37

KISSINGER: I think that I should not first on the negative side, I am not waiting for an opportunity to go back. I am not conducting myself in the expectation of returning to public life or promoting my return. I had to conduct foreign policy for nearly a decade, under near civil-war conditions. And I will not impose, insofar as it is within my power, the same I will do my best to create a more constructive environment for them. harrassment or the same conditions on my successors. I think The public has to understand the complexity and the permanance of our challenges, and, I can contribute to that by a public explanation. I hope

(It may) If I strongly disagree with tactical decisions, sooner or later, I may express this, but I'm not looking for opportunities to do it. I have not yet done it; I have no intention to do it (in any case) in any immediate future. I will over time make speeches, on the fundamental issues of foreign policy. What I do on television, which is in my writings, will be in that context; it will not be in a partisan context. And it will try to stay away from second-guessing day-to-day decisions, and I think I'll succeed in that effort.

As for the rest, I intend to do some teaching and to join activities which (which) I support, but that is the role which I seek for myself.

D. CATER: Do you, how do you take this criticism about the high amounts of money that are being bandied...

KISSINGER: All right, but I think one also has to consider that (one was completely wiped out) I was deeply in debt when

38

I left public office. Even now, a considerable amount of my
income has to go for providing personal security for myself, which is
not which doesn't affect my style of life...

D. CATER: Adversely...

KISSINGER: That's right. I mean, it's no benefit to me.
So, And it has not been unusual for public figures to write
memoirs of their period in office. In fact, every President
and most Secretaries of State have done so.

D. CATER: Do you consider these to be memoirs of ideas
or of history?

KISSINGER: I think of history that's some ideas, but hopefully, the more fundamental history than to tell interesting vignettes, hopefully - Of course one shouldn't talk about something one hasn't even started yet, but I will succeed - what I would like to do is to explain the factors that entered into the decisions. International and domestic factors, the bureaucratic pressures, the impact of personalities, what was attempted to be achieved and what it led to, so that people can read this some time in the future, not necessarily with agreement, but with the sense that this is the way it was.

Now, whether I can achieve this...

39

D. CATER: It has been said that we have no political - ~~Keynes~~
that what we need is a political canes to explain our modern
predicament. Are you up to that?

KISSINGER: It would be unbelievably presumptious to claim
this before one has written one line, and it's of course
ironic that (Keynes) became in general vogue at the very
moment that
the problems which he addressed were no longer the dominant
issues (and that while he had a great theory for unemployment,
the problem of the Keynesian economics turned out to be inflation
and so I would maybe try to avoid) So it's no unmixed blessing
to become the theorist that is generally accepted.

K. HARRIS: I have one question, which I should have put
earlier. There's frequently in Britain a discussion of the
importance of the relationship between a prime minister and
a foreign secretary and there have been some dramatic episodes,
as you know, where British foreign policy has suffered
because the Prime Minister has interfered with the Foreign
Secretary. We have a notion of a good working relationship,
which we could describe. Could you give us an idea of a good
working relationship between a president and a secretary of
state?

KISSINGER: Well, our system is geared to the President.
The British Prime Minister is the presiding officer, presiding

40

at least in theory--is presiding office of a collegiate body that takes collegiate decisions. The American Cabinet makes no decisions, and if a President is wise, he does not let it make decisions, because the decisions have to be his. So all Cabinet Members are really advisors to the President. A good system is one that makes the President feel comfortable with the decision making process, and at the same time, insures that it gives him all the choices that he ought to consider as he makes his decisions. And for that you cannot have an abstract rule, because a great deal depends on the President's conception of his role and on his personality.

President Nixon believed in running foreign policy out of the White House. President Ford believed in greater responsibility for Cabinet Members. President Carter seems to believe in a greater role again for the Presidency. On the whole, I believe that the American system works best when the Secretary of State is the preeminent foreign policy advisor, not only in theory, but in fact, because without it, this whole vast bureaucracy in the Department of State becomes underused and in time, irresponsible.

And in order for the Secretary of State to be effective, the preeminent advisor, he and the President have to get into each other's mind, so that it is really very hard for them to tell who decided what. Journalists often ask how many disagreements were there between a President and a Secretary of State and how often did the President overrule the Secretary of State?

41

State. Well, I would think that if a President has to overrule
the Secretary of State too often, he ought to get a different
Secretary of State. Because it is the duty, really, of both
of them to develop some coherent policy which they agree on.
And if they can't agree, then there is something wrong. One
of them may be right, but the system will suffer. So I
think that the Truman-Acheson relationship was ideal, and I
believe that I had a good relationship with Presidents the
conduct of foreign policy. On the whole, I believe the
Secretary of State should be the preeminent advisor; the system
is too complex to be run out of the White House. Even though
I participated in an effort to do it, and it is sometimes necessary,
It is not the best way
to do it.

K. HARRIS: Thank you. What I might have said was...a very
general question--both in in again. In view of the relationship
between the Soviet Union and China, is it possible for the
West to have a detente situation with them both.

KISSINGER: It is difficult, but it is possible. We have
different common interests with each. We have the common
interest with the Soviet Union of preventing nuclear war.

We have the common interest with the People's
Republic of China of preventing what they call "hedgehogs"
by one power in the world.

42

We can cultivate both of those interests simultaneously. We have to make sure we keep them in balance and not give either of them the impression that we are ganging up with the other against them. We must resist, in our own interests, a preponderance of power by the Soviet Union over all areas adjoining it.

And we must in our own interests seek to ease those conflicts that we can with the Soviet Union where we cannot do so without sacrificing the interests of other countries.

This is the strategic problem, and we must not let ourselves be deflected from that by the complaints of either of these large Communist countries, each of which would, of course, want us to have ~~want to have us in~~ an exclusive relationship with them. But that would unbalance the whole international structure.

K. HARRIS: Most grateful, most grateful. And..

how do you assess the condition and efficacy of the Atlantic Alliance at the moment?

KISSINGER: I believe that the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship between the United States and the other industrial democracies, especially Japan, is essential to everything else we do in the world. The problem is complicated by the fact that what started out as security arrangements between us and Europe and us and Japan has now expanded into economics, and the coordination of what used to be considered domestic policies. In April 1973 I proposed in a public speech that economic

43

policies and energy policies might be coordinated, and the general reaction was that nothing in any existing treaty obliged such an extension of allied relationships. Today, if we adopted such a view it would be generally considered as a threat to the cohesion of the industrial democracies which I consider to be progress.

