Hon Cheung JA (giving reasons for judgment of the Court):
上訴法庭法官張澤祐頒發上訴法庭判案理由書：

These are the reasons for the judgment of this Court of 15 February 2007.
這是本庭 2007 年 2 月 15 日判案的理由。

Background
背境

The Applicant faced 5 charges.  He was convicted of 4 of them by Deputy District Judge William Ng after trial and was sentenced to 5 years and 4 months’ imprisonment.
申請人被控五項控罪。經區域法院暫委法官吳承威審理後被裁定其中四項控罪罪名成立及判監五年四個月。

On 1 September 2005, the Applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence and submitted a “Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal” accordingly.  On 9 December 2005, he submitted a “Notice of Abandonment of Application for Leave to Appeal” (“Notice of Abandonment”), and the court dismissed his application for leave to appeal on the same day.
申請人於 2005 年 9 月1 日就定罪及刑期提交「申請上訴許可的通知」向上訴法庭申請上訴許可。同年 12 月9 日申請人就有關的申請提交「放棄通知」，法庭於同日駁回申請人的上訴許可申請。

On 4 July 2006, the Applicant submitted an affidavit asking the court to treat the Notice of Abandonment as a nullity.  On 18 September 2006, he filed a set of perfected grounds of appeal against the conviction on the second charge.
申請人於 2006 年 7 月 4 日提交誓章，要求法庭視他提交的「放棄通知」無效。2006 年 9 月 18 日申請人就第二項控罪的定罪存檔一份完備的上訴理由。

Mr. Steven Kwan and Mr. Eugene Yim, Counsel for the Applicant under the Free Legal Service Scheme of the Hong Kong Bar Association, contended that as the perfected grounds of appeal submitted by the Applicant involved a question of law alone, he could, by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, lodge an appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right without leave to appeal.  Mr. Kwan and Mr. Yim took the view that the Notice of Abandonment submitted by the Applicant earlier on would not affect his appeal.
代表申請人的關文渭、嚴永錚大律師（香港大律師公會法律義助服務計劃）指出由於申請人所提交的完備上訴理由書僅涉及法律問題，因此根據《刑事訴訟程序條例》申請人是無須上訴許可也有當然權利向上訴法庭提出上訴。關大律師和嚴大律師認為申請人早前所提交的放棄上訴許可申請的通知書亦不會影響他的上訴。

May only appeal once
只可一次上訴

Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221 of the Laws of Hong Kong, provides as follows:
香港法例第 221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第 82 條說 ：

循公訟程序被定罪的人可針對其定罪向上訴法庭提出上訴。	(1)	A person convicted of an offence on indictment may appeal to the Court of Appeal against his conviction.
(1)

(2) The appeal may be ―
(2) 上訴可基於以下的理由―

on any ground which involves a question of law alone; and
任何僅涉及法律問題的理由；及

with the leave of the Court of Appeal, on any ground which involves a question of fact alone, or a question of mixed law and fact, or on any other ground which appears to the Court of Appeal to be a sufficient ground of appeal;
(經上訴法庭許可)任何僅涉及事實問題的理由，或是涉及法律兼事實問題的理由，或上訴法庭覺得是足夠的上訴理由的任何其他理由；

but if the judge of the court of trial grants a certificate that the case is fit for appeal on a ground which involves a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact, an appeal lies under this section without the leave of the Court of Appeal.
但如主審法庭的法官發給一份證明書，證明該案件適合基於涉及事實問題的理由或涉及法律兼事實問題的理由提出上訴，則可無需經上訴法庭許可而根據本條提出上訴。’

Although the Ordinance states that if the appeal is on any ground which involves a question of fact alone or a question of mixed law and fact, it may only be lodged with the leave of the Court of Appeal, it does not mean that the Applicant, having submitted a Notice of Abandonment, may submit another Notice of Appeal for appeal without the leave of the court.  This is not the intention of section 82, which, in our view, only allows the Applicant to appeal against his conviction or sentence once.  If his ground of appeal involves a question of law alone, he does not require the leave of the Court of Appeal before lodging the appeal; otherwise, he must obtain the leave of the Court of Appeal before he may lodge an appeal.
雖然該條例指出，假如上訴僅涉及事實問題的理由或是涉及法律兼事實問題的理由需要經上訴法庭給予許可才可以提出上訴，但並不表示申請人在提交放棄申請上訴通知書後無須經法庭批准就可以提交另一份上訴通知書提出上訴。這不是第 82 條的原意。本庭認為第 82 條只是准許申請人對定罪或刑期提出一次上訴，若上訴人所持的理由純粹是涉及法律問題，他就不需要先獲上訴法庭給予許可才可提出上訴；不然的話，他必須要獲得法庭許可後才就有關的理由提出上訴。

