U. Fale

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January __, 1973

No date indicated.

[Done before 27 Jan 73]

K: Of course.

D: Well, it was good idea. Well, Henry, I received from Gromyko answer on this troop reduction business. Well, we agree really what you suggest. In a sense just let them arrive and we consider that it will be this way, that they will arrive -- the Committee comes to Vienna because on the others we agreed upon.

K: Right.

D: And the idea is that they will arrive before the 31st of January and ideas will begin effect on the date that was agreed upon in Moscow between you and Brezhnev -- the 31st as you suggested. At the same time there will be representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany and ______ practically all from our side. And we assume all yours will be there at the beginning. Then they will discuss -- I mean, about those who will compose this body for making decision along those lines we discussed upon.

K: All right.

D: And during this consultation we reserve the right to raise when it will be ______ necessary about this neutral countries just as the right to raise during this preliminary consultation.

K: Right.

D: As you I understand reserve your right to exercise it.

K: Right.

D: (laughter) This is my impression, yes?

K: That is correct.

D: So this is answer just for you.

K: But you will give us a formal answer?

D: Well, this is the first. I have two answers. One, first to tell you this one, that this is really -- basically this approach will not -- there is no real difference -- I mean, the reply of the whole western countries of 27th -- I mean, in your official note you send on 27th.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EA12058
By N.W. Date 01-30-73

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January ___, 1973

- 2 -

K: Yeah.

D: You propose, you remember, Italy and Greece and so on. So we rather accept it now saying that all right, let's all of us come there.

K: Right.

D: And preliminary consultations and then during this preliminary consultation, this will be pick up those countries who will make a decision and those who have troops and those who have territory on their --

K: Good idea.

D: And so it doesn't really --

K: But you are going to send us a note?

D: Yes. And I have another on the text of this note. Gromyko mentioned to me that I should give it to you but to translate it, it will take me -- I could read you if you like just draft translation.

K: I don't have to have it.

D: But you will receive it -- probably by the end of the day they will come. As it is, first he would like me to tell that really it looks as though we come to agreement on this one so inform you. And second, for your information, he send me a note which I am going to deliver within maybe 5 or 10 hours today. I mean, note to all the NATO countries.

K: Right.

D: He gave me this note for your information but on this particular day of __________, I don't want to really get in the translation and so on.

K: Well, don't bother with it. I'll get it when you hand it over officially.

D: I could read you, you don't mind. It's rough translation from Russian. All right?

K: Okay.

D: Well, there's nothing. It's really .... saying that the Soviet Government will send by the ______ of Germany, India, Austria, his representatives to begin with the representatives of other European countries as well as United States and Canada and prepare for a consultation on troop reduction questions. The Soviet ______ assumes that at the beginning of this

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: N.M. Sare

["Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "10:30 a.m., January ___, 1973", "- 3 -", "D: (cont'd) preliminary consultation that a true exchange of ideas upon multilateral level as well as bilateral level with those who really want to discuss. I mean, among those countries involved. This is the procedure of how it would be. It will be consisted -- composition of those who will participate in actual agreement or agreements about reduction of troops in Europe. As we already presumed on this particular question about who is going to be included, there is no really particular disagreement between NATO and most countries. This is not exactly what it translates.", "K: What's Hungary among friends?", "D: Well, and then the end of the last paragraph on this note. And of course we come to this discussion with understanding that in the discussion and adopting a decision on the substance of the question of reductions, we will participate. Only those countries who will use its own troops as well as country on a territory which its troops are subject to reduction are placed. This is the official note we are going to send. At the same time, there will be oral statement made to your Ambassador. It will say like this one: In connection with a note which we just delivered to the government of the countries concerned we would like to say the following: Well, we know -- I mean, they say \"we\" as Moscow. It is known that besides Soviet representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and ______ we assume that a representative of all other countries which are counted in the NATO . . . . . . . . . . . .

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January ___, 1973

- 4 -

D: (cont'd) decision and the others who ..... introduce status of observers. And we reserve the right to raise on a certain stage of the preliminary discussion about neutrals.

