The Panel believes that the premises and assumptions of the past, valid as several of them have at times been in forming U.S. approaches, are no longer adequate as guides for United States policy. New measures are required for building added strength and a new sense of common purpose in the West — and for moving toward a resolution of those principal issues which for over two decades have caused uncertainty and instability in the heart of Europe.

14

### III. NEW MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE UNITY OF THE WEST

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent stationing of Soviet forces on the Czech-West German border have set back progress in relaxing East-West tensions and in resolving the problem of Germany.

What should be the Western response? How can that response be handled in a manner which does not fuel a mutual escalation — only adding to the dangers of military confrontation? What should United States policy now be?

The Panel believes that the answers lie in a dual approach: new measures to strengthen the West and, at the same time, new efforts to reduce both the dangers and ultimately the division in present day Germany and Europe.

We turn first to the measures we believe to be required to strengthen the West.

#### The Character and Quality of Consultation in the Alliance

As the United States has become more and more deeply involved in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, major new strains have developed in the Alliance. Our allies believe that they were not adequately consulted about our growing Vietnam involvement. Some were fearful that Asia had replaced Europe in our scale of priorities.

But U.S. Vietnam policy has not been the only European anxiety. Their growing awareness of a major technological gap, new anxieties

15

over the inroads of American business in Europe and over financial and
monetary instability in the Atlantic area, and uncertainties over future
nuclear security policies — based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
on the anticipated U.S.-Soviet negotiations on strategic weapons —
have all contributed to the malaise in U.S.-West European relationships.

The Panel recommends that the new Administration, as one of its first
moves, stress the importance which the United States attaches to its relation-
ships to Western Europe, and stress likewise its belief that those relationships
can become the foundation for a more stable and more lasting security system
for all Europe.

Cohesion and unity of the West will be required if negotiations for
such a system are to be successful and not be endangered by the un-
predictabilities of East-West bilateral relationships.

Mechanisms for consultation can be important to strengthen the
Alliance. But the real key is the frequency and character of consultation.
Our North Atlantic partners must feel that on the issues which touch
their vital interests, the U.S. will consult them promptly, at the most
senior level, and in whatever forum is most appropriate, and with a
deep perception as to their options and dilemmas. Of equal importance
is their understanding of our options and dilemmas — and their willing-
ness to engage in close consultation on matters of concern to the United
States.

The Panel recommends that the United States make clear to our European
allies our intention to engage in close and continuing consultations with them,
covering, inter alia, any principal new political or military commitments to be
undertaken outside the Treaty area, and any basic developments in weapons
technology which could significantly change the value and effectiveness of
national defense programs within the Alliance and the defensive posture of the
Alliance.

As the U.S. and the Soviet Union move into bilateral negotiations in
an effort to bring the strategic arms race under control, our partners
in the North Atlantic Alliance should be kept informed. Of equal if
not greater importance, they should have an opportunity to assist in
formulating overall nuclear doctrine and policy as that applies to the
defense of Western Europe. The sensitive manner in which these new
bilateral consultations are handled could either facilitate or complicate
the necessary European adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.

The Panel believes that according our Permanent Representative on the

16

North Atlantic Council membership on the President's National Security Council would give both symbol and reality to a higher priority in our Alliance relationships.

April 1969 will mark the 20th Anniversary of NATO. The NATO Council meeting is presently scheduled to be in the United States at that time.

The Panel recommends that the occasion be used for a NATO summit meeting — designed both to develop and to reinforce a new sense of solidarity in the Alliance.

## The North Atlantic Alliance

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has already given a new sense of purpose to NATO.

The apparent arrangement for the indefinite stationing of Soviet forces on the Czech-West German frontier is only one of the aspects of the recent crisis which has altered the outlook in Central Europe. We face increased uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions and grave misgivings about stability in Soviet decision-making.

Taken together, the new stationing of forces and the new uncertainties in decision-making have made necessary, the Panel believes, both the retention of present United States forces in Europe and enlargement of present military contingents of other NATO partners much nearer to previously agreed force levels.

Questions of force levels in NATO have been accompanied in the past, and continue to be beset, by problems of how the forces are to be financed. The principle that foreign exchange consequences of deployments in the common defense are a common problem seems unexceptionable. In view of the recurring serious balance of payment problems, the Panel believes that the time has come for a new approach. It proposes that troop unit costs be projected on a four-year basis with the understanding that, if balance of payment problems prevent the payment of obligated costs in any one year, payment can be deferred for one year. No country would be permitted to fall more than two years behind in its payments.

In order to prevent the cumulative effects of continued bilateral borrowing from those countries in a surplus position, the Panel believes that NATO should establish a NATO Payments Settlements Authority (NPSA) whose membership would include all NATO countries (except France). NPSA would "buy" medium-term bonds, paying normal commercial interest, from deficit countries in the amount of their deficit. It would, in turn, issue to surplus countries bonds of its own for the same total face value and period.

17

If a country wished, for balance of payment reasons, to pay in advance for more than one year, for costs arising from deployments in the common defense, it would be free to do so.

The Panel believes that moves such as those above to reinforce NATO's military capabilities should be accompanied by assurances to the East, either in public or in private, that the North Atlantic Council will be used actively for consultation on measures designed to decrease tension over Germany and work toward a new pattern of all-European security. The "message to the East" communicated following the NATO meeting in June 1968, indicating a continued interest in mutual NATO-Warsaw Pact force reductions, should be re-emphasized as official and continuing NATO policy.

## A Greater European Role in NATO

Another divisive factor has been the dominant United States role in NATO. This role has been based, of course, on the predominant power of the United States, especially in strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is clear that the United States should not and will not give up its statutory control over nuclear weapons. With the rapid continuing development of new weapons systems, such as Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), that predominant power position is likely to continue. For that very reason it would behoove the United States to seek actively ways of helping to promote the sense of collective responsibility of European NATO members.

The Panel believes that the United States should encourage the development of a European caucus in NATO. The Europeans themselves should determine those issues on which they would attempt to reach a consensus. The United States should continue to be available for discussions on any issue and indeed, as we shall point out later, will need on certain issues such as arms control to take more leadership than it has heretofore. However, for the United States to encourage the Europeans to develop more of their own initiative in the NATO framework would be one way to remove some of the ambiguity which has characterized United States' relationships with Europe during the past decade. Such European consultation should lead to the Europeans strengthening their joint decision-making on matters of defense and military procurement.

