Jessee Incao

From: kupchanc@georgetown.edu
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2003 6:29 PM
To: lawrence_summers@harvard.edu; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com; jfly@cfr.org
Subject: CFR Task Force Documents

tfoutline.doc (45 KB)

tfoutlineII.doc (45 KB)
tfsummary.doc (37 KB)

Dear Henry and Larry,

Attached please find three documents: Draft Outline - Version I, Draft Outline - Version II, and Summary of Main Findings.

Draft Outline - Version I is the document that we discussed on the phone last week. Draft Outline - Version II is a new outline, drafted on the basis of our last conversation. I have sought to give this version more conceptual heft - I agree that greater conceptual clarity will help distinguish our group's report from the others that are circulating. I have also sought to respond to Henry's suggestion that we give greater emphasis to the profound changes that have taken place in the international system and the degree to which they necessitate fundamental change in the Atlantic partnership.

Version II would not completely supplant Version I. Rather, it would provide the conceptual framework for the report, and some of the more specific proposals in Version I would be folded into this new framework.

Please also notice that I have included a recommendation in this document for a new transatlantic institution that spans the security, economic, and political realms. This idea picks up on discussions within the group (such as the proposals of Gordon Brown and Timothy Garton Ash), but since it was not present in the first draft of the outline, we may want to discuss it in our upcoming phone conversation.

The Summary of Main Findings is a condensed version of Draft Outline - Version II. You may recall that we agreed that both Larry and I would take a crack at such a summary document.

I look forward to speaking with you in the near future.

Best,

Charlie

CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations

Draft Outline – Version I

I. The Transatlantic Rift – Gravity and Causes.

* The current deterioration in relations is not just another round of irritation. The rift runs deep and jeopardizes decades of transatlantic partnership.

* The underlying causes of the rift are structural in nature.

  * The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a common threat.

    * America no longer needs to remain Europe's protector.

    * Europe is less reliant on the U.S. for its security.

  * The evolution of the European Union as a more mature and collective polity.

  * September 11 and diverging threat perceptions.

* Leadership, rhetoric, and style are also contributing to the rift. The behavior of governments on both sides of the Atlantic has reinforced structural tensions, adding to the ill will. Matters of tone and style are not underlying causes of the divide, but they complicate the task of adapting and adjusting to new conditions.

* Europe and America do share common values and have robust economic ties. But policy makers should not place false confidence in the ability of shared values and economic linkages to keep the Atlantic bond intact.

* Restoring cooperative Atlantic relations should be a top priority for Europeans and Americans. The stakes could not be higher. The U.S.-Europe partnership has been the anchor of the international system for decades. Neither side can afford to let it atrophy.

* This report sets out a strategy for keeping the Atlantic link strong and vital.

II. Guiding Principles

* The Atlantic Alliance in its traditional form cannot be restored. Too much has changed.

  * Europe and America are no longer central to each other's security.

  * Generational and demographic change is proceeding on both sides of the Atlantic.

  * The two sides of the Atlantic no longer share a strong sense of common identity.

* A new type of Atlantic partnership is, however, both highly desirable and feasible. America and Europe still share common ends even if they at times differ on the means. If America and Europe work together, they are far more likely to realize these common ends.

* A new transatlantic bargain entails:

  * Europe must do more to recognize the new strategic environment and help address new threats. In particular, it should demonstrate a willingness to

engage the United States in a dialogue about how to advance the struggle
against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As
part of this effort, Europe must be willing to forge with Washington an
understanding on the principles and practice of preventive war. The new
security strategy recently approved by EU leaders is an encouraging first
step.

o The United States must seek to ensure that its international leadership is exercised in a multilateral spirit. While reserving the right to act alone when necessary, Washington must reassure Europe of its willingness to adhere to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. In the words of Tony Blair, the United States must lead through persuasion rather than command.

o As the EU evolves, European leaders should articulate a vision of a Europe that retains vital ties to the United States even as it grows stronger and more independent.

o As it has since World War II, the United States should support the continued integration of Europe, including the EU's efforts to build a common defense policy, provided that the EU does not adopt an anti-American identity and cast itself as a counterweight to America. In this respect, Washington should welcome the institutional reforms proposed by Europe's recent convention.

### III. The Future of NATO

#### Why NATO Remains Relevant

* A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO continues to fulfill important functions and the interests of America and Europe alike would be compromised if the Atlantic Alliance erodes.

* NATO remains the premier forum for U.S.-European consultation on security matters. It is within NATO that the United States and Europe should seek to forge a meeting of the minds on the full range of security threats.

* Although Europe's lack of power projection capability has diminished NATO's relevance to America's new security concerns, Europe's capacities in peacekeeping and nation-building complement well America's war-fighting capacity. NATO provides a vehicle for utilizing the complementary nature of European and American strengths.

* Although the bloodshed has ended in the Balkans, there remains much unfinished business in the region. Even as the EU gradually assumes from NATO increased responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, NATO must stay engaged to prevent backsliding and help address residual political and territorial issues.

* NATO remains an important institution for encouraging reform and integration on Europe's periphery, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. Even as the

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United States focuses on the struggle against terrorism, it must not neglect the importance of consolidating peace in Europe's east and south.

## How NATO Should Be Adapted To New Conditions

* As the United States draws down its force levels in Europe, the EU must prepare to assume more responsibility for managing European security. As Europe's defense capacities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure continued transatlantic consultation.

* NATO must find the right balance between out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. Washington should not seek to turn the alliance into a vehicle for global force projection. At the same time, NATO should maximize its contribution to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

* Future conflicts may well be fought by coalitions of the willing rather than a collective NATO. Nonetheless, Washington should maximize pre-war consultations within NATO in order to facilitate the involvement of the alliance in post-war stabilization and reconstruction.

* NATO should develop its capacities in the areas of military police and peacekeeping.

* [Perhaps include a reference here to coalitions of the willing and the potential reconsideration of NATO's unanimity rule? A possible formulation: As NATO continues to enlarge, reconsideration of the unanimity rule will be necessary to ensure effective decision making within the alliance.]

## IV. Trade and Finance

* The U.S. and the EU account for roughly 40% of global GDP. They remain the engines of global growth and the stewards of the global economy. U.S.-European partnership continues to be vital to global economic stability.

* Commercial relations across the Atlantic remain strong. Political tensions have affected trade only at the margins; matters of commerce tend to be compartmentalized from those of security. But this segregation also means that strong commercial relations will not on their own preserve robust security links.

* If political tensions across the Atlantic continue to mount, they do have the potential to spill over into the commercial realm. At a minimum, American and European trade negotiators will find it more difficult to pursue further liberalization of the global economy if they are operating against the backdrop of a transatlantic rift.

* Specific initiatives that the U.S. and Europe should pursue include the following:

  * Coordinate diplomacy to ensure successful conclusion of the Doha round.

  * To be determined (LS, Gordon Brown, etc.)

