MAY. 02 '88 15:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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Bertelsmann Stiftung

Mrs.
Neumann

Z-pa-st

Durchwch: (05241) 8603-28
23.03.88

Dear Mrs. Neumann,

Thank you very much for the friendly lines in your last fax. We also found it a pleasure to cooperate with you and to be able to be of service to Professor Kissinger.

We have now received the transcript of Professor Kissinger's speech in Bonn, March 15. I send it to you in order to have Professor Kissinger's authorization. Probably, he or one of his staff will also want to add some finishing touches here and there. I am well aware that there are a couple of printing or comprehension errors in the text. As far as I was able to discern them, I have duly marked or corrected them.

You will understand - I am sure of that - that we would be happy to get your OK as quickly as possible. We still have to have the text translated into German (and into French). This cannot be done until you have given us the go. There is another thing: Professor Kissinger first addressed the audience in German. In case you want to have this passage translated for the English and French version, would you furnish us with an authorized translation? Or would the sentences just be canceled in the printed text?

Awaiting your answer,

Mrs. Neumann
Office of
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington D.C. 20006

MAY. 02 '88 15:20 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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Mister Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, der Botschafter Falin sprach einige Worte auf deutsch und ich werde mir jetzt deshalb erlauben, einige Worte auf fränkisch zu sprechen, nur damit er weiß, dass, warum sein Akzent so viel besser ist als meiner. Es ist für mich eine große Ehre hier zu sein. Der Botschafter Falin und ich haben uns kurz persönlich getroffen, aber für viele Monate [indirekt] standen wir indirekt in Verbindung, als die Verhandlungen über Berlin und die Deutschlandverträge geführt wurden, und das war für mich immer ein Beweis, daß es möglich ist, dass Entgegengesetzte Ideologien im gemeinsamen Interesse Lösungen zu finden, die 15 Jahre und ich hoffe noch viele Jahrzehnte, dauern werden. Ich would like to stress, Ladies and Gentlemen, that, since I was the second speaker, I will not comment on anything that Ambassador Falin put forward, because I do not think it would be fair and because this was not intended as a debate. So even if some of my observations quite a few of my observations do not show a clear agreement with this point of view, this will be due to notes that were prepared before this conference, and are not intended in order to create a controversy in this. I took literally the intention of the proposal of the Bertelsmann Stiftung to speak about European unity and therefore in the first part of my remarks I will speak about European relationships, European - American relationships, without particular reference to the Soviet Union, as goals that have been long established for their own sake and for their own matter, and then I will turn to some of the current issues including the issue implied in the phrase "a common European house". Let me begin by saying that I believe that what has been achieved in Europe and in the relationship between America and Europe in the last 40 years is one of the major accomplishments of this century. There is no comparable period in European history in which peace lasted so long. There is no comparable period in European history in which economic development advanced so rapidly and benefited such a large part, such a predominant part of the entire population. There is no period in European history in which democratic institutions were furthered and established in a way that is not possible in a European country. And there has been no war at the end of which former enemies have achieved such a level of reconciliation as occurred between

MAY. 02 '88 15:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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the former enemies in Western Europe and the Federal Republic and between the United States and its opponents during World War II. All these are great achievements of which the Western nations have every reason to be proud. These are also great achievements that must not be dismantled in the name of even greater possibilities more or less vaguely stated. Nor should the West become so obsessed with its infidelities and with its dangers that the destruction of all that has been accomplished becomes accepted wisdom. Who would have thought it possible at the end of World War II that European unity could have made such great progress? Who would have believed it possible that France and Germany could abolish the very concept of military conflict and that its heads of government could speak of a unity based on common citizenship first for themselves and then for all Europeans? These are great achievements and they must not be forgotten when we turn to the tasks which are ahead of us, and those which are real. There is in the unity of the Western states a basis of a community of values which I mentioned when I had the great honour of receiving the Karls Prize at the city of Aachen earlier this year and which is based on four principles. One: that the state is not the personal possession of the ruler but a community of all citizens who possess equal rights in shaping the destiny of their community. Second: that all rulers, even the most powerful, rulers, are subject to law, written or customary. Third: that officials must justify themselves by a sense of service to the community, and fourth, the quest for freedom. Fifth, the history of the West, European nations and of the American nation, with all their shortcomings, can be interpreted as a never ending struggle for freedom in ever new forms throughout the centuries.

