September 12, 1972

Revised text of original

Material Submit

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12999, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NARA. Data: 5/12/72

TELCONE

Phil Geylin/Kissinger

9:43 a.m. 2/1/72

K: I felt I owed you a phone call after Sat.'s conversation while your Sun. editorial, where I don't agree with it, is balanced and fair. The other was not unfair but this was better.

G: I must have breakfast. My problem is that I have to make a speech at Women's National Democratic Club and I am supposed to talk on the Nixon foreign policy. I read Newsweek.

K: Time is better. It's great to mention the NSC system without mentioning the NSC. NSC Reports to President and he speaks first. It was positive about me. It was very thin.

G: This is all right the first year but now there should be more to say.

K: Just didn't make the right criticism of the system. The only issues that go from Sr. Review Group to the President are those that don't require NSC.

G: I would like to do this before next Thurs.

K: 10th? How about the 7th?

G: That would be best.

K: Metropolitan Club at 8:15. Look forward to seeing you there.

(Changed to 8th, as HAK could not do 7th)

Request for re-evaluation of
the Security of a Confidential
Proposed Title?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KML NAFU, Date: 5/13/04

TELECON
Max Frankel

2/1/72 10:35 a.m.

F: What do you think of the stories?

K: I like the TIME story better.

F: I haven't read them.

K: I have had a policy not to complain to you about articles about me. But I do have one comment about the Terrence Smith article. To say that our proposal is the same as the proposal put forth at Manilla Conference is like saying an elephant is like a flea because both have legs. He said some things in it are new and some aren't. A six-month withdrawal was proposed at Manilla. That proposal was six months after North Vietnam had withdrawn and the level of violence had subsided we would begin withdrawing. The big thing at Manilla was we gave up our demand for the Vietcong withdrawing. We Now we are <u>pressing</u> proposing withdrawal without them doing so, which is different.

F: It sure is.

K: I don't expect you to make any changes, but this was a major inaccuracy.

F: I'll talk with him.

K: My second day here I changed a cable to say our position in Paris was to be simultaneous withdrawal. Bill Bundy told me it would change alliances in the Pacific.

F: Why things get disrupted.

K: That they could get our military and economic aid stopped without negotiations. I think the debate convinced them that they didn't need to negotiate. All the indications at the end of October were that they were ready to talk on the basis of that proposal. They now say Xuan Thuy was ready to talk, which we knew, but he has no authority. When we said we wanted somebody with authority to settle they could have said Xuan Thuy had it.

F: Any chance now?

K: I think if the offensive comes up and it doesn't succeed, then there will be a chance of negotiating.

F: That has always been your view.

K: But it wasn't tied to a timetable.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12998, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.Y.
NASA Date: 5/12/64

TELECON

Max Frankel

2/1/72 10:35 a.m. p. 2

F: How bad is the offensive going to be?

K: Can't judge, but sizable.

F: But we are ready for it.

K: But it will not be our forces. If the South Vietnamese do as well as they did in Laos last year then they'll have a shot their wad for one year and then there will be the election. As long as it's close there's a good chance events will follow the course of 1968. What we submitted October 11 -- if we had met in November our present position wouldn't have been tabled.

F: I know that. I would love to know in which directions you think there is give, especially on their side.

K: I thought last summer -- I might have been smoking pot -- they were teetering toward thinking of a settlement. The tone of their whole approach was different. They don't throw huge concessions on the table.

F: What about the Yenka Vietcong splitting up with Hanoi over this?

K: Have no way of knowing. I know idk at the end of October we were told Madame Binh was coming back. On November 8, Le Duc Tho asked for a visa. On November ____ AFP -- or whatever it is -- reports were coming back that there was every sign that everything was on schedule. And a week later, nothing. Why should we be the only government that fights among ourselves?

F: Okay, thanks for your call. I'll see you in Peking.

H. A. M. S. T. C.
S. S. S. O. S. C. M.
M. P. C. S. O. S. C.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW NAVAQ Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

11:54 a.m. 2/1/72

S: A little good news. Rabin called and said there was a counter formulation which I worked out --

K: I have not seen it.

S: I will show you now though it's clear.

K: There's a directive out that we should see these things ahead of time.

S: I said yesterday that there was down to three words. You can raise hell with me after I finish. The PM will go into Cabinet tomorrow and seek approval of Cabinet to enter into talks. Assuming this will go through as we expect and Rabin expects Cabinet to go with PM. I assume Israelis will make an announcement that we are ready to go into talks. However, even though proximity talks are not likely to take place because the ________ won't bite there's a hell of a lot of domestic pizazz because Israel has agreed to this. From the President's point of view, he might want to exploit this. I haven't talked with the Secy. on this. If the Cabinet agrees to this I think there's political mileage for the President if Zeigler put out a sentence that we welcome this development and there is a diplomatic opportunity available. I will write it as you want.

K: I will raise it with the President.

S: I will draft it. We have a couple of days. Just wanted you to know. You let me know how you want to play it. We have agreement on both sides. Ex迂x didn't get veto they wanted but they will get a way. A simple sentence by Zeigler will be helpful.

K: I will talk with the President and let you know tomorrow.

S: ? ? ? ? there are 4 words to be settled with. Take my judgment. I haven't let you down in 3 years.

K: The Dept. has.

S: I am not the Department and I will not be here that long.

K: Not if I can --

S: I am loyal to you and the President and govt. but after this year --

K: After that there will be many changes.

Re: John F. Trower, the president
is a member of the Republican National
Committee Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.H. W. NAHA, Date: 5/12/04

Sisco/Kissinger

11:54 a.m.

2/1/72

-2-

S: I almost asked to be considered for Dave Packard's job. I held off because I thought I have something else to do in this area.

K: If the President gets re-elected there will be major changes in all depts.

S: I hope so. I will not say anything on this until you have given me guidance.

Re: [insert telephone number]

of the State or [insert state] [insert state]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.6

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin
2/1/72 12:50 p.m.

D: I just found finally my friend Yevtushenko. He is pleased and accepts with pleasure the meeting with the President, 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 3.

K: I'm glad he didn't ask the President to come and call on him.

D: I just found him.

K: I will tell the President that Yevtushenko is the one man he will meet whose ego is greater than his Assistant for National Security.

D: This is true. If you have an evening for dinner . . .

K: Unfortunately, I can't do it Thursday evening.

D: I understand. So he will be at 3:00 p.m. there.

K: And he understands it's only half an hour.

D: I'll tell him.

K: So his feelings won't be hurt.

Re: phone tree from the 9th
is the one with the conditional
Please call if

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

TELON
Zeigler/Kissinger
1:15 p.m. 2/1/72

By: KMLW NAVAQ Date: 5/12/04

Z: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx called over here. Did you announce that?
He said it was cleared over there. I said I didn't know about it.

K: How did it go?

Z: My instructions. What's probably an internal problem there. Lee over there
is ? ? ? ? . I said covered in your backgrounder.

K: I said it and I read it from our statement.

Z: 9 point plan that they released yesterday is that negotiable? I said that's what we have been trying to negotiate.

K: let me know about that schedule.

The President's Office of the Vice President
for the Vice-Secretary of the Treasury

Proprietary Use

By: K.H. V NASA Date: 5/13/72

TELCOM
H. Klein/Kissinger
3:59 p.m. 2/1/72

HK: Geo. Herman of Face the Nation has been asked to go to Paris to talk with Xuan Thuy. He wants to talk with you about the line you would like to get in on that sort of thing. He is leaving tomorrow.

HAK: Perhaps he should speak with Win Lord. Have him call Win Lord.

The following is a true report of an interview I had with President Lyndon B. Johnson, as recorded in my scrapbook.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3-5

TELECON

Hugh Sidey

2/1/72 6:10 p.m.

By: KH.V. NASA Date: 5/1/72

S: I have finished the first draft, don't have a final piece, probably won't until tomorrow. Will you be around so I can get a final version?

K: I want you to realize if my father doesn't like what you write he is going to banish you from his scrapbook.

S: I've got some good pictures of you and the President.

K: Do they see me on my kneew?

S: They reach you at chest height. I open this with a view of you in your office, not me interviewing. Is that okay? [reads] . . . hear is a quote: XXXXX "I am concerned about American civilization; we live in a world in which . . ."

K: That's fine.

S: Just one other. "The historian in me says it can't be done; the political man in me says it is possible . . ." . . . . . Nixon sense of _______________ and order. " . . . . that's out major concern about Vietnam. / The President wants to end it in a way that doesn't break the American spirit so that this country can preserve its confidence in itself." " . . . sense of things failing . . ." "History is not a cookbook from which you can get recipes." . . . That's essentially the direct quotes.

K: No problem.

S: One other thing: can I go through the part in which I . . . to give you an idea how I . . . to give you an idea how I used the material from the reports?

K: Yes.

S: "It is late in the afternoon of an earlier month in the Situation Room. Senior advisors have been summoned from State, Defense, and CIA. Henry is 10 minutes late. . . . . . . MBFR . . . . . he recalls a memorandum from an earlier meeting . . .

K: Could you drop that reference to Chiang Kai-shek?

S: Yes.

K: There must be another one, Brandt or someone.

S: No, we can just drop it out. I just wanted to show the range. "German foreign policy since 1890 leads one to believe that inflexibility is not the _______________ of the German foreign office."

TELECON

High Sidey

2/1/72 6:10 p.m. p. 2

Hq. G-Gen. D. M. E. K. C. &
1st Mar. Div. as 1st Div. in
Prairie State War?

