U.S. 'Regrets' Attack, 'Deplores' Greek Action

Washington Was Caught Unaware

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Official Washington appeared to be caught by surprise late last night by the suddenness of the Turkish landing on Cyprus, even though the imminent risk of such a move had been rated high.

Only a few hours before Turkey launched its military action, Nixon administration officials had expressed the belief that private U.S. diplomacy was effectively "buying time" for a possible peaceful compromise. A few hours after the invasion, a State Department spokesman said early this morning:

"We regret this military action by Turkey just as we explore the previous action by Greece that precipitated the crisis..."

This was the first official criticism expressed by the United States about Greece since the crisis erupted last Monday.

On Thursday, a White House official at San Clemente, Calif., said the United States was deliberately handling the crisis "low key" berause, he said, "we feel very honfident" that the diplomacy would succeed.

If the Turkish landing leads Less optimistic, but far from to a major conflict with

hopeless attitudes were expressed on all sides in Washington late Friday by officials of the State and Defense departments.

The Nixon administration was caught with its top officials spread between Washington and California where the President is.

The announcement that Turkish forces were landing on Lyprus brought a rush of officials into the operations rooms of the State and Defense departments and a burst of activity at President Nixon's West Coast White House.

President Nixon had conferred at San Clemente twice during the day with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and they met again last night after news of the Turkish invasion was flashed to the White House.

About 12:30 this morning, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said, "We are following the situation." He would make no other immediate comment, except to tell newsmen that Kissinger had telephoned British Foreign Minister James Callaghan in London.

Greece, it will grievously confound the North Atlantic alliance and jeopardize the allied position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Twice before in the last decade, in 1964 and 1967, a similar threat of war between the two NATO allies was averted by diplomacy, and the United States hoped to achieve a similar result in the current Cyprus crisis.

During the present Cyprus crisis, administration officials have disclosed virtually nothing all week about the substance of their private, diplomacy, except that Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco was hurriedly pursuing a search for peace, from London to Athens to Ankara.

Until yesterday, no disclosure was made that the Soviet Union once again has alerted seven airborne divisions, as it had done during the "Middle East crisis last October.

The U. S. response to the unannounced Soviet action in October was a spectacular alert of American military forces around the world. Those double actions raised major questions about the meaning of American-Soviet detente. This time, in the immediate wake of President Nixon's third meeting in Moscow with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, June 27 to July 3, the United States took the opposite public course, maintaining silence about the Soviet alert.

Earlier yesterday, administration officials were projecting a series of diplomatic activities extending into the coming week in the Cyprus crisis.

Kissinger, who arrived in San Clemente late Thursday, chosen "middle course of flexibility," concentrating on Washington Sunday for a low-key, private diplomacy, Monday meeting with Archbishop Makarios, the de facto president of Cyprus, successor installed by the Makarios had requested the coup, Nikos Sampson.

meeting through the Cypriot embassy in Washington after he had received an invitation earlier from Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That meeting is also scheduled for Monday, in addition to a probable appearance of Makarios before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Under Secretary Sisco, according to diplomatic sources in Athens, was informed late yesterday that Greece totally rejected Turkey's demands for restoring Archbishop Makarios to office and removing from Cyprus the Greek officials who led the coup against Makarios last Monday.

Nevertheless, as Sisco was arriving in Ankara last night to confer with Turkish officials, American officials in Washington continued to express hope that the Sisco mission would help avert a Greek-Turkish far.

State Department officials said before the invasion the situation "is not absolutely black," and most importantly that "discussions are still continuing," mit neither a breakthrough nor a diplomatic stalemate. "We have been reasonably encouraged by the progress of the discussions so far," said one senior U.S. official.

Officials at the State Department circulated firm denials that Kissinger had overridden the advice of numerous officials earlier in the week to take a strong public stand for the immediate restoration of Makarios to power.

All "principal officials," it was said, concurred in the chosen "middle course of flexibility," concentrating on low-key, private diplomacy, without U.S. commitment either to Makarios or to the proposed president of Cyprus. successor installed by the Makarios had requested the coup, Nikos Sampson.

Cyprus

Washington Post, July 20, 1974

Let's Get Him Back

The name Simas Kudirka brings back sicken-
ing memories of one of the black moments in U.S.
history. Kudirka was the Lithuanian sailor who in
1970 made a desperate leap for freedom from a
Soviet fishing trawler to a U.S. Coast Guard
vessel.

Later he was forcibly dragged back to the
trawler by Soviet toughs who boarded the vessel
and clubbed him into submission with no in-
terference from the U.S. crew.

