CBS REPORTS-TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD

as broadcast over the

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Tuesday, December 21, 1965

10:00-11:00 PM, EST

With CBS NEWS Correspondent Charles Collingwood

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Don Hewitt

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in the program are owned by CBS. This transcript may not
be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for
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written permission of the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

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ANNOUNCER: International Business Machines, IBM, which this season has brought you TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD, CBS REPORTS, THE NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP TEST, tonight presents Broadcast Four in this distinguished series. Now, another TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD, moderated by CBS News Correspondent Charles Collingwood.

COLLINGWOOD: Good evening. As part of our continuing special coverage of the war in Vietnam, this CBS NEWS broadcast, TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD, has arranged a transatlantic debate on the subject: "Resolved that the United States should carry out its commitment in Vietnam." The two debating teams, one in England and the other in the United States, are linked together via Early Bird Satellite. They see each other. On this side of the Atlantic, two Harvard students and a distinguished Harvard professor; on the other side, two Oxford students and a famous Oxford graduate. At this time, I think I ought to introduce them to each other. First, on the subject, the debating side taking the affirmative side of this resolution, the team arguing that the United States should carry out its commitment, this is Robert Shrum, a student at Harvard Law School. Mr. Shrum was picked this year as the top debater at the National Intercollegiate Debate Tournament.

Next, Professor Henry A. Kissinger, of Harvard. Professor Kissinger is a leading scholar and theoretician on defense and foreign policy in the nuclear age. He's been an advisor to the United States Government under four Presidents and has recently returned from Vietnam.

Presidents and Vice Presidents recently returned from Vietnam.

He's been an advisor to the United States Government under Tom
theRETENTAN on defense and foreign policy in the Uncertain Age.
of Harvard. Professor Klaasen is a founding scholar and
Next, Professor Henry A. Klaasen,
Tournament.

Dear Sir, the job depater at the National Intercollegiate Debate
Society, a student at Harvard Law School. Mr. Klaasen was picked this
United States should carry out its commitment, this is Robert.
theative side of the resolution, the team arguing for the
of each other. First, on the subject, the debate side taking the
Oxford graduate. At this time, I think I ought to introduce them
professor on the other side, two Oxford students and a famous
the Atlantic, two Harvard students and a distinguished Harvard
its Early First Satellite. They see each other. On this side of
in England and the other in the United States, are linked together
carry out its commitment in Vietnam." The two debate sides, one
debate on the subject: "Received that the United States should
produce a TOWM MEETING OF THE WORLD, has arranged a transatlantic
continuing a special coverage of the war in Vietnam, this CBS NEWS
COMMENTARY: Good evening. As part of our
Collingwood.

MEETING OF THE WORLD, moderated by CBS News Correspondent Charles
Broadcast from in this broadcasting series. Now, another TOWM
CBS REPORTS: THE NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP TEST, content presents
TOM, which this season has brought your TOWM MEETING OF THE WORLD,
ANNOUNGER:
International Business News

2

Mr. Laurence Tribe is, like Mr. Shrum, at Harvard Law School. He's also a notable college debater, his team having won the National championship in 1961.

Now, Messrs. Shrum, Kissinger and Tribe, I'd like you to meet your opponents in England. Mr. Tariq Ali of Lahore, Pakistan. A former president of the Union at Oxford, he's been quoted as predicting that he'll be President of Pakistan in ten years. In the meantime, he's standing as candidate for Parliament in the radical alliance interest against British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. Mr. Michael Foot, who is presently a member of Parliament and is generally regarded as the ablest and most articulate spokesman for the Labour Party's left. Mr. Foot has also had a brilliant career outside of Parliament as an author and journalist. Mr. Stephen Marks, a former chairman of the Oxford Labour Club, has been called the most formidable debater at Oxford.

Now, gentlemen, let me give you the ground rules of this debate of ours. We're going to start with minute-and-a-half arguments from the students on each team. You may find that a little constricting, but there'll be time later. They'll be followed by two and a half minutes by senior members, Professor Kissinger and Mr. Foot; and when your time is up, I'll ring a bell, like that, carried across the Atlantic via Early Bird. Now, after the opening statements, we'll open things up for a give-and-take discussion among the two teams and later we'll invite the audiences in London and New York to give questions to you, and incidentally, I think I'd better introduce the audiences. In London, students from Oxford, members of the Oxford Union. We're making no pretense, of course, that everyone at Oxford agrees with

making no pretence of coming first, everyone at Oxford agrees with
London, students from Oxford, members of the Oxford Union. Here's
incidentally, I think I'd better introduce the audience. In
audience in London and New York to give directions to you, and
and--take your disclamation along the two teams and later we'll invite the
Now, after the opening statements, we'll open things up for a five-
ing a bit, like that, carried across the Atlantic via Early Flight.
Professor Kleefuwer and Mr. Food, and when your time is up, I'll,
They'll be followed by two and a half minutes by senior members,
may find that a little contracting, but that'll be time later.
minute-and-a-half arguments from the arguments on each team. Your
draw round rules of this debate of course. We're going to start with
Now, Gentlemen, let me give you
Robert Clapp, he has been called the most considerable debater at Oxford,
Jounnalist. Mr. Stephen Marka, a former chairman of the Oxford
had a brilliant career outside of Parliament as an author and
affiliates a considerable part of the Labour Party's left. Mr. Food has also
member of Parliament and is generally regarded as the effect and most
Secretary Michael Stewart. Mr. Michael Stewart, who is presently a
Parliament in the radical alliance interest against British Foreign
in ten years. In the meantime, he's standing as candidate for
he's been noted as predicting that he'll be President of Parliament
All of Wales, Wales. A former president of the Union at Oxford,
Tripe, I'd like you to meet your opponent in England. Mr. Tait
Now, Mrs. Pease, Drumm, Kraaijen and
the team having won the National championship in 1958.
Drumm, at Harvard Law School. He's also a notable college debater,
Mr. Lawrence Tripe is, like Mr.

