THE INDOCHINA WAR: OVERVIEW, 1972

If editorial and congressional commentary on the Vietnam War in 1972 differed substantially from 1971, it was by virtue of the fact it was a Presidential election year in the United States. As Democratic candidates initiated attacks on the President's Indochina policies and set forth proposals to bring an end to American involvement in the war, President Nixon was under increasing pressure to produce results -- preferably through substantive progress at the Paris peace negotiations or alternatively through an early conclusion of his dual policy of Vietnamization and phased American withdrawal. Thus it was a year of high expectations, with the President's own 1968 campaign promise that he had a plan to end the war not far in the background.

As a result, any Administration action or announcement vis a vis the war in 1972 was viewed both in terms of its impact upon U.S. involvement in Indochina and the U.S. election. The year's successes -- and this meant indications of progress or breakthrough in Paris -- were greeted with accusations of political motivation and election year timing. Whenever events fell short of expectations -- either the ARVN did not seem to be "hacking it" or negotiations collapsed and the President took countermeasures -- he was accused of continued inflexibility, pursuit of a bankrupt policy (Vietnamization), deception of the American people, escalation of the war. and, in some instances, the continued pursuit of military victory.

1972 began with a continuation of the bombing controversy and thus a reiteration of many of the same themes which found expression in late 1971. The bombing had proven ineffectual in the past, so what did the Administration expect to achieve by it now. It had never substantially reduced the flow of

page 2

North Vietnamese troops or supplies. Moreover, the bombing had never had appreciable impact on the North Vietnamese will to fight. Henry Kissinger's hope that Hanoi could thus be driven to make a deal had been proven unfounded resting upon the old delusion that bombing could achieve effective political results. Instead, such extensive and immoral use of American air power served to reduce American stature abroad, increase the number of POW's, threaten newly improved relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and reawaken the peace movement in the United States: Had the President decided that the domestic political repercussions of resumed bombing of the North would be less than the political consequences of a major military defeat and the collapse of Vietnamization in an election year. Was not the resort to bombing in itself an indictment of Vietnamization? Alternatively, was the President engaged in a calculated deception of the American people, i.e. ending the U.S. combat role and thus giving the appearance of ending the war while attempting to win it by other means. Air power was an "inexpensive and invisible" means of maintaining the American commitment in Vietnam; but how could air power be expected to accomplish what one half million American ground troops could not. Air power was no substitute for ground power and therefore could only work to the extent that Vietnamization had worked. It could postpone defeat but not prevent it.

The President's January 25th announcement of the secret Kissinger-Tho negotiations and an 8-point peace proposal served to neutralize this intense criticism of the President's policies. For the most part, editorial and congressional commentary was cautious and supportive. No one wanted to be accused later of scuttling a delicate and hopeful process of negotiation. Despite the proposal's rejection, expectations of a possible breakthrough rose. The

page 3

New York Times. for example, expressed the view that the President's pro-
posals were "substantial enough and flexible enough" to warrant serious ex-
ploration and hopefully meaningful negotiation. The Washington Post, however,
saw little new or hopeful in the announcement. It argued in a series of
editorials that while the United States had renounced "conventional" in favor
of "limited" means to wage war in Vietnam, the President, in his statement,
continued to talk in terms of "conventional" ends. Thus, he spoke of "losing"
a war that was never "ours to lose" and about "honoring our commitments" with-
out defining them in realistic and "limited" terms. The U.S. proposals still
depended upon the North Vietnamese abandoning the objectives they had fought for
for some forty years. Others also expressed doubt that there was enough in
the new plan to reasonable expect the Communists to accept it.

In addition, the possible political motivation behind the President's
decision to "go public" was not overlooked. The Washington Post deemed it a
"veritable political masterstroke", while the Christian Science Monitor called
it a "modern classic" of effective political strategy. Nation maintained that
the revelation was not only intended to throw the President's domestic opposition
off balance. but also to lay the "political foundation" for future military
actions which might become necessary to offset any North Vietnamese gains,
particularly in light of the considerable speculation that a new communist
offensive was in the offing.

In early April following another suspension of the Paris peace talks,
the long-anticipated (though curiously ill-prepared for) North Vietnamese
offensive began. In response to what analysts viewed as a Communist effort
to discredit Saigon and the policy of Vietnamization, revive antiwar sentiment

in the U.S., and exhibit independence from both Moscow and Peking, the President resumed massive bombing of the North. Early commentary that the offensive would put Vietnamization to an ultimate and hopefully successful test gave way to outrage over the U.S. bombing of population centers and considerable fear over what the President might do next if the ARVN proved incapable of staving off a major defeat. A critical concern was that the extensive air and naval bombardment of the North risked a major confrontation with the USSR or the PRC and a setback for detente. Was the maintenance of a non-communist, and particularly a Thieu, regime in Saigon woth such a risk. As the ARVN showed signs of faltering despite massive U.S. air support, the entire policy of Vietnamization was once more called into question and in many cases deemed a complete failure. The prospect or probability of an unending American presence in Indochina was brought before the public. Moreover, the antiwar movement in the United States was rekindled with numerous demonstrations throughout the country coupled with congressional efforts to legislate an immediate end to U.S. involvement in the war.

Following closely upon a shortlived resumption and subsequent collapse of the Paris talks, the May 8th announcement of the mining of North Vietnam's harbors was greeted with a not unexpected acceleration of protest. Many considered the move a desperate and extremely dangerous gamble carrying the unwarranted risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union and collapse of SALT and East-West detente on the eve of the Moscow summit. Both the bombing of Haiphong and the mining of harbors had been proposed before and rejected for good reason. Moreover, even if the measures had any impact on incoming supplies which was doubted, such supplies were unrelated to the current offensive.

How could the President justify the risks he was taking against any possible gains.? Was he still hoping he could win the war or bomb Hanoi into submission and negotiation? Claims and counterclaims that the United States was bombing the North Vietnamese dike system further horrified the President's critics.

Far less attention was given to the "carrot" in the President's May 8th announcement, the 4-point peace proposal. The *New York Times*, as it had in the past, did express the hope that it was flexible enough to lead to meaningful negotiation despite its rejection by the communists. Others, however, saw no reason for Hanoi to accept such a ceasefire proposal wjen it was winning on the ground. To many, the President still seemed committed to the survival of President Thieu and under such circumstances no negotiated settlement was possible. While the United States might be willing to accept a separation of political and military issues, the Communists were not.

Despite this intense editorial criticism of the President's actions, antiwar protest never reached the levels of intensity or violence of the May 1970 Cambodia "incursion". The President's standing in the polls remained strong, largely due to his successful summitry in both Peking and Moscow and the fact that a serious confrontation with Moscow over the mining had not occurred. In addition, congressional efforts to legislate an end to the war continued to be thwarted. The resumption of the Paris negotiations once more in July with talk of a possible "new approach" seemed to divert attention away from the actual course of the war towards tentative hopes for a negotiated settlement.

During this period, it was speculated that secret negotiations were continuing between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and thus commentary became more

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cautious. Hopes for a possible breakthrough in the negotiations were linked both to the Moscow Summit and the U.S. election. Many conjectured that the United States and Soviet Union had recognized their mutual interest in seeing an end to the war and that the Russians had agreed to exert pressure upon Hanoi to engage in meaningful negotiation. In addition, it was believed that Hanoi had concluded that President Nixon would be reelected. If this were, in fact, the case, he would be much tougher to deal with after the election when there would be no effective political constraints upon his actions. Hence, a more advantageous agreement might be achieved before November while the President was still politically exposed to the war issue.

It was perhaps due to this continued intense speculation that a settlement might be in the offing, as well as the Democratic candidate's performance on other issues, that Senator McGovern's announcement of his Indochina Peace Plan received only cursory attention. While many long-time war critics (Boston Globe, New York Post) endorsed his proposals, others opposed his intention to cut off all aid to Vietnam and withdraw all American equipment (Washington Post, L.A. Times). James Reston, to the surprise of many, called it a "formula for surrender".

Any impact the McGovern proposal's might have had was almost immediately overshadowed by Dr. Kissinger's October 26th announcement that "peace was at hand". While some commented that the revelation of an agreement just days before an election was politics at its best and that there was nothing in the agreement that could not have been achieved four years earlier, most remained thankful that a breakthrough had finally been achieved. Few, however, had any illusions that the terms of the agreement would result in any lasting peace

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except in terms of U.S. involvement. There was no doubt that the war in Indo-
china would continue though perhaps in different guise. However, most had
long since abandoned any hopes for an end to the war in conventional terms.
Most only wanted to see the United States end all involvement in the war and
let the Vietnamese work out their political differences without outside inter-
ference.

As the delay in the signing of the agreement changed from the promised
"just a few days" into weeks and the "few details to be worked out" were
revealed to be substantive issues, the respite from criticism the President
had enjoyed ended abruptly. He was accused of a calculated deception of the
American people to get reelected. If Hanoi's claims were true, the President
had accepted the tentative agreement and now with the election over he was
seeking a renegotiation of the deal. He was reneging. The few details the
American people were led to believe needed working out were actually the central
issues of the war: the political future of South Vietnam. Moreover, the fact
that President Thieu would object to any settlement short of military victory
should have come as no surprise. The question, however, was whether the United
States would again let Thieu veto an agreement that was in the best interests
of the U.S.

As more and more issues appeared to be reopened in the negotiations, hopes
for an agreement ebbed and criticism intensified. Congressional criticism which
had been muted during the November-December negotiating period became increasingly
vocal. As the Paris talks again appeared stalemated, the year ended as it began
with the President ordering a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. The
torrent of subsequent criticism can best be illustrated by some of the titles of
editorials which followed: "New Madness in Vietnam", "Tragic and Deperate Step",

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>June 30, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate passes the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act. It specifies that without Congressional consent the President may not expend funds to retain American troops in Cambodia; provide foreign military advisors or mercenaries to aid the Cambodian Government, or engage in combat activities in support of Cambodian forces. The vote was 58-37.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 9, 1970</td>
    <td>House rejects a Rep. Riegle motion to instruct House conferees to the military sales bill to accept the Cooper-Church amendment adopted by the Senate.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 14, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate Armed Services Committee adopts a provision to the military procurement authorization bill to prohibit the use of military assistance funds to finance military operations or programs of other countries in support of the Cambodian Government (eg. could not pay Thai forces going to the assistance of Cambodia)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 1, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate defeats the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to the military procurement authorization bill. It would require the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Indochina by December 31, 1971. However, if an "unanticipated clear and present danger" arose the deadline could be postponed 60 days, provided the President justified such action. Specific Congressional authorization could further extend the deadline. The vote was 39-55</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 1, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Proximate amendment to the military procurement bill to prohibit the sending of draftees to South Vietnam against their will. The vote was 22-71.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 2, 1970</td>
    <td>14 Senators led by Senator Jackson propose a mutual standstill cease-fire in Vietnam. Their five-point plan also suggests an international peacekeeping force to oversee the ceasefire, mutual withdrawal of all outside forces and free elections.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 6, 1970</td>
    <td>House Appropriations Committee adopts a provision to the Defense Appropriations Bill stating "in line with the President's expressed intention no funds shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops into Laos or Thailand (does not include Cambodia). Provision adopted with whole bill October 8, 1970.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

C7J

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>October 8, 1970</td>
    <td>House rejects a Fraser amendment to the DOD Appropriations Bill to prohibit the use of funds for any U.S. combat or support operations in Vietnam other than those to effect the safe and orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces and POW's. Further, no funds could be used to finance military personnel in Vietnam after June 29, 1971 other than advisors. The vote was 23-65.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 3, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate Appropriations Committee adopts a provision to the DOD Appropriations Bill prohibiting the use of funds for the introduction of American ground troops in Laos, Thailand or Cambodia. In addition, the bill prohibits the use of funds to support actions by Vietnamese or other forces designed to support the Governments of Laos or Cambodia.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 3, 1970</td>
    <td>House Foreign Affairs Committee approves the President's supplementary foreign aid request after rejecting a Findley amendment providing that funds for Cambodia be used "exclusively for purposes the President determines essential to with withdrawal of American military personnel from South Vietnam and in no case for the establishment or maintenance of U.S. personnel in Cambodia.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 8, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate passes the DOD Appropriations Bill with the Committee-adopted prohibitions on assistance to the Cambodian and Laotian Governments and on the introduction of U.S. ground troops to Cambodia, Laos or Thailand. The vote was 89-0.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 14, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves the Cambodia Supplementary aid authorization bill with a prohibition on the use of American ground troops or military advisors in that country.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 14, 1970</td>
    <td>Senate passes Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill containing the above authorized aid requests.<br>The bill, as passed, stipulates that none of the funds can be used unless authorizing legislation is enacted. This proviso was designed to prevent attempts to bypass the Foreign Relations Committee. There is a parliamentary procedure whereby authorizing legislation can be waived and an appropriating bill passed. Fearing rejection or restrictions by the SFRC, there had been Administration-supported maneuvers to do this</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>December 15, 1970</td>
    <td>House and Senate Conferees on the DOD Appropriations Bill agree to a compromise on the restrictive language regarding Indochina. The agreed upon language prohibits the use of funds to send ground combat troops to Laos or Thailand (not Cambodia) with the added proviso that the ban does not prevent the President from taking action "designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from SEA or to aid in the release of POW's.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

December 16, 1970
House adopts the Conference Report on the DOD Appropriations bill with the above compromise language. The vote was 327-30.

December 16, 1970
Senate rejects a Gravel amendment to the Supplementary Foreign Aid Authorization Bill to delete $155 million in funds for Cambodia. The vote was 33-61.

December 16, 1970
Senate passes the Supplementary Foreign Aid Authorization Bill with the prohibition on the introduction of U.S. ground troops into Cambodia. The vote was 72-22.

December 22, 1970
House and Senate adopt Conference Report on the Supplementary Foreign Military Aid Authorization Bill. As finally enacted, it contains the prohibition on the introduction of ground troops into Cambodia. The Senate vote was 41-20., with a voice vote in the House.

December 28, 1970
Senate adopts an Ellender motion to table (kill) the Conference Report on the DOD Appropriations Bill. Supporters of this motion opposed the compromise language regarding Indochina.

December 29, 1970
House and Senate adopt a second, new version of a Conference Report on the DOD Appropriations Bill. While not fully meeting some Senator's objections, the new language states "In line with the expressed intention of the President, none of the funds appropriated shall be used for the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. However, this shall not be construed to "prohibit the President from taking action in said areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from SEA or to aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war. The Senate vote was 70-2. The House vote was 234-18."

(With the Cambodia restriction in the aid bill, it was no longer essential to insist in that country's inclusion in the defense bill).

NOTE: The originally passed Cooper-Church amendment (June 30, 1970) was attached to the regular FY1971 foreign military aid bill. This bill became deadlocked in conference due to the House's objection to this amendment. Subsequently, however, a similar restriction was attached to the supplementary aid bill. When this bill cleared Congress with the Cambodia restriction included, conferees agreed to drop the original Cooper-Church amendment from the regular aid bill. Hence, this bill finally cleared the Congress December 31, 1970.

January 4, 1971
23 House Members propose a new plan for the release of American POW's. In a letter to the President, they call for a proportionate repatriation plan under which the United States agrees to withdraw a certain percentage of American troops each time North Vietnam releases the same percentage of POW's.

January 21, 1971
13 House Democrats introduce a resolution demanding an immediate end to all U.S. offensive operations in Indo-China and setting a June 30, 1971 withdrawal deadline for all U.S. forces

64 House members introduce legislation to extend the 1970 Cooper-Church amendment further by banning the use of funds "to provide U.S. air and sea combat support" for any military operations in Cambodia.

(Both of the above measures were introduced in response to the apparent escalation of the U.S. role in Cambodia.)

January 2, 1971
Senators McGovern and Hatfield along with 19 Senate colleagues introduce the Vietnam Disengagement Act which would require the withdrawal of all American troops by December 31, 1971. (On September 1, 1970, an earlier version of this proposal was rejected by a vote of 55-39.)

February 9, 1971
Representative O'Neill and 37 cosponsors introduce legislation forbidding not only direct U.S. intervention in Laos but also support "of any kind by the U.S. ... of any military operation in Laos".

(The above was introduced in response to the allied Laos incursion which began February 8, 1971 with U.S. air support).

February 10, 1971
Senator Javits (along with Senators Pell and Spong) reintroduces War Powers legislation. The bill would limit the President's authority to commit American troops to hostilities without Congressional approval. It would provide the President authority to initiate action to meet emergencies, to protect lives and property and to comply with treaty obligations; however hostilities could not continue for more than 30 days without specific congressional authorization.

February 10, 1971
Representative Bingham and approximately 50 cosponsors introduce the companion bill to the McGovern-Hatfield Vietnam Disengagement Act in the House.

February 22, 1971
Senate Democratic Policy Committee calls for withdrawal of all U.S. forces -- including air and support troops -- from all of Indochina within the 2 years of the 92nd Congress.

February 25, 1971 Senator Mondale along with Senator Saxbe and 16 cosponsors introduce legislation to prohibit American forces from supporting an invasion of North Vietnam without "prior and explicit" Congressional authorization.
(The above was introduced in response to statements by President Thieu and Vice President Ky regarding the possibility of an allied strike across the DMZ.)

March 1, 1971 Senator Brooke calls for three-month studies by the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the problems and consequences of "the orderly withdrawal" of all U.S. armed forces from South Vietnam.

March 1, 1971 Senator Eagleton introduces a war powers bill similar to the Javits bill, however it prohibits the President from committing the U.S. to military action -- even in compliance with a treaty -- without specific congressional declaration of war or congressional statute. It permits the same 30-day period of action prior to congressional action.

March 8, 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins hearings on war powers legislation

March 31, 1971 House Democratic Caucus adopts broad resolution in favor of working toward ending the Vietnam War by January, 1973 - the end of the 92nd Congress. Voted 101-100 for the 1973 date rather than the end of 1971. (Final resolution considered weak and subject to contradictory interpretations.)

