2

reconcile the Islamic world with the West; of America for a
"compromise" reconciling the parties and ending tensions.

Many who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and
who are quick to add obliviousness to their advice to the catalogue
of America's derelictions) are joining the widespread chorus for
the United States to play a more active role. These pleas have been
given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia offering normalization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice
President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East has added the

3

need for Arab support in a possible showdown with Iraq to the
catalogue of American incentives to engage itself.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the
catalyst of practically all [the] progress that has been made. But it
is also the case that the impetuous attempt at Camp David to settle
all issues in one negotiation of limited duration contributed to the
outbreak of the current conflict.

A principal reason for such near unanimity is because
America is being asked to do all the heavy lifting [in] the

4
imposition on Israel of a settlement essentially identical with the
Abdullah plan.

A comparison of the positions of the parties demonstrates
their incompatibility. Israel asks for an end to the Intifada but
offers no program of what it is prepared to do in return. The only
formal position adopted by an Israeli government regarding a final
settlement was made by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David,
which offered over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula
was vague) but retained about 70% of the settlements, for which
the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into

5

Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state). Yasir Arafat, insisting on the 1967 line, preferred to start the Intifada rather than accept this proposal.

The most authoritative Arab position is Crown Prince Abdullah's. According to its vague outline, Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine of 1967 in return for normalization with the Arab world. Literally, this would imply the abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization and is silent about such

(N)

6

issues as the right of refugees to return - certain to emerge in the course of an actual negotiation.

Though the Abdullah plan has been warmly greeted, it is - in its present form - a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 line - unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontier[s] with Israel - was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line at the end of the 1948 [war]. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an

7

Israeli prime minister or chief of staff - and I have known them all
- who considered the '67 borders defensible, and especially so if
coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the
Jordan river. To bring them about, Israel is to give up territories,
including settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of
the Jewish population of Israel) and control over its holy places, in
return for diplomatic relations. But in almost all other negotiations,
mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as
a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies refusal to recognize
the legitimacy of the existence of the negotiating partner, which, in

8

Middle East conditions, moves toward the intent to destroy it. And even once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor is the prospect of other than diplomatic relations bright: the peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of normalization other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

On the face of it, negotiations for a final peace on existing terms are therefore certain to deadlock. The insistent call for them is based either on illusions or the determination to have America

9

impose it. This raises profound questions, not simply in terms of a
long-standing American commitment not to go the route of
imposition but of the ability of Israel to survive such a process.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical. Israel
has never been stronger and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab
adversary; it is clearly able to exact disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle class
advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the second intifada has

10

generated a strange ambivalence in Israeli society. On the one
hand, prior to the Oslo agreement the Israeli peace movement
viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily as a problem
of psychological reassurance. But since the Intifada, the vast
majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want
victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries. At the same
time, there is a growing sense of despair caused over the seeming
futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli casualties to
that of the guerrillas going up, and the fact that [Israel's] preferred
methods of responding will not be tolerated by the United States

11

(witness the American insistence on Israeli withdrawal from
Romallah prior to the Z______), a sense of resignation is
spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on their tormentors is
coupled with the first signs of a quest for peace at any price. Israel
finds itself facing the classic specter of guerrilla warfare as it has
come to be established for two generations now. The guerrillas not
only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of
it because a violent, emotional - and to the bystanders - excessive
retaliation serves their purpose of triggering intervention by the
international community. In the process, sanctuaries are established

12

- however dubious their basis in international law - that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla challenge. Tunisia played that role during the Algerian war; Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam war; the pattern is now recurring with respect to Zone A and the refugee camps in the West Bank.

The chief difference is that France in Algeria and America in Vietnam were fighting on distant territories; they had the ultimate - albeit painful - option to withdraw. Israel is on its home [turf]; at stake is its existence, not its possessions or geopolitical interests.

13

Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of __________ing into ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a high-ranking Israeli army officer what actions he advocated [for?] an enhanced version of the assault on the refugee camps; when asked what outcomes he expected, he said the imposition of some version of the '67 borders.

This progressive demoralization will not be solved by the imposition of the indefensible '67 borders. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know - as the rest of the world should

14

- that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological sense - as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule); but between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They will be reinforced in this sense of importance? by their experience?

[with] the attitude of the democracies toward their reactions.

15

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "final" agreement have
no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. If, as is said, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into
negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus
the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are
more the adjective than the substance.

