March 6, 1963

Mr. Paul E. Sigmund
58 Stanworth Lane
Princeton, N. J.

Dear Paul:

I am extremely sorry not to have thanked you before this for
the thoughtful note you sent me on the eve of your departure for
Princeton, and for the various reprints which you included. I
also appreciate your sending me a copy of the book on the emerging
nations; this is a very interesting collection of articles, and I
am delighted to have it. I too remember our conversations with
great warmth, and I hope we will stay in touch.

It has been suggested by Mr. Ismail Mahomed of Johannesburg
that you might be willing to write a letter of recommendation to
support his application to the 1963 International Seminar. As you
probably know, the International Seminar is a program designed for
individuals who are achieving eminence in some field of endeavor
and who wish to broaden themselves through contact with colleagues
from other countries; it is not for students interested in a course
of instruction. Since we will be selecting the finalists within
the next few weeks, I would greatly appreciate your sending this
letter as soon as possible. Any recommendation from you will, of
course, weigh most heavily when we make the final decisions about
candidates.

I will look forward to hearing from you soon.

With kind regards, and every good wish.

Henry V. Kissingen

Sincerely yours,

candidates. I weigh most heavily when we make the final decisions about letter as soon as possible. And recommendation from you will, of the next few weeks, I would greatly appreciate. You sending this of instruction. Since we will be selecting the candidates within from other countries; it is not for students interested in a candidate and who wish to broaden themselves through contact with colleagues individuals who are achieving excellence in some field of endeavor properly know. The International Seminar is a program designed for support his application to the 1963 International Seminar. As you that you might be willing to write a letter of recommendation to It has been anguished by Mr. Ismael Mohamed of Johannesburg

Great warmth, and I hope we will stay in touch. I am delighted to have it. I too remember our conversations with national; this is a very interesting collection of articles, and I also appreciate your sending me a copy of the book on the emerging Princeton, and for the various reprints which you included. I the thoughtful note you sent me on the eve of your departure for I am extremely sorry not to have thanked you before this for

Dear Paul:

Princeton, N. J.
28 Stanworth Lane
Mr. Paul E. Stigum

March 9, 1963

June 26, 1965

Mr. and Mrs. Ignacio Silone
Via Villa Ricotti 36
Rome, Italy

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Silone:

I have just returned to the United
States and I would like to tell you how
much I enjoyed seeing you in Rome.

It was too bad that the party was
so large that we really didn't have an
opportunity to talk. However, I plan to
take advantage of Mrs. Silone's suggestion
and will try to arrange a more quiet meeting
when I am next in Italy.

Best regards.

Henry V. Kieزلper

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

when I am next in Italy.
and will try to arrange a more quiet meeting
take advantage of Mrs. Silone's suggestion
opportunity to talk. However, I plan to
so large that we really didn't have an
It was too bad that the party was

much I enjoyed seeing you in Rome.
States and I would like to tell you how
I have just returned to the United

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Silone:

Rome, Italy
Via Ailia Ricotti 36
Mr. and Mrs. Ignazio Silone

June 26, 1962

February 19, 1962

Mr. Aryeh Simon
Palmachstr. 121
Beer-Sheba, Israel

Dear Mr. Simon:

I have just returned to this country,
and wanted to tell you what a nice surprise it
was to see you in Kiriatgat. I was very much
impressed by what you are doing and by the
spirit of the students and teachers in the
schools we visited.

I was sorry that we did not have more
time to spend with you, and hope our paths will
cross again soon.

With kind regards and many thanks.

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

when I am next in Italy.
and will try to arrange a more quiet meeting
take advantage of Mrs. Stlone's suggestion
opportunity to talk. However, I plan to
so large that we really didn't have an
It was too bad that the party was
much I enjoyed seeing you in Rome.

States and I would like to tell you how
I have just returned to the United
States and I would like to tell you how

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Stlone:

Rome, Italy
Via Ailia Ricotti 30
Mr. and Mrs. Ignacio Stlone

June 26, 1962

Henry V. Klaasinger

With kind regards.

on seeing you then.
College in Jerusalem. I am counting
to give some lectures at the Defence
I will be in Israel next June

me and I appreciate it very much.
It was thoughtful of you to write to
you even on occasions as said as this.
It is always good to hear from

My dear Mr. Simon:

Beer-Shepa' Israel
Palmachstr. 131
Mr. Vryeh Simon

December 13, 1963

22 December 1966

Dear Mr. Simon:

Thank you for your nice note of
December 7th.

I was distressed to learn that you
had been in Boston without my seeing you. I
do not believe I ever received the message
that you had called.

You can be sure that I would not
come to Israel without seeing you.

Best regards.

Mr. Aryeh Simon
Ben-Shemen Youth Village
Ben-Shemen Near Lod
Israel

The Development of the Totalitarian Regime in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany, by Helmut R. Wagner (Ph.D.; Assistant Professor of Sociology, Bucknell University). 1310 pages in typescript

As is evident from its title, and from its subtitle - "Political, Economic, Juridical, Social Trends and Tendencies, with Special Consideration of the Intra-Party Development of the Socialist Unity Party" - this work offers a comprehensive outline of the gradual transformation of an allegedly democratic regime into a totalitarian Soviet satellite. In the unique situation in Germany after the defeat, the process of Sovietization was carried out gradually, and hence its aspects and stratagems can be given detailed study.

Six phases of this development have been distinguished:

1) the "anti-fascist democratic" period, from the spring of 1945 to the summer of 1946, which brought all democratic elements into the service of the occupation authorities and integrated the strong social-democratic forces into the Socialist Unity Party;

2) the period from the summer of 1946 to the summer of 1948, when the Soviet-sponsored SED was gradually established in all essential social fields;

3) the period from the summer of 1948 to the fall of 1949, during which, in the wake of the rupture of Russian-American relations, the preconditions were established for an extension of the planned economy;

4) from the fall of 1949 to the spring of 1952, when a systematic Sovietization of the newly installed German Democratic Republic was carried out, with planning extended over all fields of social activities;

5) the year following the spring of 1952, when the forced establishment of totalitarian "socialism" led to the dangerous crisis of 1953;

6) the three years following the late spring of 1953, during which a short period of retreat in the name of the "new course" led to restabilization and continuation of the course of 1952, though along more cautious lines.

These six phases serve as framework for an analysis of all aspects of development in East Germany during the postwar decade: economic (industrial, agricultural, trade unions); political (state and party apparatus); cultural (education, public opinion, arts and sciences).

#

November 10, 1961

Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
49 Irving Street
Apartment 11
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Simons:

I appreciate your letter of October 18th and am sorry that I have not had the chance to reply before this. There is no disagreement between us about possible tendencies in Germany. My contention is that the way to prevent them from developing is to integrate Germany with the West. Some others seem to believe that the way to do this is to discriminate against Germany even before these tendencies develop every far. I believe the latter course is bound to bring of what it seeks to avoid, even though both courses may fail.

As for Kuby, I do not consider him an unbiassed observer of the German scene.

In short, the problem you mention clearly exists, and you (and) I have simply decided to emphasize different remedies.

Thank you again for your thoughtful letter.

[10]

49 Irving St., Apt. 11

Cambridge, Mass.

18 October 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am the kid who most surely created an impression of pitifully uninformed cockiness in his questions on the nature of the German regime and on Russian motives in the present crisis at your Quincy House Forum with Professors Hughes and Fisher. I am writing now first in the hope of correcting an impression very much the result of timidity in public, but much more importantly out of an agonized interest in German destinies and ours, which depend on them. I feel that I gave a wrong and incomplete impression of both my views and my questions, and would appreciate more than you know any comments you might feel it worth your time and effort to make.

My credentials are slight but, I feel, bulky enough to allow me to escape the charge of total ignorance which one of your questions to me implied. I am a fourth year graduate student in modern European history who has at times spoken German well enough to pass for French, Belgian or Austrian but more rarely for American. I returned last month from a year in Vienna which saw me on several occasions in Germany, among them at Bonn with Embassy people shortly before your May visit and in Wiesbaden with DFU people during the heat of the August campaign, when I attended a GDP rally. My readings, aside from the Süddeutsche and the Presse, have been largely Tucholsky, Erich Kuby and the small, new Ich lebe in der Bundesrepublik, so you see the tendency. Extensive hitchhiking has supplemented the great newspapers for my information on moderate opinion. Admittedly all this is scant and, especially since my closest friends are of the type which goes into the DFU, tendencious; still I feel that the questions which I pose myself are real ones, which you with your great knowledge and perspective and your different outlook could help me answer better, for instance, than Dr. Hughes, whose approach and prejudices would more nearly conform to mine.

I subscribe wholeheartedly to your respect and gratitude for Dr. Adenauer's attempts, from whatever personal motives, to bring West Germany into a more western tradition in such a way that after his death her destinies would no longer rest with personalities like Dr. Mende or Dr. Strauß but on a popular and rooted appreciation of and love for that whole complex of attitudes and reactions and ways of conceiving the world which defines democracy. I found much of Kurt Tucholsky applicable in Bonn's Germany, I am unconvinced that he has succeeded, or, because he only influences and does not direct a cultural change of this magnitude, that such a change has taken place. I am very conscious of the fact that I never knew the old Germany and know in a real sense little of the new, but from my worm's-eye view it seems that the price which has been paid in the preservation of the old for what presumably has been achieved bids fair, if it continues to be paid with the same willingness and at the same rate, to destroy what few tender democratic roots exist. The tendency to refuse responsibility, to respect any authority to a point where disinclination implies revolt or a total

flight into a private or dream world, seems as powerful as ever, and
nothing that I could see in the new Germany resists it, certainly
nothing in the parties, all the less then in the existence of a
consciousness of a problem of educational reform or of the problems
of an intellectual élite withdrawn from the main currents of social
evolution into a baleful, insolent and totally ineffective eddy,
épatant le bourgeois and carping against the Chancellor.

