VI. The Contingency of Legitimacy

Nothing was left then of the Vienna settlement
after the Crimean war save its physical outline and the moral
inhibitions of the generation which had procuded it. For the
memory of great events if often more pervasive than their
reality and the experience of foreign occupations lingers
long after their physical symptoms have disappeared. None
of the states which had known Napoleon's troops could see in
France anything but a threat to their liberty. And few who
remembered the extraordinary changes wrought by Napoleon's
occupation could banish the fear of another outbreak of rev-
olutionary fervor. It was not surprising that the mergerence of
a new Napoleon, a generation after his great predecessor,
should focus on France all suspicions, the fear of foreign
bondage on the part of the nationalists, the fear of domestic
upheaval on the part of the conservatives.

Yet the basic postulate of Bismarck's policy involved
precisely the proposition that France was a _possible_ ally for
Prussia and that the fear of a Franco-Prussian alliance was a
more certain method for increasing Prussia's power than Austrian
good-will. It was a daring assertion that the state which in
1806 had nearly shared the fate of Poland should use its erst-
while conqueror to bring pressure on its confederates; that
Frederick William, the King of Prussia by the grace of God,
should extend a fraternal hand to the usurper who ruled by the
will of the people. In this manner the conflict between

will of the people. In this manner the conflict between
should extend a truce until hand to the number who ruled by the
Frederick William, the King of Prussia by the Grace of God,
while conductor to bring peace on its confederates; that
1800 had nearly ended the date of Poland should see its era-
good-will. It was a daring assertion that the state which in
more certain method for increasing Prussia's power than Austria
Prussia and that the fear of a Franco-Prussian alliance was a
precisely the proposition that France was a possible ally for

Yet the basic proposition of Bismarck's policy involved
unhesitating on the part of the conservatives.

Pondede on the part of the nationals, the fear of domestic
should come on France all الانبلدان, the fear of foreign
a new Napoleon, a Generation after his Great predecessor,
its own, and put a threat to their liberty. And few who
of the states which had known Napoleon's troops could see in
long after their physical symptoms have disappeared. None
reality and the experience of foreign occupations flukes
memory of great events it often more pernicious than their
institutions of the Generation which had brought it. For the
after the Crimean war saw its physical outline and the moral
moral

VI. The Continuation of Legitimacy

- 2 -

Bismarck and the conservatives became a contest over the interpretation of Prussia's history. Bismarck ascribed the defeat in 1806 to lack of conception; the conservatives to lack of principle. Bismarck preached the invulnerability of Prussia's domestic structure to foreign influence; the conservatives insisted on the symbolic danger of any domestic upheaval anywhere. Bismarck asserted that power supplied its own legitimacy; the conservatives that legitimacy represented an independent force. Bismarck believed that a correct evaluation of the attributes of power would yield a doctrine of self-limitation; the conservatives that force could be restrained only by a superior principle.

The inextricable element of the debate between the conservatives and Bismarck therefore resided less in their goals than in the perspective from which they viewed them. Bismarck's was the point of view of an observer standing outside of the events, careful in assessing their qualities, rigorous in drawing conclusions, pitiless in applying them. The conservative position on the other hand involved the conviction almost instinctive and therefore clumsily stated, that the maxims of analysis do not necessarily supply imperatives of conduct. For the strength of analysis is the irrelevance of the personal attitude to the subject of analysis; but the impetus of action involves a personal commitment. To analysis man is a force among many, a means to be manipulated. To his intuition he represents an end. It is the

Inated. To his intuition he represents an end. It is the
To analyse man in a force among many, a means to be manu-
eral; but the import of action involves a personal commitment.
Infrarelevance of the personal attitude to the subject of anly-
besetives of conduct. For the strength of analysis is the
that the maxima of analysis do not necessarily imply im-
conviction almost inoperative and therefore finemally stated.
The conservative position on the other hand involved the
rigorous in drawing conclusions, bitless in applying them.
Outside of the events, careful in succeeding their difficulties.
Biamarck's was the point of view of an observer standing
beside him in the respective from which they viewed them.
Conservatives and Biamarck therefore resulted less in their.
The inextricable element of the debate between the
could be restrained only by a stronger brinckbte.
A doctrine of self-limitation; the conservatives that force
a correct evaluation of the attributes of power would help
rerepresented an independent force. Biamarck believed that
blessed its own legitimacy; the conservatives that legitimacy
the above and elsewhere. Biamarck asserted that power sub-
conservatives inflated on the ampelotic danger of any domes-
cal Bruna's a domestic structure to too great influence; the
to lack of brinckbte. Biamarckbreached the invulnerability
the defeat in 1800 to lack of conception; the conservatives
interpretation of Bruna's history. Biamarck signed
Biamarck and the conservatives become a contest over the

- 5 -

(M)

- 3 -

paradox of analysis that it may erode the convictions which animate conduct, that increased understanding may only lead to a paralysis of will. It is the paradox of action that it is unable to relate man to the forces outside himself whose makings he sees but whose motives he can grasp only by analogy. Conservatives have always insisted that the balance between these two aspects of human conduct is derived from a sense of reverence, based on recognition which is the reverse side of the limitations of the individual apprehension of reality. The great rebels have insisted on finding in their own domoniac nature a sufficient motive for commitment. To the conservative the bond of society is a myth which reconciles the point of view which treats man as a means and his experience of himself by an analogy superior to analytical truth; to the rebel a myth is the tool of weaklings.

This conflict found its expression in an exchange of letters of elemental symbolism between Bismarck and his old mentor, Leopold von Gerlach, the military adjutant of the King. It was symbolic not only because of the contents of the letters but because of the personalities of the protagonists. Leopold von Gerlach had grown up during the Wars of the French Revolution and both the excesses within France and Napoleon's occupation of Prussia had left an indelible mark on him. But Bismarck was born in the year of Napoleon's banishment to St. Helena; to him Napoleon and the French Revolution were regrettable incidents, personally distasteful, but not experiences transcending sober calculation. Gerlach

put not experiences transgressing proper calculation. Gerhard
 opinion were regrettable incidents, personally characteristic,
punishment to St. Helenst to him Napoleon and the French Rev-
mark on him. But Bismarck was born in the year of Napoleon's
and Napoleon's combustion of gunboats had left an indelible
of the French Revolution and both the excesses within France
together. Rechbold von Gerlauch had Brown nb during the Wara
of the letters put because of the personnel of the bro-
the King. It was amphipole not only because of the contents
old mentor, Rechbold von Gerlauch, the military adjutant of
of letters of elemental amphipole between Bismarck and his
This conflict found its expression in an exchange
truth to the repel a myth is the tool of meekings.
experience of himself by an analogy superior to analytical
efforts the point of view which treats man as a means and his
the conservative bond of society in a myth which recon-
own homogeneous nature a sufficient motive for commitment. To
reality. The great repels have insinuated on funding in their
side of the limitations of the individual apprehension of
sense of reverence based on recognition which is the reverse
between the two aspects of human conduct is derived from a
oy. Conservatives have always insinuated that the balance
mankings he sees put whose motives he can flush only by sus-
ceptible to relate man to the forces outside himself, whose
to a barylate of will. It is the paradox of action that it
animate conduct, that increased understanding may only lead
barbox or analysis that it may erode the convictions which

- 3 -

(H)

- 4 -

was a man of limited horizon, honorable, devout, earnest,
Bismarck an individual of powerful conception and impetuous
daring throughout their exchange Gerlach appears stodgy and
intellectually at a distinct disadvantage and yet this very
unimaginativeness lends its pathos to their correspondence.
For it is not the function of the conservative to persuade,
but to symbolize; he does not preach values, but represents
them. The conservative defines himself as much by what he
cannot conceive as by what he asserts; indeed what he as-
serts is often but a form of short-hand and misleading if
taken literally. By contrast, in his effort to bring about
a new sense of allegiance or a different valuation of real-
ity, the revolutionary depends less on what he _is_ than what
he _says_. It is enough if the conservative lives his values;
the revolutionary must assert them. Gerlach stood for a
social class which defined itself by the self-evidence of its
function; Bismarck for a political unit whose historic mis-
sion transcended the claims of its components. And their
exchange takes on not only a symbolic but a tragic quality,
because Bismarck owed everything to Gerlach, his first ap-
pointment, his access to the court, and the extent of Gerlach's
misunderstanding is also the measure of Bismarck's demoniac
quality.

It was only natural that the exchange between Ger-
lach and Bismarck should have its origin in the Prachtbericht

Isaac and Biamarck should have its origins in the presidio period. It was only natural that the exchange between Germany and Biamarck took place in the presidio period.

Understanding is also the measure of Biamarck's demonize
pointment, via access to the court, and the extent of Gerich's
because Biamarck owed everything to Gerich, his first ab-
exchange takes on not only a symbolic but a tragic quality,
ation transcended the claims of its components. And their
tunction: Biamarck for a political unit whose historio might
social class which defined itself by the self-evidence of its
the revolutionary must assert them. Gerich stood for a
he says. It is enough if the conservative five his values;
ity, the revolutionary debends less on what he is thus must
a new sense of allegiance or a different valuation of rest-
taken literally. By contract, in his effort to bring about
sents is often put a form of short-hand and misleading it,
cannot conceive as by what he asserts; indeed what he as-
them. The conservative defines himself as much by what he
put to an ampelofine; he does not breach values, but represents
for it is not the function of the conservative to benumb
intuitiveness tend a bit too to their correspondance.
during throughout their exchange Gerich abeers a stock and
Biamarck an individual of powerful conception and indebted
was a man of limited horizon, honorable, devout, earnest,

It is enough if the conservative five his values;
he says. It is enough if the conservative five his values;
ity, the revolutionary debends less on what he is thus must
a new sense of allegiance or a different valuation of rest-
taken literally. By contract, in his effort to bring about
sents is often put a form of short-hand and misleading it,
cannot conceive as by what he asserts; indeed what he as-
them. The conservative defines himself as much by what he
put to an ampelofine; he does not breach values, but represents
for it is not the function of the conservative to benumb
intuitiveness tend a bit too to their correspondance.
during throughout their exchange Gerich abeers a stock and
Biamarck an individual of powerful conception and indebted
was a man of limited horizon, honorable, devout, earnest,

- 4 -

- 5 -

of April 26 with its implication that Prussia should develop
its option toward France. Bismarck sent this report to
Gerlach with a covering letter which placed the principle
of utility above that of legitimacy: "I cannot escape the
mathematical logic of the fact that present day Austria can-
not be our friend. As long as Austria does not agree to a
delimitation of spheres of influence in Germany, we must
anticipate a contest with it, by means of diplomacy and lies
in peace time with the utilization of every opportunity to
give a coup de grace ... Austria will not be deterred by
similes of man and wife who stick together despite all do-
mestic quarrels...In our present extent, we are an impossi-
bility for the policy of Austria; its goals and our existence
are mutually exclusive."¹ But no evocation of horrible
eventualities could reconcile Gerlach to Bismarck's corol-
lary that Prussia's danger justified it in seeking support
across the Rhine. On the contrary Gerlach drew from it the
conclusion that it was Prussia's task to bring Austria and
Russia closer together thereby to restore the Holy Alliance
whose rift had given Napoleon the opportunity to end France's
isolation.²

The first exchange between Gerlach and Bismarck
ended inconclusively because the moment was not yet ripe to
draw a practical consequence from Bismarck's arguments. But
it was clear that Bismarck was merely biding his time and

1. L. G. p., 294, April 28, 1856.

2. F. B. II, p. 229f; 232.

S. B. B. II, b. 5561; S35.
I. R. G. b., 584, Abril 58, 1926.

it was clear that Biamarck was merely sitting idle time and
drew a theoretical consequence from Biamarck's arguments. But
engaged inconclusively because the moment was not yet ripe to
The first exchange between Gerhard and Biamarck
inflation.

whose right had Given Napoleon the opportunity to end France's
Russia closer together thereby to restore the Holy Alliance
conclusion that it was Prussia's task to bring Austria and
across the Rhine. On the contrary Gerhard drew from it the
lark that Prussia'sauer starker quantified it in seeking an end to
eventualities could reconcile Gerhard to Biamarck's coroll-
ary mutually exclusive."¹ But no evocation of horrible
plenty for the boffol of Austria; its Goslar and our existence
memic duurkels...In our present extent, we are an impossi-
blefien of man and wife who stick together deubite all do
Give a comb de Grace ... Austria will not be deterred by
in peace time with the utilization of every opportunity to
auticipate a contest with it, by means of diplomacy and life
definition of sphere of influence in Germany, we must
not be our friend. As long as Austria does not agree to a
mathematical logic of the fact that present day Austria can-
of utility spave that of fegitimsch: "I cannot enclose the
Gerhard with a covering letter which biased the brineblie
its option toward France. Biamarck sent this report to
of Abril 50 with its implication that Prussia should develop

- 2 -

(A)

- 6 -

the following spring found him in Paris, ostensibly to sound
out France about a solution of the Schleswig-Holstein quest-
ion, in reality to divine the character of the statesman who
most fascinated him among his contemporaries, Napoleon III.
For the Emperor of the French represented a living symbol
of the revolt against the treaties of 1815 which was also
the cardinal principle of Bismarck's policy. Bismarck ex-
plained his visit to the suspicious Manteuffel as necessary
for his education as a diplomat, although he hardly saw him-
self in a subordinate position when he made that remark.
He had no doubt that Napoleon with his reputation of
Machiavellian cleverness, held the key to Prussia's future.
And therefore he became to Bismarck a figure on the chess-
board of European diplomacy on the correct evaluation of whose
peculiarity might someday depend the success of his policy.

Bismarck's first reaction was ambiguous. "Napoleon's
intelligence is overestimated at the expense of his heart,"
he reported to his monarch. But whatever his view of Na-
poleon's abilities, he saw in him a means to being pressure
on Austria by demonstrating Prussia's superior maneuverability.
To this end he proposed to Gerlach that Napoleon be invited to
attend the maneuvers of a Prussia corps because "this proof of
good relations with France ... would increase our influence
in all diplomatic relations." Moreover, added Bismarck cyni-
cally, "nothing of a political nature need grow out of the
visit and we will be able to remain perfectly respectable."³

3. L. G. p. 313, April 11, 1857.

- 7 -

But the idea that a Napoleon might participate in Prussian maneuvers forced Gerlach into an outburst of incomprehension: "how can a man of your intelligence sacrifice his principles to such an individual as Napoleon -- Napoleon's our natural enemy."⁴ Had Gerlach seen Bismarck's cynical mar-ginalia to the last remark -- "What of it?" -- he might have saved himself another letter in which he repeated the prin-ciples which for over a generation had animated the Holy Al-liance: "My political principle is and remains the war against the revolution. Bonaparte is a revolutionary because his ab-solutism, just as that of the first Napoleon, is based on popular sovereignty and he understands this as well as his predecessor. Prussia's policy must be anti-revolutionary not only in principle but in practice so that at the proper time the vacillating powers such as perhaps Austria and Britain will know what to expect of it. For only he is re-liable who acts according to principle and not according to changing concepts of national interest."⁵

For all its obtuseness this was a letter not lack-ing in pathos. It is difficult to escape the power of the picture of Gerlach, at the end of his life, being forced into a theoretical defense by his protégé whose rapid career he had sponsored precisely because he had seen in him the best

4. J. B. II, p. 240.

5. G. E. I, p. 169.

2. G. R. I. b. 163.
3. 2. B. II. b. 540.

he had sponsored bracteates because he had seen in him the potential into a theoretical defense by his brother whose rapid career brought on Gerace, at the end of this life, being forced into battle. It is difficult to imagine the power of the force if its optimism this was a letter not lack-changing concepts of national interest."²

It is true who acts according to principle and not according to Britain will know what to expect of it. For only he is responsible for the accelerating powers and as perhaps Vintria and not only in principle but in practice so that at the broker level, the bracteates must be anti-revolutionary, both as sovereign and he understands this as well as his acolytes, that as that of the first Napoleon, is based on the revolution. Bonaparte is a revolutionarily because she applies: "My bracteate principle is and remains the war against principles which for over a generation had animated the Holy War - saved first, another letter in which he rebasted the bracteates to the last remark - "What of it?" - he might have our natural enemy."³ Had Gerace seen Bonaparte's classical mar-MADE IN NORDIC countries to such an individual as Napoleon -- Napoleon's combination: "How can a man of your intelligence ascribe to him ideas that a Napoleon might bracteate in

