ask the Attorney General if he is willing to make available the sum-
mary report to the committee in executive session. Then it is up to the
committee to determine what to do with it.

Senator PERCY. The Attorney General would be given an oppor-
tunity to expand on whatever concerns he may have about the civil
liberties of the individuals involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The civil liberties, such as they are, are already
compromised, if they are compromised by the publicity already given
to them. There have been many articles about the 17 named, including
the member of this staff. There is no secret about the people who were
wiretapped, many of whom bear little relation, if any, to what is
called national security. I cannot imagine that they could have been.
Why they were wiretapped is a great mystery to me.

Senator CASE. It seems to me a fundamental violation of a person's
civil liberties is involved in his being wiretapped.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in our knowing about it. It has already been
talked about. If there is any violation it took place at the time he was
wiretapped. One of these gentlemen, Mr. Halperin, I was told yester-
day, has already entered a suit against the nominee for $100 a day for
every day he was wiretapped when he was out of the Government. I
was told that yesterday.

Senator PERCY. I just want to be certain we have an opportunity to ascertain the consequences of those 17 names being officially revealed as suspects. It may jeopardize the rights of those individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator is fearful the chairman will release
them on his own authority, he can be assured on that.

Senator PERCY. I will leave it then for the moment.

ACTIVITIES OF MR. DAVID YOUNG

I think for the record, Dr. Kissinger, it would be well to have your
comments about a former employee of your own, Mr. David Young,
who has been indicted for conspiracy and burglary.

Did you, when he left your employment and was transferred to
Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time
that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities—burglary,
conspiracy to burglary, or whatever they might be.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I have no knowledge of any such activities
that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence
of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know
that David Young was concerned with internal security matters.

Perhaps I should explain for the record my connection with David
Young. I hired David Young because I had met him in New York
when I was associated with Governor Rockefeller, and he was a mem-
ber of the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. When I
came to Washington, I was looking for a man of high moral standards,
whom I knew personally, who could work as a personal assistant and
appointments secretary. David Young worked in that capacity. He
was very highly recommended. I also knew his family, and I thought
extremely highly of him. And I must say that in my own experience
I never had any reason to change my mind.

52

He worked in this capacity as my appointment secretary for a year, from roughly January 1970, to January 1971. That position is one of the more exhausting ones in the Government, for both practical and I suppose psychological reasons. David Young therefore asked to be transferred to more substantive work. We could not find any substantive work for him immediately because all of his experience had really been in domestic affairs. So David Young worked in the files; he didn't even have an office from January 1971, through June 1971. He accompanied me occasionally to meetings, but basically he was no longer working in my outer office; he was working with people located in the files.

In June 1971, David Young—on his own initiative or Mr. Ehrlichman's, I don't know which—transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. David Young had met Mr. Ehrlichman because Mr. Ehrlichman and I sat across from each other on Air Force 1 and David Young sat next to me and Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant sat next to him. In fact, the transfer occurred while I was on my first secret trip to China.

At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for 3 months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government, a project that was publicly announced and which published a public report [Executive Order 11652, March 8, 1972]. After this project ended, I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that David Young would stay on his staff, and I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have high regard for him.

In short, I did not know either from him or anyone else about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event.

Senator PERCY. Thank you for that clarification.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie.

Senator MUSKIE. Dr. Kissinger, I am conscious of the fact that you have been under these lights for 3 hours and we have been throwing the platoon system at you while we have gone to vote. Many subject areas have been opened up that I would like to talk with you about, but I am under a time limitation.

WITNESS' OPENING STATEMENT APPLAUSED

First, may I say with respect to your opening statement that I applaud it as a statement of philosophy to bring to this job. I cannot resist saying that if it had been reflected in the policies and actions of this administration in the last 5 years, we would not be here today discussing the problems that have been created by the lack of trust between us and the administration. So I hope your articulation of this philosophy expresses not only just your own personal attitude about the responsibilities you have been asked to assume but that it signals a change in the administration policies which have inhibited a free flow of information and free communication.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY IN WIRETAP FIELD

On that point I would like to ask one specific question in the wiretap field. I do not know that I will ask further questions in that field.

LQ

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

#10

January 22, 1974

No. 28

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

JANUARY 22, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will go right to the
questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, we had a number of second and
third hand reports from senior American officials and
Congressmen and so forth, about the question of whether
you, on your trip, in concluding this [Egyptian-Israeli] Agree-
ment or getting it concluded, made any commitments on behalf of
the United States. Or beyond that, whether there are any un-
published understandings which put the United States in
the position of being a diplomatic guarantor. And I
thought it would be helpful if you would tell us, yourself
about this.

A Let me sum up the documents that exist, and
then explain our understanding of their significance:

First, there is an agreement between Egypt and
Israel, signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt and Israel
at Kilometer 101 -- and which has been published in the
newspapers.

For further information contact:

PR #28

2

Secondly, there exists an undertaking about the limitation of forces in the zones of limited armament, and elsewhere, between Egypt and Israel that came about as the result, technically, of a United States proposal made by the United States to both sides. The reason was that both sides found it easier to accept a United States proposal as to the limitation of their forces, than to accept limitations which seemed to be demanded by the other side about their deployment.

This proposal was transmitted in a letter by the President, to the Heads of Government of Egypt and Israel in which it was pointed out that acceptance of this identical document -- that signature of this document -- would constitute acceptance and that it would thereby become part of the basic agreement.

It, therefore, does not constitute a United States guarantee, but it was a device by which the United States made it possible to convey to the other their acceptance of certain limitations on the armaments. This, at the request of both sides, has not been published, and since it is not a United States obligation, we felt we had to acquiesce in the views of the parties.

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3

Thirdly, in the process of negotiating the agreement, both of the parties asked us questions about the intentions of the other, that were not part of the formal agreement, but that nevertheless made it easier for them to plan their own course. And we, therefore, sometimes in writing, sometimes orally, would do one of two things:

We would either ask one of the parties what its intention was, with respect to the problem at issue, and we would then communicate that statement of intentions to the other side -- in effect, saying: "We have been informed that the Egyptian Government --" or that the Israeli Government -- "plans to do the following."

Sometimes we were asked what our interpretation was of certain clauses, and in that case we did that -- sometimes in writing, sometimes orally. In the cases that now come to my mind, it turned out that our interpretations were identical with the interpretations of both of the parties, and therefore it was essentially irrelevant.

Now, "Are we guarantors of the Agreement?"

In the sense of having a formal obligation to take specific action in case of violation of the agreement, we are not guarantors.

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4

In the sense that we will be in some way involved
if the Agreement breaks down, all of recent history in the
Middle East indicates that if there is an outbreak in the
Middle East, the United States is involved whether or not it
has engaged in prior diplomatic activity. It is certain that
if there is another conflict, one or both of the parties are
going to ask us for diplomatic support -- and in that sense it is,
of course, true that our judgment as to who violated the
Agreement will affect the course that we will pursue.
But in the legal sense, there is no obligation that the
United States has taken to enforce the Agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, if you will follow up this
question -- having read the four or five whatever you call
them, assurances -- it struck me that all of them were given
to Israel. Didn't Egypt need any? Was Mr. Sadat so self-
assured that he didn't ask for any --

A No, there were some assurances given to Egypt
as well.