You said that you had been against the rearmament, the military
integration into NATO and now the provision of the Bundeswehr with
(eventually) nuclear weapons, against these policies which have in
a real way discouraged the evolution which all westerners think
desirable and which I think necessary as well, first of all for our
own ultimate safety. I believe in the Nazi generals as little as I
believe in the bloodthirsty generals in the Pentagon, or for that
matter in the popular Ludendorff-Seeckt-Hitler image of Dr. Strauß.
But it seems clear to me that German rearmament and the effect of the
public relations policy which Dr. Strauß and with him the West German
Government feels obliged to implement at the very least do nothing to
resist, to change, those German attitudes and feelings which are at
the very least not democratic. You say, and you are certainly better
able than I to evaluate Russian motives, that Khrustschev in the present
crisis wishes to separate Germany from the West by provoking a right-
nationalist régime, that to give West Germans the impression that we
are selling or are willing to sell them down the river on Berlin would
in fact provoke a turn to such a régime. Beyond the Berlin crisis, I
gathered (perhaps wrongly) from your remarks that for the same reason
we can never accede to any measure tending toward German disarmament
or a demilitarization of Germany, or of the Germanies. That we cannot
throw the woman of ill-repute whom we perhaps foolishly married ten
years ago out now. But I ask - and here again I hope I do not seem
cocky because I ask rhetorical questions, for this year I met and fell
in love with another Germany, the famous other Germany for which Kurt
Tucholsky killed himself and which is *not* Bonn's Germany - I ask what
we should do if this woman threatens to ply her trade again, or if we
find she has been plying it all along: must we die for her if there is
no hope of reforming her? The metaphor is bad, as a metaphor; my real
question is, where do we go from here, after Berlin, if, as it seems to
me, Germany, West Germany, evolves ineluctably - since the price paid
to prevent it's happening in the immediate is to do nothing to prevent
(to the very limited extent we can prevent at all at this late date)
to prevent it's happening in a more distant but perhaps not unforeseeable
future - toward just the sort of right-nationalist government which would
make any Central European settlement, even the present one, and
consequently any world settlement breathtakingly unstable? One need not
foresee an economic crisis (or hope for it, as many in the DFW seem to),
or a Naziism dead forever, one need only foresee (or see) a revamped
Wilhelminianism, in all the senses of that word but with all its
consequences.

Again please accept my apologies for what was certainly not intended
presumptuousness, and be assured of my highest respect, of my desire for
your counsel and of my sincerity in asking it.

October 25, 1963

Mr. P.R. Sinai
316 West 19th Street
New York 11, New York

Dear Mr. Sinai:

In Mr. Kissinger's absence
I am answering you letter to him of
October 16th.

I am sure he would very much
like to see you so would you call
this office when you arrive in the
area, and I will try to arrange an
appointment for you.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES
VOLUME XXIV, NUMBER 3, 1968

# Man and World Politics:
The Psycho-Cultural Interface*

J. David Singer

University of Michigan

In every discipline, the would-be theorizer must eventually come to grips with the age-old issue of the parts-versus-the-whole, or the components-versus-the-system. This issue divides, in turn, into two fairly distinguishable subissues. First, what is the relative importance of each for explanatory purposes? Can we develop a satisfactory general theory without any regard for the parts, the particles the particular? Is inclusion of them desirable, necessary, sufficient? How much attention can we pay to micro-level entities and phenomena without invading an unfamiliar discipline, without becoming extreme reductionists? These questions cannot, of course, be answered in even the most tentative fashion until we devise an acceptable solution to the second subissue: what sort of conceptual scheme permits us to embrace parts as well as whole, or allows us to explicitly ignore one or the other? Can we develop a paradigm which gets at the interplay between micro- and macro-level phenomena? How is the interface between them best formulated and described?

For the social scientist, the issue—in one way or another—is that of relating the individual to all those social groups of which he is a

*The organization of this paper and the development of its argument have benefited from the comments and criticism of Fred I. Greenstein, Karl W. Deutsch, Guy E. Swanson, Harry Gollob and Michael Wallace; the final revision is, of course, my responsibility and not theirs.

127

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J. DAVID SINGER

member, as well as understanding the relationship between the smaller of these groups and the larger. In sociology and psychology, the hybrid discipline of social psychology has largely emerged in response to this set of questions. In anthropology, the personality-and-culture approach represented a serious, if not fully successful, effort to cope with the matter (Cohen, 1961; Hsu, 1961; Kluckhohn and Murray, 1953). In economics, the impression is that all but a handful of brave, but nonempirical, theorists have preferred to ignore the problem for the present, with the consumer, the firm and the market generally serving to identify the separate fields of interest. In political science, it has indeed been a traditional preoccupation, with man-versus-the-state and individual freedom-versus-public order very much on our minds. But as we have shifted from prescientific to more rigorous methodologies, we seem to have suffered from the same sorts of separatist tendencies as the economists, even to the extent that the philosophical issues in the discipline have been defined in so irrelevant a fashion as that of the "behaviorists" (usually at the individual level) versus the "institutionalists".

In the world politics field, the picture is much the same. Some of us concentrate on individuals (or at least their attitudes and opinions) and others concentrate on the foreign policies of the nations, with a smaller third group focussing upon the international system.¹ Even the psychologists and sociologists who have lately ventured into the world politics field, despite their many valuable and promising contributions, have tended to shy away from any systematic effort to integrate psychological and societal phenomena.²

## Rejoining Men with Their Political System

In order to get on with theory building and hypothesis testing it is necessary to bring the parts and the whole together, but in a more rigorous fashion than has been evident in the past. This need for rejoining men and their political systems is essential for at least two reasons. First, without paradigms that embrace both the micro- and macro-levels, we cannot advance very far in answering the question: how much latitude do individual citizens and decision making elites

¹Among those who have concerned themselves with the micro-macro issue, either explicitly or implicitly, there seems to be the familiar division into two schools of thought; one might be called the ecological determinist school, exemplified in the thoughtful analysis developed by Waltz (1959), and the other might be called the individual autonomy viewpoint. Among the handful of explicit but pre-operational efforts to synthesize these viewpoints are Sprout and Sprout (1965), Wolfers (1959), and Singer (1961).

²Two exceptions come to mind. One is an early article by Angell (1955) and the other is the recent anthology edited by Kelman (1965), especially his own opening and closing chapters. See also Stratton (1929), Murphy (1945), and Klineberg (1964).

THE PSYCHO-CULTURAL INTERFACE

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enjoy in world politics? Or to put it another way, what is the relative potency of men vis-a-vis their institutions?³ Second, we can seldom get very far in answering more specific theoretical and policy questions if we work with paradigms that leave out either the individual or the larger environment. By definition, any paradigm which ignores one or the other remains woefully incomplete.⁴

While the behavior of men or of social systems may be *described*, and perhaps even *predicted*, without recourse to such variables, no satisfactory *explanation* is possible until we understand the psycho-logical link which joins man to his sociopolitical environment, and through which each impinges on the other. In the absence of a judicious and well-balanced conceptual scheme, moreover, we will continue to suffer from two extremes of misinterpretation. On the one hand, there is the traditional view which sees individuals—be they members of an elite or of a mass public—as more or less irrelevant to an understanding of world politics. On the other, there is the tendency to anthropomorphize and to describe nations in such personal terms as aggressive, intro-punitive, sadistic, narcissistic, ego-defensive and the like. Closely related to this is the tendency to assume that any character trait which is widely distributed within the population provides a sufficient basis for understanding that nation's foreign policies.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the interface between individual man and the larger societal environment, from a world politics point of view, and at the same time avoid both types of pitfall. My intent is to do this via a concentration on those variables which join man to that environment: psychological variables. Given the centrality of this problem to any potential theory of world politics, and the relative inattention to it to date, my hope here is to address it in a fashion which may clarify some of the conceptual problems and at the same time increase our capacity to move toward such theory in a more operational and data-based fashion. With these objectives in mind, let me first outline a general taxonomy of world politics which hopefully is not only quite susceptible to operational treatment, but is also neutral regarding the inclusion of variables which would bias it toward either the individual autonomy or ecological determinist point of view.

³An important study on this issue is Rosenau's research into the relative potency of role constraints versus "personal preference" in the foreign policy behavior of U.S. Senators in the Acheson and Dulles eras (1968).

⁴I am certainly not urging that all research must come to a halt until we have solved these problems, or that inquiries which sidestep them are of no value. I am merely urging that anything approximating a coherent and complete theory must ultimately be sufficiently molecular to embrace the behavior of men and sufficiently molar to embrace their environment.