Should the impetus to improve NATO force levels, generated by the repositioning of Soviet forces, result in larger and more effective contributions by the European members, questions of command and

18

control may well arise. The United States should make it clear that in principle it would support an appointment of a European Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, provided an American remains in a position to fulfill U.S. statutory requirements on the control of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Planning Group of NATO and the Defense Planning Committee have now become a part of the Alliance structure. The deliberations in these bodies seem to have satisfied some of the needs for allied consultation about Europe's nuclear defense that gave rise to the ill-fated Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal. The concept of a European caucus would be appropriate in these bodies. The caucus might want at some point to consider movement toward a European defense community within the Atlantic Alliance.

## Atlantic Financial and Trade Policy: A New "Nixon Round"

We have referred earlier to the strains in Atlantic relationships based on financial and monetary instability and balance of payment problems. While these sets of problems are not the primary concern of this report, they cannot be avoided in our considerations.

Strengthened international cooperation in the financial field will be essential to assure the continued growth and stability of the economies of the North Atlantic nations and of the less-developed countries as well. To assure an adequate supply of liquidity to finance a growing volume of trade, it is essential that the new facility for Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund be quickly activated, in sufficient amounts to assure an orderly growth in the total reserves over the years.

Even if the problems of liquidity are dealt with successfully, there will still remain the difficult problems of confidence and of improving the balance of payments adjustment process. Intensified efforts should be made through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the IMF and the Group of Ten, supplemented by central bank cooperation, to encourage surplus and deficit nations to assume their fair share of responsibility for adjustment. Surplus countries like Germany can do more by accelerating their economic growth and enlarging their contributions to cooperative aid and military programs, but the U.S. must also do a better job than it has in the past in managing its domestic economy in the direction of non-inflationary economic growth in order to reduce its payments deficit and maintain confidence in the dollar.

19

One of the destabilizing elements in the present situation is the uncertainty over whether and when Britain will be accepted into the Common Market. This is a major inhibition to orderly planning by British, and indeed by Western business and commercial enterprise. It is a principal source of instability for the pound. The Common Market is more than an economic union. With its supra-national character it constitutes an important political force in Western Europe — one which would be greatly strengthened with British membership.

Further explorations might be undertaken of the advantages and disadvantages of an Atlantic free trade area which would be opened, but which might be composed initially of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. But this would not be an adequate substitute for British entry into the Common Market.

**The Panel urges, therefore, that the new Administration shape its new European policy in ways which would favor and not impede British entry — although Europe itself must take the initiative in this field. This may mean interim steps prior to full British membership.**

One of the unexpected developments in Atlantic relationships was the speed with which United States business interests jumped the tariff walls of the Common Market and established operations in Europe — at times aided by the new instrument of the multinational corporation. A substantial number of national barriers still exist which inhibit West Europeans from doing more efficient business in neighboring Common Market countries. One approach to stimulate more U.S.-West European business competition within the Atlantic area would be the development of multinational corporations whose stock ownership as well as whose management are more equally distributed among Atlantic Alliance countries. This will require a study of the extent to which changes in domestic legislation in the U.S. and Western Europe are needed to permit the lowering of a wide variety of national barriers in such areas as taxes, patents, payments restraints and corporation charter restrictions.

A concerted new effort is required to free trade from present non-tariff restrictions, such as import surcharges, export rebates, and border taxes. Governmental price support policies are in many cases in need of review.

**The Panel recommends that the new Administration propose at the earliest date a "Nixon Round" of negotiation on non-tariff barriers to trade.**

20

Common Approaches to Common Problems

It is not enough for the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to join
together in the defense of their countries, of their currencies, or of their
balance of payments.

If such defenses are to mean something beyond a shelter against
the future, the Western Alliance must join together in more far-reaching
approaches to the common problems we share in national life. It is
imperative that our technology and our affluence become invested with
more meaning to people. A more humanistic approach, the Panel be-
lieves, is required by the contemporary setting.

Current ratios comparing our national effort on measures of na-
tional security to our efforts to cope with the problems of our urban
ghettos and the pollution of our environment are causing increasing
uneasiness and concern.

*Urban Life:* We might best begin by saying to Europeans that they
have made their cities more habitable, more human, than ours. We
might find them saying their cities are not habitable enough.

The Panel believes the United States should encourage the Europeans to
set up an International Urban Institute either in Europe, or wherever our allies
would prefer, in which the U.S. would participate.*

Such an Institute would bring together the leading urban practi-
tioners, scholars, builders, and most certainly students to look at our
urban crisis, and to consider and propose new and more adequate ap-
proaches. These approaches need not only the discipline of scholars,
and the rules of pragmatism, but the utopian impulse of our youth —
endowed with a new sense of common international purpose.

The Institute would coalesce the piecemeal efforts of individual
disciplines. It could mount a concerted attack on the pollution of air
and water, the irony of poverty and joblessness in the midst of affluence,
the paradox of supersonic speeds in the air and slow crowded commut-
ing on the ground, and congested housing for the poor.

Some important work in these areas is currently underway within
the United Nations system, in UNESCO and the UN regional Economic
Commission for Europe. The International Urban Institute would need
to draw on the work of appropriate UN bodies and commissions. At
its most recent session, the 23rd, the General Assembly, on the initiative
of Sweden, decided to convene in 1972 a UN Conference on Human
Environment. Atlantic Alliance countries, whose technologies are re-

*For reservation by James N. Hyde, see page 34.

21

sponsible for so much of the changes in the planet's environment, should make every effort to assist the UN Conference in identifying those aspects of the problem that can best be handled through international cooperation and agreement.

The urban crisis, however, is more than a physical disarrangement in our societies — on both sides of all "curtains". Our young people believe that at the same time as we proclaim the morals of personal welfare and individual liberty, our political and social systems tend to become more massive, more rigid, more insensitive, more monolithic and impersonal, and less human. In an era of constant technological innovation we continue to rely on unchanged political processes and establishments. Thus the International Urban Institute needs to do more than develop systems for coping with the physical disarrangements of our time; it needs to address itself to this wider set of social relationships.

*Technological Partnership:* Technological exploration should not remain another area of U.S. domination and superiority. Upsetting the "balance of science", like upsetting the balance of payments, can be divisive and destructive. As we have pointed out, technological development knows no national boundaries. To make it a national pursuit is not consistent with the goal of making the Western Alliance a contemporary and common adventure. For example, the Panel strongly supports action now going forward in the NATO Science Council to create a European institute for computer programming.

We would recommend that the Nixon Administration take immediate steps to invite our allies to join in a space program, to join us on the moon and beyond. Our allies need to see and feel a new spirit of common adventure and an Atlantic astronaut could do much to symbolize this to the man on the street.

