10

they arise. In other words, the doctrine of flexible response removed the automatic American guarantee which made American hegemony in the 1950's bearable. No theoretical assurance could overcome the fact that no one could really be certain -- not even the President -- how he would react in the stark contingencies of nuclear war.

For example, in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee over the years, Secretary McNamara's estimate of American fatalities in a nuclear war was constantly mounted and ultimately reached the level of anywhere from 50 to 80 million fatalities. Nevertheless, he reiterated the ritualistic assertion that the nuclear guarantee to NATO remained unimpaired. This invites skepticism. It must make some difference to a president of the United States whether he faces the kind of casualties one could expect in 1949, or 80 million dead. It is not to downgrade the reliability, the devotion to alliances, or the sturdiness of American leadership, to say that in the face of such a level of damage a president of the United States may be moved by other considerations than the urge to fulfill alliance commitments. In a way, the more the United States attempted to preserve freedom of decision, the more questions -- unanswerable questions -- it raised. The tragedy of the problem lies in the fact that these unanswerable questions are also unavoidable ones.

The American attack on the national nuclear forces of our allies compounded this uncertainty, as did the oscillations with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and the emphasis on conventional build-up. The arguments used to justify the conventional build-up -- that it would raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons would have to be used and that it would induce a pause which would permit the consideration of the larger issues involved --

14

circumstances. Confronted, however, with what must amount to the des-
truction of the society as one now conceives it, it is difficult to demonstrate
that one will have to fight under more disadvantageous circumstances later on.
With society extinguished the loss of international reputation may not weigh
so heavily.

As a result, with respect to a whole range of issues, the nuclear guarantee
is no longer as credible as it was before; a consideration which tends to be bal-
anced, however, by a similar restraint on the other side. Those issues with
respect to which the nuclear guarantee remains credible, however, may in the
minds of one's allies be so overwhelmingly clear that they do not need to be
reinforced by a formal commitment. In other words, the United States will
defend its allies, not because it has a treaty that obliges it to do so, but be-
cause these allies are so important to it that it has no choice except to
defend them. From this point of view President DeGaulle's views are per-
fectly rational. Far from doubting the American commitment to the defense of
Europe, he may feel that in fundamental issues of national survival the United
States has no choice except to support France. On this basis, he can conduct
a policy which in the past would have been close to neutralism.

Here is an example of a President

Curiously enough it is the tightness of the alliance with respect to fundamental issues, and its ambiguity with respect to marginal issues, that produces many of the problems of nuclear control. For this reason, many of our efforts in the last three or four years to "solve" the nuclear problem have missed the central point. We have sent briefing teams all over Europe as if the difficulty was a lack of understanding of the subtlety of our strategic

15

thought. We have tended to identify unity of the Alliance with command arrangements. We have seen in the integrated command a guarantee of allied cohesiveness, while, in fact, in the 1950's the integrated command was a symbol of allied cohesiveness, not a cause of it. An American commander in Europe was important to the Europeans because he represented an additional direct channel to the President with a vested interest to go to war in case of attack. But the legal situation in these integrated commands was far from automatic. All this diverted attention from what is the main problem in the Alliance, namely, whether it is possible to get comparable conceptions of national interest, to an essentially technical problem of how one should go to war. The period of diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the war was given next to no attention, while the military command for the conduct of military operations received central attention.

Secondly, such discussions focused attention on something which was inherently misleading. ~~Most~~ of the political leaders engaged in these discussions, no matter how serious or how dedicated, really could be sure that they knew what they would do when a general nuclear war occurred. I can imagine no issue in which assertions of governments as to what they will do are less reliable than the conduct of nuclear operations. It led to discussions as to how one would enter a nuclear war, perhaps even by majority vote, as if it were conceivable that an American president, having decided that a particular issue was not worthy of a nuclear war, would let himself be voted into it by a majority of his allies.

17

question. One of the remedies that is often suggested is to increase the
process of consultation. On one level I agree with this. It would have
been better, for example, if we had discussed the nonproliferation treaty
more fully, earlier, and there should have been a greater degree of allied
participation in the nuclear test-ban treaty. On the other hand, there are
inherent limits to the process of consultation. The domestic experience of
our government indicates that government operates not only by consultation
but also by decision.

Finally, no process of consultation can avoid real differences in per-
spective or interest. It can only make them explicit. We have to find a
way by which countries with comparable interests can talk and get away
from the notion that unless everybody talks, nobody can talk. We must try
to identify those problems on which some consensus exists and get the
countries that are willing to participate into workable arrangements. I
do not think the NATO council in its present form can handle the entire
process of political consultation.

Let me conclude simply by saying that it seems to me that the kind of
cooperation that is desirable will depend on some common conception of a
political future, with some areas in which no agreement is possible and
some areas in which cooperation is desirable. For example, the United
States will not get European support for its involvements outside Europe,
which does not make every extra-European effort incorrect. But, I do not

Henry A. Kissinger
Professor of Government
Harvard University

NATO AND THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The question of nuclear control in its military sense, which agitated
the Alliance so much two or three years ago, is really pretty much a dead
issue, as are some of the problems of central command and control which
seemed so paramount in our strategic thinking. In fact we can now see
that the nuclear problem was a catalyst for bringing to the surface funda-
mental difficulties. Therefore, I should like to consider the interrelation-
ship between political developments in Europe and the United States and
the strategic problem, particularly in the nuclear field.