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J. DAVID SINGER

What is offered here is not a theory, but a taxonomy within which a range of theories might be developed. Moreover, it is only a static taxonomy, since space limitations preclude any attention to the dynamic interaction of the variables which are discussed. That is, all I can hope to do in this paper is describe certain components of the "global machine" in a state of rest; in a forthcoming study, I hope to describe what occurs when they are combined with other components and the entire apparatus is set in motion. As a further concession to spatial limitations, I summarize in only the briefest fashion those nonpsychological variables, which, while essential to the completeness of the scheme, have already been elaborated elsewhere (Singer, 1968).

## A General Framework

In addition to the above specific requirements for any taxonomy which is addressed to the individual-versus-society issue, a framework for the understanding of global politics must also satisfy at least four other criteria: first, it must embrace both institutional and behavioral classes of variables; second, it must be a developmental scheme in the sense that it can handle a wide range of historical periods in the evolution of the global system; third, it must be sufficiently a-theoretical (or multi-theoretical) to permit the sort of integration and synthesis most appropriate to the present state of our discipline; and fourth, it must be stated in terms that permit operational definition and measurement. Elsewhere, I hope to spell out a fairly complete scheme (Singer, 1968) but here let me merely sketch in the outlines of that framework, and indicate that it relies heavily upon a general systems approach.⁵

## Entities and Their Attributes

Whereas most laymen and most foreign policy practitioners tend to organize their ideas on world politics around a variety of social entities, many social scientists increasingly tend to build their schemes around *roles* and *relationships*.⁶ In my judgment, this rep-

⁵That approach is best exemplified in the articles found in the Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, published annually since 1956, and the most integrated single effort is James Miller's forthcoming *Living Systems* (1968). In my judgment we have not yet developed a general systems theory; hence the word "approach".

⁶Perhaps most instrumental in this movement is Talcott Parsons, whose theoretical views are synthesized for a political science audience in Mitchell (1967). For those who think I misinterpret Parsons, there is this quote: "the unit of a partial social system is a role, and not the individual . . . . A social system is a behavioral system. It is an organized set of behaviors of persons interacting with each other: a pattern of roles. The roles are the units of a social system" Grinker, (1956, 328). Two compelling discussions from the entity-oriented viewpoint are Cattell (1955) and Campbell (1958), both of which are reprinted in Singer (1965).

THE PSYCHO-CULTURAL INTERFACE

131

resents a regressive step, moving us away from conceptual clarity and operational measurement with no trade-off in the form of enhanced explanatory power. To the contrary, by subdividing an entity's roles into those appropriate to the economy, the polity or the society, we reduce the probability of ever seeing the entity in anything approximating its entirety. By focussing on only one portion of the relationships of these multipurpose entities, how can we expect to describe and understand their behavior in that isolated role, no less in their other roles? While many of the notions in common use are indeed theoretically misleading and scientifically non-operational, a fair number may easily be refined and salvaged; therefore, the burden of proof ought to be on those who would reject the more familiar concepts and intellectual frameworks.

Thus, let me begin by specifying the classes or levels of entity around which the present paridigm is organized. These are: (a) national states; (b) such subnational entities as: political parties, pressure groups (latent as well as manifest), labor and professional associations, and family, tribal, religious and ethnic groups; and (c) such extranational entities as associations of the above sorts of sub-national groups, international intergovernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations.

Once the social entities are specified—and the paridigm permits selection of those most appropriate to a given researcher's theoretical interests—we find that all relevant entities may be identified, measured and compared according to three sets of attributes. First, there are the obvious *physical* attributes, including elements of geography, demography and technology; for the purposes of this paper, no further elaboration of these attributes is necessary. The second set of attributes falls into the *structural* class, and may be conventionally (if not readily) divided into the formal and the informal, or better still, placed on a formal-informal continuum. Toward the formal end are those attributes based on observation and description of what political scientists usually refer to as institutions, and would include such phenomena as the types and powers of legitimate political and economic institutions handling legislative, administrative, judicial, banking, commercial-industrial regulation, social welfare, military, information control and related functions. Toward the informal end are those structural attributes based on the observation of: urban-rural distribution; social mobility, kinship and marriage patterns; citizen access to and influence over the decision-making process: size, centralization and scope of political parties and other unofficial or quasiofficial associations (including pressure groups); number, power and role of religious, ethnic and linguistic groupings and the like. Also relevant as aspects of informal structure might be the extent of

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J. DAVID SINGER

pluralistic cross-cutting ties, and the general coalition configurations which develop among the system's many component subsystems.

The final attributes are what might be called the *cultural* ones; being central to this paper, they will be developed in more detail in later sections. Here, let me merely point out that I use culture in a much narrower sense than do those anthropologists who permit it to embrace everything from belief in an after-life to technological artifacts, often including social structure as well. The usage here is similar to that found in some of the recent comparative politics literature (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965; Banks and Textor, 1963). Note further that these cultural attributes are all strictly nonbehavioral, or more accurately, both postbehavioral and prebehavioral in the sequential or causal sense. We will return to them in due course.

## Relationships Among Entities

Before moving from the identification of entities and their attributes to their behavior and interaction, an intermediate set of variables needs to be delineated. Reference is to the relationships that exist between and among our relevant entities, and in addition to describing some illustrative types of relationships it is necessary to clarify two definitional points. First, relationships exist not only among entities at the *same* level of analysis (i.e., among pressure groups, among nations, among international organizations) but also among those at *different* levels of analysis. Second, relationships are of two types. One type deals with the *similarity* or dissimilarity of attributes while the other deals with degrees of *interdependence* and connectedness. On the similarity side, we first decide on the attributes which interest us, next measure or scale each entity's rank or interval score on that attribute dimension, and then compute the discrepancy or "distance" between the two. And while such distances are usually measured on only one attribute dimension at a time, it is quite feasible to locate nations or other entities within a certain conceptual space on the basis of multidimensional distances, as in Rummel (1965). On the interdependence side, we are again concerned with the concept of closeness and distance, but in terms of interdependence, interpenetration, connectedness, dominance and the like. Needless to say, there is no necessary correlation between the similarity and the interdependence of a given pair of entities.

## Behavior and Interaction Among Entities

A final aspect of our taxonomy is the distinction between relationship (in the sense of interdependence) and *interaction*. In

THE PSYCHO-CULTURAL INTERFACE

133

brief, whenever a nation⁷ behaves vis-a-vis another nation (or any other entity) and the second nation responds to that behavior, we may speak of an interaction. Of course, we require evidence that the two behavioral events or acts are somehow linked causally if we are to identify them as an interaction; if not, we merely have two isolated acts. When we observe a fairly long series of causally connected acts and responses, we may speak of an interaction sequence.

It should be noted, then, that two or more entities may display both relationships and interactions, and despite the tendency in our literature to use relationship and interaction interchangeably, it seems imperative to differentiate between an essentially static pairwise phenomenon and a highly dynamic one. To put it differently, relationships change slowly and are described in highly spatial terms, whereas interactions occur in a brief interval and are highly temporal in nature. Obviously, relationships affect interactions, and vice versa, and are causally quite connected; one often *observes* a sequence of interactions in order to infer a relationship. Thus, after observing a large number of behavioral events and interactions, such as the exchange of many threatening diplomatic messages, we may infer the existence of a hostile relationship.

Conversely, one may often predict an interaction sequence or a single behavioral event on the basis of a recognized relationship. For example, if we infer a relationship such as high economic interdependence, we may predict a continuing succession of direct or indirect cargo shipments between the two nations under consideration. But since all these export and import actions happen to leave a relatively reliable trace, via standard bookkeeping procedures, it is more efficient to measure the economic interdependence between these entities by examining periodic records of aggregate shipments and transfers; we need not dispatch research assistants to all the ports of entry and departure. On the other hand, there are a great many relationships which can be inferred only by direct observation of interaction sequences, especially interactions between individuals and between less formal social entities. And there are, likewise, many interactions which cannot be readily observed—especially in diplomacy— and these must be inferred by observing changes in relationship.

## Psychological Attributes: The Individual Level

Given this fairly general framework, the next step in articulating the role of psychological variables in world politics is to direct our

⁷To keep an already complex paper somewhat simpler, I will often refer only to national entities from now on, but it is understood that the reference could always be to subnational and extranational ones as well.

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J. DAVID SINGER

attention to the individual level of analysis and to certain psychologi-
cal attributes of the single human being, both normal and deviant.
My effort here will be to impose some order on a bewildering melange
of constructs such that the political scientist or other macro-social
scientist can put them to greater use. I recognize that others, in and
out of psychology (Smith *et al.*, 1956), have tried before with only
moderate success, but the possible payoffs seem worth the effort, and
I therefore trust that our behavioral science colleagues will be under-
standing in their appraisal, and if necessary, gentle in their disap-
proval of this intruder's temerity.

In the view outlined here, there are three basic and differentiable
psychological properties of individuals which are of interest to the
societal scientist. These properties or constructs may be labeled:
(a) personality, (b) attitude and (c) opinion. Further, they may be
roughly scaled on three different dimensions. First, there is the gen-
erality dimension; second, there is durability; and third, there is
the observability dimension. In the verbal descriptions of these three
types of psychological attribute, these ranges will become more ap-
parent, but the ordering may be graphically summarized here.

