VIII-WG-4-1

Eighth International Conference
on Science and World Affairs

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

FINAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 4 ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

September 14, 1961

We here reached an agreement on the following points:

In discussing the problems of a disarmed world, we agreed that none of them will be as dangerous as the problems with which we are faced today. In some areas, new problems might arise with the disappearance of military power and of the fear of major war. These problems should be studied further.

In particular, in a disarmed world, importance of strategic problems connected with national frontiers will substantially diminish. Although some of the existing frontiers are in dispute, any changes should be made only by negotiation or other peaceful means. For instance, the existing German frontiers could not be changed without a great upheaval.

The stability of a disarmed world will depend to a large extent on general acceptance of methods of solving of international disputes by means other than the use of military force. The Charter of the United Nations provides various means for the peaceful solution of international disputes. In a disarmed world the United Nations will have a much better chance than it has today to make effective the basic principles of the Charter. The influence of world public opinion will also increase, and no nation will be able to ignore recommendations having behind them overwhelming support of the United Nations and of the public opinion of the world.

In a disarmed world, even more than at present, it will be necessary to protect each group of states against the arbitrary actions by majorities in international organs.

Both during the period of actual reduction of armaments and after complete disarmament has been achieved, the process of inspection should not be subject to veto in any form. In case of a gross and properly ascertained violation of the disarmament treaty, if agreement cannot be reached on means of enforcement, each nation would have the option of taking such steps as it would deem necessary in order to protect itself against such a violation.

In addition, we considered the following questions:

(a) Ideological conflicts caused by social and colonial revolutions, especially those in which assistance from abroad is influencing the outcome.

(b) Usefulness of regional arrangements in solving local disputes and in policing a region.

(c) Settlement of economic conflicts.

VIII-WG-4-1

2.

(d) Economic consequences of disarmament, which can probably be solved by proper advanced planning.

(e) Control of new technological developments which may introduce new dangers in a disarmed world.

(f) Development of international criminal law applicable directly to individuals violating the disarmament agreement or committing other crimes against peace.

(g) Protection of rights of various states against arbitrary majority action and adaptation of the United Nations Charter to contemporary conditions.

(h) Limitation of propaganda directed against other nations or races.

(i) Controls over the manufacture and trade in conventional and police armaments.

We suggest that these problems be studied by the joint research group to be established.

Discussion Draft
Working Group 3

September 14, 1961

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. We have considered the first steps in a disarmament agreement in the framework of general and complete disarmament.

2. The first stage in such an agreement must involve arms reduction measures large enough to lead to a radical diminution of the chances of a nuclear war.

3. At all times during the stages of such an agreement, all parties must be convinced that the strategic balance is not upset.

4. The reduction of armaments must at all times be accompanied by sufficient effective controls to assure both sides against violation of the agreement.

5. The achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the attainment of a substantial first-stage of disarmament would contribute very substantially to the solution of outstanding political problems.

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly . . . endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

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In accordance with these principles the first stage of an agreement
on general and complete disarmament should include!

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to those suggested by both sides in previous proposals.

2. A complete published inventory of military manpower, weapons, delivery systems, means of production of weapons and weapons materials, to be submitted by both sides to an international control commission at the beginning of the agreement.

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons materials by an appreciable percentage of the declared inventory; the corresponding destruction of delivery systems and diversion to peaceful uses of fissile materials to be verified by the control commission.

4. The prohibition of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other Working Groups (inspection at declared production plants).

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a limited system of statistical sampling aimed at the verification of the remaining declared stockpiles. The extent of this limited system would be in proportion to the degree of reduction previously achieved.

6. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a further reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to the level consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum for a deterrent force.

7. The next stages of the disarmament agreement should commence with complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the zero level.

Conference Paper

Eighth Conference on
Science and World Affairs

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

STATEMENT

Leo Szilard

A threat of war has arisen out of the dispute over the political settlement in Europe. I believe that the United States and the Soviet Union pursue the same true goal in Europe; this goal is to have Europe politically as stable as possible. If America and Russia threaten to go to war with each other over Berlin, they are threatening to go to war over the issue of what is the best means to secure the peace in Europe.

I do not think that either America or Russia would deliberately start a war over such an issue, but the threats and counterthreats which are being made are creating a situation in which a war might break out that neither America nor Russia wants. Once war breaks out, it may be difficult to arrange for a cessation of hostilities and the war might end in a virtually total destruction of the countries involved.

Some of the cities might be spared by tacit agreement. Thus if Russia did not bomb Washington and New York, presumably America would not bomb Moscow and Leningrad. So to speak "natural" tacit agreements of this sort would not, however, be sufficient to prevent the wholesale destruction of cities on both sides, even if both sides were trying to keep destruction at a minimum and bring the war to an end as fast as possible.

[L]

Szilard /2

It is not clear whether America and Russia would be
willing to enter into an agreement not to bomb each other's cities.
But even if such an agreement were reached, it would represent
merely a first line of defense against all-out destruction because
if a few American or Russian cities were destroyed, for instance
as an accidental attack or an attack not authorized by the head
of the state, the agreement would become void.

