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NARA Date 9/10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCOM
Senator Humphrey
Secretary Kissinger

9:20 p.m. 7/19/74

UNCLASSIFIED

...K: Hubert!
I called you earlier -- it is a little bit overtaken by events to tell you
we had no intention of recognizing sampson--you wrote me a letter

H: Yes, that is right. I understand.

K: But in the meantime the Turks have landed in Cyprus so it

H I heard that on the radio-- tonight.

K: So its no longer-our problem now is to find the way out of this.
Before it all blows up.

H: Yes. It's a very nervous thing right now.
to

K: That's right. But I want you/know we have no intention of recognizing Sampson or never did.

H: Well, I read what you had in the -- and I haven't said anything particularly about it.

K: What was in the Times was totally wrong.

H: I gathered they might be

K: And there was nothing in the State Department people who said this I don't know what level they are certainly none of the people which I work hold that view.

H: Well, as you know, in the committee the other day we kind of held back on anything there so there wouldn't be any comment coming out of the Committee.

K: I have -- Fulbright is fully briefed on every detail.

H: I understand that.

K:

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H: I guess that's right. I hope to God that they keep that thing under control.

K: Well, we're trying to bring about now what we've always tried to do -- a constitutional solution. And maybe find a compromise by which the next line in -- to Makariostakes over.

H: Yes, that seemed to me the most sensible thing if that is possible.

K: That is frankly what we tried to do all along.

H: Yes, I gather that--

K: But we couldn't tip our hand too early until we had lined up one of the parties.

H: Yes.

K: And once we had the Troops lined up for that, we were going to bring pressure on the Greeks.

H: Ah ha.

K: But we have Sisco going to Athens now to insist on that Clerities solution.

H: What can you do about these landings if anything?

K: We are telling them to stop but they haven't taken advice before, so I can guarantee they'll take it now

H: The news reports to the effect that the Soviets are kind of giving them a little shove--

K: The Soviets have been rather reckless--they urged them on earlier in the week--

H: Thank you Henry much--I felt that in the Committee, as you know, there was an effort made to be very very critical of the Greek government the other day, and we sort of side-tracked it for a while--I was just worried about that there might be some effort being made in some echelons of the department to recognize this group that came in--and that I thought would be premature and unnecessary

K: I agree and it was never our attention. Claiborne Pell can confirm that I told him it was never our intention before the invasion--

H: All right friend.

K: Hubert when you write it is always taken seriously, as when you call.

H: Thank you sir, my best to you.

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TELCORN

Amb. McCloskey
Secretary Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
9:25 p.m. 7/19/74

I: Bob McCloskey is on also.

K: That is okay. I would like to speak ill of him, but I can't when he is
on the line--

I: We did reach Joe on the plane--he of course things have changed now
with the bomb drop in Nicosia and artillery Kyrenia

K: Yeh

I: So to tell the Greeks not to fire, we don't think we can do much about that.

K: No but could we avoid conducting all our business on the open phone.

I: Sure

K: What did you discuss with him now on the plane--

M: He called to ask whether he could have instructions that would assure
the PM or FonMin would meet him at the airport

K: He must be out of his mind (god-damn bloody) Why?

M: He feels the sooner he can leave Athens the better it will be--he fears
there may be some internal difficulty as he put it develop while he is on
route and on the ground. And he thought if he could make his point--

K: Oh don't let's be absurd

M: He ask for authority to go straight away from Athens to Rome or some
place nearby--his first preference would be to return directly to Washington

K: Oh no, he is going to stay out there--he is going to go to Athens like a
good boy, he is going into the town of Athens and we are not sending
instructions to have the PM and FonMin meet him at the airport, there
have other people who have taken risks and Sisco is going to take a few
risks.

M: Okay, I told him I'd raise these questions with you.

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K: It is out of the question. However if his nerves aren't up to it, let him come home and I'll go out there.
How can we ask our Ambassador to stay in Athens while our UNSec is afraid to leave the goddamn airport.

I: Do you want to send the same message except the first part about the--flying back

K: Yep. You tell Sisco to stop -- I don't want anyone to have any further substantive discussions on the telephone--the next time Sisco calls, he is to be told that he communicates by cable. Second he is to go into Athens, he is to darry out his mission, he is to stay there until he is told to leave.

I: Okay.