The act was a vicious crime against humanity and human decency. And now it is revealed that the crime has been compounded: it was a crime against an American citizen, aided and abetted by a branch of the U.S. armed forces and condoned by the government.

Kudirka's mother was born in Brooklyn and was a U.S. citizen as well as a Soviet citizen, the State Dept. has declared—three long years after the incident—that citizenship, by U.S. law extends to her son.

Kudirka is serving a 10-year sentence in a So-
viet labor camp for his attempted escape. His
mother is not allowed to leave the country.

The reason? The Soviets do not recognize dual citizenship and reports that Kudirka "is a Soviet citizen and subject to Soviet laws."

That is not good enough. Every diplomatic tool
available should be used to pry Kudirka loose
from his Soviet chains. There is plenty that can be
done and there should be no delay in doing it. This
matter involves much more than an obscure
debate about differing citizenship laws.

It was an American citizen who was beaten by
the Soviets on an American ship and thrown into a
foreign prison.

The United States can mitigate its earlier
shame by acting proudly now.

Let's get Simas Kudirka back.

Max Lerner

Kissinger the Only Likely Survivor

Whatever else Henry Kissinger is or isn't, he is—don't
ever doubt it—a survivor. Amid the wreck of reputations
careers in post-Watergate Washington he endures, and
may even prevail.

His greatest trial has predictably been that of success,
especially in the Middle East diplomacy. The world, and
notably the liberal community, will forgive failures but it
will not forgive success. Kissinger is philosopher enough to
understand this, but not enough to be amused by it. He
fights back—which distresses his critics who forget that he
didn't get where he is by passivity.

As it happens I go along with his foreign policy for the
most part. But I am more skeptical of the Russian detente
role than he is, and more skeptical also of Soviet intentions
on the SALT talks. Yet I've felt from the start that the ef-
fort to bring him down via the bugging-inquiry route, espe-
cially through the leaks from the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, was ungenerous and unfair. He struck back at
Salzburg, with a degree of emotion which disturbed those
who had mistaken him for an iceberg.

I thought at the time that the striking-back tactic would
work, and the event seems to confirm it. The leaks from
the House Judiciary Committee dried up. There was a
change of venue to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. President Nixon's letter to Chairman Fulbright—which
should have come earlier—further strengthened Kissinger's
position that his role in the bugging was marginal. Kiss-
inger has told friends that after reading the FBI documents
he feels that, if anything, he originally overstated—not un-
derstated—his role.

The Salzburg threat to resign was not a put-on. It is all
but certain that the Senate committee will clear him (an
influential member, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), says he
has nothing to worry about), yet Kissinger still talks darkly
of resigning if more than three committee members vote
against him. Why does he feel so strongly on this issue?
The answer, I suspect, is that it was intolerable for him to
have the Watergate infection spread to his own position.
His job as secretary of state, in a crippled administration,
is hard enough without its authority eroded by the
Watergate plague as well.

The Kissinger foreign policy has been supple,
sophisticated, imaginative. The new questions about it have
to do with whether it is also tough-minded.

One must doubt that so seasoned a veteran of Kremlin
studies and of nuclear studies has many illusions about the
Russians. But the Vietnamese war, with its divisive impact
on the nation, has left its scar on his thinking. The one
thing the United States cannot afford, Kissinger is known to
feel, is a series of localized semi-military confrontations
that will resurrect Vietnam debates and the Vietnam men-
tality. I should myself agree that for the United States to
get some relative freedom from such confrontations would
be a detente plus. But we must constantly ask how high a
price we are willing to pay for it.

The problem with nuclear weapons and the SALT talks
is even more tangled. Kissinger is obviously no novice in
this area. Long discussions with Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with his own
arms control experts, have put him on his mettle in any
arguments with critics of his policies. Clearly he doesn't
feel there is any gap in effective firepower between the
Soviets and the United States, and he is determined to keep
any gap from developing—one that would make Americans
insecure and might even tempt the Russians into a pre-
emptive first strike.

My own feeling is that on national purposes or nuclear
or strategies the distance between Sen. Henry Jackson (D-
Wash.) and Secretary Schlesinger on one side, and Sec-
retary Kissinger on the other, is not as great as usually
thought. But there are real differences on assessments of
the weapons available and to come for both the nuclear
powers, and on what they mean for nuclear sufficiency and
national security. That is what the coming nuclear debate
should focus on.