K: Well, Anatol, you tell Gromyko that he has made a big effort and we will make a big effort.

D: ... So, now, Henry, I hope by the way on both points -- On European Conference, you remember, you sent to me your position?

K: Yes, I have been in touch with Bahr. And he promised me an answer by Monday.

D: Yeah, it will be very soon.

K: And as soon as I -- We are not the obstacle on that.

D: I know.

K: We can concert with the Europeans. And I will get in touch with the French after Rogers is out of there because they get too confused about our channels of communication. And I want to talk to Pompidou about this because we have been .....

D: Henry, you have your channel of communications here or there?

K: What?

D: You have your channel of communications with Pompidou in Paris or here?

K: Well, I have it there. But when their Ambassador is here but their Ambassador isn't here right now so we have to do it in a more complicated way.

D: Well, I understand. But the only clear position I would like to make -- please make sure that your Delegation in Helsinki -- I am not thinking about the final document because they don't know about it -- but I think about the so to speak mandate.

K: Yeah. But I have to get some agreement from the Europeans first, Anatol.

D: I know but --

K: As soon as I have heard from Bahr, I will --

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO12058
By N.W. Bahr 01-04-73

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January ___, 1973

D: I understand but I think still a certain kind is up to you what kind of a preliminary they have to actually -- on a working level they will . .

K: Yeah. I will --

D: They shouldn't necessarily know that we are already involved on a high-level but . .

K: No, no; I will calm them down.

D: Yes, because otherwise in a little bit they will say some suggestions or objections and our people without knowing it, they will report to Moscow Americans making fuss. So you see.

K: No, I will calm them down.

D: Only for this operation for them. Even though they will be present, you'll prefer to do it. It's up to you. But they don't know about high-level discussion but at the same time not to make them too loose, so to speak.

K: I will calm them down immediately.

D: Yeah, this is okay. Okay?

K: Okay, Anatol. Now, what girl are you taking to the country today?

D: Well, I haven't decided. I was rather counting on French but now you are opposed to Paris. What do I do?

K: No, no; we'll wind up -- What? A French girl?

D: Yes. Why not for a change?

K: Certainly.

D: But I couldn't get invited and then I have to send and say look here, because she was looking forward and was encouraged but now there is no confidence.

K: Listen, they can't demonstrate against our Secretary of State, that gets him mad.

D: (laughter)

D: This will calm down. By Monday it will be straightened out.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By: W. M. P. D. 00304

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January __, 1973

- 6 -

D: All right. By that time. But Secretary Johnson say, well, it is not yet decided the question is exactly on the 26th of February but as for the place it is not yet --

K: It will wind up to be Paris if you want my frank opinion.

D: No, I know, I know. It looks almost like this because after all, that is quite all right. So this is on -- And we're looking forward to a conciliatory participation with European leaders.

K: I will be in touch with you next week, Anatol.

D: Okay.

K: And I will instruct our Ambassador in Finland --

D: Yes, and be most I should say careful I think. ..... the discussion of this ......... no problem. Both seem clever and really experienced. They could sit down and exchange their view but you send telegram to your own that they shouldn't be too eager immediately to make any changes and so on.

K: I will take care of that.

D: Yeah. Do this because sometimes they haven't and then there come telegram from other places without knowing that there was a discussion. Then when they receive in Moscow, they begin to wonder what's going on.

K: Anatol, we have never failed in these negotiations to work it out.

D: I know. (laughter)

K: And by now in Moscow they should understand that it's a complex government.

D: Yeah.

K: You understand our government better than the professors at Harvard.

D: Well, but I have an advantage - I'm not a professor. (laughter)

K: (laughter) Okay, Anatol, behave yourself this weekend.

D: Henry, I understand about Vienna there will be no problem.

K: Well, we will accept it. Now we have a lot of allies -- we will talk to the British when they are here.

