Guidelines for the study :

In Search of Germany

Résumé of the first three meetings at the Center for International Affairs

in April 1964.

Persons attending: Messrs H.A.Kissinger (Chairman), R.A.Bowie, K.D.Bracher, A.Clement, K.Epstein, C.J.Friedrich, S.R.Graubard, S.Hoffman, K.Kaiser, C.P.Kindleberger, E.Scheuch, U.Schwarz, F.Váli.

It was agreed at the meetings that the study should be analytical and neither narrative nor descriptive. The study should focus on the dynamic aspects of the situation in an attempt to explain what was new about the Federal Republic and what represented continuity from previous history.

Provisional distribution of topics: K.D.Bracher; Politics and democracy; R.Dahrendorf; Social structure; K.Epstein; The German cultural situation; C.J.Friedrich; Germany in Europe; M.Croan; Germany and Eastern Europe; E.Scheuch; Mass media and German politics; W.Stolper; The economy of Germany; F.Váli; Reunification; Summary and Conclusion; H.A.Kissinger.

The study should have a few running themes, (a) to focus interest and analysis and (b) to provide the coordinating element for the study. On the subject of coordination it was suggested that this could be achieved in two ways, (a) by keeping constantly in mind a certain number of running themes during the preparatory stage, the writing and the criticism, and (b) by writing a conclusion as a separate chapter. This will be done by Mr. Kissinger.

Most suggestions on the running themes of the book were variations of three main problems:

(a) Continuity and change in modern Germany.

(b) Germany as a typical case for, or exception from, modern developments in

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Western European and American society.

(c) The search for national identity.

On almost all questions that were discussed there was some consensus that most of the modern developments in German society have a counterpart in other European countries and even in the United States. For that reason one will have to ask oneself whether certain characteristics of postwar Germany reflect a peculiarly German development or general trends of Western society, consequences of industrialisation, mass democracy, emergence of mass media, etc. The first two running themes of the study therefore meet in one point: what can be called 'change' in the German context might at the same time reflect general trends in Western society.

The participants suggested a closer look at the impact of Nazism in terms of continuity and change. How did Nazism change the social structure of Germany? What changes were induced by the Nazi regime which still have an impact on modern German society? What was the impact of the resistance movement on postwar Germany? These problems were also touched upon in connection with the access to power of the younger generation.

**_The élites_**: what was and is their value system, their outlook? Which positions do they hold in society? How have the basic notions and concepts in their education changed? (To be dealt with by Mr. Dahrendorf.)

**_The rift of generations_**: what is the specific value system of the different generations? What access to power do and did they have? How do they relate to each other? How has the family been affected?

How has the **attitude of workers** changed, their attitude to work, consumption, saving, discipline? How did this affect Trade Unionism and what was the impact on the economy? (To be dealt with by Mr. Stolper.)

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It was originally suggested that two institutions be selected and analysed
in terms of successful and unsuccessful change, the <u>Bundeswehr</u> as an example of
successful change, and the <u>University</u> as an example of unsuccessful change.
However, in view of the fact that Messrs Bracher and Epstein are dealing with
these two institutions in their papers and that space is limited, it seems better
to drop this topic as the subject of a separate essay.

It was agreed that the problem of <u>European unification</u> would appear in
practically all papers and should also be dealt with in connection with the search
for national identity.

In the paper on <u>social structure</u>, apart from the problem of élites mentioned
above, the following questions should be treated: demographic changes, the role and
structure of bureaucracy (in the widest sense of the word).

The question of <u>development</u> and Germany's relations with <u>overseas areas</u>
could be dealt with in the chapter on the German economy and perhaps in the essay
on Germany and the West.

The group discussed the outlines or drafts of Messrs Bracher, Epstein,
Vali and some suggestions for the paper on the German economy.

Guidelines for the study: <u>In Search of Germany</u>

Resume of the first meeting at the Center for International Affairs on
April 23, 1964.

Persons attending:

Bowie,
Messrs Kissinger (Chairman) ,/Bracher, Clement, Epstein, Graubard, Hoffman,
Hunt, Kaiser, Kindelberger, Scheuch, Valy.

There was general agreement that the study should be analytical and
neither narrative nor descriptive and that facts should be avoided as much
as possible unless they serve to make a point. The study should not
become a text book but ask questions that have not been asked before and
look at problems that have not been dealt with in other studies.

1. Bracher: Politics and democracy.

2. Clement: Germany in Europe.

3. Epstein: The German cultural situation.

4. Dahrendorf: Social structure.

5. Kissinger: Germany's military policy and the Atlantic alliance (?)

6. Stolper: The economy of Germany.

7. Valy: Reunification.

8. (One or two authors to be named): The Bundeswehr and German university as examples of failure and success in change.

9. Foreign policy (?)

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It was agreed that the study should have a few running themes, (a) to focus interest and analysis and (b) to provide the coordinating element for the study. On the subject of coordination it was suggested that this could be achieved in two ways, (a) by keeping in mind constantly a certain number of running themes during the preparatory stage, the writing and the criticism, and (b) by writing a conclusion as a separate chapter as was done in the study on France by Goguel (Mr. Kissinger?)

(b) Germany as a typical case for, or exception from, modern developments in Western European and American society,

On almost all questions that were discussed there was some consensus that most of the modern developments in German society have their counterpart in other European countries and even in the United States. For that reason one will have to ask oneself whether certain characteristics of post-war Germany reflect a peculiarly German development or general trends of Western society, consequences of industrialisation, mass democracy, emergence of mass media etc.? The first two running themes of the study therefore meet in one point: what can be called 'change' in the German context might at the same time reflect general trends in Western society.

It was suggested having a closer look at *the impact of Nazism* in terms of continuity and change. How did Nazism change the social structure of Germany and where was Germany in 1945? What changes were induced by the

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Nazi regime which still have an impact on modern German society? This
problem was also touched upon in connection with the access to power
of the younger generation.

**_The elites:_** what was and is their value-system, their outlook?
Which positions do they hold in society? How have the basic notions
and concepts in their education changed? (To be dealt with by Mr.
Dahrendorff).

**_The rift of generations:_** what is the specific value-system of
the different generations? What access to power do and did they have?
How do they relate to each other? How has the family been affected?

How has _the attitude of workers_ changed, their attitude to work,
consumption, saving, discipline? How did this affect Trade Unionism and
what was the impact on the economy? (To be dealt with by Mr. Stolper).

It was suggested that two institutions be selected and analysed
in terms of successful and unsuccessful change, _the Bundeswehr_ as an
example of successful change, and _the University_ as an example of
unsuccessful change. However, this should not at the same time discourage
Messrs Bracher and Epstein from dealing with these two institutions in
the context of their papers.

It was agreed that the subject of _European unification_ would appear
in practically all papers and should also be dealt with in connection with
the search for national identity.

In the paper on _social structure_, apart from the problem of
elites mentioned above, the following questions should be treated:
demographic changes, the role and structure of bureaucracy (in the widest
sense of the word.)

Draft for section on the planned study on Germany in the Center's
Annual Report.

(General section on the Center's concern with and research activities on
Western Europe, to be written by Mr. Brown.)