S

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the view taken by the Oxford debaters; nor for that matter, that
the American college students from the various schools in the New
York area here all agree with the views taken by the Harvard
debaters.

Now, after all that ado, but with
no further, let's begin with the first American spokesman for the
affirmative, Mr. Larry Tribe. One and a half minutes, Mr. Tribe.

TRIBE:

Ladies and gentlemen: Asians

and Americans are dying tonight in order to preserve a world in which
each nation can shape its own future. Peace was preserved in Cuba
and Berlin because no one doubted that we would carry out our
pledge not to back down. We have made that pledge in Vietnam.

Nowhere have we said more clearly, "We will stand." If we abandon
that commitment, imagine a future confrontation and ask yourself,
who would believe us then?

Vietnam was one country before
it was divided; so was Korea, so was Germany. The issues are the
same in Vietnam. There can be no peace when international lines of
demarcation are challenged by military force, when the pen that
draws those lines is challenged by the sword. Nor can there be
peace so long as unrest and social revolution remains the prey of
hostile powers, the focal point of global confrontation. We seek
no military victory in Vietnam. We will withdraw when North
Vietnam ceases its support and guidance of the South, ceases its
support of the war. That will come about when Hanoi is convinced
of our resolve. To retreat before she is convinced would tempt
aggressors everywhere.

agreements everywhere.

of our own. To return before she is convinced would render
support of the war. That will come about when Hanof is convinced
Vietnam ceases its support and influence of the South, ceases its
no military victory in Vietnam. We will withdraw when North
battling powers, the local point of global confrontation. We seek
peace as long as meat and social revolution remains the prey of
drives those lines of challenge by the award. Nor can there be
democracies that are challenged by military force, when the pen that
same in Vietnam. There can be no peace when international fire of
it was divided; to be Korea, so was Germany. The fates are the
Vietnam was one country before

who would believe us then?

that commitment, imagine a future confrontation and ask yourself,
nowhere have we said more clearly, "We will attend." If we abandon
people not to back down, we have made that pledge in Vietnam.
and Berlin because no one thought that we would carry out our
same nation can assure its own future. Peace was preserved in Cuba
and Americans are dying tonight in order to preserve a world in which

Tales: Tables and Gentlemen: Afrikaans
Afrikaans, Mr. Harry Tribes, One and a half minutes, Mr. Tribes.
no further, let's begin with the first American spokesman for the
now, after all that I did, put with
tribes.

Afrikaans, Mr. Harry Tribes, One and a half minutes, Mr. Tribes.
How, after all that I did, put with
tribes.

York area here all agree with the views taken by the Harvard
the American college students from the various schools in the New
the area taken by the Oxford depots; nor can I say that matter, first

4

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Tribe. Now, for the negative. Mr. Tariq Ali of Oxford.

ALI: I would like to pick up where Mr. Tribe left off on the subject of negotiations. The Hanoi regime, before the United States started bombing North Vietnam and increasing its buildup of troops, told the Secretary General of the United Nations that it was prepared to negotiate. This offer was not made clear to the American people, with the results that we have the situation - we have the situation as it is today. And this is basically the point, that you can't expect people to negotiate when you are bombing their cities, when you are destroying their villages.

I think it is unfortunate, and I hope members - I hope members across the Atlantic forgive this callous remark that the United States and member - citizens of the United States don't really know what bombing is. If they did, no decent United States citizen could support it. An American pilot told (a reporter) of *The New York Times*, "I don't like to hit a village. You know you're hitting women and children too, but you've got to decide that your cause is noble and that the work has to be done." This situation, as this statement, saddens me, as it should sadden every human being, as it should sadden Professor Kissinger, who just returned from South Vietnam and said that he was very worried that the South Vietnamese Government did not enjoy the support of the people; and that is why you cannot equate Germany and South Korea with Vietnam, because the majority of the people in South Vietnam supports the Vietcong.

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Ali. And now, on the affirmative side of the argument, another student at Harvard, Mr. Robert Shrum.

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[Lc]

**SHRUM:** Perhaps no nation in the history of warfare has ever known the horrors of bombing better than the United Kingdom, and yet the United Kingdom knew that in World War II, bombing was necessary to meet the Nazi threat, and if bombing is necessary in Vietnam to meet the Communist threat, then unpleasant as that course may be, it is the only real one that the United States can pursue. Why are we pursuing that course? Not because we seek a military victory, not because we seek an economic advantage, but because we seek to see to it that the people of South Vietnam are not forced to choose their way of life at the point of a gun. Rather we seek for them a free election under international auspices in which they can decide under what form of government they want to live. The form of negotiations proposed last year by Hanoi excluded the South Vietnamese Government. It's totally antithetical to the American commitment in Vietnam for we aren't fighting for ourselves. We're there fighting for the principle that people shall not have to submit their wills to aggression. We're there, fighting for the South Vietnamese. We surely could not abandon them at a time when negotiations came about. Our principal purpose in South Vietnam is to repel aggression. When aggression is repelled, when the North Vietnamese cease their aggression against South Vietnam, then the bombing will no longer be necessary; then negotiations can take place, then the people of South Vietnam can decide their own future.

**COLLINGWOOD:** Thank you. And now, on the other side of the issue, once again from Oxford, Mr. Marks.

**MARKS:** Ladies and gentlemen: I'm very frightened by those last two speeches, very frightened indeed and

tightened by those few who became very frightened indeed and

MARKS: LADIES AND GENTLEM: IN very

side of the trade, once again from England, Mr. Marks.