Q Would you tell us some more? We have read
in the papers, those you gave to Israel, but nothing about
Egypt.

A Well, the ones you read in the papers that were

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5

given to Israel, had previously been leaked by the
Government of Israel.

The ones that were given to Egypt have not
been released -- but they are of the same nature.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said at your previous,
or last, news conference, that it was increasingly
inappropriate for the Arab oil embargo to continue
while the United States was engaged in a mediating effort.

Now that that effort has been successful in
its first stage, at least, what is your feeling about
the continuation of the oil embargo? And can you
report any progress in that area?

A Well, we have had every reason to believe
that success in the negotiations would mark a major step
toward ending the oil embargo. We would therefore
think that failure to end the embargo in a reasonable
time would be highly inappropriate, and would raise
serious questions of confidence in our minds, with
respect to the Arab nations with whom we have dealt on
this issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, back on the question of the
documents -- doesn't this leave the public record of the

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6

Administration, and the United States, in a rather
strange position with these unpublished documents?
And does this not raise a question of where the Administration
is heading in its relations with Congress, where there have
been very strong demands in recent years for full documenta-
tion of international accords?

A The Congressional leaders were given a
detailed account of all of these assurances, as well as
of the content of any unpublished document.

Secondly, it makes a great deal of difference
whether we publish a document to which the United States
is a party, and which therefore, spells out an American
obligation -- or whether we publish a document which in
effect, spells out the obligations of other parties,
and in which we played a mediating role because of the
confidence these other parties had in us. I would
suggest that there is an enormous difference in these
two situations.

Nevertheless, the Congressional leaders have
been informed about these matters.

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7

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to your answer
on oil:

You mentioned that -- you used the phrase
something about a "reasonable" period of time that this
could be lifted.

Is it a proper assumption that when the disengage-
ment has been completed, when this forty day cycle is
over, that it is at that time you would think the oil
embargo ought to be lifted?

A I think in more ambitious terms.

Q Do you mean even before that?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, there is word from --

A Wait a minute --

Q Have you got some assurances from Mr. Sadat
that he would use his influence in the oil producing countries
in this embargo?

A I don't think it would be appropriate to
go into all the details of the conversation between President
Sadat and myself, but I have made clear the United States
position on the oil embargo, and I believe that it is
clearly understood by all of the leaders with whom I have
spoken.

8

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you were away, it was disclosed here, through the White House and the Pentagon that the U.S. military had been receiving certain unauthorized National Security Council documents by such devices as going through your briefcase, because they were worried about your policy on China and the Soviet Union, and further that when you heard about it, that you were furious and demanded the transfer of the guilty parties.

This becomes a matter of curiosity to me because I found myself wondering and wanting to ask you how you knew that these things were happening, when I recall your sworn testimony before the Senate was that you didn't know about the existence of the Plumbers, had no contact with David Young, and thought he was doing something else.

A. I missed you on the trip, Mr. O'Leary.
[Laughter.] Let me answer the question in terms of my knowledge of this particular episode.

This incident arose out of the leakage of highly classified documents containing minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan crisis to a columnist. As a result of this leak, Mr.

PR #28

Erlichman, who was in charge of all internal security investigations in the White House, started an investigation of this particular leak.

Sometime after this, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office at the NSC, came to General Haig and told him that the internal evidence of at least one of the documents suggested to him that the leak to the columnist had occurred from his office.

I was out of town at the time. When General Haig informed me of this, I told him to turn that matter over to Mr. Erlichman.

Sometime later, I don't have the exact dates, several weeks later, Mr. Erlichman let me see -- or rather listen -- to the interrogation of Admiral Welander with respect to this particular incident. And, in the course of this interrogation, there was developed an allegation not only with respect to the source of the leak, but also about the unauthorized transfer of documents from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Beyond this one interrogation, I was told nothing about the investigation, either preceding or following this interrogation.

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10

I was amazed by this allegation, since the Office of the Chairman, and my office, had worked closely together. I agree with what Admiral Moorer said on television last week, that there was a full flow of information between my office and his office, and I had no reason to suppose, on the basis of my experience, that there was any conflict between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my office. And therefore I have no reason to question the argument that has been made by Admiral Moorer that this incident of the unauthorized transfer of papers from my office to his office reflected overzealousness on the part of subordinates, and, in any case, gave him no information that he did not already possess.

I must add that I was not aware of the fact that a report was being prepared by Mr. Erlichman, and I have never seen that report. Nor have I seen the report of the investigation that was conducted by Secretary Laird's office. And therefore what I am saying is based on my personal knowledge of the incident which is confined to this one interrogation of one individual who volunteered his information first to my office. These reports must have come to conclusions similar to the ones I have outlined

PR #28

11

here, because no disciplinary action was taken by the
addressees of this report.

After these allegations became known to me,
it was decided in consultation between Admiral Moorer
and myself to close the Liaison Office attached to my
staff.

With respect to my statements before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee made under oath, I
reaffirm here every word that I have said to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and I assert that they were
fully consistent with the allegations of the unnamed
sources that have been made while I was on my trip last
week.

To be specific, I did not know that David
Young was conducting an investigation into the matter
of the Anderson leaks. He never talked to me about this,
or any other subject, while he was conducting what I now
know was his investigation. I did not instruct him, nor
did I request it. I never saw the report, nor did I
know that the report existed until I read it in a newspaper
early last week.*

I have called both Senator Fulbright and

* General Haig has himself assured me that he had no contact
with David Young on the report or related matters. [EDS: Added
to the record subsequent to the press conference.]

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12

Senator Stennis and told them that I would be prepared to
meet with their committees to answer any questions that
they might have on this subject.

Q One quick follow up, who interrogated Admiral Welander?

A I believe he was interrogated by David Young, but from this one could not suppose that David Young was conducting an investigation.

Q Did you know David Young had performed the
interrogation?

A I knew that David Young had performed the
interrogation, but I had assumed that since we had sent
Admiral Welander to Mr. Erlichman's office, Mr. Erlichman
had designated one of his staff members to take whatever
report Admiral Welander had to give.

I repeat again, we were not told about either
the investigation preceding it or the investigation following
it, and I had no contact whatever with David Young during
that period.

Q Mr. Secretary, to clarify, you said you
participated in the interrogation.

A I did not participate in the interrogation.

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13

Q Could you clarify that you read or listened to a tape of the interrogation?

A I listened to a portion of the tape of the interrogation.

Q Mr. Secretary, why didn't you find out the total results of the investigation and the interrogation of Admiral Welander?

A Because I was told that I was not to be informed of it.

Q By whom were you told?

A I have said all that I will say on this subject. All internal security matters in the White House after May 1970 were handled by Mr. Erlichman's Office, and therefore it was not unusual for this to be conducted in the established framework.

Q Mr. Secretary, perhaps your lack of precision on the oil question is deliberate, but I wonder if I could try to pin you down once more. Can you tell us what you would define to be a reasonable period of time? And you said if nothing did happen, that it would raise a question of confidence. What is the implication of that question?