In April 1964 a group of scholars working under the Center's auspices began a study of the Federal Republic of Germany, applying similar methods to those used in the preparation of the book _In Search of France_, published by the Center in 1963. Professor Henry A. Kissinger will organise and direct the study, assisted by Dr. Karl Kaiser, a Research Associate at the Center. (?) with some as rapporteurs. (2)

This project attempts to analyse major trends and problems in the political, economic and social spheres and in German foreign policy. It wants to go beyond the usual symposium of separate essays. Joint criticism of the drafts in seminars and the choice of a few running themes will provide coordinating elements and make this study a coherent analysis. To achieve this, its focus of interest will be on factors of change and continuity in modern Germany, her search for national identity, and on Germany as a typical example of, or exception from, modern developments in industrialised societies of the West. Topics to be investigated include: (follows the list of topics to be decided on Friday, June 5th.)

This volume will be the product of collaboration among a number of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Some of them have submitted or have been asked to submit papers on the various subjects mentioned above.
The authors include:

(follows a list of authors to be established on Friday, June 5th).

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The authors' drafts will be subjected to the criticism of a number of scholars from the Center and outside. Included so far are:
Professor Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Center; Karl Dietrich Bracher, Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne, Germany; M. Alain Clément, formerly Bonn correspondent, now Washington correspondent, of Le Monde; Klaus Epstein, Professor of Government, Brown University; Carl Joachim Friedrich, Professor of Government; Dr. Stephen R. Graubard, lecturer in the Department of History, Editor of *Daedalus*, Research Associate at the Center; Stanley Hoffman, Professor of Government and Research Associate at the Center; M.

Dr. Karl Kaiser, Research Associate at the Center; Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of Government, Director of the project; Charles P. Kindleberger, Professor of Economics, M.I.T.; Erwin Scheuch, Professor of Sociology at the University of Cologne, Germany; M. Sperber

Ference A. Váli, Professor of Government at Tufts University;

Further meetings are scheduled for Fall and Winter 1964. The study will be entitled, *In Search of Germany* and probably published at the end of 1965.

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**Kissinger.** Summarized the last meeting. Listed 3 running themes of German book: (1) continuity and discontinuity (most important in Bracher, Scheuch, and Stolper's articles); (2) degree recent developments in Germany are uniquely German or general phenomena of modern Western societies (for example, with regard to Bracher's article, is the decline of parties and executive leadership a general phenomenon?); and (3) the German sense of identity (or crisis) today.

Pointed out possible revisions: to avoid being a mere symposium of unrelated pieces, it would be helpful to cross-reference between papers--also for coherence. Had the impression that some of the articles assumed too much reader knowledge, used overly technical terms and discussed events without enough background information. The book is intended for experts on Germany, but perhaps its impact will be even more important in circles of educated people who are not authorities on Germany. Therefore, often explanatory paragraphs or sentendes are necessary.

Mentioned the problem that by the time the book is published, events speculated on by articles may have already occurred (for instance, the 1965 "prospective" elections).

**Kaiser:** Two technical problems are related to the book:

(1) How to coordinate the articles;

(2) How to deal with reaching a balance between facts versus analysis.

The first running theme of the book comes out well and appears often. However, the third theme is almost entirely absent, except for a brief reference in Bracher (concerning parliamentary democracy) and Friedrich. This theme involves the psychology and role Germans see of themselves, their attitude toward themselves as a nation. Scheuch refers somewhat to this, as does Friedrich when discussing factors predisposing Germans to a European outlook; it is not found in Stolper/Roskamp or Epstein articles.

One could ask: what is the German view of solving Europe's problems? Do the German and French views of the problems clash? For example, the German view of the organization of the EEC. Has the French concept inspired German changes of attitude? What influences German concepts?

All articles might deal with the same problem, but from different points of view (for example, Scheuch, the psychological aspect; Friedrich, what does a "european attitude" mean?) Perhaps the flight into Europe is due to a search for identity.

Bracher's article deals mainly with the first theme. Is uncertain whether Friedrich's implies a return to certain predispositions (continuity). Epstein might analyze the intellectual history in terms of general themes; do they recur in post-war Germany? Stolper/Roskamp article treats the first theme--in the transition from Nazi to post-war Germany--well, but perhaps could deal more with changes with regard to developments in Europe, such as the impact of integration on the German economy. Is Germany's economy complementary to France's? Perhaps more detail about present policy-making in agriculture.

As for the second theme, [are there peculiar German developments]--this has been largely neglected. Problem of how to deal with it. By cross-reference? For example, Friedrich's discussion of popular participation in European reunification could be related to Scheuch's discussion of the attitude of elites (create a more explicit link between them). Or

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Epstein could discuss the laissez-faire principles of Erhard in light of Stolper/Roskamp article which doubts that Erhard's is a laissez-faire policy.

Should keep in mind that the book has two audiences, the German and American; one cannot assume both groups have similar knowledge if purpose is to appeal to the "unexpert but educated." Perhaps a revision of the German edition (i.e., add more facts).

**Bowie:** Thinks there is a more limited audience than Kissinger first suggested. Besides, the German and American audiences are pretty much the same (Bracher agreed).

**Friedrich:** Perhaps the real interest of the German audience lies in how Americans think of Germany. They would consider this an "American" book which might be spoiled if they suspected it was doctored to their interests and level of understanding.

**Stolper:** Besides, most Germans know less about Germany than we do.

**Kissinger:** It might be well to enlarge on or eliminate cryptic references. An intelligent audience is probably the same in both countries.

# I. Germany's International Role

## A. Friedrich's paper

**Friedrich:** I have very little to add to my paper now. I read Grosser's article concerning Germany in Europe, written 8 or 9 years ago, and found a great deal of similarity between the two (his was most prophetic!). Kissinger has indicated some very real problems concerning European German attitudes and relations. One can't help but build on one's own philosophy.

His views on the 3 themes of the book.

**Theme one:** There are some people, groups, nations, to whom continuity is more important than change, and vice versa. Tends to favor continuity, conservative approach; change is not as remarkable as people generally assume it to be. "Can't convert an apple tree into a pear tree." Therefore, his article stresses continuity.

**2nd theme:** Is inclined to see the general as much as the specific (explains his interest in comparative gov't.) Sees the specific set off against the general background of common traits. Though there is a unique German attitude to Europe, in many ways it coincides with that of France, etc.

**3rd Theme (Identity):** There is a difference among Germans and observers of Germany as to what its identity is. Views impressions as being more important than provable facts, and has his own idea of how the German mind functions. It is a very complex problem, which Stanley Hoffmann's article simplifies (he is wrong--there is no identity crisis right now). There really isn't an identity crisis in Germany at the present; Germans know pretty well they're Germans and what in their mind this means. However, historically they have had a stronger propensity to assimilation than have others (e.g. German assimilation of

American ideas and ways after the war). Is this due to a lack of identity as Germans? No. Due to several other factors--Germany's position in the center of Europe, its open frontiers, etc. European history is more unwritable without mentioning the history of Germany (and vice versa) than is the case with other nations. This openness in all directions perhaps connotes a highly complex identity, not alek of one. Germans see their identity as Europeans, not only in the German context; it makes it easier to build bridges to deal with situations as they arise.