By: K.M.L. NAVA. Date: 5/13/04

K: I wonder if there aren't too many military examples?

S: It hadn't bothered me, but maybe there is something else we can stick in there. "I am deliberately playing the devil's advocate to crystalize our thinking about alternatives."

K: Now the only question is how you got all of this stuff.

S: Let me read you the part from the NSC which came from here and there. For those two hours the National Security Council meets, probably no more important event in the entire world . . . . . ." by M.D.D. recollection from people who have been there.

K: Could you throw in a sentence at the beginning of the material I gave you. I don't want to give any incentive to the leakers. What I gave to you is not policy. If you could throw in a sentence before . . . the NSC stuff . . . I had nothing to do with giving you . . .

S: Sure, I can simply say . . .

K: From the notes and recollections on many participants.

S: Say "Henry Kissinger runs the meeting as 10 minutes late as these recollections suggest."

K: Something like that.

S: I had written in here your feeling about the historical rise of India from the valley of the Indus as giving rise to their feeling about Pakistan. Some of our people said this was too [early/late?] How do you feel about that?

K: Not strongly. I have no feeling about it.

S: There is resentment.

K: Yes, there is resentment.

S: I won't bother you more tonight.

K: It sounds thoughtful.

S: It's too fast. I wish I had another two weeks; that's the problem with journalism though. Let me give you a call tomorrow.

K: I should have some time in the afternoon.

S: You had a question about one of the things you said about Chou and bringing

The telephone is the open line to
the brain of the commercial
Magnetic Net!

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

By: K.M. V NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
High Sidey

2/1/72 6:10 p.m. p. 3

up mystery. That's such a delightful thing.

K: Why don't you put it in and let me see where it is.

S: Okay, I'll give you a call. . . Can you help me on one thing Henry?

K: Sure.

S: I have been asked by my alma mater to speak at the commencement, May 27. Will we be back from Russia?

K: That's cutting it a little close.

S: You think that's cutting it close?

K: Yes.

S: Okay, that's good guidance.

The President of the Republic of the United States
Receives oral communica-
Propaganda Leaflet

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

TELCONE
Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
7:25 p.m., February 1, 1972

By: K.H. Y. NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: Sorry to bother you at home. I found out that Rogers is seeing Dobrynin. I know this sounds again like we are starting a constant fight but this is going to blow up the summit.

H: What should we do?

K: Somebody has to be in charge. To let this snake maneuver between the two of us.

H: What do we do?

K: No discussions until after the summit. First of all, it is an insolent note. It is useless. To say that he will cover the subjects covered at other levels of Government, that's me.

H: Yeah.

K: I don't give a damn about that. What I give a damn about -- I told Haig the minute he gets our memcon, he will get a meeting. I think I told you too.

H: Yeah.

K: The trouble is this will get -- the trouble is it gives Dobrynin the chance to maneuver between us. .... and no telling what Rogers will give on the Middle East. Then Dobrynin can take whatever is the softer version and whipsaw us with it.

H: When is he seeing him?

K: Tomorrow.

H: You don't know when?

K: No.

H: I can't do anything now because he and the President are both at a dinner.

K: It won't be early. I made my biggest mistake -- I sent him a Brezhnev letter deleting the references to me. Now I have got to call Dobrynin and tell him what he knows and doesn't know.

H: I will see if we can turn it off in the morning.

The President's Daily Report to the Nation
Volume 3, Issue 3 of 3
Reproduced with permission

TELCOM

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

7:25 p.m., February 1, 1972

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: And there is a chance of another thing about these airplanes. He is all for surfacing the May 31 proposal. No one has asked for it. It will only get us in trouble.

H: So what has happened?

K: Only surfaces those proposals the North Vietnamese had ..... him and Ziegler; him and Haig; him and McCloskey; McCloskey and Haig. You ask Ziegler if that wasn't a totally artificial crisis.

H: You mean surfacing?

K: That's right. No one has asked for it. We put a lot of things in from which we could depart and that's why he wants to surface it.

H: That's turned off now.

K: Yeah, but if he has this meeting you can't tell what he will do. What worries me is the Russian summit. Everything we give him he turns into a goddamn fight. If the Russian Summit goes the way Dobrynin and I have planned it, it will be such a smashing success it can't fail.

H: Let's see if we can turn him off in the morning.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KHLW

NARA Date 5/12/04

Husch Blackwell LLP
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
P.O. Box 3180
Palo Alto, California 94304

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

<table><thead><tr><td>DOCUMENT NUMBER</td><td>DOCUMENT TYPE</td><td>SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS</td><td>DATE</td><td>RESTRICTION</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>TelCon</td><td>John Ehrlichman / Henry Kissinger (1 pg.)</td><td>2/1/72</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>TelCon</td><td>Joan Braden / Henry Kissinger (1 pg.)</td><td>2/1/72</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>TelCon</td><td>Walter Kissinger / Henry Kissinger (1 pg.)</td><td>2/1/72</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>TelCon</td><td>Prof. Reischauer / Henry Kissinger (2 pgs.)</td><td>2/1/72</td><td>B</td></tr></tbody></table>

FILE GROUP TITLE

BOX NUMBER

Kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations

13

FOLDER TITLE

1-4 Feb. 1972 ②

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.

B. National security classified information.

F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.

G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.

D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

*U.S.GPO:1989-235-084/00024

NA 14021 (4-85)

TELECON
Secretary Connally

2/2/72 9:05 a.m.

Re: meeting of the NSC to discuss the papers
and to consider the NSC's position on the
Vietnam War.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV NASA Date 5/12/72

K: About the NSC meeting today, we're going to discuss . . . the papers . . . it's the forthcoming offensive in Vietnam. The President moved the meeting to today so you could be there.

C: I'll be there.

K: His present view, just for your information, is we haven't come all this way not to do everything possible to break the back of this offensive.

C: All right. Thank you.

Hypothetical text from an open file
log entry from a confidential
Propercy File?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KML, V NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCON
Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

9:43 p a.m. 2/2/72

K: You have good communications.

C: The Almighty is on my side. I have a telegram on my desk. We would prefer nothing be done until we see next ministerial round in Rome next week. First package final and Mintoff decided on it and second, ?? ISSUE. He is so slippery.

K: We will proceed on that basis.

C: I will report we had this conversation.

OCLASSIFIED

E.O 12958, Sept. 3.6

If possible, use the same电话 as last.
Please call me at 2:00.

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

12:30 p.m. 2/2/72

By: K.H. V NASA Date: 5/13/04

S: I called to check earlier whether as a follow-up yesterday if there was any interest on part of Zeigler.

K: No.

S: Our people will put out a one-sentence item.

K: Low key. Don't want to raise expectations.

S: That wasn't the point.

K: The President appreciated it. Thought you were highlighting his role.

The President's Office has open hours every other Friday at 6:00 p.m. in the House. No outside visitors will be allowed after 5:00 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM
Helms/Kissinger
3:00 p.m. 2/6/72
2

6/21/72

NASA Date 5/12/72

K: I was just talking to the President about the matter we discussed this morning. He thinks it's inappropriate that I do talking points. Every other head of agency when we recommend a deputy puts it up. We want the recommendation to go forward.

H: It's the first thing that has been said to me. Sitting around for weeks. President or no one told me a thing about it.

K: We are not blaming you.

H: Who does he want me to talk to?

K: Talk with Stennis. Laird should recommend him. He feels Cushman had weaker qualifications.

H: In my conversation with Al and me I want to know what it represents. I have only shaken hands with him once. I would like to know something about him. I know he speaks several languages.

K: He has been attache in Paris and Buenos Aires. So he has had intelligence work. They feel you are the natural man to do it.

H: OK. While we are talking, are talking have you ever figures out what the President wants in the man in this job? It would be an asset for me to know.

K: He knows him. Has done things for us which I will tell you about when you come over.

H: I have to be on the House side testifying tomorrow.

K: It can wait until early next week.

H: I will talk with Laird and then with you to get some e. g. 's here.

The President's Office in the State House
of Maryland, State of Maryland
Public Records Unit

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

3:05 p.m. 2/4/72

K: The President wants you to hig that truck park near the Chinese border the day he gets there so he gets a little attention.

L: Shall I send you the last pictures? I got the word that everyone is throwing in the towel. Do you think people are depressed?

K: The President wants to move assets that he can. Kitty Hawk and air assets.

L: No need to make a big deal out of this. Only one carrier out there. Bad weather. Can't exercise carrier in there very much. Put 4 carriers up there I don't understand when we are not using 3.

K: Wants a maximum force.

L: Wants Kitty Hawk there by 15 Mar.

K: Can we speed it up?

L: And keep other carrier there another month. It will arrive in Subic on the 15h and could move it up. This is one of the options.

K: I have just seen him and he told me that.

L: They have only one carrier up there.

K: You had it in right perspective. Don't want to bomb NVN before China.

L: I thought you want to be careful until then.

K: You came out well.

L: Maybe I should be stronger at meetings.

K: No. Say what you think. Bunker thinks we can hold it.

L: I live (?) on these things.

K: No one has bigger stake than you.

L: I don't want to give up and don't want SVN to think we have panicked.

K: Other thing. President wants to move Walters appointment. I have talked with Helms. Helms says you should shove it into WH.

L: It has to be either Helms or WH.

It's possible there is some error in the
math, but I'm not sure if it's intentional.
Please check it out?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12999, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L.Y. NASA Date: 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger
3:05 p.m 2/3/72

-2-

K: Both of you. You see high military man is needed and he should defend the guy. We will (support) it if you need it.

