THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY - December 2, 1990

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MR. BRINKLEY: Now, from New York, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Amir al-Anbari. And here with us in the studio are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, in New York--

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: Yes, sir.

MR. BRINKLEY: Give us your reaction, if you will, to President Bush's invitation to talk. What do you think of it?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: We welcomed it; and we believe, from the very beginning, it should have been really made because Iraq has never been given a chance to present its case, to argue its case reasonably, calmly, without being intimidated or threatened. And this is why we are very happy and welcome that the president made this suggestion.

MR. WILL: Mr. Ambassador, a few Sundays ago on this program, Iraq's ambassador to Washington conceded the point that, of course, the United States could flatten--that's the word he used--could flatten Iraq militarily. That suggests that what Iraq doubts is not the ability of the United States to win a war but the will of the United States to wage a war.

Are you convinced the United States has the will to wage a war against Iraq?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: Well, no one really can reasonably belittle the military might of the United States. However, of all the countries in the region, apart from Israel, only Iraq really knows what war means. All your allies in the Middle East have either fought war, which they lost in a few days, or really didn't they fight war, but rather tribal sort of conflicts.

On the other hand, anyone who knows really the region-- how many petrochemical plants, how many oil fields, how many refineries, how many gas tanks--knows that one bullet could convert the whole region into sort of hell where no form of life would exist.

MR. WILL: Now, be clear to me and our viewers what you're saying. Are you saying that Iraq understands that it might lose a war--that, indeed, it could be flattened, as your ambassador says--but you're willing to fighting anyway?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: I tell you what--all forms of life--Iraqis, as well as American and other Arabs, including camels and fish and birds--all would be destroyed in case of war. This is why no sane person on either side, on American or Iraq side, really should choose war instead of peace.

MR. BRINKLEY: You're talking about poison gas?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: No, I'm talking--

MR. BRINKLEY: Nuclear weapons?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: I'm talking about the industrial complex that exists in that region--whether in Kuwait or Iraq or Saudi Arabia. You have so many petrochemical plants, so many

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refineries, so many gas tanks that a war really would destroy the whole region, and every living form
would be destroyed.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. Let's talk about, not war, but the talks. What is there to talk about? Would Iraq be willing to talk about withdrawing from Iraq?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: We'd be willing to talk about all the issues that exist in the region.

MR. DONALDSON: Including withdrawing from Kuwait?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: Our president made very clear, I believe on your channel when
Mister--

MR. DONALDSON: Koppel.

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: --Peter Jennings met with him, that there is no exception and we make no reservation and no condition.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, that's a major change, isn't it, because at one time your president said Kuwait was the nineteenth part of Iraq and you would never withdraw. Now he says that he'll talk about withdrawing?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: Well, when we talk about anything, it doesn't mean that we will concede any specific things. However, there are so many other issues, the situation is so complicated, that really a fair and reasonable solution, with good faith by all parties concerned, could be arrived at.

MR. DONALDSON: Now, there's a suggestion that your president will link the talks with the Palestinian question.

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: It was made very clear, and this is our position from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, on August 12th, if you remember, we made it that all Security Council resolutions concerning Palestine, Lebanon, the Gulf, should be considered equal.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. Is that just another question of talking about everything? Or are you saying that there will be no withdrawal from Kuwait, unless there is--as he once said, your president--a withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: I think once the parties--and here particularly the United States and Iraq--agree they should resolve the problem by peaceful means, by rational means, by decent means, I believe both sides should have no difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory settlement.

MR. WILL: Mr. Ambassador, the vice president of the United States said yesterday that it would be unacceptable for Iraq, in the aftermath of this crisis, to continue pursuing nuclear weapons.

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That indicates that in addition to the U.N.'s agenda, there is an additional point, at least on that count.

Is that negotiable?

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: Well, he's free to say whatever he likes. But, I tell you, apparently some parties in the United States have some hidden agenda. They don't want to solve any particular crisis as much as they would like to disarm Iraq, and Iraq alone, of all the parties concerned. This, to us, is not acceptable--as simple as that.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Ambassador, thank you.

AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI: It's a pleasure.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thanks very much for being with us.

Coming next, Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state; and, shortly, Senator Bob Dole, the Republican of the Senate; and Dick Cheney, the U.S. secretary of defense--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger in Connecticut, thank you for coming in.

MR. KISSINGER: Glad to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: We're glad to have you with us, as always. Now, I am led to believe that you are not enthusiastic about sending the secretary of state to Baghdad. Is that true?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I have been a strong supporter of the president's policy in the Gulf; and I admire the secretary of state's diplomacy in bringing about the U.N. resolution.

