- 21 -

We do not say that the issue of economic relations, the
nuclear relationship and moral questions cannot be debated.
But we risk allowing a quest for national consensus
degenerating into a compilation of competing catalogues of
the desirable, and in doing so we may jeopardize not merely
one aspect of relations but the entire process. Thus we
insist that our critics explain what the implications of the
alternatives are, not merely for one issue, but for the
entire range of Soviet-American relations and for the prospects
for world peace.

## The Economic Dimension

Many responsible Americans ask why we should trade with
the Soviet Union at all, or whether trade and economic credits
subsidize their armament program, or permit the Soviet
leaders to avoid the necessity of liberalizing their society.
Questions of trade have also been linked to the moral issue
of dealing with totalitarian regimes.

The Administration from the outset took the view --
which it has never abandoned -- that intensified trade should
follow a generally improved relationship. We were often
criticized for failing to move fast enough on trade, for
depriving the US business community of lucrative opportunities.
Not once, however, did anyone raise questions about the
relationship of trade to the Soviet domestic system.

The Administration pursued this strategy until the
1972 summit demonstrated that both in tone and substance relations

-- 22 --

undergone a significant change and a process of normalization
committing the top leaders on both sides had been initiated.
In this setting, the gradual transformation of trading
relationships was a logical step that could serve to provide
additional incentives for maintaining the course which both
sides had set for themselves.

This approach seemed to command the most widespread
understanding and approval. Certainly, the question of the
Soviet domestic structure was not cited as an obstacle to
the processes we had set in motion. Thus bringing the issue
to the fore now involves profound questions of whether we
negotiated in good faith.

Several points need to be clarified about economic
relations with the Soviet Union. Granting most-favored-
nation trading status to the USSR is not a privilege. It
is the removal of a discriminatory aspect of our policy
toward certain countries without which we cannot claim to
be moving toward more normal relations with these countries.

The major impact of the continued denial of this status
to the Soviet Union would be political, not economic. We
established most-favored-nation trading relations in 1933
when we recognized the USSR; we withdraw it in 1951 during
the Korean War, largely as a political act. If there are to
be penalties for confrontation there must also be incentives
for cooperation.

- 23 -

It has already blocked fulfillment of the Lend-Lease
Accord -- which has been sought by every administration --
involving repayment of over $700 million to the United States.

It is quite true that in the course of expanding economic
relations the Soviet Union could gain access to some of our
technology; but it is also true that in the last ten years
they have had, and will continue to have, access to much
the same technology from other countries in the West and
from Japan. Moreover, any one familiar with the Soviet
military program would have to agree that in the past two
decades the USSR, with no appreciable economic contact with
the US, has developed highly sophisticated military technology.

In any case, we do not intend to relax restrictions on
the export of technology that might have military applications.

Finally, let me relate the question of trade to our
broader aims. This government's policy must go beyond
narrow construction of whether each and every transaction
is economically profitable, or whether one side obtained
an advantage. We have a larger interest in seeing the Soviet
economy become steadily associated with the economy of the
world at large. It should be our goal, as indeed it is, to
encourage the Soviet leaders to value the benefits of
interdependence, of obligations running in both directions,
of goods, services and funds flowing into as well as out of
the Soviet Union. It is precisely this kind of mutuality

-24-

which strengthens the process of normalization and serves
to build deterrents to hostile and irresponsible political
and military conduct.

We are not so naive as to think that complex economic
and cooperative relationships in and of themselves serve
these ends. That is precisely why we did not begin to enter
into them until broad political relationships had begun to
evolve; and that is precisely why we seek to keep these
functional aspects of our relations in broad harmony with
political and security relationships. By the same token,
our policies would be unbalanced and incoherent were we to
pursue the goals of more stable political and security
relationships without reinforcing them by more normal
connections between our two societies.

- 25 -

Strategic Issues

If it is our basic objective to preserve our security and to contribute to the building of a safer world by building a relationship of restraint, reduced tensions and broadening cooperation with the Soviet Union, we must address with utmost seriousness and precision just what security means in our age. For it is clear, that security in the nuclear age differs from the security nations sought in past ages. And security today and in the future, when the strategic military forces at the disposal of both the USSR and the US are in rough balance differs from the security we had and sought in an earlier phase of the nuclear age when we possessed a virtual monopoly in the capacity for strategic warfare.