As to Jewish problem, did not mention this. This is unusual, since it is impossible to talk about Germans without talking about Jews. There are many reasons for this--you are already familiar with the more obvious. A less obvious reason concerns the importance of Jews in German intellectual history. In other countries they are not so much identified as Jews per se. The Jewish people are European, cosmopolitan in outlook; they have a supranational bond (although they have tried, without success, to have national identities). The influence of this Jewish cosmopolitan attitude in Germany helps explain Germany's "European" attitude. Should this be included in the article?

Kissinger: What How is this relevant to the German attitude and identity now?

Friedrich It reinforces the Germans' cosmopolitan approach to Europe. As concerns German identity, of course, they look with horror on the recent past. It has had a tremendous impact; they try to forget, try to get away. Perhaps this "flight aspect" is important in the keenness with which the more sensitive Germans embrace a European identity.

It is interesting that all of De Gaulle's speeches have never mentioned this aspect (German crimes, etc); perhaps this explains the acceptance of his views in Germany. Was this lack of mention deliberate on the part of De Gaulle? Yes--he realized that this was a sensitive point, hard to deal with without offending someone. Thus, his silence.

Scheuch: The general definition of identity is membership in a reference group rather than identification in a major territory. The importance of Territorial identification is declining. Foreign influence in Germany perhaps thus means that the best way for Germany to retain its identity it to mingle in Europe.

Kissinger: Many Germans buy property outside Germany--there is a mass exodus on holidays.

--but this is a general European phenomenon

--no, it's due to bad weather in Germany...

--Does any paper deal with the German loss of Jewish scientists, educators, etc? Germans are very conscious of this.

Friedrich: German universities are making efforts to bring them back. In fact 10-20% have returned. German universities, unlike French and Italian, cater to foreigners.

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[L]

**Grosser:** (his discussion of his concept of the book)

Had uneasiness over Friedrich's paper was due to a comparison with In Search of France. Too many textbook-like presentations. French view In Search of France as throwing a new light on facts they already know, though.

For example, Epstein makes no mention of the impact of TV on German culture, when this is extremely important. Epstein's seems to be a mere textbook-like addition of different subjects.

Should have more analyses and cross references.

Bracher divides his paper into institutional topics--also textbook divisions. Should divide according to themes.

Friedrich has an "unfrench" approach to his subject (Epstein seems anti-French--forgets Camus). Gives impression that American impact and Churchill brought the European idea to Germany more than did France.

There is no mention of the "usefulness" to be European in outlook as well as the nobility of the idea. (Eg it would further reunification). Friedrich does not speak of a European feeling as arising from a desire for reunification. This feeling does have a motive in rational politics.

What does political unification and Europe mean to different political groups? How do they plan to proceed from European to German unity?

There is no mention of the problems of Germany in the world (i.e., Asia, Africa). (A new paper is not needed here) How do Germans see Europe's place in the world? Is it just opposed to the Eastern bloc? Is it a distinctive culture as opposed to that of the US and underdeveloped countries? What is the view of the new Europe in the eyes of German politicians and public opinion?

**Stolper:** didn't notice that Friedrich neglected mention of the Jewish problem. Can exaggerate Jewish role too much--under the Nazis, a minority persecuted them, and a minority were persecuted. The international role of the Jews is no larger than the role of the elite nobility, which is traditionally cosmopolitan. In fact, many people didn't feel they were "jewish" until kicked out by the Nazis.

**Kissinger:** Friedrich was not going to treat anti-Semitism, but the impact of the Jews on German thinking.

**Graubard:** Friedrich could more fully explore the change in attitude to France and forces contributing to it. It was not merely due to France, but also German interests. Like Grosser, thinks there should be more consideration of the policies Germany hasn't chosen. For example, the way Germans viewed the UK after the war. To what extent has Germany thought it necessary to change its relations with the UK? Impact of the UK's rather cold response. What has Germany chosen to do and why? What have small groups wanted Germany to do that German policymakers did not choose to?

**Kissinger:** agrees. Look at German attitude to Britain. Should it be part of Europe?

**Roskamp:** glad to see Friedrich devoted a section to the Slavic ingredient. Has been neglected recently, but the problem is an important one.

It would be useful if Friedrich could be more specific. Could stress that German history itself ~~MXX~~ has stressed the Slavs--the weak and the strong (whom they respect in power politics). Useful to treat Russia separately (due to special cases as the partition of Poland, the Hitler-Stalin agreement, etc). Show continuity as well as the recent fundamental changes in German-Russian interests. Is this a key issue in German reunification?

**Friedrich:** Possible to include this, but is not so sure of dealing with Grosser's point of the rational political content of the German European outlook. Many Germans are now saying they'd rather have a European policy than a German one, especially with regard to recent developments in the middle East (the area couldn't fight France too). Many would be willing to have minority views. Although Grosser is correct with reference to Berlin, many Germans are now discussing the possibility of agreeing on a general European policy, except for some specifics (i.e., Berlin, etc.)

For example the Patronat of France and the Industrial group in Germany are now holding regular meetings and are producing and thinking in very rational politics. There is a continual consideration of the impact of a common European policy, but this area is complex and would need a separate article.

**Kissinger:** Is it possible to distinguish trends making for a European consciousness in Germany? There are many motives behind German views. Brandt said he was glad reunification hadn't progressed because it makes German policy more national. There are some trends which lead to a more European policy, while others die out.

**Friedrich:** (with relation to Graubard & Grosser comments) Relations with France have MXX radically changed, but didn't the initiative come from France? At least in MXX the German mind, isn't it associated with beginning in France? In 1948 France wanted to prevent German participation in European unity; this was clearly recognized and resented in Germany. It was difficult to get into the French Zone in 1948. Churchill in 1946 insisted that Germany come to the Hague Conference; otherwise, the UK wouldn't have allowed German participation. This was the beginning of the emotional impact of the "European idea." A change came with Adenauer, who was skeptical of the UK, but thought Franco-German relations were decisive and must improve. He brought this about (it wasn't easy in Germany) and induced a gradual change. Though some Germans preferred French relations for intellectual reasons (historical roots), it became dominant only in the mid-1950's.

**Bowie:** This point introduces more of what Grosser wanted--XXX, for example, Adenauer used relations with France as a way to get Germany back into the family of nations. As well as being a geniune conviction on his part, he calculated it would mobilize support for him. Friedrich underrates unique French contribution (such as Schumann) to European unity--more important than Britain or Churchill.

**Grosser:** Friedrich and Adenauer have a complete misunderstanding of the French intellectual impact on Germany from 1945-48. There were many French-German initiatives in intellectual circles after the war.

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France pursued two opposing policies; on the one hand, a strict occupation government; but on the other (unlike the US), treated Germans equally intellectually, etc. Said, "let's look together at problems." Impossible to explain German policies without reference to the French impact. To understand the European view in Germany, must see Europe, and French-German relations as separate, though sometimes coinciding.

**Friedrich:** This "equality" in the French zone just wasn't there. A few, perhaps, felt it, but they didn't influence the general German population. There are many examples of French aloofness. There was a minority voice of equality, but the German attitude was influenced by the majority (though there is some lasting influence of the minority).