Let me begin by describing three phases in the political evolution
of the Atlantic relationship. In the period of acute challenge, roughly
from 1948 to 1960, the Alliance was based on a number of assumptions:
1) that the solidarity of the Allies against a common threat should over-
ride all other considerations; 2) that the European continent was divided
by an iron curtain and that this division was likely to remain as long as
communism existed in its present form; 3) that a final settlement with
the Soviet Union was distant, and, paradoxically, if it came it would be a
Western victory with the frontier moving at least to the Western frontier
of the Soviet Union--in other words the unification of Germany was per-

of the Soviet Union--in other words the unification of Germany was per-
Western victory with the frontier moving at least to the Western frontier
the Soviet Union was distant, and, paradoxically, if it came it would be a
communist exiled in its present form: 3) that a final settlement with
by an iron curtain and that this division was likely to remain as fond an
ride all other considerations: 8) that the European continent was divided
1) that the solidarity of the Axis against a common threat should over-
from 1948 to 1960, the Alliance was based on a number of assumptions:
of the Atlantic relationship. In the period of acute challenge, roughly
Let me begin by describing three diseases in the political evolution
the strategic problem, particularly in the nuclear field.

ship between political developments in Europe and the United States and
mental difficulties. Therefore, I should like to consider the interrelation-
that the nuclear problem was a catalyst for bringing to the foreseen lands-
seemed so barren in our strategic thinking. In fact we can now see
islands, as are some of the problems of central command and control which
the Alliance so much two or three years ago, is really pretty much a dead
The question of nuclear control in its military sense, which adjusted

Harvard University
Professor of Government
Henry A. Klauder

EJ

2

ceived as essentially a negotiating problem; and 4) that Alliance policy
was dependent upon United States' leadership and initiative--so much so
that all of the strategic conceptions and most of the political ones were
an outgrowth of plans developed in Washington.

Several inconsistencies persist throughout this period. There was
always a certain ambiguity about the purpose of West European integra-
tion in this kind of structure because the overriding Soviet threat gave
more incentive for an Atlantic community than an autonomous West
European partner. This was covered over with various arguments,
such as the proposition that the partnership would actually be made more
workable by strengthening the other partner. This must be one of the
few times in history that a country believed that it would be easier to
deal with a partner if the partner were made stronger.

Also, there were a number of tensions arising out of the European
involvement in colonial and post-colonial adventures, of which the
Suez crisis was an acute example. There the United States sided with
the declared enemy of the Alliance, against its traditional and formal
allies. Suez made clear that the identity of interest stopped at colonial
problems, or at least stopped at the geographic boundaries of Europe.
We see this problem today with Vietnam

The second period marked the transition from a postwar climate to
the present. Extending from roughly 1961 to 1966, it was characterized

the present. Extending from roughly 1961 to 1966, it was characterized
the second period marked the transition from a boatwar climate to
We see this problem today with Vietnam

problems, or at least stopped at the destrucpive pombaries of Europe.
Suez made clear that the identity of interest stopped at colonial
the decimated enemy of the Alliance, against its traditional and formal
Suez crisis was an acute example. There the United States aided with
involvement in colonial and post-colonial adventures, of which the
Alao, there were a number of tensions arising out of the European
debt with a partner if the partner were made stronger.

few times in history that a country believed that it would be easier to
workable by strengthening the other partner. This must be one of the
such as the proposition that the partnership would actually be made more
European partner. This was covered over with various arguments,
more incentive for an Atlantic community than an autonomous West
tion in this kind of structure because the overriding Soviet threat gave
always a certain ambiguity about the purpose of West European interac-
- Several inconsistencies parallel throughout this period. There was
an outgrowth of pisma developed in Washington.

that all of the strategic conceptions and most of the political ones were
was dependent upon United States' leadership and initiative--so much so
ceived as essentially a negotiating problem; and 4) that Alliance policy

3

3

by an uneasy oscillation between the proclamations of Atlantic partnership and the need for detente with the Soviet Union. This is exemplified by the fact that in June, 1962, President Kennedy warned the Berliners against believing that one could deal with the communists, at the precise moment that we were negotiating a nuclear test-ban treaty. We attempted to paper over such latent inconsistencies by arguments that the Alliance would be strengthened by common action in the area of the detente in East-West relations.

This did not work very effectively for two reasons: first, military alliances are not good instruments for diplomatic settlements, and, second, most of the efforts at detente were carried out essentially bilaterally, first by the United States and later individually by every other member of the Alliance. Whatever one may think about the substance of the nuclear test-ban treaty, and other arms control measures, the method by which they were achieved tended to throw into question the unity of the Alliance and to undermine the strategic assumptions upon which NATO had been based. On the one hand we were asserting that in the case of conflict everything had to be under central command and control, but in the diplomacy preceding the conflict we were proceeding essentially bilaterally. Raymond Aron drew attention to this inconsistency as early as 1959.