It was ironic that Kissinger should have been called as
a defense witness at the Ehrlichman trial. In all of Mr.
Nixon's inner circle, composed so largely of former ad-
vance men in the 1968 campaign, who has been brought into
the power center, Kissinger alone was an outsider. Yet, giv-
en Vice President Ford's enthusiasm for him, one reflects
that of the whole policy-shaping group Kissinger is the only
one likely to survive the holocaust.

Off Course on Cyprus

Against the strong recommendations of experts in his
own Department and elsewhere, Secretary of State Kiss-
singer has evidently set the United States on a Cyprus
course that carries maximum danger for everyone con-
cerned—including the United States.

It is a course that runs the greatest risk of provoking
a legal Turkish military intervention on Cyprus that
could ignite war between Greece and Turkey, shattering
the southern flank of the NATO alliance—the very dis-
aster that Mr. Kissinger presumably would move moun-
tains to prevent.

It is a course that could open undreamed-of diplomatic
and military possibilities for the Soviet Union in the
sensitive eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, eventually
imperiling even the limited progress toward peace be-
tween Israel and the Arab states that Mr. Kissinger
has worked so hard to achieve.

It is a course that over the longer run will surely put
in jeopardy those American bases in Greece—about
which the Secretary of State seems obsessed to the
exclusion of every other factor in the Cyprus picture—
and even the durability of Greece's commitment to NATO
and the West.

It is a course likely to unravel all the limited progress
made recently by the Nixon Administration in repairing
relations with this country's NATO partners; likely in
particular to give lasting offense in Britain, which has
sovereign bases on the island and a special role as guar-
antor of its independence and integrity.

Not least important, the Kissinger course, if persisted
in, can only erode further the effectiveness of the United
Nations and diminish the hopes of small countries that
must depend on it to protect them against aggression.

As the United Nations awaits the dramatic appearance
of President Makarios to plead the cause of a constitu-
tional government overthrown by forces directed from
Greece, the question asked incessantly by bewildered
delegates is: Why?

Why is the United States threatening to block any
Security Council resolution that only states the obvious
fact: the Cyprus National Guard was ordered into rebel-
lion by Greek officers whose replacement had been
demanded of Athens by Archbishop Makarios nine days
before the coup?

Why is the United States unwilling to support the
request, already made of Athens by Britain and backed
by thirteen NATO members, as well as many other
nations, for the prompt withdrawal of those Greek offi-
cers to the mainland?

Why is Washington unable to perceive the opening it
is handing to the Soviet Union to pose—with nauseating
hypocrisy in light of Moscow's brutal interventions in
East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, etc., etc. —
as champion of an elected government, the implacable
foe of both the military tyrants in Athens and their
gangster agents on Cyprus, and even as the backer of a
legal military intervention on the island by Turkey?

Is Washington's intelligence so faulty that it has not
detected the growing insecurity of the oppressive Greek
regime and thus the strong probability that the Cyprus
putsch was mounted as a diversion to rally support from
restless and unhappy Greeks?

These questions are being asked not only at the United
Nations and at chanceries around the world, but at high
levels of the United States Government. They deserve
some clear answers from the Secretary of State.

N.Y. Times

19 July 1974

Kissinger insists on U.S. caution on Cyprus

By Dan Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is maneuvering to preserve peace in the eastern Mediterranean by preventing the Turkish armed forces, now poised for action, from moving to invade Cyprus to restore Archbishop Makarios as chief of government.

But in his maneuvers Dr. Kissinger is finding himself at odds, not only

with the Turks but with Britain and the Soviet Union.

He faces the probability of a Secu-
rity Council resolution calling for
recall or replacement of the 650 Greek
officers who are believed to have
overthrown the Archbishop and in-
stalled Nikos Giorgiades Sampson as
prime minister.

The real U.S. position, one Western diplomat said, seemed to be to preserve peace at any costs, even at the expense of Archbishop Makarios.

It is apparent to correspondents

covering the State Department that
working-level U.S. officials also
would have preferred a more forth-
right American position, and had
been overruled by the Secretary of
State.

And in Washington, Sen. J. W. Ful-
bright, chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, has in-
vited Archbishop Makarios who ar-
rived in New York Thursday after-
noon, to visit the Senator in Washing-
ton immediately. He issued the in-
vitation after consultation with Dr.
Kissinger with whom, according to

some Senate sources, he differs on the
State Secretary's extreme restraint.

Extraordinary situation

For a chief of government whom the U.S. technically still recognizes to come to Washington at the invitation of a Senator rather than of the Secretary of State or President is an extraordinary situation, which indicates the direction of Dr. Kissinger's policy.