L: Helms wouldn't have a budget if it weren't for me up there.

K: Can't you prepare something together?

L: Sure. It will add a leak if not done soon.

K: Have you seen Muskie's xerox speech?

L: No.

K: Look at it and call me.

L: Another thing you can help me on over there. Herbicides. I can't give authority to SVN --

K: Have you send a memo?

L: It's been over there 5 months.

K: I will move it this week.

L: Another thing I would like to move is when we go in base area I would like to use riot control.

K: Tear gas?

L: Right. We can do it in VN but on authority I can't authorize it --

K: I will raise them both with the President before the end of the week.

L: No reason why it shouldn't be done. We will not get into trouble on these. I will take the heat but right now I have instructions against it. I have told Abrams to go ahead but he could get in trouble.

K: Now I have something on you to leak.

L: Get me covered.

K: I will get it before the President. You did fine this morning. The big thing he doesn't want to bomb NVN until March.

OCLASSIFIED

E.O 32938, Sect. 3.6

By: KML V NASA Date: 5/12/72

Laird/Kissinger

3:05 p.m. 2/3/72

Re: John F. Kennedy's report to
the Secretary of Defense
of the proposed plan.

-3-

L: You know how many sorties Abrams has in the bank he hasn't used? 16,000.

K: The President agrees with your approach for giving authority for 3 or 4 one or two day strikes.

L: During 30 day period.

K: Before Mar. 1.

L: I thought he was giving me hell.

K: No. Wanted to be sure Moorer thinking of every possibility.

Re: Telephone Call between K. L. Chapin and R. N. S. of Residential
Dwight Chapin
Publicity Staff

By: K.L. V. NARA. Date: 5/13/74

TELECON
Dwight Chapin

2/2/72 4:03 p.m.

C: What do you think of the President in Hawaii on the 18th, or maybe
you, holding a backgrounder in terms of setting the stage. . . ?

K: The President should not do it. He can only lose by it. I'll consider
doing it, but the President should under no circumstances open his mouth.
Nothing he can gain. He can only lose his flexibility.

C: All right. Thank you.

H. J. Kissinger, President
The State of California
Nuclear War?

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
5:00 p.m. 2/4/72

NASA Date 5/12/72

L: I have gone over that speech and read it since I talked to you and I don't think there is a lot you or WH should do.

K: I agree but someone ought to hit him.

L: We will have a bunch of students from the 50 states here tomorrow and I can put it in my remarks. But we should have some political people on it.

K: I agree.

L: I think some people in the Senate should take him on. I will get in touch with people to do it.

K: Say he turned it down before the NVN did and a lot of factual errors.

L: We should be prepared to answer right away. But don't you worry about that.

K: OK. Get some people ginned up. We would appreciate it.

Hegemonist, The Times, London, England

The Times, London, England

A Week in the Life of a Student

By: K.L. NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Max Frankel/Kissinger
5:08 p.m. 2/2/72

K: I am calling you because Haig just mentioned to me a conversation with Terry Smith. Terry said he was going to take it up with you.

F: I am only 30 seconds into this problem.

K: I meet these prisoners wives not for profound statements for peace. It's to help them out. It's a draining experience and I do it because other people can't take it. I do it from compassion and not to score points. I have no record of what was said and cannot confirm or deny quotes. I may have said some where in tone when I was asked that them little excuse to have them wait. How election was handled, Congress cutting off foreign and economic aid on a lot of things. If it's published I will state my views. I am trying to conciliate and not make partisan points and my whole attitude has been to bring people together and not separate. Anyone sitting in one these meetings is to make them feel their govt cares and not that we are right.

F: S someone is talking about this.

K: These are over wrought women and there are always one or two that says something. Taking something from a long session -- I don't think I said it but I can't remember. They are inching towards a negotiation painfully and everything every time something happens they wait a week or month or two to see what happens. Some things are against us -- rapidity of troop withdrawals or elections in the summer. You can't blame them when they don't know what's going on. I have never attacked individuals for screwing up chances of peace. If it turns out that these meetings turn out political controversy I will have to stop them. I have never blamed the Democrats for screwing it up. I may have said analytically there are a lot of reasons for these things. They would have come to these conclusions no matter that we said. Hit us first and then negotiate.

F: Lots of reasons is no problem. If your explanation to people who write about these things and in private and in evolve a consistent theory, then it's news.

K: If you print this I will make perfectly clear this is my view. I have never said it to the press. Perhpas at dinner parties. I have always mentioned 2-3 events including election or showing how tenuous this is. But to the best of my recollection I don't believe I have talked with a newsman about it and if I talked about it in dinner parties I would have done it in context of 2-3 other events. Some done by us and some by others but to show what a miserable thing it was for other side to come to that view and not to say someone did something wrong.

F: It has been in a couple of columns.

K: I will deny it if it is stated. It might have been a contributing factor among many.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Re: your leave the open line
and the space for a mutual
... communication?

Max Frankel/Kissinger
5:08 p.m. 2/3/72

-2-

but I could cite things I do. We are engaged in a tenuous ______ problem --

F: I agree. Your impulse is right.

K: I don't want perfect good confronting perfect evil. When I come out of these meetings I come out in an emotional state. I don't remember what I say. ¤ But I am certain that I didn't make it as an isolated charge or as a charge at all.

F: OK. I appreciate your call.

The President of the Republic of Ireland

President's Office

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
2/2/72; 7:45 p. m.

By: K.L. V NASA Date: 5/12/72

P: Any idea about the Irish thing? You noticed they burned down the Embassy in Dublin.

K: I would stay out of it.

P: That's what I think. It is the agony of England.

K: You would pay a price with the British. You could not say enough to satisfy the Irish here.

P: Just stay out of it -- an internal problem. Okay, that's my feeling. On the Muskie thing . . .

K: I talked to Laird and he is going to say something tomorrow.

P: It's a terrible thing this man did. He told the enemy wait for me and you will get a better deal.

K: It's an outrage and it's a total distortion of our position.

P: I hope Congress will . . .

K: I think we should give Congress . . . Bob tells me Buchanan did something to give to Rogers.

P: I think he should -- it depends on how this story plays.

K: I think he should say something anyway. One of the reasons we get attacked so much is because it is too easy.

P: That's right. I got Haldeman and Ziegler over here. I dictated eight points to Buchanan. This is the time to be strong.

K: It serves no conceivable purpose. I think he is hurting himself with this. For him to turn it down before the other side and to make arguments the other side has not made is outrageous.

P: In the morning -- 8:00 -- we will put you on with Mansfield.

K: I talked to Keating and gave him the full picture so he would stop sniping. We will be in touch directly. He has to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee. If you could give him a word that he should really protect the White House -- it will hurt our relations with India -- that he will understand. I called Nelson and Nelson is going to give him a little hell.

The Washington Post and the press release to the government of Pakistan

President Zia Ullah Khan

By: KHLW
NNSA Date: 5/13/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
2/2/72; 7:45 p.m.

-2-

P: In any event I think we got our contingency plan.

K: I thought your handling of the NSC meeting was superb. Moorer really gave you a lousy briefing. He acted like a cheap lawyer. He said the right things if you dug it out of him.

P: I realized he had a red thing and a black thing. By the time he was through he knew what he was dealing with.

K: I think when the attack starts we ought to bomb everything except NVN.

P: Exactly. That's why we have to get the carrier out there. He was to have ordered that today. The carrier has to move that B-52, A-1, F-4's Then we put them in South Vietnam and after we return we will blast the hell out of North Vietnam -- after we return.

K: If they start their offensive.

P: I understand that.

K: But I would get the forces in.

P: Right.

K: I think they will go through with it. Bunker is quite confident that they will handle it.

P: I have a feeling the South Vietnamese are much stronger than the North Vietnamese thought.

K: If we can __________ Vietnam I think we will have negotiations this spring. We had it before . . .

P: Senate screwed it up. I was talking to Riland. He said have I noticed India/Pakistan, Anderson papers -- everybody has forgotten them because we have so many other things . . .

K: There will be a little flap again tomorrow after Keating testifies. But we ought to tell him he will -- ought to protect the White House.

P: Will I see him before he testifies?

K: Yes.

P: I will talk to him.

Re: [subject to change] film exposed to
light from sun or incandescent
fluorescent light?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1

By: KML NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM

John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

10:01 p.m., February 2, 1972

K: John, I saw that editorial in the Star about tilting towards Peking.

S: Yeah.

K: Somebody is putting out a lot of crap.

S: I haven't seen it, Henry.

K: Come May, we'll have more with the Soviet Union than Peking.
Could you see whether you could help out a little by meeting
with Sherman or someone or bringing them in?

S: I haven't seen the article. Let me look at it and then I will
give you a judgment.

K: It doesn't require any action tonight.

S: All right.

Re: [insert telephone number here]
Is the person an official?
Please read!

By: K.L.V. NAVAQ Date: 5/12/84

TELCON
Amb. Cromer/Kissinger
morning 2/2/72

K: __________. He said Mintoff let him know that he needs a c. An economic mission to look at problems. That we can announce it. We will not do it without your advice.

C: This is what you think would be appropriate.

K: Don't know. Want to know what you think. Luns thinks it's appropriate. We would do it if you thought all right. There's British person who I don't want to identify, a private citizen, who knows Mintoff. She called me. As far as she knows it is a non-message and will not be considered but he got in a discussion with her and xx said he needed something by Sat. for a face-saving.