March 29, 1971 Representatives O'Neill, Rostenkowski, Carey and Corman (supported by Mosher) announce that they believe setting a date for cutting off the war is the best way to assure the release of American POW's and pledge to vote for measures -- to complete the withdrawal of U.S. troops by December 31, 1971.

April 1, 1971 House rejects a Fraser amendment to the Draft Extension Bill that would provide that no person inducted after December 31, 1971 may be required to serve in Indochina. The vote was 122-160.

April 1, 1971 House, by voice vote, rejects a Gonzalez amendment to the Draft Extension Bill which would prohibit, except during periods of war declared by Congress, any person from being required, without his consent, to serve in an area of armed conflict outside the U.S. where U.S. forces are engaged.

April 1, 1971 House rejects a Gibbons amendment which would prohibit anyone being inducted after June 30, 1971 from being used in combat or being deployed to a combat zone unless: 1) the President declares that an armed attack on the U.S. has occurred or is imminent, 2) the Congress by concurrent resolution authorizes such use or deployment, 3) the President has asked the Congress to declare war (authority expires after 30 days), 4) Congress has declared war or 5) the individual consents to such deployment in writing. The vote was 97-279.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>April 1, 1971</td>
    <td>House rejects, by voice vote, a Ryan amendment to provide that no part of any active duty strengths may be assigned to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam or their adjacent waters after December 31, 1971.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 4, 1971</td>
    <td>Senators Cooper and Church announce plans for a Cooper-Church II amendment which would request the President to fix a date for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 5, 1971</td>
    <td>Senator Miller introduces a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam 12 months after the release of all American POW's.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 15, 1971</td>
    <td>Senators Mathias and Brooke plead from the Senate floor for the President to set a final date for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 15, 1971</td>
    <td>Senator Case joins in support of the McGovern-Hatfield bill provided the "deadline be subject to adjustment prior to a final vote". (Case would prefer a deadline 12 months after congressional action rather than December 31, 1971.)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 20, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee opens hearings on various end-the-war proposals with a focus on the McGovern-Hatfield Bill, the Mondale-Saxbe prohibition vis a vis an invasion of North Vietnam and a Stevenson bill to establish a congressional commission to guarantee U.S. neutrality in the South Vietnamese elections.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 25, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Nelson-Humphery amendment to the Draft Extension Bill to prohibit the assignment of draftees to combat units in Vietnam after December 31, 1971. The vote was 25-52.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 25, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Tunney amendment to the Draft Extension Bill to prohibit the assignment of draftees in any combat area outside the U.S. unless authorized by Congress or the individual volunteers. The vote was 21-52.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 6, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Hatfield amendment to end the draft on July 1, 1971. The vote was 23-67.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 6, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Schweiker amendment to limit the draft extension to one year. The vote was 43-49.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 7, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate holds secret session on U.S. activities in Laos following reports of CIA operations there, U.S. financing of "Thai volunteers", and B-52 strikes in Northern Laos. Senator Symington subsequently calls for a $200 million ceiling on U.S. aid to that country.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 14, 1971</td>
    <td>Senator Mansfield proposes a "series of phased and rapid U.S. withdrawals" from Vietnam "in return for a series of phased releases of POW's".</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>June 16, 1971</td>
      <td>Senate rejects the McGovern-Hatfield bill in the form of an amendment to the Draft Extension Bill. The amendment would cut off all funding for the Vietnam War after December 31, 1971. However, it would provide the President the authority to 1) provide for the safety of American during withdrawal as well as those Indochinese endangered by U.S. withdrawal; 2) provide assistance to Indochina as Congress authorizes. In addition, the measure provided that if after 60 days of enactment, arrangements had not been made for the release of all American POW's by December 31, the deadline would be extended 60 days and the Congress may authorize such action as the President recommends to secure the release of the POW's. The vote was 42-55.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 16, 1971</td>
      <td>Senate rejects a Chiles substitute (for McGovern-Hatfield) amendment to the Draft Extension Bill. This measure amended the McGovern-Hatfield proposal by extending the deadline to June 1, 1972. It also provided that all POW's had to be released at least 60 days prior to the cut-off date or the deadline would have no effect. The vote was 44-52.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 17, 1971</td>
      <td>House rejects a Nedzi-Whalen amendment to the Military Procurement bill to prohibit the use of funds in Indochina after December 31, 1971. The vote was 158-254. The House previously rejected an amendment to this measure which would have made the cut-off date June 1, 1972. That vote was 147-237.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 17, 1971</td>
      <td>House passes the Military Procurement Bill. The vote was 331-58.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 22, 1971</td>
      <td>Senate debates a Cook-Stevens amendment to the Draft Extension Bill to cut off all funds for military operations in Indochina 9 months after enactment, provided the President obtains a "firm commitment" within 60 days from North Vietnam to release all U.S. POW's.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 22, 1971</td>
      <td>Senate adopts a Stennis modification to the Cook-Stevens amendment (above) which replaces the term "firm commitment" by making U.S. withdrawal conditional on the release of all POW's within 60 days of the bill's enactment. The vote was 50-49.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 22, 1971</td>
      <td>Senate adopts a Mansfield substitute to the Cook-Stevens amendment, as modified. The Mansfield substitute declares that "it is the policy of the U.S. to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operation in Indochina and to provide for the prompt and early withdrawal of all U.S. forces not more than 9 months after the bill's enactment subject to the release of American POW's". It also requests the President to 1) establish a final withdrawal date within 9 months contingent upon the POW release; 2) negotiate with North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire; 3) negotiate with North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for phased withdrawals of U.S. forces and phased releases of POW's. The vote on the substitute was 57-42 which was subsequently reaffirmed by a vote of 61-38.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>June 24, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects Humphrey amendment to Draft Extension Bill to prohibit the use of draftees in any combat area outside the U.S. after June 30, 1972 unless they volunteer in writing or the President determines it is essential to the national security. In the latter case, the President must justify his determination to Congress within 48 hours and terminate such deployment if not authorized by Congress in 30 days. The vote was 23-66.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 28, 1971</td>
    <td>House defeats motion to accept the Mansfield amendment to the Draft Extension Bill. The vote was 176-219. The bill goes to conference.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 7, 1971</td>
    <td>House rejects a McCloskey resolution asking the Administration information on U.S. military operations in Laos. The vote was 261-118 on a motion to table.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 30, 1971</td>
    <td>House and Senate conferees agree to a compromise on the Mansfield amendment to the Draft Extension Bill. The compromise drops the provision in the original amendment calling for a troop pull-out 9 months after enactment provided the POW's are released and replaces it with a call upon the President to set a "time certain" for U.S. withdrawal in return for the release of U.S. prisoners. It also makes the amendment an expression of "the sense of the Congress" rather than the "policy of the United States".</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>August 4, 1971</td>
    <td>House agrees to the Conference Report on the Draft Extension Bill containing the compromise Mansfield amendment. The vote was 299-108.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>August 5, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate defers action on the Draft Extension Bill conference report on a move by Senator Mansfield who opposes the watered-down version of his end-the-war amendment. Action postponed until September 13, 1971 when anti-war Senators intend to try to defeat it.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 17, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects motion to recommit the Draft Extension Bill to conference on the basis of the watered-down Mansfield amendment and House-passed pay increases. The vote was 36-47.<br/>Senate adopts cloture on the Draft Extension Bill. The vote was 61-30. This was a defeat of anti-war efforts to filibuster.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 21, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate adopts the Conference Report on the Draft Extension Bill with the compromise Mansfield amendment. The vote was 55-30. This clears measure for Presidential signature.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 27, 1971</td>
    <td>Senator Mansfield reintroduces his original end-the-war amendment as an amendment to the Military Procurement Act; however he reduces the deadline from the original 9 months to 6 months.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>November 30, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate adopts Mansfield amendment to the Military Procurement Act which provides for withdrawal of U.S. forces within 6 months of enactment, provided the release of American POW's etc. The vote was 57-38.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>October 1, 1971</td>
    <td>Senator Church announces he will offer an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill to cut off funding for the Vietnam War except for the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces. Withdrawal would be contingent upon POW release. Withdrawal date not yet decided upon.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 5, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Gravel amendment to the Military Procurement Act to prohibit the use of funds to bomb, rocket, or napalm any target within Cambodia, Thailand, North Vietnam or Laos. This prohibition extends to any target within South Vietnam unless the President determines it necessary for the safety of U.S. forces during their withdrawal. The vote was 19-64.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 6, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Montoya amendment to the Military Procurement Bill providing for a cut-off of funds for U.S. operations in Indochina after February 3, 1972, with the proviso that the President may extend this deadline not more than six months after enactment if he finds and notifies Congress that: 1) South Vietnam has conducted a democratic presidential election in which the rights of campaign workers and the franchise of the S. Vietnamese people has been protected. The amendment also requests the President to negotiate an agreement with N. Vietnam for a series of phased withdrawals of U.S. forces in return for a series of phased withdrawals of American POW's. The vote was 25-60.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 13, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee agrees to a $250 million ceiling on aid to Cambodia in the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill. It also limits to 200 the number of American personnel which can be assigned to Cambodia.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 19, 1971</td>
    <td>House rejects motion to instruct conferees not to accept certain Senate amendments to the Military Procurement Bill including the Mansfield end-the-war amendment. The vote was 192-215. House also rejects a Whalen substitute motion to instruct conferees to accept the Mansfield amendment. This vote was also 192-215.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 20, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopts a Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act to prohibit the use of funds except for the expeditious withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina. It also provides that American forces shall not engage in further hostilities in Indochina except to protect themselves from imminent danger.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 21, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopts the Mansfield amendment to the Military Procurement Bill as part of the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 28, 1971</td>
    <td>Senate adopts a Scott amendment to delete the Cooper-Church amendment (above) from the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill. The vote was 47-44.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>October 29, 1971.</td>
    <td>Senate rejects the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill. The vote was 27-41.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

CHRONOLOGY OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND ACTIONS REGARDING INDOCHINA, 1972

January 24, 1972
Senator Mansfield proposes that the Vietnam peace talks be expanded to include the opposing forces in Laos and Cambodia and be moved from Paris to Southeast Asia. He also suggests that Prince Norodom Sihanouk be returned to power in Cambodia and that, in Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma be replaced by a new government under King Savang Vatthana.

February 1, 1972
Senator Muskie offers a two-point peace plan for Indochina. It would:
- set a date for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in return for the release of American POW's and the safety of American forces as they withdraw, and
- urge the South Vietnamese Government to seek a political accommodation with the Communists or be deprived of U.S. military support.

March 1, 1972
Senator Symington releases a summary of a classified Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report entitled "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, January 1972". The Report concludes that fighting in Laos and Cambodia is increasing in intensity under "deteriorating" conditions, even if the war is winding down in South Vietnam. It adds that present U.S. policies offer "nothing but the same prospect of more of the same, at higher cost."

March 2, 1972
Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee chaired by Senator Kennedy concludes three days of hearings on the question of amnesty. The hearings were inconclusive with few new issues raised.

March 14, 1972
President requests $2.1 billion for foreign military assistance in FY73, including economic though not military assistance for South Vietnam and funds for both Laos and Cambodia.

March 16, 1972
President invokes Executive Privilege to deny Congress requested information regarding U.S. aid programs in Cambodia. (the annual county field submission).

March 23, 1972
Seven Democratic Senators and 34 House members announce the introduction of end-the-war legislation. Their bill would:
- require total withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Indochina and a cessation of all U.S. air and shelling operations in Indochina within 30 days conditional upon an agreement by North Vietnam to release all American POW's.
- failing such an agreement, the withdrawal deadline could be extended 30 days

- after that time, unless Congress cancelled the measure, withdrawal would proceed with or without a POW agreement.

page 2

CJA

March 29, 1972
Senate begins debate on war powers legislation. As reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the bill provides that the President could take emergency military action - in the absence of a Congressional declaration of war - only to repel or forestall an attack on the United States or on U.S. forces stationed abroad, or to protect U.S. citizens or nationals in danger in a foreign country. When the President takes such emergency action, he must terminate it within 30 days unless Congress specifically authorizes it to continue.

April 11, 1972
Senate rejects a Hruska motion to recommit the war powers bill to the Committee on the Judiciary. The vote was 26-60.

April 11, 1972
Senate rejects a Gravel amendment to the war powers bill to apply the bill's provisions to hostilities abroad, including the Indochina War, in which U.S. forces were engaged as of the date of the bill's enactment unless Congress declared war within 15 days. The vote was 11-74.

April 11, 1972
Senate adopts a Javits motion to table (kill) a second Gravel amendment to the war powers bill to delete the provision exempting ongoing hostilities and substitute a declaration of war on North Vietnam. The vote was 74-11. (In this way, the Senate avoided the intended straight up-or-down vote on a declaration of war against North Vietnam).

April 11, 1972
Senate rejects a Fulbright amendment to the war powers bill specifying that the bill, while exempting the Vietnam War, did not give the President any authority to continue hostilities in Southeast Asia. The vote was 28-66.

April 14, 1972
Senate passes the war powers bill by a vote of 68-16. No conference was then requested with the House which had passed a much milder war powers measure in 1971 in the form of a resolution. The House-adopted resolution merely requires the President to report to Congress whenever he initiates military operations without a prior declaration of war. The House version had been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which reported it adversely on April 20, 1972. It was hoped that when it came to the Senate floor the Senate-passed war powers bill could be offered and adopted as a substitute and then a conference would be requested. The Senate never took action, however, on the House resolution.

April 17-18, 1972
Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings ostensibly on the Administration's foreign military aid requests. Secretary of State Rogers and subsequently Secretary of Defense Laird testify at these opening sessions which focused almost exclusively on U.S. resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.

CYJ

page 3.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>April 17, 1972</td>
      <td>Following Secretary Roger's testimony, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 9-1 in favor of a Church-Case end-the-war amendment to the State-USIA authorization bill. The amendment would cut off all funds for U.S. ground, naval or air operations in or over Vietnam after December 31, 1972, conditional upon the release of American POW's and an accounting of American MIA's.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 17, 1972</td>
      <td>Senator Muskie introduces a resolution calling for the immediate end to all American military action against North Vietnam</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 18, 1972</td>
      <td>Representative Hebert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, refuses Rep. Harrington's request for committee hearings, in public or in secrecy, on the adequacy of official statistics being given to the public about the scope and intensity of American bombing in Indochina.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 19, 1972</td>
      <td>House Democratic Caucus considers and rejects, by a vote of 97-105, a resolution sponsored by Rep, O'Neil calling upon Democrats to support legislation to:<br>--cut off all funds for U.S. military operations in or over North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 30 days after enactment.<br>--cut off funds for air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand immediately<br>--cut off funds for bombing in South Vietnam immediately unless the President determines it is necessary to protect withdrawing American forces<br>--provide for a 30 day extension of the military operations deadline if American POW's have not been released.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 19, 1972</td>
      <td>At the request of Senator Cranston, the Senate sets aside three hours of debate on American bombing policies in Indochina. Some 26 Senators engaged in the debate speaking on both sides of the issue.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 20, 1972</td>
      <td>House Democratic Caucus adopts an O'Neil substitute resolution ordering the House Foreign Affairs Committee to produce, within 30 days, legislation setting some deadline for total U.S. withdrawal from the war subject to the release of American POW's and an accounting of MIA's. The vote was 135-66.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 20, 1972</td>
      <td>House Democratic Caucus adopts a Gibbons amendment to the O'Neil resolution condemning the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. The vote was 186-16.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 20, 1972</td>
      <td>House Democratic Caucus adopts the O'Neil resolution with the Gibbons amendment by a vote of 144-58.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 20, 1972</td>
      <td>House democratic Caucus rejects a Montgomery amendment to the resolution condemning the Soviet Union for sending weapons to North Vietnam. The vote was 51-149.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

page 4

April 26, 1972
House tables an Abzug resolution of inquiry to require the Administration to supply Congress with information on:
--current U.S. troop strengths in Indochina and all movements of men and supplies to Southeast Asia since March 15, 1972;
--detailed bombing statistics regarding North and South Vietnam and American casualty figures for the first ten days of March and the first ten days of April 1972;
--bombing statistics regarding Cambodia and Laos from January 1972;
--Administration compliance with the Mansfield amendment (passed in 1971) stating it was U.S. policy to withdraw totally from Indochina by a specified date, contingent upon the release of American POW's. The vote was 113-270.

May 2, 1972
Senate fails to act on a Gravel motion to insert NSSM 1 into the Congressional Record. This inconclusive action followed a four-hour secret session on the so-called Kissinger papers on Vietnam.

May 2, 1972
House Armed Services Committee rejects a Nedzi amendment to the military procurement bill calling for total U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina by September 1, 1972, contingent upon the release of American POW's. The vote was 5-32.

May 2, 1972
House Armed Services Committee maintains a point of order (kills) against a Leggett amendment to the military procurement bill to bar the reintroduction of American ground troops or the use of nuclear weapons to counter the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam.

May 9, 1972
Senate Democratic Caucus adopts a resolution "disapproving the escalation of the war in Vietnam" reflected in the President's decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors and continue intensified bombing of that country. The vote was 29-14.

May 10, 1972
Democrats in the House Foreign Affairs Committee agree to support legislation ordering an end to all American military involvement in South Vietnam and withdrawal by October 1, 1972 conditional upon American POW release.

May 12, 1972
20 House members and 2 Senators file suit to obtain an injunction to enjoin the President from continuing the Vietnam War, from further bombing or the mining of harbors, from further interruption of communication and rail transportation and other acts of violence against North Vietnam.

May 16, 1972
Senate adopts an Administration-backed Byrd amendment to the Church-Case end-the-war amendment (State authorization bill) to make U.S. withdrawal also contingent upon North Vietnam's acceptance of a ceasefire. (This reflected an endorsement of the President's withdrawal proposals made in conjunction with the announcement regarding the mining of Haiphong Harbor). The vote was 47-43.

page 5

CJD

May 31, 1972
Senate adopts the Church-Case end-the-war amendment to the State authorization bill, as modified by the Byrd amendment. In response to the President's May 8th proposal, Senators Church and Case had modified the December 31, 1972 withdrawal deadline reported by the committee to four months after an agreement was reached for the release of American POW's. Voice Vote.