The Soviet Union should be offered the opportunity to decide if it would join in a more cooperative international space program.*

*Education:* We have moved, in the Atlantic area, toward freer trade in commodities by tariff reduction and a common market. We have moved to internationalize money through convertible currencies.

The time is now at hand to explore ways in which the ultimate "commodity" in the modern world — education — can be more firmly established on an international base.

An "educational common market" should be devised — a program of "freer trade" of students and faculty between countries — beginning

*For comment by Richard N. Gardner, see page 34.

22

in the Atlantic area. Multi-national educational institutions, faculty, and students should become commonplace in a contemporary world. We again need to call upon our humility to recognize and admit that we know little about some of the seminal educational questions we should be asking.

What are the best ways to educate the very young? How can we reach the culturally disadvantaged, to remotivate their flagging aspirations? How can we develop the innovativeness that the modern world demands? How do we train the skilled workers and the scarce but vital entrepreneurs and managers that a modern technological world demands?

**The Panel recommends the creation of an International Foundation for Education supported by private and governmental funds and directed multi-nationally.** This project could lead the way in setting up mutually agreeable trans-national standards that would allow students and faculty to move more freely from country to country; in sponsoring both educational research and the development and assessment of international educational levels; in pooling the knowledge of the educational process into a "World Bank" of knowledge; and by energetically supporting a greatly expanded international scholarship program — one which might indeed emphasize environmental studies.*

If we are to build a meaningful Atlantic Community in the modern context, it must be rooted firmly in a genuine community of objectives — not just military and economic objectives — but one based on common aspirations to improve the quality of human life in a world where things tend to become more important than people.

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IV. MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES
IN THE EAST-WEST AREA

The past two decades have witnessed a series of efforts to move toward a settlement of the political and related issues left over from World War II.

The War left the Four Powers — the United States, the USSR, Britain and France — with special responsibilities for Germany. Many of the early efforts to find a way forward were made through the Four Power Council of Foreign Ministers. While several of the initial meetings were tension reducing, little progress was made on the basic question of the future of a divided Germany.

More recently efforts to resolve the problems of Central Europe have been left largely to direct negotiations between Western and Eastern Germany, or between Western Germany and the Soviet Union, or subsumed under more general efforts to ease tension and establish improved East-West relationships through bilateral negotiations between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, through such negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and through the work of the larger multilateral institutions.

The Search for East-West Common Interests through
the United Nations

The United Nations, its political organs, its commissions, and its Specialized Agencies have, over the past few years, provided the principal multilateral means through which the countries of Eastern and

24

Western Europe have explored seriously the extent and character of
their common interest.

In the trade, scientific and cultural fields, relations between several
West and East European countries have developed more rapidly than
they have between the U.S. and USSR. A new substantive level of diplo-
matic exchange has been steadily developing in the UN system between
East and West Europe — separate from the larger context of Soviet-
American bipolarity. As the Cold War and general East-West tension
in Europe lessened, increased U.S.-Soviet common interest developed
in the work of the UN Security Council — and the voting of both West-
ern and Eastern countries in United Nations bodies became more inde-
pendent. Non-bloc countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria,
and Yugoslavia have played increasingly useful intermediary roles.

Romania, in 1963, initiated one of the more useful vehicles for
political exploration and cooperation. A resolution entitled "Actions on
the regional level with a view to improving neighborly relations among
European States having different social and political systems" was finally
passed at the Assembly session in 1965. The resolution was sponsored
by nine countries of Eastern and Western Europe: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden, and Yugo-
slavia. The so-called "Group of Nine" has continued to meet, occa-
sionally during Assembly sessions, to consider matters of mutual interest.

Political multipolarity will clearly be a feature of the modern world
for years to come. While the 126 member United Nations is a far from
ideal instrument, the Panel believes its bodies and agencies provide far
greater opportunities than have yet been utilized for the development
of East-West common interests.

The Panel therefore recommends:

1. That the United States encourage closer Soviet and other Eastern European association with the World Bank through their participation in the aid consortium for India — a consortium in which the United States and the Western Europeans are now heavily involved.

Bilateral aid-giving over the past few years has tended to become
competitive. This has been particularly true of U.S. and Soviet aid
programs for India. While such competition in aid-giving has had cer-
tain advantages for receiving countries, in the long run a greater mea-
sure of cooperation in aid-planning and aid-giving would benefit both
donor and recipient.

25

2. That the United States urge the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which will have principal responsibility for developing and administering the safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to undertake immediate measures to prepare for its enlarged role.

This role would include the development of a nuclear safeguard system in Eastern as well as Western Europe.

3. That the United States, following the necessary and urgent early initiation of bilateral strategic missile negotiations with the Soviet Union, move promptly to establish close consultative relationships on the substance of these negotiations with NATO and, in conjunction with the USSR, with the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC).

4. That the new President signify a new United States interest in making maximum use of United Nations facilities for the discovery and for the reinforcement of East-West common interest, by addressing the opening of the next General Assembly in the fall of 1969.

## East-West Trade

One important area requiring immediate United States action is East-West trade.

Imports from Eastern Europe are subject to the highest tariffs in U.S. history. American businessmen are denied credit arrangements which would enable them to trade with Eastern Europe competitively in world markets. The profitable economic and political experience anticipated from trading with Eastern Europe in non-strategic items is thus totally abandoned.

The Panel considers passage of the East-West Trade Bill and repeal of all inconsistent legislation a matter of major priority. With passage of this Bill, the President would have discretionary power to determine whether the best interests of the United States would be served by granting the same "most-favored-nation" status to non-strategic goods from Eastern Europe that it now gives to imports from other countries.

The Panel recommends in addition Executive Branch liberalization of export controls, retaining controls only over those items that can demonstrably be shown to augment significantly the warmaking capacity of an Eastern European country, which cannot obtain such items elsewhere or manufacture them itself.

Short-term U.S. credits, including Export-Import Bank financing, should be available for trade in non-strategic goods with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the same basis as those for other trade. The availability of long-term credits would depend on the possibility of reciprocal measures.

26

The Panel also recommends that, as soon as the Trade Bill is passed, the United States move:

(a) to make the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) — the one international instrument functionally committed to an all-European economic integration—a more significant forum for the development of East-West trade policy. Most of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe are members of ECE. The exception is East Germany.

(b) to encourage GATT, of which Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia are Eastern members, to undertake a more prominent role in sponsoring negotiations in East-West trade by the contracting parties.

