TELECON
Senator Adlai Stevenson/Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

7:25 PM

S: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

you're

S: I'm fine and I know I'm tired and busy.

K: That's all right.

S: Thank you for returning my call. The economic - the import control legislation and also the Eximbank legislation is in a subcommittee that I'm the - the subcommittee is banking this committee and I'm the Chairman of it. Both the Export control administration act and the Exim legislation expires at the end of this fiscal year, June 30. We held some hearings and we're planning a resumption of the hearings next week. What we want to focus on at this time are the foreign policy implications for both export controls and export credits. That of course raises the Jackson amendment but it's an example of a larger question, GAC opinion that a number of proposals one way or another, or bartering food principally for other commodities. The general purpose is to get into the foreign policy implications of export policies and we're starting with some administration witnesses, Casey is going to come up but I would hope at some point we might come in on you to testify in this phase of the hearings.

K: My trouble is I'll be on vacation next. How long are these hearings going to run?

S: They'll run through the month and maybe into May.

K: I don't think I'll be able to do it before May if that's still time.

S: No, that might be better. I'm in no position to say, but we'll be continuing certainly in early May.

K: I'll be on vacation and then there's that special assembly in N. Y. which brings so many foreign ministers here. Then we have an CAS meeting in Atlanta. If you would let me wait until May I would appreciate it.

S: By all means, it will suit your convenience. I do think you and you almost alone could speak authoritatively on this aspect. At some point hope very much.

K: As long as I have you on the phone, I wouldn't have bothered with it, the newspapers today all have stories about a failure of the SALT negotiations in Moscow and that's totally wrong.

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S: Oh, really.

K: They picked out a phrase I used two weeks ago saying it was time for a conceptual breakthrough, so they asked me was there a breakthrough, I said no, there wasn't a breakthrough there was progress, but they only heard no breakthrough. Today the Soviets papers all printed what I believe to be correct that there is a chance of coming to an agreement this year.

S: I haven't seen today's stories.

K: I just say this so that in your own considerations of credits you don't do it in the context of a failing detente.

S: I don't want to do anything at this point. I have no position myself and I would hope - what I really want to do is ventilate the issue and get started on it because we're under time restraints now and I don't know where you stand with the Jackson but from a little what I've heard there's no a great deal of progress on that in connection with the Trade Bill, in Congress whether there will even be a Trade Bill. In the meantime the Exim Bank is getting up closer and closer to it's ceiling and we're approaching the June 30 date. I would hope without polarizing the issue but handling it in a responsible way we can begin to ventilate this thing and Jackson amendment is just a part. Begin to move towards some kind of a compromise. I'm complete sympathetic with the motion for using export controls and credits for political purposes.

K: Oh, no. So do I. That doesn't bother me.

S: That doesn't bother me one bit.

K: There's no disagreement by me, with us on that.

S: They're arguing the other side. They say withhold the credits for political purpose. Others, some of them in the Jewish communicate. Marshall Shullman coming out and say give them to Kissinger for political purposes. That's the - that in a very large sense is the question, I think we ought to start ventilating it. Seriously and with no disposition on my part. I suspect on the part of the others, the banking committee, to reach any premature decisions. We do have one immediate problem, I don't know to what extent this enters in your problems, but that GAC opinion, notwithstanding the Attorney General, -does raise the validity of exim credits and guarantees into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. I don't know what the attitude of the export is and the banks are. I thought they would have serious doubts about exposing themselves, until that question gets resolved. Either it gets resolved by the Congress or in the courts. Nothing I can do about that one at the moment.

K: Let me aim for testifying in early May.

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TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

7:45 PM

(Missed first part)

V: Moscow. He has the report that the Soviets complained that Gromyko tried to get in touch with you while you both were in the Middle East and did not get an explanation.

K: Total nonsense.

V: He got that from Soviet sources.

K: Tell them it is total absolute nonsense.

V: OK.

K: That Gromyko made no effort to get in touch with me. I think they're all going crazy. Tell him for me it was a successful meeting.

V: I did that, just a moment ago.

K: He doesn't believe.

V: He seemed to be taking the point and thinking about it. I will tell him from you as well.

K: OK.