America and Russia could erect a second line of defense,
by reaching an understanding that if an American city were de-
ployed by Russia and if America were to retaliate, it would
destroy one, and only one, Russian city, of about the same size.
This would cease to work, however, if in the course of the war
central civilian control breaks down--as it well may--in either
America or Russia.

Therefore, it would seem advisable to erect a third line
of defense against all-out destruction in case of war. In order
to have such a third line of defense, the American and Russian
governments ought to collaborate in drawing up a set of lists
of cities--about 10 such lists perhaps. The name of every
American city and the name of every Russian city of over 100,000
population would appear on one, and just one, of these lists.
Each such list would contain a group of American cities as well
as a group of Russian cities each with an aggregate population
representing the same fraction, say from 5%, 10% or 15%, of the
total of those who live in cities of over 100,000.

[lc]

Szilard /3

Either America or Russia could then make a unilateral
pledge that she would not intentionally bomb any city contained
in a given list, as long as the other nation did not bomb any
of the cities contained in the same list. It would be under-
stood that if a city were bombed that is located in the vicinity
of a strategic bomber or rocket base--within a radius of 50 miles--
this would not lift the immunity of the other cities included
in the same list.

On each list the two groups of cities ought to be balanced
not only with respect to their population but also with respect
to their industrial production.

This set of lists is meant to play the same role as the
subdivision of a ship into compartments, which are installed for
the purpose of enabling the ship to remain afloat even if some
of the compartments become waterlogged.

If a war breaks out which neither America or Russia wanted,
perhaps as a result of an unauthorized attack on cities, the
government of the attacked nation might not be able to withhold
retaliation but both governments would presumably try to limit
the amount of destruction and try to arrange for a cessation of
hostilities, as soon as they recovered control over the situation.
There is little doubt that in such a case both governments would
want to honor the lists of cities which were drafted prior to
the outbreak of the hostilities.

Because for a period of time the civilian governments
might not be able to control the conduct of the war, these lists

Szilard

/4

ought to be made available to all _local_ commanders of strategic striking forces and the significance of these lists ought to be explained to them.

It might take some time before the American and Russian governments have an opportunity to work out a set of well balanced lists of cities and I have therefore drawn up a provisional set of lists. I propose that a set of lists be considered as valid, until such time as a more balanced set of lists is worked out by the two governments involved.

Below are given the names of all American and Russian cities of over 100,000. Each of these cities belongs to one list and one list only and the number which precedes the name of the city designates the list to which that city belongs.

Background Paper
(Number to be assigned)

Disarmament and World Security

September 11-16, 1961

STowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

DISARMAMENT AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

A PROPOSAL ON REGIONAL DISARMAMENT IN MIDDLE EUROPE

Gerd Burkhardt

1. In recent weeks it has again become evident that the Berlin Problem represents a grave danger to peace in the world and that the solution of this problem is a most urgent task.

One cannot state that the past 10 years have brought us even one step nearer to a solution; on the contrary, the tensions have become stronger and stronger. In both parts of Germany the arms race is progressing, it is accompanied by a violent campaign in the newspapers and other means of mass communication thus contributing to enlarging the gap between peoples who for centuries have had a strong feeling of solidarity. The very unstable special status of the city of Berlin, as it was established at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, has deteriorated more and more, as each of the two German states tries to push its claim to the respective part of the city as belonging to its jurisdiction. The special status is practically canceled, since the government of the German Democratic Republic has blocked off the East sector from the Western parts of the town. Though I am convinced that this step was a necessary consequence of the foregoing political evolution and could have been expected, yet it certainly is to be regretted in the interest both of the East and the West - not only of East and West Germany. Definitely, it did not bring us nearer to a solution but it made apparent the urgency of the problem. Unfortunately it also made apparent in my opinion, the failure of the policy, pursued by the German Bundesregierung during the last 10 years, a policy of strength in order to enforce from the East a more cociliatory approach to negotiations.

2. Is there any possible solution of the problem at all? To be sure, there exists no isolated solution of the Berlin problem, it is closely connected with the problem of re-unification and must be seen in this connection. As in both parts of Germany there exist different social orders a fusion into one state is only imaginable, if in one part the now existing order is given up in favor of the other. It is quite easy to understand that the political leaders on either side hope to get the other side to give up its social order. But it is just as clear that an unified Germany belonging to the western pact system is just as unacceptable to the Soviet Union as the reverse to the Western world. This obviously means that a plan of re-unification in the manner described here, in the near future and presumably for a rather long time, is quite unrealistic. It seems to me important that all illusions in this respect should not be further sustained in the German population.

Burkhardt/2

But it is wishful thinking, too, to let the German people choose themselves by autonomous decision their own form of government, and to believe the problem could then be resolved. I am absolutely sure, such a vote would show a clear and convincing majority in favour of the western democratic form of government. I want to state this as a mere fact and not as a judgment about the value of the two systems - I may add in parenthesis, that in history the German people have not always voted in favor of the more valuable system! - To prove my statement I mention only two points which would sufficiently determine the result of the vote: the traditional distrust of communism, which at least since 1918 is very deeply rooted in the German population with its tendency to conservative authority, and secondly, the quite different standard of life, existing also in the broad mass of the population, which is of course not conditioned entirely by the different social systems.

