MEET THE PRESS

MR. KALB (on tape): "What is often called the American establishment went courting at the Kremlin this week. Former secretaries of state and defense, Cabinet officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations, exchanging views about war and peace. One major theme: whether the Russians think President Reagan at age 76 still has the political clout and desire to negotiate an arms control agreement. That is now a major question, because the Reagan administration is edging toward early deployment of the President's strategic defense initiative, or Star Wars, and if that happens, many experts think that's the end of arms control for the time being. So, what is the view from Moscow? What are the chances for a deal? We'll ask two former secretaries of state who have just returned from a fact finding trip: Henry Kissinger, who served two Republican presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; and, Cyrus Vance, who served Democratic President Jimmy Carter. Both are our guests today on 'Meet the Press,' Sunday, February 8, 1987."

MR. KALB: Hello, and welcome once again, I'm Marvin Kalb. Ever since the Iceland summit last October, both super powers continue to claim that they're still interested in reaching an arms control agreement. But Soviet leader Gorbachev is absorbed with domestic reform, and President Reagan is distracted by the Iran/contra scandal and much else. The upshot is that arms control or some major improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations may now get lost in the shuffle. Let's address that issue first.

SECRETARY VANCE: Secretary Kissinger, you've both been in Moscow this past week, representing the Council on Foreign Relations. You've talked to Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. Secretary Kissinger, first, do you feel that the Russians are seriously interested in reaching an arms control deal with President Reagan?

MR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviets are seriously interested in reaching an arms control agreement. The issue is whether the terms are those that are compatible with our national security, but they are definitely interested in reaching an agreement with President Reagan.

MR. KALB: Did you have the impression that the Russians are now prepared, that Gorbachev is now prepared, to unlink the various

elements in the arms control package that was discussed in Iceland and go for one of those parts, rather than all of them?

**MR. KISSINGER:** No, my impression is that they're at this point not prepared to unlink from the point of view of making a final agreement. What I think they are prepared to do is to negotiate the three packages separately, initial them separately, but not sign them until all three are completed. That seems to me to be their present position.

**MR. KALB:** Okay, Secretary Vance, do the Russians believe that President Reagan has the political clout, the real personal desire to reach an arms control agreement with them?

**MR. VANCE:** They asked us that question, and all of us that spoke to the issue said that we believed that he did have the capacity and he did desire to achieve an arms control agreement and that they would be making a great mistake in Moscow if they treated the situation otherwise.

**MR. KALB:** Do you feel, on the basis of your talks, Secretary Vance, that we are, as Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany seems to believe, at some kind of major turning point in East-West relations?

**MR. VANCE:** I think that we are at a crossroads. Much is happening in the Soviet Union today that is very different from the past. There is an openness, there is a willingness on their part to discuss mistakes of the past, to talk about what has to be done in the future. I was there about a year ago, and the difference, even in that one year, from the kind of atmosphere that one feels when you go to Moscow today is very, very marked.

**MR. KALB:** Well, we would like to pursue those issues, and I'll be joined by two of my colleagues, Robert Kaiser, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post; and, Strobe Talbott, the Washington bureau chief of Time magazine. "Meet the Press" will be back right after these messages.

(Announcements.)

**MR. KALB:** We're back on "Meet the Press" discussing the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control with two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance. They're both at NBC Studio 3-K in New York, and we'll resume the questioning with Mr. Talbott.

**MR. TALBOTT:** Secretary Kissinger, the West German press is out today with an interview with you that I believe was conducted before you went to Moscow. In that interview, you predict with

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some confidence that there will be another and perhaps two more summit meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan. You also predict that these summit meetings will end with the United States and the Soviet Union signing an arms control agreement in Europe that would zero out, eliminate, intermediate range nuclear forces there and also reduce strategic nuclear forces by 50 percent. In the same interview, you expressed what you called the "eccentric view" that this might not be a good thing for the United States; you're unhappy with this prospect. Has your trip to Moscow changed your view on any of this—on any of these issues?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I believe that the framework of the negotiations, as it was established at Reykjavik can be completed and that within it, in fact, compromises can be made. I have been very dubious about that framework from the beginning. I believe that the basic trade involves a cut of 50 percent of strategic forces, which fixes no significant danger, against a zero option in Europe and a limitation on SDI, which takes care of major Soviet concerns without giving us a corresponding benefit. So, I have a—the view that an agreement is possible, but that I reluctantly do not like the agreement that is emerging, and the Soviets will be quite flexible within that framework, but I don't like the framework.

