MR. PAUL STIEFEL
7452 NORTH KENNETH AVENUE
SKOKIE, ILLINOIS 60076

March 9, 1974

Dear Henry:

I hope that you received my last letter and I understand of course
why you have not answered. I want to write to you today because I
have a deep concern for a matter over which you have almost entire
control.

I am in almost complete agreement with your overall world policy
and I join the many million that admire you for the things you have
accomplished. I am however deeply concerned with the relationship
between the U.S. and Russia. You understand, that the atmosphere
we grew up in, makes us suspicious of the Russian intent. I am al-
so perfectly aware that a man of your intelligence is fully cognizant
of what I am eluding to. But Henry, I am so fully convinced that
seize
the Russian's will the opportune moment to doublecross us and I hope
that somewhere in your overall strategy there is a ready plan for
this contingency.

Another matter that I would like to relate to you, is something that
I discussed the other day with Jack Heiman. We both consider ourselves
fortunate to have taken a part in your past and how many times does

-2-

it happen in a person's lifetime that he knows somebody in as high
a government position as you are in. We would like to, completely
at your convenience, visit you in Washington and have the opportunity
to visit with you.

My mother went to New York yesterday and she will try to contact
your parents if she is able to.

Keep up the good job and I hope that your health and energy will
remain with you so that you can carry on for years to come.

MR. PAUL STIEFEL

May 24, 1975

The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger
Washington D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Happy birthday and many, many more. May you stay healthy and full of boundless energy to continue in fullfilling your most difficult responsibilities. While I may not always agree with your decisions, it cannot be denied that you have made this a better world to live in.

I cannot really adequately express in words, what a thrill it was to see you last November when you were here in Chicago for the U of C fundraising dinner and to be able to exchange a few words with you. Jack and I reminisce about that evening many times. We also still have very much on our agenda to visit you in Washington if and when you are there long enough for us to arrange it. Could you give me the name of a person with whom I could arrange such a gettogether.

Again my best wishes and also my best regards to Nancy.

Warm regards,

October 30, 1976

Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for helping to make my mother's 80th
birthday a memorable one. She was so thrilled by your phone
call and treasures this more than any of the gifts she re-
ceived.

The intimate family party last night was very nice and it
is too bad that you were unable to call at that time since
it would have given more of us the opportunity to talk to
you. On Sunday we have arranged a big party for all her
friends. With all her recent illnesses, she has recovered
marvelously and looks and feels good now. It is a blessing
indeed to have such a loving, caring mother and knowing
your mother I know you are similarly blessed.

I follow with special interest all your undertakings and
share with you in the pride of your accomplishments. I
do not always agree with your approaches, but no one can
fault you for trying. I think you, like all the rest of
us, will be glad when this election is behind us and no
matter what the outcome is, there are many challenges to
be met.

I still plan to visit you in Washington one of these days,
but in the meantime accept my sincerest thanks for answering
my request. I know that you have many praises heaped upon
you, but please accept mine since they are meant sincerely.

7617509

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1976

COPIES TO:

S
RF-ws

Dear Max:

I should like to express my deep appreciation
for your warm hospitality during my visit to The
Hague. Our consultations on the wide range of
international issues which we face in common will
surely strengthen the cooperation and collaboration
between the United States and the Common Market
countries. I know of your personal interest and
commitment, and you may count on full cooperation
on our part.

Please convey to your colleagues in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and to the other Dutch officials
concerned my warm personal thanks for their
cooperation and all that they did in making the
visit such a success.

His Excellency
Max van der Stoel,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Hague.

MICROFILMEL
BY S/S-I

DR. ERIC STOERGER
PODIATRIST
436 FT. WASHINGTON AVE.
NEW YORK 33, N. Y.
---
LORRAINE 8-9296

November 25, 1974

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Dept. of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Permit me to introduce myself as one who greatly values
Mr. and Mrs. Louis Kissinger, your wonderful parents.

Over the years, Mrs. Stoerger and I have come to know
your parents not only as my patients but as friends as well.

I would also like to say at this time that we greatly
appreciate your efforts on behalf of world peace. It seems
to me that the just concluded talks at Vladivostok - which
were initiated by you - constitute a "break-thru" with regard
to SALT.

While you were engaged in one of your almost pro-verbial
whirlwind tours abroad not so long ago, your father and I had
a most stimulating conversation at my office the other day.
On that occasion I also expressed my intention of trying to
obtain your autograph, dear Dr. Kissinger, for my two nephews
Richard (age: 13) and Jack (age: 11) and also - if I may
impose on you - an autograph for myself.

Your Dad suggested that I prepare appropriate statements ready
for your signature whenever you come to visit them at 615 Ft.
Washington Avenue. However, it goes without saying, that your
signature on State Dept. Stationary would be much preferred.

Dear Dr. Kissinger - please accept my apologies for troubling
you with (what may appear to you) such a minor matter; however,
speaking as one N.Y. Yankee fan to another (I understand you
used to root for the Yankees of Joe Di Maggio, Bill Dickey and
Mickey Mantle et al) -

-- 2 -- (over)

CAROLINE STOESSINGER

March 13, 1976

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Before the dinner Friday evening, I knew of you only from
John and from the press. Since you have been in Washington, I
have heard John defend your policies and your person hundreds of
times throughout the country. But as his description and under-
standing of you often varied radically from the media, I thought
that possibly John's image was colored by his loyalty. But now
I am compelled to write to you to tell you how personally moved
I was by your visit. That you should use your valuable time and
energy to pay tribute to Hans was in itself most admirable. Perhaps
you are unaware of just how much this meant to a frail old man who
is very much alone. Your private recognition of him( the telegram
to the Chicago hospital and this visit) have given him greater
pleasure than he has had in the last few yeras.

I am personally comforted to know that such great power can
be blended with such profound humanity.

Thank you for your kindness to Hans.

March 5, 1975

Dear John:

Thank you for your most recent letter.
I regret that I have not been able to reply sooner
but want you to know that I have kept your suggestions
very much in mind.

I am especially grateful for your further
thoughts on how you might be able to assist our
efforts for a settlement in the Middle East. Your
ideas are, I believe, very useful and could make
an important contribution to our common goal.

I have, therefore, asked Larry Eagleburger,
my Executive Assistant, to get in touch with you to
discuss further your views on a meeting of leaders
in the United States. Perhaps we could set up a
meeting after I return from the Middle East.

Mr. John Stoessinger,
275 Central Park West,
New York, New York.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

Office of

Executive Assistant to the Secretary

4/20/75

S/S-I - Mr. Brown

Bill,

These 2 letters -- Walters and Stoessinger -- were taken with the Secretary on the March Middle East trip. He signed these copies; we received word in a SECTO that he had signed them; the original which had been held here was sent to Miss Walters and Mr. Stoessinger. You probably already have in the Secretary's personal files copies of the letters to Miss Walters and Mr. Stoessinger but I would like to have filed the original incoming letters which are attached. (In case you don't already have copies of the replies, or if you want to file the copies he signed in the Middle East, they are attached). Thanks very much.

millie x21500

The City University of New York

Graduate Center: 33 West 42 Street, New York, N. Y. 10036
212/790-4268

Institute on the United Nations

April 5, 1975

Dear Henry:

It was good to see you last Thursday. You were in great form and
made a compelling and deeply moving presentation.

Let me give you a quick interim report. Elie Wiesel, on whom you
made a deep impression, knows Rabin and Peres intimately. He and I are
presently doing our utmost to elicit a more forthcoming letter from Rabin
to you so that you might find it possible to consider another try at the
step by step approach before Geneva. Rabin has promised us an answer by
Monday or Tuesday. I am not very optimistic, but we want to leave no
stone unturned to help you. You were wise to invite Hans to come to see
you once more on Tuesday before he leaves for Israel on April 10th. His
intellect tells him that you are right, but his emotions get in the way.
I do not believe, however, that he spoke against you to Dinitz. It is
probably best to convince him with his own weapons. Here is what he said
in *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics* (page 203).

We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny.

[LC]

212/790-4268

You will need all your strength during the coming months. I fear that you will have moments of deep despair, especially about the American Jewish Community. It is one thing to write as you did in _A World Restored_ that:

> Nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. But statesmen must act as if their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honour in their own country, that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programmes domestically, and that their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience.