May 31, 1972
Senate adopts a Stennis amendment to delete the entire Church-Case amendment from the State authorization bill. Voice Vote.

May 31, 1972
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports the FY73 foreign military aid authorization bill with a Mansfield end-the-war amendment. This amendment would prohibit:

- the use of funds to keep U.S. forces in South Vietnam after August 31, 1972 (no preconditions);

- participation by U.S. forces in hostilities in or over Indonesia upon completion of a ceasefire agreement, release of American POW's and an accounting of MIA's.

As reported, the bill also placed a $275 million limit on U.S. aid to or spending in behalf of Cambodia (excluded air operations) and required specific Congressional authorization for use of funds to finance foreign forces operating in Laos, Thailand or North Vietnam (aimed at CIA funding of Thai "volunteers".)

June 5, 1972
Senators McGovern and Humphrey differ sharply in a joint TV appearance on how to get American POW's back from North Vietnam. McGovern maintains American troops should be withdrawn first and POW release would follow. Senator Humphrey argued that American withdrawal should be tied to American POW release. He also urged the President to send former Secretary of Treasury Connally to North Vietnam to try to negotiate a means to end American involvement in the war.

June 12, 1972
Senate begins consideration of the FY73 foreign military aid bill which includes the Mansfield end-the-war amendment.

June 13, 1972
House Foreign Affairs Committee adopts a Buchanan end-the-war resolution stating it was the "sense of the Congress" that the U.S. withdraw from Vietnam within four months of an agreement on American POW release and a ceasefire. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 19-18, was in substance a full endorsement of the President's May 8th peace proposal. It was a substitute for the proposal supported by committee Democrats (May 10) for withdrawal by October 1, 1972 without the ceasefire condition.

June 27, 1972
House rejects a Harrington amendment to the military procurement bill to cut off funds for military operations in Vietnam on September 1, 1972, contingent upon POW release. The vote was 152-245.

page 6

EYJ

June 27, 1972
House rejects a Mikva amendment to the military procurement to prohibit the bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. Voice vote.

July 18, 1972
Senator Cannon offers an end-the-war amendment to the foreign military aid bill as a substitute to the committee-approved Mansfield amendment (May 31). Senator Cannon's proposal would alter the first section of the Mansfield proposal by changing the withdrawal date from August 31, 1972 to "90 days after enactment" (about December 1, 1972 given congressional timetables) and make such withdrawal contingent upon an agreement for the release of American POW's. The second section of the Mansfield provision would be unchanged.

July 19, 1972
Senator Cooper offers an end-the-war amendment to the foreign military aid bill to require the unconditional withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina within four months.

July 24, 1972
Senate adopts a Mansfield amendment to the Cannon end-the-war proposal to change the withdrawal deadline to October 1, 1972 and drop the POW condition. The vote was 60-32. This returns the amendment to the original Mansfield proposal with merely a one month delay in withdrawal.

July 24, 1972
Senate rejects the modified Cannon amendment to the foreign bill. The vote was 44-49.

July 24, 1972
Senate rejects a second Cannon end-the-war proposal offered as a substitute to the Cooper amendment (above). This would cut off war funds 90 days after enactment contingent upon an agreement for American POW release. The vote was 40-55.

July 24, 1972
Senate rejects an Allen amendment (in the nature of a substitute for the Cooper amendment) stating the sense of the Congress that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from Vietnam four months after an internationally supervised ceasefire and release of American POW's (the President's terms). The vote was 45-50.

July 24, 1972
Senate adopts a Brooke amendment to the Cooper end-the-war proposal requiring the release of American POW's before the fund cut-off wouls become effective. The vote was 63-32.

July 24, 1972
Senate adopts the Cooper end-the-war amendment, as modified by Brooke. The vote was 50-45.

July 24, 1972
Senate rejects a Stennis amendment to delete the Cooper-Brooke provision from the bill. The vote was 46-49.

July 24, 1972
Senate rejects the entire FY73 foreign military aid bill by a vote of 48-42. Those opposed to the end-the-war provision were aided by traditional opponents of military assistance.

page 7

July 25, 1972
House Foreign Affairs Committee adopts a Hamilton amendment to the foreign military aid authorization bill to require the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina and the termination of all hostilities no later than October 1, 1972 contingent upon a ceasefire with North Vietnam "to the extent necessary" for the safe withdrawal of American troops and upon the release of American POW's and an accounting of MIA's. The vote was 18-17.

July 25, 1972
Senator Kennedy discloses that North Vietnamese officials had sent him letters from 24 American POW's to their families.

July 26, 1972
Senator Cranston reintroduces the revised Mansfield end-the-war proposal (October 1, 1972 deadline) as an amendment to the military procurement bill.

July 26, 1972
Senator Brooke reintroduces the modified Cooper end-the-war amendment, defeated with the foreign aid bill July 24th, as an amendment to the military procurement bill. (withdrawal in four months contingent upon POW release).

August 2, 1972
Senate adopts an Aiken amendment to the Cranston end-the-war proposal (above) to declare withdrawal would be completed four months after an internationally supervised ceasefire had been declared (in line with the President's terms). The vote was 50-47.

August 2, 1972
Senate adopts the Brooke end-the-war amendment (above) as a substitute for the Cranston-Aiken proposal. The vote was 49-47.

August 2, 1972
Senate reaffirms adoption of the Brooke substitute by a vote of 50-47.

August 2, 1972
Adopts a Miller amendment to the Brooke substitute making withdrawal also conditional upon an accounting of MIA's. The vote was 95-2.

August 2, 1972
Senate adopts a Pastore motion to table a Dole amendment stating that Congress accept full responsibility for the consequences of adopting an end-the-war amendment. The vote was 59-38.

August 4, 1972
Ten Senators led by Senators Kennedy and Tunney claim that there has been deliberate American bombing of the North Vietnamese dike system.

August 10, 1972
House rejects a Whalen amendment to the foreign military aid bill to alter the Hamilton end-the-war provision contained in the bill by changing the withdrawal deadline from October 1, 1972 to December 31, 1972. The vote was 109-304. (The offering of this amendment was viewed as a means of gaining additional support for the Hamilton provision. It was defeated by a coalition of those who opposed any end-the-war legislation and those who preferred the earlier October 1 deadline.)

page 8

August 10, 1972
House adopts a Bolling amendment to delete the Hamilton end-the-war provision from the foreign aid bill. The vote was 228-178.

August 16, 1972
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the widespread bomb damage to civilian installations in North Vietnam he saw during a recent visit to Hanoi.

August 16, 1972
It is disclosed that Senator McGovern sent Pierre Salinger to Paris in an effort to obtain the release of American POW's before the November Presidential election, but was turned down by Hanoi.

August 16, 1972
House rejects by voice vote two resolutions of inquiry sponsored by Rep. McCloskey seeking disclosure of the details of U.S. bombing activities in Indochina and information on American POW's.

August 18, 1972
Senator Mansfield calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia and suggests the U.S. enlist the aid of the PRC in returning Sihanouk to power in that country.

September 8, 1972
House and Senate conferees to the military procurement bill agree to delete the Brooke end-the-war provision adopted by the Senate on August 2, 1972. Senator Brooke announces he will reintroduce an amendment when the Senate considers the revived foreign military aid bill.

September 14, 1972
House rejects an Addabbo amendment to the DOD appropriations bill to cut off funds for support of U.S. activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia pending the release of American POW's and an accounting of MIA's. The fund cut-off would become effective four months after enactment and apply only to funds in the defense bill. The vote was 160-208.

September 19, 1972
Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves a revised foreign military aid bill with another version of the Brooke end-the-war provision requiring the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina in four months contingent upon the return of American POW's and an accounting of MIA's.

September 25, 1972
Senate adopts a Stevenson amendment to the foreign military aid bill declaring the U.S. should refrain from supporting actions by the Thieu government which trample upon legitimate opposition, abridge the right to vote, or curb individual liberties or freedom of the press. The vote was 216-144.

September 25, 1972 Senate adopts a Hartke amendment to the foreign military aid bill cutting off aid to Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Cambodia if the President is not satisfied they have taken steps to control narcotics traffic.

September 26, 1972 Senate adopts Stennis amendment to the foreign military aid bill to delete the end-the-war provision from the bill. The vote was 45-42. (This same provision had been adopted on the first foreign aid bill, later defeated in toto, and on the military procurement bill, where it was later deleted in conference.)

October 2, 1972 Senate rejects a Proxmire amendment to the DOD appropriations bill to cut off funds for American bombing in Indochina. The vote was 26-55.

October 2, 1972 Senate adopts a Mathias amendment to the DOD appropriations bill restating the language of the 1971-passed antiwar amendment declaring that it was the policy of the U.S. to end military operations in Indochina "at the earliest practicable date". It urged the President to set a final date for troop withdrawal contingent upon the release of American POW's and to negotiate with North Vietnam for a ceasefire.

October 10, 1972 Senator McGovern outlines his plan for peace in Indochina. Under the proposal outlined, he, as President, would:
- bring an immediate halt to all bombing and acts of force in Indochina;
- terminate any shipments of military supplies to South Vietnam;
- withdraw all American forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia along with all salvageable American military equipment within 90 days;
- request Hanoi, in exchange, to release all American POW's and provide an accounting of MIA's to be completed during the 90-day American withdrawal;
- notify all parties that the U.S. will no longer interfere in the internal policies of Vietnam'
- close American bases in Thailand once American POW's had been released and an MIA accounting provided;
- provide reconstruction aid to Vietnam
- expand Veteran's programs in the United States;
- provide amnesty to draft evaders contingent upon a period of alternative domestic service.

December 18, 1972 President announces the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam and antiwar Congressmen renew intense criticism of the President's Indochina policies. The stage is thus set for new legislative end-the-war efforts in 1973.

1973

January 1, 1973 18 House Democrats, in letters to House Speaker Albert and Party Chairman Strauss, urge a national campaign to mobilize opposition to the bombing of North Vietnam.

January 1, 1973 Senator Brooke announces that he will reintroduce his end-the-war amendment in the form of separate legislation as soon as Congress reconvenes.

January 2, 1973 House Democratic Caucus adopts a resolution in support of legislation to immediately cut off funds for U.S. combat activities in Indochina, subject only to the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of POW's. The vote was 154-75.

January 4, 1973 Senate Democratic Caucus adopts a resolution in favor of legislation to cut off all funds for the Indochina War as soon as an agreement could be reached for safe American troop withdrawal and the release of American POW's. The vote was 36-12.

January 10, 1973 Senator Hughes announces that there may be an attempt in the Senate to delay confirmation of the President's cabinet nominees as a means of putting pressure on the President with respect to the war.

May 3, 1973 House Appropriations Committee rejects an Addabbo amendment to the Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill to prohibit a requested DOD transfer of funds from other programs for costs related to the War. It would specifically prohibit the use of funds for military activities in Southeast Asia, including U.S. raids over Cambodia. The vote was 14-31.

May 10, 1973 House Democratic Caucus agrees to support the Addabbo amendment (above) to the supplemental appropriations bill on the House floor. The vote was 144-22.

May 10, 1973 House adopts the Addabbo amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill. The vote was 219-188. A reaffirming vote was 194-187.

May 10, 1973 House adopts Long amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to prohibit the use of any DOD funds in the bill for support of combat activity in or over Cambodia. The vote was 224-172.

May 10, 1973 House rejects a Stratton amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to, in effect, nullify the Long amendment by making its effective date after the expiration of authorities in the bill.

May 10, 1973
House adopts, by voice vote, a Rarick amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill prohibiting the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

May 15, 1973
Senate adopts Eagleton amendment to the supplemental appropriation bill to prohibit the use of past or present appropriated funds to support, directly or indirectly, military activities in or over Cambodia or Laos. The vote was 24-0 in the Appropriations Committee.

May 15, 1973
Senate Appropriations Committee incorporates the House-passed Rarick amendment regarding aid to North Vietnam in the supplemental appropriations bill.

May 15, 1973
Senate Appropriations Committee adopts a provision in the supplemental appropriations bill whereby it provides DOD with $170 million in transfer authority, however prohibits its use to finance combat activities in Laos or Cambodia.

May 23, 1973
Senate Foreign Relations Committee the State Department Authorization Bill with a Church-Case Indochina War amendment. It would:
--bar the use of funds in this or any other bill, past or future, to finance U.S. involvement in hostilities in, over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos;
--bar the use of any funds for assistance to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress.

May 29, 1973
Senate rules by a vote of 55-21 that the Eagleton amendment (above) is germane to the supplemental appropriations bill.

May 31, 1973
Senate rejects a Taft amendment to the supplemental appropriation bill to permit bombing to continue if it is directed against North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The vote was 17-63.

May 31, 1973
Senate rejects Dole-Helms amendment to postpone implementation of the Eagleton amendment to the supplemental appropriation bill if the President informed Congress that the North Vietnamese were not making a good faith effort to account for American MIA's. The vote was 25-56.

May 31, 1973
Senate adopts the Eagleton amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill. The vote was 63-19.

June 7, 1973
House adopts a Rarick amendment to the State Department authorization bill barring the use of any funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. The vote was 44-18.

May 23, 1973
Senate Foreign Relations Committee the State Department Authorization Bill with a Church-Case Indochina War amendment. It would:
--bar the use of funds in this or any other bill, past or future, to finance U.S. involvement in hostilities in, over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam Cambodia or Laos;
--bar the use of any funds for assistance to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>June 19, 1973</td>
      <td>House and Senate conferees to the second supplemental appropriations bill agree to maintain the Eagleton anti-war amendment in the bill.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 25, 1973</td>
      <td>House adopts a Mahon amendment to the supplemental appropriation conference report providing that the House accept the Eagleton amendment. The vote was 235-172.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 25, 1973</td>
      <td>House rejects a Mahon amendment to the supplemental appropriation conference report to delay the effective date of the fund cut off until after September 1, 1973. The vote was 204-204.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 25, 1973</td>
      <td>House agrees to the conference report on the supplemental appropriations bill.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>Senate agrees to the conference report on the second supplemental appropriation bill.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>Rep. Addabbo offers an amendment to the Continuing Resolution to bar the use of any funds in the measure from being used to support combat activities in or over North and South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia without the express consent of the Congress. (Continuing Resolution provides continued funding for the government when appropriation bill have not been passed).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>Mahon offers a substitute amendment to the Continuing Resolution to bar the use of funds in the bill for military activities in or over Cambodia or Laos after September 1, 1973.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>House adopts a Long amendment to the Mahon proposal to prohibit any funds in this bill or previous bills from being used to support U.S. combat activities in or over Laos or Cambodia. The vote was 218-94.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>House adopts the Mahon amendment as modified by Long. The vote was 232-181.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26, 1973</td>
      <td>House adopts the Addabbo amendment in the form of the Mahon-Long substitute. The vote was 240-72.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 27, 1973</td>
      <td>The President vetoes the supplemental appropriation bill on the basis of the Eagleton amendment to bar the use of appropriated funds to support military activities in or over Cambodia or Laos.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 28, 1973</td>
      <td>House Appropriations Committee reports a new supplemental appropriations bill containing compromise antiwar language. The new bill would immediately cut off funds in the bill for support of combat activities in Laos and Cambodia and bar the use of funds found in other legislation for such purposes after August 15, 1973.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 28, 1973</td>
      <td>Senate reports a Continuing Resolution with an Eagleton amendment providing for an immediate cut-off of all funds for combat activities in North or South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate adopts a Fulbright substitute amendment to the Continuing Resolution to bar the use of past, present and future appropriated funds for combat activities in North or South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, after Aug. 15, 1973.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate adopts a McClellen amendment to delete the Eagleton amendment from the bill (replaced by Fulbright amendment). The vote was 58-31.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate adopts a Church amendment to the Continuing Resolution to bar the use of funds in this or any other bill for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. The vote was 93-0.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>House adopts an Evans amendment to the revised supplemental appropriation bill to bar the use of funds for support of combat activities in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Voice vote.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>House rejects a Flynt amendment to the revised supplemental appropriations bill to replace the committee antiwar provision with a prohibition on the use of funds in any of the four countries immediately. The vote was 169-236.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate passes bill in House-approved form. The vote was 72-14.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 30, 1973</td>
    <td>Conferees on the Continuing Resolution agree to delete reference in the bill barring the use of future appropriated funds with respect to activities in SEA.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 26, 1973</td>
    <td>House rejects an Abzug amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to reduce military assistance grants for Indonesia from $550 million to $450 million (aimed at deleting assistance to Cambodia). Voice vote.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 26, 1973</td>
    <td>House rejects an Abzug amendment to the Foreign aid authorization bill to bar grant aid to Cambodia. The vote was 26-105.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 26, 1973</td>
    <td>House adopts a Biaggi amendment to bar the furnishing of commodities or materials to North Vietnam unless the President reports to Congress that it is in the national interest. The vote was 58-8.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 26, 1973</td>
    <td>House adopts a Rarick amendment to the Foreign aid authorization to bar the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress. Voice vote.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>September 10, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports a foreign aid authorization bill (economic assistance) with a McGovern-Hatfield amendment providing for an immediate cut-off of funds for activities, both military and paramilitary, in Indochina and requiring specific congressional approval of any renewal of U.S. involvement in the war. The bill also contains a Case amendment barring U.S. funding or support of military or paramilitary activities of third countries in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and North or South Vietnam, unless specifically authorized by Congress.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
   <tr>
    <td>September 21, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate adopts Church amendment to the DOD procurement bill to prohibit the use of any funds in the bill for combat activities in Indochina.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>September 27, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate rejects a Hughes amendment to the DOD procurement bill to cut assistance for Laos and South Vietnam to $500 million (from $1.3 billion). The vote was 43-49.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>October 2, 1973</td>
    <td>Conference Report on the State Department authorization is filed with a modification of the Church-Case amendment. The fund cut-off was made effective August 15, 1973 rather than immediately.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>October 13, 1973</td>
    <td>Conference Report on the DOD procurement bill is filed with the Church funding bar in tact.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>December 4, 1973</td>
    <td>Conference Report is filed on the foreign assistance bill with Indochina amendments included.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>December 11, 1973</td>
    <td>House rejects a Stark amendment to the foreign aid appropriation bill to reduce emergency military assistance for Cambodia from $150 million to $50 million. The vote was 147-256.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>December 13, 1973</td>
    <td>Senate Appropriations Committee approves a foreign aid appropriation bill with $100 million in emergency assistance for Cambodia but prohibits the use of $250 million in drawdown authority for assistance to that country.</td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>December 20, 1973</td>
    <td>Conference Report on the foreign aid appropriation bill is filed at the House approved $150 million level for emergency assistance to Cambodia, however use of the money was made contingent upon passage of an authorization bill (none was ever passed). The restriction on drawdown authority was eliminated.</td>
   </tr>
  </table>

1

(1) US Troop Withdrawal in Exchange for POWs

Page

16 Sen. Stuart Symington, 1/21/72: The US should "agree to a date...provided they released our prisoners" and then "we could get out of Indochina."

