The Secretary
of State

Speech

April 8, 1976

New York City

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

THE LAW OF THE SEA:
A TEST OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Foreign Policy Association, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the U.N. Association of the U.S.A.

I want to speak to you today about one of the most important international negotiations that has ever taken place—the global conference now underway here in New York on the Law of the Sea. Last summer [on August 11] in Montreal I set forth a comprehensive U.S. program to help bring matters at this year's conference to a rapid and successful conclusion. Today I will offer new proposals which address the remaining important issues before us, so that this great negotiation may lead to a final result this year.

For we live in an age when the accelerating forces of modern life—technological, economic, social, and political—are leading the peoples of the world into unprecedented and interrelated areas of human activity. New prospects are opening before us—fraught with potential for international contention but filled as well with the hope of unparalleled human advancement.

The principal problems which all nations face today are truly global in nature. They transcend geographic and political boundaries. Their complexity eludes the conventional solutions of the past, and their pace outstrips the measured processes of traditional diplomacy. There is the imperative of peace—the familiar but vastly more urgent requirements of maintaining global stability, resolving conflicts, easing tensions; these issues dominate the agenda of relations between East and

West. And there are the new challenges of the world's economy and of cooperative solutions to such international problems as food, energy, population, trade, and the environment. These are the agenda of the modern period, particularly in the evolving relationship between the developed and the developing nations.

In an international order composed of sovereign states, the precondition of effective policy is security. But security, while essential, is not enough. The American people will never be satisfied with a world whose stability depends on a balance of terror constantly contested.

Therefore, side by side with seeking to maintain the security of free countries, the United States has striven to build a new world based on cooperation. We are convinced that our common progress requires nations to acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community. Therefore at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September of last year we made a major effort to project our vision of a more positive future. We sought to mobilize collaboration on a global scale on many current issues of economic development. We were gratified by the response to our initiatives. We are prepared to accelerate our effort.

Virtually all major elements of this new age of interdependence are involved in one of the great issues of our time—the question of mankind's use of the oceans. In no area are the challenges more complex or the stakes higher. No other common effort holds so much positive hope for the future relationship between rich nations and poor over the last quarter of this century and beyond.

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Today I want to speak to you about the urgency of this issue. The Law of the Sea negotiations now are at a critical stage. There have been many successes, but they will prove stillborn unless all the remaining issues are settled soon. The United States believes that if the present session does not complete its work, another—and final—session should be assembled this summer. If the negotiations are not completed this year the world will have lost its best chance to achieve a treaty in this generation.

I want to focus today upon the most important problems remaining before the conference to speed their solution. I shall set forth proposals which in our view can serve as the basis for a widely accepted treaty.

## The Importance of the Oceans

Most issues in international affairs impinge on our consciousness in the form of crisis; but many of the most important problems which crucially affect our future come to us far less dramatically. The world is undergoing fundamental economic, technological, and social transformations which do not dominate the daily headlines. Some of them are even more profound in their consequences than most immediate political crises. In no area is this more true than the oceans, a realm which covers 70 percent of the Earth's surface.

Freedom of the seas remains basic to the security and well-being of most nations. The sea-borne commerce of the globe is expected to quadruple within a few decades. The reliance of the world's people upon the seas to carry food and energy is increasing. Modern technology has enabled industries to sweep the seas for fish and to probe the ocean's floor for vital minerals and resources. Mankind's growing dependence on the seas, and the burgeoning world population along their shores, are already burdening the ecology of the oceans—a development of potentially catastrophic significance for the oceans are the very source of life as we know it, the characteristic distinguishing our world from all other planets.

These developments have brought with them a vast array of competitive practices and claims, which—unless they are harmonized—threaten an era of unrestrained commercial rivalry, mounting political turmoil, and eventually military conflict. We stand in danger of repeating, with respect to the oceans, the bitter rivalries that have produced endless conflict on land.

A cooperative international regime to govern the use of the oceans and their resources is, therefore, an urgent necessity. It is, as well, an unprecedented opportunity for the nations of the world to devise the first truly global solution to a global problem.

And the opportunity is all the greater because we start with a clean slate.

Thus the multilateral effort to agree upon a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea has implications beyond the technical problems of the use of the oceans. It touches upon basic issues underlying the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe. The current negotiation is a milestone in the struggle to submit man's endeavors to the constraints of international law. Let us understand more precisely what is at stake:

In a world of growing scarcity, the oceans hold untapped riches of minerals and energy. For example, it is estimated that 40 percent of the world's petroleum and virtually inexhaustible supplies of minerals lie beneath the sea. Our economic growth and technological progress will be greatly affected by the uses made of these resources.

* In a world where the growth of population threatens to overwhelm the Earth's capacity to produce food, the fish of the seas are an increasingly precious—and endangered—source of protein. The well-being, and indeed the very survival, of future generations may well depend upon whether mankind can halt the present wanton depletion of this vast storehouse of nutrition.

* In a world in which the health of the planet our children will inherit depends upon decisions we make today, the environmental integrity of the oceans—which affects the quality of life everywhere—is vital.

* And in a world still buffeted by national conflicts, economic confrontation, and political strife the free and fair use of the oceans is crucial to future peace and progress.

The oceans are not merely the repository of wealth and promise; they are, as well, the last completely untamed frontier of our planet. As such, their potential—for achievement or for strife—is vast. In the 19th century the Industrial Revolution gave birth to improved communications, technological innovations, and new forms of business organization which immeasurably expanded man's capacity to exploit the frontiers and territories of the entire globe. In less than one generation one-fifth of the land area of the planet and one-tenth of its inhabitants were gathered into the domain of imperial powers in an unrestrained scramble for colonies. The costs—in affront to human dignity, in material waste and deprivation, and in military conflict and political turbulence—haunt us still.

Like the non-Western lands of a century before, today it is the oceans which suddenly are accessible to new technology and alluring to explo-

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ration. Their promise may be even greater than the untapped lands of the century past. So too is their potential for conflict. The decision will be ours. The international community now stands at the threshold of what can easily turn into a new period of unheralded competitive activity. It is our contention that the nations of the world cannot afford to indulge in another round of unrestrained struggle for the wealth of our planet when the globe is already burdened by ideological strife and thermonuclear weapons.

The United States could survive such competition better than other nations; and should it be necessary we are prepared to defend our interests. Indeed we could gain a great deal unilaterally in the near term. But we would do so in an environment of constant and mounting conflict. All nations, including our own, ultimately would lose under such unpredictable and dangerous conditions.

That is not the kind of world we want to see. Our preference is to help build a rational and cooperative structure of international conduct to usher in a time of peace and progress for all peoples. We see the oceans as a trust which this generation holds—not only for all mankind but for future generations as well.

The legacy of history makes this a difficult task. For centuries the songs and legends of peoples everywhere have seen the oceans as the very symbol of escape from boundaries, convention, and restraint. The oceans have beckoned mankind to rewards of wealth and power which awaited those brave and imaginative enough to master the forces of nature.

In the modern era the international law of the sea has been dominated by a simple but fundamental principle—freedom of the seas. Beyond a narrow belt of territorial waters off the shores of coastal states, it has long been established and universally accepted that the seas were free to all for fishing and navigation.

Today the simple rules of the past are challenged. Pressure on available food, fuel, and other resources has heightened awareness of the ocean's potential. The reach of technology and modern communications have tempted nations to seek to exercise control over ocean areas to a degree unimagined in the past. Thus coastal states have begun to assert jurisdictional claims far out to sea—claims which unavoidably conflict with the established law and with the practices of others and which have brought a pattern of almost constant international conflict. Off the shores of nearly every continent, forces of coastal states challenge foreign fishing vessels: the "Cod War" between Iceland and Great Britain; tuna boat seizures off

South America; Soviet trawling off New England—these are but some examples.

It is evident that there is no alternative to chaos but a new global regime defining an agreed set of rules and procedures. The problem of the oceans is inherently international. No unilateral or national solution is likely to prevail without continual conflict. The Law of the Sea Conference presents the nations of the world with their choice and their opportunity. Failure to agree is certain to bring further, more intense confrontation as the nations of the world—now numbering some 150—go all out to extend unilateral claims.

## The Law of the Sea Conference

These are the reasons why the international community has engaged itself in a concentrated effort to devise rules to govern the domain of the oceans. Substantive negotiations on a Law of the Sea treaty began in 1974 in Caracas; a second session was held in Geneva last year. Now, here in New York, work is underway aimed at concluding a treaty before this year is out.

It is no exaggeration to say that this is one of the most significant negotiations in diplomatic history. The United States approaches this negotiation with conviction that we simply cannot afford to fail.

## Progress to Date

The issues before the Law of the Sea Conference cover virtually every area and aspect of man's uses of the seas—from the coastline to the farthest deep seabed. Like the oceans themselves, these various issues are interrelated parts of a single entity. Without agreement on all the issues, agreement on any will be empty for nations will not accept a partial solution—all the less so as some of the concessions that have been made were based on the expectation of progress on the issues which are not yet solved.

Significant progress has been made on many key problems. Most prominent among them are:

First, the extent of the territorial seas and the related issue of free transit through straits. The conference has already reached widespread agreement on extending the territorial sea—the area where a nation exercises full sovereignty—to 12 miles. Even more importantly there is substantial agreement on guaranteed unimpeded transit through and over straits used for international navigation. This is of crucial importance for it means that the straits whose use is most vital to international commerce and global security—such as the Straits of Gibraltar and Malacca—will remain open to international sea and air transit. This is a prin-

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ciple to which the United States attaches the
utmost importance.

Second, the degree of control that a coastal
state can exercise in the adjacent offshore area
beyond its territorial waters. This is the so-called
"economic zone," in which lie some of the world's
most important fishing grounds as well as major
deposits of oil, gas, and minerals. Growing inter-
national practice has made it clear that in the
absence of an international treaty, coastal nations
would eventually attempt to establish the extent of
their own zone and determine for themselves what
activities-national and international-could be
carried out there. These would be areas through
which most of the world's shipping moves and
which is, as well, the richest ground for economic
exploitation. The complexities and confrontations
which would result from such an approach are ob-
vious.

Therefore we are gratified that the conference
is ready to settle upon a 200-mile economic zone.
This will permit coastal state control over some
activities while maintaining vital and traditional
international freedoms. The coastal states will
control fisheries, mineral, and other resource ac-
tivities. At the same time freedom of navigation
and other freedoms of the international com-
munity must be retained; in this sense the eco-
nomic zone remains part of the high seas. In
addition the treaty must protect certain inter-
national interests, such as insuring adequate food
supply, conserving highly migratory species, and
accommodating the concerns of states-including
the landlocked-that otherwise would derive little
benefit from the economic zone.

Third, the rights of coastal states and the
international community over continental margin
resources where the margin extends beyond 200
miles. The continental margin is the natural pro-
longation of the continental land mass under the
oceans. The question is: Who shall have the right to
extract seabed resources in this region and who
shall share in the benefits of such exploitation? We
seek a solution which will meet the international
community's interest in the area beyond 200 miles
and still take into account the desire of coastal
states with broad margins to exploit their margin
resources beyond the proposed economic zone.
The conference has before it a reasonable proposal
for agreement on this question. In general the coast-
tal states would have jurisdiction over continental
margin resources beyond 200 miles to a limit with
a precise definition.

Under the system now being negotiated the
treaty would also provide for the coastal states
to share with the international community a speci-
fied percentage of the value of mineral resources ex-

ploited in that area for the benefit of the develop-
ing countries, including the landlocked countries.
The coastal state would pay a royalty based upon
the value of production at the wellhead in accord-
ance with a formula fixed in the treaty; the money
would then be distributed by an international au-
thority under a formula still being negotiated.

Fourth, the protection of the marine environ-
ment. Effective international measures to protect
the oceans from pollution is vital to the
health-indeed to the very survival-of our planet.
The Law of the Sea treaty will deal with all aspects
of marine pollution. On the critical issue of pol-
lution caused by seagoing vessels, we anticipate
that the conference will provide for effective
enforcement of environmental protection regula-
tions. We must now put forth our best efforts to
reach satisfactory agreement on the enforcement
of regulations covering all the outstanding issues
concerning the protection of the marine environ-
ment.

Progress on these key issues has been heart-
ening. But we must reach agreement on the remain-
ing issues, or else the encouraging progress made to
date will be lost and international anarchy will
threaten.

The Remaining Issues

There are three major remaining unresolved
issues.

First, ways must be found to encourage
marine scientific research for the benefit of all
mankind while at the same time protecting the le-
gitimate interests of coastal states in their 200-mile
economic zone, the area in which some 80 percent
of such research now takes place.

Second, the treaty must include provisions for
compulsory and impartial settlement of disputes in
order that differences of interpretation and incom-
patible practices can be settled peacefully.

And third, we must create an international
regime for the exploitation of resources of the
deep seabeds, those heretofore inaccessible reaches
of the seas beyond the economic zone and con-
tinental margin.

U.S. Proposals

The United States today proposes the follow-
ing package as a contribution to helping the con-
ference reach a swift and comprehensive solution
on the major remaining problems.

**Marine Scientific Research.** The health, the
safety, and the progress of the world's people may
vitally depend upon the extent of marine scientific
research; it must be fostered and not impeded. To
further marine scientific research the United States

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is prepared to agree to a reasonable balance between coastal state and international interests in marine scientific research in the economic zone. We will agree to coastal state control of scientific research which is directly related to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the economic zone. But we shall also insist that other marine scientific research not be hampered.

We recognize that this distinction is bound to raise difficult questions in practice. This is why we believe that its determination cannot be left either to the coastal state or to the state seeking to do scientific research; it must ultimately be decided by an impartial body.

For our part the United States is prepared to guarantee that coastal states receive advance notice of scientific research in the economic zone, will have the right to participate in that research, and will receive data and results of such research as well as assistance in interpreting the significance of those results.

This proposal would help resolve the differences between those who desire complete coastal state control over all marine scientific research and those who seek to maintain complete freedom for such research in the proposed economic zone.

**Dispute Settlement.** No nation could accept unilateral interpretation of a treaty of such vast scope by individual states or by an international seabed organization or any other interested party.

To promote the fair settlement of disputes involving the interpretation of the treaty, the United States proposes the establishment of an impartial dispute settlement mechanism whose findings would be binding on all signatory states. Such a mechanism would insure that all states have recourse to a legal process which would be non-political, rapid, and impartial to all. It would especially protect the rights of all states in the economic zone by resolving differences in interpretation of the treaty which might lead to serious conflict between parties. It must be responsible for assuring the proper balance between the rights of coastal states and the rights of other states which also use—and indeed often are dependent upon— the economic zones of coastal states. And its decisions must be obligatory.

