Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Humphrey

11/03/69 1:37 p.m

K said he had been following H's progress in cables sent by our ambassadors. K said he had never had a chance to tell H that he hoped H understood that what happened here had not been planned. K said he meant it to be a meeting of friends. K said it was a great thing H did, but it wasn't a plot. H said he thoroughly understood. He meant to have happen what happened, he was glad it happened, and he didn't give a damn what anybody said. K said he sees now that H is the leading contender on the Democratic side; K said if we've got to lose to somebody, there's nobody he'd rather lose to than H.

K said secondly he wanted to talk with H about the speech tonight. K hopes H will feel that his recommendations that we say some words of compassion for the young people has been taken into account. We were impressed by it and we tried to include it.

H said when he was in Japan and met with the overseas correspondents he made the point that we had never said we were seeking a military victory, but rather a negotiated settlement--that we want to prevent the success of aggression and that we want to give the South Vietnamese the opportunity for self-determination. We are there to help strengthen opposition to subversion and aggression. We should say that we are accomplishing these things, that Southeast Asia and the countries in that area are stronger today.

K said that H was saying something that the P feels very keenly. As the President he can't tell the mothers of the 40 thousand dead and of those still fighting that they died for nothing or that the war is a stupid mistake or idiocy. We are there for a purpose and we are achieving it. H suggested that we might say that things have changed during the past 5 years, we went there for a good purpose and some of these things have been accomplished.

H said he would help if he could. K said that's not what he was calling for, but it would be appreciated. H said that the fact that K is here means a great deal to him and if he thought K was wrong, he'd be leading the charge against him. K said he realized that and no one who knew H would presume to ask him to go against his convictions. K said that conversation with H had meant a lot to him--he never knew what a lonely place this is. H agreed and sent his best to the President.

*

Telecon
The President
2:00 p.m. 11/3/69

By: K.L.V. NARA, Dato' S/13/04

K had a few suggestions and wanted to know if the President was interested at this point. The President said he would be interested.

K indicated that he had talked to Meany. Meany is going to issue a strong statement at 8:00 a.m. Tuesday morning. The Pres. indicated that Love's wire just came in with the signatures supporting his policies.

K said that Alsop called. Alsop saw Kennedy and Kennedy was shaken. He said everyone loves Agnew. K told Alsop to watch speech and that he would be happy about it.

On page 2 - para 6 it says "the war was causing deep division at home, as well as" K thought he should say "and" instead of "as well as". The President agreed.

On page 4 where is says "5 years ago Johnson send American combat forces," K indicated it would be saver to say 4 years since he did it in April. The Pres. agreed.

On page 20 - it says "there are two obvious reasons" K asked what the Pres. meant by two reasons. The Pres. said Paris talks and progress on the other front. The Pres. agreed that it would be better to say "and there are obvious reasons." K thought it was a better transition.

On page 24 where is says "our Allies in the world," K thought it would be best to say "our allies". The Pres. agreed.

In another place it mentioned that "it may be is not fashionable," K thought it should read "it may not be fashionable." The Pres. agreed.

K talked to Humphrey and Humphrey suggested that the President show compassion for youth. K indicated that this was one of the President's chief factors in the speech. Humphrey wanted to be helpful and made a few suggestions which are, in fact, already in the speech. Humphrey also said that the point the President has been making about not telling the mothers that their sons died in vain in a stupid war was good. K indicated that this was in the speech and that the President wanted that to be a strong point.

K said no one will be able to say that the President hasn't explained his policies and also that we can't bug out.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Jay Lovestone

2:40 p.m. 11/3/69

K indicated to Lovestone that he had briefed Meany this morning on the
President's speech. When Lovestone and K talked in April, Lovestone
said if we ever stepped up to it, he would get some support for us.
Lovestone asked if K was satisfied with the speech. K indicated he
was and if he had to give the speech as his own, he wouldn't have changed
it. L asked if K explained this to Meany. K said yes and Meany said he
would draft support and release statement in the morning. K indicated that
we could also use some labor support. K suggested that Lovestone might
be able to organize as a follow up, letters and telegrams in support of
Meany's statement. Lovestone said he would get with Meany. He would
send statement to the various unions and ask them to follow suit.
K indicated that we are putting it to Hanoi. We are going to say that they
tried to wreck our domestic position, and that we would not capitulate.
K thought that this would rattle the Communists and L agreed. If the
speech fails, it means that all the strong people have failed K said.

Lovestone said if the speech was good in K's eyes it was good for him
and he would do everything he could to muster support.

K said with this support the moratoriums will fail although we were not
worried about that. We want to say to Hanoi that we have come back.
L said Moscow has already denounced speech. K indicated that Moscow
thinks we are giving another withdrawal announcement. L said that no
matter what we said, Moscow would denounce it and ask for more
concessions.

Lovestone said he would let K know when this is in motion.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Jackson

11/03/69 3:10 p.m.

J said they were still wrestling with the military procurement thing. He just wondered if Dorothy could talk with someone to get the high points of the speech. J said he understood copies of the speech were not available and they have press people calling wanting comments after the speech. K said he should have Dorothy come over at 6:00 tonight to see General Haig--he will brief her and than J said that she can brief him. K said he trusts her completely.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
McNamara

10/09/69 3:50 p.m.

K said he wanted to call M before the speech to say that he hopes M will find it reflects the spirit of their conversations. M said everything the P has done has been consistent with what they've been saying. K said for M's own information, we're not offering any new plans, we're explaining our philosophy, telling what we intend to do. We hope the young people will understand that what we do, we're doing in their own interest. M said he is sure we are right in providing an environment that keeps the Vietnam government together. K said Harriman is going to keep this going forever; it doesn't matter what government is there if we are going to do the things we discussed. M said that was absolutely right, and that fact and the fact that we are pulling troops out are absolutely consistent with what we've been saying. K said you can't talk about teh government, and that you need to hold it stable until you get out, but that is important. M said it was absolutely imperative.

K asked M when he is leaving; the P would like to see him, just to give him a rundown on the situation. M said he is leaving Wednesday at 4:00; will be back Sunday a week. K said we would try to do it before he left or soon after he comes back.

K said he just wanted to tell M that he has been great encouragement. M said he has the highest regard for K and the P and what they are doing. K said it takes a big man to act as M has. M said it's the obligation of the citizen, and he is not about to dilute our efforts. K told him that his support has meant more than he can know.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Sec. Rogers

11/03/69 4:12 p.m.