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of
marginal utility in overcoming this problem. Nobody can seriously

16

believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel,
especially against the ambiguous challenges that are most likely.
The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against
invasion from neighboring states. Aside from raising profound
domestic questions in the United States, this would imply an
American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack
and be almost impossible to apply to the resumption of guerrilla
warfare.

What, then, are the alternatives? The beginning of wisdom is
to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under current

17

conditions. Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable goals that are also irresponsible will foster a general climate of irresponsibility.

This is the case even though the status quo for all parties is becoming increasingly intolerable. The Arab side has fought with dedication and ferocity toward producing the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare - that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the society they are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the

18

Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able domestically to support what overall settlement is attainable.

Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American role in pursuit of more limited objectives. The former course is difficult to sustain in the face of pressures from allies and from friends in the Arab sphere. The course of an interim agreement has so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the

19

Palestinians will not stop because they believe they would thereby remove any Israeli incentive to make concessions; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence, especially if the outcome [is to] reward terrorism. Only the United States has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap. It must urge Israel toward a peace program; it must insist with its Arab friends [on] the limits of achievable concessions.

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally without a peace program; the Palestinians cannot achieve their maximum program except at the risk of destroying their own

20

society. A possible interim agreement would envisage substantial
withdrawals, including the removal of outlying settlements, the
creation of a Palestinian state and the elaboration of a code? of
coexistence between the two states. The line between the two states
thereby established would be final. Issues such as Jerusalem and
refugees would be left to a later negotiation. The United States
should play a major role in generating such an outcome provided it
can achieve Arab agreement to the strategy implied. So long as the
United States appears to be gradually veering toward imposing the
'67 borders, it tempts continuation of the conflict.

21

If America is to contribute to genuine progress, it must help dispel the mirages of current diplomacy. It must back a program respectful of Arab dignity and concerns limited by Israeli necessities for survival. Drifting is no longer an option.

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KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 3/17/01

The return of an American mediator to the Middle East has been greeted by all sides with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because all the parties and interested bystanders are exhausted by the bloodshed; trepidation, because all of them know that their objectives are in many respects incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is for a legitimization of essentially the status quo; of the Palestinians for the beginning of a process leading to the ultimate destruction of the Jewish state; of the Europeans for a

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diplomatic solution indistinguishable from the Arab formal peace
program though "guaranteed" by the outside world, which would
reconcile the Islamic world with the West. Russia, too, is urging a
solution to the conflict though with less precision? that Europe.

The alleged intransigence of Israel and its Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, are cited as the principal cause of the deadlock by
the clattering ______ around the world. The call for the United
States to play a more active role is nearly unanimous, even among
those who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and who
then add the ignoring of that advice to their catalogue of America's

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Sins - deficiencies deprecitations

3

These urging have been given impetus by the overture of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia suggesting normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East has symbolized the incentive of the need for Arab support in a possible showdown with Iraq.

A major American role in Middle East diplomacy can be important. American diplomacy has been the catalyst of the progress that has been made in the last thirty years. But it is also the case that the impetuous attempt at Camp David to settle all in the fall of 2000

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4
issues in one negotiation of limited duration never was a major
factor in producing the present state of affairs. A final solution
means that all parties abandon future claims - a demand in itself
certain to generate radical opposition. It also will lead to a
protracted negotiation.

Before America launches itself on a diplomatic role, it is
important to understand its nature and its possibilities - lest we
magnify the crisis that ~~tempted~~ our involvement. A number of
principles must be kept in mind:

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First, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has a different time dimension than the decisions required to address the issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Negotiating a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli violence will - if it is possible at all - take a long time. The favored remedy of imposing the 1967 borders on Israel will require an extended confrontation and a change from the [illegible] attitude in historic American policy, rejecting the [illegible] ultimate imposition of a final solution. This would involve so many [illegible] confrontations as to destroy the focus on Iraq - a partial reason why so many countries are urging American involvement. If

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negotiations on the Israel-Palestinian conflict are conceived as a
precondition for the goal of ending the threat of Iraqi possession of
weapons of mass destruction, neither objective will be achieved.

The reason there is near unanimity on the importance of
America's role in the negotiations is precisely the device of most of
those urging it to impose a settlement on Israel because the
United States is the only country in a position to do so - albeit at
heavy risk to the future survival of Israel.

The positions of the parties are simply too incompatible.
Israel asks for an end to the intifada but offers no program of what

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it is prepared to do in return. It has accepted the early stages of the Mitchell plan, which deal with the establishment of a ceasefire and a series of confidence-building measures. The only formal position adopted by an Israeli government was the proposal made by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, which offered the abandonment of over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) for which the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return [to Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state)].