Establishment of a professional, impartial, and compulsory dispute settlement mechanism is necessary to insure that the oceans will be governed by the rule of law rather than the rule of force. Unless this point is accepted many nations could not agree to the treaty, since only through such a mechanism can they be assured that their interests will be fairly protected. And agreement on this matter will make accommodation on other issues easier.

**The Deep Seabeds.** The third and the most complex and vital issue remaining before the conference is the problem of the deep seabeds.

For decades we have known that the deep seabeds contain great potential resources of nickel, manganese, cobalt, and copper—resources whose accessibility could contribute significantly to global economic growth in the future. It is only recently that the technology has been developed which can enable us to reach those deposits and extract them.

The conference has not yet approached agreement on the issue of the deep seabeds because it has confronted serious philosophical disagreements. Some have argued that commercial exploitation unrestrained by international treaty would be in the best interests of the United States. In fact this country is many years ahead of any other in the technology of deep sea mining, and we are in all respects prepared to protect our interests. If the deep seabeds are not subject to international agreement the United States can and will proceed to explore and mine on its own.

But while such a course might bring us a short-term advantage, it poses long-term dangers. Eventually any one country's technical skills are bound to be duplicated by others. A race would then begin to carve out deep sea domains for exploitation. This cannot but escalate into economic warfare, endanger the freedom of navigation, and ultimately lead to tests of strength and military confrontations. America would not be true to itself, or to its moral heritage, if it accepted a world in which might makes right—where power alone decides the clash of interests. And, from a practical standpoint, no one recognizes more clearly than American industry that investment, access, and profit can best be protected in an established and predictable environment.

On the other hand there are those who would place all the deep seabed's resources under an international authority. Such a proposal would not provide adequate incentives and guarantees for those nations whose technological achievement and entrepreneurial boldness are required if the deep seabeds are to benefit all mankind. It would give control to those who do not have the resources to undertake deep seabed mining.

Let me briefly review the specific issues before us and then set forth the proposals which we believe can form the basis for a new consensus on the deep seabeds.

**First, the decisionmaking machinery for managing the deep seabeds.** There has been considerable debate over the form and the powers of the decisionmaking machinery established under the treaty.

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The United States is prepared to accept inter-national machinery; but such machinery must be balanced, equitable, and insure that the relative economic interests of the countries with important activities in the deep seabeds be protected, even though those countries may be a numerical minority.

Second, access to the deep seabeds. The conference has been struggling with the issue of which nations, which firms, and which international authorities will have direct access to, and share in the benefits from, the developing of deep seabed resources. The United States understands the concern that the riches of the seas not be the exclusive preserve of only the most powerful and technologically advanced nations. We recognize that the world community should share in the benefits of deep seabed exploitation.

What the United States *cannot* accept is that the right of access to seabed minerals be given exclusively to an international authority or be so severely restricted as effectively to deny access to the firms of any individual nation, including our own. We are gratified to note an increasing awareness of the need to avoid such extreme positions and to move now to a genuine accommodation that would permit reasonable assurances to all states and their nationals that their access to these resources will not be denied.

Third, the effect of seabed mining on land-based producers. Land-based producers of seabed minerals are concerned that seabed production may adversely affect their national economies. This is an especially serious problem since many of these producers are poor, developing countries.

We take these concerns seriously. But at the same time it must be recognized that commercial seabed production of these metals is at least five years away. For many years thereafter seabed production will amount to only a fraction of total global production. Moreover, global metal markets are expanding and should easily be able to accommodate additional production from the seabeds without adversely affecting revenues of land-based producer countries.

## U.S. Proposals for the Deep Seabeds

The United States is prepared to make a major effort to resolve these issues equitably and to bring the Law of the Sea Conference to a swift and successful conclusion. In this spirit, the United States offers the following proposals.

First, to insure an equitable decisionmaking system, the United States continues to believe that the treaty should authorize the formation of an International Seabed Resource Authority to supervise exploration and development of the deep sea-

seabeds. The Authority would be comprised of four principal organs:

* An Assembly of all member states to give general policy guidance;

* A Council to serve as the executive, policy-level, and main decisionmaking forum setting operational and environmental rules for mining and supervising the contracts for deep seabed mining;

* A Tribunal to resolve disputes through legal processes; and

* A Secretariat to carry out the day-to-day administrative activities of the Authority.

The United States proposes that:

* The power of the Authority be carefully detailed by the treaty in order to preserve all those rights regarding the uses of the seas which fall outside the competence of the Authority and to avoid any jurisdictional overlap with other international organizations.

* The composition and structure of the Council reflect the producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with seabed mining. All nations whose vital national economic concerns are affected by decisions of the Authority must have a voice and influence in the Council commensurate with their interests.

* The proposed permanent seabed Tribunal adjudicate questions of interpretation of the treaty and of the powers of the International Authority raised by parties to the treaty or by private companies engaged in seabed mining. Without a Tribunal, unresolved contention is a certainty. Such a body will be necessary if any seabed proposal is to win wide acceptance.

Second, to insure that all nations, developed and developing, have adequate access to seabed mining sites.

* The United States proposes that the treaty should guarantee nondiscriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed resources under specified and reasonable conditions. The requirement of guaranteed access will not be met if the treaty contains arbitrary or restrictive limitations on the number of mine sites which any nation might exploit. And such restrictions are unnecessary because deep seabed mining cannot be monopolized; there are many more productive seabed mining sites than conceivably can be mined for centuries to come.

* The United States accepts that an Enterprise should be established as part of the International Seabed Resource Authority and given the

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right to exploit the deep seabeds under the same conditions as apply to all mining.

* The United States could accept, as part of an overall settlement, a system in which prime mining sites are reserved for exclusive exploitation by the Enterprise or by the developing countries direc-ly—if this approach meets with broad support. Under this system each individual contractor would propose two mine sites for exploitation. The Authority would then select one of these sites which would be mined by the Authority directly or made available to developing countries at its dis-cretion. The other site would be mined by the con-tractor on his own.

* The United States proposes that the Interna-tional Authority should supervise a system of revenue-sharing from mining activities for the use of the international community, primarily for the needs of the poorest countries. These revenues will not only advance the growth of developing coun-tries; they will provide tangible evidence that a fair share in global economic activity can be achieved by a policy of cooperation. Revenue-sharing could be based either on royalties or on a system of profit-sharing from contract mining. Such a system would give reality to the designation of the deep seabeds as the common heritage of all mankind.

* Finally the United States is prepared to make a major effort to enhance the skills and access of developing countries to advanced deep seabed mining technology in order to assist their capabili-ties in this field. For example, incentives should be established for private companies to participate in agreements to share technology and train personnel from developing countries.

Third, in response to the legitimate concerns of land-based producers of minerals found in the deep seabeds, we offer the following steps as an additional major contribution to the negotiations. tiations.

* The United States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a period fixed in the trea-ty, on production of the seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year. This would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, in-cluding copper. After this period the seabed pro-duction should be governed by overall market con-ditions.

* The United States proposes that the Inter-national Seabed Authority have the right to partici-pate in any international agreements on seabed-produced commodities in accordance with the amount of production for which it is directly

responsible. The United States is prepared to examine with flexibility the details of arrange-ments concerning the relationships between the Authority and any eventual commodity agree-ments.

* The United States proposes that some of the revenues of the International Seabed Resource Authority be used for adjustment assistance and that the World Bank, regional development banks, and other international institutions assist countries to improve their competitiveness or diversify into other kinds of production if they are seriously in-jured by production from the deep seabeds. An urgent task of the International Authority—when it is established—will be to devise an adjustment as-sistance program in collaboration with other inter-national institutions for countries which suffer economic dislocations as a result of deep seabed mining.

These proposals on the issue of deep seabed resources are offered in the spirit of cooperation and compromise that characterized our economic proposals at the Seventh Special Session and that guides our policies toward the developing nations. The United States is examining a range of com-modity problems and ways in which they might be fairly resolved. We intend to play an active role at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development next month in Nairobi and come forward with specific proposals. We look toward a constructive dialogue in the Raw Materials Commission of the Conference on International Economic Coopera-tion in Paris. And we are actively committed to producer-consumer forums to discuss individual commodities—such as the recent forum on copper.

The United States believes that the world community has before it a grave responsibility. Our country cannot delay in its efforts to develop an assured supply of critical resources through our deep seabed mining projects. We strongly prefer an international agreement to provide a stable legal environment before such development begins—one that insures that all resources are managed for the good of the global community and that all can participate. But if agreement is not reached this year it will be increasingly difficult to resist pres-sure to proceed unilaterally. An agreement on the deep seabed can turn the world's interdependence from a slogan into a reality. A sense of community which nations have striven to achieve on land for centuries could be realized in a regime for the oceans.

## Conclusion

The nations of the world now have before them a rare, if not unique, opportunity. If we can

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look beyond the pressures and the politics of today
to envision the requirements of a better tomorrow,
then we can understand the true meaning of the
task before us.

Let us pause to realize what this treaty can
mean—to this generation and to the possible reali-
zation of humanity's dream of a progressive ascent
toward justice and a good life for all peoples.

If the conference is successful mankind's
rights and responsibilities with regard to the oceans
will be clear to all.

* This will mean freedom of navigation, preserving the rights of all on the seas.

* It will mean a greater flourishing of trade and
commerce, bringing the benefits of a freer flow of
goods to consumers and producers alike.

* It will mean that the oceans—recognized as
“the source of all” since Homer’s day—can con-
tinue to enrich and support our planet’s environ-
ment.

* It will mean that there will be a compre-
hensive regime for all of the world’s oceans, em-
bracing not only territorial waters but a new
economic zone, the continental margin, and the
deep seabeds.

* It will mean the realization of the promise of scientific research in the oceans—the further probing of the mysteries of our planet to better the lives and preserve the health of all.

* It will mean that the seas' resources of nutri-
tion and raw materials can be tapped for the use of
the entire human community.

* It will mean that an arena of conflict, and
one which is becoming increasingly dangerous, will
become an area for cooperative progress.

* It will mean that the entire international
community—the developing as well as developed,
landlocked as well as coastal—will share in the uses,
the nourishment, the material resources, and the
revenues which this great treaty could provide. For
the poorer countries in particular, it will mean
revenues from the continental margin and the deep
seabeds and the opportunity to participate in deep
sea mining through an international organization.

* And, above all, it will mean the nations of
the world have proved that the challenges of the
future can be solved cooperatively; that, for

the first time, mankind has been able to surmount
traditional enmities and ambitions in the service of
a better vision.

These then, are the stakes; these are the pos-
sibilities we hold in our grasp. Will we have the
maturity and the judgment to go forward? Will we
fulfill the obligation which future historians—
without question—will assign to us? I believe we
shall. The United States is determined that we
shall. The possibility and the promise have never
been more clear. Through reason, through responsi-
bility, and by working together we shall succeed.

With hindsight it is easy to identify the
moments in history when humanity broke from
old ways and moved in new directions. But for
those living through such times, it is usually diffi-
cult to see the true significance even of epoch-
making events.

That is why the nations which are engaged in
the Law of the Sea Conference have come to a
unique moment in history. Only rarely does man-
kind comprehend the significance of change in the
world as we so clearly do today. We share a com-
mon perception of the need to contain potential
conflict, of the importance of cooperative solu-
tions to shared problems, and of the necessity to
achieve the full and fair use of the possibilities of
our planet, both material and moral.

If a second session is necessary this year to
complete the work of the conference, let us make
that session the final one. To underline the import-
ance the President attaches to these negotiations he
has asked me to lead the U.S. delegation to that
session. It is our hope that other nations will attach
similarly high importance to it and be prepared to
discuss the remaining issues before us at a decisive
political level. This should be a time for deter-
mined action—a time to avoid rhetoric and to com-
mit ourselves to decisions and a final agreement.

The United States calls upon all nations
deliberating this great treaty to summon the sense
of responsibility and urgency which history and
this task demand of us. For our part the United
States pledges itself to work tirelessly to seize this
rare chance for decisive progress on one of the
great challenges of our time.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

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-- You represent an important resource for us at a time when the American public questions as never before the need for an active and involved America -- active and involved in the world's problems, and seeking their peaceful solution with the unique genius that this republic brings to international affairs.

-- For you know, from your own experience, that this nation cannot retreat into its shell, that there is no shell which can insulate us from the world for very long.

-- So we ask you not to retire entirely from the profession which once called you, but to help us build among the American people the kind of national consensus without which there can be no coherent foreign policy.

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-- Thomas Paine chided his countrymen some 200 years ago, saying that "those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undertake the fatigue of supporting it."

-- Each of you, and each member of today's Foreign Service knows too well the burden of that fatigue, because you have borne not only your own share but, in a sense, that of your countrymen.

-- You know better than most the satisfaction, the effort -- and sometimes the anguish -- which goes with being part of a disciplined service -- discipline exercised not for its own sake, but for the larger purpose of protecting and advancing American interests in the world.

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-- When I became Secretary of State, I recall saying that I believed that working together we could prove to the American people that the Foreign Service and the Department of State could produce the best work in town. And we have done so.

-- We have produced a situation in which the Department has regained its preeminent place in the foreign policy process, vis-a-vis other parts of this government, the congress, and the American public. The Department of State is now at the center of the policy-making process -- not because an organization chart indicated that it should be, but because its quality demonstrated that it must be.

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— Today, I believe we have, in short, the Foreign
Service which was intended by the drafters of the Rogers
Act: A lean and hard-working Service, which in fact as
well as in theory leads the foreign policy process in this
government.

-- To all of you who lived and worked through the
postwar period, when our new world role created new
institutions of policy -- institutions which often overshadowed
the Department -- I think there is some satisfaction to
be taken from the state of the State Department today.

-- At this point I will stray from my prepared text
to say that we could not have done this without the
energetic contributions of the career service; the text

prepared by my staff would have me take all the credit,
but I cannot in good conscience do so.