27

V. INITIATIVES FOR
A SETTLEMENT OF
THE GERMAN QUESTION

We have referred to the failure over 23 years to make any progress
in the resolution of the German question, despite efforts to lessen East-
West tension in Europe and elsewhere.

None of these efforts, however — in arms control, in improved
relationships in the United Nations, in bilateral negotiations between
the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, or even in the limited
progress made by East and West Germany in establishing trade and
other contacts and removing barriers — has led to any substantially new
approaches to the German problem or to the establishment of a lasting
security system in Central Europe.

The Germans remain deeply dissatisfied. Their concern for unity
has made no progress. Their desire for a more compassionate policy in
East Germany, which would make possible easy intercourse between
the German people on the two sides of the line, is still unrealized. Berlin
remains both a symbol of unresolved problems and a source of potential
danger. These are political issues to which German politicians will con-
tinue to address themselves and the leaders of other nations will be
forced to respond.

The Czech crisis revealed the depth of the continuing Soviet anxiety
over the unresolved question of Germany's future. It made clear the fact
that the Soviet Union intended to regulate any liberal evolution in the
Eastern socialist countries in Central Europe and to limit their bilateral

28

negotiations with West Germany. In internal liberalization and relations with the West, progress of the Communist countries will apparently be determined from now on by the speed of the slowest ships in the fleet — the Soviet Union and, perhaps, East Germany.

What then is the best way forward? Does it lie with the continuance of bilateral East-West negotiations, supplemented with the effort to find common ground in the larger multilateral agencies?

Useful and important as these approaches are, the Panel does not believe reliance can be placed on measures principally developed within these two contexts. The recent experience in Czechoslovakia underscores the need for new approaches to a resolution of the basic question of Germany's future. Neither the German people nor the international community can be expected simply to drift into some new pattern of stability and security in Central Europe. Nor should West Germany be left alone to find its own unilateral and bilateral way out of the German dilemma.

The Panel realizes that to end the division of Germany and Europe on conditions that assure the security of the European peoples undoubtedly will require a long period of reconciliation, involving wide and disciplined consultation in the West, extended negotiation with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, and slowly clarifying relationships between the peoples of the two parts of Germany.

**The Panel believes, however, a new approach must be made now to move toward a European settlement. An agreed framework for East-West negotiations on this issue is essential.**

The ultimate objective should be a border between East and West in Europe as peaceful as that now existing between such former adversaries as Germany and France. New security arrangements in Central Europe involving arms limitations and controls should form an integral part of the settlement and must enhance, not weaken, the stability of the military balance in the area. The new arrangements should also provide special machinery for crisis management.

It is almost a decade now since the Geneva Conference last assembled the Four Powers for an effort to devise the principles and framework for a German and European settlement. **The Panel recommends that the Nixon Administration, after consultation with our allies in NATO, propose a Four Power Summit, to be prepared by Foreign Ministers, to consider a new approach* along the following lines.**

*For comment by Marshall D. Shulman, and concurrence by Edwin Huddleson, Jr., see page 35.

29

A Proposal

The Four Powers should establish a European Security Commission* composed of West Germany, East Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Commission's function would be to prepare the general principles of a European settlement and propose to the Council of Foreign Ministers, acting on behalf of the governments of the Four Powers, initial steps in implementation. The Commission would also create machinery for crisis management and negotiate, for the approval of the Four Powers, the military posture and arms control safeguards of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in a region wider than but including Czechoslovakia, Poland and the two parts of Germany.

In addition the Panel recommends that the Council of Foreign Ministers propose to West and East Germany negotiations between themselves for a step-by-step program which would have as its goal the eventual reunification of Germany. In return for Western acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier of Germany, the East would accept the division of Germany as provisional. The German negotiations would be monitored by the Council of Foreign Ministers on behalf of the Four Powers and in accord with their basic responsibility. They would also, of course, be followed closely by the European Security Commission proposed above.

The exact form of the relationship that would evolve between the people of Eastern and Western Germany could only be determined as a result of long and persistent negotiations in a context of deepening contacts of all kinds. The political framework that emerged indeed might not resemble any of the political formulations of the past. The arrangements might provide for certain non-indigenous forces ultimately to be stationed in Central Europe in substitution for some or all of the nuclear and conventional Warsaw Pact and NATO forces now positioned in the heart of Europe.

The reductions in the military strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces — to be negotiated in the European Security Commission for the approval of the Four Powers and the other governments involved — would be governed by the following principles:

(a) No increases in troop strength above present level would be made without advance notice and consultation.

(b) A 10% reduction in troop strength, including both air and ground units, and proportional in both zones for all national contingents stationed there, would begin one year after agreement is reached.

(c) During this 12-month period, a system of mutual inspection by observer teams on both sides — with authority to observe all man-

*For comment by John J. McCloy, see page 35.

30

euvers and other large troop movements — would be established either on an adversary or four-men-in-a-jeep basis.

(d) Overlapping radar screens would be a part of this inspection system, the objective of which would be to assure a situation of confidence and detente by providing both sides with the knowledge that massive surprise ground or air attack is impossible.

(e) Subsequent cutbacks across the board would follow at intervals to be determined.

(f) When the 10% reduction, as provided in (b) above, begins, the Commission should undertake negotiations for cutbacks in nuclear warheads stockpiled in the zone.

The European Security Commission would report to the Four Powers.

The Western members would, of course, consult fully with their allies in the North Atlantic Council and a system of regular reports to the United Nations should be established. The Commission might assume a relationship to the United Nations similar to that of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. This would facilitate relationships with the ENDC and at the same time permit opportunities for the emerging security pattern for Central Europe to be considered in the broader context of general arms reduction and control.

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VI. THE UNITED STATES,
THE SOVIET UNION
AND EUROPE

The Soviet response to liberalization in Czechoslovakia has made it
likely that Europe will be divided more sharply in the next five years than
in the last five. The dream of a truly united Europe, East and West, is not
to be realized in any time-frame that can now be envisaged.

But neither, the Panel believes, is the Cold War, as that term came
to be understood in the 1950s, likely to return.

Europe, East and West, as we have pointed out, is astir with new
challenges to irrelevant dogma, with a new appreciation of the need for
economic and industrial pragmatism, and with a new recognition of
common problems of urbanization, environmental preservation and
resource control. All industrialized areas, including those in the Soviet
Union itself, are not immune from these challenges, or from the conse-
quences of diverting untold resources to competition in arms.

The USSR has underscored its concept of Eastern European security
with the use of its army and that of four of its Warsaw Pact allies in
Czechoslovakia. The Western response has been a new sense of purpose
and unity in NATO. The Panel has suggested certain measures which it
believes would strengthen the Western alliance.

