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Lecture, Special Warfare School
Fort Bragg, N. C., 30 August 1962

# SOLDIERS AND THE PEOPLE

By Edward G. Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

## I.

To the man in the ranks, it seems that there is always someone figuring out a job for him to do.

The Roman legionnaire, in ancient times, as he wondered what aqueduct or road-building project the centurion was going to order him on next, is a close kin of today's man in uniform. And vice versa.

Today's man can't help wondering what you, his commander or his commander's advisor, are learning in this school -- which will mean more work for him to do. Since General Yarborough asked me to talk this morning on the topic of the "Military Support of Community Development Programs," I presume that today's man in the ranks has cause to wonder.

So, let us dedicate the talk this morning to the person who will have to go out and do what we talk about here -- the man in the ranks. We owe it to him to take a hard, practical look at the subject. . . to make certain that what we have in mind for him makes good military sense. We must not be Pharisee simply looking for cheap labor. We must not be fuzzy do-gooders simply satisfying a theory. And, above all, we must not become so engrossed in socio-economic activities that we ever forget that a fighting man must ever be ready for a fight. . . and that readiness had better include the ability to whip the enemy!

In other words, we owe it to him to help him be a good military man, with all that that implies.

## II.

Let's start, then, by thinking of communities in terms of national security, to which you and your troops are pledged.

You are here studying counter-insurgency. In a Communist insurgency, the Communist goal is to win control of the people. When control of the people is gained, along with them go the land, its bounty, the independent life of the nation.

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Since a community is basically a grouping of people, gaining control of it is vital to the success of the Communist guerrilla. When he wins enough communities, he wins the nation. Each community so brought under his control can help hide him from you and your troops, can feed him, clothe him, help finance him, and give him reinforcements.

On your side, the community is every bit as vital to your success. Having its help, you can uncover the guerrilla enemy from his hiding place, start denying him his logistics base, get him moving along to exhaustion and defeat.

The Communists' task is much simpler than yours. His end goal justifies any means for him to get there. Your means must justify the end goal you seek.

The Communist goal is a nation wherein all resources, human and physical, are rigidly, undeviatingly controlled for the benefit of the state. The "state" is an euphemism meaning the Communist Party, and the Party elite in particular. Since the Communist subversive/guerrilla is going to wind up top dog in the state he is fighting to create, he uses any means to get there. He can afford to be completely ruthless in applying coercion by terror. (Incidentally, as you study the tactics expounded by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, just stop for a moment and reflect where they and their elite got to personally -- and then what has happened to most of the poor boobs who helped them rise to power; they know now the cynicism of the earlier promises; they now know that terror does not end with Communist victory.)

The end goal you seek must be something quite different, or the people will have little to choose between you and the Communists. You are striving towards a future in which you will live, too, along with your troops, and your children, and their children, and the children's children. Therefore, the means you use in defeating Communist insurgency must be largely constructive means, on which that good future you want can be built. It requires much more than propaganda and the use of force.

### III.

Let us say that you are the commander, or the commander's advisor, of a zone in which Communist insurgents are active. In your zone, you have communities -- hamlets, villages, towns. Now, just because some of those communities support the Communist insurgents -- are those communities to be treated as part of the enemy or are they to

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be treated as part of the nation which the troops are sworn to defend? The answer should be obviously the latter, although this doesn't always happen in the bitter hatreds of a counter-insurgency campaign. However, if you and your troops start making war on the very communities which make up the nation you are defending, then to whom and to what are you loyal?

Remember how Ramon Magsaysay described the attitude of his troops, in the Huk campaign in the Philippines, as being ready to offer either "all-out friendship or all-out force." This is a good precept to keep in mind as you go to work on communities you suspect are under the secret control of the enemy. Move in with military alertness, but also with brotherly concern.

The first priority need of the community is physical protection, and it's up to you to make sure that this is given. Protection must be not only from outside attack by a guerrilla band against the community, but also must be from inside attack or individual reprisal. If a man in the community helps you, and because of this has his head cut off by the enemy later, then the community isn't being protected and remains vulnerable to Communist control. Much the same is true of the production means of the community. If you cannot protect farmers and workers in their daily tasks, the economy stagnates, and your side is weakened further. All the fine strategy, planning, training, manpower, equipment, supplies, and fiscal help are meaningless, without this protection.

Let me illustrate with the case of a fishing village I noted not long ago, in an area where Communist guerrillas were active. The government's army patrolled the road past the village twice daily, in vehicles. One day, they were ambushed from sand dunes near the village. In after-action security work, the village head man, a fisherman, was picked up by the army for questioning. He told all he knew about the Communist guerrillas, who roamed down to the coast from hills some miles away. The army kept questioning this fisherman for two days, at its headquarters, then returned him to his village. While away from home, being questioned by the army, this poor man couldn't provide for his family. He lost two days work -- a fact noted and remembered by the villagers. Several nights later, the Communist guerrillas visited the village, accused him of helping the army, and then murdered him, as an object lesson.

The village receives economic aid from the government, in advice of fishing methods, some supplementary rice occasionally, a village medical kit, and even some help with boats and nets. The army patrols the road past the village and, every so often, works on it with propaganda against the Communist enemy. But, when night comes and the guerrillas are on prowl, which side do you think the villagers must help -- or else?