These have been the fundamental values on which European unity has been based and Western and Atlantic partnership was founded. In preparing for this event I read many articles that Ambassador Falin has written from many of which, as I told him before we started, I learnt a great deal about certain historical events. But there was one point that emerged in his writings, two points that emerged in his writings and in a discussion that was published in the *New Times* between him and my old friend Arbatow on which I would like to make a comment. The impression is

- 8 -

23 MAY. 02 '88 15:23 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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the protection of Europe against the treats that were conceived to be real. It found, in itself now and has found itself for some time in the situation in which it is in its interest that Europe achieves a greater degree of articulation of its own identity. That is necessary not because Europe should withdraw from Europe or wishes to withdraw from Europe, it is necessary for the two sides of the Atlantic to be able to conduct a dialogue based on equality. Without this consultation turns into an adversary relationship. Only those who are believed to have another option can be given credit for not exercising and we must have enough confidence that a policy can be based on a community of interests for, with a parallel manner & Washington, not for us in Washington, not to have to fear a greater strengthening of European unity. And I therefore want to congratulate the Bertelsmann Stiftung for its initiative in this direction which I believe serves the cause of Europe and the cause of peace. And it is also the more important because there is a need for understanding of new conditions in which a European contribution is essential. I would like to name three of them:

The field of defense, the field of relationships with the Third World, and the field of East-West relations. In the field, I will talk. I will make a few observations about defense. I will not discuss the subject of the Third World, but I will then turn to East-West relations as I see them under the new conditions. It is undoubtedly true that nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for mankind. Have always believed that the nuclear powers are condemned to coexistence because the relationship between any rational political objective and the destructiveness of weapons has been lost. From this however it does not follow that in the field of strategy the Western nations must commit themselves on an issue to an inevitably apocalyptic strategy. All nations have an obligation to prevent war. They have an obligation that if war should break out to confine it to the least destructive level. It is absurd to believe that anybody can have an interest or would be taken seriously in shifting the focus of destruction from one continent to another. It will be totally demoralizing if we conduct in the West our eternal debates on the proposition that overrule itself America might want to turn Europe into a nuclear battle-field and therefore Europe must make sure that America suffers devastation. On this road we will all be paralyzed. I must say also, and by this I will turn to East-West relations, that it is the duty of national leaders on both sides of

23. MAY. '88 14:36 BERTLESHAW'S DIARY
MAY. 02 '88 15:24 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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and then therefore to keep repeating all the time the purpose of our politics is to do away with all nuclear weapons is either self-dilution or deliberately misleading our own people. How is one possibly going to have enough confidence in territories of one of the Soviet Union or of the United States that all weapons have been destroyed. I defy anyone to come up with an inspection system that would give confidence that either power has not kept back a residual force and that would not have to be all that large on the assumption of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The first thing negotiators would do if they are serious and not engaged in propaganda, the first thing they would have to do is to try to calculate the minimum number of weapons that must be retained against which a violation would have to be sufficiently large so that it could be detected by rationally foreseeable verification methods. Those in this room who have conducted negotiations know that this is what would happen. And then we have to consider what happens to other nuclear countries in Europe and in Asia, some of which have equally large territories not accessible to communications, very easily, so I must tell you, I do not believe that all nuclear weapons can be destroyed.
I do not believe it is a proper statement of objectives. I do not believe that our leaders should play that game, and they should talk about those rationally verifiable arms control methods that can in fact improve the situation. Now let me turn to East-West relations in a broader sense. I have had the privilege of meeting the Soviet General Secretary and I have been very impressed by his intelligence, flexibility and broad views. I would like to believe that there is an opportunity for real progress in the East-West relations, and I think there will be, there can be real progress in the East-West relation. At the same time I recognize also that Perestroika imposes on the Soviet leadership a huge task of domestic adjustment. Not every bureaucratic center in the Soviet Union can possibly work with enthusiasm or else there would be no need for Perestroika. I therefore think it is unfair to expect the Soviet leadership to volunteer propositions in the field of foreign policy that are avoidable. The difficulties with power-structures inside the Soviet Union, some of you may know that I have not always expressed myself with unreserved enthusiasm about some of the negotiations that have been conducted.

H the size

OVER

23 MAY. '92 '88 15:25 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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LJ

- 11 -

the IMF accord.
a-deal has been concluded. I must point out however that the Soviets accepted Western propositions and one cannot be excessively one cannot very well accuse somebody of bad faith for having accepted proposals that were, after all, made by the Western nations, even if I do not consider them the best that could be, that could be made. It seems to me on the issue of Europe there are three issues: the relationship of the Soviet Union to Europe especially in military matters, Secondly the relationship of the Soviet Union to its Eastern allies, and third the role of the United States in the relationship of the Soviet Union to other States in Europe. I think it is well known that there is an inherent problem that results in the fact that the scale of the Soviet Union as of historical Russia is out of proportion to the scale in which European security considerations have been determined. A country that has eleven time zones is of a different proportion than any historic European country. Wladiwostok is closer to Seattle than to Leningrad and New York is far closer to Bonn than Wladiwostok. It is so when one looks at Russian history, may be from your own perspective, one finds that Russia and the Soviet Union has reason to feel that it has a security problem because it has always been invaded. But it is also true that at the end of each war Russia seems to have thought that it could satisfy its security concerns best by extending its dominion over whole countries, not just little pieces of territory, and I go back to the seventeenth century, I do not want to get into a debate now on the past war period. So, if one observes the march westward and eastward of the Russian military left and right, then it is in Europe, partly because the distance is also different and I would say that this is something that must be understood in Moskow, when serious negotiations start. I have never believed and I do not believe now that there exists a plan for world domination by the Soviet Union. This I did not believe even in the previous period of which I spoke, but I know real peace will come when we understand that the Soviet Union must be a conceptions of security that exists on absolute security grounds, and that means absolute insecurity for anybody else. I mention this as a problem requiring solution, not as an organic fault that nothing can remove. Now, I can explain why I, who conducted many negotiations with the