In discussions with Russian friends, I found that they admitted the truth of my statement. Their argument was, that just for these reasons East Germany must be blocked off from its Capitalistic neighbors, to keep off all disturbing influences from outside which would impede the continuous evolution of a new and, according to their belief, better social system in this part of Germany. After some years of steady evolution, in their opinion, the result of a ballot in Germany would be quite different from now. Here we have the nucleus of the Berlin problem, and why Berlin has such a vital importance for East Germany, "the bone in the throat of the socialistic countries."

Indeed, there is something in this argument but pursuing this policy would lead to the definite splitting of Germany; though both systems would be stabilised in their part of the country, I cannot admit that this would be an acceptable solution of the German problem. Reunification is a legitimate demand, which again and again would create disturbance in the affairs of the world, which is not in the interest of either side. Just as a symbol of the national unity of Germany the special status of Berlin must be maintained. Moreover the west cannot simply abandon a promise given repeatedly to 2 million inhabitants of West Berlin, it has invested much prestige in this city. Indeed, the problem seems only to be solvable in a larger framework.

3. Such a larger framework could be a comprehensive peace treaty with both parts of Germany, as repeatedly urged by Premier Khrushchev, in connection with a regional disarmament agreement in Middle Europe.

Proposals for a disengagement of the two big power blocs have repeatedly been made since 1954 by Eastern and Western politicians, I just mention the names Eden, Gaitskell and Rapacki without going into the details. The proposals I would like to submit to this conference, have been worked out in the main by Helmut Schmidt, member of the Bundestag in the social-democratic fraction and expert on military problems, in connection with the above mentioned plans. They are described in his book, published 1961 entitled "Defense or Retaliation" which will soon come out in an English version. At first only a few particulars as to the military situation of today, the data are given in the above cited book:

Burkhardt/3

In East Germany there are about 20 Soviet divisions and 6 divisions of the Germany peoples' army under arms, in Poland 13, in Czechoslovakia 14, in Hungary 4 native divisions, about 6 Soviet divisions are additionally stationed in Poland and Hungary. This makes altogether more than 60 divisions in the countries of the Warsaw pact, belonging to Middle Europe. In the Nato countries of Middle Europe we have 5 U.S., 3 British and 2 French divisions, stationed in West Germany, besides 7 divisions of the German Bundeswehr, moreover 1 native division in Denmark and 2 both in the Netherlands and Belgium, that is more than 20 divisions on the Western side in Middle Europe. Of course only a numerical comparison without taking into account the many other factors of military importance is not sufficient. The superiority in manpower of the East may in part be compensated by a stronger nuclear armament of the West. In any case the numbers make evident the dimensions of a conflict, if it should come to an armed contest in this region; in German territory alone more than 1 million soldiers are now standing under arms.

The proposed zone of arms-limitation should comprise the territories of West and East Germany, of Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps also of Hungary. The areas of these territories West to East are in the proportion of 1:2 (F.R.G. 250,000 km²; Poland 310,000 km², CSR 130,000 km²; D.D.R. 110,000 km²). Nearly in the same proportion are their linear dimensions, taken from the dividing line: 300-400 km to the West, 800-1000 km towards the East. The numbers of the population on both sides are nearly equal: 53 millions on the Western side against 58 millions in the East. Regarding the industrial and economic potential the Federal Republic of Germany has the clear superiority over the 4 states of the Eastern bloc.

The military limitations must be carried out in such a way that no change in the balance of power, threatening the security of one side, takes place.

Schmidt's proposal starts from limiting the manpower of the Bundeswehr to 300,000 men. The proportion to the respective powers of the other armies should be: to Poland as 3:2; to the German Democratic Republic as 3:1, and to the CSR likewise 3:1. It follows that the proportion of all forces between the Western and the Eastern part of the zone would read 3:4 or including Hungary about 3:4,5. All these troops must be exclusively armed with conventional weapons.

The installation of such a zone of arms limitation requires an international control system which supervises the strength and types of the admitted weapons. Some of the most difficult problems of a world wide inspection system do not exist in this zone, such as the detection of hidden nuclear stockpiles, therefore inspection is much easier. The system could serve as a model for other international arms control systems and many experiences for more comprehensive and far-reaching ones could be gained. After this first step has been accomplished which I think, could be achieved during one year, it should be followed by the withdrawal of all foreign troops, stationed in the zone, which would then become completely free from all nuclear weapons. This should be done in connection with the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany, whilst the peace negotiations could immediately begin. They should be carried on independently from the negotiations about disengagement, but the peace treaty should become operative not before the above mentioned first step of arms limitation with its system of inspection is completed.

Burkhardt/4

It must be prevented that in one part of Germany a rebellious movement tries to overthrow the existing government with the moral or material help of the other part, because this would seriously disturb the established balance of power in the zone. Therefore some troops of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. should stay in Germany for some time, also in the second phase though their military value may be only symbolic.