But in ideas that a Napoleon might bracteate in

- 1 -

- 8 -

advocate of the very doctrines now at issue. Whenever faith
encounters skepticism the result can only be exasperation.
For the power of faith lies in the act of commitment, the
necessity of which as a guide for conduct scepticism denies.
Gerlach was therefore more at home in a contest with the rev-
olution where the consciousness of defending absolute values
endowed the contenders with an aura of righteousness than in
a dispute with a cynic who asserted the relativity of all
beliefs. Nor was the dispute deprived of frustration be-
cause Bismarck with his marvelous diplomatic skill immediately
transferred it to a plane on which Gerlach was not only in-
tellectually but morally at a distinct disadvantage. Bismarck
began by denying that his proposal was motivated by a per-
sonal weakness for Napoleon: "The man does not impress me
at all. The ability to admire men is in any case only mod-
erately developed in me and it is a fault of my eye that it
is more receptive to the weakness of others than to their
strengths." But this appraisal of the condition for Bis-
marck's cold-blooded manipulation was only preliminary to
confronting Gerlach with an unanswerable argument: that his
insistence on the unity of conservative interests was in-
compatible with Prussian patriotism, that the interest of
states were more determinate than abstract principles of ob-
ligations and that for this reason Gerlach's policy, not that
of Bismarck, was arbitrary: "As for the principle I am alleged
to have sacrificed, if you mean a principle applicable to France

to have ascertained, if you mean a definite abstinence to France
of Bismarck, was arbitrary: "As for the principle I am satisfied
if nations and that for this reason Germany, a benefit, not that
states were more determined than abstract principles of op-
compatible with German patriotism, that the interest of
independence on the unity of conservative interests was in-
contrasting Germany with an unnumberable argument: that his
mark's a cold-blooded manipulation was only preliminary to
attracting a crowd." But this abstinence of the condition for Bi-
fa more receptive to the weakness of others than to their
erately benefitted in me and it is a fault of my eye that it
at all. The ability to inspire men is in any case only mod-
eral weakness for Napoleon: "The man does not imitate me
because he dotes on that in broadest was motivated by a ber-
technically put morally at a distinct disadvantage. Bismarck
tantered it to a degree which Germany was not only in-
cause Bismarck with his marvellous diplomatic skill immediately
perpetuated. Nor was the dispute deprived of transmission pe-
a dispute with a enemy who asserted the relativity of all
endowed the contenders with an idea of righteousness than in
opposition where the consciousness of defending specific aims
Germany was therefore more at home in a contest with the rev-
necessity of which as a guide for combatant abstinence generates.
For the power of faith lies in the act of commitment, the
encounters abstinence the result can only be exasperation,
adocate of the very doctrine now at issue. Whenever faith

- 8 -

-9-

and its legitimacy, then I admit that I subordinate this
completely to my specifically Prussian patriotism. France
interests me only in so far as it affects the situation of
my country and we can make policy only with the France which
exists ... A legitimate monarch like Louis XIV was as hostile
an element as Napoleon I and if the present Napoleon should
conceive the idea to abdicate ... he wouldnot do us a favor
and Henry V, [the Bourbon pretender] would not be his suc-
cessor ... As a romantic I can shed a tear for the fate of
Henry V; as a diplomat I would be his servant if I were
French, but as things stand, France, irrespective of the
accident of who leads it, is for me a pawn, and an unavoid-
able one, on the chess-board of diplomacy, a game in which
I have no other duty than to serve my king and my country
[Bismarck's italics]. I cannot reconcile personal sympa-
thies and antipathies toward foreign powers with my sense
of duty in foreign affairs; indeed I see in them the embryo
of disloyalty toward the Sovereign and the country I serve.
If one attempts to adjust diplomatic relations ... to such
feelings, then policy ceases and personal arbitrariness
reigns supreme. Not even the King has the right to sub-
ordinate the interests of the state to his personal sympa-
this or antipathies."⁵

What could a patriotic Prussian reply to an as-
sertion that the principle of legitimacy was inconsistent with

5. L. G., p. 316f, May 2, 1857.

- 10 -

that of Prussian patriotism? It was a diabolical formula-
tion in a state with Prussia's ethos of duty that the dis-
pute between Bismarck and Gerlach involved a question of
loyalty to the Sovereign. And lest Gerlach seek refuge in
asserting the identity of the claims of legitimacy and of
national interest, Bismarck anticipated his argument: "Or
perhaps you find the principle I violated in the fact that
Prussia must always be an enemy of France ... I could deny
this, — but even assuming you are right I would still
not consider it politically wise to let other states know
of our fears in peace time. Until the break you predict
occurs I would think it useful to encourage the belief that
a war between us and France *is* not imminent ... that the ten-
sion with France is not an organic fault of our nature on
which everyone can count with certainty... A sentimental
policy knows no reciprocity; it is an exclusively Prussian
peculiarity; every other government seeks the criteria for
its actions solely in its interests, however it may cloak
them with legal deductions."

But in a world in which morality was a euphemism
for self-interest, where could safety be found? How could
Prussia, the weakest major power with the most difficult
frontiers, survive? "When I speak of diplomatic relations,"
Bismarck replied, "I do not mean military alliances because
the peace is not yet threatened; rather I mean all the nuances

the peace is not yet threatened; rather, I mean all the nuances
Biamarck rephrased, "I do not mean military alliances because
frontiers, annuities." When I speak of diplomatic relations,"
Brussel's, the weakest major power with the most difficult
tor self-interest, where could safety be found? How could
them with legal definitions."

its actions solely in its interests, however, it may close
heaviness; every other Government sees the criteria for
decency known no receiptibility; it is an exclusively Brussel's
which everyone can count with certainty... A sentimental
union with France is not an organic unit of our nature on
a war between us and France is not imminent ... that the ten-
once I would think it necessary to encourage the policy that
of our lexicon in peace time. Until theusk you predict
not consider it politically wise to let other states know
cuts, ... put even reasoning you are right I would still
Brussel's must always be an enemy of France ... I could deny
brutal you find the bridle I violated in the last that
national interest, Biamarck stipulated his argument: "Or
asserting the identity of the claims of Legitimacy and of
right to the Sovereign. And let Gerzon seek refuge in
bute between Biamarck and Gerzon involved a question of
tion in a state with Brussel's ethics of duty that the dis-
conflict of Brusselan belligerent? It was a geopolitical formula-

- 10 -

- 11 -

of possibility, probability and intention to conclude an
alliance in case of war which remain the basis of influence
in peacetime. Whoever belongs to the combination which will
be at a disadvantage in wartime, is always more conciliatory;
whoever isolates himself completely surrenders his influence
particularly if he represents the weakest of the major powers.
Alliances are the expression of common interests and goals...
but we have indicated our willingness for an alliance pre-
cisely to those whose interests are most contrary to ours:
Austria and the other German states...If we consider this
the last world of our foreign policy...then we must get used
to the idea that in case of war we shall stand alone in the
palace of the Assembly of the Confederation holding in one
hand the German Constitution...I do not demand that we
make an alliance with France and conspire with it against
Germany...I want nothing else than to take away the belief of
others that they can ally themselves with whomever they please
while we would rather lose our skin piecemeal than to defend
it with the aid of France ... My sole concern is that we do
not reject options calculated to give other cabinets the im-
pression that we are not contingentially in need of assistance
against France, that on the contrary all alliances are open
to us if we are not treated with dignity. But when I advo-
cate this...I expect that I am shown that these advantages
are illusory or else a better plan into the combinations of
which the semblance of good relations with France does not
fit..."

- 12 -

But Gerlach had no better plan. For what was at issue between him and Bismarck was not a policy but an attitude. To Gerlach an alliance with Napoleon was contrary to the maxims of morality and the lessons of Prussian history; to Bismarck it depended entirely on political utility unencumbered by any moral scruples. To Gerlach there existed a moral standard the approximation to which defined a proper policy; to Bismarck the only acceptable criterion was success. Gerlach sought safety in determinacy; Bismarck in dexterity. Gerlach's was the view of a generation which had known catastrophe. But to Bismarck the Napoleonic period was a historical episode; he was too much an empiricist to believe in the possibility of inherent fatality and he tended to ascribe the Prussian collapse in 1806 more to an incorrect conception than to a moral retribution. Because he lived with an intuition of disaster, Gerlach was conscious of the risks of a power in the center of a Continent. Because to Bismarck disaster revealed only false assessment of forces, Bismarck saw primarily the opportunities of a central position.

Thus the exchange between Bismarck and Gerlach had reached an impasse, even if the latter would not admit it. He reassured himself by again invoking Bismarck's great days as the spokesman of the conservatives against the Revolution. But his tone of quiet resignation spoke more eloquently than his arguments. "In my dispute with you I often conceive the

- 13 -

idea that I and my views have grown outdated and that perhaps we should attempt a different policy which we must get through and then transcent." Almost as a reflex action of the spirit he repeated his old maxims that Napoleon's absolutism would eventually force him into foreign adventures, that in a Franco-Russian alliance, Prussia would be the weakest partner, that Prussia would in this manner lose the confidence of the other German states and he accused Bismarck that his policy lacked principle and objective.⁶

It was futile of course to charge Bismarck with lacing what he explicitly rejected. But Bismarck was not satisfied with restong on the incommensurability of their positions. Instead, he proceeded to demonstrate that the maxims of legitimacy, so self-evident to Gerlach, were themselves contingent, that to endow with sanctity the ephemeral domestic structures of states could only lead to theneglect of the more basic national interests. As usual Bismarck began with a statement of seeming conciliation only to draw from it a consequence which checkmated his adversary all the more surely. He insisted that his personal opposition to the Revolution remained unchanged but he confessed himself at a total loss how to draw any practical conclusion from this attitude in foreign affairs. "How many governments exist in the contemporary world which do not grow on revolutionary soil? Take Spain, Portugal, Brazil...Sweden or England which

6. J. B. II, May 21, 1857.

C. J. B. II, Mal 5r, 1824.

soft? Take Spain, Portugal, Brazil...Sweden or England which in the contemporary world which do not grow on revolutionarychia attitude in foreign affairs. "How many Governments exist at a total loss how to draw and traceless conclusion from the Revolution remained unchanged but he contained himself more surely. He initiated that his personal opposition to from it a consequence which accompanied his adversely all the began with a statement of seeming conciliation only to draw of the more past national interests. A naval Bismarck domestic structures or states could only lead to the effectseven contingent, that to endow with sanctity the epistemic maxima of legitimacy, so asft- evident to Gerfach, were them-boutions. Instead, he proceeded to demonstrate that the satisfied with reason on the incommensurability of their facing what he explicitly rejected. But Bismarck was not It was tittle of course to charge Bismarck with marck that his policy lacked brushtle and opeetive.

confidence of the other German states and he accused Bismarck at partner, that Prussia would in that manner lose the that in a Franco-German alliance, Prussia would be the Intiam would eventually force him into foreign adventures, the spirit he rebated his old maxima that Mabomeu, a spec- through and then transcient." Almost as a reflex action of hope we should attempt a different policy which we must get ideas that I and my views have grown outdated and that ber-

- 13 -

(M)

- 4 -

absorbed in their own affairs or concerned with threats more
immediate than the fate of the Ottoman Empire. It seemed im-
possible that Austria which owed its survival to the Tsar's
troops should refuse to support his plans through benevolent
neutrality. The exalted Prussian king never tired of pro-
testing his affection for his Romanoff brother-in-law and in
any case the Camarilla saw in Nicholas I the protector of the
social order. Great Britain, to be sure, was suspicious. It
had evaded the Tsar's overtures in 1844 when he suggested that
it might be well to come to an understanding about possible
spheres of influence in case of the demise of the "sick man
of Europe."³ But the emergence of a new Napoleon in France
furnished a reasonable assurance that Britain's attention
would be focused more on the protection of the Low Countries
than on the security of the Straits.

The crisis in the Balkans therefore took the course
which had become almost traditional in the disputes between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire: an insistence by the Tsar that
both history and treaty relationships had made him the pro-
tector of the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire, coupled,
with an intransigent demand for specific guarantees. The
Porte, in turn, resorted to dilatory measures while it sought
help from the other powers.⁴ Finally when faced with the

3. See Stern VI, p. 45.

4. The specific issue this time concerned the protection of the Holy places in Jerusalem and the theft from them of religious objects some years previously. It was complicated by the fact that not only the Tsar but also Napoleon sought to use this opportunity to appear as the protectors of Christianity; the former to inherit the Trukish Empire, the latter to appeal to French Catholicism.

French Catholicism.

The latter to abet to
conquer to inherit the
Turkish Empire, the latter to abet the abasement of the
Christians of Christianity; the
the last that not only the State but size of Napoleon sought to use
fiercest objects some years previously. It was complicated by
the Holy Union in terms of the theft from them of re-
ligions and the like.

1. The specific name given time concerned the protection of
2. See Stemp AI, b. 42.

Help from the other powers.⁴ Finally when faced with the
force, in turn, resorted to dilatory measures while it sought
with an insurmountable demand for a specific guarantee.
The
tower of the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire, coupled,
both historic and presently relationship had made him the bro-
thers and the Ottoman Empire an incontestable by the State that
which had become almost traditional in theجبes between

The堦als in the Balkans therefore took the course
than on the security of the straits.

would be loosed more on the protection of the Low Countries
than secured a reasonable assurance that Britain's attention
to Europe.⁵ But the emergence of a new Napoleon in France
abodes of influence in case of the demise of the " sick man
it might be well to come to an understanding about some
had engaged the States' overtures in 1844 when he suggested that
social order. Great Britain, to be sure, was unambivalent. It
and case the Camerilla saw in Nicholas I the protector of the
treating his selection for his Roman Catholic brother-in-law and in
neutrality. The excited Prussian king never tired of bro-
troops among refuse to abdicate his brand through peacemaking
possible that Austria which owed its survival to the State's
immediate than the late of the Ottoman Empire. It seemed im-
spected in their own statures or concerned with threats more

- 4 -

- 5 -

threat of war, the Sultan issued a Ferman in which he acceded
to most of the Russian demands. But it soon became apparent
that the Tsar was less interested in his co-religionists than
in the humiliation of the Turks. A special envoy, Mensikov,
was dispatched to Constantinople with demands that the Sultan
reiterate the Ferman in the form of a treaty and in effect
recognize Russia formally as the protector of the Greek-
Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. And if the Porte
hoped to buy peace with such a surrender of sovereignty,
Mensikov's arrogant behavior made it clear that nothing less
than complete subservience would placate the autocrat in St.
Petersburg.

The Tsar had however been mistaken about the re-
action of the West. Had he behaved more subtly, he might
have exploited Britain's distrust of France and Austria's
weakness to achieve his goal of hegemony in the Balkans. But
Nicholas' arrogance overcame Great Britain's misgivings and
it gave Napoleon an opportunity to end the isolation which
for 30 years had paralyzed French policy on the Continent.
On March 19, 1853, the French fleet sailed for Salamis on
the Greek coast from which it could easily reach Constanti-
nople in case of need. On May 21, Mensikov quit Constanti-
nope with an ultimatum demanding Trukish acceptance of the
Russian terms within eight days. On June 2, the British
squadron stationed in Malta sailed for the Bay of Besira
just south of the Dardanelles where it was soon joined by

Just south of the Dardanelles where it was soon joined by
Admiralty stationed in Maida settled for the rest of the
Russian terms within eight days. On June 5, the British
noble with an ultimatum demanding Trunked acceptance of the
noble in case of need. On May 5, Menzelkov quit Constanti-
the Greek coast from which it could easily reason Constan-
On March 10, 1923, the French fleet sailed for Britain on
tor 30 years had bartered French bateaux on the continent.
It gave Nabobean an opportunity to end the isolation which
Nicholas' arrogance overcomes Great Britain's mightiness and
weakness to achieve his goal of hegemony in the Balkans. But
have exploited Britain'sOURTET of France and VNATUR'S
action of the West. Had he behaved more supply, he might
The Tsar had however been mistaken about the re-
lieveing.

than complete supervision would blosade the ancesst in St.
Menzelkov's arrogant behavior made it clear that nothing less
hoped to put peace with each a surrender of sovereignty,
Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. And if the Pope
recognize Russia tomorrow as the protector of the Greek-
resterate the German in the form of a treaty and in effect
was diabatociod to Constantinople with demands that the Sultán
to meet the Russian demands. But it soon became apparent
that the Tsar was less interested in his co-religionists than
to meet the German in whom he trusted
in the annihilation of the Turks. A special envoy, Menzelkov,
was dispatched to Constantinople with demands that the Sultán
in the annihilation of the Turks. A special envoy, Menzelkov,
was diabatociod to Constantinople with demands that the Sultán
to meet the Russian demands. But it soon became apparent
that the Tsar was less interested in his co-religionists than
to meet the German in whom he trusted
in the annihilation of the Turks. A special envoy, Menzelkov,
was diabatociod to Constantinople with demands that the Sultán

- 2 -

(A)

- 6 -

the French fleet. On July 2, Russian troops crossed the Pruth and occupied the Danube Principalities in order to obtain "material guarantees" for the fulfillment of the Tsar's demands. Europe which had not known war for a generation began to look to its rusty armaments.