K: And he will not be told to leave until we have a report so we can assess it. If he can't take it, let him go on and W Ellsworth stays.

M: Okay, we'll take care of that. Say, Mr. Secretary, do you want to consider our issuing any kind of public statement at this time.

K: Yes, we should

end conversation.

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By J.R. NARA Date 5-7/69

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCONE

Director Colby/Kissinger

9:35 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill, how are you? Sorry to have kept you on the line.

C: That's OK.

K: I just wanted to check in with you and to make sure you would of
course be keeping a close watch on this thing. Can you get us out
here-- I'm in San Clemente -- your estimate of how this thing is
going to evolve.

C: All right. Fine.

K: And also what the Turkish capability is to put troops ashore. What
is it, do you know?

C: It's very good.

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K: A regiment is what, 2000?

C: It's 2 or 3 thousand, yes.

K: And then how many can they send?

C:

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K: How many is that?

C: They apparently are going for Kyrenia on the north coast. That's the first step.

K: But what do you think they're after? They're not after the whole island are they?

C: No, no. What they would be after would be Phamagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.

K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.

C: Yeh. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka on up and then just asser themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.

By NAR Date 6/19/74

17-I

- 2 -

K: What do you think the Greeks are going to do?

C: Well, the local Greeks will fight and there are some reports that there is some bombing at Kyrenia already. And the National Guard particularly will fight. This is the one with the Greek officers in them.

K: They will fight.

C: You will have a very unpleasant thing in Cyprus itself. The Greeks themselves are a bit far away, quite frankly. They are about the range of their aircraft and they can't do very much from there.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Pardon.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Well, but there basic airfield is back in Greece and Athens and that area.

K: What is the relative strength of those two armies?

C: The Turks are about 300,000 and the Greeks about 100,000. But most of the Greek forces are up in the north, up in Thrace. And if you had kind of a mixup, that's where it would take place. Up in the northern area there, around Sowanaka.

K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?

C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right ~~maxx~~ let's negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.

K: OK.

C: There basic position has been that this is an internal affair in Cyprus. You know, so they have a face saving basis for saying, "Well, that was just a local affair. It's not Greece."

K: Yeh, OK. Thank you.

C: So in a sense they could say "Well, that was a great mistake down there in the island, but we're above that." I think the most important thing is to limit it to Cyprus and not let it go out beyond that.

K: OK, thank you. C: We'll pass on anything else we get, Henry.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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By

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Ingersoll/Kissinger/McCloskey/Stabler

9:55 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Bob.

I: Yes.

K: I was going to go back to my quarters and I was going to be out of touch for half an hour. I wanted to check how things are going.

I: We have these two wires.

K: I got a call from a Mr. Sampson in your office.

I: Samuels?

K: Sampson is what they -- they want to know what I discussed with Callaghan. I told Callaghan, which I had already told you, to call the Greeks and Turks hopefully to London.

I: Right.

K: OK, what are the two cables?

I: The ones to Macomber and to Sisco. Do you want those read?

K: Yup.

I: Do you want them over the open phone or secure phone?

K: Well, this open phone isn't as bad as the other one. This will take them a while to analyze. Are they long?

I: They're about 2 pages.

K: I think we better do it by phone, don't you?

I: Here's the one to Sisco and that's the one we need the quickest.
"The Secretary desires that Sisco make immediate plans to go on to Athens.

K: Could it be a little louder?

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- 2 -

I: "He should not request to have the meeting at the airport. From the message we have just sent to Ankara you will see what we have done and told Macomber to tell Ecevit. We have done this because we feel we must keep him playing as long as possible with the notion of a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. Ecevit in all probability rejected the Clerites proposal at the outset because he saw it as a possible bar to Turkish military intervention. Now, however, that the Turks have intervened, he has told you that he has no special concerns about who may be President of Cyprus. Under these circumstances we believe that there is still a chance, even though it may be an outside one, to try once again the Clerites solution.

"You will also have seen the instructions passed to Tasca to weigh in with Iohdides to exercise restraint in the face of Turkish landings and to float Clerites' proposal.

"Secretary wishes you to reenforce the views which have been expressed by Tasca and to tell the Greeks that they must bear a share of the responsibility for what has happened.

K: A heavy share of the responsibility.