K just wanted to tell R where we stand. The President is releasing it in 15 minutes. Then we will type it and sent it to you eyes only. Then we send a copy that goes to the press to the State Secretariat at 8:15 with a summary which will have been approved by the President--it may be used as a guidance cable. R said for the TCC briefing they will use the one sent to Thieu--Green will handle that. K asked if R would handle getting to the ambassadors. R sent the orchestration of that to the White House. K said it was fine except the P doesn't want any Communist ambassadors talked to. R said that was fine and asked about the P's state of mind. K said he hadn't seen him, but he seems fine. But K said he's in seclusion--no one can get to him. R said the P's a champ--this is when he's at his best. R said you just can't tell about these things--sometimes they come out well, sometimes they don't. K said if you are off by five percent, you've missed completely.

R mentioned the fund speech. Said this is an important speech, but his whole life is not decided by it--there he had his own neck on the block. There, the cameraman cried; the emotional strain was almost unbearable; everyone in the studio cried.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7:25 p.m. 11/3/69

Rogers had read the speech and thought it was verypowerful. He wanted to be sure we had touched base with everyone. He asked if USIA would be sending the speech out. K said yes but they won't have it until 8:30 tonight. K said they had also touched w with DC Ambassadors. K asked if there was any need to touch with NATO and Rogers didn't feel it was necessary since it wasn't that kind of speech. Rogers hoped that the President was in good shape mentally. K said the last time he talked to him which was at 2:30 to make a couple of word changes, he seemed fine. K mentioned that it certainly was "Nixon Vintage". K asked if Rogers noticed where the President used his suggestion on saying something to the youth. Rogers had seen it. He also thought the Pres. did right on the diplomatic front. Rogers said there is no turning back and he doesn't think there should be. In the past, it looked as though we were not quite sure. K said the President was pretty clear about troop with-drawals On the other hand, it nails them to low level of casualties. Rogers thought it was easy for those on the peripheral but tough for the President. K said it took a lot of guts for him to do this.

Rogers thought everybody behaved well on this speech and the LA speech and SALT. K said he thought they had worked out a way to work together and it has worked out well so far.

Rogers said he would keep his fingers crossed.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Percy

11/03/69 7:50 p.m.

P said he is going on the Today Show tomorrow morning, and has been asked to go on radio shows after the speech tonight. Indicated that he would like some assistance. K asked well what help would you like? P said any background you can give me as to what's coming so I can start to formulate ideas. K said he had to start briefing the press in 10 minutes, to which Percy replied oh fine, you go right ahead. P asked if K had briefed anyone on the Hill that P could call. K said he had briefed Griffin. P said fine, was Scott there? Yes. P said why didn't he call on them? K said he could have Haig talk with him in 15 minutes. Then K said why don't I sent you a copy of the speech to reach your house at 9:00 and have Haig brief you.

K said at this stage what we need it unity. P said of course, that's what he's hoping to assist with. K said he thinks this is the frankest, fullest account of what we're doing and where we're going and why and how. P said very good. A copy he could study as he is giving it would help a great deal. P said he is on with Peter Dominick in the morning. K said good, he would watch him.

By KCL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Peter Flanigan

11/3/69, 9:17 p.m.

K said you never told me what happened with your meetings with the Apostolic Delegate and the Cardinal. F said if you will look on the desk of your aide you will find two memoranda relating to each of these. F said I will tell you, however, the Apostolic Delegate was very sympathetic. F said he told the Apostolic Delegate that we wanted morale support from the Holy Father. The AD asked F if Wednesday would do, and F said he told him if that's the best he could do it would have to be okay but ... F said the AD said he would transmit the request to the Holy Father and he was sure it would be warmly received. F said he spoke to the Cardinal and the Cardinal said he has a problem in he is the leading advocate for the President in the Bishop's conference(?) which is unfortunately salted with doves. He said the next meeting is on Wednesday and he was assured that withdrawal would soon be on the agenda. He said he would consider the request -- but made no commitment. K said he is basically a dove himself.

Len Garmet then got on the telephone and said he spoke to Argof(?) and Argof was sympathetic. K asked if he told him we mentioned the Middle East as a commitment. Garmet said he didn't know that but in any event ... Garmet said he lunch with K's old friend, Arthur Goldberg.

Bryce Harlow then got on and said congratulations. H said when you get an irresistible urge, call Chuck Percy. K said I have called him.

feg

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato. S/12/04

Telecon
The President

11/03/69 10:22 p.m.

K said he thought it was great. The P asked how it was with the brief-
ings. K said they were amazingly respectful. They wanted to knos how
the statement about withdrawal of all combat forces related to withdrawal
of all forces. K said that he explained that withdrawal of combat forces
comes first. The P said it was a hard speech to knock.

K said McCormack and Albert will immediately put out enthusiastic
comments on the speech. Mansfield didn't say, but K is sure it won't
be friendly. Kennedy is a hard one to figure. K said of course the
press, TV commentators are nit-picking. Frank Reynolds was vicious
said it was nothing new, and why the big build-up. Tom Jarriel was
very good. The P asked about Howard Smith. K said he hadn't seen
him. K said this is a good test of the public reaction. George Meany
said he would make a statement of support. Bill Rogers said he thought
it was a very strong speech. K said he thought it was a great speech.
The P said if there was any way to reach the people, we did it tonight.
K said if we didn't reach the people tonight, it's not possible to do so.

The President

11/03/69 10:45 p.m.

The P had just talked with Gov. Rockefeller; R is coming down Sunday a week. The P told R we'd back him up on those two proposals. The P asked K if he had talked with anyone else. K said George Hinman said it was a great speech, very effective, very moving; he especially liked the quiet delivery--that was very moving. K said he thinks that these nit-pickers on TV have their vested interests, and at least they're not on very long--only about 8 minutes. The P said he had talked for 37 minutes; K said the P talked 32. The P said then he went a little fast. The P said at any rate, even Sevareid was very favorably. At the end, he was asking if Vietnamization could work, showing a little skepticism, but that question in itself is not bad. It went against all their preconceptions. The P said we'll see--be sure you keep your people working all night long--we mustn't let up. K said no we'll keep working.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Gov. Rockefeller

11/03/69

10:37 p. m.

R said he thought the speech was superb and beautifully delivered. He said the quiet strong way and clear determination were just great. R said he is thrilled. K said when R talks with the P he should encourage him as much as he can, the White House public relations boys know only commentators. R said he had talked to George Hinman and he thought it was great. K said R should tell the P that and tell him R thought the delivery was good too. K said R has always been a good friend, but the moral support he has given recently has been extraordinary; there are not many people who have the strength to do it, and R has been marvelous. R said K is great; K got this done. R said again he thought it was great, and that it's going to make a wonderful impression on 80 or 90 percent of the people. R said K could go to sleep feeling that he has done a tremendous job.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

11/03/69 10:22 p.m.

The President

11/03/69 10:45 p.m.

*

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
The President

11/03/69

11:33 p.m.