PR #28

14

A It would not be useful for me to go beyond this.
But we have carried out in good faith what we have told
both sides we would do.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States has stated
its opposition to any one country dominating affairs in
Asia or in other parts of the world. How do you look
upon (a) the Paracel Islands question; and (b), the Island
question that is dividing North and South Korea. There
seem to be disputes over both sets of islands?

A I don't think either of those issues raises
the question of dominating the area, or dominating the
world. With respect to the Paracel Islands, there has been
a dispute between various countries as to the ownership
of these islands.

The United States regrets the use of military
force in settling this dispute, but it does not raise an
issue of world domination.

With respect to the Korean Islands, those
were assigned to South Korea as the result of the armistice
agreement, and the United States supports that position.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now
for agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and

PR #28

15

Jordan? And in that connection, has your own personal
diplomacy superseded the Geneva Conference?

A With respect to Syria and Israel, on the oc-
casion of my visit to Syria, the Syrian Government put
forward put forward some ideas with respect to the dis-
engagement of forces on the Syrian front. It's the first
time that the Syrian Government put forward concrete sug-
gestions on any phase of the negotiations.

We have transmitted those ideas to the
Government of Israel, which is now studying them, and
which has promised us an answer sometime after their
cabinet meets next Sunday.

We hope that a process can be generated by
which the disengagement of forces on the Syrian side
can be negotiated with the same seriousness as on the
Egyptian side, and we have indicated that we would be
prepared, if the two parties request it, to offer our good
offices.

I might say also that the visit to Syria led
to an improvement in the bilateral relations between the
United States and Syria; one example of which is the fact
that an American citizen, who has been held in Syria on

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16

the charge of espionage since July of 1972, is being released tomorrow. His name is John Bates, and Mr. Vest can give any of you who want to pursue it further particulars.

With respect to Jordan, the United States believes that all parties that have frontiers with Israel should participate in the process of negotiation, and we favor negotiations, as well, between Israel and Jordan.

The framework for the negotiations that have taken place was established by the Geneva Conference. The co-chairmanship between us and the Soviet Union is taken very seriously by us, and we are keeping, and have kept, the Soviet Union informed of all of the actions which we have taken, which we believe are consistent with the consensus resolution which ended the last meeting of the Geneva Conference, and which carried out the spirit of this.

My personal role has been produced by the fact that both parties found it easier to convey certain ideas through an intermediary, and because given the hostility in the area, it was useful to have a more impartial third party convey certain considerations and

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17

particular assurances. It is to be hoped that as these negotiations develop, and as the parties gain confidence in each other, that the role of a mediator will become less crucial. But given the importance to the peace of the whole world, of making progress towards a settlement in the Middle East, I don't want to take a dogmatic position on that issue.

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Q Mr. Secretary.

A Marilyn.

Q Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the documents that do exist you said the second document is an undertaking of limited forces in zones of limited armaments and elsewhere. Can you spell that out a little bit, and does this involve limitation on weapons that could reach the other side?

A It concerns primarily the limitation of weapons within the zones of limited armaments and some understandings with respect to offensive capabilities.

Q Does each side then take on the responsibility not to acquire offensive capability?

A No, it is strictly a deployment question.

Q Mr. Secretary, President Sadat is quoted today in Algeria as saying that there has been a significant change since three months ago in U.S. policy towards the Middle East. I wonder if you could tell us what it was that you either said or did while you were in Egypt that would cause President Sadat to reach that conclusion.

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19

A I think --of course I am not a spokesman for President Sadat--but it is obvious that the United States has played a much more active role in the Middle East in pursuing a settlement than has been the case previously, and the United States has attempted to take into account the legitimate concerns of both sides in urging a settlement. So I would think that the change to which President Sadat referred concerns the degree of our activity and our general participation in producing a settlement.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect now that there will be a swift resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt?

A I think the conditions for that have been improved.

A Mr. Secretary, some of the Arab states or oil-producing states are said to be mining their oil fields in a direct response to Secretary Schlesinger's speech of January 6 in which he said that public opinion might force a show of force by the West. What is your opinion about the likelihood of such a show of force by the West if the embargo goes too far?

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20

A Well, I don't think the embargo will go too far, so that this is essentially an academic question.

Q Mr. Secretary, following your last round of conversations with the Chinese leadership, you expressed the hope that the process of normalization could be accelerated. Could you tell us as to what precisely you mean by normalization? Is it establishment of full diplomatic relations? And if so, how would you go about it?

A Well, in our relations with the Chinese we have always stressed that the practical improvement of our relations is more important than the legal form in which it is expressed. Therefore, we have always stressed particular concrete steps. We are at the moment negotiating a number of issues with the Chinese Government on blocked assets and claims of both sides, which are progressing, and we are proceeding along the lines which we have previously outlined. But by normalization of relations we mean at this stage closer contact, improved communications, and a greater interconnection of various activities.

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Q Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ehrlichman is gone, but
have you been assured since then that you never again
will be denied information which properly falls within
your sphere of operations?

A I had no reason to complain about the
matter because I thought it was a reasonable division
of labor that I would not participate in internal
security matters.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've talked --

Q Mr. Secretary, what's the status of the
preparations for the energy conference? And have you
yet dispatched the special emissary to the European
countries for the preparations?

A The question is what is the status of
preparations for the energy conference, and have we
dispatched the emissary?

Very active work went on in the preparations
for the energy conference as a result of a task force
composed of Mr. Donnelson, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Lord,
and Mr. Cooper from the National Security Council,
together with representatives from other departments:
Mr. Bennett from the Treasury; a representative of the
Energy Office.

PR #28.

22

Now, we are having daily meetings on the subject
this week, and when our preparations have progressed to
a certain point, no later than the end of this week, we
will be prepared to talk to our allies and to other
 invitees.

I will have to talk to Mr. Donaldson on what the
best use of his time is, whether the best use of his
time between now and the beginning of the conference
is by taking a trip or whether we can brief the other
participants here. And that decision will be made
in the next few days.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a debate
within the Government over many years as to whether it
is good or bad for the United States that the Suez
Canal be open. What is your view now, since one by-product
of this negotiation may be the opening of the Canal?

A I would say that obviously the United
States has no overwhelming reason of its own to get the
Suez Canal opened. So the arguments pro and con have
to be seen within the context of the general contribution
that opening of the Suez Canal would make to peace in
the Middle East. In that context, the United States

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23

would feel that it would be a positive step towards
peace in the Middle East, and the greater ease
by which the Soviet Union can transfer its fleet from
the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean can be compensated
both by the greater ease with which we can transfer
some of our ships into the Indian Ocean and other measures
that can be taken of a different nature.

Q Mr. Secretary, last fall when Foreign
Minister Jobert was here you spoke of the constructive
role that France was playing in the dialogue between
the United States and Europe. I was wondering if you
would still use that description for French policy in
view of the initial steps that France has taken with
regard to the franc and the negative attitude the
French have taken until now towards your projected
energy conference.

A Well, of course, the steps that France
has taken with respect to the franc is similar to the
steps that we have taken with respect to the dollar.
And we can't blame France for pursuing a fiscal policy
similar to our own.

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24

With respect to the negotiations on the various declarations, they are now in process. I am quite optimistic that the NATO declaration can be settled fairly quickly. The declaration with the European Community is in the process of being redrafted. And there will be another meeting of our representatives with those of the Nine early in February, and it will be easier to form a judgment then.