I: "We look to them to recognize that unless they are prepared to accept a change of territorial integrity in the structure of Cyprus they must join with us, with the British and the Turks in finding a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. As we see it, only if Clerites offers an acceptable alternative, we are prepared to support the proposal with the Turks.

"You are prepared to return at once to Ankara and pursue the matter further with the Turks if the Greek Government agrees with the Clerites' proposal.

"In the meantime we have asked the UK to call for immediate negotiations of the guarantor powers in London. And we hope, and assume, that the Greek Government will agree to attend such a negotiation." That's the one to Athens. The one to Ankara follows:

"Ask to see Ecevit at once. Give him the following message: I take extremely grave view of the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus which will have the most serious consequences, (chief of which is the position it will place) on free world security. We are deeply dissappointe the Turkish government did not heed our pleas to exercise restraint.

"Now that the step has been taken, however, the most urgent means must be found to restore peace and stability in the area.

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- 3 -

"While a conflict is easy to start it is difficult to stop. Statesmanship of the highest order is required of all concerned.

"The United States for its part, is prepared to support a constitutional solution and a level of forces which existed before the coup. The only way our view to restore constitutional government is through the legitimate succession of Clerides. No other solution is possible or acceptable to the Greeks.

"The Turkish has indicated that it has no special concerns as to who the Head of State should be and, therefore,

K: Don't say "The Turkish Government, say President Ecevit."

I: Pardon.

K: Or Prime Minister Ecevit.

I: Yes. "Prime Minister Ecevit has indicated that he has no special concern as to who the Head of State should be and therefore Sisco is on his way to Athens to propose to the Greeks the Clerides solution. We assume that in light of what the Prime Minister told Sisco in their last meeting the GOT will agree.

"We are proposing urgently to the UK that it call for immediate negotiations with the guarantor powers in London to seek the constitutional solution which will open the way for the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the area.

"We urgently appeal to the Turkish Government to weigh most carefully the proposals we are making, for we are convinced that to do otherwise would be self-defeating in terms of Turkey's own interests."

K: OK. Good. Fine.

I: Do you want to talk about a public statement?

K: Have you got one? Hello? Hello? I have trouble hearing you.

I: Bob has something he wants to show you.

K: OK.

- 4 -

(Bob McCloskey comes on the line.)

M: Hello.

K: Yup.

M: "The United States deplores in the most strongest terms the military intervention by Turkish military forces in Cyprus. We particularly regret that Turkey took this action at a time an active diplomatic effort in which the United States was participating was underway.

"We are appealing to Turkey to order its forces in Cyprus to cease-fire and we are at the same time urging Greece to avoid aggravating the situation by any further military action."

K: Why do we have to make a statement?

M: We don't have to now.

K: What? Are we getting a lot of calls?

M: Not many, I'm surprised.

K: Well, I think what we should say is we regret the action. We also deplore the previous Greek actions that helped precipitate this crisis. Tell them that I've been in frequent touch -- I mean don't put that out as a statement, just have it said -- I'm in frequent touch with the President, I've been in touch with Callaghan and Sisco is in Athens and we are in touch with all of the interested governments.

M: What was Callaghan's reaction?

K: Callaghan agrees with our line and he is also thinking of calling a meeting. Make sure they don't take Callaghan off the line there. Somebody on that other flickering line. Here they come. Who is it? (Talks to someone who has come in the room.)

M: Callaghan is going to let you know about going?

K: He's going to let me know whether he wants to hold the talks in London or Cyprus, but I'm going to recommend London.

M: He's agreeable to coming to London?

K: Yeh. But let him announce that. Now Irwin ought to go and see Savannah.

M: A message is being done to him.

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NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCON (San Clemente)

President/Kissinger

10:06 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Apparently the battle is started, huh?

K: Yeh. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven't had a Greek reaction yet. I've got Sisco going to Athens under protest because he thinks it might be a little dangerous for him there.

P: Oh.

K: But I figure if Tasca can stand it, he must be able to stand it.

P: Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?

K: Yeh. That's all right, Mr. President, that's what they pay under-secretaries for.

P: God almighty, that's what they pay us all for.

K: That's right.

P: And with Tasca there I should think he could have some - if anybody could have any influence with the people. Thank God he's there; he's a tough guy.

K: He's a good fellow.

P: What does he report?