## V. The Global Agenda

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* With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world. Identifying these challenges and mapping out a transatlantic strategy for dealing with them will enhance global stability and serve as a pragmatic means of breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

* The greater Middle East will continue to present the most pressing and imminent threats to the common interests of the United States and Europe. As efforts to realize the road map intensify, the United States and Europe must step up efforts to coordinate their diplomacy. Similar convergence of strategy should be pursued toward Iraq and Iran. Specific steps include:

  * Expand the use of the Quartet in developing and implementing regional initiatives.

  * The United States and EU should close ranks on a diplomatic strategy for halting Iran's nuclear program.

  * Washington should enlist greater European involvement in Iraq, even if doing so entails a more prominent UN role.

  * Other initiatives to be determined.

* The United States and Europe also need to develop a long-term strategy for fostering economic development and political liberalization in the Middle East and Africa. America and the EU urgently need to map out a program that succeeds in maximizing their diplomatic leverage and speeding aid and trade. Specific steps include:

  * Eliminating trade barriers in the areas of agriculture and textiles.

  * Supporting local organizations and programs that promote the deepening of civil society.

  * Expanding the Bush administration's efforts to tie aid to good governance while harmonizing conditionality with the EU.

  * Enhancing cooperation and funding on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.

  * Enhancing joint efforts to prevent and halt civil wars and ethnic conflict in countries such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Congo.

  * Deepening transatlantic cooperation to promote basic education and health care systems. At relatively low cost, the U.S. and Europe have the potential to markedly expand access to education and health care, both of which are critical to social and economic development.

* Through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and less regularized channels, the EU is enlarging its diplomatic and economic presence in East Asia. This development provides an opportunity for enhanced U.S.-European cooperation in the region. Top priorities include resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula and drawing China into international markets and institutions.

* Washington's decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change continues to sour transatlantic relations. To remove this irritant and to address looming environmental crises, the United States should come forward with its own set of policy proposals.

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VI. New Institutional Initiatives

* In this final section of the report, we might take up some of the proposals for institutional reform that were discussed in the task force. These include:

  * The establishment of a standing Contact Group (Ash).

  * The formation of a caucus of democracies within the UN (Slaughter).

  * Other UN issues, such as reform of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

  * Changing the structure/composition of U.S.-EU summits, especially in light of the institutional changes likely to take in place within the EU at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference. In this respect, if the EU is soon to have a single foreign minister and an elected president of the Council, the United States should prepare to deal more regularly with a collective EU rather than with its individual member states.

  * Should the report mention the dispute over the ICC?

Draft Outline – Version II

Diagnosis

The traditional transatlantic partnership is eroding. Although exacerbated by diplomatic missteps on both sides of the Atlantic, mounting transatlantic tensions have structural roots – the disappearance of the common threat that bound Europe and America together, the emergence of a deeper, wider, and more independent European Union, and the divergent trajectories of domestic politics in the U.S. and Europe. Europe and America do share common values and have robust economic ties. But policymakers should not place false confidence in the ability of shared values and economic linkages to keep the Atlantic bond intact. Indeed, the transatlantic divide that opened over the Iraq war was a stunning affirmation of the secular erosion of the Atlantic Alliance. That traditional allies like France and Germany sought to thwart the United States on a matter Washington deemed to be of vital interest made clear the serious and unprecedented nature of the current crisis in Atlantic relations.

Despite these obstacles to transatlantic cooperation, the Atlantic link remains central to
international peace and prosperity. The U.S.-Europe partnership has been the anchor of
the international system for decades – neither party can afford to let it atrophy.
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore need to establish a new foundation
for Atlantic cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old order is gone for
good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map out a strategy for
realizing that vision.

Objective, Vision, Strategy

A vision of a transatlantic partnership for the future must aim at locking in the three historic achievements of the post-World War II era: 1) the establishment of a democratic Europe at peace; 2) the creation of a security community between North America and Europe – an Atlantic zone in which war is unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated; and 3) the establishment of a transatlantic partnership that serves as the central vehicle for promoting global stability and managing an open international economy.

The first objective is close to completion; democracy and prosperity have taken root in Europe's west and are in the midst of doing so in Europe's east. The second objective has been attained for now, but both sides of the Atlantic must ensure that security community does not unravel and give way to geopolitical rivalry. The third objective – continued Atlantic partnership – will be the hardest to sustain and is the one that will require the most innovation and determination.

In pursuing these objectives, the Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, America and Europe will no longer move in lock-step on matters of security. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

At least in the near term, this new strategic landscape will lead to the emergence of a new division of labor, in both geographic and functional terms. In geographic terms, Europe will focus its primary attention and its core military assets on consolidating peace in Europe while America concentrates its power and purpose primarily on promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. In functional terms, America will bring to the table its war-fighting capability, while Europe's main contributions will be in the areas of nation-building and peacekeeping.

The United States should remain engaged in Europe even as it focuses its attention on other quarters. And the EU should more regularly backstop America's global engagement by increasing its involvement in nation-building, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention in areas outside Europe. Furthermore, as Europe's institutional and military capacities evolve over time, the EU could down the road become a more complete partner of the United States on a global basis. Nonetheless, during this critical decade, a strategic division of labor seems inevitable.

Although this division of labor takes advantage of the complementary nature of American and European strengths, it does represent a strategic separation between the United States and Europe. This separation is a logical consequence of the changing threat environment and Europe's limited ability to project power beyond its own neighborhood. It is precisely because transatlantic unity will no longer be driven by geopolitical imperative that both America and Europe must now work harder to sustain their partnership. So too does this strategic separation reinforce the need for America and Europe to cooperate closely on a host of other fronts, including disrupting terrorist networks, managing the global economy, expanding democracy, and promoting health and economic growth in the developing world.

If a new transatlantic bargain is to emerge along these lines, the United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. America's international dominance remains unchallenged, making it both possible and necessary for the United States to wield its power with restraint, adhering to the practice and spirit of multilateralism in order to win the consent of others. Washington should also resist efforts to exacerbate intra-European divisions, instead welcoming a more unified Europe - provided that the EU does not adopt an anti-American identity and cast itself as a counterweight to America.

In return, even as Europe focuses on consolidating a peaceful continent, it must do more to recognize the new strategic environment and help address new threats. In particular, the EU should seek to forge with the United States a common approach to the new security agenda, updating both practice and principle to the challenges posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential need for preventive war.

By granting Europe more autonomy and voice, America is likely to find in Europe a partner more willing to share the burdens associated with international stability. By more readily working with Washington to meet new international threats, Europe is likely to find in America a brand of leadership more to its liking. Nonetheless, differences of approach will no doubt continue to emerge, necessitating that both parties better learn how to tolerate disagreement and prevent it from compromising a broader sense of amity and common purpose.

The Task Force recommends a three-prong strategy for realizing this vision and putting Atlantic relations on a more sound foundation: *preserve comity, recast the defense partnership, and define a new agenda for concrete cooperation.*

## Preserving Comity

Although it will not be possible to sustain the tight alliance of the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies can do much better than let decades of partnership give way to acrimony. If the current drift is left unaddressed, a common identity and sense of affinity could be replaced by mutual suspicion among rising generations of both Americans and Europeans. Policymakers must urgently seek to arrest the tearing of the Atlantic community's social fabric and lock in a stable, even if looser, partnership.

