EXCERPTS FROM INFORMAL REMARKS DELIVERED TO THE INTERNATIONAL
RADIO AND TELEVISION SOCIETY NEW YORK WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1978

I would like to apply these considerations to one area
which probably will not loom as large in the question period
as I suspect the Middle East will, namely the problem of Africa.

In 1975 the Soviet Union for the first time introduced
enormous quantities of military equipment and later Cuban
expeditionary forces in an area about as far away from the
Soviet Union as it is possible to be, in Angola. At that
time we had no particular preference between the various factions
that were fighting for control of the government in Angola.
But we did believe that the introduction of proxy troops
and of a billion dollars worth of military equipment, more
than all the rest of the world was giving to all the rest
of Africa put together, would create a problem that would
make future solutions that much more difficult. We were
prevented from doing what was necessary, which did not involve
any American forces, by the Congress at the time.

In recent months, we have seen once again in Ethiopia
another billion dollars worth of Soviet equipment and another
twenty thousand Cuban troops, again in areas of no conceivable
historic interest for either of those countries, and now we
are dealing no longer with a local Africa situation but with
a geopolitical challenge.

The move into Ethiopia cannot be analyzed in terms of
the quarrels between Somalia and Ethiopia. Nor is the issue
primarily who crossed the border first. The first thing to

-2-

notice is that Soviet equipment went first to Somalia, a
country that had put forward claims on the territory of all
its neighboring states; Soviet equipment was thus guaranteed
to be used in an expansionist way. And then when that
equipment was used for the precise purpose that Somalia had
always asked for it, the Soviet Union switched sides and became
the defender of the territorial integrity which its own equipment
had threatened to begin with. And seventeen thousand Cuban
troops and a billion dollars worth of Soviet equipment went
into Ethiopia.

It is too cynical to be asked to accept the proposition
that what is involved here is the unselfish Soviet desire to
respond to the appeal of a sovereign country. The Soviet
purpose is geopolitical: to outflank the Middle East, to
demonstrate that the US cannot protect its friends, to raise doubts
in Saudi Arabia right across the Red Sea, in Egypt, in the
Sudan, and in Iran. And now we hear that once again we may
be facing the threat of Cuban and Soviet intervention in
Southern Africa.

I would like to stress that there seem to me at least
four principles to keep in mind. The first is, I hope that
our Secretary of State will be successful in the negotiations
he is now undertaking with the Soviet Union on the limitation
of strategic arms. I believe that the control of nuclear
weapons is one of the preeminent problems of our period and
I agree that it should not be lightly linked with other issues.
But I also think that it is important that the Soviet Union
understand that another move of the kind we have

-3-

seen in Angola and Ethiopia will raise the presumption that we are facing a global geopolitical challenge incompatible with any definition of detente. And under those circumstances I do not see how any agreement could possibly be ratified and how detente could possibly survive. And I hope that _that_ will be made clear to the Soviet Union.

The second is, it is time that one overcomes the ridiculous myth of the invincible Cubans. Who has ever heard of Cubans conducting a global foreign policy? We cannot conduct our foreign policy under the threat of the possible intervention of Cuban troops. It is a sign of the decline of our world position that we have inflicted on ourselves through Vietnam, the collapse of executive authority produced by Watergate, and our own internal disputes. Twenty years ago this would have been considered so absurd a proposition that nobody could have made it seriously and it is a proposition that is bound to undermine our position around the world.

Third, let us justify our foreign policy by arguments other than the fear of Cuban military intervention. We must make clear to other countries that we will not be blackmailed by Cuban troops or Soviet arms. Whatever arguments can be advanced for conducting our foreign policy we will not accept the proposition that if we do not accede to the arguments of individual countries they will then call in the Cubans, or the Soviets will then send arms.

-4-

And fourthly, of course we have an obligation to try to
remove the legitimate causes of unrest and instability in Africa.

Negotiations to this effect are now going on and it would
be inappropriate for me to go into them in detail. Of course the
US must stand for majority rule. This we did when I was in office
and I support the efforts of the present Administration in this
direction. But majority rule must be given a concrete content.
What exactly is the basis for our opposition to the so-called
internal solution in Rhodesia? I favor the attempt to enable all
leaders and factions to participate in the proposed elections.
At the same time let us take care not to turn majority rule into
a device by which those who could not win an election try to force
their way into office by the threat of force. And majority rule
must not become the slogan of those who have already rejected a
multi-party system and already announced that what they want to
do is create a one-party state. And majority rule must include
protection for minority rights. If the black and white communities
cannot live together under the rule of law we will see a race war
of tremendous proportions develop. We cannot want to encourage
this.

The problems that this Administration or any Administration
faces in dealing with these issues is enormous. The issues
cannot be partisan. When the President travels and the Secretary
of State negotiates, he has to speak for all Americans. But their
perception at a time when these problems are still subject to
creative shaping is of crucial importance. It is in this spirit
that I offer these extemporaneous remarks.