They could be replaced after a period of transition by a police force of the U.N. Moreover there should be stipulated by treaty the possibility of "re-entry" for the foreign troops, if one of the countries of the zone feels its security threatened.

There are numerous objections against such an agreement, both military and political, which are discussed in detail in the above mentioned book of Schmidt. A frequently heard objection says that the U.S.A. would withdraw their troops from all of Europe as a consequence of such policy of "neutralization". This indeed would mean a serious shift of the balance of power in Europe. The here proposed plan provides for the American troops to remain stationed beyond the Western frontier of Germany which of course makes necessary the consent and cooperation of the neighbouring nations, especially of France, to the disengagement plan. Objections from the point of strategy against diminishing the depth of the strategic area by the exclusion of the Bundesrepublik have been disproved by several military experts. To take off the nuclear weapons from the first frontline requires some rearrangements in the strategic planning of Nato, but military disadvantages, if any, are surpassed by decisive benefits. These objections all regard the disadvantages of the plan for the Western world, at the same time they often are followed up by the allegation that the U.S.S.R. would never agree with it, which in this connection is not very convincing.

4. The peace treaty with the two parts of Germany has to create the political disengagement and stabilisation in Middle Europe. It will contain the renunciation by Germany as to the former German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. A German myself, I may add that this renunciation is a real distressing one for all Germans and especially for those who had their homeland there. But the Germans must recognise that it is a consequence of the war, initiated by Germany and they must learn to accept these consequences.

If thus Germany succeeded in gaining after all friendship with its Eastern neighbour countries, in spite of all those terrible things that happened there during the Nazi occupation, the loss of these territories would be outweighed by this gain.

The peace treaty cannot cancel the partition of Germany, the two parts of Germany even should further remain partners of their specific alliances, West Germany of Nato, East Germany of the Warsaw pact. Too early a neutralization of this territory, without neutralizing the ideological antagonism, would create a dangerous instability. Moreover the political and economic integration of Europe must be kept in mind, the partnership of West Germany could not be abandoned without jeopardizing all efforts for European integration.

Burkhardt/5

The special status of Berlin should be maintained until this city can again take its role as the capital of a re-unified Germany in a later future. This special status could be emphasized, if Berlin would become the residence of the international control commission for the whole zone. A perhaps more satisfying alternative to the partition in 4 sectors would be the status of a free city under administration of the U.N., the free admission from all German countries ought to be fixed by the treaty.

The treaty should also bind the two German governments to take up negotiations with the aim gradually to reduce the gradient of the standard of life and of currency and at the same time step by step to release the restrictions of tourist traffic between East and West Germany, within a given period of about 3 or 5 years after the treaty has been signed. Certainly one of the main reasons for the problem of refugees is the fear of getting finally isolated from West Germany. One must not forget that nearly all inhabitants have points of relationship on the other side. An unrestricted travelling, I suppose, would tranquilize very soon the fluctuation of population after some initial oscillations.

This indeed requests rather far-reaching contacts between the two governments and apparently means a de-facto recognition of the East German government. I cannot see how this step which our government so eagerly refuses to do, can be avoided. It could be made easier, if the exponents of the hitherto practised politics on both sides would be relieved by other politicians. This might happen in West Germany at the next election of the Bundestag, though it is not very probable; a corresponding change in the leading personalities in East Germany could help to tranquilize the contest and to convert it into a peaceful competition.

Then perhaps the time will come to elect by ballot in East and West an all-German government. This must be connected with a new, drastic reduction of the armed forces in Germany and both parts will have to leave their respective military alliance. Germany, in this way reunified in a disarmed Middle Europe, would be no longer a danger for its neighbours. This country, which according to the words of its historian Friedrich Meinicke 1945 was an "outburned crater of power" never again can enter the claim to imperialism. Situated in the midst of Europe it can form a bridge of spiritual exchange between the West and the East, just living its own way of life. What would this way look like ?

I think it was very encouraging to hear the Vice-Premier of the Soviet Union Mikoyan declare in an interview with the press just some weeks ago, that even a Germany which had decided in favor of the capitalistic system, could be accepted by the Soviet Union. Encouraging, I think, because I myself hope - and why should I conceal it - that the German people will decide in favor of the Western democratic form of government. But we should not prophesy and anticipate decisions which must be met by the following generation. However, it is our duty to create now the conditions which make it possible for them to decide and not to leave them a devastated world !

CONFIDENTIAL

RFE/Munich
German Affairs Section

4 September 1961

A-187

Background Information
(German Eastern Policy)

THE 1961 WEST GERMAN ELECTION (II)

Introduction

On September 17 the West German voters will go to the polls to elect a new Bundestag, as the lower chamber of the federal parliament is called. The election is not expected to produce a major political upset: all indications point to another victory of the Christian Democrats who, under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer have governed the country since 1949. But it remains to be seen whether the CDU will again win an absolute majority in the Bundestag - as it did in 1953 and 1957 - or whether it will be able to form a new government only with the help of one or more other parties. The recent events in Berlin may have hurt the CDU as they were helping its principal opponent, the SPD whose leading candidate, West Berlin's mayor Willy Brandt seems to have recaptured a good deal of public attention and sympathy since August 13. Whether the impact of these developments is strong and lasting enough to have a decisive influence on the final result is another matter. Furthermore, the CDU's fortunes also hinge on the performance of the smaller parties, whose fate, owing to the workings of the German electoral system would well become the key factor in the election outcome.