Of course, many of the industrial democracies, almost all of them, have enormous domestic problems at this moment, and the greatest difficulty is the domestic one and not the usual foreign threat. But this defines the agenda which we have to set ourselves for the future. And in this respect, I welcome the tone and the atmosphere of the recently concluded London summit.

K. HARRIS: Thank you very much indeed, most grateful for that answer.

D. CATER: One question which you may or may not want to respond to but it has to do with you, with your personality--whether you were a neurotic man in your dealing with associates--an emotional man--a man who was difficult to get along with.

KISSINGER: [oh] I'm not the best judge of my personality. The fact is that almost all of my close associates stayed with me for eight years. Almost all of them became close friends.

44

And that one has a lot of the public image has been created by people who served with me for six months at the beginning of my Washington career and have made an industry out of this association. Not enough attention has been paid to the people who stayed with me for eight years and who formed one of the most cohesive and I like to think thoughtful groups of associates a very senior official was privileged to have. I believe it is the role of the head of an organization to inspire his associates to do things that they didn't know they could do.

I think you can always hire technical competence; what you cannot hire, the ability to transcend given always is beyond the framework. That can be a painful process. But finally, one is judged by one's public career, not by the ease of the day-to-day conduct of affairs but by what people feel about it after it is concluded. And I found the friendship a dedication of my associates, extremely moving. I will not pretend that it was easy to deal with. That wasn't my job to inspire, not to ratify. And the majority of close colleagues have become friends for life.

D. CATER: I remember when a group of your colleagues came down from Harvard to urge you to resign, that was quite early on--I guess it was about 1970--1970 I believe it was.

KISSINGER: May 1970--during Cambodia.

D. CATER: Did you ever come close to leaving office during the eight years?

45

CYD

KISSINGER: Really close, only [inserted] twice. But not for the reasons that they...

D. CATER: ...that they urged...

KISSINGER: That they urged.

D. CATER: Could you be more specific?

KISSINGER: No. I think you wrote a very thoughtful piece at the time, Doug. If you leave, you can get headlines for three days. But you lose the opportunity of shaping events over a long period. And what each public figure has to decide is when to resign and on what issue. And to make sure that it isn't [inserted]. It isn't either self gratification or a subtle attempt to protect [inserted] future.

D. CATER: I saw that many times.

You don't want to mention those two times, I presume...(end of tape)

END

KISSINGER: ...there'll be--you know, you can make a contrary case, but my decision will be final.

D. CATER: That is the understanding.

KISSINGER: Okay.

D. CATER: And what we are attempting to do is to to to focus on you at this point in time in a way that does not take you into (1) judgments of the present foreign policy; (2) judgments of your--Nixon or anything relating to that; and (3) does not tread upon the more expert area of your memoirs.

We thought we would start with a few opening questions that sort of, we hope you can answer without too much modesty--that put your positioning in history as it's seen from several perspectives, including your own, and with that kind of general opening then to move back to some more specific questions. I'll begin and then Kenneth will move into phase II.

But the first is--that's black for me. Thank you.
(conversation)

D. CATER: ...as I pondered on this and having been a reporter since, most of the period since World War II, it it's really remarkable--you're the first foreign minister since

2

World War II to leave office, to leave the State Department with your public esteem enhanced, as reflected in both-- both in Europe and the United States in terms of polls. I watched what happen to Atcheson, I watched what happened to Dulles--how do you account for this?

KISSINGER: I was in office during a period when major changes had to take place in American foreign policy. These changes weren't invented by me or by the Administration which has (which is what they) would have faced--any Administration that was in office at that time. They occurred at a period of great confusion and great division in this country, first due to the Vietnam War and second to Watergate.

The changes lent themselves to dramatic symbolic acts which indicated a new approach and an emergence of a new international order. Combined with the fact that there were frustrations in so many other fields, And the disintegration of Executive authority in other areas due to Watergate. The American public, and for a long period, the Congress, needed some area that of which they could be proud with which they could identify. And so, partly as the result of circumstances, I think I have emerged out of this period, if you say so, in that, in that situation.

D. CATER: Well, let's take, then, the paradox in which by some persons in the universities and in the press world you

3

[Y]

are regarded or at least you are treated publicly almost as a war criminal. And people threaten to hold rallies to prevent you from taking positions. Why the, why the depth of this hostility?

KISSINGER: In the press, I think that's [very--that's] a very small minority. I think the more interesting question is not why I would be treated like this, but what it is in the intellectual community at this moment, and indeed, over the last decade, that produces this enormous--what I would almost call self-hatred, or consider self-hatred. I can understand that people might disagree with individual decisions that were made during the Vietnam war, because many of them were close decisions, and the closing counts were obviously fairly evenly divided.

[划线部分]

But I would have thought that intellectuals, in particular, should understand the tragedy of the situation where you come into office and find 550,000 Americans engaged in combat. How you disengage, as a great power, 550,000 Americans from combat under conditions that [neither dishonor] the American spirit nor the American commitments around the world, is at least a very complicated problem. The fact is that we substantially reduced the American troop strength every year we were in office, and [mark as劃线部分] That we reduced [casualties in Vietnam] American casualties in Vietnam from 9,000 in the first year, which can certainly not be blamed, to 4,000 in the second to 3,000 in the third--so that every year casualties were cut by at least 50 percent [划线部分] and [mark as劃线部分] troop strength by more than 100%.

[Y]

So, whether we could have in fact got out a year earlier or not,
can be debated forever, ~~But the fact is that from the first
day, we moved towards disengagement. The strategy for that
disengagement was outlined in an article I wrote, published in
*Foreign Affairs* in *January, 1968*.~~
*January 1969*

If you read it today you will find that it is
substantially what we did. Now, I don't want now to debate
whether we were right or wrong. It is but to put it in
terms of liking for war, war criminals, leads to some reflection
about almost a necessity of some of these groups to have some
symbolic enemy. And it's almost as if they come out of the
trenches like the reunions of old veterans. That every time
you can relate anything to Vietnam, they try to recapture the
pristine glory of the late 1960's when they when all institutions
could be attacked.

I think the reason has nothing to do with me
~~personally, or little to do with me personally. After all, it~~
happened to too many people and precisely to those people who
were morally sympathetic to the objectives of the peace
movement, though they disagreed with its methods and its
strategy. After all, I agreed with what the peace movement was
trying to do. I just disagreed with how they were going to do
it and with the feasibility of some of their specific proposals.

