THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

7100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
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WITH THE
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TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

25 January 1957

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Henry:

Circumstances and my Scottish ancestry compel me to welsh
on my promise to send you a copy of my FA article for your ar-
chives. I couldn't or wouldn't go for the minimum number of re-
prints, for which I have no earthly use that I know of (perhaps
you can tell me what we eggheads do with reprints, I don't seem
to know), so I asked that you be handed a copy of the journal
with my compliments. I was informed that as you are a member
of the Council you don't need it. So there. I'm embarrassed and
shall be more cautious with my commitments in the future.

I do hope you read the piece and let me know if you have any
farther thoughts on it. You'll find it very much changed since the
draft you saw. So far I've had only one comment, and that from a
long range planner in naval operations (office of the Chief of) who
says he agrees in principle and largely in detail but why can't we
use the damn things for defensive purposes, the same being defined
as those that will only explode or our territory? An ingenious
notion, to which I shall, as he requested, give thought and later
comment at my leisure.

I've been wondering if you went to the Healey-Buzzard et al
conference at Brighton, England, last weekend, subject: limited
atomic war. I was invited but couldn't find the steam to propel
me over there (Ellis said no ORO interest, against George's rec-
comendations).

Having fun working on a proposal to put content into Mr. Eisenhower's
empty doctrine. It will probably suffer the fate of all ORO "think-
pieces" and all policy proposals that come from outside the sacred
inner circle. If so I may be tempted to hang it on the wash line,
if anybody wants to publish it.

How goes the book, and when do you come to Washington?

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON 9. D. C. ADAMS 4-6623

AFFILIATED WITH THE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

March 27, 1958

Dear Henry,

Thank you for your letter of the fifteenth. I still seem to have trouble
making myself clear, though. You say you do not think my category of "cases
in which the employment of nuclear weapons would be appropriate" (to which
you in general agree) would # include a "Soviet attack on Western Europe".
Doesn't it depend entirely on what you mean by the latter? If you mean your
"all-out" attack--the kind Kennan says is an official "obsession"--I don't
think that conventional defense comes into it at all, because the attack itself
would be nuclear, and probably simultaneous on the US and on Europe. But isn't
that about the most unlikely thing of all to happen? Certainly it is, if I'm
technical and tactical
right about the innate uncertainties making it impossible for either side even
(unless, if you mean, our side gets the arms race)
to be convinced that it can clobber without being clobbered. But your own
theorizing has suggested a variety of possible "attacks on Western Europe" that
would not come in that way at all. Zum Beispiel: the disengagementists seem
to be paralyzed at the thought of "another Hungary", particularly in East Germany.
They argue that we can't be sure of keeping West Germany from intervening, at
least if the West Germans have nuclear weapons, and if they do intervene we must
assume that the Russians will retaliate with all they've got. In my opinion this
is just plain rot on both counts. German brotherhood does not extend to the point
of suicide (it's all the US can do to get them to give Berlin a decent economic
break). Their "intervention", if there were any at all, would either be individual
filibustering, or some kind of "ambiguous" aid to the East German rebels engineered
by the Kaiser Ministry (don't know the present name). And the latter would, in

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all probability, only be undertaken after the most soul-searching
coordination with the rest of NATO--which means it is entirely unlikely
to be undertaken at all. Now, why in the name of all that's holy should we
assume that the Russians would respond to either of these eventualities with
an "all-out attack" on Western Europe, or anything remotely resembling such an
attack. If there is any substantial chance that they would respond in such a
way, then all of us are completely wrong about our assumptions regarding the
rational nature of their responses—and your theories as well as mine go down
the drain.

I do agree with you that the "added uncertainty" connected with "using
weapons which have never been tried in combat" adds greatly to the deterrent.
But doesn't it work both ways? It deters them from certain attacks, but it also
deters us from certain defenses—and undoubtedly helps to explain the present
wave of funk in Britain and Germany. For this reason I'd prefer to get what
deterrent effect we can out of the uncertainty regarding the type of attack
that we should consider called for a nuclear response, always leaving open the
possibility that we might defend conventionally against a conventional attack
the objective of which was not "worth" (your word) the local annihilation of
our European friends. For the life of me I see no other way that we can expect
them to feel that they can make a constructive contribution to their own defense.

On the matter of "relative numerical positions", though it is not entirely
irrelevant to the deterrent effect of the "added uncertainty", there is a good
deal more to it. I suppose you saw the report in the Times the other day that
a NATO (or EUCOM) study had shown the need for more, not fewer, troops on a
nuclear battlefield. My point is, it seems to me, even less controversial. It
is simply that there is no persuasive evidence that nuclear weapons increase
the inherent advantage of the defense (vide Clausewitz).

I'm doing a thing on Kennan and Healey for the NEW REPUBLIC the next two

weeks) that will line me up squarely on the Acheson-Dulles-Adenauer axis, also put me in the Acheson-Kissinger corner. I liked your current *Foreign Affairs* piece immensely on first--and rather hasty--reading. I still need to study it. Seems to me you knocked a lot of nonsense out of the missile phobias that are going around, and that you handled the purely military aspects particularly well. If I have any second thoughts on studying the article I'll let you know.

I'm lecturing at the Army War College in April on "a concept of national military strategy", probably the same lecture you've given in the past. Also Armstrong is expecting a piece from me for the summer number of Foreign Affairs, tentative title: Disengagement or Withdrawal? He may decide after reading my NR piece that I've given myself away, though, and withdraw his interest. I'm trying not to overlap too much, but it is the same subject.

I'll probably be in New York fairly soon, but don't know yet just when.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

LEWIS L. STRAUSS

the

# *Peaceful Atom in International Affairs*

THE new age of nuclear science, although it is not yet at the full stature of its growth, presents to man the most fateful choice of his entire civilized existence. The enormous power of the fissioned atom can be used to create a new world, rich in abundance and blessings, or it can be perverted to fashion a barren and primitive world. The choice between these alternatives still remains to be made by the peoples of the earth—in their combined enlightenment or their mass blindness.

The harnessing of the atom to serve man has been an international achievement. Our success in winning the grim wartime race to develop an atomic weapon ahead of our enemies would not have been possible without the contributions of scientists and scholars from abroad who found refuge in the United States from the tyrannies which ruled their native lands—such men as Einstein, Fermi, Szilard, Wigner, Teller, von Neumann and many others. And even earlier, basic nuclear research

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carried out in a dozen countries had provided proof that scientific
excellence and achievement can never be associated with any particular
birthplace.

Today, teamwork among the nations is more essential than ever be-
fore, for the potentialities of the peaceful atom are constantly expand-
ing. Only through the cooperation of peoples everywhere can its benef-
icent promise be fully realized.

For us, as Americans, the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is a natural and inevitable step since it is an expression of our devotion to peace and our deep abhorrence of war. We know, on the one hand, that civilization flourishes in peace. We are convinced, on the other, that a third world war would bring disasters without precedent, a regimentation destructive of the liberties which we treasure most, and a devastation that would sear and shatter the monuments of our culture and our homes and fields.

We know that the promise which the atom holds for man's welfare
affords us a great opportunity to demonstrate once again our desire
to help other people reach better standards of living and to have happier
lives as a result of peace and progress.

Radioactive isotopes—those miraculous by-products of atomic re-
actors—already are in widespread and increasing use, serving human
welfare in medical research and healing, in agriculture and industry.
And, of course, the benefits to be derived from the production of
electricity from nuclear fuels are just beginning to be demonstrated.

President Eisenhower, in his historic Atoms-for-Peace message to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, saw clearly this vision of the atom as the servant rather than the destroyer of man and called upon the nations of the world to share that vision, and to break the dismal atomic deadlock. His proposal, calling for a world pool of fissionable materials to be administered by an international agency is now nearing fulfillment. Last October 26, delegates from some 80 nations completed the charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which he initially proposed. The Senate is being asked to ratify United States' participation in the agency during the present session of Congress.

In his speech of December, 1953, the President pledged our country
to a whole-hearted effort to turn the destructive force of the atom into
peaceful channels. He promised that the United States would press
forward in cooperation with other countries toward that objective.

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We have been faithful to that promise, and we will continue to work for its fulfillment. We have initiated an extensive program of cooperation with friendly foreign countries and have made available 20,000 kilograms of uranium-235 (not of the grade from which weapons are made) for peaceful uses abroad, particularly the development of nuclear power programs. American industry has offered materials and services to other countries and is sharing its store of technical knowledge. Under authorization of the Atomic Energy Commission, a very great amount of technical information is available to friendly countries to enable them to engage in atomic research and to establish atomic industries of their own.

This sharing of the beneficent promises of the atom has been made possible by the United States system of bilateral agreements. We have negotiated such agreements with more than 40 friendly countries, agreeing to provide both technical assistance and fissionable material to be used as fuel in both research and power reactors and to exchange information with them.

The United States also has offered assistance on research reactor and power reactor projects. Grants-in-aid of up to $350,000 or half the cost of the project, which ever is the lesser, are available for countries undertaking research reactor projects. The Export-Import bank will consider extending credit for the construction of nuclear power plants abroad.

One of the most important features of the Atoms-for-Peace Program is our training program for foreign scientists. In many areas of the world, the lack of trained personnel is a major obstacle in the way of development of the peaceful atom. Many of these countries lack the facilities necessary for nuclear science training. The Atomic Energy Commission, together with the International Cooperation Administration, has instituted a program, under which foreign students attend the International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering, a cooperative effort of the Commission's Argonne Laboratory, North Carolina State University and Pennsylvania State University. Foreign nationals also study the use of radioisotopes at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies.

We are going forward with this program as rapidly as the national security will permit. Most of the information essential to the development of commercial nuclear power is now publicly available. We firmly believe that the benefits of the atom will help make a climate in which international cooperation in all fields of endeavor can flourish.

JAMES E. KING, JR.

# New Directions Needed

## Foreign and Defence Policy for the Nuclear Age

THE foreign and defense policies of any major power are interdependent. During the past few years our government has developed a general policy line, called "deterrence," in which the political and military aspects can be distinguished only with difficulty. This policy takes two forms: for the West, including our hemisphere and the North Atlantic Treaty area, and, since the Eisenhower Doctrine was announced, for the Middle East, we have the "great" deterrent of "massive retaliation"; for remoter areas we have what has been called the "graduated deterrent" of "measured retaliation." In both forms deterrence involves threatening some use of nuclear military power. Its purpose is to forestall aggressive action by the Communist powers by threatening the dire consequences we are prepared to impose in retaliation. Advancing military technology, and particularly the growth of Communist nuclear power during the years since it was first announced, suggest that the policy of deterrence should be subject to critical examination.

If the prospect of aggression is a real one, deterrence stands or falls by our ability to convince the aggressor that if he takes the military action we are seeking to prevent him from taking, we can and will take counteraction that will prevent him from achieving his objectives. In the words of the Secretary of State, he must expect that we shall inflict "punishing damage" on him.¹ It is assumed that aggression can be recognized. There is admittedly a problem connected with our willingness to act promptly and with appropriate force. Our ability to act cannot be doubted. On its face, the policy of deterrence makes sense only if it presupposes that we possess some decisive military superiority over any possible aggressor, and this presupposition is confirmed

¹John Foster Dulles, Address to the National 4-H Club Congress at Chicago, November 29, 1954

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both by claims made for the policy and by the manner in which it has
been presented to the aggressors presumptive.

The primary purpose of deterrence, then, is to forestall Communist
aggression against the free world. But an important by-product is also
claimed for the policy, that it prevents war, the only kind of war that
need concern us deeply. It is not claimed for deterrence that it is a
complete answer to the threat of Communist expansion. A distinction
is drawn between aggression and "subversion" and other policies are
designed to deal with the latter. Still, there is no question of the influ-
ence of deterrence on our foreign policy in recent years, it is the
unifying theme that runs through nearly all our relations with the out-
side world.