K said he had talked with Buckley--he's been working since before the speech and will continue to work. He says you've taken the Churchillian stand and not the comfortable Chamberlain stand. He says his friends owe you their support. He was very complimentary; he had 1 technical comment; the TV cameras picked up the edge of the paper occasionally. K said he didn't even notice it and it was a minor point.

K said Lovestone said it was a great speech. It was beyond his wilddest dreams. It restored dignity to the American people. The P said that would affect Meany.

The P said what others don't understand but he and K do is that we've got to broker all these things hard and tough and fast. The P said Rogers and Laird called. The P thought they were a little shaken. But the point is that they should have been ecstatic. But neither showed that--they haven't got the guts. I think they'll have to go. K said they didn't behave very loyally these last few days--they let the White House carry it. The P said they're not going to Key Biscayne, that's for sure--"I wrote the whole damn speech."

The P said he was going to cancel the NSC on Thursday if it's okay with K. The P said he knows what to do about SALT and he's not going to sit around and listen to them talk about it. The P is going to write them a letter, cold turkey. He's going to dictate a memo on how they must handle the *nuclear* speech. K agreed.

K said he knew Kalb wouldn't like the speech. The P said, no, he's a communist. And K said that Harriman wouldn't like it was self-evident. K said Magruder took a pole of 100 newspapers, and only two were unfavorable--the Washington Post and the New York Times. K said that was obvious--we could have written that before the speech. The P said he's got to get Haldeman to corral them.

The P asked again if Buckley was pleased. K said very pleased. He only mentioned that it might not have been tough enough. The P said it was deliberately low-key because the words were very tough. K said that Buckley said the P's friends are proud of him and stand behind him. The P asked if Acheson was really pleased. K said yes; the P said he was going to call him.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dalo S/12/04

Telecon
The President

11/03-04/69 Midnight

The P asked K if he made it clear in his briefings how the speech was prepared. K said yes, he made that part of his opening statement. K said there is nothing the P has labored over more seriously, more personally, and with more concern than this. He asked for proposals, add worked on it every evening. He read an outline to us and we all supported it. He went to Camp David and rewrote it. K said when Chancellor introduced the P before he started the speech C made a point that it was the P's speech, that it had engaged him more personally than almost anything he had done since entering office.

K said Gen. Haig had just given him a note about a call he took from parents of a boy who had been killed in Vietnam. They thought it was wonderful; said it was marvelous, and this is what he had died for.

K said actually Chancellor was good; he didn't harrass the P. He had Scammon on. The P said Rogers and Laird were waiting to see public reaction. The P said these guys should be shouting, he had mentioned them and their efforts, but they weren't. The P said he wanted that letter to them by tomorrow afternoon, and he wants it to be tough, strong, really lay it out. K said it is all drafted; the P can have it whenever he wants it. The P said Laird and Rogers don't have the guts to make the grand effort. The P said he thought there would be a great reaction from the average person. K said we were getting truckloads of cables; people are complaining that they can't get to Western Union.

The P said he had deliberately delivered it low-key, firm but not beligerant, and that he thinks that was the right thing. K said yes it was the right thing because the words were strong. It was a solemn occasion, not the beginning of a war. K asked about McCormack. The P said he was delighted and Agnew was pleased. K said the people who would say that the P should have announced the beginning of withdrawal tonight, if the P had announced withdrawal of two hundred thousalt, they would have screamed for three hundred thousand. K said you can't placate the doves. The P said that for the first time it had been explained why we are there and what we are doing, and the part about others not being able to humiliate Americans, only Americans can do that--that was a good point. that got through. And K said the ending was very strong, it was a most effective speech. Of course the peaceniks wouldn't like it. The P asked if K's staff had liked it, and K said yes, they were very enthusiastic. The P said they should be; and K said but they had no advance warning. K said they felt much as Bundy did; it was the first time it had been explained

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/13/04

The President

p. 2

what it is all about. The P said nobody has explained it--Johnson, Kennedy, and of course Eisenhower--because nobody understood it. K said and you had the courage to say we should be in Vietnam. For the mothers of the boys killed there, if the President were to imply that they died in vain would be unbearable. The P said that's why the call that Gen Haig reported was so important.

*

By KHU NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Sec. Rogers

11/04/69 9:20 a.m.

K said he didn't have anything special to say, just wanted to check with R--we're swamped with cables. Don't know what that means--R said it can't be bad--K said the cables were running about one thousand to one favorable, and there are about 10 thousand in already. They are stacked at Western Union all over the country; people were driving the Western Union president crazy last night because they couldn't get the operators. R said we should have a group of people counting them, so we can have some kind of count. K said we'll get that later. The only cables we've gotten so far by some fluke got in directly; most are still in offices in each region for some reason, and will be sent in together. K said we got one telegram with twenty thousand signatures from Colorado alone. R said that doesn't count so much, because it must have been prepared in advance. K said that's right; it came in during the afternoon, so it doesn't count. But Hopkins says he's never seen anything like it. The switchboard reported fifteen hundred phone calls by midnight.

K said it was very successful. Of course the Times and Post are having connictions. R said he thought the Post wasn't so bad. K said the Post was fair, but Reston was outrageous. K said he told Kraft the military is less influential now than in the McNamara regime. R said INRE true.

K said the group he talked to is the group he had Thursday. And we were all agreed ot was INRE too weighted toward the military people. R said he'd say. People want unilateral cease-fire; no one thinks of the alternatives.

R said most of the reaction was subjective. R said people want unilateral cease-fire; no one thinks of the alternatives. R said he was going to say at the hearings, what do they propose? K said they say unilateral cease-fire as if it would work. R said right, the enemy rejected our cease-fire. If the President had used it they would have said phoney and fake. Tje P said the choice is between pull-out and what we're doing. R thinks out position is logically totally defenseable.

K said we've gone more than the extra mile. If we ever did to Hanoi what Hanoi has done to us, people would have fits. R asked if K had listened to Harriman. R said at the Family of Man dinner, Harriman was supposed to speak for two minutes; he gave himself a 5-minute introduction, and then talked for 15 more minutes. He said some nice things about Rogers, but his talk was very confused. Nobody knew what he said. When R got up to speak, he thanked Harriman for the nice introduction and his support. R said he has no effect any more. But Reston, Gore, Javitts, even Fulbright

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

By KNV NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Sec. Rogers
p. 2

had the decency to keep quiet. K said he saw Mansfield on TV on
the Today show this morning. He was cautious, but he said the P did
have a plan.

