TELECON

Adlai Stevenson/Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

4:00

K: How are you, Senator?

S: I should ask how are you.

K: I hope you realize that as a result of my putting in a call to you I've already had a half hour discussion on the Law of the Sea. This man in our department who handles the Law of the Sea is also called Stevenson. Since my secretary cannot imagine that I wouldn't prefer a State Department person to you.

S: I can't imagine that either.

K: When he started on the Law of the Sea I couldn't imagine what had possessed you.

S: Well, I won't start on the Law of the Sea, Mr. Secretary, is there something else I should start on.

K: I think we both know the subject. I wanted to talk to you about that bill on the credits.

S: Well, I can give you a thumb nail sketch if you like of where we stand.

K: Yes.

S: I'm sure I don't have to tell you that it is very difficult business at the moment of trying to put together a position that will command the majority in the Senate. We are embattled on both sides, just now, organized labor is up in arms and there's a great deal of opposition growing on the right. So what I have tried to do starting with negotiations with Scoop Jackson is to come to terms on a proposal that will probably make nobody complete satisfied but might head off greater problems, dangers on the floor. I haven't gotten much beyond Jackson at the moment but he's where it stands. We would continue the authority for the Exim Bank. Four years is requested, we'd make it three with one year for continued credits in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries except Xingxaxal Yugoslavia and Romania. This takes the precedent we have in the legislation. Then impose a subceiling on -- within an overall authorization that would come out pretty close to 30 billion dollars. A subceiling for additional credits in the Soviet Union and that is somewhat tentatively is $300 million, which is slightly in excess of the rate at which they've been granted during this first year.

DECLASSIFIED

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K: You mean $300 million a year?

S: $300 million before you have to come back to Congress for further authorization. There would be two parts. One year authorization, or credits in the Soviet Union and separately a $300 million additional subceiling; that's $300 million in addition to what is already or would be outstanding as of the effective days. That would be $280 million. So you'd be up pretty close to $300 million. Then because of the...

K: And on top of that there's a $300 million?

S: That's the overall for the bank, worldwide. Overall for the Bank is $30 billion but within the overall authorization would be a subauthorization for credits in the Soviet Union and all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Romania. And that is a subceiling which would be the outstanding credits of somewhere in the neighborhood of $270 million plus $300 million.

K: So at no time could there be more than $600 million outstanding.

S: Thereabout--until you get further authorization from the Congress. Now there's one other, well there are a couple of others, but there's one other point which I think would be of particular interest to you. The concern here is not just with the credits in the Soviet Union; it's very largely with the whole through the notion of 3% or 7% loans anywhere in the world at a time when prime rate is up 7 1/2% at home and with no so much the routine commercial transactions as the so-called projects, the developments loans and the danger that they will involve us politically and in unforeseen consequences will have adverse impacts on US labor or the tentative position of US businesses. Some of them are just ad hoc situations that are rankling here. $50 million financing of say cotton for example to Japan. So to respond to that concern not so much about the routine commercial transactions, but about the big ones and the big ones that lead to the development of production facilities abroad, competition for our manufacturers, adverse impact on labor and so on. We would also require that any guarantee in excess of $50 million, any single transaction in excess of $50 million be accompanied by this in anywhere in the world, you don't single out the Soviet Union, the only time the Soviet Union gets singled out is in next to that subauthorization, that subceiling which I mentioned. Anywhere in the world there's a credit proposed to be authored by the bank of more than $50 million, it would have to be accompanied by a Presidential finding that it's in the national interest with specific attention to the competitive consequences, the labor impact, short supply situations, maybe a couple of other areas now. That in the past at least wouldn't pick up more than 11 or 12 deals a year. Those 11 or 12 deals or whatever they are in the future would after the Presidential finding be subject to a Congressional veto if one-third of the members of either house signed a petition, brought the issue to a vote and the credit was disapproved.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 2012958

By AR NARA Date 9/16

K: Within what time period?

S: I think it's 30 days after the Presidential finding; I'm afraid I'm a little vague on that. I think we were figuring a total of 60 days; 30 days for the Presidential finding and then 30 days after the Presidential finding after which the Congress would have to act. Now that sums up in a rather general way I think where we stand at the moment with Jackson; it may be 60 days for the Congress; I'm afraid I just can't remember.

K: Would your position change any if we were making some progress with Jackson on his own amendment?

S: We, I don't know which amendment of his you..

K: The Jackson Vania.

S: Yeah. I don't think Jackson'Vanick amendment has anything to do with this.

K: I agree with you.

S: And, I don't know where you stand with him. He's been quite willing from the beginning to leave it out of the exim bank legislation and I think I know his reasons. But this proposal to..I started work at this originally in the hopes that it could be a way of side-tracking Jackson-Vanick but in the interim the concern has been growing greatly in the Congress with not only those of the Soviet Union..well just with loans. Partly because of the very largely because of the 6 - 7% interest rates as opposed to the high rates abroad, but also with ad hoc situations--it's cotton in Japan or it's drilling equipment for Iran or the sale of Boeings to Japan--oh, one of a kind of commodities they have to buy anyway and a growing feeling that we better start exercising a little oversight here and not just give this bank/$30 billion dollar blank check. For a variety of reasons, some of which are political but most of which have plenty to do with Jackson-Vanik.

K: That ceiling of $300 million in addition to what's already outstanding applies only to the Soviet Union?

S: Yes.

K: You didn't lump Poland in with it?

S: That I'm quite sure, I wish I could, I'm 99% sure and I'd have to doublecheck just to give you a 100% answer. That applies just to the Soviet Union. I'm trying to think what it is that should bring in the Eastern Europeans. Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 5/7/68

I'll tell you what it was. Here's where I've got my notes now in front of me. The one-year authorization. I said there was a one-year authorization and a subseiling. The subseiling of what's outstanding plus $300 million would apply just to the Soviet Union. The one-year authorization as opposed to the three-year authorization for all other countries, would apply to the Soviet Union to all Communist countries, except Romania and Yugoslavia.

K: So you'd have to authorize it again next year.

S: Yes.

K: Then what's the sense of putting a ceiling on it? Oh to keep us from going crazy this year. was

S: Well, it wasn't.. there are those concerns but there was also the feeling, at least I've had the feeling, that maybe this would be helpful to you. I saw some testimony of yours, I think it was in the Senate Finance Committee, and in response to a question by Senator Nelson which seemed to indicate how you felt, you didn't commit yourself, but you indicated that it might not be unhelpful to you if you were in the position of having to say that either because of the one year or because of the $300, I think he was talking about one year, I don't think he was mentioned the subceiling, if you were in a position to say that you had to satisfy the Congress.

K: Now tell me, is this $300 million credits that can be extended or the amount of money that can actually be made available?

S: I'm not sure, frankly, we've addressed that to ourselves to that distinction. If you wanted to..

K: You'd be (inaudible) in terms of what would be drawn.

S: Yes. Well, I think we might too.

K: Because in that case we could probably give a slightly more credit because not all of them would be made available in that year.

S: But you'd be in a difficult position; you'd have to assume that you could get the authorization for the subsequent increasement. I don't know how the bank would like that. I think we could go either way on that and none of this is set in concrete.

K: Let me talk to Bill Casey about that, may I?

S: By all means. Do you have any initial reactions to the package, without committing yourself. I'm getting under the gun, here.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By J. NARA Date 5/7/79

K: Well, Casey, of course, doesn't want that $50 million for the whole world; he just wants it -- if it has to be applied, applied to the Communistxx countries. I can see your reasoning in not wanting to be that discriminatory.

S: Well the considerations are the same and also I didn't want to single out the Soviet Union any more than necessary.

K: Well it's not as bad as I was afraid it would be.

S: Well I'm afraid it could be worse, it could get worse than this unless we put together a package and really get some support.

K: Let me think about it; it doesn't look unmanageable.

S: Well, that's encouraging.

K: Can I call you over the weekend?

S: By all means, no--Sunday I will be in Illinois. I'll be back late.

K: Will you be here tomorrow?

S: I will be here tomorrow--in and out of my house.

K: Good, I'll try to call you tomorrow.

S: Ok.

K: Thank you.

S: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority L012958
By NARA Date 9/7/69

TELECON

General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

4:20 PM

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Al, I had arranged while I was in Saltzburg to drop over to ____ Garden and see the German Foreign Minister.

H: Yes.

K: Whom I had to cancel out three times and who's been dying to see me. I'm assuming it isn't going to cause any heartburn.

H: Well, I don't think so, I hope not. I wouldn't see how it could. We've got a full day with nothing to do.

K: I have arranged for Schmidt and Wilson to meet him in Brussels on the 26th. On the way to Moscow.

H: Right. OK.

K: And to sign the NATO declaration there.

H: Let me run this by him tomorrow.

K: Well, it's practically frozen, you can run it by him....

H: I mean in a sense of....

K: Don't give him any options.

H: That's right. Packing it up, you know, I mean he has to know, he can know it in the midst of our going over the <u>xxx</u> schedule. I'll just routinely....

K: Just put in on the Germans.

H: Yes, exactly. And the purpose is, therefore, to be sure we have a good <u>xxx</u> <u>xxx</u> <u>xxx</u> Brussels thing too.