The English Court of Appeal stated clearly in R v. Pinfold [1988] 1 QB 462 that if an appellant’s appeal has been dismissed by the court, he is not entitled to lodge another appeal, subject to the following two exceptions:
英國上訴法庭在R v. Pinfold [1988] 1 Q.B. 462 一案亦清楚指出若上訴人的上訴已被法庭駁回，他是無權再提出另一次上訴，但有以下兩個例外情況：

The decision on the original appeal is a nullity.  For example, the appellant submitted a Notice of Abandonment of Appeal and subsequently asked the court to treat that Notice as a nullity;
原本的判決是無效的，例如上訴人提交放棄上訴通知書之後要求法庭視該份放棄通知書為無效；

The appellant has suffered injustice by reason of some material irregularity in the appeal procedure.  For example, the appellant had not been notified of the hearing, as a result of which he was absent from the hearing, or the counsel acting for him was unable to attend the hearing, as a result of which the court dismissed his appeal.
在上訴程序中出現了重大的錯誤致令上訴人獲得一個不公的判決，如上訴人因沒有接獲聆訊通知書，以致缺席聆訊或者他的代表律師未能出席聆訊，以致法庭撤銷他的上訴。

In HKSAR v. Ma Chiu Sing, CACC 4/2003, this Court (Stuart-Moore VP, Burrell J and Suffiad J) made mention of the Pinfold case but did not go on to explain that case as it was irrelevant to the case in hand.
本庭(上訴法庭副庭長司徒冕、原訟法庭法官貝偉和石輝)在HKSAR v. Ma Chiu Sing （馬照聲）， CACC 4/2003 曾經提及 Pinfold 一案，但由於與案情無關，故此本庭在該案沒有對 Pinfold 作出詮釋。

Treating a Notice of Abandonment of Application for Leave to Appeal as a nullity
視放棄上訴許可申請通知書為無效

In our view, the Applicant must obtain the leave of this Court to treat the Notice of Abandonment submitted by him as a nullity before he may lodge a further appeal against his conviction.  In HKSAR v. Lai Siu Cheung [2005] 1 HKLRD 1, this Court (Stuart-Moore VP and Jackson J) explained in detail the legal principles governing this type of application:
本庭認為申請人必須先獲得本庭的批准，視他所提交的放棄上訴許可通知書為無效，才可以就他的定罪再提出上訴。有關這類申請的法律原則，本庭 (上訴法庭副庭長司徒冕及原訟法庭法官翟克信)在HKSAR v. Lai Siu Cheung [黎兆詳（譯音）] [2005] 1 HKLRD 一案已經作出詳細的詮釋：

上訴權是由法規賦予的。申請人一旦放棄上訴，以致上訴被撤銷，除非該放棄行爲被視作無效，或是該事按《刑事訴訟程序條例》(第221章) 第83P條給轉交行政長官，否則上訴法庭並沒有固有司法管轄權重新處理上訴。法庭只可以在以下的情況才會視申請人放棄上訴的行為是無效的：申請人不是在知情的情況下刻意決定作出該放棄行爲，即申請人的意願跟該放棄行爲互不相稱。	(1)	The right of appeal is conferred by statute.  Once an applicant has abandoned an appeal, which has accordingly been dismissed, the Court of Appeal does not have any inherent jurisdiction to entertain the reopening of the appeal unless the act of the abandonment is treated as a nullity, or the matter is referred to the Chief Executive under section 83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance.  Only under the following circumstance may the court treat an applicant’s act of abandonment of an appeal as a nullity: the act of abandonment was not the result of the applicant’s deliberate and informed decision, in other words, the mind of the applicant did not go with his act of abandonment.
(1)