With respect to energy, our views and those of France are quite opposed. And to the extent that we, of course, believe that we are correct, I could not characterize the French attitude as constructive.

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Q To follow up, at your San Clemente press conference, the last time you talked about Europe, you mentioned only two declarations. What happened to the third one, was it dropped -- the idea?

A With respect to Europe, we are working on two declarations: a declaration defining the relationship between the European community and the United States, and a declaration defining the basic principles on which NATO should proceed.

There is a project that we strongly support for a third declaration, including Europe, the United States and Japan -- and encompassing the basic principles of both of the declarations we are drafting with Europe, plus certain objectives we share together with Japan.

The United States position is that we strongly favor such a trilateral declaration, and we have not changed our policy.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you go ahead with this anyway?

A We would proceed in any event. Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you say that the removal of the oil embargo is not really enough, is not the real problem but

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26

that the production cutbacks must be restored as well, otherwise, everybody would be competing for the same amount of scarce oil.

Do you have reason to believe that that will happen, as well as the lifting of the embargo?

A I maintain the position that I advanced at previous press conferences.

Q Mr. Secretary, one of the Senators who was at a meeting with you yesterday, said that the Russian cooperation was mainly, not objecting to what you were achieving in the Middle East. Could you give us an example of the more positive Soviet cooperation?

A The Soviet Union played a very useful role and a very crucial role, in helping to get the Geneva Conference organized. It played a very constructive role at the Geneva Conference itself.

Neither of those events could have occurred without active and constructive Soviet participation.

With respect to disengagement, it was always understood by the Soviet Union and ourselves, that we were in a tactically better position to promote progress on that

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27

issue.

And therefore, at the Military Committee that was meeting in Geneva, it was agreed from the beginning, that the Israeli and Egyptians discussions should take place under the auspices of a United Nations representative, rather than under the auspices of the Co-Chairman.

Now in the last phase of the negotiations, the tactical details were handled primarily by the United States, but the Soviet Union was informed, and indicated its strong support for the effort -- and we consider this a constructive step.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned opening a new dialogue -- your desire to open a new dialogue with the countries in South America, and there has been some talk about a trip, perhaps to Panama, and your trip to Mexico City at the end of the month -- and possibly a larger trip to the Continent in April.

I would like to ask you if you could be more specific at this time about your plans, and whether you would rule out a meeting in Mexico with an emissary of

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28

the Cuban Government.

A I have indicated at a previous press conference that there has been an agreement ad referendum, which means for current examination by the United States and Panamanian Governments about the basic principles on which a negotiation leading to a new treaty for the Panama Canal should be based.

These principles are now being studied in our Government, and when they are approved, it is possible that I may take a trip to Panama to mark the Agreement on these principles.

The meeting in Mexico City grew out of a speech I made to the Latin American Foreign Ministers during the United Nations General Assembly, in which I pointed out that the United States was eager to start a new dialogue with Latin America on the basis of equality and geared to the realities of the current situation.

At this lunch, the Foreign Minister of Colombia responded to my speech and invited the Foreign Ministers of all Latin American countries to a meeting in Bogota to formulate a preliminary response to this American initiative.

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That meeting took place in November, and
came up with what we consider a very constructive
document that outlines an agenda for a proposed meeting
between the other nations of the Western Hemisphere and
the United States.

This meeting is now scheduled for the period
of February 21st to the 23rd, in Mexico City. The
Latin American Foreign Ministers will meet several days
before then, to formulate their ideas even more precisely
than was possible in Bogota.

I have been in close touch with various foreign
ministers who are active in Latin America and who are
actively engaged in this, and I am quite optimistic that
we can take a significant step in Mexico City, and we are
hard at work in preparing an American position in
response to this Latin American initiative.

With respect to a possible meeting with a
Cuban Representative, there is no such plan.

Q Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you had a
chance to be fully briefed on certain changes in
strategic nuclear weapons policies that Secretary Schlesinger
has publicly talked about, involving retargeting of

PR #28

30

nuclear warheads and also the improvements in the accuracy
of our nuclear warheads -- and if so, what effect do you
think these decisions might have on our relations with the
Soviets, and what effect, if any, on the SALT II
discussions?

A All decisions of this nature are taken within
the framework of the National Security Council system and,
therefore, in my capacity as Assistant to the President,
as well as in my capacity as Secretary of State, I'm
of course familiar with these various matters.

I would say that they underline the inexorable
nature of the arms race and the essential necessity of
making progress on the limitations of arms.

If the strategic arms race continues unchecked,
it is inevitable that both sides will refine the number
of their weapons, multiply their warheads, increase their
accuracies and develop strategies which will sooner or
later, create the threat of a gap between the first strike
and the second strike capability -- which was considered
to be a principle element of insecurity in the 1950s and
early 1960s -- which would put a premium on striking first
and therefore, contribute to the danger of the outbreak of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WEDNESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1974

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Some two weeks ago in letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, I offered to provide "all of the information available to me" concerning the anonymous allegations of "military spying," the so-called unauthorized transfer of papers and the publication of documents in the media which could affect national security -- either through the Staff "or at a Formal Hearing as you deem it appropriate or desirable."

I stand ready to do so.

It is, personally, very, very distasteful and certainly out of character to find myself discussing the attacks and insinuations appearing in the media that I was "spying" on the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is distasteful and out of character because I have served this Nation for 45 years as a member of a profession where honesty, integrity and devotion to country are the measure of the man. I have risen during this period from Midshipman to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have seen peace, and I have been a part of three wars. As a citizen and as an experienced professional, I bow to no one in or out of uniform in terms of devotion to duty, to country,

or to the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, I hope you can understand why these insinuations and allegations sicken me as a man, concern me as a military officer and deeply disturb me as the nation's senior uniformed official.

The rationale advanced for this so-called "military spying" has been that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied a free flow of National Security Council information which we were entitled to receive in order to fulfill our statutory responsibility, a "spy ring" was established to thwart or inhibit the development of policies with which they allegedly disagreed.

In the interest of setting the record absolutely straight I appeared on national TV and publicly denounced this allegation for what it is -- ludicrous and ridiculous. I stand by that statement. In the first place, there is and always has been a free and complete flow of information between Dr. Kissinger and me as required by Presidential directive. Secondly, with respect to foreign affairs and military operations, I have consistently and actively supported our national policies. I respectfully call your attention to my many appearances before this and many other Congressional Committees, my speeches and press conferences. Furthermore, I have frequently been requested by the President to brief individuals and groups from the Congressional Leadership, including the Distinguished Chairman of this Committee, the Speaker of the House and many others. I have also been the senior military spokesman charged with explaining United States national policy to our Allies.

2

In short, I have continuously been engaged in steadfastly
supporting initiatives which it is now alleged that I
opposed. Therefore, the allegation that I desired to
inhibit national policy initiatives simply does not make
sense.