Preserving comity and maintaining the transatlantic community as the anchor of the international system requires:

* Recovering a harmonious and constructive spirit of diplomacy and consultation. Absent geopolitical imperative, effective diplomacy will prove essential to maintaining solidarity.

* Mapping out new rules of the road.

  * Developing a common approach to preventive action and counter-proliferation.

  * Addressing the appropriate role of international institutions and the appropriate means of legitimating joint action.

  * Dealing with disagreements (opting out rather than actively resisting, following the model of the Concert of Europe rather than the Iraq war).

* Ensuring that political differences do not spill over into areas of trade and finance.

* Building a new transatlantic institution that spans the political, economic, and security realms. This new institution should substantially deepen formal U.S.-EU contact in step with the EU's own institutional evolution.

## Recasting the Defense Partnership

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NATO has lost its centrality and its ability to serve as the anchor of the Atlantic partnership – hence the need for a new, more encompassing institution. At the same time, NATO remains an important forum for joint military planning, for preserving peace in the Balkans, for encouraging reform and integration on Europe’s periphery, and for carrying out peacekeeping missions outside Europe. Adapting NATO to new conditions and maximizing its relevance entail:

* Deepening and regularizing EU-NATO military links, especially as the EU broadens its defense responsibilities.

* Maintaining more than a token U.S. military presence in Europe – even as a drawdown proceeds – in order to preserve military-to-military contacts and encourage interoperability.

* Enlarging NATO's role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; expanding its capacities in policing and peacekeeping.

* Revising NATO's unanimity rule in order to ensure effective decision making.

## Defining a New Agenda for Concrete Cooperation

With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world. Mapping out a joint transatlantic strategy for dealing with these challenges will enhance global stability and serve as a pragmatic means of breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

* Facilitating further liberalization of U.S.-EU commercial relations and the global economy; eliminating tariffs on and subsidies of textiles and agricultural goods is of particular importance because of the benefit to developing countries.

* Continuing and deepening intelligence, law enforcement, and financial cooperation on disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks.

* Deepening cooperation on stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and containing nascent nuclear programs, such as those in Iran and North Korea.

* Greater coordination of efforts to reach a peace settlement in the Palestine-Israel conflict.

* Mapping out a long-term strategy for promoting health, economic growth, and political liberalization in the Middle East and the developing world more broadly.

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CFR Transatlantic Task Force Report

Summary of Findings

Diagnosis

Despite these obstacles to transatlantic cooperation, the Atlantic link remains central to
international peace and prosperity. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore
need to establish a new foundation for Atlantic cooperation. To do so, they must
recognize that the old order is gone for good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic
community, and map out a strategy for realizing that vision.

Vision and Strategy

The Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, America and Europe will no longer move in lock-step on matters of security. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, WMD, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

The key features of this vision are:

* A new division of labor. Europe will focus its primary attention on consolidating peace in Europe while America concentrates primarily on promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. America's strength's in war-fighting will be complemented by Europe's strengths in nation-building and peacekeeping.

* A new bargain. The United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. In return, even as Europe focuses on consolidating a peaceful continent, it must do more to recognize the new strategic environment, help address new threats, and backstop U.S. engagement in areas outside Europe.

* Greater tolerance. Differences of approach will no doubt emerge, necessitating that both parties better learn how to tolerate disagreement and prevent it from compromising a broader sense of amity and common purpose.

Preserving Comity

[L.C.]

NATO remains an important forum for joint military planning, for preserving peace in the Balkans, for encouraging reform and integration on Europe's periphery, and for carrying out peacekeeping missions outside Europe. Adapting NATO to new conditions and maximizing its relevance entail:

With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world.

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September 19, 2003

TO: Henry Kissinger
Larry Summers
Charlie Kupchan

FROM: Richard Haass

RE: Latest Transatlantic Task Force Draft

Sirs: I have read what I believe to be the most recent draft, and while improved, I would suggest it still has a ways to go before it is likely to have the impact we all seek. I will get some line in/line out comments directly to Charlie, but here are some broader reactions:

-I believe the draft exaggerates the risk of U.S.-European rivalry and a return of traditional great power politics a la previous centuries. The real danger for the next few decades at least is less that and more a lack of cooperation/partnership. If this comes about, the two sides will be much less able to deal with the regional and transnational issues that define this era. Said differently, I am worried less about growing rivalry across the Atlantic than I am about diminishing relevance and effectiveness of the transatlantic relationship.

-Some of the language is too "wonky" for my taste. Here I would single out the talk of "other" and "self" on page 4. A bigger problem throughout is the lack of clarity. For example, the call for the United States to "remain engaged in Europe" on page 10. Or what you mean by NATO expanding its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan on page 25. Or the call for the United States and EU to make the G-8 a more effective forum for managing the global economy on page 26. Such statements are not useful absent specifics for what you have in mind.

-I agree with not getting into which side is to blame more for the current problems. But to suggest the current situation is 100% structural, i.e., inevitable, wont persuade many. You at least need to posit that statements and actions by leaders on both sides have exacerbated the situation even if you do not get into the specifics.

-More needs to be said re the cause and impact of trade differences post-Cancun.

-The draft could be more direct in making clear to Europeans that they have as much to lose as does the United States if we fail to cooperate.

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- The discussion of the United States and European integration needs to be more explicit. (I have attached a copy of an article by Gerry Baker of the FT. Agree or not, the report should take on what he writes about, especially his recommendations on the last page.)

- Why isn't genocide (a la Kosovo) a trigger for the potential use of force (page 17)?

- I disagree strongly with the assertion on page 20 that the current institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship is obsolete. (Ironically, the draft seems to as well in it is discussion of NATO's role on page 22.) I am also unpersuaded of the need for a new "oversight body" as suggested on page 21, which seems to put forward a mechanical fix to a political problem, but this is obviously your call. But if you do go this way, you should make a stronger case for it, explain why the task can't be accomplished just as well or better by existing institutions and better consultations, and explain how this new body would affect existing institutions, such as NATO. Also, you might want to opine on whether the quad should be maintained/revised.

- Why such a division of labor, where the United States does warfighting and the Europeans emphasize peace operations and nation building? Why not have both do both?

- I would think the discussion of the new Iraq UNSC resolution (page 25) will be overtaken by events.

- Why fudge the discussion on page 25 of voting within NATO? If you think the veto is obsolete or undesirable given NATO's increase in size and the reality that it will mostly be dealing with challenges that will not fall under Article V, then there is a case for revising its decision-making.

- I would not conflate your suggestions for the United States and Europe to promote economic growth and political reform in the developing world with a call for the two to actively promote political, economic, educational, etc reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The latter requires a different set of programs. I also question the need for a section on East Asia and, if you include it, the absence of a section on Africa.

- You may want to sharpen the back end of the report by breaking out recommendations to the United States, those for Europe, and those for both.

I hope some of the above is useful. Over to you.