K: We haven't had anything from Athens yet - not one word.

P: You think this is the kind of a thing that requires - that they feel my presence in Washington -- that I have to get the hell back there for this thing?

K: Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war.

P: Yeh, and then what do we do there?

K: Not much but I think. . .

P: I have to be there.

By MR. NARA Date 9/19/74

18-J

2

N: That is all that matters is that you know we can do everything-- I can do everything here that I could do in Washington.

K: You remember we had the same problem when the Mid East war started --you were in Key Biscayne and we advised strongly not to move.

N: In the Mid East we had basically interests that were -- well --

K: We didn't want to exacerbate the situation and there wasn't anything you could do in Washington that you couldn't do in Key Biscayne-- But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.

N: How?

K: Well, if the Greeks accept Clerities as a solution and if they --and if the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire

N: And you don't want to go to the UN because that'll get the Russians in it.

K: Well we can go to the UN in a few hours--its the middle night.

N: Oh, I know, I know.

K: But it won't contribute much--we can do it tomorrow morning.

N: Well as you know Henry, there is always a damn symbolism in the UN --you and I both know what a mine field it is, but I don't know.

K: The UN is going to meet again tomorrow morning, Mr President. They met on Cyprus today.

N: Yep. Security Council

K: Yeh. I think to call them in the middle of the night when neither of the parties involved--

N: No, no, no. That's the point, I just -- it is --

K: I would wait until tomorrow morning on the UN

N: Just so we can avoid the appearance that we are not completely on top of it and I think we certainly are--now you are planning to go back tomorrow afternoon, w

K

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3

K: That is right, Mr. President. That's night at there and that gives me a chance to get on top of it.

N: Hell, you are on top of it here too.

K: What I mean is I'll be travelling while people are sleeping out there--in the Middle East

N: True, true.
Thank God it isn't Syria and Israel ar something like that--that'd be worse wouldn't it?

K: Well before your term is over Mr. President, we'll have that privilege too.

N: I hope not.

K: I hope not, but I wouldn't lay odds on it.

N: That depends on our Israeli friends to a great extent--we are going to keep a very strong line there--anybody who gets arms from the US by golly to use it--this of course is the Cyprus thing--an

K:

N:

K:

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N

K:

N:

K

N

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4

K: The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probably ... over about 3,000 or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000 airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster.

N: They can, huh.

K: Yeh.

N: So what would the Greeks do--I'm just trying to--

K: Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace.

N: Gosh.

K: I don't exclude that they'll negotiate Mr. President. If Sisco hasn't lost his nerve completely, I think they can be gotten to negotiate.

N: God Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca won't. Don't underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now,

K: No, no, I have already gotten instruction to him, Mr. President. And he has -- he is already working.

N: And they know too the penalty of failing to negotiate is a--they just rupture their situation with us--they break it right, don't they?

K: That is right. First.

N: That of course isn't much of an option for us-- consider what it does to NATO

K:

N:

K:

N:

K:

N:

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TELCONE
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Callahan (GB)

10:15 p.m. 7/19/72

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Henry, good morning, if that is not a contradiction in terms. How are you again, all right?

K: I'm doing fine.

C: Well, now look, as far as Sisco is concerned, have you told him to go to Athens?

K: I've told him to go to Athens and under great protest he is on his way there.

G: What is his objection to going, Henry?

K: His objection to going is that he thinks London is a more pleasant place and that Washington is even more pleasant.

C: Well, Yeh, I think that is right. What is he going to do when he gets there.

K: Then when he gets there he is going to urge the Greeks to negotiate that solution I discussed with you and to go accept any proposal you may make for Greek Turkish talks.

C: Very good. I think that he --I think we can talk a little more frankly now because I think we are on a secure line.
Aren't we?

K: Not that I can tell--

C: As far as I'm concerned I accept that assessment that/were good enough to send me from your Ambassador about conversation with Clerides. It seems to me that Clerides is a very sensible man.

K: That is what it looks like to me.

C: I think he has the thing summed up and as far as I'm concerned I wouldn't be putting it in shorthand, I'd be willing to follow exactly that line and the line that had been following before hand.

K: That was my impression and that's why when I got your letter, I had drafted a long reply which has now been overtaken by events--

C: I don't mind--I'll put it in the scrapbook.

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K: Do you want me to send it?