This is something that must be understood in Moskow, when serious negotiations start. I have never believed and I do not believe now that there exists a plan for world domination by the Soviet Union. This I did not believe even in the previous period of which I spoke, but I know real peace will come when we understand that the Soviet Union must be a conceptions of security that exists on absolute security grounds, and that means absolute insecurity for anybody else. I mention this as a problem requiring solution, not as an organic fault that nothing can remove. Now, I can explain why I, who conducted many negotiations with the

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[Y]

each other and to ease the conflicts, and ten years from now, less or more, but within the lifetime of many of us and certainly within the lifetime of our children, there will be a world, in which the two super powers are relatively less decisive and many power centers will exist. So that we are in a position in which Kant's prediction will really come to pass. He said there will be perpetual peace. It will come about either through mankind's recognition of the categorical imperative, or through a series of endless conflicts which will teach mankind that it has no other choice. That is the real challenge before us. I have been uneasy about many of these, because, consciously or unconsciously, they seem to may to lead to an attempt to separate Europe and the United States to the denuclearisation of Europe and to the neglect of those problems which should be solved on the basis of mutual respect. The European House and European unity will best emerge in a peaceful world. Well conceived there can be no unilateral benefits for any serious negotiator. No country will be defeated by diplomacy without noticing it and when it notices it, the risks are great. So therefore fairness and a real understanding of the nature of peace are essential. All great achievements have been ideals before they became a reality. And the most important task the super powers have now and their friends is to define for themselves and together the kind of world they want to achieve and then make it possible to achieve it. Thank you very much.

May 3, 1988

SINCE I am the second speaker, I will not comment on anything
that Ambassador Falin put forward, because this was not intended
as a debate. So even if a few of my observations differ from
his point of view, this will be due to notes that were prepared
before this conference.

I took literally the proposal of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
to focus on European unity from the American prospective and
therefore in the first part of my remarks I will speak about
European relationships and European-American relationships, without
particular reference to the Soviet Union, as goals that have been
long established for their own sake. Then I will turn to some of
the current issues including the issue implied in the Soviet phrase
of "a common European house".

Let me begin by saying that what has been achieved in
Europe and in the relationship between America and Europe in
the last 40 years is one of the major accomplishments of this
century. There is no comparable period in European history

2

in which peace lasted so long. There is no comparable period
in European history in which economic development advanced so
rapidly and benefited such a large and predominant part of
the entire population. There is no period in European history
in which democratic institutions were furthered and established
in so many European countries. And there has never been a
war at the end of which former enemies have achieved such a
level of reconciliation as occurred between the former enemies
in Western Europe and the Federal Republic and between the
United States and its opponents after World War II. The Western
nations have every reason to be proud of these achievements.

These great achievements must not be dismantled
in the name of more or less vaguely stated theoretical prospects.
Nor should the West become so obsessed with its imperfections
and with its dangers that all that has been accomplished
becomes subject to controversy. Who would have thought it
possible at the end of World War II that European unity could

3

have made such great progress. Who would have believed that
France and Germany could abolish the very concept of military
conflict and that its heads of government would one day speak
of common citizenship first for themselves and then for all
Europeans? These accomplishments must not be forgotten nor
neglected when we turn to the tasks which are ahead of us.

The unity of the Western states is based on a community of
values which I mentioned when I had the great honor of receiving
the Karlspreis at the city of Aachen last year. It reflects four
propositions: First, the state is not the personal possession
of the ruler but of a community of all citizens who possess equal
rights in shaping the destiny of their community. Second, all
rulers, even the most powerful, are subject to law, written or
customary. Third, officials must justify themselves by a sense
of service to the community. and Four, the history of
West European nations and of the American nation can be

CJD

4

interpreted -- with all their shortcomings as a never ending struggle
for freedom in ever new forms throughout the centuries. These
fundamental values on which European unity has been based and
Western and Atlantic partnership was founded, with all due
respect to Ambassador Falin, distinguish the Atlantic nations
from the Soviet Union and from the history of Russia.