Cc: Jim Lindsay
Lee Feinstein

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Against
United Europe

*It probably isn't in Europe's interest.*
*It certainly isn't in America's.*

By GERARD BAKER

America wasn't the only country attempting a bit of nation-building this turbulent summer. While U.S. troops and U.N. diplomats battled insurgents in the streets and deserts of Iraq, European politicians and bureaucrats, in the less demanding surroundings of Brussels bistros and Provençal villas, were putting the finishing touches on a project that might prove every bit as consequential as the liberation of Baghdad.

Next month the Europeans will attempt to mop up the last remnants of opposition to a proposed new constitution for the European Union, the first ever codification of a supreme legal authority for the current 15 and soon-to-be 25 members. For two years, in a conscious effort to emulate the work of America's Founding Fathers, committed Europeans, under the leadership of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, have been at work in a constitutional convention to draw up a document that would establish a new relationship between their nations. In June these soi-disant successors to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton produced a draft constitution that seeks to construct in effect the basic institutions of a single European superstate. In October, member governments will begin a lengthy conference before deciding whether to approve the document.

Of course, to skeptical electorates in the member countries, the federalists strenuously deny that they are building a European über-nation. It is merely a tidying-up exercise, they say; European law already supersedes the laws of individual European nations in a number of fields. The new constitution simply recognizes this in one document.

This is pure casuistry. The draft E.U. constitution—1,000 pages long (imagine that debate in Philadelphia)—

enshrines in law a single flag, anthem, motto, and currency for the union. Less symbolically but more significantly, it also creates a single president to replace the current arrangement whereby the presidency rotates through the member states every six months, as well as a single foreign minister to run a single foreign policy. It establishes vast areas of European law where nation-states cede ultimate legal sovereignty to E.U. courts. And it creates a "charter of fundamental rights," which includes a long list of such basic human freedoms as the right to be represented on workers' councils—think Bill of Rights in socialist garb. Indeed the true intent of these founding fathers was revealed by their original proposal right at the outset of their proposed constitution—to rename the E.U. the United States of Europe (USE).

Not all governments are happy with these ideas—the USE moniker did not survive, and the drafters will probably be forced to drop some of their more ambitious proposals. But these will be mere tactical retreats. This week, even Tony Blair's British government made clear it would accept the basic principles. The constitution is expected to be approved at a summit in Rome in December and then ratified by the member states. By the end of 2005, the E.U. constitution will join the euro—Europe's single currency, launched four years ago—as a central pillar of an emerging European state.

Americans can be forgiven for yawning at these developments on the old continent. The internal deliberations of Brussels committees can send the most engaged Europeans to sleep, let alone Americans. But even those Americans who are paid to keep track of what Europe is up to—at the State Department, in Washington's think tanks, and in the White House—do not seem unduly animated. The new European Union that is being born is nothing for the United States to get agitated about, they say. Indeed, from President Bush on down, U.S. officials repeat the old line that European integration will bring untold benefits to the United States. Future Henry

Gerard Baker is associate editor of the Financial Times.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 23

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Kissingers will never again have to complain about whom to call when they want to talk to Europe.

If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of the highest order. The events of the last year should have demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united Europe.

The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld hailed in the run-up to the Iraq war—an alliance of Atlanticist nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe. It is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a self-appointed counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are likely to be the main drivers of its political direction.

Calm down, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons why the United States should not get agitated at events across the Atlantic. For starters, there is the "It will never happen, so why worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist superstates at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful European foreign policy identity?

It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of the summer adding some enteringly trivial ones. Last month aninsanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafloso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the russle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe?

But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory—if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off—and they have no intention of falling off.

In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design for the new euro was unveiled.

There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U.

that tilts the whole process strongly towards closer integration—and towards a particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the most federalist country, and France, which supports European union on French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see an opportunity to punch way above their weight in international affairs if Europe is united.

These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U. security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core. In neither France nor Germany is there any talk ofcororienting policy post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the United States.

Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic at work—one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's Spain, and the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving in our direction.

This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including Blair. If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes, Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted most European moves towards integration have been the least influential. In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed Europeanists who make up the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win this game.

As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has powerful economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the United States offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official Europe was vicious, "One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission.

All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?"

This "Europeans as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to

24/THE WEEKLY STANDARD

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

09/20/2003 17:44 FAX 202 518 3431

09/19/2003 09:13 FAX 212 434 9880

Council on For. Rel.

EXECUTIVE CFR

1006
1008/006

(L.C.)

turn itself into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single nation—with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check.

Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa.

And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could also make European awkwardness more of a constraint for America. It has long been an axiom of U.S. policy that Europe should develop military capabilities of its own—genuine ones that would enable Europe to fight hot wars in difficult places and take some of the burden off the Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a united Europe really does develop enhanced capabilities, it is inconceivable that it will not demand a bigger say in the decision-making in new international crises.

Finally, there are those who accept all these premises, but still say, What can the United States do about it? U.S. intervention in a private debate won't help—and will probably make matters worse. The one thing that would make Europeans more determined to press ahead with their project is the idea that the United States was trying to stop it.

But this does not mean Washington is powerless. It can do a number of useful things. Above all, it can stop spouting the outdated Cold War idea that an integrated Europe is in the best interests of the United States. Can anyone now seriously believe that a single E.U. foreign policy will be more helpful to the United States than a British, a Polish, and a Spanish one?

Second, it should strengthen its political and military ties with Eastern Europeans. Moving troops out of Germany to Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps other countries is a smart move, as was offering the Poles a leading role in postwar Iraq.

Third, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger European military capabilities. France

co-German-Belgian-Luxembourg plans for a core E.U. military alliance can easily be laughed off. But in these testing times, the United States should be extra careful about a separate European identity within NATO.

Fourth, it should oppose any plans to change the membership of multilateral institutions to reflect a single "European" identity. There should be no talk of a U.N. Security Council seat for Europe, or the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three in international economics to replace the G7.

Fifth, it should refrain from doing anything that might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for European integration than Britain's joining this ill-starred project. U.S. officials sometimes argue that the U.K.'s membership in the single currency would help American businesses. There is scant evidence for this, and the imperus such a British decision would give to European superstatehood cannot be overstated.

In the end, U.S. policymakers should know that the biggest threat posed for the United States by European ambitions comes from inside Europe. Most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already been handed over to Brussels. The dynamic of European integration is not a popular one, but one driven by political elites, and there is already evidence of mounting unease among the general public. The euro, the biggest leap yet towards European statehood—and the monetary and fiscal policies required to make it work—are causing real stresses for Europeans.

There are signs of broader political unrest—of a growing mood of popular disenfranchisement, with increasing support for extreme-right parties in France, Italy, Germany, and even Britain, as voters react with irritation to the growing gap between the governing institutions and the governed. In the last three years, voters in Ireland and Denmark have rejected grandiose E.U. integration plans in referendums. Polls going into Sweden's September 14 referendum on joining the euro suggest the Swedes could deliver another rebuke to the Euro-federalists.

But still the European creators press on, continuing to shift power away from communities, regions, and nations in favor of the emerging supernation in Brussels.