But the Panel does not believe that the long-run future in Europe
lies in U.S. and Soviet political and nuclear hegemonies. It has suggested
a strengthening of Western European institutions and the development
of a European caucus in NATO. It believes that changes in Eastern
Europe ultimately will convince the Soviet Union that it cannot continue

32

to respond with the use of military force to these tensions and dilemmas — many of which are exacerbated by the unresolved question of the future of Germany.

It would not be surprising if the foreign policy planners in Moscow, faced with the dissension which has accompanied their recent representative response in Czechoslovakia, should conclude that the time has come for a new effort to resolve that set of questions which if unresolved, could again plunge Europe into a major conflict.

But whether or not these considerations are exercising the Kremlin, the Panel believes that the time has come for a new initiative by the West. We have suggested a course of action and several new measures which we believe could bring both the East and West into a new and effective effort to establish security in Central Europe.

33

# MEMORANDA OF COMMENT, RESERVATION AND DISSENT

## Reservations by Mr. James N. Hyde

First Reservation: I have serious doubts about the proposal advanced by the Panel for an International Urban Institute. While I realize that in certain areas it is sometimes desirable to concentrate specialized talent in one institution, I believe the problems of urbanization in the various industrialized countries can best be approached through several centers of research and training. I do not believe the total effort at this time would be enhanced by attempting to assemble the most experienced talent in one location.

Second Reservation: I have somewhat similar doubts about the proposal for an International Foundation for Education. A great deal of progress has been made over the past few years in developing freer exchange of students and faculty within the North Atlantic area. I do not believe that the process would be accelerated by the creation of a new foundation directed to the development and support of new measures in this field.

## Comment by Mr. Richard N. Gardner

While I strongly endorse the proposal for closer cooperation with our Atlantic partners in technology as well as in economic affairs, I cannot accept the concept of an "Atlantic astronaut" and I regret that this section of the report does not call clearly for a global space effort under United Nations auspices. There are some things that the Atlantic nations should do alone; there are others that they should do through global institutions like the UN. Outer space falls into the latter category, since the Soviet Union is one of the two major space powers and all mankind has an interest in the great space adventure.

The attempt to land a man on the moon has been conducted as a competition between the two space powers, with large scale duplication of effort and expenditure. Joint ventures in the launching of astronauts have been considered impractical because the Soviet Union and the United States would not permit the other side to gain access to military information. But technology is opening up new possibilities in the post-lunar phase. Astronauts launched separately by the two countries can meet in outer space and work on joint projects. We should carefully

34

explore the possibility of lunar or orbital laboratories jointly operated by the two countries in the name of the United Nations and for the benefit of all mankind. These laboratories could gather information about the solar system and the universe beyond; they could be used for weather forecasting, geodetic surveys, and other practical assistance to our own planet. Eventually we might develop a UN inspection service capable of patrolling borders and monitoring arms control agreements.

New forms of cooperation may also be possible in missions to Mars, Venus and other planets. Even if political and security considerations preclude joint projects and a complete integration of U.S. and Soviet space programs, there are opportunities for mutual support and a rational division of tasks. The proper forums for this kind of cooperative planning are global institutions like COSPAR and the UN Outer Space Committee — not Atlantic institutions.

**Comment by Mr. Marshall D. Shulman**

I find the suggested proposal interesting as illustrating one possible approach. I would be hesitant to advance it at this time as a definitive proposal. (Mr. Edwin Huddleson, Jr. would like to be associated with the Comment submitted by Mr. Shulman.)

**Comment by Mr. John J. McCloy**

I believe our course is clear. As we move into the next decade our priorities should be (1) building up the strength of the Western Alliance, (2) improving our relationships with the Soviet Union, without falling into the trap of wishful thinking about false detente, (3) negotiating honestly and frankly when a real detente is clearly visible and (4) moving rapidly to a lasting solution of the European and German problem.

With this in mind, while I do not object to the principle embodied in the European Security Commission that is proposed in this report, I do not feel that the time is now. I recognize that there is a need for a security arrangement in Europe, but, as I see it this will evolve from a process of adjustment and accommodation between the adversary blocs. Essential to that process is the need for the U.S., Europe particularly, and the USSR to determine what kind of a Europe they want and can live with. This is why it is important that the cohesion of the West be strengthened through energetic exploration of common policies. Certainly the proposed Security Commission should be fully discussed with our Alliance partners as a possible step down what may be a long and difficult road.

35

[L.C]

UNA-USA

United Nations Association
of the United States of America

The United Nations Association of the United States of America seeks, through information, education and research, to strengthen our country's capacity for advancing peace, freedom and justice in the world through the development of the United Nations and other international organizations.

It is independent, private, non-partisan.

Its research activities are objective efforts to define the programs and policies most likely to advance this country's enlightened national interest in the operation and growth of effective international organizations.

Its information and education materials seek to be a selection of the best that is available from other organizations, foundations, research institutions, universities, government, and commercial publishers. UNA's own publications are designed to fill remaining needs.

It functions through local chapters in some 200 communities; a Council of Organizations composed of more than a hundred national civic, service, business, labor, religious, fraternal, educational and professional associations; a student-directed collegiate affiliate, the Council on International Relations and UN Affairs (CIRUNA) active on more than 550 campuses; and through more than a thousand National UN Day Committees.

UNA-USA is supported entirely by contributions from individuals, foundations, business, industry, and labor organizations; by dues from its members, and by income from its publications and conferences.

36

*JOSE de CUBAS
President, Westinghouse Electric
International Company

MRS. EDISON DICK
Former Member U.S. Delegation
to the United Nations

H.E. MOST REV. JOHN J. DOUGHERTY
Chairman, Bishop's Commission on
Justice and Peace

ROBERT W. DOWLING
President and Director
City Investing Company

*CLARK M. EICHELBERGER
Chairman, Commission to Study
the Organization of Peace

MRS. WAYNE ELWOOD
Palo Alto, California

LUTHER H. EVANS
Director, Law Library
Columbia University

GUSTAV S. EYSSELL
President, Rockefeller Center, Inc.

MRS. MARSHALL FIELD
New York, N.Y.

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, JR.
Member, U.S. House of Representatives

RICHARD N. GARDNER
Prof. of Law and International Relations
Columbia University

MRS. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG
New York, N.Y.