FIGURE 1
POSTULATED ORDERING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES ON THREE DESCRIPTIVE DIMENSIONS

<table><thead><tr><th>Dimensions</th><th>Generality</th><th>Durability</th><th>Observability</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Attributes</th><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Personality</th><td>High</td><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr><tr><th>Attitude</th><td>Medium</td><td>Medium</td><td>Medium</td></tr><tr><th>Opinion</th><td>Low</td><td>Low</td><td>High</td></tr></tbody></table>

Perhaps more critical than the hypothesized ways in which per-
sonality, attitude and opinion may scale on the above dimensions is
the nature of the subject matter with which all intra-psychic activities
are concerned. There would seem to be three very general substantive
areas. The first of these concerns beliefs about reality in the individ-
ual's life space: how he responds, cognitively and affectively, to the
way "things *are* done" or used to be done. The second concerns the
way things *should* be done, in both the present and future, as well
as the way they should have been done in the past; this category is
quite similar to what we often refer to as values. The third concerns
the way things *will* be done in the future or *might* have been done
in the past. These may be thought of as the perceptual, the prefer-
ential and the predictive dimensions. These three dimensions, it
would seem, are largely undifferentiated at the personality level,

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moderately differentiated at the attitudinal level, and rather clearly differentiated at the opinion level. Thus, if we treat personality as a reservoir of predispositions, we need not expect that any sharp distinctions between present and future, or between "is" and "ought", will be found. That is, we look to general personality traits and their configurations as a major source of (and perhaps predictor of) preconscious and unverbalized attitudes and opinions, rather than as the location of these more specific and differentiated psychic attributes. When we move to attitudes, the distinctions between and among what is, what ought, and what will, should be expected to take on greater clarity. And at the level of opinions, the distinctions may well be quite clear and perhaps might even become specific enough to be stated by the individual in relatively operational terms.

Given these general remarks on the relationships among personality, attitude and opinion, we may now turn to a more detailed consideration of each in turn. Note again that whereas most social psychologists tend to treat attitudes and/or opinions as components, aspects or levels of personality, the approach here is to treat all three as separate—but causally interdependent—psychological attributes of the individual.

## Personality

Of all the terms used in the psychological literature, none causes more difficulty than personality, and at least two reasons come to mind. First, and on this there seems to be a strong consensus, personality is the most inclusive and all-embracing psychological property attributed to the human being.⁸ Second, there is an overwhelmingly long list of schemata and taxonomies by which an individual's personality may be compared with another's, or with itself over time.⁹ One's choice of scheme here is less important than the fact that these (and other) formulations are attempts to classify and measure fairly basic internal predispositions toward action of

⁸A useful compendium, albeit a decade in age, is McCary's *Psychology of Personality: Six Modern Approaches* (1956).

⁹Over thirty years ago, Allport and Odbert (1936) pointed out that over 17,000 personality trait names could be identified in western literature. A more recent scanning of the personality literature reveals such dimensions as: high or low on the need for achievement, affiliation or power (McClelland, 1958, and Atkinson, 1958); authoritarian (Adorno, et al., 1950); conservative (McCloskey, 1953); open- or closed-minded (Rokeach, 1960); misanthropic (Rosenberg, 1957); intolerant of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949); provincial or cosmopolitan (Levinson, 1957); introverted (Jung, 1923); narcissistic and/or egoistic (Freud, 1922); optimistic or pessimistic; altruistic; exhibitionist; apathetic; dominant; dependent; sadistic or masochistic; manic-depressive; inner-directed or other-directed; and so on.

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normal, as well as mentally ill, people. As Cattell (1950, 2) puts it, "personality is that which permits a prediction of what a person will do in a given situation". And typically, these predispositions are thought of as a consequence of biological inheritance, the near-universal infancy experience, and the varying experiences of puberty and adulthood. A paraphrase of Allport's view is illustrative:

> The newborn babe lacks the characteristic organization of psychological systems, and has a *potential* personality that develops within the skin. The givens of personality are an idiographic complex of physique, temperament and intelligence, motivated in infancy by essentially biological and nutritional drives. As the infant matures and interacts with the social and physical environment, he develops a personality. Once beyond the infantile stage, this personality cannot be understood in terms of biological motives alone (Bertocci, 1965, 302).

An equally important aspect of personality is that we generally see it as the organizing and integrating framework within which all other intrapsychic attributes are embraced. In addition to its generality, post-adolescent personality is thought of as showing only the most gradual change over time, at least in the "normal" individual who has essentially "normal" experiences during a lifetime. Finally, despite the availability, demonstrated realiability, and apparent validity of many of the tests (projective and otherwise) by which we observe and measure personality, the inferential leap between the measuring instrument and the intellectual construct is so great that personality must be treated as the least observable of our three psychological variables.¹⁰ In short, personality is defined here as a hypothetical construct embracing and structuring the individual's total reservoir of behavioral predispositions.

## Attitudes

Shifting to a somewhat more restricted, malleable and observable cluster of individual attributes, we come next to what will be called *attitudes*.¹¹ While attitudes are largely shaped by the personality which organizes and embraces them, they are also seen as responsive to and modifiable by immediate (or even moderately distal) experience; more particularly, an individual's attitude on any matter may best be viewed as resulting from the interplay of personality and experience (Brim and Wheeler, 1966).

¹⁰Two possible paths to improvement in the measurement of personality come to mind. First, the clinical psychology and psychiatry subcultures could profitably borrow and adapt the more rigorous and operational methods already in use in other social sciences; there seems to be room for considerable modification in coding, classifying and scaling procedures. Second, some tentative evidence seems to be emerging that we might find occasional correlations between mental state or personality and certain biochemical or electro-physiological indicators.

¹¹A fairly complete survey of the measures for those which are most relevant to political science is in Rieselbach (1964).

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In the taxonomy employed here, attitudes (as well as personality and opinion) fall into the three subclasses outlined earlier: the individual's perceptions of the way things *are* done in his "life space", his preferences for the way things *should* be done, and his predictions as to the way things probably *will* be done. Attitudes, then, are defined here in a literal—if broad—sense to mean the partially structured disposition to act in a certain way; the meaning is highly analogous to that used when we describe the attitude of an astronaut's capsule moving in space, or that of a dancer prior to or during a single routine or even that of the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The notion may be further conveyed by terms such as posture or stance. That is, an entity's attitude markedly affects its probability of acting or moving in a given, and—depending on the state of our theory—predictable direction.

An individual's attitudes may differ from his neighbor's not only in their content, but in their degree of generality, in their durability, in the amount of affective loading with which their holder invests them, and in the extent of their structure, integration and coherence (Converse, 1964). The interdependence between personality and attitudes will be explored further, but a more orderly procedure would be to move on next to our third and final set of psychological attributes: opinions.

## Opinions

While much of the literature tends to treat opinions and attitudes as more or less interchangeable, it seems worthwhile to preserve the distinction, even at the risk of raising some difficult problems of operationalization. Thus, I would define opinions as considerably more specific than attitudes, markedly more transitory and appreciably more susceptible to systematic observation and measurement. At the same time, they may be divided into the same subclasses as attitudes: perceptions, preferences and predictions. To illustrate in regard to specificity (durability and observability will be discussed below), we can classify a person's *general* approval or disapproval of strong supranational organizations—for instance—as *attitudinal*. He may perceive those organizations now in existence as weak, may prefer that they become stronger and may (for example) predict that they will not become stronger in some relevant future. This attitudinal cluster should, of course, predict fairly well to his *opinions* on a particular aspect of the general problem. Thus, during the Congo crises of 1960, this individual might hold the opinions that the Secretary General was not exploiting the full latitude voted him by the General Assembly, that he should have assumed wider powers and that, if certain governments acquiesced in the original range of assumed authority, Mr. Hammarskjold would gradually

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try to expand that range. Whether the problem was sufficiently sa-
lient to the individual to convert the general attitude into a specific
set of opinions is, of course, in doubt, as is the extent to which the
attitudinal and opinion clusters were each internally consistent as
well as logically compatible with one another.¹²

The Interplay of Psychological Attributes

Let me now return to a somewhat more detailed consideration
of the interplay between and among all three of these psychological
attributes. More particularly, what are the ways in which personality
relates to both attitude and opinion? There would seem to be two dif-
ferent types of relationship here. First, there is the generally under-
stood notion that a certain personality type will hold attitudes and
opinions whose content is largely predictable from, and shaped by,
his personality. For example, the parochial or provincial *personality*
is associated with negative *attitudes* toward outsiders and with
*opinions* which favor policies designed to keep such groups in a
distant, if not subordinate, position.

But there is a second type of interrelationship at work here, and
it tends to get less attention. Reference is to the way in which per-
sonality affects the structuring and the durability of attitudes and
opinions, regardless of their substantive *content*. Of course, the per-
sonality syndrome as defined here is such that its content will not be
independent of its structure and durability, but these qualities may
be, for analytical convenience, treated separately. At the attitudinal
level, if we look at perceptions, preferences and predictions, it should
immediately be evident that there is a fair degree of interdependence
among them. Perceptions and preferences will both affect predictions,
perceptions and predictions will affect preferences, and preferences
and predictions will affect perceptions; all three attitudinal compo-
nents are highly interconnected. Moreover, the way in which any two
of these combine in order to affect the third is very much a function
of the more fundamental personality traits.

Let me illustrate each of these three combinational effects. For
example, a normal and concerned individual who perceives his
nation to be following a given diplomatic strategy and who prefers
that it be reversed, will—depending upon the strength of the pref-
erence—be more likely to predict such reversal than will his counter-

¹²It has become something of a ritual for political scientists to note how uninterested and/or uninformed the bulk of the world's citizens are in regard to politics, and while the evidence seems compelling, it may be somewhat beside the point for students of foreign policy. Overlooking, for the moment, the ways in which elite foreign policy articulations and arguments may easily lead to public cynicism and indifference, the fact is that those members of the public who *are* attentive and/or informed are generally those whose opinions do exercise some impact on the policy making process.