THANK YOU. And now, on the other

decides their own future.

negotiations can take place, then the people of South Vietnam can
Vietnam, then the bombing will no longer be necessary, then
when the North Vietnam cases their aggression against South
South Vietnam is to rebel aggression. When aggression is benefited,
at a time when negotiations come about. Our principal purpose in
fighting for the South Vietnamee. We aruly could not abandon them
shall not have to submit them will to aggression. We're there,
ourselves. We're there fighting for the principle that people
to the American commitment in Vietnam for we aren't fighting for
excluded the South Vietnamee Government. It's a totally arbitrary
want to live. The form of negotiations proposed last year by the
agencies in which they can decide under what form or government they
can of a gun. Further we ask for them a free election under international
South Vietnam are not forced to choose their way of life at the point
advantage, but because we ask to see to it that the people of

States can breathe. Why are we burning that smoke? Not because
as that smoke may be, it is the only real one that the United

necessity in Vietnam to meet the Communist threat, then unpleasant
bombing was necessary to meet the West threat, and if bombing in

United Kingdom, and yet the United Kingdom knew that in World War II,
or whatever has ever known the horrors of bombing better than the

BRIDGE: PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORY

6

I'd like to try, in the short time I've got, to deal with some of
the frightening misconceptions that lie behind them. First of all,
Mr. Shrum's statements - no, I'll start first with Mr. Tribe. He
talked about America's pledge. Who was that pledge made to? The
pledge the United States is defending in Vietnam was made to a
government the United States deliberately installed there in the
first place with the intention of frustrating free elections as
provided for in the Geneva agreement. That's how their government
got there. It represents no one except American dollars. That is
all that government is there for, and the commitment to that sort
of government isn't worth the paper it's written on.

What other points did he make?
Korea and Germany. Neither Korea nor Germany have specified for them
in international treaties that they have to be reunited within a
specified time under free elections. America agreed to that pledge
in '54 in Geneva. She's broken her word. That's why the comparison
with Korea and Germany doesn't apply.

What other points were made?
Support and guidance from the North. We're told when that stops,
America has no quarrel with the South Vietnamese. Then why was
America intervening, giving military help in contravention of the
Geneva agreement to South Vietnam before they started getting help
from the North? From - sorry - from the day the Geneva agreements
were signed, America was helping the South Vietnamese government
and there's no reason to think they will stop because if they did
stop that government would fall. That's just the beginning.

Thank you, Mr. Marks. We'll hear
from you later, but now we're going to hear from the two senior

CORNELIWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Markes. Well past

ago that government would fall. That's a fact that the beginning
and there's no reason to think they will stop because if they did
were agreed, America was helping the South Vietnamese government
from the North. From - sorry - from the day the Geneva agreements
Geneva agreement to South Vietnam before they started getting help
America intervening, giving military help in contravention of the
Americas has no quarrel with the South Vietnamese. Then why was
support and influence from the North? We're told when that happened,
What other points were made?

in '61 in Geneva. She's a broken per word. That's why the comparison
specified time under free elections. America agreed to that pledge
in international treaties that they have to be remembered within a
year. It's a long time. It represents no one except American dollars. That's
provided for in the Geneva agreement. That's how their government
first place with the intention of trammating free elections as
Government of the United States deliberately interfered there in the
pledge the United States is defending in Vietnam was made to a
confined about America's a pledge. Who was that pledge made to? The
Mr. Aram's statements - no, I'll start first with Mr. Tride. He
the tightening misconceptions that he behind them. First of all,
I'd like to try, in the short time I've got, to deal with some of

of government isn't worth the paper it's written on.
All that government is there for, and the commitment to that sort
of government is no one except American dollars. That's
there. It represents no one except American dollars. That's
provided for in the Geneva agreement. That's how their government
first place with the intention of trammating free elections as
Government of the United States deliberately interfered there in the
pledge the United States is defending in Vietnam was made to a
confined about America's a pledge. Who was that pledge made to? The
Mr. Aram's statements - no, I'll start first with Mr. Tride. He
the tightening misconceptions that he behind them. First of all,
I'd like to try, in the short time I've got, to deal with some of

7

[LC]

members of each team beginning with Professor Henry Kissinger from Harvard. Two and a half minutes, Mr. Kissinger:

KISSINGER:

Ladies and gentlemen: The subject we are discussing this evening is whether the United States should honor its commitment to Vietnam. Let me first answer the point about to whom this commitment was made. I take it that the commitment is made to the people of South Vietnam to give them an opportunity to choose their own future, free of outside interference. We have an obligation as well to the peoples of other new nations that the dislocations that are inseparable from the process of their development not be used by more powerful or better organized neighbors. We have a responsibility towards our friends all over the world that they can rely on our pledges. And finally we have an obligation to the peoples of the world to be in the pursuit of these obligations will you - will explore every avenue towards peace. If we withdraw from our commitment in Vietnam today, we will leave countless thousands to a brutal fate. We will strengthen all those in the Communist world who argue that war is a means for settling disputes. In the pursuit of our responsibilities, we have, of course, always to be careful that our measures reflect a political and moral purpose and not simply the momentum of past decisions. We are - we have a responsibility to see to it that political and military means reflect the proper priorities. Of course, the war in Vietnam is a grim and desperate struggle, but those who defend the principle of peaceful change will always be challenged in difficult situations. Of course, everyone watching the sacrifice and the suffering must suffer great anguish, most of all Americans whose sons are running - are risking their lives daily. But we are

8

not in Vietnam because we want to stay. We are in Vietnam because
we want to withdraw, and we will do so as soon as free choice is
guaranteed to the people of South Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. And
now, from England, Mr. Michael Foot.