The overriding consideration in Dr. Kissinger's policy, as diplomats here understand it, is not only to prevent violence, but to avoid risking the safety of American military interests in Greece. These are "home port" arrangements for a part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet — Pyraeus base rights for the Navy and Air Force at Suda Bay on Crete.

★Please turn to Page 5

# ★U.S. caution on Cyprus

Continued from Page 1

Without these positions in Greece, the Sixth Fleet would find it difficult to operate in the eastern Mediterranean. For the Defense Department, the American positions in Greece appear to be more vital than the base rights the U.S. also enjoys in Turkey.

## Officials critical

At the working level, some U.S. officials were critical of the United States decision to seek a postponement of the Security Council meeting from Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. The delay, according to the officials, gave the insurgents the time they needed to consolidate their positions.

Had the Security Council ordered an immediate cease-fire, these officials suggest, Archbishop Makarios might have succeeded in holding a part of the island. Now that the Sampson regime is in full control, however, the question of de facto recognition by the United States arises.

U.S. spokesman Robert Anderson reasserted Thursday that the question of recognition is still in abeyance.

## Thursday called crucial

Thursday appeared to be a crucial day for Dr. Kissinger.

In London, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, began negotiations with the British, and with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. The British were far out ahead of the U.S. in their demand that the Greeks immediately withdraw or replace their officers, but agreed with the State Department in seeking to restrain the Turks.

The Turks, while insisting on their

right under the 1960 treaty governing Cyprus's political status to intervene unilaterally, seem to be willing to consider a possible diplomatic solution.

UPI photo

## Kissinger: rifts to heal

### Compromise possible

In Washington, some Western diplomats believed that a compromise might be worked out if the new Cypriote President, Nikos Giorgiades Sampson, was willing to step aside in favor of someone else acceptable to the Turks as well as the Greeks.

The Greek Government and Mr. Sampson in Cyprus appeared to be bending over backwards to avoid giving the Turks any excuse for action. Both have issued statements upholding the independence of Cyprus under its present constitution and assuring the Turkish minority that it has nothing to fear.

NEW YORK POST, WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 1974

Max Lerner

KISSINGER AS SURVIVOR

WASHINGTON.

Whatever else Henry Kissinger is or isn't, he is—don't ever doubt it—a survivor. Amidst the wreck of reputations and careers in post-Watergate Washington he endures, and may even prevail.

His greatest trial has predictably been that of success, especially in Middle East diplomacy. The world, and notably the liberal community, will forgive failures but it will not forgive success. Kissinger is philosopher enough to understand this, but not enough to be amused by it. He fights back—which distresses his critics, who forget that he didn't get where he is by passivity.

As it happens I go along with his foreign policy for the most part. But I am more skeptical of the Russian detente role than he is, and more skeptical also of Soviet intentions on the SALT talks. Yet I felt from the start that the effort to bring him down via the bugging inquiry route, especially through the leaks from the House Judiciary Committee, was ungenerous and unfair. He struck back at Salzburg, with a degree of emotion which disturbed those who had mistaken him for an iceberg.

I thought at the time that the striking-back tactic would work, and the event seems to confirm it. The leaks from the House committee dried up. There was a change of venue to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. President Nixon's letter to chairman Fulbright—which should have come much earlier—further strengthens Kissinger's position that his role in the bugging was marginal. Kissinger has told friends that after reading the FBI documents he feels that, if anything, he originally overstated—not understated—his role.

The Salzburg threat to resign was not a put-on. It is all but certain that the Senate committee will clear him (an influential member, Senator Stuart Symington, says he has nothing to worry about), yet Kissinger still talks darkly of resigning if more than three committee members vote against him.

Why does he feel so strongly on this issue? The answer, I suspect, is that it was intolerable for him to have the Watergate infection spread to his own position. His job as Secretary of State, in a crippled Administration, is hard enough without having its authority eroded by the Watergate plague as well.

The Kissinger foreign policy has been supple, sophisticated, imaginative. The new questions about it have to do with whether it is also tough-minded. One must doubt that so seasoned a veteran of Kremlin studies has many illusions about the Russians. But the Vietnam war, with its divisive impact on the nation, has left its scar on his thinking. The one thing the U. S. cannot afford, Kissinger is known to feel, is a series of localized semi-military confrontations

that will resurrect the Vietnam debates and the Vietnam mentality.

I should myself agree that for the U. S. to get some relative freedom from such confrontations would be a detente plus. But we must constantly ask how high a price we are willing to pay for it.

