear distinction
services.

has down more and more with the years and within the individual
among its duties than has been given credit for. I think this
I think there is much more integrity of strategic concept
requires strategic concepts. This is a gross exasperation.
more different colored uniforms, they don't agree on anything so

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(55)

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stress that unless we improve our organization in the Department of Defense, we are going to, more and more, give the direction of strategy and of operations to the financial and controller people.

The budgetary controller people by default, are going to take over strategy. In fact, perhaps, they have already taken over strategy because of that background. We need to move our organization more in the direction of designating clearly the fact of responsibility, perhaps adding a few possible faci of responsibility that are more crystallized.

I think we would all agree on a final point that I've jotted down in summarizing part of our thoughts. It appears that there is a general consensus that the Russians are getting ahead of us as far as timing is concerned. They do things faster than we do. Now, we can charge that, in part, to dictatorships and that sort of thing, but I suggest that it may in part be due to the fact that we are not as good as we should be in the decision making operation and organizational field, and that the fault lies not entirely in our stars, but in ourselves, and that we cannot afford to be as sloppy as we have been.

as we have been.

afraid, but in ourselves, and that we cannot afford to be so slobbery
and organizational field, and that the fault lies not entirely in our
we are not so good as we should be in the decision making operation
of thing, but I suggest that it may in part be due to the fact that
Now, we can charge that, in part, to dictatorships and that sort
as far as timing is concerned. They do things faster than we do.
is a general consensus that the Russians are getting ahead of us
down in summarizing part of our thoughts. It appears that there
I think we would all agree on a final point that I've lotted
 crystallized.

perhaps adding a few possible factors of responsibility that are more
more in the direction of designating clearly the fact of responsibility,
because of that background. We need to move our organization
strategically. In fact, perhaps, they have already taken over strategically
the budgetary controller people by default, are going to take over
strategically and of operations to the financial and controller people.
of Defense, we are going to, more and more, give the direction of
stress that unless we improve our organization in the Department

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Johnson).

3) najad wu la houyhkuqy coveqy dy Lincoln, Jordan and
because 1) it nearly connects najad wu with civil defense,

(White this paper could be part of Section Two. I have but it here

EDWARD TESTER

py

THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WAR

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