K: Exactly. And that we couldn't get Schmidt there because then <u>xxx</u> there wouldn't have been a Brussels thing.

H: Right, exactly. OK. Fine Henry.

K: OK. END

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

4:33 PM

to get

K: Brent do we have a scheduled of what would be required for me back here in time for the Ottawa dinner?

S: In time for the Ottawa dinner. Which will be when, no I can get you one very shortly.

K: About 8:00. It's beyond the capacity of my office here.

S: 8:00 PM, Ottawa time, for the dinner.

K: So I would have to get in about 6:30.

S: Be in by, say, 6:00. I'll get it to you very shortly.

K: And also do you happen to know what clothes we need on the trip. I've got about 10,000 muscle bound idiots over here.

S: I don't yet....

K: They're writing book on the subject, which I get Sunday night.

S: You mean in terms of black tie and so on?

K: Right.

S: I'll find that out. I don't have that right yet.

K: Good, thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

2012958

By

NARA Date 6/7/74

TELECON

Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger.

Friday, June 7, 1974

4:49 pm

K: ..which, which would our position be?

S: Kiev

K: Well, all right. But they have proposed Odessa.

S: Well, we really want Kiev.

K: I know, but if we can't get Kiev do we then not have any?

S: If we absolutely can't get Kiev I guess we can take Odessa, but we really Kiev.

K: Would you mind explaining to me why?

S: Because there's no business in Odessa that is of any consequences, and Kiev is really a place where there's utility in having it.

K: Ok. Hold on a second, Larry. Ok, now what is this business about
Portuguese access?

S: Atomic information?

K: Yes.

S: You had wanted a harder option than we gave you, but you wanted
to take a deep breath after you came back.

K: Well, I just think that semiCommunist governments, why should we
open it up?

S: Well, that's very much my feeling, I must say.

K: Well then let's do that.

S: Ok.

K: Good.

S: All right.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 9/7/74

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

6:15 PM

(Missed first part)

K: Some specific proposal, some specific things we can give to the Egyptians.

S: Yes, Hal was doing a paper on this.

Fahmy

K: No, he was doing principles, but have you seen that/cable of what they expect?

S: My hair stood on end when I read it.

K: Yes, but is there any complete we can do?

S: Well, let me review it and we'll give you the best we can.

K: Good and will you talk to Parker and is ther something in the fields we can do?

S: Yes, we'll give you the best we can of everything because I saw that and it really....

K: Well, you know.....

S: This is Fahmy, of course, but we'll have something for you in the course of the morning to look at.

K: We haven't heard yet from...

S: From the Syrians.

K: Have delivered it?

S: Well, I sent out a cable 3 hours ago saying we would like a prompt reply. I just did it on my own because....

K: No, that was right. Thank you, Joe.

S: OK.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By J.R. NARA Date 6/14

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

6:19 PM

(Missed first part)

K: What 10%.

S: In the SALT matter.

K: Yes.

up

S: Brings our numbers up to what they've already conceded to us. A little bit over so it's just comestics.

K: OK.

S: OK.

K: Good, thank you.

Sonnenfeldt - 6:31 PM

S: Yes, sir.

K: Where the text of the ABM treaty for the Soviets?

S: That has just come out of the Verification Panel working group and Aldridge has it for another look. I have a copy of it here.

K: It is going to the Soviets tomorrow. I don't give a hoot damn what Aldridge says, I've just had enough of this.

S: You also have a problem with Defense on it.

K: No, only with the Joint Chiefs, not with Defense. What's the problem?

ed

S: The Joint Chiefs, you know, and OSB is wobbly on this. You've talk/to Schlesinger about it and our...

K: I talked to Schlesinger about it and we insist on it. You just send it over to the Soviets. The President has insisted.

S: OK. Can you say something to them about the fact that this may not be exactly final?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 5-10-74

Sonnenfeldt - page 2

K: Well, what is unfinal?

S: Well, the lawyers may pick it apart. That's why Aldridge has it now.
I'll get it back from Aldridge with any changes but if he has some major change
it has to be looked at again.

K: Can Aldridge -- there's always a one hour period in which they work is
*done*. Can Aldridge spend that hour tomorrow morning.

S: He's doing it right now.

K: Alright, then you send it in tomorrow. Send it to Dobrynin tomorrow.

S: I'll get it over to Dobrynin, OK.

K: Now also Dobrynin has sent -- brought in the Russian text of a Communique
he's giving us the English text tomorrow.

S: OK.

K: I'll take a copy with me, but I may make some comments tomorrow, but
can you and Vorontsoz work on it while we're gone?

S: Yes.

K: Good.

END

DEC 12 1958
Authority

By [signature]

NARA Date 9/14

June 7, 1974

6:35 PM

K: Hal, one other thing on that CSCE matter. Sheerer (phonetic) claimed he had no instructions. Which maybe true. Now I've cleared the instructions you've given me here, but I wanted to make t to make it a little clearer that he can talk to the NATO caucus and support it, but he also ought to suppose it at the conference.

S: Well, he'll be alone.

K: First he has to talk to the NATO caucus.

S: Well, that's what we promised to do and that's what he'll be instructed to go ahead and do now.

K: Good. But in the sense of producing an agreement.

S: Yes. As soon as that goes out, he'll do that. He wasn't instructed because..

K: Yes, but he supposed to take an active role in getting agreement.

S: Yes, he wasn't instructed because ....

K: And he will do that within a day or two of getting his instructions.

S: In the NATO caucus?

K: Yes.

S: He'll start doing it there.

K: And he will inform then the Soviet person there of where we stand.

S: He'll keep them informed.

K: OK, good, thank you.

END

By J.R. NARA Date 6/7/89

June 7, 1974

7:57 PM

K: Brent, I have a number of things. The Soviets need the composition of the advance party as quickly as possible.

S: OK.

K: Secondly, make sure that Haig gets me an answer on the Volgograd against Minsk problem that I discussed with him yesterday.

S: Alright.

K: In neither case is there a question of overnight. It would be on the way back from the Crimea.

S: OK.

K: In the case of Volgograd which is the former Stalingrad, there is no airfield big enough to handle the 707 but we're not flying the 707 anyway, we'll be on the Soviet plane. But they like the 707 to trail along.

S: Yes, they do, for communications and other people and so on.

K: OK, well, Minsk has an airfield big enough. We could compromise on __ maybe.

S: Both of them, they'll enjoy it.

K: __________ they have everything.

S: When do they want the advance party?

K: I understand they're going there on the 19th.

S: Well, that's what I understood.

K: I think it doesn't give a hell of a lot of time for planning.

S: No, it doesn't. As a matter of fact what they were going to do is sort of send the advance party reconstitute it when they finish in the Middle East right on the the Soviet Union.

But you think the Soviet Union is still __ if we could give them the names of the people who are coming and little details like this and an arrival time.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority L012958
By NARA Date 6/7/74

DECLASSIFIED

MVO E0 12958
By ____ NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

Saturday, June 8, 1974

D: Hello

K: Anatolyn

D: You are working from the very beginning. I thought you were already signing something.....

K: Historic document.

D: Well, landmark or some other very nice word as you say

K: I called it historic or it is historic

D: Of course I take it for granted. No question about it.

K: We would like to go to Mensch(Sp7)

D: Okay Mensch with understanding that it would be from ____

K: From Greme yes.

D: Greme and Moscow And going from Moscow

K: Right. Exactly

D: As for the composition of the group on Monday, I will check with Seewcroft. And ...

K: As for communique I have looked it over and I have you know, no overwhelming problems with it.

D: That is my impression too.

K: You know there are pesswords in the Middle East section for example about how to describe the Palestinians and things like that, but I don't think we need to discuss that now.

D: No, no, I understand. So we will proceed in general .... is acceptable.

K: As a basis it is acceptable. But that does not keep me.

DECLASSIFIED

MD FO 2958

By NARA Date 6/10/87

D: No, No, I understand the issues, but because some session you have. So we will take it and begin on Monday.

K: I just had it before me now they have taken it away from me again. Hold on a second.

D: Okay.

K: Hello, I had a happy life before I had this bureaucracy. I even got work done.

D: Well I think you are trying to get rid of them. By not appointing your Assistant Secretary. Finally you will be

...

K: You know there are things for example we cannot accept the reference to the nuclear testing as an objective to be comprehensive and universal, but we can accept comprehensive. But you know, there are a lot of minor things, you know the rights and interests of all states and people in the area including the Arab people of Palestine. You know phrases like that and at the end you say frank atmosphere and fruitful result. Frank usually means there was a lot of disagreement You can say constructive, friendly.

D: In understand

K: But this is the sort of thing, it is not worth; substantially it is agreeable.

D: ...

Go back and we will sit down with you together.

K: Right. Now Anatolyv, I have the transcript of my conversation here with Gromyko. Actually from Geneva.

D: You mentioned to him 40, 45, 000.