17 New Republic, 1/15/72: Favored setting a date for withdrawal "contingent on Hanoi's agreement to set free US prisoners by that date and assurances of safe exit for our troops."

20 Washington Post 1/23/72: "A withdrawal-POW deal should now be offered."

26 Frank Church as reported in the NYT 1/26/72: He would have applauded RN had he "confined his offer to a withdrawal of the remaining forces in exchange for our prisoners of war." (This is after RN 1/25/72 speech)

29 1/26/72, John Chancellor broadcast reported that Ted Kennedy felt there should have been a one-point US plan: US withdrawal contingent only on POW release. Humphrey also felt the US should set a withdrawal date but "tie" it to POWs, MIAs.

32 Mansfield as reported in the Washington Star 1/27/72 planned to offer his amendment linking withdrawal to POWs.

55 On ABC evening news, 2/2/72, Muskie complained that RN had not simply offered withdrawal for POWs: "Instead he laid down additional conditions."

59 The Boston Globe 2/3/72 felt there was only "one" way to end the war - offer a "firm and early" date for withdrawal "in exchange only" for simultaneous release of prisoners.

105 Muskie, as reported in the Washington Star 4/18/72, if elected would "within two months of my inauguration" withdraw all US troops with POW release "as the only condition."

112 The WSJ of 4/21/72 reported a Democratic Caucus resolution to the HFAC to write legislation establishing a withdrawal date linked only to the release of POWs and accounting of MIAs.

151 The NYT editorial of May 10, 1972 noted that Congress could "shut off funds for all further military operations

2

after return of the prisoners and after a certain
date...."

176 Nation magazine of May 22, in a highly critical
editorial, said "the number of POWs is increasing..."

219 The NYT of 1/26/72 reported that a day earlier the HFAC had voted legislation ordering termination of US involvement in the war subject only to a limited cease-fire with NVN and release of American POWs. The vote was 18 to 17.

234 The Washington Post 8/3/72 reported Senate action the day before (50 to 47) to force US withdrawal in four months provided NVN released US POWs in that period. Among supporters were Brooke (sponsor), Cranston and Javits. The Washington Post of Aug 4 commented favorably on the Brooke amendment.

300 The NYT 9/20/72 reported on SFRC action the day before to approve an amendment to the military authorization bill which would require US withdrawal in four months contingent upon the concurrent release of POWs.

305 The Washington Post of 9/27/72 reported the narrow defeat (45 to 42) in the Senate of the Brooke amendment.

318 The Baltimore Sun reported 10/3/72 that the day before the Senate - while rejecting a fund-cutoff amendment - did agree by voice vote to an amendment sponsored by Mathias restating anti-war language of 1971 which urged the President to set a final date for troop withdrawals contingent on the release of POWs.

349 Pham Van Dong - according to Murray Marder's account of the de Borchgrave interview with him (Post, 10/22/72) - held out hope for POWs. (WHY p 1381 covers the deBorchgrave interview)

444 The Washington Post editorialized on December 19 that RN was clinging to false hopes "when the most he can hope to achieve is an American disengagement from the conflict on terms which will bring back our prisoners and leave the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance of survival by their own efforts...."

3

(2) US Troop Withdrawal - and either (a). the POWs will follow or (b) do the best we can on POWs, but get out (i.e. no explicit link between POWs and withdrawal):

Page

29 George McGovern told a reporter in a 1/26/72 TV broadcast that "if we would announce now a definite timetable for the withdrawal of all American military operations, in the air and on the ground, no preconditions, just announce a deadline, that that would then open the way for negotiations on the release of prisoners and a ceasefire. I would announce that deadline without further delay."

49 The Washington Post 2/7/72 reported that "North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks made it clear yesterday that his side will not give up prisoners of war in return for withdrawal of all U. S. forces," and "that the military and political issues must be handled together." The NYT the next day (p. 50) said Americans "must now face" the "clear statement by Mr. Thuy that Hanoi will not release American prisoners until a political settlement brings the war, not just the American involvement, to an end."

85 The Washington Post 3/24/72 reported that Senator Gravel was leading a pack of Democrats in an effort to get legislation requiring US withdrawal in 30 days after enactment in exchange for NVN agreement to release US POWs. If there were no such agreement, the date of withdrawal would be extended for 30 days but after that, unless cancelled by Congress, withdrawal would proceed with or without a POW agreement

102 The Post on 4/17/72 editorialized that "if the President's Vietnamization policy is as successful as he would have us believe.....we ought to fix a date for our total military disengagement, negotiate as best we can for the return of our prisoners, and get out."

186 George McGovern on the TODAY show 6/8/72 would offer two concessions to Hanoi - setting a withdrawal date and cutting off aid to Thieu - "with the understanding that if we carried out our part of the bargain our prisoners would be released." (The Washington Star of June 5 - p 187 - had contrasted that position with Humphrey's who explicitly tied withdrawal to POWs)

204 McGovern was soon waffling on the issue. The Post reported 7/13/72 that he was now saying he would retain "the military capability in the region" to assure the return of POWs." But then he went on to say that the POWs "will not be brought home by more American blood,

4

by more American treasure, or more American bombs
raining on the people of Asia. There only hope is
peace."

211 Senator Frank Church was quoted in a CSM interview, appearing 7/22/72, that "One thing that should be clear by now is that the strategy of retaining American forces in South Vietnam and continuing to participate in the war has not succeeded in releaseing the prisoners." "I think, and I've thought all along, that North Vietnam will never be willing to give up our prisoners until we are willing to give up the war. Hanoi then would have no further reason for keeping them once we have stopped bombing the North and once we have withdrawn the balance of our forces....it was true with the French. It was our experience in Korea."

213 The Washington Post editorial of 7/24/72 contrasted the Mansfield and Cooper amendments on ending the war, observing that "Barring success in four months, Mr. Cooper would act on the expectation (my emphasis) that the prisoners will be freed - and that other nations will urge Hanoi to free them - only when the United States withdraws and halts the bombing." The Post quotes Cooper as saying: "I do not believe that this amendment or any amendment can promise absolutely the release of our prisoners of war.....I can only say that, in my view, negotiations and withdrawal offer the best chance to secure their release." The Post remarked of Cooper's mention of 'negotiations,' that "it seems plain that Mr. Cooper believes 'withdrawal' is the only way."

214 The NYT of 7/25/72 reported McGovern's position that he would not resume bombing even if our POWs were not released: "The bombing is how the prisoners got into prison. It's the height of folly to think you're going to get the prisoners out of Hanoi by bombing Hanoi."

221 The Post of 7/26/72 covered Jane Fonda's trip to Hanoi. She claimed our POWs "fear if Nixon stays in office they will be prisoners forever."

249 Ramsey Clarke returned from Vietnam saying he had urged Hanoi to release some prisoners "But that they tell you - and you know I have a little difficulty arguing with it - is that 'we can't release pilots when pilots are bombing our children'." (NYT 8/15/72)

5

CYJ

261 The Post carried a story of a flap surrounding McGovern and the POWs - he had sent Salinger around to find out if there was any give in Hanoi's position on releasing some prisoners. Salinger is quoted at the end as saying "They told me the word from Hanoi was that there was no change on the POWs and the prisoners will not be released until hostilities are ended." (8/17/72) (P 283 recounts a planned trip by David Dellinger and Cora Weiss to retrieve some prisoners)

325 In October 1972 McGovern delivered a speech on Vietnam in which he said "We must end the bombing - end the fighting - if we're ever to see these prisoners again. Prisoners of war come home whem the war ends - not while the war

327 continues." Reston's column of October 11 (NYT 10/11/72) labelled the speech "virtually a formula for surrender" but also said RN's policy "is endless and heartless." The choice: "Nixon has offered us more war at a terrible price, and McGovern has proposed peace at any price...."

334 The LA Times editorialized on October 12 that "we think McGovern is right in refusing to make the prisoner question an obstacle to American withdrawal from South Vietnam. In practical terms, there is little the United States can do to force this issue. The potential for negotiating release of the prisoners is being explored in Paris. McGovern has proposed that only the withdrawal of American forces off shore and in Thailand would be contingent on settlement of the prisoner question."

494 In an editorial "Beyond all Reason," attacking the Christmas bombings, the LA times said "If a negotiated settlement is still possible, then let us quit the bombing and find out; let us be willing to take the risks for peace necessary to end American involvement and bring the American prisoners home. If a negotiated settlement is not possible, then let us quit Indochina, with the reasonable expectation that the release of the prisoners will follow." (My emphasis)

6

(3) Dump Thieu:

13 A WSJ column of 1/14/72 gave the opinion that preserving the Thieu government was no longer a high priority. It quoted one US official as saying "Once we started talking about giving Thieu a reasonable chance, it was obvious that we no longer considered saving his government a vital U. S. interest."

17 The New Republic, 1/15/72: "Thieu is not worth the price we pay for him."

19 The NYT editorial of 1/22/72 described the "one man" SVN election of the past fall as "farcical."

26 Reacting to RN's Jan. 25 speech, Fulbright said the "sticking point" remained whether the US was "willing to get out and leave the Thieu Government to its own devices." (NYT 1/26/72)

29 Con. Paul McCloskey 1/26/72 on TV: "I think that as long as the President continues to insist on the survival of the Government in South Vietnam that the other side isn't going to be impelled to negotiate."

31 The NYT editorialized on 1/27/72 that "the timing of Mr. Thieu's departure from government is surely negotiable. (This editorial says positive advances in the Jan 25 speech)

42 The Post 2/2/72: "We have done all that we could reasonably do for the South Vietnamese; that we have given them the time and the weapons and the money; and that the rest is up to their own will which nobody else can supply."

63 The NYT on 4/6/72: "...whether the goal of saving the present regime in Saigon is worth the heavy costs and risks of re-escalating the conflict. In our view it is not. It is at last time that Saigon fought its own battles. It is time that the President put his repeatedly stated faith in Vietnamization to the test."

95 NYT editorial 4/14/72: "The crucial question for Americans is whether it is vital for United States interests to preserve the present anti-Communist government in an independent South Vietnam, or at least whether that goal, doggedly pursued by President Nixon like his predecessors, is important enough to warrant the high costs and risks of continuing direct involvement. The present regime in Saigon is hardly a credible model of democratic freedom. The coalition government that might emerge if the Vietnamese were left to settle their own affairs would not necessarily

7

(Thieu)

be dominated by Communists, at least at the outset.... In the event the Administration's worst fears were realized, a united Vietnam under Communist rule could pose no serious threat to the United States." (This is the Fulbright line)

146 NYT editorial 5/8/72: "The greatest service President Thieu could render South Vietnam would be voluntarily to step aside for a less intransigent leader."

154 Tom Wicker in the NYT 5/11/72 - "As for Dr. Kissinger's despairing inquiry why the North Vietnamese should not accept the President's latest ceasefire and withdrawal proposal, the answer is that it would leave the Saigon Government and its army and administrative machinery intact, which is scarcely Hanoi's aim; and it would point straight to a new and only slightly improved version of the Indochinese partition against which Hanoi has fought so long and so hard. The real question, which Dr. Kissinger did not ask, is what makes Mr. Nixon think he can gain 'withdrawal with honor,' while maintaining an American-supported non-Communist Government in Saigon when he has not been able to win the war on the battlefield? There, despite all the President's pretensions, is where the real decisions have been made."

165 The NYT editorial of 5/14/72 saw some positive elements in RN's May 8, 1972, speech, and observed that "As for a political settlement, the Nixon-Kissinger statements no longer emphasize elections as the solution. President Thieu's political survival is no longer an American condition, nor was there mention in last week's statement of preserving the Saigon regime. A willingness to discuss a valid tripartite coalition government in which the Communists would have parity with Saigon and third groups agreeable to both, is evident on the American side."

168 A Harris poll asked Americans if the only way to get peace in Vietnam was to have "Thieu...resign from office," would they favor. 60% said yes; 14 opposed and 26 not sure.

186 McGovern on TODAY show, 6/8/72, said that in addition to setting a deadline for US withdrawal, the US should also "cut off any further foreign military aid to the government in Saigon, the Thieu regime." These conditions would be linked to an "understanding" that POWs would be released.

198 Moose and Lowenstein returned from SVN in June to report that the Thieu government might not survive a decision by Hanoi to accept RN's latest peace offer. They reported many SVN felt Thieu's "inflexible political position" prevented non-Communist elements from rallying.

8

CYD

(Thieu)

209 The Post editorialized on 7/21/72 that US withdrawal alone would not end the war. Among other things, "The American-supported government in Saigon - whose leader's removal is Hanoi's dominant war aim - would still be in power."

265 A NYT editorial 8/20/72: "As long as that implied veto is left in President Thieu's hands, chances for a negotiated settlement either in October or later will remain small. Another discouraging, but we hope not totally prohibitive impediment to Mr. Kissinger's efforts to reach an accommodation is the hard line on Communist participation in a new Saigon Government that is set forth in the White House-drafted Republican platform."

273 Averrell Harriman in the NYT, 8/26/72, wrote that "American men should not continue to die to maintain Mr. Thieu in office. We should be told whether the Administration intends to continue to fight the war for one man."

324 NYT editorial 10/11/72 on McGovern speech on Vietnam notes that even RN talking to China and Russia, ergo undermining rationale for preventing a communist takeover in places like SVN. "Thieu has destroyed the second reason for American involvement - the right of political self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. Since General Thieu has suppressed virtually all of his political opponents, the U.S. in supporting him can no longer be said to be supporting freedom or self-determination."

331 At least the WSJ, in an editorial on October 12, gave a nod to Thieu writing that "it's essential that America not threat Mr. Thieu shabbily."

382 After "peace is at hand" Oct 26, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10/27/72 lamented that "the Nixon Administration might have reached agreement months or even years ago on the major provisions now announced had it negotiated as intensively as in the last two weeks, and had it denied Thieu veto power over its actions."

448 That same paper editorialized on December 19 about the Christmas bombings under the banner "New Madness in Vietnam": "Mr. Nixon cannot obtain peace in Indochina and at the same time make Thieu secure as the ruler of South Vietnam. That is what the war is about. Mr. Nixon must effectively dump Thieu, (my emphasis) though it was thought that Mr. Kissinger had evolved a clever formula that would permit Thieu to hang on a while longer."

9

Positions Bearing on Administration's Position

Page

26 "Mixed" Hill reaction to RN's Jan. 25 speech and 8-point plan.

45 Poll: RN January proposals have 47% support; 21% negative; 13% neutral. On balance, 63% felt RN was doing all he could to end the war.

46 A Post editorial concedes that even Chalmers Roberts and Les Gelb believe Hanoi seeks victory. Gelb: "Hanoi is not interested in a fair compromise. It never has been."

88 Poll: 54% favor continued bombing until NVN released our POWs.

184 Poll: 45% oppose a coalition government including Communists as the price for peace (to 38%). 52 to 31% would favor a standstill ceasefire to end the fighting and return of US POWs, 93 to 2%. Overall, asked to choose between ending US involvement or continuing it until POWs released, 75% favored continuing, 12% not sure and 13% ending.

185 Poll: RN's rating highest in two years.

264 Poll: GOP seen better able to keep the US out of another world war.

267 Poll: RN gets 59% job rating, highest in term. (Aug 72)

293 Poll: 55 to 32% support RN's bombings of the North and minings (64% to 22%). September 1972

304 Poll: Most Americans still do not wish to cut and run. September 1972, Chalmers Roberts.

391 Poll: Reconfirms support for RN policies, November 1972, but also skepticism.

415 Poll: Americans confident in the way RN was proceeding to bring the war to an end. November 1972.

431 Poll: A solid 65% believe that the reported peace terms are a "fair compromise." 58% believed that bombing had helped achieve agreement. (This is prior to Xmas bombings). December 14, 1972

10

## Other Issues - 1972

116 ff Debate over War Powers

210 Typical press coverage of the tonnage of US bombs dropped.

265 Mansfield: Get us out of Cambodia. (August)

272 Fulbright - his stock themes on Vietnam. (August)

285 Anthony Lewis: "The historic notion that American wars have a dominant moral element divorced from militarism is now finished."

295 Eugene Rostow views.

363 ff Coverage of "peace is at hand"

## The agreement could have been gotten in 1969:

253 Wash Post editorial, 8/16/72: "...Americans will be entitled to ask why the President had to wait almost four more years and expend 20,000 more American lives for an outcome that was within his reach in 1969."

357 NYT interestingly takes McGovern to task for his own credibility gap on whether he really was a long-time opponent of the war. 10/24/73

375 Gwertzman writing in the NYT 11/1/72 reported that "Informed sources said the informal agreement over the troop withdrawal was similar to one worked out in 1968 by W. Averrell Harriman...."

386 Anthony Lewis, NYT, 10/28/72: "No one can say with assurance how the terms now proposed differ from what could have been obtained if President Nixon had moved boldly for peace in 1969."

388-9 Wash Post 11/3/72, also raised questions about whether the settlement could have been reached earlier, in view of the interim cost of 20,000 lives and $60 billion.