In preparing for this event I read several articles by
Ambassador Falin. From many of them I learned a great deal
about historical events especially surrounding the outbreak of
the Second World War. But there were two points that emerged in
his writings and in a discussion that was published in *The New York
Times* between him and my old friend Arbatow on which I would like
to make a comment. The impression is created in these writings that
the Western security system was based on some imaginary danger, that
there never existed a real threat and that therefore it is possible
to undo all these suspicions by recognizing that it was a mistake ever

5

to believe in a Soviet threat. Secondly Ambassador Falin claims
that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence has been a permanent
principle of Soviet foreign policy from the days of Lenin and
therefore that Gorbachev's policy is a logical evolution of a
permanent Soviet policy. This is not a reality I recognize.
European unity and the Atlantic partnership were based on a
diametrically opposite perception of reality which I believe
to be correct. The West since the end of the war has lived with
a consciousness of danger produced in part by disproportionately
large Soviet conventional forces and periodic crises including
two surrounding Berlin. It is perfectly possible -- even hopeful --
to make the argument that a new Soviet leadership has rethought the
international environment and that it has a claim to be taken
seriously when it insists that new assessments have led it to
new conclusions. It is not possible to accept the proposition
that no rethinking was ever necessary because Gorbachev's
policy is a logical evolution of Lenin's decree of peace very

early in the Soviet period. As far as the West is concerned
there is a real problem and we only delude ourselves by pretending
otherwise. I will return to that after dealing with problems
that have existed independent of Soviet policy in the construction
of European unity and of the Atlantic partnership.

In the immediate postwar period, when the United States was
militarily, economically and politically the dominant country,
a relationship developed between the United States and Europe that
in the long run could not be healthy. When one country dominates
a relationship on all major issues, when it chooses weapons and
deployment, conducts arms control negotiations and sets the
agenda for East-West negotiations and for much of Third World
diplomacy, little incentive remains for a coherent European policy.
America deserves great credit for the economic recovery of Europe
and the protection of Europe against outside threats. It is in
its interest that Europe achieves a greater articulation of its
own identity. That is necessary not because America wishes to

7

withdraw from Europe, but to enable the two sides of the Atlantic
to conduct a dialogue based on equality. Without this, consultation
turns into an adversary relationship. Only those who are believed
to have another option can be given credit for not exercising it.
Americans must have enough confidence that Europeans will see the
community of interests in a parallel manner to Washington. It
should not fear a greater strengthening of European unity. I
therefore want to congratulate the Bertelsmann Stiftung for its
initiative which I believe serves the cause of Europe and the cause
of peace. And it is also the more important because there is a
need for understanding of new conditions in which a European
contribution is essential. I would like to deal with two of them:
defense and East-West relations.

As for defense, it is undoubtedly true that nuclear war
would have catastrophic consequences for mankind. In a way,
the nuclear powers are condemned to coexistence because the
relationship between any rational political objective and the

8

destructiveness of weapons has been lost. From this, however,
it does not follow that in the field of strategy the Western
nations must commit themselves to an inevitably apocalyptic
strategy. All nations have an obligation to prevent war.
They have an obligation that if war should break out to
confine it to the least destructive level. It is absurd to
believe that anybody can have an interest in shifting the focus
of destruction from one continent to another. It will be demoralizing
if we in the West continue our internal debates over whether America
might want to turn Europe into a nuclear battlefield while sparing
itself. On this road we will all be paralyzed. It is the duty
of national leaders on both sides of the dividing line to tell the
public the truth, and the truth is painful; to keep repeating
all the time the purpose of our politics is to do away with all
nuclear weapons is either self-delusion or deliberately misleading:
on the Soviet side to demoralize its presumed adversaries, on the
Western side to abdicate to domestic politics. How is one possibly

9

going to have enough confidence in verification in territories
of the size of the Soviet Union or of the United States that all
weapons have been destroyed? I defy anyone to come up with an
inspection system that would give confidence that either power has
not kept back a residual force. The first thing negotiators would
do if they are serious and not engaged in propaganda is to
try to calculate the minimum number of weapons that must be
retained against a violation. And it would have to be sufficiently
large so that it could be detected by foreseeable verification
methods. Then they will have to consider what happens to other
nuclear countries in Europe and in Asia, some of which have
equally large territories not easily accessible to communications.

It is not possible to make a credible agreement that all nuclear
weapons be destroyed. I do not believe that our leaders should
propound unattainable objectives; they should talk about those
verifiable arms control measures that can in fact improve the
situation.

10

At the same time, the denuclearization of areas in Central Europe -- specifically the Federal Republic -- is technically feasible. But it would be politically disastrous. It would make no sense unless coupled with a doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, given the range of modern weapons, the denuclearized area would remain under threat from the outside. But once it is agreed that the West is prepared to lose certain areas to conventional war, the entire basis for postwar Atlantic policy will disappear. It will be a major step towards the removal of the American presence from Europe. Many proposals being put forward seem to me to have this tendency if not that intention. If that tendency should become dominant we would be talking about a revolution in postwar structures not a new era of conciliation.

11

and broad views. I would like to believe that there is an
opportunity for real progress in the East-West relation. At
the same time I recognize also that Perestroika imposes on the
Soviet leadership a huge task of domestic adjustment. Not every
bureaucratic center in the Soviet Union can possibly greet
the current trends with enthusiasm or else there would be no
need for Perestroika. I therefore think it is unlikely that the
Soviet leadership will volunteer propositions in the field of
foreign policy that challenge major power structures inside the
Soviet Union. The test will therefore be whether the West
can put forward a coherent notion of a peaceful world.