The situation with regard to Britain is important but complex and will take much space. Though majority of Britains were aloof, superior, there was a pro-British predisposition in Germany (especially in North and northwest)--deeply rooted. When De Gaulle vetoed British EEC entry, there was much outcry in Germany, and they made distinct efforts to soothe the blow. The British position is now changing; they didn't realize the strength of German feeling that Britain is a part of Europe.

**Kaiser:** Friedrich's analysis of historical factors leading to a European consciousness in Germany is fascinating but later his paper seems implicitly to neglect other historical trends such as nationalism as a force in post war Germany (especially recently). The government is now more aware of national interest; De Gaulle has made such a position more "respectable."

**Friedrich:** This is too complex to deal with. Believes, on the contrary, that there is too little nationalism (i.e. patriotism). In 1848 liberal Germans were on the side of the Poles for national liberation.

Few people realize how deeply Slavic east Germany really is. (eg: church services also given in Slavic language).

**Epstein:** Will revise and say more concerning French influence after 1945 and fruitful French cultural policy.

## UNIFICATION

### Vali's paper

**Vali:** It is hard to discuss all aspects of the 3 running themes in every article. He has discussed 3 main issues:

(1) the impact of reunification on internal politics;

(2) the relation of the unification problem to the Oder-Neisse;

(3) Freedom for East Germany, or political reunification?

**Kissinger:** A paper on reunification must also deal with the dynamics of the problem and issues confronting West Germany, not just a description of events.

Is reunification to be achieved in concert with the West or on a national basis? If with West--Europe of the Atlantic group? How is it to be promoted? Toughness to the West and de Gaulle; flexible to East Europe but tough to DDR; rapprochement with DDR?

[L]

Shouldn't discuss detailed policies, but should mention major political options facing Germany--relating to Friedrich's article and the domestic situation (options associated with parties and factions within parties). It is hard to understand the emerging German political debate unless comprehended in this light (ie., in light of issues of reunification).

**Grosser:** On pp. 2 and 5, Vali says the situation since 1945 was different from previous historical situations of unification in Germany. But then he also implies it's the old problem. Should emphasize the rupture with the past.

Some facts are wrong. (1) With regard to Oder Neisse, he says that the best Polish argument is not *legality*. But major Polish and Russian argument is that expulsion has occurred, thus the Line is permanent. Vali's anti-German bias--implies the territory less German than it really is. Bismarck Germany or post-Versailles delineation?

Underestimates the talk and ferment going on in Germany concerning alternative ways to reunite. The issues should been looked at not merely on a jurist's level. The change in SPD on this issue from 1955-59 not discussed adequately. Problem of territory of Berlin.

**Epstein:** There are gaps in the paper. Should enlarge analysis of degree of ardor among different German groups (confessions, regions, etc) for reunification (for example, Protestant, N. German middle class is most zealous).

There is hyprocrisy surrounding the reunification issue in West German politics--Vali ignores this. The ones who "make the loudest noise" about reunification are the ones who privately say it won't occur in the near future.

**Friedrich:** this hyprocrisy is characteristic of all nations.

**Epstein:** in Germany, hyprocrisy on this particular issue is different.

**Kissinger:** It expresses the dilemma that they want it but at a price they may not want to pay. It may not be hyprocrisy.

**Bowie:** It has to do with the way issues are conceived; if reunification is conceived as negotiation with the USSR, it seems hopeless, and too much must be given up. Look at the recent emergence in Germany of different ways of viewing the situation. Perhaps the evolution of Eastern Europe and the DDR, not negotiations, will bring reunification. When this becomes the way of thinking about reunification, then the role of the Oder-Neisse becomes most important. Should analyze the shift in the concept of what the problem is and how to deal with it.

**Vali:** Perhaps it is a schizophrenic attitude, not hypocritical.

**Bowie:** This is a better word. Perhaps holding two mutually exclusive ideas is legitimate, the only way.

**Scheuch:** In the past, German foreign policy meant simply a consent to other existing (US, etc.) policies. Now in general (and with regard to reunification), Germany must actually formulate policies as a nation state. There are many problems.

**Bracher:** There should be more comment on internal politics.

For example, Adenauer's [maximalist] personal hold on the German people is not hypocritical. Vali underrates points the SPD and opposition had to make during the years. Changes in policy were due not only to opportunism, tactical changes, as Vali suggests, but facing the fact that past German policies have led to a certain position. It is not merely a question of what will help the party in the next election. [two]

**Kissinger:** There were three difficult choices in the 1950's: (a) relations with the West, (b) pursue reunification with possible resulting deterioration of relations with the West. Adenauer decided that due to uncertainties in following #b, he must do #a first, and it might lead to conditions to implement and further #b. A problem of priorities which illustrates the complicated position Germany now finds herself in. Not hypocritical.

**Roskamp:** Grosser said Western allies agree with the Oder-Neisse line. But the Poles base their claims on history, not allied agreements, and also the de facto situation (which Vali mentions)--"we're here and can't go back."

**Bowie:** What was said by Allies and what was done were different (hypocritical, if you like).

**Vali:** The Poles' argument was legally weak. The Postdam intentions were vague--gave Poland some territory but not all, and with reservations.

**Kissinger:** In terms of the paper, the legal position is relatively unimportant. The Poles are there. What is more important is what should be and is the German attitude toward these facts? Their impact on reunification and domestic politics.

**Friedrich:** the situation can be changed perhaps by German-Polish negotiations.

**Roskamp:** on p. 34 "1 1/2 million Germans perished in expulsion"--too high? Due to Red Army, not expulsion.

**Scheuch:** When discussing reunification, must take into account Germans' mortal fear of Russia (not as true in Elite)--a limiting condition to what can be done toward reunification. General population wants reunification, but also security.

**Croan:** Politics are important. Legal arguments are widely used to buttress the German official view, especially in putting off the issue. Germans do a disservice to reunification by discussing legalities (Poles read much of this).

**Stolper:** (agrees with Bowie) If the Poles could survive repeated national destructions, so the Germans can now. Adnauer's policy interpretations that the only way to solve the problem is to make borders meaningless (the western border is unimportant now). Until recently, Russian control of satellites, too. Both Germany and France lost the war; with the exception of De Gaulle, they realize they were small nations. At least Germans realize they're small--France and Britain don't accept the fact they're small.

**Epstein:** Re: recent discussion of reunification in Germany and Vali's paper that liberalization in East Germany, an attractive alternative to assimilation of DDR in Germany. Vali sketches out possibilities and gives background of emergence of a German "Switzerland or Austria," but ignores the uniqueness of German situation today which is different from the past. Before, German unification was an internal problem; today it is of an almost entirely external nature.

Ulbricht wouldn't concede but would probably consider a tougher policy. Any liberal concession whets appetite for more. The situation in the DDR is very different from other East European nations; there couldn't be a stabilization after moderation, due to the existence and example of West Germany across the border. Vali suggests that it is possible for the DDR to consolidate liberalization into a reality. That is not true.

**Hoffmann:** These arguments intimate that nothing can be done. You could have said that in 1957 of Kadar's Hungary, due to circumstances under which it was created, but he has liberalized. Certainly, it would entail risks, but there would be benefit in relations with the East German people and with West Germany.