It is difficult to believe that we stand to win anything in total nuclear
war, though clearly we must be prepared for it, because only by being
prepared can we hope to have any say about whether it occurs or not.
But equally no one believes that the Communist powers can expect to
gain by such a war. Therefore, the chance of total war, as a consequence
of direct and deliberate aggression, seems remote. The same cannot,
however, be said of the chance of conflict arising out of international
crises where the circumstances are such that the ensuing conflict would
be "limited," at least at the outset. With regard to the prospect of total
war, then, we feel some confidence, but because we suspect that limited
wars can happen, and because we do not see clearly how we can handle
them if they do, our reaction to the threat of aggression in the Far East
tends to be, somewhat paradoxically, less confident than our reaction
to crises in the West.

It has been noted that deterrence presupposes the ability to administer "punishment" for aggression. There is, in fact, no reason to doubt that we can administer such punishment with H-bombs; it is possible, however, that in any given circumstance we may hesitate to do so, because now that the Communist bloc has H-bombs and the means to deliver them, whatever punishment we mete out can probably be returned in sufficient measure. This is reason enough not to overextend the deterrence of threatened massive retaliation. It must not be applied to situations in which the aggressor of the moment will not believe in our intention.

This is the primary reason why deterrence for the Far East takes
"limited" form. At the same time, because the aggressor there is as-
sumed to be the Communist Chinese, and because we feel we can not
hope to match them in manpower, we have announced that our retalia-

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tion will involve the use of nuclear weapons—"limited" by being aimed at the attacking armed forces. So long as the Chinese have no nuclear weapons with which to defend themselves, the problem of deterrence appears to be exclusively one of establishing credibility. If the Chinese are convinced that we mean what we say they must almost certainly be deterred. But eventually we must think of measured retaliation in circumstances in which the aggressor will have nuclear weapons. And when that time comes we shall have to face a number of new problems, of which two will serve as examples.

Can we apply nuclear retaliation in such a way that the damage will fall largely on the aggressor, and only in insubstantial measure on our friends? Can we defend our allies against the aggressor's nuclear counteraction? Problems such as these raise the more general question whether nuclear weapons are, in fact, appropriate to any and all limited situations. And if they are not appropriate, at least when the other side has them too, are we wise to commit ourselves in advance to their employment when our one-sided advantage has disappeared. And if they are not appropriate, what alternative means do we have "to contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world"?²

We may perhaps bypass the problem of defining "limited war" if we think of it as a war (or, of course, a prospect of war) in which the interests of the nuclear powers are substantially involved, but in which there is no question on either side that national survival is in jeopardy, and in which neither side is willing to commit more than a respectable fraction of its military resources. In broad outlines the requirements of limited war are suggested by the Korean experience. Both sides must prefer limitation to "victory" in the familiar sense. This means a distinctly limited political and military objective on both sides. They must evidence this limitation by providing a wide margin, in the territorial extent of the conflict and in military operations, within which it can be guarded. Even so neither side can afford to assume that it can attain its objective by the expedient of employing just enough more of its resources, because the other side can raise its ante too, and unlimited competition in terms of military resources can only lead to total war. It has been suggested elsewhere³ that the chance of war remaining limited is most promising if a prime limitation eliminates the employment of nuclear weapons—mainly because the distinction between

²John Foster Dulles, Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 12, 1954.

³James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 2, January 1957.

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conventional and nuclear weapons is so sharp that there is no chance of ambiguity. But whether the limitation takes this form or some other, the problem will be to keep the conflict as limited as the objectives of the belligerents.

The point was made earlier that the policy of deterrence assumes that aggression is identifiable. But actually "aggression," and its counterpart, "subversion," as well, are rubbery terms. If our deterrence is designed solely to prevent military attack by Communist Armies across borders friendly to us, then we have no policy calculated to handle the crises that are most likely to arise. Nearly all actual crisis situations lie in the twilight zone between the rather abstract extremes of "aggression" and "subversion." They involve Communist support of disident elements within friendly countries, as in Malaya and Indo China, or Communist "volunteers" participating in civil or local wars, as in Korea (and as threatened in the Middle East), Communist support of official conspiracies against the freedom of a people, as in Hungary—and in Guatemala, and other such quasi-aggressions. Even when there is a third party to define aggression, as the UN has done for the Middle East, the definition is unlikely to be sufficiently authoritative to justify us in going to war.

In fact, aggression, like beauty, is more likely than not to be found in the eye of the beholder. It seems impossible to escape the identification problem except by following the Red Queen's example and affirming that aggression is what we say it is. But deterrence requires that whatever it is that is to be deterred must be recognized on both sides. And whose "miscalculation" will it be if we are drawn over the brink of war because the Communists undertake an adventure they do not believe we shall identify with "aggression."

One reason why deterrence is differently applied to Europe and the Far East is that the stability of governments in Europe tends to make "aggression" there more easily definable. Even so there have been twilight cases in the past, and there will be again. At what point in a renewal of the Greek Civil War, in developing hostilities between Jugoslavia and Romania, in a border conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey, would our Strategic Air Command be ordered into action? These possibilities suggest that "measured retaliation" is preferable to "massive," even in the West. A most curious feature of the Eisenhower Doctrine is that it deliberately ignores such possibilities, though there is general recognition that this is the form in which Communist intervention in the Middle East is most likely to occur.

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These visible shortcomings of our policy of deterrence emerge only with the loss of our preponderant nuclear military position. No one is in a better position to identify aggression than a power whose own military position is unassailable, and the problems of limiting war are nonexistent if one side can set the limits and enforce them, to the point of destroying the weaker side if it refuses to comply. The prospects of the age that lie before us, however, when the nuclear powers will have more than enough military force to destroy any adversary, indicate that deterrence, as presently understood, simply will not do. It seems most likely to result in both sides flaunting the risk of nuclear war, with the side that is most audacious carrying off the honors, until some "miscalculation" plunges both into the abyss. This ultimately suicidal tendency must be opposed, as it already is being opposed, by the growing concern on both sides of the iron curtail with the *avoidance* of nuclear war. Yet there is no visible prospect that power will cease to play some kind of role in the affairs of states, and no assurance that affairs will not miscarry to the point of hostilities. Limited war, then, is not only a problem that must be studied, a contingency that must be planned for, but it is also an alternative indefinitely to be preferred to total war, and it may well be indispensable to relieve tensions and pressures that might lead to total war. But it will serve only if it can be kept limited—it is elementary prudence to recognize the great danger that total war may develop, despite the preferences of all concerned, out of a limited war that refuses to remain limited.

The nuclear age, as it approaches maturity, demands more than a merely agonizing reappraisal of our foreign and defense policies. We Americans are reluctant to recognize limits on our power to accomplish the things we want to accomplish—witness the traumatic effects in our national life of the "loss" of China. We are even more reluctant to restrict the exercise of what power we have in support of the values we hold high. When the Secretary of State spoke of "punishing" aggression he echoed both the confidence and the self-righteousness of the American people. The Korean War was widely unpopular just because, to paraphrase General MacArthur, it lacked the saving grace of victory. But in the full maturity of the nuclear age, when our vastly increased power of destruction in war is nullified by our enemies' power to retaliate, confidence in predominant military power can only be misplaced, and self-righteousness that expresses itself in war is a luxury we cannot afford. It is equally vital to recognize, however, that

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we are not being relegated to a position of inferiority, and that nothing
in the change of circumstance dictates surrender to Communism. It is
not that a new champion has appeared in the game, but that the rules
of the game are changed. These new rules will be difficult to learn,
they are likely to require a quite unprecedented nicety of observation,
and the penalty for violation, whether deliberate or not, is disaster. It
is well that we approach this strange new world with conviction that
a cool head is much to be preferred to hot breath, even when the
latter is reinforced by good conscience.

MOREHEAD PATTERSON

“Atoms-for-Peace”

THIS year of Our Lord 1957 is year 14 of the Age of the Atom, an age whose birth it has been our privilege to witness.

Political factors have governed developments in the field of atomic
energy from its very beginning. Every nation which has achieved atomic
fission has been impelled to do so for reasons of policy, rather than
for reasons of profit. From the beginning of World War II the United
States invested billions of dollars and enlisted the dedicated effort
of its greatest scientists and engineers in the attempt to harness atomic
energy for military purposes. The Russians also engaged in an all-out
drive to manufacture atomic weapons. The culmination of these efforts
was the successful explosion of the hydrogen bomb in November,
1952 by the United States and in August, 1953 by Russia.

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Into the world-wide environment of fear engendered by these activ-
ities—the fear of annihilation by atomic warfare—President Eisen-
hower introduced in December, 1953 his historic proposal for an
International Atomic Energy Agency to promote the peaceful uses
of atomic energy. The President, in pledging the United States "to
devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the mirac-
ulous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but
consecrated to his life," lighted a beacon of hope before men every-
where.

The implementation of atoms-for-peace may at times seem to proceed slowly. However, very real progress has been made, particularly in the past year and a half. In August of 1955 there was held at Geneva an International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and last October the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute was unanimously adopted by the United Nations. The Agency will hold its first general conference in Vienna this Spring. Specialized agencies of the United Nations—International Labor Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and World Meteorological Organization—have incorporated the peaceful uses of atomic energy in their programs of exchange of information, research and technical assistance in their respective fields. By the end of 1956 the United States, for its part, had entered into 39 bilateral Agreements for Cooperation with a total of 37 different nations. Seven of these bilaterals were for power reactors and 32 for research reactors.

It is of fundamental importance to consider how our pursuit of the
objectives of atoms-for-peace may affect the relations of the United
States with other countries.

As a nation, we have always prided ourselves upon the speed, vigor
and energy with which we have answered appeals made to us for aid of
all kinds. By sharing the benefits of the atom with other countries
the United States can maintain and extend its friendships, enhance its
prestige, and give a practical demonstration of its form of government
at work. Not to lend our assistance to other nations in peaceful atomic
development is to lay ourselves open to the charge of wilfully withhold-
ing such aid. We must so conduct our atoms-for-peace policy as never
to lend validity to an accusation of that kind. To people lacking con-
ventional fuels and the technical capacities required to put the atom to
work it would seem more than strange that the United States, which

[LC]

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first achieved atomic fission, could feel no pressing need to put it to
the use of men everywhere.

It is, however, one thing to know the direction in which we wish
to move, and quite another thing to decide just how we should proceed
in order to reach our objective. The world atomic energy situation is
tremendously complicated, and permeated with problems that vary great-
ly from one country to another. It is atomic power and other atomic
industrial applications that have caught the imagination of the peoples
of the world more than any other facet of atomic energy. The primary
reason for this is that atomic reactors hold out the promise of a cheaper
source of power to countries with high cost conventional fuels or where
cheap power resources are limited. Atomic power will supplement other
sources of power without necessarily displacing them, and will become
increasingly sound economically as we solve difficulties of technology
and engineering. In certain countries there has been a tendency to
view atoms-for-peace as a cure-all for basic economic problems, but as
a result of the wide dissemination of information on the atom there is
today greater realism concerning the prospect of immediate nuclear
power, and while all countries in the world want more and more power,
they are now planning for a period 5 or 10 or 25 years ahead, rather
than for next year.

It is a matter of urgency that we develop atomic power plants
tailored to the needs of the other nations of the free world, particularly
the plants of smaller size for which there will be the greatest demand.
Today, only the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union are capable of furnishing complete atomic power systems to
the world. Other nations, since they do not have nuclear fuels or neces-
sary scientific and engineering personnel, will probably devote their
efforts for a number of years to the development of reactor components,
pumps, controls and other hardware.