Some of you may know that I have not always expressed
myself with unreserved enthusiasm about some of the negotiations
that have been conducted—especially the INF accord. I must
point out however that the Soviets accepted Western propositions
and one cannot very well accuse somebody of bad faith for
having accepted proposals that were, after all, made by the

12

Western nations. This calls attention to the crucial need for
both sides of the dividing line to rethink their concepts and
programs.

What then should be the agenda if both West and East eschew
what is domestically easiest?

It seems to me there are three issues: The relationship of
the Soviet Union to Europe especially in military matters; secondly,
the relationship of the Soviet Union to its Eastern allies; and
third, the role of the United States in a new structure.

On the relationship of the Soviet Union to Europe, in this
divided country and in a Europe split in an unnatural and
unhistorical way it is impossible to pretend that there is no
historical context to international relationships. The partition
of Europe and the division of Germany have been a source less of
military conflict than of potential political tension in the sense
that can fully accept the present arrangement as an eternal feature
of Europe's future.

13

One problem is that the scale of the Soviet Union as of historical
Russia is out of proportion to the scale in which European security
considerations have been determined. A country that has eleven
time zones is of a different proportion than any historic European
country. Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than to Leningrad and
New York is closer to Bonn than is Vladivostok. History teaches
that Russia and the Soviet Union have often been invaded. So Soviet
security concerns are understandable, But it is also true that at
the end of each war Russia thought that it could satisfy its security
concerns only by annexing whole countries, not just provinces, back
to the seventeenth century. If one observes the march westward and
eastward of imperial and of Soviet Russia, the fact is that its
neighbors have in the end had a major security problem. This is
something that must be understood in Moscow, when serious negotiations
start. And it deserves discussion. I do not believe that there
exists a concrete plan for world domination by the Soviet Union.

14

But to have real peace the Soviet Union must come to a conception
of security that abandons the quest for absolute security which
means impotence and hence absolute insecurity for all neighbors.

This is why I, who conducted many negotiations with the
Soviet leaders, have been uneasy about the recent nuclear ones.
The current definition of negotiations has had the consequence
of focussing entirely on nuclear weapons. But as far as Europe
is concerned there will always be a part of the Soviet Union
that is not subject to the limitations on the deployment of
nuclear weapons. Therefore the impact of the removal of nuclear
weapons with strategic missions from Europe is not the same on
the American as on the Soviet side. The Soviet nuclear threat to
Europe has not been diminished because the Soviet long-range
arsenal is always available and the Soviet willingness to use
it is not affected by its location. But the American capacity
to defend Europe with nuclear weapons is impaired psychologically
by the location of these weapons on American soil or the sea.

15

There is a psychological difference between national defense and
the way sovereign nations assess what risks they will run for each
other. For that reason alone I have opposed focussing arms control
negotiation entirely on nuclear weapons and to leave for the future
the issue of conventional weapons. It focuses attention exclusively
on the weapons with which Soviet conventional superiority has been
offset. The threat remains while the counter to it is
uncontrolled.

The political problem is more serious. On the one hand
current arms control negotiations could create a psychological
imbalance in the perception of nuclear defense and a real
imbalance in relationships between the nuclear and the
conventional area. More importantly it ignores that every
major European crisis in the postwar period has resulted from
crises in Eastern Europe -- in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
and most recently in Poland -- so that a purely military approach
to the problem of Europe ignores political evolutions that are

16

inevitable. I do not believe that the West should do anything
to threaten the East European countries militarily or with para-
military measures, but the power of ideas can not be arrested.

So this should be a subject which should at least be in the minds
of the heads of government.

Finally, what are we to understand by the Soviet concept of
a European house? There are three ways in which a European house
could be defined. One, to take the existing alliances and to see
in what specific way the relation between them can be made at
first more tolerable and in time more creative. That I believe is
an important task. When I met the General Secretary, he asked
me why I was less than enthusiastic about Reykjavik and I
said because you were dealing with numbers appropriate for
technicians and not about the future of where the world should
be, say, in the year 2000, and then work back from there. This
could be done by the existing military alliances. Western
Europe in any future negotiations should participate as an

17

equal partner with the United States and not be given already
negotiated results for approval or disapproval. The second way
to look at the European house is as in some Soviet statements
as a Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic. That raises two
questions. What happens to the Soviet Union from the Urals
to the Pacific and what happens to the United States? Are we
going to see a European house from the Urals to the Atlantic,
and then an Asian house from the Urals to the Pacific to the
Western hemisphere? The result could be what amounts to a
Soviet protectorate over contiguous areas while ignoring the
cultural American-European heritage discussed earlier.

A third perception of the European house might be a Europe
from the Atlantic to the Soviet border. That is a Europe without
either of the two superpowers, Such a Europe however could be
brought about only if the superpowers agree not to intervene
in the inevitable political evolution in the circumstances of
altered military relationships. I personally believe that for

18

the foreseeable future we should pick the first of these options:
That is, a negotiation in which the existing military arrangements
are maintained but major efforts are made to reduce the risk of war
and to go on to a more creative relationship. I would also welcome
the Europe in which the superpowers permit a historic
political evolution from the Bug to the Atlantic. The Europe
from the Urals to the Atlantic excluding the United States is a
synonym for Soviet hegemony.