K. HARRIS: How do you feel about being assailed by those people?

[Y]

5

KISSINGER: Well, many of them are people with whom I worked for many years, so while their significance in terms of public opinion is negligible, they are part of my intellectual history, and therefore, it is a more meaningful attack on me to me than some of the other criticisms I have received, from extreme right-wing groups, for example.

On the other hand, I have seen it for a long time. I have predicted it for a long time, that something like that would happen. I believe I certainly attempted to conduct myself in office in such a way as to heal wounds on the Vietnam issue, and I don't think you will find over all the years of my public service that I would attack the peace movement, and I think, not for my own sake, because they are not doing me any damage, that we finally ended the Vietnam war debate, because it could backfire, you know, You could also get a right wing reaction at some point.

D. CATER: A third of the position in question could be-- you are the first pure intellectual in modern times, at least, to move to the helm of foreign policy, with very little operating experience before. You've written about the role of the intellectual and the policy maker in the past. Looking at it in retrospect, what were the strengths and the weaknesses that being an intellectual brought to the job of...

KISSINGER: First of all, I had two years experience, of a

6

of
year and a half experience as a consultant in the Kennedy White
House, with no conspicuous success, which was largely my fault.
And I had six years to reflect about the reasons for my relative
lack of effectiveness in the Kennedy White House. Without having
seen the operation of the White House at that time, and without
having had the time to reflect about it, I could not have taken
on the position of Assistant to the President with relative
with whatever effectiveness I demonstrated. Now, I think
that
the difficulty, intellectuals have in policy making decisions
is that they do not generally recognize the difference between
a conclusion and a decision. It, as an academician you can
take all kinds of time to reflect before you have to commit
yourself; as an outsider you can paint the best consequences
of your proposed action and you are not responsible for its
failure because it isn't being implemented.

As a policy maker, you are responsible for the
worst that can happen, not only for the best that can happen,
and also outsiders do not understand the enormous pressure of
time. Very often I found myself in the position which is
like in a nightmare - that like in a nightmare where everyone
is on a train track with a train heading for one and can't get
off. I mean, several times I knew that certain problems existed;
I might even have known what to do about them, but I had
deliberately to postpone dealing with them until some more
urgent problem was concluded. You could only pray that the

train wouldn't hit you before you ran out of time. And so,
*one always* if one wants to have a realistic--if not a compassionate --
understanding of policy choices, one has to know how the alternatives
presented themselves and not only what the best solution might
have been, and also to the time span that was available for dealing
with the issue.

In so many of the exposed facto investigations,
they take individual documents and assume that people sat around
the table in a seminar-type discussion, having all the facts
that one then knows, that that is rarely the case. Usually
decisions are made (with →) in a very brief time with enormous
confusion.

D. CATER: Nearly twenty years ago you wrote that in describing the need, I would presume, for the intellectual to become more involved in policymaking, it says very little in the experience that forms American leadership groups produces the combination of political accumen, conceptual skill, persuasive power and an administrative ability required for the highest positions of government.

Now that was, in a sense, an indictment of the
pragmatic policy maker who has no intellectual base on which
he is building. Did you find that--did you in good stead?

KISSINGER: I believe my strength and my weakness was the

fact that I did try to conceptualize. It was my strength
because whether I was right or not, I usually could describe
the relationship of events to each other as they affected policy.

It was my weakness because there is very little
tradition in America that would give you a clear cut constituency
when you conduct policy that way, and it makes you very vulnerable
to attack from almost every traditional sector--from the idealist,
the legalist, the pragmatist, because that doesn't fit any
particular approach.

D. CATER: That leads to a fifth question that you came to
the White House almost as a stranger to the President. How did
you establish and preserve your role when -- even when one
President was resigning in office and a second one was being
defeated in office?

KISSINGER: Essentially by doing my job. And not getting
involved as much as others did in the personal relationships.

D. CATER: Well, then, how do you see yourself at this point
in history? What was the unique character of the Kissinger
Secretaryship?

KISSINGER: I think I attempted to begin an approach to
foreign policy that was less tied to crises, less prone to

9

To oscillation between extremes of hope and extremes of confrontation, more clearly tied to, I hope, an enlightened conception of the national interest and therefore more permanent.

But it could only be the beginning of the process. That process couldn't be completed in the incumbency of any official. Of any one official, a person

D. CATER: Do you feel regrets that you had, in a sense, to leave before you were through?

KISSINGER: No, I think it's the essence of politics that you always leave. If you are to be the more likely one to leave before you are through. And if you, if the goals are important enough, they have got to transcend the individual. And I've been at peace since I left office.

D. CATER: Kenneth, why don't we go to some of the second phase--these are excellent...

K. HARRIS: Fascinating, fascinating. And I'm really taking up by saying if there's one thing about you which has fascinated people in Western Europe, it's their feeling that this is the first time a mind gave itself to the development of American foreign policy. A mind is at work. And therefore, this great curiosity about what formed that mind...where it came from.

C.Y.J.

10

And one begins, naturally, by wondering to what extent perhaps
your early years, up to the age of 15 in Germany, might have
had some formative influence on your thinking. Might that be
so?

KISSINGER: Well, you would expect that surely has had some
impact on your thinking, yes.

HARRIS: Could you specify?

KISSINGER: Well, I don't think you - I think It had an impact on a number of impacts. I think It is impossible to live in a totalitarian state, especially as a persecuted minority, without realizing that societies are subject to nearly irrevocable disasters and that it cannot be taken for granted that things will always evolve in the most positive direction.

And secondly, I think that, generally as this
may sound, it gives one an appreciation of the importance of
the United States, that native Americans and some of the
-especially the intellectuals who hate sometimes hate the
country (because they hate themselves) just don't understand.
With all its failing, I've said so in a speech when I came
to this country I was asked to write an essay in high school.
And it wasn't all that easy to be a refugee with an accent
and so forth, but I wrote that (with all these problems) when
I think that here I can cross the street with my head erect,

11

it makes a difference. Now I admit, this is personal, but anyone who was in the war in Europe and saw how Americans were received at the end of the war, ~~must~~ but believe that this country has a very crucial role to give hope to the world and that it mustn't destroy itself by this endless self-criticism.