It has been stated that our national prestige will suffer if we make
available reactors for power that may be superseded by more ad-
vanced types. It is true, of course, that reactor technology advances
at a rapid rate, and that today's design may be obsolete tomorrow. We
cannot do more than make available to those countries which need atomic
power, and seek our help, the most advanced technical and economic
designs for atomic power plants insofar as we can do so in the light of
security regulations. These countries must make their own decisions,
and these must be based on all the information we can properly supply.

Inherent in the development of atomic power in other countries is

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one of our most thorny problems. This arises from the fact that the
production processes of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes are precisely
identical, up to a late stage of manufacture, with those used when the
purposes are destructive, so that materials may be diverted from non-war
to war purposes. It is obvious that very serious consideration must
be given to means for controlling by-product plutonium or uranium
233 resulting from the operation of atomic power reactors. We must
have adequate safeguards to ensure that large-scale generation of nuclear
power will not be followed by spreading production of nuclear weapons.

There are various methods by which we may hope to fulfill the
wishes of other nations for atomic power without at the same time
endangering the measure of peace we now enjoy. One of these is com-
plete international control of military atomic activities. Many years
of negotiation toward this end have not produced any real result. A
partial approach which would materially lessen the risks would lie in
the control of by-product plutonium and uranium 233 from peaceful
atomic applications, coupled with control of certain crucial steps in
the fuel cycle. Controls are burdensome, and will add to the expense of
atomic plant operation—but they are essential. The burden can be
minimized through proper design of key facilities. The IAEA should
be in a position to establish the necessary controls.

Humanitarian atomic applications form a principal category of the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. Dealing as they do with agriculture,
medicine and biology, and concerned specifically with providing food,
improving health and saving lives, they are an unparalleled weapon in
the race to win the minds of men. Hundreds of millions of people in
countries all over the world have scarcely enough food to keep alive.
Disease is rampant. The span of life is short. There is no question
that atomic energy can help all men to lead happier, healthier, and
more productive lives, and by its contributions to the needs of others
the United States can go far in bringing to the world an appreciation
of the benefits that derive from life in a free society.

In nations where primitive farming methods still obtain, and where
productivity is low, atomic energy can go far in improving the food
supply. Agronomists can use atomic tracers to determine with ease and
certainty how best to fertilize local crops, feed livestock and control
destructive pests. We can try to see that these things are done now,
pending the long-term correction of food deficiencies which will result
from measures taken to improve the low state of the economy in the
areas involved.

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The United States can take vigorous action to bring higher health standards to the people of the world by means of the beneficial applications of atomic energy in the fields of medicine and public health. Examples of a readiness to give priority to these applications, which offer immediate benefits, are the intelligent and practical planning for the use of atomic energy at the Institute for Neurological and Cerebral Research in Venezuela, and the Isotope Center in Egypt, both of which came into existence with our assistance and advice. We can help to provide medical schools abroad with facilities for training in atomic medicine techniques, make available at lower prices the expensive radioactive materials essential for therapy and research, and assure prompt availability of information with respect to all developments in the field of atomic medicine.

Our objectives are worthy, but it would be folly not to realize that they will be difficult to reach, particularly in the undeveloped nations of the world. In nearly all of these there is a lack of institutions of higher learning. The supply of professional people—doctors, engineers, scientists, teachers—is far from adequate. The supply of capital for investment is indicated by the statistic that while the per capita income in the United States is about $2,200 it is only about $100 in the undeveloped countries. In the face of all these unhappy facts and the difficulties that face us, there can be no question that we must spare no effort to meet the demands of these nations to participate in the benefits of atomic energy.

In order for us to take the lead in providing the world with the benefits of atomic energy, it will be necessary for each nation which enlists our aid to provide us with a sound development plan showing just how they wish us to help. Those countries outside the United States which have made the most progress in atomic energy development have done so by their own efforts to build programs directed to their own goals. By so doing they have become genuine partners in cooperation, and have made valuable contributions to the sum of atomic energy information as well as to their own development.

Atoms-for-peace is a tremendous program. Of vital significance to the conduct of foreign affairs, it puts us in a position to bring to other nations reactors and associated equipment, together with the benefits that flow from sharing our knowledge of the peaceful and beneficent uses of atomic energy. The initiative and vigor with which we carry out this program can make an immeasurable contribution to the establishment of world-wide peace.

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG

Russians, Asians and
Development

CAPITALISTS and Bolsheviks would agree that pre-revolutionary Russia was an under-developed country, in the modern sense of the term, but might differ as to whether or not it was "in the process of development." The masses were engaged in the traditional form of agriculture imposed by the form of their emancipation in 1861, living in poverty, afflicted by disease and lack of sanitation, largely illiterate and basically without participation in the political life of the country. At the turn of the century some large farming enterprises were developing in the capitalist pattern, with machinery and a growing need for export markets. The Industrial Revolution was beginning, and in the twenty-five years preceding World War I there was an industrial boom. Mines were dug, railroads built, oil fields opened, and manufacturing enterprises established. The capital came from the government in grants or loans, or from private investors, domestic and foreign, encouraged by government through tax benefits, high tariffs, and land and subsoil concessions. The emphasis of foreign investment was on the extractive industries; increasing quantities of Russian minerals and petroleum reached world markets. Russian imports were primarily capital equipment and consumer goods. The historic pattern of a landed aristocracy with all political and social privilege was only slightly modified by the acceptance into this elite of selected figures newly wealthy from trade or industry, sometimes by association with foreign investors. Foreign trading firms were dominant in the country's international trade.

Although Russia was backward and in the process of economic development, it was also a major world power. Its military establishment was impressive in numbers, but inferior in technology. Russia was striving to narrow the economic and technical gap that had come to separate it from its allies and competitors in world politics.

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While it was undergoing development at home and was, according to some Marxists, an object of western imperialism, Russia was itself pushing forward in imperialist ventures. Russian acquisition of colonies in Asia and spheres of influence in the Far East proceeded by land; and perhaps the process attracted little attention from Asian and African peoples who were receiving by sea the impact of other European states. Despite the fact that Russian resources had barely been scratched, interest in foreign markets for manufactured goods and in new mining properties no doubt helped to push the Russian government along its expansionist path. The drive was vigorous, arousing opposition from competing imperial systems. Although there was reform and an increased economic effort following the Japanese defeat of Russian forces in 1944, Tsardom's share in World War I proved too much for its moral and political resources; and by 1921 Russia had vanished as a military or economic force.

The Bolsheviks' ideology was industrial. They were also the inheritors of Russian national traditions and, perhaps unconsciously, of the policies of the preceding government. Their first and most obvious task was to restore production in their shattered economy at least to pre-war levels. Flexible methods, such as a heavy reliance on local private enterprise, sufficed to accomplish this in the short space of seven or eight years with little or no outside help.

Many experts have examined with great care the rate, quality, and cost of Soviet economic growth and have differed in their conclusions. Nevertheless, all concede that a great increase in the output in industrial goods occurred in Russia in the decade beginning in 1929, a substantial part in military or defense-supporting industries. The ideological complexion of the Soviet Government and the mainsprings of Russian historical development both contributed to this security-mindedness. The Soviet Government regained (or liberated) the former Czarist colonies in the Caucasus and Central Asia and exploited (or developed) their resources and people, now described as constituent republics. The high rate of investment in Soviet industrial enterprise was accomplished by authoritarian decision to force the population, primarily in the rural sector, to save more than it could have imagined possible. Industrialization and collectivization in agriculture did not significantly expand output, and administration was so poor that substantial capital in the form of livestock herds perished in the process, as did quite a few of the farmers.

Russian reaction to the European post-Munich political situation dis-

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played a sensitivity to the fact that, despite its economic progress, Russia's basic economy was no match for German technology and organization. This coincided with the Soviet political view of avoiding entanglement in an imminent war and of playing off "capitalist" powers against each other. The Soviet Union bought time to strengthen its economy and defense capacity. The economy proved resourceful and capable, but great losses in productive capacity occurred.

Thus after the war the Soviet Union again found itself with material and human resources depleted, but this time with a greatly enhanced world political status as a major power. With its basic ideological objectives either unaffected or re-enforced by very considerable new opportunities for expansion into power vacuums left by the Axis military collapse, the Soviet government proceeded simultaneously to acquire a huge new "colonial" area in eastern Europe and to pass over to a political attack on the position of its erstwhile allies at home and abroad.

The tasks at home were urgent and impressive. For five or more years after the War the Soviet Union's economic efforts were directed primarily at rehabilitating its own economy, and at re-establishing, or increasing, the prewar pace of industrial development. Economic activity abroad was limited to offering traditional exports in small quantities, and trying to buy technology the West thought important from a security standpoint. Much talk was heard of trade and the prospects of greatly expanded commercial exchanges with countries in the free world, but performance and offerings did not match the talk.

The Soviet economy, however, continued to develop; and by 1952 or 1953 basic production and technology were far ahead of their position in 1939 or 1940. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had so expanded its industrial establishment that it now appeared to be in a position to offer industrial goods of a quality and in a quantity saleable in foreign markets. This stage of development coincided with a change of administration in the Soviet Union and with a growing recognition, apparently, that polarized great power military-political rivalry could lead to nuclear war and the destruction of the Soviet Union. These factors in part explain the increase in Soviet international economic activity since 1953.

The facts of this Soviet drive are well known. Soviet salesmen are busy peddling their wares from Indonesia and Cambodia to Liberia and are in a position to offer power equipment, machinery, entire fac-

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tories, steel mills, hospitals, technical assistance missions and consumer goods. The offers are on terms which cannot fail to be interesting to countries of limited means, motivated by a tremendous drive for economic development. The interest rates are below those of the International Bank or other Western credit institutions, and the Soviet Union frequently offers to take locally produced commodities in payment of interest and principal. It takes advantage of soft spots in the world economy by accepting, for example, Burmese rice, Egyptian cotton or Icelandic fish, items not always welcomed in such markets as the United States. The potential of this traffic is substantial. The huge maw of the Soviet economy with its agricultural shortcomings can easily devour almost unlimited quantities of agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs; less perishable goods can be stockpiled. Thus good international politics for the Soviet government may also be good business for the Soviet economy. The Soviet economy can afford to spare the industrial goods it exports, especially as domestic consumers are not in a position to object. The Soviet Union can also call upon the resources of its internal colonies and satellites to complement and supplement its own resources; and the Soviet Union now has an Asian ally in Communist China, itself deeply engaged in industrialization, which often supplements Soviet international economic activity. Chinese purchases of natural rubber from Ceylon and other countries in Asia, and its very complicated trade in rice, are by no means without strong political overtones. Thus, the Soviet bloc as a whole is in a position to mount a complex and ingenious trade-and-aid offensive, both bilaterally and in such forums as the economic agencies of the U.N.

The targets of this attack may be Western Europe and North America, but the outcome depends on the response of Asian and African governments and peoples. Of course they need capital for development; of course they need consumer goods, machinery and equipment; of course they need outlets at good prices for their traditional exports. But Western Europe is the market for Middle East oil; Western Europe and North America buy the tin and rubber of Southeast Asia; Western Europe and Japan buy the bulk of Asian and African cotton; Western Europe, North America and Japan furnish most of the capital equipment, machinery and consumer goods for Asia and Africa on competitive and quality terms. Western Europe and North America furnish technical assistance, credits, commodity or financial aid, and private investment in a framework of what might be called modified capitalism. Private investment is interested in profits, merchants wish to be paid

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in money for the commodities they sell, and responsible lending insti-
tutions have to charge higher rates than can be offered by a Communist
government for political purposes. Economic aid and technical as-
sistance funds have to be obtained in the West from legislatures. Legis-
lators are prone to ask questions about the need and objectives of aid,
the intended use of funds and the procedures to assure proper account-
ing for taxpayers' money. Soviet taxpayers are subjects and have no
control over the use of their taxes.

