MAY 30, 1984

DE ROSE

FEW ALLIANCES IN HISTORY HAVE LASTED SO LONG AS THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. NONE HAVE ACHIEVED
AS HIGH A DEGREE OF INTEGRATION OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE NATO HAS EXISTED
EUROPE HAS KNOWN THE LONGEST PERIOD OF UNINTERRUPTED
PEACE SINCE THE STATE SYSTEM ORIGINATED THE MODERN
PERIOD.

WHAT THEN AMOUNTS FOR THE RESTLESSNESS OF SO MANY
THOUGHTFUL OVSERVERS? PART OF ITS REASON UNDOUBTEDLY
IS THE VERY SUCCESS OF NATO. A GENERATION GROWN
ACCUSTOMED TO PEACE HAS LOST THE CONVICTION ABOUT
ITS CAUSES. IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE WHY
SOMETHING HAS _NOT_ HAPPENED. WAS WAR AVOIDED BECAUSE
DETERRENCE WORKED OR BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER ANY

THREAT OF AGGRESSION? IS THE WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT
A NECESSITY OR A WASTE OF RESOURCES? HAVING EXPERIENCED
NO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS CENTERED ON EUROPE, THOSE
WHO HAVE GROWN UP SINCE THE END OF THE WAR -- SOON
TO BE A MAJORITY -- SHARE NEITHER THE CONVICTION
OF DANGER OF THOSE WHO CREATED NATO NOR THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ATLANTIC TIES.

BUT EVEN THOSE WHO HAVE RETAINED THE TRADITIONAL
CONVICTIONS FACE NEW COMPLEXITIES. FOR UNITY BASED ON
PREMISES OUTSTRIPPED BY TECHNOLOGY CAN ITSELF BECOME
AN ELEMENT OF INSECURITY. AND THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION
ABOUT THE TRANSFORMATION OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY SINCE
THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WHEN NATO
WAS FORMED THE UNITED STATES HAD AN ATOMIC MONOPOLY.
WHEN THAT ENDED, THE UNITED STATES POSSESSED A MARGIN
OF NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT ENABLED IT TO THREATEN

4

INVITE AGGRESSION SINCE HISTORICALLY DETERRENCE WITH
PURELY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAS PROVED ABSURD. HOW
TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR WITHOUT INVITING
CONVENITONAL AGGRESSION? HOW TO PRESERVE ATLANTIC
UNITY WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALTERED PATTERNS
OF DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC AN POLITICAL POWER?

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IS EQUALLY DRAMATIC.

IN THE 1950'S EUROPE WAS ECONOMICALLY PROSTRATE AND
MILITARILY IMPOTENT. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY REPRESENTED
50% OF THE WORLD'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. SINCE THEN
EUROPE HAS RECOVERED A GREAT DEAL OF ECONOMIC VITALITY.

THE U.S. SHARE OF THE WORLD'S GNP HAS SHRUNK TO 22%-25%.
THE UNITED STATES HAS SECURITY OBLIGATIONS IN
MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD WHICH WERE DORMANT IN THE
FIFITES. A REALLOCATION OF PHYSICAL BURDENS IS
THEREFORE IMPERATIVE. BUT A NEW DIVISION OF POLITICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IS EVEN MORE CRITICAL. IT IS NOT

5

NATURAL FOR A CONTINENT OF EUROPE'S HISTORY AND RESOURCES
TO DELEGATE MOST SIGNIFICANT SECURITY DECISIONS TO
AN ALLY 3000 MILES AWAY. THIS BREEDS SUSPENSIBILITY ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. A LARGER ROLE FOR EUROPE
IS A NECESSITY IF ALLIED UNITY IS TO CONTINUE WITH THE
NEXT GENERATION.

FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS FACED THESE DILEMMAS AND
OFFERED A REMEDY. FEW ARE AS WELL-QUALIFIED FOR
THIS TASK BOTH BY CONVICTION AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.
FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC AND
POLITICAL THINKING IN THE ALLIANCE AS AN INDIVIDUAL
AND IN MANY OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; HIS LAST POST WAS
DISTINGUISHED TERM AS FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO.
HE REPRESENTED A COUNTRY WHOSE DEFENSE POLICY WAS
A SEEMING PARADOX: REJECTING NATO INTEGRATION BUT
STRONGLY AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE.
HAVING ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITTY FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE

6

IT COULD NOT ESCAPE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE
NEED FOR JOINT ACTION -- HOWEVER ORGANIZED.