MR. TALBOTT: You spent much of your career, Secretary Kissinger, trying to get the Soviets to come to grips with the problem to the United States of their heavy ICBMs. The agreement that's being discussed, and I gather the one that you're referring to, would result in a 50 percent reduction in those most threatening Soviet weapons systems. Could you explain a little bit more why you don't think that would be a good deal.

MR. KISSINGER: No, the 50 percent—if the 50 percent reduction stood alone, I think that would be a reasonable deal. Of course, since the 50 percent reduction is fairly uniform, the targets that are being threatened by the heavy missiles would also be reduced, so that the relationship between the threat and the targets is not significantly being affected by the reduction. But the 50 percent reduction standing by itself, I would welcome. Its linking it to the two other aspects of the agreement that give me great concern. And I've been warning against this, and I regret that two years ago we didn't go on a different tack and define a different framework, because I do believe that we are at a moment in which the Soviet leadership, both because it is new, because it is facing new problems, might have been willing to look at alternative frameworks had they been conceptually presented to them.

MR. KAISER: Secretary Vance, let's check your sense of the likelihood, in a political sense, of a Gorbachev/Reagan summit this

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year or two of them, this year and next year. Does that seem more likely or less to you after your visit to Moscow?

MR. VANCE: I hope that Henry is right and that a summit or two summits may be possible. I am much more skeptical than Henry is about that taking place. There are still large differences between the two sides. I think the differences on the cut in offensive weapons during the first period of five years is not big, nor do I think that the parties are that far apart on intermediate nuclear weapons. However, I think the gap between the two sides on the Strategic Defense Initiative is huge, and there's a long, long way to go to get the two parties together on that. And, therefore, I am less optimistic.

MR. KAISER: Did you get the impression that the Russians are tempted now to look beyond Reagan, to say this guy's too tough to deal with, let's wait for the next one?

MR. VANCE: No, I didn't get that impression. I think they are prepared to deal with President Reagan and will make an effort to do so.

MR. TALBOTT: Secretary Vance, there has been a good deal of controversy in Washington—while you were in Moscow—about the ABM Treaty of 1972 and whether it permits advanced development and testing of the administration's SDI program. Did this issue come up in Moscow, and how did it affect your discussions there?

MR. VANCE: Yes. The question of whether you have a broad interpretation or a narrow interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty was a subject that came up time and time again. I happen to believe in the narrow interpretation and have believed in the narrow interpretation. That is the way we presented it to our Congress when it ratified the ABM Treaty, and I believe that that is the correct interpretation.

MR. TALBOTT: Secretary Kissinger, you had as much to do as anybody on earth with the formulation of the ABM treaty of 1972. What is your view? Broad or narrow?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, it's an ironical position. First of all, that issue was not a huge issue in 1972 because the technology for space experiments didn't exist. In 1972, as I recall it, and I have not looked at the documents, the American position strongly advocated what is today called the narrow interpretation. The Soviets took the position that you could not limit what you did not know and they advocated the broad interpretation. When the treaty was submitted to the United States Congress, the United States supported it with interpreting it in the narrow way. The Soviets, Marshall Grechko, in submitting it to the Supreme Soviet, put forward the narrow—the broad interpreta-

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tion. Now, in the last—in recent months the two sides have totally switched positions. The Soviets are now taking the American 1973 position, and the Americans are taking the Soviet 1973 position. My sense is that the documents are unclear on the subject and the negotiating record is roughly as I described it.

**MR. KAISER:** In other words, you're saying that you—the treaty that you negotiated and submitted to the Senate, and which was advertised by your administration as precluding this sort of testing of advanced technology weapons, didn't really do that?

**MR. KISSINGER:** No, I'm saying that if you—I believe that if you look at the literal text of the treaty, probably the broad interpretation is correct, but I think that this is an issue that cannot be settled by exegesis of documents, but has to be settled politically, one, by a decision in the United States of what we want; secondly, by some agreement with the Soviets of how to approach it. Because in 1973, nobody foresaw the technology that we are now talking about.

**MR. KALB:** Secretary Vance, could you tell me what you would be telling President Reagan right now on this whole issue about whether we should proceed more quickly with the Strategic Defense Initiative? Should we be holding back? Will it damage chances of getting a deal with the Russians? What would you be telling him?