At the outset, let me emphasize that I have never seen
any of the reports of investigation supposedly submitted
on the matters at hand. I have not had the privilege of
listening to any tape of any interrogation relating to
these subjects. I have only been briefly advised orally
by Mr. Buzhardt, then General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, as to the contents of an interview with Yeoman
Radford and Rear Admiral Welander. Just yesterday, for
the first time, I reviewed the summaries of statements of
various individuals compiled by the Defense Investigative
Service. As you know, this sheaf of unsigned narratives
is far from a full Investigative Report.

My letter of 30 January to you, Mr. Chairman, sets out
in detail my recollections of the circumstances surrounding
the various allegations. No useful purpose would be served
by repeating at this time all that has been said. Let me
emphasize the main points.

First, I must speak about my relationship with Dr.
Kissinger and the National Security Council Staff. The
exchange of information, the coordination of effort, and
the mutual feeling of confidence was and still is excellent.
I am sure Dr. Kissinger will attest to this fact.

3

I have always been privy to full information on all subjects with military implications and on the multitude of subjects where coordination between the NSC Staff and the JCS is necessary. Whatever contribution I have tried to make toward the development and implementation of national security policy in the past four years has been served well by the mutual exchange and confidence which exists between Dr. Kissinger and me.

On two occasions, over two years ago, I was shown papers by one of my staff officers -- papers which, as it turned out, were acquired in an unauthorized way. As I recall, these papers were treated as I treat any paper handed to me by my staff officers. I quickly scan the paper for subject matter; if the subject matter is one with which I am already fully informed, the papers are simply handed back or set aside. These particular papers, as I explained in my letter of 30 January 1974, were on subjects with which I was already completely familiar; so they were, as is my custom, routinely returned. These papers were only momentarily scanned, and I did not focus on any irregularity.

Perhaps I should have been more alert in following up as to the precise origin and transmission of these papers; but these were busy times and I was dealing rapidly with literally thousands of papers, dispatches, and documents -- in fact, a deluge of information.

It is important that I stress to you that I gave no orders, issued no instructions, gave no encouragement -- either direct or implied -- to anyone to collect or retain in any irregular or unauthorized manner any information, papers or documents from the National Security Council.

Let me again emphasize, there is no substantive relationship between the leak of official documents which appeared in the media and these miscellaneous papers which were retained by Yeoman Radford in the course of his clerical duties during two trips several months before the leak to the press. By this I mean that some of the materials acquired by Radford on these trips have appeared in the media. Yet, for some reason unknown to me, it is these miscellaneous internal papers which are being spotlighted rather than the official documents covering a different time frame which were acquired by the media and boldly displayed, with their "Secret" stamp clearly visible. These are the documents which, in my opinion, did have an adverse effect on national security.

In my most recent letter of 30 January 1974 to you, I discussed the facts and circumstances concerning the leaks of highly classified material to the press and Yeoman Radford's suspected involvement. In fairness to Yeoman Radford, I want the Committee to understand that this is

5

circumstantial evidence and does not, under military
judicial standards, establish guilt. On two occasions
I recommended orally that investigative procedures under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice be invoked in order
to establish the guilt or innocence of Yeoman Radford.
I was advised that no disciplinary proceedings would be
conducted and that Yeoman Radford would be transferred
from Washington.

Obedience, integrity, and loyalty to country are the
standards of our military services. The people of our
great country deserve nothing less than absolute adherence
to these standards from all of us who serve. The allegations
and insinuations of "spying" subvert these standards and
grossly distort the truth -- which I am confident this
Committee will establish to the satisfaction of the American
people. The trust and confidence of our people in their
military forces must not be weakened. It is absolutely
indispensable to the safety and well being of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONTENTS

I. Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee - 2/6/74.

II. Stennis letter of 1/28/74.

III. HAK reply to Stennis letter.

IV. Moorer reply to Stennis letter.

V. Summary of HAK statements to date (2/5/74) on knowledge of alleged military spying. **SECRET**

VI. A. Summary of HAK statements to date of relationship with David Young.

B. Verbatim HAK remarks on DY at Confirmation Hearings and at 1/22/74 Press Conference.

VII. Verbatim text of HAK remarks on knowledge of existence of the "Plumbers" - Confirmation Hearings and 1/22/74 Press Conference.

VIII. Sanitized text of HAK testimony before SFRC Ex. Sess. 1/29/74 - to be released.

IX. Complete transcript of HAK testimony of 1/29/74
**Classified SECRET.**

X. Recent NY Times and Washington Post coverage of "military spying" and Stennis hearings.

XI. Biographic Sketches of Senate Armed Services Committee members. **CONFIDENTIAL NODIS**

Draft Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
February 6, 1974, regarding military "spying" on the NSC.

Mr. Chairman, I am most willing to attempt to
answer any questions that you or other members of the
Committee might wish to pose. If you would permit me,
however, I would first like to make a short statement
which I hope may clarify a number of points about which
you are concerned.

On December 23, 1971 I was made aware for the first
time that highly sensitive papers were being taken from
the National Security Council in an unauthorized manner
and were being passed to the Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This discovery took place
as a result of an investigation undertaken at the
direction of John Ehrlichman into the very serious
leaks earlier that month to columnist Jack Anderson of
detailed information concerning deliberations of the
Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan
conflict.

As you may recall, beginning in mid-December 1971,
Jack Anderson published a series of columns which revealed
extremely sensitive WSAG deliberations on that conflict
and eventually Anderson published verbatim the texts
of several Top Secret Defense Department internal
memoranda which recorded in detail the course of the WSAG
discussions of December 3, 4, 6 and 8, 1971.

On December 12 or 13 John Ehrlichman telephoned me after the leak was made known to me with the message that he was conducting an investigation into the Anderson leaks, that I was not to participate in that investigation and that I would not subsequently be informed about the investigation. He did say that he might undertake an investigation of members of the NSC staff as well as checking NSC security procedures. I informed him later through General Haig that I would not tolerate an investigation of the staff, but that a check of the security procedures was not objectionable if I were given a copy of whatever report resulted.

I was not and did not expect to be further involved in any investigation of this matter, in accordance with the agreement reached in May of 1970 that Mr. Ehrlichman was thereafter to be responsible for investigating internal security aspects of national security issues, that all such reports were to go to Mr. Haldeman's office rather than to mine, and that I was not any longer to be involved.

I did later become aware that Mr. Ehrlichman's office had assigned a Department of the Air Force official to study the security procedures employed at the NSC and that a copy of his report was given to General Haig. I did not read that report on the recommendation of General Haig that nothing in it deserved my attention.

On December 12 or 13 John Ehrlichman telephoned me with the message that he was conducting an investigation into the Anderson leaks, that I was not to participate in that investigation and that I would not subsequently be informed about the investigation. He did say that he might undertake an investigation of members of the NSC staff as well as checking NSC security procedures. I informed him later through General Haig that I would not tolerate an investigation of the staff, but that a check of the security procedures was not objectionable if I were given a copy of whatever report resulted.

- 3 -

However, on December 14 Rear Admiral Welander, head of the JCS Liaison Office with the NSC, informed General Haig that it appeared that at least one of the documents leaked to Anderson had to have come from within the Liaison Office. I was away at the time and when General Haig relayed this disclosure to me I told him to send Admiral Welander to John Ehrlichman because Ehrlichman was in charge of all internal security investigations.

