# A Commission for America's Future

by Henry A. Kissinger

## I. The Need

No nation in history has carried the responsibilities of the United States today. The maintenance of security of the free countries and the achievement of positive goals alike depend on the wisdom and vision with which the United States conducts its affairs.

Yet while responsibilities have never been greater, the obstacles to farsighted action multiply as well. The very nature of modern government introduces an element of rigidity into national policy which is more or less independent of the convictions of leaders. Issues are too complex and relevant facts are too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. An institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product of the risks of international affairs in the nuclear age. The result is a constantly growing bureaucracy which develops a momentum and a vested interest of its own.

The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A bureaucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected occurrence or with the need for innovation. Bureaucracy becomes an

expected occurrence or with the need for innovation. Bureaucracy becomes an
asset, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal flexibly with the un-
due and its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are
efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most tre-
culture which can cope effectively with most problems. A bureaucracy is
The purpose of bureaucracy is to devolve a standard operating pro-
ism.

drowning bureaucracy which develops a momentum and a heated interest of its
rates of international suits in the unclean side. The result is a constantly
an institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product of the
that facts are too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition.
independent of the convictions of leaders. Issues are too complex and rele-
introduces an element of rigidity into national policy which is more or less
to fraughted action multiply as well. The very nature of modern government
Yet while reasonableness have never been greater, the obstacles
which the United States conducts its suits.

achievement of positive results like dependence on the wisdom and vision with
States today. The maintenance of security of the free countries and the
No nation in history has carried the reasonableness of the United

I. The Need

by Henry V. Klaarner

V Commission for America's Fuels

obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most signifi-
cant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant
to the problem. Then attention tends to be diverted from the act of choice
--which is the ultimate test of leadership--to the accumulation of facts.
Decisions can be avoided until a crisis brooks no further delay, until the
events themselves have removed the element of ambiguity. But then the
capacity for constructive action is at a minimum. Certainty is purchased
at the cost of creativity.

Something like this seems to be characteristic of modern bureau-
cratic states. There develops a greater concern with an analysis of where
one is than where one is going. Lip service is paid to planning; indeed,
planning staffs proliferate. However, they suffer from two debilities. The
"operating" elements may not take the planning effort seriously. Plans be-
come esoteric exercises which are accepted largely because they imply no
practical consequence. They are a sop to administrative theory. At the
same time, since planning staffs have a high incentive to try to be "useful",
there is a bias against novel conceptions which are difficult to adapt to an
administrative mold. As a result, what passes for planning is frequently the
projection of the familiar into the future. Yet true innovation is bound to run
counter to prevailing standards. The dilemma of modern bureaucracy is that
formal criteria are little help in solving this problem because the unique can-
not be expressed "objectively".

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formal criteria are little help in solving this problem because the mine can-
come to prevailing standards. The dilemma of modern bureaucracy is that
protection of the familiar into the future. Yet true innovation is bound to run
admirable mold. As a result, what passes for planning is frequently the
there is a plan against novel conceptions which are difficult to adapt to an
same time, since planning status have a high incentive to try to be "right."
practical consequence. They are a tool to administrative theory. At the
come easterly exercises which are accepted largely because they imply no
"oberating" elements may not take the planning effort seriously. Plans be-
planning status proliferate. However, they differ from two deities. The
one is thus where one is doing. Lib service is paid to planning. Indeed,
cratic states. There develops a greater concern with an analysis of where
something like this seems to be characteristic of modern purpure-
ate the coat of creativity.

casbcity for constructive action is at a minimum. Certainty is purchased
events themselves have removed the element of ambiguity. But then the
Decisions can be avoided until a crisis breaks no further delay, until the
--which is the ultimate test of leadership--to the accumulation of facts.
to the problem. Then attention tends to be diverted from the act of choice
cant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant
opposition when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant

[y]

The rigidity in the policies of modern societies is in no small part
due to the complexity of decision-making. Crucial problems may--and
frequently do--go unrecognized for a long time. But once the decision-making
apparatus has disgorged a policy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The
alternative to the *status quo* is the prospect of repeating the whole anguishing
process of arriving at decisions. This explains to some extent the curious
phenomenon that decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps with a close
division become practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administra-
tive machinery swings behind their implementations as if activity could still
all doubts.

Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political survival, of most
leaders depends on their ability to realize their goals, however these may
have been arrived at. Whether these goals are desirable is relatively less
crucial. The time span by which administrative success is measured is con-
siderably shorter than that by which historical achievement is determined. In
heavily bureaucratized societies all pressures emphasize the first of these
accomplishments.