**MR. VANCE:** I would tell him that it is a grave mistake in my judgment to talk about trying to move rapidly into a first phase deployment of the ABM. I don't believe we should ever deploy the ABM on the basis of what I know now. And I certainly think it would be a grave mistake to do it at this point. It must also be done after full consultation with the Congress, with our allies and others, and that's therefore something that one cannot do without having that kind of consultation.

**MR. KALB:** Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with that?

**MR. KISSINGER:** No, I don't completely agree with this. My view is that the purpose of foreign policy is not to make agreements. The purpose of foreign policy is to increase the security of the United States and, therefore, the security of all other countries. Therefore, I think that what the president ought to do is to define what he has in mind, strategically and politically, with his Strategic Defense Initiative, and explain why that is in the long-term national interest of this country and of the world, as I believe it is properly defined. Then we ought to put forward concrete proposals which establish a relationship between offense and defense so that both of them can be reduced simultaneously and in relation to each other. It should not be done on an ad hoc basis, and I would warn against letting the Soviets define one American program as the obstacle to negotiation and then have our whole domestic

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debate turn on the issue of how much of this we can concede to the
Soviets in order to make progress, and at the end of which, what we
will have is an agreement, but not an improvement of the situation.

MR. VANCE: Could I say a word?

MR. KALB: Yes, please.

MR. VANCE: I am not suggesting that there should be no further
research or even some limited testing. And I want to make that very
clear. I believe that's what we should be talking to the Soviets about,
what kinds of research and testing, limited testing, should be possible
under a proper interpretation of the existing IBM treaty.

MR. KALB: Okay, gentlemen, let's take a break. "Meet the Press" will be back right after these messages.

(Announcements)

MR. KALB: We are back on "Meet the Press" discussing U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control with two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, and we will continue the questioning with Mr. Kaiser.

MR. KAISER: Gentlemen, you just had an extraordinary visit to Moscow. You went from the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, to the leader of the opposition, Mr. Sakharov, an unprecedented sequence of meetings. Obviously, big things are happening over there. Give us, each of you, please, your assessments of the significance of the changes that are going on and what they may mean for us. Mr. Vance, maybe, first, or either one. Go ahead.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, this was my first visit to the Soviet Union since I left government, and the changes are striking. First of all, Gorbachev is a totally new Soviet leader in my experience, capable of conducting a dialogue. It's the first time that I've met a group of Soviet leaders who would admit that on many of their reforms, they didn't —really not know how to implement them, that there were many unanswered questions and a recognition of the domestic problems of the Soviet Union that I found unprecedented. So, from that point of view, it was interesting, even exciting and, of course, it was deeply moving to meet Mr. Sakharov who shared some of these—who would probably agree with some of the observations that I've just made. For the United States the problem is, one, to recognize that there are some changes going on; but, secondly, to make sure that in our foreign policy we do not make concessions to their domestic policy, we make concessions to their foreign policy. And, so, while we respect what they are doing, our perception of foreign policy has to be geared to the criteria

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of the security of both countries and their long-term purposes and not
necessarily to their domestic changes, which, however, I believe are
significant.

MR. KAISER: Secretary Vance, how do you feel about the
changes?

MR. VANCE: I agree with Henry that there is a new leader there
in the Kremlin, who is a very different man from the leaders that I
knew before. He's vigorous, he's intelligent, he's strong and he has laid
out quite clearly where he thinks his country should go and has indicated
that their highest priorities are on the domestic and social side. As a
result of that, I think that you are going to see changes taking place.
We've seen some of them already. There are probably many more that
will be coming in the near future as well as the years ahead. The task
that he has set himself, he, the general secretary, and his country is
vast and it is immensely complex. It will be very, very hard to imple-
ment the program that they have set out, not only in the area of inter-
national relations, but particularly in dealing with the domestic prob-
lems of reforming the economy, of opening up the society, of making
it possible for people to live a freer kind of life, and they're going to
have steps forward and, I'm sure, steps backwards. It's going to be
a very difficult task. But I think we are speaking about our relation-
ship with the Soviet Union at a crossroads, and I hope that between
the two of us, we will be able to move down the road towards a better
relationship. It will take a lot of effort and hard thought on the part
of both of us to make sure that we do go down that road.