V: On this one, our position is that Gromyko did not make an effort to get in touch with you.

K: None what so ever. Is he at home?

V: I have his phone number.

K: Why don't you give me his phone number.

V: His phone number is 362-9040. If you're going to call him I won't.

K: OK.

END

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TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

8:00 PM

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Jerry.

S: Hi. Did you see the Star tonight?

K: Yes.

S: There's a wonderful cartoon.

K: I tell you this reporting from this trip is the weirdest I've ever seen. There must have been something wrong with my briefing. Have you seen that Moscow has now denied these stories and both have said there is a possibility of achieving an agreement.

S: Then you used us right.

K: I didn't use you. I tried to tell you guys the truth, which is no break through, but progress. Nobody seemed to hear the latter part. Really, let me tell you for your own guidance. You will not look bad if you do not howl with the pack. I'm not telling you there will be an agreement by June, right now, I'd say the chances are 50/50. They made a proposal which if it is suitably clarified, could be the basis of an agreement. If we don't get the required clarifications then it cannot be an agreement in June. But it is a definite movement. For the first time we're talking about the same thing. I don't give a damn whether one week says it's bad, in fact it's slightly helpful with the Soviets. The truth is literally what I said but you guys were so focused on the break through that when I said no break through, you didn't hear there was progress.

S: I guess so. Everybody's - the other thing is that you've, you went on such an upswing that everybody I think over reacted because of that. You know what I mean. The fact at least every time you go someplace....

K: Jerry, take out the communique from every previous pre-summit meeting. Compare it and make up your own mind. I wanted to tell you about that thing George Vest mentioned to me. It is total nonsense. Gromyko did not get in touch with me on the whole trip through the Middle East.

S: He was obviously expecting to meet you.

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K: Jerry. That anybody can say now. There was no communication to me from the Soviets at all during that trip. There was a communication by me to them before I went on the trip saying I would be available for consultations by their Ambassadors, in every place I visited, that was before I knew he would be in Damascus. I never received a reply to that.

S: Why should they say that he brought Sukhodrev along with him because he was expecting to see you.

K: Jerry. Don't you think the way to have done that would be send me a message saying he was prepared to meet me. I'm telling you we received no message of any kind from him, from the Embassy, we received no Soviet message of any kind about his travel.

S: Did you see any Soviet Ambassadors?

K: No, because they never replied to my message.

S: In Moscow they were saying Gromyko got a lot of heat from Brezhnev because he's done so well in the Middle East.

K: That is conceivable. But this may be his way of covering himself.

S: In other words, what's confusing to me why did he bring Sukhodrev with him. The timing of your visits were so close. They're saying you never consulted with them. You never explained why you didn't see him.

K: That is true since I didn't know he wanted to see me. Today we announced my trip to the Middle East. We sent a letter to Gromyko. A personal letter from me explaining how the trip had come about and saying I hoped he would instruct his Ambassadors in each capitol to be available for consultation because would get in touch with them if he agreed. Then a never heard from him again.

S: The next thing was you heard he was coming to the Middle East.

K: The next thing I heard he was coming.

S: I picked up some stuff around town here about possible compromises on MFN, like no natural gas - postponing the natural gas deal but they would, the Russians, would make some progress on the hardship list and maybe increase the numbers.

K: I don't want to go into that.

S: Well, I have to go into it. I just wondered if...

K: I wouldn't speculate on any hard and fast deal too much because it's a more fluent situation than that.

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S: I meant ___ Kosygin, not you.

K: I know what you meant. OK. On this Gromyko visit, believe me there's nothing to do. All he had to do was suggest it and we would have worked something out.

S: I need some kind of quote for the story can I say no break through but progress.

K: You can say it, no break through, but definite progress.

S: OK. Can we say - I thought the fairest estimate that you gave that says, no break through - you said it was inclusive.

K: Yes. I tried to be fair. That is true. It is inconclusive means that there is a chance, but no guarantee.

S: Why don't we say that, there's a chance but no guarantee. That's nice.

K: You can use that.

S: That puts the ball in the other court, nicely, I think. Are you going tomorrow.

K: Almost certainly.

S: How is Dayan?

K: It was alright.