It is too early to pass judgment on the effectiveness of Soviet per-
formance on its contracts and offers. Criticism has been heard of Burmese
difficulties with too much cement simultaneously with the monsoon, and
of other barter goods which are of poor quality or are not wanted by
the local population. In many other cases there has, as yet, appeared
no basis for criticizing the quality of goods delivered, the timeliness
of performance of contracts, or the usefulness of the projects. Soviet
diplomats have followed a policy of being formally correct in their
dealings with governments in Asia and Africa, and of not accompanying
their generous offers with obvious political demands. The Soviet Union
certainly has the talent and wherewithal to assure performance. It
seeks, of course, to identify itself and its political policies with the
nationalist political and economic aspirations of newly independent coun-
tries, presumably hoping that people will overlook Soviet efforts in
earlier times to destroy a number of these very same governments
through internal communist subversion and attack—notably in Indo-
China, Burma and Indonesia. Soviet help to such countries could, as a
matter of fact, strengthen their economies and thus deter local dis-
content; perhaps Soviet policy makers do not consider the time ripe for
internal communist subversion. They may hope, rather, to persuade
Asian governments to side with the Soviet Union on general interna-
tional questions. Such political affinity, together with some economic
dependence, might make them ripe for harvest without revolution. The
discomfiture of the West may be a by-product, or a main objective; in
either event it can be useful to Moscow.

Much apprehension is heard in the West over possible Soviet political
success in its economic activity in the under-developed countries, over
receptivity to Soviet offers and the welcome to Soviet and Chinese travel-
ling statesmen. The implications stimulate thought by Western policy
makers.

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The most important driving force in the newly independent countries is the desire to be politically and economically free of outside influence. "Outside influence" to most Asians means Western government and business enterprise. Many aspects of the relationships of the past are recalled by Asians with something less than satisfaction. Their chief preoccupation has, therefore, been to prevent the return of "colonialism." The fact that no western power entertains the thought of re-establishing a colonial regime is irrelevant. Many of the Western businesses which were prominent under colonial regimes remain and are active, sometimes expanding, under the newly independent government. In substance they contribute, often handsomely, to the development of the country; they are frequently regarded with suspicion, however, as "colonial remnants." Many people observe that capitalism was the form of business which accompanied political colonialism; if independence is the opposite of colonialism, then "socialism" (seldom defined) is the opposite of capitalism. All under-developed countries are avidly seeking development and, naturally, must rely heavily on government capital and enterprise—which can perhaps be described as socialism—because their societies are primarily agrarian. Foreign firms are subject to regulation and taxation by new nationalist governments, but this is sometimes not enough for Asians better versed in doctrine and principle than in practical affairs. Newly independent countries in Asia wishing development do not often flatly oppose private investment, but they have trouble understanding why potential investors sometimes consider conditions unattractive, and a feeling grows that the investor discriminates against them because they have employed some form of "socialism" to some extent in their own society.

In the centre of this situation the Soviet offers appear; the newly independent nations look up with curiosity and perhaps with cheerful anticipation because of the novelty of the relationship. They observe that the Soviet Union has made great strides in economic development with its own resources. They observe that the Soviet Union is the most Asian country of Europe. They understand that the Soviet Union has professed itself a champion of colonial peoples against imperialism. They fail to see the Soviet colonies neatly tucked away inside the Soviet Union and they do not perceive the ties that bind the satellites to Moscow. Furthermore, Russians have never appeared as military conquerors in South and Southeast Asia; they come dressed as peaceful traders, talking about mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and offering aid and trade "with-

22

out strings." Finally, "socialism" is a word with a good connotation in many parts of Asia and the Soviet Union advertises itself as socialism's leading exponent. The West may point out that Soviet methods of economic development have been a little rough on the Russians, but Asians may respond that Western colonial methods were also rough, and that they see no harm in using some Soviet methods on themselves, so as to accelerate the pace of development.

There is, of course, another reason for the Asian welcome to Soviet offers of trade and aid. The Asians could scarcely have failed to observe the profound preoccupation of the United States and other Western countries with the expansion of international communism. The bargaining possibilities inherent in playing off the Soviet camp against the West are tempting. Asians can use the aid and trade of both sides without, they think, losing their independence or forfeiting their neutralism. In fact, they may think that having two bidders enhances the independence of their position.

Acceptance of Soviet aid and trade, resplendent in professions of its non-political character, cannot logically be protested by a western world which proclaims its faith in identical objectives. Everybody may suspect everybody else's motives, but development can certainly move forward. In fact, no new nations in the past have been favored by such opportunities. Never was there so little resistance to the concept of national independence, nor were there so many forms of help available. A failure of the free nations of Asia to develop along genuinely independent political and economic lines, would seem to be primarily a matter of their own responsibility.

Any Western effort to judge how the Asians may react over the long term is probably risky. Religion, tradition, class structure, political position, and access to the intellectual and material resources of the Western World would be imperilled or wrecked by a Soviet take-over. Honest and objective Asians have no trouble perceiving this. Closer acquaintance with the charms of the Russians (and mainland Chinese) may make the West appear more attractive. Experience and common sense should lead Asians to realize that the West is incomparable as a market, as a source of supply for goods and credit, and as the home of enlightened and unselfish help and friendship. The Soviet model of development appears bright and shining; acquaintance with the Soviet method of producing it, and with the motives of the builders, should bring about rejection. Like the tiger, it is not recommended for its riding qualities.

Vice Consul, Aden

OUR two years in Aden are almost over. Our tour as American Vice Consul and wife during this crucial period in the Middle East has been profoundly interesting, although somewhat arduous lately. Aden has given us a warm, friendly welcome which we will recall with happy nostalgia at other posts in years to come.

We have seen fascinating sights while traveling in this consular district which encompasses Aden Colony and Protectorates, Yemen, and British Somaliland. A year ago we made a 130 mile, nine hour jeep trip into the Yemen—that archaic, hermit kingdom which still lives in the middle ages and is ruled by autocratic, mysterious Imam Ahmed, Leader of the Faithful and absolute temporal sovereign. We stayed at the Imam's Guest House and were served *susi*, the Yemeni crepe suzette; chewed *qat*, the local narcotic; smoked a hubble bubble pipe; and suffered with an attack of Yemen Tummy.

The next trip was to British Somaliland, on the edge of the inhospitable African bush. Here we were greeted with tales of marauding lions and laughed about the warden of an isolated prison who, on one of his infrequent visits to town, spent an hour telling us of the peace treaty and serious conversations he has with the local baboons. At this point we appreciated our life in socially minded Aden; but then there came a day of shooting wild boar and antelope, a safari with a group of American ge(oil)ologists, and visits to various hill stations. Of course, there was the inevitable Somaliland Tummy.

Our latest trip was to the port of Mukalla, former slave-trading and pirate center of the Arabian coast, which still retains its full Arab atmosphere. From Mukalla we went on to the fabulous Wadi Hadhramaut, a valley oasis isolated by high cliffs that form the *Jol*, a barren plateau that stretches to the sea on the south and to the sand dunes of the Rub al Khali (Arabia's "Empty Quarter") on the north. The Hadhramaut is famous for its ancient "skyscraper" cities constructed in mud brick. The more modern buildings, designed by Hadhramis who have lived abroad, often show a definite oriental, or even European, architectural influence. One wealthy Sayyid's house, complete with swimming pool and lush garden, had a magnificent baronial staircase which led to a blank wall—obviously the designer had once visited the Folies Bergere.

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In Seiun we were entertained in Arab fashion sitting on deep piled Persian carpets and eating the delicately flavored and curried food with our right hand. Again the only drawback was the inevitable Hadhrami Tummy. (No wonder travelers to these areas are few and far between!)

We are fortunate to have had the opportunity to see these remote
places where outsiders, even those from other Arab countries, are
rarely admitted. In each locality we were thankful and humbly proud
for the growing respect of other people for America. God grant that
we may all continue to earn this respect.—Theodore McS. Collier

Letter from Bologna

ON my way to the University this beautiful but cold January morn-
ing, I thought I might record a few general impressions of Italy,
and especially of Bologna in winter. This is a time of year when a
great part of the country becomes a no-man's land for tourists: it is
a time when even Italians have to bundle up in fur-lined coats and
high shoes, and when the Emilian farmers come to town in dark,
heavy wrap-around cloaks. The comparatively empty streets, shops, and
restaurants during the cold months in such cities as Florence and Venice
make one realize how many lives are completely dependent upon the
tourist trade.

In Bologna the winter introduces striking changes in color, and the
play of light and shadow between the columns of the porticoes is
completely different. During these months the brown, yellow and
especially the red tints of the Bolognese stucco are transformed. In
the cold and wet, these colors give the city a somber appearance;
but by July the hot sun has baked out the moisture, and the brightened
colors then give the city an almost brilliant façade. These effects, al-
though more mysterious, at times remind one of the seasonal changes
of New England foliage.

Even in the rain it is possible to take the twenty minute walk from
our apartment to the University along the narrowest and smallest side
streets without getting wet, because of the ever-present arcades. Two
reasons are given by the Bolognese to explain the first use of the

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arcade. Some feel that it was an adaptation of a style in which the old Etruscan tombs were built. A more plausible explanation is that it is a product of early medieval times, when in order to get the maximum use out of a residence the second floor was extended over the street and was supported by upright or diagonal wooden beams. There are still a number of houses in Bologna which display this type of architecture. The ground beneath was not paved, and was utilized for livestock. Not until the early Renaissance were the arcades employed as an architectural enhancement. One can see the changing architecture through the centuries as one passes the differently styled arcades, columns, capitals, and cornices which bear the mark of the romanesque, gothic, renaissance, baroque, or modern period. This, perhaps more than anything else, gives Bologna its unique character, for there has been an unwritten law for centuries that the use of arcades will be continued.

The first rays of sun have not yet penetrated the crowded food market as we pass daily. The vendors, men and women wrapped in their heavy scarves, are loudly reporting the latest gossip in that strange-sounding Bolognese dialect. They are uncovering their assortments of fruits and vegetables—the delicious blood oranges and giant-sized tangerines from Sicily, the large baskets of chestnuts which the Italians love to roast, and the *carciofi* (artichokes) which are selling for fifty lire (about eight cents). But the price is still too high for many a budget-conscious housewife. She will purchase them the following week when the price will have dropped to twenty-five lire. Prices for all fruits and vegetables are naturally higher during the winter months and fluctuate with the thermometer.

The lonely, and one might say almost ostracized, banana salesman is just opening the shutters of his little grey stand which may usually be found on the periphery of every market. What is the explanation for this "splendid isolation" of the banana salesman? One of the reasons is that bananas are one of the four agricultural products which are subject to government purchase—the other three being wheat, wheat flour, and tobacco—and there is now imposed upon them one of the highest duties (thirty-six percent), surpassed only by the special fabrication taxes on imports of sugar and vegetable oil. In this paradise of fresh fruits bananas are a luxury indeed.

As we reach Via Zamboni, we are almost in the University quarter. Here during the winter months we find an occasional beggar playing the accordian, fife, or violin. There are not many beggars in Bologna, and rarely is one encouraged during the summer months. In the winter,

26

jobs are scarcer and pensions do not go very far if one also has to pay
for coal and wood. Should a foreigner not happen to be generous with
his change, he will soon learn from the Italians themselves to have a
ready coin in his pocket.

One will have to wait until spring when the cafes line the sidewalks
before one can relax with a campari soda or a cappuccino in the open
air. This is for the future. Now is the time for the pleasures and beauties
of winter.

MANFRED LANDECKER

## Letter from Rangoon

BURMA is now in the midst of its dry season. For anyone who has known it only during the rains, the changes are both startling and fascinating. The climatological changes are only the least remarkable; the entire face of the nation and its social life are altered almost overnight.