Some conceptual grasp of what Europeans are working towards
is all the more important because the next decade, whatever
the Soviet Union and the United States and Europe want will
see huge changes. Japan, China, India, certain countries
of Latin America will all become much more powerful and much
more active. In the past such historic changes have always
been accompanied by major tensions. The Soviet Union, the
United States, and Europe must take care or give these in-
evitable changes a creative direction. Ten years from now,

19

more or less, but within the lifetime of many of us and certainly
within the lifetime of our children, there will be a world
in which the two superpowers are less decisive and many power
centers will exist. We are in a position in which Kant's
prediction will really come to pass. He said there will be
perpetual peace. It will come about either through mankind's
recognition of the categorical imperative commanding reconciliation
or through a series of endless conflicts which will teach mankind
that it has no other choice.

That is the real challenge before us. I have been uneasy
about many current trends. Consciously as a mechanical extension
of traditional patterns much of current diplomacy seems to me to
lead to an attempt to separate Europe and the United States to
the denuclearization of Europe and to the neglect of those long-
term problems which must be solved on the basis of mutual benefit.
A proper European house and European unity will best emerge when
there can be no unilateral benefits for any side. No major

20

country will be defeated by diplomacy without noticing it and
when it notices it, the risks of war are too great. Therefore
fairness and a real understanding of the nature of peace are
essential. All great achievements have been ideals before they
become a reality. And the most important task the superpowers
and their friends have now is to define for themselves and together
the kind of world they want to achieve and to work seriously to achieve
it. Thank you very much,

MAY. 02 '88 15:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

I took literally the proposal of the Bertelsmann Stiftung to speak about European unity and therefore in the first part of my remarks I will speak about European relationships and European-American relationships, without particular reference to the Soviet Union, as goals that have been long established for their own sake, then I will turn to some of the current issues including the issue implied in the phrase "a common European house".

P.003

2

in which peace lasted so long. There is no comparable period
in European history in which economic development advanced so
rapidly and benefited such a large and predominant part of
the entire population. There is no period in European history
in which democratic institutions were furthered and established
in so many European countries. And there has never been a
war at the end of which former enemies have achieved such a
level of reconciliation as occurred between the former enemies
in Western Europe and the Federal republic and between the
United States and its opponents after World War II. The Western
nations have every reason to be proud of these achievements.

These are also great achievements that must not be dismantled
in the name of more or less vaguely stated theoretical prospects.
Nor should the West become so obsessed with its imperfections
and with its dangers that all that has been accomplished
becomes subject to controversy. Who would have thought it
possible at the end of World War II that European unity could

MAY.02 '88 15:07 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

3

have made such great progress. Who would have believed it
that France and Germany could abolish the very concept
of military conflict and that its heads of government would one
day speak of common citizenship first for themselves and then
for all Europeans? These are great achievements and they must
not be forgotten when we turn to the tasks which are ahead of us.

There is in the unity of the Western states a basis of a
community of values which I mentioned when I had the great honor
of receiving the Karspreis at the city of Aachen last year.

It reflects and which is based on four propositions. First: that the state is not the personal possession of the ruler but a community of all citizens who possess equal rights in shaping the destiny of their community. Second: that all rulers, even the most powerful, are subject to law, written or customary. Third: that officials must justify themselves by a sense of service to the community. And four, the quest for freedom, the history of the West European nations and of the American nation.

can be interpreted -- their shortcomings as a never ending
struggle for freedom in ever new forms throughout the centuries.
These have been the fundamental values on which European unity
has been based and Western and Atlantic partnership was founded
with all due respect to Ambassador Falin & distinguish
the Atlantic nations from the Soviet Union and from the
history of Russia.

In preparing for this event I read several articles by Ambassador Falin. From many of them I learned a great deal about certain historical events especially surrounding the authorship of the second World War. But there were two points that emerged in his writings and in a discussion that was published in *The New Times* between him and my old friend Arbatow on which I would like to make a comment. The impression is created in these writings that the Western security system was based on somebody's imagination that there never existed a real threat and that therefore it is possible to undo all these suspicions by recognizing that it was a mistake ever to believe in a Soviet threat. Secondly Ambassador Falin

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claims that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence has been a
permanent principle of Soviet foreign policy from the days of
Lenin and therefore that Gorbachev's policy is a logical evolu-
tion of a continuing Soviet policy. ~~With all respect,~~ this is
not a reality I recognize. Western unity, European unity, and
the Atlantic partnership were based on a diametrically opposite

perception of reality which I believe to be correct. The West
since the end of the war has lived with a consciousness of
danger produced in part by disproportionately large Soviet
conventional forces and periodic crises including twoWWII
Berlin. It is perfectly possible -- even hopeful -- to make
the argument that a new Soviet leadership has rethought the
international environment and that it has a claim to be taken
seriously when it insists that new assessments have led it to
new conclusions. It is not possible to accept the proposition
that no rethinking was ever necessary because Gorbachev's
policy is a logical evolution of Lenin's decree of peace very