On December 24 at his request I went to John Ehrlichman's office where he played for me about 15 minutes of a tape recording of Admiral Welander being interviewed about his knowledge of the leak. Mr. Ehrlichman had informed me on the preceding day of the contents of the tape, namely the disclosure that someone on the JCS Liaison Office staff was apparently stealing NSC documents and conveying them in an unauthorized way back to the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was appalled that anyone would do such a thing, and amazed by it because it was such a useless, pointless act. As both Admiral Moorer and I have informed you by letter and as I wish to repeat today, in my view we had a close, effective and open working relationship and that the JCS were kept

- 4 -

fully informed of NSC matters. I have never received any
complaints from the JCS of not having adequate information.

I consulted with Admiral Moorer on December 23 about
the discovery of the unauthorized transfers of documents
and on the same day ordered that the Liaison Office be
closed. This was the only action within my discretion,
as I was told that I was not to participate in any
further investigation or possible disciplinary action,
and I did not pursue the matter further.

Although I was quite angry at the time that the
theft and transfer of documents had taken place, I did
not then and I do not now believe that what took place
deserved the creation of a public scandal. I do
not pretend to explain to you the personal motivations
which led to these foolish acts, but neither do I believe
on the basis of the information available to me that
there are any grounds for the American public to lose
confidence in the U.S. military. I admit that I have
not read or heard described the contents either of the
report made at Mr. Ehrlichman's direction, or of the
report prepared by the Department of Defense after its
own investigation, but I repeat my own feeling that we
did not face a traumatic or lasting problem here which
should be of fundamental concern to the American people.

- 5 -

Admiral Moorer and I have had and continue to have
an harmonious and fruitful working relationship. He is
kept fully informed of all NSC actions, and it was well
known to the Office of the JCS that I had directed the
NSC staff to make available information on all matters
of mutual concern to our two organizations. It simply
made no sense for anyone to order the theft of NSC
documents, virtually all of which would have been or
were passed to the JCS through normal communications
channels. I am therefore strongly inclined to believe
that no such orders were given, and that the problem
has been adequately dealt with by the closure of the
Liaison Office and the removal of those persons
immediately involved.

Thank you for this opportunity to make these
remarks. I am now willing to address any questions you
may have.

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN

STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
SAM J. CRYIN, JR., N.C.
HOWARD W. CANNON, REV.
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, N.H.
HARRY F. SYRD, JR., VA.
CAROLINE E. HUGHES, IOWA
H. NUNN, GA.

STROM THURMOND, S.C.
JOHN TOWER, TX.
PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.
DAWY Goldwater, ANZ.
WILLIAM B. SAXER, OHIO
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.

J. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 28, 1974

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, the press and the media generally have focused in great detail on the issue known as "military spying" concerning the so-called unauthorized transmission of National Security Council documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In an effort to make available to the Committee the maximum amount of information as quickly as possible, I would appreciate your responding with a written statement on this matter. Though not limited to the following questions, I would like to request that your statement include all you know both personally and officially concerning the following aspects of this matter.

a. Would you describe the authorized system for the transmission of information from the National Security Council staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its scope and method of operation. This includes the personal relationship and the extent of cooperation on both a personal and official basis.

b. Would you provide comments of what you know about the NSC material which appeared in the press December 1971 - 1972.

c. What was the nature and the extent of the NSC material which was transmitted from the NSC to the Joint Chiefs in an unauthorized manner? Over what period of time did this occur?

d. What was the relationship, if any, between the material cited in (b) above, to that cited in (c)?

In summary, the Committee would appreciate a complete statement indicating the entire period concerned, the salient facts and circumstances which have been connected with this entire matter -- including all relevant information of which you are aware in addition to the issues set forth above.

STATEMENT OF HENRY A. KISSINGER
IN RESPONSE TO LETTER OF JANUARY 28, 1974
FROM SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS

(Questions as set forth in Senator Stennis' letter
and responses thereto.)

(a) Would you describe the authorized system for the transmission of information from the National Security Council staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its scope and method of operation. This includes the personal relationship and the extent of cooperation on both a personal and official basis.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military adviser to the National Security Council, which is the principal forum through which the major issues of national security policy are brought to the President for decision. He attends all meetings of the Council, and of its sub-groups at the Deputy Secretary level (which are chaired by me as the Assistant to the President). If the Chairman is unable to attend any such meetings, the Chief of Staff of the service who has been designated as Acting Chairman, or the Assistant to the Chairman, attends. On issues for which an interdepartmental negotiating team has been assembled, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, the Chairman would be accompanied to such meetings by the JCS representative on the delegation.

A JCS representative also participates in the lower level (Assistant Secretary) Interdepartmental Groups chaired by the State Department and in all ad hoc or working groups in the NSC system, at whatever level. This includes the working groups for the Verification Panel and the Defense Program Review Committee. The JCS representative also participates in the Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, which is responsible for developing operational plans for and overseeing implementation of Presidential decisions in the national security area. I am attaching for your information a listing of the number of NSC and NSC-related meetings, by year, for the period 1969-1972 at which the JCS were represented.

In addition, I meet regularly, usually biweekly, outside the institutional framework of the NSC, with the Secretary of Defense,

- 2 -

the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence for frank and full discussion of issues of interdepartmental concern.

Copies of all National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) and related NSG documents are distributed to the Chairman of the JCS directly by the NSC Staff Secretary. JCS comments on NSG papers or on issues in the NSC system are transmitted to me as Assistant to the President through the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Among other NSC documents, the JCS regularly receives the monthly report on the status of all NSSMs prepared by the NSC Staff Secretary. This report is used by the JCS Staff to monitor JCS input into the NSC system on issues of concern to the Chairman and to the individual Chiefs of Staff.

In addition to the formal distribution system, members of the NSC staff are in close and constant communication with JCS representatives on all substantive issues of interdepartmental concern. I have instructed the NSC staff to communicate to the JCS representatives all information necessary for mutual support on national security matters. In addition, they exchange informal views both orally and in writing in the course of developing policy options for review at the sub-Cabinet level, including the Chairman of the JCS, and for onward transmission to the President.

(b) Would you provide comments of what you know about the NSC material which appeared in the press December 1971-1972.

Material which appeared in the press in December 1971 included highly classified documents, the disclosure of which constituted a serious security risk to our government. In particular, the publications adversely affected our relations with India and had other consequences of grave concern.

I do not recall the full extent of the classified material which appeared in the press nor have I endeavored to make a list of it. In the main, particularly with respect to minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group -- a body on which the JCS were represented -- I believe the documents published did not come from the NSC and were not among the documents transmitted by the NSC to the Joint Chiefs. The minutes of those meetings were prepared,

I understand, in the Department of Defense and constituted their internal Department records of the meetings in question.

(c) What was the nature and the extent of the NSC material which was transmitted from the NSC to the Joint Chiefs in an unauthorized manner? Over what period of time did this occur?

I have never received any report on the nature, extent or time over which the NSC material was transmitted in an unauthorized manner to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have not seen any report of any investigation in this matter and my direct knowledge is limited to the information I learned from listening to the part of Admiral Welander's interview discussed below.

(d) What was the relationship, if any, between the material cited in (b) above, to that cited in (c)?