405 The Nation 11/20/72 quoted Ted Kennedy as saying "What different conditions exist today that did not exist in 1969?" and Fulbright: "What have we gotten in this agreement that we couldn't have gotten four years ago?"

420 Les Gelb and Tony Lake, Washington Post, 12/3/1972: "We probably could not have had the same agreement in 1969 - but any improvement in terms has not been worth the awesome cost in lives lost."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 31 DECEMBER 1971

C.Y.J.

Two Views of the Renewed X'
Bombing 1. Staving Off Major
Military Setback

By Neil Sheehan

Mr. Sheehan is a reporter for the New York Times.

WASHINGTON—Despite varying official explanations for the renewed heavy bombing of North Viet Nam, it has become evident here that the central purpose of the Nixon administration was to slave off a major military setback in Indochina.

The administration apparently has concluded that even in an election year the domestic political price for such "limited-duration" raids which ended yesterday will be less than the political consequences of a major military defeat in Indochina.

Nixon and other senior policymakers have also apparently decided that whatever the historical record, American airpower is now sufficiently effective to limit North Viet Nam's offensive capabilities severely and to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of American troops from the south.

## Action Deteriorates

While raids against antiaircraft installations and fuel and supply depots

continue in the north, the military situation on the ground in Indochina continues to deteriorate. The North Vietnamese infantrymen have seized the Lao-tian town of Pak Song, giving them control over the strategic Boloven Plateau in Southern Laos.

The defenses in Northeast Laos have similarly been crumbling before the dry-season offensive of the North Vietnamese.

The domestic political repercussions to the raids have already started with outcries by Nixon's leading Democratic opponents, Senators Edmund S. Muskie [Me.], George S. McGovern [S. D.J., and Hubert H. Humphrey [Minn.].

Muskie, the leading Democratic candidate for the Presidential nomination, said in a statement released by his office here that the bombing "exposes the bankruptcy of President Nixon's Vietnamization policy."

He called on Nixon to open "genuine negotiations" in Paris that would obtain the release of American prisoners of war by setting a date for total withdrawal of all American forces from South Viet Nam.

McGovern asked all other Democratic candidates to join him in a statement that likewise condemned the renewed raids on the north as a "desperate attempt to salvage a wrecked policy." He asked the President to negotiate the release of American prisoners by setting a total withdrawal date.

United Nations Secretary General U. Thant also entered the protest, charging that the bombing constituted "one of the major obstacles to meaningful talks in Paris."

In an apparent effort to calm the out-cry, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon spokesman, contended that "we have not resumed the bombing campaign on the north" that Nixon's predecessor, President Johnson, had waged from March, 1965, until Oct. 31, 1968.

"We have responded in a limited way

for a limited time with the geography limited and the targets limited," Friedheim said.

In Philadelphia, Humphrey called for an extended cease-fire from New Year's Day thru the Vietnamese Tet, or lunar new year holiday in February.

## 3 Immediate Reactions

Thirty-one house members, one of them a Republican, Rep. Donald W. Riegle Jr. [Mich.], sent a telegram to Nixon labeling the bombing raids "a reversion to the discredited bombing policy of the past" and requesting "stepped-up initiatives in the Paris negotiations, not a stepped-up air war."

One well-placed administration source-cited three immediate reasons for the current raids against the north:

* A "moderate" enemy buildup in the Central Highlands of South Viet Nam, where according to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, the North Vietnamese might be planning an offensive.

* Deterioration of the military situation in Laos, which is seriously worrying senior policy makers.

* The new and increasingly bold sorries by North Vietnamese MIG-21 fighter planes against American B-52 bombers pounding the Ho Chi Minh trail supply network thru Southern Laos.

This and a number of other statements by administration officials have demonstrated that the central purpose of the bombing was to prevent any major military setback in Indochina that would unravel the President's Vietnamization policy.

Vietnamization seeks to achieve the objective of a noncommunist South Viet Nam by gradually turning over the war to a South Vietnamese army and administration capable of holding their own against both the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

In fact, it is believed that the increased bombing was the inevitable consequence of Nixon's decision to reduce American troops to a residual force of 40,000 to 50,000 men and still preserve a non-communist South Vietnamese state.

2. Punishing Reds
for Phantom Jet Loss

By James McCartney

Mr. McCartney is a writer for Knight
Newspapers.

WASHINGTON — Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has declared that the massive, new United States air raids against North Viet Nam were “primarily for the protection of American service personnel.”

But by Pentagon consensus—and even
according to Laird himself—the military
threat to U. S. troops in Viet Nam is at
its lowest level in recent years.

There is no new military buildup in
South Viet Nam threatening U. S. forces.

Weaker Than Year Ago

"Virtually everybody in the Pentagon believes that Communist forces [in South Viet Nam] are weaker today than they were a year ago," a high level Pentagon official said.

Yet the raids constituted the longest

sustained air effort against North Viet
Nam ever ordered by President Nixon.

They have stirred peace groups—and
some of Nixon's potential Democratic
opponents—into a frenzy of criticism.

What was Nixon up to? What were the
real reasons for the raids?

Why should Nixon, at this time, risk
the raids when he has managed, in re-
cent months, to keep Viet Nam out of
the headlines and off of people's minds?

The raids, in all probability, were a re-
sult of a complex combination of factors.

Certainly the immediate cause has
been the aggressive new attacks on U. S.
planes by the North Vietnamese.

The pattern began to show about two
months ago in Laos, when Russian-built
Migs began to show up more than ever.

Then, from Dec. 17 to 19 the U. S. lost
five F-4 Phantom jets, which cost $4 mil-
lion each.

Laird says that in December more
U. S. planes of all types have been at-

tacked by North Viet Nam than in any
month since he has been secretary of
defense.

Fighting in Laos

Laird didn't give any figures, but the
U. S. has already staged 23 "protective
reaction" air strikes against the C
munists this month in response to
tacks. It staged 84 in the first 11 months
of this year.

The important factor in all this, how-
ever, according to well-posted Pentagon
officials, is that the Communists appar-
ently haven't really been involved in an
aerial buildup—they've just been using
their air power differently.

North Viet Nam has had about 200
MIGs for several years. The number is
not believed to have increased lately.
Until about two months ago the MIGs
weren't fighting in Laos. Now they are.

The Communists, on the other hand,
have been building up antiaircraft facili-
ties. From July 1 to early September,
for example, they increased the number
of antiaircraft guns in the area immedi-
ately north of the demilitarized zone by
about 40 per cent.

There can be little question that the
Communists are out to challenge U. S.
power—which Nixon has long acknowl-

edged he plans to use to the hilt, if nec-
essary.

At least one major reason for the
raids, in other words, was to warn the
Communists that the U. S. will punish
them with air power if they continue to
be as aggressive in the air.

Both sides have used air power with
at least some discretion in Southeast
Asia—operating under self-imposed lim-
its. The U. S. is trying to tell the Com-
munists to be more discreet.

Only One Factor

But this is probably only one factor of
several in touching off the U. S. raids.

Laird hinted at some others in a press
conference earlier this week:

* Fear that the Communists will try to tarnish Nixon's visit to Communist China.

* Fear that they will try to use military

action to influence the 1972 U. S. elec-
tions. No one here forgets that they stag-
ed their famed "Tet" offensive before
the 1968 Presidential elections.

Both Pentagon and White House offi-
cials live in considerable fear — practi-
cally day and night—that the Commu-
nists will yet be able to embarrass the
U. S. in Viet Nam.

The administration is proud of its
troop withdrawal program—removing
more than 350,000 troops from Viet Nam.
It is proud that it has slashed U. S. cas-
ualties to low weekly levels.

But the lower level of the war has
created a curious political problem.

A lightning raid, for example, in which
a few dozen U. S. troops might be killed
would attract wide attention today be-
cause the level of the war has been so
low. A similar attack might have been
lost in the shuffle even two years ago.

This is a Nixon administration night-
mare.

One preventive answer would be with-
drawal of all U. S. troops—making such
an attack impossible. Nixon has rejected
this approach.

He winds up using military power in
almost every way the Pentagon
think of to try to discourage any
ceivable Communist thrust.

Knight Newspaper Service

NEW YORK TIMES

1 JAN 1972 (3)

'No Pretty Picture'

Phase One of President Nixon's renewal of the air war against North Vietnam has ended after five days of the heaviest bombing since President Johnson suspended the attack in 1968 to get peace negotiations started. The renewed bombing halt is a welcome start for 1972. But a bigger and even more perilous Phase Two cannot be far behind unless Mr. Nixon abandons his vain pursuit of military victory in Indochina and acts to revive the neglected Paris peace talks.

Citing recent Presidential warnings, the Saigon command has strongly indicated there will be further raids unless the North Vietnamese stop trying to build up "significant" war supplies and halt their mounting challenge to American bombers over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese certainly are not going to comply with what amounts to a demand that they give up the battle in South Vietnam, just when "Vietnamization" is proving so ineffectual.

The Administration's apparent faith in the ability of air power to restore the eroding balance of power on the ground is beyond comprehension. The Peagamon Papers clearly revealed widespread disillusionment with the effectiveness of the bombing campaign that was carried out against the North in the Johnson years.

As early as Oct. 14, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara observed: "Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts." The following May Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy wrote: "On the ineffectiveness of the bombing as a means to end the war, I think the evidence is plain . . . Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues simply are not going to change their policy on the basis of losses from the air in North Vietnam."

To be sure, American bombing techniques have been improved and strengthened since then with new electronic devices and more terrible weapons of destruction. But the new techniques have not been able to prevent serious setbacks in recent weeks for American-backed forces in Cambodia and Laos and there is no reason to believe they can do more than prolong the agony of South Vietnam and of the Americans still caught up in that interminable conflict as participants or prisoners.

Beyond the practical question of the efficacy of bombing as a way to win an unwinnable war, there is a moral issue raised by these mass attacks which inevitably exact a toll of innocent lives. Before moving to Phase Two of the revived air war, President Nixon and his advisers would do well to recall Secretary McNamara's warning to Mr. Johnson in a memorandum May 19, 1967. It read, in part:

"There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States—especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be 'successful.'"

Mr. McNamara's wise counsel is even more in need

5

NEW YORK TIMES 2 JAN 1972 (3)

Moral Aftermath

The question of amnesty for the many young men who have avoided military service or deserted in recent years is properly part of the moral aftermath of the Vietnam war. The first difficulty in this tangled ethical problem is that the war has not ended. Although draft calls are temporarily suspended and casualties greatly reduced, each week a few American soldiers are still killed in Vietnam, scores are wounded and thousands run the risk of military combat if the enemy should choose to go on the offensive.

Under these circumstances it is premature to decide the amnesty question. There would be practical difficulties as well as logical absurdity in continuing the military draft—however small—while simultaneously absolving those who had defied the draft. But it is not too early for public discussion to begin and for Congress to take preparatory action on a problem which must eventually be faced.

Several different human situations have gone into the making of this problem. There are young men who refused to register for the draft. There are those who registered, sought but were denied exemption as conscientious objectors and then refused to enter the armed forces. Others were inducted and then deserted, some almost immediately and others only after experiencing combat in Vietnam.

Social class is also an element. Most draft resisters and would-be conscientious objectors are college-educated, middle-class youths. Deserters tend to be less well-educated and more apt to act on their direct military experience, rather than on an understanding of their abstract rights. That factor needs weight in deciding their cases.

The timing of an individual's resistance, flight into exile or desertion could also influence judgment of his decision. Did it show more moral courage to resist service in 1965-66 when the Vietnam war still commanded wide popular support? Or does the marked withdrawal of support for the war in the last two years tend to legitimize the action of more recent resisters?

To do justice in any complicated human situation means to recognize nuances and make reasonable distinctions. Congress could hardly frame a comprehensive law taking account of the legal and human complexities of resistance to service in Vietnam. It would be more constructive for Congress to establish an Amnesty Review Board which would study the problem and have the power to adjudicate individual cases once the war ended. Such a board could cut across jurisdictional lines between the military code and the criminal law.

It could not only examine the cases of individuals now in Canada or Sweden or awaiting military or civilian trial in the United States but also review the penalties meted out to those convicted in the past. It would be manifestly unfair to free one individual in 1972 for the same offense for which someone convicted in 1971 was still serving a prison term. Depending on individual circumstances, the board could determine whether to require a period of civilian service and specify varying terms of such service.

In short, Congress ought to make a grant of power to an independent agency to work on this problem. It cannot be disposed of by a simple answer. The resisters, exiles and deserters cannot realistically expect to be welcomed back as moral heroes, regardless of how they and their sympathizers view the moral quality of their action. At the same time, in many instances punitive action would not be justified; from society's viewpoint, it might even be self-defeating.

Nothing is gained by contrasting any of the living with the nation's honored war dead. As John Kennedy once observed in discussing the inequities of military service, "Life is unfair." This tragic truth has to be in the forefront of the nation's mind as it seeks to diminish antagonisms and reconcile differences. Let all the wounds of war be healed.

NEW YORK TIMES 2 JANUARY 1972 (3)

Bombs
To Save
The Nixon
Policy

WASHINGTON—Why was so much of the country surprised last week when President Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam? The President had said a year ago that he would do it.

Mr. Nixon is running a war in Indochina which the American public will not let him fight with United States ground troops, a war in which the armies of his Indochinese allies are falling back before an enemy offensive. So he turned to air power: American planes bombed North Vietnam for five straight days in the heaviest assaults against the North since Mr. Nixon's predecessor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, terminated his air war against the North a little over three years ago.

Many persons apparently had not believed Mr. Nixon when he made clear at a news conference in December, 1970 that he would accept no restrictions on the use of American airpower in Indochina, and that if Hanoi threatened his objective of preserving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Administration offered varying official explanations for the bombing. Officials said that Hanoi had violated an understanding reached with President Johnson at the time of the bombing cessation in 1968, that Mr. Nixon was protecting the 158,000 American troops still in South Vietnam, that the North was seeking to embarrass the President with a military initiative on the eve of his visit to China, that the Administration was attempting to abort a planned enemy offensive in the South Vietnamese central highlands.

Only the last reason was indicative of what well-placed Administration sources say is the central purpose of the air raids—the Administration is trying, with air power, to stave off a major military setback in Indochina, particularly during a sensitive election year. The fact is that the President's

Vietnamization policy is once more endangered and, having progressively used up other means, he is now becoming more and more reliant on the air weapon to carry forward his strategy.

Under Vietnamization, President Nixon is seeking to strengthen the South Vietnamese army and administration to the point where it can—with help from United States air power and a residual force of about 40,000 to 50,000 American troops—hold the line against the Vietcong guerrillas and the North Vietnamese. He has gained time and political credit with the American public for Vietnamization by slowly drawing American troops down toward this residual force. The withdrawals have created a general public misimpression that the President is getting out of Vietnam entirely, a misimpression that explains much of the surprise at his bombing of the North.

The rub is that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, intent upon overthrowing the Saigon Government and forcing the United States out of the South, have sought to undermine Mr. Nixon's strategy. Each time the strategy has been threatened seriously he has taken action.

In May of 1970 when it appeared that the North Vietnamese might overthrow the pro-American regime of Gen. Lon Nol in Pnompenh and take over all of Cambodia along the southern border of South Vietnam, Mr. Nixon sent American and South Vietnamese troops into that country. Had Mr. Nixon not sent in the troops, one senior general explained at the time, "we would have been outflanked and our strategy of Vietnamization would have had very little chance."

The Cambodian operation undoubtedly bought the President time through the destruction of enemy supplies, but the benefits have now largely worn off because the enemy today controls most of Cambodia.

Similarly, last February, Mr. Nixon sent a South Vietnamese force—backed by American air assaults—into southern Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The enemy counterattacked and the South Vietnamese came out in what can most kindly be called a disorderly retreat. Again, the operation probably bought time at the cost of mauling some of the best units in the South Vietnamese army; but again the benefits have worn off. The North Vietnamese now control more of Laos than they ever did.

More importantly, Mr. Nixon can again send United States troops Cambodia, because the AmericanERIC would not tolerate the casualties, and the South Vietnamese have privately warned the Americans they are not about to repeat the Laos adventure.

Thus, when the military situation turned critical in Laos and Cambodia last month, with rapid enemy advances that threatened the pro-American Governments, Mr. Nixon resorted to the one major military tool left to him. The fighter-bombers went in to destroy the supplies before they could be trucked down the trail and to knock out the antiaircraft installations and MIG airfields that hamper the freedom of American planes to interdict the supply network and the advancing enemy forces in northeast Laos.

Were the Laotian and Cambodian Governments to collapse, the effect on the morale of the Saigon Government forces could be severe. And the President's critics at home would gain more powerful ammunition to attack his Vietnamization policy.

The Administration was also seeking to stave off, by crippling North Vietnam's offensive capability, a possible offensive in the South Vietnamese central highlands. The position of Saigon Government troops may, cording to reports from Vietnam, weaker in the highlands than officially advertised.

The President apparently has concluded that the domestic political repercussions of renewed bombing of the North will be less than the political consequences of a major military defeat and the collapse of his Vietnamization policy in an election year.

Whether American air power will now prove sufficiently effective—despite the negative historical record—to stave off a serious setback in Indonesia only the future can tell.

At a news conference in mid-December, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans Jr. asserted that electronic sensors, rapid-fire gunships and other new techniques had destroyed all but 9,500 tons of the 68,500 tons of supplies the North Vietnamese started down the trail during the last dry season of 1970-71.

In Laos and Cambodia, however, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops have been operating as if they feared no ammunition shortage.

Much—perhaps Vietnamization, perhaps Mr. Nixon's political future — now rides with the American airmen in Southeast Asia. —NEIL SHEEHAN

NEW YORK TIMES 2 JANUARY 1974

7

# Why the Bombers Thunder

By FRED BRANFMAN

WASHINGTON—The Nixon Administration's decision to reactivate the air campaign against North Vietnam could well be the most serious escalation since the Gulf of Tonkin in May, 1964.

The 350 planes that flew 24-hour, multiple sorties conducted raids as heavy as any ever launched against the North. Unless checked by public opinion, the Administration may well be prepared to level Hanoi and Haiphong, mine Haiphong Harbor, and possibly even bomb North Vietnam's system of dikes.