It is quite another thing to know this truth in one's heart through painful personal experience. The Jewish people too will have to learn, hopefully, for once, before they descend into the abyss. I saw this crisis coming when I wrote my last book, _Why Nations Go To War_, which I enclose. I wrote then:

> Zionism, to endure, will have to find the courage not to inflict on others what had been inflicted on the Jews in history. This will take a generosity of spirit that had seldom been extended to the Jews in their Diaspora. According to their faith, they had been chosen to have a great capacity for suffering. Now, at long last, they are no longer chosen; they themselves must choose.

[LC]

212/790-4268

The closing paragraphs in the chapter about the outbreak of the First World War often also seem sadly relevant today.

I shall keep you closely informed about our efforts with Rabin.

In the meantime, please be assured of my lasting friendship.

P.S. Please address all correspondence to my home:
275 Central Park West
New York, New York 10024
212-799-6086

7507985

212/790-4268

April 10, 1975

Dear Henry:

Rabin's answer to Elie Wiesel and me was "no, not now" to our
request for a more forthcoming letter to you. What was interesting
about the Rabin message, however, and constructive in my opinion was
that he left the door open, because he added the phrase, "wait a little."
It should be most interesting to see in this connection whether Allon
will indicate a new flexibility to you during his visit. Logically,
the Israelis should be prepared to take the initiative to give back <u>all</u>
of Sinai in exchange for some real progress, instead of arguing about a
few kilometers of desert.

I do not know whether the developments on the Israeli side during
the next few days will encourage you to resume the "shuttle" once again.
If you do, Elie Wiesel and I can probably continue to be useful to you
with Rabin. Elie is willing to go to Israel and make another personal
appeal on your behalf. Hans Morgenthau, in my opinion, at worst will not
harm your position in Israel, and at best may even help. There is no
doubt that you convinced him intellectually of the validity of your approach.

If you lean toward Geneva, you might consider subdividing the conference
into individual working groups each of which would deal with a discrete
and separate problem. A formula might possibly be worked out by which a

limited success in one or more of the individual working groups might be
implemented even in the absence of a general overall agreement. This
might be a way of applying a variant of the step by step approach in the
Geneva forum.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that all of us have kept
our word and have kept the meeting absolutely confidential.

Please let me know how we can continue to help.

Telephone: 212 799-6086

May 13, 1975

Dear Henry:

Enclosed please find a transcript of a recent newspaper interview
with Hans in Israel. I believe that it indicates that he has come a
considerable distance in your direction.

Elie Wiesel and I are prepared to see Sadat and to give you the
reception in New York for Jewish leaders at whatever time seems most
useful to you. Elie is planning to visit Auschwitz in connection with
his research during the last week in May and has asked me whether you
could alert our Ambassador in Poland in case he may need some assistance.
I am sure he would be grateful.

Please let me know when you want us to follow through on our plans.

TRANSLATION

An interview with Professor Hans Morgenthau, published in *Davar* (April 25), by reporter H. Isaac, discloses that although the 71 year old professor is considered a hawk in matters of international policy, he is rather dovish according to Israeli precepts. And if some Israelis who are against giving up territories at all try to cite Prof. Morgenthau's opinions, it seems that they have not understood him fully. It is true that Prof. Morgenthau opposes the step-by-step arrangements and agreements. He feels that Israel should not make its efforts for peace piecemeal, but should rather put to the Arabs the great and decisive question, which emanates from the Security Council Resolution 242: Are the Arabs ready to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign State? But at the same time, and unlike Likud and other extremists who oppose giving up territories at all, Prof. Morgenthau thinks that Israel must be ready for considerable political concessions and even for a return to the 1967 borders from before the Six-Day War, with some minor adjustments, and he says quite decisively: "This is the only way. There is no other alternative."

Prof. Morgenthau came to Israel to lecture at the Haifa University. He is a German Jew, who settled in the U. S. in 1937 and had a brilliant career at the Universities of Kansas and Chicago, and also at the School for Social Research in New York. He published many books on international affairs, but despite 38 years of sojourn in America he still speaks with a heavy German accent. He does not accept the formula that some Israeli politicians are propagating: "A piece of territory in exchange for a piece of peace." Morgenthau says: "This peace is indivisible. Can one talk about a 'piece' of existence?"

Morgenthau admits that during the first stage after the 1973 war, a partial agreement was useful from the military point of view because it brought about a ceasefire and a separation of forces. But he says: "When we reach the political

(2)

stage, I do not believe in partial agreements any more, because the basic problem
is: Arab recognition of Israel's existence and an Arab declaration that they
give up the idea of removing Israel from the Middle East by force. At the same
time I do not think that Israel should have insisted during the Kissinger negotia-
tions on abolishing the state of belligerency. Within the framework of a partial
agreement, such a formula with time limitations seems to me like hair-splitting.
Because of this formula, Dr. Kissinger's mission should not have failed, and in
this respect he is right when he criticizes Israel's attitude. As to non-belligerency:
Hitler had non-aggression pacts with all his victims. On the other hand, I attach
great importance to a general declaration of the Arabs that they give up any
intention to destroy Israel and that they recognize Israel's right to exist."

"Some say that one cannot negotiate with the Arabs at present about a total
arrangement. The idea that the Arabs are not ready under any circumstances to
discuss it is an Israeli invention. I do not accept the argument that it is
impossible a priori to come to an agreement with the Arabs. In my view, the
Israelis didn't fight hard enough for the implementation of Resolution 242. Even
from the public relations point of view, as well as from the point of view of
public opinion, it is very important that the Israelis should put to the Arabs
the unequivocal question: Are they not ready, or are they ready to recognize
Israel's right to exist? Thereby, the Arabs will find themselves in a squeeze,
while at present Israel is on the defensive and must answer Arab propaganda
which is spreading all over the world. I think that an Arab declaration of this
kind is important. But I do not think it is sufficient. It must be accompanied
by guarantees that it will be fulfilled. At the same time I do not believe in
verbal or written guarantees only. Therefore, I prefer the idea of establishing
an American naval base in the Port of Haifa. Such a base will express the American
presence in the area, and this is more important than any formal guarantee."

(3)

The reporter asked whether it is true that he submitted such a proposal to Kissinger, and Morgenthau said: "I do not want to talk about it. Suffice it to say that I propose it. You asked me if there is a chance for such a proposal to be accepted, and I will tell you that this is first and foremost in the American interest, and public opinion in the United States as well as Congress can be brought to the point of supporting it, if it will be proven that this is important in order to withstand Russian expansionism. Such an American military presence in the Port of Haifa can serve as a deterrent to war. It exists, as you know, in West Germany and in Korea. You may ask whether the United States can afford to arouse Arab opposition by establishing a base in Israel. But in point of fact American policy is committed to Israel's existence and this by itself causes Arab opposition. Nevertheless, America insists on fulfilling its commitment, despite the threats to Israel's existence. You ask me also whether what is called reassessment does not mean a change in the above-mentioned American commitment, and I will tell you that I do not think so. The word 'reassessment' is a polite expression for the word 'wait and see'. The word 'reassessment' was born out of Dr. Kissinger's feeling that the Israelis have misled him. But what does reassessment mean in actual fact? What can the rulers in Washington discover that they didn't know before? People talk about an erosion in public opinion with regard to Israel. Israel doesn't get a good press, and Israel's information services are rather weak. The Arabs have made a tremendous propaganda effort and they were very successful, indeed. Arab propaganda uses very simple slogans. It says: Look at these poor Palestinians, who were uprooted from their fatherland and from their homes. The wrong which has been done to them must be corrected.

"We are fully aware that such a description of the Palestinian cause distorts realities to a large extent. But the man in Oklahoma or in Missouri doesn't know this, and he becomes convinced that the Arabs have a just grievance, and *that* Israel doesn't counteract this propaganda effectively. The Arabs may use the oil embargo

( 4 )

weapon again, if they will be defeated in a new war. I doubt very much whether
the Americans are ready to intervene militarily in the case of a renewal of the
oil embargo. If the Arabs use the oil embargo weapon, Western unity may collapse.
If I were an Arab leader, I wouldn't hesitate to use the oil embargo weapon. If
there is a new war, I think that it will end without a bloodied, clear-cut decision,
as has happened in the previous wars. But the new war will be more dangerous
and more costly in blood. Therefore, a supreme effort must be made to prevent
a new war, even if it is not easy to obtain from the Arabs full recognition of
Israel's right to exist, and even if there is no guarantee that they will observe
this in the future. In my view, there is no choice but to try to go along this
road. If we give up there will be a war. The condition of no war and no peace,
as is now the case, cannot continue. You ask me who will be the loser in the
long range in a war, or in several wars. It is true that the Arabs can afford
more military debacles, hoping that in the end they will liquidate Israel. They
think that in the long range the Arabs will have the advantage if there will be
no outside intervention. But let us not forget that Israel is not entirely
isolated in its struggle for existence. Today and in the foreseeable future,
it can rely in its existence on the support of the two superpowers, and I mean
two, because the U.S.S.R. also has an interest in the continued existence of
Israel. The presence of Israel in the Middle East serves for the Russians as
a mighty lever in their attempts to penetrate the Middle East and gain more and
more satellites. I think that this is the reason why the U.S.S.R. is actually
opposed to the idea of the liquidation of the State of Israel. The Soviet policy
is the most Machiavellian I have ever encountered. It is entirely based on Soviet
interests. Therefore, I do not think that if Israel would have led a less pro-
Western policy, that this would have changed the Soviet policy of political support
to the Arabs. But from the point of view of the Soviet interest, importance must
be attached to Israel's existence. Therefore, the Soviet formula is: We must

(5)

satisfy the strivings of the Arabs, but we must also preserve the existence of
Israel. If you wish, the balance between the two also expresses the basic
attitude of American policy, although in the case of America it is much more
delicate and much less tough.