FOOT: Ladies and gentlemen: I'm still
not clear, despite the statements made by the three movers of this
motion, exactly what is the commitment which the United States
claims to be defending in Vietnam. We are told by Professor
Kissinger that the commitment is made to the government of South
Vietnam, and of course it is true that the only possible excuse for
the Americans having 170,000 troops or 180,000 troops on the other
side of the world from the United States itself is that they should
be there on the invitation of a foreign government. Now, of course,
there will be many arguments, no doubt, in this debate as to who
installed the government in South Vietnam and whether in fact the
United States did not help to install the government that has issued
the invitation. There would be arguments about that. There may
be arguments also as to whether in fact they are repelling
aggression; but even if Americans sent troops - think they have the
right to send troops to South Vietnam in response to an invitation
from the South Vietnam Government, and even if we were to concede
that and even if we were to concede that the South had suffered
aggression from the North - I concede none of these things - but
even if we were to accept all those parts of the arguments put
forward by those who sponsor this motion, it still remains the
fact that the United States of America would not have the slightest
right whatsoever under the charter of the United Nations in order

right whatever may be under the charter of the United Nations in order
that that of the United States of America should not have the affairs
forwarded by those who abhor this motion, if at all remains the
even if we were to accept all those parts of the arguments but
agreement from the North - I conceive none of those things - but
that and even if we were to conceive that the South had authorized
from the South Vietnam Government, and even if we were to conceive
right to send troops to South Vietnam in consequence to an invitation
separation; but even if Americans sent troops - think they have the
de arguments like so to whether in fact they are reselling
the invitation. There would be arguments about that. There may
United States did not help to install the government that has framed
inaugurated the government in South Vietnam and whether in fact the
there will be many arguments, no doubt, in this debate so to who
be there on the invitation of a foreign government. How, of course,
side of the world from the United States itself is that they should
the Americans having 100,000 troops on 180,000 troops on the other
Vietnam, and of course it is true that the only possible excuse for
Klaasinger that the commitment is made to the government of South
claims to be defending in Vietnam. We are told by Klaasinger
motions, exactly what if the commitment which the United States
not clear, despite the statements made by the three men of this
rooft:
Tables and Sentences: I'm still
now, from England, Mr. Michael Foot.

GOTTLINGWOOD:
Thank you, Mr. Klaasinger. And
granted to the people of South Vietnam.

We want to withdraw, and we will do so as soon as free choices are
not in Vietnam because we want to stay. We are in Vietnam because

[Lc]

9

to repel alleged aggression, to bomb indiscriminately a neighboring country; and if South Vietnam were subject to aggression, why did not the United States of America take this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations? Why did they not attempt to secure - why did they not attempt to secure the backing of other countries there? Why did they not go and put their case? Why did they not go and present their evidence to the other nations, or does the United States of America think that it has the right to decide these things for themselves on the other side of the world? Well, we contest that right. We contest that right partly because we don't think the American claims conform with the facts, but also because we do not believe that any single nation has the right to decide how it is going to respond to aggression, particularly when they're doing it on the other side of the planet.

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Foot. Now we have the outlines of the arguments between the two teams on each side of the Atlantic. Let's carry on from there. Who on the American side wishes to answer Mr. Foot and the British side?

Mr. Shrum.

SHRUM: Mr. Tribe.

COLLINGWOOD: Sorry, Mr. Tribe.

TRIBE: Mr. Foot asks why did the United

States not take the issue to the United Nations? In August of 1964, it was the United States that invited Hanoi to take part in Security Council discussions on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Hanoi refused.

It was in September of this year that the government of North Vietnam said bluntly any United Nations resolutions in this area would be null and void. Under those circumstances, what sense

[L.C]

10

would it make to go to the Security Council and simply make the motion of having been there? Secretary Goldberg - Ambassador Goldberg, in September of this year, pointed out the majority of the members of the Security Council are agreed that while the United Nations can be used in a conciliatory capacity in this area and that America has done on a number of occasions, it cannot effectively be used for anything other than quiet diplomacy.

COLLINGWOOD: How about that, Oxford? Who wants to reply to that?

FOOT: Well, I don't know what right Mr. Goldberg has got to decide which matters should go to the United Nations. This is the Charter that we all signed, that the United States Government signed as well. Their obligation under that Charter is that if they think that they or their allies are subject to aggression, we should take this matter to the United Nations to be judged. My answer to the reason why the United States didn't take this major matter to be decided at the United Nations is because they had no clear case. They had no clear case that in fact the cause of the war in Vietnam was an aggression by the North against the South. I haven't any doubt that the North has given assistance to the South during the course of the war, but that's not the origin of the war. If you're going to go to the origin of the war, you have to go back at least to 1954, when an agreement was signed as to how a settlement should be made in Vietnam, an agreement which, among other things, specified that there should be elections in the whole of Vietnam within a period of two years; and the United States forces in Vietnam and the United States policy in Vietnam has upset the demand and insistence of the Geneva

[LC]

11

Conference that there should be general elections in the whole of
Vietnam, so I would like to ask the question: Do the sponsors of
this motion, does the Government of the United States now accept
the terms of the Geneva settlement of 1954?

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Kissinger.

KISSINGER: With respect to the United Nations
Charter, Article 51 specifically provides for the right of individual
and collective self-defense.

Secondly, the view that Mr. Foot
has just expressed does not seem to be shared by the Government of
North Vietnam, which on September 23, 1965, stated as follows: "The
United States authorities are feverishly trying by every means to
secure a United Nations intervention in Vietnam. They have, quote,
'requested help from the United Nations membership at large in
getting peace talks started,' unquote. This is a maneuver to use the
United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under
United States terms." There have been at least five other instances
this year in which the North Vietnamese Government has asserted that
the United Nations is not competent to enter the Vietnamese dispute.
The - this is the primary reason why the United Nations has not been
apprised of this problem.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Marks, you said at the end
of your speech that that was "only the beginning." Do you have
something that you'd like to address to the proposers of the
resolution?

MARKS: Yes, there are a number of points
I'd like to add. I'm glad to get off the United Nations. The North
Vietnamese don't think that it has much to offer and quite frankly,
I agree with them.