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January __, 1973

- 7 -

D: Yeah. Well, better not begin too late because of the 31st -- you pressed us on the 31st of January, and now you say that you will wait until Mr. Heath will be here. It will take after the beginning. (laughter)

K: Well, Anatol, it's heartbreaking to deal with a country so eager to reduce its forces.

D: Well, I know, but --

K: It's delayed by our bureaucracy.

D: Well, I know but still this is on a matter I think we really -- ......... you have ______.

K: No, no; we will agree to Vienna. I told you that.

D: I know. It's very possible Gromyko think that he is I think is under this influence.

K: Okay, good.

D: Okay. Bye, bye.

K: Thank you.

wgh

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Phuong

11:15 a.m. 1/27/73

AP: Hello, Dr. Kissinger, Amb. Phuong here.

HK: Yes, how are you?

AP: And congratulations on your work and signing in Paris--you watching it on television?

HK: I watched part of it.

AP: Yesterday I was asked to a television interview--

HK: To what--

AP: ----26

HK: Your supposed to do what on the 26th?

AP: I had a television interview--

HK: Oh you had a television interview?

AP: Yes, last night.

HK: Oh good.

AP: Asked me about the bombing and the peace with honor and I said this is what the mission set and--but I think -- amount of compromise-- we did some things and the other did get some things. And then thanked the American people for the support--I thanked the American (?) leadership and Mr. Nixon who has been working hard for the agreement--

HK: Well that's very generous for you and I appreciate it.

AP: And I think we have to do something here later--

HK: No question. And that is our policy as you know.

AP: This morning I was very worried about the --Tay Ninh

HK: It's not true.

AP: But it looked like we have recaptured it.

HK: I don't think it fell.

REPRODUCIBLE
 Authority E012958
 By: B.P. MARS, Date: 01/05/04

Page 2

AP: I got a cable that says it has been recaptured.

HK: I checked it and it's not true.

AP: I am very glad about that because if we lost anything today, that would be very, very bad.

HK: Yes, well I would assume you would try to recapture it.

AP: Before morning?

HK: No maybe before the day after tomorrow--

AP: Yeh (laughs) You know that Minister Lam will be coming in in plane--

HK: Oh good.

AP: And I have asked Gen. Scowcroft to ask for an audience with Mr. Nixon for Monday.

HK: Monday isn't possible because the President will still be in Key Biscayne.

AP: I see.

HK: But we will almost certainly be able to do it Tuesday--

AP: Tuesday--in the morning or?

HK: I will let you know.

AP: And by the way Dr. Kissinger we must love to have you at dinner on Monday night--can you make it?

HK: It depends on when the President returns--let me say this--I will definitely come by for drinks and if he returns late enough, I will come for dinner.

AP: I see good. We--I appreciate it very much. We would like to have the own hand who has been in the Vietnam we gotiations.

HK: Good I will definitely be there for a drink. And I may stay for dinner if I can.

AP: Good. It depends on the President.

HK: Yes, because I have to see him as soon as he comes in.

MAY 12 1958
 Authority Eo.
By Tef NARA Date 6/15/58

Page 3

AP: I understand that Dr. Kissinger.

HK: But if he comes in very early, I can also come. But if he comes in around 9:00 then I have to leave around 9:00

AP: Yes. Anytime if the President comes in and you have to leave, that will be fine, but I would appreciate if you just drop in and have drink and dinner and leave at your will any time you want.

HK: Good. You can count on me for some time.

AP: That would be good idea to have everyone here.

HK: And we have to stick close together.

AP: Yes, I firmly believe in that.

HK: You can count on it.

AP: Meanwhile the story you told me about Mr.SENTHILLY--it has back to Saigon--not the copy of letter--I would have someone to give by hand to Saigon not to send by air--

HK: No, I think it would be best by hand. But I think it shows you were his feelings are.

AP: Yes. It will prevent a lot of misunderstandings.

HK: Exactly.

AP: Goodbye Dr. Kissinger--Monday we hope to see you.

HK: Good. Bye.

RECEIVED

Authority Eo 12458-

By: J. CAPITOL
MAR 21 1969

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Vice President

11:29 a. m. 1/27/73

VP: Henry?