K: Let me just read you what I have. I said the General Secretary said to me and to Kennedy that everybody without a security clearance can go. Gromyko said we told you. Then I said if it were possible for me to say this, and Gromyko says you can say this. Then if I could get an estimate of what this means in numbers, Gromyko says, what would you say. I said last year it was 35,000. Gromyko says right. Then I said, if I could say 40 to 45,000, Gromyko said for what period? I said for a year, Gromyko said what year, I said for the whole year as a yardstick. Gromyko said approximately as a trend that is all right. Then I said, what I will say is my estimate is based on all my conversations this means 40 to 45,000. Gromyko says yes you will be

justified. Yes the General Secretary even made a joke the other day
that perhaps we should start a campaign for the Jews to go, and that
is what he said.

D: What I have heard

I will translate how it was written by him. Dr. Kissinger raised three
points. The first point, he said, that you said you would like to say
that the Soviet abroad authority do not have in mind or in view to prevent
or to limit immigration from the Soviet Union deliberately and that
taking into consideration the statistics or figures which already
have about immigration for the last three years, it would be
assumed that the level of immigration for 1974 will be some where
in the limits or 40-45,000. This is what you said.

I answered to Mr. Kissinger that we do not have a objection against
his qualifications which he intends to make, but made clear that this
does not mean of course to take on ourselves strick objec obligations
to fulfill exactly those figures, because the number of people who
would like to immigrate from the Soviet Union would be less, and
Dr. Kissinger should take it into ...himself.

K: Well, what are we going to do now?

D: I was just telling you to ask Gromyko. Maybe he has some additions.

K: Well, can I have Sonnenfeldt get in touch with you to work out that letter

D: Of course.

K: Because I really think we can achieve a solution and it would also solve
the credit problem.

D: Understand. Well I am just waiting now to reply to him, because
this telegram you mentioned to me. If I do not receive it today, when
I receive it, I will give Sonnenfeldt text. Okay?

K: Right.

D: Maybe I will receive it today. I don't know yet.

K: If you hear, let me know.

D: Yes, I will let you know about it. But this is exactly what I read from
his.

MAY 6 1958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/58

-5-

there is a possibility of me saying

D: He didn't specify, but in the end he mentioned Dr Kissinger, Brezhnev's
letter to Mr. Schmidt and to Mr. Wilson.

K: Okay.

D: It didn't define exactly but the idea is so please look what can be done
...later on.

K: I'll communicate with you about it or I'll get Sonnenfeldt to do it.

D: Okay, transmit usual way. and then send to you, okay.

K: Excellent.

Thank you Anatolyv

HALLADFIELD

MAY 10 1958
Author's

By ____ NARA Date 6/10/58

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By A.R. NARA Date 9-7-68

TELECON

Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger.

Saturday, June 8, 1974

9:10 AM

.....

K: Send me on a card when I have to be at the airport, do I need
special tags for my bags and stuff like that and also send some tags
over because these people ....

With not telling me anything just pouring me on an airplane.

S: I think it is intended that you leave from the South lawn
with the President.

K: Well I would like to do that, but no one has told me a GD thing
When is the plane leaving?

S: XXX 8:55. I think it is 8:30 from the South lawn, but I will get
it over to you very shortly.

K: Can you do that. ? Fine

S: I have a little information about your breakfast this morning.

Something he plans to ask you, I think.

K: What is it, I am going there now.

S: It is on the military procurement authorization bill, it is an
amendment that Jackson put on giving the Defense Department
a veto over export licensing.

K: ...

S: Mansfield is going to want your help. He posed it yesterday.

K:... Don't you think it is outrageous.

S: It is outrageous.

What he is probably going to ask for is a letter from you expressing
your views.

K: I will be glad to do it. OKAY

S: Okay.

K: You know, I will be willing to listen to their views, but they have no
right to veto. They are not a separate government.

S: No, right. I would draft up a message to Rumsfeld telling him to get together with Luns privately to work out a scenario for organizing this. I held that up last night before talking with you so I could talk with you. But I think we probably ought to do that and just tell them that Giscard has indicated that he wouldn't come and we don't know yet what the French further French...

in

K: I wish to proceed any event.

S: I understand that. I just wanted to be sure that that's what you wanted to do.

K: That's - ok. good.

S: Now on this Soviet communique. It's a workable draft. It's got problems on, as you might expect, CSCE, chemicals and a couple of other things.

K: What does it say about the Middle East?

S: I'll have to look, Henry. I've -- I think it's in the ballpark. I'm just giving you a little memo, Hyland's looking at it, and then I would like to suggest is to do an amendment draft using theirs as a basis and just getting together with Voronstov starting Monday to go over it, paragraph by paragraph and keep you informed out there if we encounter problems. We'll just have to bracket and leave open some of the things are clearly open, XX until we know a little more.

K: Ok. Now they're taking my reasoning away again. I've got somebody waiting.

S: Ok.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 6/7/78

TELECON

Saturday, June 8, 1974

11:05 AM

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: On that NATO blarney, you know everyone and his Grandmother
gives me his own schedule.

S: I'm just sending you now a little memo because of this message to you
from Souvanguard.

K: Yes, I think I should have break fast with Souvanguard.

S: Yes. There is another problem, though. And that has to do with the
Brussels Summit.

K: What about it?

S: You have a message from Souvanguard, which they unfortunately
gave to Irwin in France.

K: Yes, I've seen it.

S: Well. The question is what we do next. I think we should not
after Giscard. He obviously doesn't want to go to Brussels.

K: All right. Then let's let their Prime Minister go.

S: Well, this hasn't been suggested. What I would like to do if you
agree is to get the French Ambassador off the golf course where he is and
tell him that we have this message which indicates an interest in a signature
in Brussels, but we wondered just what they meant by that. I don't know
that we should suggest Ferrog.

K: Let's just tell him that Schmidt and Wilson are coming.

S: Well.

K: We, of course, won't press them, but we think they should have an
appropriate level official there.

By A.R. NARA Date 5-7-84

TELECON

The President/Secretary Kissinger

Saturday, June 8, 1974

KXXX

11:15 AM

P: Hello

K: Mr. President

P: I thought you would like to know I sent ....

The briefing material is very good.

K: I worked on it--covering memo.

P: The Covering memoranda is what I have been reading of course.

.... It is very helpful and we will be able to talk about it on the way of course.

K: I'll put some of the conversations with Assad and Sadat on the plane just to give you a feel for these men. A lot of it is technical stuff, that you wouldn't want to read.

P: I talked to Bob Hill who had said the Chinese Ambassador in Argentina had told him, apparently he is a loose talker that Chou EnLai was on the way out because of his physical condition. So whatever that is worth.

K: This is our impression, but it is also our impression that their relation with the US is still in good shape.

P: I wonder if there is anything to be said for your having some sort of little bow toward the Chinese before we go to the Soviet Union.

K: I already did that Mr. President,

P: I was thinking I would call him Local call between the visits.

K: That might be a good idea.

P: Just to talk to him let him know well, it is for them and for the Soviets. So that they know.

K: No, that might be a good idea. Have a little chat with him.

P: The other thing is that I wonder if. Well I don't think anything will come of it, if true, Bruce might reinstitute obviously it would come to UN α I don't know whether he would or wouldn't but for a meeting at Camp David or one in San Clemente. Obviously he won't come to Washington.

-2-

K: I'll raise that, but I don't think they will ever accept that.

P: I agree, they won't, but I think it is a nice jox gesture to raise it in quiet polite, sorta in low key subtle way.

K: I think if you see the Ambassador you ought to do it.

P: Fine. I'll put that on the talking points.

K: No I think that would ....

P: ... for the Ambassador

K: After the Mid-East trip. And you know Mr. President we have arranged for the signing of the NATO declaration in Brussels on your way to Moscow.

P: Provided that it will be ready.

K: It will be ready. We will complete it in Ottawa and we will initial it in Ottawa which just means it is completed and then it will be signed in Brussels and we have already got Schmidt and Wilson agreeing to come there. Which means that most of the heads of governments will come. Giscard can't come right now. But he will probably send his Prime Minister.

P: Well, the others are Prime Ministers so what the heck. It is perfectly all right.

K: That's right.

P: The Italians would come in a minute.

K: Of course, and this is not, Mr. President, I would not take this as a hostile move from Giscard.

P: No, no. I just wonder if it is too hostile to the Russians.

K: No.

P: Well they know the darn thing has been on the platter for a long time.

K: No, no., this is not a hostile thing. And it actually says friendly things about detente and the declaration. It is better that way Mr. President than do it on the way back.

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P: If we do M______ on the way back which I prefer much to Stalingrad. I don't want to go to Stalingrad for a number of reasons, but basically if we get M______ we could fly directly from M-______ back I think.

K: The way we are doing it Mr. President, unless you want x to change it we can do it either way. We thought we would do M______ on the way back from the Kremmer to Moscow and then fly back from Moscow which you can also do directly. M______ is only a 100 miles closer and probably .... no at all xxx closer.

P: Either one. Fine.

K: I think it is better to depart from Moscow.

P: I agree.

K: Because then they will all come to the airport.

P: We can maybe have some final communique signed.

K: That is the point Mr. President, we could issue the communique the morning of xxxxx your departure this way and then M______ wouldn't be a let down.

P: Right. I get it. Sounds better.
Everything else all right. Fine. Hxxxxx How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine.

P: Getting a little rest?

K: A little bit.

P: Not much. I understand you are going k over to see the German Foreign Minister in Austria.