MAY.02 '88 15:09 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

6

early in the Soviet period. As far as the West is concerned
there is a real problem and we only delude ourselves by pre-
tending otherwise. I will return to that after decline
~~to deal just~~ with problems that have existed independent of
Soviet policy in the construction of European unity and in the
~~construction of the Atlantic partnership.~~

In this divided country and in a Europe split in an
unnatural and unhistorical way it is impossible to pretend
that there is no historical context to international relation-
ships. The partition of Europe and the division of Germany
have been a source less of military ~~influenced~~ tension than of potential
political tension in the sense that ~~nobody~~ can fully accept
~~the present arrangement~~
thus as an eternal feature of Europe's future. Secondly, ~~in
immediate~~ the postwar period, when the United States was militarily,
economically and politically the dominant country, a relation-
ship developed between the United States and Europe that in
the long run could not be healthy. When once country dominates

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a relationship on all major issues, when it chooses weapons
and deployment, conducts arms control negotiations and sets
the agenda for East-West negotiations and for much of Third
World diplomacy, little incentive remains for a coherent
European policy. America deserves great credit for the economic
recovery of Europe and the protection of Europe against outside
threats. It has found itself for some time in the situation
in which it is in its interest that Europe achieves a greater
degree of articulation of its own identity. That is necessary
not because America wishes to withdraw from Europe, but to
enable the two sides of the Atlantic to conduct a dialogue
based on equality. Without this, consultation turns into an
adversary relationship. Only those who are believed to have
another option can be given credit for not exercising
Americans must have enough confidence that Europeans will see
the community of interests in a parallel manner to Washington.
It should not be fear a greater strengthening of European unity.

MAY.02 '88 15:10 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

8

I would like to deal with two of them: defense, and East-West relations.

As for defense, it is undoubtedly true that nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for mankind. In a way, the nuclear powers are condemned to coexistence because the relationship between any rational political objective and the destructiveness of weapons has been lost. From this however it does not follow that in the field of strategy the Western nations must commit themselves to an inevitably apocalyptic strategy. All nations have an obligation to prevent war.

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believe that anybody can have an interest ~~or~~ would be taken seriously in shifting the focus of destruction from one continuous to another. It will be ~~totally~~ demoralizing if we in the West continue our ~~INTERNAL~~ debates over whether America might want to turn Europe into a nuclear battlefield while sparing itself. On this road we will all be paralyzed. It is the duty of national leaders on both sides of the dividing line to tell the public the truth, and the truth is painful; to keep repeating all the time the purpose of our politics is to do away with all nuclear weapons is either self-delusion or deliberately misleading, ~~all peoples~~ on the Soviet side to demoralize its presumed adversaries, ~~all~~ on the Western side to abdicate to domestic politics. How is one possible going to have enough confidence in ~~verifications in~~ territories of the size of the Soviet Union or of the United States that all weapons have been destroyed.² I defy anyone to come up with an inspection system that would give confidence that either power has not

MAY.02 '88 15:11 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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kept back a residual force. The first thing negotiators would
do if they are serious and not engaged in propaganda, is to
try to calculate the minimum number of weapons that must be
retained against a violation. And it would have to be suffi-
ciently large so that it could be detected by ~~rationally~~
~~they will~~
foreseeable verification methods. Then ~~we have to consider~~
what happens to other nuclear countries in Europe and in Asia,
some of which have equally large territories not easily acces-
sible to communications. It is not possible to make a credible
agreement that all nuclear weapons be destroyed. I do not
~~unattainable objectives~~;
believe that our leaders should propound ~~this;~~ they should
talk about those ~~rationally~~ verifiable arms control ~~measures~~
that can in fact improve the situation.

MAY.02 '88 15:12 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

11

of nuclear weapons in that area. Otherwise, given the range of
modern weapons the denuclearized area would remain under threat
from the outside. But once it is agreed that the West is pre-
pared to lose certain areas to conventional war, the entire basis
for postwar Atlantic policy will disappear. It will be a major
step towards the removal of the American presence from Europe.
Many proposals being put forward seem to me to have this tendency
if not that intention. If that tendency should become dominant
we would be talking about a revolution in postwar structures
not a new era of conciliation.

Now let me turn to East-West relations in a broader sense.
I have had the privilege of meeting the Soviet General Secretary
and I have been very impressed by his intelligence, flexibility
and broad views. I would like to believe that there is an
opportunity for real progress in the East-West relations. At
the same time I recognize also that Perestroika imposes on the
Soviet leadership a huge task of domestic adjustment. Not every

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12

Bureaucratic center in the Soviet Union can possibly greet the current trends with enthusiasm or else there would be no need for Perestroika. I therefore think it is unlikely that the Soviet leadership will volunteer propositions in the field of foreign policy that challenge major power structures inside the Soviet Union. The test will therefore be whether the West can put forward a coherent notion of a peaceful world.