An exaggerated prediction? Consider these facts:

(1) The Administration made unprecedented attempts in the last month to prepare the public for massive strikes against the North. It previously bombed North Vietnam eight times in raids, involving several hundred planes, which lasted several days. Targets said to have been struck during these occasions included troop concentrations, fuel and petroleum dumps and airfields. All of these raids were carried out with minimum publicity, however. The large fanfare accompanying last week's raids suggests that the Administration has more in mind than in the past.

(2) The Administration has gone out of its way to provoke North Vietnam in recent months. North Vietnam has been officially bombed 186 times between Nixon's accession to office and Nov. 1, 1971. Thus there were an average of under six raids monthly during Nixon's first 34 months in office. In November, however, raids shot up to fourteen a month. In December there were over 26. It thus appears that the Administration was hoping to provoke a response from the North that could be used as justification for increased strikes, as with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident.

(3) Official claims that the present raids are in response to North Vietnamese escalation cannot be taken seriously. Unsubstantiated press reports of North Vietnamese MIG's heavy artillery and tanks in Laos were not used by Secretary Laird to justify the raids. No correspondents saw the fighting for the Plaine des Jarres. Newsmen are not allowed on bombing raids over Laos. Thus there is no Independent confirmation of claims of MIG's over Laos. The official report that four jets were shot down Dec. 17-19 over Laos was later admitted to be false; that at least two had been shot down over North Vietnam, one east of Hanoi.

It is, perhaps, for this reason that Secretary Laird did not use such reports to justify the present raids.

(2) Mr. Laird's statement that the 1963 bombing halt agreement was no longer in force prepares the way for full-scale bombing of the North.

The thesis that the Administration will go as far as public opinion allows it is fueled by the fact, documented in the Pentagon Papers, that all official analyses deemed the 1965-68 bombing of the North a failure. A study prepared by the top-level Jason Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, for example, stated that "as of October, 1967, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in South Vietnam." This conclusion was shared by the C.I.A., International Security Agency of the Department of Defense, and former Defense Secretary McNamara.

If it is planning on observing previous limitations on the bombing, why did the Administration renew strikes against the North that were shown to be ineffective? And, in particular, why did it do so now at a time when it is making every effort elsewhere to show that the war is "winding down"? Could it be that it is prepared to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, the dikes, if it feels public opinion will permit it?

Only time will tell. One thing is clear, however: the present bombing is serious, dangerous, and is causing heavy civilian casualties in North Vietnam, while not providing security in the south.

Secretary Laird has already threatened to bomb the "MIG airfields." Since those at Quenlang, Vinh, and Donghol are quite small and have been bombed already, he apparently means two airfields near Hanoi, and another near Haiphong. When this happens, casualties will rise.

Our interviews with pilots who bombed the North indicate that the majority of ordinance dropped back in 1968 were antipersonnel bombs. These are bombs that cannot destroy a truck, bridge or even a tiny shelter erected in the forest; they are only designed for human beings. They include the pineapple bombs, which send 250,000 steel pellets per sortie spewing over an area the size of four football fields; flechette bombs, which consist of tiny barbed pellets that enlarge the wound as they enter the body; and guava bombs, which explode in the air and send their pellets down diagonally to enter holes where their targets may be hiding.

Fred Branfman is director of Project Air War, a Washington-based research organization. He studied the air war in Laos, 1957-71, as a volunteer with the International Voluntary Service.

NEW YORK TIMES - 3 JANUARY 1972

# The Bombing—II: The Message

By ANTHONY LEWIS

"I can assure you tonight with confidence that American involvement in this war is coming to an end."

RICHARD NIXON, April 7, 1971

LONDON, Jan. 2—The bombs that fell on North Vietnam for five days after Christmas carried a message as significant to the American people as to the Vietnamese. For the message, properly understood, dissolved a number of illusions Americans have had about President Nixon's policy in Indonesia.

The illusion, liberiously constructed by the President, is that American forces remain in South Vietnam because the enemy holds American prisoners. The truth is the opposite: The prisoners are useful under the Nixon policy to help justify a residual American force.

The illusion has it that bombing is necessary to protect the remaining American forces in South Vietnam. The truth is now seen to be the opposite: A residual force will remain largely to provide a reason for continued bombing.

The illusion is that American responsibility for life and death in Indonesia is slowly coming to an end. The truth is that the Nixon policy makes it impossible to see the end of American involvement.

Those conclusions are painful, but they are not just bitter paradox. They follow remorselessly from what more and more people are beginning to understand is Mr. Nixon's purpose in Vietnam: to end the combat role of American ground forces but win the war by other means.

That is why a commitment to mass

diverse continuing use of American air power has really been implicit all along in the Nixon withdrawal program. Without bombing and close support by American planes, the Thieu Government in Saigon would have little chance of surviving. And its survival is now, unambiguously, why we are in Vietnam: The talk of stopping China and advancing democracy has been dropped.

The South Vietnamese can take over some of the functions now carried out by American planes and pilots. But there is no realistic chance of their developing the capacity to bomb Laos and Cambodia and North Vietnam as we have, to cut the flow of enemy supplies, or for that matter of our giving them the necessary aircraft to do so.

How, then, can we expect Saigon to win the war?

One theory is that we can scare the enemy into giving up, by the threat of such bombing assaults as the one just completed. According to reports, this is Henry Kissinger's hope—that Hanol can be driven to making a deal at the Paris peace talks, to accepting the Thieu Government.

But that is the same old mirage that Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk chased so long and so disastrously. They could not believe that, in the end, the immense power of the United States could be resisted by a tiny underdeveloped country like North Vietnam. But it could, as those who understood the extraordinary Vietnamese psychology had always warned. Why should Hanol's will break now when it did not under endless months of heavier bombing?

It is actually an old delusion—the idea that a great power can bring about effective political results by

bombing. Churchill's pseudo-scientific friend, Professor Lindemann, sold him on it in World War II; the result was hundreds of thousands of deaths, German and Allied, that did not speed German capitulation.

If bombing does not make the enemy give up now in Indochina, what is the alternative way to assure the status quo in Saigon? It must be for the American bombing to go on indefinitely, with raids in the North whenever the military deems them necessary.

American opinion has been muted on the war over recent months. The President has had much greater success than critics expected in persuading the public to accept his policy. But that may be because the drop in troop levels and in American casualties seemed to point toward the inevitability of a total U.S. withdrawal.

What if the public begins to see that no end is in sight? What if those bombers go North again, every few months, to attack another reported enemy build-up? What if more planes are lost, and more pilots made prisoners?

Barring some diplomatic deus ex machina, that is the message of Richard Nixon's post-Christmas bombing: The United States will continue to have the air role in what The Economist of London, a strong supporter of the war, has just called "a permanent holding position in Vietnam." Permanent.

There may be some doubt that the people who live in Indochina would welcome that result; it means a perpetual war in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam. Even assuming the merits of the Thieu Government, is it worth that cost?

But the more immediate question is what Americans want. Will they be prepared to face the fact that on the next Inaugural Day in Washington, and two years from now, and four, there will still be an American war in Indonesia?

NEW YORK TIMES 5 JANUARY 1972

Buying Time for What?

The White House has wasted no time in shattering
the illusion created by President Nixon in his television
interview earlier this week when he indicated that the
late of American prisoners of war is the "one circum-
stance" standing in the way of total withdrawal from
Indochina.

A White House spokesman now concedes that the
Administration is also still insisting that "the South
Vietnamese have a right to determine their own future."
While the words themselves are unexceptionable, their
use in this context amounts to an admission that the
total reason for keeping a residual force in South Vietnam
and for the renewed bombing of North Vietnam is to
"buy time" for the Saigon regime of President Thieu—
which is what American military spokesmen in Saigon
have been saying all along.

This raises the question: how much time, at what price
and to what end?

Despite reiterated claims of growing success in the
President's Vietnamization program, recent evidence sug-
gests that time is running against American-supported
forces in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam and may be
rapidly running out as American troop withdrawals
continue.

The Cambodlian front, which the President sought to
stabilize with a massive American-South Vietnamese
invasion two years ago, is a shambles. A series of defeats
has shattered Cambodian morale and has left in doubt
the very survival of the regime headed by Premier Lon
Nol.

In Laos, scene of a disastrous South Vietnamese inter-
vention last year, American-supported Government and
Thai forces are falling back on two critical fronts. In
the North, the Communists have again overrun the Plaine
des Jarres and are pounding the key military base at
Long Thien. In the South, the North Vietnamese control
the strategic Boloven Plateau, and are threatening Pakse,
the nation's second largest city.

Most ominous of all is a Communist buildup in South
Vietnam's Central Highlands which United States mili-
tary sources say has reached "historic" proportions,
threatening that a major offensive will be launched
there early this year.

There is no question that these developments gravely
threaten Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization plan and the shrink-
ing American forces who remain hostages to that fast-
fading illusion of military victory. But there is no reason
to believe that the renewed bombing can prevent, or even
long deter an all-out assault from the North.

Years of sustained bombing throughout most of North
Vietnam did not solve President Johnson's problems
when he had up to a half-million troops fighting in the
South. Intensive bombing did not stave off disaster for
the Cambodians along Route 6 or for the Laotians and
Thais in the Plaine des Jarres. It is extremely doubtful
that last week's five-day revival of the air war against
the North will seriously upset Hanoi's schedule, espe-
cially since those raids were apparently less successful
than President Nixon extravagantly claimed.

The agonizing question then is, what new risks may
the President hazard in his desperate attempt to salvage
a bankrupt policy? How many more Americans and
Vietnamese must die, how many more prisoners must
rot for how long in Hanoi, how much more of Vietnam
must be devastated—and to what end? Does the Presi-
dent really believe he can save the regime in Saigon by
air power alone?

Or, as Republican Representative Paul McCloskey of
California has charged, is the President merely trying to
buy time until the American elections are held next
November?

Mr. Nixon only encouraged such sinister speculation
when he suggested Sunday night that "when we come
down to the end, as far as our own involvement in
Vietnam is concerned, the question of whether or not
they [the Communists] will return our prisoners in
exchange for a total American withdrawal is one they
will have a chance to answer." If the President is pre-
pared to make such a proposal later, why not now?

Destroying Laos to "Save" It

WASHINGTON POST - 7 JANUARY 1972

By Charles W. Yost

"VIETNAMIZATION" of the Indochina war seems more and more to mean that it is now mainly waged on the ground in Laos and Cambodia and in the air over North Vietnam. This is no doubt a relief to the South Vietnamese and to the United States ground forces, but it spreads rather than ends the war.

As first United States resident ambassador in Laos, I have followed the tragedy of that small country with a special sympathy

The writer was United States Ambassador to Laos 1954-1956.

and anguish. No more kindly, humane and inoffensive community of human beings can be imagined.

Yet for 20 years, through no fault of their own, entirely as a side-effect of the ambitions of their neighbors and the rivalries of the great powers, they have been repeatedly invaded, their villages destroyed, their people killed or made homeless.

Undoubtedly the chief blame for this outrage lies with the North Vietnamese, who since 1954 have kept an artificial civil war alive in Laos and who, since 1960, have—in gross violation of the Geneva accords—used Laotian territory as their main supply route to the south.

However, more than 10 years ago President Kennedy decided that Laos was too remote and inaccessible to be saved by United States military intervention and that its only salvation lay in a negotiated settlement.

CAMBODIA, while also shamelessly used by the North Vietnamese as a supply route to their forces in the south, escaped direct involvement until the overthrow of Sihanouk in March, 1970.

Since then, however, it has been invaded repeatedly by both North and South Vietnamese, invaded and bombed by the United States, and ravaged and devastated almost as much as Laos.

I have long hoped that an eventual settlement in Vietnam, however it might come about, would more or less restore the status quo ante in Laos and Cambodia—a coalition government with the non-Communists preponderant in Laos, a neutralist government of one sort or another in Cambodia.

In view of the increasing entanglement of the two countries in the war during the past two years, and Communist gains in both of them, I am now considerably less hopeful.

On one point, however, I am certain—that if the United States, after seven years of massive involvement in Vietnam, has been unable to assure a favorable outcome there, we shall not be able to assure a favorable outcome in Laos and Cambodia by prolonging our military aid and escalating our bombing.

All we could achieve by these devices would be to add to the destruction and to prolong two civil wars which (since we cannot intervene decisively at this stage) will have to end eventually in some sort of accommodation between the two sides.

The Nixon administration has resumed bombing of North Vietnam on the alleged grounds that it is essential to protect our residual forces in South Vietnam. This can hardly be the real reason if there is any basis at all to the administration's claim that the situation in South Vietnam is now so secure that we can safely withdraw almost all our forces. If the South Vietnamese cannot by 1972 hold their own without United States airpower, "Vietnamization" has not succeeded but failed.

I suspect that the real reason for renewal of the bombing is that the President and his advisers are alarmed by Communist successes in Cambodia and Laos. They fear that these successes may, by a reverse-domino effect,

undermine morale in South Vietnam, and thus frustrate the administration's game plan of preserving a shiny facade in Indochina until November, no matter how shaky what lies beyond the facade may be.

Having at this late date no other usable weapon than airpower, the administration turns to it again, even though seven years of experience in Indochina have proved that it is ineffective, that in this sort of war it destroys friend and foe alike, and that it not only forecloses early release of our prisoners in Hanoi but adds to their number.

THERE IS only one practical means of ending rapidly both the sufferings of the people of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and United States military involvement there.

That is the one which a majority of members of the Congress has been demanding for months—that the administration fix immediately an early date for the total withdrawal of all United States forces from all three countries, conditional only on the release of our prisoners, and that there should leave to the governments of the three tries, with such modest aid as they may deem desirable from us, the responsibility for negotiating with the other side such settlements as may prove feasible.

The use of our airpower in Indochina is no longer capable of affecting the ultimate outcome of the war or of reinforcing our diminishing bargaining power in a negotiated settlement. All it can do is to give a false and ephemeral appearance of "strength"—while further destroying those we came to "save."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 10 JANUARY 1972 (6)

VIETNAM: AS WAR WINDS DOWN
NEW WORRIES SPRING UP

Getting out of Indo-China
may turn out to be more difficult
than the White House thought.
Latest raids on North are only
one indication of trouble.

Reported from
SAIGON and WASHINGTON

Intense, widespread American bombing of North Vietnam in the closing days of December is being taken as an important signal of what lies ahead in 1972.

In essence: President Nixon's strategy for pulling out of the war, without abandoning Indo-China to the Communists, may be running into trouble.

Starting on December 26, hundreds of U.S. fighter-bombers hit North Vietnam for five straight days. Targets were airfields, missile sites, antiaircraft emplacements, supplies and facilities for moving them.

The strikes were the sharpest escalation of the war since saturation bombing of North Vietnam was halted more than three years ago.

To political and military experts, the stepped-up air war, approved personally by President Nixon, had a meaning far beyond what appeared on the surface. These experts make a number of points.

**Point 1.** Chances for a negotiated settlement of the war are running down the drain. There has been undisguised dismay at the White House for months that peace talks in Paris have gotten nowhere. Cancellation by both sides of a scheduled December 30 session as a result of the latest hostilities demonstrated the mood of bitterness.

**Point 2.** President Nixon is finding

that extracting the U.S. from Vietnam is heavy with risks for remaining American troops, and he intends to keep those risks low. Air strikes, in effect, conveyed this message to the enemy:

American ground strength may be weakening, but air power remains potent and will be ordered into action when necessary. Says one observer:

"Mr. Nixon is making it clear that if Hanoi still wants to play rough in South Vietnam, he can play rougher."

**Point 3.** Vietnamization—building up Saigon to take over its own defense—remains Washington's key objective, but withdrawal of U.S. forces may be slowed somewhat.

Latest assessment from Saigon:

"The American ground-combat role still should end entirely by mid-November. But a residual force—perhaps as many as 50,000 men—will remain. Make no mistake—they will continue to take casualties as long as shooting goes on."

U.S. commanders predict the Communists almost certainly will step up the war in South Vietnam, including attacks in retaliation for the American air strikes. Also in the cards: a number of Red "spectaculars"—limited offensives on South Vietnamese targets timed to Mr. Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow and the American presidential elections.

**Point 4.** Especially worrisome to American leaders is the continuing fighting in Laos and Cambodia. Communist successes in those two countries in December showed how Hanoi can turn on the heat if it wants. More of the same seems to lie ahead. The prospect of saving South Vietnam from the Communists while losing the rest of Indo-China is not a satisfactory one to the White House.

One of Mr. Nixon's first tasks, as the new year starts, is to deal with rising objections at home.

Antiwar demonstrators in late December were back in the streets to protest the bombings. Congressional opponents opened fresh fire.

**A central criticism:** At this late stage, escalation of the air war will do more harm than good, further jeopardize the release of U. S. prisoners of war. Bombing, say the critics, has been anply proven to be a failure, both in halting the flow of war supplies to the South and in damaging North Vietnam's will to continue its aggression.

**The hostages.** Hanoi, for its part, branded the latest bombing as "an extremely grave and criminal act." As anticipated, it indicated that any chance for release of American POW's was now further "blocked."

The fact is, say top American experts, that even before the latest raids there was only the slightest prospect of American prisoners' being released except as part of a much broader agreement.

Such an accord seems remote so long as the Communists insist that the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam be accompanied by the scuttling of President Nguyen Van Thieu's Saigon regime. Mr. Nixon is not about to yield to that demand, in the view of his aides.

In Saigon, no such certainty is found. What many South Vietnamese fear is that the big powers—U. S., Russia and China—will try to arrange an Indo-China settlement at their expense.

As one top Saigon political leader puts it: "We may wake up some morning and find that both our country and North Vietnam have been sold out."

Outsiders are expressing little confidence that summit conferences are likely to resolve the impasse in negotiations. Their point is that the big powers have no unlimited power to

11

force solutions on their client states—
could they want to.

**Another Geneva?** Far more probable than imposed solutions, say many Asian diplomats, is another Geneva-style international conference on Indo-China. All belligerents would attend that kind of meeting.