K: Well, I am going over to Germany to see him. He has been wanting to see me. I canceled a meeting with him three times and now he proposed this one.

P: Yes, I understand.

K: And since Schmidt is going to come to Brussels and he'll do us more good in Brussels.

P: That's fine. OK

K: Right Mr. President

TELECOM

A. Lohrynin/Secretary Kissinger

June 8, 1974; Saturday

2:55 p.m.

D: Hello?

K: Yes, Ana...

ticker that

D: Yes, one question. I noticed on a (inaudible) General Scowcroft goes with you too.

K: Yes.

D: Who am I supposed to contact? In the White House everything should go through Sonnenfeldt.

K: You better do it through Sonnenfeldt or through Col. Kennedy at the White House if it's very sensitive.

D: Col. Kennedy, I know him, yes. He was before? Yes?

K: Yes.

D: So we are supposed to check with him now?

K: Yes. Now Anatoli, I have two other things which I had forgotten to mention. One is, well the second I better keep for a personal conversation. It's not that time urgent. The other one is the Klev versus Odessa. It seems to have it if we trade NY for Odessa, it really looks again as if we get the worst of the arrangement.

D: I could rather have you work then for your consideration there are some of your people there who but really, in our case, we do have people working in this pure organizational thing because our mission at the United Nations doesn't want to be engaged (inaudible) himself. We will think of all the things we can get other (inaudible) here in the course of whether he's calling for Department 24 hours. Because you already have people in this city. So it would be excellent if you could arrange it, but until you do it completely avoid, in this case Odessa, where you know, you could have a big wood area.

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-3-

K: No, believe me, believe me. There's no agreement planned.

D: Because we kept telling you something to claim the second stage of...

K: Absolute nonsense. Believe me.

D: No?

K: Look, we are not playing games like that. There will be no agreement announced, you know. Maybe some technical cooperation or something like that. I mean nothing of any fundamental significance.

D: I mean on a technical (inaudible)

K: Well, it turns out that we are not planning; but, you know, if they're looking around for something maybe some agreement on some minor technical issue. But there will be no second stage agreement; there will be nothing of that kind.

D: The reason is we heard there is something cooking.

K: There's nothing you can cook here. If there is, they're not doing it with us.

D: That's the Russian view. If you affirm me, because we heard something that a...

K: Anatoli, really, why should I lie to you on something you'll know in a week? Is it fair enough,

D: No, no, no. We'll wait/because I didn't ask you if the issue were you.

K: I give you the absolute assurance that total assurance that there will be no second stage agreement or no announcement having anything to do with the Middle East peace negotiations.

D: Would you make a communique or would the announcement, what kind of public documents, I mean.

K: Probably a communique, but no treaty, no. It will not be a, you know it may be visible, but it's not a big event.

D: I understand. It's rather difficult to expect you to do something in 2 days.

8

TELECON

A. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

June 8, 1974; Saturday

2:55 p.m.

D: Hello?

K: Yes, Ana...

ticker that

K: Yes.

K: Yes.

K: Yes. Now Anatoli, I have two other things which I had forgotten to mention. One is, well the second I better keep for a personal conversation. It's not that time urgent. The other one is the Kiev versus Odessa. It seems to have it if we trade NY for Odessa, it really looks again as if we get the worst of the arrangement.

D: I could rather have you work then for your consideration there are some of your people there who but really, in our case, we do have people working in..this is pure organizational thing because our mission at the United Nations doesn't want to be engaged (inaudible) himself. XXX and XXX, working at your request. We will think of all the things we can get other (inaudible) here in the course of whether they're calling for Department 24 hours. Because you already have people in this city. So it would be excellent if you could arrange it, but until you do it completely avoid, in this case Odessa, where you know, you could have a big wood area.

By AL NARA Date 9/7/8

K: The only other countries that I can tell that have consulates there are Bulgaria and India.

D: I think there are some others too.

K: No. Cuba and India-Cuba and Bulgaria, that's it.

D: That's good company.

K: That's a little boring then for our man.

D: Yes, well, I understand. Would you like something else? Something Else?

K: Well, would you look into it?

D: Well, let's look at one mutually. Ok?

K: Ok.

D: Have you had a chance to look at this communique yet?

K: I haven't got an answer but I will get it.

D: Then we will get back, yes?

K: I hope so.

D: Ok. Soon. We will wait it. If the other thing comes--if some urgency comes up, I will go through Kennedy to you, right?

K: Right.

D: Through him.

K: Yes.

D: Ok. Good. Thank you.

K: Good-bye.

D: Bye-bye (inaudible) and good luck.

K: Thank you. Don't overdo it.

D: I hope you won't surprise us with some big agreement in the Middle East.

D: Because we kept telling each other information in Egypt your plans claim the second stage of ...

D: No?

K: Well, if that's the case even that we are not planning; but, you know, if they're looking around for something maybe some agreement on some minor technical issue. But there will be no second stage agreement; there will be nothing of that kind.

D: That's the Russian view. If you affirm me. Because we heard something that a ...

K: Anatoli, really, why should I lie to you on something you'll know in a week? fair enough,

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TELECON

Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger

Saturday, June 8, 1974

5:20 PM

K: Hello.

F: Henry, Max Fisher

K: Yes, how are you?

F: How are you today?

K: Little bit harrassed.

F: ... Congress talks about wiretapping. They should be patting you on the back and telling you what a job you are doing.

K: The Congress isn't so bad, it is the Press.

F: I know that. That is the GDest thing. By the way I didn't have an opportunity to tell you, you did one fantastic job over there in the negotiations.

K: Aren't you nice.

F: Everyone over there, says it is just a miracle that you pulled that thing off. They are tremendously happy about it.

K: Aren't you nice.

opportunity to

F: I know ____ didn't have an/adequately tell you about it, but that is the fixx feeling ax all around. In fact, even sent you a sermon from the biggest synagogue. They are even talking about you in the synagogue.

K: Isn't that nice.

F: Henry, we have put some pressure on Jackson, as much as we can without letting him know.... Several of the organizations have gone on record on reformulation.

K: Wonderful.

F: I don't know what is going to happen, we have a character over there by the name of Pearl.

K: I know.

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F: But I think there is really nothing to be done.
No use meeting with this meeting. I did that more for the record
than anything else. Asking for the meeting.

K: Oh, what do you mean at the meeting.

F: Remember the other day I asked you for a meeting with
Lowell and Myself and Miller.

K: Yes. Frankly I just don't see how I can do it.

F: I don't want you. I did this just for the record.

K: I will be glad to do it when I come back, from the trip.

F: No, you hear what I said, I did it for the record there.
When you get back will be plenty of time.

K: Good.

F: But I thought we have been doing some background, I checked
with several people that we had the American Jewish Committee
talking to them, American Jewish Congress, Phil Klotnick and
a few others. Phil is going to be Financial Manager of Jackson.
We have talked to a few of them and I hope you can come out with
something. I am going over to Israel Wednesday. I'll be there
for both series of meetings if anything needs to be done further,
wish you would let me know. You'll be gone anyway.

K: I'll be gone.

F: I know that. We'll I'll be over there the same time you are.

K: Well let me know maybe we will have a chance to talk.

F: All right. We can possibly do that, because the same people will
be over there at that time.
And I'll be there, I have to be there as head of the Jewish Agency.
You moved all my 300 people out of the King David Hotel

K: Is that so?

F: Yes. I say this on this thing, you haven't made any further moves
on that yet have you at all.

K: No.

F: All right. Fine, when ever you are ready too.

K: No, because I am still trying to get a letter to Jackson cleared by the Russians. I don't want to write a letter to Jackson that the Russians then disavow.

F: Yea, well when you are, and you need a little help and push on that you let me know and we will do whatever we can. By the way the meeting the other day, I wrote you a note on it, it was a very good meeting and it was very helpful as far as the community was concerned.
Your briefings have been very, very important in creating confidence you know in the community. IXX I think it is important.

K: It is crucial and you all have been very helpful.

F: Well, I think it is good for the country and for Israel.

K: Thank you Max.

F: OK and I'll see you over in Israel my friend.

K: Good, look forward to it.

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TELECON

June 8, 1974; Saturday

5:43 PM

K: Hello?

S: Ah, yes. I just wanted to read you the sentence I want to try out. on Dobrynin on the 45,000. Fourth, we have reason to believe that the number of persons permitted to emigrate will rise to as many as 45,000 a year.

K: No, that the amplification of these criteria may well...

S: Ok. Then maybe I should stick it at the end.

K: Yeah. Maybe that.

S: We'll may well lead to a rise in the number to as many as 45,000.

K: Good.

S: Ok. Good.

K: Bye.

END

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-2-

D: Okay.

...

D: In understand

D:......