The problem with nuclear weapons and the SALT talks is even more tangled. Kissinger is obviously no novice in this area. Long discussions with Defense Secretary Schlesinger, with the Joint Chiefs, with his own Arms Control experts, have put him on his mettle in any argument with critics of his policies. Clearly he doesn't feel there is any gap in effective fire-power between the Soviets and the U. S., and he is determined to keep any gap from developing—one that would make Americans insecure and might even tempt the Russians into a pre-emptive first strike.

My own feeling is that on national purposes or strategies, the distance between Sen. Jackson and Schlesinger on one side and Kissinger on the other, is not as great as usually thought. But there are real differences on assessments of the weapons available and to come, for both the nuclear powers, and on what they mean for nuclear sufficiency and national security.

It was ironic that Kissinger should have been called as a defense witness at the Ehrlichman trial. In all of Nixon's inner circle, composed so largely of former advance men in the 1968 campaign who had been brought into the power center, Kissinger alone was an outsider. Yet, given Vice President Ford's enthusiasm for him, one reflects that of the whole policy-shaping group Kissinger is the only one likely to survive the holocaust.

Jack Anderson

program brings the Treasury $1.8 million annually.

Shadows of the Past

ADDINS

ION, before radio, before the automobile, people amused evening through the arts of silhouette and stencil. Do not use in part involve a spray-spatter technique approximated blade on a nylon-bristled toothbrush dipped in indelible ink

glass. "The light is behind the sitter, and the silhouettist is on the other side of the glass," said Mrs. Yates, pointing out the importance of the sitters' sitting still. The principle is made clear in an engraving of Lavater's 18th Century "Shadow Machine," and a few pages later the book has a drawing of a silhouette machine devised by the Yateses themselves.

"Stencilling can be mastered without artistic ability," said Mrs. Yates, now a spry 67 and a widow, come here from her home near Niagara Falls to serve on the program-

planning committee of the annual conference of the American Library Trustees Assn. To stencil is to paint any surface through cut-out designs, and "Early American Crafts and Hobbies" (Funk & Wagnall's) shows such samples as an an eagle of the Federal period and a selection of Pennsylvania Dutch motif.

The serious antiquer could have a field day stencilling Hitchcock chairs. "The good ones," she said, "are in museums or priced out of line for the average person, but it still possible to find them in the rough." A preliminary coat of clear var-

nish makes for easier blending of the stencil colors, which should go from darker on the inside to lighter on the outside, and a dress rehearsal in mixing tones before applying them is also recommended in the chapter on "Yesterday's Stenciling for Today's Furniture." Further advice: for variety in the compote motif, move the fruits around.

"American Painted Furniture 1660-1880," by Dean A. Fales Jr. (Dutton), is a compilation of photographs

of the highest interest not only to connoisseurs but also anyone looking for an idea on how to enliven, say, a second-hand blanket box.

Bouquets of violets and bunches of fruit in contemporary vein, suitable for tracing or even transferring with carbon paper, are in Marg Pond's "Decorative Painting" (Creative Home Library). And in "Norwegian Rosemaling (Scribner's) Margaret Miller and Sigmund Aarseth elucidate the swirling style. of the folk art of decoration with "C" and "S" curves.

The principle of silhouetting is illustrated in this 18th Century engraving.

Dear Abby

ABIGAIL VAN BUREN

We've lived in this nice family neighborhood for 15 years. Next-door neighbors rented their house to a group of long-living young men and women are living together there, and married.

One hundred dollars to a charity of your choice, Abby, if you print this. My nephew never misses your column.

# Nixon Absolves Kissinger
Of Wiretap Responsibility

KISSINGER, From A1

view following reports that FBI documents named him as the initiator of the wiretaps on 13 officials and four news-men. This contradicted his testimony that he had not initiated the taps but had supplied names of persons with access to classified materials. At a press conference in Salzburg, Austria on June 11, Kissinger said it was not possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States when "the character and credibility of the Secretary of State is at issue." If the matter were not cleared up, he said, "I will resign."

The Nixon letter was released following the second in the series of hearings the committee is holding at Kissinger's request. Yesterday, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley and two other FBI officials, Thomas J. Smith, an inspector in the intelligence division, and James B. Adams, deputy associate director, went over details of the wiretapping operation with committee members.

Kissinger himself is scheduled to testify on July 23 and Alexander M. Haig, Mr. Nixon's chief of staff and former deputy to Kissinger, is to appear on July 30. Today Bernard Wells, who was an aide

to William Sullivan, the No. 3 man in the FBI, is to testify. Sullivan, who recently had a heart attack, has agreed to respond to questions in writing.