So it's a combination of recognizing the perils to the modern societies as well as some conviction that America has a very crucial role at this time.

K. HARRIS: At what point in your development did you give you mind to foreign policy--thinking about foreign policy in the way that another man might have given his mind to involving a scientific theory.

KISSINGER: Well, I [didn't] was always interested in foreign policy, but I never thought that I could play any role, even an intellectual role in relation to it, until I joined the Army. But while I was in the service, in other words, in the American Army, largely in Europe, that is when I decided that this was an area about which I wanted to think more. And this then drew me into Harvard and specializing in these fields.

K. HARRIS: Was it the kind of thinking...

KISSINGER: But I started out studying philosophy, rather than... I didn't study international politics as a subject until I had

12

achieved a certain philosophical bent.

K. HARRIS: Was it the kind of thinking -- we mustn't go through this hell again. I must try and play my part to prevent it.

KISSINGER: If by hell you define not only the war but also the whole context of totalitarian existence, yes, very much.

K. HARRIS: One further question from there, a number of people in Britain feel, and people who admire you immensely, that as well as thinking about foreign policy you have a system of ideas about foreign policy as indeed some great Europeans have had in the past. Now, I'm not sure whether that's the case or not. Is it? And if so, what is that body of thought? What-or that approach-integrated approach consist of?

KISSINGER: Well, I think the problem of foreign policy, (both as to) reflection and as to substance, is to relate ideas to possibility. I don't think you can conduct foreign policy purely pragmatically, even the total pragmatists, if you search long enough, will have some rudimentary ideas that they are trying to implement. They may wait for events to force them to implement them, but there is no such thing as pure pragmatism. So we are dealing with a question of emphasis. So of course, I had rudimentary ideas. I think I think maybe

more than rudimentary ideas I thought a great deal about the
relationship between domestic structure, international legitimacy,
power between ideals and Imperial reality, indeed, I had
written philosophical papers on that subject, before I...

At the same time, a statesman must not only
have ideas, he must learn the management of means. And I would
think what I attempted to do is to relate these two. It's
the essence of policy making that you can never completely
take account of all of the possible factors.

D. CATER: What book, what thinker would you say influenced
you most in your teens?

KISSINGER: Well, as I said, I was mostly interested in
political philosophy. I was very influenced by Spinoza and
Kant and I was influenced by one aspect of Spengler, not the prediction of decline, which was really secondary, but in the idea that each society was an integral part of which
philosophy, art, mathematics, and politics formed part of the
same conceptual framework. I found that a very interesting
idea. I don't know what practical consequence it had in my approach to
policy, making except that's given me a certain empathy for
different societies, and, of course...

D. CATER: At the age of 26 in your thesis, "The Meaning
of History", you spoke about the need to appear willing to act

14

irrationally, which raises interesting questions for the
conduct of foreign policy. Has that been a...

KISSINGER: I'd have to know what context I mentioned
that in. Did I state that as my view or did I state it as
a summary of somebody else's view?

D. CATER: My understanding is, and I would double check
for that you stated it...

KISSINGER: Well, frankly, I have...

D. CATER: It leads to two questions about such as the time
of the alert, total alert at the time of the Middle East
crisis, that where in the conduct of foreign policy courage must
substitute for sweet reason.

KISSINGER: Well, I think the actions -- I think the actions
in a crisis have to be seen in the relation to the danger
one perceives and to the means which one thought one had
available.

Sometimes the seemingly safest course
is the most dangerous. Sometimes very gradual escalation tempts
the other side into following suit and therefore leads to a
higher level of violence, and a very drastic step puts
an end to the confrontation. It's hard to make a general rule
about this.

15

D. CATER: Well, I'd like to pursue I--just a moment because you say sometimes--there are those, and I've pondered this myself--who wonder in this age -- in the -- that the Vietnam experience shows that not just sometimes, but all times if you are dealing with an adversary who knows the precise limits of your escalation, that you really do not have any impact from its escalation. If limited wars for limited objectives become the pure exercise in tactics, does it any longer have a....

KISSINGER: You can have limited wars for limited objectives...

D. CATER: Can your adversaries...

KISSINGER: (Without laughing)
...but that doesn't mean that the tactics within that war have to be extremely cautious. The great temptation of statesmen is to believe... (interruption)

...is to think that they can take away the owners of their action by half-heartedness in execution. Usually that leads to failure, and that usually they give new awards for failing with... (inward) doubt.

K. HARRIS: Yes, I'd like to ask you some questions, Dr. Kissinger, about the conduct of foreign policy. For instance,

16

HARRIS: For instance, a basic question I know that British people have asked about you from time to time--great hopes of the Americans

... Can I go back and insert one more question on the formative period...I mean the late formative period.

HARRIS: You've frequently been compared to, for instance, a statesman like Metinick or statesman like Castleray. Can one compare you to anybody? If not, why do those people mention those two 19th century statesmen?

KISSINGER: Well, because I wrote a book about Metinick and Castleray, which that book itself was an accident, because I wanted to write it as an introduction to a book on Bismarck in order to describe the difference between the Bismarck foreign policy and the Metinick and Castleray foreign policy, and then it got so long that it became a separate book and the one Bismarck was half finished and I never concluded it. I had about eight chapters written and left it there and I condensed it into one article.

I think you can't use history like a cookbook, And compare yourself to any individual. I was impressed by Metinick's diplomatic skill and by the achievement of both Metinick and Castleray and the other statements of the period of fashioning an international settlement that, after all, lasted

17

a hundred years. On the other hand, the specific lessons one
can draw from this for the contemporary period are minimal.

K. HARRIS: Final question on the formative period. When you were thinking about foreign policy and writing about foreign policy and very informedly, while still a young don, did you ever think of yourself as somebody who would do foreign policy.. would carry it out...a policy maker?

KISSINGER: When I was a young professor at Harvard, it would have been next to impossible to describe a process in fact, it would have been impossible by which I would wind up as a principal foreign policy maker. I thought that I might occasionally be consulted on specific issues, but that isn't really making foreign policy, and I had no idea that I would emerge as a principal figure in making foreign policy.

K. HARRIS: I take up the question, now if I may, that I put when you went to the telephone. I hear it's often said in Britain that one of the characteristics of your conduct of foreign policy in general was that it was against the American tradition which has always been to aim for open diplomacy, whereas Dr. Kissinger's was a secret diplomacy.