申請人放棄上訴的行爲可否被視作無效是關乎申請人對於他所簽署的文件的效用或後果是否了解，或者對於他假若堅持上訴的結果是否有所誤解。如果申請人所依賴的錯誤意見，與該放棄行爲的性質或效果有關，則該放棄通知書會被視作無效。若申請人在恰當了解有關情況下，知道他所簽署的是什麽文件，亦知道他所簽署的文件的效用，而他在這種知情的情況下，刻意簽署該文件，那他要證明該放棄行爲為無效將會非常困難。	(2)	Whether an applicant’s act of abandonment will be regarded as a nullity depends on his understanding of the effect or consequences of the document he was signing or, perhaps, misapprehending the effect of an appeal were he to persist.  If the erroneous advice relied upon by the applicant relates to the nature or effect of the act of abandonment, the Notice of Abandonment will be regarded as a nullity.  If the applicant who, properly informed, knew the nature and effect of the document he was signing and, with that knowledge, deliberately signed the document, it will be hard pressed to show that that act is a nullity.
(2)

如果申請人是受到在上訴勝算方面不正確的法律意見的影響而簽署了放棄上訴通知書，該通知書不會被宣告無效。原因是關於上訴的是非曲直的錯誤意見，並非與簽署該放棄通知書或與其性質有關的意見。	(3)	If the applicant signed the Notice of Abandonment of Appeal pursuant to erroneous legal advice as to the prospect of success of the appeal, the Notice will not be declared a nullity because wrong advice given as to the merits of an appeal is not advice that goes to the nature of, or to the signing of, the Notice.
(3)

The Court of Appeal’s refusal to entertain a renewed appeal in such circumstances does not leave the applicant without remedy: section 83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance provides the remedy for appropriate cases.
在這種情況下，被上訴法庭拒絕受理重新提出上訴的申請人並非全無補救機會：《刑事訴訟程序條例》第83P條就適當的案件提供有關的補救方法。

The Applicant said that he abandoned his application for leave to appeal because at that time he had not been granted legal aid.  We do not consider this reason to be in accord with the aforesaid legal principles.  The Applicant must show that at that time he did not intend to abandon his appeal.  He clearly had not erroneously abandoned his appeal or misapprehended the consequence of such abandonment; the act of abandonment was made after consideration.  Therefore, we will not treat the Notice of Abandonment submitted by him earlier on as a nullity.
申請人指他放棄申請上訴許可的原因是當時他未能獲得法律援助的協助。本庭認為這並不是一個符合上述有關法律原則的理由。申請人必須證明他當時是沒有意願放棄上訴。明顯地，申請人絕對不是錯誤地放棄上訴或是誤解放棄上訴的後果；他是經過考慮才放棄上訴的，故此本庭不會將他早前提交的放棄上訴通知書視為無效的。

Grounds of appeal
上訴理由

In any event, the Applicant has failed to put forward sufficient grounds of appeal.  Therefore, even if his explanation regarding abandonment of appeal were in accord with the aforesaid legal principles, we would not grant him leave to appeal.
無論如何申請人現提交的上訴理由亦不是一個充分的上訴理由，故此就算申請人的解釋符合上述有關法律原則，本庭亦不會批准上訴。

The Applicant is lodging an appeal only against his conviction on one of the four charges on which he was convicted, i.e. the second charge of assisting the passage within Hong Kong of an unauthorized entrant, contrary to section 37D(1)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 of the Laws of Hong Kong.  The particulars of charge stated that the Applicant assisted the passage within Hong Kong of an unauthorized entrant, i.e. the 2nd defendant at trial (D2), on 4 March 2005.  The facts of the case revealed that on 4 March 2005, the Marine Police chased after and intercepted a motorized sampan, with the Applicant and D2 on board, in the Hong Kong waters to the south of the Ninepin Group Islands, Sai Kung.  The sampan was on fire and sank.  The Marine Police rescued the Applicant and D2.  The Applicant admitted that he was a fisherman residing in Nanao, Shenzhen, Mainland China.  At the material time, he was navigating the sampan, with D2 on board, from Nanao to Dangan Island for the purpose of picking buddhist pine trees.  On their return journey, they came across a police launch.  The Applicant was not authorized to enter Hong Kong.  At trial, Counsel for the Applicant did not dispute that D2 was an unauthorized entrant.
申請人現只是就四項被定罪的控罪的其中一項控罪（即第二項控罪）提出定罪上訴。這項控罪指申請人協助未獲授權進境者在香港境內的旅程，違反香港法例第 115 章《入境條例》第 37D(1)(a) 條。控罪詳情指申請人於 2005 年 3 月 4 日協助一名未獲授權進境者，即案件的第二被告人，在香港境內的旅程。案情顯示水警於 2005 年 3 月 4 日在西貢果洲群島以南的香港水域追截一艘載有申請人及第二被告人的機動舢舨。舢舨著火沉沒，水警在海上救起申請人及第二被告人。申請人承認他是大陸深圳南澳的漁民及在該處居住。事發時他駕駛舢舨與第二被告人從南澳到擔桿島採摘羅漢松，在回程時遇到一艘水警輪。他是沒有獲授權進入香港的。審訊時，代表申請人的大律師沒有就第二被告人是一名未獲授權進境者的議題提出爭議。