S: I heard he was - he didn't come with much.

K: You know you guys are conducting my negotiations now.

S: We spend so much time with you...

K: I am quite confident we will work that thing - that we will come up with a reasonable position. Always compared it with the trend. I am perfectly relaxed. It was a good meeting.

S: OK. good. Have fun down there. We'll see you when you get back.
You really deserve a rest. I think you did a hell of a job on this thing. Obviously
you don't need me to say this, but I wouldn't be too upset by the reaction. I don't
think it's - it looks awful but you can already see the Russians are upset. The
thing that fascinates me is that they were really unsure of themselves this time.
This time they're in a different kind of league then they've been in before. Normally
they just go in and bully people and now they really have to think about what they
want and where they're going to go and I think it's driving them to distraction.

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TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

March 30, 1974

10:05 AM

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Al, I'm meeting with Dayan today and you know on that Syrian things what needs to be done. But one of their problems is that we've been dragging our feet on the arms supply. He's the only man who understands in Israel what needs to be done. So I think it's important he come back from here with some understanding of his position. One of his problems is the Soviet have put about 800 tanks into Syria since the war. We've only replaced 225 out of the 600 they lost. He feels he must have tanks which the army says they don't have, except by taking them from unit. I think that we just have to do that. And the same with ACPs.

H: How many of those do they need?

K: 500.

H: OK.

K: I'm going to have Brent work with Schlesinger but I would like to you, if you would, if we have anyproblem, I would like Dayan when he sees Schlesinger on Monday afternoon to be told he's getting this. So that he can go back to Israel as the man who produced it. That will then help us in the subsequent talks.

H: OK. Do you want me to wait until Brent tells me the way in or to move anyway. I can do it either way.

K: What do you think?

H: Maybe it's better not to undercut Brent, let him just start and if he finds there's a problem.

K: OK, I'll have Brent work it this weekend and get in touch with you if there's any problem. And you might just say the President is interested in Dayan having something to take home with him.

H: Exactly. I understand the picture, Henry, we'll just put the arm on him. It has to be done. We can fool with it.

K: Have you seen that the Soviets have now put out a statement denying these press reports.

H: No, I didn't.

K: The Soviets have put out a statement saying it is totally wrong to say it was a failure and that an agreement by June is quite possible.

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TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger

March 30, 1974

10:42 AM

K: How's Bermuda?

S: Very rainy.

K: Is it rainy. How is your moral?

S: Splendid.

K: That it can rain there that is why I go to Mexico, always you can be sure of good weather.

S: Yes.

K: Jim, this isn't a good line on which to talk, but you are seeing Dayan on Monday.

S: That's the plan.

K: Right. We are going over, with him the various disengagement schemes. He's really been the man who on the Egyptian disengagement and on the Syrian one has been the one who has carried the intellectual ball. I would be very useful if he could come back with some positive news on some of his concern. I don't have the list here in front of me so I don't want to go over individual items with you. If Brent could work with somebody, whom should he work with over the weekend.

S: He could work with John Whickem on that.

K: OK, I'll have him work with Whicken and I talked to the President about it yesterday, again not on items but as a general idea and he is sympathetic too. So can Brent work with Whickem and if you could in your conduct when you see him, do it from that point of view it would be very helpful.

S: You want to give him something?

K: Yes, definitely.

S: You know the cobra is something they been insisting on.

K: If you feel you could spring a few of those that might be a good gesture and it might also help in other context.

S: The problem is that the others will reach for the cobra.

K: Yes, but wouldn't that be a good way of doing it?

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S: If you give the cobra to them you have to give it to the Jordanians, you may have to give it to the Jordanians, just elevated the capabilities. I don't know whether that's a worrysome point or not.

K: Why don't you raise that with him.

S: Right.

K: I don't want to go into individual weapons now, I'm more talking about the general attitude.

S: But you want to be forthcoming.

K: Exactly.

S: No problem, we can go as far as you want.

K: Let me - Brent has the list - let me go over the list with Brent. Let him talk to Whickem. I just wanted you to know my attitude.

S: OK. The Israelis are being fairly cooperative then.

K: Frankly it will have to go through a process and again frankly we are counting very much on Dayan's support in this process.