-- Livy Merchant and Foy Kohler are two of the
great virtuosi of the postwar era in American foreign
policy. They were major participants in what may someday
be looked upon as the most vibrant and creative period for
the United States in the world: along with their contemporaries
they forged the Atlantic Alliance, carried out the Marshall
Plan, and brought the West together, while managing --
with effect -- a very difficult relationship in the East. I
am honored to be able to share in their recognition today.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

April 4, 1976

No. 159

As Prepared by Delivery

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
L'ENFANT PLAZA

APRIL 4, 1976

Rabbi Hertzberg, Dean Rosovsky, Mr. Wilkins, distinguished guests, friends:

I am honored by this award, and by your most generous introduction.

The greatness of America has been not so much its physical strength as its moral significance. Since its birth this nation has stood for something larger than itself. Americans have always had a sense of mission; we have been inspired by the knowledge that we were champions of liberty and progress for all mankind. We have been not only a refuge for those fleeing persecution, but the defense of democracy, and bulwark for others in time of need, a feeder of the hungry and a solace to the suffering. And history continues to present us these challenges and more. Today we bear a central responsibility for maintaining peace and shaping a global structure which can help realize mankind's dream of an end to conflict and hatred.

These are the qualities and responsibilities and hopes which tie America to Israel. No people knows more vividly than the Jewish people that morality must be more than a theory — it must be a quality of human conduct. No people yearns more for tranquility than those who historically have been the first victims of its loss. And no people perceives more acutely that peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements but on the conscience of mankind.

History is often cruel, but the wisest are those who know that fate can be shaped by human faith and human courage. The true realists are those who recognize that all great achievements were a dream before they became a reality. These are qualities that have enabled the Jewish people to survive their tragedies. These are the qualities that brought about the state of Israel. These are qualities that guarantee the future of the people of Israel. And these are qualities which peoples and nations everywhere must possess if they are to be free.

## The Moral Basis of Foreign Policy

History challenges us amid the world's ambiguities to shape events by our own purposes and ideals. If democratic societies like America and Israel are to prosper, we must summon the unity and resolve to be masters of our futures on the basis of our values.

The decisions that must be made are always difficult — for foreign policy deals with the interaction of sovereign entities. No country, no matter how strong, can impose its will on the world. Today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power and growing interdependence, foreign policy is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete and imperfect solutions. Tension is unavoidable between moral values, which are invariably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to achieve them, which of necessity involve compromise.

For further information contact:

PR #158

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This accounts for much of the foreign policy debate in democratic societies, which to some extent is a rebellion against the contemporary world. In all democratic societies the temp-tation is great to deny the circumstances of the contemporary world and to blame them on individuals, to confuse optimism with the shallow projection of the desirable.

But we cannot escape the conditions around us. Morality without pragmatic action is empty. just as pragmatism without moral direction is like a rudderless ship. The true optimists are those who are prepared to face complexity and who have the faith that their people can master it by dedication and vision.

If democracies like America and Israel are to survive and flourish in a world of sovereign states and competing wills, they must stand firmly for their belief in human dignity; otherwise we will lose our bearings. There is no way to make these choices, and to navigate between the shoals of temptation and danger, without a strong inner moral conviction. Equally, we need a mature and hard-headed understanding of the difficult choices that must be made, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

For Americans, foreign policy has always been more than the search for stability. Americans have a vision of a world of justice that drives all our efforts. A pragmatic policy alone would be empty of humanity; it would lack direction, and roots, and heart.

But equally if policy becomes excessively moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on virtue can make impossible any solution or negotiation. Good results may be given up or sabotaged in the quest for the elusive ideal. Some of this country's most serious errors — of both involvement and abdication — were driven by misguided moral arguments. Some intervention began as crusades to reform other societies; and we were isolationist in the 1930s to preserve our purity and register our distaste for the balance of power.

Our responsibility to conduct a moral, far-sighted and realistic policy has grown in recent years. In a world made smaller by technology and communications, events anywhere are instantly known and have effects in distant places. Never before have the destinies of nations been more intertwined — not only practically but morally.

And so we have a stake in a peaceful world and an environment where man's aspirations for justice and liberty and dignity have the greatest chance of fulfillment. The ultimate safety of every minority, every oppressed people, lies in a world where respect for human dignity governs the affairs of nations. Peace can be said to exist only when the insecurity of nations is eased, the hopes of people for economic advance are fulfilled, international habits of restraint and conciliation are nurtured, and men experience at last the blessings of a world of justice and progress.

## Peace in the Middle East

I have spoken at some length about the moral foundation of our foreign policy to this group which is so concerned and serious about the survival of Israel. For the relationship between America and Israel depends ultimately not on formal assurances but on the links of our peoples and the reality of our values.

The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy, whose very existence represents the commitment of all free peoples. The moral strength of the people of Israel, which has so often meant the margin of victory in war, gives us confidence that Israel will also win peace. No people has earned it more.

Time and events have brought us to a threshold in Middle East history — an unprecedented opportunity to realize the peace of which we all have dreamed; a peace in the interest of all the peoples of a region that has experienced enough anguish for this generation.

PR #159

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— Israel, having proven by its own courage that it is here to stay, has taken equally courageous steps toward peaceful resolution of the conflict.

— Some of her Arab neighbors, for the first time ever, are now speaking openly and wisely of making peace and ending generations of conflict.

— The United States has demonstrated to both sides its commitment to continue to promote a just and enduring solution.

— The relationships among the major outside powers, if conducted with reason and firmness, can create a global environment of restraint that will enhance security and the possibilities of peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Israel obviously faces profound problems — not the least of which is that in any negotiation with her neighbors, she will be asked to yield the physical buffers of territory in exchange for intangible pledges. Indeed, Israel's gains will be intangible even as she achieves her own stated objectives of a formal peace treaty and diplomatic recognition by her neighbors. So the process of peace inevitably presents her with many anguishing decisions — and the pain is shared by all of us who are friends of Israel and who are dedicated to further progress towards peace. Throughout this process we owe Israel our compassion and support.

The risks and obstacles are many. Steps taken must be carefully thought out and realistic. But we must move together, with courage and with a vision of how reality can be shaped by a vision of peace. And we must not paralyze ourselves by a suspiciousness that deprives our relationship of dignity and our cooperation of significance.

The United States will help keep Israel strong — to ensure that peace is seen clearly to be the only feasible course. We will never abandon Israel — either by failing to provide crucial assistance, or by misconceived or separate negotiations, or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to maintain the global balance of power.

We will never forget that America's responsibility for peace includes, above all, responsibility for the fate of smaller nations who rely upon us as the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom and that Israel's fate is inseparable from the future of human dignity. America will not abandon a friend because to do so in one part of the world would shake confidence in every part of the world. There will be no American weakness or abdication for this can only tempt adversaries, confuse allies, and undermine security in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of our country.

Moral ideals and practical interest thus come together. Peace in the Middle East is a goal shared by Americans and by Israelis alike. The road towards it will be a common one. And so, in truth, as we pursue the course of peace, our guarantees rest not so much in any formal agreements or reassurances endlessly repeated but in the deeper ties of emotion and morality, history and principle, that can never be sundered.

The dream of peace is the dream of the prophet Isaiah — that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore." It is the benediction of Leviticus — that "the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee and grant thee peace." This dream is both an inspiration and a duty. And those who strive for it know both the pain and the exhilaration of man's noblest endeavor.

The United States and Israel will have the courage and the faith to seek this dream and fulfill it.

********

April 4, 1976

No. 159

As Prepared by Delivery

APRIL 4, 1976

The greatness of America has been not so much its physical strength as its moral significance. Since its birth this nation has stood for something larger than itself. Americans have always had a sense of mission; we have been inspired by the knowledge that we were champions of liberty and progress for all mankind. We have been not only a refuge for those fleeing persecution, but the defense of democracy, and bulwark for others in time of need, a feeder of the hungry and a solace to the suffering. And history continues to present these challenges and more. Today we bear a central responsibility for maintaining peace and shaping a global structure which can help realize mankind's dream of an end to conflict and hatred.

The decisions that must be made are always difficult — for foreign policy deals with the interaction of sovereign entities. No country, no matter how strong, can impose its will on the world. Today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power and growing interdependence, foreign policy is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete and imperfect actions. Tension is unavoidable between moral values, which are invariably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to achieve them, which of necessity involve compromise.

Ft. 156

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But we cannot escape the conditions around us. Morality without pragmatic action is empty, just as pragmatism without moral direction is like a rudderless ship. The true optimists are those who are prepared to face complexity and who have the faith that their people can master it by dedication and vision.

## Peace in the Middle East

[L.C.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 9, 1976

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

No. 168

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT PRESENTATION OF EDWARD WEINTAL AWARD
TO PETER LISAGOR
GEORGETOWN SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 9, 1976

I am grateful for this opportunity to join with all of you assembled here this evening to honor Peter Lisagor -- a superb journalist and a good friend. And, Peter, let me assure you that because of the former, your many other friends will forgive you the latter.

I have always considered myself fortunate to know Peter Lisagor, but I am even more pleased now that he has become a television star. In fact, his example has led me to think seriously about a television series of my own when -- I mean if -- I leave office. I had considered calling it "Kissinger and Company," but have thought better of it, since it would sound too much like what others have done.

Instead, I have a shorter title -- one that will capture the imagination and thrill the viewing public. One that has a majestic ring pleasing to the ear.

We will call it "Kissinger."

Let me, before I go any further, clarify two persistent misunderstandings between Peter and me.

First, I freely admit that I have occasionally described him as cynical. But he is cynical only in the classic philosophical sense -- which, as you know, is very different from the modern usage. He has seen the feet of clay that too many great men possess. He has heard too many big words turn hollow -- watched too many exalted dreams come to nothing -- not to have a healthy skepticism about the human condition.

But for all of that, he has never lost his faith in the human spirit, perhaps because he has always had the good sense to move in mixed company -- to know more than the great men, the big words, and the exalted dreams. He has always remained in touch with the sight and smell of everyday people and places -- and has always written and spoken eloquently about them and for them. Peter, because of you we have been a bit less -- in the modern sense of the word -- cynical. And for that we are all deeply grateful.

Second, let me say that I categorically reject your frequent assertions that I celebrate Metternich's birthday as a religious observance. Lighting a few small candles on May 15 is hardly religious; it is no more than respectful.

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#168

I wonder how many of you remember, as I do, that the disaster that befell the Republican Party in 1964 was at least partly offset by the publication, in that same year, of Peter's book on the Foreign Service. It was a fine little book -- a collection of true stories of courage and fortitude by members of the Foreign Service in difficult circumstances throughout the world over the past century and a half.

Peter, I bring to you now a request from my press spokesman and his staff that you update that book to include them as current examples of the ability of the Foreign Service to stand up to an implacable and relentless foe. I bring you the request, but confess that I do not really understand it. I had the clear impression that our spokesman's office was getting along reasonably well with the press and media people.

I have given much thought over the past week to what I might say this evening. And I decided that I should seek to give some substance to my remarks because our purpose here is to do honor to a great professional -- Peter Lisagor. And that is a task that can never be accomplished by a few humorous remarks strung together by vacuous phrases.

My first inclination was to talk to you about Athens and Sparta, but I was afraid of being accused of turning this into a partisan meeting.

I then called Charlie Bartlett, who suggested I tell you what I think of the press. But, again, I had to reject the idea because I felt this was not an occasion where the use of profanity would be seemly.

But Charlie's proposal did start a train of thought which I intend to share with you now. If my remarks sound self-serving, it is because I intend it so; self-service, you will recall, came about because of labor shortages which meant there was no one else available to do the work for you.

Although not every public agency or private business has the "exceptional talent" which Peter described in his book on the Foreign Service, news organizations clearly do. Like the Foreign Service, the profession of gathering, reporting, analyzing, editing and publishing news -- for all its frustrations and occasional tedium -- stirs the soul and quickens the mind to an extent virtually unequalled elsewhere. But, like the Foreign Service, the profession of journalism also has its pressures for conformity and its institutional biases that often slow the process of adjustment to changed circumstances.

From the end of the war through the mid-60's the national consensus underlying our foreign policy led many in the press to accept the premise that government was serving the interests of the people. Today no such consensus exists. The press and those who govern have grown apart, and government is thought by many to be guilty unless it can prove itself innocent.

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#168

One must inevitably wonder about the future state of the relationship
between the government and the press. In discussing that question
with you today -- from my perspective -- I must emphasize that I make
no claim that I have the answer. I will confine myself to stating
some issues that concern me.

First, skepticism and scrutiny of public policies and public men
are clearly the business of the press. We have seen over the past
few years the tremendous strength that a free press brings to our
society. But, as with government or any other profession, is it not
possible that the skills so useful in dealing with extraordinary
circumstances may prove less creative -- less useful -- when applied to
more normal circumstances?

We have passed through a destructive and divisive war, and through
this nation's greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War. Just
as armies are demobilized when a war is won, is it not now time to ask
whether we can demobilize some of the attitudes, assumptions, and
techniques that proved so indispensable during Vietnam and Watergate?
Have we perhaps fallen into the malaise of retired generals, endlessly
re-fighting the battles of wars long past -- battles whose lessons may
ill prepare us for future conflicts?

Second, the Government, no less than the press, must share a profound
attachment to the First Amendment, for the freedoms guaranteed therein
have set our nation apart from any other in the past or current history
of the world. And when Government seems to retreat from that
commitment, it is the responsibility of the press to remind it of
its duty.

But I think it is important to remember that endless scrutiny -- without
some minimal element of understanding -- can lead to a massive
undermining of public confidence in the very institutions of government.
Skepticism is healthy, and condemnation often deserved, but no free
nation can long exist if its people lack faith in its essential justice.
And in an imperfect world one cannot demand perfection as the price of
confidence, and insist on one's disillusionment in the face of
inevitable ambiguity. For this is the road to national abdication.

I do not claim that the press can or should create faith in government
where there is no reason for that faith. But I believe we must recog-
nize that decisions of public officials, in the real world, are often
made in circumstances where the facts at hand are ambiguous -- the
pros and cons frequently evenly balanced. Unless there is, at some level
in the public debate, some minimal degree of understanding -- yes, and
compassion -- of the complexities of the issues and of the uncertainties
about projecting the future in decision making, we risk bringing to life
Cardinal Richelieu's dictum: "Give me six lines written by an honest
man, and I will find something in it with which to hang him."

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#168

Third, I do not pretend to know what a newsman should do when a government official presents him with a classified document, even if he knows the motives of his source to be self-serving. The real culprit, if there is one, is the government official who, having taken an oath of office, then violates that oath -- no matter what his motives -- by leaking classified information. The person to whom that information is passed, on the other hand, has taken no such oath. In fact, his professional obligations run in quite the opposite direction; his duty is to inform the public, to tell the American people what is going on. But let us not, while lionizing the press for doing its duty, forget that usually the source has failed in the performance of his.