It was at the 1954 Geneva conference that Vietnam initially was divided—supposedly only until reunification elections were held. They never were. Now some analysts believe that Peking is aiming for a similar "temporary" partition of Laos and Cambodia. Such a step would, in effect, freeze the present *de facto* divisions of the country, leaving huge chunks of territory in Red hands.

Communists in that case would have a more secure base—presumably free from U. S. bombing—where they could continue the struggle for Indo-China after the U. S. pulls out of Vietnam.

In the absence of a settlement, however, prospect is for an intensification of the war in the South.

What U.S. military men foresee is Communist actions far less spectacular than the 1968 Tet offensive—a country-wide attack the Reds are no longer thought capable of mounting—but far more bloody than the fighting in 1971.

Hanoi's aims, say military experts are these:

* To shatter—or at least weaken—the Saigon regime's hold on rural areas and urban centers.

* To discredit the South Vietnamese armed forces, as well as Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization program.

* To rekindle Vietnam as a major issue in the U. S. Says one observer:

> "If the Saigon military flunked a major test at home, Hanoi may reason, the pressure to remove all Americans from Vietnam could well become unbearable for any Administration."

Wider war. Along with increased fighting in Vietnam, the struggle in neighboring Cambodia and Laos Ely will grow fiercer.

The familiar Laos pattern of Red advances during dry seasons and retreat during monsoon rains is continuing. Last year saw deeper advances and shallower pullbacks, a pattern some observers say will be repeated in 1972 as the Communists try to secure broader supply routes for future use.

Cambodia begins 1972 in the position Laos held for years—totally dependent upon the U. S. for its survival, and increasingly battered by Red attacks. The closing months of 1971 found Cambodian troops mauled, their morale and fighting capability damaged.

One possibility the Cambodians are grasping at: If Hanoi decides on a massive effort in South Vietnam, chances are it will ease up in Cambodia. A major war on two fronts is still considered beyond North Vietnam's capabilities.

President Nixon, along with prospects of increased fighting, also may face important political shifts in the region.

Saigon's President Thieu finds opposition Buddhists and Northern Catholics quiet now. But that is considered likely to change as new problems mount. Another key to Thieu's future is keeping the economy on an even keel.

In Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma is coming under increasing pressure at home to strike a deal with the Communists. The terms: obtain a respite from

Red attacks by demanding a halt in U. S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Lon Nol's role. In Cambodia, more defeats for its armed forces might trigger the ouster of Premier Lon Nol. Despite ill health, the Premier has tried to direct military operations on a day-to-day basis. Many of his officers are reported to be unhappy.

A move against these leaders would pose deep dilemmas for Mr. Nixon. From the start, Washington has been family committed to their support.

Taken together, there will be no shortage of Indo-China problem for Mr. Nixon in the new year.

LAIRD: WHY U.S. STRUCK HARD AT NORTH VIETNAM AGAIN

Official figures released by the Pentagon disclose that U.S. warplanes attacked targets in North Vietnam more than 100 times in 1971—with up to 250 planes taking part in some strikes.

That is almost as many missions as American planes carried out against the North in the previous 26 months, dating from the bombing halt ordered by President Johnson on Oct. 31, 1968.

Why the upsurge—and especially the heavy raids of late December—in areas shown on the map?

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, at a news conference on December 27, said officially that the step-up was in retaliation for the Communists' failure to live up to "understandings" the U. S. says were agreed upon just prior to the 1968 bombing halt. Said Mr. Laird:

> "I would like to stress at this

been shelled in the South; on the
nineteenth of December Saigon
was shelled. There have been DMZ
[demilitarized zone] violations by
the North Vietnamese, particularly,
the construction of an infiltration
road through the DMZ. There have
been no substantive negotiations [at
Paris] as promised in 1968. Fourth
point, unarmed reconnaissance planes
have been attacked. Also, in the
month of December more U.S.
planes of all types have been at-
tacked by North Vietnam than in
any month since I have been Sec-
retary of Defense."

Mr. Laird warned Hanoi that he
would "not rule out" further big
raids if necessary to protect the U. S.
troops remaining. He added:

"We are down below 160,000
Americans today in Vietnam. This
is from the high troop ceiling of
549,500 . . . and it is very im-
portant we protect those Americans"

["NIXON'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS IN LINE WITH POLICY, BUT POLICY MAKERS WONDER WHERE", "## THEY'RE HEADED", "By ROBERT FEATLEY", "An Excerpt from The Washington Post Journal", "WASHINGTON — President Nixon's latest withdrawal announcement—another 70, but by May 1, or about 23,300 a month later—will be made. The U.S. policy for Indochina moving on ", "But they have no clear idea of just where they're going.", "The new pullout rate will be only slightly faster than the 22,500-a-month-pace established through Feb. 1, and that's squarely in line with the policy makers' broad thinking. They maintain that the U.S. must continue providing support for the Communist-imperiled governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, lest they topple. And they contend that a slow winding-down of the American war involvement will help all Asian regimes adjust to the new realities of a reduced U.S. role in the region.", "\"It's a question of getting out in the right way,\" says a senior Washington bureaucrat.", "While the troops depart, the U.S. will continue to make its presence felt in Indochina with economic and military aid, plus bombing described as necessary to protect remaining American forces. But even if all U.S. ground troops leave, experts expect much further bombing of North Vietnamese troop concentrations and supply lines.", "## Essential—but Will It Work?", "\"Barring a successful congressional assault on the use of air power, we will probably keep bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail throughout 1972,\" a U.S. official says. \"After that, no any definite plans about anything.\"", "It convinced their course is essential, they makers aren't sure it will succeed—whether the Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam can be kept out of Communist control. In fact, officials often mention such things as \"a decent interval,\" \"a reasonable chance\" and \"a holding operation\" when discussing survival prospects of the asorted Indochinese governments that the U.S. still supports with money, material and—to a decreasing degree—manpower.", "The manpower quotient, took another drop yesterday when President Nixon said U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam will fall to 69,000 by May 1, about half its present level. He also promised another withdrawal announcement in April, presumably, then bringing the total down to the \"residual force\" level of 35,000 or less that he has mentioned.", "Senior officials foresee no fundamental changes soon in the war's conduct. There is no talk of \"victory\" over North Vietnam and its allies and little serious fear of major \"defeat\"—though officials are less sanguine about Laos and Cambodia than about South Vietnam. For the most part, the experts expect continued enemy harassment more for political gain than for military advantage. They do look for some dramatic high points in the next few weeks, however.", "There are reports that Mr. Nixon may offer Hanoi a complete U.S. pullout and a total bombing halt over both North and South Vietnam in return for prompt release of U.S. prisoners of war. But this would be more to win in November than to end the war; already rejects any deal that doesn't stop all bombing and end all support of the Saigon government; the White House finds the latter condition unacceptable", "## Murky and Pointless?", "All this seems murky and somewhat pointless to many outsiders, who want the American", "foreign policy generally, see the continued U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as unviable. They argue that any sudden abandonment of Indochina could destroy American political influence and economic interests in Asia.", "\"There is a fundamental change in thinking from Lyndon Johnson's day, however. Saving the Nguyen Van Thieu government or any Soviet regime (much less the present governments in Laos and Cambodia) no longer has the highest priority, as it once did. Aiding their survival is still considered desirable, and U.S. help for that purpose will continue to be available. But now the price tag is much lower—no American ground troops, limits on material aid, no open-ended commitments.", "\"Once we started talking about giving Thieu a reasonable chance, it was obvious that we no longer considered saving his government a vital U.S. interest,\" says one official.", "Referring to the Cambodians, another adds: \"If they make a genuine effort, we are under obligation to help them. But if they make a pass of it, it's their mess.\"", "## A Cut-Rate War", "Translated into specific actions, this means the U.S. could soldier on in Indochina indefinitely, Congress and the general public willing. The 35,000-man-or-smaller residual force that Mr. Nixon vows to keep in place until the POWs are returned will be a small fraction of the 540,000-man force in South Vietnam when he took office. War costs have dropped from $22 billion annually to about $7 billion, and will go lower. Bombing raids have generally decreased in intensity, despite such periodic surges as the recent attacks on North Vietnam. American casualties will be near zero, though native armies will still suffer heavy losses.", "\"We can keep the costs within tolerable limits,\" claims a State Department official. It's believed President Nixon assumes such a cut-rate war will serve his foreign-policy purposes yet not become a major election issue next November.", "But the short-term outlook is for increased fighting. Intelligence reports predict some major battles this month and next throughout Indochina; the combat has already picked up sharply in Laos and parts of South Vietnam. Various analysts detect various Communist purposes.", "To hear the Nixon administration tell it, one major Hanoi target is the U.S. Congress, especially the likes of dovish Senate Democrats Frank Church and William Fulbright. The suspected purpose is to revive questions here about the depth of U.S. involvement in the war and its prospects for success. It is said that a series of flashy raids—perhaps seizure of a major Vietnamese town, for example—could bring fresh congressional limitations on the U.S. military, perhaps forcing the full and final withdrawal that Mr. Nixon refuses to order himself. Then, according to this theory, Hanoi would figure it could take over South Vietnam and establish \"friendly\" regimes in Laos and Cambodia without much trouble.", "## The Situation in Laos", "Other current targets, according to various theories, are the Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane governments themselves. Hanoi obviously wants to show them to be weak and ineffective, while inflicting maximum damage upon their armies. Breaking down whatever popular support and internal morale they enjoy are said to be among the main objectives. This, too, implies attacks designed more for political and psychological impact than for straight military gain.", "However, Hanoi's unprecedented moves in the Soviet war raise questions about its pur-", "and two full divisions of regular troops have been deployed in the northern Soviet region known as the Chair of Jars. One objective clearly is to knock out the guerrilla forces there under Gen. Vang Pao, a tribal commander who is financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.", "Most officials here believe the vastly superior North Vietnamese forces now will succeed in that aim after years of trying. It's conceded that U.S. bombing alone can't halt a major ground assault. The regular Lao army, never much in the best of times, has suffered heavy losses and Gen. Vang Pao's battered guerrilla army is forced to enlist young boys even shorter than their American rifles.", "Thanks to certain political and financial arrangements the U.S. won't discuss, Thailand has sent up to 5,000 \"volunteers\" to fight along with the embattled Lao forces. But, Thailand's No. 2 man recently offered asylum for Gen. Vang Pao and any of his men who flee the Hanoi assault. This indicates no great confidence about the outcome in Laos.", "\"If Vang Pao's army is knocked out, then what? It's possible Communist forces might try to overthrow the Viennetian government, forcing creation of a coalition that would give them effective political control, including the right to ask the U.S. to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail.\"", "\"If our efforts in either Laos or Cambodia aren't successful,\" says one U.S. official, \"then the Communists could dictate the terms of settlement.\"", "Hanoi's hardline Politburo also has other purposes, analysts say. One is to embarrass Mr. Nixon as he tours China; this might complicate his dealings with Premier Chou En-lai, something North Vietnam-perturbed by the Sino-American rapprochement—would enjoy doing. Hanoi also wants to serve notice that it won't yield to any Peking pressure for a compromise settlement of the war. North Vietnamese official statements continue to trumpet that \"the U.S. imperialists will certainly be defeated.\"", "But the dominant American view is that the current holding operations in Laos and Cambodia will prevent significant Communist advances. Likewise, most officials contend Hanoi's men in South Vietnam won't be able to score any lasting gains there and probably will suffer heavy losses if they try. Thus the military situation would remain fundamentally the same once the current dry season ends in the spring.", "Then, continues the prognosis, Hanoi would have to reexamine its policies and perhaps opt for more political, and less military, actions in its effort \"to liberate the South, protect the North and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.\" If so, optimists argue, a sweeping political settlement might be possible in a year or so.", "\"If our allies do reasonably well, in Hanoi's judgment, and Communist losses are high, then it is possible we will get some important policy changes,\" claims a U.S. official.", "But this possibility of a Communist policy change seems a slender hope. Experts here concede there are no known internal crises that would force North Vietnam to switch away from protracted war; its economy is adequate, its manpower reserves sufficient and state control of the populace strong enough to prolong the war for many years.", "\"Winding down the war is an organic process, not a mechanical one,\" says one diplomat, meaning that it evolves naturally rather than by design. \"One way or another, this will lead to a wider settlement; South Vietnam will either hack it or not, and Laos and Cambodia will follow. But it's hard to see just how this", "CJY 13", "MAY 14, 1973\n\nMAY 14, 1973\n\nMAY 14, 1973\n\nMAY 14

NEW YORK TIMES

14 January 1972 P1

# NIXON WILL BRING 70,000 G.I.'S HOME IN NEXT 3 MONTHS

## LAIRD BRIEFS NEWSMEN

By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13— President Nixon announced today that 70,000 more troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam over the next three months—a move that will reduce the authorized American force to 69,000 by May 1.

Mr. Nixon disclosed the plan in a brief appearance at the White House this morning and said he would have another announcement on further withdrawals before May 1.

The announcement came at a time when some of his challengers for the Presidency — George S. McGovern of South Dakota, Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, Democrats, and Paul N. McCloskey of California, a Republican — have been increasing their criticism of Mr. Nixon's withdrawal strategy and saying that while he is pulling out troops he is not ending American involvement in Southeast Asia.

### U.S. 'Presence' to Continue

In a briefing afterwards, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, said — as the President did on television Jan. 2—that there would continue to be an American "presence" in Vietnam until the issue of prisoners of war "has been resolved." The Secretary conceded that the air power—both American and South Vietnamese—would be forced to assume a greater burden of the defense of the country as ground troops continue to leave.

According to Mr. Laird, the average monthly rate of withdrawal necessary to achieve

the new level would be about 22,300—a slight increase over the prevailing rate of 22,500 men.

### Appearance Is Brief

The President did not use his announcement either to explain or to defend his policies—his appearance in the briefing room lasted about 30 seconds—but Mr. Laird said it reflected official confidence that "the Vietnamization program has moved forward with sufficient vigor and progress so the South Vietnamese are in a position where they can provide for the security responsibilities in-country which are theirs."

Mr. Laird also took the occasion, without prompting from reporters, to criticize those who have accused the President of withdrawing American forces too slowly. He did not single out any of Mr. Nixon's challengers by name, but said:

"Some of those individuals who are going around the country criticizing the program to withdraw Americans from Vietnam where silent in 1968 and before, when we were on the escalator going up and up and up. Now that we are going down, down, down, it seems they have changed their position, and are critical of the President and the program which he has approved to withdraw Americans from Southeast Asia."

Mr. Laird would not speculate on the size or rate of the next round of troop withdrawals, or the size of the residual force that would remain after the next round of reductions. Mr. Nixon hinted in his Jan. 2 message that he might leave 25,000 to 35,000 men behind as bargaining leverage to obtain the release of American prisoners.

Asked for a statistical breakdown, Mr. Laird said the new round of withdrawals would reduce the troop ceiling for Army personnel to about 48,000, for the Navy to 4,500, and for the Air Force to about 16,000. All marines have been withdrawn.

The Navy and Air Force figures are somewhat misleading, however, since air-strike forces based in Thailand and on aircraft carriers off the coast of Vietnam will remain largely intact. These forces have never been included in the estimates of troop strength in South Vietnam.

Moreover, Mr. Laird himself warned that "we will continue to use American air power to protect the remaining forces, of course." American aircraft recently flew 1,000 sorties over enemy targets in response to what the United States termed a major enemy buildup threatening the survival of the dwindling number of men remaining in South Vietnam.

The withdrawal announcement was Mr. Nixon's seventh since he assumed office on Jan. 20 1969, when the authorized troop strength in Vietnam was 549,500 men.

Mr. Nixon began withdrawing troops from South Vietnam in June, 1969, with an announcement on "Midway Island that 25,000 would come home by Aug. 31. That lowered the authorized troop strength to 524,500 and amounted to a withdrawal average of 10,000 men per month.

Since then, he has announced six troop withdrawals, including the one today. On Sept. 16, 1969, he reduced the authorized troop level by 40,500 men over a three-month period. On Dec. 15 of that year, he authorized a further reduction of 50,000 men over a four-month period.

### Largest Withdrawal

On April 20, 1970, he announced the largest single withdrawal, a 150,000-man reduction to take place over a one-year period. On April 7, 1971, he announced he would withdraw an additional 100,000 men by the end of the year. And on Nov. 12, 1971, he announced a 45,000-man withdrawal over a two-month period, ending in mid-January.

Mr. Laird said the South Vietnamese had taken over complete responsibility for ground combat in their country and that, with the completion of the withdrawal announced today, there would no longer be any American combat divisions in South Vietnam.

Defense Department sources conceded, however, that some small American combat units would be left behind—air mobile units, for example—but that their mission would be essentially protective and defensive.

Mr. Laird said the South Vietnamese were assuming an increasing share of "air and logistics responsibilities" in what he called "Phase 2" of the Vietnamization program. He said the use of American air power had dropped by two-thirds since late 1968, while there had been a fourfold increase in the number of aircraft in early 1969 to 1,000 today.

Asked about reports that the enemy might soon begin a major offensive, Mr. Laird said that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong might attempt two or three "spectaculars," but that the South Vietnamese could survive them and would win

"75 per cent or more" of their battles.

He did not appear particularly concerned about enemy successes in Cambodia and Laos. In Cambodia, he insisted, the army is doing better than anyone expected. As for Laos, he said, "there is no question that the North Vietnamese have pushed a little further this year than they did in the last three years, but this swings back and forth."

CYD

14

NBC RADIO NEWS ON THE HOUR NBC-
RADIO 6:50 PM JAN 21

15

VN War Is Turning Into Air War

GARRICK UTLEY: The VN war is becoming an air war and the list of American prisoners in NVN is going to grow.

Remember a few years ago how the VN war entered a new phase about every month.

There was a phase with the first American ground troops. The first B-52 raids, etc.

It's happening again. But with much less attention or apparent concern here in the US.

The VN was becoming more and more an air war. American planes bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, opposed by NVNese anti-aircraft missiles and occasional Mig fighters.

This week there have been more incidents in the air war including the shooting down of a communist Mig by an American fighter bomber.