"You ask me whether Israel may have to embark on a preventive war. I wouldn't like to answer such a hypothetical question. But if the Arabs prepare again for an immediate attack, as they did in 1967, a preventive war is justified.

"In 1973 Golda Meir said that Israel avoided a preventive war because it didn't want to arouse the ire of the Americans. It seems to me that such a statement is mainly a post-factum explanation. I doubt whether the Israelis were ready for a preventive war at that time, and whether such a preventive war would have achieved its objectives under the prevailing circumstances. I am also inclined to think that the Israelis did not believe in the ability of the Arabs to attack and that's why they didn't consider at all a preventive war. It may sound well to say that Israel avoided action because of political considerations. But in the last resort, it is not good public relations to use this argument. For Israel it was very unfavorable that the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Army collapsed. But here one can say: Nothing succeeds more than success, and nothing fails more than failure.

"As to the possibility of a 'balance of atomic terror' in the Middle East --
I can visualize such a possibility. The danger of an atomic war may arise only
if and when Israel will see a danger to its very existence and in that case Israel
may manifest the so-called 'Samson Symptom'.

"You ask me whether Israel takes the right attitude towards the PLO, in view of the fact that so many countries support the idea of Palestinian independence. I will tell you that I think that the Israeli attitude is definitely justified. If someone denies your right to exist, you cannot negotiate with him. How can you negotiate with a person who puts a revolver on the table and threatens to

(6)

kill you. Israel must expose to the world the trickery of PLO propaganda.
Israel must emphasize that Palestine was already divided once, and the very idea
of establishing a new minute state is a crazy idea and will bring lots of trouble."

who

Prof. Morgenthau has opposed American involvement in the Vietnam War since
1965, although he never was a Leftist, denies the accusation that America didn't
keep its promise to South Vietnam. "This is sheer stupidity," he says. "America
invested in this war $150 billion and sacrificed 50,000 casualties. To say that
America betrayed the Vietnamese is totally absurd. The quisling governments in
South Vietnam were hated by the masses and showed themselves helpless in the end.
We couldn't possibly take their place.

"As to Israeli information, much can be done, Arab propaganda causes
in the U.S. damage not only to Israel, but also spreads anti-Semitism. It is
not the old kind of anti-Semitism. Since the days of Auschwitz, it is not
nice to attack Jews as individuals. Present-day anti-Semitism tries to arouse
hatred against the Jewish State, and this collective hatred has, of course, a
negative influence on the treatment of the Jewish individual who supports the
hated country. You ask me if there is a possibility that some Jews may hesitate
to openly support Israel. Such a possibility exists, of course. The phenomenon
of 'Court Jews' is a fact. Presidents of Jewish organizations feel good when
they are invited for a talk to the White House, and especially when they are
invited for dinner. Such Jews will think twice before they antagonize the ruling
circles in the U. S. by expressing unpopular opinions. This is a danger which
cannot be overlooked."

Hunter College

OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK | 695 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

(212) 360-2401

January 26, 1976

Dear Henry:

Hans Morgenthau will soon celebrate his birthday. As he has been rather ill, we would like to make this a very special occasion. Elie Wiesel and I are planning to give a dinner for him here in New York. I know how deeply touched Hans would be if you could attend. This might also be a good occasion for you to meet prominent Jewish leaders in a casual situation. We could make it March 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, or 14. We would prefer to have a dinner, but if this could not be worked into your schedule, an afternoon reception could be arranged.

I have been working on a book about your foreign policy which W.W. Norton asked me to do and which they would like to publish in September. If you should like to see the manuscript before I submit it to Norton, I would be happy to give it to you.

I hope you know that you have loyal friends who appreciate your efforts.

P.S. Please address all correspondence to my home: 275 Central Park West
New York, New York 10024
Telephone: 212 799-6086

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1976

Mr. Secretary,

The Stoessingers have called to tell you that the following people will be coming for their dinner for Hans Morgenthau at 8:00 p.m. on Friday, March 12:

Miss Hilde Limondjian (from Metropolitan Museum) (friend of Mr. Morgenthau)

Mr. and Mrs. Saul Bellow

Professor and Mrs. Arthur Schlesinger

Mr. and Mr. Elie Wiesel

Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Miller

Mrs. Stoessinger hopes very much that Mrs. Kissinger will accompany you.

Yes ____ No ____

snorted

3/5

Saul Bellow has asked if you might possibly see him prior to the dinner re his book.

Yes, 6:30 ____ prefer ____ No ____

jane

[4]

March 3, 1976

Sir:

You have agreed to attend a dinner on March 12 in New York hosted by Mr. and Mrs. John Stoessinger for Hans Morgenthau. A Jet Star has been reserved for the trip. It would be helpful to know your plans for the evening in order to make appropriate administrative arrangements.

You will have spent the night of March 10 and most of March 11 in Boston. Will you remain overnight in New York on March 12?

Yes, will remain overnight [Signature] 3/8 10AM
No, I plan to return to Washington after dinner

Saul Bellow will be attending the Stoessinger dinner and has asked to meet privately with you before dinner to discuss his book.

Agree to meet Bellow before dinner March 12 [Signature] next week
Schedule some other time in Washington

If you do not stay overnight, do you want us to reserve a suite for you at the Waldorf Towers?

Yes, I will need a suite
No, a suite is not necessary

Paul PEB

Hunter College

(212) 360-2401

11 May 1976

Dear Henry:

Last week we enjoyed a warm and lovely evening with your parents who came to dinner at our house. Hans was here too and we exchanged reminiscences about the past.

Your mother was kind enough to show me a brief essay "Impressions of a Journey" that you wrote in 1945 when you returned to Germany after the war.

Would you mind if I quoted three passages from that essay in my book? They read as follows:

> The woods stretched on the hillside and the city was far away......... it was quiet in the forest....... The grass was growing in the cemetery. I walked along the pathway and faced a granite stone. I stood a long time to talk to my grandfather. Because people like him don't ever die. Their spirit and faith live on forever.........

> The colonel looked up. "An American officer to see you", the orderly said. The Mädchenlyceum had been converted into a hospital. "I want to see this school", I said. We walked through the corridors and wherever we went, men stood at attention and wherever we walked, the past followed. "Why do you inspect the school", the colonel asked. "I am paying a debt, a debt to my father."

Hunter College

(212) 360-2401

We drove through the streets of Nuremberg. It was a town like so many others, only a little worse. Senseless rubble was its landmark. The opera house, the Kulturverein, the railway station, the post office, all were punched into ruin. We stood on the hill and looked into the valley. The shell of Nuremberg lay before us. "Those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword." There on the hill overlooking Nuremberg I said farewell to my youth.

I must tell you that I found this early essay both moving and deeply felt.

Needless to say, I will incorporate your initiatives toward Africa in the book. If you do not have the time to read the entire manuscript, I would be grateful for your comments on the concluding chapter.

We often speak of you with much affection and hope you are well.

P.S. Please address all correspondence to my home: 275 Central Park West
New York, N.Y. 10024

Tel: 212 - 799-6086

GUGGENHEIMER & UNTERMYER

80 PINE STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

TELEPHONE: DIGBY 4-2040

CABLE ADDRESS MELPOMENE NEW YORK
TELEX-126278

December 16, 1976

Ms. Jacqueline Wexler
President, Hunter College
695 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Re: John G. Stoessinger

Dear Ms. Wexler:

We are counsel to Professor John G. Stoessinger, a member of the Political Science Department, who has asked us to write to you concerning the status of his matter in Federal Court.

