Taxonomizing Representational Harms using Speech Act Theory (2025)

Abstract: Representational harms are widely recognized among fairness-related harms caused by generative language systems. However, their definitions are commonly under-specified. We make a theoretical contribution to the specification of representational harms by introducing a framework, grounded in speech act theory (Austin 1962), that conceptualizes representational harms caused by generative language systems as the perlocutionary effects (i.e., real-world impacts) of particular types of illocutionary acts (i.e., system behaviors). Building on this argument and drawing on relevant literature from linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics, we provide new definitions of stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure. We then use our framework to develop a granular taxonomy of illocutionary acts that cause representational harms, going beyond the high-level taxonomies presented in previous work. We also discuss the ways that our framework and taxonomy can support the development of valid measurement instruments. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of our framework and taxonomy via a case study that engages with recent conceptual debates about what constitutes a representational harm and how such harms should be measured.

## introduction representational harms @xcite -i.e., "[harms that] arise when a system represents some social groups in a less favorable light than others, demeans them, or fails to recognize their existence altogether" (blodgett, 2021)-are widely recognized among fairnessrelated harms caused by generative language systems, including llm-based systems, even * equal contribution. though definitions of these harms are commonly under-specified, leading to conceptual confusion, invalid measurement instruments, and ineffective mitigations @xcite @xcite . this under-specification is further compounded by the way "harms" are typically discussed in the ai literature, referring sometimes to types of system behaviors, sometimes to the impacts of those system behaviors, and sometimes to other broader societal impacts arising from either the development or the deployment of these generative language systems (e.g., @xcite @xcite @xcite @xcite . this lack of conceptual clarity makes developing valid measurement instruments and effective mitigations fraught. for example, it makes it difficult to understand the precise concept(s) that a given measurement instrument or mitigation is targeting @xcite @xcite . and, in the case of measurement instruments, it makes it difficult to understand what the resulting measurements do and do not mean. to address this challenge, we make a theoretical contribution to the specification of representational harms by introducing a framework grounded in speech act theory @xcite , shown at a high level in figure 1 and described in section 2, that conceptualizes representational harms as the perlocutionary effects, (i.e., real-world impacts) of particular types of illocutionary acts (i.e., system behaviors). this theory-grounded framework enables us to draw clearer distinctions between system behaviors and their impacts, and to provide new definitions of stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure. in section 3, we use our framework to develop a granular taxonomy that highlights distinguishing aspects of the types of illocutionary acts-i.e., system behaviors-that cause representational harms. in section 4, we draw on measurement theory from the social sciences @xcite to discuss the ways that our framework and the resulting taxonomy can support the development of valid measurement instruments. specifically, we explain how our framework and taxonomy can help separate conceptual debates about representational harms from debates about their operationalization via measurement instruments. finally, to demonstrate the utility of our framework and taxonomy, we present a case study that engages with recent conceptual debates about what constitutes a representational harm and how such harms should be measured. ## a speech act theoretical framework of representational harms representational harms are widely recognized among fairness-related harms caused generative language systems (e.g., @xcite @xcite . however, they are often presented as high-level concepts-specifically, stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure-with corresponding definitions that lack internal theoretical coherence and do not provide the granularity needed to develop valid measurement instruments and effective mitigations. in this section, we explain how speech act theory @xcite is a particularly appropriate foundation for specifying representational harms. speech act theory is a theory of meaning that characterizes utterances as speech acts that accom-plish things through the act of saying them. speech acts can be understood as having three dimensions: locution (concerned with word choice and ordering), illocution (concerned with purpose), and perlocution (concerned with the real-world impacts that derive from the interplay between locution and illocution). a speech act can be characterized by four components belonging to these dimensions, namely by its locutionary act; its illocutionary act and effects; and its perlocutionary effects, of which there may be more than one. for example, consider the canonical utterance "can you pass the salt?" this utterance's locutionary act is its words and their ordering; its illocutionary act is a directive or a