Finally, during the Kennedy period it first became apparent that an

Finally, during the Kennedy period if that became apparent that an
as 1969.

plausibly. Raymond Aron drew attention to this inconsistency as early
in the diplomacy preceding the conflict we were proceeding essentially
of conflict everything had to be under central command and control, but
NATO had been based. On the one hand we were assuring that in the case
the Alliance and to undermine the strategic assumptions upon which
by which they were achieved tended to throw into question the unity of
the nuclear test-pen treaty, and other same control measures, the method
member of the Alliance. Whatever one may think about the substance of
internally, that by the United States and later individually by every other
second, most of the efforts at detente were carried out essentially bi-
alliances are not good instruments for diplomatic settlements, and,
This did not work very effectively for two reasons: first, military
meat relations.

would be strengthened by common action in the area of the detente in East-
bar over such latent inconsistencies by arguments that the Alliance
that we were negotiating a nuclear test-pen treaty. We attempted to
believe that one could deal with the communists, at the precise moment
that in June, 1968, President Kennedy warned the Berliners against
and the need for detente with the Soviet Union. This is exemplified by the
by an example oscillation between the proclamations of Atlantic partnership

3

[x]

4

autonomous, integrated Europe would not necessarily carry out prescrip-
tions developed in Washington. This was faced with chagrin, and led to
an intense American-French rivalry which took the form, at least on our
side, of seeking to woo the Germans into a new structure through the
multilateral force and of getting a commitment from them against what
we considered to be French hegemonial aspirations.

Since about 1966, the Alliance has been in its third period, in which
the tensions between Allied solidarity and efforts at U.S. -Soviet detente
are beginning to be resolved in favor of the latter. There has begun a
process of military disengagement on the continent on the part of all the
major allies. France has left the so-called integrated military structure;
the United States has reduced her forces; Britain has reduced her forces to some
extent and would like to reduce more; Germany is in the process of reducing
its forces and much of the military structure that previously symbolized
solidarity is in the process of change.

Some of this has been accelerated by the breath-taking speed by which
American military policy seems to change -- moving from conventional
build-up to conventional reductions in the space of three years, from the
MLF to a non-proliferation treaty again in the space of three years. Without
arguing the merit of any of these policies, I suggest that it is very difficult
to lead an Alliance and expect others to stake their policies and expectations
on a certain degree of consistency when one's policies are in

bectisitions on a certain degree of consistency when one's policies are in
tition to lead an Alliance and expect officers to take their policies and ex-
out around the merit of any of these policies. I suggest that it is very dif-
ferent to a non-proliferation treaty aside in the space of three years. With-
build-up to conventional reductions in the space of three years, from the
American military policy seems to change -- moving from conventional
Some of this has been accelerated by the present f-tasking a deed by which
listed solidarity is in the process of change.

and its forces and much of the military structure that previously symbo-
extent and would like to reduce more: Germany is in the process of reorg-
the United States has reduced her forces; Britain has reduced here to some
major allies. France has left the so-called integrated military structure
process of military disengagement on the continent on the part of all the
are beginning to be resolved in favor of the latter. There has begun a
the tensions between Allied solidarity and efforts at U.S.-Soviet defense
Since about 1966, the Alliance has been in its third period, in which
we considered to be French hegemonist aspirations.

multilateral force and of detting a commitment from them against what
side, of asking to woo the Germans into a new structure through the
an intense American-French rivalry which took the form, at least on our
tions developed in Washington. This was faced with chagrin, and led to
autonomous, integrated Europe would not necessarily carry out precrib-

4

5

such a constant state of flux. Reliance on American leadership can often have the result of undermining the domestic position of those who have geared their policies to ours. One must look with sympathy at the succession of European leaders who have found themselves first criticized by their opposition for following the American lead, and then five years later being criticized again for jeopardizing the American relationship by pursuing policies that had been advocated by us previously but which we had since abandoned.

I have run through these political phases because they have to be matched with certain phases of military thought within the Alliance to understand why the nuclear problem took the dimensions that it did a few years ago, and why as a purely strategic problem it has now receded into the background.

American strategy has gone through a number of changes. During the immediate postwar period nuclear weapons were added to the existing conventional strategy simply as a more efficient explosive. In reaction to the Korean war, which broke out soon after NATO was formed, the United States adopted a policy of massive retaliation. This expressed our reluctance to be engaged again in an inconclusive traditional war in Europe, but asserted our right to intervene at times and places of our own choosing with overwhelming nuclear power.

The policy of massive retaliation has had such massive critique that I

The policy of massive retaliation has had such massive critique that I
with overwhelming nuclear power.

but asserted our right to intervene at times and places of our own choosing
refraince to be ended again in an inconclusive traditional war in Europe,
United States adopted a policy of massive retaliation. This expressed our
to the Korean war, which broke out soon after NATO was formed, the
conventional strategy simply as a more efficient explosive. In reaction
to the immediate boatman period nuclear weapons were added to the existing
American strategy has done through a number of changes. During
into the background.

Years ago, and why as a merely strategic problem it has now receded
understand why the nuclear problem took the dimensions that it did a few
matched with certain phrases of military thought within the Alliance to
I have run through these political phrases because they have to be
we had once abandoned.

by basing policies that had been advocated by us previously but which
later proved criticized again for jeopardizing the American relationship
by their opposition to following the American led, and then five less
ceasing of European leaders who have found themselves that criticized
desired their policies to end. One must look with ambivalence at the suc-
cess the result of undermining the domestic position of those who have
such a constant state of flux. Reliance on American leadership can often

9

[A]

6

[N]

will not repeat the standard strategic arguments of the 1950's; instead
I will point out an anomaly that existed throughout the 1950's. The
United States asserted that its nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter
aggression every place in the world except the most important, namely,
Europe. Everywhere else we were going to resist at places of our own
choosing. In Europe we were going to resist on the ground. In no
other place in the world did we try to set up a trip wire, except in
Korea where it was a legacy of the Korean war. In Europe we stationed
four divisions.