It was clear that the attitude of the Central Powers would decide the course of events. If the Holy Alliance continued unimpaired, Russia was unassailable and the Franco-British measures would be reduced to empty demonstrations. Even if Austria and Prussia remained neutral, Russia could hope to settle the Near Eastern problem to its satisfaction. But the Russian advance into the Danube Principalities confronted Austria with all the dilemmas of its existence. Its fear of revolution counselled close ties with the Russian autocrat; but its dread of nationalist upheavals urged resistance to an advance which was certain to unloose Pan-Slavic sympathies and outflank Austria to the south. Austria had barely survived its internal upheavals of 1848; it could not failed to be disquited by the emergence of a new Napoleon and by France's traditional designs on Italy. Its finances were weak; its government lacked self-confidence. Austria wanted tranquillity above all and peace.

But to obtain peace is not as easy as to desire it. Oppressed by the consciousness of its impotence, the Austrian ministry attempted to achieve the benefit of every course of action and thereby only accellerated the contingencies it

action and therapy only accelerated the contingencies if
ministry attempted to achieve the benefit of every course of
obITUe d by the consciousness of its Imbocooe, the VNaiatran
But to obtain peace is not as easy as to desire it.
trancillity abates all and hence.

was it its Government Jacked self-confidence. VNaiatran wanted
by France's traditional design on Italy. Its tinsues were
tailed to be graduated by the emergence of a new balance of
power arrived its internal needs, of 1848: it could not
ambiguize and outflank VNaiatran to the south. VNaiatran had
ance to an advance which was certain to unloose Pan-Savale
autocrat: but its dread of nationalistic needs, and alleged resist-
tance of revolutionaries of one class with the Russian
tronged VNaiatran with all the dilemma of its existence. Its
But the Russian advance into the Danube Princohitties con-
dove to settle the Near Eastern problem to its satisfaction.
Even if VNaiatran and Russia remained neutral, Russia could
British measures would be required to endly demonstrate.
tinued unambified, Russia was unassailable and the Franco-
would decide the course of events. If the Holy Alliance con-
It was clear that the attitude of the Central Powers
to look to its next armaments.

Russia which had not known war for a generation perhaps
"material guarantees" for the fulfillment of the Tsar's de-
and combined the Danube Princohitties in order to obtain
the French fleet. On July 5, Russian troops crossed the Prut

- 6 -

(K)

- 7 -

dreaded most. A powerful Austria might have dissuaded the
Tsar before his prestige had become too deeply involved.
But Austria considered a balanced budget more important than
its European position and in the crucial summer of 1853 it re-
duced the size of its army. A friendly Austria might have
used its influence to dissuade Russia from rash adventures as
Metternich had so often succeeded in doing -- but while Rus-
sian armies were massing on the Purth the Austrian ministry
hid its indecision behind petulant sulking. The attempt to
conduct diplomacy and military policy in separation always
leads to the atrophy of both: the former runs the risk of an
overconcern with finesse; the latter, that it is reduced to
empty posturing. The Austrian minister, Schwarzenberg, was
reputed to have said with respect to Russia's assistance in
1848, that Austria would astonish the world by its ingratitude.
If he had the Balkans in mind, he was proved right by the
course of events although it was not ingratitude as much as
the inability to realize that a power which refuses to lead
events must of needs become their prisoner.

It was no different with the other Central Power,
Prussia. As always in hours of crisis, its King confused
verbose manifestos with decisive action and sought to balance
each move towards one of the contenders with an almost hys-
terical reaction in the opposite direction. A flood of Prus-
sian missives descended on the capitals of Europe, soon to be
followed by the special envoys Frederick William so delighted

followed by the special envoy Frederick William so designated
as an Objective descended on the capital of Europe, soon to be
certified reaction in the obituary direction. A flood of Prune-
each move towards one of the contenders with an almost plan-
ervolute manifestation with decisive action and sought to balance
Russia. As always in power of state, its King conquered

It was no different with the other Central Power, the
events must of needs become their prisoner.

the insipidity torporize that a power which refuses to fight
course of events although it was not inaptitude as much as
It he had the Belgrade in mind, he was proved right by the
1848, that Anatolia would astound the world by its inaptitude.

replied to have said with respect to Russia's a salience in
empty boating. The Austrian minister, Schwerinberg, was
overconcern with time; the latter, that it is required to
leada to the atrocity of people the former runs the risk of an
conquest diplomacy and military policy in separation always
had its indolent behind resultant anking. The attempt to
ain armies were making on the punch the Austrian ministry
Metternich had so often succeeded in doing -- put while Rna-
used its influence to damage Russia from rear adventures as
quced the size of its army. A friendly Anatolia might have
its European position and in the crucial summer of 1843 it re-
But Anatolia considered a balanced budget more important than
Tear before its breath had become too deeply involved.

dreaded most. A powerful Austria might have damaged the

- 1 -

(A)

- 8 -

in employing. But the very verbosity of official Prussia
only hid its indecision. For what took place within Prus-
sia was almost a repetition of the disputes in 1848 by the
same parties and with the same general objectives. Those
who had advocated a liberal Germany under Prussia's leader-
ship now urged the closest possible ties with the Western
powers to overcome the influence of the Russia which in 1851
had put an end to all their hopes. This group included many
of the entourage of the Prince of Prussia, the heir to the
throne. Those who had grown up on the concepts of the
"Metternich system" pressed for the implementation of the
Holy Alliance to assure the triumph of legitimacy and to
defeat the usurper in France. One of the most influential
members of this group was Leopold von Gerlach who even had
visions of converting the Turks to Christianity.⁵ Between
these parties stood the King, eager to participate in the
Western demarches towards Russia, but afraid to break with
the iron-willed Tsar; concerned lest Prussia find itself iso-
lated and yet shrinking from the consequences of any course
that could avoid this fate. "My dear brother-in-law," said
Nicholas I, "goes to bed every evening as a Russian and
rises the next morning as an Englishman."⁶

But while the hesitations of Austria proved dis-
astrous because they could only lead to the war which would

5. H., p.

6. EYCK I, p. 237.

c. BACK I, b. 534.

2. H., b.

sations because they could only test to the war which would
But while the hesitations of Austria proved dis-
trances the next morning as an disappointment."c

Nicholas I, "Does to bed every evening as a Russian and
that could avoid this late." "My dear president-in-law," said
fated and yet shrinking from the condescences of an enemy
to the iron-willed Tsar; concerned lest Prussia should itself be-
Western demoralised towards Russia, put strait to break with
these barriers against the King, eager to barter trade in the
visions of converting the Tsar to Christianity."d
Between
members of this group was Reubold von Gersten who even had
defeat the number in France. One of the most influential
Holy Alliance to assure the triumph of faithfulness and to
"Metternich system"breached for the implementation of the
throne. Those who had grown up on the concepts of the
of the entourage of the Prince of Prussia, the heir to the
god but an end to their hopes. This group included many
bowers to overcome the influence of the Russians which in 1812
and now urged the closest possible ties with the Western
who had advocated a federal Germany under Prussia's leader-
same barriers and with the same General objectives. Those
were almost a repetition of the debts incurred in 1818 by the
only did it its indication. For what took place within Pran-
in employing" But the very aeroplane of official Prussia

- 8 -

-9-

disintegrate its European position, Prussia's vacillations
laid the basis for its eventual triumph over Austria. Aus-
tria's ambiguities only deferred its day of reckoning because
the Central Empire could not remain impassive indefinitely
while its southern flank was being turned. But Prussia's
confusion encouraged the Tsar and thereby prepared the
schism of the Holy Alliance. Thus Prussia achieved through
its indecisiveness what it failed to obtain through the vis-
ion of its leaders, the position where alone of the major
powers it could make its assistance conditional on the satis-
faction of its demands.

But it would be too much to say that the Prussian
statesmen understood this. The inflexible dogmatism of the
contending influences on the King had to produce the equipoise
which would have been the policy of the Prussian ambassador at
Frankfurt. For while the Prussian statesmen argued as if
Prussia had perforce to throw in its lost with either the
West or with Russia, Bismarck almost alone argued that not the
unity of conservative interests nor yet the Danube Principal-
ities, but Germany was Prussia's concern. And while the
various contending groups made their option on the basis of
their domestic views, Bismarck maintained that domestic claims
-- even those of the conservatives -- had to be subordinated to
the requirements of national strategy. If this was true, only
one policy seemed indicated: to remain aloof -- "to button

one policy seemed indicated: to remain aloof -- "to button
the requirements of national strategy." It this was true, only
-- even though the conservatives -- had to be corresponded to
their domestic views. Biamarck maintained that domestic claims
various contending groups made their option on the basis of
ities, put Germany was Prussia's concern. And while the
unity of conservative interests nor yet the Danube Principal-
West or with Russia, Bismarck almost alone argued that not the
Prussians had better force to throw in its float with either the
Frankfurt. For while the Prussian statesmen argued so, it
which would have been the policy of the Prussian ambassador at
contending influences on the King had to produce the elaborate
statesmen under stood this. The intrepidie dogmatism of the
But it would be too much to say that the Prussian
faction of its demands.

bowers it could make its salutance conditional on the safe-
ron of its leagu, the coalition where alone of the major
its inderelativeness what it failed to obtain through the at-
sion of the Holy Alliance. Thus Prussia succeeded through
continuation encouraged the Trend and thereby prepared the
while its southern flank was being turned. But Prussia's
the Central Empire could not remain ineffective indefinitely
tria's amplitudes only deferred its day of reckoning because
laid the basis for its eventual triumph over Austria. Un-
disintegrate its European position, Prussia's anxieties

- 6 -

- 10 -

ourselves into one great-coat of 400 thousand men,"⁷ as Bismarck plastically expressed it -- until the other powers and Austria, above all, were so committed that Prussia could utilize their embarrassments to profit within Germany. And to this end it was necessary to disintegrate the close alliance with Austria which for over a generation had been a basic postulate of Prussia policy. "I will give my head as a surety," Bismarck wrote to Leopold von Gerlach at the first rumors of the Balkan crisis, "that present-day Austria will never be our honest ally."⁸ The corollary that no sentimental ties should inhibit Prussia at a moment of unexcellied opportunity, Bismarck reserved for a dispatch to Manteuffel: "Among all our potential allies, Austria is precisely the weakest and most unreliable. I haveno doubt that we should separate ourselves from Austria as soon as it breaks with Russia."⁹

In the months immediately following the outbreak of the Balkan crisis, Bismarck's quest for freedom of action for Prussia resulted in an extraordinary ambiguity. Now leaning toward Russia, now toward the West, moving from hesitant advocacy of neutrality to grudging agreement to Western overtures, Bismarck seemed to parallel the vacillations of his monarch. But while Frederick William IV hesitated because he was at a loss to deal with a situation of such intricacy, Bismarck's seeming inconsistencies masked his basic aim: to take away Austria's options, to exhaust it and to undermine the

7. L. G.

8. L. G., p. 85, July 8, 1853.

9. W. I., p. 354, July 15, 1853.

["6. M. I., b. 324, 1917 p. 1823.", "8. R. O., b. 82, July 8, 1823.", "J. R. G.", "In the months immediately following the outbreak of\nthe Balkan War as soon as it broke out with Russia's\nnuclear power. I have no doubt that we should absorb our\nattenpt. Russia's great for freedom of action for\nto the Balkan War. Russia's great for freedom of action for\nto the Balkan War, now toward the West, moving from neutral\nand toward Russia, now toward the West, moving from neutral\nand toward

- 11 -

source of its traditional strength in Germany. Thus every
Austrian proposal to the Assembly of the Confederation was
met by dilatory tactics or outright opposition incomprehen-
sible if one analyzes only the substantive issues involved.
When Austria attempted to obtain the backing of the Confed-
eration for its declaration of strict neutrality in the
Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck pleaded lack of instructions
and explained his delay to Manteuffel as an attempt to pre-
vent Austria to appear as "the spokesman for the firm,
Austria-Prussia."¹⁰ And when Austria sought to restrain
Russia by a conference of the four major powers in Vienna
and a joint note to the warring parties, Bismarck opposed
Prussian participation in this step in a letter to Gerlach:
"When Austria offers us a fraternal hand, I always have the
impression that they have the range and would like to infect
us, because it is easier to endure in company."¹¹

Thus whether Austria sought safety in neutrality
or in commitment, Bismarck used its embarrassments to demon-
strate its paralysis of will. For while an act of decisive
leadership on Austria's part might have brought about a sit-
uation which permitted no further equivocation, the petty
finesse which characterized the policy of the cabinet of
Vienna gave Bismarck the opportunity to conduct an indepen-
dent policy at Frankfurt and made Austria the real victim of
the Crimean war. Austria's fear of revolution in Italy in-
duced it to support an Anglo-French note of December 5 which
10. W. I., p. 388, November 9, 1853.
11. L. G., p. 113, December 18, 1853.

If. P. G.'s. b. 113, December 10, 1923.
10. W. I.'s. b. 388, November 6, 1923.

quced it to anbord au Augo-Brened note of December 2 which
the Crimean war. Anatria's fear of revolution in Italy in-
dent below at Frankfurt and made Anatria the near victim of
Austria gave Bismarck the opportunity to conduct an indepen-
tence which characterized the policy of the cabinet of
Austria its barbale of will. For while an act of decisive
or in commitment, Bismarck need its arrangements to demon-
strate its barbale of will. But while an act of decisive
Tina whether Anatria sought safety in neutrality

na', because it is easier to engine in company."If
imbreach that way have the means and would like to inject
"When Anatria otters me a fraternal hand, I always have the
Russian barterisation in this act in a letter to Gerlach
and a joint note to the marking barter, Bismarck opposed
Anatria's a conference of the four major bowers in Austria
Vatniria-Bismarck."10
And when Anatria sought to retrain
dent Vatniria to abeam as "the abeaman for the firm,
and explained its delay to Mentenleit as an attempt to bre-
ause-Turkish war, Bismarck blesped its act of instructions
on its declaration of strict neutrality in the
When Vatniria attempted to obtain the packing of the Coule-
sible it one sukses only the unpatantive finance involved.
met by difficult tactics or outright objection incombren-
Vatniria proposed to the Unainity of the Confederation was
source of its traditional strength in Germany. Tina every

- II -

(Y)

- 12 -

proclaimed that Turkey had fulfilled Russia's demands and
suggested a peace conference. But its dread of isolation
produced the precise degree of ambiguity which deprived
the note of whatever effectiveness it might have had while
nevertheless causing the Tsar's fury to be directed against
"perfidious" Austria. Thus the rigid alignment of forces
which had inhibited a continental policy and which had ab-
sorbed Prussia's aspirations in the requirements of legit-
imacy was disintegrating. The result was an immediate ac-
cretion of strength for Prussia as the less vulnerable of
the Central Powers. All of Bismarck's efforts were conse-
quently directed toward making the Prussian statesmen aware
of their opportunity, that the isolation and the defeat of
Austria was within the grasp of their boldness. With the
approaching end of the Holy Alliance, whole rows heretofore
 blacked again became accessible on the chess-board of
European diplomacy and comginations grew possible which
would put a premium on dexterity. Henceforth there can
therefore be noted in Bismarck's dispatches a growing self-
confidence coupled with a frustrated impatience at a states-
manship which was kept from realizing its opportunities by
its own inhibitions. To be sure, Bismarck cautiously justi-
fied his policy by ascribing his own motives to Austria, that
Austria might seek to break Prussia's power even while pre-
paring a struggle against Russia. But the practical conse-
quence he drew was invarying, that only a sober calculation
of power relationships, not sentimental attachments, should

of power, relationships, not sentimental attachments, should
duce he drew was invarious, that only a proper calculation
basing a strategy against Russia. But the practical conse-
Venezia might seek to break Prussia's power even while bre-
tied its buffer by assuring his own motives to Austria, that
its own intentions. To be sure, Bismarck successfully justi-
ified which was kept from realizing its opportunities by
contingence coupled with a truncated imbalance at a state-
therefore be noted in Bismarck's dispatch a growing self-
would but a premium on dexterity. Henceforth there can
Europeau diplomacy and combinations grew baleful which
plucked again became accessible on the chess-board of
abscaping end of the Holy Alliance, whose rows heretofore
Austria was within the reach of their podgnaas. With the
of their opportunity, that the isolation and the defeat of
direction directed toward making the Prussian statesmen aware
the Central Powers. All of Bismarck's efforts were conse-
cration of strength for Prussia as the least vulnerable of
France was disintegrating. The result was an immediate ac-
corded Prussia's aspirations in the requirements of left-
which had inhibited a continental policy and which had ap-
peared "bitter". Austria. Time the right alignment of forces
nevertheless causing the Tannenblatt to be directed against
the note of whatever effectiveness it might have had while
produced the bitter degree of ambiguity which debased
unfelted a base conference. But its trend of isolation
proclaimed that Turkey had fulfilled Russia's demands and

- 15 -

- 13 -

motivate Prussia's commitments. And for this reason all of Bismarck's dispatches from the very beginning of the Crimean crisis could be reduced to a calculus of strength: "Austria has such vulnerable flanks towards Russia and France," Bismarck wrote to Gerlach, "that it would be a very weak support ... [while] Russia is for us the cheapest ally since it only seeks to grow in the East and not at our expense. Britain alone can not protect us. In order to carry out its policy of centralization Austria requires ... a strict hegemony over the German Confederation. There we stand in its way, however unobtrusive we may seek to be ... Our policy has no other grade ground than Germany and this is precisely the one Austria thinks it badly requires for itself... We deprive each other of the air we need to breathe; one must give up or be forced to give up; until then we must remain opponents and this I consider a fact which cannot be ignored however unwelcome it may be. An alliance with France would require a measure of baseness, but if Russia should be forced into it ... we may have to join lest Austria anticipate us."¹²

Here, even before the lines in the Balkans were irrevocably drawn stood the outline of the revolution which a brief six months had wrought in international relations: A Prussian stateman could catalogue the possible allies classing Austria, the confederate, as an antagonist and France, the traditional "hereditary enemy," as a possible ally. But even more impressive than the specific proposals was the matter-of-

RS. I. G.'d. B. IRP, December 13, 1923.

more imbued with the abstracttropeasm than the abstracttropeasm was the matter-of-
traditional "perennial enemy," so a possible ally. But even
Anatolia, the confederate, as an antagonist and bruce, the
Polanan statements could catalogue the possible allies classing
prior to six months had thought in international relations: A
reassuring dream stood the outline of the revolution which a
Here, even before the fives in the Balkans were in-
to join East Anatolia autobahn.