Fourth, the trend toward the making of news by leak can have some peculiar and misleading consequences. A little over a month ago I gave a speech in San Francisco. It was a major attempt to lay out in detail the conceptual basis for our policy toward the Soviet Union. The speech was the product of careful analysis, and was intended to be the definitive public statement of this Administration's position on the issue. Probably because it was unclassified, it attracted only moderate attention.

I had no particular reason to be concerned about the oversight until the furor that followed the leaks about Hal Sonnenfeldt's informal and off-the-cuff remarks to a Chiefs of Mission meeting in London on the same subject. Presumably because of the fascination that seems to derive from dealing with secrets, Sonnenfeldt's comments -- reported in a cable summarizing his remarks -- were promoted to the status of "Doctrine," the context in which they were given ignored, and their meaning and significance distorted.

Then, of course, the report of my own remarks to that same gathering of Ambassadors was also leaked. While it has not, as yet at least, led to the creation of a new "Kissinger Doctrine," it has been given more space in the newspapers of record than the San Francisco speech and it has led to much speculation, though much better unclassified versions are available.

In this connection, we have seen a new and interesting investigative technique emerge in the appearance of memoranda of conversation either submitted to Congressional investigations or leaked.

What is the problem? An individual records his version of a conversation. It is, naturally, one-sided; it is not seen by the other party to the conversation; it reflects the writer's perception and state of mind alone; it contains no description of the author's motives; and it is likely to reflect a tendency we sometimes see in the State Department to put down what the writer wished he had said, and what he hoped to hear from the other fellow. As Dean Acheson so often remarked, he never saw a memorandum of conversation in which the author lost the argument.

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#168

I had personal experience of this when a certain candidate for state office claimed to have recorded, in an arcane system of code, both his own words and those supposedly spoken to him. Incidentally, as far as the accuracy of the candidate's coded recollections of what I supposedly said to him is concerned, I am beginning to suspect that he lost the key to the code somewhere along the line.

I raise these points not to argue that the fascination with leaked documents has sometimes led the press to do less than justice to information publicly available -- although I believe that to be the case. I raise it for more fundamental reasons.

If there is to be openness within government, if there is to be debate, and if men and women are to have the courage to say what they think and defend what they believe, then they must be permitted some minimum degree of privacy. If every drafter of a cable must expect that he may be called publicly to account for his views, if he believes that he may have to defend himself later in excruciating detail for what he wrote, if every conversation is suspected of being the subject of a memorandum, then meaningful discussion within government will wither and we will be left with a dull and lifeless bureaucracy unprepared ever to take a chance.

Finally, you are all familiar with the ferocious dedication to news gathering which Ben Hecht portrayed in "The Front Page." Many of the attitudes and techniques Hecht saw in an earlier era are now with us again. Investigative reporting is once again the vogue. I do not object to that fact -- at least not too much -- provided there is also an understanding that investigative reporting proceeds from the assumption that there are substantial, new facts to be discovered and brought to the public's attention.

In foreign policy that is rarely the case.

Effective journalism, in the area of foreign policy at least, is not measured so much by the wealth of information discovered as by the weight of superior analysis.

These "Front Page" techniques, applied in the foreign policy field, may seem to succeed. What appear to be new facts may, indeed, be brought forth as more and more classified documents are leaked. But I would contend that too often these are likely to be new only in appearance, and to add little or nothing to the body of knowledge available to the public. In-depth reporting and analysis, on the other hand, can truly serve to educate the nation on the critical issues of the day. A recent series on SALT carried in a Washington newspaper, for example, represented a first class piece of analytic journalism. It was a deeply insightful series, and yet it unearthed not one new "fact" via the use of leaked classified information. No amount of "Front Page" digging could have produced it. Nor could leaked classified documents have done so -- no single classified document with which I am familiar contains the information, much less the insight, contained in these articles. It was, in short, a work of the mind, and we need more of it.

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#168

The Law of the Sea negotiations now underway in New York are another example. Without doubt, they are the most important multilateral negotiations of this generation. The outcome will affect the lives and livelihood of nations for years to come, and will establish the way in which we use the seas and their resources for a century at least. Yet those negotiations have received virtually no press coverage, while far more transitory events are reported on daily in exquisite detail.

But lest I be misunderstood, let me assure you that I sympathize with the media's need for reliable and timely sources of information. Of course, few contemporary writers have quite the problem Thucydides had. That poor man wrote the history of the Peloponnesian wars -- without ever knowing that the issue of who won would have to await the decision of the Republican primaries of 1976.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask your indulgence for the fact that I have taken advantage of this platform to talk briefly about the relationship between your profession and mine. Whose of you who know me realize that I have an unnatural affinity for lecturing people. I can usually manage to keep it under some control, but when I am on a university campus like this the urge to teach becomes almost irresistible.

And I might add that I have decided it is time to get in some practice. After all, just yesterday Rogers Morton called to tell me he was behind me one thousand percent.

Peter, if I may draw a serious point from that remark, I want you to know that all of us here this evening are truly behind you, and with you, one hundred percent.

You are, to put it mildly, a strange phenomenon.

You write for a newspaper that virtually no one in Washington reads. Yet you are one of the most influential newsmen in the nation's capitol. You never make heroes out of public officials -- that is perhaps an understatement -- yet they respect you, they seek your advice, and consider you their friend. You are the Renaissance man of the Washington press corps -- equally adept at writing, reporting, television and commentary. And all of it is infused with that pervasive humanity and humor which has made you a confidant of Presidents, Secretaries of State, and others with whom you often thoroughly but cordially disagreed -- and who frequently returned the compliment.

But above all else, you are a man of absolute personal integrity; a man whose professionalism has never been tainted, and whose character and principles have stood as a model for us all.

Very few come to this town and stay for long without having their heads turned, and -- on occasion -- their purposes corrupted. Not so with Peter. Not only has he never fallen victim to those afflictions himself, but his total honesty and healthy irreverence for pretension and rank have more than once kept others from those same pitfalls.

#168

He is a believer in public institutions, for he sees in public men the
germ of the fanatic. And a fanatic, according to Peter's fictional
comrade in arms, Mr. Dooley, is "a man that does what he thinks the
Lord would do, if only the Lord knew the facts of the case."

You, Peter, occupy a special place in our hearts.

Your wit and humor have made us laugh; your extraordinary grasp of
events, foreign domestic, has made us envious; your ability to compare
-- often unfavorably -- any world figure to a Chicago ward heeler has
always amazed and often disconcerted us; and your honesty, your love
of humanity, and your skepticism about the system have made us admire
and respect you.

Ed Leahy was, I know, a great hero of yours -- and justly so, because
he was the best of a long line of great Chicago newsmen. But while
meaning no disrespect to Leahy, I would contend that the disciple has
surpassed the teacher. Machines can record sights and sounds, but it
takes a mind and a spirit to reach the ultimate goal of any great
newsman -- the creation of understanding and insight. And that,
Peter, you have done beyond measure.

It is a privilege to be part of this ceremony. I will cherish it not
only because I have participated in honoring a true professional, but
also because it has given me an opportunity to say to him and to you
all, how much I value him as a friend, respect him as an adversary,
and honor him as a man.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 9, 1976

No. 168

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

We will call it "Kissinger."

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#168

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#168

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask your indulgence for the fact that I have taken advantage of this platform to talk briefly about the relationship between your profession and mine. Those of you who know me realize that I have an unnatural affinity for lecturing people. I can usually manage to keep it under some control, but when I am on a university campus like this the urge to teach becomes almost irresistible.

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#168

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 9, 1976

No. 168

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

We will call it "Kissinger."

Second, let me say that I categorically reject your frequent assertions that I celebrate Wetterlich's birthday as a religious observance. Lighting a few small candles on May 15 is hardly religious; it is no more than respectful.

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#168

I wonder how many of you remember, as I do, that the disaster that befell the Republican Party in 1964 was at least partly offset by the publication in that same year, of Peter's book on the Foreign Service. It was a fine little book -- a collection of true stories of courage and fortitude by members of the Foreign Service in difficult circumstances throughout the world over the past century and a half.

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Date:

To.

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* * * * *

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING HIS TESTIMONY
IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The basic purpose of this meeting was to brief the Committee on the situation in Lebanon and both the possibilities and the dangers we see there. There are no immediate decisions which the United States needs to take in that situation, and therefore there was nothing specific for the Committee to approve or disapprove. But we wanted to create the basis for understanding which will permit us to continue the dialogue and to work with the Committee as the situation develops.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could I take you from Lebanon for just a minute, and could you explain to us the significance of the news from Moscow about the U.S. and the Soviet Union reaching an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This agreement will for the first time establish the principle of on-site inspection on Soviet territory -- something which we've been attempting to achieve the entire post-war period. And therefore it's of importance, a symbolic step. It also establishes the framework for the Threshold Test Ban; in fact it concludes that negotiation; and relates the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions to the problem of military uses. So we consider that this is a constructive step forward.

**QUESTION:** What does it mean -- on-site -- precisely? How will that actually be followed through?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The issue with respect to the on-site inspection arises because peaceful nuclear explosions may be used in an order of magnitude comparable to those that are prohibited for military uses, and we want to make sure that peaceful nuclear explosions are not used to mask military purposes. The Soviet Union has agreed that if it uses peaceful nuclear explosions in locations that have not been previously agreed, that then American inspectors could go there to take samples and to study the geology in order to assure ourselves that the peaceful explosions are compatible with --

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, are you likely to stay on or to want to stay on if there is a new Ford term?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I thought you were going to ask me whether I'd stay on if there's a change in Administration.

**QUESTION:** If there is not, sir, are you likely to want to stay on?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Why put such a limit on it? I think that this is a decision that can only be made after the election

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in the light of the circumstances that then exist, and it's not
a question on which I can make a decision now.

**QUESTION:** Are you feeling the heat from Mr. Morton, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. Morton has told me he supports me 1,000 per cent. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Would you make an evaluation of the situation in Lebanon?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our evaluation of the situation in Lebanon is that progress is being made on a political solution, but that of course -- there is a difficulty that there's no central force which would be at the disposal of the central government. Once it emerges -- and there is still risk of outside intervention which we are trying to prevent, and which a political solution hopefully will make unnecessary.

**QUESTION:** How will the signing take place of the underground testing agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think that has been agreed yet.

**QUESTION:** But in both capitals, or will you go somewhere to do it? At what level?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The desire to get me out of this town is overwhelming. I don't plan to go to Moscow to sign it, so my guess is that it will be signed in both capitals. Frankly, we haven't made any plans.

**QUESTION:** How soon will the signing take place, and will the Congress have to approve both treaties, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Congress will definitely have to approve both treaties. I don't believe we've yet made a decision whether it will be approved as a treaty or by a joint resolution as an Executive agreement.

**QUESTION:** When might the signing take place? Do you see that agreement wrapped up as of now, or there's still work?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. We consider the agreement substantially concluded.

**QUESTION:** What does it tell you about the nature of US/Soviet relations at the present time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It tells us about this relationship -- that with all the tensions and difficulties, we have an

obligation to the future to bring the nuclear problem under control. And this is a step in that direction. I would not overstate its significance, but I would also not underrate the importance to humanity and to our own people of taking constant steps to get the nuclear problem under some discipline. And in this sense we're gratified --

QUESTION: Would the inspectors be allowed to take -- before the explosion -- sensitive detecting devices to the site of the explosion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The inspectors will be permitted to take inspections devices that have been agreed, and that will be adequate to the job. We have actually worked out in great detail the nature of the inspection devices, and we believe that they will give us the information that we require.

QUESTION: Would Americans be there during the explosion, sir, or is it before, or after?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Americans would be there during the explosion -- at the inspection site.

# # # #

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 13, 1976

No. 174

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
FOLLOWED BY A PANEL DISCUSSION
AND QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
SHOREHAM HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 13, 1976

MR. WARREN H. PHILLIPS [President and Chief Executive Officer, Wall Street Journal]: Our luncheon speaker today will be introduced by George Chaplin, Vice President of the Society and Editor of the Honolulu Advertiser.

MR. CHAPLIN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, at the outset let me say that I am heartened by the fact that the Secretary holds the press in that high regard which he usually reserves for United States Senators, Representatives, White House Press Secretaries and Secretaries of Defense — and, of late, national campaign managers. [Laughter]

It is well known that the Secretary each year nominates certain journalists for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter] Thus far he has been unsuccessful, but he is a very determined man; and I cite one current example. President Ford has stopped using the word "detente" — but not the Secretary. Only the other day Art Buchwald quoted him as saying that except for Angola and the SALT talks, detente is moving along beautifully. [Laughter]

There are a number of complex and esoteric definitions of "detente," but there are simpler ones too — such as the Israeli version, which says: "Detente is when you can open a Kosher delicatessen in Cairo." [Laughter]

I should point out that despite Dr. Kissinger's esteem for the press, he has a charming way of not answering questions from reporters. "There are too few of you present," he will say, "for me to say something historic." [Laughter] We've tried to rectify that today. [Laughter]

But, levity aside, and despite the fact that in this large audience there may be one or two editors who on rare occasions have raised mild questions about Kissinger's statements and policies, there is appreciation, Mr. Secretary, of the enormity of the burdens you face and of the intellect and determination you bring to bear on them.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chaplin, ladies and gentlemen, I realize that you have been conducting this morning your own primary for Secretary of State and that they have re-presented every point of view about the policy with which I have been connected from A to B. [Laughter]

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I, of course, would not dream of getting into a decision that will not have to be made as between men of such great distinction, but I have pointed out to my former colleague Brzezinski that there is no constitutional requirement that the Secretary of State be foreign-born. [Laughter] Now, I recognize that there is a panel waiting to question me which, by the sadistic impulse of the directors here, is composed entirely of people whom I have not encountered at recent press conferences, so that I am totally unprepared for the range of their concerns. I would not want to deprive them of the opportunity to get to me. [Laughter]

I also recognize that if I describe to you the full extent of the brilliance of our foreign policy, it would take me more than the time you have allotted for the whole program. [Laughter] But, also, I fear that after what you have heard this morning it will create immediately a credibility problem. So I will talk for only five minutes — which is, in itself, a historic achievement. [Laughter] It is not easy for me to relate my humility to my brilliance [laughter] in such a brief period. I don't know when the panelists appear [laughter], but then I will expose myself first to their questions and then to your questions.