I. The Political Parties

Altogether nine parties are participating in the election this year, but not all of them have put up candidates in every state. The principal parties are:

1. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian affiliate the Christian Social Union (CSU)

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The CDU/CSU has been a dominating force in West-war German politics, especially on the national scene where it has led the government for sixteen years. Though having strong roots in the pre-1933 Catholic Center Party in which many of leaders, including Chancellor Adenauer were active, the CDU has, from its start in 1945, aimed to be a "Christian party" in the de-nominational sense, and in its ranks there is in fact a large number of prominent Protestant church and lay leaders. While the main strength of the party remains in Catholic Rhineland and Bavaria, it is now also strongly entrenched in the Protestant areas of North Germany. Equally wide is its social spectrum which extends from the upper stratum of the business and professional classes on one end to workers and farmers on the other.

The Christian Democrats no doubt owe a great deal of their success in winning mass support across religious and class lines to the tremendous popularity and prestige which Adenauer has commanded among the people of the Federal Republic. But their broad appeal is also due in no small measure to the fact that the voters have given them the chief credit for West Germany's amazingly fast and far-reaching economic and political recovery. The CDU is campaigning again this year on its record of bringing "prosperity and security to all", warning, as in previous elections, against any "experiments" which might endanger these achievements. In the field of foreign policy it continues to advocate close cooperation with the West, especially with the United States, through the Atlantic and European institutions, claiming that these ties are the cornerstone of Germany's existence as a free and democratic country.

Despite his advanced age - he was 85 last January - Adenauer has left no doubt that he fully expects to head the new government again. Whether he will be able to serve out another four year term of course is somewhat doubtful, but the question of his succession which had many party leaders worried for some time now seems pretty well settled: it is generally assumed that the highly popular Erhard "the architect of the German economic miracle" will become Chancellor at least for a transition period, when Adenauer retires or dies.

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2. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has the oldest tradition among present-day West German parties, dating clear back to the period of the Empire and the Weimar Republic. Though still predominantly a working-class party the SPD has attempted, with considerable success, to win support among white-collar workers and other segments of the middle and professional class. Its new program, adopted at Bad Godesberg in November 1960 completed the process of jettisoning Marxist doctrines; the stated aim of the party no longer is socialization but a welfare state based on a free market economy. Its election manifesto contains a broad and ambitious scheme for greatly increased social benefits (including TV sets for all pensionists), an expansion of the highway net, for large-scale aid to education, and for combating the pollution of the air in the Ruhr and other industrial areas.

Along with this, the Social Democrats have also drastically revised their foreign policy platform: they no longer advocate a military neutralization of Germany and disengagement in Central Europe, but firmly endorse West German membership in NATO and accept the military commitment that this entails, although the SPD continues to oppose conscription and nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr.

Drastic changes in Bonn's foreign and domestic policies are therefore unlikely even in the event of an SPD victory in the election. This possibility appears however remote, for in order to win the Social Democrats would have to gain something like six million additional votes. Such an accomplishment is held impossible by most observers, despite the fact that in Willy Brandt the party now has a popular and attractive standard bearer. The SPD has itself in effect conceded that it can not defeat the CDU this time; its present main goal is to prevent another absolute majority for the Adenauer party.

3. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) claims to be the inheritor of the German liberal tradition. But its brand of "modern liberalism" has little in common any more with the political philosophy of that "grand old man of German liberalism", former Federal President Theodor Heuss, on whose tremendous popularity the Free Democrats are trying to capitalize in this election (though admittedly in a restrained fashion). It is rather a modernized and moderate form of conservatism, with an unmistakable nationalistic slant. The South German "progressive" type of liberal, of whom Professor Heuss is an outstanding representative, no longer exercise much influence on the direction of the party which

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is run today by elements who include some pre-war "National Liberals", nationalists and even former Nazis, as well as a group of younger leaders, chiefly from the Rhineland, who are fond of describing themselves as "technicians of power".

Under the leadership of the energetic Dr. Erich Mende, the FDP has largely overcome the factional quarrels which plagued it so much in the past. But it has also moved decidedly to the right of the CDU, except on issues which involve church-state relationships.¹ In the field of social and economic policy the FDP tends to be rather conservative; upholding in general free enterprise against state intervention it opposes in particular the extension of social security and welfare programs which impose an especially onerous burden on the small businessmen and professional people who make the bulk of FDP support.