The Sharon government has rejected that proposal and Yasir Arafat preferred to start the intifada rather than accept it.

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The most forthcoming Arab position has been put forward by
Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. According to its vague outline,
Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine in return for
reconciliation with the Arab world. Ritually, this would imply the
abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the
old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. Moreover, the
Abdullah plan suffers from at least two disabilities: it does not
define what is meant by normalization, and it leaves open such
other issues as the right of refugees to return - though this demand
is certain to reemerge in the course of an actual negotiation.

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Moreover, on the face of it, the balance of the negotiation in the Abdullah plan is unequal. Israel is to give up territories, settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of the Jewish population of Israel) and control over the holy places, in return for diplomatic relations. These are taken for granted in all other negotiations between other parties; non-recognition implies refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the existence [that the alternative to acquiescence is the extermination] of the which in local circumstances equates with intent to exterminate. negotiating partner, And even once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized benefits diplomatic tool. Nor is the prospect of other than diplomatic

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relations bright; the peace agreement with Egypt has brought little
in the way of normalization other than ambassadors that are rarely
used.

On the face of it, negotiations for a final peace in existing
terms are therefore certain to deadlock. The constant? call for them
is based either on illusions or the determination to impose it on one
of the parties - either by Israeli victory over the Palestinians or by
______ pressure on Israel. Nothing is to be gained by repeating that
mantra.

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11

This is the case even though the status quo for all parties is becoming increasingly intolerable. The Arab side has fought with dedication and ferocity toward producing the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare, that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.

Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the society they are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able to support what an attainable overall settlement is attainable.

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Paradoxically, 12

The pressure on Israel is even greater and for paradoxical reasons Israel is __ stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to exact disproportionate losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But as a middle class Western society, they may not be able to stand the strain of such sustained warfare.

Indeed, the second intifada has generated a dual split in Israeli society. On the one hand, the peace movement that saw the achievement of peace with the Arab world as a problem of psychological reassurance has disappeared with the collapse of the Oslo process. The vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in

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13

reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of the Arab
tormentors. On the other hand, there is a growing sense of despair
caused by the seeming futility of the enterprise. More and more
Israelis feel that the proportion of their casualties to that of the
Arab side is going up and they can stand it less being a middle
class society and far less numerous. They also see that the methods
of repression that might work will not be tolerated by the
international community; witness the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Palestinian territory imposed by the United States prior to the
Zinni mission?. They therefore see emerging before them the

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classic vista of guerrilla warfare established for two generations
now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but
practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional - and
to the bystanders - excessive retaliation serves their purpose of
triggering intervention by the international community. In the
process, sanctuaries are established - however dubious their basis
in international law - that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the
capacity of the defending forces to get to the root? of the guerrilla
challenge. This happened in Tunisia during the Algerian war; in

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15

Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam war; it is now recurring
with respect to ____ and the refugee camps in Palestine.

The chief difference is that France in Algeria and America in
Vietnam were fighting on distant territories; they had the ultimate -
albeit painful - option to withdraw. Israel is on its homeland; at
stake is its existence, not its possessions.

A stalemate, or at least a protracted war, is almost inevitable
during the course of which an increasing number of Israelis will
insist on "political" alternatives that translates into peace at any
price. Israeli society is thus torn between rage and despair,

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between a recognition of theoretical necessities and the pull of
emotional imperatives. The other day a high-ranking Israeli

military responded to my question [of] what actions he

recommended with a description of an enhanced version of the attack on the refugee camps; when asked what outcomes he expected, he said some version of the '67 borders.

This recipe for progressive demoralization will not be solved
by the acceptance of the Abdullah plan. For after the experiences
of Oslo, Israelis know - as the rest of the world should - that the
real division in the Arab world is not between those who want

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peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological sense - as a point at
which tensions magically disappear and the world lives with a
consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Arab leaders
holding this view is minuscule); but between those who want to
bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present
struggle and those who believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They
will be reinforced in this conviction because of their awareness that
the introduction of long-range missiles will gradually diminish the
Israeli military edge.

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And even if those who sign a permanent agreement on the Arab side have no afterthoughts, they cannot guarantee their replacement by radical successors. If, as is said, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement?

Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement is more the adjective than the substance. The likelihood is also that anything like the Abdullah plan, even if Israel is prevailed upon to accept it, will lead to the eventual destruction of

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19

Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff - and I have known them all - who believed that the '67 borders are defensible, and especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan river.

And the NATO, American or other guarantees are empty.

Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against the ambiguous challenges that are most likely. Nor would the United States be able to provide a credible open-ended guarantee against threats of massive ground invasions from neighboring states.

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20
Thus the Abdullah plan in anything like its present form

signifies spells the long-term destruction of Israel, especially when
combined with its inevitably related features of refugee return and
'67 frontiers. Such an outcome would break the cohesion of Israeli
politics. The elements sustaining its defenses? would be
demoralized; those acquiescing would have to seek their remedy in
submission, much like the rump Czechoslovak regime after
Munich.

What, then, are the options? It must be admitted that no good
options are available. But the beginning of wisdom is to recognize

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21
the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions.

Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable, or at least undesirable, goals will foster a general climate of irresponsibility.

Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American with casualties mounting morally difficult to sustain and is role. The former course is under constant pressure from allies in Europe and from friends in the Arab sphere?. The latter course has so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the

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Palestinians will not stop because they believe they would thereby remove any Israeli incentive to make concessions; the Israelis will not settle because they do not want to reward terrorism. Only the United States has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap.

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally without a peace program; the Palestinians cannot achieve their maximum program except at the risk of destroying their own society. If Israel is capable of generating a national policy, it should seek to come up with a proposal for substantial withdrawals, including the removal of non-contiguous settlements,

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the creation of a Palestinian state and the principle of coexistence
between the two states. It could pay respect to Arab and Palestinian
remaining concerns by calling this an interim settlement for a
specified period.

The United States should play a major role in generating such
a proposal provided it can achieve Arab agreement to the strategy
implied. So long as the United States appears either as if it is
unconditionally backing Israeli measures or gradually veering
toward an Abdullah-type plan, it has no diplomatic function other
than the wrecking of Israel.

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If America is to contribute to genuine progress, it must help dispel the mirages of current diplomacy. It must back a program respectful of Arab dignity and concerns and Israeli necessities.

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woes). These urging have been given impetus by the overture of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia offering normalization
of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to
the 1967 frontiers. And Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to
the Middle East has need of an incentive added.
support in a possible showdown with Iraq to the catalogue of
American incentives to save engage itself.

A major American role in Middle East diplomacy can be
important. American diplomacy has been the catalyst of the all
progress that has been made in the past thirty years. But it is also
the case that the impetuous attempt at Camp David to settle all

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First, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has a different time dimension than the decisions required for the issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Negotiating a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli violence will - if it is possible at all - take a long time. The favored remedy of imposing the 1967 borders on Israel will require an extended confrontation and a change of attitude in historic American policy rejecting the imposition of a final solution. This would involve so many confrontations as to destroy the focus on Iraq - a partial reason why so many countries are urging American involvement. If

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r.07

negotiations on the Israel-Palestinian conflict are conceived as a
precondition of the goal of ending the threat of Iraqi possession of
weapons of mass destruction, neither objective will be achieved.

The reason there is near unanimity on the importance of
formal
because America is
America's role in the negotiations is precisely the device of most of
being asked to do all the heavy lifting, but
those urging it to impose a settlement on Israel, and because the
impetus on Israel isential with the subversal plan. How
United States is the only country in a position to do so albeit at

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(J)

7

a series of confidence building measures. The only formal position

regarding a final settlement

but remains about 70 paces

over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) for

into Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state).

ministers on the 1967 line

The proposal.

mussadeh

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The most forthcoming Arab position has been put forward by-
Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. According to its vague outline,
Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine in return for
normalization with the Arab world. Finally, this would imply the
abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the
old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. Moreover, the
Abdullah plan suffers from at least two disabilities: it does not
define what is meant by normalization, and it leaves open such
other issues as the right of refugees to return, though this demand
is certain to emerge in the course of an actual negotiation.

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The pressure on Israel is even greater and for paradoxical reasons. Israel is stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to exact disproportionate losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But as a middle class Western society and it has evolved into advanced, they may not be able to stand the strain of such sustained warfare. As a result, psychologically draining. As a result, the second intifada has generated a dual split in Israeli society. On the one hand, the peace movement that saw the end of the intifada, primarily, the achievement of peace with the Arab world as a problem of psychological reassurance, has disappeared with the collapse of the Oslo process. The vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in

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facing the closing aspects

classic vista of guerrilla warfare, established for two generations as it was come to be

challenge. This happened in Tunisia, played a role in the Algerian war;

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15

Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam war is now recurring
with respect to time and the refugee camps in Palestine.

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Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff - and I have known them all - who ~~believed~~ *insisted* that the '67 borders are defensible, and especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan river.