The only point that I really want to make about the conduct of foreign policy is to stress the difference between the analysis of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign policy. The analyst has available any amount of time that he wishes. There is no overwhelming compulsion to write an editorial on any given day. And there were many days that would be happier if such compulsion that exists were resisted. [Laughter] But the policy-maker has to operate in a very limited time frame. His responses very often are closer to those of an athlete than to those of a thinker — in the sense that events crowd in on him very rapidly and he has to respond to them in a very limited time frame. And I would like to emphasize that the overwhelming aspect of decisions at a high level is the confusion as to the state of facts.

I mention this because there has lately been — in fact, over the last decade — an increasing problem about credibility as between the press and the Government. And while no doubt the Government has sometimes misled the press, either deliberately or unintentionally, I think it is important to keep in mind that sometimes by giving the best explanation and the best statement of events there is an inevitable element of confusion.

Secondly, the essence of policy-making is to project the future; and with respect to this, it is important to keep in mind that when the scope of action is greatest, the facts on which to base such action are at a minimum. When the facts are available, the scope for action has very frequently disappeared.

In 1936, one French division could have stopped the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, and we would today still be arguing about whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. By 1941 we all knew what Hitler was, and it was a knowledge that had to be acquired at the cost of tens of millions of lives. So today when we argue about Angola, or about Turkey — or about other issues — we have to remember we are doing it on the basis of projections that cannot be proved true when they are made — which is, in itself, an invitation to demagoguery and which, in any event, adds an element of uncertainty to the debate.

And finally, some policy-makers are responsible not only for the best that could happen, but also for the worst that could happen. They do not have the luxury of projecting only the most favorable circumstances of certain events. They must keep in mind also what will occur if these events do not turn out as was predicted.

I would apply this to the current debate about the advent of Communist parties to governments in Western Europe. It is not impossible to project favorable scenarios. But the policy-maker does not have the possibility, after the event, of saying: "I made a terrible mistake, and I am now going to write another book or another editorial." His decisions are largely irrevocable.

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Now, with respect to our foreign policy, I understand that it has been described as acrobatic rather than as architectural, and I noticed there are many people who are working and taking the safety net away, too. [Laughter]

It goes without saying that I reject all such comments as biased, malicious or one-sided — or all three put together. But if an acrobat may make an architectural comment [laughter], what we have attempted to do was to guide American foreign policy in a period of transition between a time when American strength was pre-eminent and a period when America will have to conduct foreign policy the way most nations in history have had to conduct it.

Through most of the postwar period, our decisions in foreign policy — and, to a significant extent, even in defense policy — could be made more or less unilaterally. We were not dealing with any country of roughly equivalent power, nor were we facing a situation where other parts of the world — such as Europe and Japan and the developing nations — were gaining in strength and self-confidence and had a desire to play a more significant role in the shaping of the international order.

And finally, America, after its tremendous exertions in the postwar period — the American public was reaching a point where the exclusive assumption by the United States of responsibility in the world was no longer acceptable.

So, for all of these reasons, we have tried to develop a policy which was geared less to cycles of confrontation and retreat — less to emotional commitments to favorite governments — but we have tried to develop a conception of permanent interests. And this is a difficult process for the United States because all of our traditions tend to run counter to it — the idealistic tradition that tends to unite us with like-minded people; the pragmatic tradition that waits for a problem to arise before we deal with it; the legalistic tradition that tries to deal with issues in terms of the framework of international law. But I believe that in East-West relations we have had the problem of both containing the growth of Soviet power and keeping open the option of a future not exclusively dependent on a balance of terror, constantly contested. In relations with Western Europe and Japan we have had to adjust — and I believe we have adjusted successfully — to their greater self-confidence and the necessity of their playing a greater role.

In relation to the developing countries, at the Seventh Special Session and in other forthcoming meetings, on trips to Latin America and Africa, we will lay out an agenda — all of which are building blocks. They cannot be completed in any one Administration. And, if they are to be meaningful, they must be carried out by other Administrations over an indefinite period of time.

We are now in an election year, but we must not create the impression abroad that American foreign policy is subject to total revision at regular intervals because that in itself becomes an element of instability. It is essential that we have a debate, but it is also essential that the reality that the choices of a nation are not infinite be faced as well.

And finally, I would like to stress that I believe that we have gone through a decade of national trauma, and that sometimes in the relations between the press and the Government the attitudes are those of generals who endlessly fight old battles over and over again. What we need in this country over the next decade or so, if we are going to complete the architectural task that is inevitable and that is necessary for world peace, is some confidence in ourselves, some compassion and understanding of the complexity of decision-making.

And while I recognize that the relationship of the press to Government is importantly and healthily an adversary relationship, as Americans we are also partners in a common task and we must never forget that the peace and progress of the world depends finally on American vision and on American constancy.

Thank you very much.

PR #174

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MR. CHAPLIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

There comes now a question and answer period, with questions by our distinguished panel here in the front of the room. And if there is time later, we will go to the floor for questions.

Members of the panel are: James Thomsom, Jr., Curator, Nieman Foundation; Benjamin Read, Chairman, Marshall Fund; Chalmers M. Roberts, former Diplomatic Correspondent, The Washington Post; Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., The Washington Star. As you gentlemen put your questions in no particular order, I think it might be beneficial to the audience if you would identify yourselves.

Just to start things rolling, I might ask the Secretary if he would comment on how much exposure he's had to the new Premier of the People's Republic of China and how long he thinks it might take for that situation to settle into some form of stability.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have never met the new Premier of China, and I have had occasion to say previously that we really know very little more than is publicly available about the debates that are now going on inside China.

It is our impression that, as of now, the basic direction of Chinese foreign policy is not affected by the domestic changes that have taken place there. But we have had, on the governmental level, no contact with the new Prime Minister.

MR. THOMSON: May I answer, to follow up briefly on that question, by citing East Asian specialists, both outside the Government and even inside the Government, who are beginning to express a fear that we lost, as a nation, a precious opportunity to rectify our relations with China in a more final sense fulfilling the Shanghai Communique — through recognizing Taiwan; through keeping a tacit defense agreement and establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. All this to have been done while Chou En-lai was alive — if possible, certainly before Mao passes. Do you feel yourself, sir, some sadness about a lost opportunity in that regard, and do you think it could be retrieved?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that basically the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States is based on necessity. That is to say, we were brought together because international trends produced a certain compatibility of interest.

The issue of Taiwan is, of course, important; and the United States stated certain principles in the Shanghai Communique with respect to the issue of Taiwan. But I believe that the dominant factor in the relationship has been the degree to which we have looked at certain problems in international affairs in a parallel manner.

The implementation of the Shanghai Communique has faced problems because of domestic upheavals here and domestic upheavals in China. But the direction is clear, and it will be implemented. So I do not believe that that has been a major factor in US-Chinese relations. And I believe that the trends that are taking place in China — and whatever questions there may exist in China — depend much more on their assessment of our capacity to conduct a global policy that understands geopolitical factors than it is tied to Taiwan.

Now, should I just recognize people?

MR. CHAPLIN: I wish the panelists would announce themselves.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just want to warn you: The first guy that asks a nasty question won't be recognized. [Laughter] I am not trying to influence you in any way. [Laughter]

PR #174

-5-

MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Secretary — Chalmers Roberts, the Washington Post — you mentioned Italy. You have been sounding some alarm bells in Western Europe about Communists getting into Western European countries, and Italy is the obvious instant problem — or almost instant. I wish you would tell us a little bit about what your policy is — and, especially, how do you answer this time the question — the reason, it seems quite evident here — that Italy is contemplating the entry of Communists into the government in that the Christian Democratic Party has run out of steam; it has become a disaster.

Now, in the old days, we used to ship several hundred thousand dollars through the CIA to CDU politicians. This is pretty much over. And, furthermore, it is very questionable whether it would do any good.

How do you bridge, in other words, the gap between what you would call the "conceptual approach," I guess, of not having Communists in the Italian Government and the necessity and the desire of the Italian people to get a government which will make the economic and political reforms that that country so desperately needs?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first I think we ought to be clear on what I said and under what circumstances it was said. I made a fairly considered statement on the subject a few weeks ago in Boston — which, due to the fact that it was not classified, received very little attention. [Laughter]

I previously met with a group of Ambassadors in London in a session which was supposed to generate a free exchange of ideas — or, at least, a degree of free exchange of ideas as is possible when a Secretary of State meets his Ambassadors. But, at any rate, I made a number of extemporaneous remarks that were designed to generate comment. Those remarks have been very widely reported, and are usually taken as the text of editorials and other discussions.

Nevertheless, I don't disavow what I've said or I would not have said them in this manner for publication and for purposes other than for getting a discussion started.

What is the problem with respect to Communism in Western Europe? As Secretary of State, I have an obligation to make clear what I believe the consequences of certain events are, even if we cannot necessarily influence them. I believe that the advent of Communism in major European countries is likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries will also be tempted to move in the same direction.

This, in turn, is going to produce governments with which the degree of cooperation that has become characteristic of Atlantic relations will become increasingly difficult — in which their own internal priorities are going to be away from the concern with defense — which will create new opportunities for outside pressures and towards a more neutralistic conception of foreign policy.

I, therefore, believe that the United States must not create the impression that it could be indifferent to such developments. In many respects, we cannot affect it. And if any government, if any people, votes in a way that will produce a Communist government or admits a major participation of Communists in that government, we will have to deal with that reality. But we should not delude ourselves that it would not mark a historic change that would have long-term and very serious consequences.

Now, how you get social and political reform in any individual European country depends somewhat on your conception. In 1948, faced with a similar situation, the Western countries got together with the United States and developed a program that produced a social and economic change. If that does not happen in 1976, then perhaps the present trends are inevitable. I do not believe they are inevitable. And, if they are inevitable, I do not believe that they are desirable. And I do not believe that American leaders should engage in wishful thinking about it. So when I am asked about this issue, I must point out the serious consequences. If it happens, we will then have to deal with it; but it will certainly mark a historic turning point in Atlantic relationships.

PR #174

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MR. ROBERTS: If my colleagues will forebear a minute, I would like to ask you what I think is a corollary to that problem.

For many years the United States Government, long before you got to Washington, was very blind to the Sino-Soviet break, to the general change within the Communist world, and to the end of Kremlin rule.

Aren't your remarks about Italian Communists in Western European Governments based on an assumption equally open to challenge, whether one accepts the word of the leadership, for example, of the Italian Communist Party today? Don't we have enough experience in the development of the Communist world, socialism and Marxism and Leninism, or whatever term you want to use, to look at developments like the Italian Communist Party, the differences, say, to the French, the Portuguese, and so on?

Are we just reacting? Are you basing your reaction on a lot of old assumptions that might be open to challenge?

MR. THOMSON: And if I may just add to that, aren't you in pushing wishful thinking, as the enemy, giving forth what we might call "worst case" thinking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I, of course, have to reject all these hypotheses as being based on an insufficient knowledge of the facts. [Laughter]

But seriously, with respect to the first question: Are the Communist parties in Western Europe dependent on Moscow? My analysis does not depend at all on whether these parties are dependent on Moscow. I don't know whether they follow Moscow or not. Nor does anybody else.

It is impossible to determine what the real convictions are when public statements and electoral self-interest so totally coincide. My concern is that these parties reflect, first, a Leninist internal organization. Secondly, that they come to power through a set of priorities that would certainly alter the domestic priorities of the country in which they are. And thirdly, at the very best they would conduct a kind of foreign policy that is different in character from the pro-Western foreign policy that has characterized Atlantic relationships.

In the sixties France was governed by President De Gaulle, who was sometimes extremely difficult for the United States to deal with. But, nevertheless, there was never any question that in moments of crisis De Gaulle was emotionally and substantively a man of the West.

A Communist leader in Western Europe, even if he is technically independent of Moscow, would be in quite the reverse position. He might be extremely difficult for Moscow to deal with, but I doubt whether in a moment of crisis his attitude towards Moscow might not be very similar to that of De Gaulle towards Washington.

That is a change of nuance, but that is of great importance.

Secondly, it makes a great deal of difference whether there is an independent Communist government in Eastern Europe or an independent Communist government in Western Europe.

And thirdly, about the "worst case" hypothesis. We are dealing here with one of the situations that I described earlier. Nobody can prove what the tendencies will be. What I predict is my best judgment of what is likely to happen over an historic period — not in the first six months; maybe not even in the first five years; but if you look ahead over a ten-year period I believe the result of what we are discussing here would be that there will

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be a Western Europe in which many countries will be in a different moral relationship to
the United States than has characterized the entire post-war period.

Now, it is not impossible for the United States to defend countries like this, too. But
we would have to do it strictly on balance-of-power grounds, on those grounds which are
most foreign to our national genius. And if it is true, which I believe it is, that the
United States must have ties to at least one part of the world that go beyond mere balance
of power, then I think that this would mark a major change. And I would say this even
though I recognized the merit of what you have said, that there may be nothing we can
do about it, if the people in Italy or any other country choose to go a different route.

MR. READ: Mr. Secretary, absent a Marshall Plan, or anything like it, and absent a perception of common danger which was the thread of US-European relations in that earlier phase, do you see anything that could be done, that isn't being done at this stage, that might be called international approaches to domestic problem solving?

It occurs to me that there are in these metropolitan societies, which are now in place in Europe and here, with the degree of affluence that does exist despite economic ups and downs, that the similarity of problems and the lessons that can be learned in domestic area after domestic area that we usually think of as having no international tie, would benefit enormously from some of the problem-solving techniques that have been evolved in housing, in transport, in cities, in administration of justice, and in a gamut of domestic problems.

My concern is that we seem to be very badly structured as a government to realize any
such opportunities. The large Embassies in West Europe with all of the Defense, Intell-
igence, and Commerical Attaches have no one that perceives his role as following such
affairs, not even as reporting on them. The Science Attaches to a very small degree, but
then they do not know the urban scene here. None of the great domestic agencies of
government have a single permanent person in Europe - HUD, Transport.

Can the State Department respond to this, or does it require a new approach in kind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First, let me say that I completely agree with you that the economic and social problems that are facing Europe are soluble. Secondly, that the institutions in many respects exist through which they could be approached as the Common Market moves toward political unity. As these many institutions for cooperative action, including the Energy Agency, begin to bite, there will be many opportunities to deal with the economic and social problems. But it is also true that the significance of the economic and social changes and the scope of creative actions are not always fully understood by governments - including our own government.