**Kissinger:** the issue is worth exploring--the degree the prospect of liberalization influences West German attitude, and the reality of liberalization.

Kissinger can visualize this (though not necessarily probably), but what of impact of 2 existing competitive Germanys on both of their internal politics?

**Epstein:** It is a move from one illusion to another--from assimilating the DDR to a gradual liberalization (which would lead to assimilation). How would West Germany react to liberalization? uncalculable.

**Bowie:** Policy of the small steps includes: hope to ameliorate conditions in East Germany; taking advantage of East European conditions in the hopes that East Germany will be affected by them. These may be conflicting. Today both are pursued--impossible to see outcome. Relaxation in East Europe may make DDR pursue a less liberal policy.

**Friedrich:** Tendency to underestimate role of personalities. Ulbricht is not immortal--conceivable that a new leader might see a policy change as advantageous. A possibility.

**Kissinger:** in his opinion, after Ulbricht, a more nationalistic regime--resurrection of Prussianism.

**Roskamp:** has impression that reunification is impossible because the East doesn't want it. But German officials say themselves (1964) they can't afford a relaxation--it would make a bad impression on the allies.

**Stolper:** There has been a liberalization--ie, a substantial reform in the DDR economy & economic thinking (predicted this would happened). As they learned more, became more rational (not necessarily less Communist). Suppose that the Berlin Wall becomes unnecessary, so they take it down with much fanfare, and West Germany discusses economic relations, establishing more ties, more access routes, etc. Both can technically afford to approach this as Anschluss was. Quite possible that real events change the character of the problem--ie, liberalization or cooperation on technical problems. Tendencies in the DDR now which will hasten when Ulbricht dies--more rational (or "liberal").

**Grosser:** Liberalization means the East German right to travel, less police surveillance, more contact with West Germany. It is clear what liberalization means. The problem Germans face is: is liberalization in the DDR possible only with reunification, or is liberalization acceptable only if two Germans exist? It is a major choice facing them in the next years.

**Bowie:** West Germans have a bad conscience concerning situation of East Germans. Also have a traditional conception of reunification. It is a choice, but they are trying to avoid making or recognizing it.

**Vali:** If there is a consciousness (identity) in East Germany, it would run along Prussian lines--is cautious on this subject. Though it is debated in Germany, it is highly speculative.

**Kissinger:** It is useful to speculate on what various alternative developments in the DDR might imply.

**Kaiser:** There are two contradictory policies in the Fed. Republic: (1) awareness that any official or semi-official relations or steps stabilize the DDR regime; (2) a recognition that reunification is a long term issue, thus must have dealings with DDR (has led to recent recognition and revival of old links--in small steps policy, pass agreements).

**Scheuch:** Liberalization means simply that the East German people have more influence in politics, and this helps reunification because they want it. There is no conflict between liberalization and reunification.

**Friedrich:** Is "contradiction" the best term to use to study German foreign policy. The Best foreign policy works on several alternatives-- not "This or that" (De Gaulle's skill is here). Not contradictions but things are held open as the situation matures so the right choice can then be made.

**Hoffmann:** But it's a mess if a policy maker doesn't realize he's following contradictory policies!

-11-

**Bowie:** Sometimes when two policies are pursued, one cuts the success of the other.

German Relations with East Europe, Foreign Policy

**Croan:** This topic is part of German relations with Europe in General; in another sense, unlike its relations with western Europe, it has little pre-history. In fact, the Ostpolitik of West Germany is relatively recent. It is a new area, inextricably entwined with the complex issues of reunification.

An attempt to formulate an eastern policy is for Germany an attempt to deal--consciously or unconsciously--with German history, and the definition of German history, economics and politics since World War II. It is also a conscious or unconscious attempt to escape facing these issues.

Ostpolitik can and should be discussed with reference to domestic politics, public opinion, elite opinion, etc., and its impact on them. It has relevance to foreign policy as well as the style and character of domestic politics.

The subject also encompasses a very practical range of issues (such as the ones mentioned in Kaiser's paper), and one should look at the broad range of alternatives facing West Germany--such as small steps v. continued tension, or even escape from west Europe to rapprochement with the East.

There is also the issue of whether and to what extent West Germany, due to its resources and geographic position, is able to devise a differentiated policy for different East European countries other than East Germany--for example, to create a specifically Polish interest (or remove their fears) in reunification.

There are many dimensions to this problem; they can perhaps overlap in various contributions to the book (Friedrich: Slavic history with relation to Europe; Vališ: the entirely separate problem of reunification, etc.) Should also deal with the new problems brought by Eastern European moderation.

**Bracher:** There is a widespread German feeling that the US-USSR rapprochement might lead to dealing with Europe over the heads of the Europeans--and Germans--and that the only way for Germany to break in and influence this is to have a definite policy to East Germany herself. Perhaps a reversal of Rappallo. There is a feeling that Germany hasn't done enough with respect to East Europe and Russia--especially in the FDP, and other parties.

wary

**Scheuch:** The French are way of agreements (such as the Test Ban) but 3/4 of the German elite want such agreements without German participation--they fear that an independent policy may jeopardize the security they derive from dependency. There is a problem of relying on the US. Germany is usually discussed as if it were a country, but it isn't; the German public considers it a "half country," not because of its division but because of its dependence in foreign policy.

**Hoffmann:** Actually, the test ban is in a category of its own. But what is the attitude on other issues?

-12-

**Croan:** A policy dilemma for Germany has arisen from the impulse in the West (especially during the Kennedy Administration) for Germany to engage in a relaxation of tension; yet at the same time, this is coupled with the allies' support for Germany taking a tough line.

**Kaiser:** This is seen in Wilson's statement that reunification can come through free elections. To him this is tantamount to putting off reunification and it means very little, but it does have an impact in Germany.

**Epstein:** There is a strong feeling of possible betrayal by the US (Adenauer). It is a strong current, though it is counteracted by many policy makers. However, they are over-intimidated; Germany has more flexibility than German policy makers think.

**Kissinger:** A measure of contradiction in policy and a measure of illusion (or myth) is necessary for every country. There is an uncertain sense of identity in Germany today. I am a bit skeptical of public opinion polls. How firmly based are they? A lack of identity leads to a congenital sense of insecurity. It may be a mistake to push Germany to the forefront of negotiations. The danger might be that a national Germany is forced to face too many issues as a national state. French-German competition forces this.

**Kaiser:** It might explain the acceptance of de Gaulle's statements in Germany.

There is a difference between accepting de Gaulle, and German Gaullists who use de Gaulle's notions for German aims, though.

(brief discussion & general praise of Kaiser's paper. Grosser: agrees completely with its points. Bracher: has important future policy implications)

The role of Germany as an independent Actor.

**Bowie:** Before, it was possible for Germany merely to align itself with the policy of the Alliance, but today there are two policies (that of the US and France). Germany needs both, but the dilemma lies in the fact that both countries present their policies as two very different assessments and views -thus, Germany is forced to make choices and must have its own policy now. It must adjust to the incompatibilities of the French and US views.