This produced a misunderstanding which has been at the root of
much of NATO's strategic debate. The Europeans wanted American
divisions on the continent, not because they wanted to defend Europe
locally but because their history had taught them that the decision to
go to war does not depend only on a legal commitment, but also on more
tangible guarantees. Every European country in the last hundred years
has been forced to dissociate itself, or has felt compelled to dissociate
itself, from some ally in a crisis. The reason why American divisions
were stationed in Europe was expressed by Marshal Foch in 1914. When
asked how many British soldiers he wanted, he is reputed to have said in
effect, "Give me one and I'll make sure that he gets killed on the first day
of the war." Thus, the European incentive for getting American troops to
the continent was to remove the president's choice. They wanted to make

the continent was to remove the president's choice. They wanted to make
of the war." Thus, the European incentive for deterring American troops to
effect, "Give me one and I'll make one sure that he'd be killed on the first day
sated how many British soldiers he wanted, he is reputed to have said in
were stationed in Europe was expressed by Marshallumo in 1914. When
itself, from some way in a crisis. The reason why American divisions
has been forced to disassociate itself, or has felt compelled to disassociate
sufficiently guarantees. Every European country in the last hundred years
do to war does not depend on or a legal commitment, but also on more
locally put because their history had taught them that the decision to
divisions on the continent, not because they wanted to defend Europe
much of NATO's strategic position. The Europeans wanted American
This produced a misunderstanding which has been at the root of
tour divisions.

Korea where it was a fiefdom of the Korean war. In Europe we stationed
other place in the world did we try to set up a tribune, except in
chocaid. In Europe we were going to resist on the ground. In no
Europe. Everywhere else we were going to resist at places of our own
addression every place in the world except the most important, namely,
United States asserted that its nuclear strategy was sufficient to deter
I will point out an anomaly that existed throughout the 1950's. The
will not repress the standard strategic arguments of the 1950's: instead

9

[x]

7

[Y]

sure that any attack on Europe would be as much a Soviet-American war
as they could possibly make it.

On the other hand as soon as the United States had four divisions on
the continent, we began to elaborate a strategy -- even at the height of
the doctrine of massive retaliation -- for some degree of local defense.
The misunderstandings between us and the Europeans were due to the fact
that our incentives were entirely different. We thought that our divisions
would be an incentive to the Europeans to create large forces of their own.
The European incentive was precisely the opposite: to keep the propor-
tion of our troops and/ as high as possible so that American forces
would be automatically involved in a Soviet attack.

theirs

In the 1950's this tension between American and European strategic
conceptions was not so apparent, because it was assumed that the defense
of the United States was so integrally coupled with the defense of Europe
that even on the level of pure American self-interest the choice would be
more or less automatic. As long as American bomber and missile bases
were located in Europe, whether or not they were necessary, it could be
argued that the United States could not afford to have its strategic forces
overrun. In this situation the fact / plans of NATO were essentially
American, and NATO consultation was really a discussion of the level of
European contributions to American conceptions, bearable to the Europeans,
especially, as a military attack seemed a real possibility.

that defense
was

But in the late 1950's American strategic thinkers, perhaps a little
prematurely, developed theories, first of limited war, and then of stra-

brawmmedly, developed theories, that of limited war, and then of air- especially as a military attack seemed a real possibility.

European contributions to American concepts, desirable to the Europeans, American, and NATO. consultation was really a discussion of the level of overarm. In this situation the fact, plane of NATO were essentially that of the United States could not afford to have its a strategic forces were located in Europe, whether or not they were necessarily, it could be more or less automatic. As long as American power and vital pass that even on the level of pure American self-interest the choice would be of the United States was so integrally coupled with the defense of Europe's concepts was not so apparent, because it was assumed that the defense would be automatically involved in a Soviet attack.

tion of our troops and, so high as feasible so that American forces there

The European incentive was clearly the obstacle: to keep the proper- would be an incentive to the Europeans to create large forces of their own, that our incentives were entirely different. We thought that our divisional The number of divisions between us and the Europeans were due to the fact of the doctrine of massive retaliation -- for some degree of local defense, the continent, we begun to elaborate a strategy -- even at the height of On the other hand as soon as the United States had four divisions on so they could possibly make it.

7

[A]

8

tergic war, emphasizing the differences between first and second-strike capabilities and the advantages of central command and control. These theories stressed the necessity for a maximum number of options and for discriminating targeting in the event of nuclear war. Concurrently there developed various theories of arms control, which essentially depended on an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. In these negotiations our European allies, with the possible exception of Great Britain, were really objects and not prime participants.

All of this culminated in the strategic doctrine of the Kennedy administration, which while intellectually rigorous, effectively produced what came to be known as the nuclear problem. This phase in American strategic thought was based on a number of assumptions.