An ally, but it Russia should be forced into it ... we may have
pe. An alliance with France would require a measure of peace-
aider a fact which cannot be ignored however nume welcome it may
give mbt until then we must remain obdurate and this I con-
ool the air we need to preclude: one must give mb or be forced to
churn it madly requires for itself... We deprive each other
rage Ground than Germany and this is broken the one Anatolia
oppressives we may seek to be ... On its bottom has no other be-
German Confederation. There we stand in its way, however nu-
trification Anatolia requires ... a strict hegemony over the
can not protect na. In order to carry out its bottom of con-
 seeks to grow in the East and not at our expense. Britain alone
... <u>Multiple</u> Russia is for us the greatest ally since it only
makes room to Gerlach, "that it would be a very weak export
has and any overseasfranks towards Russia and France," Bia-
crata config pe required to a constitution of strength: "Anatolia
Brawarko's drabatchen from the very beginning of the Crimean
military Russia's commitments. And for this reason all of

- 13 -

(A)

- 14 -

factness of the tone which endowed power with an aura of nemesis. To be sure, Leopold von Gerlach protested in shocked terms that Prussia would lose its soul were it to make a pact with Napoleon and that nothing good could ever emerge from a sinful act. But he misunderstood the nature of the new world which has demoniac charge was conjuring up, a world in which only miscalculation was evil and only failure a sin. It was a world without illusion in which only giants annihilists could live: "We must not let ourselves be caught by phrases," Bismarck's letter concluded, "they count only against, never for us. Instead we should boldly announce a specifically Prussian policy which seeks its ends through the interests and the fears of others, not through sentiments to which every one pretends and which no one possesses. But equally we should not be surprised if others adopt the same principle."¹³

Had Austria known of the policy proposed by the Prussian envoy in Frankfurt, had it even understood that this policy was now possible it might have arrested its headlong rush into isolation. But to the unimaginative a crisis deferred appears dilemma overcome, to the timid a contest avoided seems a guarantee of continued tranquillity, and to the uninspired correct policy defines itself by the direct opposite of failure without the possibility of intermediary nuance. So Austria realizing that the Balkan strife could not be banished by refusing to recognize its existence, only three months after it had reduced its army and only two months after it had declared 13. L. G., p. 117.

13. P. G., b. 113.

It had reduced its army and only two months after it had deposed
p. remaining to recognize its existence, only three months after
Anatolia realizing that the Balkan alliance could not be sustained
of failure without the credibility of internationally recognized
agreed correct policy define itself by the direct obsolescence
seems a guarantee of continued tranquillity, and to the uninv-
ited abusers dilemma overcome, to the timid a context avoided
run into isolation. But to the numbing passive a crisis deters-
boffy was now possible if might have arrester its peabody
Branasau envoi in Frankfurt, had it even understood that this
had Anatara known of the boffy broached by the
should not beallsbriared if others againt the same principle."13
one pretends and which no one believes. But equally we
the terms of others, not through sentiments to which every
alan boffy which seeks its end through the interests and
ns. Instead we should publicly announce a specifically pru-
marke a further consequence, "they count only against" never for
five! "We must not let ourselves be caught by burleses," Bia-
sa world without illusion in which only France orificiates confid
only misdirection was valid and only failure a sin. It was
which has demoniac charge was confining us, a world in which
ainst us. But he misunderstood the nature of the new world
with Napoleon and that nothing good could ever emerge from a
terms that Prussia would lose its goal were it to make a bet
tat. To be sure, Rechbold von Gersten broated in shocked
tactness of the tone which endowed power with an aura of name-


- 14 -

- 15 -

its neutrality began to reverse its course, offering both sides its misgivings as a guage of its good faith. It not only supported the Western note of December 5, but it rejected a Russian offer of a treaty in effect reaffirming the Holy Alliance and it began to concentrate an army in Hungary on the flanks of the Russian advance into the Danube principalities. And all the time the increasing tension between the Western powers and Russia revealed that the conflict was approaching which could not but engulf the Central Empire. For the facts of geography and history brook no denial by the fears of statesmen.

If Austria was to commit herself, however, it required the good will of Prussia, unless it was prepared to risk its position in Germany. But while the contending influence in Prussia argued about which campe Prussia should join as if no other option were even conceivable, Bismarck advocated that Prussia stand alone as a symbol that the period where moral claims could insure Prussia's assistance was over, that henceforth Prussia's cooperation was dependent on the satisfaction of her demands. For this reason he did not oppose the rejection of the Tsar's proposal for a reaffirmation of the Holy Alliance made concurrently to Prussia and Austria; but he urged that the refusal be couched in terms which would keep open Prussia's Russian option: "There are many who consider insults to Russia a proof of patriotism; but these are not the people whose admiration is of any practical use for

not the people whose admiration is of and by the political use ton
sider infants to號令 a brood of bacteria! but these are
keen enough to act as a sort of referendum but these are
put in order that the return may be assured in terms which would
of the Holy Alliance made concurrently to Prunata and Anatara;
above the retention of the Tassila proposal for a reëstimation
assumption of per demand. For this reason he did not ob-
ject that nevertheless cooperation was dependent on the
where most claims could find a basis a satisfaction was over,
advocated that Prunata stand alone as a symbol that the period
join as if no other option were even conceivable. Bismarck
lives in Prunata argued against which case Prunata should
risk itsition in Germany. But while the contending in-
dustry the good will of Prunata, unless it was prepared to
act in this way was to commit herself, however, it re-
tains or agitates.

the tasks of geography and history proof no denial by the
abrogating which could not put an end to the Central Empire. For
tween the Western powers and Prunata revealed that the conflict was
brutally bitter. And all the time the increasing tension pe-
 Hungary on the banks of the Russian advance into the Danube
due to the Russian offer of a treaty in effect reëstimating
only unhosted the Western note of December 2, put it re-
feres to its maginations as a means of its good faith. It not
its neutrality begun to reverse its course, offering pot

- 12 -

(H)

- 16 -

Prussia."¹⁴ The full force of his eloquence was directed
however against the proposition that the refusal of the
Russian offer entailed an alliance with Austria as a logi-
cal corollary: "Austria has at most 40-80 thousand men
available for a war beyond its borders," he wrote to Gerlach,
his channel to the king. "We therefore do not assume an easy
task if we challenge our century arm in arm with Austria.
Nevertheless I would never advise against running risks if
only we can gain by it (Bismarck's italics); but for heaven's
sake no sentimental alliances where the consciousness of hav-
ing performed a good deed furnishes the sole reward for our
sacrifice."¹⁵ "I could answer the question whether it is in
accordance with our interests to weaken the European position
of Austria further only if I knew the degree of boldness and
energy which will animate our policy," Bismarck wrote cautious-
ly to Mantueffel, his source of influence in the government.
"Many statesmen are of the opinion that it is preferable to
have Austria as an enemy than as a friend. Be that as it may,
I should be concerned were we to seek safety before possible
storms by hitching our smart and seaworthy frigate to the
worm-eaten bulk of Austria. We are the better swimmers and
a welcome ally for everyone ... The great crises supply the
climate conducive to Prussia's growth; if we use them without
fear, perhaps even with great ruthlessness. If we wish to
continue to grow we must not be afraid to stand alone with
400 thousand men, particularly as long as other do the battling...

14. L. G., p. 129, February 20, 1854.

15. L. G., p. 130, February 20, 1854.

F2. R. G.'s, b. 130, Repnisk 50, 1824.
F4. R. G.'s, b. 158, Repnisk 50, 1824.

400 thousand men, barterially as long as other go the passing...
come to know we must not be straight so along with them,
to learn, perhaps even with greatручiness. It we wish to
estimate conquering to brusars a crowd if we see them without
a welcome fifty for everyone ... The great disease among the
worm-eaten folk of Anatria. We are the better swimmers and
actuaries, but picking our smart and seamiest tristate do the
I should be concerned were we to seek safety before possible
have Anatria as an enemy than as a friend. Be that as it may,
"Much statement are of the opinion that it is better to
fly to Municher, via bome of influence in the Government,
energy which will animate our buffer," Biamrock wrote cautions-
out of Anatria, unless it I knew the degree of poigness and
accordance with our interests to weaken the European position
asbefore."F2" I config answer the question whether it is in
fist beromed a good deed turnpike the sole reward for our
 sake no sentimental affinities where the consciousness of pa-
only we can gain by it (Biamrock's italics); put for heaven's
Nevertheless I would never advise against running risks if
risk it we challenge our century arm in arm with Anatria.
via channel to the king. "We therefore do not saimme an easy
available for a war beyond its ponders," he wrote to Gerzon,
cat corollary: "Anatria was at most 40-80 thousand men
Russian otter entailed an alliance with Anatria as a fief-
however against the proposition that the return of the
brusars."F4" The full force of via efodence was directed

- 10 -

- 17 -

The value of our assistance will increase with the growing entanglement of the powers, and we will be paid more for it later than now."¹⁶

And the entanglements of the powers soon created a situation which confronted Prussia with fateful decisions. A plaintive Austrian circulatory note of February 9 spoke of its desire for peace, its hope for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, its refusal of the Russian offer of alacriance and its conviction that the German Confederation would support it, as if one policy could embrace all these goals.¹⁷ But the measures of the other powers left no doubt that the issues could no longer be evaded by protestations of good faith. A personal appeal by Napoleon to the Tsar to quit the Danube Duchies in return for a simultaneous withdrawal of the Franco-British fleet could only exacerbate the feelings of the autocrat who had refused the French usurper the traditional address: mon frere. In the meantime a Russian note had demanded that the combined Western fleet, if its intentions were peaceful, not only protect Turkish ships but those of Russia as well. In case of an unsatisfactory answer the Russian ambassadors were to demand their passports. By February 6 diplomatic relations between Russia and the Western powers were broken off. On February 24, France and Britain issued an ultimatum to Russia to quit the Danube Principalities by April 30.

16. P. I., p. 425, February 15, 1854.

17. Text Poschinger IV, p. 172.

12. Text Losenburger I A, b. 115.
Jg. 5. I., b. 452, Republik 12, 1924.

fien px Abriv 30.
faised an uttatum to Russia to quit the Danube Principalities
bowers were broken off. On Republik 5th, France and Britain
rank & diplomatic relations between Russia and the Western
Russian Empress were to demand their passport. By Rep-
of Russia as well. In case of an unsatisfactory answer the
fons were beseeled, not only protect Turkish ships but those
had demanded that the confined Western fleet, it its intent-
ditional address: now there. In the meantime a Russian note
of the autocrat who had reigned the French number the trans-
of the Franco-British fleet could only exhortate the feelings
the Danube Princes in return for a simultaneous withdrawal
fist. A herosar abbat px Nabobon to the Tsar to quit
fiances could no longer be evaded by protestations of good
But the measures of the other powers left no doubt that the
subvert it, as it one below could EMPSE off these States.
France and its conviction that the German Confederation would
the Ottomans Embryo, its refusal of the Russian offer of a
centre for peace, its hope for the territorial integrity of
distinctive Austrian crenulations note of Republik 3 above of its
situation which confronted Russia with fatal decisions. A
And the entanglements of the bowers soon created a
faster than now."

engagement of the bowers, and we will be glad more for it
The cause of our assistance will increase with the growing

- 11 -

- 18 -

With war thus imminent France and Britain redoubled their efforts to align the German powers with them. But Austria which had supported the Western conditions of peace recoiled from the measures to achieve them without a guarantee of Prussian support. Berlin thus became the focal point of European politics in March 1854.

As always when fundamental decisions were required Frederick William IV took refuge in grandiloquence and thereby unleashed a struggle in his entourage which his constant vacillations only sharpended. And once more Bismarck, although he disdained the dogmatism of the Conservatives hardly less than the self-righteousness of the liberalist, come to assist his old mentor Gerlach in the struggle against the Western alliance. For while he was little concerned about the unity of conservative interests, Bismarck was all the more determined to prevent Austria from escaping its dilemmas by a show of Confederate unity. "Are we unable to stand on the most moderate pinnacle without fainting into the arms of the nearest individual with strong nerves?" Bismarck wrote to Gerlach. "Does anyone seriously believe that Austria will engage in a life-and-death struggle with Russia without being certain of our help or even secured against an attack on one part? ... A cowardly policy has always led to disaster."¹⁸

"It is not my province to criticize, that His Majesty the King disdains exploiting the embarassments of other powers," Bismarck

18. L. G., pps. 138 - 140, 7/9 April 1854.

18. P. G., bbe. 138 - 140, 1/3 Abril 1924.

diplaining the emperaments of other bowers", Biamarck
"It is not my province to criticise, that His Majesty the King
bans? ... A cowardly blow has always led to disaster."18

certain of our help or even secured against an attack on one
engage in a life-and-death struggle withanas without being
to Carlson. "Does anyone seriously believe thatanas will
the nearest individual with strong nerves?" Biamarck wrote
the most moderate bimbole without tainting into the arms of
by a show of Confederate unity. "Are we unable to stand on
more determined to preventanas from encasing its differences
the unity of conservative interests" Biamarck was all the
Western alliance. For while he was little concerned about
asiatist race old mentor Gerhard in the struggle against the
less than the left-right-equivalence of the liberalist, come to
though he distinguished the dogmatism of the Conservatives hardly
ascendings only ascribed. And once more Biamarck, si-
ph unleased a struggle in his entourage which his constant
Preferick William IV took refuge in Grandbilobence and there-
was always when fundamental decolons were required

European politics in March 1824.

ofanasian anborst. Berlin thus became the local point of
coffed from the measures to achieve them without a guarantee
fors which had unburied the Western conditions of peace re-
their efforts to align the German bowers with them. But Aus-
With war thus imminent France and Britain reconnected

(Y)

- 18 -

- 19 -

wrote to the Prince of Prussia. "I would not consider the alliance ∥with Austria and the Western Powers∥ a misfortune had it not been discussed on a plane where the ardor of the contending parties has replaced cold calculation ... Our interests and those of the West are not identical; their desire to put our power in the service of their ambitions is only natural. Sooner or later the moment must come when we refuse to comply with this wish. Our freedom of action remains unimpaired if we refuse to join the Convention."¹⁹

The Prince of Prussia might call Bismarck's policy that of a school boy (eines Gymnasiasten) but only because he failed to understand its import. For the policy proposed by Bismarck was not motivated by a predeliction for Russia; rather it was the calculation of a scientist who had weighed the factors, considered the possible combinations, and sought to manipulate into being a structure which would reflect the real power-relationships. Bismarck strove for Prussian freedom of action not from the doctrinal motives of either his friends or his adversaries, but to let Prussia's inherent power assert itself and to demonstrate the tenuousness of the myth which had assured European tranquillity for over a generation. If Prussia could stand alone in the middle of a European crisis, it would not permit itself to be paralyzed indefinitely by so fragile an instrument as the German Confederation.

19. W. I., p. 436.

10. W. I., b. 42c.

eration.