R said he talked to the P last night, and the P sounded pleased. K said yes, the P is okay. R said he expected a call from Fulbright. He is concerned about the testimony--must talk to Symington now to Symington. R said if we call these people back from their country, and make what they say public, we'll have trouble. K said that's the problem Wilson's going to have. R said everybody's going to have it. R said we don't have to make the people's comments public--that's a serious problem. R didn't think it was going to arise. But R doesn't think today would be a good day to talk to Symington. R said his testimony has been indefinitely postponed. K said that was great. R said he was supposed to be toward the end of the series; Mitchell was to be the last. They are going to have to reschedule the whole hearings. They are going to try for after the 15th.

R asked when K was going to Florida. Said there is no reason for K to go to the Uruguay dinner. K said he had accepted it because of R. K said either he would go to dinner and Key Biscayne after, or go with the President. R said he would have a Jetstar if K wanted to go to the dinner and come with him.

By

KHLU NARA, Dato' 5/12/64

Telecon

Joseph Alsop

12:5 p. m. 11/4/69

Alsop thought the speech was very good. K said he thought Alsop would be happy with it. Some of the liberal commentators were incoherent with rage. Today they are singing a different tune. K indicated that we were getting an unbelievable flood of mail. Hopkins says in his 40 years in the White House, there hasn't been this much mail. It is so huge, we don't know how to begin to deal with it. We received 1,000 calls and Western Union can't handle it all. It is running about 99-1 in favor and that is probably an understatement, it is more like 500-1.plexx One of the wires said that after hearing Harriman, they now understand why we didn't get anywhere. Alsop asked what Kennedy and Mansfield's reaction has been. K said rather somber, but Mansfield was on the Today show and he was not as critical. K hadn't heard whether Kennedy has said anything or not. Alsop didn't think he would.

After the speech, K said some people told the President he enraged the demonstrators. Alsop thought it was remarkable. Alsop thought the President said it in a plain, simple, and in honest terms. K said he always said the President wouldn't bug out.

Alsop asked if K had thought about sending someone "out there"(?) to do the kind of job Alsop mentioned. K said they have sent Sir Robert Thompson. Alsop thought that was an idiotic thing to do, since Thompson just doesn't understand. That would be like sending Harriman in. K said that it has been done and it is only for our information anyway. Alsop thought they should have sent Dean Moore. K said he would discuss that later with Alsop.

Alsop had another personal problem he wanted to discuss with K but would take it up later. Alsop asked how K was fixed for breakfast in the morning. K didn't think it would work but would call if something could be worked out. In any event, he would get together real soon.

*

By: KHLN NARA, Dato: 5/12/69

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
12:55 p.m. 11/4/69

K told R that there was an unbelievable reaction to the speech. Telegrams are pooring in and we don't know how to handle them. We are 10 hours behind. The President wanted the Gov. to know about the Gallup Poll that was taken right after the speech which showed 75% of the people supporting the President's plan, 77% supporting approach to withdrawals, 72% think moritoriums are harmful and only 12% are for them. That poll will be in the newspapers tomorrow. The President appreciated the Govs. support and the fact that he called before the trend of events was clear. K said the Govs. call came at a very low moment. Some people said the Pres. delivered it poorly, but it took guts to go against the advice of everybody. The Gov. thought this was very exciting and rewarding. K said it is a new ball game with Hanoi. The Pres. has turned and apparently has the people with him. The Gov. felt that would happen and so did George Hinman. This is the old America we once knew. The Gov. mentioned that Malcom Wilson was on TV with Goodell. Wilson used the Govs line. He was there to help balance off anything Goodell would say.

K said the President asked K to call the Gov. and say he has been a good friend. K said the Senators are running for cover. Fulbright has disavowed the November 15 moritorum. K told the Gover. about the TV commentators he had in his office. Dan Rathers said he wouldn't go on after the President again -- he didn't have his thoughts together. The Gov. said they probably read the speech and didn't listen to it. They did not reflect on what he said or what he had done. K thought it would things were going to turn now. The Gov said he talked to the editor of the Westchester papers and they will produce a lot of support. Anything that can be done to keep this thing going would be helpful. The Gov. said we all ought to stay with him and support him -- it is going to be a tough job now.

On the announcement for the Rockefeller Report, K said he would make the announcement but Rockefeller should explain it. The Gov. said it would be Monday, Nov. 10 in order to catch Time and Newsweek.

Telecon

William Buckley

1:05 p. m.

11/4/69

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/69

(Missed first part of conversation) Buckley there will be ads every day from Nov. 15 on as a counter-moratorium.

K told Buckley about the reaction today of the President's speech. K was told that there hadn't been as many telegrams in the White House in 40 years and that included Pearl Harbor. Buckley said he had sent two of his own. K said that most of the cables were from the silent majority. It is running about 400-1 in favor. They were just being sorted out at this point and maybe only about 100 negative responses. K indicated that these were the unorganized telegrams, he wasn't even counting the ones that they had organized. Buckely was please and asked if there would be a public statement about that. K indicated there would be. K told B about the Gallup Poll that was taken directly after the speech which indicated 75% supporting the plan, 77% supporting the approach to troop withdrawals, 12% think moratoixum's are helpful and 72% think they are not. Buckley said there is a little light in the country yet.

Buckley said K was right in predicting the New York Times' response. He added that it is probably a mistake to read the NYT.

K mentioned that he had 3 TVcommentators in his office today and they were a little sheepish. Buckley asked if somet;ing like this get to Hedley Donovan. K said he intended to call Donovan toda y. K added that anything Buckley could do to keep the momentum going would be greatly appreciated.

By KHW NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Ambassador Lodge
1:10 p.m. 11/4/69

K wanted Lodge to know that a fantastic reaction to the President's speech. We are drowning in telegrams. Gallup will be publishing a poll tomorrow with the President wanted Lodge to use. It should be used as a counter-argument to their statements that the public is not supporting the President. The Pres. wants Lodge to give a tough, fighting statement on Thursday. Lodge said he already sent it and K should have it soon. K indicated that the President wanted to go on the offensive now because we now have the public behind him. There will definitely be no new concessions of any kind. Lodge said K should feel very happy at his part in this. K said the President did it by himself and that it came out very well. There hasn't been such a flood of telegrams in the White House in 40 years. Lodge noticed that Congressman have put in congratulations on the speech also. K said the support for the moratorium that was shown by this new poll is absurdly low.

K said he would send the poll and instructions to Lodge within the next hour.

*

By KNV NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Sec. Laird

11/04/69 1:22 p.m.

L said he wanted to check with K and didn't get a chance at the ceremony. L said there is a problem in relation to Menu. State sent a cable three days ago to Saigon wanting an investigation regarding claims, regarding violations. Paragraph Binx dealt with a strike in which Cambodians were involved. L said what he wanted to do, he asked Abrams that we ask for State not to make the investigation. L thinks it would be a bad idea. He directed Abrams to have an investigation by Menu-cleared people. K said he agreed. L said he is sure it probably did happen. K said he too is sure. One incident where they complained, you are going forward three times this week.