The ground of appeal now put forward by Mr. Kwan and Mr. Yim is that D2 was not an unauthorized entrant.
現關大律師及嚴大律師所持的上訴理由是第二被告人並非是一名未獲授權進境者。

Immigration Ordinance
《入境條例》

Section 37D(1) of the Immigration Ordinance provides as follows:
《入境條例》第 37D(1) 條說：

除第（2）款另有規定外，任何人如自行或代表任何其他人(不論該其他人是否在香港)――	(1)	Subject to subsection (2), any person who, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, whether or not such other person is in Hong Kong ―
（1）

arranges or assists the passage to, or within, Hong Kong;
安排或協助未獲授權進境者或載有未獲授權進境者的運輸工具前來香港或在香港境內的旅程；

offers to arrange or assist the passage to, or within, Hong Kong; or
要約安排或協助未獲授權進境者或載有未獲授權進境者的運輸工具前來香港或在香港境內的旅程；或

does or offers to do an act preparatory to or for the purpose of arranging or assisting the passage to, or within, Hong Kong,
作出或要約作出一項作為，以準備安排或協助，或旨在安排或協助未獲授權進境者或載有未獲授權進境者的運輸工具前來香港的旅程或在香港境內的旅程，

of a person who is, or of a conveyance which carries, an unauthorized entrant, commits an offence and is liable ―
均屬犯罪――

on conviction on indictment to a fine of $5,000,000 and to imprisonment for 14 years; (Amended 82 of 1993 s.8)
經公訴程序定罪後，可處罰款 $5,000,000及監禁 14 年； (由1993年第82號第8條修訂)

on summary conviction to a fine of $350,000 and to imprisonment for 3 years. (Amended L.N. 25 of 1996)
經簡易程序定罪後，可處罰款 $350,000及監禁3年。(由1996年第25號法律公告修訂)’

According to section 37A of the Immigration Ordinance:
根據《入境條例》第 37A 條：

‘unauthorized entrant’ (未獲授權進境者) means a person belonging to a class or description of persons who, by an order made under section 37B, are declared to be unauthorized entrants, other than a person who under subsection (2) of that section is excepted from the declaration in such order.
“未獲授權進境者”(unauthorized entrant) 指屬於某一界別或種類並根據第37B條發出的命令被宣布為未獲授權進境者的人，但根據該條例第（2）款由命令宣布屬於例外的人除外。’

Furthermore, section 37B of the Ordinance states that:
另外，該條例第 37B 條說：

總督會同行政局可發出命令，宣布任何界別或種類的人(享有香港居留權或憑藉第 2AAA 條擁有香港入境權的人除外)為未獲授權進境者。	(1)	The Governor in Council may by order declare any class or description of persons, other than persons who enjoy the right of abode in Hong Kong, or have the right to land in Hong Kong by virtue of section 2AAA, to be unauthorized entrants.
(1)

根據第(1)款作出的宣布，可受命令所指明的例外情況規限。’	(2)	A declaration under subsection (1) may be made subject to such exceptions as are specified in the order.
(2)

The Governor to which the aforesaid section 37B(1) refers is the Hong Kong Governor prior to 1 July 1997, and the relevant order is the Immigration (Unauthorized Entrants) Order made on 7 August 1979 (“Immigration Order”).  The Immigration Order, which is a subsidiary legislation, provides as follows:
上述37B(1) 條所說的總督是指 1997 年 7 月 1 日之前的香港總督，而有關的命令是1979 年 8 月 7 日所頒發的《入境（未獲授權進境者）令》 （‘《入境令》’）。該《入境令》是一項附屬法例，內容是：

宣布何人為未獲授權進境者	2.	Declaration of unauthorized entrants
2.