When the administrative machine grows very elaborate, the various
levels of the decision-making process are separated by chasms which are
obscured from the outside world by the complexity of the apparatus. Speciali-
zation permits the development of a high degree of expertise. It also makes
it difficult to develop an over-all view. The gap between the technical compe-
tence of staffs and what hard pressed political leaders are capable of absorbing

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tence of status and what hard pressed political leaders are capable of according to the complexity of the situation. It is difficult to develop an overall view. The gap between the technical combination permits the development of a high degree of expertise. If so, makes opacified from the outside world by the complexity of the apparatus. Special levels of the decision-making process are asprated by customs which are

When the administrative machine grows very elaborate, the various accomplishments,

heavily pressurized societies all pressures emphasize the fact that these
aidersly shorter than that by which historical achievement is determined. In
crucial. The time absently which administrative success is measured is con-
have been arrived at. Whether these dosis are desirable is relatively less
leders depends on their ability to realize their dosis, however these msh
Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political arrival, of most

all dooms.

tive machinery awinds behind their implementations as it activity could at all
division become practically ascosanct once adopted. The whole administra-
phenomenon that decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps with a close
process of arriving at decisions. This explains to some extent the curions
alternative to the status quo is the prospect of rebesting the whole underlying
aspiration has diaborted a policy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The
trendently do--do unrecoanized for a long time. But once the decision-making
due to the complexity of decision-making. Crucial problems msh--and

[x]

widens constantly. This heightens the insecurity of the executive and may thus compound either rigidity or arbitrariness or both. In many fields--strategy being a prime example--decision-makers may find it difficult to give as many hours to a problem as the expert has had years to study it. The ultimate decision often depends less on knowledge than on the ability to brief the top administrator--to present the facts in a way that can be absorbed rapidly. The effectiveness of briefing, however, puts a premium on theatrical qualities. Not everything that sounds plausible is correct and many things which are correct may not sound plausible when they are first presented and a second hearing is rare. The stage aspect of briefing may leave the decision-maker with a gnawing feeling of having been taken--even, and perhaps especially, when he does not know quite how.

These problems of bureaucracy are compounded in the United States by the national experience and the predominant philosophy. In the American experience most problems which have been recognized have proved soluble. As a result, the American attitude toward policymaking is _ad hoc_, pragmatic and somewhat mechanical.

There is a tendency to await developments. The belief is prevalent that every problem will yield if attacked with sufficient energy. It is inconceivable, therefore, that delay might result in irretrievable disaster; at worst it is thought to require a redoubled effort later on. Problems are segmented into constituent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. There is little emphasis or concern for their

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difficulty it involves. There is little enthusiasm or concern for their

into connotation elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special
it is thought to require a reorganized effort later on. Problems are segmented
ceivable, therefore, that delay might result in irretrievable disaster; at worst
that every problem will yield it attacked with insufficient energy. If is incon-

There is a tendency to await developments. The pellet is prevalent
and somewhat mechanical.

As a result, the American attitude toward policymaking is ad hoc, pragmatic
experience most problems which have been recognized have proved ample.

by the national experience and the predominant philosophy. In the American
These problems of bureaucracy are compounded in the United States
quite now.

ing of having been taken--even, and perhaps especially, when he does not know
The stage aspect of briefing may leave the decision-maker with a drawing feel-
not sound blamable when they are first presented and a second briefing is rare,
taking that sound blamable is correct and many things which are correct may
not be briefing, however, but a premium on theoretical dissimilarities. Not every-
tristor--to present the facts in a way that can be sponged rapidly. The effective
alion often degends less on the ability to brief the job adminis-
ments to a problem as the expert has had lesser to study it. The ultimate deci-
ping a prime example--decision-makers may find it difficult to give so many
compound either rigidity or arbitrariness or polarity. In many fields--strategically
widespread constantly. This heightens the insecurity of the executive and may thus

CJ 7

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interrelationship. Technical issues enjoy more careful attention, and receive
more sophisticated treatment, than political ones. Though the importance of
intangibles is affirmed in theory, it is difficult to obtain a consensus on which
factors are significant and even harder to find a meaningful mode for dealing
with them. Things are done because one knows how to do them and not because
one ought to do them. The criteria for dealing with trends which are conjectural
are less well developed than those for immediate crisis.

While such a mode of operation would involve a great risk of stagnation
even in "normal" times, it becomes especially dangerous in a revolutionary
period. For then the problems which are most obtrusive may be least relevant.
The issues which are most significant may not be suitable for administrative
formulation and even when formulated may not lend themselves to bureaucratic
consensus. When the issue is how to transform the existing framework, routine
can become an additional obstacle to both comprehension and action. It is
characteristic of an age of turmoil that it produces so many immediate issues
that little time ie left to penetrate their deeper meaning. The most serious
problem therefore becomes to acquire a sufficiently wide perspective so that
the present does not overwhelm the future.

