TELCONE

June 26, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Hugh Morrow

11:19 a.m.

I reached the Governor in London and he said

M: that obviously there could never have been a conversation between you Nelson on that subject.

K: How about putting that out?

M: I'm going to right away.

K: Good.

M: OK?

K: Good.

M: I'v....we've got several ferries, we'll see that it gets around.

K: It would be helpful to me. I don't recall that we ever had such a conversation.

M: Nelson said no. He said he didn't recall it. And, he said, in any event, J. Edgar Hoover never told me anything.

K: The whole thing sounds absurd.

M: Yeah, its a funny statement. It's a speculative kind of thing. It quotes Nelson er Sullivan as saying. And, of course, Sullivan was mad at J. Edgar at the time. Ah, it's ....

K: I didn't actually see it. What did he actually say? That Sullivan said...

M: Yeah, this was Dean recounting a conversation with the President in which Dean quotes Sullivan as having said that he understood J. Edgar Hoover who was represented as disapproving of wiretaps on newsmen and members of the White House Staff as having said this to somebody and that it probably came back... or that Rockefeller got a hold of it somehow and that it came back to the W. H. from Gov. Rockefeller talking to you.

K: Yeah, well that's total nonsense.

M: Yeah, well, that's what Nelson said. Absolute nonsense.

K: Because, first of all, between you and me, I didn't know newsmen were being tapped.

CLASSIFIED
DELEGATED
Authority E.O. 12958

Dated: NARA Dated: 6/2/04

TELCON (San Clemente)

Melvin Laird/Kissinger

1:32 p.m. - 6/26/73

K: Hello.

L: Henry.

K: How are you, Mel?

L: Good, how are you getting along?

K: OK.

L: Henry, they've tied that amendment on now that Continuing Resolution and I guess they're going to tie it on the debt limit. Now on the supplemental I don't think there was any problem with it. It would have been better if we only had to battle it on one. We lost it by very few votes. It was a tie vote yesterday.

K: Yeh.

L: I hope you look at that real carefully and make sure that you need the authority. If you're sure you need it

K: I would like it for two months, yes.

L: It really jeopardizes any chance of success without it.

K: It substantially jeopardizes it, yes.

L: Well, I think that we can probably sustain the veto. I don't know what we'll do from then but you know they're going to blame it - this is all going to be tied up in the context of Watergate. That's the problem with this damn thing the way it's going. You understand that, don't you, Henry, that we lost votes today because of that damn hearing yesterday.

K: No, I don't.

L: Well, we did.

K: I mean, did we lose again today?

L: Yeh. We lost again today. They put it on the Continuing Resolution, the same amendment but they put it on by a vote of about 25 or 30 votes.

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K: Well, what's your judgment, Mel?

L: Well if it's needed, if this authority is needed for success in Cambodia, then you have to veto. But if there's a chance of success -- a fairly reasonable chance -- without it I'd hate to tie up the whole damn government. Follow me?

K: Yeh.

L: If they tie up the government and don't pay social security employees and others, they are going to not blame the bombing thing, they are going to blame Watergate.

K: Yeh, it's a pity we lost it by a tie vote, isn't it?

L: Yeh, it was a shame. But today it was worse in the House. Today I got rolled by about 25 votes.

K: I just don't see how we can handle it. Everything is just going to come apart in Cambodia if we stop bombing. I think we can get it done in two months. Can you help us?

L: Sure, I'll help.

K: We will accept the September 1st cut off. I told our idiot guys that if nothing else worked, I'd accept it.

L: Yeh.

K: And they told me they had a chance at it without it.

L: Yeh, but you remember I talked to you about that, Henry.

K: My position has been I prefer not to have the cutoff but it's a helluva lot better than a July 1 cutoff.

L: Well today they voted against the September 1 cutoff by over 25 votes.

K: And you think that's the hearing yesterday.

L: Well, I think that contributed to it, yes.

K: You think that hearing is a setback? What is your assessment?

L: Well, it is right now. I think we'll get over it but it'll be a tough four weeks.

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K: You do?

L: Yeh, a very tough four week period because I mean you're going to have Mitchell and Haldeman and Ehrlichman. These guys aren't going to be a standup as a lot of people think they are you know.

K: Certainly not Mitchell and Ehrlichman.

L: Yeh.

K: No, I have no illusions about that.