This is the ultimate irony. The Europeans see themselves as latter-day Thomas Jeffersons and George Washingtons, creating a new state and a new continental global power. But they are closer in spirit to George III and General Cornwallis—imposing a remote, burdensome, and ultimately undemocratic authority on a reluctant people. The risks for stability in Europe are obvious. It is not too late for the United States to help stop the European superstate from becoming a reality.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 25

Jessee Incao

From: JFly@cfr.org
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2003 6:06 PM
To: julia_topalian@harvard.edu; beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: CFR Task Force -- Giuliano Amato's Comments on the Draft Report

Dr. Kupchan asked me to pass on these comments from Giuliano Amato on the draft Task Force report to Dr. Kissinger and President Summers.

Regards,
Jamie

Jamie M. Fly
Research Associate, Europe and National Security
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 518-3404
Fax: (202) 986-2984
http://www.cfr.org

------Forwarded by Charles Kupchan/DC/CFR on 09/23/2003 05:33PM------

To: "ckupchan" <ckupchan@cfr.org>
From: "giuliano\.amato\@iol\.it" <giuliano.amato@iol.it>
Date: 09/23/2003 11:44AM
Subject: draft report

Dear Charlie,

I told you already that I cannot attend our final meeting. Let me make my remarks on the draft by e-mail. First of all, I want to tell you that you have done an excellent job. Most of the relevant observations and comments of our previous discussions have been utilized and now enrich the clear and tense thread that runs through the draft. This is really remarkable. Some specific comments:

- pag. 5. Here you write that "Some Europeans have become openly hostile toward the US...." I would put it somehow differently by saying that "In Europe a radical hostility toward the US, that had been minoritarian in portraying it as the main threat to international stability, has been gaining ground and affects also political actors at the center of the European stage" (or something similar);

- pag. 9, where you conclude on the reasons that both parties have for making the rejuvenation of their partnership. Here I would add that it is not without importance that third countries still look at them as a sort of joint counterpart in relation to their responsibilities toward the world. They are the richest ones, they also are, in different ways, the "exemplary" democracies, and consequently they share common responsibilities;

- pag. 12, where you speak of strategic separation and division of labor. Here I would dare to introduce the notion of 'regional power' for Europe, which reflects the actual role of Europe itself, without excluding its role vis a vis the wider world;

- pag. 15: A deeper and more united Europe is in the interests of the US also because a united Europe would necessarily reflect the 'average' feelings of all of the Member States. And such average is closer to the US than some of the individual States. Can we say this explicitly? One of the consequences could be the US support to a European seat in the UN.

- pag. 19: I would delete the sentence where you say that "they may at times feel compelled

1

to take military action despite the absence of UN authorization". This is very controversial. Let us work on an agreement on the need to also cover 'threats' and therefore preventive actions; let us promote (as you suggest in pag. 20 and 21) institutions that better meet the challenges of the day. The consequences will follow:

pag.22: the proposal of a small standing council is a good one. Shouldn't we be more precise on the "European officials"? Are they officials of the EU or of the Member States or of both?

-pag.27 and following pages: are you sure that it is advisable for us to enter into the global governance agenda, the economic agenda and so forth? We run the risk to forget this or that important item. Isn't better to more broadly refer to these areas and say that the US and Europe should set their 'joint' roles, without further details?

Thank you, Charlie, for what you have done. And than you for the attention to these comments. Giuliano

TRANSATLANTIC
TRENDS 2003

# POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION:

## *Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Trans-Atlantic Divide*

Ronald Asmus (GMF),

Philip P. Everts (Leiden University) and

Pierangelo Isernia (University of Siena)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the trans-Atlantic relationship has witnessed some of the greatest debates and differences recorded in U.S.-European relations, most recently on the war in Iraq. Not surprisingly, this turbulence has also generated a growing debate over the nature and causes of such differences. A number of different views have been put forward. One explanation suggests that such differences are largely attributable to the policies of the Bush Administration. Another argues that the advent of the Bush Administration is not a major factor and that the two sides have become increasingly incompatible as a result of the growing asymmetry in power across the Atlantic. Yet another argues that current differences are essentially rooted in widely differing threat perceptions in the U.S. and Europe after 911.

It is perhaps inevitable that proponents of each of these views will look for — and sometimes find — public opinion research results that tend to confirm their own differing hypotheses. At the same time, the core issue of where and why American and European publics differ on questions of war and peace has not yet been adequately addressed. Against this backdrop, this essay attempts to supplement the analysis of this year's

survey results by digging a bit deeper into the nature and structure of the trans-Atlantic divide. It is designed as an analytical companion piece to and should be read together with the Transatlantic Trends 2003 study.

If one steps back and asks what we have learned from the Transatlantic Trends result from the last two years, one can draw several conclusions:

* Fears about American or European isolationism are misplaced. The American public is more willing to play an active role in world affairs than at any time in recent memory. Similarly, there is clear support in principle across Europe for the EU to take on global responsibility — but that support is tempered by a limited willingness to spend resources.

* Americans and Europeans still basically like each other, although such warmth has slipped this past year in the wake of the Iraq war. This drop, however, takes place from a historically very high level. While the Iraq war has led to a backlash, it is also noteworthy that this backlash has thus far remained modest. To some degree it appears largely focused on the Bush Administration as opposed to the U.S. more generally.¹ Anti-American and anti-European

¹ The question was not addressed directly in the 2003 TT survey although, as we shall argue, it does contain some clues in a more indirect fashion. Other recent polls provide at least partial answers. Data from the PEW survey, held at about the same time as the TT survey (May 2003), showed in this connection that people who demonstrated unfavorable attitudes on the U.S. by and large did so because of what they felt about President Bush and not because of their views on America in general. This was true for 74% of those who had negative feelings in general in France and Germany, while figures for other European countries showed a similar effect (Italy: 67%, Great Britain: 59%, Spain 50%) (Poll for the Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press, May 2003). Likewise, in another survey, majorities in thirty-eight countries out of forty-three, agreed that the war against Iraq had had a negative effect on their opinion concerning the U.S (Gallup International, April-May 2003).

POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 2003 | 1

sentiments may exist but they are not dominant views. Americans and Europeans continue to have clear and shared views of who are their friends and who are not — and they clearly still see each other as friends. All of this testifies to the ongoing durability of traditional trans-Atlantic ties.

* Americans and Europeans continue to see each other as potential partners. While European support for America's global role under President Bush has fallen, such slippage also takes place at a high level. Americans are strongly supportive of the EU becoming a more equal partner and both sides of the Atlantic continue to see their relations as cooperative and not competitive.

* Nor do the problems across the Atlantic appear rooted in radically different threat perceptions in the wake of September 11th. On the contrary, the results of Transatlantic Trends suggest that when Americans and Europeans look out at the world, they by and large assess the threats they face in similar terms. Americans and Europeans do not live on different planets when it comes to viewing the threats around them.

* However, both sides of the Atlantic clearly do have different impulses when it comes to how to respond to such threats, the efficacy of military vs. economic power and, finally, how one defines legit-

imacy and views the role of the United Nations. Yet even here it is not entirely clear to what degree trans-Atlantic differences on the use of force reflect deeply held convictions and matters of principle, are contingent upon specific scenarios or are also being shaped by an overall skepticism vis-à-vis policies publicly associated with the Bush Administration.