HK: Yes, Mr. Vice President.

VP: Something has come up that you and I have misunderstood each other when we talked about my time of return--I understood you to say that I should be back on the 8th and now Gen. Scowcroft has told Mike Dunn the 7th is it--now we have--the only time we can talk to the Malaysians is on the 7th--does that do violence to anything.

HK: The problem is we would really like you back here before I go.

VP: Hmhum.

HK: So what we don't have two --your trip to SE Asia is completed by the time I set out for it. Now I'm leaving actually on the 7th--

VP : What time.

HK: In the morning. But if you were to be travelling back on the 7th, your activities would be completed.

VP: My activities will be (wait just a moment....) the way this thing is set up my activities will be completed on the afternoon of the 7th our time.

HK: Well. If it's the only possible day

VP: According to Mike that's the only day we can see them--the Malaysians right Mike? That's the only day they have. That's our final stop.

HK: Yeh. I don't suppose there's a hell of a lot we can do about it--we don't want to cancel it. You'd come right back then.

VP: Oh yeh. Straight back. What is the--what were you gearing for that I would come back physically with you and the President before you--

HK: That of course would be the ideal, but that is now not achievable anyway unless you got back by the evening of the 6th.

VP: Yeh.

HK: Or the early morning of 7th, because this would give it some sequence to all the moves.

VP: Does it make any difference, as long as I am through the mission, we are in contact all the time.

Page 2

HK: That's right and as long as you're through and also we didn't want obviously your mission--the nature of mission is to produce headlines the communists don't like--I mean that's in the nature of things.

VP: Yeh.

HK: We would just as soon not have had those while I'm on the way. But Malaysia

VP: This was my intention -- as far as any press thing is concerned there what I'm going to say is that I'm on a presidential mission and I intend to report to the President when I return and any discussion of what takes place on the mission will come from the President.

HK: Actually that would be very good.

VP: That's what I had in mind doing--I'm not taking press and not talking to press. I'd like to keep any kind of conjecture off down, because I think it would be counterproductive.

HK: That would be very good. In that case, I have much less concern. Then we should go ahead.

VP: I'm going to say anything except I'm on a substantive mission for the President and I will report to him when I return any comment on what's taken place if there is any comment, he will make the comment--I will not at all.

HK: Actually that gives the mission much greater stature than the usual goodwill

VP: Right.

have

HK: In that case, why don't we go ahead on the basis you are now proposed. You should however--we told Malik yesterday that they should talk very freely to you and you should feel free to elicit from them what they think they need in the post-war period. In the countries you are visiting

VP: In other words, you want me to explore with them what they think they're needs are?

HK: In terms of American support both political and economic.

VP: Okay military and economic. All right. We'll handle it that way

HK: If you could keep the meetings to as small a group as possible, because these Ambassadors always ______ at the mouth.

Page 3

VP: Do I have permission to simply have the principal and one man and myself and one in the meetings?

HK: Right. If you could include my fellow, I'd appreciate it.

VP: All right. We'll include him--
Negroponte--

HK: He's very discreet. We have no problem if you want to exclude the ambassador you can use--Bunker I would have in because we have total confidence in him and Gaudley I'd have in.

VP: Where is he?

HK: In Laos.

VP: But aside from that you wouldn't have ambassadors in these meetings--
I can have a very brief meeting with the ambassador and --that's the
best way to do that.

HK: Good.

NATIONALITY
Authority F012458-
By:jt NARA Date 6/15/84

TelCon_11:41-1/27/73
Mr. Kissinger/
Ron Ziegler

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you Ron?

Z: Fine. Boy did you see where Laird put an end to the draft today. He is just going out with the flame.

K: I wasn't aware of it. He isn't working for us anymore. He is working for himself.

Z: Were you aware of it though?

K: No.

Z: Defense Secretary Melvin Laird today announced an immediate end to the draft, rather than waiting for the June 30th cutoff.

K: I have never heard of it.

Z: Yes. He has announced it.

K: Well hell he has announced schedules for prisoners release message, everything yesterday.