L said he wanted K to know. He is going to tell Rogers that we're going ahead. Paragraph B is being separately handled; we don't want him to think we are giving him a phony report.

K thanked L for coming over this morning, said he knew Gen. Haig appreciated it. L said he enjoyed it. Al's a great person.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo S/12/04

Telecon
Bill Sullivan

3:10 p.m. 11/4/69

Sullivan had a call from Habib. There was one item which Habib raised after having seen K's backgrounder and the distinction K has drawn on two items (1) full withdrawals in 12 months or partial withdrawals in accordance with May 14 speech (2) shift to general ceasefire. K said Habib was not to make any modifications on anything he has previously said. K said the President was determined that we don't make any new proposals in Paris. Sullivan said Habib wanted a confirmation of change in interpretation of what we have had before. K said he didn't think we would be inclined to stick on these residual forces(?). Sullivan asked just what time frame does the President have in mind. Vy and discussed this with Habib privately and had to give Vy a dusty answer at that time. K thought we should raise that when it came up next. Sullivan said Habib wanted to be sure he was with the White House and Saigon because it is something we have never discussed with the Vietnamese. The things that Thieu has said, have been along the same lines. K said he wouldn't have said this if it had not been the President's policy. Sullivan said the question is should Habib proceed in discussing this with his SVN counter part and should it be discussed with GVN in Saigon. On the threat of death, K said there will be no new proposals. Sullivan understood that but wanted to know if there should be anything said there. It might avoid confusion at a later time. K said he had no objections to discussing it as long as it is make clear that he will not be going to be put to the other side. Sullivan said he would put together a draft cable for clearance.

#2 - The Australians have come in showing concern about the timetable, if there is one, and Gorton will likely know if he will be notified. They are saying that the President's speech indicated he has a plan but he is not making it public and why can't he take the Australians into his confidence. K said that was a good point.

Sullivan said on this and other points, Marshall Green and he would like to come and see K and K agreed to have his secretary call Sullivan to set up a time.

Sullivan got the word that the President wanted the Gallup Poll mentioned. K said they have been hitting us over the head about the lack of support and the President wants the poll indicated. Sullivan said he would just say

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

- 2 -

public opinion polls xinwuxik because if we use the name, they will just
come up with one that says the opposite. K mentioned the new poll
that was taken right after the speech as the one he wanted Lodge to
use.

Sullivan said he would send the draft over and K said he would fill
in the figures.

*

By KH. NARA, Date 5/13/64

Telecon
McNamara

11/04/69 3:40 p.m.

M thought the actions the P discussed were perfect. The emphasis on
Vietnamization is exactly the course he would follow. Some of the lang-
uage was reminiscent of times past and therefore possibly inflamatory.
K said yes, but the response has been unbelievable. M said he knew
that at the same time some would find it congenial. M said speaking to
several audiences is very difficult, a problem faced in every major
speech. K said Hopkins said he has never seen such an influx on any-
thing. K said it's not the silent majority he's usually associating with.
His associations are the same as M's, but K and M are in a tiny minor-
ity. K said the kind of people with whom he has closest contact can't
be placated.

M said if you said to Kennedy what do you want me to do, and then named all the things the P has done, he would have said all the things we said and fallen over dead if we had accepted them. M said he thought it was perfect.

By: KHC NARA, Dato S/12/04

Telecon
Bill Moyers

3:55 p.m. 11/4/69

K said in light of Moyer's kindness yesterday, he thought Moyers would be interested in knowing that the response to the President's speech has been the largest volume of telegrams -- non stimulated -- that Bill Hopkins has seen in his 40 years in the White House. We are so many hours behind, we don't know what, or if there is a count. Moyers was very pleased to here this. K said they are running 500-1 in favor. Of course, there are those who will spend 365 days a year in opposition. Moyers thought the response was from the silent majority that the President spoke to. Those are the ones he has to hold. Piecing it together, he can hold them with careful backup of deeds at the appropriate time. K indicated that the President was delighted.

Moyers thought the President's presentation of the speech was the best he had seen since the President took office. K said once you have worked on these speeches it is difficult to tell what you are actually seeing.
Moyers said that Johnson never wrote any of his speeches. The Pres. was happy with the response and felt he had reached the people he wanted to reach, K said, but the demonstrators cannot be placated. Moyers said he would like to do a piece on that.

K said if we had done to Hanoi what they are doing to us, we should have gotten a little credit from these peace people. That is why he doesn't feel as bad as he should about them but he understood Moyer's point that it is not a question of justice. Moyers said these people can't be treated like everyone else. K said he wished he had asked Moyer's opinion before the speech was set since he appreciated his idea in the telegram so much. Moyers said he would be glad to help in any private way he could.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KH V NARA, Dato: 5/13/04

Telecon
Amb. Sullivan

11/04/69 4:00 p.m.

Sullivan said they had gotten a question from Bunker about what Vietnam should say if asked if they were consulted about the letter to Ho. K said they should say they had every bit of information State did. (Both laughed.) S asked if K had seen the cable. K said no. S said that what he [Bunker?] recommended is that the answer be that after some discussion, both GVN and US attempted contacts with the other side. Both sides agreed on such contacts. S said Paris thinks this would also cover the 11 private meetings, but we feel that's carrying it a bit too far. K said if they're willing to say that, he thinks that's fine. S should go ahead with that if he agrees. S said he agrees; if South Vietnam wants to say that, he thinks it's fine. Or, S said, he could use the line K just gave him.

By KHLU NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Sen. Percy

11/04/69 4:15 p.m.

K said our people were delighted with P's appearance on the Today Show-- K said he had not seen it. P said he thought they had a shock. P said he never said one word, in all 9 months, against the program. P thinks they were disappointed.

K said we are getting a fantastic response--had to put in 20 teleprinters. P said he was delighted to hear that. K said they were running 500 to 1 in favor; the positive cables are stacked in cartons, the negative ones couldn't be more than one hundred. P said frankly he is surprised. P said there was an awful lot of criticism; there had been a lot of high expectations--everybody was all built up, when really there had not been one shred of evidence that the administration said they would do anything surprising. K said the response is unbelievable, and the expression "silent majority" is in many of them.

P said if the P had said he was going to pull out one hundred thousand troops, it would have been big news. But P thinks the P wants to do more--as he said, it all depends on Hanoi. The P wants to go higher.

K said he is speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations on Nov. 12, and so, unfortunately, cannot come to P's thing. P said he is addressing a Council meeting on the 18th in New York. Rogers couldn't come and so they asked if P could--it's going to be on trade.