The State Department is organized to deal with diplomatic exchanges, and with -- to the greatest extent possible excluding the Secretary of State from any significant decisions. [laughter]. But the basic thrust of the State Department, as of any big governmental agency, is to answer day-to-day problems that are generated in the Embassies or here.

Now, how one can get a government organized to deal with the important in additon to the
urgent -- that I think is a very valid concern and I have to tell you candidly I do not
believe we are sufficiently well organized to deal with the range of issues that you
have raised. When we do deal with them we are better organized to deal with them with
relation to developing countries than with relation to developed countries, and we have
managed to come forward with a number of initiatives in the North-South dialogue, and
we will come forward with more in May at the UNCTAD meeting. But I have to agree that
this is an area that requires greater consistent attention.

PR #174

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MR. YODER: Mr. Secretary, it seems to me the most striking thing about the things said by your distinguished opposition critics this morning or the most striking premise was that the United States was still in a situation in which it can define problems in the world and then present its definition for discussion as an agenda. And to this end, on the question of the Middle East it was said that generally your diplomacy — your step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East — had taken the problem at the wrong end. What should be done, as I understood the proposition was that the United States should put forward a plan taking into account the very long-distance, long-run objectives for a stable peace in that area and then say to the potential belligerents — active or potential belligerents in that case — "Here it is, let's have your remarks on this solution of the problem."

Could you comment on that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, First of all, the difference between our views and those of our critics very significantly concerns the question of timing. We have always recognized that at some point in the peace-making process there would have to be a comprehensive approach rather than a step-by-step approach.

The difference between my views and those of my distinguished presumptive successors [laughter] is their retrospective view that we should have done this in 1973. Now, it can, of course, never be proved what would have been the right policy in 1973. But if you look at the conditions of 1973 in which all of the Arab countries, including Egypt, were considered to be substantially on the Soviet side, in which there were Israeli armies at the outskirts of Cairo and Damascus, in which Western Europe and Japan were suffering and we were suffering from an oil embargo, in which there was a great danger that the war might flare up again and the economic dislocations that have already occurred might become unmanageable.

We thought that it was, above all, important to get the peace process started, to deal with those Arab countries that were willing to take a risk for peace, and then as the parties gained confidence in the process of peace, move towards progressively bolder steps.

If we had put forward a comprehensive scheme — at least that was our judgment under the conditions that then existed — you must remember also the domestic difficulties that existed in the United States at that period. We thought that the danger of its failing would sharpen the embargo, increase Soviet domination of the countries concerned and enhance the radicalism of the area.

So we thought it was important to take the specific steps that have been taken, and that while of course they have not solved the problem, have given us the time in which to work on a more comprehensive solution.

I think it is now generally agreed, and Israel agrees, too, that the time for individual steps with individual countries is probably over, and that we now have to work on a wider canvass. And I think, as events in Lebanon have proved, we are still the country towards which most of the parties in the Middle East look for constructive solutions to the problem.

A year or so down the road, whatever disagreement I may have with the distinguished panel of this morning as to the specifics they would put forward in a comprehensive solution, I think the basic strategy will begin the merge, so we are only really debating whether that strategy should have been adopted in 1973 and whether time was lost or not. I believe that if we had adopted it in 1973 the danger of a blowup would have been outweighed by anything that could have been achieved at that period.

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**MR. CHAPLIN:** I am afraid I have to cut in. The Secretary has a tight schedule, and I think it is only fair to go to the floor for a few minutes and give members an opportunity to ask questions.

I remind you of the rule that members only may ask questions. You should use the mikes which are scattered around the aisles of the room, and kindly identify yourself and your paper, please.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in that I am not an expert on anything, I will have to ask this question necessarily briefly. [Laughter]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have trouble with people with accents. [Laughter]

**QUESTION:** I don't. [Laughter]

Mr. Secretary, this morning some of your articulate and presumptuous successors had some comments to make about the Middle East, Russia and Panama. In your judgment, which of those take priority as overriding problems for this country?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't believe that we can really choose among our problems. I think the relationships between us and the industrial democracies is essential to having a constructive diplomacy; that the relations between us and the Soviet Union are essential for any long-term peace. And I believe that the Middle East is sufficiently explosive so that it could make all other policies fail. And I fear that we cannot set priorities here and that unless we can deal with all of these issues simultaneously, we may not be able to deal with any of them effectively.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, a few weeks ago you testified before the Government Operations Committee, and Senator Ribicoff expressed concern over nuclear proliferation. As I recall, it was his concern that the United States was not working with the Soviet Union to prevent such countries as France and West Germany from peddling nuclear material to terrorist groups and to emerging nations. And I don't think at that time that you fully answered the Senator's questions. Could you answer them today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I feel that I answered fully, maybe not satisfactorily.

**QUESTION:** Could you try again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If I remember Senator Ribicoff's proposition, it was that the United States should work with the Soviet Union to impose upon our West European allies certain restraints by making a joint agreement to withhold nuclear materials and, in effect, establishing a US-Soviet condominium.

I pointed out at the time that during the period when the Administration is being attacked for being too conciliatory to the Soviet Union and neglecting our allies, it was not the most self-evident proposal that we should now impose a form of nuclear condominium on our West European allies together with the Soviet Union. And I pointed out — and I repeat it today — that this would be an extremely fateful step that we are not prepared to take.

**QUESTION:** How do you propose to prevent the other nations from getting the nuclear materials which Senator Ribicoff wants to keep out of their hands?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are working with seven nuclear suppliers at this moment on establishing, by agreement, including the Soviet Union but including also the West European countries — we are working with them to establish certain rules for the transfer of nuclear technology. And we have made enormous progress in that respect.

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There is only one area in which the West Europeans and we have not reached full agreement yet. And we are going to resume discussions in June. That area is the establishment of reprocessing plants in other countries. We hold the view that they should be under multi-national control. They are satisfied if they are under binational control. We have agreed, however, on the kind of safeguards that should be established. Therefore, I believe that with negotiations resuming in June, with very great progress having already been made so that there are now agreed safeguards, and so that there is no longer competition between the seven nuclear suppliers about the degree of safeguards, we are not prepared to take the fateful step of making a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union to bring pressure on our West European allies.

**MR. CHAPLIN:** We have got time for one final question. I think there is a gentleman over there.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, two questions, sir. Would you, on a scale of one to ten, relate to the audience the degree in which President Nixon and President Ford have accepted the wisdom of your counsel? [Laughter]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can't do it on a scale of one to ten. And besides, I am not reckless. [Laughter]

And I don't know whether Rogers Morton will get a recording of what I am going to say. [Laughter]

But in the relationship between either an Assistant to the President and the President, or the Secretary of State and the President, Dean Acheson made a very wise comment to the effect that this relationship can work well as long as the Secretary of State always remembers who is the President.

And the discussions rarely take the form of an issue in which the President has to give a yes or no answer. Much more frequently the decisions are shaped over many days and weeks of discussions in which it is very hard to say whose idea dominated at any given moment. I worked very closely on foreign policy matters with President Nixon, and I have worked very closely, perhaps even more frequent contact, with President Ford. And I really find it very difficult to rate it on a scale of one to ten.

**MR. CHAPLIN:** Our appreciation to Secretary Kissinger, and thanks to the members of the panel. And I will ask the audience to kindly remain seated until Secretary Kissinger has left the room for his next engagement. He has a rather tight schedule.

Thank you.

*****

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

April 14, 1976

NO. 177

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

April 14, 1976

As prepared for delivery

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of our security assistance program and our request for appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977.

In particular, I would like to discuss with you the fundamental place of security assistance in our effort to build an international structure in which all peoples can pursue justice, prosperity and positive aspirations under conditions of stability and wider prospects for peace.

Since World War II, the United States has borne successfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable world order. We have made steady progress in strengthening partnerships with our allies and in managing the global issues of peace and security. The security assistance programs which we are proposing for Fiscal Year 1977 will contribute to maintaining the pace of that progress.

Our security assistance must be seen in the context of our overall foreign policy. The basic objectives of our foreign policy include these:

- to preserve our own national strength and will;

- to maintain and to revitalize our relations with allies and friendly nations who share our moral heritage and interests;

- to secure peace with our potential adversaries through the strength of our military forces and those of our allies, while simultaneously moving beyond the balance of terror toward more rational and reciprocally beneficial relationships, despite continuing differences of ideology;

- to help to resolve regional conflicts that threaten world peace and stability.

Our security assistance programs have been designed with careful consideration of the ways in which they conform to these foreign policy objectives.

Our own military strength and the strength of our allies, supported by our security assistance, have been the bedrock of stability in the world for three decades. Just as the world has grown more complex and interdependent, our power has grown more interwoven with that of others. At the

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same time, our basic values, which we share with our friends and allies, have been increasingly challenged. If we are to protect those values we must do so in concert with our partners in the common defense.

In this regard, it is the special responsibility of the United States to maintain the strategic global balance while simultaneously contributing the crucial share to the preservation of the balance of conventional force. Our security assistance programs manifest that contribution.

Regional conflicts pose a particularly dangerous problem in a world of proliferating nuclear weapons capability. Insofar as we are able to help to contain these conflicts and to resolve their root causes we bear still another special responsibility to do so. Our security assistance programs manifest that effort. Our goal must be to bind regional stability in those areas where disputes cannot be allowed to go unchecked by maintaining stable balances of power through carefully considered transfers of defense equipment.

Finally, every nation's foreign policy is founded on its own security against the threats it perceives. While the United States must — and does — sustain an independent judgment on the nature and extend of the threats to other nations, we cannot expect to enjoy a persuasive influence with those who believe that we consider their felt needs for security to be irrelevant. Our security assistance programs manifest that degree of attention to the security needs of our friends which we consider to be in our mutual best interest.

We believe that it is essential to approach security assistance as we do the other instruments of our foreign policy — in the context of our overall national interests and objectives. That is the approach which this Administration has taken. We fully recognize the role of the Congress in supporting the security assistance program and in performing its oversight obligations and responsibilities. In doing so, we are hopeful that the Congress will share our approach.

## An Overview of the FY 77 Security Assistance Program

Our specific requests for Fiscal Year 1977 reflect cost-conscious attention by the Executive Branch.

- The proposed Foreign Military Sales credit program and our resultant request for New Obligational Authority are both approximately $200 million less than for 1976. The New Obligational Authority Request is for $840 million, down from $1,065 million last year. This will fund a total program of over $2 billion, of which approximately half is for essential assistance to Israel.

- Security Supporting Assistance programs have been reduced from last year by over $100 million to $1.8 billion. Nearly 95 percent of this amount is requested for the Middle East. The programs supported by these funds are a vital component of our Middle East peace effort.

- Foreign Military Training is programmed at $30.2 million. This program is highly cost-effective in improving the efficiency of allied and friendly military forces. Foreign governments are to an increasing extent paying for the training they receive from the United States. This modest grant program provides long-range benefits in terms of mutual defense and military cooperation.

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## Regional Programs

### I. Middle East

In Fiscal Year 1977 our security assistance program for the Middle East absorbs almost 70 percent of our total program.

Our request has been designed to protect and further interests of vital importance to the United States and is a central part of our efforts to help achieve progress towards peace in the Middle East.

Every American Administration and Congress of both political parties since 1947 has demonstrated a moral commitment to the survival and security of the state of Israel and we are certain that all future governments will continue to honor that commitment. We also have important interests and friendships in the Arab world. There is, therefore, an urgent need to avoid perpetual crises between Israel and the Arabs. These crises strain our relations with allies, jeopardize our hopes for world economic recovery and risk a direct US-Soviet confrontation.

The ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense is one of the essential constants of our Middle Eastern policy. Although Israel has recently imposed even more stringent domestic austerity measures, its assured survival depends upon substantial economic and military assistance, which can come only from the United States. Our program for Israel represents our best judgment of the appropriate assistance required from us to maintain the defensive strength and economic health which Israel requires for its security and survival.

Our request for **Egypt** — which is entirely for **non-military** supporting assistance — also rests on valid requirements and considerations of US national interests. Egypt holds a historic position of leadership in the Arab world and has courageously committed itself to pursuing peace. Egypt has demonstrated its good faith and sincerity by ending its long-time close dependence on the Soviet Union and by moving dramatically toward closer relations with the West. It is clearly in our interest to demonstrate that countries which pursue such policies can obtain the support of the United States. Our supporting assistance to Egypt is aimed at encouraging our growing and mutually beneficial friendship.

Jordan, which is of strategic importance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, has long been recognized as a force of moderation in the Middle East. Jordan is a strong friend of the United States and is working to overcome its serious problems of economic underdevelopment. Our security assistance helps Jordan to proceed with its development and helps it also to maintain its politically moderate course.

Syria will play an integral part in any peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and has generally followed a moderate and helpful course in political efforts to contain the conflict in Lebanon. Our non-military supporting assistance program with Syria is essential to maintaining the close working relationship we need as we continue our peace efforts.

We stress that our security assistance to, and improved relations with, Arab nations do not undermine in any sense our traditional friendship with Israel. The policy of encouraging constructive and moderate forces in the Arab world is the best way we can help all the parties to attain a durable peace that will assure the survival and security of Israel.

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During the past year, the Middle East Special Requirements Fund permitted us to respond promptly to special needs arising from our Middle East peace efforts. We will continue to need this capability to move rapidly to support activities contributing to peace in the area and to maintain our Support Mission in the Sinai.

Much remains to be done to achieve peace in the Middle East. Our efforts to generate further movement in the Middle East peace negotiations are entering another difficult and critical period. We are determined to maintain the momentum toward peace. We are currently engaged in intensive consultations with all the governments directly concerned to try to reach agreement on how to proceed. Our security assistance program, and our close, cooperative relations with countries of the region, will be as important to our efforts in the future as they were to helping us to achieve the Interim Sinai Agreement in 1975. We will continue to need the sustained, strong support of the Congress and the American people for these efforts.

The crisis in **Lebanon** is at this moment a major preoccupation of this Government and of all the Middle East Governments involved in the peace-making process. We are actively engaged in assisting the various Lebanese parties in the search for a solution to their internal conflict, so that it does not become the spark of renewed hostilities in the region. Our efforts in Lebanon are thus directly supportive of our Middle East peace-making role, which we are determined to press forward as rapidly as circumstances in the region permit.