C: It will help put it together.

K: I told her I wouldn't receive messages like this and if he has something to tell me he should get into the channel.

C: He is not retiring because he wanted to call on President.

K: Luns said he is more obnoxious then Krishna Mennon. That's something. We are not working at cross purposes with you.

C: I will get on this right away.

The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Published on Wed, Dec. 15, 1973
Reprinted with permission

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

By: K.M.Y. NASA Date: 5/12/73

TELCOM

B. Walters/Kissinger
12:00 p.m. - 2/3/72

K: You are chasing me.

W: No, I haven't talked to you in four days.

K: I sent you a list of Chinese you may see. I may show these films here at noon on Saturday.

W: Well, you know they're coming in on Sunday to go to Joan's party.

K: So you think I should show them on Sunday?

W: No, that isn't necessary. I am going to stay over on Monday and do the...

K: I don't know whether I could find the projectionist on Sunday.

W: Well, I could find one. But if Saturday is the only day you can show them I would come in on Saturday.

K: I will let you know tomorrow. I don't know if it is worth that much.

W: Well, I would like to see it, but I would just rather stay home on Saturday, but I will come if that's the only time you can show it.

K: Well, I'll see.

W: I was thinking about last week - just in terms of what kind of reading are you giving to Mrs. Nixon.

K: Let me look that up. I just gave her something last week and I will call you this afternoon.

W: This afternoon - good, that's lovely! Did you like the *Newsweek* and *Times* story?

K: I liked the *Times* story, but the *Newsweek* story was a nothing story. It's got a lot the outsiders will not like - a lot of misleading stuff which only Washington insiders will understand. Things which say - everyone reports to me and I report to the President and so forth.

H. W. UNITAR, THE WORLD OF GOD
19 MAY, 1961
Preparatory Session

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/12/64

W: You are right. It is the kind of thing most people will not understand. I want to look at it again.

K: What did you think?

W: Well, the first thing I think is fascinating is that you were on both of the covers. The second thing is the women and the wording in both was the same thing.

K: Do you want me to change the women? I am trying to protect you.

W: I won't say it wasn't complimentary, but it wasn't anything new. Some people may find it much more intriguing.

K: Well...

W: Do you remember the last words that you mentioned to me Chou En-lai said to you?

K: "Come back ______ for the joy of ______". I don't want that used.

W: Ever?

K: Yes.

W: OK, I won't ever use it. It was so nice I wanted to use it somewhere in China.

K: In China? I will check on it. I have to be meticulous about these things.

W: I see.

K: All right. So we will talk later this afternoon then.

W: And I will see this weekend.

The publication of this report is not intended to affect, alter, or构成 part of any contractual obligation on the part of the United States government.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLW NAVA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Courtney Sheldon/Kissinger
2:50 p.m. 2/3/72

S: My problem is I am putting together a paper in the next two days. You are the only reliable source on this problem. ? ? ? ? makes us feel we have evidence.

K: That's want we cannot tell you. We would rather take some beating on it. We have some conclusive evidence from both [sic] diplomatic ______ that India ? ? ? ? and particularly in Kashmir with intention of destroying Pakistan's armed forces. We are not saying they would dismember W. Pakistan. We don't know their post-victory intentions.

S: That clarifies it a lot.

K: We are sure they would have taken Kashmir.

S: The whole of Kashmir?

K: The Pakistan part.

S: My [ sic ] next problem --

K: This is off the [ sic ] record. Don't want to be quoted.

S: "It's understood"?

K: Yes but not "the WH said."

S: Next problem is Soviet relationship. I know about Soviet relationship on that. The time E. Pakistan fell there was no willingness on part of Soviets to do anything.

K: I would qualify it to say Soviets bear a responsibility of outbreak of war. Either intentionally or not seeing consequences. This you should say on your own. I believe after the 12th they did try to prevent attack on W. Pakistan but did not succeed until after E. Pakistan had fallen.

S: This is definitely as a result of our saying to them -- what did we say to them?

K: I don't want to claim too much. The things I told you I can defend. What I said to them we can defend.

S: At any time when making representations to India did they respond?

K: They took the position that they had no designs on W. Pakistan but made clear that they didn't consider Kashmir part of W. Pakistan. They did not say that much. When we asked for assurances they would not do it. They told others -- are

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KML WNAKA, Data: 5/12/04

Re: question about a film shown in a bar, but not in a bar? Commercial? Private? Call?

Courtney Sheldon/Kissinger

2:50 p.m. 2/3/72

-2-

you recording this?

S: I leaned on the push button.

K: They always said Kashmir is not a part of Pakistan.

S: There was a Dave Kraslow piece on the 18th. I assumed you had to be the xxx source

K: No.

S: Then I am puzzled. I know it's not Sisco.

K: Not from here. What's the question?

S: Question is it comes down to detail including covering areas that I hadn't seen why 7th Fleet --

K: This is someone who picked up something. I know who it was but not I.

S: One other thing -- related to Russians question. Is it true that we know Russians said to Jordanians that they should not intercede in Pakistan's behalf?

K: We know they said that to someone. I don't want to say x whom. I must go.

H. J. S.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MARCH 3, 1972
DIVISION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1.6

By: K.M.V. NARA. Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM
N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
5:20 p.m. 2/3/72

R: How did our friend do on the Hill?

K: I don't know yet.

R: I had a good talk with him.

K: It was effective session. He was k eleated.

R: I talked about campaigning but said no need unless he spx supports now the people he has to support.

K: He is chaffing at the bit.

R: That's my lead in. Were you with the President? How did he handle himself?

K: Well. The President didn't put it to him like you did. It's a much different atmosphere then a few days ago. We will come out of it all right and we have other side on VN a little frantic. Proposals. I think we will make it this year. One last shot. They have yet to turn down that last proposal of ours.

R: You are great. Will you be there in the morning?

K: Yes.

R: I want to be with Teller. He is giving a fabulous talk now -- 140 pages on Soviet/U.S. strategy. He is really a hot guy. We will have a discussion in the morning from 9-10 but anytime after 10:30.

K: 11:00?

R: You have a date. See you then.

It is possible to read the content of a
radio station's news and its comments.
Reproduced with permission.

By: K.H. V NASA Date 5/13/94

TELECON

Professor James Thompson/Mr. Kissinger

5:40 p.m., February 3, 1972

T: I have not imposed on your time and good will over the past three years. I would like to do so now. ABC has asked me to be their New York anchor man during the China trip. In order to play a useful service I would like nothing better than to chat with you. Can you do that?

K: Of course; there is no question.

T: Is that doable?

K: Of course, it is doable. I don't forget my old associates.

T: Is Friday the 11th particularly bad or not?

K: I may have to go with the President to Key Biscayne. How about the 10th?

T: Okay.

K: But call my assistant, Coleman Hicks to set up a time. I don't have my calendar with me. Would 30 minutes do it?

T: Yes. And I'd like to see John Holdridge.

K: You should talk to Winston Lord, also.

T: Good; I will call Coleman Hicks tomorrow.

lds

The position of Vice Chairman is notional. See Note 1 of the attached
Preliminary Note?

By: K.M.L. NAFU Date: 5/13/74

TELCOM
Prof. Day/Kissinger
6:36 p.m 2/3/72

D: Thanks for calling. One small point I think I should place on you before you go away. I have a compromise proposition on the Geneva thing and (genocides?).

K: About the 14th or 15th?

D: 14th would be excellent. Should I check a few days before? I will be there Sun. and Mon. I assume we can have some time in March.

K: Definitely. I would support this. That would play nicely with Moscow summit things.

D: I got a letter about it today.

K: It's going very well.

D: good.

K: It will be embarrassing how the old anti-communist will get agreements with communists.

D: You must be pleased and I hope it will work out.

K: If VN works out we will come to everything we started.

D: Mon. if it's possible and I will call before.

The President's Office in the open line
of the day, noon or at any hour
Preliminary Deal?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KMLW NAFU Date: 5/12/04

TEL CON
Amb. Lucet/Kissinger

11:27 a.m. 2/4/72

L: I am answering the call you made a few days ago. Mr. Malraux is glad to accept the invitation of the President and will be there on the 14th.

K: We will have a dinner and you are invited.

L: Let me ask you a few personal questions. Do you want it secret?

K: No. Not a great deal of publicity.

L: I have in Washington from Sun. to ____ my Secy. of Transportation. He is the guest of Mr. Volpe. I am supposed to give a dinner on Mon. Is it a stag dinner?

K: Yes.

L: It is better. Then I will ask my wife to received the secretaries of transportation. Is it possible to tell the Secretaries where I am?

K: Yes. We cannot invite them.

L: No. There will be here people from aviation and ______. My wife can tell them?

K: Yes indeed.

L: He will stay with me at the embassy or do you want to give him a place?

K: I think we give Blair House to Heads of State only.

L: I will tell him but he will meet people in my embassy.

K: We can arrange hotel arrangements for him.

L: Only ____ does it matter that he met people here in the Embassy?

K: It's up to you.

L: You will perhpas make no announcement that he came.

K: We will make a small announcement.

L: Good. In good time. A small dinner?

K: 15 people

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Re: [ sic ] [ sic ]

The State of [ sic ]

Purdue City Hall?

By: J.M.L. NASA Date 5/12/72

Amb. Luceh/Kissinger

11:27 a.m.

2/4/72

L: He will invite me?

K: You are [x] hereiwth invited. -

L: I will tell Mr. Charmain and you are making announcement.