P said if there's anything he can do to get some points across, he'll be happy to. P said he would let K know each time he had any contacts with Dobrynin.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/64

Telecon

Dave Packard

5:10 p.m. 11/4/69

Packard wanted to get a message to K before the meeting tomorrow on Safeguard. Packard didn't feel that they had enough information to go into the meeting and Laird feels it would be better not to have papers on phase 2 going around until after appropriates on the Hill. Unless K had some urgency for holding the meeting he would like to delay it. If Pac kard is going to be responsive to the concerns of Laird, it will take a little more time. The conferences have finished and work on the authorization bill is ready to go.

K suggested that the meeting be cancelled and that Packard and he get together if Packard and he could have an understanding about where the President wants to go, then we can be relaxed about when we get there. K suggested that Packard and he sit down to discuss the general approach and the parts that Laird is determined to maintain and parts he is willing to have considered. This was K's major concern in this and was sure Packard would come up with the right answer on the technical level. Pac kard thought that would be a good way to handle it. They agreed that if needed, Laird could be called in. K said if handled this way, then it can come up in the committee in the normal way. Then the foreign policy implications can be discussed.

K said he would call to set up a time.

*

By KCL NARA, Dato

5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

7:00 p.m. 11/4/69

Rogers wanted to discuss three things.

#1 - There is a draft cable to Lodge that cites the percentages in the last poll. He didn't think we should do that but should just refer to it as a general poll in to the press. K said there was a new poll that was very favorable which he said he would send over to Rogers. What the President had in mind was to show the tremendous public support and this poll shows that only 12% were in favor of moratoriums. Rogers thought it would be ok. in press background and K agreed with him.

#2 Rogers wanted to know what this Ash report meant. He is recommending some sort of super-foreign affairs department that would supercede both Rogers and K. K said he saw the Ash report as it applied to domestic policy and in effect, he recommended an organization similar to what exists in the NSC structure. Rogers said Ash was recommending a foreign policy super agency who would coordinate everybody else's work. K said he didn't mind coordinating others work but when it came to how people coordinating his work, it wasn't good. Rogers thought Haig was aware of this. K said Ash did not discuss this with his staff other than a short meeting K had with Ash in San Clemente when K explained the NSC structure. It was K's impression that the recommendation was for the domestic area, but a super foreign affairs department is a mistake and it is not really what the President wanted.

#3 - There is a cable from Stockholm #3456 which refers to a discussion Rogers had with the Foreign Minister of Sweden and in turn with the Amb. of Vietnam. He would like to be helpful. He said we had done enough, he was serious about the negotiations and that the other side ought to do something about it. He talked of the President's speech and also said that it was his personal conclusion that he wasn't conveying any message(?)? K said he would send it separately to the President so he would be sure to read it. (Cable attached)

By KLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

Telecon

Robert McNamara
9:30 a.m. 11/5/69

On the questions that the President raised in their meeting yesterday, McNamara had been doing something. There were several things he had in mind that could be reviewed as one pack/xx package. Repackaging USIA to more effective format for the American people(?) administration of Okinawa; the need to move Japanese into assuming more responsibility there; the problem of reconstruction of Southeast Asia after termination of conflict; the Mekong conflict. There are two studies being done on the Mekong matter - one by Eugene Black and the other by David Lilienthal. K mentioned that there has been some problem with the Lilienthal study. Other matters McNamara mentioned is the Asian Development Bank which the U.S. and Japan Japanese are sparing over; World Bank replenishment and potential capital increases.

K said he was reluctant to pick away at any one project at a time. McNamara agreed that no one facet should be considered alone without seeing how it will fit into all the other facets, but added that it would be hard for the Bank to do it all. He thought that K's staff could work out something. K xx said that he has found that Government staffs cannot produce answers unless told what exactly is wanted. He asked McNamara to send him a page or two of what direction McNamara thought this should go. McNamara said he would put it into the form of a talking paper and either send it over or bring it with him to the lunch a week from Monday.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Kennedy
11/5/69 9:45 a.m.

K said just don't yell at me, because I don't know what I'm talking about. S. K said that was frequently the case with him. K said the President has agreed with Rockefeller to go along with his debt service recommendations. K said the P wants to make reference to that when they release Rockefeller's report next Monday; would like George Wood as special consultant. K said he doesn't understand this, but the man on his staff who does is Vaky. K wants them to work out with Vaky something the P can say when he introduces the Rockefeller report. SK said we had to have that. SK said he was interested to see in Saturday's Washington Post that Rockefeller had announced the P had announced the postponement of repayments. SK said on the Hill we're going to have trouble with the AID bill getting anything for AID in view of that. K said he should say something about Woods. K said the P likes the recommendations, but they are technical and need to be studied. K asked who on Kennedy's staff would consult with Vaky. SK said Tony would be good, but he's away. It would probably be either Volker or Petty.

*

By KCLN NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Dan Davidson

10:20 a.m. 11/5/69

H

K was calling Davidson regarding D's call to Gen. Haig. K wanted to assure D that Blocker had mentioned D to K only briefly and asked whether there was an ideological reason for D's departure from the NSC staff. D said K had the highest regard and warmest personal feeling for D. There was nothing secret or complicated and K greatly valued the association he had with D over two administrations. D said it was getting harder and harder to get back into law since no one wanted a 30 year old. If things had gone for him, he would have stayed but in the real world things were not that perfect. D asked if Haig told K what happened. K said Blocker had mentioned the fact that so many people had left K's staff but if he talked to the people there were perfectly natural reasons. D said he left for ideological reasons. Blocker asked K if he would mind if B called D and K said he didn't. D said he believes the Administration is doing the only thing it can do. D agrees with some of the points compared to their thrust of where we are going. K said D knew as well as he did that if we want to get out fast..... Alot of what Hanoi says in true.

K said he still had the same feeling for Davidson but he wouldn't be able to go into the whole thing. When it is all over they would discuss it, and then D would agree that it was in his best interest. D said it didn't seem to be that way now. D said he would never see Blocker. K said he hardly knew Blocker himself and B would probably do a hatchet job on him. D didn't think he would. D said one day he got a call from Blocker asked about Dean Moor and D said he was a pretty good man. Blocker said K told him Moor was a lightweight. K said he certainly doesn't discuss his staff with newsmen and Kraft is the worst gossip in town. D said that Moor was a competent analysis and K agreed.

They agreed that one day they would get together if K had any spare time.

*

By KCL V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
George Rathjens

2:30 p.m.

11/5/69

Rathjens said he and Ruina discussed K's problem and had called
Garwin. The three of them felt strongly that were they to do the
papers K asked for it would be inefficient. They are proposing an
alternate where by an arrangement could be worked out so they could
spend some time looking over some of the papers that have been done
already so they would not overlap on areas where the concern is not
as much as in other areas.