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part who prefers continuation of the present strategy. But most of the variance in the prediction will probably be a function of the personality dimension which embraces optimism and pessimism. The optimistic personality might even be defined operationally by the extent to which his predictions coincide with his preferences; the extreme optimist might be called the "wishful thinker" and the person whose preferences and predictions are usually far apart appears in the role of Cassandra.

In the second and more interesting case, when perceptions and predictions combine to shape preferences, the effect of personality becomes more striking. The inner-directedness dimension or trait is central here, with strongly inner-directed personalities tending to hold onto their preferences even though they see little chance of those preferences being realized. To put it in different language, certain personality types can tolerate a much greater degree of dissonance or incongruence between the way they *expect* things to be and the way they *prefer* them to be. Those who are (a) less inner-directed, or (b) have a lower tolerance for such dissonance, find a fairly convenient solution; they tailor their preferences so as to make them more "realistic".¹³ Turning to the third case—preference and prediction combining to shape perceptions—this is probably the sector which most social psychologists have emphasized when examining international politics. They are, quite rightly, struck by the frequency with which citizens and elites either construct, or accept, the most outrageous distortions of past or present reality. Here, again, a personality typical of many societies takes its toll. Whether we call it other-directedness or something else, these attitudinal misperceptions just could not be so universal and so pronounced were it not for the prevalence in America and elsewhere of the socially acquiescent personality. While I know of no hard evidence to this effect, every indication is that—and this is almost definitional—very few citizens are deviant enough to resist the cumulative distortion of perception (Livant, 1963) and perpetuation of arbitrary judgments (Jacobs and Campbell, 1961) which social pressures are able to generate.¹⁴

¹³This normative flexibility—because it is a widespread personality trait in the industrial societies of today—may well account for (i.e., acquiesce in) a great deal of the incompetence and inhumanity found in modern foreign policies. Seeing no feasible way of changing things, many citizens merely revise their notions as to what constitutes acceptable (or justifiable) diplomacy or strategy.

¹⁴Such manipulability could be expected to vary from one society to another, and one study (Milgram, 1961) found that a French sample was significantly more resistant to such pressures than a matched Norwegian sample. We must be careful, however, not to confuse that "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" which might be more prevalent in a society characterized by high mutual trust, with high suggestibility; conversely, the distrust of others may not be equivalent to inner-directedness.

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Personality may be thought of not only as a predictor of the way in which attitudes are structured and modified, but also as a predictor of the way in which opinions will combine and change. Again, we will merely scratch the surface here, as the intent is only to demonstrate that all three attributes are highly interdependent, and that from the observation of an individual's opinion, we may make some reasonable inferences about his personality. In the most obvious sense, we generally expect that a so-called authoritarian personality would tend to correlate with opinions that perceive relationships very much in terms of superior-subordinate, and that prefer clearcut lines of authority, well-defined roles and boundaries, and vigorous law enforcement, for example. Similarly, closed-minded personality types will find it difficult to change their opinions in the face of new evidence, but might nevertheless be expected to change such opinions when authority figures express an opinion contrary to the one originally held by the subject. To put it another way, many of the personality measures and classifications used today are based on the kind of opinions and attitudes expressed or admitted to by the respondent or subject, and we should therefore not be surprised that those constructs which we call personality traits would correlate strongly with opinions and attitudes. Further, the way in which an individual structures and integrates his opinions and attitudes will also provide important indicators of, and be responsive to, the basic personality traits.

## Cultural Attributes: The Societal Level

Having summarized and/or hypothesized the general relationships among personality, attitude and opinion at the individual level, let me now shift to the societal level, be it a subnational, national, or extra-national entity which concerns us. The central thesis here is that, even though no social group can be properly thought of as having a personality, an attitude or an opinion, we may nevertheless attribute certain properties to a group on the basis of the distribution and configuration of these psychological properties. In other words, I would hold that the aggregation of individual *psychological* properties provides a quite sufficient base for describing the *cultural* properties of the larger social entity which is comprised of those individuals.

## The Aggregative-Emergent Argument

This position brings me face to face with the ancient, and still open, issue of aggregative versus emergent properties. If the issue can still arouse controversy between the defenders of "organismic" and "mechanistic" approaches in disciplines ranging from biology to

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astronomy, we need not be surprised by its durability in the social sciences.¹⁵ In my view, however, there is a relatively straightforward solution to the problem, such that the reductionist or aggregative position taken here need not appear as foolish and simplistic as it is often made out by advocates of the “emergent properties” school. That solution requires, however, a somewhat more refined taxonomy and more selfconscious epistemology than is often found among the occasionally mystical “gestaltists” in sociology, political science and anthropology.

First, it requires that we define levels of analysis along only one dimension, or at least, only one at a time. If we want to treat the economic, the political and the social *sectors* of society, and the cultural and the structural *attributes* of society as different “levels of analysis” (as does Smelser in this issue, for example) there may be no serious harm, but to shift from a horizontal back to a vertical axis and to also include the physiological and the psychological in the scheme (as do many, including Smelser) is to court conceptual chaos. It would seem more in keeping with the symbolism associated with “levels” and with conceptual clarity were we to adhere to the vertical axis alone and base our levels of analysis on the size and complexity of the entities which we are considering at the moment; e.g., from cell to organ to organism or individual to family to nation. This and closely related points are made succinctly by Coleman (1964, 84):

> One important measurement problem in sociology concerns the two levels on which sociologists must work: the level of the individual and that of the group. We have observations at two levels, concepts at two levels, and relationships at two levels. Furthermore, it is necessary to shift back and forth: measuring group-level concepts from individual data; or inferring individual relationships from group-level relations.

A second distinction of importance in this epistemological issue is that between structure and culture. Even though the structure and the culture of a social system are causally linked in a most intimate fashion, they are by no means identical; nor does it enhance our clarity to ignore the boundary between them. In the taxonomy proposed here, the *structure* of a system is defined as that set of properties which we attribute to it on the basis of the observed *relationships* among the entities (individuals or groups) which comprise the system. *Culture*, on the other hand, is defined as the set of properties we attribute to the system by observing the distribution of *psychological attributes* among the individuals who comprise the system. The problem is one of distinguishing between the construct or verbal representation which we use for descriptive and explanatory purposes

¹⁵Perhaps the most balanced and thorough treatment of the issue, from a physical science point of view, is in Nagel (1961) 336-397.

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and the operations by which we ascertain that construct's presence or absence, strength or direction of change. While there are many exceptions, a large number of system properties can only be defined and measured by observing subsystem phenomena, and on that basis, the distinction between structure and culture should not be too difficult to observe.

The third and equally critical clarification that is required is that between behavioral phenomena and essentially static phenomena of a pre- or post-behavioral nature. For example, much of the social science literature concurs that the *structure* of a social system is a property we attribute to the system on the basis of observing relationships among its subsystems. But since little of the literature distinguishes between *relationship* (marital, friendly, heirarchical, alliance, etc.) and *interaction* (embrace, fight, speak, exchange, etc.) we end up by confusing the formal or informal *structure of* a system with the behavioral and interactional regularities which *occur within* that system. To be sure, we may infer relationships by observing interactions and we often predict interactions from known relationships, but they are—and deserve to be treated as—quite distinct classes of phenomena.

## The Linkage Between Subsystems

A final distinction of importance, and one which appears to lie at the heart of the aggregative versus emergent confrontation is that between the procedures we use to *describe* a social system and those we use to *explain* how it “got that way”. We may, quite legitimately, observe the distribution of subsystem attributes, the relationships among the subsystems, and the interactions among them, and on the basis of these offer a fairly full *description* of that system.¹⁶ But until we have observed and demonstrated the linkage between and among subsystem attributes, relationships, and interactions, we can not *explain* and account for the properties, behavior or relationships of the system itself. Admittedly the line between scientific explanation and description begins to blur as that description becomes more complete, but the intellectual operations are sufficiently different to merit explicit demarcation.

As one reads the philosophers of science as well as the critics of

¹⁶My impression is that this view does not run afoul of the stricture which Wallace (1961, 43) and others keep returning to. He inveighs against the "statistical fallacy, which offers an enumeration of the properties of individual persons as if it were a description of a social or cultural system . . . ." Given the context, he is presumably concerned about those "personality and culture" authors who treat psychological factors as all, and nearly ignore the structural attributes of the society. Nor do we seem to be committing Robinson's (1950) "ecological fallacy" in which one infers individual attributes from group attributes for which only the marginals are known.