In his letter to Fulbright, Mr. Nixon reaffirmed his statement of May 22, 1973, in which he said he had authorized the wiretap program. In addition, the President outlined what he called the national security problems involved.

"You appreciate, I am sure," he wrote, the crucial importance of secrecy in negotiations with foreign countries. Without secret negotiations and essential confidentiality, the United States could not have secured a cease-fire in South Vietnam, opened relations with the People's Republic of China, or realized progress in our relations on the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union."

Mr. Nixon said he had already explained, in his May 22 speech, circumstances that led to his decision to investigate leaks of sensitive information. He added in his letter: "I ordered the use of the most effective investigative procedures possible, including wiretaps, to deal with certain critically important national security problems. Where supporting evidence was available, I personally directed the sur-

veillance, including wiretapping, of specific individuals.

The president gave full backing to Kissinger's testimony "to the effect that he performed the function, at my request, of furnishing information about individuals within investigative categories that I established so that an appropriate and effective investigation could be conducted in each case."

Fulbright suggested that the entire issue about Kissinger's role in the wiretapping was "a tempest in a teapot," calling the issue one of "relative insignificance."

The press, he said, was standing around like people at the guilloitte, waiting for a head to roll. "I wonder," Fulbright ventured, "if people are getting at the policy of detente (between the Soviet Union and the United States) by getting at Dr. Kissinger." Fulbright said: "There is a great deal of criticism of Kissinger and the policy of detente. . . You wonder if it isn't part of the effort to discredit detente. . . . If it is not a drive to unseat Kissinger by some important people" in the Senate and the Pentagon.

Asked whether he meant Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger to Fulbright responded 'Yes, and others...'

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 16 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

# Cyprus upheaval
tenses Balkans

## Greek-Turk flare-up
could widen danger

By Geoffrey Godsell
Overseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor

Will the Cyprus upheaval start a
chain reaction in the Balkans setting
Europe on edge as in the years before
World War I?

Will it lead to another flare-up
between Greeks and Turks, already
feuding over offshore oil-rights in the
Aegean?

And if open hostilities break out,
what will the great-power line-up be?

Until now the United States has
backed Greece and Turkey simulta-
neously against any threat coming
from those countries' Communist
neighbors. Both Greece and Turkey
are members of NATO, and neither
the government in Athens nor that in
Ankara has any particular love for
the Soviet Union.

In a subtle way, the Soviet Union
has always played Archbishop Ma-
karios as its card in the Greece-
Turkey-Cyprus triangle. Cyprus Com-
munist Party (AKEL) support helped
keep the Archbishop in the Cyprus
presidency. And in return, Arch-
bishop Makarios — certainly no Com-
unist — kept Cyprus out of NATO,
while allowing the British to maintain
two sovereign bases on the island for
exclusively British use.

(British refusal to let U.S. planes
use these two bases during last Octo-
ber's Middle East war strained Brit-
ish-U.S. relations for a time.)

Now Archbishop Makarios has ap-

parently gone. The Russians have lost
their man on Cyprus. And if the island
passes under the control of the junta
in Athens, Cyprus may be pulled
willy-nilly under the umbrella of a
NATO member — if not under the
umbrella of NATO itself.

In the process of that happening,
Turkey has to be reckoned with.
Turkey has no objection to Cyprus's
coming under NATO, but is
vehemently opposed to its coming
under Greek control from Athens. The
Turkish Government not only is con-
cerned about what would happen to
the Turkish-Cypriot minority but also
believes that Cyprus — only 40 miles
off Turkey's southern coast — is more
likely to pass eventually under out-
right Communist control if run by
Athens than if the island had re-
mained independent under Arch-
bishop Makarios. This is because of
Turkey's concept of inherent long-
term Greek political instability.

Thus there is immediate risk of a
Turkish countermove to head off a
complete take-over in Cyprus by the
military government in Greece.

But beyond that there is the ques-
tion of Soviet counter moves if Cyprus
developments seem to be going to
obvious Soviet disadvantage. At hand,
of course, Moscow has AKEL which is
probably strong enough and well
organized enough to make things
difficult for any Athens-run adminis-
tration in Cyprus. On a broader front,
however, Moscow could in due course
put the screws on Greece by operating
through Greece's two Communist
neighbors to the north: Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia.

As long as Marshal Tito, now in his
80's, is at the helm, Yugoslavia would
almost certainly refuse to be a party

to any moves by the Russians against
Greece. Once the marshal is no longer
in charge, though, Moscow might do
its best to exploit uncertainties and
national rivalries within Yugoslavia
to find an opening for Soviet pressure
on Greece from across the Yugoslav
frontier.