L: Yeh. You know when they're facing the penitentiary they - you have to understand that, Henry.

K: Yeh, although they're not helping themselves. Doesn't do them any good to dump it on the President. It doesn't make them any less culpable.

L: No, I think the best you could probably get now is if you come out for a 30 or a 45 day thing and support it on this other question. I don't think you can go back to the September 1 date. Henry, by the way the vote was 218 to 194 - 24 vote spread.

K: Yeh. Do you think we could have won it on a September 1 cutoff?

L: We could have won it if we would have supported it. You follow me?

K: Yeh.

L: But we couldn't win it without coming out supporting it. You see there's a difference there.

K: I understand. Well, I had always assumed we would go to that if we stood a chance of losing the other one.

L: Yeh, but all the heat was put on the other one and that was the tax one you see. But we don't need to talk about that. The problem that we have now Henry is that if it's absolutely essential for Cambodia, I think the best you can get is from 30 - 45 days.

K: 30 is almost useless; 45 could help.

L: And that would have to be done with the support of the Administration. Whether you want to go that far I don't know. It would have to be the veto with the understanding that he was vetoing and asking for 45 days more because of negotiations.

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L: And I think that weakens your negotiating position to such an extent that you might as well not have the authority.

K: Yeh. We really have to think about whether we are not better off saying these sons-of-bitches just are responsible for the defeat.

L: Politically, you'd be better off - I don't think Cambodia will ever work out very well anyway and I'd like to be able to blame these guys for doing it myself. But that's - Henry, you know I'm a kind of a black character and I'd like to blame these guys for the incapability of getting these things resolved because I think it's damn touch and go to get it resolved as far as Cambodia is concerned anyway.

K: Yeh.

L: I'd like to be able to blame them.

K: No, we'd have a pretty good chance because we got the Chinese involved and the Soviets involved but I get your point. If we say - 45 days won't do us a goddamn bit of good.

L: Then I think if the President comes out and says that's all he needs that weakens your negotiating position anyway.

K: That's impossible. OK, I'll call you tomorrow about this. Is that time enough?

L: Yeh, sure Henry, I just wanted to talk to you because I wanted you to make sure that you address these issues, that's all.

K: Right, I'll call you tomorrow, Mel.

L: All right, Fine, Henry.

K: Bye.

TELCONE (San Clemente)
Secure Phone
Dr. Schlesinger/Kissinger
1:45 p.m. - 6/26/73

K: Hello.

S: How are you doing?

K: OK.

S: The House, as you probably know, has voted through the Continuing Resolution and just added the An____ amendment which precluded any military action in any of the four countries without explicit authorization of Congress. The cutoff of activities in Cambodia is at midnight on the 30th. A Continuing Resolution is something that is normally not even considered for veto so we are going to have to face up to the question of a partial evacuation of Americans out of Phnom Penh.

K: Yeh, I just think that a partial evacuation together with a cutoff will lead to a total collapse in Cambodia.

S: It points in that direction. I asked Bill Colby to run out to the station to see what their expectations are going to be.

K: Yes.

S: We lost it.

K: By 24 votes.

S: Well, it was a 60 vote margin on the critical vote. Something like 232 - 170. It is just getting weaker and weaker each day and the Continuing Resolution was passed by 385 - 90. As a result even a veto could be contemplated for a Continuing Resolution - it could be overridden. It also puts us into a very (tough) position funds after the Fiscal Year.

K: It is getting impossible to do anything in Indochina.

S: That is right. We can't ______ the bombing should the North Vietnamese resume the bombing.

K: Or the mining.

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S: Well, the mining I have to check on. That may be sufficiently gray area that it is possible, but the Resolution was pretty well ______.

K: That finishes us.

S: That's right. We have run out of string on this one. I trust the North Vietnamese will stay put and the responsibility for the pending collapse of Cambodia should be pinned on the Congress. Normally they bitch at the Executive Branch. They should be made to recognize it is their responsibility. I think it should bring over in time some improvement of the public

K: Yes, but it doesn't help us anywhere.

S: Not in Cambodia.

K: So the Continuing Resolution applies only for two months.

S: Yes, but they will ______ on to ______ after that.

What I am hoping here is the debacle in Cambodia will ______ them into their place.

K: OK, I will talk to the President and let you know tomorrow.

DELEGATED

Authority EO 12858

Dated NARA ID 6/2/07