FRANCOISE DE ROSE HAS BEEN A PASSIONATE BELIEVER
IN ATLANTIC UNITY. HE HAS HAD THE COURAGE TO CHALLENGE
FASHIONABLE THEORIES. HE BELIEVES NEITHER IN TRADITIONAL
NATO DOCTRINES NOR IN THE RENUNCIATION OF THE WEAPONS
AROUND WHICH OUR STRATEGY HAS DEVELOPED. HE URGES
A GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. HE CALLS
FOR GREATER EUROPEAN UNITY TO ASSUME THAT RESPONSIBILITY.
HE RECOGNIZES THAT IN THE END THE WEST MUST KEEP
OPEN THE OPTION OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND HE OFFERS
VALUABLE SUGGESTIONS FOR LINKING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES.

PERSONALLY, I AGREE WITH HIS PHILISOPHY AND ALMOST
ALL OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. BUT THAT IS NOT THE
KEY ISSUE. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT NO

EXTRACT FROM FRANCOIS DE ROSE'S SPEECH AT THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
& EAST-WEST RELATIONS CONFERENCE, ORGANISED BY THE ECONOMIST
AND THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ON 7 DECEMBER 1984

IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1565 (419 YEARS AGO) THE THEN KING OF
POLAND SIGISMOND WROTE TO THE THEN SOVEREIGN OF BRITAIN
ELIZABETH I ASKING HER TO FORBID HER SUBJECTS TO TRADE WITH
THE RUSSIANS. AND I QUOTE (TRANSLATION MINE):

"WE REPEAT TO YOUR MAJESTY THAT THE TZAR IN MOSCOW, AN ENEMY
OF ANY LIBERTY, INCREASES DAY AFTER DAY HIS FORCES BY THE
PROFIT MADE BY COMMERCE AND RELATIONS WITH THE CIVILISED
NATIONS OF EUROPE. NO DOUBT YOUR MAJESTY DOES NOT IGNORE
HOW POWERFUL, CRUEL AND TYRANNICAL A RULER HE IS. OUR ONLY
HOPE RESTS ON OUR SUPERIORITY IN ARTS AND SCIENCE. BUT SOON
HE SHALL KNOW AS MUCH AS WE DO ... AND IN HIS INSANE PRIDE, HE
WILL RUSH AGAINST CHRISTIANITY" EG.

THIS QUOTATION I FOUND IN A BOOK CALLED HISTOIRE DE L'EMPIRE
DE RUSSIA WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN 1820, 164 YEARS AGO.

... OR WE SHALL HANG SEPARATELY.

By François ce ROSE

The security of Europe, or rather of the West in Europe, for all the Western Powers (Europe, the United-States, Japan) are concerned with each other's security has relied since the end of World War II on a certain "balance of imbalances" where Soviet superiority in conventional weapons was compensated by American predominance in the nuclear field. That situation is gone, leaving NATO with the prospect of having to resort to very ealy use of nuclear weapons if the Red Army was to attack in Central Europe.

Yet that hypothesis of a Warsaw Pact aggression is not the most probable as it would mean taking the chance of nuclear warfare, an irrational bet in all circumstances. What is more likely is the eventuality of crises where the Western Powers would know that opposing Soviet demands or pressure would confront them with the choice between using nuclear weapons within the first days or even hours of conflict or political capitulation.

The least that can be said is that we would be in the weaker position. For as Raymond Aron said : "In the nuclear age, the moment of truth is not tijt of battle but that of criis".

And, in a crisis, what counts is not the economic, industrial or scientific potentials that both sides are able to Marshall as did the great coalition that eventually defeated

the AXIS Powers after five years of fighting and force build up.
The decision is made by the evaluation by both sides of confronting forces and vulnerabilities that would immediately come to play. The "trade space for time" strategy which has for so long brought victory to the maritime powers is of no help at the time of crisis. The problem of the Western powers, therefore, is to reassess the parameters on which deterrence is based, so that in future emergencies, they would not have to be the first to flinch at the abyss.