JACOB A. GOLDFARB
Chairman, Union Underwear Company

FRANK P. GRAHAM
United Nations Representative for India
and Pakistan

*ERNEST A. GROSS
Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost,
Colt & Mosle

*WALTER E. HANSON
Senior Partner, Peat Marwick,
Mitchell & Company

PATRICIA R. HARRIS
Professor of Law, Howard University

FRED L. HARTLEY
President, Union Oil Company of California

LEO M. HARVEY
Chairman, Harvey Aluminum Company

HAROLD H. HEATH
President, Heath Tecna Corp.

BOBBY L. HILL
Cooperating Counsel NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Savannah, Georgia

MRS. ANNA ROSENBERG HOFFMAN
President, Anna Rosenberg Associates

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
Former Chairman, Department of
Government, Harvard University

MARSHA HUNT (PRESNELL)
San Fernando, Calif.

MRS. ESTHER W. HYMER
American Baptist Convention

*JOHN INMAN
Vice President, Council on Religion
and International Affairs

PAUL JENNINGS
President, International Union of Electrical
Radio & Machine Workers

*JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
President, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

VERNON E. JORDAN, JR.
Director, Voter Education Project,
Southern Regional Council

*KENNETH B. KEATING
Judge, New York State Court of Appeals

JOSEPH D. KEENAN
International Secretary
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers

*PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK
Senior Partner
Klutznick Enterprises

HARRY W. KNIGHT
Chairman, Executive Committee
Knight & Gladieux

ARTHUR B. KRIM
President
United Artists Corporation

*ARTHUR LARSON
Director, Rule of Law Research Center
Duke University

RABBI ARTHUR J. LELYVELD
President
American Jewish Congress

JOSEPH J. LEVIN
Chicago, Illinois

*MRS. GEORGE A. LITTLE
Chairman
UNA Communication Center

GEORGE C. LODGE
Harvard University

JOHN L. LOEB
Partner, Loeb, Rhodes & Co.

ISADOR LUBIN
Twentieth Century Fund

CHARLES MACKINTOSH
Mackintosh & Mackintosh
Los Angeles, California

KENNETH L. MAXWELL
Princeton University

JAMES S. McDONNELL
Chairman of the Board
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation

MRS. EDWARD W. McVITTY
United World Federalists Representative
at the United Nations

CARL J. MEGEL
American Federation of Teachers

*CHARLES G. MORTIMER
Chairman, Executive Committee
General Foods Corporation

FORREST D. MURDEN, JR.
Murden and Company

*ROBERT D. MURPHY
Chairman of the Board
Corning Glass International

*WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN
President
African American Institute

*EARL D. OSBORN
President
Institute for International Order

RICHARD L. OTTINGER
Member, U.S. House of Representatives

LESLIE PAFFRATH
President
The Johnson Foundation

GREGORY PECK
President
Academy of Motion Picture Arts
and Sciences

HOWARD C. PETERSEN
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company

PETER G. PETERSON
Chairman of the Board
Bell & Howell Company

CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS
President
U.S. Council, International
Chamber of Commerce

*MRS. HARVEY PICKER
Interchange Foundation

*FRANCIS T. P. PLIMPTON
Partner, Debevoise, Plimpton
Lyons & Gates

*MRS. RALPH POMERANCE
Cos Cob, Connecticut

*FRANK POST
President
Council on International Relations
& UN Affairs

WILLIAM S. RENCHARD
Chairman of the Board
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company

*WALTER P. REUTHER
President, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers
of America

MRS. LOUIS J. ROBBINS
President
National Council of Women of USA

*NICHOLAS ROBINSON
Columbia University Law School

ROBERT V. ROOSA
Brown Brothers Harriman & Company

CURTIS ROOSEVELT
Chief, NGO Section, United Nations

*BURNS W. ROPER
President and Chairman of the Board
Roper Research Associates

DAVID L. ROSENBLOOM
United States Youth Council

*WILLIAM RUDER
President, Ruder and Finn

BAYARD RUSTIN
Executive Director
J. Philip Randolph Institute

IRVING SALOMON
Former Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations

EDITH SAMPSON
Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County

CATHERINE SCHAEFER
U.S. Catholic Conference

*DONALD A. SCHMECHEL
Partner, Wright, Innis, Simon & Todd
Seattle

MRS. HARRY SCHOENFELD
New York, N.Y.

*MRS. JAMES SCHRAMM
Burlington, Iowa

JOHN W. SCOTT
National Secretary
National Grange

MANUEL SELIGMAN
Attorney
Beverly Hills, Calif.

JOE BYRN SILLS
LIN Broadcasting Corp, Nashville

*THEODORE C. SORENSEN
Partner, Paul, Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison

EMILE E. SOUBRY
Former Executive Vice President
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.)

ALONZO T. STEPHENS
Tennessee A. & I. University
President, Nashville UNA Chapter

MRS. ROBERT J. STUART
Past President
League of Women Voters

*OBERT C. TANNER
President
O. C. Tanner Co.
Salt Lake City, Utah

MRS. MARIETTA TREE
Former Member U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations

H. S. TURNER
President
Turner Construction Company

WILLIAM WEXLER
President
B'nai B'rith

WALTER H. WHEELER, JR.
Chairman of the Board
Pitney-Bowes, Inc.

URBAN G. WHITAKER
San Francisco State College

LAWRENCE A. WIEN
Partner, Wien, Lane and Klein

FRANCIS O. WILCOX
Dean, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University

*SIDNEY H. WILLNER
Vice President and Counsel
Hilton Hotels International

*JOSEPH C. WILSON
Chairman of the Board
Xerox Corporation

*EDWARD B. WINN
Attorney, Dallas, Texas

*WHITNEY M. YOUNG, JR.
Executive Director
National Urban League

*Members of the Executive Committee

February 12, 1969

Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, M.d.B.
Berliner Allee 33
Duesseldorf
Germany

Dear Kurt:

Thank you for your letter of February 3rd with attachment.
We know from experience how difficult it is to get the signatures
of leading legislators of the NATO countries to an Atlantic
Declaration - especially when the time is limited.

The U.S. signers of our *Declaration* are convinced that in our
fellow signer, Richard Nixon, we have at last a President who shares
our view as to the vital importance and the needs of the Atlantic
Community. We believe that his visit later this month to NATO
headquarters and to our principal European allies is most timely
and can be of the greatest value to us all.

I enclose a copy of a letter I wrote Henry Kissinger yesterday.
He is the President's advisor for national security affairs who,
together with Secretary of State Rogers, will accompany the President
to Europe. Like the President, he is a signer of the *Declaration of
Atlantic Unity*.

In order that you may gauge the trend of Dr. Kissinger's
thinking I also enclose some excerpts from his most recent book.