**Kissinger:** It will probably lead to a more nationalistic orientation in German policy.

**Scheuch:** It is quite probable that a future German government will be less able to act in the realm of foreign policy than is the present

-13-

government. Nationalism is not a way out.

**Friedrich:** German policy will tend toward less nationalism, because this way offers an escape from the problem.

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Bracher's Paper

**Bowie:** In Search of France didn't get bogged down in immediate issues; it was able to stand off and bawk have a perspective. Does Germany's different present situation (its immediate problems) mean that we must deal only with immediate issues and perspective, or can we bawk away?

**Grosser:** Bracher's article deplores the lack of parliamentarianism; he says it is a general weakness. After Adenauer came "normalcy." But Buch tensions in government, party, and parliamentary control as are in Germany do not exist in the US.

**Bracher:** I dealt mainly with continuity and change and see everything in this framework. Germany is different from Europe; it does not have a specific form of parliamentary democracy, but it does have a certain typical tradition (administrative handling of politics) which is being revived during the 1950's. I am not concerned with the form of parliamentary democracy.

My main points are: (1) where are the real agents of power; and (2) what are the kinds of controls--the process of institutionalization (especially with regard to parties and the financing of them).

The major question is: is the present type of parties and party system in Germany able to fulfill the task of a party system (i.e., contact voter, obtain political participation from the public) and will it be able to do so in the future? The article is an attempt to understand what is going on, not a discussion of the forms of government--with respect to German traditions and historical institutions. The position of Chancellor is very important; there is a contrast between the Adenauer and post-Adenauer periods.

**Kissinger:** If the paper is misunderstood (Grosser believed it was a study of forms of government), the theme needs to be accentuated.

(1) The role of parliament and the executive is not a peculiarly German development but is a recent general European one.

(2) Disagrees with Bracher on role of Adenauer. One of his most important contributions was that, for the first time, Germany had what it considered a democratic government. This combination of authority and democracy is an historic achievement. The sense of authority is now being lost--it may affect the confidence in the system.

**Bracher:** In the 1950's Germany had to face many problems and a modern situation. The Adenauer era enabled Germany to work out problems of democracy, yet it didn't face up to what German democracy should be.

-14-

**Friedrich:** In democratic German circles, there exists a profound misunderstanding as to how parliamentary democracy works. The UK type is very authoritarian--after debate, the Government takes over. Adenauer worked this way. France tried to do this, also (but Germany got its misconceptions from the working of French democracy). Bracher should point out this German misunderstanding.

**Stolper:** All democracies have to have leadership. Bracher doesn't point this out. It is not a question of parliament v. the President, but a class consciousness of who's supposed to do what (very complex), which also exists to some extent in Britain. The issue is put in the wrong perspective.

**Bracher:** the "treason of the conservatives" doesn't fully explain the failure of the Weimar govt. In their social analyses of present Germany, most Americans agree that everything is wrong (hierarchical, wrong attitudes, etc.). I agree. One can't point merely to general tendencies in all modern societies but must point out specific German tendencies in order to explain Bismarck, Weimar, etc. It is a major and very German issue, not merely a relative thing present in all societies.

**Stolper:** Can this be explained only in constitutional-legal terms, though?

**Scheuch:** One should examine the ways in which the federal authorities exert control: by expertisse, party control (the distribution of authority is changing here), and pressure groups (how each relates in different ways to the government). The legalistic structure is a constant, but other factors change.

**Grosser:** In the foreign policy, cultural, and political articles, *ink* it should be asked: what is the link between economic liberalism and political freedom in German thinking? Germans believe that political liberty and economic development are closely linked (as does the US). Their basic ideological attitude is very important.

Epstein's paper deals with too much--it is an inventory, but an incomplete one. The religious chapter doesn't deal with the relations between religious organizations and politics or religious philosophy in postwar Germany. His definition of German culture equals the professor--and this leads to too much optimism. He relates culture almost entirely to the university; there is nothing about TV. Becker in *Die Zeit* articles deals with mass culture; he asks: what is good and bad in Germany? He mentions that German theaters are beautiful, but there are no German films. Why are the TV and radio the temple of music in Europe? Epstein's definition is too narrow.

The Stolper/Roskamp paper has much to say about the ideology of economics. Croan's article a few months ago pointed out the DDR integration in Comecon. How far is West Germany integrated with Europe? I suspect it is far less structurally.

**Stolper:** West German trade with the eastern bloc is large and could expand. But it is hard to interpret the DDR situation; Communist jargon uses the same words we do, but they mean entirely different things. It is hard to estimate.

-15-

**Bracher:** The headings I used are provisional and may create a textbook impression. But background factual information in the realm of domestic politics is very necessary, even for an educated audience.

There is the important problem of rearmament and the impact of the Bundeswehr on the domestic situation. The book should have a separate chapter on this--the impact of the military on foreign and domestic politics, especially with regard to the image of West Germany in Eastern Europe.

**Scheuch:** The problem of how to integrate the subject of mass media into the Bracher and Epstein articles. Since 1962 in Germany there has been an emphasis on the neutrality of the press. What are the functions of the media? Many artists derive much of their income from selling to the radio. Epstein could extend his discussion of the role of radio.

**Kissinger:** Pieces of this could be taken up in all articles as they are relevant.

Bracher should make sure his references are clear for a non-German audience. His theme (that German democracy suffers from unique handicaps since the war, that Adenauer plays on parties and Erhard on the public excessively). But what is a chancellor to do? He should stress what the weakness of German democracy is, and this must be put in a perspective (especially for US readers)--German democracy is not doomed inevitably. He should discuss both the general and unique German phenomenon.

**Bracher:** I was merely saying that Adenauer's concept of democracy was different from Erhard's, not making a value judgement.

**Grosser:** There is a problem in criticising Germany; people tend to have more value judgements on Germany than on France--it is hard to write for both a German and American public on the subject of Germany.

**Bowie:** If Bracher's themes came out more clearly, perhaps the article could have a better structure--perhaps he could point out that he's being analytical, not descriptive.

**Kissinger:** Or preface the article with a philosophical statement of what is going to be explored, your aim, what you are proving--along with a conclusion. What is your own picture of German democracy? Is the importance of interest groups in politics really a weakness as you imply?

**Stolper:** Should say more of the role of the President--you underestimate this.

**Bracher:** What was important was the decision of the Parliamentary Council to change the situation and powers of the presidency.

In order to deal with the importance of personalities, as has been suggested, I would have to include a lengthy assessment of Adenauer, etc.

-16-

**Epstein:** Though Heuss was great, under him the powers of the president atrophied. The president is relatively unimportant in German government.

**Kissinger:** Bracher can point out the major problem areas and achievements of the government, and not give an account of how the whole system works.

**Friedrich:** Although it is possible to leave the president out of the picture up to 1959, it is hard to understand what has happened since then without a consideration of the office. Now the president has become an important lever in periods of indecisiveness (seen in the formation of Adenauer's cabinet).