The situation with Bulgaria is
rather different. Moscow has no more
compliant allies in all Europe than
Todor Zhivkov and the rest of the
Bulgarian Communist Party lead-
ership. But between Bulgaria and the
Soviet Union lies Romania, formally a
member of the Soviet bloc but as
reluctant as ever to have Soviet
troops on Romanian soil. Unless So-
viet troops are allowed to cross
Romania, they cannot turn up over-
land on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier
to threaten or put pressure on any
regime in Athens.

There has been widespread specu-
lation of late that the Russians may
well have been scheming for some
months to get an opening through to
the Greek-Bulgarian border for just
such a situation as might develop if
things get out of hand in Cyprus. At
the Bulgarian Communist Party's
congress in March, Mr. Zhivkov
spoke about the possible eventual
incorporation of Bulgaria in the So-
viet Union. Following this, Marshal
Yakubovsky, Russian commander of
the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe,
visited Romania and the Romanians
let it be known that he had asked for a
land corridor under Soviet control
through Romania to Bulgaria.

The Romanian response reportedly
was that there was a direct sea route
from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria
across a corner of the Black Sea and
that an overland route through Ro-
mania was consequently redundant.

So at the moment there are no
Soviet troops in either Romania or
Bulgaria. But if the Russians now
increase pressure to get troops into-
this corner of their European empire,
the situation will bear watching in-
deed.

BREZHNEV
... CONTINUED

strong advocate of arms con-
trol measures warned that the
United States and the Soviet
Union do not have much time
before the arms race escalates
further and undermines de-
tente. He seemed to be talking
primarily to the Soviet mili-
tary establishment and other
hawks here who have been
reluctant to agree on new mis-
sile limitations.

Before the summit meeting
between Mr. Brezhnev and
President Nixon here, Soviet
sources had said that the Com-
munist party leader's authority
to maneuver and bargain had
been circumscribed by his col-
leagues in the party's political
bureau.

While this report has not
been confirmed, U.S. officials

have noted that Mr. Brezhnev
met twice with the Politburo
during the late June summit
talks, the first time to report
on his private talks with Presi-
dent Nixon and the second
time to debate U.S. proposals
for limiting the two countries'
strategic arsenals.

"If it were up to Brezhnev, I
think we might have had a
deal," an American participant
in the talks said later. "We
were very close with him, but
there were some he could not
persuade."

Doesn't "come naturally"

Henry A. Kissinger, the U.S.
Secretary of State, said follow-
ing the summit meeting that
both the American and Soviet
political leaders need to con-
vince their military establish-
ments that they have enough
weapons for their countries'
defense and that there is need
for restraint in the arms race.

This, he said at a Moscow
news conference, "is not a
thought that comes naturally
to military people on either
side."

Before the summit meeting,
there had been recurrent spec-
ulation about the position of
the Soviet military on further
arms limitations following a
series of warnings by military
and conservative political lead-
ers here on the need for a
strong defense, a theme that
was picked up by a sizable
faction of the Politburo in re-
cent policy statements.

Soviet sources have acknow-
ledged "differences" among
the 16 Politburo members, but
have emphasized these are not
major and generally reflect
their different backgrounds.

Mr. Zhukov in his commen-
tary reprinted a letter he said
he had received from a man in
the Ural Mountain region who

wrote that "the unlimited sup-
port that we show them"
makes it easier for the lead-
ship, particularly Mr. Brezh-
nev, to pursue such difficult
negotiations.

"We, the Soviet people, well
understand that this is difficult
and responsible work—defend-
ing the vital interests of our
people in such complex nego-
tiations with the leaders of the
capitalist camp," the letter
said.

The context of the letter
turned it into a call for popu-
lar support for Mr. Brezhnev
and the party's "peace pro-
gram," the Soviet term for its
search for East-West detente.

Although expressions of sup-
port for Soviet foreign policy
are published daily, this one
was unusual both in its word-
ing and the surroundings in
which it was published.

3

TASS COMMENTS ON THIRD ROUND OF TALKS ON ARMS REDUCTION

L172259 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 2235 GMT 17 JUL 74 L

(TEXT) VIENNA JULY 17 TASS-- FROM TASS CORRESPONDENT ANATOLIY SEMENOV:

THE CLOSING PLENARY SESSION OF THE THIRD ROUND OF THE TALKS ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS HELD TODAY IN THE AUSTRIAN CAPITAL.