The temperature rises perhaps a little higher during the day than it did during the monsoon, but the evenings in Rangoon are delightfully cool, the humidity is low, and the nights are sometimes downright chilly. A wool suit at an outdoor party is not uncomfortable, and a couple of light blankets come in handy any time after midnight.

When we arrived, the predominant color was green—all shades of green from the Irish green of rice paddies to the blue-green of the frangi-pani trees. Even the buildings had vegetation growing out of cracks and crevices and their surfaces were spotted with mold. Our visitors were always startled to see small trees sprouting high up on the golden Shwedagon Pagoda.

Rangoon is not without green even now, after three rainless months, but the predominant color is brown. The rice has ripened and been harvested, the lawns and meadows have turned brown, many of the leaves have changed color and dropped off, very much as they do at home in the autumn. Even those trees which are still green are covered with a thin layer of dust. Only the private gardens, which are assiduously

27

watered morning and night, and an occasional stand of winter wheat,
are left to remind one how green green really can be.

But this is only half the story. This is the out-of-door season for the
Burmese, and they take full advantage of it. It starts dramatically in
mid-October with a lighting festival and, from all appearances, will
continue until the rains come again in May. Thousands upon thousands
of colored lights festoon the trees and shrubbery; outdoor stages are
set up—sometimes as many as four or five in a single city block—and
moved about the city at will, new outdoor restaurants, tea-shops, and
bazaars spring up; and Rangoon sets out to have itself a fling.

The garden party is now the standard form of entertainment. More
often than not they are in honor of some visiting dignitaries, for this
is also the VIP season. Haille Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and
Chou En-Lai, the Premier of Red China, both paid goodwill visits to
Rangoon this fall. (And in passing it might be remarked that the
consensus is that the Emperor received a much heartier welcome from
the man-in-the-street than did the Premier.) But they were only the
most notable of a long string of visitors, not the least of which were
the "cultural" troupes.

The Red Chinese sent an elaborate production made up of singers,
dancers, actors, and jugglers tricked out in colorful costumes and
whipped into shape in the finest Broadway tradition. In spite of the
recent unpleasantness about the Sino-Burmese border, they were en-
thusiastically received. The United States' contribution was Benny
Goodman and his band. In addition to their regular evening perform-
ances at the sports stadium in the city, they gave three impromptu
concerts on the University Estate. From my own observation, I would
say that anything from "Stardust" to "Cherry Red," played by a top-
notch combo, will win more friends and influence more young people
out here than all the rest of the VIP's combined.

A noticeable slackening of tension has accompanied the coming of
the dry season, and I would be the last person to say that there is no
direct connection between the two. The insurgency is still troublesome
but seems to be less active. The Sino-Burmese border question is still
hanging-fire, but it has disappeared from the newspapers and seems
to be in the process of final settlement. The University students have
stopped agitating for the moment and are busily memorizing their
notes for final examinations which start next month. Dacoities are

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less prevalent—or at least at a more comfortable distance from home. Prices are rising more slowly, and such basic necessities as milk and sugar which were unobtainable a few months ago are now in good supply. Even the transfer of the Premiership from U Ba Swe back to U Nu, it now appears, will take place with little outward disturbance in the ranks of the AFPFL.

All this is not to say that nothing is being done in Rangoon. Business goes on as usual, but the obstacles seem to be fewer. As far as the Rangoon-Hopkins Center is concerned, the pace has quickened in recent months. A point of special pride for the Center is the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning at a recent Conference in Bangkok. The idea of creating this Association grew out of a Conference held by the Rangoon-Hopkins Center in Rangoon in October, 1955, (the proceedings of which were published last June in Dean Thayer's *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*). The heads of some of the more prominent Universities in the area attended the Rangoon Conference and came to the conclusion that the interchange of ideas, information, and personnel that occurred there was valuable enough to be continued through the formation of a permanent institution.

At the recent Bangkok meeting, the proposed Constitution was ratified, a small Secretariat was set up, a program adopted, and officers elected. Acting-President Virata of the University of the Philippines was elected Chairman of the Association, and our own Rector, Dr. Htin Aung, is the new Vice-Chairman. Dean Kasem of Chulalongkorn University will be the Executive Secretary, carrying on the work of the Association from its new headquarters in Bangkok.

Twenty-five institutions from the area have been elected to membership, with the expectation that others will request membership once it is seen how valuable the Association can be for the advancement of educational goals.

Professor Johnstone will arrive in Rangoon to take over his new duties before this letter is printed. It is with mixed feelings of regret and anticipation that we take leave of Rangoon to go to Indonesia—regret at leaving our friends, this lovely country, and the unfinished business of the Center; anticipation of new experiences and new insights into the life and problems of Southeast Asia in Jogjakarta.

JOHN P. ARMSTRONG

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Alumni Notes

## Alumni Abroad

Warren Adams, '53, is Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Iraq College of Agriculture in Baghdad. As of April 1, Philip Arnold, '54, will be with the United States Information Service (U.S.I.A.) in Zagreb, Yugoslavia. Lewis Conover, '48, is now Manager of ARMCO International Corporation's activities in Colombia. Clinton Doggett, '46, is in Greece with the International Cooperation Administration. Craig Dozier, '48, is presently on a year's research grant in Central America, with headquarters in Guatemala City. John Farrington, '47, is with the American Consulate General in Singapore. Nancy (Hodges) Finlay, '48, is with her husband in Karachi, Pakistan, where he is with the Pakistan Petroleum Corporation. Formerly with the American Consulate in Naples, Italy, Gordon Heiner, '49, is now Economic Officer at the American Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. This information came to us in a letter to Dean and Mrs. Thayer from Belle Lifson, '56, who is in Cambodia with I.C.A. Rolf Lundberg, '52, is with the trust department of a bank in Oslo, Norway, finding it necessary to gain more practical experience in business than was possible in the government. George Marling, '53, now with the CounterIntelligence Corps of the United States Army in Worms, Germany, will return to America in the fall. Kenneth Neff, '56, and his wife have been at the Rangoon Center since last summer, and in a long letter they write "... we have never experienced any anti-American feeling from students

or adults, and one couldn't ask for a friendlier people than the Burmese... we have never once regretted coming. ..." Derek Singer, '53, and his wife, (Ruth Sorensen, '54) are in Formosa with the I.C.A. Mission. He was formerly with CARE, in Colombo, Ceylon. Donald Weatherbee, '56, has recently gone out to Jogjakarta, Indonesia to Gadjah Mada University under the SAIS program, as an Instructor in Political Science.

## Alumni in the United States

William Bruins, '55, in the Army since last summer, is now stationed in Washington with about a year and a half to go, after which he hopes to enter the Foreign Service. A Questionnaire returned by Robert Collins, '56, tells us that he is now with the Department of State in Washington, as a Liaison Officer in the Foreign Service, and William Culbert, Jr., '49, is back in Washington in the European Regional Affairs Division of the State Department. Lee Estridge, '56, is with the Standard Oil Company, (New Jersey) on their training program. At present he is Senior Manager of a gasoline station in Washington. Lawrence Evans, '53, is now with the National Academy of Sciences as a Professional Assistant in the Office of International Relations. As of early January, Bernard Fensterwald, '50, has been the Administrative Assistant to Senator Hennings, (D. Missouri). James Freeman, '49, is presently at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State in Washington, studying Malay. Douglas Greenwood, '46, is with the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

30

as Export Glass Supervisor. Fawzi Habib, Summer Session '56, is now with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in Washington. Leonard Hoar, '54, is with Federated Plans, Inc., an investment company in Washington. He was formerly with the Department of Defense. Donald Johnston, '52, still with J. Walter Thompson Company, has returned from the Company's Colombia office in Bogotá to the New York office. He writes that he finds himself with Rai Senior's ('49) old job on the Pan American Account. Malcolm Kerr, '56, is now working on a special study under Sir Hamilton Gibb at Harvard University. George Lambrakis, '53, previously with the United States Information Agency, is now with the Department of State on the Foreign Service Institute training program. A mid-year graduate, Lilo Lang, '57, has gone to New York to work as a researcher with Time Magazine. Win gate Lloyd, '55, is temporarily with the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia, awaiting his Foreign Service appointment. Another questionnaire returned recently was from

James McKenna, '49, with the information that he is working for Standard Oil Company of California as an Economist in Foreign Investment Analysis. He was formerly with the Department of Defense in Washington as Economic Analyst, Directorate of Intelligence. Lubitsa Nenadovich, '46, is at Illinois University studying teaching techniques. She writes that she has been busy teaching newly-arrived Hungarian refugees, and says that it has been wonderful to have a hand in doing something for these people. Marijane (Eastman) Peplow, '52, is now at Wakefield High School in Arlington, Virginia, teaching Spanish. Still with the Foreign Service, Kenedon Steins, '47, is now back in Washington, having been previously stationed in Trinidad as Vice-Consul and Diplomatic Secretary. Daniel Sullivan, '56, is a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, and his first assignment is in Washington. Formerly Research Assistant to Dr. Loftus at the Bologna Center, William Wiseley, '51, is presently at Harvard University's School of Public Administration, as Research Associate in the Defense Studies Program.

Biographic Notes

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, is a member of the Advisory Committee of the School of Advanced International Studies, and a Trustee of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation.

James E. King, Jr. is with the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University. Before coming here he had served as Secretary General and Deputy Chief of Staff with General Clay in Germany, and later as Executive Secretary in the office of the U. S. High Commissioner in Germany.

Morehead Patterson, Chairman, American Machine and Foundry Company, is also a Trustee of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation.

Willis C. Armstrong, Lecturer on Soviet Affairs at SAIS, has recently visited Southeast Asia under the Rockefeller Public Service Award program.

"Vice Consul, Aden" was written by Theodore McS. Collier, SAIS'53.

The Letters from Bologna and Rangoon were contributed by our permanent correspondents there, John P. Armstrong and Manfred Landecker '53.

All opinions expressed in the SAIS REVIEW are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the School of Advanced International Studies, or of the editors.

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

9 May 1957

Dear Henry,

This may be gratuitous, but as I asked you for a copy of your
Air War College remarks it seems only fair that I return the re-
quested favor. Herewith, then, is a copy of my lecture, which--being
less practiced than an old pro such as you are turning into--I wrote out
in full and read to the captive audience.

The reception was, I may say with becoming modesty, amazing. The
usual fifteen minute question period was extended to thirty and the
questions came thick and fast. Not one, either then or at lunch after-
wards—which I shared with a dozen or so of the students—challenged
the main thesis.

I am submitting the text to the US News and World Report to see
if they want to publish it. I think they just might, as they have
done similar things before (instance Leghorn's "No Need to Bomb Cities"),
but of course am not counting on it. It really adds little to my
Foreign Affairs article, though the approach is different.

Incidentally, I got a question from the floor that related to your
Strategic-Tactical Forces suggestion, though Col. Barrett told me the
idea had been originated independently by the Air Force colonel who
asked the question, and I roundly endorsed it.

Enclosure

Lecture to The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces

May 3, 1957

LIMITED WAR AND NUCLEAR PLENTY

by

James E. King, Jr.

I

General Hollis, General Calhoun, Gentlemen:

My subject is the defense requirements of the nuclear age. In particular, it is the problem of limited war in the circumstance called "nuclear plenty". I shall begin with a brief description of this circumstance and then touch lightly upon the "theory of deterrence", which has been developed as a defense prescription for the nuclear age. The time remaining will be devoted to limited war -- its nature and conditions and the defense requirements it generates, broadly conceived in terms of attitudes and objectives, as well as military means.