So what is going on? If Americans and Europeans both want to be engaged in the world, still basically like one another, would like to work together as partners and also see the threats facing both sides of the Atlantic in similar ways, how and why did we end up with such a dramatic divergence in debate and public opinion on the war in Iraq? Why did President Bush end up with a clear majority supporting going to war in Iraq — with little domestic political need to seek authorization from the United Nations Security Council? Why was Tony Blair so keen on getting such a resolution — and obtaining it really so crucial in terms of convincing British public opinion that this war was just? And why was public opinion in some continental European countries so strongly opposed to war — and seemingly so different from the United States? Why did some leaders in the Alliance seem to have considerable leeway when it came to their public opinion, yet others faced very real and formidable constraints?

2 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003

[LC]

## 2. UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC: A FOREIGN POLICY TYPOLOGY

To begin answering such questions one needs to go beyond our initial analyses of this year's data and seek to identify those more fundamental beliefs that drive and shape public opinion. The question we want to address thus relates not to only to differences across the Atlantic but also to differences *within* both the United States and European countries on these issues as reflected in specific schools of thought. To accomplish this, we developed a typology of foreign policy attitudes centered on different attitudes on different kinds of power (e.g. economic vs. military power), the efficacy of their use as well as their legitimacy, in short 'soft' and 'hard' power. These were chosen because they are among the central issues at the core of the alleged trans-Atlantic divide. Combining different attitudes toward both economic and military power and the acceptability of military force we distinguish four distinct groups:

* **Hawks:** Members of this school believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice, and that military power is more important than economic power. They also tend to be wary of international institutions, especially the United Nations. They are not interested in strengthening the UN and are willing to bypass it when using force.

* **Pragmatists:** Members of this school also believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice but that economic power is becoming more important than military power. They tend to recognize the important role of international institutions, including the United Nations and the need to strengthen them. They prefer to act with multilateral legitimacy but are also prepared to act without it to defend their national interests if need be.

* **Doves:** Members of this school disagree that war is sometimes necessary and believe that economic power is becoming more important than military power. Like Pragmatists, they want to strengthen institutions like the UN. Unlike Pragmatists, they are very reluctant to use force absent international legitimacy.

* **Isolationists:** Members of this group neither believe that war is sometimes necessary nor that economic power is becoming more important in world affairs.

The point of departure for operationalizing this typology is formed by the answers to two key questions. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: 1) 'Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice' and 2) 'Economic power is becoming more important in the world than military power'. Combining and cross-tabulating the answers to these two questions and excluding the missing cases produces the figures for the size of the four distinct groups mentioned below (Figure 1):

FIGURE 1
A TYPOLOGY OF FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

How sturdy is this typology? Does it really capture the underlying differences between and within the U.S. and Europe? There are two different tests one can apply to check the resilience of this breakdown. The first one is what is called *face validity*. The key question here is whether the typology makes intuitive sense and gives us the confidence to argue that different attitudes on just war or the role of economic power reflect deeper convictions that carry over to other issues. It does given the prominent place of considerations about the use of power in thinking about international affairs.

POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 2003 | 3

The second and more important test is what is referred to as construct validity. Does our index help to predict other foreign policy attitudes? And do these predictions follow the direction our theory would suggest? The first question is relevant but the second is actually more important. To test the validity of the typology we cross-tabulated it across a wider set of foreign policy attitudes and we found that it did indeed function well as a predictor of certain key attitudes. We provide some examples.

- *Attitudes on the war with Iraq:* Hawks are more likely to support the Iraq war and to judge it was worth the costs than any other group, followed closely by Pragmatists and only at a distance by Isolationists and Doves. 55% of the Hawks and 48% of the Pragmatists "think the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life and other costs," while only 12% of the Doves and 15% of the Isolationists think so.

- *United Nations:* Hawks are also less likely to want to strengthen the United Nations and more likely to agree that one is justified to bypass the United Nations when vital interests are involved. Pragmatists and Doves both want to strengthen the UN but Pragmatists are still willing to bypass it if necessary to defend vital interests.

- *Military expenditures:* Hawks are likely to say we are spending "too little" or "the right amount" on defense whereas Doves are likely to think that we are spending "too much." Among Hawks, 30% think we are spending "too little" and 47% think we are spending

"the right amount," while among Doves, 40% think we are spending "too much."

- *Economic aid:* Doves are likely to say that we are spending "too little" and Hawks are likely to say we are spending "too much" on economic aid. 48% of the Hawks think we are spending "too much" on economic aid, while 36% of the Doves think so.

- *Attitudes toward the use of force:* Hawks are more likely to support the use of military force than Doves in all the scenarios tested in our survey (e.g., scenarios involving the acquisition by North Korea and Iran of nuclear weapons) irrespective of the kind of mandate that does or does not exist. They are also more likely to prefer military action to economic sanctions across different scenarios. 58% of the Hawks are willing to impose economic sanctions in a hypothetical international crisis, while 71% are willing to do so among the Pragmatists and 79% among the Doves.

- *Attitudes toward internationalism:* Both in Europe and U.S. there is an element or undercurrent of isolationism among the Doves. This relationship is apparent in the U.S. where Doves are often less internationalist. In Europe, this relationship holds in some countries, e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and U.K. In France and Italy, however, Doves are also more internationalist.

On many of these issues, Pragmatists tend to adopt a middle position between the Hawks and the Doves.

4 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003

At the same time, these overall European numbers mask some noteworthy differences among the countries. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, the structure of public opinion is similar to that of the United States. At the other end of the spectrum, it is quite different in a country like Germany. The latter has the smallest percentage of both Hawks and Pragmatists as well as the largest number of Doves. Whereas in the United Kingdom, Hawks and Pragmatists combine for a total of 77%, in Germany they amount to less than half of that at 39%. Apart from the United Kingdom, the other European countries where the Pragmatists are more strongly represented are the Netherlands and Poland. In both of these countries, the combination of Hawks and Pragmatists adds up to a potential slim majority. At the other end of the European spectrum are Germany and France where Doves are the dominant school.

What does this suggest? In the United States, an American President — irrespective of his political persuasion — has considerable leeway in terms of building public support when it comes to the use of force. One can imagine differing coalitions forming depending on the issue and who is in power at any given time. One would be a coalition between Hawks and Pragmatists; a second might be a narrower foundation based solely on the Pragmatists; and a third could be an alliance between Pragmatists and Doves.

In Europe, the dynamics are likely to be quite different. In many if not all of the countries surveyed, the key to building stable and broad public support is dependent on a coalition between the two dominant groups — the Pragmatists and Doves. The former is concentrated on the center-right and the latter on the center-left. Given the dominant size of these two schools in Europe

and the way in which they are reflected in the party landscape, the nature of the public debate and the constraints on the ability of a government to use force is inevitably different from the United States. The Hawks are too small to be a major or relevant force in Europe — with only the United Kingdom being a possible exception. Nowhere on the continent is it large enough to be a major pillar of major public support. There may be cases — such as the Netherlands or Poland — where a slim public majority between the Hawks and the Pragmatists could be formed. But it is likely to be narrow and not a viable basis for long-term policy.