First, the doctrine of flexible response in case of general nuclear war was emphasized. "Flexible response," however, was defined in many ways. At one stage it meant that one would attempt to conduit a general nuclear war according to traditional maxims of military operations and aim for military victory. More recently, it has meant that we would engage in discriminating targeting --sparing the civilian population where possible -- without, however, being able to achieve a military victory.

The second essential attribute of the doctrine of flexible response was central command and control of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance.

9

With this as a postulate, obviously the United States became hostile to
the creation of the national nuclear forces by our allies, most
to the French but really also the British nuclear forces. Every argument
which has been made against the French force applied with equal cogency
to the British force.

Third, we downgraded the significance of tactical nuclear weapons
which had been one of the chief elements of the strategy of the 1950's.
But in order to quiet European complaints about the theoretical downgrad-
ing, we increased the number of such weapons on the continent. So the
stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons increased while the doctrine for
using them became more and more amorphous.

Finally, we urged that conventional forces had to be built up in order
to create additional options.

I will not go into these policies on a purely military ground, but I want
to stress that they were bound to produce what is today called the nuclear
problem. Whatever the ambiguity about the definition of flexible response,
whatever the target system that one was going to attack, there are at least
two key elements that stand out. First, the very qualities that make central
command control and flexible response desirable for Americans make it
questionable for our allies. The key element of the doctrine of flexible
response is that the President shall have freedom of decision in the circum-
stances of general nuclear war to adapt his response to the contingencies as

assures of general nuclear war to adopt his reasonableness to the contingencies as reasonable is that the President shall have freedom of decision in the circum-
dمينable for our allies. The key element of the doctrine of flexible command control and flexible response desirable for Americans make it
the two key elements that stand out. First, the very qualities that make central
whatever the target system that one was going to attack, there are at least
problems. Whatever the ambiguity about the definition of flexible response,
to arise that they were bound to produce what is today called the nuclear
I will not do into these policies on a purely military ground, but I want
to create additional options.

Finally, we asked that conventional forces had to be built up in order
using them because more and more snookerman.

Stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons increased while the doctrine for
ind, we increased the number of such weapons on the continent. So the
But in order to quiet European complaints about the theoretical downlead-
which had been one of the chief elements of the strategy of the 1930's.
Third, we downgraded the significance of tactical nuclear weapons
to the British force.

which has been made against the French force applied with equal celerity
to the French but really slaved the British nuclear forces. Early argument
the creation of the national nuclear forces by our allies, most


With this as a precedent, obviously the United States become possible to

9

[4]

10

For example, in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee over the years, Secretary McNamara's estimate of American fatalities in a nuclear war has constantly mounted and has now reached the level of anywhere from 50 to 80 million fatalities. Nevertheless, he reiterates the ritualistic assertion that the nuclear guarantee to NATO has remained unimpaired. This invites skepticism. It must make some difference to a president of the United States whether he faces the kind of casualties one could expect in 1949, or 80 million dead. It is not to downgrade the reliability, the devotion to alliances, or the sturdiness of American leadership, to say that in the face of such a level of damage a president of the United States may be moved by other considerations than the urge to fulfill alliance commitments. In a way, the more the United States attempted to preserve freedom of decision, the more questions -- unanswerable questions -- it raised. The tragedy of the problem lies in the fact that these unanswerable questions are also unavoidable ones.

banae which would permit the consideration of the larger issues involved -- at which nuclear weapons would have to be used and that it would induce a need to identify the conventional build-up -- that it would raise the threshold nuclear weapons and the embassies on conventional build-up. The arguments bounded this uncertainty, as did the oscillations with respect to tactics.

The American attack on the national nuclear forces of our allies commences are also unavoidable ones.

it raised. The tragedy of the problem lies in the fact that these unaniversable serve freedom of decision, the more questions -- unaniversable questions -- finance commitments. In a way, the more the United States attempted to pre-United States may be moved by other considerations than the urge to fulfill stlessership, to ask that in the face of such a level of damage a president of the grade the reliability, the devotion to alliances, or the audacity of American countries one could expect in 1949, or 80 million dead. It is not to downference to a president of the United States whether he faces the kind of remained unimbued. This invites skepticism. It must make some dilemmas the ritmistic assertion that the nuclear guarantee to NATO has level of anywhere from 50 to 80 million fatalities. Nevertheless, he reiterates in a nuclear war has constantly mounted and has now reached the mittee over the years, Secretary McNamara's estimate of American

For example, in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee the stark contingencies of nuclear war.

could result be certain -- not even the President -- how he would react in desirable. No theoretical assurance could overcome the fact that no one automatic American guarantee which made American hegemony in the 1980's they sriae. In other words, the doctrine of flexible reasonableness removed the

10

11

[4]

lent themselves very well to debating points. It was not self-evident, for example, that the United States, being unwilling to use nuclear weapons *before* its units were defeated, would be more willing to use them *after* it had already been defeated on the ground. But it would be more willing to use nuclear weapons after it had been defeated, then in a curious way it seemed more reassuring to some Europeans to hasten that moment rather than to delay it. This was not because the Europeans liked the use of nuclear weapons but because they believed that this would remove any ambiguity in the Soviet mind.