"Nuclear plenty" is Phase Three of the nuclear age. Phase One was our nuclear monopoly, which lasted from 1945 to 1959 or 50. Phase Two was transitional. It was the period during which our nuclear advantage was still militarily decisive, though the USSR was beginning to build up its weapons stocks. Phase Two did not long survive the explosion of the first Soviet H-bomb. "Nuclear plenty", then, is Phase Three; it is the situation that obtains when the imbalance of opposing stockpiles is no longer of decisive strategic significance because there is enough on each side, given existing means of delivery and existing defenses, to be so destructive that neither side dares to take the risks of all-out war.

The strategic consequence of nuclear plenty is commonly called "nuclear stalemate", or "mutual deterrence". Its existence -- now -- not tomorrow -- received tacit recognition at the very highest levels in the "meeting at the Summit" at Geneva, Switzerland, in July, 1955, when it was recognized that general war can no longer be regarded as an instrument of national policy by the great powers. Nothing has happened since, and nothing seems likely to happen -- barring a technological break-through that would give defense against intercontinental nuclear attack an overwhelming advantage -- to change the essential elements of the situation.

["to change the essential elements of the situation,\ndefense against intercurrently moving objects --\nto fire to the effect -- parry a technological pre-empt that might be\nbeyond the reach of the powers. Morning has passed since, and nothing seems\nthat General war can no longer be referred to an instrument of national\nthe Summit, at Geneva, Switzerland, in July, 1929, when it was recognised\nreceived its recognition at the end thereof levels in the meeting at\nstatements, or, \"moral deference.\" Its existence -- now -- not tomorrow --\nThe abstractie consequence of moseer, blend, is commonly called \"moeer.\nneither side nor to take the risks of all-out war.\n\nabstractie significance because there is enough on each side, given exist-\ning means of delivery and existing defenses, to be so destructive that\nmoral means of delivery and existing defenses,

Dr. Vannevar Bush, a scientist who is intimately acquainted with the problems of national defense, has put it this way:

"As nearly as we can now see, we are entering a period of technical stalemate, in which great wars are unlikely to occur, though secondary wars fought with limited means may be a common occurrence. This seems, at least to be the best that we can hope for at this present. For no great war can ever again be won; it can only end with the partial or complete annihilation of both contestants."

Our national defense policy has been in process of gradual adjustment to this prospect for at least twelve years now. What has emerged from it to date is a policy called "deterrence".

To deter means to prevent something from happening by fear of its consequences. It is both active and passive; we may deter someone; we may ourselves be deterred. We are deterred if we are convinced that a proposed action is not worth the cost or the risks it involves. We presumably can deter someone by convincing him of the same thing. The "requirements of deterrence", as a defense policy, then, encompass two things: capability and credibility. Our adversaries must be convinced that we are capable of imposing intolerable sanctions, and they must also be convinced that we will impose them.

It is on the score of credibility that the grand deterrent of thermo-nuclear attack capability fails to deter many Communist actions that we should like to deter. The stalemate means that we believe that total war with the USSR would be suicidal for us as well as for them. Consequently, we cannot expect the Russians to believe that we should retaliate for every hostile move they make if the only retaliation of which we are capable is suicidal. And if they do not believe it they will not be deterred. The logic of this has forced us to elaborate the theory of deterrence to account for lesser provocations.

The theory, as elaborated, holds that we can deny the aggressor his "worth of winning" by making certain that he will recognize in advance that his move will cost him more than it is worth, while we can be sure, likewise in advance, that the deterrent sanction we propose will not cost more than it is "worth" to us. When you consider the difficulties of this two-sided calculus, it must be evident that the chance of miscalculation is high indeed. Nor can we be sure that near-perfect calculation will not justify the aggressor's aggression. In the case of Hungary, for example, the Russian "worth of winning" far surpassed our "worth of winning" -- on no less authority than that of the President himself.

The theory of deterrence was first developed by people who assumed that the possession of nuclear attack means gave us a decisive military advantage over the enemy. This being the case we could provide an overwhelming sanction to take care of any margin of uncertainty and to preclude any calculation that would justify aggression in any case in which we had a real interest. This has been changed by the advent of nuclear "plenty". The aggressor is now as free to put overwhelming force behind his aggression as we are to put overwhelming force behind our deterrence. Quite aside from the chance of miscalculation, which has so exercised Mr. Dulles, we cannot be sure that the aggressor's "worth of winning" will not sometimes be higher than ours, and if it is higher we must expect, after we have put everything that we can into deterrence, that he will not always be deterred. We could still apply overwhelming force, but only of the kind that would, as James Burnham has said, "include ourselves in the target", because the enemy can retaliate in kind. This is what "nuclear plenty" means.

The word "deterrence" usefully expresses our purpose and aspiration to keep the peace. But let us not delude ourselves. The so-called theory of deterrence is no panacea. And it is dangerous to treat it as one. It suggests that we still enjoy the decisive military advantage that went out with nuclear plenty. The danger that lies in "deterrence" is that by causing us to misunderstand the nature of the problem we face it may discline us to adopt the attitudes and to take the steps that are required of us. I trust that both the nature of the problem and the danger of misreading it will emerge more clearly in the discussion of limited war to which I shall now turn.

## II

The definition of limited war presents difficulties, which I do not mean to go into. The following rough definition will serve for the kind of limited war I am talking about. Please remember, also, that every time I use the phrase "limited war" I mean it to apply to the prospect of such a war as well as to the conflict itself.

A limited war is a war in which opposing interests of the nuclear powers are substantially involved, but in which there is no question on either side that national survival is in jeopardy, and to which neither side is willing to commit more than a respectable fraction of its military resources.

This definition eliminates minor conflicts in which neither side in the Cold War is interested. It also eliminates objectives such as "unconditional surrender" and all similar appurtenances of "victory" in the traditional sense. In addition, by stipulating that the major nuclear powers are only fractionally involved, it recognizes the existence of a larger commitment --

["trivially invalid, if recognizes the existence of a further commitment —\nsense. In addition, *pa attributing* that the major matter becomes are only\narranger, and still stilted adherence to \"a priori,\" in the traditional\nCigd War is interested. It also eliminates objectives such as \"unconditional\nThis definition eliminates further conflict in which neither side in the\nmore than a reasonable friction of its military resources.", "Joehrdh, and to whom neither side is willing to commit", "is no direction on either side that nationalities shall be in\nmixture, however are exhaustively integrated, put in which there", "each a war as well as to the conflict itself.", "time I see the bruce \"limited war.\" I mean it to abhorr to the broach of\nof limited war I am talking about. Please kampem, also, that every", "mean to go into. The following rough definition will serve for the kind\nThe definition of limited war presents difficulties, which I do not", "EXAMPLES", "II", "limited war to which I assign now harm.\nthe center or surrounding it will emerge were clearly in the discussion of\nthat are required of us. I that that put the name of the problem and\nuse it in my discipline so to adapt the attitudes and to raise the ideas\nis that *pa carrying* us to understand the name of the problem we\nthat went out with nuclear, blend. The danger that lies in \"difference\"\none. If *a difference* that we affect only the decisive military advantage\n*the* of *difference* is no longer. And if it is greater to that it is\n*to* feed the balance. But let us not verge onto this. The so-called\nThe word \"difference\" necessarily expresses our hardware and abhorrence", "is must \"unclean blend,\" means,", "it must be \"unclean blend,\" because the enemy can result in king. This\n* Force* put only of the kind that *minds* us James Bumgarn put said, \"In which\n* must be used,\" after we have put everything put we can into difference,\n* must be used*, after we have put everything put we can into difference,\

the forces necessary to maintain the nuclear stalemate.

Now what is it that epitomizes these limited wars and war-producing
conflicts? I think it is, very simply, that they are conflicts that
can properly be described as primarily political rather than primarily
military.

The difference is one of immediacy to the issue of national
survival. Every time the state exerts its power, in the general sense
of the term "national power" that includes influence and persuasion as
well as force, there is of course some question of national interest,
and national interest always bears some relation to the issue of national
survival. But the relation may be immediate or more or less remote.
In general war, regardless how it starts, the question of survival
automatically becomes an immediate issue. Even after it becomes clear
that there is little or no chance of losing, and consequently no further
threat to survival, the pattern of conflict has been set and the war is
still fought <u>as though</u> survival were at stake.

We fought two world wars to eliminate threats to our survival.
Despite the disagreement and confusion that marked our entry into World
War I, the one compelling reason was the argument that if the Kaiser
conquered Europe we should be next. Likewise, in World War II, it was
because Nazi conquest of Europe and Japanese conquest of Asia would
confront us with continental enemies on both sides that our entry into the
war was probably a foregone conclusion, even if the Japanese had not
attacked us and the Germans had not declared war on us.

The arm of the state that is peculiarly charged with its security,
its protection against threats to its survival, is the military. Conse-
quently, despite all the political and other considerations that enter
into and influence our participation in a general war, once we are in it
the military consideration becomes dominant. This is not to say that the
military, as individuals or as a group, take over; our best militarists
in time of war have been civilians. What it does mean is that the trans-
cendant and preclusive value "military necessity" becomes the standard by
which all our actions and objectives are measured. And, in the main, this
is quite properly so, because in general war survival is the issue and
military considerations must predominate.

In limited war, by definition, survival is not an immediate issue.
But the long-range interests of the state, which have an immediate bearing
upon its place in the sun, but only an eventual effect upon its survival,
are traditionally and properly in charge of non-military elements. The
trenchant directness and simplicity of measures appropriate to a fight for
life are not appropriate to diplomacy, to the day-to-day relations of states,

in which influence, persuasion, and bargaining play so large a part. In
this area a certain indirectness is called for, and the measures required
for step-by-step progress are anything but simple.

Limited war is limited because the objectives are limited. But
if the objectives are limited survival is not an issue and military
considerations are not paramount. Limited crises, then, and the limited
wars that arise out of them, can best be regarded as points of extra
or excessive tension along the line that marks the progress of the state
toward its perhaps dimly perceived ultimate objectives by political
means. When a crisis arises, when a conflict of this nature occurs,
if the progress is to continue, political considerations must remain
paramount, else all will be swallowed up in an unintended struggle for
survival.

I am necessarily oversimplifying. National power, in the broad
sense that measures the state's ability to have its way in the world, is
immensely more complicated. For one thing, it is a compound of force
and persuasion; even with regard to those objectives that are obtained
by the consent of other nations the element of force is never wholly
absent. It may be that our friendship and favor are sought because
the force we dispose of makes it possible for us to be unpleasant;
it may be that they are sought because our force serves to counter hostile
force from other quarters. The generality of ends and actions that I am
calling "political" does not exclude force, far from it. The distinction
between "political" and "military" is not black and white. It is a
matter of emphasis.

Despite these qualifications, however, the distinction is both
substantial and inescapable. It has, in fact, often been the root of
controversy in the past. Even in total war political considerations have
had relevance, and sometimes actions that might have contributed to the
defeat of the enemy have not been taken because of their anticipated
undesirable consequences after the war. Likewise, in limited war, it
would be absurd to say that primarily or even purely military considera-
tions have no application. The distinction emerges in sharp relief when
a wartime policy can be criticized both on political and on military
grounds, as was the case with "unconditional surrender" in World War II.

The term "military", then, abstracts and emphasizes a standard of
national conduct that is perfectly familiar, though difficult to define.
It is reflected in statements of the purpose of armed conflict, such as;
THE OBJECTIVE OF US ARMED FORCES IN COMBAT WITH THE ENEMY IS TO DEFEAT HIS
ARMED FORCES AND DESTROY HIS WILL TO FIGHT AT MINIMUM COST IN AMERICAN
LIVES. You will recall that one of our great commanders in World War II
said that, on military grounds alone, beating the Russians to Berlin was
not worth the life of one American soldier. You will recall also the
advocacy of "hot pursuit" and the complaints about the "privileged sanctuary"

5

of Communist fighter planes in the Korean War. These were all expressions of military purpose, which, it can be argued, were at odds with political purpose. In World War II, by and large, the military purpose prevailed; in the Korean War, by and large, the political purpose prevailed.