KISSINGER: Well, again, you have to define what you mean by open and by secret diplomacy. I think the record

18

will show that I gave more press conferences, made more public
speeches, traveled more around the United States in explaining
our foreign policy, than I believe any of my predecessors, did.
My last two years in office I visited, I think, some 40 American
cities, and each visit I spent, I gave a speech, I answered
questions to a large audience, I met with small groups; I would
spend ten hours at least in meeting with various groups to
answer any questions. So I made a serious effort to explain
the main directions of our foreign policy. I testified more
before Congressional committees than, I believe, any of my
predecessors, in terms of numbers.

On the other hand, the tactics of day-to-day
diplomacy have, to some extent, to be confidential, and after
all, the new Administration is now conducting foreign policy, in
-I hate to see this, given their image of themselves, but in-
terms of the sharing of tactical information, perhaps a little
more restrictively than we did, certainly no less restrictively.
Because, after our foreign there are many ideas
you try out in a negotiation. That if the other side accepts,
it become quite tolerant, but which, if they are publicized
before they are accepted by either side, become
very difficult, and I think a foreign government must have the
assurance that it can explore ideas without having the whole
thing public before it is concluded.

K. HARRIS: Doesn't that method threaten to undermine what

19

one might call conference diplomacy--for instance, the authority
of an organization like the U.N. This bilateral operation.

KISSINGER: It doesn't have... well, you know, there are
many intermediate stages between bilateral diplomacy and UN-
type diplomacy. UN-type diplomacy is by definition open -- there
are too many people involved. I think most serious negotiations
that I have seen have required an element of confidentiality.

K. HARRIS: Does this massive technique of personal negotiating
which you practiced with such vast success. Does that threaten
to undermine the authority of the State Department, or indeed,
of the foreign office in any country?

KISSINGER: Well, you could also argue it enhances the
authority of the State Department. I tend to think that during
my term in office the State Department was clearly a defender
of policy making and all my key appointments were professional.
All my close advisors with one or two exceptions were pro-
fessional; all the Assistant Secretaries that had reached in
to the bureaus I think were professionals, I think for the first
time in a decade, if ever.

So I don't know in what way it would undermine
the authority of the State Department. I don't believe that
it is the duty of a minister to register the consensus
of the bureaucracy. He's there to guide and lead the bureaucracy.

[Y]

20

And the bureaucracy is not, it doesn't run like a Parliament
in which you take a vote, so I don't believe that. I believe
on the contrary, the State Department was very much at the
center of events.

D. CATER: Still, the image of the lonely man, the loner clung hard to you. That you were a man who is, of course, using your professional associates, but essentially conducting foreign policy within yourself. How would you respond to that?

KISSINGER: Well, first of all, anybody in an eminent position will be attacked for something, inevitably. All the incentives are in that direction. Are in the direction of criticism rather than in the direction of support. And if you're in office for eight years, something will be picked up.

I think that I sought to shape foreign policy and I thought it was my duty as Secretary of State to shape foreign policy. I think all strong Secretaries of State have attempted to do that. And to some extent, that is a lonely act.

On the other hand, I used to spend hours before
I made a decision talking it over with a group whose opinion
I valued, which usually included the Assistant Secretaries of
the regional bureaus, anyway of course, finally.

So to some extent, when you engage in conspicuous
activity, you are considered you are considered a loner, but
creative action has a lonely element.

21

D. CATER: Somewhat along that same line in the division of your time and energy in retrospect, do you believe you struck the right balance between the Secretary of State as being the man up above the scene and the shuttle diplomat--the man who is moving to the crisis, spots and really spending a tremendous amount of time and energy on personal...

KISSINGER: First of all, I notice that my successor, whom I respect greatly, and who announced when he was appointed that he would not spend so much time traveling, ~~is now traveling~~ at least as much as I ever did, and this is partly because the calendar imposes certain necessities. There is no way a Secretary of State can avoid attending the meetings of the Alliances to which we belong or to which we are related. There is no way a Secretary of State can avoid negotiating major issues with the Soviet Union like SALT, or with the Chinese. And there are certain North-South activities which require at least a symbolic presence.

D. CATER: But the term was applied specifically to those tireless hours that you were moving back and forth in the Middle East. Could no one have done that for you?

KISSINGER: No. I think if you look at the situation in the Middle East, it required the symbolic distillation of the American presence. At the time that I moved, personally, into

22

Middle East diplomacy, there was an oil embargo, an uneasy armistice, massive Soviet presence, a danger of a new eruption, and the whole pattern of relationships had to be altered while steps were taken towards peace, and this could not be done by subordinate officials which would have made it impossible for people like Sadat and Asad to get personally involved, and therefore there would not have been the authority on the other side.

But I think we are getting more and more into what we said we weren't going to do.

D. CATER: All right. Could I just one-- and you'll get the transcript--but could you just ...

KISSINGER: I can't edit the transcript when it has nothing else but you ask...

D. CATER: One quick follow up to that. Did you ever wonder yourself how well you were able to get along better than anyone else I know as a Jew with the leaders of the Middle East--the Arabs.

KISSINGER: Well, it had its poignant elements. I attempted in any negotiation to understand as profoundly as I could the psychology and the aspirations of the people that I was dealing with. I believe it's a popular mythology to believe

that a good negotiator is somebody who tells different things
to different people. You can't do that because you meet the
same people over and over again. A good negotiator is somebody
who can give them the confidence to move in what they must
perceive to be their own interest, and since they are responsible
for the future of their country, you would be reckless if you try to
trick them about that. What you can do is to affect the margins
of their perception, and I think that was my principal role.

HARRIS: Excellent, Excellent. Could I go back to the
conduct of foreign policy as such?

The vast amount of personal publicity that you
got when you traveled from here to there or indeed when you
stayed at home--did you find that helpful to foreign policy or
unhelpful?

KISSINGER: During the period of my maximum publicity, I
found it very helpful because it enabled the symbolization of
American policy at a time of great domestic travail. Later on,
it became a mixed blessing because it also made me much more
vulnerable to attack. But we're still in the area of the
past.

D. CATER: All right. Let's get into the present. But
would it be pushing our luck too hard if one were to say that
the accusation has been made, from what you say is what a policy

cyj

24

negotiator has to do, that in the Rhodesian thing there were
definite differences of perception as to what you meant,
what you were prepared to follow up with.