All of this suggests that all the pressures of modern administration
combine with major strands of American thought to prevent a systematic long-
range concern with shaping the world of tomorrow. No more important task
confronts American than to develop this concern. It will not develop spontan-
eously and it cannot be stimulated within the government. There is a need for

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eally and it cannot be stimulated within the government. There is a need for
contrasts American than to develop this concern. It will not develop about-
rounds concern with abiding the world of tomorrow. No more important task
combine with major strands of American thought to prevent a systematic loud-
All of this indicates that all the pressures of modern administration
the present does not overwhelm the future.

problem therefore becomes to acquire a sufficiently wide perspective so that
that little time is left to penetrate their deeper meaning. The most serious
characteristic of an age of turmoil that it produces so many immediate issues
can become an additional obstacle to both comprehension and action. It is
concerned. When the issue is how to transform the existing framework, routine
torpedoation and even when formulated may not lend themselves to democratic
The planes which are most significant may not be suitable for administrative
period. For then the problem which are most obvious may be least relevant.
even in "normal" times, it becomes especially dangerous in a revolutionary

While such a mode of operation would involve a great risk of战略
are less well developed than those for immediate criteria.

one ought to do them. The criteria for dealing with trends which are contractual
with them. Trends are done because one knows how to do them and not because
factors are significant and even harder to find a meaningful mode for dealing
intangibles is affirmed in theory, it is difficult to obtain a consensus on which
more sophisticated treatment, than political ones. Though the importance of
interrelationship, technical issues enjoy more careful attention, and receive

CJ

an institution that sets itself the task of looking a decade or so ahead not just once--as was the case with the Special Studies Project--but for a substantial period of years.

## II. A Tentative Program

In 1956, the Special Studies Project set itself the task of looking a decade ahead. Its reports made a major impact. Yet the pattern of that project does not fit the need of the moment.

In the middle fifties there was an obvious disparity between the needs of an age of revolutionary change and the actual national programs. Many of the most talented people were outside the government. It was therefore possible to write a series of reports--one-shot in character--which laid out specific recommendations for action. And a considerable pool of talent was available for that task.

In the sixties the problem is different. There has been a systematic effort to connect the ablest people with government. This has had the advantage of supplying the country with thoughtful administration. It has had the disadvantage that many of the ablest people find themselves the prisoners of the administrative dilemmas described earlier--subject to the same premium on the immediate and overwhelmed by day-to-day crises. Whatever their intention, the problems which obtrude themselves must occupy more of their time than a creative shaping of the future.

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time than a creative arising of the future.

intention, the problems which optrude themselves must occur more of their
on the immediate and overwhelmed by day-to-day crises. Whatever their
the administrative dilemmas described earlier--applies to the same premium
disadvantage that many of the spcast people find themselves the prisoners of
tide of supplying the country with thoughtful administration. It has had the
effort to connect the spcast people with government. This has had the advan-
In the sixties the problem is different. There has been a systematic
was available for that task.

out specific recommendations for action. And a considerable pool of talent
fore possible to write a series of reports—one-shot in character—which laid
Many of the most talented people were outside the government. It was there-
needs of an age of revolutionary change and the actual national programs.

In the middle fifties there was an obvious disparity between the
ject does not fit the need of the moment.

decade ahead. Its reports made a major impact. Yet the pattern of that pro-
In 1968, the Special Studies Project set itself the task of looking a

II. A Tentative Program

period of years.

once--as was the case with the Special Studies Project--but for a somewhat
an institution that sets itself the task of looking a decade or so ahead not just

CJ

[y]

The absorption of so many talented people with immediate issues
has led to the emergence of a different need from the fifties. The problem
is no longer that existing programs are obviously inadequate, but the difficulty
of recognizing problem areas that may be crucial five or ten years hence. In
the fifties the task was to alert people to the need for specific actions; in the
decade ahead the task will be to focus concerns on new challenges. In the
fifties, the Special Studies called for new policies; the program outlined here
would seek to encourage new attitudes, concepts and concerns.

The focus of the project should therefore be less on producing reports
than on surveying areas of national and international concern. The emphasis
should not be on a single effort in any one field but on a measure of continuity
in all relevant areas. This is not to say that occasionally reports may not
emerge. But the basic task would be to determine just what areas are in need
of attention and to devise the best methods for dealing with them. The reality
of tomorrow is, after all, the achievement of the dreams of today.

A scarcely less important task is to identify the resources of talent
in the nation and to encourage a concern on their part with long-range problems
before they get into positions of responsibility. After high office is reached,
administrative pressures will take over.