THE CONSUMMATING STAGE OF THE ROUND WAS COINCIDENT IN TIME WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS IN VIENNA WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF 19 COUNTRIES TAKING PART. THE DOCUMENT DEFINES THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WHICH MAKE UP THE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TALKS WORKS OUT TO SUPPORTING POLITICAL RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN EUROPE WITH A RELAXATION IN THE MILITARY SPHERE AND STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT THROUGH MAINTAINING LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT IN LIGHT OF THIS OBJECTIVE THE PROVISION AGREED UPON BY ALL PARTICIPANTS WHICH SAYS THAT SPECIFIC MEASURES TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MUST BE DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAKE THEM CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INFLICTION OF DAMAGE TO THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIGNATORIES HAS BEEN AN ALL-IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE DONE CERTAIN USEFUL WORK.

THE SIDES HAVE ALREADY LEARNED IN SUFFICIENT DEPTH THE VIEWS OF THE PARTNERS. A GENERAL IDEA OF THESE VIEWS FOLLOWS FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCES OF DELEGATION HEADS T. STRULIAK OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND QUARLES VAN UFFORD OF THE NETHERLANDS.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY, NON-INFLICTION OF DAMAGE TO THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES, A PRINCIPLE WHEREBY NO ONE SHOULD OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES MUST BE ASSUMED AS A CRITERION TO ASSESS THESE VIEWS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONCENSUS REACHED AT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS ALL IMMEDIATE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS--FOUR SOCIALIST STATES (USSR, GDR, PPR AND CSSR) AND SEVEN WESTERN COUNTRIES (USA, CANADA, FRG, GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM, LUXEMBURG AND THE NETHERLANDS)--SHALL TAKE PART IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMMES TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FULLY IN LINE WITH THIS REQUIREMENT ARE THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NAMELY, LAND ARMIES, AIR FORCE AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BY ALL ELEVEN PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, STRICTLY AT AGREED-UPON DATES AND ON EQUAL TERMS.

THIS IS PRECISELY THE POINT TO WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CALLED SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ROUND JUST ENDED. PROCEEDING FROM THE NECESSITY TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INFLICTION OF DAMAGE TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY AND NON-ADMISSION OF UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES THEY STRESSED, AS T. STULIAK POINTED OUT AT THE PRESS-CONFERENCE, THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED IN THE TALKS WERE PREPARED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING TO UNDERTAKE THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMANTS STATIONED IN THE AGREED-UPON AREA ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SEVEN WESTERN IMMEDIATE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE WESTERN STATES, HOWEVER, SHOW NO SUCH READINESS FROM THEIR PART. THEY ENVISAGE FIRST THE REDUCTION OF ONLY LAND TROOPS AND ONLY BY TWO PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS--THE USR AND USA. PRIMARILY THEY MAINTAIN THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREED-UPON AREA 2.5 TIMES MORE TROOPS THAN THE UNITED STATES. AS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER WESTERN STATES, IT IS LAID OFF FOR A LATER AND INDEFINITE PERIOD. ALSO THE REDUCTION WOULD LEAVE OUT SUCH MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT U.S. NATO ALLIES AS, FOR INSTANCE, THE FRG AND GREAT BRITAIN WHOSE TROOPS ACCOUNT FOR MORE THAN ONE HALF OF ALL NATO CONTINGENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IT IS CLEAR EVEN TO UNSOPHISTICATED MIND THAT THIS PROPOSAL SEEKS TO SECURE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES.

SPEAKING FOR THE REDUCTION OF ONLY LAND TROOPS THE WESTERN COUNTRIES LEAVE OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT SUCH POWERFUL ARMED FORCES AS AIR FORCE AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH POSSESS THE GREATEST STRIKING FORCE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR CONTINUING THE ARMS RACE OF THESE DANGEROUS TYPES OF ARMED FORCES ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AS DESCRIBED IN THE WORLD PRESS AND BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES ARE RATER COMPLEX, FOR THEY REPRESENT IN FACT THE FIRST EVER DISCUSSION OF THE RANGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND QUANTITY OF ARMANTS, I.E. REAL DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMES. PROVIDED THERE IS GOOD WILL AND ON THE CONDITION THAT THE WESTERN STATES GIVE UP ANY ATTEMPTS TO SECURE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES THE VIENNA TALKS MAY LEAD TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE RESULTS SUCH AS WOULD MEET BEST THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLE'S OF EUROPE.

18 JUL 0453Z PH/TM