KISSINGER: I don't think so. I think when that ~~when~~
that whole story is fully laid out it will be clear that we
were working from a script that was, first, concerted between us
and Britain, and then explained in great detail to various
African leaders before it was ever presented to Smith.

Then later, some of the African leaders found
a greater reluctance or greater difficulty in implementing
what they ~~originally~~ + authority thought they could do. And then
we lost the election ~~so we never had an opportunity, really,~~ to
~~my plan~~ carry that to its conclusion.

D. CATER: You said power is the ultimate aphrodisiac, but
you never really explained what you meant by that.

KISSINGER: Well, that was a joke, but you certainly..
I mean it's clear ~~you~~ that when you are in high office, your
social life multiplies beyond your intrinsic merits sometimes.
(laughter)

D. CATER: Did you enjoy the role of swinger?

KISSINGER: I've never complained about it. I made no
serious effort to stop it.

LYJ

25

D. CATER: What about the role of the press in the conduct of foreign policy and--what are its--you mentioned the degree of attention at the height of the problems was useful.

Do you have any deeper concerns about the communications system within which Western diplomacy must be conducted?

KISSINGER: Well, especially the American press has a tendency to look for some piece of news that nobody else has, and therefore may tend to emphasize the dramatic over the fundamental. In foreign policy there isn't all that much new news. The new news is the superior analysis of well known fact and that is on the whole different from the basic ethos of the American press.

D. CATER: Congress evolved significantly during your period.

It has become, some people would say, a more...

KISSINGER: You're incorrigible, Doug...you keep going on and on...

D. CATER: Well, I'm sorry but maybe my misunderstanding is wrong here, but I thought you were prepared to reflect on the problems of a Secretary of State in conducting foreign policy and that was going to be the thrust of this question.

Hear the question...if it's wrong...

KISSINGER: No, the questions themselves are all excellent,

26

but they all really lead me into a summing up of my experience
which I don't want to do.

D. CATER: Okay. I wouldn't no ...

KISSINGER: I mean, the questions are all excellent.

D. CATER: Well, some of them you can take out and use for
your own purposes, let's say that, but I really didn't--would
be interested in...

KISSINGER: I haven't written one line yet, so it's not
competitive with anything I've written so far and what I'm
writing won't appear for two and a half years...

D. CATER: Well, I think we do have a slight--perhaps
failure of understanding on the conduct of foreign policy. I
was merely going to ask if Congress as looking at it from your
historical perspective, is Congress as an institution more
difficult, less difficult or about the same for a Secretary
of State (unintelligible).

KISSINGER: Congress has become much different in the eight
years that I served in Washington. When I came to Washington
there were a number of key leaders of both houses who could tell

27

you what was possible and with whom it therefore was possible
to negotiate.

Today, there is no leader that controls enough votes
to give you a reliable estimate, and therefore there are different
coalitions for every problem, and these coalitions have to be
constructed from problem to problem, meaning, which it takes
an inordinate amount of time of the Secretary of State. I
spent half of my time with the Congress, and, when I was in town,
and I am sure that my successor is spending at least as much.

Secondly, the Congress exists to pass laws, not to
conduct day to day foreign policy. Passing laws is a series
of individual steps, which compromises are made and which the
process is concluded when the law is passed. Foreign policy
is a continuing process depending very much on the sense of nuance,
and therefore, the intervention of the Congress, and essentially
tactical decisions is bound to lead it to lack at least coherence,
because there will be a different coalition for each intervention.
And it creates enormous complications.

D. CATER: All right. Just on a point if I could...is that
kind of question out of our ball park. I thought it was within
it.

KISSINGER: I don't want this to be a summing up of all my
views...

D. CATER: Oh, no...but this isn't. This is...

28

KISSINGER: Well, it gets awfully close.

K. HARRIS: Can I ask you some questions about broad themes about foreign policy looking into the future? Its certainly not ... Shall I try one?

KISSINGER: Like what?

K. HARRIS: Do you believe that real detente is going to be possible with the Soviet Union? Do you believe that real coexistence is possible with the Soviet Union or are they always going to be trying, if not overtly, covertly to undermine Western Europe?

KISSINGER: I would say yes to both questions. I think it is not the Soviet Union, but we will try to undermine Western Europe and I think the real coexistence is possible. It requires that we prevent their achieving success in undermining Western Europe. It means that we should have no illusions about the basic success of the same time we must never forget our class policy, but I think also coexistence is imposed on us now, by nuclear weapons and will be reinforced over the decades by the emergence of other power centers in the world. So, one should not look at detente as depending on Soviet good will or a sudden change in Soviet perceptions. One should look at it as the coexistence of two ideologically opposed systems, because the alternatives to coexistence are more可能 be

29

cataclysmic. And the problem is to coexist without giving up
fundamental principles.

K. HARRIS: Are we shortly going to have to...we all of us...
rethink the degree of conflict that there is, of trying to secure
detente and stand up for human rights. Behind the Iron Curtain.

KISSINGER: This is an area in which I don't want to get.

K. HARRIS: Oh, I thought because it was future....

KISSINGER: No, no, but that involves Carter...

D. CATER: What about though...the Americans use more
frequently that in my observation than any other nation that
the word "morality" in the conduct of relations among nations, they
often equate it with the morality of individual dealing with
individual. Can you make a distinction?

KISSINGER: I think the difference in individual international-

First, of all, I agree, that foreign policy which has no moral
content, is likely to be sterile. In a democratic society
foreign policy has to be anchored in the people's beliefs. And
on the other hand, the difference between individual morality
and international morality, is that in international affairs you

30

live in a society of sovereign states, each of which many
of which have their own conception of morality, and therefore
one cannot achieve one's objectives except in stages. Each
stage by definition is likely to be imperfect from the point of
view of the moralist.

And that sets up an inherent tension between
domestic and international perception. I think morality is
without morality one will not have the strength to live in an
imperfect world. With excessive may make one strive for a
perfection that defeats one's purposes.

may undermine international order, is a first step to strike.

D. CATER: Henry Stimson who is frequently quoted as having
said that gentlemen do not open each other's mail. We've come
a ways since then. What imposes the ultimate limits on say,
immoral behavior or ungentlemanly behavior among nations?

KISSINGER: Well, first of all, one needs a definition
of what is immoral behavior among nations. One lives in a world
in which other nations engage in acts that threaten one's
security and tend to undermine stability. Now, then the problem
is what methods are appropriate for fighting this?