In many respects, the task outlined here is more difficult than that
of a decade ago because it is more subtle and even more dependent on intan-
gibles. It will require an even heavier commitment of time by the individuals
serving on its panels. Moreover, they will not be able to draw to the same

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serving on its panels. Moreover, they will not be able to draw to the same
diploma. It will require an even heavier commitment of time by the individual
of a decade so because it is more subtle and even more dependent on insur-
In many respects, the task outlined here is more difficult than that
administrative brieames will take over.

in the nation and to encourage a concern on their part with long-range problems
A scarcely less important task is to identify the resources of talent
of tomorrow's, after all, the achievement of the dreams of today.

of attention and to devise the best methods for dealing with them. The reality
emerges. But the basic task would be to determine that what areas are in need
in all relevant areas. This is not to say that occasionally reports may not
should not be on a single effort in any one field but on a measure of continuity
to an arraying areas of national and international concern. The emphasis

The focus of the project should therefore be less on producing reports
would seek to encourage new attitudes, concepts and concerns.

futures, the Special Studies called for new policies; the program outlined here
decade ahead the task will be to focus concerns on new frontiers. In the
futures the task was to alert people to the need for specific actions; in the
of recognizing problem areas that may be crucial five or ten years hence. In
in no longer that existing programs are obviously inadequate, but the difficulty
has led to the emergence of a different need from the futures. The problem
The absorption of so many talented people with immediate issues

C7

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[y]

extent on the knowledge and expertise presently at their disposal; rather
they must make a conscious and continuing effort to raise their sights.

To achieve these objectives, the following steps seem indicated:

A Commission for America's Future should be constituted. It should have a chairman of national renown who is willing to devote a major portion of his time to the task. It should be served by a small, first-rate staff with the responsibility for doing preliminary work on the basic structure of the enterprise and for identifying available talent. A panel of eminent men should be created totalling not more than fifteen. It should be chosen for vision, dedication and on a non-partisan basis. The panel should set itself the task of making a systematic survey of the problems and opportunities before America. (Suggestions for membership are to be found in Part III.)

This panel would meet no less than once a month. It would systematically survey all aspects of American life in terms of the implications for the future. It would ask where we want to be a decade or so from now and what would be required to get there. In some fields, it may conclude that existing programs, governmental or private, are adequate. In others, it may conclude that existing activities are inadequate to the challenge. It is likely to discover areas which are largely neglected. Each member of the panel would make himself responsible for one specific problem area.

When the panel discovers any inadequacy it will constitute a task force which would seek to remedy it. This task force--composed of some members of the panel and some experts in the field--will survey the existing

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members of the panel and some experts in the field--will array the existing force which would seek to remedy it. This task force--composed of some

When the panel discovers any inaccuracy, it will constitute a task
which make itself reasonable for one specific problem area.

to discover areas which are largely neglected. Each member of the panel
conclude that existing activities are inadequate to the challenge. It is likely
that existing programs, governmental or private, are adequate. In others, it may
and what would be required to get there. In some fields, it may conclude that
for the future. It would ask where we want to be a decade or so from now
that would meet no less than once a month. It would

This panel would meet no less than once a month. It would
before America's (or America's) membership are to be found in Part III.)
the task of making a systematic array of the problems and opportunities
vision, dedication and on a non-partisan basis. The panel should set itself
should be created totalling not more than fifteen. It should be chosen for
of the enterprise and for identifying available talent. A panel of eminent men
should sit with the responsibility for doing preliminary work on the basic structure
portion of his time to the task. It should be served by a small, that-while
should have a chairman of national renown who is willing to devote a major

A Commission for America's Future should be constituted. If
To achieve these objectives, the following steps seem indicated:

they must make a conscientious and continuing effort to raise their standards.

Clyde

by Henry A. Kissinger

## I. The Need

The very nature of modern government introduces an element of rigidity into national policy which operates more or less independently of the convictions of statesmen. Issues are too complex and relevant fact too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. An institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product of the risks of international affairs in the nuclear age. The vast bureaucratic mechanisms that emerge develop a momentum add a vested interest of their own.