MR. KISSINGER: May I say something about that? Again, I agree
that we are probably at a crossroads. It seems to me we have the follow-
ing problem: With respect to domestic policy, there's no doubt that Gor-
bachev and his colleagues are doing something that it unusual, perhaps
even revolutionary and which will elicit some opposition, considerable
opposition, on the part of the people that are going to be reformed.
That creates at the same time a strong temptation on their side to be
more conventional on foreign policy and to play to the foreign policy
establishment on the Soviet side that is in the army, in the KGB, that
is partially responsible for the present deadlock. It seems to me the
American role has to be not necessarily to fall in with this approach
but to come forward with creative ideas that then the Politburo would
have to study. I don't know whether they would accept them, but to
shake them out of the temptation to continue foreign policy by rote
and to apply in foreign policy some of the flexibility that they have
already shown in domestic policy.

MR. TALBOTT: If we could switch back to Washington and if
I could put a question to both of you in your capacities as students

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of the office of secretary of state, your successor, Mr. Shultz, has
had a very rough time in recent weeks and months, including on
the issue that we were discussing earlier of how to interpret the
ABM treaty. Could both of you give us your assessment of Secretary
Shultz's position right now and the prospects for him serving out
successfully the remainder of his term.

MR. KISSINGER: I think it's imperative that he serves out his
term—you should not change a secretary of state except on an issue
of overwhelming principle—at the end of the term. Secondly, he's a
distinguished public servant who is an element—who has contributed
wisdom and moderation. It will be—what he will have to do is not simp-
ly, it seems to me, to take individual negotiating positions, but to lay out
a strategy and a concept of the direction in which we are trying to go,
and I—I believe that there's no one else who can do that at this moment.

MR. KALB: Secretary Vance, what is your view? You, in 1980,
quit over an issue of principle?

MR. VANCE: I agree with Henry. I think that it would be a great
mistake if Secretary Shultz were not in the government. I disagree with
some of the things that Secretary Shultz has done, but that's under-
standable.

MR. KALB: Well, let me ask you, Secretary Vance—an issue
that is very much of today, and that is, there's a demand from
Lebanon by a group of terrorists holding three Americans and an
Indian professor that they will kill all four of them tomorrow if
Israel does not release 400 Moslem prisoners. Would you, if you
were secretary of state today, lean on Israel to do that?

MR. VANCE: This is a decision that this administration has got to
make. I would not lean on Israel if I was there, but these kinds of deci-
sions are immensely complicated. One has to know all the factors that
are at play. But to answer your question very directly, no, I wouldn't.

MR. KISSINGER: I agree with Secretary Vance.

MR. KAISER: Do we have an anti-terrorist policy any more in
this country, or have we squandered the opportunity to take a moral
position on terrorism? Mr. Kissinger?

MR. KISSINGER: I think the position as enunciated by the secretary
of state, and for that matter by the president publicly, is a strong posi-
tion and is the correct position. We have weakened it by some of the
actions that were taken in Iran. To the extent that these are recogniz-
ed to have been a big mistake, I think we should go back to first prin-
ciples as enunciated. That is the correct policy. That is the one we should
follow and stick to.

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MR. KALB: Gentlemen, I think that our time is up. I want to thank you both for being our guests here today. It is perfectly clear from this discussion and many others here in Washington that the possibility of an arms control agreement between Soviet leader Gorbachev and President Reagan over the next two years seems now, at least, to be hanging by a thread, with major decisions expected on this issue in Washington and in Moscow in the week ahead. But that is it for now. Thank you all for joining us, and we'll see you next Sunday.

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Meet the Press - February 8, 1987

Mr. Kalb (on tape): "What is often called the American establishment went courting at the Kremlin this week. Former secretaries of state and defense, Cabinet officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations, exchanging views about war and peace. One major theme: whether the Russians think President Reagan at age 76 still has the political clout and desire to negotiate an arms control agreement. That is now a major question, because the Reagan administration is edging toward early deployment of the President's strategic defense initiative, or Star Wars, and if that happens, many experts think that's the end of arms control for the time being. So, what is the view from Moscow? What are the chances for a deal? We'll ask two former secretaries of state who have just returned from a fact finding trip: Henry Kissinger who served two Republican presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; and, Cyrus Vance, who served Democratic President Jimmy Carter. Both are our guests today on "Meet the Press," Sunday, February 8th, 1987.