And they reflect this changing aspect of the war.

It is changing because the US is withdrawing its ground forces from SVN. We are getting out of the war supposedly.

But our Air Force and Naval air units are not being withdrawn. They are staying.

Their job is to bomb infiltration routes and provide close air support for SVNese government troops.

This is a tremendous burden which has been put on American pilots. They are suppose to accomplish from the air what half a million ground soldiers were there to do.

Prevent the collapse of the SVNese government from communist attack.

The new battlefield is not the Mekong Delta or the central highlands.

It is the maze of trails and roads in eastern Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail.

And the battle is whether American bombs can stop the flow of NVNese reinforcements and supplies into the south.

The leaders in Hanoi have recognized the shifting emphasis in the war and that is why they have sent their mobile missile launchers south all through eastern Laos.

And that is also why NVN is starting to send its Migs into the air.

There is hardly a chance that NVN's Migs and missiles will defeat American air power. But they don't have to.

All they have to do is provide enough protection so that communist supplies and soldiers continue to pour south.

And it is very likely the communists can accomplish that. It is very unlikely that American air power can stop infiltration now in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire if it could not stop it in the past when American flyers faced virtually no opposition.

The NIXON Administration has chosen the increased emphasis on air power because it is an inexpensive and invisible way of maintaining the American commitment in VN.

Inexpensive in that there will not be as many American war dead and wounded.

Invisible in that there are very few newspaper or television pictures of our planes in action or the damage they cause.

I don't think however, that this can go on forever.

One, as US planes are lost there will be more prisoners in NVN, men waiting to come home.

That will have an affect on American public feeling.

And second, in the long run, air power is not a substitute for ground power.

American air support will work only to the extent that theVNization has worked.

If SVN's army cannot stand up to the communists, it will be defeated.

American air power can postpone that defeat perhaps, but it cannot prevent it.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC-TV 7:00 AM

JAN 21 1972
Symington Comments On VN

BILL MONROE: Senator SYMINGTON, you indicated yesterday that you felt some of the policies we are pursuing in Indo-China don't seem to you to be consistent with our plans for withdrawal.

Why not?

SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON: It's difficult to understand why we bomb heavily up in NVN, increase our military operations in Cambodia, our support, maintain the military operations in Laos; at the same time say that we are moving out of that war as quickly as we can.

If we continue this operation, there's a chance that our troops that are left could be in very serious trouble.

It's been my position for many months that if we agree to a date and provided a withdrawal, provided they released our prisoners of war, that we could get out of Indo-China, which I now believe is important for the future of this country.

MONROE: You believe we could get out if we simply said we will pull out by a certain date in exchange for release of prisoners?

SYMINGTON: I think that would end this Indo-China war.

And I believe that would be to the advantage of the US for many reasons.

MONROE: Now, Senator, you're talking in exactly an opposite direction than from the Administration.

The Administration says that these activities in Cambodia and Laos and the bombings are actually done to protect our remaining troops and to speed withdrawal.

SYMINGTON: Well, I may be talking against the Administration, but I'm talking about something that the Senate three times has passed and been in favor of.

The House has not approved it, nor does the Administration approve it.

And I think what we're doing today is dangerous from the standpoint of our future.

And it's going to kill a lot more people on the ground - civil-

ians of the other countries.

It's going to kill more of our own flyers and soldiers. We lost five planes in the week that I was out there.

And I would like to see us either pursue it, which is now obviously wrong, or get out of it.

And I think we could get out of it if we were to agree to a date on the withdrawal of the prisoners.

Provided that the prisoners were withdrawn at the same time. (?)

***

NATION MAGAZINE 10 JANUARY 72 (14)
The New Air War

The most recent U.S. "protective reaction" air strikes in northern Laos and North Vietnam have been of such strength, utilizing as they have virtually every available military aircraft in Indochina, that the Administration can no longer conceal what is happening in the war.

Until quite recently, by a number of artful devices, the Administration had kept the spotlight off the air war by focusing it on the continuing U. S. troop withdrawals. It has adroitly avoided briefings. It has insisted that the bombings were only half as big in number of planes and tonnage as in 1968 and hence by inference the air war was tapering off, not heating up. It has steadily insisted that the air strikes were aimed at selected targets and carefully limited in time and area.

When questioned about the elaborate air bases in Thailand, one of which is perhaps the largest military complex of its kind in the world, Ambassador Leonard Unger explained to U.S. newsmen that there was not much that could be said because the Thais, our hosts, were quite sensitive about the presence of bases of such magnitude on their soil. U.S. field commanders have fallen back on the familiar line that until they know definitely about what happens to the plane crews who have been shot down or lost, they cannot be specific about the extent of the losses, etc.

But the loss in Laos of four Phantom jets on December 18 and 19 while supporting ground troops in combat, coupled with the big strikes that began December 26 against supply depots and airfields in North Vietnam, have removed any doubts that the air war has now assumed a new and even deadlier dimension.

Now the Administration is attempting to prevent a clear view of the air strikes by justifying them in terms that leave a great deal to be desired on the score of candor. The "primary emphasis," it is said, of these raids is to protect the withdrawal of U. S. troops from South Vietnam. But there is little reason to believe that the troops cannot be safely withdrawn. There has been relatively little direct action involving U.S. ground combat troops in recent weeks. Nor can much weight be given to the charge that the North Vietnamese have violated an "understanding" that was reached when the bombing was halted in 1968 and must now be punished for the breach. By "agreement" the Administration means what the Johnson administration meant: that is, it has assumed that some acid agreement exists. And it is not credible that the North Vietnamese have struck back because they want to gain some kind of psychological-political leverage with the Chinese and/or the Russians on the eve of the President's visits to Peking and Moscow. Their present activities, including the buildup of supplies and the insistence on keeping the Ho Chi Minh Trail open despite the bombings, all indicate careful planning that must have been under way long before the President announced that he would go to Peking. A much more basic reason for the recent air strikes is that American field commanders, as George McArthur reports in the *Los Angeles Times*, were "infuriated" by the audacity of the North Vietnamese attacks on U. S. fighter-bomber planes. What worries them is the skillful defensive interplay of MIGs, missiles and antiaircraft guns and the daring with which the North Vietnamese have sent MIGs into the skies to attack U. S. planes. Acting on their advice, Washington is obviously trying to stave off a major military defeat, which would endanger U.S. troop withdrawals only in the sense that the President might fuel that air power alone cannot shore up the Thieu regime until after the election.

This direct confrontation in the air clearly signals that new phase of the war has been opened up. But it was early foreseeable. It may be most inconvenient, in terms of the President's political planning for 1972, that the new year opens with a new phase in the fighting he said he would end. But as long as the Administration insists on supporting the Thieu regime, and keeping a huge military presence in Southeast Asia, it cannot expect the North Vietnamese to stop fighting or to bargain on its

NEW REPUBLIC
15 JAN 72 (13)

Let's Find Out

Again, there has been a clarification of policy on Vietnam which does not clarify. The confusion arises out of a dispute between the President and Senator McGovern (among others) over what Hanoi demands in return for the release of American POWs. The President triggered the debate by telling a CBS interviewer that these "international outlaws" in North Vietnam had said "no deal" on freeing the prisoners in exchange for an announced date for US military withdrawal. McGovern then accused the President of deception, and said that the offer had never been made by the administration. Within 24 hours, another background briefing by a White House spokesman concluded that Mr. Nixon hadn't exactly made that offer, but that he had concluded from what has been said in Paris, that no deal could be arranged because "the North Vietnamese are still demanding what they have always demanded, that we pull the rug out from beneath the South Vietnamese government." This is how the administration interprets Hanoi's statement last July, that the US must "respect the South Vietnamese peoples' right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," and specifically, cease its efforts to maintain the present Saigon government in power.

Two questions arise. The first is whether this demand of Hanoi is inseparable, as the White House insists, from an offer to let the prisoners go if a deadline for withdrawal is fixed and met. Senator McGovern believes the two are separable; the President doesn't. We are inclined to think the senator is right, but we are not sure. And we would note in passing that by prisoners, Hanoi means all prisoners, not just Americans, which complicates the problem further.

The second, related question is whether Hanoi has in mind to hold prisoners unless and until the President, formally and explicitly, announces his nonsupport of the present Saigon regime. We are not mind readers, but that is not our understanding of the situation. We read Hanoi as saying that the war will go on so long as the US government acts on the belief that the survival of Thieu is vital to its national interest. But if that belief were discarded, if Mr. Nixon were to decide, as he ought, that Thieu is not worth the price we pay for him, it would not follow that the President would have to collaborate in Thieu's overthrow. All Washington need do is allow Vietnamization full play, leaving the political and economic future of Vietnam for the Vietnamese to decide.

These opinions of ours are speculative, but they could be put to the test. One way of testing them was suggested by Max Frankel in *The New York Times* of January 4: "American negotiators have wondered why the North Vietnamese have not played on American feelings by offering an unambiguous exchange of prisoners for ground and air withdrawal." We have wondered something else. Why doesn't Mr. Nixon offer an unambiguous cessation of all US military action in Vietnam the pulling out of our forces by a definite date - contingent on Hanoi's agreement to set free US prisoners by that date and assurances of safe exit for our troops? That proposal might produce a clarification that clarifies.

Because its feverish efforts to conceal as much as
possible of what has been happening in Laos, Cambodia
and North Vietnam have failed to keep some news from
bring back to the American electorate, and because its
transparent double talk about the reasons for five days
of heavy bombings in the North aroused more doubt than
conviction, the Administration felt the need to come
on loud and bold. When in trouble, stage a quick diver-
sion. So in his interview with Dan Rather on CBS (radio
and television), the President said, with a straight face,
that only one consideration kept him from agreeing to a
total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from all of
Indochina—the continued refusal of those "international
outlaws," the North Vietnamese, to release American
prisoners of war. Mr. Rather asked the President if we
had ever asked the North Vietnamese if they would re-
lease the prisoners and assure the safe departure of U.S.
forces. once a specific date for their withdrawal had been
set. The President replied that the North Vietnamese
had "totally rejected" such a proposal, but the next day,
"Administration sources" conceded that the United States
had never proposed a firm date for withdrawal in ex-
change for an agreement of the type indicated. All that
our spokesmen in Paris had done was to seek "clarifica-
tion," quite a different matter. This "explanation" of what
the President had said received a fraction of the attention
given to his sweeping assurances on television.

The fact is that the Administration never considered
a withdrawal date in 1971 because it felt that the military
buildup of South Vietnamese forces was not complete.
Stated somewhat more realistically, the Administration's
willingness to consider a 1971 withdrawal date was
based on the fear that, if left on their own for a full year
before the November 1972 election, the South Vietnamese
might not be able to "hack it" and a major defeat or
collapse of the regime a few months before the election
could be Effectively embarrassing. On January 5, in a tele-
vised interview with Howard K. Smith and Ted Koppel
on ABC, Secretary of State Rogers stated with com-
mendable—if novel—frankness that it was still American
policy to keep a residual force in South Vietnam until
the ARVN is ready to stand on its own feet. "Eventually"
we would be willing to withdraw all troops, if the POWs
were released, but we still insist that the South Viet-
namese must be able to determine their own future. After
all, he said, we have lost 55,000 American lives and suf-
fered 250,000 wounded, and it would therefore be "folly"
to move out before the South Vietnamese were able to
defend themselves. And "of course" we will consult the
Saigon regime as to when it feels able to carry on without
the active aid of U.S. forces.

So what it comes down to is that the President, despite
his sweeping statements in the interview, continues to
believe that he can force the North Vietnamese to nego-
tiate on his terms. To this end he is using the POW issue
as an excuse for keeping a large residual force in South
Vietnam and he is using the alleged need to protect these
troops to justify continued heavy raids. at intervals. in the
North. But it will be difficult to time future raids as
cunningly as the Christmas raids were timed—while Con-
gress was out of session and the campuses were empty of
students.

In this latest ploy the President was trying once again
to buy more time, in the hope that the North Vietnamese
can yet be forced to accept his terms by a date close
enough to the first Tuesday in November to minimize the
risk of a premature collapse of the Thieu regime. Mean-
while, he continues his efforts to hoodwink the public
into believing that he is actually ending the war. American
casualties are down (Vietnamese casualties don't count).
Combat troops are being withdrawn. The Ho Chi Minh
Trail has been wired against infiltrators and there is much
talk of an automated war. At the same time, the North
Vietnamese continue to be charged with "violations" of an
agreement the conditions of which are known only to the
President. In this way the psychological-political ground-
work has been laid, so to speak, to justify further and
heavier bombings. Yet despite the fact that this calculated
deception appears to have quieted domestic opinion, the
President remains in deep trouble. The obstacle he cannot
surmount is that the North Vietnamese, and their allies
in South Vietnam, are at least as determined as he is.
Mr. Nixon will try to pull the rug from under them when
he goes to Peking, but he is not likely to succeed, even
though the Chinese seemed to be not greatly disturbed
by the Christmas raids. The Chinese can of course influ-
ence the North Vietnamese, but the bulk of military and
other assistance comes from the Soviet Union, and there
is a limit beyond which the Chinese would not want to
pressure Hanoi for fear of increasing Soviet influence.
There is also a point beyond which the North Vietnamese
are not likely to be influenced by the Chinese or the
Russians or both.

As an antidote to continuing Presidential obfuscation,
the facts about the most recent air raids should be in-
vestigated as fully as possible. Rep. Lester Wolff (D.,
N.Y.) has announced that he will ask the Subcommittee
on Asia and Pacific Affairs, on the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee, to conduct such an investigation when
Congress reconvenes on January 18. Investigations of
this sort cannot expect any help from the Administration,
but they can throw much needed light on facts which the
Administration is doing its best to conceal. Hearings can
also reveal the double-dealing and deception on which
the President is relying to keep himself afloat politically
as campaign '72 gets under way.

NEW YORK TIMES 22 JANUARY (24)

'Commitment' Without Clout

President Nixon paid scant attention to the war in Vietnam in his State of the Union messages, perhaps because he genuinely believes he can make that interminable conflict a nonissue in the Presidential campaign. That is a most unlikely prospect if the President clings to the policy which he briefly reiterated in his written message.

The essence of that policy is to continue pursuing the old objective of securing an independent, friendly South Vietnam while reducing American military clout through the progressive withdrawal of United States ground forces, relying on indigenous forces in Vietnam and neighboring Cambodia and Laos to maintain the balance of power with the help of American air forces.

The Nixon policy is faulty in two fundamentals. The avowed "commitment" to the people of South Vietnam to give them "the chance to choose their own future" has lost any semblance of credibility after the farcical one-man Presidential election of last fall.

Beyond that, the means the President has chosen to pursue this elusive end are more clearly inadequate to the task. While Mr. Nixon spoke to Congress, allied positions were crumbling in Cambodia and Laos and the President's Ambassador in Saigon was warning of expected new enemy offensives in South Vietnam itself. In Indochina, the President is ignoring the sound doctrine he himself enunciated to Congress: "We make today only those commitments we are able and prepared to meet."

Mr. Nixon reaffirmed his "hope that we can end this tragic conflict through negotiation." That is the only way the Indochina war can be ended with some degree of honor for the United States and with safety for the residual forces and the prisoners of war still in Vietnam. If the war is to be eliminated as a national issue, the course for Mr. Nixon is to advance fresh proposals in Paris, realistically geared to this country's true interests and capabilities in that tortured region.

WASHINGTON POST

23 JAN 72 (24)

New Hints on Ending the War

In his CBS interview on January 2, President Nixon hinted for the first time that he would later propose to Hanoi a total American withdrawal in exchange for release of the POWs. This is, of course, the crux of the matter. The administration has talked a good deal about it but it has not made a proposal embodying a withdrawal-prisoner deal to North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam has never been forced to go through what surely would be the terribly difficult political exercise of deciding how to respond.

Rather, Hanoi has been free to make propaganda on the issue and to float differing and confusing versions of its bargaining position—one should say its "propaganda position" because the United States has yet to force it to define a "bargaining position." For it is of the essence to distinguish what North Vietnam may say to inquiring politicians and journalists—or to American diplomats who are under instructions in effect only to buy time for President Thieu—from what its actual response on a withdrawal-prisoner proposal might be.

Now, however, the administration seems to have moved a step closer toward making such a proposal, though Mr. Nixon's State of the Union message contained no suggestion of it. Diplomatic correspondent Murrey Marder wrote on Friday that "administration strategists are reported to be increasingly tempted to put the question directly to counter critics of administration policy." One hopes the temptation is not based on private assurances that Hanoi will reject the offer. But the critics, assuredly, are gaining force. Last year they were led by Senator Mansfield, whose leverage was limited to legislative politics. This year they are led by Senators Muskie, Humphrey and McGovern,

whose leverage is applied in the much more critical arena of presidential politics.

This newspaper has previously stated its conviction that Mr. Nixon has full and fair reason to declare the United States has achieved its appropriate mission in Vietnam, and that a withdrawal-POW deal should now be offered. To many, it will be deeply disturbing that Mr. Nixon should not start issuing hints of interest in that course until now. But if Mr. Nixon is seeing matters more clearly in 1972's early light, then we urge him to move on.

Senator McGovern, among others, claims that Hanoi would surely accept a withdrawal-POW offer. We are not so sure. It is not inconceivable that some in Hanoi, perhaps those who might win the internal debate such an offer would provoke, might insist that the United States must withdraw not only its own forces but all forms of support for President Thieu. It would involve a risk. There is, however, only one way to find out whether Hanoi will bargain and that is to put the question: to put it, furthermore, in a way and in a form designed to enhance prospects of its acceptance.

The administration is currently advertising its alarm about a forthcoming military "spectacular" the Communists are said to be planning and about the unravelling effect it may have on domestic support for administration war policy. If the White House is in fact as alarmed as it professes, then why should there be any further delay in submitting a serious proposal in Paris? Such an offer could well deter the "spectacular" they believe is being planned. Surely Mr. Nixon would not want to delay the offer, if he is actually contemplating one, because he does not think this is the proper moment for it in his re-election campaign. We repeat our comment on his CBS interview: why not now?