[Lc]

12

I'd like to take up this point which I think Mr. - where are we? - I think Mr. Shrum made. He said - and the others. He said that America was in favor - of the people of South Vietnam choosing their own government. Now, I remember reading a newspaper report on this. I'm afraid I don't have the detailed reference here, but I hope you'll take my word for it - of an interview recently with Vice President Humphrey, who said that the United States would not permit the Vietcong to take part in free elections in Vietnam. Now, I'd like to know if Mr. Shrum means the same thing by free elections as President Humphry, or whether he means the same thing as most democrats mean by free elections. I'd also like to ask, since our own Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, who's usually an authoritative spokesman for the Washington line, tells us that there can be no free elections in Vietnam until there's been a period of classification - of pacification. I would like to know whether this pacification is a polite word for killing all the Communists, because I have a rather great suspicion that it is.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Shrum.

SHRUM: Well, I - before answering this question about elections, I do want to say that the United Nations is available. It could be very fruitfully used in this problem. I think that if North Vietnam were only willing to accept the good offices of people like Secretary General U Thant, then much of the Vietnamese difficulties could be cleared up.

If Vice President Humphrey said that the United States should not allow the National Liberation Front of Vietcong to participate in elections, then I disagree with him. I very much doubt that he said it. I think that the United States

[Lc]

13

aim in South Vietnam is to give these people any kind of government that they want as long as they freely choose that government in a ballot box rather than at the point of a gun.

By pacification, I would suggest Mr. Stewart probably means that the country must no longer be seething with violence and terrorism, because in that kind of atmosphere, free elections can never take place.

COLLINGWOOD: Now, let's have a question from the American side to the Oxford side. Mr. Tribe.

TRIBE: It strikes us that the idea that the Americans should not carry out their commitment in Vietnam may differ greatly from the reality that the gentlemen from Oxford want to impose. We want to know whether they are advocating unilateral and immediate withdrawal. If not, are they simply advocating that we seek a negotiated end? If that's their point, I would like to remind them that the position of the United States Government has been and remains that we want peace in Vietnam, simply peace that will guarantee the right of self-determination to that war-torn country.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Ali?

ALI: Yes, I will reply to that, if I may. We have tried to point out, and not only us here in Britain this evening, but the North Vietnamese have been trying to point out that before the bombing of North Vietnam started, there were peace feelers from Hanoi via U Thant which said that Ho Chi Minh was prepared to go to Burma and discuss a negotiated peace with an American spokesman, but unfortunately, President Johnson was busy taking on Barry Goldwater and the elections, and Dean Rusk's

[LC]

14

sensitive mind thought that these offers were not sincere and
therefore they were rejected.

As to the second part of your
question - do I think that the United States should get out of
Vietnam now, my answer is yes - without any qualifications, that the
only way - it's made out very often that this is a very complicated
issue. Perhaps I'm a bit naive, but to me it seems very simple. The
United States are there, thousands of miles away from Washington.
Surely you can't claim that this is self-defense and that the only
way in which they can earn the respect of the world - better later
than never - is by leaving Vietnam now, and this I think is the only
alternative left to President Johnson. If de Gaulle can do it
vis-a-vis Algeria, why not Johnson vis-a-vis Vietnam?

COLLINGWOOD:

Professor Kissinger?

KISSINGER:

I would like to make a - a slight
factual correction about the overture of U Thant. I'm not here to
defend every action of the American Government and I have often been
critical of it in other fields, but the facts of the situation seem
to me to be as follows: The - there was a feeler through U Thant,
which was very ambiguous and which required us to negotiate without
our - without the government to which we were committed in Saigon.
We attempted to determine through other sources just exactly what
Hanoi had in mind and received very inconclusive and rather negative
answers and on the basis of this information, the Government decided
that it would be better not to pursue this overture. But it is not
correct to say that a clear offer to negotiate was rejected, and
whatever one's judgment about that overture, there have been more than
fifteen American proposals since then which surely could have provided
an opening for another conversation.

["concluding for another conversation.\n\nFifteen American proposals arise then which alone could have provided\nwhatever one a government about that overtime, there have been more than\nwhatever one a government about that overtime, there have been more than\nthat it would be better not to bring this overtime. But if not\naccording to any that a clear offer to negotiate was rejected, and\nthat it would be better not to bring this overtime, there have been more than\nwhatever one a government about that overtime, there have been more than\nthat it would be better not to bring this overtime, there have been more than\nthat it would

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15

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Shrum, you were bouncing around there in your chair. Do you want to reply to Mr. Ali?

SHRUM: Mr. Ali said that he is in favor of complete withdrawal. Now, I think that he should probably discuss the implications of this, especially in light of the fact that people like Lin Piao, who's Chinese Defense Minister, have delivered statements — the one I'm specifically citing was on September 2, 1965 — saying that the war in Vietnam is a test case and that if the Communists can win there, they can then begin and start wars of national liberation all over the world. Of course, wars of national liberation is a euphemism for Communist take-over in these under-developed countries. I want to know whether he wants to substitute a new form of colonialism and a more iron tyranny for the one these countries have just gotten rid of.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Ali, you'd better answer that.

ALI: Yes, I will answer both Professor Kissinger and Mr. Shrub — sorry, Mr. Shrum. Professor Kissinger, first. I would like to make this point again, Professor Kissinger, with due respect to you and public opinion in the United States, that really, when you are bombing a nation, you can't expect that nation to negotiate with you. If the Japs had asked you to negotiate immediately after they started bombing Pearl Harbor, what would your answer have been?

As far as Comrade Shrum's point is concerned — I don't accept that wars of national liberation all over the world result in Communist domination. The Sino-Soviet split has shown that Communism too has its own nationalisms. And

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16

I would like to ask Mr. Shrum, that — does he really believe that 12 Communists in Santo Domingo constituted a national liberation movement and were sufficient reason for the United States to intervene in Santo Domingo? And another point I would like Mr. Shrum to answer, that what he quotes Marshal Lin Piao as saying, when responsible American generals like Curtis Le May say that the only way we can win this war is to bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, when other responsible American commentators say that this is America's test case, when they are treating Vietnam as a war laboratory with which to test new weapons, which could be used in the future in Latin America.