S: OK. Very good.

K: The more he can be strengthened the better it will be.

S: OK, we shall attempt to strengthen him.

K: Good. Many thanks. Have a good rest.

S: Bye.

END

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
Mr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger

March 30, 1974

11:45 AM

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Hi, Ken, how are you?

R: I'm fine thanks.

K: I'm sorry we couldn't get together this morning and now I'm off for a vacation.

R: I know you are, you certainly deserve one, Henry and you should have. I think you have received most of the things I had in mind.

K: You had to go home. There wasn't any mixup about getting together today.

R: No. I just finished up everything and so I can home.

K: Did they tell you - you know, there's no reason for you to have stayed.

R: I wanted to, I had some things I wanted to do.

K: You wanted to go home.

R: No, I had some things I wanted to do in the office.

K: They did tell you I was going to see you right after Dayan.

R: No, they didn't. No one told me that.

K: Alright, never mind.

R: I thought you'd probably be with Dayan too much.

K: NO.

R: When do you leave, Henry - at 1:00?

K: Yes - there's no sense for you to come in, it isn't that important. Did you make clear to Kosciusko-Morizet that we infact did have evidence along the line that these articles said?

R: Yes we did. As a matter of fact, Henry, I played golf with him and with Mel Laird and with Jim Hutson just after you had seen him and he was telling me about his talk with you. I said we did have evidence, Jacques, some of your Ambassadors had been urging the Arabic countries, I won't tell you which ones, not to lift the boycott. He said well that can't be. I said, well it is, that's the evidence we had.

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kush - page 2

I said obviously it's indirect evidence, but we have the evidence. Then he came officially to give me the demarche. When I called him back in as you requested, I told him this over again that we did have indirect evidence to that effect. He denied it, he said that would be stupid of us. He said obviously that would mean a continued curtailment of production and that in turn would mean we would not - the price would stay high and it would hurt our economy very seriously. I said I don't know about that but certainly your Ambassadors are reputed to urge the continuance of the boycott and I assume they don't do anything that Jobert doesn't tell them to.

K: Basically it wasn't so much that they urged them the continuation of the boycott but they told them after the boycott was lifted they would see we'd go back to our pro-Israeli policy.

R: That was the point. I told them that was the reason that they urge the continuation of the boycott because the boycott was the only thing that kept us from going....

K: Some people say that - I've heard one story that said that Morizet said that I put out that story and that you didn't contradict him. Is there anything to that?

R: No, I told him that the thing was unauthorized. In essence I told him what you told me to. He told me that he - I knew nothing of his talk with you on Friday. He told me at the golf game the next day on Saturday afternoon, that he was sure that you had been the one who gave Marilyn Berger her information. I said what makes you think that? He said, well I just assumed that. When I called him in...

K: I never even saw the Marilyn Berger article.

R: That was the one that came out - she made it low key. That came out before the Evans and Novak article. Evans and Novak came out in the morning, that I saw Morizet - that was the day after you had seen Morizet. He said he thought Evans and Novak had received the information from you. I said I'm sure that was not the case. He then - I then told him on that second meeting, because I didn't know where that article in the AEP(?) had come from, that I had been in touch with you and I was authorized to see that anything in connection with the State Department, except an official saying anything attributed to the State Department, except what our official spokesman said, was unauthorized. He just accepted that, or at least he said nothing about it.

K: There's not much we can do about it, but basically I think we ought to freeze our relations with these guys for the time being.

R: I think frankly, Henry, they have somewhat been encouraged, the fact they have been treated so well as they got worse and worse. They think they can carry on what India did with you. The more we did for India, the worse they got. I think they feel the same way.

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K: Yes.

R: Henry, coming to another subject, we have, I think, got to put it up to Bill
Donaldson. Either to devote his time to security assistance or to energy. The
security assistance thing is - thank God we're putting George Vest in now to take
Sy Weiss' place. Sy is not moving in. I talked to both of them, I talk three talks
now to Donaldson.

K: Well, what does Donaldson say?