K: I will discuss it with you.

L: You will have to have the best possible interpreter for [x]k Malraux. He speaks no English and French like a volcano. Alone?

K: President will see him alone with me before dinner and then a dinner.

L: Black tie?

K: Yes.

L: I will tell Paris I am in touch with you. And I will tell Mr. Charmain that I cannot meet him and I will tell Mr. Volpe.

K: It will be very useful and we are in your debt again.

Department of Defense
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Navy
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Army
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Navy
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army
U.S. Marine Corps

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.1.6

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/13/84

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
11:36 a.m. 2/4/72

L: There are 3 things that I wanted to check out with you. First, I would like to obligate us to the full amount on continuing assistance so if we get cut on appropriation I will have the obligations made.

K: Any argument not to do it?

L: Only that they feel it will antagonize the Sen. Foreign Relations Committee.

K: They are any way.

L: It's $68 million but effects Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey. This way I will get the money before the bill passes. I cannot get money after. I will take the heat. I have the authority under continuing resolution now.

K: I would do it.

L: I hope the Administration doesn't get in with the Amnest Incorp. group.

K: N O thing at all have we?

L: They say we will let them go through cells in VN. A bunch of commies interested only in Angela Davis.

K: It's a communist group. Who was it, State?

L: Sullivan. They should go to NVN before going to camps in South.

K: They don't wish us well and I will have it stopped.

L: We have that gas thing out of Germany.

K: Where is it going? Johnson Island?

L: Right. It's gone and no leak on that. No problem in Germany or any place.

K: I will send over these new authorities we did yesterday. The President keeps bugging me on them.

L: No problem on any of them. I will send these plans over to you. 24 and 48 and let Abrams choose time. Perhaps after March 1.

K: Don't want to do it before China.

L: Those 4 radar sites that are in the South -- they are the sites that direct the MIGs.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/12/72

Laird/Kissinger

11:36 a.m. 2/4/72

Re: possible T-14s in the area of the S-100's in China
Approximate Alt.

-2-

Not those that lock on our aircraft. We have been hitting MIGs.

K: We can't talk now but we should talk on one, what if there's a problem while we are in China and who can communicate with us and second, how we act in VN while we are there. Slow things down for that week. Let's discuss it next week.

L: I will be gone a couple of days. I have taken a speech in S. Diego. Thought I should get it out of the way before your trip.

K: When will you be gone?

L: Tues. and Wed. I will be gone most of the week.

K: I will see you early the following week.

L: Good.

The New York Times

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCONE

Henry Brandon/Kissinger

2/4/72 - 12:40 p.m.

K: I just want to see where we're going to meet tonight.

B: Well, would you like to come to the house and have a bite to eat first?

K: I think that's going to be too early. The theater starts at 7:30.
Shall we meet there?

B: Yes, or would you like to come for a quick drink.

K: I don't know if I'll have enough time.

B: Shall we take Nancy along with us and meet you there?

K: She will be at the Hay Adams and I can pick her up. Where do you park?

B: We always park in the Watergate which is opposite the other garage because it's somehow easier to get out of.

K: I will be in good shape so if you want to come here, we could go in my car.

B: Well, if I did that I'd have to drive my car down there and then . . . if you don't hear from me. . .

K: Why don't we meet in that second entrance as you come in - where the ticket office is?

B: No, well there or where they tear off the tickets.

K: Oh, at the Eisenhower Theater at 7:25.

B: 7:25.

K: Don't you think that's the easiest?

B: Yes, you never know how later you have to work.

K: Well, that's my problem; otherwise I would offer to pick you up.

B: Well, we're very much looking forward to this.

K: Have they asked you yet to the showing of the films on China?

A. J. Fisk, as the operator
in the Senate Chamber
Radioactive Fuel?

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/13/72

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Kissinger
5:35 p.m. 2/4/72

W: I hate to nudge you. Do you know the word?

K: I love it.

W: I had not heard about the film.

K: The projectionist has the flu. The decision now is noon tomorrow.

W: Not possible for me to take it out of the WH?

K: No. You would prefer noon on Sun.

W: If I came in on Sat. I would come in for that and Sun. I would stay over for Joan's party.

K: I will see if I can shift it.

W: I add you to my list ofOMB taxqguilts.

K: Where can I call you in the nest hour and a half?

W: I will be in the office for another half hour. Finishing up on Haldeman.

K: Are you going to kill him with that quote?

W: He knew what he was saying. I am running it on Mon.

K: So it will be obvious that it's spirit of the Administration.

W: He said consciously aiding and abbetting the enemy.

K: You don't think it will get headline?

W: I know it will. When he said there are several kinds of interviews and I don't do headline interviews he said I have given you some headlines.

K: It's a plot to make me look moderate.

W: I was happy with it. Warm and relaxed. He knew what he was doing. If I am not here I will be at home and the operator can put you through.

Hus. Prof. of Math. and Phys.
Dept. of Math. and Phys.
University of Chicago
Chicago, Ill. 60612

By: KMLW NARA Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM
Jos. Kraft/Kissinger
6:20 p.m. 2/4/72

JK: I have laryngitis. Can't talk.

HK: I just want to check -- we are putting the world report to bed tomorrow and it's tough to see you. Can it wait until Tues.?

JK: I am leaving Tues. I think so. I would like to do it early as possible.

HK: Where will you be tomorrow morning?

JK: Here.

HK: If I am through here at a reasonable time I will call you and see if we can get together.

JK: Do you know Menshikov?

HK: Yes.

JK: Is he interesting?

HK: He is interesting and honorable. Very decent to me when I was there. He is of the establishment but went to the edge of what he can do.

JK: Was Yevteshenko interesting?

HK: He was. I thought he would be a horror. Very moving.

JK: I found him interesting when he was there discussing intellectuals and scientists.

HK: What trip to Peking ______. It's tremendously revolutionary. You can be pro-American without being a traitor.

JK: I was in Moscow at the time of the ping-pong thing and said that history could turn on such a little thing. I said I would give you the first line. "3 people cannot play ping-pong." He said in Russian it will be "only 2 people can play ping-pong." Did he discuss anything in particular?

HK: I cannot talk about it. I didn't like him at NY party but I liked him here. If I can see you tomorrow I will call otherwise it will be Tues.

The President of the Republic of China

Date: 1/12/72

Re: President's Meeting

TELECON
The President

2/4/72 10:34 p.m.

By: KMLV
NASA, Date: 5/12/72

P: What's the dope today?

K: Nothing of very great significance. Bhutto has indicated he has no objection to our recognizing Bangla Desh. I think we should hold up on that until you talk to Chou. It would give you an opportunity to show how much you take them into consideration.

P: Sure. Either that or send them a message asking what they think about our doing that.

K: Well, it's only two weeks away. I think we can handle it.

P: That's not a big issue.

K: No, and you can make points on it with the Chinese. Do it after you're back and it will show our compatibility with the Chinese. But it means we ought to be able to do it in March. The North Vietnamese are still dancing around the proposal. We should stop saying they haven't rejected it yet because it will force them to reject it. They say . . . . . . which is stopping short. We got some middle level briefing the Chinese gave their officials praising you as a conscientious man. And I ran into Yevtushenko yesterday -- he was moved by his meeting with you. He has written you a letter.

P: I'm glad we got Rogers out on this.

K: That's a useful thing.

P: Instead of just Goldwater, so people don't think it's just the nuts that are saying that.

K: I think now we can let it drop. I don't know whether we should keep hitting them all the time.

P: But we had to do it to Muskie. It's interesting to see what Harriman will advise him to do on this.

K: Harriman is crazy on that.

P: He will either have to draw back or step up his attack.

K: I was at Joe Alsop's last night and Missy Chandler was there. She used to be lukewarm . . .

P: Oh yes.

The President of the Republic of Cambodia

PHILIPPINES

TELECON
The President
2/4/72 10:34 a.m. p. 2

By: KMLV NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

K: Now she's all out. She said the Muskie speech convinced her he is unfit to be the President. She thinks you even went beyond what you had to and could do. She said you have got to ______ more to the conservatives.

P: She did!

K: She really wants to work now.

P: Keep in touch with her. She is smart and more influential with the paper than her husband.

K: Before she sort of said she was a Republican.

P: But she supported our Vietnam thing last night?

K: Not just supported it, she was enthusiastic. She told me Paul Shiffern is getting film clips on your statements in 1968 which are different from what you did. . . saying that you would never get wage-price control. She hoped you would be prepared to handle it.

P: We will; that never works. The important thing is she wants to help.

K: And how!

P: How is Joe. He is a patriot.

K: He has only one test -- who is for the national interest and who is anti. He now thinks no Democratic candidate is for the national interest.

P: Except Jackson.

K: He said only one test, and Missy agreed with this.

P: He put it out strong?

K: Oh yes, and I did too. He let Missy have it about the establishment. He said you *do* have to ask yourself why this man, born in Yorbalinda, who is sitting here alone, sat through Cambodia and no one ever said 'we are with you' 'we believe in you.' She said you are right; I wish you could say that publicly. He said he could have gotten out 20 times, hiding behind his opponents. He also said, what do you want? Do you want him *to* turn it over to Agnew or a mob of students? She said any time she can do something we should call on her. And I agree she is a lot better than her husband and more determined.

P: Enormous character.

Receives Special Call

Nagasaki and Nagano Bombed

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12658, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLU
NARA. Date: 5/12/64

TELECON
The President

2/4/72 10:35 a.m. p. 3

K: And it was your speech that turned it around. She said "God how wrong have we all been?"