K: Let me just read you what I have. I said the General Secretary said
to me and to Kennedy that everybody without a security clearance can
go. Gromyko said we told you. Then I said if it were possible for me
to say this, and Gromyko says you can say this. Then if I could get an
estimate of what this means in numbers, Gromyko says, what would
you say. I said last year it was 35,000. Gromyko says right. Then
I said, if I could say 40 to 45,000, Gromyko said for what period?
I said for a year, Gromyko said what year, I said for the whole year
as a yardstick. Gromyko said approximately as k a trend that is
all right. Then I said, what I will say is my estimate is based on all
my conversations this means 40 to 45,000. Gromyko says yes you will be

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D: What I have heard

I will translate how it was written by him. Dr. Kissinger raised three
points. The first point, he said that you said you would like to say
that the Soviet authority do not have in mind or in view to prevent
or to limit immigration from the Soviet Union deliberately and that
taking into consideration the statistics or figures which already
have about immigration for the last three years, it would be
assumed that the level of immigration for 1974 will be some where
in the limits or 40-45,000. This is what you said.

I answered to Mr. Kissinger that we do not have a objection against
his qualifications which he intends to make, but made clear that this
does not mean of course to take on ourselves strick obx obligations
to fulfill exactly those figures, because the number of people who
would like to immigrate from the Soviet Union would be less, and
Dr. Kissinger should take it into ... himself.

K: Well, can I have Sonnenfeldt get in touch with you to work out that letter?

D: Of course.

D: Understand. Well I am just waiting now to reply to him, because
this telegam you mentioned to me. If I do not receive it today, when
I receive it, I will give Sonnenfeldt text. Okay?

K: Right.

K: If you hear, let me know.

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-5-

D: He didn't specify, but in the end he mentioned Dr Kissinger, Brezinev's
letter to Mr. Schmidt and to Mr. Wilson.

K: Okay.

K: Excellent.

Thank you Anatolyv

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TELCOM

June 20, 1974 - 12:25 p.m.

HAK/Martin Peretz (New Republic)

K: Hello.

P: Henry.

K: Marty, how are you?

P: How are you. God there are so many things that happened since we last spoke. Most importantly your marriage. The second most important I bought the "New Republic."

K: I heard about that. And I find it very reassuring. That doesn't mean that you're going to be kind to us but at least its an intelligent man in charge.

P: We had a rather interesting editorial board meeting -- between people saying that we should be a lot kinder -- people who say we're kind enough. An argument about the press conference about that MIT kid. God he was an awful questioner. I was wondering whether at some point you might not be willing to have lunch with us.

K: Of course. Who is us?

P: The editorial board of the magazine. Stanley Cornell, Walter Pinkus, John Osborne.

K: You know, I think Osborne is the best writer in Washington on Washington affairs.

P: I think so too. So if you know someone in your office.

K: It will have to be after I come back from the Soviet Union.

P: OK. When is that?

K: About -- anytime after July 8. Why don't we set it up in that week?

P: OK fine. Who should I talk to.

K: Talk to Jerry Bremer.

P: Maybe it would be best rather than me call him could you ask him to call me.

- 2 -

K: But if he doesn't it just means I've forgotten to do it.

P: OK. Bremer?

K: B-R-E-M-E-R.

P: OK. Good. Are things as good in the Middle East as they seem?

K: Well, you know things are good but precarious and it is a tremendous -- you know, it takes a tremendous balancing act. And just for your information, my concern in Saltzberg was how to hold this thing together if my moral authority gets undermined here.

P: Yes.

K: That is the problem I face.

what

P: I was very sympathetic with you did and what you're going through. I mean there is a sort of moral debauch of morality in the country. Really, the most unseemly sources.

K: Well, no one has yet explained the following. I had all the documents that are now leaking and I submitted them to the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Why in the hell would I lie with documents -- you know, I knew what these documents said. I also know how J. Edgar Hoover keeps books. But that is --- let's not talk about that. And I don't think we should discuss that when we meet with the editorial board.

P: No, what we really want to do is talk about foreign policy.

K: That is what I would like to do. I think it is an excellent group. We'll do it the week of the 8th. I'll be back the night of the 8th. Let's aim for that Thursday.

P: Good. And I will talk to Mr. Bremer - I'll talk to him this afternoon -- I'll call him. It would be nice if you ever have a free minutes just chat idly.

K: That would be nice.

P: OK.

K: Good. Bye.

TELCON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
6:00 p.m., June 20, 1974

k: Hello.

F: Yes.

K: Mr. Chairman, we've had an NSC meeting on SALT which would have
gladdened your heart.

F: Really?

K: I tell you -- this is why I was late but I will be free in about 15 minutes.

F: Okay. She said she was going to call. Well, should I come to the
office?

K: Would that be all right?

F: Sure.

K: Good. Let's meet at the State Department. I'm just leaving.
I'll do

F: Whatever is most convenient for you. All right. I'll come in the
regular -- diplomatic entrance.
Right.

K: Are you going to drive yourself?

F: Yes. I'm at the office but I'll be on my way in just a few minutes.

K: Is it difficult to park there? Because otherwise --

F: It never is. I can park right in the driveway this time of the day.

K: Okay. If you have trouble, just drive into the basement.

F: Yeah. But this time of the day, there won't be any trouble.

K: Good. I'll see you then in about 20 minutes.

F: All I have to have is somebody to let me in.

K: I'll take care of it.

F: Okay. I'll be right along.

K: Right.

[End of Conversation]

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7

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger

June 20, 1974

6:18 PM

K: How are you Jack?

J: OK. I called you to tell you Marion and I hope you will excuse us about Saturday night. She understands Nancy isn't coming and we had something to do which related to some of our children.

K: Sure, of course.

J: Is that alright? Nancy is not coming I gather.

K: Well, she's still laid up.

J: I see. Well, I'm really sorry and, you know, we would have set everything else aside if she were coming, but without that we just felt that we shouldn't preempt the kids.

K: I don't know whether that's a compliment to me.

J: I don't know. It's human and you're such a friend that I'm talking to you as a member of the family and not...

K: Of course, I understand.

J: The other thing I wanted to ask you was this, I understand you'll be in tomorrow, I'll be there, I gather you don't want any questions on the other matter until we have looked into it and you've gotten back.

K: It's up to you.

J: That's what Clifford suggested and it's entirely satisfactory with me.

K: Who's Clifford?

J: Clifford Case.

K: Me Oh. I will go along with whatever the Committee wants.

J: Well, what do you think about it yourself.

K: I think it's probably just as well.

J: The other thing is that Parker was here to consult me about his testimony in the morning and I suggested to him that he leave questions of the atomic

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Javits - page 2

power deal with Egypt and Israel to you, rather than trying to deal with them
himself.

K: That's a good idea.

J: And I will be there there to him harmless, in other words, I'll strongly
back him in the fact that all he could tell us is hearsay and what he read in those
papers, but you could tell us what animated you and what safeguards you have in
mind and so on.

K: Right. I think that's fair enough.

J: That's better. OK. Henry, you tired, do you feel better?

K: Well, Jack, I didn't feel so badly. You know, that's one of the myths that
is now being spread. I felt I couldn't let myself be bled to death one leak at a
time while I was traveling through the Middle East.

J: Listen, the power of honest indignation is unbelievable and that's what you
expressed.

K: After all I knew the documents, I had shown them to Sparkman and Case.

J: Of course.

K: And I knew that if they leaked one at a time there would be an editorial a day,
maybe it was a mistake to hold the press conference.

J: No, you expressed an honest indignation of an honest man who was doing an
enormous job and in danger of being messed up by __.

K: You know, what really worries me, Jack, which I can say is this; with the
President facing impeachment, what's been holding things together is my moral
authority abroad and to some extent at home. If that's lost we may be really in
trouble.

J: Absolutely right. Listen, it makes a lot of sense. I think we'll understand
that and the mix virtue of having it in our committee is exactly that, that we do
understand the whole picture.

K: Well, the committee has been fine and you've always been a good friend.

J: Well, that's the way we'll keep it. Now you go and how long will you be away?

K: About 10 days.

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Javits - page 3

J: Now (Gil?) called me from the Times and said he's writing a story about these breakfast meetings you've had with Jackson, Ribicoff and myself, and he said he will not quote me because I've told him nothing. But he said he would like to talk to me after I read his story. I said, well, I'll see when I read your story, but I didn't wanted you to....

K: Well, he has the figure of 45,000.

J: That's <u>correct</u>.

K: He tried to check it here and I refused to discuss it with him.

J: Same with me. I don't know <u>WHERE</u> where he got it but I guess he got a pretty good idea. I haven't offered anything, as you know, I've been very careful with this one because I feel very very sensitive. You and I ought to talk sometime too about the attitude to be taken on the Jackson/Stevenson amendment on the Exim Bank. Have you had that looked at?

K: Yes.

J: What does that look like to you?

K: Well, I think it's too restrictive.

J: Even the way the committee turned it out?

K: I understand there is another variation of it now.

J: Yes, the Committee turned out a variation which took the ceiling off 300 million

K: <u>Yes</u>. Yes.

J: I acquired a concurrent resolution of both Houses to negate anything. I gave the possibility of a two year instead of a one year deal.

K: That looked better to me.

J: Very good. Jackson talked to me about it today and obviously will try to forge some kind of a common front to the original version. So I think obviously you can't meet with the three of us before you go, hopefully this Exim Bank thing will not come up until after the recess, but I think you ought to meet with us as soon as you can thereafter.

K: I will meet with you immediately <u>when</u> I come back.

J: The last point I wanted to make is I'm going to Europe on the night of the 27th

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June 21, 1974

9:15 am

K: Brent, first, I think it is the highth of bad taste that -- to insist on using the President's car when we are dealing with the King of Belgium.