除第 (2) 款另有規定外，現宣布下述的人為未獲授權進境者――	(1) 	Subject to the exceptions specified in sub-paragraph (2), the following persons are declared to be unauthorized entrants ―
(1)

all persons resident or formerly resident in Vietnam;
目前或先前居於越南的人；

all persons who leave, or seek to leave, the People’s Republic of China when not in possession of documents issued in that country permitting them to do so in accordance with its laws;
未持有中華人民共和國所發准予按照該國法律離開的證件而離開或尋求離開該國的人；

all persons resident or formerly resident in Macau;
目前或先前居於澳門的人；

all persons who are or have been in Macau, whether in transit or in any other circumstances whatsoever.
在過境或是在任何其他情況下目前身在或曾到過澳門的人。

下述的人為第 (1) 款的宣布所不包括者――	(2)	The following persons are excepted from the declaration in subparagraph (1) ―
(2)

any person holding a travel document ―
任何持有下述旅行證件的人――

in relation to which an exemption has been granted under section 61(2) of the Ordinance; or
獲根據本條例第 61(2) 條給予豁免的旅行證件；或

which bears an unexpired visa issued by or on behalf of the Director of Immigration; and
其上註有人民入境事務處處長發出或代其發出的未期滿簽證的旅行證件；及

獲入境事務主任或入境事務助理員給予准許入境的人。’	(b)	any person who has been granted permission to land by an immigration officer or immigration assistant.
(b)

Basic Law
《基本法》

In support of the argument that D2 was not an unauthorized entrant, Mr. Kwan and Mr. Yim have cited the Basic Law and the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap. 1 of the Laws of Hong Kong (“IGCO”).  Article 1 of the Basic Law states that:
就第二被告人並非一名未獲授權進境者的論點，關大律師及嚴大律師引用了《基本法》及香港法例第一章《釋義及通則條例》來支持有關的論點。《基本法》第一條說 :-

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.
“香港特別行政區是中華人民共和國不可分離的部分。”

Article 8 of the Basic Law states that:
《基本法》第八條說:-

香港原有法律，即普通法、衡平法、條例、附屬立法和習慣法，除同本法相抵觸或經香港特別行政區的立法機關作出修改者外，予以保留。”	The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
“

IGCO
《釋義及通則條例》

Section 2A(1) and (3) of the IGCO provides that:
《釋義及通則條例》第 2A(1) 及 (3) 條規定:-

所有原有法律均須在作出為使它們不抵觸《基本法》及符合香港作為中華人民共和國的特別行政區的地位而屬必要的變更、適應、限制及例外的情況下，予以解釋。	(1) 	All laws previously in force shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, limitations and exceptions as may be necessary so as not to contravene the Basic Law and to bring them into conformity with the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
“(1)

在所有原有法律中出現的列於附表 8 的字和詞句，須按照該附表解釋。”	(3)		In all laws previously in force words and expressions listed in Schedule 8 shall be construed according to that Schedule.
(3)

The relevant provision in Schedule 8 to the IGCO is:
《釋義及通則條例》附表 8 的有關條文為:-

Construction on and after 1 July 1997 of words and expressions in laws previously in force
“原有法律中的詞語和詞句在 1997 年 7月 1 日及之後的解釋...

對中華人民共和國或中國（或相類名稱、詞語或詞句）的提述，須解釋為對包括台灣、香港特別行政區及澳門在內的中華人民共和國的提述。”’	17.	Any reference to the People’s Republic of China or to China (or to similar names, terms or expressions) shall be construed as a reference to the People’s Republic of China as including Taiwan, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macau.
17.

The Applicant’s argument
申請人的理據

Mr. Kwan and Mr. Yim submitted that the Immigration Order, which has not been amended since 1 July 1997, was the law previously in force in Hong Kong to which section 2A(1) of the IGCO refers.  It is argued that when the Immigration Order was made in 1979, persons who left or sought to leave China certainly included those who entered Hong Kong directly from Mainland China.  However, after 1997, the Immigration Order cannot be interpreted in a way that contravenes Article 1 of the Basic Law.  As from 1997, Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China, and “persons who leave, or seek to leave China” under the Immigration Order cannot include those who entered Hong Kong directly from Mainland China.  Any interpretation of “China”, to which the Immigration Order referred, which excludes Hong Kong or Mainland China is unconstitutional.
關大律師及嚴大律師指《入境令》是《釋義及通則條例》第 2A(1) 條所指的原有法律。1997 年 7 月 1 日後《入境令》再沒有被修訂。他們指當《入境令》在1979 年頒發時離開或尋求離開中國的人士當然是包括從中國內地直接進入香港的人士，但在 1997 年之後，《入境令》的文意就不能與《基本法》第一條有所抵觸的。由於香港是中國不可分離的部分，故此在1997 年之後《入境令》所指的「離開或尋求離開中國的人」並不能包括從中國內地直接進入香港的人士，任何將《入境令》所指的中國解釋為不包括香港或中國內地的釋義都是違憲的。