In the pre-nuclear age, nations could attempt to seek something like absolute safeguards against attack and injury by pursuing military superiority in relation to potential adversaries. Before the advent of strategic power, nations separated by oceans from potential competitors could aspire to absolute physical safety, especially when they were large and self-sufficient like the United States. And in the early years of the nuclear age, when we enjoyed a nuclear monopoly or near monopoly, it made some sense for the United States to assume that its capacity for visiting vast destruction upon potential adversaries

- 26 -

without risk of suffering significant damage in return would suffice to restrain those advarsaries from taking liberties with our interests and those of our friends and allies. For many years, facing growing Soviet strategic power, we wrestled with how to define security in circumstances where those earlier assumptions were plainly no longer valid. We sought and to a substantial degree found security through a combination of strategic forces capable in all circumstances of inflicting unacceptable damage even if the other side struck first and of conventional forces and alliance arrangements capable of deterring or if necessary fighting regional conflicts.

But now, in the age of nuclear plenty, we must come to grips with even more unprecedented and, in some respects, paradoxical attributes of security.

-- Technology and the productive capacities of the USSR and the US now permit a continuing multiplication of deliverable nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both sides;

-- New generations of weaponry with new or refined characteristics in such key indices as accuracy and reliability can be expected to appear at regular and probably ever shorter intervals of time;

-- With this enormous accretion of power and weaponry neither side, even were it in some respects to outpace the other, is likely to acquire strategic forces capable of

- 27 -

being translated into usable military advantage with
respect to the other, if reasonable efforts are made

-- Yet it is clear that neither side will permit itself
to lag behind the other in any significant aspect of strategic
power, fearing that the appearance of inferiority could have
disastrous consequences to its interests;

-- As each side keeps pace with the other in strategic
power at ever higher levels of capability and the utility of
this power in practical terms becomes increasingly question-
able, the possibility of conflict at levels below the strategic
rises at least to the extent that it is calculated that the
risk that such conflicts may explode into strategic warfare
is declining;

-- Thus, to the economic and psychological burdens of
sustaining the maintenance of a strategic balance are added
the burdens of sustaining forces that deter the lesser conflicts
which the strategic balance has seened to make less risky. An
obsession with strategic power, unrelated to its utility, is
likely, in the United States at least, to undermine our ability
to sustain these twin burdens.

Considerations such as these would lead any responsible
American Administration to seek to engage the Soviet Union in
negotiations to restrain the growth of strategic weapons
arsenals, and to avoid a situation where productive and tech-

- 28 -

nological capabilities set the pace at which new strategic
forces are acquired. Let me say at this point that I do
not mean to imply that technological advance is in itself
and in all respects dangerous. On the contrary, in many
ways technology has served to bring military power under
greater control. But that is precisely the point: we
must seek to retain mastery over the advance of weaponry
instead of permitting technology to drive it, to diminish
our choices and to dominate our decisions.

The SALT talks are an effort to undertake this task
in cooperation with the Soviet Union. And it is because
the impulses required to this are not technical and military
alone, but require a broader environment of restraint that
we have insisted in embedding the strategic dialogue in a
wider network of communication and cooperation.

Thus, in considering the issues posed by the next phase
of SALT, we require new and more sophisticated understanding
of the nature of security:

-- What is the meaning of strategic superiority or
inferiority?

-- Has the United States already accepted a position of
strategic inferiority?

-- Is it possible to pursue a relaxation of political
tensions if there is no limit to military competition?

I want to emphasize certain points that must be considered.

- 29 -

If one talks about superiority or inferiority, first of all we need to define what it means operationally.

-- Is it only the capacity to inflict a certain level of industrial damage and destroy a certain percentage of the population, under any conceivable circumstances?

-- Or is it the capacity to destroy a certain percentage of the other side's strategic forces in a first strike?

For any conceivable level of nuclear forces over the next decade, you also have to ask whether it has political utility, and what do you do with it in a crisis?

There is probably some combination of numbers of strategic weapons and qualitative characteristics that would give one side a theoretical "superiority." But that combination is not at all obvious. And as the numbers of missile warheads increase into the thousands an analytical definition of superiority becomes more and more elusive.

The basic situation is that in the foreseeable future neither side can gain the capacity to destroy the nuclear forces of the other. In this sense neither side will be superior.

There could be a more limited definition of superiority such as the ability to destroy and land-based ICBM force of the other side. Such a vulnerability is politically destabilizing in a crisis situation. But it is almost impossible to conceive of a political rationale that would cause a political leader to order an attack against ICBMs alone, even if such an attack could be accomplished with a small percentage of one's own forces.

- 30 -

Even in this limited sense, then, it is highly unlikely
that one side or the other would allow what might be con-
sidered a major advantage. The real danger is that both
sides will pursue programs rationalized by fears of a
theoretical inferiority, and after another decade of com-
petition, the result will still be a rough parity but
accomplished at staggering costs and accompanied by a return
to the tensions of the cold war.

Our policy is to use the SALT negotiations as the means
to place a ceiling on the size of strategic forces, to slow
down the pace of destabilizing technological change, to
reduce the vulnerabilities of our strategic systems, and
to ensure a balance of capabilities in which both sides
will have confidence in the sufficiency of their strategic
forces.