As you may know, on September 9, 1976, Professor Stoessinger pleaded guilty to an Information filed by the United States Attorney charging him with misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4. This section provides that:

"Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony . . . conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil . . . authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

Basically, Professor Stoessinger's offense occurred in November-December 1973 when he learned from John Barry, a Canadian businessman whom he had met earlier that year, that Barry had been defrauded by Anne Lamont and that money Professor Stoessinger had received from Miss Lamont as an advance against royalties for his book, *Nations in Darkness*, a large sale of which she claimed to have negotiated with R.C.A., had in fact been derived from Barry, a fact not definitely known to Professor Stoessinger until then. Professor Stoessinger at that time acquired "knowledge of the actual commission of a felony" by someone else. However, he spoke to no one about this and did not "as soon as possible make known" his newly-acquired knowledge.

[Lc]

-2-

December 16, 1976

In December, he was visited in his United Nations offices by Inspector Slavinski of the United States Postal Inspection Service who asked whether Professor Stoessinger had ever been given money by Anne Lamont. Without consulting his then-attorney and although he had been given two personal loans by Miss Lamont, the one in 1973 already referred to and another in 1972, which Miss Lamont also told Professor Stoessinger was an advance against royalties for *Nations in Darkness*, and although he had signed two personal notes to Miss Lamont for the loans, Professor Stoessinger told Mr. Slavinski that he had not been "given" any money, erroneously making a distinction between "being given" and "being loaned". That statement constituted the "conceal[ment]" of a material fact. However, the very next morning, Professor Stoessinger called Mr. Slavinski to clarify that he had in fact received money from Miss Lamont as a loan. Ironically, Inspector Slavinski already knew the facts and told Professor Stoessinger that he knew them.

In addition, when Professor Stoessinger learned from Mr. Barry in November 1973 that the money received from Miss Lamont earlier that year was derived from Mr. Barry, he immediately offered to pay back the money and made a $3,000 downpayment to Mr. Barry. However, after making the first downpayment, on advice of his then-counsel that he might in fact owe the money to Miss Lamont and might incur double liability if he further paid Mr. Barry, Professor Stoessinger ceased making payments. We will refer to these circumstances further below.

Subsequently, Professor Stoessinger appeared four times in the Grand Jury and on innumerable occasions in the United States Attorney's Office, telling all that he knew about the activities of Miss Lamont.

Unbeknownst to him, Miss Lamont had used various letters of recommendation for fraudulent purposes which he had written at her request for innocent purposes. When he learned in November 1973 of her fraudulent activity, he

-3-

December 16, 1976

attempted to warn foreign governments, including the Republic
of Congo at Brazzaville to stay away from her.

Professor Stoessinger told the federal authorities
all of these facts. Miss Lamont was indicted on charges of
fraud in 1974 and re-indicted in 1976. In September 1976,
the United States Attorney informed us that a criminal charge
of misprision would be brought against Professor Stoessinger
and thereafter entered into an agreement with him whereby
he would plead guilty to the charge, continue to make himself
available to investigators on the Lamont case, and testify
against her at her criminal trial.

Subsequent to his plea of guilty, Professor
Stoessinger testified for three days in Federal Court against
Miss Lamont. Contrary to newspaper reports of the trial,
Professor Stoessinger did not know to what use Miss Lamont
would put the letters of recommendation and did not know,
even until the trial, that she was not an international
financier, and so testified. His letters were not intended
by him to be other than letters of recommendation. He did
not know what her background was, but merely relied on her
representations to him.

Last Friday night, December 10, 1976, she was
convicted on seven major fraud counts. At the trial,
United States District Judge Edmund Palmieri, who presided,
closely observed Professor Stoessinger as a witness and
stated at one time during the trial to Miss Lamont's lawyer:

"I think he (Professor Stoessinger) is making a
sincere effort to tell the truth whether it hurts
him or not."

As you will remember, when Professor Stoessinger spoke with
you on Friday, December 10, 1976, he told you we were making
an effort to have the formal charge against him dropped. However,
subsequent to Friday, we have learned that the charge will not
be dropped. Thus, unfortunately, he will be sentenced on
January 18, 1977, before United States District Judge
Charles Haight.

-4-

December 16, 1976

The "misprision" charge, to which he pleaded, is a curious and minor offense in the law. Many courts have thought it to be akin to negligence. At common law, a citizen was required to intervene actively in order to prevent the commission of a serious crime. The failure of an individual to satisfy this obligation constituted the misdemeanor of misprision of felony. In our modern system of jurisprudence, the common law misdemeanor has been transmuted into a federal felony of the lowest order. In addition, many courts have felt that the full scope of misprision had to be limited so that it did not conflict with the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, in Professor Stoessinger's situation, had he in fact had a reasonable fear of being convicted of a crime by reason of the information he concealed, he could have refused to answer Inspector Slavinski's questions, and could not have been charged with misprision. Since Professor Stoessinger, in our view, could not have been convicted of a crime by reason of the information he concealed, he had some obligation to report his knowledge. Failing to do so, he committed an act of misprision.

You will undoubtedly want to know what the consequences to Professor Stoessinger will be of his plea of guilty. Generally, a judge considers three principal objectives when he must impose sentence: (1) retribution - denunciation; (2) deterrence; and (3) rehabilitation - repentence. In our experience, an individual with a background like Professor Stoessinger's is generally regarded by Federal Courts as not being a proper subject for retribution or denunciation. Furthermore, deterrence of him or of others like him is thought to be satisfied by the act of charging him with a crime. Many commentators regard the station in life and present predicament of an individual like Professor Stoessinger as extraordinarily persuasive factors pointing toward leniency in sentencing. Finally, in Professor Stoessinger's case the profound personal and financial consequences to him will clearly be regarded as severe enough punishment. Professor Stoessinger has made it clear to the federal authorities that consistent with his present financial ability, he stands ready to repay the money received from Miss Lamont to whomever is deemed appropriate, including a worthy charity or institution. Such a representation, with an appropriate plan of execution, will be made to Judge Haight at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, we believe

U. S. News & World Report

WASHINGTON

2300 N STREET, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

June 13, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Speaking for Howard Flieger, Joe Fromm, Howard Handleman and Grant Salisbury, I want to express our thanks for the time you so graciously gave us for the interview. It certainly merited the cover, and the six pages we allotted.

We are sending twenty-five copies of the magazine to Bob McCloskey early Monday for your purposes, and should you need additional copies we shall be glad to supply them. As you may already know, we provide the mail room at State 300 magazines each week, which they include in air mail pouches to all embassies and diplomatic missions abroad.

I also enclose a copy of the reprint which is being mailed to press associations, radio-TV commentators, Washington bureaus and editorial writers of daily newspapers. An additional 100 copies of the press release are being placed in the press room at State on Saturday for distribution to all accredited correspondents.

These, Mr. Secretary, together with our magazine audience of nine million readers, should give very wide dissemination of your views both here and abroad, and we greatly appreciate your time and co-operation.

MLS:h
Enclosure

[LC]

Exclusive Interview

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER

"We Are
Moving
Into a
New
World"

With events at a critical juncture—in the Mideast, dealing with Russia, China, NATO, the energy crisis—Mr. Kissinger takes a sweeping, analytical look ahead in this interview with editors of the magazine.

Q Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone was hailing American foreign policy as a great success story. Now everything seems to be coming apart at the seams. What's gone wrong?

A First of all, I don't think everything is "coming apart at the seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effective and strong.

Our relations with Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are essentially on course. With respect to the "third world," we have developed new initiatives at the recent meetings of the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] and the IEA [International Energy Agency] in Paris.

We have had a temporary setback in the Middle East, but I expect that momentum will soon be restored. Further interim discussions or some form of over-all discussions are inevitable. What has been done previously has laid the basis for what is being done now.

The collapse of Indo-China was, of course, both a setback and a tragedy—and, we believe, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy.

Q How then do you explain the widespread criticism of U.S. foreign policy?

A I believe that many of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our domestic situation and not the reality of our foreign policy.

I have consistently said that you cannot have foreign policy without authority, and that to the extent that the central authority is undermined for whatever reason—even if it's the

fault of the central authority—it will ultimately affect the conduct of foreign policy.

Curiously enough, the price we paid during Watergate, while harmful, was not extreme. While Watergate was going on, debate on foreign policy was muted. But then, after Watergate was over, there suddenly was an orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about Chile, Turkey and Vietnam all crystallized into extremely controversial issues. All of them coming together produced a serious multiplier effect.