S: We are not.

K: No, I notice a cable today that we have agreed, that he has agreed to use
our car.

S: The King has agreed to use.

K: Yes.

S: Well, we we sending one out that we would use his car.

K: No, apparently the King has already agreed. That's a proposition that should never be made.

S: The security people always make it as a matter of course.

K: Well, they more than make it because I got reports on every stop that they practically beat our hosts to death.

S: They always do that. Your security people do the same thing.

K: In my case, it is less important because it is not so much a question of prestige.

S: No, but I am telling you that is the way security people approach things and they have to be turned off.

K: I see a cable here that says the King has agreed to ride with the President in his car.

S: I still think we ought to turn it around, don't you.

K: Yes. Secondly, you know, it is not a big deal for me, but they ask that I accompany him. I'll be glad to accompany him -- the President to his call on the King.

S: Oh, yes. Don't you think you should?

K: Well, I think I should, it is not an earthshaking thing.

S: No, it is not a big deal because it is obviously just a courtesy call.

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Scowcroft - p. 2

K: The major advantage is the symbolism.

S: I agree.

K: Third, I notice that we are going to the Katin (sp?) Memorial in Minsk. Now, I don't know what that is but the Katin Forest is where 10,000 Polish officers were murdered by the Russians.

S: That's right.

K: Well, we can't go to it then,

S: I agree, but, well I'll find out what that is. It can't be that though, can it?-- or the Russians wouldn't propose that we go.

K: Why not, they would say the Germans did it. That was their position.

S:

S: That's true. That's one we ought to avoid in any case.

K: They are just cynical enough to do that.

S: That's true. Ok, let me look into that.

K: Finally, would you call Shalev and say you are calling at the request of the President who is disturbed beyond expression that the Israelis started retaliatory raids on Lebanon the day he left there and the day he agreed to a statement on terrorism. And have kept it up now for a week and that if they expect political support from us they cannot keep doing these things, and that we have now had the most violent protest from every Arab leader we visited. Did you see the cable from Sadat this morning.

S: No, I saw one from Fahmy.

K: Well from Fahmy on behalf of Sadat.

S: Yes.

K: And you just tell them to knock it off in no uncertain terms.

S: Right.

K: You know those guys are primitive.

S: I find it unbelievable. If anything is calculated to drive our friend here up the wall and it will look to him like an attempt to undercut his trip.

By ARL NARA Date 6/7/8

Scowcroft - p. 3

K: That's right, and you tell him in the sharpest possible terms --
I think it is better than if I get Sisco to do it.

S: No, I agree.

K: And then, I'll have Sisco to do it also on my behalf.

S: OK, You want me to do it with Shalev -- or Dinitz isn't back yet.

K: Dinitz isn't back yet.

S: Yes, Ok, I'll do it right away.

K: Ok, but will you let me know and make it as tough as possible.
And, let's look into this Katin thing.

S: Yes, I agree. I'll look into it. Are you still having that meeting at 9:30.

K: Yes.

S: Ok, I'll probably come over for that.

K: Good., bye.

END

By J. M. NARA Date 9/7/89

TELECON

Mr. Simon/Sec. Kissinger

June 21, 1974

10:45 am

K: I'm sorry about Yamani yesterday, I was stuck with the President.

S: Yes, I know. He was, I think a little bit hurt, as Arabs get.

K: But, did you explain it to him.

S: Completely and I explained what the President is like when he starts to talk -- how it is impossible to break away and you know I went through the whole thing, and so did Tom Enders.

K: Well, I'll write him a letter

S: That would be super if you could do that.

K: Now, Bill, you were going to put countervailing duties on Argentina today, could you hold-up on that for a bit.

S: Well, we have got a legal problem on it and it is turning into a massive Congressional problem.

K: I know, but that's how we always pay our foreign policy prices.

S: Well, there again, if it wasn't law it would be ...

K: I know, that's what George told me and then we paid a horrendous price in Brazil. Isn't there a negotiating way you can get us a little time on?

S: We sent a team to Argentina and we were talking to them up here and they said send it on May 26 and we talked to the Argentine Embassy here in Washington and were convinced our team would be welcomed and furnished with full information you know and this is the delay tactic that Treasury has always employed, recognizing your problems. Our team got completely stonewalled

K: But the trouble is that since I didn't know this team was going down there I couldn't use anybody any political channel.

S: Actually, we went through the State Department on that and those guys got down there and they got....

K: Yes, but I didn't go to the Foreign Minister on this and I am just wondering if you could give it a month and send a team down there again.

By ARL NARA Date 6/21/74

By J.R. NARA Date 9/7/8

Simon - p. 2

S: The Argentine Ambassador called over here and we've met with him a couple of times and what we have to do is really get some cooperation from them.

K: Yes, but I can't even attempt that if you make your announcement today.

S: See what happened, they came to see us last week and said that we will have a team here in Washington next week and we said good, if you'll do that then at least we can say there is motion and they called and said they can't give a response until the 17th. the Ambassador from Washington here, Buenos Aires, indicated that the Argentines couldn't possibly have a team in Washington with the necessary information this week and so you know it is just continued stonewalling. If I can get assurance.

K: But, my problem is I can't get to it. Can you give us a week?

S: Let me find out what their last conversation with them is. I would like to. Obviously, __________ is making points on the side of being just as liberal as we can be. We've got these people, as you well know, up on the Hill, stirring up the Congressmen constantly.

K: I know, but how about giving us a week and letting me work on them.

S: You mean if they have a team here during that period of time.

K: Or, well, a promise of a team.-- quickly.

S: Well, there again, it is a violation of the law and they will drag my butt up to the Congress and you know, I would love to be able to defend myself if I can show them motion and good faith and damnit, we are focusing on this thing -- and you know, quiet them down.

K: Well, give us a week and the assurance of a team and you can at least decide in that period.

S: Ok, let me find out what McDonald's last conversation with the Argentine Ambassador was and who do you want me to call over there and tell?

K: Call E_a gleburger.

S: Ok, fine

K: Or Kubish.

TELECON

Roland Evans/Secretary Kissinger

June 21, 1974

10:56 AM

E: Say, we're looking for a leg man in this office, just wanted you to know if
things don't go well over there you've x got a job here, any time you want it.

K: Well, I was hoping my contacts in this town would be used, especially by
my friends.

E: Congratulations.

K: What did I do?

him

E: I don't know. You must have done something, you got back from the
Middle East, safe. Without any major problems.

K: That's right.

E: You've got a problem now, though haven't you. This (Lebanese) thing.
How much longer is that going to go on Henry?

K: It is not going to go on beyond today, believe me.

E: (We done with it then) (practically inaudible).

K: Yes.

E: Were you surprised at the ferocity of this assault?

K: Yes. We didn't know about it.

E: We didn't?

K: NO.

E: No, and no information. I've just been talking with the Israelis all morning
on it and they, you know, it's a tough problem.

K: Yes.

E: But this isn't the way to solve it. I don't think. How are you?

K: I'm fine. How are things?

E: Tired?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/24/74

*

Evans - page 2

K: Not too bad.

E: Will we see you Saturday night?

K: Are you going to be up there?

E: Sure.

K: Of course.

E: What about Nancy?

K: She won't be able to make it, I'm afraid.

E: How sad. She was coming to dinner with us last week and had to cancel out.

K: Well, you know, that was too much of a strain, the prospect of being at the Evans.

E: How is she?

K: She's been more used to being invited by ________ then I am.

E: How is she?

K: She's been getting better.

E: But she won't be there.

K: I don't think so.

E: That's a shame. I don't suppose you'd have any time at all to see me, would you?

K: I doubt it.

E: I'm going with you to Moscow incidentally.

K: Oh, good.

E: And are you going with the President to Brussels?

K: Yes.

E: With him?

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority E012958
 By NARA Date 5/7/64

Evans - page 3

K: Yes.

E: You know ____ happened there, any importance -- an importance Winston speech.

K: Not particularly.

E: But we look at lot better, Winston don't we, right now.

K: Oh, much better. I may hold a press conference.

E: There?

K: Just along the foreign trip. I think it's now become standard.

E: Where would you have it. Over there you mean.

K: No.

E: I know. You probably will have one though, exactly.

K: Not in Brussels. I may have one Monday before we leave.

E: When is the departure?

K: I think 10:00 on Tuesday.

E: Is that for both, the press and the President?

K: This I don't know. More or less the same. F Rollie, I've got to run.

E: Will I be able to have a chat with you over there, like we did?

K: Yes, certainly.

E: Is Winston going with you?

K: I don't think so.

E: You've got to run, I'll see you Saturday night.

K: Good.

E: Bye.

END

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

June 21, 1974

11:00 AM

Z: I saw the column this morning and I just wanted to call you.

K: OH.

Z: I didn't realize you had this ____ with you...

K: Oh, that's nothing.

Z: Is that [exaggerated] exaggerated?

K: No, but I've had that sort of separate for two years.

Z: Well, I just wanted to say, make sure you get a little rest for heaven's sake.

K: Well, you're nice to call.

Z: No, I mean, that concerned me.

K: No, it's nothing. It's uncomfortable sometime. I don't even know where he knows it from.

