Question: Do both United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. and Schmerber v. California address searches that intrude the human body?

<P0-S0> Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the decision of the California Court of Appeal; which held that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under California law and that the search in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. <P0-S1>  This case answered in the affirmative a variation of the question the Court left open in "United States v. Knights", 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001), "whether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment." <SEP> <P1-S0> Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) , was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. <P1-S1>  Until "Schmerber", the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. <P1-S2>  Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution. <SEP> <P2-S0> United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), was a United States Supreme Court case involving principles of both governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of the executive branch of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs. <P2-S1>  The Supreme Court concluded not only that foreign affairs power was vested in the national government as a whole but also that the President of the United States had "plenary" powers in the foreign affairs field that were not dependent upon congressional delegation. <SEP> <P3-S0> Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that limited the doctrine of the Court's 1938 decision in "General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co." Beginning with the 1926 decision in "United States v. General Electric Co.", the Supreme Court made a sharp distinction between (i) post-sale restraints that a patentee imposed on purchasers of a patented product and (ii) restrictions (limitations) that a patentee imposed on a licensee to manufacture a patented product: the former being illegal and unenforceable under the exhaustion doctrine while the latter were generally permissible under a lenient "rule of reason." <P3-S1>  Thus, under the "General Talking Pictures" doctrine, a patent holder may permissibly license others to "manufacture" and then sell patented products in only a specified field (market), such as only a particular type of product made under the patent or only a particular category of customer for the patented product. <P3-S2>  The "Ethyl" decision held, however, that a patent licensing and distribution program based on both the sale of a patented product and licenses to manufacture a related product was subject to ordinary testing under the antitrust laws, and accordingly was illegal when its effect was to "regiment" an entire industry.