The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A bureaucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected occurrence or with the need for innovation. Bureaucracy becomes an obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant to the problem. Then attention tends to be diverted from the act of choice--which is the ultimate test of statesmanship--to the accumulation of facts. Decisions can be avoided

by Henry A. Klaasen

## I. The Need

The nature of modern government introduces an element of rigidity into national policy which operates more or less independently of the convictions of statesmen. Issues are too complex and relevant of the risks of international stirs in the nuclear age. The vast An institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product fact too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. of the statesmen. The vast of the risks of international stirs in the nuclear age. The vast An institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product fact too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. of the risks of international stirs in the nuclear age. The vast

Something like this seems to be characteristic of modern bureaucratic
states. There develops a greater concern with an analysis of where one is
than where one is going. What passes for planning is frequently the projection
of the familiar into the future. Lip service is paid to planning; indeed planning
staffs proliferate. However, they suffer from two debilities. The "operating"
elements may not take the planning effort seriously. Plans become esoteric
exercises which are accepted largely because they imply no practical con-
sequence. They are a sop to administrative theory. At the same time, since
planning staffs have a high incentive to try to be "useful," there is a bias
against novel conceptions which are difficult to adapt to an administrative
mold. Yet ture innovation is bound to run counter to prevailing standards.
The dilemma of modern bureaucracy is that while every creative act is
lonely, not every lonely act is creative. Formal criteria are little help in
solving this problem because the unique cannot be expressed "objectively."

The rigidity in the policies of modern societies is in no small part due
to the complexity of decision-making. Crucial problems may--and frequently
do--go unrecognized for a long time. But once the decision-making aparatus
has disgorged a pplicy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The alternative
to the *status quo* is the prospect of repeating the whole anguishing process of

to the **atma** who is the broadest of repesting the whole subminding process of
has gladdened a bliccy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The alternative
do---do unrecognized for a long time. But once the decision-making sprasma
to the complexity of decision-making. Crucial problems mst---and dredently
The rigidity in the policies of modern societies is in no small part due
solving this problem because the mind cannot be expressed "objectively."
lonely, not every lonely act is creative. Formal criteria are little help in
The dilemma of modern pnmnemcracy is that while every creative act is
mold. Yet true innovation is bound to run counter to prevailing atitudes.
ridat novel conceptions which are difficult to adapt to an administrative
planning attitude have a high incentive to try to be "meaningful," there is a bias
aesthesia. They are a sop to administrative theory. At the same time, since
exercitation which are accepted largely because they imply no practical con-
elements may not take the planning effortserional. Pians become aeterni-
attitude proliferate. However, they amuse from two deprivities. The "operating"
of the familiar into the future. Lab service is paid to planning: indeed planning
down where one is doing. What bases for planning is frequently the projection
atlast. There develops a greater concern with an analysis of where one is
something like this seems to be characteristic of modern pnmnemcracy
removed the element of ambiguity.
until a criteria prokes no further delay, until the events themselves have

- 2 -

arriving at decisions. This explains to some extent the curious phenomenon
that decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps with a close division
become practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administrative
machinery swings behind their implementations as if activity could still
all doubts.

Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political survival, of most leaders
depends on their ability to realize their goals, however these may have been
arrived at. Whether these goals are desirable is relatively less crucial.
The time span by which administrative success is measured is considerably
shorter than that by which historical achievement is determined. In heavily
bureaucratized societies all pressures emphasize the first of these
accomplishments.

When the administrative machine grows very elaborate, the various
levels of the decision-making process are separated by chasms which are
obscured from the outside world by the complexity of the apparatus. Research
often becomes a means to buy time and to assuage consciences. Studying a
problem can turn into an escape from coming to grips with it. In the process,
the gap between the technical competence of research staffs and what hard
pressed political leaders are capable of absorbing widens sonstantly.
This heightens the insecurity of the executive and may thus compound either
rigidity or arbitrariness or both. In many fields--strategy being a prime

rigidity or arbitrariness or poir. In msnd fielda--attraetly peind a brime
This heightens the insecurity of the executive and may time compound either
breased political leaders are asaple of spaeoping widens anotainstly.

the dsb between the technical competence of research staff and what hard
problem can tmu into an esabe from coming to drbe with it. In the process,
often becomes a r assumed to pay time and to assume conaciences. Sndidt s
opacned from the outaide world by the complexit of the aspensna. Research
levels of the decialn-making process are ascerted by chamea which are
When the administrative machine dows a very elapdate, the various
accomplishmants.

pmnesmcrstined acctieties all preasame emprize the first of these
shorter than that by which historical achievement is determined. In presdly
The time asou dy which administrative success is mesamed is conalderspy
arrived at. Whether these dosla are desirable is relatively less crucial.
debena on their spability to realize their dosla, however these may have been
Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political annvist, of most leaders
all doata.

machinery awinds behind their implementations as it activity could atill
become practically acroasant once adopted. The whole administrative
that decalons taken with enorrrons doubt and berrake with a close divaion
arriving at decalons. This explains to some extent the curious phenomenon

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example--decision-makers may find it difficult to give as many hours to a problem as the expert has had years to study it. The ultimate decision often depends less on knowledge than on the ability to brief the top administrator --to present the facts in a way that can be absorbed rapidly. The effectiveness of briefing, however, puts a premium on theatrical qualities. Not everything that sounds plausible is correct and many things which are correct may not sound plausible when they are first presented and a second hearing is rare. The stage aspect of briefing may leave the decision-maker with a gnawing feeling of having been taken--even, and perhaps especially, when he does not *quite* know how.