Some of you may know that I have not always expressed myself with unreserved enthusiasm about some of the negotiations that have been conducted especially the INF accord. I must point out however that the Soviets accepted Western propositions and one cannot very well accuse somebody of bad faith for having accepted proposals that were, after all, made by the Western nations. This call attention to the crucial need for both sides of the dividing line to rethink their concepts and programs.

MAY.02 '88 15:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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It seems to me there are three issues: The relationship
of the Soviet Union to Europe especially in military matters;
secondly, the relationship of the Soviet Union to its Eastern
allies; and third the role of the United States in a new structure.

On the relationship of the Soviet Union to Europe.

the Soviet guests here will agree with me that the scale of
the Soviet Union as of historical Russia is out of proportion
to the scale in which European security considerations have
been determined. A country that has eleven time zones is of
a different proportion than any historic European country.

Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than to Leningrad and New
York is closer to Bonn than Vladivostok. History teaches
that Russia and the Soviet Union have often been invaded. So
Soviet security concerns are understandable. But it is also
true that at the end of each war Russia seems to have thought
that it could satisfy its security concerns best by extending
its dominion over whole countries, not just provinces, back to

MAY.02 '88 15:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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14

the seventeenth century. If one observes the march westward
and eastward of imperial and of Soviet Russia, the fact is that
in the end its neighbors have also had a security problem. This is some-
thing that must be understood in Moscow, when serious negotia-
tions start. I have never believed that we can ever乎 do now
that there exists a concrete plan for world domination by the
Soviet Union. But to have real peace the Soviet Union must come
to a conception of security that abandons the quest for absolute
security which means impotence and hence absolute insecurity
for all neighbors.

This why I, who conducted many negotiations with the
Soviet leaders, have been uneasy about the recent nuclear ones.
I fear that the current definition of negotiations has had the
consequence by focussing entirely on nuclear weapons. But as far as Europe is concerned
will always be a part of the Soviet Union that is not subject
to the limitations on the deployment of nuclear weapons.
impact of the
Therefore the removal of nuclear weapons with strategic

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missions from Europe is not the same on the American as on
the Soviet side. The Soviet nuclear threat to Europe has not
been diminished because the long-range arsenal is always
available. But the American capacity to defend Europe with
nuclear weapons has been affected by the fact that the defense
location of the weapons in
has to be conducted from American soil or the sea. Hence by
a strategy
a foreign nation on behalf of a foreign nation. There is a
psychological difference between national defense and the way
sovereign nations assess what risks they will run for each other.
For that reason alone I have opposed focussing arms control
negotiation entirely on nuclear weapons and to leave for the
future the issue of conventional weapons. It focuses attention
exclusively on the weapons with which Soviet conventional
superiority has been offset. The threat remains while
the counter to is unrelieved.

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16

imbalance in relationships between the nuclear field and the
conventional area. More importantly it ignores that every
major European crisis in the postwar period has resulted from
crises in Eastern Europe -- in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
and most recently in Poland -- so that a purely military
approach to the problem of Europe ignores the inevitable political
evolutions. I do not believe that the West should do anything to
threaten the East European countries militarily or with para-
military measures, but the power of ideas can not be arrested,
so this should be a subject which should at least be in the hands
of the heads of government.

Finally let us deal with the ultimate question: What are we
to understand by the Soviet concept of a European house?
There are three ways in which a European house could be defined.
One, to take the existing alliances and to see in what specific
way the relation between them can be made at first more
tolerable and in time more creative. That I believe is an

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18

A third perception of the European house might be a Europe
from the Atlantic to the Soviet border. That is a Europe
without either of the two super powers. Such a Europe how-
ever could be brought about only if the superpowers agree
not to intervene in the inevitable agreement about superpower attitudes towards political evolution in the circumstances of altered military relationships.
I personally believe that for the foreseeable future we should
pick the first of these options: That is, a negotiation in
which the existing military arrangements are maintained but
major efforts are made to reduce the risk of war and to go
on to a more creative relationship. I would be prepared to
work for the Europe in which the superpowers permit a historic
political evolution from the旧 world to the Atlantic. The Europe
from the Urals to the Atlantic excluding the United States is
a synonym for Soviet hegemony.

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is all the more important because the next decade, whatever
the Soviet Union and the United States and Europe want will
see huge changes. Japan, China, India, certain countries
of Latin America will all become much more powerful and much
more active. In the past such historic changes have always
been accompanied by major tensions. The Soviet Union, the
United States, and Europe must take care or give these in-
evitable changes a creative direction. Ten years from now,
less or more, but within the lifetime of many of us and cer-
tainly within the lifetime of our children, there will be a
world, in which the two superpowers are relatively less de-
cisive and many power centers will exist. We are in a position
in which Kant's prediction will really come to pass. He said
there will be perpetual peace. It will come about either
through mankind's recognition of the categorical imperative
commanding reconciliation or through a series of endless con-
flicts which will teach mankind that it has no other choice.