MR. KALB: Hello, and welcome once again, I'm Marvin Kalb. Ever since the Iceland summit last October, both super powers continue to claim that they're still interested in reaching an arms control agreement. But Soviet leader Gorbachev is absorbed with domestic reform and President Reagan is distracted by the Iran/contra scandal and much else. The upshot is that arms control or some major improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations may now get lost in the shuffle. Let's address that issue first. Secretary Vance, Secretary Kissinger, you've both been in Moscow this past week representing the Council on Foreign Relations. You've talked to Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. Secretary Kissinger, first, do you feel that the Russians are seriously interested in reaching an arms control deal with President Reagan?

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President Reagan.

MR. KALB: Did you have the impression that the Russians are now prepared, that Gorbachev is now prepared, to unlink the various elements in the arms control package that was discussed in Iceland and go for one of those parts rather than all of them?

MR. KISSINGER: No, my impression is that they're at this point not prepared to unlink from the point of view of making a final agreement. What I think they are prepared to do is to negotiate the three packages separately, initial them separately, but not sign them until all three are completed. That seems to me to be their present position.

MR. KALB: Okay, Secretary Vance, do the Russians believe that President Reagan has the political clout, the real personal desire to reach an arms control agreement with them?

MR. VANCE: They asked us that question and all of us that spoke to the issue said that we believed that he did have the capacity and he did desire to achieve an arms control agreement and that they would be making a great mistake in Moscow if they treated the situation otherwise.

MR. KALB: Do you feel, on the basis of your talks, Secretary Vance, that we are, as Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany seems to believe, at some kind of major turning point in East-West relations?

MR. VANCE: I think that we are at a crossroads. Much is happening in the Soviet Union today that is very different from the past. There is an openness, there is a willingness on their part to discuss mistakes of the past, to talk about what has to be done in the future. I was there about a year ago, and the difference, even in that one year, from the kind of atmosphere that one feels when you go to Moscow today is very, very marked.

MR. KALB: Well, we would like to pursue those issues and I'll be joined by two of my colleagues, Robert Kaiser, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post; and, Strobe Talbott, the Washington bureau chief of Time magazine. "Meet the

(w)

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(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: We're back on "Meet the Press" discussing the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control with two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance. They're both at NBC Studio 3-K in New York and we'll resume the questioning with Mr. Talbott.

MR. TALBOTT: Secretary Kissinger, the West German press is out today with an interview with you that I believe was conducted before you went to Moscow. In that interview, you predict with some confidence that there will be another and perhaps two more summit meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan. You also predict that these summit meetings will end with the United States and the Soviet Union signing an arms control agreement in Europe that would zero out, eliminate, intermediate range nuclear forces there and also reduce strategic nuclear forces by 50 percent. In the same interview, you expressed what you called the "eccentric view" that this might not be a good thing for the United States; you're unhappy with this prospect. Has your trip to Moscow changed your on any of this -- on any of these issues?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I believe that the framework of the negotiations, as it was established at Reykjavik can be completed and that within, in fact, compromises can be made. I have been very dubious about that framework from the beginning. I believe that the basic trade involves a cut of 50 percent of strategic forces, which fixes no significant danger against a zero option in Europe and a limitation on SDI, which takes care of major Soviet concerns without giving us a corresponding benefit. So, I have a -- the view that an agreement is possible, but that I reluctantly do not like the agreement that is emerging and the Soviets will be quite flexible within that framework, but I don't like the framework.

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MR. KISSINGER: No, the 50 percent -- if the 50 percent reduction stood alone, I think that would be a reasonable deal. Of course, since the 50 percent reduction is fairly uniform, the targets that are being threatened by the heavy missiles would also be reduced, so that the relationship between the threat and the targets is not significantly being affected by the reduction. But the 50 percent reduction standing by itself, I would welcome its linking to the two other aspects of the agreement that give me great concern. And I've been warning against this and I regret that two years ago we didn't go on a different tack and define a different framework, because I do believe that we are at a moment in which the Soviet leadership, both because it is new, because it is facing new problems, might have been willing to look at alternative frameworks had they been conceptually presented to them.

MR. KAISER: Secretary Vance, let's check your sense of
likelihood, in a political sense, of a Gorbachev/Reagan summit
this year or two of them, this year and next year. Does that seem
likely or less to you after your visit to Moscow?