I have the sense that this phase was terminated with the collapse of Vietnam. While Congress is now not in an uncritically accepting mood, it is also not in an uncritically contentious mood. The position of the Presidency—which is, after all, the central element in foreign policy—has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and the Congress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore, the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on a healthier basis.

Q Why did the collapse in Vietnam bring that change in Congress?

A First of all, because no one can debate any more that there was a "domino effect"; this is self-evident. Secondly, no one can deny that it has had a shocking impact even where there was no domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline. Whatever the public's reaction was to the merits of our involvement in Vietnam, the public reaction to its aftermath is that the United States should not be seen to be retreating in the world.

The support for the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident and the general public attitude which are reflected in the votes on the defense bill seem to indicate that the American public now feels that the period of turmoil—of the Vietnam debate, of the Watergate debate—should be ended.

Q As you see it, are the American people still prepared to accept the defense burden and other sacrifices necessary to support a world role for this country?

A Yes, that is my impression. I think our biggest asset is

20

Copyright © 1975, U.S. News & World Report, Inc.

[L.C.]

KEY POINTS MADE
BY MR. KISSINGER

Editors of U.S. News & World Report with the Secretary.

USN&WR

widespread public support—which was never as weak as the noise level in Washington would have indicated.

**Q** What effect has the Vietnam collapse had in the rest of the world?

**A** I think the sudden collapse of Vietnam brought home to a lot of countries the central role of America and its foreign policy. It led to a profound concern in many countries about the conclusions we might draw from that event.

Basically, what happened in the NATO meeting [summit conference in Brussels, May 29-30] was what we were hoping to achieve in the "Year of Europe" in 1973. Our basic argument then—in 1973—was that security, political and economic factors are all related and that the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, had to deal with them simultaneously and with a concept of what kind of future we wanted for ourselves and our children.

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this approach in 1973. But in 1975—at Brussels—Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put forward as his own idea, and without any previous discussion with us, exactly this proposal. And all heads of government present accepted it—with France, which was not represented by the head of government, being the only exception.

So I think that in this sense the events in Indo-China have brought things into perspective.

**Q** Do you expect that our allies, as a result of this, will now do more to keep America involved around the world?

**A** First, the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position.

Secondly, the central importance of the American role for both peace and progress has been brought home to them in no uncertain terms.

And, thirdly, I think that the President's calm and strong leadership has had a very positive effect.

**Q** As you look to the future, what lies ahead for the United States?

**Israel:** "We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. . . . But we are in no way committed to the status quo."

**Foreign-policy setbacks:** "I don't think everything is coming apart at the seams." Relations with allies "have never been better," and with Russia and China they "are essentially on course."

**Oil-price increase:** In view of increases over the past two years, "another rise is clearly not justified." The U.S. would "certainly strongly oppose" the $4-a-barrel increase that some OPEC countries have mentioned.

**Arab oil embargo:** "I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it." In any case, "it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price manipulation."

**Detente:** "Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity."

**Brezhnev visit:** The Washington visit by Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev this fall will depend on a new SALT agreement. Chances of an agreement "are better than even."

**SALT violations:** "The Soviets have worried us in several areas" with respect to alleged violations of the strategic-arms-limitation agreement. Most questions have been resolved, but "one or two issues are still unsettled."

**U.S. and China:** "What Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders" indicated they want the U.S. to stay in Asia. As a result, they are "not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia."

**War danger in Korea:** U.S. was "profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position." But recent events make it clear "it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea."

**Communism in Portugal:** At some point "we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government."

**European neutralism:** "In many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life."

**Effect of Vietnam:** As a result of the collapse in Indo-China, "the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position."

**President vs. Congress:** "The position of the Presidency has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and Congress is now on a healthier basis."

**U.S. world role:** "I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline," and they are prepared to accept the burdens and sacrifices necessary to sustain it.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 23, 1975

21

[LC]

## INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER

[continued from preceding page]

A We are moving into a new world. The kind of world that emerged in the immediate post-World War II period had substantially eroded by the late '60s and early '70s. We are in a period of adjusting the American role in the world to a new environment.

Today's world is marked by multipolarity among countries, divisions in the Communist world, growth of Europe and Japan, and greater assertiveness of the underdeveloped countries. All this fragmentation has occurred at the same time that economic interrelationships are demonstrating the interdependence of the world.

So you have confrontation on a political level, and on an economic level the need for co-operation. You have on the political level continued ideological hostility, but you have on the nuclear level the realization that there is no alternative to peace.

Q What does that mean as far as American foreign policy is concerned?

A We had to design a much more complex strategy than the one that characterized the immediate postwar period. We are trying to design a policy that is not a response to crisis but to the realities of the present and the hopes of the future; a policy that looks at the evolution of history and the American contribution to it. While any policy has imperfections, I think we are clearly moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, the architecture is not completed; many issues remain unresolved. There is still an unfinished agenda.

But I would like to point out that if you interview a Secretary of State three years from now he, too, should have an unfinished agenda. It is an American illusion to believe that foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems. Foreign policy cannot do that; it is always a dynamic process.

Q Turning to Soviet-American détente: How do you answer the criticism that is so often heard that this is a one-way street that benefits only Russia?

A I am certain that in Moscow whatever opponents of détente there may be are making exactly the same argument. What you get, as the result of three years of détente, is that people like all the benefits of détente, plus all the psychic satisfaction of a tough posture.

There is no question that the American public prefers peace to war and anti-Communism to Communism. So the question is—and it's not an easy one: How do you bring these two into balance with each other?

Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity; both sides have benefited. Some of the events that have happened in the world that have been against our interests have been caused by the Soviets; others have not. Some have been caused by our failure to take adequate unilateral actions. For those we have no one but ourselves to blame.

Détente is not a substitute for American action. Détente is a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Détente is not a substitute for American strength. But it can enable us to reduce the risks that we will ever have to make use of that strength.

Q Do you mean that under the rules of détente, one side is free to exploit a local situation to gain an advantage?

A Of course not. I am saying that the minimum objective of détente must be to reduce the dangers of general nuclear war. That we have certainly done with some success.

The second objective is to reduce direct conflict in areas of vital importance to both countries, such as Central Europe. That we have done remarkably well.

USN & WR

> "We are the only non-Communist country strong enough and cohesive enough to play a world role."

The third objective is to create links that will provide incentives for moderation. Progress here has been uneven, and we have been weakened by the Trade Act.

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, we have not made as much progress as we should.

Q You mentioned the Trade Act, which made economic concessions to Russia contingent on more-liberal Soviet emigration policies. How has that weakened the policy of détente?

A Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation and penalties for intransigence. The penalties for intransigence are supplied mostly by our defense budget and by our foreign policy. I think that is going reasonably well.

As for incentives for moderation, the Trade Act was one of the elements we had hoped to have available. We have always held the view that to inject the emigration issue into it hurt our relations with the Soviet Union, hurt us economically and—most tragically of all—hurt the people it was supposed to help.

Q How can you reconcile what the Russians have done in Vietnam, the Mideast and Portugal with détente?

A Let's discuss each of these.

First, Vietnam was not caused by the Russians. Vietnam had its own dynamics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Vietnam remained relatively constant. But our aid level dropped—by 50 per cent in each of two successive years—to the point where no equipment and very few spare parts were delivered in Vietnam after May, 1974. The GVN [Government of South Vietnam] even reached the point where ammunition had to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Therefore, what happened had many causes of which Soviet actions were only a part.

The situation in Portugal was not caused by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have not assisted the democratic forces adequately, the reasons lie far more in our own domestic debates than with the Soviets.

Q And the Middle East?

A In the Middle East, I would not be surprised if in

22

[L.C.]

Moscow they made the same argument and said that we
have been using détente to improve our position.

At any rate it is not evident to me—in contrast to our own
position—that the Soviet Union has improved its position in
the Middle East in the last two years. The opposite seems to
me to be the case.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not
cheating on the strategic-arms-limitation agreement that was
signed in 1972?

A When you have strategic forces on both sides in the
present state of technical complexity and in the process of
modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will
emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have
taken those up in the Soviet-American standing commission
which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect
to a number of these issues, we have received answers
which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right
direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do
not go to the heart of the SALT agreement. But we will
pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been
reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and
special pleading.

Q What about SALT II? Is there going to be an agreement
this fall?

A The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been
more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is
the technical implementation of issues that are very compli-
cated. I should think that the chances are better than even
that we will have a SALT II in the fall. But we could fail,
either because we just can't solve the technical issues or
because political tensions rise.