Discussion
本庭的意見

It is clear that Article 1 of the Basic Law is absolute in the sense that no ordinance or subsidiary legislation can contravene it.  However, we do not agree with the argument of Counsel for the Applicant.  It is well-known that Hong Kong is a tiny but densely populated place.  It is necessary for the government to control the entry into Hong Kong of people from other territories in order to maintain a reasonable allocation of social resources such as employment, education and medical services.  The legislative intent of the Immigration Ordinance and the Immigration Order is to control the entry into Hong Kong of people from other territories.  People subject to such control include those to whom paragraph 2(1)(aa) of the Immigration Order refers, namely those who leave, or seek to leave, China when not in possession of documents issued in that country permitting them to do so in accordance with its laws.
明顯地《基本法》第一條是絕對的，沒有任何條例或附屬法例可以與它相抵觸，但本庭不同意申請人代表律師的論點。眾所皆知，香港地少人多，政府必須控制外來人口進入香港以維持社會資源合理分配：如工作、教育、醫療等。《入境條例》及《入境令》的立法原意是管制香港地區之外的人士進入香港，這包括《入境令》第 2(1)(aa) 條所指的未持有中國所發准予按照該國法律離開證件而離開或尋求離開該國的人。

This legislative intent is also apparent from the wording of the relevant provisions.  When interpreting the legislative intent of the Immigration Order, the court cannot merely look at the literal meaning of the Order, but also has to consider the Order in conjunction with section 37D(1) of the Immigration Ordinance.  The focus of these provisions is plainly on territorial distinction, i.e. the distinction between Hong Kong itself and places outside the territory of Hong Kong.  This legislative intent or focus is not affected by the reunification of Hong Kong with China on 1 July 1997.  Article 22 of the Basic Law serves to indicate that the relevant provisions do not contravene the principle of “Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China” under the Basic Law.  Article 22 provides as follows:
這立法原意亦可從這些法規的文字表達出來。在詮釋《入境令》的立法原意時，法庭不可以單獨考慮該命令的文字意義，也要將《入境條例》第 37D(1) 和《入境令》的內容一併加以分析。這些法規文意的重點肯地是著眼於地區性的界別，即香港本身及香港境外地區的界別。這立法原意或法規文意沒有受到香港在1997 年 7 月 1 日回歸中國影響。有關的法規並沒有抵觸《基本法》的「香港是中國不可分割的部分」的概念，從《基本法》第 22 條的內容可見一斑：

For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval.  Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region […] shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People’s Government after consulting the government of the Region.
中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區需辦領批准手續，其中進入香港特別行政區的人數由中央人民政府主管部門徵求香港特別行政區政府的意見後確定。’

Furthermore, according to the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China:
另外，根據《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於中華人民共和國香港特別行政區《基本法》第二十二條第四款及第二十四條第二款第三項的解釋》：

1.	The provisions of Article 22(4) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China regarding ‘For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval’ mean as follows: People from all provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, including those persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong permanent residents, who wish to enter the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for whatever reason, must apply to the relevant authorities of their residential districts for approval in accordance with the relevant national laws and administrative regulations, and must hold valid documents issued by the relevant authorities before they can enter the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  It is unlawful for people from all provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, including persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong permanent residents, to enter the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region without complying with the appropriate approval procedure prescribed by the relevant national laws and administrative regulations.
一、《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》第二十二條第四款關於“中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區須辦理批准手續”的現定，是指各省、自治區、直轄市的人，包括香治永久性居民在內地所生的中國籍子女，不論以何種事由要求進入香港特別行政區，均須依照國家有關法律、行政法規的規定，向其所在地區的有關機關申請辦理批准手績，並須持有有關機關製發的有效證件方能進入香港特別行政區。各省、自治區、直轄市的人，包括香港永久性居民在內地所生的中國籍子女，進入香港特別行政區，如未按國家有關法律、行政法規的規定辦理相應的批准手續，是不合法的。’

And the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong states that:
還有，《中華人民共和國和大不列顛及北愛依蘭聯合王國政府關於香港問題的聯合聲明》亦說