MR. VANCE: I hope that Henry is right and that a summit or two summits may be possible. I am much more skeptical than Henry is about that taking place. There are still large differences between the two sides. I think the differences on the cut in offensive weapons during the first period of five years is not big, nor do I think that the parties are that far apart on intermediate nuclear weapons. However, I think the gap between the two sides on the Strategic Defense Initiative is huge and there's a long long way to go to get the two parties together on that. And, therefore, I am less optimistic.

MR. KAISER: Did you get the impression that the Russians are tempted now to look beyond Reagan to say this guy's too tough

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MR. TALBOTT: Secretary Vance, there has been a good deal of controversy in Washington -- while you were in Moscow -- about the ABM Treaty of 1972 and whether it permits advanced development and testing of the administration's SDI program. Did this issue come up in Moscow and how did it affect your discussions there?

MR. VANCE: Yes. The question of whether you have a broad interpretation or a narrow interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a subject that came up time and time again. I happen to believe in the narrow interpretation and have believed in the narrow interpretation. That is the way we presented it to our Congress when it ratified the ABM Treaty and I believe that that is the correct interpretation.

MR. TALBOTT: Secretary Kissinger, you had as much to do as anybody on earth with the formulation of the ABM Treaty of 1972. What is your view? Broad or narrow?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, it's an ironical position. First of all, that issue was not a huge issue in 1972 because the technology for space experiments didn't exist. In 1972, as I recall it, and I have not looked at the documents, the American position strongly advocated what is today called the narrow interpretation. The Soviets took the position that you could not limit what you did not know and they advocated the broad interpretation. When the treaty was submitted to the United States Congress, the United States supported it with interpreting it in the narrow way. The Soviets, Marshall Grechko, in submitting it to the Supreme Soviet, put forward the narrow -- the broad interpretation. Now, in the last -- in recent months the two sides have totally switched positions. The Soviets are now taking the American 1973 position and the Americans are taking the Soviet 1973 position. My sense

(L)

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MR. KAISER: In other words, you're saying that you -- the treaty that you negotiated and submitted to the Senate, and which was advertised by your administration as precluding this sort of testing of advanced technology weapons didn't really do that?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I'm saying that if you -- I believe that if you look at the literal text of the treaty, probably the broad interpretation is correct, but I think that this is an issue that cannot be settled by exegesis of documents, but has to be settled politically, one, by a decision in the United States of what we want; secondly, by some agreement with the Soviets of how to approach it. Because in 1973, nobody foresaw the technology that we are now talking about.

MR. KALB: Secretary Vance, could you tell me what you would be telling President Reagan right now on this whole issue about whether we should proceed more quickly with the Strategic Defense Initiative? Should we be holding back? Will it damage chances of getting a deal with the Russians? What would you be telling him?

MR. VANCE: I would tell him that it is a grave mistake in my judgment to talk about trying to move rapidly into a first phase deployment of the ABM. I don't believe we should ever deploy the ABM on the basis of what I know now. And I certainly think it would be a grave mistake to do it at this point. It must also be done after full consultation with the Congress, with our allies and others and that's therefore something that one cannot do without having that kind of consultation.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with that?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I don't completely agree with this. My view is that the purpose of foreign policy is not to make agreements. The purpose of foreign policy is to increase the security of the United States and, therefore, the security of all other countries. Therefore, I think that what the president ought

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to do is to define what he has in mind, strategically and politically, with his Strategic Defense Initiative, and explain why that is in the long-term national interest of this country and of the world, as I believe it is properly defined. Then we ought to put forward concrete proposals which establish a relationship between offense and defense so that both of them can be reduced simultaneously and in relation to each other. It should not be done on an ad hoc basis and I would warn against letting the Soviets define one American program as the obstacle to negotiation and then have our whole domestic debate turn on the issue of how much of this we can concede to the Soviets in order to make progress, and at the end of which, what we will have is an agreement, but not an improvement of the situation.

MR. KALB: Yes, please.

MR. VANCE: I am not suggesting that there should be no further research or even some limited testing. And I want to make that very clear. I believe that's what we should be talking to the Soviets about, what kinds of research and testing, limited testing, should be possible under a proper interpretation of the existing IBM Treaty.

(Announcements.)