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the position taken here, it turns out that the ancient argument against reductionism and in favor of organic or holistic epistemologies rests largely on the inability of a reductionist model to account for the system's properties or behavior; we cannot, they remind us, explain or predict the behavior or future states of the system solely on the basis of the properties of its constituent elements. But even here, knowledge of the components' properties can carry us a fair part of the way from description to explanation. To illustrate, we can pour pellets of steel into a container until it is full, with little qualitative change in the aggregate; it merely becomes larger. But if we do the same thing with pellets of enriched uranium under appropriate conditions, we will eventually arrive at the "critical mass" threshold, with important qualitative change in the aggregate as a result. In such a case, the emergent properties of the system are largely explicable in terms of the properties of its component parts. In the same vein, observation of the placement or relationships among components may enhance our understanding of the system's behavior. For example, a society which becomes involved in a limited war and has a large number of citizens who are intolerant of ambiguity may move quickly into all-out war in the "drive for closure". The same result could come about, even if such a personality trait were infrequent in that society, but typical of its elites or only of its chief of state. My point, then, is that while knowledge of subsystem or component properties, or relations or interactions among these components may not always suffice for explanatory, or even predictive, purposes, such knowledge constitutes a major basis for describing the larger system. And while explanation and operational description must be distinguished, the latter is not so plenti ful in social science that we can afford to dismiss it as trivial.

Once any of these four distinctions become blurred, we are much more likely to reject the view outlined here and retreat into some sort of metaphorical and pre-operational formulation. That is, unless levels are arranged on one set of dimensions only, unless structure and culture are distinguished, unless behavioral and nonbehavioral phenomena are differentiated and unless the needs of explanation kept distinct from those of description, we have almost no choice but to accept the organic-emergent position. By explicitly recognizing these distinctions, however, it becomes possible to devise social science taxonomies within which data may be gathered and the testing of alternative theories may go forward.

Having digressed for this unavoidable epistemological-ontological excursion, let me now return to the psycho-cultural interface by which we might better comprehend the relationships between man and world politics. To reiterate, the position taken here is that the cultural properties of any subnational, national or

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extranational system may be described in a strictly aggregative fashion, by observing the distribution and configuration of individual psychological properties.¹⁷

## National Character, Ideology and Climate of Opinion

The most straightforward, if not the only, way to convert the distribution of individual properties into social system properties is to let each of the three psychological variables serve as the basis for a distinct cultural variable. Choosing that path, let us treat personality as the basis for national (or any other social system's) character, attitude as the basis for ideology, and opinion as the basis for climate. That is, when we have ascertained which individuals score where on one or more personality, attitude or opinion scales, we have the basis for descriptive statements about the culture (or portions thereof) of the entity which they constitute. In this manner, then, the three social "equivalents" would rank the same way as their psychological "counterparts" on the three dimensions used earlier. National character (or basic personality, as it is often called) would be the most general of the three cultural variables, most durable, and least accessible to direct observation and measurement.¹⁸ At the other end, climate of opinion would be most specific, most transitory, and most observable; ideology would fall in the middle range on all three dimensions. Let me now say a few words about each of these cultural attributes of national, sub-national, and extra-national entities and then go on to a discussion of their measurement and statistical description.

There are many approaches to the study of national character but two stand out in the literature; one tends toward the *organismic* and the other toward the aggregative and *statistical*. The former often attributes certain individual personality traits to the society as a whole, usually anthropomorphizing to some extent. This approach usually rests either on the assumption that there is near-uniformity of personalities within the social system or that the social structure impinges upon and molds diverse personalities in such a

¹⁷As suggested earlier, my definition of cultural properties is considerably narrower than that used by most anthropologists, whose consensus is approximated in Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952); the classical and global definition is Taylor's: "That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society".

¹⁸It is certainly not my intention to suggest that ease of direct observation necessarily guarantees that our measures will be high on both reliability and validity. As Campbell and Fiske (1959) as well as others, have pointed out, it is difficult to actually *achieve* construct validity but easy to believe that it has been achieved. Reliability is, however, an essential precondition for validity and while it may often be necessary to make trade-offs between the two, our selection of variables cannot be insensitive to the observation and measurement problem. These issues are discussed more fully in the next section.

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way as to produce highly uniform attitudes, opinions or behavior. The statistical approach is obviously the one taken here, and it coincides with the definition offered by Inkeles and Levinson (1954, 983): "national character refers to relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of a society". Whether we speak of national character or of basic personality, the theme is almost always an aggregative and additive one, in which we look for the ways in which certain personality traits are distributed throughout a given population. There is, of course, no assurance that we will find only one modal personality in a given entity; the possibility of bi- or multi-modal types is always present (Levinson, 1957).

Moving from personality and national character to attitude and its societal counterpart, ideology, we come to that cultural attribute which is perhaps most central in understanding a nation's foreign policy. Neither as remote from policy concerns as personality, nor as evanescent as opinion, attitudinal configurations provide the most salient nonmaterial incentives and constraints within which nations decide upon their behavior in world politics. When we speak of ideology, it is important to distinguish among the various ways in which it is defined. A formal institution such as political party, pressure group or government usually has both an official or articulated ideology, as reflected in speeches and documents, and an operative ideology, which actually guides the group's behavior. The latter may not even be fully known to the group's own members, but it inevitably differs from the official ideology, especially as the time lag since the articulation or revision of the official ideology increases. There are few more serious errors in science, or in policy, than to assume that the official and the operative ideologies are identical; yet it occurs with alarming frequency.¹⁹ Not only is it crucial to distinguish between the formal and the operative ideology of an elite group, but to distinguish between both of these and the ideology of the larger social entity for which the elite claims to act. This distinction is often most evident when we contrast opinions to attitudes. That is, the elite may hold, or merely express, a given set of attitudes, and may try to bring the general public's attitudes into line with either of these. Unfortunately, there has been little research on the congruence between elite and mass ideology, but the impression is that the effort is not always successful. The several publics may well express, and even hold, opinions which

¹⁹ A particularly distressing example is Leites' *Operational Code of the Polit-buro* (1951) based largely on the "holy scriptures" of Marxism-Leninism. The saving grace of the study is its open-endedness, in which an extremely wide range of behavioral patterns is predicted from a given cluster of formal articulations.

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coincide with those urged by the elite, but never internalize them sufficiently to qualify as attitudes.²⁰

Ideology is crucial in foreign policy not only because it provides the matrix within which the present is interpreted, the past recalled, and the future anticipated, but because it provides the boundaries within which the climate or distribution of opinion can range. Within that range, opinion distributions for given sectors of a society will respond to behavioral events and information about them.

On the basis of what we now know about the malleability of most people's *opinions*, it is safe to say that political elites and/or mass media can—if they have a fairly accurate picture of the attitudinal configuration or ideology within their society—generate an impressively wide range of opinion changes. There are important constraints on such manipulation, including the climate of opinion at the moment, the ideology of the period, and the more slow-moving national character, but the degree of malleability is remarkable as well as alarming. More specifically, the would-be engineer of opinion change needs to know how many individuals in what particular classes (from mass to elite, from indifferent to attentive, etc.) hold what attitudes and opinions with what tenacity on what issues. In other words, he must know in some detail what the ideology and the climate of opinion look like at some particular point in time. This consideration leads us, then, to the problems of observation, measurement and description by which such distributions and configurations may be ascertained.

## The Observation and Description Problem

The statistical description of a nation's character, ideology, or climate of opinion—all combining to constitute its cultural attributes—are not only of interest to those who would modify or exploit that state of affairs. Until we have progressed further along this road, social scientists will also have a most incomplete understanding of the dynamic processes which occur within and between those en-

²⁰ Highly suggestive in this context is Kelman's "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change" (1958). Despite the fact that he does not distinguish among attitude, opinion and behavior, his scheme meshes in a general way with the one proposed here. The "compliance" process may be thought of as producing opinion change but little more, with identification and internalization both affecting attitudes and internalization perhaps even impinging on personality.

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tities, from small groups to the global system, which constitute our
major theoretical focus.

In the sections above, I contended that opinions were most sus-
ceptible to observation, that personality traits were least susceptible,
and that attitudes would fall somewhere between. Such a statement
may misleadingly suggest that all three phenomena can—or must be
—measured via direct observation alone. If we bear in mind that all
psychological, and therefore, all cultural (in the restricted sense used
here) phenomena are literally intrapsychic, it is evident that we must
always make an inferential leap from those events which can be
observed directly to the variable which we seek to measure. To
return to an epistemological theme which is central to the whole
scheme developed here, we need to be ingenious in looking for the
traces and indicators of our variables, but we must remember that
the traces, and the variables they reflect, are seldom the same thing.
If this were not so, the problem of validity in social science measure-
ment would be considerably less vexatious; that is we would be less
concerned with the question of whether we are measuring that
which we claim to be measuring. As difficult as the problem is in
other sectors of social science, it is even more troubling at the intra-
psychic level, where few of our observations are made in the natural
setting and most occur in the artificial and contrived laboratory or
interview setting. In addition to this type of danger, validity is also
threatened by the rather standard practice whereby we not only ob-
serve such behavioral events as verbal response in order to tap opin-
ion, for example, but move back and forth (or up and down) among
all three variables by inferring attitudes from opinions and personal-
ity from attitudes, and by predicting opinions from attitudes and
attitudes from personality.²¹

To continue at the individual level, it seems to me that social
scientists have all too often tended to assume that directly elicited
verbal behavior represents the major—or even the only—avenue to
understanding and measuring individual traits. Thus, in order to
get at personality, we generally ask for written or oral responses to
such stimuli as Rorshach blots, TAT pictures or incompleted
sentences. To get at attitudes, we present our subjects with rather
lengthy questionnaires, many of whose items seem to have little face
validity, and then tote up the responses. To get at opinions, we
usually organize a survey, replete with its myriad costs and prob-

²¹This inferential strategy is particularly risky in a cross-cultural research setting, inasmuch as variations in social structure—or differential rates of change therein—may impinge upon essentially similar modal personalities and “produce” appreciably different ideologies.