In foreign affairs the Free Democrats, while endorsing co-operation with the West favor a more "independent" policy of the Federal Republic on the ground that unification of the country must be achieved by the Germans themselves and is not a matter for the Allies. In this connection they have stressed the need for concluding a peace treaty which would define Germany future status and have even envisaged direct negotiations with Pankow.

While the FDP thus attempts to offer the voters an "alternative" to the two big parties it has left no doubt about its eagerness to resume the partnership in office with the Christian Democrats which broke in 1955. Four years ago the Free Democrats paid dearly for their attempt to play with both sides: thousands of its staunchly anti-socialist followers, frightened by the prospect that the FDP might help the SPD into the saddle, went over to the CDU. In order to win back these straying voters, the FDP this time has made a firm commitment that it would form a coalition only with the CDU, though under certain conditions only. The party leaders are quite optimistic about the chances of recovering the ground they have lost in previous elections; they hope to increase their strength in the Bundestag from its present 45 to something like 55-65 seats. But their main goal

¹The FDP, for example, has strongly opposed recent changes in the divorce laws, the reduction of Sunday work in the steel industry and certain other measures, forced through by the CDU, which it regards as manifestations of "confessionalism" in politics and government.

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remains to prevent an absolute CDU majority so that they could
set their own terms in entering the government. Whether this gambit
will work remains to be seen. The CDU has become increasingly cool
toward the idea of partnership with the FDP whose attitude has only
strengthened Adenauer's determination to maintain his ability to
govern without any other party.

4. The All German Party (Gesamtdeutsche Partei - GDP) was formed only last spring by a merger of the right-wing German Party (DP) and the Expellee Party (BHE). This alliance between the conservative peasants and burgers who comprise the main support of the DP, and the expellees from Silesia, Pomerania, and the Sudetenland is considered by many observers (and quite a few members of the new party) as a somewhat unnatural marriage; its frankly-admitted purpose is to save the two partners from political extinction. The German Party was able to enter the Bundestag in 1957 only with the help of the CDU, which is not forthcoming this time; the BHE was barred from membership in parliament because it failed to receive the required minimum number of votes four years ago. By pooling their resources the two hope to overcome the formidable barriers which the electoral law has erected against small parties.

Under the influence of the BHE which, by virtue superior strength
and organization dominates the new party, the GDP is waging its
campaign on an openly nationalistic platform: it rejects any surrender
of German territories whether these are the Oder-Neisse areas, the
Soviet zone of Germany, or Berlin, and assails all those who might
suggest compromises on these issues as "traitors and appeasers". The
GDP is also casting aspersions on the willingness of the Western
powers to defend German interests. By taking this line it hopes to
appeal not only to the expellees but also to the hard core of
nationalists and Nazis who have in the past supported the various
splinter parties on the extreme right wing, such as the Deutsche
Reichspartei.

5. The Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU) is a new leftist group that participates for the first time in a German election. Headed by a handsome ex-school teacher, Dr. Renate Riemeck, the DFU consists of

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an odd assortment which includes extreme pacifists and opponents of "the bomb"; some left-wing intellectuals, dissident socialists, as well as outright fellow-travellers and hard-line communists. ¹ Its program calls for a military disengagement in Europe, the removal of all nuclear armaments from Germany, the neutralization of the country on the "Austrian model", and for direct negotiations between the two German states. While the DFU is highly critical of nearly all aspects of political and social life in West Germany it usually keeps discreetly quiet or is even outright complimentary about conditions in the GDR.

Although that the party stresses its complete independence many of its leaders, including Dr. Riemeck who in fact lost her job because of it, maintain close contacts with the East German regime. There is in fact good evidence that the DFU is actually financed and steered from East Berlin, by the SED which decided last October not to set up another orthodox Marxist party in West Germany in place of the outlawed KPD, but instead to pursue its objectives through a popular-front type organization.

Until a few weeks ago it was possible that the DFU might garner up to 4 to 5% of the vote, attracting largely left-wing socialists who are dissatisfied with the present "reformist" course of the SPD. But the brutality of Pankow's actions in Berlin seems to have reversed this trend and dimmed the chances of the DFU.

## II. The Electoral Process

1. The procedure used in German federal elections is very complex, being a mixture of the American-British majority or "single constituency" system and the proportional representation scheme which is the norm on the European continent. The 494 members of the Bundestag are chosen by two different methods: one half is elected directly in the 247 electoral districts of the country, the candidate receiving the largest number of votes, i.e. a simple majority being the winner. The remainder of the seats is filled from the slates - the so-called **Landeslisten** or reserve lists - which the various parties have put in the eleven states of the Federal Republic. The seats are allocated in proportion to the popular vote which each party polls in the particular state.²

¹ For an analysis of the background and activities of the DFU see *Der Spiegel* (Aug. 23).

² West Berlin, owing to its special status, does not participate in federal elections, but is entitled to send into the Bundestag 22 non-voting members who are selected by the city legislature in accordance with the strength of the parties represented there. At present these are only the CDU and the SPD.