The nuclear problem in NATO, then, was really a debate about changed political and strategic conditions and not primarily a military problem. In the 1950's American predominance was so great, the fear of Soviet attack was so overwhelming, the memory of European impotence at the end of the Second World War so recent, that American leadership was accepted. The NATO Alliance in the 1950's was not an alliance in any traditional sense and was not really conducted by the maxims of foreign policy. It was more akin to the operations of a domestic system, where European leaders established their domestic position by proving that they had great influence in Washington and where lobbying in Washington was really more crucial than what had in the past been known as diplomacy. But in the 1960's, as Europe regained some strength, as the fear of Soviet attack began to recede, and as the United States tended to complicate the situation by intellectually

[N]

respectable but politically ineffective arguments, several of the latent problems of the Alliance became apparent,

One of these problems, characteristic of all alliances, has its roots
in the different self-interest of the various members, produced by the very
notions of sovereignty. One of the standard American responses to Euro-
pean queries about what America might do in case of conflict is to say that
Germany is as important to us as Alaska and can therefore count on us,
situation of Alaska. However, Alaska is not asked to participate in the
strategy for its defense. It is perfectly conceivable that the United States
might give up Alaska and hope to recover it in a peace settlement. But it
is not possible to get the government of the Federal Republic to acquiesce
in a strategy which they will identify with the destruction of their society,
in the hope than an eventual peace settlement will restore the situation.
Therefore, there are pressures within the Alliance which cannot be assessed
on purely military grounds or by acting as if the Alliance were one super-
state. Deployment in the Alliance has always had a symbolic significance,
and the symbolic significance is overlooked at the risk of Allied cohesion.

Secondly, the range of modern weapons has created an entirely unprece-
dented situation. In the past, a country threatened with attack had the choice
of resistance or surrender; it could not resist by shifting the risks of devasta-
tion to some other country. In 1914, Belgium could not insist that it would

tion to some other country. In 1914, Belgium could not resist that it would
of resistance or amender; it could not resist by shifting the risks of devesta-
dented situation. In the best, a country threatened with attack had the choice
Secondly, the range of modern weapons has created an entirely unbreake-

and the hydraulic significance is overlooked at the risk of Villedieu cession.
state. Deployment in the Alliance has always had a hydraulic significance,
on briefly military grounds or by acting as if the Alliance were one under-
Therefore, there are breaches within the Alliance which cannot be assessed
in the hope than an eventual peace settlement will restore the situation.
in a strategy which they will identify with the destruction of their society,
if not possible to get the government of the Federal Republic to seduce
might give up Alsace and probe to recover it in a peace settlement. But it
strategically for its defence. It is perfectly conceivable that the United States
Alsace-Lorraine would. However, Alsace is not asked to participate in the
Germany is as important to us as Alsace and can therefore count on me,
besides queries about what America might do in case of conflict in order that
notions of sovereignty. One of the standard American reasons to Euro-
in the different self-interest of the various members, produced by the very
One of these problems, characteristic of all alliances, has its roots
in the Alliance becomes apparent,
respectable but politically ineffective arguments, several of the latent prop-

13

[x]

13

fight only if Britain were guaranteed equal devastation. Today, however, the possibility exists of shifting the theater of operations to the territory of some other ally. From the American point of view, a war confined to Europe is relatively more tolerable than a general nuclear exchange. From the point of view of some European countries, however, a war fought over their heads, in which the United States and the Soviet Union are devastated but Europe is spared, may be more attractive than some of the options of flexible response.

Then there is the subsidiary argument about what best produces deterrence. This is complicated by the fact that deterrence is essentially a psychological problem. What deters depends on the calculations of the aggressor, not on the calculations of the defender. A threat which is intended as a bluff but which is taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a threat intended seriously but taken as a bluff. In a situation of constantly changing technology, there is infinite debate -- even within each government -- as to what constitutes deterrence. The gap between experts and policy makers within each government is so enormous that it is very difficult to achieve a consensus. This difficulty on the domestic level is compounded in relations with allies.

Third, the enormity of the risks of the nuclear age has created a novel situation. In the past, a country faced with the problem of honoring an alliance could more often than not decide that not honoring it would involve consequences more serious than honoring it, either in terms of international reputatation or in terms of having to fight later under less advantageous

["reputation or in terms of having to fight later under less advantageous\nconsequences more serious than honoring it, either in terms of international\nalliance could more often than not decide that not honoring it would involve\nsituation. In the past, a country faced with the problem of honoring an\nalliance could more often than not decide that not

14

circumstances. Confronted, however, with what must amount to the destruption of the society as one now conceives it, it is difficult to demonstrate that one will have to fight under more disadvantageous circumstances later on. With society extinguished the loss of international reputation may not weigh so heavily.

As a result, with respect to a whole range of issues, the nuclear guarantee is no longer as credible as it was before; a consideration which tends to be balanced, however, by a similar restraint on the other side. Those issues with respect to which the nuclear guarantee remains credible, however, may in the minds of one's allies be so overwhelmingly clear that they do not need to be reinforced by a formal commitment. In other words, the United States will defend its allies, not because it has a treaty that obliges it to do so, but because these allies are so important to it that it has no choice except to defend them. From this point of view President DeGaulle's views are perfectly rational. Far from doubting the American commitment to the defense of Europe, he may feel that in fundamental issues of national survival the United States has no choice except to support France. On this basis, he can conduct a policy which in the past would be close to neutralism.

the difficulty was a lack of understanding of the appeal of our strategic
misuse of the central point. We have sent briefing teams all over Europe as it
efforts in the last three or four years to "solve" the nuclear problem have
many of the problems of nuclear control. For this reason, many of our
issues, and its ambiguity with respect to marginal issues, that produces

Curiously enough it is the tightness of the alliance with respect to fundamental
a policy which in the past would be close to neutralism.