K said that would be reasonable, but what he needs most is what he had asked for at the meeting because that points K to his immediate problem. K said that he had already done that. Rathjens said they really didn't understand what the problem was -- which things are most bothersome to K. K said the thing he has to get solved here is whether it is feasible to ban MIRVS and if it is, K has never had anyone do a paper between moratorium and ban. K said he has no trouble understanding that you can ban be/lax in a moratorium than in a ban. K wanted to know what the essential elements of a moratorium should be. -- what should we get done in a moratorium to figure whether it is worthwhile continuing. On some of the ABM issues like SAM, the upgrading of some of the collateral measures on MIRV ban. Some say there are no risks and some say there are strategic risks. There is also the question of banning missile launchers but not radars. To ban radars takes a long time to construct. K would like something so when people say there are strategic risks, he would know what they are talking about. Rathjens asked if K had any papers prepared on these issues. K said he has agency positions where the JCS is willing to ban launchers but not radar because Soviet radar can be netted. K said he had nothing that tells him what the risks are. ACDA will say there are no risks. There are no papers on the relationship between moritoriums and bans. K said why they should be able to do something in three days which he hasn't been able to do in three months, he understood. K didn't think it would help though for them to look at the papers since the questions weren't answered, but he didn't mind letting them see the papers. K said he they could do a paper on moratorium and ban limitations it would help. and said that an issue would be high priority. K said he would be glad to let them see the summary of MIRV panel reports. He said that if he could have something by the 17th it would be appreciated. Rathjens said he would call back.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Marshall Green

11/5/69 2:42 p.m.

K said Ehrlichman asked K to see whether G could review the transcript once more; he's had talks with the Secretary. G said he knew; they are trying to get as much out as possible; trying to get Col. Inyard's (?) testimony. In that he says this is all unsubstantiated, and then he tells all. G indicated that his "telling all" made him suspect. G said there will be a major battle on this. G was about to call Holt then. G said on the Fil-Kog thing, he thinks they can go along. K said what we want to avoid is putting ourselves in a position where we could be accused of being mercenaries. G said we have a way of covering it with Marcus; everybody knows the situation anyway, but it's not a thing you can argue with the American people. G said it would be headline news that we held back, and lots of other problems. G said there are a lot of things we have to get out. G said we will say that on national security grounds we do not object, but we reserve the right to approve or disapprove. G said we have to move; the hot breath of publication is breathing down our necks. We'll try to clear the lesser things away. G said he hoped K's people would support him on this. K said G should give him advance warning, and K would try to help him. G said it would be helpful if the Pentagon would give him some cooperation. They should be more interested in the Menu testimonies. G said he feels this must come out, a certain amount is necessary, and that if done in the right way, it could be good.

K asked if there is a reporting cable on the conversation today. G said no, he hadn't seen one. G told K that the Secretary is going down and would fill K in down there [at Key Biscayne]. G said he thinks it's far from over.

K asked about a roundup on the reactions to the speech. G said the reactions were very good. G said he would get a write-up on it over here right away. G said the reactions were uniformly good in his area. K asked if there was a global roundup. G said no.

*

By: KVL NARA, Date: 5/13/69

Telecon

Gerard Smith

4:20 p.m.

11/5/69

Smith said he had regretted 76 requests to give press backgrounder before he leaves. Smith's press people say its important to do before he leaves. Under the guidance, it has to be put before the Under Secretaries Committee. K said on operational matters it should go to the Under Secretaries but for basic policy it should be cleared through the White House. Smith said he wouldn't discuss anything except general map scope of talks but wanted to be sure he would not be violating anything by not going through Under Secretaries Comm. K said he could go ahead, but when he is giving the background he should keep in mind that the President finds it painful that the linkage idea is being repudiated. He wants to keep, at least in the Soviets minds, there is some relationship between happens in the political world. The likely answer for Smith to give would be to say there is a relationship, as a fact of life but not as a conditional thing.

Smith said he would see if he could put some life into it.

By KLC NARA, Dale 5/12/69

Telecon
Gerard Smith

4:25n p.m.

11/5/69

Smith said he had just talked to Dobrynin and he reports that "Semyarnoff" who is the third man in the Foreign Ministry, is going to head up their delegation. K recalled that he was the German expert, and thought that would be o.k. K guessed that S was on the same level as Smith. Smith didn't feel he was a German expert but that it was the equivalent rank. Smith said they would be sending EKG over the rest of the delegation soon.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Theodore White

11/5/69 5:10 p.m.

W said K must be exhausted; K said it has been a tiring time. W said he is coming to Washington next week to take a look at the whole thing and would love it if K could give him some time. W said he will be here, arriving Monday, leaving Friday. K said he would get his office to call W and fix a time late in the day some day. They could spend an hour together then.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Kirk Douglas

5:55 p.m. 11/5/69

K apologized that this had to be the week of the Vietnam speech. Douglas thought the speech was wonderful and a fair appraisal, in his humble opinion, as to what is going on. K said if we could get all the political scientists to be like actors, it might start a new trend. K said he appreciated Douglas' approval and comment on the speech, but he thought Douglas would be opposed. Douglas said he listened to it and then read it over again. If there were any criticism at all, D said the preliminary buildup promised something drastic. K said that a lot of our critics promised a lot so that they could blame us for not producing.

K apologized for not being able to see D this time and asked when he would be back. D said he was going to Paris and would be back in New York on the 15th or 16th at which time he would call the office to see if K had any free time. K said he was interested in D's idea and Frank Shakespeare would be back from his trip and would also be interested in it. D said we had the perfect example of his idea when the Russian Cosmonauts were in New York for the reception. They had such a good time and they wouldn't let Douglas go. This is an example of dialogue at a different level. K mentioned that Arlene Dahl was in last week to see the President and she had a similar idea. Douglas said he wouldn't waste much of K's time but maybe Frank Shakespeare would be interested in looking at some of the folks he had.

D said he should have sent the President a text telegram. K said he would convey the message to the President. They agreed that Douglas would call on the 15th or 16th to set something up.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
5:50 p.m., 11-5-69

R said Henry, you are going down tomorrow with the President, aren't you? K said yes, I am going down with the President. R said well, I did not have a seat and would have had to make a seat if you were going with me. K said no, I'm OK. K said you won't mind if I duck out of the Uruguay thing, will you? R said no, not at all.

R said President seemed to be in a good mood today. R said I guess you heard Fulbright has decided not to have a public session on Vietnam. R said so far I am making out alright with them. K said I think it came out just as well as it could.

R said that was quite a dinner last night, wasn't it? K said I thought it was nice and I liked what you said about Fulbright. R said I don't know whether you saw the CBS Kalb thing. R said I sent it over to the President. It was great.