**Bracher:** Heuss himself had very definite notions of the office as an unpolitical one.

**Friedrich:** But under his successor a change is occurring. Perhaps you could just mention this fact and nothing more.

**Bowie & Scheuch:** Perhaps you could begin not by saying what was intended in 1949 but with your own present analysis of the situation and the nature of the problems--then discuss how institutions have adapted successfully or unsuccessfully to these. Is it a question of fearing both weakness and strength, of finding a mean? But this is not unique to Germany, though perhaps it is more difficult there.

**Bracher:** But then I would have to make guesses and speculations before finding a sound basis of analysis. I am reluctant to do this.

## Scheuch's Article

**Scheuch:** (summarizes main points of his article). The major point of the article is the cross-cutting of many past "packages" of groups, or cleavages (for example, a negro physician living in a suburb--as soon as skin color becomes most important attribute, then society has made a decision). There is a high degree of German autonomy or discretion. Deference is confused with distance in many discussions. Deference refers to rank, distance to respect. There are three rankings: social groups, acceptability (how good are these people), and the value of the person. These intersect; for example, a highly skilled worker of a low social group may be valued and accepted. This interaction contributes to peacefulness between different social groupings and to a feeling of being rewarded by society. One could have a high rank but low acceptability, and vice versa (for example, some businessmen has low attributes).

**Grosser:** In any society a multiplicity of factors leads to stability (since there are many choices). Why is this special to Germany?

**Scheuch:** The class system is not specifically German--it doesn't make German politics unique.

- suggestion that there could be a link between Scheuch & economic article.

-17-

**Scheuch:** (continuing summary) These groups represent a self-contained
universe (isn't sure if this is uniquely German or not but has
the impression there is more communication between groups in US, UK,
and France). One group knows little of the other.

The self-definition of elite is the specialist, having had a long
career and few job changes.

**Bowie:** how does one know if he is an elite?

**Scheuch:** I do this through an institutional and reputational approach.
Questions elites to see if they consider each other elite.

**Bowie:** Organizations now have their own politics. Those who run the
politics of the organization are not necessarily elites in their
profession, though.

**Scheuch:** They would be considered elite if they were political leaders
though (for example, a professor becomes elite when he becomes a cabinet
minister). I start out with positions, then find out what these positions
mean to others.

Elite and middle class values correspond tremendously. 80% of the
elite is from the upper middle class; there is no elite sub-group
(defines middle class by family background, not income). There is
an interaction. The elite audience is the upper middle class (about %5
of the population--1 million) and it plays to them. It is almost
too large an audience (very unlike the UK).

There is no common place, field of study, or university for the
elites. There is interaction among elites; they claim expertise
for their range of knowledge (in some fields there is a very small
number of experts--for example in strategy and military affairs, only
20 both in and out of the govt). There are no general experts, and
many considered expert in their fields aren't so by professional
standards (example, Erhard in economics). There is a mutual granting
of autonomy among elites, and much bickering among them. How is
consensus reached? European policy, military policy are some of the
fields in which only a small minority is considered expert. Public
opinion on these issues derives almost solely from the views of these
experts.

Values elite guided by (no personal ties) are strong consensus
on rules of conduct and on substantive beliefs. But ostracism is not
as influential as it is in the UK; though a person may lose his
effectiveness vis-a-vis his peers, he still has a subordinate following.
All elites believe that "democracy is good," so they have to phrase
their ideas in terms of a "better German democracy." There is really
no consensus on the substance of democracy.

What controls political choices in the elite is connected with a
sense of national identity. Germany is now defined as a Western country;
therefore, the "western elite" are respected, have much leeway and freedom.

**Kissinger:** German history shows a trend both to anarathy and authority
(this can relate to Bracher's article). There are either many or no
parties; there is much individualism. It is hard to assemble a group
of senior German officials of different convictions who would be able to
act together as Americans could. A hierarchical, feudal structure.

**Scheuch:** There is a belief among the German elite that public life is not something to "go all out for." They are somewhat apathetic. Believe public life is the life of alienated men.

**Graubard:** I find your comments most interesting. However you should emphasize some of the following points:

in Europe as a whole there are certain fundamental or traditional kinds of elites. These are changing, but they still retain traditional forms. This is not the case in Germany.

--there is a change in the professional life of the German people. What does this mean with respect to elites?

--One is least conscious of the past when one is in Germany. Criteria in Germany are now very different from traditional values.

--Elites in Germany refer themselves not to the general public but to foreign (outside) elites. Perhaps this has bearing on the German conviction that an idea presented to the US is accepted when it is accepted by the corresponding elite group there.

--should define middle class more clearly.

--on p. 7, you imply Germany shows more contradictions than other industrial nations. Is this really true? This paper may provide an opportunity to show German uniqueness due to World War II.

**Bracher:** can use Scheuch's points in his article, but didn't reach an optimistic conclusion after reading it. There are changes between 1950 and 1964--what in what direction are they going?

**Scheuch:** There are two or three important changes. The relative size of the nobility (elite) doesn't change.

**Roskamp:** Scheuch seems to conclude that elite opinion is restrained by that in other countries. What if this restraint should dissappear? Is there any historical evidence of how German elites behave without constraint, on their own? Stable? What does history (Hitler, etc.) show?

**Kaiser:** Graubard's emphasis on Scheuch's point that the German elite is unlike the elite in other nations--it doesn't come from the same group. But there is a residual of historical tradition in the elite; since the education is still geared to these notions and norms.

**Scheuch:** The question is whether the elite is a continuation of the value system of the upper middle class? There is basic agreement between the 2 groups onxxx nature of obligation to the state, etc.

Should the political beliefs of the elite & upper middle class be included?

**Kissinger:** This should be studied more than the social-psychological--xxx and also with reference in Scheuch's paper to xxx Bracher and Stolper. Discuss elite beliefs and how they relate to the social structure. If it is true that German elites are influenced by foreign elites, what bearing does this have on German foreign policy?

**Bowie:** Would the values of the elite influence the alternatives Germans see in their foreign policy & the pursuit of such?

**Scheuch:** Yes. Germany is now a Western country. This belief, strongly held by elites, influences foreign policy decisions.

**Friedrich:** How can this belief be related to their image of what is a desirable man?

**Scheuch:** This was discussed only with regard to the alienation of the public man.

**Friedrich:** The elites' self-image today is very different from that of the Weimar era (in which the image was the "high official"). Today, German businessmen look to American businessmen for their image, when formerly they looked to the Junker tradition.

**Kissinger:** editorial note--avoid German terms unless in brackets with American phrase in text.

**Kaiser:** Then there is the problem of how to distinguish references.

For example, in the *Spiegel* affair, there were three reactions: (1) outrage, (2) the feeling that "this would never have happened in the UK", and (3) "What will people think of us?" Must separate and study these.

## Epstein's paper

**Epstein:** How to organize the paper was a problem. I tried to get a guiding conception in the contrast of the hopes of 1947 and the reality of 1965, but perhaps there is a better one.

**Stolper:** I found the organization no problem. As for using 1947 as the guiding principle, there was a great contrast then between the "worldly" and the naive who were cut off from the mainstream of reality. I think this contrast means something very different than a first glance seems to imply.

What about music, the performing arts (comparison with 1920's, Hindemith), and art. They seem to have rediscovered it all now--almost as if they were repeating an experience. And what about architecture, one of the most important modern art forms? Too much emphasis on literature.