C: Yeh, sure why not.

K: I'll send it on, saying it is overtaken but for your scrapbook.

But I substantially agreed with it--

C: I wanted to put my thoughts on paper to you, but they are not so different from the way Clerides apparently is looking at things.

K: No, I thought we were all coming together in the same direction.

C: That's right. I think if Joe Sisco can persuade them to get rid of Sampson and to constitutionally get Clerides installed, then we've got the makings of a package to deal with the Turks, haven't we?

K: That is exactly my view.

C: Right. And I've got the Turkish ambassador waiting outside to see me now--I thought I would send a strong note through him to the Turkish government, calling on them to bring about the earliest possible ceaseifre to get the Greeks and Turks here

K: I agree with that completely--I was going to make that strong suggestion to you--you'll have too messy a situation on the island--much to messy

C: Yes, all right. Then I'll try to get them to come here and Joe Sisco can pressurize the Greeks to come here

K: Those are Joe Sisco's instructions.

C: Very good --

K: So may I tell Joe that you are fully backing him--

C: That we are on the same line

K: I will tell Joe this and I will tell him that you are--your people are going to talk in the same sense.

C: Very good. Very good.

K: And you should know that we have--

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C: What about the Soviet Union, Henry

K: Should we tell them that we understand that you are going to task for talks--that we strongly support it and that we hope they encourage it

C: That's a good line.

K: Well, we will do that within thenext hour

C: How much detail--you've had more dealings with them than I've had.
How much detail should I go into?

K: I wouldn't go into endless details, but I would tell him that we are

C: I missed you then-- say it again

K: To whom to the Soviets?

C: Yeh

K: I wouldn't go into all the details--I would tell them that--I would go into detail about the negotiating process, not about the solution.

C: Very good.

K: Otherwise they will hang behind another fellow and just thwart it.

C: This line is very bad--you keep disappearing completely

K: I would give them the solution--I would give them the process

C: Right, okay

K: And we will do the same

C: Very good

K: And I also wanted you to know that I have told the Turks ifx substantially what you are going to tell them--that we object to what they are doing and they must get into talks immediately

C: Yes, very goodthen-- I should think after Sisco's persuaded them to go to come to Lond, he'd better come on to London too, hadn't he

K: Ah--ahha--I think London he will want to go to. London, I won't have trouble persuading- Athens he is a little shakey about.

C: Okay, Henry, we'll keep in touch--what time is with you/

TELCONE
Secretary Kissinger
DSec Ingersol
7/19/74 10:30 p.m.

K: Bob, I've just talked to Callaghan--they completely support our program now and they will make representations in that sense.

I: Very good.

K: I mean they support Clerides and they will urge negotiations. Tell that to Sisco--tell Sisco his major job is to get the Greeks and Turks to London.

I: Fine.

K: And calm down--and you do you calm down Sisco, I don't know, but that is your job. I mean can we send him a cable-- I sent him an encouraging cable--did that ever go to him?

I: No, that is the one we didn't send because we had already sent another one.

K: What do you mean?

I: Remember this afternoon--we decided that we wouldn't send that one because we already sent one--

K: I sent him a cable telling him he had done a good job--could that have gone?

I: No, it was the first paragraph of your cable--

K: I sent him a three line telegram, saying he had done a good job--that wasn't sent?

I: I didn't see it--I don't know

K: Ah--he--it went through a WH channel. Now, can somebody send him a cable and tell him we need his special skills and tired as he is, we want him to make one more effort and it is to get the Greeks and Turks to London--the British are fully aboard now, fully following the line we worked out?--they no longer want Makarios, they are going along with the Clerides thing and he has the support of Callaghan too. And to be steady and firm and we are sending Dr. Nidel out with pills.

I: All right, get it off right away--

K: Right Okay and you might tell Macomber where we stand with Callaghan and tell him to keep the heat on the Turks to accept an offer to go--to talk

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Authority

NARA Date 6/19

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E012958

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NARA Date 9/10

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

18-S

UNCLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Director Colby
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 10:35 p.m.

K: .... divisions!
Are they walking across water?

C:

K:

C

25x(1)

K: Of course--Colby, mayI tell you something?

C: Yeh

K: I don't know where the hell Samagusta is--and may I tell you something else?