K said Acheson is another friend who has behaved as well as McNamara. R said you know the Acheson thing means more to me than to you. I can remember the President excoriating Acheson in 1953 in speech after speech. K said he said today maybe he was a little hard on him.

R said OK Henry, I'll see you down there.

mlh

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
7:00 p.m. 11/5/69

The President thought of a couple of other things K might tell Sidey. The President mentioned a book by Tompson, "1940" which is the story of what really happened when Churchill came in. He mentioned the story about Patton and Pershing and what makes a good commander that there were never tired commanders decisions, only a few tired commanders. In terms of history, when we talk about the crucades that H. G. Wells talked about, for example the moon thing, had the effect of bringing to Western Europe not just the discovery in the East but the fact that Western Europe at that time devoted itself to a great cause beyond itself. It changed Western Europe. (The President read passages from H. G. Wells). The President said nations must have great ideas or they must cease to be great. They talked about what happened to England and France and that peoples greatness has to be extra-dimensional and move beyond themselves. The question is whether we do what we need to both abroad and in the ghettos. If we just go to the ghettos and let go abroad, apart from the destruction that might come from a war, we might destroy ourselves. Roosevelt talked about it as the White man's burden. Both of these people were searching for that same feeling that people need.

K said he would have a talk with Sidey and do his best.

7:10 p.m. The President

The President said for K to tell Sidey that he really thinks Kissinger is more valuable to him ... You can tell him that fellow like Alastair Buchan and the other fellow from England -- a little of that is worthwhile. K said what he wants to do in that story is to say this was not a gimmick but a deeply thought out position of a man who was concerned with the philosophical and historical aspect. The President agreed.

*

TELCONE
Joe Kraft
Dr. Kissinger
8:20 p.m., 11-5-69

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/13/04

K said Joe I am sorry you are distressed. Kraft said well you had some briefings after the speech and I was not included. K said I never arrange anything. Herb Klein got together the three network people - Howard K. Smith, Dan Rather and John Chancellor on Tuesday morning and asked me if I would see them. I saw no one on Monday night. Herb Klein asked me if I would see these three people since they had to get ready for their broadcast. Those were the only people I saw. This afternoon Hugh Sidey called and asked if he could see me about a story he was doing and I saw him.

Kraft said the reason I am angry, I asked Ziegler about it and he was rather abusive. I called Tony and did not get a call back. K said I give you my word I just heard about it. Kraft said I called five or six hours ago. K said all I want to tell you is that when you want to see me I will see you. Secondly, I was not giving any briefing to anyone. The only people I saw were these three network people and really doing with them what should have been done before the speech. K said the only other one I saw was Hugh Sidey who is doing a color story. Kraft asked K if there was any reason why Ziegler could not have told me that? K and Kraft then discussed previous conversations they had on Vietnam speech. (Could not hear Kraft at all during most of the conversation).

Kraft said you don't find lots of interesting elements in that Ho letter. K said what would you consider lots of interesting things? Kraft said the words I remember were reference to ten point program and final sentence said something about good will. The reason I am so annoyed is that I thought I had to reflect and so I did not write anything. K said this is very anguishing to me - it is something that I would be glad to discuss with you at some time. If you tear the Administration and me to pieces, it will always cause me great anguish not to be on the same wave length. I don't doubt your sincerity.

K said will you still let me come on the 14th. Kraft laughed and said yes. K said all I want you to know is that whatever dedication I have had to get this war settled has been increased in this job. And maybe when the whole story is apparent you will think more kindly. K said let me again express that I couldn't be sorrier if I have caused you anguish. Let's say when you call and say it is important I will see you and you will be the judge of what is important.

mlh

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Professor Arthur Maass
10:57 p.m., 11/5/69

M said I have no suggestions at all about Vietnam -- laughter. K said
you must be the only Harvard professor who doesn't.

M said I am a job applicant. M said I see something that maybe I can
do. They are going to set up the international organization for INTELSAT
and I was thinking that I might have some talent for the general manager
of the international organization that is being set up. M further said
I don't know if the US will determine who that is. K said let me talk to
Scranton about that -- you know that he is our representative. K said
I don't know a thing about what they are doing. M said he thought it
would be a very challenging assignment. K said he didn't know what
if any influence we had but he would explore it and if anything opens up
he would let M know.

K asked how the situation was at Harvard and said it doesn't sound like
a place to go back to. M said it is unbearable. The faculty is split
and it is so dense you could cut it with a knife. M said it is no fun.
M said at the faculty meetings the 3-400 assistant professors are
pretty much alienated from the other people. K said it is depressing.
M said the department meetings have been alright but they are begin-
ning to show wear. M said the juniors outnumber the seniors and they
are demanding more and more decision-making authority. M said it
has not shown yet in the senior meetings -- to think that Stanley is a
radical.

K said why don't you send me a brief outline on the water program
we can get the rest from the WHO'S WHO.

*

By KHLN NARA, Date 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Laird
4:30 p.m. 11/6/69

Laird asked when K was leaving. K said he would be leaving whenever the President left -- probably about 5:00.

Laird said he thought they should get together and spend some time before the meeting with the President. K didn't think the president expected to have much of a meeting but he wanted to get with Laird anyway. Laird said there were a lot of things he wanted to discuss just with K and he would bring along all of the "things".

Laird - 4:35 p.m.

Laird wanted to make sure that the President had signed the consultation paper for NPT or at least that he took it down with him. The group starts on Monday. Laird thought Rogers had signed off on it already. K said he would check and agreed that something should be done before Monday.

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

4:35 p.m.

11/6/69

Rogers asked when K was leaving and K said about 5:00.

Rogers asked about K's meeting with Dobrynin. K said he didn't have very much. He came in and talked about this linkage problem and I just said to him what the President had said he wanted before. K said he would write it up and send it to R. He told D that it is a fact of live that there is some relationship between but it is conditional. Rogers felt that that was the way to play it. Rogers talked to Tommy Tompkins and his Government thinks there is some confusion. He agreed that there is linkage but everybody Rogers said the Foreign Relations Committee has questioned him about this. Ford and Scott said something along the lines of linkage and the papers indicated that they had talked to K about it. K said he hadn't discussed this with Ford or Scott. Rogers said we have never laid down any conditions on SALT. On the other hand, if we are actually having confrontation in the Middle East, it would be difficult to engage in meetings with a friendly atmosphere in Helsinki. K indicated that D had come in to get clarification in his own mind since K had talked with K about something had been mentioned in Time magazine 6 months ago that K had that concept. Rogers said it might be helpful if he knew when K was having these meetings. K said he would call next time.

Rogers suggested that they have an NSC meeting in K. B. because it would only take a plane load. K said that was a possibility. He said we would see how things went down there. d