I do not have the necessary information to make the analysis requested. As mentioned above, insofar as I know, none of the material published by Jack Anderson in December 1971 comprised NSC papers, or came from the files of the National Security Council. Thus, the material published by Mr. Anderson could not, to the best of my knowledge, have been a part of the material reportedly taken from the NSC in an unauthorized manner.

General Comment:

As a result of the publication of the information referred to above, an investigation was started by Mr. Ehrlichman who was in charge of internal security investigations in the White House. After that publication and while I was out of the city, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office to the National Security Council Staff, told General Haig that it appeared that the leak of at least one of the documents published had come from his office. When General Haig informed me of the Welander conversation, I told him to turn the matter over to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Sometime later Mr. Ehrlichman let me listen to a portion of a tape recording of an interview of Admiral Welander by David Young. As I recall, this interview covered not only the possible

- 2 -

Copies of all National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) and related NSC documents are distributed to the Chairman of the JCS directly by the NSC Staff Secretary. JCS comments on NSC papers or on issues in the NSC system are transmitted to me as Assistant to the President through the office of the Secretary of Defense.

- 3 -

General Comment:

sources of leaks but also unauthorized transfer of papers from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
As noted above, this interview came about as a result of General Haig sending Admiral Welander to Mr. Ehrlichman. Apart from this one interview I have no direct knowledge of the results of any investigation in this matter, nor have I seen any report of such results.

I was of course concerned by the allegation that there had been unauthorized transfers of documents from my office to the office of the JCS. Any attempt to transfer papers from my office to the JCS was pointless, since there was a full flow of information in authorized channels between the respective offices. Furthermore, Admiral Moorer was kept fully informed of all NSC actions; in addition, he and I have had many conversations on these questions over the years. Thus, the fact that someone would undertake an unauthorized transfer of such information to that office was incomprehensible to me. I believe Admiral Moorer when he said he did not focus on the precise origin of the papers because he already had all the information he needed on the subjects concerned, and that the unauthorized transfer represented overzealousness on the part of subordinates. The unauthorized transfers, of course, should not have taken place and should not have been tolerated. I have noted above that to my knowledge the unauthorized transfers had nothing to do with the leaks to the press, regardless of whether the person who made the unauthorized transfers was responsible for the leaks.

It seems to me that the unauthorized transfers do not justify a "public scandal" that could undermine public confidence in the military. However, I had no part in the decision to close any investigation or to reprimand or not to reprimand the participants. The only action within my area of jurisdiction was my decision, after consultation with Admiral Moorer, to close the Liaison Office attached to my staff.

From my point of view, I worked entirely harmoniously with Admiral Moorer, we had a full exchange of information on NSC matters, and I had and have complete confidence in him. I have never had any reason to consider Admiral Moorer as anything but a personal friend, and I believe he reciprocates my feelings.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

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30 January 1974

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Your letter of 28 January pertaining to recent press and media reports dealing with allegations of "Military Spying" and the so-called unauthorized transmission of NSC documents have been received. I am pleased to respond to your request that I set out my knowledge of the matter. I would emphasize, however, that I have never been provided or seen any investigative report pertaining to these matters, although apparently, simultaneous investigations were conducted in the Pentagon and the White House. I would, therefore, note that the following is reconstructed from memory and informal discussions with others associated with the case which arose over two years ago.

First, I wish to record a few general observations which I consider crucial to the issue. Thereafter, your specific inquiries will be addressed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and codified in 10 United States Code, Section 141, "The principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." The statutory language, of course, does not fully describe the close, harmonious relationship which has--and continues to--exist between the President, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the NSC Staff on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as represented by the Chairman, on the other. The exchange of data, facts, opinions, and views was--and is--free, continuous, and involves all matters of mutual concern. I am privy to all matters and information in areas where close cooperation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council is required. Dr. KISSINGER issued instructions to his Staff ensuring that this information is made available to me.

Turning now to your specific inquiries:

a. Transmission of information between the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council Staff.

The means and methods of transmitting information between the two organizations are virtually unlimited. They include

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secure and unsecure voice, telecommunications, LDX, courier and direct personal contact. The level of interface between the NSC and the JCS runs from clerk-to-clerk in exchange of routine scheduling information and transmittal of documents for comment or concurrence through staff officer-to-staff officer discussion of substantive issues, to personal contact between the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As early as 25 January 1969, Doctor KISSINGER announced his procedures for support and cooperation which established two essential ingredients; first, that the Chairman, JCS, would be routinely furnished copies of all National Security Council documents; and, second, that there would be direct access between the President (and the NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to facilitate this exchange of information, a Liaison Office was established in 1950. "The Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for National Security Affairs" was the official title of the liaison officer from the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the NSC Staff. In 1962 the liaison officer established facilities in the Executive Office Building. When I became CJCS, RADM ROBINSON held this position. YN RADFORD was assigned as his clerical assistant in September, 1970. Subsequently, RADM WELANDER routinely replaced RADM ROBINSON. The essential function of the office was the exchange of information, recommendations, views, and decisions pertaining to the JCS and NSC activities. This liaison officer had direct access to Dr. KISSINGER and was often tasked directly by him. The function of the office included assistance in preparation of memoranda and staff papers for consideration by the President and the NSC. The incumbent served in many respects and was designated a senior member of the NSC Staff. He regularly participated in Staff conferences and discussions in preparation for meetings. The JCS, represented by the Chairman, were--and remain on--every NSC Committee of any international significance. It was my policy--and my entire Staff was so instructed--to ensure that this Liaison Office was informed of all matters relating to the activities of the JCS knowledge of which was required by the NSC Staff.

The personal relationship between Dr. KISSINGER and CJCS is of great importance in this context. Our relationship was--and is--excellent. As a matter of fact, aside from the continuous flow of staff papers and information, we frequently had--and continue to have--expanded personal discussions by telephone, or in his office, on key matters. I never had the feeling of isolation from information. Dr. KISSINGER and I

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continue to have almost weekly discussions at a luncheon-type
arrangement. I had direct access to the President and fre-
quently met with him, aside from the formal meetings of the
NSC and budget matters, on such military activities as air
operations and cross-border operations in Cambodia, the 1971
incursion into Laos and the air campaign into Norther Vietnam,
including the Mining of Haiphong Harbor in May, 1972 and the
attacks on military targets in the Hanoi Area in December, 1972.
Discussions with Dr. KISSINGER included arrangements and
advance preparations for all his trips to the Peoples Republic
of China, including the first one, and discussions of SALT
matters, including contact from Moscow during the June 1972
Summit.

With regard to information pertaining to matters under
discussion within the NSC system, in reality, my problem--if
I had one--was sifting, synthesizing, and analyzing the flow
of information, data, and opinion available. In the event I
felt the need for any information-specific or general--I
simply called Dr. KISSINGER, who was immediately forthcoming.
This remains the case today.

b. The material which appeared in the press late 1971-
early 1972.