And the NATO, American or other *guarantees* are *empty*.

*United States utility in overcoming this problem.*

The only *possible solution* would be most likely. Nor would the United States be able to operate an *American guarantee* against all open-ended guarantee against threats from *mussive ground* invasions from neighboring states. And invasions from neighboring states...

from mining, profound domestic questions in some United States this would simply mean an American act of war against Israel's neighbors, against them all, and attaching and the almost impossible & apply & be remeasurement officille warfare.

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2316 WORDS

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2

The alleged intransigence of Israel and its Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, are cited as the principal cause of the deadlock by
the clattering ______ around the world. The call for the United
States to play a more active role is nearly unanimous even among
those who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and who
then add the ignoring of that advice to their catalogue of America's

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3 woes). These urging have been given impetus by the overture of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia suggesting normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East has symbolized the incentive of the need for Arab support in a possible showdown with Iraq.

A major American role in Middle East diplomacy can be important?. American diplomacy has been the catalyst of the progress that has been made in the last thirty years. But it is also the case that the impetuous attempt at Camp David to settle all

03/17/02 13:42

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Before America launches itself on a diplomatic role, it is
important to understand its nature and its possibilities - lest we
magnify the crisis that tempted our involvement. A number of
principles must be kept in mind:

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5

First, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has a different time dimension than the decisions required for the issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Negotiating a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli violence will - if it is possible at all - take a long time. The favored remedy of imposing the 1967 borders on Israel will require an extended confrontation and a change of attitude in historic American policy rejecting the imposition of a final solution. This would involve so many ____ confrontations as to destroy the focus on Iraq - a partial reason why so many countries are urging American involvement. If

03/17/02 13:42

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6
negotiations on the Israel-Palestinian conflict are conceived as a
precondition of the goal of ending the threat of Iraqi possession of
weapons of mass destruction, neither objective will be achieved.

The reason there is near unanimity on the importance of
America's role in the negotiations is precisely the device of most of
those urging it to impose a settlement on Israel, and because the
United States is the only country in a position to do so - albeit at
heavy risk to the future survival of Israel.

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7

it is prepared to do in return. It has accepted the early stages of the Mitchell plan, which deal with the establishment of a ceasefire and a series of confidence-building measures. The only formal position adopted by an Israeli government was the proposal made by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, which offered the abandonment of over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) for which the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state).

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8

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9

Moreover, on the face of it, the balance of the negotiation in the Abdullah plan is unequal. Israel is to give up territories, settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of the Jewish population of Israel) and control over the holy places, in return for diplomatic relations. These are taken for granted in all other negotiations between other parties; non-recognition implies that the alternative to acquiescence is the extermination of the negotiating partner. And even once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor is the prospect of other than diplomatic

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This is the case even though the status quo for all parties is becoming increasingly intolerable. The Arab side has fought with dedication and ferocity toward producing the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the society they are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able domestically to support what overall settlement is attainable.

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The pressure on Israel is even greater and for paradoxical reasons. Israel is ____ stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to exact disproportionate losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But as a middle class Western society, they may not be able to stand the strain of such sustained warfare.

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13
reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of the Arab
tormentors. On the other hand, there is a growing sense of despair
caused by the seeming futility of the enterprise. More and more
Israelis feel that the proportion of their casualties to that of the
Arab side is going up and they can stand it less being a middle
class society and far less numerous. They also see that the methods
of repression that might work will not be tolerated by the
international community; witness the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Palestinian territory imposed by the United States prior to the
____ mission?. They therefore see emerging before them the

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Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam war; it is now recurring with respect to ______ and the refugee camps in Palestine.

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between a recognition of theoretical necessities and the pull of
emotional imperatives. The other day a high-ranking Israeli
military responded to my question [of] what actions he
recommended with an enhanced version of the attack on the
refugee camps; when asked what outcomes he expected, he said
some version of the '67 borders.

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17

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Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against the ambiguous challenges that are most likely. Nor would the United States be able to operate an open-ended guarantee against threats ______ massive ground invasions from neighboring states.

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Thus the Abdullah plan in anything like its present form
spells the long-term destruction of Israel, especially when
combined with its inevitably related features of refugee return and
'67 frontiers. Such an outcome would break the cohesion of Israeli
politics. The elements sustaining its defenses? would be
demoralized; those acquiescing would have to seek their remedy in
submission, much like the rump Czechoslovak regime after
Munich.

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Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in
Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing
to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American
role. The former course is under constant pressure from allies in
Europe and from friends in the Arab sphere?. The latter course has
so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the

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