## II. Other Regional Programs

Aside from the Middle East program request for $2.9 billion, the breakdown of our Fiscal Year 1977 requests is as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Percentage of Total Program</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Europe</td><td>$448 million</td><td>11 percent</td></tr><tr><td>East Asia</td><td>$496 million</td><td>12 percent</td></tr><tr><td>Latin America</td><td>$208 million</td><td>5 percent</td></tr><tr><td>Africa</td><td>$ 59 million</td><td>1 percent</td></tr><tr><td>Near East</td><td>$ 47 million</td><td>1 percent</td></tr></tbody></table>

### Europe

In Europe, **Greece** and **Turkey** continue to be the focal points of our program. We must continue to give substance to our concern for their security and stability and for the friendship that has so long characterized our relations with these nations. The **MAP**, **FMS**, and training funds requested should help to return our mutual defense relationships to a more normal footing, and allow both Greece and Turkey to play more effective roles within NATO.

As you know, the Turkish Foreign Minister and I signed a new defense cooperation agreement between the US and Turkey on April 7 which will be submitted to Congress in the near future under a joint resolution. This agreement will replace the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and will, when approved by the Congress, provide for the resumption of our

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use of important intelligence facilities and installations in Turkey. The agreement establishes the level of US assistance to Turkey during a four-year period at $250 million per year, one-fifth of which will be in grant assistance, the remainder in credit and guarantees. The implementation of this agreement will restore the traditional US-Turkish relationship within the NATO Alliance, contribute to the settlement of problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, and strengthen the conditions for peace and stability in that area.

This Administration has endeavored to maintain an even-handed approach to both Greece and Turkey. By way of pursuing that approach we have begun negotiations with the Greek Government which will lead to an agreement parallel to the one which has been signed with Turkey. We are meeting presently with representatives of the Greek Government in order to discuss a multi-year security assistance commitment. We are convinced that our demonstration of even-handed concern for the security interests of these two traditional allies of the United States will contribute to the environment within which their disputes can be resolved quickly and peacefully.

We also have key strategic interests at the western end of the Mediterranean, on the Iberian Peninsula.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain is currently before the Senate for its advice and consent. We engaged in extensive consultations with the Congress during the negotiations with the Spanish Government, and decided to submit it as a treaty largely because of the advice which we received. This treaty is a unique agreement which encompasses both a closer relationship with Spain and an agreement for the use of facilities in Spain in exchange for a five-year program of assistance. We consider this a particularly significant agreement which serves US interests in the Atlantic area and supports Spain at a time when it is moving into a new era in its domestic and international activities. We have suggested to the Senate that a Joint Resolution for authorization might be appropriate. We request that the Congress take whatever measures are necessary to approve the funds in the treaty.

In regard to Portugal, the supporting assistance funds which we are requesting will contribute to its ability to deal with massive economic dislocations left in the wake of last year's political turmoil and will help to support a emerging democratic process.

## East Asia

In East Asia, we are continuing our security relationship with the Republic of Korea. As a result of Korea's continuing economic progress, we are terminating our grant material assistance program after FY 75 and are now requesting only those MAP grant funds needed to deliver material previously funded under MAP. If we receive the FMS funding levels requested in our FY 77 program, we will complete the joint US-ROK modernization plan begun in 1970. For its part, the Republic of Korea is now undertaking a further five-year Force Improvement Plan on its own initiative and with its own resources. At the same time, we for our part expect to continue to request significant levels of FMS guaranteed loans in support of our mutual security objectives in Korea.

We know the concern of the Congress on human rights matters. The Korean human rights situation is an important element in our policy considerations. We have strongly made known our views to the Korean Government and there should be no doubt about the position of the US on the human rights issue.

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At the same time we cannot lose sight of our basic concerns over the security situation on the Korean peninsula and its importance to the peace and security of the area. Our request is based on our own assessment of the need to maintain the military balance in Korea and is in support of our security objectives in Korea, Japan, and East Asia generally.

For **Thailand** we have requested continuing grant MAP and FMS credit funds.
We believe the essential objectives of our support for Thai self-sufficiency
remain valid.

## Latin America

In Latin America, the common program denominator continues to be training. We believe that training provides, at minimal cost, significant benefits in terms of working level contacts between American officers and their Latin American counterparts, some of whom may be expected to rise to positions of leadership in their respective governments. Proposed FMS credits are modest in relation to both the purchasers' means and modernization requirements, and entirely consistent with the tendency of Latin American governments to hold defense expenditures to a low level in favor of development spending.

## Africa

Recent events in Africa have shown that our unilateral restraint cannot prevent the introduction of arms and great power interests into this continent. We support self-determination for the peoples of Africa, and wish to contribute to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. As you are aware, I am planning to visit several African countries in the near future, which will provide opportunities to discuss with various national leaders our perceptions and evolving policies with respect to conflict areas. Our security assistance program consists of modest FMS credits for Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia and Zaire. MAP is limited to Ethiopia. Low-key training efforts in these countries, plus Ghana and Senegal would enhance our present bilateral cooperation while minimizing our military involvement.

## Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination

I would like to turn now to an issue which is of concern to both the Congress and the Administration — the relationship between our security assistance program and the domestic conduct of some of the governments that receive our assistance. I have, on several occasions, expressed my firm belief that the security of the United States and its allies is the paramount rationale for extending security assistance.

Certainly we cannot — and we do not — ignore domestic practices which deny those human rights that civilized states commonly agree are inalienable. Nor, in our view, should the United States ignore domestic practices which are prejudicial to equal status among human beings. We make our views — and those of the Congress — known to the governments concerned. We are convinced, however, that withdrawal of security assistance is an extreme measure that harms our other objectives while holding little promise for effecting desirable changes. Indeed, experience has shown that influence with other nations depreciates as we cut the bonds that hold us together. Moreover, such withdrawal, or even the threat of withdrawal, depreciates the defense relationship which we share with our allies and offers encouragement to our potential enemies.

The Secretary
of State

Speech

April 16, 1976

Phoenix, Ariz.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

A STRONG FOREIGN POLICY
FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Downtown Rotary Club.*

I am happy to be here in the great Southwest, where the freshness and vitality of the American spirit are so evident.

In recent years we have seen opinion on foreign policy in this country swing back and forth erratically—from peace demonstrations to calls for confrontation; from antimilitarism to concern for a strong defense; from over-involvement to a new isolationism; from enthusiasm to disillusionment; and back again.

Today some would have Americans believe that the issue is between those who are optimistic and those who are pessimistic about America.

But that is *not* the problem before us. The real issue is whether we understand the complexities and the opportunities that are before us.

Winston Churchill once said: "When danger is far off, we may think of our weakness; when it is near, we must not forget our strength." A period of thermonuclear peril and global upheaval is not the moment to forget our success, our unequalled reserves of military and economic power, or the decisive advantages we enjoy as a free people with a free productive system.

In this Bicentennial year it is time to remind ourselves that an effective foreign policy must reflect the values and permanent interests of our Nation and not the fashionable trends of the moment. These values and interests antedate this election year and must be maintained beyond it.

I am here to tell you that America remains— and will remain—the most powerful nation in the world.

I am here to tell you that the President and his Administration have founded their policies on a fundamental faith in America's vast strength and potential for greatness.

We see challenging trends but we are confident that they can be mastered. We see dangers but we are certain that they can be overcome.

The optimist is not one who pretends that challenges do not exist—that is escapism. The true optimist has faith in his nation; he believes that challenges are to be mastered—not avoided. He is willing to trust the intelligence of the public for he knows that Americans can understand and deal with complexity. He knows that Americans have always regarded challenge not as a cause for despair but as a call to action, a stimulus to achievement, and a priceless chance to shape the future.

The Founding Fathers, the pioneers who opened up this vast land, the men and women who built the greatest and freest and most productive society in history—they were people of confidence and hope. Those of us today who truly have faith in America will live up to that tradition.

To oversimplify, to substitute brittle rhetoric for hard thinking is not confidence in America. To offer slogans instead of answers is to show little faith in the American people.

The task of foreign policy is to understand our reality—to perceive the challenges to our interests and principles. It is to devise means for

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meeting those challenges. And it is to persevere
toward our goals unafraid and unswayed by the
passions of the moment.

Government in a free society has the obligation to tell the people the truth, without sugar-coating or resorting to scare tactics. The real issue before our country now is not between optimists and pessimists but between those who support a strong American leadership in the world and those who believe that America cannot, or should not, play such a role.

The Administration has made its choice. Our policy is based on the conviction that without America's determination there can be no security; without our dedication there can be no progress; and without our example there can be no freedom.

## America's Response to Challenge

In the inevitable self-criticism of a democracy, we must take care not to create an impression of impatience or uncertainty. We must never forget the great achievements of American foreign policy over three decades of involvement in world affairs.

The United States took the lead in helping Europe and Japan recover from devastation and join us in alliances that are the pillars of global stability. We opposed aggression; we mediated conflicts. We created the international economic institutions that expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. We became the world's leader in technology, in agricultural productivity, in economic enterprise. We led the world's struggle against famine, disease, and natural disaster; we promoted education and economic development in every quarter of the globe; we welcomed refugees from oppression to our shores.

And amid all the turmoil of recent years at home, our foreign policy has seen one of its most fruitful periods. Today:

* We are at peace.

* We are the world's strongest nation militarily and economically; our technological superiority is unquestioned, continuing, and growing.

* Our alliances are cooperating more closely than at any time in many years.

* We have begun to forge more rational and long-term relations with potential adversaries. Our new relationship with China is growing, durable,

and a positive factor in the world scene. With the Soviet Union we have resolved some conflicts, such as Berlin, and slowed some aspects of the arms race.

* For the first time in 30 years we have helped the countries of the Middle East take significant steps toward peace.

* We have been leaders in shaping new economic relations between the industrial world and developing world.

This is a record of which we can be proud and on which we should seek to build. So let us not delude ourselves with fairy tales of America being second best and forever taken in by wily foreigners.

Americans have nothing to fear from competition—for in almost every area of rivalry we have the advantage. Americans know we have the capacity, if we have the will, to maintain freedom and peace. They understand too that our strength is essential for peace but also that peace must be something better than a precarious balance of terror.

Therefore our foreign policy is designed to further three principal objectives:

* To strengthen the unity of the great industrial democracies and our alliances;

* To maintain the global balance of power and to build on this foundation a lasting peace; and

* To fashion between the industrial world and the developing nations positive and reliable economic relations to insure mutual prosperity.

Let me discuss these in turn.

## The Challenge of Democracy

Our first priority is our relationship with the great industrial democracies.

There is no doubt that freedom today is under serious challenge. Democratic societies are in a numerical minority in the world and, within many of them, antidemocratic forces are gaining in strength.

The dangers are real but so is our collective capacity to respond. We and our allies account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade; we are the world's most indus-

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trialized and urbanized societies; it is we who are the pioneers of the modern age; we who have the experience, the intellectual creativity, and the resources to lead attempts to solve the economic and social problems facing this shrinking planet. There is no reason for us to falter. Many of the challenges to the industrial democracies are of their own making. Therefore they can be mastered with confidence, vision, and creativity.

We are by nature a self-critical people and never more so than in our election year. This causes us sometimes to take for granted the solid achievements of the recent past.

* Faced with an oil embargo and an energy crisis the United States took the lead in establishing—together with the other industrial democracies—a new institution: the International Energy Agency. This cooperative enterprise will enable the industrial democracies to support each other in case of another embargo. It has established common conservation policies and common policies for the development of alternative sources of energy. A great challenge has brought forth a cooperative and vital response.

* Faced with global recession the heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan met to concert their economic policies. They stimulated fresh approaches to reinforce each others' programs for recovery, trade, and energy. They agreed on monetary reform which over time may usher in a period of unparalleled economic progress. Most fundamentally they symbolized their political cohesion and shared moral values.

* Faced with the growth of Soviet power we have strengthened the defenses of our alliances with new programs of planning, consultation, modernization, and standardization.

* And faced with the need to fashion more balanced partnerships we have intensified our consultations and our collaboration.

These are not the actions of governments uncertain of their future. They reflect the conviction that no force in the world can match the voluntary association of free peoples. Our relations with the industrial democracies have never been stronger and our unity never more effective. With

economic recovery well underway we will be even stronger—individually and collectively.

Together with the other industrial democracies we face, with confidence, a vast agenda.

* The United States is determined to protect our Nation's security and that of our friends and allies; we will do our part to maintain the global balance that has preserved peace and freedom for three decades.

* Together we will foster economic progress and social justice in our societies, for the principles of freedom and human dignity which we cherish must rest on a firm foundation of responsiveness to the needs of our peoples.

* We will intensify collaboration on the great new issues of our time—the economic, political, and social challenges of global interdependence; the easing of tensions between East and West; and the forging of cooperation between developed and developing countries.

* The United States has encouraged and welcomed those of its allies that moved from dictatorship toward democracy. For the same reason we will continue to warn against those who would turn over a major share in Western democratic governments to Communist parties suddenly seeking respectability. We would do our allies no favor if we encouraged wishful thinking that the advent of Communist parties into power will not represent a watershed in our relations. The basic reality is that our people will not accept the same close and confidential relationship with Western countries where Communist parties have been granted a major share in government.

* We will stand for the cause of liberty and independence around the world for if we do not champion our own cause, no one else will do it for us.

* We will never forget that the democratic nations hold in trust humanity's highest principles and aspirations and that they thus bear a grave responsibility.

## The Challenge of Peace

Time and again in this century Americans have fought for peace. No people knows better than we the meaning of that responsibility—especially in an age shadowed by the menace of

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nuclear cataclysm. When war would threaten the life of literally every American there is no higher duty than the dedicated search for peace.

But peace is far more than the mere absence of war. We will never make-in the name of peace-agreements that jeopardize our values and interests or the values and interests of our friends. We know, too, that the mere desire for peace is not enough. Since the days of Thucydides statesmen have recognized that peace with justice comes only "... where the pressure of necessity is equal; for the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must." There can be no security without an equilibrium, and no safety without a balance of power.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world's fears of catastrophe and its hopes for peace have hinged centrally upon the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. When two superpowers have the capacity to destroy mankind in a matter of hours, there can be no greater imperative than managing the relationship between them with wisdom and restraint.

The growth of the Soviet Union to superpower status was inevitable given its industrial and technological base. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it; nothing we do now will make it go away. What we can do-together with our friends-is to maintain our strength and our considerable advantages and demonstrate our determination to prevent the irresponsible use of Soviet power. At the same time we must strive to go beyond a balance of force to shape a safer and more durable relationship of coexistence. Peace thus requires a dual policy. And we have worked hard at both these tasks.