We very much hope that you will convey to the President and to
his advisors your own suggestions on how best to strengthen the
Atlantic Community, and also that you will help to persuade the
German Government to participate actively in this great enterprise.

With all best wishes, I am,

Encs.

Enc.,

Director
Wjden Moore

Braunfels' Home,

With all best wishes, I am,

German Government to participate actively in this great enterprise.
Atlantic Community, and also that you will help to because the
State advisors whom our suggestions on how best to structure the
We very much hope that you will consent to the President and to
franking I also enclose some excursions from the most recent peak.

In order that you may gauge the trend of Dr. Kiehlner's
Atlantic Unity.

## Atlantic Unity.

To Europe. Like the President, he is a signer of the Declaration of
Together with Secretary of State Roberts, will accompany the President
He is the President's advisor for national security affairs who,
I enclose a copy of a letter I wrote Henry Kiehlner yesterday.

and can do of the greatest service to us all.
Headquarters and to our principal European allies is most timely
Community. We believe that the vital interest of this month to NATO
omnium est to the vital importance and the needs of the Atlantic
to fellow signers, Richard Nixon, we have at last a President who agrees
The U.S. signers of our Declaration are convinced that in our

Declaration - especially when the time is limited,
of leading statesmen of the NATO countries to an Atlantic
We know from experience how difficult it is to get the signatories
Thank you for your letter of February 3rd with attachment.

Dear Knauf:

Germany
Dresdendal
Berliner Allee 33
Dr. Knauf Birkenspeck, N.G.B.

February 13, 1969

MOUVEMENT POUR L'UNION ATLANTIQUE

39, B° COMMANDANT CHARCOT - NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE

Le 27 Janvier 1969

Mr. Walden Moore
156 East 52nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Cher Wally,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 17 Janvier. Je vous en remercie vivement, elle m'a beaucoup intéressée. Comme vous le savez peut-être, je préside maintenant le Groupe FRANCE-ETATS UNIS de l'Assemblée Nationale et ceci me permet d'être aussi actif que possible pour rétablir de meilleurs rapports entre nos deux pays. Je vous beaucoup vos diplomates à Paris, vos parlementaires lorsqu'ils sont de passage et, d'autre part, je suis en rapports étroits avec le Général de Gaulle et Michel Debré. Les rapports entre nos deux pays évoluent d'ailleurs vers le mieux.

Le probable entretien qui se déroulera entre nos deux Présidents, peut-être vers le Printemps, devrait encore les renforcer.

Pour les affairés atlantiques, il est évident que le comportement du Président Nixon sera déterminant. Va-t-il pouvoir, maintenant qu'il a la responsabilité, maintenir, en tant que Président, les positions qu'il avait prises en tant qu'homme privé ? Je ne pense pas que les Européens puissent beaucoup avant que cette position n'ait été précisée, et ceci est votre rôle.

Je vous donne bien volontiers mon accord pour que mon nom, en tant que sponsor, réapparaisse sur votre liste de la Déclaration d'Unité Atlantique.

Le voyage d'Odette Pétrequin aux Etats-Unis est sûrement une bonne chose. Elle se réjouit des contacts qu'elle va y retrouver.

Bien amicalement à vous,

Pierre Billotte

February 3, 1969

General Pierre Billotte
39 Boulevard du Commandant Charcot
Neuilly-sur-Seine
France

Dear Pierre:

Thank you for your letter of January 27th with the most
welcome news that you now lead the FRANCE - ETATS UNIS group
in the National Assembly. That is indeed a most important
assignment especially in this critical year.

As you doubtless know, our signer M. E.Giscard d'Estaing
(father of the political leader, and former Minister) has headed
this group outside of Parliament and I enclose a copy of a letter
received from him last October.

Of course you are quite right that much depends on whether
or not President Nixon now puts into practice the strong Atlantic
Community sentiments which he has expressed not only as a private
citizen but, before that, as Vice-President (for eight years) and
as Senator and Congressman.

I have no direct evidence on this matter since the November
elections but I am hopeful. We keep in touch with the Secretary
of State and with our signers who are close to the President
including Henry Kissinger, Governor Scranton and Ambassador Murphy.

In this connection I enclose a copy of a section of a report
on the last Board meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United
States on January 22nd which I made at the request of one of our
Sponsors who could not attend.

Shonoree who could not attend.

States on January 22nd which I made at the request of one of our
on the last Board meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United
States and with our agreement who are close to the President.

Including Henry Kiebler, Governor Scranton and Ambassador Mains.
In this connection I enclose a copy of a section of a report
I have no direct evidence on this matter since the November
I saw in the paper that I am Responsible. We keep in touch with the Secretary
elections put I am satisfied. We keep in touch with the Secretary
of State and with our大使 who are close to the President.

as Governor and Congressmen.

Citizens put, before that, as Vice-President (for eight years) and
Communists sentiments which he has expressed not only as a private
or not President Nixon now bases into practice the strong Atlantic
Of course you are quite right that much debate on whether
received from him last October.

this month outside of Parliament and I enclose a copy of a letter
(letter of the political leader, and former Minister) has been
As you doubtless know, our aligner M. E. Oakesdell q;Serving
assignment especially in this critical year.

in the National Assembly. That is indeed a most important
welcome news that you now feed the BRANCE - EIVAS UNIS d'ebd
Thank you for your letter of January 27th with the most
assurance

Dear Sirs:

Bruce
Hewlett-am-Isles
29 Boulevard du Commandant Charcot
General Pierre Siffolle

February 3, 1969

General Pierre Billotte

- 2 -

February 3, 1969

Just recently I had a letter from the Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the U.S., former Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant, which concluded as follows:

"I have the feeling this is going to be a truly good and encouraging year for Atlantic Unity, NATO and the ACUS. We must capitalize in every way on the favorable auguries."

We are all delighted that you can now again undertake the position of French Sponsor for the Declaration of Atlantic Unity and resume with us your most effective and imaginative work for Atlantic Unity.

I enclose, also, an endorsement of the Atlantic Union Resolution by the New York Bar Association.

With all best wishes, I am,

Encs.

Ecco.

Director
Walden Moore

Bathurst home.

With all best wishes, I am,

Recommend by the New York Bar Association.

I enclose, via, an endorsement of the Atlantic Union

Atlantic Union.

and resume with me how most effective and imaginative work for
position of French Sponsor for the Declaration of Atlantic Union
We are all delighted that you can now again undertake the

work on the favorable studies.

NATO and the UN. We must capitalize in every
word and encouraging hear for Atlantic Union.

I have the feeling this is going to be a truly
enjoyable trip.