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, this was my first visit to the
Soviet Union since I left government and the changes are striking.
First of all, Gorbachev is a totally new Soviet leader in my
experience, capable of conducting a dialogue. It's the first time
that I've met a group of Soviet leaders who would admit that on
many of their reforms, they didn't -- really not know how to
implement them, that there were many unanswered questions and a
recognition of the domestic problems of the Soviet Union that I
found unprecedented. So, from that point of view, it was interesting,
even exciting and, of course, it was deeply moving to meet Mr. Sakharov
who shared some of these -- who would probably agree with some of
the observations that I've just made. For the United States the
problem is, one, to recognize that there are some changes going
on; but, secondly, to make sure that in our foreign policy we do
not make concessions to their domestic policy, we make concessions
to their foreign policy. And, so, while we respect what they are
doing, our perception of foreign policy has to be geared to the
criteria of the security of both countries and their long-term
purposes and not necessarily to their domestic changes, which,
however, I believe are significant.

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implement the program that they have set out, not only in the area of international relations, but particularly in dealing with the domestic problems of reforming the economy, of opening up the society, of making it possible for people to live a freer kind of life, and they're going to have steps forward and I'm sure steps backwards. It's going to be a very difficult task. But I think we are speaking about our relationship with the Soviet Union at a crossroads, and I hope that between the two of us, we will be able to move down the road towards a better relationship. It will take a lot of effort and hard thought on the part of both of us to make sure that we do go down that road.

MR. KISSINGER: May I say something about that? Again, I agree that we are probably at a crossroads. It seems to me we have the following problem: With respect to domestic policy, there's no doubt that Gorbachev and his colleagues are doing something that it unusual, perhaps even revolutionary and which will elicit some opposition, considerable opposition, on the part of the people that are going to be reformed. That creates at the same time a strong temptation on their side to be more conventional on foreign policy and to play to the foreign policy establishment on the Soviet side that is in the army, in the KGB, that is partially responsible for the present deadlock. It seems to me the American role has to be not necessarily to fall in with this approach but to come forward with creative ideas that then the Politburo would have to study. I don't know whether they would accept them, but to shake them out of the temptation to continue foreign policy by rote and apply in foreign policy some of the flexibility that they have already shown in domestic policy.

MR. TALBOTT: If we could switch back to Washington and if I could put a question to both of you in your capacities as students of the office of secretary of state, your successor, Mr. Shultz, has had a very rough time in recent weeks and months, including on the issue that we were discussing earlier of how to interpret the ABM Treaty. Could both of you give us your assessment

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MR. KISSINGER: I think it's imperative that his term -- you should not change a secretary of state except on an issue of overwhelming principle -- at the end of the term. Secondly, he's a distinguished public servant who is an element -- who has contributed wisdom and moderation. It will be -- what he will have to do is not simply, it seems to me, to take individual negotiating positions, but to lay out a strategy and a concept of the direction in which we are trying to go and I -- I believe that there's no one else who can do that at this moment.

MR. VANCE: I agree with Henry. I think that it would be a great mistake if Secretary Shultz were not in the government. I disagree with some of the things that Secretary Shultz has done, but that's understandable.

MR. KALB: Well, let me ask you, Secretary Vance -- an issue that is very much of today, and that is there's a demand from Lebanon by a group of terrorists holding three Americans and an Indian professor, that they will kill all four of them tomorrow if Israel does not release 400 Moslem prisoners. Would you, if you were secretary of state today, lean on Israel to do that?

MR. VANCE: This is a decision that this administration has got to make. I would not lean on Israel if I was there, but these kinds of decisions are immensely complicated. One has to know all the factors that are at play. But to answer your question very directly, no, I wouldn't.

MR. KAISER: Do we have an anti-terrorist policy any more in this country or have we squandered the opportunity to take a moral position on terrorism? Mr. Kissinger?

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is a strong position and is the correct position. We have weakened
it by some of the actions that were taken in Iran. To the extent
that these are recognized to have been a big mistake, I think we
should go back to first principles as enunciated. That is the
correct policy. That is the one we should follow and stick to.

MR. KALB: Gentlemen, I think that our time is up. I
want to thank you both for being our guests here today. It is
perfectly clear from this discussion and many others here in
Washington that the possibility of an arms control agreement
between Soviet leader Gorbachev and President Reagan over the
next two years seems now, at least, to be hanging by a thread with
major decisions expected on this issue in Washington and in Moscow
in the week ahead. But that is it for now. Thank you all for
joining us and we'll see you next Sunday.

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