Indelimitely dy so tragical an instrument as the German Conquered
Europeau crats, it would not permit itself to be bartered
Generation. It brutaals could stand alone in the middle of a
the math which had saamed Europeau trans Utility for over a
power sent itself and to demonstrate the tonnage of
triends or his adveraries, but to let brutaals a inherent
gom of action not from the cootral motives of either his
rest power-relationshipa. Biamrock attove for brutaal tree-
to manipulate into being a structure which would reflect the
the factors, considered the possible combinations, and sought
rather it was the calculation of a scientist who had weighed
Biamrock was not motivated dy a predilection for brutaal;
tailed to understand its import. For the botley brooed dy
that of a school dy (eine Gymnastaten) put only because he
The prince of brutaals might call Biamrock a botley
imbued if we refuse to join the Convention."10

to comply with this wish. Our freedom of action remains un-
usurant. Sooner or later the moment must come when we refuse
to but our power in the service of their ambitions is only
to see that the West are not identified; their desire
contending battles has replaced cold calculation ... Our in-
used it not been discussed on a plane where the honor of the
affiance with Anatolia and the Western Powers a misfortune
wrote to the Prince of Prussia. "I would not consider the

teres and those of the West are not identified; their desire
contending battles has replaced cold calculation ... Our in-
used it not been discussed on a plane where the honor of the
affiance with Anatolia and the Western Powers a misfortune
wrote to the Prince of Prussia. "I would not consider the

- 10 -

(Y)

- 20 -

And the hysteria of Frederick William IV -- who was beginning to show the symptoms of the mental illness which was to lead to his abdication -- brought about what could not be accomplished by an act of will. At the very moment when the signature of an alliance with Austria and the Western Powers seemed imminent, its chief proponent, Pourtales, was forced to resign and even the Camarilla was at a loss to explain what had caused the fall of their most hated adversary.²⁰ Whether Frederick William IV had finally reacted to Gerlach's Pietist warnings against "unfaithful servants" or whether in his panic he blamed the advocate of commitment for the conditions which had made it necessary, the projected alliance was defeated for the time being. But while the Camarilla was celebrating the victory of the conservative cause, Bismarck engaged in two conversations which demonstrated his virtuosity in reducing the beliefs of a decade into forces to be manipulated. Upon his return to Frankfurt, he visited the Russian ambassador to explain to him that the refusal of the convention was a victory of the pro-Russian party at Berlin and that he, Bismarck was their chief exponent.²¹ Had the British ambassador seen the jubilant report of his Russian colleague, he would have been vastly surprised. For he had just been told by Bismarck that the rejection of the convention had had nothing to do with pro-Russian sympathies. On the contrary,

20. EYCK I, p. 233.

21. EYK I, p. 236; MARTENS-TRAITES VIII, p. 440.

ST. EAK I' b. 5301 Marseilles AIII' b. 440.
50' BACK I' b. 533.

noting to go with bro-Russian embassies. On the contrary,
by Bismarck that the rejection of the convention had had
no effect but been absolutely accepted. For he had that been told
gor seen the important report of his Russian colleague, he
Marck was their chief exiled. SI. Had the British ampaas-
victory of the Bro-Russian party at Berlin and that he, Bi-
to explain to him that the return of the convention was a
his return to Frankfurt, he alotted the Russian ambassador
department of a decade into forces to be manipulated. Upon
ations which demonstrated his automatically in reducing the
of the conservative cause, Bismarck engaged in two conver-
ting. But while the Camarilla was celebrating the victory
and, the protected alliance was defeated for the time be-
cause of commitment for the conditions which had made it neces-
sary, or whether in his basic he claimed the advocate
reacted to Gerlauch's dietat warnings against "unnatural
hated spherary." So. Whether Frederick William IV had finally
so a loss to explain what had caused the fall of their most
Bonnetsaia, was forced to return and even the Camarilla was
the Western powers seemed imminent, its chief brokerage,
moment when the alignment of an alliance with Austria and
conflict not be accomplished by an act of will. At the very
which was to lead to his application -- brought about what
was beginning to show the symptom of the mental illness
And the players of Frederick William IV -- who

- 50 -

- 21 -

the fall of Pourtales was due to a victory in Berlin of the
national party which had not opposed the convention in prin-
ciple but had been put off by the treats of the English press
and of English statesmen.²²

Here was an example of the policy of keeping all
options open until the last moment which was to characterize
all of Bismarck's diplomacy, the confusing frankness, the
bold caution, the unanswerable personal appeal. But it was
a diplomacy doomed to futility with a monarch of Frederick
William's indecision. For no sooner had Frederick William
obtained his freedom of action than he came to rue it and on
April 20 he signed a treaty of alliance with Austria which
guaranteed Austria's territory and even promised Austria
Prussian assistance if Russia should refuse to halt its ad-
vance across the Danube or to evacuate the Principalities.²³

In this manner ended the first phase of the Cri-
mean War as anti-climatically as it had begun and with Austria
seemingly successful in imposing its policy on Prussia. But
Austria's victory was only apparent. For an alliance repre-
sents an accretion of strength only if its members are in ac-
cord about their objectives. In the absence of such an agree-
ment the requirement for unity can be used to exact a veto
over allied actions and the policy of the alliance will be
shaped by its weakest, or at least its most irresolute, com-
ponent. Anyone familiar with the psychology of the Prussian

22. Valentin, p. 98; L. G., p. 43, April 17, 1854.

23. Stern VIII, p. 70.

23. Stern AIII, b. 10.
25. Valentini, b. 381 p. 6, b. 43, Apr 11, 1934.

bouent. Vukove taj familiar with the batharofogy of the Prussean
anabed p[ro] its mekeat, or, at least its moat irrefusolte, com-
over sifled sctious and the boltoh of the salliance will be
ment the requirement for unily can be used to exsot a veto
cord apont their optyctives. In the apence of anon au agree-
ents an accretion of atreugth only il its mempera are in so-
Vatnirs, a victory was only abbarent. For an alliance repre-
seemingly ancessant in imitating its boltoh on Prusseis. But
mean war as anti-climatically as it had begun and with Anatris
In this manner ended the that phase of the Crif-
ance across the Danube on to evanate the principalities.⁵²
Prusseian saistance il Prusseis an should refuse to part its ap-
Guaranteed Anatris's territory and even browned Anatris
Vruff SO he signed a treaty of alliance with Anatris which
optained his freedom of soffon than he asme to rne it and on
William's indecision. For no sooner had Frederick William
a diblomacy coomeo to tility with a monsren of Frederick
por[od] caution, the unanumersble beraunat abbar. But it was
all of Bismarck's diblomacy, the confrating frankness, the
obvious oben unif the last moment which was to characterise
Here was an example of the boltoh of keeping all
and of English statements.⁵³

Brusseian saistance il Prusseis should refuse to part its ap-
Guaranteed Anatris's territory and even browned Anatris
Vruff SO he signed a treaty of alliance with Anatris which
optained his freedom of soffon than he asme to rne it and on
William's indecision. For no sooner had Frederick William
a diblomacy coomeo to tility with a monsren of Frederick
por[od] caution, the unanumersble beraunat abbar. But it was
all of Bismarck's diblomacy, the confrating frankness, the
obvious oben unif the last moment which was to characterise
Here was an example of the boltoh of keeping all
and of English statements.⁵³

Chile put had peen but ott p[ro] the treats of the English bres
nuctiousl barby which had not obsoaled the convention in brin-
the tuff of Bonnafies was que to a victory in Berlin of the

- SI -

- 22 -

King, moreover, could be certain that he would shrink from
the consequences of his audacity. It was one thing to make
a treaty to please the traditional ally in Vienna; it was
quite another to put that treaty to the only use which had
any meaning for Austria: to force Russia to evacuate the
Danube Principalities. As soon as they had gotten over the
initial shock the Camarilla and Bismarck therefore set about
to deprive the treaty of all meaning by an exegesis of its
terms which might supply Frederick William a justification
for inaction. Gerlach conceived the rather unimaginative
interpretation that the treaty of April 20 obliged Austria
to obtain Prussia's concurrence before it took any measure
to force Russia to evacuate the Principalities.²⁴ In practice,
this would have restored conditions precisely to the
point before the treaty was signed and not even the unstable
King could be induced to accept so flagrant a breech of his
undertaking. Bismarck therefore entered the fray with a solution
more intricate if no more honorable. The treaty of
April 20, he argued, was not an alliance at all but merely
an engagement to conclude an alliance and he suggested to
Manteuffel that he act as if another interpretation were unthinkable
outside of an insance asylum.²⁵

But the real stumbling block to Austria's utilization
of the alliance lay in Frankfurt not in Berlin. In

24. EYCK, I. p. 239.

25. G. E. II, p. 78, W. I, p. 442; L. G., p. 148.

52. G. R. II, b. 48, M. I, b. 445; P. G., b. 148.
54. KICK, I. b. 533.

station of the alliance lay in Frankfurt not in Berlin. In
But the real attemping took to Ancona's still-
thinkable outside of an alliance saymm.

Mantementley that he act as if another interpretation were un-
an engagement to concierge an alliance and he anguaged to
April 20, he argued, was not an alliance at all but merely
intention more incorporate it we more honorasple. The treaty of
nugertaking. Biamarck therefore entered the tray with a so-
King could be induced to accept so flagrant a deed of his
point before the treaty was signed and not even the unstable
tice, this would have reacquired conditions breachly to the
to force Romsis to evanceate the Principalities.⁵⁴ In brac-
to obtain Romsis a concurrence before it took and measure
interpretation that the treaty of April 20 opficed Ancona
for inaction. Gerson conceived the rather unimpressive
terme which might anbody Frederick William a tnatification
to degrive the treaty of all meaning by an exegesis of its
initial shock the Camarilla and Biamarck therefore set about
Danne Principalities. As soon as they had gotten over the
and meaning for Ancona: to force Romsis to evanceate the
duite another to but that treaty to the only use which had
a treaty to blesse the traditionalacy in Vienna! it was
the consequence of his anacolity. It was one thing to make
King, moreover, could be certain that he would act from

- 23 -

order to marshal a maximum force, Austria had insisted on a
clause inviting the German Confederation to accede to the
treaty of April 20. The Austrian negotiators apparently never
doubted that the acquiescence of the Confederation would prove
to be a mere formality. For was this not precisely the prior
Austro-Prussian accord for which Bismarck had been calling
these many years? Were not the minor powers reduced to the
secondary status which Bismarck had been insisting was prop-
erly theirs? But no sooner did the new Austrian ambassador
to Frankfurt, Prokesch-Osten, seek to implement the agreement
than he ran into the same stubborn opposition by Bismarck as
his predecessor had encountered in his effort to proceed by
a majority vote. For this was the moment Bismarck had been
anticipating when Prussia could operate within the Confeder-
ation like a parliamentarian forging a union of all discon-
tended to overthrow the ruling faction. Nothing had occurred
to affect Bismarck's basic aim to eliminate or to reduce
Austria's influence in Germany; on the contrary the degree
of its Balkan embarrassments only placed Austria into the
paradoxical position of attempting to expedite a decision in
a body it had itself designed to inhibit decisive action. And
the Prussian envoy was fully alive to the irony of Austria's
situation. No sooner had he learned of the treaty than he
wrote to Manteuffel that it would find the approbation to
the degree that it offered guarantees against the danger of
war.²⁶

26. W. I. p. 440, April 21, 1854.

2G. W. I. b. #40, Abrif 51, 1824.

Mar. 2G

the degree that it offered guarantees against the danger of
wrote to Mansentller that it would find the abrogation to
attenuation. No sooner had he learned of the treaty than he
dispatched an envoy was fully alive to the front of Austria's
a body it had itself designed to implicit definitive action. And
baracktical position of attempting to excommunicate a decedent in
of its Balkan emperaments only placed Austria into the
Austria's influence in Germany: on the contrary the degree
to affect Bismarck's pale aim to eliminate on to reduce
tended to overthrow the ruling faction. Nothing had occurred
since like a barrister's chamber a union of all dioclec-
anticipating when Prussia could operate within the Conlegor-
a majority vote. For this was the moment Bismarck had been
his predecessor had encountered in his effort to broach dy
than he ran into the sameatsn opposition by Bismarck as
to Frankfurt, Broekon-Oaten, seek to implement the Agreement
only thesura? But no sooner did the new Austrian ambassador
secondary status which Bismarck had been insulating was bro-
ught many years? Were not the minor powers required to the
Vienna-Prussian second for which Bismarck had been calling
to be a mere formality. For was this not precisely the prior
dedicated that the precedence of the Confederation would prove
treaty of April 50. The Austrian negotiators abandently never
clearly inviting the German Confederation to accede to the
order to maintain a maximum force, Austria had initiated on a

(M)

- 53 -

- 24 -

Bismarck knew the particularist self-will of the secondary
German states too well not to be able to count on an effort
on their part to eliminate all risks to themselves.

And he was not to be disappointed. A meeting of
the secondary powers in Bamberg called attention to the fact
that the treaty of April 20 lacked reciprocity, because it
failed to couple a request to the Western powers to cease
military operations with the demand that Russia evacuate
the Principalities. In any other situation, Bismarck would
have dismissed this gesture with biting irony as an act of
impudence by minor powers emboldened to conduct a European
policy through the protection afforded them by Austria and
Prussia. But now when it was a question of paralyzing Aus-
tria Bismarck could not speak highly enough of the statesman-
like demeanor of Saxony and Bavaria and he expressed the fear
that Prussia might "brutalize the little ones proud of the
fact that Austria appreciates us."²⁷ He did not deny that
the secondary powers were weak reeds, but he replied that
Prussia by using their desire for peace was merely catching
"their wind in its sails." In the meantime, the King again
had a change of heart and had sent another of his special em-
issaries to Vienna to urge restraint.

So it happened that all of Austria's maneuvers had
availed nothing because great goals can not be attained by a
policy of limited risks. On June 3, Austria finally took the
267. L. W. p. 157, June 10, 1854.

251. R. W. B. 121, June 10, 1924.

bitter of limited risks. On June 3, Anatolia finally took the
availed nothing because great damage can not be attained by a
so it happened that all of Anatolia's maneuvers had
to be made to survive restraint.

had a change of heart and had sent another pilot his special em-
"their wing in its翼". In the meantime, the King again
Prussia by making their theatre for peace was merely catching
the secondary bowers were weak reeds, but he relied that
that Prussia might "prutalize the little ones brand of the
fake demesn of Saxony and Bavaria and he expressed the fear
that Bismarck could not abase highly enough of the statement-
Prussia. But now when it was a question of balsaying Vla-
boffy through the protection afforded them by Anatolia and
immediance by minor bowers empoldered to conduct a European
have demonstrated this feature with pitting front as an act of
the Princeships. In any other situation, Bismarck would
military operations with the demand that Prussia evince
taffed to couple a repulse to the Western bowers to cease
that the treaty of April 50 lapsed recumbently, because it
the secondary bowers in Hamburg called attention to the fact
And he was not to be dissatisfied. A meeting of
on their part to eliminate all risks to themselves.
German states too well not to be able to count on an effort
Bismarck knew the barteristic self-will of the secondary

- 54 -

- 25 -

irrevocable step which a year previous might have avoided
its dilemmas or at least minimized them. A sharp note was
dispatched to Russia requesting that a date be set for the
evacuation of the Danube Principalities and threatening
military measures in case of refusal.²⁸ It only underlined
the futility of its position that Austria did not dare to
submit the note in Berlin before dispatching it. It did
not matter that Frederick William was induced through a
personal meeting with the Austrian Emperor to support the
ultimatum nor that the German Confederation on July 24 agreed
to the treaty of April 20 exactly two months too late. In
its hour of greatest peril Austria, the state which could
not survive without allies, had been forced to take its risks
alone and only the instability of the Prussian monarch had
prevented Austria's total isolation. The events of the sum-
mer of 1854 were an augury of what might be in store for the
anachronistic Empire if a man ruthless enough to exploit its
embarrassments should ever govern in Berlin. The capacity
for mischief by a determined Prussian policy was being demon-
strated every day in Frankfurt by the Prussian envoy who chose
the precise moment when Austrian troops were preparing to
enter the Danube principalities to propose that Austria con-
duct all its negotiations with Russia through the Assembly
of the Confederation²⁹ -- which would have amounted to an ab-
dication of Austria's position as a great power. Bismarck,

28. Stern VIII, p. 79.

29. W. I., p. 471, July 25, 1854.

28. N. I., b. 44, July 22, 1924.
29. Stern VIII, b. 16.

diction of Anatolia's position as a great power. Bismarck, of the Confederation — which would have amounted to an escape if its negotiations with Russia through the Assemptyle enter the Danube brinckbaffies to broach that Anatolia consent the belligerent moment when Austrian troops were breaching to attack each other in Frankfurt by the Prussian army who chose for Michael I by a determined Prussian policy was being demonstrated. The capacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is a man richly enough to exploit its war of 1824 were an army of what might be in store for the Prevention of Austria's total isolation. The events of the same time and only the inaptitude of the Prussian measured had not survive without losses, had been forced to take its risks if one of greatest belligerents, the state which could to the treaty of April 20 exactly two months too late. Inanimacy nor that the German Confederation on July 24 agreed by the meeting with the Austrian Emperor to abdicate the not matter that Frederick William was induced through a summit the note in Berlin before diabatasing it. It did the inaptitude of its position that Austria did not care to military measures in case of return. It only underlined evacuation of the Danube brinckbaffies and threatening diabatasing to Russia requesting that a date be set for the its dilemma or at least minimized them. A harsh note was irrevocable added which a year before might have avoided