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Accordingly, each voter is entitled to cast two ballots: one - the so-called *Erststimme* for the district candidate, the other - the so-called *Zweitstimme* - for the party ticket. The voter is thus able to pick the *man* or *woman* whom he considers best fitted to represent him in the Bundestag, irrespective of party affiliation, without, however, thereby injuring the over-all chances of the *party* of his choice, for the final outcome of the election, in terms of quantitative strength, is determined by the *second* ballot, not by the first.¹ The reason for this is that the *total* number of seats for each party is calculated on the basis of the Zweitstimmen it received in the particular state, and that from this total all those seats won in the direct contests are deducted before seats from the reserve lists are allocated. A party which, according to its popular vote, would be entitled to say 30 seats from a given state, but has also carried 20 electoral districts there would thus receive only 10 additional seats from the reserve lists. To illustrate this by a practical example: in 1957, the CDU won 53 of the 66 districts in North Rhine-Westphalia, the SPD 13. Polling 54.4% of the state's popular vote the CDU obtained only 34 additional seats through the reserve lists; the SPD, with a vote of 33%, got 41, however.

2. In order to participate at all in the distribution of the seats a party must win either at least three electoral districts or poll 5% of the *national* total of the valid *Zweitstimmen*. Otherwise, its entire vote is disregarded in the count. This provision, devised to discourage splinter parties which hinder the formation of stable parliamentary majorities, can have important effects on the final outcome of the election. For the greater the loss of votes through the "de-barring clauses" is, the more seats remain to be divided among the other parties, with those at the top naturally benefitting most. As a result, a party might be able to win an absolute majority in the Bundestag while getting only a minority of the popular vote. This actually happened in 1953 when the CDU, on 45.2% of the popular vote, obtained one more seat than all other parties combined. In 1957, the CDU took

¹Another motive for "splitting the ticket" might be the existence of an electoral alliance between two or more parties which have put up a joint candidate in the district, asking their followers to support him while casting their second ballots along straight party lines. In 1953, about 12% of the electorate split the ticket for one reason or another.

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over 54% of the seats, while polling only slightly over 50% of the
Zweitstimmen. In both instances, about 7% of the ballots cast for
splinter groups were not counted in the distribution of the seats, and
from this the CDU, as the strongest party, drew the greatest profit.

3. As the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (August 12) has pointed out, the ultimate result may again this year be determined by the size of the "lost vote". If this remains at around 7% an absolute majority in the Bundestag would only require a popular vote of between 45 and 46%. But if, the All-German Party, for example, should be able to clear the 5% hurdle the CDU would need about 48% to retain its majority, and it might easily lose it, if another one of the splinter parties qualifies for representation in the Bundestag. For the Christian Democrat election chances the performance of the small parties therefore will be of considerable importance; if they are eliminated altogether, the CDU could afford a fairly substantial drop of its popular vote (by perhaps as much as 10%) without endangering its control of parliament. But if one or more splinter groups get back in, the margin would narrow, and the loss of a few percentage points might then deprive the CDU of its absolute majority even though it remained by far the strongest party.

4. In order to ensure the election of their prominent figures all parties take care to assign them either a "safe" electoral district and/or place them in the upper bracket of a Landesliste. Thus, Chancellor Adenauer, although sure of a landslide victory in the Bonn district also occupies the No. 1 place on the reserve list for North Rhine-Westphalia; Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, who is running in Ulm, leads the list in Baden-Wuerttemberg; Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss the one in Bavaria. Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano who this time appears to have a formidable opponent in his home district is assured of re-election on the Hessen reserve lists which he heads.

To obtain a secure position on a Landesliste is particularly
important for the candidates of the SPD and the FDP which normally
do not all well in the district races.¹ With the exception of Erich
Ollenhauer, Carlo Schmid, Herbert Wehner and a handful others few of
the top echelon leaders of the SPD have what might be considered a

¹In 1953 the CDU carried 172 districts, the SPD only 45. In 1957, the figures were 194 and 46, respectively. The FDP won only district in 1957, which it is almost certain to lose this year.

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"safe" constituency and must therefore be back-stopped through the
reserve lists. The party's candidate for Chancellor, Willy Brandt,
thus holds the No. 1 in North Rhine-Westphalia; Fritz Erler is No. 3
in Baden-Wuerttemberg; Wilhelm Hoegner, a former Minister President
of Bavaria, leads the list there.

In attempting to find safe havens for important or deserving
politicians the central party leadership quite frequently runs into
conflicts with the state and county organizations which control the
nomination of the candidates and the composition of the reserve lists.
The lower echelons are, as a rule, very jealous of this prerogative
which is one of the few means they have for maintaining some influence
on over-all party policies. More important still, they may in many
cases have to accomodate powerful economic and social groups in the
district by selecting a candidate which will represent these local
interests.

As a result, even Adenauer whose grip on the CDU is otherwise so
strong sometimes is powerless against the local bigwhigs when it comes
to the placement of candidates. His efforts, for example, to help the
Federal press chief, Felix von Eckardt to exchange his present arduous
job for a Bundestag were only moderately successful. Despite the
Chancellor's endorsement Eckardt was turned as a candidate by two
CDU district organizations; he finally was nominated in the Cuxhaven
district which is now held by the SPD, and where the CDU, moreover
was only third in the last election. Nor was Herr von Eckardt able
to obtain the necessary re-insurance through a good place on the
Landesliste.