Such a mode of operation would involve a great risk of stagnation even in "normal" times. It becomes especially dangerous in a revolutionary period. For then, the problems which are most obtrusive may be least relevant. The issues which are most significant may not be suitable for administrative formulation and even when formulated may not lend themselves to bureaucratic consensus. When the issue is how to transform the existing framework, routine can become an additional obstacle to both comprehension and action. It is characteristic of an age of turmoil that it produces so many immediate issues that little time is left to penetrate their deeper meaning. The most serious problem therefore becomes to acquire a sufficiently wide perspective so that the present does not overwhelm the future.

Concern for the future will not develop spontaneously. There is the need for an institution or framework that sets itself the task of looking a decade or so ahead not just once--as was the case with the Special Studies

decade or so ahead not just once--so was the case with the Specialist Studies need for an institution or framework that sets itself the task of looking a Concern for the future will not develop aboutaneously. There is the herabedive so that the present does not overwhelm the future.

The most serious problem therefore becomes to acquire a sufficiently wide immediate issues that little time is left to penetrate their deeper meaning. It is characteristic of an age of turmoil that it produces so many and so serious. It is administrative that it is administrative relevant. The issues which are most significant may not be suitable for period. For them, the problems which are most optimal may be least even in "normal" times. It becomes especially cumbersome in a revolution which a mode of operation would involve a great risk of atavism not quite know now.

feeling of having been taken--even, and perhaps especially, when he does The attitude toward may leave the decelerator with a slow sound pliable when they are first presented and a second hearing is rare. that sound pliable is correct and many things which are correct may not of priesthood, however, but a premium on theoretical duties. Not everything--to present the facts in a way that can be separated readily. The effectiveness depends less on knowledge than on the speed to present the job administrator problem as the expert has been to study it. The ultimate deceleration often example--decelerators make it difficult to give so many home to a

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## II. A Tentative Program

A panel of eminent individuals from different aspects of American life, non-partisan, chosen for quality and vision. This panel should set itself the task of making a systematic survey of the problems and opportunities before America. Depending on funds available, it could concentrate either on the domestic or on the foreign scene. The best course, however, would be to survey both.

This panel would meet no less than once a month. It would systematically survey all aspects of American life in terms of the implications for the future. It would ask where we want to be a decade or so from now and what would be required to get there. In some fields, it may conclude that existing activities are inadequate to the challenge. It is likely to discover areas which are largely neglected.

When the panel discovers any inadequacy it will constitute a task force which would seek to remedy it. This task force--composed of some members of the panel and some experts in the field--will survey the existing talent and seek means to enlist it in the task. It will consider which institution could best deal with the problem or undertake research with respect to it. It may undertake to issue a report directly.

The panel--which could be called Commission for America's Future-- would generally try to act as a leaven to encourage and discover the best talent available and focus it on the future of America.

talent available and focus it on the future of America.
would generally try to act as a haven to encourage and discover the best

institution could put deal with the problem or undertake research with respect
talent and seek means to enlist it in the task. It will consider which
members of the panel and some experts in the field--will survey the existing

force which would seek to remedy it. This task force--composed of some
When the panel discovers any inadequacy it will constitute a task

area which are largely neglected.

first existing activities are inadequate to the challenge. It is likely to discover
and what would be required to get there. In some fields, it may conclude
for the future. It would ask where we want to be a decade or so from now
specifically survey all aspects of American life in terms of the implications

This panel would meet no less than once a month. It would atomize-

would be to survey people.

either on the domestic or on the foreign scene. The past decade, however,
units before America. Depending on funds available, it could concentrate
itself the task of making a systematic survey of the problems and opportunities
life, non-partisan, chosen for clarity and vision. This panel should set
A panel of eminent individuals from different aspects of American

## II. A Tentative Program

Project--put for a substantial period of years.

- 5 -

- 6 -

The Commission should be chaired by a nationally known figure. A
small staff--an Executive Director and two or three staff assistants--should
have the responsibility for developing the basic framework, to commission
back-up papers and to service the operation of the Commission.

pack-up papers and to service the operation of the Commission.

have the responsibility for developing the basic framework, to commission
small staff--an Executive Director and two or three staff assistants--should

C]

- 8 -

JAN 14 1966

January 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Dr. Kissinger
Miss Hickey
Mr. Lockwood
Mr. Ruebhausen
Mr. Creel

Subject: Overall Panel Review Meeting

This is to confirm that a meeting will be held on
Tuesday, January eighteenth, 4:00 p.m., in Room 4100,
1290 Avenue of the Americas to consider a review of the three
international reports of the Overall Panel in the light of
developments since they were published in 1958 and 1959.