Beginning in the middle of December, 1971 and running
through January, 1972 "The Washington Merry-go-Round" a
syndicated column written by Mr. Jack ANDERSON published, with
particular reference to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, a series
of columns demonstrating clearly a source with access to highly
classified information reflecting on the functions of the
National Security Council system. These documents included
memoranda for the record (MFRs) of Washington Special Action
Group (WSAG) Meetings on 3, 4, 6, and 8 December, 1971, clas-
sified "Top Secret" and originating in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (ISA) or the Office of the Chairman, JCS. These MFRs
were prepared by Staff officers in attendance at the WSAG
meetings. In addition, there were classified cables and intel-
ligence reports pertaining to the topics under discussions at
these meetings. Subsequently, the full MFRs were published by
The Washington Post and other newspapers.

The 14 December 1971 article was of particular note. It
alluded to "guided missile destroyers, PARSONS, DECATUR, and
Tartar SAM." A Memorandum from RADM WELANDER to GEN HAIG,
which was typed by YN RADFORD and hand-carried by RADM WELANDER
to GEN HAIG, had referred to "PARSONS, DECATUR, Tartar SAM
Destroyers" (referring to their surface-to-air armaments and not
to the name of a ship). This memorandum was available only to
RADM WELANDER, GEN HAIG and YN RADFORD. Upon reading this
column, RADM WELANDER immediately recognized the relationship
between his memorandum and the misconstruction of the expression,

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and reported his suspicions to GEN HAIG and me. I understand GEN HAIG, on instructions from Dr. KISSINGER, informed Mr. EURLICHMAN's office. I immediately advised SECDEF LAIRD and recommended institution of investigative proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). I would emphasize that it was RADM WELANDER--my Liaison Officer--who discovered the probable source of the leak and immediately reported the matter to his superiors, both at the White House and here in the Pentagon.

Subsequent examination by RADM WELANDER and my administrative officer of the entire series of articles published by Mr. ANDERSON indicated the following:

(1) The series of articles published extracts from all MFRs of WSAG meetings for the period 3-8 December except the ISA MFR of the 6 December WSAG Meeting. RADM WELANDER had withdrawn this MFR from the file and returned it directly to my administrative officer. It was not available to YN RADFORD. It, alone, in the series of MFRs, was not published by Mr. ANDERSON.

(2) In the process of decided on a course of action with regard to a Naval Contingency Force, RADM WELANDER dictated a memorandum to YN RADFORD "brainstorming" optional courses of action--which included proposed public leaks in Djakarta, Manila, and Singapore. Only one copy of this "think piece" was made. It was never used, since RADM WELANDER was unable to discuss the matter with GEN HAIG prior to a decision being made. Only RADM WELANDER and YN RADFORD had access to the paper. Subsequently, Mr. ANDERSON referred to leaks in the same three capitals which, in fact, never occurred.

(3) Subsequent to YN RADFORD's being denied access to documents, no ANDERSON column appeared dealing with these matters based upon documents dated later than 15 December 1971--the date on which YN RADFORD was denied further access.

(4) It was also reported that YN RADFORD had been stationed in India and had developed close relationships with Indian nationals and had an interest in US-Indian relations. We knew Mr. ANDERSON and, on occasion, met with him--including having dinner with him on 12 December 1971.

YN RADFORD, in the routine performance of his duties, had direct access to all the documents published by Mr. ANDERSON. These documents were distributed in the normal and regular administrative process with the

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exception of the two memoranda written by RADM WELANDER.

c. The nature and extent of the so-called unauthorized transmittal of NSC materials to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On occasion, YN RADFORD accompanied senior NSC Staff personnel on various trips. For example, GEN HAIG requested that YN RADFORD be assigned to assist Dr. KISSINGER on his July, 1971 trip to Asia. RADM WELANDER resisted due to his newness in the job and YN RADFORD's pending leave request. GEN HAIG insisted and YN RADFORD was so assigned. Upon his return. YN RADFORD provided to RADM WELANDER a collection of miscellaneous staff papers, roughs, and questionnaires. After screening these papers, RADM WELANDER hand-delivered some of the working papers to my office, noting that YN RADFORD had retained them incident to his clerical duties on the trip. To the best of my memory, based upon a very brief exposure, these papers dealt primarily with the military and political situation and discussions taking place during the trip--matters with which I was already familiar. These papers did not stimulate close attention by me because they contained no new information. I had already received several messages from the various embassies involved, as well as reports from the military authorities in the field, on the progress of the trip. In addition, on 16 July, five days before the receipt of the RADFORD papers, I spent the entire day in San Clemente with the President and Dr. KISSINGER discussing the details of the trip. I did not scrutinize the papers as to their precise contents or origin but handed them back to RADM WELANDER.

Subsequently, in September 1971, at GEN HAIG's request, YN RADFORD was again assigned to accompany GEN HAIG to Southeast Asia. I had received reports pertaining to this trip from ADM MC CAIN (CINCPAC) and GEN ABRAMS (COMUSMACV). I had been informed by GEN HAIG not only about the trip, but also in detail on other matters. Subsequently, RADM WELANDER provided me with some miscellaneous papers YN RADFORD had prepared during the trip. These papers had been overtaken by events, and again, I did not scrutinize them as to their content or precise origin. I want to stress that these papers were provided me by a Staff officer in a routine manner. They were treated by me in the same manner that I would treat any other Staff officer's report on a matter upon which I was already fully informed. Such papers are only momentarily scanned for subject matter--not precise origin or method of transmission.

These are the only instances, to the best of my knowledge and belief, where information acquired in a manner which, in retrospect, might be labeled "unauthorized," was brought to my attention. No one has questioned my access to the information

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itself, and I don't believe anyone can rightfully do so. I
might add that RADM ROBINSON, while assigned to the NSC Staff,
briefed me on NSC activities as it was his duty. I presume
that the acquisition of this information had been normal and
regular in every instance.

By statute, my responsibility is limited to operational
matters and the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. I
have no authority in the field of discipline or military
justice. Recognizing this fact, when I was advised of these
matters, I consulted with the Chief of Naval Operations concern-
ing my desire to institute proceedings under the UCMJ. Upon
receipt of his concurrence, I so recommended to the SECDEF and
to the DOD General Counsel. I was, however, advised that no
disciplinary proceedings were to be conducted and that it had
been decided by the civilian leadership that YN RADFORD was to
be immediately transferred. I accepted these orders and
directed my staff to implement them without delay. I repeat--
I have never been provided, or read, any of the many White
House and DOD investigative reports allegedly associated with
this matter.

When I was advised by Mr. BUZHARDT, the DOD General Counsel, that YN RADFORD testified during the Defense Investigative Service inquiry that he had not only been retaining papers in the course of his clerical duties but, also, had been actively collecting them in a clearly unauthorized manner, I directed that any such papers which might be in the Liaison Office files be returned to the NSC Staff. Acting on those instructions, all such papers were then returned.

### d. The relationship between the matter published in the media and the allegations of unauthorized information.

There is no substantive relationship between the leaks of official documents which appeared in the media and the miscellaneous papers retained by YN RADFORD in the course of his clerical duties several months before the leaks to the press. None of the papers discussed, in reply to your question "C," appeared in the press. It was the leaks of official documents covering the period 3-15 December 1971 which were subsequently widely published in the news media that were detrimental to national policy.

Several additional factors seem worthy of mention at this time. In retrospect, one could argue that, perhaps, I should have been more alert in following up on the manner in which the information provided by RADM WELANDER was acquired. However, since the same information was freely flowing from

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