Z: Yes, I know.

K: Well he was so loyal during difficult periods = he is entitled to it.

Z: Henry I wanted to get your advice on tonight. When do you see his requested - Admiral Moorer. They are apparently going to do some special from 7 to 8:30. They are going to go around the country you know talking to POW wifes, go to Vietnam, etc. But they want to talk to Admiral Moorer about the military aspects - in other words where do we go from here. Do you think Moorer can handle that all right.

K: No.

Z: You don't.

K: No. He may say we are bombing the britches out of them in Laos.

UNIVERSITY
Authority
Eo. 2458

By: CAPT. NARA Dated: 6/15/79

- 2 -

Z: That is my concern. My view is that we don't give them Moorer.

K: That is mine.

Z: Well, I wanted to test my judgement with yours.

K: How is the weather down there?

Z: It is sunny.

K: Well it is rainy here.

Z: Is it. OK. Well I am going to turn Moorer off.

K: Right.

Z: I can't reach Bill Small with CBS in terms to find out what they had in mind for you but we will get all that cracking next week. OK?

K: That is up to you.

Z: Well you know I think it is important to do.

I think it would be wrong of you to be involved in any of these specials tonight.

K: I agree.

Z: But I think next week - I think it is good for you to do.

K: OK.

Z: How do you feel.

K: I feel fine. You know I don't feel that everyone thinks I am jumping up and down. I know how much it cost and I know how difficult it is going to be.

Z: Who thinks you are jumping up and down?

K: You know, people call in and say isn't this the greatest day of your life.

Z: You should say no, the greatest day of my life was when we made the decision to proceed with the bombing during the Christmas period.

Authority Eo. 12458
By: CAPT. NARA Date: 11/5/59

TELCONE

Scotty Reston/Kissinger

1:04 p.m. - 1/27/73

K: Hello Scotty.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

R: Fine.

K: I'm sorry we couldn't get together this morning but as it turned out I go so jammed up anyway that we couldn't have - it wouldn't have worked out.

R: How does it look? How are you fixed for tomorrow?

K: Tomorrow - unless we do it really very late in the evening say around 9:30. How about Monday?

R: Either one is all right. I think the main thing

K: I would like to talk to you.

R: I would like to talk to you about two things. First of all, that we ought to talk and then the other question is the question of the interview and on that point.

K: You mean with the President?

R: No, with you. I'm not talking about the interview with the President. That's out of the question. What I would like to do about your sitting down and talking is for you and I to talk in a conversation recorded but within your control of it.

K: Yeh.

R: Put it on paper and then look at it and then tidy it up any way you would like but get the main points. Then either at your disposal, scrub the whole thing or publish it. But I would like for us to talk on that basis that you're entirely relaxed and philosophical about the whole thing and then if you decide it doesn't work or it doesn't come off, well, then we'll forget it.

K: Well, Scotty, I would really love to do it because I can't forget your decency in this really trying period in addition to my admiration for your work.

A-1000000000
Authority Eo.12458
By: [REDACTED] NARA Doc.151249

2

R: Well uh

K: And let's discuss what the problems with it are when I see you.
I'd rather do it personally.

R: All right. Or we can do that anytime that you stay - late tomorrow
night or

K: Or maybe for a drink on Monday. Say around 5 or 5:30. Why don't
we say 5:30 at the Metropolitan Club or any other place you'd like.

R: That's fine.

K: OK, is that convenient?

R: Yeh, well I think it might be better if

K: You want me to come to your house?

R: Yeh, why don't you come here at 5:30 or at 9:30 or 10:00 tomorrow
night, either one.

K: I tell you I have a weekend visitor. This is my problem. Let me
find out when the departure is. If it's at 9:00 then I'll come by at
9:30.

R: That's fine; otherwise we'll meet here on Monday evening.

K: Good. In fact I'd prefer to come to your house. I just didn't want
to suggest it.

R: I just think it's better if we're not seen together in public.

K: I think it's better. Good. So I'll come to your house 5 - 5:30 on
Monday. Unless I call you tomorrow.