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lems of sampling, fielding an interview team, and then laboriously coding the alleged responses.²²

It is certainly not my intention to reject these observational methods, but it is worth emphasizing their several shortcomings and suggesting the availability of alternative strategies. First of all, it cannot be emphasized too often that the assumed directness of these methods is generally overstated. The inferential leap from verbal response back to imputed trait is a long and elusive one at best. As to projective tests, there is the subjectivity of the coding criteria, illustrated by the amount of training and experience required before the interpreter is considered qualified and before we get any satisfactory degree of inter-coder agreement. Whereas a cardinal rule in the search for reliability is to reduce coding procedures to a highly routinized algorithm, the projective tests are of limited value except in the hands of an insightful, artistic and trained expert. And even as the personality scales gradually reach satisfactory levels of reliability across time and across subjects, they still leave unanswered a number of serious questions on the validity side. On too many occasions we hear the assertion of the hyper-operationalist: "The ______ syndrome is what this scale is designed to measure, and what it measures is, therefore, the ______ syndrome"! Worth consideration, too, in both the paper-and-pencil and the face-to-face situations are the dangers of systematic error resulting from interviewer or experimenter induced bias, the unnatural setting, the low salience of the questions, respondent indifference and faulty recording (Remmers, 1954). Whether we are interrogating publics or elites, whether we seek to measure something as deep and general as a personality trait or as close to the surface and specific as an opinion, the inferential leap is a long one, marked by a variety of hurdles, only some of which we fully understand.

## An Alternative . . .

Are there any alternatives to the direct verbal expression route, and are they any less problematical? One option which political scientists are now using with some regularity is the search for behavioral rather than prebehavioral or merely verbal indicators. Thus, we ask respondents—or find out through informants or public records—which political party they belong to, how they have voted or plan to vote, which pressure groups and professional associations they belong to and in what capacity, whether they write to their newspapers or legislators, and so forth. By and large, these provide

²²For a valuable discussion of the many problems involved in the opinion survey approach, see Kahn and Cannell (1957), Kish (1965), and Maccoby (1954). An early study which concentrates on the sources of error is Hyman *et al.* (1954).

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somewhat more reliable information, but they too pose certain prob-
lems of validity. If we want to tap psychological attributes it is
usually in order to use such data for predicting to *behavior*, and it
may be risky to observe behavior, infer back to alleged psychological
predispositions and then predict to the very behavior which has been
observed. The danger of tautological explanations is very much with
us in this sort of research design, but as more varied psychological
and behavioral data become available, the opportunities for cross-
validation will inevitably increase. The same problems remain
even if we shift from interrogation to behavior-inducing experi-
ments, or if we observe more natural or field-setting behavior, since
we must still infer personality, attitude and opinion phenomena from
the more directly observable—but not easily codeable—behavioral
phenomena.

Having emphasized the pitfalls, let me now retreat somewhat and recognize that often we have no alternative other than direct interrogation or experimentally induced behavior, and that social scientists have shown remarkable ingenuity and rigor in seeking to minimize the misleading effects of these methods. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that there really is no such thing as a *directly observable* variable in social science; we always have an inferential leap of some magnitude between the event or condition on the one hand and the repertorial representation on the other. Thus, despite the danger to validity and reliability, any serious research on personality, attitude and opinion will continue to depend on the resourcefulness and precision with which we apply and develop the basic research strategies already in use. The only place where dramatic improvement seems both necessary and possible is at the personality level, where much of our knowledge depends upon the psychiatrist's protocols and reports, and the clinical psychologist's investigations. The consensus, which I largely share, is that the intra-psychic probings of these researchers (especially the former) leave a great deal to be desired when it comes to the operationalization of their variables; intuition is absolutely essential to scientific discovery, but is is seldom sufficient.²³

Despite the central argument here—that we can and should
employ the distribution and aggregation of individual attributes in
order to measure certain social attributes—it does not necessarily
follow that we can *only* do so by *observing* individual responses.
That is, we seem to have underestimated the extent to which the

²³ Interestingly enough, some of the most rigorous research on personality variables is that of the anthropologists. Some imaginative and persuasive methods of data-acquisition and analysis via Rorschach blots are reported in Wallace (1952) and in the anthology compiled by Kaplan (1961). On the cross-cultural use of Rorschach see Adcock and Ritchie (1958).

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distribution of intrapsychic phenomena within a population may be inferred via observation of *collective* phenomena.²⁴ Not only does this strategy avoid the artificialities of many interview and experimental situations, but it even provides an economical route for getting at macrophenomena in a more direct fashion. Thus, we may follow the anthropological approach and merely observe a great deal of social interaction, and on the basis of the way things are done and discussed, infer the nature of the personalities, attitudes and opinions of those who constitute the entity under investigation. Another tack widely used in anthropology is to examine the physical or artistic artifacts of the entity and treat them as indicators of these same phenomena; whether pottery or poetry, conference chambers or constitutions, and whether recent or ancient, these products may serve as manifestations or traces of the way in which a population views or did view many phenomena of interest to us.²⁵ Likewise, such phenomena as elections, mass movements, migration, market behavior, social mobility, and so forth, may all provide the empirical base from which we might infer back to the underlying culture.

When we observe societal and collective phenomena in order to tap the distribution of individual psychological attributes, however, there is again the danger of circularity in our reasoning. Thus, unless we have sufficient understanding of the social structure (roles and relationships) within which these interactions occur, and unless the state of our theory is relatively advanced, inferences about national character, ideology and opinion distributions can be quite wide of the mark. Another way to avoid unwitting circularity is to opt, quite consciously, for the cyclical model in which feedback is explicitly introduced; in such models, each set of variables serves the dependent, the independent, and the intervening role, in turn. Moreover, with some of the more recent tools of path analysis, and causal inference (Blalock, 1964), we can discover which particular sequence offers the most powerful explanation in the process, thus settling many of the old issues as to which is cause and which is consequence in sequences that can only be understood within a feedback framework (Deutsch, 1963).

Turning from problems of observation to the ways in which we might report and describe our observations, the standard tools of

²⁴ An excellent discussion, with examples, of alternative methods for getting at such social phenomena is in the volume of *Unobtrusive Measures* (Webb et al., 1966).

²⁵ One approach is represented in the McGranahan and Wayne (1948) analysis comparing popular drama in Germany and the United States during the late 1920’s. And despite certain acknowledged inadequacies in his methods, David McClelland has demonstrated the possibilities of systematic examination of such cultural artifacts as textbooks and tapestry for generating politically relevant data (1961).

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descriptive statistics seem quite appropriate to the task at hand. What are the familiar ways in which a frequency (or probability) distribution is portrayed, so that the dominant characteristics of the configuration are best illuminated? First of all, we generally want to know something about the central tendency of a set of observed frequencies, and the median, mode and mean all have their uses in this regard. Beyond these, important aspects of an aggregate can be graphically portrayed via the histogram (bar graph), the frequency polygon (line graph), or the cumulative frequency curve, especially if individual scores on a given psychological dimension are collapsed into grouped frequency distributions. Nor should the factor analysis approach be overlooked (Cattel, 1955). While these graphic representations offer an economical overall picture of the dispersion, as well as the central tendency, of an aggregative distribution, we can get a more precise indication of the former by computing the variance or the standard deviation. Going a step further, the asymmetry of the distribution is precisely measured by computing the magnitude and direction of its skewness, and another measure of the curve's deviation from normality is found in its kurtosis (peakedness). To demonstrate the application of these familiar statistical descriptors is neither necessary nor appropriate here, but their relevance to the many empirical studies (many of which are cross-cultural) of personality, attitude, and opinion distributions should be selfevident. Nor is this the place to suggest the theoretical purposes to which such descriptions might be put.²⁶

## The Individual . . .

Up to this point, I have tended to treat every individual's personality traits, attitudes and opinions in an undifferentiated fashion, ignoring the obvious fact that some individuals exercise a far greater impact on world politics than others. Let me now recognize, if not rectify, that omission by way of a brief digression. While research on the strength and direction of differences between elites and others has not yet led to many universal generalizations, the evidence does point to the regular existence of certain mass-versus-elite discrepancies. In the work of Lasswell (1948), Dicks (1950), and others, we find suggestions of data which would permit the construction of

²⁶ A few possibilities, might, however, merit a footnote. We could, for example, search for the amount of symmetry in the way two populations perceive one another as well as themselves, in order to ascertain which of the many combinations of these four attitude configurations best predicts to the relations and interactions between the entities which they comprise. Some basic data can be found in Cantril and Buchanan (1953) and in Singer (1964). Another possibility might be a longitudinal analysis, in which any observed convergence or divergence in cultural profile could be examined to ascertain whether cultural differences and similarities associate with various types of interdependence, friendly or hostile, in any regular fashion.

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cultural profiles which take explicit account of such discrepancies.²⁷ One might, for example, superimpose on the histogram for some trait or cluster of traits in the general population, similar profiles of the groups from which foreign policy or military elites are drawn. It might well turn out that the isomorphism or lack thereof between the two configurations would predict to that nation's behavioral tendencies or correlate strongly with the types of relationships it forms. Or, in line with the "two-step flow" hypothesis (Katz, 1957), a useful inquiry into the identity and potency of community influen- tials could be mounted. That is, if the foreign policy opinion profile for a general population sample and for several alternative reference groups could be ascertained on perhaps a weekly basis, and the various media could be content analyzed, one might be able to trace the path along which information and influence tend to move. Space limitations preclude further pursuit of these research possi- bilities, but the options are many and the need is great.