In Europe, these parameters are :

a/ A conventional build up, mainly based on emerging technologies wherever and whenever new conventional weapons can replace small yield nuclear ones and deny implementation of Soviet plans for a non nuclear lightening decision.

b/ Maintaining the right and determination, if need be to first use of nuclear weapons, at least against invading forces already on Western soil and preferably with neutron weapons. Re-nouncing that possibility would amount to giving the aggressor the guarantee that he would suffer no harm as a result of his initiative while Europe would be condemned to conventional destructions. Crisis management would be impossible under such conditions.

c/ Ensure the coupling between the defense of Europe and United-States forces :

- at the nuclear level by going ahead with the deployment of American missiles with a range sufficient to reach Soviet territory and a clear commitment to use them against Military targets inside the Soviet Union as soon as the Red

Army would have made use of its own nuclear weapons
against allied forces and territories.

- at the conventional level, by the continued presence in Europe of U.S. land, air and nuclear forces in numbers sufficient to leave no doubt, with friends and foes that vital interests as well as the honour of the American people are inseparable from the preservation of the independence of its allies.

Since European forces contribute the greater part of NATO's conventional posture, European countries will have to assume the greater share of that conventional build up. And France would have to participate fully in that effort. Two chapters are devoted to a presentation of her position in the Alliance: what it is and what it should be in that prospect of a new distribution of responsibilities. Based on the idea that, if France's geographical frontier is on the Rhine, the frontier of her political independence is, as well as for the other European countries, on the Elbe, they probably offer the most complete and lucid analysis of France's military doctrine and capacities presented to English speaking readers since General de Gaulle withdrew her forces from NATO's integrated military structures.

The results of such efforts would not make themselves felt in the military field only, vitally important as it would be. The political "fall out" should be a very substantial increase in the sense of responsibility the European nations should feel about their own security, becoming thereby a much more responsible partner and participant over the broad decisions on defense within the alliance. At long last, they would have the oppor-

tunity to give their Community a competence in defense which
they could not exercise as long as NATO's strategy was so much
d defendant on American nuclear arms and...thinking. In that
perspective full French participation would have to be restored
at the strategic planning level. The first task should be to
address that problem of conventional deterrence, the concept to
be implemented and the means and equipment necessary to that end

Such a reshaping of responsibilities would also require Ameri-
can cooperation. In the build up of conventional forces in the
first place. But, if the shift of emphasis from the nuclear to
the conventional was simply to be seen in the U.S. as a means
of receiving billions of Dollars of orders from European govern-
ments, it will simply not happen. While, if the Europeans prove
to be able to embark on this new approach to their contribution
to their own and to common security, there should be both at
the government and economic levels a similarly broad minded res-
ponse from the United-States.

If the countries on both sides of the ocean which has given
its name to their alliance can see this juncture as an oppor-
tunity to seize and not as a burden to shirk, their relation-
ship in the years to come would be placed on a much healthier
footing, much more in harmony with their respective political
and economic weight. It might make all the difference for the
times to come if the United-States be called upon to assume more
world wide security duties and, indeed, when new perspectives
connected with possible developments in space technologies may
present new and different problems for allied solidarity.

MAY 29, 1984

DE ROSE

WHAT THEN AMOUNTS FOR THE RESTLESSNESS OF SO MANY
THOUGHTFUL OVSERVERS? PART OF ITS REASON UNDOUBTEDLY
IS THE VERY SUCCESS OF NATO. A GENERATION GROWN
ACCUSTOMED TO PEACE HAS LOST THE CONVICTION ABOUT
ITS CAUSES. IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE WHY
SOMETHING HAS _NOT_ HAPPENED. WAS WAR AVOIDED BECAUSE
DETERENCE WORKED OR BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER ANY

3

CREDIBLY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE MAIN DETERENT
TO SOVIET AGGRESSION. SINCE THE MIDDLE SIXTIES THE
GROWTH OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES HAS OVERTURNED THAT
EQUATION. IN THE PAST, NATIONS WENT TO WAR BECAUSE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT APPEARED TO OUTWEIGH THE
RISKS OF RESISTANCE. THE NUCLEAR AGE THREATENS TO
REVERSE THAT CALCULATION. A GROWING NUMBER OF CRITICS
ADVOCATE WHAT AMOUNTS TO ABDICATION; THE STRATEGY
OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BECOME CONTROVERSIAL.

