CreditMultiplier is not applied to `creditAsked` when a bid for an active auction is placed. This can reduce the creditMultiplier and thus the value of creditToken holders.
Audit: 2023-12-ethereumcreditguild-findings
Severity: HIGH

# Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L228-L230
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L751-L755
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L758-L767


# Vulnerability details

## Impact
- auction can't be won as long as auction is in first phase;
- interest is not paid;
- protocol (and credit holders) are forcing to incur a loss when auction enters second phase (100% collateralToBidder, less and less Credit payed back).
- when auction enters second phase, bidder pays less Credit than it should. 

## Proof of Concept
In case of a late partial repayment or offboarding lendingTerm loans can be `call`ed.

`LendingTerm.getLoanDebt` is [used](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L665) to calculate the outstanding borrowed amount of a loan. It includes the principal, interest, openFee. A `creditMultiplier` correction is [applied](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L228-L230) to reflect the updated loan value in case creditToken <-> underlyingToken ratio decreased after the loan was opened.  

```js
//getLoanDebt
        uint256 creditMultiplier = ProfitManager(refs.profitManager).
            creditMultiplier();
        loanDebt = (loanDebt * loan.borrowCreditMultiplier) / 
            creditMultiplier;
```

`loans` mapping is [updated](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/LendingTerm.sol#L665-L667) with up-to-date `loadDebt` amount. 
```js
//_call
        // update loan in state
        uint256 loanDebt = getLoanDebt(loanId);
        loans[loanId].callTime = block.timestamp;
        loans[loanId].callDebt = loanDebt;
```

The auction is started. `auctions[loanId]` [store](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/AuctionHouse.sol#L101) same up-to-data `loanDebt` (named callDebt now).

```js
        // save auction in state
        auctions[loanId] = Auction({
            startTime: block.timestamp,
            endTime: 0,
            lendingTerm: msg.sender,
            collateralAmount: loan.collateralAmount,
            callDebt: callDebt
        });
```
Now auction is active and anyone can `bid` on it. 
`AuctionHouse.getBidDetail` is used to get the `collateralReceived` (by bidder) for `creditAsked`.
As we can [see](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-ethereumcreditguild/blob/2376d9af792584e3d15ec9c32578daa33bb56b43/src/loan/AuctionHouse.sol#L134-L153) updated `callDebt` (updated at the moment the auction started) is returned for `creditAske