My proposition, then, is that in limited war the broader political purpose *must* predominate, *must* not give way to "military necessity", *must* not subordinate other considerations to the military objective of "victory" over the visible enemy. If this is not the case the chances are very slim indeed that the war will be limited. Moreover, only broad political purpose can define for us the limits to the conflict, both in geographical and in operational terms, that best accord with our real interest, out of the alternative limitations that might be agreed to tacitly by the enemy. Finally, only such broad purpose can tell us what we may count as a "win" when we have eliminated the traditional military objective of "victory".

It should be remarked, however, that this proposition applies only to the nuclear powers engaged in conflict. The Korean War was not thus "limited" to Syngman Rhee. Further, the proposition holds only because the major contestants have vast resources that are withheld so long as the conflict remains limited. If they could not convert the conflict into total war there would be less sense in the proposition because some at least of their conflicts would be limited by capability.

The capability of converting a limited conflict into total war is peculiarly the product of nuclear plenty. But it is not exclusively the product of that circumstance. Limited wars have been fought before between major powers -- the Crimean War between Britain, France, and Turkey on the one side and Russia on the other is an example; our own war with Spain is perhaps another.

To say that it is characteristic of limited war that broad political considerations predominate is not, of course, to say that limited wars must be fought by men in striped pants. Just as in total war our best militarists have been civilians, so some of our best political strategists are men who wear the uniform of the services. The point is not who will fight the action; the point concerns the principles and objectives that will govern the conduct of the action. It is not that the field commander will take orders from the political advisor, but that the field commander and the political advisor will both be thinking in terms of limited objectives and in terms of predictable long-range effects.

You may have been wondering why we should get involved in all this. The answer is, unfortunately, that it is unavoidable. We do have the cold war, in which the moves are primarily political, though they involve measures

6

of an economic or psychological nature, and though some of the pawns are
military. The Communist world is driven by innate forces to expand; we
are compelled to resist. Success or failure, on both sides, is cumulative.
The success the Red Chinese were able to claim in Korea, for example, was
an immense assist to the Communist cause throughout the Eastern Hemisphere.
"If Vietnam falls", someone said, "Thailand, Malaya, and Burma will fall
too, like a house of cards". Likewise in Europe and the Middle East,
Soviet penetration of Egypt's affairs, even to the extent to which that
has so far occurred, has abruptly changed the face of things around the
eastern end of the Mediterranean. On the other side, the defection of
Hungary and the partial defection of Poland were mighty blows to Soviet
prestige.

Properly considered, then, limited wars are but episodes of increased
tension and irritation in this ceaseless striving to retain a political
position and to gain political advantage. They arise out of moves made
for political reasons, they are aimed at objectives that are meaningful
only in terms of political advantage, and must be fought, if fought at
all, with a weather eye to the political consequences. In each such case,
in present circumstances, the adjective "political" relates to the
general and long-range balance of prestige, influence, and security in the
cold war.

Great, general wars, the wars of survival to which we are accustomed
and attuned by our own civil war and by two world wars, are epochal
in nature. They change the course of history by determining which of rival
powers and coalitions will have a chance to dominate the next period.
It seems increasingly unlikely that such a war will again occur except by
misadventure. It seems most unlikely that any great power can be so
confident of winning a general nuclear war that it will deliberately
choose to initiate a new historical epoch. But this circumstance does
not alter the competitive spirit of mankind, nor satisfy its unrealized
ambitions and aspirations. Power and will to power are not diminished.
Instead, the day-to-day processes of expression and competition achieve
new emphasis.

The demands upon our ingenuity to find ways of achieving our ends
in this context are extraordinary. Just now we are engaged in a great
debate on foreign aid. All the best arguments for foreign aid, whether
military aid or economic aid or technical assistance, relate to the fact
that aid in these forms contributes to the success of our efforts in the
international competition in which we are entangled. The means we
employ in this competition are primarily peaceful, but so -- we must admit --
are those employed by our opponents in the cold war. Yet the contest is
bitter and the stakes high.

Already on a number of occasions there have been peaks of tension, and some of these have erupted into hostilities. If we turn our back on these eruptions, if we do not use our power at least to protect our position, regardless of our success in those phases of the contest that are peaceful, we stand to lose out in the end. And as we approached that end, by a process of piecemeal erosion, eventually a time would come when our survival would be in jeopardy, because all our force and influence would have been dissipated save only the ability to bring our world down in ruins. But there is another peril against which we must be fortified. It is at these same high points of tension, on which we cannot afford to turn our backs, that the inhibitions born of nuclear plenty may prove unbearably onerous. If in our impatience we lost sight of the essentially political nature of the conflict, if we allow "military necessity" to motivate our actions, and if we lift the limits of the conflict in order to achieve the satisfaction of "victory", we can, indeed, end the contest, but only at the cost of eliminating the contestants -- ourselves included.

We cannot win the cold war by military means alone. We cannot destroy International Communism as we destroyed National Socialism, because International Communism is armed with weapons that would destroy us too. We cannot liquidate the cold war; we must live with it and fight it on terms that make sense.

## III

I hope that what I have said already is sufficient to convince you, if indeed you need to be convinced, that we inhabit today an entirely new strategic environment, which demands a revolution in our strategic thinking. I should agree that more questions have been raised than have been answered, and in this concluding section I hope to answer at least a few of these.

### First, then WHAT CONSTITUTES WINNING IN LIMITED WAR?

I have spoken of "worth of winning" as the aggressor's prime consideration. I have also said that winning in the sense of "victory", as we have known it in past general wars, is ruled out in conflicts that are truly limited. How do we resolve the apparent paradox?

In principle the question has already been answered. A "win", so-called, is a gain in the cold war balance of advantage. In this sense the Communist world won both in Korea and in Indo-China. In the former they gained no territorial advantage, but by fighting the great power of the West to a standstill they gained tremendously in prestige. In the

8

8

the West to a socialist world. In the
first five years of the war there was a
split in the Communist Party of the
United States. The split was caused
by the conflict between the Soviet
communists and the other communists
in the country. In the later years
the split was further widened by the
split between the communists in the
United States and the communists in
the Soviet Union.

The split was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the Soviet
Union.

The split was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the Soviet
Union. It was caused by the split
between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the
Soviet Union.

## B. How CAN WE CONSTITUTE WINNING IN LIMITED WAR?

A few of these.

The conflict was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the Soviet
Union. It was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the
Soviet Union.

The conflict was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the Soviet
Union.

## III

between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the Soviet
Union. It was caused by the conflict
between the communists in the United
States and the communists in the
Soviet Union.

latter case they even more clearly defeated a Western power, and did
add a satellite to the Communist orbit. Oddly enough, both Korea and
Indochina can also be counted as "wins" for the West, as they have been,
because in the circumstances, given the political and military advantages
with which the Communists started, the outcomes could have been much
more unfavorable. This is, of course, typical of any evaluation of
political "advantage". Even a provisional resolution of any limited
conflict requires an element of agreement, of consent by both parties.
And it is quite normal for both sides to claim the advantage. It only
subsequently appears, often after many additional moves, whether one
side really lost out.

This is a reason for arguing that in limited crises the outcome
must almost always resemble a stalemate. It is also a reason why these
outcomes are emotionally so unsatisfactory to people whose strategic
notions have been nourished in general war. There is something almighty
satisfying about crushing the enemy, occupying his capital, and guiding
his recovery -- despite the sour reactions that result when we learn that,
even so, things do not entirely go our way. In contrast, it is downright
frustrating to have to accept a settlement in which the enemy can claim
that he has "won".

From this I believe we can draw three important morals. First,
that the prior moves, before the conflict results in hostilities, are
even more significant than the war that may follow. Second, the side
that is physically in position enjoys a tremendous advantage. Third,
we must not be timid.

On the first moral, both sides will certainly endeavor to avoid
the risks inherent in any armed conflict these days, consequently both
will seek to gain the desired advantage by "peaceful" means. This is why
we have a cold war -- it is what both sides are doing, with weapons drawn
from their political, economic, propaganda, and military arsenals. It
is only if one side or the other "miscalculates", or if the aggressor
expects to gain significant advantage, that hostilities will occur.
And certainly the aggressor will try to prepare the way so that his chances
in combat will be good. Likewise, it is our appointed role, taking advan-
tage of his reluctance to enter into even limited hostilities, to discourage
him by assuming defensive, or, if you like, "deterrent" postures that
indicate to him the difficulty of achieving his objectives with an effort
prudently limited.

As has always been the case in limited conflict, of course, if we
have not made appropriate preparations we can lose before the first shot is
fired. The situation in old style general war was different, because,
if you had the military power you could wait until the aggressor had
pushed you too far and then recoup all your earlier losses by liquidating
him.

9

pim.
inspired him for ever and then remembered all his earlier losses in fighting
it him and put the military power he could get until the effort he had
tried. The inspiration in old style General war was different, because,
have not made any appreciable benefit, so can lose before the first end is
the war.
As far as possible then the case in limited conflict, of course, if we
broadly limited.

Indicate to him the giddiness of such objectives with an effort
himself meaning delimitation, or, if he lives, "deferrant" because that
take of his responsibility to enter into even limited hostilities, to discharge
in combat will be too. Likewise, if he can abandon the role, asking him to
and certainly the effort will go to better the men so that he can see
exhausts to earn a sufficient advantage, that hostilities will occur.

He only it one side or the other " Hostilities," or if the effort
from their benefit, economy, trade, wage, and military resources. If
we have a cold war -- if it was poor sides are going with mediaeval drawn
will seek to win the desired advantage by "beauty," means. This is why
the risks inherent in such armed conflict these days, correspondingly pop
On the other hand, both sides will certainly endeavor to avoid

we meet not be timing.

that is, he will act inition and a tremendous advantage, timing,
even more significant than the war that may follow. Second, the side
that the prior moves, before the conflict results in hostilities, are
from this I believe we can draw three important lessons. First,

that he has "now."

Introducing to him to accept a sufficient in which the enemy can claim
even so, though do not entirely so our way. In contrast, if he can right
his recovery -- give him the sort of reactions that result when we learn that,
establishing spot, ending the enemy, offsetting his caption, and timing
notions have been normalized in General war. There is something unified
outcomes are emotionally so ununified so ununified so be able to use strategic
must at least show some resemblance to something. It is also a reason why these
type is a reason for arising that in limited cases the outcome

side really cost one.

immediately abates, often after much additional moves, especially one
and it is quite normal for poor sides to claim the advantage. It only
conflict requires an element of skill, an element of skill, of consent to pass barriers,
benefit or advantage." And a successful revolution of such limited
more multilateral. Type 1a, of course, affects not only theivation of
with which the Committee agreed, the outcome could have been away
because in the circumstances, given the benefit and military advantages
influencing can also be considered as "win" for the West, as they have been,
and a satellite to the Committee orbit. Oddly enough, both Korea and
further case find even more clearly defined a Western power, and did

This brings us to the second moral. The aggressor must either try to worm his way into position, and into possession, as he will do when the prospect is for guerrilla action or civil war, or, if his "peaceful" efforts fail and he decides to resort to force, he will try to complete his military moves rapidly and present the world with a fait accompli. There is nothing new about this except the increased risk of general nuclear war. But this increased risk, which makes for reluctance to take up arms, puts a tremendous premium on being in position. This is the legitimate purpose of our troops in Western Europe and of our Seventh Fleet in the far Pacific.