R: He said he's getting on top of it. I'd tell him about the personnel problem - he's
getting on top of it. I asked him to come back and report to me, and I'm just not
getting the reports back. I've just decided he's so completely wrapped up in energy
that it's not going to be able to get on top of security assistance.

K: Basically, he ought to be able to do them both.

R: He's certainly wrapped completely around energy now. With George Vest in,
PM is supposed to be, in essence, the staff for the Under Secretary for Security
Assistance. We'll see how that goes, but I'm very sceptical that Bill can handle
both jobs. At least he's not doing it now and he's been in there for 6 months.

K: He ought to be told he must.

R: I've told him three times now. I'll tell him again next week. I think I'll call
him again and tell him he may have to make a choice. See what his reaction is.
I don't think he quite has the capacity to spread himself over those two big jobs.
I think he's so deeply in on security - on energy. He's traveling too, quite a bit
on it. The security assistance thing, we just have to take up ourselves that Joe
is helping out on the Middle East. Did Joe see you, by the way, about Jordan.

K: Not yet.

R: On the 12 million five for Jordan, I just sent it back into Joe. On the 12 million
five, Henry, both AID and Holton think, they in essence told the committees, that
the Vietnam was the mass supplemental we were coming in on. They think it will
have a very bad reaction in the Congress on the whole thing if we go back in for an
extra supplemental of 12 and a half for Jordan. That the thing to do is to include
the Jordanian 12 and a half next year. That Jordan's cash position is very strong
now and they don't need the cash and that we might jeopardize even Vietnam if we
got back in additional supplemental request on Jordan. They've had a very bad
reaction in the Congress on Vietnam but I hope we'll get that through. I'm inclined
to think we ought to let Jordan go into the '75 budget at 12 and a half million. Is
that alright?

K: Yes.

R: Good. Now I left with Larry a new group of names for the Under Secretary for

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Economic Affairs. If you want me to I can get busy on some of these.

K: Let me check those names and I'll leave my recommendations with you.

R: Good. I've got one last thing. I talked to Jim Schlesinger again. Jim insists he talked to you three times or four, about Bill Porter continuing as the negotiator for the Icelandic negotiation. I told him it's just impossible, I think.

K: I thought at that time it was only one more session.

R: I was thinking about this. They don't want Joe to do it, that's the point. I mentioned Bob McCloskey. He said maybe that would be a good out. What we could do is get Joe and Bob both in on the thing. I'm afraid Joe is going to take a beating from them if anything goes wrong because they haven't wanted him, you see.

K: Why don't you explain that to Joe.

R: And sort of dilute it between Joe and McCloskey. I thought also to suggest to make Jim happy, I might for this one session to bring Bill Porter down from Canada and let him sit in on this last one negotiating session. To wash himself out. What would you think of that?

K: OK, good. I think that's a good idea.

R: That will satisfy Jim to a certain degree and then push it on over.

K: Good.

R:

SANITIZED

K: OK, well then let McCloskey handle it after the next meeting.

R: Good, well thanks a lot Henry.

K: Thank you.

R: Hope you have a good vacation, you certainly deserve it.

K: Thank you.

R: Bye.

END

TELECON
Frank Mankiewicz/Secretary Kissinger

March 30, 1974

12:00 noon

K: Frank, how are you?

M: Well, other than recovering from the flu, but otherwise I'm fine. Are you going to Syria or Acapulco?

K: I'm going to Acapulco.

M: I thought this morning, Holly said she thought you were going to Syrian and then somebody came over and said that Francie Bremem says that you're going to Acapulco.

K: That is right.

M: Then I figured she knows best. I had a couple of things I wanted to raise with you. One before you went down to the Latin American meeting, but I don't know whether you've done anything with it or not, concerning a fellow Chon Chol. Ever heard of him?

K: NO.

M: Well, he was the Chilean Agricultural Minister. You know, an agricultural economist, but apparently a very high class intellectual academic fellow and in jail. It struck me from what I heard about it and the kind of people who were calling about it, that it would be an awfully effective thing if somehow we could put some pressure just in respect to him, because it would look awful good and he's a kind of a Galbraith (?).

K: Do I have his name here.

M: Chon Chol. C-h either a-n or o-n. C-h-o-l.

K: OK, we're making a representation about somebody else, so I'll include it.