Finnlandon Merchant, which concluded as follows:
Atlantic Council of the U.S., former Under Secretary of State
Just recently I had a letter from the Chairman of the

Geneva Pierre Billette

February 3, 1968

INSTITUT DE FRANCE

101 avenue Henri Martin
Paris (XVIe).

ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES MORALES
ET POLITIQUES

Paris, le 3 Octobre 1968.

Cher Monsieur Walden Moore,

Je m'excuse infiniment de répondre si tard
à votre lettre du 9 août contenant votre échange de
correspondance avec Monsieur Maddan. Mais vous
annonciez que vous enverriez une lettre aux 326
"signers" avant le 20 janvier, et je me demandais si
je n'aurais pas l'occasion de répondre à la fois à
vos deux communications.

Mais je tiens à vous dire tout de suite
combien je suis d'accord avec vous pour écarter toutes
les déclarations catégoriques concernant l'abandon
de l'idée européenne, la séparation définitive entre les
Six et la Grande Bretagne, et le brisement du Monde
Atlantique.

Vous avez surtout tout à fait raison de pro-
tester contre le fait que les élections françaises auraient
marqué le renforcement de la volonté d'écarter la
Grande Bretagne. Les élections, en France, ont été domi-
nées par l'indignation devant les troubles scandaleux
qui ont agité le monde de l'Université, et rapidement
aussi le monde économique. Cela explique des résultats
que six mois auparavant personne ne croyait vraisem-
blables. Dire en tout cas que le peuple de France a

Monsieur WALDEN MOORE
Director of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity ...
156 East 52nd Street
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

2

manifesté son approbation à une politique de
détachement vis-à-vis de la Grande Bretagne et
des Etats-Unis serait la plus grossière des erreurs.
Je peux vous dire au contraire par expérience qu'au
cours de la campagne électorale, chaque fois
qu'était prononcé le nom de nos amis et alliés
américains ou anglais, presque partout les applau-
dissements crépitaient.

Les événements de Tchécoslovaquie n'ont
fait que renforcer dans toutes les couches de la
population française le sentiment de notre solidarité
avec le monde anglo-saxon et la nécessité vitale
pour nous tous, non pas seulement de ne pas quitter
l'Alliance Atlantique, mais au contraire de la ren-
forcer. Nous déplorons certes tant de positions
ou de déclarations officielles qui ne sont pas con-
formes avec ce sentiment profond de la nation, mais
cela ne nous empêche pas de le sentir et de pouvoir
vous répéter que la conscience de notre solidarité
Atlantique est aussi vive, sinon plus vive que jamais.

Croyez, je vous prie, cher Monsieur
Walden Moore, à mes meilleurs et très sympathi-
ques sentiments.

Ed. GISCARD d'ESTAING

ROUTING SLIP

MEMORANDUM TO: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

The attached correspondence directed to Henry Kissinger
is being referred to you for:

Reply for HAK signature

Reply for your signature

Recommendation to HAK

No action, for your information

It would be appreciated if you could reply within three days.

Retain file

Return file with response

JAN 18 1969

DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY

156 EAST 52nd STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 • PLAZA 8-0215

UNITED STATES SPONSORS: William H. Draper, Jr., Thomas K. Finletter, Lithgow Osborne, Adolph W. Schmidt, Hans Christian Sonne

DIRECTOR: Walden Moore ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR: Livingston Hartley

January 15, 1969

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Office of the President-Elect Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your letter of January 7th.

We, of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity, hope to find out
how we can be most helpful in furthering the Atlantic policy
goals of the Nixon Administration which, we are convinced, are
substantially the same as our own.

As the President's advisor on foreign affairs and as a
signer of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity, we shall rely on
you for suggestions as to how we can best do this in all NATO
countries - especially this one.

My Associate Director, Livingston Hartley, and I hope to
have an opportunity to discuss this with you confidentially
sometime between January 20th and the next meeting of our
American Sponsors at the end of February.

With all best wishes, I am,

SIGNERS OF THE SECOND DECLARATION LISTED ON REVERSE SIDE

5151

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

No further action required.

H. Sonnenfeldt

April 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to you from Walden Moore
dated March 21

With reference to the request of Mr. Moose
of March 31, I enclose a copy of Assistant
Secretary Hillenbrand's reply on your behalf
to Mr. Moore's letter. The Secretary received
an identical letter from Mr. Moore bearing the
same date. Also enclosed is a copy of
Mr. Moore's correspondence with you.

John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosures

As stated.

156 East 52nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY

Program for 1969

(Agreed to by U.S. Sponsors - February 26, 1969)

1. Continue our role as a Committee of Correspondence with our signers and other leaders in the NATO countries.

2. Support efforts by President Nixon to strengthen and unify NATO.

3. Encourage and support initiatives aimed at the development of a true Atlantic Community and the full participation of all NATO allies therein.

4. Urge early and continuing consultation within the North Atlantic Council in advance of decisions on all important matters of common or individual concern wherever they may arise and, whenever possible, collective action by most, or all, NATO allies.

5. Urge long-term NATO military and financial arrangements to insure adequate European and North American force levels and defense capabilities in Europe.

6. Urge the raising of Ambassadors to NATO to Cabinet status when at home.

7. Promote the continuing development of the North Atlantic Assembly including an official relationship to the North Atlantic Council.

8. Continue to support the implementation of the Harmel Report and urge that it be supplemented by more far-reaching measures, including the sharing of responsibility and decision making among all NATO members.

9. Support a new round of negotiations on non-tariff barriers to trade.

Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, M.d.B.

- 2 -

January 28, 1970

The best way, I think, will be the method suggested in the last two
paragraphs of "The New York Times" editorial mentioned in my letter to
Mr. Merchant.

This is the only reference I have seen in the press to the American-
German Conference in Bonn and, since Chris Emmet is still away, I hope you
can confirm this report and give us more details. We would also welcome
your advice on how we can help to implement this project - both in this
country and in Germany.

When you next come to this country I hope that we can have a good talk.
Meanwhile, I look forward to lunching at the Council on Foreign Relations on
February 13th with your colleague on the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee
Walther Kiep.

With all best wishes, I am,

Encs.

# DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY

## Program for 1970

(Agreed to by U.S. Sponsors - January 12, 1970)

2. Support efforts by President Nixon to strengthen and unify NATO, including his proposals to create special intergovernmental commissions on long-range problems.

6. Give NATO a "third dimension" by cooperative efforts to deal with environmental challenges.

8. Support increased sharing of responsibility and decision making among all NATO members.