Since one of the major items on the agenda will be to
discuss participants in the review, we are enclosing lists of
the Overall Panel, Subpanels I, II, and III for your review.
Presumably a few people should be invited to augment the old
Overall Panel.

Nancy Hanks

January 13, 1966

ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.
SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT

MEMBERSHIP, OVERALL PANEL

LAURANCE S. ROCKEFELLER, panel chairman; president, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, New York, New York (became chairman May 26, 1958)

HONORABLE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Governor of New York, Albany, New York (resigned as panel chairman on May 26, 1958)

*ROBERT B. ANDERSON, former partner, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Company, Greenwich, Connecticut

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., senior partner, Berle, Berle and Brunner, New York, New York

CHESTER BOWLES, Ambassador to India, American Embassy, New Delhi, India

ARTHUR F. BURNS, president, The National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, New York

GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY, senior partner, Lehman Brothers, New York, New York

JOHN COWLES, president, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Minneapolis, Minnesota

JUSTIN W. DART, president, Rexall Drug and Chemical Company, Los Angeles, California

**GORDON E. DEAN, senior vice president -- Nuclear Energy, General Dynamics Corporation; former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

JOHN S. DICKEY, president, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire

HONORABLE JOHN W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D. C.

*Resigned from the panel when he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury

**Died, August 1958

(Membership, Overall Panel)

- 2 -

LESTER B. GRANGER, Dillard University, New Orleans, Louisiana

CARYL P. HASKINS, president, Carnegie Institution of Washington,
Washington, D. C.

REVEREND THEODORE M. HESBURGH, president, University of Notre
Dame, South Bend, Indiana

MARGARET A. HICKEY, public affairs editor, Ladies Home Journal, St.
Louis, Missouri

OVETA CULP HOBBY, president and editor, The Houston Post, Houston,
Texas

DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS, former chairman, New York Life Insurance
Company, New York, New York

MILTON KATZ, director, International Legal Studies, Harvard University
Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts

DR. JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR., chairman of the corporation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

HENRY R. LUCE, editorial chairman, Time, Inc., New York, New York

THOMAS B. McCABE, chairman and executive officer, Scott Paper
Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES McCORMACK, chief executive officer and
chairman, COMSAT, Washington, D. C.

DR. RICHARD P. MCKEON, Department of Philosophy, University of
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois

LEE W. MINTON, president, Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of the
United States and Canada, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

CHARLES H. PERCY, chairman of the board, Bell and Howell Company,
Chicago, Illinois

JACOB S. POTOFSKY, general president, Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, New York, New York

(Membership, Overall Panel)

- 3 -

ANNA M. ROSENBERG (Mrs. Anna R. Hoffman), public and industrial relations consultant, Anna M. Rosenberg Associates, New York, New York

HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID SARNOFF, chairman, Radio Corporation of America, New York, New York

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, partner, Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland and Kiendl, New York, New York

DR. EDWARD TELLER, associate director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratories, University of California, Berkeley, California

FRAZAR B. WILDE, chairman of board, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Hartford, Connecticut

HENRY A. KISSINGER, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, served as director of the project until his resignation, June 30, 1958, and thereafter as a consultant

January 13, 1966

SUBPANEL I -- U. S. INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, panel chairman; Secretary of State, Washington,
D. C.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., senior partner, Berle, Berle & Brunner, New York,
New York

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, partner, Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland &
Kiendl, New York, New York

HADLEY CANTRIL, chairman of the board, The Institute for International
Social Research, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

SAVILLE R. DAVIS, chief editorial writer, The Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Massachusetts

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, president, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, New York, New York

MAX F. MILLIKAN, director, The Center for International Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

DR. PHILIP E. MOSELY, director, European Institute, Columbia University,
New York, New York

JOHN W. NASON, president, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 3rd, trustee, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, New York,
New York

HONORABLE EDWIN F. STANTON, former Ambassador to Thailand, Devon,
Connecticut

*JOHN ANDREWS KING, JR., panel secretary; secretary, International League
Studies, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts

*No current record

January 13, 1966

SUBPANEL II -- U. S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES J. McCORMACK, panel chairman; chief executive officer and chairman, COMSAT, Washington, D. C.