M: The first name is Jacque. As near as I can figure out, he's pure academic and very respected here. You know, in a non-political sort of agricultural agronomist fellow. I'm sure he probably isn't that pure if he served, but I'm also sure it would look awful good if something could be done. How long are you going to be gone down there.

K: About a week.

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M: Well, when you get back, let's talk because I may be going on my visit. To the Caribbean.

K: Oh. OK, good. Will you call me when I'm back?

M: Yes, I'll call you when you get back.

K: And I hope you feel better soon.

M: Well, I'll be alright. Also maybe we can get together then on a date for our seminar sometime.

K: May would be possible. April is impossible.

M: Well, why don't you get your people to think about a date in May.

K: OK.

M: Talk to - oh who is it we've been talking to? Miss...

K: Andrews?

M: No.

K: Rothe?

M: Yes.

K: OK.

M: Or Eagleburger.

K: Eagleburger would be the best, but I think they can't pick a date until I'm back because - not until I've talk to Syria and it's fallen into place there.

M: Yes. The way you're going it will fall into place. Just a quick nudge. I tell you there's nothing like it. I even like the setback.

K: The setback isn't actually so bad compared to what the papers said.

M: That's right. I can see that coming along too.

K: It is coming along. Actually the papers got carried away. I told them there wasn't a breakthrough, but I did say there was progress.

M: They want a miracle a day.

K: But they're now so used to homeruns that they won't settle for doubles.

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M: That's right. Exactly.

K: Frankly given the situation with the Chiefs, I couldn't get a homerun, but I couldn't have - but I would have tried to avoid hitting one if I could have had one.

M: I must say I think those guys - they want only the superlative. I thought if even you read between the failure lines you see success. I'm sure the stories aren't very well written anyway.

K: No, they over wrote them.

M: I'll tell you who's not fooled by the failures is F. Edward Herbert, if I read the paper correctly.

K: Who?

M: Did you see that story - Herbert who is the House Armed Service...

K: Oh yes, did he pop off?

M: Oh, yes. He's setting up a separate subcommittee.

K: Oh, on disarmament.

M: To study these terrible disarmament agreements that you're about to reach.

K: No, he isn't fooled. We have no interest in high profile right now.

M: Well, he doesn't see you as failing, I'll tell you that. I think it's all just fine. But I'll call you when you get back.

K: Good, wonderful.

M: And we'll talk to Eagleburger on a May date.

K: Good. I want to talk to you at any rate about where the liberal Democrats are going in foreign policy. I think they're killing themselves.

M: Well, I want to talk to you about that, because where they're going is in a very strong ____ position.

K: Well, that's alright. That they have a right to do.

M: But you've got to undercut that somehow.

Mankiewicz - page4

K: But what they're also doing is in a hard line position.

M: The way to head that off is on the human rights area. You can't let this become a confrontation between, you know, with them on the human rights question. I thought you had won that day and I hope I can tell you this, that was the ___ day. Terrible. You can't get into that position again.

K: I'll tell you the truth. I wasn't prepared for the questions.

M: That was obvious.

K: Whic is another stupidity.

M: You should have waited. Waited till you saw the statement and so forth.

K: I agree with you.

M: Let's talk about that question because I think that can be blunted and then you can let the liberal democrats go where they want. If they want to be hardmind Richard Nixon 1950 anti-Communist, that's fine. Because they're not going any where with it.

K: OK. Hope to see you soon Frank.

M: Yes. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-95

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

March 30, 1974

12:45 PM

K: Hello?

D: Dr. Kissinger.

K: Mr. Ambassador. Look I'm writing a letter to the Prime Minister of some of my thoughts which I thought I'll have Sisco give to you on Tuesday, so that it gets there about the time Dayan does. What do you think?

D: Dayan told me about this and I think it cannot hurt. In fact, I think it's a good idea.

K: I'm not pressing her. She doesn't have to do anything for a few weeks.

D: Right. No, I understand. I think its - and I relied that you put it in such a manner that in which it explains the motivation, though it does not....

K: Why don't I tell Sisco to go over it with you and you edit it.