What can one deduce from this? Obviously, there are important differences in the structure of public opinion across the Atlantic — as well as within Europe — when it comes to attitudes on the use of force. Perhaps the most noteworthy one is the dominant size of the Pragmatists and the greater size of the Hawks in the United States. The potential pool of public support in the United States is much larger than in most European countries. The greater size of these groups clearly impacts the options a U.S. President has when it comes to building public support for going to war.

Does this gap mean that the U.S. and Europe are somehow incompatible or incapable of acting together on such questions? Clearly, if one were to sit an American Hawk across the table from a German Dove, they will not necessarily have much in common. They might even conclude that one comes from Mars and the other from Venus. The same might be true in the United States, however, if one paired a Bush Republican Hawk with a Howard Dean Democrat. If one were to pair an American Pragmatist with a European Pragmatist, on the other hand, they would in all likelihood have few problems in devising a common agenda.

6 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003

[L.C]

United States, the United Kingdom and in continental Europe on the question of war in Iraq and the freedom or constraints that public opinion provided or imposed on ruling governments. The figure illustrates the comfortable position of some governments and leaders and the awkward situation of others. Let us look at some of the individual countries.

### *The United States*

In the case of the United States, President Bush's point of departure was the much larger pool of potential supporters based on the size of both the Pragmatists and the Hawks. The 60% majority of Americans who believe that the war in Iraq was worth the costs comes over-

whelmingly from these two groups. Nearly three-in-four Hawks (74%) as well as two-in three pragmatists believe that the war was worth the costs. Such support was overwhelming among Republicans but also reached into the ranks of Democrats. It was not dependent upon obtaining further international legitimacy via the United Nations or a clearer demonstration that force was unavoidable. Due to the absence of such steps, however, the Iraq war was overwhelmingly opposed by American Doves.

### *The United Kingdom*

Although the structure of British public opinion is quite similar to the United States, Prime Minister Tony Blair

faced a very different political line-up, especially within his own Labour Party. Majority support for going to war in Iraq was potentially within reach for Blair, but the dynamics of how to get there were quite different. In contrast to Bush, Blair could not rely on a coalition of Hawks and Pragmatists within his own party. Indeed, the Labour straddles the Pragmatists vs. Dove fault line so typical in European countries. In order to bring his own party behind him, Blair needed a rationale that appealed to both Pragmatists and Doves. Blair's lower level of support on Iraq reflects the lower level of support he enjoyed on the right — only slightly more than half of British Hawks (55%) and Pragmatists (53%) — as well as the fact that only slightly more than one quarter of British Doves (28%) believe that the war was worth the costs. The Prime Minister's effort to secure a second UNSC resolution made good domestic sense as an attempt, albeit ultimately an unsuccessful one, to gain the kind of international legitimacy that could have given him greater support within this constituency.

POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 2003 | 9

## Germany

The point of departure for the German debate, as well as the result, was significantly different than in the United States or the United Kingdom. First, the potential pool of support for military action in Iraq in Germany was much smaller. Whereas Hawks and Pragmatists amount to over 80% of the American and British publics, together they are less than half of that in Germany (39%). If one looks at the supporters of Chancellor Schroeder and the current Social Democratic-Green coalition, they are even less. But what is striking in Germany is how few Hawks and Pragmatists also opposed the war. At the end of the day, the fact that over 85% of Germans do not believe the war in Iraq was worth the costs reflects not only the dominance of Doves in Germany and their overwhelming rejection of war, but the Bush Administration's inability to gain anything but the most tepid support among German Hawks and Pragmatists as well.

## *The Netherlands and Italy*

Support for the Iraq war in the Netherlands (41%) was

more than double that in Germany (15%) and three times higher than in France (13%). That higher level of support also reflects differences in the structure of Dutch public opinion discussed in the previous section — in particular the higher number of Pragmatists. Some six-in-ten (61%) of this group supported the war. What is interesting in the case of Italy is that whereas overall support for the war in Iraq is low (28%), Berlusconi did enjoy the support of more than half (52%) of Italian Pragmatists who, arguably, are an important part of his party's constituency even though they are fewer in numbers than Doves for the country as a whole. In the case of France, Poland and Portugal there is very little public space for supporting the Bush Administration's approach on Iraq among the groups supporting the ruling coalitions. These results show that if one goes beyond an aggregate analysis of the overall public, to a more detailed analysis of the voters supporting the ruling coalition, it can help explain why different leaders in Europe were able or forced to pursue very different policies.

## 5. LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?

The Transatlantic Trends 2003 survey also included a series of questions addressing public attitudes toward the use of force to prevent either North Korea or Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Respondents were asked whether they would support the use of force across a spectrum that included unilateral U.S. action, a US-led coalition of the willing, a NATO operation or, finally, action sanctioned by the UN Security Council. As noted in this year's Transatlantic Trends survey, these were experimental questions. Moreover, with respect to the levels of support for the use of force,

the answers may also be conditioned by the specific scenarios used.³ One therefore needs to be cautious about drawing broad conclusions from this data. With those caveats in mind, applying the typology developed above nevertheless allows us to examine how support for the use of force varies among the four groups in our typology in both the U.S. and Europe.

Figure 6 shows the aggregate responses to these questions for the U.S. and the European countries surveyed. It shows that there is a clear gap between the US and European publics surveyed of over 30%.

³ One should not forget, however, that the lower figures for support of the use of force for Europe are probably contaminated by the fact that the cases concerned, Iran and North Korea, are seen by large numbers of people as part of 'the Bush agenda', and hence for many elicit an immediate refusal to go along with military action. The figures should not be taken as absolute indicators of a (lower) level of support for the use of force in general. This is an issue where respondents are (extremely) sensitive to setting and question wording. Thus, for example, more complicated questions with more answer categories or with alternative policy options mentioned tend to reduce the support for the use of force among American respondents while increasing it among Europeans.

10 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003

In Figures 7-9 we break down that support in the United State, the United Kingdom and Europe according to our typology. Several interesting conclusions stand out. First, the results confirm that the United States stands in a league of its own. The use of force is supported by nearly 80% of the Hawks and of the Pragmatists and hardly fluctuates as one moves across our spectrum from a unilateral U.S. action to one sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Moreover, these two groups dominate the American landscape. In the case of American Doves, however, support is very low for a unilateral action or one involving a coalition of the willing but climbs considerably if there is a move to a NATO or UN action. The latter drives support for military action among Doves from around 30% to over 60%. Clearly, in the United States there is a reservoir of potential public support for the use of force to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In the case of the United Kingdom, we again find a structure that has much in common with the United States, but with some important differences. There is majority support for the use of force across the spectrum among Hawks and Pragmatists, albeit at a slightly lower level than in the United States. Like their American brethren, support for military action among British Doves is also heavily contingent upon the level of international legitimacy. That support climbs nearly 30 points percentage as one moves from a theoretical unilateral US action to one sanctioned by the United Nations. While the overall level of support among British Doves remains lower than in the U.S. it is higher than in any other European country.

For Europe as a whole, one again sees that the lower level of support is rooted in the same key factors discussed earlier. Support for military action is very weak among Doves who are a key if not dominant force in most countries. In contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom, such support does not increase significantly as one moves across our spectrum — at least not for the scenarios involving Iran and North Korea.