R: Splendid. Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

A DEPARTMENT OF
Authority
By: [Signature]
NAPLES
Date: 6/15/64

TelCon

Armond de Borchgrove/Mr. Kissinger

1:07, January 27, 1973

K: Hello.

deB: Congratulations, you did it. Fantastic.

K: Well.

B: I know you weren't there today, but I wanted to be there more than you.

K: Well, I tell you, I couldn't faceanother transatlantic trip
this week.

B: How about me.

K: I think I may have given you more reason for definitely than existed.
I told you if I remember it, that I would recommend it. I didn't tell
you that I would necessarily succeed.

B: I thought you had said that the President had agreed in principle, but not
right now because you were waiting for the end of the war.

K: The President had said it was a good idea, and that he respects your work.
I have not yet been able to pin him down to anything like a date.

B: Right.

K: Partly because we've all been so absorbed in this rather difficult episode.

B: Naturally.

K: I will raise it with him next week. He's in Key Biscayne today.

B: Yes.

K: And let me see when I can generate some sort of an answer.

B: Right. I'll just stick around this coming week.

K: To be quite honest with you, my influence on PR matters is not as great
as it is on foreign policy, because there are about 25 advisers on that
subject.

B: Right. What about doing something with you.

K: Well, that might be easier to arrange.

2

B: Because any something with you, if it is all the same with you, naturally subject to your approval after we've done it, on the next four years will be fascinating.

K: Well, let's consider that. That's much easier to arrange.

B: It is?

K: Well, again, I'd like to consult my colleagues here because I've taken the position that I won't do these things without their approval.

B: Naturally.

K: But why don't you call me towards the middle of the week.

B: Will do, thank you so much. Sorry to bother you.

K: You haven't bothered me, and I enjoyed our talks some months ago.

B: I hope we can do it again. We had dinner with Jan last night and she's coming up this weekend to Switzerland. I wish you could take a few days off.

K: I'd love to do that.

B: When do you think you are going to get a break.

K: Well not until the end of the month because now we've got to get this Agreement launched. But I hope in March I'd can take a week of two.

B: Okay, well many thanks for calling back, and I'll call you then around Wednesday.

K: Wednesday or Thursday. Good.

B: Thank you.

K: Bye.

B: Good luck.

K. RAMACHANDRAN LLD
Authority Eo. 12458
By: Sef NARA DATE: 01/05/1949

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1030 1:40, January 27, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry, you're still here. What you are doing?

K: What am I doing?

D: Yeah, I thought you were the key Watergate witness. It is unusual such a day, you are quietly working and working.

K: I thought one of the Walker bottles you gave me undoubtedly had a microphone in it.

D: (Laughter) But I already ________ so there is no need for even
W ________ bottle because we chat with you third or fourth time today.
Your place, even your secretary say he is in meeting, he is somewhere
but you arguing yourself, this is ________ why I am pleased, I should say,

K: Henry, I'm giving you the Grade A treatment today.

D: Henry, I just received a telegram which they asked me to give it to you for the President. I will read it to you, this is a rather short, from Brezhnev to President. Is all right to read?

K: Yes.

D: "DEAR mr President. On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I wish to express our profound expression in connection with signing the, which took place in Paris, of Agreement for ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam. We are confident that the end of ________ in Vietnam is a tremendous significance and will be warmly welcomed not only by XXXX the American people but also for all the people who have good will. There is no doubt, there is a consistent relavation of the chief agreement on peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem while eliminating one of the most dangerous onset of international tension will in many ways facilitate the healthening of the whole world ________. We think that there is no need to dwell much on the scheme of the special developments events will have positive effects on relations between our two governments as well. Thus opening new possibilities for their further development and deepening and restraint for such a course of ________. Sincerely ________ Brezhnev, General ________,"

K: Well we appreciate this very much, and of course, we'll answer it next week but I can tell you now that this reflects our sentiments exactly.