It is very hard to give an abstract rule. One
should not do things that are so offensive to the public
morality that people will begin to doubt the purpose
of the whole conduct of foreign policy. But on the other hand,
there is a security element that may impose necessities that

31

have to be carefully analyzed and that one cannot in the abstract
simply discard.

D. CATER: Assassination has been the subject of speculation...

KISSINGER: I can think of practically no circumstance in
which a democratic government should adopt assassination as
an operative method.

K. HARRIS: Could I attempt two questions simply from the
point of view of Britain. They may be out of bounds, but we
just will have to try if we may.

The old chestnut... do you think there is a
special relationship between Britain and the United States.

KISSINGER: Yes.

K. HARRIS: Can you tell me what it consists of?

KISSINGER: Well, it consists of it essentially
of a degree of consultation and the needs of communication
that is unparalleled between any other nations. I think that
confidence that is shown by British and American officials
towards each other and I think now, and practically every Admini-
stration since the war, and so it is a permanent feature, leads
to an intimacy of exchange that doesn't need to be formalized.

32

And it makes possible for them--but then, the most difficult task of foreign policy, the harmonization of our *limits* of ultimate purposes.

It hasn't led to any special privileges for Britain in any formal legal sense, but it has made it possible to communicate with British leaders in an unusually frank, candid and friendly way, and I think it makes a difference that in almost every case in the post war period--certainly during my term of office, and I had the impression in the present administration, that a person of affection has developed between the leaders that is not faked and that is not imposed by abstract considerations of the national interest and that makes a difference at the margins of decisions.

K. HARRIS: I'm very, very grateful for the answer to that question. May I try one more, also on Britain? Do, to paraphrase that phrase--does Britain have a particular role in the modern world today?

KISSINGER: Well, of course, I am a great Anglophile--you have to keep this in mind. I think Britain still has the civil service and the foreign service of a great power even if its relative strength has declined in the post-war period.

K. HARRIS: Very interesting.

33

K. HARRIS: I think the judgments that Britain makes may -- sometimes--go beyond its own capacity to implement, but are of great value to us. And to the whole free world. The British system, with its dependence on an aristocratic traditions, which means that whatever party is in office, there is a sense of quality and of national service, produces an approach to policy that, at least in the international field, is in the direction of moderation and good practical sense in the solution of problems.

And therefore, I have always favored Britain playing the largest possible formal role, and, but whatever role Britain decides to play, I think it's accumulated wisdom and the quality of its officials and leaders makes its role extremely important, and I hope that it will not withdraw into a purely insular conception because that would really be a loss to all free people.

D. CATER: As one who's been living now, for several months, in Great Britain, I've become increasingly aware of how both the U.S. and Great Britain are preoccupied with the domestic aspect of role in the world--the limits of growth, the limited means with which to accomplish domestic social purposes.

Do you see this as being a major factor in--major problem for foreign policy in the next decade.

KISSINGER: If I could go back to the first--to your question for one minute...when I look back on my time in office, I don't

34

think, I can't remember any other country where I would feel
that I would call up some of the ambassadors and occasionally,
some of the officials, to ask of you on something that didn't
particularly concern Britain, and in which there wasn't even any
formal consultation, and I'd sometimes just--ask either somebody
to come over whose views I particularly respected or ask some
of the ambassadors to come in and just chat with me about a
decision in which I was involved--that was not the subject of
formal consultation and which I didn't so much ask--what does
His Majesty's or Her Majesty's government think, but I just--
which is a very unusual thing and even though they certainly
reported it to Whitehall, they understood the difference between
a formal consultation and this sort of informal advice.

Now this is a very special sort of relationship,
now on the limits of ..

Growth and limits of possibilities. Certainly,
a country has to know the limits of its possibilities. But also
a country has to reach beyond what is technically possible seems
technically feasible at any one time--at any one point.
Usually the margins of action are greater than the experts
believe, and to do great things you have to have an element of
faith. Of course, the faith has to be related to technical
possibility, but it mustn't be driven by technical possibility.

And I think if one becomes too obsessed with
what cannot do, one will never try for greatness. And in a world

35

in which so much depends on structure and imagination, and
where the limiting condition is not always resources, I don't
think we should become so obsessed with defining our limits,
in (importantness) that is, but also, with -- without possibilities.

If you look at most great achievement were
defined as impossible before they were attempted.

D. CATER: Could I ask one blockbuster question?

Because I want to be sure to get it in. You have been quoted,
and I can get the precise citation--that tragedy can be the
fate of nations as well of as individuals. And its meaning
may well reside in living in a world with which one is no longer
familiar. There have been hints and various thoughtful articles
written about you from time to time that -- way down deep, you
are a pessimist, despite your Herculean efforts--that there
is a Gibbonsque quality to your world view.

KISSINGER: Well, I think that anybody, any serious student
of history who is not conscious of the fact that every civilization
that has ever existed has eventually declined, is being fatuous.

History has always been constant change and
no society has ever remained permanently stable. On the
other hand, a statesman cannot act upon the assumption of
imminent doom. Any more than man can act--should needs
should commit suicide because he is conscious of his mortality.
I think this is a fact to be considered. I think it is the

36

duty of leaders to maintain the creativity of their society,
And to keep them dynamic and perhaps, if they are fortunate,
to represent the first society that escapes the fate of others.

But you cannot ask for a guarantee of success.
And I see no incompatibility between making major efforts and
being conscious of what has happened to other societies. I think
some societies have achieved great permanence. The Chinese
society has had an uninterrupted historical evolution as
a functioning society, but certainly with many changes of
system, and dynasties within it, so I don't consider myself a pessimist.

On the other hand, I believe that serious people
have an obligation to understand what the deepest problems of
the historical period are in which they live and not to pretend
that *they are that*-so that tragedy cannot occur.

D. CATER: Could I ask a personal question. You--one other
unique aspect of your period is that you've come out of office
at a time when public figures of your preeminence have turned
out to be highly in demand as -- to be continuing public figures
in terms of -- there's been criticism in fact, of the amount
of money being tendered to you and to some of the others who
have left the Administration. What do you see as your job
of defining your place now for the immediate future?