165.  	Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of person from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the present practice.
165.  對中國其他地區的人進入香港特別行政區將按現在實行的辦法管理。’

The aforesaid provisions all show that there is a territorial distinction between Hong Kong and other parts of China as far as immigration matters are concerned.  This distinction is not in conflict with the exercise by Mainland China of its sovereignty over Hong Kong, and is indeed expressly retained by the relevant laws.
上述幾項條文都顯示，中國體驗對香港行使主權和在入境事務這個範疇上，香港與中國其他地方的地區性分別。兩者不但沒有衝突，更是明確地被保留下來的。

Paragraph 17 of Schedule 8 to the IGCO cited by the Applicant is not applicable to the Immigration Order.  Paragraph 22 of Schedule 8 states that “This Schedule applies unless the context otherwise requires”, and the context of the Immigration Order is clearly the entry into Hong Kong of unauthorized entrants from other parts of China, which is outside the territory of Hong Kong.
申請人所引用《釋義及通則條例》附表 8 第 17 段並不適用於《入境令》，因為附表 8 第 22 段說明「除文意另所指外本附表適用。」。《入境令》文意明顯是指香港以外的其他中國地區未獲授權進境的人士。

A fundamental axiom of statutory interpretation is that a statute cannot be interpreted in such a way as to render the statute absurd.  If the principle of Hong Kong being an inalienable part of China is forced upon section 37D(1) of the Immigration Ordinance merely because Hong Kong is indeed an inalienable part of China, section 37D(1) will be given this absurd meaning: as Hong Kong is part of China, persons who have not been granted approval by China for leaving China would still have not left China even if they arrived in the territory of Hong Kong.  Such an interpretation would render section 37D(1) meaningless.  Nor does Hong Kong need such a provision because it would not have any legal effect on those defendants who have assisted the entry into Hong Kong of unauthorized entrants from China.
詮釋法規的其中一項重要原則是不可以令法規的意思變得荒謬。假若只因為香港是中國不可分割的一部分而強將這個概念加之於《入境條例》的第 37D(1) 條，這肯定是會令該條文的意思變得荒謬：由於香港是中國的，故此未獲中國批准離開中國的人士，就算到達了香港的境域亦依然從未離開中國。如這樣詮釋第 37D(1) 條，它就變成一條無意義的條文。香港亦不需要這樣的法規，因為它對那些協助未獲授權的中國人士進入香港的被告人完全沒有法律效力。

The Applicant cited the judgment of Ma J (as he then was) in Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Nonferrous Metals Co. Ltd. [2002] 2 HKLRD 844 on the question of whether Mainland arbitral awards can be enforced in Hong Kong.  Ma J pointed out that Mainland arbitral awards made between 1 July 1997 and February 2002 were not “Convention Awards” within the meaning of the Arbitration Ordinance.  Although he did refer to Article 1 of the Basic Law, his judgment was made on the basis of the definition of “Convention Awards” in the New York Convention and cannot be applied generally to other circumstances or other ordinances.  In our view, before determining whether a statutory provision contravenes the Basic Law, the legislative intent or context of that provision must first be ascertained.
申請人引用高等法院原訟法庭法官馬道立（當時官階）在 Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Nonferrous Metals Co. Ltd. [2002] 2 HKLRD 844 一案有關內地仲裁的判決可否在香港執行的裁決。馬法官指 1997 年 7 月 1 日至 2002 年 2 月期間的內地仲裁裁決並不是《仲裁條例》中所指的「公約裁決」。雖然馬法官是引用《基本法》第一條，但他的裁決是根據《紐約公約》內有關「公約裁決」的定義而作出的。他的裁決不可以被泛用於其他的情況或其他條例。本庭認為在詮釋某些法規是否和《基本法》有抵觸時最重要是要先確定這些法規的立法原意或文意後，才可作出決定。

Conclusion
總結

For the above reasons, the application is dismissed.
故此本庭駁回有關的申請。

Mr. Patrick Cheung, Deputy Principal Government Counsel, and Ms. Sally Yam, Senior Government Counsel, for the Respondent
答辯人：由律政司張維新副首席政府律師及任可高級政府律師代表。

Mr. Steven Kwan and Mr. Eugene Yim, assigned by the Free Legal Service Scheme of the Hong Kong Bar Association, for the Applicant
申請人：由香港大律師公會法律義助服務計劃委派關文渭大律師及嚴永錚大律師代表。