States has no choice except to support France. On this point, he can conduct
Europe, he may feel that in fundamental issues of national survival the United
fluently rational. Far from coupling the American commitment to the defense of
defend them. From this point of view President DeGalle's views are per-
cuse these issues are so important to it that it has no choice except to
defend its allies, not because it has a treaty that obliges it to do so, but be-
reinforced by a formal commitment. In other words, the United States will
minds of one's allies be so overwhelmingly clear that they do not need to be
respect to which the nuclear guarantee remains credible, however, may in the
sanced, however, by a similar restraint on the other side. Those issues with
is no longer as credible as it was before: a consideration which tends to be bal-
As a result, with respect to a whole range of issues, the nuclear guarantee
so heavily.

With society extinguished the loss of international reputation may not weigh
that one will have to fight under more disadvantageous circumstances later on.
truction of the society as one now conceives it, it is difficult to demonstrate
circumstances. Controunced, however, with what must amount to the des-

14

15

thought. We have tended to identify unity of the Alliance with command arrangements. We have seen in the integrated command a guarantee of allied cohesiveness, while, in fact, in the 1950's the integrated command was a symbol of allied cohesiveness, not a cause of it. An American commander in Europe was important to the Europeans because he represented an additional direct channel to the President with a vested interest to go to war in case of attack. But the legal situation in these integrated commands was far from automatic. All this diverted attention from what is the main problem in the Alliance, namely, whether it is possible to get comparable conceptions of national interest to an essentially technical problem of how one should go to war. The period of diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the war was given next to no attention, while the military command for the conduct of military operations received central attention.

Secondly, such discussions focused attention on something which was inherently misleading. None of the political leaders engaged in these discussions, no matter how serious or how dedicated, really could be sure that they knew what they would do when a general nuclear war occurred. I can imagine no issue in which assertions of governments as to what they will do are less reliable than the conduct of nuclear operations. It led to discussions as to how one would enter a nuclear war, perhaps even by majority vote as if it were conceivable than an American president, having decided that a particular issue was not worthy of a nuclear war, would let himself be voted into it by a majority of his allies.

that a particular name was not worthier of a nuclear war, perfumes even by majority
discussions so to how one would enter a nuclear war, perfumes even by majority,
do are less refutable than the conduct of nuclear operations. If led to
imagine no issue in which assertions of government so to what they will
they knew what they would do when a general nuclear war occurred. I can
alone, no matter how serious or how dedicated, really could be sure that
perently miesesquid. None of the political leaders embedded in these discus-
cs secondly, such discussions focused attention on something which was in-
cident to military operations received central attention.

war was given next to no attention, while the military command for the
one should do to war. The period of diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the
conventions of national interest to an essentially technical problem of how
problem in the Alliance, namely, whether it is possible to get comparable
was far from automatic. All this diverted attention from what is the main
war in case of attack. But the legal situation in these integrated commands
additional direct channel to the President with a vested interest to do so
der in Europe was important to the European because he represented an
was a symbol of stilled coexistence, not a cause of it. An American comman-
stilled coexistence, while, in fact, in the 1960's the integrated command
arrangers. We have seen in the integrated command a guarantee of
thought. We have tended to identify mainly of the Alliance with command

16

A

16

The fact is that we are now in a new political situation -- in which traditional maxims concerning the relations of states with each other become operative affairs. Three years ago I would have predicted an autonomous Europe and considered that desirable. Today, under the impact of French detente policy, and reawakened German interest in the national problem, West European unity has become much less probable. Also in international affairs the conditions of the 1950's are reversed; the United States is now engaged in extra-European enterprises and is asking for support from its European allies -- a support which is no more probable than was American support for European colonial efforts in the 1950's. In addition, the Soviet threat has taken on a different significance, and there are vague notions of all-European settlements whose lack of precision does not prevent them from exploding the old notions of a tight Atlantic community.

One of our problems is that we have a tendency to deal with this new scenario in the terms of the 1950's. Most of the American NATO experts identify a vital Atlantic community with the vision of the 1950's and there is a constant proclamation of American leadership without any very clear notion about what this American leadership would do if it were actually exercised.

So the problem that we face now is to create a structure which makes it possible to articulate close common interests but does not freeze everything to the attainment of consensus. I do not think it is primarily an organizational

17

Finally, no process of consultation can avoid real differences in per-
spective or interest, It can only make them explicit. We have to find a
way by which countries with comparable interests can talk and get away
from the notion that unless everybody talks, nobody can talk. We must try
to identify those problems on which some consensus exists and get the
countries that are willing to participate into workable arrangements. I
do not think the NATO council in its present form can handle the entire
process of political consultation.

which does not make every extra-Europeans effort incorrect. But I do not
States will not let European authorities for its involvements outside Europe,
some areas in which cooperation is desirable. For example, the United
political future, with some areas in which no agreement is possible and
cooperation that is desirable will depend on some common conception of a
Let me conclude simply by asking that it seems to me that the kind of
process of political consultation

do not think the NATO council in its present form can handle the entire
countries that are willing to participate into workable arrangements. I
to identify those problems on which some common consensus exists and get the
from the notion that unless everybody talks, nobody can talk. We must try
what a dy which countries with comparable interests can talk and get away
a positive or interest. It can only make them explicit. We have to find a
Finally, no process of consultation can avoid real differences in per-
but also dy decision.