P: Your evaluation of that may have been right. It may be more important than the November 3 speech. Then we stimulated support that was there; this time we had to turn people around. Ziegler said on the plane coming down: already it's beginning to build; the interest of the press is turning almost exclusively to China; they are fascinated and obsessed with it. When he told Phil Potter he was going he broke down and cried. He point was that all this nitpicking about all . . . the important thing is that people think that China is the overriding event of our time.

K: In addition to what we are planning in Hawaii to get some news people together on the trip and tell them there won't be any daily briefings of hot news.

P: We can do it in Hawaii. I have it in mind. I'll handle it in a way . . . this is what you can have; this is what you can't have. You'll have a joint statement by Ziegler and his counterpart on color, but no background.

K: Good.

P: I don't want some of them to walk up to Marshall Green and have him -- he wouldn't do it deliberately -- say . . . are we making progress?

K: I can fix it with the Chinese so we will be hard to reach on Chinese telephones. They did that last time. Then we can give them a bit of the feel of the planes, not on substance. I wrote a paper for you about some of the basic approaches . . . some of the mood, what they are likely to do, what they are looking for and how they talk.

P: Send if if you want.

K: I may send it tomorrow.

P: The Irish thing didn't flare up.

K: No, and Bill at the last minute decided not to step out with him.

P: Stepping out with him would have embarrassed him wouldn't it? The Irish are unreasonable here, aren't they?

K: There are more Protestants than Catholics there. We don't appreciate it if someone gets into our race problems.

St. George's Theological Seminary
Serving God's people in the=
USA, since 1959

PRESBYTERIAN SEMinary

T ELECON
The President

2/4/72 10:35 a.m. p. 4

NASA Date 5/12/64

P: While I agree with you we should drop the line that they haven't rejected it, we should keep saying that prospects aren't hopeless, shouldn't we?

K: Oh absolutely. And there is some movement.

P: I read in the paper this morning, there is movement. I don't think we are doing wishful thinking.

K: They are responding for the first time to an American proposal. They did it in a completely unacceptable way, but it's only the beginning.

P: On the Moorer thing, I expect you to follow up relentlessly on that.

K: Instructions are going out this morning.

P: I don't want Purshy countermanding it.

K: We are checking them all out with Moorer whether he can do it.

P: And we have a perfect base for it because Laird was there in ______________. Just say we made these decisions. One other thing, South Vietnam has pretty good naval forces doesn't it?

K: Yes, for defense for what?

P: To fool around in these harbors and for obstruction and raising hell.

K: I don't know how far north they can go, but we will look into it.

P: To harrass the hell out of them.

K: We'll see what their x and radius is.

P: Tell them to think imaginatively.

Re: [Subject: How will the report be
printed, if Yes or No is changed]
Re: [Political Issue: Nuclear
Powerplant]

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: KHLW NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

MacGeorge Bundy/Kissinger

afternoon 2/4/72

B: The Japanese-American Assembly which has been a good fix show is having its third session in June. We are the financers but they run it. They are anxious to have an American keynoter on June 8, near Tokyo. Any chance for bridge-building reasons that you or the President or Secy. would be amenable?

K: I might go before then. The Secy. might do it. President certainly not. Shall I raise it with the Secy.?

B: It will be one of the things --

K: If I don't go before that it would be a good excuse.

B: When will you know?

K: A couple of weeks.

B: Let's wait. After a great deal of hemming and hawing and ?? tell us they have a bargain on East-West Center. I thought you should know. Handler acts as a semi-autonomous figure. Would you like someone on your staff brought up to date? Because the President needs some credit. It's good on Sov. - U.S. relations. Who should I speak with?

K: Walsh handling scientific things.

B: Someone will be in touch with him.

K: John Walsh.

B: Nothing like the chagrin of the press in their inability to trace you to Paris. They can't quite keep their irritation out of the way they go about it.

K: And Democrats can't keep out ______ on VN have accepted. Muskie criticizes on ceasefire.

B: That's not a problem.

K: It's whether we put communists in the govt. Ceasefire they agreed to.

B: As my brother said, they won't go for ceasefire until they have what they want.

K: We won't go with that.

B: Ceasefire is what Clark Kerr's haveasked you to do. I am the original disbeliever that it will be solved this way but I think you made a Sunday try.

K: Let me know when you are here.

A. M. Kissinger and Jerry Smith
in the Marine Corps
Attn: Jerry Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3-6

By: KHLU NAFI Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Jerry Smith
2/5/72 10:20 a.m.

HAK: Welcome back home.

JS: Thank you. I wanted to report I am available when anyone wants to talk about SALT.

HAK: Early next week--Monday morning maybe.

JS: Is that when the Verification Panel is meeting?

HAK: Oh hell, let's have the Verification Panel meet on Wednesday.

JS: Good, I can get my thoughts together by Wednesday.

HAK: We have to get the defense plan on the table. Let them present it--I am glad you are there for it. Laird is submitting the paper to the President...... We have to examine it.

JS: I will be glad to examine it.

HAK: I have had no other conversations with Dobrynin on the subject. He seems to be badly informed about what was going on.

JS: My last conversation with Sab______, there was no flexibility.

HAK: I don't know how to interpret that.

JS: It sounds as though he was signaling something.

HAK: On the first or second comment?

JS: On the second comment.

HAK: The second remark was ambiguous. My impression is that there will be an agreement. Dobrynin basic attitude was that it would be settled. On the submarine ________, I don't know. I don't understand the chiefs. Why a big program and limitations. Why is the ICBM's to our disadvantage when they are building them and we are not?

JS: Okay Henry. We'll see you next week.

A. M. Kissinger, Jr., and J. Kissinger

A. M. Kissinger, Jr. and J. Kissinger

OCLASSIHO
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KHL NAFU Date: 5/12/04

TELCORN

HAK: Welcome back home.

JS: On the second comment.

The telephone is the most common form of
communication in the world.

By K.L. V. NAFIA, Date 5/13/04

TELCOM'

President/Henry Kissinger

2/5/72 11:30 a.m.

RN: I didn't need to get you at the Map Room.

HAK: That's all right. I am finished with Rabin. Scenario of what we are going to be doing.

RN: Where is the report now?

HAK: We will put it to the press in the morning if it is finished.

RN: Should I see it--you can say I saw it. There is no need if it is within the framework we discussed.

HAK: Yes, it's in that framework--I can get you a copy.

RN: No just get it down. How do you feel about it?

HAK: I think it is thoughtful and good and it will get respectful attention this year.

RN: It is coming out at a good time

HAK: It is an excellent time. We pushed it to Wednesday which gives us 36 hours editing over the weekend. Chou had talked with Bhutto-- said U.S. saved Pakistan and Mao said Chinese let you down.

RN: Mao said that? They know we put it to them and so do I.

HAK! Chou said the Americans saved you and (Pakistani) We are going to try an opening statement to Chou; a skilfully firm but conciliatory tone. I am sending you a memo on it. They are different in how they should be approached--different from Brandt give and take. These fellows approach matters in a philosophical way--they put practicality and details aside at first.

RN: I had that in mind.

HAK: Your manners are subtle and tailored made for them. That is their style.

RN: The interest is getting hot. These press guys are panting. They want a chance to do it. It is good we are taking only a few--makes it useful for them. On the other hand, others will get a crack at Moscow.

HAK: Yes. We wouldn't get any more news out with 1,000.

RN: Let me ask you one thing. This will be rejected by Haig and the

Sergeant Major of the Army
in the Tropics
Assistant Staff

R: KAL NARA Date 5/12/64

TELCOM
President/Henry Kissinger

Page 2

military because it is inconsistent with the traditional way of things. And you may reject on the ground that Bunker, etc. rules it out. The use of air power. When you study war--any war--the military are horribly conventional. They are basically interested in seeing that everything is timed and can't be responsible for any thing that goes wrong. My main point is this on the use of air power. What we are doing at the present time is extremely routine--we send out a number of planes and a number of ______, so we routinely hit them and do it better than ever because of lasers and better intelligence, but on the other hand there might be something to be said for a standdown. I am speaking about the period before we return from China and then have a day or two, weather permitting to concentrate in a massive way everything we have got in say the B-3 area.

HAK: I think it is a good idea.

RN: My view is the Patton concept--his whole thing was concentration in a certain area. We are not talking about that kind of thing here. Step up the number of sorties and the number of ______. For 48 hours we will hit everything in the B-3 area; everything that might cripple the North Vietnamese and hurt their morale.

HAK: I agree

RN: This was the Churchillian strategy. When I look at the various battles--Hoffman disobeyed orders. We are not in a position to do it on the ground with Americans. And the South Vietnamese don't have the guts

HAK: They don't have the resources. Laird hasn't presented this to you adequately. We haven't given them any Phantoms or helo's(?).

RN: This standdown has its points psychologically--they will think they have to defend every place. Drop 3,000 tons in 24 hours on the B-3 area. We want to get a division, not just a battalion.

HAK: But the papers will report a standdown

RN: Can you get Haig thinking on this?

HAK: Haig is a very creative thinker. We will just tell the deamn military to have their own schedule. This is no problem.

RN: Abrahams doesn't think creatively.

Husqville, France
At the end of the month
Admiral de St. Germain

By: K.H.W. NARA Date: 5/12/94

TELCORN
President/Henry Kissinger

Page 3

HAK: No he is a shell.