Z: It was a good column, don't you think.

K: I've just gone through it and it had too much personal stuff in there.

Z: I mean over all it was good. You're __this afternoon, aren't you?

K: Yes.

Z: OK.

K: And it doesn't concern my case.

Z: No, but I mean you'll step out afterwards and make some points. Don't you normally do that. I'm talking about (TD) tonight.

K: With Fulbright, yes.

Z: Good. You're planning on the press conference Monday, aren't you?

K: About 11:00.

Z: That would be good if you'd do it. So I'll count on that too?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By J.R. NARA Date 6/21/74

TELECON

Senator Taft/Secretary Kissinger

June 21, 1974

11:02:

T: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: OK, how are you?

T: Oh, ... listen I called because I understand you're going up before Foreign Relations this afternoon.

K: Yes.

T: And I think among other things there's one area that came up yesterday that I wasn't sure you had any report on and Symington is extremely quite likely to ask you some questions about it. I thought I ought to background you just for a moment.

K: Good.

T: With us yesterday for the Armed Services Committee was Paul Nitzey and I was the only republican present when he made most of his testimony. Thurmond came in later, but I don't think Thurmond ever got the gist. What he is saying in effect is that after SALT I there was an interpretation of protocol which entitles into that was not communicated with regard to the G Class submarines and the 66 missiles on those SLBMs that they're not be in 950 limitation of SALT I. He says this was held back and not communicated and that the Russians first made it known sometime late in 1973.

K: Total nonsense.

T: Well, this is what he's saying. And I questioned him quite hard on it as to who told him, he wouldn't specify that it was you, he wouldn't specify who it was. He said it was a communication which he does not have a copy coming from the State Department confirming it after the Russians had made it known and....

K: But the point was they were __dismantel__ in order to reach 950 to __209__ submarines.

T: Right.

K: At the end of 9 missiles. We want to ____ to ICBMs rather than G class submarine missiles which I have only ranged at only 200 miles and which are becoming total anyway and none of which are on station right now and therefore we had agreed already in Moscow that they could not use B class submarine for replacement. We considered that a victory for us, not a set back.

T: He said that that would be the argument made for doing it and he didn't attempt to weigh the argument, he'd rather use it as a basis for saying that

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012858

By NARA Date 6/24

Taft - page 2

his position and the position of the delegation as negotiators has been made impossible because of that fact that there was two levels negotiations and if they're not kept informed by you and by State, I pointed out, for instance, that you were not Secretary of State at the time.

K: Yes, but I did do the negotiating.

T: Well, he said that he understood that you did and I tried to pin him down and to from whom he understood it.

K: No, but that's correct, I did do the negotiating. There was nothing secret about this.

T: Well, I got that impression too because later I had lunch yesterday with __________ and he said when he came on board in July of 1973 that it was well known and he knew all about it.

We

K: __________ considered this a great success.

T: Yes. Well, I just thought you ought to know that __________ this came up and that the import of Nitzy's __________ testimony is that there is double of a negotiation going on and this has made it impossible for the __________ delegation to work toward any objective, satisfactory objective __________ in SALT II. The other thing he mentioned is the...

K: Now on SALT II there was no double level of negotiation going on and that's one reason why didn't have a successful outcome.

T: He also cited, well he said that in __________ 1972 that he and Smith had been told to drop the ABM thing and they __________ for 48 more hours and during that time the Russians accepted it. I don't know if that's true either. He also mentioned Article 12 and...

K: What is article 12?

T: __________ Article 12 is the instruction to the delegation not to __________ with regard to the withdraw position in so far as our forces in Europe are concerned and that they the delegation according to him have been instructed not to __________ negotiate in this area. I went ahead and asked him a further question. I asked him if the reason for that __________ clearance on negotiating in the area was not the fact with a negotiated in it that we might __________ get into very serious trouble with our allies __________ unless there was complete coordination with....

K: Exactly.

T: He kind of agreed but said __________ late with Brussels 30 times and so forth.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By A.L. NARA Date 5/7/78

June 21, 1974

11:36 AM

K:

K: Al, what is this stuff of Ehrlichman's of giving orders to the chiefs out of channels?

H: I saw that this morning. I don't know what the hell he's talking about, unless he's talking about you remember the President would have those tantrums on the bombing stuff.

K: But all of that went through Laird.

H: Sure it did. But you remember he would go through the ____ occasionally and saying I'll deal just directly with the chiefs.

K: No worder was ever issued that didn't go through Defense.

H: No, we'd never do it. Well, I can see why Ehrlichman might have the delusion

K: Well, that's a God-damn irresponsible thing to say.

H: He's really a _____. We're moving here today to quash his <u>subpoena</u> of the President, you and me.

K: OK.

H: That's what we'll do on that. How's Nancy <u>accidentally</u> incidentally?

K: Well, you know, it's a slow process.

H: Yes. Is she going to be able to go to that thing in New York?

K: No.

H: Listen, Henry, the question came up after the briefing yesterday from McClellen and a number of others, Stennis....

K: About public statement on the reactor?

H: Yes. That's point one and that's of less importance. Are you going to do this press conference Monday?

K: I'm going to do a press conference.

H: Good, OK. Well you could hit that.

BEATRIZED
Authority
£012958

NARA Date 5710

By A.J.

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

Authority

By ARL NARA Date 9/14

Haig - page 2

K: What is that, the reactor? What is the other thing.

H: The other one is more fundamental, it's the SALT business.

K: Yes, I'm going to have several forums for that.

H: OK, because what the x President suggested, I just talked to him about it, Rush mentioned to him that some people have been very goosey about it.

K: No, I will hit that in the press conference.

H: You'll hit that?

K: You know, I can't go into the numbers but I'll go into the general.

H: You see Timmons is in here with me and he -- Stennis, McClellan, Goldwater, Tower and Dominic are the key guys who....

K: I'm going to testify on that before the Armed Services Committee, on Monday afternoon and they're going to hear all the figures.

H: Oh, OK. Well, why don't we do it that way, that's a better way. They were going to try to get you to have them for breakfast.

K: I'll be glad to do it, but why don't you see whether I'm going to testify before Jackson, see that they all come to that.

H: OK, let's do that and we'll tell them the schedule is so cramped that it would be better to do it this way.

K: Right.

H: OK. Everything else alright?

K: Everything else is fine. But I think the White House should say something about this Ehrlichman statement.

H: Yes, I've got to read and find out what the hell this is all about.

K: Because we can't have a statement around that orders were given on bombing out of channels.

H: No, that's crazy, it really is crazy. There were never any orders given to the chiefs that didn't go through there.

K: Exactly.

["TELECON", "Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger", "June 21, 1974", "12:05 PM", "(Missed first part)", "D: If you don't mind.", "K: Except I have the Spanish Foreign Minister waiting. You wouldn't want to undermine my relations.", "D: Very quick matter. Exactly one minute.", "K: Yes.", "with", "D: It's OK about us about signing new things you proposed yesterday. You remember? About fulfillment about the ______. Maybe it will be signed in Moscow. Second, Mr. Gromyko asked me urgently to come to Moscow and check. Your first party which arrived to Moscow, they say that they do not nothing about Crimea.", "K: They are f

Dobrynin - page 2

K: I take care of it.

D: He asked you to give instructions to solve this.

K: Oh, they're crazy. OK.

D: OK, because they say they no nothing....

K: Anatol, I've got to run.

D: OK. So you will give me a call when you -- tomorrow or day after, OK.

K: You want to come over here tomorrow morning.

D: Tomorrow or day after next tomorrow, what is better for you?

K: Why don't you come here about 9:00 tomorrow morning.

D: I think this is a good idea.

K: Good.

in

D: 9:00 am/the morning.

K: Good. See you then.

END

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
By -- NARA Date 6/4/04

June 21, 1974

12:05 PM

(Missed first part)

D: If you don't mind.

K: Yes. with

K: They are fools. Of course we're going to the Crimea.

D: No, they say they have only Moscow and Minsk and they say they are going to ______.

K: Oh, they are......

D: ______ social practice is please check with ______.

K: No.

D: And ask him to give...

K: No, they don't want to go to Yalta.

D: Well Yalta -- this is the Crimea.

K: Yes but they'd go anywhere else in the Crimea.

D: Where. Who goes to -- we discussed about Crimea about -- in Yalta there is a place where Brezhnev lived personally.

K: I see.

D: So, this is the Crimea, really.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 9/27/74

June 21, 1974

12:07 PM

K: Brent, our advance party in Moscow claims that they have no instructions to go to the Crimea, that they want to go to the (Caucuses) and the Russians are in a panic.

S: Oh, that cannot be true, that's absurd. As a matter of fact I just sent them a cable.

K: OK, just get them straightened out, that I had agreed to the Crimea. Where in the Crimea I don't give a damn about.

S: What I heard was that they're claiming that you agreed to Yalta.

K: No. I didn't agree to anything in particular, but what Dobrynin now says is that Brezhnev wants him to stay at the place that he's got which happens to be in Yalta.

S: That's right.

K: Well, that's a PR question to me it makes no difference.

S: Well, I think we ought to try to resist it, don't you?

K: Well, yes, but we can't shift it to the Caucuses.