COLLINGWOOD: Well, we're getting a little far afield in Santo Domingo, but I think Mr. Shrum ought to have a chance to answer that.

SHRUM: I don't think 12 — I don't think 12 Communists in Santo Domingo necessarily constitute a Communist national liberation front. I don't want to really talk about Santo Domingo, but I think that thousands of Communists in Vietnam do constitute a national liberation front, and a real threat to the peace and security of the United States and of Southeast Asia. Yes, this is a test case for the United States of America, and it's a test case because the United States has to prove to aggression that it cannot succeed and that Communism cannot expand all over the world, simply through wars of national liberation. Because someone like General Curtis Le May sometimes might make an irresponsible statement does not discount Lin Piao's statement when he said that wars of national liberation could

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17

begin all over the world, taking their inspiration from the war
in Vietnam. I'm not here to defend Curtis Le May; I'm here to
defend American policy in Vietnam, because I think it's right.

COLLINGWOOD: Now from — from England,
Michael Foot, we haven't heard from you for a while.

FOOT: We are told that the aim of the
United States in Vietnam is to prove that aggression doesn't pay.
First of all, as I have said, they haven't yet proved that it's
aggression. They haven't attempted to prove that it's aggression
before any independent tribunal. One of the reasons why they have
not done so, is because they wish to draw a veil over what really
happened, and what are the real origins of the war in Vietnam.
This maybe is the reason why we have had no answer in this debate
and no clear answer from the United States Government in all the
negotiations over — and all the discussions over these years as
to whether they accept in full the Geneva settlement of 1954.

At the time, most of the other countries concerned accepted that
agreement, with its commitment to free elections in the whole of
Vietnam, which we were told by the spokesman here is what the
United States is fighting for in Vietnam. But, we've never had
from the statement from the American Government that they accepted
in full the Geneva settlement of 1954. If they would say that,
there would be some advance, but of course, if they accepted
that, one of the difficulties is that it would destroy a large
part of the American argument. Because the Geneva settlement
also laid down that Vietnam is not two countries; there is one
country, and therefore, what has been happening throughout these
years in Vietnam is not a war of aggression, but a civil war, and

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18

what the United States is doing is to intervene in a civil war,
intervene in a manner which they've certainly got no international
claim under any international law to do. They intervene in a
manner which they have not been prepared to put before any
international tribunal. Now, this is a very serious matter indeed,
and you cannot say that they are doing it in order to uphold
international law when they are not prepared to apply international
law to their own actions and moreover, it's no good to say that
they are repelling aggression. That's what the people in North
Vietnam think they are doing.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Tribe?

FOOT: -- The people in North Vietnam say they want the right to shape their own right, and to shape their own destinies. So they're fighting and will continue to fight very hard for those same things. Somehow we have to overcome that barrier and if we're going to do that, the American Government, the most powerful government in the world, will have to retreat from its present position, and be prepared to make proposals for a settlement very much in advance of anything they've yet suggested.

COLLINGWOOD: We'll give the American debating team an opportunity to answer the points made by Mr. Foot when we return with TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD after this message.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

COLLINGWOOD: In this transatlantic debate between students of Oxford and students at Harvard and Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Foot on both sides of the Atlantic via Early Bird, we've just heard a challenging statement on American

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19

policy, its defects, according to him, by Mr. Foot. Who on the
American side would like to reply to that? Professor Kissinger?

KISSINGER: I would like to make — to reply both to Mr. Ali and to Mr. Foot, briefly. Mr. Ali presented the beginning of American bombing as if it were a decision that President Johnson took because he felt angry one Sunday morning and decided to proceed. I think the facts of the situation are that North Vietnamese — North Vietnam had been encouraging, supporting and supplying an uprising in South Vietnam for five years; and it is not obvious to me what the moral distinction is between explosives carried on the back of foot soldiers and explosives carried by airplanes. Every argument that was made against negotiation on the part of Hanoi would apply equally well to negotiations on the part of Saigon, which has also been subject to attack. And I would say that the only way to escape this log jam, is to stop talking about the past and to try to see whether one can find comparable restraints on both sides to stop the shooting and to begin the negotiations.

Secondly, to Mr. Foot: It is not correct, I believe, to say that there were no international commitments in the case of other countries. At least in the case of Germany with which I am familiar, there was a commitment at the Summit Meeting of 1955, to settle — to achieve German unification on the basis of free elections, and no one would argue that the fact that no free elections have been held in East Germany, and that the government demonstrably does not enjoy the support of its population, that this entitles the West German government to

[Lc]

20

start a guerrilla movement in Eastern Germany.

Thirdly, it is the Geneva settlement. It is my belief that the United States should accept the Geneva settlement as a basis for the settlement of the present war in — in Vietnam, and it is my impression that the American Government has indicated its readiness to do so. The issue in South Vietnam with respect to pacification is not to kill every Communist. The issue is to induce the Communists in South Vietnam to accept the principle of free choice, and as soon as this is accepted, they should as individuals be permitted to participate in the political process.

**COLLINGWOOD:** The audiences on both sides of the Atlantic have been following with great interest. Let's bring them into this discussion now. You may ask questions of either side or individuals on either side, no matter which side of the Atlantic you happen to be on. Let's begin though with the American audience. Dave Dugan, do you have someone who wants to ask a question?

**DUGAN:** Charles, we have lots of people who want to ask questions. It's a matter of getting as many in as we can. I think in Section D, in the front row, there's a gentleman, third from the aisle, who has a question if we could get a microphone to him.

**QUESTION:** Yes, I'd like to direct this question to Mr. Foot. Does he believe that the way to achieve peace is to allow the spread of international Communism to go unchallenged, much as Prime Minister Chamberlain did in World War II, when he gave Adolf Hitler Czechoslovakia in return for peace in our time?