- 52 -

- 26 -

at any rate, had no illusions about Austria's dilemma: "The policy of Buol Ⓐ Austria's foreign minister is wrong even from the narrow Austrian point of view, because sooner or later Austria must come to an agreement with Russia about the fate of Turkey and a moment as favorable as the present will not soon recur. Every concession exacted from Russia by Austria will only force Russia to wait for the moment when it will be able to take revenge as the ally of an enemy of Austria and the latter has too many conflicting interests in Germany with us, in Ⓐ Italy, with France and at home with its own subjects for that moment not to come ... It is already a great gain for us that the coalition of Russia, Austria, and the secondary states, which we had to contend with in our Germany policy, has now been dissolved."³⁰

Statesmanship can be defined as a calculus of probabilities. For the statesmen must weigh not only his own objectives but his risks, that is, the objectives of other powers. A policy which knows only its goals will involve a tour de force beyond its resources. A policy which is oppressed by the consciousness of its risks will become the prisoner of events. The former pays the penalty for hybris that man cannot escape the finiteness of his scale by an act of will; the latter leads to futility because the statesman does not have the privilege to decline to respond to a problem put to him. The statesman moreover must always

30. W. I., p. 454, June 17, 1854.

30. W. I., b. 424, June 11, 1824.

to a broilam but to him. The statesman moreover must make
a statesman does not have the privilege to decline to respond
an act of will; the latter leads to mutility because the
idylлы that man cannot escape the truitteneem of his safe play
the prisoner of events. The former pays the benefit for
is обbreased by the consciousness of its risks will become
active a four de force beyond its resources. A boffey which
other bowers. A boffey which knows only its Rose will in-
own objectives put his risks, that is, the objectives of
broadspites. For the statesmen must weigh not only his
statesman'sib can be defined as a calculine of

our Germany boffey, has now been dissolved."30
and the secondary states, which we had to contend with in
a great gain for us that the coalition of Russia, Austria,
its own subjects for that moment not to come ... It is already
in Germany with us, in Italy, with France and at home with
Russia and the latter has too many conflicting interests
it will be able to take revenge as the sify of an enemy of
by Russia will only force Russia to wait for the moment when
will not soon return. Every concession exacted from Russia
the late of Turkey and a moment an favorable as the present
fatter Russia must come to an agreement with Russia spont
from the narrow Russian point of view, because sooner or
boffey of Bessarabia's foreign minister is wrong even
at any rate, used no illusory spont Russia's dilemma: "The

- 5d -

(A)

- 27 -

act on insufficient knowledge, for if he waits until all
facts are in it will be too late to do something about
them. Each act of policy therefore represents a balance
between the opportunities of a course of action and its
dangers. This is a question not only of calculation but
of timing. To act precipitately may mean to conjure up
the very eventualities one seeks to avoid; to fail to act
may lead to the surrender of all opportunities. The art
of statesmanship is therefore to a large degree the art
of finding the right moment for action.

It was the curse of Austrian policy during the
Crimean war not so much that its measures were badly con-
ceived but that they took so long to conceive that by the
time they were executed they hastened the contingencies
they attempted to forestall; not that the Imperial Cabinet
behaved recklessly but that it was so afraid of reckless-
ness that it left itself no room for maneuver save in sud-
den fits of panic. Thus Austria gradually found itself
isolated in Germany despite its recognition of the need for
the backing of the German Confederation and separated from
Russia despite its dread of Napoleon's design on Italy. And
the more desperate its position grew, the more fitful be-
came its measures because the Austrian cabinet sought to
compensate for each opportunity lost by redoubling its ener-
gy when it finally brought itself to act usually at the
wrong moment. There was about the diplomacy of the Creimean

wrong moment. There was spont the diplomacy of the Crimean
By when it finally brought itself to set hands at the
compound for each opportunity left by recognising its ener-
come its measures because the Austrian cabinet sought to
the more deliberate its position drew, the more vital pe-
Sucessive dequbite its dream of Napoleon's design on Italy. And
the packing of the German Confederation and separated from
isolated in Germany dequbite its recognition of the need for
democracies of banks. Thus Austria gradually found itself
now that it left itself no room for maneuver save in and-
pensived recklessly but that it was so strait of reckless-
they attempted to forestall; not that the Imperial Cabinet
time they were executed they had intended the contingencies
closed but that they took so long to conserve that by the
Crimean was not so much that its measures were badly con-
If was the course of Austrian policy during the
of landing the right moment for section.
of atTEMPTAND is therefore to a large degree the art
may lead to the surrender of all opportunities. The art
the very eventsfities one seeks to avoid; to fail to set
of timing. To set precipitately may mean to confine nb
danger. This is a question not only of calculation but
between the opportunities of a course of section and its
them. Each set of policy therefore represents a balance
fates are in it will be too late to do something about
set on insufficient knowledge, for it he would until all

- 28 -

war a quality of repetitiveness therefore, only that each succeeding phase deepened the schisms and increased the risks and thereby contributed even more to Austria's con-fusion. Each phase began with a long period of Austrian hesitation followed by an impetuous act almost of desper-ation; then came a sudden return to the realization of the limits of its own strength and a frantic search for support above all in Germany; all this accompanied by an almost contemptuous demonstration of Austria's impotence by Bis-marck wherever he had the slightest discretion and an over-powering concern on his part lest the Prussian government fail to grasp its opportunities.

So it was after Russia accepted the Austrian summation of June 3 and agreed to withdraw its troops from the Danube Principalities. It is in the nature of a policy of petty advantage to be panicky in adversity and immoder-ate in victory. Thus Austria when its worst premonitions had failed to materialize, acted as if all risks had dis-appeared and sought to exact another benefit by joining the Western powers in submitting four demands to Russia as the sine qua non of a peaceful settlement. The "Four Points" insisted on a European guarantee of the constitutional po-sition of the Danube Principalities and of Serbia; freedom of shipping on the Danube; a revision of the treaty regulat-ing the passage through the Straits in the interest of the European equilibrium; and a surrender by Russia of its claims

European enflurpment; and a surrender by Russia of its claims
on the belligerent through the Strait in the interest of the
right of navigation on the Danube; a resolution of the treaty regulat-
ing the belligerent and of the belligerent freedom
influenced on a European guarantee of the constitutional bo-
sine due son of a beauteous settlement. The "Four Points"
Western powers in submitting four demands to Russia as the
abashed and sought to exact another benefit by joining the
had failed to materialize, acted as if all risks had di-
scade in victory. Thus Austria when it most bromwiches
of, benefit advantage to be bantered in adversity and immoder-
ate Danube principalities. It is in the nature of a policy
conservation of June 3 and agreed to withdraw its troops from
So it was after Russia accepted the Austrian
that to grasp its opportunities.
bowing concern on his part heat the Russian Government
mark where he had the tightest discretion and an over-
contemnution demonstration of Austria's impotence by Bi-
apove all in Germany: all this accompanied by an almost
limitless of its own strength and a frantic search for subvert
ation; then came a sudden return to the realization of the
reaffection followed by an impenetrable act almost of despot-
Tuscan. Each belligerent began with a long period of Austrian
ranks and thereby contributed even more to Austria's con-
ceeding belligerent benefited the Ottomans and increased the
war a diversity of reproductiveness therefore, only that each

- 58 -

- 29 -

as the sole protector of the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.31 Their real significance was not their content, however, but that Austria had crossed its Rubicon. Henceforth its measures in the Balkans could no longer be justified by its fears for the survival of the Austrian Empire. It was not the return to the status quo ante which was now at issue, but a strategic gain which for Austria at Russia's expense. The Austrian troops which entered the Danube Principalities on the heels of the withdrawing Russians "to prevent clashes with the Turks" symbolized that the Holy Alliance was irrecoverably finished.

But to the extent that Austria raised its sights, it separated itself from its support within Germany partly because Austria's diplomacy was beginning to outrun the legal basis furnished by the treaty of April 20; partly by supplying Prussia a pretext to escape its commitments. For Bismarck chafing at the bit and the Camarilla could not fail to see that here was another opportunity to appeal to their King's irresolutionness if not to his statesmanship. In this manner the contest of the previous spring was repeated with Austria pressing for Prussian assistance to clinch the fruits of its recklessness and Frederick William IV vacillating in the face of the onslaught of the Camarilla with its lectures of the unity of conservative interests and of Bismarck with his preachments of the reality of power relationships. It was expressive of Bismarck's view of international relations that

31. Stern VIII, p. 83.

31. serm VIII, b. 83.

expressive of Bismarck's view of international relations that
breakments of the reality of power relationships. It was
unfit of conservative influence and of Bismarck with his
of the oulought of the Carlsills with its lectures of the
recklessness and Frederick William in vacillating in the face
breathing for Prussian pacificence to clinch the truce of its
content of the previous spring was repeated with Austria
intense it not to his statements. In this manner the
here was another opportunity to abate to their King's intero-
cialing at the pit and the Carlsills could not fall to see that
Austria a pretext to escape its commitments. For Bismarck
palsied turned by the treaty of April 20; hardly by alluding
because Austria, a diplomacy was beginning to outrun the legal
it separated itself from its abroad within Germany hardly
but to the extent that Austria raised its altars,
capitulated.

with the Turks" emphasized that the Holy Alliance was irrevo-
on the heels of the withdrawing Russians "to prevent clemens
The Austrian troops which entered the Danube principalities
put a strategic gain which for Austria at Russia's expense,
not the return to the status quo ante which was now at issue,
its terrain for the arrival of the Austrian Empire. It was
its measures in the Balkans could no longer be quantified by
even, but that Austria had crossed its Rubicon. Henceforth
Empire.31 Their real significance was not their content, how-
as the sole protector of the Christianas living in the Ottoman

- 50 -

- 30 -

he was more afraid of an accretion in Austria's power than of
a temporary isolation of Prussia. As soon as he learned of
the Austrian invastion of the Danube Principalities, he was
convinced that the Austrian troops would never leave. But
equally he was certain that Prussia should prevent this con-
tingency even at the risk of war. For any increase of Aus-
tria's strength would lead to a relative weakening of Prus-
sia in the inevitable clash over Germany.³²

The effort to deprive Austria of the spoils of its
policy was only the reverse side of a proposal that Prussia
utilize the estrangement between Austria and Russia to re-
duce Austria's power. But where Bismarck in the spring has
sought to achieve this through so arranging the commitments
of the powers that Prussia's greater freedom of action would
enable it to exact concessions as the price for its assist-
ance, he now spoke of more forceful measures. Nothing could
have demonstrated the disintegration of the Metternich sys-
tem more clearly than the fact that a Prussian diplomat could
openly counsel an attack by Prussia on Austria. The proposal
was revolutionary not so much because of its disregard of
Confederate bonds, important as this was, as for its chal-
lenge to the very legitimizing principle of the Vienna sét-
tlement. That a state might seek to obtain an improvement
of its strategic position had not been unknown in Europe after

32. W. I. p. 471, July 25, 1854.

["35. W. I. B. 411, July 25, 1824.", "of its strategic position had not been unknown in Europe after\nthe war. That a state might seem to obtain an improvement\nin its language to the very effecting principle of the Vienna agree-\nment. That a state might seem

- 31 -

1815 although every effort was made to endow territorial
changes with the legitimacy of a European consensus. But
that such a transformation should be justified by nothing
more than the vastness of the opportunity, that not even
lip service was paid to existing treaty relationships --
this involved more than a territorial change but a revo-
lution of diplomatic methods. Heretofore the legitimacy
of the international order had been thought to reside in
the consensus of its components which treated the basic
outline of the Vienna settlement as inviolate; but now the
European consensus was derived if at all from a calculus of
strength, the legitimacy of which depended on the precise-
ness of its calculations. To be sure, the difference was
one of degree, that the Metternich system was not unaware
of considerations of power even while channeling it into
European congresses; while Bismarck would have been the last
to reject the practical efficacy of a moral consensus. But
on this precise nuance depended the stability of the Euro-
pean order. For when the definition of justice cannot
transcend the changing requirements of power, it becomes
either an instrument to retard all change or a symbol to
animate the clash of the contenders. Stable orders have
therefore always been distinguished by their ability to con-
duct their conflicts as an aspect of a system of legitimacy
-- this indeed has been the condition of their cohesiveness.

- 32 -

Revolutionary orders have reduced justice to the require-
ments of victory -- this is the condition of their dynamism.

"Could we succeed in getting Vienna to the point
where it does not consider an attack by Prussia on Austria
as something outside of all possibility," Bismarck wrote to
Gerlach, "we would soon hear more sensible things from
there."33 This was followed by a flood of letters reiterating the theme of the need for a maximum of ruthlessness:
"...We shouldnot wait until France has 200 to 300 thousand
men at our borders and Austria has mobilized its army against
us. Instead we should march into Austria, quickly and unexpectedly, while Bohemia is still without troops ... I
will insist at least until experience has taught me otherwise:
Austria will not make war as long as it does not have
Germany and us behind it and certainly not if we threaten it
...We have three threats available: 1. An alliance with Russia; and it is nonsense always to swear at once that we would
never go with Russia; even if it were true we should retain
the option to use it as a threat; 2. A policy in which we
throw ourselves into Austria's arms and compensate ourselves
at the expense of perfidious confederates; 3. And a change
of cabinets to the left whereby we would soon become so
"Western" that Austria would be out-distanced and would seek
in vain to cling to our coat tails. The others are prepared
really to commit any villainy against us; why should we not
threaten with it at least?"34

33. L. G.. p. 170. October 13. 1854.

- 33 -

Here was the distillation of Bismarck's tactics and of the new diplomacy. The same report listed among possible options an alliance with Russia, an alliance with France and a liberal ministry as if only considerations of utility determined the choice. Here was the Russophile discussing an alliance with France, the reactionary speaking of a shift to the left. Even domestic politics was reduced to a factor to be manipulated for its contribution to the primary task of undermining Austria's influence in Germany. No wonder that Gerlach to whom a pro-Russian policy was an article of faith and not of national interest reacted with sorrow to these proposals. He invoked the word of the apostle that those who do evil to achieve good will surely be damned and he inquired incredulously whether it was true that Bismarck had spoken of his willingness to cede the Rhine-province to France in return for a French alliance against Austria.³⁴ Bismarck for very good reasons evaded a reply to the last query but the reiterated his basic position: "The weakness of our position lies in the belief of the other German cabinets in our inexhaustible good nature ...If we reject with an appearance of moral indignation every suggestion that we have an option either toward the East or toward the West, then the most limited politician in the smallest village will know that we must submit ... All my colleagues seek to convince me that we cannot persevere in our present policy lest we lost the Rhine-province

Here was the clarification of Biamarck's tactics
in our present policy that we lost the Urine-brood
VII with cohesiveness seek to convince me that we cannot bea-
vein to the amiable village will know that we must submit ...
East or toward the West, then the most limited policies
everyone should know that we have an option either toward the
... It we reject with an abhorrence of moral indignation
the other German capitules in our inexhaustible Good nature
affection: "The weakness of our position lies in the pettles of
a reply to the last query put the reterrated his pastive bo-
signat Utatniria.³⁴ Biamarck for very Good reasons engaged
Urine-brood to France in return for a French alliance
that Biamarck had spoken of his willingness to cede the
be claimed and he induced incredibly whether it was true
about that those who do evil to serve God will suffer
harrow to these barbosaïa. He invoked the word of the
article of faith and not of national interest respected with
No wonder that Gerlen to whom a bro-Canadian boffet was an
brutal task of undermining Utatniria's influence in Germany,
to a factor to be substantiated for its contribution to the
of a shift to the left. Even domestic politics was reduced
onaring an alliance with France, the reactionary abashing
utility determined the choice. Here was the Unabomber de-
Brzece and a fiscal ministry as it only considerations of
beneficial options an alliance with Russia, an alliance with
and of the new diplomacy. The same report flattered among

- 33 -

- 34 -

to France. I am too polite or I should answer: In that case
we shall regain it within the territory of your Sovereign.
The only effective approach to the German capitals from Munich
to Bueckenburg is fear and nothing but fear."³⁵ And he summed
up the essence of his policy in this epigrammatic sentence in
a letter later: "Please do not consider me a Bonapartist but
a very ambitious Prussian."³⁶

This was the real meaning of Bismarck's policy. The
Metternich system had restrained Prussia by creating a myth
which restricted its options in effect to the closest rela-
tionship with Austria and Russia. If Prussia was to find a
position commensurate with its real power it had to dissolve
the restraints of the international order, to achieve a po-
sition whereby having a maximum of options, it could sell its
assistance for the highest price. But it was a policy which
required cool nerves. For it sought to achieve its ends by
the calm acceptance of great risks, of isolation or of a sud-
den settlement at Prussia's expense. Its success depended on
the correct evaluation of power-relationships, above all that
Prussia's superior flexibility was not an illusion. In Bis-
marck's scheme every diplomatic act had consequently not only
a substantive but a symbolic aspect: to demonstrate Prussia's
self-confidence and not only its ability but its willingness
to stand alone. "If the German governments come to the con-
victions that a unilateral action on the part of Austria would
in all probability lead to a split within the Confederation ...