FIGURE 6

FIGURE 7

POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 2003 | 11

Although there is potential support among
European Pragmatists and Hawks, there are too
few in numbers to bring the overall European
levels of potential support close to that of the
United States.

The degree to which these scenarios are
indicative of overall views on the use of force is
not clear. One wonders whether European support
might be higher when it comes to, for example, a
scenario in the Balkans along the lines of Bosnia or
Kosovo. Nevertheless, these numbers do suggest
that building public support for the use of force in
a scenario involving Iran or North Korea will be
an uphill struggle given the structure of European
public opinion. While one can imagine support
coming from the Hawk school, moving beyond
that core and generating additional support from
the Dove school would require considerable work
given their proclivity against the use of force and
their strong belief in the need for international
legitimacy.

Irrespective of the specific scenario, in Europe
there is clearly a greater need to obtain interna-
tional support to create legitimacy for military
action. Our analysis shows that it makes a signifi-
cant difference whether a potential military
action involves a unilateral U.S. move or one
supported by NATO or the UN. While our typol-
ogy is a strong predictor of differences across the
Atlantic as well as between EU countries, the
issue of whether the action is unilateral or multi-
lateral is also a critical variable.

Support for the use of force increases if the
operation is conducted under a multilateral aegis,
such as NATO and UN. In Europe support
increases under the various modalities from 36%
for the U.S. acting alone to 48% for an action
under a U.N. mandate. For the U.S. these percent-
ages are 70 and 79% respectively. In short, while
the US and European patterns are similar, our
results show that for the scenarios we surveyed
there is a clear gap of some 30% across the
Atlantic when it comes to willingness to use force.

This does not mean that our typology is any

FIGURE 8

FIGURE 9

12 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003

less valid. While the unilateral/multilateral nature of
the action clearly makes a difference in terms of support
for the use of force, our typology is still a very impor-
tant predictor of attitudes (Figures 7-9). Across the
entire spectrum of possible military operations — with
the U.S. alone, U.S. with its allies, NATO or UN — both
Pragmatists and Hawks are systematically more willing
to support the use of force than Doves and Isolationist.
Figures 7 and 8 show also that in U.S. the multilateral
nature of the action might have a greater role to play
compared to Europe. In Europe, the nature of the
action (unilateral/multilateral) and our typology pro-
ceed in parallel, producing independent effects, while
an interaction effect is present among the Doves in U.S.
Doves are more sensitive than other groups in our
typology to the nature of the action. However, until this
group is needed, the Bush administration can ignore all
appeals to a multilateralization if it sees fit.

In this connection, the British case is again quite

interesting as it seems to combine elements of both the
American and European political landscapes. (Figure 9).
One can easily see the dilemma that Prime Minister
Blair could face if he were to contemplate joining the
U.S. in such military action. First, in the United
Kingdom the degree of multilateral support is crucial
for obtaining support among the Pragmatists. In con-
trast to President Bush, this is the key constituency to
which Blair must appeal and upon which he must rely
for public support given the fact that there only a small
number of Hawks in the UK (and even fewer in the
Labour Party). To obtain anything more than a slim
national majority and achieve broader public support,
Blair must also be able to reach into the Doves whose
potential support is extremely sensitive to the nature of
the action (unilateral vs. multilateral), as shown in
Figure 9. This group, therefore, can be mobilized to
opposing the war on the issue of the lack of multilateral
support.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This brief essay has shown that going beyond look-
ing solely at aggregate survey results can reveal
additional insights into structural differences in public
attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. For the reasons
listed at the outset, we have focused on public attitudes
towards the potential the use of force given the key role
that this issue appears to play in recent trans-Atlantic
frictions. This essay has shown that on this and other
key issues it is important to understand the building
blocks that underlie public attitudes in the U.S. and
Europe. A better understanding of basic attitudes on the
use of force and other forms of power, as well as on the
tension between the demands of peace and justice,
enables us to build a viable typology of attitudes that,
in turn, helps explain how attitudes on international
affairs cluster into recognizable patterns and are trans-
lated into political schools of thought.

The typology introduced here suggests that the
issue is less one of a "gap" between America and

Europe per se, but the effects of the differing structure
of attitudes on the use of force or other forms of power
that exist and the relative size and weight of differing
groupings in different countries in the Alliance. Clearly,
these differing structures are critical in shaping domes-
tic debates and in framing the different strategies politi-
cal leaders can pursue in generating support when it
comes to questions of war and peace.

Just how important such decisions are is clearly
shown by the example of Iraq. In this case President
Bush chose a specific strategy and rationale for making
the case to go to war. It was a strategy that was politi-
cally viable in the United States, and especially within
his own party, in terms of generating public support
given the structure of U.S. public opinion. However, it
was a strategy and rationale that was unlikely to work
in many European countries given the different struc-
ture of attitudes that exists there, especially on the con-
tinent. Whether an alternative strategy and rationale

POWER, WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 2003 | 13

might also have worked in the United States, or would
have been more effective in Europe, is one of those
interesting questions that future historians may ponder.

What is clear is that in order to get domestic support
for particular foreign policies, including the use of mili-
tary force, leaders on either side of the Atlantic must be
sensitive to both their own and their allies' structure of
public opinion if they hope to forge coalitions to act
together in the future. One of the key gaps or diver-
gences that needs to be managed if such cooperation is
to be viable is between the instincts and preferences of
the what we have labeled Hawks and Doves when it
comes to issues of just war, the use of force and interna-
tional legitimacy. In the absence of such efforts, even
modest differences in the structure of public attitudes
can have far-reaching consequences in public debates.
The natural coalitions that can emerge on both sides of
the Atlantic may continue to cluster at opposite ends of
the political spectrum, and hence aggravate a relation-
ship already under tension in spite of broad agreement
on the nature and urgency of common threats.

In practical terms, an American President can
indeed seek to form a working majority for using force
absent a UN mandate built on a coalition between
Hawks and Pragmatists — and enjoy majority public
support as was the case on Iraq. No European leader

can attempt to pursue such a strategy and hope to gain
majority public support — with the possible exception
of the United Kingdom. This does not mean that
European leaders cannot mobilize public support for
going to war or using force. It means that a different
rationale and basis of legitimacy is likely to be required
if public support is to be gained. In most European
countries, that majority would have to consist of a coali-
tion between Pragmatists and Doves. This is what Tony
Blair sought to do in the United Kingdom in the case of
war in Iraq.

This suggests that the approach the United States
uses to build support for it policies in Europe matters a
lot. An American President who pursues a unilateral
and hawkish foreign policy course may be able to bank
on potential public support in the United States — but
thus he is going to have a hard time gaining public sup-
port in Europe given the structure of public attitudes,
and irrespective of who is in power on the other side of
the Atlantic. If Washington is interested in restoring a
viable consensus across the Atlantic when it comes to
the use of force, it must recognize the need to develop a
rationale for such action that takes the structures and
requirements of European public opinion into account
— especially if those structures are different from those
in the United States. ♦

14 | TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2003