SOME FAVOR CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO. OTHERS
ADVOCATE A RENUNCIATION OF WEAPONS OR AT LEAST THE
FIRST USE OF THEM. NEITHER COURSE CAN GUIDE THE
FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE. THE STATUS QUO HAS LOST
CREDIBILITY WITH THE ADVERSARY AND THE PUBLIC. A
RECOMMENDATION OF NO FIRST USE INDICATES THAT ONE
WOULD RATHER BE DEFEATED BY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
THAN TO RESORT TO THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL. IT MAY THEREFORE

INVITE AGGRESSION SINCE HISTORICALLY DETERRENCE WITH
PURELY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAS PROVED ABSURD. HOW
TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR WITHOUT INVITING
CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION? HOW TO PRESERVE ATLANTIC
UNITY WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALTERED PATTERNS
OF DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER?

FRANCOISE DE ROSE HAS FACED THESE DILEMMAS AND OFFERED A REMEDY. FEW ARE AS WELL-QUALIFIED FOR THIS TASK BOTH BY CONVICTION AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

FRANCOISE DE ROSE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL THINKING IN THE ALLIANCE AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND IN MANY OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; HIS LAST POST WAS DISTINGUISHED TERM AS FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO.

HE REPRESENTED A COUNTRY WHOSE DEFENSE POLICY WAS A SEEMING PARADOX: REJECTING NATO INTEGRATION BUT STRONGLY AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE. HAVING ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE

FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS BEEN A PASSIONATE BELIEVER
IN ATLANTIC UNITY. HE HAS HAD THE COURAGE TO CHALLENGE
FASHIONABLE THEORIES. HE BELIEVES NEITHER IN TRADITIONAL
NATO DOCTRINES NOR IN THE RENUNCIATION OF THE WEAPONS
AROUND WHICH OUR STRATEGY HAS DEVELOPED. HE URGES
A GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. HE CALLS
FOR GREATER EUROPEAN UNITY TO ASSUME THAT RESPONSIBILITY.
HE RECOGNIZES THAT IN THE END THE WEST MUST KEEP
OPEN THE OPTION OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND HE OFFERS
VALUABLE SUGGESTIONS FOR LINKING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES.

MAY 29, 1984

DE ROSE

THREAT OF AGGRESSION? IS THE WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT
OF A NECESSITY OR A WASTE OF RESOURCES? HAVING EXPERIENCED
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS CENTERED ON EUROPE, THOSE WHO
HAVE GROWN UP SINCE THE NED OF THE WAR -- SOON TO
BE A MAJORITY -- SHARE NEITHER THE CONVICTION OF
DANGER OF THOSE WHO CREATED NATO NOR THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ATLANTIC TIES.

BUT EVEN THOSE WHO HAVE RETAINED THE TRADITIONAL
CONVICTIONS FACE NEW COMPLEXITIES. FOR UNITY BECAME-
an element of necessity. AND THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION
ABOUT THE TRANFORMATION OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY SINCE
THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WHEN NATO
WAS FORMED THE UNITED STATES HAD AN ATOMIC MONOPOLY.
WHEN THAT ENDED, THE UNITED STATES POSSESSED A MARGIN
OF NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT ENABLED IT TO THREATEN
CREDIBILY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE MAIN
DETERENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSION. SINCE THEN THE GROWTH

4

FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS FACED THESE DILEMMAS AND OFFERED A REMEDY. FEW ARE AS WELL QUALIFIED FOR THIS TASK BOTH BY CONVICTION AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

FRANCOISE DE ROSE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL THINKING IN THE ALLIANCE AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS WELL AS IN MANY OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; HIS LAST POST-WAR DISTINGUISHED TERM AS AMBASSADOR TO NATO.

HE REPRESENTED A COUNTRY WHOSE DEFENSE POLICY WAS A SEEMING PARADOX: REJECTING NATO INTEGRATION BUT STRONGLY AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE. HAVING ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE IT COULD NOT ESCAPE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR JOINT ACTION -- HOWEVER ORGANIZED.

PERSONALLY, I AGREE WITH HIS PHILISOPHY AND ALMOST ALL OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. BUT THAT IS NOT THE KEY ISSUE. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT NO STUDENT OF THE SUBJECT -- AND THAT SHOULD INCLUDE ANYONE CONCERNED WITH THE FUTURE OF THE WEST -- CAN AFFORD TO FORM HIS OPINION WITHOUT READING THIS THOUGHTFUL WORK.