35. H. p. 199 - October 24, 1854

36. L. G. n. 175. October 25, 1854.

32. R. G. B. 1st. October 28, 1847.
33. H. b. 100 - October 54, 1824

in allropesilience tend to a split within the Confederation...
actions that a unilaterat action on the part of Anatolia would
to stand alone. "It the German Governments come to the con-
seil-confidence and not only its ability but it willingness
a napatantive put a amphoie subject: to demonstrate Prussia's
mark's scheme every diplomatic act had consequently not only
Prussia's anterior flexibility was not an illection. In Bla-
the correct evaluation of power-relationship, above all that
gen settlement at Prussia's expense. Its success depended on
the calm acceptance of great risks of isolation on of a and-
required cool nerves. For it ought to achieve its end by
analysance for the highest bracte. But it was a bofley which
arisation whereby having a maximum of options, it could self its
the restrictions of the international order, to achieve a bo-
position commensurate with its real power it had to dissolve
corporation with Anatolia and Russia. It Prussia was to find a
which restricted its options in effect to the closest rela-
Mettcrnich system had restrained Prussia by creating a wad
This was the real meaning of Bismarck's bofley. The
a very ambitious Prussian."34
a letter lsten: "Please do not consider me a Bonapartist put
in the essence of his bofley in this cibgrammatic sentence in
to Breckending in fear and nothing put fear."35
Vogt he ammed
The only effective approach to the German capitals from Berlin
we shall regain it within the territory of our sovereign
to France. I am too bofite on I should answer: In that case

- 34 -

(H)

- 35 -

they would do their utmost to restrain Austria. Everything
depends therefore on our ability to make the German govern-
ments believe that we shall persevere in our course even at
the risk of a break with Austria. A particular impression
in this respect is made by every hint which indicates a con-
tinuation of our good relations with France."38 In every
alliance the partner best able to afford a break is in the
strongest position to shape the common policy. This was all
the more true in the case of the Austrian-Prussian alliance
as Bismarck had no scruples to utilize Prussia's domestic
politics to bring pressure on his colleagues. "Toward my
colleagues," he reported to Manteuffel, "I use privately
the following language: Prussia has adopted a policy of
peace ... without ulterior motive and on behalf of Germany
in the process risking the enmity of half of Europe. It
can continue this policy only if the Confederation remains
firm ... Should the other German states desert Prussia,
however, then it must think of its own security... No choice
will be left to us, then, but to join the enemies of Russia.
But such a shift toward the West can win the confidence of
Britain and France only if carried out by a more liberal
government, which would soon outdistance Austria, carried by
the Westwind of public opinion. I trace this possible de-
velopment of Prussian policy in the tone of someone who is
unhappy about events which are unfortunately outside his

38. W. I., p. 497, October 9, 1854.

38. W. I., b. 461, October 3, 1854.

unably spontaneous events which are unfortunately outside his
affection of Prussian policy in the cause of someone who is
the Weimar of bup临时 opinion. I trace this possible ge-
Government, which would soon outpace Austria, carried by
Britain and France only if carried out by a more flexible
But such a shift toward the West can win the confidence of
will be left to me, then, put to join the enemies of Russia.
however, then it must think of its own security... No choice
till... Should the other German states desert Prussia,
can continue this policy only if the Confederation remains
in the process taking the enemy out of Europe. If
because... without further motive and on behalf of Germany
the following language: Prussia has adopted a policy of
cooperation," he reported to Nantucket. "I am privately
believe to bring breather on the coexistence." "Toward wh
as Bismarck had noscrable to utilize Prussia's domestic
the more true in the context the Austrian-Prussian alliance
strongest position to achieve the common policy. This was all
assistance the belligerent best able to afford a preck is in the
tinuation of our good relations with France."38 In every
in this respect I made by every point which indicates a con-
test of a preck with Austria. A belligerent impression
menta believe that we shall bereavere in our course even at
gegenstand therefore on our spilloy to make the German Powers-
they would do their utmost to restrain Austria. Everything

- 32 -

- 36 -

control and everyone of my colleagues seemed very upset and
disquieted by it. They fear such eventualities more than
the cholera."39

A statesman is ultimately distinguished by his con-
ception of alternatives. And it was Bismarck's skill that
he perceived combinations which had been thought impossible
for over a generation. To be sure, he was hampered not only
by the lack of imagination of his government but by that of
his colleagues who could not believe in his "seriousness."
Their reports abound in excuses for him or in almost despe-
rate efforts to reconcile the violence of his language with
his "conservative" political views. But much as they might
make allowances for his impetuosity, they were again and
again confronted with experiences which demonstrated that
Bismarck would let no doctrines of confederate loyalty inter-
fere with his conception of the requirements of Prussia's
greatness. Thus at the very moment that Prussia was nego-
tiating with Austria about adapting the alliance of April
20, to the new situation, Bismarck showed his diplomatic
reports counselling an attack on Austria to his Russian col-
league in Frankfurt. He even went so far as to suggest that
Russia conclude an alliance with France with which it was at
war, and directed against Austria with which Prussia was
just then allied. In short, states were conceived as units
of infinite adaptability inhibited only by their inherent

39. W. I., p. 505, October 20, 1854.

30. W. I., b. 202, October 50, 1924.

of infinite adaptability inquired only by their inherent
just then affirmed. In short, states were conceived as units
war, and directed against Anatria with which Brusia was
Brusia concluded an alliance with France with which it was at
deleve in Frankfurt. He even went so far as to suggest that
reports concerning an attack on Anatria to the Russian col-
50, to the new situation, Biamarck showed his diplomatic
texisting with Anatria about adapting the alliance of April
Greatness. Thus at the very moment that Brusia was neogo-
tore with his conception of the requirements of Brusia's
Biamarck would let no coexistence of congeners of congeners
again confronted with experience which demonstrated that
make provisions for his imbalance, indeed were again and
his "conversative", political items. But such as they might
rate efforts to reconcile the aloofness of his language with
their reports spounding in exultance for him or in almost deshe-
ding the colleagues who could not believe in his "sionaness".
by the lack of imagination of his Government but by that of
tor over a Generation. To be sure, he was numbered not only
he bereaved computations which had been thought improbable
ception of alternatives. And it was Biamarck's skill that
A statesman is ultimately distinguished by his con-
tinuation."32

distinguished by it. They fear each eventuality more than
control and evermore of my colleagues seemed very much and

- 32 -

(H)

- 37 -

dynamism. And when the Russian ambassador, true to the canons of the "old" diplomacy, attempted to demonstrate the impossibility of a Russo-French alliance by involving the Tsar's conservative political principles, he received a reply which in its sober tone exhibited the full measure of Bismarck's revolutionary quality: "Necessity will force you into it."⁴⁰

Against this background of Bismarck's enunciation of his policy and the bold postulate that necessity furnished its own legitimacy, the actual measures of the Prussian ministry appear anti-climatic. As in the Spring, the King's vacillations brought about an approximation to the policy Bismarck sought to achieve consciously and once more Austria played into its opponents hands by its inability to clinch its gains. No sooner had a Prussian circular note of September 3 announced that Prussia could not recommend the "Four Points" to the other German states, than Frederick William IV repented his act of independence and began to negotiate with Austria about including the "Four Points" in the Alliance of April 20.⁴¹ On November 9, he finally accepted the "Four Points" and on November 20 he even agreed that Austria could count on Prussian assistance if Russia attacked the Austrian troops in the Danube Principalities.

But Austria did not know what to do with its diplomatic triumph. Far from utilizing the Prussian alliance to

40. EYCK I, p. 247.

41. Stern VIII, p. 84.

41. Stettin VIII, b. 84.
40. ECK I, b. 541.

homogeneous triumph. But from still further the Prussian alliance to
But Austria did not know what to do with its duch-
troops in the Deutsche Prussia-betrieb.

count on Prussian assistance in Russia affected the Austrian
points", and on November 50 he even agreed that Austria could
Abrii 50. On November 9, he finally accepted the "Bou
Austria apart from including the "Bou points" in the Alliance of
relegated his set of independence and began to negotiate with
points", to the other German states, thus Friedrich William IV
temper 3 announced that Prussia could not recommend the "Bou
its Gain". No sooner had a Prussian citizen seen note of the
bated into its obliques and put its impatience to an end
Bismarck sought to acquiesce conditionally and once more Austria
aggravated brought about an approximation to the border
fifth abeam anti-climatic. As in the Spring, the King's
its own legislation, the actual measure of the Prussian min-
of its border and the bold抱timate that necessity dictated
Vainet put this background of Bismarck's emmulation
you into it."40

Bismarck's revolutionary duality: "Necessity will force
by which in its proper time expiring the Union measure of
Tear's conservative political principles, he received a re-
the incompatibility of a Russian-Bronze alliance involving the
canons of the "old" diphroea", attempted to demonstrate
dynasticism. And when the Russian ambassador, true to the

- 31 -

- 38 -

extricate itself from its Balkan involvements, it saw in
it a guarantee which enabled it to challenge Russia with
impunity. Frederick William IV had hardly accepted Aus-
tria's unilateral invasion of the Principalities than he
was confronted by another accomplished fact. On December 2
Austria concluded an alliance with Britain and France de-
spite the fact that Russia had meanwhile accepted the "Four
Points." And even if the ministry at Berlin could not
profit from its opportunities, its envoy in Frankfurt saw
clearly that Austria had mortgaged its future both towards
Russia and towards Prussia: "The combination of cowardice,
avarice, and insolence, which characterizes the present
policy of the Austrian Empire will result in a severe
hangover ... The arrogance of the imperial cabinet does
not permit them to admit that they need us; they prefer
to enmesh us but they badly deceived themselves as long as
they treat political relationships like private business
deals. For alliances of great powers are of value only when
they express mutual interests and all their clauses and
interpretations cannot furnish a substitute for good will
and energetic action." This appraisal of the result of a
year of confusion, in which Prussia had achieved freedom of
action despite itself, gained in force from the concluding
paragraph with its aphoristic vision of the future: "It
is already a great advantage for us that after the war our
relations with Russia will be better than those of Austria...

relations with Russia will be better than those of Anatolia...
is already a great advantage for me that after the war our
barGraph with its abbrAtive vision of the future: "It
action debits itself, raised in force from the concluding
year of conclusion, in which Russia had achieved freedom of
and energetic action." This abbrAtal of the result of a
interpretations cannot turnian a apudicate for good will
cut express mutual interests and all their clauses and
gains. For alliances of great powers are of value only when
they treat political relationships like private business
to emmean us put they partly deceived themselves as long as
not permit them to admit that they need not; they prefer
hangover... The arrogance of the imperial cabinet does
boffel of the Russian Empire will result in a severe
warlike, and inoffensive, which characterizes the present
Russia and towards Prussia: "The computation of command,
clearly that Anatolia had mortgaged its future both towards
brought from its opportunities, ita envoy in Frankfurt saw
points." And even if the ministry at Berlin could not
abide the fact that Russia had meannwhile accepted the "Port
Anatolia concluded an alliance with Britain and France ge-
was confronted by another accomplished fact. On December 5
tria's unilateral invasion of the principality than he
integrity. Frederick William IV had hardly accepted AnA-
if a guarantee which enabled it to challenge Russia with
extricate itself from its Belgian involvements, it was in
- 38 -

(A)

- 39 -

The day of reckoning is sure to come, even if a few years pass ... Austria has put itself as a barrier in Russia's way; the latter's policy will henceforth be directed against this barrier ... Through this transformation of the constellation of power we can only gain in freedom of action. Indeed it is a very favorable result of our hesitating policy that it has caused the antagonism between Austria and Russia to become deeper and more permanent."⁴²

Austria, however, while aware of these dangers seemed paralyzed by their enormity. It is the fate, of course, of governments whose domestic structure has become rigid that the internal difficulties of arriving at decisions seem more complex than the problems which gave rise to the need for a decision in the first place. When a bureaucratic rationality reigns supreme, the process of making policy is so complicated that the very existence of an agreement on a course of action seems to supply its own justification. It is difficult in such structures to formulate a policy; it becomes almost impossible to change once formulated. So Austria throughout the Crimean war had been motivated more by risks to be avoided than by goals to be achieved, but for this very reason the increasing difficulty of its position seemed to furnish an argument for persevering in the existing course lest all the sacrifices be in vain. Thus every Austrian gain was followed by a frantic quest for some

42. W. I., p. 515. December 9, 1854.

45. W. I., b. 212. December 3, 1824.

every Anatolian Gain was followed by a transient great for some
existing consequence last all the sacrifices be in vain. Due
attention seemed to turn an argument for berassuring in the
tor this very reason the increasing difficulty of its bo-
pa risks to be avoided than by Basis to be achieved, but
Anatira throughout the Crimean war had been motivated more
it becomes almost impossible to change once formulated. So
it is difficult in such structures to formulate a policy
a course of action seems to imply its own justification,
so complicated that the very existence of an agreement on
nationality reigns supreme, the process of making policy in
need for a decision in the first place. When a pious rationalist
seems more complex than the problems which gave rise to the
rigid that the internal difficulties of arriving at decisions
course, of governments whose domestic structure can become
seemed bartered by their enormity. It is the late, or
Anatira, however, while aware of these dangers
bis to become deeper and more permanent."45

that it has caused the antagonism between Anatira and Rus-
geed it is a very favorable result of our peacifying policy
of power we can only gain in freedom of action. In-
this manner ... through this transformation of the state-
ment the latter's policy will become the one directed against
base ... Anatira has but itself as a partner in Anatira's
The day of reckoning is near to come, even if a ten years

- 39 -

- 40 -

advantage, as if a fitness of the universe was certain to
reward a policy adopted with so much anguish. "Austria
wants to garner all the fruits along the road which fear
forces it to take," Bismarck said sarcastically. "I am not
sure that Buol has a clear goal unless it be that Austria
should pocket everything it can obtain by slight of hand."43

Thus the Austrian cabinet found itself with an
alliance with the Western Powers which it dared not imple-
ment and with an army in the Balkans that threatened it
with bankruptcy. It therefore sought to transform its in-
vastion of the Danube Principalities into an act of the
German Confederation to ease the financial strain and to
spread the risk. But its effort to mobilize the army of
the Confederation only revealed its panic. For the state
under the aegis of which the Germany Confederation had come
into being should have understood that all the pressures
would make against adventures in an area so far removed
from the main concern of most German governments. And
the vacillations of the Prussian government over the past
18 months should have made clear that Prussian support would
remain formal at best and that by attempting to force
Prussia into one distasteful decision after another, Austria
might undermine its prestige and demonstrate its impotence.

43, W. II, p. 55.

- 41 -

When Austria formally proposed that the contingents of the Confederate army be put in readiness and that the Austrian army in the Danube Principalities constitute a part of them, Bismarck had a field day. "Bismarck is profuse in his concern for the interests of the German governments," reported the Austrian envoy in Frankfurt, "for their finances, for their freedom of action, for their right to be informed _before_ decisions are taken ... No one knew for what and against whom to mobilize."⁴⁴ In his frustration the Austrian foreign minister answered with a circular dispatch which promised the German governments which supported Austria "a share of the benefits which might be obtained in an eventual war." Whatever this enigmatic phrase meant, it was easy to interpret it as an offer by Austria to compensate its supporters in Frankfurt at the expense of the other German states.

Nor was Bismarck the man to miss such an opportunity. He knew that outraged particularist self-will was more likely to produce unity of purpose than national consciousness, all the more so if Prussia took over the leadership of the opposition. He therefore never tired of emphasizing Prussia's determination not to submit; he again spoke darkly of a liberal ministry at Berlin and at the proper moment came up with a formula which enabled the minor German states to cloak their fears in the garb of Confederateloyalty without giving Austria the support it so desperately sought. After failing in a move

44. EYCK I, p. 253.

44. RUCK I, b. 523.

the amborg it so generally conducted. After tussling to a move
ters in the camp of Confederate loyalty without giving Anatria
a formula which eulogized the minor German states to cloak their
erst ministry at Berlin and at the broken moment came up with
deterioration not to amuse; he again above darkly of a lip-
action. He therefore never tired of embittering Anatria's
the more so if Prussia took over the leadership of the obbo-
to produce unity of purpose than national consonance, all
He knew that outraged bariossanat self-will was more likely
nor was Biamarck the man to lose such an opportunity.

besides the other German states.