D: Yeah, I think it really is good one. So, I'll--

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: MW, NAD 50000
Date: 1-2-73

2

K: Let me, I forgot to tell you earlier, first I've already given instructions to our people in Helsinki to take a moderate response. Are you going to put forward these mandates?

D: Mandates, yes, but not a document.

K: No, but you are going to say you want short mandates.

D: Yes. It is for the--what? we discussed with you, it was your idea too.

K: No, no, I agree. I just want to know what's going to happen. Your people are going to put it forward.

D: Yes.

K: Well, our people will not accept it, but they won't reject it either.

D: Well, because they will work together.

K: I have to hear from Bob before I can--but at any rate we will not do anything negative.

D: Yes, I understand--

K: And they have been told to behave in a constructive way.

D: Yes. This is the point because they won't let them sit down and look it through and find what they really is. In a very constructive manner will discuss what does Hanoi--

K: They are not instructed to settle, but they will be instructed not to reject.

D: That's all right, but at the same time to try to work even on a bilateral--

K: Frankly, a bilateral stuff we would rather do here with the people we have-- they aren't bright enough to keep their mouths shut.

D: Just to talk, not to settle, but to try on their own level constructively--

K: Well, they have been told--

D: This and that, but I mean, any--

K: They have been told to be constructive, but if you get any reports from your people you let me know and we'll straighten it out.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01 2057
By: N.W. Deaton

3

D: Because rather this is approach during their talk so to speak.

K: But you understand my difficulty. I cannot tell them enough, but --
let's see how this new instruction works. If there is any problem,
you let me know.

D: Okay.

K: Well at any rate, I will deal with you when I hear from Bob.

D: Okay, and then, Henry, I give another problem. I received a telegraph from Gogarty today in the evening another message from, a little more lengthy, from Mr. Brezhnev to the President.

K: What subject?

D: I don't know. This I receive already, but at the same time I receive
a telegram shortly to be or will be another message from Mr. Brezhnev
to the President. I don't know what is the subject. My question is,
would you be available tomorrow, in one way or another, in the morning
let's say.

K: Certainly.

D: You will, you will be here.

K: Anatol, of course. You know where I am, you've got these devices all
over my place.

D: (Laughter) Well, well, well. Would you then maybe say some hour,
10:00 or 11:00.

K: Well, I'll call you in the morning. I'll call you around nine or nine-thirty.

D: 9:30. Around nine thirty you will call me.

K: I'll call you and then we'll decide where to meet.

D: Yes, I appreciate if you will do it.

K: Yes, we'll do it in the morning.

D: And then I will bring you---

K: And you can bring me both messages.

D: Both messages. But this you can already mention to the President
because I already read it to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: N.W.па. 53-001

4

K: Okay.

D: But I will bring both messages. Okay.

K: Right, and I'm also working on the Ebanoff case.

D: Okay, I think this is good. This is the only one which is left. And we will make twenty-five thousand dollars, all right.

K: (Laughter) Do I get a percentage.

D: It's very difficult to bargain with you, you even ask for percentage. For the 30 years percentage, there I will ______.

K: I know what you are doing, you are making it so tough for me when we get one of your people that we won't pick anyone up anymore.

D: (Laughter) No, I assure you, there be no more trouble. All right.

K: Okay, Anatol.

D: Tomorrow you call me around 9:30, then we will take the vow (?), because I will have this one and the new one. Okay.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

Tel Con
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1-1-73 1:40, January 27, 1973

K: Hello.

K: What am I doing?

D: (Laughter) But I already _______ so there is no need for even
W _______ bottle because we chat with you third or fourth time today.
Your place, even your secretary say he is in meeting, he is somewhere
but you arguing yourself, this is _______ why I am pleased, I should say,

K: __________ I'm giving you the Grade A treatment today.

D: Henry, I just received a telegram which they asked me to give it to you for the President. I will read it to you, this is a rather short, from Breshnev to President. Is all right to read?

K: Yes.