I am deeply worried about the process that has started on Friday. I understand the president's intentions of trying to obtain public support, and of trying to show he's gone the extra mile. But I believe that this is getting us on a road that is extremely dangerous.

MR. BRINKLEY: What road is this?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I believe that--first of all, I gag at the idea of the secretary of state arriving in a state that is holding a thousand American hostages, that has looted and raped a neighboring country, which has disobeyed twelve U.N. resolutions that we have sponsored, and against which we have deployed so many forces. There must be another way of conducting a negotiation with it than this way.

Secondly, I do not believe that we can maintain the distinction between discussions and negotiations that have been outlined by the administration.

Third, I think it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hold the coalition together and to achieve the objectives that the United Nations has voted under our leadership on twelve different occasions.

And at the end of this process, I believe that the debate in this country will not be any easier

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because it will then shift from whether we should delay to whether we have put forward the necessary effort in diplomacy.

And, finally, I believe if we do not our objective, that we will face a worse crisis with more
fearful consequences very shortly down the road.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kissinger, try and explain to use what might happen when Mr. Baker walks in the room. The vice president has said yesterday on television that these are not negotiations. It's, however, not an ultimatum that he'll be delivering--but that we want Saddam Hussein to see Secretary Baker's body language. I gather by that the vice president means that he wants him to see that we mean business.

If that's all that the secretary is going to communicate, is that not acceptable?

MR. KISSINGER: I cannot conceive how this is going to occur. I have great respect for the diplomacy that the secretary of state has conducted up to now; but I cannot imagine what the talking points will look like in which one says we will not negotiate; we will simply repeat the United Nations' proposals--but it is not ultimatum. It will inevitably lead to a negotiation. Above all, it will be perceived as a negotiation by our allies--many of whom, I believe, will now start their own lines to Baghdad. And I think it will be very difficult to hold the coalition together.

MR. DONALDSON: Dr. Kissinger, what is wrong with negotiation if, at the end of the negotiation, you achieve your objectives?

I mean, you just heard Ambassador al-Anbari--and you may not believe him, and please tell us if you don't--suggest yes, they will talk about withdrawing from Kuwait; and, no, while they want to talk about Palestine, it's not necessarily linked.

MR. KISSINGER: If we achieve the U.N. objectives, if we can obtain withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of the government, unconditional release of the hostages, we will have fulfilled our minimum conditions. There will still not be any penalties for having raped and looted a country. And once again American hostages will have been taken without any penalty--which I think we cannot continue.

MR. DONALDSON: So what you're saying is--

MR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that will be the outcome.

MR. DONALDSON: What you're saying is that your agenda is not just to have Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and the hostages released; there must not only be reparations, but what about Saddam Hussein? Can he remain president of Iraq?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I don't care whether Saddam Hussein stays in office or not. I care about the fact that there has been an escalation of the taking of hostages without any penalty to the hostage takers, which puts Americans around the world in increasing jeopardy. And I have also argued from the beginning of this crisis that the military preponderance of Iraq in the area has to be reduced, or American forces have to be kept there permanently (inaudible).

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MR. DONALDSON: Well, then, Dr. Kissinger, the only thing that will satisfy you, it seems to me, is that we go to war. The end result has to be we go to war.

MR. KISSINGER: Actually, though--Sam, it' very easy to say somebody's for war and somebody else is for peace. What will satisfy me is an improvement in the prospects of peace in the area. I see no benefit in making a settlement which will make a worse war likely in two or three years' time. It's the same problem as in the thirties.

MR. WILL: Mr. Secretary, the ambassador to the U.N. from Iraq said just a moment ago--and you heard him say it--that some Americans have a hidden agenda. If you listen, say, to Vice President Quayle, it's not at all hidden. It is that not only must the three basic U.N. demands be met, but also there must be some rolling back of the nuclear and other arsenals of Saddam Hussein.

Given that that is the case, does that not radically reduce the incentive Hussein has for leaving Kuwait because, even if he leaves Kuwait, we're still coming at him with other demands?

MR. KISSINGER: Here is a country that has gone to war, that has attacked two of its neighbors, is in mortal conflict with two of its other neighbors, that has annexed a neighbor. We should try to bring about a situation in which it is less likely to have an offensive capability. I have always supported that Iraq's defensive capability be maintained. I do not see any reason to destroy Iraq's capacity to maintain its independence. It is an important country in the area.

But I also think it is extremely dangerous to settle on a basis that in the whole region will be perceived as America not having achieved its fundamental objectives--because, if that happens, we will face a worse crisis two, three years down the road. I know I'm in a tiny minority, but so were the people who opposed the policy of conciliation in the thirties.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, thank you; thanks very much for being with us and giving us your thoughts on this. Come again.

Coming next, Senator Bob Dole, Kansas, Republican leader of the Senate--and, shortly, the secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Dole, thanks for coming in.