[c]

21

**FOOT:** The prewar situation was that governments in Britain and America were appealing Fascism, and I think it was a very dangerous policy to follow. But I don't believe there's any — any comparison between what is happening in Vietnam and what happened in Czechoslovakia before the war. You see, I think what the United States is doing in Vietnam, so far from resisting the spread of Communism, is increasing the likelihood of the spread of Communism. I think that the more the United States continues to bomb North Vietnam, the more they will rally support behind the government of North Vietnam, the more they will drive the rest of Asia into the hands of China. If that's what they want, if the United States policy was designed for spreading Communism, then I think it's carrying it out extremely efficiently.

**COLLINGWOOD:** Now — now let's have a question from the audience in London. Bob Trout, do you recognize someone?

**TROUT:** Yes, Charles. After listening so far in comparative silence, I'm sure that our 50-odd Oxford students are eager to join the fray. Who does have the first question? In the first row on the right side?

**QUESTION:** Professor Kissinger, I find American intervention in Vietnam as immoral as Nazi and Italian intervention in Spain before the last war. Why don't you?

**KISSINGER:** I don't find the intervention in Vietnam immoral because our purpose is to give the people of South Vietnam a free choice. The Nazi intervention was to deprive the people of a free choice, and I would have thought that people in Britain should know the difference between American and Fascist motivations.

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22

COLLINGWOOD: Another question now from the New York audience.

DUGAN: Yes, Charles, in Section C there's a gentleman in the third row on the aisle...if we could get a microphone to him.

QUESTION: This question is directed to Mr. Foot. If you so ably agree with Mr. Chamberlain, how else do you think Communism would be able to be stopped throughout Asia if not by domination by the United States?

FOOT: I think it is a great folly and indeed one of the — I think it is a great folly and indeed one of the great mistakes made by the Government of the United States, and one that we could all suffer for, to equate international Communism or Communism with prewar Nazism. They're two very different institutions indeed; and indeed, international Communism has not shown anything like the aggressive tendencies which were shown by Fascism before the war. Indeed, the meaning of Fascism was that it was aggressive in that sense. I don't think necessarily that the international Communism is aggressive in that sense, although it sometimes is aggressive. But you know, the United States is sometimes aggressive, and you see the actions of the United States in Vietnam are not merely actions taken in response to aggression. We've been trying to get to the bottom of this matter, right since this dispute began — this argument began. We asked Mr. Kissinger whether the United States Government accepted the Geneva settlement. If they accepted it, the war might never have started. There would be no necessity to resist international Communism in Vietnam; and

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23

incidentally, what right has the United States to say that we're
going to pick on Vietnam for carrying out your crusade against
international Communism. What right have you got to pick on
Vietnam, only if you can claim that there was an aggression that
you had every right to resist, but you've never been prepared
to take this before any international tribunal whatsoever for
them to judge. Moreover, Professor Kissinger would not tell us
whether the United States Government, his own government, accepted
the Geneva settlement or not. He said they should accept it. Well,
I agree, they should. Why don't they? He said it was his
"impression" that the United States Government does accept it.
I think for an expert of Professor Kissinger's eminence to say
that it's his impression that they accept it — why does not
the United States say quite clearly they will accept the whole
of the Geneva settlement. If they did that, then I think we
would make progress toward real negotiations and an escape from
the present confrontation, which certainly will spread
international Communism much more likely than it will kill it.

**COLLINGWOOD:** Now, I don't want to turn this
into just a debate between Michael Foot and Henry Kissinger.
I'd like to get some of the students in, but I think I really
must let Professor Kissinger have a chance to answer that.

**KISSINGER:** I used the word, "it is my
impression" in deference to the debating skill of the — of my
British friends. I have every reason to believe that the American
Government accepts the Geneva settlement, whatever may have
happened in the past. I simply do not have the document in front
of me in case I am challenged to produce the exact words.

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24

COLLINGWOOD: Now let's have a question from the London studio, but let's address this one to one of the students and not to Professor Kissinger.

TROUT: In the front right section, you have a question?

QUESTION: I don't mind which of the American students answers this question. The government which invited the American troops into Vietnam in the first place was not a democratically elected government. The government which is now supported by the American troops in Vietnam is possibly even less democratic, since it was installed by a military coup d'état. I should like to know the legalistic basis on which the American Government claims to be justified in sending troops to South Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD: They're both law students, but let's have Mr. Tribe answer that.

TRIBE: I think it's important to remember with regard to the particular governments in South Vietnam that our commitment is broader than a commitment to any one of them; but with regard to either the government of Diem or the government of Marshal Ky, Bernard Fall, recognized as an objective, impartial authority on this question, points out that at least nine out of ten of the member states of the United Nations have no greater a claim to legitimacy.

It is not our contention, and it is not the position of the United States, that any particular government of South Vietnam is the pre-ordained and necessarily

Government of South Vietnam in the pre-occupied and necessarily
not the position of the United States, that any partition
...

United Nations have no greater claim to legitimacy.
that afermath nine out of ten of the member states of the
objective, impartial authority on this question, put on our
Government or Marshall K. Hennig Fall, recognised as an
out with regard to either the Government of Vietnam or the
our commitment in order than a commitment to any one of them;
with regard to the particular governments in South Vietnam that
I think it's important to remember

THERE:

I let a have it. True answer that.

COTINGWOOD:

They're both few students, but

trials to South Vietnam.

which the American Government claims to be justified in sending
our troops. I should like to know the justificative basis on
which the American Government can be justified in sending
our troops into Vietnam. The Government which is
American Troops into Vietnam in the first place was not a
justification for the American troops in Vietnam he possibly
now endorsed by the American Government. The Government which is
not justified in sending our troops to South Vietnam.