D:
"DEAR mr President. On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I wish
to express our profound expression in connection with signing the , which
took place in Paris, of Agreement for ending the war and restoring peace
in Vietnam. We are confident that the end of ______ in Vietnam
is a tremendous significance and will be warmly welcomed not only by
the American people but also for all the people who have good will.
There is no doubt, there is a consistent relavation of the chief agreement
on peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem while eliminating one of
the most dangerous onset of international tension will in many ways
facilitate the healthening of the whole world ______. We think that there
is no need to dwell much on the scheme of the special developments
events will have positive effects on relations between our two governments
as well. Thus opening new possibilities for their further development
and deepening and restraint for such a course of ______. Sincerely
Brezhnev, General ______,"

2

D: Yes.

D: Yes, I understand--

D: Yes. This is the point because they couldn't tell us they could sit down and look it through and find what they really is. In a very constructive manner will discuss what does Hanoi--

S

3

D: Okay.

D: Okay, and then, Henry, I give another problem. I received a telegram
from Gormyko today in the evening another message from, a little more
lengthy, from Mr. Brezhnev to the President.

K: What subject?

K: Certainly.

*

4

K: Okay.

D: It's very difficult to bargain with you, you even ask for percentage. For the 30 years percentage, there I will ________.

K: Okay, Anatol.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

August 5 FRI Sep 15 1954
BY: ANATOL

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1/27/73

AD: Good morning. You are up too early.

HK: I am up.

AD: You are watching the signing--

HK: No, I didn't know--it was

AD: It still is.

HK: Is it on television.

AD: Yes. On Channel 4. Now they have a second signing--they just show the ________--the signing that took place four hours ago when there was four of them--now they are going to show the signing of two.

HK: I see. Now Anatol you are going into the State Department today.

AD: I'm going right now.

HK: What I wanted to tell you was that there was a demonstration in Paris by your party and the Vietcong. The French made no effort to control. So we now withdrawn again from Paris. We are just going to leave it open.

AD: For the time being it's open.

HK: We now insist on some assurances that this can't be repeated.

AD: Yeh.

HK: I just don't want you to be surprised if when you get called in they tell you something that I haven't told you something that I hadn't told you yesterday.

AD: Yeh.

HK: We had agreed to Paris and we had in fact already informed Pompidou-- But when they didn't control the demonstration by the communist party and the Vietcong--they withdrew it again.

AD: You withdrew in a way conditionally so to speak? or finally.

HK: Not yet finally. Just don't want you to be surprised--I know you handle unexpected situations so badly.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012055
By: W.W.APAS, 5-24-73

Page 2

AD: (Laugs) That's all right.

HK: And lose your composure so easily.

AD: Yes, you are right. I know. All right. I received a telegram from Gromyko that he agrees with the ______ published on about that you agreed to begin the next session on March 12.

HK: Excellent.

AD: Reason I give to you to give the necessary order to publish this kind--

HK: We will do it here on Tuesday at noon.

AD: That's all right. All right. Okay.

HK: Good Anatol.

AD: Well, I'm going to meet Mr. Kissinger's on SALT talks, Mr. Johnson, last time I guess as Secretary of State--

HK: Just don't sell him any of your MBFR and European Security ideas.

AD: (laughs) He is a man who usually--the he's I think themost difficult bureaucrat you have ever had in the department.

HK: He's very cautious.

AD: Exactly, he's very difficult. Okay.

HK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: M.N. Gage

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1/27/83

HK: I am up.

HK: No, I didn't know--it was

AD: It still is.

HK: Is it on television.

AD: I'm going right now.

AD: Yeh.

AD: Yeh.

AD: You withdraw in a way conditionally so to speak? or finally.

REDACTED

Authority Eo.12458

By: Bf NARA File 6/15/89

Tيليفاک

Page 2

AD: (Laugs) That's all right.

AD: Yes, you are right. I know. All right. I received a telegram from Gromyko that he agrees with the ________ published on about that you agreed to begin the next session on March 12.

HK: Excellent.

HK: Good Analys

HK: He's very cautious.

HK: Bye.

REPRODUCIBLE
 Authority Eo. 2458
 By: CAPT. NARA Date: 6/15/69