request to pass the salt; its illocutionary effect is that the hearer is asked to do something; and its perlocutionary effects include the resulting realworld impacts, such as the salt being passed. these components are described in detail in appendix a. considerable effort has gone into characterizing and theorizing about speech acts since their presentation by @xcite . significant developments include the identification and description of five basic classes of illocutionary acts, namely representatives, expressives, directives, commissives, and declarations @xcite ; the definition and further refinement of illocutionary effects @xcite ; the development of an interactive and multimodal model of speech acts that incorporates paralinguistic cues such as facial expressions @xcite ; and more (see @xcite @xcite . we describe some of these developments that are particularly relevant to generative language systems in appendix a. speech act theory is a particularly appropriate foundation for specifying representational harms because of the linguistic nuance it provides. in contrast with other linguistic theories of meaning, it distinguishes between an utterance's purpose (illocution) and real-world impacts (perlocution), while also capturing word choice and ordering (locution). as we explain, this specificity enables us to draw clearer distinctions between system behaviors and their impacts, while providing a unifying theoretical lens through which to compare different taxonomies of representational harms. speech act theory can also be used in conjunction with other linguistic theories to provide further linguistic-specifically pragmatic, syntactic, and lexical-nuance. consequently, it has the potential to facilitate deeper interrogations of generative language systems across a wide range of linguistic topics, including questions about the extent to which generative language systems conform to conversational norms and implicate other sociolinguistic and pragmatic frameworks. 1 we argue that the outputs of generative language systems can be conceptualized as speech acts and therefore understood using the three dimensions of locution, illocution, and perlocution. this framing distinguishes between system behaviorsi.e., illocutionary acts and their illocutionary effects-and the real-world impacts of those system behaviors-i.e., perlocutionary effects. we additionally distinguish between first-order perlocutionary effects that occur at the time of output generation and second-order perlocutionary effects that occur subsequent to output generation. ## a granular taxonomy of stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure having conceptualized stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure as particular types of illocutionary acts, or system behaviors, that empower or disempower individuals and social groups via the evaluative lenses of similarity/difference and authenticity/inauthenticity, we now build on this structure to develop a granular taxonomy that goes beyond the high-level taxonomies presented in previous work. following @xcite , who further divided the five basic classes of illocutionary acts into subclasses, 8 we draw on the definitions in the previous section to analyze stereotyping, demeaning, and erasure from multiple altitudes. specifically, we divide the three types of illocutionary acts described in the previous sectionstereotyping, demeaning, and erasure-into subtypes, namely illocutionary act patterns. these patterns highlight distinguishing aspects of the types of illocutionary acts, reflecting the ways they manifest in language. together, these levels capture an utterance's purpose, while differing in their illocutionary act type illocutionary act pattern example shared illocutionary effect stereotyping describes stereotypically "all [social group] are [characteristic]" group/individual is stereotyped caricatures individual as a member of a social group "those russian trolls are always at it" prescribes stereotypically "[social group] should be [characteristic]" proscribes stereotypically "[social group] shouldn't be [characteristic]" demeaning stigmatizes using slurs "r*tard! " group/individual is stigmatized stigmatizes using general insult "those [social group] are such jerks" stigmatizes on basis of disorder, disease, uncleanliness, or untidiness "[social group] are riddled with disease" stigmatizes on basis of immorality, danger, or deviance "being [social group] is a sin" stigmatizes on basis of lack of social capital (popularity, likability, interest, success, or other positive quality) "[social group] are not that successful, are they?" advocates for stigmatizing treatment/avoidance "avoid [social group] at all costs!" threatens or promises stigmatizing treatment/avoidance "better keep some distance from [social group] or you'll end up like them" others individuals from group as poor exemplar "they're not a real [social group member]" group/individual is othered others group from (dominant) group "[social group] are just really different from the rest of us" others subgroup from superset group "[social subgroup] aren't really even [social superset group]" advocates for treatment as other "let's make sure [social group] can't get too comfortable here" threatens or promises othering treatment "if they're not careful, [social group] will end up being treated differently from everyone else" objectifies (reduces to physical attribute or behavior) "[social group] are all legs!" group/individual is simplified glorifies (reduces to prominent and often