QUESTION:

Have a question?

TOWNS:

in the front right section, Mr. On

Students and not to Professor Klaasen.

COTINGWOOD:

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25

legitimate representative of the people. That is the contention of the North when it insists that no settlement can be reached which does not accept the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front as prima facie the representative of the people. What we want is to ask the people that question, and you cannot ask them that when the Vietcong are conducting terrorist raids within Vietnam. The only reason America is in Vietnam is to create a condition in which the people themselves can constitute a truly representative government.

COLLINGWOOD: Now, we have time for a very quick question from the American audience, and a very quick answer. Question from the New York audience, quickly.

DUGAN: Yes, Charles, in Section A, in the second row, can we get a microphone down to the second gentleman from the aisle, please.

QUESTION: A question directed to the American team. They have said that it is our purpose to give a free choice to the Vietnamese people. Let us attempt to expose this hypocrisy. As long as there is a chance, which is now good, that we will lose those elections, we will not permit them.

COLLINGWOOD: Quick answer, Mr. Shrum.

SHRUM: We're committed to democracy, and as long as we're committed to self-determination in Vietnam, all the North Vietnamese have to do is agree to free internationally supervised elections, and we will hold them.

26

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you very much. We'll be back with more of this transatlantic debate on TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD after this message.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

COLLINGWOOD: Let's have some more questions now from the audiences both in London and New York, addressed to the debaters on this TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD. I think it's the London audience's turn. A questioner from London.

TROUT: The gentleman in the ---

QUESTION: Would a member of the United States team like to state quite clearly whether or not the United States would accept a democratically elected Communist government in South Vietnam?

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Tribe.

TRIBE: The answer is, yes. The United States has no — has no ambitions in South Vietnam. We have no interest in creating an outpost of American democracy there. However, we think it is extremely unlikely that South Vietnam would be the first nation in the history of the world to accept in free elections a Communist government -- unlikely not only because of the one million people who fled the Communist government from the North, but unlikely as well because of the fact that the basic traditions in Vietnam, the traditions of land ownership, of family and of religious belief, are inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of Communism. Even if it were true that Ho Chi Minh had some popularity, it is certainly not demonstrable that the people of South Vietnam would, in any free election,

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27

elect a Communist regime. But I emphasize, our purpose is not
to impose a particular government on South Vietnam. Our purpose
is only to give them a chance to choose.

COLLINGWOOD: And now a question from the New York audience.

DUGAN: Yes, Charles, in Section A in the front row, we have a gentleman right by the aisle, if we can get a microphone to him.

QUESTION: I address my question to Mr. Foot, who says the United States picks on Vietnam, and to Mr. Ali, who says the majority of the people in South Vietnam support the Vietcong. If this is true, how do you explain the half-million South Vietnamese soldiers who have been fighting and dying, and often dying valiantly, for their country; and how do you explain the fact that there are one million North Vietnamese who have fled their country and are now living as refugees in Saigon?

ALI: Yes, I'll answer to all three of your points. Point No. One, how do I say that the Vietcong is supported by the majority of the people in Vietnam? I say this because it has been admitted by every — almost every newspaper correspondent in Saigon and, indeed, even admitted by Mr. Kissinger. When he returned from a visit from South Vietnam he said he was distressed to find that the gulf between the government and the people was very large. There's more evidence for this: the whole attempt to herd people into concentration camps or strategic hamlets, as you euphemistically call them, was an attempt to separate people from the Vietcong, an attempt which did not succeed. And also, the North Vietnamese, according to every American reporter and the State Department—

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COLLINGWOOD: At this moment, Mr. Ali, I must interrupt you because our time is running out and I want to ask the senior members of both teams for a brief summation of the debate so far. And let's begin with Mr. Foot.

FOOT: Of course, all of us must be passionately concerned to see the end of this appalling war and I am glad that Professor Kissinger has said that the United States Government now accepts the Geneva settlement of 1954. I didn't ask him that as a kind of trick question. I wanted genuinely to know, and I think it is correct that they have said sometimes that they do accept the Geneva settlement. Unfortunately, they may have accepted it in the letter, but never in the spirit.

This very weekend we have Mr. Rusk in Paris saying United States still wants peace talks on Vietnam, but only if South Vietnam's independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed. In other words, they are still saying two Vietnams. That is contrary to the Geneva settlement. The Americans refused free elections. That is contrary to the Geneva settlement. The Americans are obviously refusing to neutralize the area. That is contrary to the Geneva settlement. If the United States would come forward with proposals for genuinely seeking a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Agreements, then we could begin to end this appalling horror which, if it continues, could drag not merely the United States but the whole world into nuclear catastrophe.

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COLLINGWOOD: Sorry, Mr. Foot. And now, a last word, one-minute summation from Professor Kissinger.

KISSINGER: The war in Vietnam is a tragic and desperate effort. I'm distressed that so many of the questions seemed to challenge not the judgment but the motivation of American policy. I would like to emphasize that our goal is and should be freedom for the people of South Vietnam to chart their own future, and freedom for the people of all of Vietnam to determine the future of their country. As Americans, we would far prefer to engage in tasks of construction. We would far prefer to do what President Kennedy said in his Inaugural Address, that to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe, we pledge our best efforts to help themselves. But we do not have the choice between defense and construction. Unless we can do both, we will not be able to do either.

COLLINGWOOD: Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen of Oxford and gentlemen from Harvard, for an hour's interesting and provocative debate. This is Charles Collingwood. Good night.

ANNOUNCER: This TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD was produced in cooperation with the British Broadcasting Corporation, using the facilities of the Early Bird Communications Satellite. The Oxford students and Mr. Foot were seen from a BBC studio in London. The two Harvard students and Professor Kissinger were seen from a CBS studio in New York. We wish to thank the Oxford Union and universities in the New York area for their cooperation in helping us to select the student audiences on both sides of the Atlantic.