Q Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?

A That will depend on SALT.

Q In other words: no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?

A I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark
his visit with some significant result.

REFUSING TO LET MIDEAST "FESTER"—

Q President Ford recently spoke of the Middle East as the
most dangerous problem in the world today. What are the
prospects now of making progress toward a settlement of the
conflict there?

A Logically, the conditions should be there—either on an
interim or an over-all basis. As the President has said, we are
determined to make progress. If we cannot get it on an
interim basis, we will promote an over-all settlement. We
will not permit the situation simply to fester.

Q How do you prevent it from festering?

A By engaging in active diplomacy and using our influ-
ence—which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that area—to
encourage progress.

Q What has resulted from President Ford's meetings with
President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel
that will open the way to new negotiations for a Middle East
settlement?

A The meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have been extremely important in helping to crystallize our thinking on how best to proceed. They have helped us understand the views of both on how they think the negotiating process might be renewed.

They were both constructive, though neither meeting was
an occasion for coming to detailed decisions. We, as well as
the two governments concerned, are now reflecting on the
best course to follow. We will be following up with both
Israel and Egypt through diplomatic channels, as well as
talking with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam here in the

coming days. We will also stay in close touch with other
interested governments.

From all of these consultations we hope a decision can be
taken on how to move toward the negotiated settlement we
all seek.

Q Is it feasible to go for an over-all settlement if you can't
get Egypt and Israel to agree even on a limited settlement in
the Sinai?

A That remains to be seen. It probably won't be an
extremely rapid process.

Q Can you count on any help from the Russians in
promoting a settlement—or are they mainly interested in
perpetuating a conflict that they can exploit?

A On the one hand, you can argue that they like the
tension in the area because it creates a chance for enhanced
influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that tensions
which force a country to take positions which it then cannot
implement do not, in the long run, enhance its influence.

So I would think that, as a result of the events of recent
years, the Soviet Union could come to the view that it is
running risks disproportionate to what it is getting out of. It.
And if that is true, perhaps conditions for a more construc-
tive relationship will develop. Certainly in recent months the
Soviet Union has not been as aggressive about the Middle
East as they might have been.

Q How is your negotiating position in the Middle East
affected by the fact that 76 Senators have signed a letter in
support of Israel?

A I did not recommend the letter be sent. But we will
take it into account. We will study it.

“TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL”-

Q Six Presidents have declared a commitment to the
survival and security of Israel. In practical terms, what does
that really mean?

A We have a historic commitment to the survival and the
well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed
by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to
the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on
the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

The art of our foreign policy is to reconcile as many of
America's interests as we can, and not to emphasize one to
the exclusion of all of the others. We have many interests
that need to be accommodated:

We have an interest in good relations with the Arab
countries. We have an interest in the economic well-being
and security of Western Europe and Japan. And we have an
interest in not having unnecessary confrontations with the
Soviet Union. We believe all these interests can be recon-
ciled with our traditional friendship for Israel.

Q What do you think of suggestions that an Israeli with-
drawal to its pre-1967 borders would tend to lower oil prices?

A I think it would be extremely dangerous for the United
States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price
manipulation. We have refused to discuss our political objec-
tives in relation to the price of oil, and will continue to do so.

Q More generally on the oil problem: Can we live with
another $4-a-barrel increase that's being talked about for the
fall?

A I do not know that there will be a $4 increase in the
price of oil. That would be an increase of over 30 per cent.
We are strongly opposed to an increase. We believe that the
increases of '73 and '74 have been so inflationary and so
disruptive of the world economy that another rise is clearly
not justified. To impose a $4 increase on top of the present
precarious world situation is not even in the interest of the
OPEC countries. We would certainly strongly oppose it.

Q But what can we do to oppose any increase that the

23

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### Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries chooses to make?

**A** Basically, we cannot fight unilateral increases effectively until we create the objective conditions which will transform the market forces. It is another area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated to objective factors is not going to do us any good.

We are attempting in the International Energy Agency to create the objective conditions which will transform power in the marketplace by reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. At the same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut production in order to sustain prices will diminish as development programs in other countries grow and the producers' need for real resources mounts.

Therefore, some point inevitably will be reached where the market must shift. How quickly it is reached depends on the decisiveness with which the industrialized consumer countries co-operate. This is the effort in which we are now deeply—and reasonably successfully—engaged.

**Q** A year ago the Administration was talking about getting the price of oil down. Now you're talking about keeping the price from going up. Why has the objective changed?

**A** The policy has not changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be kept separate. We would like prices to come down. But we cannot get them down until after we have succeeded in keeping them from going up.

At a time when OPEC is threatening to increase prices, it's senseless to talk about getting them down. We are opposed to the current prices. We are even more opposed to higher prices. We will work with determination to bring about conditions in which this cannot continue.

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I have no doubt that it will lead to increased consumer solidarity and a speeded-up program to shift market conditions. This is our policy—to change market conditions—and I think it will succeed.

We are pursuing the only sensible policy available to bring about a price cut. You can talk about embargoes and counter-embargoes, but when you analyze them you will find they usually hit the countries that politically give us the strongest support and whose role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these measures generally would not be backed by the other consuming countries.

So if we pursued them we would be putting ourselves at a political and probably economic disadvantage. But we are determined to bring about an improvement in the market conditions of oil.

**Q** Why is it so difficult to get the industrial consuming countries to co-operate on the kind of joint policy that you advocate?

**A** Because none of the consumer countries want to risk a confrontation. Therefore, to some extent the producer countries can blackmail at least some of the consumer nations.

Another reason is that independence requires difficult domestic efforts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and occasionally painful.

So, many countries—including ours—are using the fact that there is a recession which imposes oil conservation as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conservation.

**Q** How much will the success or failure of this whole program depend on action by Congress?

**A** The role of the Congress is absolutely pivotal.

The United States consumes 50 per cent of the world's energy; many of the resources for alternative programs must come from American technology. Without a major American program there can be no effective policy among consumer nations.

USN&WR

> "Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation, penalties for intransigence."

**Q** Is the energy program that Congress appears likely to approve sufficient to do the job?

**A** It is sufficient to make a start on the policy. It is not, however, adequate to do the whole job.

**Q** Have you been surprised at the ability of the OPEC countries to cut production as deeply as they have in order to maintain their price?

**A** No. I think they are beginning to approach a point where production cuts will become more and more painful.

**Q** But isn't pressure on OPEC countries to cut production going to ease as we get economic recovery here as well as in Europe and Japan?

**A** It is going to be a very serious problem. The recovery will increase our need for oil, but it will not affect the ability of the OPEC countries to make further production cuts.

**Q** Do you anticipate another oil embargo by the Arabs?

**A** I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it.

**Q** Getting back for a moment to the aftermath of Vietnam: We keep hearing that China wants the United States to stay in Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance you've had?

**A** It is based not on assurances but on fairly hard evidence—that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders.

**Q** Why do they now want us to stay after agitating for so many years to get us out of Asia?

**A** The Chinese are extremely realistic. They realize that their security depends on a world equilibrium. They understand that the United States must inevitably be a major part of such an equilibrium. For this reason, they do not want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent.

**Q** In that connection, is there any truth to reports that China has tried to dissuade North Korea from going to war against the South?

**A** I cannot confirm those reports. But our general impression is that the People's Republic of China is not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia.

**Q** What, in your judgment, are the chances of war in Korea?

**A** In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, we were

24

[continued from page 24]

profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position. We were also concerned that a collapse of South Korea would have a disastrous impact on Japan.

The events of recent weeks are beginning to make clear that the United States is prepared to defend its interests in the world and that it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea. Many of the problems that existed with respect to Vietnam do not exist with respect to Korea.

**Q** Because the United States has a mutual-security treaty with South Korea—

**A** That's right.

**Q** In view of the Vietnam debacle, is President Ford still planning to go to China this fall?

**A** That is still the plan.

**Q** Is it possible for him to go without discussing the Taiwan situation?

**A** No, but it is possible for him to go without bringing that situation to a conclusion.

**Q** Will the United States be obliged to change its relations with Taiwan?

**A** Not in order for the President to go to China.

**Q** Looking a bit further ahead: Do you expect the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship to survive after Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone?

**A** The problem in foreign policy is to be able to discern the realities of the situation and not to tie it to personalities. The realities could shift to some extent—and all foreign policy is subject to change.

The reality of Asia is the geopolitical impact on each other of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, plus the memory of what has happened. We are not exploiting this. We are not encouraging it, and we didn't create it.