D: That would be highly irregular, Mr. Secretary. Especially to do it with Sisco. But I'm willing - maybe Eagleburger shows it to me and then I will tell Eagleburger if I think something should be changed. But that should remain only between us.

K: I thought I'd tell it to Marilyn Berger.

D: Marilyn Berger grabbed me in the corridor before we left and she asked me if it's true that the Secretary's getting married today. I said that was one of the bilateral issues that wasn't discussed.

K: She is an absolute pain in the neck.

D: Are you, Mr. Secretary?

K: Listen, if you don't know, it can't be true.

D: I'm not sure anymore. I think my information is slipping.

K: You know that these things wouldn't ever happen without you.

D: I wanted to tell you but whatever you decide to do, Mr. Secretary, my blessing goes with you. I really mean it.

K: Thank you. I hope you don't mind my teasing you. It is really a sign of great affection.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-74

Dinitz - page 2

D: I really appreciate it, it's mutual, I can assure you, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know that. You've been a friend beyond the call of duty.

D: I like you as a human being and I think you're doing a great job for the free world.
That is my main thesis about you.

K: The crowd is gaining on me, you know it.

D: You say what I did with the Soviet press for you, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know. I didn't know you had a gang there. Actually I found that very interesting.

D: I think they realized that they undermining their own cause by this. They don't want to weaken the President, they don't certainly want to weaken your position.

K: No, my position they'd love to weaken.

D: I don't think so, Mr. Secretary. I had a very interesting luncheon with the editors of the U. S. News and World Report the other day - while you were in Moscow. We were discussing this question of detente and I was trying to convince them that ______ because of their interest in perpetrating the President's position. I really believe it. I think the biggest catastrophe that can happen to them is if there's a change here, because when there is going to be a change, it will also be a radical change toward Soviet detente. They know it, so therefore - I mean I don't say that they.....

K: I'm not sure that's true.

D: I think it is. I think they are very much interested in keeping the....

K: Why should Ford change his policy?

D: Because they don't know. It's a new element, it will take ______ another two years to study him and all his friends and all his motivations. They don't know what power base he will have around him.

K: It's an element of uncertainty.

D: They know that in any event Congress will be stronger on the front because he comes from there and he is dependent on them. They know that Congress is not particularly sympathetic to them, so all these considerations, I think, indicate to them. Besides they have great respect for your ability and ...

K: Since they now know that ability is not working for them.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CD KARA Date 6.8.01

Dinitz - page 3

D: Well, I think they still think that they can best advance detente under you then under anyone else. I don't mean it critically, I mean I think that you are trying to get the best things for America out of detente. That is obvious, but I think that they would see new mobility to advance than anybody else. I know, and they realize that their instructions you came with on SALT were not sufficient. They know, I presume they even surmized that if it were up to you individually you would gone further.

K: No, not much. A little.

D: More than I would say on material things.

K: I think we're not pursuing an insane course which will lead...

D: to confrontation in the front.

K: No, that eventually too, but at first it will lead to Soviet military superiority because we're not going to increase our budget enough to - but that's a different problem, we can discuss it some other time. OK.

D: Dayan flew to New York and I'm joining him this evening and he will be coming back for meet the press. I think their meeting was good, the meeting today. It put him into a better frame of mind. And he is now afraid that by Monday it will not all be toppled down while the Secretary is going to be in Acapulco. I said, I think that the Secretary will see to it before he leaves that he closes all the avenues so that nobody will run away with the show.

K: No question.

D: And he explained to me what you told him that we have to give the credit to Schlesinger that you don't want to...

K: That's why I maneuver in such a way.

D: Yes, I understand. When you come back and we will have one of those personal talks, I will tell you some of the things that are happening town. I don't want you ever to misunderstand me, Mr. Secretary. I'm not saying it to you in order to play into the Departmental game. I don't play those games. Not with you anyhow, but I think you ought to know what is going around town and his talks with Congressman and his talks with professors. I'm not saying he is talking against you, but he's building it on constituency. He's building a constituency which is based on the line then the one you take. He does not speak against you except on specific issues. He's speaking about the need for stronger American and for a less compromising America. He has attraction to these circles because he is intellectual, he's the only one in that Administration that...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64