our government indicates that government operates not only by consultation
inherent limits to the process of consultation. The domestic experience of
participation in the nuclear test-ban treaty. On the other hand, there are
more truly earlier, and there should have been a greater degree of settled
been better, for example, if we had discussed the noncollaboration treaty
process of consultation. On one level I agree with this. It would have
dispute. One of the remedies that is often undesired is to increase the

17

[N]

18

think we can create a structure in which all allies will act uniformly in
every part of the world at every moment. On the other hand, in some
areas such as East-West relations, a greater degree of consensus is
necessary if the alliance is not to continue to suffer the process of attrition.

necessary if the alliance is not to continue to suffer the process of attrition,
area such as East-West relations, a greater degree of consensus is
every part of the world at every moment. On the other hand, in some
to think we can create a structure in which all allies will act uniformly in

18

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ANN ARBOR

48104

April 16, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

You will recall that the plan for our Symposium on the Atlantic World, in which you participated so ably last September, included the publication of a volume based upon the papers and presentations at that Symposium. I shall be at work on the editing of that volume during the next several months, and I hope to have it assembled in the fall, for probable publication next spring by the University of Michigan Press.

As we arranged in advance, your presentation was taped, and I now enclose a slightly edited version of the typescript. It was garbled at a few points, but I think you will find it a reasonably accurate reproduction of your remarks, with only a few gaps and marginal queries. I shall be very grateful to have you edit and revise it in any manner you may wish, and send it back to me for inclusion in the book. I enclose also the transcript, quite rough, of the discussion that followed your presentation, with the thought that it might contain some points that you would want to incorporate into your paper.

I think that preparation of your paper for publication will not be a major undertaking for you, and I shall appreciate your giving attention to it as promptly as possible. If you can have the manuscript in my hands not later than June 1, it will greatly facilitate my work. I think we have the makings of an excellent and very timely volume.

Best regards.

MAY 6 - 1968

120 SW 15th Street
Boca Raton, Florida 33432

May 1, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am sure that after Governor Rockefeller's announcement yesterday you are going to be extremely busy explaining his views to the country. I must say I am anxious to hear them.

I thought this was a very interesting paper and it seems to have been taken off the tape quite well. A few questions.

On pp. 6 and 7, the last 4 lines on 6 and the top of 7: It was not clear to me what was meant by the "existing strategy," particularly when juxtaposed with "this strategy" on the next page. Are they the same strategy? If so, weren't the testimonies in the late 1940's?

P. 22, last paragraph: I was hoping that in your conclusion you would give some indication of what kind of cooperation, consultation, etc. might be possible. Therefore, I lifted a few sentences from the discussion and inserted them here, as you can see. However, it seems to me that one important question is still unanswered (I think someone brought it up in the discussion)--What do we do now about the nuclear problem? By not mentioning it further, you left me with the impression that De Gaulle's method of just assuming U.S. protection without any elaborate machinery or consultation is the answer. Perhaps that is what you meant.

McCarthy is attempting to blossom down here, but this is an extremely Republican area, although I doubt that Rockefeller would have very much chance of success. Things are looking up, however, We have now met two other people who read the New Republic.

[y]

Page 1, NATO AND THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The question of nuclear control in its military sense,
which agitated the Alliance so much two or three years ago,
is really pretty much a dead issue, as are some of the
problems of central command and control which seemed so
paramount in our strategic thinking. In fact we can now
see that the nuclear problem was a catalyst for the more
fundamental alliance difficulties, that have existed and exist
today. Therefore, I should like to consider the interrelation-
ship between political developments in Europe and the United
States and the strategic problem, particularly in the nuclear
field.

Let me begin by describing several phases of the political
evolution in the Atlantic relationship, of which there are
essentially three. In the period of acute challenge, roughly
from 1948 to 1960, the Alliance was based on a number of
assumptions: 1) that the solidarity of the Allies against
a common threat should override all other considerations;
2) that the European continent was

Insert for p. 22:

So the problem that we face now is to create a structure
which makes it possible to articulate close common interests
but does not freeze everything to the attainment of consensus.
I do not think it is primarily an organizational question.
One of the remedies that is often suggested is to increase
the ~~process of consultation.~~ process of consultation. On one level I agree
with this. It would have been better, for example, if we
had discussed the nonproliferation treaty more fully, earlier,
and there should have been a greater degree of allied partici-
pation in the nuclear test-ban treaty. On the other hand,
there are inherent limits to the process of consultation.
The domestic experience of our government indicates that
government operates not only by consultation but also by
decision. Finally, no process of consultation can avoid
real differences in perspective or interest. It can only
make them explicit. We have to find a way by which countries
with comparable interests can talk and get away from the
notion that unless everybody talks, nobody can talk. We
must try to identify those problems on which some consensus
exists and get the countries that are willing to participate
into workable arrangements. I do not think the NATO council
in its present form can handle the entire process of political
consultation.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

April 16, 1968

Dear Henry:

Best regards.