Even though an objective analysis indicates our forces
are in no sense inferior, we recognize that political action
may be based on a perception of strategic advantage, by
either side, or by the world at large. The subjective belief
that one side did have a margin of superiority would impact
on our diplomacy, our will to react in crises, and the confidence
of our allies. Our arms procurement policies, and our SALT
position, therefore, must ensure that our real as well as
our perceived strategic capability does not expose us to
miscalculations.

- 31 -

Thus, in this discussion I want to settle the question
of a so-called American inferiority arising from SALT lest a
false perception in this country lead to an unnecessary and
dangerous acceleration of certain strategic arms programs,
possibly to the detriment of military programs in other
areas where continued efforts are required.

Let us look at the realities about the SALT
agreements:

-- The SALT agreements of 1972 were the first ones ever negotiated to establish some jointly acceptable pattern for the strategic forces of the two superpowers; that fact in itself does not make them immune from critical analysis but it does impose a requirement upon us at least to debate them seriously.

-- Our strategic programs for the duration of the
agreement -- from 1972 to 1977 -- had been established for
some time on the basis of careful calculations of what our
security required. None of our offensive strategic programs
were stopped or hampered by the agreements.

-- Soviet programs, on the other hand, were in a
dynamic phase and the limits imposed upon them by the
agreements established levels of forces for the USSR well
below those generally estimated to be within their capacity
to acquire over the ensuing five years. Whatever the precise
Soviet plans, the agreements for the first time placed an
explicit ceiling upon them both with respect to the ability
of the USSR to build its heaviest types of ICBMs.

- 32 -

-- Counting missile warheads and bomber weapons, the ratio of capabilities between the US and the USSR will be substantially unchanged: it was 3 to 1 in 1972 and will be about 5 to 2 in 1977. At this moment, because of our deployment of sea and land-based launchers with MIRVs, the ratio is actually 4 to 1 in our favor.

Thus, our advantage in these elements continues to be overwhelming and will remain substantial for several years even if no agreement is reached to follow the interim Agreement when it lapses in 1977.

It was always understood that the larger size of Soviet ICBMs would over time enable the Soviet Union to deploy a greater number of warheads on those missiles; an interim agreement covering five years could not and did not cope with this longer term problem, nor was this ever claimed. But the interim agreement did provide a basis for doing so in a follow-on agreement and certainly in no way precluded us from dealing with it unilaterally with our own programs should it not be possible to do so, or do so adequately by agreement.

- 33 -

Indeed, it is the facts of present US advantage and the
possibility of future Soviet advantage that pose the major
problems in the SALT negotiations.

-- As long as the Soviets remain substantially behind in
the number of warheads and bomber weapons, which in their cal-
culation also includes forces we consider tactical rather than
strategic, we can only expect a determined Soviet effort
to close the gap.

-- The problem is that this effort has the potential
of creating a momentum and temptation in the USSR to acquire
a temporary advantage at some point in the next decade.

-- Thus, some of our planners foresee a theoretical
Soviet advantage in the future and urge that we either
abandon SALT or reduce it to a minimum and seek our security
in an accelerated rearmament program to recapture the out-
right superiority of the 1950s.

This is why the present is a critical juncture for the
strategic arms negotiations. If each side now relaxes the
effort to achieve mutual restraint, and relies solely on its
own capabilities, then we face a multiplication of weaponry
that will leave our political leaders with an ever de-
creasing freedom of choice. As the leaders of Europe in
1914, we will become the prisoners of our plans and strategies
that will dictate our actions in a crisis.

- 34 -

The Moscow talks in July were of profound importance
in this regard. For the first time each side seemed to
understand the longer term fears, concerns and perceptions
of the other. What at first seemed to us grossly exaggerated
Soviet statements about the military threat to them, proved
more plausible if it were assumed that the United States
would strike first. We are accustomed in our own analysis
to count what we would have left after a first strike by
the other side; the Soviets have done the same.

We realized that we could not come to an agreement in
Moscow because a truly permanent agreement would inevitably
face the many uncertainties of technology change, and thus
would have to have far too many hedges built into it. On
the other hand, perpetuating the five-year current agreement
for a year or two more would allow us to address only the
current cycle of weapons decisions. By 1978-79, just after
the end of the five-year Interim Agreement, the United States
and the USSR will both be potentially on the edge of a period
of vast increases in their strategic capabilities. Thus we
now believe a ten-year approach might be the most realistic
timeframe.

We think we now have a general framework within which,
over the next six to nine months, we should be able to tell
how serious the Soviets are in reaching an understanding.

- 35 -

Moral Choices and Policy Dilemmas

The final issue, and one that has run throughout the postwar period, is the relationship between our foreign policy objectives and the "liberalization" of the internal policies of the Soviet Union. The issue has now been joined, specifically in the matter of making our economic relationship dependent on a policy of free emigration.