RN: Give him this responsibility to see that carriers are moving and the 52's are moving. I don't want any bullshit.

HAK: Haig has already asked for a detailed report from Moorer. Any orders you give in this office will be followed.

RN: Just any more orders. The idea cannot be compromised. You know what destroyed the Schefflin plan--moving two armies from the west to the east--they would have won the war in 1914 (?). I want the Air Force and Navy to follow this without compromise. I want them to hit everything in the B-3 area or northern part of the DMZ. It was H. A. Wells who wrote the military are by nature conventional--Napoleon wasn't convention.

HAK: Most great leaders were not conventional. It think it has great merit and I will start on it immediately.

RN: Knock the hell out of them. One of the problems before was that they never concentrated on anything

Re: telephone conference of the above title
At the request of the President
Approved and Issued

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW NAVA Date: 5/13/74

TELCONE

W. Rostow/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 2/7/72

R: Henry, you're doing great.

K: Thank you.

R: And I thought the Secretary of State did fine yesterday.

K: Yes, it's amazing.

R: I just want to tell you I am coming to town to give a Christian Herter lecture on Thursday night at Johns Hopkins. If there is any way I can be of help, I would be glad to come. I could do some reading for you on Friday.

K: Well, I would love to see you for a few minutes. We will certainly have some reading for you.

R: Well, I'll come in at 7 o'clock Friday morning then.

K: Well, I hope to see you briefly anyway.

R: I will be giving a speech which incorporates and extends the kind of material - well, I am going to say publicly what I did privately. There is an account where in times of crisis the Congress can be more moderate in the use of military power than the President. My advice to Kennedy in October of '62 was a much more radical action be taken. I want to make the point that in a number of crises the President ________, but in any case I will be around at 7 o'clock on Friday.

K: OK, Walt.

Haldeman/Kissinger
is the son of a commercial
代理文件

By: KH. V. NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:02 p.m.

2/7/72

K: I forget what I wanted. You got yourself some publicity. You are jealous.

H: 10 days ago it was a point we were trying to get out. When you pounded on Preside
saying we need to take the attack.

K: I was just pulling your leg.

H: Who tole me to go on the show to begin with?

K: That was not what I had in mind. What was it? This will blow over in a day.

H: We are excalating it above what it will be on the outside.

K: If we have no questions we shouldn't bring it up.

H: Ron not volunteering it. He should do only what he is asked.

K: BBC doing a program on the day the President arrives in China. They are
having Fulbright and others in segments. Shown only in England. They want me to
appear. Not shown in the US.

H: What does that get us?

K: Our position out.

H: What does that gain us?

K: I haven't agreed to it. My position is I would ask you.

H: It seems to me -- if we are in agreement then there's no problem -- that we should
not react to anybody and you should not react on anything and we should
decide on our own what we want. We should initiate. We are in the driver's seat
on this one. You are the hottest commodity there is. We don't have to react to
them and feeding question in ahead of time gets us nothing. When we come back
get you on so you have maximum impact.

K: Any commitment we have is to Kalb when I get back. National TV on prime
time. Except for that, I have nothing.

H: Even on that one I have a feeling -- it depends on the President. It maybe
you can get all 3 networks which gives you 6 times more audience.

K: I am no expert on it. Whatever you want.

H: No one is.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1203, Sept. 3.6

By: K.H. V NASA Date: 5/13/74

Haldeman/Kissinger
2/7/72

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:02 p.m. 2/7/72

-2-

K: We agreed with Marvin Kalb. On BBC, tell me what you want.

H: Say no. We must take position that because of demands for commitments that you are not doing anything prior to visit. We can always go back.

K: I have no interest in being on BBC except to make points for the Administration. Nothing in it for me.

H: If you are on TV it's better to have you live on U.S. TV. U.S. will pick it up from BBC and take only what they want.

K: I have turned down CBS before.

H: Keep pressure on them. The more we give them what they want, the less pressure we have.

K: I will tell them we are too busy. You problem.

H: Let me go back to the President.

K: The press is the most important thing in England.

H: Damn little help. We will get good press there anyway.

K: It's a marginal thing. Not worth conversation. Talk with the President.

H: I think I should. What I am saying is my view.

K: On other thing--

H: You are on the record on that we look with favor on it.

K: In March.

H: You will want to do that.

K: Let's just-- Don't have to do anything about that until Mar. 1.

H: Any problems over there?

K: In China? I don't think so.

H: One thing, We have a medal that Treasury Dept. has produced. Has Geo. Washington on front side and on other side is old legend of President. Has Peace,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: K.H.Y. NASA Date: 5/17/72

Haldeman/Kissinger
12:02 p.m. 2/7/72

Friendship, and ________ on it and peace pipe crossed with battle axe. Treasury
can make them available to us. Max Two in solid gold for Mao and Chou.

K: Do something better for Mao.

H: Then we can do sterling silver for Chou, gold for Mao, and bronze for those
coming to the return dinner. Washington is a big man over there, I understand.
Do we want to say peace and friendship?

K: It's our medal.

H: And good backing for the President's visit. Old medal used by 14 first presidents.

K: I have no problem.

H: Good to have a sovenir. This would be our gift to lower level Chinese.

K: A lot to be said for it.

H: Our way of giving it is at a farewell banquet. Their way is something different.

K: A good idea.

H: This medal came up. Connally said we could get some for the President's
use. Give them a folder with historical significance.

K: Good idea.

Re: please remove the copy I made of
the Macs from the conditional
PROROCATION STATEMENT

By: KMLV NASA Date 5/13/04

TELCOM
Flanigan/Kissinger
12:35 p.m. 2/7/72

K: Have you got somebody for Argentina?

F: Decision was not to make any move. The President wants to leave him because he is surrounded by competent people. The President wants another post for him.

K: We have to find Farland something. He has been very helpful. He has stayed when he wanted to leave last summer. He helped us on China and had a rough time of it and we promised to get him out of there.

F: Let's bring him back here and give him Holland.

K: I will check with him. He is here.

F: Ceylon --

K: Out of the question.

F: Finland.

K: I doubt it.

F: We haven't gotten Middendorf out of there.

K: How about moving Steessel to Bangladesh when we recognize that and put Farland in there?

F: If you can get State to go along.

K: Are we going to punish those who are for us?

F: How about a problem of Chinese pro and con on India?

K: That's a problem. What about Canada?

F: That's a Mellon job. I will check to see when Middendorf wants to come home. Have you seen that memo on Kennedy?

K: I haven't seen it.

F: I give it to your secy. on Friday.

K: Those maniacs in my outer office probably have it in a pile of papers on my desk.

F: Well, find it. All I need is a clearance from you and I can get to work on it.

The President's Office of the Vice President
for Academic Affairs
and Chief Financial Officer

Publications Staff

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Vice-President/Kissinger
3:30 p.m. - 2/7/72

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

VP: Henry, I have something that may be of interest to you. What it really amounts to is a suggestion for a possible subject of consideration with the Chinese. It really relates to a new brand new system of airborne gravity survey system - a technological advance that is just coming into its own which allows an airborne platform to survey for oil and mineral. The Chinese are now desirous of developing these resources more rapidly and it might be of interest to them.

K: How can I get information about them?

VP: I have a brochure about the helicopter gravity system I could send you. I also have a man who could brief you if you would like further information on it.

K: Could you send it over?

VP: Yes, I'll put it in an envelope and send it right to you.

A. M. E. T. C. of the R. N. C. in
a room, one of the R. N. C.'s
Preliminary Study

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sept. 3.5

By: K.M.W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/74

TELCOM
Safire/Kissinger
3:34 p.m. 2/7/72
‡

S: Having cryptic call from Haldeman to go 250 words longer. I understand you are upset about the cuts I made.

K: Not particularly.

S: Any x cuts you don't like?

K: No.

S: Then why is Haldeman telling me I can go to 1500 words? Have you had a chance to look at it?

K: I was just looking at it. I don't mind your adding 250 words.

S: The draft you sent was 1650 words and I cut it to 1200.

K: I guess he decided to do more.

S: Then you will get another. Stuff that was in the original.

K: Have you seen LIFE stroy?

S: I have heard people say you must own stock in Time, Inc. Read Stu Alsop.

K: It's great but with Haldeman quote we will not get it out. Hate to see a grown man commit suicide on TV.

S: Was it that bad?

K: He looked good.

The position of White House counsel to the President or a confidential official is not a trivial one.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KN.L. NASA Date: 5/13/84

TELCOM

Jos. Kraft/Kissinger
3:50 p.m. 2/7/72

K: We have a clear case of overkill because they have just approved you on the
President's trip.

JK: Chinese have told me I cannot go alone. They have said probably I could
stay over for 3 weeks.

HK: Then it's good. We established a new category and then had to have Chinese
approval of that. It's boring but in existing categories I couldn't do much.

JK: I am pleased about this. If you talk with them -- they called last night to say
I cannot go alone. I am still hanging as to whether I can stay over.

HK: If you can't there's a good chance you can stay. Probably they saw your name
on the other list. Other list was submitted prior to your -- I couldn't take you off
the other list. I think it will be automatic. They don't want you to come alone.

JK: I will see you at 11:00 tomorrow? I will have had a chance to read the thing.
Some very curious things between Rogers and Xuan Thuy. Have you seen it?

HK: Why curious?

JK: Says 8 points doesn't address itself to ? ? ? ? ?. You know Rogers refused to
see Xuan Thuy? CBS set it up so he could see it there and make comments.
He refused. You can't have that kind of idiocy. Asked for a transcript. Dean
Rusk always said something.