We have kept our strategic forces sufficient to deter attack and maintain the nuclear balance. And because we know that the perception of power can be almost as important as the reality, we have made certain that other nations recognize the adequacy of our strength.

Nevertheless the strategic arms competition takes place in unprecedented conditions. As late as the end of World War II every increase in destructive power was strategically useful. Today additions to the nuclear arsenals of either side do not automatically lead to political or military advantage. Indeed at current and foreseeable levels of

nuclear arms it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic arsenals of the two sides determined the outcome.

The tendency toward stalemate inherent in the nuclear arms race produces new requirements for our national defense. Under the umbrella of strategic standoff, increasing attention must be given to regional defense. For it is in peripheral areas where a military imbalance can be turned into a geopolitical change that could, in time, affect the global balance. This is why we are expanding our Army from 13 to 16 divisions, developing a new generation of fighter aircraft, and accelerating our naval construction; and it is why we must spend what is necessary to meet the new overall requirements.

In assessing current debates and charges it is important that the public understand the long-range nature of modern military planning. Because of the long leadtimes in the development of new weapons, the forces in being today reflect decisions taken in the 1960's; the decisions we make today will not affect our forces until at least the early 1980's. This imposes upon us the need for careful long-range planning and analysis of needs. With modern weapons national defense cannot be assured by quick fixes. Not every category of weapon is as useful for us as it is for our adversaries and vice versa. We must and we shall maintain a steady course, mindful that what we decide today will affect the security of Americans for decades.

At the same time we must look beyond security to a safer, more durable pattern of coexistence. A balance of terror constantly contested is an unsatisfactory foundation for our security. We shall defend the global balance with vigilance, but at the same time we shall continue to search for new patterns of restraint, of communication, and of cooperation. Only when the rights of nations are respected-when accommodation takes the place of force-can man's energies be devoted to the realization of its higher aspirations.

To check-and ultimately to reverse-the nuclear spiral, we have sought and achieved important arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement of 1972 halted the Soviet numerical buildup, and the Vladivostok agreement places an equal ceiling

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on strategic forces of both sides. When this ceiling is translated into a formal agreement we shall have reduced the danger of nuclear cataclysm. At the same time we will be able to devote the priorities in our planning to regional defense where the needs are greatest.

In the past week we have achieved a new agreement which will limit the size of peaceful nuclear explosions and—for the first time—allow the United States to conduct on-site inspections on Soviet territory. This is a principle which we have sought to establish throughout the postwar period. Its achievement is not only a significant symbol but an important practical step to bring greater discipline to the nuclear age.

In addition to arms control we have engaged the Soviet Union in efforts to resolve concrete political problems. For example the Berlin agreement of 1971 was a negotiated solution to a perennial problem that had threatened major war on at least three occasions in 20 years. And we have also reached agreement on many bilateral projects that are based strictly on mutual benefit and can help moderate Soviet behavior.

We must see these achievements in perspective. We cannot relax our vigilance. We must not believe that the conflict of two generations can be quickly overcome. For the foreseeable future we and the Soviet Union will remain ideological adversaries. But we have an obligation to explore all honorable roads to reduction of tensions and a relationship based on coexistence rather than on tests of strength. We cannot stop trying, for we owe our children a better world than we found.

These then are the realities of our policy toward the Soviet Union.

* We have the military, diplomatic, and economic capacity to prevent the use of Soviet power for unilateral advantage or political expansion.

* We shall maintain the strategic and conventional forces needed to protect our security, and we shall muster the political will to insure that local situations are not exploited for unilateral gain which could undermine global stability.

* We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us, whether by violations of agreements already concluded, by making unwise

new agreements, or by neglect of our own programs.

* At the same time we must recognize that sovereign states of roughly equal power cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other and ultimately must deal with each other by compromise.

* We shall pursue the two strands of our policy toward the Soviet Union—firmness in the face of pressure and readiness to work on the basis of strict reciprocity for a more cooperative world. This is an obligation we have to our people, to our future, and to mankind.

## The Challenge of Prosperity

In recent years no issue has demanded more of our attention than the prospects of the world economy. This Nation has unrivaled economic strength, but in an interdependent world we must work with others if our economy is to thrive.

The facts of interdependence were brought home to us dramatically by the oil embargo of 1973. It accelerated inflation and produced the largest unemployment, as well as the most severe recession, of the postwar period. It is estimated to have cost us upward of $10 billion in lost production.

The global economy is now a single system; interdependence can strain it or enhance it. For the first time in history humanity's age-old dream of a just, stable, and prosperous world for all is a realistic possibility.

American policy has been designed to serve our interests in a global context of cooperation. For our Nation's prosperity requires a healthy and cooperative world environment. The price and supply of energy and raw materials, the conditions of trade and investment, the protection of the environment, international law to govern the use of the oceans and space—these are all issues on which our prosperity and progress depend.

As the world's strongest power the United States could best survive an era of economic warfare. At home we are leading the recovery from the most difficult economic period since the 1930's—a performance which stands in sharp contrast to those economies based on rigid principles of planning, on labor extracted by compulsion, or capital formed through inadequate compensation

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of labor. Abroad our technological innovation, global business expertise, and commercial dynamism have reinforced American interests and spread prosperity to every part of our planet. It is America that is the engine of the global economy; we to whom the developing nations address their claims and their complaints—for they know that our open economic system more than any other fosters the prospects for growth and widening opportunity for all.

But while we are prepared to defend our economic interests unilaterally, we know too that nations will prosper together or they will suffer together.

This is why the United States has taken the lead in advancing the vision of an open, growing, and cooperative world economy. It was the United States that called for and helped launch the World Food Conference in 1974 where we offered concrete proposals to improve world food production; we offer every human being security against hunger. At the special session of the United Nations last September and at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, we have set forth a wide range of practical initiatives which address all the key global economic issues—raw materials, development, finance, and—most important—energy. A week ago [April 8] I presented the Law of the Sea Conference in New York with new American proposals designed to move this historic negotiation to a successful conclusion this year. This would be a major diplomatic event with far-reaching implications for security and commerce, for food and energy, for raw materials and research, and for international law and cooperation. Later this month I will attend the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development where we will continue to demonstrate American leadership on the broad range of relations between North and South.

These U.S. initiatives have substantially improved the international atmosphere and laid the foundations for progress on one of the great endeavors of the modern era—the construction of a truly just and cooperative international economy.

These are the realities of the global economic challenge.

* Today all national economies are sustained

by the global economic system; interdependence is not a slogan but a reality and goes to the heart of the international order. Prosperity and justice underpin every society's ability to achieve its national goals.

* Since we are the single greatest concentration of economic wealth and power, global prosperity and our own well-being depend crucially on this country's leadership. What is asked of us now is not so much our resources but our creativity and vision in helping the world organize equitable patterns of economic relations.

* The United States will not be pressured, nor will we yield to blackmail or threats. Those who indulge in unrealistic proposals, one-sided bloc voting, appeals to stale ideologies of confrontation or resentment will only block cooperative progress.

* Here, too, we will pursue a dual policy; we will resist pressures, but we are prepared to participate constructively in cooperative efforts based on mutual respect.

## The American Responsibility

Thus the challenges we face are great and complex.

But the record shows that we have responded—with confidence and with success. Ours is not the record of a tired nation but of a vibrant people for whom frontiers have always denoted a challenge, not a limit. We are not weak; we have no intention of letting others determine our future. America has the strength, resilience, and purpose to meet the modern era on its own terms. We are determined to help shape an international environment which, more than ever before in history, improves the lives and reflects the values of our people.

So let us stop disparaging our strength, either moral or material, because if we do friends of America grow uncertain, enemies become bold, and a world yearning for leadership loses hope.

Let us tell our people and the world the truth: America will continue to meet the challenges of its time. America and its allies possess the greatest economic and military power the world has ever seen.

We have the courage and the self-confidence

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to prevent nuclear war. We have the vision and the
spirit to help shape a more peaceful, more stable
world.

We have the resources, the technology, the
skill, and the organizing genius to build a world
economic system together with all nations-
developing and developed alike. And this will fufill
the aspirations of all peoples for dignity and well-
being.

It is in this spirit that next week I shall go to
Africa where I will carry America's message of
hope, social justice, aspiration for human dignity,
the rule of the majority, and cooperation. And I
shall also warn against foreign intervention-direct
or surrogate-that would block all hope for
progress.

But we can realize our historic responsibility
only as a united and confident people. Our greatest
foreign policy need is to end our divisions and self-
denigration-to recall that we have permanent
interests and values that we must nurture and de-
fend, to recapture the sense that we are all engaged
in a common enterprise.

We remain the world's strongest nation, but
we no longer have the overwhelming global pre-
dominance of previous decades. Today we must
lead, not by our power alone but by our wisdom,

boldness, vision, and perseverance. We must be a
steadfast friend to those who would be our friend;
we must be a determined opponent of those who
would be our enemy. We must maintain
simultaneously our defenses, our alliances, our
principles, and our commitment to a cooperative
world. And I have every confidence in our ability
to do so.

In this Bicentennial year we honor our
Founding Fathers for many things-but most of all
for their faith in the American people on whom
the success of the American experiment has always
depended. They were dreamers who believed in the
future and the Nation they had created. They were
optimists, because they believed that free men of
courage could shape their destiny. And in the end
they were realists, because they were right.

At its foundation America was, because of its
promise, the hope of the world. Today it remains,
because of what it has become, the best hope of all
mankind.

This generation of Americans, like every
generation before it, will shape its destiny and in
helping the world will help itself. For what we-
and the world around us-shall be is in our hands.
And like those Americans who have gone before
us, we shall not fail.

Ladies and gentlemen:

In recent years we have seen opinion on foreign policy
in this country swing back and forth erratically -- from
peace demonstrations to calls for confrontation; from
antimilitarism to concern for a strong defense; from over-
involvement to a new isolationism; from enthusiasm to
disillusionment; and back again.

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about America.

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permanent interests of our nation and not the fashionable
trends of the moment. These values and interests antedate
this election year and must be maintained beyond it.

I am here to tell you that America remains -- and will
remain -- the most powerful nation in the world.

The optimist is not one who pretends that challenges do
not exist -- that is escapism. The true optimist has faith in
his nation; he believes that challenges are to be mastered --

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not avoided. He is willing to trust the intelligence of the
public for he knows that Americans can understand and deal
with complexity. He knows that Americans have always
regarded challenge not as a cause for despair, but as a call
to action, a stimulus to achievement, and a priceless chance
to shape the future.

The Founding Fathers, the pioneers who opened up this
vast land, the men and women who built the greatest and
freest and most productive society in history -- they were
people of confidence and hope.

To over-simplify, to substitute brittle rhetoric for hard
thinking, is not confidence in America. To offer slogans

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The task of foreign policy is to understand our reality --
to perceive the challenges to our interests and principles. It
is to devise means for meeting those challenges. And it is to
persevere toward our goals unafraid and unswayed by the passions
of the moment.

Government in a free society has the obligation to tell the
people the truth, without sugar-coating or resorting to scare
tactics. The real issue before our country now is not between
optimists and pessimists, but between those who support a strong
American leadership in the world and those who believe that
America cannot, or should not, play such a role.

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Today:

-- We are at peace.

-- We are the world's strongest nation militarily and
economically; our technological superiority is
unquestioned, continuing and growing.

-- Our alliances are cooperating more closely than at
any time in many years.

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-- We have begun to forge more rational and long-term relations with potential adversaries. Our new relationship with China is growing, durable and a positive factor in the world scene. With the Soviet Union we have resolved some conflicts, such as Berlin, and slowed some aspects of the arms race.

-- For the first time in 30 years, we have helped the countries of the Middle East take significant steps towards peace.

-- We have been leaders in shaping new economic relations between the industrial world and developing world.

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Americans have nothing to fear from competition --
for in almost every area of rivalry we have the advantage.
Americans know we have the capacity, if we have the will, to
maintain freedom and peace. They understand too that our
strength is essential for peace, but also that peace must be
something better than a precarious balance of terror.

Therefore, our foreign policy is designed to further
three principal objectives:

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-- to strengthen the unity of the great industrial democracies and our alliances,

-- to maintain the global balance of power and to build on this foundation a lasting peace,

-- to fashion between the industrial world and the developing nations positive and reliable economic relations to ensure mutual prosperity.

Let me discuss these in turn.

## The Challenge of Democracy

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in the world and within many of them, anti-democratic forces are gaining in strength.

The dangers are real, but so is our collective capacity to respond. We and our allies account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade; we are the world's most industrialized and urbanized societies; it is we who are the pioneers of the modern age; we who have the experience, the intellectual creativity and the resources to lead attempts to solve the economic and social problems facing this shrinking planet. There is no reason for us to falter. Many of the challenges to the industrial democracies are of their own making. Therefore, they can be mastered with confidence, vision and creativity.

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so than in our election year. This causes us sometimes to
take for granted the solid achievements of the recent past:

-- Faced with an oil embargo and an energy crisis,
the United States took the lead in establishing
together with the other industrial democracies a
new institution: the International Energy Agency.
This cooperative enterprise will enable the
industrial democracies to support each other in
case of another embargo. It has established
common conservation policies and common policies
for the development of alternative sources of energy.
A great challenge has brought forth a cooperative
and vital response.

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-- Faced with global recession, the heads of government of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan met to concert their economic policies. They stimulated fresh approaches to reinforce each others' programs for recovery, trade and energy. They agreed on monetary reform which over time may usher in a period of unparalleled economic progress.

Most fundamentally, they symbolized their political cohesion and shared moral values.

-- Faced with the growth of Soviet power we have strengthened the defenses of our alliances with new programs of planning, consultation,

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modernization and standardization.

-- And faced with the need to fashion more balanced partnerships we have intensified our consultations and our collaboration.

Our relations with the industrial democracies have never been stronger and our unity never more effective. With economic recovery well underway we will be even stronger, individually and collectively.

Together with the other industrial democracies we face, with confidence, a vast agenda:

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-- The United States is determined to protect our nation's security and that of our friends and allies; we will do our part to maintain the global balance that has preserved peace and freedom for three decades.

-- Together we will foster economic progress and social justice in our societies, for the principles of freedom and human dignity which we cherish must rest on a firm foundation of responsiveness to the needs of our peoples.

-- We will intensify collaboration on the great new issues of our time -- the economic, political and social challenges of global interdependence, the