To some extent the reality will continue. There may be shifting accents that will affect us, and we must be aware of these. It is also important not to be so obsessed with immediate threats that one forgets long-term threats.

But the essential architecture of our foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be sound. The fact that it has survived some of the shocks of this past year proves that it is sound.

**Q** A final point concerning Europe: Why is it left to this country to deal with major problems in Europe while Europeans turn their backs—problems such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey?

**A** It is left to the United States because fate has put us in the position where we are the only non-Communist country that is strong enough and domestically cohesive enough to play a world role. Therefore, if certain things are not done by us, they will not be done by anyone. And while it might be fairer if somebody else took some of the responsibility, the fact is that a catastrophe is no less real for having been brought about by attempts to shift responsibility to others.

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portuguese problem. Many of the European countries are extremely active with respect to Portugal. However, as the strongest country in the Alliance, we have to state a position with respect to Portugal, and particularly its relationship to NATO. This is all we have done, in addition to some economic aid which we have given.

With respect to Spain, we are the only Western country that has a defense relationship with Spain. For some European countries there is a domestic problem with respect to dealings with Spain. But it is also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, the evolution there could take very traumatic forms, and this is what we are attempting to deal with.

**Greece, Turkey:** Again, we have a problem of the eastern

end of the Mediterranean, of the domestic evolution in both of these countries, and of the world equilibrium. We were perhaps projected into it somewhat more dramatically than we might have desired by certain domestic events in the United States, and we have been forced to stake more on this than might have been thought desirable from an abstract consideration of foreign policy.

But we do have an interest in retaining both of these friendly countries in NATO, in maintaining our traditional friendships with both countries and not have the eastern end of the Mediterranean turn into uncontrolled chaos—or, for that matter, controlled chaos.

**Q** Why does the U.S. seem so much more concerned than the Europeans about the Communist influence in Portugal?

**A** All we are saying is that at some point the evolution in Portugal will have reached a stage where we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government. At that point, we will have to consider the implications of our actions for Italy, Spain and the other European countries.

We have told our European allies that this is not something to be determined in the abstract. We are continuing our economic-aid program to Portugal for the time being. But we do not believe that we have to delude ourselves about what is going on there.

**Q** Outside Portugal, do you get the feeling that neutralism is spreading in Western Europe?

**A** No, I have the sense that, with the present governments, the awareness of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is increasing. However, in many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life. And that is a worrisome phenomenon for the middle and longer term. It is one of the factors we are keeping in mind with relation to Portugal.

**Q** All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic about the future?

**A** I'd like to repeat: We're moving into a new world, and I think that we are moving in the right direction.

There will always be unfinished business, and the more effective you are, the more unfinished business you will have.

[END]

USN & WR

> "It is an American illusion to believe foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems."

27

[LC]

Aspen Berlin
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

1 Berlin 37
Inselstraße 10
Telefon 803 10 90
803 10 80

Cable: Aspen Berlin

Feb 17, 1975

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

R. O. Anderson
Chairman of the Board
J. E. Slater President

Dear Henry,

The papers report the good news about
your forthcoming visit to Berlin. Don't
forget as I have previously written to
include Aspen Berlin in your visit to
Berlin.

Our place in Schwanenwerder is really
beautiful. You can either relax here or
we can have a few people for a talk. Your
visit would be a contribution to Aspen's
work.

Needless to say our thoughts and
hopes are with you in the efforts you
are undertaking.

Shepard Stone
Director

Politik

Äthiopien Militärrat
bereit zum Waffenstillstand?

Eritreer flüchten aus Addis Abeba / Regierungstruppen verstärkt

ADDIS ABEBA, 16. Februar (AP). Ausnahmezustand und Kriegsrecht in Eritrea sind nach Mitteilung des äthiopischen Rundfunks von einer Reihe von Umbesetzungen in der Zivil- und Militärverwaltung der Provinz begleitet. Dem Sender zufolge wurde der Brigadegeneral Getachew Nadaw als Nachfolger des bisherigen Zivilgouverneurs zum gemäß Kriegsrechtsbestimmungen amtierenden obersten Vollzugsbeamten ernannt. Er übernimmt gleichzeitig das Kommando aller in Eritrea stationierten Regierungstruppen in Stärke von rund 20 000 Mann, das sind vierzig Prozent der gesamten Streitmacht des Landes. Auch an die Spitze der 2. Heeresdivision und der Polizei in Eritrea wurden neue Befehlshaber berufen. Im größten Teil Eritreas galt das Kriegsrecht schon seit 1971, doch war Asmara bisher davon ausgenommen.

Regierungskreisen in Khartum zufolge hat die äthiopische Militärregierung dem sudanesischen Waffenstillstandsvorschlag in drei Punkten zugeimmt: sofortiger Waffenstillstand zwischen den äthiopischen Truppen und den Aufständischen in Eritrea, Verkündung einer Generalamnestie der äthiopischen Regierung für alle Eritreer,

treer, die Waffen trugen oder in den Reihen der eritreischen Befreiungsfront (ELF) tätig waren, Beginn eines Dialogs beider Seiten ohne Vorbedingungen. Den Informanten zufolge hieß es in der Antwort aus Addis Abeba, eine äthiopische Persönlichkeit hohen Ranges werde in Kürze in Khartum eintreffen, um „die Anwendung der drei Punkte zu erörtern“.

Zu Tausenden verlassen gegenwärtig Frauen, Kinder und betagte Menschen die äthiopische Hauptstadt Addis Abeba, die, so befürchten sie, der nächste Schauplatz des eritreischen Bürgerkrieges sein könnte. Täglich befördern bis zu 60 Autobusse die flüchtenden Familien über 700 Kilometer in die Nordprovinz Eritrea, in der sich sezessionistische Aufständische blutige Kämpfe mit den Regierungstruppen liefern. Die Flüchtlinge gehören zu jenen schätzungsweise 30 000 Eritreern, die im Laufe der Jahre ihre Heimat verlassen und sich in der äthiopischen Hauptstadt niedergelassen haben. Die gleiche Richtung wie die Flüchtlinge nehmen Hunderte von Militärfahrzeugen und Soldaten, die zur Verstärkung der rund 20 000 Regierungssoldaten auf dem Land- und dem Luftweg nach Eritrea geworfen werden.

Türken deuten Konzessionen auf Zypern an

Die Griechen haben wenig Hoffnung auf internationale Unterstützung

Das Rennen zwischen
in Nordrhein-Westfalen

Die Union nach Umfragen knäf

L. B. DÜSSELDORF, 16. Februar. Zwischen Koalition und Opposition in Nordrhein-Westfalen zeichnet sich derzeit in der Wählergunst ein totes Rennen ab, wobei kräftige Verluste der SPD offenbar durch eine Stabilisierung der FDP aufgefangen werden. Die CDU steht knapp vor der absoluten Mehrheit. Der sozialdemokratische Ministerpräsident Kühn hat eine Januar-Umfrage des Godesberger Infas-Instituts dahingehend interpretiert, daß die SPD mit 43 Prozent und die FDP mit 6 Prozent der Wähler rechnen kann. Die CDU sei demgegenüber von 49 auf 48 Prozent zurückgefallen. Zugleich soll der Anteil der links- und rechtsradiakalen Splittergruppen von zwei auf drei Prozent gewachsen sein. Bei der letzten Landtagswahl 1970 hatten die CDU 46,3, die SPD 46,1 und die FDP 5,5 Prozent errungen, während auf Splittergruppen nur 2,1 Prozent entfallen waren.

Die Werte solcher Trendermittlungen sind mit Vorsicht zu betrachten, weil die Zuordnung der unentschlossenen Wähler erfahrungsgemäß problematisch ist, die Höhe der Wahlbeteiligung eine große Rolle spielt und die heiße Wahlkampfphase in Nordrhein-Westfalen erst drei Wochen vor dem Wahltag des 4. Mai beginnen wird. Kühn scheint selbst Vorbehalte zu haben. Er bekräftigte am Wochenende seine These, die Düsseldorfer Koalition sei in Gefahr, wenn bis April keine Tendenzwende bei der Konjunkturlage und der Arbeitsmarkt-Entwicklung eintrete. Er wiederholte auch seine Ansicht, die Bundesrepublik werde unter einer

Frankfurter Allgemeine, Montag 17. Feb. '75

[LC]

# Kissinger kündigt baldigen Besuch West-Berlins an
Gespräche in Bonn über Nahost und Energiefragen

Zwischenstation in der Bundeshauptstadt auf der Rückreise von Riad / Heute Treffen mit Gromyko

haw. BONN, 16. Februar. Mit der überraschenden Mitteilung, daß der amerikanische Außenminister Kissinger spätestens im April West-Berlin besuchen wird, ist am Sonntag eine kaum zwanzigstündige amerikanisch-deutsche Regierungskonsultation in Bonn zu Ende gegangen. Regierungssprecher Bölling wußte noch nicht zu sagen, ob Bundeskanzler Schmidt Kissinger in die ehemalige Reichshauptstadt begleiten wird, aber er betonte, daß es nicht notwendig gewesen sei, die Berlin-Frage in ihren Einzelheiten zu behandeln.