C: What

K: I could not care less--will somebody bring me a map--just because
you drop names on me doesn't mean you are a bright guy--

C: [laughs]

K: You probably got a map right in front of you--is it Famagusta?

C: Yeh it is on the east--

K: I've got it right in front of me. You mean it is moving overland?
Are they going to take the whole island?

C: No, they are going to land probably--they have landed at Kyrenia on the north coast and they have landed some paratroops at Nicosia.

K: Why?

C: Because it is the capitol and because there is nothing but Turkish population between them and Kyrēnia up to the north, so they can link up easily.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 5/7/74

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON-9/1/03
by NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

18-T

PAge 2

K: Do you think they'll take Nicosia?

C: Yeh, well there will be some fighting there. But you see what they can do is land there and land at the airport -- link up with the people coming in from the sea from the north and then they fight a lot of National Guard in that area--a serious fight will probably develop there. Then they also have a separate landing over Famagusta on the east coast and perhaps one down at Lynica down on the southeast coast. The object would be then to try to establish themselves in 3 or 4 places and perhaps even link up but that is a little less sure and then have a basis for negotiation. The problem is the Greeks can only defend in that area-- they can't really get much force over there from the mainland because most of the Greek forces are up in the north around Salanica and Thrace.

K: You mean they can only defend with what they've got on the island?

C: With the National Guard on the island--that is about 30,000 troops, which is a lot of troops.

K: They've got 30,000 NG--I thought only 9,000

C: No excuse me--9,000 plus the mobilization of about 30,000

K: But they won't be able to mobilize them

C:

K

C:

K:

C:

K:

C:

K: Could it wind up with double enosis?

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 5-10-58

25x(1)=25x(6)='

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey

7/19/74

M: This would go flash immediately. Subject your instructions for meeting Ecevit

K: Now if Sisco isn't there to deliver it, Macomber should deliver it.

M: Okay. That's what it says, if Sisco not yet arrived, Macomber should see Ecevit immediately and deliver the following

1. We are extrmely concerned over insistent reports of turning Turkish military moves towards Cyprus.

K: Reports can't be insistent.
Repeated reports.

M: You should add that US would take the most serious view of any military move with respect to Cyprus before the diplomatic process has had an opportunity for the fullest play. 2. You should make Ecevit understand that Turkish intervention will be only the first in the sequence of moves

K: That in our judgment

M: Right... sequence of moves which would be difficult if not impossible to control. Any government in Cyprus which would emerge at the end of this process would not better serve the Turkish interests because in order to attempt a counter-balance of Turkish dominance... government would inevitably look for support both internally and externally to communism. You should give Ecevit an assurance that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping.

K: You should reaffirm our...right

M: Finally, you should tell Ecevit that as his friend and admirer, I must make clear my convictions that if he follows the course of military intervention, he will have started a process which will not only have serious adverse affects for Turkey in the long run, but will be extremely dangerous for the West as a whole.

K: Yeh. Ah--you took out great consequences at the beginning.

M: We will insert that back in.

K: And what I would like to get across in that last paragraph is not get the impression that this is a threat from us, but to say that he is going to start a series of events which out of the control of either the US and Turk which will have long-range disadvantageous consequences for Turkey, See

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NAR Date 9/19/74

Page 2

So he doesn't read it as a US threat.

M: Right. Otherwise okay?

K: Yep.
Good cable.

M: Mr. Secretary, we think here that the group in the department that prepares evacuation plans ought to get into motion.

K: Exactly.
And also we ought to get some contingency planning for what happens when the war breaks out

M: All right
How would you suggest we organize ourselves. With Defense?

K: Yeh.
Let Ingersoll call a meeting of Defense and NSC CIA--a WSAG meeting

M: This afternoon?

K: Yeh. And our briefer is saying we would take a grave view of mili

M: Military intervention from any quarter.

K: Until diplomatic processes are exhausted.

M: Right.

K: Good. T

M: That's the language I gave them.

K: Thank you, I'll be back to talk over the Clerities thing.

M: All right.

K: Hello--I mean don't give Fulbright any sense that we are against Makarios. Tell him the strategy I outlined to him is in full force, he need have no worry that we are going to back junta on the island and this is what we are doing, but wright now we have to prevent a war.

M: I'll call him right away.

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

Authority

By J.R. NARA Date 5/16