But as the aggressive side cannot, in general, be denied the initiative, it is incumbent upon us, in those cases in which we are not in position, to be able to react rapidly, with sufficient appropriate force to counter the aggressor's initiative. It is because this requirement for rapid reaction is widely recognized that the mobile response potential of our nuclear air power has been emphasized. It is because that particular type of response does not always appear to be appropriate that the need for air transport of our ground forces has been emphasized.

The third observation that I have referred to as a "moral" is a commonsense qualification. Both in the preparatory phases and in the armed showdown, if we are timid we are licked. We must always remember that the risk of general war is at least as mortal to the aggressor as to us.

At this point I could go into a long discussion of the tacit limitations of the Korean war. Our acquiescence in some of them has been bitterly criticized, even by people who are thinking constructively about the problems of limited war. I think, myself, that most of these criticisms are wrong, particularly those that relate to the form of the contest and the limitation of its geographical scope to Korean territory. The "privileged sanctuary" of Communist fighter planes beyond the Yalu, for example, was matched by the equally privileged sanctuary of our bombers on Okinawa and elsewhere, even of our fighters on Korean airfields. The security of the Communist Manchurian base was matched by the security of our ports and shipping. It seems to me that the irreducible condition of limitation in this case was that the war not become a Sino-US or Sino-UN war, and that the Russians and Chinese very definitely connived with us to make that a certainty. But within the limits laid down I agree that we made mistakes, one of which was to relieve pressure on the Communist armies when they offered to negotiate a ceasefire. The military problem of limited war is to achieve as soon as possible a tacit agreement on the limitation of its scope and then to seize boldly upon the military opportunities that are offered within that limit. Understandably, in this first experiment with limited war in the nuclear age, our performance was somewhat less than satisfactory on both counts. We did observe the irreducible limit to which I referred a moment ago, but we made the mistake of

["10", " principle limit to which I referred a moment ago, but we made the mistake of assuming less than actuality on our part. We did operate the same limit experiment with limited war, in the morning, so our performance was quite different that are offered within that limit. Unfortunately, in this limitation of its scope and then to these points when the limited experiment was made, one of which we to relieve pressure on the Communist states to make that a certainly. But again the limit itself is too great that we must have to relieve pressure on the Communist states to make that a certainly. If again to me that is the opposite condition of the condition which we have to meet, then we have to meet that with the security of the Communist states, and that the British and Chinese anti-fascist alliance connected with us of limitation in this case was that the war not become a Second World War, or a Second World War, and that the British and Chinese anti-fascist alliance connected

leaving the other side in doubt regarding the limit we should observe
within Korea itself, and when this resulted in the Chinese coming in,
perhaps we did become overcautious and fail to press our military advantages
home.

As a further comment on the point about timidity or caution, it
should also be said that we do not have to accept the other side's minimum
tender regarding the scope of the conflict. This is what is valid in
saying that we shall react "in places of our choosing". Obviously each
side will seek the limitation in scope that is most favorable to it. We
do not have to confine our reaction to the geography where the aggressor
prefers to fight. But, at the same time, we cannot expect to choose
freely the ground that is most favorable to us. Again there must be an
accommodation, though a tacit one. And this again emphasizes the importance
of what goes before, because one of the aggressor's intentions will
certainly be to set the conflict up so that it will be fought on ground
of his choosing. To insist that we will not go along may indeed be a
way of deterring him, but only if the scope we project is within reason.
If the best we can do is to hint that we shall drop H-Bombs on Moscow or
Peiping to defend Baghdad or Bangkok, it is rather unlikely that our
"deterrent" will pass the test of credibility.

I can summarize the answer to the first question, then, by saying
that to "win" in limited war must be rather like conducting a successful
negotiation with another state. We must derive our satisfaction from
the long range benefit to our interests, and not be overly chagrined if
the enemy can claim, with some color of justification, that he was the
winner. Given such an expected outcome, the significance of the preparatory moves on both sides is notably increased, and if we are outmaneuvered during this phase the best possible remedy is to be able to move rapidly but appropriately during the combat phase. Finally, in all phases, overcaution is as misguided as irresponsible temerity would be.

This, then, is what it means to "win" in limited war. At the risk
of oppressing you with repetition, let me point out again what it does
not mean. It does not mean "victory" in the sense of destroying the
enemy, or gaining control of him so that his future can be dictated.
This is what he cannot be expected to permit if he can help it, and, with
nuclear weapons in plentiful supply he obviously can help it.

The second question is one on which I have already touched a number
of times: WHAT IS THE APPOINTED ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR?

One possible answer, I believe, will stand almost without challenge.
Just as the existence of two-sided capability of launching a general

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thermuclear attack deters that kind of war, it seems reasonable to argue that there is a good likelihood that the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides can be used to deter their employment in limited conflicts. The reason is that general nuclear war is implicit in the employment of nuclear weapons. Their non-employment is the most obvious of all possible limits. The distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear war is one that everyone can understand. It is a distinction, furthermore, that is proof against inadvertent violation and possibly fatal misunderstanding. It is sharp, clean, and convincing. I am aware that many people insist that the employment of nuclear weapons can be kept limited, but they realize that they are on the defensive and must justify their position. So, without taking further issue with them at the moment, I suggest the possibility that the appointed role of nuclear weapons in limited war is to keep nuclear weapons from being used.

It has been said, in all seriousness, that nuclear weapons will be used because even if a conflict starts conventionally, neither side will go down in defeat with unused nuclear power in its arsenals. I want to direct your attention to the word "defeat". Ignoring for the moment the question whether nuclear war can be limited, assuming, in fact, that it can be limited, the proposition -- as stated -- simply denies the possibility of limited war and consequently is a historical absurdity. For if nations will not admit defeat without using nuclear weapons, they also will not admit defeat while using nuclear weapons, and the same argument that denies the possibility of limiting war by eliminating the use of nuclear weapons also denies the possibility of limiting nuclear war itself. If neither side will accept anything less than "victory", if neither side will admit even limited "defeat" -- even though the latter may be glossed over by claiming political gains, as I mentioned earlier -- there cannot be limited war between nuclear powers.

As applied to general war the proposition that neither side would accept defeat without using its nuclear weapons is true but trivial. No one supposes that an unlimited, general, or total war between the nuclear powers could be anything but a nuclear war to the finish. But the point of limited war is that it is not a war to the finish, and surely it must be obvious that in limited war the winner, I repeat, the winner, not the loser, would be committing a crime against himself if he were to press the loser so far as to convert the limited engagement into total war. This is the loser's ultimate safeguard. So long as he retains his capacity to destroy the winner in total war he need not fear for his survival in limited war. The limits must be drawn so as to protect this capacity and thus eliminate the issue of survival from the conflict entirely. Henry Kissinger has suggested one way that this must be done: the reserves for general war, on both sides, must be inviolable in limited war. They must not be used and they must not be attacked.

There are some people, including some in positions of great responsibility in our Government, who are on record as saying that, leaving aside

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15

pilfith in our Government, who are on record as saying that, leaving aside
there are some bodies, including some in conventions of great reasonat-

mar. "They must not be need and fuel must not be approved.
reserves for General mar, on port side, met pe insoluble in limited
Hemly Kreuzer, pas angetroped one man that put met pe gone: the
cabotship and true eliminate the issue of atrialist from the conflict entiref.
arivalist in limited mar. The limit must be shown so as to bridge this
obedient to control the winner in fleet mar. We need not ten for life
mar." This is the leader's sufficient statement. So long as he retains his
breath the leader so far as to convert the limited arrangement into fleet
not the leader, must be committing a crime against himself. It is more so
it must be opine that in limited mar, the winner, I rebeef, the winner,
the being of limited mar is that it is not a mar to the tiring, and arreth
mocer. Bonuses could be enough for a moeier mar to the tiring." But
no one acknowledges that an unlimited General, or top of mar, peneen the
seech, делет without making its moeier mebome is the put private.
As applied to General mar, the broadeftow that neither side may

carrier -- there cannot be limited mar between moeier boners.
the after mar pe greened over pe creating heliostro lines, se I mentioned
"apportion," it neither side will squiff even limited "delete" -- even though
mocer mar fitst. It neither side will receive any gain
int the see of moeier mebome sira genies the besepitiffi of limiting
the same arrangement that genes the besepitiffi of limiting
mebome, sira sira will not squiff delete while moeier mebome, and
openly. For it networks will not squiff delete without making moeier
genes the besepitiffi of limited mar and consequently is a better
set, first it can be limited, the broadeftow -- se sira -- simply
moment the direction moeier moeier mar can be limited, seems? in
mutt to direct mar attention to the word "delete." It must be for the
will go down in delete when named moeier boner in its enealies. I
pe need because even it a conflict starts conversationally, neither side
is pe been said, in all sentences, that moeier mebome will

limited mar. I am so much moeier mebome how paint meeg,
unless the besepitiffi that the ebboied role of moeier mebome in
besition. So, without taking further issue with them at the moment, I
put them realize that they are on the defensive and must quickly expir,
beodee first that the employment of moeier mebome can be kebe limited,
standing. If it is sharp, eisen' and convincing. I am aware that men
that is both significant toeharepene allocation and besepitiffi itself stranger
mar is one first everyone can understand. If it is a distinction, stranger
of self besepitiffi limit. The distinction between moeier and non-moeier
employment of moeier mebome. Their non-employment is the most opinions
conflict. The reason is that General moeier mar is implied in the
mebome's poyt side can be need to defer their employment in limited
same that there is a good likelihood that the besepitiffi of moeier
thermomoleer, affect defers that kind of mar, if it seems reasonable to

"brush-fires", we cannot afford to become involved in a limited war in which we cannot use our "best weapons". To me there are at least two considerations that bear substantially on the question whether we should use nuclear weapons or not -- before we decide what we can and cannot "afford". The first is whether nuclear war can, in fact, be limited. I've already mentioned this, my own position is one of deep skepticism, but the question is one that at this point, each must decide for himself. The other consideration is whether nuclear weapons are appropriate in limited war, even if their employment can be limited.

Are these weapons of mass destruction compatible with the political objectives of limited conflict? A little while ago there was a lot of talk around Washington about the manpower we could save, or about the ease with which we could balance the "massive manpower of the Communist world", by augmenting our firepower with nuclear weapons. But the reluctance of our European allies to be "defended" by means of a nuclear holocaust, even a "tactical" holocaust, began to inspire second thoughts on this subject a year or more ago. Moreover, the recent experience of the Middle East crisis has made a lot of people think about what is and what is not appropriate in such cases.

Limited wars are quite likely to occur in real situations, where there are real people whose interests and preferences have to be considered. Some of these conflicts may be guerrilla actions, perhaps most will be civil conflicts, or they may be wars between sovereign states. All will be, both for the Communists and for ourselves, "the continuation of politics by other means", which is just what general nuclear war is not. The actions we take during hostilities must not be allowed to defeat our ultimate purposes. You do not persuade people to choose democracy rather than Communist dictatorship by dropping atom bombs on them. You probably would not choose to hold one corner of the Middle or Far East at the cost of alienating all the rest. If you survey the trouble-spots in which hostilities may occur, you will see for yourselves that in few of them are our "best weapons" appropriate.

The next question I want to consider concerns the scope of limited war. WHAT SIZE LIMITED WARS SHOULD WE BE PREPARED FOR?

I have already suggested that the possibilities run the gamut from guerrilla operations to full-blown, though still limited, wars between states. The in-between cases are not difficult. Let us look at three of the extremes.

The role of guerrilla conflict in the cold war has been noted widely, often with the conclusion that it is not a problem for the armed forces of this nation. Too often the argument proceeds in a negative fashion, from the proposition that our forces cannot be prepared for everything, must be prepared for something else, therefore, guerrilla warfare being a low priority, we must have no interest in it. Even when legitimate interest is conceded

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