Die beiden Hauptthemen der Regierungskonsultation, die am Sonntagmittag im Bundeskanzleramt in einer Aussprache zwischen Außenminister Kissinger, Bundeskanzler Schmidt, Außenminister Genscher und Staatssekretär Sisco ihren Höhepunkt fand, waren der Nahe Osten und die verschiedenen Aspekte der Energiepolitik. Die Verhandlungen wurden, wie Bölling feststellte, mit Freimut und mit der traditionellen Offenheit geführt, durch die schon sehr viele Gespräche

zwischen Kissinger, Schmidt und Genscher charkterisiert worden seien.

Bilaterale deutsch-amerikanische Gespräche waren, wie Bölling hervorhob und Kissinger schon gleich nach seiner Ankunft vorausgesagt hatte, diesmal nicht zu besprechen. Insbesondere wußte der Regierungssprecher nicht darüber zu berichten, daß das Problem von Versorgungsflügen über die amerikanischen Luftstützpunkte in der Bundesrepublik berührt worden sei. Die Unterrichtung, die Kissinger über seine Bemühungen im Nahostkonflikt gab, hat nach Mitteilung des Regierungssprechers bei der deutschen Seite wegen der Sorgfalt und der Ernsthaftigkeit der Anstrengungen des amerikanischen Außenministers in den verschiedenen Hauptstädten tiefen Eindruck hinterlassen. Details wurden der Öffentlichkeit bekanntgegeben.

Die Gespräche über die Energiepolitik befaßten sich mit einem Austausch von Vorstellungen über die Vorkonferenz, bei der Frankreich einladende Macht ist. Von deutscher Seite wurde gesagt, daß sich die Standpunkte sehr

nahegekommen seien. Der Regierungssprecher verhehlte dabei nicht, daß es in einigen Fragen der Energiepolitik auch unterschiedliche Einschätzungen gibt. Im Zusammenhang mit den Erdöllproblemen sind monetäre Fragen der Zahlungsbilanz, der Investitionen, der Erdölüberschußländer und der Entwicklungshilfe durch die Erdölländer sowie andere mit den Petrodollars zusammenhängende Probleme besprochen worden. Hinsichtlich der Energiekonferenz waren sich beide Regierungen darüber einig, daß es auf ein Höchstmaß von Kooperation ankomme.

Ein drittes wesentliches Thema der Konsultationen, die von Außenminister-Gesprächen und Vollsitzungen der beiden Delegationen in Schloß Gymnich umrahmt waren, ist die beabsichtigte China-Reise Schmidts gewesen. Kissinger hat dem Bundeskanzler die eigenen Eindrücke von seinen Peking-Reisen vorgetragen und will ihm auch andere amerikanische Untersuchungen über die Rolle der Volksrepublik China in der Weltpolitik zugänglich machen.
(Fortsetzung Seite 2.)

161 Jahre, zu denen sie das Sondergericht für öffentliche Ordnung verurteilt hatte, erhielten die zehn Arbeiterführer jetzt nur noch zusammen 38 Jahre.

Vier von ihnen — Francisco Acosta, Luis Fernández Costilla, Pedro Santiesteban und Miguel Zamora — wurden am Wochenende schon freigelassen, weil sie schon vier Monate zu lange im Gefängnis waren. Marcelino Camacho erhielt 6 Jahre — das Sondergericht hatte ihn zu 20 Jahren verurteilt —, Nicolás Sartorius 5 statt 20, Eduardo Saborido und der Priester García Salve 5 statt 19 Jahre. Die 1973 zu 17 und 18 Jahren verurteilten Fernando Soto und Juan Muñiz Zapico erhielten vier Jahre, zwei Monate und einen Tag. Die vier jetzt Freigelassenen, die damals zu zwölf Jahren verurteilt worden waren, erhielten zwei Jahre, vier Monate und einen Tag.

Die Änderung der ersten, allgemein als Terrorurteil empfundene Entscheidung des Gerichts für öffentliche Ordnung wird in weiten Kreisen der Bevölkerung, auch in manchen Sektoren des Regimes begrüßt. Die katholische Zeitung „Ya“ spricht von dem Urteil des Jahres. Verärgerung soll bei dem

Sondertatskundgebungen in Spanien und im Ausland hätten die Änderung des Urteils bewirkt. Die Regierung habe gemerkt, daß der Kampf gegen dieses Urteil von Kräften getragen werde, die weit über den Kreis der Anhänger einer Gewerkschaft, einer Partei oder der Mitglieder einer bestimmten sozialen Klasse hinausreichten. Im Namen auch ihrer noch eingesitzenden Gefangenen dankten sie besonders den ausländischen Zeitungen für ihre ausführliche Berichterstattung.

Die Freigelassenen äußerten weiter, daß sie im Gefängnis Madrid-Carabanchel im allgemeinen gut behandelt worden seien. Sie hätten Kurse in Soziologie, Philosophie und Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, ja sogar Versammlungen der politischen Häftlinge durchführen können. Dagegen sei ihnen die Lektüre der — legalen — Oppositionszeitschrift „Cuadernos para el dialogo“ verboten worden. Allerdings sei Carabanchel das bei weitem humanste und am besten eingerichtete Gefängnis Spaniens.

Als Schikane des höheren Aufsichtsbeamten Mejuto bezeichneten sie einige Zwischenfälle am letzten Tag ihrer Haft und die Tatsache, daß es

den

Die zehn Angeklagten wurden in erster sowie zweiter Instanz wegen „Zugehörigkeit zu einer verbotenen Organisation“ verurteilt. Allerdings in erster Instanz als „führende Mitglieder der Organisation“, jetzt nur noch als Mitglieder. Die Beschwerden der Verkeidigung wegen formaler Verstöße der ersten Instanz (Verweigerung von Zeugen und Beweisanträgen) wurden vom Obersten Gerichtshof nicht akzeptiert, hingegen aber eine der Beschwerden wegen Verstoßes gegen das Gesetz.

Der Oberste Gerichtshof fand im Gensatz zum Gericht für öffentliche Ordnung keine Beweise dafür, daß die Verurteilten Führungsfunktionen in den „Arbeiterkommissionen“ ausgeübt hätten. Allerdings sieht auch die zweite Instanz die Gewerkschaft Arbeiterkommission als eine von der Kommunistischen Partei Spaniens abhängige Organisation an. Das wird von den Angeklagten bestritten. In den Arbeiterkommissionen, so sagten die Freigelassenen, seien Kommunisten, andere Marxisten, Katholiken und Arbeitnehmer ohne klare politische Heimat zusammengeschlossen.

## London und Moskau wollen ihre Beziehungen verbessern

### Wilsons Gespräche mit der sowjetischen Führung / Breschnew kritisiert Ost-West-Verhandlungen

Pzg. MOSKAU, 16. Februar. Premierminister Wilson, der das Wochenende in Leningrad verbrachte, ist am Sonntagnachmittag nach Moskau zurückgekehrt.

Generalsekretär Breschnew kritisierte in seiner Tischrede den Verlauf der Ost-West-Verhandlungen. Zu den Genfer Beratungen für die Europäische

er seine Politik der kleinen Schritte mit einem Schlafmittel, das die arabischen Völker beruhigen und ihre Forderungen vergessen lassen sollte. Aber

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 1601

PAGE 01
STATE 271423

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /016 R

DRAFTED BY: S:HCOLLUMS:GH
APPROVED BY: HCOLLUMS
S/S:MR SEBASTIAN

088856

P 040244Z NOV 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 271423

FOR LANDFAIR ONLY - PASS TO MR. SHEP STONE/ASPEN

DEAR MR. STONE:

SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS ASKED ME TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR
VERY KIND INVITATION TO ATTEND THE ASPEN INSTITUTE'S
CONFERENCE ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. BECAUSE OF PRIOR
SCHEDULE COMMITMENTS, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY REGRETS THAT
HE WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND.

UNCLASSIFIED