* GORDON E. DEAN, senior vice president -- Nuclear Energy, General Dynamics Corporation; former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

FRANK ALTSCHUL, vice president, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York

GENERAL FREDERICK L. ANDERSON, former deputy United States Special Representative in Europe, Palo Alto, California

KARL R. BENDETSEN, director, Champion Papers, Inc., Hamilton, Ohio

DETLEV W. BRONK, president, Rockefeller University, New York, New York

JAMES B. FISK, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., Murray Hills, New Jersey

GAYLORD BRADLEY, former chairman, The Pennroad Corporation, Brooklin, Maine

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New York

**ELLIS A. JOHNSON, director, Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland

COLONEL GEORGE A. LINCOLN, professor, social sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

*Died, August 1958

**No current record

(Subpanel II)

- 2 -

*FRANK C. NASH, United States Delegation to General Assembly of the United Nations, presidential consultant on overseas base study.

LAURANCE S. ROCKEFELLER, president, Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
New York, New York

ARTHUR SMITHIES, Department of Economics, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts

T. F. WALKOWICZ, aeronautical engineer, New York, New York

CARROLL L. WILSON, professor, School of Industrial Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

**JOHN F. FLOBERG, lawyer, Akron, Ohio

TOWNSEND W. HOOPES, panel secretary; deputy assistant, Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, D. C.

*Died, December 1957

**Resigned, June 1957

**Resigned, June 7, 1927

*Died, December 19, 1927

Defense for International Security, Atlanta, Washington, D. C.
TOWNSEND W. HOOPES, panel secretary; deputy assistant, secretary of

**JOHN P. FROBERG, lawyer, Akron, Ohio

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
GARRETT F. WILSON, professor, School of Industrial Management,

T. I. WATKIN, C.S., aeronautical engineer, New York, New York

Cambridge, Massachusetts

ARTHUR SMITHS, Department of Economics, Harvard University,

New York, New York

LAURANCE S. ROCKELLER, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund,

United Nations, presidential consultant on overseas peace study
*FRANK C. WASH, United States Delegation to General Assembly of the

- 3 -

(supplement I)

January 13, 1966

SUBPANEL III -- INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES
AND STRATEGY

MILTON KATZ, panel chairman; director, International Legal Studies,
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts

*ROBERT B. ANDERSON, former partner, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades and Company,
Greenwich, Connecticut

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., senior partner, Berle, Berle, & Brunner, New York,
New York

HARLAN CLEVELAND, assistant secretary of state for international
organization affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

FREDERICK H. HARBISON, director, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton
University, Princeton, New Jersey

**AUGUST MAFFRY, economist, New York, New York

STACY MAY, economist, Wellfleet, Massachusetts

DAVID ROCKEFELLER, president, Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, New
York

***MAX WESTON THORNBURG, foreign industrial consultant

FORREST D. MURDEN, panel secretary; partner, Allen Murden, New
York, New York

*Resigned from panel when he was appointed Secretary of State

**Resigned from panel

***Deceased

***Deceased

**Retired from panel

*Retired from panel when he was appointed Secretary of State

***MAY WELTON THORMAN, foreign industrial consultant

York

DAVID ROCKELETTER, president, Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, New York

STACY MAY, economist, Wellesley, Massachusetts

**AUGUST MALLIN, economist, New York, New York

FREDRICK H. HARRISON, director, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University

HARVAN CLEVELAND, assistant secretary of state for international

Minneapolis

JOHN COMEY, president, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Minneapolis,

India

CHERIE BOWES, Ambassador to India, American Embassy, New Delhi,

New York

ADOLE V. BERLE, Jr., senior partner, Parle, Berle, & Boumer, New York,

Greenwich, Connecticut

ROBERT B. ANDERSON, former partner, Carl W. Loep, Rhodoe and Company,

MILTON KATS, panel chairman; director, International Legal Studies,

SUBMITT III -- INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND RAWAGE

SELECT STUDY PROJECT

ROCKETTER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

January 13, 1988

Dr. Kissinger:

Mr. Benjamin Brown called. You had discussed with him the
possibility of returning via Libson.

Mr. Brown has checked and you can

Leave Munich, Saturday, 29th, at 8 a.m.
Change at Frankfurt
Arrive Lisbon, 12:30 p.m.

He understands you wish to go from Lisbon to London. If you
must go on Sunday, you can

Leave Lisbon, Sunday, 30th, at 2:25 p.m. (BEA)
Arrive London, 4:55 p.m.

This is the latest flight that day.

Mr. Brown very much hopes you could stay until Monday when you would

Leave Lisbon, Monday, 31st, 17:50 a.m.
Arrive London, 11:25 a.m.

or

Leave Lisbon, 2:25 p.m.
Arrive London, 4:55 p.m.

It is urgent Mr. Brown know today of your plans.

617, UN 8-7600, x 2112 or 2114 or 2123

I will be glad to call him for you if you wish.

Janet Gracey