### III. The Campaign

From the manner in which the campaign has been conducted this
year, especially in the early stages, it might easily appear that the
voters are going to elect a new chief executive, as they do in the
United States Presidential elections. This impression is course wrong,
constitutionally speaking, for the West German Chancellor is not chosen
by the people but by the Bundestag, and the present election is, as
pointed out before, primarily a battle between parties for control of
parliament. Nevertheless, in their propaganda all major parties place
great emphasis on the personalities of their leaders whose names and
pictures - carefully selected on the basis of tests - dominate the

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big posters and appear on nearly every bit of campaign literature.

But German electioneering methods are becoming "Americanized" in other respects also. Nearly all parties now make heavy use of Madison Avenue publicity techniques, backed up by intensive opinion research, in shaping their campaign strategy. Propaganda slogan tactics are being devised - and changed - on the basis of surveys conducted by the leading West German public opinion institutes under contract to the various parties for the purpose of exploring and checking voters' preferences and reactions. The CDU, for example, has commissioned the EMNID Institute at Bielefeld to make a massive study of virtually all aspect of voter sentiment, and its results which fill 12 volumes are basic reference materials for the CDU strategists. These and other studies are constantly brought up to date by new samplings. One of West Germany's leading pollsters, Erich Neumann, head of the Allensbach institute, is himself a candidate for the Bundestag and conducts his entire campaign on such scientific lines.

Radio and Television are of course playing a larger part than ever before in bringing the parties' case before the voters. But broadcasting time, allocated to those parties which are now represented in the Bundestag on an equal basis, is relatively scarce, especially as far as TV is concerned, and the principal election forum therefore remains the public meeting or the street-corner gathering where the parties and their candidates present their appeals.

As a result of the Berlin crisis the main figures had to curtail their appearances at these occasions; Brandt has cancelled the special train which was carrying him and his motor-car cavalcade back and forth across the Federal Republic. Adenauer, who is stumping the country with the aid of a military airplane also had to cut down on his engagements, confining his trips now mostly to populous North Rhine-Westphalia which is of crucial importance for the election outcome.

While the heightened tension in and around Berlin has thus thrown a dark shadow over the election it was evident even before that the campaign was not making much impact on the voters. One important reason for this seems to be that there is this time a distinct absence of any real issues which would excite the interest of the voters. In previous elections the debate over Bonn's foreign policy and about West German rearmament provided such an issue; but now the differences

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between the major parties regarding these problems have been
narrowed down to questions of tactics, and the same is true with
respect to most important domestic issues. Many voters seem there-
fore inclined to regard the whole campaign as a mere shadow-boxing.
This attitude of indifference is reflected, for example, in the
unusually high number of those who still are undecided which,
according to the latest opinion polls run to over 30%. To win over
these hesitating voters in whose hands the decision might well lie
will be a major task of all parties during the closing weeks of the
campaign whose intensity therefore will be stepped up, Berlin crisis
or no Berlin crisis.

Background Materials continued/ 2

6. "Disarmament at a Glance"
The Department of State

7. Soviet Disarmament Proposals: 1946 - 1958
The Department of State

8. Reprint of the Introduction to "World Peace Through World Law," Second Edition, (Revised)
by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn

9. Russian Translation of (8)

10. French Translation of (8)

11. "The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control;" a statement of the NPA
Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control and
A Technical Report
by W. Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser

12. "The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; Gateway to Peace"
The Department of State

13. A Basic Bibliography; disarmament, arms control & national security
United States Disarmament Administration, Department of State

14. Address by the Honorable Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State,
Before the National Press Club, Washington D. C. Thursday, February
18, 1960, at 1:00 P.M. EST.
"National Security with Arms Limitation"

15. "Disarmament, the Intensified Effort 1955-1958"
The Department of State

16. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September, 1961, Vol. XVII, No. 7

17. H.R. 7936, In the House of Representatives, A Bill to Establish a
United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security
Introduced by Mr. Morgan, June 29, 1961.

18. Three Documents of Current History: Report by Chairman N. S.
Khrushchev on his Meeting with President John F. Kennedy in Vienna;
The Soviet Memoranda on Ending Nuclear Weapons Tests and Signing
a German Peace Treaty

19. "Inspection for Disarmament" (presented at European-American Assembly,
1961) by Jerome Wiesner

Background Materials continued/ 3

III. <u>Books for Distribution</u>

1. Brennan, Donald G., ed. <u>Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security</u> (George Braziller, New York, 1961).

2. Clark, Grenville, and Sohn, Louis B. World Peace Through World Law, Second edition (revised), (Harvard University Press, 1960, Cambridge, Mass.).

3. Frisch, David H. ed., <u>Arms Reduction Program and Issues</u>, (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961).

4. Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton H., <u>Strategy and Arms Control</u>, (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961).

5. Szilard, Leo, <u>The Voice of the Dolphins</u>, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1961).