flattering character or personality traits) "[social group] are so brave in the face of so much adversity" advocates for treatment along the lines of simplified (objectifying or glorifying) features "let's go get us some [social group] ass" threatens or promises treatment along the lines of simplified (objectifying or glorifying) features "we're going to treat you [social group] like your [objectified body parts] deserve" equates to baby/child, animal, disease or inanimate object "[social group] are such babies" group/individual is dehumanized notes characteristics that match baby/child, animal, disease or inanimate object "why are [social group] always whining?" advocates for treatment like baby/child, animal, disease or inanimate object "[social group] need to be disciplined" threatens or promises treatment like baby/child, animal, disease or inanimate object "if those [social group] aren't careful, i'm going to skewer them" erasing deprioritizes or questions the needs that diverge from the norm or majority "there aren't that many [social group] here anyway, so consideration for their needs isn't important" group/individual needs, experiences, contributions and accountability are presented as equal delegitimizes or denies a group's suffering or minimizes the harm of oppression, including via denial of historical events "[social group persecution event] wasn't that bad for [social group] anyway" diffuses accountability for a harm across the hierarchy, including blaming victims for their circumstances "[social group] shouldn't have been [characteristic] if they didn't want that to happen to them" advocates for non-differentiated treatment "[social group] shouldn't get special treatment just because they're [characteristic]" threatens or promises non-differentiated treatment "i guarantee we're not going to specially accommodate [social group]" denies justice and fair access to accommodations "no exceptions for [social group]!" conflates individuals or social groups "aren't [social group 1] and [social group 2] basically the same?" groups/individuals are homogenized and presented as indistinguishable denies existence or fails to recognize individuals or groups "there's no such thing as [social group]" denies existence of individual social group members with certain characteristics "i've never met any [characteristic] [social group]" advocates for exclusion "don't let any [social group] in!" threatens or promises exclusion "you [social group] better follow these rules or you'll be kicked out" denies fair access (excludes) "no [social group] allowed" / "[social group] only" finally, different illocutionary act patterns can share an illocutionary effect-i.e., an entailed linguistic consequence. for example, consider the three utterances 1) "[social group] are such babies," 2) "why are [social group] always whining?" and 3) "[social group] need to be disciplined." the first compares a social group to a group of people who do not have full legal recognition or rights, namely babies and children. the second characterizes a social group as having child-like characteristics, while the last advocates for treating a social group like children. these three illocutionary act patterns all share an illocutionary effect, namely that a social group is dehumanized (specifically, infantilized)-i.e., represented in a way that suggests members of that social group are not "fully human" and do not have or need the recognition, rights, and agency that come with adulthood. in ## measuring representational harms the goal of our paper is to provide the conceptual clarity needed to develop valid measurement instruments and effective mitigations. using the language of measurement theory from the social sciences (see, e.g., @xcite , we are therefore engaging in the process of conceptualization in order to produce a systematized concept-i.e., a specific formulation of a concept, commonly involving explicit definitions. this structured approach separates conceptual debates-i.e., does a particular systematized concept possess internal theoretical coherence and provide the granularity needed to develop valid measurement instruments?-from operational debates-i.e., did we operationalize the systematized concept via measurement instruments that yield meaningful and useful measurements? our framework and the resulting taxonomy can be viewed as one way of conceptualizing representational harms. explicitly distinguishing this systematized concept from any specific operationalization via one or more measurement instruments has two benefits: first, our framework and taxonomy can help advance conceptual debates about representational harms. second, they can bring structure to the operationalization process by providing a clear specification of exactly what should be operationalized and why, in turn providing grounding for operational debates. in the rest of this section, we present a case study that demonstrates the utility of our framework and taxonomy by engaging with recent conceptual debates about what constitutes a representational harm and how such harms should be measured. in section 6, we briefly discuss operational debates. ## conclusion although representational harms are widely recognized among fairness-related harms caused by 14 we emphasize that denying people the opportunity to self-identify does not require stereotyping. systems may characterize individuals as members of social groups, thereby denying them the opportunity to self-identify, without involving either stereotyping beliefs or illocutionary acts.