## In Conclusion . . .

Between the familiar regions of individual behavior and the dimly perceived ones of world politics lies a terra incognita into which few social scientists have yet begun to venture. Given the inadequacy of our maps, it is little wonder that we have given those regions a wide berth. My purpose here was to draw up a tentative map, preliminary to more thorough exploration. The map is largely conjectural, but may possibly have profited from the missteps and false starts of those who have explored comparable regions in other disciplines.

On the basis of those not dissimilar experiences, certain caveats seem justified. First, the map should identify the entities which exist in the region, and next, provide operational descriptions of their ma- jor attributes. Once these entities are recognized and described, we may safely inquire into their various roles and relationships vis-a- vis one another. Then, if we can resist the temptation to assign them all sorts of goals, purposes and functions, and treat the whole matter as an empirical question, we might get on to the next item on our agenda. That item, of course, is not explanation, but description. Until we have described a range of phenomena, we cannot explain it, and the main purpose of the map drawn here is to help us describe and measure now that which we hope to explain later.

Leaving the map-making metaphor behind, the scheme pro- posed explicitly rejects the need for an "emergent properties" con-

²⁷ A systematic and carefully coded survey of much of the literature on the social background and personality traits of modern political elites is in Raser (1966).

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cept when the description of social entities is the matter at hand. Conversely, it urges that we can be both operational and relevant by defining and measuring the *cultural* properties of a subnational, national, or extranational entity strictly in terms of the *psychological* properties of those individuals who constitute that particular system. It does not deny the possibility that the interaction of individual properties (both within and among single humans) may produce emergent effects, but it insists that: (a) those effects are either structural or behavioral, and (b) if they are not in either of these two classes, but are indeed themselves cultural, then the effects can be observed in the form of individual psychological properties.

In sum, while the nature of the man-society conjunction has been debated and discussed for years, no satisfactory formulation has yet emerged. I have, therefore, taken not only a very explicit, but fairly extreme, aggregative position here, in the hope that if it accomplishes little more, this paper will have served to clarify and sharpen the methodological and theoretical issues. In the interim, I should like to believe that this type of formulation will carry us some distance toward a fuller understanding of the psychocultural interface by which man's role in world politics might be more fully comprehended.

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March 5, 1962

Mr. Talogh Singh
Assistant Secretary, Planning Commission
Yojan Bhavan, Parliament Street
New Delhi, India

Dear Mr. Singh:

Just after I had returned to this country
from Asia a few weeks ago, I found that I had to
go to Europe. This, therefore, is the first oppor-
tunity I have had to tell you how much I enjoyed
our conversations at your home and your wonderful
hospitality. I learned a great deal from you,
and hope we will stay in touch and that you will
realize your plan of coming to the United States
this fall for a few months. If you do, I hope
you will let me know.

With kind regards.

Biographic Background
on Exchange Visitor Sponsored by
Friends of India Committee
256 South 16th Street
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

NAME: Mr. K. K. Sinha

AGE: 50

PRESENT POSITION
AND ADDRESS:

Director,
Institute of Political and Social Studies
357-1-A Prince Shah Road
Calcutta 31, India

EDUCATION: Lucknow University, B.Sc.,1933; LLB., 1935.

CAREER:

Practiced law for one year after graduation. Joined Congress Party later becoming one of All-India-Secretaries of League of Radical Congressmen formed in 1937 by ex-Communist, M.N. Roy. Elected to same post in Radical Democratic Party, which was formed when League broke Congress Party in 1940; R.D.P. was dissolved in 1948. Mr. Sinha no longer belongs to any political party. Worked with farmers' and labor union movements and consumers' cooperatives in towns. Turned from politics to journalism upon dissolution of R.D.P.

Has contributed articles to various Indian journals and is currently
Editor of *Indian Journal of Power and River Development*, which he
founded in 1950. Author of *Towards Pluralist Society*, 1957, a book
of essays on major Indian problems.

Member of Indian Renaissance Institute, a movement established by M.N. Roy among Indian intellectuals to revaluate Indian traditional values and to promote a modernist outlook. Honorary Secretary of Calcutta Center of Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom since 1956.

The Institute of Political and Social Studies, of which he is
currently Director, has helped focus attention on various Indian
problems from foreign and defense policies to scientific research.
Its Bulletins are published monthly in Bengali and English, with
reprints appearing regularly in various other Indian language
journals. Serves also as Honorary General-Secretary of the
Association for the Advancement of the National Languages of India,
an organization critical of the government's official language policy.

Mr. Sinha is accompanied by his wife, Mrs. Sati Sinha, who is an officer or member of various women's organizations and social work committees.

March 21, 1982

Mr. K. K. Sinha, Director
Institute of Political and Social Studies
211, Park Street
Calcutta 17, India

Dear Mr. Sinha:

I am sorry not to have answered your nice letter of January 16th which came while I was in India. My schedule was terribly crowded and did not permit me any time to write, and after I returned to this country from Asia, I had to leave again for Europe. This is, therefore, the first opportunity I have had to write.

I appreciate your sending me the material with your letter, and found it very interesting. I hope to have a chance to meet you on one of my next visits to India, and look forward to it.

All good wishes.

Cable: INDIVFREE

Phone: 44-5820

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES

DIRECTOR
K. K. SINHA

JANUARY 16 : 1962

211, PARK STREET
CALCUTTA-17
INDIA

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL:

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you two Notes for your perusal. The one (Note 'A') contains a few suggestions regarding U.S. Foreign Policy in this region. For obvious reasons these are not sufficiently analysed. Note 'B' is a brief scheme for a project of study of the communist movement in India in particular and in South East in general. In case you happen to find it of interest, may I request you to see if something can be done to give it a concrete shape.

I shall be glad to discuss these Notes with you if you have some time and in case you are interested.

Thanking you,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the
President of the United States,
C/o. U.S.I.S.,
Calcutta.

Note 'A.'

[Lc]

A brief note for Dr. Henri Kissinger from Mr.K.K.Sinha,
Director, Institute of Political & Social Studies, 211,
Park Street, Calcutta-17.

I venture to suggest that you consider the following proposals
which are indicated only in a very brief outline. These are in regard
to the U.S. foreign policy in this part of the continent:

I. It is suggested that the principle of the Marshall Plan be applied in a revised form in the matter of aid for development in some of the countries in South-East Asia. The essence of the Marshall Plan was that the aid from the U.S. would be given to the countries applying for jointly. Already the U.S. is giving aid to the countries in South-East Asia on a bilateral basis of agreement. It is suggested that the U.S. announce that it will provide a considerably more aid to all these countries if a joint plan is submitted by these countries together: In other words, more aid would be available in the same area if there is an attitude of cooperation and integration in terms of planning and, possibly also in terms of execution in projects where an integrated execution would be more economical, efficient and fruitful.

The area suggested is India, Pakistan and Nepal as
the core and, if there is a general climate of a sympathetic
acceptance of this approach, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Burma,
Malaya & Singapore may be included.

The subjects that may specifically be considered for aid
on this basis are suggested as follows:

(a) river basin development;

(b) power development;

(c) communication development; and

(d) technical training and scientific education.

The Western Aid Club has come into being through the good offices of the World Bank. This implies coordination of the aid-giving powers on the Western side. The above proposal is only an extension of the same idea on the aid-receiving side. But some of these countries are accepting substantial aid from Communist

- 2 -

[Lc]

countries too. It may, therefore, be suggested by the U.S.government that in order to promote a planned and rapid development of under-developed areas, it welcomes cooperation in this matter with not only other Western States but also cooperation from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. It is my understanding that it is the policy of the Communist camp to keep each of these newly freed countries isolated from the others unless they join in some form or other the Communist camp.

This integral approach to aid in this area will have its own political implications and effects. But these will be indirect. As a matter of fact this proposed U.S. policy should not be mixed with political aspects and policies of the participating countries in the region, provided of course that no Communist country would be included in the group.

## II.
I think a time has now come when the U.S. should take initiative in improving the Indo-Pakistan relationship. A determined though cautious attempt has to be made. Whether the initiative should be openly declared or to remain behind the scene is a matter for consideration. I think after the necessary soundings, it is much better that the public knows of American initiative, although the details of actual negotiation need not be public.

The area to be covered in this respect should be wide: (a) Kashmir, (b) joint defence policy and friendship treaty, (c) co-operation in integrated economic development.

## III.
The political situation in Pakistan is rather unstable. In view of the fact that the U.S. has been such a big factor in Pakistan affairs, it is necessary that the U.S. takes a closer look at Pakistan and sees to it that a more constitutional and democratic set-up is established in that country before long. Some straight talking with the leaders of Pakistan may be necessary in this respect.

- 3 -

[LC]

IV. Recently the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister has created the necessary background for a closer relationship between India and Japan. Some positive steps should be initiated to see that Japan and India appear to take joint steps in the international field. For example, in some respects the U.S. could ask Japan to take the initiative in certain matters instead of the U.S. taking it itself.

V. I would very much suggest that Mr. Adlai Stevenson tour India in a big way and expound American foreign policy. He is regarded very highly in this country.