37

KISSINGER: I think that I should not be first on the negative side. I am not waiting for an opportunity to go back. I am not conducting myself in the expectation of returning to public life or of promoting my return. I had to conduct foreign policy for nearly a decade, under near civil-war conditions. And I will not impose, insofar as it is within my power, to same harrassment or the same conditions on my successors. I think the public has to understand the complexity and the permanance of our challenges and I can contribute to that by public explanation.

It may, if I strongly disagree with tactical decisions, sooner or later, I may express this, but I'm not looking for opportunities to do it; I have not yet done it. I have no intention to do it in any immediate future. I will over time make speeches, on the fundamental issues of foreign policy. Now, what I do on television, which is in my writings, will be in that context; It will not be in a partisan context. And it will try to stay away from second-guessing my successors. And it will try to stay away from day-to-day decisions, and I think I'll succeed in that effort.

As for the rest, I intend to do some teaching and to join activities which I support, but that is the role which I seek for myself.

KISSINGER: All right, but I think one also has to consider that one was completely wiped out. I was deeply in debt when

38

I left public office. Even now, a considerable amount of my
income has to go for providing security for myself, which is
not which doesn't affect my style of life...

D. CATER: Adversely...

KISSINGER: That's right. I mean, it's no benefit to me.
So, and it has not been unusual for public figures to write
memoirs of their period in office. In fact, every President
and most Secretaries of State have done so.

KISSINGER: I think of history that's some ideas, but hopefully, of the more fundamental history than to tell interesting vignettes, hopefully Of course one shouldn't talk about something one hasn't even started yet, but hopefully I will succeed what I would like to do is to explain the factors that entered into the decision, International and domestic factors, Bureaucratic pressures, the impact of personalities--what was attempted to be achieved and what it led to, so that people can read this some time in the future, not necessarily with agreement, but with the sense that this is the way it was. Now, whether I can achieve this...

39

D. CATER: It has been said that we have no political ~~Keynes~~ canes to explain our modern
that what we need is a political ~~Keynes~~ canes to explain our modern
predicament. Are you up to that?

KISSINGER: It would be unbelievably presumptious to claim
this before one has written one line, and it's of course
 Keynes
 ironic that (Caines) became in general vogue at the moment, that
 the problems which he addressed were no longer the dominant
 issues and that while he had a great theory for unemployment,
 the problem of the Keyn~~es~~ian economies turned out to be inflation
 and so I would maybe try to avoid. So it's no unmixed blessing
to become the theorist that is generally accepted.

at least in theory--is presiding officer of a collegia
to body that takes collegia decisions. The American Cabinet
makes no decisions and if a President is wise, he does not let
it make decisions, because the decisions have to be his.
So all Cabinet Members are really advisors to the President.

So, a good system is one that makes the President feel comfortable
with the decision making process, and at the same time, insures
that it gives them all the range of choices that he ought to
consider as he makes his decisions. And for that, you cannot
have an abstract rule, because a great deal depends on the
President's conception of his role, his personality.

And in order for the Secretary of State to
become the preeminent advisor, he and the President have to
get into each other's mind, so that it is really very hard then
to tell who decided what. Journalists often ask how many dis-
agreements were there between a President and a Secretary of
State and how often did the President overrule the Secretary of

41

State. Well, I would think that if a President has to overrule
the Secretary of State too often, he ought to get a different
Secretary of State. Because it is the duty, really, of both
of them to develop some coherent policy which they agree on.
And if they can't agree, then there is something wrong. One
of them may be right, but the system will suffer. So I
think that the Truman-Acheson relationship was ideal, and I
believe that I had a good relationship with my Presidents for
the conduct of foreign policy. On the whole, I believe the
Secretary of State should be the preeminent advisor, the system
is too complex to be run out of the White House, even though
I participated in an effort to do it. It is not the best way
to do it.

We have the common interest with the People's
Republic of China of preventing what they call "hedgemonial -
hedgemony" by one power in the world.

42

We can cultivate both of those interests simultaneously. We have to make sure we keep them in balance and not give either of them the impression that we are ganging up with the other against them. We must resist in our own interests a preponderance of power by the Soviet Union over all areas adjoining it.

And we must in our own interests seek to ease those conflicts we can with the Soviet Union where we could do so without sacrificing the interests of other countries.

This is the strategic problem, and we must not let ourselves be deflected from that by the complaints of either of these large communist countries, each of which would, of course, want us to have ~~we want to have us in an exclusive relationship with~~ them...but that would unbalance the whole international structure.

policies and energy policies might be coordinated, and the general reaction was that nothing in any existing treaty obliged such an extension of allied relationships. Today, if we adopted such a view it would be generally considered as a threat to the cohesion of the industrial democracies, which I consider to be progress.

Of course, many of the industrial democracies, almost all of them, have enormous domestic problems at this moment, and the greatest difficulty is a domestic one and not the usual foreign threat. But this defines the agenda which we have to set ourselves for the future. And in this respect, I welcome the tone and the atmosphere of the recently concluded London summit.

D. CATER: One question which you may or may not want to respond to but it has to do with you own personality--whether you were a neurotic man in your dealing with associates--an emotional man--a man who was difficult to get along with.

KISSINGER: Oh, I'm not the best judge of my personality. The fact is that almost all of my close associates stayed with me for eight years. Almost all of them became close friends.

44

And, that one has, I think, a lot of the public image has been created by people who served with me for six months at the beginning of my Washington career and have made an industry out of this association. And not enough attention has been paid to the people who stayed with me for eight years and who formed one of the most cohesive and I like to think thoughtful groups of associates. I believe it is the role of the head of an organization to inspire his associates to do things that they didn't know they could do.

I think you can always hire technical competence. You cannot hire the ability to go beyond the framework. That can be a painful process. But finally, one is judged by one's public career, not by the ease of day-to-day conduct but by what people feel about it after it is concluded. And I found the friendship, a dedication of my associates, extremely moving. I will not pretend that it was, that I was. . . of course I wasn't easy to deal with. That wasn't my job, I know, but I can't justify it. And the majority of my colleagues were become friends.

KISSINGER: 1970--during Cambodia.

45

KISSINGER: Really close, only once... Or twice. But not for the reasons that they...

KISSINGER: That they urged.

KISSINGER: No. I think you wrote a very thoughtful piece at the time, Doug. If you leave you can get headlines for three days. But you lose the opportunity of shaping events over a long period. And what each public figure has to decide is when to resign and on what issue. And make sure that it isn't such -- it isn't either self gratification or a subtle attempt to protect its future.

END