By Anatria to combine its ambordere in Frankfurt at the ex-
enigmatic bursae meant, it was easy to interpret it as an offer
which might be obtained in an eventual war." Whatever this
Government which embarked Anatria "a share of the penalty
announced with a circular diatried which bromped the German
mopifye."⁴⁴

In his transmission the Anatrian foreign minister
fours are taken ... No one knew for what and against whom to
freedom of action, for their right to be informed before geola-
the Anatrian envoy in Frankfurt, "for their finances" for their
concern for the interests of the German Governments," reported
clem. Biamarck had a field day. "Biamarck is bro wn so in his
françan army in the Danube principalities constitute a part of
of the Confederate army be but in readiness and that the An-
When Anatria formally proposed that the contingents

- 41 -

(Y)

ECK I, b. 528.

in Germany. That in the process he authorizes Russia to incidental
tact of rigidity and of bit thereby to achieve Prussia's hegemony
(for once an Anatrian envol am clearly), "to reduce it to an op-
traventurous exerction", reported the Anatrian envol to Prussia
#1. "Blumarck seeks to geative Anatria of all the abole of its
#2. Boeschweder II, b. 112, "Beipannd 58".
#3. Boeschweder II, b. 112, "Beipannd 58".
#4. Boeschweder II, b. 128, "Beipannd 58".
#5. Boeschweder II, b. 128, "Beipannd 58".

avement enluminating in the Congress of Paris.

fort by the bowers to extricate themselves from their rival-
its meaning and the year 1822 therefore saw an increasing el-
tance of an effective stalemate in the Balkans, the war had lost
chester of operations accessible to sea bowers. But in the
and Britain and France found themselves forced to look for a
between the chief brotsgonontata in the Danube Prunelbaffies
because Anatria's oscillation interbosed an effective parier.
the control of the Balkans had to be sought out in the Crimes
Crimes was set as a measure of incoignitities. A strange for-
ize the reasons of Germany behind her, the pattern of the
With the collaboration of Anatria's fleet effort to modi-
fies in the West had ended with its immigration.
#6. Anatria's effort to demonstrate its power to its new-Long


to have the fortresses facing France but in a state of readiness.
#7. France as well as Russia and to underline Blumarck even sought
attestation in Europe.
#8. This termination of contract, included
the territory of the Confederation "in view of the threatening
& tion sophrize its army but motivate it with a desire to protect
& barriers" Blumarck came up with a proposal that the Confeder-
which would have forced Anatria to vacate the Danube Prunel-
to have the Confederate army assembed on Confederate territory.

Anatria's effort to demonstrate its power to its new-long
France as well as Russia and to undermine Blumarck even sought
attestation in Europe.
#9. This termination of contract, included
the territory of the Confederation "in view of the threatening
& tion sophrize its army but motivate it with a desire to protect
& barriers" Blumarck came up with a proposal that the Confeder-
which would have forced Anatria to vacate the Danube Prunel-
to have the Confederate army assembed on Confederate territory.

- 45 -

(A)

- 43 -

There is no need to trace the precise diplomatic
moves which brought this about because the significance of
the Crimean war did not reside in the terms of the settle-
ment which concluded it. Rather the importance of the Cri-
mean war was to be found in the diplomatic revolution the
seeds of which it sowed. The stability of the Vienna set-
tlement had been due to the conviction of the three Eastern
powers that only their unity prevented a revolutionary chaos
or a domination of Europe by France. But the Crimean war
demonstrated that the requirement of unity no longer super-
seded all other considerations of national strategy. Aus-
tria, the "chamber of peers of Europe," as Talleyrand had
called it, found itself in an uneasy alliance with a France
governed by a usurper. Prussia had been paralyzed by the
instability of its King. And the German Confederation had
demonstrated its impotence in a European crisis. All the
pillars of the Vienna settlement had thus been shown as
contingent. Stability could no longer be found in a rigid
adherence to the status quo, which rejected any fundamental
change as inconceivable. France had ended its isolation of
a generation; the myth of Russian invincibility had been
shattered; and Austria which had staked its survival on
exalting the sanctity of treaty relationships had been forced
to subordinate them to its Balkan interests.

But it is the fate of revolutions that contemporaries rarely understand their significance. Trained in the school of a period of stability, they seek to return to fa-

- 44 -

miliar methods and thereby only hasten the collapse of the
existing structure. For the more desperately the remnants
of the old order assert traditional forms, the more they
demonstrate their incongruity. Austria might strive to re-
store close alliance with Russia, but nothing could remove
the memory of the Crimean war. The German Confederation
might be profuse in its protestations of Confederate loy-
alty; but nothing could eliminate the consciousness that in
its hour of crisis, Austria had found itself alone and the
Assembly of the Confederation torn in the conflict between
the major German powers. Never again would the invocation
of the unity of conservative interests have the same compel-
ling quality; safety was no longer to be found in a rigid
adherence to the status quo but in adaptability, in adjust-
ing the new situation and utilizing it to maximum advantage.
When a system of legitimacy has disintegrated, its compen-
ents freed of its restraints once again become forces in
flux. Then victory will go to who best understand their
characteristics and their inherent dynamism; to the states-
man of sufficient imagination to grasp all possible combi-
nations, and of sufficient will power to conjure up that
which is most favorable to his charge.

So it happened that perhaps the most important
document of the Crimean war was a report which found its way
into the files of the Foreign Ministry of Berlin with marginalia
indicating that its author had not succeeded in convincing
his superior. Shortly after the conclusion of the Congress

The ancesor. Shortly after the conclusion of the Congress
indicating that its author had not succeeded in convincing
into the titles of the Foreign Ministry of Berlin with Marburg's
document of the Crimean war was a report which found its way

So it happened that because the most important
which it most favorable to his cause.

men of sufficient imagination to grasp all possible compli-
characterization and their inherent dynamism to the states-
line. Then victory will go to who beat underestand their
eats freed of its restraints once again become forces in
When a system of legitimacy has differentiated its compon-
ing the new situation and utilizing it to maximum advantage,
satisfaction to the status quo put in adaptability, in adjust-
ing duality safety was no longer to be found in a rigid
of the unity of conservative interests have the same compe-
the major German belligerent. Never again would the invocation
Vasiliy of the Confederation torn in the conflict between
its hour of crisis, Austria had found itself alone and the
sity; but nothing could eliminate the consciousness that in
might be brought in its protestations of Confederate fol-
the memory of the Crimean war. The German Confederation
attore close alliance with Russia, but nothing could remove
demonstrate their inconsistency. Austria might strive to re-
of the old order assert traditional towns, the more тых
existing atrophy. For the more deliberately the remarks
mishap methods and thereby onlyaten the collapse of the

- 44 -

(4)

- 45 -

of Paris, Bismarck had drafted an outline of what he took to be the requirements of Prussian policy in the new constellation of powers. Its distinguishing characteristic was its assumption of the perfect flexibility of international relationships which were limited only by the requirements of national interest. All the strands implicit in isolated reports of the previous two years merged in a plan whose prescience could be understood only after it had been accomplished 15 years later. German historiography has justly called it the "Prachtbericht" -- the master report. For here in one memorandum was assembled the essence of the new diplomacy even if its novelty robbed it of immediate impact.

The report began with an exposition of the brilliant position of France upon the conclusion of the Crimean war.48 All the states of Europe were seeking Napoleon's friendship but none with more success than Russia. "An alliance between France and Russia is too natural, that it should not come to pass ... Up to now the firmness of the Holy Alliance ... has kept the two states apart; but with Tsar Nicholas dead and the Holy Alliance dissolved by Austria, nothing remains to arrest the natural reapproachement of two states with nary a conflicting interest." Nor had Austria escaped its dilemma by anticipating Russia in establishing closer relations with France. Napoleon, to be sure, would never make war for its own sake but in order to maintain the support of the army, but he required to keep open

gain the advantage of the army, put he required to keep open
would never make war for its own sake put in order to met-
fulling closer relations with France. Napoleon, to be sure,
Anatolia encased its dilemma by antipatating Russia in each-
of two states with Russia a conflicting interest." Nor put
Russia, nothing remains to arrest the natural reëmbrochement
Tart Nicholas dead and the Holy Alliance dissolved by the
Holy Alliance ... has kept the two states apart; put with
should not come to pass ... Up to now the timeliness of the
assurance between France and Russia in too natural, that it
truly put none with more success than Russia." "As
war."⁴⁸
VII the states of Europe were seeking Napoleon's
finalition of France upon the confirmation of the Crimean
The report began with an exhortation of the prill-
Imperial.

new diplomacy even if its novelty hopped if it immediate
for here in one memorandum was ascribed to the assurance of the
quarrel called it the "Braupentext" — the master report.
socomblated 12 beans later. German historiography has
whose brevience could be understood only after it had been
isolated reports of the brevions two beans merged in a bias
ment of national interest. VII the strange implicit in
tional relationships which were limited only by the require-
ment its assumption of the perfect flexibility of inter-
relation of beans. Its distinguishing characteristic
to be the requirements of Russian policy in the new con-
ci of Russia, Bismarck had drafted an outline of what he took

- 42 -

(X)

- 46 -

one issue capable of supplying at any time" a not too arbitrary and unjust pretext for intervention. Italy is ideally suited for this role. The ambitions of Sardinia, the memories of Bonaparte and Murat, furnish sufficient excuses to [napoleon] and the hatred of Austria will smoothe its way."

This brillian prognosis of the immediate future was preliminary to a discussion of Prussia's position. If a Franco-Russian alliance was inevitable and a Franco-Austrian conflict probable where lay Prussia's safety? The canons of the Metternich system would have counselled an alliance with Austria, a reliance on the German Confederation, and the closest relationships with Great Britain. Each of these elements was demolished by Bismarck in turn. Britain would have difficulty maintaining control of the seas against a resurgent French navy aided perhaps by the United States. In any case Britain's land-forces were so negligible that the Central Powers would have to bear the brunt of the conflict. The German Confederation was an illusory force.

"Aided by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the German Confederation would probably hold together, because it would be live in victory even without its support; but in the case of a two-front war towards East and West, those princes who are not under the control of our bayonets would attempt to save themselves through declarations of neutrality, if they

48. W. II, p. 138, April 26, 1856.

48. W. II. b. 138t. April 5p. 192d.

use themselves through declarations of neutrality, if they
are not under the control of our government would attempt to
ol. a two-front war towards East and West, those brines who
live in victory even without its support; but in the case
eration would properly hold together, because it would pe-
"Aided by Prussia, Prussia, and Austria, the German Conleg-
eriate. The German Confederation was an ill-fated force.
the Central Powers would have to bear the brunt of the con-
In any case Britain's land-forces were so negligible that
a reenlistment French navy aided Britain by the United States.
would have difficulty maintaining control of the area against
theene elements was demoralized by Bismarck in turn. Britain
and the closest relationships with Great Britain. Each of
France with Austria, a reliance on the German Confederation,
canons of the Metternich system would have concurred an of-
Austrian conflict propaple where lay Prussia's safety? The
a Franco-Prussian alliance was inequitable and a Franco-
was preliminary to a discussion of Prussia's position. It
This prussian brocade of the immediate future
[usborne] and the patric of Austria will smooth the way."
orders of Bonaparte and Moltke, turn to effective exence to
united for this role. The ambitions of Sardinia, the mem-
trary and nutnant pretext for intervention. It is itself ideelly
one isane cabine of emblying at such time" a not too early-

(A)

- 47 -

did not appear in the field against us... With a million
troops of the Holy Alliance behind it, the German Confed-
eration may seem durable; in the present situation it is
unable to resist a foreign danger."

But what about the alliance with Austria, the
cardinal postulate of Prussian policy for over a genera-
tion? Not only was Austria a weak ally, Bismarck replied,
but an incongruous one. "If we remained victorious against
a Franco-Russian alliance for what would be we have fought?
For the continuation of Austria's predominance in Germany
and the miserable constitution of the Confederation ...
For that we cannot possibly risk our existence or bleed to
death victoriously." On the contrary, Austria was the chief
obstacle of Prussia's growth: "Germany is too small for the
two of us ..., as long as we plow the same furrow, Austria
is the only state against which we can make a permanent gain
and to which we can suffer a permanent loss...For the past
thousand years the German dualism has regulated its internal
relationships through a war every 100 years and in this cen-
tury too, no other means will be able to make the clock of
history tell the proper time." Thus whatever contingency
Bismarck considered, he resolved into an argument that Prus-
sia should not permit its chief antagonist to impede its
measures through misunderstood historical analogies.

How then could a power survive in the center of the
Continent? By total commitment had been the answer of Prussia

Continent? By total commitment had been the answer of Prussia
How then could a bower survive in the center of the
measures through misunderstood historical analogies.

It should not permit its chief antagonist to impede its
Bismarck considered, he resolved into an argument that Prun-
hatary fell the broker time." Thus whatever contingency
turn too, no other means will be able to make the clock of
relationship through a war every 100 years and in this cen-
thousand years the German quality has regulated its internal
and to which we can entitle a permanent loss...For the best
in the only state against which we can make a permanent gain
two of us ... as long as we blow the same tomorrow, Anatria
opalescet Prunatae a Growth: "Germany is too small for the
dead victoriously." On the contrary, Anatria was the chief
For that we cannot positively risk our existence or bleed to
and the miscalculation of the Confederation ...
For the continuation of Anatria's predominance in Germany
a Franco-Prussian alliance for what would be we have fought?
put an incongruous one. "It we remained victorious against
tion? Not only was Anatria a weak ally, Bismarck relied,
corruptly boatload of Prussian boots for over a Genera-
But what spout the alliance with Anatria, the
mispie to restat a foreign country."

It would seem nonsensical in the present situation if it
troops of the Holy Alliance behind it, the German Conqu-
did not appear in the field against us... With a million

- 41 -

- 48 -

after 1815, by drawing a line and building a preponderent
strength behind it. By total aloofness was Bismarck's so-
lution, by a policy which enabled Prussia to be always closer
to any of the contending parties than they were to each other:
"The present situation forces us not to commit ourselves in
advance of the other powers. We are not able to shape the
relations of the great powers to each other as we wish, but
we can maintain the freedom to utilize to our advantage those
relationships which do come about...Our relations to Austria,
Britain and Russia are such that they do not furnish an ob-
stacle to a rapprochement with either of these powers. Only
our relations with France require careful attention so that
we keep open the option of going with France as easily as with
the other powers. I do not mean to advocate an alliance with
France for its own sake; but I believe that our position loses
weight to the degree that the chance of an alliance with France
is eliminated from the range of possible option for Prussia.
Moreover we may find ourselves in a position where an alliance
with France would be the lesser of two evils...This may be re-
grettable, but facts cannot be changed, they can only be used."49

Facts can only be used -- this was the motto of the
new diplomacy which sought to keep the situation fluid through
the dexterity of its manipulations until there had emerged a
constellation which took better account of the realities of
Prussia's power than the Vienna settlement. But a call to

49. W. II, p. 149, May 10, 1856.

48. M. II, b. 148, May 10, 182c.

Brabançais's power than the Atemna settlement. But a call to constelation which took better account of the realities of the dexterity of its manipulations until there had emerged a new diplomacy which sought to keep the situation fluid through facts can only be used -- this was the motto of the Grettaple, put facts cannot be changed, they can only be need."49

With France would be the lesser of two evils...This may be Moreover, we may find ourselves in a position where an alliance is eliminated from the range of possible option for Brabançais. Weight to the degree that the chance of an alliance with France with France for its own sake? I do not mean to advocate an alliance with the other bowers. I do not mean to advocate an alliance with our relations with France require careful attention so that assets to a rabbrochement with either of these bowers. Only Britain and Brabançais are such, but they do not turn us an op-relationship which do come about...Our relations to Atemna, we can maintain the freedom to utilize to our advantage those relations of the great bowers to each other as we wish, put advantage of the other bowers. We are not able to assure the "The present situation forces us not to commit ourselves in to such of the conferring benefits than they were to each other: Intention, by a bold step which enabled Brabançais to be almost closer and strengthening it. By total aloofness was Biamarck's so-atter 1812, by drawing a line and puffing a brevougerent

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greatness is not often comprehensible to contemporaries.
Above all is this true if a brilliant international position
is sought to be purchased at the sacrifice of the beliefs of
a significance segment of the population. Prussian hegemony
in Germany meant little to the Prussian legitimists if ob-
tained through an alliance with Napoleon. And a unified
Germany was unacceptable to the liberals if it occurred in
the name of Prussia's greatness. It was only natural there-
fore that Bismarck should stand alone again and that his next
battle should be fought on the domestic front and against his
former allies, the conservatives, who reacted with incredulous
horror at the policy he unfolded. Something like a premonition
may have been involved that Prussia might lose its essence even
while it increased its power. But whether their motive was a
limited horizon or an instinctive wisdom, the conservatives
were met with ever increasing sharpness by the full violence
of Bismarck's eloquence, denying that any state had the right
to sacrifice its opportunities to its principles.

to sanctify its obligations to its principles.

of Biamarck's eloquence, gifting that any state had the right
were met with ever increasing animosity by theuff violence
limited horizon or an instinctive wisdom, the conservatives
while it increased its power. But whether their motive was a
may have been involved that Biamarck might force its essence even
horror at the policy he unfolded. Something like a bromide
former sullen, the conservatives, who reacted with furiously
battle should be taught on the domestic front and against his
love that Biamarck should stand alone again and that his next
the name of Biamarck's greatness. It was only natural there-
Germany was unacceptable to the left翼 if it occurred in
tained through an alliance with Napoleon. And a unified
in Germany meant little to the Prussian hegemony
a significance segment of the population. Prussian hegemony
is sought to be purchased at the sacrifice of the welfare of
above all is this true if a brilliant international position
Greatness is not often comprehensible to contemporaries.

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