As for theology, what about Tillich? How are Eliot and Sartre in same sentence (Stolper misread here). Sartre got his philosophy from Heidegger (Epstein over-emphasizes the foreign influence on Germany), and the tradition goes back to Kierkegaard. In pre-Nazi times, all important theologians were radicals--this has spilled over.

The Concordat is ignored. This has led to Catholic opposition to protestants, homosexuals, etc--though this may now be changing.

**Roskamp:** Why concentrate on 1947 as the "key date?" Was this a really outstanding year of change in Germany? Was in Germany at the time and saw a widespread feeling that the fate of Germany was completely undecided. The allies were groping their way. The returned prisoners of war were those who, in normal times, would have had new ideas, but in 1945-47, there was much apathy. Monetary problems and sheer survival were primary concerns. Are you justified in looking at the small Group 47 as representative?

-20-

**Kaiser:** I agree. The activities of the late 1950's are much richer and different. A comparison with 1947 is not really valid.

Epstein deals with too much history and not enough culture. Such an inventory cannot be complete. His guiding principles are not carried through. For example, in the literary chapter, the book summaries he gives (inventory-like) should really be grouped under the political problems of Nazism. Here would be a good place to show the intellectual treatment of Nazism (i.e, discuss here Gunther Grass, radio, TV, revolt of the young intellectuals). A re-grouping is necessary.

Problem of continuity could be treated more comprehensively. Are there any specifically German themes in the tradition of earlier periods? Are there peculiarly new themes? On the other hand, there is too much comparison of present Germany with the Weimar days. Epstein seems to hold it against intellectuals that they really can't influence policy and merely criticize it--are impotent. But the contribution of intellectuals is more positive; they often perform what the political opposition traditionally does (example, Die Zeit, TV, etc)--and politicians listen.

Should include mass media, and a discussion of music which is flourishing in Germany (its relation to radio), and the theater (why is Hugger's *EX* a play and not a book, why is Grass writing a play), which is flourishing.

**Scheuch:** Should the products or the producers (organization) of culture be emphasized?

**Friedrich:** How are the products of the mind organized and produced? Popular culture (mass media, etc) includes a range of issues quite different from the formation of cultural products. There are three topics here: (1) the products of culture, (2) the organization of culture, (3) mass culture & criticisms.

One could take the records of one year in Germany and study them--see what concerts, lectures, etc., were given and were popular. One would get an entirely different picture. The reality seems to escape one in Epstein's article--the portrait, panorama doesn't emerge. Perhaps this is due to his contrast with 1947 and Weimar. Before one makes a contrast, one must know what one is contrasting, what is there.

Some of the things he says concerning the Ordinarius are simply not true. They do seek a widening of professorships; assistants have a very attractive position which is improving (have stipends, can do research, etc). For an American audience, it is not fruitful to concentrate on the organizational improvements & aspects of the university. There is a general unfamiliarity with this (he personally would prefer an organization somewhere between Harvard and Heidelberg--dislikes UCLA organization). The authoritarianism of the German university is nothing compared to the situation in France and Italy. Epstein misrepresents the German university. What needs to be emphasized is *change* in the authority of the professor. It is decreasing. The average age of professors is radically decreasing--he should mention this--and the younger men have entirely different attitudes. In fact, the converts to democracy are obsessed by it and often endanger the system--there is too little authority! What used to be the case is still there, but it is weakening. New factors are more important.

--either the life of the mind or the organization of culture should be studied, not both (too much).

-21-

**Bracher:** Rather than organization, Epstein could note the simple change that has occurred simply with the increase in the amount of material being taught.

**Stolper:** The Germans seem to have a better educational philosophy, the US better educational practice. The present increase in university staff shows a continuity in that it makes it possible to translate and effect traditional educational philosophy in present circumstances.

**Kissinger:** Perhaps Epstein could concentrate on the product rather than the organization of culture, analyzing the characteristics of those products. There is much provincialism in German literature; I don't have the impression they're writing for a universal audience. Perhaps Epstein could generalize on the character of literature, etc.

**Scheuch:** Aren't all Europeans provincial in this respect?

**Kissinger:** Then this could be pointed out as a general phenomenon.

**Scheuch:** The Germans have a peculiar concern with guilt and responsibility, of course.

**Friedrich:** I disagree--the themes are universal ones, though they may be of a particular kind.

**Bowie:** The article should concentrate on a social, rather than aesthetic interpretation of currents.

ECONOMICS--STOLPER/ROSKAMP PAPER

**Kaiser:** The paper could deal with the following more explicitly: how Germans view their role in economic integration (changes in policymaking with regard to unification--e.g., monetary policy, etc.); French-German conflict of view; structural changes (i.e., agriculture, etc.) and how far have they progressed?

**Scheuch:** Should point out that when Germany "re-entered" Europe, it was a highly diversified country, not dependent on any 1 country. Yet, since it had no colonial relations as did France and the UK, it was more dependent on the world economy. Should pay more attention to role of banks and German capital shortage. To what degree did a particular school of German economic thinking serve as a blueprint for the economy and official economic decisions?

**Stolper:** As to the latter point, it didn't matter, since Germans behaved pragmatically. What sounds banal in the US is not always self-evident to others (i.e., Germany). In economics, one is dealing with a situation in which Germans and critics are preoccupied with the wrong thing. Erhard talks economic nonsense, but it helps him get support for what he wants to do. Ideology matters very little in all countries. All come to the same conclusions. I hoped to break through ideology and look at the real situation.

(summarizes paper--wants to emphasize structural changes).

(believed agricultural issue unimportant; it will get smaller, as it will in all countries).

-22-

disagreement as to the importance of agriculture. Even if economically unimportant, it should be mentioned, since it is **believed** to be important by others.

**Epstein:** But what you (stolper) think is important may not be what Germans think important.

**Stolper:** They'll catch on quickly when shown what the facts are.

**Epstein:** Not necessarily.

**Kissinger:** At any rate, agriculture has been very much in the news, and has seemed to be a test of EEC. Perhaps it is a political rather than economic problem. Though agriculture is economically relatively unimportant, it has much political significance, especially if it becomes entirely controlled by the EEC.

**Stolper:** Agriculture is becoming less important everywhere.

**Epstein:** Then you must stress this very fact--just say isn't important.

**Stolper:** Main point of the paper is the importance of retaining freedom of action. This depends on the productivity of the economy. Thus, one doesn't lose freedom in integration if productivity is improved.

**Scheuch:** Importance of redistribution of wealth--pension system.

**Stolper:** There has been a deliberate use of the market economy, but not of course in its pure form. (Discusses present integration as a return to the turn of the century where all was "naive"--i.e., mobility of capital & labor, no passports, open territories & inspection. Present integration trying to regain lost innocence).

**Kissinger:** Should expand some ideas, especially the revolutionary ones you have, or reader may not get the point. Should enlarge first section. There is a difference between what was done in the UK and Germany. In the UK intervention itself was desirable; in Germany it was a tool to an end. This explains many attitudes--for example, the development of the pragmatic use of the state.

**Stolper:** But the pragmatic in Germany is even more doctrinaire than the doctrinaire in the UK!