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One solution, of course, is to provide the means for the community to protect itself, and then to back up this self-help with military force to meet a contingency larger than the community is able to handle on its own. This is the practical thought underlying the "strategic hamlet" program in Vietnam, which is reportedly starting to be so effective against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

As a community starts helping against the Communist guerrilla enemy, two series of activities open up. One is quite pragmatic, militarily. The second is of the spirit, in terms of motivation. The pragmatic consists of not only organizing the defense of the community, in earthworks, weapons, and citizen defenders, but also such things as will help the military come to the rescue: landing strips, helicopter pads, access road, a radio receiver-sender.

The second series of initial activities come as the community starts seeking answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? Often, this too, commences in a pragmatic way, by adding to the material things in a community: improving the water supply with a new well or pump, drainage for the streets, a generator for village power, pit latrines for public health, a kit of medical supplies. It is a short step from this to starting a school in the community, getting books for those who learn to read, creating an information center where news and advice from the capital is available. The community finds itself becoming linked up closely to the nation, a real part of something bigger. As it does so, the political life of the community grows also, demanding more meaning in answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? As the community resolves these political factors at its grass-roots level, as the national government becomes responsive itself, and as the bond between the people and the soldiers grows stronger, the Communist guerrillas find themselves forced out of existence as their cause is exposed for the paltry thing it is.

Americans recently in Vietnam have told me that the "strategic hamlets" there are starting to elect their own village leaders by secret ballot, and are being encouraged in this by the national government. If this is true democracy, starting at the grass-roots level and becoming spread throughout the country, with the government responding, then this might well mark the vital turning point in the fight for Vietnamese freedom against the Communist Vietcong.

#### IV.

What I have been describing is the combat area of counter-insurgency.

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Now, it is quite understandable that a military man, experiencing the realities of what happens when Communist guerrillas have actually hit a country, will start doing some thinking on the subject. I know that many of the military, and others, in the free world, have given thought to how to catch insurgency early, in its infancy, and how to prevent it. From this thinking has come many of the ideas and programs for civic action by the military -- or, if you will, "military support of community development programs."

My purpose in sketching in the community in an active counter-insurgency area was two-fold. I wanted you to see the community the way you must -- if you have to apply in combat the lessons you are learning in this school. And, I wanted you to start doing your own thinking on just when it is best for the military and the community to get together -- at a tragic, late hour or early on, when opportunities abound.

In order to stimulate your thinking on the subject, let me note briefly what two other military men have done about it.

V.

Do you remember, months ago, when journalists first started going into the Congo to write about the post-independence crisis there? Many of these journalists made a point of the emphatic difference between Leopoldville and Brazzaville across the river, the difference between the two Congos. The flattering remarks about the French side of the river reminded me of an unusual French soldier serving there. He is Lt. General Le Pulloch, who commanded the Ground Forces of what was then French Equatorial Africa, from Brazzaville.

Recruits for military service were taken straight out of tribal communities, usually knowing only their own local area and speaking only their own tribal dialect. So, as part of their basic training, they were given language instruction, taught French. General Le Pulloch added some instruction in old-fashioned "civics," on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. It resulted in not only a better military force, but in creating a whole new group of responsible citizens after their period of military duty.

Tribal chiefs, district officers, and other officials, were so struck by the results of this training in "civics," that they asked the military to start giving similar instruction in "civics" to classes of civilians in all villages. This was done, with far-reaching results.

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Along these same lines are many other examples of the military
helping a civilian education. The outstanding one which comes to mind
for an American is the Philippines, where U. S. combat soldiers started
teaching the three R's to Filipino children just before the turn of the
century, and the U. S. War Department established the fine public school
system of free education. Much of the noted Filipino resistance in World
War II against the Japanese invader, the close comradeship with the
American military, came from a shared devotion to the cause of liberty,
which we mutually had learned young.

VI.

In Colombia is an unusual soldier, whom I hope to meet some day.
Everything I know about him has come from others, with some fine com-
pliments from people I respect as realists and practical do-ers. The
soldier is Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar.

Colonel Valencia has been in command of Colombian Army opera-
tions at Vichada, Colombia, working towards bringing peace and stability
to one of Colombia's noted areas of "violencia" or "violence," where the
Communists might well have been going full-bloom by now in guerrilla
operations, if it weren't for the inspired work of the Colombian military.
Colonel Valencia uses his officers and men to start self-help projects in
the region. They practically carry a gun in one hand and a text-book in
the other. They've helped local people build bridges, construct river
ferries, start schools, build villages, and establish small local industries.
While he and his forces have become sort of "jacks of many trades" while
helping the people of the region, they haven't forgotten that they are
soldiers first. The bandits, the guerrillas of the region, have a real
respect for them as top-notch fighting men.

VII.

I hope these two examples and the sketchy descriptions of the bond
between the military and the community in counter-insurgency operations
will serve as a take-off point for your thinking further about this subject.
If our brief time together this morning has caused this, then our time has
been well spent.

Just remember this. Communist guerrillas hide among the people.
If you win the people over to your side, the Communist guerrillas have no
place to hide. With no place to hide, you can find them. Then, as military
men, fix them . . . finish them!

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