S: Oh, of course not. That was never intended.

K: OK.

S: No, my cable would suggest __ as an alternative.
the

K: OK. We can try __/crucifix in there. OK.

S: I'm talking to Dinitz now.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By MR NARA Date 6/16

Authority
 DECLASSIFIED
 2012958
 By
 NARA Date 6/24

TELECON
Senator Kennedy/Secretary Kissinger

June 21, 1974

7:08 PM

K: Henry, how are you?

HAK: Ted, how are you?

K: Congratulations on your trip to the Middle East.

HAK: Thank you. I appreciated your letter.

K: Very, very fine. An outstanding accomplishment. You deserve all the
gratitude of many millions of Americans.

HAK: You've been a very good friend.

K: I understand the meeting went well this afternoon. I came up here -- I'm
up in Rhode Island now, the Foreign Relations Committee.

HAK: That was about the report on the Summit. We didn't talk about the other
matter.

K: I wanted to just see on this CTB. I'm sure you probably talked about it at
some length at the.....

HAK: We talked about the threshhold test ban and Humphrey and Muskie
raised the CTB and I didn't oppose it very strongly.

K: Well, this would be the -- our count on it probably is that 48 that have
indicated support and probably 8 or 9 that might lean our way. I think an awful
lot about whether bringing this up....

HAK: Well, my view -- Oh, I was asked about that. My recommendation is
to bring it up after the summit because if you bring it up before the summit and
then the TDB doesn't go, people will say it was because the Soviet back was
stiffened, hoping for something more sweeping. I don't think you forego
any option by pressing it afterwards.

K: Well the point of course there before would be some indication, I would think,
of support for whatever you were, you know, the negotiations that were taking
place.

HAK: You mean that even if we don't get a CTB it would be an indication of
support for some sort of test ban.

K: That's right.

Kennedy - page 2

HAK: Well, from that point of view and I'll tell you we will have some Jackson pre-hab problem on this one again. Can you phrase your resolution in such a way in which your preference is made clear? But you'd go along with something else as long as it moves it that direction?

K: I think if they had -- I mean, if there was some language that they had that I think even that was worked out before, I think, that could help us....

HAK: I'm not opposed to the resolution as long as it isn't used to knock off what's attainable.

K: Yes. I suppose the Defense Department will be opposed to it.

HAK: To the CTB?

K: Yes.

HAK: Totally. They're violently opposed to the threshhold test ban. Not violently, but substantially opposed to the threshhold. They'll be violently opposed to the complete test ban. That I can assure you.

K: The thinking in terms of the threshhold of moving towards a comprehensive and the treaty after that or is this just....

HAK: Well, I think it could certainly be -- we would not object to writing into a threshhold test ban if this is a step towards a complete test ban. And we're going to put into the communique, this is just for your information, the desirability of the complete test ban.

K: Well, but if you were asked about it, Henry, I mean, the only thing we don't want to get into a situation where.....

HAK: I was asked about it by Humphrey. Let me tell you -- Humphrey at the committee. I said that I would prefer it after the summit but then I didn't look at it from the point of view that you just raised. I would think that if you -- if this think thing could be phrased in such a way that you maintain your position on the comprehensive but that you'd go along with something as an intermediate step or interim step then I wouldn't oppose it.

K: I'll talk to Hubert and Ed at the -- I'll try to get them over the weekend or the first of the week.

HAK: Good. I'll be here thru Monday evening.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 9/7/89

Kennedy - page 3

K: Fine. OK. Thanks very much.

HAK: How's your son ?

K: Oh, he's over in Ireland. I don't know whether that's the most dangerous.
Somebody was telling me it would be better to be in the West Bank then be in
Ireland these days. But I'm going over for the 4th of July break and we're
camping out and that sort of thing for five days.

HAK: I still hope to meet youx him. Will you let me know when he gets back --
when you both are back in town?

K: Yes. He'll be over there now for about 2 1/2 or 3 weeks and then up to the
Cape, but maybe in the Fall.

HAK: Let's do it in the Fall.

K: Good. OK, Henry. Thanks very very much.

HAK: Thanks for calling. Bye.

END

By J.R. NARA Date 9/7/68

June 21, 1974

7:40 PM

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Brent, when we were in Israel there was a tentative agreement that Paris would come here on Monday, for a preliminary talk with Schlesinger and me. What is your judgment of Schlesinger's frame of mind.

S: Not very good.

K: Should he wait until we get back from Russia?

S: I think so. That would be my impression. I would just be leary right now.

K: That's what worries me.

S: I think he's shaken up. I don't know what his frame of mind is, but I think it's not good.

K: He's shaken up by what?

S: Well, by, you know, his meeting with the President and meeting yesterday, I think he understands that the President was not happy with him yesterday.

K: Yes. It was one of the most outrageous performances I've ever seen.

S: It really was. As a matter of fact, when the President called about x and Julie and David, incidentally, they are not going going.

K: Good. Thank God.

S: Oh, I agree. He said something about, what did you think of your Defense colleague yesterday and I told him I thought it was disgraceful. And then he went on a bit about the idiocy of the comments about his friends capability and what did they think of these negotiations were and so on and so forth. He was upset. I've let Wickham know and this morning that it was not a very good performance in my opinion. I just think he's uneasy. I mean, in a period of instability and I just don't know what he'd do. He might be fine.

K: Do you want to see whether he's free for breakfast tomorrow morning.

S: Schlesinger?

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

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By MR

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

June 21, 1974

8:13 PM

N: Hello?

K: Mr. President.

N: I understand you did very well before the committee. Hugh Scott was pleased at least.

K: Yes and he was very supportive.

N: Well, I called him beforehand and told him, look here we want you to tell a few of these people to stand up and he said he would. He did, did he?

K: Absolutely. And he asked a very helpful question. He said everything already negotiated so that he's just going there to sign? Or is there a lot left to negotiate. I said, I wish there were a little less left to negotiate, because in most of the areas there are very big problems remaining. I went through it with him. And then Fulbright stepped out and said he fully supports you.

N: Good. And you were able to before and after to get the nuclear power plant thing.

K: That's right. I don't know whether they showed it on television but I.....

N: But to Ron -- I think they must have because he said you got out in time to be on if they were going to use it. I'm competent they must have used it.

K: Good.

N: Anyway, that's one out of the way.

K: I think we're going to have a very successful trip.

N: Well, the way it will work out is that, work out a communique that handles MERVE thing the way that you suggested. I think it's just about in the _______. And that leaves something left to be done.

K: That's right. I think that's just as well.

N: Yes. And find the areas of agreement on the other two items.

K: Exactly.

The President - page 2

N: Which are not insignificant, let's face it.

K: Well exactly, Mr. President, if we got a breakthrough on SALT which will get negotiated later on, that's not bad.

N: That's right. But I mean having the threshhold of the ABM thing, is an accomplishment of itself.

K: Of course. I don't find much nitpicking about the trip anymore.

N: Scott said the committee was pretty well set, they didn't badger you with other strenuous matters.

K: No, I don't think this was the time to do it.

N: Good. The Committee was, in other words, pretty supportive all the way around, then.

K: The Committee was very good. It was a very good session.

N: That's good.

K: And it was all on the summit, a little bit on NATO and Fulbright, when he came out, made a very strong statement, the press tells me that others as they were coming out made good statements.

N: Well, we have to understand this little flap on the nuclear thing -- they have to find something to pick on so they -- and people just -- it's such a the trouble is such a darn mistery, you know, we have to remember Eisenhower talked about atoms for peace; way back there we were going to share it with the world and gave the same speech, and Kennedy was for it. That's what this is all about. How do you do it otherwise? Isn't that what it's about.

K: Exactly. It's the only way you can control relations in this period.

N: How about our Israeli friends. Are they still bombing?

K: No, they stopped it. We made a sharp protest and they sent us a message this afternoon -- this evening. In fact, Dinitz was just in here to tell me they had stopped it.

N: That's good. It should, in their own interest. We're not asking them to do something harmful for them. We're asking because if they go too far, we'll get one hell of a reaction here. People now are on the mountain top; they want a peaceful settlement in the east.

K: No question about it. I think they're coming on very strong.

END

By AL NARA Date 9/7/8

June 21, 1974

8:37 PM

S: Yes.

K: Another thing I find unbelievable is that they gave the OSB
OSD memo on the test ban to Jackson.

S: I find that unbelievable too. I just had a long go around with Wickham and I said my goodness, you know, I said those are internal working documents before we have a government position. I find that <u>incomprehensible</u>.

K: What's his answer to that?

S: Well, his answer was, well, he said, it's the same as Schlesinger said in the NSC meeting. I said, sure, what that is that it's militarily disadvantageous but the President may want to overrule it on political grounds. That's just great. He said, well, that was the same as he testified and I said, again he shouldn't have testified to <u>that</u> that before we have reached a position, you shouldn't do that and he said, well, they asked questions, what are we supposed to do. They're a duly constituted authority. You know, they're just unbelievable.

K: Have you told Haig this?

S: I haven't yet.

K: I wish you would.

S: He went home early tonight, he's got a sort throat or something. No, I plan to.

K: OK. Thank you.

S: Right.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 2012958
By NARA Date 6/26/74