SENATOR DOLE: Thank you very much.

MR. BRINKLEY: Glad to have you. You were in the desert in the Middle East with the president over Thanksgiving, going to see the troops. Did he tell you anything about what he has done since then? Did he tell you what he was going to do this past week?

SENATOR DOLE: No, we didn't have any advance indication. I've got to believe a lot of it was his frustration with Congress. Congress wants to be a spectator in all this--most members of Congress--sort of sit it out and do the Monday morning quarterbacking on a daily basis--nit-picking, criticizing the president, criticizing strategy. And I think, in part, the Baker maneuver was in response to what he saw as a non-cooperative Congress.

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MR. WILL: Well, are you saying, then, that he is doing this because he thought that, if he asked Congress to give him the equivalent of what the U.N. has given him--which is a kind of international Gulf of Tonkin resolution--are you saying that he thinks that, if he asked Congress for that, he would not get it at this point?

SENATOR DOLE: I think he would get it, even though I guess I'm in the minority. The other three leaders think we shouldn't call the Congress back. But it seems to me that the American people ought to demand that Congress have a role in this; and we ought to be back here debating it. And I think, in the final analysis, the vote would be a substantial majority for the president's position.

MR. WILL: Do you think that ought to happen now or very close to what is now the January 15th deadline?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, it should happen now, but it's not going to happen apparently. The speaker and the majority leader have indicated they don't want to do that. The president asked I think about seven times in our meeting on Friday for help from Congress. And he came away empty-handed; he got nothing. We all went out on the tarmac afterwards and told the press, oh, yes, we support Baker going to Baghdad.

But, in my view, Congress has a role to play other than nit-picking.

MR. WILL: Well, what would you have them come back, debate and vote on?

SENATOR DOLE: I'd come back and recognize the importance of the U.N. Security Council resolution, which would authorize the use of force, if necessary; and, in some way, put that into a resolution, have a vote up or down, and then go on home.

MR. DONALDSON: If Baker goes to Baghdad and does not come back with Saddam Hussein's surrender on the issues, has anything really changed?

SENATOR DOLE: I think what the president has done has sort of called time-out--I mean, we've got all the hearings going on, all the criticism from Congress--and I think fairly--say also the American people thought there was sort of a rush towards war, the president said: Let's take a 45-day time-out; we'll invite their foreign minister and we'll send Secretary of State Jim Baker to again see if we can do anything in that interim.

But my view is there won't be much accomplished in the initial visit with Baker visiting Saddam Hussein.

MR. DONALDSON: If there's not much accomplished, does that time-out change anything? And I mean by that, if Baker hadn't gone or doesn't go to Baghdad, and Saddam Hussein doesn't back down, and the 15th of January comes, presumably there's going to be a showdown for war.

Does sending Baker give the president the ability to say to the American people, ah, look, I went the extra mile--now let's pulverize him.

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I don't know whether I'd go quite that far. But I think it is a clear

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indication the president has gone--has taken an extra step, has pursued the path of peace which we all want.

MR. DONALDSON: But is getting off an airplane, if negotiations are not to be had--and the president has assured us they're not going to negotiate--is getting on and off an airplane an extra step that means anything?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, we don't know precisely what will happen when Baker gets off the airplane. Maybe the four congressional leaders ought to go with him to indicate strong congressional support for what we're trying to achieve in the Gulf. Maybe that would help his bargaining--

MR. DONALDSON: Is that a serious suggestion?

SENATOR DOLE: It is a serious suggestion.

MR. BRINKLEY: You're willing to go?

SENATOR DOLE: I'm very willing.

MR. BRINKLEY: The other three?

SENATOR DOLE: I've been there before; but I'm very willing to go.

It seems to me, somehow, Congress can't sit this out. We can't sit on the sidelines as if nothing happened, and then, if it goes sour, criticize the administration.

MR. WILL: It is within the power of the president to call Congress back into session, just as Truman did in 1948, even when a Congress controlled by the other party didn't want to come. If you think Congress ought to be involved, the president having the power to call them back, isn't it fair for the American people to surmise that the reason he's not calling them back to vote this resolution of support is that he thinks the votes aren't there?

SENATOR DOLE: That's right. I think it's unfortunate; but I think he's right. The votes may not be there. It may be, whatever resolution, there might be a "no" vote. And what would that do to our position in the Gulf?

MR. BRINKLEY: We could come home.

SENATOR DOLE: Congress has already abdicated its responsibility. I assume we'd come home, or the president would go ahead and do precisely what he intended to do in the first place.

MR. WILL: That's a political judgment--

SENATOR DOLE: Right.

MR. WILL: --and an important and relevant one. There's also a constitutional judgment.