The morality of conducting relationships with totalitarian governments or more broadly with governments of which we disapprove is an old one in our foreign policy. It was established even in Washington's administration that we could not define our national interests in terms of our ideological preferences alone. In the modern period, each President has followed the doctrine that while our preferences are clear, we will not impose our own set of values on foreign governments.

Yet, the problem of dealing with Communist governments has always troubled the American people and the Congress. There is the implication that by dealing with a regime that pursues internal policies so sharply in conflict with our own values, that we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. It is believed by some that until there is a genuine "liberalization" or some sign of serious progress in this direction, all other

- 36 -

elements of relaxation or conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. Thus, they would make demands for internal changes the condition for our own pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our position has been clearly set forth on many occasions. We cannot condone the repression of fundamental liberties in any country. We must always urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But there are two questions: first, are there limits to such efforts, and second, can we make internal changes in any country a pre-condition to constructive diplomacy.

How hard can we press without provoking Soviet leadership into a return to those practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Would a new Cold War encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies? Would it nourish the hope of liberalization in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union? Has detente increased repression or has it helped generate the pressures and demand for openness we are now witnessing?

Our position is that there are sharp limits to what we can insist upon as part of an improved relationship with the USSR. We have a right to demand responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union. But with respect to basic changes within the Soviet Union the issue is not whether we condone what the USSR does internally; it is the extent

- 37 -

to which we subordinate our foreign policy objectives to
domestic change.

We believe we have accomplished much over the past five
years. The attitude of the American people has been made
clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced
effective results:

- The exit tax on emigration is not being collected.
We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government
have been given increased attention.

- The volume of Jewish emigration increased from a
trickle to the tens of thousands.

But there are those who say this is not enough. They
argue that the Soviets must massively reshape their policies.
What they seek is in fact a sudden reversal of five decades
of Soviet history and of centuries of Russian history.

The goal may be a noble one, but they have chosen to
seek it through the wrong vehicle at the wrong time.
Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, especially
since 1956, and more will come. But if they come it is
most likely to be through an evolutionary process that can
only take place in an environment of decreasing inter-
national tensions.

As political pressures in this country have cast doubt
on our willingness to live up to the agreements of October
1972, Soviet emigration rates have slowed, and even

- 38 -

slipped backward. Now we must acknowledge that if our
ability to affect emigration is real, it is also limited.

It may be that we have allowed a debate over tactics to
obscure agreement about objectives. If a consensus emerges
from this debate, then I am confident we will see a resolution
that ensures both increased trade and increased emigration.

If, on the other hand, the debate is over the principle
of making internal change a pre-condition to the pursuit
of our foreign policies, and, indeed, subordinating other
aspects of policy to its achievement, then we have a major
issue that involves a fundamental reorientation of American
foreign policy.

## Conclusion

In concluding my statement I want to turn to the prospects
for the future: it is obvious that the international environ-
ment has changed radically since the early post-war period when
we first defined out general policy toward the Soviet Union.
At that time the closest we came to a great State paper was
the brilliant analysis of Ambassador Kennan about the nature
of Soviet society and the policy which came to be called
containment.

In his famous Mr. X article of July 1947, he made the
following points:

- 39 -

"It is clear that the main elements of any United
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a
long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of
Russian expansive tendencies. ... It is clear that the United
States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy
political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue
to regard the Soviet Union as a rival not a partner, in the
political arena."

In 1947, the US had no choice but to pursue the general
directions of policy outlined by George Kennan. It may be
that historians will find that the unfolding of
the cold war was not as clear as it seemed to that generation.
But the point I want to make is that at present there seems
to be an inclination to return to the view that our relations
with the Soviet Union are basically intractable, and to
resign ourselves again to a long period of struggle.

The United States faces a moment of historic choice.
It exists for us as a people, not as partisans of any
particular cause. The consequences of our choice will be
borne not by this Administration, but by its successors in
the decades to come, not by our contemporaries but by future
generations.

Our view is that we face a vital opportunity that was
not possible 25 years ago, but one that will not soon
return:

- 40 -

-- First, to ensure that a history in which brief moments of improved Soviet-American relations gave way to prolonged periods of confrontation is replaced by an irreversible process of growing contact and restraint.

-- Second, to place limits on the acquisition and deployment of arms so that military technology is not the sole determinant of policy.

-- Third, to create an international environment in which problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the rigidities of stark confrontation.

-- Fourth, to build a network of East-West cooperation that by reducing international tensions may gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distraction from domestic ills. But equally, domestic problems must not be used as an excuse for abandoning the bipartisan consensus which has supported our foreign policy for over a quarter century.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union -- in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more decent relationship. In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative to a peaceful relationship between the two powers which have the capacity to destroy mankind.