HK: I didn't know about this. Interesting thing about VN is that they are negotiating
in public for refinements of points that they should know.

JK: They are trying to hook some people.

HK: Debate getting into focus. Getting into political issue. However, you define it. The ceasefire attack is nonsense. Framework because as a political settlement it won't fly anyway. I was concerned about Muskie thing last week. We will discuss it tomorrow. Your letter was fair.

JK: I will see you tomorrow.

Re: your leave the open line
and, Sir, at least, make a call!

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KML V

NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM
M. Kalb/Kissinger
5:12 p.m. 2/7/72

HK: Sorry I couldn't get you earlier. The powers that be here ruled against it. Not in March but the 10 mins. on Arrival date.

MK: We will soon live with it.

HK: I should maintain my anonymous standing!

MK: I hadn't noticed it. To the degree that you can get it closer to the time your return will cause my problems with CBS IN THE sense of their keen interest in it

HK: Here everyone wants to give President clearest possible shot at report. Whenever he makes a report to the public there has to be a certain interval.

MK: You have given us some interesting bedtime reading.

HK: It isn't 100% commitment that I will do it. But they said it will be considered favorably so it's 95%.

MK: I like those odds.

HK: They are pretty good.

The Times, Sunday and other open lines
are open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NAFIA, Date: 5/12/72

TELCORN
Connally/Kissinger

10:35 p.m. 2/8/72

K: I can't get my secretary to put me on first. They have this strong sense of heirarchy.

C: They know where their bread is buttered. They know that under this democratic air you hide is inner core of autocracy. You would really make a great member of the German ________. You are from Prussia.

K: No, Bavaria. I was going to tell Anderson that no one took notes because they stand at attention. We had a letter from the Elisee and we sent a reply saying couldn't respond until you are back in town. He thinks we have not defended the dollar and he thinks we made a commitment to him to defend in the margine we discussed. I will send it to you in an envelope for you only. Could you reply?

C: Sure.

K: We would like to reply as conciliatory as possible.

C: I am a very conciliatory fellow.

K: The Canadians tell me so. It's that jealous streak in you. You want to become an issue in two campaigns in every country in N. America.

C: I am trying to emulate you.

K: I haven't gotten across the frontiers yet.

C: The only place I can't run in your footsteps is in the amorous field.

K: I am going to run for mayor of XX Beverly Hills when this is over, haven't you heard?

C: I should think when you parade them all that they would get them jealous.

K: Everyone tells me I make diplomatic feats but no one ever says anything about my personal feats.

C: I am making it now. I think you should concentrate on Jill St. John and then Marlo Thomas. I have given it considerable worrying and thought a lot about it.

K: I appreciate your help. It will be painful but I will try. Can you imagine what your friend in Johnson City would do?

C: He would put in 2 couches or fire you, one.

K: The latter, I think.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293, Sec. 3.6

By: KHL, V. NAFU, Date: 5/13/72

TELCONE
Mrs. DuLong/Kissinger
5:13 p.m. 2/8/72

D: I will not ask how you are.

K: I am active.

D: I have read so many articles. Jean would like to know if you have sent to him
Mr. Gaston Weil?

K: No. He claimed he was a friend of Jean's.

D: That's what Jean thought.

K: I met him once. He gave me a proposition and I said I would have to check
it with a friend. He asked if I can check with our mutual friend, Saintenay.
I said certainly.

D: Jean doesn't know him.

K: Drop the whole thing. If I have something to say to Jean I will call him. He
said he had an urgent message. I saw him for 5 mins. and I said you have to
clear with someone I trust before I consider it.

D: He will drop the matter. He already has half done it.

K: Give my warm regards to Jean.

["A. M. S. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T

Re: John F. Kennedy's open letter
to the press on the Vietnam War
Re: Kissinger's trip to Vietnam

By: KHC W. NASH, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Robert Kleiman/Kissinger

5:50 p.m. - 2/8/72

RK: Are you polishing up your chopsticks?

HK: Sure I am.

RK: Listen, I have something to ask you. I haven't really digested this State of the World Message yet. That's quite a job you've all done. But in view of all this controversy, do you think it would be useful to let me look through the minutes of the meetings and write what is releaseable.

HK: No, we just can't do that. There can be no dispute about it.

RK: Well, I thought it might be interesting. You know I wouldn't use anything you wouldn't approve.

HK: No, as long as there is any chance of restoring these things.

RK: I gather there is a lot in there that totally disproves. . .

HK: Of course I would have to say the verbatim of what Xuan Thuy said to Barnett. But he is so contradictory because he says on the one hand the key issue was the removal of Thieu. At any rate we offered them a withdrawal date during the summer. If they had accepted it there would be no problem.

RK: The impression Barnett gave was the whole thing was connected to the election campaign and if you can one way or the other get Thieu out. . .

HK: Well, that is true, but that's just another way of saying Thieu was overthrown.

RK: What he is saying is that we do not do it directly but. . .

HK: That is not true. They wanted a guarantee that he would be beaten. We were willing to work with them to have a contested election with public declarations on our part of a deadline, for Vietnam afterwards which would have clearly undermined his position to some extent.

["H. E. S. I. W. H. E. S. I. W. H. E. S. I. W. H. E

The president of the republic has
the power to issue an order
or to make a decision.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KMLW NASA Data 5/12/04

-3-

RK: No, and I'm not suggesting it to you. What I am suggesting is
what you have already said to them is not secret any longer.

HK: No, but it could lead to debate in this country. They could
easily get answers to these questions if they asked them.

RK: Let me raise another question with you - Berlin and the Berlin
negotiations with the Russians. I don't find in the State of the
World anything new in the account that hasn't already been put
out on the Berlin negotiations.

HK: That may be true.

RK: You and I had a conversation sometime ago which was not
followed up in which you said you thought the story had not
really been told of the real role the White House played in
bringing this thing off. Now is that something that we might
be able to get at and get a fresh account of?

HK: Let's consider that after Peking.

RK: We can't consider it in terms of the State of the World message?

HK: No.

RK: Now in the China thing I was surprised in the glossary not to
find any reference to the deletion of the State (S) patrol.

HK: Because we have trouble enough with Formosa as it is. That
was asked yesterday and it is an omission.

RK: What did you say?

HK: Oh, I said something obviously profound.

RK: Is there a transcript of yesterday's session?

HK: Yes.

The position of the open office
is not as comfortable
as the open office itself?

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

6/21/72
NASA Date 5/12/72

TELCORN

Sam Speigal/Kissinger
6:12 p.m. 2/8/72

S: You sound weary.

K: Not at all. I tried to reach you earlier. I am afraid I will not be able to come tonight because I couldn't get out of that other engagement.

S: You could bring them.

K: Its a PR Exercise I am doing. It's for an editor and he wants to do some talking and not going to a movie. It's not a compliment to say I would rather be with you. Is there a reception?

S: At the Shoreham until 11:00.

K: I will try to drop by.

S: I would be delighted and so would Miss Suzman. Please try to make it.

K: If I don't how do we stay in touch?

S: 475 Park. That's my home to which you are most welcome when you come.

K: You are not there often.

S: I will be in London and then Europe. In London I stay at Grovesnor House.
I will send you a letter with the addresses.

K: I will perhaps be in London in late April.;

S: If you want to spend some time on my boat this summer --

K: That's very tempting. I take vacations I cannot really keep and I am thinking of going to the Olympics. Maybe a few days for that. Late July and early August. In Munich.

S: Perhaps you can have a little unpublicized vacation.

K: I would enjoy that.

S: No longstanding plans. Only a day or so ahead.

K: Let your office know that?

S: In London and they will get in touch with me and tell you where to come. It's just as easy to fly to Nice as to --

Re: [illegible text] in the upper left corner
Subject: [illegible text]
Re: [illegible text]

By: K.H.Y. NAFI. Date: 5/12/72

S. Speigal/Kissinger
6:12 p.m. 2/8/72

-2-

K: That makes no difference.

S: You can fly any place. Keep in touch. If you come tonight I would be delighted.

K: I will do my best to drop by at the Shoreham about 11:15.

S: If you can't make it I will send you a letter tomorrow with all the details. You phone my office and you are welcome wherever you want.

K: Then If we don't meet tonight I will see you in London in April or in the summer on the boat.

S: I have a wonderful cook and great music and great company. You can bring whoever you want or have local company.

K: I will make an effort to be there tonight.

Re: Kissinger's电话和电报
Re: Kissinger's电话和电报
Re: Kissinger's电话和电报

By: KHLW NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Dave Kraslow

February 8, 1972 6:30 p.m.

DK: Thank you for calling. Regarding the Burchett breakfast.

HAK: There was absolutely nothing to it. He got a message through to me through a mutual acquaintance, so I asked him for breakfast. He had no information that I did not have.

DK: Did you have just the one meeting?

HAK: Yes

DK: Did the information deal with negotiations?

HAK: ...no information of any weight.

DK: In other words, you had more refined information.

HAK: That's right, that's not for quotation, though.

DK: The intermediary was a non-governmental type

HAK: No, a mutual acquaintance.

DK: And the message was oral to you

HAK: A telephone call.

DK: He was covering the UN

HAK: He was at the UN. It was early in October when we were preparing another offer. I agreed to see him just in the off-chance that he might have more information.

DK: All right. I will see you tomorrow morning at the press conference. The story came out rather well, I think. Did you see the *Morning Paper* on Sunday paper?